


US-EUROPEAN COMMON APPROACHES TO TURKEY

Istituto affari internazionali

Roma, 20-21/XI/1998

- a. Program
- b. List of participants
 1. "Turkey's domestic political evolution and the future"/ William Hale
 2. "State and democracy"/ Hugh Poulton
 3. "Turkey's economic outlook"/ Michel Chatelus
 4. "The economic outlook of Turkey : structural strenghts, weaknesses and the perspectives for 1999"/ Aldo L. Kaslowski
 5. "Bridge or frontier? Turkey's post-cold war geopolitical posture in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Balkans"/ Shireen T. Hunter
 6. "Where Turkey stands?"/ Seyfi Tashan
 7. "Cyprus: perspectives and options"/ Hansjörg Brey
 8. "Turkey and the European security architecture"/ Gulnur Aybet
 9. "The European Union and Turkey"/ Roberto Aliboni
 10. "Turkey's strategic options"/ Ian O. Lesser
 11. "The West and Turkey: varying roles, common interests"/ John Roper



Conference on
"Us-European Common Approaches to Turkey"
Rome, 20-21 November 1998

Conference site: Palazzo Rondinini
Via del Corso, 518
Tel.06/3210543

20th November 1998

- 9.00 am Opening of the conference
- 9.15 am Session 1: **Turkey's Domestic Evolution and Future Scenarios**
 Prof. William Hale, SOAS, London
 respondents Prof. Binnaz Toprak, Bosphorous University, Istanbul
 Dr. Edward R.M. Kane, CSIS, Washington
- 11.00 am Coffee break
- 11.30 am Session 2: **State and Democracy in Turkey**
 Dr. Hugh Poulton, School of Eastern European and Slavonic Studies,
 London University
 respondents: Dr. Graham Fuller, Rand Co., Washington DC
 Prof. Ilter Turan, Bilgi University, Istanbul
- 1.30 pm Lunch
- 3.00 pm Session 3: **Turkey's Economic Outlook**
 Prof. Michel Chatelus, Grenoble University
 respondents: Dr. Aldo Kaslowski, Tüsiad, Ankara
- 4.30 pm Coffee break
- 5.00 pm Session 4: **Bridge or Frontier?**
 Turkey's post-Cold War geopolitical Posture in the Middle East, Asia and the
 Balkans
 Dr. Shireen Hunter, CSIS, Washington DC
 respondents: Mr. Alain Gresh, Le Monde Diplomatique, Paris
 Dr. Seyfi Tashan, Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara

21st November 1998

Conference resumes

- 9.00 am Session 5: **Cyprus: Perspectives and Options**
Dr. Hansjörg Brey, Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, München
respondent: Dr. Stephen Larrabee, Rand Co., Washington DC
- 10.45 am Coffee break
- 11.15 am Session 6: **Turkey and Europe**
- Turkey and European Relations, a Turkish point of view
Prof. Gülnur Aybet, Bilkent University, Ankara
- The EU and Turkey, a European point of view
Dr. Roberto Aliboni, IAI, Rome
respondent: Prof. Thanos Veremis, ELIAMEP, Athens
- 1.15 pm Lunch
- 3.00 pm Session 7: **Turkey and the West**
- Turkey's Options
Dr. Ian Lesser, Rand Co., Santa Monica (Ca)
- The West and Turkey: respective Roles, common Interests
Dr. John Roper, Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), London

End of the conference

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-Conference on "Us-European Common Approaches to Turkey" - Rome, 20-21 November
1998

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Turkey's Domestic Political Evolution and the Future

William Hale, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London

(Paper for presentation at the Conference 'US-European Common Approaches to Turkey', Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, 20-21 November 1998)

For those unfamiliar with the story, the first part of this paper summarises the main developments in Turkey's politics since the last general elections, held in December 1995, and the current position of the government with its short-run prospects. The second part tries to broaden the focus, by considering future perspectives in a variety of contexts. These include the future of the party system and possible constitutional changes, the prospects for political Islamism and the political position of the armed forces, the human rights regime and the Kurdish question, and deeper changes affecting political culture, and the relationship between the state and civil society.

(1) Recent Developments and Short-Run Prospects

(a) *Turkey's Party Structure*

Probably the most serious political problem currently faced by Turkey is the extreme fragmentation and instability of the party system, which has the predictable result of producing weak and fragile coalition or minority governments. In the last general elections, held in December 1995, no single party won more than 22% of the vote, though the pro-Islamist Welfare Party (Refah) led by Necmettin Erbakan came nearest to this, with 21.4%. Neither Refah or any of the four other parties which surmounted the 10% threshold necessary to qualify for any seats in the 550-member Grand National Assembly, Turkey's unicameral parliament, came near to securing an overall majority. Moreover, since the elections, no less than five other minor parties have been established or re-formed by defections from the major parties, so there are currently ten parties with parliamentary representation, plus 15 independents (for details, see the Appendix). Since December 1995 there have been three governments, all of them coalitions and two of them minority governments, with an average life-span of under 11 months, and fairly long periods with no established government, or a temporary caretaker administration. Taking the longer period since May 1993, there have been five governments, lasting an average of just over 12 months each. As a result, governments have drifted on without direction, or badly divided, and unable to implement effective or credible programmes to deal with pressing economic, social, cultural and external challenges.

Solutions for this phenomenon are not easy to establish, let alone implement.¹ Explanations are also complex and uncertain, but can probably be reduced to three main factors. First, the application of a proportional representation system of elections since 1961 has almost certainly increased the tendency towards a multiplication of parties, in spite of the application of a minimum vote threshold since 1983. However, the effects of this can be exaggerated, since it is not certain that changing the electoral system would, by itself, help to overcome the problem (the point is returned to later). Second as Maurice Duverger remarks 'multi-partism arises from the mutual independence of sets of antitheses' - that is, for instance, from fault-lines run across separate socio-economic, cultural or ethnic domains.²

¹ However, some suggestions are made later in this paper: see p.000.

² Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties* (London, Methuen, 1959) pp.231-34. Duverger applies his analysis primarily to France under the Fourth Republic, but it also seems quite appropriate in the present Turkish case.

Such divisions can clearly be located in the present Turkish party array, along the classic lines of left versus right (though this divide has become much less sharp or acute since the global collapse of communism and 'old socialism') of secularism versus Islamism, and ethnic or quasi-ethnic cleavages between Sunni and Alevi Muslims,³ or between the ethnically Turkish majority and the Kurdish ethnic minority. Thus, the parties can be summarily be classified as those of the centre-right and centre-left, of those of the Islamist persuasion as opposed to the majority of predominantly secularist parties (though some of the centre-right parties also have Islamist tinges) and of parties with important blocs of support from Alevis or Kurds,⁴ as opposed to those identified with the Turkish-Sunni majority. In most cases, individual parties can be identified with more than one of these cross-cutting elements.

Third, the party structure was severely fractured by the actions of the military regime of 1980-83, which dissolved all the pre-1980 parties, establishing new ones in their place. However, in practice it could not prevent the pre-1980 party leaders establishing successor parties, which then set up in competition with those which the military regime had allowed. Thus, Süleyman Demirel, who remained officially excluded from the political fray between 1980 and 1987, established the True Path Party (DYP) now led by Mrs Tansu Çiller, as a rival to the Motherland Party (Anap). The latter was founded by Turgut Özal with the permission (albeit not the encouragement) of the Generals, and is currently led by Mesut Yılmaz. Similarly, on the centre-left, the present Republican People's Party (CHP) under Deniz Baykal is effectively the successor of the party of the same name led before 1980 by Bülent Ecevit.⁵ However, Ecevit - who, like Demirel, was constitutionally excluded from official participation in politics until 1987 - nonetheless established a separate party, known as the Democratic Left Party (DSP) as a rival of the CHP and its predecessor, the former Social Democrat Populist Party (SHP).⁶ Thus, the centre-right is divided between two parties similar in their policies, Anap and DYP, just as the centre-left is split between the CHP and DSP. These historical divisions are reinforced by personal rivalries - currently and most notably, between Tansu Çiller and Mesut Yılmaz on the centre-right, and between Bülent Ecevit and Deniz Baykal on the centre-left. Since each of these parties had built up its own network of patron-client dependencies at the political grass roots, mergers between them would be severely obstructed by locally institutionalised pressures.

³ Alevi-ism can effectively be treated as a Turkish mystical version of Shi'ism, although it differs from the classic 'twelver' Shi'ism of, for instance, Iran, in important theological and political respects. Although no reliable data are available, it is said to command the loyalties of around 20% of the population. Unfortunately there is little literature in English on the Turkish Alevis, but see David Shankland, 'Diverse Paths of Change: Alevis and Sunni in Rural Anatolia', in Paul Stirling, ed., *Culture and Economy: Changes in Turkish Villages* (Huntingdon, Eothen Press, 1993) pp. 46-64.

⁴ Both the nominally centre-left parties - that is, the Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Democratic Left Party (DSP) - are apparently supported by Alevis, although neither party issues an open or specifically pro-Alevi appeal. The only overtly and legal pro-Kurdish party in Turkey, the People's Democracy Party (HaDeP) has no parliamentary representation, but it also has to be said that the Welfare Party also formerly had the support of a large number of Turkish Kurds. These cross-cutting affiliations and identities illustrate the complexity of the model proposed by Duverger.

⁵ This must be treated as a summary explanation of an extremely convoluted story. One of the parties allowed by the military to compete in the 1983 elections was the centre-left Populist Party, but this was challenged by the Social Democracy Party, which was excluded. The latter rapidly established itself, however, and the two parties merged in 1985 as the Social Democrat Populist Party (SHP). In 1992 a group of dissidents led by Deniz Baykal broke away from the party, to re-establish the Republican People's Party (CHP) but this re-united with the SHP under the CHP's banner, and Baykal's leadership, in February 1995.

⁶ See previous note.

(b) *Government since 1995*

On 12 March 1996, following the indecisive elections of 24 December 1995 and after over two months of fruitless negotiations between the main parties, Mesut Yılmaz formed a centre-right coalition with the True Path Party.⁷ However, this fell apart on 12 April, when Refah tabled a motion to set up a Commission of Enquiry to investigate Mrs Çiller's alleged malpractices in awarding privatisation contracts the previous year, during her premiership. Since around half the Anap MPs (including Yılmaz) failed to support her, the vote was carried. Relations between Anap and DYP reached breaking point, leading to the government's resignation on 5 June. With an evident promise from the Refah leader Necmettin Erbakan of dropping the corruption investigation, Mrs Çiller then entered into negotiations with Refah. The 'Refahyol' coalition was announced on 27 June 1996, with Erbakan as Prime Minister, and Mrs Çiller as deputy premier and Foreign Minister. Under the coalition protocol, Mrs Çiller was due to take over the premiership after one year. The government carried a vote of confidence on 8 July by 278-265 votes. The (then seven) members of the ultra-nationalist-cum-Islamist Great Unity Party (BBP), a breakaway from Anap, voted in favour of the new government, but 14 of Mrs Çiller's backbenchers stayed away, abstained or voted against. On 16 July, eight of them formally broke away from the DYP to form the Democratic Turkey Party (DTP) under Hüsamettin Cindoruk.

The first defect of the Refahyol government was the weakness of Çiller's hold over her own party (rather than that of Erbakan over his) and the fact that her entente with Erbakan simply was not credible except part of a cynical trade-off over the corruption charges. Opposition was further heightened by an automobile crash at Susurluk in western Anatolia, on 3 November 1996. In the accident, Hüseyin Kocadağ, the Head of the Istanbul Police Academy, Abdullah Çatlı, a 'Grey Wolf' ultra-nationalist militant and gangster who had been implicated in seven murders in 1978 and convicted on drugs charges in Switzerland, and Çatlı's mistress Gonca Us, were all killed in the same car. The driver of the car was Sedat Bucak, a DYP MP and Kurdish chieftain heading a large gang of 'village guards' (that is pro-government Kurdish militiamen paid for and trained by the armed forces) who was the only occupant to survive the accident. The crash suggested credible links between the security forces, the 'Grey Wolves', organised crime and pro-government Kurdish chiefs, but it has still to be properly explained. By the beginning of November 1998, 25 prosecutions had been launched, covering crimes including murder, gangsterism and narcotics smuggling, in which 75 suspects had been charged and the parliamentary immunities of both Bucak and of Mehmet Ağar, the Minister of Interior in the Refahyol government, had been lifted. However, after two years, only two convictions had been concluded, both of relatively low-ranking police officers. Most of the alleged ringleaders in these crimes were still at large, in some cases abroad.⁸

There was also fierce opposition to Erbakan's Islamist agenda from much of the state structure (the army, judiciary, and the civil service) as well as civil society (business and trades unions, the media, and other pressure groups). A prominent feature of this was Erbakan's foreign policy, which was quite at variance with the generally pro-western line pursued by Tansu Çiller, as Foreign Minister.⁹

⁷ This and the subsequent narrative is based on contemporary Turkish press reports, mainly in the dailies *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet*. Specific references are given only for other sources, for quotations, economic statistics, or what appear to have been 'exclusive' reports.

⁸ For a useful summary of the scandal, as it stood in November 1998, see *Milliyet*, 3 November 1998.

⁹ For details, see Philip Robins, 'Turkish Foreign Policy under Erbakan', *Survival*, Vol. 38 (1997) pp.82-100.

Domestically, the most contentious question faced by the government by early 1997 was the widely supported proposal to extend compulsory primary education from five to eight years. In principle, the Welfare Party did not oppose extending the period of compulsory education, but insisted on the continuation of the then-existing system, providing for separate Islamic junior high schools (nominally 'Schools for Imams and Preachers'). The alternative proposal, supported by the Motherland Party and the centre-left parties, called for the extension of the existing non-clerical state primary schools to cover the first eight years of education, and the gradual amalgamation of all junior high schools with the primary schools. It was this issue which was to prove a fatal cause of conflict for the government.

In the economy, the growth of GNP continued at a rate of 7.1% in 1996 and an estimated 8.2% in 1997. However, the government's plan to reduce inflation by bringing down the deficit in the consolidated budget to zero in 1997 proved to be a chimera, as the expected revenues from privatisation failed to materialise, and hefty wage hikes were awarded to civil servants together with large increases in agricultural subsidies. As a result, the budget deficit rose to an estimated 2.181 trillion (thousand billion) Liras in 1997, or about 9% of GNP, and consumer price inflation continued at 80.4% in 1996 and 85.9% in 1997.¹⁰ In dealing with the Kurdish problem, the government failed to keep its promise to end the state of emergency regime: the fighting against the insurgents of the PKK continued, with attendant human rights abuses, and no end clearly in sight.

Public frustration at creeping Islamisation and corruption emerged in early 1997. In February, in the 'one minute of darkness' campaign, millions of ordinary citizens turned off their lights at 9.00 p.m. every evening as a powerful expression of protest, and frequently came out into the streets banging saucepans or joining candlelit processions. This was accompanied by protest marches by women's groups, Muslims of the Alevi sect, and secularist opinion generally, as well as fierce opposition from both business, the trades unions and the mass media. The conflict between the government and the military came out into the open on 2 February 1997, when the Welfare Party mayor of Sincan, an outer suburb of Ankara, organised 'Jerusalem Night' celebrations, at which calls for *jihad* were issued from the platform. In response, on 4 February, the army rolled its tanks down the main street of Sincan during the morning rush hour. The claim by the General Staff that this was just a normal training activity was very hard to believe, since it was fairly clear that the military demonstration was intended as a warning to the government, and Erbakan in particular. At a meeting on 28 February of the National Security Council (NSC), which brings together the armed forces commanders together with the President, Prime Minister and other ministers, the military chiefs raised the heat by issuing a long list of 'recommendations' to the government. The called among other things for legal measures to ban fundamentalist propaganda, strict adherence to the secularist provisions of the constitution, implementation of the eight-year education plan according to the secularist proposals, and a limitation of the number of Schools for Imams and Preachers. Erbakan accepted these recommendations, but did very little to implement them. Nonetheless, the military continued to insist on them at subsequent NSC meetings.

It was against this background that the Refahyol government collapsed in June 1997. On 18 June Erbakan resigned, expecting to reconstruct the government by incorporating the BBP and to hand over the premiership to Tansu Çiller. However, President Demirel then passed on the office to Yılmaz, as he was constitutionally entitled to do. This provoked large-scale defections from the DYP to the DTP (as well as independents) reducing the DYP to 95 (later 92) seats. On 30

¹⁰ Data from Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: Turkey*, 1st quarter, 1998.

June, Yılmaz announced his successor government - a coalition of Anap, Bülent Ecevit's Democratic Left Party (DSP) and Cindoruk's DTP, with outside support from the Republican People's Party, plus some independents. On 12 July 1997 this received a vote of confidence of 281-256 votes. In the current parliamentary arithmetic, Anap has 136 seats, while the DSP has 61 and the DTP 19, giving the government a total of 216 seats, or 54 seats short of an overall majority (270, allowing for the 11 current vacancies: see Appendix). Hence, the government is dependent for its survival on the outside support of the CHP, with its 55 seats. Following the dissolution of the Welfare Party by the Constitutional Court in February 1998 (see below) a successor has been set up in the shape of the Virtue Party (*Fazilet*) led by Recai Kutan, which currently has 144 MPs. It is followed in size by the DYP with 96 seats: there are also 13 MPs of minor, mostly ultra-rightist, parties and 15 independents (see Appendix).

Since its establishment in June 1997, the government has proved more durable than many observers expected. To its credit, it succeeded in passing the eight year compulsory education bill in August 1997, soon after coming into office, and has also passed a tax reform bill in July 1998 which, if properly implemented, should succeed in filling at least part the gap in the state's finances. In the struggle against the PKK, the Turkish army appears to have re-established control over most of the south-east. The PKK itself is evidently in severe disarray, following the agreement with Syria of October 1998, and its leader Abdullah Öcalan has apparently taken refuge in Russia. However, the effectiveness of the government has been badly undermined by dissension between Anap and the DSP (mainly on economic policy issues) and its failure so far to make a more effective attack on the problems of inflation and the public sector deficit. Although, quite exceptionally, the government is expected to meet its budgetary targets for 1998, inflation has continued at a very high rate by international standards. In the year to September 1998, the rise in the wholesale price index stood at 65.9% and that of consumer prices at 80.4%, forcing the government to revise its wholesale price inflation target for 1998 upwards from 50% to 58%. The budget deficit for the first nine months of 1998 reached TL 3,033 trillion, or \$10.64 billion, with an expected public sector borrowing requirement equivalent to 9% of predicted GNP. While annualised GNP growth slowed to 4% in the second quarter of 1998, compared with annual growth of 8.2% in 1997, and the foreign trade deficit has widened, the government's domestic debt stock rose to TL9,947 trillion at the end of September, or \$34.9 billion, and its overseas debt to around \$100 billion. In the wake of the economic collapse in Russia and east Asian markets, the Istanbul stock market composite index fell by 50% in dollar terms between the end of July and the end of October.¹¹

The fact that there has been little effective action to deal with allegedly widespread corruption, and the apparent connection between sections of the security forces and organised crime which was revealed by the Susurluk affair, has also undermined public confidence in the government, and the political system generally. In fact, the trail originally unearthed by the Susurluk crash has broadened, and has not left the Yılmaz government unscathed. Admittedly, the most concrete allegations are those levied against the former DYP minister Mehmet Ağar, who is accused of sanctioning an international drug-smuggling operation, of providing Abdullah Çatlı, who died in the crash, with false identity papers and passport, of providing a diplomatic passport to mafia boss Yaşar Öz, who was wanted at the time by Interpol, and protecting the murderers of the casino magnate Ömer Lütfü Topal. However, the web has also spread to former Anap Minister of State Eyüp Aşık, who was forced to resign in September 1998, following the release of taped conversations between himself and another Turkish mafia godfather, Alaatin

¹¹ Data from *Briefing* (Ankara, weekly) 26 October 1998, p.18; 5 October 1998, p.33; 7 September 1998, p.24; 3 August 1998, p.26; *Milliyet*, 5 November 1998; Reuters, 26 October 1998, and information from ABN-Amro, London.

Çakıcı, warning him of a plan to arrest him by the state intelligence organisation MIT: (Çakıcı, who is currently in gaol in France, faces possible indictment in Turkey for over fifty murders, including that of his previous wife Ugur and a former cabinet minister Cavit Çağlar). On 4 November 1998, Mehmet Gedik, the Anap party chairman in Bursa province, was also arrested for alleged links with the wanted Bursa businessman Erol Evcil, who is in turn alleged to have arranged the murder of money lender and banker Nesim Malki. Meanwhile, Deniz Baykal has alleged that he has further files linking the present government with organised crime, leading to accusations of blackmail by Ecevit. While the government is clearly attempting to point the finger of blame at Mrs Çiller and the DYP, there was a widespread suspicion that, as the Ankara weekly *Briefing* has put it, 'the efforts of the government currently reflect a struggle for control between Yılmaz and Çiller over a highly corrupt system, rather than an effort to clean it up.'¹²

In parliament, the government's most immediate source of weakness is its dependence on the outside support of Baykal, who prefers to keep Yılmaz on a short leash rather than give the administration full support by joining it. Two reasons can be suggested as to why the government has been able to muddle through, avoiding total collapse. First, although the government has a weak parliamentary position, there is insufficient support for any alternative, which would probably take the form of a coalition between Fazilet and DYP - effectively, a reconstruction of the 'Refahyol' government. Even with the support of the small ultra-rightist parties, which is not a foregone conclusion, and some independents, such a coalition could only muster about 260 seats, compared with around 280 for the present pro-government parties plus some independents. A new Islamist-DYP coalition would almost certainly encounter the strongest opposition from the military and much of civil society. Many MPs (including some in the DYP) will probably wish to avoid this. Almost certainly, President Demirel would try to avoid appointing Recai Kutan (who is effectively the representative of Erbakan) as Prime Minister, and is deeply hostile to Mrs Çiller. Second, Baykal prefers to stay out of the government, since he believes that its failures should redound to his advantage, enabling his CHP to take over from Ecevit's DSP as the standard-bearer of the centre-left. However, he does not wish to be seen as the instrument by which a generally pro-secularist government fell, and the Islamists returned to power, since both he and his followers are strongly committed to the secularist position. Hence, he has continued his current ambivalent attitude, by supporting the government in votes of confidence and other agreed measures, but only supporting other motions on a case-by-case basis. Since the start of the government, he has also been pressing for early general elections. Although it is not at all clear that his party would do particularly well in them, it is likely that it would at least perform more strongly than it did in December 1995, when it only just scraped over the 10% threshold: hence, new elections would almost certainly leave it in a stronger position than it is at present.

(c) *The short-run outlook: early elections? Prospects and implications.*

Under the Constitution, general elections will not be required until December 2000. However, in an attempt to stabilise his relationship with Baykal, Yılmaz met the CHP leader on 5 June 1998. He agreed that, in return for the CHP's support for an agreed legislative programme for the rest of 1998, early elections would be called in April 1999, to coincide with the local elections which would then be due (the exact date has since been fixed as 18 April). As his part of the bargain, Baykal agreed to support the government on a number of important measures,

¹² *Briefing*, 19 October 1998, p. 9.

which were said to include bills to reform the social security system and local government, and a so-called 'Struggle against Reactionaryism' (read Islamism) law. The present government would resign at the end of 1998, to be succeeded by a temporary 'low-profile' government in which neither party leader would play an active part, although they would give it their support. This would stay in office until polling day. Misgivings about this agenda were then expressed by Ecevit and Cindoruk, but on 25 July it was announced that they had agreed to the plan. Accordingly, the proposal was put to parliament on 30 July. Since both the DYP and Fazilet support the idea of early elections (indeed, they favour holding them as early as possible) the motion passed by a majority of 486 to 11, with 44 abstentions or absences.

After this apparently firm decision, doubts about the plan began to surface during the summer. Cindoruk, whose party would almost certainly fail to surmount the hurdle posed by the current election law, raised both constitutional and practical objections to the plan. Instead, he favoured running the local elections as required in April, but postponing the general elections until the autumn of 1999. President Demirel appeared to take a similar position. Doubts were also voiced by some Anap ministers, who now expressed a preference for holding the elections as early as possible, perhaps in December 1998. Although the DSP appeared to abide by the original plan, the Prime Minister appeared to be tossing the whole idea back into the melting pot in early September, when he suggested that he was not happy with the plan, and appealed to the CHP to re-evaluate the situation. Surprisingly, Baykal responded by saying that 'certain parties [including, presumably, his own] are within their rights to reconsider a proposal they have already approved in parliament'.¹³ However, while the pundits were trying to digest and interpret these Delphic pronouncements, Yilmaz turned the tables once more on 10 September by announcing that the elections 'will be held on 18 April 1999'.¹⁴ According to the Prime Minister, there could be 'no question' of holding elections in November or December 1998 or postponing them until after April 1999, though the last possibility could be discussed if a proposal to that effect came from the CHP.¹⁵ Nonetheless, at a subsequent meeting on 23 October, Yilmaz kept up the pressure on Baykal, by trying to persuade him to join the coalition, and drop his demand for a 'low profile government', so that a broadly-based administration could carry on into 1999. In a television programme later that day, he threatened that if the CHP failed to live up to its promise to pass the five agreed laws then their original agreement would be deemed null and void, and he would not resign as planned. Passage of the legislation was in turn judged to be difficult, since by mid-November parliament would be heavily preoccupied with preparing the 1999 budget.¹⁶ Later, Baykal firmly rejected the idea of joining the government on the grounds that the move was designed to 'melt away the left': if the five laws were not passed by the end of the year, this would not be the CHP's fault, he claimed.¹⁷

Given this fluid and confusing situation, there seems to be something like a 50-50 chance that the elections will be held in April 1999. Alternatively, if the Yilmaz-Baykal agreement breaks down, then the Prime Minister might decide to opt for elections in February, as a means of clearing up the uncertainty.¹⁸ A third option for Yilmaz would be to stay in office until the end of 1999, or even 2000, as he is

¹³ Quoted, *ibid*, 7 September 1998, p. 1.

¹⁴ Quoted, *Milliyet*, 11 September 1998.

¹⁵ Quoted, *ibid*.

¹⁶ *Briefing*, 26 October 1998, p. 3.

¹⁷ Quoted, *Milliyet*, 3 November 1998.

¹⁸ Suggestions of an even earlier date, including December 1998, have been made, but a snap election would appear to be ruled out for organisational reasons, according to the chairman of the Supreme Electoral Board, Tufan Algan: *Briefing*, 19 October 1998, p. 6.

under pressure to do from business and other opinion. However, this would assume either that Baykal and his party join the government, or that the Prime Minister can reach a viable and long-term agreement with the CHP for outside support, both of which seem very problematic at present. Apart from Baykal's reluctance to join the cabinet, the formation of a new coalition would almost certainly encounter bitter disputes, especially between the CHP and DSP, on the distribution of government portfolios, with the CHP demanding ministries which both Yılmaz and Ecevit would be unwilling to concede. For his part, Hüsamettin Cindoruk clearly opposes the proposal of general elections next April, but his party only has 19 seats. Hence, he is in no position to prevent it, if the other government parties, plus CHP, Fazilet and DYP, abide by their previous decisions.¹⁹ President Demirel is known to oppose the plan for April elections, but his constitutional powers are constrained, since he effectively only has powers of limited postponement rather than absolute veto over any bills passed by parliament. He has correctly pointed out that he has the sole right to appoint the Prime Minister, and could exercise this to refuse the government's nomination for the head of the temporary government. However, this would probably not damage the plan fatally. The temporary government would in any case have to win a vote of confidence in parliament, limiting Demirel's range of choices. Lastly, it should be pointed out that there is no great enthusiasm for early elections among the public, or the grass-roots structures of the ruling parties: hence, abandonment of the plan would probably not provoke much public opposition.

Predicting the results of the elections, assuming they are held in early 1999, is very hazardous, since much could change in the intervening period. Mid-term opinion polls in Turkey are notoriously unreliable, and there is a large percentage of 'don't knows'. Recent surveys suggest that Anap and Fazilet could each score around 20-25% (with Anap currently slightly ahead) leaving DYP, CHP and DSP with around 10-15% each. The ultra-rightist Nationalist Action Party (MHP) might just break through the 10% barrier, giving it a handful of seats, but other parties, such as Cindoruk's DTP and the pro-Kurdish People's Democracy Party (HaDeP) would fall well short of this.²⁰ On these figures, none of the main parties would have an overall majority in parliament. Almost certainly, none of them except DYP would be willing to form a coalition with Refah, while Fazilet and DYP together would probably be short of an overall majority. Hence, the prospects are that something like the present coalition will probably be re-formed after the elections. The main difference will probably be that Baykal will be reluctant to stay in his current 'on-off' position for too long, and will be under strong pressure to reward his followers with the fruits of office. Hence, an Anap-DSP-CHP coalition seems a likely outcome, and could be reduced to Anap-CHP if both these parties do better than currently expected. Either of these outcomes should produce a somewhat more stable government than at present.

In the short run, the prospect of elections will obviously limit the government's willingness to undertake potentially vote-losing structural reforms (such as raising the retirement age, scrapping or radically reforming the agricultural price-support scheme, or making the Central Bank independent). Inflationary populist economic policies will also be a temptation, though the government strongly denies it will head in this direction. Nor can the temporary government due

¹⁹ Cindoruk has also argued that the proposal would be unconstitutional, on the grounds that Article 127 of the Constitution requires that general and local elections could only be held on the same day if the due date for general elections falls within one year of that required for general elections. His argument does not seem proven, but even if the Constitutional Court upheld such a plea, parliament could easily alter the constitution to the form required. A two-thirds majority would be required for this, but the massive majority by which the motion was carried on 30 July 1998 suggests that this could be done quite easily.

²⁰ See, for instance, *Briefing*, 28 September 1998, p.2.

to take office in January be expected to do much more than hold the fort. On the other hand, if Turkey crashes into a Russian-style economic meltdown (which is, on balance, judged unlikely) the parties may well decide to postpone the general elections anyway. In any case, and whoever is in power, the government faces some uphill economic tasks in the first four months of 1999, in which about \$21.2 billion in domestic debt, or about 60% of the existing debt stock, will be due for redemption. Given uncertainty in international markets, financing this debt is likely to prove difficult, unless high real interest rates are offered to investors. More broadly, this side of elections the political will for the implementation of basic structural reforms will almost certainly be lacking.²¹

(2) Future Perspectives

(a) *Party and Electoral Systems, and Constitutional Reform*

As the first part of this paper tried to suggest, the establishment of a more stable and less fragmented party system looks like one of the most important *desiderata* in Turkish politics. In most western European democracies, political loyalties can be broadly divided into those of the left or right, with additional parties representing the centre ground, or such diverse currents as environmentalism, racism, reformed communism, or religious or sub-state national identities. On the face of it, it would seem logical for Turkey to adopt at least part of this pattern, through mergers of the two centre-left and three centre-right parties into single parties, or at least cohesive blocs. Even though the serious institutional and personal obstacles to this cannot be ignored, such a development cannot be discounted in the longer run. A political party does not normally accept a merger with another one unless either or both of the parties feel their short or medium run future as a separate entity to be weak. On the centre-right, the DTP's prospects are currently very bleak, and it seems likely that the party will either be wiped out at the next elections, or only survive by means of a merger or alliance with Anap.²² Similarly, the DYP's future depends heavily on whether Mrs Çiller survives the serious charges of corruption and other malfeasance which are levied against her and her husband. If she does not, then it is likely that her party would either fall apart, or fall short of the 10% electoral threshold (perhaps both). In this case Anap would either merge with the anti-Çiller remnants of DYP, or at least take over its electoral base. On the centre-left, prospects are different, since neither DSP or CHP seems likely to wither away in the near future. However, of the two the DSP is probably in the weaker long-run position since it is heavily dependent on Bülent Ecevit's personality and his role as leader. Ecevit is now 73 years old, and there are rumours that he would prefer to retire some time after 2000: even if he did not, it is unlikely that he could carry on for long after that, leaving the field clear for the re-establishment of the CHP as the single party of the centre-left.

However, such a development would not necessarily overcome the problem of establishing effective and stable governments. Essentially, the Turkish electorate's ideological allegiances are currently split four ways, between the centre-right, the centre-left, the pro-Islamists, and a residual category representing mainly the ultra-right and the Kurdish identity. On the current showing, a united party of the centre-right would probably garner about 35% of the total vote, a united centre-left party about 30%, and the Islamists around 20%, leaving the fourth category of parties with a combined total of around 15%. Under the present electoral laws, a

²¹ Information from ABN-Amro, London.

²² Such an alliance would also be of benefit to Yılmaz's party, since although the DTP seems unlikely to score more than 5% at most in a future election, such a margin could still be of crucial value to Anap in putting it ahead of Fazilet. Moreover, DTP's current members are concentrated in the Aegean region, where Anap has generally been relatively weak, enabling Anap to overcome a fairly significant geographical gap in its support base.

party would probably need to win around 38% to capture an overall majority in parliament.²³ On these calculations, a combined centre-right party would still fall somewhat short of an overall majority, while a single party of the centre-left would be well behind the target, and unable to form a government except as part of an anti-Islamist coalition with the centre-right. More crucially, the Islamists would be left holding the balance of power, and might be able to force the formation of another Islamist-cum-centre-right coalition.

Alternatively it is often suggested that if the party leaderships are not willing to negotiate mergers voluntarily, they might be forced to do so by changes in the electoral system. Since the indecisive elections of December 1995, the idea of introducing a French-style double-ballot voting system, with single-member constituencies, has been much discussed in Turkey, as a replacement for the present d'Hont list system, with its multi-member constituencies. Under the new system, all parties would compete in the first ballot, and any candidate getting more than 50% would be declared elected. If no candidate achieved this (which is far more likely) then the two front runners would fight a run-off in the second round. The secularist centre-right parties, principally Anap, support the proposal, since their hope is that in cases where Fazilet and Anap are the only parties to qualify for the second round, then supporters of other parties would opt for Anap to keep Fazilet out. Fazilet opposes this change for precisely the same reason. Moreover, both the centre-left parties, DSP and CHP, are also unenthusiastic, since they fear that they would be the main victims of 'third party squeeze'. Hence, the idea of adopting this system for national elections has been put on hold, though it may well be introduced in mayoralty elections (which are currently run on a simple majority basis anyway). Another, more limited proposal is to reduce the current 10% minimum vote hurdle - possibly to 5%, or through some other modifications. One of the aims of this is to allow HaDeP to win at least some seats in the south-east, which would otherwise probably go to Fazilet. However, it would also let in MHP (assuming the latter does not quite make 10%) and generally increase the number of parties in parliament - making the job of coalition building even more difficult than it is already.

More broadly, it can also be argued that alteration of the electoral law, designed to reduce the fragmentation of the party structure, seem to have little effect on the behaviour of politicians. Since the 1995 elections, no less than five new parties have been formed by MPs originally elected for other parties. With one exception (that of the MHP) none of them are at all likely to break through the 10% threshold. One can only explain this phenomenon by assuming that Turkish politicians are incurable optimists, or that the leaders of small parties hope to blackmail the bigger ones into adopting them as candidates at the next elections. Whatever the explanation, the Turkish experience demonstrates the difficulties of 'political engineering', or trying to reform the party structure by altering the election laws.

²³ This calculation has to be a very inexact one since much would depend (a) on how many votes were 'wasted' by being given to parties which failed to surmount the 10% threshold, and (b) the size of the gap between the leading party, and the second runner. As Ersin Kalaycıoğlu remarks, 'The current electoral system of Turkey looks like proportional representation, but works as if it were a majority system'. In the 1987 elections, quite exceptionally, Anap (then under Turgut Özal) won 64.9% of the seats with 36.3% of the votes - a votes-to-seats ratio of almost 1:1.8. However, in subsequent elections this ratio has been reduced substantially - partly by changes in the electoral system, and partly because more parties have succeeded in overcoming the 10% threshold and their shares have been closer to one another. Thus, in 1995, the votes-to-seats ratio enjoyed by Refah, which was the leading party by a small margin, was 1:1.34. If repeated, this would mean that a party would need about 38% of the vote to win a bare overall majority. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, 'Constitutional Viability and Political Institutions in Turkish Democracy', in Abdo I. Baaklini and Helen Desfosses, eds., *Designs for Democratic Stability* (New York and London, Armonk, 1997) pp. 190-91.

An alternative proposal designed to cope with the fragmentation of the party system would be to allow parties to form electoral alliances which might then solidify in parliament. Currently, this is forbidden under the electoral law, but it would only require a simple majority in parliament to alter the rules. In the past, parties have been able to evade the law by officially merging just before elections, and then splitting again soon after. Negotiations between Fazilet, DYP and some other small parties have taken place, but do not seem likely to develop into a full electoral alliance, even assuming the law is altered. Nor do other parties seem prepared to drop their differences. However, it has been pointed out that if a double ballot system is introduced for mayoralty elections, as seems quite possible, then inter-party alliances may develop anyway, so there may be movement on this front.²⁴ If they do develop, then Anap will probably be the main beneficiary.

Another striking feature of the Turkish parliament, which further increases the instability of the system, is the frequency with which MPs switch parties after their election, or resign from a party to become independents. By August 1998, no less than 71 deputies, or about 13% of the Assembly's total membership, had changed party at least once - and in many cases several times - since January 1996.²⁵ Of these inter-party transfers, 19 were straight switches from the DYP to DTP, which reflected genuine and serious divisions within the party over its attitude to the 'Refahyol' coalition and the leadership of Mrs Çiller. However, the vast majority can only be explained by the fact that the party loyalties of many MPs are very weak, and that they are likely to join any party which appears to offer them the best personal benefits, whatever their party affiliation at the time of the election. Article 84 of the Constitution, which is designed to prevent deputies from switching parties, is clearly quite ineffective. One solution might be to alter Article 84 by requiring any deputy who resigns from the party for which he or she was elected to run for immediate re-election, but this can be criticised as an over-draconian restriction of the MP's legitimate autonomy. Given the present electoral system, it would also be hard to carry through in cases where a party is dissolved, as in the case of Refah, since by-elections would then have to be held in a large number of multi-member constituencies - tantamount almost to a general election.

More fundamentally, President Demirel and some others have suggested a major constitutional overhaul, moving Turkey from the present parliamentary system of government to a presidential or semi-presidential system, presumably on the models of the United States and France under the Fifth Republic, respectively. According to the first model, the President would be directly elected by the voters (rather than indirectly elected, as at present) for a fixed term, and would be the executive head of the government, rather than a symbolic head of state. He would choose his cabinet independently, regardless of party or whether the members were previously members of the legislature, and would not be dependent on a vote of confidence in parliament. On the second model, the President would again be directly and separately elected, but the Prime Minister and government would be appointed by him from within the parliament, and would need to maintain majority support in it.

The advantages of relative stability and continuity which such constitutional changes might produce cannot be ignored, but it also has to be said that they would face some formidable obstacles. In the first place, the French-style semi-presidential model would probably not go very far to cure the problems which the Turkish

²⁴ This suggestion has been made by, for instance, Mehmet Keçeciler, an Anap MP for Konya and a minister in previous Anap governments: see *Milliyet*, 11 September 1998.

²⁵ Data from *Briefing*, 10 August 1998, p.5. The record was held by Kubilay Uygun, who had transferred no less than seven times.

political system currently faces. By being directly elected, the President would have increased moral authority, but his constitutional powers would not be greatly enhanced (unless they were also increased in some other ways - by, for instance, giving him the unilateral power to dissolve parliament, or the right to veto legislation barring a two-thirds overruling vote in the legislature). The Prime Minister would still be faced with the task of forming a government from a fragmented assembly. If, on the other hand, a US-style presidency were instituted, the President would enjoy more independence, but would still need to cobble together a majority in the legislature to pass the budget and other legislation. In spite of occasional deadlocks, a US President whose party does not enjoy a majority in Congress can usually overcome this problem, but only through a complex and informal process of 'log-rolling', compromise, and individual persuasion. Essentially, the US system works because it is an established part of the political process and culture, which both sides are accustomed to handling. Moreover, the internal looseness and lack of ideological commitment of American parties gives the President considerable room for manoeuvre. Such conditions are simply not present in Turkey, so adoption of a US-style presidential system might well be a recipe for constant deadlocks between the legislature and executive.

Leaving aside these probable operational problems, the Turkish parliament is most unlikely to voluntarily accept such a major reduction in its power, or a corresponding increase in that of the President. Under the current constitutional rules, the Constitution can only be altered by a two-thirds majority in parliament (with a possible referral to referendum by the President) or by a three-fifths majority with a compulsory referendum. A change to a presidential or semi-presidential system is unlikely to be accepted by such a majority in the present or a likely future parliament. As an historical signpost, it is worth noting that in 1924, when the Turkish Republic's first Constitution was being drawn up, the Assembly refused to grant the President greater powers, even though that office was then occupied by Kemal Atatürk, who enjoyed virtually unchallengable national authority at the time.²⁶

(b) *Fazilet and the future of political Islamism*

Under the verdict of the Constitutional Court, which took effect on 22 February 1998, Refah was officially dissolved, due to statements and actions by Necmettin Erbakan and other prominent members of the party which were held to have contravened articles of the Constitution and other statutes making it illegal to exploit religious beliefs for personal or political gain. Erbakan and five other Refah MPs were expelled from parliament by the Court, and forbidden to run for public office or hold positions in any political party for the following five years.²⁷ Additionally, Erbakan faces a possible gaol sentence for individual infractions of the law, while Tayyip Erdoğan, the mayor of Istanbul and the former party's second most prominent personality, is also confronted with a 10-month sentence. Meanwhile, the Virtue Party has continued under the leadership of Recai Kutan, who is regarded as effectively a proxy of Erbakan.²⁸ As a party, it could face closure for alleged financial irregularities, though whether these proceedings could be completed before the expected early elections is open to question.

²⁶ These included the proposal that the President should be elected for a seven year term, and that he should have the unilateral right to dissolve the Assembly and veto legislation, barring a two-thirds overruling majority: see Suna Kili, *Turkish Constitutional Developments and Assembly Debates on the Constitutions of 1924 and 1961* (Istanbul, Robert College Research Center, 1971) pp.41-47.

²⁷ For the details, see, e.g., *Briefing*, 2 March 1998, pp.6-7.

²⁸ On 28 October 1998 the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office announced that it would also be applying for the lifting of Recai Kutan's parliamentary immunity, so as to allow his prosecution for allegedly making defamatory remarks about the Alevi minority: *Reuter's*, 28 October 1998.

These prosecutions have left Fazilet with an uncertain future and some serious immediate problems. Of these, the most serious is probably its evident 'leadership gap'. With Erbakan and Erdoğan both officially removed from the political stage, Recai Kutan lacks the popular appeal which his two former colleagues both commanded. Voters who supported Refah in the 1995 elections may also have been disappointed by its failure to deliver on its promises while it was briefly in office - a particularly important factor for the many Turkish Kurds who voted for Refah - although the party has proved far more successful in local government. More broadly, one has to be careful not to exaggerate the Islamist phenomenon in Turkey. The political Islamists have attracted attention because they break with conventions, and are seen as part of a global movement, affecting a wide range of Muslim countries. On the other hand, the fact is that they still only represent a minority of opinion, and in Turkey they have to compete in the political marketplace with a majority of well-established secularist parties.

The point was made quite dramatically by public events in October 1998. On 11 October, demonstrators demanding the right for female students to wear 'Islamic' head scarves in class, who were supported by Fazilet from behind the scenes, formed a human chain around Istanbul which was reportedly supported by around 500,000 people. Two weeks later, however, on 25 October, far larger crowds - reckoned at 'millions' - turned out for marches and meetings to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the foundation of the Republic. The significance of the demonstrations was not just ceremonial, or a ritual expression of patriotism, since they had a specifically secularist tone. Placards carried by the marchers carried such slogans as 'Turkey is secular, and secular it will remain', or 'We are proud, powerful and Kemalist'. The millions of ordinary citizens in the demonstrations were accompanied by army officers and their families, but in many places, local Fazilet mayors and MPs were notable by their absence from the demonstrations.²⁹ The evidence of 25 October suggests that even though Turks may feel anger and frustration at the failures of the contemporary generation of politicians, Kemalism as a political principle still has a very impressive degree of public support.

This does not mean that Fazilet should be written off, however. It may have been unsuccessful in government, but its secularist rivals have not performed significantly better. The present leadership of Fazilet also seems anxious to avoid the mistakes of the past. On the weekend of 24-25 October, 250 party delegates attended a meeting at Alanya, at which they were reportedly told to 'establish good relations with everybody and don't provoke quarrels', 'chat with women and shake their hands', and 'visit other parties and obtain their opinions concerning Fazilet'.³⁰ Whether the party activists would adhere to this code of conduct remained to be seen, but the leadership was evidently anxious to project a new, 'clean' image. At the grass roots, it also appears that Fazilet continues the excellent organisation it inherited from its predecessor Refah. Hence, whatever happens to the leadership or the party organisation at the top, proxy leaders and/or a successor party are likely to remain an important force in Turkish politics. On the other hand, Fazilet does not seem to be near an electoral breakthrough, taking it up to the 35-40% threshold. Hence, it will probably not be in a position to form a government on its own after the elections. There is a chance it might be able to do so in coalition with the DYP, but, as earlier remarked, DYP's electoral fortunes also look very uncertain.³¹

²⁹ See reports in *Milliyet*, 26 October 1998.

³⁰ *Briefing*, 26 October 1998, p. 5.

³¹ For other information on the historical evolution and recent position of political Islamism in Turkey, see, in particular, Binnaz Toprak, *Islam and Political Development in Turkey* (Leiden, Brill, 1981); Sencer Ayata, 'Patronage, Party and State: the Politicization of Islam in Turkey', *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 50 (1996); Metin Heper, 'Islam and Democracy in Turkey', *Middle*

(c) *The political position of the army.*

The downfall of the 'Refahyol' government in June 1997 is often characterised as a 'soft coup' by the military. Admittedly, the armed forces had played a major role in bringing the government's collapse to a head, notably through the demands issued by the National Security Council. However, this was only part of the story, since although there were some rather vague and veiled threats of a coup, it was clear throughout the crisis that the army was very reluctant to take this step. As General Cevik Bir, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff put it, 'it's not our job to run the country, neither is it our intention'.³² As already described, the resignation of Refahyol had also been preceded by an impressive volume of public protests, and serious tactical miscalculations by the coalition leaders. It could thus be argued fairly convincingly that Erbakan had been removed from office by perfectly legal and constitutional means, and not primarily as a result of unconstitutional threats or actions by the military. Almost certainly, President Demirel, while careful not to exceed his constitutional powers, played a major role in persuading a critical mass of DYP backbenchers to desert Mrs Çiller. In effect, if there was a coup, it was as much one hatched in combination by the armed forces commanders and the President, as a unilateral military intervention. Moreover, the way in which the military chiefs handled the crisis, with frequent press conferences and 'briefings', suggests that they realised the importance of keeping public opinion on their side: without this, they might not have been able to act in the effective way which they achieved.

The possibility of a Fazilet victory in the next elections - even if it is a remote one - raises the question as to whether the armed forces might intervene to overturn the results. In August, President Demirel publicly hinted that if a Fazilet-DYP coalition were formed after the elections then 'the state' would act to defend the secular democratic order.³³ The warning is not without force, but it is also likely that the army would be very reluctant to take a leaf out of the Algerian book, for fear that this might produce similar results. More probably, it would probably act behind the scenes, and working with the President, to persuade DYP backbenchers not to support such a coalition, and thus give a secularist government a chance, as it did in June 1997. Short of such a crisis, it is also likely to keep up strong pressure on an Anap-led government to take tougher measures against Islamist activities in educational and other fields, as it is doing at present. In response, Yılmaz is likely to show outward compliance, but actual foot-dragging, since his party has a moderate Islamist component, which he does not want to drive into the hands of Fazilet.

(d) *Human rights and the Kurdish problem*

To judge by most western European commentary on Turkey, one could be forgiven for imagining that Turkish politics revolved entirely around these two issues. The previous discussion has tried to draw attention to the fact that this is far from the case. Nonetheless, it would be quite wrong to ignore them, since they are of pressing concern to many Turks, as well as overseas observers. On the first score, the present government has secured few advances, and prosecutions for offences which purely relate to oppositional statements, rather than overt support for terrorism, are still regular occurrences. As an example, in early October, the

East Journal, Vol. 51 (1997) and Ely Karmon, 'Radical Islamic Political Groups in Turkey', *MERIA Journal*, Vol. 1, no. 4 (January 1998: published on Internet at <http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/meria.html>

³² Quoted, *Briefing* 14 April 1997, p. 8.

³³ *Ibid*, 17 August 1998, p. 6.

chairman of the Human Rights Association Akin Birdal, who was recovering from a murderous attack by ultra-rightist gangsters, found himself faced with a charge in State Security Courts, allegedly for insulting the armed forces. Most of these prosecutions are brought under the much-criticised Section 8 of the 'Law for the Struggle against Terrorism' of 1991, or other articles of the Penal Code. In spite of Turkey's international commitments under the European Declaration of Human Rights and other international instruments, governments have not acted to end such prosecutions, are not likely to do so unless an effective and stable administration is established which can take some bold and badly needed steps. At the same time, foreign critics have to approach the topic carefully, recognising that stridently anti-Turkish campaigns are likely to be counter-productive, and that progress will probably be slow and incremental, rather than sudden and dramatic.

The recent departure of Abdullah Ocalan from Syria, and the apparent scaling down of PKK attacks in the south-east, suggest that the military phase of the Kurdish problem may be gradually ending. The Turkish army's unwritten alliance with Masud Barzani, the dominant leader in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq, is also strengthening its position against the PKK. This tosses the ball into the politicians' court, though how they will react is uncertain. Several long-discussed moves - notably the withdrawal of the state of emergency regime in the remaining south-eastern provinces where it is still applied, and the ending of the 'village guards' system which has reportedly led to some flagrant abuses, will then become prominent items on the agenda. A serious effort to overcome the economic backwardness of the south-east would also be an important element in new policies. In all this, much will depend on the policies of the pro-Kurdish party, HaDeP, and whether it is allowed to compete in the forthcoming local and national elections. Certainly, the leadership of the party seems anxious to distance itself from the PKK, and to claim that it does not seek to undermine the territorial integrity of Turkey.³⁴ Its principal problem is that many of its grass roots-supporters, though far from all, are also supporters of the PKK, so that the leadership has to tread a fine line between avoiding closure by the courts, and not alienating part of its support base.³⁵

How Kurdish voters are likely to behave in the next elections is, as usual, a mystery, as opinion polling in the south-east is very difficult and unreliable. However, some reports suggest that Fazilet is losing ground among the Turkish Kurds, as the previous Refah-led government failed to deliver on its promises to them. If so, then this should redound to the benefit of HaDeP, assuming it is allowed to run, and especially if the electoral law is altered (see above). The CHP is also likely to be a beneficiary, since it has relatively liberal policies on the language issue and the withdrawal of the present quasi-military regime in the region (whether it would implement them may be another matter). Anap, DYP and even MHP will probably retain some Kurdish support, through the exploitation of local patronage and tribal networks, plus some outright coercion. In the 1995 elections, Refah did well among Kurds settled in the poorer districts of the industrial cities of the west, which now probably account for about half the Kurdish population. Fazilet may well retain this support, but it is argued that many voters in this section of the electorate do not politically identify themselves as Kurds, so analysis is difficult.

³⁴ See for instance, the speech of the party's chairman, Murat Bozlak, at HaDeP's third national convention, on 1 November 1998, as reported in *Milliyet* on the following day.

³⁵ Henri J. Barkey, 'The People's Democracy Party (HADEP): the Travails of a Legal Kurdish Party in Turkey', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 18 (1998) pp. 135-36. There is now a substantial literature in English on Turkey's Kurdish problem: see, in particular, Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth Wintow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: an Example of Trans-state Ethnic Conflict* (London, Cass, 1997); Michael M. Gunter, *The Kurds and the Future of Turkey* (London, Macmillan, 1997) and Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question* (Lanham, Md., Rowman and Littlefield, for Carnegie Commission for Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1998).

(e) *Corruption, political culture and an emergent civil society*

As the earlier part of this paper tried to suggest, the apparent penetration by parts of the state structure by organised crime, and its links with prominent politicians, is likely to strike many Turks as an equally serious threat to the democratic regime as Islamist radicalism or PKK terrorism. Public reaction has naturally not been lacking, as there have been constant calls by the media for a 'clean society', and claims that they are also trying to achieve it by party leaders. More concretely, an independent association, the 'Public Initiative for Enlightenment', which was set up after the Susurluk crash, has called for an 'Emergency Action Package' of new legislation to combat organised crime, including increased prison sentences for mafia leaders, the lifting of the parliamentary immunity of all MPs involved with them, and more independence and resources to be granted to the judiciary.³⁶ Almost certainly, a post-election government will be under strong pressure to implement such a programme, and will have done democratic government a serious disservice if it fails to do so.

Broadening this theme, Ersin Kalaycıoğlu characterises the present party system as one of 'amoral partyism'. As he puts it, 'the Turkish political elite plays by rules based on very short term interest calculations', exploiting a neo-patrimonial network in which parties stay in government mainly to reward their clients with emoluments drawn from the state budget. He argues that their supporters are not worried by the politicians' lack of fiscal rectitude, so long as they receive their rewards: the politicians for their part, are happy to do deals with the leaders of other parties, with whom they share few ideological objectives, simply to stay in power, producing unworkable governments.³⁷ Other commentators have doubted whether public opinion will force the elite to uproot gangsterism, on the grounds that this would 'damage the state', which still holds a dominant and autonomous position in Turkish political culture.³⁸

Whether this situation will change, or is already changing, is the subject of much speculation. On the one hand, most existing accounts of Turkish political culture have suggested a high degree of state dominance.³⁹ Civil society - that is, independent associations, pressure groups, the media, and the like - are held to be weak and ill-developed. A survey by Piar-Gallup in August 1997 found that only 10% of Turks were members of any social, cultural or professional organisation: civil society evidently still has some way to go, if defined in those terms. Nonetheless, experience suggests that although there may still be a cultural attachment to the strong state paradigm, the state has actually grown notably weaker

³⁶ *Briefing*, 12 October 1998, p. 9.

³⁷ Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, 'The Logic of Contemporary Turkish Politics', *MERIA Journal* (see n.31) Vol. 1, no.3 (September 1997).

³⁸ E.g., Kemal Kirişçi, speaking in 'Roundtable: Kemal Kirişçi and Bülent Aras, Four Questions on Recent Turkish Politics and Foreign Policy', *ibid.* Vol.2 no.1 (March 1998)

³⁹ E.g., Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Washington, Eothen Press, 1985); Ergun Özbudun, 'State Elites and Democratic Political Culture in Turkey', in Larry Diamond, ed., *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries* (Boulder, Col., Lynne Rienner, 1993). For possible alternative approaches, see Nilüfer Gole, 'Towards an Autonomization of Politics and Civil Society in Turkey', in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic* (Boulder, Col., Westview, 1994). Jenny B. White argues that, in Turkey, voluntary associations and other forms of civic activities are often 'organised on the basis of mutual trust and interpersonal obligations, rather than on an individual, contractual membership basis': she emphasises, however, that there is a wide array of popular movements in working class districts of Istanbul, of which she gives examples: Jenny B. White, 'Civic Culture and Islam in Urban Turkey', in Chris Hann and Elizabeth Dunn, eds., *Civil Society: Challenging Western Models* (London, Routledge, 1996) pp. 143, 148-52.

since the 1950s. In the economy, the private sector is now the strongest and most dynamic element. Education, urbanisation, and the mass media have spawned a 'modern' network of autonomous structures, so that it is possible that Turkey may be moving towards a liberal system of pressure group politics. Most dramatically, the impressive and often spontaneous role played by the structures of a nascent civil society in protests against the Refahiyol government - such as civil rights societies, secularist pressure groups, women's associations, students, and organisations of both employers and labour - were a striking demonstration of what might turn out to be a more participatory, rather than supposedly representative democracy.⁴⁰ Meanwhile, the biggest task is to find a formula for the effective and stable mediation of relations between society and the state, since the political parties, which are supposed to play this role, are currently failing to perform the function effectively.

⁴⁰ This point has been developed by, for instance, E. Fuat Keyman as part of a 'radical democracy project': see his paper 'Globalleşme ve Türkiye: Radikal Demokrasi Olasılığı', in E. Fuat Keyman and A. Yaşar Sanıbay, eds., *Küreselleşme, Sivil Toplum ve İslam: Türkiye Üzerine Yansımalar*, (Ankara, Vadi Yayınları, 1997).

Appendix

TURKEY: THE PARLIAMENTARY BALANCE, 1995-98

Party	Distribution of Seats			
	General Elections Dec. 1995	Jul. 1996	Aug. 1997	Nov. 1998
Centre-right				
Motherland Party (Anap) (Mesut Yılmaz)	132	131	139	136
True Path Party (DYP) (Tansu Çiller)	135	128	92	96
Democratic Turkey Party (DTP) ¹ (Hüsamettin Cindoruk)	-	-	20	19
Centre-left				
Democratic Left Party (DSP) (Bülent Ecevit)	76	74	67	61
Republican People's Party (CHP) (Deniz Baykal)	49	49	49	55
Islamist				
Welfare Party (Refah) (Necmettin Erbakan)	158	158	151	-
Virtue Party (Fazilet) ² (Recai Kutan)	-	-	-	144
Others and independents³	-	10	30	28
Vacant	-	-	2	11 ⁴
Total	550	550	550	550

¹ Formed by defectors from the DYP who opposed the DYP-Refah coalition and Mrs Çiller's leadership, in July 1996.

² Formed by former members of Refah (officially excluding Mr Erbakan) following the dissolution of the party by the Constitutional Court in February 1998.

³ Currently (November 1998) includes Great Unity Party (BBP: defectors from Anap: current strength 8) plus Nationalist Action Party (MHP: current strength 3) plus 2 other parties and 14 independents (defectors from DYP and other parties).

⁴ Includes six vacancies caused by the exclusion from politics until 2003 of Necmettin Erbakan and five other former Refah MPs, ordered by the Constitutional Court in February 1998.

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STATE AND DEMOCRACY

by Hugh Poulton, November 1998

The political and administrative concept of Turkey as a centralised unitary state

The Turkish republic was set up in the aftermath of the collapse of the Ottoman empire in the First World War and the defeat by nationalist forces led by Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) of the Greek armies in the Greco-Turkish war of 1920-22. The Ottoman empire was a multi-national, multi-ethnic and multi-religious polity, which despite a growing emphasis in the last decades of its existence on the Turks as the main political element, was for most of its existence a polity in which the population was divided using religious rather than ethnic or linguistic criteria. This was the *millet* system. However, modern concepts of nationalism had progressively penetrated the empire in the 19th Century, beginning with the Orthodox Christian populations, leading to the gradual retreat of the empire in the Balkans and the setting up of successor 'national' states. By the time of the First World War the new creed of nationalism had begun to affect predominantly Muslim groups such as the Albanians and the Arabs as well as the Turks themselves.

The citizens of the new state, which roughly equated to the militarily defensible Anatolian heartland, were seen to be essentially the Muslim population of Anatolia. However, this population was itself divided in religious belief between Sunnis, those with Shiite tendencies (the Alevis) and a small secularised elite, as well between those who spoke differing mother-tongues: Turkish, Kurdish, Laz or other languages. There were also deep cleavages between the small urban elites and the traditional villagers, as well as between nomads and settled populations, and, especially in the east and southeast, tribal and non-tribal structures. It appears that Kemal initially saw the national movement as embracing Turks and Kurds (separately identified¹) and even went as far as to promise the Kurds autonomy in areas where they constituted substantial populations.² Kemal quickly introduced a number of sweeping reforms with the expressed aim of modernising the new state. These reforms included a new alphabet and change of script from Arabic to Latin, language reform, an attempt to relegate Islam to the private sphere and remove it as a potential political force — this despite Kemal's use of it in this manner in the resistance war as a rallying cry against the 'Christian' invaders — and the closing of all the *tarikats*. There were even laws regulating dress with the banning of certain headgear — usually Islamic in character — which were seen as symbols of reaction. Islam was clearly seen as a reactionary force and an obstacle

¹ His famous speech of October 1927, *Nutuk*, in which he explained and justified his actions in the liberation struggle, repeatedly refers to the Kurds as separate from the Turks.

² This reportedly happened at a meeting in İzmit in 1923, but the Sheikh Said revolt in 1925 (see below) resulted in all references to this promise subsequently being censored from official accounts of the meeting. See 2000'e Doğru, 1978, no. 35, and 1988, no. 46, and Baskın Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği: Resmi İdeoloji Dışı Bir İnceleme*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 3rd edn, 1993), p. 211.

to modernisation. Although the state progressively viewed itself as a secular one³ there was never any real separation of state and religion. On the contrary, the Kemalist state continued and amplified the late Ottoman practice of incorporating the official urban *ulema* into the central state authority.

There were strong reactions against the sweeping reforms especially in the east where Sunni Kurds led by Sheik Said rose in mass revolt in 1925 even before the bulk of the reforms came about. Although this revolt appears to have been essentially religious rather than ethnically Kurdish, Kemal backtracked on previous hints at including the Kurds as a separate component of the new state. Instead, a conscious attempt was made to inculcate Turkish nationalism as the primary focus of political loyalty for all citizens. To achieve this, the central institutions of the state, including the educational system and the army, were used. As Islam was now relegated to the private sphere, the new state's nationalism began to exhibit a strong 'ethnic' component.⁴ The entire Ottoman period was effectively negated. Instead, the state ideologues looked back, in classic nationalist fashion, to a mythologised 'golden era'— in this case to pre-Islamic Turkish history. Strong social and other pressure was brought to bear to make all citizens speak Turkish as their mother tongue. The state only recognised the small religious minorities as guaranteed in the 1923 Lausanne Treaty.⁵ All manifestations of ethnic difference between Turkish and non-Turkish Muslims were taboo and the Kurds were referred to officially as 'mountain Turks', and penalties were levied against the use of Kurdish language. Although anything between 40,000 and 250,000 died when the Said revolt was put down, and Ankara decided to forcibly remove large numbers of Kurds from the area, revolts in the Kurdish areas continued. Mass deportations and an official policy of settlement by Turks continued throughout the 1930s and the army was engaged in almost permanent fighting with rebels.⁶ The Kemalist catch-phrase 'What happiness to call oneself a Turk', was displayed in all schools and army barracks throughout the country, as well as being prominently displayed in public places.

³ The Caliphate was abolished in 1924 but the new constitution did emphasise the central place of Islam in Articles 2 and 26. Article 2 stated that 'The State religion of Turkey is the Muslim religion', while Article 26 mentioned the *Şeriat* as the holy law. Kemal himself saw this as a purely temporary measure "to satisfy the exigencies of the time. When the first favourable opportunity arises the nation must eliminate these superfluities from our Constitution." *Nutuk*, vol. 2 p.328.

⁴ The two classic models for nationalism are the 'territorial' and 'ethnic' models. The territorial model is essentially an inclusive one whereby all those within a particular territory (and not anybody outside) are seen as members of the nation, while the ethnic model views as members all those sharing certain characteristics (language, culture or whatever) as belonging regardless of where they live. This latter model tends to be exclusive as it rejects those without the necessary defining characteristics even if they have resided in the actual state territory for considerable time. France is often held up as the classic territorial model, while Germany is seen as the classic ethnic model. The 'French' model tends to negate any concept of minorities within the state viewing all members (in theory at least) as 'Frenchmen/women' or whatever, and correspondingly is essentially assimilatory in practice.

⁵ These were viewed with official distrust and have been subjected to repeated pressures. As a result the number of Greek Orthodox citizens in Turkey fell from some 100,000 at the time of Lausanne, to some 10,000 in 1974 and today numbers only a few thousand.

⁶ Especially in Dersim (now Tunceli) which remained outside of government control until 1938 and under martial law until 1946. David McDowall, *The Kurds: A Nation Denied*, (London: MRG, 1992), p. 38.

The Kemalist state was, despite short-lived experiments like the setting up of the Free Party in 1930, a one-party state ruled by the Republican People's Party (CHF — CHP after 1935). The 1930s saw a *Gleichschaltung* of political and cultural life, in which the CHP party-state took over all forms of political and cultural activity, and the official ideology was propagated through the education system. There was national conscription of all males which was used in a similar role as a 'builder of the nation'. However, the state was not totalitarian in the manner of Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, and while the elites dominated in the urban centres, people in the country-side continued to live in the main according to traditional norms. These were usually Islamic but in areas in the east tribal as well.

Thus, the Kemalist state was a strongly centralised unitary state in which the only officially recognised minorities were small religious ones as per the Lausanne Treaty. All concepts of ethnic groups other than 'Turks' was taboo. Assimilation was deliberately used to overcome ethnic differences. In this Turkey can be seen as following perceived 'modern' norms of the time,⁷ and despite penalties and other pressures brought against those expressing other identities, there was no 'ethnic' bar to Kurds and others rising to top posts in the bureaucracy as long as they abandoned their own culture and adopted the state approved Turkish model. This model remains essentially unchanged to the present day. This unitary nation-state model, which often includes a strong army to protect national boundaries, has recently gone out of fashion. The new concepts refer to the late or high-modern state where there is: greater emphasis on cultural diversity and multi-culturalism, regionalism (Catalonia, Wales etc); greater international freedom of movement; a multi-national economy operating on a global scale; the communications revolution which has seen the ending of the old 'modern' state's monopoly on media (and education); the beginnings of a 'global' morality based on liberal free-market capitalism and human rights; and the progress towards trans-national units like the European Union (i.e the end of the nation-state). In this climate, minorities are seen as potentially a good thing, and instead of 'benign neglect' (which can often lead to assimilation over usually two to three generations as without help the minority culture is clearly at a serious disadvantage vis-a-vis the dominant culture) the new thinking (since the end of the 1980s) is one where the state should actively support minority cultures. This is expressed in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic of Minorities of 1992; and more recently by the Council of Europe's Framework Convention on the rights of minorities.

Turkey post-1950 as a multi-party polity

When the one-party system was dismantled in the late-1940s and the 1950s, and democratic practices began to take root, the continuing Islamic sensibilities of the large majority of the population began to make themselves evident. To win elections, politicians needed to take this into account. The classic Kemalist elite attitude of ignoring religious sensibilities and dictating

⁷ This view fitted the prevailing wisdom of the times concerning 'the modern state' which was seen as being a unitary homogenised polity with guaranteed **individual** rights for all (non-discrimination, equality before the law etc) but not really for minorities. The ideal was the nation-state where the nation (however defined) coexisted completely with the state (i.e. all one nation live in one state without any minorities). In such a state everybody shared a common culture usually propagated by a centralised education system and other methods like the army (**national** conscription). The 'modern state' looked to be secular and industrialised and often seen as the French model.

cultural norms to the masses became increasingly untenable, and it is noticeable that since 1950, the secular Kemalist CHP and its successors have never won an outright majority of the electorate. At the same time, mass migration from the country-side to the urban centres began to change traditional attitudes for the first time. This process had two contradictory sides: on the one hand, the mass of the population began truly to be subjected to the centre's nationalist ideology. On the other, the centre itself had to take into account the (Sunni) Islamic wishes of the majority. These wishes included state support for mosque construction as well as for religious education in schools. However, overt politicisation of Islam remained taboo and parties seen as too radically Islamic were banned and dissolved.⁸ Thus, the parameters were set. Islam could be used to bolster electoral support but it had to be subordinated to Kemalist republicanism.

The role and function of the Turkish army in political life

Since Ottoman times the army has seen itself as a progressive force. Despite Kemal's partial withdrawal of the military from politics, it continued — and continues to this day to see itself as the ultimate guarantor of Kemalist norms and ideology. The army has remains among the most trusted institution in Turkey with some 80% of the population consistently viewing it as such in public opinion polls. In the single party period, the close association of the army with Kemalist norms proved unproblematic. However, the multi-party period and the subsequent failure of the CHP — the main political party claiming to represent Kemalist secularist norms — ever to win a majority of votes in elections was different. The military has repeatedly intervened directly in the political process whenever it feels that political forces are seriously challenging what it considers to be Kemal's legacy, or whenever it considers that politicians are not properly representing the nations' interests, as viewed by the army high command. This happened in 1960 with the coup against Adnan Menderes and subsequent 17 months of military rule, which saw the drafting of the 1961 Constitution. It happened again in 1971 with the 12 March 'coup-by-memorandum' which ousted Süleyman Demirel from power and ushered in close military control until 1973. As well as these periods of overt military control, there were other radical forces within the military⁹ who wanted the army to take an even more active role.

The 1980 Military Coup and its aftermath: the role of the National Security Council (MGK)

The 1970s were a decade of great political turbulence in Turkey with anti-systemic armed groups from both ends of the political spectrum fighting each other on the streets. The situation was exacerbated by a succession of seemingly powerless weak coalition governments. The violence dramatically escalated throughout the decade. On 12 September 1980 the military authorities stepped in to end the anarchy — apparently with a large degree of public support. The ensuing military regime of 1980-83, closed down all political parties and banned their leaders from political life. Large numbers of activists, especially those seen as left-wing, were imprisoned

⁸ For example the 1954 closing of the Nation Party which was accused of exploiting Islam for political ends and calling for a return of *Şeriat*.

⁹ Like Talat Aydemir who attempted coups in February 1962 and again on 20 May 1963. For the latter attempt he was executed on 5 July 1964. There were two other coup attempts in 1971 led by and navy First Lieutenant Sarp Kuray and Major Atif Ercikan who both attempted coups in 1971 supported by young Kemalists in the armed forces.

and many tortured. Unlike previous army interventions in 1960 and 1971, when military control was of limited duration, this time the military seemed determined to remain in power long enough to cement changes in attitudes and avert a repetition of the anarchy of the late 1970s. The regime oversaw the drafting and implementation of the 1982 Constitution, which remains in force today.

Despite the army seeing itself as the bastion of Kemalism, it appears that the military rulers concluded that a lack of religious instruction in Turkey's youth had resulted in a proliferation of anti-systemic ideologies such as Marxist-Leninism and fascism. Correspondingly, Article 24 of the Constitution stated that; "Instruction in religious culture and moral education shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools." However, this state-propagated religion was not seen as a recipe for rampant Islamism, and the same article underlined that such practice could not violate the secular nature of the state. The new emphasis on Sunni Islam as social cement was clearly seen by the military as subordinated to Kemalist republican norms. This policy was widely known as the 'Turkish-Islamic synthesis' which aimed to merge Turkishness with moderate Sunni Islam.

This period saw the National Security Council (MGK) come to the fore. This body was established under Article 111 of the 1962 Constitution 'to assist the Council of Ministers in reaching decisions related to national security and coordination'. It comprises the chiefs of general military staff as well as the President and Prime Minister. Its powers were greatly enhanced in 1962 to provide 'preparatory and advisory assistance' to the government to assure 'coordination between organisations working in the fields of internal and external security.' Henceforth, the MGK was able to directly interfere in the political process under the guise of protecting 'national security', as defined by itself. After the coup, the civilian members of the MGK were purged and it became, in effect, the government. The 1982 Constitution set up a Presidential Council composed of the ruling MGK, with powers to examine laws passed by parliament and to advise the president (at that time coup leader General Evren). This body was wound up in November 1989 as per the timetable laid down in the Constitutional. The MGK, however, has remained with its powers intact. Another facet of the new Constitution was that the COGS remained answerable to the President not the Minister of Defence. Thus, policies concerning defence and matters of internal security were effectively removed from governmental control.

The return to democracy within restrictions on freedom of expression

In 1983, despite the military's stated preference to the contrary, the electorate voted in Turgut Özal's Motherland Party (Anap) as ruling party. Özal, partly of Kurdish extraction and a devout Sunni Muslim - he had personal affiliation to the Nakşibendi sufi sect - ushered in a number of far-reaching reforms including the opening up of Turkish economy through privatisation. Although many giant state enterprises remained, the privatisation was especially noticeable in the cultural field with the monopoly by the state of broadcasted and printed media broken. As a result a plethora of Islamic publications and cassettes became available. The new climate allowed the Islamic Welfare Party (RP) of Necmettin Erbakan — the successor to the banned National Salvation Party of the 1970s — to widen its appeal and become a mass party apparently operating just within the constitutional limits allowed regarding overt Islamism. At the same time

the Ministry of Religious Affairs responsible for overseeing Sunni Islam greatly expanded. Mosque construction carried on a pace with an average of some 1,500 built each year by the end of the 1980s. Many extra-curricula Koran schools were opened. The state continued to exert its central control over Islam by, among other methods, issuing central instructions for the content of *hocas* weekly sermons.

Özal also oversaw the relaxation on the restrictions on the private use of Kurdish which occurred by the end of the 1980s. Law 2932 of 1983 which in conjunction with Article 26 of the Constitution had penalised the use of Kurdish, was finally abolished in April 1991 along with Articles 142,143 and 163 of the Turkish Penal Code penalising Marxist and Islamic political activity. However, the Law to Fight Terrorism of April 1991 once more penalised freedom of expression (see below). In mid-1992 the ban on pre-1980 coup political parties and their leaders was lifted after a referendum, and leading politicians like former prime ministers Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit as well as Erbakan returned to open political activity.¹⁰ However, the political system remained to a large degree open to influence and control by the military through the National Security Council.

The Kurdish Issue and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)

As noted above, Kemalism viewed Turkey as a centralised unitary state and was very antithetical towards all concepts of minorities within the country with the exception of religious ones recognised by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. This policy has remained a constant. Since the advent of multi-part politics since 1950, any party which openly campaigns for Kurdish causes has faced closure, often with its leaders being prosecuted. In 1984, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), an extreme left-wing group set up by Abdullah Öcalan in 1978 in a village near Diyarbakır, began armed attacks on Turkish security forces mainly in the south-east of the country. Since then the conflict has dramatically escalated and has claimed some 27,000 lives.

What the PKK aims are remains problematic. The Turkish authorities perennially refer to it as a 'separatist' and 'terrorist' organisation. It certainly uses terror as one of its methods. Regarding separatism, the founding programme drawn up by Öcalan and associates in 1977 clearly called for an independent Kurdistan which it saw as being divided into four regions by the 'exploiting countries: Syria, Iraq, Iran and Turkey.' Subsequently however, Öcalan became ambivalent on the PKK aims: at times calling for an independent Kurdistan and at others for a Belgian-style federal solution within Turkey. Currently the PKK and Öcalan himself reject secession completely. Given that huge numbers of Kurds have in the last few decades, along with all other sections of the population, migrated to the western cities like Istanbul, it could be argued that the population is so mixed that any partition along ethnic lines would be impossible without massive ethnic cleansing.¹¹

¹⁰ In the meantime they had continued to pull the strings behind post-coup mass parties.

¹¹ Additionally, Turks and Kurds share many close similarities and inter-marriage is common — unlike e.g. the case with Albanians and Orthodox Slavs whether the latter be Serbs or Macedonians.

To counter the threat from the PKK, the Özal government set up the Village Guard system in May 1985 whereby local villagers were armed and seen as an extension of the security forces. At this time the PKK still lacked mass support. However, it appears that in 1987 the authorities embarked on a more active policy and a state of emergency was set up in eight (in May 1990 two more were added) provinces of the south-east¹² and the Village Guard system expanded. Concomitant with this expansion was an increase in repressive measures by the authorities which seemed to greatly aid PKK recruitment by alienating many Kurds. At the same time, the PKK also committed numerous gross human rights abuses targeting all those it saw as agents of the state: the military; the Jandarma (Military police in rural areas); the police; Village Guards and their families as well as teachers and other state employees. These abuses, despite alienating many Kurds, escalated government reprisals and state terror which bolstered support for the PKK. PKK support was further increased after March 1990 when the National Security Council decided on full-scale evacuation of villages to create a 'security buffer zone'.¹³ This policy, begun under the government of Tansu Çiller, saw the forcible evacuation and destruction of over three thousand Kurdish villages and hamlets, often carried out with great brutality and disregard for human rights, with houses burnt and mass detention of villagers in appalling conditions. It reached a peak in 1994.¹⁴ As a result huge numbers of people have fled to the towns of the region or out of the area completely. To some extent the continuing state repression has reduced PKK effectiveness in the region.

Restrictions on the expression of Kurdishness

While there has been slow improvement since the end of the 1980s and the lifting in 1991 of the outlawing of all use of the Kurdish language, restrictions remain especially in the field of broadcasting. Currently Kurdish publications are legal (although most are repeatedly subject to sanctions for political reasons) as are the broadcasting of Kurdish music but spoken Kurdish remains taboo on the airwaves. The Turkish authorities have repeatedly attempted to end satellite broadcasts by MED-TV, set up in March 1995 with its headquarters in Brussels and broadcasting from London under license of the UK's Independent Television Commission (ITC). Although MED-TV broadcasts in Turkish and other languages besides Kurdish, it is essentially a Kurdish programme and currently plays a crucial role in propagating Kurdish culture and consciousness

¹² The original eight provinces in Decree 285 of 10 July 1987 were: Bingöl, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, Tunceli and Van, while Batman and Şırnak provinces were added by Decree 246 of 18 May 1990. In 1998 the measure was lifted from Bingöl, Batman, Elazığ and Mardin.

¹³ The fighting force of the PKK rose from about 3,000 armed militants at this time to 13,000 by November 1992 plus a reserve pool of 45-50,000 in the southeast underlining the relationship between state repression and PKK support — see İsmet G. İmset, *The PKK: A report on Separatist Violence in Turkey (1973-1992)*.

¹⁴ Human Rights Minister Azimet Köylüoğlu, who called the destruction 'state terrorism' stated on 11 October 1994 that 2 million people had been displaced during the previous ten years and that 600 villages and 790 hamlets had been evacuated — over half since the beginning of 1993. In January 1994 the İHD reported that some 1,500 villages or hamlets had been evacuated or destroyed. In July 1997 Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit announced that 3,185 villages and hamlets had been evacuated.

both within Turkey and other neighbouring Kurdish areas and in the Diaspora. The Turkish authorities view MED-TV as supportive of the PKK and have repeatedly protested to the ITC and to the British government about the station. In 1996 a number of countries refused to renew MED-TV contract apparently due to Turkish pressure, and in September there were simultaneous raids on its offices in London and Brussels. In January 1998 MED-TV was fined for breaching ITC programme codes for three programmes shown in 1997. The Turkish authorities periodically engages in illegal jamming of its signals.

Within Turkey, cultural associations created to promote Kurdish language and culture are legal but in practice face official censure and pressure. The main such organisation, the Mesopotamian Cultural Centre (MKM) has branches throughout the country, but the second half of 1997 witnessed police pressure on MKM branches in Adana, Mersin, Şanlı Urfa and Diyarbakır. This highlights the problem that although Kurdish plays and music performances are not illegal per se, the authorities tend to view such actions as suspect, and performers are at times prosecuted for the content of songs which are construed to promote Kurdish separatism.

Political Islam in relation to state and society

As noted above, Kemal attempted to remove Islam from the political agenda. However, the advent of multi-party politics saw it once more return, albeit within closely controlled limits. Turkey's population remains overwhelmingly Sunni Islamic by religion. As such many main stream political parties have attempted to tap into the religious sensibilities of the population to achieve electoral support. In addition there have been a number of attempts to set up overtly Islamic political parties. These have repeatedly run foul of successive constitutional and penal sanctions forbidding such parties. Despite these sanctions, the Islamic political movement has continued in a number of different guises and names, garnering support from the discontented and uprooted villagers who moved to the squatter settlements of the big cities. Under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan — himself a member of the technocratic élite — it took part in weak governmental coalitions in the 1970s. Despite this participation in government, it remained electorally weak until the 1980s. This period saw the ushering in under Özal of greater opportunities for public expression and the ending of the state's monopoly on the means of expression. At the same time, a new generation of university-educated Islamic intellectuals appeared who were adept at taking advantage of the new situation. They were also adept at arguing their views in opposition to the old secular Kemalist élites. As a result, the Islamic Welfare Party (RP) managed to break out of its seemingly electoral prison and become a truly mass party challenging the main political groupings. It succeeded in even capturing the mayoralties of Ankara and Istanbul, and in December 1995 becoming the largest political party in Turkey with some 21% of the national vote allowing Erbakan to become Prime Minister in a coalition government with the DYP.

This growth in Islamic political influence saw the old secular élites experience something akin to panic. This was compounded by the appearance of radical Islamic groups willing to murder those they saw as enemies of their vision of society. The old élites were long used to dictating their vision of Turkish identity and culture unopposed. Now they were faced with an adversary

which they thought that modernisation would sweep away, but which, on the contrary, was both growing, and adept at using the new technological opportunities afforded by this modernisation.¹⁵ The RP also showed itself adept at grass-roots organisation and support for its members — this in marked contrast to some other mass parties whose local administrations became by-words for corruption and venality.

The struggle can also be seen as an economic one between the old élites based in Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara, and the new ones coming out of the conservative Anatolian heartland where a number of cities are becoming prosperous centres. These new élites are RP supporters and are challenging the old economic élites who are virtually part of the state. Turkey remains a polity where state patronage is a key factor in economic life. The Özal era of the late 1980s which saw a rise of new élites in the western centres who competed with the old Kemalist ones who tended to be centred on the bureaucracy. However the new Özal élites were still linked to the all powerful state, with many companies on the Istanbul stock exchange being state companies (i.e. public companies ruled by bureaucrats). Turkey today is characterised by the huge gap between the new 'haves' and the mass of impoverished others in squatter settlements, many of whom turned to RP both as a means of support as well as a protest. Thus there is a competition underway which is dressed up in Islamic clothes but is really about money and power, with the RP being the political representative of new rising societal forces. Either way, the MGK forced Erbakan out of office in June 1997 and the RP was banned by the Constitutional Court in January 1998. Just prior to the banning the Constitutional Court scrapped Article 103 of the Political Parties Law which stipulated that a party should be warned of unconstitutionality before banning. Furthermore, Erbakan and other RP leaders were banned from political life for five years and criminal prosecutions begun against some for speeches they had made.

Restrictions on political activity

Political parties which openly espouse politicised Islam like the RP, the Kurdish issue or radical left-wing views face censure for being unconstitutional and a number of such parties have been banned. In the last 15 years or so there have been a number of attempts to set up legal Kurdish parties which would run for election in parliament. The People's Labour Party (HEP) was formed in 1990 by seven members of parliament expelled from the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) for attending a conference in Paris in November 1989 on the Kurdish situation. These seven, along with three other SHP deputies established HEP on 7 June 1990. However SHP reabsorbed HEP just prior to the October 1991 election in a deal which allowed the Kurdish members to stand under the SHP umbrella¹⁶ and which bolstered SHP showing in Kurdish areas. The tensions inherent in the deal surfaced almost immediately when several of the new deputies took the parliamentary oath, which declares allegiance to Turkey as an indivisible state, in

¹⁵ For example, the RP was noted for its use of computer bases to target its voters.

¹⁶ Turkey has an electoral barrier which necessitates a party gaining at least 10% of the national vote to qualify for seats in parliament.

Kurdish rather than Turkish. A number of them eventually left SHP to re-establish HEP in 1992. HEP was subsequently closed by the Supreme Court for 'functioning with the intention of destroying the indivisible integrity of the state and nation' on 14 July 1993. To circumvent this ban, a new party the Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP) was founded in November 1992. This was also closed on 30 April 1993 and formerly banned on 23 November for 'making separatist propaganda'. Before ÖZDEP was banned, another party the Democracy Party (DEP) was formed on 7 May 1993 by 18 Kurdish deputies. DEP was similarly banned by the Constitutional Court on 16 June 1994, and this allowed 13 deputies whose parliamentary immunity had been lifted, to be charged with treason. Six fled to Belgium and the rest were sentenced to up to 15 years' imprisonment on 8 December 1994. Four of them remained detained. Another DEP deputy, Mehemt Sincar, was shot dead on 6 September 1994 in circumstances implicating the security forces. HEP was succeeded by the People's Democratic Party (HADEP), which was founded on 11 May 1994 and experienced much the same hostility from the state as its predecessors.

The state has constantly accused these parties of links with the PKK. Such charges are hard to assess, especially as little hard evidence is produced. However, even parties like that of former Minister of Public Works, Serafettin Elçi, a Kurd by origin, to set up a pro-Kurdish party clearly without any links to the PKK have been thwarted, and his Democratic Mass Party (DKP) prosecuted in June 1997 under Article 81 of the Political Parties Law concerning 'preventing the creation of minorities'.

HEP was succeeded by the current main Kurdish party, the People's Democratic Party (HADEP), founded on 11 May 1994 which while still legal has been subjected to a variety of pressures including the prosecution of its leaders on a number of charges and the closure of some of its branches in the southeast. Left-wing parties which espouse any form of communism even if non-violently have been banned. All these bans appear to be flagrant breaches of the European Convention to which Turkey is a party. The RP has stated that it will appeal to the European Commission and Court against its closure. In January 1998 the European Court unanimously found a violation of the Convention regarding the dissolution of the United Communist Party of Turkey (TBKP) by the Turkish Constitutional Court in July 1991 for calling for a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question.¹⁷ Again in May 1998 the Court ruled unanimously that Turkey had violated Article 11 of the Convention by closing the Socialist Party in 1988 for once more calling for a non-violent solution to the Kurdish question.¹⁸

Civil Society

Civil society is a key feature of modern pluralist democracies. It relates to sectors of society outside of control of the state. While it is usually used in the singular, in modern states it is not

¹⁷ European Court of Human Rights, TBKP v Turkey, judgement, Strasbourg 30 January 1998.

¹⁸ European Court of Human Rights, Case no 20/1977/804/1007, judgment, Strasbourg 25 May 1988.

and should not be monolithic — on the contrary it is a milieu whereby different groups with varying opinions can both express their views as well as exerting influence on the ideology and practice of the state. In this, civil society is a key counterbalance to the state centre in the liberal political system. As noted, the modern state appears to be evolving into one where diversity expressed through non-violent methods is seen more as a positive factor and less as a negative one.

The Turkish state has, as noted above, attempted to retain key features of the early Kemalist period, notably a centralised unitary ideology concerning nation and state, and a distrust of all forms of activity, whether they be for example primarily ethnic or religious — which it perceives a threat to this. The military especially is inimitable to all forms of expression other than the official Kemalist line. As such the Turkish polity is inimitable to civil society *per se*. There remains in Turkey a strong deference to the all-powerful state — *Devlet Baba* — which is the source of so much patronage and power. To some extent this is a continuation of the Ottoman period whereby the state (personified in the Sultan) was all powerful without competition from a hereditary nobility as in the western Europe.¹⁹ Additionally there were no major economic forces outside of the state to rival its power. In the field of the press and media, it is noticeable that the press centre was set up in areas adjacent to, and under the control of, the central authorities, rather than in for example London or Paris adjacent to the independent money centres of the city of London or the Bourse.

However, Turkish society is not, despite the wishes of the military and others, a homogenised block. It is divided along lines of religious belief (including those without religious belief at all), class, ethnicity, city and country etc. As noted, the RP can be seen as the political manifestation of Sunni Islamic conservative Anatolian society competing with other interest groups for power. Such a struggle, when it is conducted in a formalised and non-violent manner is in many ways the essence of pluralist democracy: similarly, expressions of minority identity and culture. The continuing pressure by the central state on all form of such differences are eloquent illustrations of the essential hostility to pluralism within Turkey.

Despite this hostility, civil society is beginning to grow in Turkey, especially in the main cities like Istanbul. Manifestations of this growth are the actions of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) like those detailed in section 9.3. An other manifestation is the civil disobedience campaign undertaken by writers and intellectuals to support freedom of expression in Turkey. This began in earnest in reaction to the trial which began on 23 January 1995 of Yaşar Kemal — perhaps Turkey's most famous writer — by the Istanbul State Security Court (DGM) for an article published in *Der Spiegel* magazine in Germany. Within a short time a petition on his behalf signed by 1,080 Turkish intellectuals had been collected, and the signatories co-published a volume entitled *Düşünceye Özgürlük* ("Freedom of Expression") and voluntarily presented themselves to the DGM prosecutor to similar charges as Kemal. Such actions have been repeated

¹⁹ At times when the centre in the form of the Sultan was weak, local magnates could and did create regional power bases. However, from the time of Mahmud II in the 19th century the centre retained its control.

at regular intervals in an attempt to highlight the current legal restriction on non-violent freedom of expression. On 15 March 1998 a two-day march in selected places between Istanbul and Ankara by NGOs and actors in support of freedom of expression in Turkey began. In February and early March 1997, a mass popular movement called "a minute of darkness" spread across the country as citizens turned off their household lights in protest at the allegations of complicity and corruption in high places revealed by the Susurluk affair (see below). Lawyer Esber Yağmurdereli organised a campaign to collect one million signatures to highlight the Kurdish conflict and handed the petition to the Speaker of parliament in mid-1997.²⁰

The 1982 Constitution and the legal framework

As noted, the Constitution was introduced by the military after the 1980 coup. It contained many articles which severely restricted democratic political activity. In July 1995, 16 amendments were ratified by the national assembly which removed both the references in the preamble praising the military intervention of 12 September 1980 as well as many of these undemocratic articles. For example, henceforth trade unions, cooperatives, associations, foundations and vocational institutions were allowed to participate directly in the political process, and university teachers and students were now able to join political parties.

However, these changes only effectively related to previous restrictions on political activity by specific groups, and some basic principles which clearly infringe the right to non-violent freedom of expression remain, as well as others which have been used as the basis for repressing free expression. The Constitution includes unalterable basic principles enumerated in Articles 2 and 3 which state that Turkey is a "secular state" and that its "territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish". These principles have been used to close down political parties for being "unconstitutional" for either allegedly being anti-secular or for espousing a Kurdish national consciousness, regardless of whether violence was used or advocated. Furthermore, Article 13 allows for the restriction by law of fundamental rights and freedoms in order to "safeguard the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation...", while Article 14 states that none of the constitutional rights and freedoms may be "exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation". This article forbids any action aimed at "establishing the hegemony of one social class over others, or creating discrimination on the basis of language, race, religion or sect, or of establishing by any other means a system of government based on these concepts and ideas". Article 24 dealing with "Freedom of Religion and Conscience" forbids the exploitation of religion "in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of personal or political influence, or for even partially basing the fundamental, societal, economic, political, and legal order of the State".

Article 26, dealing with "Freedom of Expression and Dissemination of Thought", states, *inter alia*, "[n]o language prohibited by law shall be used in the expression and dissemination of

²⁰ *Human Rights Watch 1998 Annual Report*, p 283

thought" and calls for seizure of all offending materials. The application of this provision in conjunction with Law 2932 of 1983 which declared the mother tongue of Turkish citizens to be Turkish resulted in the use of the Kurdish language being penalised for over a decade. Article 27 of the Constitution dealing with "Freedom of Science and Arts" forbade scientific or artistic dissemination which could be used to change Articles 1,2 and 3 of the Constitution.²¹

Article 28 deals with "Provisions relating to the Press and Publication". It begins by stating that "[t]he press is free, and shall not be censored". However, it then goes on to enumerate a number of limitations including forbidding publication "in any language prohibited by law"; or "any news or articles which threaten the internal or external security of the State or the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation". It also allows the seizure and temporary suspension by court order of publications which endanger or contravene this same "indivisible integrity".

Article 120 also allows the 'Declaration of a State of Emergency on Account of Widespread Acts of Violence and Serious Deterioration of Public Order'. Currently such provision covers six provinces in the southeast (see sect, and Article 148 exempts from control by the Constitutional Court all decrees issued during a state of emergency. In addition, provisional Article 15 stipulates that "[n]o allegation of unconstitutionality shall be made in respect of decisions or measures taken under laws or decrees having force enacted" in the period from 12 September 1980 when the military took power to the first post-coup general elections in 1983. This measure covers 426 laws which are thus deemed to be outside of the constitutional control. A proposal to amend this article in the Constitutional amendment package of July 1995 was rejected by the national assembly.

Although Article 125 allows recourse to judicial review against all actions of the state administration, the same article exempts "acts of the President of the Republic in his own competence, and the decision of the Supreme Military Council" from judicial review. In 1997, The Supreme Military Council (YAS) summarily dismissed 306 officers and non-commissioned officers from the military apparently for their religious (Islamic) views although reportedly they were not informed of the actual charges.

Article 174, dealing with the "Preservation of Reform Laws" states, that no provision of the constitution can be interpreted as rendering unconstitutional a number of laws dating from the early republican period "which aim to raise Turkish society above the level of contemporary civilisation and to safeguard the secular character of the Republic". These include Act No 671 of 25 November 1925 "on the Wearing of Hats", and Act No 2596 of 3 December 1934 on "the Prohibition of the Wearing of Certain Garments". These two laws prohibit the wearing by men of certain head gear like the fez and the turban aiming to replace them by a 'western-style' hat, as well as banning the veil for women. Also included is Act No 677 of 30 November 1925 which closed all the Sufi *tarikats*. These laws, introduced by Atatürk to modernise Turkey, clearly infringe on the individual's rights concerning the freedom of religious activity.

²¹ Article 1 states: "Turkey is a Republic."

Penal sanctions

As well as the constitutional limits, there are a large number of legal measures which severely curtail freedom of expression and political activity in Turkey. Currently, the main legal instruments used in freedom of expression cases are: Article 158 and 159 of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK) which penalise any "insult" to the President or "the Turkish nation, the Republic, the Grand National Assembly, or the moral responsibility of the Government or the military or security forces of the State or the moral responsibility of the judicial authorities"; the Law to Protect Atatürk of 1951 which carries sentences of between one and three years' imprisonment for anyone "who reviles or openly insults the memory of Atatürk", and up to five years for destroying or defacing any of the huge number of his statues, busts or monuments; Article 312 of the TCK which carries sentences of six months to two years for anybody who "openly praises or incites others to disobey the law", and sentences of between one and three years' for anybody who "incites hatred based on, class, race religion, or religious sect, or incites hatred between different regions" (this article has been widely used against left-wingers, Islamists and those raising the Kurdish issue); and above all the Law to Fight Terrorism of 1991.

This law, introduced in 1991, has been used against thousands of people usually accused of aiding or being members of the PKK or extreme left wing groups. In the first 10 months of 1996 alone, 1,024 people were in custody and a further 1,943 people charged but not in custody relating to offences under this law.²² It has been and continues to be widely used to suppress freedom of expression in Turkey. It defines terrorism so broadly and vaguely that almost anyone can be convicted of an offense under it. Article 6 includes writing and reporting ideas as methods of "pressure" proscribed under article 1 if the government deems them to threaten the state on a number of bases, including by damaging the "indivisible unity of the State" and endangering "the existence of the Turkish State and Republic". Article 8, amended in October 1995, still prohibits written and oral propaganda, assemblies, meetings and demonstrations "aimed at damaging the indivisible unity of the State... regardless of method, intention, and ideas behind them" and in which there is an element of incitement to violence.

The Press Law of 1950 empowers a public prosecutor, without securing a court order prior to actions, to stop distribution of a newspaper or magazine. The 1983 addition to the Press Law requires that there be "responsible editors" in each publication who bear legal responsibility including possible imprisonment, for the publication's contents. Law no 3984 regulating radio and television broadcasting allows the government body responsible for broadcasting, RTÜK set up in 1994, to fine and close for up to 30 days radio and television stations without court order.

Under Decree with the Force of Law No. 430, the Minister of the Interior has the power to ban any publication from circulation in emergency regions (currently six provinces in the south-east) or to order the closure of its printing press for up to 30 days (irrespective of its location),

²² US Department of State, 'Turkey', Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1996, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, February 1997, p. 1161.

provided a warning is first issued to the owner or publisher of the publication.

All the above laws fall well below the internationally accepted standards and have been and continue to be used to widely curtail freedom of expression and political discussion in Turkey.

Proposed changes

At the time of writing there were a number of proposed changes to the existing penal sanctions. However, as has happened repeatedly in the past, the promised improvements either did not happen, or were themselves open to criticism. The changes included a draft penal code which, despite reported objections from the Minister for Human Rights, Hikmet Sami Türk, is expected due to pressure from the military, to reintroduce the essence of the previously discredited Article 163 of the TCK which was abolished in April 1991. This carried stiff prison sentences for those who aim to adapt, even partially, the basis of the state along religious lines. The draft bill reportedly envisaged the abolition of the Law to Fight Terrorism but the Justice Minister Öltan Sungurlu reportedly stated that the scope of this law would be covered by other paragraphs penalising propaganda which threatened the social order.²³

However, it was foreseen that comprehensive changes to the Turkish Penal Code would take some time, and thus to deal with immediate high profile cases there was also a draft bill endorsed by the Parliamentary Justice Commission on 26 March 1998 which called for three amendments to the Penal Code and one to the Law to Fight Terrorism. This bill proposed amending Article 17 of the TCK so that conditional release would only be subject to revoke if the person is subsequently prosecuted and sentenced to over one year in prison for another subsequent offense. This measure was apparently introduced so that the blind lawyer Eşber Yağmurdereli would not have to serve 17 years in prison for a speech he made on 8 September 1991 at a meeting in Istanbul organised by the Turkish Human Rights Association in which he criticised the State's treatment of the Kurds in the southeast. Yağmurdereli, one of a group of Turkish intellectuals who deliberately confront the state over freedom of expression (see above), was sentenced to 20 months's imprisonment — subsequently reduced to 10 months' — for this speech under Article 8 of the Law to Fight Terrorism which, under existing law, breached the terms of his conditional release from a life sentence given in 1985 in trial condemned by international human rights organisations as being clearly in breach of international standards for a fair trial. He had already served 13 years and five months of that sentence. The other amendments refer to reducing the sentence for defaming the organs of state under Article 159 to six months to three years; the removal of the fine for those convicted under Article 312 as well as a change in wording which would allow the courts greater leeway; and a reduction in the prison sentences and fines proscribed in Article 8 of the Law to Fight Terrorism. However, in June 1998 the draft bill was dropped from the parliamentary agenda, and Yağmurdereli, who emphasised that he wanted fundamental freedom of expression for all Turkish citizens rather than a specific amnesty for himself, was imprisoned on 1 June 1998 and currently faces many years in detention.

²³ Reuters, 28 Jan. 1998, quoting *Yeni Yüzyıl*.

The State Security Courts (DGMs)

Most trials concerning freedom of expression in Turkey are heard by the State Security Courts (DGMs). These are constituted as per Article 143 of the Constitution "to deal with offenses against the indivisible integrity of the State and its territory and nation, offenses against the Republic which are contrary to the democratic order enunciated in the Constitution, and offenses which undermine the internal or external security of the State." Thus the DGMs have jurisdiction over Articles 125-172 and 312 of the Turkish Penal Code, and Articles 6 to 8 of the Law to Fight Terrorism, and thousands of cases have been brought before them. There are currently eight DGM precincts; Ankara; Istanbul; Izmir; Konya; Kayseri; Erzincan; Diyarbakır and Malatya, and 17 tribunals, five of which are in Istanbul. The DGMs comprise three members, one of whom is a military judge. Article 7(a) annexed to the Law on Military Judges makes eligibility for promotion, seniority in grade and salary increments of military judges serving in DGMs dependent on "the first hierarchical competent superior". The presence of a military judge answerable to his military superiors in the judging of civilians has given rise to doubts of judicial independence, and the DGMs have been condemned by the European Court as not impartial.²⁴

Extrajudicial measures: torture and killings by 'unknown' assailants and 'disappearances

Along with the above detailed battery of formal legal measures, those who raise taboo topics have also been subjected to a variety of extra-legal measures. These include arbitrary arrest, threats, physical violence and even murder.

Torture and other cruel inhuman and degrading treatment remains endemic in Turkey despite governmental promises to end the abuse, and is routinely used against those arrested for political reasons. Those responsible are often not brought to justice, and if they are they receive lenient sentences. In December 1996, the Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) issued a "Public Statement on Turkey". This condemned the "flagrant examples of torture encountered by CPT delegates". These included electric shocks, squeezing of the testicles, suspension by the limbs, the use of blindfolds and tripping prisoners naked. Such methods were often used during interrogation especially in connection with those held under the Law to Fight Terrorism. During a public debate in the Turkish parliament on 28 February 1996, a former Justice Minister, Firuz Çilingiroğlu, admitted that torture was a widespread practice especially during periods of custody when detainees did not enjoy the necessary legal protection. However, those responsible for torture were increasingly being brought to trial and he quoted a figure of 252 prosecutions for such offenses in 1993 and 224 for 1994. The High Council for Human Rights recommended various reforms to end such practices notably a reduction to a four-day maximum period of custody (from 15 days under the Law to Fight terrorism and 30 days in the State of Emergency Region) and giving detainees the possibility to consult a lawyer.²⁵ In March

²⁴ European Court of Human Rights, *Incal v Turkey*, Case No 41/1997/825/1031, Strasbourg, 9 June 1998

²⁵ Commission of the European Communities, Report on developments in relations with Turkey since the entry into force of the customs union, COM(96) 491 final, Brussels, 30 October 1996, p 7.

1997 the Refahiyol coalition government reduced the maximum period of detention for security detainees to seven days, or 10 days in the State of Emergency Region. However, torture continues, with reports alleging torture of detainees occurring virtually on a daily basis, leading at times to deaths of the victims.

The murder of people for their views began in earnest in 1990 with some 20 killings. For example on 6 October 1990 Bahriye Üçok, a retired professor of religion, was killed by a parcel bomb. Her death was claimed by an extremist Islamic group who acted because of her 'opinion on the veil'. Other notable leading secularists killed included Cumhuriyet journalist Uğur Mumcu, murdered in January 1993, and journalist-writers Onat Kutlar and Yasemin Cebenoyan who died after a bomb attack of 30 December 1994. This last outrage was reportedly perpetrated by the Great Islamic Raiders-Front (İBDA-C), an organisation which has claimed responsibility for a number of similar outrages in recent years and is described by the police as an underground organisation intent on creating a Sunni state. In September 1997 Vasat, an İBDA-C splinter group killed one person and injured 24 others in a grenade attack on a book fair in Gaziantep.

While such killings of prominent secularists in centres like Ankara and Istanbul continued, 1991 saw political killings of left-wing Kurds by radical Islamic organisations, especially the shadowy Hizbullah group (which has no connections with the Lebanese organisation with a similar name), become systematic in the southeast of the country, reaching a peak in 1993/4. There were 20 such killings in 1991, 362 in 1992, 467 in 1993, 423 in 1994, 166 in 1995 and 78 in 1996 and 36 in 1997. Some of the victims appear to have been killed as a result of internecine feuding in Hizbullah. Those murdered included journalists and news vendors selling pro-Kurdish left-wing papers like Özgür Gündem.²⁶ As well as radical Islamic movements, extreme-rightist groups and the PKK were responsible for some of these murders. There have also been a number of allegations of official complicity in these killings, allegations which have been confirmed in the wake of the Susurluk affair (see below).

Despite the fact that the majority of these murders and associated 'disappearances' were taking place over a period of some years in an area under emergency legislation akin to martial law, large numbers of them remained unsolved and were officially ascribed to 'unknown assailants'. Despite the state's denial of knowledge of these crimes, both internal and external human rights organisations have since the murders began in earnest pointed to clear manifestations of official complicity on these murders and other attacks. It is noticeable that Hizbullah which was set up in 1987 in Batman and is committed to establishing a Sunni Islamic state, only appeared as a prominent actor in the southeast after a purge of pro-Islamic police officers from Ankara in July 1991 and their transfer to the region. It appears that Hizbullah's policy of assassination of perceived enemies appears to have been initially tolerated by the authorities, as the victims were seen as working against the unity of the Turkish state and thus as enemies. Indeed, the authorities

²⁶ See ARTICLE 19, Turkey: Censorship by the Bullet, September 1992, and ARTICLE 19, The Kurdish Human Rights Project, the British Bar Human Rights Committee and Medico International, Censorship and the Rule of law in Turkey: Violations of press freedom and attacks on Özgür Gündem.

refused to even use the name Hizbullah until 1994, and it was not until mid-1994 that Hizbullah members began to be arrested and charged with murder.²⁷ A parliamentary Commission of Investigation of Killings Whose Murderers Are Unknown was set up in February 1993 and completed its findings in a report of April 1995. The report implicated members of the security forces and village guards in some of the killings. This 1991 purge did not apparently affect the reputed ultra-nationalist domination of the country's political police which became more evident with the Susurluk affair, which also made clear the involvement of the state in many of the murders.

On 3 November 1996 a car-crash occurred in Susurluk in western Turkey. Three passengers were killed and one injured. The dead were Abdullah Çatlı - a leading ultra-rightist militant wanted by Interpol and Turkish police for a number of crimes including political murders and narcotics smuggling -, his girl-friend, and ex-police chief Hüseyin Kocadağ. The injured man who was also the car owner was Sedat Bucak - Anap parliamentarian and Zaza Kurdish tribal leader who controls some 20,000 tribal members who fight in the village guard system against the PKK. In the car were also a number of firearms, 12 separate identity papers including an official Turkish passport (for use of state officials only) made out for Çatlı, as well as a large amount of cash.

The accident showed a clear connection between an internationally wanted terrorist, the police and a powerful political figure, and opened up the whole question of state responsibility for many of the unsolved murders and other crimes. The ramifications from the incident were taken up by many sections of the media who began to uncover collaboration between the security forces and organised crime. A parliamentary committee was set up to investigate the incident but was unable to access much of the information with the military and the National Intelligence Organisation (MİT) reportedly refusing to give crucial information. The government set up an investigation under Kutlu Savaş and in January 1998 Prime Minister Yılmaz began to reveal the findings of the report. Although not all the report was published - apparently sections relating to direct involvement of the military remain secret - the findings were damaging enough. The report confirmed what many alleged: namely that "an execution squad was set up within the state" and that members of MİT, the police and JITEM - the military's intelligence unit operating under control of the Military police in rural area (the Jandarma) - were all involved.

The report confirmed the state involvement in the bombings of the offices of pro-Kurdish newspaper Özgür Gündem, as well as the assassination of its owner Behcet Cantürk.²⁸ The

²⁷ The clamp down on Hizbullah gathered pace with the clamp down on "fundamentalism" following the outlawing of the RP in January 1998. It seems that Hizbullah's use in the fight against Kurdish activists was no longer needed. A detailed report on Hizbullah by the head of anti-terrorism branch of the Şanlı Urfa security forces was distributed to all governors and police chiefs in March 1998, and on 3 April it was announced that 79 Hizbullah members including leading activists in the organisation had been caught in Diyarbakır, and that some 1,000 others were now being hunted.

²⁸ The report stated "Although it was obvious who Cantürk was and what he did [the report alleged he was involved in drug smuggling as well as financing the newspaper], the state was unable to cope with him. Because legal routes were inadequate 'the newspaper Özgür Gündem was blown into the air with plastic explosives and when Cantürk moved to set up a new establishment...it was decided by Turkish Security Organisation to kill him and the decision was carried

report also confirmed that the state had been responsible for the murder of Kurdish writer and founder member of the Kurdish political party HEP Musa Anter in a gun attack in Diyarbakır on 20 September 1992. The report shows no remorse on the part of the state. On the contrary, the murder of Cantürk is justified by due to him being a drug-dealer and close association with ASALA (the Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) as well as a Kurdish activist, while it states that "Musa Anter was not involved in an armed action, that he was more concerned with the philosophy of the matter [the Kurdish issue], and that the effect created by his murder exceeded his own true influence and that the decision to murder him was mistaken."

The report confirms that "[t]here are also other journalists who were murdered." JITEM was given a carte blanche for murder: "we [JITEM] had the authority to execute almost everyone in Diyarbakır and its environs whom we suspected of being connected with the PKK..Instead of handing them over for justice we adopted a method of 'murder by unknown assailant'. This was what was wanted of us. We received instructions to this effect."

However, many questions as to the exact nature of complicity by leading members of the state as well as the military remain unanswered. The report concentrates on the period 1993-5 when Tansu Çiller, a bitter opponent of current Prime Minister Yılmaz, was Prime Minister. She appointed Mehmet Ağar as police chief and later Minister of the Interior with a brief to direct a special police team to smash the PKK's financial links with Turkey's major drug dealers. Within two years most were dead. However, many of the killings took place when Turgut Özal was Prime Minister and Yılmaz initially foreign minister and then later Prime Minister. The continual reporting of the ramifications of this affair began to upset the top echelons of the military, apparently because they themselves were in danger of being implicated. After a mass 'briefing' of selected press by the military, most media dropped Susurluk entirely (after six months solid reporting) and instead switched to attacking the RP.

Conclusion

Turkey is a democracy functioning within severely imposed limits. Despite proposed changes, and government promises, freedom of expression in Turkey, the basic pre-condition for democracy, remains severely curtailed. People continue to be prosecuted and imprisoned for the non-violent exercise of their right to freedom of expression. Many of the problems stem directly from the nature of the state, its self-perceived secularism and its relationship with its Kurdish minority. Hiding behind such special pleadings as 'Kurdish terrorism and irredentism', 'Islamic fundamentalism' and the like, the authorities continue to severely hinder democratic development, and continue to fail to draw an adequate distinction between armed groups in opposition to the state - primarily the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and extreme left-wing organisations - and those peacefully advocating full implementation and protection of the rights of racial and ethnic minorities, in conformity with international obligations voluntarily assumed by the state.

The military, which sees itself as the self-appointed guardians of Kemalist secularist norms, continues to interfere in the political process through its dominant position on the highly influential National Security Council. Such overt military interference in the political process is at odds with the essence of a modern pluralist democracy in which it is essential that the military be brought under control of the elected representatives of the people rather than the reverse.

Turkey is a party to the European Convention on Human Rights and is therefore bound by its provisions, including the substantive articles establishing the rights to freedom of expression, freedom from racial or ethnic discrimination, and the right to a fair trial; as of 1991 Turkey became subject to the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court. As detailed above, many of Turkey's laws and practices are in direct contravention of the Convention, and as of 30 January 1998, 16 of the 116 pending cases at the Court concerned Turkey. Unless Turkey changes its laws and practice, the number of such cases will certainly rise and Turkey will continue to be found wanting by the Court.

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TURKEY'S ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

Michel Chatelus*

- 1 The macroeconomic situation: performances and shortcomings**
- 2 The economic relations between Turkey and the European Union**
- 3 The privatization process**
- 4 The domestic and international importance of the energy sector**

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I The macroeconomic situation: performances and shortcomings

I 1 Salient features. Turkey's economy displays a striking contrast between its remarkable vitality and dynamism on one side (high economic growth rate, buoyant manufacturing sector), and its deep rooted and dangerous weaknesses (inflation, public and foreign deficits) leading to a high degree of instability, on the other side.

According to OECD analysts, the knowledge of the economic situation is not as satisfactory as it should, and forecasts are particularly difficult due to the low dependability of the options expressed by the officials in charge of economic policy.

Political instability has strong repercussions on the economic life, and links can be noticed between political and economic cycles (periods of increased public spending, high deficits and high inflation lead to political changes and an adjustment policy reducing the purchasing power of the people.)

The Turkish economy is now widely opened to the outside world, especially the European Union.

1. 2 A dynamic economy.

The average yearly growth rate of the Turkish economy over the last 15 years exceeds 5%. Considering the 2% demographic increase, per capita GDP growth is close to 3%. After a sharp drop in 1994 (-5.5%), overall growth exceeds 7% in 1995, 1996 and 1997; the estimate for 1998 is between 4.7 and 6.4%. At current market exchange rate, the per capita income in 1995 reaches \$2745, at Purchasing Power Parity, it reaches \$5000, a figure close to half that for Portugal. The manufacturing sector production accounts for 22.5% of the GDP, and its share is increasing. Since 1995, the growth of exports is superior to 10% per year, and imports are growing still faster.

Following the liberal turn of the early 1980s, the Turkish economy is **opened to the outside world**, and tries to make the best use on foreign markets of its comparative advantages arising from low wages and a 50 years old industrial experience led by state-controlled enterprises. Two sectors are dominant: textile and clothing (37.5% of total exports), and steel products (10%). Industrial exports constitute 87.5% of total exports. The exports capacity however are very limited for high technology and fast growing industrial goods

The agricultural potential is important; Turkey is one of the very few globally self-sufficient Mediterranean countries. The agricultural production accounts for 15.6% of GDP, and over 45% of total employment. The agricultural employment is particularly high in the Eastern and Southern part of the country. The huge hydrolic projects in Anatolia (GAP) will significantly increase the agricultural output..

The private sector, despite the delays and the slow path of the privatization process and the still massive presence of the state in the economic life, is extremely

dynamic and able to adapt itself and rapidly seize opening opportunities. Whenever administrative and bureaucratic constraints are too heavy, he strongly asserts its capacities and ambitions through the activities of a widely developed informal sector which, according to OECD's estimates, reach 30 to 50% of the dimensions of the formal sector.

Since 1990, **the Turkish Lira is totally and freely convertible**, and a partial dollarisation of the economy is to be observed. Dollars (and Deutsche Mark) deposits in Turkish banks sometimes represent more than 50% of the monetary circulation. In order to keep the competitiveness of Turkish goods on export markets, the authorities favour a systematic depreciation of the TL, the value of which tends to depreciates faster than the inflation rate would justify.

1.3 Severe weaknesses threaten the continuity of high growth

High inflation has been for long a serious problem for Turkey. During the recent years, the price level increases oscillate between 60 and more than 100%. The estimated inflation rate is 85.7% for 1997, and 80% for 1998. That such a high rate over a very long time span never degenerated into hyperinflation is a particular feature of the Turkish economy, not to be observed in other inflationary economies. Turkey has learned to live with a somewhat "integrated" high inflation, which makes particularly difficult to implement an efficient antinflationary policy as most of the influent social groups are able to protect themselves from the negative effects of inflation. Successive plans to curb inflation met rapid failure, and one can be skeptical concerning the issue of a June 1998 agreement between the IMF and Turkey pledging a reduction of inflation to 50% at end-year 1998 and 20% by year-end 1999.

One of the determinant cause of the persistent inflationary pressures is **the heavy public finance deficit**. The public sector borrowing requirements reach 8.6% of GDP in 1996, 9.2% in 1997, and despite strong commitments to a drastic reduction, the estimation for 1998 is 8.5%. The public account deficits, including Social Security, are financed through monetary creation, a part of which consisting in direct Central Bank advances to the Treasury, and by borrowing on the domestic market. The burden of the debt weighs very heavily on the budget, because of the extremely high interest rates on short term state bonds. (The average nominal interest rate on 3-months bonds in 1997 reaches 116%, the real interest rate attaining between 30 and 35%, debt service payments represented 10% of GDP in 1996). Far reaching tax reforms are a pressing necessity in order to increase fiscal revenues and to compensate the reduction in external duties following the implementation of the Custom Union with the EU.

The Balance of Payment is characterized by a sizable deficit of the Trade balance: \$13Bi in 1995, \$20bi in 1996, \$15Bi in 1997, an estimated \$13 Bi in 1998 (\$42 Bi for imports, \$29.2 Bi for exports). The UN embargo on Irak is estimated to have cost Turkey \$30-\$60 Bi in lost trade and foregone business opportunities through 1997. One of

the many paradoxes of Turkey's economy is the absence of difficulties to reach an equilibrium of the global external accounts, despite the heavy trade deficit. Part of the explanation lies in the important surpluses of the services and transfers flows, with a favorable touristic balance, and important remittances from migrant workers. For 1998, the service surplus is estimated at \$10Bi. Another factor is to be taken into account: the paramount role in the recent years of the so-called "shuttle trade". This applies to the non officially registered exports from Turkey of merchandises bought in huge quantities by "tourists" from the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries who sell them back home. IMF estimates give an approximate value of \$8 to 9 Bi for those disguised exports in 1996. The present Russian crisis has a very negative impact on these activities, the decline of which may be accelerated by the devaluations of Eastern Asian countries currencies which can justify "touristic" trips in this region. The magnitude of the inflows of foreign currencies linked to drug traffic is not precisely known, but is certainly sizable.

Turkey therefore paradoxically combines **significant deficits and an abundant supply of external resources**. The foreign debt estimation for 1998 amounts to \$83Bi (25% short term), which represents 43% of GDP and 250% of the exports of goods. High real interest rates on foreign currencies accounts attract foreign capital, but volatile portfolio investments and short term loans are the overwhelming majority. Direct foreign investment in the productive sectors are scarce (\$612 mi in net value in 1996 for a total long-term capital flow of \$2.818mi). The Turkish debt has been downgraded in 1996 by the rating agency Standard's and Poor, as it had already been the case in 1993. Globally, Turkey is considered as a high risk country by the international economic and financial community: the immediate cost is an high prices for borrowed financial resources and the long term implication is the necessity of major structural reforms. It should be underlined however that to-date the Asian crisis appears to have had little effect on the "financially fragile Turkey".

In the real sector, Turkey knows a significant unbalance between supply and demand in the energy system. Increasing power shortages have a negative impact on industrial production and on life conditions of the population. The importance of the energy question justifies a specific treatment in our presentation (See section 4).

Turkey suffers serious **inequalities in income distribution** and weaknesses in human resources development. The average income in remote provinces of the Eastern and Southeastern parts of the country is comparable to South Asian income, and only one tenth of that found in Istanbul and the Egean region, where the figure is nearing the Portuguese or Greek levels. The drift from the land is important: in the early sixties, 38% of the population was urban, to-day it is more than two third. On the average, urban revenues are much higher than the rural ones. During the recent years, an important share of urban incomes (over 24.5% in 1994), are made of rents and interests, expressing the magnitude of the financial transfers arising from high interest rates and masive state

borrowing. The monetary rent attracts the enterprises and household savings to the detriment of productive investments. For the majority of the population, by contrast, the public provision of educational and sanitary facilities is considered by the OECD as quite unsatisfactory, a fundamental reorientation of public spending toward those sectors is an absolute necessity.

With its high rate of growth and its open economy, Turkey suffers from numerous **structural maladjustments** which accentuate the disequilibria inherently associated to any rapid growth process, and are the origin of violent political and economic fluctuations. The private sector is the spearhead of growth, but it remains strongly affected by the long lasting tradition of a state managed economy, the privatization process has to overcome powerful bureaucratic and political oppositions, the archaisms of the public financial sector and the lagging modernisation of the banking sector hamper the private sector initiatives, while the monetary financing of public deficits and the high rates of return on public bonds limit the funds available for industry. Genuine entrepreneurs are still a rarity, and the large dimension of the informal sector is a constraint on the strengthening of a modern export oriented economy with the capacity to produce high value added goods in high growth sectors. Presently, Turkey's economy is rather "ill specialised" and not very attractive for foreign direct investments.

1.4 Perspectives.

Turkish economic growth is slowing down in 1998, but should probably still reach 5%. The question opened to forecasters is the nature and the path of the expected "soft landing" which would result from the government efforts to reduce inflation and the public deficits. In June 1998, the Turkish government signed an unconventional 18-month agreement with the IMF in which Turkey pledged to cut its inflation rate to 50% by year-end 1998, and to 20% by year-end 1999. Under the deal, the IMF is to monitor and endorse Turkey's economic policies, while Turkey's government has promised to implement monetary, exchange rate and other economic policies (tax reform, reduction in subsidies), consistent with its inflation reduction goal. The speeding up of the privatization process might help to increase public revenues and thus reduce the deficits. Structural reforms are required in order to create the conditions for a more balanced economic growth. The main targets for reforms are the inefficient fiscal administration and the unjust tax system; the reallocation of public spending to increase investments in human capital; the acceleration of the privatization process wherever it is feasible; the improvement of the financial results of the state economic enterprises in order to reduce the budgetary supports; a complete restructuring of the social security pensions system which is quasi bankrupt. The implementation of this far reaching reforms program depends largely on the existence of a political stability giving a dedicated government the time required for success.

1.5 A synthesis of the main positive and negative factors in Turkey's economic conditions.

Favorable factors Global Dynamism and high growth rates,

Big market potential (63 mi. inhabitants, 23 mi. active),

Geopolitical situation: access to European markets, links with "Turkish Asia", and Black Sea states, Arab neighbourhood (inescapable Irak reopening)

Industrial and agricultural high potential.

Often qualified manpower and low wage rates.

High adaptative abilities of the private sector.

A growing agreement on the necessary reforms

Negative factors

Political

Instability, lack of credibility and reliability and frequent corruption of the political class, (but a large political agreement on the economic policy to be implemented).

Islamic "menace".

Endemic violence, poor human rights record, Kurdish question

Negative attitude of the EU and Greek hostility

Social

Drift from the land and urban explosion

High demographic growth

Growing social inequalities

Underdevelopment of human resources.

Economic

Persistent high rate of inflation

Financial unbalances and negative role of the financial rent

Delays in the implementation of structural reforms.

Low level of productive investment and of foreign direct investments.

2 The relations between the European Union and Turkey

2.1 General framework of the relations

Chronology

- 1952 Through its membership in NATO, Turkey asserts its belonging to the Western World.
- 1959 Turkey applies for an association with the EEC
- 1963 Association agreement between the EEC and Turkey
- 1981 Greece's membership of the EEC
- 1987 Turkey's application for membership of the EEC. EEC aids to Turkey are suspended for human right reasons
- 1995 March. Treaty establishing a Custom Union between the UE and Turkey.
- 1996 January I the CU becomes effective
- 1997 November. The UE decides not to invite Turkey to begin membership discussions. (invited candidates are Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, The Czech Republic and Cyprus).
- 1998 The CU is maintained, but political relations are frozen. The French Parliament "recognizes the Armenian genocide"

Institutions

The mechanisms instituted by the Custom Union Treaty are: meetings of Turkey's Prime Minister with the Presidents of the European Commission and of the Council of Ministers; frequent interministerial meetings within the framework of the Association Council, established in 1963, contacts between high ranking civil servants; the use of existing diplomatic channels. A mixed Consultative Committee (made of 18 Turkish personalities representative of the economic and social world and of 18 members of the European Economic and Social Council), meets at regular intervals. A meeting was scheduled last June 1998 in Ankara.

2.2 Analysis

221 Turkey's positions. When applying for EU membership, Turkey's aims are both economic and political.

The economic objectives are to accelerate the modernization and rationalization of the economic structure, to help reduce macroeconomic unbalances, especially the high inflation rate, to enhance the international competitiveness of Turkish firms, to attract foreign investments, to "catch up" more rapidly with the Western Europe standard of living, to benefit from global and sectorial financial aids.

The political objectives predominantly express the point of view of the "laïcists", the modernizers and the advocates of a more democratic Turkey. They expect from the

Chatelus Turkey's economic outlook Rome Nov. 1998

membership a decisive insertion in the Western World, the strengthening of "pro-west" political and social currents vis a vis the Islamic threat, the international recognition of Turkey as an influent nation occupying a strategic position, an equal treatment with Greece. It is believed that 3 Turks out of 4 would favour the membership.

222 The positions of the Europeans.

The global EU position. While admitting the necessity and the legitimacy of special relations between the EU and Turkey, (the aptitude for membership of which has been recognized as early as 1963), the EU has always expressed strong reserves toward Turkey's membership, and long delayed any direct and clear answer. The major official objections are the poor human right record, especially with regard to the Kurd problem, Turkey's occupation of Northern Cyprus, the territorial disputes with Greece. On several occasions, the European Parliament has blocked the aids to Turkey to protest against the violations of Human rights. After its decision not to invite Turkey to begin membership negotiations in late 1997, the EU reaffirmed that Turkey is still "eligible" for membership, and should prepare its integration by positive moves in the controversial issues. Past commitments, the demographic, economic and geopolitical importance of Turkey necessarily lead to grant it a particular place in EU's post Barcelona "Renovated Mediterranean Policy". The stake is high, particularly for the future of democracy in Turkey and the peace process in the Middle East.

The attitude of some EU members.

Greece had been treated by the EU on an equal footing with Turkey until its rather unexpected membership in 1981. As a member then on, she adopted a policy of violent opposition to Turkey, which it often managed to impose to the Commission through the use of its veto right. All financial protocols, for instance, have been systematically suspended by the Greek government. A Greek animated "anti-Turk lobby" is very active in Bruxelles.

Germany, a country where lives an important community originating from Turkey, (more than 2 millions people, including a high proportion of Kurds), is the most influential of the opponent to Turkey's membership. The human right question and the repression against the Kurds are a very sensitive issue in Germany. At several occasions, during the past years, the Government has imposed an embargo on arms sales to Turkey. Some German political leaders may be heard invoking the adamant obstacle that would represent the Moslem character of the Turkish society. This vision of a "Christian Europe", is the object of violent criticisms from the Turkish government and opinion, which stigmatize an anachronic crusade, and denounce racist attacks against Turks in Germany.

Of all EU members, **France** is the more favourable to Turkey's membership. Beyond an historical reference to a more than 4 centuries old alliance, the central explanation is to be found in the French desire to compensate by an opening to the South

the widening Eastward of the UE which is considered as excessively increasing Germany's and other "Nordic" members' influence in the Union. Due to a growing interest for Turkey, France has become the second foreign investor in the country, and the number of French firms has increased from 7 in 1989 to 150 in 1997. One should notice however the presence in France of an influent community of citizens from Armenian origin: their intense lobbying has led the French Parliament to adopt in the spring 1998 a resolution "Recognizing the Armenian Genocide".

2.3 Present situation and perspectives.

2.3.1 Of all non-member countries, **Turkey has the closest relations with the UE.** About half of Turkey's foreign trade is realised with the Eu, and there are numerous trade and exchange agreements, the most important of which is the Custom Union Treaty. With 63 millions inhabitants, Turkey ranks tenth among EU clients and the growth prospects for this market are promising.

The recent decision of the EU not to begin discussion on membership has greatly angered Turkey which responded by freezing all political relations with the EU as well as moving towards closer integration of the self-declared Turkish Cypriot state (recognized only by Ankara). By refusing the participation of the Turkish Cypriots to the negotiations for Cyprus membership of the EU, the Turkish government can block those negotiations. Meanwhile, Greece has vetoed some \$400 m in EU aid to Turkey. The purposes of this money are to help Turkey become more competitive.

Economic relations, notwithstanding some Turkish menaces concerning the choices of firms elected after answering tenders for great public contracts, do not suffer too much of the deteriorated political climate, as the Custom Union, which came into effect on January 1 1996, has not been suspended.

2.3.2 The Custom Union gives Turkey improved access to the EU member countries' markets (since a 1973 agreement, most Turkish industrial goods entered freely in EEC, to the major exception of textiles and clothing and of many processed agricultural products), and give EU countries full and free access to the Turkish market. It guarantees the free circulation of industrial goods and processed agricultural products. Customs duties and charges are abolished, and quantitative restrictions such as quotas are prohibited. The agreement covers all aspects of trade and commercial policy to ensure that there is a "level playing field" for Turkish and EU firms.

Among the main features of the Decision we find the following:

1 The elimination of customs duties, quantitative restrictions and measures of equivalent effect on trade in industrial goods, including processed agricultural products, between Turkey and the EU. The EU will abolish the Voluntary Restraint Arrangements in trade in textiles with Turkey.

- 2 The adoption by Turkey of the EU's Common External Tariff in its trade with third countries.
- 3 Agreed competition rules and the alignment by Turkey of its legislation in the area with that of the EU
- 4 The adoption by Turkey of a legislation in the field of intellectual property protection to secure a level of protection equivalent to that in the EU
- 5 Grants to Turkey, as that was the case for other countries entering a Custom Union with the EU, of a structural aid (Euro 2 Bi in 5 years) to facilitate the adaptation of its economy to the shocks of full open competition.

In a March 1998 Report, the Commission reaffirms its demands relative to the implementation by Turkey of "an appropriate economic strategy to improve the public finance situation, reduce the inflation rate and stabilize the currency". It denounces the persistently poor human right record. It tries however to introduce some positive perspectives by proposing the extension of the CU to so far excluded agricultural products and to services, and suggesting the development of a cooperation in such fields as energy, transports, communications and environment. Ankara looks interested, but somewhat skeptical on the reality of the intentions. The crisis in the relations between Turkey and the EU might be long lasting, and the systematically obstructive policy of Greece will not contribute to ease the tensions. This however will not endanger the general orientation of the Turkish economy and its quasi integration in the European orbit.

3 The Privatization process in Turkey

3.1 General Outlook

The drastic change in the orientation of Turkey's economy initiated in the early 1980s, towards a liberalized and open economy, required the implementation of a far reaching privatization process, all the more ambitious because the state presence in the economy was massive. A privatization programme was initiated in the mid-80s. The philosophy of the privatization was 1) to confine the role of the state in the economy in areas like health, basic education, social security, national defense, large scale infrastructure investments 2) to provide legal and structural environment for free enterprises to operate and thus to increase the productivity and the value added to the economy by ensuring more efficient organisation and management in the enterprises that should be commercialized to be competitive in the market.

The major targets of the privatization are primarily:

To minimize state involvement in the industrial and commercial activities of the economy

To provide legal and structural environment for free enterprises to operate.

To reduce the financial burden of the State Economic Enterprises on the budget.

To transfer privatization revenues to the major infrastructure projects.

To expand and deepen the existing capital markets by promoting wider share ownership.

To provide efficient allocation of resources.

In 1984, the first regulation law on privatization was enacted. Between 1984 and 1996, 83 partially or totally state-owned enterprises have been privatized, the proceeds amount to \$3.1Bi, but almost \$2.5Bi had to be spent on privatization expenditures, especially on capital increase and loans, prior to sales. This is a rather disappointing outcome, as the global portfolio of enterprise eligible for privatization was estimated over \$ 60 Bi.

To accelerate the privatization process, a new law was enacted on November 1994. The main objectives are:

To expand the scope of assets to privatize

To provide adequate framework/funds/mechanisms to speed privatization and restructuring

To establish a social safety net for workers who may lose their jobs as a result of privatization .

To establish a special Privatization High Council (at ministerial level, it is the body in charge of ultimate decisions) and a Privatization Administration (the executive body) to facilitate decision making and the process of privatization.

To regulate the petroleum law in order to facilitate the privatization of related companies.

3.2 Delays and acceleration in the privatization process.

The November 1994 law, which provided for the sales of 17 State Economic Enterprises worth \$40Bi, constitutes an important step. The commitment of the successive governments to the implementation of the programme is not questionable. Privatizations, the structural changes and the financial resources they are bound to bring, are now a central piece in the overall effort to modernize Turkey's economy. They are an indispensable condition to finance major public investments which the state cannot fund through external borrowing due to its bad external credit.

The progress in the implementation of the programme however is rather slow, and in 1996 and 1997, the results are far below the announced targets (the expected proceeds of privatization amounted at \$6.5Bi in 1997, the actual figure is less than half this sum). A positive step has been passed in January 1997 when the supreme Court rejected a claim against the privatization of Telecom, and the implementation of the programme has been stepped up. Numerous obstacles: political, judicial, administrative (for example the necessity to create a regulatory instance for energy or telecommunications), and financial are still to be overcome. It should be observed, furthermore, that privatization programmes are presently implemented in many countries and so competition to attract private foreign investors is severe.

The main economic sectors involved in the 1994 law are tourism, cement works, food processing, iron and steel, trade, banks, electric power production and distribution, oil refining and distribution, communication and telecommunications.

The cement sector is now completely privatized, and so are the ports authorities. Several banks and insurance companies are already privatized or in the process of privatization. Shares of Türk Telecom and licenses for mobile GSM telephones were put for sale in early 1998, \$3Bi were expected from 34% of Türk Telekom, and \$1Bi from GSM licenses. Tender procedures are proposed for various industrial concerns, from food processing to pulp and paper production or iron and steel), transport companies (the Turkish Maritime Lines, and THY, Turkish Air Lines), touristic activities etc. The drive toward privatization is of particular significance in the energy sector and will be presented in the last section of this presentation.

3.3 Perspectives on privatizations

The privatization process in Turkey looks an irreversible commitment. To meet a complete success, it requires an increased political stability which would favour the economic and institutional environment needed for the security and profitability of private investments. Foreign capital is bound to play a decisive role. In a globalized world

economy, where the competition is fierce to attract Direct Foreign Investments, Turkey should provide itself with the economic structures and the social policy able to encourage investors and enhance the value of its comparative advantages, particularly its growth potential and its geostrategic position.

4 Energy questions in Turkey: the country as a bridge and as a terminal.

Energy is an outstanding economic and geopolitical issue in Turkey. An analysis of the main energy questions is therefore of special interest for its own sake but also because it provides a significant synthesis of most of the problems and perspectives bound to shape the economic future of the country. Two determinant aspects can be identified to sum up the fundamentals: 1) The Turkish demand for energy is increasing at a very rapid path, and the traditionally dominant fuel (domestic coal and more specifically lignite), is quantitatively and environmentally unfit to satisfy the industry and population thirst for energy. 2) The geostrategic position of Turkey makes the country a potential bridge or crossroad between the producing zones of the Gulf and the Caspian and Central Asia, and the oil and gas consumers in Western Europe.

4.1 The main factors accounting for the **rapidly increasing energy needs** in Turkey are the high overall and industrial rates of growth and the rapid urbanization process. Energy consumption increases more than 10% per year, and electricity shortages are not uncommon even in the big cities. The massive utilization of energy inefficient and environmentally devastating domestic lignite adds to the acuteness of the energy problems in the country. A satisfactory answer to the demand for an abundant, environment safer and low cost supply of energy and particularly of electrical power is a major constraint for future economic and social developments.

Technically, the two main directions in the effort to build up an efficient energy system are the growing recourse to imported Natural Gas, and the speeding up of the increase in the country's power generation capacity. From an institutional and financial perspective, the privatisation of existing installations and the growing recourse to private capital and market incentives for new capacities are the dominant orientations.

Natural Gas (NG) has been chosen as the preferred fuel for the greatest share of the huge amount of new power plant capacity to be added in coming years. This makes sense for Turkey for several reasons: environmental: gas is cleaner than coal, lignite and oil; geographic: Turkey is closed to huge amounts of gas in the Middle East and Central Asia; security of supply: it allows a diversification of energy sources, and Liquefied Natural Gas may be shipped in addition to gas transported by pipelines; economic: Turkey could offset part of the cost of imported gas through transit fees it could charge for oil and gas transit; and political: Turkey seeks to strengthen its links with Caspian and Central Asian new independent states several of which are potential hydrocarbon exporters. Actual or potential sellers among Turkey's immediate or close neighbours include: Russia, Iraq, Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and more distant suppliers can be found via the utilization of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) chains. In 1996, NG accounted for about 14% of Turkey's

total energy consumption, domestic production, and reserves are negligible, and nearly all of the imported 7 billion M3 come from Russia via a pipeline through Roumania and Bulgaria. Gas demand is expected to increase considerably in the near future; it may exceed 40 Bm3 before 2005, and raise to 60 Bm3 later in the 2000's according to some optimistic estimates. Although Russia will remain a major supplier, and recent agreements will make possible a significant increase of Russian gas sales (through Georgia and Armenia, and through the Black Sea or Bulgaria), Turkey would like to diversify its import sources. An important and controversial (because of American criticisms) deal is a \$23Bi, 23 years agreement for gas shipment from Turkmenistan via Iran, and from Iran itself (the annual delivery would reach 2 Bm3 by 1999 and exceed 10 Bm3 by 2005). The supply contract will require the construction of three new pipelines in Turkey. Turkey would like to increase NG imports from Irak once UN sanctions are lifted. Botas (The Turkish Gas public firm) has signed an agreement with Irak for up to 10 Bm3 per year of gas. In addition to increasing NG pipelines imports, Turkey is considering increased imports of LNG to help meet higher projected demand. Under a 20 years agreement signed in 1985, Algeria is shipping about 2Bm3 a year to a terminal in the Marmara sea; additional supplies of LNG are discussed or agreed upon with Nigeria, Qatar and Yemen. Deliveries from fields in Egypt's Nile Delta should begin in 2000, and talks have been initiated between Turkey and Egypt for the construction of a natural gas pipeline between the two countries under the Mediterranean.

Electric Power. With a young, growing and urbanizing population, low per capita electricity consumption, and strong economic growth, Turkey is one of the fastest growing power markets in the world. Turkey's electric power consumption estimated yearly growth reached 9% between 1973 and 1996 (twice the country's overall energy demand growth). Projections indicate that the demand for electricity will continue to grow at a high rate (8% per year) for the next 15 years. With shortages and blackouts already common (partly as a consequence of generation and distribution losses as high as 20%), increasing the country's electricity generating capacity is a top priority. Turkey may need to triple its total electric power generating capacity to around 64 gigawatts by 2010. (The present 21 Gigawatt capacity is 53% thermal and 47% hydro). Plans have been drawn to install 33 lignite-fired units, 27 natural gas-fired units, 12 coal-fired units, 2 nuclear plants and 113 hydroelectric units. This will require between \$35 and \$50 Billion in investment over 10 years. Foreign capital inflows are an absolute necessity in order to finance those investments.

The liberalization, restructuration and partial privatization of the energy sector, especially the power sector, are considered an essential condition for the energy supply to meet demand. The privatization efforts in the energy sector, even more than in the rest of the economy have been delayed by the lack of political consensus and the legal

debates in the Parliament and the Turkish Constitutional court. A step toward a more market oriented economy has been taken with the introduction on July 1st 1998, of a new price fixing mechanism for petroleum products aiming at the liberalization of prices and the suppression of the \$40 per tonne state support to refineries. Privatization targets in the oil and gas sector include the state oil products distribution company Petrol Ofisi AS: (a 51% stake is scheduled for sale in 1998 and a further 21% in 1999), the Turkish Petroleum Refining company (TUPRAS) and the petrochemical company Petkim Petrokimikya.

For electric power generation, great legal and administrative obstacles have to be overcome in order to attract domestic and foreign investments. Under the proposed legislation, energy production and distribution would be privatized, while transmission lines would remain state-owned. BOT (Built and Operate Transfer) schemes have been introduced in 1984. Under such a model, private investors build and operate private sector generation facilities for a number of years, at which point they transfer ownership to the state. Legal problems about the status of the agreement have slowed their implementation; a call for bid for 6 BOT gas-fired plants of great capacity has been offered in early 1987. In 1996, has been introduced the BOO (Build, Operate and Own) financing model, under which developers retain the ownership of the plant and are given the option to sell the power to an end-user, to the state-owned electricity authority or directly into the national grid. Tenders for six "emergency " plants to be financed through BOO have been issued, the plants were to be commissioned between 2000 and 2005, but , again, administrative injunctions cloud the future of these projects.

4. 2 Turkey as an energy crossroad.

As a land bridge between Europe and Asia, Turkey has sought consistently to make its geographic advantage serve the cause of domestic development. After the huge increase in oil prices in the 1970s, Turkey tried to persuade Middle East oil producers to use the country as a transit route for part of their exports. The only concrete results of this policy has been the construction and the doubling of capacity to 1.5 mbd of an oil pipeline from Northern Irak to Yumurtalik, in the Gulf of Adana on the Southern Turkish Mediterranean coast. Efforts or projects to build oil and gas pipelines from Iran and from the Gulf countries to Turkey did not materialise, due to political and economic obstacles. Closed after the Gulf war, in 1991, the pipeline from Irak is presently used to transport part of UN-authorized Iraqi oil sales.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union furnished new grounds for Turkish hopes to make use of the country's strategic location between the hydrocarbon rich ex-Soviet republics and the European energy markets. Building on geography and cultural affinities between Turkey and the new independent states, Turkish diplomats launched a campaign to route through their country the oil exports from Azerbaidjan, the oil and gas exports of Kazakhstan and the gas exports of Turkmenistan. The Turks pointed out the utility of

offering a fail safe route limiting the present Russian transit monopoly both for political and strategic consideration, and for avoiding the transit through the Bosphorus of the additional oil arriving in Russia's Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. This additional flow of Caspian and Asian oil would increase the already unacceptable ecological threat to the ten million inhabitants of Istanbul living on both sides of the narrow Strait. This is a conflictual situation, since the Russians have recently protested that the new transit regulation imposed by the Turkish authorities violated the Montreux Convention ensuring unlimited free passage of commercial shipping through the Straits. The Turks have also to take into consideration a Russian plan to ship the oil from Novorossiysk to Bulgaria and the Greek port of Alexandroupolis on the Aegean. The Turks' preferred option is the construction of an oil pipeline from Baku in Azerbaijan to Ceyhan in Southern Turkey, the estimated cost is \$3.2 billion for a 758-mile dual pipe. This plan is seconded by Washington which refuses to yield total control to Moscow over the hydrocarbon exports of the former Soviet republics. This route might be used to transport not only Azeri oil, but also oil exports from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and via pipelines under the Caspian Sea, to move gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to the West. Besides Russia's efforts to keep its monopoly, the Turkish ambitions of becoming a major transit route and collecting significant fees may be checked by the possibility that most of the Central Asian oil exports take the much shorter route through Iran to the Arabo-Persian Gulf. The eventuality of such an occurrence would increase with the probable improvement of the relations between Iran and the United States. Turkey's hopes of serving as the second, if not the first transit route for the Caspian and Central Asian oil and gas thus remain uncertain.

Annex Statistical overview

Area: 779000 Km²

Population: (1997 E). 64.1 million

GDP (1998 E. market exchange rate): \$199.4 Billion

Real GDP Growth rate : 1996: 7.2%, 1997: 6.3%; 1998E.: 5.5%

Per capita GDP (1998E.): \$3110

Inflation rate: (1997 E.): 85%, (1998E.): 79.8%

Currency: Turkish Lira, exchange rate 8/31/1998: US\$1=277800TL

Budget deficit (1998E.): 9.5% of GDP; (1999E.): 7% of GDP

Current account balance(1998E) -\$0.9 Bi

Merchandise Exports (1998E.) \$29.2 Bi

Merchandise imports (1998E.): \$42Bi.

Merchandise Trade Balance (1998E.): -\$12.8 Bi.

Chatelus Turkey's economic outlook Rome Nov. 1998

Main exports products: Textiles, (37.7%), iron and steel (10.4%) agricultural (11.7%).

Main import products: oil (10%), machinery (25%), chemicals (12%), iron and steel (10%)

Major trading partners: Imports: EU(52.8%), other OECD (16.1%), Saudi Arabia (4.1%).

Exports: EU (49.6%), other OECD (10.9%), MENA; East Eu. and FSU

Unemployment rate (1998E.) 5.7%

Foreign Reserves (4/28/98): \$24.2Bi.

Total foreign debt (1998E.): \$83 Bi

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**THE ECONOMIC OUTLOOK OF TURKEY
STRUCTURAL STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND THE
PERSPECTIVES FOR 1999**

International Conference on
US and EU Common Approaches to Turkey
Rome

**Istituto Affari Internazionali
Rome, November 20 – 21st., 1998**

By Aldo L. Kaslowski

Vice Chairman of the Board

Chairman of the External Relations Committee

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Ladies & Gentlemen,

Considering that this is the only section on economics, I will try to evaluate Turkey's economic outlook for 1999 from the perspective of structural weaknesses and strengths. Since the international crises still rises concerns about emerging markets, I will have to touch upon the recent crises when necessary.

My argument is that the recent Russian and East Asian crises proved that, unless the institutional framework of a market economy functions properly, integration to the world markets will not secure a sustainable growth process. In that sense, Turkey as an emerging market economy having established customs union with the EU, has important structural strengths and has achieved some progress towards establishing macroeconomic stability in the last one and a half year. However, there remain some structural weaknesses also, which should be acted upon immediately in order for Turkey to improve the economic conditions for 1999 and to take its deserved place in the world economy.

Recent Economic Developments in Turkey

Turkey is one of the crucial emerging markets, with a well-functioning market economy, where financial markets, foreign trade and foreign capital movements are liberalised, and has a Customs Union since 1996. Although Turkey has high public deficits, which result in high inflation and high real interest rates, it has a very dynamic private sector and a rapidly growing domestic demand.

Turkey enjoys high economic growth in the subsequent years since 1994 crisis, with an average rate of 7.8 %. In the first half of 1998, the Turkish economy grew by 6.3 %, which is in fact slower than the previous periods. The measures to restore macroeconomic balances can be identified as being responsible for this slowdown.

The inherited problems of the economy, such as high inflation and large fiscal deficits forced the government to take measures to restore macroeconomic balances. The measures against inflation dates back to July 1997. Beginning in 1998, the government had reinforced these measures with the quarterly programs of the Treasury, the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance. Although it was far away from being a strict stabilization program, yet it reduced uncertainties and break inflationary expectations. The success of the government to obey these programs resulted in considerable

improvement in economic variables with optimism in financial and real sectors. Inflation began to decelerate since January, and in July inflation rate fell 20 points when compared with the beginning of the year. The yearly inflation rate is expected to fall further to 61% in December from 65.9% in September. This smooth and continuous fall, brings the rate of inflation back to its level prior to 1994 crisis.

To support the program by more strict policies and gain further credibility, the so-called "Memorandum of Economic Policies" was declared and the 'Staff Monitoring Agreement' signed at the end of June '98 with IMF.

The decrease in the inflation rate, the speed up in the privatisation process, the increase in tax revenues, the consensus in the parliament which gave way to the enactment of the tax reform, all of these factors increased positive expectations as to restoring macroeconomic balances in Turkey.

The effects of the Russian Crises

However, in August, the positive climate began to vanish. Nevertheless, the starting point of the dissolving optimism is certainly the Russian Crisis. This crisis came just one year later than the Asian crises and created suspect on all emerging economies including Turkey. Turkey is effected from the Russian crises because of trade relations, availability of foreign funds and foreign investors in the Turkish stock exchange market, which I will touch upon below.

❖ The foreign trade, the luggage trade and the invisible revenues of Turkey will definitely be negatively effected by the Russian crisis. Russia is one of the main counterparts of Turkey when the 2 billion USD registered export, and 5 billion USD unregistered export volumes are concerned. Including the tourism and entrepreneur revenues which amounts nearly 1.5 billion USD, the gain resulted from the Russian foreign trade constitutes almost 14 % of total foreign exchange revenues of Turkey. Consequently, the Russian Crisis may induce reductions in FX revenues. On the other hand, devaluation of Rubble will certainly cause a decline in import prices of Turkey, especially cheaper raw materials prices will promote the competition power of exports.

❖ In the international market the reluctance of international investors to lend to

emerging economies may make it difficult for Turkey to raise the necessary amounts to rollover its foreign debt. In this case, foreign debt repayments should be financed from the domestic market which will soar up inflationary pressures and interest rates.

- ❖ The recent financial crises around the world in emerging market economies caused international investors to change their portfolio allocations, moving away from not only a specific country that is no longer perceived as profitable, but from all countries having similar characteristics. As a result of the foreign investors' attitude of shifting away from all the emerging markets, the Istanbul Stock Exchange experienced one of its sharpest falling trends. However, the trend is over and the index has increased by 21% since then. However, since advanced economies will begin to be interested in real sector investment and production, instead of short-term capital investments, which become more risky with global crisis, the struggle on foreign funds among emerging markets will be harder and the well-performers will be those which attains progress on macroeconomic structure.

Considering the measures that Turkey has taken, there was considerable success on short-term measures but macroeconomic reforms are still to be realised. The bureaucrats have so far managed the crisis successfully by using international reserves, interest rates and corrections in tax legislation. The government introduced a number of measures designed to substantially ease the tax burden on financial markets, which had an immediate positive effect on financial markets. On the other hand, the rise in interest rates, coupled with Central Bank's foreign exchange sales helped to reduce the capital inflow. The Central Bank which has forced to sell over 4 billion \$ in three weeks to meet the demand, has began to rebuilt its reserves, which increased by 1.2 billion \$ since then. The interest rates which climbed sharply from 109 % to 157 %, which had been an indicator that market mechanism functions properly, decreased to 139% recently.

Turkey's structural strengths

In order to assess Turkey's outlook in the near future, I would like to draw your attention to **Turkey's structural strengths**.

Considering the crises in emerging markets, Turkey's historical achievements in the last 20 years should not be overlooked. Besides, setting up and operating market economy institutions, Turkey integrated its economy to world economy in this period.

- ❖ Turkey, reformed its legal structure and enacted new legislation to regulate markets within the market economy perspective. Turkey has liberal financial and goods markets, liberal foreign trade and capital movements. Turkey has enacted all multilateral agreements on environment. Turkish Competition Law was enacted, the Competition Board started to operate Turkish Patent Institute was founded and intellectual property legislation was modernised. State-aid regulation and incentive regime was reformed
- ❖ Furthermore, the Customs Union with the European Community is an important step for Turkey not only for integrating its economy into the biggest regional bloc in the world but also bringing a discipline to reforming its legal structure.
- ❖ The other important achievement is the Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). To be in conformity with the Common Commercial Policy of the EU and to be included in the Pan-European Cumulation of Origin System, Turkey has signed FTAs with the countries having FTAs with the EU. Turkey, in this way, further deepened its export markets.
- ❖ Being a raw materials importer (65 % total imports) and manufactured goods exporter (58 % of total exports) Turkey, is favourably effected from the slow down in international prices of raw materials, and of course likewise the EU benefiting of low oil prices.
- ❖ Having stable export markets (59.7 % of total export go to OECD countries), Turkey is less vulnerable to global recession.
- ❖ Has large and very dynamic domestic consumer market where consumer

durable demand has been growing more than 28% in real terms in the last three years.

- ❖ Total international reserves of 34 billion \$ can finance eight months imports.

The outlook for 1999

Under the assumption that there won't be a change in the direction of economic policies and meagre stability attempts will continue in 1999, it is estimated that the economy will slowdown but the inflation rate and public deficits will increase.

However, the government is more optimistic. According to the budget proposal in the Parliament, the growth rate and the average inflation rate are targeted as 3% and 44.4%, respectively. While the budget deficit to GNP ratio will fall to 7%. The foreign trade deficit and the current account deficit are estimated as \$23 billion and \$3.6 billion, respectively.

The expectation surveys and projections utilizing past trends indicate a different picture than that of government's. These record a decrease in production while predictions for the rate of inflation mark 70%.

The structure of the budget also supports the pessimistic approach. The attempts to roll over both domestic and foreign debt, relying mostly on internal market will cause real interest rates to increase further. High real interest rates will hurt investment and production efforts and aggravate inflation.

Under these conditions, it is probable 1999 will be a year with higher rate of inflation, together with a reduced growth. The budget deficit to GNP ratio will exceed the 7% target of the government and may record a level of 10% or more. The growth rate may still be somewhat bigger than the government's target of 3%, but possibly will be below 4%. The slowing domestic demand will prevent balance of payments imbalances. In this regard, it is probable that the government's targets on foreign balances may come true.

Turkey's structural weaknesses

The account for 1999 reiterates the importance of structural reforms.

Despite the good management of the repercussions of the Asian and Russian crises and the above mentioned economic, structural and legal strengths, there are also some **structural weaknesses** of the economy which should be dealt with serious concern.

In this regard, the efforts since June 1997 although insufficient should be regarded as the necessary first steps. The progress attained so far, should be supported by additional measures.

In order to put the economy on a stable path, which is less vulnerable to international shocks such as the recent cases, the officials had to finalise the reforms on the agenda of the Parliament in nearest future. *Tax reform*, putting aside some of its deficiencies a part, constitutes a good example of how a consensus may be reached and solutions to structural problems are found.

In this way, the *social security system*, the *agricultural support system* and *financial sector reforms* should be finalised.

These reforms will not only allow a sustainable growth path, but also will give Turkey, the chance of coming out from the crises as the target country for international investors.

Thank you for your attention.

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DRAFT**Bridge or Frontier? Turkey's Post-Cold War Geopolitical Posture in the Middle East, Asia**
and the BalkansCentral
2**Introduction**

Before analyzing the way Turkey has adapted its external policies to the geopolitical conditions of the post-Soviet world and, how it has responded to the challenges and opportunities presented by the new circumstances, it is important to discuss briefly the consequences the Soviet Union's collapse for the character and dynamics of the international political system and various regional sub-systems in which Turkey is involved. This analysis should be followed by a short assessment of the balance of negative and positive consequences of these systemic changes for Turkey's regional and international position.

Systemic Consequences of the Soviet Union's Disintegration

The end of the cold war, followed by the Soviet Union's collapse on December 1991 have drastically altered the character of the international political system and, the dynamics of inter-state relations. First, the disintegration of the Soviet Union's external and internal empires has changed the bi-polar character of the international political system to one which is often described as unipolar. What the latter term means, in fact, is an international system in which the United States has an overwhelming military preponderance and, the West, collectively, is economically dominant. It further means that there is no single power or a coalition of countries which can constitute a credible counterweight to the West's economic and military power.

This situation does not mean that the West has total freedom of action and the capacity to reorder the world according to its own liking and preferences. Nor does it mean that the West can

easily translate power into influence in the sense of making others behave as it wishes. It does, however, mean that in the post-Soviet era the West's freedom of action and its ability to project force abroad have both been enhanced, since it no longer has to be concerned with the reaction of a significant rival, such as the Soviet Union, as it was during the cold war.

This enhanced Western freedom of action and ability to project force into far flung areas was most dramatically demonstrated during the Persian Gulf war of January-March 1991, even before the official collapse of the Soviet Union when the United States introduced close to 500,000 military personnel into the Persian Gulf, an act which would have been inconceivable during the cold war. The other example is the introduction of NATO forces, into Bosnia.

The elimination of a significant counterweight to the West has also deeply affected the balance of influence between the West and other countries, especially those which are in a militarily and economically weak position. Again, this shift in the balance of influence does not mean that the Western powers can force other countries to do exactly what they want. But it does not mean that they can more easily take punitive measures against those countries of whose policies they disapprove, since they no longer have to be concerned about potential Soviet gains. A good example of this new situation is the U.S. policy towards Iran which substantially hardened after the Soviet Union's disintegration.

The elimination of the Soviet Union has also deprived the weaker countries of an alternative source of military and economic assistance further shifting the balance of influence in favor of the West.

Impact on Regional Politics and Balances of Power

The disintegration of the Soviet Union has also fundamentally altered the dynamics of regional

politics, especially those regions which are situated in the proximity of the former Soviet Union, such as the Middle East and the Balkans.

In terms of the overall balance of power the Soviet Union's demise has enhanced the position of pro-Western countries and, undermined those of countries which were close to the Soviet Union and, thus has reduced the impact of anti-Western states in shaping the pattern of regional politics. A good example of this situation is a serious erosion of Syria's influence in shaping Arab and Middle Eastern politics, including those regarding the issues of peace with Israel.

Iran has been another Middle East country whose position has been undermined by these systemic shifts as the United States has been able to pursue a punitive policy towards Iran without fearing Soviet inroads in that country.

Other consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union have been: 1) The erosion of cooperative dimensions of relations among a number of regional countries because of the elimination of the common Soviet threat. A good example of this is the deterioration of Turkish-Iranian and Iranian-Pakistani relations; 2) The intensification of the conflictual aspects of relations because of the resurfacing of old enmities which were suppressed during the cold war because of the common fear of Soviet expansionism; 3) The development of new alliances; and 4) Competition for influence in the post-Soviet space.

Impact on Turkey

The Soviet Union's disintegration has had such wide ranging systemic ramifications that it has left very few countries unaffected. However, the impact of this event has been stronger on those countries, notably Turkey, which have had common borders with the Soviet Union and, a long

history of interaction with the Russian empire before the advent of Communism. On balance, Turkey has benefitted from the systemic changes triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union as the following points illustrates: First, the collapse of the Soviet Union has weakened Turkey's enemies and rivals such as Syria, Iraq and Iran; Second, the weakening of its rivals has relieved Turkish foreign and security policy from certain constraints and has increased its options; Third, the collapse of the Soviet Union has opened up new areas for Turkish economic and political activities extending from the Balkans, to the Caucasus, Central Asia and Afghanistan; and Fourth, Western predominance in the international system has benefitted Turkey which is a major ally and partner of the West.

Two of the concrete examples of how these changes have affected Turkish policy are the strategic alliance concluded between Turkey and Israel, and the Turkish threat of the use of force against Syria if it did not end its support to the PKK and continued to shelter its leader Abdullah Ocalan. It is extremely unlikely that Turkey could have embarked on either of these courses if the Soviet Union was still standing.

On the negative ledger the Soviet Union's disintegration has created a belt of actual or potential instability in Turkey's vicinity, be it in the Caucasus or in the Balkans, which could potentially, although not very likely, involve Turkey in regional conflicts or face it with difficult choices.

Turkish Responses to the Post-Soviet Geopolitical Environment

In order to understand the process of how Turkey has responded to the post-Soviet world and, has developed the basic frame work of its foreign policy to fit the new circumstances two points must first be noted: 1) This process of adjustment and response to the post-Soviet regional and

international dynamics has not yet been completed and, therefore, Turkish policies vis a vis a range of areas and issues are likely to evolve in light of new developments, especially the evolution of the Russian situation and policies. 2) The creation of the modern Turkish republic in 1923 and the consolidation of the Communist power in Russia nearly coincided. What the latter point implies is that for sixty eight years Turkish foreign policy at regional and international levels was to a considerable degree determined by the fact of the proximity of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War years this fact played a determining role in shaping the character and direction of Turkey's foreign policy.

The consequences of this proximity for Turkey's security and other interests were mixed. On the one hand, it made Turkey vulnerable to Soviet pressures, including its efforts to internally destabilize the country and, on the other hand, it enhanced Western interest in Turkey and led to its inclusion in the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Membership in NATO gave Turkey a strong Western security guarantee as well as a seat in the highest councils of the West, plus economic and military benefits. Of course, Turkey was not always enchanted with policies and attitudes of its allies regarding issues that it considered to be of vital importance to its security. Nevertheless, it has, by and large, considered the benefits of its Western alliance outweighing its inconveniences. In particular, the powerful military, the bureaucracy, especially the foreign ministry and, in the last few decades, the vibrant entrepreneurial class have supported Turkey's West-centered policy.

Another factor which should be taken into account in this connection is the modern Turkey's vocation to become a Westernized country and an integral part of Europe. Turkey's other geographic aspects, notably the fact that the bulk of its territory is in Asia and, that it

borders both Iran and the Arab world, as well as its Islamic culture, have exerted their influence on its regional policies and, at times, have led to differences of opinion with its Western allies. Nevertheless, often, Turkey's regional choices have been affected by its overall Western orientation and more importantly its Western vocation.

This does not mean that Turkey has always agreed with its Western allies policies towards regions which are of importance to its interests, or that at times it has not hesitated to follow policies that differ from those of its allies.

However, this has been within certain limits, namely that Turkey has been careful that its regional policies do not strain its ties with its Western allies beyond a certain point unless such policies relate to an issue--such as Cyprus-- that Turkey views to be vital to its national interest. Three additional points need also to be noted before examining the process of Turkey's adjustment to the post-Soviet world namely that: 1) the post-Soviet patterns of international and regional relations have not yet been consolidated and, are in a state of flux. This means that all countries would need a flexible approach to many issues in the coming years; 2) In many respects the post-Soviet era began before the official end of the Soviet Union, with the end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union's external empire which started with the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989.

Therefore, those countries which had been a particular focus of cold war competition began to feel the impact of these changes as early as 1989 and, had to reassess their new geopolitical position and security environment and, rethink the old underlying premises of their foreign and security policies. Because of its central place within the geopolitical environment of the cold war era Turkey was one of the first countries to undergo this process; 3) even before the

collapse of the Soviet Union, the process of Glasnost and Perestroika had eliminated most of the barriers to communication and interaction between various peoples of the Soviet Union and their ethnic, linguistic and religious kins in the neighboring areas. This enhanced interaction not only had raised new questions regarding issues such as ethnic and cultural identity and the direction of external relations for various Soviet republics, but also for their neighboring countries.

Given the considerable number of Turkic peoples in the Soviet Union, plus Turkey's historic links with many of these peoples Turkey was deeply affected by these developments. An important aspect of the impact of these events was the triggering of debate in Turkey regarding its own identity and, the necessity of reassessing some of basic foundations of its security and foreign policy.

Period of Anxiety: 1987-1990

Turkey received the end of cold war with feelings of anxiety and expectation. This mixed reaction derived from a concern on the part of Turkey that the warming of East-West relations would reduce its strategic importance to its Western allies and, this diminished significance would then translate into less economic and military assistance and, perhaps a harsher Western attitude towards human rights issues in Turkey. Nor these concerns were totally unfounded. Indeed, in the late 80's a number of U.S. lawmakers, including such influential figures as the former Republican senator Robert Dole, were expressing the opinion that U.S. should reduce its assistance to a group of countries, which included Turkey, on the grounds that the end of the cold war had diminished their importance for the United States. (1)

Meanwhile, although the relaxation of internal politics in the Soviet Union had created opportunities for Turkey to expand its ties with the Turkic-speaking populations of the U.S.S.R.,

it was, nevertheless, clear that as long as the Soviet Union remained intact, even in an altered state, there would be limits to Turkish presence and, Russia would remain the principal actor in this space. This factor, plus the fact that the traditionally prudent streak of Turkish foreign policy was still strong at this time meant that while a variety of Turkish political, cultural and other groups became active in various republics of the Soviet Union the Turkish government remained cautious in its approach towards developments there. (2)

This desire not to become embroiled in the Soviet Union's internal disputes was best illustrated during the 1989 crisis in Azerbaijan triggered by the Armenian-Azerbaijani disputes which led to the introduction of Soviet troops into Baku in January 1990.

President Turgut Ozal, who at the time, was visiting the United States, when asked about Turkey's reaction to these events said that the Azerbaijan crisis was more of concern to Iran than to Turkey because the Azerbaijanis were Shi'a. This statement, however, generated a strong and negative reaction on the part of a considerable segment of the Turkish population and political elite. For example, Bulent Ecevit the leader of the Democratic Left Party, warned that Turkish neglect would force Azerbaijanis into the arms of Iran. There were even disagreements between Ozal and his foreign minister Mesut Yilmaz on this subject. (3)

Conditions prevailing in the Middle East at the time also did not offer much opportunities for Turkey to prove its continued importance for its Western allies. In the summer (August) of 1988 Iran had just concluded a humiliating ceasefire agreement with Iraq and, was in the throes of a deep national soul searching about the result of not only the war with Iraq, but also 10 years of a revolutionary Islamic government. Not only the revolution had lost its elan, the very system it had created was under serious questioning by the people.

Iraq, meanwhile, was still viewed by the West in a bening light, although some of its neighbors, notably Kuwait, were beginning to feel uncomfortable with the imbalance that Iran's defeat had created in the Persian Gulf.

In short, there were no exceptional circumstances which could enable Turkey to assume a new role which would compensate for the erosion of its strategic significance.

Yet, this period while a time of anxiety and uncertainty for Turkey was neither an inactive episode in terms of Turkish diplomacy, nor a stagnant one in terms of new thinking about the underlying premises of Turkish foreign policy and how they should be reassessed or revised in response to the new circumstances.

On the diplomatic front, Turkey under the leadership of its then prime minister and later president Turgut Ozal intensified its efforts to become integrated into the European community (EC), as it was then called. As a result of this strategy, in 1987, Turkey applied for full membership of the EC, although it was advised against doing so by a large number of existing members.

EC's refusal to accept Turkey's application accelarated the process of new thinking in Turkey about alternative strategies to follow. One such idea was that Turkey should forge a close bilateral strategic and trade alliance with the United States. But, as noted earlier, at the time the atmosphere in the U.S. was not very propitious to such schemes. It was also during this period that Tukey began to develop the idea for a Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone. The first important step towards preparing the ground work for the establishment of BESEC was taken before the collpase of the Soviet Union during a meeting in Ankara in December 1990 in which deputy foreign ministers of Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and the Soviet Union took part. (4)

On the intellectual front, a number of political analysts and key politicians were beginning to openly challenge the underpinnings of Turkey's foreign policy, especially its prudent and non-interventionist dimensions. One important aspect of this rethinking was a reassessment of the Ottoman past and, efforts to develop a modern version of Ottomanism as a framework for a new Turkish world view and foreign policy.

The Turkish journalist Cengiz Condar was an important proponent of this view. It should be noted here that the emergence of the neo-Ottomanist school of thought was partly the culmination of a ten year old process of rehabilitation of Turkey's Ottoman past. As Edward Mortimer put Ozal "had debanked the orthodox Kemalist vision of history with its near deification of Ataturk and the denigration of the Ottoman past." (5) The underlying theme of the neo-Ottomanism was that Turkey should no longer be bound by the strait-jacket of the Kemalist theory or, at least, the particular interpretation of Ataturk's thinking that was accepted during most of the life of the modern Turkish republic. Some Turkish scholars have recently been questioning this interpretation as representing Ataturk's views accurately. (6)

Once freed from this partly self-imposed limitations the neo-Ottomanists, such as Candar, recommended that Turkey "must develop an imperial vision", while stressing that this vision should not be interpreted as "expansionism or adventurism". Rather this vision meant the "free movement of people, ideas and goods in the lands of the old Ottoman empire". (7)

This period also saw a revival of pan-Turkist ideas, although they were more fully elaborated after the Soviet Union's fall. Many intellectuals, political analysts and, some officials began to talk about the need to shed old taboos against pan-Turkism. Thus professor Aydin Yalcin wrote that pan-Turkism was an idea whose time had arrived. According to him, the

collapse of the Soviet Union and the discreditation of Communism “had finally given a public expression and support to pan-Turkism.” (8) However, this new version of pan-Turkism was different from the earlier concept in that it essentially aimed at creating a Turkic group of countries within which Turkey would play a leadership role economically and politically rather than a closely knit political union.

The following quote from the head of the Turkic Department of the Turkish foreign ministry, Bilal Samir expresses this new vision. According to him, Turkey’s efforts to develop ties with the Turkic republics could lead to the emergence of “something similar to the Nordic Council, the Arab League, or the Organization of American States.” He then asked “What is more natural than Turkey taking the lead in creating such a grouping?...This is not Pan-Turkism in the wrong meaning, it is not expansionism...The Nordics, the Arabs, the Latins and others have such groups. Why should not the Turkish people?” (9)

Period of Euphoria 1991-1993: Turkey as the Center of a New Eurasia

By the late 1990, events which were taking place in the Soviet Union and in the Middle East not only would ease Turkey’s concerns regarding the erosion of its strategic significance and its value to its Western allies, but would give it--and others--a new appreciation of its potential as a significant player in three sensitive regions namely, Central Asia and the Caucasus, the Middle East and the Balkans. Furthermore, these developments would enhance Turkey’s value to its Western allies. They would also give rise to a Turkish version of Eurasianism according to which Turkey would be the epicenter of a land mass extending from the northern Caucasus to the Great Wall of China and from the Adriatic to the Persian Gulf.

These important developments were the Persian Gulf crisis and war of August 1990-

March 1991, and the acceleration of the disintegration of the Soviet Union leading to its official end in December of 1991.

Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait: Implication for Turkish Policy

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and, the ensuing events which led to the formation of an international coalition against Saddam Hussein and, eventually to the war of 1991 initially faced Turkey with a difficult choice. The basic dilemma faced by Turkey was the following: To remain neutral in the conflict or to become an active participant in the anti-Saddam coalition.

The decision to go either way was not an easy one. A solid majority--65%--of the Turk's favored a neutral posture. A non-negligible number of officials of the Turkish foreign ministry also leaned in this direction. They felt that Turkey's traditional policy of minimum involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts had served it well and, that there was no need to alter that policy. It is also worth noting that Turkey's defence minister at the time resigned over policy disagreements regarding the Persian Gulf conflict.

It was against these oppositions that President Ozal opted for Turkey's full engagement in the anti-Saddam coalition, arguing that the changes triggered by the end of the cold war necessitated a more activist and less cautious Turkish policy at regional and international levels. He perceived the opportunities that the Iraq crisis offered Turkey to demonstrate its continued strategic importance to its allies. Thus he talked about the pivotal role that Turkey should play in setting up the post-war structure of the Middle East, including its becoming a pillar of the post-war security system in the Persian Gulf. Many of these expectations did not materialize. But this was largely because no regional security system was set up for the Persian Gulf and, the Gulf states opted for bilateral security arrangements with the Western countries. The way the Gulf war

ended also created new difficulties for Turkey in dealing with its Kurdish problem. There was also loss of income because of the closure of the pipeline exporting Iraqi oil through Turkey.

Nevertheless, the shift produced in the regional balance of power by the Gulf war, largely because of the enhanced U.S. military and political presence in the Persian Gulf and the weakening of the anti-Western countries in the Middle East, created new policy options for Turkey in the Middle East and enhanced its relative power vis-a-vis its neighbors and hence its freedom of action.

The best example of this new configuration has been the strategic and political alliance formed between Israel and Turkey and, the Syrian-Turkish showdown over Syria's harboring of Abdullah Ocalan the PKK leader. (10) This showdown ended in a clear victory for Turkey since Ocalan was expelled from Syria and was caught in Italy in November 1998 while returning from Moscow. (11)

The Collapse of the Soviet Union: Turkey as the Model for Post-Soviet States

By the early 1991, especially after Michael Gorbachev's New Union Treaty presented in March failed to gain acceptance and the political infighting continued in Moscow, it had become clear that the Soviet Union as then constituted would not last much longer. Given the fact that a considerable number of the Soviet Union's constituent republics were inhabited by Muslims the question of their future ideological orientation and, hence to a great extent, their foreign policy choices had become of serious concern to Turkey's Western allies and to Turkey itself. The main concern was that these countries might be influenced by radical Islamist ideas, especially those similar to the views espoused by the Islamic government in Iran and thus fall under its sway.

The antidote to an Iranian-inspired political ideology and system of government was

considered by the West to be Turkey's secular ideology and form of government. Thus already by 1991 the so-called Turkish model was promoted by the West as the best alternative to Communism. The disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991 intensified this process. Furthermore, as early as January 1992 the United States embarked on a policy of preventing Iranian inroads in the Caucasus and Central Asia and, in general weakening and isolating it. (12) This policy was further refined by the Clinton Administration in the context of its Dual Containment strategy.

These developments enhanced Turkey's value to its allies as barrier against the Islamist contagion and Iranian influence in the post-Soviet Muslim states and, strengthened its position among the latter as the favored partner of the West.

The collapse of the Soviet Union, moreover, intensified the shifts in the regional balance of power triggered by the Persian Gulf war by depriving the anti-Western countries from their supporter. As an ally of the West Turkey was a beneficiary of this new configuration of power.

Policy Consequences

The result of this favorable geopolitical circumstances was increased Turkish activism in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. A detailed account of the forms that this activism took is neither necessary here nor within the scope of the present paper. Suffice it to say that it was multi-dimensional--economic, cultural, political and security--and, involved the government and, the private sector both economic and political. (13) One aspect of this activism which is worth noting because it has current relevance is Turkey's campaign to become the main export outlet for the energy resources of Central Asia and the Caucasus.

The greatest success of the Turkish diplomacy in this period was in Azerbaijan when the

pro-Turkish Azerbaijan Popular Front and its leader Abul Fazl Elcibey came to power in June 1992. Elcibey idolized Ataturk and, in the past, he had expressed the wish that someday Turkey and Azerbaijan would form a federation or confederation. During the short-lived Elcibey presidency Turkey also established security relationship with Azerbaijan, including the training of the Azerbaijani military personel, a relationship which would survive the fall of the APF government and Elcibey. (14)

There were some efforts at reconciliation with Armenia, but they fell victim to the dynamics of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as well as certain deep-rooted historical factors. In the Middle East, this period marked the beginning of a process of forging a close Turkish-Israeli partnership, which according to some analysts extended to the Transcaucasus and Central Asia. (15)

Initially, concerns over the negative implications of the Arab-Israeli peace for Turkey's security and strategic importance and, the desire to gain the support of the American Jewish community for Turkey were the primary motives behind Turkey's rapprochement with Israel. The following quotes from a series of articles written by former Turkish ambassador to the U.S. and which appeared in "Miliyet" indicates this line of reasoning.

In one article Sukru Elekdag wrote that "The Israeli lobby in the United States is far superior to all other ethnic lobbies put together. Whenever this lobby has worked for us, Turkey's interests have been perfectly protected against the fools in the United States. The development of relations between Turkey and Israel and the formalization of their de-facto alliance will place this lobby permanently on our side." (16)

Meanwhile, there was a concern that peace between Israel and the Arabs would reduce

Turkey's importance for Israel and, might also shift the military balance against Turkey in the southeast, because after resolving the Golan dispute Syria would be able to move its troops to the Turkish border. (17)

During this period Turkey also finalized the process of the creation of BESC. The Turkish foreign minister invited his counterparts from Bulgaria, Romania and the Soviet successor states of Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and the Russian Federation which had been involved in the initial talks while the Soviet Union was still in existence together in Istanbul on 13 February 1992. The aim of the meeting as stated at the time was to enable the successor states to renew their commitments and prepare for the signing of the declaration on Black Sea Economic Cooperation. During this meeting it was also decided that Greece and Yugoslavia could attend the planned summit meeting as founding members of BESEC provided that they applied to the Turkish foreign ministry before May 1992, which they did. Later it was also agreed that Albania could join BESEC as a founding member and, eventually Armenia also became a member.

The summit meeting and the founding conference were held on 25 June 1992 in Istanbul and thus BESEC came to official existence as a regional economic organization. The creation of BESEC is the best example of an important aspect of Turkey's post-Soviet foreign policy strategy namely the use of regionalism as an instrument of both mitigating conflictual aspects of inter-state relations as well as a vehicle for expanding Turkish influence in a non-threatening manner.

Other Balkan Issues

Despite the fact that the Ottoman empire had had a long and pervasive political and cultural

presence in the Balkans and, the existence of considerable number of Muslims in the region as well as the presence of Turkish citizens of Balkan origin until the outbreak of the Bosnian crisis Turkey did not have an active Balkan policy.

Of course, policies such as the creation of the BESEC and the promotion of regional cooperation had a Balkan dimension, but it was not specifically designed to address issues related to the Balkans. Nevertheless, two factors seem to have influenced Turkish outlook towards the Balkans. The first has been an increasing feeling among considerable segments of Turkish people that Turkey has a moral responsibility for the Muslim population of the Balkans. The pressure of the public opinion understandably became strongest during the height of the Bosnian crisis.

The second factor which somehow runs counter to pressures emanating from the public opinion has been Turkey's determination to avoid any action that might be interpreted as adventurism or the pursuance of any irredentist claim towards former Ottoman territories and, consequently cause difficulties in Turkey's relations with its Western allies. (18)

The result of the interaction between these two contradictory factors has been a Turkish policy that has tried to influence events in the Balkans but essentially within multilateral frameworks such as NATO, OSCE and the United Nations. Turkish handling of the Bosnian crisis illustrates Turkey's efforts to reconcile these two influences. Turkey tried hard to argue the case of the Bosnian Muslims within the U.N. and NATO and, undertook other diplomatic activities in this direction, including in its capacity as the president of the OIC, but it scrupulously avoided to take any unilateral action. (19)

Similarly, Turkey did not allow public concern over the Balkan Muslims and, a sense of

moral responsibility towards them to affect the development and improvement of its relations with individual Balkan countries. This has even been the case where the Muslims in question have been ethnic Turks. The best example of this approach is the evolution of Turkish-Bulgarian relations which after a difficult period in the 1980's now seem to have entered a cooperative stage. (20) In short, if one were to analyze Turkish post-Soviet foreign policy within the paradigm of daring versus caution, as one scholar of the Turkish scene has done, in regard to the Balkans caution has predominated over daring. (21)

Nevertheless, developments in the Balkans, especially the break up of Yugoslavia and the dynamics that they have set in motion, have had negative consequences for aspects of Turkey's relations. For example, they have exacerbated other conflictual dimensions of Greek-Turkish relations. Nevertheless, both countries' desire not to endanger their other interests, especially as they relate to their membership in NATO, has, so far, limited the extent of damage that Balkan developments could have done to their ties.

Moreover, in the last few years the gradual improvement in relations between Athens and Tirana coupled with the easing of tensions between Greece and the FYRM have reduced the negative impact of Balkan developments on Greek-Turkish relations without, however, eliminating it.

Nevertheless, the opening up of the Balkan countries after the fall of the Soviet Union has triggered a degree of competition between Greece and Turkey for economic and political presence in the Balkans.

The Period of Disillusionment: 1994-1996: Russia Flexes Its Muscles

During the period of political infighting within the Soviet leadership between the pro-Gorbachev

and pro-Yeltsin elements the latter had encouraged nationalists and pro-independence movements within various republics. Moreover, statements by such key liberal figures as Andrei Kozyrev to the effect that in future Russia's greatness should be measured not in terms of its size but in terms of the well being of its people, coupled with the talk of a Euro-Atlantic Partnership encompassing Russia, Europe and, the United States seemed to indicate that Russia had abandoned any desire of exerting a controlling influence over its ex-colonial possessions.

However, this perception was a misreading of the Russian thinking. Russia--including the Euro-Atlantists--had never forgotten Russia's intrinsically Eurasian character, nor had they abandoned what they saw as its civilizing mission in the post-Soviet states. The difference was that the Euro-Atlantists believed that they would be able to perform this function in partnership with the West. More importantly, the Russians felt that a strong Russian presence in the post-Soviet space, especially in the south, was essential for the maintenance of the security of the Russian Federation. (22) In short, Russia continued to see itself as the main hub and center of the Eurasian land mass, a vision which inevitably clashed with Turkey's view of itself as the principal link between Asia and Europe.

The Eurasionist school of thinking in Russia became stronger as the so-called Russo-Western honeymoon came to end by the mid 1993. This development in the Russian thinking led to a more interventionist Russian policy in the former Soviet Union, especially in the Caucasus. It also led to active Russian campaign to ensure the transport of Caspian energy resources through the Russian port of Novorossiysk. This Russian objective was another challenge to Turkey's desire to be the main transit hub for the Caspian energy.

The new Russian activism in the Caucasus contributed to the fall of the pro-Turkish

government of Abul Fazl Elcibey and, later the stationing of Russian troops in Armenia and Georgia.

Elcibey's fall was viewed with dismay in Turkey because they suspected Aliev of being Russia's man. (23) However, these fears were proved to have been exaggerated, and Turkish-Azerbaijani relations remained close under Aliev.

Events in Central Asia, too, developed in a direction which fell short of Turkey's earlier expectations. The Central Asian countries were eager to develop relations with Turkey and, to form a loose kind of Turkic grouping symbolized by the periodic Turkic summits. But they were even more keen to assert their independence and, to diversify the range of their diplomatic and economic contacts and, in short, to become full participants in the international arena rather than junior partners in a grand Turkic coalition under Turkish leadership. (24)

The participation of these countries in Western security institutions, most notably in NATO's Partnership for Peace Program and, their signing of association agreements with the European Union has helped the process of their integration within the international community. This in turn, has reduced their need for an intermediary be it Turkey, Russia or some other country.

However, as events later would show, the pessimistic mood that gripped Turkey after the change of government in Azerbaijan and, renewed fears about Russian neo-imperialism were exaggerated. In the following years, Turkey consolidated its position both in Azerbaijan and Georgia and, maintained its good relations with the Central Asian countries. Turkey has also gained the support of the Caspian countries for the export of their energy through Turkey.

Indeed, what was viewed by Turkey as a major blow to its aspirations to become the

critical center of a new Eurasia was, in fact, the beginning of a process of regional shifts and realignments in response to the entry of new actors and the gradual integration of the post-Soviet space into the international political system.

These developments in the post-Soviet space, nevertheless, had an important impact on Turkey's thinking regarding its foreign policy priorities. By demonstrating the limits of a Eastward looking strategy, these real or perceived disappointments, shifted Turkey's attention towards Europe and the question of its integration within the European institutions. They may also have contributed to the acceleration of Turkish-Israeli rapprochement.

The Erbakan Interlude: 1996-1997

The Turkish Islamists' world view and their vision of Turkey's regional and international roles were in sharp contrast to those of Turkey's traditional elites. Consequently, the kind of foreign policy they advocated for Turkey was also different from one pursued by Turkey throughout most of its existence in its present form and within its present boundaries.

To put it very simply, the Islamists believed that Turkey should replace its Western orientation with an Islamic orientation. Thus, according to the Islamists, Turkey should leave NATO and abandon its aspiration to become part of the EU. Instead it should expand its relations with Islamic countries, play a leadership role within the Islamic world and, create an Islamic common market.

Thus when in June 1996 Necmettin Erbakan the leader of the Islamist Refah party became Turkey's prime minister within the framework of a coalition with the True Path there were expectations of a significant shift in the orientation of Turkish foreign policy and serious anxieties among Turkey's Western allies regarding potential changes in Turkey's approach to

regional and international issues. (25)

Indeed, during the brief premiership of Erbakan there were some steps towards improving and expanding Turkey's relations with Muslim countries. (26) This strategy had both a bilateral and a multilateral dimension. The latter dimension was reflected in the establishment of a so-called group of eight which included Turkey, Iran, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Bangladesh. (27)

Yet, regarding the essentials of Turkey's foreign policy, including its NATO membership, the question of its relations with Israel, and the Customs Union with the EU the Erbakan government did not make any changes. This passivity reflected the impact of several factors: 1) The limited mandate of Rifah. It is important to note that Rifah had only captured 21 percent of popular vote; 2) Continued influence of the secular military and political elites; 3) The realization of the costs of imprudent changes of strategy such as withdrawal from NATO; and 4) The disappointing results of Islamic diplomacy. (28)

Renewed Confidence and the Emergence of New Alliances: 1997-Present

Since the end of the Erbakan interlude Turkish foreign policy has been characterized by an effort to consolidate gains made in the former Soviet space and in the Balkans in the past several years and, the formation of a new strategic alliance with Israel which will have important consequences, both of a positive and negative nature, for Turkey's relations with its neighbors and beyond.

Despite the fears which were generated by Russia's activism in the Caucasus and Central Asia regarding the renewal of Russian hegemony which would lead to an inevitable Turkish retreat from these regions, events in the last few years have led to a weakening of Russian grip

over the post-Soviet space.

The most important event was the Chechen war which demonstrated the inefficacy of brute force in reestablishing Russian control not only over former Soviet states, but also over the non Russian members of the Russian Federation itself. The Chechen war has also made it much less probable that Russia would resort to the use of force to prevent the slippage of its influence in the former Soviet space.

The second event has been the worsening economic and political crisis in Russia itself which has further reduced its ability to use economic incentives and instruments to reestablish a controlling influence over the former Soviet States. Furthermore, the heavy-handed policies of Russia vis-a-vis some Soviet successor states, such as Georgia, have backfired and, have encouraged them to balance Russian influence by expanding their ties with other countries, including Turkey.

The failure of Russia's efforts to regain control over the post-Soviet space have not translated into an absolute Turkish gain because of factors discussed earlier. But within the limits of a more realistic Turkish view of what it can achieve in the former Soviet States which has been emerging since 1995, Turkey's position and influence in these countries has improved and stabilized. The most dramatic departure from traditional Turkish policy has been the alliance with Israel. The alliance has obvious benefits for Turkey in terms of enhancing its military, industrial, and technological capabilities. The costs are mostly in terms of relations with Arab and Muslim countries. The unhappiness of these countries about Turkish-Israeli ties was clearly demonstrated during the Islamic summit of December 1997 in Tehran. However, in view of current military and strategic balance internationally and in the Middle East coupled with the

economic difficulties of Arab states it is unlikely that this unhappiness could be translated into a serious joint Arab or Arabo-Islamic challenge to Turkey. (29)

Nevertheless, the Israeli-Turkish alliance has contributed to some closing of Arab ranks, an improvement in Arab-Iranian relations and emerging cooperative arrangements which go beyond the Middle East as traditionally defined.

Conclusions

The end of the cold war, the Persian Gulf war of 1991, followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union have dramatically altered the character of the international political system and the subordinate regional sub-systems, especially those situated in the proximity of the former Soviet Union.

These changes were triggered because of a shift in the balance of power in favor of the West and its regional allies, the re-emergence of old conflicts, the surfacing of new disputes, plus the reappearance and religitimization of old ethno centric political ideologies.

These changes have necessitated a process of rethinking and reappraisal of old premises of foreign policy on the part of many countries. Moreover, the balance of benefits and losses resulting from these systemic changes has not been equal in the case of different countries. Turkey as a neighbor of the former Soviet Union and a country with extensive historical, cultural and ethno-linguistic links with many of the peoples of the Soviet Union has been affected by these changes.

These changes have triggered discussion about the validity of the basic premises of Turkey's traditional foreign policy, including the balance between an Eastern and Western orientation. They have also given currency to old and, largely discarded, ideologies such as pan-

Turkism, and elicited debate about what should be the balance between daring and caution in Turkey's approach to the new circumstances. In adjusting to these changes Turkey has passed through various phases extending from excessive optimism to extreme pessimism and, a brief experimentation with an Islamic ally-oriented foreign policy. To its credit, however, Turkey has not allowed its policy to be determined by the excessively unrealistic and perhaps adventurous impulses unleashed after the Soviet collapse. Rather, it has endeavoured to achieve its goals through legitimate bilateral and multilateral channels. And in this it has greatly benefitted from the current configuration of international and regional power and the active support of its allies.

Now after ten years since the end of the cold war Turkey seems to be reconciling its various interests and aspirations and striking a balance between continuity and change and daring and caution in its foreign policy.

All in all Turkey has been a beneficiary of the post-Soviet systemic changes although its new environment is not without risk.

I.

Footnotes

- 1) See: Duygu Bazoglusezer "Turkey's Grand Strategy Facing A Dilemma" The International Spectator, Vol. XXVII, No. 1, January-March 1992, "In the spring of 1990, The American Congress pressed for the passage of strongly anti-Turkish resolution that threatened drastic cuts in annual military aid" p. 25.
- 2) These groups included Islamist and ultra-nationalist elements as well.
- 3) Other opposition figures also reacted negatively to President Ozal's statement see: "Ozal, Yilmaz far apart on Azerbaijan" Turkish Daily News, January 23, 1990.
- 4) On the beginning of BESEC see: Oral Sander "Turkey and the Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation" in Kemal H. Karpat (ed) Turkish Foreign Policy: Recent Developments, Madison, Wis: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996.
- 5) Edward Mortimer "A Tale of Two Funerals: Reviving Islam Challenges Ataturk's Legacy of Secularism" Financial Times Surveys: Turkey May 7, 1993.
- 6) For example, some scholars have challenged the view that dictum peace at home, peace abroad was coined by Ataturk.
- 7) On Candar's view see Sami Cohen "Contact with Central Asian States: A Foundation for Pan-Turkism" The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, August/September 1992.
- 8) Ibid.
- 9) Ibid.
- 10) On Israeli-Turkish alliance see: Daniel Pipes "A New Axis: The Emerging Turkish-Israeli Entente" National Interest, No. 50, Winter 1997-1998.
- 11) On Syrian-Turkish crisis see: "Turks Give Syria Last Warning" Washington Post, October 7, 1998.
- 12) On U.S. attitude towards Iran's presence in Central Asia see: Thomas L. Friedman "U.S. to Counter Iran in Central Asia" New York Times, February 6, 1992.
- 13) For examples of Turkish activities see: Kemal H. Karpat "The Foreign Policy of Central Asian States, Turkey and Iran" in Kemal H. Karpat (ed) Turkish Foreign Policy op. Cit..

II.

- 14) Aliev after coming to power agreed that Turkey should continue to train Azerbaijani military personnel. See: "Azerbaijan Asks Turkey to Train More Officers" RFE/RL Daily Report, No. 2, January 1994.
- 15) See: "Israel and Turkey in the New World Order" Israeli Foreign Affairs, Vol. VIII, No. 5, May 31, 1992.
- 16) See: "Paper Views Common Interests with Israel" Milliyet, November 7, 1994.
- 17) See: The third part of the above article in Milliyet dated December 4, 1994.
- 18) On Turkey's Balkan policy see: Gulnur Aybet Turkey's Foreign Policy and its Implications for the West. London: Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, 1994. PP. 31-43.
- 19) Ibid.
- 20) Recent visits by Turkish and Bulgarian leaders to each others' countries, including Prime Minister Yilmaz's visit to Bulgaria in early November reflects this improved atmosphere.
- 21) See: Malik Mufti "Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy" Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, No. 1, Winter 1998.
- 22) On Russian thinking in this regard and various schools of thought see: Mohaiddin Mesbahi "Russian Foreign Policy and Security in Central Asia and the Caucasus" Central Asian Survey, Vol. 112, No. 2, 1993.
- 23) For a certain period Turkey continued to support Elcibey and refused to recognize the new government. See: Shireen T. Hunter The Trans-Caucasus in Transition: Nation Building and Conflict, Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies/West view Press, 1994.
- 24) On the evolution of the Central Asian countries foreign policy see: Shireen T. Hunter, Central Asia Since Independence, Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1990.
- 25) See: Steven Erlanger "Islamic Turkey Perturbs West" International Herald Tribune, August 12, 1996.
- 26) Iran was among the countries especially targeted by Erbakan partly for economic reasons.
- 27) On Erbakan's foreign policy see: Philip Robins "Turkish Foreign Policy Under Erbakan" Survival, Vol. 39, No. 12, summer 1997.

III.


28) A particular embarrassing and sobering incident was the fiasco of Erbakan's visit to Libya during which Colonel Gadhafi criticized Turkey's treatment of its Kurdish population.

29) See: Alain Gresh "Turkish-Israeli-Syrian Relations and their Impact on the Middle East" Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, No. 2, spring 1998.

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Figure 23

La Turquie : un carrefour gazier et pétrolier potentiel




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

IFP /Direction Stratégie-Économie-Programme/ 1997

Table 1
THE WEB: COMPETING ROUTES FOR
EXPORTING CENTRAL ASIAN OIL

Route	Construction Required (kilometers)	Terminal	Constraints	Boundaries
Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) via Novorossiysk	1,500	Expand	Bosphorus; less than 100,000 deadweight tons (dwt)	Russia + Kazakhstan
CPC via Ceyhan	2,500	Expand	None	Russia + Georgia (+ Abkhazia)
CPC via Aegean	2,750	New	No very large crude carriers	Russia + Moldavia + Trans-Dneister + Greece + Romania + Bulgaria
Baku to Black Sea	Upgrade	Expand or rebuild	Bosphorus; less than 1000,000 dwt	Russia (Georgia)
Baku via Iran	150-400	None	None	Iran
Caspian area	100-150	Yes	None	Iran



**TURQUIE ET EGYPTE,
CARREFOURS D'ECHANGES EN MEDITERRANEE**
(Gazoducs et oléoducs)



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DRAFT

Where Turkey Stands?

Seyfi Tashan

The announcement of EU's enlargement program at the Luxembourg Summit on December 12-13, 1997 that excluded Turkey from the foreseeable enlargement program even though its eventual candidacy for integration has been granted has led to a kind of soul searching, and has raised many questions that need answers.

Will Turkey be excluded from the building of the 21st Century Europe? Does Turkey have to find a new place for herself in the evolving system of partnerships and alliances? What will be the effects of the eventual creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy on Turkey's overall security interests in her zones of interest in Europe and elsewhere? Will Europe's policies towards Turkey be guided by Greek hostility and ethnic nationalism in some of the European countries? What will be the effects of the putting of Turkey-EU relations to Greek calens on Turkey-US relations? Will alienation be the order of the day in the mutual images of Turkey and Western European Countries, and what will be the impact of this alienation on the nearly 4 million Turks living in various European Countries?

There are more questions to be asked because European countries are important for Turkey both as individual countries and as European Union and other European organizations.

In this article, an attempt will be made to review Turkey's foreign and security issues in the context of Turkey's overall foreign and security policy implementations.

In EU countries and the US in the wake of the Luxembourg Summit, Turkey's strategic importance is a debated subject. A frequently asked question is whether Turkey's strategic importance has diminished. A sound answer to this question can only be given only if we can determine why and for whom Turkey has had a strategic importance. The evaluation of this importance is closely related to the attributed positive or negative functions of Turkey to help in dissipating or aggravating threats and risks perceived by various countries against their security and social orders. For example, Germany at this moment does not perceive any significant external threat to its national security. Yet, in resolving such problems as refugees, migrations, anti-drug warfare, terrorism, etc., Turkey's cooperation as a strategic partner might be deemed highly useful. However, the reluctance of European countries from entering into a meaningful institutional cooperation demonstrates their reluctance also in this highly important field.

The US, on the other hand, in keeping with its superpower status considers Turkey as a strategic ally insofar as its strategic interests in the region are concerned. Yet, the anti-Turkish lobbies in the US are capable, from time to time, to cause major setbacks in Turkish-US strategic cooperation. Similarly, in Turkey, anti-American hostile attitudes of extreme right and extreme left have had their deleterious impact on the relations though their effectiveness has recently diminished.

Turkey's military cooperation with Israel that began in 1995 has created the image of a triangular military partnership in Eastern Mediterranean between US, Turkey and Israel although its scope is extremely modest. Turkey's Arab neighbors have strong suspicions about the aims of this cooperation; similar, to their sentiments when Turkey joined the North Atlantic Alliance in 1952.

The prospects for an armed conflict between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus or Aegean issues are matters of high concern both for these countries as well as for Western allies. Both EU members and US are embarrassed by Greece's unscrupulous behavior in using Greek diaspora as lobbies and its use of its position as an equal partner in NATO and EU against Turkish interests. Yet, they are hardly in a position to counterbalance this influence. Particularly in EU, the institutional voting system is used mainly by Greece to block any EU gestures towards Turkey; and the backing received by Greece from other EU members as part of membership solidarity contribute to the hardening of Greek attitude in their refusal to enter into a meaningful negotiation with Turkey in order to solve the problems between the two countries. EU's attitude, therefore, in respect to the Kardak issue and the decision to begin membership talks with the Greek administration of Cyprus disregarding existing treaties contribute not to the solution of Turkish-Greek disputes but to their exacerbation. In the Turkish public opinion, this West European attitude is interpreted as a resurrection of 19th century European diplomacy that eventually whetted Greek ambitions and led them to their tragically failed attempt to invade Turkey in 1919-22. In this respect another important disagreement that helps destroy mutual images in the role of some European countries, is the difference of approach in interpreting who is a terrorist and who is a victim of political discrimination.

Another point is in the description of Turkey's geopolitical position and various interpretations given to it. Some European writers refer to this position as a bridge between Europe and the Middle East extending to Central Asia. Contrary to historical misconception Turkey has never been a bridge. In her history she has been a central power and later a medium power defending the margins of Europe.

When the Soviet Union was dismantled, some writers argued that Turkey situated in the margins of Europe, CIS, Middle East and the Mediterranean could remain a marginal country forever. Theory says that if a country is weak multiple marginality may encourage centrifugal forces leading to eventual dismemberment. Therefore, in order to preserve their existence the countries that face up multiple-marginality, have to be strong in all respects. That strength creates a centrality function which is accompanied by radiation multi-directional influence.

While discussing the strategic significance of Turkey in the region, we must devote some attention to the NATO enlargement, Russia's reaction and energy networks.

At first sight, NATO's enlargement to cover Central and Eastern Europe may appear to be a positive development that would enhance the security and solidarity of the European community of nations as the organization acquires greater capacity to defend common interests and stability in the continent. However, a detailed analysis might demonstrate that such enlargement may at the same time upset the balances somehow established during the post-cold war period and contribute to the loosening of solidarity in the alliance and to a proliferation of categories of nations benefiting from one or overlapping security guarantees. Furthermore, a new enigma has arisen because WEU which gives the appearance of an hybrid organization between NATO and EU reflects not the strengths but weaknesses of both organizations; although on paper the Brussels Treaty appears to be a more committing document than the Washington Treaty. The anomaly for Turkey is that once they become members of NATO and soon of EU, the former Warsaw Pact members of Central and Eastern Europe will have the right to become full-fledged members of both NATO and WEU and Turkey while a member of a NATO will be a security provider as an associate of WEU without benefiting from whatever security guarantee that Brussel's Treaty would provide for its members. This development has the potential of exacerbating European aloofness to Turkey's own security requirements while tying Turkey as a contributor to European security without letting her to take part in the actual decision-making process. This will lead to a lessening of Turkey's role and place in the future European architecture.

Another division that is being created through NATO enlargement is the rejection of Russia from taking a real role in European security system and the disadvantages that the ensuing psychology of rejection of the Russian people will have for flank countries of NATO namely Norway and Turkey. Since 1949, Russia has perceived NATO as an alliance set up against herself and the distrust against this organization is firmly rooted among the Russian public. The enlargement of NATO towards Russia's western frontiers leads Russia to increase its forces particularly in the flanks and to increase its pressure in such areas as the Southern Caucasus and the Baltic region. Turkish public opinion is highly concerned that its partners may give concessions in CFE talks yielding to Russian demands for increased force levels in flank areas.

The damaging effects of NATO enlargement on Turkey's security interests may partially be alleviated through Turkey's full participation, as an equal partner in the decision-making mechanism of WEU and the common security policy formulations of EU and by effectively taking part in the European security architecture. Yet, these developments and the fact that the Turkish government has ratified the NATO enlargement protocol, does not remove the unfavorable effects of NATO enlargements on Turkey's security interests. The Turkish Parliament as an exceptional measure has accompanied the ratification of the first enlargement with a rider asking the Turkish Government. That the second enlargement should include Romania and Bulgaria, and Turkey should become integrated in the European security system.

However, it appears that the lessening of West European concern in Turkey's security interests and the lack of disposition to avail itself of Turkey's strategic assets Turkey needs to establish new strategic balances in its region in an effort to reduce its defense burden, although, such an effort may involve a certain degree of de-coupling between Turkey's and West European security perceptions and interests. In this context, we could mention the military cooperation with Israel, confidence building measures with Bulgaria, attempts to create a multi-national intervention force for the Balkans are highly positive developments, security dialogue with Georgia and Azerbeycan, neutralizing Syria and better control in Northern Iraq. New steps must follow such as the proposal of the present Turkish government to establish "a neighborhood forum" and a possible security dialogue with Russia.

The geographic location of Turkey in the midst of turbulent and clash-prone regions of the Balkans, the Caucasus, Middle East, and Eastern Mediterranean compels Turkey to be highly attentive to the developments and any conflict in these areas may have serious repercussions in Turkey for ethnic, economic or sheer security reasons. The conflicts in these regions are also of serious concern for countries of Western Europe and the United States. It is therefore highly recommendable that there should be an effective cooperation either within the existing institutional mechanisms or a dialogue be organized among the most concerned parties with a view to establishing a cooperation and harmonize varying approaches, if we want to contribute to regional peace in this part of the world.

Another requirement for Turkey in the face of regional problems is to prepare and maintain a highly efficient military structure that should be capable of prevailing over occurrences threatening the security and integrity of Turkey.

The variety and high concentration of conventional arms and the presence of rogue states possessing or capable of possessing mass destruction weapons and delivery vehicles prescribe a high mobility, superior technology and constant preparedness for the Turkish armed forces. The introduction of Russian-made tanks and possible introduction of missiles to Cyprus and the challenge posed by Greece in the Aegean basin reinforces this requirement. All these considerations necessitate the maintenance of a strong and modern defense structure including a certain amount power projection capability and a defense doctrine that would address multiple character of the perceived threats; while at the same time maintaining a structure also addressing Petersberg tasks.

While defense preparedness is one of the most significant requirements of Turkey, diplomacy to alleviate the defense burden is of no less important. In this context we will attempt to review some of the political challenges facing Turkey in its regional and global relations.

Turkey-EU Relations

The factors characterizing Turkey-EU relations may be defined as reciprocal economic and security interests as well as social and security problems.

Despite economic recessions and growing political problems, the basic aim of the 1963 Ankara Agreement and the procedure outlined in the 1973 Supplementary Protocols has been achieved and a Customs Union has been established between EU and Turkey as from the beginning of 1966. However, most other features of the Ankara Agreement and the Supplementary Protocols have either been partially implemented or simply ignored by EU. Since 1981, EU has suspended the financial protocols and disregarded without any compensatory system, the social provisions of the Agreement. While Turkey considered the Customs Union, in keeping with the wording of the Ankara Agreement as the final phase of the relations before the accession took place, the decisions of the EU Council (Madrid, December 1995, Luxembourg, December 1997) imply that Customs Union would be either the final status of the relations or accession will be delayed to a distant future. Subsequent declarations have somewhat modified this attitude by mentioning in half-mouth Turkey's candidacy, their very little substantive change.

In any event, whatever the current intentions are it would be normal to expect that the economic relations between EU countries and Turkey will increase in keeping with the growth of the Turkish economy, leading to an economic interdependence and serious steps will taken for harmonization of standards and legislation paving the way for economic integration. During this process, Turkey may not expect financial support from EU.

On security issues, it was earlier pointed out that Turkey's strategic importance for Western Europe had diminished and there were few points of consensus on regional security issues. It is unfortunate that because of the existing institutional structure, EU countries willingly or not find themselves alongside Greece in that country's disputes with Turkey justifying this attitude as "membership solidarity" or simply surrendering to blackmail.

So long as EU is able to benefit from the economic advantages provided by the Customs Union, the member countries have no incentive to stand against Greek pressures. In other words, by submitting to Greek demands on Turkey they lose nothing but for resisting to such demands involve paying a price.

In the face of this trend, an improvement cannot be expected neither in EU-Turkey nor in Turkish-Greek political relations. Conscious of the EU's willing or reluctant support, Greece feels its position strengthened in her disputes with Turkey and this reduces its willingness to find compromises. While Turkish-Greek problems and Cyprus are considered by EU as a major impediment for the development of Turkey-EU relations, EU's behavior in respect to Turkish-Greek disputes and Cyprus paradoxically become additional causes for the continuation and aggravation of the disputes.

With respect to social problems, it is clear that Germany did not want to see one more Turk in that country. This obsession seems to have been the major promoter of German policy regarding Turkey's membership in the EU under the Kohl government. It is clear that in the foreseeable future the German economy and once euro is adopted as the common currency, all over the EU the recessive economies will prevail making little impact for the reduction of the current high unemployment levels in EU particularly in Germany. It's well understood in Turkey that the free circulation of manpower

provisions of the Ankara Agreement and the Supplementary Protocols cannot be implemented in the near future. But, since this is a contractual right of Turkey borne out by Ankara Agreement, it should only be rescinded by mutual agreement and certainly not by fiat. There is a social question that need to be resolved in a manner compatible with the existing agreements; namely, the status of the members of the Turkish community in EU countries, particularly in Germany where their numbers exceed 2 million. Until the advent of the present SPD-Green Government Germany refused to recognize for these Turkish citizens most of whom have been living in that country for several decades the status of minority or give them double citizenship or accept the bulk of them to German citizenship or recognize them to the European Union citizenship rights. The present leaders of Germany have promised to accept double-citizenship but the "proof of the pudding is in its eating"

Under the light of the above considerations, the reluctance of EU to include Turkey among the list of candidates and create a special category with conditions the fulfilment of which are not only dependent on Turkey, such as the solution of Greek and Cyprus problems, may be explained by both objective and subjective objections to Turkey's EU membership. EU's politically and economically motivated objections do not, however, constitute a waiver for their legally binding obligations resulting from Ankara Agreement and subsequent decisions of the Association Council. In the light of the above, while there is no obligation on the part of Turkey to fulfil or even negotiate the political conditions stipulated in the Luxembourg declaration, the community and Turkey are under the obligation and have mutual concrete interest in pursuing their existing agreements and deepening their integration process. This would entail the following:

- The Customs Union must be developed in a manner that would eventually cover all goods and services;
- A solution must be found to resolve the problem of free circulation provision unilaterally suspended by EU, probably by ensuring EU citizenship rights to Turkish citizens who have settled down in EU countries;
- The harmonization of the legislation must proceed;
- Other chapters of the Ankara Agreement, Supplementary Protocol, and the decisions of the Association Council must be continued;
- The arbitration system for resolution of disputes foreseen in article 25 of the Ankara Agreement must be made operable through a decision of the Association Council.

If EU and Turkey can demonstrate adequate maturity to defend their mutual interests, the adoption of an incremental development pattern in their relations may be the best choice. But, to follow such a policy, EU must rid itself from almost capricious policies encouraged by a few of its members and hardly responsible politicians. EU must refrain from sitting on the high ground and resolving problems in the relations by fiat, and finally membership solidarity must not force EU to block the development of its relations with this country.

Turkey-US Relations

The United States occupies a very important place in Turkey's foreign and security policies. The latter was more conspicuous during the cold war period. In the post-Soviet era, US involvement in the region where Turkey is situated has changed its character and the new US approaches are no less important for Turkey's foreign and security policies. It would be advisable for the purposes of this article to search the objectives of US policy in the Middle East, the Balkans, Greece-Cyprus, Caucasus and Central Asia--regions of vital interest to Turkey.

During the cold war days, US policy objectives in the Middle East consisted of insuring free flow of oil, assuring the security of Israel, and counteracting the Soviet influence. Immediately after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, US believed that Russia could be a partner in the Middle East issues;

however, this optimism was short lived and the reassessment of Russian policies has brought Russian and US interests at logger heads in dealing with Iraq and Iran.

Turkey's interests coincide with that of assuring free flow of oil and helping peace and security in the Middle East. However, most Turks see prolonged US hostility towards Iraq as somewhat exaggerated and hope for continued improvement in the relations.

In the Balkans region, US and Turkish policies have come closer particularly after the European Union has chosen to keep Turkey out of the Union for the foreseeable future. Both Turkey and US have now an interest in counterbalancing EU (particularly German) and Russian influence and possible hegemony in the area. US has been the major player in the Dayton Process and Turkey has been a continuous contributor to UN peacekeeping efforts. Again thanks to the efforts of US a solution will eventually be found to the Kosovo crisis, if at all. US is trying to develop and maintain close relations with each of the Balkan states and are promoting economic cooperation through SECI. Similarly, Turkey has been providing economic assistance to several Balkan countries and supporting various schemes for inter Balkan cooperation.

In respect to Greece and Cyprus, there are serious differences between Greece and the United States on regional policies. For example, while United States clearly supports Turkish-Israeli cooperation, Greece opposes it; the United States officially supports the proposed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project and Greece opposes it. The US supports Turkey's EU membership, Greece vetoes it. US are against the deployment of S-300 missiles in Cyprus, Greece is for it; US consider PKK as a terrorist organization, Greece provides public and material support to it. The list goes on. However, all these differences are not adequate for the US to take a firm stand, thanks to the power and influence of the Greek lobby in Washington.

In the regions of Caucasus and Central Asia, Turkish and US policies have certain similar characteristics. The security and real independence of these former Soviet republics have been a major objective of the policies of the two countries. Unless economic independence can be secured, it would be difficult for these countries to advance towards fully democratic regimes. For this reason, both Turkey and US support alternate routes for the transit of gas and oil of these regions. Turkey and US support peace and stability in the Southern Caucasus, while US policy is somewhat tilted towards Armenia in the Karabag dispute, Turkish policy is tilted towards Azerbaijan for the same reasons.

Hopefully, in the face of hardening attitude in the leadership of Armenia, US Congress will find it increasingly difficult to maintain the embargo on Azerbaijan. Both Turkey and US support Georgia economically and hope that this country's reliance on Russian troops for internal security will diminish. The plan signed between Georgia and US on defence and military cooperation on March 24, 1998 may be a good step in the right direction.

The Balkans

With an intertwined ethnical structure where hatred and hostility often create explosive situations, the Balkans region is a source of concern and opportunity for Turkey. Geographically herself a Balkan country (more than 11 million of Turkey's population live on the Balkans peninsula) Turkey, shares the destiny of the peninsula also through bonds of history and presence of substantial Turkish national minorities and akin nations. Balkans constitute Turkey's main transit route to Central and Western Europe where nearly 4 million Turks live and more than half of Turkey's foreign trade is conducted. Since the Ottoman era, the transit route for social and administrative reforms has been the Balkans. Balkans area is economically highly important for Turkish exports and investments. Today, this country meets most of its gas requirements from Russia through the Balkans.

With its pluses and minuses, the Ottoman heritage constitutes a strong tie between Turkey and different Balkan countries. About 15% of the population of Bulgaria consist of ethnic Turkish people. There are approximately 70.000 Turks in Macedonia and about the same number in Kosova. In western Thrace, there are about 130.000 Turks. These people have long suffered from various types of persecution and continuous discrimination. In addition to these Turkish speaking people, in Kosova, Bosnia, and Bulgaria, there are large numbers of Muslims who consider themselves close to Turkey because of the fact that during the 19th. And 20th centuries there have been large migrations of these people to Turkey.

Although economic instability in most of the Balkan countries seriously hampers the development of trade relations and Turkish investments, already in Rumania, there are several thousands of small and medium Turkish investments and in Bulgaria members of the Turkish community and expatriates in Turkey have established many business links between Turkey and Bulgaria. Turkish President recently described Turkey's relations with Bulgaria as "exemplary". Turkey has provided economic assistance to several Balkans countries and continues to do so.

The prospects for most of the Balkan countries joining eventually the European Union will no doubt be a significant factor contributing to the democratization and peace in the region. However, outside Greece, which is already a member of EU, the accession prospects have been offered only to Bulgaria and Rumania. Former Yugoslav republics and Albania are not yet given any green light for future membership. For countries like Rumania and Bulgaria to adapt themselves to the conditions of adhesion to EU is indeed a very long-term task.

In view of this delayed prospects Europe's role and influence in the Balkans region will suffer from serious constraints. In an effort to play a certain role for peace and security in the Balkans, the EU has started the Rayemaund Process and has appointed a Greek diplomat as coordinator of this project. This, directly or indirectly, supports Greece in her quest for a leadership role on behalf of the EU in the Balkans. On its part, the United States is promoting an economic cooperation model through the SECI (Southeast European Cooperation Initiative) within the framework of OSCE. Four Balkan countries, namely Turkey, Rumania, Bulgaria and Greece are members of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization. Furthermore, the Balkans ministerial conference series is continuing to be a helpful dialogue forum.

A serious question which is source of concern for the Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans is the future of the Turks and akin people living in the Balkans in the face of increasing nationalist trends and xenophobia.

The task of bringing peace and stability to the Balkans lies in the lessening of ethnic tensions. This requires in the first place, a moderation the sense of nationalism. In practice as and when, democratic regimes, respecting human rights are established the Southeast European countries are admitted in European multi-lateral organizations and agreements, One would expect that by joining these organizations these countries will not pay mere lip service to the European norms, but adopt them as part of their social culture.

The second point is that the Turkish and Muslim minorities must be accepted as inalienable part of the Balkans and forcing them to emigration through discrimination and persecution would in no way serve peace and stability.

Thirdly, Balkan countries should accept that modern Turkey is neither an extension of the Ottoman Empire nor a new conqueror of Islam. But, it goes without saying that human rights are no longer a purely domestic affair and every nation under UN Charter, Paris Declaration and under the

European convention of human rights has the right to promote human rights anywhere. The use of this right by Turkey can in no way be interpreted as an expression of aggressive intentions

Fourth, Turkey's approach towards the Balkan countries must be based on the requirements on the *Realpolitik* and Turkey must show care and attention to the sentiments of Balkan nations.

Fifth, for people who are in genuine distress or for reasons of family union, a program of immigration policy must be pursued by Turkey.

The Mediterranean

While Turkey as one of the most important Mediterranean powers has a special place in security, stability, and economic programs elaborated by various international organizations she has to develop her own bilateral or multilateral programs, that would better preserve her own interests. In the MEDA Program, which puts Turkey in the same category as the Arab countries in the Mediterranean, Turkey's position, is reduced to the position of a country under punishment thanks to decisions of the European Parliament and the European Council. While MEDA Program provides economic assistance and consider free trade agreement with the Mediterranean countries including some that are hot beds of terrorism, all economic programs foreseen for Turkey in compensation for Turkey's losses for establishing Customs Union with EU and under the MEDA program have been suspended arbitrarily.

While under the Customs Union arrangement, Turkey will provide the same trade preferences as EU to Mediterranean countries as part of the Customs Union, only Israel has agreed to sign a free trade agreement with Turkey.

EU's approach on where to place Turkey is also ambiguous. The aim of MEDA Program is to maintain a security dialogue that would lead a stability pact in the Mediterranean. In this respect, Turkey, which is a member of NATO, OSCE, and an associate member of WEU, has a different status than non-EU member countries.

Turkey certainly takes part in OSCE and NATO dialogue with the Mediterranean countries being aware that their contribution to the problems of the region is highly limited.

Under these circumstances, Turkey has to develop special relations with each other Mediterranean countries basing herself on historical and cultural ties and mutual interests in an effort to contributing to mutual economic advantages and preserving peace and stability.

In Eastern Mediterranean a multi-lateral cooperation is highly desirable for the creation of the suitable atmosphere for developing economic relations and contributing to peace and security cooperation. However, the most important obstacles in this direction are Greek-Turkish disputes; position of Syria and Israel's dispute with Palestine and Syria.

Tourism is an area of non-political cooperation possibility for Eastern Mediterranean countries. The agreement concluded a few years ago between Egypt, Israel and Turkey is highly significant. Another agreement which could presage a multi-lateral cooperation in the future is the Turkish-Israeli military cooperation agreement, on condition that major conflict sources in the region are reduced.

The Middle East

The definition of the Middle East as area varies from one country to another. In the current American literature, Middle East covers a very wide region extending from Atlas mountains in the West to Central Asia. For our country, the Middle East is an area including Mashrek countries, Iran, and Afghanistan. For the purposes of the Turkish foreign policy the most important countries may be considered as Syria, Iraq, and Iran which are adjacent to Turkey. The problems inherited from the past sometimes transform themselves into vital security issues. A significant difficulty in resolving the problems is that parties to disputes firmly believing in the righteousness of their positions has a lack of incentive for compromises. In the absence of a common threat or a major common interest, compromises through mutual concessions become highly rare among the Arabs and non-Arabs in the Middle East. In the questions of Palestine, Syria-Israeli dispute, in the Gulf, and in Turkish-Greek relations, the biggest handicap is the fear of "giving concession". The second obstacle is the psychological inability of individual governments to perceive the reality and develop suitable policies. Turkey suffers from the inability of understanding of most of their neighbours regarding the nature and aims of modern Turkey. Although Turkey is the strongest military and economic power in the Middle East, its policies are for self preservation and advancement, not one of expansionism. Yet, neighbouring countries unduly fear from Turkey's potential and attribute to it, intentions which do not exist.

What surprises Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbours is how Turkey, which came out of the Ottoman Empire weaker than many other Arab parts of the Empire could in over half a century, could reach a high level of industry and economy. The democracy, secularism, and market economy which constitute the basis of success of the Turkish model are hard to adopt by neighbouring Arab countries. Particularly, oriental type of dictatorships which run the adjacent Middle East countries are disturbed by democracy in Turkey and they are the particular countries that feel hostility to the Turkish model. The fundamentalist regimes are, on the other hand, disturbed by secularism of an Islamic nation. As a consequence, nonexistent or small problems are blown up turning them into major political issues. There is little effort to search for reality and we are now faced with an anti-Turkish Arab attitude based more on sentiments than reason. Since overcoming the sentiments is not a short term task, we must learn how to live in peace and hope time and good gestures on the part of Turkey will alleviate the sentiments.

Outside the possibility of use of weapons of mass destruction, Turkey does not face a serious military threat from Middle East. Low intensity challenges such as terrorism are disturbing but do not constitute a major military danger.

It does not seem likely that Turkey may develop extensive economic relations with Mashrek countries. The oil rich countries prefer to purchase luxury goods and weapons from the West and poor countries can afford little to buy Turkish goods.

An important country in Turkey's Middle East policies is Iran. Geographically larger than Turkey, Iran has a similar number of population a large section of which are Turkish language speakers which should be a factor for bringing the two nations together. Turkey and Iran have fought many wars in the past for regional hegemony and the stalemate has provided for them an unsurpassed period of peace since 1732. Yet, this entire period of peace has hardly led to a comfortable and close economic and political relations.

In the intervening years since the beginning of 19th century Turkey has turned its face and attention to Western Europe, while Iran focused its attention on the Gulf region. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, many Western writers have dwelled upon a Turkish-Iranian rivalry and competition in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Iranian behaviour may better be explained as a reactive policy both to the developments in the Caucasus region and increasing Turkish links with Central Asian republics.

Regarding the Caucasus, a strong and wealthy Azerbaijan based on oil economy might eventually fuel ethnic Azeri nationalism in Iran. For the time being, the religious regime in Iran based on Shiite sect to which both Azeris and Persians belong, reduces the sentiments of ethnicity. If ethnic nationalism is supported in the region there is no country that would be immune to the danger of separatism.

Eurasia

I think it may be proper, at this time, to define an area of new and increasing interest for Turkish foreign Policy as "Eurasia". For this purpose, Ukraine, Moldova, Russian Federation, Caucasus and Central Asian states may be considered as Eurasian States. Turkey has significant economic and political interest in this entire region and in the welfare and independence of all nations living in this wide region.

Three political ideologies which had their reflection on Foreign Policy had existed at the terminal period of the Ottoman Empire with residual influence in modern Turkey. These ideologies can be described as Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism and modernism. Throughout the republican era, Turkey has stuck with European oriented modernism; even though the first ideologies or their combinations continued to exist in the Turkish political life as under current tendencies.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union, was rejoiced by Turkish-speaking Republics in Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus. The first country they turned for emergency aid, economic and political support was naturally Turkey. Their leaders have considered Turkey as akin and friend and they still do so. Turkey in return, has provided all the assistance and the support it could muster to meet their urgent needs and to introduce these NIS's into the global system. Turkey helped them join UN, OSCE and establish partnership with NATO. She provided economic assistance and trained students and bureaucrats and still does so. Yet, it is clear that this Turkish interest can in no way be interpreted as a revival of Pan-Turkism. For the simple reason that it is a utopia under the existing conditions, in which geographic dissimilarity is coupled by diverging economic and social systems as well as the different national identities attained in each country in modern times.

Furthermore, it would not be realistic to expect these countries, most of whose frontiers are still guarded by Russian troops and their economies are tied Russia to be considered independent in full sense of the word, nor can they be expected to develop their democracy and human rights performances adequately until they attain their independence.

In the economic field, Turkey has significant investments in Central Asian countries like in other CIS countries. Turkey offers interesting possibilities for establishing an alternate route for the supply of Central Asian gas and oil to global markets. The development of this alternative will gain increasing importance in the next decades.

Thanks to the exchange of students and culture, a better understanding is developing among the Central Asian countries and Turkey.

On the other hand, from the points of view history, economy and ethnical variety, the Southern Caucasus region constitute a focus for neighboring countries and even for major powers outside.

The countries of the region are composed of ethnical groups who do not know how to get above their historical enmity and harmonize their economic and social interests.

The policies of the neighboring countries in pursuit their economic and political interests in the region are divergent. In discussing Iran's policy in the Caucasus, it was pointed out that these policies were more inclined towards Armenian rather than Azerbaijan; Russia's policy towards Southern Causes is motivated by the pursuit of the Near Abroad policy which interpret Russian interests as Soviet interests in as much as they express a desire to maintain an economic and political hegemony in the region.

Furthermore, in response to the enlargement of NATO towards Eastern Europe, and the interpretation of Turkish activism in Eurasia, even though a false one, may be considered as some of the factors that lead the Russians to keep the Southern Caucasus within their military defense perimeter.

Russia is also perturbed by the possibility that full independence might encourage separatist tendencies among the non-Russian federated Republics, like Chechnia.

Russia is sometimes accused by leaders of Southern Caucasus Republics of intruding in domestic affairs of their countries and encouraging interstate conflicts, directly or through intrigues.

The third actor in the region is Turkey. Turkey's national interests in the Southern Caucasus requires that this area should function as an effective bridge between Turkey and Russian Federation and Central Asia; and also as a buffer zone between Russian Turkish armed forces. Prerequisite for this function is peace and stability in the entire region good relations with all the countries of the region. The existence, however, of a major conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan has forced Turkey to take sides. The logic of this policy is based on the fact that the first place that Armenia has no right to keep occupied parts of Azerbaijan and to change frontiers by force. Secondly, Azerbaijan and Turkey are akin nations and they cannot stand aloof to each other's problems. Thirdly, Turkey needs an improvement in the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan in order to establish diplomatic relations and direct economic and transport links with Armenia.

The existence of Russian troops in Georgia and Armenia, even at symbolic levels, deprives the Southern Caucasus from playing a buffer zone. This situation is disturbing for Georgia that does not need anymore Russian troops for its internal and/or external security. US and Turkey have committed themselves to support Georgia to train its armed forces and Turkey has also done so for Azerbaijan.

The recent elections in Armenia where a nationalist from Karabagh region has been elected to power, will no doubt have a negative effect on the prospects of a settlement in the crisis between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The continuation of the no peace situation in the Southern Caucasus will in the first place hurt, the economies of the countries concerned and make them subject to outside interference and intrigues.

Azerbaijan with its rich oil resources is destined to become a rich country. Integration and close cooperation among the states will no doubt help their welfare. Southern Caucasus represents a significant venue for the transit of Central Asian and Caspian gas and oil. The lack of peace in the region will damage its prospects also in this respect. A great responsibility fall in the shoulders of the Armenian leadership. One wishes to think optimistically the election of a nationalist to the presidency in Armenia may even be a good chance for the future in the sense that the initiators of the peace process in the Middle East, Begin and Sadat were nationalists.

Russian Federation

For many centuries Russia has been the most powerful neighbor of Turkey. In their history, both nations have established multi-national empires. The Turkish Empire having been dissolved at end of the First World War, had spawned a Turkish nation based on the unity of language and religion. Although during the same period Russian Empire had also undergone a dissolution, Russian domination was continued and even extended in the form of the Soviet Union.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union also spawned many independent countries leaving many questions behind such as identity, minorities and even viability. Russian Federation itself, composed of several republics and autonomous regions is also in search of identity. The Federation, is in difficulty in finding a common ideology, or myth or providing adequate prosperity for keeping together the Federation composed diverging nationalities and religions.

It is no surprise that one of the topics most discussed in Russia today is how to keep Russia as a whole and to combine Russian nationalism with democracy and open market economy.

Russian Federation must develop a national identity. A multi-ethnic Federation can hardly develop an identity belonging to one of its members. Russian empire, or the Soviet Union could not be a melting-pot of different ethnicities, like US, France or Turkey. The chances of the present Russian Federation in this respect are also very slim, because Russia itself cannot provide economic and social means to encourage such an integration. The Chechen refusal to be a member of Federation is an extreme example. A debate on the solidity and durability of the Russian Federation on the basis of Russian nationalism even if democratic may well be debatable. The current economic weakness in the Federation makes the current leadership of Russia extremely touchy about Russian identity and on the definition of Russian interests; most of the times they choose to equate the Russian Federation interests with the interests of the Former Soviet Union and behave accordingly.

This touchiness casts a shadow on the otherwise excellent relations (particularly in the economic field) between Turkey and Russia. Russians are very worried lest Moslems in Russian Federation be attracted by Turkey and that Turkey may encourage separatism in the Russian Federation. This introduces a major paradox into Turkish-Russian relations.

In the economic field too Turkey and Russia have overlapping and contradicting interests. Turkey is a major customer of Russian energy supplies particularly in the forms of natural gas and electricity. There are active projects to increase these supplies. In return, Russia has become a major recipient of Turkish export of goods, construction services and direct investments.

The contradiction starts with the Russian desire to have gas and oil supplies from Caspian and Central Asian to pass through Russian Black Sea ports to reach international markets, while Turkey proposes as the safest way pipe links to pass through Turkey to the Mediterranean. Even though the commercial interests of the oil companies participating in the consortia will decide which course will be preferable, US government has given support to Caspian-Mediterranean pipeline project. The Black Sea route is shorter, but, are two major problems on the concentration of the entire oil traffic on the Black Sea. One is that the Black Sea is already highly polluted has become a nearly dead-sea thanks to high pollution coming from rivers and coastal industries in Ukraine and Russia; and particularly through Danube from Central Europe. Major tanker traffic in the highly windy Black Sea, coupled with the risk of a tanker accident with a major oil spillage is an almost fatal risk for Black Sea environment.

The danger is worse in the Bosphorus, which is a narrow passage way in the city of Istanbul. A tanker accident carries the risk of destroying an important part of the city and particularly some of its

cultural heritage. If such an accident happens Turkey might have to close the Bosphorus to tanker traffic over a certain tonnage, or highly restrict the passage to ensure safety. Turkish warnings in this respect are not well received by the Russians who insist on the literal wording of the Montreux Convention of 1937 regulating the free passage of ships through the Turkish Straits, and concluded when shipping volume was incomparably low and 100.000 ton tankers did not exist.

All this makes Turkish-Russian relations highly complex and it seems the two countries will have to learn how to live and cooperate in the absence of easy solutions to their problems.

Conclusion

What I tried to show above is that Turkey faces multiple problems in different directions. I did not dwell on Turkish-Greek relations and Cyprus which is subject of another panel; I did not tackle the relations with Syria because after the recent debacle over the Ocalan question, the ice may be broken with Syria and there is no reason why Turkey should not develop a friendly and cooperative relations with Syria like it did with Bulgaria, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Israel.

Turkey's economy and permits her to follow a multi-directional political, economic and cultural policy and her military power factor is adequate to deal with any threats to her security.

Turkey considers herself to be a European country, and will continue to be involved in European affairs as much as it does in its own neighborhood.

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Cyprus: Perspectives and Options

Paper presented at the IAI conference "US-European Common Approaches to Turkey", Rome, 20-21 November 1998.

1. Cyprus as an issue of Turkish politics

The Cyprus issue has since long been of eminent relevance for Turkish foreign and domestic politics alike. In early 1998 Vice Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit stated that Cyprus is of indispensable strategic interest for Turkey and Ankara would not withdraw its troops from the island, even if there were no single Turkish Cypriot living on the island. It seems indeed that never before Turkish politicians have expressed their determination to defend the Turkish presence in Cyprus more vigorously than during the past two years.

Cyprus is located only 80 km from the Anatolian coast at the "soft belly" of Anatolia. The island provides an ideal base for both protecting Turkey and controlling the Eastern Mediterranean area and the Middle East. The

argument of protection has become a new impetus since it has been decided that the port of Ceyhan in the bay of Iskenderun will be the terminal for the oil and gas pipelines from Central Asia in the future. In addition, exercising control in the Middle East has received a new relevance in the context of Turkey's strategic alliance with Israel.

Equally important, the Cyprus issue is at the very core of Turkey's delicate relationship with neighboring Greece and the European Union alike.

After all, critics see Ankara's conduct in Cyprus as proof that Turkey is constantly violating human and international right and is therefore not eligible for a close relationship with the European Union. Critics of Ankara's policy in Cyprus find support by numerous resolutions of international bodies like the UN, the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, a.s.o. Ankara has been criticized mainly for:

- its continuous occupation of 37% of the island with considerable military forces;
- intentionally colonizing Northern Cyprus with population from Anatolia and thereby changing the demographic character of Cyprus;

Rauf Denktaş and the leadership in Ankara have always argued that the 1974 military intervention and occupation of part of the island was instead a "peace operation" legitimized by the Zurich/London Treaty of Guarantee which is a part of the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus. According to Denktaş, the Greek Cypriots already destroyed the basis for ethnic cohabitation in 1963/64. He considers the military presence of Turkey to be indispensable for the security of the Turkish Cypriots. Ankara has stationed about 35000 soldiers of the third Turkish army as well as 350 tanks on the

island (in comparison: some 650 Greek officers are in the Greek Cypriot National Guard; an additional 950 Greek soldiers are in the Greek contingent in Cyprus - ELDYK). Turkey is the only country which has recognized the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus", declared by Rauf Denktaş on 15 November, 1983.

In the past, Ankara's aspirations to achieve a closer relationship with the European Union have at least theoretically been an incentive to show some will to compromise in the Cyprus question. After Turkey's rejection by the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997, this incentive has finally become irrelevant. Now, Turkish politicians have little reason to hide their political and strategic concepts and options behind diplomatic formulas.

Not only has Turkey seen its interests violated by the way, the Turkish EU-application has been dealt with. In a similar way, Ankara was snubbed by the way, the Greek Cypriot 1990 application for full membership was handled by the EU countries. From Ankara's perspective Greece was in a position to blackmail its EU partners to act according to its interests, whereas Turkey had to remain helpless without being able to exert much influence.

At this point, a short review of recent Cyprus - EU relations seems appropriate. On June 3, 1990, the government of the Republic of Cyprus formally presented its application for full membership to the EU. Three years later, on June 30, 1993, the Commission of the European Community presented its Opinion to the Cypriot application. The application of the Republic of Cyprus in the name of all Cypriots was recognized as being legitimate. The EC-Commission stated that Cyprus was meeting the

requirements of the EC-Treaty and other relevant legal frameworks.

Nevertheless, the Commission addressed two major problems that were implicit in the Cypriot application:

(1) Whereas the south of the island presented no major problems concerning the adaption of the *Acquis Communautaire*, economic competitiveness, and other factors, the same was not true of the north. For example, GDP per capita reached 55% of the EC average in the south but only 19% in the north.

(2) The Commission stressed, that the integration of Cyprus into the European Union must imply a peaceful, just, and durable solution of the Cyprus question.

The latter statement of the Commission could easily be interpreted as a demand for a solution of the Cyprus question prior to an accession. However, the key question "solution before accession?" was put aside in the following political process. In June 1994 the European Council in Corfu decided to consider the Cypriot application in the next round of EU enlargement. On March, 6, 1995 the Greek Cypriots and Greece attained a substantial breakthrough, when Greece gave up resisting the establishment of a customs union between the EU and Turkey. As a *quid pro quo* for Greece's willingness to compromise, it was decided to start accession negotiations with Cyprus six months after the commencement of the Intergovernmental Conference (Maastricht II). This decision was reconfirmed several times at later meetings of the European Council. As concerns the connection of the Cyprus membership with a solution to the Cyprus question, the hope was expressed that the ongoing accession process would act as a catalyst for the Cyprus question. Additionally, the Greek Cypriot side was asked to include Turkish Cypriots into the delegation at the EU accession talks.

Turkey as well as the Turkish Cypriot leadership have repeatedly expressed their refusal to accept the EU's approach towards Cyprus. According to the Turkish position, the application of the Republic of Cyprus is illegal, as it does not reflect the will of the Turkish Cypriot community. The accession of Cyprus to the EU is considered to be a disguised Enosis with Greece. The Treaty of Guarantee, according to the Turkish position, rules out any accession to political units like the EU. Finally, an accession of Cyprus to the EU should not be considered before Turkey itself has become a member of the EU, and before the Cyprus question has been solved. Consequently to these positions the Turkish side has also rejected President Klerides' offer to include Turkish Cypriots into the Cypriot delegation attending the accession talks.

Another reason for explaining Ankaras present hard line position towards Cyprus may be seen in the light of a changing strategic situation in the southern part of the island. At the end of January, 1997, the Klerides government announced that it had ordered modern S-300 air-defence missiles in Russia to be stationed on the territory of the south. The order consisted of four systems of 12 missiles each with a reach of 160 km. In Turkey, the announcement provoked vehement reactions: Prime Minister Tansu Ciller threatened to destroy the missiles. The strategic purpose of deploying the S-300 seemed to be obvious: The stationing of the missiles would for the first time enable the Greek Cypriots to defend their airspace against the Turkish airforce, and, Turkish aircrafts could even be hit behind the Anatolian coastline. Nevertheless, military experts agree, that the S-300 do not endanger the absolute military superiority of the Turkish army on the island. Turkey's strong reactions to Greek Cypriot armament plans can only be understood if

we consider the new role that Greece is playing on the island. In Pafos a new airbase was established where Greek F-16-fighters will be deployed.

Additionally, it was decided to erect a new port for Greek military vessels.

With its new bases, Greece is at the same time meeting two requirements. In 1993 Cyprus was declared part of a new Greek "defense doctrine" and a common defense policy inaugurated between Athens and Nicosia. The deployment of Greek aircrafts is indispensable for the Greek army to effectively support the Cypriot National Guard, hereby giving some substance to the common defense policy. At the same time the reach of the Greek airforce is extended far into the Eastern Mediterranean area. For this purpose the Greek airforce needs the S-300 mainly for its own protection. Thus, much more than by the S-300, the generals in Ankara are alarmed by the idea that Greek aircrafts could use the Greek air base on Cyprus to attack the sensitive "soft belly" of Anatolia.

As we have seen, Cyprus plays a manifold role in the foreign and military politics of Ankara.

In addition, Cyprus has long since been an issue of Turkish domestic policy. The fate of the compatriots in Cyprus has stirred up national feelings in Turkey. Consequently, no government in Ankara has ever dared to exercise severe pressure on the Turkish Cypriot leadership for substantial concessions in the Cyprus question. Turkish politicians feared the risk of being denounced as national traitors at home. More recently, Cyprus has become an issue of domestic Turkish policy in yet another sense: In a common declaration on July, 20, 1997, President Demirel and Mr Denktash agreed on a partial integration of the "TRNC" to Turkey. Turkey should take over the responsibility for the foreign and defense policy from the TRNC. At the end of

March, 1998, Turkey and the TRNC agreed on the establishment of an economic union. "From now on we are considering the KKTC as a part of ourselves", Minister of State Gürel has been quoted saying. Turkey's motives to partly annex the "TRNC" have been outlined above. Ankara may put the blame for its Cyprus policy on others. Still, it provides additional arguments for those within the EU, who prefer Turkey to be left out in the long run.

At a press conference on August 31, 1998, Denktash, accompanied by Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem, presented a document containing proposals for a solution of the Cyprus question. According to Denktash, it constituted a last effort to bring about an acceptable and durable solution in Cyprus. It called for the establishment of a special relationship between Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Greece and the "Administration" in Southern Cyprus respectively, by means of analogous treaties. The Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot side should recognize each other as sovereign states with equal rights. The two states on the island should then form a "Cyprus confederation". If both parts of the confederation agreed, it could then apply for EU membership. A comparison of the latest proposals with earlier positions taken by Denktash reveals that they do not contain many new elements. As concerns Turkey's relationship with the TRNC the proposal was just a repetition of the de-facto situation with the TRNC being a protectorate of Turkey. But the proposals do at least constitute a clarification of the Turkish position. Some months earlier Mehmet Ali Birand criticized the Turkish (Cypriot) policy in the following sense: According to Birand, Turkey has always wanted a partition of Cyprus but instead pretended its readiness to negotiate about a federation.

Some analysts have argued that the US-administration is not thoroughly opposed to the Denktash proposals. But, Madleine Albright and other US-officials have rushed to stress that they fully support the UN proposals as a basis for negotiations. That is, any solution of the Cyprus question should be based on a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation. This formula is in principle widely accepted also by the EU member-states and - last but not least - the Greek Cypriot majority on the island.

A consensus about a solution for the Cyprus question is far from being on the horizon. Still, the EU has formally opened accession negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus on November 10. Yet, there is still the risk of an armed conflict involving Greece and Turkey as long as the plan for stationing the S-300 missiles in the south of Cyprus is not finally abandoned.

2. Perspectives and Strategies for Cyprus

2.1. Maintaining Peace and Reducing Security Risks

Preventing an armed conflict on and around the island is the immediate task for all parties interested in the security and stability of the area. In more concrete terms, the following issues have to be addressed:

(1) **Military de-escalation at the Green Line:** The United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP), with presently only about 1200 men have by and large been able to prevent armed escalations at the demarcation line. The bloody events of summer 1995, when 5 people were shot and many were injured, yet showed that the capability of the blue helmets to prevent violent incidents, especially during mass demonstrations, is limited. De-escalation at the Green

Line is part of an ongoing military dialogue involving NATO and the UN that needs to be intensified.

(2) The deployment of S-300 in the south has to be prevented; Pressure from EU countries as well as from the US has been considerable in that respect. Most EU-countries are not likely to admit accession to a country involved in acute military confrontation. By providing support to the critics of a Cyprus accession, the S-300 issue has already caused considerable damage. The US do not appreciate the idea of a Russian missile system stationed on the island, the radar system of which needs to be supported by Russian specialists. President Klerides was right in his argument that the S-300 would not really threaten the military superiority of Turkey over the island. Yet, he has understood that the negative repercussions of the armament project inspired by Greek generals are too big a prize to pay for an uncertain increase in security. Military experts have stated that the S-300 can be easily identified and neutralized by the Turkish airforce. The costs involved in the armament project - about 2,5 billion dollars - are a heavy burden for the economy. Foreign tourists, the most important source of foreign currency, are deterred from visiting the island. Thus, President Klerides is presently struggling to find a way out of his self-made "missile trap". Klerides has once again presented a plan for a complete de-militarization of the island. If de-militarization could be accomplished, the Greek Cypriot side would reconsider its S-300 project, such is Klerides' offer. Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos presented another suggestion for a solution: With a military flight moratorium applied, the S-300 would be rendered unnecessary. Turkey has rejected Klerides' and Pangalos proposals. Recently an analyst has stated that armament in the greek part of Cyprus may also serve as an excuse for

Turkey's own armament activities. As concerns the S-300, the government of the Republic of Cyprus has postponed their deployment several times. Former president Vassiliou, head of the Cyprus delegation at the EU accession talks, has recently suggested in an interview: The deployment of the S-300 will be postponed to the end of December or to the end of another month. Still, a way out of the "missile trap" has to be invented.

(3) Generally the armament race on the island has to be slowed down. This task is even more important in the long run, and is certainly more difficult. Armament in Cyprus is connected to the huge armament programs launched by Greece and Turkey. Greece is currently spending 4.8% of its GDP for military purposes, more than any other country in the EU. On 6 November 1998 Athens announced the purchase of four batteries of US-made patriot missiles at a cost of 1.2 billion dollars. Additionally, substantial military equipment will be ordered in France and Canada. Greece intends to spend about 24 billion dollars for modernizing its military forces during in the next five years. On the other hand Turkey has started a giant armament program with 150 billion dollars to be spent for the modernization and the extension combat effectiveness during the next 25 years. Both the US and some European states are supplying military equipment to Turkey and Greece and thus have little credibility in demanding measures of disarmament.

(4) Deficient security in Cyprus is also caused by national hatred and prejudices on both sides. After all, any durable solution for Cyprus, and even the maintenance of peace in case of a non-solution, must be built on a certain degree of mutual confidence. It was this logic that inspired UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali to put confidence building measures (CBM) at the top

of his agenda in his 1992 Set of Ideas. Regardless how desparate the outlook for a negotiated solution may be - CBM are to be considered necessary by all parties interested in a lasting stability on a little island.

2.2. Accession Talks with the European Union

On 10 November 1998, the EU has started accession talks simultaneously with the Republic of Cyprus and the Central and East European countries Hungary, Poland, the Tchech Republic, Slovenia and Estonia. With the excellent economic performance of the Republic of Cyprus, the accession of Cyprus is becoming a more and more realistic perspective. At the same time more and more of the EU-members seem to feel uncomfortable with the idea of Cyprus becoming a member. The S-300 issue as well as the deadlock in intercommunal negotiations reminds the EU of a dilemma whih has not been solved but just banished. The EU partners feel uneasy with Greece continously trying to block payments to Turkey according to the financial protocols. On the other hand, the December 1997 decisions as concerns Turkey have left some of the EU leaders with a bad conscience. The US, on the other hand, have been pressing for a change in the EU policy against Turkey. At the Luxembourg EU-summit of October 5, French Foreign Minister Védrine stated that Cyprus could not become a member of the European Union without a prior solution of the Cyprus question. The French position was supported by other countries. German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel at an earlier occasion has expressed the view that the accession of a divided island is hard to imagine. Nevertheless, according to Kinkel, Turkey should not have the right to veto the accession of Cyprus. Despite of all reservations the EU partners might have - it is Greece who objects to putting

up any new preconditions in the case of Cyprus. Greece has repeatedly made it clear that it would otherwise veto the EU's eastern enlargement.

Taking into account the present situation within the EU, there are three possible scenarios concerning the accession process of Cyprus to the European Union:

(1) the accession talks will stagnate as the existing diplomatic impasse cannot be resolved; this might eventually also imply a failure of the whole Eastern enlargement of the EU;

(2) the Republic of Cyprus will be unilaterally accepted as a member, with an option given to the Turkish Cypriots to join later; at least, this option seems to be acceptable for the Greek Cypriot leadership and Greece. The provisions of the Treaty of Rome concerning the divided Germany are considered to be a similar case (yet, the situation is quite different). The EU-Commission has stated that the option of an unilateral accession of the South will imply some technical problems but will be principally feasible. While it would meet the Greek Cypriot European aspirations it will most certainly mean the end to all hopes for a unification of Cyprus. Turkey will most probably react with a final annexation of Northern Cyprus. There been little discussion about the victims of such a scenario: certainly, these will be the Turkish Cypriots who will be endangered of finally losing their Cypriot identity.

(3) Cyprus will become member as a whole: In fact, such an option is most unlikely as it must be based on a solution of the Cyprus question according to the concepts of the Greek Cypriots and the United Nations: The provisions of the EU-treaties require a strong central government that acts as a legal

personality, controls the economic policy and guarantees for the functioning of the Common Market on the whole territory. In short, such an option would require that the "Cyprus knot" must be cut without cutting the island into two parts at the same time.

2.3. Negotiating a solution for Cyprus

If we define a solution of the Cyprus question to be a true alternative to the status quo, it may be postulated that all the elements of such a solution have been on the agenda in earlier negotiations. It should be based on the model of a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation. Such elements should include confidence building measures, demilitarization and the establishment of an international military force, economic incentives for the Turkish Cypriots, a.s.o. Finding the elements for a just solution, the Boutros Ghali "Set of Ideas" of 1992 may be useful, at least as a "quarry".

Who could eventually cut the Cyprus knot and bring about a solution to the Cyprus question ?

The United Nations have recently (at the end of September 1998) launched another Cyprus initiative. The previous initiative of intercommunal negotiations in Glion/Switzerland has failed like countless previous UN initiatives. At Glion, Denktash had demanded a prior recognition of the TRNC as a sovereign state and furthermore the withdrawal of the Greek Cypriot application for EU membership. With the Turkish resistance to a federal solution now being clearer than ever before, the prospects for the new initiative are everything but bright. It seems that the UN's means of offering good services for a negotiated settlement have been exhausted.

The European Union is itself interested in a solution. But it has neither the mandate to act as a negotiator nor is it a credible and independent intermediary, with Greece as a member. US initiatives, like Holbrookes recent mission, have equally failed. The EU's demand that the accession process should act as a catalyst to a solution seems to remain wishful thinking.

The most probable option for the years to come is the preservation of the status quo on the island, with occasional interventions from mainly the US to preserve peace and prevent armed conflicts. With both sides armed to the teeth, this task will be difficult enough.

After all, Ankara retains the key role in allowing a political settlement in Cyprus. Yet, to allow for the establishment of a bi-zonal and de-militarized federation, Turkey would have to give up Northern Cyprus as a military base. This implies that substantial incentives should be given to Ankara. The EU therefore must give Turkey a clear perspective for its future membership. Like with other applicant countries the EU has to define its preconditions precisely. Binding Turkey closer to Europe seems to be the only possible strategy that might finally cut the Cyprus knot. It is a project that is in the interest of Europe and the US alike.

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TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

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Turkey's relations with Europe have gone through three stages. The first stage was before the modern state of Turkey emerged in the international system, and the identification of the Ottoman Empire and the notion of Turk was defined in terms of the adversarial other. Turkey, although a peripheral European power like Russia at the time was nevertheless involved in the evolution of European politics, alliances, wars and the emergence of the European states system, although it was not considered to be part of this system until the mid 19th century.

The second stage of Turkey's identification vis a vis Europe came with the creation of the modern Turkish state, its pledge to follow a path of modernization to accede to a level of contemporaneity. The commencement of the Cold War and the redefinition of the idea of Europe in terms of what constituted the 'west' brought Turkey into the fold of this redefinition. This saw the creation of a 'western security community' centering around NATO. According to Bradley Klein, this constituted a 'project' to create a 'western system' through a variety of institutions which ranged from the IMF, World Bank, GATT, NATO and ANZUS. But as Klein maintains, the focal point of this system was the transatlantic relationship embodied in NATO. For the *raison d'être* of this system rested on preserving a 'way of life' against another.¹ In this sense Turkey was no longer the other in terms of western identification but very much a part of that 'way of life' that was being preserved and part of the system set up to preserve it. Turkey's

¹ Bradley Klein 'Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence Politics', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 14 No.2 1988.

involvement with essentially western institutions commenced in this period. This was a period of rebuilding the west, in which Turkey became part of that architecture.²

The third stage of Turkey's role and identity vis a vis Europe commenced with the end of the Cold War, as the 'western security community' inherited from the Cold War searched for a new *raison d'être*. As defending a 'way of life' against another subsided, it became replaced with the promotion of those values that were defended during the Cold War - that is, democracy and free markets- with an added emphasis on human rights, and the utilization of the institutions inherited from the Cold War as a vehicle for achieving this purpose, particularly to radiate these values to the post Communist world. Thus since 1990, a European Security Architecture is being constructed largely for redefining the purpose and legitimacy of these institutions. Whilst Turkey's place in the 'western security community' of the Cold War was not questioned, its place in terms of European identity that is being reforged in political/cultural/historical terms has become unclear. Perhaps not so with the other components of this European Security Architecture such as NATO and the WEU, but more so in terms of its long standing relationship with the EU.

Turkey and the EU

Turkey's relations with the EU as well as being long-standing have also never been static. In this sense, Turkey's bid for EU membership is markedly different from the other candidates in line for membership. Turkey's relations with the EU have evolved over time alongside the EU's own structural development and Turkey's evolving role and identity vis a vis Europe. Turkey's relations with the then EC commenced at a time when Turkey's role and identity was clearly defined in institutional/security terms as being part of the 'western security community'. In this sense, the 1963 Ankara Treaty establishing Turkey's long standing associate membership of the EC was part and parcel of the same package of absorbing Turkey as part of this 'security community' into a

² For an account of the development of the 'western security community' see Gulnur Aybet, *A European Security Architecture After the Cold War: Questions of Legitimacy*, Macmillan, forthcoming 1999.

practical working relationship with essentially 'western' institutions. These institutions ranged from the EC - a solely European economic grouping which at that time consisted of the founding six members and hence excluded many of today's prominent voices in the EU, most notably Britain - to the Council of Europe, which Turkey joined in 1949. Turkey's membership in the OECD (then OEEC) in 1948 and its membership of NATO in 1952 completed this package.

Turkey was thus 'absorbed' into the 'western security community' and its role within this community was never questioned during the Cold War. In the post Cold War era, as the *raison d'être* of that 'western security community' is changing from one of collective defence against an identifiable threat to the promotion of the western values of democracy, free markets and human rights to the post communist world, and using the institutions inherited from the Cold War as vehicle to achieve this purpose, so is Turkey's place within this changing 'western security community' being transformed.

As explained in the introduction, what was significant about the early Cold War era which saw the evolution of these institutions and the absorption of Turkey in this system was the nature of this 'project', of absorbing all the units of the so-called 'western camp' into institutional bonds ranging from security to economic and monetary cooperation. The 'west' as such was identified within these relations and practices and found its moral definition and purpose in preserving a certain 'way of life' against 'another'. The dissolution of the 'other' after 1990, left a trail of redefinitions as to what constituted the 'west'. Here, Turkey's identity vis a vis Europe entered shaky ground, as the new objectives of this security community turned towards the 'absorption' of the post communist vacuum. This constituted, as explained above, the second objective of the western security community of radiating stability to regions where it was scarce in the post Cold War era through institutional absorption. Turkey, already a member of the 'western security community' did not fall into this category of those needed to be 'absorbed'. Turkey's absorption had commenced a long time ago in 1948, but somehow it was never complete. And this is where the problem lay in terms of Turkey's grey area

status in Europe. This has become more acute in terms of Turkish-EU relations than with other institutions.

The evolution of Turkish-EU relations runs parallel with the evolution of the EU and the development of democracy and sociological and demographic factors within Turkey. This parallel process which occurred independently from each other was further complicated with the changing parameters of European objectives at the end of the Cold War, which required a renewed institutional rebuilding process, not unsimilar to the institution building process in Europe in the late 1940's and early 1950's. These three ongoing developments shaped the nature of Turkish-EU relations.

When the 1963 Ankara treaty was further enhanced with the Additional Protocol of 1970 which foresaw the establishment of a Customs Union between Turkey and the EC, this occurred at a time when the EC's structural evolution was not yet as wide-reaching and sophisticated as today's EU. For a start, the EC agenda in political terms was not as ambitious. True, there was an EPC process (European Political Cooperation) which was the predecessor to the CFSP (the Common Foreign and Security Policy), but the EPC measures of that time, were more in the context of protecting vital EC economic interests rather than promoting the EC as a major political voice that had an impact of international affairs. The most significant aspect of the EPC process in the 1970's was the Euro-Arab dialogue which reflected European economic interests in terms of the oil embargo. However, nothing as far reaching as CFSP regularly passing joint decisions and opinions on all aspects of global affairs, including the recognition of new states, was existent. Similarly, in terms of the economic and structural development of the EU, the *acquis communautaire* of the 1970's was not as dense as today's. Furthermore, the criteria for adhesion of new members was still largely defined in the framework of the Rome treaties and any enhancing measures to this criteria as put forward at the Copenhagen summit of 1993 were not yet in place.

At that time, in terms of Turkey's on/off democratization process and the relative internal turmoil it was experiencing, nevertheless, in terms of the stability, it projected in foreign affairs, in contrast to its domestic troubles and its membership of NATO, which at that time was still the cornerstone of the 'western security community', Turkey was undeniably part of the 'west'. If anything, a major consideration for the EC at that time in terms of future Turkish membership would have been more likely based on economic factors rather than political/cultural ones.³ This is because in the 1970's the Turkish economy was still largely unprivatised and therefore its capacity for competition in international free markets was dubious. Also the prominence of the political/cultural criteria at this stage did not figure very high as three later EU members, Greece and Spain and Portugal were experiencing their own democratic transformations during this era. In fact for both Greece and Spain, negotiations for accession commenced almost immediately after the end of military rule, in 1975 and 1977 respectively, which can be contrasted to the EU's markedly different response to Turkey in the same situation in 1987.

When Turkey finally did apply for EU membership in 1987, this came at an inopportune moment. In terms of Turkey's internal profile however, things ironically looked better than in the 1970's. After the 1980 coup, the restoration of order, the withdrawal of the military and the creation of many new political parties started a new wave of the democratization process. Furthermore, the large privatization process started under Ozal's regime created a more open and competitive economy. However, there were also sociological and demographic factors that had begun to emerge, and would inevitably have a role to play in the redefinition of Turkish politics and identity. This rapid socio-economic change was due to the 'economic marginalization and alienation of lower middle urban classes and fixed income groups'⁴ This not only increased migration from the rural eastern areas to the urban western areas but also increased the profile of

³ However, of all the EU institutions, the Parliament has been the one consistent criticism of Turkey's democratization process. See Balfe report 1985 and the 1988 Werner report, European Parliament.

⁴ See Mettem Müftuler-Bac, 'The Never Ending Story: Turkey and the European Union', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 4, October 1998, p.248.

political Islamist and ultranationalist movements. The commencement of guerrilla tactics and terrorist activities by the separatist Kurdish group the PKK, in 1984, also occurred within this time. The Turkish state's immediate response to this situation with military operations in the south east of Turkey and later the declaration of a state of emergency in the region, and the repercussions this had on the political voice of some PKK sympathizers coupled with the rise of other extremist movements have all in conjunction proved to be a setback for the post 1980 democratization process, and this has inevitably come to be reflected in the status of Turkish-EU relations. Therefore, these internal developments were already taking place in Turkey at the time of its application to the EC in 1987, ironically coupled with a growing and booming economy.

In the international sphere the timing was also inopportune, because with the culmination of the INF (Intermediate Nuclear Forces) treaty and the removal of all short and medium range land based nuclear forces from Europe, it seemed that at least the Cold War, in its most precarious form had subsided in Europe. By 1989, when the European Commission passed its Opinion that Turkey's application ought to be shelved, it was evident that the Cold War itself was about to come to a close with the commencement of the 'velvet revolutions' in central and eastern Europe and the downfall of the Berlin Wall. ~~With the end of the Cold War~~ Not only were the parameters of European security being re-defined, but also those of what constituted a European culture, as the division of Europe ceased to exist and Europe, east and west, were finding new grounds for bonding in historical/cultural/religious terms. Meanwhile in Turkey, because of the socio-economic revolution explained above, the cultural differences with Europe became more visible. From that point on, Turkey's place in Europe and its future in the European Union became increasingly questionable. The rest of the story consists of an increasingly frustrated western Turkish elite and an increasingly adamant, insistent EU. On the part of the Turkish elite there is surprise and considerable anger that whilst Turkey's place in Europe was not questioned during the Cold War when it had a strategic importance vis a vis the Soviet threat, in the post Cold War era, Turkey's European identity is being questioned on cultural terms, as Europe has united in historical terms. For the EU, the

enlargement to those who most need 'absorbing', ie the post communist east and deepening its structural foundations of integration at the same time, leave no place for absorbing Turkey. Furthermore, as the values of democracy and human rights gain more prominence in the post Cold War era, the EU¹⁴ has turned to be more critical towards Turkey's performance in these areas as well as tightening the screws on criteria for admission by emphasizing these factors.

The end result has been the tightening of the admission criteria at the Copenhagen summit in 1993, particularly emphasizing the conditions for stable democracy, human rights and protection of minorities. Turkey's Kurdish problem in this context has been shown in EU circles as an impediment to fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria for membership. A decade after Turkey's application, 1997 proved to be a particularly bad year for Turkish-EU relations. In July 1997 the European Commission President Jacques Santer proposed 'Agenda 2000', setting the Commission's enlargement strategy. The Commission proposed commencing negotiations for accession with five countries: Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia and Slovenia. At the EU Luxembourg summit at the end of that year, it was decided on the addition of Cyprus to the above list, thus constituting the so-called six 'fast track' countries. The second track of countries eligible for accession were listed as Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia. Turkey did not feature in either list. Except, a 'European Conference' comprising of all the above countries and Turkey was established at the summit. The Conference which met for the first time in March 1998 in London, has been boycotted by Turkey, who has refused to participate unless treated on an equal basis with the other acceding states. Another aspect concerning Turkey which was revealed at the Luxembourg summit was the 'European Strategy for Turkey', emphasizing the unique relationship between the EU and Turkey, therefore justifying the reason for treating Turkey's application process separately. Particularly, the one to one meetings between Turkey and the Commission on the Strategy have focused on the payment of EU funds allocated to Turkey which have been blocked by Greece's veto. Additionally the financial compensation due from the

EU to Turkey as part of the Customs Union agreement on 1995 has also not been forthcoming for this reason.

Turkey's non participation in the European Conference and its criticism of the Luxembourg and Agenda 2000 decisions have not gone without notice. The EU's Cardiff summit of June 1998 not only opened the way for the definition of Turkey as one of the twelve acceding states but also emphasized the need for a more detailed working timetable for the Strategy. In pursuant to this, the EU Commission presented a report to Turkey at the same time as the other applicant states, removing the Luxembourg suggestions of Turkey's exclusion from membership negotiations in the near future. At least for the time being there seems to be some earnest search in the EU to help bring Turkey closer to meeting the Copenhagen criteria. This ~~is~~ even includes the possibility of lifting of the Greek veto on payment of due EU funds to Turkey, by making the issue a qualified majority voting decision. At least this seems to be the intention of the Austrian presidency before the EU summit in Vienna in December 1998.

These are efforts to keep Turkey well embedded and bonded with Europe. Much as Europe has had difficulties in clarifying the role and identity of Turkey in a post Cold War Europe, nevertheless, these latest developments also show that a Europe without Turkey is an uncomfortable thought for most EU states. Turkey's policy of insisting on nothing short of membership has proved successful in this sense, that other measures of indirect relations with Turkey without membership such as completing the Customs Union Agreement in 1995, and even Turkey's participation in the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue have not been satisfactory for Turkey as measures in place of membership. At least now that this is clear, there seems to be an earnest search on both sides to come to some agreement on preparing Turkey for accession. As to how long this might take remains an open ended question.

Turkey and NATO and the WEU

The early stages of the development of a European Security Architecture from 1990-1993 focused on the debate of whether or not to fold the WEU into the EU which would form the defence arm of the CFSP or to enhance the WEU in terms of NATO's European Pillar. The so-called 'Atlanticist' and 'Europeanist' debate came to centre around the crucial question as to whether NATO could develop further that a collective defence alliance in the post Cold War era, and whether it could undertake 'out of area' operations, which technically the WEU is not limited by treaty to undertake. This debate subsided as NATO's involvement in collective security operations, most notably in the former Yugoslavia commenced. NATO had indeed found a new role for itself in the post Cold War era - that of exporting its military 'know how' in coordinating and overseeing collective security missions of a humanitarian nature by involving non-NATO states within this operation. In terms of the 'absorption' of the post communist world into western practices, this became a very valuable asset. The involvement of non-NATO forces in SFOR is an example of this. The growing prominence of NATO's military edge was also of significance, heralding France's rapprochement with NATO military circles since its departure from the integrated military structure in 1966. This also altered the shape of the NATO-WEU relationship, as the WEU's operational capabilities came to rest on NATO, and also since the development of the defence side - the ESDI- of CFSP was not such a smooth evolution as envisaged back in 1991.

In terms of where Turkey fits into this evolving architecture, its full membership of NATO but associate membership of the WEU, once more leaves it in a grey area. ~~In~~ ~~terms of military operations,~~ ~~WEU's~~ ~~NATO's~~ Turkey participates fully in NATO's post Cold War activities. However, in terms of the WEU, although an associate member, Turkey also has the right to participate in all operational aspects. The closeness of the NATO-WEU relationship makes things a little awkward for the non full member states of the WEU. In 1996, NATO and the WEU signed an agreement for the sharing of intelligence. In 1994, NATO approved the CJTF concept, later adopted in 1996. The CJTF (Combined Joint

Task Force) is a 'deployable multinational, multi-service formation generated and tailored for specific contingency operations.'⁵ In this sense, through the CJTF, forces assigned to NATO, trained in NATO exercises, could be used in conjunction with or entirely for WEU operations. The linkage of the WEU's operational role in this way with NATO created 'separate but not separable' capabilities, to be used either by the WEU or NATO. In this sense, Turkey's associate membership of the WEU is no different in operational terms from full membership.

What is different between the two memberships, and a cause of some concern for Turkey is the fact that Turkey is uninformed of EU decisions that have direct bearing on the security and defence dimension of the CFSP, thus the role of the WEU. Turkey claims that this is unfair in the light of non-NATO members who are informed of NATO's policies and have a chance to feedback on these issues through the Partnership for Peace, and now the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, whereas non-full members of the WEU and EU are not party to a similar mechanism. To this effect, Turkey as a participating state in the operational development of the WEU through the WEU's links with NATO and its associate status in the WEU, would at least like to sit in on EU Council meetings that have a direct bearing on that part of the CFSP that touches upon the European Security Architecture.⁶ The way that the institutions are hooked up with each other creates these sort of problems in terms of overlapping memberships.

In conclusion, although Turkey's identity in terms of the political/cultural evolution of post Cold War Europe has come under scrutiny, a European Security Architecture cannot be envisaged without Turkey. It is wrong to assume that for Europe, Turkey's strategic importance has decreased. Security in the post Cold War era is no longer identified in terms of building a mass collective defence against an identifiable enemy. Instability, national movements, the control of natural resources in regions of turmoil all have a bearing on European security interests. In this context, Turkey's geo-strategic

⁵ See Anthony Cragg, 'The Combined Joint Task Force Concept: A Key Component of the Alliance's Adaptation' *NATO Review*, July 1996.

⁶ Interview with official from the NATO section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

importance has if anything increased for Europe in the post Cold War era. A country with democratic institutions - which may not satisfy EU criteria for the moment, but are still nevertheless democratic institutions, a country with a competitive free market economy, ~~a country~~ which refrains from unilateral action in times of crises but works through institutional and diplomatic channels as part of the western system, a country which has a long standing working relationship with western institutions in a region of turmoil, instability and the vital strategic interests of natural resources such as oil and gas, has to remain part of a European Security Architecture, otherwise any other alternative would be detrimental to European security interests.

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THE EUROPEAN UNION AND TURKEY

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Between the EU and Turkey there is a long-standing relationship envisaging Turkey's inclusion in the EU as a full member, contingent to the fulfillment of conditions that have to be acknowledged by the European Union. A formal request of accession put forward by Turkey in 1987 was rejected in 1989, but a customs union between Turkey and the EU was enforced on 1st January 1996 - a unique feature with respect to other less developed EU neighbors. Despite the customs union, however, the decisions taken in November 1997 by the European Council in Luxembourg on the next EU enlargement round seem to exclude Turkey again.

Three decisions were taken in Luxembourg: (a) to start a process of accession to the EU including eleven countries, recognized in principle as eligible to membership; (b) to start negotiations for membership with six of these countries (the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia) reputed more prepared to enter the Union than the other five (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia); (c) to establish a European Conference including the EU countries, the eleven countries above, and Turkey, aimed at bringing consistency to the different sets of relations being pursued in the greater European context.

These decisions have hurt Turkey for two reasons. First, Turkey's eligibility has been put off till the Greek calends and its political status in front of the EU made uncertain and ambiguous, even with respect to countries with a very debatable political and economic record (Slovakia and Romania). Second, starting negotiations with Cyprus while Turkey finds itself sidelined in the European game has been resented as an act of strong political hostility to be strenuously opposed.

Although the current state of EU-Turkey relations would suggest that the breaking off may - amidst growing tensions - go on for some time, there are many ambiguities which could result in positive changes and adaptations. The "no" expressed by the Union with respect to Turkey's prospects of membership is less clear-cut and definitive than it may look. The same can be said about Turkish aspirations to merge the country with the European Union.

Today's debate within the Turkish elite contemplates more options than just the European one. Most of the traditional kemalist elite seems to see Turkey as a primarily Western country, politically and military anchored to NATO, with a strong interest in developing economic cooperation with the EU, without necessarily entering it. On the other hand, during the short-lived premiership of Mr. Erbakan, the political religious elite showed a decisive interest in developing Turkey's relations with the non-Western world, though it did nothing to downgrade relations with the European Union. Though the international perspectives of the kemalist and religious elites are deeply different, both are convinced that post-Cold War Turkey must go its own way. Still, the self-

established kemalist political legitimacy and culture demands a more explicit and organic link with Europe. Furthermore, many in Turkey, as well as in Europe and the US, are afraid that without such a European link, Turkey could not remain a member of the Atlantic Alliance either. For this reason, most of the incumbent kemalist elite, as convinced as it is of the primarily Western identity of the country, is working towards re-opening an effective European perspective for Turkey.

On the other hand, after the decisions taken at the 1997 Luxembourg Council, European diplomacy (with its multiple and complex interactions between member states, as well as communitarian institutions) lets it be sensed that, like in Mozart's "Don Juan", the players of the EU enlargement process are regularly accompanied by a stone guest. There is no doubt that the decision taken in Luxembourg with respect to Turkey is not proving fully convincing for a number of EU members and the Commission, and efforts are being made to put the role of Turkey in the enlargement process set out in Luxembourg into a more politically acceptable perspective.

These remarks suggest that EU-Turkey relations may be adjusted. Against this backdrop, this paper draws some conclusions and makes some suggestions for restoring effective relations between Turkey and the European Union. In order to do so, the paper takes into consideration the impact on Turkey and its relations with the EU of three factors: (a) the resetting of the European architecture after the end of the Cold War; (b) transatlantic relations; (c) intra-EU relations and the Greek-Turkish dispute.

Post-Cold War Europe and Turkey

There were elements of ambiguity in Europe's attitudes towards Turkey even during the "hey day" of the common effort within NATO to contain the Soviet Union. There is no doubt, however, that the strategic and military transformations introduced by the end of the Cold War have objectively changed the European strategic setting and the role played in it by Turkey, as well as made opposition to Turkey's inclusion in the EU more stringent and open.

Turkey's strategic exposure¹ has increased tremendously in the nineties, but with respect to the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. With respect to Europe, its strategic and military role has, instead, ceased. Furthermore, Turkey's increased strategic exposure concerns areas that are not of primary strategic relevance in the EU perception.

The progressive estrangement between Turkey and the EU in the nineties is normally traced back to strategic factors. However, there are ideological, cultural and identity factors - strongly attuned to current European security thinking and extremely important for the EU's ongoing efforts to establish an expanded European security space - that seem no less relevant in explaining the tendency to exclude Turkey from such a space or refrain from giving it a distinctive position in it.

Let's look first at the strategic rationale of the European security architecture, in which enlargement plays a major role, and then at the impact of cultural, ideological and identity factors on this architecture.

¹ F. Stephen Larrabee, "US and European Policy towards Turkey and the Caspian Basin", in Robert D. Blackwill, Michael Stürmer (eds.), *Allies Divided. Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East*, Cambridge (Ma), London: MIT Press, 1997, pp. 143-73.

The debate that took place in Europe immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall was based on the trade-off between the deepening of the EU (then European Community) and its enlargement. Broadly, this debate came to the conclusion that EU integration had to be deepened while democracy and economy in the European East were reinforced with a view to including the region in the Union. After almost ten years the result looks different: enlargement is proceeding in the context of a politically weak and unbalanced process of deepening. While the currency union has been achieved, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as the democratic institutions of the Union are lagging well behind. The subsidiarity principle has been construed as a shield against the lack of democratic control in the development of communitarian policies and institutions. However, it prevents such democratic control from being developed at the community level. As a result, the Union is growing loosely and weakly on the political and institutional planes, and enlargement, which was supposed to take place under the umbrella of a reinforced Union, is, on the contrary, one of the very factors of such loosening and weakening.

From a strategic point of view, the basic change in the trade-off between deepening and enlargement that has taken place in the nineties is explained by the perceivedly greater urgency of stabilizing Central-Eastern Europe (and, whenever possible, adjoining areas) than of reinforcing the Western core of the Union. In the eyes of Western European governments and analysts, external factors impinging on security (i.e. inter-state conflict, the absence of a strong and structured civil society, economic backwardness, ecological decay) and their feared consequences (mass immigration, ecological damage, exported political violence, etc.) are bound to make their influence felt earlier than any favorable process of political and institutional deepening of the Union. In fact, the strategic trade-off has been between stabilization and deepening: a greater and faster chance of stabilization in the greater European space has been preferred to the deepening of the Union. For this reason, the architecture of European security is going to be based on a numerous and variegated membership that prevents the emergence of a strong and cohesive political Union, but secures a stable community of states linked more by the spirit of the Act of Helsinki than by the grand hopes and objectives that underlay the Treaty of Rome.

If Europe is going to emerge as a loose commonwealth of distinctive nations likely to preserve their essential sovereign attributes, why should Turkey be excluded? From the point of view of security, this kind of EU is less a distinctive international player than a component of the European security framework envisaged by the OSCE Lisbon Declaration. In this sense, Heinz Kramer very aptly argues that the European reluctance to include Turkey

might have been justified as long as the EU's basic rationale was the creation of a new and special political actor whose main task was to ensure economic prosperity for its member states and to bring Europe's weight to bear in international economic and political relations. In the future, however, the main task of the Union will be to organize and guarantee stability and security for all of Europe. ... Moreover, the original goal of an "ever closer union" among the people of Europe will become obsolete with the envisaged enlargement of the EU to twenty-five members over the next decade or so.

Hence the issue of Turkey's participation should be re-evaluated under that perspective."²

Thus, the likely political trivialization of the EU would in itself solve the question of Turkey's inclusion in the Union. Of course, one can speculate about trends in the ongoing process of European integration and the forces that drive the latter. There are open debates about developing a European defense, establishing a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO and absorbing the WEU in the EU, the outcome of which could change the outlook of the European political identity and security architecture. But this is speculation. As things stand today, Kramer is right.

Still, while the weak political-institutional dimension of the European security architecture may allow for Turkey's inclusion, the cultural, ideological and identity dimension of the same architecture is basically opposed to such inclusion. The post-Cold War security thinking is strongly based on democratization, the state of law, and respect for human rights and minorities. Stability and security in today's Europe are regarded as essentially dependent on the democratic nature of the European polities, in both their governmental and societal layers. The accomplishment and reinforcement of democracy is not only a political option but the most effective and strategic factor of security and stability. At the same time, democracy is an ideological and identity factor in the sense that there is the feeling of a two-way correspondence between being democratic and being European. The consequence of these perceptions is that, even if Europeans were to accept the idea that their political structure is so loose as to include Turkey, the latter would still not be included because its polity is far away from the democratic standards Europe enforces and the identity deriving from the enforcement of those standards.

In sum, while the security architecture may be conducive to Turkey's inclusion in the EU, the security thinking on which that architecture is prominently predicated tends to exclude Turkey. The factors of identity and stability on which the post-Cold War European security architecture relies strongly oppose Turkish inclusion. The role of the military in the Turkish polity, the abuses of human rights and the rejectionist attitude towards the Kurdish culture are at the very roots of Turkey's exclusion.

Turkey and transatlantic relations

Transatlantic relations are characterized by a remarkable American-European harmony with respect to the European East, including Russia, and conversely by many and not negligible differences with regard to the regions south and east of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea: from North Africa, through Turkey, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. These differences are not new. To some extent, they are a legacy of the Cold War debate on "area" and "out-of-area" allied security policies and are still based on different American and European concepts about the "Orient" and what is fitting to do with it. It may not be by chance that after its transformation, NATO is still - at least so far - operating in its old theater and its prospects to manage crises or conflicts in the southern regions remains an academic exercise.

Transatlantic post-Cold War differences pertain, on one hand, to the growing regional self-perception of the Europeans vs. the persisting strategic vision of the Americans. On the other hand, to the Euro-American divergence in assessing factors of risk and threat from the southern and south-eastern approaches to Europe: while the US tends to

² Heinz Kramer, Friedemann Müller, "Relations with Turkey and the Caspian Basin Countries", in Robert D. Blackwill, Michael Stürmer (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 175-202; quotation p. 185-6.

emphasize military and political risks, like proliferation of WMD and their delivery means, the EU members tend to underscore social, cultural and economic risks, like immigration, terrorism and international organized crime. The expanded role of Turkey towards the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia is, therefore, appreciated differently in the EU and the United States. Both recognize this role but only the US puts it in a strategic perspective. The EU does not have a definite strategic perspective on the areas adjoining Turkey - nor does it want to have one. Consequently, EU members have policies on specific rather than all-regional issues; these policies rely basically on non-military instruments; and, while member states' policies are diplomatically harmonized within the loose framework of the CFSP, they can easily be politically inconsistent and fragmented.

Will this situation change and the EU accept a strategic international role within the framework of a fresh transatlantic understanding? The kind of regionally-limited and inward-looking security architecture the EU has started to implement with its enlargement is hardly conducive to such a change. As mentioned in the previous section, however, there are also tendencies within the Union to work out a European strategic and military role, as shown by the recent ideas put forward by the British premier at the informal European Council of Pörschach (24-25 October 1998)³ and by the renewed Italian insistence on the need to absorb the WEU into the EU. This role is hardly acceptable to a number of EU members. Still, it may be feasible, thanks to the variability introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam with "reinforced cooperation", which could enable EU members to act separately without separating.

Such a development would probably ease EU-Turkish relations. As said, it is however very uncertain. In the meantime, in the shorter term, the deep political understanding which commands transatlantic relations and the concrete existence of a Western defense network - from NATO to the WEU and the OSCE - of which Turkey is a part, contributes to keeping Turkey and most members of the EU together. There is no doubt that the firm European wish to make up for the breaking off caused by the Luxembourg Council that has emerged in its aftermath is also due to transatlantic links and the concerns that, despite differences, transatlantic partners continue to share. In this sense, it must be stressed that the strong negative impact of the emerging European security architecture on EU-Turkey relations is attenuated and to some extent even countered by the impact of transatlantic relations. Indeed, they can have a considerable impact on and act as a key-factor to re-shaping a viable EU-Turkish relationship.

Intra-EU relations and the Greek-Turkish dispute

The Europeans are divided about Turkey. The dividing line, however, is less between those who wish to include Turkey in the EU in the near future (very few indeed) and those who want to exclude it (or hold it at bay) than between the latter and those who would like to establish a positive and fruitful relationship with it - a relationship in which EU membership, while being in principle relegated to a more or less distant future, would not be the focus of present EU-Turkey relations.

This dividing line, it must be noted, cuts across civil societies, not necessarily only across countries and governments. For example, the attitude of the European business world is in general rather positive towards Turkey and, more often than not, is favorable

³ See *Atlantic News*, No. 3053, 28 October 1998, p. 3. Mr. Blair's ideas were previously introduced in an interview to *The Times*.

to or not reluctant at all towards closer political links that would consolidate economic relations.

No European government, however, accepts the legal and political abuses which characterize Turkey's situation. Nor do they accept the role of the military in Turkish constitutional life. The declarations of the revolving EU presidency, such as the one of 21 January 1998 criticizing the dissolution of the Refah Party, regularly express a deeply shared feeling, which is in turn largely supported by the parliaments and public opinion. Nevertheless, several governments do not fail to take into account the military and strategic role Turkey plays towards Europe's southern and south-eastern approaches, that is, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. In particular, the governments of France, Italy and Spain consider Turkey an important balancing factor in the European security architecture.

To be sure, these southern European countries support the enlargement to Central-Eastern Europe that was discussed above. Still, they cannot ignore the specific nature and weight of threats and risks emanating from the southern areas, nor the fact that these cannot be met by the European security architecture being shaped by eastward enlargement of the Union. And they do not ignore that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership set up in Barcelona at the end of 1995, based on the cooperative security blueprint drafted for the European East, has to work in a very different world from that of the enlargement - a definitely less cooperative and inclusionary world - and cannot really meet the challenges and the risks coming from southern areas. Hence the greater interest in Turkey than other EU member states.

All in all, a majority of EU states agree with the need for an important and structured relation with Turkey, though they have different ideas on how this relation must be shaped and implemented. For this reason, by deciding in Luxembourg to exclude Turkey, not only from early negotiations but from the process of enlargement itself, the European diplomacy misinterpreted the basic political will of EU members and made a gross diplomatic mistake. Diplomacy is of use, among other things, in managing situations that cannot be solved comfortably right away and require time and attention. But several EU states use it as a sword, as if they were facing Gordian knots. Thus, to avoid wasting time, the risk of second thoughts by EU partners and other headaches, the knot of the EU's relationship with Turkey has been severed, as was done with that of recognizing Croatia at the end of 1991.⁴

Beside diplomatic mismanagement, EU policy towards Turkey is made particularly difficult by the long-standing interference of the Greek-Turkish dispute and the viciousness which, as a consequence of the dispute, permeates relations between Greece, a member state, and the Union. This is a major structural challenge to EU-Turkey relations.

Without entering into the dispute and its complex details, what must be stressed here is that Greece has hardly tried to create a communitarian consensus towards its national issues. On the contrary, it has systematically misused the power of the Union by making it hostage to its bilateral relations with Turkey. This course has progressively deprived the Union of any capacity and credibility in mediating the dispute. The opening of the negotiations for the accession of Cyprus to the EU has dealt a final blow to that

⁴ Richard Holbrooke (*To End A War*, New York: Random House, 1998) says that "while the decision on Croatia was wrong, its importance should not be overstated" (p. 32), which is right from the point of view of the evolution of the Yugoslav conflict, but less so from the point of view of the EU and its integration.

capacity, as the terms of the negotiations - as correct as they may be legally - completely overlook the interests of Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot community and are therefore politically mistaken. This development has become so clear in the aftermath of Luxembourg that the EU position has been significantly corrected: the wording of the conclusions adopted by the EU Council of 5 October 1998,⁵ to comment on the first stage of the enlargement negotiations and provide guidelines for the second stage, is definitely more precise about the Turkish-Cypriot involvement in the negotiations than the wording of the European Council conclusions in Luxembourg.

The nationalist and uncompromising course followed by successive Greek governments, particularly that by Mr. Andreas Papandreou, is now clearly declining. A non-official Greek view suggests that Greece has to "move away from a strategy of conditional sanctions, and towards one of conditional rewards."⁶ Fellow EU members have never been conspicuous for their sympathy towards Greece, while using Greece to solve their concerns towards Turkey. With the advent of Mr. Kostas Simitis, things have a rather good chance of changing. A more sympathetic and constructive attitude on the part of EU members could be important in fostering such change and allow the EU to work out a more reasonable and inclusive stance towards Turkey. For the time being, however, even attempts at correcting the diplomatic *gaffe* in Luxembourg are taking place in an adverse intra-European framework.

Conclusions

The security architecture and security identity currently evolving in the EU, particularly in the framework of the enlargement towards the European East, require that deep changes take place in the constitutional and political setting of Turkey before it can be included in the Union. Such changes will not occur tomorrow, still there is no reason to rule them out. At the same time, the majority of EU members desire an important political and economic relationship with this country. In this context, while negotiations for membership cannot be initiated, Turkey can well be included in the process of enlargement. The existence of a longer-term perspective would have the effect of normalizing EU-Turkey relations and allowing Turkey to progress. On the other hand, it would be in tune with the pragmatism required by the fact that both partners are looking for new options and identities. Finally, such normalization would contribute to easing EU relations with the United States.

Reconsideration of the notion of "process of enlargement" adopted at the 1997 European Council of Luxembourg is the necessary condition for resumption of normal and positive EU-Turkey relations.

As just mentioned, the EU's relations with Turkey, along with other "oriental" issues, is not irrelevant to the re-establishment of a significant and effective strategic and political dimension in the Atlantic Alliance. At the same time, while the EU as a whole is currently focusing on the regionally-limited and inward-looking security strategy of enlargement towards the European East, several members of the EU - in particular countries in southwestern Europe and Great Britain - are also sensitive to the need for a degree of global and strategic EU capacity in connection with NATO. In this sense, they

⁵ See *Europe*, Documents, No. 2100, 14 October 1998. The conclusions have been termed "immoral" by the Greek Foreign Minister (*Europe*, No. 7316, 7 October 1998, p. 3).

⁶Theodore Coulombis, "Strategic Consensus in Greek Domestic and Foreign Policy Since 1974", *Thesis*, Vol. 1, No. 4, Winter 1997-98, p. 12.

are not at all indifferent to Turkey's increased strategic exposure towards the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. They look on it as an asset rather than as a liability.

A revamping of the EU's political and strategic dimension in the framework of the broader transatlantic sphere would help foster closer relations with Turkey.

It must be noted that this conclusion is somehow at odds with Turkish thinking about the Western security architecture. Like Norway and Iceland, Turkey looks with suspicion at the attempts to develop an ESDI within NATO, lest the latter be weakened. However, the Western security constellation as it stands today, with a strong NATO and a weak or non-existent EU defense component, is not a factor that can foster an inclusionary EU-Turkey relationship. One can understand that Turkey wishes to consolidate the new NATO⁷ and take advantage of NATO to reinforce its positive relationship with the United States. But this could be in opposition with its desire to strengthen its relations with, let alone be included in, the EU. By the same token, Turkey's political motives to acquire full member status in the WEU, even before becoming a EU full member, should be clarified.⁸

The exclusion of Turkey from the process of enlargement at Luxembourg and the beginning of the negotiations for the accession with Cyprus have definitively excluded the Union from any political role in the Cyprus dispute (as well as in the whole Turkish-Greek dispute). This development, complicated by the process of re-armament taking place in Cyprus and around it, has also curbed any other possibilities for mediation from other sides. The real stumbling block on the road to EU-Turkish normalization today is Cyprus.

A reformulation of the terms of the EU-Cyprus negotiations is needed to make the intra-Cypriot talks for a bi-zonal and bi-communitarian federation more credible and effective. This would allow the US and the UN to resume their mediations and open up the possibility, in time, of a federated Cyprus becoming an EU member.

⁷ To consolidate the "new" NATO, for the "old" NATO didn't prove very helpful when Turkey felt threatened by the Gulf War developments: at that time, Germany and other European members of NATO maintained that Art. 5 regarded Europe and not the Middle East.

⁸ Larrabee (*op. cit.*, p. 169) maintains that having Turkey in the WEU would provide the advantage of its association to European military planning and intervention in those crises in which the US would not take part and intervention would be entrusted to the WEU in the framework of the CJTFs mechanism approved by the June 1996 North Atlantic Council in Berlin. In practice, all this is still very uncertain, in particular because the destiny of the ESDI is uncertain, as is that of the WEU. Furthermore, the WEU is not just a military mechanism: for example, what if the WEU is absorbed into the EU (be it as a new pillar or as part of the CFSP)? In this case, Turkey could not just play the role of a smart Western marquess, but would have to show a relevant interest in developing a European identity.

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TURKEY'S STRATEGIC OPTIONS

Ian O. Lesser¹

ADJUSTING TO A CHANGED ENVIRONMENT

Turkey has been profoundly affected by changes on the post-Cold War international scene. These changes have emphasized the country's geopolitical importance, but have also sharpened long-standing questions concerning Turkey's identity and role. The Turkish debate on foreign and security policy has become more vigorous and more diverse. Public opinion now plays a far more important role, as does the media. The foreign policy agenda has also expanded. Turkish interests are now more global, and questions of direct concern to Ankara now stretch from western Europe to western China, quite apart from more traditional challenges stemming from troubled relations on Turkey's borders.

Turkey has long been part of the European system, but not, in the eyes of most Europeans, part of Europe. The deterioration of Turkey's relations with the European Union, and the worsening outlook for full membership has spurred an "agonizing reappraisal" of Turkey's aims and interests in relation to the West as a whole. At the same time, changes in Eurasia and the Middle East, as well as new political currents in Turkey, have raised interest in foreign policy opportunities to the east and the south. Do these non-western orientations offer a valid alternative to Turkey's traditional foreign and security policy orientation? The following analysis explores this question in light of new realities in Turkey's domestic and external environment.

NEW INTERNAL REALITIES

In the post-Ozal era, Turkey has been influenced by the rise of political forces offering alternatives to the traditional Atatürkist ideology of secularism, statism, non-intervention, and western orientation. Segments of Turkish society have become more overtly religious, and political Islam has emerged as a potent electoral force. A decade of high, if very uneven, economic growth has made the country more prosperous, but also deepened regional and income disparities. The former Refah party's electoral successes

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(and the continuing strength of its successor, the Virtue Party, in national polls) reflect the increased significance of the religious factor. Arguably, the Islamists owe as much or more of their appeal to other factors, including a populist economic agenda, widespread dissatisfaction with corruption and immobility among the traditional political class, and a more assertive Turkish nationalism -- always part of the Islamist message. Indeed, nationalism rather than Islamism may now be the most important factor in Turkish politics across the spectrum, including centrist and secular circles.

The political turmoil of the last few years has placed longstanding issues of Turkish identity in sharper relief. Growing prosperity has brought Turkey closer to the West in many respects. At the same time, chaotic politics, a very active illegal sector and difficult episodes in civil-military relations have confirmed important differences in democratic development. The Turkish state also has real and, in some cases, violent opponents, from Kurdish separatists to extreme leftists of a sort that Europe has not had to contend with since the early 1980s. The experience of a Refah-led government and its aftermath has confirmed the vitality of Turkey's secular and western-oriented elites, but has also had a polarizing effect on society. At a time of tremendous change on the international scene, these developments have also diverted the attention of Turkish policymakers from some external opportunities, and caused others to be seen through the lens of Turkey's own domestic problems.²

Turkey's international policy options are now debated in a way that would have been unthinkable even a decade ago. This is not simply a reflection of the more diverse political scene in which non-western options are now openly voiced. The traditional foreign and security policy elites have been augmented by more active business and non-government circles. The economic elites are generally secular and Western-oriented, but not exclusively so. Refah had many Islamist-oriented supporters among small and medium sized enterprises, and generated a good deal of interest in more active Turkish cooperation with Turkic and Muslim states. Even within the secular elite, there is a growing capacity for analysis of international questions inside and outside the government, and new institutes devoted to the study of foreign and security policy.³

Public opinion now plays a very significant role in the Turkish foreign policy equation, spurred by an extremely active electronic and print media. Indeed, the

²One of the casualties may well be the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline scheme which has suffered from a lack of funding from the Turkish side.

³e.g., the Center for Strategic Research in Ankara, and the Strategic Studies Center of the University of Galatasaray in Istanbul.

aggressive role of the media in recent experience has led some Turkish observers to worry about the implications for future crisis management in critical areas such as the Caucasus and the Aegean.⁴ At the same time, Turkish public opinion has become more highly differentiated, with the rise of what might be termed ethnic "lobbies." Turks are increasingly attuned to their ethnic and biographical identity, and this encourages attention to events in such places as Bosnia, Azerbaijan and Cyprus where many Turks have historical connections. Developments in the Balkans and the Caucasus resonate strongly in Turkish public opinion and interact with a more vigorous sense of nationalism across the board.

Political events of the last few years have also seen a reassertion of the military's influence over many aspects of the country's foreign and security policy. While strongly committed to the secular, western-oriented tradition, Turkey's military leadership has not been unaffected by the changes in Turkey's internal and external situation. The Turkish General Staff has been particularly sensitive to the implications of Europe's rebuff on the question of membership, and has put commensurately greater energy into solidifying relations with the U.S. and Israel. New resources are being devoted to the analysis of international issues within the National Security Council. External policy decisions are being taken with a more critical and sovereignty-conscious eye, a tendency that has become more pronounced since the Gulf War. The military establishment is very much in the mainstream in pursuing what may be described as a more assertive, independent and diversified foreign policy -- still broadly aligned with the West.

A COMPLEX CRISIS OF IDENTITY

Turkey now faces a dual identity crisis. Internally, the challenges of political Islam and ethnic identification (centering on, but not limited to the Kurdish issue) raise important questions about what it means to be a Turk. Turkey's political leadership and, to an even greater extent, the military leadership, has come to place internal concerns -- safeguarding secularism and preserving the unitary character of the state, that is, the struggle against Kurdish separatism -- at the top of the policy agenda. Approaches to key external issues are, in large measure, derivative of these concerns. Thus, the EU's arm's length relationship with Ankara is perceived as strengthening the hand of anti-secular, anti-

⁴Examples include the direct role of Turkish television journalists in negotiating an end to the hijacking of a Black Sea ferry by Chechen sympathizers, and the Imia-Kardak crisis in which Greek and Turkish media served as active and provocative participants.

western elements inside the country. By contrast, it is argued that closer European and U.S. engagement with Turkey will reinforce the country's secular, western orientation.

Externally, traditional assumptions about Turkey's international orientation can no longer be taken for granted. Modern understandings about what it means to be in the western "camp" have come under pressure from a variety of quarters. The end of the Cold War has fundamentally changed the debate about Turkey's importance to the West (although concerns about Russian intentions continue to shape stakes in the relationship with the West, as seen from Ankara). Today, the measures of whether Turkish policy conforms to Western interests include not simply attitudes toward Russia, but toward an array of regional issues from the Balkans and the Aegean to the Middle East. In many cases -- Iran and Iraq provide examples -- it is no longer very easy to define "western" policy in any meaningful sense.

The West, for its part, has become more, not less, sensitive to issues of religious and "civilizational" differences. Samuel Huntington's arguments about the clash of civilizations may not have been very original or very revealing, but there can be little question that they have reshaped the intellectual and policy discourse concerning the West's relations with the Muslim world, including Turkey.⁵ Turkey's own debate about events in key regions such as the Balkans also reflects these Huntingtonian sensitivities (e.g., concern over the rise of an "Orthodox axis"). On a more practical level, the end of the Cold war and the progressive reintegration of central and eastern Europe within European and Atlantic institutions has encouraged a good deal of geopolitical and cultural redefinition. The redefinition of the European space, in particular, has had the effect of reinforcing existing perceptions of Turkish "otherness."

Following on the heels of crises in Bosnia and Chechnya, both of which sharpened popular Turkish concerns about Western attitudes toward the Muslim world, the EU's inability to offer Turkey a promising avenue to membership has shaken Turkish assumptions about the external scene and Turkey's place in it. To be sure, Europe has always been highly ambivalent about the integration of Turkey for economic, political and cultural reasons.⁶ To these must be added an unease about Turkey's scale which makes the foregoing concerns more dramatic. Finally, there is an important strategic dimension

⁵For a discussion of the historical context and contemporary implications, see Bernard Lewis, *Islam and the West* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); and Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, *A Sense of Siege: The Geopolitics of Islam and the West* (Boulder: Westview/RAND, 1995).

⁶There is also an important history of Turkish ambivalence on this score. See Halil Inalcik, "Turkey Between Europe and the Middle East," *Perceptions* (Ankara), March-May 1998.

to Europe's ambivalence. Turkey's pivotal position in relation to Balkan, Middle Eastern and Eurasian developments, and potential to serve as a "bridge," is often portrayed as a strategic asset for Europe in Turkish (and many American) circles. Although the European debate reflects this role for Turkey, proximity to extra-European flashpoints also has some additional and negative consequences for perceptions of Turkey. The country is often seen as more of a useful *barrier*, a defensive glacis in relation to problems on Europe's periphery, a valuable Middle Eastern rather than European ally (as demonstrated in the Gulf War). Political turmoil within Turkey, human rights concerns, and tensions between Islamist and secular visions of Turkey as a society have also caused many Europeans to see Turkey as all too Middle Eastern.

TURKISH-WESTERN RELATIONS IN FLUX

The post-Luxembourg deterioration in Turkish-EU relations is not irreversible. Even without progress on membership issues, both sides have important stakes in a positive relationship. Turkey is in many respects the EU's most important Mediterranean partner, and along with the U.S. and Russia, a critical partner in geostrategic terms. For Turkey, relations with Europe will remain an overwhelmingly important factor in the country's economic future. But these practical imperatives will be influenced by less tangible issues of confidence and affinity. Turkey's traditionally western-oriented foreign policy elites have been badly shaken by the perceived European rebuff. Simply put, Europe is no longer seen as a reliable or even particularly attractive partner, although opportunities to bolster relations with the EU probably would not be ignored. Against this backdrop, other issues have taken on new significance in shaping the outlook for relations with the West -- and alternatives.

First, relations with Greece, always a part of the equation in relations with the EU, now represent one of Europe's most dangerous flashpoints. The post-Luxembourg atmosphere, the apparent willingness of the EU to press ahead with accession negotiations on Cyprus, and security developments in the region, have heightened sensitivities on all sides. A serious clash in Cyprus or the Aegean, perhaps in connection with the delivery of Russian-supplied S-300 surface-to-air missiles to Cyprus, could well result in the open-ended estrangement of Turkey from European institutions. It might also seriously injure Turkey's relations with the U.S. and NATO. In the absence of the Cold War imperatives that prevailed after the events of 1974, this estrangement could prove durable, even permanent.

Second, the relationship with NATO is becoming less predictable. Turks have rightly placed considerable importance on the NATO link. Given the poor outlook for full membership in Europe, membership in the Alliance has emerged as the principal badge of Turkish membership in the Western club, and a critical source of deterrence and reassurance against the many tangible security risks facing Ankara. Yet this link could face new tests. Although Turkey has a strong stake in NATO adaptation to maintain the relevance and viability of the Alliance, Ankara will be troubled by any sign that NATO is neglecting conventional, Article 5 commitments to the defense of territory. Turks will also be wary of developments that might imply less automatic, more conditional security guarantees, or debates about "gray area" threats to which allies might or might not respond. Future crises on Turkey's borders -- frictions with Syria provide the best example -- will be seen as critical tests of NATO's commitment to Turkish security. Looking back to the tardiness of some Allied responses to Ankara's request for reinforcements during the Gulf War, many Turks are concerned that future crises may expose a tendency toward "selective solidarity" within the Alliance.

Third, Turkish relations with the U.S. have become more important and more difficult in the wake of the Gulf War. Trends in U.S. security thinking, not least the rediscovery of geopolitics on Europe's periphery (especially in the Caspian) and growing emphasis on the challenges of WMD and missile proliferation and regional power projection, have reinforced interest in Turkey as a strategic partner.⁷ Senior officials have come to view Turkey as the new "front line" state in NATO and a key actor in Balkan, Middle Eastern and Eurasian security.⁸ The new strategic environment is characterized by a range of trans-regional issues, from terrorism to energy security, and Turkey is at the center of these concerns. Yet, Turkish and American approaches to some important policy questions, from the Aegean to the Gulf, differ substantially. Traditional patterns of security assistance have "matured" (i.e., ended), and major commercial arms transfers have been plagued by Congressional opposition. Turkish cooperation in regional crises has become less predictable since the Gulf War (admittedly, a problem in transatlantic relations as a whole). Outside the security realm, some important avenues for cooperation exist, but relations with Europe will always loom larger

⁷The fate of Turkey itself can also have serious regional implications, as discussed in Robert Chase, Emily Hill and Paul Kennedy, "The Pivotal States," *Foreign Affairs*, January-February 1996.

⁸See F. Stephen Larrabee, "U.S. and European Policy Toward Turkey and the Caspian Basin," in Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Sturmer, eds., *Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997).

in the economic realm. Turkey's troubled relations with Europe have inevitably placed greater pressure on the bilateral relationship with Washington. There is now considerable interest, on both sides, in redefining and reinvigorating this strategic relationship to make it more relevant to new concerns, and more predictable for Ankara and Washington. Overall, the balance in Turkish relations with the West has shifted markedly over the past few years, with Washington rather than Brussels now at the center of Turkish perspectives.

Fourth, Turkey has acquired some tangible strategic options -- new "geometries" rather than alternatives *per se* -- in its external policy, especially in the security sphere. Above all, Ankara is engaged in a burgeoning strategic relationship with Israel. To the extent that Israel can be seen as a Western (even an Atlantic) actor, this new relationship offers opportunities to reinforce Ankara's traditional alignments. But it is also a reflection of Turkey's changing international outlook. On a practical level, defense-industrial cooperation with Israel offers a degree of diversification away from reliance on U.S. and European supply relationships, which Turkish policymakers are increasingly inclined to see as unreliable. Similar objectives may be seen in relation to intelligence sharing and military training, quite apart from any special advantages that Israel might provide in these areas. The steady rise of Turkish concern about proliferation risks also makes Israel a valuable partner, especially in relation to ballistic missile defenses.

Strategically, closer relations with Israel give Ankara additional leverage in confronting Syria on the issue of Syrian support for the PKK, and in containing Syria, Iraq and Iran as longer-term geopolitical competitors. Jordan can be a politically significant part of this regional equation. Taken together, these new security geometries can also have a synergistic effect on Ankara's relationship with the U.S. This would certainly be the case in the event that Washington seeks to diversify its own approach to maintaining security in the Gulf via a "northern" route, implying a greater role for Turkey, Israel and Jordan.

The new Turkish-Israeli alignment is a product of evolving Turkish security concerns, together with a degree of impatience and frustration with conventional geometries in relations with the West. Turkish policy also recognizes that deep-rooted Arab ambivalence about Turkey -- paralleling European ambivalence in many respects -- means there is little opportunity cost for Ankara in pursuing relations with Israel. Arguably, the relationship is more an extension of Turkey's Western orientation than a strategic alternative.

SOME EXTERNAL OPTIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

Does Turkey have viable options to a Western-oriented foreign and security policy? Yes, it does, but only within certain important limits. A detailed discussion of Turkey's political future is beyond the scope of this paper. But given recent experience, and despite important popular support for Refah's successors, an Islamist return to government must be considered unlikely. Barring a fundamental change in leadership that could introduce wilder options (it is worth noting that even Erbakan was more ineffective than radical in foreign policy terms), or more chaotic developments that would effectively disable Turkey as an international actor -- both unlikely scenarios -- essential continuity can be expected. If the choice is described as Turkey looking West or elsewhere, Turkey's western orientation will almost certainly hold. But Turkey's choices are complex, and may have more to do with activism than direction. That said, three broad "options" are worth considering in more detail, together with their implications.

1) Turkey looks West. Many elements, from a realistic calculus of power politics to the tradition and affinity of Turkey's secular elites, argue for a continued Western orientation. Ankara will need to reassure itself against the possibility of a resurgent Russia (a key Turkish concern). Energy security concerns and energy transport opportunities dictate cooperation and will provide additional incentives. Western, especially European, investment will be essential for continued high levels of economic growth. Turkey is most unlikely to abandon its role in NATO, much less its security ties to the U.S. Relations with Europe, while problematic, will continue to occupy a central place in economic terms. Whatever the tenor of relations between Ankara and Brussels, European and Turkish futures -- political, economic and military -- will be more, rather than less, closely interwoven as a consequences of common challenges and instability on Europe's periphery.

Leaving aside radical developments in Turkish politics, three developments could undermine this tendency to look westward. First, a conflict between Greece and Turkey could result in the long-term estrangement of Turkey from the West. Even relationships in key institutions such as NATO could become dysfunctional. Second, a major conflict with a regional state (Syria is the most obvious candidate; Russia is another), in which the West fails to support Ankara, would be highly corrosive of Turkish-Western relations. Third, and most unlikely, Western criticism of Ankara's domestic policies, or the nature of Turkish policy itself -- could reach a point that precipitates a fundamental break in relations. Developments along these lines may be capable of disturbing, perhaps

irreparably, Turkey's relations with the West, but they do not give any additional weight to alternatives. A Turkey that breaks with the West will not necessarily find common interests with Russia or Iran. Countries such as Azerbaijan will not be any more capable of supporting Turkish interests under these conditions. Syria will be just as competitive.

Variations on the "Turkey looks West" theme are possible, even likely. Turkey has already adjusted its policy toward the West to give primacy to relations with Washington and accommodate a more uncertain dialogue with the EU. The relationship with Israel introduces an element of diversification, and allows Turkey greater leverage in addressing issues at the top of the new security agenda -- terrorism, proliferation and Middle Eastern friction. As noted earlier, there may also be opportunities to reinforce the overall relationship with the U.S. and the West, as a whole, as a consequence of new geometries in the Middle East.

2) Turkey looks elsewhere. Turkey *will* look elsewhere -- indeed has been doing so since the 1980s -- but partners elsewhere are useful options, not alternatives in the strict sense. Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq was Turkey's leading trade partner, but hardly a real partner in strategic terms. With the break-up of the Soviet Union, there was considerable optimism about opportunities for Turkey in the Turkic republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia.⁹ Important economic and political relationships have developed, but the re-discovery of these regions has not revolutionized Turkish foreign policy, and a more realistic attitude toward the Turkic republics now prevails. The key economic partner for Ankara in the former Soviet Union has turned out to be Russia itself. But relations with Russia, an historic competitor with numerous points of bilateral friction from the eastern Mediterranean to Central Asia, can hardly constitute an alternative to the West. As in relations with Israel and Jordan, Turkish relations in Eurasia are more likely to be seen as a means of increasing Turkey's value to the West and bolstering Ankara's own freedom of action (diplomatically, and in economic terms, especially with regard to the country's own energy needs).

"Elsewhere" might also imply the Arab and Muslim Middle East. Economically, there is much to be gained in this quarter. The loss of Turkey's vibrant pre-1990 trade with Iraq is deeply felt in Ankara. Turkish enterprises would be well positioned to expand in the region, especially under conditions of a durable Arab-Israeli peace. Politically,

⁹See, for example, Graham E. Fuller, "Turkey's New Eastern Orientation," in Fuller, Lesser, et al., *Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China* (Boulder: Westview, 1993).

Turkey faces significant constraints. Within the Arab world, secularists and nationalist view Turkey with ambivalence as a former imperial power and a NATO ally.¹⁰ The relationship with Israel has only reinforced these suspicions. Islamists, for their part, view secular Turkey with disdain. Turks themselves tend to prefer an arms length approach to the Arab Middle East (even Erbakan made a point of avoiding Arab states in his Islamic tour abroad). Syria is an outright source of risk. Iran is a potentially important economic partner, but in other respects a long-term geopolitical competitor. Relations with Iraq have great significance in economic terms, and as a vehicle for managing Kurdish separatism. In other respects Baghdad is a potentially serious source of military risk and regional instability -- hardly a viable strategic partner for Ankara.

Perhaps least appealing is the notion of Turkey looking "south," aligning itself with key actors in the developing world. As Erbakan discovered with his brief foray in this direction, this concept holds little appeal for Turks used to engagement in leading Western institutions. The idea of Turkey as a leader in this sphere might possibly have had some appeal during a decade in which emerging markets and regional "tigers" captured the attention of investors and leaderships. In the wake of the Asian economic crisis and failing confidence elsewhere, this is a far less attractive club to join. More realistic and attractive is the notion of Turkey as a key interlocutor for the West in its relations with the south, above all Europe's Mediterranean periphery.¹¹

3) Turkey looks to its own interests. As a general policy thrust, this is a viable and likely "option" for Ankara toward the 21st century. It is not incompatible with other approaches, and is most likely to coexist, if somewhat uncomfortably, with the enduring interest in broad alignment with the West. Several trends encourage a more independent and assertive Turkish stance toward key regions and institutions. First, social, political and economic changes within Turkey have given rise to a very much more active discourse on external policy. Turkish affinities, as well as interests are engaged in the Balkans, the Caucasus and elsewhere. Elite and public foreign and security policy horizons have expanded both regionally ("from the Balkans to Western China") and functionally (the

¹⁰See Philip Robins, *Turkey and the Middle East* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991).

¹¹By this measure, Turkey should have a special stake in NATO's Mediterranean Initiative aimed at promoting dialogue and cooperation with select Mediterranean, non-member partners. For an analysis placing Turkish perceptions of the Mediterranean in strategic perspective, see Ilter Turan, "Mediterranean Security in the Light of Turkish Concerns," *Perceptions* (Ankara), June-August 1998.

status of Turks abroad, terrorism, proliferation, energy security, territorial defense are all part of the equation). A more vigorous Turkish nationalism is apparent across the political spectrum and is central to Ankara's policy toward such key issues as Cyprus, the nationalist issue par excellence, and relations with Syria. Turkish security elites, although eager to engage in useful defense cooperation, are nonetheless highly sensitive to questions of Turkish sovereignty.

Second, Turkey is emerging as a more capable and confident regional actor. Turkey has been an active participant, and sometimes a leader, in multilateral initiatives from the Bosnia to the Black Sea and the Middle East. But Turkey has also been willing to act unilaterally beyond its borders (e.g., northern Iraq), and is increasingly capable of projecting military power for this purpose. The confrontation with Syria provides a most recent example of this willingness to intervene in defense of perceived vital interests. The development of close relations with Israel, in the face of strong regional criticism, provides further evidence of a more assertive and independent approach. If multilateral options are unavailable for the management of risks on Turkey's borders, whether in the Balkans, the Aegean, the Caucasus or the Levant, Ankara may now be more inclined to approach these problems unilaterally, although not necessarily directly or militarily.

Third, disenchantment with Western policies, not only toward Turkey itself, but also toward problems that matter to Turks, will tend to reinforce a more independent and assertive approach. In some cases, strained relations with Europe or the West, as a whole, will reduce the apparent costs of an independent policy, especially where Turkish political or economic stakes are high (e.g., in relations with Greece or Iran). In other cases, lack of confidence in Western backing may make an assertive stance more difficult and risky (e.g., in disputes with Russia or in Balkan and Caucasian crises). But a Turkey that has lost confidence in the Western link will almost certainly look to safeguard its interests and seize opportunities in a more independent fashion.

OVERALL OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In sum, Turkey now has a broader range of options in its foreign and security policy, but no viable alternatives to alignment with the West on a strategic level. Many of the directions for Turkish policy that have been presented as "alternatives," from opportunities in Central Asia to cooperation with Israel, are more properly understood as new geometries, most useful to bolster rather than circumvent ties to the West. Turkey's history and modern foreign policy tradition make it unsuited to radical, alternative

conceptions of the country's international role -- most Turks aspire to the G-7, not the leadership of the D-8.¹²

Within these constraints, however, Turkey can, and most likely will, continue to pursue a more independent and assertive set of external policies, impelled by a more vigorous sense of Turkish nationalism. In a sense, Turkey has already chosen the "independent" option. The quality of Turkey's relations with the U.S., Europe and key Western institutions such as NATO and the EU, will be a leading determinant of how assertive -- and how divergent from Western approaches -- Ankara's policies will be. Turkey may not have any true strategic alternatives to the West, but this does not mean that Turkish-Western relations can be taken for granted. Turkish estrangement would introduce new risks and impose new limitations on Turkish policy. It would also deprive the West of a potentially critical strategic partner in addressing new challenges spanning Europe, the Middle East and Eurasia. Finally, the failure to reinvigorate Turkish relations with the West, especially with the EU, is likely to make the process of political and economic change in Turkey itself more difficult and crisis-prone.

¹²Erbakan in power proposed the creation of an alternative D-8 grouping of major developing countries, led by Turkey.

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United States and European approaches to Turkey

The West and Turkey: varying roles common interests

John Roper

During the Cold War, the United States, Western Europe and Turkey had a common foreign and security policy. For all three the overwhelming priority was given to responding to the perceived threat of the Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War there is much greater variation in the assessment of priorities in external relations, and a diminution, at least in the case of the United States and Western Europe, of the relative priority given to defence and security issues within government. Not only is there less homogeneity of assessment between the three partners, but within each of them there is less homogeneity. Different groups within governments and more widely within societies have different external policy agendas with different rankings of priorities. The countries of the European Union have perhaps found this most acutely when the avowed intention to create a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has coincided with a period when there is in fact less commonality among member states about priorities in external relations. More generally the end of the Cold War has lead to a tendency to "renationalise" foreign and security policies.

In looking at the convergence and divergence of Western European and United States approaches to Turkey and the opportunities for cooperation or conflict in the light of our common interests and varying roles, it must first be recognised that within the European Union there are only common approaches on some aspects of relations with Turkey, and that within the United States there are sometimes differences in different parts of the administration on aspects of policies towards Turkey and the

European Union¹, with Congress also sometimes having different views from the Executive Branch.

In the same way within Turkey, as Ian Lesser has discussed in his paper for this meeting and elsewhere,² Turkey's security concerns have widened with the end of the Cold War, there are now a wider group of actors playing a part in the internal foreign policy debate in Turkey, and with the end of the Cold War "Turkish national interests are being promoted more assertively, and sovereignty concerns are at the forefront of key relationships, not least with the US."³ While the European reluctance to give Turkey any clear prospect of integration in its institutions has contributed to changes in Turkey's attitudes, there are also independent internal developments which affect her foreign policy stance.

There is a temptation to Cold War nostalgia when confronted with the inevitable tensions of the divergent interests of the present situation. However this does not provide a very constructive basis for constructing healthy relations in the present situation. The essential difference between the United States and Europe in the analysis of post Cold War security challenges is that the United States shares with Turkey a view that security must be increasingly seen on a trans-regional basis while the countries of the European Union still concentrate, to a much greater extent, primarily if not exclusively on problems of European security. This, as will be

¹ For instance, those parts of the administration dealing with agricultural issues might not feel that early enlargement of the European Union to Turkey would necessarily facilitate agricultural negotiations with the EU in the WTO.

² Ian Lesser, unpublished paper for Washington Institute for Near East Policy conference, July 1998. As will be seen from what follows this paper had a very formative influence on my thinking on this subject.

³ Lesser, *op cit* p.3.

seen, has implications not only for the scope of the CFSP and the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) but also for NATO and for the future cooperation among Western Europe, Turkey and the United States within that structure.

I. The substance of the geo-political relationship of Western Europe and the United States with Turkey

As Lesser has argued "at the broadest level, Turkey, Europe and the United States have a shared stake in regional stability, and share a status quo rather than revolutionary outlook in international affairs."⁴ I want to examine in a number of more specific areas the extent to which interests are shared and the extent they differ in approach

1. Turkey as part of the European Security System.

During the Cold War, Turkey played a critical role as part of the barrier protecting the West from Soviet advance, but even then the culture of NATO tended to 'central frontism'. This concentration on the problems of the Central Front and failed to credit Turkey with the role it played in 'locking up' 24 Soviet Divisions which would otherwise have made an addition to the direct threat to Western Europe. On September 27 1989, only weeks before the fall of the Berlin Wall, the then Turkish Prime Minister, Turgut Ozal, addressing the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe could appeal for a fundamental change of attitude to Turkish membership of the European Union, claiming that as Turkey had shared for forty years the burden of the defence of Europe against Communism, it should share the benefits of European economic growth. Everything that has happened since then has widened the gap between Western Europe and Turkey and reduced the perception in both Turkey and Western Europe that they are in the same security system..

⁴ Lesser op cit p.13.

Whoever else has enjoyed a European "peace dividend" since 1989 it has not been Turkey. Indeed the post Cold War developments have distanced Turkey from Western Europe in two different ways. The proposed enlargement of the Union to include the Central and Eastern European countries is argued for in part as a means of strengthening European security by including these countries in the Deutschian "security community"⁵ which has been established among the members of the European Union. The ten candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe have taken priority over Turkey in the queue for European Union membership, and that has inevitably distanced Turkey from Western Europe. It is not correct to place the responsibility for European reticence on Turkish membership of the European Union on Greece, although the long running Greco-Turkish conflicts have meant that Turkey has not been perceived as part of the existing Deutschian "security community", in Western Europe and this has been one factor leading to Europeans including Turkish problems in the "too difficult" basket.

The second factor of divergence has been that, with the end of the Cold War, there has been a difference in appreciation between Western Europeans and Turks as to the nature of developments in Russia and the future of relations with it. This is in part a question of geo-politics, the end of the Cold War meant that the Red Army withdrew some thousand kilometers on the Central Front, and although with the breakup of the Soviet Union they are no longer on the physical borders of Turkey, Russian armed forces are still a good deal closer to Turkey than to Western Europe. In addition Turkey's possible partners in Central Asia are still much more part of Russia's "near abroad" than are the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Even the Baltic States have made a cleaner break with Russia than the

⁵ Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton University Press, 1957) p.5 The term 'security community' refers not to an institutionalised community of states, but to a region in which military force is no longer contemplated as a possible way of resolving inter-state disputes.

members of the CIS. Europeans, and indeed Americans, are more inclined to be optimistic about developments in Russia than Turkey is.

This can be seen rather directly in the negotiations taking place to adapt the European conventional arms control treaty, the CFE agreement. Turkey feels that the withdrawal of Russian forces from Central Europe has increased the pressures on the northern and southern flanks. Russia facing complex problems inside its own borders in the Caucasus, and in neighbouring CIS countries where it has forces deployed, wants to maintain the maximum flexibility in force deployment. Western European members of NATO and the United States, both of whose primary priorities lie in trying to find adaptations to the 1990 Treaty to take into account NATO enlargement to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, are frequently felt by Turkey not to be sufficiently sympathetic to her position. In practice Turkey finds more support in dealing with flank issues from the "GUAM" countries, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, who share many of Turkey's misgivings about Russian deployments.

The development of the ESDI within both NATO and WEU has been carried out by Western Europeans in ways which they feel have attempted to meet Turkish sensitivities. Following the signature of the Treaty of European Union (the Maastricht Treaty) in 1991, which for the first time enunciated the defence vocation of the European Union and the role of WEU in implementing this as "an integral part of the development of the Union", an invitation was extended to Greece, as a member of the European Union, to join WEU, although the accession agreement, to the disappointment of many Greeks, made it clear that Greece could not make use of the security guarantees included in Article V of WEU's Brussels Treaty in any conflict with a NATO partner (i.e. Turkey). Turkey, along with Norway and Iceland, as members of NATO not being members of the European Union, were invited to become Associate Members of WEU and have since then

attended all the weekly meetings of the WEU Permanent Council.⁶ It has been recommended by Stephen Larrabee that Turkey should become a full member of WEU,⁷ but this is considered by the existing WEU members to be incompatible with the vocation of integrating WEU into the European Union. Meanwhile the three Associate Members, including Turkey, participate fully in the military planning of WEU and their officers, along with those of the full members but not of the Observers or Associate Partners, make up the staff of WEU's Planning Cell.⁸ The WEU Erfurt Ministerial Declarations of November 1997, which, followed negotiations on WEU-led Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) with NATO, have made it clear that Turkey would have the right to a full role of participation and decision-making of any WEU-led operation which made use of NATO assets and capabilities. (this covers a much wider range of operations than WEU-led CJTFs). This, in fact, goes a long way to achieve the objective of integrating "Turkey more fully into the mainstream of European security planning." ⁹

On the other hand the extension of EUROFOR (European Rapid Deployment Force), at present made up of France, Italy, Portugal and Spain, and EUROMARFOR (European Maritime Force) with similar participation, both of them being forces answerable to WEU (FAWEU), to Greece but not to Turkey, as has recently been

⁶ The ten full members only meet in practice on their own to deal with institutional and personnel matters.

⁷ F. Stephen Larrabee in Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Stürmer (eds), *Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East*, Cambridge, Mass, MIT Press, 1997, p.169..

⁸ The WEU Observers are the four members of the European Union who are not members of NATO and Denmark, the Associate Partners are the 10 Central and Eastern European countries who are negotiating entry to the EU, (but not Cyprus). The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland will become Associate Members in 1999 when they join NATO.

⁹ Larrabee op cit p.169..

suggested, would be very badly received by the Turkish Defence Staff.

The issues of Turkey's long term relations with the European Union must influence the security relationship. This is discussed in more detail elsewhere at this meeting, but there is no doubt that there has been considerable American impatience with what it perceived as European clumsiness. General Cevik Bir, then Deputy Chief of Turkish General Staff, made clear the attitude of the Turkish military in his March 1998 speech,¹⁰ He criticised the European Union for "ousting Turkey from the European Union process", and criticised Europe for "not being interested in what is going on beyond the wall that it has created, yet everything important that is happening in the world is happening in the region of which Turkey forms the centre." Having described the European Union's decision as a "senseless" move, he continued that "It is necessary to educate, awaken and warn Europe. . . Breaking off with Europe is out of the question; on the contrary it is necessary to unite with Europe to remove this wall and to explain this to Europe."

It is at least encouraging that the decision by the European Commission to provide a progress report on Turkey as one of the candidates for admission on whom it reported to the Council of Ministers in November 1998 will in the words of the Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem "open the way for an improvement in relations."¹¹

While there are very few in Turkey, Western Europe or the United States who have accepted the whole of Huntington's analysis of a "Clash of Civilisations" as a replacement for ideological dispute and an explanation of the geopolitics of the post Cold

¹⁰ Cevik Bir, speech on "New Security Architecture for Turkey and Europe in the 21st Century", reported in *Istanbul Sabah* (Internet Version) in Turkish, 29 March 1998 and in English in FBIS Daily Report, 26 June 1998, FBIS-WEU-98-177.

¹¹ *Financial Times*, (London Edition), 6 November 1998. p.3.

War world, one does find attenuated elements of it in some discussions.¹² This is a factor tending to take Christian Western Europe away from Muslim Turkey, and also finds Turkey worried about an Orthodox bloc bringing Russia, Serbia and Greece, and possibly Armenia, as an antagonistic alliance.

2 Turkey as a partner in the problems of South East European Security.

Turkey has of course central historic roles throughout the Balkan peninsula, the area which divides her geographically from Western Europe. There have, throughout much of the Cold War period, been disputes between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean and over Cyprus. These were managed by NATO and Western Allies because the cost of a dispute would have had strategic implications. The end of the Cold War has if anything intensified these disputes and the continuing stresses are reflected in the perpetuation of the militarily inefficient arrangements for NATO's command structure in South East Europe, where two Joint Sub Regional Commands, one South-Centre based in Larissa, Greece, and the other South-East based at Izmir, Turkey, have been maintained for purely political reasons. The conflict over the uninhabited Kardak-Imai islands in the southern Aegean in 1996 was resolved thanks to direct intervention by Ambassador Holbrooke. The problems unfortunately continue as seen by the events in 1997. Following the US brokered agreement of May 1997 whereby Cyprus agreed not to invite Greek military aircraft to overfly the island during a joint Cypriot-Greek military exercise, Turkey committed itself not to overfly Cyprus as long as Greece did not do so. However within less than six months, in October 1997, Greece and Turkey held the *Nikiforos* exercise and in November Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots responded with the *Toros* manoeuvres. Thus both

¹² The statement by six mainly Christian Democratic Heads of Government on 4 March 1997 that they opposed Turkish European Union Membership in part because of cultural differences is an example of this. *Financial Times*, 5 March 1997, p.2.

parties violated the moratorium on overflights of Cyprus they had signed six months previously.

Many attempts at mediation of the Cyprus dispute have been made in recent years without success, but the relatively stable division is now under challenge for two reasons. Under pressure from Greece the European Union has agreed to begin negotiations for Cyprus's entry to the European Union along with the five Central and Eastern European countries¹³ who are on the "fast-track". There are many existing EU members who feel Cyprus cannot be admitted to the Union while it is divided, but the prospect of negotiations for admission which were initially seen, perhaps naively ¹⁴, as a catalyst for change are now seen to be complicating rather than helping the resolution of the problems between Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the island. In addition the Cypriot Government ordered in January 1997 some S-300 (S-10 Grumble)¹⁵ air defence missiles from the Russian Federation which were originally planned to be delivered in August 1998 but this has been postponed to November 1998. This is seen as an aggressive act by Turkey which has made it clear that it will not be able to ignore this threat to its security.

Both Western Europeans and the United States have tried to resolve these disputes, if the United States has been able to do so more directly and apparently energetically it is because Greek membership of the European Union does inhibit the operation of the CFSP in this area. This should not however be

¹³ The five are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. Five other countries, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia, are also recognised as candidates for admission but on a longer time horizon.

¹⁴ Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War*, Random House, New York, 1998. p.61.. claims that this was done by the European Union "under American pressure."

¹⁵ These missiles have a range of 90 miles, which is significantly less than the distance from Cyprus to the Turkish coast.

taken as meaning that Greece has gained the support of her EU partners in these disputes. In most cases both parties are considered equally responsible, and Greece frequently manages to irritate her European partners with her attitudes.

Turkey has earned respect for her restrained but generally helpful part in sharing in Western efforts to settle the conflicts that have arisen since the end of the Cold War in former Yugoslavia and Albania. There have been significant Turkish contributions to UNPROFOR from the end of 1993, (1,469 Turks out of a total of 19,000 troops in 1995), NATO's Operation "Deny Flight" (18 F-16s), IFOR and SFOR (1,300 troops) as well as in the Italian-led Operation Alba in Albania in 1997 (700 troops).¹⁶

Turkey's relatively low profile position may have arisen because in the first half of the nineties she was too busy developing a new post Cold War strategy towards the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East, regions which had more strategic priority for her than the Balkans. In spite of a strong internal emotional reaction both on grounds of religious solidarity, and because many Turks saw in Bosnia another secular Muslim Society,¹⁷ there was relatively little public pressure from Turkey on Western negotiators.¹⁸ Turkey played a helpful role in the meetings of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC).¹⁹ There was a limited amount of Turkish food and medical

¹⁶ All figures for Turkish forces from IISS *Military Balance*, 1995-6, 1996-7, and 1997-8

¹⁷ This view was not entirely reciprocated. President Izetbegovic refusing to visit the tomb of Kemal Atatürk on his visit to Ankara on the ground that Atatürk had undermined the Islamic character of the Turkish state.

¹⁸ David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*, Victor Gollancz, London 1995, p.113.

¹⁹ Holbrooke, *op cit* p,121

aid to Bosnia, but this was rather less than Turgut Ozal had promised at the outset of the war and the Bosniaks anticipated. Initially Western European governments felt the Turkish participation in UNPROFOR would have been unhelpful, but in practice the Turkish infantry battalion deployed in UNPROFOR in Bosnia at the end of 1993, which it had been anticipated would have produced very negative Serb reactions, had very few problems.

Where there was a difference between European and American approaches were in the Turkish preparedness to assist in arming the Bosniaks. It is not clear how far Turkey was involved in the supply of arms to Bosnia-Herzegovina in contravention of the UN embargo prior to 1995 although some suggestions have been made that the Bosnian government moved much of its arms purchasing to Turkey in 1993-4.²⁰ A more serious difference between Western Europeans and the United States involving Turkey arose over the US inducement to Bosnia-Herzegovina to agree to the Dayton agreement by promising a programme to "Train and Equip" the Federation army. The Western Europeans disliked this proposal and in general refused to participate in it. A conference was held in Turkey in March 1996 of those willing to cooperate on this without Western European participation. Turkey is playing a significant part alongside the United States in this programme, and this is seen by the United States as a way of replacing any alternative Iranian influence on military developments in Bosnia. However there is still a friction here with Europeans and this could increase if, under domestic pressure, the US presence in the Balkans were to be withdrawn and that lead to Turkey from its role in "Train and Equip" taking on "an independent political role as protector of the Balkan Muslims."²¹ It is important not to exaggerate this risk, but

²⁰ Julian Pettifer, *The Turkish Labyrinth, Atatürk and the New Islam*, Penguin Books, London, 1998, p.178.

²¹ Pettifer, *op cit* p.179.

there is a potential for friction if this is not treated with considerable care.

In the southern Balkans the post Cold War situation has seen a considerable improvement in relations between Bulgaria and Turkey primarily due to wise policies by Bulgaria.²² Turkey has played a useful role in Albania during the Italian-led "Operation Alba" in 1997 providing about 10% of the total force. They have subsequently at the invitation of the Albanian government sent a military contingent advisers to help rebuild the Albanian armed forces. However as an experienced Albanian military commentator has noted Greece and Italy have also accepted such invitations and "only time will tell whether these countries' representatives will be able to set aside their own disputes and participate in a joint effort together with the Albanians, to re-establish a military capable of external defence."²³ In the situation in Kosovo Turkey has fully shared in the position of its NATO partners in terms of military threats to Serbia and in supporting the political opposition to Kosovan independence. Whatever its sympathy with the largely Muslim Kosovan Albanians, Turkey is worried that an independent Kosova might be seen as a precedent by Kurds. A similar reticence is seen in relation to Macedonia²⁴ and the position of the Albanian community there.

Possibly in the long term one of the most important development would be the construction of the proposed Highway 8, linking

²² The final points of dispute were settled in November 1998 when the Bulgarian Prime Minister on an official visit to Ankara agreed to pay pension to Turkish-Bulgarian former employees of Bulgarian state enterprises who had been expelled from Bulgaria by the Zhivkov government in the 1980s.

²³ Halit Daci, *Albanian Army and Regime changes*, Harmonie paper No 3, Centre for European Security Studies, Groningen, 1998 p.78

²⁴ Except for the fact that Turkey recognised the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia under the name Macedonia, and insists on footnoting this fact to NATO communiques!

Durrës, Tirana, Skopje, Sofia and Istanbul. Although it is not clear when if ever the economic resources will be found for this, important infrastructural development, it would also certainly have an important geopolitical impact on the South Balkans. It would presumably become the main trade route between Western Europe and Turkey.

3 Turkish Kemalism as a model for the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia.

During the Cold War but perhaps more importantly immediately after the Cold War, the Kemalist secular model for a Muslim country was widely seen as one that could be transposed to other states in the Middle East and North Africa as a form of governance which would be significantly easier for the West to deal with than the alternative fundamentalist models which were developing. This view could be found both in Western Europe and the United States and provided an argument for maintaining and developing good relations with Turkey and in particular persuading the European Parliament to ratify the EU-Turkey Customs Union in 1995. Since then this argument has become less effective, both because of a realisation that it was not so easy to transfer models of governance, and because the Kemalist model has begun to look less attractive to outside observers.

Domestic developments in Turkey have raised questions about the Kemalist model in the eyes of observers, and the dominant role of the military in Turkey, a long-standing NATO member, has proved perhaps more worrying at a time when NATO has been trying to give lessons in political military relations to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe who are candidates or would-be candidates to join the Alliance.

One important dimension of the problem is seen in the rise of Refah, the Islamist "Welfare" Party which received 21% of the votes in the December 1996 General Election, and whose leader Necmettin Erbakan formed a coalition government with Tansu Ciller's True Path Party in June 1996 only to be eased out of

office by military pressure in June 1997 and the party closed by the Constitutional Court in January 1998. There is an ambiguity in Western attitudes to the obligation within the Kemalist state model for the army to act as a guarantee of the Constitution. The role of the army is seen as having contributed in important ways to modernising and westernising Turkish society, and the armed forces have been the strongest point of contact for NATO and the United States in particular, but Western Europeans now find the role of the armed forces in the Turkish state system,²⁵ and their interventions in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997, quite out of keeping with Western practice. There was during the Cold War a greater tolerance to the internal policies of Allies, as seen by the acceptance of Caetano's Portugal as a member of NATO from 1949, or the position of Greece from 1967 to 1974 under the Colonels, but this tolerance has been much reduced in Western European Parliaments and the US Congress by the end of the Cold War.

The failure of the Kemalist structure to provide an inclusive framework for Islamist politics is paralleled by its failure to find a satisfactory place in Turkish politics for the Kurds. The continuing problem of the 13 million Kurds in Turkey, some 20% of the Turkish population and more than half of the total Kurdish population, is, like some of the problems of South Eastern Europe, inherited from the break-up of the Ottoman empire in the first decades of this century. The Kurds who existed as a people within the Ottoman were divided principally between Turkey, Iraq and Syria after the first World War. The question of what status they should have within the three countries, or in their own entity, presents a problem for each of the three countries and for relations between them. Since the Gulf War of 1990-91 it has been linked to the United States and United Kingdom use of the Turkish base at Incirlik to

²⁵ This is symbolised by the fact that the Chief of Defence Staff of the Turkish armed forces cannot accompany the Minister of Defence to NATO ministerial meetings as in Turkish domestic protocol he is senior to the minister!

provide assistance to Iraqi Kurds through "Operation Provide Comfort" and to maintain the "no fly zone" over Norther Iraqi airspace.

There is no consensus among the Kurds as to how their national objectives should be obtained and Turkey has had to respond to the violent policies of the militant left-wing Kurdish faction the PKK which has maintained an armed struggle since 1984 against what it considers to be Turkish oppression. Although the bulk of the Kurdish population are in south-eastern Turkey, a significant minority have now moved into the expanding urban centres of western Turkey and particularly Istanbul which may now have over two million Kurds in its population.

Western Europeans can understand the need to respond to PKK acts of violence, although there was less support in Western Europe than in the United States for the various Turkish army incursions in hot pursuit into Iraq. There is much more difficulty in understanding Turkish resistance to finding a political solution to the problem. There is therefore a risk of significant political differences between Western Europe and Turkey on this, General Bir in his March 1998 speech said that "Europe is practising double standards, whereas America is aware of the situation."²⁶ Among the possible continuing grounds of friction are the judgements on the outstanding backlog of some several hundred Turkish-Kurdish cases before the European Court of Human Rights²⁷, Turkish anger at the satellite Kurdish language television programmes broadcast from London and

²⁶ General Cevik Bir *op cit*

²⁷ There are in addition up to a thousand other Turkish cases before the Court.

Brussels by Med TV,²⁸ and attempts to hold sessions of the Kurdish National Assembly in Western European cities.²⁹

4 Turkey as a partner in Middle Eastern problems.

The differences between Western Europe and the United States may appear to be greatest in terms of their different approaches to the potential role of Turkey in the Middle East. The Turkish view of this difference is very clearly described by General Bir in his speech, "After all, there is a big difference between the United States and Europe, Europe approaches the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Eurasia not with political goals but with short term economic interests. The approach of the United States, however, is in line with the importance of the region, and its policy is in accord with Turkey."³⁰

While in fact the degree of accord between United States and Turkey on policies towards a number of individual countries is not necessarily so clear, what is the case is that the United States has persuaded the Turkish authorities, and particularly the Turkish armed forces, that in the post Cold War situation they consider Turkey as still important because of its potential as a partner in the region. This Europe has failed to do.

The Turkish-Israeli relationship, which survived the period of Refah participation in government, is seen in part by Turkey as providing an alternative source of armaments given the restrictions placed by the US Congress on US sales to Turkey. It is assumed by Turkey to be a way of gaining support from the

²⁸ These broadcasts are reported to be frequently jammed by the Turks.

²⁹ At least no Western European Parliament has yet gone as far as the Russian Duma where on 4 November 1998, 298 deputies voted for a resolution, with no votes against, to ask President Yeltsin to give Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK leader, political asylum in Russia.

³⁰ General Cevik Bir, *op cit*.

friends of Israel in the United States, but it is not clear whether it has had this effect. However regrettably limited the European Union's participation in the Middle East Peace Process has been, it is by no means clear that Turkey's has been greater.

Turkish-Syrian relations have been bad as have European-Syrian and United States-Syrian relations, but for three different sets of reasons. There is very little congruence here. A deterioration of relations between Turkey and Syria, which for a period looked likely in the autumn of 1998 and the possibility of military conflict in which Turkey might wish to rely on NATO's Article V to require Allied support would as Ian Lesser has pointed out "be a major test of post Cold War security relations between Turkey and the West."³¹

Similarly in relations with Iraq Turkey would like for purely economic reasons to see an end to sanctions and a resumption of the full flow of Iraqi oil through its pipeline. Lesser estimates that "Ankara will be most unwilling to place Turkish facilities at the disposal of a US-led coalition in a renewed confrontation with Saddam unless the operation aims at permanently altering the regional order."³² It is therefore difficult to see any closer relation between US and Turkish policies: this is more in common with some Western European countries.

There has been little sympathy in Ankara for Washington's hard line policy to Tehran, particularly since the election of Khatami, and here Turkey has a position very close to that of the European Union. The only exception would be on the question of the choice of oil pipelines where, for reasons of national interest, Turkey shares the United States strong preference for a Turkish rather than Iranian route.

³¹ Lesser, *op cit* p.12.

³² Lesser, *op cit* p.14.

5 Turkey and the geo-politics of energy.

It is, therefore, perhaps here as much as anywhere where there is a very strong correlation, at least at the declaratory level, between United States and Turkish positions. The problem here is that decisions are by no means exclusively in the hands of governments driven by geo-political considerations. In the United States and Western Europe oil companies are relatively long term in their thinking, but their ultimate responsibility is to maximise returns for their shareholders. Thus decisions on the choice of pipelines will not necessarily follow the political preferences of governments, unless the latter are prepared to back their political preferences with significant amounts of their taxpayers money. It is not clear how far the taxpayer should be involved in the subsidisation of supply routes for oil companies.

There have been very wide variations in the estimates for Caspian and Central Asian oil and gas reserves. Recent analysis suggests a more cautious approach to oil resources in the region than some of the earlier estimates of the US State Department.³³ The IISS in their 1997/98 Strategic Survey suggest that, "instead of the 16% of world reserves the US State Department implies, the true figure for the Caspian is likely to be closer to 3%."³⁴ The combination of this, the relatively low price of oil and the prospects in the medium-term of a resumption of Iraqi production, and the defeat of Senator d'Amato in the November 1998 Senatorial election in New York may mean that Iranian pipelines will become more attractive than pipelines through Turkey.

³³ Heinz Kramer and Friedemann Müller, *Relations with Turkey and the Caspian Basin Countries* in Blackwill and Stürmer, *op cit*, p.19-4.

³⁴ International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1997-98*. OUP, London 199, p.24.

6 Turkey and WMD and BMD

Turkey's geographical position makes it more sensitive than the Western European members of NATO to the threats of weapons of mass destruction. While this does not seem to have led it to a very forward position on Iraq and UNSCOM, it certainly has been among those taking an active interest in US initiatives within NATO on counter-proliferation policy and ballistic missile defences. This is another area in which it may, outside the Alliance, see scope for common developments with Israel. Although there is a difference in priorities here with Western European members of NATO which may lead to bilateral cooperation with the United States, if it does not prove possible to develop joint programmes among a wider group of NATO members, this does not seem one of the areas where there is likely to be any significant stress between the United States and Western Europe because of Turkey's particular position.

7 Turkey and new transnational risks.

Apart from the possible spillover risk of Kurdish PKK violence to Western Europe, which until present has been relatively limited, and the more substantial flow of illegal immigrants and asylum seekers from Kurdish Turks, the more serious way in which Turkey affects Western European security in terms of the new transnational risks is through the flow of drugs. It is generally accepted that the principal supply of heroin into Western Europe comes through Turkey and that the vast majority of opium/morphine that transits Turkey from Afghanistan and the Golden Triangle is processed into heroin in Turkey. This is not a problem which directly affects the United States, but unless more effective patterns of cooperation can be developed between the Western Europeans and Turkey it could lead to considerable friction and provide another argument against Turkish candidacy for the European Union. The alternative argument that Turkish membership of the European Union is the only way to deal

satisfactorily with this problem does not seem to have much credibility.

II Developing common approaches .

In trying on the basis of this survey to see where the future strains on relations between Western Europe and the United States and Turkey and how these might effect relations between the United States and Turkey there would seem to be three key areas, the differing perceptions of the importance of internal developments, the stronger European concern over the risks of serious deterioration of relations between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus, and the discrepancy in the extent to which United States and the European Union are seen by Turkey as security partners on a wider range of trans-regional security issues.

On the first the difference was well summarised by Kramer and Müller "Concerning Turkey's domestic situation, the US government is mainly interested in a 'stable and democratic' Turkey, whereas the driving European interest seems to aim at a 'democratic and stable' Turkey."³⁵ This is not only because of the possibility of Turkey's candidature for the European Union, but also in the light of her membership of the Council of Europe where the democratic credentials of members are necessarily more central than they are within NATO.

The Greco-Turkish-Cypriot issues were of greater security concern during the Cold War as an explicit dispute would have serious implications for the Alliance, now they are more important in terms of their implications for the European Union and its enlargement.

The final discrepancy reflects the concentration of the members of the European Union on the problems of integrating the post-Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe, and the substantive difficulties in developing a common foreign and

³⁵ Kramer and Müller *op cit*, p.183..

security policy for a group of fifteen states who have often found the centrifugal pulls of national interests more powerful than then centripetal effect of integration and solidarity in the disorienting period of the post Cold War world.

Western Europeans and the United States have a common interest in working at getting solutions to the nexus of problems linking Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. In spite of the depressing results of attempts at mediation in recent years, there is a case for a major exercise involving the most senior figures from our countries. The European Union is not best placed to lead on the given Greek membership. The Contact Group, given Russian participation, is not right either, but an ad hoc arrangement perhaps between the country holding the presidency of the European Union and the United States might be one approach. The present Greek government might welcome a *deus ex machina* to resolve the issue. At present Greece spends 4.6% of its GNP on defence which is more than twice the NATO average and a serious obstacle to Greece meeting the 'Maastricht criteria', a precondition to it joining Economic and Monetary Union.

How can the European Union build on the slight *détente* on relations with Turkey following the November 1998 European Commission report on Turkey as a potential applicant? Would Turkey now participate in the European Conference between existing members and all candidates which it rejected in the first half of 1998 when it was proposed by the British Presidency?

Does the proposal of the British prime minister Tony Blair to reexamine the relationships between WEU and EU provide the possibility of developing a mechanism whereby, if the functions of WEU were subsumed under a restructured second pillar, Turkey's Associate Membership of WEU could be 'grandfathered' into some associate relationship with CFSP. There seems to be something of a precedent in the way that Norway and Iceland's have been through the Nordic Passport Union 'grandfathered' into

the Schengen Agreement and thus indirectly into the Third Pillar of the European Union.

Can ways be found to enable NATO to develop more credibility as a means of true security consultation among its members, rather than the exchange of stale information which is labelled 'consultation' at present? NATO has proved the case for maintaining itself as an excellent instrument of military cooperation. It has been far less effective since the end of the Cold War as an instrument for the development of policy among its members. The NATO instrument does give us considerable leverage with a key group in Turkish society - the Turkish military. Are we using it as effectively as we could? As Lesser has argued, the new NATO strategic concept is very likely to define a number of new functional missions - counter-proliferation, peace support operations and possibly counter-terrorism - that are "far more likely to be performed on or near Turkey's borders than elsewhere in the European security space."³⁶

The central instrument of developing policy for the Balkans since 1993 has been the Contact Group, it was enlarged to include Italy in 1995 and given the constructive and responsible role Turkey has played in the Balkans what are the arguments, apart from Greece, for not enlarging it further to include Turkey?

Larrabee has argued that Turkey should participate in the Transatlantic dialogue between the United States and the EU.³⁷ Such a development of the dialogue into a triologue would not be appropriate for the totality of the areas considered but an arrangement should be explored to see how a triangular element could be introduced when topics such as the Middle East or Central Asia were being discussed. A regular triangular

³⁶ Lesser *op cit*, p.18.

³⁷ Larrabee *op cit*, p.170..

discussion between the US Secretary of State, the Foreign Minister of Turkey and the Foreign Minister of the country holding the Presidency of the European Union together with the Vice President of the European Commission responsible for external policy might be one approach.

III Conclusions.

Many of the problems of the last decade has arisen from our failure to recognise how much was changed with the end of Cold War. Nowhere is that more true than in the case of relations between the West, the United States and Western Europe, and Turkey. The future pattern of developments will turn more than anything else on the evolution of Turkey herself. Predicting that goes beyond the scope of this paper. It is in the interest of the West to maintain a security partnership with Turkey, although both the substance and precise institutional framework of that partnership could take a variety of forms. Certainly one of the principal tasks of transatlantic relations between the European Union and its members and the United States will be to ensure that the security dialogue with Turkey is strengthened wherever possible.

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THE WINSTON FOUNDATION WASHINGTON, D.C.

November 18, 1998

To: Roberto Aliboni, IAI
From: John Tirman¹

The Extradition Dilemma—and Opportunity—for Italy in the Case of Abdullah Ocalan

Extradition need not be a black-and-white choice. The decision the Italian government must make about the extradition demand of Turkey for Abdullah Ocalan should be considered as a political opportunity to satisfy legitimate needs for justice on both sides of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. A creative solution—"extradition diplomacy"—could open major avenues toward resolving the conflict.

Italy can foster fruitful conditions in the extradition process. Already, the Government of Turkey has vowed to end its death penalty. Ocalan himself has declared a cease fire and has vowed to "halt terrorism." These actions demonstrate a willingness to bargain, a recognition that the extradition process is adaptive. The Italian government should now utilize this mechanism to promote a net gain for human rights and peace in Turkey.

The process must begin with the assumption that Ocalan has in fact committed criminal acts of violence that place him in legal jeopardy. To consider him exclusively as a political actor is surely erroneous—it is very likely he ordered the executions of innocent civilians during the 14-year civil war—and additionally would forfeit the value of having him in custody and, in effect, as a bargaining chip.

But Italy must also be careful not to bargain him away without receiving much in return. The PKK is an obsessive concern of the authoritarian military and the civilian government it dominates. Ocalan's arrest and trial, with the possibility of further actions on his part that in effect demobilizes the PKK, removes the military's commanding rationale for its anti-terrorism laws, its state of emergency in the southeast, its repression of open debate about the civil war, and its denial of Kurdish social rights (e.g., free use of the Kurdish language).

Because of that repression, non-PKK Kurdish politicians have suffered greatly. The constitutional parties such as the outlawed DEP and the successor HADEP have been bludgeoned by the state. Turkish political dissenters and the non-governmental sector, particularly human-rights organizations, have also been unfairly persecuted by the state. As a result, few interlocutors for a

¹ John Tirman, executive director of the Winston Foundation, is author of a recent book on the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, *Spoils of War: The Human Cost of America's Arms Trade* (1997), and related articles in the *Washington Post*, *World Policy Journal*, *Boston Review*, *The Nation*, *Los Angeles Times*, *Boston Sunday Globe* and elsewhere. He has also spoken widely on the conflict. The Winston Foundation has made several major grants to organizations dedicated to human rights in Turkey and a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

political settlement of the war can thrive. It is this objective—the reestablishment of a non-violent Kurdish “center” and a sympathetic Turkish civil society—which Italy should consider as paramount and achievable. That is the route toward protection of human rights throughout Turkey and the chance for a political settlement of the civil war.

As a result, Ocalan’s extradition could gainfully be conditioned on the following actions (possibly among others) by the Government of Turkey:

- Release unconditionally jailed Kurdish parliamentarians, local officials, and others who were prosecuted under the Article 8 anti-terrorism laws or similar provisions.
- Rescind the anti-terrorism laws.
- Declare amnesty for PKK soldiers.
- Honor the human-rights conventions already signed—which would obligate the government to compensate displaced villagers, among other measures.
- Allow Kurdish political parties which honor the territorial integrity of Turkey to compete openly for political power.
- Rescind laws and practices that prohibit the free use of language.

Tangible progress on each of these measures could be exacted before Ocalan were returned to Turkey. Ocalan’s promises of a new peace initiative should also be tested as a reciprocation, namely, a demobilization of the PKK.

Europe and the United States should also commit to support this kind of bargain with resources for economic development, reconciliation processes, and the like. Backsliding can easily occur, so it is imperative to structure further incentives and disincentives, which may be beyond the scope of the extradition diplomacy itself.

Italy should keep in mind how fundamentally important the capture and prosecution of Abdullah Ocalan is to the Turkish state. A flat denial of extradition would embitter Turkish elites and quite possibly worsen the human-rights situation in Turkey. A creative solution to the extradition crisis could achieve a significant reversal of fortunes for the Kurdish people and a rapid improvement in the protection of human rights for all citizens of Turkey.

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INCONTRO CONFINDUSTRIA - TUSIAD (Industriali turchi)

Il Direttore Generale di Confindustria, Innocenzo Cipolletta, ha incontrato a Roma l'ing. Aldo Kaslowski, Vicepresidente di TUSIAD, l'Associazione degli industriali turchi, per un approfondito scambio di vedute sulla situazione determinatasi in relazione al "caso Ocalan" ed alle gravi difficoltà che emergono per il mantenimento delle positive relazioni economiche fra le imprese italiane e turche.

E' stata sottolineata con forza la necessità di evitare fermamente ogni commistione fra motivazioni politiche e rapporti economici, che finirebbe per danneggiare non solo gli scambi attuali ma la stessa credibilità ed affidabilità internazionale del sistema economico turco. Le restrizioni all'importazione ed i boicottaggi che si vanno attuando in Turchia sono dichiaratamente illegittimi per la regolamentazione commerciale internazionale (WTO) e rischiano di rendere difficile la futura ripresa dei rapporti bilaterali.

E' stata comunque auspicata una soluzione rapida della questione e una distensione del clima, anche per salvaguardare l'importante ruolo assunto dagli scambi bilaterali e ripristinare un clima di fiducia e rispetto della legalità, evitando ulteriori danni economici.

OCALAN: VICE PRESIDENTE INDUSTRIALI TURCHI 'DOVETE CAPIRCI' (V. ANSA 'OCALAN: UN ITALO-TURCO INVIATO A MEDIARE...' DELLE 18)

(ANSA) - MILANO, 20 NOV - "Dovete capirci: il problema Ocalan in Turchia e' perfino piu' importante dell'ingresso nell'Ue"; a dirlo e' il vicepresidente della Tusiad, la Confindustria turca, Aldo Kaslowki. Lo dice da italo-turco, anzi da italiano (non ha nemmeno la doppia nazionalita') che vive da sempre in Turchia e si sente parte di quel paese, con la sua azienda, la 'Organik Kimiya' di Istanbul.

In Italia ha incontrato la Confindustria e spiega: "Bisogna capire che il problema Ocalan per i turchi e' perfino piu' importante dell'ingresso nell'Unione europea. Ho fatto presente alla Confindustria che in questa situazione e' molto difficile separare la politica dall'economia". E la situazione secondo Kaslowski "e' davvero drammatica, tanto piu' se si considera che i rapporti con l'Italia erano eccellenti. Basti pensare che un italiano come me e' vicepresidente della Tusiad".

L'arrivo di Ocalan in Italia "sembra una cosa organizzata da tempo. Ma ormai il danno e' fatto e in questa vicenda ci si lascerà qualche penna" dice Kaslowski, aggiungendo: "Noi industriali stiamo cercando di dare indicazioni alla stampa turca perche' calmi gli animi, perche' faccia presente che era stato gia' un risultato non avere piu' Ocalan in Siria, ai confini con la Turchia, e che averlo in Italia in fondo e' meno pericoloso. Ma e' difficile. Che Ocalan sia un terrorista non ci sono dubbi, lo ha ammesso egli stesso". (SEGUE).

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OCALAN: VICE PRESIDENTE INDUSTRIALI TURCHI 'DOVETE CAPIRCI' (2)

(ANSA) - MILANO, 20 NOV - "Capiamo che la giustizia italiana deve fare il suo corso, ma non sara' facile spiegare che avete 'liberato' Ocalan", continua il vicepresidente della Tusiad.

"La tensione - sostiene Kaslowski - rischia di diventare sempre piu' grave. Tenete presente che il governo turco e' in bilico, ha gia' avuto un voto di sfiducia e se si va alle urne anticipatamente, in questa situazione, non so cosa puo' succedere". Vanno aggiunte, secondo l'industriale italo-turco, le conseguenze economiche, anche per l'Italia "dove la crisi dei rapporti mette in gioco migliaia di posti di lavoro".

Per salvare il salvabile "sarebbe necessario - continua Kaslowski - che il governo italiano facesse delle dichiarazioni che dimostrassero di capire i problemi della Turchia, senza innalzare questo signore al rango di eroe. La stampa italiana sui curdi fa cattiva informazione: il 25% del Parlamento e' formato da curdi, il 35% dei lavoratori della mia azienda sono curdi, e' curdo perfino il ministro dell'Industria Erez che ha chiesto l'embargo. In realta' siamo molto integrati. Bisognerebbe che questo venisse spiegato meglio, che si capisse la storia della Turchia almeno da Ataturk in poi".

"Noi industriali - conclude - in Turchia cercheremo di spingere a separare l'economia dalla politica e dalla giustizia, ma voi cercate di capire quanto la vicenda Ocalan sia importante per noi". (ANSA).

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