


**WEU AND UKRAINE:
AN EMERGING SECURITY RELATIONSHIP**

Istituto affari internazionali

Institut d'études de sécurité

Kyiv, 9-10/X/1998

- a. Programme
- b. List of participants
 - 1. "New challenges for European security and the role of Euro-Atlantic institutions"/ John Roper
 - 2. "The role of the Western European Union in European security"/ Maurizio Cremasco



WEU AND UKRAINE: AN EMERGING SECURITY RELATIONSHIP
Kyiv, 9-10 October 1998
 Under the auspices of the Italian Presidency of WEU

Programme

Thursday, 8 October

Arrival of the participants (hotel "Ukraina", 5 Tarasa Shevchenka blvd.)

19:00 **Reception at the Residence of Ambassador of Italy in Ukraine** (3, Sichnevoho Povstannya St.)

Friday, 9 October

8:30-9:00 **Registration of the participants** (here and further - the Institute of international relations, 36/1 Melnikova St.)

9:00-9:15 **Presentation of the Seminar**
 Andriy Vesselovsky, Director of the Department of Policy Analysis and Planning, MFA of Ukraine
 Guido Lenzi, Director WEU ISS
 Ettore Greco, Deputy Director IAI

9:15-10:30 **Honorary address**
 H.E Mr. Borys Tarasyuk, Minister, MFA of Ukraine
Key note speeches
 H.E Mr. Massimo Brutti, Deputy Minister for Defence
 Amb. Thomas Mayr-Harting, Deputy Political Director, MFA of Austria, EU Presidency
 Amb. Roland Wegener, Deputy Secretary General of WEU

10:30-11:00 **Coffee break**

11:00-12:45 **The Evolving European Security Scene**
 Chair: Andriy Vesselovsky, MFA of Ukraine
 Presentations:
 John Roper, Senior Fellow, Royal Institute of International Affairs
 Yevgen Bersheda, First assistant to the Secretary of the NSDC
 Olexandr Goncharenko, NISS
 Discussion

12:45-14:00 **Lunch** (Dining hall of the Institute of the International Relations)

14:00-15:45 **WEU role in the European Security**
 Chair: Guido Lenzi, WEU ISS
 Presentations:
 Valerij Samovalov, NSDC

15:45-16:15

Maurizio Cremasco, IAI
 Discussion

Coffee Break

16:15-18:00

The state of security cooperation between WEU and Ukraine

Chair: Olexandr Belov, NISS

Presentations:

Steffen Elgersma, Political Division of WEU, Secretariat and Representative of WEU Military Staff
 Rudiger Trapp, Planning Cell, WEU Military Staff
 Oleg Strekal, Academy of Diplomacy of Ukraine
 Discussion

19:30-21:00

Buffet-dinner (at the premises of the MFA of Ukraine, 1 Mykhaylivska sqr.)

Saturday, 10 October

9:00-11:00

Political and operational prospects for WEU-Ukraine cooperation

Chair: Ettore Greco, IAI

Presentations:

Anatolij Shevtsov, NISS, Dnipropetrovsk branch
 Stephan de Spiegeleire, WEU
 Discussion

11:00-11:15

Coffee break

11:15-13:15

Final discussion

Chair: Andriy Vesselovsky, MFA of Ukraine

13:15-15:00

Lunch (Dining hall of the Institute of the International Relations)

Departure of the participants

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BIBLIOTECA

WEU and Ukraine: an emerging security relationship
Participants.

1. Tarasjuk Borys, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Kyiv
2. Wegener Roland, Deputy Secretary-General, Western European Union, Brussels
3. Martinez Casan Guillermo, MP and WEU Assembly Rapporteur, Madrid
4. Mayr-Harting Thomas, Deputy Political Director and Representative of the Austrian Presidency of European Union, Vienna
5. Brutti Massimo, Deputy Minister for Defence, Rome
6. Lenzi Guido, Director, WEU Institute for Security Studies, Paris
7. Krjuchkov Heorhij, Head of the Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on National Security and Defense, Kyiv
8. Olijnyk Borys, Head of the Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on Foreign Affairs and Relations with the CIS, Kyiv
9. Belov Olexandr, Deputy Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, Director of the National Institute of Security Studies, Kyiv
10. Dovgopolyj Anatolij, Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine, the Head of the Armament of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Kyiv
11. Vanhaeverbeke Andre, Delegation of the European Commission to Ukraine, Kyiv
12. Magee Charles, Head, OSCE Mission to Ukraine, Kyiv
13. Afanasjev Victor, National Scientific and Research Center of the Defense Technologies and Military Security of Ukraine, Kyiv
14. Behma Vitalij, the National Institute of the Ukrainian-Russian Relations, Kyiv
15. Bilousov Mykhailo, professor of the Department of International Relations, Institute of International Relations, Kyiv
16. Bocharnikov Victor, National Scientific and Research Center of the Defense Technologies and Military Security of Ukraine, Kyiv
17. Bodruk Oleg, Head of the Division of the military and technical relations, the National Institute of the Ukrainian-Russian Relations, Kyiv
18. Carnovale Marco, Officer, Political Affairs Division, NATO, Brussels
19. Chevallard Giancarlo, Head of the Security Issues Unit, European Commission, DG.1A, Brussels
20. Chikal Adam, the Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on National Security and Defense, Kyiv
21. Chumak Volodymyr, the National Institute of Security Studies
22. Cremasco Maurizio, Senior Research Fellow, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
23. David Dominique, Charge de Mission aupres du Directeur, Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, Paris
24. De Spiegeleire Stephan, Research Fellow, WEU Institute for Security Studies, Paris
25. Djemchenkov Yaroslav, Department of cooperation with the EU and international technical assistance, Ministry of Economy of Ukraine, Kyiv
26. Djadjushkin Yurij, Ministry of Industrial Policy of Ukraine, Kyiv
27. Drach Ivan, the Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on foreign affairs and relations with the CIS, Kyiv
28. Elgersma Steffen, Security Policy Section, Political Affairs Division, WEU Secretariat-General, Brussels
29. Ferrary Peter, Ukraine Desk Officer, Directorate for Central and Eastern Europe, Ministry of Defense, London
30. Fialko Andrij, Deputy Head of the Department of the Foreign Policy, President's Administration of Ukraine, Kyiv
31. ~~Greco Ettore~~, Deputy Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
32. Holod Natalia, National Institute of Security Studies, Dnipropetrovsk branch, Dnipropetrovsk
33. Honcharenko Olexandr, the National Institute of Security Studies, Kyiv
34. Hrazhdan Yevhen, National Space Agency of Ukraine, Kyiv
35. Ivaschenko Andrij, National scientific and research center of the defense technologies and military security of Ukraine, Dnipropetrovsk
36. Kryzhanivsky Victor, Head of the European Integration Department, MFA of Ukraine, Kyiv
37. Kononenko Kostjantyn, the Division of the foreign policy aspects of the national security, National Security and Defense Council, Kyiv
38. Kostenko Borys, National Space Agency of Ukraine, Kyiv
39. Kostytsky Vasyl, the Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on Foreign Affairs and Relations with the CIS, Kyiv
40. Kozhyn Borys, the Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on National Security and Defense, Kyiv
41. Kyslytsya Serhij, the Head of the Secretariat of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Kyiv
42. Kuzio Taras, Director, NATO Information and Documentation Center in Ukraine, Kyiv

43. Leonov Valerij, National institute of the Ukrainian-Russian Relations, Kyiv
44. Lindner Rainer, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen
45. Lytvynov Ihor, National Space Agency of Ukraine, Kyiv
46. Malko Yuriy, Deputy Head of the Administration of the National Security and Defense Council, Kyiv
47. Malskij Markijan, the dean of the faculty of international relations, Lviv State University, Lviv
48. Melnik Andrij, the Department of Foreign Policy of the President's Administration, Kyiv
49. Minhazutdinov Ihor, the Department of International Relations, Institute of International Relations, Kyiv
50. Movchan Pavlo, the Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on Foreign Affairs and Relations with the CIS, Kyiv
51. Nosok Pavlo, President, Ukrainian Association of the Euro-Atlantic cooperation, Kyiv
52. Ochmann Cornelius, Head of the Central and East European Department, Bertelsmann Foundation, Gutersloh
53. Ostash Ihor, the Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on Foreign Affairs and Relations with the CIS
54. Pavliuk Olexandr, Director, Kyiv Center of the Institute for East-West Studies, Kyiv
55. Pavlychko Dmytro - the Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on foreign affairs and relations with the CIS, Kyiv
56. Perepelytsja Hrygorij, the National Institute of Security Studies, Kyiv
57. Pirozhkov Serhij, Director of the National Institute of the Ukrainian-Russian Relations, Kyiv
58. Potekhin Dmytro, Ukrainian Center for Peace, Conversion and Conflict resolution Studies, Kyiv
59. Puhkal Olexandr, the Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on Foreign Affairs and Relations with the CIS, Kyiv
60. Roper John, Associate Member, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London
61. Samoalov Valerij, Head of the division of the foreign policy aspects of the national security, National Security and Defense Council, Kyiv
62. Semikov Olexandr, National Scientific and Research Center of the Defense Technologies and Military Security of Ukraine
63. Silvestri Stefano, Vice-President, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
64. Sherr James, Fellow, Conflict Studies Research Center, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Sandhurst
65. Shevtsov Anatolij, Dnipropetrovsk branch of the National Institute of Security Studies, Dnipropetrovsk
66. Shmarov Valerij, the Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on National Security and Defense, Kyiv
67. Shulepov Victor, Head of the Department of the Military and Technical Cooperation of the Ministry of Industrial policy of Ukraine, Kyiv
68. Sultan Tsezar, the Head of the Committee of the Military and Technical Policy of the Armament, Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Kyiv
69. Strekal Oleh, Deputy Director, Academy of Diplomacy of Ukraine, Kyiv
70. Tolstov Serhij, Center of the Political Studies, Kyiv
71. Trapp Rudiger, Planning Cell, WEU Military Staff, Brussels
72. Tutjunyk Vadym, Head of the military policy division, National Security and Defense Council
73. Verros Franciscos, Assistant Secretary, Political Committee, First Secretary, Matters relating to Associate Partner Countries, WEU Assembly, Paris
74. Vesselovsky Andrij, Head of the DPAP, MFA of Ukraine, Kyiv
75. Volten Peter, Director, Center for European Security Studies, University of Groningen, Department of International Relations, Groningen
76. Zadorozhnyj Olexandr, the Committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on Foreign Affairs and Relations with the CIS, Kyiv

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**Western Europe and Ukraine:
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New challenges for European Security
and the role of Euro-Atlantic institutions.

**John Roper,
RIIA, London, and College of Europe, Bruges.**

Instituto Affari Internazionali, Roma

Institute for Security Studies, WEU, Paris

Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kyiv

New challenges for European Security
and the role of Euro-Atlantic institutions.

Too much of the discussion¹ of European security since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War has concentrated on institutions, and not enough attention has been given to the new and changed challenges to Europe security. This was, in a sense, inevitable as the security institutions, NATO, OSCE, WEU, and to some extent the EU, were themselves responses to the problems of the Cold War and the question of what should happen to them and how they should adapt to the radically changed security environment of the last decade were therefore questions that were unavoidable. Although questions on the substance of security and of the new security challenges have been raised, they are inevitably difficult and the debate upon them and the development of the necessary policy is far from completed.

The first security challenge that has been the major priority of twentieth century security in Europe, - protection from disputes among European countries - has disappeared for Western European countries. We have become in the sense defined by Karl Deutsch a "security community", where the use of military force as a means of settling disputes among states has become unimaginable. The extension of that "security community" to other parts of

¹ This paper is written from a Western European perspective, it will be interesting to see during the discussion how far the analysis differs from that of the Ukrainian participants. It draws in part on an essay "Wandel tut not. Herausforderungen für Europas Sicherheitspolitik" which I contributed to *Internationale Politik*, Juli 1998.

Europe through a network of developing patterns of cooperation and evolving institutional arrangements is a continuing task. The second challenge which has been the security of Europe from external threats, has significantly diminished with the end of the Cold War, if not totally disappeared.

In these circumstances therefore the relevant security debate should have become how can Europe best contribute to security outside its borders, both on its immediate periphery and more widely. Insecurity and instability among its neighbours can have direct spillover effects and a prosperous Europe has to consider its interests and responsibilities for a peaceful world.

Instead the debate has too often concentrated on how specific institutions should adapt to the new situation, over who should be admitted to these organisations rather than on what are the new security challenges for European countries and for their security institutions. While some of the debate has been about the inter-relationship between the different institutions, the fact that they have often been described as the "interlocking institutions" indicates that this has too often been a rather mechanical one. This concentration on institutions rather than substance of security also arises from the fact that it has taken some time for most of those involved to absorb the full implications for European security of the strategic revolution caused by the end of the Cold War and the success of the process of European integration in changing the nature of European

security. Almost all the participants in the debate have lived for too long with Cold War "mind-sets". Some unfortunately still do.

It is therefore logical, in looking at the future challenges for European security to begin by considering what is now the substance of the problems of European security, and leave for subsequent consideration what would be the best institutional arrangements by which these could be addressed. In practice, and certainly in day to day politics and diplomacy, one cannot make such a tidy distinction, institutions exist and are not "neutral" instruments. There is an institutional inertia and those involved with institutions sometimes may appear more interested in their preservation than their substance. As the Canadian cultural philosopher Marshall McLuhan said in a different context, "The medium is the message", so the institutions themselves are, for good or ill, part of the substance of security perceptions; institutions can therefore sometimes be part of the problem as well as part of the solution.

This can be seen in the case of NATO and its enlargement , where positive attitudes towards it in the countries who wish to become members and negative attitudes in the leaders of the Russian Federation have caused some complications for the current problems of European security and have a potential, if not properly handled, to add to as well as respond to the future problems of European security. Another instance in which

institutions are not neutral has been in the preferences of different European countries as to whether NATO, WEU or the EU should be the principal locus for the development of a European Security and Defence Identity. The choices of different countries on this in the discussions of much of the nineteen nineties have reflected their attitudes to wider issues of transatlantic relations as well as their preferences on the speed and nature of European integration.

During the Cold War the overwhelming security task in Western Europe was the provision of security from external attack. The perceived threat from the Warsaw Pact concentrated the minds of political leaders, the military structures and, to a large extent, public opinion in Western European countries. Now the widespread perception is that that challenge - or rather any possible challenge from the Russian Federation - has declined to a residual concern, at least as far as the sixteen existing members of NATO are concerned. Other direct challenges, including the risk of spillover from Middle Eastern conflicts, are widely assessed to be relatively implausible, although the risks may be greater in the case of indirect threats involving the interruption of supply of oil and other essential raw materials. New threats, including the development of criminal economic activities and drug trafficking, as well as migratory flows from the Third World, can be seen as challenges to the security of Europe, but these are unlikely to be met primarily by military force. While parliaments of Western European countries may therefore continue to see the main rationale for

defence expenditure as still related to the defence of their own national territory or that of their allies from direct attack, this may become increasingly implausible to them and to their electorates. The new members of NATO, and, perhaps to a greater extent, the would-be members of NATO in the Balkans and the Baltic States, may see direct homeland defence as the primary task of their defence effort, it becomes decreasingly so for the sixteen existing members.

The remarkable transformation of security relations between the existing European members of NATO and of the European Union means that as suggested above a "security community" has been created whereby military force no longer conceivably plays any part in their mutual relations. These states are therefore the "post-modern" states that Robert Cooper has described.² This evolution has been the combined effect of the security umbrella provided by NATO, which has developed a culture of transparency and cooperation among the members of its integrated command structure, and of the development of the European Community and now the European Union in transforming the political relations between the countries concerned. Together this implies that the challenge of security in Europe as we go into the twenty-first century is as different as possible from that of the first half of the twentieth century; most West Europeans believe that this transformation is irreversible.

² Robert Cooper reference to be added.

These positive developments among the members of the European Union and NATO have not totally eliminated the problems of security in Europe, or among European countries, as can be seen from the continuing difficulties between Greece and Turkey and in particular the situation in Cyprus. Outside the European Union, and the existing candidates for admission, the problems of south-east European countries do provide tasks for security in Europe as the deployments of UNPREDEP in Macedonia, IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia and the Italian-lead 'Operation Alba' in Albania in 1997 and the continuing situation in Kosova have demonstrated. While these problems may diminish in the twenty first century, they and the OSCE presence in Moldova, Georgia, Tajikstan, and perhaps in future in Nagorno-Karabakh, indicate that there may well be continuing security tasks to be undertaken from the relative security of Western Europe.

In addition certain European countries have continued to face various internal security problems which have sometimes required the deployment of military force in support of the civil power. While the most serious of these, the problems the United Kingdom has faced since the late nineteen sixties in Northern Ireland, may now be coming to a peaceful conclusion, problems remain in the Basque country in Spain, in Corsica and in dealing with Mafia activity in southern Italy.

The Russian Federation, while not likely to be an early candidate for membership of the EU or NATO, is a European country which may also face internal security challenges in

future, although hopefully not on the scale of Chechnya.³

Although the OSCE created an important precedent in using its good offices in the Chechen case, it does not appear very likely that any internal security challenges in the Russian Federation are likely to lead to security tasks for other European countries in the next century.

During the twentieth century Europe has been an area of relative instability in the world. It has therefore been on three occasions an importer of security, primarily from the United States. The earlier discussion and a rapid examination of the prospects for disorder in the rest of the world suggests that there is a high probability that Europe may well be a zone of relative stability in the world of the twenty-first century. The hypothesis must therefore be examined as to whether the future security task of the countries of the European Union will be to contribute to the security of their immediate neighbourhood, both in the Balkans and perhaps the Caucasus and in what may be an increasingly disturbed area on the southern side of the Mediterranean, or more widely to global security. In one sense this will be nothing new, European colonial activities apart, European countries, particularly some of the smaller ones, have contributed substantially to UN peacekeeping activities, and a number of Western European countries contributed to the UN force in Korea in the early nineteen fifties and participated in the Gulf War of 1991. However ,

³ Developments in Daghestan in the summer of 1998 while relatively small scale show the risks that remain.

unlike the United States, contributing to security outside their own borders has not been for most European countries a major security task in the twentieth century, and it is by no means clear what priority it will be given in the twenty first century.

The difficulties Europe has had in facing up to its responsibilities in its own neighbourhood can be seen by the uncertain initial response in the early 1990s to the situation in Croatia and Bosnia and now in Kosova. Looking further afield, does a prosperous and relatively secure Europe feel it has any responsibilities for global security? Whether this is to constrain proliferators of weapons of mass destruction, to punish perpetrators of genocide or other crimes against human rights, to bring humanitarian aid to victims of natural or man-made disasters or to balance the development of some new potentially hegemonic power which might in the long term provide it with a challenge? The twentieth century has seen a decline almost to vanishing point of any residual European imperial pretensions or responsibilities. They will not return and do not seem to have yet been replaced by any particularly strong vocation to use military force to right wrongs in the rest of the world.

Nor at the moment are the armed forces of European countries designed for the projection of military force outside our continent. Unlike the United States which since the American-Mexican wars of the early years of this century has almost only

used its forces outside its own continent, Europe collectively has no experience in the twentieth century of deploying forces outside this continent and no country in Western Europe has deployed forces of more than a division outside Europe in the last forty years. Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution has recently argued that the expenditure on defence of the European members of NATO is more than 60% of that of the United States but that the Europeans capability to deploy forces overseas is only 10% of that of the United States.⁴ To develop the logistical and related capacities to be able to increase significantly European capacity to deploy overseas would require major reorientations of defence expenditure in European countries. While there are some limited changes occurring which might make this more possible, there are still substantial psycho-political as well as equipment constraints on such a change.

This issue of contributing to global security is linked to the more fundamental question of what sort of player Europe, and more specifically the European Union, intends to be in world affairs. Whether it intends to be a regional power concerned that there is no trouble on or adjacent to its frontiers, or to be more ambitious and contribute to global security, it will need to consider what instruments it will require to influence developments. If it wishes in addition to diplomatic and economic instruments to be able to use, or have the capacity to use, military force elsewhere in the world, there will be a need

⁴ Michael O'Hanlon quote

to develop appropriate forces, a military command structure and political arrangements for the direction of such forces.

It is clear from recent United States studies that their planning for future major military action to face possible challenges is centred outside Europe, with the Gulf and North East Asia being two particularly risky areas. While few at present would expect European forces to return to North East Asia, a contingency in the Gulf would lead to American expectations of active European cooperation, with consequential strains on the North Atlantic Alliance if this did not occur. Moreover, if Europe wants to be able to influence the actions of the United States in the exercise of its power, military as well as non military, in the world, it has to have the capacity to be a partner in action as well as discussion. In the longer term the continuation of United States interest in European Security may be linked to the preparedness of Europeans to take an interest in wider issues of global security.

In looking at these future security challenges for Europe, an important distinction can be made between the military challenges of the Cold War which if they had come to active conflict would have lead to 'wars of necessity' in that no ally would have been able to stand back from participation, and the post Cold War challenges which can lead to 'wars of choice' where different European countries come to different conclusions about participation. This makes the question of appropriate institutional arrangements more difficult and may, until

European solidarity has been developed, lead to more responses by limited groups of countries acting as *ad hoc* "coalitions of the willing". Europe must also remember that in devising arrangements for itself - a region that is 'institution-rich' - it will have implications for other regions that are relatively 'institution-poor'. Going for regional arrangements and institutions to respond to Europe's security challenges may weaken the authority of the United Nations and thereby make that body less able to fulfil its role elsewhere in the world where effective regional arrangements do not exist.

Implications for Euro-Atlantic institutions.

With the end of the Cold War some thought that the only pan-European security entity, the CSCE, would assume a central role. While a series of documents have been adopted and the change of name to OSCE in 1995 was intended to signify a new role for the institution, "in practice, however, European security was sought through NATO and EU enlargement".⁵ There have been some specific successes, but inevitably the more successful OSCE is in its task of early warning and conflict prevention, the less it will be known. It is only the failures of conflict prevention that hit the headlines. In general OSCE was not designed to handle the new challenges discussed above of European contributions to global security.

⁵ Adam Daniel Rotfeld, *SIPRI Yearbook 1998* p.160.

WEU (Western European Union) was one of the first institutions to attempt, at least nominally, to respond to these new challenges by the adoption, as part of the 1992 Petersberg Declaration of its Council of Ministers, of three additional tasks for the forces contributed by its member states. These were to be additional to the obligation to the common defence of the members which lies at the heart of WEU's Brussels Treaty as well as at that of Nato's Washington Treaty. These tasks were to be "humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; [and] tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making". Similar language was incorporated into Article J7 of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty of the European Union under pressure from Sweden and Finland, who are both non members of WEU and NATO. This gives some indication of the way that a European Union might eventually go in developing a Common Defence Policy as part of its Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The possibility of developments in WEU and the EU caused some concern in NATO and in Washington. There was anxiety that the parallel development of command arrangements under WEU and eventually the EU might weaken the centrality of NATO as a defence institution and lead to calls on limited defence budgets to duplicate headquarters and other assets already existing in NATO. This led to the American proposal, accepted by all the members of NATO at their Berlin ministerial meeting of June 1996, that the European Security and Defence Identity should be able to draw upon NATO's common assets and deployable headquarters to undertake action which could be under the

political supervision of WEU. This arrangement, which would mean that the forces of the European countries involved in WEU could be put together in a combined task force using the familiar NATO command arrangements, became known by the acronym of a CJTF (Combined Joint Task Force). Other CJTFs involving US participation would remain under NATO's direct political control. In order to be properly effective such an arrangement required the two European NATO members that had not been involved in NATO's integrated command structure, France and Spain, to come into it. Spain has done so but, in spite of President Chirac's initial enthusiasm, disagreements arose between Paris and Washington on the question of who should be the Commander of Allied Forces in Southern Europe (CinCSouth) based in Naples, French officers have therefore not come back into operational tasks in NATO headquarters. This absence of French participation in the headquarters which could be used for European actions will certainly make the formal establishment of the new arrangements more difficult, although it is not clear how important this will be in practice as the active French participation in the command structures of IFOR and SFOR demonstrate.

NATO has therefore retained its centrality as an instrument of military cooperation among its members, as well as developing a wide range of instruments for politico-military cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries as well as the Russian Federation, Ukraine and other members of the CIS. These instruments have included successively, the NACC, Partnership

for Peace, the NATO-Russia Founding Act and PJC, the NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, the negotiations for enlargement with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) with 44 members. While becoming effective in developing a range of politico-military links with partners throughout Europe and remaining the instrument of choice of its existing members for military cooperation among its members as well as with European partners as seen in IFOR and SFOR, NATO has not proved an effective structure for developing foreign and security policy among its members. Policy has been agreed in smaller groups including the Contact Group and then implemented using NATO as an instrument.

For the countries of the European Union to be able to respond to the new challenges of European security, and develop effective mechanisms for developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy with a defence dimension, they have to accept changes in their approach to security policy, this has probably proved more difficult for some states than others. Those members of the European Union that were neutral during the Cold War, Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden, have to work out how they will wish to participate; three of them are already particularly active in NATO's Partnership for Peace activities and all are Observers in WEU. Italy has taken a much more pro-active role through her initiative to establish EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR, multilateral groupings of forces from southern European members of NATO, which will be available to WEU, and her leadership in 'Operation Alba'. Germany had to develop her concept of the functions of

defence accepting that in the post Cold War world these had to go beyond territorial defence. Volker Rühle as Defence Minister led the German government and Bundestag to accept such changes, as is seen by the German presence in Bosnia in SFOR. France needed to accept that its partners considered that the NATO command structure should continue and that France should rejoin it. In spite of President Chirac's attempts this could not be agreed, and the situation now looks fairly difficult to resolve. Britain had to accept that there was not necessarily a zero sum game between Atlantic and European security cooperation. In particular, the incorporation of WEU into the EU and the development of a European Common Defence Policy could be achieved without undermining NATO. In spite of a more positive approach in general from Prime Minister Blair to European issues this was too far for him to go at the Amsterdam Inter Governmental Conference of the European Union in 1997. Thus only some of the required changes have been accomplished and there is still much to be done if Europe is to move effectively to respond to the new security challenges.

Conclusions

If the arguments developed in this paper are correct that the new challenges for European security in the twenty first century are as likely to involve European responses to problems outside our continent as well as those within its boundaries, we may envisage a Common Foreign and Security Policy within the European Union developing general guidelines of policy as well

as the response to particular developments. Such a response might require the use of political, economic and military instruments. In the latter case there could be transatlantic consultations which would determine whether there would be a combined response from north Americans and Europeans. If this were the case, NATO would be used directly as the instrument of military cooperation, if not and a purely European operation was appropriate, then the procedures for a WEU-lead CJTF would make use of NATO machinery to command the forces of the European countries concerned. In almost all cases the proper response would also require as much concertation as possible with other European countries such as Ukraine and the Russian Federation. In addition security policies which involve the use of military force, other than those carried out under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter in self-defence or with the agreement of all the states involved, would normally require the legitimation of a resolution of the UN Security Council. This is however the subject of another discussion!

John Roper,

RIIA, London, and College of Europe, Bruges.

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THE ROLE OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION IN EUROPEAN SECURITY

by

MAURIZIO CREMASCO

Rome, September 1998

INTRODUCTION

The assessment of the role of the Western European Union (WEU) in European security has to be carried out against the background of several pertinent considerations.

(i) The world's multipolarity has been furthered by the end of the Cold War and the increasing economic interdependence of the majority of its states. The term security has lost its exclusively military meaning and now includes economic, humanitarian and social factors.

(ii) The end of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the Soviet Union have dramatically changed the European security picture. Moreover, NATO and European Union enlargements are bound to condition the transformation and shape the development of that picture for the foreseeable future.

(iii) Issues and prospects about the European security situation will be assessed and evaluated in different, and sometimes diverging, ways by the countries on the European continent and in those adjacent areas, whose events are likely to affect directly or indirectly that same security situation.

(iv) Security trends in Europe are somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, the trend is towards integration and expansion, as shown by NATO's enlargement and EU's single currency and prospected enlargement - though it has taken 40 years to reach the present stage. On the other hand, the trend is also towards regional fragmentation, domestic instability and ethnic conflicts. Moreover, European security is bound to be negatively affected by all-encompassing threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); domestic and international terrorist threats, possibly strengthened by chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons blackmail; new confrontations in regions of significant European interest such as the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and the Balkans.

(v) Russia continues to be a major European power in geostrategic terms and a nuclear superpower, as it is the only nation with a nuclear force capable of seriously threatening the United States. The role of Russia in the prospected building of a new European security system is of paramount importance. No new

European security system can be stable without Russia's stability and contribution. The same can be said for Ukraine's role. Ukraine's independence and sovereignty are essential for European security and stability.

(vi) Future European security arrangements will be conditioned by the varying membership of NATO, the EU and the WEU. The WEU has ten Full Members which are also NATO members;¹ three Associate Members, which are also NATO members,² and five Observers -- only one of which is a NATO member.³ Finally, the WEU has developed an Associated Partnership with seven central-eastern and south-eastern European countries and the three Baltic states.⁴ Of the 18 WEU Members (Full and Associate) and Observers, 15 are also EU members. Congruence between the membership of NATO, the EU and the WEU is thus not complete. In contrast to the position within the EU, there are specific security rights and responsibilities in NATO and the WEU.

(vii) There will not be a Common European Security Policy without a Common European Foreign Policy. There will not be a Common European Defence Policy without a Common European Security Policy. There will not be a European Defence without a Common European Defence Policy.

(viii) The legitimacy of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) has been fully endorsed by NATO and, in June 1996, strengthened by the decision taken by the NATO Council on the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept.

(ix) A specific and defined reference framework for the WEU role in European security is provided by Title V of the Treaty of Amsterdam and the "Declaration of Western European Union on the Role of Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance", which was adopted by the WEU Council on 22 July 1997 and attached to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) which concluded with the signature of the Treaty of Amsterdam on 2 October 1997.

The most significant tenets and provisions of the two documents are as follows: (a) WEU Member States' objective is to build up WEU in stages as the defence component of the EU; (b) the WEU is an integral part of the development of the Union

providing the Union with access to operational capabilities notably in the context of the so-called Petersberg missions, which consist of "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking"; (c) when the EU avails itself of WEU, WEU will elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the EU which have defence implications; (d) WEU is an essential element of the development of the European Security and Defence Identity within the Atlantic Alliance and will accordingly continue its efforts to strengthen institutional and practical cooperation with NATO. The Atlantic Alliance remains the essential forum for consultation among Allies and the framework in which they agree on policies bearing on their security and defence commitments under the Washington Treaty; (e) WEU affirms that this identity will be grounded on sound military principles and supported by appropriate military planning and will permit the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of WEU.

(x) It would be wrong for the WEU to build capabilities and structures that are in competition with those of NATO. In shaping WEU's role in European security, it must be recognized that NATO should not be undermined by pretending that its core tasks are going to be transferred to a European body. In this context, key words should be "no duplications" and "separable but not separate" military capabilities.

THE ROLE OF THE WEU IN EUROPEAN SECURITY. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

I will try to evaluate the WEU's role in European security by answering five basic questions related to (i) the WEU's operational capabilities, i.e. its capacity to effectively perform the Petersberg missions; (ii) the programs aimed at strengthening those operational capabilities; (iii) the WEU's response to recent regional crises; (iv) the WEU's relationship with NATO and the EU; (v) the WEU's prospected development.

1. WEU operational capabilities

Since 1991, the WEU has gradually but consistently improved its military capacity to effectively perform the humanitarian and crisis management operations explicitly indicated in the Petersberg Declaration.

WEU has neither its own forces nor its own command and control system, nor an integrated military structure like NATO, but it has a politico-military structure for the management of the crises.

The WEU member states have designated forces that can be assigned to WEU, the so-called "Forces answerable to WEU" (FAWEU). In addition to national units, a number of multinational formations have been designated as FAWEU: (i) the EUROCORPS composed of troops from Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain; (ii) the EUROFOR, an on-call rapid deployment force with ground units provided by France, Italy, Portugal and Spain; (iii) the EUROMARFOR, a maritime force composed of naval units from France, Italy, Portugal and Spain; (iv) the Spanish-Italian Amphibious force. In addition, NATO has earmarked its Multinational Division Central (composed of units from Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom), and its UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force for WEU assignment. Finally, Germany and the Netherlands have nominated the Headquarters of the First German-Netherlands Corps as a HQs answerable to WEU.

Other assets that strengthen WEU operational capabilities are: (i) the Planning Cell, mainly responsible for contingency planning for FAWEU's employment, recommendations for C3 arrangements for each WEU operation, coordination of the preparation of the deployment of forces under WEU auspices and authority, and coordination of exercise programs; (ii) a Situation Centre, capable of operating around the clock, whose main mission is to monitor crisis areas designated by the Council, as well as the progress of WEU operations, and to collect and produce the information required for Council decisions; and (iii) a Satellite Centre, in Spain, whose main task is the interpretation and analysis of satellite data for the verification of arms control agreements, crisis monitoring and

management in support of WEU operations, and maritime and environmental surveillance.

Finally, in those cases in which the WEU intends to lead crisis management operations which the EU may wish to undertake, while the Atlantic Alliance (in fact, the United States and Canada) decide not to participate directly, the WEU could ask for NATO support. In other words, in deciding to confront a crisis, and autonomously conduct peace support operations within the framework of the Petersberg Declaration, the WEU could ask NATO to use its assets and capabilities, under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU Council, through the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept. In fact, NATO's new military structure includes CJTF mobile Headquarters which can be expanded in case of need and utilized by the WEU for its military operations. Moreover, WEU could use specific NATO military assets, such as AWACS and JSTAR aircraft, long-range transport, electronic warfare systems, and strategic intelligence data.

Now, considering the present FAWEUs, the additional military capabilities that the twenty-eight WEU countries, individually or collectively, can provide to the Organization, and the assets eventually made available by NATO, there is no doubt that the WEU as the military arm of the EU is fully capable of performing the Petersberg Tasks.

2. The WEU programs to enhance operational capabilities

These programs encompass different but closely interrelated fields: the build-up of the operational structure, the acquisition of new assets and means, the training of the forces so that they can operate more effectively in joint, multinational missions, the establishment of clear and effective procedures for the use of NATO assets. For several of these programs, follow-up decisions and work are expected.

As for the operational structure, the WEU has: (i) improved the functioning of the military components at WEU Headquarters; (ii) established a Military Delegates' Committee (MDC) to provide constant and coherent military advice to the Council; it will

represent a strong reference point for national MODs and military staffs, and a clear counterpart to NATO MC; its Chairman will direct WEU's military staffs and act as WEU Secretary General's military advisor and Point of Contact for operational commanders when needed; (iii) approved the initial harmonization of crisis management mechanisms and procedures and the framework concept of an autonomous WEU operation; (iv) decided on modalities for mounting Headquarters of multinational FAWEU.

As far as capabilities are concerned, a new force, the recently established Multinational Land Force (MLF) composed of units of Italy, Hungary e Slovenia, will be made available to WEU. Moreover, WEU has significantly improved the technical capacities of its satellite centre, while work is in progress for WEU access to the advanced HELIOS satellite imagery and use of a mobile ground station offered by France for crisis management operations. Moreover, the WEU is considering the possibility of improving its strategic mobility, its joint logistic support capability, and its C3 system.⁵

As for training, apart from the exercises conducted at national level, and within the framework of the already established FAWEUs, the WEU has adopted a draft exercise program to the year 2001 and is planning the first full-fledged joint crisis management exercise with NATO in the year 2000. Moreover, work is progressing on the joint use of training facilities in the member states' territory.

3. The WEU response to international and regional crises

The record of WEU response to recent international crises is a clear sign of the dichotomy between capabilities and political will. The WEU countries have never found the political consensus needed to adopt a common position and a common decision to intervene.

In fact, the WEU was only able to adopt a minimum common denominator policy and operate at the fringe of the crises in a limited commitment, low-risk missions.

In April 1993, within the framework of the international effort to manage the Yugoslav crisis, the WEU decided to assist

Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania in enforcing the UN sanctions on the Danube by a "police and customs" operation. It was stressed that the operation, which was to be of a "non-military" nature, would be based "on a system of coordinated control areas upstream and downstream of the Serbian border", to check that transports toward Serbia did not contain goods banned by the sanctions.⁶ To contribute to the patrolling operations, the WEU provided eight fast patrol boats and a 250-man force.

In August 1993, the WEU contributed a police contingent to the EU administration of Mostar, which was deployed in early July 1994 and withdrawn on 15 October 1996. The goal was to assist the Bosnian and Croat parties to set up a unified police force for the town

Finally, on 14 March 1997, the WEU Council met at ambassadorial level to discuss the situation in Albania, but no decisions were taken. The final communiqué contained no words on WEU's prospective willingness to play a role, nor a reference to its readiness to act within the framework of a formal call on the part of the European Union, in accordance with the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, only a generic commitment to support the initiatives of other international organizations.

However, the WEU felt that it could not be totally absent from the international efforts to rebuild Albanian institutions.

In May 1997, the WEU Council decided to send a Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE) to Tirana. A small-scale, civil-police, advisory team, whose task was to provide advice and train instructors, was considered to be an effective way of assisting the new Albanian Government on public order, border policing and the reconstitution of the Tirana Police Academy.

The split within the EU, in which Germany and the United Kingdom strongly opposed a European military intervention, logically reflected on the WEU position towards the Albanian crisis.

However, the WEU could have at least acted as the legitimizing organization for that "coalition of the willing" which was taking shape and for the Multinational Protection Force (MPF) which was eventually deployed. After so many declarations

about the need for a more visible European Security and Defence Identity, after the approval in 1996 of the concept of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), and thus the possibility of requesting NATO assets, the WEU could have made the most of the golden opportunity offered it and demonstrated its capacity to confront and manage a regional crisis autonomously, while acting as a catalyst for the intervention of other WEU countries, either associate members, associate partners or observers.⁷

Several WEU countries eventually participated in the military intervention in Albania, but the MPF was not a "WEU" force.

The WEU let this golden opportunity pass, losing credibility as an organization capable of playing a stabilizing regional role by providing the necessary peace-support capabilities or, at least, the political-military framework for a mission undertaken solely by European countries.

4. The WEU relationship with the EU and NATO

A true WEU role in European security would be difficult to perform if attempted outside the framework of a close relationship with the EU and NATO. The first is needed because, as previously noted, if there is no minimum consensus among the EU members that are also WEU members, there will not be a common position within the WEU, and no significant military action can be undertaken in managing international crises. The second is needed because NATO could fill some of the WEU operational requirements and allow for a smooth transition in case an autonomously initiated WEU military mission were to become a NATO mission with the participation of the United States. And both are necessary to attain a higher degree of compatibility between the WEU's two major functions: being the European pillar of NATO and, at the same time, the defence component of the EU, in other words, its military arm.

a. As far as cooperation with the EU is concerned, the "Rhodes Declaration" issued at the end of the WEU Council held on 11-12 May 1998 outlines the work being done in this field: (i) the development of a practical model for linking the decision-

making processes of both organizations in crisis management operations; (ii) the framing of a Common European Defence Policy; (iii) the fuller use of WEU/EU *ad hoc* groups to facilitate and enhance practical cooperation between the two organizations; (iv) the improvement of the working relationship between the WEU Secretariat and the EU Council Secretariat; (v) the cooperation and contribution of the WEU to the future Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit of the Union (vi) the submission to the EU of the image interpretation provided by the WEU Satellite Centre.

Moreover, the WEU developed a procedural document that details how the EU could use the new provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty to deploy the FAWEU for a military task, and this *modus operandi* was employed in a joint seminar, in June 1998, in a specific crisis situation scenario.⁸

Finally, the WEU decided to harmonize its Presidency system with that of the EU. By 1 January 1999, the two institutions will be led by the same country, except when the country is not a full WEU member.⁹

b. As for cooperation with NATO, the same "Rhodes Declaration" outlines the work conducted in this field: (i) the establishment of clear and concrete WEU/NATO consultation arrangements, to facilitate the linkage of the two decision-making processes; (ii) WEU participation in NATO's force planning process in order to evaluate the military capabilities of both European Allies and non-Allied EU members for carrying out the Petersberg Tasks, making it possible to identify problems and shortcomings; (iii) the elaboration of contingency planning for possible crisis scenarios in which the use of WEU and NATO forces is anticipated, as well as the establishment of consultation and institutional interaction mechanisms during the different stages of the crisis; (iv) determination of the technical and procedural modalities for the transfer, monitoring and return of NATO assets and capabilities requested by the WEU for the autonomous conduct of peace support operations.

5. WEU's prospected developments

There are two developments that are bound to shape the WEU's future identity and structure, thus directly affecting its capacity to play an effective role in European security: its enlargement and its proposed integration into the EU, a move that finds open opposition among the members.

The first is an uncontroversial development that will take place with the enlargement of the EU to those Central and East European countries (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) with whom accession talks are currently being conducted. With their entry into the Union, the new members will be invited to accede to the WEU in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become Observers if they so wish. For the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland the passage from Associated Partners to Associated Members will take place earlier with their entry into NATO in April 1999. The number of Associate Partners will decrease accordingly and more resources will be available to the WEU for crisis management operations, considering that the Observers are also fully involved in the work of the Permanent Council "at 18" today.

The second development, mainly supported by France and Germany, is a controversial proposal aimed at bringing the WEU into the EU's fold. In Amsterdam, in July 1997, the United Kingdom, together with Denmark, Finland, Ireland and Sweden defeated this proposal, but the issue is still open and debated.

On the one hand, EU enlargement raises the problem of its direct impact on the EU decision-making process, on the viability of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and, indirectly, on WEU's role in European security. There is a clear possibility that the enlargement will make a true CFSP even more difficult and aleatory than it is today, as demonstrated by its failure in the Yugoslav and Albanian crises. But if the enlarged EU is unable to take a decision on military action, it would be very hard for the WEU to agree on it. This problem is likely to become more complex if the WEU is eventually merged with the EU.

On the other hand, bringing the WEU into the EU will further constrain, if not totally end, the present, already limited, WEU

decision-making flexibility in the employment of military forces in crisis management situations, freezing the organization in an untenable position.

The nation state is likely to remain, for the foreseeable future, the fundamental entity for cooperation in the fields of security and defence. And this inter-governmental approach to crises will be better preserved if WEU remains an organization with its own specific security identity.

There is no doubt that WEU crisis management will have advantages over crisis management done by "coalitions of the willing", which are potentially divisive and hinder rather than further European integration. However, there will be cases in which some WEU members will be unwilling to participate in a joint military operation. In these cases, the "coalition of the willing" could be the only feasible option. The important point is not to repeat the mistake of a coalition *ah hoc* or *a la carte*, such as that established for the Albanian crisis, but to give the countries "willing and able to participate" full WEU legitimizing cover and political support. This would be easier to achieve in the WEU, as it is today and will be after the EU enlargement, than in an enlarged Union encompassing the WEU. The same is valid for the changes in the decision-making rules which will be needed to implement a true WEU crisis management role.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

(i) As the WEU Secretary General has declared, the WEU is not an instrument for the prevention of crises, but an instrument for their management, operational today, at the disposal to the Europeans for operations conducted by Europeans.¹⁰

(ii) The operational implementation of the CJTF concept will concretely and effectively strengthen the ESDI within NATO. The procedures related to the NAC's approval of the release of NATO assets and capabilities, and the monitoring and review of their use should not be interpreted as an American effort to maintain a too pervasive *droit de regard* on WEU-led operations.

(iii) The definition of a European security and defence policy should start with a candid operational assessment of what

the European allies would realistically be willing and able to do together. And this assessment should take into consideration that European action in the security and defence fields is bound to be inter-governmental and based on cooperation for the achievement of shared political and military goals. In other words, a "task-based approach" to defence should form the basis for deciding which new institutional arrangements and improvements to existing European capabilities are necessary. The means should be provided only after this complex process has been completed.

(iv) For the foreseeable future, the ESDI should not be intended and developed as a replacement for NATO in the whole spectrum of European security and defence requirements and tasks. It would be useless and wasteful to develop separate, wholly European military structures for the defence of European territory. NATO's cohesion and credibility would be undermined if its core functions were transferred to a European body.

(v) The WEU should not be expected to cope with any kind of crisis or build up the capabilities to confront with any threat to European security. In terms of "task-based approach", the list provided by the Petersberg Declaration is a good starting point, which could be fine-tuned in accordance with the evolution of the international situation. On the other hand, the WEU should be militarily and operationally put in a position where effective, collective European action is possible, when the political will is there to support it.

(vi) The option of having the WEU "dissolved" within the EU, would very likely lead to the paralysis of any attempted European effort at managing regional crises.

European security and defence arrangements should be based on the WEU acting in a reinforced partnership with the European Union. Only by maintaining its autonomy can the WEU truly be developed as the defence component of the EU and a means of strengthening the European pillar of NATO. And it would be able to elaborate and implement those decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications while at the same time building an ESDI within the Atlantic Alliance.

Only by preserving its "profile", would the WEU be able to maintain its international credibility as a potential "crisis manager", and to form those "coalitions of the willing and able" which may be the best (perhaps the only) tool for coping with present and future European security issues, provided that they are clearly the result of a WEU decision and have its full legitimizing cover and political support. Coalitions of those involved could vary from mission to mission, thus European security and defence structures should be able to accommodate this "variable geometry" arrangements.

(vii) A strong trans-Atlantic link continues to be paramount for European security. Not only in terms of Europe's defence but also in terms of management of those crises which touch vital European security interests, and need a concerted effort and the pooling of political skills, economic resources and military capabilities. The ESDI should not be construed as having among its final aims the marginalization of the United States from the new European security system. The threats and the risks of the next century require a strong re-assertion of the value of an Atlantic Community which includes NATO.

NOTES

1. Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom.
2. Iceland, Norway and Turkey.
3. Austria, Denmark (NATO member), Finland, Ireland and Sweden.
4. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
5. Work is being carried out for the development of pertinent concepts of operation for both cases.
6. See the text of the WEU "Declaration on implementation of U.N. sanctions on the former Yugoslavia" in *Atlantic News*, n. 2514, 7 April 1993, pp. 1-2.
7. José Cutileiro, WEU Secretary General, speaking at a seminar for the 50th anniversary of the Institut des Hautes Etudes de Défense Nationale, stated that the risks of the *ad hoc* coalitions is that of leading to the renationalization of European military systems, and that the WEU could and should have intervened in Albania. WEU Documents, Paris, 6 June 1998.
8. Alyson J.K. Bailes, "WEU in the European Security Architecture", *A paper for the 1998 Halki International Seminar*, September 1998, p. 5.
9. In those cases a full WEU member for the old rotation cycle will step in. A.J.K. Bayles, *cit.*, p. 5.
10. Speech at the Colloquy on the European Security and Defence Identity, Madrid, 4 May 1998.

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