BUILDING THE EURO-AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Instituto de estudos estratégicos e internacionais

Oporto, 22-23/VI/1998

a. Program
b. List of participants
1. "L'Union européenne en tant qu'acteur méditerranéen"/ Alvaro de Vasconcelos
2. "The Unites States and the Mediterranean"/ F. Stephen Larrabee
3. "Impact of developments in European security structures on the Mediterranean region"/ Uwe Nerlich
4. "The changing Mediterranean security environment: a Trans-Atlantic perspective"/ Ian O. Lesser
5. "European and American economic relations in the Mediterranean"/ George Joffé
6. "Euro-Atlantic relations in the Mediterranean: the Algerian crisis"/ Simon Serfaty

(2)

Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais

Program

Meeting : 22 and 23 of June 1998 Oporto
"Building the Euro-American Partnership in the Mediterranean"

Monday, 22 June

9h30 **Opening Session**

José Calvet de Magalhães, Chairman, IEEI
Charles Buchanan, Administrator, Luso American Foundation
Fernando Gomes, Mayor of Oporto
José Luis da Cruz Vilaça, Universidade Lusíada

10h30 The European and American approach to The Mediterranean

European approach to the EuroMediterranean region
Álvaro de Vasconcelos
The Mediterranean region in the priorities of the US foreign policy,
Stephen Larabee
Kalid Alioua
Mark Heller

11h30 Coffee Break

12h00 Impact of the recent developments in European security structures on the Mediterranean
Uwe Nerlich
Elvira Sanchez Mateos

13h30 Lunch

14H30 The changing Mediterranean Security Environment, Security co-operation and Southern Perceptions
Ian Lesser
Roberto Aliboni
Princess Dr Wijdan Ali

16h00 Coffee Break

16h30 Trans-Atlantic economic relations and the Mediterranean
Georges Joffé
Maria João Furtado
Mohamed Mohattanne

17h30 European and American positions towards political Islam
Eric Rouleau
May Dubarry
Ibrahim Karawan

Tuesday, 23 June

Case Studies

9h00 Middle East
Marianne Heiberg
Gamal Soltan

10h00 Coffee Break

10h30 Algeria
Simon Serfaty
Fifi Benaboud

11h30 Caucasus and the Gulf
Jerry Green
Fatih Tayfur

12h30 **Closing Session**

Álvaro de Vasconcelos , Director, IEEI
José Manuel Durão Barroso, Universidade Lusíada

13h30 Lunch

BUILDING THE EURO-AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP IN THE MEDITERRANEAN
OPORTO, 22-23 OF JUNE 1998

List of Participants

Princess Dr Wijdan Ali, Jordan Institute of Diplomacy, Amman

Roberto Aliboni, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Roma

Kalid Alioua, Groupement d'Etudes et de Recherches sur la Méditerrannée, Rabat

José Manuel Durão Barroso, Universidade Lusíada, Lisboa

Fifi Benaboud, Centre Nord-Sud, Lisboa

Charles Buchanan, Fundação Luso-Americana, Lisboa

José Calvet de Magalhães, Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, Lisboa

Maria Carrilho, Assembleia da República, Lisboa

José Luís da Cruz Vilaça, Universidade Lusíada, Lisboa

May Dubarry, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Paris

Maria João Furtado, Direcção Geral dos Assuntos Comunitários, Lisboa

Fernando Gomes, Câmara Municipal do Porto, Porto

Jerry Green, Rand, Washington

Marianne Heiberg, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo

Mark Heller, The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv

Georges Joffé, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London

Ibrahim Karawan, University of Utah, Salt Lake City

Stephen Larrabee, Rand, Washington

Ian Lesser, Rand, Santa Monica

Barbedo de Magalhães, Universidade do Porto, Porto

Mónica Marques da Silva, Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, Lisboa

Mohamed Mohattane, Groupement d'Études et de Recherches sur la Méditerranée, Rabat

Maria do Rosário de Moraes Vaz, Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, Lisboa

Uwe Nerlich, IABG, Ottoburn

José Luís Nunes, Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, Lisboa

Paula Pereira, Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, Lisboa

Eric Rouleau, Ambassadeur, Paris

Elvira Sánchez Mateos, Centre d'Informació I Documentació Internationals, Barcelona

Simon Serfaty, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington

Gamal Soltan, Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo

Fatih Tayfur, Middle East Technical University, Ankara

Álvaro Vasconcelos, Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, Lisboa

First Draft

L'Union européenne en tant qu'acteur méditerranéen

Álvaro de Vasconcelos

Existe-t-il aujourd'hui une vision de l'Union européenne de la Méditerranée ? L'Union doit-elle être perçue comme un acteur de poids dans la Méditerranée, indispensable à la création d'une zone de paix et de prospérité et à la résolution des crises et des conflits qui s'y déroulent ? Un acteur sur lequel les Etats-Unis et les pays du Sud doivent s'appuyer ?

Sur la scène internationale, l'Europe apparaît d'une manière générale comme un acteur de second ordre. Elle doit cette pâle image à la fragilité de sa politique extérieure et de sécurité commune, à l'absence d'une politique de défense, à l'inexistence du célèbre numéro de téléphone, aux actions désordonnées menées par certains de ses Etats, comme la France au Liban ou au cours de la crise en Irak et enfin au manque de volonté commune ou tout simplement de volonté politique affiché par la plupart des Etats de l'Union. En ce qui concerne la Méditerranée, la politique européenne a longtemps été perçue comme relevant de la seule initiative des Etats du Sud (Forum Méditerranéen, Eurofor ou Euromarfor) et est à l'heure actuelle indubitablement marquée par le manque de visibilité dans le processus de paix israélo-arabe. Cette analyse ne manque pas de révéler les faiblesses de la politique extérieure et de sécurité commune de l'Union, mais elle ne reflète pas le fait que l'action extérieure de l'Union ne se limite pas à la célèbre PESC, à la conviction erronée que l'Union européenne puisse devenir un acteur international semblable aux Etats-Unis et que l'objectif du processus européen est de créer un super-Etat.

L'action extérieure de l'Union européenne doit être analysée à partir de la constatation qu'elle est une puissance civile utilisant des instruments de *soft security*.

L'Union est un formidable acteur économique et sera sous peu également un acteur financier de poids, et elle a, ne serait-ce qu'en raison de cela, un point de vue sur ses relations avec les pays voisins, avant tout de l'Europe, mais aussi d'Afrique du Nord et du Moyen-Orient. Cette vision émane en partie de l'orientation que la Commission européenne surtout dans la période de Delors a cherché à imprégner dans l'action extérieure de l'Union. Elle bénéficie pour cela de l'appui du Parlement européen, ce qui peut paraître peu important mais qui est pourtant utile, si l'on considère les nouveaux pouvoirs de co-décision qui lui ont été attribués par le Traité d'Amsterdam et de l'appui du Conseil européen qui, pour sa part, est fondamental.

S'il est indiscutable que l'Union joue un rôle dans la consolidation de la démocratie en Europe centrale et de l'Est et dans la transition, pour l'essentiel pacifique, de l'après-guerre froide sur le continent européen, pourra-t-elle jouer un rôle similaire envers l'Afrique du Nord et le Moyen-Orient ? Il s'agit là du défi du partenariat euro-méditerranéen, lancé à Barcelone en décembre 1995. La grande difficulté que l'Union rencontre dans la Méditerranée réside dans le fait que les pays de la rive sud de la Méditerranée, au contraire de la plupart des pays d'Europe de l'Est, ne se trouvent pas dans un processus de transition démocratique. D'un autre côté, les Etats de l'Union européenne n'ont pas été capables de définir une politique commune en relation à certaines questions essentielles de la problématique méditerranéenne, telles que la crise algérienne ou l'islamisme politique. Les faiblesses de l'Europe politique se reflète dans la propre inefficacité de la Communauté internationale à contribuer à apporter une solution aux crises en Méditerranée. Il s'agit d'un des coûts de la non-Europe politique. Mais l'Union est d'ores et déjà un acteur incontournable dans la Méditerranée, surtout dans la perspective de la recherche d'une solution aux problèmes économiques, politiques et sociaux de la région.

La "méditerranéisation" de l'Europe

Beaucoup pensaient en 1989 que la Communauté, de par la volonté allemande, se concentrerait seulement en Europe centrale et de l'Est et qu'une des conséquences de

la fin de la guerre froide serait la marginalisation de la Méditerranée. Or il n'en a pas été ainsi et ceci pour quatre raisons principales :

a) le poids de l'Europe du Sud dans le processus européen ;

b) la nature du propre processus d'intégration ;

c) l'impératif d'un équilibre au sein de l'Union ;

d) la "méditerranéisation" des défis de *soft security* qui se posent à plusieurs Etats membres.

Le poids de l'Europe dans le processus européen n'a pas cessé de croître, avant tout en conséquence du succès de l'élargissement de l'Union européenne à l'Espagne et au Portugal et de l'adhésion de la Grèce. La position de l'Europe du Sud a récemment été renforcée par l'option claire de l'Europe latine, la dénommée "Club Med", pour l'euro, et, par ce biais, par son intégration effective dans le noyau dur de l'Union. Il n'en a pas été de même pour l'Europe nordique, moins impliquée politiquement dans le processus européen (l'Angleterre, le Danemark et la Suède, bien que répondant aux critères de convergence, n'ont pas adhéré à l'euro et la Norvège ne fait pas partie de l'Union). Des pays du Sud, seule la Grèce est restée en marge, non par manque de volonté de participer à l'Union économique et monétaire mais pour ne pas avoir rempli les critères requis.

Le poids du Sud dans le processus européen serait bien différent si l'Italie ou l'Espagne n'avaient pas intégré le premier noyau de la monnaie unique. C'est dans le souci de l'établissement d'un équilibre européen que la France s'est battue pour la non marginalisation de l'Italie et de l'Europe du Sud et a refusé la proposition allemande d'un noyau dur carolingien (Allemagne, France, Belgique, Luxembourg et Hollande). Selon le document *Réflexion sur la politique européenne*, du groupe parlementaire CDU/CSU, ce noyau dur se concentrerait presque exclusivement sur l'élargissement au centre et à l'est de l'Europe et avait expressément pour objectif celui d'empêcher la formation d'un groupement sud-ouest européen incliné vers le protectionnisme et dirigé par la France. Ce même document stipulait que les pays de l'Europe du Sud, comme l'Italie, un des pays fondateurs de la Communauté, ou l'Espagne, ne répondraient pas aux critères de convergence stipulés dans le Traité de

Maastricht et ne participeraient pas pour cette raison à l'Union monétaire qui est, selon eux, "la pierre de touche de l'Union politique".

Nous pouvons prévoir que le poids des pays méditerranéens au sein de l'Union va devenir plus important dans les prochaines années. Ils vont en effet bénéficier des fruits de l'euro et tout porte à croire qu'ils continueront à se moderniser, à se développer sur le plan économique, atteignant progressivement des niveaux similaires à ceux de l'Europe du Nord. Dans cette perspective, le débat sur l'Agenda 2000, qui préparera les élargissements, revêt une importance particulière.

Le poids grandissant de l'Europe latine se reflète dans la politique méditerranéenne, notamment au Maghreb. Organisée sous la présidence espagnole de l'Union européenne, la Conférence de Barcelone a été préparée au cours de la présidence française qui l'a précédée.

En Méditerranée orientale, une présence plus marquée de l'Union dépend de son élargissement dans cette direction et de la consolidation du processus d'intégration de la Grèce et de sa transformation en un partenaire fiable. De nouvelles adhésions de pays du sud semblent toutefois, en dehors du cas de la Slovénie, peu probables à court terme (l'autre candidat de la première vague d'adhésion, Malte, a décidé de ne pas se candidater). Dans l'Europe balkanique, la consolidation de la démocratie et de la paix se fait attendre.

La question turque sera un thème central du débat européen des prochaines années. L'adhésion de la Turquie, qui élargirait les frontières de l'Union jusqu'au Moyen-Orient, a été reportée *sine die* pour des raisons européennes et turques. Les raisons européennes tiennent à un manque d'audace politique de la part de ses actuels dirigeants et à l'influence de la vision culturelle de l'identité européenne, au détriment de la construction d'une Union réellement plurielle, non seulement d'un point de vue politique mais aussi culturel et religieux. Pour que la Turquie puisse être membre de l'Union, il est nécessaire, de toute façon, qu'elle s'engage pleinement sur la voie de la démocratie et qu'elle respecte les droits de l'homme, y compris ceux des minorités. L'élargissement à Chypre, de par sa dépendance de la problématique

gréco-turque, obligera dans tous les cas l'Union à intervenir politiquement dans la question chypriote et à abandonner sa position de neutralité.

Pour l'Union, la crise des Balkans, comme la question chypriote ou gréco-turque, et de manière plus floue, la question turque, doivent toutefois être inscrites à l'agenda européen et non pas à l'agenda euro-méditerranéen. La politique méditerranéenne est celle que l'Union développe dans ses rapports avec l'Afrique du Nord et le Moyen-Orient. La Méditerranée est, selon cette définition, restreinte à l'espace où l'Europe rencontre le monde arabe et islamique. C'est à cette Méditerranée que le processus de Barcelone fait référence.

Perceptions et préoccupations de sécurité

L'Union européenne et la plupart de ses Etats membres ont une vision de la sécurité qui est essentiellement régionale. Mais on doit inclure dans cette région non seulement l'Europe mais aussi la Méditerranée, et surtout le Marghreb. En dehors de l'espace euro-méditerranéen, seule l'Afrique subsaharienne apparaît sur la liste des préoccupations de sécurité des Etats membres.

L'évolution du concept stratégique de tous les Etats membres va dans le sens de donner la priorité à la défense des intérêts au détriment de la défense territoriale. Cette évolution s'accompagne de la perception que les défis ne relèvent désormais plus en priorité de la *hard security* mais de la *soft security*. Dans les nouveaux concepts, les défis provenant du Sud méditerranéen occupent une place à part.

Les priorités, du point de vue de la sécurité des pays européens en ce qui concerne la Méditerranée, sont, selon les listes officielles, les suivantes :

a) le terrorisme, essentiellement lié aux guerres civiles ;
b) le traffic de drogue ;
c) l'émigration ;
d) la prolifération d'armes de destruction massive et de missiles à longue portée;
e) l'accès aux sources énergétiques ;
f) la possibilité de l'arrivée au pouvoir d'un parti islamiste radical au Maghreb.

Le terrorisme est aujourd'hui la principale source de préoccupation en terme de sécurité, notamment parce qu'on considère qu'il peut être le reflet en Europe des guerres civiles du Sud. Les attentats à la bombe dans le métro de Paris, reflets de la guerre civile algérienne, sont l'exemple précis des dangers de l'instabilité en Afrique du Nord et de leur possible impact sur les sociétés européennes.

Les décideurs européens s'entêtent à placer l'émigration dans leur liste des problèmes de *soft security*, en raison du fait que la crise économique et l'instabilité politique au Maghreb ou en Turquie pourraient entraîner une augmentation significative des flux migratoires et de réfugiés en direction de l'Europe. La Méditerranée est en effet loin de ne représenter qu'une simple question de politique extérieure de l'Union. Elle occupe une place de plus en plus centrale dans le débat politique européen, sur l'émigration, le chômage, et, bien entendu, le racisme et la xénophobie. L'émigration est devenue une question essentielle pour les démocraties européennes car elle alimente le discours identitaire xénophobe de l'extrême-droite, dans toute l'Europe et de manière particulièrement préoccupante en France, avec le succès politique du Front National qui a obtenu 15% des votes aux élections régionales de 1998, en Autriche où le Parti Nationaliste "Libres Penseurs" a remporté 22% des votes aux élections législatives de décembre 1995 ; en Belgique, où le Parti Nationaliste flamand a obtenu 8% des votes aux législatives de mai 1995 et plus récemment en Allemagne orientale, au cours des élections pour l'état de Sachsen-Anhalt, où le German People Union (DPU) a obtenu 13% des votes et 40% des votes des jeunes entre 19 et 32 ans. L'émigration est de nos jours une question essentiellement politique vu que les populations émigrées dans la plupart des pays européens n'ont pas connu de grandes variations ces dernières années, à l'exception de l'Espagne et de l'Allemagne, qui ont connu une légère augmentation des émigrants d'origine marocaine, pour l'un et turque, pour l'autre.[1] Une nouvelle forme d'émigration liée aux guerres civiles est apparue récemment et se traduit par l'augmentation du chiffre de demandes d'asile qui, en 1996, s'est élevé à 226 mille dans l'Europe des Quinze.

Les questions de *soft security* inscrites à l'agenda des pays du sud de l'Europe sont devenues, depuis la création du marché unique européen qui s'est accompagné de la

libre circulation des biens et des personnes, des questions européennes. Une frontière extérieure commune est en train de s'établir comme en témoigne la communautarisation des accords de Schengen décidés lors de la révision du Traité d'Amsterdam. C'est ce qui nous permet de parler de la "méditerranéisation" de l'Allemagne et, avec elle, de l'Union européenne. Dans le débat sur la sécurité en Allemagne, les préoccupations touchant à la frontière sud de l'Union ont gagné de l'importance. L'aspect particulièrement délicat des questions relatives au flux d'émigrants ou de réfugiés pouvant avoir accès à l'Union européenne a été démontré par les récentes crises des réfugiés, comme les Kurdes ; le commerce de drogues provenant du Maroc au travers de la frontière espagnole, et le «not-so-realistic scenario of the Turkish-Kurdish ... civil war being transported to Germany».[2]

Du point de vue de la *hard security*, il existe en Europe une certaine inquiétude quant à la prolifération d'armes de destruction massive et des missiles à longue portée, mais malgré leur proximité géographique, la perception est que ce problème s'encadre dans la problématique des conflits sud-sud.

Les décideurs politiques européens ne semblent pas convaincus du fait qu'il existe une menace militaire directe contre les pays de l'Union. Israël ne s'identifiant pas, pour les Européens, avec l'Occident sa sécurité est perçue comme un problème régional.Pour les Européens il ne s'agit pas uniquement d'un conflit sud-sud parce que pour les Etats-Unis il s'agit d'une question de politique interne.

Il est évident que les conflits sud-sud ou les conflits internes dans la Méditerranée peuvent toucher directement les intérêts européens. Ils peuvent mettre en jeu les intérêts de sécurité aux niveaux nationaux, mais aussi des intérêts économiques, notamment de la France, de l'Italie, et de manière croissante de l'Espagne et d'autres Etats membres. Ceci est particulièrement vrai en ce qui concerne la dépendance énergétique européenne de la région. L'approvisionnement en gaz du Sud de l'Europe par l'Algérie a été pertubé par la guerre civile algérienne. Le conduit qui l'attachait à l'Italie et celui réunissant l'Espagne et le Portugal par le biais du Maroc ont été sabotés, respectivement, en novembre 1997 et en février 1998.

L'islamisme radical dans les pays d'Afrique du Nord est vu par les pays de l'Europe du Sud comme une menace aux intérêts européens, et ceci explique l'appui qu'a reçu le gouvernement de Zéroual. Le nationalisme identitaire, anti-européen et anti-occidental, de l'islamisme radical est, avant tout, un problème pour les citoyens des pays du Sud ; il deviendrait menaçant pour les pays du Nord si associé au terrorisme d'Etat ou à la prolifération d'armes de destruction massive.

Quelle politique européenne ?

Les caractéristiques de puissance civile de l'Union constituent un atout important même si elles restent insuffisantes. Cette forme de puissance est un élément positif dans l'actuelle situation internationale. Comme le rappelle Joseph Nye, les nouvelles réalités "rendent plus importants le comportement coopératif et les ressources du *soft power*". Dans le cas européen, il faut inclure dans le *soft power* la capacité d'utiliser l'instrument économique à des fins politiques, de manière à influer sur l'évolution interne des sociétés pour prévenir les crises et promouvoir la démocratisation et la paix. Les effets d'uen telle stratégie, que Christopher Hill a résumé comme une volonté de "mettre l'accent sur les instruments diplomatiques plutôt que coercitifs, placer la médiation au centre de la résolution de conflits, donner la priorité aux solutions économiques à long terme aux problèmes politiques et mettre en avant l'exigence que les peuples puissent déterminer eux-mêmes leur destin", ne peuvent nécessairement se faire sentir qu'à long terme.

L'action économique reste donc la direction fondamentale de la politique extérieure de l'Union européenne, même après Amsterdam. Le Traité de Maastricht mettait en cohérence la politique économique avec les options de la politique extérieure et de sécurité commune, en particulier, l'aide au développement. Ces avancées ont pris la forme de clauses de conditionnalité politique dans les accords d'association et de coopération.

L'Union européenne agit en faveur de la consolidation démocratique et de la paix essentiellement par la méthode d'inclusion. Elle a été appliquée dans le cas du

Portugal, de l'Espagne et de l'Europe centrale. Elle cherche aujourd'hui à élargir le champ de cette méthode au Sud. Il s'agit de l'objectif principal du partenariat euro-méditerranéen.

Ce partenariat a l'intention d'atteindre cet objectif en élargissant, avant tout, son espace d'intégration économique vers le Sud avec la création d'une zone de libre-échange, à l'horizon 2010, qui verrait le jour au moyen d'accords "bimultilatéraux" signés entre l'Union européenne, ses Etats membres et chacun des douze partenaires du Sud considérés individuellement.

L'objectif essentiel du partenariat euro-méditerranéen est d'élargir l'espace d'intégration économique vers le Sud. Cette tâche est à la fois exaltante et difficile. Il faudra en effet prouver qu'il est possible d'intégrer, dans un même cadre de coopération et de paix, des pays aux racines et civilisations très diverses, des pays également où la crise de civilisation et le rejet de l'Occident - Europe comprise - alimentent et se nourrissent de courants politiques de l'islamisme radical. Mais le processus de Barcelone reste fragile.

Le partenariat ne repose pas seulement sur son volet économique, sans aucun doute le plus important. Pour les Européens, le succès du partenariat dépend de l'interaction du volet des accords de libre-échange et des aides financières (programme MEDA), qui, avec le volet politique et culturel, devrait permettre :

- le renforcement de la démocratie et de l'état de droit ;
- la coopération dans le domaine de la sécurité, fondée sur la confiance réciproque ;
- le changement des perceptions mutuelles négatives se frayant au sein des opinions publiques, notamment par le dialogue culturel et civilisationnel.

En ce sens, son objectif peut se résumer en la création d'une vaste zone de paix, de stabilité et de prospérité, par le biais d'une collaboration dans le domaine politique et de sécurité et d'une libéralisation progressive du commerce, moyennant des aides économiques et financières et la conditionnalité politique. Cet objectif va, bien évidemment, également dans le sens de contrôler les flux migratoires.

Les obstacles évidemment restent innombrables. Ils ont trait, avant tout, à la situation politique et sociale de la majorité des pays du Sud (le cas le plus grave étant la guerre civile qui déchire l'Algérie depuis des années), à la timidité de la réforme politique déjà engagée (Jordanie, Maroc) et surtout à la fuite en avant vers des solutions autoritaires de type asiatique dans l'espoir de bloquer l'avancée de l'islamisme radical.

Un des objectifs du partenariat est l'intégration régionale sud-sud. Il existe ici aussi la conviction née de l'expérience européenne que l'intégration régionale est le meilleur antidote contre les conflits entre voisins.

Ce qui est plus grave est qu'ils prétendent tous instrumentaliser le partenariat euro-méditerranéen comme un moyen pour légitimer et renforcer le propre régime.[3]

Pour certains dirigeants du sud, le partenariat s'inscrit dans la vision de la sécurité par le développement économique.

Cette vision de certains gouvernants du sud des relations avec l'Union européenne se heurte cependant au fait qu'ils ont signé, à Barcelone, une déclaration sur les droits de l'homme et qu'ils ont accepté la clause de conditionnalité dans les accords de libre-échange. Pour cela, le Parlement européen a un droit de regard sur l'application des accords qui a été utilisé dans le sens de la défense des droits fondamentaux. Mais le plus important est que Barcelone a créé une dynamique de relationnement avec les institutions de la société civile des deux rives, dans les plus divers domaines, y compris la coopération des ONG liées aux droits de l'homme et à la démocratie.

Le point faible de Barcelone est de ne pas aborder les crises politiques et militaires qui conditionnent les relations entre les Etats méditerranéens, notamment le partenariat euro-méditerranéen, comme le conflit israélo-arabe.

Le processus de Barcelone est apparu à un moment extrêmement favorable du processus de paix au Moyen Orient. Sa paralysie a rendu très difficile, et ceci a été évident depuis la réunion ministérielle de Malte en avril 1997, toute progression significative dans le chapitre de la sécurité. Les pays arabes refusent de dialoguer sur le thème de la sécurité avec Israël. Le lien clair existant entre le partenariat et le

processus de paix pourra obliger les acteurs du partenariat à discuter les questions israélo-arabes.

La création de mesures de confiance est un des objectifs du partenariat euro-méditerranéen. Mais le fait que les problèmes militaires soient essentiellement de nature sud-sud et le domaine du partenariat essentiellement nord-sud, ont rendu, depuis le début, le processus de Barcelone peu efficace dans ce domaine et seulement deux mesures de confiance mutuelles ont été mises en pratiques : le réseau des instituts de relations internationales EuroMeSco et le projet italo-égyptien de sauvetage en mer.

Malgré tout, et il est important de le souligner, ce serait une erreur de sous-estimer le caractère de mesure de confiance que revêt le partenariat, qui voit, malgré l'impasse du processus de paix, Israël, la Syrie, le Liban et l'autorité palestienne continuer à s'asseoir à la même table et à discuter les questions qu'ils considèrent être d'intérêt commun. Aucun des sept Etats du partenariat euro-méditerranéen, comme il est ressorti clairement de la réunion ministérielle de Palerme, des 3 et 4 juin, ne met en cause l'importance du partenariat.

Les partenaires vont discuter, bien que par le biais de la diplomatie de séminaires, un ensemble de questions qui sont prioritaires du point de vue politique, notamment le terrorisme et la question des droits de l'homme. [4]

La contribution du partenariat à ces thèmes sera intéressante mais rencontre une difficulté essentielle dans le fait que les initiatives européennes dépendent en large mesure des réformes politiques dans les pays du sud et que pour leur avancée les acteurs extérieurs sont secondaires. On peut affirmer que le processus de réformes politiques actuellement en cours au Maroc n'est pas complètement étranger à la volonté de la monarchie marocaine de s'ancrer à l'Europe.

Quel consensus existe-t-il entre les quinze Etats en relation à la vision de la Méditerranée que nous venons de définir comme européenne ?

En ce qui concerne le Moyen-Orient, au contraire de ce qui a été affirmé[5], il existe une convergence croissante franco-allemande sur la nécessité de construire les bases d'un Etat palestinien.

En ce qui concerne l'islamisme politique, les divergences sont réelles, entre le Sud qui craint son arrivée au pouvoir et valorise la stabilité et un nord disposé à accepter l'expérience d'un pouvoir islamique en même temps qu'ils mettent l'accent sur les droits de l'homme. Mais, en raison de la spécificité du processus européen, la position de la France, le pays qui se sent le plus directement visé, tend à prévaloir.

La diversité des points de vue européens, y compris ceux exprimés par la polémique "aide ou commerce", est un atout de l'Union dans ses relations avec les pays méditerranéens et forment des composantes possibles d'une politique commune.

Les relations euro-américaines et l'OTAN

Les relations euro-américaines dans le bassin méditerranéen sont confrontées à un problème général : elles convergent en ce qui concerne l'énoncé des défis, comme le montre le plan d'action commun Union européenne–Etats-Unis, approuvé à Madrid en novembre 1995, mais divergent dans l'ordre des priorités et surtout dans la politique à suivre. L'Union européenne et les Etats-Unis ne sont pas non plus d'accord sur les rôles respectifs qu'ils ont dans la Méditerranée occidentale et le Moyen Orient.

En Méditerranée, et en particulier dans le Proche et le Moyen Orient, se concentrent certains des principaux problèmes que les Etats-Unis considèrent comme des menaces à la sécurité internationale : prolifération d'armes de destruction massive, Etats hors-la-loi, menaces aux sources d'énergie, terrorisme. Les Etats-Unis exercent une forte pression sur l'Europe afin qu'elle s'aligne sur la politique américaine de *containment* – par des sanctions économiques et la pression militaire – de ces menaces.

Dans l'optique des Européens, ces "menaces" résultent avant tout de problèmes de nature politique, économique et sociale qui exigent des mesures de même nature. A cette perception, on doit ajouter le fait que les Américains, pour des questions de

politique interne, ont des difficultés à condamner la politique d'Israël ; en revanche, la relation avec les pays arabes est, pour l'Union européenne, une priorité stratégique.

Il résulte de ces considérations un ensemble de divergences significatives :

a) En ce qui concerne les Etats hors-la-loi, l'Union européenne privilégie le *trade-engagement,* le dialogue critique, l'opposition à la politique d'isolement vis-à-vis de ces pays et aux sanctions économiques rigoureuses préconisées par les Etats-Unis. Parallèlement, l'Europe est beaucoup plus sensible que les Etats-Unis à l'opinion publique arabe ;

b) En matière de sécurité énergétique, question liée à celle des Etats hors-la-loi, l'accès aux matières premières est garanti, pour les Européens, par des relations commerciales stables, quasiment indépendamment de la nature des régimes ;

c) En relation au processus de paix dans le Moyen-Orient, la position américaine est conditionnée, plus fortement que la position européenne, par la politique israélienne. Les Européens tendent à cet égard à valoriser l'appui à la création d'un Etat palestinien ;

d) En ce qui concerne la prolifération d'armes de destruction massive, s'il s'agit du thème prioritaire du programme américain en matière de sécurité, les Européens ont tendance à le placer sur un plan secondaire. Il s'agit d'une attitude apparemment paradoxale étant donné que l'Europe est plus proche des sources potentielles d'une telle menace.

La coopération politique euro-américaine en Méditerranée s'est accompagnée, pour cela, d'un manque de confiance mutuelle. Les Etats-Unis refusent à l'Union européenne un protagonisme politique dans le processus de paix en Moyen Orient et lui attribuent uniquement la qualité de principal bailleur de fonds, et l'Union Européenne refuse toute présence américaine dans le processus de Barcelone.

Un ensemble de facteurs devrait être pris en considération dans le débat sur la globalisation de l'OTAN ou de son rôle dans la Méditerranée :

a) Le fait que la convergence euro-américaine qui existe en Europe et a rendu possible la réorganisation de la sécurité européenne au sein de l'Otan, sous leadership américain, ne se vérifie pas en relation au Sud.

b) L'opinion publique des pays du Sud considère que l'élargissement de la zone d'intervention de l'Otan vers le Sud se ferait contre le monde arabe et islamique, « le nouvel ennemi ».

c) L'Otan transformée en un directoire de la sécurité mondiale, sous leadership américain, serait vue comme la confirmation des thèses sur le "choc des civilisations" ou la création d'une super-alliance occidentale contre le reste du monde.

d) L'élargissement de l'Otan aux pays de la Méditerranée, l'adhésion des pays d'Afrique du Nord à l'Alliance, qui serait une alternative au directoire, ne peut pas avoir lieu car, contrairement aux pays de l'Est, les pays du Sud ne sont pas des démocraties et leurs opinions publiques sont contre l'Otan.

e) Les problèmes qui se posent en Afrique du Nord sont essentiellement de nature politique, économique et sociale.

f) L'Union européenne n'est pas membre de l'Otan et ne participe donc pas à ses délibérations. Il n'existe d'ailleurs pas de relation de travail entre la Commission européenne et l'Otan.

g) L'identité européenne de défense ne s'est pas concrétisée ni l'intégration militaire de la Frane et ont a cessé d'être une priorité américaine.

L'Union européenne et ses Etats membres s'opposent à l'idée de la globalisation de l'Otan, avant tout car ils sont sensibles aux perceptions de l'opinion publique des pays du Sud, mais aussi parce qu'une telle globalisation, dans l'actuelle situation de faiblesse de la PESC et sans politique de défense européenne signifierait que l'Europe accepterait de conditionner ses intérêts et sa vision du monde aux Américains.

Conclusion

La coopération euro-américaine est essentielle à la résolution des crises méditerranéennes et à la paix et aux progrès dans le Maghreb et le Moyen-Orient, mais celle-ci ne doit pas forcément passer par l'Otan, mais plutôt par une coopération politique transatlantique. Le partenariat euro-américain devrait avoir les priorités suivantes en ce qui concerne la Méditerranée :

a) On ne devrait pas faire de distinction entre le dialogue sur les questions de sécurité (au sein de l'Otan) et le dialogue économique au sein du partenariat. Le dialogue devrait être intégré.

b) L'Otan devrait poursuivre ses dialogues avec les pays du Sud, pour contribuer à contrecarrer les perceptions négatives et à créer une "culture de sécurité" commune.

c) Dans le débat sur le concept stratégique de l'Otan, on devrait veiller en particulier à la forme dont seront traitées les questions méditerranéennes. L'immigration est un sujet fort sensible dans tout le périmètre méditerranéen et sur les deux rives elle fait l'objet d'une démagogie dangereuse : il est inacceptable que les immigrants puissent être perçus comme une menace à la sécurité européenne contre laquelle l'OTAN devrait se préparer. Adhérer à une telle perspective contribuerait, objectivement, à alimenter la xénophobie – que, précisément, toutes les initiatives européennes se proposent de combattre.

d) L'Europe et les Etats-Unis doivent, avec les autres Etats de la Méditerranée, chercher à définir les règles du système de sécurité dans la région. De telles règles peuvent être construites à partir d'une réflexion commune sur les leçons à tirer de la recherche de la paix au Moyen-Orient ou des tragédies humaines en Algérie. Les nouvelles règles du système international devraient tendre à être universelles et adverses à toute politique de deux poids, deux mesures. Une attention particulière devra être donnée aux droits de l'homme et il devra être souligné que, dans le cadre international actuel, la politique des valeurs

fait partie intégrante des intérêts des nations démocratiques. Un système sans règles précises est condamné à l'unilatéralisme ou bien à l'anarchie.

e) Il faudait aussi que les Etats-Unis admettent que le partenariat euro-méditerranéen est un composant de la régionalisation du système international, qu'il a en effet un contour géographique précis, comme la NAFTA en a un sur le continent américain.

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[1] Voir rapport OCDE de septembre 1997.

[2] Voir Volker Perthes, Germany and the Euromediterranean Partnership – Gradually Becoming a Mediterranean State, EuroMeSCo Papers, 1, février 1998, p. 3.

[3] Voir Béatrice Hibou et Luis Martinez, *Le partenariat euro-Maghreb*.

[4] Déclaration de la Présidence britannique à Palerme.

[5] Voir Dominique Moïsi, *Foreign Affairs*.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

By F. Stephen Larrabee[1]

The United States and Europe today face a historic challenge: to redefine their relationship to meet the new strategic challenges of the Post-Cold War era. During the Cold War the United States essentially acted as Europe's protector. The relationship was one of inequality, of protector and protected. While this relationship worked well during the Cold War, it is no longer tenable in the Post-Cold War era. Today the United States and Europe no longer face an overwhelming undimensional strategic threat. As a result, Europe no longer needs the strategic protection of the United States the way it did during the Cold War. In addition, Europe is economically and politically much stronger today than it was during the Cold War and thus more capable of taking on more responsibility, including in the military field.

Finally, the U.S. is going through a period of economic, political, and military "downsizing": It does not want to be--and indeed cannot afford to be--the world's policeman. It needs a reliable partner with whom to share the burdens and responsibilities of managing the new Post-Cold War security environment.

For the United States, Europe is the natural partner. Europe and American share a common heritage and common values, important national differences

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[1]F. Stephen Larrabee is a Senior Staff Member at RAND in Washington, D.C. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect those of RAND or any of its sponsors.

notwithstanding. Moreover, a firm institutional foundation exists on which to build a new partnership. To achieve its historic potential, however, this new partnership needs to be more ambitious, more global, and more equal.[2] This will require adjustments on both sides. Europe must be willing to assume more global responsibilities, including in the military field, while the United States will need to display a willingness to share power and influence with Europe, including in areas like the Middle East, where the U.S. has traditionally played the dominant role.

MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY AND THE TRANSATLANTIC AGENDA

The Mediterranean could be an important area for building this new partnership. Both the United States and Europe share important interests in the region--especially preservation of unimpeded access to Persian Gulf and Middle East oil--even if they do not always see eye-to-eye on every issue. Moreover, the importance of the Mediterranean security issues in U.S. eyes is increasing.

During the Cold War the Mediterranean was a strategic backwater. The attention of U.S. policy makers was primarily focused on the Central Front. This made good strategic sense at the time because this was where the main challenge to Western security interests was located.

With the end of the Cold War, however, the locus of risks and challenges to U.S. and European interests is moving south. In the coming decade the key strategic challenges are likely to be on Europe's

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[2]See David Gompert and F. Stephen Larrabee, *America and Europe: A Partnership for a New Era* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

southern periphery and beyond Europe's borders.[3] Hence U.S. policy makers will need to pay increasing attention to security challenges in and around the Mediterranean.

The Balkans, in particular, are likely to be a major source of instability and require the increasing attention of U.S. policy makers. Indeed, instability in the Balkans could pose the most immediate threat to European security and Alliance interests. The U.S. and its European allies already face an emerging conflict in Kosovo. If the conflict is not contained, it could spill over into Macedonia (FYROM) and other parts of the Southern Balkans, possibly unleashing a fourth Balkan war.

But even if the conflict in Kosovo can be contained, the Balkans are likely to be a major security concern for years to come, requiring long-term, sustained U.S. and European engagement. Bosnia's reconstruction will require years--perhaps decades. Serbia's future also remains unclear. In addition, Croatia and Macedonia both face political successions which could significantly affect the prospects for stability in these countries and the Balkans as a whole.

To this must be added the new security risks emanating from the southern shore of the Mediterranean, particularly immigration and the growing gap between a "rich" North and a "poor" and increasingly populous South. The countries of the Maghreb have been experiencing population growth of about 3 percent a year. While there are signs that this trend is beginning to slow, it has significant

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[3]See F. Stephen Larrabee, Jerrold Green, Ian O. Lesser, and Michele Zanini, *NATO's Mediterranean Initiative: Policy Issues and Dilemmas* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998).

political and social implications for both sides of the Mediterranean.[4] On the one hand, it is creating strong pressures for out-migration from the Maghreb countries to Europe. On the other, it is creating new social and economic problems in Europe and precipitating strong efforts to limit immigration in several Southern European countries, particularly France. As a result of these pressures, the distinction between European and Mediterranean security is becoming increasingly blurred.

These linkages have important implications not only for Europe but also for the United States. They could affect the political landscape in Europe, strengthening nationalist forces in some European countries and possibly leading to a renationalization of European foreign and security policies. Thus the U.S. cannot remain oblivious to these trends and their potential implications.

In addition, the role and "strategic weight" of Southern Europe within Europe has increased in recent years. Once marginal players in Europe, the Southern European countries have begun to make their weight felt within the European Union (EU) and NATO in ways that have forced the U.S. to take notice. Concerned by what they perceive as an excessive emphasis on enlargement to the East the Southern European countries have pushed for more attention being given to the Mediterranean. The EU's Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, launched at a special summit in Barcelona in November 1995, was largely a Southern (especially Spanish) initiative; Spain and Italy were also the driving force behind NATO's Mediterranean Initiative.

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[4]For a detailed discussion, see Larrabee et alia, *NATO's Mediterranean Initiative*, pp. 1-21.

The U.S. cannot afford to ignore these developments. Indeed, the price for Southern support for Eastern enlargement is likely to be a greater opening of the Alliance to the south over the next decade and greater attention to "southern" issues. At the same time, as the locus of conflict shifts south, the strategic assets of Southern European states are becoming more important. Italy's air base at Aviano, for instance, served as an important staging area for air strikes in Bosnia and for monitoring the no-flight zone. Turkey also played an important role in the U.S. "train and equip" program, designed to enhance the military effectiveness of the Bosnian army.

At the same time, Europe is becoming more exposed to risks from the Middle East, especially from weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Within the next decade, all the capitals of Southern Europe could be within range of ballistic missiles launched from North Africa and the Middle East.[5] This will create new security dilemmas for these states--and for the United States--and could give the security dialogue with these states quite a different character.

Moreover, instability in North Africa and the Middle East has important security implications not only for Europe but also the United States. The United States could be asked to assist in the mass evacuation of foreign nationals caught in the violent civil war in Algeria. An escalation of internal violence in Algeria or the seizure of power by radical Islamic forces could also have a spill-over effect on Tunisia, Morocco, and possibly even Egypt, exacerbating internal tensions in these countries.

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[5]See Ian O. Lesser and Ashley J. Tellis, *Strategic Exposure: Proliferation Around the Mediterranean* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996).

An upsurge of instability in Egypt would be particularly unsettling from the U.S. point of view. The U.S. has an enormous stake in Egypt's prosperity and political stability. Egypt is the cornerstone of U.S. Middle East policy and the second largest recipient of U.S. assistance. If Egypt were to become destabilized, it would be a major blow to U.S. policy and interests.

In addition, the Greek-Turkish dispute over the Aegean and Cyprus continues to be a major source of U.S. and Transatlantic concern. The dispute has traditionally posed a threat to Alliance solidarity. But in recent years it has taken on a new dimension. On several occasions since 1993 the two countries have gone to the brink of war and a military conflict has been avoided only by last-minute U.S. diplomatic intervention. However, as long as the dispute remains unresolved, there is always a danger that some incident could inadvertently lead to the outbreak of armed conflict between the two countries, as nearly happened during the Imia/Kardak crisis in January 1996.

Here again U.S. interests would be directly affected. A clash between Greece and Turkey would not only create new instabilities in the Mediterranean, but could have a major impact on NATO's evolution, especially future enlargement. Many NATO members would be reluctant to open up NATO's ranks further, fearing that this could expose the Alliance to new internal risks and weaken its cohesion.

Moreover, a clash could exacerbate tensions in the Balkans, accentuating Greek-Turkish rivalry there. For these reasons, the U.S. has recently become more actively engaged in an effort to try to find a solution to the Cyprus question. While these efforts

have yet to bear visible fruit, they attest to the importance the Clinton Administration attaches to enhancing stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.

At the same time, the political dynamics in the Greek-Turkish dispute are changing in subtle but important ways. During the Cold War, Europe was largely a passive actor in the dispute and was only too willing to leave mediation of the conflict to the United States. However, with Greece's entry into the European Union, the EU has become a more important actor in the Eastern Mediterranean. Indeed, on some issues, such as Cyprus, the EU may have greater influence than the United States.

Finally, growing uncertainty about Turkey's own evolution has heightened U.S. interest in the Mediterranean. The end of the Cold War has increased Turkey's strategic importance in U.S. eyes. As Richard Holbrooke, the architect of the Dayton Accord and currently U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, has noted, Turkey is at the crossroads of almost every issue of importance to the United States on the Eurasian continent, including NATO, the Balkans, the Aegean, Iraqi sanctions, Russian relations with the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, peace in the Middle East, and transit routes for Central Asian oil and gas.[6] Hence keeping Turkey tightly anchored to the West has been and remains a top U.S. priority.

These trends highlight the growing U.S. interest in the Mediterranean and the degree to which Mediterranean security issues are beginning to move to the forefront of the Transatlantic agenda. In the

[6]See his testimony to the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Senate Appropriations Committee, March 3, 1995, p.12.

coming decade, they are likely to be among the most pressing security challenges that the U.S. and its European allies will face. It is not clear, however, whether the U.S. and Europe see these challenges in the same way or with the same immediacy. Yet without a shared strategic assessment of the nature of these challenges, it will be difficult to develop a common Transatlantic strategy for managing them.

This chapter examines U.S. policy in and toward the Mediterranean. The first section looks at where the Mediterranean fits into U.S. strategy. The second section focuses on U.S. policy and interests in the Mediterranean. The third section examines U.S. perceptions of Europe's role in the Mediterranean. How does the U.S. see Europe's role in the region? To what extent do U.S. and European interests overlap? Where do they differ? The final section suggests how these differences can be overcome.

THE MEDITERRANEAN IN U.S. STRATEGY

Despite its great geographic distance from the region, the United States has a long history of involvement in the Mediterranean. As Ian Lesser has pointed out, the United States has been a "Mediterranean power" for over 200 years.[7] Indeed, America's earliest experience with overseas presence and "power projection" was in the Mediterranean.

However, U.S. involvement in the Mediterranean largely remained marginal until after World War II, when the U.S. replaced Britain as the main maritime power in the region. The onset of the Cold War, especially Soviet pressure on Greece and Turkey, led to a deepening American involvement in the region and

[7]See Ian O. Lesser, *Mediterranean Security: New Perspectives and Implications for U.S. Policy* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992).

the establishment of a permanent maritime presence (the Sixth Fleet) there. This involvement expanded further with the U.S. commitment to Israel after 1948.

Despite this deepening involvement, the United States has not had--and does not today have--a "Mediterranean policy." Rather, it has tended to deal with specific issues or sub-areas in the region in an *ad hoc* manner. It has a policy toward Israel, Cyprus, Algeria, Iraq, etc. but not a policy toward the Mediterranean as a whole.

The organization of the State and Defense Department bureaucracies both reflect and reinforce this separation and fragmentation. Greece, Turkey, and other NATO members on the northern littoral of the Mediterranean are part of the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs in the State Department. The countries of the southern littoral belong to the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. There is no one in the U.S. bureaucracy who deals with "the Mediterranean" as a geographic entity. Rather, different officials deal with different parts of the region.

In addition, the U.S. has tended to give priority to specific geographic sub-areas in the Mediterranean, focussing attention, in particular, on the Gulf, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean (Greece, Turkey, Cyprus). By comparison the Western Mediterranean--with the exception of Morocco and Libya--has attracted less attention. This too has worked against the emergence of a comprehensive Mediterranean policy.

Several different perspectives have characterized American thinking about the Mediterranean.[8] One has

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[8]For a detailed discussion, see Lesser, *Mediterranean Security*, p. 7.

tended to see the Mediterranean as an extension of the European security environment. This view tends to focus on the problems facing the Southern European countries themselves and sees developments in and around the Mediterranean in terms of their impact on European security.

A second approach has been to see the Mediterranean as "the place where the Gulf begins." This approach focuses on the Mediterranean as a gateway to the Middle East and Gulf and emphasizes the Mediterranean's importance in providing logistical support and communication lines to the Gulf and Middle East.

Both approaches have had a strong influence on U.S. policy. However, with the waning of the Cold War, the second approach has tended to dominate U.S. thinking. From an American perspective, the main security challenges today are on Europe's periphery or beyond its borders--particularly in the Gulf--not in Europe. As a result U.S. defense policy has increasingly begun to emphasize the importance of developing military capabilities which can deal with a major regional contingency (MRC) in the Gulf.

The Gulf War reinforced the linkage between Mediterranean and Gulf security in American eyes. During the Gulf War 90 percent of the material needed to support the coalition operations for Desert Storm and Desert Shield arrived via the Gulf.[9] If the U.S. had had to rely exclusively on routes through the Indian Ocean to deploy forces in the Gulf, the capacity for rapid power projection would have been greatly reduced.

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[9]Lesser, ibid., p. 4.

This strong concern with security challenges in the Gulf is a major hallmark of U.S. policy. When U.S. officials and strategists think about the Mediterranean, they think first and foremost about the Gulf. When European officials and strategists think about the Mediterranean, by contrast, they think first and foremost about the Western Mediterranean. For them, the Western Mediterranean, not the Gulf, is "the place where the Mediterranean begins."

This difference has important strategic implications. The U.S. and Europe approach the question of Mediterranean security from different perspectives. The U.S. perspective tends to be more strategic and focused on hard security, especially the requirements for power projection. The European perspective, on the other hand, tends to be more political and focused on soft security. Neither approach is right or wrong. But they help to explain why it is difficult to formulate a common Alliance strategy toward the Mediterranean.

U.S. INTERESTS AND POLICY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

The U.S. has a number of specific interests in the Mediterranean. These have tended to drive its policy in the region. They include:

1. Preservation of the sovereignty and security of Israel.

This has been a bedrock of U.S. policy since the founding of the Israeli state in 1948. It is driven by domestic as well as strategic concerns. As a result, U.S. policy is regarded by many Arabs as being "pro-Israel" and "lacking balance."

2. Promotion of the Middle East Peace Process.

The United States has a strong interest in peace and stability in the Middle East and has strongly

supported the Middle East peace process. At the same time, it has been skeptical of efforts by European countries and the EU to play a major diplomatic role in the peace process.

3. Maintaining unimpeded access to Middle Eastern/Persian Gulf oil.

Concern about energy security--in particular unimpeded access to Middle Eastern/Persian Gulf oil--has been a cornerstone of U.S. policy in the Mediterranean and one of the main reasons why the U.S. went to war to repel the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. U.S. policy makers worried in particular about the impact of the Iraqi invasion on Saudi Arabia and on the West's ability to maintain the free flow of gas and oil (especially the latter) from the Persian Gulf to the United States and Europe.

4. Preventing a Greek-Turkish conflict.

Maintaining the cohesion of NATO's southern flank has been a major U.S. priority. During the Cold War the concern was mainly motivated by the desire to contain the expansion of Soviet influence in the Mediterranean as well as to be able to deter a possible Soviet attack on Turkey and Greece. The Cold War has eliminated the Soviet threat, but the U.S. still maintains a strong interest in preventing the outbreak of a military confrontation between Greece and Turkey. A Greek-Turkish conflict could severely weaken NATO's cohesion and effectiveness, and doom any prospect for further enlargement of the Alliance in the near future.

5. Preserving a stable democratic secular Turkey.

The United States maintains a strong interest in the preservation of a stable, democratic secular Turkey. Turkey is the only secular democracy in the Middle East. It serves as an important alternative

model for other Islamic states in the Middle East. At the same time, its strategic importance has increased since the end of the Cold War. Turkey stands at the nexus of three areas of growing strategic importance to the United States: the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caspian region. Thus the U.S. has strongly supported anchoring Turkey firmly to the West and Turkey's integration into Europe, including its eventual membership in the European Union.

6. Countering the threat from weapons of mass destruction.

In recent years, the U.S. has shown growing concern with the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, especially from Iraq and Iran. This has been one of the main motivations behind its controversial policy of "dual containment." However, many countries in Europe do not share this concern to the same degree. As a result, the issue of how best to counter the WMD threat has recently emerged as one of the most contentious issues between the U.S. and its European allies.

7. Reducing the threat posed by terrorism and radical extremists.

Reducing the threat of terrorism and radical extremism has been a key element of U.S. policy in the Mediterranean and a major driving force in particular behind U.S. policy toward Iran, Syria, and Libya. At the same time, the U.S. has been careful not to portray the religion of Islam as a threat. Rather it has focused its criticism on specific extremist groups and/or governments in the region that use terrorism and violence to achieve their political goals.

THE U.S. AND EUROPE: COMPLEMENTARITY OR COMPETITION

As noted earlier, these disparate interests do not form a coherent regional policy. Rather they have been pursued separately largely on an *ad hoc* basis. This represents a major difference with Europe, which has tended to take a more "global" approach to the Mediterranean and tried to formulate a comprehensive policy toward the region (the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership).

Despite this difference of approach, U.S. and European interests and policies in the Mediterranean are broadly complementary. As noted earlier, the U.S. has tended to concentrate its attention on the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean and it has generally sought to preserve its dominant role in both areas. At the same time, it has been content to let Europe take the lead in the Western Mediterranean, where European--especially Southern European--interests are the strongest.

The U.S., for instance, has strongly supported the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, even though it is not a direct participant in the Barcelona process, since it benefits as well from an increase in prosperity and stability in the Mediterranean. It has also supported the efforts of the Southern members of NATO to develop a stronger Alliance profile in the Mediterranean, as long as these efforts do not divert scarce resources from Eastern enlargement or interfere with the Middle East peace process.[10]

At the same time, there are a number of issues in the Mediterranean area on which the U.S. and Europe do not entirely see eye-to-eye.

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[10]See Larrabee et *alia*, *NATO's Mediterranean Initiative*.

-- **The Middle East Peace Process.** The U.S. has traditionally been the dominant player in the Middle East game and it has generally been reluctant to share influence with the Europeans. The preference for unilateralism is particularly strong among conservative Republicans and many members of the U.S. military. They feel that the Europeans do not "bring much to the table" militarily and that the difficulties of trying to coordinate policy with the Europeans far outweigh the benefits. In their view, the Europeans are more of a hindrance than an asset in the Middle East.

This preference for unilateralism, however, is by no means universally shared. A number of American analysts have recently begun to argue that the U.S. cannot manage the security challenges in the Middle East on its own and that it should be willing to share more influence with Europe in return for a commitment by the Europeans to increase their power projection capabilities in any future Middle East or Persian Gulf contingencies.[11] Others have suggested that NATO should put less emphasis on the defense of national territory and focus more on "common interests," especially in the Persian Gulf.[12]

Such views, however, remain highly controversial and have not as yet found broad acceptance in the U.S. policy community, though they have some important adherents within the Clinton Administration.[13] They

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[11]See Zalmay Khalilzad, "Challenges in the Greater Middle East," in Gompert and Larrabee, *America and Europe*, pp. 191-217.

[12]See David Gompert, "Introduction: A Partner for America," *Ibid*, pp. 1-18. Also Warren Christopher and William Perry, "NATO's True Mission," *New York Times*, October 21, 1997.

[13]See, in particular, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's statement to the North Atlantic Council in Luxembourg, May 28, 1998. In the statement, Albright stressed that NATO's prime mission is collective

would require NATO to undergo a far more sweeping process of adaptation than has so far been contemplated. Many members of Congress prefer the "old NATO" and fear it will lose its cohesion if it takes on too many new tasks.[14] They are thus opposed to expanding NATO's roles and missions--whether in Bosnia or in the Gulf.

Many Europeans also oppose a "globalization" of NATO, arguing that this would change the nature of the Alliance and that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain an internal consensus for a broad expansion of NATO's role beyond Europe's borders.[15] Some--especially in France--also fear that the Alliance would become little more than a tool for pursuing American global interests. At the same time, there is a growing recognition in Europe that the Alliance's security horizon needs to be broadened, especially to the south.[16]

The real debate is not whether but *how far* the horizon should be broadened. Many American analysts see the main threats to Western security in the Gulf and Middle East. They feel that Europe should share more of the burden for addressing these security challenges. NATO, in their view, should be the instrument for addressing these challenges. The

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defense, but the Alliance also allows the U.S. and its European allies to "meet common threats that emanate from the North Atlantic area."

[14]This concern was strongly reflected in the debate on the ratification of NATO enlargement during the Spring of 1998. Many Senators expressed a strong concern not only about an expansion of NATO's membership but also its roles and missions.

[15]Karl-Heinz Kamp, "Eine 'global' Rolle für die NATO," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 2, 1998.

[16]See Volker Rühe, "Towards a New Strategic Consensus for a New Alliance," speech delivered at the German-British Königswinter-Conference in Edinburg, Scotland, March 26, 1998.

alternative, they argue, is a growth in American unilateralism.[17]

Many European officials and analysts agree that the Alliance's security horizon has to be broadened. But they see this broadening limited essentially to the *periphery of Europe*--the Balkans and the Western Mediterranean--not the Gulf or Middle East. They believe an expansion of NATO's mission to include security challenges in the Gulf would fundamentally change the nature of the Alliance and drag Europe into conflicts in which it does not have a vital stake.

To some extent, this debate can be seen as an extension of the old burden-sharing debate. But there is an important difference. The old debate was essentially about money--getting Europe to pay more for Alliance defense, reducing the American share of the costs, etc. The new debate is about "responsibility sharing"--broadening the definition of the security challenges and getting Europe to assume more responsibility for meeting these challenges, most of which are on Europe's periphery (Balkans) or beyond its borders (the Mediterranean).

The real debate revolves around the age-old question of the geographic scope of "the Mediterranean." For American strategists and officials the Mediterranean means, first and foremost, the Gulf. For European officials, on the other hand, it primarily means the Western Mediterranean. That is where Europe's key interests are most vitally affected and where Europe is most strongly politically and economically engaged. They are thus prepared, at best, to see NATO involvement in the Western Mediterranean but not in the Gulf.

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[17]See Gompert and Larrabee, *America and Europe*, pp. 252-253.

-- **Turkey.** Turkey is another issue on which U.S. and European views diverge. The U.S. and Europe approach Turkey from different perspectives. For the U.S., Turkey is an important strategic ally. It plays a key role in three areas of increasing strategic importance to the United States: The Balkans, the Middle East/Persian Gulf, and the Caspian region. Washington has thus been anxious to see Turkey anchored more firmly to the West and integrated more tightly into Europe, including membership in the EU.[18]

The EU, on the other hand, looks at Turkey primarily from an economic and cultural perspective. The key issue for the EU is not Turkey's strategic importance--which it fully acknowledges--but how Turkey fits into the new Post-Cold War European security architecture, especially its aspiration for EU membership.

The end of the Cold War has tended to highlight Turkey's distinctiveness. Turkey stands outside the general trend toward "Europeanization" that has characterized most countries in the Southern region.[19] At the same time, with the end of the Cold War, Turkey's human rights policy and democratic credentials have come under greater scrutiny by European organizations. This has significantly complicated Turkey's relations with Europe and contributed to a serious deterioration of Turkey's relations with the EU.

Turkey's relations with the EU have become a source of growing Transatlantic discord, particularly

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[18]See F. Stephen Larrabee, "U.S. and European Policy Toward Turkey and the Caspian Basin," in Robert D. Blackwill and Michael Stürmer (eds.), *Allies Divided. Transatlantic Policies for the Greater Middle East* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), pp. 143-173

[19]For a detailed discussion, see Ian O. Lesser, *Bridge or Barrier: Turkey and the West After the Cold War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992).

between the U.S. and Germany.[20] The U.S. has strongly supported Turkey's aspiration to join the EU and has been critical of the EU's handling of Turkey's candidacy for EU membership. EU members, in turn, have become resentful of what they consider U.S. high-handedness and meddling in internal EU affairs. Unless a way is found to address Turkey's aspiration for EU membership more effectively, its relations with Europe are likely to deteriorate and disagreement over Turkey could poison even more acutely Transatlantic relations.

-- **Cyprus.** The Cyprus issue could also become an increasing source of disagreement between the U.S. and its European allies. In the past, the Cyprus issue was largely an issue between the U.S. and Greece and Turkey. Europe played a relatively small role. Recently, however, the EU has begun to play a much more active role in the Cyprus issue.

The EU's decision at the Luxembourg Summit in December 1997 to open accession negotiations with the Greek part of Cyprus has significantly complicated the prospects for a Cyprus settlement. The EU hopes that the accession negotiations will act as a "catalyst" for a comprehensive settlement and give the Turkish Cypriot side an incentive to be more flexible. However, the EU's decision is likely to have the opposite effect and lead to a hardening of the status quo and the permanent division of the island.

The EU decision has reinforced anti-EU feeling in Turkey, already smarting from the EU's failure to

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[20]These differences emerged sharply at a U.S.-German conference on the occasion of the founding of the American Academy in Berlin in March 1998, which was attended by high-ranking U.S. and German officials. See "Türkei-Politik trübt transatlantischen Dialogue," *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, March 21-22, 1998. See also "Differenzen über Rolle Europas," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 21, 1998.

include Ankara on the list of candidates with whom it intends to open accession negotiations, and has led to hardening of the Turkish position on Cyprus. In the past, Turkey placed priority on the security and well-being of the Turkish Cypriots. But since mid-1997 Turkey has begun to emphasize that Cyprus is a security concern in its own right for Turkey as well.[21] At the same time, Turkey has moved away from the bizonal and bicommunal federation that it supported for nine years, insisting instead on the recognition of two separate states as a basis for any solution.[22]

In short, rather than facilitating a Cyprus settlement, as the policy was intended to do, the EU's decision to open accession negotiations with the Greek part of Cyprus prior to an overall political settlement threatens to lead to a hardening of the status quo and *de facto* partition of the island. At the same time, the deterioration of the EU's relations with Turkey has removed any incentive for Turkey to make compromises over Cyprus. As long as Turkey feels it has no chance of getting into the EU, it has little incentive to make the tough choices on Cyprus that will need to be made.

-- **Rogue states.** This has been one of the most contentious issues between the U.S. and Europe. Both the U.S. and Europe agree on the basic need to contain the threat posed by "rogue states" such as Iran, Iraq, and Libya. The differences have been over the *means* and *tactics* that should be employed to achieve the goal. The U.S. has put priority on using sanctions to

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[21]Yusuf Kanli, "Revolutionary Changes in Turkey's Cyprus Policy," *Turkish Daily News*, July 4, 1997.

[22]Yusuf Kanli, "Federation Shelved, Turks Want Two-State Settlement in Cyprus," *Turkish Daily News*, January 19, 1998.

compel compliance and change their policies. It has also been more willing to use military force to ensure compliance. Europe, on the other hand, has generally been skeptical about the utility of sanctions and has favored a policy of "constructive engagement"--especially with Iran--designed to encourage the growth of the moderate forces within the regimes. It has also been more skeptical about the use of military force (witness its reluctance to support the use of force by the U.S. in the most recent Iraq crisis).

In actual fact, neither "dual containment" nor "constructive engagement" has been very effective in moderating the behavior of Iran or Iraq. Both policies need to be revised. In the U.S. case, the process of rethinking has already begun. Over the last two years, the policy of dual containment has come under increasing assault, both in the U.S. and abroad.[23]

This process has gained greater momentum since the election of President Khatami in Iran. Since then, a small but important thaw has taken place in U.S.-Iranian relations. This thaw, together with President Clinton's decision not to enforce the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), may help to reduce the most acute sources of friction between the U.S. and its European allies. But the basic differences of approach are likely to continue to inhibit the emergence of effective common policies in this area.

-- **Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).** Since the end of the Cold War the U.S. has placed increased emphasis on the need to counter the threat posed by

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[23]See Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft, and Richard Murphy, "Differentiated Containment," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 3, May/June 1997, pp. 20-30. For a trenchant French critique of U.S. policy, see Eric Rouleau, "America's Unyielding Policy Toward Iraq," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 14, No. 1, January/February 1995, pp. 59-72.

the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.[24] This issue has been at the heart of its dual containment policy and its differences with Iran and Iraq (particularly the latter). Europe, on the other hand, has adopted a more low-key approach and has tended to believe that the U.S. is exaggerating the threat, especially from Iran.

Here again, however, the disagreement is more over tactics than long-term goals. In the recent Iraq crisis, most European governments did not support the U.S. threat to use force against Saddam Hussein not because they did not think that Saddam's policies represented a serious threat to regional security, but because they did not believe that the use of force would be effective: it risked angering Saddam without significantly degrading his WMD capability or removing him from power. It thus risked doing more harm than good--a view shared by many U.S. critics as well.

-- **NATO's role in the Mediterranean.** The U.S. has also been at odds with some European allies, especially France, over NATO's role in the Mediterranean. While the U.S. has supported NATO's Mediterranean Initiative designed to engage select countries in the Middle East and North Africa in a security dialogue, it has done so with little real enthusiasm. The rather reserved U.S. position on expanding and deepening NATO's outreach to the Mediterranean has been motivated by concerns that the Initiative might divert scarce funds from Eastern enlargement--a top U.S. priority--or interfere with the Middle East peace process.

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[24]For a detailed discussion, see Richard Falkenrath, "The United States, Europe and Weapons of Mass Destruction," in Blackwill and Stürmer, *Allies Divided*, pp. 203-230. For a European perspective, see Joanna Spear, "Weapons of Mass Destruction," in *Ibid*, pp. 231-252.

Unlike enlargement, which was largely an American (and Germany) initiative, the main promotees of the Mediterranean Initiative have been the countries of Southern Europe, especially Italy and Spain. France's position has been more ambiguous. While France has a strong interest in the Mediterranean, it has been reluctant to see NATO--which it regards as a stalking horse for U.S. interests--get very deeply involved in the Mediterranean, preferring instead that the EU, through the European-Mediterranean Partnership, take the lead in providing regional stability and security in the region. This reflects France's special interest in the Mediterranean as well as its desire to see Europe take on greater responsibility for security in and around Europe more generally.

This broader interest in enhancing Europe's visibility and security profile has also been at the heart of the dispute with the U.S. over control of the Southern Command (AFSOUTH) at Naples. President Chirac's demand that the Southern command be turned over to a European was ill-conceived and poorly executed. The U.S. refusal to give up the command was not only related to concerns about putting the Sixth Fleet under foreign command--a move that would be widely opposed in the U.S. Congress--but to broader U.S. strategic concerns about the growing importance of challenges in the South.

The French power play, moreover, was badly handled diplomatically. By raising the issue publicly at the Presidential level right at the outset rather than vetting it through normal diplomatic channels first, Chirac put President Clinton visibly on the spot and left him little room for maneuver, thus practically ensuring a negative American response. Once the issue had been raised at the Presidential level, the hands

of lower-level subordinates were tied and it was difficult for either president to back down without losing face.

For the immediate future, there is little prospect that the U.S. will relinquish its control of the Southern Command, especially since the command is likely to become more important in the next decade, as NATO faces increasing demands in the South. However, a gradual "Europeanization" of the command over time is likely, even desirable. How fast this will proceed will depend to a large extent on the willingness and ability of America's European allies to take the necessary measures--including military measures--to address the new set of challenges in the South and the ability of the U.S. and its allies to work out a more concerted strategy to deal with these challenges.

TOWARD A BROADER SOUTHERN STRATEGY

In the coming decade, the U.S. and its allies will face a set of challenges quite different from the ones they faced during the Cold War. Many of these challenges will be in the South, especially in and around the Mediterranean. This will require the U.S. and Europe to develop a more overt and coherent Southern strategy.[25]

This strategy will need to link a number of diverse elements into a coherent whole:

- command reform
- PfP (for candidate and noncandidate members)
- policy toward the Balkans
- dialogue with the countries along the Southern Mediterranean littoral

[25]This section is based on issues covered in chapter five of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative: Policy Issues and Dilemmas (Santa Monica: CA: RAND, 1998)

- enhancing cooperation and stability in the Aegean
- counterproliferation.

At present, these various elements ae running on different tracks and are not closely connected to one another. They need to be integrated into a broader, more coherent strategy designed to enable NATO to better meet the security challenges it is likely to face in the coming decades.

In particular, the role of AFSOUTH needs to be upgraded as part of the overall effort to modernize and streamline NATO's command structure. During the Cold War AFSOUTH was of secondary importance. The Central Front was where the action was. Hence it made sense that AFCENT should get the lion's share of NATO resources.

With the end of the Cold War, however, the responsibilities and importance of AFSOUTH have increased significantly. During the Cold War, the AFSOUTH commander (CINCSOUTH) had to worry primarily about the Soviet Mediterranean fleet. Today his Area of Strategic Interest (AOSI) includes the Balkans, the Mediterranean, parts of the Gulf, and the Caucasus. Yet there has been little corresponding shift in resources to enable the AFSOUTH commander to carry out his expanded responsibilities or to closely monitor and plan for contingencies in his AOSI.

This imbalance needs to be redressed as NATO carries out the process of internal adaptation. More resources need to be shifted to AFSOUTH to enable the AFSOUTH commander to carry out his expanded responsibilities and to monitor and plan for contingencies in his AOSI. In addition, the command reform under way needs to be designed to meet the new

challenges NATO is likely to face in the future, many of which are likely to be in the South.

At the same time, the Alliance needs to ensure that its political and military strategy in the Mediterranean are closely harmonized. Efforts to enhance NATO's power projection capabilities could create new anxieties and fears among the dialogue countries and inhibit efforts to intensify cooperation with them. Thus, it is important that any changes in NATO's military strategy and command structure be carefully explained to these countries ahead of time to reduce the chances of misperception and misunderstanding.[26]

Embedding the Mediterranean Initiative in a broader Southern strategy would also help to ensure stronger U.S. support. To date, the United States has not exhibited a strong interest in the initiative, in part because it does not see the linkage between the initiative and many of the "big" strategic issues in the South. The more NATO's initiative can be linked to this broader U.S. agenda in the Mediterranean, the more likely it is to obtain backing in Washington. Such support will be crucial if the initiative is to really gain political weight and momentum.[27]

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[26]The strong reaction of some dialogue countries to the opening of the EUROFOR headquarters in Florence in November 1996 illustrates the problems in this regard and underscores the need to ensure that NATO's political and military strategy are closely harmonized.

[27]The highly visible U.S. role in promoting NATO enlargement to the East highlights this point. Without strong U.S. backing and active engagement, it is unlikely that enlargement would have become a major NATO priority.

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Impact of Developments in European Security Structures on the Mediterranean Region

by Uwe Nerlich

10 June 1998

The problem in context

More than a hundred years ago no lesser man than Alfred Thayer Mahan has observed that "circumstances have caused the Mediterranean Sea to play a greater part in the history of the world, both in a commercial and a military point of view, than any other sheet of water of the same size."[1] Circumstances certainly have changed profoundly again since Mahan.

Not long ago, the Secretary General of the Atlantic Alliance, Javier Solana, stated that "the Mediterranean has come into focus as a security region on its own merit for all European institutions."[2] This requires two qualifications. One is the resurgence: During the Cold War the Mediterranean played a subordinate role even though one of the major origins of the Cold war were the subversive activities in Greece and Turkey which led to the Truman Doctrine.[3] The other is the emphasis on institutions rather than nations. While individual European nations have continuing or renewed interests in the region - on top the European littoral states -, European institutions hardly represent a coherent view, European institutions are highly developed as distinct from the highly diversified Southern periphery, and the approaches to that region by the EU and NATO, to mention the two most important institutions, are bound to be exploratory and incremental at best for some time to come.

Solana went on to suggest that to understand the reasons for the renewed relevance it is important to see "the Mediterranean region as part of a larger whole."[4] But in some way this has indeed been particularly true during the Cold War: While Central Europe was the strategic focus, control of the Mediterranean has been a systematic part of the contest.[5] With the Soviet Union gone there is no major opponent left in the Mediterranean.

This raises several questions:

- Does the Mediterranean present itself as a "strategic whole" - be it in terms of strategic interactions among countries surrounding it or of perspectives of major external countries with interests in the area?

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[1] Alfred Thayer Mahan, the Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660 - 1783, New York 1963, p.29

[2] Speech by Dr. Javier Solana at Ce.Mi.S.S/RAND International Conference on "The Future of NATO's Mediterranean Initiative," Rome, November 10, 1997, p.2

[3] See Legislative Origins of the Truman Doctrine, Hearings, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 80th Congress, Washington 1973

[4] Solana, ibid

[5] In spite of the Truman Doctrine the delineation of the NATO Treaty area has been a matter of debate before Art. VI has been accepted (originally including Algeria) with important voices in favor of excluding the Mediterranean region altogether. But already MC 14/1 (1952) stresses the importance of the Mediterranean region within the overall strategic context (See NATO Strategy Documents 1949 - 1969. SHAPE 1998, p.225 f). While NATO's regional definition was unambiguous during the Cold War, it did not correspond with the U.S. command structure which extended to the Gulf area.

- Does the Mediterranean lend itself to unifying concepts other than geographical circumscriptions or to coherent frameworks for generating common approaches of sorts?
- If the Mediterranean region is best understood as "part of a larger whole," what are the characteristics of that "larger whole?"
- What are the driving circumstances and trends that bring the Mediterranean once again back into focus as a special security region, provided this is the case?
- To what extent do European developments - recent and pending - shape this new Mediterranean environment?

The Mediterranean as a strategic whole?

Whenever the Mediterranean presented itself as a strategic whole, it was not for intrinsic reasons, but - to refer to Mahan again - resulting from circumstances. The practical meaning of geographical circumscriptions is changing all the time - in modern times mostly due to technologies of communication and transport. Historical retrospective may suggest that "for thousands of years, the Mediterranean has been a strategic whole,"[6] but in reality this was so only in periods of regional dominance. The Roman imperial dominance is the most obvious case in point. British dominance, especially during the 19th century, provided strategic unity, albeit as part of a "larger whole." When the United States became a Mediterranean actor in 1942, and again in 1947, this was as a mediator and protector rather than as an imperial power, and much of the continuing influence depended on Cold War conditions.

Today the United States are the only power with pervasive influence, if not leverage, on a global scale. This applies to Europe as it does to the Middle East. But two points stand out. First, the United States pursue global interests, and for a long time to come these interests can be challenged only by regional opponents. Second, the United States pursue global interests in a region-by-region manner[7], and interestingly all major security documents of the U.S. during the 1990s refer to Europe, the Middle East and increasingly to Africa, but never to the Mediterranean as a security region. American strategic interest in the Western Mediterranean is low, and in case of unforeseen circumstances the mobility of the Sixth Fleet always provides a sufficient hedge.[8]

During the formative years of the Alliance socio-economic conflict in Greece and Turkey was seen to be a source of "confusion and disorder (which) might well spread throughout the entire Middle East."[9] Europeans have all along stressed the socio-economic nature of instabilities in Southern littoral states rather than a potentially unifying strategic threat.

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[6] Ted Greenwood, U.S. and NATO Force Structure and Military Operations in the Mediterranean. National Defense University Washington, D.C., June 1993, p.2. Roberto Aliboni has rightly pointed out that "the word Mediterranean is sometimes employed elliptically to refer to much more than the Mediterranean basin" (European Security across the Mediterranean. Chaillot Paper 2. Paris, March 1991, p2f.) But this still leaves the question of how best to delineate it unanswered.

[7] See the statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee by Henry Shelton, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on February 3, 1998 (excerpts in U.S. Information and Texts, February 12, 1998, p.13ff.) In this context it is worth noting that in Zbig Brzezinski's recent geostrategic grand design the Mediterranean hardly figures at all. In his vision the Eurasian continent consists of a central region and Western , Southern, and Eastern peripheries. The Eastern Med is part of the Southern periphery. This Southern periphery entails more than what is included in the American concept of Southwest Asia. (See Zbignew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard. American primacy and its geostrategic imperatives. New York, 1997, chapter 2)

[8] For a discussion of the differences of the Western and Eastern Mediterranean see Ian O. Lesser, Mediterranean Security. New Perspectives and Implications for U.S. Policy. RAND R-4178-AF, Santa Monica 1992, p. 10ff.

[9] Legislative Origins of the Truman Doctrine, loc.cit., p.

The sources of instability have shifted since - to the inter-state level between Greece and Turkey and to former Yugoslavia where socio-economic tension combined with political disintegration into severe civil war. As for the Southern littoral states the prevailing European view corresponds to the Truman Doctrine of 1947: In the words of Secretary General Solana, "most security challenges in the Mediterranean arise from worsening socio-economic conditions and fragmentation, not from military risks."[10]

The current maximum goal for the Alliance is a dialogue with a select group of six countries which are assumed to be potentially like-minded in a longer run, but which include countries with profoundly different interests - a dialogue to cope with marginal political problems. In other words, from a European perspective the Mediterranean does not represent a strategic whole either. Instead there exists a differential of interests among European states. It results from a combination of country-unique preoccupations and concepts of compensation between stabilization of Eastern Europe and some unspecified outreach to the Southern littoral Med states. Such concepts of compensation are derived from the differential of interests within Western institutions - notably NATO and the EU. None of these interests and objectives pertains to the Mediterranean as a whole, let alone a strategic whole.

The Mediterranean - A coherent security region?

In traditional geographic terms the Mediterranean is bordered by three Continents and it is surrounded by 22 countries many of which face internal strife and/or intra-regional tensions. Most major external countries have interests, if not stakes, in the region, and given the inter-relationships between some external influences and some internal and intra-regional developments, outcomes in one part of the region can shape outcomes in others. The interplay between the present Israeli government and the Clinton Administration in regard to the Middle East peace process are a case in point: It tends to stall not only the peace process itself, but potentially constructive beginnings in other parts of the region. But these interactions within the region are not distinctly different from interactions with Asian and potentially African countries outside the region, if the region is understood to include the states bordering the Med

What then follows in terms of a Mediterranean security area? It is not a strategic whole. There does not exist a generic threat to or from the Mediterranean area. The geographical circumscription of the Mediterranean - NATO and EU members excluded - is charac-terized by diversity, tension, instability and often grim perspectives, and neighboring the Med hardly is a distinctive characteristic any more. There is no dominant power in sight that could seek to control the Mediterranean once again[11] nor do the incentives and stakes of the past still exist in an era of telecommunications and modern transport: The Mediterranean no longer is either a major bridge or a barrier.

Given the peculiarly intrinsic relationship between multinational institutions and regional confinements ("treaty areas"), it is not surprising that the only framework within which the Mediterranean comes back into focus as a coherent region is that of existing European institutions - above all NATO and EU. One should add that this is a European and Euro-Atlantic perspective: Neither of the two other bordering continents is conducive to a similar perspective.

[10] Solana speech in Rome, loc.cit., p. 3

[11] E.g., reluctance on the part of the U.S. to use military force on the Balkans displays how little leverage U.S. military presence provides in serious contingencies.

Europe as an institutional larger whole?

NATO's agenda is and will be focused on its continuing internal readjustment and its continuing effort to project stability into Central Eastern and Eastern Europe, i.e., the relationship with Russia and the Ukraine, the formation of a region between the old NATO and the CIS, and increasingly the Caucasus/Trans-Caucasus region - the Asian Balkans as Brzezinski has labeled it. Enlargement of membership is part of this process, and the terms of reference for enlargement are likely to change after the Washington Summit in April 1999. NATO's new strategic concept is expected to reflect growing concern over emerging international and transnational threats which may in part originate from the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. It is also driven by worries over the prospects for continued military partnerships in and near the Gulf area which are considered important for power projection in case of major contingencies with access to energy sources at stake.

This stabilization of Central Eastern and Eastern Europe is essential for all Alliance members. It consumes substantial resources, albeit modest in comparison to the Cold War burdens. It requires a complex process of cooperation ranging from bilateral cooperation of sorts to 16 plus 1-type cooperation to multilateral cooperation, in particular through the European-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). Institutionalization of this cooperative network is critically important. It has been achieved in Paris, Sintra, and Madrid. The resulting security structure leaves many questions to future answers, in particular in regard to future common objectives, to the role of a unifying Europe and to the viability of cooperation with the United States in the longer run. But a framework has been established which has a chance to channel future developments in stability projection. Membership issues may continue to spring up. On the other hand, after the first round of enlargement it may become more apparent that the issue of membership in NATO has been blown out of proportion. Cooperation can happen in may ways once the basic framework has been established. The core element of this security structure is NATO (see Chart 1).

The Uniqueness of European stability projection

Why is stability projection into Central Eastern and Eastern Europe uniquely important to the whole Alliance? There are several reasons:

- The Soviet Union has dismantled its vast military machinery of suppression in Eastern Europe virtually without a shot. For Russia as a succession state to be included in Western cooperative schemes is the only alternative to suffering from a Versailles syndrome. Such cooperation needs to be reconcilable with building some viable structure with the other remains of the Soviet Union except the Baltics which requires further self-restraint amidst enormous socio-economic strains.

  At the same time acceptance of Central Eastern Europe as part of the Western structure is easily seen not only as a further loss, but as something that tends to push Russia further into the "East" at a time where it has to seek partnership with the West under very weak economic, political, and military conditions. Building Russia into a viable structure without major sacrifices in terms of the viability of the Alliance and its relationship with Central Eastern Europe is a daunting task - depending on uncertain conditions within Russia and on Western support conditioned by competing claimants. The new security architecture in Europe offers at least a promising chance. The alternative would be major instability with a tendency to be exported and a lingering threat of a reconstitution of a militant posture.

- Central Eastern Europe is historically and culturally part and parcel of Europe, but after decades of the European divide, the unprecedented challenge of transforming former command economies into viable market economies with a chance to compete

in Western markets is a daunting task too. The difficulties of German economic, social, and cultural unification provide a measure for the complexity of the Central East European challenges. Without consolidation of the Central East European region and rapid integration into Western structures - without straightforwardly antagonizing Russia - a new European divide will result from internal weakness in that region. Moreover, that region would in effect be reduced to a mere buffer zone, and as such it could be exposed to a Russia in turmoil or even on its way to resurgent aggressiveness - indeed a most counterproductive development.

- Without subscribing to Brzezinski's geostrategic grand design - his concept of a Eurasian continent - successful stabilization of Central Eastern and to a degree Eastern Europe could strengthen Europe at large with positive implications for the Atlantic Alliance. But given that this also includes major regroupments and rebalancing within Europe and the Alliance, this is a vitally important task also for intrinsic Western reasons. This pertains in particular to the roles of Germany on the one hand and the United States on the other. To take the German case, Germany has turned from a highly dependent role in an exposed position at the dividing line of a potentially deadly confrontation to a centrally embedded state surrounded by friendly neighbors, with a major increase in population and resources (temporarily tempered by the burdens of unification) and with less certain political orientations in the decades ahead. Building Germany into an institutionalized multilateral structure thus is Germany's vital interest to reassure the rest of Europe. It is also in the interest of all others. However, counter-vailing trends are at work in Europe: While the EMU in particular will reinforce further integration within Europe, there is a renaissance throughout Europe of intergovern-mental cooperation, if not national pursuits. Continued emphasis on further integration thus is also in demand to counterbalance more nationalist trends in most of Europe. Germany would be particularly vulnerable to such trends because surrounded by states with mostly nationalist policies it would need to react for basic competitive reasons which would render it more vulnerable still to the verdicts of nationalism by states which have imprudently chosen this course much earlier.

European political reconstruction thus remains crucially important for Europe and the Alliance, and to that end multilateral institutionalization and its extension to Central Eastern Europe remains one of the main vehicles - along with industrial concentration and other sectoral forces.

The Asian Pacific: A model for the Mediterranean?

None of this applies to the Southern European periphery, however defined. The stabilization of Central Eastern and Eastern Europe and the stabilization of the Southern periphery - be it the Maghreb, Egypt, the Israeli-Palestine compound, or the Arab peninsula - are different tasks in structural and political terms. There must not be a competition between Eastern and Southern claimants: Both are important to Europe, albeit in different degrees. Nor should there be competing "Northern" and "Southern" strategies within NATO - and within the EU for that matter -, although the competence, stakes, and attention level of more contiguous countries will naturally differ from that of more distant ones.

It may be useful to compare Europe to the Asian Pacific: As in Europe a former enemy had turned into a close ally of the United States. As in Europe a superpower competition has dominated for decades albeit without the risks inherent in a huge direct military confrontation. As in Europe a country with important potentials was divided also without dividing the region at large. As in Europe the United States were the dominant security manager. But while generalizing the division, integrating the Western half, making the former enemy the center of an integrated structure and superimposing an

institutionalized multinational structure resulted in a European formula for success which eventually led to the overturn of the division, the Asian Pacific region offered little prospect for multi-lateralism, in particular in the military realm. American bilateralism was the dominant pattern, and even on a bilateral base there were at best embryonic versions of common defense organizations.

The end of the Cold War thus was bound to have very different consequences for the region. The U.S. role, while shrinking militarily, became more dominant in the region. China's major role in the decades ahead was increasingly foreshadowed by both, own economic success and the weaknesses of neighboring countries including Japan. Korea and its division moved back into focus and changing attitudes towards Korea reflected the important realignments in the area. Patterns of subregional cooperation in the economic field pointed towards a potential for security consultations. But the absence of a multi-lateral security structure and the dominance of mostly American-led bilateralism is going to prevail for a long time to come in a situation characterized by a latent long-term rivalry, various potentials for subregional conflicts - some with escalatory potentials -, economic competition largely unmitigated by multilateral restraint, the presence of three recognized and several potential nuclear weapons states, vast geographical discontinuities coupled with unreconstructed memories of war atrocities, etc. While the construction of a European security architecture originated in part from the Korean war - with several European countries involved in that war - European experience with security structures has little bearing for the Asian Pacific except for one common basic feature - American bilateralism has become a dominant feature in both regions.

The Asian Pacific and the Southern and Eastern Med have a number of characteristics in common:

- Diversities in culture and statehood reinforced by subregional conflict potentials and several pairs of potential antagonists,
- population growth,
- the presence of several nuclear powers and the availability of other weapons of mass destruction,
- dominant military power of the U.S.,
- weak conduciveness for multilateralism and institutionalization,
- Western vs. Non-Western opposite coasts ("Gegenküsten"): although the Asian-Pacific opposite coast is more distant, however, power projection capabilities on the part of the U.S. are at least as strong in the Asian-Pacific region,
- dominance of subregional patterns of conflict and cooperation,
- generic contingencies for outside intervention and a WMD potential for counter-intervention strategies.

There are, however, also significant differences between the two regions:

- In the Mediterranean the U.S. and Europe, although in a different manner, are present in ways that can shape outcomes. In the Asian Pacific major regional powers exist with China, Japan, Russia and others in addition to the U.S., whereas - economic interests notwithstanding - Europe will at best play a minor role in Asian-Pacific security affairs.
- In the Asian-pacific some of the major industrial centers exist that can impact on a global scale: on the Southern periphery of Europe urbanization will continue, yet without prospects of advanced industrialization.
- in the Asian-Pacific several major powers compete for power and influence in the whole region, and in the longer run great power competition could result in new types

of conflict on a massive scale. In the Mediterranean basin the Atlantic Alliance shares basic attitudes towards the role of their military forces in the region, and except for Greece and Turkey - there exists virtually no potential for direct conflict among members in spite of many possible growing policy differences over specific issues like the Peace Process. Russia has no leverage left to resume its struggle for a major role in the Mediterranean. And, with the possible exception of Turkey, all neighboring states in the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean are vulnerable and too weak to assume a dominant role - ambitions aside.[12]

In short, the Mediterranean deserves increasing attention, but it does not rank in importance with the Asian-Pacific, let alone with Central Eastern and Eastern Europe. What follows from this brief survey?

The Mediterranean region as part of a Western larger whole?

Given that there is no obvious structural concept for the Mediterranean per se or as part of a larger whole, two questions arise in terms of processes between Europe and the Mediterranean. They both pertain to the fact that some interactive processes are taking place which involve more than interests of individual states:

- Are these processes driven by European and U.S. interests to shape the environment in the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean[13] or by anxieties to prepare against possible threats from the Southern periphery?
- To the extent the latter is true, are these concerns focused on flashpoints[14] as part of preventive diplomacy or more broadly on regions from which one hopes to eliminate possible flashpoints - some kind of stabilization policy after all?

The obvious answer to the first is that current interactive processes are driven by a combination of reasons:

- Given that multinational institutions follow a club-logic - i.e., they have a propensity for extensive rather than intensive growth - some members of the European lead organizations pursue an interest in institutional outreach: the Barcelona-process on the part of the EU and the Mediterranean initiative on the part of NATO.[15] Neither is geared toward close institutional links, but both aim at more regular consultative mechanisms. Naturally member states contiguous to the Mediterranean play a more active role or even seek "compensation" for privileged treatments of Central Eastern and Eastern Europe.
- In terms of both selective preferences on the part of the EU and NATO respectively and selective responsiveness, participation of Mediterranean non-members is also limited, at least for the time being.

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[12] The likely scenario underlying Iraq's attack on Kuwait is not likely to apply again in the foreseeable future. Most others are involved in subtle balancing games.

[13] Shaping the environment has become a key concept of the Clinton Administration's strategic policy. In essence it is the replica of a key concept of NSC 68 back in 1950: "Our overall policy may be described as one designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish." (reprinted in Ernest May (Ed.): American Cold War Strategy. Interpreting NSC 68. Boston/New York 1993, p.40)

[14] An analytical framework for assessing future risks in terms of flashpoints has been offered in the 1997 Strategic Assessment by the NDU Institute for Strategic Studies: "Flashpoints and Force Structure," Washington, D.C., 1997, p.11. Four types of flashpoints are being distinguished: 1. major powers, 2. significant regional contingencies, 3. troubled states, and 4. transnational problems.

[15] See F. Stephen Larrabee et al., NATO's Mediterranean Initiative: Policy Issues and Dilemmas. The RAND Corp. DRR-1699-IMD, Santa Monica, September 1997, chapters 2 and 3.

These processes pertain to problem-solving in the Mediterranean, if only at the margin, and to marginal involvement of non-members in activities of European institutions.[16] In the end a free-trade agreement with the EU and some kind of multilateral consultative arrangement beyond ad hocery may come out of that.

The answer to the second is very different indeed:

- some trends, capabilities and strategies not from the region, but from within the region appear increasingly worrisome to European states and in part of the United States: demographic trends with a risk of massive illegitimate immigration into Europe, troubled states like Algeria with similar prospects, the spread of violence within Europe through militant minorities from the region, an increase of terrorism from so-called "rogue-states" or militant fractions, the likely spread of WMDs and ballistic missiles which could reach increasingly large parts of Europe, disruption of trade patterns, and above all subregional conflicts with a potential for dangerous spill-overs.
- Given this emerging situation, some members of the Alliance are actively engaged in efforts to raise the attention level within the Alliance.

The problem is that most potential challenges require non-military responses to the extent they can be dealt with in the first place, and both in terms of possible repercussions and plausible responses the European Union is much more in demand than the Alliance. But the EU is already overburdened with ongoing internal developments and pending enlargement in terms of both resources as well as political attention. The emergence of a coherent and sustainable EU policy to cope with large-scale socio-economic and political issues in the Eastern and Southern Med will thus remain quite limited. Besides the United Sates are not part of it, and even if there existed a CFSP relating to the Med, this would probably tend to exacerbate policy differences with the U.S. on some of the major issues in the region, in particular the Peace Process.

On the other hand, to the extent new military challenges emerge, the United States are indispensable and NATO in some way will need to be the dominant framework for planning and decision-making. This tends to result in fragmented approaches where coping with possible sources of aggression, i.e., socio-economic and political tensions - mostly inside rather than between states - become easily disconnected from policies for coping with challenges that may require military responses. Neither the EU nor NATO are in any way prepared at this stage to generate a comprehensive strategy, and this is so far because of institutional reasons as well as prevailing policy divergences between members, in particular the U.S. and European core countries.

Two kinds of activities can thus be distinguished on the part of the Western lead organizations:

- One is to structure a political process that is bound to be open-ended and non-inclusive for a long time to come, and unless intermediate common objectives requiring commitments on both sides develop - e.g., a free-trade zone - even modest institutionalization will not be within reach. Perceptions of potential unrest and threats my become a driver, but this would tend to emphasize conflicting interests rather than common stakes.
- The other is to enhance crisis prevention - be it by minimizing the sources of potential disarray and conflict through support of sorts, or be it by appropriate measures to be prepared for severe contingencies.

The first is meant to engage partners in the region and to do so with increasing inclusiveness, albeit potentially jeopardized by concerns over threatening contingencies.

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[16] See Larrabee, loc.cit., chapter 5

- NATO force planning continues to shift away from main defense forces in favor of crisis reaction forces which widens NATO's defense perimeter far beyond the binding commitments in Art.s V and VI of the Washington Treaty.
- NATO is making progress with its counter-proliferation policy and while it is not confined to Mediterranean subregions, possible threats emerging from these subregions play a prominent role.
- Given the increasing importance of expeditionary forces in contingencies involving opponents with WMD as a means of blunt interventions, defensive measures as a back up gain in importance including theater ballistic missile defense, and again possible threats from the South and South East play an important role in pending planning decisions.
- In this vain coalition formation policies and coalition strategies (possibly including non-members) become a major concern for the U.S: and gradually for European core countries as well.
- This raises profound issues of military interoperability (let alone shared crisis management policies): Unless European Force modernization tries to minimize the capability gap between U.S. and European forces or at least to prevent it from becoming larger to the point of lacking interoperability or highly undesirable military division of labor, the Alliance will loose much of its leverage at precisely the point in time where new kinds of cooperation are increasingly in demand.

These developments may not provide answers to all of the emerging security risks. The dominantly military planning may not easily be reconciled with political processes. But the Alliance's focus is shifting more strongly to the Mediterranean partly for internal reasons, but reinforced by perceptions of emerging threats from the Mediterranean region.

A lot will depend on whether the United States and Europe, the Alliance and the European Union find more common ground. To do so would be beneficiary for Europe, the United States, and the non-member states in the Mediterranean region. There is no royal way. But the fact that military planning within NATO is bringing the Mediterranean more into focus can eventually mean more than improved preparedness: During the Cold War deterrence and defense were supplemented early on (in fact since NSC 68) by policies of détente. A more coherent military policy towards the Mediterranean region could be conducive also to more intense efforts towards constructive environment shaping. Coping with U.S.-European structural and policy differences will be a key. However, to bring adjustments within the Alliance - and within the EU for that matter - fully to bear, non-members in the Mediterranean region must remain aware of the need to "come into focus on its own merit for European institutions", to quote Solana gain. There is unlikely to be a regional structure, but Mediterranean subregions need to get more organized multilaterally. This is the only way to gain weight other than the disruptive potentials of mass migration, terrorism, and more threatening kinds of violence. The miracle of the end of the Cold War inspired hope. But it took four decades of sustained effort and sacrifice to make it happen.

The other aims at crisis prevention through supportive sacrifices or unilateral preparations.

Both will link Europe and the Alliance more closely to the Eastern and Southern Med, but this does not in itself make growing portions of these Mediterranean subregions part of the Western "whole". While the two types of activities point in different directions in terms of commitments, resources, responsibilities, stakes, time horizons, etc., in the end political process, to become constructive, requires effective crisis prevention, and enhanced crisis prevention will require political process. But it is important to recognize the divergences between the two and the intrinsic difficulties to generate comprehensive policies and strategies.

A more coherent Mediterranean policy as a spill-over from internal adjustments?

No structural concept seems to exist as a basis for a coherent approach to the Mediterranean region - be it as a strategic whole, as a security region in a broader sense or as part of a larger whole. Similarly interactive processes which are underway are fragmented, if not countervailing, and they are thus unlikely to result in a coherent political process driven by common objectives and eventually in some significant contractual basis in a foreseeable future.

Given the response side of these interactive processes, there is, however, a third approach that deserves due consideration: Internal adjustments and structural developments within both the EU and the Atlantic Alliance can result in common policies, if not new rationales, which establish a much stronger role of either within the Mediterranean region. To take the NATO case, a number of rather profound changes are underway and many of those are expected to be completed at the time of the Washington Summit in April 1999, i.e., of the 50th anniversary:

- NATO will increasingly undergo institutional changes in response to the emerging role of the EU, the uncertain role of the U.S. in the longer run, enlargement, the implications of the PJC, the growing importance of peace operations and other non-Art. V-missions, etc., and this is likely to broaden the scope of NATO not in the direction of globalisation, but with increasing attention to adjacent regions including the Mediterranean.
- NATO has decided to develop a new strategic concept, and strategic concerns and options at the Southern periphery will play a more prominent role than in the 1991 concept.
- NATO's command structure is undergoing rather profound changes. The Strategic Command Europe will exist of two Regional Commands RC North and RC South with two service commands (air and sea) in Naples and four joint subregional commands (JSRC) in Larissa (Center-South), Izmir (South-East), Madrid (South-West), and Verona (South).[17] These new commands will be mutually supportive and more flexible. They could easily apply to the whole Mediterranean region, if the need arises - in support of endangered countries or to cope with emerging threats.
- The strategic policy of core members of the Alliance is gradually moving in the direction of increased preparedness in the Mediterranean region. Given previous German hesitancy, the cautious shift in German strategic policy may be particularly telling.

[17] Klaus Naumann, Die neue militärische Kommandostruktur der NATO, NATO-Brief 1/1998, page 10-14

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THE CHANGING MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: A TRANS-ATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE

Ian O. Lesser[1]

DRAFT

The Mediterranean is set to become more important to the U.S. as well as Europe, and more central to transatlantic relations. But many political and intellectual obstacles will need to be overcome for a more concerted approach to Mediterranean security. The essence of the transatlantic interest in addressing the region's problems will be the wider interest of relatively secure, wealthy societies in managing relations with far less secure, less develped societies on their periphery. At the same time, states along the southern shores of the Mediterranean will seek means of addressing their own security challenges, both internal and external. Their successs or failure will have increasingly direct meaning for European security and the nature of the U.S. engagement in and around the Mediterranean.

The Mediterranean security environment is changing in important ways. This analysis discusses the evolving significance of the region from an American perspective, and describes three different models for conceptualizing Mediterranean security, each of which highlights important dimensions of change as well as differences in perspective among European, U.S. and southern Mediterranean observers.

Origins of the U.S. Approach

Only very recently have Mediterranean questions become a fashionable part of the American foreign policy debate, and their importance remains limited. This is not because the U.S. lacks interests in the region -- far from it. Nor is it because Washington has no tradition of engagement there -- the presence in the Mediterranean long pre-dates the U.S. involvement in continental Europe. The U.S. is actively engaged in and around the post-Cold

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[1]Ian Lesser is a Senior Analyst at RAND, Santa Monica. The views expressed here are the author's and do not necesarily reflect those of RAND or its research sponsors.

War Mediterranean, partly as a consequence of being both a European and a Middle Eastern power, and partly because the Mediterranean is the scene of crises, potential crises and initiatives of concern to policymakers. From Algeria to the Aegean, and from the Balkans to the Middle East peace process, the region's problems place important, perhaps even disproportionate demands on America's foreign policy leadership.

Nonetheless, one will search in vain for any explicit, official U.S. reference to a "Mediterranean policy" as the term has come to be used in Europe. U.S. officials and most American observers do not speak of policy toward the Mediterranean as a whole because the U.S. lacks the specific intellectual tradition (largely a product of France Italy and Spain, even within the EU) for doing so. Intellectually, and not least bureaucratically, American foreign policy decisionmakers and analysts, as well as scholars, have tended to think rigidly in terms of "European" and "Middle Eastern" affairs, with North Africa as a minor subset of the latter. In sum, there is little consciousness of the Mediterranean as a coherent geo-strategic space.

Indeed, the notion of Mediterranean policy and Mediterranean initiatives has had negative connotations in some quarters. During the Cold War, Mediterranean initiatives, especially in the security sphere, came to be associated in the American view with Gaullist and non-aligned concepts of the "Mediterranean for the Mediterraneans," or even naval arms control, all of which implied limitations on American freedom of action. Some of this uneasiness remains, and may be seen in the preference for security approaches in the region to be organized from NATO southward, rather than on a global CSCM-like basis.[2] This may also reflect a more general U.S. intellectual preference for the concrete over the theoretical.

The compartmentalization of American policymaking into quite separate European and Middle Eastern spheres (the Middle East peace process is further isolated as an activity of its own) has also made Europe's Mediterranean initiatives, above all the Barcelona process, difficult to digest and difficult for U.S. diplomacy to support with enthusiasm. The European bureau of the State Department and others concerned with European policy remain firmly fixed on the priority areas of consolidating the transitions in eastern and central Europe and the process of NATO enlargement. Issues

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[2]In the early 1990's, Spain and Italy led an active debate on the merits of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM).

bearing on the future of Europe emanating from the south are often regarded as marginal and distracting. Consideration surounding the articulation of a new strategic concept for the Alliance, and challenges in the Balkans and in and around Turkey, are weakening this tendency, but have not entirely reversed it.

At the same time, those responsible for policy toward the Middle East tend to regard Mediterranean initiatives as code for a greater European role in the Middle East peace process -- a prospect few see as desirable. Mediterranean diplomacy appears as a complicating rather than complimentary factor, especially given current Arab-Israeli tensions and the stalemate in negotiations. More simply, the strict division along European and Middle Eastern lines, both inside the government and among non-government experts, leaves cross-cutting Mediterraean questions in a vacuum. Mediterranean approaches have few, if any, structural advocates in the formal foreign policy process.

American foreign policy over the last decade has come to focus heavily on functional rather than regional issues and objectives (e.g., economic reform, "democratic enlargement"). Some of the most prominent functional concerns, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, migration and refugees, the environment and transnational crime, and human rights, are also key issues for the Mediterranean region. This has had the effect of focussing additional attention on Turkey, the Levant and North Africa. But the general tendency in American foreign policy circles has been to cast these functional concerns in global terms. Increased interest in the Mediterranean is simply a by-product.

Regional attitudes have also contributed to American ambivalence about a more explicit Mediterranean policy. Quite apart from the Gaullist and non-aligned legacies noted above, the Euro-Mediterranean partnership has never been presented as an initiative with a natural transatlantic dimension. In security as well as economic terms, the Mediterranean has emerged as a theatre of special interest for EU and WEU activity, in part because these are the out-of-area roles NATO has left for European attention.[3] Even a symbolic U.S. role as "observer" in Barcelona was controversial and ultimately

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[3]For example, planning and exercises for EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR have focused heavily on Mediterranean, especially North African contingencies.

impossible to arrange. European attitudes were not uniform on this question, with, for example, greater interest in Spain than in France.

The absence of a U.S. role in the Barcelona process was a result of both proximate and more fundamental realities. In proximate terms, U.S. participation was doomed by the lack of strong advocates on the European side, together with Washington's own reluctance to express support for the initiative until the "eleventh hour." More fundamentally, real U.S. involvement in Barcelona could only come about as a result of a broader transatlantic bargain on mutual participation in regional initiatives, including U.S.-led activities of concern to Europe, e.g., in the Western Hemisphere or the Middle East peace process. No such bargain exists, and the desirability of developing one remains controversial on both sides of the Atlantic. Indeed, the entire question of political and economic relations in the Mediterranean, especially relations with North Africa, has come to be viewed by the U.S. as a legitimate sphere for European leadership. Even in the security arena -- where the U.S. remains a preeminent actor -- "soft" security issues (e.g., migration) continue to be seen as the natural preserve of the EU.

Strategic Stakes and the Prospects for a More Deliberate Approach

There is little in recent history to suggest the emergence of an explicit American policy toward the Mediterranean or a formal role for the U.S. in exisiting Mediterranean initiatives outside the security sphere. This could change as a result of several factors, including the growth of U.S. stakes in the region as a whole.

First, at a time of considerable interest in refashioning U.S. engagement in Europe as a relevant, European power, Europe's own concerns about the "south" take on new importance. To an extent, the Mediterranean matters to the U.S. because it matters to Europe. If southern European countries are uneasy about the longer-term implications of migration, spill-overs of political instability and new energy dependencies for their prosperity and security, this is inevitably reflected in bilateral discussions. It has also had the effect of introducing a Mediterranean initiative in NATO. None of this can be ignored by the U.S., and has had an effect on transatlantic agendas. To the extent that NATO enlargement proceeds smoothly, and the Alliance begins to take up a "post-Madrid" agenda, Mediterranean issues will likely receive

more attention. If five or six European allies press for greater attention to the Mediterranean, this has some significance. If this call is taken up by other leading, non-Mediterranean allies (e.g., Britain, Germany) it will have far greater importance for Washington. Inclusion of France in this equation already gives Mediterranean questions far greater weight.

The crisis in Algeria provides an example. U.S. interests in regional stability are influenced by the turmoil in Algeria, but the U.S. stake in Algeria is indirect and far less pronounced than that of Europe. Notwithstanding enduring French suspicions about independent U.S. motives in relation to Algeria, the primary and perhaps the only compelling aspect of the crisis for the U.S. concerns its potential effect on Europe. For the U.S., Algeria is a transatlantic rather than a regional issue. Washington has been as reluctant as the EU in contemplating any serious political intervention in Algeria. Yet, Algeria has for some time been an important topic of discussion with France, Spain and Italy. If NATO and the EU move to strengthen transatlantic cooperation in the Mediterranean, the spectre of Algerian chaos will be a strong, contributing factor.

Second, the Mediterranean matters to the U.S. because of its link to wider interests in the Middle East and Eurasia. In periods of success for the the Middle East peace process, the Mediterranean dimension became important, not least because it allowed moderate actors such as Morocco and Tunisia to contribute. This activism of smaller Arab states in North Africa, as well as the Persian Gulf, was evident in the multilateral negotiations (e.g., in ACRS and REDWG), and in the Casablanca economic conference.[4] There has been a persistent American interest in broadening as well as deepening the constituency for Arab-Israeli peace -- to look beyond the disputes on Israel's borders -- and this continues to include a Mediterranean dimension. The current period of stagnation in the peace process complicates the outlook for several Mediterranean initiatives, including NATO's efforts at cooperation with southern states. The burgeoning Turkish-Israeli cooperation introduces a new, Mediterranean factor, and suggests the possibility of wider Turkish-Israeli-Jordanian-U.S. strategic cooperation.

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[4]The Arms Control and Regioal Security (ACRS) talks and the Regional Economic Development Working Group (REDWG).

Conceptualizing Mediterranean Security: Three Models

During the Cold War, transatlantic perspectives on the Mediteranean focused on the notion of NATO's "Southern Region"; a concept that had less to do with objective security problems, than with the political and geographic distinctiveness of NATO's five southern members. The sense of risk, including the risk of Soviet aggression, was low in relation to that in the center of Europe. To the extent that NATO Europe worried about the problem of coupling security interests across the Atlantic, southern European countries had the additional concern of how to link their own more diffuse security concerns to wider Alliance strategy -- a problem of double coupling. The risk of Soviet adventurism on NATO's southern periphery, and extensive bilateral cooperation with the U.S., provided the necessary basis for cohesion, but on the whole, NATO's southern region remained marginal in political and security terms.

It is a mark of the difficulty of portraying the Mediterranean as an area of strategic consequence in its own right that post-Cold War approaches also tend to couple the region to other facets of international security, both regional and functional. Three models for conceptualizing the Mediterranean in security terms stand out in today's debate. First, the region is increasingly seen as "Europe's near abroad". Second, it can be described as an ante-room to more "global" concerns in the Middle East, the Gulf and beyond. Finally, the Mediterranean is a prominent arena for north-south conflict and cooperation. Each model has something to contribute, and each plays a role in shaping regional intiatives. Significantly, these models also illustrate important differences in European, American and southern Mediterranean perceptions.

The Mediterranean as Europe's Near Abroad

Much as Russia has come to identify critical security interests on its immediate periphery, Western discussion of security in and around Europe is increasingly focused on challenges emanating from south, both across the Mediterranean in North Africa and the Levant, and in the contiguous south, above all the Balkans. The crises in Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo have encouraged an expanded conception of the European security space. Although engagement in the Balkans remains out-of-area for NATO, it is

arguable that the management of security problems in the Balkans is no longer really seen as out-of-area in all but a narrow, technical sense. Alliance policy toward Bosnia, and more recently Kosovo, has changed the way decisionmakers and publics perceive crises on the European periphery. The Western European Union has also come to focus on this near-abroad, including the Maghreb, as a natural sphere of activity, and initiatives such as EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR have had an implicit southern vocation. Indeed, many observers in the south express their concern that WEU efforts are oriented toward intervention across the Mediterranean.

The security problems of Europe's Mediterranean periphery are highly diverse, and fill a spectrum from intangible threats to identity and prosperity -- above all, the highly politicized issue of economic migration and refugees -- to more tangible concerns about internal security, including crime, drugs and spillovers of political violence from North Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans. [5] Much discussion about Mediterranean security rightly centers on so-called "soft security", especially in relation to the western and central Mediterranean where social, political and economic challenges predominate. As the EU seeks greater competence in addressing "Third Pillar" problems, additional attention will inevitably be focused on Europe's Mediterranean periphery where these challenges abound.

At the far end of this risk spectrum are concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery at ever increasing ranges.[6] The proliferation risk is especially meaningful for Europe because it implies a growing exposure to the consequences of conflicts beyond Europe but near enough to engage European interests. Ultimately, proliferation trends can imply an end to European sanctuary in relation to crises as far away as the Gulf, or as near as the Balkans.[7] This exposure also has the potential to complicate security cooperation between Washington and southern Europe.

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[5]See Alessandro Politi, *European Security: The New Transnational Risks* , Chaillot Paper 29 (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, October 1997).

[6]See Ian Lesser and Ashley Tellis, *Strategic Exposure: Proliferation Around the Mediterranean* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996).

[7]Much attention has been focused on missile and WMD capabilities in North Africa and the Middle East, but it is also worth noting potential missile risks emanating from the Balkans. It is not beyond consideration that an isolated, aggressive regime in the Balkans could chose to respond to Western intervention in an "assymetric" fashion, for example, holding Rome at risk to deter attacks on Belgrade.

Many regional risks are of a more traditional sort. Western and Central Europe now offer few serious examples of irredentism and territorial flux. But the Mediterranean near-abroad has a concentration of potential threats to borders. Europe and the United States will have a strong interest in asuring the territorial integrity of states on the periphery and a systemic interest in preventing the use of force to change established borders. This concern is an important part of the Western calculus in the Balkans in the wake of the Bosnian experience, as well as in the Caucasus. In North Africa, where internal security is a first-order concern, the conventional defense of borders is still an important factor. Potential conflicts between Morocco and Algeria, Libya and Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, Egypt and Sudan, all imply a likely Western concern about the security of borders as well as regimes.[8]

Energy security is emerging as another important issue shaping the security environment in Europe's Mediterranean near-abroad. This concern is, of course, longstanding and has waxed and waned with changes in the oil market and developments in the Persian Gulf. Most recently, it has become fashionable to speak of the Caspian as another Gulf, with all the economic and geopolitical significance this implies. The actual significance of the region in energy terms, and as a sphere of geopolitical competition, is still open to question.[9] Expanding European gas imports from North Africa may be a more important and direct concern. Southern Europe and Turkey are increasingly dependent on gas supplies from North Africa and Eurasia, respectively. The capacity for the transport of gas acrosss the Mediterranean has expanded significantly over the past few years, with increases in capacity of the Transmed pipeline and the opening of the trans-Maghreb line linking Algeria, Morocco and Spain. Russia has emerged as a Turkey's leading trade partner, largely on the basis of large-scale gas imports.

Unlike oil, gas trade remains a regional rather than global market, and offers fewer opportunities for adjustment in the face of supply interruptions. Southern Europe's dependence on North African gas is therefore likely to be a "permanently operating factor" in future Mediterranean geopolitics, and is

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[8]The Gafsa incident of 1980 illustrated the French, U.S. and Italian commitment to the territorial integrity of Tunisia in the face of a small-scale Libyan incursion.

[9]For example, unclassified CIA analyses suggests a significant but relatively modest role for Caspian production in world energy supply.

already influencing security perceptions in diverse ways. In particular, concern over gas supply has played a role in French and southern European views of the crisis in Algeria. [10] At the same time, it is arguable that new, cross-border energy links across the Mediterranean and along the North African littoral, can foster economic interdependence and, perhaps, a shared stake in regional stability.

The "near-abroad" model can be discerned in much of the current discussion about how the Mediterranean will be treated in future NATO strategy. There is probably a consensus within the Alliance on the need to adjust strategy and missions to meet more likely challenges on the periphery. Yet some states, notably France, will be reluctant to singularize the Mediterranean as an area of strategic concern, either because NATO is not seen as the appropriate vehicle, or for fear of provoking a negative reaction from the south A general tendency toward conservatism in Alliance behavior suggests that the new NATO strategic concept will place additional focus on the Mediterranean, but will do so in functional terms. That is, rather than articulating a specific strategy for the Mediterranean *per se*, the strategic concept will likely highlight new functional missions for the Alliance such as countering terrorism and proliferation risks, and building the capacity for peacekeeping and crisis management. These missions are, however, most likely to be conducted on the Mediterranean periphery rather than in central and eastern Europe. The net result will almost certainly be a more southward-looking alliance.

In the eastern Mediterranean, the strategic environment is being shaped (distorted may be a more accurate term) by two persistent disputes with important implications for European security. First, the Greek-Turkish dispute is perhaps Europe's most dangerous flashpoint. There may be little strategic rationale for conflict in Athens or Ankara, but the complex of issues and the on-going military brinksmanship poses the risk of an accidental clash.[11] A serious military confrontation would imply enromous risks for

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[10]Early fears of energy supply interrurptions have not materialized. Despite the crisis in Algeria, European and American firms continue to invest in new oil, gas and pipeline activities, and the country's energy infrastructure has been relatively untouched by the violence.

[11]The Imia-Kardak crisis of 1995 illustrated the potential for conflict and escalation even in the absence of a deliberate, aggressive strategy. It is arguable that policymakers on both sides

both sides, and might well result in the permanent estrangement of Turkey from European and Atlantic institutions. The example of a conflict between two NATO allies would deal a blow to the processes of Alliance enlargement and adaptation, and could de-stabilize the larger southeastern periphery, from the Balkans to the Caucasus.

Beyond the problem of Greek-Turkish relations, security in the eastern Mediterranean will be strongly affected by the future character of the relationship between Turkey and the West. Turkey's role in relation to Europe is increasingly uncertain. Traditional notions of Ankara's position as a "bridge" between between Europe and the Middle East, or even a "barrier" against instability on Europe's periphery, are being overtaken by Western perceptions of a troubled Turkey with a more assertive and independent foreign and security policy. The Luxembourg summit decisions regarding Turkey's bid for EU membership, and perhaps more significantly, the subsequent tone of the dialogue on all sides, has reinforced the idea of Turkish "otherness" -- part of the European system, but unlikely to become a formal member of Europe. Ankara can be a key actor in the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Caucasus-Central Asia. But the deterioration of the relationship with Europe has dimmed the prospects for a cooperative approach in these important areas of EU and transatlantic interest.

The Arab-Israeli dispute is the second critical influence on security in the eastern Mediterranean, and to a important degree, across the Mediterranean periphery as a whole. Europe has become more actively engaged in the post-Oslo peace process, especially in the economic dimension. EU interests are now more closely bound up with the prospects for peace. In "hard" security terms, Europe is exposed to potential spillovers from renewed Arab-Israeli confrontation, most obviouly in relation to terrorism and proliferation risks. In diplomatic and economic terms, lack of progress in the peace process has had a variety of negative effects on initiatives important to Europe, and especially southern Europe, from the Euro-Mediterranean partnership to NATO's Mediterranean Initiative.[12] The gap between Europe's growing stake in Middle Eastern outcomes and its relatively limited

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simply lost control of the situation in the face of assertive media and strong public opinion pressures.

[12]On the Euro-Mediterranean implications, see Stephen C. Calleya, "The Euro-Mediterranean Process After Malta: What Prospects?", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 2, No.2, Autumn 1997.

role in the peace process is set to emerge as an even more contentious issue in transatlantic relations. Washington's continuing discomfort with the notion of a more active European role in the process is inevitably a factor in the EU's own ambivalent attitude toward U.S. involvement in its Mediterranean policies.

The Mediterranean as Strategic Waypoint

An alternative approach to the Mediterranean emphasizes the region's importance as a waypoint to areas of perceived vital interest further afield. This idea is not new, and is in fact a traditional way of describing the strategic significance of the Mediterranean in the West. Over the last century, the region, especially the eastern basin and its hinterlands, has been seen, variously, as a crucial link to the Persian Gulf and India, and as a means of outflanking dominant continental powers. [13]

Since 1945, and with even greater emphasis since 1990, the concept of the Mediterranean as a logisitical ante-room to the Persian Gulf has been particularly prominent among American strategists and policymakers. The ability to project military power to the Gulf in a timely fashion depends critically on the lines of air and sea communication through the Mediterranean (lines that run from across the Atlantic, through the Azores and southern Europe to Suez, as well as Turkey in the north). Some 90 percent of the troops and materiel sent to the Gulf during the Gulf War passed through or above the Mediterranean. Recent deployments to the Gulf have only underscored the importance of this link. As a result, the character of U.S. political relationships around the Mediterranean exerts a strong influence on U.S. freedom of action beyond the Mediterranean basin. If, for example, public opinion in Egypt compels Cairo to withold transit for Western naval forces through the Suez Canal, this will have an immediate and costly effect on the ability to respond to crises in the Gulf or the Horn of Africa. Should Suez be unavailable to the West in a future Gulf crisis, the politically sensitive burden of access and overflight might fall even more heavily on NATO's southern members.

The notion of the Mediterranean as a strategic waypoint has been further reinforced by the issue of Caspian oil. Although the contribution of

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[13]See Jeremy Black, *War and the World: Military Power and the Fate of Continents,* 1450-2000 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

Caspian oil to world supply over the next decades may be modest in relation to Persian Gulf production, it has become fashionable among Western analysts to speculate about the new security demands arising from the Caucasus and Central Asia.[14] Much of the new Eurasian oil production will come to world markets via the Mediterranean, either through the Black Sea or by pipeline across Turkey (if the proposed Baku-Ceyhan route is built). This will augment the already important role of the Mediterranean as a terminus for Gulf and North African energy supplies, and it will likely bind together even more firmly the economic and security futures of areas adjacent to the Mediterranean. The West's ability to project power around the Caspian basin and the Caucasus in defense of energy security interests will turn on access to the Black Sea and cooperation with key regional states, most notably Turkey.

The Mediterranean-Eurasian link is not new, since much of the Mediterranean's Cold War importance flowed from its role as a theater of East-West competition. The prospect of new overland and Black Sea routes for Caspian oil, and the revival of overland transport links from the Balkans to Central Asia and the Levant suggests a growing economic, political and even security connection between these regions. Since 1945, few in the U.S. or elsewhere have focused on the geopolitical implications of these links. Today, the growing attention to these issues is striking and reminiscent of strategic debates in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. [15]

This aspect of the strategic evolution of the Mediterranean also raises the question of Russia's role and behavior. Russia continues to have a strong economic stake in trade relationships and shipping routes through the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and Suez.[16] Russian political and security interests are engaged in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Levant. As a legacy of the Cold War era, Moscow retains close diplomatic relationships with key states in the region, and some of these ties (e.g., with Serbia , Greece and Cyprus) have

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[14]A conservative estimate suggests that Caspian oil will constitute perhaps six percent of total world supply by 2010. Less attention has been paid to the Caspian role in gas supply, where the regional contribution may be far higher.

[15] See, for example, Geoffrey Kemp and Robert E. Harkavy, *Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1997). This and other recent analyses are very much in the tradition of writing surrounding the Berlin-Baghdad railway project prior to the First World War.

[16]See Nicolai A. Kovalsky, ed., *Europe, the Mediterranean, Russia: Perception of Strategies* (Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences/Interdialect, 1998)

actually deepened in recent years. In military terms, Russia is no longer present in the Mediterranean in any meaningful way. There is no standing Russian naval presence in the Mediterranean, and Russia no longer shares a border with NATO in the Caucasus. But the post-Cold War environment presents new opportunities for conflict and cooperation with Russia on Europe's periphery.

Russia may share a basic interest in stability on its southern periphery, but its sensitivity to separatist tendencies may give rise to policies at variance with Western approaches, especially in the Caucasus (e.g., Chechnya). In the Balkans, Orthodox affinities will be a motivating factor, as in the close relationship between Moscow, Belgrade, and Athens. Elsewhere, in North Africa, the Levant and the Middle East, Moscow's arms and technology transfers, both conventional and unconventional, have emerged as a source of concern. These include sales to Iran, Syria and Libya. The transfer of SA-300 surface-to-air missiles to Cyprus has been particularly controversial. It remains unclear whether, as some observers assert, active Russian diplomacy and arms sales around the Mediterranean are evidence of a deliberate "peripheral strategy" aimed at exerting influence in areas of concern to the West outside the center of Europe.[17] In the worst case, an assertive, nationalist Russia might chose to confront the West through proxies in the Mediterranean and the Gulf. More realistically, Russian relations with the West across the region may be characterized by a mixture of conflict and cooperation based on perceptions of key interests in the Russian and European near-abroads.[18]

European observers and decisionmakers are, in broad terms, less comfortable than their American counterparts with a model of the Mediterranean as strategic waypoint, or with what is essentially a power-projection model for the Mediterranean. Southern Mediterranean opinion is even more strongly negative. As noted earlier, European forays in this area, such as those undertaken under WEU auspices, have been more narrowly drawn, and concerned with the ability to conduct limited humanitarian and

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[17]This interpretation of Russian behavior is especially common among Turkish observers, who worry that Ankara will be left alone to face a more assertive Russian policy on NATO's flank.
[18]An example would be the recent proposal to form a joint Russian-Turkish crisis response force for the Caucasus.

crisis management operations on the European doorstep, in the Maghreb or the Balkans. Europe has a limited capacity for power projection, mostly French and British, and has displayed a selective willingness to participate in interventions beyond the continent. But Europe as a whole is reluctant to allow power-projection needs to drive strategy toward the Mediterranean, especially if these needs complicate political and economic relations with near neighbors in North Africa. To the extent that the American military presence in southern Europe and the Mediterranean becomes more heavily oriented toward power projection further afield, this tension in transatlantic approaches to the region may deepen.

Finally, the Mediterranean has emerged as a political as well as logistical way point in the context of the debate over NATO adaptation and the future of transatlantic cooperation. Those, mainly in the U.S., who argue for a more "global" conception of Atlantic cooperation, with an expansive defintion of alliance areas of responsibility, tend to view more active security engagement in the Mediterranean as a natural step toward globalization. If Europe and the U.S. can routinely cooperate in more than an ad hoc fashion to manage crises on Europe's southern periphery, the prospects for closer cooperation in areas further afield, in the Gulf and beyond, may be more promising.[19]

The Mediterranean as a North-South Arena

A third model for understanding the Mediterranean security environment emphasizes the region's significance as a place where differing cultures, political systems and levels of economic development meet. This is largely, although not exclusively, a question of relations between north and south, between "haves" and "have nots", and between relatively secure societies and their relatively insecure counterparts across the Mediterranean.

The question of whether the Mediterranean unites or divides, acts as a bridge or a barrier, is a perennial one, and has inspired sharply differing answers. The Braudelian tradition emphasizes the historic unity of the Mediterranean in cultural, economic and geopolitical terms.[20] In this

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[19]See David C. Gompert and F. Stephen Larrabee, eds., *America and Europe: A Partnership for a New Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press/RAND, 1997).

[20]Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972, originally published 1949).

conception, the most significant divide -- including in security terms -- has been between the Mediterranean littoral and the hinterland. In an era of modern communications, including the global disemination of information, it is doubtful that this distinction still holds. Indeed the process of "globalization" calls into question the entire notion of "bridges" in international relations. If information, capital and people can move easily and rapidly with little reference to borders, and if ballistic missiles can reach across traditional theaters, the idea of geographic bridges loses much of its meaning. Yet, a number of states around the Mediterranean continue to define their strategic significance in these terms. Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Greece and Cyprus are leading examples.

An alternative tradition treats the Mediterranean as a theater of civilizational conflict. Samuel Huntington's analysis of the "clash of civilizations" and the prominent Mediterranean cleavage between Islam and the West illustrates this approach. Critics of his analysis often imply that it is a modern distortion in the same vein as Arnold Toynbee, but in reality the Huntingtonian thesis is part of a very old, even ancient tradition in which civilizations to the south (or the east) are seen as the "other" and a source of insecurity in the Mediterranean world. [21] The mixed history of confrontation and coexistence across civilizational and geographic lines around the Mediterranean is suggested by the original use of the term "cold war" to describe relations between Spain and the Ottoman Empire. Simple geopolitical divisions are unlikely to prove a useful guide to understanding the security environment given the variety of cleavages along both the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. The complexity of EU politics and the sharp differences between key states in the Muslim world on Europe's periphery illustrate this point.[22]

The potential for civilizational and developmental frictions in the contemporary Mediterranean to fuel security risks has been a leading force behind various regional initiatives and national policies. There has been a growing recognition, especially in the wake of the Gulf War, of security challenges along north-south lines. With few exceptions, these challenges

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[21]See the discussion of ancient Greek and later European thinking about the Orient in Thierry Hentsch, *Imagining the Middle East* (New York: Black Rose Books, 1992) ; and Bernard Lewis, *The Muslim Discovery of Europe* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1982).

[22]See Martin Lewis and Karen Wigen, *The Myth of Continents* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1997).

are more accurately portrayed as the north-south spillovers of conflicts in the south.[23] Terrorist activity by Algerians in France or Kurdish separatists in Germany are examples. Similarly, the proliferation of weapons of mass detruction and ballistic missiles along the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean is, for the moment, driven mainly by the struggle for regional weight in the south. In both cases, Europe is exposed, but in a secondary fashion. Regime changes and the radicalization of opinion in the south could alter this equation for the future. Europe and the U.S. therefore face the difficult task of hedging against security risks in the south without provoking an aggressive response across the Mediterranean (i.e., without encouraging new Libyas).

This tension between defense and dialogue is evident in NATO's evolving approach to the Mediterranean. The Alliance has developed a Mediterranean initiative aimed at promoting dialogue with selected non-member countries in the south -- Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel and Jordan.[24] The addition of further states, such as Algeria, is possible, but highly controversial. The emphasis has been on information, education and north-south confidence building of a generalized sort. More significant contributions in the confidence-building area are constrained by the essentially bilateral, or more accurately, multi-bilateral nature of the Initiative. Arab-Israeli tensions make the development of a true multilateral process difficult, and prevent the Initiative from engaging in meaningful confidence-building activities along south-south lines. The "political and security partnership" envisioned in the EU's Barcelona Declaration, as well as the WEU and OSCE dialogue efforts, face similar constraints in the confidence-building realm. [25]

At the same time, NATO and to a lesser extent the WEU, are concerned with bolstering Western capabilities for defense against "hard" security risks emanating from the south. Proliferation is the leading concern, and more

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[23]An exception is the potential for conflict between Spain and Morocco over the future of the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. If Turkish estrangement from Europe continues to deepen, Greco-Turkish friction may also acquire a more palpable north-south dimension.

[24]*See F. Stephen Larrabee, Jerrold Green, Ian Lesser and Michele Zanini, NATO's Mediterranean Initiative: Policy Issues and Dilemmas* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1998); and Pedro Moya, *NATO's Role in the Mediterranean* (Brussels: North Atlantic Assembly, Mediterranean Special Group Report, 1997).

[25]See Claire Spencer, "Building Confidence in the Mediterranean", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 2, No.2, Autumn 1997.

active efforts to address ballistic missile and other threats along south-north lines can complicate north-south relations. Sensitivity here is evident, especially among some of the southern European states most directly exposed to proliferation risks. Spain and Greece, for example, are wary of "counter-proliferation" strategies that envision preemptive action by the U.S. or NATO against proliferators. Improved ballistic missile defenses are less controversial, but imply daunting costs. There is also a presumption in some quarters that American systems will always be available for this purpose in the event of a crisis. In general, and with some exceptions (e.g., Turkey) the European preference is for an emphasis on diplomatic approaches to limit southern capabilities, together with north-south dialogue to address the uncertainty of southern intentions.

The northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean differ sharply in terms of the security institutions available to manage regional and trans-regional risks. The Euro-Atlantic area has a surfeit of architecture and instutions of varying competence to address security problems. The Middle East, including the southern Medietrranean, lacks any effective architecture for this purpose beyond informal alliances and external guarantees. In the absence of any real security architecture, even modest institutions for regional dialogue (e.g., the Mediterranean Forum, EUROMESCO) have an important role to play in promoting transparency in security perceptions among societies with very different strategic cultures. Societies in the south are not only less secure, but also tend to define security in different terms, with a far greater emphasis on internal security. In northern capitals, for example, the issue of Islamism is often seen in the context of human rights and political reform, whereas southern Meditrerranean leaderships are inclined to view Islamic oppositions as a security threat.

Progress toward a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace might facilitate the creation of security instutions for the south -- whether Middle Eastern or Mediterranean in focus. In the absence of this, and with the erosion of Cold War era alignments, states in the south may find it worthwhile to build closer relationships with capable European and Atlantic institutions -- above all the EU and NATO -- a tendency that might be described as "borrowed" security.[26]

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[26]Some Israelis have long argued that their security interests are best served through alignment with existing Euro-Atlantic institutions rather than participation in new, regional security initiatives.

At a minimum, regional states are seeking to vary the geometry of their foreign and security policies. The Turkish-Israeli strategic relationship provides a striking example, as do Israeli and Egyptian efforts to develop a more active political relationship with the European Union. A more developed NATO approach to the Mediterranean could provide another vehicle for diversifying southern security ties, although this will require considerable progress in reforming NATO's image among publics, and many elites, in the Arab world. [27]

Outiside the narrow security realm, the EU's Barcelona process has emerged as the leading instrument for engagement along north-south lines in the Mediterranean. In the broadest sense, European approaches to the Mediterranean are being shaped by the desire to promote economic development and stability on Europe's poor and increasingly populous periphery. [28] The Euro-Mediterranean partnership initiative is in large measure an attempt to "subsidize" stability across the Mediterranean, or more realistically, to create the conditions for future investment and development.[29] The initiative recognizes the reality that Europe will continue to be the critical economic partner, and a leading factor in development prospects, for states across the Mediterranean. The desire to foster prosperity and stability, and to limit migration pressure from the south has obvious parallels in the U.S. attitude toward Latin America and the Caribbean -- Washington's own "south", and a traditional area of policy regard.

The south also faces considerable challenges in the management of its relations with the north, and with Western institutions. A wider trade and investment relationship with Europe implies a need for economic reform, and very likely a degree of political reform, with implications for stability and the future of existing regimes. Growing European restrictions on migration threaten a longstanding economic and social safety-valve in North Africa,

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[27]The severity of this perceptual problem is described in Larrabee et al., *NATO's Mediterranean Initiative,;* see , in particular, chapter 4, "Perspectives of the Dialogue Countries".

[28]See John Van Oudenaren, ed., *Employment, Economic Development and Migration in Southern Europe and the Maghreb,* Conference Proceedings (RAND/Luso-American Development Foundation/Fundacion BBV, 1996).

[29]The funding goals are modest in relation to EU programs aimed at central and eastern Europe, and represent a small fraction of the EU's spending on cohesion programs for its own southern European members.

where regimes are already facing tremendous domestic challenges. Even if longer-term EU efforts to encourage prosperity in the south are successful, the political consequences are far from clear. As the Moroccan and Turkish cases suggest, higher growth rates are not necessarily a recipe for stability where income disparities are pronounced.

The societies on Europe's periphery are also increasingly aware of developments affecting the security of immigrants within Europe, as well as Muslim communities in the Balkans and elswhere. Perceived Western indifference to the fate of Bosnia's Muslims has left a lasting impression in North Africa and the Middle East. Future Western policy on the Balkans, as well as toward the Arab-Israeli dispute and the Persian Gulf , will inevitably have an effect on southern atitudes towards Euro-Atlantic institutions. The effect of public opinion along the southern shores of the Mediterranean on the behavior of leaderships during the Gulf War provides a potent illustration of the forces acting on regimes in the region.

Some of the most pressing hard and soft security challenges around the Mediterranean cut *across* north-south lines. Some risks, such as terrorism, international crime, refugee flows, and some forms of environmental degradation are inherently transnational, and may require a degree of north-south cooperation if they are to be effectively addressed. Other challenges, such as the relentless process of urbanization on both sides of the Mediterranean -- a significant factor in the political evolution of the region -- are shared in character, if not necessarily in scale. Failure to cope with these challenges, and in the worst case, the complete failure of states and a descent into anarchy on the Algerian model, could have profound implications for the entire Mediterranean.

Overall Observations and Conclusions

The Mediterranean security environment is in flux, with important changes affecting the prospects for stability within societies, between states, and across regions. In the absence of a defining construct for understanding the strategic significance of the Mediterranean, differing intellectual and policy traditions are now shaping attitudes toward the Mediterranean in security terms. The Mediterranean has clearly become more prominent in the security debate on both sides of the Atlantic. This new-found attention is the product of compelling crises in Algeria, the south Balkans, and the eastern Mediterranean. It is also the result of a more general recognition that the most pressing security challenges -- of a political and economic as well as a military sort -- are now along the European periphery. They are also at the intersection of traditionally distinct European, Middle Eastern and Eurasian theaters. Indeed, some of the most intensively debated contemporary security concerns, from proliferation to energy supply -- are inherently trans-regional. The Mediterranean is at the center of this cross-regional trend, and the Mediterranean security environment is increasingly defined by it.

The strategic significance of the Mediterranean emerges in somewhat different ways from the three models discussed in this analysis. Each has something to offer in understanding the current environment and possibilities for the future. These alternative approaches do, however, share a common feature -- all three refer to interests beyond Mediterranen shores, whether in Europe, the Middle East or Eurasia -- or view developments in the Mediterranean as a facet of wider transatlantic and north-south relations. In this sense, the Mediterranean security debate has moved quite far from the regionally-based approach typified by the notion of the "Mediterranean for the Mediterraneans" or the CSCM idea. This may be one of the clearest indications that the period of Mediterranean marginalization is drawing to a close.

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EUROPEAN AND AMERCIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

George Joffé
(RIIA)

The predominant aspect of the economic relations enjoyed by the Middle East and North African region (MENA) with the European Union and the United States is based on trade. Investment flows are, of course, of growing importance, but they are still relatively small in significance, compared with the issue of trade. In economic terms alone, the MENA region is not of great significance to either power but the strategic implications of this relationship and the fundamental ideological and theoretical assumptions governing it are important and betray a growing disjunction of interests between them.

The nature of the economic links

There is little doubt that the European Union is of prime importance for the MENA region, since it is involved in over 30 per cent of regional trade. When the North African region is taken alone, this percentage rises towards 38 per cent. For the European Union, the MENA region generates around 3 per cent of total trade, although, once intra-European trade is excluded, this figure rises towards 10 per cent. In short, the Union is an extremely important trade partner for the MENA region, but the MENA region itself is of minor importance to Europe. The United States, on the other hand, is engaged in around 19 per cent of total MENA trade and the MENA region, in turn, generates around 3.5 per cent of total American trade.

I - SHARES IN WORLD TRADE 1995

	Exports *bn Ecu*	*%*	**Imports** **bn Ecu**	*%*
European Union	413.6	14.7	487.4	16.5
United States	575.0	20.4	484.9	16.5
Japan	229.3	8.1	364.7	12.4
"Triad"	1,217.9	43.2	1,336.9	45.4

Source: IMF/EU (Eurostat)

The preponderant role of the European Union and the United States in MENA trade is hardly surprising since together they form the largest trading block in the world, as Table I shows. In 1995, they generated 35.1 per cent of world exports and consumed 33.0 per cent of world imports. Together with Japan they accounted for roughly half of world trade. Even though the newly industrialising countries of Asia were rapidly expanding their role in this picture, the recent Asian crisis ensures that the "Triad's" hegemony of world trade will now endure for many years to come.

II EUROPEAN UNION - MAIN TRADE PARTNERS: 1995

	Exports		Imports	
	%	*bn Ecu*	%	*bn Ecu*
Extra-European Union	100.0	569.0	100.0	544.7
United States	17.8	101.0	19.0	103.6
Japan	5.8	32.9	10.0	54.3
Efta	12.2	69.5	12.9	70.4
CEEC	10.2	58.3	8.6	47.1
CIS	3.7	20.8	4.7	25.3
Africa	9.1	51.6	8.8	48.2
Latin America	5.6	31.9	5.5	30.2
DAE*	11.5	65.6	10.0	54.4
China	2.6	14.6	4.8	26.3
Asia**	10.9	61.9	8.5	46.3
Oceania	2.4	13.5	1.4	7.4
ACP	3.1	17.5	3.7	19.9
Mediterranean	11.3	64.4	8.5	46.3
Asean	6.5	36.9	6.3	34.5
Opec	7.0	39.7	7.4	40.2
NAFTA	20.3	115.6	21.8	118.6

Source: Eurostat Comext: II

Notes: DAE - Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong
Asia - Middle East, Afghanistan, Indian sub-continent and other Asia once the DAE are excluded.

Inside overall extra European Union trade, the United States plays the predominant role by far and also dominates the NAFTA trade patterns with Europe. However, amongst the regional groupings the Mediterranean is second in importance. Although the percentage figures decline if total European Union trade is considered, the underlying patter remains the same. The United States accounts for 9.20 per cent of European Union exports and 9.08 per cent of its imports, whereas the Middle East accounts for 3.98 and 2.69 per cent respectively. In the latter total, Israel absorbs 0.79 per cent of European exports and generates 0.42 per cent of European imports, according to the IMF's *Direction of Trade Statistics 1997*.

UNITED STATES TRADE PARTNERS: 1996

	Imports		*Exports*	
	$ bn	*(%)*	*$ bn*	*(%)*
Total trade	837.8	100.00	624.5	100.00
Industrialised countries	442.3	52.79	351.6	56.29
European Union	106.3	12.68	260.1	20.42
North Africa	2.6	0.31	1.3	0.20
Middle East	19.9	2.37	23.1	3.70
MENA	22.5	2.42	24.4	3.90
Israel	6.5	0.78	6.0	0.96

Source: IMF, *Direction of Trade Statistics 1997*

American trade patterns with the Middle East region show a similar structure. Israeli trade with the United States, incidentally, represented 32.9 percent of imports into the Middle East and 26.04 per cent of the region's exports. Israeli imports for Europe, by contrast, were 23.72 per cent of exports to the Middle East from Europe in 1994, but generated on 17.66 per cent of the region's exports to Europe. European levels of trade with Israel, as a proportion of the Union's total trade with the Middle East were thus substantially lower than those of the United States.

In both the cases of the European Union and the United States the major imports traded with the Middle Eastern region tend to be hydrocarbon-based energy. For the United States, this has traditionally been crude oil and American dependence on Middle Eastern and North African crude is now in secular decline as more politically attractive sources of crude emerge in Latin America and elsewhere. Indeed, it will be the Far East that will tend in future to absorb an increasing proportion of crude and refined products from the Middle East, once the after-effects of the Asian crisis have disappeared.

For Europe, however, natural gas is increasingly dominating the horizon. Already a fifth of Europe's natural gas requirements have been satisfied from North Africa and that dependence on the South Mediterranean rim will grow as gas from Central Asia and even from the Gulf or Nigeria becomes available. Furthermore, such gas imports will increasingly be delivered through fixed pipeline systems, rather than by liquefaction methods. This means that European security concerns over the region will increasingly diverge from those of the United States, both in nature and in intensity.

The other important aspect of future economic links relates to investment flows. At present, the MENA region is very low on the hierarchy of investment destinations world-wide. Despite the vast increase in international investment flows since the start of the 1990s, the Middle East and North Africa have continued to be relatively marginalised, even when oil and gas investment is taken into account. Although the absolute figures have improved since 1993, the relative positions have not changed.

IV - FOREIGN INVESTMENT BY REGION: 1993

($ bn)	*FDI*	*(%)*	*PEI*	*(%)*
East Asia/Pacific	36.5	54.8	18.1	38.3
Latin America/Caribbean	16.1	24.2	25.1	53.1
Europe/Central Asia	9.6	14.4	1.3	2.8
Sub-Saharan Africa	1.8	2.7	0.4	0.8
Middle East/North Africa	1.7	2.6	0.4	0.8
South Asia	0.8	1.3	2.0	4.2
Total	66.6	100.0	47.3	100.0

Source: COMET 41 (July 1994)
Notes: "Europe" excludes the EU and EFTA

Table 4 demonstrates that the Middle East and North Africa lie far behind other regions except South Asia in their access to foreign investment flows. Admittedly, portfolio equity investment has risen in recent years, largely because of the

privatisation programmes under way there, but foreign direct investment is still the main form of investment, particularly since loan (debt) investment is minimal because local rates of return and comparative advantage are restricted. Europe and the United States are the major sources for this, but it is Europe that is by far the most important, except in the special cases of Israel and Egypt on the one hand and Turkey on the other.

In the former case, such American investment attention reflects crucial political interests stemming from the Cold War. Similar political concerns are true as far as Turkey is concerned, but the Turkish economy is far more developed than its partners in the region and thus attracts significant amounts of foreign investment, including portfolio equity investment. Indeed, portfolio equity investment has boomed in Israel, but again partly because of the nature of its economy and partly for political reasons - as happened after the 1967 war! Those investment lines specific to the Camp David Process with Egypt and Israel may soon end, however. This would leave Europe as the predominant player in the field.

The nature of economic linkages

These economic patterns and linkages are not, however, *sui generis*. They reflect wider concerns in the geo-political and geo-economic arenas. Thus, for Europe, the Mediterranean region is in essence part of its crucial strategic periphery and economic relations have security and political implications. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, instituted by the Barcelona Conference in November 1995 - an event from which the United States was excluded - is a consequence of that. It is also because of this regionalist dimension that the collapse of the Middle East peace process, particularly in terms of the REDWG multilateral process and the MENA Economic Summit, has meant that the Barcelona Process is now the dominant economic agenda in the Mediterranean.

This outcome, of course, runs counter to American geo-strategic views of the Mediterranean and the Gulf region. Not only does it imply that it is Europe that will eventually become the dominant partner in the Middle East peace process - an outcome which will be impossible as long as there is no viable common foreign and security policy - it also runs counter to American interests in three other aspects of regional economic and political affairs.

- The Clinton administration has identified Turkey as one of the ten big emerging markets for future US economic attention - despite prior European links and the possibility of Turkish integration into the European Economic Communities. It has identified Algeria, alongside Turkey and Egypt, as a "pivotal state", both as economic partners and as potential regional hegemons, despite European interest in Algerian hydrocarbons and Egyptian interests in a closer link with Europe.
- In the Gulf, the policy of "dual containment" and of irredentist hostility towards the Saddam Hussain regime is not only beginning to creak when confronted with European policies of critical dialogue. American economic advantage is also waning, as the creation of *US Engage* - an alliance of over 400 US companies

dedicated to destroying the dual containment policy and related policies - makes clear.

- Alongside the potential demise of "dual containment" is the problem created by the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. This, in essence, replays the problems of dual containment in a more specific forum and allows Congress to have a direct hand in foreign policy formulation and control. Once again, the consequence is economic stultification which compounds the problems already caused for potential investors by the collapse of the Oslo peace process.

The fundamental assumptions

In part these differences arise because of a fundamental difference in views about the geo-economics of the Mediterranean and Gulf regions between Europe and America. European concerns reflect the need for periphery-control, for security rather than economic reasons. The Barcelona process is therefore a statement about regionalism which reflects political anxieties over migration and the consequences of economic lack of or under-development. For the United States, there is a far more sophisticated concern, that reflects the early assumptions of the first Clinton administration, in which geo-economics was to replace geo-politics in a process of global economic integration spearheaded by the United States.

Of course, over the past decade, this vision itself has been profoundly modified and parts of the original agenda have escaped national control. Enough remains, however, for it to inform the current globalisation paradigm in ways that underline the dominant American role. Indeed, the pattern of rolling regionalisation that has become the agenda of the second Clinton administration - with NAFTA becoming FTAA and being linked to the Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Area as well as the Asia-Pacific Economic Forum - underlines this commitment. Europe is increasingly reluctant to engage in such a process, although not all European states agree on the approach to be adopted.

This picture of American economic unilateralism is partnered by a new aggressiveness in American policy formation which results from the increasing weakness of the presidency in Washington and the new role of Congress. It is Congress that threatens aid flows and support for multi-nationalism through the United Nations. It is Congress that has led the attack for American extra-territoriality with its profound economic implications, and it is Congress that has hampered progress on replacing the outworn model of "dual containment" which discriminates primarily against American companies. The knock-on effects on, for example, Caucasian energy development and on official European attitudes towards American policy imperatives in the Middle East and North Africa region are easily discernible and will have deleterious effects on future relations between these two pillars of the world's economic triad.

Outcomes

In essence, the increasingly disparate economic interests in the Middle East and North African evinced by the European Union and the United States are causing a divergence between them. It is evident in their attitudes towards the World Trade Organisation -

where American anxieties over tribunal cases on sanctions are mirrored by European disquiet over the effect on the Partnership Initiative - which is inherently discriminatory in nature. American concerns about strategic lines of communication in the Red Sea, the Mediterranean and the Gulf run up against European concerns over economic security in the Barcelona context. It is still not clear to what extent these concerns are fundamental, rather than contingent. Yet they will affect the way in which the new economic agenda over transparency and accountability in the MENA region is addressed in future unless the two former partners find the basis for a new working relationship that ensures their mutual economic interests there.

(6)

EURO-ATLANTIC RELATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THE ALGERIAN CRISIS

SIMON SERFATY

INSTITUTO DE ESTUDOS ESTRATEGICOS E INTERNACIONAIS

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Simon Serfaty is Director of European Studies at the Center for Strategic & International Studies in Washington, D.C., and Professor of U.S. Foreign Policy at Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia. His most recent book is *Stay the Course: European Unity and Atlantic Solidarity* (1997).

EURO-ATLANTIC RELATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: THE ALGERIAN CRISIS

Simon SERFATY
Director, European Studies, CSIS
Professor, US Foreign Policy, ODU

Since the end of the Cold War, Western Europe has been caught between two arcs of crises.[1] First, in what was then described loosely as the East, territorial and ethnic conflicts that had haunted the European continent for centuries have been resurrected. In coming years, these conflicts may precipitate an especially discordant phase in West-West relations, both within the North Atlantic Treaty and its Organization (NATO) and in the European Union (EU) and its related institutions (including the Western European Union). The other arc of crises lies in what was called, just as loosely, the South—an area broadly defined as that part of the continent where the Ottoman Empire used to end, the Russian empire used to begin, and the European empires in Africa used to start. How historically factual this perception is matters less than the political fact that it is shared widely. Extended from Algeria to Turkey, these crises affect mainly Muslim countries in which rejection of the West and its secular institutions are or may become the focal points of government policies or their critics. There, too, dissymetrical interests, expectations, and traditions among EU states, as well as between them and the United States, may cause significant tensions in coming years.[2]

The nature of these crises varies from one place to another, but several recurring patterns can be identified, from one crisis to the other:

- failed states, some of them stillborn, and crisis of representativeness in fragile democracies, many of them newly born or still in the process of incubation;
- crises of identity in fragmented polities often organized in the context of past colonial dependence, and conflicts of legitimacy in unruly societies;
- unmet expectations often worsened because of an austerity conveniently explained by global forces (commodity prices and the discipline imposed by multilateral institutions) but occasionally caused by ineffective public policy; and
- disruptive memories of past ethnic clashes and territorial disputes over boundaries drawn coercively in earlier years.

In the West, meaning mainly among the states of the European Union and in the United States, these issues are viewed differently from country to country. Nonetheless, they can give rise to several processes of potential significance for intra-European and euro-Atlantic relations:

- a renationalization of foreign policies based on the negotiation of separate deals

whose short term gains would take precedence over the long term costs they might entail;

- deeper EU divisions between a France-led Mediterranean caucus that looks to the South and a Germany-led northern group that looks to the East, both priority areas of traditional security concerns;
- further complications for the Maastricht mandated attempts to organize a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for Europe; and
- a public disavowal of Western institutions deemed to be tested over issues which they are not equipped to address—including Bosnia—but also said to be defined by such troubling polemics as Turkey's membership in the EU (long overdue) and a role for NATO in North Africa (occasionally overstated).

For the past four decades, the nation-states of Europe have been fashioning common institutions designed to rescue them from their inability to recover alone from the political collapse caused by two devastating world wars, and from their incapacity during the Cold War to attend alone to various security threats from the East and the South.[3] As members of such institutions, these states now face broad difficulties that are surprisingly comparable to those of their neighbors in the East and the South:

- first, citizens question the representativeness of democratic institutions whose elected representatives can no longer satisfy the will and the aspirations of their constituencies;
- second, as groups uncover the need to become something "more"—or, worse yet, something "else" and occasionally something "less"—than "who" or "what" they have always been, they bemoan losing the identity they used to have;
- third, with resources made scarce by the budgetary intransigence of unelected technocrats in Brussels, the welfare state can no longer satisfy the demands of its citizens as generously as elected politicians formerly did; and
- fourth, the earlier security concerns for the collective "We" (which prevailed in the past era of total wars) have been replaced by individual apprehensions over personal safety said to be threatened, among other factors, by the large and largely unwanted arrivals of distinguishable minorities from now-defunct empires.[4]

France, which enjoys multiple centrality as a Mediterranean, Atlantic, and Northern European country, holds a special interest in Algeria (and the rest of North Africa), remains clearly vital to the construction of a united and strong Europe, and is the sole hold out of a desirable NATO consensus at 16 before it is enlarged to 19 members in April 1999. Yet, France also faces an especially difficult domestic crisis—arguably as difficult as any it has faced in nearly 30 years—which raises questions about France's ability to play its role fully in either of these three arenas, namely, the resolution of the Algerian crisis, the *relance* of European institutions, and the reform of an expanded transatlantic organization. The race for economic and monetary union (EMU) by early 1998 proved enormously demanding for political majorities that have come and gone every other year through the elections of 1993

(legislative), 1995 (presidential) and 1997 (legislative), and it has undermined the permissive consensus that surrounded the construction of Europe during the Cold War. Announcement, in December 1996, that France would return in NATO's integrated structures suggested a possible end to the ambiguities that had surrounded the fashioning of a transatlantic security personality nurtured at NATO with the organization of a European identity centered on the EU. After unfortunate delays caused by exaggerated French demands for the redistribution of NATO commands (and abusively offensive U.S. public responses), the 1997 elections has left the status of France within NATO in disarray: mainly in as a matter of fact, but mostly out as a matter of general perception. The ambiguities and even contradictions of France's security policy since December 1995 have also confirmed this country's difficulty in defining a role in the new Europe which can be sustained with policies that do not exceed its means. As Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine recently put it, France is a country that finds it difficult to come to grip with reality.[5] This condition hardly facilitates current prospects for thinking anew about security relations in Europe and across the Atlantic.

WHAT ABOUT?

The Algerian crisis is fairly typical of the instabilities that have characterized the post-Cold War years: a crisis inherited from the Cold War but rooted into the long history that preceded it; a conflict shaped by a difficult and complex agenda that combines traditional economic and security issues with cultural, religious, and ethnic questions; and a civil war initially neglected by Western powers preoccupied with other crises in the Balkan region and in the Persian Gulf, which were made all the more urgent as they were viewed as more immediately relevant to their vital interests.[6] The crisis began long before the Cold War, but even within the limited history of the past 50 years Algeria is a particular case because of the war waged against France to win its independence and its subsequent efforts to assert its sovereignty.

Several short generations of unfinished political projects and unmet expectations have thus converged over the past few years. At Evian, France, in 1962, Algerians gained a state before they could reclaim a national identity.[7] The only tie with their pre-colonial past, more than 130 years earlier, was Islam; their only explicit relationship with, or awareness of, the state's post-independence leadership of the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) was war and violence. Ancient memories of heroism and new delusions of socialism, Arab and otherwise, helped sustain a national idea for the 1960s and the early 1970s, among *francisants* and *arabisants* alike. As these memories faded, a new generation of younger Algerians who had never known colonization rebelled against former heroic leaders whose corrupted and repressive one-party regime was blamed for Algeria's inability to meet raised economic expectations after the dramatic (and unexpected) rise in oil revenues in 1973. They integrated various Marxist thoughts—class struggle, socialism, and anti-imperialism —into Arab nationalist thought and even some emerging Islamic movements.[8] Yet, political dissent was muted because, as compensation for the lack of democratic fundamentals (political multipartism, free press), the government could provide many of the amenities of

a better life: free education, free medical care, employment, and much more.[9]

After the death of President Houari Boumedienne in December 1979, neither a brillant but impotent elite *gauchisante* (and still *francisante*) nor a less gifted but powerful army—nor even a divided and discredited *parti unique*—could fill the vacuum created by the weakening of the early revolutionary leadership. This role was assumed readily by Islam as the most effective, if not only, organized outlet for Algerians' anguish and even anger: not only the rampart against the left, which the state hoped to build, but a kind of counter-society where social services which the Algerian government could no longer afford would be provided and where democratic frustrations which the regime could not alleviate would be released. Especially after oil revenues stumbled in 1986 (by 42 percent), as the government could no longer hide its inefficiency and corruption, the mosques became in growing demand not only for religion but also, and more directly, for politics. When violent urban riots erupted in November 1988, President Chadli Bendjedid again turned to Islam as a safety-valve, and he adopted liberalization measures as an "effective method of crisis management" more than as a credible conversion to democratic reform.[10]

From the beginning, the objective of the *Front Islamique du Salut* (FIS) was not merely to gain a share of power but to gain power altogether, and not only to sharpen the Islamic identity of Algeria but to make of Algeria a true Islamic state. Accordingly, the FIS never was the "phenomenon" which the government could understand, consult, manage, and ultimately coopt, as suggested by then-Prime Minister Mouloud Hamrouche, who "consider[ed] the Islamist party [to be] like any other."[11] In the context of the economic, political and social conditions that had emerged over the previous 30 years of ruinous and debilitating independence, the FIS had neither the will nor the time to be or to become a traditional opposition party or, for that matter, a government party: it became almost instaneously a mass party, the God-sanctioned populist alternative to an irreversibly tarnished FLN—*le fils du FLN*.[12] Yet, many, or most, of its followers and, eventually, voters were not identifiable with the hard core of the Islamic themes, methods and objectives which, lacking any other specific program (whether economic or otherwise), it quickly imposed in each of the many districts it won in the local elections of December 1989.[13] Thus born to be much more than a semi-benevolent association, but not organized yet to remain a government party for long, the FIS could hardly be expected to become a "loyal opposition" after it had been outlawed by the Army: loyal to whom, or rather to what?[14] Certainly not to a regime whose main goal was to eliminate it. Thus, the situation of protest that had worked to the advantage of the FIS was transformed into a situation of political violence that undermined the status, and even legitimacy, of the FIS as that violence became more and more deliberate and indiscriminate.

Admittedly, dire predictions of a radical Islamist Republic—Algeria's future as Iran's past or the next fundamentalist state—made after and since the cancellation of national elections in January 1992 and the open eruption of the Algerian crisis have not come to pass.[15] The killing has continued, to be sure, and divisions remain deep, but neither this violence nor these divisions are likely to force the replacement of President Liamine

Zeroual's regime with a government headed by the FIS. Indeed, from one election to the next, during, and possibly because of its forced exile and the nature of the war waged on the government, the FIS has lost much of the support it briefly enjoyed at the turn of the decade. Its electoral performance of late 1991 (let alone that of mid-1990) no longer appears to be repeatable—whether alone or in alliance with other political parties that are less eager to help the FIS' rehabilitation at the expense of their own political prospects.

The rift between the FIS and the *Groupe Islamique Armé* (GIA) has become open and extraordinarily brutal—a civil war within the civil war. FIS leaders who joined the GIA in 1994, and urged all Islamist groups to merge under its leadership, were summarily killed by their new allies in early 1996. The FIS leadership has grown divided, embittered by escalating atrocities, frustrated by the government's refusal to negotiate, and no longer courted by foreign governments that have grown more sensitive to the FIS leaders' rhetoric abroad and their actions at home.[16] Meanwhile, the GIA has become a loose confederation of autonomous groups politically and psychologically remote from any central leadership and even sophisticated weaponry. Many of these groups, said to represent an estimated 5,000 guerillas, have progressively developed interests that have little to do with Islam and more to do with other aims, whether economic gains, criminal activities, or plain nihilistic tendencies entertained by field unit commanders whose average age is under 19 and whose life expectancy barely reaches six to nine months from the time they take charge of a unit. Under such conditions, there is little will for restraint. Targets previously spared are viewed as fair game—especially those of greatest practical significance to the state (such as oil and gas pipelines and installations) and of greatest symbolic significance to the fighters (such as European and U.S. citizens and assets).[17] New levels of primitive and de-humanizing brutality are set from one indiscriminate attack to the next. Predictably, such violence adds to the confusion which, in turn, complicates prospects for national consultation, even assuming a genuine commitment to such a goal, which can hardly be found within the government or in the Army.

As the populist appeal of FIS has faded and as the GIA has become identified with intolerable levels of brutality, the regime attempted to redirect their constituencies towards other secular parties. Thus, after the other Islamic party, *Hamas*, participated in the presidential election of November 1995, it was offered and accepted minor posts in the government, and also attended the government-sponsored Conference of National Concord of September 1996. Hamas, many Algerians thought, could become what the FIS was hoped to be a decade earlier: an opposition that is Islamic but also democratic and non-violent.[18] To that extent, Hamas helped President Zeroual's partial dialogue on constitutional reforms aimed at the organization of an explicitly secular political system that would limit the executive's authority and the influence of the political parties.[19]

Yet, even though Zeroual's triumph in November 1995 was relatively fair and statistically convincing (if only because of a surprisingly high turnout), the vote did not mean that people had new confidence in the government's ability to restore peace and order in the country any more than the 1991 result was a vote of confidence in the FIS' democratic

credentials.[20] The 1991 national election was a forceful statement of discontent by voters who demonstrated their determination to oust a ruling party that seemed unable to change for the better. Hence the decline of the FIS. Those who voted for Zeroual in 1995 did not deny the legitimacy of Islamic participation in the state, but they did rebel against an Islamic attempt to overcome or hijack the state by force if necessary. These people could, therefore, vote for Zeroual as well as for whatever Islamic alternative there might be, including Hamas. Hence the limits of Hamas as a vehicle which the regime conveniently used pending the organization of its own mass movement, the Rassemblement National Démocratique, which was designed to pre-empt Hamas (now dubbed the Mouvement de la Société pour la Paix) and provide an alternative to both the pre-1986 FLN and the post-1989 FIS.[21]

In both cases, 1991 and 1995, voters wanted a new beginning, first to force a ruling clique out of power, and, next, to leave religion out of politics—not because a majority of Algerians have discovered that they can be better off without Islam, but because they have come to realize how much worse off they can be with it. In short, the 1991 vote was not for the kind of confrontation that followed, and the 1995 vote was not about a reconciliation that is still awaited. Indeed, the many elections held by Zeroual since November 1995—legislative (June 1997) and local (October 1997), with constitutional referendum (November 1996) in between—have not solved the question of state legitimacy, which was the reason why these elections were held in the first place: legitimacy at home, of course, as a belated redemption for the cancellation of the 1991 elections, but also legitimacy abroad as a long-delayed response to the call for unity issued by all political parties, including the FIS, at San'Egidio.[22]

Most generally, secular forces in Islamic states receive the support of Western governments because there is an underlying assumption that such forces are by definition more democratic (or, at least, less anti democratic) and moderate (or, at least, less radical) than any available alternative. That this is not the case is one of the many reasons why support for Zeroual remains discreet. By defining themselves as anti-Islamist, the secular forces become fundamentally anti-democratic since their oponents cannot be "eradicated" democratically.[23] The meaning of democracy has to do with a differentiated political space, in which every movement and its opposition can live and coexist. The Algerian political system is stalled because there is no attempt to open that space to the opposition. Zeroual can claim victory because he is still in power (so long as the Army does not replace him), but to win he has allowed a dictatorship which is also (and especially) that of the Army, and which he cannot lift, therefore, because the Army (and he as well) does not want to risk sharing power with any Islamic party, whether a marginalized FIS or a moderate Hamas (or whatever name it carries).[24]

What is left for the government, then, is to make the Algerian political space more livable. That is not easy either, even for those who escape the daily massacres. The Algerian economy has performed relatively well since 1996, but its limits are known. Because most of its national income and nearly all of its foreign exchange revenues are generated by oil and gas fields located on a very narrow territorial base, there are in fact two

Algerias: one that is fundamentally productive and hence usable (the Sahara, source of $12 billion in annual export earnings), and one that is mainly useless as a consumer of resources.[25] To enter the former, which has been condoned off by the Army, special passes are needed; to enter the latter, arms and explosives suffice.[26] The oil market upon which depends the former define the government's ability to satisfy the needs of the latter: at prevailing export levels, and other things being equal, a $1 variation in oil prices creates a $6 billion change in receipts for Algeria.[27]

The recent "good" news may, therefore, only amount to a short reprieve. Public dissatisfaction with Zeroual's "institutionalized dictatorship" will persist unless economic conditions improve beyond the selective and limited improvements admittedly recorded since 1996. Solid growth (up to 5 percent), falling inflation, small budget surpluses and a positive trade balance, and growing reserves (about $8 billion by the end of 1997) are convincing indicators for potential investors and multilateral lenders abroad. They do not suffice at home if they fail to reduce widening inequalities and control intolerable levels of unemployment (estimated at 47 percent by the end of 1996, including more than 30 percent in direct unemployment).[28]

Algeria is not at the point in its development which might have been anticipated by any "reasonable observer" 35 years ago.[29] In fact, such a claim ignores the political grounds in which the seeds of the new state were planted in 1962: a state reborn after 130 years of French rule that emphasized the principle, but not the practice, of democratic and secular life. This is not an emotional judgment, although, admittedly, it contains some emotion. Over the past decade, Algeria has become unhinged, and what will follow for the balance of the decade remains uncertain. However the states of Europe and the United States care about Algeria—for reasons of self-interest, alliance cohesion and sheer compassion— they must remain vigilant. Yet at a time when key European countries, including France, look fragile, the process of European integration faces an extraordinarily demanding agenda, and the U.S. role in the post-Cold War world is ill-defined, how can Western vigilance be exercized?

WHAT IF?

Although the Algerian crisis has unfolded in the shadow of the "savage war of peace" waged against France to gain independence, ties between the two countries have remained remarkably close.[30] On the whole, Algeria still defines itself in terms of its relations with France. For many Algerians, Paris remains the place where it is especially gratifying to be seen, to have friends, and to be heard. Conversely, for others, it is the place against which this final war of liberation—intellectual and ideological, as well as cultural and religious—must be waged if Algeria is ever going to be truly independent. In short, the savage war which Algerians have been waging on each other since 1992 is "prompted by the same causes, tracing the same contours and unfolding with the same unspeakable brutality" as the war of independence although it is waged this time not merely against France and its culture but against Western culture, and even, in the end, culture itself.[31]

In France, memories of *l'Algérie française* have not died either: they are memories of political turmoil and imported violence that ultimately brought a Republic down. As a

defining domestic issue that stands at the forefront of France's security concerns, Algeria has re-entered the political games of the Fifth Republic which it helped create in 1958. The broader agenda raised by the Algerian crisis—which has to do with issues of race, religion, and ethnicity—has served as a distasteful background for the political surge of Jean-Marie Le Pen and his party, the *Front National*, and it has encouraged most other political parties in France to adopt elements of Le Pen's agenda, which is designed not only to close the door on further entries of Algerian immigrants but also to force their return back to their points of origin.[32] Moreover, the Algerian crisis could also influence the alignment of political forces in the Gaullist party, whose new leader, Philippe Séguin is a native of North Africa, and remains personally and politically close to former Minister of the Interior Charles Pasqua, one of France's best known hawks on Algeria.

For the past 12 years, many of the crucial moments in Algeria have been lived in the difficult political context of *cohabitation* in France—in 1986-88, 1993-95, and since 1997. The 1988 riots and the country's general deterioration were ignored by the government of then-Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, who was facing an electoral battle with incumbent President François Mitterrand. In 1992, suspension of the democratic process and further repression in Algeria produced words of condemnation from Mitterrand, but little else. The following year, another period of *cohabitation* between Mitterrand and Prime Minister Edouard Balladur produced higher levels of French aid, designed to bolster the regime against its Islamic challengers (Balladur's emphasis) but not to bolster democracy against the regime (Mitterrand's emphasis). Fears that violence might spread to France were confirmed in mid-1995, shortly after Chirac's election to the presidency (achieved against Pasqua but with the support of Séguin). Whether such violence was part of the internal conflicts between and within the FIS, the GIA and the Algerian Army, or whether it was part of an explicit Islamic terrorist campaign, it had a dramatic impact on the French public. When winter came, however, violence ended as suddenly as it had begun. But this lull may not last, and the French continue to fear another spate of terror inspired abroad but carried out mainly by new French citizens and illegal aliens: nearly 75 percent of the French still view the Algerian crisis as a threat to France.[33]

To keep Algeria's violence and its people at a safe distance, the French government has drawn a metaphorical Maginot line that rests on two pillars: bilateral aid (about $1.2 billion a year), whose purpose is to buy time for the Algerian government and good will for France, and restrictive measures designed to reduce, deny, or even reverse the entry of North Africans in France. With Le Pen's *Front National* gaining increasing political leverage out of this issue, other political parties have adjusted their own attitudes while pretending otherwise. Thus, the 1993 laws named after Charles Pasqua, included tougher visa requirements (required by Algerian nationals to enter France since 1988), an extension of the allowed detention period, tougher police enforment powers, and such other measures as the denial of residence papers for undocumented parents of children born in France and, thus, French citizens. In 1995, approved Algerian demands for asylum fell at their lowest level since 1981 (about 2,200) and represented the lowest ratio of grantees to applicants in more

than 20 years (with a mere 16 receiving it). Although declarations of intent for adopting French citizenship are still readily accepted, and naturalizations proceed quickly, the debate on immigration has only started, and the impact which Le Pen and his party are having on new legislation has hardly run its course yet. In short, a decrease in France's foreign population can be expected during the coming years.[34]

To achieve its undeclared objectives of zero-level of immigration and zero-tolerance of violence from immigrants, Paris is not adverse to recruiting questionable allies abroad too. Links to Sudan, whose ruling National Islamic Front has traditionally maintained close ties with the FIS, were used to reduce terrorist pressures in Paris—with such tangible results as the arrest of the infamous Illych Ramirez Sanchez, Carlos the Jackal, who had been associated with an earlier wave of terrorism in France.[35] In the Gulf, Paris' policy of dual engagement is sensitive to French trade interests in Iraq without ignoring the need to accomodate Iran, often viewed as one of the GIA's main sponsors and benefactors. Elsewhere, the French government cultivates the self-serving image of a state that is sensitive to the needs and aspirations of Muslim and Islamic communities abroad: French policies in Bosnia and Chechnya, over Cyprus' and Turkey's applications for EU membership, and on the peace process and nuclear testing, are cases in point. In late January 1991, polls showed that over two-thirds of the Maghrebin Muslims in France were hostile to the then-ongoing intervention in Iraq, with more than one-fourth between the age of 15 and 24 claiming a willingness to fight on behalf of Iraq if given the opportunity.[36]

The export of violence from Algeria and other Maghreb countries to France and the rest of Europe is no small matter, and demographic pressures—both factual and perceived —make matters worse. An estimated 5 to 7 million legal foreigners in the EU are Muslim, mainly from North Africa (in France) and Turkey (in Germany). Numbers of illegal foreigners vary so much that they are estimated in terms of millions. Even the French population in Algeria is difficult to estimate, because the past French practice of giving citizenship to anyone born in French territory—which used to include Algeria (and other overseas outposts in the Caribbean, Pacific and Indian Ocean)—has left tens of thousands of Algerians in Algeria with dual citizenship, at least nominally.[37]

According to some reports, in 1993 Spain's police arrested nearly three times as many Algerians for criminal activities as there were registered Algerian residents in the country: bland statistics need not be reliable to produce nightmarish images for a credulous public.[38] Even under sound economic and political conditions, the Maghreb is not just an underdeveloped or developing region: it is underdeveloping—meaning that disparities from within, as well as between these countries and their wealthier neighbors across the Mediterranean Sea, are growing wider. Thus, with annual average growth rates for the Algerian population placed at 3.7 and 4.1 percent during the 1980-1990 and 1990-95 periods respectively (as compared to a steadier 2.6 in Morocco for both periods), more than 250,000 youths enter the job market every year but barely 50,000 jobs are created in a good year, thus leaving the young with the lion's share of total unemployment (with four-fifths of the unemployed under the age of 30).[39] With two-fifths of all Algerians now under the age of

14, with illiteracy giving way to a pattern of under-education that is not sufficient for a global economy or for jobs in performing foreign economies, with rising life expectancy (over 68 in 1996), with more people moving to the cities where there is little housing and no work, the risks of explosion are all too obvious. Additional foreign investments attracted by the discovery of new oil fields and improved political conditions are not conducive to job creation, and the new revenues generated by more exports are earned with a weak dollar that must buy imports denominated in strong European currencies.

Most of France's Muslim population deplores the violence in Algeria and opposes the more radical Islamic groups: about one-fourth of them fought on the side of the French during the war of independence, and their convictions make them fundamentally hostile to any violence exerted against Muslims, whether it originates from other Muslim state and group or from a Western state or group. But prevailing political and societal conditions in France force Muslim nationals—new immigrants, legal or not, but also French-born children of older immigrants—into separate communities that could be easily radicalized.[40] This pattern is not limited to France. Elsewhere in Europe, too, this is the new generation of Franz Fanon's "wretched of the earth"—economically and politically marginalized, denied their dignity and identity, the first to lose their jobs, and now threatened with losing their passport too.[41] Evidence of a re-Islamization of Muslim citizens who rebel against conditions of permanent humiliation abounds. With tens of newly-established rival Islamic groups determined to outbid each other, they demand that new Koranic schools be open, that Islamic law be applied for personal and family matters, that new Mosques and Muslim cemeteries be built, and more.

These demands are often answered by foreign governments whose intentions are not accepted at face value even when such Muslim largesse comes from conservative states—including Saudi Arabia and Morocco for mosques, the Gulf emirates for schools, or Egypt for *imams*. In France, Muslim enclaves are passionately condemned as immigration has traditionally attended to the individual rather than to the group. In other words, there is a contradiction in the very notion of an *Islam français*, not only because the essence of Islam is communitarian but because the idea of France is stubbornly national.[42] As noted by French scholar Oliver Roy, there is "a new kind of ethnic identity, a characteristically American kind ... [that] seems likely to prevail among the young Arabs ... of the urban zones" as an increasingly assertive subculture within the previously dominant national culture.[43] These apparently contradictory and even adversarial communitarian identities reinforce the reaction of non-Muslim citizens as evidence that Muslims who "refuse adhesion" form an Islamic society separate from their own, and may even be the agents of a conspiracy aimed at the West, its institutions and its values. Like their "brothers" in Islamic countries, their inability to work with the state leads them to working first without it, or in spite of it, before they migh ultimately turn against it.

Elsewhere in Southern Europe, interests are not different; but because North Africa is cause for less passion and fewer collective memories, they tend to play out differently than in France. Nonetheless, the rise of a radical Islamic government in Algeria—or, more

generally, of new instabilities anywhere in North Africa—would probably increase the appeal of neo-nationalist parties because of a widespread concern over refugees. In Spain and in Italy, new legislation has been passed to reduce the flow of new immigrants who used to be willingly accepted as many of them were passing through. This concern is also shared further from the Mediterranean—in Austria, Belgium, Holland, and even some Scandinavian states. The fact that net migration to the EU fell to two per 1,000 inhabitants in 1994, down from a high of 3.7 per 1,000 in 1992, is not coincidental.

As neo-nationalist parties gain influence in a number of EU countries, they can create additional obstacles to "Europe" and its union. Thus, instabilities in Algeria and other southern Mediterranean countries complicate negotiations in the EU, as they either force a review of past agreements (as with the 1990 Schengen agreement, stipulating passport-free travel among its signatory countries), or delay new agreements. This is especially true of enlargement to the East. Pledges made at the insistence of southern EU states to assist southern countries that would be broadly comparable to the assistance provided to countries in the East (about $6.1 and $8 billion respectively) make neither policy easier and both much more difficult under mounting budgetary pressures for the EU and its members. Yet, failure to deliver such aid to both groups of countries might widen the north-south divide within the EU, and it might even widen the post-Cold War rift between France and Germany.

WHAT FOR?

Over the years, France has always resisted the intrusion of other countries in its imperial backyards across the Mediterranean. Recently, however, the French have become less hostile to the presence of other countries in the Mediterranean, in Europe, and across the Atlantic, to help the french, in President Chirac's words, "to find a way of acting effectively from the outside."[44] Algeria's future need not be evenly viewed by all these countries to care, however differently, about instabilities in Algeria and the entire region. Concerns are geoeconomic (with the EU doing more profit-generating business with Mediterranean Arab countries than with Japan), geopolitical (including a dangerous proliferation of weapons of mass destruction), and geocultural (with the risks of a fast-growing populace inspired by of anti-Western governments).

French economic interests in Algeria and the rest of the Maghreb are significant—although less than they are often claimed to be.[45] France remains Algeria's main supplier, with nearly 30 percent of all Algerian imports (including a large proportion of capital goods) and its main banker, with a significant share of Algeria's large debt owed to French private and public institutions. However, because of a successful attempt to reduce France's dependence on energy supply from Arab sources, imports from Algeria have diminished. In 1993, France was the fourth largest importer of Algerian goods—after Italy, the United States and Germany. Yet many of France's largest companies are active in Algeria—including Bouygues, Total and Peugeot—and several highly politicised regions have especially close ties with Algeria, including the region of Provence-Côte d'Azur, which contains the port of Marseilles, one of Le Pen's political strongholds.

No less, and arguably more, significant than these economic links, are politico-security ties rooted in geography, fashioned by history and nurtured by tradition. France's fear of *les Arabes* results from a blend of prejudice toward all that is not French, resentment over the loss of what used to be French, and fear of anything that might harm the French. Since the end of the Cold War, the countries most immediately feared and most persistently courted by France have been Muslim countries, including Iraq, Iran and Libya, as well as Algeria.[46] More instability in Algeria and its neighbors would worsen a concern that reached its peak in Christmas 1994 when an Air France plane was hijacked in Algiers and reportedly filled with explosives for an attack on Paris. Theater ballistic missiles (TBM) able to deliver nuclear, biological or chemical weapons (which are reportedly available in several of the more radical Arab countries, including Libya) are especially worrisome for all Northern Mediterranean countries, as well as for others in the EU and NATO.[47] Such concerns have increased Europe's interests in surface-to-air missile systems that can engage TBMs and cruise missiles, and might be developed either nationally or preferably multilaterally, whether with other European states or through cooperative arrangements with the United States.

Apprehensions over Algeria's acquisition and development of weapons of mass destruction are not new. Besides the risks of TBM terrorism, the Ain Oussera complex, about 130 kilometers south of Algiers, is cause for concern. Its nuclear reactor, which is of Chinese origin, is reportedly able to produce enough plutonium for a nuclear-weapons program.[48] The Gulf War raised these apprehensions to unprecedented levels. References to some future "Cuban missile crisis" are no longer the stuff of fiction. That these capabilities would be more likely to be used by a state with an Islamic rather than a secular government is implicit in Europe's apprehensions. More convincingly, a radical government in Algiers would increase incentives for further and faster proliferation while correspondingly reducing prospects for arms- control and threat-abatement measures. These developments would also call for increases in defense spending elsewhere, thus worsening budgetary pressures within the EU.[49] North Africa is a long way from South Asia, but over time the spill overs from South Asia could extend to areas increasingly closer, including the Gulf and the Aegean.

As happened for other out-of-area issues in the 1950s—including the war in Indochina, the Suez crisis and the Algerian war—the French government is not adverse to using Algeria as a test of its allies' solidarity: in Europe—with the EU and, if necessary, with the WEU—but also across the Atlantic, bilaterally with the United States and with NATO. In 1994-96, criteria of solidarity included a willingness to support the established regime in Algiers, and, by implication a willingness to avoid political steps that could weaken that regime in order, allegedly, to avoid another Iran.[50] After a difficult start, these criteria were generally satisfied: transatlantic and intra-European views were coordinated in 1995, and multilateral and bilateral aid to Algiers was extended. Equally successful were transatlantic "tests" of support in the hypothetical case of evacuating Westerners from Algeria, and, to an extent, intra-European tests for developing earmarked European forces (including Eurofor

and Euromarfor land and sea forces created by France, Spain, Italy and Portugal in May 1995).

The revolutionary tradition of Algerian leaders, irrespective of their political persuasion, might give them the motivation and reach that other Muslim states that attempted to export their revolution, by secular or Islamic means, have lacked.[51] A radically oriented Islamic government in Algeria could affect the government of Tunisia's President Zine el-Abidine Ban Ali, whose highly effective economic reforms (with a per capita income doubled over the past five years) have come together with strict political control of Islamic tendencies and, for that matter, any type of political dissent.[52] The potential for severe internal trouble remains, therefore, real, although admittedly lesser than in earlier years (so long as economic conditions continue to be favourable). East past Tunisia, through Libya and Sudan and into Egypt and Saudi Arabia, disorder in Algeria might heighten existing anti-secular instabilities that threaten to take an increasingly violent turn.

Morocco's Alaouite monarchy will continue to prevent, at least for a while, serious political spill-overs from Algeria. But Moroccan "moderate" policies towards its neighbors in the Maghreb and Arab "brothers" in the Middle East might become less constructive than has been the case over the past 25 years. Most visibly, Algeria's weary support for the Polisario Front would increase under a FIS-led government, thus making a final referendum in the Western Sahara even more difficult and a resumption of war more likely.[53] The resulting pressures of a war on Morroco's improving economy could have serious consequences on the monarchy and its attempt at political reform. Finally, a radical Islamic government in Algiers could pressure Rabat to assert its sovereignty over the Spanish enclaves in Ceuta and Melilla: both house 135,000 Spanish nationals and are defended by about 15,000 troops.[54] Neither enclave is included in the NATO area, and neither could count on much support from the WEU or Spain's Mediterranean partners. In any and all of these cases, the key to Morocco's policies and its stability remains the King, who could easily manage these difficulties, as he has done many times in the past. But irrespective of persistent reports concerning Hassan's health and succession, a regime dependent on a man alone is not stable and this is fact the reason why the King has effectively launched his most recent (and, at this time, his most credible) democratic opening.

Concerns about the possible extension of the Algerian crisis are not meant to suggest an automatic fall of domino states in, around, and beyond North Africa. Nor do they imply that any conflagration in North Africa, the Middle East or the Persian Gulf will find its shortest, fuse in Algeria.[55] Much can happen that would have worse consequences than events in Algeria—as witnessed, for example, in May 1996 with the elections in Israel, in late 1997 with renewed prospects for war with Iraq, and, in May 1998 with a round of nuclear tests in India and Pakistan. In all of these instances, the risk is not the spread of instabilities from Algeria to other Muslim states but the reverse. Yet, however such risks flow, Algeria can and should be viewed as a "pivot state"[56]—a critical actor in the evolution of the European Union, the transatlantic security structure, the continued peace process in the Middle East and other regions that include states with a significant Muslim population.

WHO FIRST?

The French now handle Algeria like the Alsace Lorraine of their school days —*n 'en parler jamais mais y penser toujours*. Bilateral aid, which has been reduced since Balladur was prime minister (and Alain Juppé foreign minister), remains abundant even though it has fulfilled neither of its main goals: to relaunch the Algerian economy and encourage national reconciliation. The political need for low profile is such that aid is provided almost anonymously—without the explicit objectives usually associated with aid from other countries (to assist Italian exporters, for example, or to facilitate wheat sales from the United States).[57]

Most generally, French policies are both passive and intrusive, as they are influenced by various doses of historical guilt (or regrets), racial prejudices (or political correctness), and economic greed (or relative indifference). Any step Paris takes openly is the focus of new suspicions. In Algiers, specifically stated French objectives are interpreted as conditions against which the government and its opposition can rally to reinforce their respective nationalist identity. In Paris, explicitly defined French policies would precipitate a sharp debate over the cost of losing, or the illusions of regaining, France's former influence. Yet, in mid-1995, the increased levels of bi- and multilateral aid that were partly organized by France did encourage the Algerian government and most political parties to hint at future compromises.[58] Since his election, however, Zeroual's "cooperative monologue" has not been very cooperative, because his consultations were not inclusive, and it remained, therefore, a monologue as he did what he pleased anyway. Chirac's occasional statements have remained uncharacteristically tepid, and since his electoral debacle in June 1997, even Jospin's own silences have sounded eloquent by comparison.

Chirac, who served in the Algerian war, and Jospin, who probably demonstrated against the war, advocate an orderly and more-or-less democratic dialogue that will contain Islamic radicals in Algeria without alienating Islamic moderates elsewhere. The need for French discretion was probably reinforced by the wave of terrorist bombings that affected Paris in mid-to-late 1995. Significant, too, was the scope of Chirac's agenda after his election in 1995. Given what he was attempting to do in the name of "Europe" or because of the end of the Cold War, the ability to keep Algeria out of the headlines was not the least of Chirac's aspirations for the region. After his defeat in 1997, the Jospin government did not change the defining theme of French policies—"no wish to interfere"—but it did change its tone, with an increased willingness to sound indignant and protective of human rights.[59]

With France less able to lead than in the past, a more active role has been sought by a Mediterranean caucus of up to five EU states (France, Spain and Italy, plus Portugal and Greece) dealing with another small group of states on the southern side of the Mediterranean (including Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, as well as Malta, Egypt and others). This caucus, dubbed "Club Med," had its best opportunity in 1995-96 when France, Spain and Italy held the rotating presidency of the European Council and, in the second half of 1995, formed the

EU's ruling troika of European states. As could have been expected, however, despite such limited numbers, different national interests and political aspirations stood in the way of any lasting common policies. Chirac is especially close to Morocco's King Hassan, who has cultivated the FIS and who is charged by the regime in Algiers with providing safe heaven for terrorist activities in Algeria: the King's advice is likely to have been more nuanced than two of Chirac's many other friends in the Arab world, Tunisia's President Ben Ali and Egypt President Hosni Mubarak. With senior members of Chirac's government and political entourage also emotionally tied to Morocco (like his current and former chiefs of staff, Dominique de Villepin and Michel Roussin), Algeria (for example, his former adviser on security and foreign policy issues, Pierre Lellouche) and Tunisia (for example, the president of the Gaullist party, Philippe Seguin), the political and ideological focus of French policies is not the same as under Mitterrand and remains different from that of Jospin, two *gauchistes* with an explicit predilection for *une certaine idée* of Algeria over the idea they have of Morocco and his King.[60] In Spain, memories are closely tied to Morocco (a central feature of the post-Franco succession, and the last site of Spain's colonial past) but economic interests are more centered in Algeria (the source of nearly 70 percent of Spain's natural gas) than in Tunisia or even the rest of the Arab world. For Italy, the Maghreb countries that matter most—on grounds of gas, investments, and expatriated nationals—are Tunisia and Libya, but Italian attention has been increasingly diverted by increasing instabilities and audible rumors of war in the Balkans around Kosovo, and in the Aegean around Cyprus..

Not surprisingly, differences between the Mediterranean states obstruct multilateral policies for the region. Notwithstanding the Mediterranean Summit held in Barcelona in September 1995, eighteen months of Mediterranean leadership showed limited results in three modest areas.[61] First, a shared need to enforce the Schengen agreement produced some coordinated national policies on asylum and immigration, as well as on issues such as organized crime and drug smuggling. Spain, encouraged by France, has managed to stem the flow of northward bound Moroccans. In Italy, an unnatural alliance between the ex-communists, the federalist Northern League, and the neo-fascists has been generally supportive of various attempts to expel tens of thousands of illegal immigrants.[62] A will for cooperation in this area was confirmed most recently before and during the 1998 World Cup, when Islamic sympathizers were rounded up in the name of security for this grand display of world soccer, to the satisfaction of the Algerian government that had sought such action during an official EU visit a few months earlier.

In addition, a stated commitment to a free trade area (FTA) between the EU and its neighbors in North Africa has produced a series of bilateral accords pending the comprehensive framework scheduled to be completed around the year 2010. Agriculture, however, remains excluded from these agreements, and the steps needed to make a FTA with former colonies in the South in this and other areas may not be fully compatible with the steps needed for EU enlargement to the east—not only from the standpoint of the funds needed under conditions of budgetary cuts, but also from the standpoint of the concessions

that will be made to applicants countries from the East during the ongoing accession talks. Accordingly, the FTA's first goal is, or should be, to increase trade among southern Mediterranean countries, which remains virtually insignificant, and assist them with soft loans, which are still far too modest.

Finally, Club Med planning envisions a common security space populated by at least two European land- and sea-based forces led by France, with participation from Spain and Italy (Eurofor and Euromarfor). These forces will require many years before they become operational, if ever. Admittedly, Euro-Atlantic security organisations have been gaining western, northern, and southern coherence—with Spain joining the Eurocorps and France bargaining its return to NATO's integrated military structures. Yet, like every other attempt by EU countries to develop common policies and build common forces, within or outside the EU, the availability of NATO assets (including surveillance and transport), U.S. power (including its Sixth Fleet), and even U.S. leadership (that can produce followership from at least some EU states) will remain indispensable for any significant European action in the Mediterranean.

On the southern shores of the Mediterranean especially, such a supportive role for NATO is preferable to the leading role envisioned in early 1994 by then Secretary-General Willy Claes with extraordinary awkwardness, bad timing, and insensitivity.[63] With the United States unwilling to give up NATO command in southern Europe at least so long as the Europeans are not prepared to assume it with capabilities of their own (and a will to use them); with the debate over the future NATO strategy already showing a major divide between the current 16 partners over the geographi boundaries of NATO action; with widespread confusion over the steps ahead for future enlargement to other countries formerly in the Warsaw Pact and the defunct Soviet Union; with declining defense budgets, no shared will for military action, no lasting consensus for economic sanctions or any other non-military forms of collective action; and, last but hardly least, with a multiplicity of crises crowding the agenda ahead—in Kosovo, Cyprus, the Gulf, the Middle East, South Asia, to cite only a few of the strategic questions that are immediately identifiable—questions of reform and governance for NATO, whether at 16 or at 19, will not be resolved easily, and after solutions have been negotiated, these will not be enforced readily.

Because and in spite of such conditions—NATO stalled (including the United States, its peerless leader often driven by mere memories of leadership)[64], Europe astray (including France, its natural out-of-area leader), and Algeria unhinged (with implications for neighboring states)—the United States can afford neither the same level of indifference towards this region as it did in the past, nor the same level of intrusive unilateralism as it has shown elsewhere in recent years. Even if it is agreed that Algeria is a unique case, that the Algerian crisis is mainly home-grown, that automatic spillovers of instability from Algeria to its neighbours are unlikely, and that the current regime is now beyond the reach of the extremists, too much is at stake for the United States to be dismissive of, or reactive to the region, as was the case during the Cold War.[65] Not the least of what is at stake is Europe's view of America's reliability, and even the Arab view of America's global sensibilities. In

the spring of 1995, bilateral talks that were held to review U.S. support for an hypothetical French-led evacuation of its citizens, as well as those of other foreign countries, from Algeria, were especially constructive because of the will for dialogue that was shown on both sides.[66] They reduced Paris' fears that Washington aimed at a separate deal in Algiers. They may even have helped facilitate a bilateral *rapprochement* that was consummated both in Bosnia that summer, and over NATO that winter. Other instances of reported U.S. activism in Algeria have included a public intervention of the U.S. Ambassador to help maintain Chadli in office against the Army in the late 1980s, and, more recently, the role played by former Secretary of State James Baker in encouraging a peace agreement in and over the Sahara. What is most significant perhaps is the implicit French support for an enhanced U.S. role. In 1996, President Clinton reportedly wrote at least two letters to President Zeroual urging him to be "inclusive" in his quest for reconciliation.[67]

France's diminished reluctance to open the door for actions that would not only be joined by, but also be initiated by others, takes many forms. Thus, French criticism of the government in Algiers is often accompanied by similar criticism from other Western or even Islamic capitals, as was the case when the holy month of Ramadam helped set new standards of brutality in early 1998. Following these criticisms, Algiers' reluctant approval of a EU mission responded to a proposal that was initiated by Germany and not by France—an initiative which the French Minister for European Affairs, Pierre Moscovici, described as "a bit new."[68] Possibly as a delayed EU payback for its mission, a Europe-wide crackdown was launched by France and other EU states against local Islamic extremists, under cover of the World Cup.

In Algeria, the gap between authority and legitimacy remains wide, to be sure, but it may be narrower than it has been in many years. Since his election as president, Zeroual has gained some democratic legitimacy from the cycle of elections held during the subsequent three years (1995-98), and the Islamists have lost much of the populist appeal they enjoyed before the GIA lost its human senses. Such elections feed the illusion at least of democratic procedures that are reinforced by occasional public displays of a democracy at work—with, for example, the inevitable parades against massive electoral frauds that seem to follow every such election. Yet, behind such fraud lies the reality of a weak opposition centered on political parties that go up and down like puppets, and proliferate like wire hangers.

The next round of elections, however, will have to do better than just reduce the gap between authority and legitimacy. There is no mystery about the butchery of the past several months and years: where it originates is known even when its reasons remain incomprehensible or unacceptable. But there is no mystery either about the indifference of the Army to much of the massacre: its silence has been too loud, and its passivity provides a sense of complicity or at least acquiescence that are also unacceptable. The regime will not bridge the gap between the authority it holds and the legitimacy it needs, until all key participants, meaning the FIS, are included in the political dialogue, thereby demonstrating that non-participation is a choice which political parties and groups exercise on their own and at their own risk. Otherwise, the state's insistence on excluding what some persist in

viewing as a more significant political force than it really is adds to the government's perceived illegitimacy and enhances perceptions of electoral manipulation. The paradox, then, is that the more elections are held to reinforce the legitimacy of the state and the less legitimate the state becomes.

The Government, however, sees things differently. Its goal remains the eradication of the Islamists through an assimilation of its electorate via other parties (including Hamas first, and now the RND). Hence the encouraging signs of the 1995 presidential elections when Hamas jumped from 5 percent of the vote in 1991 to nearly 25 percent, before falling to 16.8 percent in June 1997 and a meager 6.8 percent four months later, while the RND and the FLN grew during the 1997 elections from a combined 67.9 share of the vote to a domineering 77 percent.[69] The model is that of revolutions in Central America. Protection against the limited risks of a generalized social explosion comes from the emphasis which citizens continue to place on their own survival.[70]

A democratic opening will be most likely, therefore, and also more convincing, if it is argued through the collective intervention of states and multilateral institutions on whose support Zeroual depends most. Reasons for collective rather than individual pressures abound—rather, that is, than action by any one country or institution acting alone or in spite of its allies, whether France, the traditional leader in the region, or the United States, the natural world leader since 1991, acting without each other and without the institutions to which they belong.

Admittedly, conditionality is easier to recommend than to implement. It evokes earlier debates over a "third force" as the answer to civil conflicts that used to erupt periodically in the Third World during the Cold War. Conditionality raises issues of will and vulnerability: the will, that is, to impose a price for the target state that refuses to act contrary to its preferences. Conditionality also raises issues of timing and substance: when to link the extension of aid (whose aid and by whom?), which reforms to emphasize first and how can their enforcement be guaranteed; and how to balance the threat of withdrawal and the promise of rewards. On the whole, conditionality is an interventionist gamble based on two assumptions. First, it assumes that the changes sought as "conditions" for support are preferable to what may or will happen unless the recommended changes are adopted—and, not insignificantly, that an interest in such changes is common, even though not commonly shared, by and for all the parties. Second, conditionality assumes that the consequences for the target states of ignoring these conditions are lesser than the consequences of changing them—with enough specificity and enough certainty to facilitate acceptance.

On all grounds, this is not an easy gamble, for those who initiate the process and for those who give in to it. As the economy performs, or at least improves, the Algerian regime becomes less dependent on the outside world, and hence less sensitive to warnings of denials (of credits or of access or of plain political support) than might have been the case otherwise. Resistance to conditionality in Algiers is especially forceful as denials of what Algeria might want (loans, for example) remain a long way from crippling sanctions against what it needs (oil exports especially, but also foreign investments),[71] and as sanctions remain, in any case,

a measure which the United States is not contemplating at this time and which EU countries do not have in their small CFSP tool box. In addition, there is no evidence that the goals that could be satisfied through the imposition of conditions—how much democracy with, relative to without or against, the FIS?—will be more appealing than current conditions.

Still, there comes a time when even the inability to do more should not constrain one's ability to speak mote. Western aid to the regime in Algiers can expect, and demand, some efforts for the daily protection of citizens and some visible progress towards national reconciliation. This should include evidence that the Army is protecting from, rather than contributing to, the terror and the killing. This should also permit some visible steps toward a rehabilitation of the FIS—because of what it represents rather than because of what it has done or what was done in its name. In addition, an effective policy toward Algeria must be designed to prevent future Algerias elsewhere to contain the risks of spill-over but also to avoid repeating the conditions that precipitated the Algerian crisis in other places. Western countries should thus:

- provide more tangible support for countries like Morocco and Tunisia. A good policy for Algeria begins with sound policies for its two neighbors in North Africa. The U.S. awareness of North Africa continues to oscillate between long period of total indifference and occasional bursts of panic because discussion of this region is often hijacked by other issues not always related to that region or any single country in the region;
- develop closer ties between countries on both sides of the Mediterranean with, for example, separate Partnerships for Stability and Partnerships for Prosperity that link some countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean with the WEU and with the EU—a more logical vehicle for such security arrangements than NATO. The need for an active discussion of such ties is especially significant at a time when the decisions about to be made over the future of each of the two Western institutions are decisions that will lock these institutions in place for many years to come;
- state their open support for political reforms that accomodate opposition parties (in Egypt, for instance), or for policy adjustments that provide enough satisfaction for regional adversaries (from Israel, for example) rather than succumbing to implicit blackmail that justifies ineffective government methods and policies with the alleged threat of anti-Western fundamentalism;
- coordinate policies toward "rogue" states (including Iran and Iraq), meaning, first, a reappraisal of dual containment in the Gulf, which satisfies no ally and shows little result, and agreements on procedures preventing the sales of weapons of mass destruction and the export of related technologies, which bring security to no one and increase instability for all;[72]
- link Europe to U.S. initiatives in the Middle East so that the Europeans do not have to challenge U.S. initiatives to demonstrate that they have policies of their own, but also so that Americans do not have to await the success of their policies before being

able to rely on support from, and contributions by, the countries of Europe and their Union.

An institutional mechanism that would enable Western countries to coordinate their policies on such questions is still missing. On out-of-area issues, the United States and Europe, as well as NATO and the EU, often seem more willing to upstage each other than to consult and cooperate. Unilateral U.S. actions designed to solve regional conflicts that affect EU states (as is the case in North Africa) or NATO states (in the Aegean Sea) suffer from the limits of U.S. will and credibility; expressions of EU unilateralism to settle local disputes on its own (as was to be the case in Bosnia) are limited by EU capabilities and influence. The European, Mediterranean, and transatlantic troikas are not the answer. The EU troika, which groups the three presidents of the European Council (past, present, and future), depends on the alphabetical listing of EU countries that determines these assignments: some troikas are more effective than others, depending on participating countries. (The intergovernmental conference that will have to be held prior to the next EU enlargement is likely to begin an end the current troika system anyway.) The Mediterranean troika (France, Italy, and Spain) is externally divided and internally weak: in these countries especially, issues pertaining to North Africa have a domestic dimension that makes policy coordination among them difficult irrespective of an insufficiency of available means of action, whether military or otherwise. Finally, the transatlantic troika — which includes the presidents of the United States, the European Commission and the European Council—is undermined by the short mandate of the European Council presidency (six months, unless a national election makes the term even shorter), and the vagaries of EU agreement on naming the Commission president.

WHAT NEXT?

Whether in the Mediterranean or elsewhere, the first five years of the post-Cold War era have confirmed the centrality of U.S. power and leadership. This is not Europe's time yet. Given the operational weaknesses and fragmentation of EU institutions, close cooperation with the United States remains imperative. A transatlantic Action Group consisting of the four or five most influential NATO and EU countries could effectively address out-of-area issues involving NATO and EU states. Patterned after the five-nation Contact Group developed for Bosnia (but without Russia), such a group could be installed quickly and with enough flexibility to include other EU and NATO countries, depending on the issue at stake. Such a Group could meet periodically to activate a process of Transatlantic Policy Coordination, comparable in its informality to the earlier version of European Political Cooperation. The goal would be to make full consultations possible before decisions are made; these consultations would aim at preparing at least the first draft of a Western policy that would distribute responsibilities and roles in the context of impending crises.

However, no policy coordination across the Atlantic can work without better policy

coordination in Europe. Paradoxically, as prospects for European Monetary Union (EMU) become more uncertain, or, conversely, as the reality of EMU takes hold, the potential for the Maastricht-mandated goal of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) improves: either as the most visible venue for *relance* in the aftermath of EMU collapse, or as the most compelling venue for an institutional end game in the afterglow of EMU success. In truth, the formulas that might be envisaged for the CFSP seem less draconian than the steps undertaken on behalf of EMU. Compared to the euro, and compared to the organization of a European Central Bank, agreement on having a single voice speak for Europe, looks benign —a receptionist or answering service that receives messages and passes them around before eventually returning the call. Algeria would not be the only issue on Mr. Europe's agenda. But relative to Bosnia, Northern Ireland, islets in the Aegean Sea, Cyprus, post-Yeltsin Russia, Ukraine or the Baltic states, and the Persian Gulf or the Middle East peace process—not to mention an economic meltdown in Asia or in Russia—Algeria and the rest of North Africa may be issues over which agreements within Europe and with the United States may prove to be achievable.

The past few years have shown some evidence of a public desire for compromise in Algeria. After the FIS called secular democracy blasphemy and became identified with violence, its public appeal fell significantly from the levels reached in June 1990. In January 1995, the political parties that signed the National Contract calling for reconciliation represented 82 percent of the votes cast in December 1991. In the end, Algeria do have a secular tradition born out of the long relationship with France, where secularity is a religion. Because of this experience, history may tell that the Algerian crisis of the past few years was an aberration. Its choice for secularity, which is an intellectual choice, has been confirmed repeatedly since November 1995. This choice must now be bolstered with confirmation that Zeroual is prepared to make a democratic choice as well—a choice which opens the door to all parties and groupings, including those that define their identity primarily as resisting the West. Attempting instead to police them by force will not reduce that resistance. On the contrary, it will leave little alternative to assassination, confrontation, and coups. As in most other places, democracy is the best of the bad gambles still available to achieve stability and preserve Western interests in Algeria.

NOTES

1. A shorter and earlier version of this essay appeared as "Algeria Unhinged: What Next? Who Cares? Who Leads?" *Survival*, vol 38, no. 4 (Winter 1996-1997), pp. 137-153.

2. Michael Sturmer, "Need for a Military Option," *Financial Times*, February 28, 1995.

3. Milward

4. Simon Serfaty, "Half Before Europe, Half Past NATO," *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 1995, pp.

49-58, and *Taking Europe Seriously* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).

5. Quoted in Le Monde. See also, Simon Serfaty, *Revue Française de Géoéconomie*, Summer 1998.

6. Claire Spencer, "Algeria in Crisis," *Survival*, vol. 36, no. 2, Summer 1994, p. 152.

7. "Algeria," notes Hugh Roberts, "has no indigenous state tradition. The state tradition in Algeria is a tradition of alien states being established by external powers (the Turks, the French) and imposed by force on the Algerian population." See Roberts, "The Algerian State and the Challenge of Democracy," *Government and Opposition*, Autumn 1992, p. 442. Also see Sandra Laugier, "Quelle politique pour l'Algérie?", *Esprit*, no. 215, October 1995, pp. 55-75.

8. Paul Salem, "The Rise and Fall of Secularism in the Arab World," Middle East Policy, vol. 4, no. 3, March 1996, p. 153. Also, Walter Laqueur, *Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East* (London: Routledge, 1961), pp. 31-36.

9. From the early 1960s to the mid-1980s, Algeria was a leading member of a group of countries in North Africa and the Middle East that outperformed all other regions except East Asia in income growth per capita, life expectancy growth and literacy rates, among other leading economic indicators. Phebe Marr, "Swords into Plowshares: The Middle East Economic Challenge, *Mediterranean Quarterly*, vol 8, no. 2, Spring 1997, p. 177.

10. Gilles Kepel, "Mouvements islamistes et frustration démocratique," *Géopolitique*, No. 42, Summer 1993, pp. 23-4; Khalid Duran, "The Second Battle of Algiers," *Orbis*, vol. 33, no. 3, Summer 1989; Alfred Sherman, "Algeria—An Intellectual Fashion Revisited," *The World Today*, vol. 45, no. 1, January 1989. Mustapha K. Al Sayyid, "Slow Thaw in the Arab World," *World Policy Journal*, vol. 8, Fall 1991, p. 717. Barbara Conry, "North Africa on the Brink," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Winter 1997, p. 119. Hamou Amirouche, "Algeria's Islamist Revolution: The People Versus Democracy?" *Middle East Policy*, vo. V, no. 4, January 1998, p. 89.

11. François Burgeat, *The Islamic Movement in North Africa* (William Dowell, 1992), p. 275.

12. Graham Fuller, *Algeria, The Next Fundamentalist State?* (Santa Monica, Cal.: Rand, 1996), p. 97.

13.The extraordinary speed with which the FIS organized itself into a mass movement left no time to articulate any specific program. Hence the ability to deny or argue that the FIS was no more than "a radical nationalist party that articulated its policies in the context of Islamism" and, therefore, did not introduce any "dramatically draconian social measures." Martin Stone, *The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political History* (NewYork: New York University Press), and Martin Stone, *The Agony of Algeria* (New York: Colombia University Press). See the review of these books by Barbara Smith, "Algeria: The Horror," *New York Review of Books*, vol. 45, no. 7, p. 27.

14. Mumtaz Ahamd and I. W. Zartman, "Political Islam: Can it Become a Loyal Opposition?" *Middle East Policy*, vol. 5, no. 1, January 1997, p. 74]

15. Edward G. Shirley, "Is Iran's Present Algeria's Future?" *Foreign Affairs*, col. 74, no. 3, May/June

1995, pp. 28-44. Graham E. Fuller, *Algeria. The Next Fundamentalist State?* (Santa Monica, California. 1996).

16. Early examples of this trend emerged in 1996 with the lastminute cancellation of a "Rally for Islamic Revival in London in early September, and a crackdown on reported arms sales to the GIA in Germany. In mid-1998, the World Cup provided an easy justification—almost an alibi—for rounding up reported Islamist leaders alleged with terrorist intentions, not only in France and in several other EU states.

17. "No winners in Algeria's endgame," *Middle East Economic Digest*, vol. 39, no. 15, April 14, 1995, p. 3. Phebe Marr, "The United States, Europe, and the Middle East: An Uneasy Triangle," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 48, no. 2, Spring 1994, p. 213. Such retargeting of the GIA would be especially significant because it would come at a time when important U.S. investments have been made (such as Atlantic-Richfield) or are being contemplated (like Chevron). Since independence, U.S. citizens and firms have been protected from violence — whether physical, as now, or ideological as was the case when a socialist Algeria eager to lead the non-aligned states allowed U.S. investments (including Bechtel and Ingersoll Rand) to achieve preeminence in leading economic sectors, to the irritation of other French companies. See Ali Habib, "La rupture du FLN traduit l'ambivalence du pouvoir algérien," and "Faute d'ouverture politique, la violence reprend son cours en Algérie," *Le Monde*. January 24 and February 9, 1996.

18. Jan Ellis, "Algeria pushes for credible rule," *Christian Science Monitor*, January 30, 1996; Imtiaz A. Khan, "Webwire Situation in Algeria," Federal Document Clearing House (FCDH), *FDCH Congressional Hearings Summaries*, April 16, 1996, Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

19. Zeroual's proposed reforms included a two-term limit for the president, who would also be made responsible to a constitutional court; an electoral system based on proportional representation, designed to limit the representation in parliament of the larger parties; and the explicit dissociation of religion and ethnicity from political platforms.

20. In 1991, the FIS lost about 1 million votes relative to the previous year's local elections, as its share of the turnout fell from 54 to 47 percent. In 1995, despite the FIS boycott and threats of GIA violence, the 60 percent level of electoral participation was much higher than in 1991. The boycott probably hurt the parties that advocated it more than either the process or Zeroual (who received 61 percent of the votes cast). See Yahia Zoubir, "Algeria: the ballot box versus the bullet," *Janes Defense Weekly*, vol. 25, no. 6, February 7, 1996; I. William Zartman, "Algeria After the Election: A Giant Small Step," *CSIS Africa Notes*, no. 186, July 1996. Robert Mortimer, "Islamists, Soldiers and Democrats: The Second Algerian War," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 50, no. 1, Winter 1996, p. 25.

21. The RND includes some of Algeria's largest public groups: the main labor union (Union Génétale des Travailleurs), former liberation fighters (Organization Nationale des Moudjahidines), as well as their children and the children of those killed during the war of independence (each group with an organization of its own), and army veterans (always in large numbers).

22. Daho Djerbal, "Les élections législatives du 5 juin 1997 en Algérie," *Monde Arabe. Maghreb. Machrek*, no. 157, July-sept. 1997, p. 152.

23. Olivier Roy, interview by JP Tuquoi, *Le Monde*, April 24, 1997.

24. Not the least part of the public and international resistance to the Zeroual government are the repeated charges of the Army's criminal passivity or, worse yet, its active sponsorship, of some of the more outrageous acts of recent violence, whether directly or through some GIA groups which the Sécurité Militaire is alleged to have infiltrated to the point of control. For example, J.P. Tuquoi, "Algérie, autopsie d'un massacre, *Le Monde*, 11 November 1997; also George Joffé, "Terrorism in the ME and N.A.," *The Middle East and North Africa. 1997*, 4th ed., p. 8.

25. Interview of Gilles Kepel, by Dominique Dhombres, *Le Monde*, February 11, 1997.

26. *New York Times*, December 28, 1996.

27. Erian, p. 142; for comparative purposes, note that Algerian Saharan blend sold at $14.5 a barrel in early 1998, as compared to the the $18 assumed by the government in preparing its 1998 budget. Roula Khalaf, "Algerian regime smiles grimly through oil price headache," *Financial Times*, p. 10.

28. J. P. Tuquoi, "L'économie algérienne sur la voie du redressement," *Le Monde*, October 23, 1997; Ghiles Francis, Réformes économiques, *Le Monde*, May 29, 1997; Anthony Cordesman, *Algeria and the Mahgreb* (CSIS, January 1998); "Algeria Gains a Vote of Confidence with Foreign Oil Contractsm" *New York Times*, December 21, 1995; "Total and Repsol Sign $850m Gas Deal with Algeria," *New York Times*, January 30, 1996. These improvements deserve to be placed in some context: during the period 1985-1995, Algeria's annual rate of economic growth was negative (-2.4% a year) compared to a +0.9 growth rate in Morocco. During that same period, the terms of trade fall from 173 to 83 (as compared to Morocco, where they fell slightly from 99 to 90). Alain Féler and Oussama Kanaan, "An Assessment of Macroeconomic and Structural Adjustment in the Middle East and North Africa Since 1980," *Middle East Policy*, vol. V, no. 1, January 1997, p. 102. Net private capital flows went from 897 million to 129 million in 1995 (with 731 and 572 millions as the corresponding figures in Morocco). *World Development Report. 1997*, pp. 214, 216, 218.

29. As suggested in William H. Lewis, "Algeria at 35: The Politics of Violence," *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 19, no. 3, Summer 1996, pp. 3-18.

30. Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace. Algeria, 1954-1962 (London: McMillan, 1977).

31. Hamou Amirouche, "Algeria's Islamist Revolution," op. cit., p. 82. Malise Ruthven, "The Islamist Movement in the Middle East and North Africa," *The Middle East and North Africa*, 1997, 4th edition, p. 13.

32. In mid-1996, 28 percent of the French people described themselves in agreement with Le Pen's ideas, compared to 19 percent two years earlier. See "Plus d'un français sur quatre d'accord avec les idées du Front national," and "L'influence des idées du FN connaît sa plus forte progression depuis 1990," *Le Monde*, April 3, 1996.

33. *Le Monde*, September 12, 1997.

34. Philippe Bernard, "Le nombre de naturalisations atteint son plus haut niveau depuis 1945," and "1995, l'année noire du droit d'asile en France," *Le Monde*, February 6 and 27, 1996, respectively

35. William Pfaff, "France and Algeria: When the Status Quo Is no Longer Supportable," *International Herald Tribune*, August 23, 1994.

36. W. De Wenden, in W.A.R. Shadid et al., *Muslims in the Margin*, 1996, p. 60.

37. How irresistibly tempting it is to recall De Gaulle's comment, reportedly made to Alain Peyrefitte just before he decided to withdraw from Algeria: "Have you been to see the Muslims, with their turbans and jelabas? You can see they are not French.... People who talk about integration have pigeons' brains.... How can we stop them coming to France and settling in our cities...? My village would no longer be called Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises, but Colombey-les-Deux-Mosquées."

38. "Europe Can Only Guess At How Many Foreigners Call It Home," *Christian Science Monitor*. November 16, 1995.

39. *World Development Report. 1997*, p. 220.

40. The so-called headscarf controversy in France in the early 1990s illustrated the dilemmas that the encounter of the two cultures in Europe is presenting to European governments and societies. At the center of the controversy was the question of whether the determination of a number of female Muslim students to wear headscarves in class violated France's strict secular principles, notably those relating to the separation of religion and politics, and church and state. French educational authorities did decide that wearing the headscarf was, indeed, incompatible with France's secular values; as a result Muslim girls who insisted on this right were barred from attending school. M. Silverman, *Deconstructing the Nation*, 1992.

41. Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1965).

42. Henri Tincq, "Les voies de l'intégration d'un islam à la française," *Le Monde*, October 10, 1996.

43. Roy, "Islam in France," in Bernard Lewis et al, *Muslims in Europe*, 1994, p. 55.

44. Quoted in Craig R. Whitney, "Burdened by History, France Balks at Wading Into Algeran Strife," *New York Times*, 13 January 1998.

45. Andrew J. Pierre and William Quandt, "Algeria's War on Itself," *Foreign Policy*, no. 99, Summer 1995, p. 139, and *The Algerian Crisis: Policy Options for the West* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1996).

46. "La menace du Sud l'emporte sur celle de l'Est," *Le Monde*, September 12, 1991. Margaret Blunden, "Insecurity on Europe's Southern Flank," *Survival*, vol. 36, no. 2, Summer 1994, p. 138.

47. Ian O. Lesser and Ashley J. Tellis, *Strategic Exposure: Proliferation Around the Mediterranean* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996).

48. Mark Stenhouse, "Proliferation in the Mediterranean: causes, consequences & remedies," *International Defense Review*, vol. 27, October, 1994; Ian O. Lesser, *Security in North Africa: Internal and*

External Challenges (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993), pp. 50-2; John Deutch, "The New Nuclear Threat," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 71, no. 4, Fall 1992, pp. 131-32.

49. In July 1995, Algeria joined the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, following an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency signed the previous March to provide scientific assistance for the development of nuclear energy and technologies for civilian uses.

50. See, for example, Edward G. Shirley, "Is Iran's Present Algeria's Future?" *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 74, no. 3, May/June 1995, pp. 30-31.

51. James Phillips, "The Rising Threat of Revolutionary Islam in Algeria," *Heritage Foundation Reports*, November 1995.

52. "Les limites du système Ben Ali," *Le Monde*, October 21, 1997, p. 19.

53. Graham Fuller, *Algeria. The Next Fundamentalist State*, op. cit., p. 86.

54. Kenneth W. Estes, "Spain's View of Maghreb as NATO's Southern Flank," *Jane's International Defense Review*, vol. 29, January 1, 1996, p. 20.

55. Thus, one observer has spoken of Algeria as "the first of many insurrections which may erupt in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq"—and the author to conclude, should this line of dominoes be insufficient, "for starters." Peter St. John, "Insurgency in Algeria: War Without End," Occasional Paper, Center for Defence and Security Studies, University of Manitoba, April 1996, p. 2.

56. Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill and Paul Kennedy, "Pivotal States and US Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 75, no. 1, January-February 1996, pp. 33-51.

57. Thus, aid programs that work are ignored, programs that fail are criticized, and the motivation of all programs is always questioned: scholarships for Algerian students in France, or French teachers to Algeria, are condemned as cultural imperialism, as is Algeria's use of French television (which most Algerians prefer to watch). Similarly, France's newly restrictive policy on visas—which used to amount to as many as 1,000 a day a few years ago—is said to encourage immigration because criteria for applications favor Algerians who are most likely to emigrate: namely, those with education, wealth and family or political connections in France. See "La politique française de coopération vis-à-vis de l'Algérie: un quiproquo tragique," unsigned, *Esprit*, no. 208, January 1995. Jean-Pierre Turquoi, "La France compte réduire son aide à l'Algérie en invoquant des contraintes budgétaires," *Le Monde*, June 26, 1996.

58. In 1995, a new wave of international aid included a $1.8 billion three-year credit facility from the IMF in May and a rescheduling of $7 billion of Algeria's debt to the Paris club of international creditors in the summer — plus $1.2 billion in yearly French credits.

59. Hubert Védrine, interview on Radio France Internationale, 21 January 1998. Gilles Bassir, "Lionel Jospin souligne le violence de l'Etat algérien," *Le Monde*, October 1, 1997. For Vedrine, the French and European interest in the Algerian crisis is "esssentially inspired by compassion" Interview, Radio Monte

Carlo, January 10, 1998.

60. Catherine Simon, "Au Maghreb, la France privilégie le Maroc et la Tunisie," *Le Monde* (January 24, 1996), p. 4.

61. Roberto Aliboni, "Multilateral Political Cooperation in the Mediterranean" and "Institutionalizing Mediterranean Relations," Istituto Affari Internazionali, *Documenti IAI* no. 9409, September 1994, and 9505. March 1995. Club Med accomplishments are limited relative to the EU ambitious objectives of political stability, balanced and sustained economic growth, and conflict resolution and management. Saleh M. Nsouli, Amer Bisat, and Oussana Kanaan, "The EU's New Mediterranean Strategy," *Finance and Development* (September 1996), p. 14.

62. "No Room at the Inn," *The Economist*, December 9, 1995, p. 53.

63. Claes caused some controversy when he stated, in February 1995, that Islamic fundamentalism was "at least as dangerous as communism used to be to the West." *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, February 1, 1995.

64. See my "Memories of Leadership," *Brown Journal of World Affairs* (Summer 1998).

65. Graham Fuller is right to fall in a repetitive mode when discussing the U.S. and Western stakes in Algeria. Perhaps this is, indeed, the only way to be heard. "The stakes are ... high" (p. 1) and "the stakes are high" (p. 119) open and conclude his short book, with the phrase reappearing on at least one other occasion. *Algeria: The Next Fundamentalist State? op. cit.*

66. These talks reportedly included contingency plans for flying in troops (mostly French and none American) to secure oil and gas installations and bring out expatriate staff (including 500 or so American nationals) — possibly as had been done earlier in a few countries in Africa (although on a smaller scale than that contemplated for Algeria). Michael Sheridan, "US and France prepare for Algerian evacuation," *The Independent*. March 22, 1995. Earlier, the French were especially concerned over the U.S. characterization of the Algerian government as a "ruling elite" that hangs on to power "tenaciously" and with "little in the way of political liberties" (as stated in March 1994) and, in December of that year, the refusal to link the hijacking of an Air France jetliner to the Islamic groups that had revendicated it. Mark Parris, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, *Hearings*, House Foreign Affairs, Africa Subcommittee, March 22, 1994; Thomas W. Lippman, "To Islam, an Olive Branch," *Washington Post*. December 28, 1994.

67. *Dallas Morning News*, Janurary 5, 1997.

68. As stated at the National Assembly, January 7, 1998). "La France somme le président Zéroual," *Le Monde*, 7 January 1998.

69. Youcef Bouandel and Yahia H. Soubir, "Algeria's elections: the prelude to democratisation," Third Wolrd Studies, vol. 19, no. 2 (1998), pp. 177-90.

70. Interview, Luis Martinez, *Le Monde*, January 26-27, 1998.

71. According to some estimates, Algeria's investment needs for attending to the job demand amount to

$20 billion by the year 2010. That is a significant amount of money, but in 1997, Algeria recorded a foreign trade surplus of $5.7 billion, which follows a $4.3 billion surplus the year before. William H. Lewis, "The Middle East and North Africa: The Military Versus Democracy," CGSC Monograph. "Toward 2000 Series," No. 6, p. 11. Barbara Smith, "Algeria, The Horror," op. cit. As a consequence of such performance, Algeria grew disdainful of IMF and other multilateral aid, in opposition to what had been the case earlier, on the eve of the presidential elections. For example, Roula Khalaf, "Algeria likely to end IMF programme," *Financial Times*, May 11, 1997.

72. Simon Serfaty, "Bridging the Gap Across the Atlantic: The United States and Europe in the Gulf," *Middle East Journal* (Summer 1998).