


Halki International Seminars

1997



Halki, Dodecanese Islands, Greece
September 1997



**HELLENIC FOUNDATION FOR
EUROPEAN & FOREIGN POLICY**

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INTERNAZIONALI - ROMA

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BIBLIOTECA

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION

Halki International Seminar

Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)

Halki, 11-16/IX/1997

- a. Programme
- b. List of participants
1. "Security considerations in the Mediterranean and the Middle East: a Russian perspective"/ Nicolai A. Kovalsky (18 p.)
2. "The Middle East peace process. The issue of Jerusalem: a point of conflict or a chance for co-existence"/ Sotiris Roussous (12 p.)
3. "Israel right wing parties and the peace process"/ Daniel Ben-Simon (3 p.)
4. "Recent developments in the Middle East peace process: a Palestinian view"/ Mohammed S. Dajani (12 p.)
5. "Democratization in the Muslim-Arab world"/ Bichara Khader, Vincent Legrand (15 p.)
6. "Domestic dynamics and their impact on foreign policy: the case of policies on peace in Israel, Palestine, Syria and Iran"/ Ziba Moshaver (19 p.)
7. "Domestic dynamics in the MENA region and their impact on external relations: Middle East state systems approaching the year 2000"/ Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (12 p.)
8. "The peace process: is it in a coma, collapsing or still viable?"/ Abdel Rahman Abu Arafah (4 p.)
9. "Natural resources in the Middle East"/ Arnon Soffer (21 p.)
10. "Europe and the Mediterranean region: inter-cultural communication and exchange"/ Mohamed Chtatou (22 p.)
11. Conclusions / Theodore A. Couloubis, Thanos Veremis (24 p.)

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SESSION 97.2

The European Union and the Mediterranean Region

Programme

Thursday 11 September	19:00	Seminar Registration
	20:00	Seminar Orientation Yannis VALINAKIS Jean Monnet Professor, University of Athens; Director-General, ELIAMEP, Athens Welcome Dinner
Friday 12 September	11:00-13:30	Political and Economic Perceptions in the Mediterranean and Central-Eastern Europe: The Post Amsterdam Summit Environment Chair: Nicolai KOVALSKY Professor, Center for Mediterranean and Black Sea Studies, Institute of Europe, Moscow
		An EU Perspective Eberhard RHEIN Adviser, European Policy Center, Brussels
		A CEEC View Urszula PAŁŁASZ Head of German Section, Europe-West Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Warsaw
		A Mediterranean View Stephen CALLEYA Lecturer, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta

Friday 12 September
(continued)

18:00-20:30 Security Perceptions in the Mediterranean and Central-Eastern Europe: The Post Madrid Summit Environment

Chair: Ian LESSER
Senior Analyst, RAND, Santa Monica

A Mediterranean View
Mohammed MASALHA
Secretary General, Jordanian Parliament, Lower House, Amman

A CEEC View
Sebestyén GORKA
Guest Fellow, NATO Defence College, Rome

A NATO/WEU View
Monica WOHLFELD
Senior Fellow, WEU Institute for Security Studies, Paris

Saturday 13 September

09:30-13:30 Security Considerations in the Mediterranean and the Middle East

Chair: Roberto ALIBONI
Director of Studies, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome

A European View
Charalambos TSARDANIDIS
Director, Institute of International Economic Relations, Athens

A Mediterranean View
Stephen CALLEYA
Lecturer, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta

An Arab View
TBA

A Russian View
Nicolai KOVALSKY
Professor, Center for Mediterranean and Black Sea Studies, Institute of Europe, Moscow

A US View
Geoffrey KEMP
Director, Regional Strategic Programs, Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom, Washington DC

17:30-20:30 Recent Developments in the Middle East: The Middle East Peace Process

Chair: Geoffrey KEMP
Director, Regional Strategic Programs, Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom, Washington DC

The Case of Jerusalem

Sotiris ROUSSOS
Middle East Expert, Athens

The Rise of the Israeli Right-Wing Parties and the Middle East Peace Process

Daniel BEN-SIMON
Journalist, Jerusalem

Terrorism and the Middle East Peace Process

Anat KURZ
Researcher, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel-Aviv

The Inter-Arab Relations and its Impact on the Middle East Peace Process

Mohammed DAJANI
Director, Palestinian Regional Research Center, Jerusalem

Sunday 14 September

09:30-13:30 Domestic Dynamics in the MENA Region and their Impact on External Relations

Chair: Joel PETERS
Visiting Fellow, Truman Institute, Hebrew University, Jerusalem

The Issue of Political and Religious Fundamentalism

Bassam TIBI
Georgia Augusta Professor of International Relations and Director, University of Goettingen

Democratisation

Vincent LEGRAND
Assistant, Université d'Etude et de Recherche sur le Monde Arabe Contemporain, Louvain

The Interaction between Regional and International Relations in the Middle East Area

Ziba MOSHAVER
Lecturer in Politics, Near and Middle East School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London

Sunday 14 September
(continued)

**Middle East State Systems Approaching
the Year 2000**

Bruce MADDY-WEITZMAN
Senior Research Associate, Dayan
Center for Middle Eastern and African
Studies, Tel-Aviv University

17:30-20:30

Case Studies I

Chair: Bassam TIBI
Georgia Augusta Professor of International
Relations and Director, University of
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Deputy Director, Centre for Defence
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Joel PETERS
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Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Palestinian Authority

Abdel Rahman ABU ARAFEH
President, The Arab Thought Forum,
Jerusalem

Monday 15 September

09:30-13:30

**The European Union and the Mediterranean
Region**

Chair

Theodore COULOMBIS
Professor of International Relations,
University of Athens, Secretary
General, ELIAMEP, Athens

The Barcelona Process

TBA

Migration Issues

Sarah COLLINSON
Research Fellow, Department of
Geographic Sciences, University of
Plymouth

**Cooperative Security in the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership Area**

Roberto ALIBONI
Director of Studies, Istituto Affari
Internazionali, Rome

Natural Resources in the Middle East

Arnon SOFFER

Professor, University of Haifa

Inter-Cultural Communication and Exchange

Mohamed CHTATOU

Directorate of Education, UNESCO,
Rabat

19:00-20:00 Overview

Theodore COULOUMBIS

Professor of International Relations, University of Athens, Secretary-General, ELIAMEP, Athens

Key-note speaker

HE Mr. Dimitrios APOSTOLAKIS

Deputy Minister of Defence, Athens

20:00 Reception

Tuesday 16 September

05:30 Departure from Halki to Kamiros Skala and from there to Rhodes Airport and Port

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Halki International Seminars

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SESSION 97.2, 11-16 SEPTEMBER 1997

The European Union and the Mediterranean Region

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
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Security Considerations in the Mediterranean and the Middle East: A Russian Perspective.

The Mediterranean and the Middle East are traditionally in focus of the Russian public opinion. It was evident during the epoch of tsars and the period of communist regime. The same assessment is correct for our days. The biggest reason for such attention is that the situation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East has an enormous influence on all dimensions of the Russian security.

1. The global security of Russia is linked with the security of the adjacent regions of Europe and Asia but the Mediterranean and the Black Sea space plays a special role. It is a part of the so called "arch of vulnerability" from Gibraltar through Black Sea and the Middle East up to India and China. Stormy events and conflicts, enormous armament potential and oversupply of weapons (the Mediterranean is one of the regions with highest concentration of naval forces) in this area became dangerous challenges for European security and for Russia too.

Prof. Dr. Nicolai A. Kovalsky, President of the Council for the Mediterranean and Black Sea Studies, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow)

2. This kind of assertion is based first of all on the assessment of geo-strategic dimension of the Mediterranean - Middle East - Black Sea Region which during a lot of centuries was a weak point of the Russian military security system. Enemies of Russia could always use the geographical configuration of this area. History is rich with this kind of examples: Crimean khans, Ottoman Empire, Crimean war of 1853-1856, Western intervention in the Black Sea countries in 1918-1921, World War II, 1941-1945.

In this connection it would be useful to take into account that according to the opinion of the authors of Russian military doctrine adopted in 1993 and further statements of Russian officials the immediate threat to unleash a "big" war doesn't exist today, but the military menace remains.

Hypothetically it can be said that holding the Mediterranean as the base for aggression, the potential Russian enemy can isolate Russian South by closing the Dardanelles. Entering the Black Sea waters, he is able to begin an offensive towards the Central Russia and even Moscow. The same possibilities exist in the Balkans.

But more probable could be a missile attack against Russian territory by the naval forces and from land bases in the Mediterranean.

3. As to Russia, it couldn't answer today to military challenges by effective manner. Russian army appears to be in crisis. The combat potential of the Black Sea Fleet which in the past was a powerful instrument of Soviet foreign policy on the southern borders of the country is weakened. By some assessments, 60 % of the Russian Black Sea Fleet are older than 15 and more years.¹ The 28 May 1997 agreement between the Russian

¹ "Nezavisimaj Gazeta" 5 May 1997

Federation and Ukraine was signed. But the process of its implementation remains a difficult issue in relations between Russia and Ukraine. After some months they believe that problem of the Black Sea Fleet is not resolved.²

3. Besides all geo-strategic aspects of present situation the security of Russia depends also on some geopolitical factors. Russia traditionally takes into account a complicated structure of regional international relations, the peculiarity of historical development of the region, the controversies between different groups of Mediterranean nations.

After the collapse of the USSR it became evident that Russia was not able to continue to play the same role in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, which the Soviet Union had been playing. Nowadays the presence and political influence of Russia in the region are being reduced to minimal level as well as Russian participation in the process of decision-making regarding the Mediterranean - Middle East - Black Sea problems. At the same time the activity of the USA and West European countries is growing.

The security on Russian southern borders is undermined by such a geopolitical factor as conflicts and confrontations. Among them is the situation in the Balkans. As far as the Balkans are near to the Russian territory, it determines permanent Russian intention to support constructive processes in the Balkan countries.

4. Given the role which the Balkans played in Russian history, the conflict on the territory of former Yugoslavia attracts special attention of Russian public opinion. The idea that Russia has its own interests in the Balkans is common for almost all trends of Russian public life. All what is

² See: "Bezopasnost Rossii. Chernomorski Region" ("Russian security. The Black Sea Region") M. 1997 pp. 25-44; "Nezavisimaj Gazeta" 6 August 1997

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happening in the Balkans is a substantial factor for the Russian domestic policy and for the political life inside the country.

The perception of necessity to maintain good-neighbor relations with all Balkan countries increased specially at the end of the 20th century. The geopolitical factor influences the Russian line for the stability in the Balkans. It can be said that the line of Russian diplomacy consists there of efforts to influence the general situation by maintaining traditional contacts with the Serbs, preserving good relations with the Muslims and Croats, cooperating and interacting with the Western powers. "It's impossible to replace Russia in the life of Jugoslavia - was declared by first deputy of Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov - our relations will be preserved in long - term meaning on very high level".³

5. For a long period the Middle East is a region of Russian interest. Now Russia is one of two cosponsors of the Middle East peace process. This reason as well as the economic necessities, as Foreign Minister Evgeni Primakov believes, are the impetus to develop here a Russian diplomatic activities.⁴

Moscow wants to maintain its role in the Middle East. Last year E.Primakov visited Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon. This year (1997) the highest leaders of Lebanon, Israel, Palestine were received in the Kremlin. One can say that Russian official line is to have constructive relations with all sides of the peace process, with all countries of this huge region.

6. Russia is interested also to ease tension between Greece and Turkey over territory in the Aegean; this confrontation creates direct threat to security of the Black Sea area and to the navigation through the Straits.

³ "Nezavisimaj Gazeta" 5 February 1997

⁴ "Segodnya" 5 November 1996

For the same reasons it is important for Russia that the Cyprus problem will be resolved as soon as possible. Recently the Russian Foreign Ministry declared that "actual status quo is intolerable" and called for demilitarization of the island.

As to the signing of the contract of the purchase of Russia surface-to-air missiles C-300 the Russian position is that cooperation between Moscow and Nicosia in defense matter is a bilateral act that doesn't concern third parties, and that the sale of Russian arms did not violate international law, nor does it put back into question the balance of forces.⁵ It seems that new possibilities may appear if some progress will be evident in the process of normalization of situation on Island.

7. For better understanding the Russian Mediterranean policy it is good to keep in mind that the Russian tradition is to consider the Mediterranean and Black Sea Region as a single space. Today new geopolitical elements of the Black Sea area are of large influence on Russian security system. Russia is witnessing an overhaul of the geopolitical environment in the Black Sea region distinctly marked by an expanded number of international subjects in the area. Now the Black Sea geopolitical situation is a combination of more than a dozen nations and international organizations. Their multifaceted relations are incomparable to those of the Soviet era and Cold war.

Conflicts and crises in the Black Sea are serious challenges to Russia, especially to its internal policy. It became evident particularly in the course of violent clashes and conflicts on the Caucasus provoked by ethnic aggravations, increasing nationalism and secessionism (separatism). The situation in Ossetia, Abkhasia, Nagorno Karabakh has not been settled down so far, even though Russian peace-making and mediatory efforts

⁵ Agence Europe 9 January 1997, "Nezavisimaj Gazeta" 18 January 1997

undertaken with the UN and OSCE produced some results. The situation in Chechnya appears to be especially complex.

8. Other big group of factors determining the role of Russia and its security policy in the Mediterranean-Black Sea region is inseparable from developing economic and social processes.

First of all many Russian internal regions have maintained effective economic contacts with the Mediterranean and Black Sea countries. The South of Russia (Krasnodar and Stavropol Territories, Rostov-on-Don Region), which play a big role in national life as a breadbasket, sea gateway and recreational area, has developed economic and trade relations with countries of this region.⁶ There are direct economic regional accords with Romania and Bulgaria. The Central Russia, the Volga Region, the Ural and Siberia cooperate closely with the areas adjacent to the basins of the Black Sea and Azov Sea, even those that have become part of Ukraine, Moldova or Georgia, with many Mediterranean countries.

9. The Mediterranean and Black Sea has always been a gateway to the World Ocean for Russia. The Black Sea routes and Straits accommodate about 25 percent of Russian foreign trade. The Mediterranean countries are Russian traditional trade and economic partners. Unfortunately, 1990s have seen the weakening of economic ties especially with the South-Mediterranean subregion.⁷ Merchant maritime routes will be gaining importance in the future decades when Russian economy gets stronger, its foreign trade diversifies and it branches out to new markets.

⁶ "The South of Russia" in "International Affairs", Moscow, N10 1994 pp. 64-157

⁷ Boris M. Pichugin "Russia's trade with the Mediterranean countries" in "Russia: The Mediterranean and Black Sea Region", M. 1996. pp. 108-114

10. The factors which provide the global security for Russia in the Mediterranean and Black Sea Region have also some social aspects. Social stability can be considered as necessary precondition for the creation of a really effective security system. The Euromediterranean efforts to control such social problems as consequences of the economic gap between two shores of the Mediterranean Sea, the demographic situation and migration provoke the interest of Russian scholars and practitioners as a matter of positive experience.

As to the Black Sea zone its high level of social tension is a permanent challenge to the Russian security. The problem of refugees and forced migrants is clearly extraordinary in this context. As a large portion of refugees is socially marginal, it is fairly susceptible to extremist idea of any sort. The inevitable tumult and disorder in conflicts become a fertile breeding ground for organized crime and drug-dealer rings. There is a very real and confirmed danger of turning the area lying at the cross-roads of merchant routes from Asia to Europe into haven for international drug traffickers.

11. For better understanding of Russian approach to the problem of Mediterranean security one has to emphasize that the history of the Mediterranean and Black Sea space rendered the substantial impact on the shaping of Russian national identity. Religions and cultural ties played a big role. Christianity came to Russia from the Eastern Mediterranean through the Balkans and the Black Sea lands. The battles in the Mediterranean against Napoleon I and Ottoman Empire, the Crimean War in the Black Sea contributed to the evolution of the Russian national idea. The traditional view of Russians was that of liberator in the Black Sea region and the nearby Balkans.

12. During a certain period after the collapse of the USSR a naive belief in eternal and indestructible friendship with the West dominated over Russian society. The public opinion was waiting for dissolution of the NATO after the end of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.

The first steps of the West appeared to be more or less encouraging. While the NATO continued to exist, nonetheless the NATO's leaders announced that the NATO was reviewing its strategy and would rely on political actions henceforth.

But soon the inexorable laws of geo-politics began to work. The result was that the NATO tried to fill the vacuum which sprung up after disappearance of the Soviet Union, in particular in the Mediterranean and Black Sea space.

The increase in the military activity of the NATO in the Mediterranean Region became a distinctive feature of the new situation.

An analysis, for example, of the NATO's activity in 90s in the Balkans revealed that it continued to rely on the threat and use of force. This was graphically seen when NATO joined the hostilities on the side of one of the parties. NATO military leaders have been consistently advocating the right to independently take decisions on delivering bomb strikes, clearly expecting the UN to provide a cover of respectability to their actions.

The Dayton agreements created basis for a long-term peace-building process. For being really effective their application has to be achieved not by the violence but by elastic political methods without preferences and discriminations.

13. The continuing presence of the US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean provoke the same kind of concern.

The question is, what is the aim of its continued presence there, if the enemy against which it had been deployed is no longer there? Is it designed to symbolize the US might in the region, putting pressure on South European, African and Middle Eastern countries? But this can not help reduce tensions in the region, if normal and effective political methods will not be used.

14. Besides, NATO is establishing itself very actively in the Black Sea, which has always been the priority zone of Russian interests. NATO's instrument of this policy is the program known as Partnership for Peace, which all Black Sea countries have joined.

In the new situation developing in the region as a result of the conclusion of relevant accords, NATO's southern flank is shifting northward, which means that the Black Sea became one of its components.

Never before did the NATO countries warships sail the waters of the Black Sea so often as today. Let us to compare: in 1990 7 navals of non-coastal countries visited Black Sea ports, 29 in 1996.⁸ It has become a regular NATO practice to hold joint exercises in the area, which the Russian military regard with a measure of worriness. By the way, Russia refused to take part in the 1995 and 1996 naval exercises in the Black Sea, held under the Partnership for Peace program.

This increasing activity of NATO is matter of discontent of Moscow. President Boris Yeltsin declared that Russia would react hard on all efforts "to transform the Black Sea into jumping-off place for the fleets of NATO and non-Black Sea countries". The exercise "Sea Breeze" in august 1997 provoked a stormy reaction in Russia.

⁸ "Nezavisimaj Gazeta" 18 January 1997

15. The biggest danger for aggravation of relations between the West and Russia are the plans of NATO's enlargement towards the East.

If NATO accepts as its members not only Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic but also Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Ukraine and Moldova, as it was announced in the Resolution of the US Congress in July 1996, Russia will be turned out face to face with a single military bloc from the Baltic Sea up to the Mediterranean.⁹ The visit of Mr. J.Solana to Caucasian and Central Asia republics in March 1997 was considered as a pressure on Russia.¹⁰

In this context the recent NATO's efforts to expand its influence in the Mediterranean acquire a special meaning.

16. The course for strengthening military cooperation between the NATO and the West European Union has to be mentioned too. In May 1994 the WEU admitted Romania and Bulgaria as associated partners.

Thus, the Russian public opinion, which got used to viewing NATO through the characteristics of the Cold War period, has some reasons to be concerned. Naturally the situation can be improved if NATO will establish truly partnership with Russia and will take into account not only its own interests but the security concerns of Russia too.

It seems that effective application of the "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the NATO and the Russian Federation", signed in Paris on May 27, could reduce a tension between the two sides, especially if, as Mr. J.Solana said, would be realized the common goal to overcome the vestiges of past confrontation and competition.¹¹

⁹ "Isvestia" 25 July 1996

¹⁰ "Nezavisimaj Gazeta" 7 March 1997

¹¹ "NATO Review" N3 May-June 1997, p. 3

17. The significant role plays an other active subject of regional multilateral relations - the European Union.

It seems that its biggest achievement in this area is the Conference in Barcelona in November 1995, when the new so called Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was launched.

But two big countries, which have economic interests in the Mediterranean - the USA and Russia - were not invited to attend the conference in Barcelona and hence they are not members of the Euromediterranean cooperation system.

Regarding the USA one can say that this non-participation can not have serious consequences for American economic interests, because the US economic presence as well as political one in the Mediterranean have sufficient and solid roots.

For Russia consequences can be much more negative given its actual economic crisis and general weakness of its position in the area. The impression is that this absence of invitation to the Euromediterranean cooperation means the intention to isolate Russia from regional activity. For various reasons some North-Mediterranean countries do not want to see Russia participating in this system, but there are some which have other point of view.

18. The analysis of documents of the Barcelona and Malta conferences provokes an important question: will the Euromediterranean cooperation be a closed structure, where the entrance is forbidden for non-coastal countries and non-members of the EC? It is an opportunity to remark to this point that another regional structure - The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) - is open for participation of interested countries and includes some Mediterranean countries.

Why among all European countries will the EU members have special privileges in the region? The politics of discrimination regarding other continental countries will not help to resolve the difficult problems of the Mediterranean. Russia, which has its own traditional interests in the region and being linked with the Mediterranean basin through the Black Sea, may claim the right to contribute when the problems of the region are discussed.

19. There are some reasons which provoke negative reaction of Russia on radical Islamism in the Mediterranean area.

First, it prevents normal economic activity of Russian business circles, commercial companies and other economic organizations in the region. As an example the situation in Algeria can be mentioned, where after the murder of several Russian citizens in 1994 the number of Russian specialists working for Algeria was reduced by half. In the 1996 the issue of security of Russian personnel was put again because one of the biggest Russian companies "Lukoil" announced its intention to begin large-scale project in Algeria.

Second, the ideological and psychological impact of Mediterranean Islamic radicalism on the Islamic community in Russia and on Muslim population of Central Asia, Caucasus, Crimea.

Third, the Muslim factor in the Balkans where the Serbs traditionally supported by Russian public opinion have a lot of unsettled problems with their Muslim neighbors.

And, lastly, the Mediterranean Islamic radicals are an active element of the arch from Afghanistan up to the Atlantic Ocean of those Islamic forces which for different reasons consider themselves as enemies of Russia.

It must be said that in Russia there are different approaches to the phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism. While one part of experts condemn totally the fundamentalism, another part believes that such

approach would be not correct because the Islamic fundamentalism consists of several trends and it would be wiser to find a compromise with the forces of moderate fundamentalism.

20. What can be done? It is obvious that the strengthening of regional security - including those of Russia - is based on the process of development and improvement of bilateral and multilateral relations.

21. To enhance the quality of political interaction with all Mediterranean - Black Sea nations for ensuring stable regional security and stability would be of great importance for the foreign policy of Russia.

The Mediterranean problems can be discussed in the frameworks of treaties and agreements concluded by Russia with all the North-Mediterranean countries - with France in 1992, Turkey - in 1992, Greece - in 1993, Spain - in 1994, Italy - in 1994, Portugal - in 1994. Unfortunately only few of them have clauses specially regarding the Mediterranean.

The international documents signed by Russia with the countries of the North-Africa provide also a good possibility for developing bilateral efforts.

Why "the Mediterranean elements" of these treaties do not work can be explained by different reasons: the quick changing of political situation, the lack of farsightedness of some governments, including those of Russia, the inertness of national bureaucracies etc. Nevertheless it must be noticed that, it seems, Russia has some positive results in its Mediterranean - Black Sea bilateral foreign policy activity.

22. The relations with Greece seem to be promising and this country is considered by a big part of Russian public opinion as the most possible preferential long-term partner in the area. The realization of the project for

construction of the oil transfer system Novorossiisk-Burgas-Alexandropol is of big importance for all sides. In June 1997 the Greek Olympic Airways launched the new line: Athens - Moscow - Athens.

Until recently public opinion was impressed by Turkey's initiatives aimed at promoting various ties with Russia. Turkey is very active on the Russian market and is a good economic partner. However, from a certain point in the past the public opinion is concerned about Pan-Turkic propaganda and a tightening of the regime of the Black Sea Straits. The problems of mutual cooperation will be discussed by the end of 1997, when E.Primakov is supposed to visit Turkey.

23. Effective for resolving regional problems can be the common efforts of several or many countries.

The current cooperation between the NATO and Russia in the Balkans is one of this kind of example. It is evident that such cooperation can have good results as to problems of regional security and may be realized in the framework of the Founding Act between the NATO and Russia.

The same kind of constructive cooperation in the Mediterranean with the European Union could also be fruitful. It seems that Russia is ready, and it is the turn of the EU. Probably, the EU, which has some technical assistance project for the Black Sea area could establish a special Black Sea Program for promoting regional development.

A special attention Russia pays to the OSCE, which is the only really all-European organization with 52 member-states. Admittedly, the potential of OSCE for peace and economic change in the Mediterranean has not been used to the full. The root of the problem lies in the contradictions between various groups of member states of OSCE about the formulation and implementation of a policy of OSCE in the Mediterranean. However, there

is the growing feeling among the member states that this organization cannot remain inactive in the Mediterranean.

24. It seems that really effective system of Mediterranean cooperation can be born by a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean - CSCM. The idea of calling such a conference, advanced by Italy and Spain several years ago, was supported by the majority of Mediterranean countries. It won approval at the CSCE's Palma de Mallorca meeting on the Mediterranean. Foreign Ministers of Western Mediterranean took a positive stand on it at their meetings. So did a number of West European countries having no direct access to the Mediterranean. The war in the Gulf and later in Balkans delayed the convocation of the CSCM but did not detract from relevance.

It appears obvious that the participants of the CSCM would forge ahead with a discussion of the most essential political, economic, social and ecological issues. One of these categories should include the security problems of the Mediterranean. The idea of indivisibility of security, as well as the assertion that nobody should maintain its security at another expense and that the cause of tension and mistrust in the region should be removed through constructive and effective policies will apparently form the bases of the related decisions. It seems appropriate that the CSCM should reaffirm that every state, irrespective of its size or outlook, has the right to maintain its own security, that war should not be used as a means of achieving political goals and that new ways of maintaining security may provide for the safekeeping of life under peaceful conditions.

The matter of cooperation in economic, commercial, technological, scientific and environmental spheres would constitute another major theme for CSCM action. The issues of economic cooperation are close with those

of cooperation in the social sphere. The priority must be given to problems connected with the migration.

25. A constructive contribution in this field is made by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, which convened Inter-Parliamentary Conferences on Security and Cooperation in Mediterranean in Malaga in 1992 and in Valetta in 1995. At these conferences where among participants were also members of Russian parliament, some constructive ideas about the content of the CSCM were formulated.

26. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation - the BSEC can be considered as a good example of the regional partnership, which helps the shaping of a new European architecture. One can say that the cooperation became just reality in this part of the Mediterranean and Black Sea Region. Eleven Heads of States or Governments, who came in Moscow in October 1996 for their summit, discussed important problems of this area.¹² They reiterated the intention of making the Black Sea Region a zone of peace, stability and economic prosperity and thereby to make contribution to the building of new Europe based on the known principles including equal security.

Some provisions of their Moscow Declaration are directly linked with the Mediterranean. They noted the positive steps in the Balkans and expressed readiness to cooperate constructively, relying also on the BSEC structures, in the implementation of economic projects in the Balkans.

The members of the Moscow Summit noticed the ties and confirmed the need to develop efficient cooperation between the countries of the Black Sea and Mediterranean and to establish the appropriate mechanism of

¹² "Meeting of The Heads of State or Government of The Participating States of The Black Sea Economic Cooperation and The eighth Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of The BSEC Participating States. Moscow, 25 October 1996". Istanbul 1996, 162 p.

interaction. They appreciated the Euro-Mediterranean initiative of the EU and expressed the intention to cooperate with this institution.

"Russia highly appraises the role of the BSEC" - Boris Yeltsin mentioned in the Address to the participants of the Summit. The BSEC countries account for 16 plus percent of Russian foreign trade. In security sphere of the BSEC Russia stands especially for effective measures against political terrorism, organized crime, belligerent nationalism, drug trafficking.

The Government of Russian Federation adopted The Decision N 500 on further participation in the BSEC.¹³

27. Finally some conclusions can be formulated.

- Russia, as a big power with enormous and developing potential, needs to be present in the Mediterranean - Black Sea - Middle East region. This is evident from all points of view. Given that the Russian foreign policy regarding this area is linked with a lot of internal factors, it become a significant factor of struggle of home dominant political and economic-financial forces. Thus the future of the country, its democratization and development of the market economy depend to a considerable degree on the role, which Russia can play in this region and on the realization here of Russian natural interests. Besides the actual Russian activity here is a laboratory of region foreign policy, which now become a very important element of the global system of international relations.

- The implementation of this line may be accomplished only through peaceful measures, i.e. through application of principles of cooperation and partnership, which are of priority for the practice of Russian foreign policy, as it was officially proclaimed. Taking into account the meekness of

¹³ "Rossiyskaj Gazeta" 21 May 1997

Russian economy, it's naive to believe that resurrection of the so-called Russian Empire is possible.

- To make these cooperation and partnership really constructive and corresponding to the interests of all sides depends not only on Russia but also on all other subjects of the international community. Unfortunately at the end of the twentieth century there are political forces, which are regressing to the Cold War period.



Sotiris Roussos

THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
*THE ISSUE OF JERUSALEM: A POINT OF CONFLICT OR A
CHANCE FOR CO-EXISTENCE*

There is no dispute about the sanctity and centrality of Jerusalem in Judaism, Christianity and Islam. There is also no doubt about the symbolic role of Jerusalem in various cultures and societies from the Ethiopians to the Nordic Churches and from the vast Jewish Diaspora to the Muslims in Indonesia. The Holiness of Jerusalem transformed the issue of sovereignty over the city into one of the most intractable international problems.

The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate proposals that had already been put forward for a solution of the problem and to designate the common ground for compromise. The essay will also refer to the long-standing, ancient Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem and its important role in the region. Firstly it will go through international attitudes towards Jerusalem in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries until 1948. Secondly it will refer to various proposals for a settlement of the issue of Jerusalem.

The issue of Jerusalem is not a novelty in international affairs. Since the beginning of the eighteenth century, the diplomatic corps of countries such as France, Austria and Russia had believed that Jerusalem should be handled as a special issue and that the Holy City should be "governed" under a special status separate from the political and social situation in the region. It was this very idea that led to Russo-Turkish agreements in the mid-eighteenth century and the great diplomatic effort over the protection of the Holy Places throughout the nineteenth century; it was this idea also that led to the abortive

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international commission on the Holy Places in the early 1920s and propelled the proposals for internationalisation in 1946-1947.

Jerusalem was under the Ottoman rule and by the mid-19th century it became the "bone of contention" among the Great Powers. The Crimean War, although it was fought over Central European issues and imbalances, it presented Jerusalem and the Holy Places as its main pretext. The "internationalisation" of Jerusalem was behind all European diplomatic initiatives from 1852 onwards. The Prussians had, from 1841, suggested an international agreement on Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Nazareth and these suggestions remained present and prevailing a century later.

Plans for "extra-territorial" settlement of the issue of the Holy Places were always met with suspicion by the Ottomans and the indigenous Churches, namely, the Patriarchate of Jerusalem. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century, French, Austrian and Venetian intervention led to the strengthening of the Catholics in Jerusalem at the expense of the rights and privileges of the Orthodox Church. The Patriarch of Jerusalem, on the other hand, exploited the influence of the Greek bureaucrats in the Ottoman Court and thwarted the plans of an international-Western intervention. The Ottoman state mistrusted French, Austrian and Venetian plans and, as a result, was ready to appease the Greek grievances.

Thus, there were two poles in the discussion over the status of Jerusalem and the Holy Places. One pole, constituted by France, Austria, Prussia, Venice, and represented by the Catholic Church in the Holy Land, saw the status of Jerusalem and the Holy Places as an international issue. The other pole, constituted by the Greek Orthodox Patriarchates in the East and the Orthodox Church of Jerusalem in particular, suspected any international

intervention and supported regional settlement based on agreements with the Ottoman government and the indigenous population ¹

During the nineteenth century the situation became more perplexing due to the emergence of the Russian ecclesiastic and political influence in the Middle East, on one hand, and the increase of Western Protestant missionary activity on the other. From the mid-nineteenth century Russian ecclesiastic initiative became the main feature in the life of the Eastern Church in Syria and Palestine. The foundation of the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society in the last decades of the nineteenth century emphasised the educational, cultural and political motives of the Russian presence in the Christian Orient.

The Protestant missionary work on the other hand was planned and initiated by the Anglicans and the Prussian Church and started as a romantic endeavour to convert the Jewish community of Palestine into Christianity. Protestant missionaries found themselves in a completely unknown environment and, thus, failed in their conversion task. Nonetheless, they established a small but vivid network of education and welfare institutions. Both Russian and Protestant educational work targeted on the Arab population, connecting the Arabic language and culture to the movement of European Enlightenment and helping the articulation of an Arab nationalism by bringing the Arab Christians closer to European nationalisms of the nineteenth century.

A third element of the nineteenth century was the Jewish immigration waves to Palestine, the first and the second *aliya*. These Jewish immigrants, though imbued by romantic socialist ideals, they had a strong sense of coming back to their own sacred Land, a sense of *Heimatland* that was rooted in their culture and social education.² At the beginning of the twentieth century the establishment of the Jewish immigrants provoked the reaction of Arab

intellectuals in Syria and particularly in Palestine. It was this reaction that prompted the emergence of a circle of Christian Arab nationalists who identified their own Land with the land of the Holy Places and Jerusalem.³

The two Great Wars came as catalysts to the situation of the Middle East by either eliminating or enforcing the above mentioned internal and external factors. The Russian presence sank with the great boat of the Tsarist Russia. The Jewish people were promised the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. The Arab nationalists were disappointed to find themselves without an independent state but a patchwork of territories under British or French Mandate and a non-Catholic power, England, had been attributed the task to arrange the issue of Jerusalem and the Holy Places.

The idea of placing Jerusalem under a special international regime had already been conceived during secret British, French and Russian talks in the winter 1915-16 on the division of the Ottoman Empire. The Sykes-Picot Agreement provided for a neutral entity including Jerusalem under international administration.⁴

The Article 14 of the Mandate for Palestine provided for a commission on the Holy Places. It is well understood that the status quo in the Holy Places influenced the fate of Jerusalem. The British proposed that the Commission on the Holy Places should have three sub-commissions, one Christian, one Jewish and one Muslim. The Christian sub-commission would be composed by three Roman Catholics (Italian, Spanish, Belgian), by three Orthodox (one of whom Greek and one Russian), one Armenian and possibly one or two representatives of the Ethiopians and the Copts.

The British proposal met with strong French opposition who maintained that a Christian commission should have a Catholic majority and of course the president of such a commission should be French, given the traditional role of

France as protector of Catholicism. On the other hand, such a preponderant role of France met with the strong reaction of Italy since the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem was Italian.

Facing this deadlock the British stated, in October 1922, that they were not able to settle the disputes among the Catholic States and that they assumed the protection of the Orthodox rights since these were not represented by an Orthodox power in the League Council. Thus they would not accept a solution which would not be just for the Orthodox. The commission never came to life and the British Mandate undertook the obligation to preserve the status quo in the Holy Places.

The diplomatic struggle over the Commission of the Holy Places revealed the weakness of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The transfer of the decision-making from Jerusalem and Istanbul to Paris, London and Rome deprived the Greek Orthodox Church from any power and gave the Holy See the initiative. The arguments of European powers on the issue mirrored the same ideas and notions about the Holy Places which were prevailing in the 19th century especially after the Crimean War.

The period of the British Mandate was marked by two developments: the strengthening of the Zionist movement and the establishment of political, economic and social organisations that became the nucleus of a future Jewish state and the emergence of a Palestinian Arab national movement headed by Haj Amin Al Hussein, the Mufti of Jerusalem, making the Holy City its political centre.

In 1947, the extra-territorial character of the Holy Places would give way to *corpus separatum* of Jerusalem. The "internationalisation", which was behind all European diplomatic initiatives from 1852 onwards, was now

presented unveiled. The General Assembly of the United Nations in the Resolution of 29 November 1947 recommended the establishment of Jerusalem as *corpus separatum* under a special international regime to be administered by the U.N.

It seemed that this extra-territoriality of Jerusalem could not rebuild checks and balances structured by the Ottoman system of communal-confessional autonomy, the *millet* system. The *millet* system, which, in contrast, was based on the regional situation was no longer there. Extra-territoriality was met with mistrust by the indigenous Churches, notably the Greek Orthodox Church and by almost all regional factors.

The land of Palestine became one of the most important issues of the common and at the same time diverse culture and history of the Palestinian Arabs. Their notion of Palestine could not exclude the Holy Places and as such any idea of *corpus separatum* for Jerusalem could not be accepted by the Palestinian Arabs regardless of their confession. At the same time Jerusalem was part of the culmination of Zionist aspirations and thus could not assume an extra-territorial character. The partition of the city in 1948 and the situation created by the 1967 war, arguably demonstrated the failure of extra-territorial solutions.

Proposals for solution: Accommodating the different facts on the ground

Each of the various proposals on the issue of Jerusalem provided also for its own perception on the geometry and geography of Jerusalem. Each plan "invented" its own version of Jerusalem. Internationalisation plans included Bethlehem and a wider zone round the city. The Jerusalem notion of Jewish Agency in 1947-49 did not include the Arab neighbourhoods and the Old City

apart of the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall. King Abdullah on the other hand in his negotiations with the Jewish Agency seemed to prefer partition than internationalisation and indirectly limited his concept of Jerusalem into the East side of the city as well as the Old City.

The 1967 war and the subsequent situation changed the geometry and the versions of Jerusalem. National myths on the Israeli side came to be fulfilled and constituted nation-wide consensus. But this is another version of Jerusalem different of that in Sykes-Picot agreement in 1915-16, or of that of 1947 internationalisation plan or of what Zionist leadership negotiated for, with King Abdullah.⁵ Even after the Israeli conquest of the East Jerusalem, chief Israeli commanders, namely Moshe Dayan, were not sure about the status of the Old City.⁶ This new version of all-Jewish Jerusalem faced the exclusiveness of an all-Arab Jerusalem capital of the Palestinian state as it was put forward by the Palestinian national institutions and leadership.

Throughout 1990s a series of nation-wide consensualised concepts and perceptions came to be radically reversed. An ongoing political debate in Israel turned views about Israeli-Palestinian negotiations from the margins to the centre of Israeli politics. The late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin shook hands with President Arafat and the Oslo Agreement was a vindication of adjusting political visions to the facts on the ground. Israel could no longer ignore the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and the PLO should admit the right of Israel to exist in peace and utmost sense of security.

The lesson of the *millet*-system status quo on the Holy Places may be an example of how different Churches and confessions live side by side with little interaction. Each of them have been creating its own sphere of activity that never intersect.⁷ Joint decisions regarding functional and physical unity in the Holy Places, when necessary, took a considerable amount of time to be

reached but eventually they acquired the widest consensus and, hence, viability. The status quo on the Holy Places, as it was preserved in the last two centuries is nothing more than codification of the facts on the ground. The model can be working in the issue of Jerusalem.

As Cecilia Albin marvellously demonstrated there are two notions regarding Jerusalem that impede any fruitful discussion: firstly that Jerusalem is a zero-sum "fixed pie" in which parties are doomed to either unacceptable compromise or permanent conflict.⁸ Secondly that the concept of sovereignty and capital city is absolute and indivisible.⁹

The facts on the ground, however, clearly manifest the lack of functional and physical unity of the city. The integration of the 160.000 Palestinians into an Israel political, social and municipal authority has not been achieved and the same seems true about indivisibility. The present situation is one of violence and hatred, miles away from a positive-sum approach. This is far from a solution beneficial to both Israelis and Palestinians. And the first step may be the legitimisation of what is the present situation. Generations of Israelis have been born and grown up in the post-1967 neighbourhoods of East Jerusalem. They can not be uprooted, the existed map of Jerusalem can not be reversed. On the other hand the right of the Palestinian neighbourhoods to be under the new Palestinian Authority is equally legitimate.

In March 1993 the First Israeli-Palestinian International Academic Seminar on the Future of Jerusalem put forward alternative plans for a solution of the problem based on the present situation and not on symbolic, ideological or political rhetoric. Their main proposal regarded the drafting of a Charter of Jerusalem that provided, among others, for a fresh definition of the city boundaries, clear division of authority between the various authorities

entrusted with the government of the city, freedom of access and worship in the Holy Places and certain fundamental planning regulations binding on both Israelis and Palestinians.¹⁰

An alternative model proposed the establishment of two municipalities one Israeli and one Palestinian, separately elected by citizens of the State of Israel and Palestinians citizens. Another one provided for a joint Israeli-Palestinian municipality. Neighbourhood self-management should be widespread aiming at a high level of decentralisation of the municipal governments. The *minhalot* (neighbourhood -based self-governing bodies) could serve as initial model.

The deliberations of this Israeli-Palestinian seminar were the outcome of a decades-long process of proposals drafted from both sides which were not always free from prejudice, symbolism and ideological-political rhetoric.¹¹ Nonetheless all these earlier proposals by ex-Mayor T. Kollek, S. Toledano, M. Amirav, S. Peres and King Hussein (1987, London Accords), Abdul Hadi, Al Fajr and S. Nusseibah contributed to public discussion which was the only way to avoid deeply rooted concepts and presuppositions.¹²

It, thus, appears that a public discussion on a solution in the issue of Jerusalem has revolved round the following principles:

- A model of scattered Israeli-Palestinian sovereignty which would respect the facts on the ground. Free access of people, goods and services from and to both the State of Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
- An Israeli-Palestinian Metropolitan assembly which would guarantee the physical and functional unity of the city.
- Preservation of the Status Quo in the Holy Places. Any attempt to alter the Status Quo would create more problems.

Provision should be made for a Council consisting of the religious bodies and institutions that already have rights on the Holy Places with veto right for each of the participants.

- There should also be a sort of international guarantee over the implementation of such delicate agreements. A United Nations High Commissioner could undertake the task.

However, all these plans, models and patterns can not be implemented without the building up of an economic and social commonwealth that includes Israel, the Palestinian Authority and possibly Jordan. Such a commonwealth can promote development and growth and, hence, eradicate the main problem of socio-economic inequality bridging the gulf between the Israeli and the Palestinian neighbourhoods. The socio-economic dimension of the Peace Process has now acquired a preponderant role with its capacity to solve most irritating every-day problems.

Another precondition for the implementation of a Jerusalem settlement is the speeding up of the democratisation process and the building up of a civil society. No self governed bodies and institution can flourish if there is no absolute freedom in electing the members of these bodies, or if there is no accountability and transparency in the handling of public affairs. Non-governmental Organisations with no affiliation with either the State of Israel or the Palestinian Authority, but manned and operating across the line can play pivotal role in preserving the physical and functional unity of the city.

Moreover, centuries-long established institutions, notably the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem, having no state or other international connection can be instrumental in building cross-line connection and preserve the city's unity, by breaking introvert attitudes and using their rich experience

in dealing with the matters on the ground. The spheres of education, welfare and housing can serve the purpose.

Some general observations

In conclusion the issue of Jerusalem came up with the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of the Western Powers and Russia in the Eastern Mediterranean. Jerusalem and the Holy Places was then seen as a mere European issue and all the solutions which were put forward for the status of Jerusalem were imbued by the notion of extra-territoriality.

The two World Wars reshaped the political geography of the region and gave the opportunity to propose and test plans of extra-territoriality and direct or indirect internationalisation of the issue of Jerusalem. The plans proved futile owing to European disagreement over the control of the Holy Places in 1920s as well as to misunderstanding of the situation on the ground in the proposals of 1947. Along with the European reflection, both the Zionist and the Palestinian Arab national movement created their own notion of Jerusalem.

Hence, Jerusalem corresponded to various versions, changing its geometry and geography according to international balances, political aspirations, ideological rhetoric, tactics and compromise on the ground. Despite the efforts to present an eternal version of Jerusalem, history teaches us that "our" Jerusalem is a shape-changing mirage. Each community, each side in Jerusalem holds its own mirror of history, its own mirror of Jerusalem.¹³ As Ze'ev Chafets points out, Jerusalem issue is closely connected to arguments about religion, history, strategy and patriotism.¹⁴ Although all the issues in the Middle East and the Balkans are closely connected to these four spheres, most of these issues proved to be negotiable.

Thus, a solution of symbiosis and functional partnership in Jerusalem can be a golden chance to learn to tolerate the "other" and, so, become the cornerstone of peaceful co-existence in the region.

Instead of "nationalising the sacred" both parties had to look on the facts on the ground and open a public discussion. It is well established how painful is for both sides to cede part of what they believe it is their legitimate right on the city. It may take time but we must be sure that the public discussion is always right open.

Elefsina, 12. 9. 1997

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¹³ Penny Johnson, "City of Mirrors, A conversation with Albert Aghazarian", *Middle East Report*, vol. 23, No. 182, May June 1993, p. 13.
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Israel's right wing parties and the peace process

Daniel Ben-Simon

For many Israelis, until recently, the Middle East peace process seemed to be moving pretty well. After decades as something of an international rejectionist, Israel agreed to trade land for peace with its Arab and Palestinian neighbors and was suddenly welcomed into the world community. Yet, given the choice, the Israeli people turned away from the peace process and its leaders and elected a prime Minister who campaigned against what he called the folly and danger of reconciliation. In May 1996, Israel abruptly stepped back from where, it had seemed, to be going.

I will abstain from getting into the reasons which helped Benjamin Netanyahu become Prime Minister. One thing is sure: the peace process was not the most significant factor in the elections' outcome. Even as I speak, most Israelis still favor the Oslo agreement and the majority of them believe that even the creation of Palestinian state in the West bank is inevitable. A poll conducted few days before I arrived here, showed that 56% are still in favor of the agreement as has been signed by the Labor government. Netanyahu would not have been elected had he turned his back on the Israeli-Palestinian accords. During the electoral campaign, he vowed to carry on the peace process but that he would add; once elected, his own trademark: a strong fist against terrorism. His campaign slogan "peace with security" appealed to many Israelis.

Four Islamic suicide bombers who blew themselves up in crowded places, 3 months before the elections, drew Israelis closer to Netanyahu's formula of peace with a strong security.

Netanyahu's government has been in power for a year and half. As we all know, the peace process has, since, suffered major blows and many in Israel believe that they are witnessing the beginning of the end of peace accords with the Palestinians.

What is Netanyahu's concept of peace? does he have any? can he count on his coalition if he decides to break away with the peace process? and I would add another question: Can this coalition push the peace process forward?

Before I try to answer these questions, I would like to shed some light on the various political parties that form the Netanyahu coalition. It has been called by many a "tribal coalition". I called it in a book I've written "the coalition of the outcasts, the rejected. Namely, the minority groups who have never been accepted, let alone given legitimacy, by Israeli elites and mainstream Zionism. By voting against the Left, many voters expressed their rejection of Zionism for being Western, Secular and of late too eager for peace. I dare say that these new tribes who run Israel today will stick to a right wing candidate, no matter who he is.

This coalition looks like a right wing coalition with a vengeance, but a closer look reveals that 4 out of the 7 coalition parties have no clear agenda on the

peace process or are indifferent toward it. They were born because they felt socially disenfranchised and cultural deprived. Had it been for the peace process, these parties could have easily joined and collaborate with a Labour government had Shimon Peres defeated Netanyahu in the 1996 elections.

Let me say few words on each one of them and start with the Shass party. This ultra orthodox party has 10 seats in the parliament and is the third largest party in the 120 seats parliament, after Labor and Likkud. The Shass party is Oriental both by ideology and by its members' origin. It entered into politics in the 80s in order to enhance Oriental Jews' living standards in Israel. For many Years, The religious oriental communities had lived under the total hegemony - both political and spiritual - of the Ashkenazi ultra-orthodox communities. That has changed since the Oriental Jews reached political independance.

The spiritual leader of this party, Rabbi Ovadia Yossef, has acquired a strong reputation among Israelis as having extreme dovish positions and as being fully committed to peace between Israel and the Arabs. He has said and repeated that peace is essential to Israel's existence and that the Bible rejects anything, even land, for the sake of one human life.

Of all parties in Israel, both secular and religious, this party can bring Netanyahu down if it comes to the conclusion that the Prime Minister is turning his back on the peace process. One senior political commentator gave a free advice to Secretary Madeleine Albright last week: If you want to succeed in your peace mission, go and have a long chat with Rabbi Ovadia Yossef.

Another coalition party is the "Guesher" party headed by the foreign minister David Levy. It has 5 seats in the parliament and enjoys a dovish reputation. Like the Shass party, the Levy party has committed itself to promote the Sephardic community in Israel. Its position on the peace process has been clear, namely, it is ready to make greater concessions both in the West Bank and in the Golan Heights in return for peace.

I dare say that like the Shass party, the Levy party carries the potential of breaking away from the government if it comes to the conclusion that the Prime Minister puts the peace process at risk. Last week foreign minister levy made it clear that unless Netanyahu commits himself to the Oslo Accords, the danger of war in the Middle East remains imminent.

Netanyahu enjoys the support of another coalition party which represents the Ashkenazi Ultra Orthodox Jews. For years this party has abstained from meddling with issues of peace and war, because it has considered them to be of concern to secular Israelis. Their spiritual rabbi, who is 100 years old has stated time and again that violence in the region had started as soon as the Zionist movement took over Palestine. "we lived a peaceful life in Palestine until the Zionists came in and messed everything up because of their nationalistic zeal", he said on various occasions.

This party joined the Netanyahu government, first and foremost, to enhance Jewish and religious values and help destroy the Zionist character of Israel and its secular image.

As to the Peace process, this ultra orthodox party has been consistent with the position, stressed out by its spiritual leader, who sees a war over territories as a Zionist provocation.

Last but not least among these four coalition parties is the Russian party, which holds 7 seats in the parliament. Most of the 700 thousand who immigrated in the last decade, are not familiar with this century old struggle between Israel and Palestinians. In 1992, more than 70% of them voted for Labor and helped Yitzhak Rabin become Prime Minister. In 1996, these very same Russian voters changed course and voted in large numbers for Mr. Netanyahu.

Opinion polls showed that their prime concern in voting against Peres in 1996 had been their personal well being. By voting for Netanyahu, these voters expressed their deep frustration with unemployment, housing and racial prejudice. They blamed Labor for their problems and voted accordingly.

It is difficult to define their position on the peace process. At times they show willingness for large concessions, at times, they are depicted as anti-Arabs and anti-Palestinians.

Now back to Netanyahu. Can he rely on his "tribal and ethnic coalition", if and when he decides to kill the peace process? never before have Israelis been so divided and so split over the character and the future of the state. Unlike previous years during which Israelis split over peace and war, nowadays, they differ on the most fundamental issues. We have now a Russian party, a Moroccan party, soon we'll probably have a Yemenite party, an Ethiopian party and so on. This tribal politics is partly responsible for the dismantling of Israeli unity and the current deep divisions among Israelis.

I don't know if Netanyahu wants to kill the prospects of peace in the region. The sad fact is that they are dying. For him, the Oslo Accords lead inexorably to the birth of a fully independent and sovereign Palestinian state on Israel's doorstep. He envisages a Palestinian entity which resembles the black settlements of white ruled South Africa. According to his views, it would have no large army or air force, no right to form military alliances with other countries - a Bantustan-like enclave surrounded by Israeli troops.

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**RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS:
A Palestinian View**

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"THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION"
SEPTEMBER 11-14, 1997
HALKI, GREECE**

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me begin by expressing my appreciation and thanks to the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy for having organized this seminar and for giving me the opportunity to express Palestinian views on recent developments in the Middle East peace process.

Due to the constraints of time, I would like to focus on three aspects of the issue under discussion, namely, the human , political, and economic.

1. The Human Dimension

In a shocking statement to both the Israelis and the Palestinians, the mother of a teenage Israeli girl who was killed in the latest suicide bombing in Jerusalem, blamed Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for her daughter's death. She openly described the suicide attacks "as a product of the continued oppression of the Palestinians by the Israeli government". She is reported by the Israeli daily newspaper, **Ha'aretz**, as saying: "They sacrifice our children for their megalomania - for their need to control, oppress, dominate." Her husband, interviewed by CNN on 11/9/1997, attributed the suicide bombings to the "hopeless situation under which Palestinians live.... the lack of hope."

This should by no means be construed as a justification or a defense for suicide bombers, but desperate people do desperate things. Terrorism by nature transcends the confines of rational judgment since rationality requires one to preserve and protect his soul not to destroy it.

The Israeli policy of "control, oppression and domination," as the mother of the unfortunate young innocent victim put it, created a hopeless situation in which a whole people, and not just a few isolated individuals, see no glimmer of hope at the end of the peace tunnel. This is mainly due to the political and economic conditions under which they live.

The expansion policies of Jewish settlements on Palestinian lands continue as we speak. The confiscation of Palestinian land in the Palestinian Territories to build new settlements and roads in defiance of international law, and UN resolutions continues. The Israeli Government continues to detain Palestinian prisoners without trials. It continues to deprive Palestinians (Moslems and Christians) living in the West Bank and Gaza from praying in holy places in Jerusalem. It continues to harass Arab residents of Jerusalem and to deprive many of them from their basic right of residing in Jerusalem. Unemployment among Palestinians is rising sharply. Poverty is spreading like fire in a haystack, and the morale of the people is dropping lower and lower.

Suicide bombers in their choice of bombing locations are not targeting Israelis only but Palestinians as well. The streets and souqs in Jerusalem chosen as target locations are frequented by both Palestinians and Israelis. I personally was in both areas with my family just few days before the explosions - in Yehuda Mahane market to buy fish and in the popular Ben Yehuda promenade to sip coffee.. Now we do not go there not for fear of another attack but in order to avoid Israeli negative reaction. In this, I feel that terrorism did bear fruit as the bridges of communications between the Palestinians and the Israelis have collapsed and are now being replaced by a wall of fear, hatred, and mistrust.

Initially, the feeling of mutual mistrust was there. All the world watched on television when late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin hesitated to shake the hand of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat extended to him in peace on the White House lawn. Rabin at the time was not to be blamed as decades of enmity, conflict, and bloodshed cannot be wiped out in one day, or one month, or one year. For some, it may even take a lifetime.

Twenty Palestinian fanatics who have turned themselves into human bombs have succeeded in taking us far back in time. Today, Palestinian leader Arafat and Israeli leader Netanyahu are not only refusing to shake each others' hands but are reluctant to meet or talk. On the human level, the demise of the peace process has marked a triumph for terrorism. Sadly, this will not be the end of it. Yossi Beilen, a leading Labor strategist had correctly warned: "If Netanyahu doesn't give the Palestinians some light at the end of the tunnel, there will be more terrorism>"

2. The Political Dimension

On the political level, it is important to be reminded of three main concepts embedded in the Oslo Accords. Oslo I & II were based on three main propositions:

First Proposition: Graduality; this is a gradual approach to problem solving which meant that both parties agree to stick to an priorly agreed-upon timetable to resolve their differences. approach to problem-solving was agreed upon -here, one move followed another until the road is cleared from all obstacles setting the stage for the the second phase. For instance, according to the Oslo

Accords, Israel should have deployed its troops from the West Bank by September 7, to clear the road for both parties to move to the next items on the peace agenda of the negotiation's table, such as Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, and cooperation with neighboring countries.

The Israeli Prime Minister Mr. Benjamin Netanyahu announced recently that he wanted to move to the final status settlement negotiations without taking the necessary steps of getting there.

In response to this, the obvious question raised by Palestinians is: "How can we reach that stage without first taking the necessary steps eventually are supposed to lead to the final status negotiations?"

Showing goodwill is the basic cornerstone of any final settlement negotiations. Negotiations ought not to be among the Israelis themselves, between the Prime Minister and his cabinet and then imposing on the Palestinians what is decided. The peace process is a partnership between equal partners. Reaching the stage of negotiations on the final status obviously means that both Palestinians and Israelis are mutually content with the progress of the implementation of the issues that a move forward becomes necessary.

Second Proposition: Prosperity; this meant an expectation that there will be a general improvement in the standards of living for the people of the region as a result of implementing the peace agreements..

Third Proposition : Security; this meant that implementing the peace would bring security to the states in the region.

The Oslo II Accord, signed in Washington on 28 September 1995, contained three major undertakings from the PLO to Israel:

1. To annul clauses in the Palestinian Covenant calling for the destruction of Israel;
2. To put an end to hostile propaganda;
3. To combat terrorism.

The first two commitments were fully implemented by the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). However, the third commitment, on the other hand, has become very controversial as it was never spelled out in the agreements how and what should the PNA do to fulfill this undertaking. Israeli security officials do admit that Palestinian security agencies were very cooperative on security matters, and on a number of occasions they prevented suicide bombers from accomplishing their missions.

This is why the Palestinians feel they delivered their share of the peace bargain and were expecting the Israeli government to do the same. But unfortunately, the Israeli Government of Benjamin Netanyahu had in fact abandoned the peace process long before Mr. Netanyahu declared it dead. Eversince he was elected as Israel's prime minister, Netanyahu deliberately torpedoed the peace process citing security considerations in order not to honor Israel's commitments stipulated by the Oslo Accords. The question one poses here is : Where does Israel's security lie: In a healthy peace or a dead one? Israeli Foreign Minister David Levy raised similar questions when he asked Netanyahu: "What will happen without the Oslo process? Won't we find ourselves on a dead-end road? Will that stop the terrorism and attacks?"

3. The Economic Dimension

Economically speaking, the rationale for supporting the peace process is to raise the standards of living in the Palestinian territories. Thus, in the aftermath of the peace process, Palestinians were hoping that the economic conditions would improve and that peace would bring prosperity.

Just the contrary, while the Israeli economy boomed, the Palestinian economy dropped drastically. Several constraints influenced the pattern of economic development in the Palestinian Territories:

First, funds from the Arab countries dried, money from Palestinians working in the Gulf dwindled, and Israeli measures such as collective punishment, closures, forced unemployment etc. made things worse. Donors pledged funds but eventually did not deliver as much as they pledged.

Second, movement of capital, goods and people on the Palestinian Territories reached new lows, resulting in critical levels of unproductively and unemployment, and leading to starvation and new levels of desperation. The border crossing points are still under Israeli control hindering the movement of goods and people.

Third, the dependency factor. As a result of Israeli policies, the Palestinian economy became highly dependent on the Israeli economy resulting in almost non-existing Palestinian economy. Israel had restructured the Palestinian economy in such a way to make it become totally and completely dependent on the Israeli economy.

Consequently, instead of market factors of supply and demand determining the ups and downs of the Palestinian economy, it is the

Israeli economic policies which determine the overall mechanisms of the Palestinian market by deciding whether it would buy Palestinian products to export at a predetermined price or not. This means in the final analysis that neither the Palestinian consumer nor the forces of supply and demand play any role in determining the forces of the market.

This restructuring of the Palestinian economy can be explained as forced integration with a much larger economy causing tremendous economic imbalances, bottlenecks, unfair trade practices, monopolies, cartels, and artificial restrictions imposed on Palestinian trade. Several other negative factors have contributed to the disintegration of the Palestinian economy which is partly linked to the region, but in a distorted manner. For example, the Palestinians were able to sell their labor regionally, but not their commodities, specially in the Gulf states. It is one of the main objectives of the Palestinian Authority is to decrease this dependency and to untangle the threads of linkage to the Israeli economy, seeking new trade partners and commercial relationship with its neighboring countries, Europe, the United States and Japan.

What do the main actors in the peace game want for the peace train to be on the move again?

First, What do the Israelis want?

High on the Israelis political agenda is "security".

This raises the question : How can Israeli security be achieved?

And by whom?

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu provides disturbing answers to his promise of "peace with security." To him, Israeli security lies in

sheer military power, a dead Oslo, and a wide carpet of Jewish settlements. He wants PNA President Arafat to crack down on the Palestinian Islamic movement even those leaders who have condemned terrorism. However, there is no hard evidence that either of the last two suicide attacks were planned or executed by them from the Palestinian Territories.

On the contrary, there are indications that such operations may have been financed and operated from abroad. PNA President is not in charge of Israeli security and as such should not be blamed for its failure to prevent terrorism committed by unknown parties against Israeli and Palestinian targets aiming at sabotaging the peace process..

Here one may pose the question: Is the PNA holding back information on terrorist activities against Israel which its leader is not sharing with the Israelis? Even the Israelis are convinced that this is not the case.

There is no doubt that President Arafat would have Palestinian public opinion turned against him if he would take harsh measures against the Islamic movement just to please Israeli public opinion. How would it sound if Arafat would ask Netanyahu to crack down on Jewish militants who strongly oppose the peace process just to please Palestinian public opinion?

Should Arafat move against the Islamic movement just to please Netanyahu, he would most certainly lose his support among the Palestinian masses and may trigger a scenario similar to that of Algeria where fanatic militants murder and massacre innocent civilians in what is building up to a civil war.

The dilemma President Arafat finds himself facing is that, on the one hand, he is being expected to institute a democratic political system, while on the other, he is required to crack down on the political opposition which constitute an important pillar of any democratic society.

What do Egypt and Jordan want?

High on the political agenda of Egypt and Jordan is the "resumption of negotiations".

The mini-summit held in Cairo on 7 September and attended by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, King Hussein of Jordan, and PA President Yasser Arafat reflected Arab views on the present stalled peace process. The communiqué they issued spelled out their demands as follows:

1. Implementation of the interim agreement in all its clauses;
2. Resumption of negotiations on final status as soon as possible;
3. Israel to refrain from actions alien to the "spirit of peace" such as building of settlements, confiscation of Palestinian land, collective punishment, and changing the status of Jerusalem.

The three Arab leaders condemned all acts of terrorism and violence regardless of their motives and sources, and viewed such acts "as an attempt to obstruct the peace process." They urged more intense international efforts to save the peace process.

What do Palestinians want?

High on the Palestinian political agenda is "honoring Oslo obligations".

The PNA wants Israel to honor the following commitments stipulated by the "**text of Oslo**" :

1. To redeploy its troops from the West Bank initially scheduled for September 7, 1997.
2. To allow opening the Gaza airport and the Gaza seaport;
3. To facilitate constructing a "safe passage" between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank;
4. To stop changing the character of Jerusalem.
5. To free Palestinian prisoners detained in Israeli jails.


In addition, the PNA wants Israel to honor the following obligations emanating from the "**spirit of Oslo**":

1. To freeze its settlement policies;
2. To end the policy of collective punishment;
3. To abandon the policy of closure;
4. To assist in Palestinian economic development.
4. To free funds due to Palestinians.

The Oslo Accords did not contain clear provisions obligating Israel not to construct settlements on Palestinian territories. Yet such views are perceived by Palestinians to violate the "spirit of Oslo", though the "text of Oslo" is devoid of any clear reference to it.

In conclusion, peace in the Holy Land remains elusive. It is unfortunate that success carries within it the germs of its demise. The Oslo Accords are no doubt a historic breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli conflict and as such was met with much resistance and rejection. However, Oslo is not dead inspite the claims to the contrary. At present, few Palestinians think the peace process is doomed; however, many believe it is weakened, especially because of the contrast between the way things were before Oslo and the way things became after Oslo.

Both Israel and the Palestinians need to be forward in their thinking They ought to cooperate together to preserve what both want - peace and security. The United States and the European Union are defying dispiriting odds to salvage the peace process; however, this will not be achieved unless both Israelis and Palestinians adopt a more cooperative conciliatory spirit.



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Democratization in the Arab-Muslim World

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I am very pleased to represent today the CERMAC - the Research Centre on the Contemporary Arab World - of the Catholic University of Louvain and his director Prof. Bichara Khader, who would have much enjoyed to join us and attend the Halki Seminar, but who has been kept back in Belgium for previous commitments. I will try to present to you the results of our reflection we have led in harmony on the subject that we have so kindly been invited to treat by Eliamep : "Democratization in the Arab-Muslim World".

A preliminary remark to our reflection on "Democratization in the Arab-Muslim World" is related to our activity here at this Halki seminar. Most of us here are diplomats or politicians in charge of their state's foreign policy, journalists or scientific researchers. This triad constitutes what the British "critical" geopolitician Klaus-John Dodds calls "the state's privileged story tellers"¹. He means that, on a geopolitical point of view, this triad - diplomats or politicians, the media and research workers in the field - is the main group constructing the dominant representations of the "other", of the "foreign" in foreign policy decision-making. We think this seminar partakes of this process and the representations of the "other" in the Southern part of the Mediterranean we will produce or reproduce and which will confirm or invalidate our previous world views on the subject may influence the attitudes we all will adopt towards the region in our respective fields of activity, in this case with this paper on "Democratization in the Arab-Muslim World". So, as members of this community of the "state's privileged story tellers", what is - with all due modesty - our story about ?

Beyond the culturalist-essentialist approach to "Islam and democracy"

First, there are widespread representations in the West according to which democracy is inconceivable in Arab-Muslim societies. This vision mainly derives from the presupposed assumption that Islam and democracy are in essence incompatible. This type of approach is called essentialist or culturalist and is in fact disconnected from the context in which a culture or a religion is lived, in particular places and at particular times. From this

¹ Klaus J. DODDS, "Geopolitics, experts and the making of foreign policy", *Area*, 25 (1993) 1, p. 73

point of view, Islam, far from following a proper dynamics, is submitted to the contexts in which it is lived².

So, asserting for instance that, in Islam, "democracy cannot be pluralistic because it cannot contradict aspiration for unity"³ is, from this point of view, nonsense. A caricatured and stereotyped example of asserting essentialist viewpoints about Islamic societies is the literal use of Koranic passages which reinforce the representations in question. But one could also refer to other Koranic passages which would quite easily invert the presupposed assumptions and, in this way, be useful for amending them. But, as we will see, that's not the point. In fact, on sociological and politological points of view, philological or similar textual approaches should rather be dismissed in order to give way to the social sciences - sociology, anthropology, political science, economics, geography, history etc. -, as it is usually the case in similar studies for instance on Latin-American or East-European societies.

In the present problematics, we should clearly avoid considering Islam as "irremediably linked to any kind of theocracy which, in the guise of its latest misadventure, islamism, would prove unable to open to the pluralistic universe and its democratic corollary"⁴.

The rise of civil society -

islamism as one of the driving forces of political transition

On the contrary. Indeed, a more and more held thesis among specialists in Middle East studies is that islamism, as an expression of political opposition to the post-colonial authoritarian regimes, along with feminist movements, Human Rights' organizations and other political or professional forces - all what constitutes the rising civil society -, is one of the driving forces of political transition in this area, sometimes in democratic terms. As the problematics is so wide, we have opted to focus on one particular theme : Islam, islamist or - more correctly - Muslim societies and democracy. But naturally the whole problematics should not be reduced to this aspect. We nevertheless chose this because it is one of the most

²Clifford GEERTZ, in Jean-Noël FERRIE, *Paradoxes de la réislamisation en Egypte*, *Monde arabe / Maghreb Machrek*, n°151, janvier-mars 1996, pp. 4-5

³Bertrand BADIE, *Culture et politique*, Paris, Economica, 1993, pp. 99-100

⁴Baudouin DUPRET, "Politique, religion et droit dans le monde arabe", *Les Cahiers du Monde arabe*, Louvain-la-Neuve, CERMAC, n°116, 1995, p. 4

worrying and - we, in all due modesty, think - misunderstood aspects in Western decision-making circles.

The crisis of legitimacy of post-colonial Arab states

The rise of civil society goes hand in hand with the deep crisis of legitimacy post-colonial Arab states are going through for (1) political-ideological, (2) socioeconomic and demographic and (3) cultural-ideological reasons. Some of these states have adopted what Prof. B. Khader calls a "survival strategy"⁵ consisting in the opening up of the political spectrum, yet in a controlled way, as we will see, which led to the arrival of - among other forces - islamist forces on the legal political scene.

In fact the socioeconomic factor played a major role in leading authoritarian regimes to open up the political spectrum during the eighties, following popular protest namely in the so-called "bread riots", which were not necessarily linked to islamist initiatives. But this opening led to the emergence of islamist forces - among other forces - on the legal political scene and to their reinforcing presence on the political scene in general.

But first, let's analyse what kind of crisis of legitimacy Arab regimes are going through. As I said, we can distinguish three aspects in the question : these are (1) the political-ideological, (2) the socioeconomic and demographic and (3) the cultural-ideological.

(1) *At the political-ideological level*, the post-colonial Arab state, which based its legitimacy on nationalism, reached a "social contract" - a "negative consensus"⁶ - with its citizens "under the terms of which [it] was to effect development, ensure social justice, satisfy the basic needs of its citizens, consolidate political independence, and achieve other national aspirations (e.g., Arab unity, the liberation of Palestine). In return, citizens were to forego, at least for a while, the quest for liberal participatory politics"⁷. So, authoritarian political regimes settled, with their one-party or

⁵Bichara KHADER, "Etat, société civile et démocratie dans le monde arabo-musulman", Paper presented at the conference on "Governance in the Euro-Mediterranean Region" organized by the Dutch government and the Dutch Presidency of the European Union, 1997, March 17-18, p. 14

⁶*Ibidem*, p. 6

⁷Saad Eddin IBRAHIM, "Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World : An Overview", in Rex BRYNEN, Bahgat KORANY & Paul NOBLE (eds.), *Political Liberalization & Democratization in the Arab World*, Vol. 1, Theoretical Perspectives, Boulder / London, Lynne Rienner, 1995, p. 36

dominant party systems. But, as we will see at the point about the cultural-ideological aspects of the question, such an authoritarian domination on the society could not persist with the erosion of the legitimacy capital of the nationalist ideology.

(2) *At the socioeconomic and demographic levels*, post-colonial Arab states have been less and less able to face the challenge of satisfying the needs of their steadily growing population. During the last fifty years, Arab population raised from 80 to 250 million people, 60% of whom are less than twenty years old. At the same time, during the last two decades, Arab states went through a financial crisis, namely due to the erosion of a whole series of rents :

- the strategic rent (due to the end of the bipolar system),
- the oil rent (due to the 1985-86 reverse shock and the reduction of the energy demand),
- the inter-Arab solidarity rent (as a consequence of the Gulf War),
- the tourist sector rent (characterized by uncertainty and linked to security performance),
- the remittances (due to the gradual definitive installation of Maghreb's immigrants in Europe and the forced return of Egyptian and Palestinian immigrants from the Gulf);
- the international aid rent (linked to political positions).

Consequently, during the eighties and the nineties, Arab states have been financially less and less able to perform their modernizing projects such as infrastructure, create jobs (particularly in the public sector) and supply with social services. Simultaneously, they could not reduce unemployment by resorting to the emigration of a part of their non-working population. In such conditions, no wonder the unemployment rates are high, namely among the youth. The labour market cannot absorb all those who are leaving school : while Arab countries should create 2,5 million jobs each year, they can only create one fifth of them. This leads to much frustration among the youth - frustration which fosters radical protest against the regimes.

(3) *At the cultural-ideological level*, the crisis of legitimacy can be seen as follows : such a contemporary phenomenon as islamism can be understood as "a political ideology which, by resorting to a religious

referent, finds a means to break the universalist claim of Western political thinking and to make a reconnection with a pre-colonial past felt as authentic⁸, during the third step of the decolonization process - a third step which is cultural -, after its political step (independence) and its economic step (nationalizations)⁹. This naturally goes hand in hand with the generational change, with a youth that has not lived through the national struggle for independence, which could build for a time the nationalist legitimacy of the fathers of the Nation and their successors. The claim here is not aimed at the global rejection of Western values (imported nationalism in its liberal or socialist versions, developmentism), but at the rejection of them as a monopoly : this is a demand aiming at contributing on an equal footing to the production of sense in world society.

Islamism and democracy

So the legitimacy capital of nationalism is eroded, as well as the authoritarian character which regimes had adopted in its name. As such, "for some, namely François BURGAT (...), nowadays islamism is the force which represent civil society and the democratic claim against repressive, corrupted and basically conservative states"¹⁰. This is undoubtedly a too cut general assertion. But what we no doubt are of the opinion is that islamism constitutes one - and again not the only one - driving force of political change in the Arab-Muslim region, in some cases maybe in democratic terms. In some cases, because there are lots of different ideological trends in the islamist wave and situations differ a lot from country to country and even within a same country, in place and time. We can look into this latter problematics in two steps : first, how does the islamist wave lead some authoritarian regimes to the opening up of their political spectrum ? second, once the political spectrum is opened to the islamist forces, do these constitute democratic forces in themselves ?

⁸Baudouin DUPRET, "L'Islam et l'islamisme dans notre miroir", *Adapi*, n°15, 1994, p. 8

⁹This third-step thesis is held by François BURGAT, *L'islamisme au Maghreb : la voix du Sud (Tunisie, Algérie, Libye, Maroc)*, Paris, Karthala (Coll. "Les Afriques"), 1988.

¹⁰Olivier ROY, *Généalogie de l'islamisme*, s.l., Hachette Livre, 1995, p.125. The author refers to François BURGAT, *Face à l'islamisme*, La Découverte, 1995

Inclusion strategy :

how does islamism lead in some cases to political opening ?

Arab regimes have adopted three types of attitude towards the rising force of islamist movements : eradication, selective cooptation and inclusion. We will particularly focus on the inclusion strategy, which offers the most interesting material to observe how islamist forces do react when they are put to the test of democratic participation. Inclusion is the process which leads to the parliamentary opening up of the political spectrum and which is adopted by regimes in a "survival strategy"¹¹ as "an experimentation of the state on the society in order to control it and not as a control instrument of the society on the state"¹². This does not mean that it cannot lead to this in the future, even if this was not intended so at the beginning. Here, regimes try to contain the islamist forces by integrating their protagonists in the basic political scene in opening their parliament to them.

Once the polity opened through inclusion strategy,

do islamists constitute democratic forces in themselves ?

The second question is : once the political spectrum is opened to the islamist forces, do these constitute democratic forces in themselves ? In other words, do they play the democratic game in a tactical or in a strategic way ? Some have argued that, with islamism, electors would be granted a "one man, one vote ... one time" process. Such an assumption derives from the essentialist vision which considers, as we have seen, Islam (and thus also islamism) and democracy as incompatible. Moreover, it has to be noted that islamist leaders in general have taken a long time to give up the dogmatic refusal of democracy put forward by the first islamist theorists, who considered it incompatible with the ulemas' monopoly and a threat to the unity of the Muslim community¹³. Moreover, some Arab regimes

¹¹Bichara KHADER, *op.cit.*, p. 14

¹²Muhammad 'Abid AL-JABIRI, quoted by Ghassan SALAME, "Introduction - Où sont donc les démocrates ?", in Ghassan SALAME (ed.), *Démocraties sans démocrates - Politiques d'ouverture dans le monde arabe et islamique*, s.l., Fayard, 1995, p.20. Al-Jabiri refers to the failure of what Salamé has called the "first liberal moment" in the region, but it is a still relevant topical reflection.

¹³François BURGAT, "Les islamistes et la démocratie : repères pour une recherche", in Bernabé LOPEZ GARCIA, Gema MARTIN MUNOZ & Miguel H. de LARRAMENDI,

perceived as the West's "relays" have resorted - yet in a selective way - to the democratic referent, so that it could not easily be taken over by their islamist opposition. But some islamist forces have begun to adopt the democratic referent - often not in tactical terms but in strategic principles¹⁴. More importantly, in some countries where inclusion strategy is applied, islamist forces seem to behave in a democratic way in integrating the logics of the parliamentary game. One really has to study the problematics case by case in a contextual and dynamic way, as situations differ from country to country and are volatile.

Sure, the "one man, one vote ... one time" vision is not to be peremptorily rejected as it is a theoretically possible consequence of each electoral process outcome. It is not to be excluded, but it is not a fatality. We think one has to analyse carefully the question in the various contexts in order to avoid a priori generalizations based on essentialist presupposed assumptions or on the basis of outdated islamist textual sources.

Political interactions between the Northern and the Southern parts of the Mediterranean in cultural-ideological terms

There is anyway no determinism : it depends from the behaviour political actors adopt in reference to some norms and not from the norms in themselves. And it is on this point that I would finally like to invite you to pay attention. In the question of "democracy" and "Islam" as ideological elements in the attitude we mutually adopt in the Northern and the Southern parts of the Mediterranean, how do cultural differences between political actors interact ? But, first, the preliminary question is : "are there differences ?" And if the answer is : "Yes, there are", first, of which kind are they ? and second, do they necessarily lead to conflict ?

Democracy seen as a Western concept

An interesting starting point in the problematics of "Democratization in the Arab-Muslim World" is the Ghassan Salamé's definition of democratization as "the adoption of institutions and practices acknowledged by the West as democratic, or at least similar to its own"¹⁵. This definition is

Elecciones, participacion y transiciones politicas en el Norte de Africa, Madrid, Agencia espanola de Cooperacion internacional, 1991, p. 169

¹⁴*Ibidem*, p. 171

¹⁵Ghassan SALAME, *op.cit.*, p. 7

on a sociological-politological point of view perfectly relevant because it is not based on a philosophical abstraction¹⁶ disconnected from its context, but, on the contrary, it highlights its cultural and sociopolitical basic roots. This definition enables us to understand the geopolitical problematics of the "Islam and the West" relationship in socio-psychological and political terms.

Democracy seen as a selectively applied concept

Democratization is "the adoption of institutions and practices acknowledged by the West as democratic, or at least similar to its own". In a way, the democratization process in the Arab-Muslim World in itself is not the point. In many islamists' eyes, the point, which is highlighted by Salamé's definition, is its particular - Western - cultural basic roots. As such, the concepts of democracy and democratization are not seen as neutral in the Muslim-Arab world as well as in the South in general. Moreover, history shows that the West often applies them "swing-wingly", it is to say where and when it suits its interests. As Robert Mugabé, from Zimbabwe, reminds : "Why must we ever listen to those who only yesterday were our oppressive colonialists, as they now seek to be our mentors of democracy and preach to us multiparty democracy which they never practiced in respect of our countries ?"¹⁷ But as a Yemeni professor mentions about Human Rights, "the wrong application of the Human Rights' theme by dominant powers does not prove that the idea of respect for Human Rights itself is suspect"¹⁸.

Both as an analogy and as a part of the problematics, we would like to briefly mention one of our past studies about Islamic and Western perceptions of the "New World Order"¹⁹, which showed how the new order was felt in the Arab-Muslim world as partial in both senses of the word : it is to say particular - non-universal - and biased - unjust.

¹⁶as interesting as it may be in other kinds of studies

¹⁷New York Times, 1990, April 22. Quoted by Jean-François REVEL, *Le regain démocratique*, Paris, Fayard, 1992, p. 341

¹⁸Mohammad Abdel Malek Al-Mutawakkel, "Islam and Human Rights" (in Arabic), *Al-Mustaqbal al-Arabi*, n°2, 1997, p. 5

¹⁹Vincent LEGRAND, "Islam-Occident : normes et perceptions croisées sur le Nouvel Ordre mondial", Paper presented at the Louvain-la-Neuve Workshop on "L'éthique de l'espace politique mondial : métissages disciplinaires", 1996, June 21-23, Unité des Relations internationales, Département des Sciences politiques et sociales, Université catholique de Louvain (Belgium). A revised version is to be published in Fall 1997 in *Les Cahiers du Monde arabe*

The "New World Order" is considered as partial - unjust - because it would not be applied in all similar situations, but only when it suits Western interests.

Second, the "New World Order" is considered as partial - non-universal - because it would reflect anything but Western values. This is a subtle subject, because if we look into the alternative Islamic projects for instance in Human Rights' affairs, while we can observe some "substantial" differences, our impression remains that there are lots of differences which emerge more from the psychological need of differentiation from the West than from the ontological existence of fundamental differences with the West.

We think democratization namely as an element of the "New World Order" project can be granted the same kind of approach.

Democracy seen as a selectively applied concept : further insights

What about the partial - unjust - character of the democratization problematics ? This comes from the Arab-Muslim perception - namely islamists' perception - that the West promotes democratization in the Arab-Muslim world only where it suits its interests. This is the well-known "double standards" protest which was cried during the Gulf Crisis and the Gulf War, in this case, in view of the different treatment administered to Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and Israeli occupation of Palestine. It is important to note that islamists' primary target is not the Western civilization, but their own governments²⁰. When do they aim the West ? When it supports authoritarian regimes which are reluctant to open up the political spectrum to the opposition, namely the islamist opposition. Moreover, let's recall that regimes which do open up their political spectrum, mainly formally do so in a "survival strategy", as a last resort as a way of controlling the society, namely islamist forces, as we have seen earlier, and under Western pressure, for the West to see, in order to conform to conditions necessary to get some aids : as such, they adopt what

²⁰J. J. KIRKPATRICK, "The Modernizing Imperative. Tradition and Change", *Foreign Affairs*, 72/4, September / October 1993, p. 23

Prof. B. Khader calls an "accommodation strategy", in French, a "stratégie de complaisance"²¹.

Democracy seen as a Western concept : further insights

What about the partial - non-universal - character of the democratization problematics ? What is important here is to realize that the current re-islamization of Arab societies "is based on a refusal of the Western-style cloning and a rejection not of the modernity in itself but of its arrogances"²². The world liberal utopia does not pose problems in itself. What does pose problems is its propagandists' arrogance. The universal or the democratic emancipation do not in themselves trigger off fear, turning in on oneself and barricading. What does provoke such reactions is their ideological expression, it is to say disdainful and imperial²³.

"Substantial" differences vs. aesthetical differences

If we look into the Arab or Islamic political thinking, we will find lots of reflection on the organization of power in the political society namely on the base of Islamic principles. The question of popular participation to politics is naturally treated as many other subjects. The Islamic concept which is most often paralleled with the Western concept of democracy is "shura", which literally means "consultation". Sure, there may be differences, but again, texts in themselves do not provide us with relevant sociological and politological materials : the question is "how are these texts enacted by political actors ?" Second, if there are differences, of which kind are they ? We think this is a quite similar problematics as that of Human Rights' islamic alternatives as it has appeared in the "New World Order" issue. There are certainly some "substantial", fundamental differences, but there are also lots of differences which emerge from the aesthetic-coloured psychological need to differentiate oneself from the "other", in this case, from the West. So, it would not be wondering to see Islamic versions of democracy, which would in essence look much to Western democracy, but full of Islamic referents. Let's repeat that a same referent - religious or not - can be used in quite different directions. What seems anyway true is the need of identity assertion, should it be within the Western schemes or not.

²¹Bichara KHADER, *op.cit.*, p. 14 .

²²Jean-Claude GUILLEBAUD, "La fin du modèle occidental ?", *Politique internationale*, n°69, août 1995, p. 391

²³*Ibidem*, p. 384

**Samuel P. Huntington's "clash of civilizations" :
the presupposed conflictual character of cultural differences**

The question of difference is very complex. But whatever differences may be - rather fundamental for fundamental reasons or rather superficial (but no less important) for linguistic or aesthetical reasons, what do we do with them? what do we do with the often presupposed conflictual character deriving from them? We would like to end our talk by discussing the "clash of civilizations" of the well-known "state's privileged story teller" Samuel P. Huntington.

According to Samuel P. Huntington, the different civilizations are in conflict with each other precisely because of their differences. First, we have to place civilizations in relation with each other and be conscious of the complexity of their "closeness" vs. "distance" is more subtle than it can appear at first sight, at least, in the case of "Islam" and "the West". Some have shown that "their opposition is not that of opposites like light and darkness, but a rivalry of neighbours coheirs of a same philosophical and religious humanism", so that their differences would be less responsible for the conflictual character of their relationship than their exclusive claim to manage a common civilizational patrimony²⁴. This is useful to balance the representations (as important as they might be) of differences, but this is finally a non-problem.

Beyond the deterministic presupposed conflictual character of cultural differences : the necessary ethics in political decision-making towards the "other"

Indeed, whatever "close" or "distant", it is the way civilizations are "instrumentalized" by political actors which determines the co-operative and/or conflictual character of their relationship. As far as the Mediterranean is concerned, it depends on the vision actors from both shores see it as a bridge or a gap²⁵. In fact Samuel P. Huntington contrasts the ideologies' era of the Cold War with the civilizations' era of the post-

²⁴Jean R. MICHOT, "L'Islam et l'Occident : concurrents ? partenaires ?", *Revue de l'ADAPI-Lv*, n°15, 1994

²⁵Bichara KHADER, "Le pont et le fossé. La Méditerranée dans les échanges économiques euro-arabes", *Les Cahiers du Monde arabe*, n°64, 1988

Cold War era. But would the inter-civilizational confrontation not be the new ideology restructuring the international relations on other cleavages ?

We consider that relations between civilizations are not fundamentally conflictual as such, rather it is the way political actors - "in Islam" as well as "in the West" - consciously and probably more frequently unconsciously - instrumentalize them which determines the co-operative and/or conflictual character of their relationship. It is possible to go beyond the deterministic vision of an unavoidable clash between different civilizations, in conflict because of their differences and pave the way for an ethics for the political actors (partly) free to manage the inter-civilizational otherness in warlike or peaceful terms. Partly, because these actors, namely Western actors, besides the sometimes negative dominant representations of their circles, are submitted to a whole series of pressures coming from their societies, would it be public opinion by the way of the media or corporatist interest groups. For the media, let's note its great responsibility in the relation of often misunderstood sociopolitical phenomenons such as islamism - a subject which has been remarkably treated by Allan Thompson in the 1993 issue of Eliamep's Southeast European Yearbook²⁶. With regard to the corporatist interest groups, let's note for instance that according to well-informed circles in the United States, the "clash of civilizations" thesis would be used to prove the existence of a new danger - of a new foe (after the communist foe) - to convince the American people and its representatives of the necessity to maintain the Defense budget at its present level²⁷. However that may be, is the political decision-maker - within the limits of his cognitive capacities - finally not fully responsible in all conscience ?

Before wrapping up, let's sum up the main points of the thesis of this paper in eight points.

First, in order to study the problematics of democracy in an islamic context, one has to resort to social sciences' instruments of analysis, and not

²⁶Allan THOMPSON, "Fundamental Misperceptions : The media and the Islamic revival", in Theodore A. COULOUMBIS, Thanos M. VEREMIS & Thanos DOKOS (eds.), *The Southeast European Yearbook 1993*, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, 1994, pp. 189-203

²⁷Mohammed Abed AL-JABRI, "L'Islam et l'Occident. «Choc des civilisations» ? - Avenir des relations ?", Paper presented at the International Seminar on "L'Europe et l'Islam : Dynamiques et Convergences", Toledo (Spain), 1996, April 11-13, p. 4

to Koranic texts or discourses of islamist theoreticians disconnected from their historic or present contexts. The problem of democracy has preoccupied Latin-American, African and Asian researchers in social sciences. So, why the Arab-Muslim world would be so exceptional that we would not use the same tools of analysis. Besides, that there is no such thing as incompatibility between the Arab-Muslim world and democracy is exemplified by the fact that democracy works in other islamic contexts, like Malaysia or Turkey.

Second, islamism, as an expression of political opposition to the post-colonial authoritarian regimes, along with feminist movements, Human Rights' organizations and other political or professional forces - all what constitutes the rising civil society -, is one of the driving forces of political transition in the Arab-Muslim world, sometimes in democratic terms. This is due to the crisis of legitimacy of nationalism on which were based post-colonial Arab states, and for which we can distinguish (1) political-ideological, (2) socioeconomic and demographic and (3) cultural-ideological factors.

Thirdly, we saw how islamist forces can lead in some cases to the political opening of regimes which perform a "survival strategy" through their parliamentary inclusion in the political system. The issue : "once the polity opened, do islamists constitute democratic forces in themselves ?" remains an open question, which can only be tackled but case by case.

Indeed - and this is the fourth point - islamism is multifaceted and diverse, assuming various characters in each country and within each country. It has to be analyzed in its geographical and historical perspectives. Let's avoid generalizations presenting Islam and islamism as the enemy replacing communism and the Soviet Union, as it is indirectly suggested in Samuel P. Huntington's thesis.

Fifthly, cultural differences are to be relativized and a distinction should be made between "substantial" differences and aesthetical differences. These latter particularly play a subtle role of differentiation deriving from the psychological need to demarcate oneself from the West. So the actual prominent use of the islamic referent in the contemporary Muslim societies. This should not be considered as antinomic with the

adoption of modernity itself. It is the modernity in its arrogant Western hegemonical imposition which poses problems.

Sixthly, whatever cultural differences, should they be "substantial" or aesthetical, it is the way political actors - on both shores of the Mediterranean - instrumentalize them which determines the co-operative and/or conflictual character of their relationship. Differences in themselves do not unavoidably lead to conflicts. This is the ethical challenge political actors face in this problematics. In this respect, respect for "otherness" is crucial.

Seventhly, democracy should be viewed as a process. It emerged as a concept and a practice in Athens, took roots in emerging industrial Europe and yet has to be protected every day from corruption and subversion. In the Arab-Muslim world, the concept is perceived as linked to its Western cultural roots, yet there is a popular quest for democracy. But democracy is a continuing education process and should not be purely reduced to an electoral game. So we should not fall in the trap of confusing real democracy, based on the respect of the law and the "legitimacy of the difference"²⁸ with formal electoral democracy.

Eighthly, we think that democracy cannot be sold "key-in-hand". Rather it should emerge as a popular demand taking into consideration the cultural identities of Arab-Muslim societies. Indeed, democracy is often perceived as a Western concept, and, even worse, as a selectively applied Western concept. There are Southern demands for contributing to the elaboration of universal norms in the "New World Order" on an equal footing with the actually dominant West.

We hope we contributed somewhat to open out new horizons in our reflection about "Democratization in the Arab-Muslim World", maybe sometimes against the current of some dominant representations in our societies or in our political, mediatic and scientific circles and as "state's privileged story tellers", since we were condemned to write a story, we hope we helped writing another story, a better one, full of promise for a better understanding, peaceful and respectful relationship between the two shores of the Mediterranean.

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**Domestic Dynamics & Their Impact on Foreign Policy:
The case of policies on peace in Israel, Palestine, Syria & Iran**

**A paper presented for the Halki International Conference
September 1997**

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Domestic Dynamics and their impact on foreign policy:

the case of policies on peace in Israel, Palestine, Syria and Iran

The Madrid Conference in 1991 brought together parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict marking the beginning of a process that promised a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict. The first breakthrough was achieved in June 1992 after the election of the Labour government in Israel. The resulting Oslo Agreement and Declaration of Principles (DOP) signed by Israel and the PLO in September 1993 formally ended the Israeli-Palestinian hostility. This historic change was believed to lead to a peaceful solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and facilitate the resolution of Israeli conflict with other countries in the region. The Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty in October 1994 was another positive step in that direction.

The peace process, however, began to slow down with terrorist campaigns by extremists on both sides culminating in the assassination of the Labour Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, in November 1995. Prior to his assassination, during 1993-94, obstacles in front of bilateral negotiations were removed with such a speed that the peace process seemed firmly on course and at times even irreversible. Rabin's successor Shimon Peres continued negotiations along the same line although at a lower pace. The electoral victory in May 1996 of the Likud government led by Benjamin Netanyahu replaced the initial optimism with skepticism. In the election campaign, Likud raised serious doubts about the peace as negotiated by its predecessor replacing the previous Labour slogan of "land for peace" with Likud's "peace for peace". With the new coalition government, the peace process entered a new phase which can be characterized as stalemate. Events on the ground began to show more familiar patterns of conflict reminiscent of the pre-Oslo period. Israel blames its negotiating partners, the Palestinian Authority led by President Yasser Arafat and

Syria's President Hafiz Al-Asad for the lack of progress in negotiations. The latter, in turn, blame Netanyahu and Israel's new coalition government for delays.

On a macro level, all parties agree on the need for a political settlement and seek security based on their, at times diverse, perception of national interest and right. Israel seeks secure defensible borders with access to economic resources considered necessary to the Israeli state and society. Palestinians quest for a sovereign state of their own in the West Bank and Gaza. Syria seeks security based on the return of the Golan Heights. This position, however, is reached after a long journey. Three Arab-Israeli wars, 1948, 1967, 1973 and many peace initiatives have all helped to bring the parties to their present position. The Oslo Accord is thus the result of the warring parties, in Abba Eban's words, having 'exhausted all the other alternatives'.¹

Yet, while the parties' current position on peace reflected in the Oslo Accord seem achievable, the process is not moving forward. The question is, what accounts for the lack of progress in the peace process. This paper suggests that neither the parties' position on peace nor the international systemic forces explain the current stalemate. It argues that domestic dynamics, in particular the decision making process and its concerns are the main sources of the current peace policies. Three key parties to negotiations are examined: Israel, Palestine and Syria. In addition, the impact of Iran's domestic framework on its peace diplomacy is evaluated. Iran is a major actor not as a negotiating party but as one with an impact on the politics of peace & conflict in the region.

1. Domestic sources of foreign policy: theoretical overview

It is argued that national governments have no major influence on foreign policy and it is determined by international forces. This subordination of foreign policy

¹ The Guardian, 10 September 1993

to external sources is believed inevitable with the increasing global interdependence. The inherent weaknesses of the state in the developing world is a further constraint limiting the influence of domestic level on foreign policy. The Middle East is a prominent case in point where most explanations of foreign policy focus on international level of analysis.

This theoretical approach, referred to as 'structuralism', tries to explain major developments in foreign policy domain in terms of the structures which exist at the international level. There are two broad divisions within structuralism: neo-realists and neo-liberals. Despite their opposing views on many issues they share a disregard for the importance of the state level explanation. Neo-realists do not differentiate among states as 'state' is regarded subordinate to the international system.² Emphasizing economic factors, neo-liberals, too, believe transnational forces leave little independence for national actors.³

There are basic theoretical problems associated with analysing foreign policy solely in terms of international forces.⁴ Empirically, however, the view of foreign policy as autonomous and subordinate to international forces fails to explain many developments in foreign policy. One of the developments that cannot be explained through international systemic analysis is the policies on peace in the Middle East especially for the actors we examine here.

The Oslo accord and the peace process began not during the Cold War but in the post-CW international system.⁵ This post-CW system has remained constant at least in those elements that have contributed to the peace process in the first place. The most important of those is the continued absence of the two superpowers' competitive influence in the Middle East. Many other international

² A prominent exponent of this school is K.Waltz developing these views in Theory of International Politics, 1979

³ On neo-liberal views refer to R.Keohane & J.Nye, Power and Interdependence, 1987 or R.Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations

⁴ On the critics of neo-realism see: R.Keohane ed. Neo-Realism and its Critics, 1986 and for a debate on internal sources see: R.W.Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory, 1993; chill 'Foreign policy analysis: a theoretical guide' in Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, 1996; & S.Smith 'Foreign policy analysis' in L.Freedman & M.Clarke eds. Britain in the World, 1991

⁵ International system is used in a broad sense for the purpose of this study.

elements, too, remain constant. They include: the international economic order; international institutions such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; the European Union, etc. Equally important is the fact that the regional balance of power has not altered. Israel maintains a clear strategic superiority and no major re-alliance has taken place.

While the international system that influenced Oslo remains unchanged, the domestic dynamics have altered in ways that influence peace policies in a different direction. This can best be explained by the use of 'middle range' theories of foreign policy analysis⁶ looking at variables such as decision-making, political parties, public opinion, linkage with domestic issues or constitutional frameworks.

As will be explained, change of leadership in Israel from Labour to Likud coalition under Netanyahu is an important factor changing Israeli negotiating stance as the ruling coalition represents and responds to different constituency. Similarly, Asad's power position within Syria's political context is viewed as a major element influencing Syrian policy on peace. Similar forces, along with public demands, shape policies of the Palestinian Authority. Finally, decision making's belief system in addition to institutional framework explain Iran's position on the Middle East peace process.

II. Processes leading to the Peace process in the 1990s

Although the Madrid Conference is regarded as the beginning of the peace process, dynamics for peace were at work for much longer. It could be said that it was not only the Arab-Israeli wars and different peace initiatives but even the history of interacting with one another, even in such a hostile fashion, were in itself, part of the peace process. The 1967 and 1973 are among the most important dates. The 1967 war confirmed Israel as a regional power that cannot

⁶ See M. Clarke & B. White, eds. Understanding Foreign Policy, 1989

be challenged militarily and diplomacy should be employed as an alternative to war. The 1973 Yom Kippur war marked the last armed conflict between major protagonists (Israel, Egypt, Syria) confirming the need for a political rather than a military solution to the conflict.

Egypt was the first Arab country to break rank, signing the Camp David Accord in 1977. This ended Israeli-Egyptian conflict in return for Israel giving back Sinai captured in 1967. Other Arab countries were slow in following Egypt but the move in that direction seemed inevitable. The attitude in Israel was however changing in the opposite direction especially after Likud's election victory in 1977. Israel had become more intransigent under the conservative Likud government of Menahem Begin. The continued occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and Golan (lost by Jordan and Syria respectively in 1967) and the decision in the 1970s to create Jewish settlements in those areas reflected the changing attitudes in Israel, or at least among segments of its population and political elite, that occupied territories need be kept as part of Israel. The building of settlements was to strengthen Israel's grip over these territories.

Nevertheless, Arab attitude have evolved since the 1980s as a result of conceptual and structural transformation at international as well as regional and national level. The PLO and Syria realized that the Soviet Union's involvement and support was eroding. The 1980s saw another important change: the rise of *Intifada* (uprising) in the occupied territories. This movement changed the relationship and relative weight of the Palestinians from 'inside' and 'outside' with the inside exerting greater influence on the PLO and its diplomatic agenda. Moreover, siding with the losing party in the Second Gulf War, 1990-91, was another factor weakening the PLO. These realities forced the PLO to redefine its position by formally accepting a two-state solution. For Syria, too, the loss of its superpower 'patron' and the weakened position of Arab-radicalism required a redefinition of priorities, hence, negotiating the return of the Golan.

It could be said that the PLO and Syria have recognised in the 1980s what Egypt came to accept in the 1970s. Although militarily superior, Israel was not immune from the fallout of the conflict. The costs of fighting the *intifada* on Israeli state and society was becoming too great to be ignored and now that the Arabs had changed course the ball was in Israel's court. Hence, the Oslo Accord and the peace process.

III. Internal sources of Israeli revision of the peace process

It could be said that Israel has been a more satisfied partner in the peace process. Not only has Israel achieved most of what it wanted on the grounds but also set the agenda and timetable for the negotiations. This state of affairs, however, does not mean that Israel's current position is a result of sheer intransigence. The present government's peace policy is constrained by domestic dynamics involving security considerations, leadership structure and economic calculations.

Israel's history and geography are among the factors turning security into the single most important issue on its political agenda. The new ruling coalition interpret security and ways of achieving it somewhat different from its predecessor. Israel's public is split into two principle groups regarding occupation: those who are against occupation and those in favour of annexation of the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) even at the expense of undermining Israel's democratic principles. The first group accepts peace comes with territorial concession, the other believes peace comes through strength. Part of the support for the present ruling coalition comes from the group that have views similar to the first group. Another related issue is the leadership's perception of internal security. The geographical proximity of the two populations, Israelis and Arabs, and population density in Israel makes the state particularly vulnerable to

acts of terrorism. One of Netanyahu's criticism of his predecessor was 'abdication' of its responsibility for internal security.

Israel's political system is yet another source limiting the present Likud government's maneuverability. Israeli governments since 1980s have been coalition governments. The present coalition government is in a partnership which consists of many right wing and religious parties. Likud was elected in May 1996 with only 32 seats in the 120 member Knesset (parliament). Netanyahu relies on the support of the religious (winning an unprecedented 23 seats), centrist and right-wing parties to make up the rest of the 66 seats parliamentary coalition.⁷ Last year the new coalition published a 'Basic Guidelines' promising negotiations for peace but with some preconditions. Netanyahu's willingness to trade land for peace is not clearly demonstrated. He has introduced terms such as 'reciprocity' and 'democratization' as conditions for progress implying that peace cannot be achieved before democracy in the Arab states. Since the bombing campaign of February-March 1996, he limited West Bank and Gaza Palestinians' access to Israel (bearing economic consequences to Palestinian).⁸

Another area influencing peace policies is economic considerations. Israel's economic liberalization, introduced in the 1980s, has been quite successful. Both the public and private sector have made major investments but foreign investments were crucial to the success of liberalization policy. In 1995 alone, foreign investments amounted to \$3.6 billion compared to \$741 million prior to Oslo.⁹ But investment, especially foreign, is heavily influenced by political and security conditions in Israel.

⁷ In late June 1997, the government survived a vote of confidence after a previous vote of no-confidence. This became possible after intense political bargaining and securing the support of the Russian immigrant party that with 7 seats hold the balance of power. See Financial Times, 25 June 1997

⁸ For a discussion of post-election debate see Benny Morris, 'Israel's elections and their implications', Journal of Palestinian Studies, XXXVI, no.1, Autumn 1996

⁹ Washington Post, 25 June 1996

In sum, a new leadership having to keep a conservative coalition together with serious concern over its internal security, especially that of its civilian population, are the main sources slowing down the drive in Israel for peace negotiations.

IV. Problematics of the Palestinian Authority

Like in Israel, one of the internal sources of the Palestinian policy on peace is public opinion: the public whose expectations from Oslo is increasingly frustrated. The lack of progress in the peace process may force a revision by the Palestinian decision-makers to follow a path similar to Syria's cautious and less compromising policies.

Oslo is undoubtedly a historic turning point as it reconciles the two principle parties to the conflict who had previously refused to accept each other's legitimacy and right to exist. The rejection of Israel's legitimacy was enshrined in the Palestinian National Charter of 1968 and Israeli leaders, in turn, have denied the existence of a Palestinian people.¹⁰ In Oslo Israel also signed a treaty with the PLO which, until recently, was branded as a terrorist organisation. Similarly, Oslo formally recognized two nation and the principle of partition which was first proposed in 1947. Finally, the agreement confirms that both sides accept territorial compromise: the principle of land for peace. In addition, Oslo made it possible for Israel to normalize relations with many other Arab states; a card most Arabs held for almost as long as Israel had lived.

But the Oslo process is far from final. Oslo I and II (Taba Agreement of September 1995) were interim agreements scheduling the 'Final Status Talks' to start in March 1997. But negotiations have since broken down over violent dispute about the construction by Israel of settlement in Arab east Jerusalem. Recent attacks in early September causing 4 deaths and over 150 casualties as

¹⁰. See D.Hirst, The Gun and the Olive Branch, 1977

well as military casualties in South Lebanon increased the temperature in Netanyahu camp. Arafat has therefore made a major strategic choice when he agreed to a peace that was exclusively focused on interim arrangements. Many outstanding issues with considerable Internal repercussions are not resolved yet. The three most important issues left to the final negotiations are the question of a Palestinian state, Jerusalem, the settlements. No major breakthrough had yet been reached on these issues.

A Palestinian state: Likud's electoral slogan of 'security prior to peace' suggests a more restricted form of settlement. On the question of a Palestinian statehood, the political leadership in Israel has introduced new terms such as 'restrained self-determination' or 'limited sovereignty'.¹¹ Unless some compromise is made - such as accepting a state in the West Bank and Gaza in exchange for control over Jerusalem which is currently mentioned - it is likely the issue be postponed until after the next election in November 2000. Lack of progress over this and other issues makes the Palestinian Authority's standing among its population more difficult. The Palestinian frustration already led to an *Intifada* type violence following the PM's decision to inaugurate the disputed tunnel in Jerusalem earlier this year. Since then, little has been negotiated to help rebuild confidence in both parties.

Jerusalem: This is another important and highly emotive issue. Control over the city has an undivided support within Israeli society with all parties trying to show commitment to this principle. The right goes further wanting the undivided city as the eternal capital of the state. For Palestinians, on the other hand, a state with East Jerusalem as its capital is regarded an integral part of Palestinian nationalism. At present this is being rejected by Likud. The January 1997 joint Labour-Likud statement (known as Beilin-Eitan Forum after the participants from the two parties) on final-status accepted that Israel has to make some concessions but these have to be minimized by a compromise over the

¹¹ For the debate in Israel on the Palestinian statehood see M.A.Heller 'Towards a Palestinian State', *Survival*, vol 39, no.2, Summer 1997

Palestinian state. Recent official talks limited the Palestinian section of the city to the small village of Abu Dis on its outskirts with certain religious rights over al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock. This position is considerably short of Palestinian's placing them on opposing platforms.

Settlement: On the issue of Jewish settlement, the January 1997 Hebron agreement protects the interests of about 400 settlers which puts Palestinian residents of those areas under effective Israeli occupation. The Beilin-Eitan agreement too rejects uprooting such settlements. This requires Israeli security presence for the protection of these settlement in midst of Palestinian sections. The issue of the return of the Palestinian refugees are not yet tackled.

Being constrained by the internal dynamics discussed above, the Likud led coalition government is unable to make serious compromises for a final settlement of these issues under the present conditions. As Labour hopes to use Netanyahu's weakness to force a re-election, the prospect of a national unity government with Labour that accepts the idea of self-determination and eventually the creation of a state is not bright.¹² The lack of progress, in turn, reduces Arafat's ability to deal with his critics especially the radicals and extremists in the Palestinian camp and Arafat's position would be undermined in favour of the extremists as the choice for the Palestinian population is between him and the extremists such as the Islamic Jihad and Hamas. This situation creates both an obstacle and an asset for the PA negotiators. It is an obstacle as Netanyahu's government blames extremists' activities on Arafat's inability to control the territories. At the same time it is an asset for the PA in showing the risks posed by extremists, hence, the need for Israel to compromise with the PA.

The other internal source influencing the peace process is the nature of the PA's political system and its infant institutions. The PA has been engaged in a process of power consolidation that has not been easy especially in view of

¹² The newly elected leader of the Labour, Ehud Barak, seems to have adopted a strategy of using the Knesset to put pressure on the government and therefore force new elections.

the limitations within the PA itself and conditions on the ground. To consolidate its power, the leadership relies on four pillars: a) police and security elements (with some 20 to 40,000 personnel for a population of 2 million). b) The use of patronage system. Around 10 to 20,000 are employed by the Authority as bureaucrats and security forces. c) Fatah, Arafat's own faction in the PLO. d) The last pillar is the old land-owning elite. Effective state institutions such as a working parliament, independent judiciary, functioning executive bodies such as ministries are still not fully in place. Although Yaser Arafat won last year's election with 88% of the votes, there are serious skepticism about PA's democratic nature. The consolidation process resulted in the marginalization of the inside political elite and in undermining of the civil society and its institutions. The PA leadership does not consist of the local elite but the PLO (recognized by Oslo).¹³ This process led to many grass-root autonomous institutions to be undermined by the PA through coercion or co-option. It is worth noting that the PA's authoritarianism is not so undesirable for Israel as one of its advantages is believed to be the ability to control extremists and reduced terrorism.

The state of the PA's economy is another factor influencing its peace policies. The West Bank and Gaza had, in many ways, regressed economically during the occupation. Economic considerations were among the reasons for the Palestinians, especially inside, to accept to negotiate a settlement with Israel. Therefore, the success of the peace process, the stability of the PA and the survival of its leadership are very much dependent on how peace is to improve their economic conditions and create a solid economic base. The PA not only needs investment funds and technical aid to improve the economic conditions but also accountability, transparency, and effective management. PA's two main sources of funds are foreign aid and transfer of Palestinian assets from Israel. Foreign aid consists primarily of over \$2 billion promised by the European Union, Japan, the US and the Gulf States at the time of Oslo. This fund did not

¹³ For an analysis of elite formation among Palestinians see: Glenn Robinson, Building a Palestinian State 1997

come as smoothly as the PA hoped since the donors have been concerned about the lack of transparency. Another source of income is the transfer from Israel of funds collected from wages of Palestinian laborers (Arafat estimated Israel to owe around \$1.3 bn in backpayments on such transfers).¹⁴ This was also at times stopped as means of pressurising the PA.

One of the fallout of this situation is however to turn the PA's economy into a rentier economy.¹⁵ Rentier economy is a double edge sword. It enables the leadership to maintain a patronage system that could protect the ruling elite which, in turn, breeds greater authoritarianism. But at the same time it increases the leadership's vulnerability as socio-economic grievances in a rentier economy tend to be expressed by political action against the ruling elite.

Another source of dispute between Israel and the PA that influences the economics of peace is access to water. Since 1967, the management of scarce water resources in the West Bank & Gaza was with Israel.¹⁶ Per-capita consumption of water from the occupied territories, primarily for agriculture, by Israeli consumption was far larger than Palestinian (this was one of the reasons for their economic regression after 1967). Around 25-30% of Israel's total water resources and more than 50% of its drinking water come from the West Bank.¹⁷ The water provision of the 1995 interim Oslo II Agreement was a major step forward with Israel recognizing Palestinian rights in the West Bank (although Palestinian claims on the Jordan River is not mentioned). However, here again the detail questions on such rights are left to the 'final-status' and was discussed in line with the Hebron accord of January 1997.

Ultimately, the support of the public under the PA controlled territories is crucial in the leadership's ability to negotiate. Whether the political system under

¹⁴ Palestine Report, 7 February 1997

¹⁵ On the concept of rentier economy where large part national income comes from rent from outside see G. Luciani ed. The Arab States, 1990

¹⁶ There are three main sources of water shared by the two sides: the River Jordan including lake Galilee; aquifers extending from the contains of the West Bank; and aquifers along the coastal.

¹⁷ For further details on the water dispute see: A.R. Rouyer, 'The Water Issue in the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process', Survival, vol.39, no.2, Summer 1997

the PA is democratic or not, Yaser Arafat cannot disregard Palestinian public opinion both at home and abroad at least as long as the state has not gained full capacity for coercion. Oslo accord has been criticized for not meeting Palestinian's basic demands. With the current stalemate he would be under much greater pressure at home. The PA is challenged by both the moderates and the extremists among Palestinians. Even moderates would not welcome a retreat from Oslo as their moderation is very much linked to the success of Oslo. Extremists' challenge is obviously greater as they object to the whole process.¹⁸

V. Internal structures and the Syrian peace policies

Syria's policy towards Israel has been remarkably consistent as far as its macro demands on the return of the Golan Heights are concerned. In this sense Syria's current peace policy is influenced by external factors as much as by immediate internal dynamics as applies to the three other cases. An important factor in Syria's policy remains geopolitical. In sum, although Syria's historical rejection of Israel remains ingrained within its political culture, its peace policy is dictated by regional realities. Syria recognizes that it does not have the means to challenge Israel militarily thus regaining its lost territories has become its prime objective since Madrid. This is inspite of Syria's formal adherence to 'strategic parity' with Israel. Apart from the conflict over the Golan, however, Israel and Syria remain geopolitical rivals in the Levant: Lebanon and Palestine. For historical as well as security reasons Syria seeks to retain influence in what is regarded as greater Syria while Israel nurtures similar aims for security reasons. Syria views Oslo as having helped Israel to expand its influence in Palestine and Jordan.

¹⁸ A public opinion poll showed that two third of Palestinian in the West Bank and Gaza supported the September 1995 interim accord. Just under 60% did not expect a lasting peace with Israel. See Efraim Inbar and Shmuel Sandler, 'The Risks of Palestinian Statehood', *Survival*, vol 39, no.2, Summer 1997, pp.26-40

Regional considerations apart, there were significant internal dynamics that have contributed to Syria's relative consistency in its peace policy as well as its current reservation. The most important internal influence on Syrian peace policy is President Asad's authoritarian control of the decision making process. Up to 1970, the more radical Ba'th party held power supporting a rejectionist policy on Israel (1963-70). The situation changed after 1970 with Asad creating what is called a 'monarchical presidency' by controlling the three main institutions in Syria: the Ba'th Party, the military, and the Presidency. Asad was the product of the failed Egyptian-Syrian unity, 1958-61, and the crushing defeat of the 1967 war in which instead of achieving the rejectionist aim of liberating Palestine Syria lost the strategically significant Golan Heights. It could thus be summed up that limitations of Arab nationalism combined with the realities of power relationship between Syria and Israel were the main influences on Asad's position on peace revolving around the return of the Golan.¹⁹

Asad's ability to formulate Syria's peace policy is, nevertheless, constrained by the nature of the political system he has created. His autonomy is based on not only his ability to control but also to balance the three institutions on which Asad relies. The Party is an important source of power as it is used to mobilize urban and rural support for Asad's government. To balance the Party's power, Asad extended his control of the Army, and to counter the army's power he uses, in turn, his co-ethno/religious minority in the security system.²⁰ With the economic liberalisation of the 1980s Asad added a fourth group to his supporters, namely, a segment of the commercial private bourgeoisie.²¹ This

¹⁹ Hinnebusch suggests that this was Asad's position much earlier and was one of the issues in the internal Ba'th conflict which eventually led to Asad's overthrow of his radical rivals. R. Hinnebusch, 'Does Syria want peace', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, XXVI, no.1 (Autumn 1996), p.56

²⁰ For further details on Ba'thist Syria & Asad's rule see: N. Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism, Regionalism and Tribalism in Politics 1961-78*, 1979; R.A. Hinnebusch, *Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba'thist Syria*, 1990; and M. Ma'oz, *Syria Under Asad*, 1986

²¹ For this group's rise and its political role see: V. Perthes, 'The Syrian Private Industrial & Commercial Sectors and the State', *International Journal of the Middle East Studies* 24, May 1992.

group's participation in the political process helped enlarge the number of pillars Asad relies on. One should add to these balancing tactics, the repressive nature of Asad's regime in dealing with political opponents (the most prominent challenge came from the Muslim Brotherhood that was ruthlessly crushed). In 1990, Asad began to introduce limited democratic measures.²²

This political structure on which Asad's autonomy lies has also endured because of its components' own stakes in preserving the political structure. The power of these components did not decrease with liberalisation but instead increased along with the increase in their wealth. Therefore, despite Asad's authoritarian control, he has to safeguard the interests, both political and economic, of the institutions he controls. This includes the cadre of public sector administrators, group of top commanders who control the state's military and security apparatuses, large-scale commercial interests and private bourgeoisie who have close connections to the central administration. These interests, nevertheless, do not always coincide. For example the new economically influential groups oppose policies likely to divert resources from investment where as the military is keen on preserving 'strategic parity'. The new economic classes are also against any policy that would limit their access to growing regional and international financial and commodity market including those of the West and the Gulf States. There is a growing interest among the public to end the war with Israel in order to facilitate this access.²³ Moderation in foreign policy has been an option Asad also used to alleviate internal discontent arising from economic liberalization. In one of his key speeches Asad announced a strategic change in favour of a gradual withdrawal from the Golan.²⁴

²² Such as increasing the number of seats in the People's Assembly from 195 to 250 to encourage independent candidates to run for parliament.

²³ For more on this refer to F.H.Lawson, 'Domestic Transformation and Foreign Steadfastness in Contemporary Syria', Middle East Journal, vol 58, no.1, Winter 1994

²⁴ See E.Kienle ed, Syria: Liberalization Between Cold War and Cold Peace, 1996

VI. Iranian theocracy and the Middle East peace

Despite having no direct stake in either the Arab-Israeli conflict or the peace process, Iran influences the peace process primarily by its support for radical rejectionist groups and by its active hostility towards the peace process. In a sense the Iranian theocracy has been carrying the flag previously carried by the radical Arab-nationalists in the 1950s and 1960s. This is a natural extension of Iran's foreign policy based on pan-Islamism on the one hand and *tier mondism* on the other.

This foreign policy is reflective of the Islamic Republic's domestic political/ideological and institutional framework. The source of legitimacy sought by the clerical leadership for the political structure they have established is rooted in Islam. As such, the leadership cannot disassociate itself from wider concerns of the 'Islamic' community. Arab and Palestinian concerns are therefore regarded as concerns of Muslim communities against others. In their terminology, the Palestinian struggle is 'just' against 'unjust', and a struggle against the 'oppressor'. Iranian presence and support for the Hizbollah in Lebanon is another reflection of this internal choice. Here again, their involvement is in large part a reflection of their ideological roots in Islam, especially the Shi'a, and, accordingly, support for a struggle against aggression.

Institutional setting of the Islamic Republic is another source guaranteeing this ideological preoccupation. Despite the use of modern democratic institutions & symbols such as the constitution, parliament, elections, presidency etc, the final decision maker is the 'guardian jurist'. This institutional arrangement sanctioning the ultimate authority of a clergy as the guardian of the Republic and its Islamic value system is to preserve the continuity of this ideological position. This dominant elite position is in contrast to political, economic and especially cultural integration in the international society which is believed to be dominated by the West/US. Accordingly, the Middle East peace is viewed as a victory for the West, Israel and global integration and their control

over the Muslim Middle East. As such the Islamic Republic and its clerical leadership are best equipped to respond to such domination. Traditional methods such as Islamic solidarity, tier mondism, militancy, support for terrorism, etc. are part of the response of the dominant clerical elite. Their internal legitimacy is symbolized by hostility towards Israel and antagonism to compromises such as the Middle East peace process. These are foreign policy choices that form part and parcel of the working and survival of the Islamic Republic.

The socio-economic system associated with the dominant elite outlook, based on a mass society model, is also reminiscent of the Third World views of earlier period. The state control of the economy (which is helped by the rentier nature of the economy) places Iran more in line with the type of *tier mondism* of earlier periods and against the current international trend for market liberalization and globalization. Foreign policy manifestation of this domestic socio-economic choice is support for the South against the North or in their vocabulary support for the 'oppressed against the oppressor'. This distinction is translated in the Arab-Israeli context by regarding Palestinian as the 'oppressed' and Israel supported by the US as the 'oppressor'.

Conclusion


Oslo created many expectations and uncertainties. Expectations, shared by all parties involved include the promise of a stable and, if possible, peaceful Middle East. It also created expectations of, especially among the Palestinians, a better political and economic conditions. The peace process also demands sacrifices on populations. But Oslo's success is not dependent on what it has already achieved but more on what will come.

Nonetheless, while demonstrating the obstacles in the road from interim agreement to a 'final status' remain considerable, the study argued that internal

dynamics are the main sources of the current slow progress. Two developments in particular have reduced the speed of progress. One is the change of government in Israel and the emergence of a new leadership that is responsive to a constituency who is not necessarily willing to make compromises required by Oslo especially in the face of continued security risks. The other difficulty is related to the Palestinian Authority's failure to create a democratic, accountable, and effective political institutions able to meet both Israeli security needs and its own public's.

These created a situation whereby Syria becomes too skeptical about the advantages of engaging in a serious negotiations as the outcome is not clear. Similarly, it creates conditions whereby Iran, in pursuit of its own domestic policy choices, can negatively influence the climate by encouraging extremism on both sides, either directly or indirectly.

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Halki International Seminar
"The European Union and the Mediterranean Region"
September 11-16, 1997

**"Domestic Dynamics in the MENA Region and their Impact on External
Relations: Middle East State Systems Approaching the Year 2000"**

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The year 2000 A.D. is nearly upon us. In addition to the predictable fanfare and partying around the world, it will most likely occasion increased religious fervor, proclamations of the imminence of Christ's return and extremist behavior among various cults and sects. We will also be subjected to innumerable sober analyses by all manners of pundits. At first glance, this should have little to do with the Middle East. To be sure, the Christian message originates there, and Christian communities of various stripes continue to exist throughout much of Egypt and the Fertile Crescent. However, the overwhelming majority of the population of the MENA region, are, of course Muslims. The Gregorian calendar does not carry any special resonance; the rhythm of their societies' revolves around the Muslim calendar; their collective historical, religious and cultural memories are of a different sort. The same is true, to a large extent, of Israeli Jewish society.

Nonetheless, the occasion can not, and will not be ignored in the MENA region. Earlier in the century, the peoples of the region adopted the Euro-centric term "Middle East" to describe the area where they lived. Doing so marked an undeclared acknowledgement of Western superiority. That imbalance remains in force today, despite their achievements -- the attainment of independence, the withdrawal of imperial power, and the consolidation of national identities. Engaging in discussions regarding their place in the world entering the 21st century will be another tacit acknowledgement that they live in a West-centered universe. Coincidentally, the countries and peoples of the region are at a crossroads in any event, facing multiple challenges and difficult choices, with no clear road map to guide them.

One can begin to analyze these choices by looking at developments in three overlapping, but nonetheless distinct spheres:

the state framework; the international environment; and the socio-cultural sphere.

The State Framework: The division of the world into national states is, of course, one of Europe's gifts (perhaps a dubious one) to the world. It was

implanted in the ME, by and large, at the end of World War I, with varying degrees of success, more so in Turkey, less so in the Arab world. Now, at the end of the century, one can state confidently that the territorial state has won out in the ME over all other competing political frameworks and ideologies - pan-Arabism, pan-Islam, and pan-Turanism. Pan-Arabism posed special problems for Arab regimes, often delegitimizing their very existence and rendering it difficult to openly articulate particularist "state interests" (raison d'etat). Although Arabism survives, both in the cultural and political spheres, it is no longer the primary reference point by which leaders must articulate their policies. Interestingly, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was initially carried out in the name of "territorial nationalism" (returning the so-called 19th province" to the homeland (Iraq)) ; pan-Arab justifications for the move came only afterwards, and were in any event rejected by Saddam's Arab opponents, who preferred the existing Arab state system framework. Similarly, Kuwait's restoration to existence by the international coalition was done, apart from all of the other reasons, to reaffirm the basic principles enshrined in the UN Charter regarding the international community of states and their right to exist. Indeed, the international system has a heavy bias in favor of existing states: look at how difficult it's been for the Kurds, and how nervous the thought of Iraq's fragmentation makes its neighbors, and the US, too, for that matter. The current, tortured process by which a Palestinian state is emerging, accompanied by the gradual Arab acceptance of the Israeli state, is the exception which proves the rule.

Pan-Islam was never a viable program, although it was, and remains, a strong sentiment. Current Islamist opposition movements in the region may feel solidarity with one another and even provide aid and succor. However, they operate within the framework of their particular states. Even the Islamic revolution in Iran was never divorced from an Iranian national identity, and acted on behalf of Iranian national interests, a trend which has steadily increased under Khomeini's heirs. As for pan-Turanism, it never had much of a chance either, given Attaturk's resolute renunciation of claims beyond Turkey's newly defined borders. The emergence of

independent Central Asian republics on the ruins of the Soviet Union but according to Soviet-determined boundaries further indicate the primacy of the multiple state framework, based on local nationalism, over larger, more diffuse frameworks for political loyalty.

ME states over the past half-century have steadily accumulated a preponderance of power vis-a-vis societal actors. However, the power to survive and dominate their societies has not been accompanied by the kinds of social and economic modernization which would allow ME states to compete with the world's more advanced economies. . Indeed, it is perhaps ironic that the triumph of the state as a legitimate entity and focus of practical, pragmatic loyalty has now called attention to the shortcomings of regime performances. Ruling elites have managed to survive and prosper against formerly powerful trans-national ideologies; they've done a far poorer job in providing for the needs of their own populations. Autocratic rule and the absence of political-civil rights, cumbersome bureaucracies, low GNP's among the non-oil producing states in the face of high rates of population growth, corruption, failure to properly deliver basic services such as education, health care and suitable housing to their overwhelmingly youthful and increasingly urban populations are all recognizable features of most MENA states.

Turning for a moment to the international environment, which has been so crucial to shaping political, social and economic dynamics in the ME for over two centuries: we are all aware of the radical alterations which have taken place in recent years. The end of the Cold War and the results of the Gulf War have left the US as the single Great Power in the region, the guarantor of the regional status quo. Managing this unipolar reality does not always suit the US well; "dual containment" is more of a slogan than a policy; nor we can expect Russia to remain aloof from the areas adjacent to its southern frontiers indefinitely; the EU, for its part, is acutely sensitive to developments on the southern side of the Mediterranean, fearing the possibility of sudden waves of large-scale immigration. Nonetheless, it is the US which provides the military might to deter any would-be

revisionists in the region. Upheaval in any of its main regional allies - Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey - would pose difficult dilemmas for Washington. So would a collapse of the Arab-Israeli peace process, or the fragmentation of Iraq.

Accompanying this unipolar strategic environment is the ubiquitous process of what is commonly known as "globalization", or in Prof. Benjamin Barber's pithier term, "McWorld". On the macro-economic level, this refers to the new orthodoxy of the IMF and the World Bank - restructuring and financial packages, subsidy-slashing, privatization and attracting foreign capital. Politically, this necessitates close ties between MENA regimes and the West. No less profound are the socio-cultural aspects of McWorld - MTV, the NBA, Planet Reebok, Pizza Hut, and McDonalds - brought to us by satellite dishes, the whirring of fax machines, cellular phones and the Internet. Thomas Friedman of the NYT has pointed out that no countries with McDonalds franchises have ever gone to war against one another, surely a good reason to encourage an MPT - a McDonalds Proliferation Treaty. But this global leveling comes at a high price to local cultures and values. How does a tea-drinking society like Indonesia cope with Coca Cola? How does Israel address the problem of the establishment of a McDonalds outlet on the site of a sacred war memorial? What happens when a pious Muslim can move from a televised Koran reading to gyrating, half-naked dancers at the press of a remote control button?

I would argue that the combination of globalization, the failure of the various "pan" ideologies to overturn the territorial state system and the very real failures of ME states to provide either material or spiritual cum emotional satisfaction for their populations has created enormous uncertainty throughout the MENA region. Arab scholars and commentators refer to this as the "Azma" (crisis); the endless conferences and discussions debating and analyzing the phenomenon have been termed by one Moroccan sociologist as "azmatology." In many ways, we can speak of MENA politics in terms of a "politics of identity" - a search for meaning, for comfort, for transcendence against the confusion and uncertainty of an extremely complex, and often unfamiliar materialist world. Nationalism - Jewish, Arab,

Turkish, Kurdish, Iranian; religiosity; tribal and ethnic ties - all are seen as providing the appropriate shelter from the storm. Both "McWorld" and its rival offspring - Barber calls it "jihad", referring not just to Islamist currents and movements but all forms of reactive ethnicity and tribalism - pose grave challenges to those who seek to create and maintain civic-based, pluralist societies governed by the rule of law, and able to creatively interact and compete with the modern world.

So where does the MENA region stand as the century draws to a close, in the face of the socio-cultural, political and economic "azma"? Prof. Samuel Huntington has caused a great stir in academic circles by postulating a coming "clash of civilizations," between Western, Confucian, Islamic, Japanese and perhaps African and Latin American units. But this broad-brush stroke of Huntington's creative pen has little relevance to the MENA region. Here the relevant factor for analysis are state-society relations within each state. It is the domestic political arena where the most crucial developments are taking place - the struggle for power, and ultimately for the "soul" of Arab countries and between their ruling elites and Islamic opposition movements. Iran, Turkey and Israel are each in a category unto themselves with regard to these issues, but there too the "politics of identity" weigh heavily on the public discourse. Speculating on the likely outcome of this domestic struggle, and the relationship between domestic and regional developments, is a task better left for prophets than historians. But I shall try, nonetheless.

Let me begin with the Arab world, a problematic term in and of itself, given the wide geographic, social, economic and political diversity within Arabic-speaking lands. The ideological vacuum left by the withering of pan-Arabism has provided fertile ground for opposition Islamic fundamentalist movements carrying a populist message: they are able to claim authenticity in the face of alien cultural and imperialist challenges, and to castigate unjust regimes and corrupt ruling elites. However, while Islamist movements are genuine, and durable parts of the social and political landscape in the Arab world, their appeal has not proved to be unlimited. Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan, for example, have witnessed the growth of a

more educated, technocratic middle class, sensitive to their own cultural and religious heritage but refusing to be put into neat social and political dichotomies such as "tradition vs. modernity", "religion vs. secularism", "authenticity vs. alien cultures." Ruling Arab elites, for their part - acutely aware of the breakdown of order in Algeria following the sudden explosion of democracy there - are committed to a go-slow approach towards political and economic reform. Their caution is understandable, particularly given the absence of deep-rooted democratic political traditions, as well as their primary concern with retaining power.

However, they need to promote the expansion of the middle classes in order to buy the time, and the legitimacy, which will allow for the evolution of their societies in the direction of an authentic civil society, while avoiding excessive upheaval.

"National pacts" between various societal forces and groups can perhaps serve as a basis for controlled incremental change and the slow expansion of democratic space. Both Jordan and Tunisia have experimented with this concept.

If we think for a moment about the ruling regimes in Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia, we find that their leaders have been in power, as number one or number two, for at least a generation. This raises questions regarding the possibility of instability during the succession processes. Ironically, Arab monarchies - once thought to be destined for the dustbin of history - may possess legitimacy resources unavailable to Arab republics, and thus may be in better shape to manage the inevitable transition of power to a younger generation than the republics. Egypt, Jordan and Morocco have all experimented with political pluralism and economic restructuring, with varying degrees of success. To be sure, there are problems, even regarding the inevitable transfer of power: Mubarak has steadfastly refused to name a vice-president; Morocco's Crown Prince is frequently viewed as not up to the task of governing such a complex society; Jordan is much more than a one-person state, but filling King Husayn's shoes will not be an easy task. Some positive indicators in recent years include: the partial cooption of Islamist movements in Morocco and Jordan, and the successful repression of

violent Islamists in Egypt; macro-economic figures pointing to at least modest growth; the implementation of restructuring policies and signing of new agreements with the EU; and even the appearance of local, non-governmental human rights groups and other signs of "civil society". Most importantly, for the longer term, population growth rates have finally started to come down in Egypt and Morocco, and governments throughout the region have finally woken up to the dangers of unchecked growth and implemented family planning policies. In general, progress by one state in managing contradictory socio-economic and political pressures and problems will have a beneficial, reinforcing effect in others.

To be sure, there are "failed states" in the Arab world, which contain many of the same shortcomings and fewer of the redeeming virtues than the countries I've just referred to. Algeria and Sudan come to mind immediately when speaking of "failed states"; Lebanon is still trying to recover from 15 years of civil war; Yemen's unity is fragile, and maintained by force. Syria is far more stable than it was in the 1950s and '60s, but remains a "Mukhabarat" ("national security") state, ill-prepared for the next century. Saddam Husayn's Iraq is both a menace and a tragedy.

How Turkey and Iran manage the competing pressures of "McWorld" and "Jihad", of the quest for meaning and identity and the requirements of participating and competing in the modern, or even post-modern world, will surely be crucial to the future of the region. Attaturk's heirs feel both threatened by the Islamist trend and determined to assert Turkey's role as a regional power. The interaction of these two factors, the domestic and regional, has led the Turkish authorities, and particularly the military, to forge a new alliance, with Israel. The perception of common strategic and political-cultural interests, and the willingness to act on the basis of those interests, marks one of the most significant regional developments of recent years, and points to how domestic and foreign policy exigencies interact.

Iran, for its part, is far from being the monolithic, mono-cultural society depicted in the Western press. What Iran will be like under its new President, Khatemi, is anyone's guess. One could perhaps venture a guess that the hard

edges of the Islamic revolution may be softened somewhat in the years ahead. At the same time, Iran's interest in being a regional hegemon, and its striving to develop a non-conventional weapons capability, are likely to continue.

Israel has always been the outsider in the MENA region - culturally, economically, and politically. But identity issues are central to Israel's daily discourse as well, and are intensified by its lively, competitive free press. The struggle over Israel's identity - 50 years after achieving independence - played an important part in the assassination of its Prime Minister less than two years ago. Here too, internal fissures - religious-secular; Western and Eastern Jewry; Jewish-Arab, liberal Zionism and more nationalist, muscular Zionism - and developments beyond its borders interact in complex, and mutually influential ways. The gifted travel and political writer, Robert Kaplan, sees Israel evolving towards a society both more materialistic and, in some respects, more intensely religious. This, in my view, is too one-dimensional, and underestimates Israel's simultaneous evolution towards a more liberal, civic-minded and genuinely pluralist order. On some level, Israel will have to "reimagine" itself, both as a state and a society. In my view, a rapid conclusion of contractual Arab-Israeli peace would provide important breathing space for Israel to fruitfully and properly address this question.

How might developments in the domestic sphere affect regional politics, and vice versa? Domestic upheaval, along the lines of Algeria, or revolution, a la Iran, does not seem to be on the immediate horizon. Here again, I emphasize the importance of the state as a legitimate structure in the eyes of substantial portions of its populations; ruling regimes possess at least some of that legitimacy; and, no less important, they hold a near-monopoly on the instruments of force, giving them the ability to defend their interests, in the name of the state, against centrifugal forces. In Turkey, the military-secular alliance appears strong enough to counter-balance the Islamic trend; in Egypt, the power of the state - epitomized by the bureaucracy, the military, and the economic elite - appears not to be mortally threatened by the Islamist opposition, for the time being at least. The regimes of

both countries, to be sure, cannot be complacent, and will have to accelerate their policies promoting economic development. Whether or not this has to entail a postponement of greater political liberalization until a later stage, along the East Asian model, is an open question. Morocco, on the other hand, is inching towards greater political liberalization - it is currently on the brink of elections which are expected to result in having opposition political parties assuming the responsibility of governing for the first time in almost four decades. Such policies are vital in order to maintain Western economic and political support.

Regionally, one can speak of three areas of concern - the Arab-Israeli sphere, the Gulf, and historic Mesopotamia. At one level, Israel is only an interested spectator, watching as Arab domestic political and cultural struggles take their course. Even a quick conclusion of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace cannot have the deciding influence on the future course of Arab politics. At the same time, Israel is not a passive bystander. Its policies, pronouncements and actions contribute to Arab-Israeli dynamics no less than those of any other country. The failure to conclude the peace process, and a renewed slide towards war, will narrow the capabilities of Arab regimes to address their underlying domestic problems and embolden their opposition movements. It will also lead to Arab governments seeking to strengthen their domestic legitimacy by reviving the slogans of Arabism and forging anti-Israeli alliances with one another (which, inevitably, will also result in the intensification of inter-Arab divisions). As we have already seen, beginning with the terror attacks after the Oslo accords, a slide towards renewed Arab-Israeli hostilities reinforces the political strength of the Israel's right wing. Ironically, the renewal of hostilities will allow both Arabs and Israelis to ignore for a while longer the cultural challenges which "peace" and "normalization" pose to both sides. In the long run, though, I would argue that the likelihood of achieving a formal, contractual end to the Arab-Israeli conflict is higher than the possibility of a meltdown. The price that will be paid for reaching that point, however, may turn out to be significantly higher than had been anticipated just a few years ago.

In the meantime, the confluence of Turkish and Israeli interests pose new challenges to the Arab world, particularly Syria. Syria, Egypt, Iraq (and Iran) are palpably nervous regarding a return to the 1950s atmosphere of regional blocs, with Israel replacing Iraq in a potentially powerful Baghdad-Pact type alliance. Whether such an alliance will ultimately moderate or exacerbate regional tensions remains to be seen.

As for the Gulf, for the time being, American power serves to preserve the regional status quo in the Gulf, against Iraqi and Iranian ambitions. It may be less valuable for stemming domestic unrest within the GCC principalities. Bahrain faces a serious challenge from its Shi'i population; Saudi Arabian Islamists have shown that they can carry out terror bombings; Kuwaitis of all shades have expressed their unhappiness with the ruling family's excesses and failures. Differences between the GCC states, especially in recent years, highlight their inherent weakness and vulnerability, individually and collectively.

One of the great regional uncertainties is Iraq. Will Saddam remain in power and return to being a force to be reckoned with in the region? How will a post-Saddam Iraq behave, both domestically and regionally? Northern Iraq is a potential flashpoint for regional conflict; so are the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border and even the Shi'i south. Instability in other areas of the ME, whether in the Arab-Israeli arena, the Gulf, or inter-Arab tensions, such as between Syria and Jordan, or in Lebanon, will surely attract a reassertive Iraq to fish in troubled waters.

In sum, the MENA region is likely to remain a zone of conflict and tension: lacking the capabilities of achieving an East Asian-type economic miracle; its regimes broadly like-minded on major core issues and challenges, and bent on pursuing incrementalist policies to partially ameliorate their situation and buy time; its peoples seeking to find some kind of balance between cultural authenticity and dignity, on the one hand, and the need and desire to participate in the modern world, on the other. Determinists would conclude that the deck is irreversibly stacked against the MENA states: Robert Kaplan, for example, speaks ominously of "the coming Mideast meltdown," in which secular elites will give way to people from below, "less sophisticated, less tolerant, less fatalistic and, in many cases more crudely ambitious." Such a gloomy, and determinist prognosis, however, must be

leveled by the recognition that the lives of large numbers of Middle Easterners have improved significantly in recent decades, for example, in terms of life expectancy, literacy levels, sanitation; and water supplies; that the alternatives posed by opposition movements - Islamist, nationalist, or a combination of the two - offer little in the way of concrete solutions to people's day-to-day problems; that existing states, and regimes, have resources available to combat the political challenges from below. As in all human endeavors, the actions taken, and the choices made by MENA's political leaders and political and economic elites will decisively contribute to shaping the ways that their states and societies enter into the next century.



HALKI INTERNATIONAL SEMINARS 1997

The Peace Process: Is it in a coma, collapsing or still viable?

Abdel Rahman Abu Arafah

The future of peace in the Middle East has been further jeopardized by failure to meet the obligations for this process, each side is trying to blame the other for this failure, while the Israelis are blaming Palestinians for the lack of personal security by accusing the Palestinian Authority on the failure to clamp down on Islamic movement in their area.

The Palestinians from their side blaming the new Israeli government and its Prime Minister by adopting a very clear policy of torpedoing and destroying the peace process.

The Israeli position

Many Palestinians and others including Israelis think that Netanyahu had been waiting all along for an opportunity to get out of an agreement he always stands against, in fact Mr. Netanyahu himself spoke to the Cabinet as if the process was finished, referring to the agreement signed by the previous government as a dead case, and declaring that if negotiations resumed, they would be on a final status agreement not on interim steps.

Palestinians believe that Netanyahu's proposal for jumping immediately to final status talks, and further conducting them within six months, is based on the idea of Palestinians giving things up before the negotiations and they have to adjust to the reality of the facts on the ground in accordance with a "ceiling" of expectations imposed by Israel.

Palestinians are being told by Netanyahu:

- That they should give up the idea that negotiation will lead to the implementation of UN resolution 242 and 338 and they should give up the dream of a return to the 1967 borders with complete contradiction to the principle of land for peace. Netanyahu defined his suggestions for a final map of the West Bank and Gaza which he called "Alon plus" referring to the Allon plan produced by Israel shortly after the 1967 war.

According to Netanyahu map, the majority of Palestinian land will remain in Israeli hands, and the Palestinian population will be corralled in geographically isolated places.

Additionally, Israeli controlled territory will include the entire Jordan Valley as well as huge swathes of roads and adjacent, in addition to the entire 1967 green line. As for Gaza, the Israeli settlements which occupying 40% of the entire Gaza area would remain under Israeli control.

- That they should give up the re-division of Jerusalem, the Israeli definition of Jerusalem doesn't include the already annexed part of Jerusalem but will extend to include what they call the Greater Jerusalem, which includes settlements located as far as 25 kilometres from the central of the city.

Netanyahu even warn the Palestinians that Jerusalem is not subject for negotiation and further he ordered the bulldozers to begin work on Mount Abu Ghunim and warn Palestinians not to use violence in protesting the decision.

- That they should give up the dream of retaining the Palestinian refugees, in fact the meetings of the special committee for this issue has been frozen since the last Israeli election.

- That they should give up the dream of establishing a palestinian state, while on this subject, the late labor party leader had advocated a position of "No objection", after his assassination, his party entered into the heart of the point and eliminated any objection to a palestinian state.

The Palestinian position

Palestinian position to this proposal developed by Netanyahu was that this plan would provide excellent ground for negotiation between Netanyahu and the settlers, but it is entirely unacceptable to Palestinians, and instead palestinian insisting on the accurate implementation of the internationally signed agreement which includes:

- The re-deployment of Israeli forces in three phases covering a total of 90% of West Bank.

- The future withdrawal is to be implemented before the final status negotiation are over.

- Other interim-phase obligations has to be fulfilled by Israel, including the free passage between Gaza and West Bank, the international passages, freedom of prisoners, and other obligations.

Palestinian further claims that peace talks have been actually suspended long time ago, and it has nothing to do with recent bombing in Jerusalem, this suspension took place

since Israeli make ground for new settlements, in addition to the Israeli failure to meet the deadline for the first phase of further redeployment in the West Bank, for palestinians settlements freeze is there only pre-condition for a resumption of the peace talk.

What we observe now is pressure on palestinian, aiming not only at lowering the palestinian ceiling of expectation, but rather pushing them to a very narrow corner that will leave them without any option beyond the Israeli mercy, which depends on replacing the signed Oslo accord with Israeli imposed formula known now as post - Oslo stage or the getting out of Oslo stage, by this, Netanyahu would be freed of the obligations of Oslo in a typical illustration of the "Netanyahu's school of thought".

Looking to the future

True mediators should actively involve themselves in the peace process by addressing the fundamental reasons for the stagnation and lack of adherence to signed agreements, namely the Israeli attempts to gain peace without giving anything, the Israelis from the other side are demanding the maximum security guaranties from the Palestinians inspite of the minimum sovereignty mandated to them.

With this type of polarization between the two parties, it seems that the hope for resumption the peace process has to come from other parties who witness and signed the agreements, in particular the United States. On May Mrs Albright announced that she is interested in a peaceful outcome and is willing to mediate when situation has matured and is ripe for development, now that this visit finally took place, unfortunately, it was accompanied by down plays expectations as a reminder to the problem with United State approach that it uses the criteria of resumption of contacts as a measure of progress in the peace process. This approach is radically different from the criteria used by the two sides, who measures progress by the potential for results rather than the simple resumption of direct contacts.

To how far the United States role will be positive and active in resolving the dead lock of the peace process will remain a big question, knowing that the role of the United States has never been an active one and being based instead on having internal factors to play their part by increasing a pressure on the parties as a result of the lack of progress.

This tactic is usually harmful to all parties, further more, the American expects that this pressure generated from domestic factors in a bizarre form of events will help to change the position of the parties which will in turn achieve some progress.

CONCLUSIONS

Main observation to what is happening since the Hebron agreement last year indicates that the peace process is in a steady march back to square one, in order to stop that and to move forward, once can conclude that thos messian would be impossible as long as Netanyahu is in the power, considering the following:

A. There seems to be no reason for Netanyahu to change his thoughts based on the following factors:

1. The paralyzed role of the United States and other relevant international parties which has left the process at the mercy of the balance of power
2. The Arab World's weakness which based on verbal support for the palestinians.
3. Dependancy in the military power based on accumulated huge arsinal of weapons controlled by Israel
4. lack of seriousness among the Israeli peace camp which shows continuous weakness in facing the disasterous policy of Netanayhu

B. For the Palestinians and after centuries of continuous struggle for their homeland and rights as a people, they will not accept anything less than independent state with Jerusalem as its capital. This is the Palestnian Ceiling, and any attempt to lower that ceiling and push the Palestinians to the corner will serve anything but peace.

C. The situation as it looks now is in a "pause stage" which in its nature a short stage, and somebody has to push the button "on" or to push it "off".

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NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

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Resources are the foundation of wealth and power because people are material-using animals.

Everything we use, from the food we eat to keep us alive to the objects we manufacture, comes from substances found on this planet. Our concern over resources, however, is nothing new. The hunger for land, water, mineral supplies is as old as the ages. (Larkin et al., 1981).

All over the globe, in first-world societies and in third-world societies, we encounter rising exploitation of natural resources to the point where it threatens our existence. Human beings are increasing their use of water (later we shall expand on this issue regarding the Middle East), burning the earth's forests at an ever-faster rate to clear land for agriculture, using up the minerals that serve for building and industry, and of course are widely exploiting energy sources, particularly oil, gas and coal. The sea shores should be considered a resource in its own right, and it is dwindling through erosion, construction, pollution, and crowding of bathers, marinas, and the like.

The intensive exploitation of natural resources affects other resources: in several extreme cases, for example Athens and Mexico City, air pollution has become critical. River water, groundwater, seawater and ocean water is polluted. We witness pollution of lakes (such as Lake Baikal, the Caspian Sea, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean) or their disappearance (such as the Aral sea and the Dead Sea).

We are also watching processes that change the weather, desertification, and destruction of drainage systems.

In the following we shall focus on the water resource. It has special importance in the Middle East and the Mediterranean countries because these are arid or semi-arid zones.

Water resources in the Middle East are depleting day by day (this refers to ground water, rain water, and river water). This fact when combined with other factors create the threat of water shortage over a considerable part of the states in the area.

This article will concentrate mainly on the Nile, the Euphrates, the Tigris, the Jordan Rivers and groundwater. The following countries are connected to the drainage basins of these rivers: Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia with the Nile (omitted are Kenya, Uganda, and Zaire, which have a common drainage basin in the White Nile); Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, with the Euphrates and Tigris; Lebanon, Israel, the Palestinians, Syria, and Jordan, which are partners to the Jordan and Yarmukh. Israel and the Palestinians or Israel and Jordan, which are partners to the groundwater aquifers.

Causes of Water Shortage

Population Explosion

The population explosion is perhaps the toughest blow of all. The Third World in general and the Islam countries in this context in particular, find themselves in a process of continual population growth owing to natural increase, a process that threatens to bring them to the point of economic, social, and ecological collapse indeed to the brink of ruin. The problem is that even if the governments succeed in bringing about an immediate halt to the process in their states, some 15-20 years will have to pass until high natural increase ceases in these countries (as results of the

“demographic momentum”), and the deterioration might in the meantime lead them to the edge of an abyss.

Within a decade, the population of the states of the Nile Valley will grow by 50 million souls, this addition coming into an area that already has a water shortage. A similar picture may be depicted for the other basins. The population of the Tigris-Euphrates basin will grow by 25-30 million; that of the Jordan basin by 6-7 million (Population Reference Bureau, 1996).

Each additional person needs water - for drinking, for food, for bathing - and the shortage can only worsen. In other words, water is a more or less fixed resource, but its consumers are increasing. Even today, a state like Egypt cannot support its inhabitants with its own water resources by becoming one of the world's largest wheat importer. This is the same Egypt that once was the “bread basket of the Roman Empire”, and even in our own times was a world famous exporter of cotton.

Efforts to Raise the Standard of Living

There is a world-wide effort to raise the standard of living of the inhabitants of the globe, to increase per-capita income, and to improve the quality of life. All this necessitates (even if natural increase were to stand at a 0 percent level) utilizing more water for industry, for private cars, for food, for tourism (which consumes a relatively large quantity of water), while exploiting a resource that is, as mentioned, fixed.

On the other hand, the improvement in the standard of living is related to improvements in education, and these in turn may lead to a savings in water through the transference of manpower from agricultural employment to industrial occupations (which consume less water than does agriculture). This may be expected, too, because intelligent farmers will employ more

economical irrigation techniques (droplets instead of flooding, pipes instead of canals). Such improvements can save millions of cubic meters of water.

Local and Global Droughts

The issue of droughts has to be discussed cautiously. Proof exists that Northern Ethiopia and Sudan were hard hit by a difficult, prolonged drought of at least ten years. There is also proof that the Nile discharge has very slowly been going down over the past 100 years. In light of this trend, very serious concern arises over the future of the Nile basin people (Howell and Allan, 1990).

Signs exist in various regions of the world that point as it were to global processes that perhaps are leading to a warming and drying up of the planet. What is happening in the Nile basin is, perhaps, part of this threatening process. Despite these fears, proof may also be brought of the cyclical nature of the "seven good years" following "seven bad years," which is well known from the history of this region. If this is so, then perhaps all the talk is just over a passing climatic crisis. Whether it is this or not, the past two decades has seen the drying up of the Blue Nile basin; the quantity of water contained in it has so diminished as to bring about tragedy in Ethiopia and Sudan, and almost of national dimensions, too, in Egypt in summer 1988, when the water of Lake Nasser nearly reached the level of the sluices of the Aswan Dam (Howell and Allan, 1990).

Is the Middle East really in a water crisis?

We can answer this question by comparing water supply in the various countries (based on average many-year data) with the present demand for water, and also by comparing water demand forecasts in the near future.

Such a comparison will give us the best indication of the magnitude of the approaching crisis. The issue of water demand in the near future is not simple: it is contingent on the strategy to be adopted by the states of the region. This can be one of two strategies, the first of which we may term "business as usual". This views water as a vital resource for the existence of millions of farmers in the region, who will continue to grow their usual crops, even if they are "water guzzles" such as rice, sugar-cane, avocado, bananas, etc. They will go on with the same irrigation methods as in the past, usually flood irrigation. By this strategy water prices will continue to be close to zero and the same for all users, as is the case nowadays in most of the Arab states.

The second strategy may be termed "economic" or "rational". It sees water as a production element and agriculture as driven by market forces. Water has a price, so presumably it will not be used to grow tropical water-thirsty crops in the desert, and an effort will be made to reduce the number of those who live off agriculture. This strategy will prevent a water crisis.

Israel and perhaps the Jordanian kingdom and the Palestinians are the only countries whose governments are already able to decide which strategy to choose, and even then implementation has to be slow and cautious to prevent shocks on the economy and in society.

Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Turkey, Syria and Iraq are unable to adopt the second strategy in the foreseeable future because of their large populations and high natural increase rates. These populations are incapable of making the required change in the water economy. All these states must therefore continue with the first strategy, at least for the time being, and try to move gradually over to the second.

In our considerations of future demand for water we shall rely on the data of the various states as they themselves plan their water consumption in the next one or two decades.

Tables 1-6 show the water supply and demand in these countries, with conclusions as to water balance at present and forecasts for the future (the tables are from Soffer, in press, where the sources are given).

In the Nile basin (Tables 1,2) the picture indicates impending crisis: the forecast for Egypt is a water shortage at the beginning of the 21st century. Its postponement is a function of the civil war in Sudan, which has caused water allocated to Sudan not to be used fully and to reach Egypt. Egyptian plans continue to give priority to development of the desert, despite the fact that accumulated experience with desert reclamation generally shows failure and enormous national cost. Signs exist of the start of recycled water use, and an effort is being made to save water, but all this is dwarfed beside the increasing demand.

Table 1: Water Supply and Demand in Egypt (billion m³)

	Mid 1970's	Mid 1970's	1980	1980	1990	1990	2000	2000	2000	2000
	W	E	W	E	W	C	Sr	Sd	E	A
Demand										
Irrigation	33.0	29.4	37.2	37.9	44.2	33.6	50.7	45.2	40.9	58
Domestic	15.0	1.8	3.0	2.2	4.0	12.4	14.8	14.8	3.5	6
Industrial	-	4.1	3.5	2.4	3.6	-	-	-	3.0	5
Drainage	12.0	16.0	15.0	14.2	14.2	17.5	11.7	11.7	23.4	4
Evaporation	1.4	2.7	6.7	2.2	7.4	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.3	2
Total Demand	51.4	54.0	65.4	58.9	73.4	55.5	69.2	63.7	73.1	75
Supply										
Aswan release	55.5	57.5	60.0	61.7	58.9	55.5	55.5	50.0	57.5	58
Water reuse	-	-	2.5	5.4	6.0	-	6.0	6.5	4.5	6
Drainage reuse	-	-	4.0	-	4.0	-	3.0	3.5	6	3
Groundwater	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.9	5*
Total Supply	55.5	57.5	66.5	67.1	68.9	55.5	64.5	60.0	73.9	72
Balance	+4.1	+3.5	+1.1	+8.2	+4.5	-	-4.7	-3.7	-	-3

¹ Domestic and Industrial use together

Sources*: E - Egyptian Water Master Plan

W - Waterbury, 1979, 1988, 1991

C - Chesworth, 1990

S - Stoner, 1990 (r-rainy year; d-drought)

* Groundwater use can slightly change the balance positively

A - A. Soffer's assumptions, based on E and the great efforts to reclaim more Western desert

* Soffer A. Rivers of Fire, Boulder: Rowmen and Littlefield Publ. (in Press.).

Table 2: Water Supply and Demand in Sudan (estimation, billion m³)

	1990	1990	2000	2000
	Estimate A	Estimate B	Crisis continues	End of political crisis
<u>Demand</u>				
Irrigation	17	12	12	30
Domestic and industrial use	2.0	1	2	2.7
Total	19	13	14	32.7
<u>Supply</u>				
Groundwater	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Nile	20.5	20.5	20.5	20.5
Total	20.8	20.8	20.8	20.8
Balance	+1.8	+7.8	+6.8	-11.9

Sources: Soffer A. Rivers of Fire, Boulder: Rowmen and Littlefield Publ. (in Press.).
 Waterbury 1979, 1988; Chesworth, 1990; Knott and Hewett, 1990;
 Whittington and Haynes, 1981

To Egypt's misfortune, Nile water cannot be replaced by desalinated water because the price is too high for so poor a population. This is also the case with Sudan and Ethiopia.

The only way to prevent hunger and unrest within and among these states is by external aid, especially in food. Such aid may save the day only temporarily, and cannot serve as a long-term solution. This requires assistance to these countries to build water-recycling installations and to introduce water-saving measures such as replacement of irrigation through open canals by pipes. Meanwhile the effort must continue within states,

primarily Egypt, at family planning, otherwise all other steps will go to waste.

We must be ready for another climatic crisis in the Nile basin, and if it materializes Egypt will have to receive emergency aid.

In sum, people's minds in Egypt have to become accustomed to the fact that it is time to build dams in Ethiopia for Egypt, and thus reduce dependency on the wasteful Aswan Dam.

Regarding the Tigris and Euphrates basins, Table 3 shows that there is no crisis for the time being. The Arab states evince great anxiety over the major activity taking place in Turkey. In the future, the danger of a crisis in the Euphrates basin looms over Syria and Iraq. The Tigris basin, by contrast, does not show signs of a water crisis, and this fact allows solutions for the water needs of the three states even without many joint projects, on condition that good-will and wise policies are evinced. Iraq is rich in oil, which it could use to make the transition from agriculture to industry. The Tigris could compensate for the Iraqi portion of the Euphrates, all of whose water would serve eastern Turkey and Syria. Syria would be able to move Euphrates water southwards, to the Damascus area and the south of the state where water is scarce.

Table 3: Demand and supply of water in Euphrates-Tigris Basins
(1995-2040) (billion m³)

	1995	2000	2010	2020	2030	2040
A. Euphrates:						
Country						
Turkey	3	4-6	10	12	15	20
Syria	1-2	2-3	6	8	10	12
Iraq	14-17	14-17	14-17	14-17	14-17	14-17
Total demand	18-22	20-26	30-33	34-37	39-42	46-49
Supply	30	30	30	30	30	30
Balance	+12 +8	+10 +4	-3	-4 -7	-9 -12	-16 -19
B. Tigris:						
Country						
Turkey	0.5	1	2	3	5	7
Syria	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5
Iraq	32-38	32-38	32-38	32-38	32-38	32-38
Total demand	33-39	33-39	34-40	35-41	37-44	40-46
Supply	50	50	50	50	50	50
Balance	17-11	17-11	16-10	15-9	13-6	10-4
C. Euphrates + Tigris						
Country						
Turkey	3.5	5.7	12	15	20	27
Syria	1-2	2-3	6.2	8.3	10.4	12.5
Iraq	46-55	46-55	46-55	46-55	46-55	46-55
Total demand	50.5-60.5	65-65	64.2-73.2	69.3-78.3	76.4-85.4	85.5-94.5
Supply	80	80	80	80	80	80
Balance	+30 +20	+27 +15	+15.8 +6.8	+10.7 +1.7	+3.6 -5.4	-5.5 -14.5

Source: Soffer A. Rivers of Fire, Boulder: Rowmen and Littlefield Publ. (in Press.).

Remarks: Iraqi demands based on 1980s use. The table is based on the author's interpretation from available data and the progress of the development projects.

In the Jordan basin the water crisis is severe even now in some of the basin states; this is evident from Tables 4-6 (maps 1,2). The crisis in the Jordanian kingdom has been put off for now due to the Israel-Jordan peace agreement whereby Israel transfers about 80 million cubic meters of drinking water to the kingdom annually, and in the future this volume will increase to about 150 million cubic meters (Israel-Jordan Peace Agreement, 1994). Yet Table 4 also shows that the Jordanian kingdom has plans to enlarge its agricultural areas and increase the demand for water. If indeed the first strategy described above guides the kingdom, the water crisis is inevitable in the next five or ten years. Nor will the citizens of this state be able to afford the cost of desalinated water that will be needed to make up the deficit. The only way to save the Jordanian kingdom is constant movement towards the second strategy, meaning a reduction of agriculture, re-use of recycled water, economy in irrigation methods and choice of water-frugal crops, replacement of the water piping networks in the towns, and increased storage of floodwater. In parallel the countries of the first world should assist the Jordanian kingdom with essential food aid for its citizens until the shift is accomplished to more industry and tourism and less agriculture. In the first place, natural increase must gradually diminish, otherwise disaster is sure to strike. If a crisis erupts in Jordan it will endanger domestic stability and may also find expression in worsening hostility between Jordan and Syria over the use of the Yarmuk river water, and between Jordan and Israel over the use of Lake Kinneret water.

Table 4: Jordan: Water Potential, Supply and Demand

	Yarmuk	Eastern Tributaries of Jordan River	Groundwater Renewable	Fossil	Recycled Water	Total
Potential (1990)	400	207	271	560	45	1483
Supply						
1990	130	170	190	210	30	730
1993	160	241	534		48	983
Years/Demand	Agriculture		Domestic	Industry	Total	
1975	375		40	20	435	
1985	400		150	30	580	
1990	920		175	35	790	
1995	889		224	49	1162	
2000	1051		315	63	1429	
2005	1224		398	80	1702	
2010	1419		497	100	2016	
2020	1879		705	150	2734	
Years/Deficit						
1990 (Demand - Supply 1990)					-60	
1995 (Demand - Supply 1993, without recycled water)					-179	
2000 (" " " " ")					-446	
2005 (" " " " ")					-719	
2010 (" " " " ")					-1033	
2020 (" " " " ")					-1751	

Source: Soffer A. Rivers of Fire, Boulder: Rowmen and Littlefield Publ. (in Press.).

For Supply 1990 and Demand 1975-1990 - Chezawi 1992; Canaan 1990;

Sut al Sha'ab 6.6.89; al-Rai 8.1.90.

For 1993-2020: Shatanawi and al-Jayousi 1995: 90; Rozental 1993/5.

The water shortage in southern Syria, for the population of greater Damascus (about 3 million in 1997) and 1.5 million more in the south of the country, will amount to about a billion cubic meters, but it can be solved by the laying of a pipeline carrying Euphrates water to southern Syria. This water will be an addition to the upper Yarmuk water that Syria now uses (about 150-200 million cubic meters). If the Euphrates water transfer is implemented the water crisis in southern Syria will be averted, and then Israel too will be more flexible, and likely to reach a peace accord with Syria. The water component in relations between the two states is as important as security (Soffer, in press).

Lebanon is rich in water, so it is the only state of the Jordan basin that does not constitute a threat to the water arrangements among these countries.

Israel is the only country in the Middle East considered a first-world state, and therefore it is able to adopt the first strategy should it so desire. If it undertakes a responsible policy (which was not implemented consistently in the past) the state machinery is capable of imposing water demand that will match supply. Hence no danger of a water crisis exists there (and see Table 5). In reality, Israel is already a decade into the transition to the second strategy. The shift is not easy, as agriculture and water have a mythic quality in Zionist history, and it is hard to break free of such a myth (Cophaken, 1996).

Table 5: Water Supply and Demand in Israel (1985-2010 in million m³)

Sector	1985			1990			2000			2010		
	FW	RW	T	FW	RW	T	FW	RW	T	FW	RW	T
Agriculture	1200	210	1410	860	380	1240	820	430	1250	550	767	1317
Domestic	420	-	420	650	-	650	768	-	768	970	-	970
Industry	80	30	110	*180- 90)	40	40	100	45	145	131	50	181
Total (Supply and Demand)	1700	240	1940	1510	420	1930	1678	476	2153	1651	817	2468

FW: Fresh water; RW: Reclaimed water; T: Total

* within domestic use

Source:

Source: Soffer A. Rivers of Fire, Boulder: Rowmen and Littlefield Publ. (in Press.).

Israel State Comptroller' Report 1991: 46; Israel Water Commissioner's Report 1944

Israel was generous (in its perception) in the water agreement with the Jordanian kingdom, being willing to gradually transfer 100-150 million cubic meters of water to the kingdom. Despite some occasional friction, this agreement is in fact being implemented (Israel-Jordan Peace Agreement, 1994, Soffer, in press).

Israel fears that it will be required to give water also to Syria, and especially the Palestinians, and then a water shortage, although not a crisis, will develop. In preparation for such a likelihood, indirect action is being undertaken in water recycling and re-use in agriculture (Tahal, 1995), and the economy is now getting ready for the era of desalination, which is inevitable. From 2005-2010 Israel will begin to desalinate water incrementally, and the desalination of about a billion cubic meters is planned by 2040 (Water Commissioner, July 1997). By comparison, in 1997 the total desalinated water in the world is estimated at 6-7 billion cubic meters! Israel will be the only society in the region able to afford desalinated water for domestic and industrial use. To lower desalination costs, and to use the opportunity to assist Jordan and the Palestinians, ideas have been put forward to desalinate water by use of cheap electricity generated by a project sending Mediterranean water or Red Sea water down to the Dead Sea; Each project will cost an estimated 3 billion dollars. Israel hopes to receive this sum as aid from Europe, North America, and Japan (Israel, 1994/6).

The Palestinians are partners (willingly or not) with Israel to the Jordan river, and principally to the mountain aquifer of Palestine (Table 6a, b).

Table 6 A: Supply and Demand in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (million m²)

Present and Year 2000

A. Gaza Strip				
	1995	2000		
Supply	45-60	35-50		
Demand	110-120	190-200		
Agriculture	80-88	150		
Domestic	30-32	40-50		
Jews	3.4-4			
B. West Bank*				
	1995	*2000	2008	
			**	***
Supply	610-670	610-670	610-670	610-670
To Israel	455	310-360	110-160	135-195
Demands in W.B.	200	250-300	500	475
Arabs	40	200-250	500	475
Agriculture	105			
Domestic	10			
(from Israel	25)			
Jews	55	50	-	-
Agriculture	40			
Domestic	10			
(from Israel	5)			

* "Business as usual"

** Palestinian demands

*** Minimum water requirement

Sources: Gaza Water Department 1994

Civil Administration 1993

West Bank Water Commission 1996

Gvirtzman 1993, 1995; Assaf et al. 1993

Soffer, (in press).

Table 6B. Water Consumed from the Aquifers of the West Bank (million m³)

Aquifer	For Jewish Population	For Palestinians	Total
Yarkon - Taninim	340 (to Israel)	20	360
Nablus-Jenin	115 (to Israel)	23	138
Eastern Aquifer	40	60-70	100-110
Total	490	103-113	598-608

Sources: Table 4.6.

The water issue in the peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians is important, although it appears secondary compared with the weight of other matters such as Jerusalem, the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, security, and the 'right of Palestinian return'. Several alternatives are on the agenda (Soffer, in press). One is that Israel will continue to control all the water throughout Palestine, an alternative that the Palestinians oppose. The second is that all the water in the territory that by agreement goes to the Palestinians will be under Palestinian ownership; this alternative is vigorously opposed by Israel, being a downstream state with historical rights to this water. The Palestinian approach is that once their view of their ownership of the water in their terrain is accepted, the water of the mountain aquifer will be carried to the Gaza Strip (through a corridor in Israel), so a water shortage in Gaza will be prevented. This claim is backed by a further argument holding that since Israel is rich state (annual GNP of \$17,000 annually against \$1000 in the Palestinian population), it can desalinate all the water it needs (Al-Katib & Assaf, 1994; Al-Kloub & Al-Shemmer, 1986).

The third alternative is joint management of the water by means to be decided on, and the fourth is acceptance of the principle that all the water in Palestine will in any case only suffice for drinking by the present and predicted population, and this will be the basis for all calculations and management methods for the water regime (which in fact will be integrated) (Assaf et al., 1993).

Summary

The findings presented indicate a real water crisis in the basins of the Nile and the Jordan, including groundwater, and increasing nervousness in the Euphrates basin.

In view of the expected increase in the region's population, the outlook for demand for water is grave; nevertheless, we have seen that human society is capable of assisting in the prevention of crises. We have suggested projects all of which are small-scale and do not need cooperation between the states of the region. This consideration stems from recognition of the facts: we are dealing with an area that has never known genuine cooperation (Soffer, in press), and our proposal is merely for recycling of sewage water and repair of piping systems in all areas. We suggest import of food to replace water-thirsty crops, and at the same time we recommend steps by the regional states to limit childbirth and to educate, in the wake of which will follow the vital transition from agriculture to industry, services and tourism.


For all this to occur, Europe and the other rich states have the duty to assist in funding these projects, and also to offer food aid for a short time, with the undertaking by the states involved to adopt the recommended strategies.

Talk of large-scale projects must be postponed for at least a generation. In the present atmosphere in the region plans and recommendations for cooperation among the states must be treated as unrealistic, and a time when the region is free of war and suspicion, and natural increase has declined, must be awaited. All ideas of importing water (the Turkish peace pipeline, the Egyptian peace pipeline, import from overseas, grandiose plans for cascading water down to the Dead Sea, and the like) and joint management of the drainage basins are entirely unreal; to speak of them raises false hopes on the one hand, and disappointment on the other.


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
Map 1 : Jordan River Basin and Eretz Israel Aquifers



Map 2 : Water Projects on the Jordan River



Soffer A., Rivers of fire, Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, (in press)



HALKI INTERNATIONAL SEMINARS 1997

SESSION 97.2

**THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE MEDITERRANEAN
REGION**

***EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION :
INTER-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION AND EXCHANGE****

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ORGANIZATION - ISESCO-**

RABAT, MOROCCO

****INITIAL VERSION***

EUROPE AND THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION : INTER-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION AND EXCHANGE

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DEFINITION OF THE CONCEPT

Cultures are not isolated and static sets of customs, rituals, beliefs and practices, they are living phenomena that need input from other cultures to live and prosper, and experience has shown that those cultures that choose isolation, as a way of life, definitely do not disappear but do remain, somewhat, handicapped.

Over centuries of human history, cultures have entered into collision with other cultures, either through wars, invasions or annexation but they have never died out completely as long as people who represent them are still in life, a good example of that is the Red Indians, who after being decimated by the US Army in the 19th century have been parked in reserves with the idea of assimilating them to the all-powerful American culture. But, though many Red Indians have over decades assimilated to the American way of life, yet the majority cling to their culture because it is a symbol of their identity. And one of the main reasons for which cultures survive even in the most adverse environments is the fact that they are potent symbols of identity.

According to Samuel Huntington,¹ as argued in his controversial article entitled « The Clash of Civilizations ? », the next century will see a clash between the three main civilisations of the world i.e. Western, Islamic and Confucian or rather, and that is what the writer was driving at, : a clash between the Western and the Islamic civilisations. This demonisation of Islam is may be the result of the end of the Cold War which left an uncomfortable threat « vacuum ».²

For some Islamists like Benkirane,³ a moderate Islamic leader of the group *Islah wa Tajdid*, the Western world cannot live and prosper in the absence of a potential enemy. Yesterday it was Communism and today it is Islam and if there were not Islam, they would have had to create an enemy of some sort.

¹ Cf. Huntington, S.P. « The Clash of Civilizations ? ». *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993) ; cf. also Lewis, L. « The Roots of Muslim Rage ». *Atlantic Monthly*, September 1996.

² Cf. Roberson, B.A. « Islam and Europe : an Enigma or a myth ». *The Middle East Journal* 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994)

³ Personal communication.

It is a known fact that ideologies, political systems, political philosophies, religions do clash quite often, but cultures⁴ do not and they manage to co-exist even in the most adverse situations. In fact, even in the most critical situations, cultures manage to set up extraordinary channels for communication and exchange between themselves.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

As far as human memory can go back, Europe and the Mediterranean Region have had a very long record of exchange and communication as well as conflict and misunderstanding. Indeed, throughout known history the populations of these two regions visited, lived, traded and made exchanges with each other but also fought, invaded and massacred each other. And today, in spite of centuries of exchanges both peaceful and violent, these two regions stand far apart, unable to benefit from their long common history. The question that comes to mind right away is : why this situation then and now ?

Obviously there is no straight down to earth answer to this complex question, maybe the answer is the whole record of history itself and not specific aspects or parts of it. However, there are two main factors that have been instrumental in bringing together and setting apart the two regions : these are religious and ideological beliefs and commercial interests.

The Roman Period

During the Roman Empire, North Africa and the Middle East, which were outside of the Roman control and influence : *axis romanus*, were conquered by the force of the sword around 146 to 40 BC and brought within the fold of the empire. The Romans imposed on the population their language, their beliefs and way of life and even the urban centres were built within the norms of the Roman architecture i.e. *Volibilus*, *Lixus*, *Sbeitla*, *Dougga*, etc.

The Berbers of North Africa, who by the way call themselves *Imazighen* « free and noble people » and their language *Tamazight*, have been given the name Berber by the Romans who called them *barbarus* i.e. people who live outside the *axis romanus* and who are not civilised, in other words : barbarians.

In the administration of the territories of North Africa, the Romans were extremely flexible in their approach, they allowed the indigenous people to hold important positions in the administration and in the army as indicated by E. Guernier :⁵

Un fait paraît dominer toute l'administration romaine : une extrême souplesse dans l'application des mesures législatives et des règlements. D'autre part, une place importante est faite aux indigènes dans les rouages impériaux aussi bien dans l'administration civile que dans les cadres militaires.

⁴ Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language (second college edition) defines culture as : « the ideas, customs, skills, arts, etc. of a given people in a given period. » ; as for The Columbia Viking Desk Encyclopedia (second edition), it defines culture in the following terms : « ... the way of life of a society, without implication of refinement or advanced knowledge. Culture is historically transmitted, primarily through language, and is the attribute that most distinguishes man from the animals. »

⁵ Cf. Guernier, E. 1950. *La Berbérie, l'Islam et la France. Vol. I.* Paris : Editions de l'Union Française. P. 98.

Economically speaking, the Roman colonisation did not improve the living conditions of the population that was in its majority made of peasants, already under Carthaginian rule the North Africans were used to the techniques of the cultivation of wheat, barley, vines and olive trees which are still somewhat the basic crops of the area today.

However, the most remarkable achievement of the Romans in the area is undoubtedly the introduction of sophisticated irrigation systems and techniques⁶. They built aqueducts for the cities, cisterns for the farms and artesian wells for the oases. The most well-known irrigation works the Romans left behind are : the aqueduct of Carthage and that of Cherchell, the dam of Kasserine and the cisterns of Cirta and Hippone. The Romans, also, taught the locals techniques to collect rain water in valleys in order to use for agriculture, when needed, and to build irrigation ditches along rivers and streams to use the water for the neighbouring lands. It is, also, a known fact that the Roman legion had in its ranks many engineers who provided advice and, also, built underground canals like the one in Bougie. It is thanks to the experience of the Romans that Berbers developed their own techniques in irrigation such as the famous *khettara-s* in the plain of Marrakech and the water towers that organise the distribution of water along the two sides of the Atlas chain of mountains.

The Romans, also, built several roads to secure the control of the territories and allow the exchange of goods between the people. Some of the known roads of the time are :

- the Carthage-Thevest road 275 km long ;
- the Carthage-Tripoli road 823 km long.

These roads necessitated a good knowledge of bridge building over rivers and streams and *wadi-s*.

Among the other Roman influences still present with the population of North Africa is a certain obsession with cleanliness. Indeed, the Romans built baths everywhere, and encouraged people to bathe frequently, and they made out of them public places of intellectual discussion and commercial transactions and political lobbying. The Romans, also, washed excessively before , between and after meals . Indeed, slaves passed between the beds on which lie their masters and guests and poured on their fingers fresh perfumed water.⁷ Later on , when the Muslims arrived they had no problem, as they did in some other areas, in introducing the concept of cleanliness and the idea of ablutions before prayer. Today, it is a common practice in North Africa to offer guests, on arrival, to freshen up and, also, to wash before and after meals.

The influence of the Roman civilisation on North Africa is also present in both Berber and Arabic languages as shown by the following examples :

Latin words used in the Berber language⁸

⁶ Cf. Albertini, E. 1937. *L'Afrique Romaine*. Alger. P. 34 :

« L'aménagement hydraulique a été la partie la plus importante de l'oeuvre romaine en Afrique. »

⁷ Cf. Carcopino, J. 1939 . *La vie quotidienne à Rome*. Paris : Hachette.

⁸ Cf. Chtatou, M. 1997. *Central-Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean Region : Similarities and Differences* in Halki International Seminars Occasional Papers OP97.10. Athens : ELIAMEP. P. 4.

Cf. also Chtatou, M. 1982 . « Aspects of the Phonology of a Berber Dialect of the Rif ». Unpublished doctoral dissertation, SOAS , University of London, London. P. 82.

TAMAZIGHT		LATIN	GLOSS
firas	<	pirus	« pears »
fuḡus	<	pullus	« chick »
asnus	<	asinus	« small donkey »
oθan	<	hortus	« orchard »
furu /firu /filu	<	filum	« thread »

LATIN WORDS USED IN THE ARABIC LANGUAGE⁹

ARABIC		LATIN	GLOSS
qubba	<	cuppa	« dome »
qindil	<	burgus	« country house »
ṣaqf	<	scapha	« ceiling »
sizil	<	sigillum	« seal »
till	<	tellus	« hill »

Among the celebrations and the rituals still common in North Africa and especially in Morocco, there is the *Boujloudia* known in Berber as *bou-ihidorn*, *bou-ilma-wen* or *bou-isrikhen*¹⁰ that often takes place during the religious celebration of *I-aid l-kbir* « the feast of sacrifice ». On the first day of the feast, a ram is ritually slaughtered in remembrance of God's request made to Abraham in a dream to sacrifice his son Ismael to him.

In fact, this practice is quite common in many areas in Morocco and in some parts of Algeria and Tunisia and its existence is traced back to ancient Greece and ancient Rome. It used to take place in the summer at the end of the agricultural cycle, when the crops have been reaped, as gesture of thanksgiving to the gods for their generosity and a prayer for more fertility for the coming year.

However, in the Jbala region of north-western Morocco, in the village of Tatoft among Ahl Srif, an arabised Berber clan, there is a professional group of musicians known as the Master Musicians of Jahjouka who have given the rites of *Bou Jelloud* a special significance because they believe that their rites hark back to pre-Islamic times and derive from the rites of Pan.¹¹ Their origins stem from Greek and Roman influences and correspond - in the wild chase of *Bou -Jelloud* (the father of skins), the instigator of a fertility dance - to various fertility traditions found in most Mediterranean countries. There is even a reference to this tradition in Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* (Act1,Scene 2) :

*Forget not,
In your haste , Antomuis,*

⁹ Cf. Guernier (note1) p. 115.

¹⁰ Cf. Hammouda, A. 1988 . *La Victime et ses masques*. Paris : Seuil, for ample discussion of this unique phenomenon which is traced back to ancient Greece and ancient Rome.

¹¹ Pan, in Greek religion, pastoral god of fertility. Worshipped chiefly in Arcadia . He was portrayed as merry, ugly man with horns, beard, tail, and goat's feet. All his myths deal with amorous affairs : e.g. , his unsuccessful pursuit of the nymph Syrinx, who became a reed, which Pan plays in memory of her. He was later identified with Greek Dionysus and Roman Faunus, both gods of fertility.

*To touch Calpurnia,
For our elders say
The barren touched in the holy chase
Shake off their sterile curse*

Even today, the ceremony still involves **Bou Jelloud**, emerging from his place of concealment on hearing the sounds of *ghaita-s*¹², and dancing himself into a trance while flailing women with branches to make them fertile.

The location of these rites is a small village situated in the Jbala region of Northern Morocco, in the piedmont region leading, further east, into the mountains of the Rif. The village of Jahjouka is still the home of Pan, the goatlike god and his persisting presence is a challenge to time space and religion. The tradition emerged from Egypt and, despite transformations of nomenclature and culture it has been transmogrified into the practices of the Master Musicians and their practice of the Pipes of Pan. A crucial factor in this development was the fact that the introduction of Islam in the Jbala region did not destroy the pre-existing traditions. Islam was introduced in 800 AD by the eastern mystic, Sidi Ahmed Sheikh, who allowed local practice to continue unhindered and even managed to dignify it by granting it *baraka*.¹³ The musicians involved were, therefore, able to depend on their music to earn their living. Today, the musicians receive a tithe - *ziyara* - from local people for their music and it is this on which they survive. In return they play *ghaita* music in the courtyard of Sidi Ahmed Sheikh's shrine, which is located in the village of Jahjouka. Visitors come to the shrine - *kubba* - every Friday to seek *baraka* from the saint. The musicians, also, fulfil a psycho-medical function for they cure the sick and those with medical disorders. Those afflicted are tied to a tree in the courtyard of the shrine and the *ghaita* and *tbel*¹⁴ are played by the musicians to drive out the demons supposed to be responsible for the illness- whether physical or mental.

The major celebration in Jahjouka is the Pan festival which takes place during *I-aid I-kbir*. For the ten days of the feast, local villagers attend the musical celebrations and participate in its climax, when **Bou Jelloud** emerges from his cave to seek out according to the myth, his lover - *Aisha I-hamqa* - « crazy Aisha » - identified by her goatlike feet (a typical attribute of female in Morocco). **Bou Jelloud**'s arrival in the area before the shrine is heralded by the screams of women and children whom he flails as he passes by - a feature that recalls some of the traditions of religious brotherhoods such as *Hmadsha*¹⁵ and *Aissawa*.

The Pan festival is not the only cultural practice and ritual inherited from ancient Greece and ancient Rome and still is in use in the popular culture of North Africa, we find such bizarre rituals as dancing around fires and jumping over them as well as throwing buckets of water at passers by during the celebration of the Islamic New Year - *Fatih Muharram* -.

What this means in other words, is that inter- cultural communication and exchange between North Africa and the ancient civilisations of Europe were so strong that subsequent civilisations and religions have been unable to erase them from the memory of the local

¹² Oboe-like pipe.

¹³ *baraka* : divine blessing .

¹⁴ *tbel* : a large and resonant drum played by beating two wooden sticks on either of the skin covered sides of the instrument

¹⁵ Cf. Crapanzano, V. 1973. *The Hamadsha : A Study in Moroccan Ethnopsychiatry*. Berkeley : University of California Press.

population. On the contrary, Islam aware of their appeal to the people attempted to Islamic most rituals by introducing Islamic concepts in them as is the case with the Pan festival in which the character of the *Haj* « Muslim pilgrim », dressed in white, dances around aimlessly while *Bou Jelloud* runs after his lover *Aisha l-hamqa*.

The Arabs in Spain

Many centuries later, the Arabs returned the Roman courtesy by paying Europe a visit that was to last some eight centuries. Indeed, in 711, Musa Ibn Nusayr, then Arab Governor of North Africa, on learning that King Roderick, the last Goth king, was busy in the north subduing rebellious Basques, dispatched one of his able generals the Berber Tarik Ibn Ziyad at the command of an army of 7,000 Berber soldiers to make a raid on Andalusia.¹⁶ Tarik landed at the lion's rock which was to be named after him since : *Jabal Tarik* (Tarik's mountain) or Gibraltar and disobeying his commander burned his ships and made his famous speech :

*The sea is at your back,
The enemy is in front of you
And all that is left for you to do
Is to push forward and die in the name of Allah*

It might be true that the Arabs conquered Spain by the sword, but it is universally admitted that their presence in this part of Europe brought prosperity, knowledge , culture and refinement to this country and the whole of Europe and was instrumental in its renaissance. This is corroborated by S. Lane-Pool in his book entitled *The Moors in Spain* published in 1887 :¹⁷

The history of Spain offers us a melancholy contrast. Twelve hundred years ago, Tarik the Moor added the land of the Visigoths to the long catalogue of kingdoms subdued by the Moslems. For nearly eight centuries, under the Mohammedan rulers, Spain set to all Europe a shining example of a civilized and enlightened State. Her fertile provinces, rendered doubly prolific by the industry and engineering skill of her conquerors, bore fruit and hundredfold. Cities innumerable sprang up in the rich valleys of the Guadalquivir and the Guadiana, whose names, and names only, still commemorate the vanished glories of their past. Art, literature, and science prospered, as they then prospered nowhere else in Europe . Students flocked from France and Germany and England to drink from the fountain of learning which flowed only in the cities of the Moors. The surgeons and doctors of Andalusia were in the van of science : women were encouraged to devote themselves to serious study, and the lady doctor was not unknown among the people of Cordova. Mathematics, astronomy and botany, history, philosophy and jurisprudence were to be mastered in Spain, and Spain alone. the practical work of the field, the scientific methods of irrigation, the arts of fortification and shipbuilding, the highest and most elaborate products of the loom, the graver and the hammer, the potter's wheel and the mason's trowel, were brought to perfection by the Spanish Moors. In the practice of war no less than in the arts of peace

¹⁶ Cf. Lane-Pool, S. 1887 (1984). *The Moors in Spain*. London : Darf Publishers Ltd. p ; 13 .

¹⁷ Ibid., pp vii-viii ;

they long stood supreme. Their fleets disputed the command of the Mediterranean with the Fatimites, while their armies carried fire and sword through the Christian marches. The Cid himself, the national hero, long fought on the Moorish side, and in all save education was more than half a Moor. Whatsoever makes a kingdom great and prosperous, whatsoever tends to refinement and civilization, was found in Moslem Spain.

It goes without saying that the Arab-Islamic civilisation in Spain did not reach its apogee by the sheer might of the sword but on the contrary it owes its success to inter-cultural communication and exchange initiated by the Arabs. The Arab presence in Spain for eight centuries is undoubtedly the result of some sort of coexistence between people of different ethnic origins, cultures and religions. S. Lane-Poole¹⁸ argues that the Jews and the Moors and the Persians were instrumental in the development of Muslim Spain :

Jew Wherever the arms of the Saracens penetrated, there we shall always find the Jews in close pursuit : while the Arab fought, the Jew trafficked, and when the fighting was over, and Moor and Persian joined in that cultivation of learning and philosophy, arts and sciences, which preeminently distinguished the rule of the Saracens in the Middle Ages.

It is a known fact among historians that prior to the arrival of the Arabs to Spain, the Jews were persecuted,¹⁹ especially during the Visigothic king Sisebut (612-21 AD), though in reality the legislation allowing discrimination against them had been passed earlier during the reign of Alaric II (484-507 AD) as a follow-up of the decisions of the third Council of Toledo approved by Reccared (586-601 AD) which forced Jews to convert to Christianity and forbade them to buy Christian slaves.

After the conquest of Spain by the Muslim forces was completed, the original inhabitants of the conquered land were given the choice between converting to Islam or remaining Christian with the status of *dhimmi* and be subjected to the payment of a tax known as *jizya*, and indeed many people preferred to stick to their Christian faith. A good illustration of the ideal inter-cultural communication that was set up by the Muslims then is the rise to power of many Christians within the bureaucratic and political structure of the Islamic state.²⁰

As a result of the contact between the Muslims and the European inhabitants of the Iberian peninsula, we still find today on either side of the Strait of Gibraltar traces of the civilisation of the other in cultural practises or in the language. Indeed, one of the most famous dishes of Spain is *paella* which is made of rice, chicken meat and seafood. In the time of Muslim Spain, this was actually the dish of *albaycin*, the poor, (name given in Granada to a quarter which was inhabited by the poor) and which consisted of the remains *al-baqiyya* of the previous days. In the North African side, the Spanish word *fiesta* « feast » pronounced *fishta* has a special meaning that no other word could describe, in spite of their abundance in the Arabic language : *hafl*, *'ihtifal* , *'id*, etc. because it refers back to the excessive celebrations of

¹⁸ Op. cit. p. 24.

¹⁹ Cf. Taha, A.D. 1989. *The Muslim Conquest and Settlement of North Africa and Spain*. London : Routledge . P. 42 « *There is clear and unequivocal testimony from every Visigothic edict concerning the Jews that they were persecuted and savagely treated .* »

²⁰ Cf. *The moors in Spain* op. cit.

the Spaniards during the weekend, unknown elsewhere in either side of the Strait of Gibraltar. Another word which is of Spanish origin and has a special meaning in North African Arabic is the word *gana* « mood, disposition, feeling, etc. ». Indeed this word is used in Arabic in various situations as shown by the following examples :

-tl°at li l-gana °lik

I am disposed to like you

-ma °andi gana

I am in no good mood

-huwwa u gantu

It is up to how he feels

-kayjini °la ganti

We get along together

Because of the long inter-cultural interaction between the Arabs, the Berbers and the Spaniards, the languages of these people borrowed from each other :

BERBER LOAN-WORDS FROM SPANISH²¹

BERBER		SPANISH	GLOSS
pasaporte	<	passaporte	« passport »
kamppu	<	campo	« country side »
nobyu	<	novio	« boyfriend, girlfriend »
biaksi	<	viaje	« trip, travel »
cama	<	cama	« bed »

ARABIC LOAN-WORDS FROM SPANISH²²

ARABIC		SPANISH	GLOSS
bukadiyyo	<	bocadillo	« sandwich »
malita	<	maneta	« blanket »
murtadilla	<	mortadella	« luncheon meat »
cama	<	cama	« bed »
kantina	<	cantina	« bar »
srbisa	<	cerveza	« beer »

SPANISH LOAN-WORDS FROM ARABIC

SPANISH	ARABIC	GLOSS
alcazar	al-qasr	« castle »

²¹ Examples given from tarifit Berber dialects spoken in the coastal Rif area of Northern Morocco and which were prior to Independence in 1956 under Spanish colonial rule.

²² Examples given from Moroccan Arabic.

guadelquivir	al-wad al-kabir	« the big valley »
alhambra	al-hamra'	« the red »
valadolid	balad al walid	« the land of Walid »
albaycin	al-ba'isin	« the wretched, the poor »

Through contact with other European cultures and languages in Muslim Spain, there took place an important word-borrowing on both sides. An important manifestation of this is the word-borrowing that took part in English as shown by the following examples :

ENGLISH LOAN-WORDS FROM ARABIC

ENGLISH		ARABIC
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admiral	<	amir al bahr
arsenal	<	dar as-silah
almanac	<	al-munax
whim	<	wahm
algebra	<	al-jibr

THE IMAGE OF THE OTHER

Representation of the Moor

In 1603-1604, Shakespeare (1564-1616) at the height of his career as a playwright produced *Othello* which the critics believe was based on a story in Giraldi Cinthio's *Hecatommithi* (III, 7), a collection of some hundred plays published in Italy in the 16th century. It is believed that at this time there was no translation of this work in the English language and it is more likely that Shakespeare read the collection in its original version in Italian and may have also been exposed to the French language as translated by Gabriel Chappuys.²³

The story from Giraldi Cinthio's *Hecatommithi*, which inspired Shakespeare to write his tragedy *Othello*, is about a valiant and handsome Moor in Venice, who distinguished himself in battle against the Turks and this earned him much respect and recognition from the Signoria of the Republic in whose pay he was. Desdemona, a virtuous lady of great beauty, moved by his courage and valour fell in love with him. He returned her love vanquished by her ravishing beauty and nobility of character. Her parents, unhappy with the subject of her infatuation tried to convince her to change her mind, but in vain, because responding to her heart's desire she ended up marrying the Moor.

Having decided to make a change in the troops stationed in Cyprus, the Signoria of Venice appointed Othello commander of the soldiers to be dispatched. For Othello this decision was a great honour bestowed upon him by the state, but it caused him at the same time great pain because he was going to be away from his beloved Desdemona. Having realised the true source of her husband's pain and sadness, she revealed to him the extent of her love and affection. Relieved by what he heard and engulfed by her expressions of love for him, he left for Cyprus happy and content.

²³ Cf. Muir, K. 1957. *Shakespeare's Sources* : Vol. I, « Comedies and Tragedies ». London : Methuen & Co., Ltd. The first volume on comedies and tragedies, attempts to ascertain what books were Shakespeare's sources, and what use he made of them.

But it so happened, that Othello had in his soldiery a handsome man of tremendous wickedness and malice by the name of Ensign who was in the favour of the Moor. This man had great infatuation for Desdemona and was constantly plotting to make her fall with the Moor in order to gain her favour and affection. Among the brave and loyal men of Othello, there was a Captain for whom he had much affection and whom Desdemona liked as a consequence. This Captain, on killing a guard with his sword was deprived by the Moor of his rank, troubled by what had happened Desdemona aware of her husband's respect and friendship for the man, intervened in his favour. Ensign, who in his villainy and wickedness was waiting for such a propitious occasion, started leading purposefully the Moor to believe that her attempts to have him reintegrate the Captain were justified by her love for him. The web of villainy so neatly knitted by Ensign started to unfold slowly. Thus, Othello turned against his wife and began to treat her with much disdain and disrespect.

Once, while visiting Ensign's wife, with whom she used to spend much time, Desdemona had an embroidered handkerchief, offered to her by Othello, stolen from her by the villain soldier and left at the Captain's house. Having found the handkerchief, resolved to return it to its rightful owner, so he went to Desdemona's house and knocked at the back door and Othello who had just returned home answered the door, fearing for his life the Captain fled before Othello opened the door. This incident increased the level of suspicion that the Moor had towards his wife's faithfulness and allegiance to him. After consulting with Ensign, who further aroused his jealousy and hatred, he resolved to slay both his wife and the Captain in such a way that their death would not be attributed to him.

The Moor convinced Ensign to kill the Captain in return of a handsome reward while he would put Desdemona to death, but later changed his mind. Ensign attacked the Captain but only managed to cut off his leg. Having realised that Othello did not have enough courage to kill his wife, he suggested to carry out this dirty task by himself by beating her on her head with a sand bag and attribute her death to the old ceiling of the room that he would pull down on her and pretext that it caved in. And this he did, but before dying Desdemona, not aware of the conspiracy, turned to her husband for help and her appeal was met with insults and disdain, having realised what had happened she appealed for the heavenly justice.

However, it did not take long for this justice to materialise, because right after Desdemona's burial, the Moor whom she loved more than her life regretted his act and felt tremendous loss and sorrow as a consequence. Realising that it was Ensign who was responsible for much of his trouble, he resolved to kill him, but had it not been for his fear of the retribution of the Signoria of Venice he would have fulfilled his resolution gladly. Instead, he deprived him of his rank and had him moved away from his company. This incensed Ensign who decided to take revenge, so he first informed the Captain that it was the Moor who was behind his misfortune on the account of the suspicion he had formed of the conduct of his wife. On hearing this, the Captain went to the Signora and accused the Moor of the murder of his wife, the latter was brought before justice in Venice but would not confess in spite of torture. Later, he was thrown in jail where he was slain by his wife's kinsmen. As for Ensign, he returned to his country and following up on his mischief he accused one of his companions of inciting him to kill an enemy of his of a noble rank. This man was arrested and denied all accusations, even under torture, upon which Ensign was arrested and tortured to prove his accusations. Later, he was removed from prison and died in his house a horrible death.

Shakespeare's version is not much different apart from a surgical change of some characters' names and some facts. But with the great mastery that is his he managed to give the plot more flavour, the tragedy more suspense and the characters more life and more independence and reality.

In introducing this play, Alvin Kernan²⁴ argues that *Othello* came about at the height of Shakespeare's career as a playwright at a time when he acquired a better knowledge of humanity, its nature and its aspirations :

When Shakespeare wrote Othello, about 1604, his knowledge of human nature and his ability to dramatize it in language and action were at their height. The play offers, even in its minor characters, a number of unusually full and profound studies of humanity: Brabantio, the sophisticated, civilized Venetian senator, unable to comprehend that his delicate daughter could love and marry a Moor, speaking excitedly of black magic and spells to account for what his mind cannot understand; Cassio, the gentleman-soldier, polished in manners and gracious in bearing, wildly drunk and revealing a deeply rooted pride in his ramblings about senior officers being saved before their juniors; Emilia, the sensible and conventional waiting woman, making small talk about love and suddenly remarking that though she believes adultery to be wrong, still if the price were high enough she would sell- and so, she believes, would most women. The vision of human nature which the play offers is one of ancient terrors and primal drives - fear of the unknown, pride, greed, lust- underlying smooth, civilized surfaces- the noble senator, the competent and well-mannered lieutenant, the conventional gentlewoman.

Othello in its entirety is but a cultural representation of the other, the other here being the dark world of Islam symbolised by the black complexion of the Moor. Even if the Moor had converted to Christianity and had learned the ways of the civilised, he remained suspicious and barbaric and indeed at the height of his rage, Shakespeare makes him compare himself to the raging seas, savage and uncontrollable :²⁵

*like to the Pontic Sea,
Whose icy current and compulsive course
Nev'r keeps retiring ebb, but keeps due on
To the Propontic and the Hellespont,
Even so my bloody thoughts, with violent pace,
Shall nev'r look back, nev'r ebb to humble love,
Till that a capable and wide revenge
Swallow them up*

In short, what Shakespeare means to say is that all the Moor can think about is violence and revenge and that is his true personality, his true nature and culture and for all of this he is but a genuine reflection of his people and their beliefs.

²⁴ Cf. Kernan, A. 1963. « Introduction » in *Othello*. New York, New York : New American Library.

²⁵ Cf. *Othello*, III iii, 450-457.

In this representation, the Moor is a brave soldier and an able commander and that is why beautiful Desdemona fell in love with him, but he is a fool and is considered by Iago as such and advises to treat him like an ass.²⁶

*The Moor is of free and open nature
That thinks men honest that but seem to be so ;
And will as tenderly be led by th' nose
As asses are.*

Iago, a man of lesser rank and valour but of tremendous intelligence manages to manipulate Othello, at will, and to work him up in such a rage of jealousy that he loses his wisdom and composure and murders his wife. Emilia, the wife of his villain attendant, enraged by his act speaks her mind and treats him like dirt.²⁷

*t pow'r to Thou hast not half thado me harm
As I have to be hurt. O gull ! O dolt !
As ignorant as dirt ! Thou hast done a deed*

Brabantio, Desdemona's father, grieved by his daughter's decision to marry the Moor, considers the marriage as being an act against nature. He lets free his deep feelings of racism and ethnocentrism by wondering why on earth his daughter agreed to marry « what » she feared most to look on :²⁸

*A maiden never bold,
Of spirit so still and quiet that her motion
Blushed at herself ; and she, in spite of nature,
Of years, of country, credit, everything,
To fall in love with what she feared to look on !
It is a judgement maimed and most imperfect
That will confess perfection so could err
Against all rules of nature, and must be driven
To find out practices of cunning hell
Why this should be.*

He believes the whole business of love and marriage to be the work of witchcraft and black magic, and like all the men of his time what they could not explain by the prevalent logic of the time is automatically attributed to the dark forces of magic :²⁹

*I therefore vouch again
That with some mixtures pow'rful o'er the blood,
Or with some dram, conjured to this effect,
He wrought upon her.*

For Brabantio, Desdemona did not choose to live with the Moor of her own free will. She does not control her actions, she is under a strong spell :³⁰

²⁶ Ibid, I, iii, 390-393.

²⁷ Ibid, V, ii, 159-161.

²⁸ Ibid, I, iii, 94-103.

²⁹ Ibid, I, iii, 103-106.

*She is abused, stol'n from me, and corrupted
By spells and medicines bought of mountebanks
For nature so prepost'rously to err,
Being not deficient, blind, or lame of sense,
Sans witchcraft could not.*

But the Moor is not only portrayed as savage, violent and uncivilised, he is also vulgar and vile, and when Iago went to the house of Brabantio to inform him that his daughter has taken Othello the Moor for husband, he described what happened in the most xenophobic and racist terms possible using terminology related to horses and equestrian life:³¹

*you'll have your daughter covered with a Barbary
horse, you'll have your nephews neigh to you,
you'll have coursers for cousins, and gennets for
germans.*

he used the basest of metaphors and idioms to make reference to their betrothal and especially its physical aspect:³²

*I am one, sir, that comes to tell you your daughter
and the Moor are making the beast with two backs.*

Iago's hatred for Othello, in particular, and for the Moors, in general, is incommensurable and he expresses his abhorrence of them in a monologue that could well express the general feeling that was prevalent in his time:³³

*These Moors
are changeable in their wills-fill thy purse with
money. The food that to him now is as luscious as
locusts shall be to him shortly as bitter as colo-
quintida. She must change for youth; when she is
sated with his body, she will find the errors of her
choice. Therefore, put money in thy purse. If thou
wilt needs damn thyself, do it a more delicate way
than drowning. Make all the money thou canst. If
sanctimony and a frail vow betwixt an erring
barbarian and supersubtle Venetian be not too hard
for my wits, and all the tribe of hell, thou shalt enjoy
her*

In Shakespeare's Othello, the Moor is valiant, courageous and faithful in his allegiance and he has proved that by rendering numerous services to the Signora of Venice as a military

³⁰ Ibid, I, iii, 60-64.

³¹ Ibid, I, iii, 108-111.

³² Ibid, I, iii, 113-114.

³³ Ibid, I, iii, 342-354.

commander and that is why he was appointed to command the troops in Cyprus and confront the Turks. He is, also, of the Christian faith. But, in spite of all these fine qualities and excellent attributes, he is violent, savage, barbaric and vile because the general feeling expressed by the playwright in his work is one of disgust and that seems to reflect the image the public opinion of that time had of people of darker complexions and foreign origins. Racial superiority of the white Christian European over other races was a very important issue for the Elizabethan public as explained in what follows by Margaret Webster:³⁴

The question of racial division is of paramount importance to the play, to its credibility and to the validity of every character in it. There have been much controversy as to Shakespeare's precise intention with regard to Othello's race. It is improbable that he troubled himself greatly with ethnological exactness. The Moor, to an Elizabethan, was a blackamoor, an African, an Ethiopian. Shakespeare's other Moor, Aaron, in TITUS ANDRONICUS, is specifically black; he has thick lips and a fleece of woolly hair. The Prince of Morocco in THE MERCHANT OF VENICE bears « the shadowed livery of the burnished sun, » and even Portia recoils from his « complexion » which he himself is at great pains to explain.

As argued above, it did not matter much to the Elizabethan elite what the term Moor³⁵ stood for as long as it represented someone of « inferior » race and different religion as well as darker complexion, something close to the derogatory term *wog* used today by the British racists to refer to Arabs and sometimes aliens, in general, or the term *basané* or *bicot* used by the French racists to refer to Arabs, too, or to people with darker complexions.

We learn from this tragedy of the 17th century that Europe and the southern Mediterranean were at all times engaged in inter-cultural communication and exchange. A Moor from the *Barbary States*³⁶, made his way to Venice, he even might have been fighting on the Ottoman side prior to joining the Venetian army, where he rose to the prominent position of commander. Being a Moor, it is more likely that originally he was a Muslim and later on converted to the Christian faith. It is likely, also, that he spoke Arabic or Berber or some other African language

³⁴ Cf. Webster, M. 1966. *Shakespeare without Tears*. New York, New York : Premier Book. P. 178.

³⁵ *New World Dictionary (Second College Edition)* 1976, defines the term *Moor* as 1. a member of a Moslem people of mixed Arab and Berber descent living in NW Africa 2. a member of a group of this people that invaded and occupied Spain in the 8th century AD. P. 924.

The Columbia-Viking Desk Encyclopedia (Second Edition), 1966. *Moors*, nomadic people of N Africa, once inhabitants of Mauretania. Converted to Islam in 8th cent., and became fanatic Moslems. Crossed into Spain in 711 and easily overran crumbling Visigothic kingdom of RODERICK. Spreading beyond Pyrenees into France, they were turned back at Tours by CHARLES MARTEL 732. Moors made TOLEDO, CORDOBA and SEVILLE centers of learning and culture, but never had a strong central government. Christian reconquest of Spain began with recovery of Toledo (1085) by Alfonso VI, king of Leon and Castile, and ended with recovery of Granada by Ferdinand and Isabella in 1492. Moors were driven from Spain, leaving contributions to W Europe in art, architecture, medicine, science and learning. P 1207-1208.

³⁶ *Barbary States*, term used for the N African states of TRIPOLITANIA, TUNISIA, and ALGERIA (and usually also MOROCCO), which were semi-independent under Turkish rule from 16th cent. onward. Rulers derived revenue from large-scale piracy on Mediterranean shipping. European powers launched punitive expeditions against them but largely relied on payment of tribute as means of protection. The U.S. joined in this system. The insult offered by the dey of Algiers to William BAINBRIDGE, taking U.S. tribute to Algiers, led to the TRIPOLITAN WAR. French capture of Algiers (1830) marked the end of piracy in the region. (Cf. *The Columbia-Viking Desk Encyclopedia*, 1966. P. 150.)

but managed later on to learn and converse easily and fluently in European tongues. He managed to mix with the aristocracy and the elite and that is how he managed to meet the ravishing Desdemona. Desdemona, on her part, did not bother neither about his colour nor his origin, she fell in love with him, because of his worth and courage and went on to marry him not worrying, in the least, about her father's misgivings about the whole thing, for when asked to whom she owes allegiance most, her father or the Moor, she chose the latter.³⁷

*My noble father,
I do perceive here a divided duty.
To you I am bound for life and education ;
My life and education both do learn me
How to respect you. You are the lord of duty,
I am hitherto your daughter. But here's my husband,
And so much duty as my mother showed
To you, preferring you before her father,
So much I challenge that I may profess
Due to the Moor my lord*

In the council chamber, where the affairs of the state are debated, the Moor is held in much esteem, a proof of that are the terms of address used to call his attention by First Senator.³⁸

*Here comes Brabantio and the valiant
Moor*

Even the Duke addresses the Moor with much respect.³⁹

*Valiant Othello, we must straight employ you
Against the general enemy Ottoman.*

It is a well-established fact that love and affection know no boundary, no obstacle, do not owe allegiance to no religion, no ideology or race, no bias and no prejudice, but on the contrary they have always been ambassadors of good will and understanding. Love always brings people together and bridges gaps between cultures and civilisations. It is, perhaps, the best form of inter-cultural communication, it needs no words, no etiquette and no special occasion. It is spontaneous, direct and clear. In the following verse, Othello describes to the council members of Venice, the circumstances in which Desdemona fell in love with him.⁴⁰

*Her father loved me ; oft invited me ;
Still questioned me the story of my life
From year to year, the battle, sieges, fortune
That I have passed.
I ran it through, even from my boyish days
To th'very moment that he bade me tell it.
Wherein I spoke of most disastrous chances,
Of moving accidents by flood and field,*

³⁷ Cf. *Othello*, I, iii, 178-187.

³⁸ Ibid, I, iii, 47.

³⁹ Ibid, I, iii, 48.

⁴⁰ Ibid, I, iii, 127-169.

*Of hairbreadth scapes i' th' imminent deadly
breach,
Of being taken by the insolent foe
And sold to slavery, of my redemption thence
And portance in my travel's history
Wherein of anters vast and deserts idle,
Rough quarries, rocks, and hills whose heads touch
heaven,*

*It was my hint to speak. Such was my process.
And the Cannibals that each other eat,
The Anthropophagi, and men whose heads
Grew beneath their shoulders. These things to hear
Would Desdemona seriously incline ;
But still the house affairs would draw her thence ;
Which ever as she could with haste dispatch,
She'd come again, and with greedy ear
Devour up my discourse. Which I observing,
Took once a pliant hour, and found good means
To draw from her a prayer of earnest heart
That I would all my pilgrimage dilate,
Whereof by parcels she had something heard,
But not intentively. I did consent,
And often did beguile her of her tears
When I did speak of some distressful stroke
That my youth suffered. My story being done,
She gave me for my pains a world of kisses.
She swore in faith 'twas strange, 'twas passing
strange ;*

*'Twas pitiful, 'twas wondrous pitiful.
She wished she had not heard it ; yet she wished
That heaven had made her such a man. She thanked
me,*

*And bade me, if I had a friend that loved her,
I should but teach him how to tell my story,
And that would woo her. Upon this hint I spake.
She loved me for the dangers I had passed,
And I loved her that she did pity them.
This only is the witchcraft I have used.
Here comes the lady. Let her witness it.*

So, we conclude that origin, colour of skin, religion, language and social status have not been an obstacle for Othello to reach the centres of knowledge and excellence in Europe and become an important member of society there and this is a fine example of the cultural interaction that existed then between Europe, as a whole, and the Southern Mediterranean.

INTER-CULTURAL INTERACTION

Lyautey, the great communicator

At the beginning of the 19th century, the European nations' appetite for more colonies, raw materials and markets grew stronger and especially among France, Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain who expressed a special colonial interest *vis à vis* the North African countries of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. In 1830, the French occupied Algiers and in 1847 they won complete control of the rest of the country except for the Saharan area which was subdued between 1900 and 1909.⁴¹ In the French colonial terminology, Algeria was an integral part of France : *Algérie française*. As for Tunisia it was occupied by the French in 1881 and despite Italy's opposition, they went ahead and established a protectorate under a French resident general with the bey as titular ruler.⁴² Italy took control of Libya in 1911 and began its development as a colony in 1930 when they brought 20,000 colonists and settlers from the home country.⁴³ Morocco, which remained free of Ottoman influence and control, was finally subdued in 1912 by European powers and as such French and Spanish protectorates were established.

Both in Morocco and in Tunisia, the French established a European type of administration and government alongside the traditional system of rule based on the Islamic model, whereas in Algeria they only acknowledged the French system on the ground that Algeria is French and should be ruled by the French legal system only.

In Morocco the cohabitation between the traditional Moroccan system and the modern European one was initiated by the first French resident general Lyautey⁴⁴ and was instrumental in the emergence of modern Morocco. Lyautey was an excellent cultural communicator, he was respectful of the local traditions and all his efforts and those of his administration were geared towards the modernisation of the country without destroying, in the process, its culture. He had an incredible sense of adaptation to places and situations as pointed out by Alan Scham :⁴⁵

Lyautey had qualities that appealed to the Moroccan, Berber or Arab. He was a man of decision, integrity, and justice ; he liked a good show ; he was a superb horseman, and a born leader. One of his greatest qualities was that he could adapt himself to new situations without restricting himself to any specific formula in his administration of Morocco : « Everything depends upon the time and place. You tried one method in Indochina and it succeeded ; that does not mean it is going to work in Madagascar or Morocco. What is suitable for some is not necessarily suitable for others : climate, religion, race, history- so many elements can change the problem. »

Lyautey was a man with the distinctive ability, that only few people possess, to respect the « other » in all aspects of his « otherness », in all humility. In his legendary generosity of soul and nobility of origin, he taught people of different languages, cultures and faiths to engage in inter-cultural communication for a better understanding of each other and undoubtedly this is one of the valuable secrets of his success in leading Morocco, with extreme care and serenity,

⁴¹ Cf. *The Columbia-Viking Desk Encyclopedia*, p. 56.

⁴² *Ibid*, p. 1862.

⁴³ *Ibid*, p. 1025.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 1068-1069, Lyautey, Louis Hubert Gonzalve, 1854-1934, marshal of France. As French resident general in Morocco (1912-16, 1917-25), he proved an extremely able colonial administrator and may be said to have created modern Morocco.

⁴⁵ Cf. Scham, A. 1970. *Lyautey in Morocco*. Berkeley : University of California Press. P. 17.

to modernity and development. Alan Scham⁴⁶ points out in this respect that Lyautey did not sincerely wish any form of Frenchification of Moroccans :

Lyautey's distinction, aside from his exceptional force of character, was that, unlike most contemporary French colonial officials, he was not an « assimilationist. » He felt a sincere respect for Moroccan civilization, and did not think it either possible or desirable simply to Frenchify the Moroccans. He hoped that Frenchmen and Moroccans would be able to collaborate in the necessary modernisation of Morocco without destroying intrinsically valuable Moroccan traditions and characteristics. He wanted the Protectorate to be a genuine protectorate, not a disguised colonial administration.

Mohammed V (1913-1961),⁴⁷ monarch of Morocco (1927-1953 ; 1956-1961), was very much an admirer of Lyautey and his work in this country, for his respect of the traditions and his great ability to convince and communicate with people in their own beliefs and cultural symbols. During a visit to the Colonial Exhibition at Vincennes in France in 1931, Mohammed V, then a young monarch, paid a unique tribute to the man :

Coming to admire the Colonial Exhibition, which is a wonderful achievement of your genius, it is Our special pleasure on this occasion to convey Our greeting to the great Frenchman who was able to safeguard Morocco's ancient traditions, morals, and customs, while at the same time introducing the spirit of modern organization, without which no country could exist today.

Can we in fact forget that upon your arrival in Morocco, the Sherifian Empire was threatened with ultimate ruin? Her institutions, her arts, her faltering administration- all were calling for an organizer, a renovator of your ability to put her back on the right path, to direct her toward her destiny. By taking into consideration the susceptibilities of her inhabitants, by respecting their beliefs and customs, you have drawn them to la France protectrice by your noble qualities of heart and by the grandeur of your soul.

Migration

As early as 1920s, North African populations started to move north to work or study in Europe. At the initial stage this movement involved individuals only, but, with time, families and dependants joined the movement and communities started to form in the main capitals of Europe, as well as, in the main industrial centres. After World War II, in the wake of the Marshall plan, Europe in full frenzy of reconstruction encouraged thousands of unqualified workers to move north to work in construction sites, coal mines and assembly lines. This migratory movement, considered one of the most important of the century was at the origin of a new cultural reality : the establishment of migrant communities' ghettos.

Initially, the migrants in their majority illiterate and coming from poor rural areas, went to the *bled nsara*⁴⁸ with the intention of making as much money as possible, in the shortest time

⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 192.

⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 204.

⁴⁸ *bled nsara* means literally « the land of the Christians », it is also used to refer to Europe.

possible, and return home to build a house and start a business. However, after the initial euphoria, this goal proved quite difficult to achieve and around 1975, as the European governments decided to put an end to legal migration, the migrants were allowed to bring their families and settle down with them. With the arrival of the families, new cultural challenges appeared, having to do especially with the education of children : in what culture to educate them Arab-Islamic tradition or Christian / secular European system ? The former was difficult and costly to set up, the latter was readily available but was alienating and contrary to religious teachings.

With time the migrants had children born to them in the countries of migration and brought up in its culture ; generally speaking they are bicultural and bilingual by belonging to both countries i.e. country of origin of parents and country of residence, but they are also confused and torn apart between two allegiances. To solve this thorny problem, the children of migrants born in the country of migration, referred to themselves as *beur*⁴⁹ and their culture as *culture beur*.

In this regard Paul Balta,⁵⁰ argues quite rightly that the *beurs* and *beurettes* (feminine form for *beur*) are considered to be pernicious vehicles of western way of life and thought. But in spite of this recrimination, it is a well-known fact that the *beur* generation has achieved success in various fields : show biz, theatre, cinema, literature, etc.⁵¹

Non pas que la situation de la génération « beur » soit idyllique et qu'elle ne connaisse pas de nombreux problèmes (délinquance juvénile, difficultés d'insertion dans la société d'accueil pour les moins favorisés, les plus fragiles, les plus déchirés) mais remportent aussi d'indéniables succès dans des domaines très divers, elle s'affirment de jour en jour à travers ses représentants. Comédiens : Isabelle Adjani, Nadia Samir, Souad Amidou, Lydia Maoudj, Smain, Kader Boukhanef, Mouss, Hakim Ghanem, Rachid Ferrache, Pascal Kelaf, Hammou Graia, Farid Chopel, Karim Allaoui, pour n'en citer que quelques-uns ; écrivains : Farida Belghoul, Leila Sebbar, Leila Houari, Nacer Kettane, Akil Tadjer, Azouz Begag, Jean-luc Yacine, etc. ; chanteurs et musiciens mais aussi peintres, graveurs, sculpteurs, journalistes , hommes et femmes de radio et de télévision, chercheurs, entrepreneurs...

This migrant community proved to be a formidable instrument in inter-cultural communication and exchange between North Africa and Europe and, indeed, thanks to them, such foods as tagine, couscous, harira, mechoui, etc. became popular in all of Europe and especially in France. The migrants also succeeded in imposing their music and educating the western ear to accept it and enjoy its melodies. As such in the late 70s and early 80s, the Berber singer Idir took France and Europe by the storm with his album « vava inou va » of Kabyle melodies, Cheb Khaled followed in his steps and brought to fame world-wide the Algerian Arab *ray* music. His song « ddi ddi » was the first Arab single to make it to the top 40, an important parameter of fame and appreciation in the field of European show business

⁴⁹ *beur* finds its origin in *rbeur* French slang for *arabe*, and it refers generally to second generation Arabs in France.

⁵⁰ Cf. Balta, P. 1990. *Le Grand Maghreb : Des indépendances à l'an 2000*. Paris : La Découverte. P. 285.

⁵¹ Ibid, p. 286.

Because of contact between France and North Africa through colonisation and migration, both French and colloquial Arabic borrowed from each other scores of words as shown below :

NORTH AFRICAN COLLOQUIAL ARABIC

tbib	>
kelb	>
bled	>
kif kif	>
fissa fissa	>
mechoui	>
chouia	>
salam alaik	>

FRENCH

toubib
klebs
bled
kif-kif
fissa fissa
méchoui
un petit chouia
salamalek

GLOSS

« doctor »
« dog »
« place, country »
« it is all the same »
« quickly »
« roast lamb »
« little amount »
« peace be upon you
(greeting) »

NORTH AFRICAN COLLOQUIAL ARABIC⁵²

l-biru	<
l-kamyu	<
l-kaskrut	<
s-stilu	<
l-bulis	<
l-bisri	<
t-tumubil	<
traktur	<
sulima	<
misiriya	<
šumaž	<

FRENCH

bureau
camion
casse-croute
stylo
police
épicerie
automobile
tracteur
cinéma
misère
chomage

GLOSS

« office, desk »
« van »
« snack, sandwich »
« pen »
« police »
« grocery shop »
« motor car »
« tractor »
« cinema »
« poverty »
« unemployment »

It must be said that inter-cultural communication and exchange between North Africa and Europe is bound to increase in quantity and quality at the beginning of the next millennium with the implementation of the partnership agreement between Morocco and Europe and Tunisia and Europe.

CONCLUSION

We have attempted to show in this paper that inter-cultural communication and exchange between Europe and North Africa is a social and cultural phenomenon that has existed as far back as there were contacts between the two regions.

We have shown, also, that this form of interaction has always manifested itself directly through the following channels :


⁵² It is to be pointed out here that all borrowed words are obligatorily nativised, except in the case of the elite who use the words in their original form as a sign of distinction and sophistication.

- language ;
- literature ;
- migration ;
- commerce ;
- colonisation, etc.

irrespective of the difference of way of life, religious beliefs, patterns of thinking and material wealth.

Similarly, we have argued that xenophobia, racism, ethnocentrism have never been a serious hindrance to inter- cultural communication and exchange.

In conclusion , we believe that inter-cultural interaction will go crescendo between Europe and North Africa during the next millennium as the two sides initiate a new phase of partnership in the era of globalisation of exchanges.



CONCLUSIONS

by Theodore A. Couloumbis and Thanos Veremis

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Raymond Aron in his classic treatise on international relations¹ had divided his analytical approach into four categories which he called history, sociology, theory and praxeology.²

In presenting our concluding thoughts in this book on Europe and the Mediterranean, we shall employ our version of the thoughtful Aronian taxonomy, raising some difficult questions in the case of "history" and "sociology", juxtaposing alternative conceptual paradigms in the case of "theory", and arriving at some policy responses and recommendations in the case of praxeology.

I. HISTORY

The Mediterranean -a remarkable body of water- gave birth to some of the world's great civilizations, religions and cultures. Over the centuries, before and after the birth of Christ, the littoral regions of the dark wine sea experienced waves of migrations, the formation of city states, and the rise of great empires such as the Hellenistic, the Roman, the Byzantine, the Arabic, the Ottoman and the British.

Yet, whereas the Hellenic-Judaic tradition conquered the minds and hearts of the Europeans with little resistance, Islam failed to make significant inroads in the West. The Ottomans left their religious heritage in Bosnia and Albania but the Arabs that preceded them facilitated the transmission of Aristotelian thought into

Europe of the tenth century. The subsequent blooming of the Renaissance was assisted by the Byzantine transfusion of classical Greek philosophy and Platonic thought that questioned the established Aristotelian wisdom.

Europe's emergence from the waters of the miraculous sea as a child of the Hellenic-Judaic tradition was followed by the gradual extinction of the same tradition in the eastern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. "This epochal event, to a great extent established the cultural division between East and West, North and South in the Mediterranean".³ The division persists to this day as an east-west and north-south cultural and economic cleavage. The Mediterranean in fact had only been a cultural unit in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. After the decline of Byzantium the region became a frontier of hostile civilizations or, at best, a junction of diversity expressed in terms of economic development, degrees of secular modernity and the nature of political authority. As Vatikiotis points out, on the European side of the Mediterranean there is a concept of natural law which does not exist on the other side of the sea. "Consequently, such matters as individual rights deriving from this higher law, to protect the individual from the excesses of the state, are difficult to formulate and maintain".⁴

When the empires that had politically unified parts of the Mediterranean came to an end, the sea and the adjacent lands became the battlefield of great power disputes. Most of them -Britain, Russia, Austria, Germany, the United States and the Soviet Union- determined the fate of the region without even being part of it. Many wars of these powers were waged and fought by proxy, through Balkan or Middle East surrogates. Little concern was displayed by the great powers for the damage inflicted upon the region and its people as long as their strategic aims were realised.

The strategic importance of the Mediterranean was eclipsed at least twice in history. Once by naval technology which shifted the traffic of sea commerce to the Atlantic, then during the Cold War period when the central front of the European continent attracted most allied attention. The Western alliance turned to its southern flank when the Middle East crises erupted and their impact on the price of oil became apparent. In our post-Cold War era the strategic importance of the Mediterranean is once more being upgraded. The current setback in the Arab-Israeli

peace process, may be a temporary one, but the Persian Gulf will remain a trouble spot, the Greek-Turkish problem will still beg a solution and the Caspian Sea oil will certainly draw international attention early in the coming century.

The tug of war between Russia and Turkey over the conduit of Caspian and Kazakh oil reflects old regional tensions. Turkey and the Western companies prefer a pipeline that will cross from Baku-Azerbaijan into Georgia and from there to the Yamourtalik harbour of Hatai. Russia is determined to secure a route for a new pipeline, half-way to the Russian Black Sea harbour of Novorosisk. The battle for positions in the Caspian pipeline competition threatens to pit the interested Western companies and Turkey against Russia. Could a Crimean war scenario recur in the 21st century that would isolate Russia from Europe once more? The answer to the possibility of such a repetition of the past, lies in other historical instances when Russia was drawn into the European nexus of alliances and the Concert of Europe. The present Partnership for Peace which is something of an anti-chamber to the community of western European states, could act as the beginning of a reintegration of Russia into the European family.

II. SOCIOLOGY

In the evolving post-Cold War architecture of international politics the European Union together with North America, Japan and the remaining advanced states belonging to the OECD comprise a global platform of political stability and economic interdependence. Unfortunately, vast regions of what we used to call the Third World as well as parts of the post-Communist Balkans and the former Soviet Union, are still in a state of real or potential fluidity and instability.

The Mediterranean region offers a most dramatic illustration of the structural problems that beset the global divide and which can be summarised with one word: inequality. For example, the collective GDP of the EU Mediterranean states in the North is eleven times greater than its southern littoral counterparts.⁵

With the passage of time, this gap in economic levels of wealth and development is growing rather than shrinking. The countries of the North tend to be

importers of raw-materials (especially oil) and they export finished goods. The countries in the south are raw-material and agricultural product exporters and they import (maintaining a sizable trade imbalance) finished goods. In the EU-North the economies are capital-intensive and the cost of labor is high while in the South the economies are labor-intensive and labor is cheap. Both in the North and the South there are sizable rates of unemployment, but the EU-Mediterranean states afford safety net mechanisms and social welfare institutions that tend to cushion the shocks, tempering attendant challenges to political stability.

This unpleasant (especially for the South) situation is further exacerbated if we take into consideration demographic trends in North (EU) & South respectively. The northern littoral states (with the exception of Turkey) are hovering near zero or even negative population growth rates. In the South and the NorthEast (with the exception of Israel) the countries are experiencing a virtual population explosion. By the year 2015 the total population of the fifteen EU members will increase by only thirteen million, while the population of the non-EU Mediterranean countries will number an additional 170 million persons. By the year 2015 the combined population of Morocco, Algeria, Egypt and Turkey will amount to 270 million souls -mostly young and unemployed- that will throng in the unfriendly slums of major urban centers.⁶ This is indeed an explosive mix and it could easily result in civil conflict, revolutions, military intervention in politics and wars that could produce major population shifts (political and economic refugees, and illegal immigration) which in turn could trigger social, political and economic upheavals among the so-called privileged regions of the North.

As Tables 1 and 2 on comparative quality of life indicators, unequivocally demonstrate, there is relative abundance in the North and abject poverty in the South. Whether we are talking about indicators such as nutrition, housing, health care, literacy and environmental protection, the gap is once more huge and it is growing.⁷

On another very sensitive statistical indicator -income distribution- one could talk about societies of 2/3 in the comfortable (Middle Class) category in the North and 1/10 in the less egalitarian South where overwhelming majorities live well below the level of poverty feeding the fires of revolutionary movements (mostly of the

anti-Western fundamentalist variety) that could be likened to a time bomb with a short fuse.

In the cultural area, there is a juxtaposition of social, religious and attitudinal differences. One is tempted to talk of a "Christian Club" when addressing the Mediterranean countries that are currently members of the EU. The rest of the Mediterranean is predominantly Islamic, with the exception again of Israel. And here lies a danger of correlating Islam with authoritarian political systems and Christianity with pluralistic democratic ones.⁸ Suffice to say, at this point, that in using correlation as a substitute for causation, one could argue that Christian Catholicism and Christian Orthodoxy have correlated positively in the recent past with the incidence of military/authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe (until the mid 1970s) and much of Latin America (well into the 1980s). Yet, careful quantitative studies⁹ have posited that authoritarian systems and military dictatorships were more likely to flourish in countries with low levels of economic development and minuscule middle classes (that cannot sustain civil societies) and that democracy could more easily be consolidated in industrial and post-industrial societies with sizable middle classes.

The central question, therefore, that the picture of great structural inequality poses, is whether the Mediterranean region can gradually evolve into a cohesive space of security and cooperation rather a region of growing suspicion and North-South mutual alienation. We will address this and related questions, in the next two sections of this chapter.

TABLE 1**Balance sheet of human development - Arab states****PROGRESS****DEPRIVATION****HEALTH**

- In 12 of the 19 countries in the region life expectancy is more than 65 years, compared with an average of 45 years in 1960.	- Only half the people in rural areas have access to safe water, and only a third have access to basic sanitation.
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EDUCATION

- During the past two decades the adult literacy rate almost doubled - from 30% in 1970 to 54% to 1992.	- About 60 million of the region's 240 million people are illiterate.
- Between 1960 and 1990 the primary enrolment ratio more than doubled, from 38% to 77%, and the secondary enrolment ratio nearly tripled, from 18% to 51%.	- Nine million children are out of primary school, and 15 million are out of secondary school.

INCOME AND POVERTY

- Between 1960 and 1993 real per capita income grew by nearly 3% a year.	- About 73 million people still live below the poverty line, and more than 10 million are underfed.
- In 1980-90 the agricultural growth rate was nearly 5% a year - the highest among the developing regions.	

WOMEN

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - At the secondary level the number of girls per 100 boys rose from 47 to 77 between 1970 and 1990, and at the tertiary level it rose from 34 to 65. - Of women enrolled at the tertiary level, about 30% are in natural or applied sciences. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Only 25% of Arab women participate in the formal labour force, compared with 39% in the developing countries as a group. - Women hold only 4% of parliamentary seats, well below the 10% average for the developing world.
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CHILDREN

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Between 1960 and 1993 the infant mortality rate declined by more than three-fifths -from 167 per thousand live births to 66. - More than three-quarters of one-year-olds are immunized. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - At 73 per thousand live births, the under-five mortality rate is still more than four times as high as that in industrial countries.
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ENVIRONMENT

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Between 1965 and 1991 energy use per \$100 of GDP declined by two-thirds, from 228 kilograms of oil equivalent to 76. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - With less than 1,000 cubic metres of water per capita available each year, about 55% of the population suffer from serious water scarcity.
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POLITICS AND CONFLICTS

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - During the past two decades six countries have held multiparty parliamentary elections, and since 1990 there have been 18 general elections. - In 1994, 250,000 refugees in the region 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - At the end of 1994 more than one million people were refugees.
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returned to their country of origin.	
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Source: *Human Development Report - 1996*, Published by UNDP, (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX

HDI rank	Sequence of rankings 1-175	Life expectancy at birth (years) 1993	Adult literacy rate (%) 1993	Combined first, second and third level gross enrolment ratio (%) 1993	Real GDP per capita (PPP\$) 1993
France	7th	77.0	99.0	88	99,140
Spain	10th	77.7	98.0	87	13,660
Italy	20th	77.6	97.4	70	18,160
Greece	21st	77.7	93.8	78	8,950
Cyprus	23d	77.1	94.0	76	14,060
Israel	24th	76.6	95.0	76	15,130
Malta	28th	76.2	87.0	76	11,570
Portugal	35th	74.7	86.2	79	10,720
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	59th	63.4	73.7	88	6,125
Bulgaria	62nd	71.2	93.0	65	4,320
Algeria	69th	67.3	58.8	66	5,570
Jordan	70th	68.1	84.8	66	4,380
Tunisia	78th	68.0	64.1	66	4,950
Turkey	84th	66.7	81.1	62	4,210
Syrian Arab	92nd	67.3	68.7	65	4,196

Rep.					
Lebanon	97th	68.7	91.7	74	2,500
Albania	104th	72.0	85.0	59	2,200
Egypt	106th	63.9	49.8	69	3,800
Morocco	123d	63.6	41.7	44	3,270

* The HDI is based on three indicators: *longevity*, as measured by life expectancy at birth; *educational attainment*, as measured by a combination of adult literacy (two-thirds weight) and combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratios (one-third weight); and standard of living as measured by real GDP per capita.

Source: *Human Development Report - 1996*, Published by UNDP, (New York/Oxford: University Press, 1996), pp. 135-6.

III. THEORY

Focusing on the Mediterranean region in the period since World War II, we can employ three distinct conceptual paradigms to help us enhance our understanding of past patterns of behaviour and to project developments in the near and the medium term. The first and second paradigms (or conceptual frameworks) are offshoots of traditional Realism. They both emphasise the centrality of state actors but tend to focus on *conflict* (the first paradigm) and on *consensus* (the second paradigm) among the world's great powers.¹⁰ We can also call them "conflict" and "concert" global systems respectively. The third paradigm asserts that non-state actors, in addition to nation states, are playing a growing role in international affairs and that the global system, once described as bipolar or multipolar, depending on the number of relevant great powers, is now becoming a system of complex-interdependence.¹¹

Clearly, relations in the Mediterranean region during the Cold War years (1947-1989) could be best understood as being derivative of three major sub-patterns of the conflict paradigm. The first sub-pattern was reflected in the intense bipolar confrontation between the forces of Soviet-controlled communism versus the Western coalition of democracies led by the United States. In such a setting the northern littoral countries of the Mediterranean (from Portugal to Turkey) joined the Western strategic sphere (Spain joining NATO only after the restoration of democracy in the post-Franco era). The southern littoral states, in turn, joined the ranks of the non-aligned, post-colonial states. They reflected nonetheless security and political connections and/or dependencies with one Cold War superpower or the other. It is not, for example, coincidental that, during the Cold War, Morocco procured its weapons mainly from the West, Algeria from the East, Tunisia from the West, Libya (after King *Idris*) from the East, Egypt (after Nasser) from the West, the Palestinians from the East, Jordan from the West, Syria from the East and so forth.

The second sub-pattern of the conflict paradigm pitted ex-colonial powers of the Mediterranean North (Spain, France and Italy) against post-colonial new states of the South. The Algerian war in the 1950s dominated the anti-colonial movement which led to widespread and voluntary decolonization in the 1960s. Once the European powers, however, digested the imperatives of decolonization, patterns of cooperation between the post-colonial governments and the old metropolitan centers were once again developed.

The third sub-pattern of conflict has centered around the protracted confrontation between the state of Israel and its Arab neighbours (together with their supporters). This protracted conflict was heavily exacerbated, as well as modified, by the impact of the Cold War. Israel enjoyed the unqualified support of the United States while the Soviet Union tilted in favor of Syria and the Palestinians. The Arab governments, however, became gradually stratified between so called moderates (supported by the West) and so called radicals (supported by the former Soviet Union).

The end of the Cold War has ushered in a new period that fits the explanatory framework of the concert/consensus paradigm of Realism. With the breakdown of

Soviet controlled communism, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the disaggregation of the Former Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany, the central premises of global politics have been radically altered. The cessation of the Cold War and the ideological and political convergence of the United States and Russia (the nuclear power that succeeded the Soviet Union) have given an opportunity to the UN Security Council to reactivate itself and to authorise collective action in critical areas such as Iraq/Kuwait and Bosnia. One could even argue that the peace process between the Israeli government and the PLO was a product, among other factors, of the realisation by the Palestinians that support emanating from the former Soviet Union would no longer be available.

Paradoxically, the end of the Cold War, and of the mutually neutralizing system of the nuclear balance of terror, has made it possible for new actors and forces - reflecting nationalist, ethnic and religious fundamentalist values- to surface and to plunge regions of former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union into "clash of civilizations" type wars.¹² In an ironic twist of fate the resumption of cooperative relations among the world's superpowers has increased the incidence of low grade (local war) conflicts in the so-called periphery of our planet.

The major question in the Mediterranean region in the decades to come will be whether conflict-prone zones such as the Middle East, the Balkans and North Africa will manage to integrate themselves into an emerging zone of stability (the center) or cling atavistically to patterns of local and externally manipulable conflict (the periphery). It is clearly in the interest of all the Mediterranean regional states to adopt policies and to engage in programmes designed to promote economic development and political convergence in a climate of genuine interdependence.

As we are entering the gates of the 21st century (and the third millennium A.D.), the central question, in theory as well as in practice, is whether the Mediterranean region, despite its structural asymmetries discussed in Section II above, will manage to fit into a functionalist paradigm which permitted Western Europe, after two bloody world wars, to move forward toward economic and political integration employing the geoeconomic premises of Jean Monnet and abandoning the military power considerations of Clausewitzian geopolitics. Monnet has offered us a paradigm that defines "national interests" in collective/regional

terms, that abandons territorial logic (irredentism, revisionism, expansionism, revanchism), and which presupposes the willingness of cooperating governments to accept one another's legitimacy and reduce emphasis on sovereignty and national independence in favor of economic interdependence and respect for the values of democracy, pluralism and human rights.

If we accept the premise that the existence of democratic states with civil (pluralist) societies is a central prerequisite for the development of systems of regional integration and interdependence, then we must pose a set of difficult and even uncomfortable questions: Are the low levels of economic development and the inequality in incomes and privileges (in education, health care et. al), which are typical characteristics in most non-EU Mediterranean states, likely to thwart efforts to establish legitimate and viable democratic institutions? Employing for a moment Huntingtonian logic¹³ could we argue that cultural/historical traditions such as the Islamic, the Catholic and the Slavic-Orthodox are incompatible with the values and institutions of democracy and human rights? Would a system of asymmetric-interdependence (a polite rendering of the concept of dependency) gravitate into new and veiled forms of neocolonialism and exploitation of the poor South by the rich North?

We will return to some of these important questions in the last section of our conclusions (on Praxeology). We should hasten to state, at this point, that we share the view that consolidated democracy is a prerequisite for EU-type integration. But we discard the assumption that pluralist democracy is only compatible with Judeo-Christian values (look, for example, at the post World War II record of India and Japan), and we believe that the old-style "fortress Europe" logic, perpetuating political and cultural hierarchies, is most likely to explode in the face of the privileged and advanced nations of our planet.

IV. PRAXEOLOGY

As the relevant chapters in this volume suggest, France together with Italy, Portugal and Spain have sought to coordinate their policies vis-a-vis the western Mediterranean. Their major preoccupation -especially in France and Spain- has been instability, internal conflict and the rise of anti-Western Islamic fundamentalism (as manifested in Algeria). Their collective fear is that revolutionary conditions and interstate conflict in the Maghreb will unleash tidal waves of refugees flooding the northern shores of the Mediterranean and exacerbating sensitive social and political balances leading to increased unemployment as well as to the rise of racist, exclusivist and chauvinistic political forces throughout Western Europe.

Among the EU members, Portugal, Greece, the South of Italy and, to a certain extent, Spain share some of the features of the least developed regions of the EU and for that reason they can act as bridges between the rich North and the poor South of the ancient sea. On Mediterranean questions, their priorities have been determined mainly by their location and other specific concerns. The proximity of Portugal, Spain and Italy to North Africa and the common borders of Greece and Italy with the former communist Balkans, help explain each country's regional vocation.¹⁴ Yet the constant challenges in the region have endowed these states with a common task. Besides the traditional threats to security posed by regional conflict and the danger of weapons proliferation in the Middle East, new items have been added to the security agenda: The collapse of the economies, the denial of human rights, the rise of terrorism, narcotics trafficking, the persecution of minorities and the degradation of the environment.¹⁵

Although traditional security issues continue to elude institutionalization between the EU and Mediterranean non-member states, the new security agenda, may offer potential for much closer co-operation and policy co-ordination between the two sides. Migration constitutes the gravest challenge for EU member by non-member states. Linked to the migration issue are the questions of integration, assimilation and citizenship of migrants within the EU, and the relevant issue of Western preoccupation with Islamic fundamentalism. Developments in Algeria have generalised the depiction of the danger in the Western press.¹⁶

The turbulent Middle East, which has for decades drawn international attention to the Mediterranean, is being tempered by the Arab-Israeli peace process. Yet the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their means of delivery, is nowhere more acute than in this region where several states possess such items. Chemical weapons and ballistic missiles have been used in conflict and the collapse of the Soviet Union has added to the availability of know-how for their construction.¹⁷ Tensions in the Arab world could reemerge over the rise of religious fundamentalism in Egypt, a collapse of the Arab-Israeli peace process, support for international terrorism or even over strict Western migration policies. Although the capabilities of states that possess weapons of mass destruction are limited, the stake of the West in availability of Middle East oil is large and will grow with the emergence of China and India as significant energy consumers.¹⁸ Pacifying the region and maintaining cooperation cannot be limited to non-proliferation.

Iran's exclusion from Gulf politics after the Gulf War and US military presence in the region, predictably have turned Iranian efforts northward. Although it will be long before Russia returns as a major player in Middle East Affairs, it is certain that she is already a major protagonist in the Caspian region. Relations between Russia and Iran are vital in the military sector. Russia maintains that its cooperation with Iran is based on principles determined by the talks on conventional arms sales, initiated by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and that weapons will only be sold for self-defense. Arms exports to Iran are important to both sides because Russia needs the cash and Iran the arms. The continuation however of arms exports, and more so the transfer of nuclear technology, will no doubt have an adverse effect on Russo-American relations. On the other hand Russia's role in the Arab-Israeli peace process and its aspiration to play a greater role in the future might in time have a moderating impact on Iranian policy.¹⁹

Post-Soviet Russia has a stake in the improvement of the intractable problems between Iran and the United States. Such an improvement would facilitate Russia's role in Transcaucasia, would reduce Turkey's importance in Western calculations, and would ultimately increase Iran's role in the Middle East and Russia's input in the peace process.

The factor that has brought Iran and Turkey together in the past was a common fear of Soviet power. In almost every other respect, relations between the two states have been a zero sum game vis-a-vis the West. In the oil crisis of 1973 Iran's position was enhanced at the expense of Turkey's strategic importance. The Khomeini revolution and Iran's subsequent estrangement from the West, constituted the greatest strategic benefit that Turkey has gained in the region. Turkey has since assumed most of Iran's Western role has tried to isolate it from its regional links in the pipeline competition and has widely advertised its own strategic importance as a buffer against the spreading of Islamic fundamentalism.²⁰ Furthermore, Turkey's continuing interest in the Caucasus and Central Asia is creating the structural foundations for a future rift in Russo-Turkish relations.²¹

The route of pipelines that will carry oil from the Caspian Sea to the West has been a major instrument of policy and a decision to a large degree dependent on political considerations. Russia, as the major military actor in the region, lacking resources to make the necessary investment for such a project, relies mainly on its mediation in the Armenian-Azeri dispute in order to secure that the pipeline will end in the Russian harbour of Novorossiysk (from there oil will be shipped through the Black Sea). Turkey and the United States have convinced the oil companies to overrule the Iranian conduit and support a route through Turkey.²²

In spite of the economic strength of its own Western partners, Turkey has taken up many formidable foes simultaneously: Russia, Iran, Armenia, Syria and the Kurds. Neither Britain nor even the US can project their military might in this remote region. Besides playing their hand in the peace negotiations between Armenians and Azeris, the Russians use their monopoly on existing pipelines to dissuade Azerbaidzhan and Central Asian states from considering new pipelines that will bypass Russia. Furthermore, Russia in the October 1993 meeting of the littoral states on the Caspian Sea, pushed to define the latter as a sea rather than a lake. That definition signifies Baku's loss of all major off-shore oilfields because waters beyond the 12 - mile limit will be declared neutral, placing the sea under Russia's naval influence.²³

Italy's and Greece's Balkan interests are, given their proximity, more vital than those of other EU members. Committed to the territorial status quo, both initially

opposed instant and unqualified recognition of secessionist Yugoslav states and counselled caution to their EU partners before an alternative state arrangement was explored. The collapse of Yugoslavia in AFSOUTH's region of responsibility has produced the most conspicuous "failed state" in Europe.²⁴ The Bosnian settlement of 21 November 1995 in Dayton, Ohio, is certainly a hopeful development in the troubled region, but peace is still not consolidated. The lifting of the international embargo and the reconstruction of the former Yugoslavia has opened a wide field of activity to the private sector. The Greek government has much to offer in facilitating the exodus of Serbia from its present isolation vis-a-vis the international community and could also act as an interlocutor in future negotiations for an association agreement between the European Union and candidates from the region of former Yugoslavia.

Lebanon, Sudan and Algeria might be added to the Mediterranean list of "failed states" and the outcome of their "inability to bring into appropriate balance the goals of sustainable state power, wealth and welfare".²⁵ Failed states lead to geopolitical vacuums and therefore conflict between suitors that compete for their domination. Of equal concern for regional security are the "troubled states" in the Mediterranean: Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Egypt and Tunisia. The frailties of their domestic systems, their inability to resolve ethnic and ideological cleavages without violence and the isolation of some from the outside world, might be the ingredients of "troubled states". Yet neither "failed" nor "troubled states" are a new feature in the South of the Mediterranean Basin. While the North was structurally bipolar and stable in its adversarial relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the South remained unstable and conflict prone. Furthermore, throughout the Cold War period the UN was veto-blocked, limiting itself to marginal peacekeeping activities in the Middle East and Africa.

The Maghreb region is undergoing the difficulties of transition caused by high-birth-rates, unemployment, debts and Islamic radical movements. The legitimacy of ruling elites has been undermined by their failure to deliver modernization accompanied by economic growth and development. Although Islam, as a manifestation of discontent, is popular, it is questionable if it can succeed where traditional leaderships failed. As Wilton Park paper #103, aptly suggests "European

states are seeking greater engagement in the region but are disinclined to bolster existing regimes faced with opposition groups, and recognise that future progress will occur primarily through the efforts of local peoples and elites".²⁶

A serious credibility gap hinders any solution of the Greek-Turkish dispute. The consideration of Cyprus as a full member of the EU however offers a unique opportunity, not only for the resolution of the intractable Cyprus problem, but also for the creation of a significant building bloc in Greek-Turkish relations. Should Turkey advise the Turkish Cypriot leadership not to resist an agreement between the two communities that would facilitate the accession of the island to the EU, Greece could champion Turkey's future entry. This would constitute the most important confidence -building measure between the two states. There is little doubt that if relations deteriorate to the point of armed confrontation, not only the two states, but the entire region will suffer a great setback. A war between Greece and Turkey would destroy Greece's prospects of convergence with the EMU requirements and would exclude Turkey from the European family. The eastern Mediterranean would become a sore of chronic hostility.

Will the post-Cold War era witness a new world order of generalised stability based on respect for the territorial integrity of states, enhancement and consolidation of democratic institutions, the protection of human rights and the institutionalization of structures for the peaceful settlement of intrastate disputes, or are we moving toward a period of atavistic disorder, ethnic conflict, disorientation and escalating economic protectionism, all resulting in a generalized instability? Will the "limited wars" which have been taking place in the troubled Southern regions of the planet, also become a phenomenon of the North as we have been witnessing in former Yugoslavia? To avoid such a possibility the new architecture of global security should be based on an implicit consensus on fundamental premises shared by the World's major centers of power. This arrangement also requires participation of a considerable number of smaller states. A series of interlocking international institutions of economic and political cooperation with the United Nations also need to be developed.

It would be a serious mistake for European states to engage in a debate juxtaposing the merits and demerits of a "Europeanist" versus an "Atlanticist" choice.

It would be equally mistaken for North Americans to view progress in the European Union as being at odds with the interests and objectives of a post-Cold War NATO. The crucial challenge facing the world today, rests on the need to establish a set of complementary and overlapping security structures in areas of actual and potential conflict.²⁷

A Parting Thought

We have raised in this concluding chapter a number of dilemmas facing the Mediterranean region, its people and their governments from the perspectives of history, sociology, theory and praxeology. The problems are many and they are described variably depending on the location, capabilities, objectives and interests of the countries surveyed.

The fundamental question which we must answer from a praxeological (normative) perspective is whether the differences and distances in the Mediterranean region (North, South, East and West) make it likely, difficult or impossible to generate lasting international and transnational regimes of peaceful and cooperative co-existence. In short, the question is whether the Mediterranean sea will function as a bridge or a barrier.

From the enlightened perspective of each of the countries whose foreign policies are surveyed in this volume, there is every incentive to widen and solidify patterns of peace and interdependence in the wider Mediterranean space. If the EU member states fail to contribute substantively and in a timely fashion to the process of economic development of the non-EU Mediterranean states, then they will be undermining the very foundations of peace, stability and prosperity in their own societies. Economic development in the South will contribute to political stability, lower unemployment and birthrates, and reduce the tension in the current zones of high conflict quotients.

The EU strategy for security and cooperation in the Mediterranean must be multi-dimensional. In the cultural dimension we must cultivate a spirit of mutual understanding and appreciation that will transform the Mediterranean into a region

of peaceful and cooperative projects that take advantage of the long and rich religious and secular traditions of Christianity, Islam and Judaism.

In the economic dimension, cooperation should not be considered "philanthropy" by the privileged of the North. The European Union's investments in enterprises that are labor-intensive will invigorate the economies of the South and will reduce unemployment and resultant pressures for legal and illegal immigration. The removal by the EU of protectionist measures targeting the products of the Mediterranean-South will permit the growth of exports from South to North and simultaneously will reduce governmental methods of the past that have been perpetuating state-monopolies and inefficient public-owned enterprises in the South. Simultaneously, MEDA and other regional credit, investment and cooperation programmes will gradually reverse current trends in the so-called brain-drain and will permit the citizens of the developing states in the Mediterranean to resist the siren songs of populism, nationalist fanaticism and fundamentalist exclusivism.

In the political dimension, the institutionalization of bilateral, sub-regional and multilateral mechanisms for tension-reduction, conflict resolution, and -in cases of conflict- peace-keeping, peace-building and humanitarian operations should be at the top of the EU's priorities list. But the EU should resist the temptation of becoming a *participant* rather than an *intermediary* in potential conflict situations.

The Barcelona conference of 27-28 November 1995 when the fifteen EU members and twelve non-members (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta) discussed free-trade and closer cooperation in the region, mentioned security only in its preventive, political and diplomatic aspects, assuming that the defence mechanisms would soon follow. "They now have to be addressed openly, without the ambiguities and misunderstandings of the past".²⁸

In sum, the evolving mechanism of EU common Foreign and Security Policy must synthesise and harmonise the foreign policies of EU member states so that they will not independently return to old and obsolete policies and practices seeking

to create "exclusive spheres of influence", "antagonistic alliances" and "special relationships".

NOTES

1) See his *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations* (New York: Doubleday, 1966) [English Translation by Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox]. In his book Aron analyses international relations in the following sequence: Theory, Sociology, History and Praxeology.

2) The terms are self-explanatory with the exception of "praxeology" which for Aron entailed the analysis of contemporary events and the generation of policy recommendations.

3) P. J. Vatikiotis, "The Mediterranean in Historical Perspective: Cultural, Ethnical and Religious Diversity" in, *To Ellinikon. Studies in Honour of Speros Vryonis Jr.* Edited by Jelisaveta Stanojevich et al. Vol. II, New York: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1993. p. 458.

4) Vatikiotis, op. cit., p. 464-65.

5) For these and other useful statistics illustrating the North-South gap in the Mediterranean see Roberto Aliboni, et. al, "Cooperation and Stability in the Mediterranean: An Agenda for Partnership", *The International Spectator*, Vol. 29, No. 3, July-September 1994, pp. 5-20.

6) *Ibid.*

7) For most comprehensive and analytical data on the comparative status of the human condition across the planet see "Human Development Report 1996", published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), New York, Oxford University Press, 1996.

8) For this type of thinking see Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", *Foreign Affairs*, 72, (Summer 1993).

9) See Eric A. Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule Upon Economic and Social Change in the Non Western States", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXIV, No. 4, December 1970.

10) See for example E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1939); Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1973); George F. Kennan, *Realities of American Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954); Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-1822* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964).

11) For a pioneering work of this school of thought see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).

12) See Samuel P. Huntington's much discussed and highly controversial article "The Clash of Civilizations?", *Foreign Affairs*, 72 (summer 1993).

13) Ibid. For the authors' highly critical response to the Huntington thesis, see Theodore A. Coulombis and Thanos Veremis, "In Search of New Barbarians: Samuel P. Huntington and the Clash of Civilizations", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 5, No. 1, Winter 1994, pp. 36-44.

14) T. Veremis, "International Relations in Southern Europe" in John Loughlin (ed.) *Southern European Studies Guide*, London, Bowker-Saur, 1993, pp. 207-210.

15) Ewan Anderson & Dominic Fenech, "New Dimensions in Mediterranean Security" in R. Gillespie (ed.) *Mediterranean Politics*, vol. I, London, Pinter, 1994, pp. 13-15.

16) Epaminondas Marias, "Why Europe Must Now Look to the South", *European Brief*, Vol. 2, No. 4, February 1995, p. 22.

17) "The European Union and the Mediterranean". Workshop Report, The University of Reading, 17-18 June 1994.

18) T. Couloumbis & T. Dokos, (eds.) *Arms Control & Security in the M. East and the CIS Republics*, Athens, ELIAMEP, 1995.

19) Geoffrey Kemp, *Forever Enemies? American Policy and the Islamic Republic of Iran*, A Carnegie Endowment Book, 1994, pp. 36-37.

20) Shireen T. Hunter, "Turkey at the Crossroads: Islamic Past or European Future", Brussels, CEPS Paper No. 63, 1995, pp. 103-104.

21) Ibid. See also Rosemary Forsythe, *The Politics of Oil in the Caucasus and Central Asia*, Adelphi paper No. 300, London: IISS, 1996.

22) Alexis Alexandris, "Tourkiki exoteriki politiki. Valkanike, Kaukasos kai Kentriki Asia", in T. Veremis (ed.) *I Tourkia Simera*, Athens, Papazissis-ELIAMEP, 1995, pp. 470-473.

23) Nicolai A. Kovalsky (ed.), *Russia: The Mediterranean and Black Sea Region*, Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Europe, 1996. See also on wider issues Geoffrey Kemp, "Security and Stability in the Persian Gulf: The Role of Iran & Iraq", *Halki International Seminars: Arms Control Non-Proliferation*, ELIAMEP, September 3-10, 1994.

24) Yannis Valinakis, "Southern Europe Between Defense and New Threats: The View from Greece" in Roberto Aliboni (ed.) *Southern European Security in the 1990s*, London, Pinter Publishers, 1992, p. 60.

25) William H. Lewis, "The Challenge of Failed States", Conference on *Mediterranean Security in the Post-Cold War Era*, AFSOUTH-Naples, 27 March 1995.

26) Richard Latter, *The Mediterranean Security Crisis*, Wilton Park Paper 103, July 1995, p. 14.

27) Michael Stuermer, "Clausewitz and the Return of History at the end of the 20th Century" in A. Clesse et al. (eds.) *The International System After the Collapse of the East-West Order*, Martinus Nijhoff, Publishers, London 1994, p. 263. Also,

Roberto Aliboni, George Joffe & Tim Niblock (eds.) *Security Challenges in the Mediterranean Region*, London: Frank Cass, 1996.

28) Guido Lenzi, "European Security and the Mediterranean" in Alberto Bin (ed.), *Cooperation and Security in the Mediterranean. Prospects after Barcelona*, Malta: Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, 1996, p. 33.

