


WORKSHOP ON U.S.-EUROPEAN RELATIONS AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom

Wye Plantation, 8-10/V/1997

- a. Programma
- 1. "The states of Europe and the United States in the Persian Gulf"/ Simon Serfaty
- 2. "United States and European cooperation on Iran policy : elements of a common approach"/ Geoffrey Kemp
- 3. "Security in the Persian Gulf: integration or rivalry?"/ Shahram Chubin
- 4. "Recent progress in containing Iran"
- 5. "Iran's contempt for Europe"
- 6. "Foreign leaders accuse Iran"
- 7. "Appunti su Europa-USA-Iran (e Libia)"/ Stefano Silvestri



(2)

U.S.-EUROPEAN WORKSHOP ON THE MIDDLE EAST

RIVER HOUSE
Wye Plantation Conference Center, Maryland

Thursday, May 8, 1997

4:30 p.m.	Check-in and Registration
6:00 p.m.	Cocktails
6:45 p.m.	Introductory Meeting
8:00 p.m.	Dinner

Friday, May 9, 1997

7:30-8:15 a.m.	Breakfast
8:30 a.m.	Session I: <i>U.S. & European Perspectives on the Contemporary Middle East</i>
10:30 a.m.	Break
10:45 a.m.	Session II: <i>Iran: Containment or Critical Dialogue?</i>
12:45 p.m.	Lunch
2:00 p.m.	Session III: <i>Iran: A U.S.-European Dialogue</i>
4:00 p.m.	Break
4:15 p.m.	Session IV: <i>Benchmarks for Assessing Iranian Policy</i>
6:30 p.m.	Cocktails/Dinner

Saturday, May 10, 1997

8:00-8:45 a.m.	Breakfast
9:00-11:00 a.m.	Closing Session: <i>Summary & Recommendations</i>
12:00 p.m.	Lunch

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NIXON CENTER FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM

**The States of Europe and the United States
In the Persian Gulf**

**Simon Serfaty
Center for Strategic and International Studies**

Prepared for:

Workshop on U.S.-European Relations and the Middle East

Wye Plantation, May 8-10, 1997

THE STATES OF EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Simon SERFATY
Director of European Studies, CSIS
Professor of US Foreign Policy, ODU

During the cold war, many of the most serious crises between the United States and its allies in Europe involved issues outside Europe. At first, conflicts waged by the states of Europe to maintain their empires in the Third World were questioned in the United States for giving the West a bad name. Later, after the empires had been lost, it was America's turn to be criticized in Europe for policies that sought to assert U.S. influence relative to that of the Soviet Union in regions that were often indifferent or hostile to both.

Among such regions, the Persian Gulf (and, by extension, the Middle East) were especially significant. To be sure, divisions within Europe — that is, between the member states of the European Union (EU) but also Turkey as a non-EU member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) — were always no less important than divisions between Europe and the United States. Then as now, there was no single European position except when such unity could be achieved at the expense of U.S. leadership — as was shown during the second oil crisis in 1980, for example. In other cases, like Suez in 1956 and the first oil crisis in 1974, Europe's support for U.S. policies could be gained most effectively thanks to these divisions but at the expense of European unity.

Now that the cold war is over, transatlantic differences on the entire range of Western relations with Islam remain deep. Assuming otherwise would be to assume that these differences merely grew out of the conflict with the Soviet Union. Indeed, the opposite may well be true. The

collapse of the Soviet threat has made the United States and the states of Europe even less tolerant of their differences over issues that raise questions of interests as well as questions of values: interests whose urgency is not felt evenly, and values whose relevance is not perceived equally from one side of the Atlantic to the other.

Neither intra-European nor transatlantic divisions are over threat perceptions and related objectives. How to deal with hostile and revolutionary states is no easy matter, even when the need to contain such states is widely recognized. The United States and the states of Europe agree on many important goals: to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to deter the spread of terrorism, to avoid the interruption of oil supplies and the manipulation of oil prices, to sustain the peace process between Israel and the Arab states — and often, but admittedly not always, to protect and enhance human rights. Disagreements emerge over the choice and enforcement of policies most likely to fulfill these goals expeditiously and at the least cost. Different priorities across the Atlantic and within Europe result from different degrees of vulnerability to policy failure and reprisals; discordant voices are heard because of the uneven capabilities that can be provided for effective action.

In addition, the EU, too, plays a role of its own that can add to, or compensate for, interstate differences, within Europe but also with the United States. Thus, the EU can be used as the alternative to, or a rampart against, Europe's dependence on NATO — as a cover for action or as an alibi for passivity. Ongoing attempts to deepen the EU and widen NATO complicate the role of each institution. For the EU, an especially demanding agenda calls for unprecedented decisions in the two vital areas of national sovereignty — economic and monetary union (EMU) and common foreign and security policy (CFSP). Trade-offs among EU countries may have to be negotiated at

the expense of some EU members or against U.S. preferences. These trade-offs may be especially significant between France and Germany, as well as between each of these countries and other EU members. For NATO, the agenda is not merely over enlargement and its ratification by all 16 members. The agenda also involves questions of institutional adaptation and reform. Resolution of the NATO (and EU) agenda can hardly be indifferent to developments in the EU (and NATO) or within each member of either institution.

During the cold war, Europe's outbursts of activism in the Middle East and the Gulf were designed to avoid the two extremes of superpower collision (with a danger of military escalation deemed to be highest on the European continent) and superpower collusion (with immediate consequences for Europe's vital interests in the area). In a world reduced to one superpower, these extremes have changed but Europe's refusal to be "cast in the uncomfortable role of an increasingly bemused spectator" has not changed.¹ Political and economic conditions in the nation-states of Europe, and in the two main institutions to which they belong or which they wish to join, make it more important than ever to pick issues of discord carefully, and to use rhetoric of confrontation advisedly. Mistakes with regard to the former, and excesses with regard to the latter, may have consequences that go beyond what can be accomplished or even what is worth accomplishing.

The Setting: What Now?

The first few years lived since the end of the cold war and the signing of the Maastricht treaty have been hard on Europe. The early expectations that emerged after the end

¹ Stanley Hoffmann, "La France, les Etats-Unis et le conflit israélo-arabe: Différences et asymétries, 1967-1971," *Politique Etrangère* 36, no. 1 (1971), 659; Jolyon Holworth, "French Policy in the Conflict," in Alex Dancchev and Dan Keohane eds., *International Perspectives on the Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991* (1994), 175; Patrick Clawson, "Business as Usual? Western Policy Options Toward Iran", *International Perspectives* 33 (September 1995), 11.

of communism in Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany, the dismemberment of the Soviet Union, and the Maastricht treaty have not been met.

A Union of Fragile States

In March 1957 in Rome, six of the nation-states of Western Europe signed treaties designed to fashion a "community" that would "save" them from their inability to attend alone to their most fundamental economic interests and political aspirations. After 40 years, however, these institutions threaten to deny the members of an expanded European Community (EC) the national sovereignty for which they used to fight and the national identity they used to enjoy. That such an institutional takeover of the nation-state would be unveiled at the worst possible time — in the midst, that is, of the job-depleting economic crisis that began to engulf the continent soon after the Maastricht treaty was signed in December 1991 — makes matters worse. Everywhere now, EU countries bemoan their condition:

- ▶ as democracies whose representatives can no longer represent their constituencies because of a technocratic "European" leadership that lacks democratic legitimacy;
- ▶ as national groups that are asked to become something "more" or, worse yet, something "else" than "who" or "what" they have always been;
- ▶ as citizens whose identity is said to be blurred by distinguishable minorities that have come in large but now largely unwanted numbers.

Some of the new political volatility has to do with the end of the cold war, which has removed the convictions that helped protect each country and its people from the threat abroad or the enemy within. Some of this volatility also has to do with the economic rigor and political discipline imposed on each state in the name of Europe. Finally, some of this volatility may also be linked to a more fundamental national rebellion against an ideological convergence and social cohesion sought at the

expense of some heroic myths about who "we" used to be and what "we" used to do. Whatever the case may be, no nation-state in Europe can now show the way, alone or in the name of the EU.

The Fragile State of the Union

Populated with fragile members, the Union, too, is in a fragile state.² For the EU and its members, this is truly a defining moment, and the 1996 intergovernmental conference (IGC) must agree on:

- ▶ institutional reforms, including reorganizing the European Commission, rethinking majority voting in the European Council and enhancing the rights of the European Parliament;
- ▶ painful decisions over EMU and CFSP, decisions expected to become the defining cleavage of the political debate in each member state for years to come;
- ▶ costly enlargement to the East, but also to other countries at the periphery of the continent (including Turkey) and association regimes farther East (including Russia) and South (including North Africa).

None of these issues is new. In the past, each has stood in the way of European unity until it was settled with last-minute compromises and trade-offs or, when disagreement could not be overcome, with a relaunching of the institutions over other issues. What is new, however, is that all items on the agenda must be addressed simultaneously: widen in order to deepen, deepen in order to widen, and reform in order to do both. This is a case of Europe-overload: too much "Europe" may be killing it.

A Fluid Set of Bilateral Relations

Bilateral relations, too, are unusually fluid—especially between the three EU countries (France,

² Simon Serfaty, *Stay the Course: European Unity and Atlantic Solidarity* (1997). Also, "Half Before Europe, Half Past NATO," *The Washington Quarterly* (Spring 1995).

Germany, and Great Britain) whose relations have been most directly responsible for the evolution of Western Europe since 1945.

Thus, the Franco-German relationship which has helped "define" Europe since 1945 rests on uncertain grounds. That such would be the case has little to do with the German ghosts that still haunt French memories. Rather it has to do with the difficulties faced by France to keep up with Germany's leadership in Europe: within the European Monetary System and, more recently, over a rigid application of the Maastricht criteria for EMU; in the European Parliament and, more recently, over the broader extension of majority voting in the European Council; during successive rounds of trade negotiations and, repeatedly, over the cost of reforming the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP); for the accommodation of France's privileged ties with its former dependencies in the South, and now over the modalities of enlargement to the East; over the pace of CFSP and over the format of WEU integration in the EU. On more and more issues differences between a maximalist Germany and a subdued France are getting wider while differences between France and a minimalist Great Britain appear to become smaller.

The change of government in Great Britain may well open the door to the first lasting Anglo-French rapprochement in the history of the Fifth Republic — a rapprochement that would account for France's increasing ambivalence about Europe's future (which may worsen after the legislative elections of June 1997) and Britain's more accommodating attitude toward the EU (likely to improve with a "new" Labour party that has been learning to live with "Europe" ever since its humiliating defeat of 1983). Closer relations between London and Paris would be all the more significant as they would emerge in the context of improved Anglo-American relations. Thus, Tony Blair's first Labour government in Britain since 1979 would provide a natural intercontinental link, across the Atlantic

but also across the Channel, that has been missing since the 1956 Suez crisis, the 1957 Rome Treaties, and the 1958 Gaullist call for a NATO *directoire*.

The Empires Come Home

In addition to the post-Soviet crises in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, the states of Europe are exposed to an arc of crises that covers an area loosely defined as that part of the continent where the Ottoman empire used to end, the Russian empire used to begin, and European empires in Africa used to flourish. Extended from Algeria to Turkey and their respective neighbors, these crises affect mainly Muslim countries where rejection of the West and its secular institutions are, or may become, the focal point of government policies or their critics. These crises varies from one place to another, but recurring patterns are not different from those identifiable in countries north of the Mediterranean — though, admittedly, at another scale and with more potential for outbursts of violence:

- ▶ institutional crises of representativeness in newly born democracies and, even more dramatically, failed states in stillborn democracies;
- ▶ national crises of identity in fragmented polities, and conflicts of legitimacy in unruly societies;
- ▶ historic memories of ethnic clashes and disruptive territorial disputes over boundaries drawn and imposed coercively in earlier years.

In recent years, Europe's apprehensions about a southern arc of crisis have centered mainly on North Africa. For each EU Mediterranean state, the main country of concern may differ — Algeria for France, Morocco for Spain, and Libya for Italy.³ Yet all of them share many concerns to which they respond in an increasingly similar fashion: population flows that are contained with

³ See my own "Algeria Unhinged," *Survival* 38, no. 4 (Winter 1996-97), 136-53.

increasingly harsh legislation, and which prevent the full opening of boundaries among all EU members; populist rhetoric that enhances the appeal of extreme political parties and induces moderate political leaders to adjust their own attitudes accordingly; doomsday scenarios that anticipate waves of terror coming from the Islamic shores of the Mediterranean and eroding the democratic shores of Europe; and domestic retrenchment that reflects a lingering predilection for the sovereign "I" of the nation-state over the collective "We" of the member states.

Hazardous Dependence

Finally, Europe's fragility makes it even more sensitive to the role of the United States as the military guarantor of the status quo and the political architect of change in the post-cold war world. Questions in Europe about U.S. leadership are hardly new. Countries on the continent have always feared hegemonial power — except their own, of course; they have always feared America's penchant for unilateral action — except when they thought they had cause for bemoaning America's instinct for disengagement. Throughout the cold war, Europeans usually made the United States rather than the Soviet Union responsible for the crises that threatened most directly their dependence on Arab oil, including the first and second oil crises and the two Gulf wars: for making Israel the U.S. primary interest in the region, for its blind assistance of the shah of Iran as the guardian of the Gulf, or for its support of Saddam's Iraq as the rampart against a new Islamic regime in Iran.⁴

Thus, European states that continue to be concerned over the price of failure will usually seek distance from U.S. policies until (and as long as) they have worked. Meanwhile, the U.S. leadership is said to be reflexive, hazardous, futile, and deceptive: reflexive because emotionally related to

⁴ F. Gregory Gause, "Illogic of Dual Containment," *Foreign Affairs* (March-April 1994), 58. Stephen Zunes, "Hazardous Hegemony: the United States in the Middle East," *Current History* (January 1997), 20-24.

personalities (and explicitly sensitive to domestic political pressures); hazardous because the ultimate price of U.S. leadership is to make Islam unsafe for the West (and its markets unavailable for European firms); futile because it neglects the essence of the region (often to the expense of long-term political trends); and deceptive because it confines policy options to extremes that deny the potential of more moderate alternative policies (reportedly tested during the long history of Europe's entangling relations with the region).

Whether Western countries enforce their policy in the Gulf and the Middle East separately or in unison, they must beware of outside influence. Former or aspiring superpowers like Russia and China are prepared to exploit whatever opportunity might emerge in the context of transatlantic discord or anti-Western sentiments in selected Muslim states. Thus, was it a hint or a coincidence if on the very day when the German court was announcing their verdict over the Mykonos case, the anti-Western candidate with the best prospects of being elected Iran's president, Parliamentary president 'Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri, was in Moscow with his country's ministers for economy, finance, trade, and defense — at about the same time as Iraq's parliament was approving an agreement with Russia for the development of the Qurna oilfield in southern Iraq, including an apparent commitment to undertake some work before the lifting of the embargo?⁵

Critical Dialogue — What Now?

The most prominent alternative to U.S. leadership in the Gulf was unveiled by the then-12 EU countries at their Edinburgh summit of 1992. "Critical dialogue," said

⁵ Robert Corzine, "Russia and Iraq reach agreement to develop oilfield," *Financial Times* (April 1997), 1.

President Chirac in March 1996, is "not open and friendly, as it would be with countries with whom we have normal trade, cultural, and political relations ... [but] a limited, organized dialogue, through which the Europeans convey to Iran a certain number of ideas, notably in the area of human rights, a certain number of thoughts, not always pleasant to hear, but which nevertheless preserve the ability to talk."⁶ The dialogue takes the form of political visits, often at the next to highest levels; frequent parliamentary exchanges; fairs and corporate partnerships; soothing opposition to the United States in international fora; concessions on the repayment of Iran's debts, as well as state insurance for exports and new credits designed to increase trade and investments. The formula was developed explicitly for Iran, against which most European countries ignored the U.S. subsequent economic embargo; but it also applies to Iraq, about which European states differ among themselves and from the United States over the conditions under which the sanction regime imposed by the United Nations since 1991 might be lifted before Saddam Hussein is removed from power.⁷

Whether with Iran or Iraq — or, more broadly, with the Palestinians and any of the more radical Arab states (including Libya, Sudan, and Syria) — Europe's urge for dialogue is based on several broad interests. Every interest is very important and even vital for most European states — although not equally between them — and all of these interests combined give the Gulf and the Middle East unparalleled significance, especially now that the end of the cold war helps the EU states take security in Europe for granted.

⁶ "This has already had positive results," added President Chirac, with no semblance of humor, in the same televised interview of March 13, 1996, held at the close of the terrorism summit. "The EU managed to ensure that a certain number of Iranian citizens of Jewish origin against whom sentences had been passed were finally spared."

⁷ Rosemary Hollis, "Europe and the Middle East: power by stealth," *International Affairs* 73, 1 (1997), 27.

Islamization of Europe

The geocultural interest is rooted in Europe's long life with Islam as a civilization, and with Muslims as people. Significantly, this shared existence has been mainly conflictual, beginning with over six centuries during which European Christians and Islam had no one else to fight with than each other. More recently, European generals and European foreign ministries drew maps, demarcated boundaries, created states, installed rulers, and educated elites.⁸ It is this history that ranks the countries of Europe in the Arab world: traditional great powers like France and Great Britain, with mixed traditions of involvement on their own or in alliance with others, but also Germany, the business partner *par excellence*; Club-Med countries like Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, whose interest is a matter of proximity and even, on occasion, of affinities; more distant countries whose attitude is determined by local conditions — somewhat hostile for the Benelux states (especially Belgium and the Netherlands) and relatively receptive for most of the northern European states (especially Denmark and Sweden); and, of late, intruders like Russia, whose influence has to do with its potential for mischief but whose interest has to do with its multicultural identity as a patchwork state. It is also this history that helps Europeans organize the Arab world into countries and regions defined by Europe's past influence: colonial relationships still fraught with passion and emotions, historic partnerships still conducive to close or renewable ties, and oil suppliers and trade customers.⁹

Over the past 20 years, history has caught up with geography — meaning that since time (and principles) ended the empires of Europe, unhappy settlers and abandoned natives have returned to

⁸ Kenneth Stein, "Will Europe and America Ever Agree," *Middle East Quarterly*, March 1997, 39.

⁹ Hussein J. Agha, "The Middle East and Europe: the Post-Cold War Climate," in Hugh Miall ed., *Redefining Europe: New Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation* (1997), 249. Michel Chatelus, "The Economic Relationships Between France and the Arab Countries," *Journal of Arab Affairs* 11 (1992), 113-14.

the mother country for solace, refuge, and work. With large numbers of Muslims settled in different countries in Europe — 2.6 million Turks in Germany (and many others in Holland), about 3 million Algerians in France, uncertain numbers of Moroccans in Spain, Italy, and Belgium — Islam has become an increasingly contentious domestic issue for a populace that rebels against a loss of identity started during the cold war in the name of "the West" and pursued in the name of "Europe" since the cold war.

The potential for a radicalization of Muslim groups in some EU states is real.¹⁰ Whether citizens or immigrants, but also whether locally-born children of legal immigrants (with or without citizenship) or illegal foreigners (with lesser hope of gaining legal status), Muslims form the new generation of Frantz Fanon's wretched of the earth — economically and politically marginalized, denied their dignity lest they renounce their identity, the first to lose the menial jobs they hold, and now threatened to lose their passport or whatever official document they enjoy. In thousands of mosques or religious sites in France and Germany, prayers said in Arabic by an imam named in Ryad or in Ankara, is heard but not understood by young Muslims born in a country which does not accept them and is not accepted by them. In each Muslim community, there are signs of re-Islamisation aimed at such conditions of permanent humiliation: Turkish or Ottoman flags that hang in the ever larger number of local Mosques, older Muslims who insist on being buried in the country they left in order to live, demands for ever more Koranic schools, requests that Islamic law be applied to personal and family matters — all questions that remain ignored by the local governments but to

¹⁰ The danger of internal strife seems to have been considered carefully in Paris during Desert Storm, and conditioned President Mitterrand's peace initiative up to the start of hostilities. Alec Hargraves and Timoty Stenhouse, "The Gulf War and the Maghrebian Community in France," *Maghreb Review* 17 (1992), 44. B.A. Robertson, "Islam and Europe: An Enigma or a Myth," *Middle East Journal* 48 (Spring 1994), 302.

which foreign state or religious authorities are willing to provide guidance and support.

The Imperative of Economic Engagement

Economic interests have to do with the need to preserve a reliable flow of oil and gas imports at reasonable prices, but also with the related need to maintain access to markets that ensure Europe's ability to pay for these imports. With about 9 percent of the world's proven oil reserves and 15 percent of the world's proven gas reserves, Iran's daily production of about 3.6 million barrels is absorbed entirely by European states (and Japan). Iran also has claims to the petroleum-rich Caspian sea, and it provides an access route to other important trade outlets. Iraq's importance in the oil market is also growing quickly in the light of predictable future patterns of demand. Levels of dependence vary from state to state, as some states in Europe have diversified their energy sources rather effectively, or else can rely on different foreign suppliers or even on domestic sources of their own. But irrespective of such differences, most agree that oil is an import which the states of Europe continue to need in large quantities and at predictable prices.¹¹

During the decade that followed the first oil crisis, European exports to the Middle East more than doubled, not merely as a matter of greed but also as a matter of sheer economic necessity (and hence, political stability). Increasingly since 1975, when full employment ceased to be fact of life in Europe's welfare states, a growing inability to create jobs at the prevailing levels of economic growth has made the need for new or bigger market shares even more compelling, not only in oil-rich states but also, in more recent years, in every other region of the world where the EU has gone peddling its goods and its money with all kinds of bilateral and regional agreements and trade preferences, and

¹¹ Harvey Sicherman, "The Strange Death of Dual Containment," *Orbis* (Spring 1997), 225. Alon Ben-Meir, "The Dual Containment Strategy is no longer viable," *Middle East Policy* iv, no. 2 (March 1996), 58-71. Also, Patrick Clawson, "What to Do about Iran," *Middle East Quarterly* (December 1995), 39-49.

with all sorts of joint projects designed to respond to the Gulf states' interest in more diverse economies — desalination technology to road construction and shipbuilding.

Monthly Trade Exports to the Middle East (in millions of dollars)

<i>Exporter</i>	<i>1975</i>	<i>1984</i>	<i>1993</i>
European Union	1278.3	2351.1	2639
United States	450.1	730.8	841

Source: OECD, *Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade*. Excludes Israel.¹²

Large amounts of short- and medium-term national debts owed to European states create an additional interest in avoiding that countries like Iran and Iraq default on their obligations. Furthermore, European firms that find little to be gained in the East and face too much competition in the Far East view the Middle East as their most lucrative prospect — one that is geographically close, historically known, and politically open to them. It is the potential of these markets rather than the modest trade or earnings they currently generate which is targeted. Iran has one-and-one-half times the population of all Gulf states, including Iraq. Before Iran's Islamic revolution and war with Iraq, its imports amounted to about \$14 billion. Iraq's potential, too, is compelling: before the Gulf war, its exports averaged \$12 to 14 billion a year and its imports ranged from \$12 to 18 billion. Iraq's per capita income has fallen to \$800 a year (as compared to its earlier peak of about \$14,000), but the country's needs for reconstruction are estimated at \$150 billion: reportedly, thousands of letters of intent have been signed by European firms that hope to have, after the embargo has been lifted, a political advantage over their U.S. competitors which they lack elsewhere in the Middle East.

Predictably, such an economic bait is effectively manipulated by both countries, whose "problem" with the West is pointedly reduced to the United States while the countries of Europe,

¹² Tom Lansford and Steve Yetiv, "Euro-American Rivalry and Security in the Persian Gulf," *Defense Analysis* 13, No. 1 (1997), 110.

reputedly Iran's "main partners," are urged to be "a good middleman" and address a "problem of values" which they can allegedly comprehend better than the United States. To that end, oil fields are "earmarked" for "sisterly and friendly states," like the Nahr Oman and Majun fields for Total and Elf respectively. Legally, little can be done to prevent deferred agreements that reportedly include pledges by the French government to continue to seek a full end to the UN embargo. In Iran, too, trade follows the flag. Total promptly took over the Conoco deal to develop Iran's oil and gas fields of Sirri (which would have been the first such deal between Iran and a U.S. oil company since 1980). These steps worsen not only differences across the Atlantic but also within Europe. Germany's new status as Iran's number one enemy, with the United States and Israel, is a badge of honor which its neighbors readily exploit to their own economic advantage.

A Matter of Security

Security issues are both traditional and non-traditional. Traditional issues have to do with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that can inflict deadly damage on continental Europe: rogue states with missiles and nuclear weapons are legitimate concerns for neighbors across a narrow area of land or water. Thus, Iran is deploying chemical weapons, may be deploying biological weapons, and has purchased Scud-C missiles and long-range SU-24 strike aircraft; Iran also has an active nuclear program — and can be assumed to have the ability and resources to produce a crude bomb.¹³ The scars left by the belated discovery of Iraq's military inventory in January 1991 -- reportedly "months away from having one nuclear weapon" — are deep enough to make every European state concerned over Saddam's remaining capacity to produce quickly a

¹³ Anthony Cordesman and Ahmed Jashim, *Iran: Dilemmas of Dual Containment* (1997). Rolf Ekéus, "Dismantling Saddam's Arsenal," *Middle East Quarterly* (March 1996), 71-76.

number of weapons for which he is likely to have hidden the prohibited components.

Such concerns are felt all the more deeply as they were brought closer to southern Europe first by reported threats during the Gulf war, and more recently by events in Algeria. Dysfunctional states, or non-state actors born out of such states, can act in the name of God or in that of a man-made figure of God, in the name of principles or most simply in the name of anarchy. The small and heavily populated states of Europe are especially vulnerable to a wholesale terrorism that might target cities and people with WMD or with conventional and primitive weapons. Already, Islam is cause for local political conflicts that call for civil disobedience within and across established boundaries: for example, demonstrations about an immigration bill in Strasbourg lead to counter-demonstrations joined by Germans across a border which the EU has blurred anyway. In the short term, such apprehensions help extremist political parties. Ultimately, perceptions that a clash of civilization is imminent might precipitate confrontations with Muslim citizens separated from their country of adoption and viewed as the agents of a conspiracy aimed at the West, its institutions and its values — marginally comparable to the ominous tones used to describe the challenge raised by communists and *agents provocateurs* in the earlier days of the cold war. The mental equation — unemployment = immigrant worker = Arab = Muslim fundamentalist = terrorism — merges Islam into one single destructive force hostile to each Western state and the entire Western civilization.¹⁴

Dual Containment — What Next?

It is in 1956 over Suez that the Cold War hijacked the debate over Western differences in the Middle East, thus forcing the neglect of the inherent factors which, beyond the

¹⁴ Demetrios Papademetriou and Kimberly Hamilton, *Converging Paths to Restriction: French, Italian, and British Responses to Immigration* (1996), 28.

challenges raised by Soviet power and communist ideology, conditioned U.S.-European and intra-European relations in the region. In 1991, the U.S.-led triumph in the Gulf war preempted any post-cold war debate over the centrality of U.S. leadership in the region. Later, a strategy for the "dual containment" of the "backlash states" in the Gulf and elsewhere was announced with the confident expectation that it would be accepted readily and enforced diligently by the global coalition whose unity had helped defeat Saddam's ambitions.

Most generally, dual containment assumed that, the Persian Gulf would become both less important and less dangerous; that Western and Gulf countries would remain willing to accept U.S. leadership; and that broader trends in the region would continue to improve. In practice, of course, these assumptions, however justified they may have been after the Gulf war, have not been confirmed.¹⁵

Enduring Strategic Importance

Admittedly, Iraq will not dare any new adventure for long, and arguably Iran "unable to govern effectively, has lost appeal both at home and abroad."¹⁶ But there has been no "dramatic" reduction in the strategic significance of these countries for the region, or of their impact on West-West relations as well as on Western relations with other parts of the world, including other Muslim states and states in Asia.

The Saudi-managed fall in oil prices in 1985, combined with a generally weak dollar have left

¹⁵ Anthony Lake, "Confronting the Backlash States," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 1994); Zalmay Khalilzad, "The United States and the Persian Gulf: Preventing Regional Hegemony," *Survival* (Summer 1995), 95-120; Harvey Sicherman, "The Strange Death of Dual Containment," *Orbis* (Spring 1997), 225.

¹⁶ Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft and Richard Murphy, "Differentiated Containment," *Foreign Affairs* 76, No. 3 (May/June 1997), 27.

the West more dependent on imported oil — especially the United States relative to its European partners. Thus, as oil prices per barrel rose from \$3.32 in 1972 to \$27.52 in 1982 (in current prices) before falling to \$15.98 by 1992, consumption evolved accordingly: a sharp drop in 1972-82 but a steady rise in 1982-92. Current trends point to rising consumption in the United States and Japan (estimated at 20 percent by the year 2015) and, most dramatically, in the new oil junkies of Asia (expected to double by the same date), which leaves the EU states even more vulnerable to instabilities in the region, even though their own consumption is expected to grow at a more moderate pace of about 8 percent.

Iran's influence in the Arab-Islamic world has not abated either, especially since it need not be exerted state-to-state or government-to-government to be real. Muslims who look up to the Iranian regime for inspiration and emulation would not accept its humiliation easily — and there is no convincing evidence at this time that a different regime would pursue significantly different policies over most issues of concern to the West. Finally, *faute de mieux* Iran may be called upon to play an important role in supplying and training the local army in Bosnia against Serbia if U.S. forces (and, as a consequence, European forces) were to leave in June 1998, as currently assumed.

Fading Western Coalition

Second, the unity achieved during the Gulf war was short lived. Now, transatlantic cohesion has been eroded by Europe's increased dependence on markets that permit more economic growth and hence more political stability. Europe's post-cold war economic crisis ends an era during which the countries of Europe had become used to the services provided by the welfare state — including the "right" to a job and, in its absence, state aid that provided adequate income. In a new age of budgetary austerity, the struggle for market shares is imperative irrespective of actual levels of oil

dependence. That the U.S. decision to sever all trade and investment relations with Iran on April 30, 1995 was not endorsed by any U.S. ally is not surprising. On the contrary, the decision was welcomed by other trading states eager to seize new commercial opportunities. Similarly, Germany's reduced economic exchanges with Iran would be easily compensated by France, especially if these were to come with promises of a reprieve in terrorist activities on French soil.

In Iraq, even though the ostracization of Saddam Hussein is largely justified in Europe, there is some sentiment that the UN embargo should be lifted more fully at an early time on grounds that it has been ineffective (to the extent that it sought the elimination of Saddam) and is now turning counterproductive (to the extent that it is causing an irreversible alienation of Iraq). Few would support the covert or overt use of force to achieve Saddam's removal because of their fear of a breakdown of Iraq and its impact on neighboring states — not only Turkey but also other Arab states that oppose an independent Kurdish state. "We do not want there to be a serious destabilization that will add to the problems of this region," stated French defense minister Charles Millon on September 4, 1996, after he refused to be associated with the U.S. strike within the internationally recognized borders of northern Iraq. Added Foreign Minister de Charette ominously, "When violence returns to the Middle East, sooner or later it will show up in Paris."¹⁷ Significantly, French participation in the surveillance missions in the exclusion zone, alongside U.S. and British planes, was first announced by the Pentagon but the end of French participation in these missions came from Paris on the eve of a visit by deputy prime minister Tariq Aziz in January 1997 (his third since the Gulf war but the first since December 1995).

Conditions in Turkey are especially significant. Among the many shortcomings and outright

¹⁷ Interview by Marie-Laure Cittanova, *Les Echos* (April 8, 1997), 4.

contradictions of Europe's policies toward Islam, few if any are more significant than the denial of Turkey's EU membership. For EU states to debate Turkey's cultural identity and democratic personality is an open invitation to that country to leave the West. With Iraq's embargo said to have caused cumulative damages in excess of \$20 billion, Turkey views itself as the second main loser of the Gulf war. Compared to the \$4 billion worth of oil revenue gained by Iran through the short-lived occupation of Kuwait, Turkey's \$3.5 billion arrangement for the coproduction of F-16s looks meager and hard-earned.¹⁸ A grand alliance of Turkey and other Muslim countries with Ukraine for a giant pipeline that would bypass Russia and link Turkey's Black Sea coast to the oil fields of Iran, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Central Asia, and the Persian Gulf. Predictably enough, it arouses the envy of Germany and France whose security interest in Ukraine merges conveniently with their economic interests in such a pipeline.

Worsening Trends

The "broader positive trends in the region" envisioned as dual containment was being announced — meaning not only the Gulf but also the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict — have not been confirmed either. After the Gulf war, the restrictions imposed on Iraq, the expected Soviet withdrawal as an arms supplier, and Iran's exhaustion as an arms consumer helped assume that the new regional military balance could be kept at lower levels. (Between 1986 and 1992, Iran's defense spending relative to total government expenditures fell from 55.2 to 24.9 percent respectively.) In late 1991, the Madrid Summit reinforced such expectations. Iran's arms purchases remained significantly lower than those from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait — with Egypt as the only

¹⁸ Hooshang Amirahmadi, "Iran's development: evaluation and challenges," *Third World Quarterly* 17, no. 1 (1996), 126.

Middle Eastern country that increased its arms purchases during the first half of the 1990s.¹⁹

Events since have not been as positive, however. With Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE soon reacting to the inadequacy of the security arrangements exposed by Iraq's aggression, and with Iran showing renewed concern over its depleted military arsenal, six of the top eight arms importers in 1992-1995 came from the Middle East — with the largest increases in market shares achieved by the United States and France (at the expense, in part at least, of Britain). Nor is there a lack of arms suppliers outside the Euro-Atlantic states. Rosy assumptions about Russia's role, too, have darkened. The cold war was about both ideology and power: with communist ideology gone, there remains substantial Russian military power that can be loaned, leased, sold, or even used depending on Moscow's will (potentially bad) to use emerging opportunities (mainly good) that serve enduring Russian interests in the region. Thus, a Russian challenge is a modified version of the previous Soviet challenge. In coming years, Russia's potential as arms supplier may well increase all the more dangerously as previous cold war inhibitions will no longer apply. So, too, will the potential for unhibited arms sales from rogue states (like North Korea) and, most of all, potential superpowers (like China) in search of revenues and influence.

Finally, the peace process that had been gaining momentum since the Madrid Summit, through the Oslo process and past the historic Israeli-Palestinian hand shake at the White House, was

¹⁹ For the period 1992-1995, Saudi Arabia concluded agreements worth \$22.3 billions, which is 80 percent of all purchases made by Iran, Kuwait, UAE, Egypt, and Israel (ranked third, and fifth through eighth respectively). The U.S. share amounted to 56.4 percent (compared to a 40.3 percent share in 1988-1991) while the French share amounted to 26.6 percent (compared to 4.8 percent during the previous period). Richard Grimmett, Congressional Research Service, *Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1988-1995*, 48-50. Also, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers* (1995), 12, and Hasan Johar and Gawdat Bahgar, "The American Dilemma in the Gulf Region," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* XIX, no. 1 (Fall 1995), 61.

stalled first and is now deteriorating. Israel and the PLO are again on a dangerous collision course to which no Arab state in the region will be able to remain indifferent; mounting evidence of an Iranian role in acts of violence against U.S. forces stationed in U.S. allies has been creating domestic pressures for retaliation, which in turn would cause more debates with Europe about its legitimacy and more apprehensions over possible retaliation; an Islamist party that already holds the premiership in Turkey appears to be gaining enough political ground to cause public concern in the Army over the country's secular tradition; a progressive decay of the economic and political structures of the Gulf Council states has been eroding their ability to cooperate with the United States and other Western countries, as was shown during the latest U.S. strike against Iraq in September 1996; the killing in Algeria has been setting new standards of brutality on the eve of elections from which significant constituencies will remain excluded, and conditions in neighboring Morocco are cause for concern as questions are raised about the post-Hassan future of the monarchy; and even during the current reprieve from war in Bosnia (or even in Chechnya), other conflicts involving Muslim communities are still festering in the former Muslim republics of the Soviet Union.

Dual Containment and Critical Dialogue: Who Leads?

In the end, the debate is over policy: whether it works, to whose advantage and at what cost. To Europe's question — Do you know what you're doing, and are you satisfied with the results? — America's response is — Neither do you, and neither are you. That Europeans are sensitive to U.S. pressures is certain. Congressional sanctions do deter Europe's investments in the region — at least to an extent. That governments in Tehran and Baghdad take U.S. power seriously is beyond doubt too: memories of the brief war with Iraq remain vivid — and not in Iraq

only. Yet, conclusive results remain elusive. Saddam is still in power, long past the six weeks to six months President Bush gave him in 1991, and the mullahs are still full of anger, long after the shah has been all but forgotten in the West. Nor can Europeans claim results, even for their most visible interest — economic — and their most urgent concern — terror. After France, Germany, and other EU states rescheduled Iran's debts in the fall 1993, terrorist attacks ceased only briefly, as France was soon to uncover. Although Germany increased its line of credit for Iran, the volume of trade between the two countries fell by a factor of four between 1992 (when it stood at 8 billion marks) and 1996.²⁰ "They have little to show for ... something that in other times might have [been] called appeasement," observed Robert Deutsch, director of Northern Gulf Affairs at the State Department. Adds former CIA director James Woolsey, "The German-French approach [is to] wink at Tehran's support for terrorism and rationalise, in effect, appeasement of it."²¹ "Little to show" and even "appeasement" are also the sources of a European dissatisfaction that deplores U.S. policies that have little to show for the pain they impose and even the risks they take, and are allegedly designed to "appease" domestic critics with periodic outbursts of military action aimed at Saddam and of rhetorical attacks aimed at Tehran.

The U.S. strategy "to neutralize, contain and, through selective pressures, perhaps eventually

²⁰ Two-fifths of the DM 12 billion owed by Iran to German companies receive Hermes export guarantees which the German government would need to pay out of a federal budget already pressured by the Maastricht criteria for monetary union.

²¹ "US Sanctions against Iran at center stage," *The Oil and Gas Journal* (June 3, 1996), 28. James Woolsey, "Appeasement will only encourage Iran," *Survival* (Winter 1996-97), 18. Germany's Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel gives critical dialogue credit for "[Iran's] adoption of the chemical weapons convention ..., [its] approval of the extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty, cooperation [with] the International Atomic Energy Agency, the release of German and other West European hostages in Lebanon, the pardon and later release of a German sentenced to death ..., the verbal promise that Iran will not send any killer commands against Salman Rushdie, and the resumption of cooperation between Iran and the special UN rapporteur for human rights issues." Interview reported in FBIS-WEU-97-104 (April 14, 1997).

transform these backlash states" was expected to remain in effect "until circumstances change[d]." To urge patience, some observers evoke the cold war as a reminder that containment takes time.²² The analogy may look and sound irresistible but it is self-deceptive and mostly irrelevant. The conditions that made containment work in Europe after World War II were fundamentally different — the common interests that shaped the commitment and the threat that sustained it, the American power that guaranteed the commitment and the Soviet power that challenged the interests. In 1945, a choice between Truman's good will and Stalin's good faith was made even easier by the tangible benefits the former provided in the shadow of the latter, including political stability and economic recovery. Moreover, there was a strategy of dual containment in postwar Europe, and that strategy consisted in achieving reconciliation with the former German enemy (now divided and weak) in order to attend to the emerging confrontation with the former Soviet ally (now united and strong).

Dual containment in the Gulf hardly enjoys a similar degree of interest convergence between the two sides of the Atlantic, of recognized dependence of Europe on America's leadership, or of a sustainable commitment of U.S. power to Europe's interests. Moreover, it provides for no instant advantages, and countries in Europe find that the time it requires is lacking given their needs, progress is too erratic given their apprehensions, and the U.S. strategy is too dangerous given the risks of a backlash raised by a demonized Iran and a disintegrating Iraq in the midst of worsening conditions in the Middle East. On both sides of the Atlantic, therefore, suspicions are common and evenly shared. Critical dialogue and dual containment are no more separable than were containment and detente in the days of the cold war: each continues, and might even complete, the other by other means (and through other interlocutors). No country in Europe nor the United States can escape

²² Peter Rodman, "Why Ease Up on Iran?" *The Washington Post* (December 11, 1996).

charges of economic and commercial greed, worsened by mutual suspicions of incompetence. As every country in Europe wants to be "the Arabs' best friend" none can guarantee the protection needed to seal such friendship: only the United States can. The U.S. ability to guarantee security is compelling but other goals and commitments make it difficult to translate this guarantee into friendship.

Thus, the critical dialogue that is most needed for the Gulf is between the United States and Europe. The dialogue begins with the recognition that Europe's endorsement of the U.S. strategy, which most Europeans find self-defeating, is no more likely to happen than a U.S. endorsement of European policies which a large fraction of the American people find repulsive. This stalemate should not be allowed to persist because it risks to degenerate into an Atlantic crisis that would be especially disruptive at this time of other vital U.S. and European interests. The issue is not only which of the strategies urged on either side of the Atlantic is more valid on principle and more workable in practice. Rather, the issue is also, and even mainly, which policy will achieve the optimum balance of U.S. interests in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, to be sure, but also Europe and the EU. Finally, a transatlantic dialogue must also account for the limits of European unity (and hence, action) and the primacy of U.S. power (and hence, influence), as well as the urgency of European priorities and the range of Western interests to ascertain prospects for consultation and joint action by NATO and the EU.

Who Speaks for Europe?

As often shown over the years, neither France nor Germany can lead Europe alone — one for lack of national capabilities and the other for lack of historic legitimacy. Instead, both countries must speak jointly on behalf of a community which France launched initially and Germany funded

subsequently. There as elsewhere, France, of course, likes to claim otherwise. "In the Middle East," declared foreign minister Hervé de Charette in May 1996, "we are still able to shape history," — as he attempted to pursue a Gallic version of shuttle diplomacy in Lebanon while President Chirac attempted his own brand of brinksmanship in Israel later that fall.²³ Such claims and initiatives, however, are hardly enough to make of France either the U.S. main interlocutor in Europe or the main alternative to the United States in the region. What matters more is France's ability to speak on behalf of the EU, which is in turn conditioned by the French leverage on Germany and by Germany's inhibitions in Europe. During the cold war, U.S. pressures occasionally compelled Germany to choose between its two main partners — one leading an Atlantic context that provided security and the other leading a European context that was conducive to stability. As could be expected, the more security was taken for granted and the more difficult Germany's choice became. Now, the choice is defined less by the U.S. commitment to collective defense than by the French commitment to monetary union — an economic and political imperative for Germany and his chancellor. In the future, Germany may well show more flexibility on enforcing dual containment in the Gulf — but that alone would not mean more flexibility from other European states individually, and the EU collectively, unless the French, too, choose to follow — an unlikely prospect in light of the French problems at home and the French designs for Europe.

As was the case already after the end of World War II, Great Britain is the other European state that can best help set the terms of U.S.-European and intra-European cooperation and discord in the Gulf after the cold war. This is first a matter of history: the history of Britain as the former hegemon in the Gulf, whose withdrawal in 1947 changed America's role in the world, but also the

²³ Interview by Jacques-Marie Bourget, *Paris Match* (September 5, 1996), 56-57.

history of Britain as America's most reliable ally in the region. In coming years, Tony Blair might restore Britain's significance as a credible broker between the two sides of the Atlantic — as a prime minister with an influence on France which Germany no longer has, assuming it ever did, but also an influence on the United States which France does not have, and never will.

In the case of Iraq but also for Iran, political changes may have some impact. Thus, a socialist governing majority in France would be better disposed toward Iraq, less responsive to NATO and U.S. leadership, and more weary of German leadership in the EU — all of which could well be accommodated in a political cohabitation whose other head, Jacques Chirac, seems personally committed to improving France's relations with Iran but also Saddam's Iraq (with whom Chirac maintained close personal relations when he served as prime minister in 1974-1976 and again in 1993-1995). Meanwhile, there is growing sentiment in Germany's social democrat and Green parties that the dialogue with Iran has failed because it remained insufficiently critical of Iran, even in the aftermath of the Mykonos trial.

Half Before Europe and Half Past NATO

This is not Europe's time: the Gulf war first, and the war in Bosnia since, have confirmed that on issues that raise vital security questions the EU remains unfinished and cannot lead. All 15 member states are not united around a common EU policy; instead, there are 15 national positions that make self-serving references to the EU for legitimacy, even if these policies are not explicitly in agreement. Thus, in the political-security arena "Europe" is an idea at best, and an alibi at worst: an idea because it points to what must be done, however slowly; an alibi because it helps justify what is not being done, however awkwardly. Exceptions take mainly the form of occasional bursts of anger at U.S. policies, when the EU can indeed be "quick in its deliberations, unanimous in its conclusions,

unwavering in its condemnation, and steady in its decision to take action" — as Sir Leon Brittan declared in July 1996 after a meeting of the European Council devoted to the Helms-Burton legislation.

While NATO remains the institution of choice, it can be effective only to the extent that U.S. leadership and power remain committed — a condition that cannot be maintained unless this power remains explicitly under U.S. command. Leaving this latter question aside, the specificity of European priorities cannot be overlooked, however. In the Gulf especially, but also elsewhere, there are limits to Europe's willingness to accept the terms of U.S. leadership, even when the states of Europe understand the limits of their own power and especially if U.S. failure to fulfill their objectives threatens to make the U.S. strategy counterproductive. The regime's own mismanagement of Iran's economy during a short moment of affluence in the early 1990s, as well as its brutal treatment of the Iranian society, have served Western interests in the region well. Arguably, Western policies may now help the regime lay the blame elsewhere, and even build a semblance of solidarity based on national and Islamic pride.²⁴

The permissible boundaries of unilateral U.S. leadership in Europe were crossed with a legislation, Helms-Burton and D'Amato-Gillman, that seeks to impose sanctions on non U.S.-firms doing business with Iran and Iraq (and other rogue states). Transatlantic separation could widen dangerously if military action were to be initiated by the United States against Tehran, *à la Libya* — an action which all countries in Europe (except, perhaps, Britain) would be reluctant to condone, and some (including, perhaps, France and Germany) will be prepared to condemn. Even as economic sanctions and military action are considered, and certainly before they are enforced, the advantages

²⁴ Robin Wright, "Dateline Tehran: Revolution Imploding," *Foreign Policy*, no. 3 (Summer 1996).

of either should be weighed in relation to their impact on other vital U.S. policies in post-cold war Europe, including the adaptation of NATO (especially in the context of bilateral relations between the United States and the three main EU states), the ratification debates for NATO enlargement (in the U.S. Senate and relevant European parliaments), the future course of European integration (including the development and role of the WEU), and U.S., NATO, and EU relations with Russia as well as Turkey's relations with the West and its institutions.

Limits of Dialogue, Limits of Containment

The United States and the states of Europe view containment in the Gulf differently. Yet there are issues of vital concern to all Western countries which cannot be settled readily through a dialogue with states that persist in ignoring these issues and worsening Western concerns. These issues include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, acts of terror against and in the United States and Europe, and the peace process in the Middle East. They are the benchmarks of the Euro-Atlantic consensus. The tone used in any related dialogue should be explicit enough to be heard and clear enough to be believed.

Recent reactions to Iran's involvement with terrorism show that this is not the case, however. Thus, following a difficult three-and-half-year trial, the verdict reached by German courts over the Mykonos case was surprisingly clear and even explicit: it is the reaction of the EU and its members that was neither as clear nor, therefore, as surprising. That the EU members would decide to recall their ambassadors from Tehran immediately after the Mykonos verdict was also an encouraging display of firmness and solidarity. Ambiguities followed almost at once, however, as most EU states (except mainly Britain) emphasized that such action was temporary, had no commercial or economic implications, and, perhaps most of all, did not imply a EU decision to end the critical dialogue with

Iran. Indeed, within less than three weeks, the decision had been reversed and only Iran's own objections stood in the way of EU returning to business as usual.²⁵ In coming months, a U.S. response to confirmation of Iran's involvement in the murderous attack against U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia would have to be more militarily explicit — so long as the evidence is convincing and can be made public — to justify the price that may have to be paid by the United States and its allies (including, that is, the price of reprisals). By definition, a response that insists on being vaguely "proportional" cannot be "clarifying" too.

No formula, however clever, can satisfy the complex Euro-Atlantic objectives in the Gulf. The dangers raised by Iran and Iraq are too diverse to be locked into concepts that explain neither what is to be contained specifically (and how) or what is to be discussed explicitly (and to what end). Nor can any formula, however magic, address the complex agenda of problems raised in the broader Middle East — problems of economic growth and demographic explosion, of political governance and cultural coexistence, of fanatical terrorism and hopeless nihilism. In short, the policies that are demanded in the Gulf and the Middle East are policies that demand contributions from all states on either side of the Atlantic, as well as of the two institutions to which these states belong or which they are about to enter.

Most generally, a process of transatlantic policy coordination (TPC) would establish a framework of consultation between a small core group of NATO/EU states that would be expected to draft common policies for consideration by all their EU and NATO partners. The procedure might

²⁵ The evidence of Iran's involvement has been available for many years. "Behind all these crimes stands a sovereign state.... Iran....," concluded a 1993 investigation of the German Federal Crime Office, quoted in a *Washington Post* report on "The Killing of Iranian Dissenters: Bloody Trail Back to Tehran" (November 21, 1993). Cited in Clawson, *op. cit.*, 16. Evidence of Iran's involvement is also compelling as regards hundreds of other incidents in and beyond Europe (from Ankara to Buenos Aires).

resemble the *directoire* proposed by France in the past. That the idea was not right then does not make it wrong now. A hard core of three or more European states plus the United States would satisfy the dual objectives of European unity and transatlantic solidarity. Leadership provided by Europe alone does not suffice, whether it is that of the EU or of one or more EU state. But in the Gulf or elsewhere, leadership provided unilaterally by the United States no longer satisfies either the United States' or Europe's interests. What is at issue is not whether U.S. power is available, which it is, but when, how, where, why, with whom, and to what ends such power will be used. Both sides of the Atlantic, and the two institutions they built together, are needed to combine credible tools of military enforcement and necessary tools of economic enticement that are not only compatible but complementary.

Such engagement requires a more moderate rhetoric vis-à-vis adversaries but above all vis-à-vis allies: the states of Europe may not be the most vital part of the solution needed for the problems at hand, but they are not the central part of these problems either. Indeed, a magic wand that would remove from the map would not make these problems any easier, and might even make them worse. Such engagement would also cease to preclude economic relations without some of the excesses that characterized such relations prior to 1994 (including U.S. excesses, such as intolerable levels of U.S. exports of dual technologies).²⁶ Nor, finally, would such engagement suggest that there would not continue to be harsh transatlantic and intra-European economic rivalries in these regions and

²⁶Thus, before the United States adopted "the strictest national export controls in the world" (as viewed by then-Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff in November 1995) and before the Gillman-d'Amato bill was voted by a nearly unanimous U.S. Congress, the excesses of the European states compared well to U.S. excesses: between 1988 and 1992, the United States gave Iran 366 exports licenses for nuclear-related dual-use equipment--still a small fraction of the 24,000-odd licenses for goods with possible nuclear applications approved by Washington during that same period.

everywhere else. Such engagement would presuppose, however, that in most instances transatlantic cooperation is more likely to emerge if it is preceeded by genuine consultation before decisions have been made, and that disagreements are less likely to escalate if they follow an explicit discussion, and hence possible understanding, of the interests that caused such disagreements. U.S. interests in Europe, as well as Europe's interests in the United States, are too important to be left at the mercy of U.S.-European differences in the Gulf and the Middle East.

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United States & European Cooperation on Iran Policy

Elements of a Common Approach

Geoffrey Kemp
Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom

Prepared for:

Workshop on U.S.-European Relations and the Middle East

Wye Plantation, May 8-10, 1997

The differences between the United States and Europe over Iran policy concern means not ends. The U.S. dual containment policy towards Iran, announced in 1993, was supplemented in 1995 by the imposition of a unilateral trade embargo, essentially ending all U.S. commercial relations with Iran. Then, in 1996, legislation was signed giving the President authority to impose a range of penalties on foreign companies who invest in Iran's energy industry in excess of \$40 million. Penalties could include denial of access to the huge U.S. market. The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) was initiated by New York Senator Alfonse D'Amato and has been greeted with hostility by the European Union. However it appears to have had some effect in deterring investment by foreign companies in Iran's oil and gas projects. The EU has threatened to retaliate against U.S. companies doing business in Europe if the new law is ever enforced. If European companies are penalized, a much more serious confrontation will be unavoidable. Since such a polarization would play into the hands of Teheran, a major diplomatic effort is needed to prevent it from happening. This will require compromise by both sides of the Atlantic.

Despite quarrels over ILSA, the European countries agree with the United States that Iran's behavior has to change. The EU policy of engaging Iran in a "critical dialogue" was initiated at Edinburgh in December 1992. There were five areas where the EU wanted Iran to change its behavior: terror; weapons of mass destruction; the Arab-Israeli peace process; human rights; and international law. The purpose of the critical dialogue was to keep channels open and influence the moderates in Teheran. Americans are skeptical this dialogue has achieved any meaningful results. Each European country has a different spin on the definition of "critical dialogue" and, although this term is now increasingly criticized in Europe -- it is neither critical, nor a dialogue -- there is skepticism that economic sanctions will change Iranian behavior in the five designated areas.

The decision of the Berlin Appellate Court on April 10, 1997 finding the Iranian leadership ultimately culpable for the murders of Iranian Kurdish dissidents at the Mykonos restaurant in Berlin in 1992 led the EU to suspend its critical dialogue with Iran and withdraw its ambassadors from Tehran. On April 29 the EU Court of Foreign Ministers agreed on the following:

- confirmation that under the present circumstances there is no basis for the continuation of the critical dialogue between the European Union and Iran;
- the suspension of official bilateral Ministerial visits to or from Iran;
- confirmation of the established policy of European Union member states not to supply arms to Iran;
- cooperation to ensure that visas are not granted to Iranians with intelligence and security function;
- concertation in excluding Iranian intelligence personnel from European Union member states.

It is important that Europeans and the United States use the Mykonos case to try to resolve their differences to avoid an escalation of rhetoric and mutual trade sanctions over Iran. What is required is a high profile and sustained diplomatic initiative by the United States and Europe to reach an agreed agenda on how to achieve realistic changes in Iranian policy, in exchange for an eventual ending of the American isolation of Iran.

The "Good Cop - Bad Cop" Approach

One way to set the agenda and determine benchmarks for Iranian behavior is to use the "good-cop, bad-cop" method. The essence of the good cop/bad cop technique is that both cops

have the similar objectives of enforcing the law. The good cop nurtures the subject, seeking his or her friendship. He relies on pleasantries and small but kind gestures, while warning the subject that it is much better to cooperate otherwise he or she will be turned over to the bad cop. The bad cop, on the other hand, uses threats and intimidation and unpleasantness to achieve cooperation. However, both cops understand the limits of their respective approaches: In the last resort, the good cop has to enforce the law and must be prepared to draw his gun. Likewise, the bad cop must respect the constitutional rights of the subject and behave within the law. In other words, the good cop/bad cop policy involves a mixture of carrots and sticks.

How would this approach work in the case of a U.S.-European initiative on Iran? Clearly the roles are preordained: the Europeans would play the good cop, and the U.S., the bad cop. Europe would use its access and influence with Iran to persistently and firmly make the argument that unless Iran complies with certain standards and changes its behavior on specific issues, it will not be able or willing to act contrary to the policies advocated by the bad cop. This means that Europe would be prepared to consider tougher measures -- the sticks -- including economic sanctions, against Iran more in line with those proposed by the United States if, after a specific period of time, Iran refused to comply.

In return, if Iran does comply the United States would be prepared to offer carrots and soften its hard line policy towards Iran. This could include loosening its economic sanctions and opposition to Iranian attempts to raise equity in the concessionary capital markets.

In order for such an approach to work the following ingredients could be constituted:

- A high level initiative by senior U.S. and European diplomats to formulate and agree upon a common action policy, including better coordination and

interpretation of intelligence data on sensitive issues. The agenda would focus on the five areas of Iranian behavior the U.S. and Europe agree need to be changed -- terrorism, peace process, weapons of mass destruction, human rights and international law.

- Benchmarks would be established based on expectations of what changes in policy the Iranian regime is realistically likely to consider. The benchmarks are listed in Figure 1.
- A time frame for Iranian compliance would be agreed upon, as well as a methodology for assessing compliance. The Iranian government should be given a time-frame to change unacceptable behavior or all contacts will be reduced through a united U.S.-European policy.
- An agreed list of sticks and carrots that would be jointly considered in response to Iranian behavior. It is more likely that Europeans will agree to reduce diplomatic contacts and psychologically isolate the Iranian regime rather than resort to economic isolation. Nevertheless, this could have a significant impact on the Iranian leadership since one of the issues Iran is most concerned with is its isolation. In the last resort, Europe must be prepared to consider economic pressures. A list of carrots and sticks is suggested in Figure 2.

While these steps alone will not mollify the most severe critics of Iran, they would certainly be a significant step forward. Within the structure of this list, the components of a deal could be made. However, it must be stressed that this approach will come to naught if it is clearly demonstrated that the Iranian government has been behind recent terrorist incidents, especially the

Khobar Towers bombing of Americans in Saudi Arabia. If there is overwhelming proof of Iranian involvement at the official level, then the United States and its European allies will have to take very tough measures together, although unilateral American action may be necessary.

Conclusion

A more coordinated agreement between Europe and the United States -- indeed all the G-7 countries -- should stress to Iran the huge opportunity costs it is incurring by continuing unacceptable behavior on terrorism, peace, weapons of mass destruction and human rights. Such an initiative would have great clout with Japan and could not be ignored by either Russia or China. The alternative -- U.S.-European widening divergence and conflict over Iran and Gulf policy -- is a recipe for a disaster that will benefit no one except the extremists.

Figure 1
Benchmarks for Changes in Iranian Policy

	<u>Ideal</u>	<u>Possible</u>
<u>Peace Process</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recognition of Israel • Participate in Regional Multilaterals, esp. ACRS • End all support for Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Publicly accept Oslo process and accept Arafat and PLO as interlocutors for Palestinians • Accept principle that peace between Israel and Arabs beneficial for region, including Iran • End vitriolic rhetoric against Israel
<u>Terrorism</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • End all support for third party radicals (Sudan) • End terror and assassination programs against foreigners and Iranian opposition 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stop arms shipments to Hezbollah (to be coordinated with Syria) • Reduce funding for Hamas, Islamic Jihad • End all cooperation with dissidents in Arab Gulf
<u>WMD</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Abandon all nuclear power and research programs • Cancel CW/BW programs • Limit SSMS to 150 kms. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accept open-ended IAEA challenge inspections and enhanced IAEA monitoring • Ratify CWC • Cancel No-Dong missile agreement with N. Korea

**Human Rights
& International
Law**

- Abide by all international norms on human rights
- Apologize for taking U.S. hostages in 1979
- Cancel remaining nuclear reactor deals
- Abandon attempts to acquire enrichment or reprocessing capabilities
- Remove fatwa on Rushdie
- Permit Bahais more freedom
- Release nonviolent political prisoners

Figure 2
Incentives for Iran to Change Policies

STICKS

- EU diplomatic and cultural isolation of Iran.
- U.S. and EU priority effort to forge common G-7 position, including joint economic sanctions.
- U.S. to link North Korea negotiation to termination of Iran-N. Korea No-Dong program.
- Bring Rushdie case before UN and World Court.
- Intensify use of VOA and other media outlets to broadcast to Iran.
- Preparations for political, economic and military reprisals against Iran if Iranian regime proven to be directly implicated in terrorism against U.S. and European citizens.

CARROTS

- U.S. to amend ILSA.
- U.S. to lift many unilateral sanctions.
- U.S. to cease opposition to Iranian borrowing rights in concessionary financial markets.
- U.S. to permit U.S. companies to conclude energy agreements in Iran.
- U.S. to reduce rhetoric in describing bilateral relations.

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1° Inv. 13758	
23 SET. 1997	
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Security in the Persian Gulf: integration or rivalry?

Shahram Chubin, Director of Research, Geneva Centre for Security Policy.

Security and Organizing Regionally

Since the end of the Cold War and the coalition war against Iraqi aggression in Kuwait, many have believed that Middle Eastern politics have entered a new era. The Madrid peace process and resultant bilateral peace treaties, together with a perceptibly new atmosphere, have given rise to a fresh optimism about regional politics. Some believe that the trend is toward greater regional cooperation and that this is likely to influence Gulf politics. The positive influence of arms control and dialogue in the Arab-Israel sector, will, in this view, have beneficial results in the related but distinct politics of the Gulf.

From this perspective, the presence of United States forces in the region, is seen as temporary and necessary. Eventually, perhaps quite soon, the two major problem powers of the Gulf—Iran and Iraq—will change regimes or policies and "get into the spirit" prevailing in the new age. Much of this optimism is based on the proposition that wars, especially between states, do not pay and are therefore in a declining and terminal phase in international relations. This in turn is buttressed by the belief that the futile rivalry for power of the past, has been superseded by greater recognition among states of their common interests, which are not necessarily competitive and which can be mutually beneficial, and that this revelation lends itself, or will translate into, greater cooperation, bilaterally and regionally.

This paper briefly examines this contention as it relates to the politics of the Persian Gulf. What is the security situation, what are the threats in the Gulf? Which factors make for greater regional integration and which, for disintegration? What are the prospects for greater cooperation among local states leading to enhanced regional security? This implies a discussion of a "regional security" system and a clarification of our assumptions about such systems. Usually the ideal, long-term aim, which is used as a yardstick, is that states should organize their relations and interact peaceably, resolve their differences amicably, collectively and preferably institutionally.

The image of a "security community" is one where common interests overwhelm differences, making resort to force costly, counterproductive and eventually, unthinkable. Such a community would rely on procedures, practices and mechanisms for regulating disputes, preferably on a "regional" basis. It would normally include, indeed often be based on, an institution furthering economic cooperation or integration

(as in the line from the ECSC to the European Union). Whether or not such a "security community" is a unique product of a particular area, or is exportable, remains unclear. What is evident is that the European case has certain distinct features: 1) a long history of interaction among the independent states; 2) many wars in which the relative positions of the states was clarified by recourse to arms and 3) the states are all democracies. Is the Persian Gulf a candidate for such a system? If not, what is the prognosis?

The thesis of this paper can be put bluntly : for cooperation to take place on a region-wide basis, the principal states must have a sense of shared interest. At a minimum they must relate to one another and have a sense of their own position vis a vis the other regionally-important states. In this region there is little history of interaction among the littoral states themselves. Regional order has been the product of external intervention. Recent wars have not clarified the power positions of the key states or their place on the regional hierarchy. The major issue in Gulf politics has been—and remains—the inability of Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia to agree on the regional distribution of power, on their respective positions in the power hierarchy. Until this is settled, rivalry leading to occasional conflict is likely. At present, two of the three largest states are subject to embargoes, and are "contained". This leaves the third, Saudi Arabia, artificially, with a free hand. This in turn feeds the revanchism of the other two major states, giving them incentives to upset the current order. Finally, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was created in May 1981 around the common threat of Iran (and Iraq). This shared external threat was used as justification for creating a security framework that excluded (and was aimed at) two major regional powers, under the tutelage of the third. The smaller GCC states have chafed ever since at the loss of room to manoeuvre that has resulted. They do not all see the threats emanating exclusively from the north, nor do they accept that the GCC can be a permanent answer to regional security. The GCC remains essentially a local grouping dependent on an outside power's security guarantee, an informal alliance. This distinguishes it from a regional security arrangement, which at a minimum, needs to include the principal regional powers.

The three principal states in the Gulf, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, are, or have been until recently, bent on local imperialism against the regional order. In Ghassan Salameh's phrase these "mission" states, whether Wahhabi Saudi Arabia, Ba'thist Iraq or Khomeinist Iran, have used force and posed threats to their neighbours. The current tendency to focus on Iraqi or Iranian use or threat of force to the exclusion of that of Saudi Arabia, and to do so on moral grounds, is to reject historical experience and to defy the logic of regional politics.¹

Defeated in different ways, Iran and Iraq remain hostile to the current—imposed— order. They harbour motives of revenge, an impulse which is not necessarily specific only to the regimes, which it may well outlast. At the same time they remain in competition and are unlikely to be able to make common cause. Conflict between them, as well as their reconciliation, threatens Gulf security.

The GCC states need to deal with external threats but without aggravating their growing internal problems. This implies a policy of balancing, which needs a United States component, and a domestic policy that strengthens their domestic legitimacy. There exists a tension between their external security needs, which appear to require tighter integration into a stronger GCC under Saudi Arabia, and the requirements of domestic legitimacy and individual and dynastic independence, which argue for greater freedom and differentiation.²

The incentives to distance themselves from the Saudi embrace are clear and is seen by the general reluctance to integrate their militaries within the GCC. This is underscored by the tendency of some states to take positions different from Saudi Arabia on various issues; for example Oman takes a different position on relations with Iran, sanctions on Iraq, and the pace of ties with Israel. Similarly Qatar takes a different position on all three of these issues. Bahrain and the UAE also take a different position on Iraq.

Equally significant is the persistence of frontier disputes. An important prerequisite for a regional security arrangement and a common interest among all the Gulf states, would be collective agreement on the territorial status quo or at least agreement on the mechanisms through which disputes would be negotiated or settled. A pledge on non-intervention would be an important part of this. To note that this has not yet been agreed among the GCC states themselves, is to underscore how far this is from agreement among *all* the states of the Gulf.

A related consideration is the increased salience of domestic issues. Both Iraq and Iran are under domestic pressure and their policies and regimes might be affected by internal forces. A radical change in the domestic political status quo, such as the collapse of either regime or the Saudi monarchy is possible. Domestic change for the better toward more representative and accountable governments would dampen down rivalries and tendencies toward conflict but they are not on the horizon and are unlikely to come at the same time for all three states. At the very least the GCC states will be more constrained in foreign policy by domestic politics and their publics. Differences among the GCC states may increase with:

- 1) the surfacing of local concerns which crowd-out common interests;

2) the growth of state nationalisms which sees rulers differentiating themselves from each other and which increases the symbolic and importance of issues such as frontiers and resources and the tendency to resort to national myths with divisive consequences;³ and

3) the appearance of more voluble and less controllable National Assemblies.

Another set of issues raised by the transformation of domestic politics is the relationship between domestic reform and security policy. In the past Britain paramountcy in the region, for reasons to do with convenience as much as policy, tended to keep rulers in power, to reinforce their domestic control and authoritarian rule. Britain's heir, the United States, though not as comfortable with this arrangement, has found it equally convenient. As domestic pressures for power sharing and pluralism increase, the shaykhs will find themselves torn between their habits and new political requirements. Whether they will be able to undertake timely political reform and preserve control over foreign affairs, remains to be seen. At the very least though, the conduct of foreign relations will be subject to greater domestic political constraints.

Obstacles to Regional Integration

I have argued that the basis for regional cooperation does not yet exist in the Gulf because there is no agreement among the three principal powers on their respective roles or on their power relations one with another. The rivalry among these three states may be seen through various prisms, geopolitical, historical and ideological. *Geopolitical* rivalries are a function of differential resource endowments, population, size, location (access to sea, strategic depth) etc. etc. *Historical* rivalries encompass dynastic and territorial disputes, feuds and jealousies as well as such "historical" cleavages as those between Arab and Persian, Sunni and Shi'i, and Iraq and Iran. There are many feuds that stretch back in time among the GCC states of the Arabian peninsula, and between them and others, notably those between Saudi Arabia and Oman and Yemen, the most significant and oldest states of the peninsula.

The third category *ideological*, has been an exacerbating factor rather than prime cause and is less salient today in most cases. However it remains important in relations as a cover for other sources of rivalry and to the extent it impinges on the question of a state's source of legitimacy. On the one hand the animosity between monarchies and republics, and those based on East/West lines are less acute. On the other, the divide between secular and religious states has been sharpened as well as that within Islam, e.g. the rivalry between competing versions of Islam exemplified by the "ideological war" between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Although disputes are expressed in terms of territorial differences (e.g. the Shatt al Arab), or in ideological terms, "true Islam" versus "American

Islam", they are basically about power and regional primacy. The ideological cover Iran utilizes by its reference to its Islamic credentials, cloak its naked ambitions which remain, for many Arab states, indistinguishable from those of the Shah. These states see Iran as a potential military threat, a not-so-subtle intimidator, a promoter of subversion especially among the Shi'i populations which ring the entire Gulf (a majority in Iraq and Bahrain and significant minorities in Kuwait and the GCC) and a state prepared to play the spoiler in relation to the Middle East process in order to garner political benefits in Muslim world. Saudi Arabia feels more threatened by these dimensions of Iran's behaviour than its purely military threat.

The major Gulf states possess very different political systems and structures as well as societies, factors making cooperation difficult. At the very least Iraq's fragmented society with its clan system of loyalties encourages its minority Sunni ruler(s) to try to enhance their legitimacy by playing a diverting and compensating role in the domain of pan-Arab politics. Saudi Arabia derives its identity from tribe and its legitimacy from its Islamic role. Like most of the other Arab states of the GCC, the Kingdom is quintessentially a *rentier* state, whose powers of extraction (taxation, conscription) vis a vis its populace remain untested. Many of these states are literally dependent on foreign nationals (eg. the UAE) while many still equate regime and dynastic with "national" security. In addition some of the GCC states may be said to face the equivalent of existential threats. Iran, by contrast, needs neither tribe nor Islam as a framework for its identity. Its legitimacy as a nation state is more established, its Islamic aspect is basically discretionary, that is, up to the regime to emphasize or not, as it wills. As a "mobilisation regime", revolutionary Iran has a proven (if waning) state capacity to use its extractive powers. Furthermore Iran faces no existential threats. It therefore has the luxury of defining security in terms of self-reliance, independence or non-dependence, thus depicting the dependency of the GCC states' reliance on foreign powers as an affront to their independence and an abridgement of their sovereignty.

Conflict Scenarios

What types of conflicts are possible and likely in the Persian Gulf, given that there is no dominant conflict and that there are many axes of potential conflict? Since rivalries are overlapping and do not displace one another, there is little incentive for most states to tie themselves down to one set of allies. Four sets of conflict suggest themselves

- 1) Iran vs the Arabs (not unlike the Iran-Iraq war in its last phase);
- 2) Arab vs Arab (Iraq's aggression against Kuwait; Saudi Arabia vs Yemen etc.);
- 3) Arab vs Israel (Iraq against Israel in 1990/91); and

4) Iran vs Israel.

Of the four categories of conflict, only one—the last—has not (yet?) occurred. Not all disputes are of strategic interest. Most intra-GCC disputes need not lead to "system affecting" consequences. What are the most probable key sources of conflict in the future? For the GCC and the United States, the canonical scenario is an attack by Iran and /or Iraq against the GCC. It is against this that the US ' forward presence has been deployed and the Fifth fleet created. However just as plausible are other conflicts, especially a re-run of the Iran-Iraq war perhaps touched off by political shifts in one or both states. Other future sources of instability leading to conflict include the prospect of competitive interventions in a disintegrating Iraq or post monarchical Saudi Arabia. United States' policy is geared for none but the first of these four contingencies.

The likelihood of an Iranian or Iraqi attack against the GCC is largely affected by these states' capabilities and opportunities, as well as motives. For Iraq an attack against Kuwait or Saudi Arabia might be motivated by the thirst for revenge, by the quest for acquisition of territory, (border rectification or the seizure of new land) or by an impulse to exploit and influence any local instability that might arise. Similarly Iran may be moved to exploit local instability in the GCC. However in Iran's case the acquisition of territory on the Arab shore of the Gulf would be politically unrealistic and militarily difficult (see below). Unlike Iraq, there is in fact no evidence that Iran harbours any such aim. To be sure, both states are "deterred " by the United States' physical presence and backup. But to be deterred from something implies that in the absence of the deterrent, behaviour would be different. In the case of Iraq this might be true ; in Iran's case, it is not so evident.

If Iran and Iraq's motives or aims are different, so too are the constraints operating on them. Both states' military capabilities are limited by embargoes, sanctions, and the lack of funds and suppliers. However in a scenario against the GCC, geography does not constrain Iraq as much as Iran. Under normal circumstances for Iraq an incursion into Kuwait or further south is not militarily demanding. For Iran, any military engagement of the GCC requires either a route overland through southern Iraq with long supply lines, which would need protection, a logistical capacity not yet demonstrated by Iran, as well as air cover and air defence. At present none of these capabilities are in Iran's grasp. There remains also the little matter of Iraq; if Iran were to try and engage the GCC states by land, it would first have to settle matters with Iraq unless it acted in tandem with Baghdad, an unlikely eventuality. Similarly, if Iran were to intervene militarily against the GCC or to engage it at sea, it would need a more extensive amphibious lift capability to project power onto the southern shore. Here

again Iran's deficiencies in air power and airdefence limit its offensive capabilities against the GCC, whether in keeping any land seized, or as a backup for naval engagements.

The Role of Arms Control: Prospects

Arms control in the Persian Gulf where there are no blocs or camps neatly divided into two, promises to be difficult. However there are general lessons to be learned from arms control in the East/West context. Arms races reflect insecurities and exacerbate them. Arms control cannot precede let alone substitute for political relations. However arms control can bolster political rapprochement, especially when embedded in a political process. Dialogue and contact are essential ingredients of progress in political relations. Institutionalized contacts are essential to build on relations, deepen them, make them cumulative and to insulate them from setbacks in other areas of the relationship. Of course these observations apply to consensual rather than coercive arms control. The types of controls on Iraq surely cannot be applied in perpetuity or generalised and applied to other states.

How do these propositions apply to the Persian Gulf ? First, there is little interest among the GCC or in the United States in limiting arms to its allies. "Dual containment" is intended to weaken Iran and Iraq, while arms transfers by the United States build up the other Gulf states. These transfers also have an economic role in recycling petrodollars, and a diplomatic function, acting as the equivalent of a treaty commitment. Rather than building down among all the states, the aim is to build up the GCC, while "taking down" the capabilities of Iran and Iraq. [This reflects the broader problem; the inability of the major states of the Gulf to agree on their respective power positions and their competition for leadership and dominance.]

This is likely to be translated into differences on arms control. While Iran and Iraq were at war, Saudi Arabia's military expenditure was greater than both of these states combined; later, between 1989-1992 Saudi Arabia's military expenditures were two and a half times the combined expenditures of Iran and Iraq. As a result of two wars, subsequent embargoes and Saudi Arabia's relentless arms build up, the *relative* positions of the three state have shifted drastically. Thus, to take one dyad, in 1979 Iran had 460 aircraft to Saudi Arabia's 170 and over a thousand tanks to the Kingdom's two hundred and fifty. By 1994 Saudi Arabia had the same number of aircraft (270) and tanks (700) as Iran, and these were arguably more advanced as well.⁴ This would make agreement on a baseline on which arms control could be calculated very difficult. Iran would naturally prefer 1979 as the baseline; Iraq, 1988 and Saudi Arabia 1995.

What role could arms control play in regional security in the absence of an agreement by the three major states on their relative power positions? "Structural" arms control, which may take place in the Arab-Israel zone, involving military posture and doctrine as well as force structure, is a long way off. Asymmetries, which also exist in the Gulf zone, cannot be tackled comprehensively in the short term. However, there may be room for arms control intended to improve crisis stability. Bilateral agreements may be possible if part of a wider process of confidence building. Agreements reducing the threat of accidental war may be achievable. The most dangerous scenarios are those on the land borders between Iran and Iraq and Iraq and Kuwait. There may be measures that can be undertaken bilaterally or unilaterally. These could guard against the threat of surprise attack and increase stability. They could encompass measures that demilitarize the border regions, include deployment constraints or thinned-out zones, prior notification of manoeuvres and other measures to increase warning-time against the concentration of forces prior to an attack. These could include technology for monitoring, early warning stations, the exchange of information and joint satellite and reconnaissance facilities. As a prelude to broader arms control, bilateral undertakings could be rewarding, especially if it includes political dialogue as it does in the case of Iran-Iraq but does *not* between Iraq and Kuwait.

The other scenario —of amphibious attack across the Gulf by Iran— is more demanding militarily. Granted the political context and motive for such an attack is not self-explanatory, the perception by the United States and some of the GCC states that in a crisis, or given the opportunity, Iran will seek to exploit local difficulties, is hard to fault. Nevertheless, the military capabilities required for a sustained attack and seizure of land, for the projection of power at some distance from Iran's coast, is beyond Iran's current and prospective capabilities. At the very least, it will require better sea-lift and improved air defence and air cover. The pattern and scale of Iran's frequent military exercises in the Gulf are ambiguous regarding ultimate intentions. But there is as yet no sign of any priority attached to increasing its ability to project power (armour and manpower in sufficient quantities) to execute a coup de main on the southern shore of the Gulf. Arms control has a limited role to play here.

A third area of importance is in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. All three principal Gulf states have long-range missiles. Iraq and Iran are believed to be developing the full spectrum of WMD. Neither can be sure that the other will not seek to exploit the others' lack of preparedness; both seek to be in a position to be able to deter attacks on them by the United States. There is no sign that either regime considers these as the weapons of choice; both now appear to see these as

deterrents, and to some extent as compensation for lack of access to a regular supply of conventional weapons. The trade-offs between missiles and aircraft; the links between chemical and nuclear weapons and between quantity and quality, remain to be established. Imposed arms control on the model of Iraq today, is neither generalizable nor sustainable. Consensual arms control requires a sense of shared interest. It can build on global regimes but will need regional components. A focus on the Gulf sub-region in the Middle East should emphasize regional and joint verification. As the Korean de-nuclearisation agreement demonstrates, even bitter enemy-neighbours can envisage extensive and intrusive verification provisions in arms control agreements. These may be implemented only slowly and guardedly, if at all. But they have the merit of drawing the parties most concerned together in a common enterprise in which they have a shared stake.

Systems of Security

a/ The balance of power

Since Britain's departure from the Gulf in 1971, devising a means for achieving and maintaining security has proven elusive. The balance of power among the individual units that prevailed 1971-1979 proved relatively effective. Although there was some jockeying for advantage, none of the principal states was able to secure a pre-eminent role, and the rough balance was conducive to the security of the smaller states. The balance was upset by Iran's revolution which challenged the entire system. The resultant war, in effect, saw the emergence of a new system: an Iran/Arab cleavage in which revolutionary (Islamic) Iran was seen as the common threat, and Iraq as the "eastern gate" for the defence of the Arab world. Even so, it required foreign intervention and assistance to end the war. In the meantime Saudi Arabia's establishment of the GCC, effectively oriented against both Iran and Iraq, had created a new actor.

The new possibility opened up by the GCC was of a three-cornered balance with Iran, Iraq and the GCC balancing each other. Such a system can work only if the GCC functions effectively, and if the politics of the region remain non-ideological and fluid. To that extent it is likely to be the *product* of a mature, moderate system of interaction rather than the *cause* or agency for the creation of such a system.

A third variant of the balance of power was suggested by the Damascus Declaration of April 1991. This envisaged a 6+2 arrangement in which the GCC could call in two regional powers, Egypt and Syria to buttress and compensate for the inadequacies in the local balance in the Gulf. Apart from the objections of Iran and Iraq and Saudi skepticism, there are problems about the credibility of such a system, not least militarily.

b/Collective Security.

In many ways this is the ideal or model system. It is seen as the logical product of an evolution from the cruder balance of power system (which, recall, is intended to preserve stability not the independence of all states) to the more refined system which seeks to ensure the security of all.

Collective security can in theory take two forms, a highly structured institutional one or a more loose arrangement of individual units/ states. In either case it presupposes joint responses to aggression from whatever quarter, based on a shared stake in the established order. In the looser variant, the incentives for reacting to any aggression stem from balance of power considerations that are held in common. In the more structured model, the elaboration of norms and a code of conduct will have been developed and given institutional form and this will more closely resemble the security community discussed at the outset. In this case, agreement on security will have been complemented by the growth of functional cooperation among the parties giving concrete evidence of common interests and ability to cooperate. Both variants depend upon agreement of the major, indeed all, players on the regional order.

However desirable, neither model is in sight in the Gulf today.

c/ An external balancer

This is the current and historical model. British paramountcy in the Gulf favoured the coastal states. It preserved a regional order favourable to Britain's interests but effectively froze the possibility of political change. More important, in exercising a "protecting" role Britain's presence prevented any diplomatic interaction among the Gulf states until recent decades.

In seeking to maintain the current regional order, the United States has acquired the role of regional balancer. This role is not its preferred one. However, it reflects the conclusion that no self regulating balance of power is achievable in the foreseeable future. It is geared to an attack by a hostile state against the GCC. It seeks to build up GCC military power, hold down that of Iran and Iraq, and by its presence (forward defence) act as a deterrent to local aggression. It thus serves as source of reassurance to the GCC. It presupposes an ability to maintain its presence as long as is required, presumably until the regimes or policies of Iran and Iraq change for the better. It is predicated on timely military intervention when necessary. It hopes for, but does not rely on, allied diplomatic support.

On the face of it, the policy is a prudent one, short-term. The end of the Cold

War reduced the regional states' leverage, without eliminating the regional dynamics of local conflicts. The US' emergence as the dominant global power was to some extent acknowledged by the increased willingness of the GCC states (in varying degrees) to be associated publicly with Washington. In focusing on the threat from Iraq and Iran, the US (in its view) is targetting regional nuisances but states that constitute prototypical new global threats, ideologically motivated, proliferators, supportive of terrorism and hostile to peace. Nevertheless, US policy suffers from several defects:

- > In erecting a system dependent on its active involvement, the US may be over-estimating its staying power. How long will it remain in the region supporting UNSCOM. How many times (and at whose cost) can the US repeat its interventions and punishment of Iraq? How united are the US' European allies likely to remain over time?⁵

- > The policy is geared to one of several likely scenarios. It makes little provision for others, for example change in Iraq after Saddam, possibly as a result of US pressure.

- > In containing Iran and Iraq and excluding them from normal interactions with their neighbours, the US is further distorting relations in the Gulf. It widens the breach with the Gulf states and makes the eventual establishment of normal relations more difficult.

- > The United States' dispute with Iran and Iraq goes beyond their Gulf roles. With Iran for example, the issue is more emotional and encompasses recent history as well as a perception that this state/regime is a global menace. Whether left to themselves the GCC states would go this far, seems doubtful. By associating the GCC with its global priorities, strategic agenda and rivalries, there is a risk that the US' connection will unnecessarily aggravate the relations between the GCC and their Gulf neighbours. In so doing it increases the danger to these smaller states, for Iran and Iraq in their resentment at US policy, may find it easier to strike out (in frustration?) at their US dependent neighbours.

- > US policy from the point of view of short term Gulf politics needs to focus on the threat posed by Iran and Iraq. However, from a non-proliferation standpoint it needs a different focus. It should consider whether the threat of the use of nuclear weapons is more probable in a contingency in which Iran or Iraq is involved with the GCC or whether use is more probable in another Iran -Iraq war. Such a war could be fueled by suspicions of the other's search for "unilateral advantage" in a WMD arms race. Such a scenario would argue for preventive diplomacy that engages the two parties, encourages their dialogue, brokers arms control measures between them and seeks to reduce their motives for acquiring such weapons, in brief addresses their sense of insecurity. Current policy does none of these things.

Conclusion

Despite two recent wars, future conflicts look likely. Both the Iran-Iraq and the Iraq-Kuwait wars ended in a murky fashion, with less-than-decisive results. Neither war ended in a clearcut manner; in each case outside coalitions and third parties became involved, postponing a regional reckoning. The wars have produced no definitive lessons either. For Iraq, the lesson could be to act more quickly next time as much to avoid antagonising outside powers. For Iran, the lesson might be to emphasize military preparedness and thus avoid strategic surprise. Neither Iraq nor Iran accept the current regional order erected by the United States to favour its interests and strengthen its allies at their expense. Both harbour feelings of resentment and possibly also revenge.

Recent wars have not established agreement on the distribution of power or clarified the power hierarchy or relative position of the three major Gulf states. The lack of clarity or established position encourages "testing." The future of Gulf politics will in all probability therefore be one of continued testing of the power balance with resultant crises as opposed to full scale hostilities.

Geopolitical differences among the three Gulf powers make cooperation difficult at best. These are exacerbated, however, by ideological differences (Islamic versus secular and intra-Islam). At the same time the lingering demands of solidarity around the tattered banner "Arab Nationalism" amplifies bilateral disputes (such as that between Iran and the UAE over an inconsequential island) investing it with a symbolism and broadening the dispute into an Arab/Iranian issue, and thus complicating its resolution.

The Gulf states are new to the practice of diplomacy with its emphasis on equality, give-and-take, its ever-changing coalitions, and the need for negotiations and flexibility. The Gulf states have yet to establish a forum for interaction which would include all littoral states. Excessive caution—or Saudi jealousy about maintaining leadership over its smaller neighbours—has inhibited the creation of an institution in which all the states of the Gulf can interact and at least establish a political dialogue.

The GCC needs a common foe to keep it united and Saudi Arabia needs to emphasize an external threat to maintain its leadership over its restive partners in the GCC. In fact, all of the regimes of the Gulf benefit in terms of their domestic political control from the existence of regional insecurities and uncertainties.

Reliance on an external power for the provision of security can at best be only a short-term measure. It does not come cheaply in terms of identification with the guardian's goals. The risks of excessive identification in terms domestic political repercussions may be increasing. And the protection offered may not cover the most likely contingencies.

The prospect in the future is for more crises but not necessarily wars. The three major powers do not agree on the territorial status quo or a regional balance of power. They have competing conceptions of regional order. A regional code of conduct presupposes agreement on the respective positions of the major states, an interest in the status quo.

US support for Saudi Arabia is artificially maintaining an order distorted by two wars, which is not sustainable. Does the futility of war make war less likely? Yes, if it is convincing. Does it make the status quo acceptable? It can, if the alternatives are much worse. This is what has occurred over time in the Arab-Israel conflict. This is not yet the case in the Persian Gulf which therefore remains in a pre-arms control phase.

¹ Saudi Arabia's use of force and pressure to pursue its interests is often neglected in the West. A few examples would include, its dispute with Oman over the Buraimi oasis; persistent interventions in the Yemen; heavy handed pressure on Kuwait and Bahrain to muzzle their National Assemblies in the 1970's and 1980's; the acquisition of long range missiles in 1986/7; the funding of the Iraqi nuclear programme after 1981; and a remarkable inability to settle border disputes with states like Qatar.

² See Ghassan Salame "Assessing Alternative Future Arrangements for Regional Security" Chapter 3 in Geoffrey Kemp and Janice Stein (eds) Powderkeg in the Middle East: The Struggle for Gulf Security (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995), 65-86. I have drawn freely from Salame in this paper and hereby acknowledge my debt.

³ See Charles Tripp and Shahram Chubin "Domestic Politics and Territorial Disputes in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula" *Survival* Winter 1993/94 (Vol. 35, No. 4) 3-27.

⁴ Derived from figures in The Military Balance, (London: IISS) annual 1981-1995.

⁵ French (Russian and Chinese) support for continued sanctions on Iraq have proven shaky throughout 1995. Germany too is reluctant to continue underwriting the UN commission monitoring Iraq's arms programmes, UNCSCOM.

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Recent Progress in Containing Iran

Some critics of the U.S. policy towards Iran assert that sanctions have failed to achieve their objective. This is erroneous. In fact, even before the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) was passed by the Congress and signed by the President in August 1996, many foreign companies backed away from Iranian projects. After almost two years of failed efforts, not one of the 11 projects offered by Iran at the November 1995 conference in Tehran has been bid upon by a foreign company. In Iran's first official admission of the effectiveness of ILSA, a senior member of the Iranian parliament's oil commission in January 1997 conceded that "[d]espite widespread arrangements by the [oil] ministry, foreign contractors are not much interested in engaging in petroleum projects in Iran."¹ Here are some examples of the many prospective investments that have been cancelled:

◆ No Additional Total Projects: In July, 1995, France's Total picked up the contract to develop oil and gas production in Iran's offshore Sirri A and E projects, and announced that "There will be other projects in the future.... It is not a case of doing Sirri and ending there."² But in late February 1996, Total representatives (joined by ELF-Aquitaine) Alain LeChevalier, VP for Mideast, and C. DeMargerie, Executive VP and member of the management committee, told the State Department that they "don't have any interest in a confrontation [with the U.S.]. They don't intend to go further."³

◆ Impeding Total's Sirri Deal: Progress is also being made in efforts to impede Total's Sirri deal. Industry experts, Conoco, and the CIA believe that the deal will not be economically viable and Total will not be able to get the syndication partners it needs if the gas output is not contracted to Dubai. U.S. Ambassador to the UAE David Litt met with Dubai and UAE officials at least six times to urge that Dubai not buy Total's gas for reinjection into the Dubai Petroleum Company's (DPC) oilfields. In October 1996 the UAE announced that it would sell gas from an offshore field to Dubai; interestingly, that field, Abu al-Bukhush, is partially operated by Total.⁴ Moreover, Conoco, which operates DPC's offshore oil production, clearly understands that, under the terms of President Clinton's Executive Order, it cannot take the gas from Total's Sirri project and does not believe the Government of Dubai would force it to do so.⁵

¹ "Iran MP says US embargo slows foreign investment," Reuters, January 28, 1997.

² Statement of Total President Thierry Desmarest, Reuters, July 27, 1995.

³ "Threat of Sanctions on Oil Companies Seems to Deter Deals," Wall Street Journal, March 8, 1996, quoting State Department official.

⁴ Iran Times, October 18, 1996.

⁵ Conversation with Conoco officials.

♦ **Blocking BHP's Iran-Pakistan Pipeline:** The President of Australia's Senate took officials of Australian giant Broken Hill Properties (BHP) to meet with Rafsanjani in Teheran in January 1996, and said he was able to "break the logjam on decisions by the Iranian government" to achieve "Australia's biggest project in Iran," a multibillion dollar pipeline deal from Iran to Pakistan.⁶ BHP had been negotiating the project since 1993.⁷ Following warnings from Senator D'Amato that he would make his legislation retroactive if necessary to impose sanctions against the deal, BHP announced in February 1996 that it would not go ahead with the project.⁸

♦ **Blocking JGC's Iran Gas Projects:** Japan's JGC, one of the largest construction contracting firms in the world, said in February 1996 that "we are very much positive" on three onshore gas projects in Iran, at a time when other Japanese energy and contracting firms said they were reluctant to pursue any of 10 projects announced by NIOC because of concerns over the US legislation.⁹ Senator D'Amato sent a demarche to JGC on Feb 28. JGC's Chairman responded on March 5 that "it does not appear...that the participation of JGC in new projects in Iran will be possible because of lack of finance presently available from Japan and other sources and because of the current economic and political situation surrounding Iran."¹⁰

♦ **Dissuading Shell from Investing in Iran:** Shell has been the leading company expected to pick up the largest of the oil and gas production projects being offered by NIOC, the South Pars gasfield. A Shell official recently told an Arab trade publication that no oil company can neglect the American position towards Iran whether it has important interests in the US or not. The Arab Oil and Gas journal reported that, "unlike other European companies, such as Total and ELF-Aquitaine, Shell has no intentions of defying the American Congress and government and will not sign an agreement as long as tensions between the US and Iran remain high."¹¹ Renewed speculation about Shell and South Pars in January 1997 was squelched when Shell's president ruled out any major exploration project in Iran as long as

⁶ "Australia's BHP Set to Sign Billion Dollar Iranian Pipeline Deal," AIP Review, February 14, 1996.

⁷ "Fuel Injection: Australia's BHP is Proposing a Pipeline...", Far Eastern Economic Review, August 19, 1993.

⁸ "Australian Oil Firm Abandons Iran Deal," Journal of Commerce, February 22, 1996.

⁹ "Iranian Gas Projects Attract Japanese Interest," Reuters, February 28, 1996.

¹⁰ Reuters, March 5, 1996.

¹¹ "Shell Does not Intend to Risk US Sanctions, Arab Oil and Gas, March 1, 1996, based on an interview with Mark Moody-Stuart, a managing director of Royal Dutch/Shell.

the US is committed to economically isolating Iran. He stated: "The US takes it very seriously and makes it very difficult for international groups like ours with a big presence in the US to do anything [in Iran]."¹²

♦ **Dissuading ELF from Investing in Iran:** Frederic Isoard, executive VP of ELF-Aquitaine, said in June 1996: "ELF could face a problem if the bill were to be implemented, because its activities in the US chemical sector are very substantial. Before embarking on an investment operation in Iran, we must be careful and protect our US chemical activities, which are linked to the company's chemical activities outside the United States. Consequently, we must think carefully about embarking on any activities in Iran. If we are to embark on such activities, it must be a highly profitable operation."¹³ This theme was repeated by an ELF spokesman on August 6: "We have been talking with the Iranians about developing an offshore field. We have not yet made a decision. We will have to take our North American interests into consideration as well as the American considerations."¹⁴ In response to reports that ELF would soon sign a deal to develop Iran's Dorud project, a respected industry analyst reported in November 1996 that the company would not develop any Iranian projects because of their extensive interests in the U.S.

♦ **Blocking German Bank Financing of Iranian Project:** In early 1997, according to reports in the oil press, Germany's Westdeutsche Landesbank and an Iranian company headed by President Rafsanjani's son devised a method to circumvent the ILSA investment sanctions, so the Iranian company could proceed with the Soroush oilfield project for which no foreign investor could be found. The German bank planned to lend \$160 million to the Iranian firm to finance the project, and the bank would be repaid from receivables from Iran's overall crude oil exports paid into an escrow account, rather than from the cash flow of the specific project itself.¹⁵ Soon after the Mykonos verdict was announced, an authoritative oil industry journal reported that a number of Westdeutsche Landesbank's co-lenders pulled out, and that the Iranian company abandoned the search for external financing.¹⁶

¹² Platt's Oilgram News, January 17, 1997.

¹³ "France: ELF will 'Think Carefully' on D'Amato Bill," al-Hayat (London) June 26, 1996, p. 13, FBIS June 27, 1996.

¹⁴ "French Firms Shrug Off U.S. Sanctions Threat," Reuters, August 6, 1996.

¹⁵ Middle East Economic Survey, 2/24/97, p. 3. Westdeutsche Landesbank has agreed to lend \$90 million, and is considering an additional package worth \$70 million, to an Iranian company, the Offshore Engineering and Construction Company (OIEC). This company is 51% owned by the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and headed by the son of Iranian president Rafsanjani for the development of the Soroush oil field in the Persian Gulf. This bank is already involved in the financing of the OIEC's \$180 million reconstruction of the Abuzar offshore platform, destroyed by the U.S. Navy during the Iran-Iraq War.

¹⁶ Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 4/17/97.

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May 8, 1997

Iran's Contempt for Europe

Rafsanjani: "The Europeans...quickly put their hands in the air. This is a sign of Iran's real strength.... Was it not so in the Salman Rushdie affair [in 1989] that all of them recalled their ambassadors and later disgracefully sent them back with apologies?"

Iranian President Rafsanjani stated after the Mykonos verdict on April 11: "The [U.S. and Israel] needed a propaganda wave. We should expect them to keep up the noise in the West. But this will bring them nothing. It is like a thunderstorm that brings clear weather in its wake.... This [verdict] is a historic disgrace for the German judiciary and claims that Germany's legal system is independent is now totally in question. Not only were they [the court] not independent from their own government, they were even dependent on foreigners. We have no doubt that American and Israeli agents had a finger in this."¹

Rafsanjani derided the EU's April 10 recall of its ambassadors as "airs put on by a 60-year old bride." Rafsanjani said: "Was it not so in the Salman Rushdie affair [in 1989] that all of them recalled their ambassadors and later disgracefully sent them back with apologies?"²

Iran's official news agency responded April 29 to the EU decision to return its ambassadors to Iran: "In defiance of U.S. pressure, the EU ministers said that they wanted to have a constructive relationship with Iran, but in an attempt to save face, agreed to suspend ministerial meetings.... [EU] ministers voted not to jeopardize trade links with Iran by deciding to return their ambassadors to Tehran.... [This move is] a political gesture that the EU did not want to further damage ties." The news agency added that the EU nations have "a burgeoning trade gap with Iran."³

Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said on April 22: "In the [Mykonos] affair there was a lot of effort to...isolate Iran and the Iranian nation, and to make Europe and Asia confront Iran. But the agents of arrogance [The United States] and the Zionists -- of which the German government has become a toy -- did not succeed in their plot."⁴

¹ "Iran president blast German court verdict," Reuters, 4/11/97.

² Reuters, 4/11/97.

³ "EU shows it seeks to save Tehran ties - Iran agency," Reuters, 4/29/97.

⁴ "Iran calls ambassadors home from Europe," AP, 4/22/97.

Foreign Minister Velayati told the Tehran Times April 30 that the if the German and Danish ambassadors did not return to Tehran as a result of the EU's decision to return their ambassadors, "Iran will not be upset if the German ambassador never returns to Tehran and we may even be...pleased."⁵

Interior Minister Ali Besharati stated April 22 that the Mykonos verdict was "mere political propaganda orchestrated by Zionist brokers and fugitive terrorists from Iran."⁶

Khamenei stated May 1 that the EU's behavior after the Mykonos verdict was "unfair, ill-intentioned and shameless" and that Europe had no right to pass judgment on Iran. "Over the past 100 years," Khamenei continued, "the Europeans were responsible for two world wars that were full of destruction. And these same gentlemen who passed judgment against us, their countries were the colonizers of tens of other countries."⁷

Khamenei stated April 16: "The German government has become the victim of a U.S.-Zionist plot but this does not mitigate its fault.... They will have to pay for this error and, in my opinion, the German government has paid and will continue to pay a high price.... The Germans have lost something in this transaction which is not easily won: the trust of the Iranian people."⁸

Khamenei responded May 2 to the EU's decision to halt the critical dialogue: "We don't give a damn about your ending the critical dialogue.... We never sought such a dialogue and we have more criticism against you than you do against us."⁹

Rafsanjani said April 30: "Critical dialogue, the suspension of which is being hailed in Europe as an achievement, has long been suspended before this at the instigation of Iran."¹⁰ He portrayed the EU's April 28 decision to return their ambassadors to

⁵ Tehran Times, 5/1/97; Reuter, 4/30/97.

⁶ "Iran says Germany loser in row with Tehran, Reuters, 4/22/97.

⁷ Middle East Mirror, 5/1/97.

⁸ "Iran leader says Germany must pay for mistake," Reuters, 4/16/97.

⁹ International Herald Tribune, 5/2/97.

¹⁰ "Iran says Bonn envoy not welcome, others returning," Reuters, 4/30/97; AFP, 4/30/97.

Tehran as a European defeat, "The Europeans have engaged in propaganda intrigues and stubborn and childish games, but they have become ashamed of themselves and quickly put their hands in the air. This is a sign of Iran's real strength."¹¹

The Tehran Times, the Tehran English-language daily which is close to Rafsanjani's faction, stated April 29: "If the critical dialogue is going to be a one-sided avenue for the EU to impose its ideas on Iran, we are not interested in the critical dialogue any longer.... In today's world, which is based on competition, it is not difficult for Iran to replace its trade partners when its values are at stake."¹²

The radical Tehran daily Jomhuri Islami stated April 29: "We have to act more wisely towards Europe and act towards cutting Europe's share and role in the fields of economic and industrial ties and create the situation in which Europe could not even get the idea of striking blows against us."¹³

Iran's official radio announced April 13: "Europe is not Iran's only choice. Therefore the suspension or even severance of ties with Iran by European states will fail to isolate Iran politically.... Even the European states joining the U.S. embargo will fail to affect Iran. And finally, Iran's geopolitical, economic and security status in the region necessitates cooperation of the European states with Iran."¹⁴

Intelligence Minister Ali Fallahian stated in April that the Germans, "in a political deal designed by the Zionists, were seeking information from us on Ron Arad. But we didn't have any information. So the German officials said in response that they would retaliate through the Mykonos trial. This proves that the whole proceeding was a move to gain concessions from Iran."¹⁵

¹¹ Middle East Mirror, 5/1/97.

¹² Tehran Times, 4/29/97.

¹³ "Iran says EU move will have no effect," Reuters, 4/29/97.

¹⁴ Tehran Radio, quoted in the USIA "Foreign Media Reaction Daily Digest, 4/16/97.

¹⁵ Iran Times, 4/25/97.

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BIBLIOTECA

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May 8, 1997

Foreign Leaders Accuse Iran

Terror Against Arafat:

Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen), Arafat's designated successor, said in February, 1997 that Palestinian police had foiled an assassination attempt upon Yasir Arafat and that Iranian involvement is indicated, an Arabic daily reported.¹

Abu Mazen said on August 22, 1996, "The Palestinian Authority has recently received information and reports that Iran is planning with extremist Palestinian organizations to carry out military operations and assassination attempts on the Palestinian Authority and its leaders with the aim of deposing it."²

Terror Against Mubarak:

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak said on September 18, 1996 that Iran helped the gunmen who tried to kill him in Addis Ababa last year because Egypt stood in the way of Iran occupying Arab land and dominating the Gulf states. One of his senior advisers, Osama el-Baz said that both Sudan and Iran took part in the plot to assassinate Mubarak on arrival in the Ethiopian capital in June 1995. Mubarak said: "There is information, the source for which is the confessions of the terrorists who were arrested,...that Iran was involved and that it helped Sudan organize this operation.... What's been published about the investigations conducted by the Ethiopians...[also] dealt with Iran's involvement in this."³

Terror Against Egypt:

In February, on the floor of the Egyptian parliament, Interior Minister Alfi accused Iran of supporting the Muslim radicals trying to overthrow Egypt's government. "Iran is carrying out a conspiracy against Egypt," he stated. Alfi also noted that an Iranian embassy in Europe helped the extremist group responsible for the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981.⁴

The Interior Ministry announced on October 22, 1996 that it had arrested 55 members of a Cairo-based Shiite organization for planning "to target the country's system of government,...promote Iranian objectives,...and implement the Iranian model [of Islamic revolution]." Those arrested reportedly had visited Iran and had received financial backing from "external sources."⁵

Osama al-Baz accused Iran of using the Sudan as "a Trojan Horse through which it is trying to infiltrate neighboring countries.... For example, [Sudan's] embassies in west African countries...are a front behind which Iranian intelligence aims to promote Iranian and Shiite influence."⁶

Iran Threatens Gulf Neighbors:

The commander of Iran's Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran), Major-General Mohsen Rezai, stated after Iran's May, 1997 military exercise in the lower Persian Gulf that "we can keep the Strait of Hormuz open...but if we want to, we shall close this strait to anyone who is an obstacle to security in the region

¹ Reuters, 2/24/97; al-Hayat, 2/25/97.

² "Palestinian says Iran plotting to overthrow Arafat," Reuter, August 22, 1996.

³ "Mubarak Says Iran Wanted Him Dead to Dominate Gulf," Reuter, Sept 18, 1996.

⁴ Al-Akhbar, 2/16/97.

⁵ "Egypt Claims to Have Foiled 'Iranian Plot,'" Mideast Mirror, October 22, 1996.

⁶ Radio france International, quoted by Reuters, 1/31/97.

and keep it open for our friends and the Moslems."⁷

Iran's Supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei said on February 10, 1997: "If this region should become insecure, the very same countries that have prepared the conditions for that insecurity will bear the brunt for their action.... Should any of these foreign powers indulge in a lunatic act in the Persian Gulf and put the region into chaos because of an irrational act, the first state that will burn in the fire will be the very same state which has created the conditions for the presence of that foreign power in the Gulf."⁸

Foreign Ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States, plus Egypt and Syria, issued a statement on December 29, 1996, expressing their "deep concern at Iran's deployment of surface-to-surface missiles in the Arabian Gulf, including its deployment of missiles on UAE's three occupied islands, which exposes the GCC states and their vital installations to direct threat."⁹

Khamenei told the Revolutionary Guards on December 15, 1996: "The American Administration...has decided to strike.... Any aggression or attempts to make Islamic Iran insecure will make the Persian Gulf more insecure for the enemies of the Iranian nation, particularly those living in glass houses.... It should know that the region can have tranquility only when Iran has tranquility."¹⁰

Terror Against Peres:

On March 17, 1996, Arafat accused Iran of being behind the wave of suicide bombings in Israel that undermined the Shimon Peres' government and destabilized the Middle East peace process. "Who ordered the latest attacks? Iran. Iran ordered them."¹¹

Peres himself said, "I have 100 percent evidence...[that Iran is] pressing upon Islamic Jihad and other subversive organizations to act against Israel before the elections¹²...with the intention of toppling the (Israeli) government."¹³ "We have caught some people who came under the strict orders of Iran to cause...killings.... And we know for sure from our information that Iran is pressing very hard upon the Hizbollah...the Jihad and...the Hamas to try and destroy the electoral process by bombing and killing and sending Katyushas (rockets)."¹⁴ Peres appealed to the Europeans at the "Summit of the Peacemakers" in Sharm al-Sheikh on March 13, 1996: "This terrorism is not anonymous. It has a bank account, it has an infrastructure, it has a network camouflaged as charity organizations. It is spearheaded by a country -- Iran.... Tehran has become the capital of terror."¹⁵

⁷ "Iran wargames were warning to Arabs-analysts," Reuters, 5/4/97.

⁸ "Khomeini's Diatribe Deemed a 'Threat' Rather than a 'Warning' to Gulf Arab States," Mideast Mirror, February 10, 1997.

⁹ Mideast Mirror, January 2, 1997, p. 13.

¹⁰ "Iran Says U.S. Decided to Strike Over Saudi Bomb," Reuter, December 15, 1996.

¹¹ "Arafat: Iran Ordered Latest Wave of Suicide Bombings," Jerusalem Post, March 17, 1996

¹² "Iran Aims to Unseat Government--Peres," Jerusalem Post, Interview, 4/8/96.

¹³ Shimon Peres in Ma'ariv interview, reported in Associated Press (AP), July 4, 1996.

¹⁴ "Peres Says Iran Targeting Israeli Elections," Reuter, May 22, 1996.

¹⁵ "Israel Denounces Iran as Capital of Terrorism," Reuter, March 13, 1996.

Subversion of Turkey:

Turkish Foreign Minister Tansu Ciller in March 1996 demanded that Iran prove it had no hand in training an Islamist assassin involved in attacks in Turkey or face Ankara's wrath as a "terrorist" collaborator. "What we want from the Iranian administration is to follow the clues, and if there are links (between groups in Iran and the attacks) they should bring them to light.... If our neighbors are working not with us but with terrorists, then we will do what is necessary. Neighbors can trust our friendship but must fear us as enemies," Ciller told reporters.¹⁶

Israel Radio reported on December 11, 1996 that Turkish security forces arrested 15 people in Istanbul on December 8 who confessed that they were trained in Iran to commit "subversive acts" in Turkey with the goal of establishing an "Islamic regime similar to that in Iran."¹⁷

The head of the Turkish Chief of Staff's domestic security department stated April 30 that tolerance of Islamic radicalism was tantamount to the suicide of the Turkish republic and that Iran headed the list of countries supporting both Islamic radicalism in Turkey as well as terrorism.¹⁸

Turkish intelligence submitted a report in February, 1997 to the National Security Council in February which accused Iran of forming an intra-agency "Revolutionary Council" within its state apparatus to "direct" the activities of radical Islamist organizations in Turkey which are "actively striving to make Turkey an Islamic state." Iran supports 23 radical Islamic groups in Turkey; some have been implicated in the murders of opponents of Iran's regime in Turkey and Turkish intellectuals who support secularism in Turkey or carry out terrorism and assassination in Turkey's southeast. Iran also hosts 16 terrorist camps of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) adjacent to the Turkish border.¹⁹

Turkey's Deputy Chief of Staff, General Cevik Bir, reiterated the report's conclusion in Washington February 20 in accusing Iran of "supporting terrorist Islamic movements and forces in Turkey."²⁰

Subversion Against Bahrain:

The government of Bahrain disclosed on June 6, 1996 what it said was a plot backed by Tehran to stage armed revolution, overthrow the island's government and install a pro-Iranian regime.²¹ Then-Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Pelletreau told House International Relations Committee that "[t]here is credible evidence that a small group of Bahraini militants with a stated aim of overthrowing government had received assistance and training from Iran."

In March 1997 a court sentenced 15 Bahraini Shiites to jail terms of up to fifteen years for plotting to overthrow the ruling family with help from Iran. Those sentenced were members of Bahrain Hezbollah, a group founded in 1993 in Qum and armed, funded and trained by Iran through the intelligence service of the

¹⁶ Reuters, March 13, 1996.

¹⁷ Israel Radio Farsi Service cited a report from the Cairo-based Middle East News Agency (MENA), December 8, 1996.

¹⁸ Turkish Daily News, 4/30/97.

¹⁹ Milliyet, 2/27/97, p.10, and Sabah [FBIS translated texts], 2/124/97, p.14.

²⁰ Turkish Times, 3/1/97, p.1.

²¹ "Bahrain, Britain Accuse Iran," Reuter June 6, 1996. "Bahrain Prime Minister Accuses Iran," New York Times, January 29, 1996. "Bahraini Defence Minister Sees Iranian Danger," Reuters Nov 12, 1995.

revolutionary guards.²²

Terror Against Algeria:

On September 21, 1995, Algerian Prime Minister Modad Sifi accused Iran of backing Islamic terrorism in Algeria.²³

Terror Against Tajikistan:

In June 1996, Tajik President Imamali Rahmanov accused Iran of training Islamic guerrillas seeking to overthrow his government.²⁴

Iraq Accuses Iran

Iraq's Foreign Minister wrote a letter to the United Nations Security Council on January 4, 1997 accusing Iran of complicity in the attempted assassination of Saddam Hussein's son Uday Hussein.²⁵

Terror in Germany:

A German federal prosecutor in the Mykonos trial stated in November 1996 that "it is not possible to avoid mentioning the state terrorist background for the murder of the four [Iranian] Kurdish exile politicians. Germany's Development Minister said: "Iran's state terrorism against those who think differently has once again become visible as a result of this trial."²⁶

Assassination in Switzerland:

Swiss Magistrate Roland Chatelain said that the accumulated evidence on the August 1990 murder of the head of the Mojahedin organization in Geneva (which implicated 13 Iranians) "permits confirmation of a direct involvement by one or more official Iranian services."²⁷

Assassination in Italy:

An Italian MP in March wrote to Italy's Prime Minister and Foreign Minister that the primary suspect in the assassination of an anti-regime figure in 1993, Hamid Parandeh, an Iranian diplomat, "was transferred from the Iranian embassy in Italy Rome to [Iran's embassy to]...the Vatican."²⁸

Terror in Thailand

A Thai court in July 1996 sentenced an Iranian to death for killing a Thai citizen and plotting to blow up the Israeli embassy in Bangkok in March 1994. The Iranian embassy in Thailand denounced the verdict, calling it a "result of

²² Washington Post, 3/29/97.

²³ "Algeria accuses Iran of 'Destabilizing' Role," Agence France Presse September 23, 1995.

²⁴ "Iran, Tajikistan Expel Diplomats in Spy Row," Reuter, September 24, 1996.

²⁵ "Iraq Again Fingers Iran in Uday Hussein Shooting," Reuter, January 4, 1996.

²⁶ Reuters, November 21, 1996.

²⁷ Washington Post, Nov. 21, 1993.

²⁸ Italian Kronos news service, March 12, 1997.

pressure from...foreign countries."²⁹

Warning Assad Not to Make Peace:

In January 1996, the Tehran daily Abrar, which reflects the views of Iranian spiritual leader Ali Akhbar Khomeini, said, "Syria is now abjectly seeking peace.... The bomb explosion in Riyadh [in November] showed what dependence on foreigners brings. If the Damascus statesmen ignore it, they will suffer the same fate as Anwar Sadat."³⁰

Financing Hezbollah Terror:

Hezbollah leader Sheik Hassan Nasrallah said on March 10, 1996, "We don't hide Iranian support. There is no need to deny that we receive financial and political support from Iran. We are not shy and they [Iran] are not afraid about it."³¹

Terror Against the U.S. and France in Lebanon?

In March a Lebanese military court began investigating two senior officials of Hezbollah for involvement in the October 1983 suicide bombings which killed 299 French and American soldiers.³²

Terror Against the United States and Saudi Arabia:

Canadian authorities revealed in March that members of an Iran-backed organization, Hezbollah, helped Saudi Shiites, part of an organization known as Saudi Hezbollah, carry out the June 25, 1996 bombing of the al-Khobar Towers in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia that killed 19 U.S. airmen.³³ Canadian authorities also stated that the mastermind of this attack is now living in Iran under the protection of the regime, according to U.S. officials.³⁴ This information seems to support indications reported in the American press over the past few months that tie Iran to the bombing.³⁵

Atomic Smuggling:

Konrad Porzner, the head of Germany's BND intelligence service told a parliamentary committee on Jan. 18, 1996 that Iran has been acquiring nuclear materials using undercover buyers on the international black market. The BND has also said that Iran has built up contacts with German firms that supplied arms and dual-use technology to Iraq.³⁶

In December, two German magazines, Focus and Der Spiegel, reported that German authorities raided the offices of Iran's Defense Industries Organization

²⁹ "Iranian Sentenced to death over failed Thai bomb," AP, July 17, 1996; Thailand Times, July 18, 1996.

³⁰ Quoted in Jerusalem Post, January 26, 1996.

³¹ Interview in al-Wasat, March 10, 1996, quoted in Associated Press, March 11, 1996 and Jerusalem Post, March 11, 1996.

³² AP, 3/26/97.

³³ Immigration hearing record, Federal Court of Canada, 3/27/97; New York Times and Washington Post, 3/28/97.

³⁴ Newsday, 3/29/97; Washington Post, 3/28/97.

³⁵ Washington Post, 12/22/96, 12/11/96 and 11/1/96; New York Times, 1/8/97 and 11/6/96.

³⁶ Reuter, Jan. 18, 1996.

in Dusseldorf in an investigation of German firms which are suspected of supplying "components for the entire Iranian weapons program, including biological weapons" through Iranian dummy companies in Germany. Der Spiegel reported that Iran's embassy in Bonn protested the raid and urged German companies it was dealing with to bring potentially damaging records to the Iranian embassy.³⁷

The German weekly Stern reported in April 1997 that the Economics Ministry is investigating an Iranian network in Germany and its ties to as many as 120 German firms suspected of having helped Iran procure military equipment and dual-use technology which Iran cannot purchase legally in Germany.³⁸

Assassination in France:

A French appeals court April 25 upheld prison sentences for "conspiracy towards terrorism" for two Iranians implicated in planning attacks on Iranian dissidents living in France. At the 1996 trial of the suspects, prosecutors charged that one of the Iranians was ordered personally by Ali Fallahian, Iran's intelligence minister, to kill Manucher Ganji, a prominent dissident. Fallahian reportedly stated: "Ganji has been condemned to death by an Islamic court and [President] Rafsanjani personally ordered his execution."³⁹

France Confirms Iran's Involvement in Terror, Nuclear Weapons:

French Defense Minister Francois Leotard called Iran a country that is "making the region unstable and dangerous" with a "desire to acquire weapons of mass destruction" and "strategic weapons able to make them into [a] regional power which would be particularly destabilizing. I am thinking here of Iran's purchase of submarines, of purchases of ballistic missiles with a greater and greater range in increasing quantities.... Iran...continues to brandish the discourse of the Iranian revolution, and to help terrorism."⁴⁰

German intelligence sources told US News in April 1997 that Iran was moving its European and espionage and terror operations from Germany to France in the wake of the Mykonos verdict. Iran also plans to reduce the ties between its diplomatic and intelligence personnel in France by beefing up a network of french-based Iranian business ventures and expanding its ties to France's 10 million Muslims.⁴¹

Yves Bonnet, the head of France's DST counter-espionage service from 1982-85, accused Iran of "state terrorism" and funding and supplying arms to extremists in Algeria and Egypt as well as Palestinian self-rule areas.... He also said that "Western countries including France were misguided in their so-called 'critical dialogue' with Iran aimed at encouraging reforms. It was illusory to expect Iran to soften policies."⁴²

Assassination in Austria:

Austria in May 1997 reopened the murder case against three Iranians suspected of assassinating three Iranian Kurdish leaders in Vienna in 1989. The three suspects, who all held Iranian diplomatic passports, fled Austria before arrest warrants were issued. Alois Mock, Austria's foreign minister at that time, stated in April 1997 that Iran "probably" was responsible for the killings

³⁷ AP, December 14, 1996.

³⁸ Iran Times, 4/25/97.

³⁹ Iran Times, 5/2/97.

⁴⁰ BBC, Feb. 22, 1995.

⁴¹ US News and World Report, 5/4/97.

⁴² Reuters, August 3, 1995.

and that the Iranian embassy had warned him "of the dangers for Austrians in Iran" if action was taken against the suspects. Mock spoke after Austria's Green Party released a 1989 document written by a judge, who described a telephone call from the state police chief, telling him not to issue warrants for the iranians due to "dangerous diplomatic implications."⁴³

Erich Schmid, an official in the foreign ministry in 1989, told Austrian state television in April 1997 that Austria was bullied by Iran. He reported that the Iranian ambassador came to the Foreign Ministry and "made it pretty clear it could become dangerous for Austrians in Iran if Austria brought the suspects to court."⁴⁴

European Union Statement on Iranian Terrorism:

The European Union issued the following statement on March 10, 1996: "We are deeply concerned at the absence of specific Iranian condemnation of the terrorist bombings in Israel and the gap between Iranian assurances in the critical dialogue that they would do nothing against the peace process on the one hand and, on the other, other irresponsible declarations made in Iran about the bombings in Israel. We call on Iran to condemn, once and for all, all acts of terrorism, whoever by and for whatever end, and to respect its commitment to refrain from any action which could undermine the peace process or legitimize terrorism."

Norway Accuses Iran:

Jan Egeland, State Secretary of Norway's foreign ministry, told the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva in March, 1997 that "an ever increasing number of countries is realizing that Iran is systematically supporting international terrorism. There is also growing acknowledgement of Iran's destructive international role.... [N]either international nor bilateral dialogue with Iran has led to the writing of [this] untenable situation.... We feel the time has come for joint international action. The Government of Norway calls for international economic sanctions against Iran."⁴⁵

⁴³ Reuters, 5/6/97; Iran Times, 5/2/97.

⁴⁴ Iran Times, 5/2/97.

⁴⁵ Aftenposten [FBIS translation], 3/19/97; statement issued by the Permanent Mission of Norway to the UN, 3/19/97.

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INTERNAZIONALI - ROMA

n° inv. 17750

3 SET. 1997

B BLIOTECA

Roma, 19 maggio 1997
Stefano Silvestri

Appunti su Europa-USA-Iran (e Libia)

L'8-10 maggio scorsi ho partecipato ad un seminario ristretto, nei pressi di Washington, organizzato da Geoffrey Kemp, del Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom, uno dei maggiori esperti americani di Medio Oriente, già del National Security Council. L'idea era quella di discutere del futuro della politica americana ed europea verso l'Iran (e più in generale il Golfo, il Medio Oriente, il bacino del Caspio e la Turchia).

Il punto di partenza era che la politica americana del "double containment" verso Iran e Iraq, alla lunga, non fosse stabile e produttiva. Era presente l'ex Consigliere per la Sicurezza Nazionale Brent Scowcroft che, insieme a Zbig Brzezinski, ha appena scritto su Foreign Affairs un articolo in tal senso. Nel contempo l'affare Mykonos ha anche ridotto a pezzi il "dialogo critico" degli europei con l'Iran. Idea: è possibile un nuovo approccio congiunto euro-americano?

L'interesse dell'incontro (ristretto a 25 partecipanti di cui io ero il solo italiano) era dato dalla partecipazione dell'ala dura del Congresso americano (Howard Berman, co-firmatario della legge Kennedy-D'Amato su Iran e Libia, Bill McCollum, presidente sia della Sottocommissione sulla Criminalità e che di quella sull'Intelligence, oltre a importanti funzionari parlamentari che lavorano su questo tema) e di due esponenti chiave dell'American Israel Public Affairs Committee (la lobby israeliana a Washington): Bradley Gordon e Steven Rosen. Erano inoltre presenti alcuni parlamentari tedeschi (Hermann Groehe e Ruprecht Polenz della CDU, Guentram von Schenck, consigliere di politica estera del gruppo parlamentare SPD), alcuni esperti, un francese (diplomatico) e un britannico (giornalista). Due interessanti papers di Simon Serfaty e Geoffrey Kemp hanno dato il via alla discussione.

Le conclusioni sono state molto interessanti, nel senso che hanno prefigurato la possibilità di una politica congiunta, con ruoli differenziati, di Europa e America, verso l'Iran, con minaccia del bastone ma anche promessa di appetitose carote. La cosa potrebbe allargarsi ad un discorso di consultazioni politiche congiunte euro-americane su tutta l'area (questione arabo-israeliana inclusa).

Differentiated Containment di Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft e Richard Murphy su E.A. May-June 1997

Riconoscimento che il Golfo è un interesse vitale americano. La politica Clinton del *double containment* è più uno slogan che una strategia: non ha visibilità e comporta alti costi finanziari e diplomatici.

Distinguere: l'Iraq esercita una minaccia semplice ed immediata, l'Iran invece costituisce una sfida politica di molto maggiore grandezza e complessità. Questa percezione è condivisa dagli alleati, dai paesi del Golfo, dalla Russia.

Nei confronti dell'Iran, Clinton sostiene che le sanzioni non tendono a rovesciare il regime, ma solo a influenzare il suo comportamento (in particolare sulle questioni delle armi di distruzione di massa, sul terrorismo, sulla sovversione in Medio oriente e sul processo di pace arabo-israeliano). Tuttavia questa politica è stata dominata soprattutto da fattori di politica interna americana (rapporto tra maggioranza repubblicana e Casa Bianca). Il Congresso vuole accrescere le pressioni sui *rogue states* (Iran, Libia) impedendo ogni rapporto economico con questi paesi (anche con forme di punizione extraterritoriale). Questa politica non ha avuto alcun apparente successo né in Iraq né in Iran o Libia.

Bisogna cambiare la politica verso l'Iraq. Dimostrare la propria considerazione dei bisogni della popolazione irachena, pur mantenendo la dissuasione nei confronti del regime di Bagdad. La concessione di vendere petrolio per risolvere problemi umanitari rimane una buona idea. In ogni caso è bene parlare di *sospensione* delle sanzioni e non di una loro eliminazione. Contemporaneamente, bisognerà rassicurare i vicini dell'Iraq circa il mantenimento dell'impegno militare di contenimento americano. Terzo: maggiori consultazioni con la Turchia sul Kurdistan. Quarto: segnalare chiaramente la disponibilità americana a discutere costruttivamente con qualsiasi regime iracheno post-Saddam (anche con un regime *baathista*). Quinto: essere pronti a punire efficacemente l'Iran quando violi il comportamento voluto in particolare sulla questione delle armi di distruzione di massa e sulla sicurezza dei suoi vicini.

E' contemporaneamente necessario rilanciare la cooperazione multilaterale con l'Europa, il Giappone e i paesi alleati del Golfo. Il che richiede un ripensamento della politica verso l'Iran.

E' importante valutare bene il fattore negativo di molte politiche iraniane ma non demonizzare l'Iran né ritenere che sia più pericoloso di quel che è. Tuttavia, *attacchi diretti, anche terroristici, contro cittadini americani sono un caso speciale che richiede misure di rappresaglia*. In questi casi il semplice contenimento non è una risposta.

E' necessaria una politica efficace di *controproliferazione*. Essa dovrebbe essere più puntuale (concentrarsi sulla minaccia nucleare) e comportare l'offerta di *carote* oltre che del bastone. E' necessario trovare dei *tradeoff* magari con l'aiuto dell'AIEA, della Cina e della Russia.

Le sanzioni unilaterali americane sono un errore e sono inefficaci. E' necessario aprire un discorso comune con europei e giapponesi e con gli alleati del Golfo per stabilire una politica multilaterale. L'attuale politica danneggia gli interessi americani in Asia Centrale e *lacks the support of US allies and is a leaky sieve*. Scambi più creativi potrebbero riguardare anche progressi settoriali (ad esempio sul problema delle armi di distruzione di massa).

The States of Europe and the United States in the Persian Gulf di Simon Serfaty, documento preparato per la riunione

E' un lungo documento di analisi storico-politica. Le sue conclusioni propongono tra l'altro l'istituzione di un sistema di consultazioni transatlantiche con alleati europei (e giapponesi): in pratica una sorta di *directoire*.

United States & European Cooperation on Iran Policy di Geoffrey Kemp, documento preparato per la riunione

L'ILSA di Kennedy-D'Amato e altri ha avuto qualche moderato successo deterrente nei confronti degli investimenti in Iran: non ci sono stati accordi successivi a quello Total sui progetti Sirri A e B; lo stesso accordo Total è in via di rallentamento e ripensamento; è stato per ora bloccato l'accordo BHP (Australia) sulla pipeline Iran-Pakistan; non si è ancora fatto l'accordo sul progetto JGC (giappone) sul gas; la Shell (anglo-olandese) è stata dissuasa dall'investire nel campo gas di Pars-Sud; ugualmente sembra essere stata dissuasa l'ELF sul progetto di Dorud; è stato dissuaso un progetto di finanziamento bancario tedesco (della Westdeutsche Landesbank), anche grazie alle conseguenze della sentenza sul caso Mykonos.

Tuttavia questa situazione non potrà andare avanti indefinitamente e crea tensioni. Grazie anche alla sentenza Mykonos il *dialogo critico* degli europei è sospeso. Ricordiamo però che i cinque punti di maggiore preoccupazione degli europei erano simili a quelli americani: terrorismo, armi di distruzione di massa, il processo di pace arabo-israeliano, i diritti umani e il rispetto della legge internazionale.

Ora è importante superare i due approcci americano ed europeo che, separati, non hanno dato risultati apprezzabili, e inventare un nuovo approccio comune.

L'idea potrebbe essere quella di una politica *Good Cop - Bad Cop*. L'idea di base naturalmente è che i due poliziotti abbiano lo stesso obiettivo. Gli europei sarebbero il poliziotto buono e gli USA quello cattivo, evidentemente. Il che significa che gli americani debbono essere pronti a concedere premi (carota) ma che gli europei debbono essere anche pronti a ricorrere a politiche più dure (bastone).

Una simile politica richiede una iniziativa ad alto livello diplomatico tra USA ed Europa, un accordo sugli obiettivi e soprattutto sulla lettura dei risultati intermedi, oltre che sulle offerte da fare. Bisognerebbe stabilire dei traguardi (*benchmarks*) non solo massimi, ma intermedi di questo tipo (elenco indicativo):

- | | | |
|-------------------------|---|--|
| Processo di pace | - | accettazione pubblica del processo di Oslo e dell'OLP come interlocutore legittimo dei palestinesi |
| | - | accettazione del principio che una pace tra arabi ed israeliani sarebbe un fatto positivo per la regione |
| | - | fine delle tirate retoriche anti-israeliane |
| Terrorismo | - | fine degli aiuti agli Hezbollah (da coordinare con la Siria) |
| | - | scioglimento della organizzazione terroristica (ormai |

- molto indebolita) *Jihad islamica*
- riduzione dei finanziamenti ad Hamas
 - stop alla cooperazione con i movimenti dissidenti nei paesi del Golfo
- Armi di distruzione di massa -**
- accettare le ispezioni aperte dell'AIEA e un sistema rafforzato di monitoraggio
 - ratificare la CWC
 - cancellare l'accordo per i missili *No-Dong* con la Corea del Nord
 - cancellare i restanti programmi per i reattori nucleari
 - abbandonare ogni tentativo di acquisire tecnologie per l'arricchimento e la riprocessione
- Dritti umani ecc.**
- rimuovere la *fatwa* su Rushdie
 - concedere maggiore libertà ai *Bahai*
 - liberare i prigionieri politici non violenti.

Tra le carote gli americani possono considerare:

- emendamenti all'ILSA
- liberazione dei fondi iraniani negli USA (oltre 7 miliardi di \$)
- sospensione di molte sanzioni unilaterali
- sospendere ogni opposizione alla ricerca di crediti sul mercato finanziario
- consentire la conclusione di accordi industriali relativi al mercato energetico
- elaborazione di un piano finanziario e tecnologico multilaterale per la riattivazione completa di campi petroliferi iraniani e per lo sviluppo di un nuovo sistema produttivo e commerciale integrato
- riduzione della retorica anti-iraniana

Tra i bastoni invece gli europei dovrebbero considerare:

- l'isolamento politico e culturale dell'Iran
- lo sviluppo di una posizione comune del G-7, incluse sanzioni collettive
- portare il caso Rushdie di fronte all'ONU e alla Corte Internazionale
- prepararsi a rappresaglie politiche, economiche e militari (specie per casi di provato terrorismo)

Inoltre gli americani potrebbero pensare di:

- inserire la questione dei *No-Dong* nei negoziati con la Corea del Nord
- intensificare la propaganda radiofonica e televisiva
- intensificare l'appoggio alle opposizioni.

Impressioni dalla discussione

Le incertezze sono moltissime. I tedeschi in particolare sembrano temere una sorta di doppiezza americana (frase tipica: "ci avete dato botte in testa per quattro anni perché

avevamo il dialogo critico con l'Iran, ed ora ci chiedete un dialogo critico"). ma forse c'era anche il timore che una simile apertura americana, viste le conseguenze del caso Mykonos, potesse contribuire ad isolare la Germania in Europa. Io sono stato più aperto ed ho insistito anche sugli aspetti formali e procedurali. Ad esempio, è molto diverso se gli USA arriveranno a rappresaglie contro l'Iran dopo un dialogo sul che fare con gli europei, ovvero autonomamente e senza valutare le possibili alternative. In altri termini, una strategia multilaterale deve porre un freno deciso ad iniziative unilaterali, oppure fallisce.

Interessante la disponibilità dei "duri", in particolare della lobby israeliana, probabilmente preoccupata del fallimento dei negoziati di pace. Questi sono evidentemente interessati soprattutto al rapporto Iran-processo di pace: avanzamenti in questa direzione ne farebbero degli utili alleati negli USA.

E' comunque chiaro che il problema a livello USA è aperto, anche se il Congresso potrebbe pensarla diversamente dagli analisti, dai gruppi di pressione e dalla Casa Bianca. Tuttavia difficilmente il Congresso si opporrebbe ad una revisione dell'ITSA nei termini previsti dalla legge stessa.... Quindi ciò apre uno spazio politico.

Importante tuttavia sottolineare le prospettive di più largo respiro. Un dialogo transatlantico non può riguardare solo l'Iran (e la Libia), ma l'insieme della politica verso il Golfo, il processo di pace e l'Asia Centrale. Un simile obiettivo sarebbe di grande interesse per gli europei e un completo rovesciamento della politica sin qui seguita da Washington. La cosa potrebbe essere anche messa in rapporto, nel lungo periodo, con il nuovo ruolo *out-of-area* della NATO.

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n° inv. 17758

3 SET. 1997

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