

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON

The Outlook for Security Cooperation Across the Mediterranean

organised by
IAI, International Affairs Institute, Rome

co-sponsored by

CERI, Spanish Center of International Relations, Madrid
DPE, Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara
ELIAMEP, Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy, Athens
IEEI, Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Lisbon
IFRI, French Institute of International Relations, Paris

with the support of the **NATO** Office of Information and Press, Brussels

PROGRAMME

Rome, October 4-5, 1996

*Palazzo Rondinini
Via del Corso, 518*

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1996

9:00 Chair: Prof. **Stefano Silvestri**

Introduction: Dr. **Roberto Aliboni** and Dr. **Nicola De Santis**

Opening address: Hon. Prof. **Valdo Spini**

9:30 First session: *The Evolution of Western/European Security Institutions: Their Relevance for the Mediterranean area*
- Introductory remarks by Hon. Gen. **Luigi Caligaris** and Mrs. **Jette Nordham**
- Hon. Prof. **Fathallah Ouallalou**
- Dr. **Seyfi Taşhan**

11:00 Coffee break

11:30 Chair: Amb. **Ahmed Friaa**

Second session: *Arab Security Perceptions with respect to the Mediterranean area*
- introductory remarks by Dr. **Abdel Monem Said Aly**
- Dr. **Alvaro Vasconcelos**
- Maj. Gen. **Abraham Tamir**

13:00 Lunch

15:00 Chair: Prof. **Thanos Veremis**

Third session: *Israel and the Mediterranean*
- Introductory remarks by Prof. **Zeev Ma'oz**
- Dr. **Mona Makram-Ebeid**

16:15 Coffee break

16:45 Chair: Hon. **Maria Carrilho**

Fourth session: *Conflict Prevention and Crises Management in the Mediterranean*
- Introductory remarks by Dr. **Roberto Aliboni**
- Amb. **Antonio Badini**
- Dr. **Salah Brik el Hannachi**

18:00 Seminar adjourns

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 5, 1996

9:00 Chair: Hon. **Houda Kanoun**

Fifth session: *The Influence of Cultural and Religious Factors on Mediterranean Security*

- Introductory remarks by Dr. **Osama El Ghazeli Harb**
- Dr. **Bassma Kodmani-Darwish**
- Prof. **Mümtaz Soysal**

11:00 Coffee break

11:30 Chair: Prof. **Cesare Merlini**

Sixth session: *The Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Gulf: security links*

- Introductory remarks by Gen. **Carlo Jean**
- Gen.(Rtd) **Mohammad K. Shyaab**


13:00 End of the Seminar

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The Outlook for Security Cooperation Across the Mediterranean - Rome, October 4-5, 1996

Address by the Hon. Prof. Valdo Spini, Chairman, Defense
Committee of the Italian Chamber of Deputies , I. A. I. *Pellegrino*

Ladies and Gentlemen, dear colleagues,

It is a great pleasure for me to have the opportunity to address the meeting organised by the Italian Institute of International Affairs on the outlook for security in the Mediterranean area.

Italy is a European country with a significant Mediterranean dimension dictated by geographic as well as cultural and historical factors.

Because of this Mediterranean dimension, both Italian public opinion and the Italian government are fully aware that the area is important for our prosperity and our security. But, since Italy remains fundamentally a European country -- strongly embedded politically, culturally and economically in the continent -- our attention and policies towards the Mediterranean are intimately linked with the policies towards the Mediterranean area of the European Union and its member states.

After the decisions made at the June 1995 Cannes European Council, which led to the successful organisation of the Barcelona Conference in November 1995 and the establishment of the Euro-

Mediterranean Partnership, security in the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe have become parts of a shared European foreign policy, in which Germany and the other Northern European countries are no less concerned and involved than the Southern European members of the Union.

In other words, the Mediterranean is an element of European cohesion and this is an important factor for Italy's national security. By the same token, Italy's Mediterranean policy is to be largely understood as a pro-active component of the Mediterranean policy of the European Union.

But Italy also remains strongly convinced that security in the Mediterranean, from both an Italian and a European point of view, is linked to the presence of the United States.

Despite the end of the Cold War, the US is still an essential element of Europe's political stability and prosperity. Also, it is an important element in securing the cooperation and integration of individual European states, i.e. European cohesion. Both trans-Atlantic and Mediterranean relations contribute to European cohesion. Therefore, trans-Atlantic relations are as important as European relations in shaping Italy's Mediterranean policies and perceptions.

In the nineties, Italy has played a significant role in integrating the Mediterranean area into the emerging Common

Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union, but it has played an equally important role in including the Mediterranean among NATO's priorities. In January 1994, Mr. Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, the then Italian Prime Minister, contributed to having the Mediterranean area included in the final communiqué of the Brussels Summit as a common concern. Italy is convinced that NATO has to undergo a transformation to become an element of a new peaceful international order. And it is also convinced that this transformation has to be reflected in the Mediterranean as well.

Against this political background, Italy is not just waiting for European and trans-Atlantic initiatives. Italy is actively contributing to shaping these initiatives and sharing efforts and resources with its allies. NATO and the EU are important factors in Italian policy towards the Mediterranean, but at the same time Italy is active in helping to shape NATO and EU policies.

This Italian attitude derives from the fact that we share a number of concerns regarding the Mediterranean with our European and trans-Atlantic allies.

The first concern is related to development. In a world of strong economic competition and regional restructuring, Europe needs effective regional partners on both its Eastern and Southern wings. Furthermore, underdevelopment in the regions south of

Europe generates social instability, political extremism and a growing migratory pressure. Italy's bilateral aid is declining because of the country's poor economic performance since the beginning of the nineties and the need for restructuring of the Italian economy. However, Italy is doing its part in the strong effort that is being made by the European Union within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Furthermore, although Italian bilateral aid has been reduced, what is left is mostly devoted to helping the Mediterranean countries.

A second concern is for the cultural cleavage between North and South that is apparently arising in the region. In this respect, the Italian government has made clear many times that, while we condemn violence, intolerance and extremism wherever they may arise, i.e. in the Muslim as well as in the Christian and Jewish worlds, we think that religion can provide a ground for democratic political expression. We think that everything must be done to foster religious and cultural dialogues between the three main components of the Mediterranean historical setting and that this must be reflected in the management of holy places such as Jerusalem.

A third concern is for security, in particular the existence of nuclear weapons in the Middle East and the tendencies toward the proliferation of arms of mass destruction in the area. We are not

x We have in the Mediterranean the three ^{monotheistic} ~~monotheistic~~ religions, the three religions of the Book: the Torah, the Gospel, the Quran.

The nomination of Prime Minister Rabin was a turning point in this matter.

happy with the degree of compliance with international disarmament and arms limitation conventions in the Mediterranean and, though we don't see any real military threats to our security for the time being, we cannot neglect the risks of the present situation.

x In order to attain a more positive attitude towards arms control and limitation, a key-condition remains a fair political solution to the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli conflicts. And this is the fourth and probably most important concern today.

Unfortunately, negotiations have been less boldly conducted and internationally supported than necessary. They have lost momentum we have to criticize ourselves on this and this has permitted conservative forces -- from Hamas to Iran to Jewish extremists -- to step in and almost reverse the peace process. The consequences and latest events are before our eyes. If the peace process is reversed, all the concerns I have listed so far will be greatly aggravated and the actions that have been undertaken to deal with them will be undermined and there will be serious risks for peace in the entire region.

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6 Nevertheless, I believe that the peace process will not be reversed in the end and that the parties will manage to start it up again. I would like to conclude with this wish.

For this reason, I hope that your deliberations will provide a contribution to the very long road to peaceful and just conditions in

) In this sense, Italy is participating to the meeting on common defense initiatives, such as EUROFOR and ~~EUROFOR~~ ^{EUROFOR} ~~EUROFOR~~ ^{EUROFOR}. In these November - at what I know - the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (French - German - Spanish - Italian base) will be introduced in Florence.

the Mediterranean and the Middle East and, to that end, I wish you all success.

XXX It is true that negotiations ~~to~~ held place in Washington, but it is also true that Europe must participate more -

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INTERVENTION OF PROF. MONA MAKRAM-EBEID
FORMER MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT, PROF. OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE AVC.

I) The speaker started her remarks by emphasizing that if peace and cooperation do not get irreversibly underway soon, the region will not only miss the train of "globalization", but most of it risks becoming a chronic basket-case in the world system.

Among the most serious challenges facing the entire area are the issues of water, population food, productivity, environment and education.

After elaborating on the water issue to indicate how the dire need for such a scarce resource could be the main cause of future wars in the region, she indicated that it could also be an inducement for cooperation not only to optimize and distribute water equitably but also to develop alternative water resources e.g. underground and desalinated water.

II) She then spoke about the Europeans' view of Islamism and stated that the widespread feeling of organic dissociation between Europe and the M.E. has been strengthened by the Europeans' anxiety - when it was not clear hostility - towards Islamism. Europeans views tend to be panic-driven and show little understanding of the Islamization of the political domain. 4 factors affect the European reaction to Islam:

1 - the well entrenched idea that Islamism ultimately will affect domestic politics thanks to the presence in Europe of millions of Muslims (12-15 million); the idea is that immigrants, even when they have acquired citizenship in Europe, remain sensitive to their countries of origin.

2 - The recurrence in Europe or against Europeans traveling in Islamic countries, of acts of terrorism explicitly related to Islamic movements, so for a while and due to recurrent spectacular coverage in the media of the Islamic "threat", both Islamism and terrorism have become synonymous in the minds of many Europeans.

3 - Is the fear of new waves of immigrants fleeing the establishment of Islamic governments in the M.E.

Finally and most importantly political culture in most European countries seem unable to accommodate religious politics. Consequently, the predicament of Muslims in mixing their faith with secular politics is perceived as something that ultimately has to change for their integration into the new countries to be fully achieved.

- 2 -

4 - The fourth determining factor involves Europeans views of themselves. Beyond Islam and especially Islamism what is at stake is the place of religion and communitarian feelings in European societies. The approaches are quite different from one country to the other: in France, secular republicanism has meant an implicit exclusion of religion from the political domain; in other countries such as Spain and Italy religion has been domesticated by the state rather than excluded; in Germany citizens pay taxes to their churches not only to their governments; in the Netherlands, most education is run by confessions; It appears therefore that Islamism has challenged the established domestic consensus between politics and religion which was duly noted by practicing Christians and Jews when the position of Islam in these societies became a publicly debated issue. On the whole Germans and Scandinavians were more at ease in accommodating yet another faith in their public spheres. All this confirmed a widespread feeling that Islam, let alone Islamism, could not be viewed as a mere foreign policy issue.

Consequently, we can see how the role of Islam has become a controversial issue and in some circles Islamism has replaced the Cold War as a justification for a new strategy that focuses on the negative aspects only. A misunderstanding of Islam may serve to distance Europe from the M.E. widening a perceived cultural gap and acting as an obstacle to finding common ground on which to approach difficult policy issues. That is why care must be taken to keep the Islamic revival in prospective and take it in stride, particularly that I believe with Mr. Echeverria, that with the European Union gradually becoming a fact, ^{there} ~~the~~ certainly is much more room for maneuvering regarding European rebuilding influence in the M.E.

III) The speaker then proceeded to offer some concrete suggestions as areas for special attention and action in the context of cooperation across the Mediterranean:

. 1 . Encourage the development of the civil society and non-governmental organizations, including professional associations, self-help educational, social and other institutions. She emphasized that NATO should be aware of this important area, as this development would solidify a sense of national unity, and purpose (she emphasized, as a parenthesis, the importance of taking Arab and Middle Eastern public opinion into consideration).

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2. Establish a Euro-Mediterranean institutional framework for the Euro-Med cooperation project. This framework would have to be left to the heads of state and cabinet ministers, reminiscent of the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC). This framework would ensure coordination between different sectors and comprehensive economic policies between both sides of the Mediterranean. As an offshoot of this framework and within its context, we could envisage the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Institute for Democracy and entrust it with carrying dialogues between the different religions and different cultures: Judeo, Christian and Arab Islamic, that will focus on (among other issues) how the image of the OTHER is portrayed in different institutions: media, schools, etc...

She underlined the importance of the cooperation of intellectuals on both shores of the Mediterranean who should move and give a rationalization of the importance of the Mediterranean. The institute can also help in the implementation of a democracy-building programme similar to what has been undertaken in the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

IV) Start an educational programme on the fundamental requirements for the establishment and functioning of a democratic system emphasizing the items of tolerance and diversity, and the centrality of the principles of political alternation for the functioning of a democratic system. These programmes should be carried out gradually taking into account cultural specificities, and in cooperation with the governments of the Southern Mediterranean countries. The greatest emphasis should be placed on the centrality of political reform.

V) Development of contingency plans for various crisis scenarios and necessary instruments to cope with them.


VI) More active engagement of NATO in encouraging the resolution of inter-state conflicts in the South. This will be important also in the context of preventing the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear) as inter-state conflicts are a principal impetus behind the search for such weapons.

VII) NATO should encourage the establishment of sub-regional centers of conflict management. These centers could gradually develop the basic outlines of a Euro-Mediterranean Security Charter and galvanize support for it on both shores of the Mediterranean.

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DEBATE ISSUES

In her answer to General Abraham TAMIR's remarks that transitional periods from war to peace takes time, that the period from the Cold War to a future new arrangement took 25 years in history, that the decline of Western imperialism took 30 years and that now we are living the decline of Soviet imperialism, that one has to take into account the roots of conflicts, and that security depends on regional security cooperation etc...establish interdependent circles of cooperation in areas such as settlement of disputes, opening borders to free flow of goods, terrorism, early warning systems, opening security institutes, cooperation in Rand D etc... to which she replied that if we had to wait as long we would all be dead by then... The main point we have to clarify is the lack of respect for a time table for negotiations otherwise what was the use of internationally recognized agreements? Is it only smiling, shake hands on the White House lawn? She added that Mr. Netanyahu's "tunnel" vision of peace, in the name of security, has damaged the confidence of Palestinians and others in his profession of peace and has rendered the region more explosive than ever before. Lack of confidence does not encourage interdependent circles for integration and cooperation or a regional security order but rather fasters feelings of separation. Our prime objective on the contrary should be to nurture the peace process until we reach the ultimate phase of reconciliation and peaceful co-existence.



MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE

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The Outlook for Security Cooperation Across the Mediterranean

International Conference in Rome , October 4-5, 1996

NATO'S MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE

1. INTRODUCTION

I am pleased to open this International Conference in Rome on Mediterranean issues. We consider such a seminar very fruitful and timely as well: we need to encourage greater Mediterranean dialogue between the countries on both sides of the shores. We also need to gather experts and interested parties together to address the important issues of Mediterranean security in the post-Cold War era.

That NATO is sponsoring this seminar shows how important we value our partners to the South. It also shows the realisation that the security of Europe can not be divorced from countries of the Southern Mediterranean. NATO has always had a close interest in the region - the Alliance has six Mediterranean member states who all enjoy a security guarantee under the Washington Treaty.

While NATO remains a defence organization it has transformed its policies and its political and military structures to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War era - an era where the most likely risks to security arise from "instabilities" stemming from ethnic and territorial disputes and from emerging dangers such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

- NATO has chosen a cooperative approach to security and to this end:
 - established a network of cooperation within the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP). The relation

with the former Warsaw countries has been changed from confrontation to cooperation.

- force structures have been slimmed down and geared towards new challenges of crisis management (e.g. nuclear forces cut by more than 80%; US forces in Europe cut by more than 60%. Readiness levels of forces drastically lowered);
- relationships with other security institutions (UN, OSCE, WEU) have been built to enhance crisis response options.
- the Alliance participates in peacekeeping operations and other operations under the authority of the UN or the OSCE. An example is the IFOR operations and implementing the military aspects of the Dayton Agreement by an UN mandate.

The Mediterranean dialogue is to be seen in this context - as part of the Alliance transformation and the wish to project stability also to the South.

2. DEVELOPMENTS LEADING UP TO THE INITIATIVE

A) Historical

- NATO's interest in the Mediterranean is not new as NATO already during the cold war followed developments in the region. The interest was first and foremost restricted to activities related to the Cold War. NATO followed the naval build up of the former Soviet Union in the Mediterranean and political and security development in the region.

B) Ministerial Declarations

- For years there were various references to the Mediterranean in the Ministerial Declarations.

- The **Alliance's Strategic Concept** from 1991 has a reference to the Mediterranean region and the Middle East, expressing a wish to maintain peaceful and non-adversarial relations with the countries in this area.

- The Strategic Concept also stated that stability and peace in the region were important for the security of the Alliance as shown by the Gulf War.

- **In June 1993** the Ministers gave a general encouragement to "all efforts for dialogue and cooperation which aim at strengthening stability in this region." They also said that "the example of our improved understanding and cooperative partnership with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe could serve to inspire such efforts."

- At **the Brussels Summit** in January 1994 NATO leaders stressed that events in the area had "had a positive impact on the overall situation in the Mediterranean, thus opening the way to consider measures to promote dialogue, understanding and confidence-building between the countries in the region."

- In **1994**, the Ministers decided to establish a dialogue by expressing their readiness "to establish contacts, on a case-by-case basis, between the Alliance and Mediterranean non-member countries with a view to contributing to the strengthening of regional stability."

This resulted in a decision on **8 February 1995** by the North Atlantic Council to invite Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia to the **initial round** of the dialogue.

3. **REASON \ AIM**

There is no coordinated agreed Allied position on the Mediterranean or on risks occurring from that area. Only periodic exchanges of views of experts take place.

NATO does not see the South as a threat. Nor do we want to be considered as a threat by the South. To enhance mutual understanding was one of our main motivations in launching the initiative.

The Mediterranean dialogue should first and foremost be seen as

- a contribution to security and stability in the Mediterranean as a whole;
- a tool to achieve a better mutual understanding through transparency; and
- to correct any misunderstandings of the Alliance's purpose that could lead to a perception of a threat
- in other words create a climate of trust and confidence in the region

The dialogue is not aimed against any country or countries or anybody. It is in complete conformity with one of the core functions of the Alliance, namely to promote a stable security environment in Europe and to take a cooperative approach to security.

We see the Mediterranean not as a horizontal dividing line but as an important link between three continents.

4. THE DIALOGUE

The initial round of the dialogue started during summer and autumn 1995. It consisted of two or three meetings with each dialogue partner in which the International Staff of NATO gave an overview on NATO and its activities. Dialogue partners explained their security concerns and interests in the region and finally the way ahead was discussed.

In light of the outcome of the initial round and the interest expressed by the Mediterranean partners, it was decided to continue the dialogue and extend the invitation to Jordan. This second stage provided for a twofold approach to the way ahead:

- regular political discussions at least twice a year with an agreed agenda and

- specific activities in the fields of information, scientific affairs as well as visits and courses on peacekeeping at NATO Schools.

Apart from the political dialogue the following activities are covered by the dialogue:

- Currently, Mediterranean partners can be invited to send scientists, on a self funding basis, to participate in scientific meetings conducted under the auspices of the NATO Science Committee and receive information concerning the scientific activities of NATO.
- Information activities were added to the dialogue in November 1995. Unfortunately the room for manoeuvre has been very limited due to budgetary restraints. This seminar is a result of this activity.
- Mediterranean partners can send participants to peacekeeping courses at the NATO school in Oberammergau on a self-funding basis. They can also receive general briefings by the IS or NMA's at NATO Headquarters on different topics. The NATO Defence College here in Rome (NADEFCOL) is in the process of establishing contacts with corresponding institutions in Mediterranean partner countries to compare curriculum and explore areas of cooperation.
- Briefings on civil emergency planning activities have recently been added to the dialogue. This cooperation area within NATO is unique in the sense that it provides for civil-military cooperation in dealing with natural or man-made disasters.
- Current military activities are limited to the offer to participate in courses on peacekeeping at the NATO school in Oberammergau and contacts between the NATO Defence College and equivalent educational institutions in Mediterranean partner countries.

The implementation phase of this second stage is well under way and we are now considering how to proceed.

Let me underline that the International Staff conduct the dialogue on behalf of NATO, who are being kept fully informed about the outcome of the dialogue and determine its pace and direction.

It should also be mentioned that so far has the dialogue been bilateral - i.e. a separate dialogue for each country - except in the field of information. For the future, the aim could be to multilateralize the dialogue so as to enhance cooperation among the partners, but this would of course depend upon their position as we fully understand that we are not dealing with a group of countries but individual states.

All participants have been offered the same basis for discussion and activities, but in practice has there been considerable difference among their levels of participation within that framework.

[5. **ACTIVITIES OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**

- NATO's efforts aim to complement efforts undertaken in other organizations.
- There are ongoing initiatives but not necessarily with the same participant within
 - the **WEU** (Algeria, Israel, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania)
 - the **EU** (with twelve parties - Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, the Greek Cypriot side of Cyprus and Malta)
 - the **OSCE** (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco and Tunisia as Partners for Cooperation)
 - the **NAA** (which has afforded observer-status to Israel, Morocco and Egypt)
 - the **Mediterranean Forum** (Algeria, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey)
 - the **Middle East Peace Process**.
- the **UN** does also concern itself with strengthening security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region.]

6. ASSESSMENT

It is too early to judge and evaluate the results of the dialogue but we feel that the first rounds of talks have been fruitful. It has increased understanding on both sides. We are aware that NATO is still perceived as a military organization and to some extent considered with suspicion by some groups in the Mediterranean region. Very little is known about NATO's extensive political cooperation, information and scientific activities.

It is very important having established a framework for contacts and the discussions so far have been based on reciprocity. It is not only NATO informing on politics and activities but our interlocutors have also had substantive inputs.

I feel the dialogue is going to bring mutual benefits, first and foremost in increasing mutual understanding. In addition our dialogue partners might become inspired by learning about the network of cooperation we have set up with our former adversaries in the East.

The power of such a dialogue should not be underestimated as it has all the potential to develop into a constructive and deep cooperation. In fact, all major developments associated with the end of the cold war, from German unity to NATO's deepening relationship with Russia, began with dialogue.


The history of NATO relations with the East since the 1990 shows what can be the result of what started as a dialogue. We are with the Mediterranean dialogue where we were in the beginning of the NACC process. Whether we will end with some sort of PfP for the Mediterranean - time will only show.

The dialogue is kept under constant review and as we are taking a step by step approach we foresee a progressive development. Through the Political Committee we are in a position to evaluate the dialogue.

Independently from the dialogue three of our Mediterranean partners are participating in IFOR. Egypt with approximately 700 troops, Morocco with 1200 troops and Jordan with about 50. We do, in other words, already have practical cooperation with these countries which makes it even more important to leave all political channels open. The positive experiences gained in cooperating within IFOR should be part of the future dialogue.

7. THE WAY AHEAD

A report shall be made to ministers in December about the activities undertaken on the basis of the dialogue including recommendations on the way ahead.



Mediterranean Security and Western Security Institutions

Seyfi Taşhan

The basic security issues inherent in the Mediterranean and littoral countries have changed little from the cold war period. At that time the extension of the Soviet power to the Mediterranean that provided a vivid threat perception for Western alliance and the Soviet client states in North Africa and Eastern Mediterranean were viewed with great suspicion and as sources of military threat because of sophisticated weaponry supplied by the Soviet Union. Against these perceived threats the Western response was provided by NATO which has its southern headquarters in Naples and maintained military bases in Turkey, Greece, Italy, Cyprus, Malta, and Spain. France chose to remain outside NATO military structure but maintained a strong military presence in the Mediterranean.

The departure of the Russian *Escadra* from the Mediterranean left behind a number of socialistically inclined authoritarian countries some of which sought legitimacy by espousing Islamic fundamentalism in place of their lost socialist ideological pranks. As the capacity of these countries to threaten the West militarily was never great and it became insignificant when Soviet support disappeared, the West begun to perceive Islamic fundamentalism and the Mediterranean states as dangerous breeding grounds for aliens who, with rising demographic trends and illegal migration to Western Europe, would threaten European social order and encourage terrorism even though they were not the only source of international terrorism. Such modern writers as Samuel Huntington have conceptualized this state of affairs as a source of clash between differing civilisations.

The Western/European security institutions feel therefore that they must provide for themselves with a revised concept of security which they must provide for the peoples of their member countries. In view of the diminishing Soviet threat the conventional defence and security doctrines need be redrawn to take care of new regional conflicts, and sources of threat to internal security and social order of the member countries.

The regional conflicts which may be prone to turn into armed clashes that could eventually draw in member states certainly require a different treatment than other risks involving internal security of Institutional members. In the first case what we need are: measures to alleviate inter-state conflicts through dialogue, CSBMs, mediation and in the extreme case military intervention. Since NATO has accepted the principle of acting outside the Article 5 area the last option that is military

intervention ^{under} a UN mandate will have to be carried out ^{by} NATO/in the absence of another organisation, as was the case for NATO air power in Bosnian airspace and for Ifor. However, it may not always be possible to obtain a consensus in the NATO Council for such an operation for reasons of national interest. In such cases *ad hoc* coalitions will become the only way to carry out a UN mandate. Indeed the coalition formed for the Gulf and for Provide Comfort operation in Northern Iraq. The latter was successful in the first stages of the operation but during the last intervention in Iraq the consensus was broken.

What would be the WEU's role for regional conflicts such as the ones that may occur in the Mediterranean region? The recent agreement for WEU to use NATO military means naturally requires approval by NATO council. This involves the consent of all NATO members. Such a consent will have to be an outcome of Euro-American agreement plus those of Norway and Turkey which do not have voting rights in the European decision making.

In this connection it is important that in the trans-atlantic dialogue for this purpose in a Mediterranean scenario, all major allied countries ~~in~~ which have a direct interest need be involved. In this context the composition of the Bosnian Contact group has been inadequate. On the other hand, any possible WEU decision for intervention must also be subject of a decision of the EU Council because the development of Common Foreign and Security Policy is a function of the EU. Since the basic principles of CFSP have not yet been elaborated the clarification how EU will respond to regional crisis will have to be on an *ad hoc* basis, until, if and when, the inter-governmental conference can work out a system to create necessary principles and instruments and make them work.

As regards the dialogue and CSBM's as part of conflict management there is some possibility that different security organisations may play positive roles. The dialogue system attempted within the context of the Barcelona process is an important venue for inter-state and NGO contacts that would contribute to a reduction of tensions through open dialogue. Could this lead to an ultimate stability pact for the Mediterranean is a highly doubtful proposition given the diversity of the character disputes and parties involved in the Mediterranean. Barcelona process does not envisage a conflict resolution mechanism. Furthermore, it includes central and northern European countries that may be involved in only certain aspects of security risks in the Mediterranean.

A Mediterranean Forum composed of Mediterranean countries which are ready and willing to contribute to the conventional security in the Mediterranean could be a useful instrument for conflict resolution. However, in its present structure and mandate the Forum is no more than an unofficial talking body even though the working groups established under the forum are doing a fair amount of cooperative

work The current Mediterranean Forum must be transformed into a more effective organ if there will be a general desire to have an exclusive Mediterranean security dialogue or system. In any case, we need to think how can we increase the contribution of Mediterranean Forum and other Western organisations to the security in the region.

One idea could be extending NATO's partnership for peace project to cover also the non-member Med Forum countries. Joint military excersizes in the sea and land of the riparian countries together with other NATO countries could be a significant contribution to CSBMs and peace in the Mediterranean. This could be a good programme for NATO's Mediterranean initiative launched at the December 1994 meeting of North Atlantic Council. Such a project could also encourage regional countries to move towards democracy and improve their human rights. There are, of course, difficulties in organising such a partnership. Leaving aside historic prejudices against NATO among Southern Mediterranean countries, there is a difficulty in the definition of "the objective" of the partnership particularly for joint exercises. Under the prevailing circumstances something like North Atlantic Cooperation may be envisaged as a preparatory step.

We need also to take into account that in developing cooperation there is a difficulty in choosing the scope of cooperation i.e. global versus sub-regional. In the sub-regional approach there is a further difficulty in deciding the nature of cooperation and the scope of the sub-region.

In the case of the Mediterranean the soft security issues such as demography, economic and social development, environment, migrations, terrorism and drugs are more amenable for larger scale cooperation under the umbrella of international donor countries such as EU, World Bank, UN etc.. the Barcelona process would no doubt provide a highly appropriate instrument for achieving such cooperative goals. But there are many bugs in the system created and the need to be rectified.

As far as military security is concerned two geographical sub-regions may be considered. In western Mediterranean Portuguese, Spanish, French an Italian plus Maghrebian countries could form a good group of dialogue. In this connection the initiãtive_by France, Spain, Italy and Portugal to create a Eurofor_and Euromarfor could_be interpreted as a right step but must somehow involve the Maghreb countries because these countries are also concerned with the security in western Mediterranean; furthermore, coordination and cooperation with AFSOUTH will only contribute to the efficiency of these forces.

Naturally differentiated approach of France, Spain and to certain extend Italy towards Eastern and Western Mediterranean issues tend to make them less effective in Eastern Mediterranean region and its issues. In this area therefore US is

looked upon as more effective partner. In eastern Mediterranean where inter-state conflicts are more accentuated involving all states of the region in a ready made cooperative model is very difficult. Like in the west, however, issue based cooperation is possible in respect to soft security issues within the global Mediterranean context. There are however several countries in Eastern Mediterranean which could begin and conduct security dialogue among themselves and they could be joined by others. Outside parties that may be concerned such as US, NATO, EU-WEU may also join in the dialogue. For the time being dialogue concerning the entire eastern Mediterranean could take place among NGOs. However, bilateral, trilateral cooperation could be envisaged among states in the form of security dialogue and military cooperation. Likeliest initial candidates for such cooperation may be Egypt, Turkey, Israel and Jordan, ~~and Greece & Italy~~.

Under these circumstances it would be natural to expect EU and WEU in their approach to Mediterranean security to be more weighted towards dealing with the type of security issues that are of greater concern to Western Mediterranean because one third of the EU members are riparian countries of the Mediterranean. Non Mediterranean partners in EU and WEU may prefer to consider their contributions to the Mediterranean programmes to be for the entire region but as far as security issues go they might prefer to listen to Mediterranean members.

The soft issues of security, which are demography, fundamentalism, terrorism, and environment are issues susceptible to different interpretation in regard to their security implications. Therefore, addressing these issues as security risks may involve roles from institutions that may not be considered as security institutions in the conventional sense. Consequently, Euro-Med programme initiated with the Barcelona Declaration must be considered as a direct contribution to mundane security definitions but only as an indirect one for conventional security.

In term of hard the security, the situation in the Mediterranean region seems to be better than the cold war days in respect to inter-state clashes. In Eastern Mediterranean, peace process have every chance of progressing towards a sustained *modus vivendi* between Israel and her Arab neighbours in spite of the current flare up in Jerusalem. Fighting in West Sahara has ended. Former Soviet client states are now more quiet and less threatening even though their political systems still continue to be autocratic and some of them still encourage terrorism. The acquisition of conventional and non-conventional weapons is still at an alarming level particularly in Eastern Mediterranean. There is no change in Turkish Greek disputes in the Aegean and Cyprus, where issues seem to defy a permanent solution.

It must be admitted however, the Gulf crisis of 1990 and the American vengeance against Saddam cause serious economic and security problems for Turkey and

other countries in the neighbourhood. Northern Iraq continue to present an important challenge for Turkey's domestic security and its fight against terrorism.

Western and European institutions and governments all want to contribute to security, in all its definitions, in the Mediterranean. Yet diversities in the Mediterranean are so wide and issues are so complex that the existing institutions, partly due to their structural inadequacies, are unable to come with correct definitions and cures.

At the end I would like to refer to the roles of two other organisations in the security of the Mediterranean basin, namely OSCE and the Council of Europe, although the latter does not claim to have a security role.

OSCE with its large membership and extensive mandate has become a significant center for dialogue among "European" countries extending from Honolulu to Vladivostok. It has up to now played significant roles in the Caucasus region and in former Yugoslavia. The dialogue programme it has started with the Mediterranean region provides a good platform from which non-member Mediterranean countries could address the large and interested audience in this organisation.

There has been an extended debate over the past decade about the feasibility of establishing a CSCE type global agreement for the Mediterranean region as suggested by Spain and Italy. The current policies of some important Mediterranean and the difficulties arising from the diversities and disparities of the region seem to have discouraged this idea.

** appropriate*

The Council of Europe has two important functions one being to encourage democracy freedom and a compulsory system of control in human rights. The other is to encourage qualitative increase in the lives of individuals through an inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary system. Terrorism, drugs, migrations, environment, are some of the aspects of "soft security issues" that are dealt with in the Council of Europe. The Council in addition to its 39 member states has a number of countries that have a "guest" status and one Mediterranean, non European country namely Israel has an "observer" status. It might be logical to establish observer or guest status with non-member Mediterranean countries whose human right standards and democracy approach the European norms. Their presence in this European political laboratory particularly in the Parliamentary Assembly may be helpful and constitute a major step in the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue and contribute to security.

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