THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE OSCE TO SECURITY OF SMALLER STATES

NICOSIA, 15-16/I/1996

CIPRO. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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TO SECURITY OF SMALLER STATES

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ΚΥΠΡΙΑΚΗ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ

ΥΠΟΥΡΓΕΙΟ ΕΞΩΤΕΡΙΚΩΝ

(a)

INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE OSCE TO SECURITY OF SMALLER STATES. NICOSIA, 15 - 16 JANUARY, 1996

P R O G R A M M E

Monday 15.01.1996

11.00	"Famagusta Gate"	**Opening Session**
12.00	"Famagusta Gate"	Reception hosted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, H.E. Alecos P. Michaelides
13.00		Sightseeing for foreign participants
15.00	"Hilton"	**First Session** Subjects to be discussed: The OSCE principles and norms of behaviour today: how to interpret? how to enforce? The comprehensive concept of security and its practical implications.
20.00		Dinner for the participants hosted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs

Tuesday 16.01.1996

09.00	"Hilton"	**Second Session** Subjects to be discussed: New unconventional challenges to security (organized crime, arms proliferation, drug trafficking, migration, intolerance); possible answers to challenges and the limits of the OSCE response.
13.00	"Hilton"	Lunch break
15.00	"Hilton"	**Third Session** Subjects to be discussed: The OSCE as a community of equal participants: the role of medium and smaller states. States versus organizations as conflict managers: what roles? what responsibilities? Peacekeeping as an essential component of the new security relations.

O P E N I N G S E S S I O N

Famagusta Gate

11.00: Welcoming Choral Performance
Choir "Leandros Sitaros" of Pnevmatiki Steghi, Nicosia, conducted by Mrs Maro Skordi

11.08: Welcoming Address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. Alecos P. Michaelides

11.15: Address by the Representative of the Presidency of the OSCE, H.E. Mr. Peter Bloetzer, Member of the State Council of Switzerland and Chairman of the Foreign Policy Commission of the Federal Parliament

11.25: Speech by the Secretary General of the OSCE, H.E. Dr. Wilhelm Hoynck

11.55: Statement by the President of the House of Representatives H.E. Mr. Alexis Galanos

12.00: Reception hosted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs H.E. Mr. Alecos P. Michaelides

13.00: Sightseeing for foreign participants

MONDAY, 15.01.1996 - HILTON, 15.00 -19.00 hr

FIRST SESSION

The OSCE Principles and the Norms of Behaviour today: how to interpret? how to enforce?
The comprehensive concept of Security and its practical implications

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Keynote Speaker: Ms Thalia Fr. Petrides, Director for European Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cyprus

Moderator: Mr Linus von ~~Castelmur~~, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland, Representative of the OSCE ~~Presidency~~

Panellists:

Dr Christodoulos Yiallourides, Professor, Panteios University

Dr Charis A. Zachariades, Head of International Arms Control and Disarmament Section, Ministry of Defence

Mr Harold Hickman, Mission of Canada to the OAS

Mr Xenios Xenopoulos, President of the Cyprus Bar Association

Mr Efstathios Mavros, Campus Director of Intercollege

TUESDAY, 16.01.1996 - HILTON, 09.00 - 13.00 hr

SECOND SESSION

New unconventional Challenges to Security (organized crime, arms proliferation, drug trafficking, migration, intolerance)
Possible answers to challenges and the limits of the OSCE response

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keynote Speaker: Mr Phanos Epiphaniou, President of the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry

Moderator: Professor Dr Ettore Greco, Italian Institute of International Affairs

Panellists:

Mr Michael Leptos, Director of Planning, Planning Bureau of Cyprus

Mr Nicos Georgiades, Director, Environment Service, Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment

Mr Andreas Christophides, Cyprus Police Force

Dr Stelios Georgiou, Assistant Professor, University of Cyprus

Mr Stelios Theodoulou, President of the Pancyprian Association for the Protection of Human Rights

Dr Prodromos Prodromou, Sociologist

TUESDAY, 16.01.1996 - HILTON, 15.00 - 17.00 hr

THIRD SESSION

The OSCE as a Community of equal Participants: the role of medium and smaller States
States versus Organizations as conflict managers: what roles? what responsibilities?
Peacekeeping as an essential component of the new Security relations

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Keynote Speaker: H.E. Mr Andre ERDOS, Deputy State Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary

Moderator: Dr Jan Pechacek, Head of OSCE Section, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Czech Republic

Panellists:

Dr Joseph Joseph, Professor, University of Cyprus

Professor Dr Ettore Greco, Italian Institute of International Affairs

Professor Dr Andreas Orphanides, The Cyprus College

Dr Calliope Agapiou-Josephides, Vice-President, Institute "Europe-Cyprus-Mediterranean", Lecturer, University of Cyprus

Dr Aristos Aristotelous, Cyprus Centre for Strategic Studies

Closing Remarks: Ms Thalia Fr. Petrides, Director for European Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cyprus

(b)

SEMINAR ON THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE OSCE TO SECURITY OF SMALLER STATES. NICOSIA, 15 - 16 JANUARY, 1996

PROVISIONAL LIST

OF PARTICIPANTS

(AS PROVIDED BY DELEGATIONS)

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Costas P. KYRRIS	European Academy of Historical Science
Michael LEPTOS	Director of Planning, Planning Bureau
Loris LYSSIOTIS	Member of Parliament
Dr. Michael MARANDA	Head, Arts & Sciences Department, Cyprus College
Christos MATHOPOULOS	Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation
Andreas MAVROMMATIS	Ambassador, Former Permanent Representative to the UN and Chairman of UN Human Rights Committee

CYPRUS (continued)

Efstathios MAVROS	Campus Director, Intercollege,
Andreas G. ORPHANIDES	Dean of Academic Affairs, Cyprus College
Thalia Fr. PETRIDES	Director for European Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Prodromos PRODROMOU	Sociologist and Economist
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Maria YIASEMIDOU	Ministry of Defence
Anthoulla ANDREOU	Ministry of Defence

Seminar on the Contribution of the OSCE to Security of Smaller States

Nicosia, 15 - 16 January 1996

OPENING ADDRESS

BY H.E. MR ALECOS. P. MICHAELIDES

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Distinguished Guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I wish to welcome you all to the Opening of the Seminar on the role of the OSCE to Security of Smaller States.

The Seminar aims at contributing to the ongoing discussions within the OSCE for the shaping of new security relations in the 21st century, from the perspective of smaller states. For, the safeguarding of the territorial integrity and security is a constant and deep concern of the smaller states.

Let me add that this is also an opportunity to inform the Cypriot public on the role and the great potential of the OSCE, in helping smaller states to safeguard their independence and strengthen their security.

The presence among us of the Secretary-General of the OSCE Dr.Wilhelm Hoynck, stresses the attention the Organization wants to pay to meet the concerns of its smaller members. I also wish to welcome the presence at a high level, of the Troika of the OSCE.

During its twenty years of existence, the CSCE, not only promoted the implementation of the principles guiding the relations between states but also opened new paths for co-operation, especially in confidence-building and the human dimension.

We must, however, recognize that since the signing of the Final Act in Helsinki in 1975, the political landscape of Europe has completely changed. The East-West division, the bipolar confrontation and the ideological struggle all belong to the past. Now more than ever before, it is recognized that the common values of democracy, human rights, economic freedom and social justice, shape the new relations within the whole of Europe.

To this positive evolution, the CSCE has substantially contributed in many ways. It served as the forum for a frank dialogue among states, on the whole spectrum of their activities, reinforcing the accountability to one another. Furthermore it created awareness of the need to adhere to the common values, thus giving encouragement to groups and individuals to pursue their efforts for freedom and democratic change.

Today the OSCE , the successor of the Helsinki Process, continues its pioneering role in interstate and intra-state relations. The OSCE basing its philosophy on the comprehensive concept of security, is clearly becoming the primary instrument in European affairs of early warning and conflict prevention, even though sometimes, certain scepticism is voiced regarding the extent of its effectiveness.

The OSCE, has already proven its great potential as an international instrument for conflict prevention and crisis management. The various OSCE missions deployed in different areas of crises, the preventive diplomacy so skilfully performed by the Presidency of the Organization and by the Troika, all are already bearing concrete results.

The functional maturity of the Organization, as such, will develop gradually while safeguarding the non-bureaucratic character of the OSCE. This is done mainly through the constant review of its functioning by the member-states and the able administrative guidance by the Secretary-General Dr. Wilhelm Hoynck.

I am proud to say that during the Cyprus Presidency of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, we held

a joint meeting of the Presidencies and the Secretary Generals of both institutions, (the OSCE and the Council of Europe) in order to lay the foundation for coordination of efforts in cases where both institutions are engaged.

Distinguished Guests,

Approaching the end of the 20th century the preoccupation of European institutions and member states is the future that unfolds before us. The building of Europe of tomorrow is our vision. We aspire to set and maintain democracy throughout Europe, respect of human rights and the rule of law, prosperity for all people.

Last but not least, we aspire to strengthen security and stability throughout Europe. Our perspective cannot be

confined within the borders of our own country. In a world of interdependence, no one can live in splendid isolation, nor can any country be indifferent to the problems of its neighbours.

Within this context, the OSCE assumes a greater role. For it reflects these high principles and values as its goal. What remains for all member states is to make the OSCE an effective instrument for realising this vision of a new Europe. And the effectiveness of the OSCE, depends on how committed the member-states are, not only in making declarations but respecting these values and principles. And even more important demanding and ensuring respect by all, without accepting double standards, or compromises on principles.

Today the Seminar is focusing on all small states and projecting the competences of the OSCE and examining how the member-states will honour their commitments. The broad reference remains the great challenge for realising our vision for Europe of tomorrow.

Distinguished guests,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The end of the bipolar confrontation will remain a landmark in the history of Europe. Millions of people felt free to voice their vision, their views and their wishes. We must recognize that historic this event may have been, it has not brought an end to confrontation. Old problems remain unresolved and new are emerging. The European institutions are definetely enriched and present a hope

and a promise for many people. But the key question still remains. Are the principles enshrined in declaraions and conventions being respected?

Cyprus is one of the signatory states of the Final Act in 1975, and one of the States that has faithfully implemented the principles and commitments arising as a consequence. Our commitment remains unshaken. Even though 37% of our land is under occupation. Not even one refugee has returned home and, in fact, more are added since the enclaved persons in the occupied part are leaving because the pressures are unbearable. Not even the fate of the missing persons has been examined.

At the Summit Meeting in Budapest, we adopted a Code of Conduct. An innovative instrument which contains the norms of behaviour in the politicol amd military field in the New Europe. When adopting the Code of Conduct, all member States, as a consequence voiced their commitment not to impose military domination over any other State. The Code also stipulates that a member state can station its armed forces in the territory of another state only with the agreement of the State, freely negotiated and in accordance with international law.

All members of the OSCE, including Turkey, endorsed the Code of Conduct. However, Turkey has refused to show the slightest sign of compliance, but, instead, continues to increase and upgrade its occupation forces to the extent that the UN Secretary-General stated in his

recent Report "the northern part of the island is one of the most densely militarised areas of the world."

Committed to the principles and declarations of the OSCE and also realizing the dangers of military escalations and the question of continued occupation, the President of the Republic of Cyprus Mr. Clerides submitted a concrete plan for the demilitarisation of Cyprus. We are convinced that the demilitarisation of Cyprus, will not only end the occupation, but will remove the elements that make Cyprus an explosive situation that affects the security of the people of Cyprus and the stability in the region. Furthermore, demilitarisation will significantly facilitate a solution. The arguments for security concerns as a consequence of the withdrawal of the Turkish troops, are answered by the presence of multinational force until a solution is being found. No

doubt, the OSCE can play an important role in the promotion of the implementation of this proposal.

In a Europe which is free from division, Cyprus should not remain an exception. When the need for security and stability is a goal recognized by all, it is vital that the occupation troops from Cyprus must be withdrawn.

The Cyprus experience is a frightening signal for the small States, When small states are faced with aggression and threat to their territorrial integrity and sovereignty, they are unable to face it, and their only recourse is turning to the international community for support. The key question remains: Will the international community through its several insitutions act decisively and effectively?

This is why the effectiveness in dealing with the case of Cyprus will not only end the drama for the people of Cyprus that continues for more than 21 years, but will also send a strong message, both to potential aggressors, as well as to the small states whose security is their permanent and constant concern, that aggression will not be tolerated much less accommodated.

I said earlier that old plroblems continue and more are created. Yet, at the same time, we must recognize that there are encouraging signs that peace is possible.

The peace process in the Middle East has had a remarkable success and there is now increasing confidence that comprehensive peace throught may be realized.

The Bosnian drama has also had a positive and hopeful development.

These positive developments prove beyond shadow of doubt, that when there is political will by all involved in a conflict and when also there is resolute action by those who have the power to effectively help, problems can be solved. Peace and stability can be achieved.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

We are soon embarking on the 21st century and we feel the need and responsibility to express our vision for the Europe of tomorrow.

The challenge is for all of us. So is the responsibility. For we cannot sit back watching things happening or making declarations of grand principles and values, but not ensuring these are respected and become an integral part of our lives.

Being at the doorstep of a new century, our responsibility is not to analyse or report the past, but to design and build the future. In our vision for the Europe of tomorrow, the OSCE has a great role to play and a vast potential to realise. Its role is even more critical when it comes to the security and stability of the Small States. As a long standing member of the OSCE we share the vision and recognize our responsibility which we shall fulfill.

Concluding, I declare this seminar open. I welcome all the foreign participants and wish every success to your deliberations and exchanges during this seminar.

Check against delivery

SPEECH
by
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE OSCE,
DR. WILHELM HÖYNCK

at the
Seminar
on the
"CONTRIBUTION OF THE OSCE TO SECURITY OF SMALLER STATES"

(Nicosia, Cyprus,
15-16 January 1996)

Embargo:

15 January 1996, 11:00 a.m.

I

Introduction

I wish to thank the Government of Cyprus for taking the initiative to hold a Seminar on the Contribution of the OSCE to Security of Smaller States.

We all realize that, since the end of East-West confrontation the overall situation of military security has dramatically changed for the better. But we also realize that security, in particular comprehensive security that goes beyond military aspects, is still a serious problem and a - perhaps unending - challenge.

Some smaller states might view security as a new and particular challenge now. At the same time, smaller States can and must have a more active security policy using the possibilities of the emerging new security structures such as the OSCE.

But smaller States today also have a responsibility to contribute to overall security. Winston Churchill addressed this aspect in 1946 in his famous Zurich speech on European Integration: "Small nations count as much as the large, and they win their respect through their contribution to the common cause."

This contribution to the common cause, I would like to add, can have many forms. At times it will be specific activities; at other times it might be particular, well-considered patience.

In the last instance it is solidarity based on common values that protects smaller States and to which smaller States must make their specific contribution. The OSCE provides a comprehensive structure for this give and take.

There is no precise definition of what constitutes a "smaller" State. What should be taken as the yardstick? Is it territory? Is it population? Is it economic potential or per-capita income? Are political weight or military holdings perhaps decisive indicators?

I do not believe that we should spend time trying to elaborate a definition. It is probably a case where one can have a clear understanding of what is meant without being able to define it precisely.

These States are very heterogeneous. It might be that their feeling of being "smaller" is one of the few things that they share, in addition to common values, commitments and interest stemming from membership in the OSCE.

This Seminar is taking place in a time of unprecedented operational challenge for the OSCE. We are undertaking, one by one, important practical steps in implementing the tasks assigned to the OSCE under the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Two sets of negotiations on measures to enhance mutual confidence and reduce the risk of conflict and on measures for sub-regional arms control were opened some days ago in Vienna under OSCE auspices. The first members of the OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina have started their work, preparing the ground for full-scale deployment. As this Seminar takes place, an important meeting is being held in Sweden to discuss experience in preparing and monitoring elections.

The OSCE tasks in Bosnia and Herzegovina require the full mobilization of the political will and resources of the entire OSCE community. Every contribution counts. Smaller States have a vital role to play. The credibility of the OSCE has always been based on the readiness of all its participating States to be directly involved in the implementation of common tasks. Every OSCE member has the possibility to be an active "player" and not just a passive bystander. Broad direct participation in such tasks fosters the sense of shared responsibility for the maintenance of security and stability in the OSCE area.

I thought it would be important to bear in mind this practical aspect when discussing the topic of the Seminar.

I also thought that it would be important to talk not only about the contribution of the OSCE to security of smaller States. Let us also discuss the other side of the coin, namely the contribution of smaller States to the OSCE's work and - in a broader sense - to security in the OSCE area.

II

The Historic Change in Europe and the Role of Smaller States

The Charter of Paris of 1990 pronounced "the end of the era of confrontation and division. The Summit declared that henceforth the relations among OSCE States "will be based on respect and co-operation."

Indeed, the Cold War period was not particularly conducive to a meaningful role for smaller States. The main, determinant factor in European, and indeed world, politics was the East-West divide. The Soviet dominance over the Central and Eastern European countries restricted the possibilities of their people to express their sovereign will. In the mainstream of European dialogue was group-to-group talk, with the key roles assigned to the superpowers.

When concrete preparations for the Conference on Security and Co-operation started in the early 70s, a platform was established allowing smaller States to articulate their interests and manifest their identity. Neutral and non-aligned States took up the role of "honest brokers" between East and West. They co-ordinated informal negotiations and as a rule were expected to come up with compromise proposals serving as the basis for agreement. This was a difficult and responsible role. Much of the credit for leading the dialogue between East and West to concrete results and providing dynamism to the CSCE process is owed to the neutral and non-aligned States, most of them smaller States.

East-West détente, of which the CSCE was an integral part, led to a situation allowing several Central and Eastern European States to restore their historical links with Western Europe and express their particular security concerns.

The end of the Cold War brought about a pluralistic structure of international relations. In Helsinki in 1975, 35 countries participated in the CSCE; the OSCE has since grown to 54 members by incorporating new States established after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia, and the split-up of Czechoslovakia. All or almost all of them are medium and small States. Central and Eastern Europe regained full sovereignty. These States embarked on the process of building their new identity and strengthening their stability.

In the post-Paris CSCE/OSCE, the NNA countries lost their strategic role as there was no longer a need for an "honest East-West broker." But the new environment offers smaller States other possibilities relevant to their individual and specific interests.

The OSCE does not, of course, have a particular policy or programme addressing the security problems of smaller States. Except for a special programme to foster the integration into the OSCE of the so-called "recently admitted participating States," there are no projects designed to meet concerns of only a group of States. The particular expectations of smaller States are addressed as an integral part of the overall OSCE stabilization strategy.

The OSCE's goal, as confirmed at the 1994 Budapest Summit, is "a community of nations with no divisions, old or new, in which the sovereign equality and the independence of all States are fully respected, there are no spheres of influence and the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all individuals, regardless of race, colour, sex, language, religion, social origin or of belonging to a minority are rigorously protected."

These elements of a security order correspond fully to the aspirations and expectations of smaller States. This should inspire them to participate actively in its full implementation.

The OSCE thus contributes in many practical ways to enhanced security of smaller States by

- fostering dialogue;

- ensuring that the OSCE consultation and decision-making process is open to participation of all its members;

- developing norms of behavior based on partnership and equality;

- offering possibilities for smaller States to contribute directly to security-building.

III

The OSCE as a Platform for Fostering Partnership

Smaller States may have different security concerns. Some of them sometimes face dramatic security challenges. Some do not feel threatened and are comfortable with their security environment. But they all share one common desire: they want their security interests and concerns to be known and respected.

The OSCE, as declared in 1994 at Budapest, "will be a forum where concerns of participating States are discussed, their security interests are heard and acted upon." New forms of frank and unbureaucratic dialogue are being developed. The weekly meetings of the Permanent Council in Vienna allow States to raise particular concerns, express views on current issues and seek clarification. Each State has the right to raise at any point any issue relating to the implementation of OSCE commitments, which provides a flexible

procedural basis. Active articulation of specific views of smaller States early on is the *conditio sine qua non* that these views will later be taken into account when an OSCE decision is elaborated, determining the substance of normative or operative decisions. Smaller states are therefore reluctant to react positively to proposals that create bodies with restrictive participation.

The OSCE also provides a platform for discussion on strategic, long-term security developments. The ongoing work on a Security Model for the 21st Century affords an opportunity to all States to formulate their security concerns and share their perception of the security situation in the OSCE area. This is of course relevant for all States. But while some States have other fora in which they can address their security concerns, for many of the smaller states the OSCE is the only broad multilateral forum in which they can speak about their security on an equal basis. Now that the Security Model discussion has entered into a more operational phase, concrete ideas, concepts and proposals coming from smaller States will be even more relevant.

It is understandable that smaller States feel more encouraged to speak out when the other States are ready to react to their views and bear them in mind. The OSCE has been able to achieve positive results in this regard. However, to what extent the OSCE is ready to "act upon the security interests" of smaller States remains the key question.

I believe that the OSCE is moving into the right direction. On the one hand, OSCE instruments for conflict prevention and crisis settlement are available and being used. This is true in particular for the Chairman-in-Office, the High Commissioner on National Minorities and the OSCE Missions in the Balkans, in some Baltic Member States and the Caucasus Countries. On the other hand, realism must prevail. The OSCE cannot provide the security guarantees of an alliance, and OSCE action cannot be the answer to all the old and the many and different new security and stability problems of its member States.

But it is also clear that the potential of multilateral co-operative action to strengthen co-operative security is far from exhausted.

The Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security adopted in 1994 is a case in point. In it, the OSCE States declared that "they are determined to act in solidarity if CSCE norms and commitments are violated and to facilitate concerted responses to security challenges that they may face as a result. They will consult promptly, in conformity with their CSCE responsibilities, with a participating State seeking assistance in realizing its

individual or collective self-defence. They will consider jointly the nature of the threat and actions that may be required in defence of their common values."

The dialogue within the OSCE also provides smaller States with an important source of information and evaluation. They receive first-hand information on developments in real and potential conflict areas through the reports of the OSCE Missions and findings of the Chairman-in-Office representatives, and on other conflict prevention efforts such as the activities of the High Commissioner on National Minorities. The ODIHR and the Parliamentary Assembly reports on elections also contain such "eye-witness" information. In many instances, this information concerns countries and regions where many smaller States either do not have permanent diplomatic representation or do not have resources to undertake information-gathering on their own.

The dialogue in the Permanent Council and other OSCE structures allows States to get acquainted with the views of their partners. They can take these views into consideration when elaborating their own policies and thus avoid problems and confrontation. Again, this is important for all States, but particularly for smaller ones.

Smaller States, for understandable reasons, cherish the notion of partnership and equality among States. The OSCE is well-suited to foster it by virtue of its consultation and decision-making procedures. For some, especially those not having seen the OSCE at work, decision making by consensus is the OSCE's handicap. For many, not least those coming from smaller States which are not part of the European Union, consensus is an asset. It is a guarantee that they will be treated like partners. On issues constituting a matter of national priorities, their views will have to be taken into account.

The consensus rule fosters a sense of responsibility among all States for maintaining security in the OSCE area. It makes States look beyond their own interests and share the broader responsibility for overall security.

The right to block any decision is a powerful form of leverage. The OSCE "institutional culture" teaches us to use it in a responsible way. Sometimes it may be tempting to use the "veto" to demonstrate dissatisfaction or even despair with a bilateral problem or other matter of concern not directly related to the issue at hand. But a common, although unwritten, understanding exists that a single State may block decision-making only when vital interests related to the issue justify it.

It remains a challenge to organize the consultation process in such a way that also involves smaller States. But with urgency accompanying some of the decisions, it becomes difficult for practical reasons for the Chairman-in-Office and the Troika, as the co-ordinators of decision-making, to involve all States fully in preparing and drafting all the texts. It is a very narrow path on which the Chairmanship tries to ensure adequate involvement of all.

The OSCE contribution to the enhanced security of smaller States consists also of developing standards and norms of behaviour strengthening equality and partnership among States. These norms of behaviour took root with the Helsinki Final Act. The 1975 Decalogue contained a commitment to respect and put into practice its principles by all States "irrespective of ...their size, geographical location or level of economic development." The participating States committed themselves "to respect each other' s sovereign equality and individuality, as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, including in particular the right of every State to juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence." The Charter of Paris further strengthened these norms. The States declared that they were striving "for a new equality in [our] security relations while fully respecting each other's freedom of choice in that respect." In the 1994 Code of Conduct, the OSCE States declared that they "will base their mutual security relations upon a co-operative approach." The Code stated that "Each participating State, bearing in mind the legitimate security concerns of other States, is free to determine its security interests itself on the basis of sovereign equality and has the right freely to choose its own security arrangements in accordance with international law and with international law and with commitments to OSCE principle and objectives."

These norms of behaviour form a new culture of relations based on partnership and mutual respect, where free will and fulfilment of obligations guide the behaviour of States and "nothing about them is decided without them."

IV

Enhancing Security through Direct Participation

The OSCE is a political framework based on the direct participation of its members, not only in policy-making but also in operational activities. This direct participation makes it possible for all States to assert their identity and to raise their international prestige.

It is through common action with other States that the notion of partnership is strengthened and substantiated. The fact that the OSCE makes each member State part of its operational

system is also a kind of additional guarantee that their security interests are looked after. All OSCE States are full-status subjects of action, not just objects of OSCE decisions.

The OSCE offers its members direct involvement in political management. They have proven their leadership and co-ordination skills. It is remarkable how successful medium and smaller States have been in fulfilling the task of the Chairman-in Office. Czechoslovakia, Sweden and Hungary reached the highest degrees of achievement, politically managing the OSCE's work in the most difficult periods of the transition. If, to quote Foreign Minister Kovacs, "the Chairmanship was a maturity test," it was passed by them with excellence.

The Swiss Chairmanship has already started to bring new elements to these patterns of active leadership.

The OSCE's conflict prevention and crisis management activities are in particular dependent on the active participation of its members. Let me only mention the role played by Finland in co-chairing the Minsk Group and Minsk Conference, the contributions of Bulgaria, Norway, Switzerland and many other countries who in the past have provided the OSCE with experienced and skillful diplomats as Heads of OSCE field missions. Twenty-five countries provide representatives to serve on the staff of our nine missions, among them experts from Austria, Armenia, Belarus, the Czech Republic, Georgia, Ireland, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland and Slovakia.

I would also like to stress the importance of the contribution made by those OSCE States which host OSCE institutions and volunteer to organize OSCE Seminars and related events. Last year we marked the 20th Anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act. Medium and smaller States were more active in the preparations than those who would not like to be mentioned in this category.

The OSCE lives through the creativity of its members. The richer the inventory of ideas, the better the chances for a good policy choice. Medium and smaller States have throughout CSCE/OSCE history made many innovative proposals which had a tangible impact on the development of the organization. Let me mention, for example, the persistence of the Netherlands in promoting its proposal to establish the post of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, sometimes despite serious skepticism of other partners. Malta, continuing its long standing tradition, has recently advocated with success a new status description for Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation. Poland made several important contributions to the CSCE/OSCE work on arms control and

confidence-building. Spain was at the origins of the OSCE instrument of CiO Personal Representatives. Sweden launched the idea of establishing a special programme for recently admitted participating States. This list is long and difficult to exhaust. It shows that good ideas are born in all States, regardless of their size. This list also demonstrates that the OSCE consultation and decision-making procedure is well suited to judge ideas and proposals by their true merit rather than their source.

This all confirms fully what the late Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Jörgen Holst said sometime ago, underlining that the CSCE enables the smaller and in particular the middle powers to play a role.

V

Conclusions

This Seminar is expected primarily to help formulate views, needs and concerns of medium and smaller States in view of the ongoing Security Model discussion.

The topics envisaged for discussion, especially in working sessions, touch upon some of the key aspects of the Security Model discussion. Considering them will help us to find the right answers to the most fundamental questions facing the OSCE:

- how to make the security environment in the OSCE meet the hopes and expectations of all OSCE members;

- how to make the OSCE members identify themselves more closely with the OSCE and how to mobilize their support for the common cause and common action;

- how to make better use of these contributions and enhance the effectiveness of the OSCE.

We are still living in a time of transition. Our chances are by far greater than the considerable risks. I continue to believe that we were perhaps never before so well placed to achieve our ultimate goal: a lasting and peaceful order throughout the OSCE area. This peaceful order cannot leave unresolved the key problems of its member States, be these States large or small.

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ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AT A SEMINAR ON THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE OSCE
TO THE SECURITY OF SMALL STATES

Alexis Galanos

Nicosia, 15 January

The signing of the Helsinki Final Act over 20 years ago marked the official launching of a continuous process of European Security.

In reviewing this period, we cannot overlook the important role played in evolving a commonly accepted framework, by the small states, the Group of Neutral and Non-Aligned, the so-called Group of Nine, which in the capacity either of arbitrator or bridge builder and conciliator shouldered the difficult task of preventing impasses between the two Blocs and of finding contact points through which consensus was made possible. It is not accidental, after all, that the Final Act was signed in Finland nor that, thanks to this small and neutral state, all the states of the Third Group were accepted as fully equal members of the Conference.

The end of the cold-war period brought about the dissolution of ideological camps, but not the prevalence of peace and cooperation which are inextricably linked with security. With the collapse of the "Nuclear Balance of Terror" established by the two opposite ideological camps, the need arose for devising a New Security system which would not be based on the military might of regional powers or the geopolitical and economic interests of the victors of the Cold War, but on the principles governing the U.N. Charter and the Eurropean Convention of Human Rights. This by itself opens up wider horizons for the upgrading of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, entrusting it at the same time with a very important mission: To take on a decisive role in securing peace and stability in Europe and to prepare for the expected transition to a New World Order. For we have to acknowledge that the first post-cold war years, far from bringing closer such a New Order, have led to a new International disorder

characterized by the prevalence of local conflicts and clashing economic interests.

Being fully conscious of its mission and guided by the fundamental principles of universal and indivisible security, the Organisation for the Security and Cooperation in Europe, has made its primary concern the search for a new Model of European Security for the 21st century, which will exclude any form of division in the future.

The results of the Budapest Summit and particularly the Code of Conduct of the Political-Military Aspects of Security, certainly lay the foundations for a model of European Security which will bring us closer to our common vision, i.e. that of a democratic and stable Europe. However, the prerequisites that will ensure the viability of such a model are undoubtedly the strengthening of the existing mechanisms and the creation of new ones for the effective and impartial implementation of the principles and the decisions of the Organization, as well as the degree to which they are binding. Another indispensable condition is the abandonment of a selective "a la Carte" approach which tends to relegate questions of principle and International Law to a secondary role vis-a-vis narrow and petty national and geopolitical interests, with the result that gross injustice is committed at the expense of the small and powerless states, which in the past were at least protected to some degree as a result of the equilibrium created by the Cold War. Unfortunately today, the flag of nutrality and Non-Alignment accords no protection whatsoever.

However, the principles of Universal and Indivisible security which form the "cine qua non" prerequisites for achieving peace and stability in Europe, make imperative the provision of guarantees for the security of all the participating states of the OSCE and particularly the small states. These states have always been the defenceless victims of aggression by more powerful states, and this fact is particularly valid at a time when Poweful Regional states have been granted the privileged role of Surrogates by the mighty nations and especially the United States.

Allow me to refer to the case of Cyprus, a small country, and an OSCE member-state which, precisely because of its size, its recent history and gegraphical position, has been subjected, for 21 years now, while powerless to do anything, to foreign aggression and occupation, the flagrant violation of its sovereignty and the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its people. Turkey of course is also a member of the OSCE, which unfortunately enjoys the favour of the decision-making centres in the U.S.A. and other Western countries. As a consequence, the implementation of policy of double standards is aptly demonstrated in the case of Cyprus.

Flagrantly violating the UN Charter, all the UN resolutions on Cyprus, the principles of the OSCE and other international organisations, including the Statute of the North Atlantic Alliance, Turkey has been maintaining for twenty-one years now occupation troops on Cyprus territory. Turkey is preventing by force of arms two fifths of the Cypriot population from returning to their homes and properties. She is altering, on the basis of a deliberate policy, the demographic character of the island through the mass transfer of settlers form Anatolia. This has resulted in the mass exodus of Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, she is also responsible for the systematic destruction of the cultural heritage in the occupied area. Everything that has happened and is happening in Cyprus is much more grave and prolonged than what occured in Kuwait or in other countries where the UN Security Council has chosen to show much greater sensitivity and resolve.

All the efforts so far of the UN to find a just and viable solution have come up against Turkey's lack of political will and this, has been pointed out inter alia by the UN Secretary-General himself, in his Report of 30 May 1994.

We therefore welcome the decision of the Heads of State and Government at the Budapest Summit to make the OSCE the foremost organisation for dealing with problems concerning the maintenance of peace and security in the region.

The increased responsibilities of the Organisation make it imperative that it demonstrates greater determination in the implementation of its principles, the strengthening of its mechanisms and instruments and, above all the applying of effective measures against countries which, despite their participation in the OSCE, persistently and systematically violate fundamental principles and rules of the Organisation. Half-hearted and feeble admonitions rather than decisive actions and initiatives undermine not only the prestige but also the role this Organisation can undertake.

But here the ancient Greek maxim "Seek well and you shall find" comes to mind and we wonder whether we, as Cyprus, have made full use of the OSCE mechanisms and procedures to promote the settlement of our national problem and make it more costly for Turkey to continue maintaining its military presence on the island, as a number of our European friends have advised us to do. We should also mention to this effect the decisive role the OSCE has played recently in the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Moldova and the Baltic States.

International experience and practice reconfirms that international organisations are effective to the degree and extent that the constituent-states wish them to be. But irrespective of this general and empirical observation, we express the hope that the OSCE will rise to the challenge and will fulfil those expectations which aim at creating conditions of security, cooperation and mutual understanding among all states without exception - powerful or not - without taking into account geo-strategic interests and expediencies. This would constitute a significant step in the quest for a Model of European Security for the 21st century which will safeguard in practice the equality of states, big or small, politically powerful or not. And surely, in a world of interdependence where distances have shrunk, we cannot separate European security from a future global system of Security.

Small Cyprus, hopefully in Europe and reunited by the year 2000, is destined to become a bridge and bastion of peace between peoples and civilizations which will unite Europe with Asia and

Africa. It can also become a haven of security, peace, prosperity and cooperation as well as a model of the role small states can play in a New World Order.

In concluding I must stress once again, that Cyprus will be playing a growing role in Mediterranean security and will be undertaking the role of a link in the region, particularly with non members who are now cooperating with the OSCE, within the framework of the Mediterranean security partnership which has already been announced.

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INTERVENTION OF MR. MARIN STANESCU,
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE OSCE DIVISION,

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

REPRESENTATIVE OF ROMANIA

WORKING GROUP, JANUARY the 15 th, 1996

Mr. Chairman,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to point out the principles and norms of conduct of the present moment, together with the concrete aspects of the new security model and concept.

I also have the pleasure to congratulate our hosts for organising the seminar and the exhibition dedicated to the CSCE/OSCE history.

These initiatives are a proof of the OSCE's importance in the definition of Europe's new architecture of security, which is meant as a contribution of all the member states.

The political evolutions which occured after the signing of the Charter for a new Europe confirm the perenity of the 10 Helsinki principles, repeated in the Helsinki documents - 1992 and the Budapest documents - 1994, and also in the Pact on Stability in Europe - 1995.

Those principles and norms provide the solid basis of all genuine, pan-european and democratic initiatives of security and cooperation. Also a clear tendency is still present, in giving priority to the principles of human rights.

It would be in the interest of the OSCE's objectives to preserve as a whole the interpretation of the 10 Helsinki principles, each one being applied by the member states in strict connection to the other principles.

The preservation of the political character of the OSCE decisions and documents is to be be wished, altogether with the avoidance of a juridical framework of the organization, which could diminish its present flexibility and subsequent advantages.

The OSCE principles, norms of conduct and engagements - inherited from the former CSCE - are completed especially by the standards in the humanitarian field and provide our organization with a dynamism of its own - which will never be the same should the OSCE follow the path of juridical principles (by far much more difficult to be elaborated).

Some of the OSCE documents have been adopted under the impact of geo-strategical events; it would be useful to proceed to a better coordination between the somewhat dissipated committments in order to classify and harmonize them.

One must learn from the general OSCE experience that decisions of the "consensus minus one/two"-type do not have many chances to be applied, mainly by the states directly concerned.

In the adoption of decisions, the unanimous opinion is that the OSCE must maintain the rule of consensus and, at the same time, not to interfere with the UNO or other euro-atlantic organizations.

Also it is neccessary to maintain a fair orientation and a balanced approach of the new security concept and model; OSCE is a complementary part of the future architecture, based on a gradual process of integration and cooperation, along with the NATO and WEU enlargement, the NACC and PfP development and the implication of other similar structures and institutions.

At the present moment, as far as we can see, the security of the OSCE member states could be ensured by the interaction and cooperation between the already existing structures and institutions - none of them having the possibility/ability to provide in itself a sufficient basis for the stability and

security of the entire OSCE space.

All the states are interested to define a new security concept and model in Europe, in order to better respond to the new risk sources and provocations, which is precisely the topic we are debating here today.

The document containing the principles, objectives and guidelines for both the concept and the model was recently adopted at the Ministerial Council in Budapest. This text must be improved until the year's end, but before the Lisbon Reunion and we think it would be suitable to mention a "concept of security for the near future" instead of one for the next century, an ambitious project for a too long and uncertain span of time.

The process of clarification must focus on the objectives as well as on the contents. The model's main goals will be the strenghtening of the institutions and mechanisms of good neighbourliness and stability in the entire OSCE space, as well as security's regional and subregional dimension of security the avoidance of disintegration, separatism, isolationism and conflicts.

The model must sanction the common affiliation to the democratic values and standards, as stated in the OSCE documents, as well as the democratic character of the relations between the OSCE member states : democratic pluralism, the rule of law, the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the market economy.

The perception of states on risks and threats regarding the security of the new european arhitecture are different, the main task being to harmonize them and to find common denominators.

The model should ensure an active partnership between the OSCE and other euroatlantic structures, to lead to the establishment of a democratic international order in Europe where the OSCE should play an important role, due to its increasing efficiency, to the principles and democratic norms which define its specific character. It is inconceivable to establish a certain hierarchy between security organizations.

Discussions in this respect should be more efficient to

reach the establishment of a model through identifying risks and challenges concerning security. The informal list of risks and challenges to security presented by the Budapest Ministerial Council could be updated and modified as a result of the conclusions after discussions.

The work is attributed to the Security Model Committee under the auspices of the Permanent Council with input from other OSCE fora.

One can easily see that certain risks must be also taken into account, especially in the economic, social and environmental fields, in order to accelerate the human, cultural and scientifical exchanges.

It is evident the need to examine how the OSCE principles, commitments and mechanisms should be implemented to deal more effectively with the diverse security concerns of participating states.

It is obvious that in the present and future conditions, security problems are related to the countries and regions in a different way, function of their membership or non-membership to the euro-atlantic structures, especially NATO and WEU.

The key objective presented by the Budapest Ministerial Council is to apply fully the OSCE's unique capabilities and inclusive nature to develop a common security space based on the OSCE's comprehensive and co-operative concept of security and its indivisibility.

Within this space, free of new dividing lines, all OSCE participating states and the organizations to which they belong shall be able to work together in a constructive, complementary and mutually reinforcing way, building a genuine partnership. While doing so, they will respect the inherent right of each and every participating state to be free to choose or change its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance, as they evolve. Each participating state will respect the rights of all others in this regard. They will not strengthen their security at the expense of the security of other states.

Within the OSCE, no state, organization or grouping can have any superior responsibility for maintaining peace and stability

in the OSCE region, or regard any part of the OSCE region as its sphere of influence.

The Budapest Ministerial Council decided that the work on a model should proceed in accordance with certain guidelines which can be improved and added by the contribution of other organizations.

There is still a lot to be done, the task is complex and we all have to contribute to this issue.

This contribution should encourage a wide-ranging discussion on a security model, in a transparent manner, promoting reconciliation, good neighbourliness, partnership and cooperation.

It is exactely the way our country intends to act and I would be honoured to present you, during the third working group, a few considerations on this issue.

CYPRUS BAR ASSOCIATION

THE NEED TO OBSERVE THE RULE OF LAW AND THE ROLE AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE LAWYERS, THE BAR ASSOCIATIONS AND JUSTICE IN GENERAL TO THE SECURITY OF SMALLER STATES.

PANEL PRESENTATION
BY XENIOS L. XENOPOULOS,
PRESIDENT OF THE CYPRUS BAR ASSOCIATION,
PRESENTED AT THE SEMINAR ON THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR THE SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE (OSCE) TO SECURITY OF SMALLER STATES

THE CYPRUS HILTON

NICOSIA 15 - 16 JANUARY, 1996

Your Excellencies,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is indeed my pleasure, honour and privilege to be invited and availed the opportunity to address this Seminar on behalf of the Cyprus Bar Association.

As my time is limited, I think I should immediately get directly to the point of my presentation.

It is my belief that in the latest years of Human History we are witnessing apparent signs of social and legal disorder and moral degrading, as a result - in my opinion - of the blandness of the people or Governments in control, power and authority, amounting to an expression of indifference - to say the least - towards the credibility of National and International Law and, at the end of the day, lack of respect of the Rule of Law.

This lack of respect or observance of the Rule of Law, results, finally, to the oppression of the smaller countries, by the bigger ones.

A striking and "classic" example is our own Country, Cyprus, a small country, which, as a result of the invasion by a big and powerful Country, Turkey in 1974, and the continued occupation of 37% of its land, in violation of every local, National or International Law, is struggling for almost twenty two years now for Justice and Security through Legal and Peaceful means.

It is my strong opinion that the persistent respect, application and compliance with the Rule

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of Law by all the Countries of the World, big on small, both in the exercise of their internal authority, as well as in their international relations and behaviour, will preserve Peace, will protect the Human Rights and will save our World from the danger of the total destruction.

The Rule of Law and its application through the two authorities that are designated to implement it - namely the Lawyers and the Judiciary - is invited today to control the above exploitation and injustice and as "wise teacher" to guide our societies towards the Road of Peace and Justice.

The power and application of the Law within the State will guarantee the social tranquility and the smooth functioning of the Country.

History has tought us that Sparta became Great, as long as the famous Lygourgos Laws existed.

Rome became a Great Power and survived as such for centuries precisely because it was based on its excellent Laws, which today are the foundations and backbone of most of Europe's Legal Systems.

Both above States collapsed and were destroyed when exactly the Laws were violated by the strong against the small.

Our Great Orator Demosthenes said it all:
"Πόλεως ψυχή οι Νόμοι εισίν. Ωσπερ γαρ το σώμα στερηθέν ψυχής πίπτει, ούτω και η πόλις μη όντων Νόμων καταλύεται" -
(Free Translation: "The soul of the State are the Laws (the Rule of Law). And as the body, after loosing the soul, collapses, the same way the State, without Laws, falls appart").

And Xenophon, the Great Historian said: "Τοις Νόμοις των πολιτών εμμενόντων, αι πόλεις ισχυρόταται και ευδαιμονέσταται γίγνονται"
(Free Translation: "When people respect, insist on, comply with the Laws, the States become stronger and happier").

Concluding, therefore, I would emphasize that the Role of the Rule of Law and Justice in preserving Peace, Security and Cooperation in Europe, through the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) especially with regard to smaller States, is vital.

However, we the Lawyers and our Bar Associations allover Europe, the Honorable Servants of Justice and the fighters and protectors of the Moral Values and Human Rights, have an additional duty towards the World - not just towards our professional clients.

We must defend and observe the application of the Rule of Law and Order and the Administration of Justice, not only by our own Countries, but also by all the Countries of Europe and the World, especially over the smaller and weak States, so that their Peace, Prosperity, and Security will be guaranteed.

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This we owe to our History, but, mostly, to our children to whom we have to deliver a better World.

I assure you, Ladies and Gentlemen, that, during this Honourable Struggle, we the Lawyers of Cyprus, shall be in the Front Line.

Thank you,

Xenios L. Xenopoulos
President

The OSCE and the security vulnerabilities of small States

Charis. A. Zachariadis
Head, International arms control and disarmament section
Ministry of Defence
Republic of Cyprus

In adapting to the changing international environment, the OSCE has been changing internally, and has also taken target-oriented actions in the fields of preventive diplomacy, development of the human dimension as well as co-operative security. In the area of security, significant results that can be cited are the following:

- the Treaty of Conventional Forces in Europe of 1990
- the 1992 Open Skies Treaty
- the Vienna Document 1994, including the document on Defence Planning and the Programme for Military Cooperation and Contacts
- the establishment of OSCE conflict prevention and conflict management missions
- the Budapest Summit Meeting decisions on Nagorno-Karabakh for the establishment of a multinational peacekeeping force
- the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, as well as the principles governing non-proliferation among Participating States, agreed in 1994
- the Budapest decision to strengthen OSCE political consultative and decision-making bodies as well as the chapter devoted to the further tasks of the Forum for Security Cooperation

Of the above results and activities of the OSCE some do address issues of particular concern to small States. One can mention here, for example, the OSCE Missions to Moldova, Estonia and Latvia. The Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, even though not addressing specifically the needs of small States, is a very important document for small States. Hopeful is the inclusion in the Code of Conduct of the provision that Participating States will not provide assistance to or support States that are in violation of their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations and with the Principles of the Helsinki Final Act.

Perhaps it would be worthwhile here to elaborate somewhat on what is meant by the term "small State". Around 40% of OSCE Participating States have a population of less than 5 million, which might be classified as small or medium size States. Population and size are objective criteria which do impose definite constraints on the response of a State to a specific security threat. Geographical location is also another important factor affecting the security situation of a small State. Among OSCE small and medium size States there is considerable variety of resource endowments, as well as a variety of threats and threat perceptions. Even a large or medium size State, situated next to much larger State, may consider itself to share the security vulnerabilities of small States. One such distinguishing vulnerability of small States is that once invaded they find it very difficult to recover their independence and territorial integrity, unless they are rescued by external events or forces.

The support given to small States in situations where they face military aggression is indicative of the effectiveness of international security frameworks, since in such cases the main recourse of a small State is the appeal to international forums. We must sadly acknowledge that it is often easier for third countries to ignore the fate of a small State in a conflict with a much more powerful neighbor, if the fate of the small State is perceived as not affecting the order of things on a large scale.

Despite their inherent security vulnerabilities small States should not be viewed as liabilities. They have a unique perspective to offer to international organizations that they participate in, and they can be useful, active participants in such organizations. As an example, one can mention here the role of the neutral and non-aligned countries of the OSCE, most of them small States, during the period of East-West confrontation.

Small States can do for themselves certain things in the way of addressing their security vulnerabilities. Even though they may not be able to attain total defence against an overwhelming force, they should seek to attain a credible deterrent, defensive capacity within their means

However, the greatest contribution to the security of small States does not arise from military might. A strong and diversified economy, and paying attention to the economic welfare of their population, is essential in order to avoid instability and weakness.

Small States need to have open economies, they need to be open in the political and information fields, and they must be members and actively participate in international organizations. This will ensure that others have a stake in their security and see them as valuable partners.

One more responsibility that small States must take upon themselves is to always uphold the principles of the UN Charter as well as OSCE principles and commitments. There is nothing that can help the security of small States more than the adherence to international law and to the OSCE principles and commitments by larger States. They need to speak out against violators, support each other, and co-operate with each other in international fora.

Small States within the OSCE have also a particular interest in making the principles of international law, and the principles and commitments of the OSCE, widely known. Such documents, even if they sometimes seem to have small practical value, tend to form the ideals to which we all aspire. The wide dissemination of OSCE texts, combined with democratic institutions, a concerned public able to influence decisions, as well as free and objective mass media reporting all violations, are among the important safeguards that those principles and commitments will be upheld.

As a community of States, there is much more that the OSCE can do in order to ensure the implementation of OSCE principles and commitments. Operational mechanisms need to be in place that can deal with violations in the security as well as in the human dimension areas. In the security area, existing mechanisms, such as the Vienna mechanism for consultation and cooperation as regards unusual military activities, need to be strengthened and expanded. A particularly positive feature of this mechanism is that consensus is not required for convening consultation meetings to address the issue of unusual and unscheduled military activities. In cases where it is established that serious violation of the UN Charter and OSCE principles and commitments has occurred, the response of the Organization to isolate and sanction the offending State needs to be immediate and binding for all. Serious violations in the human dimension area must also be dealt with resolve.

OSCE Confidence and Security Building Measures need to be expanded in order to be able to address cases where aggression by one OSCE Participating State against another has already taken

place, or is in the process of taking place. OSCE CSBM's as they stand now are useful "fair weather" tools for the prevention of conflict and the building of confidence. When there have been gross violations of the UN Charter and the Helsinki principles, such as invasion and occupation, the effect of the CSBM's can be distorted, and they may even have some unexpected effects. For example, in the case of Cyprus they lead to the one-sided provision of military information to the occupying power, which refuses to provide any information concerning her troops in Cyprus.

Within the OSCE we must develop the resolve, and the necessary mechanisms, to isolate and confront violation and non-implementation of OSCE principles and commitments. The case of Cyprus offers a particularly clear example where such violations and non-implementation are occurring. It is also an example of aggression by a large State against one of the OSCE small States.

Turkey has invaded Cyprus and has occupied 37% of its territory, and since1974 it has carried out a policy of ethnic cleansing in Cyprus. The presence of the Turkish forces in Cyprus is altogether illegal and they have established themselves here as a result of military operations and combat. These forces maintain a forward order of battle right on the cease-fire line and hold important points of terrain. All their units are kept at 100% wartime strength. They number 36000 troops, and in addition to them there are Turkish Cypriot forces which number 4500 men. On the other hand the National Guard of the Republic has a small force of less than 10000. The Turkish forces are continuously being modernized, and they include around 300 battle tanks, 200 armored vehicles as well as a number of aircraft and helicopters. The Turkish forces in Cyprus outnumber the Government forces by a ratio of more than 4:1 in terms of personnel and by a ratio of more than 5:1 in the number of battle tanks. Fighter planes of the latest type are on the ready on Turkey's southern coast, at a distance of five minutes from Cyprus. The offensive character of the Turkish forces in Cyprus is further underlined by the offensive nature, scale and character of exercises carried out. Often, and not only during exercises, Turkish aircraft violate national air space and offensive scenarios are tried regularly.

Here I would also like to mention the fact that the weapons given to Turkey by her NATO allies are illegally being transferred to Cyprus and are being used to maintain the occupation.

The above military stance of Turkey in Cyprus has been

accompanied by intransigence of the Turkish side in the efforts for a negotiated settlement, and refusal of the proposal put forward by the Government of Cyprus for the demilitarization of the island.

Turkey does not provide the OSCE with military information on her troops in Cyprus, nor any prior notification for military exercises, or information concerning the transfer of armaments to the occupied part of Cyprus. This renders the Confidence and Security Building Measures of the OSCE meaningless as far as they pertain to Cyprus, and results in an unacceptable one-sided provision of information to the Turkish forces. In fact, the CSBM's are poorly effective in handling situations such as the one in Cyprus, of invasion followed by military occupation.

The fair-weather CSBM's need to be developed so that they can accommodate bad-weather situations, for the purpose of preventing the resumption of fighting, and of facilitating the implementation of OSCE principles.

In the development of a new model of European security, the OSCE States must pay foremost attention to the implementation issue. Preventive diplomacy, crisis management and conflict resolution, including peacekeeping, should be enhanced. The comprehensive concept of security, which is of particular importance to the smaller States, needs to be incorporated within the new model of security, and the convergence of security and human dimension issues need to be emphasized. In an era where throughout the OSCE a common system of values is being adopted, based on political plurality, market economies and respect for the rights of the individual, we must internalize the fact that the security of people is both an outcome of and a precondition for the security of States. All individuals have a right to security and freedom, and all States have an obligation to protect those rights. Security for all will be realized when the rights of any individual within the OSCE region are upheld by all OSCE States.

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Sociological Reflections on the Security of States

Paper presented to the Seminar on the Contribution of the OSCE to the Security of Small States, organised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Nicosia, on the 15th and 16th of January 1996

by

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Preamble

We have gathered here to discuss the contribution of OSCE to the security of small states. The subject is, of course, vast and, as can be seen from the papers that will be presented in this seminar, it can be approached from a variety of angles. My contribution, as I see it, is to approach the subject from a sociological perspective and raise issues and questions that will hopefully lead to a fruitful discussion. It goes without saying that it will be impossible to do justice to the subject within the limited time that has been allotted to this presentation. It is hoped, however, that the issues that will be raised will provoke discussions that will enhance our understanding of the subject.

Why Sociology?

I should like to begin by saying a few things about the scope of sociology. Although there is no such thing as *a* sociological perspective, certain kinds of sociology could help us clarify the issues that concern us here, in at least three important respects.

First, Sociology introduces a holistic approach to the study of states and security. Such an approach views the social world not as a collection of different 'aspects' that can be analysed by different disciplines but as a *structured whole*. Sociology, that is, can help us see the relations that exist between the different facets of the modern world and the interrelationship between social, political, economic and cultural processes. Thus, for example, a sociological perspective would try to trace the

connection between state structures and policies, inter-state relations or diplomatic initiatives to seemingly unconnected processes and phenomena such as unemployment, attitudes to ethnic minorities, secularisation, the strength of trade unions, family structures, and the spread of satellite television.

Second, a sociological perspective enables us to raise questions that are often taken for granted by other disciplines and the public in general. For sociology does not take the social world at face value. To many sociologists, what we call 'society' is not a 'given', fixed and immutable entity but an outcome of specific practices. Hence one of the major features of sociological practice, is the questioning of assumptions and practices that are often taken for granted. Because sociologists view the world as outsiders, they raise uncomfortable questions and challenge assumptions that structure our lives and are often unnoticed.

Third, a sociological perspective illuminates the social origins of ideas and shows that they do not flow in the air. Ideas are generated by individuals and groups in the pursuit of their lives and are often used to promote their interests. Quite often, an eloquent set of ideas may conceal extremely sinister motives and interests. A sociological investigation into discussions concerning security will not therefore restrict itself at the level of deliberations but will examine the interests that are at stake behind the stance that states or groups take.

The Global Context

Time does not allow a detailed discussion of certain important changes that seem to have influenced the global socio-economic and political context within which security is debated. They could be mentioned, however, as mere headlines: the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the presence of unemployment as a permanent feature of most advanced industrial societies, the advancements of science and technology, the spread of information technology and electronic media, the transformation of work, the explosion of the services sector, the decline of manufacturing industry in the advanced industrial societies, the destruction of the environment, the growth of transnational corporations, the appearance of the so called 'newly industrialised countries', the intensification of the internationalisation of production, the rise of nationalism, urban decay and rising crime figures. Changes such as these, have led many researchers to believe that we are going through a qualitatively and quantitatively new era that requires new concepts to understand it. Terms such as 'post-industrial society', 'post-modern era' or 'late capitalism' have been among those that have been hotly debated by commentators who try to come to grips with the new world as it appears before us in the late 20th century. However we choose to describe the changes that take place in front of our very eyes, the truth remains that societies in the late twentieth century are faced by unparalleled opportunities and threats.

This Janus-faced world - a world that offers tantalising prospects for a more humane and prosperous society while shockingly reminding us of the horrors of military technology, alienation and the possibility of total destruction - is the context within which we are called upon to debate issues of security. But security of what? And security from whom or what? And who is to give us the answer to these questions? Who is to define the 'threat'? This is I believe the crux of the matter. The term security, as I pointed out earlier, is by no means obvious. Like other terms of political discourse (e.g. 'democracy', 'national interest', 'freedom', 'human rights', sovereignty and so on), it is part and parcel of public debates and an object of dispute.

Few ideas today enjoy global acceptance and 'security' is not an exception. Since controversy and conflict constitute permanent features of the contemporary world and domestic politics, we must look more closely into the social, political and economic context within which the notion of security appears to be of concern.

Political struggles always contain disputes over ideas and terminology. Ideas, let us recall, inspire and encourage but also conceal or justify. Ideas render our world meaningful because they influence our perceptions. The same event (e.g. the killing of one person by another, the imprisonment of a civil rights

activist, the invasion of one country by another) acquires a totally new meaning every time we change the words we use to describe it. That is why the groups or states engaging in political struggles are invariably involved in attempts to develop and impose their own definitions, terminology and perceptions. This is also one of the reasons that the educational system and the mass media - the two principal agencies of political socialization that are involved in the dissemination of ideas - are always the subject of so much scrutiny by social scientists and political actors alike.

Discussions of security, then, are taking place within a global system that is dominated by inter-state relations. Such a system is characterised by close co-operation and interdependence among societies. Co-operation takes place at different levels and concerns different subjects even though economic relations seem to dominate. Despite the co-operation, however, the modern world system is a *stratified* system because some states are more powerful than others. This is a seminal characteristic of the modern world and should always be in our minds when discussing the security of small states.

Ultimately, no state will voluntarily adopt policies that contradict its perception of its interests. And yet as the case of OSCE shows, the unequal distribution of power among different societies does not prevent states from attempting to develop relations that are based on mutual respect and consent.

We are faced, then, with the following paradox: On the one hand, we see that world politics is dominated by the advanced industrial societies who also happen to be both economically strong and militarily powerful. Such societies have a lot of leverage at their disposal and they do not hesitate to use it. On the other hand, however, states do attempt to develop forms of co-operation that are based on formal equality and trust. What is more, we witness even the most powerful states to be anxious to appear respectful to international law and to project themselves as acting out of concern for moral principles and standards. To put it differently, even the most powerful states appear to be eager to secure legitimacy for their policies. One could go even further and argue that, as time passes by, the question of the legitimacy of policies becomes even more important. This should come as no surprise. As anyone who is familiar with political sociology knows, the state is heavily involved in legitimation processes both domestically and internationally.

Within the context that we outlined above, we see that powerful states are prepared to engage in discussions about the course of inter-state relations and the nature of world order; and accept states that are weaker and unable to significantly influence world affairs as equal partners in the debate. Such discussions include as we know, the notion of security. Security concerns have often been presented as a major guideline of

state foreign and domestic policies. There is nothing sociologically surprising in this, provided we understand some basic features of the modern state and contemporary societies.

State and Society

The state is an institutional ensemble that acquires its characteristics within a definite social context. What states do and how they do it, are largely and seriously affected by the *composition, structure and trajectory* of the societies they form a part. This is not to deny the importance of the global context within which states are located. Most states, though, have been established to tackle problems that arose within specific territorial boundaries and are predominantly accountable to their citizens. Foreign policies and other forms of intervention outside state boundaries are therefore decisively affected by such factors as, for example, the class structure of a given society, the stage of its development, the nature and intensity of conflicts that are found within it, the prevailing world views, the norms and values governing political behaviour, and, more generally, the democratic traditions of a given society.

Many sociologists question the view that the state is socially neutral and has nothing to do with the conflicts that are found in a given society. They maintain, on the contrary, that the state is controlled by the powerful groups of the society, the interests of which it serves and helps to preserve. To many sociologists, the state is heavily involved in the reproduction of

the fundamental characteristics of society, including, of course, the structures of inequality. That is why, despite the spread of democratic institutions and practices, a careful look into the social composition of Parliaments, Cabinets, and the senior civil service in virtually all modern industrial societies, clearly indicates that certain groups, such as, for example, the poor, women, and ethnic and other minorities, are very poorly represented. For many sociologists, then, it is an open question whether parliamentary democracy truly provides people with the opportunity to run their lives.

Modern states are located within societies which constitute arenas for conflicts and struggles, as different groups seek to improve their living standards and assert their right for more control over their lives. One of the challenges that modern states face, is the regulation of conflicts and the manufacturing of consent. The state instigates legitimation processes that strive, on the one hand, to secure popular (and international) acceptance for its policies and activities and, on the other, to preserve social cohesion. It is important to note that no modern state, however authoritarian, can exclusively rely on coercion to secure the compliance of its population and promote its interests abroad. It needs to win the hearts and minds of its people by appearing to act in the 'national interest'. It also needs to maintain a facade of civility in the international arena. How - or indeed *if* - states manage to achieve that remains a debated issue.

The legitimation processes in which states are involved, include attempts to promote an image of society that is more or less homogeneous and consists of members who share similar interests. However, given the conflicts and inequalities that can be found in modern societies, it is doubtful whether one can take for granted that there is such thing as a 'national interest' that guides state policies. A national consensus is more likely to be found when a given society faces an external threat. Otherwise the 'national interest' is constructed and articulated by those who happen to control the policy making institutions and the agencies that disseminate ideas (notably the school and the mass media).

Enter 'Security'

How is what we have said thus far related to the notion of security? States use the concept of security in order to justify domestic and external policies and practices that usually serve the interests of certain groups in society. States do not wish to appear sinister to their local and international audiences. They must articulate their policies in codes that are thought to be acceptable to the prevailing ethos and are eager to appear that they enjoy popular support. They therefore call upon the notion of security to explain their actions both domestically and internationally. The notion of security makes them appear as guardians of values, principles, the very society itself. Let us recall that in many countries, the police and the army are called

security forces, there are national security councils, and some groups or individuals are defined as security threats. The idea behind the use of the term security, is to portray a given society as being somehow threatened by something. That 'something' has to be contained, repressed, fought or contained. But, to put the question once more, what or who exactly is being threatened? Who defines what needs to be secured and who or what is the threat? These questions are important because, as I pointed out before, in most cases there is no such thing as a national consensus over values and definitions.

A careful examination of modern societies will reveal that, as in so many other cases, what constitutes a security threat is a matter of dispute. The deliberations of the OSCE on the concept of security indicate that such a dispute also exists at the level of inter-state relations.

Concluding Remarks

I should like to conclude by making three points that I invite you to consider:

First, we should remember that conflict is a powerful agency of change. Such a conflict need not be violent. But it is partly through the resolution of differences that society moves on. The growing and spreading democratic ethos in world affairs is probably the outcome of such conflicts. Violence and the threat of violence are still major tools of foreign policies and they will

probably continue to be so in the foreseeable future. However, many policy makers are increasingly becoming aware that confrontation is not necessarily the best way to resolve differences. This is partly a result of the growing importance that societies seem to attach to dialogue, consensus, and tolerance as norms and values governing political conduct. The fact that powerful states participate in international organisations such as the OSCE and appear to abide by international rules, indicates that it is not always easy to appear as if you are acting with total contempt to the values that ostensibly underpin our democratic culture. Small states should therefore develop strategies to strengthen those elements of the European cultural tradition that emphasise dialogue consent and democracy. Within this changing climate smaller states should promote their definition of security. For example, one could argue that, apart from strategic and economic interests, the cultural practices and features of small societies require protection and security from the intrusion of modes of living and thinking that characterise more powerful societies.

Second, smaller states should use the opportunities offered by the democratic institutions of the more powerful societies to promote a dialogue *within* those societies, as to what constitutes security and a security threat. State policies, as we mentioned before, are responsive to popular pressure. The

deepening of democratic institutions and practices, forces states to respond even more to popular demands.

Third, a thorough analysis of states will reveal that different parts of state bureaucracies may have different perceptions of security. These differences should be identified and used for the promotion of conceptions of security that are nearer to the concerns of the smaller states.

How can one end 'sociological reflections on the security of states'? Speculation does not help much but one would not be totally unjustified to claim that organizations such as the OSCE offer hope for the future. Not that there are easy answers ahead of us. The violence that we have been witnessing around us, at a time when the scientific and technological preconditions for reducing human suffering are stronger than ever, is depressing and discouraging. Furthermore, cynicism, double-standards and hypocrisy are more than evident in world politics. On the other hand, the fact that the vision of a more humane and safe world has not been abandoned can only be an encouraging sign. Social change has never been a painless process.

RETHINKING SECURITY, RETHINKING THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS*

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As the title of this seminar implies, the issue of security of small states deserves special attention. And there is an obvious reason for this. The international system, by nature, tends to be dominated by big powers and their politics. The recent experience of the bipolar system of the Cold War era is an illustrative case of the dominant role big powers play in the world. The form, level, and intensity of antagonism or cooperation among the leading powers of the world system -- and, indeed, among any countries or groups of countries -- may change. The main actors and protagonists on the world stage may also change, as it has been happening for centuries. But the basic rule of the game remains the same: the bigger you are in terms of power and influence, the stronger your voice and the heavier your hand is in the international arena.

In a world dominated by the big and the powerful, it is natural for smaller countries to look for ways and means to raise their concern over issues of security. Small countries cannot rely on themselves for protection. But relying on powerful

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countries involves risks and costs. And certainly, relying on the good will of good neighbors is not a principle or an advice small countries want to hear about.

The security of states, especially the small ones, should be seen as an issue of collective concern and interest within the context of an institutional framework based on international law and the rule of law. Peace and security cannot and should not be divided along state or regional boundaries, real or imaginary. Moreover, our world is shrinking and getting smaller and smaller everyday. In many ways, we live in a world without borders characterized by interconnection and interdependence. Technological advancement and progress in many fields, but especially in communication, transportation, and weaponry have created a global village, in both the conceptual and the real sense.

Modern means of communication have established global links of awareness on an international scale. Any major event in any country or continent is instantly known all over the globe and may have effects in far away places. Advancement in transportation has globalized the economy by destroying barriers to the mobility of people, goods, capital, and services. The development of weapons of massive destruction has led to the creation of a unifying global sense of insecurity and uncertainty. These changes have created a new international environment and a new reality calling for a collective and global approach to issues of peace, stability, cooperation, and security.

At the same time, and because of these structural changes in the world, the concept of security itself has been gaining a new meaning. In recent decades, while the

traditional meaning of the term, emphasizing protection of territorial integrity and political independence, remains the core element of national security, other elements are becoming important too. For example, the protection of human rights and democratic institutions, along with the promotion of economic growth, social stability and environmental protection are increasingly getting more and more attention.

Security is becoming a more comprehensive term, while at the same time it is becoming a matter of direct, collective, and legitimate concern to the international community. It is, therefore, not surprising that efforts to address and regulate issues of peace and security in recent decades were global in scope and institutional in nature.

This is a trend that began evolving at the turn of the century and was already evident in The Hague Conventions (1899, 1907) and the Covenant of the League of Nations. In 1919, the Covenant of the League was emphatically stating that "*Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.*"[1]

Nine years later, in 1928, another attempt was made to protect international peace and security with the signing of the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, also known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact.[2] With this Treaty, states agreed to "*condemn recourse*

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[1] Article 11 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

[2] The Treaty was signed in Paris, 27 August 1928, and was the result of a joint initiative by Frank Kellogg, American Secretary of State, and Aristide Briand, French Foreign Minister. It had 15 original signatories, but within a year almost all countries of the world ratified or adhered to it.

to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another."[3] Although theoretically this was a legally binding treaty, in reality it could only be seen as a moral preachment and a statement of principle.

The creation of the United Nations (UN) in 1945 was a milestone in the efforts of mankind to address and resolve issues of war, peace, and security in a collective manner and at a global level. Since then, several regional arrangements proclaiming devotion to peace and security were created, and all of them, as a rule, were linked to the UN and its purposes and principles. For example, organizations such as NATO, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO, Warsaw Pact), and the Western European Union (WEU) clearly stated in their founding charters that their goals and the ways and means for their attainment were within the letter and the spirit of the UN Charter.[4]

Similarly, the Helsinki Final Act and other CSCE documents were linked to the UN Charter and its principles as the appropriate framework of reference for addressing issues of peace and security.

More recently, another important document, the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military aspects of Security which was adopted last year by the participating States of the OSCE, makes, on three occasions, direct substantive reference to the United Nations

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[3] Treaty for the Renunciation of War (1928), article 1.

[4] Similar statements linking the mission of these organizations to the UN Charter, especially to article 51 which confirms the "inherent right of individual or collective self defense", are found in their founding charters as follows: NATO, article 5; WTO, article 4; WEU, article 5.

Charter. It also makes several references to international law in general or to specific international treaties in particular, such as The Hague Conventions and the Geneva Conventions. And, of course, it makes reference to the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, and the Helsinki Document of 1992.

These references to fundamental instruments and principles of international law link the norms incorporated in the Code to legally binding rules of law. They define the broader legal context within which states should develop and follow responsible policies and practices in the field of peace and security. References to the UN Charter in particular are of paramount significance because the Charter has come to be regarded and used, at least theoretically, as a source of legitimacy and approval or disapproval of the policies and actions of states.

The first reference to the Charter is found in the preamble of the Code which makes it clear that nothing in the Code "*diminishes the validity and applicability of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations or of other provisions of international law.*"

Then, article 8 of the Code provides that "*The participating states will not provide assistance to or support States that are in violation of their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.*"

And in article 9 of the Code it is clarified that "*The participating states reaffirm the inherent right, as recognized in the Charter of the United Nations, of individual and collective self-defense.*"

The above references to the UN Charter, in a precise and meaningful manner, direct the attention of states to the UN legal system as a framework of reference for their behavior. More specifically, countries are reminded -- or, to be more accurate, they are reminding themselves -- that the substantive rules of law embodied in the UN Charter should be observed and followed as the supreme law of the international community.

The rules governing the settlement of disputes and the prohibition of the threat or use of force are the cornerstone of the UN collective security system through which peace should be protected. Indeed, this set of rules reflects the hopes of mankind and the vision which the founding fathers of the UN had on how "*to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.*"[5]

As we all know, the UN was created and its Charter drafted against the background of two destructive World Wars and the failure of the League of Nations. The legal system created under the UN Charter to protect and maintain international peace and security is a rather simple one. Under this system, the use of force in international relations can fall into one of three categories: aggression, self-defense, or sanction.

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[5] UN Charter, preamble.

The use of force for the settlement of disputes is considered illegal aggression and as such it is completely prohibited. The Charter is as clear and imperative as it can be on this issue by stating that "*All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.*"[6] Then, in the same imperative and peremptory tone, it states that "*All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.*" [7]

Under the UN Charter, the only cases in which states have a legitimate right to use force are in individual or collective self defense and in implementing appropriate measures adopted by the Security Council.

The reference made in the Code of Conduct of the OSCE to the inherent right of states to self-defense leads to article 51 of the UN Charter which confirms the natural right of states to defend themselves against aggression. According to the Charter, nothing impairs "*the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.*"[8]

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[6] Article 2(3).

[7] Article 2(4).

[8] UN Charter, article 51.

A natural consequence, or corollary, of the right of collective self-defense is the recognition of the right of countries to establish alliances and create organizations for their defense. Nothing in the UN Charter "*precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.*"[9]

The Security Council itself can also, "*where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority.*"[10]

In broad theoretical terms, observance and implementation of the substantive rules of law contained in the UN Charter and governing the use of force would leave no room for the use of force in international relations. Because if all states "*refrain from the threat or use of force,*" as the Charter provides, and if all states "*settle their international disputes by peaceful means,*" as the Charter prescribes, it is difficult to think of any cases where countries will have to act in self-defense or the UN to impose sanctions. But as we know, theory is one thing and reality is another.

The UN Charter went into effect 50 years ago, but throughout this period our world never came close to becoming a peaceful place. Dozens of major and minor wars, and hundreds of other incidents involving resort to armed force by states have taken

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[9] UN Charter, article 52(1).

[10] UN Charter, article 53(1).

place. Big, medium, and small states alike have been involved in armed conflicts in many regions of the world. It is evident that the UN system has failed to create or maintain conditions for peace and security and save mankind "*from the scourge of war.*"

But blaming the UN for this failure is an oversimplification. Because the UN is nothing else than a microcosm and a reflection of the real world which has many problems and few solutions, or no solutions at all in some cases. Moreover, the UN, as an institutional arrangement through which countries can act, interact, and cooperate can only function if countries have the political will and commitment to do so. And this seems not to be often the case, especially when vital national interests are involved.

Therefore, problems related to peace and stability still abound and present a challenge to the international community. In this regard, regional arrangements and organizations, such as the OSCE, can play a constructive role in the search for innovative and effective ways to address security issues. The current debate within the OSCE and the search for a new European security model for the twenty first century is a welcome and promising one. For this search to be as successful as possible, however, emphasis must be placed on the creation of an action- and result-oriented security system which will be based on and reflect both political commitment and legal obligation on the part of states which will be willing to support it. Reaffirmation of principles is always a good thing, but it is never enough to give results.

International organizations, as permanent institutional arrangements, must also cultivate and promote a comprehensive approach to security which will be based on

cooperation in many fields rather than on confrontation in the military field. A network of cooperation and interdependence can be a better mechanism for the protection of peace than a confrontational balance of power. International organizations themselves, must be ready to cooperate in a spirit of mutual complementarity to lay the foundations of a permanent working peace system. Organizations like the OSCE, the European Union, the Council of Europe, the Western European Union, NATO, and of course the UN could serve as interlocking institutions to serve the cause of peace. Such a cooperation, or the prospect of it, could be helpful for both conflict prevention and conflict resolution purposes. In other words, it can be instrumental in establishing an effective security system for the next century.

I will conclude by commenting on something Thucydides, the Greek historian, wrote twenty-five centuries ago. He wrote that "*identity of interests is the surest of bonds whether between states or individuals.*" Today, more than ever before, nowhere else can we find a better identity of national interests than in the preservation of peace and the joint pursuit of prosperity by nations in our global village.

Seminar on the Contribution of the OSCE to Security of Smaller States. Nicosia, 15-16 January 1996

SUMMARY REPORT

1. The purpose of the Seminar was two-fold; (a) to provide a concrete and comprehensive presentation of the views, needs and concerns of medium and smaller states as a contribution to the ongoing discussion on the new security relations within the OSCE area, and (b) to stimulate a broader interest of the Cyprus public on the role and potential of the OSCE.

2. The Seminar was opened with a welcoming address by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Cyprus and by statements of the OSCE Secretary-General and of the Representative of the Chairman-in-Office. The program of the Seminar is attached to this Summary Report.

3. The Seminar was attended by participants from many OSCE States and from Cyprus, both from government and academic circles. The broad participation ensured a rich variety of views on the issues addressed by the Seminar and stirred a lively interaction of ideas and suggestions.

4. The Summary Report does not claim to be an exhaustive presentation of the wealth of ideas and suggestions put forward during the Seminar. It will, however, serve the purpose of stimulating further examination in Vienna of the security concerns of smaller and medium states. The complete proceedings of the Seminar will be published and transmitted to all participating States in Spring 1996.

5. One basic conclusion can be underlined; the OSCE has a great potential to which smaller and medium States are turning their attention. The need for better implementation of commitments, supported by an enhanced capacity of the Organization to act promptly to safeguard the rights of its smaller members, was stressed as a matter of great importance.

6. The OSCE should not shy away from the acute problems facing some member states.

7. The Helsinki Decalogue of Principles is still valid and remains the cornerstone of the OSCE as it was for the CSCE for the last twenty years. The main issue is how to interpret it and adapt it to the new political conditions which prevail in the OSCE area today.

8. A suggestion was put forward to enrich the Helsinki Principles with the three commonly accepted values as enshrined in the Charter of Paris, namely Democracy - Free Economy - Equal Security. While the sixth Principle of the Final Act "non-intervention in internal affairs" should dissappear as being anachronistic and contrary to the practical implications of the comprehensive concept of security and of the indivisibility of security. However, concerns of caution were also voiced.

9. It has been suggested that although the concept of the indivisibity of security is one of the pillars of the OSCE edifice, in reality it still remains a goal to be achieved. Geography continues to be a major factor in international and regional politics affecting considerably smaller and medium States.

10. The gap between declarations and reality was pointed out. The question remains whether the OSCE can fill this gap where other international organizations have failed.

11. The OSCE serves the interests of its smaller members by providinfg a forum for consultation. This has to be developed further, in order to assist decisively the identification of problems and their resolution on a co-operative basis. Persuasion can be the strongest tool of the OSCE, putting emphasis on the interests of the parties to a conflict. It was aptly pointed out that "identity of interest is the strongest bond, both for individuals and for nations alike".

12. The importance of preserving the character of the OSCE as an international instrument based on democratic procedures, was stressed. In this regard, a list of ten operational principles of the OSCE was proposed to maintain the democratic character of the Organization. This "Decalogue of the Operation of the OSCE" comprises the principles of (i) equal participation, (ii) sharing responsibility, (iii) consensus, (iv) impartiality, (v) review-control, (vi) transparency, (vii) modernization, (viii) standardizing procedures, (ix) proportional distribution of costs, and (x) co-operation with other organizations. Each of these norms was supported by an explanatory note.

13. The importance of establishing democratic societies based on the rule of

law and respect for human rights was emphasized as the best guarantee for peaceful intra and inter-state relations, benefitting smaller states who cannot rely on their limited or minimal defence capabilities.

14. The difficulty of determining a harmonious interrelationship between the principles of Territorial Integrity and of Self-determination was underlined as an often reccuring source of crisis. Federalism was proposed as a possible answer, but certain scepticism was also voiced.

15. The whole spectrum of acute problems facing smaller states in the economic sphere were examined. The close connection of internal stability with the internationally spread problems such as organized crime, drug trafficking, and environmental abuse, was emphasized. This situation has particular relevance to smaller states who are very much exposed to external pressures and rely on very limited internal resources to meet these problems. The all-european integration process multiplies these new challenges with the opening of borders, the free movement of people and the advanced communication technology.

16. It was suggested that the OSCE, having special responsibility to promote security for its smaller members, should become active in these fields which now are only at the margins of its competence. Various suggestions were made broadly proposing that the OSCE should develop its own capacity, while others maintained the view that the OSCE should try to rely on the capabilities and capacities developed by other regional or international organizations in these fields.

17. Specific suggestions were put forward to enhance international and regional co-operation through the OSCE. In particular, the convening of a special meeting of the Economic Forum devoted to the analysis of the economic aspects of security affecting smaller and medium states, received support. This task could also be assigned to a group of independent experts.

18. It was pointed out that the fact that powerful states participate in international organizations such as the OSCE and appear to abide by international rules, indicates that it is not always easy to act with total contempt to the values that ostensibly underpin our democratic culture. Small states should develop strategies to strengthen those elements of the european culture

which emphasize dialogue and consent. Smaller states should also use the opportunities offered by the democratic institutions of the more powerful societies to promote a dialogue within those societies as to what constitutes security and a security threat, because state policies are becoming increasingly responsive to popular pressure.

19. During the discussion of the features of the OSCE as a community of equal participants, it was mentioned that a UN type of Security Council would destroy the OSCE democratic system, to the detriment of the interests of smaller and medium states.

20. A comparison between the role of individual states and that of organizations as conflict managers, revealed that they should be viewed as complementary actors rather than as competitors. Such complementarity could help avoid institutional overcrowding.

21. The differences of the traditional Peace-keeping set by the UN and that practiced by the OSCE were examined. The view was expressed that the exclusion of coercive action on behalf of the OSCE renders almost impossible in practice any attempt for large scale peace-keeping operations of the Organization. It presents the risk of merely limiting the OSCE to a role as a legitimizing institution for traditional peace-keeping action undertaken by other organizations.

22. The impact of culture on multinational peace-keeping operations was analysed, emphasizing that such operations are often impeded by cultural barriers. It was suggested that the OSCE forms without delay regional groups of scholars and other specialists to conduct research, collect the necessary data and information on the culture and societies of member-states, in order to develop instructional material readily available for use when the need to prepare a multinational peace-keeping operation arises.

23. The security vulnerabilities of smaller states of the Mediterranean in connection to the challenges facing the Continent were pointed out, as well as the prospects opened by the Barcelona Conference for the Euro-mediterranean co-operation and the supportive action that can be played by the OSCE.

24. The convening in Tel-Aviv, Israel, of an international seminar on "the OSCE as a Platform for Dialogue and Fostering Norms of Behaviour" was announced.

25. It was generally assessed that the holding of the Nicosia Seminar at this juncture was important both for the OSCE and its member-states and for the host country. For the Former, the Seminar provides an original input to the ongoing dialogue on the new Security Model, and for the Latter it gave an opportunity to familiarize the participants with specific aspects of the Cyprus problem.

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