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Istituto Affari Internazionali

IAI

INVITO

Diversi osservatori internazionali hanno rilevato sorprendenti somiglianze fra i mutamenti politici in Italia e in Giappone nel corso degli ultimi decenni: prima una "stabilità" delle maggioranze di governo intorno a un partito dominante, poi un'ondata di scandali e l'accesso al governo di nuove, composite maggioranze. Vi è anche qualche similitudine in campo economico, come l'alto tasso di risparmio e la capacità manifatturiera orientata all'esportazione, anche se qui le differenze predominano per la potenza mondiale acquisita dal sistema Giappone in campo finanziario, tecnologico e industriale. Altra differenza è che l'Italia da tempo è inserita in un sistema integrato regionale mentre l'integrazione nell'area Asia-Pacifico è solo agli inizi.

Questi temi saranno oggetto di una tavola rotonda che si terrà a
Roma, Palazzo Rondinini (Via del Corso 518)
giovedì 7 dicembre con inizio alle ore 11.00.

Faranno parte del panel tre personalità del mondo accademico giapponese:
Seizaburo Sato, *professore emerito all'Università di Tokio*
Junko Kato, *professoressa di scienze politiche alla Tokyo University*
Fusao Ushiro, *professore di politica comparata all'Università di Nagoya.*

e per parte italiana:
Umberto Colombo, *ex ministro dell'Università,*
Enrico Letta, *Segretario generale dell'Arel*
Stefano Silvestri, *sottosegretario di Stato alla Difesa*
Moderatore sarà **Cesare Merlini**, *presidente dell'Iai.*

L'incontro è organizzato dal Sole 24-Ore, dal quotidiano giapponese Yomiuri Shimbun e dall'Istituto Affari Internazionali con la collaborazione dell'Ambasciata del Giappone a Roma.

La presente è per formulare un cordiale invito a partecipare. I lavori si concluderanno alle ore 13 e saranno seguiti da un rinfresco offerto dal dr. Shuichi Habu, corrispondente a Roma dello Yomiuri Shimbun.

Si prega di dare conferma della partecipazione per telefono (06-3224360) o via fax (06-3224363).

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"Italy and Japan: National and International Change"
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Roma, 7 dicembre 1995

Remarks by Prof. U. Colombo

1. The extraordinary interest of this meeting is in its effort to compare the political and economic situations of two countries, Japan and Italy, that show remarkable similarities and also fundamental differences in character, performance, vision of the future, value system.

2. I shall not deal with the political situations. My view point is that of an expert - if I may say so - of science and technology. I plan to compare the competitive situation of Japan and Italy based on their respective technological strength.

3. First, let us keep in mind a few figures concerning the two countries:

	Japan	Italy	J/I
population (million)	124	57	2.2
Labour force (million)	66	22	3.0
Unemployment (% of l.f)	3.0	10.8	0.27
Per capita GDP (US $)	33,800	17.400	1.94
As above corrected for p.p.p	20,500	17,800	1,15

While in Japan the labour force is about 53% of population, in Italy it is only 38% of it, one of the lowest values in the advanced OECD countries, and nevertheless unemployment in Italy is, in proportion, three and a half time greater. This helps to explain the very large difference in per capita GDP, which, however, becomes much less when correction is made for purchasing power parity.

4. I believe that Japan's emergence as a world power was based primarily on the use of its traditional social model with its deeply engrained sense of belonging, to achieve an economic and productive development that has evolved, in the post war period, through the sequence of phases previously recorded by the already mature industrial countries of the West. The objective was success in world markets, partly in response to the country's lack of primary resources and consequent structural dependence on imports. A large domestic market provided a useful test bench for exports.

5. Japan implemented the most explicit industrial policy, successfully shifting its manufacturing focus from heavy industries requiring a high use of energy and materials resources to high value-added products in the most advanced industrial sectors. This strategy could not have been so successful without the joint guidance of the Government (the Ministry of Finance and MITI) and industry, with its powerful Keidanren. Japan came thus to excel in technologically advanced sectors and in the overall quality of its products. A recent White Paper on Science and Technology produced by the Science and Technology Agency and the Prime Minister's Office evidenced that Japan shows a relative superiority *vis à vis* Europe in all industries, including the advanced industrial sectors, with the exception of chemicals and pharmaceuticals, while its position *vis à vis* the United States is relatively more balanced. The index is based primarily on R&D capabilities of business enterprises. The same report indicates that in the last three years there has been a strong improvement of the position of the United States and a moderate improvement in that of Europe, due to the economic crisis that Japan run into, which was hard to overcome.

6. One of the decisive factors in the Japanese success was the commitment to education, training and technological research. More than 95% of Japanese children of both sexes have a high school diploma of some sort, with often very demanding courses, while resources amounting to about 3% of GDP have for a long time been regularly devoted to R&D, mostly applied research and technological development. Industry has been the main performer and the main financing source of R&D.

7. The focus in recent years has been shifted to strengthening basic research: already a few years ago the government had created instruments for the support of firms (such as R&D tax credits, loans and incentives of various types, and recently has set up the R&D Project on Basic Technologies for future industries, which includes 14 programmes covering new technologies: materials, biotechnologies, new electronic devices and systems, etc. It has also supported the project on Fifth Generation Computer based on Artificial intelligence and other forms of advanced treatment of information. It has created the Human Frontier Project in biosciences and their application, open to international collaboration, and now supports basic research in Universities and S&T Parks. A couple of days ago I had a long exchange of ideas with Prof. Leo Esaki, the Nobel Price laureate who is presently the president of the University of Tsukuba, who described me the new scheme for enhancing cooperation between industry and academia under the TARA initiative (Tsukuba Advanced Research Alliance).

8. To conclude this assessment of Japan's position, I would say that Japan has demonstrated an extraordinary ability in promoting technological advancement, focusing on the new emerging technologies that are key to the industry of the future. It must now foster fundamental scientific research and primary creativity, rather than innovation based on scientific results generated in other countries. This change is necessitated by one of the characteristics of our times, that is the shortening of the time lag between scientific discovery and its applications in the market, and by the blurring of the borderline between science and technology: a fundamental discovery of success is often also a technological advance, soon to be translated into a commercial success.

9. Finally, Japan needs to encourage the small and medium size enterprises sector to undertake autonomous research, thus loosening the present dependence of many such companies from the large corporation, which has requested in a socio-economic stratification that exploits the small to the advantage of the big.

10. Let me now use the few minutes that are left to the time assigned, to illustrate shortly the position of Italy, in the context of that of Europe, because there is a growing integration in R&D and hopefully in industrial policy, at the European Union level.

11. Europe spends in R&D a little over 2% of its GDP (that is, one third less than Japan). Italy's situation is still weaker: we devote to R&D only 1.3% of our GDP, the effort announced by the government to move from 1.4% of two years ago to 2% of GDP in R&D in three or four years has been interrupted due to the critical financial situation of the state.

12. In fact, while in Japan over 77% of the R&D is financed by the private sector, in Italy only 48% of the costs have been supported by industry, including the companies which were (and still by and large are) state owned.

13. As far as the number of researchers is concerned, Italy has 78 thousand of them, compared to 457.000 of Japan (about three times less, when correction for the size of population is made).

14. Opposite to Japan, Italy excels in some areas of fundamental research (high energy physics in the paramount example, but there are also areas in solid state physics, chemistry and biology, including neurobiology), Italy is weak wherever innovation requires the functioning of complex technostructures, high discipline and managerial capabilities, the definition and implementation of long range strategies.

15. The sense of identification of the Italians with their nation-state is much lower than in Japan. As far as industry has been concerned, the important weight of Government as procurer of industrial products, and the collusion between political and economic powers (quite often resulting in diffused corruption) has somewhat shielded some key industrial sectors from a healthy competition, because the way to success was more based on political relations than on market factors.

16. The real economy of Italy is, however, in a healthy state, because the economy is dominated by the small size enterprises (only 11 Italian companies are included in the list of the 500 largest world enterprises produced by the Fortune magazine every year, as against 149 Japanese). Of these 11 companies, only 5 operate in industry (the remaining being banks).

17. 71% of our labour force works in enterprises with less than 100 employees, and 47% works in microenterprises with less than 10 employees. The Italian small enterprises are extremely lively and able to compete in the international market, thanks to a particularly interesting form of organization at the system level: that is to say, small firms in the various regions of Italy, but especially in the North East and in the Center of the Country, group together informally constituting "industrial districts", generally focused on one industrial sector (usually in traditional sectors such as textile and clothings, leather, shoes, furnitures; ceramics, jewellery, etc.), with a cluster of related industries associated to it: for example silk textiles and advanced machinery and instruments serving it; furniture and equipment for furniture manufacturing.

18. In other words, the co-existence, in the same typical industrial district, of hundreds (when not thousands) enterprises in a given traditional sector, and of a number of companies operating in the investment goods and services supplying that sectors allows the prompt, I would say immediate, diffusion of advanced technologies and innovation within the whole district. Firms organized in this way, retaining their family values and the local traditions, have had so far little incentive to grow in size: a more common feature has been the increase in the number of firms, emphasizing the role of the individual enterprises and a form of innovation combining technological features with creativity in design and, if I may say so, the injection of elements of culture in their products. This helps to explain the great success of Italy in fashion industries.

19. Contrary to Japan, Italy's specialization is not in the high tech industrial sectors, nor in the basic industries where the large size if the enterprise and the economy of scale are success factors. With the exception of FIAT, ENI, IRI and a handful of other large companies, Italy is strongest in the

traditional sectors, usually referred to as low or medium technology sectors, but the Italian feature in these sectors has been success in injecting elements of high technology that have allowed the small size of the enterprises to be compatible with high productivity, high quality of the products, high creativity in design, helped by a long tradition of artisanat going back to the Middle Age, diffused in hundreds of middle size towns and smaller villages throughout the country.

20. This model of production, and the heavy devaluation of the lira in 1992 and later, help to explain the great success of the Italian economy. We should, however, be aware of the high vulnerability of this system, menaced by the growing competition of emerging economies (particularly in South and South East Asia, but also in Central and Eastern Europe) where the cost of labour is much lower.

21. Italy can not prosper for long counting essentially on the small enterprises and on the industrial district model, interesting as it may be. The role of the state can no longer be one of planner and owner of an important proportion of the country's large enterprises and banks. Privatization of state-held enterprises is the precondition that will allow their return to market competition. So far, the main strenght of the Italian industry, if we take exception for very few large companies, has been the small enterprise system, extremely flexible and agile. But invertebrates are not superior animals, there is the need for a strong and resilient skeleton, and the large enterprises should be the back-bone of the industrial structure.

22. We need an alliance between industry and academia. At present, they are two separated worlds, with industry concentrated on short term objectives, and university usually doing research of very little interest for the real economy. As I said earlier, Italians excell in some areas of fundamental science. Of the six scientific Nobel Prizes assigned to Italian investigators after the war, five have been awarded to Italians for research carried out abroad (Segré, Luria, Dulbecco, Rubbia, Levi Montalcini). The only truly autoctonous Italian Nobel Prize, the one assigned to Giulio Natta for the discovery of polypropylene, is the result of a unique alliance developed in the 1950s and 1960s between the Milan Polytechnic and Montecatini, then the largest and most advanced Italian chemical company. Awareness of the need of University-industry cooperation is now building up, and this represent one of the significant symptoms of the will of the country to come out of its present vulnerable situation and get ready to play its role in the construction of a united Europe, able to contribute to the growth of the world economy and the sustainability of the planet.

Giappone e Italia a confronto

di
Umberto Colombo

Per confrontare le posizioni competitive di Giappone e Italia, è bene tenere a mente qualche cifra, pur essendo consapevoli del valore limitato che ha il confronto "secco" di dati statistici (Tabella 1). All'osservatore italiano appaiono sorprendenti l'elevato rapporto tra forza-lavoro e popolazione, il basso valore della disoccupazione, e la forte differenza fra il reddito pro-capite giapponese, se misurato in base al cambio yen/dollaro, e lo stesso corretto in base alla parità del potere d'acquisto. La forza economica del Giappone non si traduce dunque in un benessere proporzionato della popolazione, e il rapporto fra i redditi pro-capite giapponese e italiano, che è pari a 1,94 se misurato sulla base dei tassi di cambio, diventa 1,15 quando lo si riferisce ai poteri d'acquisto. Ecco perché gli italiani che visitano il Giappone non ne escono con l'impressione che il tenore di vita sia molto superiore al nostro.

In questo articolo cercherò di esaminare la posizione dei due paesi, basandomi sulla forza relativa dei sistemi scientifico-tecnologici.

L'ascesa del Giappone a potenza mondiale si è basata essenzialmente sull'utilizzo del modello sociale tradizionale, fortemente connotato dal diffuso sentimento di appartenenza, per conseguire uno sviluppo economico-produttivo che ha ripercorso nel secondo dopoguerra a tappe accelerate quello dei paesi occidentali industrialmente più maturi. L'obiettivo è stata l'affermazione sui mercati mondiali, necessitata anche dalla carenza di risorse primarie di alimenti, energia, minerali, e dalla conseguente dipendenza strutturale dall'importazione. Un mercato interno di grandi dimensioni ha costituito per il Giappone un utile banco di prova per le esportazioni. La conquista di ampie quote sui mercati mondiali è stata perseguita all'inizio con prodotti di bassa-media tecnologia e di qualità non elevata, l'unico fattore competitivo essendo il prezzo; ma in tempi eccezionalmente brevi, con la regia congiunta del Governo (Ministero delle Finanze e MITI) e dell'industria (Keidanren), il Giappone è arrivato a eccellere in settori tecnologicamente all'avanguardia e nella qualità globale della propria produzione. Termini come "just-in-time" e "total quality management" sono innovazioni nell'organizzazione dell'impresa messe a punto in quel paese.

E' possibile ricostruire, attraverso l'evoluzione della struttura degli scambi commerciali con l'estero, il disegno di una strategia precisa del Giappone di progressivo orientamento verso industrie e tecnologie sempre più sofisticate, fino a quelle di avanguardia in assoluto.

Uno dei fattori decisivi di questo successo è stato l'impegno del paese nella formazione e nella ricerca: oltre il 95% dei giovani giapponesi di ambo i sessi consegue l'equivalente di un diploma di scuola media superiore, e con programmi molto impegnativi, mentre alla ricerca, sin qui in gran parte costituita da ricerca di applicazione e sviluppo tecnologico, viene da tempo dedicata stabilmente una

frazione del PIL attorno al 3%. L'attenzione si è ora spostata sul potenziamento della ricerca scientifica di base. Il Governo, che aveva creato da tempo strumenti di sostegno alle imprese (crediti fiscali sulle spese di ricerca, prestiti a tasso agevolato, incentivi finanziari di vario tipo), ha poi costituito il "Progetto di ricerca sulle tecnologie di base per l'industria del futuro", che include 14 programmi specifici sui nuovi materiali, sulle biotecnologie, sui nuovi dispositivi e sistemi elettronici. Il Governo ha pure sostenuto il programma sui computer di quinta generazione, basato sull'intelligenza artificiale e altri tipi di trattamento avanzato dell'informazione. Ha creato, con la Science and Technology Agency, il progetto scientifico "Human Frontier" nel settore delle bioscienze e delle loro applicazioni, aprendolo subito alla collaborazione internazionale. Ora il Governo sostiene la ricerca di base nelle Università e nei Parchi Scientifici e Tecnologici, e incoraggia l'alleanza strategica fra Università e Industria. Tipica sotto questo aspetto è l'iniziativa TARA (Tsukuba Advanced Research Alliance), che si avvale della guida del Premio Nobel Leo Esaki, presidente dell'Università di Tsukuba.

Il Giappone ha, in sostanza, dimostrato di possedere una straordinaria abilità di portare avanti lo sviluppo tecnologico, concentrandosi sulle nuove tecnologie via via emergenti, che sono i fattori-chiave dell'industria del futuro. Ora il Giappone deve spostare l'accento sulla ricerca scientifica di base e sulla creatività "primaria", rinunciando all'approccio seguito in passato di partire da risultati scientifici conseguiti in Europa o in America, per generare innovazioni di successo sul mercato. Questo cambiamento d'enfasi è necessitato da una delle caratteristiche del nostro tempo, ossia il ridursi dei tempi necessari per passare, in molti settori di punta, da una scoperta scientifica fondamentale all'applicazione dei risultati. In altre parole, accade oggi spesso che una importante scoperta scientifica sia anche essa stessa una innovazione tecnologica che presto potrà penetrare il mercato. Nell'era attuale di "scientifizzazione" della tecnologia nessun paese avanzato può fare a meno della ricerca fondamentale.

Parallelamente, il Giappone deve incoraggiare le piccole imprese a emanciparsi da quelle di grandi dimensioni, diventando esse stesse protagoniste sul mercato globale. Finora, si può dire che il sistema economico produttivo giapponese sia stratificato, a vantaggio dei grandi complessi industriali, i cui dipendenti hanno potuto godere di stipendi più elevati e di una maggior sicurezza del posto di lavoro.

La posizione italiana dovrebbe a stretto rigore essere valutata nel contesto di una progressiva integrazione europea, almeno per quanto attiene alle politiche scientifiche e tecnologiche e alle convergenze in atto nelle politiche industriali (si pensi alle grandi reti infrastrutturali). L'Europa dei 15 spende in ricerca e sviluppo circa il 2% del PIL, vale a dire un terzo meno del Giappone. La posizione italiana è più debole di quella dell'Europa nel suo complesso: la spesa in R&S, che era l'1,4% del PIL nel 1993, si è ridotta all'1,3% per effetto dei vincoli imposti alla spesa pubblica. Inoltre, mentre in Giappone il 77% della ricerca è finanziata dall'industria privata, in Italia il finanziamento industriale (incluse le imprese a partecipazione statale) copre solo il 48% dello sforzo totale.

Un simile divario lo si ha anche per quanto attiene al numero di ricercatori: 78mila in Italia, 457mila in Giappone. Se si correggono questi dati per tener conto della differenza di popolazione, il Giappone ha tre volte più ricercatori del nostro paese.

Al contrario del Giappone, che finora non ha espresso il meglio di sé nella ricerca scientifica fondamentale, l'Italia eccelle in alcuni importanti comparti della scienza cosiddetta "pura". L'esempio classico è quello della fisica delle alte energie, ma un esame approfondito indica che esistono molti comparti della scienza, dalla fisica alla chimica alla biologia, dove l'Italia è scientificamente competitiva. La ricerca industriale italiana è invece debole, specie dove si richiedano strategie di lungo termine perseguite con costanza e con una visione d'insieme, e tecnostrutture complesse con moderna capacità di management. Alcuni settori industriali caratterizzati da committenza pubblica sono stati, come è noto, sottratti alle regole del mercato e della competizione per fenomeni di collusione fra potere politico e industrie. La vitalità e il buon stato di salute dell'economia italiana sono dovuti principalmente alle imprese piccole e medie, aiutate anche, negli ultimi anni, dalla svalutazione della lira. Solo 11 gruppi italiani, di cui sei nel settore bancario, sono inclusi nell'elenco dei maggiori 500 gruppi mondiali che la rivista "Fortune" ha pubblicato nel 1995, e questo va confrontato con ben 149 gruppi giapponesi.

Il 71% della forza lavoro italiana opera in imprese con meno di 100 dipendenti, e il 47% in microimprese con meno di 10 addetti. La competitività complessiva delle nostre piccole imprese è dovuta in buona parte al modello dei "distretti industriali", nei quali coesistono centinaia, a volte migliaia, di imprese operanti in un dato settore tradizionale (tessile, articoli in cuoio e pelle, scarpe, mobili, ceramica, gioielleria, ...) a fianco delle quali si sono installate simbioticamente imprese che producono beni d'investimento e servizi per quel settore. Questa struttura produttiva assicura la pronta diffusione alle imprese del distretto delle innovazioni generate o fatte proprie da una di esse, innovazioni spesso basate sull'uso di tecnologie avanzate. Un sistema di questo tipo ha consentito il permanere di culture e specializzazioni locali, e ha incoraggiato piuttosto il moltiplicarsi del numero di piccole imprese a base familiare, che non la crescita dimensionale delle singole imprese.

A differenza del Giappone, la specializzazione produttiva prevalente in Italia non è nei settori industriali "high tech", e neppure nelle industrie di base, dove prevale l'economia delle grandi scale. Fatti salvi FIAT, ENI, IRI, Pirelli, e un ristrettissimo numero di altre grandi imprese, la maggior forza dell'Italia si esprime nei settori industriali tradizionali, spesso considerati a torto come settori a basso contenuto tecnologico. Il successo italiano sta proprio nella capacità di introdurre in questi settori elementi di alta tecnologia, a partire dall'informatica e dai nuovi materiali. Questo ha consentito di rendere compatibile la piccola dimensione dell'impresa con alta produttività, alta qualità del prodotto, flessibilità, diversificazione. La creatività espressa dal "made in Italy" è dovuta alla capacità di valorizzare culture e tradizioni locali, spesso connesse a capacità artigianali risalenti ad attività secolari.

Un siffatto sistema economico-produttivo è però assai vulnerabile, dato che è fortemente esposto alla concorrenza dei paesi emergenti, sia della regione asiatica,

sia del centro-est europeo, dove il costo del lavoro è molto più basso. Questo induce da un lato le nostre imprese (anche quelle piccole e medie) a delocalizzare la produzione laddove esistano fattori di produzione più favorevoli, dall'altro a cercare le condizioni per far crescere la dimensione delle imprese. Un sistema produttivo troppo incentrato sulle piccole imprese ha il vantaggio dell'agilità, ma si comporta come un animale invertebrato, mentre gli animali superiori, i vertebrati, hanno un forte scheletro, che in questa metafora è rappresentato dalle imprese maggiori.

Un'ultima osservazione: l'Italia ha bisogno di stabilire un'alleanza fra Università ed enti di ricerca da un lato, e imprese dall'altro. Oggi questi due mondi sono distanti fra loro. Per comprendere i vantaggi che un'alleanza di questo tipo potrebbe far conseguire, basti pensare che cinque dei sei Premi Nobel assegnati a scienziati italiani nel secondo dopoguerra sono dovuti a risultati di ricerca ottenuti all'estero, e che l'unico Premio Nobel autoctono, dovuto cioè a ricerca totalmente effettuata nel paese, è quello assegnato nel 1963 a Giulio Natta per la scoperta del polipropilene, merito di una felice alleanza fra la nostra maggiore impresa chimica di allora, la Montecatini, e il Politecnico di Milano.

Tabella 1

	Giappone	Italia	G/I
Superficie (Kmq)	377.835	301.277	1,25
Popolazione (milioni)	124,67	57,07	2,13
Forza-lavoro (milioni)	66,15	22,79	2,90
Disoccupazione (1993, % della forza-lavoro)	2,5	10,8	0,23
Prodotto Lordo per capita (U.S.$ ai prezzi correnti)	33.802	17.371	1,94
Prodotto lordo per capita (U.S.$ corretto per parità di potere d'acquisto)	20.523	17.830	1,15

Fonte: Statistiche OCSE 1995

Japanese Political and Economic Development: Before and After the Recent Political Changes

Prepared for the delivery at the Japan-Italy Symposium,
Milan & Rome Italy, 4-7 December 1995

Junko Kato, University of Tokyo

1. THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, STRONG BUREAUCRACY, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DURING THE POSTWAR PERIOD

From 1955 to the early 1990s, Japanese politics was principally characterized by a stable one-party government, coherent bureaucratic organizations, and relatively good economic performance. All these factors supported the conventional view that Japan was a unique case of early democratization and industrialization among non-Western countries.

The first turning point in the Japanese postwar politics was the unification of the conservative camp in 1955 which, in retrospect, was the foundation of the conservative rule that continued for thirty-eight years. The conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) subsequently shifted its emphasis to industrial development and economic growth while deflecting public attention from the ideological politics since 1960 upon the formation of the Ikeda cabinet. This agenda setting served to stabilize and consolidate public support for the LDP and to alienate the Japan Socialist Party which had been a substantial threat to the LDP in the late 1950s but began to decline in popular support after that. At the same time, Japanese economic development was pursued under the LDP governments, and the Japanese strong bureaucracy concurred with this goal set by the conservative politicians.

The second turning point in the Japanese politics occurred in the 1970s when Japan joined a group of advanced industrial democracies in terms of economic development. The public began to pay attention to new policy problems such as preventing environmental pollution and expanding the social security program. At the same time, the world economy experienced a severe downturn for the first time since

the WW2 and Japan also felt the effect of this. The LDP suffered declining electoral support both because of its party government's inability to cope with new policy demands and because of worsening economic performance.

The Japanese adjustment to these changes in the 1970s, reinforced the impression of the peculiarity of the Japanese political economy instead of reversing the conventional view. First of all, Japanese adjustment to the world-wide recession in the 1970s was considered a success. Japan experienced a relatively stable economic growth rate and lower unemployment during the period compared with other advanced capitalist democracies. Moreover, the Japanese LDP regained its popular support and stabilized its rule in the early 1980s while many other advanced democracies experienced major shifts in partisan politics and/or alterations of party governments. These economic and political developments in Japan in the 1980s not only focused new attention on Japanese party politics and bureaucracy, but also introduced new issues such as Japanese management and industrial organization which broadened the perspectives for studying the Japanese political economy.

Japan had appeared immune from the major political economic changes in the late 1980s that accompanied the erosion of the former socialist countries and end of the cold war. The LDP was defeated in the elections of House of Councilors in 1989 and lost its majority in a Diet house for the first time since 1955, but the party's popularity was regained in the next general elections in 1990. However, in June 1993 the thirty-eight year long conservative dominance was abruptly ended by the party's breakup. Why did this happen?

2. THE LDP'S SPLIT AND POLITICAL REFORMS

The LDP's break-up unexpectedly led to the demise of long-term conservative rule. The interfactional rivalry, for which the LDP was famous, was not a reason for the recent split. Instead, party defectors *across* (instead of *along*) factional lines led to the break-up of the LDP. This split also caused the LDP to lose its majority in the House of Representatives. Immediately before the breakup, the LDP was under public

criticism because of a newly disclosed political scandal, but the opinion polls did not indicate a decline in the support rate for the LDP.[1] In other words, the rule of the LDP, which had suffered no sharp drop in popularity nor any real challenge from other parties, began to be paralyzed by its own split.

The LDP had institutionalized the informal organization of five factions as a system of command and control inside the party since the late 1970s. The potential for the LDP's split emerged in December 1992 when the biggest Takeshita faction divided into two groups. The political influence of two previous faction leaders, Noboru Takeshita and Shin Kanemaru, had declined because of their implication with political scandals. Hostility among the next generation's seven leaders divided the Takeshita (the former Tanaka) faction into two almost equal-sized groups among members of the House of Representatives (i.e., the Obuchi group and the Hata group).[2] Thus the break up of the most influential and biggest faction meant the weakening of the system of intraparty control using factions.

The dispute between the splinter groups of the former Takeshita faction had originated with a power struggle over faction management, but meanwhile, the two splinter groups came to express different views about the most politicized issue at that time, "political reforms (*Seiji Kaikaku*)." Since the end of the 1980s when the LDP

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1. According to monthly opinion polls by the *Jijitsushinsha* about party support, the LDP's support rates in the early 1990s recovered from a decline at the time of the introduction of the consumption tax in 1989. It maintained a level of 30 - 35 %, which was almost the same as the level from 1986 to 1988 when the LDP controlled the majority of both Houses of the Diet by a large margin.

2. Although the one group, headed by Keizo Obuchi and comanaged by two other leaders, extended its influence over faction members in the House of Councillors as well as the House of Representatives, the other group, headed by Tsutomu Hata and comanaged by three other leaders, declared the formation of a new intrafaction group with almost half of the faction members of the House of Representatives and several members in the House of Councilors.

was under the severe public criticism because the party leaders' implication with recurrent political scandals, the LDP cabinets (first the Kaifu cabinet and then the Miyazawa cabinet) had tried to implement reforms of the election system and political finance. The both cabinets, however, had failed to implement the reform proposals which aimed to prevent political corruption mainly because of a disagreement between the LDP and the opposition parties. As additional scandals with which the LDP members were again implicated were disclosed in the early 1990s, the public demanded that the government remedy them. Opposition parties as well as many LDP members, especially those with one or two terms, became eager to respond to the public's demand. Many of these young members organized various groups to discuss what reforms would be necessary to decrease the political corruption and to demand such reforms from the LDP leadership and executive.

The Hata group capitalized on this situation and began to allege that the reforms were necessary to prevent political corruption. It criticized the Miyazawa cabinet's reluctance about the reforms. The Obuchi group's cautious attitude toward the political reforms was in sharp opposition to the Hata. One of the Hata group's leaders, Seiroku Kajiyama, who was in charge of managing the whole party as the LDP secretary-general under the Miyazawa cabinet, believed that the Hata group's unconditional support for the political reforms would weaken the LDP.

This disagreement over political reforms provided a reason for the Hata group to vote for a nonconfidence motion on the Miyazawa cabinet which had been proposed by the opposition parties in June 1993 after political reforms failed to be implemented. Subsequently, the Hata group quit the LDP and formed a new party, the Japan Renewal Party (*Shinseito*). Aside from the Renewal Party, ten LDP junior members across other factions who had been dissatisfied with the Miyazawa cabinet's attitude toward political reforms quit the party and formed a new party, the Harbinger (*Sakigake*). Several other members also quit the LDP and became nonparty-affiliates or formed an independent legislative group. Most of the defectors had expressed dissatisfaction with the LDP leadership under the Miyazawa cabinet by voting for the

nonconfidence motion or by being absent from the voting. Consequently, politicization of the political reforms eventually caused the further breakup of the LDP that had been triggered by the intrafaction dispute of the former Takeshita faction.

After the breakup, the LDP remained a plural party but lost its majority in the House of Representatives. In the general elections in July 1993, which followed the dissolution of the House of Representatives after the passage of the nonconfidence motion, the LDP kept almost the same number of seats but could not restore the majority lost by the preelection exits of many members. Seven parties, that is, former opposition parties and two LDP splinter parties formed the first non-LDP cabinet since 1955. They were the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), the the Clean Government Party (CGP), the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), the Federation of Democratic Socialists (FDP), the New Japan Party (NJP), the Renewal Party, and the Harbinger. Morihiro Hosokawa, who had formed the NJP about one year before, became prime minister in August. The formation of the non-LDP coalition government after the elections directly terminated the predominance of the LDP. But what is to be noted here is that this major change in the party system would not have happened at this juncture if the LDP had maintained its unity.

Meanwhile, Japanese politics revolved around the issue of political reforms, especially the reform of the general elections system though there were other important issues such as the liberalization of rice markets in which the Japanese government reversed its previous position.

The first non-LDP coalition government, headed by Hosokawa, implemented reforms of the election system and political finance at the beginning of 1994. The major points of the reforms were as follows. The House of Representative members are elected under a new hybrid system of a single member election district system (300 seats) and a proportional representation with a party list in eleven districts (200 seats). The old system of the medium-sized election districts is believed to encourage personal votes because of intraparty competitions (especially in the case of the LDP) and is thus regarded as a major reason for political corruption and huge financial burden for

winning elections. The new election system was introduced to remedy this. The revision of the political financial control law allegedly strengthens its control over political money especially in terms of financial contribution of private corporations to parties. Also, the reform includes a new system to provide public funds for the party activities.

Immediately after deciding on the political reforms, a new issue - tax reform emerged. Prime Minister Hosokawa, who had strengthened his connection with the two coalition parties, the JRP (Japan Renewal Party) and the CGP (Clean Government Party) abruptly proposed the introduction of the people's welfare tax (*kokumin fukushizei*) which meant an increase in the existing consumption tax rate. This proposal caused disharmony among the coalition parties. Especially the JSP and the Harbinger opposed the proposal, not only because they had shown a cautious attitude to the tax increase, but also because Hosokawa had not previously consulted the leaders of the two parties about the tax proposal.

3. THE COLLAPSE OF THE FIRST NON-LDP COALITION GOVERNMENT AND ITS AFTERMATH

Although Hosokawa withdrew the tax proposal immediately because of public opposition, the antagonism within the Hosokawa coalition government remained. The JSP and the Harbinger walked out of the coalition, and the remaining coalition parties were forced to form a minority government in May 1994 headed by Tsutomu Hata. At the end of June, the Hata cabinet resigned, and all the parties sought their coalition partners to form a government. The result was a coalition of the LDP and the JSP with the Harbinger as a broker.

Aside from the Harbinger's effort, this coalition was a child of the LDP's political entrepreneurship and the JSP's left wing's deep distrust of the other non-LDP coalition parties, especially the JRP and the CGP. The left wing also opposed to the party's right wing which had been eager to repeal its leftist positions and strengthen the

non-LDP coalition since the Hosokawa cabinet. After the JSP dropped out of the non-LDP coalition, the LDP capitalized on the internal disharmony of the JSP. The LDP attempted to coax the JSP's left wing which would otherwise have been most hostile by offering the position of prime minister to their leader. Tomiichi Murayama, who was supported by the left wing, became prime minister of the LDP-JSP-Harbinger coalition government.

The LDP-JSP-Harbinger coalition government has continued since then, although it has experienced several critical junctures mostly because of the JSP's intraparty difficulties upholding policy agreements with its coalition partners. However, as of October 1995, this coalition government has survived. Despite the intraparty opposition, the JSP leadership has accepted major policy changes, such as the abandonment of its neutrality position, the acceptance of the constitutionality of a self-defense force, and support for the US-Japanese security relationship.

This means that the Japanese House of Representatives has not been resolved since the enactment of the political reforms and there have been no elections under the new system. The parties are still searching for their electoral strategy; they all have difficulties pitching the party candidate in a small election district while coordinating the interests of the members inside the party as well as between the parties in the alliance. The major configuration of the future party system in Japan remains to be seen after the first general election under the newly-created system.

Party Dominance and Factionalism: The Italian Christian Democrats and the Japanese Liberal Democrats in Comparative Perspective

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Introduction

Throughout the postwar period, the Italian Christian Democratic Party (DC) and the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) were conservative parties that monopolized or at least dominated key positions in party governments as well as majority coalitions in legislatures. Both maintained party unity for a long period of time despite intense factionalism and both held on to a conservative dominant regime. In 1993, the conservative party governments that reigned in Italy and Japan faced crises. Both suffered from public criticism of political corruption, suspicious links with organized crime, and the inability to carry out political reform.

In Italy, the public uproar about political corruption targeted clientelistic ties which the conservative party nurtured through factionalism running from leadership to grass-roots levels of the party. Sharpening public censure decreased the stability of the DC-centered government which had managed to survive with a former economic official, Carlo Ciampi, as prime minister. After the 1994 election, the right wing coalition government was formed and the centrist coalition of the former governing parties obtained only about 15 to 16 percent of the votes in the elections. The long-term incumbent DC was reduced to a much weaker political force.

In Japan, a party split caused the demise of a conservative dominance that was exceptional among industrialized democracies for its totality and length. About one-tenth of the LDP legislative members (mostly from the House of Representatives) not only quit the party, but also formed a coalition government with previous opposition parties to drive their former colleagues out of a governing position. In 1994, after two non-LDP governments, the LDP came back into office and allied with the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Harbinger. But it was certain that the party dominance had ended: the LDP needed to support to elect a Socialist Party head as prime minister, and the party leadership lost much of its leverage over its members.

The history of the long-term predominance and the recent demise of conservative dominance of the DC and LDP is characterized by an interesting combination of similarities and differences. First, both parties had factions - called *correnti* in the Italian case and *habatsu* in the Japanese case. The organization of these factions was very similar: they were strong vertical organizations within a unified party in a democratic system; they satisfy the strict definition by Katz (1980: 6). This definition identifies a faction by the existence of a durable leader-followers relationship, a vertical organization at all levels of the party, and a strong influence over members that is capable of resisting overall party decisions, thus of posing a threat to party coherence.

Second, both parties included a variety of ideological positions among their members. The existence of a variety of viewpoints, however, was not directly related to factionalism in both cases. Among the Japanese LDP's factions, it is very difficult to find ideological distinctiveness. Ideological diversity was not the basis of the Italian DC's factions except the leftist factions. The absence of overall differences in policy positions among factions in both parties certainly prevented the parties from rupturing, but it does make it more difficult to understand the coexistence of non policy-oriented factionalism and ideological diversity in the party. In this sense, the intensity of factional strife in both the DC and LDP during their long-term dominance poses the same question: why had neither the LDP nor the DC previously broken up despite recurrent factional strife[1] and long held dominance?

Third, both conservative parties survived under quite different electoral systems - a proportional representation system with an optional preference vote (for the House of Chambers) in Italy and a medium-sized election district system with a single-non-transferable-vote (for the House of Representatives) in Japan. Some Italy and Japan specialists have recently presented an independent claim that the election system provided an incentive for party factionalism. It is interesting to examine whether this claim is true or

false by comparing the two cases and the mechanism through which the election system promoted factionalism in each of them.

Fourth, the DC and the LDP have been regarded for the last decades as typical examples of long-term conservative dominance, but they differed in how they managed their governments. Although the LDP, as a unified conservative party, could maintain a one-party government without allying with other parties, the DC, which occupied the centrist position in a multipolar party system, almost always relied on an alliance with other parties to form a government. The LDP's strength lay in keeping a majority in the Diet and preventing other parties from entering office; the DC's advantage was derived from its cooptation with other parties to become the core party in a coalition despite declining support for the party in elections and a decreasing share of seats in the Chambers.

Fifth, the manner in which they left power differed. In the early 1990s, both parties endured public criticism of their deep involvement with political scandal and corruption. Emerging new parties assumed the important role of ending conservative rule. However, in Japan the LDP split before the party experienced declining popular support despite a political scandal; subsequently the two LDP splinter parties allied with former opposition parties and ended the conservative dominance. In Italy, the party that had experienced a slow but steady decline of popular support throughout the postwar period suffered a sharp drop in support in the elections after the disclosure of massive political corruption; emerging new parties and a revitalized left-wing party contributed to ousting the DC from power. In other words, in Italy, declining electoral support was a key factor in the weakening and disarray of the DC, while, in Japan, the deprivation of popular support followed, instead of preceding, the LDP's own spontaneous split.

Sixth, both countries went ahead to reform their election systems in the early 1990s almost at the same time as that their rules were fading. Although the direction of the reforms unexpectedly converged with a combination of a small election district system and a proportional representation system, the timing of the reforms was different. Italy swiftly

implemented the election reform, and the resulting parliamentary elections under the new system in 1994 confirmed the end of the DC's rule. In Japan, the reform of the election system became an issue that caused the former opposition parties and new parties to oppose the incumbent LDP. The election reform was a symbolic achivement of the non-LDP coalition government which was formed in 1993.

This illustration of the similarities and differences between the conservative dominance of the two countries raises several interesting questions about Italian and Japanese conservative dominance and their demise. First, why had the two conservative parties maintained their rule and not broken up despite intense factional rivalries over the previous decades? Are there factors that contributed to the long-term predominance of the conservatives in the two countries? Second, if such factors constituted the appropriate conditions for conservative dominance, did changes in them have anything to do with its recent demise?

For an analytical comparison of conservative dominance in Italy and Japan, I will focus on intraparty organization. For this purpose, I would like to pose a few assumptions about the motivations of party legislative members and party behavior. First, I assume that party politicians try to secure their reelection as well as to increase intraparty influence. The second assumption is that maintenance of the party's internal organization is supported by such self-interested behavior of members. Third, the paper pays special attention to intraparty organization as an influence on the party's behavior as a whole.

Based on these assumptions, I will show that, in a democratic system, factionalism emerges as a result of individual members' adjustment to intraparty politics and that, in the case of the Italian DC and the Japanese LDP, it helped to maintain conservative dominance. The arguments here are two-fold. First, factionalism is a device for solving the dilemma of intraparty electoral competition that individual party politicians face. More specifically, I will demonstrate that the DC and the LDP both relied on factionalism to cope with intraparty competition in different electoral systems, i.e., in the Italian proportional

representation system with optional preference votings and in the Japanese multiple member district system with a single non-transferable vote. Second, factionalism served to give strategic advantage to both conservative parties in partisan politics. The analysis will show that the LDP identified and recruited as many promising candidates as possible in elections through different channels among factions and thus maintained its majority rule. In Italy, the factional rivalry effectively helped the DC to seek better partners for party coalitions and thus helped the party maintain a key role in coalition governments until very recently.

Of course, the maintenance and demise of one-party dominance in the two countries were the results of the interaction of many factors such as the rise and fall of the cold war climate (Tarrow 1994), changing social economic coalitions, and so on. Instead of providing a comprehensive explanation for the recent demise of one-party dominance in Italy and Japan, the paper will ultimately clarify the role of factionalism in each of the dominant party systems and present an example in which an intraparty organization influences party adjustment in electoral and partisan politics.

The focus on factionalism will add a new explanation for the continuity and strength of one-party dominance in Italy and Japan, - both rare cases among industrialized democracies. The arguments here should not be overblown. For example, the election system is not the only cause of factionalism. This paper argues that party factionalism can be maintained by the reelection-seeking behavior of individual politicians, and that intraparty electoral competition gives an incentive to self-interested party politicians to maintain factionalism. With regard to the second argument, factions are not prerequisite organizations for the party that seeks strategic advantage or achieves dominance. My claim here is more qualified: the party can use its internal organization, such as a faction, to adjust to the election system as well as to the party system. This paper explains how both conservative parties adjusted to the conditions inside and outside the party to maintain conservative dominance. More specifically, I argue that the particular nature of the

factionalism in the two dominant parties was useful to help each stay in power despite different electoral, parliamentary and party environment. Also, I argue that the change and/or weakening of these conditions explain why each party lost its dominance in the 1990s.

Although the boundary of the theorization in this paper is the role of factionalism in a dominant party system, this work will go beyond the analysis of a particular case. Based on the general assumptions and hypotheses presented above, this paper cultivates a new interest in party organization in studies of party politics. Although party politicians may simultaneously cope with electoral competition, be involved in intraparty politics, and engage in government formation in real situations, scholars have recently begun to study electoral competition, party organization, and government formation together. Examples include Lubbert's focus on party leaders' behavior to analyze coalition politics (Lubbert 1989), Laver and Shepsle's proposal for a unified model of intraparty politics and government formation (Laver and Shepsle 1995), and Budge's attempt to combine models of electoral formation and coalition negotiations (Budge 1994). Using the cases of dominant party systems, my paper also aims to bridge the gap between theories of behaviors of party politicians at electoral, intraparty, and interparty levels.

In the next section, I will review existing explanations of factionalism and show that they are not well focused to explain factionalism in different contexts. I will argue that institutionalized factionalism can be used to establish a subtle balance of different members' interests and maintain party coherence. Then, comparing the Japanese and Italian cases, I will demonstrate that, for conservative dominance, factions were used differently to adjust to electoral and partisan competitions between the two countries. In the final section, I will interpret the recent demise of the two parties' dominance in terms of their different use of factionalism.

Factionalism: Why it Exists

Party factionalism has been a subject of study that has attracted the attention of many political scientists. In the most comprehensive comparative study to date on faction politics, Belloni and Beller (1978: 419) define a faction as "any relatively organized group that exists within the context of some other group and which (as a political faction) competes with rivals for power advantages within the larger group of which it is a part." Party factionalism is ubiquitous; this phenomenon exists across different countries, political systems, and cultural traditions. Its existence challenges a perspective in which the party is considered the organizational unit of analysis in contemporary democratic politics. Despite the importance of this subject, however, there is only a small number of studies of the role of factionalism in party politics that can be applied beyond a specific case or country. There are a few existing explanations that speculate about the reason for the existence of party factionalism.

The first popular explanation regards a faction as the expression of personal bonds between a faction leader and followers. This is based on the frequent observation of the origin of a party faction: previously, it was an informal political group, and subsequently it came to constitute one part of a political party. The explanation provides a good reason for the formation of factions that requires certain initiation costs, but it falls short of offering a reason for maintenance of such intraparty groups despite successive leadership changes and their merger into a single party. It is hard to presume that party members continue to support organizations that satisfy only their desire to maintain personal relationships.

Thus, some scholars interpret the personal ties between faction bosses and their subordinates as patron-client relationships. This explanation provides politically meaningful benefits for faction members through clientelism. The leader-followers relationship in a faction is based on a certain reward structure which is supported by a distribution of power and resources and hierarchy in it. For example, the study of clientelism edited by Schmidt, Scott, Landé, and Guasti (1977) includes a variety of instances in which the clientelism that was initiated from a vertical dyadic human

relationship develops into party factionalism. But this explanation, which focuses on the evolution of factionalism, cannot be extended to justify the continuity of factionalism inside a unified party organization. The personal bonds and ties which existed prior to the emergence of factionalism are especially important because factions require initiation costs of organizing their members. At the same time, however, I want to stress that party members have little reason to continue to participate in an intraparty organization if they have no personal interests in it. In this sense, the above explanation does not answer why different factions maintain independent patron-client networks and still constitute a single party. The explanations that use ideological differences, regional differences, and religious interests as causes for the formation of factions also have similar weaknesses. All such explanations can provide the reason for the origin of factions in a party, but they say little about why the party does not eventually split because of different interests and ideologies between factions.

While the perspectives described above try to find a reason for party factionalism in a broad range of social activities such as the boss-subordinate relationship and clientelism, another explanation regards factionalism as a form of rational adjustment to an electoral system. Katz (1980) summarizes the factors derived from the electoral system which influence party coherence and factionalism and regards intraparty competition as the most critical factor (Katz 1980, 34). The electoral system, in which members of the same party run against each other, is expected to increase the incentive of party politicians to organize factions that will give them intraparty supports. The district magnitude, which is measured by both the numbers of voters and deputies, is an important intervening variable that determines the pattern of disunity (Katz 1980: 30-31). The larger the district magnitude, the more institutionalized the organization which supports each candidate in the same district becomes. A well-organized party faction is an obvious organizational device for the candidates who strive to defeat their party colleagues.

However, this explanation is also incomplete because such conflicting interests may be solved by breaking up the party. In other words, unless there is a substantial incentive to maintain a single party, conflicting interests in elections may lead to the break-up of the party, most plausibly, along factional lines. Some institutional constraints may work to bind together party factions. A minimum vote share to qualify as a winner or a legal threshold to participate in electoral competitions as a party (also expressed by a percentage or number of votes), prevents the party, especially a small one, from splitting. But, in some empirical cases with an election system that pits one party candidate against another without a strict threshold, the party often maintains its unity despite intense factional rivalries. The cases employed here - the DC in Italy with a proportional representation system with the optional preference vote for individual candidates and the LDP in Japan with the multi-member district system (3 to 5 seats) with a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) - were, at least until 1993, such examples.

The recent work by Cox and Rosenbluth (1993) on the Japanese LDP's factionalism combines factors that relate to a legislative electoral system and a party presidential election. More specifically, they believe that certain systems cause factionalism. One is the multiballot election[2] of the party president (by an electorate most of whom are the party's Diet members): another is an intraparty competition among Diet members in multi-member districts with single non-transferable vote (SNTV). That is, while the party line members need to seek intraparty assistance to compete with same party competitors in elections in multi-member districts, the (present and prospective) party leaders are interested in cultivating strong ties with particular subordinates expecting their support for the presidential election. The obvious result of rational adjustments to the presidential and legislative electoral systems by party members is, according to Cox and Rosenbluth, an institutionalized factionalism. The combination of incentives of leaders and followers may be a plausible reason for institutionalized factionalism in other cases as they argue. However, Cox and Rosenbluth defy any generalization of election rules of party

followers and leaders which can lead to party factionalism in different contexts. Instead they provide an extensive analysis of competitions between different factions of the Japanese LDP's case (Cox and Rosenbluth 1993: 579).[3]

Differing from the analysis that tackles head on the existence of factions within a unified party, some scholars try to explain party coherence separately from factionalism. In a recent work, Cox and McCubbins (1993: chapter 4) explore the reason for the existence of the party in a world of rational party politicians, that is, reelection maximizers. They contend that the party provides a certain kind of public good, for example, collective-benefits legislation by which all the members gain the chance of reelection. They explain that party leaders were allowed to enjoy certain privileges because they contributed to providing public goods to the party members. Cox and McCubbins' work on congressional parties in the U.S. may explain the unity of parties in general, including factional ones. Moreover, their focus on reelection incentives of individual members is consistent with the explanation of factionalism based on electoral politics. Their explanation is, however, difficult to apply to parties that have ideological diversities such as the DC and the LDP. Under their dominance, parties were not ideologically coherent and engaged primarily in distribution issues, and individual members were more likely to compete for services for constituencies in such issues. As a result, they were less likely to benefit from legislations that expressed common ideological orientations and policy view points. In other words, whether the party can provide enough public goods to satisfy its legislative members hinges on conditions in which individual politicians regard their affiliation with the party as consistent with their personal interests.

This paper is concerned with the relationship between individual members' interests and factionalism inside a unified party in the same way as the above mentioned literature. Differing from it, however, the paper will distinguish between the creation and maintenance of factions, and will investigate the reason for the maintenance of factionalism. It will also show that both conservative parties' factions were related to their dominant positions and

that relationship differed in Italy and Japan. The following sections deal in more detail with the relationship between factionalism and the party's electoral and political adjustment. First, let me examine each of the two cases in terms of individual members' interests in staying in the faction-ridden dominant party, and then explore the meaning of intraparty competition in a faction-ridden party.

Intraparty Competition and Factionalism: Maintenance of Party Unity and Individual Members' Interests

The factions in the DC and the LDP had their origins in groups that got together and formed conservative parties (Graziano 1977: Uchida 1983). As explained in the previous section, intraparty competition in lower house elections both in Italy and Japan intensified the factionalism which already existed in both countries. But there is a critical difference in the intraparty electoral competition between the two countries. This difference affects the problems which party members face in the intraparty competition, and subsequently influences party factionalism that results from members' adjustment to it. Before analyzing the factionalism of the two cases, I will examine the problems involving intraparty competition.

The intraparty electoral choice presents two different kinds of problems for the party that wants to maintain its unity while surviving an interparty electoral competition. One can find a different intensity of competition in intraparty choice in situations when votes for the same party can be and cannot be shared among the same party candidates. In the former situation, intraparty competition means assigning a rank order only among the same party candidates. And if the competition shifts from intra- to inter-party levels, some candidates may count on the gains from the votes which are cast because of the popularity of other candidates. On the other hand, without a vote transfer or share, intraparty competition has the same impact as interparty competition for each candidate to win in elections. In this situation, to maximize the number of successful candidates, the party

needs to divide votes effectively among prospective candidates. Moreover, intraparty competition leads to little mutual interest in electoral competition among members.

Another problem associated with intraparty competition requires more careful consideration than those involving the necessity of vote division and the acceleration of competition among party members. This problem is concerned with whether the advantage earned in the intraparty electoral competition can be reflected in the power relationship inside the party. In most cases of electoral competition, reelection is a prerequisite for party politicians to stay in office and it works only as a threshold which a party politician needs to cross for his political career. Thus, electoral strength is only an approximate indicator of influence inside the party. Intraparty competition without a vote transfer falls into the situation in which the electoral strength is rarely integrated into a hierarchical order of the party. However, election results directly influence the status of politicians inside the party when the same party candidates compete in elections and votes can be shared among candidates in the same party. When it occurs, the stronger candidates (i.e., those who can collect more votes for the party under their name) can earn a certain kind of leverage against the weaker candidates through intraparty electoral competition. This system is very rational in the sense that "the winning candidates, or even those who look as though they might win, gain power," and "influence within the party, therefore, will follow closely individual success and failure in the electoral market" (Schlesinger 1984, 384).[4] In this respect, intraparty choice with a vote transfer constitutes not only a condition in electoral competitions but also a mechanism which determines the power structure inside the party.

While the DC members competed with their colleagues but were allowed to share votes among them in elections of the Chamber of Deputies under the proportional representation system, the LDP members faced much harsher competition with their fellow members because of a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) rule. This is the reason why the intraparty choice had a different impact on members' competition and subsequently on

the coherence of a factionalized party. If so, in what way a different impact of the intraparty electoral choice influenced each country's conservative dominance?

In the Japanese SNTV system (under a plurality rule - the first-past-the-post system) in a multi-member district, voters chose one candidate for a multiple number of seats (three to five deputies in most districts). A single plurality rule determined successful candidates; votes for an overtly successful candidate were wasted without allowing them to be transferred to candidates in the same party. Such a system imposed an especially difficult problem for the party seeking more seats. Since the vote was non-transferable, the party needed to divide the vote among its candidates so as to get as many seats as possible. In the medium-sized districts, most of which had 3-5 seats, a small margin was likely to divide successful and unsuccessful candidates, and thus election results were more sensitive to the effectiveness of the vote division. Though the SNTV has been regarded as semi-proportional, the low district magnitude of the Japanese system diverges significantly from proportional representation (Taagenpera and Shugart 1989, 28).

The LDP was exceptionally good at dividing votes in a system which was likely to work against the emergence of a majority party (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993 chapter 4). If the LDP wanted to obtain a majority of seats in the Diet, it needed to pit and win plural candidates, say, more than two candidates in three members districts, more than three in five and so on. To solve this intraparty competition problem, the LDP's factions became supporters of different candidates in the same election districts. The LDP's faction tendency to put one candidate in the same election district was well known to Japan specialists (Watanabe 1967, 145; Curtis 1988, 85-86).[5] At the same time, the party devised a special mechanism through which intraparty competition among different factions was integrated into the party organization. For example, McCubbins and Rosenbluth (1995) argue that the LDP divided the votes in the same election district by using the party policy organization, Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC). According to them, the LDP dietmen in the same election district did not belong to the same policy divisions of the

PARC. Dispersing the policy specialization of members who compete in the same election district was not only useful to divide votes, as McCubbins and Rosenbluth argue, but also effective to tame the rivalries between the members which might have led the party to split.

The intraparty competition without the vote transfer not only necessitates the vote division, but also requires a rule other than electoral strength to determine the members' influence and status inside the party. A clear and reasonable measure is necessary, especially because the intraparty choice increases the rivalries and antipathies among the members. This purpose was fulfilled by a strict seniority order in the LDP in assigning lower- and middle-rank positions. In order to strengthen each faction's ties with the party, the LDP factions were developed into systems of party management and discipline in the 1980s. The hierarchy inside factions was created by allocating positions based strictly on the number of terms served.[6] The main-stream factions, which supported an LDP president (and prime minister until June 1993), obtained the lion's share of party and legislative positions at the expense of the anti-mainstream factions until the 1970. But the LDP developed the so-called "all mainstream factional system" which assigned the positions more equally to the presidential faction and the non-presidential factions (Kato 1994). This change would contribute to maintaining the unity of the party in the sense that it would prevent a split along factional lines. The equalization between members in different factions increased. Also, the size of the faction to which the party members belonged became irrelevant for determining such appointments.

But, the employment of the seniority system does not always prevent party members from being dissatisfied both with the party and the faction which served as agents to allocate the position directly to them. First of all, the strict application of seniority order is difficult - especially in decisions of higher-ranking positions whose numbers are limited. Even with the same number of terms served for office, there are differences between those who are relatively better off and worse off. Among positions at the same level, for example, party committee policy chairs, some are more attractive than others. Second,

backbenchers who are subject to factional leadership and party discipline need to be reassured constantly that their compliance now will be paid back in the future after serving more terms. At the same time, the expectation of rewards, i.e., higher positions and status and increasing influence, should be large enough to make the backbenchers put up with the current compliance. Because future uncertainty increases without effective assurances, the backbenchers are more likely to feel that present costs exceed future rewards. Consequently, even under the seniority system, more experienced members may be dissatisfied with their assigned positions compared with those of their fellow members, and the voluntary compliance of backbenchers is not necessarily guaranteed. The LDP was able to adjust to the challneges of such intraparty competition by using factions, but this adjustment was not necessarily fail-safe.

Thus the dissatisfaction of some experienced members and the antipathy of backbenchers toward the leaders explain the failing coherence of factions and the disunity of the party which ushered in the LDP break-up in 1993. First of all, in the biggest Takeshita faction, the conflicts among seven next generation leaders under two top leaders divided the faction into two new factions. This split in the biggest faction resulted in the defection of one of the two splinter factions and the subsequent formation of a new party. Second, the backbenchers gained their voices during this process. Groups and organizations across party lines, which had rarely appeared during the long-term dominance of the LDP, had been forming since 1992; nine junior members headed by a senior member formed a new party, Harbinger. Backbenchers remaining in the party increased their criticism of the leaders, and this could no longer be controlled by the hierarchical order of each faction tied with party executives.[7] The LDP split apart without waiting for elections. The members' interests within the party explain the split and the loss of any organizational coherence in the party. Their dissatisfaction with the present situation of the party and factions, rather than their concerns about elections, caused this change.[8] At the same time, it is important to note that the party split *across* instead of *along* the line

which divides the factions. This means that the organizational adjustment of the LDP throughout the 1980s contributed to taming the interfactional rivalries but the same discipline system was unable to prevent members from becoming dissatisfied with the increasing faction held control over them. I will return to this point later.

In a proportional representation system with optional preference votes for the lower house - the Chamber of Deputies in Italy - (in the 1994 election, a new electoral system was first implemented, as explained later, and proportional representation with optional preference votes was abandoned), the voters chose a party, more precisely, a list of candidates presented by a particular party. Until the referendum in 1991, they were also allowed to vote for plural (three or four in the largest case) candidates in the party list which they chose. The seats were first allocated to different parties in proportion to the party voting and then were assigned candidates in the same party based on preference voting. The party provided its own list to the electorate, but the election of each candidate was strictly determined by a rank order in the number of preference votes which she or he obtained in elections. A medium sized election district (thirty-two election districts throughout the nation) encouraged the candidates to cultivate personal votes through the media (Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 56), by pork-barrel politics and the network of party activists (Zuckerman 1979, 64-69; Hine 1993, 131). In the same way as politicians in the LDP, the DC politicians sought organizational support inside the party; the faction served as an agent of their competition with same-party candidates. But, the intraparty choice was not a zero-sum game for party members because the same-party competitors could share the votes under the rule of proportional representation. Also, the party did not need to divide votes a prioi because the votes were eventually shared by party members.

This difference between the electoral systems in Italy and Japan shows that factionalism was accelerated by the legislative members' adjustment to the electoral system in each party in quite a different way. While the Japanese SNTV rule made inevitable the intraparty competition between different factional candidates as far as the LDP sought to

win a majority, the intraparty competition of the DC was rather a device to facilitate the power entrenchment inside the party using the preference voting system. More specifically, the Italian proportional representation system made the result of intraparty competition a legitimate measure to determine each member's status inside the party. Because of preference votes, the popular candidates' contribution to party votes was visible, and this increased superior candidates' influence inside the party. Consequently, "[i]n contests for the control of party and government positions, the relative strength of the competitors is measured in a large part by the amount of preference votes obtained in party and government elections." (Zuckerman 1979, 67). The number of seats is simply allocated to the election districts in proportion with the population, and thus the number of votes became a common criterion of a specific candidate's popularity across the nation (Morita 1993, 72).

The detailed examination of preference voting in the Italian proportional representation system by Katz (1980, 74-79) shows that the party's list order was generally a good predictor of successful candidates. More importantly, he presents evidence that the voters cast preference votes because of their own personal judgment rather than party endorsements of the list.[9] For example, those who were popular in preference voting included some well-known politicians, such as Andreotti, Fanfani (both from the DC), and Craxi (the Socialist Party, PSI), who repeatedly served as prime ministers or cabinet ministers and exercised influence over Italian politics for a long period.

Before the decrease in the maximum number of preference votes (from 3 or 4 to 1) in 1991, the popular candidate could solicit votes for lesser-known candidates by including them in "an unofficial internal 'slate'" (Hine 1993, 131).[10] This system further guaranteed compliance by followers with their boss who provided direct electoral protection, and made electoral strength an indispensable part of the party governing structure. Those who voted for the DC used preference votes more frequently than those who voted for other parties (Zuckerman 1979, 65-67).

It is not a coincidence that the DC experienced a major defeat in the April 1992 parliamentary elections, the first elections after the single preference vote was introduced. Hine summarizes the aim and expected consequence of it (Hine 1993, p.131):

> The aim was to limit the extent of this internal electoral battle, and remove the incentive for alliances [of candidates]. ... Eventually, such a mechanic may assist in dissolving the rigidity of factional alliances, but the habits of mind induced by many years of patron-client networking will take some time to erode.

In retrospect, the erosion of factionlism occurred sooner than Hine expected. There are certainly other factors which contributed to this erosion (i.e., the public criticism of clientelism and the corrupt political relationship based on a factional network) but the introduction of the single preference vote is also an important step that led to the introduction of a new election system.

In this way, under the previous electoral system in Italy, popular candidates provided the party with votes which amounted to more than those needed for their own elections, and thus legitimately claimed more influence and advantage inside the party. Since the strength of each candidate in elections was more easily translated to and reflected in intraparty influence, the Italian DC and its members escaped the dilemmas which its counterparts in Japan faced. Moreover, the intraparty electoral competition constituted an important part of a mechanism inside the party which determined the influence and status of each member. Consequently, as far as electoral politics are concerned, factionalism in the Italian DC produced far fewer contradictions for individual members' interest in electoral politics and party organizational arrangement than that in the Japanese LDP.

Faction as an Agent of Interparty Competition

While the DC faced fewer problems than the LDP in the relationship between party dominance and the election system, the DC needed continuous adjustments and shifts in strategy for coalition formation and interparty bargaining to maintain its dominance. This

seems to be explained by a difference between the LDP's complete and total dominance in terms of vote and seat shares and a slow but steady erosion of popular support for the DC throughout the postwar period (Table 2). But this explanation is relevant only if the LDP would have responded to a loss of majority position in the same way as the DC did thus far. When the LDP remained a major party but lost a majority in the House of Representatives in 1993, however, it failed to make a coalition with other parties and was subsequently deprived of governing power. Thus, the question here is: why the DC succeeded in being a rock-base of successive coalition governments throughout the postwar period until very recently while the LDP, which should have been in a more advantageous position in terms of share of seats and votes, proved to be an unpopular coalition partner in 1993.[11]

This section will explain this divergence between the two parties in terms of their interparty bargaining strategy which was shaped both by partisan position and party factionalism. More specifically, I pay attention to the differences in partisan positions in the two conservative parties, the DC as a centrist party and the LDP as unified conservatives, respectively. The two parties are both regarded as conservative in the sense that they have been anti-communist, pro-capitalist, and relatively reform oriented, but far from eager to pursue social democratic reforms. Thus, different positions in ideological dimensions in the partisan politics of both countries derive from constellations of other parties. These differences are expected to influence both parties' behavior to pursue dominance. Let me begin with the Japanese case.

Until 1992, the LDP attracted the support of voters located from center to right. Weak centrist parties and a relatively strong leftist bloc influenced the peculiar position of the conservative party (see the Japanese case in Figure 1). The center parties that emerged since the 1960s claimed only 20 percent of the vote (to total votes cast) at their peak in the mid-1970s. The largest opposition party was the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) with a declining vote share from more than 30 percent in the 1950s (immediately after the merge

of the right and left wings of the socialists) to less than 20 percent in the 1980s. The Japan Communist Party (JCP) maintained about an 8-10 percent vote share with a slight downward trend since the 1970s. In such a situation, small middle-of-the-road parties could not help but vacillate between the two giants, the LDP and the JSP, instead of becoming vote-casting parties in a legislative majority formation and a governing coalition.

The LDP's electoral adjustment using factionalism limited the growth potential of the centrist parties. Sponsorship by party factions helped the LDP recruit several conservative candidates in the same election districts. This recruitment prevented the fragmentation of the conservative camp. Both the need for political endorsement and the need for campaign funds motivated the candidates to join the LDP factions. Moreover, the LDP even extended the search for moderately conservative candidates. The LDP's ideological diversity and the importance of a personal vote in the medium-sized election districts encouraged such candidates to seek the support of conservative factions in elections and to join the LDP if elected. Consequently, it prevented the fragmentation of the conservative camp and increased the dilemma for centrist parties.

Of course, the weakness of centrism may be attributed to the incomplete organizations of the middle-of-the-road parties in Japan. The Clean Government Party (CGP), which was based on a religious organization, has suffered from this original image despite its formal declaration of a division between politics and religion in 1970, and it failed to attract a core support group beyond the boundary of religious sympathizers. The Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), which was formed from a splinter group of Socialists, had difficulty increasing support among moderately conservative voters.[12] However, the LDP's electoral adjustment to use the faction was an important factor in fortifying the partisan formula which advantaged the LDP at the expense of the centrist parties.

The expansion of the Tanaka faction from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s demonstrates that using factional rivalry to increase faction size facilitated identification and recruitment of promising candidates and resulted in maintenance or increase of the entire

party's seats in the Diet. Table 1 shows that the Tanaka faction, which had been the second largest faction in 1972, became the largest one in 1983. The Tanaka faction increased its size significantly in the mid-1980. Anecdotal and observational evidence indicate that the Tanaka faction did so first by luring conservative independents and non-faction legislative members and then by finding and supporting new candidates. (Asahi Shimbunsha 1985, 144-50 and 109-211). The election results in 1983 and 1986 specifically demonstrated that the Tanaka faction increased its size by seeking more newcomers as candidates and helping them more successfully than the other factions.

In the 1983 general elections immediately after the guilty verdict of Kakuei Tanaka in the Lockeed trial, the LDP decreased its previous 286 seats to 250 in the House of Representatives but the Tanaka faction decreased its members by only 2. As a result, its postelection size, 62, in the House of Representatives was far bigger than the second largest faction, the Suzuki faction, which previously had had 62 members but decreased them to 50. Because many incumbent politicians of the Tanaka faction were expected to face an uphill campaign because of the implication with the political scandal of their faction head Tanaka, the faction chose as many promising candidates as possible among the politically hopeful.[13] In this election, the Tanaka faction pitted 17 newcomers in different multiple-member districts and succeeded in electing 9 of them.[14]

In the 1986 simultaneous elections of both Houses of the Diet, the LDP increased its seats in the House of Representatives from 250 to 304. The Tanaka faction contributed the increase of 21 LDP legislative members, and there were 14 newcomers among them.[15] The LDP factions needed to have many new candidates win in the elections in order to increase its size because a very few incumbents moved from one faction to another and the number of nonfaction affiliates decreased. This competition over successful newcomers often resulted in sustaining or increasing the entire party's power. As mentioned above, evidence of the expansion of the Tanaka faction confirmed this.

While the Japanese LDP maintained its clear and total dominance until the end of the 1980s, the Italian DC, which had suffered from a narrowing electoral base during the last four decades, managed to stay in office as a key party in coalition formations until recently. The DC's rule encountered many challenges, but was stable in the sense that it continued to adjust to such changes. During most of the 1980s, the DC gave up the prime ministership to other parties (mostly the PSI) in order to obtain coalition partners until it regained the prime ministership in 1987.

The party system in which the DC dominated is characterized as "polarized pluralism" (Sartori 1976: 131-45). Powell (1987, 174) contends that four out of the eight features of polarized pluralism listed by Sartori are enough to identify the system.[16] These major characteristics are 1) the presence of a relevant antisystem party, 2) the existence of bilateral oppositions (to the government), 3) the occupation by a party or (a group of parties) of the metrical center of the system, 4) the polarization of the system, i.e., ideological distance of the parties. Among them, the prevalence of centrifugal drives over the centripetal ones, i.e., "a persistent loss of *votes* to one of the extreme ends (or even to both)" (Sartori 1976, 136) is important here, because, if this prediction were prescient, the DC, which occupied the metrical center, was destined to lose its dominant position.

This change, however, did not happen to the DC until the early 1990s. The centrifugal drive did not occur despite the erosion of popular support for the centrist DC in the 1970s and 80s. Daalder (1983) contends that the vote share of the DC declined as Sartori suggests, but some previously antisystem parties became prosystem (the case of the PSI) or came halfway to a prosystem mentality (the case of the PCI). Powell's (1987) comparative study of polarized pluralism also supports Daalder's argument by showing that the centrifugal drives and outbidding of political promises and appeals were absent.[17] As a result, instead of suffering from bipolarity, the DC included both moderately right and left parties in its governing coalition and asserted a center dominant position in coalition governments. This shows that the DC maintained its dominance *because of* rather than

despite its centrist position.[18] The centrist position actually allowed the DC to reach out to both sides of the ideological spectrum.

The reason for this lies in the DC's own coalition behavior. First, the DC intentionally isolated the extreme right and left and encouraged "the tripolar structure of the system" and made its centrist position as a key for coalition formations. This orientation was necessary because the DC faced a strong leftist camp, especially the Communists (PCI) whose strategy was to aim at "establishing a classic bipolar party system and government alteration' (Donovan 1989, 114). The DC made the PCI illegitimate by utilizing factors related to international politics and the maintenance of a capitalist economy and successfully isolated the PCI from the government. This isolation was made independently of the popular support for the PCI and was a part of an important strategy for party dominance of the DC (Arian and Barns 1974). After it was forced to accept PCI as a coalition partner in the parliament in 1976, the DC did not assign a cabinet position to the PCI. This exclusion of the strong left contender from executive power contributed to preventing it from becoming a viable alternative in governing. Thus the DC maintained a tripolar structure instead of a bipolar structure which allowed the alteration of government.

What to be noted here is that the DC's factions contributed to the maintenance of a tripoilar structure in the party system described above. First of all, the factions helped the party make a coalition with different parties. The study of multi-party government by Laver and Schofield (1990, 20-22) distinguishes unitary and factionalized parties as coalition actors. It points to the Italian DC as a typical example of the latter. According to Laver and Schonfield, the party which is a unitary coalition actor has a "single policy position" which makes its policy affinities with other parties "unambiguous," and thus has a "single set of preferences concerning the range of potential coalitions": in this situation, coalition bargaining takes place between party leaders. In contrast, the party which is a coalition of factions has a "range of policy positions" which makes its policy affinities with other parties "ambiguous;" it has "internally conflicting sets of preferences concerning a

range of potential coalitions": the negotiation for coalition formation is multilateral and done by faction leaders.

This simplified picture fits nicely with the observation presented by a comprehensive study of the DC's factions (Zuckerman 1979, 148-54). In Italy under the DC-dominated coalition, the government was formed through competition between DC's factions and was dissolved by their conflicting interests. Factions competed for a more favorable coalition formula to obtain more influence in the party and cabinet. Though the party and cabinet positions were allocated to each faction based roughly on proportional representation of the number of delegates in the Party Congress (Hine 1993, 132), there was still room for competition for influence-seeking factions. In other words, the coalition building was largely influenced by the power struggle between different party leaders seeking the influence of their own factions. In his comparative study of parties' policymaking and coalition behavior of different democracies, Lubbert also concludes that in Italy the coalition formation by the DC was explained mainly by the party leaders' motivation to secure their power inside the party while maintaining the DC's dominance (Lubbert 1986, p.246).

The coalition formation by the factions is the reason why Italian politics showed both instability - a succession of short-lived coalition governments - and stability - the unchanging dominant role of the DC in the coalitions. Different policy orientations, especially between left and non-left factions (Zuckerman 1976, 113-20), and the manifestation of different party strategies by factions made various coalition options available for the party through factional competition. The coalition bargaining using factions led to the successful inclusion since the late 1970s of the PSI in the government coalition, and the PCI's cooperation in the legislature from outside the government in the mid-1970s. The occasional co-optation with both leftist parties contributed to making the previously anti-system parties more cooperative with the government without losing the

DC's dominant position and restored the tripolar structure despite the slow downturn in popular support for the DC.

Discussion

Thus far, this study has shown that factionalism in the two conservative parties in Italy and Japan served individual legislative members' interests in electoral and intraparty politics and was utilized when they pursued dominance in the party system. A comparison of two countries such as the one presented here often confront the following questions. Why are they being compared? What are the general implications of the study? In the cases of Italian and Japanese conservative dominance, the theorization obtained from such a comparison can be examined against the evidence provided by the recent changes in the politics of both countries. To what extent and in what way do the theoretical implication obtained from the present comparison of two conservative parties (until 1993) explain the recent demise of their dominance? I will now answer these questions.

One may hold suspect the comparability of conservative dominance of the two countries because the one-party dominant regimes between Italy and Japan differed in terms of the political institutions into which they were placed, the partisan politics which they faced, and the extent of dominance which they enjoyed in the party system. To answer such criticism, I would like to emphasize that this study did not aim to show similarities between the two cases. Except for their conservative dominance in partisan politics and the factionalism in intraparty politics, the Italian DC and the Japanese LDP were different in many ways. What I have shown in this study is a close linkage between factionalism and individual legislative members' interests, and the influence of that factionalism over party behavior. Differences between the two parties, such as in the electoral system, partisan dynamics, and advantage over other parties, have been used to illuminate their distinctive adjustment patterns. The diversity of the cases fortifies instead of weakening the argument that emphasizes the role of factionalism in intraparty and interparty politics. This is because

a comparison of the two countries shows that, despite different circumstantial conditions, factionalism is related to individual legislative members' interests and is used as a means to pursue party dominance in both cases.

A comparison of the two cases also illustrate the different relationships between individual legislative members and the organizational consequences of a party with factions. The different interests of members in staying in the party and belonging to a faction would influence both the possibility for and the way the party splits as Table 3 shows. As explained thus far, the Italian Christian Democrats had a strong interest in staying both in a party and in a faction because of the optional preferential voting system used in a proportional representation system. Under this system, factions were important agents for the intraparty competition and were also used for power entrenchment by faction leaders inside the party. At the same time, factional rivalries were unlikely to split the party because the votes for which the party candidates competed were eventually distributed to the entire party under the proportional representation system. Thus, the DC maintained its unity until 1993 while the factions were reorganized as the intraparty power balance changed. This situation corresponded to the alteration between cases 1 and 3 in Table 3. The DC factions began to be disbanded as public criticism increased over the political corruption in which the Christian Democrats were deeply implicated. The DC finally split in January 1994 immediately after its massive defeat in municipal elections at the end of the previous year.

In the case of the LDP, as described in the previous section, a multiple member district system with a single non-transferrable vote (SNTV) imposed a dilemma on the legislative members which the DC politicians did not face. The legislative members needed to rely on factions for intraparty electoral competition. Differing from the Italian case the votes were not shared among candidates of the same party. The competition among the LDP factions had the potential for developing into a party-wide conflict.

Thus the LDP experienced repeated break-ups and reintegrations of factions (case 1 of Table 3) in the 1950s and 1960s. During this process until the 1970s, five major factions emerged (see Table 1). After a minor defection of several members in 1976 upon the formation of the New Liberal Club, in 1980 the LDP faced a massive crisis of a split along factional lines (case 2 of Table 3) because the two factional alliances supported different candidates (Masayoshi Ohira and Fukuda Takeo) for a party president who would become prime minister under the LDP's total dominance. After avoiding a party split with the unexpected death of one of the opposing faction leaders, Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira, the LDP executive (consisting of faction leaders) attempted to alleviate factional rivalry in the 1980s in order to avoid another risk of a party rupture. This so-called "all mainstream factional system" aimed at treating more equally all the factions and at integrating factions into a party hierarchy (Kato 1994). As explained in the section on the intraparty choice, this system involved another risk of a party split: members who were not satisfied with the party were also unhappy with the faction and thus threatened to quit both. This situation, which is categorized as case 4 of Table 3, explains the LDP split in 1993 in which dissident members were found across factions.

In comparing the Japanese and Italian experiences of conservative dominance, it is interesting to remember the following statement by Sartori in the mid-1970s when both the LDP and the DC managed to stay in office: "if the LDP loses the absolute majority of seats, Japan may easily qualify as a polarized system" (Sartori 1976, 200). What is to be noted here is that the LDP was located at the right end of a one dimensional partisan competition scheme in this prediction, while the DC occupied the metrical center in a continued polarized competition with the PCI on the left and the neofascist MSI on the right end of a dimension, respectively (Figure 1). The behaviors of the two dominant parties are diametrically opposed. For the LDP, it is important to extend support groups among moderately conservative voters and to prevent the middle-of-the-road parties from making a decisive move either to the left or the right. Since the leftist camp had assumed the role of

opposition in ideological politics, the LDP's behavior resulted in the maintenance of a bipolar structure in policy discourse between the governing LDP and the leftist parties, the JSP and JCP. In retrospect, the bipolar structure of Japanese party politics may have been regarded as an artificial product of the LDP's behavior because the real policy conflict occurred in the more centrist arena involving different attitudes to social democratic policy orientation (Otake 1983). The LDP factions served to maintain this bipolar structure by allowing the party to pit plural candidates against each other in a multi-member election district and narrowed the support base for the middle-of-the-road parties in electoral politics.

The DC, however, needed to maintain a tripolar structure in which it could remain the key party in a coalition government and factions became agents of coalition formations in changing situations. This allowed overt flexibility in the DC-centered coalitions, and explain why the Italian coalition government is not based on clear policy orientations (Mastropaolo and Slater 1992). Thus, in the Italian case, the competing and distinctive factions which were supposed to weaken party coherence actually helped the party to stay in office and maintain its dominant position by providing a wide range of possible coalition formulas.

Conclusion

My paper investigates party adjustment to electoral, parliamental and party environments in order to maintain dominance, by presuming a certain electoral support and extends the analysis to intraparty organizations - factions - and investigates how party factionalism impacts on party dominance. Both parties in this paper effectively used faction organizations, although in different ways and for different purposes. The LDP's factionalism solved the question of how the party effectively translates the obtained votes to seats and served to maintain a unified-conservative camp, while the DC's factions allowed the party an overt flexibility to form a coalition government. Consequently, the dominant

party system, which is considered an anomaly of competitive party politics or "uncommon democracy" (Pempel 1989) can be explained in terms of the party's successful accommodation to members' individual interests and partisan dynamics.

In the early 1990s, both parties faced public criticism of political corruption, suspicious links with organized crime, and reluctance to carry out political reform, especially reform of the system of the general election. Among the observed similarities and differences between these two parties in recent hardships, two interesting changes were related to the topic of this paper. First, both countries' governments abandoned their electoral systems (Italy's proportional representation with an open list and Japan's multi-member district system with the SNTV) which they used for the maintenance of party dominance. Second, party dynamics have changed to destroy the arrangement which advantaged both parties. I will briefly review these recent changes in both countries in order.

In Italy in early 1992, a Milan businessman's refusal to pay a bribe to a politician evolved into a massive disclosure of political corruption with which not only the governing DC but also its coalition partners were implicated. Penetration of the DC's clientelistic style into coalition partners resulted in the same chaotic situation across parties. The referendum in April 1993 supported major political changes including a change in the electoral system. The public uproar led to the resignation of Socialist Prime Minister Amato in April 1993. The prime ministership then went to a nonparty politician and economist, Carlo Azeglo Ciampi. Subsequently, the government repealed the old electoral system. A new electoral system of the Chamber of Deputies was a combination of the first-past-the-post system like Britain (75% of seats) and previous proportional representation (25 % of seats).

In municipal elections in November and December 1993, the scandal-tainted centrist coalition parties such as the DC and the PSI collapsed, and the candidates backed by ex-Communists (PCI) beat back the neofascist Italian Social Movement (MSI) and the

separationist Northern League which were rapidly increasing the power in the right camp. The PCI, the second largest party which had long been excluded from office by the successful illegitimation by the DC, had once been declared dead after the end of cold war. But the main body of the PCI has changed its name to the Party of the Democratic Left (PDS) and reformed itself into a Western European type of social democratic party since the late 1980s, and finally came to be the possible choice of the governing party allying with small left parties such as anti-Mafia Network (La Rete), the Greens, and so on. This election result showed that the tripolar structure on which the DC's dominance hinged had been destroyed: the former Communists and the extreme right groups, which had not been considered as legitimate governing parties, asserted their place in a battle over a governing position.

While the local elections at the end of 1993 precipitated a switch from the tripolar dynamics of Italian politics to a bipolar type which would weaken the DC, the former governing parties in the centrist alliance were further weakened until the elections of the Chamber and Senate in March 1994. First, in January the DC split apart when dissidents decided to form a new party called the Christian Democrat Center to ally with parties of the right. The remaining members changed the party's name to the Italian Popular Party (PPI) to make a centrist alliance with a reformist group (headed by Mario Segni) which had defected from the party the previous year. The PSI also broke into the right and left wings which subsequently joined the right and left party alliances, respectively. However, the biggest change during the first three months in 1994 was the rapidly growing popularity of Silvio Berlusconi, a media tycoon, who decided to enter the political world and formed his party, Forza Italia, at the same time as the splits in the former governing parties. Using political leverage accompanied by public expectation of a new political movement, he succeeded in luring both the MSI and Northern League, which were hostile to each other, and formed a right alliance championed with his own Forza Italia. He advocated a challenge to the left alliance led by the PDS which had been expected to form the next

government. During a very short period until the elections of both houses in March 1994, fueled by Berlusconi's popularity, the right alliance increased its public support. In the elections, the right Freedom Alliance obtained 40.4 percents of the votes for the Senate (155 out of 315 seats) and 42.9 percents of the votes for the Chamber (366 out of 630 seats). In April 1994, it formed the first conservative coalition government in postwar history in Italy .

After he was elected a prime minister, Berlusconi invited public criticism with the possibility of his own implication in political corruption. The issue of a controversial decree to limit corruption investigations was withdrawn only after five days because of public criticism. Also, two other parties of the right coalition government, the MSI and the Northern League, were not getting along very well with each other. In December 1994, the Berlusconi's government fell and at the beginning of 1995 Lamberto Dini, a former banker, formed a care-taker government until the next election. Despite such high uncertainty in Italian politics, it is clear that there no longer exists a virtuous mechanism for the centrist parties, especially the former DC, which had dominated Italian politics for several decades. The old electoral system had been abandoned and the centrist position was weakened by partisan politics. These changes ended the DC's rule which had utilized party factionalism to pursue an advantage both in elections and in interparty bargaining. In the local elections in April 1995 a country split almost evenly between the center-right coalition led by Berlusconi and the center-left coalition driven by the PDS. The ex-DC parties were divided into the two camps: the partisan politics in Italy shows a clear sign of bipolarity.

In Japan, political changes were slower and more complicated than in Italy. While political corruption was under public criticism also in Japan, the direct cause of recent changes came from the LDP's split rather than from the loss of public support for the incumbent party in elections. However, just as in Italy, Japanese conservative dominance was destroyed by the changing dynamics of partisan politics that led to the electoral reform. The unity of the Japanese conservative camp was first shattered by the formation of a new

conservative party (Japan New Party) in 1992, and the LDP's own split in the following year ascertained the broken unity of the conservative camp. The formation of the Japan New Party in 1992 was not a severe blow to the LDP rule, but the secession of two splinter parties (Renewal Party and Harbinger) from the LDP in 1993 disrupted the LDP's advantageous position. After the party split and the subsequent general election in 1993, the LDP was still far bigger than any other party, although it lost a majority in the Diet. However, no parties have tried to ally with the LDP. Two splinter parties of the LDP were overtly successful in the general election, formed a coalition government with a new conservative party and the former opposition parties, and drove the LDP out of office. The fragmentation of the conservatives and the formation of new parties overturned the LDP's advantages. The formation of a coalition government in 1993 was characterized by the exclusion of the Communists (JCP) and the LDP. This first non-LDP coalition government since 1955 put the reform of the system of general elections at the top of the political agenda and decided on electoral system which would be similar to the Italian one - a combination of the first-past-the-post system in a single member district (about 60% of seats, that is, 300 out of 500 seats) and proportional representation (about 40% of seats, that is, 200 out of 500 seats).

After the Diet decided on electoral reform, the non-LDP party coalition began to suffer from an internal dispute based on disagreements about tax policies, security policies, and the Constitutional revision as well as conflicting interests in a redistricting to be scheduled under the new electoral system. When this dispute became salient and the Harbinger and then the Socialists were isolated from a decision making by the other coalition partners they walked away from the coalition, and the next non-LDP coalition government which was formed under Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata in May 1994 became a minority one. The Hata cabinet was short-lived; a new coalition government was formed the next month by the LDP and the Socialists with the Harbinger as a broker. Although the LDP came back to the office again, Japanese partisan dynamics were completely different

from those under its long-term rule. Since an explanation of ongoing attempts to form new parties or the future prospects for the Japanese party system are beyond this paper's scope, I would like to point out an important recent change that is related to the argument of this paper. The broken unity of the conservative camp overturned the LDP's advantage in interparty dynamics until 1993 under which the smaller parties could not form an effective alliance. A consequence of this change made the LDP the most conservative party, which confines it to a smaller conservative camp than before. This difference emerged because the new parties were allegedly more reform-oriented and had claimed their distinct positions between the JSP on the left and the LDP on the right. The middle-of-the-road parties that had existed previously began to have more important roles in party dynamics than they had had under the conservative dominance. For example, after the conservatives' split, the CGP has become a key party of the non-LDP party coalition and its participation is considered to be critical for forming a new party from the non-LDP coalition of parties. Also the formation of the LDP-Socialist coalition might not have been possible if the Harbinger had not worked as a middleman between them. These facts mean that the LDP's own breakup and the subsequent formation of splinter parties have broken the conservative advantage which the LDP had maintained by using the factions in intraparty electoral competition. Electoral reform is expected to consolidate this change because the mechanism to divide votes and manage the intraparty electoral competition will no longer be useful under the new electoral system.

What will happen to the Italian and the Japanese partisan politics remains to be seen, but it is certain that the situations no longer exist in which factionalism of the DC and the LDP helped them to stay in power. This consequence shows that such adjustments hinge on an institutional arrangement of electoral competition and contingencies of partisan politics which may change. At the same time, the cases of the Italian and Japanese dominant parties demonstrate that intraparty organizations such as factions influence and

interact with partisan dynamics. This conclusion sheds light on new interests in the intraparty organization in the studies of electoral and coalition politics.

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1. Using Table 3, this point will be further explained later in terms of relationships between members' interests, factional rivalries, and party unity.

2. If no candidate gets a majority in the first round of voting, however, the final voting on the two most successful candidates is held, and the one who obtains a majority support will be a winner.

3. Cox and Rosenbluth's theorization explains the institutionalization of factions rather than the maintenance of institutionalized factions in the LDP. In 1956, when the party presidential election was held for the first time after the LDP's formation, the factional arrangement became more salient and then better organized as the same electoral system for a president continued until 1978. However, the primary election by the party rank-and-file members, which was introduced in 1978, resulted in recognition of the most successful candidate at a much earlier stage of the presidential race. More importantly, this change in the party presidential election procedure had its own impact on party factionalism. The change in the party presidential election intensified factional rivalries in the early 1980s. To avoid vehement and costly primary competition among presidential candidates, from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, party leaders (consisting of representatives from all the factions) tried to agree on the nomination of a party president through negotiations. In other words, the mode of competition for the LDP presidency changed, but the same factions continued (with leadership changes in some factions) throughout this period, i.e., until 1992 (see Table 1).

4. Schlesinger actually presents this statement as a general condition of party organization. But, I think that this statement can be applied to the special situation described above.

5. Kohno (1992) explains this tendency using the rational choice approach and shows that the larger factions pit their sponsored candidates in almost all the election districts while the smaller ones sponsor candidates only in larger election districts which have more than four or five seats.

6. The clearest presentation of the institutionalization of a seniority system is found in Sato and Matsuzaki (1986, chapter 2).

7. After the general election following the party split, the LDP executive tried to elect the next party president by negotiations among only the top leaders, as they had done since the mid-1980s. The backbenchers resisted this proposal and required equal participation from backbenchers. As a result, the leaders backed down and decided on participation of two representatives each from those who had served the same number of terms (i.e., those newly elected, those entering the second term, and so on).

8. Although political reforms of the electoral system of the House of Representatives and of the system of political fund control were big issues in the Diet immediately before the election, and the LDP executives' reluctance for the reform was exposed to public criticism, it is hard to argue that many LDP members quit the party to deflect the public criticism. The reelection rate of the incumbent politicians on the LDP ticket was about 84 percent (179 out of 211) and quite high. This rate was lower than the rate for incumbents in the Renewal Party (*Shinseito*) - 97 percent (34 out of 35) - and of the one in the Harbinger Party (*Sakigake*) - 90 percent (9 out of 10), but these parties' higher rates were results of the loss of the Socialists in which only 64 out of 121 incumbents won the election.

9. While the party's list order and voting results were generally correlated, there existed a small but not negligible divergence of voters' choices from the party's list.

10. This soliciting was possible also because the limited size of the election polling stations (usually less than six to seven hundred voters) enabled the identification of votes cast by those who were asked to combine specific names (Bardi 1992, 454).

11. Although the LDP returned to office allied with the Socialists who had long been adversaries, the party's return was made possible by the Harbinger which mediated between the two parties and joined the LDP-Socialist coalition rather than the LDP's independent strategy. I will explain this further in the final section.

12. The minor Social Democratic League (SDL), which was another splinter party from the Socialists, joined the middle-of-the-road camp in 1977.

13. Tanaka quit the LDP at that time because of his implication with the scandale but retained the substantial control over his faction.

14. The Tanaka faction was strongly motivated to expand its size in order to ensure enough influence inside the party to prevent any prime minister from investigating Tanaka's legal problems: because of its leader's implication with the Lockeed scandal the Tanaka faction could not have any member serve as a candidate fo the party's presidency and a prime ministership.

15. Noboru Takeshita formed the intrafaction group and was taking over the control over the faction from Kakuei Tanaka in 1986. However, the faction was still called Tanaka faction at the time of the elections.

16. Powell (1987, 174) considers that the remaining characteristics are consequences of partisan competition identified by the above features.

17. Powell (1987) admits that other consequences, ideological patterning by parties and peripheral government turnover existed.

18. Laver and Schofield (1990, 80-81) also argue that if policy matters in the formation of the government, it is very difficult to exclude from a coalition government the party located at the center of the right-left spectrum; thus it may be able to form a minority government.

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Table 1 Transformation of the LDP Factions

Cabinet	Nov. 1960 Ikeda	Dec. 1972 Tanaka	Dec. 1983 Nakasone	Nov. 1987 Takeshita	July 1993 (Hosokawa from August)
Factions	Total number of members+ (HR membership + HC membership)				
	Ikeda 55	Fukuda 88 (55+33)	Tanaka 114 (62+52)	Takeshita 120 (72+48)	Mitsuzuka 73 (55+18)
	Sato 55	Tanaka 93 (48+45)	Suzuki 77 (49+28)	Abe 89 (59+30)	Miyazawa 68 (55+13)
	Kishi 42	Ohira 65 (45+20)	Fukuda 67 (42+25)	Miyazawa 89 (61+28)	Watanabe 66 (48+18)
	Fujiyama 40	Nakasone 39 (39+0)	Nakasone 56 (49+7)	Nakasone 84 (63+21)	Obuchi 62 (29+33)
	Kono 34	Miki 49 (38+11)	Komoto 36 (28+8)	Komoto 31 (25+6)	Komoto 27 (21+6)
	Ono 32	Shiina 18 (18+0)	Ishihara* 6 (6+0)	Nikaido* 14 (11+3)	Kato* 10 (5+5)
	Miki 33	Mizuta 13 (13+0)	No-faction 38 (22+16)	No-faction 19 (11+8)	No-faction 16 (10+6)
	Ishii 22	Funada 9			
	Ishibashi 8	Ishii 9			
		No-faction 10			

+In 1960, when the House of Councilors (HC) members did not belong to factions, the number of members included only those in the House of Representatives (HR). From 1972, the members from both houses are included and membership from each house is broken down in parenthesis, first for the HR and then for the HC.

* These were loose groups and many members of them were to be integrated into other factions. Only the Kato group has been an exception to this thus far.

Sources: Ishikawa and Hirose (1989, 214) for 1960, 1972, 1983, 1987, and Asahi Newspaper, July 20, 1993 for 1993.

Table 2 Comparison of Proportion of Votes to Total Voters (Percentage of Absolute Vote Share)* in General Elections between Italian Christian Democrats (in Chamber of Deputies) and Japanese Liberal Democrats (in House of Representatives) from 1945 to 1993

	Vote Share of Italian Christian Democrats	Vote Share of Japanese Liberal Democrats
1947	---	40.88
1948	44.71	---
1949	---	47.90
1952	---	50.74
1953	37.61	48.71
1955	—	47.65
1958	39.68	46.75
1960	—	42.92
1963	35.58	40.66
1967	---	37.95
1968	36.28	—
1969	—	34.37
1972	36.07	35.30
1976	36.15	35.53
1979	34.70	34.14
1980	---	38.53
1983	29.28	34.37
1986	—	39.05
1987	30.49	—
1990	---	37.68
1992	25.90	—
1993	—	26.77
		(If splinter parties' votes are included.
		35.24
		= 26.77 + 6.77 [Renewal party]
		+ 1.68 [Harbinger])

* I use the absolute vote share instead of a percentage of the valid votes cast because turn-out rates between two countries are quite different (around 90 percent in Italy and around 70 percent in Japan). In other words, the Japanese conservatives did much better in terms of percentages of valid votes cast, while the Italian counterpart's share does not increase much in percentage of valid votes cast.

Sources: Italian data are calculated from Hine (1993), 71-6. Japanese data from 1947 to 1986 are adopted from Ishikawa and Hirose (1989, 77) and percentages in 1990 and 1993 are calculated from the data in Asahi Newspaper, July 19, 1993.

Table 3 Members' Interests and Factional Rivalries

	individual members' interests staying in a party	staying in a faction	organizational consequences or potential crisis for a party with factions
1)	yes	no	break-up and reintegration of factions in a unified party
2)	no	yes	the party divides along factional lines
3)	yes	yes	continuity of the same factions in a unified party
4)	no	no	the party breaks-up across factional boundaries

Figure 1 Different Partisan Dynamics in Italy and Japan
(Parties in House of Chambers and House of Representatives)

Italy

Under the DC dominance

Left	*DC and its Centerist or Center-Left Coalition Partners*	*Right*
PCI	DC	MSI
	PSI	
	PSDI	
	PLI	
	PRI	

At the time of 1994 elections

Progressives	*Pact for Italy*	*Freedom Alliance*
PDS	PPI/DC	Forza Italia
Refounded Communists	Seigni group	Northern League
The Greens	Former Craxi group	MSI
La Rete		
and other small parties		

Japan

Under the LDP Dominance (June 1993 before the LDP's split)

Opposition Parties			*Incumbent Party*
JCP	JSP	CGP	LDP
		DSP	
		SDL	

The First non-LDP Government (August 1993 - April 1994)

Opposition	*Non-LDP coalition*			*Opposition*
	left	center	conservative	
JCP	JSP	CGP	Japan New Party	LDP
		DSP	Harbinger	
		SDL	Renewal Party	

These figures show overall pictures of the partisan politics in both countries and indicate only the relative location of each party (distances between parties mean little). Some may disagree with the relative locations of specific parties presented in the above figures. But, the critical points in my argument, that is, the centrist position of the DC and the LDP's position as a unified conservative party before recent changes are not disputable.