



**PRELIMINARIES TO A CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION
IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA**

Bertelsmann Stiftung
Roma, 14-16/XI/1995

- a. Programme
- b. List of participants
 - 1. "An Israel-Arab security regime: an Israeli view"/ Joseph Alpher
 - 2. "From geo-politics to geo-economics: collective security in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf"/ Abdel Monem Said Aly
 - 3. "Collective security in Maghreb"/ Rémy Leveau




Roberto ALIBONI



Rome 15-16 November 1995

Bertelsmann Stiftung

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Bertelsmann Stiftung

PROGRAMME

Preliminaries to a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East and North Africa

**Rome
November 14 - 16, 1995**

conference at the

**Istituto Luigi Sturzo
Palazzo Baldassini
Via delle Coppelle, 35
I-00186 Rome**

Tel.: **39 / 6 / 689 23 90

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accommodation at the

**Albergo Santa Chiara
Via di Santa Chiara, 21
I-00186 Roma**

Tel.: **39 / 6 / 687 29 79

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Conference language will be English. There will be no translation service.

Tuesday, November 14, 1995

07.30 p.m.
Holiday Inn
Crown Plaza Minerva
room "Olimpo"

APERITIF

Welcome

Dirk Rumberg,
Vice President Politics Division
Bertelsmann Foundation, Guetersloh

08.00 p.m.

DINNER

**Preliminary Remarks on the Middle East and
North Africa**

Dr. Mario Bondioli-Osio
Minister Plenipotentiary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Rome

Wednesday, November 15, 1995

09.30 a.m.

Chair:

Josef Janning
Director, Research Group on European Affairs,
Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Munich

Introduction:

Christian-Peter Hanelt
Director Middle East, Bertelsmann Foundation, Guetersloh

10.00 a.m.

**Cooperative Security in the Middle East and the
Persian Gulf**

Joseph Alpher
Director, Israel and Middle Eastern Office,
American Jewish Committee, Jerusalem

Comment:

Dr. Stefano Silvestri
Undersecretary of Defence, Ministry of Defence, Rome

11.15 a.m.

COFFEE BREAK

11.45 a.m. **Discussion**

01.00 p.m. LUNCH

03.00 p.m. **Cooperative Security in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf**

Prof. Dr. Abdel Monem Said Aly
Director, Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo

Comment:

Dr. Guido Lenzi
Director, Institute for Security Studies of WEU, Paris

04.15 p.m. COFFEE BREAK

04.45 p.m. **Discussion**

07.30 p.m. APERITIF

08.00 p.m. DINNER

Thursday, November 16, 1995

09.00 a.m. **Cooperative Security in the Mahgreb**

Comment on Prof. Dr. Rémy Leveau's paper:

Dr. Michael Köhler
Administrator, Arab Countries Middle East,
EU Commission DG 1; Extraordinary Lecturer, Department
of Islamic Studies, University of Bonn

Prof. Dr. Mustafa Sehim
Professor of Civil Law, University of Rabat

10.15 a.m. COFFEE BREAK

10.45 a.m. **Discussion**

12.00 p.m. End of Conference

Departure

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LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

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
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Prof. Dr. Mustafa Sehim	<i>Professor of Civil Law, University Rabat</i>
Dr. Stefano Silvestri	<i>Undersecretary of Defence, Ministry of Defense, Rome</i>
Prof. Dr. Udo Steinbach	<i>Director, German Orient Institute, Hamburg</i>
Seyfi Tashan	<i>Director, Foreign Policy Institute/ Hacettepe University, Ancara</i>
Mr Faleh A.K. El-Taweel	<i>Columnist of the Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Amman</i>
Professor Dr. Trevor Taylor	<i>Professor, Staffordshire University</i>



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AN ISRAEL-ARAB SECURITY REGIME: AN ISRAELI VIEW

by Joseph Alpher

(Sept. 28, 1995; draft paper for Bertelsmann Stiftung/University
of Munich working group on Security and Cooperation in the Middle
East and North Africa, Rome, November 14-16, 1995)

The current Middle East peace process will be four years old in the Fall of 1995. Given its complexity--it involves a multiplicity of bilateral negotiations and multilateral issue areas--the achievements registered thus far are indeed of some note: the Oslo DOP followed by the Cairo and Taba agreements, the Israel-Jordan peace, Israel's enhanced relations with Morocco, Tunisia and Oman, and progress in the multilateral working groups. This is particularly so in view of the broad strategic terms of reference: the Arab-Israel peace process is not based on a clear instance of victory and defeat, in which terms are dictated, as in World War II, but rather on an attempt to juxtapose a multiplicity of interacting and often conflicting interests. It requires the projection of a win/win atmosphere among peoples long accustomed to viewing their conflict as a zero-sum game.

The Arab interest in this process is both political and security oriented. The Palestinians see negotiations as a vehicle for statebuilding; Syria and Lebanon wish to recover territory, while Syria strives to expand its regional sway; Jordan seeks to regularize its sensitive relationship with Israelis and Palestinians alike. All have arrived at the political choice of a peace process through a recognition that Israel's capacity to defend itself rendered the military option counterproductive. World interest is mainly economic--ensuring regional stability so as to guarantee the viability of oil-supplying Gulf regimes; strategic--stabilizing the Middle East arms race and security trade routes and key alliances; and religious--e.g., Jerusalem.

The interest of Israel in this process, and Israel alone, can be defined almost exclusively in terms of security.¹ From the standpoint of a large majority of Israelis, it is the preoccupation with security that will, for a long time to come, continue to direct the country's attitude toward peace with its neighbors. Indeed, peace will be essentially security. That this may disappoint many of Israel's well-wishers in the Middle East and the world (as well as a few very optimistic Israelis), who seek now to discuss Israel's economic and cultural integration into the region, does not denigrate the reality. Of course, this observation need not prevent or delay a discussion of the possibilities of greater Arab-Israel normalization and integration. But we must beware of excessive haste in effecting integration, lest efforts carried out with the best of intentions prove counterproductive.

It follows that, from an Israeli standpoint, the broader process of making peace between Israel and the Arabs can be divided into three stages. The first is the security element, the second, normalization, and the third, legitimization.

Security is the key element upon which peace is based; it must be mutual and reciprocal. A peace characterized essentially by a successful security regime, for example that between Egypt and Israel for the past 15 years, may be a cold peace, but it is nevertheless a peace, and is worth a huge effort.

The second stage, normalization, is generally an Israeli aspiration and, in a few cases like that of the Palestinians, an Arab necessity. While Egypt and Israel too have recently

registered important progress, particularly in economic normalization, for the most part Israeli-Arab normalization will remain limited for the coming generation or so. Certain infrastructure areas and key industries--energy, electricity grids, tourism--may prosper. But by and large, and despite what some visionaries in Israel hope to see, normalization--however desirable as a means of fortifying the peace process--will be limited: by a general lack of complementarity between Israeli and Arab economies, by an Israeli preference for dealing with the western and far eastern post-industrial economies, and by Arab suspicions that can be traced to the third element or stage, legitimization.

Even among moderate Arabs--those who are currently pursuing peace settlements and accommodation with Israel--Israelis detect a lingering lack of legitimization. The moderate Arabs, beginning with Egypt, are prepared, for lack of a realistic and safe alternative, to coexist peacefully with Israel. But not intimately. If, in their minds, they are reconciled to Israel's presence, in their hearts they still apparently see Israel as what the Arab-American scholar Ahmed Hashim calls a "high-tech crusader state"--a foreign invader that has conquered and occupied Arab lands.

That Israel is a non-Arab island in an Arab Middle East, Israelis and Arabs agree. But beyond this definition, there exists a wide perceptual gap as to the underpinnings of Israeli-Arab coexistence. Israelis, by and large, see Israel as the legitimate fruit of the Jewish national movement, Zionism; as the only non-

Arab ethnic minority that has achieved national self-determination in the Middle East. They wish to be accepted as such by their neighbors. But Arabs--even moderate, peace-seeking Arabs--react very critically to these concepts.² What separates Arab moderates from Arab extremists is the formers' readiness to reach political accommodation with Israel. As one of these moderates, Sameh Rashed of Cairo's National Center for Middle East Studies, put it recently, "Egypt may support Arab-Israeli peace. . . , but [it knows] full well that the struggle with Israel is not coming to an end but taking on new forms. Ultimately, all the indigenous countries of the region stand on one side, and Israel stands on another."³

Further, Israel also continues to perceive among some extremist Arab actors a persistent rejection of its physical existence; this is expressed in their military preparations (e.g., most recently by Saddam Hussein), in Palestinian Islamists' refusal to countenance Israel's existence even within the 1948-1967 boundaries, and in lingering or ambiguous references to the Palestinian "right of return" to pre-1967 Israel--now a concern that is clearly listed for discussion in final status negotiations with the PLO, to begin in mid-1996. Increasingly in recent years, rejection has been expressed in the approach of radical Islamic actors like Iran that view Israel's very state existence as an unacceptable affront to Islam.

The Arab attitudes toward Israel that we have surveyed here appear to be deeply held. Israel's nuclear image, its close links with the United States and with world Jewry, and its western

cultural bias do much to further them. So does the inclination of many Israelis, with regard to economic aspects of the peace process, to patronize their Arab neighbors, although here Israelis can learn, and are changing. Nor, for that matter, do most Israelis, in their search for "acceptance," wish to compromise the political, economic and cultural characteristics that contrast so sharply with those of their neighbors.

Primary Security Concerns: Israel and the Arabs

One cannot begin to describe a security regime of peace without first, briefly, attempting to understand Israel's and the Arabs' primary security concerns. Because of Israel's overriding preoccupation with security (and because this is an attempt by an Israeli to describe an acceptable security regime), we begin with Israel.

Israelis' national threat perceptions are existential. True, for many Israelis the day has passed when the Arab world was perceived as a monolithic, aggressive coalition bent on destroying Israel while an indifferent world turned its back. The fact is, Israel is deep into a peace process predicated on a very different set of assumptions. But the negative images are not very distant; they remain, ready for instant recall, in the Israeli collective subconscious.

Thus instances of military aggression and terrorist violence against Israelis and Jews in general, trigger among Israelis a recall mechanism of the Holocaust and earlier (throughout 3,000

years of Jewish history) attempts to physically destroy the Jewish people or part of it. It is no coincidence that many Jewish holidays (e.g., Passover, Channukah, Purim) celebrate victories over tyrannical rulers of the ancient world who planned precisely such genocidal operations. No other people of modern times has such a legacy--from Pharaoh to Hitler--of survival on the existential abyss.

Israeli security concerns and conflict scenarios are inevitably also a reflection of the war experiences of the past 47 years. Most Israeli-Arab wars (1948, 1967, 1973) involved an Arab coalition, rather than a single Arab state. In most of these wars, Arab war aims were perceived as absolutist, i.e., aspiring to destroy Israel (even when, as in the October 1973 conflict, current wisdom indicates that at least Egypt apparently did not harbor such an operative aspiration). Hence Israelis--who do extensive military service and are highly informed on security issues--tend to envision conflict scenarios as potentially broad, and to prepare military solutions accordingly, frequently falling back on 'worst case contingencies' as the only safe way to conceive of the next war.

To these considerations must be added Israel's own fairly unique circumstances. Israel has no official allies, and no friendly neighbors. America's support is welcomed, of course, but it is looked at through the filter of self-reliance, honed by the sense that Jews must never again depend on others for their security. Ultimately, Israel is all alone. (That Palestinians

harbor a similar sense of isolation is one of the potential building blocks of genuine Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement; see below.)

The country's objective lack of strategic depth, close proximity of deployed Arab armies, and reliance on emergency call-up of reserves to provide the bulk of the Israeli fighting force, generate a special sensitivity among Israelis to surprise attack and to the vulnerability of the civilian rear. These, and the perception of Arab (and now Iranian) war aims as being far-reaching, have tended to encourage the concepts of preventive war, preemptive attack, and transfer of the battle to enemy territory. In a more formal sense, these factors have helped generate a military doctrine based on a comprehensive concept of deterrence. It operates overtly and declaratively on the conventional level, as well as against threats of low-level violence; it is perceived by the Arab/Iranian side to operate on the nonconventional level as well. It is also at least in part responsible for the Arab view of Israel as consistent aggressor--a mirror image of Israelis' perception of the Arabs. But this too, as we shall see, is a potential building block for solid security arrangements as part of peace settlements.

The preeminence of security leads Israelis to view most of the components of peace through a security orientation. Thus water and demographic issues are 'security,' insofar as a faulty agreement involving these issues could also have irreversible existential ramifications.

Secondly, Israelis' concern over Palestinian terrorism is probably the major consideration--overriding religious-ideological claims--in contemplating withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinian terrorism does not constitute a genuine threat to Israel's existence. It does, however, constitute a major current (i.e., terrorist or low-level warfare) security challenge; it drains Israeli manpower and economic assets, and it presents a huge emotional/psychological obstacle, in that it is integrated into the aforementioned sense of existential threat. Insofar as it threatens to persuade Israelis to abandon the peace process, it is a factor of strategic importance.

What Israelis perceive as Palestinian terrorism has been a security threat since the 1920s. And it persists, despite (indeed, perhaps because of) progress toward peace. Surveys show that 85 percent of Israelis fear attack by an Arab in their daily lives.⁴ This ensures that terrorism is integrated into the aforementioned sense of existential threat.

Here we may also speculate that the advent of a nuclearized Middle East is liable to have far-reaching consequences for Israeli security thinking at both the public and the elite levels. The prospective emergence of a hostile Arab power, or Iran, with nuclear weapons and appropriate means of delivery, would presumably trigger an extremely vocal and anxious reaction among a population accustomed to thinking about itself in existential terms, and would have far-reaching ramifications for Israeli security policy. Israel's deliberate ambiguity regarding its nuclear capability

would probably end. This might trigger a general realignment of regional powers, and would almost certainly affect the peace and arms control processes.

We have already alluded to the presence, in Israel's perception of security issues, of a number of positive characteristics of the current environment that tend to mitigate toward peace and stability, rather than war. Over the past 20 years or so, and with particular emphasis since the Second Gulf War, most Arab actors have evolved to a position of accommodation regarding Israel. They recognize that a political solution, and peaceful coexistence, are in their interest, and that the military option, or even the status quo, are liable to be counterproductive and highly destructive of their assets. The end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union introduced greater stability in the Middle East-superpower relationship; pervasive American influence throughout the region appears to be conducive to peace. The role of economic incentives is also proving helpful to peace and stability. Hence the current Arab-Israel peace process, and the current low overall danger of an Arab-Israeli conflict. Indeed, it must be noted that, with the exception of Saddam's Scuds and terrorist attacks from Lebanon, there has been no Arab military attack against Israel for 20 years.

Only in Israel are the political Left and Right defined solely by the parties' reading of the possibilities, and the price to be paid, for a successful peace process. Yet on both sides of the political spectrum, Israelis' attitudes toward peace and its

security component, and their sense of Arabs' attitudes, present a picture of considerable cynicism: Israelis continue to suspect Arab motives, yet opt for peace nonetheless. This too appears to reflect fairly faithfully the uniqueness of the Israeli security dilemma.

This fairly extensive treatment of the security aspects reflects, as noted from the outset, the main Israeli preoccupation concerning peace. For most Israelis, security, coupled with formal relations, however 'cold' (e.g., Israel-Egypt), and relatively modest instances of normalization, will suffice as peace, largely because they do not expect much more from the Arabs, and in many cases distrust or shun Arab culture. They also assume that Arabs react to Israelis in a similar fashion. Legitimization will have to wait.

The Arab attitudes toward Israel that we have surveyed here appear to be deeply held. Israel's nuclear image, its close links with the United States and with world Jewry, and its western cultural bias do much to further them. So does the inclination of some Israelis, with regard to economic aspects of the peace process, to patronize their Arab neighbors, although here Israelis can learn, and are changing.

The Arabs' difficulties in legitimizing Jewish peoplehood and statehood in their midst tend to reinforce Israelis' preoccupation with the security aspects of peace, and to generate a readiness to live with limited degrees of normalization. For it is Israeli military strength that, in Israel's perception, persuaded the Arabs

to opt for the political peace-process track. Correspondingly, it is first and foremost a strong and secure Israel that can cement the peace for many years to come.

The Arabs' security preoccupations with Israel focus, then, on the perception that Israel is an alien presence, associated with American imperialist interests. Israel, in the Arab view, initiated all the Arab-Israel wars due to its naturally aggressive and aggrandizing nature, beginning in 1948, when its very attempt to achieve statehood in the region was viewed as aggression, and culminating in the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. In the course of the past 47 years, Israel developed a nuclear potential that is viewed as a major threat by some, though by no means all, Arab actors, and that creates an incentive for other regional powers, like Iran, to go nuclear.⁵ Since the peace process commenced, Israel has begun pushing economic "cooperation" as a new vehicle for neocolonialist domination.

Hence, in the view of a majority of Arab parties, those that support a peace process, a successful Arab-Israel security regime must resolve the Palestinian issue sufficiently to enable the delineation of acceptable rules, and borders, for coexistence; provide guarantees for Israeli non-aggression by keeping Israel at a distance militarily and culturally/economically; and assure the "defanging" of Israel's nuclear capability. There are considerable differences in the degree of urgency that diverse Arab parties attach to each of these provisions. The Gulf states may actively solicit some degree of economic cooperation with Israel, while

Syria and Egypt remain wary. And the latter evince far greater concern over Israel's nuclear capacity than do many of the smaller and weaker Arab states, some of whom respect Israel's ongoing need for a deterrent, and may even prefer the option of an Israeli nuclear umbrella if Iran, Iraq or Algeria become both nuclear and aggressive.

Security Aspects of Peace

What, then, does Israel seek in terms of security in its prospective agreements with the Arabs? Essentially, and given that Israel is expected to withdraw from strategically important territory, it is an improvement in military security vis-a-vis the current situation, under which the territory is occupied by Israel but there is no peace. This means making it more difficult for an Arab enemy to make war upon Israel, and providing Israel with better early warning if and when he does. In turn, this requires that the Israel Defense Forces and the Arab army in question be separated to the greatest extent possible, with each side given an improved early warning capacity. And this means the introduction of demilitarized zones, or buffers between the two sides, perhaps with an international tripwire or verification presence. The Arab side's mirror image of the Israeli aggressive potential tends to ensure that both sides will share this approach to the security aspect of peacemaking.

The classic instance in which these principles have been successfully applied is in the Sinai--250 kms. of demilitarized desert buffer zone separating Israeli and Egyptian forces. As a

result of the separation, and, in the Israeli case, as a consequence of withdrawal from territory, both sides feel more secure. The Israeli-Egyptian case is also an exercise in asymmetrical demilitarization (a mere three km. strip of Israeli territory in the Negev is demilitarized), one that recognizes Israel's extremely small dimensions and lack of strategic depth.

In the case of Syria, since the Golan is barely one-tenth the width of Sinai, and in view of its regionally dominant topography, demilitarization must extend beyond it, deeper into Syrian territory (although allowing for Syria to defend Damascus) and perhaps, symbolically and asymmetrically, slightly into the Israeli Upper Galilee. Since even this measure will not enlarge the buffer beyond around 50-60 km., Syria will have to undertake a thinning of its forces on the eastern perimeter of the buffer, agreeing to transfer several divisions to distant fronts. (As for Israel, with its army based largely on a reserve system, a large force is never deployed in the north in normal times.)

As further compensation for lack of strategic depth, these arrangements should be supplemented by an international force whose deployment is based on that of UNDOF today. Each side would retain electronic early warning stations on the other's territory. Under these circumstances, and assuming genuinely peaceful relations, Israel could withdraw from the Golan over a period of years. The last area to be evacuated, the escarpment and Jordan water sources that constitute the westernmost strip of the Golan, would only be

turned over once the legitimization dimension of peace had been created between the two sides, with Israel retaining all its current water rights under ironclad guarantees.⁶

This notion of separating large armies with extensive territorial demilitarization measures on a bilateral level is only applicable to Egypt and Syria. The West Bank and southern Lebanon provide special cases of a different sort. Here Israel needs, on the military strategic level, guarantees that territory evacuated will not only be demilitarized, but will not be used by more distant armies, coming from or via Jordan, and from Syria, respectively. Hence the need for a degree of linkage in security arrangements for these areas: Jordan has undertaken to keep its own (small) army away from the Jordan River border, and not to allow foreign (e.g., Iraqi, Syrian) forces on its territory; Syria must undertake to keep its own forces in Lebanon far from the south. These arrangements, incidentally, have long been in effect on a de facto basis; peace treaties render them de jure. In this way their violation would constitute clear and easily defined casus belli for Israel.

Here we return to the principle whereby Israel achieves greater security in return for withdrawal from territory. It is essentially Jordan's agreement not to allow foreign forces onto its territory--a kind of semi-demilitarization--that will allow Israel to withdraw the bulk of its military forces from the West Bank, leaving only early warning and tripwire units (on the Samarian ridge and in the Jordan Valley, respectively) in a demilitarized

setting. Thus Israel's withdrawal would actually enhance its security vis-a-vis enemies to the east, who would remain 500 km. away, beyond Jordan's borders with Syria and primarily Iraq. Jordan of course entered into such an agreement with the parallel achievement of an Israel-Palestinian settlement. Hence the emergence of a Jordanian-Israeli-Palestinian security regime.

The West Bank and Lebanon also present current security threats. These are much more difficult to deal with by treaty. The Oslo agreement constitutes the first serious attempt by Israelis and Palestinians to transfer current security responsibility to Palestinians; for most Israelis, this is an absolutely critical test of the Palestinian ability to "deliver" on peace. It must be seen to succeed before Israelis will engage seriously in final status talks.

The transfer of security authority in the Israeli-occupied territories (beginning with Gaza and Jericho) must be a phased operation, with strong elements of cooperation between the two sides' security forces. The Palestinians, and the international community, must recognize Israel's right to slow down or stop the process if the PLO proves incapable of maintaining security. Israel, for its part, must deal with the Palestinians on a basis of equality and symmetry to the greatest extent possible, to help foster Palestinian support for the interim government. The process has already involved serious security incidents; these test the Palestinians' political will and security capacity to deal harshly with those who seek to sabotage the peace.

The main obstacles to progress in an Israeli-Palestinian interim settlement appear to be the dissenters on both sides: among Israelis, the settlers and their political backers, who reject the very notion of territorial compromise; and among Palestinians, the Islamic and Marxist opposition, which continues to reject Israel's very existence. The early stages of execution of the Oslo agreement also appeared to reflect serious defects in Palestinian decisionmaking, leadership and planning capabilities. All of these difficulties dictate caution on Israel's part, and a focus on security. Whether or not a Palestinian government achieves democracy, or protects its people's human rights, or delivers on sanitation and education, Israelis will be loathe to judge the Oslo experiment any more severely than they judge neighboring Arab state regimes. But a Palestinian failure to deliver on security would almost certainly bring the process to a halt.

In Lebanon the situation is almost surreal, in that, despite the seeming lack of political movement, all sides agree on precisely what has to happen in order to produce a peace treaty: a successful demonstration by Lebanese security forces, backed by the Syrians, of their ability to pacify the south; the closing down of Hizballah by Syria; and the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces. In view of Syrian hegemony in Lebanon--which Israelis, since their own sad experience there in 1982-1985, now tend to accept--southern Lebanon must also be worked into an Israeli-Syrian security regime. Hence the necessary close linkage between an Israeli-Syrian and an Israeli-Lebanese settlement, and the effective evolution of a

triangular Israeli-Syrian-Lebanese security regime to complement the Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian security regime described above.

The thrust of these measures is that occupied territories are indeed of strategic importance for Israel--particularly the high ground of the Golan and the West Bank. For Israel to withdraw from them, it must be compensated by the creation of extensive buffers. And because these buffers are seen to serve Arab interests as well, they are perceived to be acceptable, even desirable, to the Arab side.

Here a brief word is in order about Jordan's unique status. The prevailing view in Israel of Jordan's strategic role in the region, is believed to correspond broadly with that of the Hashemite leaders: a regional buffer, sharing Israel's fear of Palestinian nationalism and potential irredentism, and ready to join in finding ways to contain it. Jordan and Israel have no strategic quarrel, and much in common in their regional threat perceptions. Israel is the only country associated with the anti-Iraq coalition of 1990-91 that emerged from the war with an appreciation for Jordan's stand, which effectively kept Israel out of a new Arab-Israel war by keeping the Iraqis out of Jordan. In the context of the regional peace process, an ongoing Jordanian refusal to allow foreign forces onto its territory should be accompanied by region-wide guarantees, including by Israel, of its security.

We have already noted that Jordan and Israel must coordinate closely with regard to a Palestinian solution. Jordan is the only

country in the region (perhaps in the world) that refers to 'demographic security' in the context of its strategic view. It insists that a solution to the Palestinian question also alleviate its own tenuous demographic balance in favor of the Hashemites. This explains Jordan's worried reaction to the Oslo agreement, and Israel's (and America's) haste in reassuring the Hashemite rulers. Essentially, Jordan seeks to ensure that an Israeli-Palestinian settlement bring about the migration of Palestinians (1967 displaced persons and, in the final stage of the peace process, 1948 refugees) from Jordan to the Palestinian entity, and prevent an exodus of Palestinians from the West to the East Bank (due, for example, to a collapse of PLO rule on the West Bank). This corresponds broadly with Israel's own interest in ensuring the vitality of the Hashemite Kingdom, and the viability of a Palestinian entity.

Because of the implicit affinity of strategic concepts linking Jordan and Israel--with regard to the region in general and the Palestinians in particular--Jordanian strategic thinkers tend to project the Jordan-Israel-Palestine security regime discussed here, as the core area, geographically and chronologically, of a broader Middle East security regime.⁷

There are a number of additional security components of a final settlement with the Palestinians that require discussion. We have already noted that the West Bank and Gaza must be demilitarized, with reinforcing semi-demilitarization in Jordan (as in Egypt, where the demilitarized Sinai Peninsula borders Gaza).

Assuming that a successful experience with autonomy has persuaded Israelis that a Palestinian state is an acceptable solution, Israel should insist on territorial adjustments to the 1948-1967 border, for both current and strategic security reasons: expanding the Jerusalem corridor to the north and south; attaching the Latrun salient overlooking Ben-Gurion Airport; assuring a foothold in the foothills of Western Samaria; protecting Jerusalem from the east, at Maale Adummim; and maintaining a presence in the Jordan River Valley. (See Map.)⁸

Not coincidentally (because settlement plans prior to 1977 were dictated largely by security considerations), these territorial adjustments would place most West Bank Israeli settlers inside Israeli territory. In addition to their demographic aspect, they add a minimal dimension of tactical security: protecting Israel's international airport from terrorist attack from nearby foothills, securing the route to Jerusalem from the coast, and widening Israel's "narrow waist" in the Hadera-Netanya region, which sits atop the primary source of Israel's coastal water. On the military strategic plane, we have already noted that a presence along the Jordan Valley affords an early-warning/tripwire mechanism vis-a-vis attack from the east; Ma'ale Adummim protects the capital Jerusalem from attack across the Jordan. Finally, as noted earlier, traditional water sources like those of western Samaria take on security significance in a region where control over water has been an active casus belli (e.g., between Israel and Syria in the mid-1960s).

This list is long and, at present, unacceptable to Palestinians. That it represents a demand for redundancy not only regarding Jordan but in West Bank security arrangements as well (the area, after all, would be demilitarized), corresponds with Israel's aforementioned and understandable tendency to contemplate worst-case contingencies. Redundancy appears to be desirable, especially in the early stages of the reconciliation process, and in view of the uncertain future of Hashemite rule. In any event, negotiations on these issues have not yet begun. Certainly Israel's territorial demands from Palestinians would have to be balanced by an Israeli readiness to grant Palestinian statehood in the remaining contiguous territory, some 90% of the West Bank and Gaza; but they would also be balanced by the Palestinian need for Israeli concessions, e.g., a Gaza-to-Judea corridor or safe-road.

Thus far our discussion of security issues relating to an Israeli-Palestinian settlement has focused on the West Bank and Gaza (Jerusalem will not be discussed here, insofar as it is not a strategic security issue). For an Arab-Israel peace to be truly final, there are two additional Palestinian communities whose needs will have to be addressed within the framework of Israel's overall security needs: the Israeli Arab community, and the Palestinian refugees in Arab states.

Constituting some 18 percent of Israel's population, the "Israeli Palestinians" have in a variety of ways been treated over the past 47 years as second class citizens. One key justification was their understandable identification with the Palestinian cause.

An Israeli-Palestinian peace may bring to the fore Israeli Arab demands for autonomy; it would almost certainly confront Israel with the need to define the status of its Arab citizens from a national-constitutional standpoint (i.e., what is the status of a non-Jewish minority in the Jewish national homeland?), and to fully equalize their citizenship rights and obligations, given that security would no longer be a prime factor. A failure to address these issues could generate serious internal security consequences for Israel.

Taken together, Israel's Arabs and the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza (and East Jerusalem) constitute only about half the worldwide population of some five million Palestinians. Most of the remaining half have lived in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan since they fled Israel in 1948-49. Many are in refugee camps; many remain stateless to this day. An Arab-Israel peace that provides only for those Palestinians living in Western Palestine would merely set the stage for another phase of Palestinian irredentism, spearheaded by the refugees in neighboring Arab countries.

Thus Israel must insist that peace agreements with its neighbors contain binding provisions for the rehabilitation and/or resettlement of all Palestinian refugees. As long as there are hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who actively claim the homes of Israelis for their own, Israelis will not feel truly secure. Obviously, many refugees can be resettled in the emerging Palestinian political entity. But given the need to deal with the huge problems already posed by Gazan and West Bank-based refugees

in need of rehabilitation, this could be a slow and incomplete process. Hence the need for Israel to insist, within the framework of its peace treaties with Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, that these countries take some responsibility for eliminating the refugee issue.⁹

These measures would appear to meet Arab security goals insofar as they restore to Arab rule most of the territories captured in 1967, create demilitarized buffer zones between Arab and Israeli armed forces, and introduce some sort of international verification mechanism. Both sides also wish to reduce one another's armed potential. However, conventional force reduction will be difficult in the Arab-Israel context in the near term, due to the interlocking nature of Middle East conflicts: Israel has been in a state of war with many Arab states; each of these is locked in conflict with several neighbors (e.g., Syria with Turkey, Iraq and Lebanon). Moreover, even if the security measures described above prove completely successful, Israel still sees itself threatened by more distant enemies such as Iraq and Iran, who reject the entire notion of a peace process with it, and whose instruments of warfare in the coming years are likely to include nonconventional armaments and missile delivery systems that are oblivious to territorial buffer zones.

Hence Israel will insist tenaciously on maintaining its own nonconventional potential, until the entire region is locked in a stable peace. Nonconventional and missile controls, to be effective, must apply first and foremost to the most dangerous

regimes, Iran and Iraq. At the same time, Israelis are increasingly aware of the detrimental effects of their nuclear image on the Arab perception of long-term possibilities for peace and stability. These perceptions must be addressed in the expanding Israeli-Arab dialogue, hopefully within the framework of western-sponsored regional security cooperation against threats posed by actors like Iran.

In this context the Israeli strategic dilemma may be defined as follows: How can Israel maintain the deterrent that it feels it requires precisely in order to advance and preserve a shaky, cold peace process with sometimes sullen neighbors, yet at the same time reassure those neighbors that this deterrent is not a threat to them? And the key Israeli request of its neighbors within the framework of the arms control process, is, "don't make key demands of the other side that it cannot concede at such an early stage of the process." Just as Israel does not demand that Syria join ACRS immediately, or that the geographic parameters of the Middle East region be rigidly defined, as conditions for engaging in the arms control process, so the Arabs must not at this stage demand that Israel place its nuclear capability on the negotiating table, if they wish the process to proceed.¹⁰

Because Israel sees itself as one against the many, and its army is based mainly on reserves, a conventional force reduction program must be approached very cautiously. (Most of Israel's neighbors also see themselves as 'one against the many,' hence will shrink from conventional force reductions.) Thus a series of

bilateral force separation agreements appears to be the most logical and likely measure, with multilateral force reduction postponed until a comprehensive peace is achieved. The same logic applies to the nonconventional sphere: only the achievement of a comprehensive peace will enable the countries of the region to divest themselves of nuclear, chemical and other nonconventional armaments and to ensure effective mutual verification. Of course, the most productive near term avenue of arms control for the Middle East is supplier restraint. Yet, for domestic economic reasons all the major suppliers, led by the United States and Western Europe, remain anxious to increase their sales to the region.

No discussion of Israel's security needs under peace would be complete without a brief reference to the Israeli-American relationship. We have already noted the Israeli perception, that in the final analysis Israel cannot rely on any allies to maintain its security. Nevertheless, in the Arab perception, Israel's strategic relationship with the United States is part and parcel of its overall deterrent profile. To the extent that that profile has been a positive factor in bringing the Arabs to the peace table, the United States should have an interest in maintaining its close links with Israel. Indeed, the peace process is in the short term a principal rationale for continuing American-Israeli strategic relations: US backing for Israel, as a component of Israel's deterrent, will continue to reinforce Arab assessments that there is no alternative to the political route to peace; at the same time, it will reassure Israel that its territorial concessions will

be compensated by continued strategic backing. In the medium term, too, the United States and the EU can be instrumental in cementing the peace by encouraging nascent Arab-Israeli strategic cooperation, for example against the threats posed by Islamic and/or nuclearizing states in the region.

Multilateral Security and Economic Arrangements

In conclusion, we turn briefly to the prospects for multilateral security, economic and other regional arrangements--an area rich in possibilities for European and American involvement. We noted at the outset that fundamental preoccupations of each side toward the other--Israel, with security, the Arabs, with Israel's foreignness to the region--appear to preclude extensive near-term cooperation. But there are some significant exceptions.

One is the progress evinced so far in the Madrid-process multilateral working group on arms control and regional security (ACRS). In effect, the parties involved--some 14 Arab states together with Israel--have, with extensive European and American support, drafted most of a Middle Eastern/North African "Helsinki" type document that lays out 'rules of the game' for regional security cooperation that even the non-participants (such significant countries as Iraq, Iran and Syria) will have to address if and when they seek to join a regional security regime. A Regional Security Center is scheduled to come into existence in Amman--with branches in Qatar and Tunisia--by 1996, with the aim of facilitating integration and support work on arms control. A

Communications Center is being studied for Egypt. Only the nuclear issue--spearheaded by Egypt's recent demands concerning Israeli compliance with the NPT--remains to be resolved.

In the ACRS deliberations, the parties have looked primarily to the CSCE and other European precedents. Moreover, EU countries and experts are now the most active in leading regional activities and exercises, having displaced an increasingly reluctant and inward-looking United States. In turn, the regional parties' readiness to cooperate with the West in developing models for regional arms control is clearly a key to the ongoing success of this vital framework.¹¹

Turning to the economic sphere, it appears likely, in the short term, that there will be a large degree of close integration between Israelis and Palestinians, due to the latter's dependence on the Israeli economy for their sustenance. Jordan is likely to be fairly intimately linked with Israel for its trade needs. Most of the major infrastructure projects currently being discussed--canals, tourist links, joint electric grids--also center on the Israel-Palestine-Jordan triangle, and offer instances where relatively "transparent" areas of cooperation, coupled with the attraction of guaranteed profits, will overcome hesitations about doing business with Israel. Whether these will expand to involve Egyptians, Saudis, Lebanese and Syrians will, in the long term, be one of the main tests of the degree of intimacy and legitimacy that Arabs are prepared to bestow upon Israel. But they will depend on rational market principles as well, and it is not at all certain

that these will make sense in the Israel-Arab context, given the basic lack of compatibility between the economies, the growing gap between the size and sophistication of Israel's and the Arab economies, and the Arabs' own lack of readiness to move to market economies and open trade among themselves.¹²

It also behooves us to ask whether, and to what extent, Arab-Israel peace will bring about changes in the two sides' political cultures. We have already asked how Israel will integrate its Arab minority, once the threat of war is reduced, and how this will affect Israel's character as a Jewish state? Looking to the Arab states, how will they, once freed of their conflict with Israel, confront the many alternative dynamics that have been there all along, frequently lurking on the sidelines: democratization, Islam, demographic pressures? Will Iran replace Israel as a 'cause' to rally against? And what of the flimsier Arab states that appear to have weak foundations as nations, and are frequently ruled by minority ethnic groups or tribes: how will they fare without the Arab-Israel conflict to concentrate their minds? To what extent is the non-democratic nature of virtually all Arab and Islamic regimes a factor delaying rapprochement? Or have we grossly exaggerated Israel's centrality to the Arab dynamic all along?

The prospects for close American and European involvement in the region appear equally ambiguous. Ongoing American-Israeli and American-Arab strategic relationships appear likely for some time. But they could be affected by growing American isolationism. On the other hand, European desires to export the EC/EU model to the

Middle East appear premature. If Muslim Turkey is difficult for the EU to digest due to its human rights record, creeping fundamentalism and minorities problems, how likely is a Europe-MENA free trade area and joint security structure to succeed? We have noted that the Arab states have never opened their borders to free trade and movement of peoples among one another; hence they seem unlikely to adopt the European model even within MENA. The author Samir al-Khalil summarized the obstacles as: "the abject failure of Arab political culture even to formulate, much less solve in practice, questions of legitimacy, freedom and the nature of citizenship."¹³

Thus, while there may indeed be a role for collective security in the Middle East and North Africa, a CSCMENA, it is surely an incremental, step-by-step process. It cannot replace or compensate for the faults of the Madrid multilaterals; rather, it can only build upon a successful Madrid process. And it must build upon a successful set of Israeli-Arab and Arab-Arab bilateral security breakthroughs. European and American support for--and involvement in--such a process appears to depend also on the critical variable of evolution of political and socio-economic change in Arab society.

There is another possible scenario whereby the countries of the region, including Israel, might collectively seek such involvement in the near term, but it is not a happy one. Were the MENA region to be confronted by the emergence of a major nonconventional challenge from, say, Iran or Iraq, perhaps

supported by an Islamic extremist ideology--thereby, in effect, threatening to close the current strategic 'window of opportunity' that nurtures the Middle East peace process--then Israel and the Arabs could conceivably turn collectively to the West for strategic support. Much would depend on the progress made in the peace process up to that hypothetical point. The US and European leadership of the regional response to Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait suggests an interesting precedent. Was this a totally unique, never-to-be-repeated event, or a portend of things to come?

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Notes

1. Some of the ideas in this paper were first discussed in Joseph Alpher, "Israel's Security Concerns in the Peace Process," International Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 2, April 1994.
2. For a brief summary of opinion survey results on this issue, see Daniel Pipes and Tonya Ugoretz Buzby, "The Word on the Arab Street on Israel," Wall Street Journal, June 8, 1995.
3. Al-Hayat, Sept. 19, 1995, quoted in Mideast Mirror, Sept. 20, 1995.
4. See the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies' annual surveys regarding Israeli public opinion on national security issues, for 1992-95. JCSS, Tel Aviv University.
5. See Shahram Chubin, "Does Iran Want Nuclear Weapons," Survival, Spring 1995.
6. For detailed treatments, see Zeev Schiff, Peace with Security: Israel's Minimal Security Requirements in Negotiations with Syria, Washington Institute Policy Papers, number 34 (Washington, DC: 1993) ; Aryeh Shalev, Israel and Syria: Peace and Security on the Golan, JCSS Study no. 24 (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1994).
7. Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan, address to WINEP Conference, "Building on Peace," Amman, September 9, 1995.
8. Joseph Alpher, "Settlements and Borders," Study no. 3, Final Status Issues: Israel-Palestinians, 1994, JCSS, Tel Aviv University.
9. See Shlomo Gazit, "The Palestinian Refugee Problem," Study no. 2, Final Status Issues: Israel-Palestinians, 1995, JCSS, Tel Aviv University.
10. Address by David Ivri, Director General of Israel Ministry of Defense, WINEP Amman Conference, September 10, 1995.
11. For additional and far more expansive Israeli views on regional arms control, see Efraim Inbar, ed., Regional Security

Regimes: Israel and Its Neighbors (Albany: SUNY, 1995), esp. pp. 175-200, Gerald Steinberg, "Arms Control in the Middle East;" Arms Control in the Middle East, JCSS Study no. 15 (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1990); Shai Feldman, Confidence Building and Verification: Prospects in the Middle East, JCSS Study no. 25 (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1994); Shai Feldman and Ariel Levite, eds., Arms Control and the New Middle East Security Environment, JCSS Study no. 23 (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1994).

12. See Jacob Heilbrunn, "Shimon Peres's Neighborhood: The Chimera of Middle East Cooperation," The New Republic, July 10, 1995.

13. New Statesman and Society, August 31, 1990, reprinted in Introduction to Republic of Fear (New York: Pantheon), 1990.

LEGEND

- INTL BORDER
- GREEN LINE
- MAY 1994 AUTONOMY BORDER
- AREA ANNEXED TO ISRAEL
- OVERALL DEPLOYMENT ZONE OF TEMPORARY ISRAELI FORCE

0 10 20 30 KM

HAIFA, JENIN, TULKARM, TUBAS, NABLUS, KAPUR SHOSHON, KAFAR SABA, GALILIA, BIRAZAT, APHEL, RAMALLAH, JERUSALEM, MALE EDUEN, BETHLEHEM, KAFAR ETZION, KURYAT ARBA, HEBRON, ASHDOD, GAZA, BEER SHEVA, TEL AVIV, SYRIA, JORDAN, JORDAN RIVER, DEAD SEA.

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BIBLIOTECA

FROM GEO-POLITICS TO GEO-ECONOMICS
COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
AND THE PERSIAN GULF

BY

ABDEL MONEM SAID ALY

CAIRO - EGYPT
OCTOBER 1995

I. CONCEPTUAL NOTES

Classic theory of Collective Security had emphasised the notion that war prevention among states could be achieved by implementing the principal of a war against one nation is a war against all nations . After World war I , the League of Nations created a system of collective security that was rested on the collective prevention and punishment of aggression . Article X of the League covenant imposed on member nations the " **obligation** " to " **preserve against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League** " . The charter of the United Nations after World War II followed the same traditions . The same notion was globally and regionally implemented in the form of military alliances with the function of deterring aggression . However ,the persistence of wars and conflicts in the international and regional systems have made the classic theory a myth more than reality . In fact, in many cases alliances that was based on the theory tended to prolong conflicts because of its over emphasis on power politics and military preparedness that usually ended in escalating arms race and tensions .

The end of the Cold War and the integrative experience of Europe , where the classic theory of collective security was originally fashioned , have changed the theory fundamentally from being military oriented into being based on extensive political and socioeconomic cooperation . The basic notion here is that nations are not deterred from aggression by power politics only , but mainly by creating a stake for them in preserving peace and stability . Collective Security has been broadened to an over all concept of cooperative security that involve different forms of cooperative interactions among nation - states on both regional and global levels .

The conceptual focus of the paper is the change in regional orders from conflict prone regions (power politics oriented) into a more cooperative ones. In other words, its located in regional cooperation as a field of inquiry. "**Regional cooperation**" is an intermediate concept which tackles cooperative interactions among states in a specific regional area. It is intermediate because of its standing in the middle between the cooperation in the international or global level on one hand and bilateral cooperation among state actors in the international system on the other.

Scholars of international relations, such as Russett , Berton , and Cantori and Spiegel, have studied various geographic regions of the world as regional systems of actions. Russett has isolated particular systems of action involving two or three or more entities that interact frequently regardless of geographical proximity . Oran R. Young emphasizes " **The growing interpenetration of a global or a system-wide axes of international politics on the one hand and several newly emerging, but widely divergent regional areas or subsystems on . the other hand.** Young developed a "**discontinuous model**" which encompasses the concurrent influence of global and regional power processes. Some actors, including superpowers, and certain issues, such as nationalism and economic development, are relevant throughout the international system. Yet, the regional subsystems have unique features and patterns of interactions of their own.

This differentiation between the international or the global and the regional is rooted in the human confrontations with the issue of peace and war. The concept of "**regionalism**" is one of the major topics in the field of international organizations. The debate of universalism versus regionalism has captivated the theoreticians of peace in

this field. Article 21 of the League of Nations Covenant recognized the role of **"regional understanding"** for **"securing the maintenance of peace"**. Article 52 of the U.N. Charter states that **" Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security..."**. The remainder of article 52 encourages the use of the regional arrangements **" to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes...before referring them to the Security Council"**. The U.N. also has supported the idea of regionalism by creating the four regional economic commissions (ECE, ECAFE, ECLA, ECA) under ECOSOC , and has made it clear that regionalism is concerned not only with peace and security issues, but also with economic and social matters.

If international organizations have made the first root for "regional integration", the second root came from the experience of regional integration. The experience of EC, EFTA, ASEAN, NAFTA, APEC, and others, have been regional attempts to transform historically conflictful regions into peaceful and cooperative ones. The EC, now the EU, in particular, provides a living laboratory for observing the peaceful creation of new types of human communities at a very high level of complex processes and organization. The French-British rivalry and the French-German conflict which bedevilled international politics for almost a century and half were transformed into cooperative interactions, peaceful transactions, and noncoercive processes of adaptation and learning.

If the EU experience represents the classic example for regional integration and cooperation that are based on institutional development and the **" spill over"** effect of cooperation in economics to other fields of social and political cooperation, other experiences give different lessons. The very backward institutionally ASIAN experience shows that dependence on extensive and intensive networks of economic, social, and political cooperation, could lead not only to conflict resolution but also to an upgraded levels of regional integration. ASIAN has created vast and intensive networks of **"talking grinding machines"** that allow officials , bureaucrats , and intelligentsia to interact and facilitate cooperative networking in different fields over an expanded period of time. This led finally in 1992 to the establishment of a free trade area among the participating six states, although ASIAN itself was established in 1968. In so doing, ASIAN has went into the opposite direction of the European experience which started with institutions, supranational organizations, and free trade areas.

A third form of regional cooperation and integration was noted by Kenichi Ohamae in his article **" The Rise of the Region State"** (Foreign Affairs, Spring 1993), in which **" region states"** sprang out of natural economic zones. In his words :

They may or may not fall within the geographic limits of a particular nation- whether they do is an accident of history. Sometimes these distinct economic units are formed by parts of states, such as those in Northern Italy, Walles, Catalonia, Alsac-Lorraine or Baden-Warttemberg. At other times they may be formed by economic patterns that overlap existing national boundries, such as those between San Diego and Tijuana, Hong Kong and southern China, or the " growth triangle" of Singapore and its neighbouring Indonesian islands. In todays borderless world these are natural economic zones and what matters is that each possesses, in one or another combination, the key ingredient for successful participation in the global economy.

Regional cooperation, therefore, is a mood for conflict resolution and changing hostile perceptions among states and a way to release noncoercive socioeconomic

processes of learning and adaptation to achieve human progress for the concerned states. The literature on regional integration and historical experience show that certain characteristics have to be met to achieve regional cooperation: geographic proximity, cultural and socioeconomic homogeneity, intense transactions and interdependence, and an intensive institutional networks which facilitate compromise and splitting differences. This all could not be achieved without a vibrant and healthy economic growth for the participating states, an economic growth that could not be sustained without cooperating with other states.

Central to the idea of regional cooperation is the concept of **spill over**. Certain types of cooperation tend to "spill over" to other areas, hence create more opportunity for consolidating cooperative behaviour. There is no definitive area that spill over cooperation more than others. However, as it is noted, studies show that of all issues and policy areas the commitment to create a common market is the most conducive to rapid regional cooperation and the maximization of a spill over. Military alliances have triggered very little permanent integrative consequences. Common technical and scientific services tend toward self-encapsulation. Organizations with an economic mandate short of creating a common market or a free trade area have great difficulty in influencing the policies of their members.

The objective of this paper is to relocate the concept of regional cooperation into the Middle East region. The paper's main argument is that the Middle East region and its sub - regions, such as the Persian Gulf, are going through a painful transition from patterns of interactions which are characterized by power politics and geo- political concerns to new ones which are marked by politics of geo - economics . Geo-politics here is understood as the traditional national security threats that emanate from geography as well as history of the nation state .The survival of the nation and protecting its territorial integrity are the main objectives of national security policy .Power politics and the balance of power are the means to achieve these objectives .Geo-economics, on the other hand, is much more complex concept . The survival of the state and safeguarding its territorial integrity are not the subject of external threats but rather its economic well being, its social cohesion and ability to withstand economic competition .Raising productivity , economic reform ,integration into regional and international markets , and protecting sources of income are the means to protect national security in geo- economic terms.

The great difficulty of studying regions, however , has been in identifying their boundaries . This difficulty arises from the fact that outside powers play a role in defining what constitute a region. Each region, in addition, is in itself tenuous and dynamic. The Middle East is not an exception. Historically, the term Middle East evolved in European usage. The area far from Europe, from India eastward, were called the Far East. The lands of the Eastern Mediterranean were called the " Near East". It seemed logical that the region between the Far East and the Near East should be designated the "Middle East". During the Second World War, United States and British military activities for Turkey, Iran, and the countries of the Arabian Peninsula were placed under the British "Middle East" command . Thus, the habit of designating these territories as the Middle East has continued since then, and the region has been gradually enlarged to include an area that extended from Pakistan to Morocco, and from Turkey to the Horn of Africa reflecting the superpowers' changing interactions and conflicts.

The studies on the Middle East region have faced this problem of territorial identification and failed to reach an agreement on what countries constitute it. In one of the earlier studies about the Middle East as a regional " subordinate system", Leonard

Binder defined it as the area from Libya to Iran, with fringe areas including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Maghreb, and a core area including the Arab states and Israel. Cantori and Spiegel define the Middle East into three different parts: a core (Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Jordan, Syria, and the states of the Arabian Peninsula), a periphery (Israel, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan), and an intrusive system (U.S., U.S.S.R., France, U.K., W. Germany, and PRC). Michael Brecher defines the Middle East as three interrelated areas, a core (Egypt, Israel, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon), a periphery (Algeria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Cyprus, and Ethiopia), and an outer ring (Somalia, S. Yemen, N. Yemen, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco). Carl Brown defines the region as all Arab states except Morocco and Mauritania, Turkey and Israel. Armajani, Evron, Thompson, Pearson and Hudson offered different constellations of states that should be included in the Middle East region.

The IAEA defined in 1989 the Middle East as " **the area extending from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in the West, to the Islamic republic of Iran in the East, and from Syria in the North to the People's Republic of Yemen in the South**". A UN study on the proposed nuclear-weapons-free-zone in the Middle East found the IAEA concept somewhat limited for its purpose and suggested an area that eventually could encompass " **all states members of the League of Arab States (LAS), the Islamic Republic of Iran and Israel**".

This apparent confusion in defining the Middle East region led some scholars to question its existence. The confusion is but a result of the criteria used to define the region. Alliances, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Islamic world, the ottoman heritage just are a few examples of criteria utilized to define the Middle East. More confusing is that the Middle East overlaps with other regions like Southwest Asia, Near East, North Africa, and the Arab World. Sometimes the Middle East is mixed with issues like the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In terms of self- perception, although Israeli scholars accept that Israel is part of the " Middle East ", they differ on what constitute the region. In one Israeli university (Tel Aviv University), the Military Balance of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies define the Middle East as the members of the League of Arab States, excluding Mauritania and Somalia, in addition to Israel and Iran, while the Middle East Contemporary Survey of the Moshe Dayan Center excludes all the Maghreb countries and add Turkey to the list of Middle Eastern countries. The Israeli delegation to the ACRS process suggested the delineation of the Middle East along the following lines:

- * **a broad scope comprising of all states of the region for ballistic missiles, chemical, biological. and nuclear weapons;**

- * **a division of the region into three sub-regions (Maghreb, Central, Gulf) for conventional arms and forces. An umbrella agreement will regulate the relationship among the three sub-regions.**

- * **Many extra-regional states will called upon to respect the regional agreements.**

Arab scholars in general are very apprehensive about the term. Dessouki and Matter argue that :(1) The term Middle East does not refer to a geographical area but rather it represents a political term in its creation and usage; (2) the term is not derived from the nature of the area or its political, cultural, civilizational, and demographic characteristics; and (3) the term tears up the Arab homeland as a distinct unit since it always has contained non-Arab states. The western portrayal of the Middle East is based on the assumption that the area is an ethnic mosaic, composed of a mixture of cultural and national groupings. Dessouki and Matter continue to argue that the goals of this

western image are basically to reject the concept of Arab nationalism, the call of Arab unity, and to legitimize the Israeli existence in the area.

If the Middle East concept appears to be vague and western- oriented, Dessouki and Matter and other Arab scholars offer, instead , the concept of the " **Arab regional system** " as a key for the analysis of interactions among Arab states, their neighbours, and the international system at large. In their point of view, the Arab states, in addition to geographical proximity, exhibit a striking homogeneity which qualify them to be a region. They share a common culture, history, language, institutional forums (the Arab League and an extensive network of governmental and non-governmental organizations) and a religious tradition. They also share, along with the states of the third world, the goals of economic development and a viable political order. They have a common experience of foreign domination, including a common response to certain global issues, notably colonialism. They are attached to nationalism and the symbols of independence. As a result of these important intangibles, they are psychologically knit together as a community.

Whether this view of the region is true or not is not the issue here. Indeed many scholars will question this point of view. The seminal analysis of the rejectionist approach is Foad Ajami's " **The End of Pan-Arabism** ", and his longer work " **The Arab Predicament** ". What is at issue here, however, is that there is no agreement on what is the Middle East. To a large extent, the Middle East, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder.

However, inspite of the lack of a mature crystallization of " **regionalism** " in the Middle East, the area has witnessed several attempts for regional cooperation since the 1940s. The first of these attempts came in 1941 with the creation of the Middle East Supply Center (MESC). The supply center was established by the British government (and made a joint Anglo-American project in 1942) to ensure that the population of the Middle Eastern countries would continue to get essential supplies despite the war time shortages of goods and shipping space .

To achieve this objective, MESC had made a great effort to survey the economic resources of the area , to encourage trade among Middle Eastern States, to develop agricultural and industrial production and to contribute for the development of human resources. The Center succeeded in reducing imports to the area from 6 million tons before the war to 1.5 million in 1944. More important, the Center's efforts had stimulated economic cooperation and production among Middle Eastern countries .

The MESC was closed after the war. American and British ideas to establish a Middle East Economic Council (MEEC) or a Middle East Defence Organization never materialized. A shadow of these ideas was implemented in the creation of the Baghdad Pact in February 1955 among Britain, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey. The Pact called for defensive and economic cooperation among Middle Eastern countries. The Pact failed however to attract Arab countries and Iraq was soon to withdraw in 1958 .

Similarly, another American attempt to stimulate regional economic cooperation through the development of the Jordan River Basin did not materialize. In 1953, Eric Johnston, special ambassador and an envoy of President Dwight Eisenhower, developed a plan which provided for the development of the surface water resources in the Jordan Valley Basin. The plan took into account the interests of Israel, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon and aimed at " equitable distribution " of water among these parties. Although most of the technical elements of the plan were eventually agreed upon by all the parties by October 1955, formal agreements were never concluded because of the rising intensity of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the mid-1950s. Israel and the Arab states,

however, have followed tacitly some of the principles enunciated in the plan.

Among Arab states, attempts towards regional cooperation (and even unification) are numerous. The starting point of the Arab regional cooperation came with the establishment of the Arab League in March 22, 1945. The League's covenant called for coordinating economic activities among the Arab states. In April 13, 1950, these states signed the treaty for collective defence and economic cooperation. The treaty led to the formation of the Arab Economic Council in 1953, the Arab Economic Unity Council in 1964 (13 Arab states only) and the Arab Common Market in the same year. Only six Arab states (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Mauritania) are members of the Arab Common Market. Furthermore, a large number of agreements to facilitate trade and investment were signed by the Arab states .

By 1970s, it was apparent that all Arab attempts towards regional cooperation had failed or had very limited success. Inter- Arab trade never exceeded eight percent of the overall Arab trade. Political as well as economic reasons stood to achieve this result. The weakness of the production base of each Arab country is the most important obstacle for economic cooperation among the Arab states. Consequently, Arab cooperation tended for creating projects and institutions which are capable of stimulating Arab economic growth such as the Arab Monetary Fund, The Arab fund for Social And Economic Development, The Arab Institution for Investment ... etc.

In the 1980s, inter-Arab cooperation went into new direction. Although trade flows among Arab states remained constant, the oil revolution created new forms of social, economic, and cultural interdependence. Labour migration, remittances, inter-Arab tourism and investment have been essential elements of the economies of many Arab countries . Further, petrodollars created a massive industrialization drive in the Arab World. For the first time in history, the Arabs were not only producing raw materials, but also refined oil, petrochemicals, aluminium products, iron and steel, and cement and construction materials. The share of industry and manufacturing in each Arab country's GDP have been raised notably.

As the output of these industries went beyond the scope of internal markets, Arab countries have attempted to cooperate with each other in a different way. Consequently, new sub-regional groupings emerged. First, The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was established in 1981. The GCC contains six Arab states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Oman, Bahrain and Qatar). Although the council was established for security reasons (facing the Iranian threats), it was soon to assume economic functions. Second, the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) were established in 1989. The ACC has four Arab states (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and N. Yemen). The AMU has five (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania). However, the outcome of these regional sub-groupings did not mount to too much and the ACC collapsed all together after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Although all the above show that the " Middle East " is not a well defined region , and the record of regional cooperation is very much less than impressive , regional cooperation is still an important goal to facilitate cooperative collective security in the area . This paper, therefore , will argue that because of fundamental changes in the world as well as the Middle Eastern regional orders, a new trend of cooperative interactions are emerging. However, as still a new trend, traditional politics of power are also still bearing heavily in the politics of the Middle East . The function of regional policy from within and from without , therefore, is to help the consolidation of this trend in order to allow the Middle East to have a more constructive role in world affairs. The paper , consequently , will be divided into four sections . The first two sections will monitor the

changes in the world and regional orders . The third section will focus on the geo-political agenda of the Middle East , with special emphasis on the Persian Gulf sub-region . The fourth section will attempt to redefine the region and propose policies that might help in its transformation from a conflictful mood of interactions into a more cooperative ones .

II.A WORLD TRANSFORMED : THE VICTORY OF GEO-ECONOMICS

The birth of "The New World Order" came as a declaration of forces and processes that had started since World War II and even before. In theory, any world order entails a mood of technology, a power structure, and an agenda. Technologically, the "new" in the world order is the increasing dominance of the third industrial revolution over world affairs. This revolution evolved from the wombs of the first and second industrial revolutions. The world had known its first television in 1934, its first computer in 1941, its first space ship in 1957, and genetic engineering before all. However, only in The 1970s and 1980s, revolutions in electronics, informatics, genetic engineering, and space ... etc. reached an intensity level that changed fundamentally the lives of individuals, the status of states, the harmony of peoples, the ways of production and the moods of distribution and consumption.

Structurally, the "new" in the world order is not really the change from a bipolar world to the much "older" unipolar or multipolar worlds, but the fundamental change in the nature of polarity itself. Traditionally, polarity was defined in terms of power distribution among nation-states or blocs of nation-states. They are engaged in eternal pursuit of hegemony and dominance that involves the use, or the threat of use, of force. Now, it seems, that polarity can be defined in terms of the prevalence of a whole system of political-socio-economic interactions in world affairs. This system is the Western and Capitalist (and also liberal) order, as it dominates the world at the final years of the 20th Century. It represents the powers of North America, Western Europe, and Japan plus the Pacific rim. This order, is highly integrated through a large networks of institutions, (G-7, GATT, IEA, OECD, IMF, IBRD), multinational corporations, trade, and investments.

The third industrial revolution released a historical process of significant proportion. In one hand, economically, it has generated production capacities unprecedented in human history. No state in the world can be satisfied with its internal market. Even the United States which took pride until the end of the 1960s that its external market generated small proportion of its GNP , by the 1980s that became no more the case. The search for larger markets, thus became relentless. Through mechanisms such as interdependence, "global factory" structures, multinational corporations, world financial markets, international financial institutions, regional and transcontinental integration in the Western Hemisphere , Europe Northern America and The Pacific, the world economy became more and more integrated. Within this system, power is distributed not only by military capabilities but also by the ability to innovate and to market. The U. S. may have a leading position, because of its \$ 6 trillion GNP, but by no means a hegemonic place. The competition, so much claimed, in the system is actually feuds that are dealt with through cooperation, compromise, institutions, bargaining, and market forces.

Naturally, a change in the world structure means a new agenda. While the post World War II order was dominated by issues of arms race, and arms control, regional conflicts, and Soviet-American contestations, the new order is looking for new issues. The new agenda is basically an economic one. Unemployment, inflation, exchange rates, stock-markets, trade barriers, population are the issues of the day. Global issues such as pollution, environmental safety, communication, air trafficking are increasingly getting their place in world summits. Transnational social problems such as drugs, refugees, AIDS, are getting global attention. The "Earth summit" in 1992, followed by similar summits on human rights, population, and women have been testimonies for the change in the global agenda.

The new world order, as has been described, could not have come to being without other socio-economic-political processes that took place in different regions in the world. In the socialist bloc, particularly in the USSR, the socio-economic-political systems could not adapt to the change in world environment. The uniformation of man, the public ownership of the means of production, and the dictatorship of the proletariat led to a stifling command political and economic systems which were not capable in dealing not only with the impacts of the technological revolution, but also to keep its rate of development. In the 1950s and 1960s socialist countries achieved impressive developmental results in technology, industry, GNP ... etc. However by the 1970s, it became evident that these societies had reached a developmental halt. By the 1980s, the socialist countries went on the road of regression that led in the end to their final collapse and disintegration.

In the western bloc the socio-economic-political systems were much more capable of adapting and adjusting to the new developments. After facing serious socio-economic and political difficulties in the late 1960s and the 1970s, by the 1980s, western countries were able to recover economically, deal with the energy crisis, have better handling of the environment etc. This could not have happened without the ability to absorb the third industrial revolution and creating mechanisms which are capable of dealing with the necessities of regional and global economic integration and better handling of political disintegration.

In the Third World, the socio-economic-political systems which emerged after decolonization mostly failed in dealing with their internal and external environments. Many Third World countries, particularly in Africa, became more underdeveloped than they were before independence. The third industrial revolution have led to their marginalization in the world's political and economic systems. The collapse of the Soviet bloc has deprived them from the advantages of the cold war. The end result of this development was a decline in their economic fortunes and a decay in their political institutions. However, it has to be said that some Third World countries in Southeast Asia, Pacific, and Latin America succeeded in using the opportunity of the need for the enlargement of the world market to associate with the rising unipolar order. They succeeded in adjusting their socio-economic, and lately political, systems to deal not only with the third industrial revolution but also in dealing with the complexities of competition in a largely integrated world economic system.

III. TRANSFORMING THE MIDDLE EAST : TOWARDS A NEW REGIONAL ORDER

If the world order has been transformed, the Middle East has witnessed major changes. The most important development in the region was the Second Gulf War. The war changed the behaviour of the major parties to the Arab - Israeli conflict. For Israel, the war manifested the results of the arms race in the Middle East. Iraq's missiles of Scud-B hit Israel's population centers. In spite of the minimum damage they occurred, the prospects of another war in which chemical weapons would be used made Israel more inclined to search for a process that will curtail the Arab mass destruction capabilities. The discoveries that Iraq was developing biological and nuclear capabilities made this process an urgency. In Israel's eyes, the Arabs, in spite of their technological gap with Israel, will continue to try to catch up with her and will be able to inflict serious damage in the case of a new war. Furthermore, the American-Arab coalition in the war has minimized the Israeli strategic value to the United States. Israel, after all, was a burden for the coalition not an asset. Israel, consequently, found it was more appropriate to get into a peace process in a time that its standing in the U.S. still high. The fact that Syria, the arch enemy of Israel, participated in the war side by side with the U.S, created worries in Israel. The growing Saudi and Egyptian ties with Washington were no less worrisome. In the meantime, Israel has estimated that the general Arab position was weak because of the Arab divisions and the destruction of Iraq's military capabilities. In a way, the Arabs fought a war with one of Israel's most radical foes thus creating a common interest though indirectly.

For the Arab states parties to the multinational coalition in the war, there were risks and opportunities. The risks came as a result of Saddam Hussain's initiative of August 12, 1990 when he linked his withdrawal from Kuwait with the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories. The initiative worked well with the Arab masses. The accusation of "double standards" was raised not only against the U.S, but also against the coalition Arab partners. Fearful of losing credibility in the Arab world, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia found it imperative to use the opportunity of their coalition with the U.S to harness a "consequential linkage" between the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, peacefully or by force, and the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Finally, these countries found that unless there is a resolution to conflict, radical forces in the area will continue to use the Palestinian and Arab grievances to destabilize the Middle East.

For pro-Iraq Arabs, particularly, the PLO and Jordan, the defeat of Iraq left them much weaker. Their participation in an Arab-Israeli peace process will work as an avenue to return to the majority Arab fold and allow them Arab and international aid. After all, the defeat of Iraq has proven the fallacy of radical solutions for the ills of the Middle East. Time has become essential for them to reach a resolution of the Arab-Israeli questions or to accept an erosion to their negotiating positions.

For the U.S, the major mediator in the Middle East since 1973, credibility was at stake. The defeat of Iraq was the opportunity for American President George Bush to declare the birth of a "New World Order" led by the U.S. The resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict became a test case for American leadership. For Washington, furthermore, the resolution of the conflict was an essential part of a strategy to secure oil resources and fight radicalism in the Middle East. Finally a resolution of the conflict will put a cap on the Middle East arms race particularly in the field of mass destruction weapons which became alarming in recent years.

The second most important development which encouraged the peace process in the Middle East was the collapse of the Soviet Union. The story of the Soviet collapse is not of concern here. What is important is the ramifications of this collapse on the Arab-

Israeli conflict. The end of the cold war has changed the attitudes of the Arabs and Israelis alike. For Syria and the PLO, they lost an important diplomatic, political and military ally. Losing a constant and reliable arm supplier narrowed their options to only look for the U.S. help to launch a peace initiative. For Israel, although the collapse of the USSR has made a formidable foe disappear, and a flow of Jewish migration went to the Hebrew state, the new situation created incentives to move towards peace. The end of the cold war has minimized the role of Israel as a strategic asset for the U.S. in the global confrontation. Furthermore, the massive flow of Jewish migration put pressures on the Israeli economy which could not be dealt with without American and western help. This, in turn, could not be guaranteed without an involvement in a serious Arab-Israeli negotiations. For the U.S., the end of the cold war meant an American de facto monopoly over the Arab-Israeli peace process; a policy the U.S. has tried to accomplish since mid 1970s.

Although the Second Gulf War and the end of the cold war were the most decisive factors behind the launching of the Arab-Israeli peace process, it has to be mentioned that the parties to the conflict were also changing their positions. The Palestinians, encouraged by the intifada and fearful of the Israeli settlement policy in the West Bank and Gaza, opted for peace with Israel. In 1988 the Palestinian National Council adopted a resolution to accept the 242 Security Council Resolution, recognize Israel, and accepted a two states solution to the Palestinian question. Syria gave a de facto acceptance of the Camp David accords between Egypt and Israel by restoring diplomatic relations with Egypt. A reality that allowed Egypt to return to the Arab League. For Israel, the arms race in the Middle East started to make alarms. The Palestinian intifada made the Israeli occupation more costly. The economic problems, which was serious enough before the massive flow of the Jewish migration, became even more serious. The Israeli needs for water could not be met without some form of regional cooperation. All these factors, in addition to others, made gradual shift in the Israeli public opinion. This shift was to show later in the Israeli elections in June 1992 when the electorate opted for a Labour led Coalition instead of the Likud right wing and intransigent coalition. All in all the parties were changing, and the Second Gulf War and the end of the cold war created an opportunity that no body wanted to miss.

And the opportunity was not missed. Through an active American mediation efforts the Madrid peace process started in October 1991 and by 1994 a Palestinian - Israeli agreement and an Israeli - Jordanian peace treaty were in place. What is important about the new Arab - Israeli reconciliation process is that it introduced geo-economic dimension to its traditional geo-political concerns of territory and security. In addition to the bilateral negotiations, another layer of negotiation was to be a multilateral one to discuss five issues of interest to the parties: arms control, water, refugees, economic development, and environment. The negotiations started at the end of January 1992 in Moscow with 35 states participating including 13 Arab countries and Israel. Syria and Lebanon declined to participate until a serious progress took place in the bilateral negotiations. Not waved by this setback, the participants agreed to form five sub-multilateral committees to discuss the five issues under consideration. Although the results of the multilateral negotiations are still limited, it has inspired a host of initiatives to accelerate development and economic cooperation in the Middle East, the most notable of which was the economic Middle East summit in Morocco in the end of October 1994, and the Amman economic summit in October 1995. More elaborate vision was represented to the interlocutors of the area by Shimon Peres, the Israeli foreign minister in his book " **The New Middle East** " in which he argued for a new way of

thinking and moving the economy of the region " **From an Economy of Strife to an economy of Peace** " .

In the bilateral agreements the economic dimension were even more concrete .Although the Palestinian - Israeli agreement entailed a gradual " political " separation between Israel and Palestine that may include the birth of a Palestinian state , it contained provisions for consolidated linkage between the two sides . The linkage is manifested in a highly complicated network of coordinating committees in the areas of security , economics , and infrastructure . More important , Annex III of the agreement (Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation and Development programs) contains provisions not only for legitimizing the existing linkages between Israel and the West Bank and Gaza but also to consolidate them in the areas of water , electricity , energy , finance , transport and communications , trade , industry , labour and welfare issues , human resources , environment , and communication and media . Annex IV even went furthermore to make the Israeli-Palestinian linkage a corner stone in a very ambitious regional developmental and cooperation plan .The Jordanian -Israeli peace treaty listed seven areas for cooperation : water , refugees , natural resources , human resources , infrastructure , economic fields , and tourism .

IV. The Middle East : The Geo- political Agenda

These positive developments in the Middle East should not overshadow the seriousness, and the gravity, of the geo-political agenda that the region is still carrying on its shoulders . Indeed, it is still very premature to decide if the new trends in the region are sustainable or not . Observers of the area could not overlook the recent bloody history of the region . For decades, the Arabs and Israelis fought each other for affirmation of their national identities, territories, and natural resources. For the Israelis the fight was for a self-recognized sense of nationhood that gather all the Jews of the world in the holy land of Palestine. For the Arabs the fight was for rectifying the "original sin" of uprooting the Palestinians from their historical homeland, thus their deprivation of the right of self-determination. Over almost a half a century, the conflict between the two sides continued without abatement in the international forums and in the battlefield. Six wars, to count only the major ones, (1948, 1956, 1967, 1969-1970, 1973, 1982) between them have made bitter memories for all the parties . For almost forty five years, the two parties were involved in a deadly arms race, mobilizing world resources and preparing always for another more devastating war. Over time, the conflict which was about the partition of Palestine was protracted to a host of increasingly complicated issues such as the occupied Arab territories since June 1967, arms race, water supplies, refugees, economic boycott, settlement and settlers, terrorismetc.

And, for sure , the Arab - Israeli conflict was not the only conflict in the region during the same period . In fact , the Middle East , with only 8% of world population , has had 25% of all the world's armed conflicts since 1945 . The Middle East has Known all sorts of conflicts during the same period such as regional wars , wars of intervention , civil wars , intra - Arab rivalries and conflicts with devastating consequences to the human and material resources of the region . Most notably in the past two decades alone , the region witnessed two major wars in the Persian Gulf , civil wars in Lebanon , Yemen , Somalia , and Sudan , and waves of violence and terrorism .Table (1) below shows the devastating impacts of these conflicts on the resources of the region . Still these estimates

excludes the opportunity cost lost for the area if these resources were put for a better use than armed conflicts . Table (1) also shows that the Arab - Israeli conflict , though considered the principal conflict in the region , has claimed some 200,000 lives in forty years . In contrast , during the same period , ethnic conflicts have claimed several times as many lives . The Lebanese civil war alone matched the same number of casualties as all Arab - Israeli wars . The Sudanese civil war has claimed at least five times as many lives as all Arab - Israeli wars . The same relative costs apply in terms of population displacement , material devastation , and financial expenditure .

Table (1)
The Cost of Armed Conflicts IN The Middle East And North Africa (MENA)
Region :1948-1993)

Type Of conflict	period	No. Of Casualties	Estimated Cost in billions of \$ US (1991 Value)	Estimated Population Displacement
A) Inter - State				
Arab - Israeli	1948-1990	200,000	300.0	3,000,000
Iran-Iraq	1980-1988	600,000	300.0	1,000,000
Gulf War	1990-1991	120,000	650.0	1,000,000
Other Inter-State	1945-1991	70,000	50,0	,000,000
Sub-Total		940,000	1,300.0	6,000,000
B) Intra-State				
Sudan	1956-1991	900,000	30.0	4,500,000
Iraq	1960-1991	400,000	30.0	1,200,000
Lebanon	1958-1990	180,000	50.0	1,000,000
N.Yemen	1962-1972	100,000	5,0	500,000
Syria	1975-1985	30,000	.,5	150,000
Morocco	1976-1991	20,000	3,0	100,00
S. Yemen	1986-1987	10,000	.,2	50,000
Somalia	1989-1991	20,000	.,3	200,000
Other Inter-State	1945-1991	30,000	1,0	300,000
Sub-Total		1,690,000	110,0	8,000,00
Grand Total (All Armed Conflicts)		2,630,000	1,500,000	14,000,000

Source : Files of the Arab Data Unit (ADU), Ibn Khaldoun Center for Developmental Studies , Cairo , 1993 .

Reasons behind this propensity for inter - state and intra - state violence in the Middle East are abundant : the nation - state building process with what it entails in terms of the legitimacy of political regimes , the colonial heritage of borders , super and great powers contestations in the region , transnational ideologies of Pan -Arabism , Pan -Islamism and Zionism , sharp differences in wealth and resources among states ... etc. All these reasons have made power politics and geo-political concerns the dominant factors in influencing state behaviour . A case in the point could be demonstrated by having a

close look at the conflict in the Persian Gulf sub - region of the Middle East . Else where , the author has elaborated in the geo - political dimensions of conflicts in the rest of the Middle East particularly the Arab - Israeli conflict .

The Conflict in the Persian Gulf

The nine countries of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula (The GCC six states, Iraq, Yemen and Iran) share being Third World countries with all the pains and ills that goes with it. They are all basically consumers of powers depending on the outside countries for military supplies. All are oil and gas producers (about 60 percent of world reserves) and their economies are highly dependent on that one source of income. Yet, the states of the region differ on everything else: size, population, wealth, levels of economic development and modernization, and of course military power. The uneven distribution of material resources creates certain imbalance that enhance ambitions and hegemonic tendencies on one hand, and apprehensions, suspicions and fears on the other. Historical legacies from the ancient times of the Persian empire to the more recent two Gulf wars are seldom forgotten from the mind set of old and new nations across the gulf. Islam, the dominant religion across the water way, seemed to have divided peoples along the Sunni - Shi'a dichotomy.

However, imbalance of power, historical legacies, and religious divisions are not by themselves enough for conflict, though they may pave the road to it. Other forces have to come into play in order to threaten the security of a given region, most notably in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula are the following:

First, there is a large imbalance between the wealth of GCC states individually and collectively and the small number of their population. The GCC countries have a total population of 17.6 million (Table 1) compared with 54 million for Iran, 17 for Iraq and 13.5 for Yemen (Table 2). And while the GCC states are surplus money countries, Iran has \$ 30 billion foreign debt, Iraq has \$ 84 billion (plus reparation for the Gulf War), and Yemen has \$ 8.5 billion.

Table (2)
Estimates of the GCC populations (1992)

	Nationals	Non Nationals	Non-nationals as% of the total	Total
Bahrain	330,000	134,000	29	464,000
Kuwait	387,000	803,000	67	1,190,000
Oman	1,062,000	380,000	26	1,442,000
Qatar	141,000	272,000	66	413,000
S.Arabia	8,066,400	4,192,600	34	12,259,000
UAE	531,000	1,294,000	70	1,825,000
Total	10,500,000	7,100,000	40	17,600,000

Source: Roger Hardy, *Arabia after the storm: International Stability of the Gulf Arab States*, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992, P. 25.

Table (3)**Estimates of Iran (1991), Iraq (1991) and Yemen (1990)
populations**

Iran	55,840,000
Iraq	17,903,000
Yemen	11,282,000
Total	85,025,000

Source: *The Europa World Year Book*, 1994.

Second, the citizens of each GCC country are a minority in their own country with the exception of Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia. Further more, the ethnic and religious compositions of the populations in the two sides of the Gulf are quite diversified. While Iran, a Persian Shi'a dominant country, has considerable Arab Shi'a and Sunni minorities, the other eight Arab countries have Shi'a and Iranian minorities, with the exception of Bahrain as indicated on table (4).

Table (4)**Shi'a in the GCC States (1984 estimates)**

	Shi'a population	%of nationals
Saudi Arabia	440,000	8
Bahrain	168,000	70
Kuwait	137,000	24
UAE	45,000	18
Qatar	11,000	16
Oman	28,000	4

Source: Roger Hardy, *Arabia after the storm: International Stability of the Gulf Arab States*, London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992, P. 23.

The Shi'a minorities in the GCC states have been under a cloud of suspicion from the late 1970's and throughout the 1980's. This was mainly because of the Islamic revolution in Iran, the first Gulf war (Iran-Iraq war) and the Shi'a subversion in Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The second Gulf war of 1990-91 helped to lift this cloud by showing the Shi'a patriotism, like Sunnis, in opposing Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and led to a rapprochement between the Gulf states and Iran, causing fear of Iranian-sponsored activities to decline. This however, did not end the Shi'a grievances.

The Shi'a problems three dimensions. One part of the problem is sectarian especially in Saudi Arabia where the Shi'a were seen as heretics . Second the problem of human rights in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia where any sign of Shi'a activism is harshly crushed. Finally, the Shi'a community in all Gulf states suffer, in one way or other, from various forms of discrimination. They, for example, are often barred from high military and civilian positions.

As a result of this situation, the Shi'a in the Gulf states remains susceptible to

external influences especially from Iran. The latest dispute between Iran and the UAE over the islands of Abu Musa , Lesser Tumb , and Greater Tumb is a good example , especially since mid-1992 when Iran decided to take full control of the Abu Musa island. Since 1971 Abu Musa has been subject to a sharing agreement between sharjah and Tehran and the Iranian step would add more fuel to the problem and would affect the domestic position of the Shi'a communities in the Gulf states.

Third, like most Third World countries, the states of the region are new states in the modern sense of stateness. They face the problems of undefined borders, which was inherited from the time of the colonial powers. These undefined borders played a major role in the arm conflict which the Gulf region witnessed. The Buraimi conflict of the 1950's was a direct result of a border dispute between Saudi Arabia, on one side, and Great Britain, representing Abu Dhabi and Oman on the other. The Iraq-Iran war of the 1980's was also caused, to a large degree, by the disagreement between the two countries over the ownership of the border area of Shatt-al-Arab water way. The border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait, over the Rumila Oil field and the ownership of the islands of Bubian and Warbah, was one of the main reasons for the Gulf crisis of 1990-91. All the states in the region suffered from border disputes with its neighbours. Of these disputes , the Bahrain-Qatar conflict over the Hwar islands and Fasht Al- Dibal resulted in a military confrontation in 1986 . Tensions rose again in 1991 when Qatar submitted its claim to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. In September 1992 , the Saudi-Qatar border dispute erupted in an armed clash at Al-Khofus, some 130 Km south of Doha . Qatar threatened not to attend the 1992 GCC summit in Abu Dhabi, yet Egyptian mediation resulted in the signing of an agreement between the two countries in the Saudi city of Al-Medina . A committee was to be established formally to demarcate the Saudi-Qatari borders which resulted in Qatari attending the GCC summit . As of 1995 the Saudi - Qatari border had yet to be officially demarcated . Other border issues which are yet to be solved include the Omani-UAE dispute over their common border and the Saudi-Yemeni disagreement over their borders. The border disputes in the Gulf region will continue to present a serious challenge to Gulf security in the future.

Fourth, and probably the most important, the region is divided along conservative status quo powers versus radical and revolutionary powers. The GCC States are traditional, conservative states which find its security and well-being linked to the West. Iran, Iraq, and to some extent Yemen are republics that also spout revolutionary visions of themselves and the regional context in which they live .This includes the Islamic revolutionary ideals of Iran, the Arab nationalist ideology of Iraq, and the mixture of both perspectives in Yemen. Iraq and Iran are clear cases . Yemen, However, is a different story especially after the Northern Yemeni leadership succeeded in crushing the rebellion in the former south Yemen in the summer of 1994 against the wishes of the majority of the GCC states with the exception of Qatar .The legitimacy of the state system in the area is not acceptable. For the less fortunate, more populated, and radical Iran, Iraq and Yemen, the GCC states are up for grabs in the name of the Arab nation or the Islamic one or both.

These four realities constituted the basic vulnerabilities of the the Persian Gulf region and made power politics and geo- political concerns predominantly leading to an environment of conflict the result of which is the reliance on military power as a major instrument in foreign policy behaviour . All countries in the region , as well as in the rest of the Middle East, have been involved in a deadly arms race . The second Gulf War was instrumental in bringing a new phase in the arms race in the Gulf region and the entire Middle East. THE DESERT STORM validated and introduced many future doctrinal concepts and combat behaviour. Lessons of the Gulf War were: the importance of the air

phase and air assets; the vital role of global reconnaissance and secured communication; the combat continuity at day and night; the fire power at depth and the electronic warfare. During the combat, more than 7400 tons of advanced precision guided munitions were used. Laser-guided bombs (GBU-12), (GBU-24) were employed by the stealth strike aircraft F-117 to hit hard targets. High Speed Anti-Radiation missiles HARM were used to deter SAMs radars and control centers. F-15 multi-role fighters used Low-Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infra-Red for Night systems LANTIRN pods to locate and destroy missile sites and missile launchers. Certainly, DESERT STORM became a turning point for defence acquisition planning by most of the states in the Gulf. Military planners are now considering a large array of systems that they would have not taken seriously in the past, or regarded as important. In conclusion the Gulf War sparked a new wave of arm racing in the Gulf region. An attempt to describe the current status of weapon acquisition in the nine countries which are affecting the military balance in the area are as follows:

Iraq

The Iran-Iraq war was instrumental in the expansion of the Iraqi army. Table (5) below shows the monumental increase in the Iraqi military capability. In addition, Iraq had built up an important armaments industry by the end of the war, whose products included a surface-to-surface missile based on the Soviet scud, developed with Egyptian and Argentinean assistance. By 1989-1990, Iraq was manufacturing chemical weapons and sophisticated missiles and not far from acquiring the means to produce nuclear weapons; the essential components of all were being provided by firms in Western Europe and the United States.

Table (5)
Expansion of the Iraqi Armed Forces , 1979-1988

Item	1979-80	1987-88
Men	190,000	1,000,000
Tanks	1,900	6,310
Combat Aircraft	339	500+
AFVs	1,500	4,000

Source : IISS , **The Military Balance 1987-1988** (London : International Institute for Strategic Studies , 1987) , p. 100.

During the Gulf War, Iraq suffered considerable military losses. According to IISS military balance (1991-1992), 41 Iraqi divisions may have ceased to exist. Equipments destroyed or captured included 3,008 tanks, 1856 armoured vehicles and 2,140 pieces of artillery, thirty five aircrafts were shot down while 115 combat aircraft flown to Iran. The whole Iraqi Navy was sunk with the exception of the Italian-made frigates still held in

Italy and Egypt. Nonetheless, according to IISS military balance (1994-1995) Iraq still has considerable force. It has around 382,00 active man power under arms, 2,200 MBTs, 1,980 artillery pieces, about 316 planes, 4,200 armoured vehicles, and all its helicopter force. Although the Iraqi military power has been reduced considerably, Iraq remains a military power in the Gulf with defence and deterrent capability. If compared with the GCC states alone, Iraq could mount sizable offensive operations.

Iran

Important efforts are being made by Iran to re-organise and modernize its armed forces which suffered severe losses during the long war with Iraq. At the same time the arms industry has been expanded to support a growing military machine. Between 1984 and 1994, Iran signed arms transfer agreements valued \$ 19.8 billion in which \$ 16.1 billion worth of arms were delivered. Values of covert U.S. agreements and deliveries in 1985-1986 were not included in these estimates, nor were the black market agreements and deliveries were included. In one estimate, arms deliveries to Iran for the period 1983-1990 valued \$ 39.5 billion.

The current active military presence in the Gulf by the West, the policy of permanent pre-positioning of defence heavy equipment in the area, and the large scale arms purchase plans by the Gulf states, all represent new security environment for the Iranian regime. Iraq is still considered an important threat for Iran as far as Saddam Hussein remains in power.

Iran still remains a fundamentalist state which retains its strong attitude to expand its Shi'a Moslem ideas to other countries. Currently, Iran is actively involved in Lebanon and is becoming a growing factor in Sudan. Iran has wide-ranging strategic interests in the Gulf with strong Shi'ite populations in the area. Future oil and gas disputes with Saudi Arabia and Qatar could also bring the Iranians to try to impose their wishes by force. Vital oil resources and installations in Saudi Arabia are only within 150 km from the Iranian coast, a situation which could permit blackmailing Riyadh with a tactical missile attack. Such potential threat can produce tremendous risks on disembarkation ports in the Persian Gulf and intervention forces intending to use these ports. Iran have recently made a very important move in the area by expelling all Arab nationals from the island of Abu Musa which caused considerable concern in the area.

Tehran's most intense political action is currently aimed at the former Soviet Moslem republics in Central Asia, and especially those bordering Iran. Azerbeidjan, Turkestan, and Tajikstan are all targets for Iranian intervention. There is current fear that Iran can acquire nuclear weapons giving the current situation in the ex-Soviet Moslem republics, and economic difficulties facing ex-Soviet officers and officials. Considerable efforts are also underway in Iran to establish R&D and production facilities which could eventually provide access to nuclear capabilities. The Ex-Director of the US Central Intelligence, Robert M. Gates, testified to the Congress that Iran was seeking a nuclear bomb and could have one by the year 2000. U.S. authorities interfered to block deals between Iran, Argentina and China to obtain equipments that would have allowed Iran to begin its own nuclear manufacturing. In 1994, Iran signed nuclear cooperation agreements with China and Russia Which presumably will enhance its nuclear capability.

Russia has already agreed to supply Iran with a large number of the latest version T-72 MBTs, some 40 MIG-29s, a few MIG-31s and two squadrons of SU-24 FENCER strike aircraft. This has allowed the depleted Iranian Airforce to regain its strength in a remarkable short time. A total of 115 Iraqi Airforce combat aircraft escaped to Iranian

airports during the last Gulf War. A large percentage of these aircrafts are in serviceable conditions. At least a part of these aircraft could be kept in operation with assistance from USSR and/or China. Iran also negotiated with Italy the sale of CH-47 Chinook medium-lift helicopters which could be used for civilian and military purposes.

Latest figures of Iranian arms purchases indicate orders from China, the ex-Soviet Union states, Brazil and North Korea which is becoming rapidly one of Iran's best suppliers with a contract for almost 200 SCUD Bs and Cs. Bulgaria delivered over 10000 rockets and SAM launchers from its stocks. Iran is also trying to rebuild its naval capability a move which could become extremely dangerous to oil shipping routes through the Straits of Hormouz. Iran has recently bought three ex-Soviet Navy KILO class submarines which can be used with long-range air patrols and shore-based SILK WORM anti-shipping missiles to support Iranian Military operations in the Gulf.

Saudi Arabia.

A very ambitious tentative plan has been announced calling for the defence forces to be expanded to about 250,000 men over the next five years. This plan is supposed to bring Saudi forces to the same size and effectiveness level as the whole Coalition forces deployed during the Gulf War. Of course, DESERT STORM became a turning point for Saudi defence planning just as it had for other countries of the Middle East. Saudi planners are now considering a large array of US systems that they would have not taken seriously, or regarded as important, prior to the Gulf War.

Riyadh has pursued a prudent diversification policy, procuring from non US sources items the US could not or would not deliver (i.e. the TORNADO strike aircraft or the Chinese DF-SA IRBM). The Saudis often grow weary with US caution over technology transfer and Washington's fear of upsetting the Middle East regional balance. However, there are now five AWACS planes in the Saudi inventory and more than 98 F-15 fighters. For its ground forces, Saudi Arabia will have up to 465 M-1A2 ABRAMS MBTs and some 600 M-2 BRADLEY MICVs in its inventory before year 2000, and already deploys more than 60 MLRS artillery rocket systems. In addition the Saudi forces use the STINGER MAN-PADS, the Bell 406 COMBAT SCOUT and AH-64 APACHE helicopters. They also have 116 TOW launchers with 2,000 anti-tank guided missiles. Some recent requests to purchase include 150-plus HELL-FIRE anti-tank missiles and more than 2,000 MAVERICK air-to-surface missiles. The "Al-Yamamah 1" expansion program called most notably for 48 TORNADO IDS, 24 TORNADO ADV, 30 HAWK trainers and deliveries are being completed. "Al-Yamamah 2" calls for further batch of 48 TORNADOS, 60 HAWK, 40 WS-70A BLACKHAWK helicopters. 6 PATRIOT batteries with 384 missiles are on order, and a further 14 batteries have been request.

Other Gulf States

The other five states of the GCC have small military powers. Yet, they face tremendous military challenge caused by the threat coming from Iran and Iraq. They could hardly face alone such a threat without outside help from either the US or other Arab States. Kuwait armed forces were severely beaten during the early stages of the Iraqi invasion with most of their equipment destroyed. In order to rebuild its armed forces with the best equipment. Kuwait is expected to spend over US \$ 9 billion on arms purchases in the near future, plus all other defence related expenditures. Among the major weapon systems being procured are 40 F/A-18 HORNET fighters, was delivered under a

US \$ 1.9 billion contract. Furthermore, a US \$ 2.5 billion deal covers the purchase of several PATRIOT and improved HAWK air defence missile batteries. After negotiation with both the UK and US regarding the selection of a new MBT to rebuild the Kuwait armed forces, Kuwait has chosen to buy 236 US M1A-2 tanks to be delivered over a two-year period starting in 1994. It was reported also that Kuwait ordered French naval equipment, including Simonneau Marine fast patrol boats, La Combattante 4 fast missile corvettes, Aerospatiale MM-40 Exocet antiship missiles, Matra Mistral air-defence missiles, and possibly Eridan-Class Minehunters.

Bahrain is going to purchase the AH-64 APACHE attack helicopter but cost reasons may suggest the upgraded COBRA as an alternative. Some MLRS systems were sold in addition to one squadron of F-16 fighters and two dozen M-60A3 tanks within a 54 tanks deal.

United Arab Emirates received 45 Mirage 2000s. The UAE has expressed its need for a second batch of modern fighters. The competition for this follow-on order was largely between additional MIRAGE and F/A-18C/Ds. The UAE has signaled its preparedness to diversify its traditional supply sources by signing a deal for 500 Russian BMP-series MICVs. Sultanate of Oman recently signed a L150 million contract to buy two missile corvettes equipped with an advanced combat systems. The Qatari Navy is also planning to build four VITA-type large missile craft for L200 million.

Yemen

On May 22, 1990, The Yemen Arab Republic and the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen joined to form The Republic of Yemen. Since then the country has been going through the difficult process of unification. Domestic, political and economic problems are creating instability and some times anarchy that reached in the summer of 1994 to become a civil war. The extreme poverty in the country and its rigid tribal system are a ground for civil disorder and possibly war. During the Gulf crisis, Yemen took sides with Iraq which led to the expulsion of 750,000 Yemenites from Saudi Arabia and, thus, depriving the country of a major source of hard currency. The newly discovered oil and gas (200,000 b/d) are not expected to have a significant change in the fortunes of Yemen, at least in the short term.

A major reorganization of the armed forces is underway after the end of the civil war. The war, however, was instrumental in unifying the command of the two armies that was too difficult to obtain previously. The combined forces are small in terms of active manpower which total 65,000 with perhaps 40,000 in reserve. In terms of equipment, however, Yemen has a force of 1,140 MBTs, 670 APCs, 527 artillery and 110 combat aircraft. It is possible that these equipment are undermanned, and faced with problems of maintenance and spare parts because of the lack of hard currency and the collapsed of USSR.

CONFLICT SCENARIOS

The picture that emerges from the previous review on the Persian Gulf sub- region shows the following:

- a) There are considerable power imbalance in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. These imbalance are compounded by religious, ideological, demographic, and geo-strategic factors that may lead to different forms of conflict.
- b) The whole region is involved in a relentless arms race. The Iran-Iraq war and the

Gulf war motivated the search for high quality and highly destructive weapons.

c) In the post Gulf war period all regional arrangements for the security of the Gulf did not materialize. Currently, Gulf security is highly dependent on defence and security arrangements between the GCC states and Western countries particularly in the U.S. These by themselves could contribute to insecurities in the area if they are used by radical and revolutionary states, such as Iraq and Iran to ignite anti-Western and anti-American feelings.

d) The current military balance in the area is not stable. As different countries in the area especially Iraq, Iran and Yemen, look for more weapons, the balance may change. However, it seems for the moment Iraq could not present an urgent danger. The world community sanctions and the Western presence in the Gulf constitute considerable deterrence. Yet, if these two elements waned, Iraq under Saddam Hussain could raise a considerable threat.. Iran is still suffering from its long war with Iraq. However, its military capability is increasing rapidly. The combination of political upheavals, economic crisis, and ideological militancy could produce adventurous military posture. For the moment, Iran is incapable of launching large scale operations like the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The combined forces of the GCC states could make a noticeable deterrence. However, Iran has enough power to seize small targets (such as Abu-Musa or other small islands in the Gulf) and blackmailing Bahrain. The Northern Gas field of Qatar, and the oil fields of Saudi Arabia could be hostages for Iranian subversion and missiles. In the future Yemen will be busy with its domestic problems. Its military power is undermanned and incapable of launching large scale operations. Most likely, it will hardly suffice to maintain its own internal stability. Therefore, Iran is currently the major threat for the region. Its anti-status quo attitude is influencing attitudes in the ex-Soviet Islamic republic and the entire Middle East. Iran stands against the Arab-Israeli peace process, and harbour fundamentalist anti-West feelings. In many ways, Iran is becoming similar to Iraq before the Gulf War.

e) Finally, the border disputes in the region represent a ticking bomb that could easily ignite the area once again and destroy any hope for future security arrangement in the Gulf. These disputes produced three major arm conflicts in 1950's, 1980's and in 1990-91, and could start more friction in the future. Iran's latest moves in the island of Abu-Musa and the continuation of border disputes among the GCC states and between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, would certainly lead to future conflicts in the region. Unless a new formula is found to settle these border disputes, a future conflict in the Gulf is foreseeable.

V. Redefining the Middle East : From Geo- politics to Geo - economics

The above detailed review of the traditional security situation in the Persian Gulf sub-region is prevalent in the entire Middle East. Traditional geo-political concerns are still dominating the behaviour of states in the region. Power politics and balance of power are still motivating foreign and national security policies of states. New ingredients of peace in the area, however, give new hope for the prospects of regional cooperation. Some of these ingredients are motivated by global trends away from geo-political and geo-strategic interactions towards geo-economic ones. Others are coming from the current peace process in the Middle East.

However, for peace in the area to be completed and materialized, it will be only

through intensifying cooperation among the concerned states, particularly if the political obstacles to the Israeli-Syrian and the Israeli - Palestinian negotiations are removed. Yet , regional cooperation is one way to facilitate negotiations and create hospitable environment that may compensate for the perceived loss of the parties in the bargaining process. Regional cooperation, furthermore, can facilitate the creation of a common security regimes through positive security arrangements which utilize non-military and non-territorial ways to achieve security.

Traditionally, negotiations and bargaining are perceived to be a zero-sum-game, regional cooperation to the contrary, is a non-zero-sum-game since all the parties can gain from this process. The problem, however, is what is the region that is called for cooperation ?, and what kind of cooperation is necessary for peace ?. Answering these two questions is not an easy task. What is needed is a criteria for the selection of states that should be involved in the process. Also, cooperation should be in areas that are possible to materialize and mature overtime. These issues should also be of a paramount importance for the parties and the peace process.

One possible basic criterion for the selection of states and issues can be the ones that can positively influence the thorny issues of the negotiations. The states and issues that can overcome some of the security needs of the parties, and work as a substitute for military and territorial demands of the parties with positive security measures , are the ones that should be selected. Another criterion is economic and spill over viability. Parties to the conflict can be persuaded to substitute war for peace, if regional cooperation can offer them rewards that narrow nationalist policies cannot contribute. A third criterion is the largest possible number of states to be involved in the process. This is necessary because it reduces the opposition to the peace process in one hand and decreases the risks that one of the parties, particularly Israel, will perceive if one of the adversaries remained not involved. Israeli security demands in this case will be reduced. A fourth and final criterion is flexibility and innovation in selecting types and issues of regional cooperation that draw in the different experiences for regional cooperation in the world.

Based upon this criteria one can tailor the Middle East region and the types of regional cooperation that is bound to achieve peace. It is possible to envisage a Middle East, which has four interrelated parts :

1-Israel, Palestine, and Jordan : The countries which are directly involved in the Palestinian question.

2- Egypt, Syria, Iraq (in the future), Lebanon : The countries which participated heavily in the conflict with Israel.

3- The GCC countries, Turkey (and possibly Iran when it loses its revolutionary fever) : The countries which are involved in the conflict in different ways and are important for regional cooperation in certain economic sectors.

4- Countries in the vicinity of the above mentioned states and are committed to participation in regional cooperation.

These four layers, or circles, of the Middle East, represent three degrees of intensity and involvements in the issues of the Arab - Israeli conflict . Regional cooperation among them can take five overlapping forms :

1- A common market or confederate arrangement among Israel, Palestine, and Jordan can be of valuable help in solving some of the security, settlements and refugees problems. Palestinians and Israelis have shown interest in this proposition.

2- A free trade area between the common market and Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq will make war, particularly a surprise attack, undesirable and impossible and thus reduce Israeli military and territorial demands.

3- A Middle East security regimes for arms and water which involve the above mentioned states and the GCC countries, Turkey and possibly Iran will involve the largest number of states in solving the problem of water supplies (Also a major problem in the negotiations) and reduce the tensions of the arms race in the area. The Water security regime will not only tackle the distribution of existing water resources, but also look at reducing the military forces of all states and dismantling weapons of mass destruction. Verification, including on sight verification, will be necessary.

4- Sectoral cooperation agreements in areas such as agriculture, energy, industry, tourism, transportation and communication among all the states of the area will be possible according to their developmental needs.

5- " Natural " economic zones can play the linkage between the first two forms particularly around the Gulf of Aqaba and the GCC regions .

This framework of regional cooperation , should satisfy the criteria mentioned above. It is understood that many of its details need to be worked out. Also it is understood that it is complex and far reaching. However, regional cooperation, as well as peace making, is a difficult and complex task. The framework should provide for the interested parties the " **Middle East** " which is called for cooperation. It should also provide for the areas where cooperation may contribute to a durable peace .

The necessary conditions for this framework to be materialized are the following :

First, the completion of the current agenda of the peace process particularly in the Syrian and Palestinian fronts. Fortunately , the signing of the Taba agreement for the implementation of the Palestinian self- rule in Washington in the 28th of September,1995 has moved the Palestinian - Israeli track another step forward . However , difficulties of implementation will remain in the near future . Moving the negotiation to the final status stage will add more burdens on the peace process . Nevertheless , the parties have already reached the point of no return , and further movement on regional cooperation should facilitate handling the thorny issues of the final status .

On the Syrian , and consequently the Lebanese , track ,Syria could not be happy with the new developments not only because of the Palestinian , and later the Jordanian , breakaway from what it hoped to be a Syrian led Arab coordinated position in the negotiations , but also because they weakened the Syrian position . However , in one hand , Syria announced it will not act to sabotage the Palestinian-Israeli agreement . The Syrian ambassador in Washington attended the ceremony of signing the agreements of Oslo and Taba . On the other hand , Syria signalled that it will not accept isolation for long . Palestinian opposition in Damascus was left if not encouraged to work against the agreement in coordination with the Lebanese based opposition . More important , Syria did not object to Iranian attempt to coordinate and unify an anti peace front that may include Iran , Iraq , the Palestinian and Lebanese opposition , and possibly Syria . The recent Syrian flirtation with Iraq goes in the same direction .

The Syrian threat to join the opposition though probable is not possible . Syria has bid to heavily on the peace process that it can not change course at this juncture to join the rejectionist camp . The changes in the international and regional situations do not give Syria many options . More important , the gap between Israel and Syria although still wide , it remains bridgeable . An international , and particularly American , commitment to reach a Syrian-Israeli agreement along the lines of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement will enhance the conclusion of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East . The Syrian-Israeli agreement should have the following :

a) Israel reaffirms Syrian sovereignty over the Golan and commits itself to full

withdrawal from the Golan during acceptable period of time .

b) Syria commits itself to recognize Israel and its rights to security . Syria pledges its commitment to full peace which include the following : establishment of full diplomatic relations , the end of economic boycott , and the development of economic and cultural relations .

c) Israeli withdrawal and Syria's steps to normalize relations will be in parallel stages and phased in accordance with a schedule negotiated by the parties . These phased steps will be simultaneous and interdependent , and will be accompanied by the introduction of mutual security measures .

Second , a commitment by all the parties for geo-economic cooperation based on market forces is crucial. The multilateral negotiations in the Middle East should provide the forum for the reconstruction of a new regional order in the Middle East . In fact some limited progress has been achieved .On November 17 , 1993 , in Cairo , in the Arab-Israeli multilateral talks committee on environment , Israel , Egypt , and Jordan agreed to start work on a plan to control pollution in the Gulf of Aqaba . The three countries will set up a pollution control center with emergency teams based in Nuweiba in Egypt , Aqaba in Jordan , and Eilat in Israel . Also , six Arab countries-Egypt , Jordan , Palestine , Tunisia , Algeria , and Oman- in addition to Israel agreed to launch a project to combat desertification . The project will be financed by the World Bank and the Japanese government . This limited progress can be enhanced by an international commitment from major industrialized countries, particularly the United States and Europe , for including the Middle East in their global capital investment posture. American and European efforts should upgrade the Middle East from an area for crisis and conflict management to an area of economic management in the road of development , interdependence , and integration into the world capitalist system . All aid to the states to the region should involve a portion for regional cooperation projects.

Third, a substantial strategic and geo-economic understanding among the major regional powers in the area. If the Western European integration projects were built on the shoulders of France , Germany , Italy , and Britain , Egypt , Saudi Arabia , Turkey , and Israel in the Middle East should do the same . The agenda for the four regional powers can very much be the consolidation of peace in the area , promoting different forms of interdependence , and integrating the Middle East into the world economic system , and reincorporating the still radical states in the region into an ambitious regional economic development . Luckily , the four countries have close association with the west for different reasons , and thus they could bridge the Middle East to the new emerging world order . A special attention from the west for creating this understanding among the four regional powers is needed .

Fourth, transforming the Middle East from geo - political orientations to geo - economic ones can not be achieved without controlling the arms race in the area . Even during the current peace process in the Middle East countries in the region continued the race without abatement , hence fermenting suspicions and fear. Arms control efforts in conventional and non-conventional weapons , therefore , is fundamental for the transformation to occur . Since the author has discussed the issue elsewhere in detail , it will suffice here to outline the major propositions as follows :

a) Since all parties in the region agree on the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East , it is important to link the establishment of the

zone to the peace process through the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) sub-committee of the multilateral negotiations. The general principal should be, although certain asymmetries might be acceptable to facilitate agreements, symmetrical and reciprocal arrangements should be the norm at the end of the road. Israeli nuclear weapons should be "phased-out" over a period of time. These weapons should be reduced in number as a part of the confidence building measures. Some of them could be eliminated as a result of international guarantees. Others should be traded with peace treaties with Arab countries. The rest should be eliminated once full normalization of relations and different types of economic and functional cooperation installed. The same process should be applied to chemical weapons for both sides of the conflict. The idea here has two folds. The first is to link arms control measures with a political timetable for the overall settlement. The second is to eliminate the most devastating weapons from the area. This could not be achieved without transparency of information about mass destruction weapons in the inventory of both sides of the conflict. Arms control talks in Europe could not have accomplished anything without prior agreement on the arms that the talks intended to control: Transparency, then, should be the first step in the multilateral arms control negotiations in the Middle East.

b) Transparency also is important for negotiations on conventional weapons. Both sides should provide information about not only the existing inventory of weapons under their disposal but also about weapons under development. A moratorium on the acquisition and development of high technology weapons should be implemented during the negotiating process. Another alternative is to make the moratorium on the deployment of these weapons. This particularly important for long range (more than 150 km) ballistic missiles and ABMs such as the Israeli Arrow. A ban on exporting cruise and long range ballistic and cruise missiles should be arranged among arms exporting countries. The present Israeli plans to expand their sea projection capabilities, particularly sea launched long range conventional and nuclear missiles and advanced submarines should be halted during the Arab-Israeli negotiations. This step will prevent triggering a new naval race that may make arms control measures difficult in the future. CBMs such as notification of naval movements, cooperative sea operations against drug smuggling or terrorist actions by regional powers could enhance both the possibilities of arms control and mutual trust necessary for peace in the Middle East. Some of these ideas has been discussed within the framework of ACRS.

c) If all these measure attempt to cap the existing level of arms under the command of both sides, it is worth considering to reduce certain categories of weaponry such as tanks and artillery. In a general condition of an Arab-Israeli peace, it will be worth examining in the Arab side to restructure and redeploy Arab armies in such a way to reduce Israeli apprehensions. The shift from standing armies to mobilizing armies should be considered.

d) These ideas will face the major problem of Iran and Syria which are not participants to the current multilateral negotiations. Consequently, capping the Iranian and Syrian arms build up could not be achieved without the cooperation of the supplying states, particularly the five permanent members (P-5) of the Security Council, to strain their supplies to the area. Straining supplies to the Middle East is not easy, however, in the light of the economic difficulties in the West, ex-Soviet bloc, and China, arms exports will continue to be targeted to decrease deficits, create jobs, and generate hard cash. It will take a good deal of restructuring their economies and conversions from military to civil industries. This will take a long time in which the Middle East will continue to be the largest possible market, hence, creating incentive for arm racing. Yet,

the conditions for supplier's efforts could not be better. The end of the cold war, the existing more or less stable balance in the Middle East, the dominating role of the U.S. in the area, and the economic difficulties for the recipient countries, all are conducive to new attempts to strain arm supplies to the region particularly these arms that may lead to a new wave of arms race in the area or destabilize the existing balance. Accelerating the Syrian - Israeli peace process , as mentioned above , could greatly help arms control efforts . Another idea for the P-5 is to curtail the export to the region new generations of weapons which were developed in the 1980s. A third idea is to make an agreement among major suppliers to declare publicly every arms deal to the Middle East. A third one, and probably the most difficult is to tax all arms deals to the Middle East. The revenues developed by this taxation should be projected for economic cooperation among Middle East countries particularly the countries involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Fifth, building , or rebuilding , regional institutions could be one of the functions of the regional strategic understandings among the four major regional powers . So far , Middle Eastern countries are belonging to different regional institutions such as the Arab League , the Organization of Islamic Conference , and the Organization of African Unity . Only Israel does not belong to any of these institutions . In fact these institutions tended to take an anti - Israeli stand as a part of the Arab efforts to balance the Israeli strong association with the West . Integrating Israel into a regional institutional framework could be part of a regional effort in a new era . Recently , Israeli foreign minister Shimon Perez suggested that Israel and Turkey should join the Arab League providing that the League will change its name to be a Middle East regional organization . The idea was negatively received in Arab countries because it seems to replace an organization based on the Arab cultural identity and replace it with a Middle Eastern one . Solving these contradictions through creating observer and association status in addition to membership in the Arab League that allow non-Arab states to participate should overcome this obstacle. The same principal should be allowed in any other regional arrangements. The purpose of this type of arrangement is to create the largest possible web of networking in the region.

Sixth, Special attention should be given to the security of the Persian Gulf sub - region . As shown before the GCC states are suffering from four basic vulnerabilities. To face these threats, the Arab-Gulf states devised a security policy based on six elements:

a) They, particularly Saudi Arabia, increased their military capabilities through the acquisition of high technology weapons.

b) They increased their collective security through the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and a joint military force under the name of Al-Gizira Shield. The force was small (about 5000 soldiers) but it was hoped it will grow in the future.

c) They attempted to balance regional powers by helping Iraq against Iran, Syria against Iraq and keeping lines open with other regional powers particularly Egypt and Turkey.

d) They gave considerable economic assistance to major regional powers such as Syria, Egypt, Iraq, and Yemen. Even Iran was given assistance in the time of natural disasters.

e) They created the most extensive welfare states in the world for citizens and residents alike to satisfy the population and reduce socio-economic and political tensions.

f) They consolidated their political and economic relations with the West by following a strong anti-communism and anti-radicalism policy.

These six elements of the Arab-Gulf states security policy were not enough for the

security of the Gulf. Kuwait was threatened by Iran during the Iran-Iraq war and then invaded by Iraq. Saudi Arabia was threatened directly by Iran, Iraq, and Yemen. Iraq threatened Qatar and the UAE during the Gulf crisis. Iran, from time to time, shows ambitions in Bahrain. All these threats made the Gulf security at the top of the post Gulf War agenda. Several security schemes were introduced to the area during and after the Gulf War. The most notable of these was an American one. On March 6, 1991, President Bush, speaking to a joint session of Congress defined four key challenges which would have to be met in the Middle East:

a) Creating shared security arrangements in the region with the help of the US through American participation in joint exercises involving both air and ground forces and maintaining Naval presence in the region.

b) Controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile systems.

c) Putting an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict in a comprehensive peace based on the UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and principle of the exchange of territory for peace.

d) Fostering economic freedom and prosperity for all the people of the region.

Another European security project for the entire Middle East was encouraged by France, Italy and Spain. The European project was based on the European experience in the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The idea was to hold a Conference of Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME) to guarantee existing borders in the area, encourage economic cooperation and regional integration, controlling arms race in the area, and promoting democracy and the respect of human rights.

The Third security project came from Iran in a speech by Iranian President Hashimi Rafsangani in September 21, 1990. Rafsangani called for an Islamic Peace Project based on security arrangements by the GCC countries and Iran to secure the Gulf. The project called for the replacement of the "Foreign" forces in the Gulf by Arab and Iranian forces. It also called for an Islamic court of arbitration to resolve conflicts in the area. And, finally, the project called the Arab-Gulf states to pay for the reconstruction of Iran and Iraq.

A fourth security project came from Egypt not in a direct form but through indirect gestures and in close rooms. The Egyptian project called for a new Arab order based on an invigorated Arab League in which the Arab partners in the international coalition to liberate Kuwait would be the corner stone. The GCC, Egypt and Syria (6+2 formula) could play a moderation role in the Middle East, secure the Gulf through the presence of Egyptian and Syrian forces, and encourage forms of economic and social development in the area.

The fifth security project came from the GCC itself. Abdallah Bishara, the Secretary General, announced four pillars for the Gulf Security. The first pillar was the consolidation and further integration of Arab-Gulf States under the banner of the GCC. The experience of political, diplomatic, economic, and military cooperation during the Gulf crisis should be the bases for a new advanced phase of the Gulf collective security arrangements. The second pillar was the consolidation of the strategic relationship among the Arab partners of the international coalition to liberate Kuwait; e.g., the GCC states, Egypt and Syria. The third pillar was creating special cooperative relationships with the neighbouring Islamic countries particularly Iran and Turkey. The fourth pillar was to establish security arrangements between the GCC states and western countries, particularly the U.S., the U.K., and France to protect the common interests of both parties specifically the flow of oil to the industrial world.

The GCC security project aimed at integrating the merits of all security projects in

the Gulf. However, four years after the Gulf War, there is no sign that the Gulf is more secure than before. The survival of Saddam Hussain in Iraq and his claim on Kuwait has continued the Iraqi threat even in more moderate form. The Iraqi mobilization next to the Kuwaiti borders in the fall of 1994 and Kuwaiti dependency on the U.S. to repel this threat was an example. The collective security arrangements among the GCC states fall very short in reality. The Omani proposal to create a 100 thousand men standing Arab-Gulf army did not take off the ground. In fact, the GCC did not only show any sign of progress in integration, but also it showed signs of disintegration. Border disputes between Qatar and Bahrain, and Qatar and Saudi Arabia were soon to sway any possibility of collective security arrangements.

Further, the security cooperation between the GCC on one hand and Egypt and Syria on the other hand fell very short in reality. On March 6, 1991, immediately after the Gulf War, the two sides signed the "Damascus Declaration" which called for security cooperation based on the presence of Egyptian and Syrian forces in Kuwait in exchange for an Arab economic fund to help the development of poorer Arab countries particularly Egypt and Syria. A few weeks after signing the Declaration, Kuwait asked for amendments which reduced the security cooperation to be based on bilateral not multilateral relations and on the times of crises. By the summer of 1991 Egyptian and Syrian forces withdrew from the Gulf. The Arab economic fund never took off the ground. Meetings between the two sides continued on the foreign ministerial level, however.

Cooperation with the neighbouring Islamic countries did not continue for a long time. After a short period of reconciliation between the GCC countries and Iran, their relationship was soon to reflect a climate of apprehension, fear, and acrimony. Iran, after resuming diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia did not waste much time and politically attacked the GCC, the Damascus Declaration and the western military presence in the Gulf states. Iran continued its arms build up thus making reasons for suspicions of its intentions. It occupied the UAE part in the Abu-Musa island in the Gulf. It took sides with Qatar in its border dispute with Saudi Arabia. The Iranian behaviour showed that the Gulf War had created, with the defeat of Iraq, a serious imbalance in the area which Iran intends to exploit.

The only progress in the security of the Gulf took place in terms of security agreements between the Gulf states and western countries. Kuwait signed agreements with the U.S., U.K. and France. Similar agreements were signed with Bahrain and Qatar. The U.S. has already previous agreements with Oman and Saudi Arabia. All these security agreements called for military cooperation to protect the Gulf region. Also, there are some progress in settling some of the critical border disputes as already took place between Yemen and Oman, Saudi Arabia and Oman, and there are negotiations in the same directions between Saudi Arabia in one side and Yemen and Kuwait on the other.

However, with the absence of an Arab or even an Arab-Gulf dimension for security, the western oriented security system could not guarantee the security of the Gulf alone. In fact, and more likely than not, it will call radical forces in the area, particularly Islamic fundamentalists, to accuse the Gulf states of relying on ex-colonialist powers. Iran has already raised this accusations. In Saudi Arabia religious forces expressed resentments at the presence of foreign forces. With the exception of Kuwait, a long term reliance on western countries for security in the Gulf will breed new forms of violence and instability as we demonstrated in the different conflict scenarios before. Rising Islamic militancy in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen in the past four years is a sign of more to come from the anti-Western forces.

What is needed , therefore , is to fashion the security of the Gulf in such a way that reduces the short and long terms threats . For sure every progress in moving the entire Middle East from geo-politics to geo-economics will give more security to the Arab Gulf states . In fact , this progress will give the economic advantages of these states more opportunities in socioeconomic , and probably political development . Iraq and Iran , nevertheless will continue to pose a possible threat . Here , because of their ideological make up , their political systems and type of leadership , Iraq and Iran will continue to pose a geo-political threat of the first order . It will be extremely difficult to seduce them to join in the geo-economic transformation in the region . Therefore , power politics and deterrence will be necessary so far as the existing regimes in both countries are still in power . Putting the Gulf security project , as outlined by the GCC secretary general after the Gulf War , into implementation should offer sufficient deterrence against both countries . If this power posture is added to strong signals of integrating the two countries into the transformation process in the Middle East if they change radically their policies and/or regimes , security in the Gulf will be enhanced . The strategic understanding among the major four regional powers, mentioned above , in the Middle East should include in their agenda the future of Iraq and Iran .

Figure (1)
The Middle East Region




Table () : Constallations of states in The Middle East

Binder (1958)	Brecher (1969)	Cantori and Spiegel (1970)	Thompson (1970)	Pearson (1971)	Evron (1973)	Hudson (1976)
Core States	Core States	Core States	Core States	Core States	Core States	Core States
Jordon	Jordon	Jordon	Jordon	Jordon	Jordon	Israel
Israel	Israel	U.A.E.	Tunisia	Israel	Israel	Iran
S. Arabia	Syria	S. Arabia	Algeria	S. Arabia	Syria	Turkey
Sudan	Iraq	Sudan	S. Arabia	Syria	Iraq	Algeria
Syria	Lebanon	Syria	Sudan	Iraq	Lebanon	S. Arabia
Iraq	Egypt	Iraq	Syria	Kuwait	Egypt	Syria
Lebanon		Kuwait	Iraq	Lebanon		Iraq
Libya	Periphery	Lebanon	Kuwait	Egypt	Red Sea	Egypt
Egypt	Ethiopia	Egypt	Lebanon	N. Yemen	States	
Iran	Iran	S. Yemen	Libya		Erhiopia	Periphery
Turkey	Turkey	N. Yemen	Egypt		Israel	Jordon
Periphery	Algoria	Periphery	Morocco		S. Arabia	UAE
Afghanistan	S. Arabia	Israel	N. Yemen		Sudan	Banhrair
Pakistan	Cyprus	Iran			Egypt	Tunisia
Tunisia	Kuwait	Turkey			S. Yemen	Sudan
Morocco	Outer Ring				N. Yemen	Oman
	Tunis					Cyprus
	Sudan				Gulf States	Qater
	Somalia				Iran	Kuwait
	Libya				S. Arabia	Lebanon
	Morocco				Iraq	Libya
	S. Yemen				Kuwait	Morocco
	N. Yemen					S. Yemen
						N. Yemen

Table () : Regional Cooperation in The Middle East

Sactoral Cooperation										
Communi- cation	Transport- ation	Tourism	Energy	Industry	Agriculture	Arms Security Regime	Water Security Regime	Free Trade Area	Common Market and / or Corfed- ration	Cooperation States
x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Israel
x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Palestine
x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	Jordon
x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		Egypt
x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		Syria
x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		Iraq
x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		Lebanon
x	x		x			x				Gcc
x	x						x			Turkey
x	x		x			x				Iran

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Collective Security in Maghreb*

Collective security problems in the Maghreb are far more linked with the questions having to do with internal stability of the states in this area than with international conflicts.

The Maghreb has been very marginally affected by the East-West conflict even though its disappearance has contributed to desorientate political apparatuses as well as public opinions. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has never exercised a major influence beyond referential or legitimizing discourses about states' rulers. Regional conflicts inherited from colonization there are far from reaching intensity levels comparable to those in the Middle East. The Western Sahara which represents a standard example has not degenerated into a direct confrontation between Algeria and Morocco. In the long-run it has probably even contributed to internal stability of the political regimes existing then in Algiers and Rabat, which since their respective independances have largely established themselves by mutual opposition in every single field.

* Preliminary report for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East and in North Africa organized by the Bertelsmann Foundation, Rome 14/16 Nov. 1995. First-draft. Not to be quoted.

If the Maghreb is not involved into international or regional conflicts, it does not belong either to clear and coherent solidarity systems. Its main economic and human links are established with the European Union's countries as well through exchanges as by way of settled populations. The same is true for cultural and linguistic links, a still unavowable inheritance from colonization. On the other hand, legitimate but highly theoretical solidarities are going to be established in relation to the defence of the Palestinian cause, more recently in relation to Irak or Bosnia, and attempts are going to be made to translate them into weak institutions such as the Arab League, ALECSO or AMU (Arab Maghreb Union).

Given that context, only the states remain the real holders of power and allegiance. They have built up a strong identity derived from the decolonization period, sometimes even from a more ancient past. On the other hand, the existing powers' legitimacy has weakened and collective security problems are due for the most part to internal stability stakes having to do with that distancing. Thus considered, radical islamism connected with Algerian civil war engenders the same effect as a forest fire, the smoke of which pollutes the environment and screens a landscape of far more complex social and political relationships. Without denying how important this problem is for the three countries of the Central Maghreb, one must also be aware that it is not the only one. The uncertain succession of Morocco's King might create unstable conditions which could provide that country's islamists as well as other actors, especially the army, with an opportunity to come back into the political game. In the Maghreb, especially as far as the Algerian-Moroccan relationships are concerned, while objecting to any analysis based upon the domino theory, one must nevertheless consider the consequences in Tunisia of major political changes either in Algeria or in Libya. But the most significant transnational factors are perhaps, in the medium term, those which govern relationships between the Maghreb and Europe, because of the Maghribi

origin of populations settled for good in various countries on the Northern bank, particularly in France, and which today represent over 5 million persons.

When considering collective security in the Maghreb, one will thus have to pay attention to those factors upon which the states' internal stability depends, and, beyond the rise of islamism, particularly to the poorly managed changes which have taken place in societies which have experienced major qualitative and quantitative transformations without any real adaptation of political structures established at the beginning of the 60's. Thinking about integration of the urban youth, the position of the new middle-classes, that of managers, of various social movements such as Human Rights Leagues, may better reveal these societies' underneath tensions than a superficial discourse about the weight of the religious factor.

One will also have to consider the relationships established in the long-run with European Union, not only in the economic field but at a cultural and human level. New types of links comparable in nature to those which start taking shape in North America within the framework of NAFTA ought to contribute to reinforce the states' stability and their opening to democracy should make inter-Maghribi relationships more predictable and more manageable. Certainly, when considering all that, one must not put aside the accumulation of perverse effects which might contribute to multiply destabilizing effects as much at the internal level as at a transnational one. They appear less probable than the hypothesis of a virtuous circle, but along that line the Maghreb experiences a stimulating competition, as far as its relationships with the European Union are concerned, with other important regions such as Turkey, Egypt or the Middle East, not to mention Eastern countries which are bound to occupy a special place within the Union.

That analysis of collective security problems will choose to focus essentially on the central Maghreb's three countries, leaving aside, on the one hand

Mauritania, the Maghribi orientation of which is declining as the conflict in the Western Sahara calms down, and on the other hand, Libya, the regional partner of which is still Egypt, while keeping in mind interactions and fears that colonel Khadafi's regime engenders in Tunisia.

I - Internal stability and collective security

Since the 60's, Maghribi states have built up their identity by recuperating the former colonizing nation's inheritance, while considering that step as temporary and illegitimate and while being firmly opposed to their close neighbors and at the same time proclaiming an ideal based upon Maghribi as well as Arab unity. That schizophrenic rivalry is dominated by the relationships of the Algerian-Moroccan couple, none of the two countries being able to accept the other one's hegemony. To start with, Morocco holds better cards; its agriculture, its mineral resources as well as the quality of its technical and urban infrastructures make it, at the beginning of the 60's, a kind of Maghribi California opened towards the outside, more modern at that time in some respect than Spain which still bears the mark of Franquist autarky. In the eyes of Moroccan rulers, the violence of Algerian decolonization ought to lead to a breaking off in the guinean style which inevitably would put them into the position of privileged intermediaries between France and other Maghribi countries.

Quite the contrary, they witness with astonishment, the establishment of a privileged Franco-Algerian cooperation and the development of Algerian resources which, due to the rising up of the petroleum rent, come to represent more than the double of Moroccan GNP. That inequality fed, during the Boumediene's period, an hegemonic Algerian discourse, nevertheless careful to avoid any direct confrontation. Algiers was hoping that the Western Sahara conflict would exhaust

the Moroccan monarchy and deteriorate the difficult relationships existing between Hassan II and the army since the 1971-72 plots. In fact, tensions have reinforced each of the two states' will to set up opposite systems, one associating a liberal economy, a centralized power and ways of managing social groups inherited from a centenary monarchical tradition, the other one associating a discourse of a socialist and collectivist type, a voluntarist Jacobin State and clientelist practices. That antagonism which helped to build the two regimes' identities and paradoxically contributed to their internal stability lasted until the beginning of the 70's. External factors are not sufficient to explain then the allegiance and passivity of populations vis-à-vis their rulers. The capability to distribute resources and to satisfy basic needs with a controlled poverty economy plays, especially in Algeria, a main part. The fact that rulers were no longer able to maintain that unstable balance in front of a rising demand of the population engendered urban uprising and created favourable conditions for the development of islamist movements. In that respect, the Algerian case represents a standard example of a lack of internal stability due to the growing power of extremist islamism; it has direct consequences upon collective security as well at the Maghribi level as within a transnational space having mainly to do with Europe-Maghreb relationships. Its analysis will be made without going back to the facts in detail, by trying to isolate a few significant variables and to submit hypotheses connected with mechanisms for getting out of the crisis.

1° - Algerian civil war

The term "civil war" is not adopted by the actors, and a great deal of observers hesitate to use it. Comparing it with examples from the past, such as the Spanish Civil War, is difficult. Referring to the independence war (1958-1962) would be more appropriate but conflicts such as those in Lebanon or in ex-Yugoslavia are better points of reference but nevertheless one cannot speak of an ethnic or religious war. The number of victims (1000 dead per week) and the type

of violence which is exercised between persons and groups knowing one another and going from conviviality to intimate crime are meaningful. But the parting lines are still hazy; they divide villages, neighbors and families. For survival reasons, one goes from one side to the other, in a struggle which aims at controlling the State, the oil rent, and external resources that one tries to mobilize by playing upon solidarity or by using menace.

Algeria did not appear, by the end of the 80's, to be the state most threatened by the islamist uprising. After Bourguiba had been put aside (1987), the Tunisian M.T.I. seemed to come closer to participating in power. Its rulers discussed openly with president Ben Ali's representatives about the terms of an official recognition though no engagement had been entered upon with them. As for Chadli Ben Jedid, he was probably hoping to instrumentalize the FIS islamists in his fight against the FLN's bigwigs after the Algiers' uprisings in October 1988. Contrary to Ben Ali he was unable to regain control upon the Party and had to take into account external pressures in order to sustain his liberal economic reforms policy.

During that transitory period, islamists win on two sides. On the one hand, they appear at the local level as being the only credible contesting force in front of power networks set up at the time of independence; on the other hand, they are going to benefit by the support of people at the top power. Thus, in 1989, they obtain legal recognition as a political party and they are going to play in society the part of defending the excluded ones, similar to the "Tribunus plebis" in Ancient Rome. As very quickly, they will be able to give themselves an efficient political machine in front of incredulous adversaries who were capable of governing only because they were supported by the state apparatus, they are going to win the local elections in June 1990 and the first run in the December 1991 legislative elections. Because of those successes, some islamists are going to wish to control the whole

power while, on the contrary, the army and the technostucture start feeling that Chadli's subtle game of complicity and opposition ought to be stopped immediately.

But the Algerian military will not be capable of regaining control as efficiently as the Tunisian power did after the Gulf War. If, in Algeria, the rulers have failed, it is probably due to the contrast between the fall of their legitimacy since the beginning of the 80's and the fact that they still controlled important resources coming from the petroleum rent as well as external aids. The country had built up a very strong identity based upon a long and violent decolonization, presented as an example to the new generations as well as to the external world in order to justify the monopolistic power existing since Boumediene's time. Algerian rulers have also used that credit to claim for their country a leading role at the Maghribi level, that Morocco could not accept without falling into disrepute, and to manage an active foreign policy within the non-aligned countries' movement next to Yugoslavia and India. They have been capable of translating into a dramatized though controlled fight their relationships with the former colonial power and with the Western world in general, particularly with the nationalization of oil and gas (1971) or the various steps towards arabization, while keeping an important flow in the field of technical, cultural and commercial cooperation, which makes Algeria the most gallicized country in the whole Maghreb.

That opposing strategy is part of the power's legitimizing sources but it creates a kind of schizophrenia at the elites' level. Confrontation brings resources and prestige during a long period of time. During President Boumediene's years, Algerians are deeply feeling proud and that they belong to a country which was in charge of an exemplar mission within the Arab world as well as vis-à-vis the whole Third World. At that time, the petroleum rent provides it also with the means for managing an active external policy while allowing the state to pay for its citizens

passivity by way of a re-distribution capacity largely favouring the urban middle-class.

Symbolically, the situation is going to change with the coming into power of Chadli Ben Jedid (1979). Because he did not have the charismatic power of his predecessor, he is going to try to reduce antagonisms that the latter had fostered as well with neighboring countries as with the Western world and especially France. By doing so, he is going to loose part of his legitimacy and of public opinion's support without getting as quickly as he had hoped the external aid necessary for modifying an etatic, socialist type and far too costly system. The economic opening claimed by the power is going to engender inequalities and new hopes that it won't be able to satisfy. It represents also a breaking up with the unanimism of the political discourse used since the independance and, as an indirect effect, puts the power in a position where it can be criticized.

As for resources, the predatory behaviour of clientelist networks becomes more tangible at a time when the decline of the petroleum's rent (the price for a barrel goes down in 1986 from 40 to 18 dollars) makes the state incapable of maintaining the policy aimed at creating more jobs and houses as in the previous period.

That situation discredits even more at the level of collective conscience a government which is no longer able, as in Boumediene's time, to impose its conditions upon its foreign partners. The myth of an Algeria sold at a low price by corrupt rulers to a confident and dominating Western world, establishing its prosperity upon the Arab's impoverishment is spreading over. The fact that people become aware of that lessening of influence, undermines the power's legitimacy as much as its inability to manage economy. In the short-run, Algeria chooses to live

above its means, refuses to reduce its consumption or to devalue its money in order not to obey, as its neighbors do, the constraints of structural adjustment.

If not for the Gulf War, internal and external compromises which guaranteed the functioning of Algerian power during that temporary period could have gone on functioning. But, in that time of crisis, islamists are going to take advantage of an opinion trend favorable to Irak while the Algerian civilian as well as military rulers cannot claim their solidarity with Saddam Hussein. The falling down of the Soviet block would render that choice too dangerous in spite of their deep hostility towards the Western undertaking. Yet, until the interruption of the electoral process, Algeria appeared as a country which was still able to realize without any major conflict the integration of the islamists within a renewed political game. But the FIS' electoral success together with the arbitrary interruption of the process are going to create a double destabilizing effect. The fact that they call upon Mohamed Boudiaf, a former historical FLN leader in exile in Morocco, murdered in mysterious conditions six months after his coming into function, will further discredit the state. That succession of errors and failures accumulated by an Algerian ruling class which, in spite of its divisions, remains homogenous, has created the social and political conditions for it to be put aside, what it will refuse until the last moment. In that context, the islamists have appeared as the only opponents willing to regain control over a society which has been neglected and managed by a power which had totally lost its legitimacy, and which, when calling upon the army, is perceived as trying in an absurd way to maintain the status quo without being able to give back to the country its lost dignity as well in relation with its past as in its relationship with the external world.

From then on, the whole problem of rebuilding a viable political field has to be solved by the army, while it has not been able to define either a clear political line or durable and safe orientations. It has better succeeded than the reformers of

Hamrouche's government to obtain international aid which today helps more to continue the war than to lead to an investments policy. Apart from the oil sector which still benefits from a sort of implicit sanctuarization in the civil war, other economic activities experience complete recession, mainly due to the extortions they have been submitted to. Algeria has succeeded in getting those external resources because its European partners feared the extension of the conflict. French leaders in particular have shown that they were anxious to buy their quietness during the presidential campaign in the course of which the two candidates kept the Algerian question out of the debate. That situation engenders perverse effects inasmuch as the aid helps maintaining the repressive capacity of the state. Thus the power's adversaries are tempted to attack those who provide support by murdering their nationals in Algeria or by transferring violence outside.

That strategy may have, beyond an ideological justifying discourse, tactical and economic motivations and the PKK's attitude in Germany may help having an idea about them. On the one hand, it is easier to put pressure on the Turkish government by mobilizing Kurdish immigrants in German cities than to achieve military successes against the Turkish army in Anatolia. On the other hand, the control exercised upon the immigration settled in Europe might constitute the only external financial resource capable of making up for the means and aid the governments benefit from. The levies operated on internal economic circuits by the Algerian islamist "maquis" are very little productive and some marginal groups such as the GIA are tempted to use a strategy similar to that of the PKK. Officially, the FIS is against it, Kabyle and secular currents oppose outside a considerable resistance to that type of ascendancy and cooperate with the police services in the European states. Those attempts represent nevertheless an unavoidable drift connected with the conflict going on without any hope of a political solution. Yet, in the short-run, the safety policy exerted to the extreme appears to be along with the alternation of negotiations, aimed more at compromising the FIS' historical

leaders than at really associating them to power, the only way chosen by the military.

Thus, the army finds itself forced to govern in conditions of greatest illegitimacy without any relay within the civil society. In order to get out of that situation and to give an acceptable image outside, especially to the providers of international aid, it contemplates organizing presidential elections in November 1995. Given the Algerian constitutional regime, those ought to allow it to maintain its control over society by protecting its "esprit de corps" and the control of its official as well as unofficial resources. If most of the officers want to preserve those established privileges, some of them, such as president Liamine Zeroual, think nevertheless that the army's long-term interest implies a partial integration of the islamist stream within the political game. After a period of rest following their intervention in January 1992, military have lost the monopoly of violence. The intense repression phases which follow do not lead to any political solution. It is very tempting to obtain, at the lowest possible cost, a denunciation of the violence by the FIS' historical chiefs imprisoned since 1991. Some generals will view it only as a measure aimed at compromising them in the eyes of their followers in exchange of a few symbolic concessions. As for general Zeroual, the political purpose is probably closer to that Chadli had in mind at the time of his conflictual dialogue with Abassi Madani: to integrate moderate islamists into the political game so that they might play the representative role of tribunes and defenders of the excluded people. Their accepting that would justify an even more determined repression, with the FIS' leaders guarantee, against those who would carry on the armed fight. By involving itself openly, since the end of 1993, into a privileged dialogue with Abassi Madani and Ali Benahdj, the Algerian power reinforces the FIS leaders into their position as the unique credible alternative in front of rulers for whom it is difficult to have their authority accepted but by using violence. Despite significant steps forward, that army-islamists tête-à-tête will result in failures made known

publicly in September 1994 and in June 1995, without being totally interrupted. It is not sure, all things considered, that the top Algerian military hierarchy does not prefer the evil chain of terrorism and repression to a too highly paid compromise. This better protects the absolute character of its power than solutions which would place it under control with guarantees as well for the persons as for the institution. The two adversaries do not seem to be exhausted enough to come to that.

Yet, another way seems to present itself consisting in a reconstruction of the political space for the benefit of the main parties represented in the 1991 elections (including the FIS). One must remember, in order to understand the process which led to the conferences organized in Rome in November 1994 and in January 1995 by the Sant' Egidio community, that the FLN leaders, as those of the FFS, have condemned the taking of power by the military in January 1992. While refusing also the extremism of the FIS, they have never broken off contact either with that party or with the military. But the big celebration of "national dialogue" wanted by the army in order to mask its tête-à-tête with the FIS are not suitable to them. A transitory solution of the South-African or Mozambican type, under international arbitration and without any particular role for the military would fit them better. The political purpose they bear in mind is more oriented towards legislative elections taking place after a transitory period than towards a presidential election. The common program and decisions defined at the Rome conferences imply for the FIS a quasi-contract of sharing power with the parties, of accepting the principles of popular sovereignty, of democracy and even a certain recognition of Kabyle identity. By involving itself in that way, the islamist movement renounces in fact to exercise power on its own or to be the main interlocutor in a tête-à-tête with the army. One may wonder if some of its historical leaders, uneasy about the emergence of neighbourhood "émirs" or that of "maquis" chiefs do not prefer that sharing of power. By undertaking that way, political parties hope to both canalize the FIS and control the military by relying on international aid. Now, since 1994,

this aid is attributed abundantly to Algeria through the government, without any condition being linked to its use as far as investments or democratic opening are concerned. That situation leads indirectly to an internationalization of violence on which the hijacking of an Air France Airbus in December 1994 or the bomb attack in the St. Michel station's in July 1995 provide a first glimpse. Other nuisances could happen if some marginal islamists decided to break the tacit agreement by seriously damaging the energy production apparatus, for example, by having an oil-tanker or a gas-tanker explode or by damaging the Arzew equipments.

The instability of the Algeria political system thus leads to external drifts, the islamist groups which today are not involved in the negotiating process either with the army or with the parties having to gain by exporting violence. That ought to allow them to slow down the aid the Algerian government benefits from, and to have access themselves to external resources far more important than those they control in Algeria if they succeed in exerting influence upon the muslim community which is settled in Europe. By making sure they have a strong symbolic visibility, they also introduce themselves as unavoidable partners in a future negotiation.

Paradoxically, Algeria's internal instability does not exert, for the time being, a major influence upon its Maghribi neighbors. Since Algeria's independance, Morocco has built up itself in opposition to that country (it works both ways), and one can say that the rising up of the islamists has rather favoured compromises between the monarchy and the parties in 1992-93, without leading them into total submission to Hassan II. The same is true as far as the consequences of the Western Sahara conflict are concerned, a conflict which played as well in Morocco as in Algeria the role of an internal stabilizator. Its slowing down since 1988 marks a turning point in the pursuit of inter-Maghribi hegemonic fights. Rivalries engendered by the various incarnations of Arab nationalism in relation to each country's history and identity have a tendency then to be replaced by common

action strategies, symbolized by the creation of the AMU in Marrakech in March 1989, against the islamists. The project will not really succeed, but active rivalries disappear. Truly, if the islamists had a more or less important but controlled access to power in Algeria, that would probably influence the compromises agreed upon between the power and the political forces in Tunisia and in Morocco, each country reacting in relation to its political agenda and to the relationships existing between internal and external factors as far as the managing of its political balance is concerned.

2° - The uncertainties of the monarchic succession in Morocco

If internal stability in Algeria is linked with the integration of islamists under various forms, their noticed absence from the Moroccan political field could be put in question if Hassan II's succession was going to be opened in a near future. The King has succeeded in dominating nearly by himself alone the political system since he came to power (March 1961). Weakened after the military plots in 1971 and 1972, he has been capable of using the Western Sahara conflict as a vast project for national union around the monarchy. Under his reign, no political or autonomous social force has been able to develop without giving proof of its allegiance. The role of official islam, as early as at the 60's, has been integrated into the functioning of the system and the attempts to organize themselves made by autonomous islamist movements which appear as early as the 70's, are either marginalized or put under control.

Nevertheless some of the popular-based brotherhoods have appeared and the impregnation of university circles by islamist organizations has developed as everywhere else in the Arab world in competition with the leftist tendencies being labelled here as baathist. A certain islamisation of political life has also been able to take place through populist tendencies as the one represented, within the USFP, by

Amaoui, the trade-union leader imprisoned in 1992-93 for obscure reasons. One must also notice among the intellectuals close to the Moroccan left, as the philosopher Mohamed Al Jabiri, an attitude of opening towards the islamists which could meet that of populist trade-unionists in contemplating new forms of pluralist representations. But the old party, the Istiqlal, has exerted long before independance and still has a major influence upon vast sectors of traditional islam within the universities and important mosques, well inserted into Moroccan society. Its presence among the Arab educated clerks prevents them from becoming marginalized and from becoming controlled by new actors escaping the influence of the Makhzen.

One may nevertheless assume that this game, rendered stable and set, would be upset if the King, the central actor, was going to disappear and if several rival princes started to compete, each of them looking for support and legitimation. Islam would then become the main stake in the ideological or political debate. Morocco has experienced similar situations in the 18th century, when Moulay Ismaïl died, or at various times in the 20th century, especially during the transitory period between the Algeiras' Treaty (1906) and the Fes' Treaty (1912), which marks the establishment of the French protectorate when two princes, Moulay Abdelaziz and Moulay Hafid are going to oppose one another and to reign in succession, before a third one arrives, Moulay Youssef, the present sovereign's grand-father. Each of the pretenders had then fought in order to find religious guarantees for its political power while looking for the support of influential "caïds" such as the Glaoui or the M'tougi, and of foreign powers. Despite the open character of the fight and the existence of a great many pretenders from various origins (cherif Kettani, Oueazzane's cherif...), it did not seem possible to call upon a candidate who would not belong to the group of the Alaouites' cherifs.

At the time of the writing of the first Moroccan constitution, approved by referendum on December 7, 1962, one year and a half after Hassan II's coming to the throne, it had been provided for the organization of the succession among the male descendants of the late King, chosen according to primogeniture order. That provision aimed precisely at putting an end to the uncertainties which had characterized royal successions in the past, when the only constant had consisted in calling upon an Alaouite cherif, generally a direct descendant of the late King. Hassan II had been on the throne only for two years and it appeared normal to him to codify a provision he had just benefited from. On the opposite, in 1976, taking advantage of a constitutional reform which lasted only a few years after the military plots in 1971-72, he suppressed the reference to primogeniture order, thus going back to the traditional practice. After the second plot, a rumour had gone around according to which general Oufkir had had the intention of governing by having himself designated as the Regent during the minority years of the heir, a prince of 9 years old then. It is also likely that Hassan II did not accept the idea that a legal instituted rule could be imposed upon him as important a field as that of his succession. Given the distance and the maturity of the young princes, one gets the feeling that the King's second son, Moulay Rachid, could incarnate an interventionist, intelligent and authoritarian style of power in a more direct continuity with his father. The eldest son, Moulay Mohamed, would situate himself more in the perspective of a constitutional monarchy. One should have also to take into account the King's nephew, Moulay Hichem, an engineer educated in the United States, who also belongs to the liberal tendency. Once the succession will be opened, only one way appears as having to be excluded evidently: the one that the King will have chosen before his death. The emerging of several pretenders seems unavoidable, each of them trying to mobilize for his own benefit religious legitimization as much as popular support, without taking into account the other forms of possible supports.

At the begining of the century, the uncertainties related to the succession have lasted for nearly five years and Moulay Ismail's succession has lasted for nearly thirty years. It would then be reasonable to expect a transition which might include bouncings. The Ulemas will be immediately solicited; but other religious actors may use the crisis as a pretext for introducing themselves as partners or as arbitrators. The old and the new brotherhoods, the islamist currents could find there an opportunity to show themselves if one assumes that the new sovereign will feel the need to resort to a referendum, as Hassan II did in 1962, in order to consolidate his power on a popular basis. Participation of civil society, of parties and trade-unions seems rather uncertain for anything else than a ratification. On the contrary, the army, the bureaucracy in charge of public order, entrepreneurs coming from the Souss or from Fes and living in Casablanca, the Rif's bigwigs of the drug network, will be able with various resources to intervene in favor of this or that candidate who will appear as the incarnation of a network or of a program. If one refers to examples at the beginning of the century, foreign (Western) powers will be involved into those rivalries. One can also wonder if the decision to keep Driss Basri at the Home Office the last time there were ministerial changes in the name of the defence of monarchic privileges contrary to the opposition parties' advise, is not linked with the succession question. The minister would probably be the best King's executant in case he would choose a succession putting his eldest son aside.

Apart from these uncertainties having to do with the succession, Morocco's internal and external situation appears rather well balanced. This country in which the rural population still represents nearly 50 per cent of the global population, has experienced several years of drought without any major social movements happening, thus proving a contrario the strength of its economic development and the vitality of its urban middle class. Yet, the urban riots in the 80's (1981, 1984, 1990) had engendered the fear of a great unstability. Truly enough, young people's unemployment remains a problem, but it has not created until now the same type of

drift towards islamist movements as it has in Algeria. The gradual ending of the Western Sahara conflict with conditions favorable to Morocco, is certainly an international success for the monarchy but it is faced again to the problem of the army's place and that of the disappearance of a mobilizing great national cause. Those questions may have, today, a secondary aspect, but they will come back sharply in case of a succession conflict in which the heir who would be the most likely to be contested would be the one the King would choose when still alive in order to go on with his own style of government and policy, without being able to transmit his legitimacy to him.

3° The Tunisian pause

Tunisia, because of its size and its resources, constitutes the Maghribi country most submitted to external influences. Its internal stability is guaranteed since 1987 by a kind of astute and authoritarian recapture of the the situation by president Ben Ali. The new power functions without the charismatic authority of the founder, Habib Bourguiba, but with a more efficient pragmatism. After a reign of thirty years there existed a problem of relief of generations and of integration of new strata into the political system. General Ben Ali, who certainly did not represent the type of successor Bourguiba wanted has established his supervision in softly putting aside his predecessor, in controlling and renovating the leading staff of the single party, in integrating intellectuals and a great part of the middle-class. Chadli Ben Jedid had tried, vainly, a similar operation in Algiers after the October 1988's riots. This failure had led him undertake at the same time an accelerated economic opening policy with the Hamrouche's government and the introduction of islamists into the institutional game in order to counterbalance the assumed weight of the FLN.

Having taken back control over the former ruling party (the Neo Destour changed into RCD), having integrated the Tunisian middle-class as well as the drift of the Algerian experiment after the Gulf War, Ben Ali does not have to attempt any longer an islamist opening while that seemed utterly probable after Bourguiba had been put aside; Compared to Algeria, the evolution of which one could compare, with nuances, to the Soviet way for getting out of communism, Tunisia has followed a Chinese model securing a high rate of economic growth without any major change of the political framework. But that equilibrium can be maintained only as long as Tunisia remains protected from destabilizing external influences (Algeria, Libya). Tunisia has not invested in the setting up of costly military apparatus which would be out of proportion with its resources in case it would be reach an efficiency level comparable to that of its neighbors. In Bourguiba's time, the army was, a priori, suspicious in the eyes of the power and the latter preferred to guarantee its security through an external alliances network, in which Algeria counterbalanced Libya's weight and in which France and the United States could be called upon as a supreme recourse. The Tunisian system has not changed fundamentally its orientations related to that question, Egypt having, maybe, a tendency to replace Algeria in the counterweight system, and the contemplated economic Union with Europe implying a safeguard duty in relation to Tunisian identity.

In the Tunisian case, one gets the feeling that economic growth has thus been used as a stabilizing factor. Stimulated by a strict budgetary policy led since the beginning of the 80's and by an oil-rent which has not contributed to make exorbitant the cost of manpower. Investments in education have developed a skilled labor-force, mainly a female one in the services sector with a moderate level of wages. This has allowed for a certain form integration of the middle-class which was refused to it in terms of political opening.

Tunisia does not have thus any longer a problem of succession and its stability is guaranteed by an authoritarian power largely accepted. Nevertheless, one can ask questions about the factors capable in the middle-run of endangering such a system in which stability gives sometimes the impression of being a blockage. The evolution of Algeria towards an islamist take over of the power will probably reinforce, whatever the price, the middle-class' union around Ben Ali. On the opposite, a compromise formula of the kind which has been considered at the Rome conferences will create many problems, in case it would appear applicable. One must not forget that, between November 1987 and April 1991, a project of a non-majoritary association of islamists to power had been contemplated. Until 1989, Tunisia appeared as the first Magribi country ready to carry out that experiment. The Gulf War has considerably modified the situation on both sides. Islamists believed they could control the whole power system by using the anti-occidental tendencies which started to be against too opportunist and cautious government. The Tunisian leaders have thought, as the Algerian military, that the time had arrived to put an end to a dialogue which could be nothing else but dangerous. The carrying out of the experiment under the form of a partial integration and of a sharing of power in the neighbor country would question the choices made during the period 89-91. One must not forget that Tunisian islamists had obtained officially, in the legislative elections, 13 per cent of the votes in urban districts (and unofficially 26 per cent). Would the power be capable of anticipating such a change way of a Moroccan type of dialogue with the opposition parties and the moderate islamists? Until then, this is absolutely not contemplated. The few moderate opponents (e.g. the President of the Human Rights League) who have shown themselves have been submitted to petty persecutions.

Thus external factors appear in Tunisia to be more important in the setting up of a possible change than internal factors. As in Morocco, the center of power has a recognized competence in the field of security. Tunisian islamists who have

gone underground are far from having acquired the capacity of violent action of Algerian islamists and the relative economic prosperity of the country probably deprives them from a larger influence. But the main example against them comes from the Algerian civil war.

II - Temporary balance of the present situation in the Maghreb

We have thus considered the major aspects of internal stability policies in the three Magribi countries. One way, at the end of that study, draw a few conclusions. None of these countries has yet really succeeded in enlarging the basis of power, established at the time of the independences, that is to say, for one generation. At best, one witnesses a changing of generations, as in Tunisia and may be in Algeria with the new army teams that Liamine Zeroual is setting up at the level of regions and services. Now, the Magribi countries have undergone deep qualitative as well as quantitative changes which have not been translated in terms of a political integration. A new middle-class is born, the product of widely spread education. The population has more than doubled within thirty years and has become urbanized. The Maghreb has become a mass society, marked by the European neighborhood. Now, no party or trade-union has conquered these new strata. Only islamists have mobilized them at given moments. The direct or indirect effects of a globalization of images affects them and leads to reactions such as : "Why them and not us" in comparison with that inaccessible and still close "elsewhere".

Faced to those deeply changing societies, states have lost a part of their legitimacy. Those who based it upon great causes such as the non-alignment, Third-Worldism, socialism, have been more affected, especially Algeria. Moroccan external investments, the Western Sahara to start with, the intermediate role between Palestinians and Israelis, western and European solidarities have

maintained a better quotation. Last of all, one must not underestimate the role of the political and police systems of control of these societies. The Moroccan and Tunisian apparatus are in the hands of professionals, Dris Basri on the one hand, president Ben Ali on the other hand, both having, for more than ten years, the experience of those organizations. Algerian military security which has been able to play that role in the long-term, has probably split into teams pursuing different and contradictory objectives after 1988. If internal stability greatly determines collective security problems at the present time, with cautious states which compete with their neighbors, one may nevertheless try to figure out the recombinings which could take place within one generation, without projecting the evolution achieved since the independence, but making an effort to draw main lines and to imagine new solidarities.

A succinct study of the relationships between the three countries' leaders and islamist movements puts the problem of the integration of the urban youth at the heart of the questionings for the next generation. It renders evident differences in approach between Morocco on one side, Algeria and Tunisia on the other, and nothing allows one to think that an equilibrium might be found quickly. One may then assume that the functioning of Magribi political systems will go on being dominated by that problem at the time when, for different reasons, major problems of change exist in Algeria and in Morocco.

In comparison with the problem of communism and of the integration of the working-class in western democracies, will one witness, on one side, a Moroccan strategy, comparable to that of English democracy which has marginalized communism but integrated the working-class by way of parties and trade-unions constituting the equivalent of what social-democracy may have represented for the working-class ? The problem will probably be at the heart of the debate about successions and the capability of the Moroccan system to give an answer founding

the new consensus will probably influence the continuity of the monarchic institution. One could imagine, as a counterpart, an Algerian (and Tunisian) way, once the phase of overcoming the present situation of civil war achieved without victory of any side. One will then go towards a recognition with limited effects, within a context of shared power, allowing for the integration of an Islamic party which would develop a defense function of the excluded ones without any hope of access to power, following the case of communists in France and in Italy after 1945 ?

If the integration of urban youth is the most lasting conflictual problem for the Maghreb countries because of its interferences with islamism, the minorities' status comes after. There are essentially Berber territorial minorities but also "diasporas" constituted within urban and foreign emigration which prolongs them and revives their identity. The problem is more tangible in Algeria than in Morocco (even though Berbers are more numerous in that country). Kabyle identity expresses itself by demonstrations in Tizi-ouzou in 1980, but also through clientelist networks and self-conscience in front of a contested state. Indeed, many Kabyles belong to the state apparatus, including security services and the FIS' hold on Kabilya is stronger than FLN's one. One must then express with nuances what might seem an absolute opposition between Kabyles/FLN or FIS. In the course of the Rome's meetings, the FIS has accepted that the Berber fact would be taken into account.

In Morocco, Berber identities have long recognized unofficially by the monarchy which used that fact after the independence in order to avoid being crushed by the Istiqlal party. The western Sahara affair will also have greatly contributed to attenuate that type of identitary construction. Its recent evolution might raise the problem again, if the integration of the Sahara takes place at the price of a regional autonomy since it will become necessary then to have other parts

of the kingdom benefiting from it, starting with the Souss, the Rif or the Middle-Atlas.

Protection of minorities or that of certain social groups such as women, raises the problem of democracy which is present to-day in the Maghreb as in many other regions which seemed, only a short while ago, dedicated to authoritarian regimes. If great participation is looked for everywhere, no political party is really ready for alternation forms which might be highly dangerous for the leaders. Integration of the excluded ones will be achieved only at the cost of compromises offensive to political ethics, or simply to ethics, but one finds examples in Latin-America or South-East Asia.

III - Regional and transnational perspectives

The integration of the new urban strata and of the youth implies probably in the Maghreb a banalisation of islamism within a pluralistic context. That evolution constitutes a kind of previous achievement before the recomposition of a synthesis combining identity and legitimacy undergoing a crisis under various forms in each of the states since the beginning of the 80's. Recovering their internal stability might open the way to take into account in a better way the collective security problems within the Maghreb regional context as well as concerning the relationships between the Maghreb and Europe. One may, partly, reverse the factors and assume that a better integration into Europe according to a process close to the Turkish model of Customs union might contribute to reinforce internal stability in Morocco and in Tunisia, while waiting to be able to do the same in Algeria. Such an evolution implies that the problems related to the circulation of people might be considered with as much an open mind as that of goods, of capitals, of images or ideas.

To-day, demography in the Magribi states is still too much a worrying question for their partners. A free circulation or a loosening of control measures might engender population moves with consequences hardly acceptable for the European countries. But one can now foresee an important change of tendency as far as population growth is concerned. The demographic transition has started in the Maghreb its effects, in terms of stabilization of population, ought to be felt around the year 2015; more clearly for Tunisia and Morocco than for Algeria. The global tendency towards a level close to the Mediterranean Europe's one, falling down sharply under four children instead of seven or eight at the time of the independences. Urbanization, education, as well as the coming of women into the labor-market have played a major part as far as this fast decrease is concerned. One may witness there also the effect of the value systems and of the way of living of Magribi immigration in Europe, the comparison with the middle-East concerning that question being striking. Consequences of that change at the internal and external level are considerable and represent an astonishing contrast with the perceptions of the present period. Economic, social, political pressures exerted to-day by an urban youth ought then to diminish and allow for an easier integration. But the horizon of change being largely over that present governments, it cannot be taken into account, as on the opposite, it has been necessary to wait until the end of 60's for the setting up of the first measures aiming at fighting against the demographic pressure scientifically noticed ten years before that.

The feeling that the efforts made in the sector of employment and basic equipments were vain, should in particular be replaced by a more qualitative and subtle treatment of collective needs. The interference of those reactions with migratory problems and feelings of fear which come from a perception of realities corresponding to the situation of the previous generation should be replaced by more rational reactions. The European demographic deficit, at the beginning of the

next century, might then lead to the re-opening of borders. Those evolutions would in turn contribute to ease the situation in the Maghreb.

If the consequences of demographic transitions take time to be translated into the political field, economy will probably influence more quickly the future of the Maghreb countries. Continuity and breaking off characterize that field in which the part of the Algerian oil and above all gas wealth will go on rising and be more important in relation with other productions, as well in that country as in the neighboring countries. Now, Algeria had chose in order to develop its wealth in the 60's a financial and technical strategy which guaranteed its maximum independence : no association with foreign companies, SONATRACH being the only foreman, no important stable connections, the exportation using essentially gas-tankers. To-day, the need to exploit the trump card that its proximity to Europe represents and to compete with Norwegian or Siberian gas forces it to consider stable connections. It must find the capital and the technology capable of achieving these project, and capable at the same time of improving the conditions of production of its gasfields, as well as its means of transportation and of liquefaction. now, Algeria's debt is so high that it must consider finding the necessary resources in the form of participation and not of loan. At more general level, external partners of such financing, to-day have a great capacity of choice and decide to invest in relation to the perspectives of association to management.

The logics of these choices has already started to work. On one side, the demand for natural gas rises up due to the fact; in particular, that Italy, Spain, Belgium, have abandoned nuclear as the main source of energy. On the other hand, the complexity and security of the supply with Siberian gas lead the European countries to consider with interest the utility of several suppliers. With far more modest reserves than Russia, Algeria represents a serious partner for Southern Europe; The projects of fixed equipments allow for the interconnection of the gas

networks coming from Siberia, Norway and Algeria. An Italian company, EMEL, has signed, in October 1992, a contract with SONATRACH, which makes it the first buyer of Algerian gas and a Spanish company, ENAGAS, considers doubling the natural gas consumption of that country within three years thanks to the injunction with the French network on one side, and the establishment of a pipe-line between the Maghreb and Europe, on the other side, which, in 1996, will carry the Hassi R'Mel's gas onto the Spanish market at the price of an investment close to three billions of dollars.

These simple facts will have heavy consequences in the long-run. Algerian resources should grow quickly enough to go largely, in 1997, beyond 12 billions of dollars at a time when the repayment of the debt will decrease in importance because of the readjustments. The situation appears thus as a perfect classical case of readjustment giving again the government a capacity for economic intervention in opposition to its present difficulties. Now, this development of the energy sector will take place only at the cost of an external financial technological presence taking the dominant form of a private European or American partnership. That leads that region to abandon the policies of economic nationalism and to accept in most of the sectors, penetration rates, by external capital, close to those that Spain and Portugal after it, have registered since the 60's.

In that scheme, Algeria remains as much for Europe as for the neighboring Maghreb countries, the major economic and probably political partner but also the most difficult one. The construction of a Magribi economic aggregate thus remains a realistic project in spite of short-term political difficulties. By itself, a large Maghreb market stabilized, around 100 million inhabitants may constitute an interesting pole of equilibrium within the southern environment of Europe. Complementarities between irrigated agriculture, consumption industries, Moroccan and Tunisian tourism, Algerian gas and heavy industries, may take place if a will to

institute unity without any effect of domination upon one country exists. Seen from that angle, the construction of intercontinental gas pipe-lines constitutes both a choice of a long-term cooperation with Europe, but also with the other Magribi countries. A vast Magribi market with convertible currencies and free circulation of people and goods will create dynamics of growth of its own superior to that of present states. It would attract external investments in relation to the interest represented by that economic space and not to finance sub-contractors industries which run the risk to be in competition with Asian labor-force far less costly than the Magribi one, or agricultural products which will be victims of European protectionist measures. At term, the relationships between a Europe which will remain the main partner of the Maghreb and those three countries, ought to develop towards the constitution of a free-trade zone comparable to that which is being established between the United States, Canada and Mexico. that perspective seems realistic when reciprocal fears will have quieted down and when the Magribi political systems will be stabilized.

Now , for the time being, the great economic exchange networks are created rather as a system of relationships mainly bilateral and competitive. The interest of the various partners ought to be to achieve the rationalization of a Magribi regional system capable of dealing at better conditions with Europe and to manage with some distance the various effects of a transnationality which goes beyond the controls the states can establish. That situation may affect fields as different as language and culture, the conception of Islam, of modernity and of democracy.

One may see, nevertheless, in those hypotheses to put in perspective the situations that an ideal evolution in which the rationality of objective constraints would necessarily influence behaviors. Now, the part played by the irrational in the internal functioning of political systems as well as in the transnational space, may still have important effects because of the colonial past and of the new present

myths. On the other hand, the interests of restricted groups occupying control positions may, in the Maghreb, block changes larger social groups would benefit from.

As in the Turkish case, a closer association between Europe and the Maghreb implies the establishment of a code of good behavior in which it appears that internal tensions of those societies (no-integration of the Kurd minority in the kemalist state in the Turkish case, non-integration of islamists in the Magribi case) must not be exported into the European societies. Those will repress the violent movements which attack their internal public order but will intervene after in order for the states to put an end to the cause of that disorder by using democratic practices ensuring the representation of minorities or excluded ones rather than violent measures.

At a more general level, a special attention should be dedicated to integration and to the recognition of the culture of the populations coming from Magribi immigration in Europe - especially in its religious dimension : Islam. Now, the definite place of Islam within the European culture is far from being acquired for all the systems of thought. The need for dignity together with the process of insertion of these populations is translated at the cultural and religious levels, among other things. In exchange, they will have to abandon a large part of their particularisms and become also the messengers outside of European values related to individualism and democracy. That double religious and individualistic dimension will influence their relationships with Magribi societies with which they keep a very strong feeling of solidarity which is part of their collective identity.

An approach of Maghreb-Europe relationships in terms of collective security implies in the long run that one stops to build up a myth of an "islamist danger". The imposition of reinforced barriers and controls, the creation of a Europe of

polices which goes faster within the framework of the Schengen agreements than the monetary Europe, in the absence of an institutional basis, tends to mobilize collective fears, mixing together illegal immigration, drugs and terrorism. Now, these opposite myths greatly established for an internal use are directly projected on the southern bank of the Mediterranean by way of the European televisions and affect urban masses. Misunderstanding on security questions between Maghreb and Europe gives birth to phantasms and clumsy attempts to cope with them building a network of agreements similar to the CSCE. But such a construction will have mainly to deal with illegal immigrations, drugs and islamism. As the main function of armies is today the protection of regimes rather than borders, exchanges on security questions with Europe will be interpreted in the Maghreb as a solidarity with those regimes who fight the islamists with the support of armies without counterpart in favor of democratization.

At a general level, Europe will have to accept the presence of minorities and of diasporas, the collective rights of which will have to be recognized by the European societies in order not to have to call upon foreign protection. as a counterpart, Magribi countries associated to Europe will be led to enter a democratic transition process in order to become predictable partners with which one shares common values, thus justifying solidarities. Magribi countries will also have to guarantee the security of capital and people including that of their emigrated ex-nationals involved in a process of investment and of modernization.

That positive plan of a rational evolution of the relationships between the Maghreb and Europe after the model United-States-Mexico should not exclude possible drifts. Nationalist temptations which represent, in the short run, an easy mean to unify a country around its leaders, may delay notably the establishment of a Magribi regional aggregate of 100 millions to-day or tomorrow to nuclear escalation especially if the Algerian nuclear research center started to work.

The weakening of the states might constitute another type of internal and external nuisance for it will open the way to regional and sectorial egoisms going greatly towards a delinquent economy coinciding with a few isolate places of modernity (oil industries, phosphates and a few other agricultural or industrial sectors). Drugs, fraudulent imitations economy, undertaking of illegal emigration could flourish in vast regions which would escape the central power's control and would be dominated by autonomous and competitive militia, searching for external supports.

Europe's role may be considerable in the evolution of the Magribi countries towards one or the other model. Being too much preoccupied by its own future, it is less available now than in the past to engage into new solidarities with a region which is too often perceived as a menace. It would be paradoxical nevertheless that one does not pay attention to that part of the world which is so close by geography, history and culture, an attention comparable to the one which can be witnessed to avert natural or technical catastrophes (acid rains, risks engendered by the decay of Russian nuclear power plants, and so on...). Considered from that angle, the Maghreb's problems present themselves as collective security problems for Europe which one could manage with a forecasting open to solidarity spirit if one does not want to have to deal in emergency with the nuisances engendered by a lack of understanding.

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