


1995 NATO SYMPOSIUM



OPINIONS and OPTIONS


24-25 APRIL 1995

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C. 20319-6000

NATO EXPANSION: OPINIONS AND OPTIONS

1995 NATO Symposium
National Defense University
NATO Defense College
Washington, 24-25/IV/1995

- a. Program
- b. Attendance list
- c. Biographies
 - 1. "The path to expansion: information and background"/ James Cunningham
 - 2. "NATO expansion: reactions from representative PFP countries: a view from Romania"/ Ioan Mircea Paşcu
 - 3. "NATO expansion: a Russian perspective"/ Alexei K. Pushkov
 - 4. "NATO expansion: view from Ukraine"/ Ihor Yu. Kharchenko
 - 5. "System of European security: the Belarussian perspective"/ Anatol Maisenya
 - 6. "If NATO expands, how must NATO change?: The political dimension"/ Hans Jochen Peters
 - 7. "The defense program question: the military and budgetary dimensions of NATO expansion"/ Richard L. Kugler
 - 8. "NATO expansion: a view from the Southern periphery"/ Tugay Özçeri
 - 9. "NATO expansion: historical aspects"/ Lawrence S. Kaplan



(2)

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THE NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE

"NATO Expansion: Opinions and Options"

Monday, 24 April 1995

- 0730-0815 REGISTRATION (Marshall Hall, Room 155)
- 0815-0830 ADMIN ANNOUNCEMENTS AND WELCOME (Baruch Auditorium - Eisenhower Hall)
- 0830-0930 KEYNOTE ADDRESS: Honorable Walter B. Slocombe; *Under Secretary of Defense for Policy*
- INTRODUCED BY: Lieutenant General Ervin J. Rokke, U. S. Air Force; *President, National Defense University*
- 0930-1000 BREAK
- 1000-1200 Panel I: The Path to Expansion: An Assessment
- PFP -The Past and Future: Mr. James B. Cunningham; *Director, European Security and Political Affairs, United States Department of State*
- WEU Expansion and its Relationship to NATO: Mr. Jean Felix-Paganon; *Director for Political Affairs, Western European Union*
- Criteria for Expansion: Dr. Jeffrey Simon; *Senior Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University*
- Moderator: Dr. Hans Binnendijk; *Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University*
- 1215-1415 LUNCH - Marshall Hall, Room 155
- 1430-1630 Panel II: NATO Expansion: Reactions from Representative PFP Countries
- A View From Poland: Dr. Andrzej Karkoszka; *Director, Department of International Security, Ministry of National Defense, Warsaw*
- A View From Romania: Dr. Ioan Mircea Pașcu; *Secretary of State, Ministry of National Defense, Bucharest*
- A View From Lithuania: Mr. Eitvydas Bajarūnas; *Deputy Head, Multilateral Relations Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vilnius*
- Discussant: Dr. Stanimir Alexandrov; *Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bulgaria*
- Moderator: Mr. Joshua B. Spero; *Political-Military Affairs Analyst, NATO Policy Branch, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5), The Joint Staff*

1630-1745 DISCUSSION GROUPS - See Seminar Assignment Sheet

1745-1900 RECEPTION - Atrium - Marshall Hall

1900-2130 BANQUET: Marshall Hall, Room 155

SPEAKER: Ambassador John C. Kornblum; *Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary, European Affairs, Department of State*

INTRODUCED BY: Lieutenant General Ervin J. Rokke, U. S. Air Force; *President, National Defense University*

Tuesday, 25 April 1995

0800-1000 **Panel III. NATO Expansion: The Russian, Ukraine and Belarus Perspective**

View From Russia: Dr. Alexander G. Savelyev; *Vice President, Institute for National Security and Strategic Studies, Moscow*

View From Ukraine: Dr. Ihor Yu. Kharchenko; *Director, Policy Analysis and Planning Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kiev*

View From The Republic of Belarus: Dr. Anatol Maisenia; *President, East-West National Centre for Strategic Initiatives, Minsk*

Moderator: Dr. Milton Kovner; *Professor of Political Science, Department of Strategy, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University*

1000-1030 **BREAK**

1030-1230 **Panel IV: If NATO Expands, How Must NATO Change?**

The Political Dimension: Mr. Hans Jochen Peters; *Head, Partnership and Cooperation Section, Political Affairs Division, NATO*

The Military Dimension: Dr. Catherine McArdle Kelleher; *Defense Advisor, U.S. Mission to NATO*

The Defense Program Question: Dr. Richard L. Kugler; *Associate Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND*

Moderator: Dr. Stuart Johnson; *Director, Research Directorate, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University*

1245-1445 **LUNCH - Room 155**

SPEAKER: Ambassador Tugay Özçeri; *Permanent Representative of Turkey to NATO*

INTRODUCED BY: Dr. Hans Binnendijk; *Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University*

1500-1700

Panel V: NATO Expansion - Historical Aspects and Public Relations

Historical Aspects: **Professor Lawrence S. Kaplan;** *Director Emeritus, Lemnitzer Center for NATO Studies, Kent State University*

Public Opinion - The U.S. Perspective: **Dr. Kenneth A. Myers;** *National Security Advisor to Senator Richard Lugar*

Moderator: **Dr. Hugh DeSantis;** *Faculty, Department of National Security Policy, National War College, National Defense University*

1700

ADJOURNMENT

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n° inv. 15157
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
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The Institute for National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University (NDU), in cooperation with the NATO Defense College, is pleased to sponsor this important and timely symposium entitled "NATO Expansion: Opinions and Options." For the next two days we will discuss the major expansion issues confronting the North Atlantic and European communities. We will also investigate how public opinion will influence courses of action required for NATO enlargement.

The first day will be devoted to hearing different opinions relative to the issues on NATO's future expansion possibilities. The first panel, titled "The Path to Expansion: An Assessment," will analyze the successes and problems of the PFP and the WEU; they will also discuss the most probable criteria for NATO expansion. We will then convene a panel of representatives from Poland, Romania, and the Republic of Belarus to discuss "NATO Expansion: Reactions From Representative PFP Countries."

On the second day, the first panel titled "NATO Expansion: The Russian and Ukraine Perspective," will answer questions pertaining to how Russia and the Ukraine are thinking about the expansion issues. The next panel will answer the question "If NATO Expands, How Must NATO Change?" from the political, military and infrastructure perspectives. The symposium will close with a panel investigating "NATO Expansion: Historical Aspects and Public Relations." The real challenge of this panel will be to link these critical public attitudes to the strategic interests and political issues that were discussed by the preceding panels.

We wish to extend a very warm welcome to all participants, especially those of you who journeyed a great distance to join us. The NDU staff stands ready to assist each of you in making your visit as productive and pleasant as possible. Please accept my best wishes for a successful symposium.



Ervin J. Rokke
Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force
President

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NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

The mission of the National Defense University is to ensure excellence in professional military education and research in the essential elements of national security.

Specifically, the National Defense University is tasked to do the following:

- * Prepare selected commissioned officers and civilian officials from the Department of Defense, Department of State, and other agencies of the government for command, management, and staff responsibilities in a multinational, intergovernmental, or joint national security setting. The curricula of the two senior Colleges emphasize national security policy formulation, military strategy development, mobilization, management of resources for national security, and planning for joint and combined operations. The Armed Forces Staff College curriculum is designed to prepare midcareer officers for joint and combined staff duty. In addition to mission-specific education, the Colleges emphasize developing executive skills and improving competencies.**

- * Promote, through the Information Resources Management College, excellence in information resources management education for executive users of information systems at senior and intermediate levels.**

- * Provide, through the Institute for National Strategic Studies, research and gaming resources, and symposia, for the benefit of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the component Colleges of the National Defense University, and other federal departments and agencies involved in national security.**

- * Conduct short-range and long-range studies of national security policy, military strategy, the allocation and management of resources for national security, and civil-military affairs. Associated research is centered on College missions and is relevant to Joint Staff and OSD study requirements. A goal of University research is to create a national repository of expertise on mobilization, military strategy, and joint or combined policy and plans.**

- * Promote understanding and teamwork among the Armed Forces and between them and those agencies of the government and industry that contribute to national security.**

INFORMATION

The following information is provided to assist you during your stay here and participation in the symposium at the National Defense University, Fort McNair.

A nametag was included in your folder provided during registration. It is coded and admits you to all sessions and the meals for which you are registered. If incorrect, notify the Registration/Information Center and a correction will be made. If your name tag is incorrect, please notify the Registration/Information Desk. Also, we ask you to return them at the end of the symposium in the receptacles placed at the exits.

A message board is at the Registration/Information Desk on first floor, Eisenhower Hall. During the symposium, incoming callers may only leave messages and should use commercial 202-475-0521 or DSN 335-0521. Pay phones are located next to room 100 on the first floor of Eisenhower Hall, near the escalator outside Baruch Auditorium, in the basement of Roosevelt Hall, and in Marshall Hall, first floor, room 192 (across the hall from the elevators). Courtesy phones are at the South end of the first floor in Eisenhower Hall. Only local and DSN calls can be made from these phones.

Dress for all scheduled events on the agenda is military service uniforms or appropriate civilian attire. There is no requirement for formal attire.

The University intends to publish a set of proceedings. A copy of these proceedings will be mailed to each registrant after the symposium (subject to editorial and publication lead times)

Bus transportation from/to the Channel Inn and the Georgetown Suites is available. The schedule is as follows:

- a. 1st day: Depart hotel at 0715
Depart Building #62, Fort McNair
at approximately 2130 to hotels**

**2nd day: Depart hotel at 0715
Depart Building #59, Fort McNair
at approximately 1715 to hotels**

- b. Phone numbers for taxis are:**

Yellow Cab: 544-1212

Capital Cab: 546-2400

Red Top Cab: 522-3333

Diamond Cab: 387-6200

If you are experiencing any problems or need additional information during the symposium, visit our Registration/Information Desk.

BIOGRAPHIES

FEATURED SPEAKERS

MR. WALTER B. SLOCOMBE

Mr. Slocombe is the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Prior to this appointment, he served as Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Mr. Slocombe had been a consultant to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy since 1993. He had previously served as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning from November 1979 to January 1981, and as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs from 1977 to 1979. In both positions, he served concurrently as Director of the DoD SALT Task Force. Immediately prior to joining the Clinton Administration, he had been a member of the Washington, D.C. law firm of Caplin and Drysdale, Chartered, since February 1981. He had earlier been with Caplin and Drysdale since 1971, where he became a partner in 1974. In 1970-1971 he was a Research Associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. In 1969 and 1970 he was a member of the Program Analysis Office of the National Security Council staff, working on strategic arms control, long term security policy planning, and intelligence issues. Mr. Slocombe graduated from Princeton University, where he was in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. From 1963 to 1965 he did graduate study on Soviet politics as a Rhodes Scholar at Balliol College, Oxford. He received his law degree summa cum laude from Harvard Law School. He clerked for Mr. Justice Abe Fortas during the October 1968 Term of the United States Supreme Court.

AMBASSADOR JOHN C. KORNBLUM

Ambassador Kornblum is the Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. He entered the United States Foreign Service shortly after graduation from Michigan State University. After early assignments in Hamburg and Washington, he was assigned to Bonn as Political Officer. Returning to the State Department, Ambassador Kornblum was assigned a series of policy-related positions, including a member of the Policy Planning Staff and head of the European regional political affairs office. From 1979 to 1981, he was Political Advisor at the United States Mission in Berlin. In 1981, he was appointed Director of the Office of Central European Affairs in the Department of State. Ambassador Kornblum returned to Berlin as United States Minister and Deputy Commandant in 1985. He became United States Deputy Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Brussels. President Bush appointed him as Ambassador and United States Representative to the CSCE in 1991. In this capacity, Ambassador Kornblum served as Chief of the American delegation to the 1992 Helsinki Review Conference and played a major role in drafting the Declaration approved at the 1992 Helsinki Summit.

AMBASSADOR TUGAY ÖZÇERI

Ambassador Özçeri is Permanent Representative of Turkey to the North Atlantic Council. Prior to his current assignment, he was Undersecretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1989 to 1991. From 1988 to 1989, he held the position of Ambassador, Permanent Representative to NATO and later Ambassador, Assistant Under Secretary for Bilateralpolitical Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ambassador Özçeri was Director General of Mutual Security Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1988. Between 1974 and 1988, he was Counsellor at the Turkish Delgation to NATO and later became Executive Secretary at the Office of the Secretary General of NATO. Ambassador Özçeri graduated from Ankara College and the Faculty of Political Sciences of Ankara University. He joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the same year.

BIOGRAPHIES

Panel I: The Path to Expansion: An Assessment

MR. JAMES CUNNINGHAM

Mr. Cunningham is the Director, European Security and Political Affairs, Department of State. Mr. Cunningham joined the Foreign Service in 1975. His first assignment was to Stockholm as Staff Assistant to the Ambassador, and then as Political Officer. Before his assignment in Rome as Political-Military Affairs Officer, he returned to the United States and served in the Office of European Security and Political Affairs. From 1985 to 1988, he served as Executive Officer of the U.S. Mission to NATO and then moved to the Political Section. In 1988 he was appointed as Deputy Director and subsequently Director of the Private Office of Secretary General Manfred Woerner. In 1990, Mr. Cunningham returned to the U.S. and assumed the post of Deputy Political Counselor at the U.S. Mission to the UN. Mr. Cunningham became the Deputy Director of the Office of European Security and Political Affairs in 1992. He graduated Magna Cum Laude from Syracuse University with degrees in Political Science and Psychology.

MR. JEAN FELIX-PAGANON

Mr. Felix-Paganon is Political Director, Western European Union in Brussels. Prior to his current assignment, he was First Counsellor in the French Permanent Mission to the United Nations (New York). From 1989 to 1990, he was Diplomatic Advisor to the Ministry of Defence, Minister's Private Office in Paris. Other assignments include Deputy Director for the Middle East, Central Government (Paris) 1988-1989, Deputy Permanent Representative, French Delegation to the CSCE (Vienna) 1986-1988, Deputy Permanent Representative, French Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (Stockholm) 1985-1986, and First Secretary, French Delegation to NATO (Brussels) 1983-1985. Mr. Felix-Paganon is a Graduate of the Paris *Institut d'Études Politiques* and the *Institut national des Langues et Civilisations Orientales*.

DR. JEFFREY SIMON

Dr. Simon is a Senior Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. Previously he was Chief, National Military Strategy Branch and Soviet Threat Analyst at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. He has taught at Georgetown University and has held research positions at System Planning Corporation, the RAND Corporation, and the American Enterprise Institute. Dr. Simon holds a Ph.D. from the University of Washington and an M.A. from the University of Chicago.

DR. HANS BINNENDIJK

Dr. Binnendijk is the Director, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. His government service includes Principal Deputy Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, Director of the State Department's Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Staff Director and Senior Staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, National Security Council Staff member, and Budget Examiner for the Office of Management and the Budget. In academia, he was the Marshall Coyne Professor of Diplomacy and Director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University. He was also the Director of Studies at London's International Institute for Strategic Studies. He taught at Tokyo's Sophia University, and served as a journalist for the Virginia Sentinel. He received a BA from the University of Pennsylvania and a MALD and PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

BIOGRAPHIES

Panel II: NATO Expansion: Reactions from Representative PFP Countries

DR. ANDRZEJ KARKOSZKA

Dr. Karkoszka is the Director of Department of International Security, Ministry of Defense. Before assuming his present position, he was Advisor to the Minister of Defense. From 1990 to 1991, Dr. Karkoszka was Advisor in the Chancellory, Office of the President of Poland. Between 1984 and 1990, he was an expert on the U N Secretary General Group of Governmental Experts on Non-nuclear Zones, UNIDIR Expert Groups on Outer Space, and on Verification of Disarmament. Dr. Karkoszka was a member of the Polish Delegations to the UN GA annual session (1971), the MBFR Negotiations in Vienna (1973), the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva (1983-1985), and to the BW Convention Review Conference (1986). He earned an MS in Applied Entomology, Agricultural Academy, Warsaw, Faculty of Journalism, Warsaw's University and a Ph.D. at the Polish Institute of International Affairs.

DR. IOAN MIRCEA PASCU

Dr. Pascu is the Secretary of State, Ministry of National Defense. He has been a Member of the Council of the Foundation "A Future for Romania" since 1992. He is also Head of the Security Studies Section of the Association's of International Law and International Relations, Bucharest, and a Member of the Council of the Euro-Atlantic Center, Bucharest. In 1993, he became a Member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. Before his current assignment, Dr. Pascu was Professor of International Relations, Dean of the International Relations Faculty, The National School for Political and Administrative Studies. Between 1990 and 1992, he was Presidential Counselor, Head of the Foreign Policy Directorate, The Department for Political Analysis, The Presidency of Romania. From 1989 to 1990 he was a Member of the Foreign Policy Commission of the Council of the National Salvation Front. Dr. Pascu earned an M.A. from The Academy of Economics, Bucharest and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Institute for Political Sciences, Bucharest.

MR. EITVYDAS BAJARŪNAS

Mr. Bajarūnas is Deputy Head of Multilateral Relations Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1994, he was appointed by Decree of Government of the Republic of Lithuania as a member of the Working Group for PFP Coordination. He was appointed by Decree of the President of the Republic of Lithuania as a member of the Ad Hoc Working Group for preparation of "National Security Concept of the Republic of Lithuania" in 1993. Before his current assignment he was the Head of the Division of Information Service at the Ministry of National Defence and Head of International Organizations Division, Department of International Relations, Ministry of National Defence. From 1989 to 1991, he was Lecturer at Vilnius Technological University. From 1986 to 1991 he was assigned to the Institute of Physical-Technical problems of Energetics and Institute of Mathematics and Informatics (Lithuanian Academy of Sciences). Mr. Bajarūnas attended the Vilnius University and was a postgraduate student at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (Stockholm).

STANIMIR ALEXANDROV

Mr. Alexandrov was appointed as the Bulgarian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1995. As a career foreign service officer, he has served in a number of posts beginning in 1981. His career began as an international law legal advisor in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and he headed the International Public Law Division from 1984 to 1986. In 1986, he went to Kuwait as the Second Secretary and ultimately the Deputy Chief of Mission in the Embassy of Bulgaria, Kuwait. In 1989 and 1990, he was a member of the Permanent Mission of Bulgaria to the United Nations in New York. He returned to Sofia for a short while in 1990 as the Deputy Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Legal Department prior to returning to the United States as a counselor, and ultimately the Deputy Chief of Mission and Minister Plenipotentiary, at the Embassy of Bulgaria in Washington D.C. Since 1994, he served as the Deputy Director and Director of the Department of European Integration in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prior to assuming his current position. Mr. Alexandrov has a degree in International Law from The State Institute for International Relations in Moscow, and Master of Laws in International Comparative Law, as well as a Doctor of Juridical Science, from the George Washington University. He has lectured at The School of Law of the University of Plovdiv in Bulgaria and at the Georgetown University Law School in Washington D.C.

BIOGRAPHIES

PANEL III: NATO Expansion: The Russian and Ukraine Perspective

DR. ALEXANDER G. SAVELYEV

Dr. Savelyev is the Vice President of the Institute for National Security and Strategic Studies, Moscow. He is also the Head of the Section in the Department of Strategic Analysis of IMEMO. In 1991, Dr. Savelyev was elected a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies - IISS (London). During the period 1989-1991, he participated in the Soviet-American START negotiations in Geneva, Defense and Space Talks, as an adviser of the Soviet delegation. In 1992, he moved to the Department of Strategic Analysis of IMEMO as a head of section. He received a diploma as a senior researcher in international relations from the Academy of Sciences for a set of complex analysis and studies on the arms control issues. Dr. Savelyev graduated from Moscow Institute of National Economy, and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations Academy of Sciences. He earned a Ph.D. from the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

DR. IHOR KHARCHENKO

Dr. Kharchenko is the Director of Policy Analysis and Planning Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ukraine. Prior to his current appointment, he held the position of First Secretary, Head of Section at the department. From 1988 to 1992 he was the Assistant Professor, Lecturer in International Relations, Kyiv University. Dr. Kharchenko earned a Ph.D. in history from Kyiv University. His publications include *Ukraine's Foreign Policy, Security Relations in Central and Eastern Europe, and Modern European Security Relations.*

MR. ANATOL MAISENIA

Mr. Maisenia is President, East-West National Centre for Strategic Initiatives. Prior to his current appointment, he was a Columnist "Narodnaja Gazzetta" newspaper in Minsk. From 1989 to 1990, Mr. Maisenia was Special Correspondent, New Program, USSR TV. He graduated from the Minsk Institute for Foreign Languages and did post graduate studies at the Institute of Philosophy and Law, Academy of Sciences of Belarus. He earned a Ph.D degree based on dissertation on American Politics.

BIOGRAPHIES

Panel IV: If NATO Expands, How Must NATO Change?

MR. HANS JOCHEN PETERS

Mr. Peters is the Head, Central and Eastern Europe and Liaison Section, Political Affairs Division, NATO International Staff. Before his current assignment, he held the position of Foreign Policy Advisor to Minister President of the Land Schleswig-Holstein from 1989 to 1991. From 1987 to 1989, he was the Speechwriter for Foreign Minister Genscher and from 1984 to 1987 Mr. Peters was a member of Foreign Ministry Policy Planning Staff. From 1975 to 1981, Mr. Peters was Federal Chancellery, Bonn (Deputy Head, Eastern Europe Section, and later Private Secretary to Chancellor Schmidt and Deputy Head of his Private Office. Mr. Peters joined the German Foreign Service in 1970 and was assigned abroad in Moscow, USSR from 1973 to 1975 and Montevideo, Uruguay from 1981 to 1984. He studied Slavic Languages, History, Political Science, and Philosophy at the University of Tübingen. He also attended the University of Kiel.

DR. CATHERINE McARDLE KELLEHER

Dr. Kelleher is the Defense Advisor to the U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Before assuming her current position, she was a Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution. Dr. Kelleher served as a staff member of the National Security Council during the Carter Administration, and was Professor in the School of Public Affairs at the University of Maryland. She has also taught at the Universities of Denver, Michigan, and Columbia, and was Professor of Military Strategy at the National War College. She has served as Director of the Center for International Security Studies, was a research fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and a visiting fellow at All Souls, Oxford. Dr. Kelleher recently completed a monograph entitled The Future of European Security: An Interim Assessment, outlining the changing nature of European security in the post Cold War world. She received her undergraduate training at Mount Holyoke College, her doctorate in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and a D.Litt. from Mount Holyoke College.

DR. RICHARD L. KUGLER

Dr. Kugler is currently Senior Social Scientist and Associate Director International Security and Defense Policy Center, RAND. Other assignments at RAND include Associate Head, Political Science Department, Santa Monica, California from 1988 to 1990 and from 1990 to 1991 he was Senior Social Scientist in Washington. Dr. Kugler served as Director, Strategic Concepts Development Center, National Defense University from 1984 to 1988. From 1980 to 1984, Dr. Kugler was Director, European Forces Division, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation, and from 1975 to 1980 he was assigned as Senior Analyst in the Asia and European Division. Dr. Kugler's academic career includes Adjunct Professor of International Relations, George Washington University from 1979 to 1988 and Faculty Member, RAND Graduate School from 1988 to 1991. His publications include two books, three major RAND reports, seven scholarly articles and forty DoD studies, all on NATO/European security affairs and U.S. defense policy. He earned a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a B.A. in Political Science from the University of Minnesota.

BIOGRAPHIES


Panel V: NATO Expansion - Historical Aspects and Public Relations


DR. LAWRENCE S. KAPLAN

Dr. Kaplan is University Professor Emeritus of History and Director Emeritus of the Lyman L. Lemnitzer Center for NATO and European Community Studies at Kent State University. He is currently Adjunct Professor of History at Georgetown University. Prior to his position at Kent State, he was with the Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense. He has written numerous articles, monographs, and books on U.S. diplomatic history and NATO affairs, including *A Community of Interests: NATO and the Military Assistance Program, 1948-1951* (1980), *The United States and NATO: The Formative Years* (1984), (ed.) *American Historians and the Atlantic Alliance* (1991), and *NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance* (1988; updated edition, 1994).

DR. KENNETH A. MYERS

Dr. Myers is National Security Advisor to Senator Richard G. Lugar, the senior Senator from Indiana. His primary responsibilities in the Senate relate to that body's consideration of the START II Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the issue of NATO enlargement which will be in subject of a series of hearings by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee commencing on April 27. He has served in the Senate for 13 years, representing Senator Lugar on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. He served as Chief of Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during Senator Lugar's tenure as Chairman of that Committee in the 1980s. Before joining the Foreign Relations Committee, he served in the Department of Defense and was Director of European Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Over the past three years, he has worked closely with Senator Lugar and Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia in devising and implementing the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program that provides assistance to America's START I partners in meeting their dismantlement and destruction obligations under that treaty.






1995 NATO SYMPOSIUM

"NATO EXPANSION:
OPINIONS AND OPTIONS"

APRIL 24-25, 1995
WASHINGTON, DC



THE PATH TO EXPANSION: INFORMATION AND BACKGROUND

MR. JAMES CUNNINGHAM
DIRECTOR
EUROPEAN REGIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

National Defense University

**Address by James B. Cunningham, Director for
European Political and Security Affairs,
Department of State**

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

BACKGROUND PAPERS

April 24, 1995

- I. Introduction
- II. PFP Invitation and Framework Document
- III. PFP Fact Sheet
- IV. December 1994 NAC Communique
- V. President Clinton's Remarks, Cleveland, January 1994

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

The Partnership for Peace (PFP), a U.S. initiative, was launched by Allies at the January 1994 NATO Summit. The goal behind this initiative was to strengthen ties between NATO and democratic states to its east through creation of a real partnership that went beyond dialogue and cooperation. In little over a year the Partnership for Peace has evolved from a mere concept to a highly successful, key component of the European security structure

OBJECTIVES

PFP comprises a program of activities designed to enhanced political and military cooperation between NATO and its Partners. Specific objectives, as listed in the PFP Framework Document, include:

- (a) facilitation of transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes;
- (b) ensuring democratic control of defense forces;
- (c) maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the OSCE;

- (d) the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may be subsequently be agreed;
- (e) the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Who Has Joined

Twenty-five states have joined PFP, including all seven former Warsaw Pact states of Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic republics, Sweden, Finland, Slovenia, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus and Austria. We expect other states will join in the near future. Malta is scheduled to join (i.e. sign the PFP Framework Document) on April 26.

How It Works

States that join PFP can assign personnel on a full-time basis to NATO Headquarters and to a Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) at SHAPE. Twelve Partners (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Estonia, Romania, Sweden, Finland, Czech Republic,

Ukraine, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, and Austria) have liaison officers working at the PCC., and almost all the Partners have assigned representatives to NATO. PFP states may participate in PFP exercises and in relevant discussions with Allies at NATO. A Steering Committee, the Political-Military Steering Committee (PMSC), meets regularly to discuss policy issues and manage day-to-day PFP affairs. It meets in various formats -- Allies only, Allies plus one or more Partners, Allies plus all Partners -- depending on the issue to be discussed.

Each Partner submits to NATO a Presentation Document setting out the resources it will contribute to PFP activities and the steps it will take to meet PFP's political goals, such as democratic control of the military. On the basis of the Presentation Document and a Work Program drawn up by NATO, each Partner will develop with the Alliance a unique Individual Partnership Program (IPP). Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Ukraine, Hungary, Bulgaria, Russia, Sweden, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Moldova, Albania, Kazakhstan, and Georgia have submitted Presentation Documents. Poland, Romania, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Finland, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, Hungary, Ukraine, Russia, Estonia, Albania, Moldova, and Slovenia have submitted IPPs. NATO has reached agreement on IPP's with Poland, Romania, Sweden, Finland, Slovakia, Russia, Lithuania, Hungary, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Albania, and Estonia.

NATO will consult with any state actively participating in PFP that faces a direct threat to its security. These consultations would not involve extension to Partners of NATO's security guarantee under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Structures and Activities

All components of the Partnership, including the PFP Steering Committee (PMSC) and PCC are fully operational. Two PFP field exercises were held in 1994 -- Poland hosted "Cooperative Bridge" in September and the Netherlands hosted "Cooperative Spirit" in October. SACLANT hosted a maritime exercise in October in the North Atlantic. NATO ministers agreed last December on a comprehensive program of PFP activities, including thirteen "live" (field, maritime, command post, search and rescue, etc.) joint training exercises for 1995. The U.S. will host a PFP exercise, "Cooperative Nugget," in August at Ft. Polk, Louisiana.

Fourteen Partners are participating in an optional Defense Planning and Review Process in order to improve interoperability and transparency with NATO. Based on an initial assessment of information provided by Partners, NATO will provide each participating Partner with specific recommendations on how to improve its ability to work with the Alliance. The process is intended to be ongoing, and to help NATO and participating Partners plan and refine their IPP's.

Role of PFP in NATO Enlargement

Through PFP, NATO hopes to forge new, stronger security relations with all Partners. For some Partners, PFP will be the path to NATO membership. For others, the Partnership will be a strong and lasting link to the NATO alliance. As the President said in January, "we expect those who seek to join the alliance to prepare themselves through the Partnership for Peace for the obligations of membership..." While active participation in PFP will not guarantee membership in NATO, it can help states gain experience and training relevant to membership. The U.S. considers active participation in PFP as an indication of a state's commitment to strengthening its relations with NATO.

Partnership for Peace

— INVITATION —

*Issued by the Heads of State and Government
participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic
Council held at NATO Headquarters,
Brussels on 10-11 January 1994*

We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, building on the close and longstanding partnership among the North American and European Allies, are committed to enhancing security and stability in the whole of Europe. We therefore wish to strengthen ties with the democratic states to our East. We reaffirm that the Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to the membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe.

We have today launched an immediate and practical programme that will transform the relationship between NATO and participating states. This new programme goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership - a Partnership for Peace. We therefore invite the other states participating in the NACC and other CSCE countries able and willing to contribute to this programme, to join with us in this partnership. Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO.



The Partnership for Peace, which will operate under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, will forge new security relationships between the North Atlantic Alliance and its Partners for Peace. Partner states will be invited by the North Atlantic Council to participate in political and military bodies at NATO Headquarters with respect to Partnership activities. The Partnership will expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin our Alliance. NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security. At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating states, we will work in concrete ways towards transparency in defence budgeting, promoting democratic control of defence ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed.

To promote closer military cooperation and interoperability, we will propose, within the Partnership framework, peacekeeping field exercises beginning in 1994. To coordinate joint military activities within the Partnership, we will invite states participating in the Partnership to send permanent liaison officers to NATO Headquarters and a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programmes.

Since its inception two years ago, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council has greatly expanded the depth and scope of its activities. We will continue to work with all our NACC partners to build cooperative relationships across the entire spectrum of the Alliance's activities. With the expansion of NACC activities and the establishment of the Partnership for Peace, we have decided to offer permanent facilities at NATO Headquarters for personnel from NACC countries and other Partnership for Peace participants in order to improve our working relationships and facilitate closer cooperation.



Canada

Denmark

France

Germany

Greece

Iceland

Italy

Luxembourg

Netherlands

Norway

Portugal

Spain

Turkey

United Kingdom

United States

Partnership for Peace

— FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT —

1. Further to the invitation extended by the NATO Heads of State and Government at their meeting on 10 - 11 January 1994, the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other states subscribing to this document, resolved to deepen their political and military ties and to contribute further to the strengthening of security within the Euro-Atlantic area, hereby establish, within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, this Partnership for Peace.

2. This Partnership is established as an expression of a joint conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common action. Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through democracy are shared values fundamental to the Partnership. In joining the Partnership, the member States of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other States subscribing to this Document recall that they are committed to the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law. They reaffirm their commitment to fulfil in good faith the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; specifically, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, to respect existing borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means. They also reaffirm their commitment to the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent CSCE documents and to the fulfilment of the commitments and obligations they have undertaken in the field of disarmament and arms control.




3. The other states subscribing to this document will cooperate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in pursuing the following objectives:

- (a) facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes;
- (b) ensuring democratic control of defence forces;
- (c) maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE;
- (d) the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed;
- (e) the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

4. The other subscribing states will provide to the NATO Authorities Presentation Documents identifying the steps they will take to achieve the political goals of the Partnership and the military and other assets that might be used for Partnership activities. NATO will propose a programme of partnership exercises and other activities consistent with the Partnership's objectives. Based on this programme and its Presentation Document, each subscribing state will develop with NATO an individual Partnership Programme.

5. In preparing and implementing their individual Partnership Programmes, other subscribing states may, at their own expense and in agreement with the Alliance and, as necessary, relevant Belgian authorities, establish their own liaison office with NATO Headquarters in Brussels. This will facilitate their participation in NACC/Partnership meetings and activities, as well as certain others by invitation. They will also make available personnel, assets, facilities and capabilities necessary and appropriate for carrying out the agreed Partnership Programme. NATO will assist them, as appropriate, in formulating and executing their individual Partnership Programmes.



6. The other subscribing states accept the following understandings:


- those who envisage participation in missions referred to in paragraph 3(d) will, where appropriate, take part in related NATO exercises;
- they will fund their own participation in Partnership activities, and will endeavour otherwise to share the burdens of mounting exercises in which they take part;
- they may send, after appropriate agreement, permanent liaison officers to a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programmes;
- those participating in planning and military exercises will have access to certain NATO technical data relevant to interoperability;
- building upon the CSCE measures on defence planning, the other subscribing states and NATO countries will exchange information on the steps that have been taken or are being taken to promote transparency in defence planning and budgeting and to ensure the democratic control of armed forces;
- they may participate in a reciprocal exchange of information on defence planning and budgeting which will be developed within the framework of the NACC/Partnership for Peace.

7. In keeping with their commitment to the objectives of this Partnership for Peace, the members of the North Atlantic Alliance will:

- develop with the other subscribing states a planning and review process to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating forces and capabilities that might be made available by them for multinational training, exercises, and operations in conjunction with Alliance forces;
- promote military and political coordination at NATO Headquarters in order to provide direction and guidance relevant to Partnership activities with the other subscribing states, including planning, training, exercises and the development of doctrine.



8. NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.



BASIC FACT SHEET

NATO OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND PRESS
1110 - Brussels

JUNE 1994

Nº9

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

Partnership for Peace is a major initiative by NATO directed at increasing confidence and cooperative efforts to reinforce security. It engages NATO and participating partners in concrete cooperation activities designed to achieve these objectives. It offers participating states the possibility of strengthening their relations with NATO in accordance with their own individual interests and capabilities.

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At the January 1994 Brussels Summit, Alliance leaders announced: "We have decided to launch an immediate and practical programme that will transform the relationship between NATO and participating states. This new programme goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership - a Partnership for Peace".

The states participating in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)⁽¹⁾ and other CSCE countries able and willing to contribute to this programme have been invited to join the NATO member states in this Partnership. Partner states are invited by the North Atlantic Council to participate in political and military bodies at NATO Headquarters with respect to Partnership activities. The Partnership will expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin the Alliance.

NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security. At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating partners, NATO will work with its partners in concrete ways towards transparency in defence budgeting, promoting democratic control of defence ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed.

(1) There are 38 NACC member states, including the 16 members of NATO, as well as Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Finland is an observer. Austria, Finland and Sweden participate in the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping.



The first peacekeeping field exercises under the auspices of Partnership for Peace will be held in the autumn of 1994.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NACC AND PFP

The process leading up to the Partnership for Peace initiative can be traced back to the decisions taken at the London (May 1990) and Rome (November 1991) Summits relating to NATO's transformation in the post-Cold War era. A key aspect of this process was the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council - a forum for dialogue and cooperation between the Alliance and the emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union - which first met in December 1991.

Partnership for Peace has been established within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. It builds on the momentum of cooperation created by the NACC, opening the way to further deepening and strengthening of cooperation between the Alliance and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and other states participating in the Partnership, in order to enhance security and stability in Europe and the whole of the NACC area. Partnership for Peace activities will be fully coordinated with others undertaken in the NACC framework to ensure maximum effectiveness. NACC cooperative activities listed in the annual NACC Work Plan which cover fields in addition to those under Partnership for Peace, including regular consultations on political and security related issues, will continue to be implemented.

AIMS OF THE PARTNERSHIP

Concrete objectives of the Partnership include:

- facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes;
- ensuring democratic control of defence forces;
- maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE;
- the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed;
- the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the process of NATO's evolutionary expansion, which Alliance Heads of State and Government have stated they "expect and would welcome". Article 10 of the Washington Treaty provides for such expansion to include membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.

OBLIGATIONS AND COMMITMENTS

To subscribe to the Partnership, states sign a Framework Document in which they recall that they are committed to the preservation of democratic societies and the maintenance of the principles of international law. They reaffirm their commitment to fulfil in good faith the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; specifically, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, to respect existing borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means. They also reaffirm their commitment to the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent CSCE documents and to the fulfilment of the commitments and obligations they have undertaken in the field of disarmament and arms control.

IMPLEMENTATION

The procedure begins with the signature of the Partnership for Peace Framework Document by each participant. The next step is the submission by each partner of a Presentation Document to NATO, developed with the assistance of NATO authorities if desired, indicating the scope, pace and level of participation in cooperation activities with NATO sought by the partner (for example, joint planning, training and exercises). The Presentation Document also identifies steps to be taken by the partner to achieve the political goals of the Partnership and the military and other assets that might be made available by the partner for Partnership activities. It serves as a basis for an individual Partnership Programme, to be agreed between the partner and NATO.

Partners undertake to make available personnel, assets, facilities and capabilities necessary and appropriate for carrying out the agreed Partnership Programme. They will fund their own participation in Partnership activities and will endeavour to share the burdens of mounting exercises in which they take part.

A Political-Military Steering Committee, as a working forum for Partnership for Peace, meets under the Chairmanship of a senior member of the NATO International Staff, in different configurations. These include meetings of NATO Allies with individual partners to examine, as appropriate, questions pertaining to that country's individual Partnership Programme. Meetings with all NACC/PFP partners also take place to address common issues of Partnership for Peace; to provide the necessary transparency on individual Partnership Programmes; and to consider the overall programme of Partnership activities.

To facilitate cooperation activities, NACC partner countries and other PFP participating states are invited to send permanent liaison officers to NATO Headquarters and to a separate Partnership Coordination Cell in Mons (Belgium), where the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) is also located. The Partnership Coordination Cell is responsible, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, for coordinating joint military activities within the Partnership for Peace and for carrying out the military planning necessary to implement Partnership Programmes between NATO and individual PFP partners.

The Partnership Coordination Cell is headed by a Director whose responsibilities include coordination of Partnership activities with NATO's military authorities. Detailed operational planning for military exercises will be the responsibility of the military commands conducting the exercise. The Cell will also have a small number of permanent staff officers and secretarial and administrative support.

When NATO and NACC Foreign Ministers met in Istanbul in June 1994, at their regular Spring Ministerial meetings, they were able to review practical steps taken towards the implementation of Partnership for Peace since the January Summit. Ministers expressed their satisfaction with the significant number of countries which had already joined PFP⁽¹⁾ and looked forward to more countries joining, including other CSCE states able and willing to contribute to the programme. Three such CSCE countries which have joined PFP and are not members of the NACC - Finland, Slovenia and Sweden - participated in the deliberations on PFP issues and attended the rest of the NACC meeting in Istanbul as observers.

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(1) By 22 June 1994, 21 countries had signed the PFP Framework Document, namely: Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkmenistan and Ukraine.

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For immediate release
1st December 1994

MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
HELD AT NATO HEADQUARTERS, BRUSSELS,
ON 1 DECEMBER 1994

FINAL COMMUNIQUE

1. We have met today in Brussels for the first time under our new Chairman and the Alliance's new Secretary General, Mr. Willy Claes. We paid tribute to the outstanding achievements of the late Secretary General, Dr. Manfred Wörner, who served the Alliance with great distinction, leadership and vision.

2. We have noted the progress achieved in implementing the January 1994 NATO Summit decisions with regard to Partnership for Peace, our full support for the development of the European Defence and Security Identity and for the Western European Union, the development of the Combined Joint Task Forces concept, our approach to the problem of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, and the Mediterranean region. However, much remains to be done.

3. We discussed today the essential role NATO continues to play in reinforcing stability and security in Europe. NATO has always been a political community of nations committed to promoting shared values and defending common interests. These and NATO's defensive capabilities are the firm foundation which make it possible for the Alliance to contribute to stability and cooperation in the whole of Europe. A strong trans-Atlantic partnership and a continued substantial presence of United States forces in Europe, as reconfirmed by the January Summit, are fundamental not only to guarantee the Alliance's core functions but also to enable our Alliance to contribute effectively to European security. We are committed to continuing the process of adaptation of the Alliance, which began in 1990 and was carried forward at the Summit in the context of a broad approach to building

political, military and economic stability for all European countries. We will continue to consult closely and in an open manner with all our Partners about the evolution of the security architecture of Europe.

4. Allies have already taken important steps to expand cooperation through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and through the decisions of the January 1994 Summit, including the creation of the Partnership for Peace. Partnership for Peace is developing into an important feature of European security, linking NATO and its Partners and providing the basis for joint action with the Alliance in dealing with common security problems. Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will also play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO.

We are pleased with the rapid progress to date in the implementation of Partnership for Peace. Twenty-three countries so far have joined the Partnership. Ten Individual Partnership Programmes have been agreed and several more are close to completion. The Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons is fully operational and practical planning work has begun, especially with regard to the preparation for Partnership exercises in 1995. Together with Allies, eleven Partner countries already have appointed Liaison Officers at the Cell. Partner countries' representatives have taken up their dedicated office facilities in the new Manfred Wörner Wing at NATO Headquarters. We strongly encourage full Partner participation both at NATO Headquarters and in the Partnership Coordination Cell.

The three Partnership for Peace exercises held this Autumn with broad participation by both Allied and Partner nations launched a practical military cooperation that will improve our common capabilities. We will tomorrow present to our Partners a substantial exercise programme for next year. We welcome and encourage the large and growing number of exercises nationally sponsored in the spirit of Partnership for Peace. We also welcome and endorse a defence planning and review process within the Partnership, based on a biennial planning cycle, which will advance interoperability and increase transparency among Allies and Partners, and invite Partners to participate in a first round of this process beginning in January 1995.

We have also tasked the Council in Permanent Session, the NATO Military Authorities and the Partnership Coordination Cell to expedite the implementation of the Individual Partnership Programmes. We reaffirm our commitment to provide the necessary resources. In this regard, we have requested the Council in Permanent Session to examine how best to allocate, on an annual basis, existing resources within the NATO budgets to support the Partnership and to report back to us at our Spring meeting. We have also noted the effort of Allies to provide substantial bilateral assistance in support of Partnership objectives and agreed to exchange information on our respective national efforts with a view to ensuring the maximum effectiveness in their use. However, all this can only supplement, not replace, the efforts of Partners to undertake the short-term and long-term planning necessary to fund their own participation in Partnership for Peace.

5. Our Heads of State and Government reaffirmed that the Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We expect and would welcome NATO enlargement that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe. Enlargement, when it comes, would be part of a broad European security architecture based on true cooperation throughout the whole of Europe. It would threaten no one and would enhance stability and security for all of Europe. The enlargement of NATO will complement the enlargement of the European Union, a parallel process which also, for its part, contributes significantly to extending security and stability to the new democracies in the East.

6. Accordingly, we have decided to initiate a process of examination inside the Alliance to determine how NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide this process and the implications of membership. To that end, we have directed the Council in Permanent Session, with the advice of the Military Authorities, to begin an extensive study. This will include an examination of how the Partnership for Peace can contribute concretely to this process. We will present the results of our deliberations to interested Partners prior to our next meeting in Brussels. We will discuss the progress made at our Spring meeting in The Netherlands.

7. We agreed that it is premature to discuss the timeframe for enlargement or which particular countries would be invited to join the Alliance. We further agreed that enlargement should strengthen the effectiveness of the Alliance, contribute to the stability and security of the entire Euro-Atlantic area, and support our objective of maintaining an undivided Europe. It should be carried out in a way that preserves the Alliance's ability to perform its core functions of common defence as well as to undertake peacekeeping and other new missions and that upholds the principles and objectives of the Washington Treaty. In this context, we recall the Preamble to the Washington Treaty:

"The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security."

All new members of NATO will be full members of the Alliance, enjoying the rights and assuming all obligations of membership. We agreed that, when it occurs, enlargement will be decided on a case-by-case basis and that some nations may attain membership before others.

8. We affirm our commitment to reinforce cooperative structures of security which can extend to countries throughout the whole of Europe, noting that the enlargement of NATO should also be seen in this context. Against this background, we wish to develop further our dialogue and consolidate our relations with each of our Partners. Having just overcome the

division of Europe, we have no desire to see the emergence of new lines of partition. We are working towards an intensification of relations between NATO and its Partners on the basis of transparency and on an equal footing. NATO's right to take its own decisions, on its own responsibility, by consensus among its members will in no way be affected.

9. A cooperative European security architecture requires the active participation of Russia. We reaffirm our strong support for the political and economic reforms in Russia, and we welcome the considerable contributions that Russia can make towards stability and security in Europe on a wide range of issues. We also reaffirm our commitment to developing a far-reaching relationship, corresponding with Russia's size, importance and capabilities, both inside and outside the Partnership for Peace, based on mutual friendship, respect and benefit, and we are encouraged by the progress and plans that have been made in the various elements of that relationship. We welcome also an initial programme of consultations and cooperation between the Alliance and Russia, on the basis of the Summary of Conclusions of 22 June 1994 agreed at the meeting of Russian Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev with the Council, in areas where Russia has a unique or particularly important contribution to make. In this context and with the aim of increasing European and global security, we propose using the opportunity of our regular Ministerial meetings to meet with Russian Ministers whenever useful. In the same spirit, we also propose that our experts discuss key issues like true partners. We welcome the completion of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Germany and the Baltic States, which represents a significant contribution to security as well as benefitting general stability in Europe. We also welcome the agreement between the Russian Federation and Moldova which provides for the withdrawal of the Russian 14th Army from the territory of Moldova.

10. We attach considerable importance to developing our relationship with Ukraine. An independent, democratic and stable Ukraine is of great importance for European security and stability. We are pleased that Ukraine was involved in the two Partnership for Peace field exercises in Poland and in The Netherlands. We look forward to the completion of its Individual Partnership Programme. We want to develop our cooperation with Ukraine still further. We welcome the Ukrainian Parliament's vote in favour of Ukraine's accession to the NPT, which is a fundamental step to enable this country to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.

11. We meet only four days before the Budapest CSCE Summit, a crucial opportunity to progress further towards our vision of a Europe whole and free. We will work individually and collectively to ensure that the CSCE fulfils effectively the vital role it should have in the construction of an inclusive security architecture. The Helsinki Accords and other CSCE documents remain the basic definition of our common goals and standards, and the CSCE defines both the values and goals of a broad community of security and cooperation. NATO respects and upholds the principles of the CSCE. The CSCE has developed useful methods for conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy which provide the important first line of efforts to attack the root causes of conflict. Much progress has been made in this direction since the 1992 Helsinki Summit, but the challenges have expanded since then.

12. As a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, the CSCE should play a key role for conflict prevention and crisis management and resolution in its area. In accordance with Article 52 of the UN Charter, CSCE Participating States should make every effort to achieve the peaceful settlement of local disputes through the CSCE before referring them to the UN Security Council. We support the objectives of the forthcoming CSCE Summit to:

- reinforce our commitment to the CSCE as the comprehensive forum for consultation and cooperation in Europe;
- strengthen further the CSCE's capabilities, including in decision-making, and effectiveness;
- adopt substantial agreements reached in the Forum for Security Cooperation: the Code of Conduct on Security Matters, the agreement on global exchange of military information and the increased focus on non-proliferation issues, together with a further enhancement of the Vienna Document on confidence-building measures, which will represent a solid step forward in the field of arms control and cooperative security;
- develop further the CSCE's capabilities in early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and peacekeeping;
- reaffirm and strengthen the CSCE's fundamental role in the protection of human rights and the promotion of democratic institutions;
- foster good neighbourly relations through the conclusion of bilateral and regional agreements between and among Participating States; and
- enhance transparent and effective arms control and confidence-building measures throughout the CSCE area and at regional levels.

We fully support the activities of the CSCE to achieve a peaceful solution to the conflict in and around Nagorno-Karabakh. This will be an opportunity to demonstrate the political determination of all the Participating States to put the CSCE principles into practice.

13. We welcome the success of the process initiated in Paris for the conclusion of a Pact for Stability in Europe. The launching of two "regional tables" has demonstrated the progress that rapprochement among European states can bring. This initiative makes a substantial contribution to stability in our continent. We recommend continuation of this close co-operation for conclusion of the Pact for Stability in Europe, as an active contribution to good neighbourly relations in Central and Eastern Europe.

14. We welcome the endorsement by the WEU Council of Ministers in Noordwijk of preliminary conclusions on the formulation of the common European Defence Policy taking also into account the results of the NATO Brussels Summit. We welcome the WEU's decision to initiate reflection on the new European security conditions, including the proposal

put forward by France that this should lead to a white paper on European security. We attach great importance to the process of cooperation that NATO and the WEU are engaged in, aimed at the effective implementation of the Summit results, especially with regard to the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept and the possibility of making assets and capabilities of the Alliance available to the WEU. We take note that a report on criteria and procedures for effective use of CJTF has been prepared by the WEU and presented to a joint Council meeting of NATO and the WEU on 29 June 1994.

15. We have taken note of the work undertaken on the development of the CJTF concept, which is an essential part of the Alliance's continuing effort to adapt and adjust its structures and procedures, in order to conduct more efficiently and flexibly the Alliance's missions, including peacekeeping, to provide separable but not separate military capabilities that could be employed by NATO or the WEU and to facilitate operations with participating nations outside the Alliance. Much remains to be done to adapt Alliance structures and procedures and, in this context, to develop the CJTF concept, and to move the whole process forward as quickly as necessary. Work is in hand to develop this concept in detail, in coordination with the WEU and with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, as a means to implement the Alliance's readiness to make its collective assets available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations. We have tasked the Council in Permanent Session to continue its work and to examine ways that would enable further development of the CJTF concept, including, as soon as appropriate, through pilot trials and look forward to a progress report at our next meeting.

16. Work on the Summit initiative on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means has been taken forward through the creation of the Joint Committee on Proliferation and two expert groups, the Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation and the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation. We took note of the report of the Joint Committee on Proliferation on the work undertaken by these Groups, which is based on the basic principles of the Alliance Policy Framework that we adopted and made public at our Istanbul Ministerial. We welcome the progress made in intensifying and expanding NATO's political and defence efforts against proliferation, which remains one of the greatest concerns for the Alliance. We have instructed that the Groups should move forward in implementing their agreed work programmes in order to examine, without replacing or duplicating efforts underway in other fora, the means available to prevent and respond where necessary to proliferation, and to facilitate NATO defence activities in the field of proliferation. We look forward to another progress report at our meeting in May. We welcome the consultations with all Cooperation Partners in the framework of the NACC and look forward to ad hoc consultations with Russia on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

17. We remain fully committed to the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) at next year's Extension and Review Conference. We urge the other States Parties to the Treaty to do likewise. We will continue to support other ongoing efforts to strengthen the international non-proliferation system. In this context, we urge other states yet to accede to the Treaty to do so well before the upcoming NPT Conference. We will also work to enhance the verification regime for the

NPT. In this context, we consider the recent "agreed framework" between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a step towards bringing the Democratic People's Republic of Korea into full compliance with its NPT commitments and as a contribution towards the maintenance of peace and stability in the region.

18. We continue to attach particular importance to full compliance with and fulfilment of all obligations resulting from existing disarmament and arms control agreements. In this context, we welcome the successful completion of the second reduction phase of the CFE Treaty. This Treaty, which remains the cornerstone for European security and stability, must be fully and firmly implemented and its integrity must be preserved. The process of elimination of former Soviet weapons of mass destruction must rapidly be advanced further. We welcome the contribution made by some Allies to that effect. We attach great importance to the negotiation of a universal and verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It is also important to achieve a universal ban on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. We continue to consider as essential tasks the early entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the elaboration of measures to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. Noting the importance of the Open Skies Treaty in promoting openness and transparency of military forces and activities, we reiterate our hope that all signatories who have not yet ratified the Treaty will do so and that all instruments of ratification necessary for the entry into force of the Treaty will be deposited at the earliest possible time.

19. We reaffirm the importance we attach to developments around the Mediterranean. At our meeting in Athens we encouraged all efforts for dialogue and cooperation which aim at strengthening stability in this region. In this context, we welcome the recent positive steps in the Middle East peace process, which will help remove the obstacles to a more constructive relationship between the countries of the region as a whole. The NATO Summit in January reiterated the conviction that security in Europe is greatly affected by security in the Mediterranean. As agreed at our meeting in Istanbul, we have examined proposed measures to promote dialogue and are ready to establish contacts, on a case-by-case basis, between the Alliance and Mediterranean non-member countries with a view to contributing to the strengthening of regional stability. To this end, we direct the Council in Permanent Session to continue to review the situation, to develop the details of the proposed dialogue and to initiate appropriate preliminary contacts.

20. We deplore the continuing conflict in Bosnia, which has brought about large-scale suffering, most recently in and around the Safe Area of Bihac. We reiterate our strong support for the continued efforts of the international community, including those of the Contact Group, in attempting to bring peace to the region. We continue to believe that the conflict must be settled at the negotiating table. We call on the Bosnian Serbs and all those forces which support them to end their offensive in Bihac and on all parties to agree to and honour a cease-fire and allow humanitarian aid to flow to that beleaguered population and throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bosnian Serbs should immediately and without conditions release all UN personnel currently being denied freedom of movement. We reaffirm our commitment to provide close air support for UNPROFOR and to use NATO air power, in accordance with existing arrangements with the United Nations. We will continue.

together with the WEU, the maritime embargo enforcement operations in the Adriatic. We are determined to maintain Alliance unity and cohesion as we work together with the international community to find a just and peaceful solution in Bosnia and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia.

21. The situation in Southern Caucasus continues to be of special concern. We welcome the ceasefire that has been established, but lasting peaceful and just solutions to ongoing conflicts in the region, particularly in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, can only be reached under the aegis of the UN and through CSCE mechanisms. We hope that the CSCE will be in a position to contribute effectively to the peace process on Nagorno-Karabakh, including through the establishment of a CSCE multinational peacekeeping operation based on the principles of Chapter III of the Helsinki Document 1992.

22. We reiterate the Alliance's condemnation of international terrorism as stated at the NATO Summit in January.

23. We reaffirm our commitment to the Alliance's common-funded programmes. We consider these programmes vital elements in underpinning our military structures, providing essential operating capability and strengthening Alliance cohesion. We have directed the Council in Permanent Session, taking account of the Fundamental Review of the Military Budget and the Civil Budget Priorities Review, to engage in a wide-ranging examination of Alliance budgetary management, structures and procedures to ensure that the appropriate resources are directed towards the programmes which will have the highest priority and to report initially at the Spring session.

24. The Spring 1995 meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Ministerial Session will be held in Noordwijk, The Netherlands, in May.

The U.S. and Central and Eastern Europe: Forging New Partnerships

President Clinton

Remarks to Plenary Session of the White House Conference on Trade and Investment in Central and Eastern Europe, Cleveland, Ohio, January 13, 1995

Thank you very much. Mayor White; Congressmen Stokes, Sawyer, and Brown; distinguished officials here from Cleveland and Cuyahoga County. Secretary Brown, thank you for your kind introduction. That was an illustration of Bill Clinton's second law of politics, that introduction—whenever possible, be introduced by someone you have appointed to high office. You always get a good one.

I do want to say here that I believe, in the history of the Department of Commerce, there has never been a better Secretary than Ron Brown. I am grateful to him for his dedication to the American business community and to the growth of the American economy and for his commitment to international outreach.

I thank the Commerce Department and the Business Council for International Understanding for organizing this conference. You have assembled

Continued from previous page

meeting to be a great success, it also is very important for the two of us to get together today to talk. I have been in the office of Foreign Minister for more than six months now, and during that time, I have had four meetings with Secretary Christopher, including this one.

I am very pleased to note that there have been so many good results coming out of each meeting, and for this year, also, I would like to make my own best efforts for bilateral cooperation in the global interest.

To achieve this end, I would like to discuss with Secretary Christopher all the issues that we have between us, including the security, economic, and all other issues. I very much look forward to our talks today. ■

an impressive and diverse group—delegations from Central and Eastern Europe, business leaders from the United States and Europe, American ethnic leaders from all around our country, and so many outstanding state and local officials. I thank you all for being here.

I have to say I am especially pleased we are meeting in Cleveland. Many of the men and women who made this great city a foundation of America's industrial heartland came to our shores from Central Europe. With just a little money, but with lots of determination and discipline and vision, they helped build our great nation. Now their children and their grandchildren are leaders in Cleveland and in dozens of other American communities all across our country. Strong bonds of memory, heritage, and pride link them today to Europe's emerging democracies. So it is fitting that we should be meeting here.

I also chose Cleveland because people here know what it takes to adapt to the new global economy. Whether you are in this great state or in Central Europe's coal and steel belt, meeting the challenges of change is hard. But Cleveland—Cleveland is transforming itself into a center for international trade. It is a real model for economic growth throughout our country. Already, Cleveland exports \$5.5 billion worth of goods every year, and that trade supports 100,000 jobs.

Cleveland was one of the cities to recently win in a highly competitive effort to secure one of our empowerment zones. Cleveland was selected because of the remarkable partnership that has been put together here between the public and private sectors. So I am very glad to be here.

I came to this office with a mission for my country that involves all the countries represented here today. I came because I believed we had to make some changes to keep the American dream alive in the United States; to restore a sense of opportunity and possibility to our people in a time of great and sweeping change; and to give us a clear sense of purpose at the end of the Cold War, as we move toward the 21st century.

But I also wanted us to move into that new century still the world's leader for peace and democracy and for freedom and prosperity. This conference symbolizes both those objectives. We have worked hard in the United States to get our economy going again, to get our government deficit down, to invest in our people and the technologies of the future, and to expand trade for our own benefit. We have been fortunate in this country in the last two years in generating over 5.5 million new jobs, and having a new sense that we could bring back every important sector of our economy. But we know that over the long run, our success economically in America depends upon our being true to our values here at home and around the world.

So, I say to you that I came here today because I know that America must remain engaged in the world. If we do so, clearly, we have a historic opportunity to enhance the security and increase the prosperity of our own people in a society that we hope will be characterized forevermore by trade, culture, and learning across national lines rather than by hatred, fighting, and war.

Many of you in this room are proving that proposition every day. The new partnerships that you are forging between America and Central Europe bring tangible benefits to all the people involved. Increased trade and investment promotes our exports. It gives our people new skills and creates good jobs—but not only for us—for our trading partners as well. It plays another very important role—it gives us a dividend by helping the nations with which we trade, and especially the nations in Central Europe, to consolidate their hard-won democracy on a foundation of free enterprise and political freedom.

In all of our countries, we stand at the start of a new era, an era of breathtaking change and expanding opportunities. The explosion of trade and technology has produced a new global economy in which people, ideas, and capital come together more quickly, more easily, and more creatively than ever before. It is literally true that the end of the Cold War has liberated millions of Europeans and introduced both free markets and democracy to countries not only there, but on every continent of the globe.

This promise is also clouded by fear and uncertainty. Economic uncertainty—the breakdown of the old rules of the social contract is a problem in every advanced Western democracy and in wealthy countries in the East, such as Japan. Beyond that, and even deeper, is aggression by malicious states and transnational threats such as overpopulation and environmental degradation, terrible ethnic conflicts, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—all these problems beyond our own borders make it tempting to many Americans to retrench behind our borders, to say, look, we've got a lot of possibilities and we've got more problems than we can handle here at home, so let's just forget about the rest of the world for a while. They say we did our job in the Cold War, we spent our money to keep the world free from communism, and we are tired, and we've got plenty to do here.

There are many people who believe exactly that in this country—and in our Congress. But the very fact of democracy's triumph over the Cold War, while it has led some to argue that we ought to confine our focus to challenges here at home and to say we cannot afford to lead anymore, in fact, imposes on us new responsibilities and new opportunities. I would argue that we cannot benefit the American people here at home unless we assume those responsibilities and seize those opportunities.

Those who say we can just walk away have views that are short-sighted. We must reach out, not retrench. I will continue to work in this new Congress with both the Republicans and the Democrats to forge a bipartisan coalition of internationalists

who share those same convictions. The agreement we reached yesterday with congressional leaders from both sides of the aisle to help Mexico restore full confidence in its economy demonstrates the potential of a coalition committed to America's interests in the world of tomorrow. I will do everything in my power, as I have done for two years now, to keep our country engaged in the world. I will not let anyone or anything divert the United States from this course. The whole future of the world and the future of our children here in the United States depend on our continued involvement and leadership in the world.

History teaches us, after all, that security and prosperity here at home require that we maintain a focus abroad. Remember that after World War I, the United States refused the leadership role. We withdrew behind our borders—behind our big trade barriers. We left a huge vacuum that was filled with the forces of hatred and tyranny. The resulting struggle in World War II to preserve our freedom cost millions of lives and required all the energy and resources we could muster to forestall an awful result.

After the Second World War, a wise generation of Americans refused to let history repeat itself. So, in the face of the communist challenge, they helped shape NATO, the Marshall Plan, GATT, and the other structures that ensured 50 years of building prosperity and security for America, Western Europe, and Japan.

Ultimately, the strength of those structures, the force of democracy, and the heroic determination of people to be free produced victory in the Cold War. Now, in the aftermath of that victory, it is our common responsibility not to squander the peace. We must realize the full potential of that victory. Now that freedom has been won, all of our people deserve to reap the tangible rewards of their sacrifice—people in the United States, and people in Central Europe. Now that freedom has been won, our nations must be determined that it will never be lost again.

The United States is seizing this moment. History has given us a gift and the results are there to prove it. Because of the agreements we reached

with Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, for the first time since the dawn of the nuclear age, Americans can go to bed at night knowing that nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union are no longer pointed at our children.

Our patient but hardheaded diplomacy has secured an agreement with North Korea on nuclear issues that is clearly and profoundly in our interest. The critics of that agreement are wrong. The deal stops North Korea's nuclear program in its tracks. It will roll it back in years to come. International inspectors confirm that the program is frozen, and they will continue to monitor it. No critic has come up with an alternative that is not either unfeasible or foolhardy.

U.S. troops, who maintain their preparedness and their enormous capacity to stand up for freedom as the finest fighting force in the world, have stood down Iraq's threat to the security of the Persian Gulf. They caused the military regime in Haiti to step down peacefully—to give the Haitians a chance at democracy.

We are using our influence constructively to help people from the Middle East to southern Africa transform their conflicts into cooperation. We have used our ability to lead on issues like GATT and NAFTA, the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, and the Summit of the Americas to help create a new trading system for the next century.

Already, trade is becoming more free and more fair and producing better jobs for our people and for others around the world. In Central Europe, as elsewhere, the United States has moved aggressively to shape the future. The reasons are simple: Helping Central Europe consolidate democracy and build strong economies is clearly the best way to prevent assaults on freedom that, as this century has so painfully demonstrated, can turn quickly into all-consuming war. A healthy and prosperous Central Europe is good for America. It will become a huge new market for our goods and services.

America is also engaged with Central Europe because it is the right thing to do. For four-and-a-half decades, we challenged these nations to cast away

the shackles of communism. Now that they have done so, surely we have an obligation to work with them—all of you who are here—to make sure that your people share with our people the rewards of freedom that the next century and the new economy can bring.

Some argue that open government and free markets cannot take root in some countries, that there are boundaries—that there necessarily will be boundaries to democracy in Europe. They would act now in anticipation of those boundaries by creating an artificial division of the new continent. Others claim that we simply must not extend the West's institution of security and prosperity at all—that to do so would upset a delicate balance of power. They would confine the newly free people of Central Europe to a zone of insecurity and, therefore, of instability.

I believe that both those visions for Europe are too narrow, too skeptical—perhaps even too cynical. One year ago this week, in Brussels, Prague, Kiev, Moscow, and Minsk, I set forth a vision of a different Europe—a new Europe that would be an integrated community of secure and increasingly prosperous democracies; a Europe that, for the first time since nation-states came into existence on the European Continent, would not be subject to a dividing line. With our engagement with the countries of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, we can help make that vision a lasting reality.

Security and Stability

First, Europe must be secure. The breakup of the Soviet Union has made the promise of security more real than it has been for decades. But reform in Russia and all the states of the former Soviet Union will not be completed overnight, in a straight line, or without rocky bumps in the road. It will prove rough and unsteady from time to time, as the tragic events in Chechnya remind us today. Chechnya is part of the Russian Federation, and we support the territorial integrity of Russia, just as we support the territorial integrity of all its neighbors. But, the violence must end. I call again on all the parties to stop spilling blood and start making

peace. Every day the fighting in Chechnya continues is a day of wasted lives, wasted resources, and wasted opportunities. So, we again encourage every effort to bring the bloodshed to a lasting end. We encourage the proposals put forth by the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. These proposals deserve to be heard and embraced.

Some have used this conflict in Chechnya to question continued American support for reform in Russia. But that conflict, terrible though it is, has not changed the nature of our interest. We have a tremendous stake in the success of Russia's efforts to become a stable, democratic nation, and so do all the countries represented here today. That is why the United States will not waiver from our course of patient, responsible support for Russian reform. It would be a terrible mistake to react reflexively to the ups and downs that Russia is experiencing and was bound to experience all along and will continue to experience in the years ahead, indeed, perhaps for decades, as it undergoes a historic transformation.

If the forces of reform are embattled, we must renew—not retreat from—our support for them. So we will continue again to lead a bipartisan effort here at home and an international coalition abroad to work with Russia and also with the other New Independent States of the former Soviet Union to support reform, to support progress, to support democracy, and to support freedom.

We are well aware, too, of Central Europe's security concerns. We will never condone any state in Europe threatening the sovereignty of its neighbors again. That is why the United States protected Baltic independence by pressing successfully for the withdrawal of Russian troops.

In this period of great social and political change, we want to help countries throughout Central Europe achieve stability—the stability they need to build strong democracies and to foster prosperity. To promote that stability, the United States established the Partnership for Peace. We have taken the lead in preparing for the gradual, open, and inevitable expansion

of NATO. In just a year, the Partnership for Peace has become a dynamic forum for practical military and political cooperation among its members. For some countries, the partnership will be the path to full NATO membership. For others, the partnership will be a strong and lasting link to the NATO alliance.

Last month, NATO began to clearly and deliberately map out the road to enlargement. Neither NATO nor the United States can today give a date certain for expansion, nor can we say today which countries will be the first new members. But let me repeat what I have said before: The questions concerning NATO expansion are not whether NATO will expand, not if NATO will expand, but when and how. When expansion begins, it will come as no surprise to anyone. Its conditions, its timing, and its military implications will be well and widely known and discussed in advance.

NATO membership is not a right. We expect those who seek to join the alliance to prepare themselves through the Partnership for Peace for the obligations of membership—they are important. Countries with repressive political systems, countries with designs on their neighbors, countries with militaries unchecked by civilian control, or with closed economic systems need not apply.

Let me say once again: Only the 16 members of NATO will decide on expansion. But NATO expansion should not be seen as replacing one division of Europe with another one. It should, it can, and I am determined that it will increase security for all European states—members and non-members alike. In parallel with expansion, NATO must develop close, strong ties with Russia. The alliance's relationship with Russia should become more direct, more open, more ambitious, and more frank.

European security embraces a democratic Russia. But for Central Europe to enjoy true security, its nations must develop not only military ties and security arrangements but also successful market economies. If we have learned anything about the new century toward which we are moving,

it is that national security must be defined in terms that go far beyond military ideas and concepts. That is why we are all here. From Tallinn to Tirana, people must have good jobs so that they can provide for their families and feel the self-confidence necessary to support democracy. They must have the tools to adapt to this rapidly changing global economy. In short, they must have economic confidence to believe in a democratic future.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States has played an important role in promoting these goals. We have strongly supported Central Europe's integration into the European Union. We have taken significant steps to improve access to our own markets, and we have provided Central Europe with financial aid, technical support, and debt relief. This assistance has been used for a staggering array of projects—from helping the Czech Republic draft a modern bankruptcy code, to training commercial bankers in Slovakia, to advertising and equipping modern and independent media throughout the region.

But for all our government has done and will continue to do, the fact remains that only the private sector can mobilize the vast amounts of capital and the human skills and technology needed to help complete the transformation of Central Europe's free markets.

President Walesa put it to me this way last July: "What Poland needs," he said, "are more American generals—like General Electric and General Motors." That is not a commercial; I could have advertised the other auto companies, the other electric companies. Congressman Stokes reminded me that Lincoln Electric, here in Cleveland, just got the Secretary of Commerce's E Award last night. But the point is that President Walesa's comment defines national security for Poland in a broader context and demonstrates an understanding of what it will take for democracy and freedom to flourish.

Economic Reform

In just five years, most of the countries in Central Europe have undertaken many of the difficult reforms necessary to build credibility with investors and

trading partners, to make themselves attractive to the General Electrics and the General Motors. Bold economic reform works. Countries that have pursued it with the greatest conviction have rebounded most quickly from the recession. They are among Europe's fastest-growing economies, and they are drawing the most foreign trade and investment.

More trade and investment is good for Central Europe. But make no mistake about it, it is also very good for the United States. For all of us, it means more jobs, higher wages, and an opportunity to learn the new skills we need to succeed in the new global economy. I say again, it means more real security.

Consider the benefits of just two recent American ventures in Central Europe: The International Paper Company of New York bought a major mill

*"From Tallinn to Tirana,
people must have good
jobs so that they can
provide for their families
and feel the self-confidence
necessary to support
democracy."*

in Poland, retrained its work force, and turned it into a thriving exporter. It also acquired a strong presence in the competitive European market that will generate \$30 million in American exports in support of hundreds of jobs back here at home.

Denver-based U.S. West will soon bring nationwide cellular phone service to Hungary. That will give Hungarians, who now wait an average of 12 years to get a phone, immediate access to modern communications. And it will produce \$28 million in United States exports and will support hundreds of jobs here in the United States. I have to say—sort of off the record—that we will also soon make the Hungarians as frayed around the edges and overbusy as Americans are with their cellular phones. But if they want it, we should help them have it.

I am very proud that these and literally dozens of other projects went forward with the help of loans and insurance and other guarantees from the United States Government. But I know what our trade and investment in Central Europe could do if we all were to make the most of the opportunities that are there. Our involvement should be much greater. American companies and investors are second to none in identifying good opportunities. But they will reject a project if roadblocks to getting it done efficiently and fairly are too high, especially given the fierce competition for trade and investment from Latin America and Asia.

Our companies need to be sure that when they make a deal, it will not be arbitrarily reversed. They look for full information and reasonable regulation. They want clear commercial tacks and legal codes. Of course they want private sector counterparts—the driving force of Central Europe's economies—with whom they can do business.

One of the most effective roles the United States can play is to promote continued reform and help businesses do business, which is, of course, what this conference is all about. Our efforts did not begin and will not end here in Cleveland. Already we have concluded investment and taxation treaties with many of the countries represented here. The Trade and Development Agency has identified thousands of business opportunities throughout Central Europe. Peace Corps volunteers are teaching business, banking, and finance skills to new entrepreneurs. Our Export-Import Bank is promoting the use of America's products for major infrastructure products and for bringing environmental technology and expertise to Central Europe.

Today, I am pleased to announce that the Overseas Private Investment Corporation has set up two new equity funds that, together with funds OPIC already supports, should leverage more than \$4 billion in private investment. Every United States economic agency is working hard to help American business, big and small, to take advantage of the opportunities in Central Europe and around the world. I want to say that what I said about Secretary Brown and the Commerce Department could also be said about the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private

Investment Corporation. It is the strongest economic team the United States has ever put in the field of international business, and we intend to see it keep working until we make a success of the ventures such as the one we are engaged in here today.

All of their teamwork has proved that government can work for the American people—a proposition very much in doubt in our country today. I know how difficult and unsettling this period of change is for so many people from the countries represented in this room and here at home, as well. Sometimes it seems that the more you open your eyes to the world around you, the more confusing it becomes. We must not lose sight of the fact that even greater forces of history are working for the development of human capacities and the fulfillment of human dreams than the forces working to undermine them.

If we use these great positive forces—if we guide them, if we shape them, if we remain committed to making them work for us, we can make our people more secure and more prosperous. Look at what is happening in Central Europe: Every day, open societies and open economies are gaining strength. Every day, new entrepreneurs and businesses are spurring growth and are creating jobs in their own countries and for us back here in America as well. It is in our national interest to help them succeed. We cannot afford to do otherwise.

Just six years ago, the countries of Central Europe were still captive nations. Now, 120 million people have the freedom to speak their own minds, to create, to build, to prosper, to dream dreams and try to fulfill them. This new freedom is the fruit of Europe's struggle and America's support. We owe it to those who brought us this far—more importantly, we owe it to ourselves and to our children—not to turn our backs on their historic achievement or this historic moment. That is why this Administration will not retreat. We will continue to reach out, working together, trading together, and joining together. We will fulfill the great promise of this moment. Thank you very much. ■

Building Peace and Prosperity in the Middle East and North Africa: The Role Of a Regional Development Bank

Secretary Christopher, Summary Conclusions

Secretary Christopher

Remarks at a luncheon for an Experts Meeting on the Middle East Development Bank, Washington, DC, January 10, 1995. [Introductory remarks deleted.]

We are faced again with a rare challenge in the Middle East. Extraordinary breakthroughs have been made, as we all know, but they must be sustained and we must find ways to sustain the momentum toward peace.

Credit and responsibility for the advances in the peace process, as usual, of course, remain with the parties. Only they can make the fundamental decisions that are necessary. But the entire international community, represented by all of you, faces an obligation—indeed, a real imperative—to provide the parties with the moral, political, and material support they need to take the risks for peace; the support they need to overcome the momentous challenges that they all face.

Over the past four years, we have worked together in pursuit of the goal of a comprehensive peace in a new era of prosperity in the Middle East, and as I look around this room, I see so many faces who have joined together in that tremendous pursuit of a comprehensive peace.

In 1991 at Madrid, many of the nations assembled here today joined together to launch the process of bilateral negotiations which has resulted in the four tracks. Three months later in January of 1992, we gathered in Moscow to launch the multilateral peace process. Then in October of 1993, we met right here in this building, indeed, right here in this room at the Donors

Conference to pledge our financial support to bring the Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles—to bring that great Declaration to life.

Just 10 weeks ago, business leaders and political leaders from all the countries in the region and in North Africa gathered at the Casablanca Summit. At that meeting we gave a strong signal to the world that the Middle East and North Africa are open for business. With the vision and leadership of King Hassan, we took very significant steps to undergird the peace process with a prospect for prosperity.


I think the lesson from all this is clear: When the international community works together, we can accomplish a great deal, but we must work together to support the parties and to help them translate the gains they have made at the negotiating table into concrete changes on the ground.

All of us here know that while peace may be symbolized by a historic handshake, it must be built on more than a handshake. Our mission is to transform that handshake into a peace between people, a peace that fundamentally lifts their lives.

Governments can sign treaties and they can remove impediments, but only people can build a peace that will endure and only the private sector can bring the prosperity that is so essential and upon which peace ultimately depends.

Working together, we have started to lay the foundations for greater regional prosperity. The boycott is being dismantled. When the final remnants are removed—and, of course, the sooner the better—I feel that the region will once again become economically whole.


The multilateral peace process has enabled our diplomats and our technical experts from both within and without



1995 NATO SYMPOSIUM

"NATO EXPANSION:
OPINIONS AND OPTIONS"

APRIL 24-25, 1995
WASHINGTON, DC



NATO EXPANSION: REACTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE PFP COUNTRIES

PROFESSOR IOAN MIRCEA PASCU
SECRETARY OF STATE
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
BUCHAREST

"NATO EXPANSION: OPINIONS AND OPTIONS"

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"NATO EXPANSION: REACTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE PFP COUNTRIES"

A VIEW FROM ROMANIA

Professor IOAN MIRCEA PASCU

Introduction

1. Transition has already taught us a number of important lessons. One of them is that **man tends to complain for things which later regrets**. In social terms, this signifies that progress is not always a straight line from point A to point B, but rather a trend over a long period of time largely subjected to unpredictability. For instance, during the Cold War we used to complain about the significant **threats** derived from the superpower confrontation, ignoring the value of **stability**. Today those **threats** are over, but, with them, off it went that **stability** too. Because, if it is true that the well defined **threats** of the cold war are gone (for instance, no European country fears a deliberate foreign **aggression** against it today), it is no less true that **risks** have not disappeared; on the contrary, they have even multiplied (see, for example, the risk of foreign **subversion**).
2. However, such substantial changes, perhaps rightly, were not evident from the very beginning. Rather, we entered them based on our previous beliefs and convictions, which complicated the situation even further. Thus, **the end of the Cold War was**

largely interpreted, particularly in the West, as a "victory" only to find out, relatively soon afterwards, that the "vanquished" did not consider themselves as such. Moreover, they even claimed - and the "victors" accepted in fact - an equal place in the decision-making process shaping the post-Cold War world, which was unthinkable in any other previous similar situation in which the victors fully imposed their will on the vanquished in the aftermath of any war.¹ But, in spite of that, the false assumption that the negative effects of the fall of communism could be securely contained exclusively in the Eastern part of the continent, because it had "lost" the Cold War, prevailed largely until the Moscow coup in August 1991. The dismemberment of the former Yugoslav federation, for instance, which, at first, was encouraged by such a conviction, later fully proved its lack of justification.

3. At a superior level, the best illustration of this wrong thesis was, perhaps, the belief that **change in general, especially negative change, following the end of the Cold War, was entirely an affair of the East.** At first, the West thought that it was simply immune to that "virus of change" only to find out that its consequences were not only **external**, but

¹. That was possible because, on the one hand, the cold war was not just another war, but rather a "special" kind of war, fought through **competition** rather than sheer **physical combat**, and, on the other, the degree of **interdependence** reached at within the present international system was such that the exclusion of the "vanquished" from the process of shaping "the new world" was virtually impossible.

rather **internal**, too. Indeed, the persistent character of the economic recession, coupled with the need for adaptation to a totally - and suddenly - transformed world soon started to generate important **internal** effects even in the most developed states of the West.² Seemingly, the truth is that some important cycles, particularly in the **political** and **military** fields, have reached their final point, exhausting their resources. Therefore, perhaps the change of the East is more than what it first appeared to be; maybe it was not only the result of the pressure applied from the West, but rather a catalyst for the change of the West itself, too. And if that might be so, perhaps it would be necessary - and even useful - to reconsider the nature of the entire post-Cold War East-West relationship.³

Myth and Security in Europe

4. Such a reconsideration might be justifiable even if one thinks at how soon the euphoria after the end of the Cold War

². See, for instance, the numerous changes of government in Japan, the total collapse of the entire Italian political system, the pressure to which the same system is subject to in France, or even the dissatisfaction of the American electorate in the last mid-term elections, which, according to some analysts, proves less a sudden support for the opposition and more a lack of alternatives.

³. Some might say that using the East-West approach after the end of the Cold War was wrong. Actually, it is not. At least because, on the one hand, that has been the driving force of world politics for the most part of this century, and, on the other, that inertially, it continues to affect it even after the fall of communism (see, for instance, the Russian present approach to NATO's enlargement).

evaporated soon after the dust produced by the fall of the Berlin Wall set down. At that time, in November 1989, we all strongly believed that all the obstacles preventing the European integration were thus removed, that new divisions would be unthinkable, that the full unity of the West would be preserved, that the transition would be a 100 m run and not a marathon, and that the importance of the former "East" was mainly economic, derived from the new markets they offered to the developed countries of the West. Now, after five years from those euphoric moments, things look different. All obstacles have not been completely removed, new divisions are still possible (see, on the one hand, the NATO trend towards enlargement and, on the other, the drive towards integration in the CIS), that transition is, after all, a marathon, that the unity of the West is undermined by increased competition, and that the importance of the former "Eastern" countries is essential to no less than the entire process of power redistribution in world politics.

5. All these myths, including their fall, have not obscured **the security problem** of the continent, namely, given the general incapacity of the Central and Eastern European states to meet their security requirements appealing exclusively to their national resources, **how can we project the security and stability achieved in the West by the West towards the East and thus make up for the "security deficit" existing there ?** From the very beginning, there were only two answers: either

to build upon **the CSCE process**, thus substituting for the loss of one of its previous "pillars", namely the Warsaw Pact, or to enlarge **the Western institutions** - which proved their vitality - towards the East. Soon, it was discovered that the first solution was unworkable, because, even if modified, the CSCE, being too tributary to the previous division of the continent, was incapable of providing alone that continental security system we all need under the new circumstances. In consequence, the second solution was adopted and the Euro-Atlantic and European institutions have started to expand gradually towards the East.

6. As a result, the security situation is, in general, better now than five years ago. The West continues to be fully protected by mainly the Atlantic Treaty, Central Europe is "covered" by the Article 4 of the same treaty by virtue of active participation in the Partnership for Peace Programs (together with the "Associate Partner" status offered to some of them by the WEU), further East we find states covered by either a combination of PFP and CIS arrangements (see the case of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova), or only CIS. Of course, the above statement is relative, given the unpredictable course of the current conflicts in former Yugoslavia and former Soviet space and the permanent possibility that some of the present risks, including a potential break down of internal authority in Russia and/or Ukraine, might get materialized. However, in general, one could say that, in spite of all those risks, we

are on the right track and that in itself generates "security" every moment.

The General Context of NATO Enlargement

7. In order to have a more accurate picture of our topic - NATO enlargement - we should attempt to place it in the right context. Thus, first, it is **part of the larger process of redefining the transatlantic relationship**. Of course, as in any similar situation, there are conflicting views on what that really means. Some say that the United States and Canada should continue to maintain their physical presence in Europe, while others say that, with the disappearance of the Soviet threat, that was not any longer necessary. In turn, in the United States there are voices which, on the one hand, maintain that NATO should be scraped all together, and, on the other, that NATO could only be saved by an infusion of "fresh new blood" (read new admissions). **For us, in Central Europe, both NATO and the US physical presence on the continent are indispensable** and if there is a consensus among all our states now, than that is around these two aspects.
8. Second, NATO enlargement **cannot be dissociated from Europe's effort to redefine itself and shape its new political, military, economic, technological and commercial identity through the extension of its own institutions (particularly the EU and the WEU) towards the East**. This dimension is not

lacking some problems either, especially with regard to the competition between, on the one side, as mentioned above, Europe and the United States, and, on the other, the European powers themselves. However, it should be noted that, for obvious reasons, the common interest of all Central European states is that such competition - which had always existed in the economic field - should not be pushed and/or permitted to reach the political and military fields.

9. Third, the process of NATO extension is - and should continue to be - part of the more general process of creating a general, all-European, security system. That means at least two more things. First, that NATO enlargement, in spite of its strength, cannot be substituted for that system, and second, that no other existing security institution would be able to meet that requirement alone either. Rather, NATO enlargement should be pursued together with efforts to create that system by bringing in all the existing organizations with responsibilities in the field of security according to a an efficient "division of labor" between them.
10. Moreover, through the Partnership for Peace initiative (and its current missions in Yugoslavia), NATO has already engaged itself in performing two functions simultaneously: first, it continues to remain a military alliance for the initial members (including those who will be accepted in the future)

and, second, it acts like an embryo of a security organization⁴ for the Partner countries actively engaged in pursuing the PfP Programs. Thus, while the future enlargement appears to strengthen the former function, its connection to the general effort aimed at creating an all-European security architecture would definitely strengthen the latter.

NATO Enlargement: Possible Scenarios

11. In order to evaluate the future, we think it would be useful to review, even succinctly, the recent past. That, we think, would highlight at least some of the factors on which the enlargement might continue to depend in the future too. In that respect, the possibility that the Moscow coup in August 1991 might have succeeded has probably increased the West's awareness that the recently acquired independence of the former non-Soviet Warsaw Pact allies needed consolidation and safeguarding. As a consequence, the first public pronouncements suggesting the extension of NATO towards the East have surfaced in the summer of 1993. Later, President Yeltsin's visit to Poland, when he officially declared that Russia would not be, in principle, against to the future admission of that country in NATO - later desperately denied

⁴. The difference between an alliance and a security organization lies in their functions. While the former is created by and directed at countering a rather well defined external threat, the latter is meant to address all possible risks in the field of security, including internal ones, that is within the organization itself.

by other Russian officials - increased the heat considerably, starting a real "race for NATO" among the former non-Soviet Warsaw Pact allies. As a consequence, a sort of a "beauty competition", discretely encouraged by the would-be "jury" (or at least by some of its "members"), has been initiated, in which some competitors - particularly the ones encouraged to think that they had the first chance - had not so much preoccupied themselves with their own performance, but rather with the effort to ruin the chances of the other competitors ?! Later, following a strong letter from President Yeltsin and, perhaps, other appeals to reason, the formula of an early and selective admission, which had been reached at following that hasty "beauty competition" mentioned about, was replaced by the more wise and pragmatic one, offered by the Partnership for Peace initiative, officially launched in January 1994. From that point on, things have engaged themselves in a more or less linear course, even if occasional "flare ups" were not eliminated completely.

12. Although the enlargement process has been officially presented as **a response to the manifest interest of the Central and Eastern European states to be integrated into NATO**, the truth is that the interest is mutual: **NATO needs these countries too** either because some of its members do (see, for instance, Germany's justified drive for "space") or because it wants them as an organization feeling it requires a transfusion of "fresh new blood" for "rejuvenation" (see, for example, the

American opinions which consider that NATO is practically dead and, therefore, should be abandoned all together). Of course, the utility of such a "balanced" view could be under question, especially if one considers the pragmatism derived from the fact that, in its absence, NATO could always motivate to the Russians that it is not she who is seeking the enlargement, but rather the Central European countries are the ones to push for it, thus hoping to diminish the Russian resistance.⁵ However, ignoring this reservation, by adopting such a "balanced" view it would be easier, and therefore, even more pragmatic, to see which are the real factors influencing the NATO enlargement process.

13. In general lines, they are **three**. First, there are **the "credentials" of the candidates**. Without them, one cannot even think of enlargement and, therefore, **the criteria** established by NATO for admission are obligatory. Moreover, one should not even insist on discussing their substance, because, on the one hand, they are not negotiable (although their interpretation is ?!), and, on the other, meeting them is only in the interest of the candidate countries, helping them quicker achieve their transition to democracy and market economy. Second, there is **the intra-Western balance of interests (and power)**. One could even venture to say that this is **the most**

⁵. That leaves aside the question that, this way, the Russian pressure concentrates mainly on the Central and Eastern European countries to deter them to join, which is, at least morally, unacceptable.

important deciding factor with respect to NATO enlargement. Indeed, after firmly taking the decision to enlarge, given both the impact of the disappearance of the Soviet threat on allied unity and the consequent revival of individual national interest in the West, the concrete details of that future enlargement tend to get decisive prominence. And third is **the Russian opposition to any enlargement.**⁶ In respect to it, we would like to say now only two things: first, that the NATO "double-track" decision, namely to pursue the enlargement in parallel to establishing a strong and substantive security tie to Russia is positive. Not only because it corrects the moral imbalance mentioned above (see footnote no 5), but because it is an important step towards the creation of the new security architecture of the continent, in which NATO enlargement will be a very important component. Second, that, apparently, Russian opposition seems to increase when one gets closer to the former Soviet territory, a factor of significant importance when the feasibility of the enlargement process is taken into account.

14. Of course, **the nature of the envisaged security tie between NATO and Russia is not indifferent to the candidates.** Because, as anyone can realize, it will be one thing to give the future

⁶. As for the main motivation for such a resistance, one could detect, first, the psychological factor derived from **the difficult adaptation to a lesser status**, second, the economic negative effects derived from **the loss of the Central European arms market**, and third, the increasing internal feeling that **Russia had already conceded too much**, which, apparently, is drastically limiting the room of manoeuvre for even the most democratic Russian leaders.

committee a **consultative** role and make the future agreement discuss the details of that committee, and a totally different one to give it a role in the NATO **decision-taking** and make the agreement decide on how **the future security architecture of the continent** would look like ?! And that is so because Yalta and Potsdam are still very live in the memory of Central Europe and anything which might resemble them, even vaguely, will be totally unacceptable.

15. If these had been the factors affecting the enlargement from the candidates' perspective, let us now address ourselves to the requirements posed by enlargement from the members' point of view. First, if one wants to give NATO a new impulse through enlargement, it is essential that this process **should not dilute the organization**. (Incidentally, that is in the very interest of the candidates too, because they want to join a healthy organization, not a weakened one). Second, **it should avoid creating new divisions on the continent** either by selective group admission or/(and) triggering a strengthening and a potential extension of the CIS arrangements. If that happens, the chances for a unitary continental security architecture will be seriously and negatively affected, if not decisively compromised. Third, in general, **the enlargement should try to eliminate the present obstacles rather than create new ones**. Naturally, meeting these rather restrictive requirements is not an easy task; indeed, they themselves require balancing a significant number of dynamic factors.

However, they should be perceived as a common challenge for both the members and the candidates, as this very reunion rightly offers the framework to do so. Meeting the above mentioned requirements - and other unmentioned too - will be helped by the future nature and dimension of the military build-up requested by enlargement to support the security guarantees to be thus extended to the new members. And that, in turn, would depend on the future balance between the military and the political dimensions of NATO, a function of its relation to the general process of creating the new continental security architecture.

16. In respect to **effective enlargement**, it should be reminded that, during the Cold War period, **geographically**, NATO had only two direct borders with the former Soviet Union: in **Norway** and in **Turkey**. Both of them, for very obvious reasons, are impracticable for enlargement. Theoretically, that leaves **only two other potential options**: an east- and southeasterly drive from the present **Eastern German border** and/or a northwards drive initiated from **the Greek-Turkish border**. The first option has a number of advantages. Thus, first, it is along the West-East axis, which dominated the confrontation in Europe during the Cold War and, inertially, seems to still do the same today. Second, it serves best Germany, which can thus add "space" between her and the former Soviet territory. Third, it would comprise countries benefitting the double advantage of being both already seriously connected to the

German economy and further away from Russia and thus - theoretically, at least - more acceptable to Russia. Its main disadvantage would be that, if implemented, it will certainly create a new line of demarcation in Europe⁷ and send the wrong signal to Moscow that those not included might be considered for Russia's own sphere of influence. Moreover, militarily, it would permit the creation of a corridor beneath the "Visegrad" countries, which would start in Russia, pass through Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, (Bulgaria) and former Yugoslavia reaching the southern border of Austria and/or the eastern border of Italy. As for the second option - namely, a northwards drive from the Greek-Turkish border, particularly if coupled with the first option, its main advantage is that it might give some additional geographical protection to NATO's troubled southern flank and, militarily, provide for a reserve position in that most important area in case those troubles make the flank questionable. Naturally, there are disadvantages too, particularly the close proximity to Russia and the ongoing Yugoslav conflict.

17. However, it might well be another, third, option which, although not safe from difficulties, might seem to combine

⁷. It should be noted that if, even theoretically, there was a line dividing that part of the continent, than that might be between **Central** and **Eastern** Europe, with the latter circumscribed to the former Soviet space (with the exception of the territories not belonging to the Slavic civilization, which were included later in the former Soviet Union). Politics, history, culture, former links to the West, living experience in democracy and market economy are all parameters which differ in those two areas.

some of the advantages of the other two options. And that option - which one could call "**the checkers approach**" would consist of the admission, first, of only two states: **Poland and Romania**. Apart from both the fact that these are **the two most important states in Central Europe** (see their territory, population, armed forces and geostrategic location), and **their crucial role in providing Ukraine with two indispensable, reliable, and meaningful anchors for her independence⁸**, the most important advantage is that it makes all the states between them and the NATO borders - Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria - de facto members of NATO without having to make them first de jure too ?! As for their proximity to Russian territory, which is considered as a disadvantage, it should be noted that both "enjoy" a relatively similar situation of having to deal with either Kaliningrad or the Black Sea respectively. Yugoslavia, in turn, which could be, theoretically, entered on the debit of Romania, could also be entered on Hungary's debit either.

18. In reality, the adoption of any - or a combination - of these options would depend mainly on what **type of admission** will prevail in the end. At the moment, the "competition" is still between "**group admission**" and "**individual admission**". Without

⁸. It should be noted that the combined Slovak and Hungarian border to Ukraine is considerably smaller compared to Romania's which has the additional advantage that is lacking major minority problems, given the relatively small number of Ukrainians living in northern Romania and Romanians living in southern and south-eastern Ukraine.

getting into detail, suffice it to say that, in view of Russia's predictable strong negative reaction, if "group admission" prevailed, it would be difficult to make the child take a second teaspoon of medicine, particularly if it was bitter ?! Therefore, in that case, it should rather be either all or none. However, if "individual admission" prevailed (and most of the "signs" seem to indicate that), an order of priorities is technically unavoidable. But, under such circumstances, those countries which will not be on the top seats need a strong guarantee that the "admission" is a process and would not be stopped before they enter too (either because of the potentially increased Russian opposition or even a veto from those already accepted).

Romania and NATO enlargement

19. When addressing this topic, one should start with the handicap Romania had to eliminate in "the race for integration" into the Euro-Atlantic and European structures. That handicap was mainly the result of Ceausescu's decision that, at a time when all her European allies from the Pact were desperately trying to move closer to the West, Romania marched in the opposite direction, towards Asia and the North Korean model ?! That was why one of the ten points of the Romanian Revolution stated clearly Romania's willingness to reintegrate with the European continent. But sudden efforts could not instantly tear down years and years of growing conviction created in the mind of

the Westerners that Romania was lagging far behind. "the champions" of democracy and market economy. That is why, on all lists, there was a clear-cut separation between, on the one hand, the "Visegrad" countries and, on the other, Romania and Bulgaria (with the former Soviet space forming a third category).

20. However, in spite of all "accusations" of conformity with Russia, Romania's willingness to sign first the Partnership for Peace Initiative has apparently shattered that edifice of separation. Moreover, there are voices in Romania which say that it even disturbed the initial planning in respect to the enlargement of Western institutions towards the East ?! Although it might be some truth in it, this opinion is not reflecting the reality because the motivation for that decision was, in Romania's case, more profound. Indeed, **Romania did not want to impress the West.** She took the Partnership for Peace for what it was (or, at least, for what it was publicly said to be). Thus, first, as indicated in the invitation issued by NATO in January 1994, Romania saw in the PfP **a necessary but not sufficient condition for admission into the Alliance.** Second, she saw in it **the perfect instrument for the required modernization of her armed forces - including in the peace-keeping field -** through increased contact with the armed forces of the developed NATO member countries. Third, she saw in it **an important means to contribute - through the positive climate it certainly helps**

create - to increased stability and security on the continent. Fourth, she saw in it an important means to improve the relations with her neighbors, given the significant and positive impact military collaboration usually has on the general bilateral relationship.

21. If those were the motivations, with respect to expectations, one could say that, in general, one would expect the possibility to continue along the same lines, whose utility is now unquestionable. However, although perceived correctly, as said, as a necessary but insufficient condition for admission to NATO, PFP should continue to, on the one hand, remain the most important vehicle for integration into the Alliance, and, on the other, give equal chances to admission to all the participants who have expressed their wish to do so.
22. As for the reaction in case of admission/non-admission, there is, perhaps, a need for a distinction between the two. Because, while the answer to the first - that is, positive - scenario is clear, namely that Romania would honor her obligations fully, being that way able to increase her contribution to peace and stability both in the area around her borders and in Europe⁹, given the support thus obtained

⁹. That raises the problem of Russia. In that regard, Romania has clearly stated that she does not treat the admission to NATO as a "zero-sum game" with that big power. And that, because, on the one hand, Romania's wish to join NATO does not stem as much from fear of Russia, as from her will to fully integrate with the West, which is the only source for meeting her long time need for modernization. As a result, even after admission, together with all


for the process of reform, the answer to the second - negative - scenario cannot be given as such. Rather, perhaps one should rephrase the question and ask not for a definite answer but for potential consequences. If that was permitted, apart from the consequences already mentioned as disadvantages of the options excluding Romania, there will be a need for a rather careful consideration of the internal consequences of non-admission. And in that respect, most probably, if, after all her courageous efforts to fully integrate with the West, Romania had not been admitted, it would become almost impossible to continue to motivate the Romanian public/electorate that that was the right direction for the country. Certainly, one could argue that we only speak of NATO and that there are other organizations too. Only that, although Romania has already taken the necessary steps in their direction too, they will not be able to compensate for - at least in short to medium term - the diminished security following the non-admission.

23. But it would be premature to come up with final judgements like this. While it is true that very important decisions lie ahead of us, it is equally true that, given exactly their

other member states, Romania will continue to maintain good and balanced relations with Russia, which should not be isolated, but fully integrated into the international system and world economy. Besides, by becoming a full member of those organizations, Romania will be able to melt her inevitably asymmetrical relations with the great powers of the West into the multilateral diplomacy of those institutions, as every other small and medium member state does for more than half a century now.

importance, one needs not to rush. Rather, all of us, in the US, Western Europe, Central Europe, Eastern Europe and Russia should cooperate and solve what is, perhaps, the most important challenge of our time, namely how to push forward with the integration of our world and build a new security architecture to serve us all and the generations to come.


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NATO EXPANSION: A RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE

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NATO EXPANSION: A RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE

by Alexei K. Pushkov

In 1995, after the decision to expand NATO was announced, the prospects of NATO enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe has become the most important and potentially explosive issue of Russia's foreign policy. It should also be regarded as the ultimate test of its relationship with the West. No other issue, such as disagreements between Moscow and Washington over the sales of a nuclear reactor or conventional armaments to Iran, the lifting of the UN sanctions against Iraq, differences over the crisis in Bosnia, or even Russia's military actions in Chechnya, can harm this relationship to the extent that NATO expansion would, if it is accomplished irrespectively of Russia's deepest worries and frustrations. Seen from Moscow, the outcome of NATO expansion to the East will shape the relationship between Russia and the West for the next period of world's history.

I.

The extremely nervous reaction of Moscow to the prospects of NATO expansion is closely connected with NATO's image as it was formed in Russia during the Cold War. This image did not change significantly since then having subsisted to a large extent to the mental revolution of Gorbachev's perestroika and of Yeltsin's honey-moon with the West.

Paradoxically enough, it did not undergo the same changes in the Russian psyche as the general picture of the West which was thoroughly reconsidered by the Russian elites and the general public in 1987-1991. Whereas Western countries, including the

United States and Germany, were not regarded anymore as Russia's enemies, NATO was still viewed as a potentially anti-Russian coalition. It was also seen as a collective enemy. The mere fact of NATO being a powerful alliance of 16 most developed Western states, a mechanism which assures the link between the United States and its European allies made it more ominous for the Russians than any single Western state, including the United States, Germany or even Japan.

To a large extent this attitude has been inherited from history. The creation of the Warsaw Pact on May 14, 1955 was pictured then as a response to the creation of NATO which had occurred 7 years earlier. Until the beginning of the 1990's NATO was described in the Soviet political literature as "a military bloc of capitalist countries under the American leadership, directed against USSR and other peaceful countries" (1). NATO was considered as the centerpiece of a system of military alliances created by the United States all over the world (CENTO, SEATO, ASEAN) in order to encircle the Soviet Union and "the socialist camp". At least three generations of Russians, including diplomats, journalists, military officers, and government and party officials were brought up on the basis of this paradigm.

What made NATO look even more as the embodiment of evil was the affirmation that it was designed, among other things, to revive the German military machine, the fearsome Bundeswehr in order to use it against USSR and its socialist allies in case of war. Taking into account the memories Russians and other Soviet nationalities had from the Second World War, it was an extremely powerful argument.

Starting from the first thaw which occurred under Nikita Khrushchev in the late 1950's, fewer and fewer people in the USSR believed in the possibility of NATO launching a military attack against the USSR or the member-states of the Warsaw Pact. This approach did not, however, change the basic attitude towards NATO. It was accused of trying to profit from the weaknesses inside the socialist countries, and in fact contributing to splits and tensions between them with the goal of destroying "the socialist commonwealth" as such. Among the strongest accusations brought against the Hungarian reformers in 1956 and the initiators of the Prague's spring in 1968-69 were revelations that they planned for their countries to leave the Warsaw Pact and join NATO. In the minds of the Soviets this alone, more even than intentions to modify the political system or to reform the economy, was considered as the ultimate proof of the guilt of East European reformers.

This image did not change through the 1970s and 1980s - in spite of the rapprochement with the United States and Western Europe which the Soviet Union started to accomplish under Gorbachev. One of the reasons was the leninist concept, according to which there were two camps inside the world's bourgeoisie: a militarist and aggressive one, and a pacifist one, inclined to compromise with the Bolshevicks. This concept was given a new life under Khrushchev, and then in the years of the first detente in the first half of 1970s. Soviet leaders started by then to court the representatives of the so-called "realistic and moderate forces" in the West as opposed to "aggressive and militaristic circles". NATO fell automatically in the second

category. And whereas it was admitted that the correlation of forces inside the USA, Germany or Great Britain could change in favor of those who called for cooperation with the Soviet Union, NATO was seen by definition as the stronghold of the most hawkish, militaristic circles in the West.

It is interesting to note that Mikhail Gorbachev in his book "Perestroika and New Thinking for Russia and the Whole World" published in 1987 condemned NATO for the split in Europe and called it "an instrument of military-political confrontation in Europe". At this point Moscow called for the dissolution of both NATO and the Warsaw pact or at least of their military organisations.

At the end of the 1980s the dominating attitude towards NATO changed to that of indifference with a tilt towards the negative. NATO did not become a matter of high political or strategic concern for the Soviet leaders and the public opinion even after the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist. The concept of the common European house formulated by Mikhail Gorbachev was for many Russians a welcome change from the Cold War division of Europe. In the new political setting the future of the alliance appeared bleak, anyway. It was widely thought NATO would lose its *raison d'être*, and slowly wither away as an all-European security system would render it useless and obsolete.

At the same time the communists and nationalists never stopped to affirm that NATO would benefit from the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. They were also pointing out that the Soviet Union, and later Russia would find itself facing a new geopolitical situation in Europe which would be highly

unfavorable to it. But these warnings were considered by many as old-fashioned and ideosyncratic. The euphoria of the end of the Cold War prevailed both in the Russian government and in the general public. Besides, after the failure of the coup of August 1991 those who were sticking to the old concept of NATO as Russia's enemy (the orthodox communists, a number of KGB officers, a part of the military, governmental officials and military-industrial complex) were disoriented by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, weakened by the radical changes in the country and neutralised for a while as a political force.

II.

In the first two years of Yeltsin's rule the liberal political establishment in Russia did not consider NATO to be a serious problem. The adjustment of its foreign policy to the requirements of the rapprochement with the West seemed much more significant. The main goal of the reformers was to get rid of the remnants of the Communist system, to change radically the foreign policy, to part with its anti-Western ideological heritage and to start Russia's integration into international economic and financial institutions (IMF, World Bank, GATT). It was largely thought that NATO would change by itself so that its main areas of interests would become disarmament and responses to threats outside of Europe (for instance, in the Persian Gulf). As the notion of Russia's geopolitical interests was virtually absent from the early Yeltsin foreign policy doctrine, the alliance was not seen as a potential threat to those interests.

It was the time which by the end of 1992 was labeled by the

Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev as a romantic period (3) in Russian foreign policy. High hopes were pinned on Western assistance. An idealistic, non-conflictual vision of Russia's international role prevailed in Moscow. Russia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and started to develop ties with NATO. Pro-Western liberals defined NATO as a friendly organisation. In the United Nations Russia almost automatically supported all US moves. Moscow backed the West anti-Serbian position in the former Yugoslavia crisis. Although the Russian leaders could not make up their minds whether Moscow should ask for the entry into NATO or not, the concept of strategic alliance with the West advanced by Andrei Kozyrev seemed to offer an answer to this question.

Predictably enough, such a policy did not and could not last. By the end of 1992 it became clear that the West was not ready to regard Russia which had just emerged from 70 years of Communism as a close ally. Neither were the Western powers eager to grant Russia a place on their own arms markets. On the contrary, Washington exercised pressures on Moscow in order to make it drop some of the arm deals Russia intended to sign with China and some other countries. By the summer of 1992 Kozyrev's foreign policy came under a sharp attack from the conservatives and communists in the Supreme Soviet. They insisted that such a policy, inherited from the Gorbachev-Shevardnadze period, was conducive to the geopolitical strengthening of the West and a progressive weakening of Russia on the European scene as well as on global scale. In the Spring of 1993 Moscow's stand on Yugoslavia was seriously questioned by the opposition which considered it to be

pro-Western and contrary to Russia's interests.

The mood was changing in the West, too. As the political honey-moon with Russia was heading towards the end, NATO's future began to focus the debates in the United States and other member-states of the alliance. By Summer 1993 the governments of Central and Eastern European countries started to prepare the ground for joining the alliance. By summer 1993 the idea of NATO enlargement had become widely accepted in the West. In the Summer 1993 issue of Foreign Affairs three experts from the RAND Corporation argued for the necessity to expand NATO eastward admitting that under certain conditions even Ukraine might become a member of the alliance (4), while Russia should be kept out of it.

In this context, the famous statement made by President Yeltsin in Warsaw on August 26, 1993 that Eastern European countries were free to join any alliances they deemed necessary, happened to be an ideal pretext for bringing the NATO expansion issue from theory into practice. Immediately after Yeltsin visit to Warsaw Moscow reversed its stance trying desperately to prevent a development that did not depend on it, anyway. Yeltsin sent letters to the leaders of the main NATO powers making his case against the alliance extension to the Central and Eastern Europe in the foreseeable future. His arguments reflected something more than his personal opinion or that of his government: there was a virtual consensus in Russia that NATO expansion eastward would create conditions for the isolation of Russia and therefore would run contrary to its national interests. Yeltsin's address to NATO leaders was based not only on

advice from the alarmed Foreign Ministry, but on memos from his advisors from the Presidential Council as well, and reflected a wide consensus in the Russian political class.

III.

The general public in Russia remained largely indifferent towards the prospects of NATO enlargement eastward. However, it certainly contributed to the growing scepticism towards Western intentions, and a feeling that the West wants to profit from Russia's weakness. These feelings coincided with the end of hopes for massive Western financial and economic assistance. For some, Russia did not gain but only lost from the rapprochement with the West. This attitude contributed to some extent to the triumph of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, the ultra-nationalist head of the Liberal-Democratic Party, on the parliamentary elections of December 1993, which gave him the support of 24 percent of the voters.

The Russian political establishment, the military and the bureaucracy - three main forces which determine Russia's domestic and foreign policies - took the prospects of NATO's enlargement with great concern. The general opinion was that the expansion, if it took place, would be directed against Russia.

Different political forces converged on this point, too. The communists and nationalists saw in NATO's urge to enlarge a confirmation of their warnings of the anti-Russian intentions of the United States and other Western powers which, according to them, were planning to move NATO's troops closer to the borders of Russia.

The traditionalists, including top governmental officials, key military figures, and influential members of the Yelstin

administration and of the Security Council perceived the future expansion as a move directed against Russia, at least politically. They thought it would subvert Russia's security, isolate it in Europe, and result in the West taking over its former sphere of influence in Eastern and Central Europe, creating additional grounds for the American dominance in the post-Cold War world.

Radical pro-Western democrats viewed NATO enlargement not in terms of a new danger for Russia, but as a sort of negation to it of the right to be a part of the "civilized world". They were hurt by the fact that Russia had moved decisively towards the West, but the West decided in return not to embrace Russia, but to strengthen NATO. Some, like Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, felt personally endangered by the prospects of enlargement, for they could have been accused by their more conservative colleagues in the government as well as by the opposition in the parliament of playing into the West's hands.

Finally, statist democrats (those who stand for political democracy and a strong Russian state capable of defending its national interests), both outside and inside the administration, stressed that NATO's expansion, while not representing a direct danger for Russia, created conditions for its isolation and changed the geopolitical configuration of Europe in a way which was unfavorable to Russia. They thought that inside Russia the enlargement would have negative domestic repercussions, contribute to the strengthening of the communists and ultra-nationalists, help the rise of anti-Western feelings, and offer new arguments to the communist-nationalist opposition against any

sort of partnership with the West.

Another unifying point of all those factions of Russian politics, with a possible exception of a few experts and Foreign Ministry officials, was an extreme negative attitude towards the possibility of NATO including in the future Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states while leaving Russia outside of the alliance.

IV.

The debates over Russia's reaction to NATO expansion started in Autumn 1993 and reached a high degree of tension in 1994. At this point they were focused around three major questions: first, whether to join the Partnership for Peace; second, what kind of relationship with the alliance Russia needs; and third, what Moscow should do in response to NATO's decision to study the conditions and terms of enlargement.

The period between Yeltsin's visit to Poland and the official declaration of the PFP in January 1994 did not see any serious debate for it was a time when Russia was completely absorbed with the fierce fight between the President and the Supreme Soviet, and then with the parliamentary elections of December 12, 1993. It was only in January 1994 that the passions somewhat calmed down, and the Russian political establishment decided to look upon NATO's decisions and what they meant for Russia. Meanwhile the Foreign Ministry spared no efforts to make NATO leaders to put off the expansion until an indefinite future. Partially in response to those efforts, and especially the argument that NATO's movement eastward would give an additional boost to the communists, conservatives and ultra-nationalists which displayed their potential force during the attempt of a

coup on October 3-4 in Moscow, that NATO decided to adopt a slow approach to enlargement.

The Foreign Ministry took special pride in noting that the rejection by NATO of an immediate enlargement and the adoption of the PFP were direct results of Moscow's efforts. However, the Partnership for Peace did not generate enthusiasm among the prevailing part of the Russian political establishment. Kozyrev boasting that, by making NATO adopt the PFP, he eventually buried the plans for NATO expansion, were not taken seriously. It was considered mainly as a compromise which was doomed to end at a certain moment, opening the way for a practical entry into NATO of the "Vyshegrad four". Russia, on its part, was considered in Moscow as a highly unlikely candidate for joining NATO.

While this opinion was shared by the majority of experts, the attitudes towards PFP differed significantly.

Four main schools of thought, notwithstanding the nationalist-communist opposition, appeared at this stage. The first, represented by Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, top Foreign Ministry officials and a narrow circle of experts sustained that PFP was an achievement of Russia's foreign policy; stressed the willingness of the West to find an arrangement which would be acceptable both to Russia and NATO; underlined that in case of Moscow's refusal to join the PFP Russia would find itself in isolation even inside the CIS, and with no opportunities to influence the future developments in this field. Therefore, they called for joining the PFP and placed high hopes on interaction with NATO. Such cooperation, according to them, could prevent NATO enlargement or at least postpone it well into the future.

The second school which regrouped the adversaries of Andrei Kozyrev in the parliament, the Security Council and the Presidential Council considered the PFP as an example of NATO's "dictate" towards Russia. It parted from the assumption that PFP was designed in order not only to marginalise Russia in Europe and take over its former sphere of influence, but to weaken its political and military ties with other former Soviet republics as well. This school evoked the necessity to keep good relations with China as an important argument against joining the PFP. Only staying outside the PFP structure, claimed representatives of this school of thought, would Russia exercise "a disciplinating influence and remain an independent center of power which freely determines whom to interact with and on what conditions".

The third school's main concern was that Russia would be doomed in the PFP to the role of just one of a number of NATO partners with no special status, no say over NATO's decisions and no freedom of maneuver. One of the participants in debates in the State Duma pointed out three areas where there was, according to him, a lack of clarity between NATO and Russia: commitments, which would be taken by both sides; the mechanism of decision-making; and the forms of military and political cooperation between Russia and NATO. Yet, this group refrained from rejecting the PFP, preferring to stress the necessity of an "equal partnership" with NATO.

The fourth group welcomed the PFP as a temporary compromise. It regarded Moscow's dialogue with Brussels as instrumental for a constructive and stable relationship between Russia and the West, and therefore stressed the political importance of Russia's

participation in the PFP. It considered the adherence to PFP as the first practical step towards Russia's deeper interaction with the alliance. At the same time, this school of thought called for NATO granting Russia a special status or concluding a strategic agreement with it which would guarantee Moscow a permanent participation in the activities of the alliance without turning Russia into a member-state.

Y.

Facing a serious opposition on the PFP issue, the Foreign Ministry corrected its initial stance. It decided to couple the signature of the PFP with a specific arrangement with NATO which would single Russia out of the other partners and give it at least a resemblance of a special status.

Besides NATO's plans to enlarge, another important factor shaped the new approach towards the alliance in Moscow : differences between Russia and NATO over Bosnia.

Those differences became evident in early 1994, when the international community looked for ways to stop the Serbian siege of Sarajevo. NATO's inclination to use air strikes against the Serbs hardly added sympathy to it in the Russian public opinion. The fact that it was a collision over means, not ends helped to keep the irritation towards the alliance in due limits. Yet, in statements made at this time by top Russian diplomats involved in the settlement of the Yugoslav crisis (for instance, the deputy Foreign Minister Vitaly Churkin) this irritation showed. After

the relative success of Russian diplomacy which allowed to make the Serbs stop the siege without using force against them. Foreign Ministry officials presented it as a victory of Russia's peaceful policy over NATO's aggressive one. Somehow they failed to mention that NATO's ultimatum to the Serbs was instrumental for Moscow's diplomatic achievements.

The new coldness towards NATO was also called by the alliance reluctance to coordinate with Russia its actions towards Bosnia. The reason why the first NATO air strike against the Serbs called a strong negative response from Moscow was that Russia was not informed about it. Boris Yeltsin was hurt not so much as the defender of the Serbs than as a leader of a great power who had not been notified by the West of a major action, on which Moscow had serious doubts.

Later the Kremlin got over this initial frustration and even supported NATO air strikes against the Serbs. But the feeling of uneasiness, compounded by NATO's steady preparations for enlargement remained. It grew somewhat stronger when Moscow discovered that it was not a privileged partner in the contact group on Bosnia, where it had "to knock on the door" to obtain the necessary information and to make itself heard.

Initially, there was some hope in Moscow that "strategic partnership" with the United States and Yeltsin personal close relations with Bill Clinton and Helmut Kohl would suffice in order to make NATO put off the enlargement into an indefinite future. By Autumn 1994 it became plain that it was not the case. The strong response the alliance received from Moscow reflected its anger at what it perceived as a failing partnership.

Yeltsin's tough speech on the CSCE summit in Budapest, where he did not hesitate to put in jeopardy his personal relationship with President Clinton by threatening a "Cold Peace" in Europe in case NATO finally decided to expand eastward, translated his feelings. Once again the syndrome of "us against them" started to assert itself in the Kremlin.

In this setting the Protocol signed between Russia and NATO on June 22, 1994 as an addendum to the PFP agreement was definitely not enough to appease Moscow's fears and suspicions. The Protocol which recognised Russia's special status of a great power did not meet any enthusiasm in Moscow. In fact, it was dismissed by Kozyrev's critics as something meaningless, a mere lip-service to Russia's worries.

In order to keep the idea of cooperation with NATO alive and to sell it domestically, Andrei Kozyrev initiated talks on a special agreement on enhanced cooperation with NATO. An agreement on areas of broad and enhanced dialogue between Russia and NATO was reached in October 1994. It supposed interaction in three areas: exchange of information, political consultations and cooperation in the field of security-related areas.

The agreement marked a success for Russia which had been asking for a special treatment by NATO since the end of 1993. It created the possibility of its cooperation with the alliance according to the formula "16 + 1". But by the end of 1994 the general cooling of relations with the United States, the partial resurgence of old suspicions and fears towards the West neutralized whatever positive effect this agreement could have had on Russia-NATO relations. The negative attitude towards NATO

expansion in Moscow was building up faster than diplomats proceeded with talks.

This explained Kozyrev's abrupt turn-over on December 1 in Brussels. Instead of admitting the texts negotiated with NATO the Russian Foreign unexpectedly declined them under the pretext that NATO intentions on enlargement were not clear. Few days later in Budapest Boris Yeltsin reiterated his strong opposition to the expansion and threatened the West with Cold peace.

VI.

One can speak of three stages in the development of Russia's relationship with NATO, which correspond to the domestic debates over the alliance expansion.

The first stage lasted from August 1993, when the issue first came into the open during Yeltsin's visit to Warsaw, until January 1994 when the PFP was adopted at the NATO summit in Brussels.

The second stage covered the period from January 1994 until December 1994. It was characterised by intensified negotiations between Russia and NATO and the building up of a large opposition to NATO eastward expansion in Russia.

The third stage started in December 1994 with Kozyrev refusal to put into force agreements on cooperation with NATO and Yeltsin's Cold Peace speech in Budapest. The main content of this stage is the growth of tension between Russia and NATO over this issue. Internally, it is characterised by a virtual consensus of Russian political elites against NATO expansion.

This stage coincided with an important shift in Russian domestic politics conditioned by the war in Chechnya. In fact the decision to resort to military force in this remote area of the Russian Federation reflected, at least partly, Yeltsin's reaction to the new distancing between Russia and the West, and lost illusions about strategic partnership with Western powers. NATO resolve to expand reiterated on a number of occasions by Western leaders contributed to the feeling in Moscow that they did not want to take seriously Russia's objections. Yeltsin started to have doubts whether "dear friend Bill" was his big friend after all. The feeling in the Kremlin was that Russia was once again on its own. Thus, the declared intentions to expand NATO in a way helped the decision to use force in Chechnya. It was regarded by Russian leaders not only as a means to solve an internal issue but also as a show-case of Russia's growing assertiveness and strength.

The war in Chechnya changed significantly the Russian domestic scenery. First, it was "the last drop" which marked the end of the shift from liberal democrats to statist bureaucrats as the main moving force of the Yeltsin rule. In the conditions of war the struggle for influence over the president was not anymore between democrats and conservatives, but rather between the reformist and traditionalist factions of bureaucracy.

Second, the war produced a serious break between Yeltsin and all democratic parties. Since December 1994 Yeltsin is facing both a strong communist-nationalist and democratic oppositions, and enjoys almost no support in the State Duma.

Third, the war strengthened conservative trends and

elements in the government. In response to attacks on the government and the president from the democratic circles and mass-media, the traditionalists advanced the ideology of a strong state, patriotism and "derjavnost" - Russian for strong power. Those in the government and in the Yeltsin administration who were associated with the democratic movement had to change their former positions, or to limit themselves to relatively narrow field of economic reforms without interfering in political matters.

The most vivid example was the Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev who openly defected the Russia's Choice faction in the Duma when its leader, Yegor Gaidar dared to oppose Yeltsin on the war in Chechnya. Another example is the first vice Prime-Minister Anatoly Chubais who, in spite on his democratic credentials, preferred to keep quiet on the issue in order not to put himself in jeopardy.

The inevitably sharp, although mainly rhetorical reaction of the West to the military operation in Chechnya added to the already existing irritation in Moscow with the West. Boris Yeltsin publicly voiced this irritation when speaking before the collegium of the Foreign Ministry on March 14, 1995.

VII.

When active debates over NATO expansion resumed in February 1995 the political scenery was already significantly different from Winter-Spring 1994. The diversity of views on NATO expansion found itself reduced to two main positions.

The first one, represented by Andrei Kozyrev and his few followers in the academic community and mass-media, parted from the fact that expansion was unavoidable. Therefore, they argued, Russia has to accept it and start to negotiate for the best possible terms from the point of view of Russia's security.

The second, represented by the mainstream of the Russian political establishment, adopted an attitude against the expansion and against any preliminary talks on its terms and conditions. As Yeltsin's national security assistant Yuri Baturin put it, "as to the conditions or guarantees capable of compensating the damage which NATO enlargement would inflict on the interests of Russia's national security, such conditions simply do not exist".

Kozyrev's attempt to start the negotiations over the conditions of the enlargement with the US administration (talks between his deputy Georgui Mamedov and Strobe Talbott in Washington which took place at the end of February 1995) created an uproar in the very narrow, but rather influential circle of those who opposed NATO expansion in the presidential administration, the State Duma, the Ministry of Defense, the press and the academic community.

The mere fact of such talks was regarded as backing off under NATO pressure and giving an approval to the expansion. The conditions formulated by Kozyrev - non-stationing of nuclear armaments and NATO combat troops on the territory of the future members of the alliance in Eastern Europe - were considered as meaningless by his critics. If the West wants to keep a working

relationship with Russia, it was argued by this school of thought, it would refrain from stationing troops and nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe anyway, unless there was a direct threat to its security from Russia.

Boris Yeltsin espoused the approach of Kozyrev's opponents. In a speech before the Foreign Ministry collegium in the Kremlin Yeltsin criticised Kozyrev for his hasty actions in negotiating the conditions of the expansion and stated that he did not approve of such talks. He reiterated his strong opposition to the enlargement and suggested that Kozyrev reconsiders his stand and withdraw whatever promises he had made to his Western counterparts.

Yeltsin did his choice under the impact of the general shift in the Russian political establishment. This shift was characterised by a consolidation of both traditionalists and democrats around the idea of opposition to NATO enlargement. In fact, starting from December 1994 a new coalition against NATO expansion was born in Russia. The coalition regrouped four main forces: the Yeltsin administration; the military and state bureaucracy; the democratic opposition (with few exceptions); and the communist-nationalist opposition.

The reasons for such a paradoxical consensus, however, were different for each group. In the Yeltsin administration the dominant feeling was that Russia which behaved very friendly towards the West did not deserve NATO expansion, and that having taken the decision to expand the alliance the West has betrayed the idea of partnership with Moscow.

The military and the state bureaucracy regarded the future expansion as challenging Russia's security and forcing it to take countermeasures in the military and political fields. They stresses the fact that the balance of forces in Europe is 1 to 4 in favor of NATO, and that with NATO enlargement it would change even more.

The democratic opposition underlined that NATO enlargement would strengthen the nationalists and communists and weaken the democratic flank in Russian politics. As Vyacheslav Nikonov, a member of the State Duma put it, "all those who would like Russia to have good relations with the West, are against NATO expansion. On the contrary, all those who would like to see those relations worsen, welcome NATO enlargement".

There is a lot of truth in this. While in their official statements the communist and nationalist leaders strongly attack the West for preparing NATO eastward expansion, they also hope that it will cast a deadly blow to Yeltsin's policy of partnership with the West, provoke an upsurge of anti-Western feelings in Russia and contribute to their electoral success. As Vladimir Zhirinovsky once stated, "the next day after they take the decision on enlargement I will become president of Russia". A number of Russia's top-ranking military think that the future NATO expansion would help their requests to enlarge the military budget under the argument that the West remains antagonistic to Russia.

NATO enlargement will not generate a second Cold War between Russia and the West. Russia is not in a position to engage into another confrontation with a western coalition. At least five factors prevent it from engaging on this path:

- its present economic weakness;
- its dependence on Western financial sources and investments;
- the necessity for Russia to integrate in the world economy and to become part of international economic and financial institutions;
- the desire of its leaders to be part of the global decision-making (G-7);
- the weakness of its military and the absence of belligerent attitudes in the society.

Yet, it would be a big mistake to underestimate the consequences of NATO expansion for Russia civilisational development, national mentality, foreign policy and strategic posture. Those consequences fall into seven categories.

The first consequence - and historically the most important one - is the deepening of the civilisational gap between Russia and the West.

As NATO enlargement reflects a civilisational consolidation of the Western (romano-germanic) world, Russia's reaction to it will reflect the consolidation of the Russian civilisational phenomena as distinct from the Western one. NATO expansion which will leave Russia outside the alliance will cast if not a fatal then a very severe blow to Russian westernisers and greatly benefit their opponents. It would also mean that the West lost,

at least in the foreseeable future, a unique opportunity to bring Russia civilisationally closer to itself - which is the only way to solve the West's historical task of making out of Russia an ally rather than an rival or even adversary.

Of course, this civilisational gap will be partly bridged with Russia's progress on the road of economic reforms and creation of a working market economy. But the decision to spread NATO over the whole of Europe will leave Russia little choice but to assert itself as a force not necessarily antagonistic but different from the Western community.

Second. There should be no doubt that NATO expansion will result in an inward reorientation of Russia. It means Russia will conceive its international role and national interests with less, not more respect for the interests of Western countries. If until recently Russia played by the rules established by the West and tried to find its role inside the framework created by the West after the end of the Cold War, from now on it would look for a role of a much more independent player, less constrained by a real or illusionary partnership with the West. In the absence of strong strategic ties with the Western alliance, Russia might well become a loose-canon of world politics. The effect of such reorientation on the fragile post-Cold war international system remain yet to be seen.

Third. Geopolitical consequences will be important, too. If Russia considers itself cut off Europe and the euroatlantic community, it will have no choice but to strengthen its historical sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union. This will certainly mean a closer economic and military cooperation

with Belarus and Kazakhstan which already started. Ukraine will be more of a problem. But here, too, Russia has powerful levers, especially close ties between Russian and Ukrainian enterprises, Ukraine dependence on Russia's natural resources such as oil and gas, and a presence of 11 million native Russians on Ukrainian soil (over 20 percent of the population).

One might even argue that NATO expansion will seriously limit Ukraine's freedom of maneuver in foreign policy. Therefore, NATO enlargement will have an adversary effect on the geopolitical pluralism on the territory of the former USSR.

Fourth. While NATO expansion is considered as a means of strengthening the security of the West, and provide effective security guarantees for Central and Eastern Europe, it will cast a severe blow to the European security as a whole. Eventually NATO will have to consider the entry of the Baltic states and maybe even Ukraine into the alliance. Russia's predictably negative reaction, as well as attempts to exercise pressure on Ukraine in order to prevent it from joining NATO would certainly create additional strains between Kiev and Moscow and create conditions for new tensions between Russia and the West. Any attempts to include Ukraine and the Baltic republics into NATO will result in a major crisis between Russia and the West.

Fifth. NATO expansion will jeopardise the security structure already established after the end of the Cold War. As Vladimir Lukin, head of the State Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs predicts, the decision to enlarge NATO eastward will kill the prospects for the ratification of START-2 treaty in the Russian parliament, as well as question the treaty on conventional

armaments in Europe and the convention on chemical weapons. " NATO enlargement is the worst idea of all those that are connected with european security ", says Lukin.

Sixth. NATO expansion will strongly influence the balance of forces inside Russia on the eve of the parliamentary elections due to take place in December 1995 and presidential elections of June 1996 in favor of anti-Western circles. If the decision to expand is adopted - and there are good reasons to believe it will be - this move will be largely used in both electoral campaign by anti-Western and nationalist forces in Russia. (The West itself will be put in an extremely controversial position. While it declares its support for elections and the development of democracy in Russia, it might find itself in a position when it will have to back those in Russia who favor the postponment of elections and even the establishment of a dictatorial regime - out of fear that elections might results which would be highly undesirable for the West.)

Seventh. NATO expansion will promote to key positions those of the Russian military who favor a strong military posture for Russia. New troops will be positioned on the Western Russian border, and possibly in Belarus and the Kaliningrad area. The so-called flank restrictions will be disregarded. Along NATO eastern borders a new dividing line of distrust will emerge.

The strategy adopted by NATO which combines the expansion with a parallel enhancement of cooperation with Russia can hardly bring results. The main reason is that such cooperation coupled with NATO enlargement is viewed in Russia as an obvious contradiction: either we trust each other and in this case we

cooperate which makes the enlargement meaningless, or we do not trust each other, and in this case cooperation will remain on paper. In the words of Yuri Baturin, "the hopes for combining NATO expansion with the establishment of special partner relations with Russia are fairly weak. NATO's enlargement will sap the basis for such partnership because Russia can not see this step as anything but unfriendly".

The idea of a non-aggression or strategic cooperation treaty, which in the beginning of 1994 enjoyed some support in Moscow, is not considered today as a very promising neither. Such an treaty would have to be ratified by all NATO member-states which makes it extremely vulnerable. And if it is not accepted by at least one member-state, Russia will have to face an enlarged NATO without any sort of strategic compensation. Finally, it may be safely predicted that after the decision on expansion is adopted by NATO the negative domestic reaction to it in Russia will make it almost impossible for any government to conduct effective talks on Russia-NATO cooperation.

Conclusions

Today the common wisdom in the West is to accuse Russia of trying to veto NATO expansion without suggesting any alternative in the field of strengthening the european security. But Russia is not in a position to veto the process of enlargement. It is true that it does not have a clear-cut concept of relations with NATO, and that its suggestion to put more stress on the OSCE

lacks substance. But it should be stressed that it is not Russia but NATO which aims at changing the whole post-Cold war european security structures. Therefore it is up to NATO to make Russia a viable offer.

Until today NATO has failed to work out a formula that would satisfy Russia. Moscow has good reasons to question Western leaders sincerity when they try to appease Russia's worries. When in 1994 NATO offered the PFP to all interested countries, Yeltsin's government presented it as an alternative to NATO expansion which took into account Russia's interests. At this point the PFP adversaries in Moscow pointed out that the PFP was a hoax, a smoke-screen for the preparations for NATO expansion at Russia's expense. Less than a year later it turned out that they were right. NATO almost abandoned any talk about the PFP and concentrated fully on the future expansion. Russian leaders drew some lessons out of it.

Today Moscow is placed before a take-it-or-leave-it offer: either you agree with a formal enlargement of NATO, and in this case we offer you vague promises of cooperation and enhanced dialogue - or the enlargement will happen without your approval. This is hardly a means of conducting effective negotiations. The suggestions to conclude a non-aggression treaty between Russia and NATO also sound hollow : such a treaty will be a mere constatation of the evident fact that both sides do not have plans to attack each other.

NATO expansion risks to poison for a long time the relationship between Russia and the West. It is in the interests of both sides to prevent such an outcome. However, as of today,

there seems to be few converging points in their respective positions. While President Clinton stated that the expansion was unavoidable, President Yeltsin stressed that his negative attitude towards it did not change neither. If there is no rapprochement between those positions on the May summit in Moscow both sides should look into possibilities of minimising the unavoidable evil.

NATO expansion represents a huge techtonical change in European and Eurasian geopolitics. Therefore, the country it affects most - Russia - should be given not merely a token compensation but strong guarantess on five directions:

1. Time guarantees: NATO should make it plain that practical enlargement will not start until a remote time, for instance, the year 2000.

2. Strategic gurarantees : the new NATO will not move directly to Russian borders, which means it will refrain from accepting Ukraine and the Baltic republics inside the alliance (offering them PFP as a compensation).

3. Nuclear guarantees : the new NATO would not station nuclear weapons in East and Central Europe, including East Germany (a promise which was given by Kohl to Gorbachev in response to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany).

4. Military guarantees: the new NATO would refrain from the strategy of forward deployment of its troops in Central and Eastern Europe in times of peace.

5. Finally, NATO should consider to offer Russia to conclude a strategic treaty which would stipulate clearly the areas of its interaction with NATO in the security-related

fields.


When making such an offer and giving those guarantees NATO should not adopt a quid pro quo attitude. These moves would enable those in Russia who favor close relations with the West to make the case for those relations and to withstand the pressure of anti-Western forces which would gain a lot out of NATO expansion. The West has to pay a certain price for enlarging NATO against Russia's objections. Otherwise it risks to complicate its relations with this temporarily weakened Eurasian superpower with its huge potential for a long time to come, or - in the worst case scenario - even to lose Russia for good. And the costs of Russia moving away from the West risk to be much bigger for it than the pluses of NATO spreading over the rest of Europe.

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
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"NATO EXPANSION: OPINIONS AND OPTIONS"

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NATO EXPANSION: VIEW FROM UKRAINE

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NATO EXPANSION: VIEW FROM UKRAINE

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Paper presented at
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To follow adequately the development of Ukraine's approach towards the issue of relations with NATO in general and - of late - vis-a-vis the problem of possible NATO expansion one should see the picture of Ukraine's thinking on broader national security issues in the terms of new international environment.

The first main outlines of Ukraine's foreign and security policy were laid down in the document called the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine adopted by the then Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) of Ukrainian SSR back in July 1990, under the existence of the former USSR. The Declaration claimed Ukraine's "intention to become in future a permanently neutral state, which does not participate in military alliances and adheres to three non-nuclear principles...". It was also stated in the Declaration that Ukraine would act "as an equal partner in international relations, actively support enhancing general peace and international security, directly participate in all-European process and European structures". Noteworthy, this document appeared more than a year before the formal disintegration of the USSR

and the disbandement of the Warsaw Pact, so for some period it was regarded mainly as a declaration of intentions. Nevertheless, claims for the future neutrality and nuclear-free status signified important political tendencies within the republics of the former Soviet Union (FSU) and in the later course became the conceptual and legal framework of Ukraine's foreign policy after gaining independence.

The clause of neutrality was one of the legal reasonings, along with the Reservations of the Verkhovna Rada to the Agreement on Establishing Commonwealth of Independent States, according to which Ukraine has abstained from entering into CIS Collective Security Treaty of 15 May 1992 signed in Tashkent. Another national legislative provision requires the consent of the Parliament on every possible case of sending Ukrainian Armed Forces abroad, which also influenced the governmental policy vis-a-vis different security-related issues within the framework the CIS, specifically the issue of peace-keeping operations on the territory of the FSU.

On the other hand, Ukraine, along with other former Warsaw Pact members and New independent states (NIS) of the FSU became in 1992 a member of a NATO-designed North Atlantic Cooperation Council and showed much interest in promoting the activities of this forum.

New trends and developments in the european politics and in the security environment of Ukraine, namely her apperance as well as other Central and East

European (CEE) countries, in the so-called "security vacuum", brought Ukraine's foreign policies closer to the concept of common European security and stability and to the concept of her future participation in all-European security system. It was publicly stated by President and the Foreign Minister of Ukraine during 1992-93 that the ultimate goal of Ukraine remained to be in future the part of European structures. The "neutrality clause" and sorting out of visible contradiction between the notion of neutrality and cooperation with NATO in the NACC framework, as well as with other international structures, had been developed conceptually to become a part of Ukraine's Foreign Policy Concept approved by the Parliament on 2 July 1993. It was noted in the Concept that Ukraine "stands for the creation of comprehensive international system of universal and all-European security and considers the participation in them as the fundamental component of her national security". It was also noted that "due to the elimination of bloc confrontation in Europe, the issue of creating all-European security structure on the basis of existing international institutions such as CSCE, NACC, NATO, WEU becomes the issue of prior significance. Ukraine's direct and full membership in such a structure will ensure the relevant external assurances of her national security. With a view of the crucial transformations which took place after the disintegration of the USSR and which shaped the modern geopolitical situation of Ukraine, her before stated intention to become in future a neutral and non-bloc state should be adapted to new circumstances and can not be construed as an obstacle to her full-scale participation in the all-European security structure". The main parameters of this formula had been included, along with the

claim of Ukraine's adherence to non-bloc country status, into the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, approved by the Parliament in the mid-October 1993. Thus the national legal and political framework had been laid down on the main issues of Ukraine's international security policies.

Ukraine became one of the most outspoken champions of developing closer relationship between former Cold War adversaries both in political and military spheres, paying great attention and interest to the activities within NACC. In fact, the very idea by NATO of creating a Cooperation forum on security issues in a wider european geographical framework was seen in Ukraine as the extremely important step in enhancing all-european stability and security. Politically, extending security dialogue to the partners "out of NATO area" meant a de-facto expansion of the Alliance's activities and contributed significantly to the development of the "interlocking institutions" concept designed to fill in the structural security vacuum in the new Europe and to address the controversial issue of emerging ierarchy of existing european security institutions. Ukraine's policy during the first years of NACC existence was directed at its consolidation and finding out practical elements and mechanisms of the proper "division of powers and responsibilities" between european security institutions in the new historical circumstances without losing their effectiveness and newly emerged wider geographical framework. The essence of Ukraine's approach should be found in one of the most important fundamentals of the countries Foreign Policy Concept, which sets the principle of indivisibility of security

as the upper priority in the international endeavours. That prioritization did not and does not mean for Ukraine the simple protocolar repetition of the "indivisibility of security" concept, formalized in the well-known multilateral political documents. Being strategically located in one of the most geopolitically vulnerable regions of Europe, Ukraine rather regards this formula to be the principal issue in practical politics of today.

Following this line Ukraine have proposed back in 1993 to seek all possible solutions, including on the regional and sub-regional level, of strengthening security confidence in Europe and brought out the idea of creating a stability and security zone in CEE, which could for the time being serve as a political and psychological fill-in of the regional "security vacuum" and the natural linking device between western structures and Russia. That idea had something in common with President Valesa's concept of NATO-bis, and was mainly directed at avoidance of new dividing lines in Europe and strengthening Central and East European regional confidence and common profile. The accent on the regional efforts in the CEE somewhat later became a part of the French/EU's approach in proposing the idea of European stability Pact.

With the development of the mounting criticism amongst the CEE cooperation partners on the "looseness" of the NACC framework and unclearness of its future the issue of the Alliance's formal expansion came into being, focusing the european security discussions on the problem of NATO's future as a collective defence and

collective security structure. Ukraine's view on these issues was concentrated on the vital necessity for the future stable European security architecture of preserving the political momentum of building up the United New Europe according to the above mentioned principle of indivisibility of security. In that particular respect Ukraine, while addressing the issue of possible NATO expansion, had persistently stressed throughout 1993-1994 that her principal point was to adequately safeguard the nation's vital security interests vis-a-vis the realities of new security environment the country appeared in after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and dissolution of the FSU.

One of the related issues in this context was the issue of nuclear powers' security guarantees for Ukraine in connection with the elimination of nuclear weapons located on her territory. Throughout 1992-1994 Ukraine had been insistent on receiving such a guarantees as a prerequisite for the final decision on eliminating nuclear weaponry and acceding to NPT. Although that sort of security guarantees had nothing to do with NATO as it is, Ukraine used, in particular, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council to express her concerns on the issue and succeeded in putting together the views of the NACC partners towards this problem. As a result, several Ministerial NACC statements comprised formulae of support to Ukraine's seeking of security guarantees in relation with acquiring non-nuclear-weapon state status. The role of the US - the leading Alliance member - was important in this regard, as well as the views of Central and East European NACC partners which openly expressed their understanding and support of Ukrainian concerns.

Noteworthy that in the course of rather speculative debates on the issue of NATO's future Ukraine was holding during 1992-1994 with her immediate western neighbours seeking Alliance membership, the views expressed by the sides on the role of the Alliance and its perspectives as an effective european security structure were mainly similar. The differences in the approaches of Ukraine and CEE applicants for NATO membership lied not in the overall political pohilosophy of modern european security debate but rather in practicalities and formalities of West-East security dialogue and its geographical framework. Ukraine was and still is critical about the geographically and politically restricted "6+3" formula of WEU cooperation with post-communist eastern democracies, considering this formula to be of rather "exclusive" character, contrary to the wider dimension of NACC and PFP cooperation framework. Similar conceptual approach was in fact taken towards the problem of formal NATO expansion.

Pursuing the policy of "indivisibility of security" in the course of greater european security debate, Ukraine expressed open support to the principle of "inclusiveness and not exclusiveness" which had been taken as the foundation of the US/NATO proposed Partnership for Peace. Ukraine became one of the first signatories to the PFP Framework Document and remains to be the champion of furthering wide cooperation in the PFP framework, viewing the Program as the very important practical excercise of former adversaries' cooperation "on the ground". Extremely significant in this context is the possibility of direct military-to-military collaboration,

including joint NATO allies' and former Warsaw Pact members' military units participation in the field exercises, which helps a lot to eliminate the "image of enemy" mentality. This particular point was among the principal positive aspects of PFP program accentuated in Ukraine's approach.

Other important aspects of Ukraine's stance towards PFP concern both internal and external political parameters of her national security doctrine and are directly connected with national views on the "enlargement" issue. It has to do with the above-mentioned "neutrality clause" in the fundamental legislative documents, and its correspondence to Ukraine's participation in the PFP. There were some comments in the public debate in Ukraine on whether this neutrality clause should prevent the country from joining any multilateral forms of security cooperation, PFP as well. The point of "inclusiveness" and, moreover, the examples of traditional european "neutrals" (Sweden, Finland, Austria), who, while joining PFP, are remaining cautious on their perspectives as for NATO membeship, are in fact the most important relevantly conceptual and formal feed-backs of Ukrainian approach toward the issue. Suffice it to mention in this particular respect that rather unpoliticized and "low profile" Ukraine's course in establishing formal relations with NATO through NACC and PFP mechanisms did not cause the strong political debate in the society, as it was the case in Russia. Both "neutrality clause" and highly profiled "nuclear-stamped" issue of security guarantees in conection with acceding of the country to NPT overshadowed the public attention.

Current Ukraine's official approach towards the issue of NATO expansion within the context of the already commenced official inter-Alliance debate on "how", may be summarized in several major points, reflecting the general development of the nation's security-related policies since independence.

First, it must be noted that Ukraine had never renounced principally the very idea of possible NATO expansion as the variant of its future development. The logics of this approach stems directly from the open understanding shared by Ukraine that the issue of this or that structure's enlargement primarily lies within the scope of responsibilities of the very structure and the applicant country. No one can exercise a sort of a "veto power" on the deliberate decisions of nations of whether or not to join any international organisation. This is a normal and recognised principle of interstate behaviour and of international law.

Second, the above-mentioned "no-vetoes" principle must not be translated as the one which can be exercised without taking into consideration the security concerns of other interested parties whose stability and security may be affected. This goes directly to the practical implementation of "indivisibility of security" in a united Europe principle, to which Ukraine pays close attention. Ukraine is firmly a promoter of building up a comprehensive and "inclusive" all-European security structure with adequate security assurances for every participant in such a Europe which won't be divided into military-political blocs. Ukraine considers the situation under which the

renovation of old security dividing lines in a new geographical framework may appear to be the most unhappy and even detrimental development for the cause of building up new undivided Europe.

Third. The overall security situation in Europe today is mainly characterized by the fact of the parallel existence of NATO and the Tashkent collective security treaty created by number of CIS states. Modalities and scopes of co-existence of these two structures, as well as perspectives of their possible co-operation and supplementarity, are not very much clear. Nonetheless, it is obvious, that the leading power of Tashkent treaty - Russia - holds a very negative stance towards the issue of NATO expansion to the east. It is also often being argued, that the Tashkent treaty structure - due to several important formal and political reasons - can not be truly regarded as the the genuine collective security institution.

Under such circumstances, an important part of public opinion in some NIS shares the view of parallels existing with the "cold war" period. Ukraine's coherent approach is by every means to avoid the situation in which such parallels may be drawn up, even in public opinion. Ukraine is also meeting with great concern the possibility of appearing in a position of a "buffer state" between the expanded NATO and unstable Tashkent treaty structure.

Fourth. Ukraine considers that clear-cut and persistent interest, expressed by the countries of the region of Central and Eastern Europe (the region, to which

Ukraine herself organically and historically belongs), to acquire quick membership in NATO, must influence the Alliance itself to reconsider its role in modern Europe, to widen the scope of its evolutionary development from the classic-type collective defense system to the type of the collective security institution, being relevant and efficient nucleus of future all-European security system. Ukraine, on her part, sees the full-scale participation in such a system as the necessary and natural assurance of her national security.

Fifth. Ukraine, not rejecting the very idea of possible NATO enlargement, sees this process not as a speedy and momentuous one. The realities of modern european security development and natural security concerns of Ukraine demand a certain unspecified period of time during which the question of NATO expansion should not be practically focused on two main issues, which are "who" and "when". This period of time is needed primarily for two reasons: a) not to politically overburden the unstable political situation in NIS on their road of building up open democratic societies, and, b) to save up time limit for the consensual evolution of new understanding by all european states of new NATO's role as the efficient mechanism for creating all-European security system in cooperation with other existing structures. Ukraine considers also that during this period of time special attention should be given to effective and deep implementation of the Partnership for Peace program, which in fact creates substantial opportunities for all interested countries (both partners and non-partners) to facilitate effective practical cooperation with the Alliance.

The specific point in Ukraine's views on the expansion are the issues of Russia-NATO and Ukraine-NATO relationships, which may seem to have many similarities in their overall assesment but do vary on some very important aspects.

Ukraine is obviously and quite naturally interested in developing normal and fruitful relations between NATO and Russia, including working out specific formal modalities of such relationship. Ukraine is very much confident in the view that it is impossible and even hazardous to consider that a sort of a new european security structure can be created without Russia. The mentioned "indivisibility of security" principle is crucial in this regard. There must not be any attempt at exercise in working out future european security architecture which may - for any possible reasons - create the feeling of "isolation" in this or that country, specifically in Russia, which has a unique geopolitical and security posture. On the other hand, Ukraine is non the less confident in the necessity of excluding any possibility of establishing a sort of "zones of influence" while seeking for a durable solution of NATO/Russia formal relationship.

Ukraine, which also possesses a specific geopolitical posture in today's Europe, considers it necessary to look more broadly at the scope of her relations with the Alliance. This approach is based on the presumption that NATO/Ukraine relationship, as well as NATO/Russia relationship, has an important role to play in the process of evolutionary Alliance's expansion, since the matter directly concerns the basic security

interests of a 52 million european nation which has one of the biggest military potential throughout the continent. While not making the application for NATO membership at the time, Ukraine deems it necessary to work out the modalities of a "special relationship" with the Alliance, beyond the framework of PFP and NACC. Developing the framework of NATO/Ukraine "special relationship", which must be a double-track and quite an intensive process, should go in parallel to the NATO/Russia dialogue, but the two processes should not be confused.

The problem here is that Ukraine, being a part of the NACC and a partner in PFP (as well as Russia is, and this is very important), does already have a form of formalized relationship with NATO, including in military sphere, but does not have such sort of formalized military ties with the CIS Tashkent collective security arrangement. The other side of it is that part of public opinion in NIS, especially in Russia, but to some extent also in Ukraine still has an inertia of thinking about NATO as of a rudimentary and "agressive" structure of the Cold war period. Under such circumstances, it is important to create an adequate external and internal prerequisites for and in Ukraine and Russia which would prevent possible political uneasiness vis-a-vis future decisions on enlargement. The form of implementing of "inclusiveness" principle is nowadays one of the most pressing issues in the whole framework of the expansion debate. Ukrainian point here is very much clear: the environment for taking such important decisions, affecting the existing and future european security architecture, must be ripe not only in the context of NATO/ applicant countries

relationship, but also in the regions and countries directly interested and involved in general european security dialogue.

Ukraine's position on this background is different from that of Russia. Russia, as a big and in fact global power, has its own very specific security profile and interests. Ukraine, being not a global power and trying not to claim some global security interests for herself, is mainly preoccupied with the perspectives of creating stable and friendly external environment for proceeding with a crucial task of transforming the country into an open democratic european society with market economy. In this context both developing closer and mutually beneficial ties with Russia and the same ties with her immediate western neighbours, as well as gradual extension of relations with the West, are the tasks of principal priority for Ukraine.

In the East Ukraine exploits the mechanisms of deepening bilateral dialogue with Russia and other NIS, as well as the possibilities of CIS structures, to achieve these ends. In the immediate west the most efficient mechanisms of these activities of Ukraine prove to be mainly bilateral. As for the relations with the West in general, Ukraine combines both bilateral and multilateral schemes but feels a sufficient lack of latters. In fact, the only West-designed structure for a security dialogue of which Ukraine is a part now is the NACC - a NATO subsidiary - which provides for a very limited scope of adressing basic security interests of the nation. The PFP scheme is a very important and quite logical extension of whole NACC design, which has an immensely useful practical dimension, but it can not be regarded as a sort of

international security structure. Having in mind the "neutrality clause" and specific geopolitical location of Ukraine, which, according to recent Secretary Christopher's statement, "is a linchpin of European security", it is extremely important for the cause of enhancing all-European stability and security that Ukraine keeps a proper and efficient "linkeage" position between Central Europe and Russia. The adequate balance of Ukraine's relationships with the West and East is also non the less important. An uncontroversial solution for safeguarding this specific role of Ukraine, which already has obtained security guarantees of five nuclear countries both of the West and East, is, as we see it, working out a closer formal relationship with NATO in the context of the mentioned "special relations" formula while preserving open and close special relationship with Russia.

It is worth nothing that the average public and political views on NATO in Ukraine and Russia are not similar. Although the post-war communist ideological indoctrination of NATO's "agressiveness" and "enmity" still has traces of influence on public and political minds, situation changes. If Russia witnessed a heated political debate on the issue of "whether to join PFP" back in the first half of 1994, that was not the case for Ukraine. If Russia was put into situation to in fact cancel the planned joint military exercise with US units on Russian territory due to strong political opposition, Ukraine's military units have already twice took part in the military exercises under PFP aegis in Poland and Netherlands, and the joint US-Ukrainian exercise is planned to take place on Ukrainian territory in May 1995. Part of the

answer to this lies in the fact that, unlike Russia, Ukraine pursued rather "low profile" policy on these issues, preferring to take more pragmatic course of practical cooperation. These factors also influence the general scope of what may be achieved in the course of NATO/Ukraine and NATO/Russia dialogues.

Ukraine does not in any way want to somehow link the possible outcome of reaching a final result in a current NATO/Russia negotiations with the prospects of Ukraine/NATO relationship, for these two cases are different. On the other hand, one can not rule out the obvious complexity of these issues, because of the very significance of Ukraine - Russia relationship.

Formally, the prospects of reaching a closer Ukraine/NATO tie seem to be more feasible at the time, since the two sides do not have outstanding issues at their agenda. Russian approach for the expansion for the time being impedes the prospects of finding quick mutually attainable solution. In the final end however, the outcome of NATO/Russia negotiations, being an important part of the "openness and transparency" formula of "how" exercise, cannot but influence not only the whole framework of current process within the Alliance, but also the modalities of Ukraine/NATO future relationship. The simple reasons here are the characteristics of existing Ukraine/Russia relations and the factor of Ukraine/CIS and Russia/CIS stances.

The prospects of achieving a consensual view on the essence of possible

Russia/NATO and Ukraine/NATO formal relationship are unclear for the time being. Part of this unclearness can be traced to the issue of possible "compromise" in NATO/Russia general dialogue. Too many important aspects of European security are within the scope of this "expansion-related" dialogue between the Alliance and Russian Federation, and they are matters of high priority from the interested countries' perspective. Ukraine is not an exclusion.

The public debate is now under way in Central and East European countries, Ukraine included, and some New Independent States on the parameters of the so called Grand Compromise between the Alliance and Russia. Several options are being discussed for proposed "package deal". Some of these are not out of scope of Ukraine's concerns.

Ukraine for a long time was and still is consistent in her view that any possible "spheres of influence" balance deal is absolutely irrelevant in today's Europe. Either the attempts at creating the image that different "zones of responsibility" may appear in Europe are very dangerous. This particularly refers to the issue of the so called "specific responsibility of Russia" on the territory of the former Soviet Union. Although one may argue that the whole issue carries a significant ideological and propagandistic load, it is important to note that these arguments do have important influence on the public opinion in the post-communist societies, which experienced decades-long ruling of totalitarian "closed island" ideology. Ukraine, being the biggest

and the closest neighbour of Russian Federation and having specific kind of historic relationship, is the most exemplary case of the complexity of this problem. Disruption of ties between Russia and Ukraine is both unwise and unrealistic. Adding "outer" security element in Ukraine-Russia complicated bilateral dialogue is by every means not an easing of this dialogue, even if real policy is balanced and well-designed. Avoiding, in the context of NATO expansion debate, the possibility of "greater Russian influence" in the so called "near abroad" thus becomes a very important task and, in fact, one of the most challenging issues specifically concerning Ukraine. On this background, the need for adequate facilitating of non-confronting "parallelism" in proceedings of Russia/NATO and Ukraine/NATO dialogues on the modalities of their future formal relationships acquires additional importance. PFP framework does provide sufficient and proper mechanism to achieve these ends, and it should be exploited. Basic issue here is Russia's attitude towards PFP. Having become a part of the Program since June 1994, Russia then took a specific stance vis-a-vis the prospects of its active participation. Ukraine, on her side, had been clear on supporting Russia's active participation in the PFP, considering this element as one of the important new linkages in the whole spectrum of emerging all-european ties in the field of security. Still Ukraine speaks for broader cooperation of Russia within the PFP framework, and is as well supportive to the idea of widening the list of participants.

The types of relationship between NATO and Ukraine/Russia in the final end would inevitably reveal significant differences. They should not be approached in

the terms of who of these two biggest NIS on the territory of the FSU will come "closer" to the Alliance in developing formal ties. The essence of the two cases is different not only due to understandable geopolitics. Russia is a part of the CIS collective security arrangement, and Ukraine is not. Russia is a nuclear power, and Ukraine is completing implementation of START-1, approaching the de-facto status of non-nuclear country. Ukraine and Russia are very special partners not only within CIS, but also in pure bilateral historic dimension. At last, Russia and Ukraine still have not finally sorted out some important bilateral issues which have both internal and external security dimension (Black Sea Fleet).

All these realities lead to a pre-judgement that possible outcome of NATO/Ukraine and NATO/Russia dialogue on the form of relationship should be seen from not conciding perspectives. Additional important aspect in this context is the fact that two countries have different views on the possibility of proceeding with concerted "CIS" approach towards PFP and the issue of NATO expansion. What may be understood as seeking a consensual view on the security-related issue amongst the members of a security structure (Tashkent Treaty), does not necessarily go in line with the political framework and modalities of PFP Program and the proposed individual character of "why and how", as well as future "who and when" discussion on enlargement. Ukraine's point of view here is based on the already mentioned clear-cut adherence to "indivisibility of security" principle, as well as to the principles of inclusiveness, openness and transparency in the terms of the evolutionary process.

What may be seen as the final result of Ukraine/NATO dialogue on relationship, is not very much clear for the time being, since the very process of "how" study shows immense complexity. Nevertheless, Ukraine would definitely be interested in such sort of relationship to NATO, which will embrace both regular political and close practical military ties, the specific format of NATO/Ukraine security consultations on the constant basis, as well as direct participation in some Alliance's bodies dealing with specific activities in which Ukraine is definitely interested. This will not lead, for the time being, to putting by Ukraine the issue of application or seeking Article 5 guarantees. This will, at the same time, be understood as creating such sort of environment in formal Ukraine/NATO relationship which embraces both "16+1" and wider multilateral formulae, keeps the future options open and generally connected to the development of the new European security architecture, and is not translated by any country as infringing upon its security interests. The latter premise is definitely the most controversial and complex one, and may specifically be seen in the context of Russia/ NATO dialogue.

In the long-term prognosis, deliberations around NATO expansion issue should lead, together with the OSCE discussion on the security model for the XXI century, to a more clear and more wider and comprehensive idea of what should future European security architecture look like. Ukraine, championing balanced, evolutionary and step by step approach towards the issue of possible future NATO enlargement, speaks consistently for concentrating united efforts on the creation of a new security

system for Greater Europe which will embrace all interested countries without any exceptions in the Transatlantic region. Existing security institutions, notably OSCE, NATO and WEU should serve as nuclei of this future system. The problem now lies in the essence and modalities of "interlockage" between these institutions without entering potentially dangerous issues of hierarchy, "chain of command" or whatsoever. The new consensual security concept for Europe should arise. Time is pressing.


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
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SYSTEM OF EUROPEAN SECURITY: THE BELARUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE

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System of European Security: the Belarussian Perspective

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The second part of 80s commenced deep changes in the world policy. The post-war world order has undergone radical changes before our very eyes. The system disease that had been for a long time undermining forces of the communist nations and regimes finally led to their disappearance, break-up of their military-political organisation - Warsaw Treaty, collapse of the USSR - stronghold of the world communism.

The most impetuous processes accompanied by the outbursts of a uncontrolled energy took place and are still in progress in Europe.

The transitional period from non-democratic authoritarian super-centralised orders to democracy and market economy entails such contradictory phenomena as a more or less partial lost of controllability of social processes and a reinforcement of military-political instability. The epoch defies new challenges to Europe.

The former, actually distorted security system based on the opposition of the blocks and the policy of nuclear deterrence and "fear balance" is razed to the ground and will not be restored anymore.

The outline of a new system has just began to take shape. The key principle "you strive for peace - get ready for war" that used to

back up the post-war security system changed. Today, the system of European security gets filled with mutual activity towards prevention and handling conflict situations wherever on the continent, instead of preparing for military conflicts with a defined enemy.

Meanwhile, we can speak about that in terms of potential possibility only. Instead of stability and predictability of the former communist nations we have instability and unpredictability of the post-communist period. The politicians of the moment that hold power now lack the understanding of "game rules" and conjuncture being often represented by militant nationalism.

These changes are especially vivid in some states newly formed on the ruins of the USSR. And that seems to be a major threat to Europe.

The uncontrolled, actually spontaneous break-up of the Soviet Union led to spontaneous uncivilised division of arms and military equipment. Such a division was based on a formally territorial principle, i. e. the location of arms and equipment by the time of complete collapse of the USSR, what turned out to be a conflict source itself.

The threat to security and stability in Europe was also burdened by uncertainty upon the fate of nuclear arms located on the territories of four independent states - Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus.

The dramatic opposition between Russia and Ukraine on the Black Sea fleet issue as well as their notorious rivalry in nuclear arms controls and attempts to ground their belongings on the territorial principal - these are just echoes of the spontaneous disintegration of the Soviet Union.

Degeneracy of national liberation and democratic movements in some republics of the former USSR into a wild nationalism has totally nothing to do with democracy and is a serious instability factor and a source of interethnic conflicts. Nationalism always tries to find an excuse for its existence creating an "enemy image". It is irrational and when combined with power and nuclear ambitions becomes an extremely flammable mixture. Russia most often gets to appear in such an "enemy image" or is considered as an "empire of evil".

>From my point of view, it is not only due to the distorted consciousness of nationalism. It is also due to the inconsequent Russian policy in the neighbouring states.

Reinforcement of anti-Russian attitudes in some of the neighbouring countries is a reaction to the attempt of certain officials in the Russian establishment to make policy in those countries from the position of "economic egoism" and to their intention to stay apart from a deep energy and financial crisis that enveloped the former republics. This crisis appears to be a basic instability factor.

Under conditions of economic discord the efficiency of civil controls over armed forces, that despite of its national colouring in many newly states retain the psychology and traditions of the Soviet Army, is reducing. The acute problems of technical and welfare provision of national armed forces is no doubt one more risks factor. The recent events on the Black Sea fleet might serve as an illustration to the said above. Under conditions of economic unsuitability the idea of national belongings of nuclear arms cannot be justified.

The ghost of theocratic regimes strolling around the CIS southern borders as well as reinforcement of religious fanaticism in Central Asian republics do undermine stability in this area.

Living standards being down and "neurotic reaction" of mass consciousness to the burden of material existence - all this makes stability even more relative.

Russia being called to serve as a stronghold of stability and security all around the former USSR is objectively not able to carry out this role, for Russia itself has been going through the acutest internal disorder, the system crisis of power. And even due to this Russia becomes a major hearth of unsuitability, a challenge to European security.

The interests of survival must make the West adequately answer the threats to stability. That is a condition of a great importance to security and well-being of Europe. And successful reforms in NIS creates market conditions for military-political stability, what is axiomatic. Western countries which used to spend from 3 up to 5 per cent out of their GNP on the arm-race must understand that creating of efficient system of European security through overcoming the crisis in eastern European nations will also require considerable expenses. But they must do that in the name of the armament costs cuts.

The shortest way to creating a secure and stable Europe lies through the opening of the European perspective for NIS and their including into the common European economic space involving in the process of "euroconstruction". I speak not only about a material technical and consulting assistance, an active exploration of the eastern markets and opening of the western ones free to the goods from CIS, but also about working out of a new architecture of European security and its institutionalisation.

The aim is to create a multi-level system of collective security and to ensure efficient interaction of its elements.

The North-Atlantic Council for Co-operation and the Helsinki Process must be given new development impulses. In the framework of the Helsinki Process it might be advisable to consider as one of the options establishing of European Security Council which would reflect, in the first place, common European interests and would ensure their organic tie-up with Atlantic links of the western European countries.

In this case, creating of a military political organisation is required for ensuring the European Security Council resolutions be carried out. Equal participation of the western central and eastern European nations seems to be an indispensable condition for existence of such an organisation as a guarantor of security and stability in Europe.

The same condition may be referred to NATO which at the moment revalidates the vision of its role in the modern world. NATO tends to step out beyond its traditional environment. But this role can be realised only when the NATO structure and organisation frames would be widened by bringing Russia and other independent states to its activity. That is an indispensable condition.

Otherwise, expansion of the NATO involvement in Europe might become a destructive and instability factor.

In the process of constructing of a new system of European security it is not acceptable to underestimate the role of the mentioned above "Atlantic factor" and, of course, its main body - USA. Recognising American right for its interest in Europe and its specific responsibility for maintaining peace and stability on the planet, it is necessary to define the admissible limits and spheres of the American involvement into European affairs. First of all, to avoid political interventionism in the areas that are traditionally beyond American "spheres of influence". That is absolutely relevant to the geopolitical area of the

former Soviet Union. Otherwise, collisions of national interests and new tension sources would be inevitable.

In these regions it seems to be more advisable to realise American political initiatives through supranational mechanisms and institutes, but not straightway. In this connection, I would like to draw your attention to a recent statement of the US Defence Minister Mr. Les Aspin regarding readiness of the USA to act as a go-between in Ukrainian-Russian negotiations on nuclear weapons and disarmament controls- issues. The same can be referred to the attempts to hand over the main peace-making role in Caucasus to USA.

Such limitations do not contain any anti-American attitudes. They are just a reflection of geopolitical realities and specific update international relations what means increasing the coordinative role of supranational institutes as well as strengthening of their integration function in the European affairs. Simultaneously, the process of creating of new supranational organisations and diversification of interstate associations on the regional basis are taking place.

Inevitably simplifying the architecture of European security I would mention what seems to be basic. That is going to be a complex multi-level configuration which will have "vertical" and "horizontal" dimensions. And herein lies its most principal difference from the post-war system, which reflected bipolar structure of Europe and the world.

The horizontal section of the new European security system gives a picture of the crossing spheres of influence and interaction of different regional organisations.

If we accept this theory then the idea of the complete neutrality of Belarus proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence makes no

sense. It becomes synonym to voluntary self-isolation of Belarus and leads to the injury of its national interests.

A complicated "holographic" perception of the future European security gives us the opportunity to ground the perspective of Belarus participation in creating such regional associations as the Baltic and Black Sea Union, association of the states from "Vyzegrad group" as well as "NATO-bis" or "Warsaw Pact" suggested by the Polish president. According to Lekh Valensa this union of the states aimed at co-operation and security would include Poland Hungary Czech Republic Slovak Republic Moldova Ukraine Romania Baltic states and Belarus. The idea of "NATO-bis" has emerged not on an empty spot. It reflects the traditional economic and political attraction of ex-partners on the Warsaw Treaty united within common geopolitical space. And as the observers have noted that is a reaction to unwilling of the West to open up its markets and NATO doors to eastern European countries. Even the superficial analysis of this idea confirms its right for existence.

However, I cannot but caution the inspirers of this project against any attempts to play out the "threat from the East" card. If the Warsaw Pact or the Baltic and Black Sea Union have the anti-Russian grounding the Bickford fuse will stretch out from them to explosives over the whole system of European security.

On the other hand, there are not any serious reasons for anxiety except some provocative statements. And it is quite unexplainable that the reaction of the half-official Russian press to the "Warsaw Pact" is rather rigid, what means a steady hostility of Russia to the second idea of creating a belt of non-nuclear states of the Baltic and Black Sea region. That is a natural right of every sovereign state to get together for the sake of national security.

>From the very beginning, Brussels Summit was doomed to commence a new stage in NATO history and to finally reconsider the role and the place of this military-political organisation in the changed world. Out of the "cold war" and the bloc opposition NATO came as a winner having buried its long-term enemy, Warsaw Treaty Organisation, under the fragments of communism. But NATO itself was not more able to live in the old way. Stability and world order through mutual co-operation being on agenda for modern policy have required a basically new architecture of European and global security. The major problem here is to work out a proper correlation between NATO and other key constructive elements (UN, EC, CSCE, WEU) and their relevant location on the different levels of the global security system.

In the course of discussion held right before the Summit it was clear that political realism was taking a victory in the NATO circles. The eastern European countries step out with a proposal to directly join NATO and the first violin in this company was played by Poland. In the last days before Summit the eastern European countries united in the club of NATO candidates came to decisive actions and started a tough pressing towards the NATO leadership and the head of states of its members. In late December the Polish president Lech Valesa gave an interview to the "Washington Post" newspaper in which he stated that "the Russian bear cannot be tamed" and "if the West does not listen up to the Polish arguments, the devils will awake and something like Yugoslavia may happen. The statements like that was also made by the Czech and Hungarian leaders. On the very eve of the New Year Lithuania being scared by the results of parliament elections in Russia knocked the NATO doors too. "Zhirinovsky's factor" and the increase of pro-empire and ultra-national attitudes in Russia became a "trump card" in the statement made after the meeting of the Defence Ministers from the eastern European countries that was held last Friday in Warsaw.

The increase of pro-NATO's attitudes in the eastern European countries was also encouraged by the absence of clearness on this issue in Russia itself. Boris Yeltsin actually approved their endeavours to NATO during his visit to Warsaw. It is hard to say whether it was one more "improvisation" of the Russian president. But in fact, several weeks later the official Moscow expressed its critical attitude to the plans of NATO expanding. Most rigid it was heard in the last statement of the press-secretary of the Russian president in terms of Lithuania.

Today we can be quite confident that the West held out against the pressure of the central and eastern Europe, and a simple - yet deceptive decision about expanding of the NATO's responsibility zone in the East through accepting new members did not succeed. Does that mean that the West remained deaf to Lech Valesa's warnings about the war devils dozing in Russia and to the arguments of other eastern European countries? Does that mean that NATO effaced itself under the pressing from the Kremlin. Of course, not. Choosing between bad and the worst, the leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty stuck to a more cautious and considered position. We should particularly note the efforts of the official representatives of the USA and France contributed the most to their success.

So, what factors and arguments made the NATO leaders come to such a decision?

First of all, their awareness that the consequences of widening of the NATO membership list would not work on promotion of the European and global security but rather on its undermining. Quantity in such a question not always turns into quality. At this background, the idea of "partnership for peace" put forward by the White House seems to be more attractive. It gradually spreads out the influence of NATO as a global militarypolitical organisation on the whole space of the central and eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. This idea does not bring back to

life the ghosts of the block policy and the "sanitary cordon", but it creates equal possibilities and qualification conditions for all exmembers of the Warsaw Treaty. And what is the most important - it has Russia involved on the partnership grounds.

Secondly, reinforcement of processes of the European integration being in progress at the background of an apparent unwilling of the USA -the main Atlantic NATO support, to participate in ground operations in the conflict regions of Europe (for example, in Yugoslavia) premises prerequisites for redistribution of the roles between NATO and WEU and for promotion of the last as an organisation which will take the main responsibility for continental security prevention and solution of conflict situations in Europe. It seems logical in the common context of Euroconstruction where WEU is an instrument of the Western Union. That is why, as distinct from entering into NATO there is basically no objections against the proposal to the eastern European countries to join WEU as associated members, the more so they are the full members of the Council of Europe.

Thirdly, we cannot but agree that even if to believe the NATO leaders that they have not any intentions to create a "sanitary cordon" in the central Europe, many things would happen apart or even against some subjective intentions. Moreover, there is an institutional security what means that military-political organisations, NATO included live under their own rules. In this case the reaction of Russia is quite natural. Getting close to its borders is understood as a threat to the Russian security.

Fourthly, the West cannot but see that striving of Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Romania and other central- and eastern European states for the NATO membership was also encouraged by economic reasons. In such a way, they were trying to break through to the Western markets.

At last, since Russia remains a powerful military nation and historically has interests in the eastern Europe and the Baltics, it becomes one more important reason. We should also take into account a forceful inertia of anti-NATO attitudes in the Russian society. The acceptance of new members into NATO from the eastern European states would definitely cause the wave of chauvinism and empire ambitions what might lead to an uncontrolled collapse of its political system and chaos with nuclear weapons. That is the time when the war devils can wake up. It is more important to the West to preserve the readiness of Russia for co-operation and movement towards reforms than give away instant security guarantees to the central- and eastern European states. And this position will be in effect until any direct threat to the continent emerges from Moscow. But even in such a case the West will know what to do, as explained clearly by the American senator Sam Nunn: if proempire forces in Russia take a victory, formation of an anti-Russian coalition will be inevitable. In that case, Russia will be to blame in having a new "sanitary cordon" around.

If Poland was accepted into the Treaty, that would bring NATO close to Belarus borders. That would put us before a tough choice and would mean a tight closeness with Russia in the common opposition to the West. Fortunately, the events took another way, and Belarus got a chance to foster co-operation both with the West and the East.

The independent Belarus is located right between two polars - highly integrated western Europe and Russia. Due to such a geopolitical position Belarus must create two vectors in its foreign policy levelling gradually the disbalance legacy. This process of deliverance from economic super dependence upon Russia and from political monorientation towards Russia will take many years. Russia is to leave behind any jealousy and partial attitude. I speak about a natural process of self-realisation of Belarus that has realised its national interests. In fact,

Eurasian Russia itself has the same active foreign policy course at any directions supporting and cementing with its membership different regional unions and associations. Besides, Russia will remain a strategic ally and partner of Belarus at any case.


Proceeding from the up-date placing of the forces in Europe indivisibility of European security and the highest integration of the CIS states, the outlined paradigm of European security, the place and the role of Belarus in this paradigm neutralise all basic objections against the Collective Security Treaty. There is no alternative to such a militarypolitical union on the Eurasian direction. Another thing is that Belarus must define principals terms of such a participation and limits of involvement due to its own national interests. That is an inalienable right.

The main choice for Europe today lies between restoration of the bloc post-war structure revival of the "Versailles system" and creation of a new flexible multi-level system of security and cooperation. It is a quintessence of the whole said above. Should we make a choice?! The earlier political leaders realise that and throw away the foolish illusions of prosperity in neutrality, the best it will be for Belarus itself. The shortest its way to Europe.

Over the whole period of NATO existence, since that very first day when in April 1949 in Washington, D.C. was signed the North Atlantic Treaty, there have not been a lot of any events comparable by their dramatism and significance to what was taking place on the eve of the last Summit in Brussels.

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
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1995 NATO SYMPOSIUM

**"NATO EXPANSION:
OPINIONS AND OPTIONS"**

**APRIL 24-25, 1995
WASHINGTON, DC**



***IF NATO EXPANDS, HOW MUST NATO CHANGE?
THE POLITICAL DIMENSION***

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NATO EXPANSION: Opinions and Options**24-25 April****Panel IV: IF NATO EXPANDS, HOW MUST NATO CHANGE?****The Political Dimension****Hans Jochen Peters, Head, Partnership and Cooperation Section,
Political Affairs Division, NATO**

The enlargement of NATO will be the most significant decision the organization has had to take since the dual track decision of 1979. And like the decision of 1979, it may entail long-range consequences, many of which are as yet unforeseeable. Enlarging NATO launches us all on a voyage of discovery. Not only will it change NATO, it will also deeply change the environment in which NATO operates. It is therefore not surprising that opinions on enlargement are divergent and intense.

Enlarging NATO will be an act of major political significance -- not only for those who join, but also for those left out and indeed for those already Alliance members. That is why the study launched by NATO Foreign Ministers last December on the "how" of enlargement is so important. We need to prepare such a decision as carefully as we can.

The NATO Summit of January 1994 accepted in principle that NATO would enlarge, although it did not specify the steps to be followed. Some analysts believed that NATO enlargement should follow in the wake of the European Union's own enlargement, sometime in the early years of the next century. Others thought that too close a link between the two enlargement processes would not be advisable

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but that an extensive period of preparation through Partnership for Peace (PfP) should precede NATO's enlargement. Still others hoped that an improving security situation and the development of good cooperative ties with Russia might obviate over time the urgency and possibly the very need for Alliance enlargement.

The undertaking of a study -- which started immediately after the December Ministerial and has covered much ground since then -- should not be seen as a delaying mechanism. Rather, it represents the first essential step in the process of enlargement - namely, the building of consensus among the existing 16 Allies on how new members will be brought into the Alliance. Unless all 16 Allies can harmonize their ideas and agree on the "how", there is no possibility of agreeing on the "who" and the "when".

There will be no difficulty in "selling" membership of NATO to countries in Central and Eastern Europe. They have been clamouring for it since the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact disintegrated several years ago. But we may have more difficulties in persuading our own publics and parliamentarians to ratify enlargement, especially if the costs are not known and the additional security benefits it will bring not clearly presented. This task should not be underestimated. Here the experience of the Maastricht Treaty ratification is salutary. It took almost three years for that Treaty to be ratified, and in some countries the debate was so difficult and divisive that the EU's standing was severely damaged. We do not want to repeat that experience with NATO enlargement. It is, by the way, one of the big advantages of the internal enlargement study that the 16 governments will have a common, agreed "set of

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arguments" at their disposal in the forthcoming ratification debate.

The basic question to be addressed is whether NATO will remain an effective security actor after enlargement? In arguing that inclusion in NATO will give a necessary stimulus to the new democracies in their reform processes, we should not overlook what NATO has achieved during the years of the Cold War and now its aftermath. It created the conditions for unprecedented security cooperation in a continent which for centuries preferred to achieve security through uncertain and unstable balances of power. Nor could the post-Cold War era of cooperation have been realised without NATO.

It is important to understand that NATO does not have to "go East or die"; It does not need to enlarge to remain relevant. Rather, the Alliance's relevance comes from the major role it has assumed in shaping European security. We are, along with other European institutions and countries, trying to construct a framework for European security which at once reduces the possibility of major conflict and, just as importantly, multiplies the opportunities for real security cooperation between countries. To put it another way, we are enlarging the benefits of the kind of close security cooperation which has developed over more than 4 decades between present Alliance members. One way of extending this relevance is to enlarge NATO's membership - but only if it is consistent with the new framework of European security.

In developing this framework NATO itself has undergone a profound and rapid adaptation to the new post-Cold War environment. After the 1991 Rome

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Summit, the NATO Secretary, General Manfred Wörner, concluded that NATO had become a new Alliance:

"The decisions taken at the recent summit of the North Atlantic Alliance in Rome signifies nothing less than the birth of a new Atlantic Alliance - an Alliance with a broadened political role, a new strategic concept, ever closer cooperative relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, a stronger European pillar within the Alliance and a new structure of forces which are considerably reduced. The Alliance reacted thus to the changed situation and by doing so once again proved its vitality."

The Rome Summit set the stage for a number of subsequent decisions. One of these was taken a scant month later in December 1991, when the North Atlantic Council established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as a forum for discussion and concrete cooperation in the area of security and security-related issues. The purpose of the NACC was the projection of political stability which was (and continues to be) a fragile commodity in post Cold War Eastern Europe. With the NACC came the beginning of NATO's outreach policy to its East. That was in late 1991. Two years later a substantial new addition was made in the form of the Alliance's Partnership for Peace.

The Brussels Summit in January 1994 that launched Partnership for Peace also decided that NATO would enlarge to admit new members. It is important to examine the inter-relationship of these two decisions. They both went far beyond the mere process of adapting NATO to the new international strategic environment. Both will be elements of the very foundations of the future European security architecture.

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Some commentators have recently suggested that the Partnership had been oversold, that it lacked enough substance to provide the closer ties to NATO sought by many Central and East European states. But PfP has yet to achieve its full potential, and this cannot occur just overnight. Consider the objectives of the Partnership:

- to bring the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as other OSCE member states, closer to NATO as a community of nations sharing the values of democracy, liberty, pluralism and the rule of law;
- to provide all partners with a means to develop ever closer cooperative military relations with the Alliance and other partners;
- to develop transparency in defence planning and budgetary processes and thus enhance confidence among participating states;
- to strengthen the democratic control of armed forces; and,
- to increase the capability and the readiness of states to contribute with NATO and other partner countries in the areas of peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, search and rescue and other agreed activities.

If anything, the Partnership has been undersold. Its substance will accrue as and when the individual programmes take root and depending on their

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nature. And that will be as usual a matter of initiative and resources which the Partners themselves bring to their programmes.

Could enlargement damage PfP? By taking out presumably the most active present PfP participants, by discouraging those who do not join in the first wave, by developing a relationship with Russia beyond PfP - there may be a few countries tempted to reconsider the usefulness of their participation in the elaborate framework we have put in place. Enlargement may mean that we will have to find new ideas of substance to invigorate PfP to ensure that those outside the expanded NATO have an interest in further maintaining their cooperative ties with us.

This may particularly be the case with Russia. Russia remains the strongest military power in Europe, the only country that can change the political configuration in Europe through military means. This accounts for the enormous interest NATO Allies have in helping the process of Russian reform succeed. If Russia develops along the lines of a market-oriented democracy, most of the pressing security problems in and beyond Europe would appear to be manageable, be they nuclear proliferation, regional conflicts, or conventional arms sales. By contrast, if Russia slides back into a confrontational pattern, crisis management in and beyond Europe would become far more difficult, to say the least. Would we have to resurrect a policy of containment as a result?

Of course, few people - either in the West or in Russia - believe that the current phase of domestic turmoil in Russia will end anytime soon. But this does not

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change the need to engage Russia in a constructive, open-minded dialogue on security matters on common concern. We could easily become victims of a self-fulfilling prophecy if we simply assumed that Russia was fundamentally un-reformable.

This is why an enhanced relationship with Russia must be part and parcel of NATO's enlargement process, and why this process itself must remain highly transparent. We are willing to take into account Russia's weight in European security and its legitimate security interests. In addition to the invitation to Russia to join the Partnership for Peace, we have offered Russia an enhanced dialogue and cooperation in areas where Russia and the Alliance have important contributions to make. It is unfortunate that Russia, after drafting the relevant documents together with us, then decided not to sign them. More and more the message from Russia seems to be that Russia wants to make the NATO-Russia relationship a hostage to the enlargement issue; NATO's enlargement being interpreted in outdated terms as part of "zero sum game", instead, as we do, as a step which will increase stability and security in the whole of Europe and thus be clearly also in Russia's interest. The question becomes one of assessing the mood and prevailing political currents in Moscow, as next year's presidential elections draw nearer. How far does Russia want to take its relationship with NATO? Is it using the enlargement issue as a bargaining chip to obtain a more substantive consultative relationship - perhaps in treaty form - with NATO on the bigger political and security issues in Europe? I believe that the NATO Ministerial meeting at the end of May will address these questions, in assessing how NATO's cooperative relationship with Russia, both through PfP and beyond it, will impinge on the enlargement process and vice-versa. In any event, the last word on this matter

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has not been spoken. NATO and Russia are simply too important for European security to "artificially" ignore each other. Russia is too big to be isolated from Europe; it can therefore only isolate itself.

Let me now turn to some more specific questions regarding NATO's enlargement:

Since its inception, NATO has taken in new members on three occasions: in 1952 Greece and Turkey joined; in 1955, the Federal Republic of Germany; and in 1982, Spain. No enlargement studies were deemed necessary on these previous occasions. This reflects the fact that the enlargement being conceptualised and prepared today is categorically different from previous enlargements in at least three important aspects.

In the past, only particular countries were invited to join. Today the number of countries which might be invited amounts to no less than 10. On the personal, but probably plausible, assumption that NATO would not consider including CIS member countries, i.e., Belarus and Ukraine (leaving aside here the very special case of Russia), options exist, at least theoretically, for the 4 so-called Visegrad countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary), the 3 Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) and the 3 South-Central European countries (Romania, Bulgaria and Albania). This means that the whole region of Central Europe, ranging from the Baltic to the Black Sea, is a possible subject for consideration. It is certainly true that some of these countries may have better chances than others, and some

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may have no realistic chances at all to be included in the foreseeable future. Experience advises however strongly against making any predictions.

Previous enlargements served primarily the purpose of extending protection to the new members via the Article V guarantees of the Washington Treaty. However, the second main purpose of inclusion in the Alliance - that of integrating new democracies into the community of states sharing the same values - also played an important role in each previous enlargement. This was especially true in the case of Germany and Spain. It is reflective of the changed security equation in the Europe of today that the main reason advanced by the Central and Eastern European countries for their wish to join NATO is not of a military but of a political nature. They want to belong to the Western family of nations. NATO is considered to be the main organization to join in order to belong to that community. This political rationale is certainly backed up and supported - in each individual case to various degrees - by perceived security concerns. The relationship between political and security related motives has, however, undoubtedly changed in favour of the political ones. This corresponds to the principal position of NATO that NATO's forthcoming enlargement must not draw new dividing lines in Europe, which means that it is not directed against any state. The practical implementation of this principle, that is the concrete modalities of the inclusion of new members in the political and particularly the military structures of the Alliance will, in my view, be of crucial importance for our future relations with Russia.

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Thirdly, all previous enlargements took place within the framework of a rigorously defined European security structure and further cemented it. The forthcoming enlargement, regardless of whoever will be invited and whenever the invitation(s) will be issued, will be one pivotal element of an ongoing process of building a new security structure. This structure would centre around an enlarged NATO, linked with partners through PfP. It was from this perspective that Richard Holbrooke characterised the present juncture as "the fourth architectural moment" - i.e., following 1815, 1919 and the late 1940s, which were also times when Europe's basic security architecture was substantially reshaped into a relatively long-lasting, stable and peaceful order.

Given the qualitatively different nature of the impending enlargement of NATO, the question also becomes one of where NATO must **not** change and how to ensure that it does not. If NATO's enlargement is to strengthen the security of the whole of Europe, including, of course, of its own member states, it must not lead to NATO's dilution. There is not a single decision which is not taken by consensus - the only conceivable rule for an organization charged with preserving the very security of its member states. Reaching consensus among 16 sovereign states has never been an easy task. As U. Nerlich has observed: "The typical state of the Alliance was [one] of crisis over some kind of project that served as a vehicle for marginal repositioning within the Alliance, if not for domestic needs". Even so, the process of consensus-building in the Alliance which has developed over more than 40 years of common work is part and parcel of a unique political culture. Any new member state will need some time to adapt to becoming a fully fledged member, just as the Alliance itself will need time to absorb any new member. And, if anything, the cohesion and

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solidarity in decision-making will be more difficult than before, for the simple reason that pressure from an outside threat is simply not there in the same way as during the Cold War.

There is certainly no law of nature which determines that the process of consensus building, which works at 16, is doomed to fail at 16 plus X. It is, however, not unreasonable to assume that there is a limit to the size of the organization, beyond which the process of consensus-building would become just unmanageable. This might seem to be a rather abstract and theoretical argument, and to a degree it certainly is. It is, however, driven by an appreciation of the overall political situation in Central and Eastern Europe, and the network of inter-regional relations - and tensions - that exist. It is a region which is still - or again - fraught with unresolved ethnic and border problems, many of which are rooted in the peace treaties of Versailles, Trianon and Saint Germain. It is possible that bilateral issues still not peacefully settled could come up anew, putting an additional burden on NATO's internal cohesion should these same countries be accepted as full NATO members. The export of stability by expansion will unavoidably mean a certain import of instability.

This, of course, is not a totally new challenge to NATO. NATO was never only about collective defence against an external aggressor, but always fulfilled at the same time "collective security tasks", the most striking example being of course the Greek-Turkish relationship. The fact that the fundamental security question - the question of "Peace or War" - is no longer a serious question, even not a question at all, among NATO member states is an achievement of NATO. It is only too obvious

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that some of the Central and Eastern European countries applying for membership wish to join in order to reap the benefits of this "collective security" function of the Alliance as a forum for peacefully settling bilateral problems. This is a perfectly legitimate motive and even welcome from NATO's point of view. But when considering enlargement, the assets and liabilities that each state brings will have to be weighed very carefully in every individual case. There are clear limits which exist, beyond which NATO's structures, at least as they are now, would be overburdened and the consensus-building and subsequent decision-making processes seriously impaired.

The same line of reasoning also applies not only to relations between new members themselves and new members and individual current member states, but also to relations between the new members and those left outside. Last Decembers' NAC communiqué stated that enlargement must strengthen security and stability as a whole and should not draw new dividing lines. This means that new members must be prepared to support NATO's policies, including the provision of aid for those remaining outside the Alliance; NATO's dialogue and cooperation with Russia; and NATO's contribution to UN and OSCE peacekeeping missions. It also means that new members must actively reach out across their own borders to those left outside. It will be vital to ensure that new members, who join the Alliance and therefore assume all the obligations and rights which membership entails, do not block the accession of further states on selfish grounds. For all these questions there is no guarantee and no water-tight solution. One can only hope that the collective political judgment and wisdom of the 16 or, at a later stage, possibly the 16+, will turn out to be right.

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All this might sound somewhat paternalistic towards potential new members. But these are important points and we have to get them right. NATO's credibility and effectiveness, and to a certain degree its very essence, is at stake. It would be too high a price to pay if enlargement leads to the dilution of the Alliance as a "hard" security agency - to its degradation into a "weak" collective security institution with a large and disparate membership.

What political changes will be required after enlargement? And what will be the impact of enlargement on NATO's agenda? It is certainly fair to assume that common positions of NATO encompassing 16+X countries will differ from those of the current NATO at 16. As new members will be expected to accept the political "acquis communautaire", medium and long term issues on NATO's agenda - on which NATO's position is still evolving - are of particular relevance in this regard. It is clear that much will depend on the timing, the concrete modalities and the scope NATO's enlargement process will take. What is possible at this stage is therefore no definite answers but rather "educated guesses" and sometimes not even that. It might therefore be better to just ask the questions without giving an answer.

The most fundamental task NATO is facing for the next years to come is certainly that of forging a new transatlantic bargain - to put our transatlantic relationship on a new foundation by fleshing out the twin pillar concept of NATO. Since last year NATO has made some headway in this concept with the proposal for Combined Joint Task Forces. The new NATO-WEU relationship which is evolving must, in the longer run, be followed by an equally coherent relationship between NATO and the European Union with whom the Alliance shares common strategic

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interests. What will be the contributions of new members to this debate, given that they seek to join the European Union and the WEU as full members as soon as possible and yet are very much dependent in defence terms on the transatlantic pillar?

Another long term issue that comes to mind is the recent effort of NATO to project stability to its South, the Mediterranean initiative. Although 5 Allies are situated along the Mediterranean, the overwhelming focus on East-West relations during the Cold War tempted the Alliance to overlook NATO's Mediterranean dimension. The recent Mediterranean initiative tried to create a re-balancing between the East-West and North-South dimension. Should one assume that enlargement will more or less automatically re-direct NATO's focus on East-West issues at the expense of the Southern dimension?

Another issue will be put on NATO's agenda by the very process of enlargement. How NATO will organize its relations with those Central and East European countries (except Russia) which will for whatever reasons not be invited to join the Alliance in the first wave?

Enlargement of NATO is not a political goal per se, but part and parcel of the process of building a comprehensive European security architecture, including the process of (re-)structuring the entire region of Central and Eastern Europe. If the inclusion of some countries in the Alliance will be perceived by those not invited to join as exclusion, leaving them in a "grey zone", a "no-man's land" of security, the consequences could be serious, leading to a decrease of stability instead of its increase. Any enlargement of NATO must therefore be complemented by most

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determined efforts of the Alliance and bilateral efforts of its member states to draw closer to the Alliance those countries left out. An enlarged Alliance will have to produce - not only to seek, but to achieve in reality - a close cooperative relationship with those countries. The instruments for doing so are already available: the North Atlantic Cooperation Council provides those countries with access to the political consultative and decision-making bodies of the Alliance. PfP provides them with a flexible instrument for ever closer military cooperation and in addition offers them the possibility of consultations with NATO in case of a direct and imminent military threat to their territorial integrity and independence. Our aim must be to make the difference between "export of stability" via inclusion in the alliance and the "projection of stability" via PfP and NACC as small as possible. I mentioned already the possible need to re-invigorate PfP in order to keep it attractive for those countries which will not be included in the first wave and may have no realistic prospects to be invited in the foreseeable future. NACC, being basically confined to political consultations, and thus "weaker" than PfP which focuses on concrete military cooperation might be an even more serious problem in this regard.


The last point concerns possible unwelcome political developments in Central and Eastern Europe induced by the very process of enlargement itself. Interlocutors from Central and Eastern European countries often make the point that the inclusion of their neighbour(s) without inviting also their own country, or at least giving it a concrete perspective to be also included at a later stage, would run the risk of creating most serious internal problems and even political instabilities. This should not be dismissed too early as being only part of a game of repositioning among potential new members. It makes it clear that it is necessary to "compensate" those


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countries left out in parallel to the process of integrating the new member states. The political and resource problems which NATO will face in order to successfully meet this challenge should not be underestimated. It is clear that new member states will have a particular responsibility and vocation in this regard and will be expected to make some considerable contributions to this long-term undertaking which one can expect to put considerable additional strain on NATO's resources.

I hope that what I have said gives you an idea of the range of difficult political and internal problems the hard decision to enlarge will pose to NATO. It is in my view, paradoxically, this very fact which might indicate that the decision to enlarge will, from an historical perspective, prove to have been the right one.






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"NATO EXPANSION: OPINIONS AND OPTIONS"

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THE DEFENSE PROGRAM QUESTION: THE MILITARY AND BUDGETARY DIMENSIONS OF NATO EXPANSION

DR. RICHARD L. KUGLER
RAND

**THE DEFENSE PROGRAM QUESTION:
THE MILITARY AND BUDGETARY DIMENSIONS OF NATO EXPANSION**

by

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I. INTRODUCTION

Although the task assigned to this paper is that of addressing the "Infrastructure Question" deriving from NATO expansion, the challenge facing the alliance will go far beyond that of merely creating an appropriate military infrastructure, as this term is commonly defined. When NATO analysts speak of "infrastructure", they normally are referring to the nuts and bolts of what underlies a force posture. This includes road and rail systems, reception facilities, ammo storage sites, POL pipelines, ports, airbases, interoperable weapons, common training, and the like. To be sure, a host of important infrastructure issues will rise to the fore as expansion occurs. But military infrastructure will be only one part of a much larger challenge facing the alliance. The larger challenge will be that of fashioning an overall "defense program" so that appropriate security arrangements vis-a-vis new members can be brought to life. In addition to infrastructure, this program will need to include initiatives for creating a command structure, and for upgrading the forces of new members while making them operationally compatible with NATO's forces. It also will require measures for improving the capacity of current NATO forces to work with the forces of new members, to help defend their territory, and to carry out other security missions with them. Only when this larger defense program is decided upon will it be possible to determine infrastructure goals and the host of other measures to be pursued.

Accordingly, this paper focuses on the larger "Defense Program Question". It seeks to shed some speculative insights on the looming issue of: "What kind of coordinated defense program will NATO and new members need to adopt as expansion occurs? How can this program best be carried out, how much will it likely cost, and who should pay for it?" In grappling with these tough questions, this paper's purpose is not advocacy. Nor does it pretend to offer definitive judgments about either programs or costs. The analysis of this entire topic is only in its infancy: a great deal of planning and analysis must be accomplished before anything concrete can be known. This paper merely endeavors to illuminate the issues and alternatives that may lie ahead, and to offer a general sense of the magnitude of the challenge facing NATO. Its purpose is to help educate and inform, not to prescribe anything specific.

In order to focus the analysis, this paper assumes that the four Visegrad states--Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia--will be joining NATO by the end of the 1990's. No claim is made here that the future is destined to unfold precisely this way. NATO has not yet fashioned a schedule for expansion. When it does so, NATO may choose to admit only one or two countries by the turn of the century, and more than four in the aftermath. Consequently this assumption says nothing definitive about

how expansion will begin or end. What it provides is merely a convenient mechanism for crudely gauging the programmatic agenda ahead. By allowing us to form an estimate of what may be needed to incorporate the four Visegrad states, it provides a reasonable basis for making inferences about the expansion process in general, regardless of who is admitted and when. All of the accompanying data, especially budget costs and force levels, are illustrative and unofficial. Official data will be available only after NATO, SHAPE, and the participating countries have had an opportunity to study these issues in far more depth than can be provided here.

II. THE NEED FOR A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

The best place to begin this analysis is to put things in proper perspective, for before the trees can be studied, the forest must be seen. The current debate on NATO expansion is largely cast in political terms. Defense issues typically are deemed secondary or too hot to handle. Yet postponing the inevitable is not normally a good idea--especially when important matters will soon be at stake. The act of admitting new members is truly a strategic undertaking, one that must be guided by a coherent sense of alliance policy and strategy. During the Cold War, NATO was preoccupied with deterrence and defense to the point where its activities took on a largely military character. Happily, those dark days have passed into history. The primary purpose of NATO expansion into East Central Europe (ECE) is not to erect a western military bloc there or to wage a new Cold War, but rather to help pursue larger political and economic objectives. These goals include strengthening democracy, bringing the ECE states into the western community, keeping EU and NATO membership in rough tandem, and fostering peaceful integration across Europe. At its heart, nonetheless, NATO remains a collective defense alliance. Wherever it goes, a security agenda of some sort will follow in its wake. This has always been the case in the past, and it will remain true as NATO enters the ECE region in the coming years.

The idea of keeping new members at an arms-length distance from NATO's defense mechanisms may appeal to some. So may the parallel idea of creating a kind of neutral zone in East Central Europe where alliance political commitments are made, but organized coalition defense activities do not take place. The viability of both ideas falls apart when the alliance's essence is considered. When they join, new members will become permanent parts of the NATO family and household, not mere neighbors. The act of expanding NATO will create two-way commitments and involvements that go far beyond those

fashioned by NACC or Partnership for Peace (PFP). NACC and PFP are important vehicles for establishing a security dialogue with former Warsaw Pact adversaries, and for creating a climate of growing cooperation. By contrast, formal entrance into NATO is a far more serious endeavor for everybody. New members will be required to accept all of the duties and responsibilities that accompany alliance membership. NATO, in turn, will accept a solemn treaty obligation under Article 5 to help give these countries a sense of security and protect them from external aggression. The result will be a tight bonding of these countries to the entire alliance. Today these countries are new friends with which the alliance is becoming familiar, but to whom it has no deep commitments. Once they join, these countries will become strategic blood brothers of NATO's current members. The alliance will be obligated to help protect them through thick and thin--in peace, crisis, and war.

The strategic importance of this Article 5 commitment is magnified because all of these new members reside in a region that is legendary for its chronic volatility. Some years ago, the alliance welcomed Spain into the fold. This step was troublesome enough, but it was eased because, owing to its location, Spain was not directly threatened by anybody. The act of admitting new members from East Central Europe will be a somewhat different proposition. Fortunately Europe no longer faces a hegemonical threat akin to the Cold War. Indeed, there are reasonable grounds for hope that Russia will emerge as a market democracy and a close partner of the West. Even so, nobody can be certain of what the future holds. This is the case for reasons that go well beyond worry about Russia. The entire ECE region, as well as the Balkans and Eurasia, are laced with many historical rivalries, simmering ethnic feuds, uncertain borders, and other geopolitical faultlines. Perhaps these troubles will fade as market democracy and western institutions spread across the region. Yet they remain realities today. The desire to gain protection from them is a primary reason why the Visegrad Four want to join NATO. In important ways, these countries will be entering NATO as "front line states": as countries that, while not exposed to a direct military threat, are situated on the frontier of the new era's emerging geopolitics.

To cite the Article 5 commitment is not to deny that it will play a vastly different and less center-stage role that was the case during the Cold War. Then, fear of major war was an ever-present reality. Article 5 consequently was at the forefront of NATO's *raison d'être*. In the coming years, the atmosphere will be more peaceful across all of Europe. Article 5 will take on the status of a backup reserve clause: a valued insurance policy, but one unlikely to be called upon. Moreover, the defense contingencies to be worried about will be far less threatening than during the Cold War. Then, theater-

wide conventional war and even nuclear conflict animated defense planning. In the coming era, defense planning will focus on a spectrum of less threatening contingencies, most of them at the low end of violence. Even so, the underlying if easily overlooked reality needs to be kept firmly in mind when the future defense agenda is contemplated. Expansion is more than just a political act. It is also a security and military step. NATO and ECE forces will be drawing close to each other for strategic reasons that go beyond learning how to operate together, or conducting purely peacetime missions, or promoting the larger cause of political integration. They also will be learning how to wage war together, and how to carry out collective defense commitments that will remain one important part of NATO's mission in life.

The security and defense requirements of these new members thus are something to be taken seriously by NATO as a whole. These countries will enter the alliance as nations perceiving a need for military protection from a host of contingencies: some big, others small; some imagined, and others real. The alliance will be legally obliged to work with them to craft this protection even as it takes parallel steps in diplomacy and economics to render the entire continent peaceful and democratic. Because the future is so uncertain, the worst thing that could be done is to extend a hollow political commitment whereby these countries are allowed to enter the alliance, but appropriate steps are not taken to fashion the security guarantees needed to help meet their defense requirements. In this event, these countries will have gained little by joining NATO. Equally important, NATO will have acquired entangling new commitments in a potentially dangerous region, but it may lack the capacity to carry them out at the moment of truth. To avoid this disastrous outcome, expansion will need to be accompanied by appropriate defense arrangements required to bring the Article 5 commitment and related security missions to life. This is the beginning point for putting expansion into proper strategic perspective.

The solemnness of this Article 5 commitment does not mean that NATO faces the task of fostering a level of military preparedness anywhere near to that of the Cold War. Indeed, the opposite will be the case. The dangers, threats, and requirements of the coming era will be far less than during the troubled past. For this reason, NATO's defense preparations can be commensurately smaller. In all likelihood, there will be no need for a major and outwardly provocative NATO military presence in East Central Europe in peacetime. Barring the unexpected, new members can be protected by improving their own forces, and by configuring NATO's forces so that modest numbers of them can move eastward in the event of a crisis. Consequently, the defense agenda ahead likely will not be an imposing one. It will not necessitate an earth-shaking upheaval in NATO's defense plans, forces, strategy, and budgets.

The alliance has undertaken far more demanding tasks many times in the past, and successfully carried them out. NATO therefore can approach this agenda with a calm sense of confidence that its resources will not be overwhelmed, and that the steps needed to defend new members will not themselves provoke a new Cold War with Russia.

Nonetheless, the alliance should not underestimate the complexity and demanding nature of what lies in store. Although this agenda will be manageable, it is not something that can be dismissed as trivial, or as easily accomplished in absence of concerted effort. Defending new members will require the performance of military missions that go well beyond PFP, which focuses mostly on peacekeeping and similarly modest operations. More will be involved than merely making ECE forces "interoperable" with NATO forces in a purely technical sense. Forces from new members and current NATO countries will need to be welded together so that they can carry out true coalition operations of a fairly demanding nature. Acting together, these forces will need to become capable of fulfilling new Article 5 commitments and carrying out other NATO military missions, such as peace-enforcement and crisis interventions outside the ECE region. At the moment, they are not fully capable of doing so. The problem lies partly with ECE forces and partly with NATO's own forces, both of which reflect their Cold War heritages. The act of bringing these forces into the new era and joining them together may be no more formidable than what NATO has experienced in the past, but it will be demanding enough in its own right. This agenda is not one that NATO can afford to ignore, or shrug off as too simple to worry about. The alliance will have to pull up its socks and get to work.

Exactly what will NATO need to do? In a nutshell, it evidently will need to fashion a comprehensive defense program of some sort to accompany expansion. The term "defense program" means a coordinated set of measures aimed at creating the military capabilities needed to carry out specific missions and attain well-defined security objectives. It can be large or small, but it normally is characterized by the blending together of numerous separate but interrelated activities over a period of time, often several years. Regardless of its size and character, what marks it is the expenditure of money, resources, and energy on behalf of a concrete purpose. It can involve the creation of something entirely new out of wholecloth, but equally often, it necessitates merely a limited set of improvements needed to bridge a partial gap between an existing military capability and a perceived requirement. Happily, this latter state-of-affairs will be the case for NATO when expansion occurs.

The ECE and NATO combat forces needed for the new missions and objectives already exist, as do most of the support assets. Thus, an expensive enlargement of the alliance's military posture will not be necessary. What seemingly will be needed is a far less expensive set of programmatic measures aimed at reconfiguring existing forces so that they can operate effectively together, perform the new coalition missions assigned them, deal with the contingencies of the future, and thereby render NATO's new members as secure as the rest of the alliance. Even so, these measures are nothing to be sneezed at. What is involved here is the combined defense of a new region well outside NATO's current borders and its old Cold War military perimeter, in interaction with national forces that, as of today, are not designed to operate with NATO's forces. The gap between existing capabilities and future requirements is not overwhelming, but when the thorny details are considered, it seems significant. This gap is eminently bridgeable with a patient effort over a period of time. Yet bridging it will require NATO and its new members to expend some energy on behalf of a common purpose. A remedial and constructive defense program will be needed--not sometime in the distant and discountable future, but fairly soon, for the future is arriving with a rush.

III. BUDGET COSTS AND FORCE GOALS

How much will the entire enterprise cost? This question is hard to answer with any single, fixed estimate. The reason is that the cost will be a variable, not a constant. It will depend upon the force goals and military horizons that NATO sets for itself, and upon the programmatic measures to be pursued, which can be few or many. An organizing concept will be needed, and NATO can turn to its own history for a variety of models. During the Cold War, military exigency compelled it to defend AFCENT with a large, multinational joint posture deployed near the old intra-German border. Yet NATO protected the flank countries through different models embodying alternative combinations of self-defense, logistic support, air forces, and ground forces through power projection. All of these models, and new models besides, will be available to NATO as it decides how new members are to be made secure.

If the alliance's goal is merely to configure ECE forces to defend themselves with NATO help only in the areas of C3I and logistics support, then the cost will be relatively low. If the alliance decides to supplement this commitment with sizable NATO combat forces through a purely power-projection

strategy from Western Europe, the cost will rise. The cost will grow further if steps are taken to develop a military infrastructure in East Central Europe so that NATO combat forces can deploy there quickly. Depending upon the choices made in these areas, a reasonable estimate is that the alliance-wide, 10-year "out of pocket" cost for a satisfactory program probably will fall in the range of \$10-50 billion. Along with these direct costs, there likely will be a need for a security assistance program to the ECE states in the form of FMS loans and grants to help finance replacement of obsolescent weapons.

As will be discussed below, this \$10-50 billion is the expense deriving from NATO expansion over-and-above the spending already programmed or otherwise required to maintain ECE and NATO forces at currently planned preparedness. It is the additional amount needed to bring NATO security guarantees and treaty commitments to life by upgrading ECE and NATO forces in the required ways. Up to \$20 billion reflects the cost of preparing ECE forces and infrastructure for NATO membership and missions. The remainder is the cost of configuring NATO forces for projection missions and equipping them with a forward infrastructure so that they can deploy rapidly to the east. This estimate, it is noteworthy, assumes that NATO refrains from stationing large forces in East Central Europe and that improvements to the ECE infrastructure are relatively austere. If either of these assumptions are violated in major ways, the cost could rise far higher--up to \$100 billion or more.

If a cost of \$10-50 billion is an accurate estimate, this is a plausibly affordable amount. By comparison, the life-cycle cost of a U.S. Army division is about \$60 billion, and the acquisition cost of individual U.S. weapon systems often runs \$20-30 billion or more. Yet in today's climate of fiscal stringency, it is not a trivial amount. Moreover, the difference between the low and high ends of this estimate is large. The low end buys one kind of capability; the high end, something better but more expensive. Where along this continuum does NATO want to fall? How much defense preparedness in East Central Europe does the alliance want, and how much is it willing to pay?

The program question boils down to the old hardy perennial that has confronted NATO since its inception: "How much is enough?". Because no single theory of military requirements stands out as the obvious choice, a strategic judgment will have to be made. NATO will need to make judgments about the level of insurance to be sought, the degree of risk to be accepted, and the theoretical dangers to be hedged against in an era of political ambiguity. The alliance will need to decide upon the nature of the security relationship to be crafted with the new ECE members, and upon the military strategy to be

pursued. Once again, the alliance will be confronted by the necessity for choice, and by the need to balance impulses that pull in opposite directions. The manner in which NATO chooses to balance these countervailing impulses will determine the costs of expansion. The alliance will have a variety of options at its disposal, with ascending levels of military commitment and capability. In the final analysis, policy and strategy will be the key driver of the choice.

Powerful factors will argue in favor of a modest program solely focused on making the ECE states militarily self-sufficient, and therefore not undertaking any special steps to prepare NATO combat forces to participate in their defense. These factors include the scarcity of defense funds across NATO, competing modernization priorities, the belief among some that the ECE region will be stable in absence of any weighty military shadow cast by NATO, and reluctance to do anything provocative that might upset Russia. The drawbacks of this limited approach, however, are obvious. The ECE states that will be joining NATO are all small or medium-sized powers. They will have military establishments capable of handling minor emergencies, but not fully capable of defending their borders and vital interests against larger regional dangers. All of these countries will be looking to NATO to provide not only moral support and logistics help, but also reassurance that sufficient alliance combat forces will be available to help them in a dire emergency. As full-fledged members of NATO, these countries will have legal rights to assurances of adequate protection: rights that are as powerful as those belonging to the alliance's oldest members. To the extent that these assurances are not provided, the vitality of NATO's collective defense pledge will be eroded. What good is an expanded but diluted alliance? If some members are defended less effectively than others, is not the entire collective defense pledge eroded?

For its part, NATO will have powerful incentives to back up its collective defense guarantees with combat forces of some magnitude. After all, the best way to exert influence over a fluid strategic situation in peace, crisis, and war is to provide combat forces, not merely logistics support. But what kind of combat forces, and in what quantities, will be enough? Will tactical air forces alone suffice? If so, how many fighter wings will be needed? Will ground forces also be required? If a joint posture is required, will a small force suffice: for example, three divisions and five fighter wings? Or will a much larger force be needed: for example, ten divisions and ten fighter wings? And what should be the internal mix of the posture selected? Should it be composed of air intercept forces and lightly configured ground units, or should it involve multimission air units and heavily armored ground forces?

The answers to these questions are anything but obvious, and will be determined by the strategic, political, and military goals that NATO sets for itself. What can be said is that the answers embraced by NATO will have a major impact on determining the budget costs of expansion. Because NATO's force posture today is not well-configured for projection operations into the ECE region and major missions there, each additional increment of combat power can be purchased only at a price. If NATO is satisfied with the capacity to project rather small forces in a slow-paced fashion, the cost may be minor. But if the goal is to project fairly large forces rapidly and effectively, the cost will rise. In all likelihood, NATO will not be able to afford, much less need, the permanent stationing of large combat forces in the ECE region in peacetime. Yet even a largely power-projection strategy from Western Europe will not be a free lunch, for significant programmatic measures will be needed for this strategy to be brought to life. Budgetary restraints may argue in favor of limited efforts, but military prudence may pull in the opposite direction.

If the budget cost for the entire program proves to fall near the high end of the spectrum, its relative importance and bearability needs to be kept in strategic perspective. The ECE states will be required to carry their fair share of the load, but they will lack the resources needed to upgrade their own postures and infrastructure to meet NATO standards, much less pay for a power-projection strategy from Western Europe. NATO's current members therefore will be required to carry a large share of the financial burden. Claims that a sizable program is unaffordable are belied by the fact that it will amount to only about 2-3% of what NATO already plans to spend in defense of current borders that are no longer seriously threatened. Even recognizing that small changes in spending patterns can have an upsetting effect, can room not be found for new programs to defend the part of Europe and NATO that genuinely may be endangered? Again, the answer may not be easily arrived at, but as expansion unfolds, NATO may find itself coming face-to-face with the question.

This expense, moreover, should not be seen exclusively through the prism of NATO expansion. Many of the measures contained in a sufficiently robust program might well be needed even if NATO does not expand. If expansion does not occur, after all, the goal of defending the ECE region will not go away. Indeed, it might be harder and more expensive to accomplish if the ECE states are kept out of the alliance, for the benefits of coalition planning will be lost. In addition, the act of configuring ECE and NATO forces in these ways will provide strategic benefits that go beyond merely protecting East Central Europe, for these forces will be better able to project power and operate together elsewhere.

Within the ECE region, the effect will be to make the prospect of expensive crises and wars far less likely. These strategic considerations make the budget costs of NATO expansion more bearable.

Regardless of how the costs are appraised, the key point is that NATO has multiple options at its disposal. It is not imprisoned by history, or by its present force posture, or by a menacing enemy, or by overburdening military requirements, or by inflexible budgetary realities. The alliance can carry out the military dimensions of expansion in a variety of ways, with costs that range from truly small to fairly large. Moreover, it can navigate the future with a step-by-step approach that surveys the situation at each stage, and adjusts its defense efforts accordingly. Yet the alliance does need to begin planning and deciding, for when strategic priorities are at stake, muddling through is almost always a bad idea. Equally important, NATO must begin thinking about these matters fairly soon. NATO treaty commitments will apply on the day new members join the alliance, not several years later. Because the lead time between program inception and execution is fairly long, the alliance will need to know how it plans to defend its new members at the time when they join the fold. Indeed, NATO would be best advised to get a jump on the process by beginning now, for momentum will soon start building, and it should be guided in the right direction.

What NATO needs to do is to bring its well-oiled force planning process to bear. Focusing on the coming ECE defense agenda, it needs to craft a strategic concept, a military strategy, balanced force goals, and appropriate programs that are adequately funded. A top-down approach of this sort is needed to avoid the fallacy of acting on multiple different fronts without a guiding vision in ways that are almost destined to produce a poorly construed outcome. Even with a sound approach, the act of preparing ECE and NATO defense arrangements for the coming era is not one that can be accomplished overnight. What likely will be needed is a 10-year plan, one that establishes coherent goals, coordinated programs, cost-control standards, and fair burden-sharing practices.

A plan of this sort would amount to something conceptually similar to NATO initiatives of the past: AD-70, the LTDP, and CDI. A ten-year plan would not accomplish everything. The full process of integrating ECE forces and defense plans into NATO will take considerably longer. But the essential foundations can be laid over the course of a decade. A carefully managed, slow but steady ramp upward seems better than either perpetual delay or a mad rush to achieve everything at once. This gradualist but visionary approach has worked for NATO before, and provided it begins fairly soon, it can work again.

The key lies in NATO getting its strategic bearings straight from the onset.

IV. PREPARING ECE FORCES AND DEFENSES

Any effort to contemplate the manner in which the ECE defense establishments should change in order to prepare for NATO membership must begin by recognizing the disadvantageous historical legacy inherited by them. Until only a few years ago, all of these countries were decades-long members of the Warsaw Pact. Their defense postures were designed to support a coalition military strategy, crafted by the USSR, which aimed at posing an offensive threat to Western Europe and NATO. Each of their postures played a specialized role in this Warsaw Pact strategy. They were designed accordingly. Their command structures, doctrine, tactics, and procedures reflected the Soviet model. Their ground and air forces--both combat units and logistic support assets--mimicked the Soviet approach. Virtually all of their weapon systems were either manufactured in the USSR, or at least designed there.

This historical legacy is important because the old Soviet/Warsaw Pact model is so vastly different from the NATO model in many critical respects. The most obvious difference lies in basic military strategy. Whereas the Warsaw Pact strategy was offensive, NATO's strategy is defensive. Underlying this difference are major dissimilarities in the very fundamentals of military philosophy--differences that reflect not only the distinction between totalitarian and democratic values, but also dissimilar geostrategic situations, economic systems, and historical experiences at waging war. The Soviet/Warsaw Pact model reflected an emphasis on ground operations, quantity, combat formations, firepower, simple technology, and regimentation. By contrast, the NATO model emphasizes the opposite: joint air-ground operations, quality, a mix of combat forces and logistic support, maneuver, high technology, and individual initiative. These major differences penetrated to the depths of the force postures on both sides. Warsaw Pact C3I structures, combat forces, and logistics units were arrayed very differently from those of NATO. Their training patterns, readiness standards, weapon systems, maintenance practices, and support systems were equally dissimilar. Everything taken into account, it is hard to imagine two military alliances so radically different in their approaches to coalition operations and warfare.

Owing to this historical legacy, the magnitude of the challenge facing the ECE states is very great. For the past five years, these countries have been pursuing the goal of building downsized national

defense establishments aimed at protecting their individual borders. They have made considerable progress at casting off the past, but they still have a long distance to go. As they enter NATO, they will face an entirely new requirement: that of adopting the ways of a new alliance, with a very different approach to military affairs. In essence, the ECE defense establishments will face the formidable task of embarking upon a second revolutionary upheaval at a time when the first upheaval is not yet complete. The extent of the transformation facing them upon joining NATO is great, and it will be complicated by the act of entering an alliance system as integrated and pervasive as that of NATO. This transformation will not be completed in the course of only a few years. Yet over the course of the coming decade, it can be initiated in important ways.

As the ECE states enter NATO, they will be primarily responsible for maintaining the size, readiness, and modernization of their own forces. Although all are downsizing their forces from old Cold War levels, their national economic problems and dwindled defense budgets limit the financial resources available for military spending on the roughly 20 mobilizable divisions, 1000 combat aircraft, and other forces that will remain. As of today, most apparently are spending about 3-4% of GNP on defense, and their GNP's are not large. If their economies recover under the stimulus of market capitalism and western investments, additional resources may become available for defense. Barring an economic miracle, however, the likelihood is for a slow but steady increase--not a major upsurge.

From the amount of money available, the ECE defense ministries will face the problems not only of maintaining fairly large postures at adequate readiness, but also of modernizing forces whose weapons will become increasingly obsolescent in the coming years. The inventories of the ECE states reflect varying age profiles, but on whole, their weapons are mostly based on technology from the 1970's or earlier. Most weapons can be kept in service for many years with adequate maintenance and periodic upgrades, but at some juncture all have to be replaced. Even if a normal rate of turnover occurs, roughly 25-50% of their major weapon systems will face replacement over the next decade. Although the ECE states produce some weapons and support vehicles on their home soil, they will need to acquire a fair amount of equipment from abroad. This especially is the case for modern combat aircraft, which will dominate the cost of their modernization programs.

Because the ECE states now operate Soviet-style equipment, continuity would argue in favor of buying replacement models from Russia, which is now launching an effort to rebuild its international

weapon sales program. The need to build ECE force postures along NATO lines, however, argues in favor of buying western models from the United States, Germany, Britain, France, and other manufacturers. The drawback is that western equipment tends to be expensive owing to its sophisticated technology, modern munitions, and demanding maintenance and training requirements. The financial squeeze can be lessened by buying at the low end of the technology scale, and where possible, procuring rebuilt models rather than new weapons hot off the production line. For example, a used but rebuilt F-16 can cost well less than a newly minted, advanced version.

Even so, the ECE states likely will require western security assistance in the form of loans and grants in order to modernize at a sufficient pace. The amount of assistance needed is uncertain and will depend upon a variety of factors, but a reasonable estimate is roughly \$1-2 billion annually. This security assistance will have less of an impact on western defense spending than new acquisition programs that must be funded directly out-of-pocket. Yet, it will have a major impact in influencing the degree to which ECE defense establishments are able to draw close to the NATO model. If these countries are compelled to keep old Soviet-style weapons or to buy new Russian-built models, they will remain somewhat outside NATO's military orbit irrespective of steps to promote commonality elsewhere. But if they steadily acquire western aircraft, tanks, and infantry fighting vehicles, they will come to look and act like NATO for this reason alone. Moreover, the transition will be rendered far easier in many other areas, including interoperability, training practices, and common military doctrine.

Along with this normal modernization will come a need for a host of other, less visible programmatic measures that are required to interlock ECE forces with those of NATO, to enhance their self-defense capabilities, to build a better military infrastructure, and to help meet treaty commitments once membership is granted. All of these measures will need to be funded out-of-pocket, and most are over-and-above current defense plans. Many will have to be funded by the ECE states. But a number can qualify for NATO security investment (infrastructure) funds. Still others may be partly fundable by individual NATO countries that see advantages flowing to their own growing defense commitments in the ECE region. As discussed earlier, the ten-year cost of a relatively austere set of measures is likely to be \$10-20 billion taking into account acquisition and operations costs. If the investment faucets are opened more fully, the cost could rise higher, but the need to control expenses seems likely to beget a modest approach.

One of the important issues affecting not only the new members but NATO as a whole will be that of creating a command structure to supervise defense activities in the ECE region. The complexities of this subject go far beyond this paper's scope. Suffice to say that NATO civilian and military authorities doubtless will study the issues and alternatives thoroughly. The basics deserve mention, however, because they will influence the costs of the defense program and the way that the entire enterprise is carried out. The idea that the ECE states might remain outside NATO's integrated command--like France--appeals to some for political reasons. But powerful military incentives may arise for new members to join in order to gain the full strategic benefits of NATO membership and to help empower the alliance to carry out its commitments to them. The real issue, therefore, may be not be whether they join the integrated command, but the extent to which they become integrated within NATO and with each other.

A variety of models are available, ranging from deep integration to a relatively mild outcome. The deepest model is that of AFCENT during the Cold War. The severe threat to Central Europe compelled NATO to form a highly integrated multinational command composed of two Army Groups and two numbered Air Forces, which commanded the forces of eight nations. These forces operated quite closely together, and had a war broken out, they would have fought side-by-side in a layer cake array. The post-Cold War era has seen the old forward defense scheme go away, but integration has deepened in AFCENT owing to creation of multinational corps. In the northern and southern regions, by contrast, a looser form prevails. This owes to geographic realities, political factors, and a lesser threat during the Cold War. Although NATO multinational reinforcements were planned for each country during the Cold War, defense planning was conducted mostly on a national basis, but under supervision of regional NATO commands: AFNORTH (now AFNW) and AFSOUTH. Although the tradeoffs will need to be weighed closely, the strategic situation in the ECE region may lead to adoption of some version of this second model. That is, the forces of the ECE states may draw close to NATO, but air defense aside, they will not necessarily be joined with each other to form a single, unified defense posture.

Even so, some type of regional command structure may be needed, as continues to be the case in the northern and southern regions. Recently, NATO adopted the idea of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF's), and plausibly this solution could be applied. Task forces, however, are best-suited for single operations, not guiding complex defense preparations over a period of years. This argues for something similar to AFSOUTH. Perhaps AFCENT might be extended eastward, or an AFEAST created, or a

subsidiary body established. Regardless, some command facilities probably will need to be built. The program requirement could include a central structure, principal subordinate posts, an intelligence center, and communication linkages to national defense ministries and assigned forces. This structure could be mildly expensive if existing facilities are deemed inadequate.

Far more expensive could be the task of configuring ECE forces to become at least minimally compatible with NATO forces and standards. In particular, ECE air defenses seemingly will require a major and potentially expensive face-lift. Apparently a new medium-to-high altitude SAM system should be installed, along with improved radars and communications nets. Fighter interceptors will need to be rewired for NATO munitions and safety standards. For both combat aircraft and ground weapons, technical compatibility will need to be fashioned through a host of measures: common fuels, munitions, nozzles, radio frequencies, and the like. The readiness of several air and ground units may need to be enhanced. NATO training practices and safety standards will have to be adopted. An intensified exercise program with NATO could be needed to help promote common doctrine and procedures. ECE military personnel will need to attend NATO schools in large numbers. All of these changes cannot be achieved overnight, but even a step-by-step program could prove fairly demanding of resources.

Measures to improve the ECE military infrastructure also could prove fairly widespread and therefore expensive. Owing to the Cold War and their membership in the Warsaw Pact, all of the ECE states have rather elaborate military infrastructures. But in some places, these infrastructures evidently are eroded, or poorly configured for the new era, or inadequate for NATO's requirements. Steps to improve them might include upgrades to the road and rail systems, Polish ports, the POL production and distribution system, the telecommunications system, airbases, ground installations, and exercise facilities. Also important, measures might have to be pursued to reconfigure and enhance ECE war reserve munitions and stocks. This could produce expensive acquisitions of ammunition, spare parts, replacement end items, better maintenance equipment, and storage facilities. The total volume could be high. Some of these changes will take place owing to the natural evolution of ECE economies and defense programs, but as these countries join NATO, pressures likely will arise to accelerate the improvements.

The exact cost of all the programmatic improvements to ECE defense establishments will be known only when comprehensive plans are formed. What stands out from this cursory review is the sheer number of separate endeavors to be launched, and the magnitude of the potential requirements

owing to the admission of fully four new members. Measures in Poland likely will be the most demanding, but requirements in the other three countries could add up to a sizable whole. An improved air defense system alone is likely to cost several billion dollars. A new NATO command structure, other upgrades to ECE forces, infrastructure enhancements, and acquisition of war reserves could further increase the total by a significant amount. For these reasons, a total cost of \$10-20 billion seems plausible even if the fiscal faucets are not turned wide-open. Yet this expense is hardly staggering when seen in relation to the costs of maintaining NATO as a whole. Even today, after 45 years of building the alliance, NATO's annual infrastructure budget alone is about \$875 million--or nearly \$10 billion for ten years.

The need to fashion a program to align the ECE defense establishments with NATO is apparent. Yet, the challenge should be kept in perspective lest it become a basis for paralysis. The dominant factor in the equation is that the new members already possess well-armed military postures, and are capable of carrying their fair share of the load. Thus, NATO does not face the task of protecting the unprepared or unwilling. The ECE postures will need to be reshaped to reflect the NATO model, but there is no pressing urgency for them to adopt all of NATO's multitudinous practices and procedures immediately. What the situation requires is sufficient military compatibility to carry out common defense missions, not carbon-copy postures. This raw-bones compatibility is achievable in fairly short order. Once it is attained, the task of refining the details can be pursued in a step-by-step fashion over a period of years. Picture-perfect standardization and gleaming infrastructures are desirable goals, but in the final analysis, they are means to a strategic end: not ends in themselves. If they had been criteria for launching the alliance enterprise, NATO never would have been formed in the first place.

V. PREPARING NATO FORCES FOR NEW TREATY COMMITMENTS

NATO will have little difficulty providing C3I and logistics support to new members, but to the extent that it must back up its treaty commitments with combat forces, it will have a constraining historical legacy of its own to overcome. The Cold War left NATO with a powerful posture for defending alliance borders, but not well-designed for power projection outward. The United States has long thought in projection terms, and it has become fairly good at the enterprise. But apart from maintaining a capability for projecting small forces for minor incidents, most West European countries

still have military establishments mostly designed for border defense. If new treaty commitments are to be carried out in the ECE region but large forward deployments there are ruled out, this legacy will need to be overcome, for NATO will have to become skilled at a projection strategy.

To be sure, the act of defending East Central Europe will be far easier than protecting the distant Persian Gulf. Yet, the distances in Europe are not inconsequential. The eastern borders of Poland and Hungary are located fully 1000 km. from NATO's bases and logistic facilities in western Germany. This distance lies at the outer limits of airpower's reach, and is beyond the reach of ground forces without a major redeployment. Europe's impressive rail system will ease the task of eastward deployment in a crisis. But a major constraining factor enters the equation here. The Persian Gulf deployment was possible because the U.S. military came equipped with a large theater logistics structure capable of supporting West European units. The defense of East Central Europe will be conducted more heavily by the West Europeans, with U.S. forces playing a less central role. As of today, most West European forces—including German forces—do not possess the deployment, mobile logistics, transportation, and service support assets to fully carry out this mission. As a result, they too will need to change. Some of the changes already are underway, but the process has only just begun. It will need to be accelerated as NATO expansion draws near.

The act of choosing the source of NATO forces to help protect new members will be an important one. Surface appearances might suggest that NATO's Rapid Reaction Force is the obvious candidate. But it will be needed for other missions (e.g., defense of Turkey), it is designed for corps-sized missions at most, and it is heavily populated by lightly equipped ground units and forces from Southern Region nations. A better candidate may be AFCEM's Main Defense Force. Yet, it is especially wedded to its Cold War logistics base, it lacks large mobile support assets at echelons above corps, and its multinational formations may further complicate the act of rapid projection. If it is to help defend the ECE region, it may have to undergo important changes to its composition by acquiring a far better capacity for outward deployment eastward. This especially will be the case if requirements turn out to be fairly large, not small. In any event, strategic realities dictate that commitments primarily should come from NATO's major powers: the United States, Germany, and Britain. Modest forces from the Low Countries, through multinational corps, would broaden the political base. Participation by France would be a good idea too.

The cheapest and easiest solution would be for NATO to provide only tactical air forces. The rationale for this approach presumably would be a "division of labor" philosophy whereby the ECE states would handle ground missions for which they have large forces, and NATO would provide help in areas in which it enjoys a relative advantage. As discussed earlier, however, powerful strategic and military incentives may lead to the commitment of NATO ground forces in one quantity or another. To the extent this is the case, the cost will rise, for the act of configuring a single West European division for projection can cost over a billion dollars. If the required joint posture turns out to be small (e.g., three divisions and three fighter wings), the cost will be fairly small. But if the requirement becomes large (e.g., ten divisions and ten wings), the cost could rise well higher.

Another important factor will be the extent to which a military infrastructure is developed in East Central Europe to enhance the prompt deployability and effectiveness of NATO combat forces. For example, NATO might decide to deploy POMCUS sets and WRM stocks onto the soil of new members. It might also establish COBs airbases, ground reception facilities, and training sites there. It might further decide to base small combat forces there (e.g., 2-3 brigades and air wings) to provide a signal of reassurance and better combined training opportunities. Depending upon its size, a military infrastructure of this sort could be fairly expensive. What could truly drive the cost sky-high is a decision to permanently station large combat forces in the ECE region: for example, corps-sized forces or more. This step would entail the creation of a quite large support infrastructure: command staffs, large service support units, and facilities for civilian dependents. However, budgetary constraints, to say nothing of strategic impediments, make this step improbable as long as East Central Europe remains a tranquil place.

Short of this unlikely step, a modest military infrastructure aimed at supporting a power-projection strategy would be less expensive, but not inconsequential. The cost of this infrastructure would be added atop the expense of configuring NATO combat forces for projection missions. The overall expense would be determined by the ambitiousness of NATO's force goals in both areas. It could range from a few billion dollars to upwards of \$30 billion for a ten-division, ten-wing posture with a fairly substantial forward infrastructure. When combined with the cost of preparing ECE forces and infrastructure, the total bill could rise from \$10-20 billion to about \$50 billion. This amount, however, is an outer limit. The cost could be less if NATO's force goals and programs turn out to be more modest. A reasonable best guess is a ten-year cost of about \$35 billion for a controlled upgrading of

ECE defenses and a modestly sized NATO military commitment.

Once again, this cost needs to be kept in strategic perspective. The cost is no larger than that of acquiring a single, active duty ground combat division, and not much larger than that of buying a single modern weapon system in large quantities. The strategic gains are quite large, for a program of this magnitude will transform a potentially hollow commitment into something credible. Regardless of how the tradeoffs are appraised, the key point is that the cost will be driven by policy and strategy--not by unavoidable fixed expenses over which NATO has no control. NATO can spend as much, or as little, as it wants to spend. Everything depends upon the goals that NATO sets for itself, but the nature of these goals matters if the strategic purposes of expansion are to be achieved. The key lies in studying the issues thoroughly and then making a sound choice.

VI. BURDEN-SHARING AND INVESTMENT STRATEGY

Assuming the program cost is \$35 billion, this amount may be small in the overall scheme of things, but when account is taken of competing priorities and tight limits on defense spending everywhere, it is not something to be taken lightly. All the more so since this program would require a major increase in NATO infrastructure funds, and either modest budget increases or program sacrifices elsewhere by participating nations. This amount of money will become available only if approval is granted by national leaders and parliaments. But the presence of politics means that the enterprise will be scrutinized carefully before it is launched. Who then pays? How are the financial burdens to be distributed?

Based on financial realities and traditional NATO practices, the ECE states probably can be expected to pay for about 20-30% of the total: the amount needed to fund national programs and their fair share of common infrastructure spending. The remainder presumably must come from NATO's current members. Two models are available for allocating the responsibility. The first model is one in which the countries participating most heavily with force commitments, and with the greatest interests at stake, provide the financing. In this case, a core group composed of the United States, Germany, and Britain (perhaps also France) would be obligated to provide not only most of the forces, but also 70-80% of the money. To the extent NATO's other powers enjoy the strategic benefits, they would get a free

ride. The second model is one in which the costs are shared by the entire alliance even as a smaller subset handles the key force commitments. In this event, the financial burden carried by the core group might decline, for example, from \$27 billion to \$16 billion. Of the two models, the second would do the best job of preserving coalition planning and fair burden-sharing. Yet history suggests that, in cases like this, something approximating the first model is the one often adopted.

Regardless of how the burdens are shared, the prospect of a ten-year plan means that an investment strategy should be forged for guiding the enterprise from start to finish. A variety of alternative strategies are available, and they should be weighed carefully. The traditional approach is to initiate all of the program sub-elements at the onset, and to fund them in parallel fashion as the enterprise unfolds. The advantage is that consensus is forged behind the entire program at the onset. The disadvantage is that, if funding falls short or the program is halted mid-stream for political reasons, an incoherent outcome may be the result because none of the sub-elements are completed. An alternative strategy is a building-block approach whereby the key subcomponents are funded sequentially, in order of opportunity or greatest strategic leverage. For example, NATO might use the years preceding expansion to upgrade its own forces for projection missions. New members thereby would enjoy a greater level of NATO protection on the day they join the alliance. In the immediate aftermath, investments could focus on improving the self-defense capabilities of new members. At the end, emphasis could switch toward developing a forward infrastructure for NATO's forces. The advantage of this approach is that NATO could test the waters as it goes, gradually ascending from one strategic plateau to another, while postponing the most controversial decisions until the political situation in Europe is clarified. The disadvantage is that consensual support for the entire program might not exist from the onset, and this absence could impede execution when difficult items are encountered. The alliance might end up with half a loaf.

Most likely, a mixed strategy will prove best. Historical experience suggests that coalition planning works best when consensus is formed behind a complete plan from the onset. Yet a comprehensive plan can be executed in flexible ways. The years prior to admission may provide an opportunity--one that should not be lost--for improving NATO's posture and starting to work with new members through security assistance. To the extent key goals are achieved, relative emphasis can then switch to improving the ECE postures and slowly building a NATO forward infrastructure to the extent that the political traffic will permit or demand. Regardless, the key point is that, while NATO enjoys

flexibility in choosing how to proceed, it will need a coherent investment strategy to avoid the dangers of incoherently muddling along. The greatest danger lies in adopting no investment strategy at all.

VII. CONCLUSIONS


Although today's debate over NATO expansion is cast largely in political terms, a defense agenda seems destined to rise to the fore sooner or later. The simple but powerful reason is that Article 5 commitments are involved, and the alliance's military posture will need to be arrayed to carry them out. This paper suggests that the coming defense agenda is manageable, but that NATO will soon need to begin thinking in terms of a long-range program. NATO's own experience shows that establishing a sensible destination and a strategic plan to get there is the best way to shape the future, and thereby avoid being victimized by it. If this analysis is broadly correct, the budget costs of preparing NATO's defenses for expansion are not trivial, but they are affordable. To be sure, the act of pursuing the necessary military measures will not be a free lunch. But it will bring major strategic benefits in its wake, not only in East Central Europe but for NATO military missions elsewhere. Above all, it is the only way to avoid the worst of all worlds: a hollow NATO expansion that leaves everybody no better off than before, and maybe worse for the wear.

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
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1995 NATO SYMPOSIUM

"NATO EXPANSION:
OPINIONS AND OPTIONS"

APRIL 24-25, 1995
WASHINGTON, DC



***NATO EXPANSION:
A VIEW FROM THE SOUTHERN PERIPHERY***

**AMBASSADOR TUGAY ÖZÇERİ
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF TURKEY
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
NATO**

**TURKISH DELEGATION
TO NATO**

20.4.1995

**TALKING POINTS
by Ambassador Tugay ÖZCERİ**

- The Heads of State and Government of the Alliance confirmed at the January 1994 Brussels Summit that the Alliance is open for enlargement.
- At the December 1994 Ministerial, an internal study has been initiated to discuss during the first phase the "why" and "how" of enlargement, leaving more difficult questions of "when" and "with whom" to a later stage. The countries of the Southern flank fully subscribe to these decisions.
- In fact the North Atlantic Alliance has always been open for enlargement. Article 10 of the Washington Treaty stipulates and I quote, "The Parties may, by unanimous agreement invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty" end of quote.
- The Alliance in the past has enlarged on three occasions. In 1952 my country Turkey and Greece joined the Alliance in its first enlargement. This was followed in 1955 by Germany and in 1981 by Spain.
- Turkey, who joined the Alliance in the first batch, is committed to enlargement.
- I would like to dwell first of all on what enlargement entails as stipulated in the Washington Treaty.
- The Treaty has brought two conditions to enlargement. One being geographical and the other political.
- According to the Treaty the geographic limitation is confined to "European States". Therefore, any European State is theoretically eligible to be invited to join the Alliance.

3.

- Turkey supports the view that new members should join NATO's Integrated Military Structure right from the beginning. In our view, this would serve best both the security interests of the prospective members and the Alliance as a whole. So far, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania have declared that they are willing to assume all the responsibilities, including appropriate military roles, that NATO membership would entail.

- Another important consideration for the countries in the Southern flank is the impact of enlargement on those countries which are not early or at all prospective members of NATO. One should not lose sight of the fact that a great number of these countries are situated in our close vicinity. Here I am not thinking only of Russia. Russia with its size and capabilities is not a realistic candidate. Nonetheless, the Alliance is taking the necessary steps to engage Russia in a more close and constructive dialogue, and it is for Russia to respond in a positive fashion.

- My concern is rather for other successor states of the former Soviet Union. We should not let Russia impose its hegemony once again over its former empire, using NATO's enlargement as a pretext. We already see signs of this Russian designs in its efforts to turn the CIS into a supranational body, encompassing also a security and military dimension. A hasty enlargement process might give the Russians the excuse they have been hoping for. We should not inadvertently draw new lines of division and create zones of exclusive influence. We should not let history repeat itself in the form of a new Yalta.

- Russia's objections to NATO's enlargement reaching to her borders are well known. However, it is not clear what Russia means when it speaks about borders. None of the prospective NATO members in the Southern Flank share common borders with the Russian Federation. Still, NATO membership of these ex-Warsaw Pact countries will probably generate some frictions with Russia. Russia's main interest might be to preserve its armaments market in the countries concerned, whose armed forces are equipped totally with Russian weapons, and given their economic situation, could not replace their inventories with Western armaments in the near or even long term. This is of course not an exclusively Southern Flank question. The key to a solution satisfactory to all sides could be found in a balanced and cooperative approach that would allow Russia to pursue its legitimate economic interests in the armaments markets concerned, while not compromising NATO's interoperability objectives. In passing, I should also point out that Turkey, a NATO Ally, has a good degree of armaments trade with Russia, working to the benefit of both sides.

- A cooperative NATO-Russia relationship cannot but be based on the assumption that while NATO refrains from hasty moves on enlargement, Russia will also adopt a more objective attitude towards NATO and come to terms with the fact that NATO's enlargement poses no threat to her security. If, however, Russia chooses to turn down the hand of partnership and cooperation the West continues to extend to her in good faith, despite certain developments which argue for acting otherwise, the enlargement process might gain speed to the detriment of Russia's own interests.

- Of course this would be the worst-case scenario which none of us would like to see materialize. But history has proven that mistakes are sometimes repeated. If there is a return to Cold War conditions, not only the new members of NATO who would be forced to devote more resources to common defense, but Russia itself who might bid farewell to all hopes of becoming a democratic, prosperous Western country, will suffer. We earnestly hope that the future will not confront us with such a challenge.

- If a number of countries were to join the Alliance in a short time span, this could inevitably affect the efficiency of the Alliance adversely, especially its decision making ability, and will be a drain on resources, at a time of diminishing defence budgets. This is valid for any group of countries, including those in the Balkans. This said, at the expense of repeating myself, I have to underline once again that we should have an open mind on all prospective members, including Balkan countries, and take our political decisions on a case by case basis, taking into account each country's ability to contribute to security and the internal dynamics of the Alliance.

- I do not believe that a detailed list of criteria will help us solve the critical issue of enlargement. A check-list of criteria is not the most suitable answer for a process which is essentially political in nature. Nonetheless, the founding fathers of the Alliance have given us the necessary criteria through the Washington Treaty. It has proved to be flexible enough in the former three enlargements of NATO.

- The Alliance is on the right track as far as the criteria issue is concerned. The internal study initiated at the December 1994 Ministerial entails a phased approach to enlargement. It embarks upon tackling questions of how and why in a general and practical manner without going into detailed criteria, which proves in any case difficult to determine at 16.

- The Partnership for Peace (PfP) program has a unique and indispensable role both in the preparation of prospective members to NATO rights and obligations that membership will entail and in integrating other partner countries which will not join NATO in the wider European security structure.

5.

- The PfP program has made a good start and gained momentum in the course of the past year. Several partnership exercises and many specific activities are planned also for this year. I would not wish to take your time by elaborating on the success of PfP, which you know very well. One problem remains, however, to be dealt with more satisfactorily, namely the funding question. Recently, some key contributors to NATO's Security Investment Program (SIP) (former Infrastructure program) including the United States, proposed the use of SIP in the framework of PfP. Although we are a net beneficiary of the SIP, we are not against this idea. To the contrary, we believe that such an approach would be extremely useful in maintaining strong links between NATO and especially those partner countries which lack the appropriate resources needed for a genuine interaction with this Alliance. This is especially important in the context of our efforts aimed at preventing new divisions and spheres of influence. I have in mind first and foremost the Caucasus and Central Asian Republics, as one could easily understand.

- The PfP has to continue to exist and develop unaffected by the discussions on the "when and who" aspects of enlargement. It would be a pity if, partners with an aspiration for early membership lose their interest in the PfP. However, it would be most regrettable if partners who have no intentions to join NATO in the foreseeable future remained outside of this cooperative structure.

- We believe that it is important to exploit the PfP's potential in the context of efforts aimed at bringing peace to Balkans also. From the successor states of Former Yugoslavia, only Slovenia was found eligible to join PfP, although Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina also made formal applications last year which were never considered seriously. It was our view then that Bosnia Herzegovina's application could be employed as a leverage against the Serb side in support of the efforts of the Contact Group. Obviously one could not expect Bosnia Herzegovina to be in a position to contribute to the goals of the PfP by taking part in joint exercises and peacekeeping or humanitarian missions, unless one is not making a point of sheer sarcasm. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that Bosnia Herzegovina's legitimate struggle for its territorial integrity is fully in line with the principles of the PfP as enshrined in the Framework Document launched at the NATO Summit held in Brussels in January 1994. After all, trying to repel aggression and defend its own territories is no less a contribution to peace and order than sending peacekeepers to conflict regions only to remain powerless in the face of blatant aggression.

- We continue to believe that, whenever the time is ripe, NATO should take a fresh look into the question of whether the PfP could not be instrumental in contributing to peace efforts in that region, which is a part of Europe in every sense of the word.

6.

- Before concluding let me briefly address the issue of the possible spillover of the war in former Yugoslavia.

- First of all the international community, be it UN, EU or NATO, has failed in Yugoslavia. The credibility of international institutions has greatly diminished. Containment of the war in Bosnia Herzegovina has become the main goal. And even for this, concessions are offered one after the other to the aggressor. Mr. Milosevic, who, we tend to forget, has initiated the whole tragedy, is being rehabilitated as a "statesman". However, one should not lose sight of the fact that containment is not and should not be the main goal. The international community should make sincere efforts to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of an independent state, whom we all have recognized.


- NATO has not been allowed to function effectively in Yugoslavia. The so-called "dual key" approach subjected the most mighty Alliance to the whims and priorities of the UN, its Secretary General, or even the UNPROFOR Commanders in Bosnia. The result is that our credibility has been tarnished. I have to remind in passing that some Allies who are also permanent members of the UN Security Council must shoulder most of the responsibility for this outcome.


- Any NATO action should therefore be under the command and control of NATO both politically and militarily. Unity of command is the first step towards determined action.

- Furthermore, if NATO is going to carry out its new missions as set out in our Strategic Concept it must be allowed to act independently.

- If a spillover does not create an Article V situation but still leads to a deterioration of overall security and stability, (which is the more probable case), NATO should continue to act in unity and solidarity. A more principled approach will be called for. Security consultations with PfP Partners, in the spirit of the PfP Framework Document, might be necessary.

- And finally, NATO is an organization of common defence. If any spillover of the war in Yugoslavia leads to an Article V situation all Allies must be ready to stand up to their commitments and responsibilities.






1995 NATO SYMPOSIUM

"NATO EXPANSION:
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***NATO EXPANSION:
HISTORICAL ASPECTS***

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Panel Five: NATO Expansion: Historical Aspects

**1995 NATO Symposium
National Defense University
24-25 April 1995
Fort McNair**

**Lawrence S. Kaplan
Lemnitzer Center for NATO and
European Community Studies
Kent State University**

For over a year, since the Brussels summit of January 1994, the prospect of expanding the alliance by admission of new members, particularly Poland the Czech Republic, and Hungary, has been a major concern of the Atlantic allies. Under the label of "Partnership for Peace" NATO pressed by the United States has been preoccupied with the consequences of a new relationship, whether as "partner" or full member. Such questions as the scope of expansion, the impact on Russia, and the terms of admission are not yet resolved. Nor has the larger question of the meaning of NATO in light of projected expansion been settled. What can be answered in this period of gestation is what happened in NATO's first two generations as a result of enlargement of the alliance in 1949 when the "stepping stone" nations were accepted; in 1952 when Greece and Turkey joined the alliance; in 1955 when the Federal Republic of Germany entered NATO; and in 1982 when Spain became the sixteenth member.

From the time of its conception in 1948 to the present the composition of its membership was a problem for the Atlantic alliance. If NATO was an instrument of American imperial power, as political scientist David Calleo proclaimed a generation ago, it was also an "empire by invitation," as Norwegian historian Geir Lundestad suggests. The inspiration for the alliance was European not American. Worried about the rising tide of Soviet-led communism anxious Western Europeans insisted upon an American guarantee of their security, threatened as it appeared to be by internal Communist subversion and by external Soviet

intimidation. While the United States had recognized the fragility of European economies through the Marshall Plan of 1947, economic aid was not sufficient of itself. Economic recovery would be unlikely if it were not accompanied by a sense of security which only an entangling tie with the United States would confer.

America's response initially was hesitant, despite bipartisan concern for the containment of Communism and the revival of Europe. An entangling alliance would repudiate a tradition of non-entanglement beginning with the termination of the Franco-American alliance in the eighteenth century. Additionally, it might also give Europe a license to raid the American treasury as it turned over its own defense preparations to the United States. To obviate this criticism Britain's foreign minister, Ernest Bevin in association with France's foreign minister Georges Bidault, along with the Benelux countries, signed the Brussels Pact in March 1948, establishing the Western Union, as an earnest of their intentions to meet American demands of self-help and mutual cooperation.

Ideally, the Western Union countries would have preferred the United States to become a member of their association. But recognizing the continuing pull of American isolationism, they were able, with the help of American supporters in the Congress and administration, to remove the stigma of entanglement by the semantic device of an "Atlantic label" and by bringing Canada into the alliance. In the lengthy negotiations in Washington in

the summer of 1948 the European allies were required to make concessions to win the American "pledge" under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, wherein "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all."

To achieve this objective the European partners in the Western Union had to agree to expand the alliance in accordance with American concerns. This was not in the plans of the Brussels pact nations which negotiated the terms of the Treaty of Washington. They wished to confine European membership to their own ranks. American demands to include Norway, Iceland, and Portugal were initially resisted on the grounds that Norway's interests differed from Belgium's or Holland's, while Iceland and Portugal were hardly part of Europe at all, even though they fitted into an Atlantic context. And Italy and Denmark were objectionable, if only because of their distance from the Atlantic. What the Europeans did not say directly was their unwillingness to share American military and economic support, which would be by-products of political commitment, with outlying nations. Eelco van Kleffens of the Netherlands had a solution, offering a second-class membership to non-Western Union allies. The alliance, he recommended would resemble "a peach, the Brussels Pact would be the hard kernel in the center and a North Atlantic Pact the somewhat less hard mass around it."

The core members only grudgingly accepted what they called "peripheral" members to perform specific tasks but not to share

decision-making authority. None of these reservations was acceptable to the senior partner, although in practice some of the peripheral members in fact limited their own contributions to the alliance for their own reasons. Iceland had no standing army, and had no intentions of creating one. Portugal was wary of any European integration that would complicate its relations with Spain.

Norway and Denmark accepted membership with some hesitations, Denmark more than Norway, but also with the understanding that, a "footnote," as it came to be identified, assured that neither atomic weapons nor allied military forces would be stationed on their territory. Fear of repercussions from the Soviet Union and not doubts about American pledges accounted for this footnote. But neither doubts on the part of the peripheral members nor antagonism on the part of the Brussels partners deterred the United States from pressing its case for bringing Norway, Denmark and Portugal into the alliance. The explanation lay in Norway's Spitzbergen, Denmark's Greenland and Portugal's Azores as vital strategic locations for American participation in the defense of Europe. The islands guarded Atlantic sea lanes and would serve along with Iceland as bases for American aircraft enroute to Europe.

Italy, however, was another matter. The Western Union powers had no more interest in bringing Italy into NATO initially than they had the Scandinavian countries. Moreover, Italy suffered more disabilities as a potential member than the Nordic

nations. Its geographic location was far from the Atlantic, and the terms of the 1947 peace treaty with Italy would restrict its military development. A strong Communist presence was another obstacle in the way of membership. If Italy was able to surmount them it was in part through the role of John Hickerson, director of the State Department's Office of European Affairs. From the beginnings of negotiation he served as a "grey eminence" quietly impressing diplomats with the importance of preventing Italy from loss to future Communist control. He first overcame objections from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to overextending commitments in the Mediterranean, and then from senior American diplomats. As for the Europeans, France's early hesitations evaporated as it insisted on Italy in the alliance to balance Norway's inclusion. The French ambassador in London informed Bevin it was unlikely that France would ratify the treaty "if Norway was a member of it and Italy not." France was determined to see to it that the northern Europeans would not dominate the European side of the Atlantic. Such were the complicated nine-month negotiations over the North Atlantic Treaty.

Italy's accession to NATO inevitably raised Greek and Turkish hopes of joining the alliance. If Italy, a former Axis partner geographically removed from the Atlantic, could become a member of NATO, why should not other anti-Communist nations bordering the Meditterrean be excluded? Greece and Turkey had other claims as well. They had been the initial potential victims of Soviet expansionism, from their own perspective, and

initial beneficiaries of the Truman Doctrine in 1947. It made sense that membership in the Western alliance would anchor the security which both nations were seeking in 1949. If Italy was acceptable to the allies, then the important strategic position of Turkey along with its considerable military potential should have been welcomed by the NATO partners.

While Greece lacked the military potential to assist the alliance, it held a special place in American foreign policy. The Greek civil war had become a symbol in the United States of resistance to Communism. The initial Greek-Turkish aid program of 1947 had been extended by an appropriation of \$25 million for the fiscal year 1949. The American investment psychologically and economically was heavy, as the American mission in Athens under General James Van Fleet was the effective bulwark against the Communist opponents. Greece and Turkey in the American mind stood in the way of Soviet expansion in southeastern Europe. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff Turkey in particular could be a valued ally, with its strong national spirit and geographic situation. At the Pentagon conversations in March 1948 the United States and Great Britain did not include either country in a projected Atlantic security arrangement but planned to issue a joint declaration pledging to uphold the independence and territorial integrity of Greece, Turkey and Iran. Given the special visibility of the plight of Greece through the efforts of Greek-Americans Greece if not Turkey should have been as reasonable a candidate for membership as Italy.

No invitation was forthcoming. Inevitably, there was opposition on the part of all the European allies to extending even further the scope of the alliance, even as they recognized that both Greece and Turkey would share such military aid as the United States would grant in the future. But even empathetic Americans recognized the problem of overextension of commitment and the importance of concentrating on Western Europe. Greece and Turkey were rebuffed in 1949.

The Korean conflict changed American, if not European, perceptions of a potential role of Greece and Turkey in NATO. The unusual comity between the two usually hostile nations was a factor in making them more attractive partners; the defection of Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc produced a Balkan Pact among the three neighbors which lasted through the Korean war. But the major attraction was a consequence of the reorganization of NATO. The invasion of South Korea was a reminder to the United States and its allies that the pledge of military assistance, particularly at the modest levels of 1949 and 1950 were insufficient deterrents to Communist-inspired aggression. NATO required a military presence on the ground to inhibit the Soviets from testing Allied resolve in a divided Germany as they presumably were doing in divided Korea. the result was a transformation of the treaty into a military organization which would be capable of defending Europe against attack from the east. If the Russians could act through North Koreans or Communist Chinese, they could also employ East Germans as their

surrogates. To prevent such an outcome NATO under the leadership of General Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, planned in the fall of 1950 to organize Europe into defensible regions. In this context Greece and Turkey on the southeastern flank of NATO became strategic assets rather than embarrassing applicants for membership.

When Greece and Turkey made their first formal applications for membership, they received initially only the firm support of Italy. The northern members were concerned about assuming responsibility for defending a region distant geographically and culturally from the West. Britain had its own reasons for rejecting Greece and Turkey; it preferred the establishment of a separate Middle East command in which a British commander would group the Balkans with friendly Arab states. These considerations dissolved under the heat of the Korean conflict, and the fears it inspired among Western Europeans in the summer of 1950. At the September meeting of the North Atlantic Council in New York, the members decided to accord Greece and Turkey associate membership, allowing them to participate in defense planning relating to the Mediterranean. When the SHAPE command was established in December the United States cast its influential vote behind their joint entry in order to secure the southern flank of the SHAPE Command and to establish American air bases in Turkey. In May 1951 the United States proposed full membership, and as the Iranian crisis mounted in the summer of 1951 the British agreed. Although the approval was reluctant on

the part of the Scandinavian allies, the North Atlantic Council unanimously recommended the accession of Greece and Turkey at its September 1951 meeting in Ottawa, and formal entry at the Lisbon meeting in February 1952.

For the moment the deep divisions between Greece and Turkey were subsumed under fear of a common enemy. Whatever doubts the other allies had about the stability of the new members were swept away by the consideration of 25 divisions which Turkey would be able to supply to NATO's southern flank. Visions of the Soviet Union pressing the Turks in eastern Turkey or reigniting the Greek Civil War preparatory to moving against the Dardanelles thrust aside doubts about admitting two nations with a history of hostility to each other and with concerns over the unresolved differences over Cyprus. The Korean war remained the probable opening gambit in the Soviet Union's long-term plans for Europe. NATO's evolution once again was shaped by the perceived defense needs of the alliance.

If controversy attended the entry of the 13th and 14th members of NATO the accession of the 15th, the Federal Republic of Germany was by far the most difficult as well as the most necessary in the view of the senior partner. The contest between the United States and the Soviet Union over Germany had been central to the Cold War from its inception. It was no coincidence that the Federal Republic grew out of Bizonia and Trizonia, the monetarized Anglo-American-French zones of occupied Germany. Nor is it a coincidence that the Federal Republic

itself came into being a month after the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. While it may be an exaggeration to assert that American postwar policy centered on the reconstruction of Germany, it was obvious that the reconstruction of Europe itself, economically as well as militarily, required the incorporation of German resources. Germany was the unstated major issue in every meeting of the allies and in most planning sessions within the United States, even as it was excluded from membership in the alliance.

The linkage of Germany and NATO was made clear in Acheson's conviction as early as April 1949 that the success of negotiations for a German state as well as the termination of the Berlin blockade had been facilitated by the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty. The attraction of German membership was self-evident, both in terms of the resources Germans could bring to the alliance and the restraints an Atlantic community might impose on a rehabilitated Germany. Congress was willing. On the crassest level Senator Arthur Watkins noted at the hearings on the ratification of the treaty that German membership would force Germans to contribute their fair share of the cost to the common effort. After all, Germans would be the beneficiary of Western defense under any circumstance. As the senator put it, "We certainly are not going to fight all their battles for them." In the course of these hearings John Foster Dulles, the leading Republican foreign policy spokesman, offered another reason for considering German membership: namely, it would inhibit German

temptation to use its geographic position as a bargaining chip between East and West inhibiting a Rapallo-like rapprochement with the Soviet Union in the manner of the Weimar Republic. In executive session Arthur Vandenberg suggested to fellow senators that German membership would dissolve French fears of Germany.

There were limits to how far public discourse could extend when the issue of German membership arose. The memories of Nazi bestiality were too recent and too strong to expect that the European partners would accept a German national presence in their midst no matter how rational the arguments might be. This barrier was well understood by the Truman administration and by the Senate as well. Despite a recognition of advantages inclusion of Germany into NATO might afford, there was no call to action by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The language on the German issue had been carefully modulated at the Senate hearings on the Atlantic alliance. Its spokesmen were cautious. Former Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett noted that while Germany was discussed in the negotiations over the treaty, "We found that its circumstances at the present time make it impossible to be considered as a participant." As the most influential administration spokesman testifying, Secretary of State Acheson begged the question. When asked if the inclusion of western Germany would improve the strategic position of the Atlantic powers, he claimed he was no military expert but that "quite clearly at the present time a discussion of including western Germany in the pact is not possible."

The most that the administration could say in public was that Germany's relations with NATO could be reevaluated after the dismantling of German industry had been completed and the elimination of vestiges of Nazism had been eradicated. Even as the Allies recognized the importance of German manpower in coping with superior Soviet ground forces the language of denial remained in place. As the House Foreign Affairs Committee deliberated on extending military aid to Europe more than a year after the signing of the pact, Secretary Acheson claimed that demilitarization of West Germany remained a keystone of American policy: "There is no discussion of anything else," he reported in June 1950, "That is our policy and we have not raised or revalued it."

While Acheson was technically accurate in his statement of policy, there was full recognition among the allies that the twelve divisions at NATO's disposal in Europe required a German contribution to make a credible defense posture. Position papers in the State Department reflected this concern. As early as November 1949, one paper observed that "the German problem must be viewed and dealt with in the total context of general developments. It cannot be isolated. What we do in Germany must not be dictated by considerations of what the Germans demand, or even of our respective national interests, but by a fair appraisal of the indispensable requirements of the Western community of free peoples."

The outbreak of the Korean war permitted these confidential

communications to be made public, and to generate pressures to counteract the general allied revulsion against the remilitarization of Germany. The leitmotifs of de Nazification, democratization, and demilitarization were subsumed in the summer of 1950 under a generalized fear that Stalin was planning the same action in a divided Germany as he had done in a divided Korea. The specter of 60,000 East German paramilitary troops, backed by 27 Soviet divisions in the eastern zone, galvanized American planners. Instead of a progressive buildup of Western forces, as projected in the May meeting of the North Atlantic Council the United States prepared for a massive armament throughout the alliance. Military aid would be increased fourfold, and U.S. forces in Europe would be reinforced. The United States intended to keep its pledge to Europeans.

But such satisfaction as Europeans felt over American activity had to be weighed against the price they would have to pay for America's help. It would be high, particularly if in reciprocation, the European partners would have to concur in the rearmament of Germany. It seemed illogical to Congressmen to exclude German resources from the common defense. Germany after all would be protected with Allied manpower and equipment, and so Germans should share the burdens. This line of reasoning was so obvious to Americans that Secretary Acheson had difficulty defending allied defense plans that did not include a German component. But once the immediate threat of a Soviet attack in Germany receded, Europeans, and particularly the French, made

clear their reluctance to countenance a revival of their neighbor. The psychic cost of a German army in being only five years after the end of World War II inspired massive French resistance. Yet Europeans had no choice. American pressure was ultimately irresistible, particularly in light of the manifest inability of the West to mount a credible defense without German assistance.

The immediate solution in the difficult fall of 1950 was a compromise. Europe would receive American arms, troops and even a military leader, none other than General Dwight D. Eisenhower, in a new NATO military command. SHAPE under Supreme Allied Commander Eisenhower, who was at the same time chief of the United States European Command, was a major confidence-builder. In return the anxious French who could not accept an independent German force agreed to lead a European army, in which German units would be placed under French leadership. The Plevin Plan of October 1950 would have Germans enter at the battalion level. This was raised to regimental level, as long as Germany would never exceed 20 percent of the total force. The result in the following year was the creation of a European Defense Community finally signed in May 1952, and ultimately collapsed in August 1954.

American leaders were suspicious from the beginning that France had put forth the idea of European army and community as a way of putting off American pressure while receiving the benefits of four U.S. divisions and continued military aid. The American

commitment was firm; the French response was filled with caveats. While most European allies agreed with France's suspicions of German reliability, the other partners in the European Defense Community recognized the absence of a credible alternative to a German contribution to NATO. Only France was not satisfied, and proceeded to demand protocols binding as closely as possible the United States and Britain to the community. And still France failed to accept its own creation. The result was an American backlash against the French as the Senate by a vote of 88 to 0 on 31 July 1954 urged the president to give the Federal Republic full sovereign, and perhaps even make a bilateral military alliance with West Germany if the French did not ratify the EDC treaty.

The result of France's action initially was disarray in the alliance. But it was quickly followed by imaginative proposals from Britain to bring Germany into NATO through an expanded Western Union, the progenitor of NATO. In the London and Paris agreements of September and October 1954 the European allies hammered out a plan whereby the West Germans would enter the alliance through membership in the Western Union, enlarged to include Italy as well, under the new name of Western European Union. France accepted Germany as a NATO ally when it would not be a partner in the defense community. The answer lay in part on French concern with loss of national identity in a "European" army, but mostly in the special terms whereby the WEU would restrict German manufacture of nuclear, biological, and chemical

weaponry, as well as of warships and strategic bombers. While there would be German rearmament, which indeed was a key factor in the admission of the Federal Republic, its army, unlike the other partner's, would be wholly dedicated to the SHAPE command.

Although most of the restraints on German membership were quietly shelved over the next generation the terms of West Germany's membership in 1955 disclose a unique way of enlarging the alliance. Spain's entry into NATO in 1982 as the sixteenth member offers still another model.

Spain had been an unofficial associate of NATO long before it joined the alliance. Its geographic position on the western approach to the Mediterranean was a logical complement to Turkey's position on the eastern flank of the Mediterranean, and the strong anti-Communist posture of its leader, Generalissimo Francisco Franco, gave support to the major objective of the alliance in the Cold War. The fact of dictatorship itself did not bar Spain before 1982; Salazar's Portugal was no more democratic than its Iberian neighbor, and Greece under the colonels in the 1970s was hardly a model of democratic governance. But Franco's fascism in support of Hitler's Germany was a burden that kept the nation out of the alliance for a generation. Only Portugal lobbied for its inclusion in 1949.

But once SHAPE came into being the need for air and naval bases in Spain outweighed the obloquy of its fascist history, at least in the United States. From 1953 to his death in 1976 the United States enjoyed base rights in return for economic and

political support of the Franco regime. While Spain's concessions were not enough to permit entry into NATO, their service to the defense of Europe was sufficient to allow NATO partners to accept Spain in the United Nations in 1956. But the price of the informal Franco-NATO ties and the close military connections with the United States was popular opposition to both the United States and NATO which erupted openly after Franco's death. The link between the dictator Franco and NATO reinforced an isolationism from the rest of Europe which had been an important part of Spain's history. The continuing British control of Gibraltar was another barrier to post-Franco Spain's interest in joining the alliance.

Spain's centrist government, however, pressed for membership with strong American backing. By the end of the 1970s Western European governments were ready to accept democratic Spain into the alliance. The main opposition came from the powerful Socialist party which assumed power in October 1982, four months after Spain joined the alliance. Surprisingly, the youthful Socialist Premier, Felipe Gonzalez, whose platform promised a referendum which presumably would remove Spain from NATO, changed his mind about the connection, and carried the country with him. Fears of the security of Spanish enclaves in North Africa combined with a recognition that the Socialist governments of France and Italy would help Spain contain potential anti-democratic coups d'etat won support for NATO in the 1986 referendum.

The referendum also underscored Spain's refusal to integrate its forces into the military structure of NATO; it would be a member of the alliance, but not of the organization, in a manner similar to France, although for dissimilar reasons. Spain's interest in NATO in the 1980s was not stimulated by the Soviet threat but by the strength adherence would give to Spanish democracy and by the opportunity it might open for entry into the European Economic Community.

If the Partnership for Peace program should bring new nations into the alliance, it could cite a variety of precedents for admission to an "Atlantic" alliance which in 1995 was still dedicated to the security and stability of Europe. Spain provides a case study of an informal relationship in its pre-NATO experience as well as an example of membership in the alliance but not in the organization. While France may be returning to the SHAPE fold in the future, it is unlikely that Iceland, another member outside the organization, would change its status. If concern about antagonizing and undermining the fragile Russian democracy becomes a paramount factor in preventing membership of foreign Warsaw Pact nations, possibilities of allaying Russian concerns inhere in the protection of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty without a SHAPE presence beyond the German border. It may be worth noting that in the negotiations over the unification of Germany the Soviet acceptance of East Germany into NATO was matched by West Germany's agreement to hold back a NATO military presence in the former German Democratic Republic until

Russian troops had evacuated the territory in 1994.

NATO's 46-year history not only shows no barriers to its expansion but also makes clear the pragmatic bases for membership. From the alliance's inception in 1949 the criteria had been the contributions the applicant would make to the security of the West in the broadest sense. Specific service to the containment of the Communist bloc was evident in such cases as Turkey and Germany. Protection of sea and air routes for American military assistance explains the presence of Iceland and Scandinavia in 1949. Prevention of Communist control by means of force as Norway feared, or by election as seemed possible in Italy in 1948, were major considerations. They carried more weight than the democratic credentials of a potential member. Yet the democratization as well as the security of Europe was always an objective, and membership in NATO fostered the growth of democracy in the Iberian peninsula after the passing of the dictators. The naming of the "North Atlantic Treaty" was designed to assure the allegiance of the North American partners in 1949, and from the beginning was open to loose construction.

