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مركز الدراسات السياسية والاستراتيجية بالأهرام

COOPERATION OF THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES


MeSCo Annual Meeting

Mediterranean Study Commission

Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies

Alexandria, 29/III-1/IV/1995

- a. Program
- b. List of participants
- 1. "Institutionalizing Mediterranean relations: complementarity and competition"/ Roberto Aliboni
- 2. "Mediterranean issues and institutional paradigms"/ Seyfi Taşhan
- 3. "L'aire méditerranéenne et le 'changement global'"/ Khalifa Chater
- 4. "Quelques notes sur la Méditerranée dans la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune"/ Álvaro de Vasconcelos
- 5. "Conceptualizing non-military security in the Mediterranean"/ Mohamed El Sayed Said
- 6. "Mediterraneanism: a new dimension in Egypt's foreign policy"/ Mohammed El Sayed Selim
- 7. "France's Mediterranean policy: new challenges, old dilemmas"/ May Chartouni-Dubarry
- 8. "Pour un dialogue substantiel et credible sur la sécurité en Méditerranée"/ Lounès Bourenane
- 9. "The Mediterranean: bridge or divide? Proposals for non-military cooperative measures"/ Salvino Busuttil





CENTRE FOR POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

Al Galaa St.

Cairo, Egypt

Program

M e S C o Annual Meeting

29 March - April 1

Cooperation Of The Mediterranean
Countries

Organizer : Al Ahram Centre for Political & Strategic Studies

Funding Institutions : Al Ahram Foundation, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung

Venue : Hilton Ramses Hotel, Cairo
Tel: 575 8000 - Fax: 575 7152

Palestine Hotel, Alexandria
Tel: 03- 547 3500 - Fax: 03- 547 3378



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Wednesday March 29th, 1995:

Arrival of all participants to Cairo, Residence at Hilton Ramses.

07. 00

The Troika Meeting,
Dr. Abdel Monem Said, Dr. Roberto Aliboni,
Dr. Alvaro Vasconcelos.

Thursday March 30th, 1995:

10.00

All participants bused to Alexandria, Residence at Palestine Hotel

14.00

Lunch

17.00 - 18.00

Opening and Introduction by:
Dr. Abdel Monem Said
Director, Centre for Political & Strategic Studies

Speech:

Egyptian Mediterranean Policy

* H.E. Mr. Raouf Ghoneim

Assistant to the Minister of Foreign Affairs

Welcoming Address by

* Dr. Werner Puschra

Resident Representative of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung,
Cairo.

18.00 - 18.30

Break.

18.30 - 20.00

Mediterranean Institutional problematic

Moderator

* Alvaro Vasconcelos

① Institutional Interlocking across the mediterranean

Speaker:

Aliboni

② Addressing Mediterranean Issues: Institutional Paradigms

Speaker:

Tashan (Turkey)



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Friday, March 31st, 1995:

- 09.00 - 11.30 Moderator
* Roberto Aliboni
- ③ Mediterranean Area in the Global Change
Speaker:
Chater (Tunisia)
- ④ The European Common Foreign and Security Policy and
the Mediterranean
Speaker:
Vasconcelos (Portugal)
- 11.30 - 12.00 Break
- 12.00 - 14.00 Moderator
* Chartouni (France)
- ⑤ Conceptualizing Non Military Security: The Mediterranean.
Speaker:
Mohammed E. Said (Egypt)
- ⑥ The Dynamics of the Mediterranean Forum
Speaker:
Selim (Egypt)
- 14.30 Lunch
- 17.00 - 18.30 Moderator:
* El Sayed Yassin (Egypt)
- ⑦ French Mediterranean Priorities
Speaker;
May Chartouni (France)
- Threats to Peace and Stability
Speaker:
Heller (Israel)
- 18.30 - 19.00 Break
- 19.00 - 20.00 Discussions



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Saturday, April 1st, 1995:

09.00 - 11.00

Moderator:

* Hamarneh (Jordan)

(8)

Muslim in Europe

Speaker:

Bou Ranan (Algeria)

Multilateral Security Cooperation in the Balkans

Speaker:

Couloubis (Greece)

11.00 - 11.30

Break.

11.30 - 13.00

Round Table on the Future of MeSCo

Moderator:

* Abdel Monem Said

Speakers:

Monem Said , Aliboni and Vasconcelos.

13.30 -

Lunch.

14.30

Departure to Cairo.

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Mr. Pierre Tornillon	Secrétaire General Union Interparlementaire <u>GENEVA</u>
Amb. Constantine Lymberopoulos,	(GREECE)
Dr. Fred Tanner	Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies <u>MALTA</u>

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**INSTITUTIONALIZING MEDITERRANEAN RELATIONS:
COMPLEMENTARITY AND COMPETITION**

*paper presented by Roberto Aliboni
Director of Studies, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
to the second session of the MeSCO
Alexandria, 30-31 March 1995*

In the past and particularly the last five years, numerous institutional schemes have been put forward with the aim of establishing cooperation and security within the North-South Mediterranean dimension (which, for the purposes of this paper, will be taken to mean North Africa and the Middle East). Yet, with the exception of the EC's longstanding Mediterranean Policy--a network of EC-related bilateral agreements rather than a multilateral scheme--none of them has been implemented. A few projects were initiated, but they proved very short-lived.

Since the end of the 1990-91 Gulf war and the beginning of Arab-Israeli negotiations, a new generation of proposals aimed at giving Mediterranean relations a more stable and institutional form is being debated.

These institutional responses can be evaluated from different points of view. One fundamental question is how the parties concerned assess their mutual strategic and political relevance. As almost everywhere in the post-Cold War world, the search for new international relations is not yet based on firm strategic visions. Whether and why the areas across the Mediterranean matter for Europe and the West, on the one hand, and for the Arab countries and Israel, on the other, is not fully clear.

In a less distant perspective, another important question

is whether and to what extent the schemes being put forward today are complementary or competitive in the international and regional contexts. The past proliferation and inconclusiveness of such schemes suggest that a response is required. Which processes are warranted by present international conditions? What schemes or constellation of schemes seem more conducive to cooperation and building confidence in the present situation?

These are the questions that will be addressed in this paper. Consequently, an attempt will be made to underline the complementary and competitive aspects of the most important proposals and processes of institutionalization presently emerging in the Mediterranean area and to understand which factors are conducive to complementarity/cooperation and which spur competition.

The paper is divided into three parts: the first considers schemes that are currently functioning or have been proposed in the past; the second discusses whether and to what extent these schemes are complementary or competitive; the third draws some conclusions and suggests how to maximize the effectiveness and complementarity of the schemes and thus Mediterranean cooperation. °

Present institutional trends in the Mediterranean

The Gulf crisis and the beginning of the Arab-Israeli negotiations--the first consequences of the end of the Cold War in the Mediterranean and the Middle East--marked a turning point in the political situation in this area and its search for an institutional configuration. After these events, the schemes

which had previously been debated or had begun to work were swept away, while new proposals and initiatives were put forward. The Western Mediterranean Forum, also known as the "5 + 5" Group, is dormant. No substantive progress is in sight for the so-called "Mediterranean Dimension" of the cumbersome CSCE framework, although the Mediterranean countries' role in the organisation was formally enlarged¹ at the end of 1994 and the Review Conference in Budapest confirmed the CSCE members' interest in this scheme. Finally, the CSCM is being debated within the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), which took it up as one of its major initiatives,² but governments have shelved the scheme for the time being and it no longer constitutes a part of relevant diplomatic efforts. At the same time, four major initiatives are now being debated.³

First, Egypt has proposed to establish a Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (also referred to as the Mediterranean Forum) concentrated on a limited group of North African and South European countries: Algeria, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, and Turkey. The Mediterranean Forum's profile has not yet been clearly defined, but the inter-ministerial meeting in Alexandria (July 1994) adopted a document called the "Med-2000 Report",⁴ which stresses the need to develop a pragmatic and flexible institution within the Forum dealing with Mediterranean Political Cooperation (MPC) and to couple it to the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

The Mediterranean Forum is now evolving through three Working Groups related to political cooperation, inter-cultural

dialogue and economic and social cooperation. The "Med-2000 Report" gives prominence to the development of private cooperation and cultural dialogue; it suggests that MPC should focus on mitigating the contrast between global trends and regional identities by strengthening cultural and non-governmental factors.

The second initiative is the Arab-Israeli negotiations and their multilateral dimension. Although the various aspects negotiated within their framework are not organically and explicitly linked to one another, two are extremely relevant to our discourse: the working group on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) and the Regional Economic Development Working Group (REDWG). The ACRS is composed of Israel and twelve Arab countries (excluding Syria). It addresses a large range of military and security issues, ranging from nuclear weapons to confidence-building measures, with the aim of establishing a multilateral understanding on forms of collective and regional security, such as the elimination of weapons of mass destruction from the area.⁵ The REDWG seeks to establish a regional framework for economic integration and cooperation. It includes a large and diversified number of "donor" countries, whose efforts focus on the countries directly affected by the negotiations (i.e. Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria).⁶

The multilateral dimension of the Arab-Israeli negotiations provides important non-regional and international actors, such as the US, the Russian Federation, Japan, the EU and the World Bank with important roles. Like the proposed CSCM (and the CSCE), it therefore has an important global component, which is not

present in the above mentioned Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation in the Mediterranean.

Finally, it must be noted that the accent put on the Levant in the negotiations is a totally novel trend with respect to traditional Mediterranean attempts to establish cooperative groupings and that this novelty is the result of the beginning of negotiations between Israel and the Arab front-line countries. Indeed, the attention to the Levant may not be unrelated to the Egyptian proposal to initiate a Forum focussing west of the Levant and including regional actors only.

Third is the North Africa and Middle East Economic Summit, known as the Casablanca Economic Summit because of the meeting convened in that town by King Hassan on 1 November 1994 and organised by two private American associations under the sponsorship of Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin. The summit has been turned into a permanent organisation under the guidance of a secretariat. The Casablanca Economic Summit aims at stimulating both governments and firms to promote growth and private economic activities throughout the entire North African and Middle Eastern area.⁷

The global component of the Casablanca Economic Summit is no less important than the multilateral dimension of the Arab-Israeli negotiations. In addition, the REDWG and the Casablanca Economic Summit could turn out to be mutually reinforcing and highly complementary for three reasons: (i) economic integration may be more easily induced in the broader area contemplated by the Casablanca initiative (which includes North Africa) than in that of the Middle East alone; (ii) the emphasis put on private

business and resources by the summit may emerge as a strong factor in increasing growth and investment opportunities; (iii) the enlargement of the REDWG area may help decouple the debate on regional economic integration from that on political and security relations and thus facilitate working economic relations between Israel and the Arab countries. This is not to say that the two processes must merge: they may well remain separate, but they could be managed so as to generate and exploit complementarities.

Fourth, the EU intends to embark on a third edition of its "Mediterranean Policy". In addition to the strengthening of the financial and commercial scope of the policy, what sets it apart from previous EU schemes is the idea of discussing the scheme prior to implementation in a multilateral Euro-Mediterranean Conference to be held under the Spanish EU presidency in the fall of 1995 with the participation of the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean countries already associated to the EU,⁸ and the integration into the Mediterranean Policy of a security and foreign affairs dimension, in tune with the enlarged EU competences set out by the Treaty of Maastricht.

The EU's goal is to establish a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership with the task of merging economic, political and security aspects; it is clear from the EU Commission's document that "a swift economic development, social change and . . . political pluralism" would be functional to the creation of a "zone of peace, stability and security". This combination of elements--the multilateral conference, the integration of economic and political aspects and the links between the latter--

brings the EU initiative very close to the CSCM: it may, in fact, result in a CSCM that is less global in nature (e.g. it would not include the US) and in which the EU has pivotal responsibility.

In sum, it seems that there are three processes working towards the institutionalization of relations in the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern area today: (a) a CSCM-like Mediterranean initiative stemming from the EU, based on the integration of both political and economic dimensions under European guidance; (b) a scheme for regional economic integration and security cooperation in the Middle Eastern area (the economic aspect of might might be enlarged to North Africa) basically conceived of in a global dimension; (c) a Forum limited to North Africa and Southern Europe which seems intended, however, to be coupled to the EU.

Complementarity and competition

There are clear areas of overlap among the processes mentioned above. At times sub-regional trends seem to emerge--for example, a Mashreqi framework within the Arab-Israeli process or a Maghrebi framework within a closer partnership with Europe--but at other times they are blurred by more comprehensive trends--for example, the Maghreb is included in the Casablanca Economic Summit and attached to the Arab-Israeli process, while the Middle Eastern countries belonging to the core of the Arab-Israeli process are also included in the EU-sponsored Euro-Mediterranean Conference for a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

In general, the processes at work in the Mediterranean region tend to become more comprehensive rather than more

specialized (a tendency that arose with the CSCM proposal and the "5+5"). The Arab-Israeli negotiations include both security and developmental aspects, in addition to bilateral political negotiations. At the same time, the Euro-Mediterranean Conference now has the ambition to create a security and political dimension beside the more traditional developmental relations developed by the EC's Mediterranean Policy over time.

Factors of duplication and competition - Problems of duplication, low complementarity and competition stem essentially from two factors.

First, the Mediterranean--as is widely recognized--is devoid of internal coherence. Thus the forces to provide it have to come (more often than not) from outside the region. For this reason global and regional components are intertwined in the Mediterranean area and the institutional projects referred to previously largely reflect that. As a result, Mediterranean coherence reflects the problems of coherence which may affect relations among external actors. Now that the US and the EU are both important and almost exclusive partners of the North African and Middle Eastern region, problems affecting trans-Atlantic and intra-EU relations have a great impact on the coherence of the Mediterranean area. (It may be noted that, despite important differences in substance and circumstances, the same issue is affecting Western relations with Eastern Europe and the attempts at institutionalizing those relations.)

Second, regional coherence is affected by competition among countries on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean and by the attempts of these countries to use relations with the

West and Western incoherences for their own competitive purposes.

South-South competition - South-South competition is an important factor in the contemporary picture. The Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation in the Mediterranean was initiated by Egypt as a means of seeking reassurance against the threat it perceived in the region's strategic evolution. The Arab-Israeli process, the implications of the 1990-91 Gulf war and the policies that the US is pursuing from its dominant position in the region acquired after the end of the Cold War are perceived as a threat to Egypt's traditional leadership and, in a more distant future, to the enormous foreign assistance it currently enjoys, largely because of its important regional role.⁹ In this perspective, the REDWG is seen as challenging Egypt's future economic role, while the Forum is regarded as a way of containing American influence by bolstering the European role in the region. Moreover, if the Forum succeeds and paves the way for a privileged Euro-Egyptian relationship, this could help reaffirm the country's leadership in North Africa and the Middle East. Finally, a strong relationship with Europe may insure the continuation of the significant flows of financial and economic transfers.

The Forum, therefore, is both an instrument of competition for regional leadership and an instrument for using competition among external powers in regional competition. Egypt's request for membership in the Arab Maghreb Union (put forward in November 1994) must be regarded as a way of pursuing the same goal of reassurance as the Mediterranean Forum.

Another example of South-South competition is provided by

Morocco, which opposed the Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation in the Mediterranean in early 1994 as an unwelcome alternative to the CSCM-like conference it had organized only a few months earlier during the 1993 CSCE conference in Rome. Morocco felt that its prestige and regional role might be put in jeopardy by the Mediterranean Forum. Furthermore, it felt that the latter might prove a futile exercise as it does not include important global components such as the US and the EU.

The Casablanca Economic Summit can be regarded as a second round in the regional competition for political and economic bonuses. But while the Forum bets on Europe, the Casablanca initiative seems to reflect the more widespread belief in the region that the US should play the dominant role.

The impact of trans-Atlantic contradictions on Mediterranean cooperation - Jockeying for positions in the Mediterranean South-South circle is not beneficial for institutional processes. It may matter less, however, than policies and signals coming from Europe and the West. A clear and well coordinated Western policy for organizing cooperation and institutions in the area would act as a driving force and strongly discourage South-South competition. But is there such a Western policy? There are important convergences in current trans-Atlantic policies towards the Mediterranean, but also important contradictions.

There are no major disputes between the US and the EU about the Mediterranean and the Middle East today: there are dissensions in Europe about continuing sanctions against Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Libya, and Europeans are not certain about the rationale of "dual containment" in the Gulf; but there

is agreement on most important policies, such as proliferation and Islamism.

Above all, the end of the Cold War has resulted in a lower profile for the EU in the Middle East and unprecedented condescendence to the US. Western Europe, including France, chose to align with the US in the Gulf and agreed to make a special economic contribution to the Arab-Israeli negotiations, even though the EU and Europeans were unceremoniously excluded from political negotiations. This low European profile was epitomized in the statement of Mr. Roland Dumas, French Foreign Minister, that France's Arab policy had to be dismissed as a "sheer illusion". All in all, there is convergence and unprecedented accord between the US and Europe in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

Nonetheless, contradictions spring from the deep changes that have taken and are taking place within the Atlantic Alliance. With the end of the East-West confrontation, the US is trying to lessen its international commitment. It expects the EU and the European countries to shoulder more responsibility in neighbouring areas, such as Central and Eastern Europe, former Yugoslavia and the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

Exactly how this division of labour between the US and Europe should be, however, is not very clear. In the Middle East and the Gulf, for example, the US commitment, both political and military, is more central than ever. This is due to the fact that President Clinton's foreign policy is far from isolationist: it lies somewhere between weak multilateralism and selective

unilateralism,¹⁰ meaning that the US wants to maintain its global leadership while reducing its cost through strategic discrimination in disengagement and commitment. In the framework of this policy, the Middle East and the Gulf have retained great strategic prominence for the US and therefore remain an important commitment.

There is also a more specific reason for the continued US commitment towards the Mediterranean area. Since the area is not covered by the Atlantic Alliance, the US sees the establishment of any Euro-Mediterranean institution going beyond economic cooperation and international aid as a risk: if the US is not included in the institution, it could be faced with European or Euro-Arab policies that contrast with US national security interests or NATO interests; if the US is included, its role in the region--in the Arab-Israeli circle as well as in the Gulf--could be unduly constrained by endless and inconclusive collective diplomacy.

Thus the US stance towards Europe's role in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Gulf is somewhat ambiguous: an increased European role is sincerely desired, but the extent and limits of that role are not clear.

Europeans are not helping to solve the American dilemma. The end of the Cold War has been accompanied by a tendency towards renationalization of foreign policy which is hindering and slowing down the formation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the defence policy set out by the Maastricht Treaty. This evolution is also preventing Europeans from taking on substantive responsibilities in the Mediterranean area (as in

former Yugoslavia). Together, European hesitations and American doubts are generating a kind of vicious circle.

Finally, the alliance with the US and the survival of a US military presence in Europe is perceived by the Europeans as strategically crucial for avoiding disruptions in European integration and the reappearance of fault lines and conflicts among European nations. In this sense, many Europeans more or less consciously see greater political and military autonomy from the US as a factor that could accelerate American disengagement from Europe.

Yet there is ambiguity here, too. Europe would like to take on more international responsibility but is unable and unwilling to give precise indications about the extent and the limits of this responsibility with respect to the US.

Trans-Atlantic problems in working out a division of labour derive essentially from the difficulty in reconciling the global and regional dimensions of common security in the new post-Cold War situation. Debate has progressed but remains open. The Treaty of Maastricht has essentially reconciled emerging contrasts between NATO and the EU defence identity by construing the WEU as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance (rather than the defence pillar of the EU). Interlocking between the Eurocorps and NATO has also been agreed upon. Finally, an optimal variable geometry has been worked out by the creation of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) approved by the North Atlantic Council on January 1994. The CJTF can provide the Europeans with the (American) logistics, intelligence and mobility they now lack, thus allowing for autonomous European military operations under

WEU, multinational or national umbrellas.

Nevertheless, CJTF military operations are inconceivable outside of the framework of a prior political agreement between the US and its European allies.¹¹ This kind of political agreement can no longer be anticipated automatically by NATO today as it was at the time of East-West confrontation. After due transformations, the Atlantic Alliance could become the locus for common political decision making, but this direction does not seem very convincing (NATO proved unable to reconcile the allies' political differences in Bosnia even though these differences risked discrediting the military credibility of the Alliance).¹² So where can the US and the EU take common political decisions-- if they should feel so inclined--about areas like the Mediterranean and the Middle East? The question of a trans-Atlantic political forum for common US-EU decision making (mainly with respect to Eastern Europe) was raised at the February 1995 annual Wehrkunde meeting, but no answer was found.

If the question is not solved, the ambiguities pointed out above will remain. The US would like Europeans to shoulder more of the burden in the Mediterranean, but without assurances of a forum for making prior joint political decisions, Americans will not feel confident about the outcome. Thus they will prefer to retain the upper hand on security policies and will tend to be against establishing any CSCE-like Mediterranean-centered institution dealing with security. By the same token, without a common forum, Europeans will not be encouraged to take on increasingly clear-cut political and security responsibilities in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

These ambiguities tend to complicate identification of complementarities for implementing cooperation in the Mediterranean.

Arabs and trans-Atlantic contradictions - There is yet another ambiguity to complicate things. The general attitude of the Arabs towards the European and American sides of the US-EU-Arab triangle is a far cry today from that which inspired the Euro-Arab dialogue policy ¹³ in the 1970s. At that time, Arabs thought they could reach a preferential agreement with Europe and play it against US Middle Eastern policy. Today, very few Arab governments would accept a Euro-Arab or Mediterranean understanding decoupled from the US. Most feel that present efforts at cooperation with Europe must go hand in hand with more cohesive and cooperative trans-Atlantic cooperation: cooperation should not come from across the Mediterranean alone, but also from across the Atlantic.

Yet this is not exactly the way things stand either. As important a partner as the US may be for Arab peoples today, the latter remain fundamentally uneasy about the US. More generally, there is a confused and ambiguous Arab belief that Europe is closer to the Arab world than the US.¹⁴ The South-South attempts at exploiting trans-Atlantic competition mentioned earlier reflect these feelings and perceptions.

Competition and contradictions within the EU - The trend towards renationalization of foreign and security policies in the EU may also have a negative effect on the attempts underway to institutionalize Mediterranean relations.

The European Council, other EU institutions and the WEU have

on numerous occasions stressed the need for coherence in CFSP and the importance of integrating the Mediterranean side of European security into the CFSP. The most serious European stance against the EU's alleged tendency to privilege Eastern Europe and neglect the Mediterranean area can be found in the October 1994 European Commission communication to the Council of Ministers (already mentioned) putting forward the idea of a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. This communication recognizes the imbalance in the flow of EU resources presently going towards the two areas (in a 5 to 1 ratio for the East against the South) and proposes a significant increase (up to 5.5 bn ECU in 1995-1999) in EU aid to the Mediterranean.

In December 1994, the European Council in Essen accepted the broad argument made by the Commission, but refrained from spelling out any specific aid figure with respect to the East or the South. At the same time, the Essen Council recalled that European Council decisions taken in Edinburgh in 1992 on 1993-1999 EU financing set precise ceilings on EU expenses, including external assistance. This means that there will have to be negotiations among EU members on the future amount of external assistance and its destination. Northern members of the EU are not against the idea of increasing resources towards the Mediterranean but they do not want to pay for it or to pay for it in full. Given the ceilings, there are two solutions to such negotiations: Southern European EU members will have to either give up a part of the EU assistance allotted to their economies so as to enable the EU to shift some of those resources towards Mediterranean countries, or increase their contribution to the

EU budget substantially so as to allow the latter to increase the Union's financing in favour of Mediterranean countries.

The upshot of this kind of intra-EU competition may become clearer after the French presidential elections in spring of 1995. Germany and France are widely regarded as the *chefs de file* of the "pro-Eastern" and "pro-Southern" groups in the EU. Commenting on the future of the German-French relation--a relation which has provided leadership for European integration so far--Michael Stürmer pointed out that the "Germans view co-opting the countries of central and eastern Europe into the EU as being in their national interest as well as a wider European concern. France, on the other hand, is more worried about troubles in the Mediterranean basin, from Casablanca to Amman".¹⁵ If the outcome of the French elections allows for a renewal of the German-French axis, such a deal may include revision of the EU ceilings on external assistance in favour of both Southern and Eastern Europe and the countries south of the Mediterranean.

As a result, competition and complementarity inside the EU is bound to have a significant impact on the future of cooperation and institutions in the Mediterranean. If European resources for external cooperation are not significantly increased because of intra-European competition or disunity, EU-led schemes will have a slim chance of preventing competition or encouraging complementarity in the Mediterranean.

Complementarity and competition: the case of the Mediterranean Forum - Unlike other cooperation schemes, the Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation in the Mediterranean is characterized by the limitations on its geographical scope: on

the southern side, it includes North Africa and excludes the Levant countries; on the northern side, it includes Southern European countries and excludes the northern members of the EU. In addition to this narrow Mediterranean scope, the Mediterranean Forum does not contain any global component among its members.

The most important question arising from these limitations concerns the Forum's relations with the EU as a whole: in what way should North African countries' special relations with their Southern European partners be distinguished from their ordinary relations with the EU? Will the Southern European members of the Forum provide their North African Arab partners with more political and/or economic solidarity than the EU and the European countries not included in the Forum? Will the Forum be the locus for developing a special kind of Mediterranean solidarity and reaping the benefits of proximity?

The "Oral conclusions" provided informally by the Egyptian government at the end of the July 1994 first inter-ministerial meeting of the Mediterranean Forum in Alexandria are very general and do not answer these questions. As already mentioned, however, the "Med-2000 Report" adopted by the meeting includes two important ideas for trying to give the Mediterranean Forum a precise purpose and, at the same time, bring it into line with the EU's wider framework of cooperation. According to the Report:

- * "Mediterranean cooperation must receive a specific institutional framework within which the [EU] countries of Southern Europe can take on special responsibility towards their partners both on the Southern Rim and in northern

European countries. Whatever its degree of institutionalization, this framework must be linked to the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)";

- * "the institutions for political cooperation must pursue two main objectives: i) increased coherence between the consensus-building mechanisms in individual countries and international cooperation so that better management of interdependence and global economic, social and cultural processes may be achieved, thereby attenuating and solving possible crises and reducing risks; ii) definition of the type of dialogue required to bring the Mediterranean area into the processes of globalization, thus reducing tensions between globalization and specificities; the human dimension is bound to be predominant in Mediterranean cooperation".¹⁶

A Southern European role in mediating between the countries south of the Mediterranean and the EU was already suggested at the Western Mediterranean Forum in Tangiers, where the concluding document refers to Southern European countries as "mentors" of the Arab countries participating in what was to become the "5 + 5" Group. The "Med-2000 Report" tries to substantiate this (very Mediterranean) metaphor by coupling local political cooperation (called MPC, Mediterranean Political Cooperation, in the document) to broader political cooperation with the EU (i.e. the CFSP) and by arguing that proximity and shared cultural heritage may contribute to solving contrasts between global trends and

regional identities. Such a contribution could in turn be an important factor in smoothing Euro-Mediterranean relations, thereby facilitating their institutionalization.

If the Mediterranean Forum proves incapable of working out an institutional and political identity consistent with the wider European framework, survival will be difficult. It is more likely that survival will be linked to attempts at using it in a competitive way in the South-South arena--as mentioned earlier--or in the North-North context (e.g. as an element of attrition between France and Germany or between southern and northern members of the Union). This would be detrimental to the Mediterranean Forum itself.

Towards complementarity

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Mediterranean Forum -
As pointed out earlier, there is potential for complementarity between the Mediterranean Forum and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Yet, while the latter can perform even in the absence of the Forum, the reverse is not necessarily true. In order for the Forum to work and provide its members with the benefits of its geopolitical specialization, it has to be coupled to the EU (e.g. through Mediterranean Political Cooperation). If the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership does not materialize or if it is too weak to tackle the challenge of institutionalizing multilateral cooperation in the Mediterranean, the identity of the Mediterranean Forum will be easier to assert, but it will lack significance since the decoupling from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership would almost certainly reflect some

form of disunity within the EU. If this were the case, the Mediterranean Forum could even prove detrimental to the interests of its southern members.

The most favourable solution from the point of view of Mediterranean cooperation would be a strong Euro-Mediterranean Partnership flanked by and well connected to a viable Mediterranean Forum intent on developing cultural proximity and relations.

Euro-Mediterranean Political Cooperation - Mediterranean Political Cooperation (MPC) is bound to play a pivotal role in any cooperation scheme between European countries and the countries across the Mediterranean.

A flexible and effective MPC is a necessary condition for both European-Mediterranean and trans-Atlantic complementarity: if the MPC proves ineffective, any Euro-Mediterranean arrangement will lose its interest for the countries concerned; if the MPC is inflexible, it will create problems within the trans-Atlantic sphere.

The kind of effective and flexible MPC that is required to make Euro-Mediterranean institutional cooperation work has been outlined in the "Med-2000 Report":

MPC should not be seen as one complex, multi-faceted institution, but rather as a set of "light" institutions which can be adapted to circumstances and requirements and adjusted to the real level of possible cooperation. It should be able to link up with the other existing international organisations and multilateral cooperation activities in different ways on specific initiatives or

when the latter involve important interests or commitments in the area.

The MPC's tasks should be dialogue and consultation among governments and the organisation of multilateral communication between the public and private spheres. Ideally, the CPM should set up a list of priorities and objectives to serve as a stimulus and guideline for all cooperation (whether bilateral or multilateral, public or private). It should constitute a useful institutional interlocutor and a possible instrument for verification of progress in the desired direction.

. . . the MPC must be endowed with a permanent network for consultation (with special technical equipment) among participating countries. Another permanent network can be envisaged for exchange of information between countries not involved in cooperation. Both would be linked to the European CFSP. These networks could also be integrated by periodic meetings at different levels and *ad hoc* meetings. . . .

MPC should also include multilateral consultations on the more general issues of global security (proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) and other issues that go beyond foreign policy, such as the legal matters dealt with by European cooperation, the fight against organized crime and international terrorism, and other aspects of government policies.¹⁷

To conclude on this point, it is difficult to conceive of separate MPC schemes, even if a plurality of Euro-Mediterranean

institutional arrangements were to emerge. In that event, the countries concerned should be prepared to set up an intimate link, or better, to share the same institution of political cooperation from within different institutional schemes.

Trans-Atlantic impact on Mediterranean cooperation - All in all, despite Arab perceptions and current discrepancies and gaps between the US and Europe, it would be grossly unfair to say that there is trans-Atlantic competition with regard to the Mediterranean and the Middle East. There are uncertainties in both the US and Europe about strategic perspectives. But inconsistencies do not come from competition or conflict; they come from the absence of a unifying strategic vision.

Trans-Atlantic relations are not fuelling competition or hindering cooperation in the Mediterranean today, but they are not encouraging it either. US-EU relations suggest a division of labour, but this division of labour does not stem from firm political agreements and a clear-cut strategic vision. As a result, it is fragile and indefinite instead of being evident and effective.

This situation of flux does not insure complementarity. While waiting for the establishment of a US-EU forum for political decision making, Mediterranean relations should be based on policies giving strong priority to complementarity in the short term and planting the seeds for more European responsibility and a more effective US-EU division of labour in the medium term.

In this sense, two main directives should be applied to regulate the relationship between the emerging EU Euro-

Mediterranean Partnership and the US-led Mediterranean processes.

First, the EU should be allowed to take on more responsibility for security. It is obvious that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership will only be able to deal with some arms control and limitation issues after the Working Group on ACRS has provided an understanding on this point between Israel and the front-line Arab countries. Nonetheless, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership should be able to set up a framework of comprehensive Mediterranean CBMs and CSBMs¹⁸ without suffering significant limitations or delays because of the on-going Arab-Israeli process.

Second, the EU should accentuate its economic regionalization towards its southern approaches, just as the US is trying to do with Mexico. At the same time, the EU's role among the global components of assistance to structural adjustment and stabilization in the Mediterranean should be increased. In other words, the EU should increase its economic and financial responsibility towards the Mediterranean, while being allowed to increase its voice within the international organizations. The IMF decision to support Algeria was the outcome of special European (French) pressure and concern. But it is only one case. The EU cannot pursue an effective economic cooperation policy in the Mediterranean without promoting its own role in international organizations regarding actions directed at the Mediterranean and a more Mediterranean-directed policy within these same organizations.

Notes

- (1) *Helsinki Monitor*, no. 2, 1994, p. 89.
- (2) See the Document approved in Malaga, 15-20 June 1992, at the 1st Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, and Victor-Yves Ghebali, "De la CSCE à la CSCM", in *Bulletin Interparlementaire*, no. 2, 1992, pp. 114-135 and pp. 149-152, respectively.
- (3) The new situation is outlined by Laura Guazzone, "The Neighbours Europe Has Too Long Neglected", *European Brief*, vol.2, no. 4, February 1995, pp. 23-24.
- (4) The Italian International Affairs Institute, "Cooperation and Stability in the Mediterranean: An Agenda for Partnership", *The International Spectator*, vol. XXIX, no. 3, July-September 1994, pp. 5-20.
- (5) On the ACRS, see Shai Feldman, "Progress Towards Middle East Arms Control", in Shlomo Gazit, Zeev Eytan, *The Middle East Military Balance 1993-1994*, The Jerusalem Post & Westview Press for The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Jerusalem and Boulder (Co.), 1994, pp. 182-210; Mahmoud Karem, "The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and of Ballistic Missiles", in Chantal De Jonge Oudraat (ed.), *Conference of Research Institutes in the Middle East. Proceedings of the Cairo Conference (18-20 April 1993)*, UNIDIR, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 1994, pp. 39-50.
- (6) Stanley Fisher, Dani Rodrik, Elias Tuma (eds.), *The Economics of Middle East Peace*, Cambridge (Ma.), MIT Press, 1993; Rodney Wilson, "The Economic Relations of the Middle East: Toward Europe or within the Region?", *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 48, no. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 268-287.
- (7) The Summit was attended by representatives of 61 countries. See Edmund O'Sullivan, "Marching to a new tune", *Middle East Economic Digest*, 11 November 1994, pp. 6-7, which also report the document approved by the conference: "The Casablanca Declaration".
- (8) Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Occupied Territories of Palestine (Cyprus and Malta are candidates to become members of the EU, which means that they will sooner or later be on the other side of the EU Mediterranean Policy). The outline of the EU's proposal is included in the EC Commission communication to the Council and the European Parliament, *Renforcement de la Politique Méditerranéenne de l'Union Européenne. Etablissement d'un Partenariat Euro-Méditerranéen*, COM(94) 427 final, Brussels, 19 October 1994.
- (9) Wadouda Badran, *Egypt's Security Policy*, paper presented to the ISS-WEU International Seminar on "Security and Defence Policies of the Maghreb Countries and Egypt", Paris, 9-10 March

1995 (unpublished); Gema Martín Muñoz, *L'Egypte et la stabilité en Méditerranée. Les conséquences pour l'Afrique du Nord et l'Europe*, paper presented to the ISS-WEU International Seminar on "L'Egypte et la stabilité au nord de l'Afrique et en Méditerranée: les conséquences pour l'Europe", Paris, November 3, 1994 (unpublished); Abdel Monem Said Aly, *From Geo-Politics to Geo-Economics. Egyptian National Security Perceptions* (unpublished: draft circulated by the author at the end of 1994 within the framework of the UNIDIR Expert Group on Confidence Building Measures in the Middle East); Mohammed El-Sayed Selim, *Mediterraneanism: A New Dimension in Egypt's Foreign Policy*, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, 1994 (unpublished).

(10) Current American schools of thought in relation to international policy and European relations are outlined in R.D. Asmus, "The Rise--or Fall?-- of Multilateralism: America's New Foreign Policy and What It Means for Europe", in Marco Carnovale (ed.), *European Security and International Institutions After the Cold War*, London, MacMillan Press, 1995 (forthcoming).

(11) See the comment by Daniel Vernet, "L'Europe, l'OTAN et la Russie", *Le Monde*, 7 February 1995.

(12) Recently, NATO took the decision to initiate an informative dialogue with a selected group of Eastern and Southern Mediterranean countries: see *Atlantic News*, no. 2688, 25 January 1995, p. 1. This dialogue, however, is not targeted to establish any kind of institutional link with the countries concerned (Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) and does not link necessarily with the broader question of a US-EU forum for political decision making pointed out in the text.

(13) Bichara Khader, *L'Europe et le monde arabe...*, cit., pp. 91-139; Jaime Munich Gasa, "El diálogo Euro-árabe", *Revista CIDOB de Afers Internacionals*, no. 16, 1989, pp. 23-36. Earlier: David Allen, "The Euro-Arab Dialogue", *The Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 16, no. 4, June 1979, pp. 323-342; Edmund Volker (ed.), *Euro-Arab Co-Operation*, Sijthoff, Leyden, 1976.


(14) This is very perceptively noted by Ghassan Salamé, "Torn between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean: Europe and the Middle East in the Post-Cold War Era", *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 48, no. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 226-249 (see p. 228), who cites Ellen Laipson, "Europe Role in the Middle East: Enduring Ties, Emerging Opportunities", *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 44, no. 1 as saying: "Europe has, and is to continue to have, a more sustained and durable political, economic, and cultural presence in the region than either the United States or the Soviet Union" (p. 7).

(15) "An open relationship", *Financial Times*, 27 January 1995.

(16) "Cooperation and Stability in the Mediterranean: An Agenda for Partnership", cit., p. 9.

(17) *Ibidem*, pp. 10-11.

(18) Antonio Marquina, Hans Günter Brauch (eds.), *Confidence Building and Partnership in the Western Mediterranean. Tasks for Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Avoidance*, UNISCI Papers no. 1, Universidad Complutense, Madrid, 1994.



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B.BLIOTECA

DRAFT (NOT TO BE QUOTED)**Mediterranean Issues and Institutional Paradigms****Seyfi Taşhan**

The purpose of this paper is to review the relevance of existing international organizations to the current problems of the Mediterranean countries both individually and as a region, and to suggest improvements and possible alternatives.

Issues:

There is a wide variety in the perception of the current issues and societal disruptions depending on the venue and interests of the beholder. Therefore, some issues which may pose serious problems for some people may be considered by others as developments auguring a happy future. Consequently, any analysis of the issues and institutional paradigms must reflect the subjective character of the issues and the proposed remedies.

There are, however, a number of issues which we can be defined as real problems in objective terms, the rest constituting another category of problems that can be identified but there may be a divergence of opinion on their causes and remedies.

In the first category lies the the subject of Islam as a political power. We know that in the course of the past two decades, particularly with the demise of communist ideology both as a vision of salvation for masses and as a totalitarian system of Government as practiced in the former Soviet Union, much of the hopes attached to this ideology had crumpled in the Mediterranean region, and those who had attached hopes to the Soviet superpower as an ally were disappointed. Similarly, nationalist ideology based on ideals emanating from the French Revolution has proved to be ineffective in bringing about a degree of unity that could provide sufficient political and military strength to meet its challenges. Now, Islam as a political power seems capable of winning support around around its dogmas that appear in the economic sense a kind of socialism and a nationalism of a different kind in the form of umma. The fact that political Islam is anti-American and anti-west in the sense of challenging many of Western policies and political and economic order, and the use of violence by some radical groups have aroused new threat or risk perceptions in several European countries, not only because of the fear for a clash of civilizations as predicted by Samuel Huntington, but also because of possible dangers to their internal security and social order that may be disrupted by reactive racist and xenophobic forces.

Demography and economic underdevelopment are not such issues that could be considered only in the context of an island Europe or its pending extension to the East. Demography and underdevelopment seem to be for the MENA countries two major evils feeding each other. So long as demographic trends cannot be attenuated it will be nigh impossible to reverse the increasing income gap between Europe and MENA region. Similarly continuation of the current economic conditions will contribute to a continuation if not to an increase in the current demographic trends.

If one considers that the demographic growth in the European continent is very slow and there are attractive work opportunities, the pressures on the borders will increase, and measures to halt immigration will lead to further alienation and breed anti-Western sentiments and policies.

The establishment of a *modus vivendi* and possibly a peace settlement between Israel and her neighbours may augur a change in the negative trends in the Mashrek scene. Yet the challenges are enormous and I need not repeat them. The situation appears to be worse in North Africa and inner Africa.

The European interest is not limited to protecting itself against dangers that may emanate from Islamic radicalism or demographic pressure. The Mediateranean provides the main sea connection to world's vital energy resources. With the opening of the Caucasian and Central Asian oil and gas resources the strategic importance of the Mediterranean waterways will further increase.

Protecting the Mediterranean is also a problem by itself. The pollution largely coming from the industrialized North is a problem whose solution cannot be put-off.

In the North, interstate conflicts and disagreements constitute major impediments for harmonious policies. The problems of former Yugoslavia and frictions between Greece and Turkey over the problem of Cyprus and the Aegean Sea and air delimitations as well as Greece's disputes with her northern neighbours complicate the security picture of Mediterranean.

The proliferation of mass destruction weapons and means of delivery also constitute an imbalance in threat perceptions and security concepts. With the destruction of Iraq's Nuclear capability, the only country that is declared to possess nuclear weapons is Israel. Many countries possess medium range missiles. The continuation of this situation which is also linked to non-proliferation issues in South Asia will greatly hamper the prospects of the NPT review conference this year.

The Roles of International Organisations and Groupings:

There are many international organisations to which some or all of the Mediterranean countries are members or have special status and it may be noteworthy to mention the basic functions of these institution and the degree of their usefulness for the Mediterranean security and cooperation.

The largest and all embracing organisation is no doubt the United Nations, in which all Mediterranean countries are members. Mediterranean countries are members to some or all of the specialized agencies.

As far as security is concerned the UN Security Council, still occupies itself with several issues that pertain to the Mediterranean. The situation in Bosnia, Cyprus problem, embargo on Iraq, partial embargo on Lybia, are some of the issues that are on the agenda of the of the Security Council. It is clear that the ability of the Security Council in solving problems depend on the consensus of its permanent members. This consensus generally requires similarity of view or a compromise of national interests among the five. Only one of the permanent members is a riparian state of the Mediterranean. In security terms we know the views of this country do not always coincide with the United States, nor with the other European permanent

member, which has also specific military interests in the Mediterranean that are adverse with some of the Mediterranean countries' interests. Cases in point are the fate of Gibraltar and British military bases in Cyprus.

Greater role and expectations are due to UN specialized agencies, but their effectiveness are limited by the resources at their disposal that need to be shared with the rest of the world. One should not minimize the activities of these organisations, but it is difficult to say that they are highly effective in solving the problems falling within their competence in the Mediterranean region.

European Union

European Union: Since the days of the signing of the Rome Treaty, European Union has accepted a certain responsibility towards former colonies in North Africa. Various Mediterranean programmes initiated at different stages of development of the Community into a Union have provided some economic assistance and certain customs privileges. European policy towards the Middle East has gone little beyond the Venice declaration of 1980. For the first time in the Lisbon Summit of June 1992 the EU declared that "southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean, as well as the Middle East, are geographical areas in relation to which the Union has strong interests in terms of security and social stability." In a report entitled Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the EU Commission (Doc. Com. (94)427) noted several areas of Euro-Mediterranean interdependence such as environment, energy, migration, trade and investment. It is felt that Europe cannot limit itself to merely increasing financial contributions to the region. The objective is described as working towards the establishment of free trade, supported by substantial financial aid. This should then develop through closer political and economic cooperation, towards a close association, the content of which will be defined at a later stage. As regards creating a zone of peace and stability the EU proposes a close dialogue based on respect for democracy, good governance and human rights. The dialogue should be extended to security issues. In the economic sphere, the modernization of the economies and increased competitiveness of the region are considered a long process of transition which should eventually lead to the creation of the largest free trade area in the world. At Shengen last year the Union approved 5.5 billion ECU's as aid to the Mediterranean countries for the period 1995-1999.

Are these realizable objectives? The conference to be held with Mediterranean countries in November will shed greater light on the chances of success of the European policies towards the basin. There is no doubt that as the strongest power of the Union, the Federal Republic of Germany has started, at least in the strategic sense, to have an interest in the Mediterranean affairs. The German argument is that "the abolition of internal borders means that this does not only affect EU states on the Mediterranean. Thus the Middle East, Gulf region and the Maghreb are of importance to the whole of Europe" (see: "Europe and the Middle East" a Working Paper Presented by the Bertelsmann Foundation to a Conference on 'Europe and the Middle East'..). This new interest on the part of Germany may be considered as two edged. On the positive side it may provide additional resources and backing of the EU to the Mediterranean members of the Union to increase their assistance and cooperation with other Mediterranean countries. On the negative side, EU as the main body of aid may reinforce the opposite trend; i.e. Mediterranean EU members may be tempted to pass the burden of assisting other Mediterranean countries to the Union which may divide available sources with Eastern Europe, where Union's interests are more obvious. Beginning with the Mediterranean countries the Union's

new interest in the Middle East and North Africa seem to focus mainly on the effects of rise of Islamic radicalism, and the demographic pressure. EU is not in a position at this stage to offer anything more concrete than a dialogue and a long term process of transforming the MENA societies into European style democracies. Both are legitimate and good intentions but, as a vision take little count of realities.

Council of Europe

The other European Organisation which does not deal with security and economic matters is the Council of Europe. During the past decade the Council of Europe has made various attempts to establish a dialogue with the Middle East and North Africa, in the fields of international cooperation falling within its own competence, such as the promotion of democracy and human rights as well as encouraging peace and stability. There are numerous resolutions by the Council of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly encouraging peace and condemning aggression and terrorism in the Mediterranean area. The Council of Europe has supported various cultural projects such as Euro-Arab University in Spain. It has also enacted a number of conventions and protocols that would support the human rights of immigrants to Europe. However, the Council of Europe does not have enough resources and proper terms of reference to address the issues of the Mediterranean in the measure they deserve. As seen from the attached table only the Northern riparian states of the Mediterranean are members of the Council of Europe where only Israel has an observer status.

Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE):

Like the two European Organisations mentioned above the OSCE is also a European organisation with an area that in reality extends from Vladivostok to Honolulu. The service this organisation (as a talking forum) rendered in the transition from cold war to detente has been extremely valuable. The decisions of the Budapest conference to turn this conference into an organisation reflects the hopes attached to it, for crisis management, mediation and even for the protection of minority rights in Europe. However, this organisation has proven itself to be highly inefficient, if not useless in solving regional conflicts in Europe. There have been several attempts to establish similar patterns of cooperation systems in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East. However, the successful original concept of CSCE was conceived as a process between two hostile military blocs. The implementation of a similar pattern in the Mediterranean area, where the only shared entity is the sea itself, and the rest full of political, ethnical, religious and national interest diversities may not be an appropriate and productive model.

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO):

NATO, a European and North American security Institution, is interested in the security of the shipping lines in the Mediterranean and this is included in the NATO area. Of course, this is a task somewhat different from the one clearly defined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Nevertheless, it legitimizes NATO's Mediterranean role, and the US presence in the Mediterranean.

With the demise of the Soviet Union as a challenger to American power, the role of the US and US Fleet in the Mediterranean had to undergo a significant change. US interests seem to lie now mainly in preserving the security of Israel and protecting

shipping lines in addition to showing the US flag as the only remaining superpower in the world.

Under these circumstances any security role NATO can play in the Mediterranean must be conceived to protect the joint interests of NATO's European and North American members.

Like EU when an extension of NATO is considered towards the East, there is a notion that the risks that may emanate from the MENA region for NATO's security should not be overlooked. In this connection in 1994 NATO council decided that the situation in the Mediterranean should be taken under scrutiny. However, the intention of the new Secretary General of NATO to enter into a dialogue with five MENA countries may be premature and too overt a gesture which may in the end prove to be counter-productive, given the limited means NATO has for alleviating risks that are not of a military nature. Furthermore, NATO can take military measures only if and when permitted by the security council.

West European Union (WEU)

A similar dilemma exists also for the WEU which aspires to become the security arm of EU and which hopes to become an interface between EU and NATO. Both NATO and WEU can do nothing concrete in the Mediterranean region other than having overlapping dialogues with parties who are ready to talk to them. Let us not forget that Euro-Arab dialogue which continued for many years produced practically nothing significant.

After having briefly touched on the main functions and usefulness of Western Institutions it might be worthwhile to mention the organisations to which MENA countries belong. (See: Table 1)

Islamic Conference Organisation: (ICO)

This organisation which started as a conference of Islamic countries to voice protest over the attack on Aksa Mosque in 1969, has eventually become a permanent structure of Islamic countries all over the world for a number of concrete projects. The Islamic Bank, and COMSEC are useful institutions but it seems that their ambitions are far ahead of the means at their disposal for achieving positive results in the Mediterranean area, let alone the entire Moslem world.

Arab League

Arab League founded as an expression of Arab nationalism to create an interdependence among the Arab countries has made significant progress in certain areas of cooperation. But inter-Arab frictions in the political sphere and lack of resources for rapid development, has led many Arab countries to seek cooperation with outside partners, rather than enhancing the role of the League as an instrument creating interdependence.

Organisation for African Unity (OAU)

Organisation for African Unity, has taken successful steps in several cases in Africa and it may serve as a useful tool in crisis management on the African continent, but it has little relevance for the development of the Mediterranean basin.

The Mediterranean Forum:

This informal meeting of ten Mediterranean countries' foreign ministers is a useful instrument for dialogue, that may help in coordinating multi-lateral cooperation projects in the Mediterranean and for achieving a harmonious Mediterranean voice in international arena. Its working groups may develop a number of specific cooperation areas. So long as this Forum remains an informal instrument its effectiveness will no doubt be highly limited.

For the purposes of encouraging cooperation in diverse fields among the Mediterranean countries the most suitable forum may be a Mediterranean version of the Council of Europe. Such a Mediterranean Council may be open to all riparian Governments, and should basically be an inter-governmental cooperation body. No country large or small should be excluded from being represented in its Council of Ministers. It could have an assembly for parliamentarians, NGO's and local administrations, which could elaborate recommendations to the Council.

A secretariate under the Council could develop multi-lateral conventions and schemes providing for transfrontier cooperation or setting norms applicable for the Mediterranean countries, in a wide range of subjects such as environment, shipping safety, culture for which there is a consensus among the participating countries. European Settlement Fund also constitutes a model for encouraging socially motivated development projects in the basin.

My hope is that the Mediterranean Forum may eventually take such an institutional form in which every Mediterranean country will have the opportunity to take part in an international effort to enhance peace, and assure better quality of life for their citizens.

Ankara, March 2, 1995.

List of International Affiliations of the Mediterranean Countries

	UN	OSCE	NATO	WEU	EU	CE	OECD	G7	BEC	ECO	ICO	AL	OAU	MED.Forum
Portugal	x	x	x	x	x	x	x							x
Spain	x	x	x	x		x	x							x
Italy	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x						x
France	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x						x
Albania	x	x												
Greece	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x					x
Turkey	x	x	x	*	*	x	x		x		x			x
Morocco	x									x	x	x	x	x
Algiers	x								x		x	x	x	x
Lybia	x										x	x	x	
Egypt	x										x	x	x	x
Israel	x				+	**								x
Lebanon	x										x	x		
Syria	x										x	x		

* Associate Member
 ** Observer
 + Free Trade Arrangement. □

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B BLIOTECA

L'aire méditerranéenne et le "changement global"

par le Professeur Khalifa Chater*

L'effondrement de l'URSS, annonçant son implosion et la guerre du Golfe qui constituent deux repères majeurs du "Changement global", qui affecte les relations internationales, se produisirent en dehors de l'aire méditerranéenne. Mais l'onde de choc de ces deux événements se propagea dans les sphères de solidarité naturelle de ces sujets de l'histoire immédiate. La chute du mur de Berlin, en 1989, annonce l'élargissement de l'Europe et promet de lui redonner sa dimension et ses frontières historico-géographiques, en occultant les postulats idéologiques d'antan. Dans le même ordre d'idées, la guerre du Golfe, bouleverse l'aire Maghreb-Machrek et induit objectivement une révision générale des principes fondateurs de co-existence sinon d'alliance des partenaires et des protagonistes de la région. Ces deux événements extérieurs à l'aire méditerranéenne ont donc eu un impact différentiel, mais très important, sur les rives européennes et afro-asiatiques de la Méditerranéenne, aggravant cette dichotomie Nord-Sud, à l'ère de la disparition du tiers-monde, suite logique du *knocked Out* du camp communiste dans la compétition bipolaire. Fait plus important, la nouvelle donne stratégique de la fin de la guerre froide suscite, dans toutes les aires géographiques, y compris évidemment la zone méditerranéenne, des changements globaux, dus aux paradigmes, rapports de forces, aux règles d'alliances et même aux utopies de la nouvelle aire. Nous nous proposons d'identifier les mutations qui affectent la scène méditerranéenne : défis et stratégies, volontés de normalisation et opportunités de paix mais aussi risques de dérives et d'instabilités. Or les restructurations de notre aire et ses dynamiques régionales en gestation s'inscrivent dans ce "changement global".

I - La problématique du "Changement global" :

Nous adoptons, dans notre étude le concept du "Changement global" définie et explicitée par Werber Weidenfeld et Josef Janning¹ : "Evolution de la perception de la menace et des zones de

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¹ - Werber Weidenfeld et Josef Janning, *Europe in Global Change, strategies and options for Europe*, Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, Gütersloh, 1993, pp. 288. Voir p. 14.

risques", les scénarios de guerre Est-Ouest étant dépassés. "Nouvelles priorités et adaptation de l'agenda de la politique mondiale" en conséquence. "Émergence de nouveaux conflits et de nouveaux risques". Tout en définissant essentiellement le "Changement global", par la fin de la guerre froide - il s'agit en fait d'un fait majeur et décisif, mais qui couronne une lente maturation et une profonde mutation - les auteurs identifient les différents cas de figure des causes de tensions de la situation géostratégique actuelle : les conflits re-actualisés de l'ère pré- guerre froide, les conflits non réglés par l'ancien ordre et les nouveaux conflits issus des mutations de l'environnement international².

Problématique controversée de "la fin de l'histoire" de Francis Fukuyama (été 1989), thèse du "nouvel ordre international" du Président Bush (18 janvier 1991), définition de la nouvelle "mission" américaine pour l'ère post-guerre froide, par les deux candidats Bush et Clinton, pendant la dernière campagne présidentielle, les concepts clefs de cette nouvelle stratégie furent ébauchées sinon définies, dans le discours politique américain³. Mais il ne s'agit que de postulats idéologiques et des affirmations de principes. Comment décrire alors la nouvelle scène internationale et dégager les différentes implications, afin de faire ressortir la grille d'interprétation de la géostratégie méditerranéenne ?

Peut-on parler d'un "ordre mondial relâché⁴", selon le concept de Zaki Laïdi, un ordre dont le "trait distinctif, n'est pas tant le désordre que la tension croissante entre une dynamique de puissance qui pousse, sous la pression économique, à la mondialisation et à l'intégration et une problématique du sens qui depuis qu'elle a perdu tout soubassement téléologique, semble de plus en plus sécale, friable, précaire⁵"? Mais peut-on affirmer qu'une dynamique de puissance d'un ordre monopolaire est plus relâchée que dans le cas d'une situation de dominations concurrentes entre deux ordres antagonistes? Ce qui est certain, c'est que l'ère post-guerre froide suscite une nouvelle restructuration des relations internationales, qu'elle favorise la création d'un nouvel ordre mondial, dont les spécificités déterminantes découlent de son caractère originel

² - *Ibid.*

³ - Voir *The end of the cold war : its meanings and implications*, édité by Michael J. Hogan, Cambridge university Press, 1992, 294 pp.

⁴ - *L'ordre mondial relâché, sens et puissance après la guerre froide*, sous la direction de Zaki Laïdi, Presse de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, 1993, 2ème édition, 263 pp.

⁵ - Zaki Laïdi, " penser l'après -guerre froide", *ibid.*, p. 5.

distinctif : des conflits entre les aires post-historique et historique du monde, selon la problématique de Fukuyama⁶, ou en le paraphrasant entre la société post-industrielle et les autres communautés industrielles ou proto-industrielles ? Zaki Laïdi lui-même affine son concept, puisqu'il affirme que l'ordre mondial devient "plus normé et plus contraignant"⁷. Je préfère, quant à moi, parler de velléités d'instaurer une stabilité hégémonique, de volontés de restructurer et de re-hiérarchiser l'ordre mondial et de faire valoir l'impact des réseaux de contrôle et des mécanismes de gestion des géostratégies régionales et de résolution des conflits. L'ordre qui succède au *modus vivendi* de l'ère de la co-existence, instituée par les USA et l'URSS, tente de refaçonner la carte des alliances traditionnelles, des rapports de forces, de la géographie des éléments de puissances. La compétition des deux grands a mis à l'ordre du jour le partage idéologique du monde. Cette politique d'intégrations stratégiques concurrentes est abandonnée après le repli de l'Est. Considérés essentiellement en fonction de leurs potentialités économiques, les pays retrouvent leurs dimensions véritables : "deux poids, deux mesures", la politique internationale dépendra plus que jamais des enjeux mondiaux, des zones utiles et des marges pauvres, qui ne peuvent susciter que des interventions humanitaires, quasi désintéressées ? En dépit d'un désordre spontané apparent, en l'absence d'un système politique ordonnateur supérieur, régi par ses principes directeurs et ses références, les cartes géostratégiques et en l'occurrence celles des séismes, des zones de turbulences et des oasis de paix, fussent-elles provisoires, inscrivent dans l'actualité les rapports de forces internes, les effets d'interventions de l'environnement régional, les interférences des puissances hégémoniques, les données géo-économiques et même certaines contingences historiques, désormais actualisées. Les thèses hatives de la fin de l'Histoire (Fukuyama) et de la fin de la Géographie (Zaki Laïdi), séduisantes et magiques représentent des modes de pensées, qui n'appréhendent que des apparences, des images fugitives, les illusions de l'imaginaire.

Quel est alors l'impact du "changement global" sur l'aire méditerranéenne ? Couvrant différents ensembles régionaux, appartenant à des structures de ralliements anciens ou nouveaux, formelles ou spontanées : la communauté européenne, la constellation des Etats de l'Europe ex-communiste, l'UMA et le Moyen-Orient, tiraillée entre les différentes alliances, pôles, ou enjeux qu'ils

⁶ - Francis Fukuyama, "La fin de l'histoire", in *Commentaire*, n° 47, automne 1989, pp. 469.

⁷ - Zaki Laïdi, "Sens et puissance dans le système international", in *L'ordre mondial relâché*, op. cit., p. 37)

impliquent, l'aire méditerranéenne n'ambitionne de s'ériger ni en projet unitaire, ni en nouvelle structure régionale. Discours de ralliement culturel symbolique, la méditerranéité est revendiquée par des intellectuels et d'hommes de bonnes volontés sans grande emprise sur la réalité. Au gré des circonstances, de séminaires, de forums ou de concertations d'exception, elle peut constituer un objectif ponctuel à même de susciter l'intérêt des sphères de décision. Peut-on dire que cet ancien "appendice crisogène du grand théâtre européen" (expression de Daguzan) et j'ajoute mais aussi du grand théâtre moyen oriental est en train d'acquérir "une nouvelle autonomie⁸"?

En dégageant les éléments lourds et les faits passagers de la conjoncture du changement global, nous essayerons d'identifier, dans cette aire fragmentée et nécessairement solidaire, les lignes de fractures, les zones de perturbations et les pôles de stabilité, afin de dégager les enjeux, les stratégies et les options pour le futur.

II - Démembrement / dérives :

a) Le syndrome bosniaque:

L'effondrement du communisme qui a sonné le glas de l'URSS, menace l'intégrité des pays communistes de l'Europe centrale et méditerranéenne. Après l'euphorie, vint la désillusion ou plutôt le triste constat, d'une résurgence des violences, en Europe centrale et orientale. Est-ce le réveil de la " question d'Orient " qui englobe désormais les peuples balkaniques et pourquoi pas les marges extrêmes orientales ?

Discours idéologique fondateur, le communisme a été un puissant facteur d'intégration politique et une doctrine de définition socio-économique des espaces qu'il a marqués par son empreinte spécifique. Tous les contentieux de l'histoire étaient occultés par les nouveaux établissements, qui ont fait valoir, parfois par la persuasion et l'entraînement, plus souvent par le recours à la force leurs promesses d'avenir. Derrière les solides remparts idéologico-stratégiques qu'ils ont érigés, ils avaient prêché l'unité, la solidarité, la communion des peuples frères. La logique de la décommunisation de l'Europe centrale et orientale a suscité la désintégration de l'URSS et précipité l'implosion des Etats-nations, dont l'idéologie communiste et le système socio-politique qu'elle a imposé

⁸ - Jean -François Daguzan, " la sécurité en Méditerranée : une approche globale", in *La Méditerranée Occidentale : quelles stratégies pour l'avenir*, collectif, FMES, Paris, Publisud, 1994, pp.159-172. Voir particulièrement p. 160.

constituaient les seuls facteurs de rassemblement. La remise en question de cette cohésion conjoncturelle - l'évolution actuelle permet désormais de définir le communisme comme un fait de conjoncture - engagea certains pays dans une dynamique de fragmentation ethnico-religieuse. Exemple tragique et modèle d'évolution probable des glaces du communisme, la Bosnie traduit l'ampleur de la dérive. Il s'agit en fait d'une conséquence directe de l'effondrement de l'Etat communiste, mais qui s'inscrit dans la logique du système défunt, dans son discours parallèle. Durant des décennies, les régimes communistes de l'Europe centrale ont développé le culte de la culpabilisation de l'empire ottoman et de tous leurs concitoyens -sujets islamisés, les prolétaires-otages des nomenklaturas privilégiés. La libération du communisme permettait d'achever, sans états d'âmes, la sinistre œuvre, de traduire dans les faits, ces excommunications idéologiques, de re-exécuter ces ennemis symboliques de l'Etat communiste. La fin de la guerre froide marque le retour aux guerres chaudes " (diagnostic de Jean Pierre Chevènement⁹). Aujourd'hui en Bosnie, mais l'arc des guerres peut se prolonger amplement vers d'autres rivages, la purification ethnique est à l'ordre du jour... L'homme est revenu à l'âge des guerres de religions, des embuscades de quartiers, des sinistres tableaux de chasses des hommes des cavernes. La civilisation humaine paye le lourd tribut de l'épreuve communiste, sans réagir ou presque. La conscience internationale s'accommode de ses interventions humanitaires, devenus indispensables. Désespoir, démobilisation après le "show médiatique" que l'épreuve a suscité, l'impuissance de l'Establishment international, peut conforter les ennemis du message que semblait porter l'ordre post-communiste, à savoir la défense de la liberté, des droits de l'homme et de la culture de paix¹⁰.

9- Jean Pierre Chevènement, " Inventer une autre Europe ", *Le Monde*, 9 juillet 1992. Ce diagnostic sévère et lucide de l'ancien ministre socialiste français, rejoint l'analyse du Sommet de Munich des chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement des sept principaux pays industriels (G 7), qui identifia les déviations de l'ère postcommuniste et souligna l'ampleur du problème des " instabilités et conflits nouveaux, dus à une résurgence du nationalisme et à des tensions interethniques ". Déclaration du 7 juillet 1992. Voir *Le Monde*, 9 juillet 1992.

10 - Cri de désespoir, la déclaration de Zlatko Dizdarevic, directeur d'*Oslobodenje* : La seule amère victoire des Bosniaques, c'est d'avoir compris que "toutes ces histoires de droits de l'homme sont des contes pour enfants," in " Sarajevo, mille jours de sièges: nous devenons fous" in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, n° 1580, 16-22 février 1995, p. 37.

b) Les tentatives de déstabilisation intégriste :

Les rives sud-méditerranéennes constituent les enjeux de la mouvance intégriste qui a pour objectif d'instaurer un pouvoir totalitaire théocratique. L'émergence de l'intégrisme islamique et son expansion précédèrent certes "le changement global" de l'ère post-guerre froide¹¹. Notons cependant que le monde arabe a été un théâtre passionné et un enjeu stratégique de la guerre des géants. Sa recherche de soutiens pour ses combats de libération, la guerre de Palestine et la quête de partenaires alternatifs d'un commerce à décoloniser, l'ont bel et bien impliqué dans les rivalités du monde bipolaire. Il y eut, d'ailleurs, bel et bien une prolongation de la guerre froide dans les campus, les journaux et certains centres de décisions arabes, où les intégristes ont été mobilisés contre les avant-gardes. D'autre part, les observateurs n'ont pas réalisé que les signes avant-coureurs de la chute du communisme se sont manifestés sur la scène arabe : Renversements spectaculaires ou progressifs d'alliances, échecs des modèles de développement et de systèmes politiques apparentés. Il y a eu une maturation des faits, amorcés par le renvoi des experts russes d'Egypte, annoncé en juillet 1972 et parachevé par la reconstruction de l'unité du Yémen. L'aire arabe a donc été l'un des théâtres du changement global. Mais sans doute n'a-t-elle pas pris la mesure exacte des signes de mutations, qui s'inscrivaient dans un processus lent.

Autre aspect de la question, les intégristes dont leur anticommunisme primaire a facilité leur mobilisation en Afghanistan, dans le camp du "monde libre", nourrissaient des ambitions et revendiquaient un refaçonnement des cartes des positions dominantes à leur profit. violemment anti-occidentaux, ils ne pouvaient qu'accomplir des rôles provisoires, aspirer à des alliances conjoncturelles. Après le retrait des troupes russes de l'Afghanistan, en 1989, ces alliés formés par les écoles-laboratoires de guérillas, devenaient encombrants, d'autant plus qu'ils prêchaient un discours de guerre sainte et affirmaient leur opposition à toute coexistence entre les nations. Frustrés, aguerris, et sommairement idéologisés, les Afghans sont les jusqu'au boutistes, sans états d'âme, des luttes dites islamiques. Ces membres des légions étrangères d'un

¹¹ - Nous avons montré dans des études précédentes que la crise pétrolière de 1973 et l'augmentation de la rente qui s'en suivit, l'échec des projets de développement et les sentiments de frustration qui en résultèrent, les défaites successives des Arabes face à Israël et les réactions de colère et de désespoir qu'elles nourrissent, dynamisèrent la contestation intégriste et favorisèrent son expansion, hors de ses foyers originels, du Moyen-Orient.

nouveau genre sont à la recherche de nouvelles guerres, de nouvelles scènes d'extermination. Ils seront les principaux agents de radicalisation de la lutte intégriste. La dérive intégriste mobilisera ces mercenaires désengagés de la guerre afghane. Nous nous rendons compte ainsi que d'une certaine façon, les Afghans, c'est-à-dire en fait des intégristes - volontaires des différentes régions musulmanes, sont les séquelles, les avatars de la guerre froide qui les a conditionnés, marginalisés et mentalement déstructurés. D'autres champs de batailles, en Bosnie et en Chéchénie par exemple, pourraient sécréter leurs Afghans.

Fait important, le postmodernisme qui s'inscrit dans cette donne nouvelle, constitua le socle de la pensée de repli et des nostalgies. Il créa une conjoncture propice à la dérive intégriste, qui permit de redynamiser ses activités et de les radicaliser. L'ère postmoderne, dont la faillite du marxisme fut l'une de ses manifestations, remit en question les repères et les références de l'homme d'aujourd'hui : Ayant perdu "les certitudes qui (le) téléguidaient vers le futur...", il sait que son histoire "est catapultée dans une aventure inconnue... et que le futur se nomme désormais incertitude¹²". Je me réfère ici à Edgar Morin. Crise des intellectuels, éclipse des maîtres à penser, abdication de la philosophie, notre aire subit davantage les effets de ce séisme de l'esprit : remontée des peurs ancestrales, re-activation des contentieux de l'histoire, diabolisation de l'autre, le retour du pendule marqua la défaite des éclaircisseurs de la pensée réformatrice, les constructeurs enthousiastes du futur et n'oublions pas les grands oulémas humanistes musulmans, qui ont marqué de leur sceau le mouvement de la renaissance des Machrek-Maghreb. Porté par les clercs traditionalistes (les moddebs), qui retrouvent, par ce concours de circonstances, une grande liberté de manœuvre, l'intégrisme apparaît désormais, dans cette ère qui redimensionne la pensée - puisque les faits ont révélé qu'elle fut longtemps dupée par les utopistes tous azimuts - comme l'alternative pessimiste aux idéologies de progrès, de développement, de démocratie, de droits de l'homme.

Soutenue par les establishments intégristes, disposant de moyens financiers prodigués généreusement par des alliés idéologiques, hostiles aux projets de sociétés civiles, la contestation intégriste tenta de gagner toute l'aire arabe. Maîtrisé en Tunisie, au Maroc et en Jordanie, du moins dans l'immédiat, l'intégrisme s'attaque à la Palestine, l'Egypte et surtout à l'Algérie, tout en consolidant ses poches de résistance, au Liban, en Syrie et en Irak et en entreprenant

12 - Edgar Morin, " la terre astre errant", in *Le Monde* du 14 février 1990.

une action d'embrigadement des communautés musulmanes, en Europe.

La situation est bien préoccupante. Tout mouvement de subversion, qui se propose d'instituer l'Inquisition et la guerre sainte, menace l'aire méditerranéenne, en remettant les pendules, aux ères d'antan d'affrontement Islam /chrétienté, Croisade/ Jihad, aux profits des adeptes de l'exclusion et de l'extrémisme de part et d'autre de la Méditerranée, qui se rejoignent, dans leurs soucis de déterrer les haches de la guerre.

III - Les promesses de la paix :

L'accord israélo-palestinien, conclu le 13 septembre 1993, s'inscrit dans le processus général du "changement global". La fin de la guerre froide et le re-équilibrage des priorités stratégiques internationales qui s'en suivit, annonce une révision en profondeur, fut-elle lente et discrète, des relais d'alliance des Etats-Unis avec le Moyen Orient. Alors que le monde bi-polaire a consacré Israël en tant qu'allié absolu, sinon exclusif, la conjoncture nouvelle redimensionne nécessairement "le pion" de la guerre froide au profit des partenaires du Golfe, associées désormais dans une alliance vitale pour les deux parties. Mieux encore, la mondialisation revendiquée comme objectif général justifie la volonté d'adopter une politique d'intégration des marchés de l'espace arabe. Il faut donc redessiner les contours de la nouvelle mouvance. Ce repositionnement des Etats Unis précipita l'accord. Lucides et courageux, les partenaires saisirent cette opportunité.

La construction de la paix est une gageure importante qu'il faut coûte que coûte tenir. Les dés sont certes pipés puisque la zone libérée de Gaza est une région surpeuplée, pauvre, périphérisée et dépendante de l'économie israélienne. Situation explosive¹³, l'OLP gère avec des moyens dérisoires - vu la défection de la communauté internationale et l'attachement d'Israël à ses prérogatives coloniales - une économie à bout de souffle, un marché de main d'œuvre. Ces situations sociales de désespoir sont exploitées par les intégristes puisque la paix dérange leur stratégie générale.

¹³ - Lors du colloque, organisé par Radio-Shalom, TF1 et al-Ahram " La Méditerranée : après la paix, quel avenir ?", Paris, UNESCO, 18 - 20 février 1995), Jean Frydman déclara : "Gaza est la vitrine de l'échec". Robert Asraf ajouta ; " A Gaza, nous sommes en face d'un incendie. Commençons par l'éteindre". Les participants faisaient valoir l'urgence d'un plan international d'investissements. Voir le compte rendu du séminaire in *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 23 fév. -1er mars 1995, pp. 34-37.

"Culture de guerre et économie de paix¹⁴", la politique israélienne qui a pour objectif de "normaliser ses relations", de s'associer aux structures du Moyen Orient¹⁵ et de s'intégrer dans le marché arabe, tout en assurant la sauvegarde des acquis territoriaux est paradoxale. Cet enjeu reste bien entendu possible, à condition de jouer la carte de la paix, qui nécessite, il va de soi, la décolonisation courageuse de l'Etat d'Israël: discours de respect des souverainetés nationales, adoption d'une culture de paix, abolition des colonies et rejet des politiques de domination, désormais désuètes. Il faut que l'Etat hébreu se donne les moyens de sa politique d'intégration dans son aire géographique naturelle. Une large opinion publique, de part et d'autre du Jourdain, revendique la satisfaction de ces attentes. Le renversement de la situation est à ce prix.

Cette perspective de paix ouvre à l'aire méditerranéenne de larges horizons. Le Forum d'Alexandrie (3 - 4 juillet 1994), qui réunit dix pays riverains de la Méditerranée¹⁶, se proposa d'instituer une structure de dialogue, fut-elle informelle, dans le but de promouvoir la concertation, de désamorcer les crises et d'engager des programmes de co-paternariat. En dépit des vœux pieux de tels rassemblements, l'adhésion des opinions publiques peut constituer un gage de succès.

Prônant "une vision représentant une paix globale et l'établissement d'un partenariat nouveau...", la Conférence de Casablanca¹⁷ (30 octobre-1er novembre 1994) se proposait de rassembler les Etats du Moyen-Orient et de l'Afrique du Nord, sans exclusive. Il s'agissait, en fait, de dessiner les contours d'un vaste ensemble, une "communauté économique du Moyen-Orient et du Maghreb" en vue "d'assurer, dans un délai déterminé, le libre flux des marchandises, des capitaux et de la main d'œuvre...". Associant des institutions internationales et extra-régionales et des hommes d'affaires intéressés par l'entreprise, la Conférence dégagea les moyens susceptibles de promouvoir la coopération et de lever les

14 - Titre de l'article de Saïd Alioua, in *al-Ahram*, Le Caire, 15 février 1995.

15 - Shimon Pérès déclare que "l'Etat d'Israël souhaite faire partie de la Ligue des Etats Arabes et affirme qu'il est temps d'accomplir cette étape, à condition de nommer la Ligue, Fédération du Moyen Orient". Déclaration de Shimon Pérès à la radio israélienne, citée par le quotidien londonien *El-Qods* du 5 janvier 1995.

16 - Les dix pays participants sont : Le Portugal, l'Espagne, la France, l'Italie, la Grèce, la Turquie, Le Maroc, l'Algérie, la Tunisie et l'Egypte.

17 - Pour l'étude de la déclaration de cette Conférence de Casablanca, voir par exemple *Asharq Al-Awsat*, 2 novembre 1994.

handicaps, dans les meilleurs délais, y compris les embargos et toutes les entraves au commerce et aux investissements. Ce projet de visionnaires prend ses distances par rapport aux contingences, accorde le préjugé favorable à tous les partenaires de la région et affirme un optimisme que les événements actuels ne justifient pas encore. Il a cependant le mérite de baliser les repères d'une saine évolution des choses et de faire valoir les dividendes de la paix.

Afin d'assurer le meilleur suivi ou peut-être de faire valoir une restructuration régionale alternative, le projet est appelé à s'institutionnaliser, par le choix d'un siège marocain et la création d'organes d'orientation et de direction¹⁸. S'agissait-il de redimensionner la Ligue des Etats Arabes, de la dépasser ou de limiter son action à l'expression de la solidarité panarabe. La polémique suscitée par la question¹⁹ a surpris certains establishments. Il faudrait peut-être éviter prioritairement durant cette étape de réconciliation arabe et de construction de la paix globale, tous les motifs superflus et hors propos de discorde. Nos intellectuels et nos politiciens doivent identifier les nouvelles constructions d'avenir : un nouveau Moyen-Orient²⁰ ? Une Communauté du Moyen-Orient et du Maghreb ? Une aire de la Méditerranéité ? Ces projets ne sont guère incompatibles. Mais cette dynamique de paix doit nécessairement adapter La Ligue des Etats Arabes aux nouvelles priorités, la réformer énergiquement et lui donner un second souffle. Elle doit répondre impérativement aux nouvelles attentes des nouvelles générations.

Conclusion

Le "changement global" induit des mutations d'envergure, qui affectent l'aire méditerranéenne, développent et amplifient les relations conflictuelles qui débordent désormais ses frontières, puisqu'ils réactualisent les fractures Occident/Orient, Nord/Sud, à peine cicatrisées. Enjeu géostratégique évident - qu'il nous suffise de signaler les richesses pétrolières Libye/Algérie, les marchés

18 - La Conférence créa les organes suivants :

- Un Comité d'Orientation formé par les représentants des gouvernements,
- Un secrétariat exécutif, ayant pour siège le Maroc, "pour œuvrer à la consolidation de la construction économique nouvelle...." (*Ibid.*)

19 - Nous nous référons aux réactions suscitées par la Déclaration du souverain marocain à la chaîne MBC et des articles de Mohamed Hédi Tazi, Conseiller du roi (Journal *El-Alam* du 26 octobre et du 18 novembre 1994).

20 - Cette opportunité de co-existence, lors que l'établissement de la paix permet de tourner la page est souvent évoquée. Voir par exemple l'étude de Rachid Driss "remarks about the relations between The European Union And The Union of Arab Maghreb", sous presse.

prometteurs Maghreb/Machrek - cette zone en contact avec La communauté Européenne, détient des positions clefs, dans les compétitions entre les grands ensembles économiques : la Communauté, Alize et l'Extrême-Orient, qui se profilent à l'horizon. Cette zone peut simultanément jouer les rôles de verrous et de fenêtres, en assurant la fermeture de l'expansion méridionale de la communauté et en ouvrant, au profit des protagonistes de la guerre économique, des brèches dans l'édifice de protection du marché européen. Une analyse objective de la situation révèle que la zone méditerranéenne est un terrain de compétition des grands acteurs. Toute restructuration régionale et toute fragilisation de cet espace solidaire peuvent avoir des répercussions et servir des enjeux qu'on n'a pas le droit d'occulter.

Les restructurations concurrentes qui ont pour théâtre le Moyen- Orient suscitent évidemment une compétition pour le leadership. Elles expliquent les velléités de repositionnement dans l'aire arabe : candidature d'Israël, dans la Ligue des Etats Arabes, éventuellement désarabisée, candidature de l'Egypte à l'UMA, appelée à se délocaliser, formulation de projets de rassemblements alternatifs sinon concurrents à l'occasion du Forum méditerranéen d'Alexandrie et de la Conférence de Casablanca, souci de révision - renforcement de la Ligue des Etats Arabes, dont la lutte pour la Palestine a constitué, en fait, sa principale raison d'être.

Les paradigmes de l'ère post-guerre froide ont réalisé un transfert symbolique du mur de Berlin vers la Méditerranée. Soucieux d'assurer la pérennité du wargame, certains idéologues occidentaux organiques, c'est-à-dire liés à la défense des intérêts dominants se mobilisent pour retrouver un nouvel ennemi, suppléant ou intérimaire, de lui donner la configuration convaincante, afin d'assurer le fonctionnement du système. Il s'agit vraisemblablement de reconstruire l'imaginaire occidental adéquat, pour instaurer une co-existence conflictuelle et éventuellement armée. Samuel P. Huntington, le prophète du "choc des civilisations²¹" déclara, avec assurance, durant l'été 1993 :

" ... Mon hypothèse est que dans le monde nouveau les conflits n'auront pas essentiellement pour origine l'idéologie ou l'économie. Les grandes causes de division de l'humanité et les principales sources de conflits seront culturelles... Le choc des civilisations dominera la politique mondiale. Les lignes de

²¹ - Samuel P. Huntington, "le choc des civilisations" in Commentaires, n° 66, été 1994, pp. 238-252 (première version, Foreign affairs, été 1994).

fractures entre civilisations seront les lignes de front de l'avenir²²...."

Réalisant la synthèse des dérives d'une certaine opinion publique occidentale qui retrouve les bréviaires de ses maîtres de pensée de l'entre-deux-guerres, pour re-actualiser ses visions raciales, théorisant et conceptualisant cet état d'esprit, somme toute marginal, Huntington invente les nouveaux ennemis : "L'Islam", pis encore "la connection islamo-confucéenne²³". La scène politique internationale est désormais définie, par "les regroupements de civilisations" et le "syndrome du pays frère²⁴", présenté curieusement comme valeur absolue après les guerres Irak -Iran et Irak-Koweït. Le nouveau puzzle des guerres d'avenir est désormais inventé, dessiné, reconstruit. Fait symptomatique, les partenaires des nouveaux affrontements se révèlent en fait solidaires, puisqu'ils partagent les mêmes vues bellicistes. Alliés objectifs, les intégristes jouent leur rôle, dans ce nouvel échiquier, en développant leur discours de guerre dite sainte. En contrepartie, le nouvel Occident guerrier²⁵ de Huntington devra comprendre et respecter les références de base des autres civilisations. Est-ce à dire que ce ménagement de l'intégrisme hors Méditerranée est destiné à assurer la sauvegarde de l'ennemi retrouvé et à propager ses signes et ses slogans les plus provocateurs? Il serait certes excessif de l'affirmer. Mais les prémisses de ce choc de civilisations déjà visibles sur certaines scènes méditerranéennes (La Bosnie, les foyers de tensions raciales et les arcs de fractures intégristes), peuvent se propager dangereusement. Ils peuvent être dans la logique du changement global ou plutôt faire partie des scénarios de ses dérives. Il nous appartient donc d'être attentifs à ces risques de débordement qu'il faudrait circonscrire et mettre en échec.

Signes de renouveau et peut-être attitudes de rejet de ces velléités d'enfermement occidental et d'institution d'une nouvelle

22 - *Ibid.* , p. 238.

23 - *Ibid.* , p. 250. Notons que cette thèse a suscité une riposte polémique. Voir, par exemple, l'article de khaled El-Kachtini, " Conflit des civilisations ou civilisations de conflit, *In Asharq Al-Awsat* , 12 février 1995, p.10. Révélateur d'un état d'esprit conflictuel latent, l'auteur évoque le contentieux entre l'aire moyen orientale et les occidentaux depuis l'Antiquité : guerre de Troie, guerres médiques, puniques, puis duels contre les musulmans et les Ottomans etc. Cette re-actualisation du contentieux historique qui constitue la toile de fond de la thèse et de la contre-thèse montre que les schémas de pensée et leurs assises continuent à puiser, dangereusement, leurs références dans les paradigmes d'un autre temps.

24 - *Ibid.* , pp. 244 et suivantes.


25 - Notons que cette thèse a suscité une polémique en Europe et aux Etats-Unis. Voir le dossier réuni par la revue *Commentaires* , n° 66, été 1994, pp. 253-279).

guerre froide civilisationnelle, les initiatives de l'OTAN et de la Communauté européenne d'engager le dialogue avec les états sud-méditerranéens. Une telle attitude qui s'explique, sans doute, par des soucis sécuritaires réels révèle que ces aires géographiques : l'espace nord-atlantique et l'Europe communautaire que ces institutions représentent, sont concernées par la résolution des problèmes de la région. Elle traduit une volonté de s'associer à une stratégie de paix sinon de co-développement. Serait-il utopique de croire que cette dynamique qui s'ébauche timidement indique un renversement de tendances salubre !

"Globalisation / fragmentation", construction / déconstruction les termes de ce paradoxe éclairent la problématique de l'ère post-guerre froide et dessinent le nouveau paysage géostratégique ou du moins ses restructurations régionales. Mais ce nouvel ordre de fait doit faire valoir les principes universels de tolérance, de co-existence pacifique, d'entraide, de partenariat et de coopération. La globalisation ne doit pas être une stratégie unilatérale de domination politico-commerciale. Dans ce même ordre d'idée, la fragmentation ne doit pas être une attitude de démission internationale, permettant l'émergence des zones d'exclusion, de guerres de religions, de dérives identitaires et intégristes. Méditerranéens, nous devons être attentifs, afin d'annihiler les facteurs d'instauration d'une guerre froide, définie par le choc des civilisations et faire échec aux diverses dérives que le changement global pourrait induire. Dédramatisée par les chances de la paix, la Méditerranéité est avant tout une attitude de solidarité. Plus que jamais, ce changement de paradigmes de la nouvelle donne doit sonner le glas des malentendus des conflits religieux ou culturels, d'un autre temps, exhibés par les apprentis-sorciers, les va-en-guerre et différents "cavaliers de l'apocalypse".

Khalifa Chater

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QUELQUES NOTES SUR LA MEDITERRANEE DANS LA POLITIQUE ETRANGERE ET DE SECURITE COMMUNE

Álvaro de Vasconcelos

Comment l'Union européenne - au moment où la priorité des priorités semble être l'élargissement vers les démocraties d'Europe centrale - peut-elle équilibrer l'ouverture à l'Est avec une politique vers le Sud proche, notamment le Sud méditerranéen?

Comment la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune et l'Union de l'Europe occidentale pourront-elles contribuer à pousser l'Union au-delà de son état actuel de puissance civile, la décider à entreprendre une politique globale pour la Méditerranée occidentale et orientale?

La réponse à ces questions se trouve plus dans l'analyse des problèmes de sécurité qui se posent dans la Méditerranée, notamment dans l'Afrique du nord, et des possibilités de la PESC pour les résoudre, que dans une tentative d'analyse proprement institutionnelle.

Les défis posés

1. Quels sont les défis de sécurité que l'Europe prend en considération s'agissant de la sécurité méditerranéenne?

- L'accession au pouvoir de gouvernements hostiles à l'Occident, notamment en Algérie, en résultat du remplacement des régimes actuels par des régimes islamistes radicaux dont le comportement dans le domaine de la politique étrangère est imprévisible, mais qui en tout état de cause tendraient à «prendre le devant» de leurs opinions publiques, traversées par des perceptions anti-occidentales.

- Un creusement des divergences politiques entre les Etats de la région qui pourrait résulter, par exemple, d'un triomphe de l'Islamisme radical en Algérie, et qui pourrait par la suite dégénérer en conflit grave de nature sud-sud.

- Les conséquences de la prolifération d'armements de destruction massive dans les pays de l'Afrique du Nord.

- Une nouvelle montée du terrorisme, notamment du terrorisme d'Etat.

- Un dérapage des processus de paix au Moyen Orient avec une aggravation des crises dans la région.

2. Quelle est, au fond, la nature des défis évoqués?

Aucun de ces défis ne peut se traduire à présent dans une menace directe contre les Etats membres de l'Union. La coïncidence à moyenne échéance de plusieurs d'entre eux pourrait néanmoins engendrer un problème sérieux de sécurité.

L'immigration, à mon sens, ne peut être considérée comme une question qui relève du domaine de la sécurité. Aborder le problème de l'immigration d'un point de vue sécuritaire, comme il est souvent le cas, ne fait qu'alimenter les nationalismes radicaux, dans les deux rives méditerranéennes à la fois.

Les causes de la crise dans la rive sud de la Méditerranée sont tout d'abord de nature économique et politique. Il en résulte une crise sociale profonde dont le chômage est la manifestation la plus évidente, en même temps que l'islamisme radical s'affirme en tant que principale alternative aux régimes en place.

Face au Nord où règne l'abondance, la crise que connaissent les pays de l'Afrique du Nord contribue à renforcer dans l'opinion publique une perception de marginalité et l'idée que l'Occident, depuis la fin de la guerre froide, regarde le monde islamique comme l'ennemi. L'Occident aurait trouvé dans l'Islam son ennemi de substitution, la guerre du Golfe et l'impuissance de l'Occident en Bosnie - voulue, selon certains - en étant offertes pour preuve. Les déclarations récentes du Secrétaire-général de l'OTAN sur la nouvelle menace, malgré le désaveu des Etats membres, en seraient la confirmation.

3. Où va la PESC et quelle est l'importance de la Méditerranée dans cette politique?

Le Conseil Européen de Lisbonne (juin 1992) a défini les domaines prioritaires pour des actions communes - l'Europe de l'Est et l'Europe centrale, l'Afrique du Nord, le Moyen Orient -, faisant preuve d'une volonté d'équilibrer Est et Sud, un équilibre qui est d'ailleurs nécessaire au maintien de l'équilibre entre les Etats membres. En même temps, la nécessité a été affirmée d'aborder les relations avec l'Afrique du Nord dans le cadre d'une politique globale, accordant la priorité nécessaire aux mesures de nature économique, sans oublier pourtant des initiatives dans le domaine de la coopération politique et de la soft security

visant à la création d'une confiance réciproque. Voilà ce que l'on pourrait appeler un mélange de l'acquis des Cinq+Cinq et de la CSCM.

La politique européenne, cependant, n'a pas été globale, et n'a même pas pu se procurer, par ailleurs, les moyens que lui exigeaient ses ambitions dans le seul domaine économique. Après Maastricht, les initiatives prises dans le domaine commercial et de l'aide économique, pour limitée que soit leur portée, ont commencé à être incorporées ou associées des initiatives dans le domaine de la politique étrangère et de sécurité. C'est le cas de l'action commune en Palestine. Cependant, des initiatives pour l'ensemble de la Méditerranée n'ont pas encore été lancées. La CSCM, comme on le sait, n'a pas pu démarrer, les Cinq+Cinq se trouvent dans un état de paraplégie, le Forum méditerranéen demeure une initiative limitée aux seuls pays de l'Europe du sud, n'ayant pas réussi à franchir le pas nécessaire pour devenir une initiative de l'Union.

L'Union européenne n'a même pas été capable, pour le moment, d'adopter une attitude commune ou au moins convergente face à l'islamisme radical, hésitant entre la «compréhension» du phénomène islamiste et le soutien «inconditionnel» des régimes nord-africains.

Europe puissance civile versus Europe puissance politique - un débat vital pour les rapports avec l'Afrique du Nord

L'Europe demeure, après Maastricht comme avant, dans l'état de puissance civile, et ne dispose pas encore des moyens pour agir de façon décisive en matière de politique étrangère, de défense et de sécurité, en dépit des perspectives ouvertes par le Traité de l'Union dans ces domaines.

L'élargissement aux pays neutres de l'AELE a renforcé la capacité d'action de l'Europe pour ce qui est de la politique économique vers l'extérieur; en revanche, il a freiné davantage son évolution en tant que puissance politique, capable d'aborder aussi bien les questions de *soft security*, selon les dispositions du Traité, que celles de *hard security* ou sécurité tout court, dont par exemple les garanties de sécurité qui pourront devenir essentielles dans les rapports avec certains pays de la rive sud.

La priorité que certains accordent en ce moment aux élargissements dans une perspective «libre-échangiste» a pour objectif de freiner tout progrès de l'Union dans le domaine du politique. Dans une Europe-grand-marché, l'Allemagne, qui aura vraisemblablement la tendance à privilégier le centre-est européen, pèsera sans nul doute d'un poids plus lourd, voire

décisif. L'Afrique du Nord, le Maghreb, deviendraient difficilement prioritaires pour une telle Europe.

La possibilité existe, cependant, de création d'un noyau dur (ou noyau de cohésion) dans le domaine de la sécurité et de la défense reposant essentiellement sur la concertation franco-allemande, qui serait en mesure d'équilibrer l'Est et le Sud et de doter l'Union avec les instruments d'une politique globale. Il est à noter l'intérêt progressif de certains pays, dont l'Allemagne et les Pays-Bas pour la Méditerranée, en raison notamment de l'importance que lui accordent d'autres Etats-membres.

4. Les priorités, en bref

L'affirmation de la capacité européenne en matière de politique étrangère et de sécurité ne saurait contribuer à faire monter les tensions en Méditerranée. (Naturellement, il faut ici distinguer entre gouvernements et opinions publiques.) Bien au contraire, c'est le spectacle d'impuissance européenne en Bosnie qui détruit la crédibilité de l'Union.

Les conditions sont réunies, à mon avis, qui permettent le développement d'une politique de coopération en matière de sécurité entre l'Union européenne et les pays de la rive sud, intégrant dans cette politique l'UEO.

La préoccupation prioritaire de l'Europe devrait être de combler le vide qui existe entre le Nord et le Sud dans le domaine des institutions de coopération en matière de sécurité. C'est là l'objectif que devrait se donner la Conférence Euro-Méditerranéenne à la fin de l'année.

Il est essentiel, aussi bien pour le succès d'une coopération euro-maghrébine que pour d'autres aspects de sa politique étrangère, que l'Europe se définisse d'une façon «ouverte» en non pas «fermée», c'est-à-dire, qu'elle assume une perspective multiculturelle, multi-ethnique, multi-religieuse, qui puisse faire de tous les Européens, y compris ceux de religion musulmane, des citoyens à part entière.

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**Conceptualizing Non-military Security
in the Mediterranean**

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Conceptualizing Non-military Security in the Mediterranean

Introduction:

The power politics school of thought has elevated itself to the status of common sensical epistemology, and actually managed to become so dominant in the modern political and media culture. This was possible because this school addresses one of the most crucial needs and rights of man, i.e. the right to security. By emphasizing this theme, it has engraved in modern culture the belief that security could only be attained by means of power. Balance of power, deterrence and compelling power are seen to be the only keys to security.

This belief overlooks a great variety of approaches and means of security that do not rely on power, and specifically military power. We may not even come to recognize the empirical existence of these approaches and means in the past history of mankind, and in certain present traditions and mechanisms in a variety of social configurations.

Given the massive horrors of contemporary military encounters we are obliged to explore alternative varieties and approaches to security, in both past and present experiences; alternatives that may not rely on military means, or at least not rely on them exclusively or as preferred scenarios.

The Mediterranean region, in particular is in dire need to develop positive and creative thinking on non-military approaches to security. This region, because of the sheer fact that it constitutes the basin of old civilizations and the arena of the richest and most influential in world history of interactions and encounters among old nations and peoples, is particularly better equipped for drawing on past and present experiences of non-military security.

In order to explore specific forms or projects for non-military security in the Mediterranean, we need first to determine what do we exactly mean by this term, and the approaches to it. We may then try to draw on some essential features of the past history of this region and its present experiences for lesson and conclusions on viable forms and approaches to non-military security.

I- The meaning of non-military security:

While the term has become a novel platform for exciting new thinking on security, it is still far from systematically conceptualized. We shall perhaps pass a long time to come before we may become capable of developing a vigorous theory or even a conceptual frame for non-military security.

Non-military security signifies a function that is systematically produced by a given social or political system, at any level: international, regional or international. It also pertains to a given culture of peace. The infusion of this culture and the education of people in its methods and tradition could and should be supported by other sub-structure, i.e. the economy and polity. For example when the economy is developed as a true commonwealth and endowed with certain minimum standards for satisfaction of certain essential needs and with mechanisms for systematic reduction of inequalities and developing a sense of dignity on the part of all people, there would be no need to violence. The welfare state, in Western Europe in the aftermath of the second world war, and until recently provides an ample evidence of the magnitude of reduction, in levels of domestic violence produced by the shift in economic system, as compared to pre-war period. We have every reason to believe that a parallel change could be attained by transforming the nature of economic interactions, at regional or international levels.

Democratization, or the enhancement of equal participation and of mechanisms of conflict avoidance and conflict resolution, within a given polity tends to have, generally, the same effect, at any level of political association or community. Specifically, the presence, resilience and fair running of an independent judicial mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes is an essential ingredient to cooperative and non-violent security, at all levels of political association, including regional and international.

While judicial means, at the local/national levels imply the potential use of force, in the last instance, as a means of punishment of crimes and deterrence of acts of aggression, security as a systematically produced function tends to be highly correlated with the presence of elements conducive to it in a culture. There is a strong evidence that supports the claim that a humane and human rights culture once spread and stabilized as a mainstream belief system leads to a great reduction in levels of violence. It could as much be assumed that the spread of common and shared respect to international human rights law in its entirety, at the international level may produce the same effect; i.e. systematic reduction of violence and wars at the international and regional arenas.

This analogy between the domestic and the international levels is used in this context, as an approximation that might be useful in determining the meaning of non-military or cooperative security in certain regions, such as the Mediterranean.

By reference to this analogy, we may designate a certain range of institutional arrangements within which we may locate this concept. The

ceiling of this range is defined by voluntary submission to certain norms and rules, such as these embedded in the international law, in general and human rights and humanitarian law, in particular. This voluntary submission may correlate with the degree to which a conducive culture is assimilated and internalized by all nations concerned. At this ceiling a multitude of institutional arrangements could be devised. The floor of this range, on the other hand, is designated by the presence of a commanding and compelling power at the top that is willing to undertake the function of law enforcement, in a fashion similar to that of a democratic state, for example. The institutional expression of such a function of law enforcement could be a fairly run collective security system. While such a system is eventually based on force and power, it implies certain fundamental elements of non-military security, at the horizontal level, since no state or local power may be willing to risk a gross punishment by showing distention with international law.

The practical range of non-military security, or cooperative security is certainly much below the ceiling and much higher than the hypothetical lines demarcated above. In other words, we may not hope to establish cooperative and non-military security by relying on impartial mechanisms of (international) law enforcement or by putting faith in moral and cultural development, within the international arena conducive to this type of security. We may however work hard on devising certain instruments and mechanisms that enhance the role of cooperative and non-military security in international and regional spheres.

2- Instruments for non-military security in the Mediterranean:

For a modest start, on the long road to conceptualizing non-military security, we may take a look at a conflict situation. This situation involves three basic dimensions: parties, an object or issue of dispute, and means of deciding on this dispute whether it be violent or non-violent. We may then come to think of various approaches to non-violent (non-military) means and instruments of security, in terms of each of these dimensions.

A - The fundamental fact about parties, in relation to security is their mutual perceptions as a) others, b) enemies, in the sense of perceived willingness to cause harm, subjugate or eliminate oneself.

Thinking on non-military security may theoretically start with these primitive vectors in the formation of parties to a potential conflict situation. Approaches that may correspond to non-military security may then be distinguished, in relation to parties, into two categories. The first is the

elimination of other-ness through a process of integration or forming an umbrella identity in terms of which entities ,e.g. states may come to conceive of themselves as sharing certain fundamental aspects of identity. In this perspective, we may get astonished of the variety and extreme diversity of experiences of integration of various groups or nations. The other is the systematic lessening of the sense of animosity peoples and nations may anchor towards each others. The connected-ness (mostly in terms of neighborliness) and objects of disputes notwithstanding , this category pertains to either moral power and possibly the power of learning that distance people or states from easy yield to negative feelings towards others, or a total rupture with the whole (history-long) discourse and form of consciousness based on fixed identity. What could be called objective thinking is certainly more conducive to fair, non-violent view of the other, since the demarcation line between oneself and the other is not thickened by some fixed notion of identity.

Could we possibly think of employing certain instruments akin to these approaches in the Mediterranean region. The following remarks may shed some lights on this aspect.

a) Mediterraneanism as such is far from being an important element in the identity of a majority of nations located in the Mediterranean. It is also still far from forming an umbrella identity for these nations.

b) We may , however, draw great lessons from the vast and extremely rich experience of integration , past and present , gained by Mediterranean nations. The present experience of integration within the European Union is most inspiring in relation to the rapidity with which traditional animosities were contained, controlled and reduced in the interest of peace and non-military security.

c) Taking Mediterranean regions, in totality , We may strike a distinction between these nations that are still largely inspired by the identity discourse, on the one hand, and these that seem to have passed in the direction individual satisfaction discourse. Western Europe is largely within the latter category, while Southern Europe and the Southern shores of the Mediterranean are largely and sometimes intensely within the former. With certain exceptions, the difference may be explained not in terms of relative welfare , but in terms of successful settlement of historical issues of contention as well as the effects of learning.

Within the same perspective, reduction of certain animosities could still be possible by resolving certain essential objective problems even when a nation is still seized by an identity discourse. For example, one is truly astonished with the rapidity with which Egyptians, for instance , forgot their long standing hate to the British after the final evacuation of British troops from Egypt at the end of 1956. Similar experience, although not as

consistent could also be observed in the case of Tunisia and Morocco in relation to France, as an ex-colonial power.

2- The object of dispute is as important dimension of conflict and security situations. The crucial factors in security of people, in relation to this dimension are a) the divisibility and exchangeability of the object ,b) its value in the survival, integrity of social structures and in maintaining the dignity of the parties , as seen by these parties themselves. Non-military approaches to security could be thus deduced on logical grounds, as follows:

In relation to the nature of the object itself, the best option is to render it potentially shared in totality, so as the possession or access of an entity to it may not automatically imply the exclusion of the other from claim to the same possession or equal access. This is the best option simply because it avoids the often intractably complex issue of distribution or splitting an object, even when the object is naturally divisible. Natural divisibility is often obstructed by the moral relationship between humans, at every level of association , and natural objects; a fact that raises the problem of dignity, self-esteem or even the very moral existence of a community or entity. Division and splitting of an object may , eventually , prove inevitable for a period , as a second best option.

The value of the object to people could be approached , for the purpose of non-military security , in one of two hypothetical ways. First is rendering the object increasingly less valuable to the survival or dignity of parties. For instance, the quest of groups and communities to form independent states or to join the state in which a majority of their kin is located is so valuable , in so far a state connotes potential inequality of citizens or inhabitants or arbitrary restrictions on freedom of movements or cultural and other rights. A practice such as open border may ease the tensions associated with the deprivation from the right to form an independent state, and make the demand on the latter less valuable and significant. The other is to model the perception of the object and the assessment of its value to the dignity, equality or survival of the parties in an interlocking form so as both (or all) parties may correlate the loss of dignity on the part of the other with equal or similar loss to oneself, and vice versa ; i.e. the maximization of one's dignity correlated with maximizing the dignity or sense of equality of the other. This correlative model is often difficult to implement. It may not prove impossible, though , especially on the longer run , and after a period of peace.

The experiences of Mediterranean nations, are again quite rich ,in regard to approaches pertinent to objects of contention. Most of intra-

Mediterranean conflicts, at this moment, are about indivisible objects, most specifically the quest of nations and sub-nations to either form an independent state or join the state in which a majority of their fellow national live, e.g. the Palestinian nationalist movement, Serbs and Muslims in Bosnia, Albanians in the Balkan. And one of the most unfortunate feature of international conflict resolution, and of European concepts of conflict resolution in the Mediterranean is the tendency to 'divide' the objects of contention as opposed to eliciting a sense of sharing and joint property and common access to the state powers. A whole variety of institutional expressions of this common possession of the object of contention, e.g. states and territories could have been devised and tried. The following themes are also important.

a) the experience of the European community provides some evidence on the possibility of rendering certain objects of conflict less valuable to the parties dignity and survival. The conflict between France and Germany over Elsass and Lorraine has become almost forgotten, in the course of cooperation within the EC. In fact, Germany (West) was able to gain a great sense of security by just entrenching and stabilizing the EC.

But this approach could possibly work when the issue of contention is somewhat marginal to the survival, dignity and sense of equality and justice. For example this may hold when the conflict is about territorial adjustments, and disputes over border regions. It may not work however in cases where a nation is entirely deprived of its right to self-determination or political rights more broadly, such as the case with the Palestinian people.

b) When the issue of contention is indivisible and involves some abstract notions, such as equality and justice, there is no way on the short run to depreciate the value of this object. The approach based on correlative maximization of satisfaction of the contending parties is much more effective, in terms of pay-off, even though it is, undoubtedly, more difficult to achieve, and much more demanding on creativity and care of third parties, when national dignities are wounded. In this perspective, the experience of Franco-German conflict is, again, quite pertinent. The economic and political partnership of the two countries within the EC stirred this correlative maximization of satisfaction, on the part of the two countries.

c) While the approach based on common possession and equal access to indivisible objects, e.g. states and rights to self-determination is a greatly better option, division (e.g. of territories) may prove inevitable as a transitional arrangement.

However, it is crucial to include this approach based on division with a long range view on conflict resolution and avoidance based on sharing.

Given the extreme difficulty of coping with the intense rise in nationalist (more broadly identity) feelings , convenience entails a divisional approach , but since natural conditions of territories are as compelling, this approach has to be commended by some elements of sharing and equal access.

d) Given that Southern Mediterranean and Southern European nations are going keep engulfed in the identity discourse for some time to come , and these nations are suffering from a whole range of socio-economic and politico-cultural problems, the nations on the Northern shores of the Mediterranean and in Western Europe have certain obligations towards earthling the grounds for non-military approaches to security in the whole region. This could be facilitated by certain fundamental pattern of signaling that should calm down wounded dignities and identities by communicating respect and reaching out , in the place of the present pattern which emphasizes differences, deepens the sense of humiliation and widens gaps.

3- Non-violent means of deciding on the outcome of a conflict or dispute also fall on numerous approaches that are well documented , in conflict avoidance and conflict resolution literature. For our interest, in this juncture, we may emphasize the following , as corresponds with the concept of non-military security.

A) The greatest preference is certainly located in conflict avoidance. Information, communication, negotiations ,mediation and arbitration are all needed for the effectiveness of this approaches once a conflict situation starts to arise , or differences and contentions are showing.

A crucial instrument of conflict avoidance is dis-armament. This is far from a complete safeguard against the eruption of conflict. People have proved to be prone to violence under certain circumstances and it matters not whether they are heavily or lightly armed. Nevertheless, this argument is increasingly cast in doubt by the development of increasingly sophisticated , costly , and more destructive weapon systems and technologies. Indeed, the sheer cost of modern weapon systems and the magnitude of their destructiveness may constrain even the most aggressive from the waging of wars. The true explanation of the eruption of violence may then be located in the state of outrage or xenophobia that may seize collectivities in given circumstances leading to grave sense of insecurity. Irresponsibility of leaders and regimes, the recklessness of certain political and ideological movements and the negligence on the part of the international system do all contribute to this situation of wrath, outrage and xenophobia.

But even in circumstances of this nature, the less heavily armed an area pregnant with contentions and disputes the more likely conflicts when they erupt are less destructive. The existence of a certain collective, better it be judicial, conflict resolution and conflict-avoidance machinery and its fast initiation of action help a great deal, if coupled with the implementation of early measures of disarmament.

The same may prove true, on the use of disarmament for non-military security, even in cases of mature or entrenched conflicts, when properly coupled with the setting of motion of a certain political or judicial machinery for conflict avoidance and conflict resolution.

B) A second best approach is based on the concept of unilateral concession, once a conflict situation starts to arise or even when conflicts are fermenting. This approach could also be extremely effective, for a whole range of issues of contentions, even in cases of mature or entrenched conflicts. Its true viability as a non-military approach to security is certainly tied balance of power. When balance holds, this approach is possible and potentially very effective in reducing tensions, on and by both sides. But it may even work better if initiated by the more powerful, who may not fear that unilateral concessions may signal weakness and induce ambitions.

C) A third best alternative, if the former are tried, is legal and judicial means. This is unfortunately not highly developed in the international system, as a whole. For an approximation of this approach collective decision making instruments, at international or regional levels may implicitly fulfill certain judicial and legal functions, in conflict situations, only in so far as they develop impartial, consistent and even-handed traditions.

D) It could also be said that collective deterrence and collective security, at the international and regional levels may work in ways conducive to non-military security, from the view points of the parties engaged in disputes, if and only if they get adequately strong signals that the system works against aggression, with a great deal of impartiality.

The question that arises, in the present context, is could Europe assume the essential function pointed out in this scheme of non-military approach to security.

The following themes may help us get a better understanding of the possibilities of this role.

1) As shown by the European position towards Bosnia and Hertgovian, Europe is clearly lacking the will to invest in the stabilization and peace-maintenance in Southern Europe and the Southern shores of the Mediterranean. European apathy towards the politics of conflict resolution


and conflict avoidance is even greater in relation to the Southern shores of the Mediterranean.

2) A part of this apathy could be explained by the American monopoly over the politics of certain areas, such as the Middle East at large and the Arab-Israeli conflict, in particular.

3) Europe may play a crucial role, however, in conflict resolution, conflict avoidance and peace maintenance through a systematic policy of encouragement of disarmament. This seems the only area run with certain efficiency in the European management of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, even though the wisdom of it in this particular case is cast in thick shadows. But the essence of this position could be developed as a long run orientation. Europe may start inserting this dimension through a solid support to the need to free the Middle East from weapons of mass destruction in totality.

This latter theme provides an excellent opportunity for all parties concerned to initiate a policy of non-military security. While Europe may play a role in encouraging Israel to join the NPT, Israel could and should unilaterally initiate a cycle of good will, in this sphere by declaring a program for the destruction of its nuclear arsenal, in a fashion similar to South Africa, in regard to the same thing.

A strategy of generalized peace maintenance, non-military and cooperative security may utilize all these approaches or mixes of them according to circumstances.



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MEDITERRANEANISM : A NEW DIMENSION
IN
EGYPT'S FOREIGN POLICY

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Over the last five years, Egypt's foreign policy has been undergoing a noticeable shift in its scope of action. Egypt is re-ordering its foreign policy scopes of action and exploring new ones. The crux of this process is the deliberate attempt to add a Mediterranean (Med) scope action and give it more weight relative to some of the present ones. The analysis of Egypt's foreign policy during the last five years reveals an unmistakable inclusion of a Med dimension. Such dimension was almost lacking during the 1952-1990 period or at best was a secondary dimension. Egypt is re-assessing the feasibility of the present scopes of action and has taken crucial decisions to formulate and pursue an active Med policy. This is clearly reflected in the 1991 proposal to establish a Med Forum, its relentless efforts to convince Med countries of the feasibility of the proposal, and its active participation in virtually all Med conferences.

This paper will attempt to assess the extent of the Med dimension in Egypt's foreign policy, identify the correlates of the inclusion of the dimension, and outline the basic elements of Egypt's new Med policy. These simple and straitforward tasks will help us to deal with the main research problems of this paper ; Does the inclusion of a Med dimension mean that Egypt's foreign policy orientation as articulated in the 1970s is changing or about to change? Is the Med dimension likely to become the main foreign policy scope of action for Egypt in the years to come? Will the inclusion of a Med scope action negatively influence other ones, such as the Arab and African scopes of action?.

THE OSCILLATION BETWEEN TWO FOREIGN POLICY ORIENTATIONS

Since the advent of the Greeks to Egypt in 332 B.C. until today, Egypt's foreign policy has been oscillating between two main orientations : The Mediterranean and Eastern orientations (Lorenz, 1990). According to the Med orientation, Egypt belongs to the Greco-Roman civilization and as a result it looks northward and interacts mainly with Northern Med nations. According to the traditions of the competing orientation, Egypt is defined as an Arab - Islamic entity organically linked to its Eastern (Arab or Ottoman) larger space. As a result, Egypt's foreign policy interactions are located in the Nile basin, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Middle East. The Med orientation was imposed on Egypt by Greece and Byzantium. For almost 1000 years, Egypt interacted mainly with the maritime empires and identified itself as a European power. In 641 A.D., the Arab Moslems conquered Egypt. They brought with them a religion and a language which the Egyptians gradually embraced. The result was the emergence of Egypt as an Arab Moslem entity and the identification of Egyptians with the East. Egypt's foreign policy interactions were oriented towards the Arabian Peninsula, the Fertile Crescent, and Mesopotamia. The Ottoman invasion in 1517 reinforced this pattern. Although the Ottoman Empire was partly a European power, it approached Egypt from an oriental perspective and severed any links between Egypt and the Med nations for almost 300 years.

With the advent of the French campaign in 1798 and the rise of Mohammad Ali's modern Egypt, the Med orientation seemed to have gained momentum in Egypt's foreign policy. Mohammad Ali's modernizing scheme was essentially a joint venture between Egypt and Europe. Two basic factors reinforced this trend : (i) The modernizing policies of Mohammad Ali's successors, especially Khedive Ismael who vowed to turn Egypt into " a part of Europe", and (ii) The scramble of the European powers over Egypt and its subsequent control by Britain in 1882, which resulted in Egypt's structural dependence on Europe. Since then, the Med and Eastern orientation have been struggling over Egypt's soul.

The story of Egyptian political thought during the first half of the twentieth century can be summed up in the debate between two basic groups : The Western - educated or oriented intellectuals who advocated Egypt's Mediterranean (European) character, and the traditional elite which defended Egypt's Arab and Islamic identity. The Mediterraneanists, led by the famous Egyptian writer Taha Hussein, argued that Egypt should orient itself towards Europe in all aspects of life . In 1938, Taha Hussein published his book The Future of Culture in Egypt (Hussein, 1938) in which he asserted that Egypt had begun to interact with the Greeks almost ten centuries before Christ and that such interaction was persistent and all-encompassing. As a result, the Egyptian mind, Hussein argued, became a Med one, not only in politics and economics but also in art and culture. Further, Islam and Arabic do not constitute solid foundations for political affiliations with the Arab Moslems. The

second trend was mainly championed by the Egyptian and Arab nationalists and Islamists. They argued that Egypt is an integral part of the Arab - Moslem nation, and as such the Arab and Islamic circles were its basic foreign policy domains. However, they differed on the rank ordering of domains and the rationale of their arguments. The leaders of the Egyptian nationalist movement, such as Mostafa Kamel and Mohammed Farid, asserted Egypt's Ottoman identity in order to delegitimize the British occupation. Mohammad Rashid Reda, one of the prominent leaders of the Islamic movement, viewed Egypt as a part of a grand Islamic state led by the Caliph (Selim, 1991). The Arab nationalists, denied the existence of a Med culture or a civilization which Egypt might belong to. They asserted that Egypt's Arabic language brought with it an Arabic culture. Such culture meant that Egypt's culture links should be directed towards the Arab world. The Mediterranean, according to Satie Al-Hosary, one of the main advocates of this line of thinking, was not a foreign policy domain for Egypt. (Al-Hosary, 1964). Other Arab nationalists, such as Makram Ebeid, Abdel Rahman Azzam, and Zaki Mubarak articulated variations of the same argument.

The Med-Eastern debate created a deep tension in Egypt's foreign policy during the first half of the twentieth century. Although Egypt's foreign policy was basically directed towards Europe, by virtue of the European background of the ruling dynasty, Egypt kept a close eye on the Arab and Islamic world in an attempt to grasp its political leadership after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The objective was to re-instate the Caliphate system in Egypt. This

objective was never achieved partly because the Islamic world was suspicious of Egypt's European inclinations.

During this era, Egypt's Med policy was characterized by its Europeaness. Egypt was not interested in all Med nations. It directed its policy mainly to the northern Med European nations. This is understandable as most other Med non-European nations were European colonies. Further, Egypt's policy toward the European northern Med nations was loaded with a deep sense of dependence and persistent attempt to "import" the European way of life.

-II-

THE EASTERN ORIENTATION OF EGYPT DURING THE NASSR ERA

As Egypt began to gain some form of limited sovereignty in the 1920s, the Med dimension of its foreign policy declined. The ruling elite attempted to strike a balance between the Med and Eastern orientations. This was reflected in the crucial decisions which Egypt took in the 1940s to join the League of Arab States and take part in the 1948 Palestine war. When Nasser came to power in 1952, he put an end to the Med-Eastern debate for twenty years. Nasser opted for the Eastern orientation. He adopted a new foreign policy orientation which identified Egypt as an Arab actor functioning within three rank-ordered "circles" : Arab, African, and Islamic. According to Nasser, by virtue of its location and culture, Egypt's foreign policy role laid in the Arabic circle. In this circle, Egypt must perform the roles the liberator, defender, and integrator of the Arabs

within the framework of an Arab regional system independent of great power hegemony. In a study of Nasser's foreign policy role conceptions, we found that 41% of Nasser's total references to Egypt's roles were articulated in relationship with the Arab and Arab - Israeli domains (Selim, 1979). Another 38% of the references were related to Egypt's role as an active independent and non-aligned actor. One of the basic themes in Nasser's foreign policy role conceptions was the theme of solidifying Egypt's independence and emerging in the global system as an actor controlling its foreign policy decisions. Consequently, Nasser refused to join any military alliance in which Big Powers participated (Dawisha, 1976).

In this context, one can understand the absence of a Med circle in Egypt's foreign policy during the Nasser era. The Med circle was inconsistent with the value system which Nasser brought with him. A Med circle would have meant cooperative interactions with European Med powers. These powers were members of NATO and some of them was heavily engaged in imperial wars in Africa. Further, there was a deep suspicion that an institutionalized Med circle contradicted with Egypt's commitments in the area of the Arab - Israeli conflict. The Mediterranean was also the arena of superpower competition and Cold War rivalry. Under these conditions, any engagement in the politics of the Med would have necessarily engulfed Egypt in the Cold War battles. Nasser also introduced a domestic policy value system based on the notions of socialism, nationalization, and unipartyism. Such system was not consistent with the capitalist-liberal European value system.

THE ORIGINS OF EGYPT'S MED POLICY

By early 1970s, Anwar Al-Sadat, Egypt's new leader, introduced the country to a national enterprise and value system which were quite different from Nassers. Sadat moved away from Nasser's socialism and unipartyism to privatization and limited multi-partyism. At the regional level, Sadat allied himself with Arab conservatives and made peace with Israel (Ayubi, 1982, Burkart, 1980). Ironically, peace with Israel meant Egypt's isolation from Arab and Islamic institutions. Globally, Egypt broke away from the Soviet Union and entered into an informal alliance with the USA. These drastic changes were not mere reflections of Sadat's new value system. They also reflected deep changes in the domestic and external environment. Perhaps the most important of these changes was the economic crisis which plagued the Egyptian economy as a result of the Arab - Israeli wars and the lack of Arab economic support. By the mid 1970s, the economic crisis emerged as the most crucial variable influencing Egypt's foreign policy. This policy was dominated by the "primacy of economics" (Dessouki, 1991). At the level of the external environment, Afro-Asian national liberation wars ended and superpower rivalry was replaced with detente.

The net result of these changes was to the emergence of a new orientation in Egypt's foreign policy characterized by pro-Westernism. The new orientation and the variables which led to its emergence created an environment conducive to Euro - Egyptian

rapprochement. For Example, the end of liberation wars and peace with Israel removed some of the most difficult knots in Euro- Egyptian interaction.

Further, the old Med-Eastern debate of the 1930s was revived in the 1970s with some Egyptian influential intellectuals advocating a Mediterranean identity for Egypt. In 1972, Tawfiq Al-Hakim published a critique of Nasser's policy, The Return of Consciousness, in which he argued that the time had come for Egypt to stop fighting the battles of the Arabs and return to its Med roots (Ajami, 1981). Al-Hakim represented a trend among Egyptian intellectuals which included prominent figures such as Naguib Mahfouz (Noble Prize winner), Hussein Fawzi, and Lousi Awad. They all stood for an Egypt attached to the Greco-Roman Med traditions (Ibrahim, 1978). Gamal Hamdan, a noted Egyptian geographer, wrote a book in the early 1970s titled, We and Our Four Dimensions, in which he pleaded for a full integration with Med Europe. Hamdan (1993) wrote : "Egypt must look northward ... It is quite useful to deepen our Med dimension".⁽¹⁾

Despite these developments, Egypt did not develop a Med policy until 1990. The pro-Western foreign policy orientation did not produce a Med policy because Europe was not perceived as a viable option for Egypt. Sadat relied mainly on the USA as a source of economic and military support and as an intermediary in the resolution of the Arab - Israeli conflict.

However, the 1970s witnessed the beginnings of an Egyptian Med policy at two levels. The first was the level of Euro-Egyptian cooperation. Egypt initiated bilateral contacts with the European Community (EC), outside the realm of the Euro-Arab dialogue in which Egypt took part until 1979. Through these contacts Egypt was granted trade preferential treatment through a set of protocols signed in 1975 and 1977. In 1983, a Euro-Egyptian Council was established to promote relations with Egypt in the field of economic aid. By the end of the 1970s, Egypt was the largest Med aid recipient from the EC (Badran, 1992). Nevertheless, Egypt was not satisfied with the outcome of the Euro-Egyptian cooperation. It contended that Euro-Egyptian balance of trade was in favor of the EC and that the latter was not providing sufficient technical assistance. The second level of Egypt's Med policy was the emphasis on the linkages between European, Med, and Middle East security. By 1985, one can detect a recurring theme in Egypt's foreign policy asserting the inter-connectedness Between these geographical areas are far as the issue of security is concerned. From this premise, Egyptian policy makers deduced four main policy stances : (i) the security of The Mediterranean should be de-linked from great power rivalries, (ii) the Med should be turned into a sea of economic, cultural, and scientific cooperation between all Med nations regardless of their political identities, (iii) Mediterranean security was linked with European and Middle Eastern security as a result, Middle East conflicts should be resolved in order to safeguard the security of the Mediterranean, and (iv) the Med should be declared a nuclear-free zone⁽²⁾.

In this context, Egypt took part in the foreign ministerial meetings of the Med Group of the Non-Alignment Movement held in Malta (1984), and Yugoslavia (1987). In the Malta meeting, Egypt focused on the resolution of the Middle East conflicts as an instrument to safeguard Med security and the theme of the Med as a nuclear-free zone (Kamel, 1994). The second meeting witnessed Egypt raising, for the first time, the question of establishing a Med Forum. The proposal, accepted by the 1987 meeting, called for studying the idea of establishing a Med Forum which might include governmental and non-governmental representatives to study issues of intra-Mediterranean cooperation. Upon the recommendation of the Egyptian delegation, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, was authorized to contact Mediterranean European countries to explain the possibility of establishing the suggested forum. However, there was no follow-up of the Egyptian proposal. In December 1987, Egypt hosted the "International Symposium on the Middle East and the Mediterranean as Nuclear-Free Zones", sponsored by the Egyptian Peace and Disarmament Committee and supported by the Egyptian government⁽³⁾.

In a word, during the 1970s and 1980s, Egypt developed a pro-western foreign policy orientation, but no Med policy ensued. This was because of Egypt's strategic partnership with the USA and Europe's inability to provide a viable option to Egypt. Egypt's Med policy was characterized by its focus on bringing Europe to bail Egypt out of its economic troubles and to help resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.

THE INCLUSION OF THE PAN MED DIMENSION IN
EGYPT'S FOREIGN POLICY

In his address to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on 11 November 1991, President Mubarak of Egypt suggested to establish "a Med forum which will be increasingly expanded to include all European and Middle Eastern nations". Mubarak touched upon three main features of the suggested forum : (i) it will focus on issues of economic cooperation, (ii) it will begin as a purely Med forum, but will expand later on to include all European and Middle Eastern nations; and (iii) it will consist of a set of governmental and non-governmental institutions.

The Mubarak proposal was followed by intensive activities designed to promote the proposal and sell it to other Med nations. These activities indicate that Egypt has formulated a pan Med policy and that she is serious about pursuing it⁽⁴⁾. A new dimension is being added to Egypt's foreign policy. But before proceeding any further to explicate the Med policy of Egypt, it is important to understand the context in which the new Egyptian policy was formulated, and to draw some inferences about the correlates of that policy.

The Egyptian Med policy was introduced in the wake of the dramatic global changes of the late 1980s which ended up with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union and the emergence of the USA and the only superpower in the global system. These

changes created new opportunities and at the same time posed certain risks as far as Egypt's interests are concerned. For the first time, it became possible for Egypt to institutionalize its relations with southern European Atlantic nations without facing the risk of being engulfed in the Cold War. However, Egypt felt the immediate danger of the EC focusing its attention on the economic plight of Eastern European countries, thereby neglecting, or at least downgrading its economic linkages with Egypt. The Med policy seemed to be a mechanism through which Egypt would be able to keep the EC interested in Egypt's economic problems. Further, when the Cold War ended, Egypt's policy makers found themselves on the winning side. However, there has been a deep sense of anxiety over the reduction of the options available as a result of emergence of the USA as the dominate power in the global system. The Med policy was attempt to cope with the threats of unipolarity by diversifying Egypt's external economic relations and increasing the options.

Egypt's Med policy was a direct response to two major developments, the convening of the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991 and the upgrading of the Euro-Maghreb cooperation within the framework of the 5 + 5 formula. In Madrid, the Arabs and Israelis met publicly for the first time to strike a peaceful settlement. Now, it became possible to talk about a Med forum to safeguard Egypt's economic interests without facing the embarrassment of Israel's participation in that forum. One should also remember that the second Gulf crisis (1990 - 1991) has weakened the radical forces which used to criticize the notion of

Mediterraneanism. Perhaps the most crucial factor in triggering Egypt's interest in pan Mediterraneanism has been the Euro-Maghreb "Algeria Ministerial Declaration" issued in October 1991 calling for the convening of a summit under the 5 + 5 formula. According to this formula five Southern Med Arab countries (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunis) would enter into a collaborative and institutionalized venture with five northern Med nations (France, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Spain). The ten nations were supposed to hold a summit meeting in January 1992 (Al-Ayari, 1992). The 5 + 5 formula meant that Egypt would be excluded. Egypt had to face the double risk of the EC getting involved with Eastern Europe and North Africa, thereby jeopardizing its economic interests. The Mubarak 1991 Med Forum proposal was designed to slowdown the momentum of the 5 + 5 formula and replace it with a pan Med formula. Fortunately for the Egyptians, the Libyan-Western crisis broke out and the Europeans decided to postpone the Euro-Maghreb summit indefinitely.

From Egypt's perspective, the Med forum should focus mainly on promoting areas of economic cooperation. Political cooperation can be tackled in other forums or brought into the Med forum at a later stage. The papers submitted by the Egyptian delegation to the Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean held in Malaga in June 1992 and Ministerial Meeting of the Core-Group countries of the Mediterranean Forum held in Alexandria, Egypt in July 1994 dealt only with issues related to economic cooperation and cultural dialogue among civilizations.

Although delegations to the Malaga Conference were supposed to present three papers on security issues, socio-economic cooperation, and dialogue among civilizations, the Egyptian delegation did not submit a paper dealing with the first issue. In the other papers, the Egyptian delegation focused on the issues of co-development and dialogue among civilizations as the main concern of Med cooperation. In the area of co-development, the Egyptians contended that Med cooperation should deal with issues of control manpower influx through the subsidy of development projects in the source countries of the Arab Maghreb and the improvement of the terms of trade and establishing a free trade zone between the European market and the Med region. They also pleaded for a review of the European aid programs to Southern and Eastern Med countries in the direction of debt-relief, technology transfer, control of multinational companies, and containing the social consequences of structural economic reform. Further, the Egyptian view of Med cooperation in the area of co-development included cooperation in social domains such as boosting health and educational services, environmental protection, upgrading the impoverished classes, combating social problems of global dimensions such as drug-trafficking, and reinforcing democratic reforms and broadening popular participation in development processes. Cooperation in these fields, the Egyptian maintained, "should be built on the basis of mutual respect for the indigenous culture of every society", (Group of Egypt, 1992 a). In the area of dialogue among civilizations, the Egyptian proposal underscored the importance of the Med forum as a framework for promoting "cultural cooperation in the field of

the exchange of ideas, theories, and arts", and for embarking upon a dialogue among Euro-Arab civilizations, which "should not be limited to the economic aspects only, nor should it limit itself to the scientific and technological aspects. Rather, this dialogue must extend to cover the political and cultural aspects as well" (Group of Egypt, 1992 b).

The same approach was clearly articulated in the policy papers submitted by Egypt's Foreign Minister to the Ministerial Meeting of the Core-Group Countries of the Mediterranean Forum held in Alexandria in July 1994. These papers dealt with cooperation in the fields of science and technology for development, protection of the environment in the Mediterranean, energy, and transportation and communications. In the field of science and technology, Egypt focused on "Human Resource Development for Technology ", which includes development of partnership between enterprises based on subcontracting agreements or licensing for cooperation in the production of final technological products, and training programs within the existing European Union (EU) programmes such as Med-Campus and Avicenna Erasmus. Areas such as information technology, telecommunications and electronics, and semi-conductors and biotechnology are of special importance, the Egyptians argue (Egypt, 1994 a). In the area of environment, the Egyptian policy paper proposed four areas of Med cooperation, (i) drawing an accurate environmental map of the Mediterranean based on scientific data (ii) review of the literature, action plans in connection with the ongoing efforts, (iii) the establishment of links

between the national, sub-regional and regional research and development centers working on the environmental issues with the aim to ensure better co-ordination of their activities, and (iv) co-ordination of the regional activities, in order to achieve homogeneity in the region, avoid repetitions, and to ensure efficiency in implementation (Egypt 1994d). In the field of energy, the Egyptians argued that the Med forum should deal with three main issue-areas. (i) rationalization of the depleting sources of energy, (ii) cooperation in the field of new and energy resources, (iii) co-operation in research and development in the field of new and renewable resources of energy with the aim to make them attractive enough for commercial use, (Egypt, 1994e). In the area of transportation and communications in the Mediterranean, the Egyptians listed six main areas of Med cooperation (i) enhancement of the Mediterranean ports, (ii) organization of training programmes and scientific seminars to facilitate exchange of information regarding recent developments in that field, (iii) co-operation in the field of ship-building industry, (iv) studying the feasibility of the establishment of a regional center for maritime emergencies, (v) increasing the level of homogeneity and cooperation in the field of transport regulations, and (vi) enhancement of cooperation in the field of maritime services (Egypt, 1994c).

The conclusion to be drawn from reading Egyptian parliamentary and governmental policy papers on the Med forum is that Egypt views the forum as a technical institution which focuses on channeling European aid to the Southern Med nations. In this area, Egypt is in disagreement with Spain, Italy, Tunisia, and

Morocco who favor granting the framework for Med cooperation a clear mandate in security matters. The Spanish - Italian Med proposal of 1990 focused on the establishment of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) similar to the Conference in Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The proposal listed three "baskets" of Med cooperation ; the security, economic, and human baskets (Ghebali, 1993)⁽⁵⁾. The Euro-Maghreb 5 + 5 formula also referred to political-security issues as the top issues on the agenda of the meetings of the ten nations (Ben Yehia, 1993)⁽⁶⁾.

At the institutional level, Egypt advocates the creation of a forum quite similar to the present structure of the Movement of Non-Alignment. The Med forum should be a loose and flexible institutional framework which serves as a forum for consultation among Med nations through ad hoc meetings. No permanent secretariat is needed and no charter should be adopted. In his presentation to the Alexandria Meeting of the Core-Group countries of the Med Forum, the Egyptian Foreign Minister described the Med forum as a "system of regular consultations". This system " can take the form of regular meetings at the level of High Officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs to carry out consultations on specific issues of common interest pertaining to the region", (Egypt, 1994 b). It can also take the form of ad hoc meetings for consultations on specific issues by representatives of the Med countries at other levels. The recurrence of themes such as consultations, ad hoc meetings underscores Egypt's view of the Med forum as a "light" institution with no decision making

powers. As for membership of the forum, Egypt contends that the forum should be open to all Med countries, regardless of their foreign policy orientations or political systems⁽⁷⁾. Countries such as Israel, Cyprus, Lebanon, and Syria will have to be brought into the forum. Initially, Egypt raised some reservations on Israel's membership in the forum as long as the Arab - Israeli conflict has not been resolved (Group of Egypt, 1992 a). After the Israeli - Palestinian Declaration of Principles of 1993, Egypt dropped this reservation⁽⁸⁾. Further, Egypt argues that the forum should be open to all European and Middle East nations at a later stage. Other Arab states should be invited to the membership of the forum, or else, the Egyptians argued, the forum will serve as a tool of division among the Arabs (Group of Egypt, 1992 a). Membership in the Med forum, the Egyptians contend, should not preclude membership in other institutions and the forum itself should not be an alternative to other existing cooperation schemes.

THE PROSPECTS OF THE MED DIMENSION

IN EGYPT'S FOREIGN POLICY

Having outlined the basic elements of Egypt's new Med policy we are now in a position to deal with the basic research questions which were raised in this paper. Does the emergence of the Med dimension mean that Egypt's foreign policy orientation is changing or about to change? The analysis of Egypt's conceptualization of the Med forum indicates that Egypt is trying to expand the scopes of action of its present foreign policy orientation and that the Med policy is an instrument to safeguard Egypt's economic interests which seem to have been jeopardized after the drastic changes in the global system. Egyptian policy makers saw the global and regional changes as leading to the marginalization of Egypt's interests and as a result formulated the Med policy in order to stay at the center of regional action and at the same time increase options available and diversify foreign policy interactions. Further, Egypt's foreign policy orientation is not likely to become a Med one thereby abandoning Egypt's Eastern commitments. This assertion can be understood in the light of Egypt's limited ability to translate its Med ambitions into reality, its strategic commitments in the Arab world, and the lack of consensus among Egyptian intellectuals on the desirability of a Med orientation. Egypt's Med approach is not widely accepted by France and North African countries. They prefer the 5 + 5 formula than the Egyptian Med forum proposal. Further, the European Union (EU) seems to be interested in developing sub-regional cooperation

schemes with the Western Med and Eastern Med nations separately. In the former era , it tilts towards the 5 + 5 formula and in the latter it focuses on developing a "a balanced triangular relationship between the EU, the Arab Mashrak, and Israel" (Commission of the European Communities, 1993). Realizing this EU strategy, Egypt decided to adhere to the Maghreb Union (MU), a regional organization which includes the five north African nations of the 5+5 formula. Egypt attended the November 1994 Ministerial Meeting of the MU as an observer and contends for a full membership, a move which has been rejected by Tunisia, (Neal, 1994, Al-Karay, 1994). Egypt's objective is to be a part of the 5+5 formula when it is resumed after the end of the Libyan - Western crisis (Salama, 1994 a+ b). If Egypt's MU bid achieves its objectives, then it is only logical that Egypt will abandon its Med Forum proposal. It seems also that developing such Forum is not one of the main priorities of the EU, which adds additional constraints on Egypt's ability to put it into action. Egypt has also developed strategic links with the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf states which cannot be sacrificed for the sake of a Med orientation. These strategic relations include, inter alia, security commitments, labor relations, trade and investment relations which have become crucial for the survival of Egyptian economy an the maintenance of Egypt's national security. Finally, Egyptian intellectuals are in disagreement over the Mediterranean issue. Whereas a sizable sector of them support the Med forum policy, including some of those who used to be staunch Nasserites (Hamroush, 1994, and Hanna, 1994), the Islamists and the Arabists reject it. The Islamists view the Med policy of Egypt as an attempt

to rally Europe with Egypt against the Islamic resurgence movement. They contend that Mediterraneanism is an alliance between Arab secular regimes and Europe against Islam. Likewise, Arab nationalists contend that Mediterraneanism will dilute the Arab identity of Arab regional system and lead to its dismantling (Hafez, 1994, Al-Bakoury, 1994).

Will the Med scope of action negatively influence the present ones? In our judgement, the Med scope of action is emerging at the expense of the African one. Egypt seems to be re-rank ordering its scopes of action in the direction of upgrading the Med one while keeping its African commitments at its present level of interactions. This does not mean that Egypt is neglecting Africa. It simply means that Egypt does not have an African project similar to its Med one and that Egypt's African ambitions are quite limited compared with its Med ones.

The inclusion of a Med scope of action in Egypt's foreign policy seems to be a mechanism through which Egypt is attempting to cope with the recent regional and global changes. These changes seemed to have been marginalizing Egypt's regional status. By including a Med scope of action Egypt seemed to be attempting to connect with the emerging powers (the European union), securing other sources of economic support, and enhancing its strategic significance.

NOTES

- 1) According to Hamdan's publisher, the book was written in the early 1970s. However, it was published in 1993, apparently after Hamdan's tragic death.
- 2) Address of Egyptian Foreign Minister Abdel-Meguid before the Arab, Foreign and National Security Affairs Committee of the Shura Council on 14 June 1987 and his address before the UN General Assembly on 29 September 1987, (Shura Council, 1988).
- 3) Further, Egyptian research centers began to develop an interest in the Mediterranean and its impact on Egypt's interests. In this context, the writer coordinated a project under the overpices of Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in the early 1980s which attempted to survey the major trends of international equilibriums in the Eastern Mediterranean (Selim, 1985).
- 4) Among these activities one may refer to the participation of the Egyptian Committee for Solidarity in the "Conference for Solidarity and Cooperation among the Mediterranean Countries" held in Athens in February 1992 and the convening of the second round of the conference in Cairo in March 1993. The Egyptian Solidarity Committee also participated in the deliberations of the "International

Symposium on which Future for the Mediterranean" held in Tunis in 1992. An Egyptian government delegation participated in the discussions of the conference on the "Priorities of the Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation" held in Cyprus in November 1992. In the same month, the writer represented Egypt in the Arab - Spanish Meeting held in Toledo, Spain to discuss the future of Med cooperation. Further, in June 1992, an Egyptian delegation participated in the Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean held in Malaga, Spain, and recently Egypt hosted the Ministerial Meeting of the Core-Group countries of the Mediterranean Forum in Alexandria in July 1994. Ten countries attended the meeting, namely : Algeria, France, Greece, Italy, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunis, Turkey and Egypt. Egypt also is a co-founder of the Mediterranean Organization for Vocational, Small, and Intermediate Enterprises established in April 1994. The Secretary General of the Organization is an Egyptian citizen. At the moment there are eight member states in organization, namely : Egypt, Turkey, Libya, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Palestine, and Tunis.

- 5) In 1990, Egypt endorsed the Italian- Spanish proposal. Egypt also hosted a preparatory meeting to study the proposal in December 1990. Eight countries attended the meeting : Egypt, Spain, Italy, France, Portugal, Algeria, Malta, and Yugoslavia. In that meeting, France and Portugal criticized

the proposal as impractical because it covered a wide area (Al-Magdoub, 1994). It seems that Egypt sympathized with the French-Portuguese views and withdrew its initial support. The idea of a Med security cooperation was never raised by the Egyptians in their later statements. Egypt did not even refer to the Mediterranean as a nuclear free zone in its 1991 proposal.

- 6) The 5 + 5 Group issued two documents : The Declaration of the Nine States on Dialogue and Cooperation in the Western Mediterranean in 1990 (Declaration of the Nine States, 1992) in 1990 (1992), and the Algeria Ministerial Declaration in 1991 (Algeria Ministerial Declaration, 1992). The first document referred to Euro-Maghreb Western Med cooperation in the area of "setting political and security issues of common concern". The second document elaborated on this theme. It established a Political Committee to overlook discussions on political and security matters. Perhaps Tunis and Morocco are the strongest Maghreb advocates of this line of thinking (Ben-Yehia, 1993, Morocco Group, 1992).
- 7) On one occasion, Egypt's Foreign Minister stated that "When we talk about Med security, we mean "Mediterranean Europe and beyond, the European Union, and the group to which Britain belongs is not excluded from the issues of Med. security". (Al- Ahram, 23 November 1994).

8) In a press conference held in Cairo on 3 January 1995, Israeli Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres, asserted that he had received assurances that Egypt supported Israel membership in the Mediterranean Forum (Al-Ahram, 4 January 1995).

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
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France's Mediterranean policy: new challenges, old dilemmas

(rough outline)

May Chartouni-Dubarry

It is quite difficult to draw a clear picture today of what would be France's Mediterranean policy in the coming years. Since the Gulf War which dealt a final blow to what was labelled as "France's Arab Policy" (*Politique arabe de la France*), this policy has been left in a state of disarray, lacking cohesiveness and consistency. The major changes the southern Mediterranean region has been undergoing since then, in its eastern and western part as well, have added to this sense of confusion. The nineties have seen both the Middle-East (under the Arab-Israeli peace-process impulse) and the Maghreb (tragically and deeply shaken by the Algerian war) moving rapidly beyond French control. Domestic constraints -the 1992-1995 "cohabitation" period followed up by the presidential election- have also played a key-role in preventing France from formulating a strong and rejuvenated policy towards the Mediterranean.

No doubt that the election of a new president for a seven-year term especially if backed by a strong majority will help France to have a higher profile on the Mediterranean and to promote it as an issue of priority on the Europe Union's agenda. It has already started, together with Spain to which it will hand over the European presidency on July 1995, to press its EU's partners to increase aid and attention to the countries bordering the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean. In so doing, France seeks to "rebalance" the EU's emphasis on eastern and central Europe championed by German and the EU's Nordic states. It is pointing out that the security needs for EU's countries to have a stable and prosperous neighbourhood have now become even more pressing on its southern flank than on its eastern one.

Driven by a new sense of urgency, France is genuinely determined to inject fresh momentum into the EU's relationship with its southern neighbours. But whether it will succeed remains fraught with uncertainties. Not only because of its Europeans partners' reluctance to share the financial burden this implies but mainly because of France's own deep-seated ambiguities when it comes to defining a policy in accordance with its perceived interests and role in this part of the world. The forced French disengagement brought about by the fallout's of the Gulf War did not dramatically alter its vision of the region nor did it resolve the basic dilemmas which still are hindering its Mediterranean approach. To better understand in what way the new Mediterranean challenges are likely to re-shape French policy, let us examine first what were the reasons behind the collapse of the long-held "Arab policy".

Initiated in the aftermath of the Algerian independence War by President de Gaulle's strong ambition to replace an outdated colonial policy and to pursue a "grande politique extérieure" independent from the two Blocs, the "Arab policy" was never to outlive France's military involvement in the Gulf War. On the eve of the Gulf conflict, it could be summarised as follows: a set of closely-woven even "organic" relations with the Maghreb, historical and sentimental ties with Lebanon, a very active diplomacy with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the partnership with Iraq. Actually and despite its ambitious label, France's Arab policy has never been a comprehensive and integrated one, but rather a collection of bilateral and autonomous policies. Indeed, France's ambitions, interests and influence were far from being the same in the Maghreb and in the Machrek. Even within these sub-regional groupings, the intensity and nature of France's involvement were not the same. While the ties with Iraq were built on Realpolitik considerations, making it France's main Arab ally and client, the enduring "special relationship" with Lebanon is of an emotional kind, a remnant of past involvement in a country where France's influence has steadily shrunk over the past few years. This "single Arab policy", despite its fragmented underlying approach, has had considerable impact on Arab public opinion which started to view France as the sole Western actor with a balanced policy in the region, i.e. one that is more sympathetic to the claims and aspirations of the Arabs. It was

precisely this homogeneity and unity in popular perceptions across the Arab World that gave credit to France's "difference" (*la spécificité française*). All French presidents since de Gaulle including F. Mitterrand have been very attentive to preserve this favourable image of France as a middle size power but one EU foreign ministers which is committed to maintaining an independent foreign policy on the Arab scene. In 1990, France could rightly prided itself on its special relationship with the Arab world and for succeeding over the past three decades in building up a strong capital of sympathy and credibility there.

The fact that the Arab policy relied mainly on images and symbols has led some to describe it, or rather to condemn it as a mere collection of myths. For those, the Gulf War did nothing but reveal the shallowness of France's pretence to play a pivotal and independent role in the region. It is true that the Gulf War was a major trying test for French ambitions in the Middle East insofar as it confronted France for the first time with a dilemma: either to break ranks with its Western allies by refusing to join the multinational force or go at war alongside the US and place in jeopardy its Arab friendships. But what brought French Arab policy to an ending was not so much the damaging effect of its military involvement on its overall standing in the Arab World as it was the unprecedented post Cold-War situation which imposed a whole new agenda of priorities on French foreign policy. At the time when Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait, France was deeply concerned with the urgency of coping with the newly emerging challenges in Europe (the collapse of communism, the German reunification, democratisation in Eastern Europe) and with the need to secure for itself a future role in the new international order in keeping with its status as a leading second-rank power. These are the major extra-regional factors which have decisively shaped French decision to sacrifice its "difference" in the southern Mediterranean for the sake of northern geostrategic interests. By doing so, it has lost all of the three middle-eastern pillars of its presence in the region. With regard to its Iraqi ally, France proved unable to prevent the outbreak of the conflict and the loss of Iraq was in itself a serious setback. In Lebanon, it had to relinquish what remained of its influence to the benefit of Syria which took total control over the country (with the exception of South-Lebanon) as soon as October 1990. Finally, concerning the Arab-Israeli issue, France's hopes for a high profile

role in the post-war peace-making process turned out to be an illusion. At the inaugural conference in Madrid, there was no French representation, only an EC side-seat. In sum, at the end of the Gulf War, "French specificity" in the Middle-East was devoid of all its meaning. With the new environment of East-West detente and the United States' exclusive responsibility for handling Middle-eastern affairs, France has lost its special position. Its role in the Eastern part of the Mediterranean has become equal to that of German or Italy which have traditionally looked at the Middle East as a region of economic opportunities and never have the means nor the desire to achieve grand political designs there.


This major turning-point was publicly acknowledged by French officials as soon as March 1991. In a much-publicised interview, French Foreign minister publicly dismissed French "Arab policy", declaring it null and void. Later on, his successor Alain Juppé was to assign more limited, and some would say realistic, objectives to what have become France's "Mediterranean policy". This shift from an Arab to a Mediterranean policy is not purely rhetorical. It reflects the waning of French influence in the Middle East and the subsequent tilting towards the Maghreb as well as the desire of Paris to get its European partners more deeply involved in a global Mediterranean project aimed primarily at creating a Euro-Maghreb partnership, as mentioned above. But here again, French leaders are far from being unambiguous. While they are well aware that coping with the pressing challenges confronting Maghrebi states today require a European concerted strategy, they still regard this region as a traditional zone of influence where France's almost exclusive presence is long-standing and multifold. In other words, if France is ready to share the financial and economic burden as well as some of the strategic risks with its European partners in the Mediterranean, it is more than reluctant to share what it perceived as a matter of its sole political responsibility.

The dealing with the Algerian crisis reflects very acutely this French dichotomy. France is more affected by war in Algeria than any other European State. With the attacks on French interests and especially with the Christmas hijacking of the Air France airliner by Islamic extremists, the Algerian crisis had thrust itself in the heart of French domestic politics. Given the painful

colonial legacy, the issue of relations with Algeria had always been a very sensitive one. Now because of deep ties to a country it ruled for 132 years and because some 800,000 Algerian immigrants live in France today, Paris cannot opt for a hand off policy and extract itself from involvement in the country's new war. France seems to have unwillingly become a party to the war. Viewed from outside, French policy towards the Algerian crisis looked erratic, lacking a clear direction. It is true that the electoral campaign is blurring the picture. The more likely candidates to win the elections are being very cautious not to be very specific about their position on Algeria so as not to make an election issue out of the Algerian crisis. Nonetheless, this has not prevent Interior Minister Charles Pasqua to launch large-scale police operations against islamist support networks in France, in an aim to "terrorise the terrorists". The tough and highly publicised line adopted by Pasqua is clearly dictated by domestic electoral considerations. But at the same time, it shows that Algeria is as much an internal political issue for France as it is a foreign policy matter. The need to maintain the status quo until France's presidential elections (i.e. to keep on providing material and diplomatic support to the Algerian regime so as to prevent any major breakdown), has brought French officials to play down their differences over the Algerian issue. But it is clear that Alain Juppé is backing for a more balanced French approach to dealing with Algeria by calling for political dialogue and democratic elections as the only way to resolve the crisis. The hijacking had a considerable impact on French leaders' reading of the crisis. It showed that France is maybe paying a high price for backing a regime that seems unable of defeating the islamist. There is also a new awareness that whatever future French policy is, it still will be regarded by suspicion by both sides of the Algerian conflict. At this point, France seems unable to come up with a solution on his own. Not only had it proved powerless to influence events there but it had taken the risk of being directly drawn into the Algerian crisis. Many feel inside French decision-making circles that the only way to break this deadlock is to "europeanise" the problem by arguing that a further deterioration of the Algerian situation would eventually affect Europe's security as a whole. But French officials have not succeeded so far in convincing them that Algeria is to become a problem for Europe as much as for France. Its European partners showed no particular enthusiasm for providing further assistance to the Algerian government. While the

EU has not formulated any specific policy on Algeria, it is clear that it has very little confidence in the regime's ability to handle the situation. A clear sign of this was the EU foreign ministers' endorsement of the peace plan drawn by Algerian opposition parties in Rome last January. To generate sympathetic concern from its European allies require from France that it ceases regarding the Maghreb and more especially Algeria as its own preserve.

Nor France, neither Europe have a ready-made Algerian policy. But whether the EU will succeed in defining a common position on this issue will have as a major test a decisive effect on the credibility and the viability of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership project.



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8

TRADUCTION

(de l'arabe)

POUR UN DIALOGUE SUBSTANTIEL ET CREDIBLE
SUR LA SECURITE EN MEDITERRANEE

COMMUNICATION DE MONSIEUR Lounès BOURENANE
DIRECTEUR GENERAL DE L'INSTITUT NATIONAL
D'ETUDES DE STRATEGIE GLOBALE (INESG - ALGERIE)

DOCUMENT A USAGE INTERNE AU FORUM

MARS 1995

INTRODUCTION

Le recentrage des travaux de la présente rencontre sur le thème du Développement Institutionnel du Forum Méditerranéen constitue une décision bien avisée de la part des organisateurs. Je leur en sais personnellement gré.

En effet, il paraît indiqué de consacrer un effort commun de réflexion pour nous assurer que le statut et l'organisation de nos activités au sein du Forum sont bien les plus appropriées à la production commune de contributions significatives à la résolution de conflits et au renforcement de la paix et de la stabilité en Méditerranée.

Au demeurant, les groupes de travail ont assez bien balisé le terrain sur ce volet comme sur les autres volets : politique, économique et culturel. Que leurs membres en soient félicités.

Tirant avantage des travaux des groupes, j'articulerai ma contribution comme suit :

- 1 - Développement Institutionnel du Forum Méditerranéen,
- 2 - Volet politique,
- 3 - Volet Économique et Social,
- 4 - Volet Culturel,
- 5 - Perceptions des menaces pour la paix et la stabilité en Méditerranée.

1. LE DEVELOPPEMENT INSTITUTIONNEL DU FORUM MEDITERRANEEN

La démarche engagée initialement, confirmée dans ses principes et affinée dans ses modalités par les groupes de travail paraît appropriée pour la phase actuelle :

- 2 -

- le Forum gagnerait à préserver son caractère informel pour promouvoir une vraie concertation et éviter les dérives vers la négociation et la confrontation qu'une officialisation plus marquée du statut de ses instances et de la sanction de ses travaux ne manquerait pas de générer ;

- l'organisation des structures et des procédures de travail doit être assez souple pour permettre l'adaptation opportune et graduelle avec consolidation au fur et à mesure des progrès réalisés ;

- le Forum devrait se manifester comme une force de proposition capable d'alimenter pertinemment les processus de décision stratégique en matière de sécurité en Méditerranée sans pour autant faire redondance avec les autres cadres de concertation ni interférer dans les processus officiels de décision.

Ce sont là des principes fondateurs du Forum qu'il serait judicieux de ne pas remettre en question mais plutôt de conforter par des réflexions et projets communs visant l'amélioration continue de la qualité du dialogue que nous nous sommes engagés à promouvoir.

Pour dialoguer il faut un objectif commun, je dirai plutôt une profession de foi commune, un langage commun, une participation équilibrée, une gestion correcte de l'interface entre les différents segments du Forum et une démarche pragmatique et efficace.

UNE PROFESSION DE FOI COMMUNE

Au delà de la répétition des grands principes qu'on retrouve dans les Chartes auxquelles adhèrent déjà les pays de la région, il serait indiqué de mettre en exergue dans une Charte les règles d'éthique dont l'observation constitue une condition indispensable pour la promotion du dialogue méditerranéen au sein du Forum et par le Forum.

- 3 -

Peut être faudrait-il préciser s'il s'agit d'une Charte que le Forum proposerait aux pays de la Méditerranée ou bien d'une Charte du Forum lui-même sorte de contrat moral d'adhésion.

Les deux options n'étant d'ailleurs pas exclusives.

C'est la seconde option : Charte contrat moral d'adhésion du Forum méditerranéen qui relève du développement institutionnel de celui-ci ; car elle pourrait faciliter le développement et la préservation, au sein du Forum, du climat de confiance, de convivialité et de tolérance indispensable au bon déroulement de nos activités et que nous ambitionnons de diffuser et de faire prévaloir dans les relations entre nos nations respectives.

En effet, la persistance tenace de mythes qui alimentent la xenophobie dans nos pays respectifs sous ses formes directes ou pernicieuses, aggrave au plan sécuritaire une bipolarité et une asymétrie déjà évidentes aux plans économique et social.

Cette combinaison d'asymétries entretient des perceptions de défiance comme celle qui voudrait que les Etats du Sud de la Méditerranée, incapables de régler leurs affaires internes et de s'entendre entre eux, constituent des sources de perturbation voire de menaces pour les pays du Nord ; ce qui ouvrirait un droit ou, plus, ferait obligation morale pour les pays du Nord d'interférence voire d'ingérence.

En réaction, des perceptions sont entretenues dans les pays du Sud selon lesquelles les Etats du Nord ne chercheraient qu'à exploiter les ressources naturelles et les débouchés commerciaux du Sud et seraient prêts, dans un esprit de croisade, à exercer toute forme de pression sur tout pays du Sud qui ne se plierait pas à leur hégémonisme.

L'interaction de ces perceptions de défiance constitue en réalité l'une des menaces principales pour la paix et la stabilité en Méditerranée.

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C'est vraisemblablement de ce constat qu'a dû naître l'idée de la création du Forum Méditerranéen.

Pourquoi ne pas investir dans une réflexion commune pour élaborer une Charte qui proclamerait avec une certaine solennité notre engagement commun à détruire ces mythes pour corriger ces perceptions par la promotion des études, des recherches et des échanges qui mettraient en évidence la communauté de nos patrimoines respectifs, la convergence fondamentale de nos intérêts bien compris et qui feraient accepter nos différences comme des richesses et non pas comme des menaces ?

UN LANGAGE COMMUN

L'objet essentiel de notre Forum est la sécurité en Méditerranée. C'est un concept à géométrie variable. Commençons par réfléchir ensemble pour aboutir à une définition commune ou plutôt à des définitions communes qualifiées de la sécurité en Méditerranée dont il convient de bien gérer les interdépendances tant il est vrai que la paix et la sécurité en Méditerranée sont indivisibles.

Profitons-en pour décharger les concepts que nous aurons fréquemment à utiliser, des connotations abusives dont ils ont été encombrés par des manipulations médiatiques ou autres et redonnons-leur un contenu plus scientifiquement fondé.

Cela facilitera grandement nos échanges, améliorera la qualité de nos travaux et nous fera l'économie de beaucoup de malentendus et d'incompréhension.

UNE PARTICIPATION EQUILIBREE

Pour imprimer aux activités du Forum, une certaine régularité, il serait souhaitable de promouvoir la coopération dans l'optique de la constitution d'un réseau d'instituts d'études stratégiques points focaux dans chaque pays (Networking).

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En effet le développement de réseaux nationaux autour d'instituts pivots, insérés dans un réseau méditerranéen constitue pour l'avenir la meilleure garantie d'échanges équilibrés, durables et de qualité. Il aidera considérablement à l'amélioration des processus nationaux et régionaux de décision stratégique.

L'équilibre de la participation se gère également à travers la question d'élargissement du Forum.

Confirmons tout de suite qu'à terme, tous les pays riverains de la Méditerranée devraient, s'ils le veulent, faire partie du Forum.

Dans l'immédiat, il semble qu'il faille étudier cette question avec un certain soin parce que les problèmes qu'elle peut générer sont à l'évidence très épineux.

Il sera très difficile d'arriver à des règles parfaites d'admission. Notons que dès lors qu'on accepte le principe de la conditionnalité à l'admission, on introduit automatiquement celui de l'exclusion encore plus traumatisant pour le climat de travail du Forum.

A titre illustratif on peut constater que le critère de Méditerranéité tel qu'il a été proposé conduirait à rechercher d'autres critères pour sélectionner les pays non riverains qui feraient partie ou bien qui estiment qu'ils font partie de la géopolitique méditerranéenne.

Le critère d'acceptation de la légalité internationale semble procéder de l'exclusion préventive ciblée. Or, il se trouve que le pays ainsi proposé à l'exclusion préventive est membre de l'UMA et de la Ligue Arabe.

Il semble a priori difficile pour les autres membres de ces deux Institutions d'accepter le principe d'une telle exclusion préventive qui cible un pays dont le littoral s'étend sur 2000 km de côtes méditerranéennes.

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Pour un Forum dont la raison d'être est de contribuer informellement mais efficacement à la résolution des problèmes de sécurité en Méditerranée on serait en droit de se demander en quoi une telle exclusion résoudrait-elle les problèmes qui se posent ?

Le dernier critère avancé, celui de l'engagement dans le processus de coopération méditerranéenne semble ouvrir la voie à des frictions fréquentes dont on pourrait faire l'économie en adoptant une Charte du type contrat d'adhésion.

Etant donné les nombreuses interrogations qu'elle soulève, cette question d'élargissement du Forum mériterait plus ample réflexion pour aboutir à une formule consensuelle qui permettrait de traiter en toute sérénité les candidatures présentées.

Le Forum, étant à ses premiers balbutiements, ne semble manifestement pas avoir atteint un stade de maturité ou d'institutionnalisation qui l'autoriserait à porter des jugements sur les comportements des Etats ; d'autant plus que l'expérience a montré que ces jugements procèdent souvent d'approches fragmentaires et sélectives qui ne tiennent pas suffisamment compte de l'évolution des problèmes.

Ne serait-ce pas de telles approches qui au moment où on met en avant la légalité internationale, tendent à privilégier l'entrée au Forum d'un Etat qui refuse d'adhérer au Traité de Non Prolifération Nucléaire et de soumettre ses installations aux contrôles de l'Agence Internationale pour l'Energie Atomique précisément au moment où la Communauté Internationale se mobilise et déploie des efforts considérables pour réaffirmer la validité du TNP et pour en consacrer la prorogation.

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LA GESTION DE L'INTERFACE ENTRE ANALYSTES, HAUTS FONCTIONNAIRES DECIDEURS

La gestion de cet interface renvoie à une conciliation du temps de l'analyse avec le temps de la décision.

En effet, pour que les travaux des analystes aient une quelconque valeur d'usage pour les décideurs il faut qu'ils soient pertinents et exploitables aux grandes échéances de décisions stratégiques.

Il est très difficile de réaliser des séquences d'analyse qui puissent permettre de satisfaire cette préoccupation de pertinence et d'opportunité.

En revanche si le Forum se donne l'objectif d'organiser la coopération entre les Instituts Méditerranéens de Stratégie pour éditer régulièrement un "rapport stratégique sur la Méditerranée" (Méditerranéen strategic survey) il pourrait mieux articuler ses différents travaux et projets de manière à contribuer à l'actualisation et à l'enrichissement de ce rapport stratégique qui serait alors une référence utile pour les planificateurs et pour les décideurs stratégiques.

UNE DEMARCHE PRAGMATIQUE MAIS EFFICACE

Le foisonnement récent des cadres et des initiatives de concertation sur la sécurité en Méditerranée rend encore plus complexe le positionnement du Forum par rapport à celles-ci et à ceux-là.

La question des relations du Forum méditerranéen avec les cadres existants et les initiatives nouvelles de concertation sur la Sécurité en Méditerranée (5 + 5, CSCE, PROJET CSCM, PNAM, PAM etc...) devrait constituer en soi un thème d'études et d'échanges de réflexions.

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2. VOLET POLITIQUE

La proposition relative aux : "questions relatives à la démocratisation aux droits de l'homme et aux minorités. Possibilité d'adoption d'un code de principes" est intéressante sous plusieurs angles :

- tout d'abord ça ne fait pas de mal de mettre de la solennité dans la proclamation des principes de démocratie, des droits de l'homme et des minorités ;

- ça pourrait permettre de passer en revue la chronique des cas d'intervention de pays méditerranéens ou autres dans d'autres pays pour identifier les cas où ces interventions étaient motivées réellement par la défense de la démocratie, des droits de l'homme et/ou des minorités et d'en analyser les résultats pour en tirer des leçons utiles permettant d'éviter le renouvellement d'expériences tragiques comme en Bosnie ou en Somalie par exemple.

Cette proposition renvoie également à la question de la clarification des concepts puisqu'elle invite à ne pas faire l'amalgame entre violence et religions ni la confusion entre tendances politiques et religion d'une part et terrorisme d'autre part.

Il conviendrait de se poser la question de savoir qui est habilité à trancher sur ces qualifications en dehors de l'Etat souverain directement concerné conformément à sa Constitution et à ses lois ?

Le fait pour certains Etats de s'autoproclamer censeurs en la matière, les autorise-t-il à se transformer en sanctuaires et en bases logistiques pour l'organisation de crimes quelle que soit l'appellation qu'on donne à leurs auteurs ?

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N'y a-t-il pas là un vaste champ de manipulation et de perversion de ces nobles principes de défense de la démocratie, des droits de l'homme et des minorités du type deux poids deux mesures ?

Ne faudrait-il pas mieux prendre ensemble les vraies dimensions des terrorismes à travers une réflexion commune approfondie ?

Les proclamations solennelles seraient beaucoup plus crédibles si on essayait d'évaluer les exigences d'un processus de construction d'une démocratie véritable ; un processus qui est une pédagogie de la démocratie. Mais pédagogie n'est pas à confondre avec prosélytisme. C'est plus exactement un processus d'apprentissage de type learning by doing. Un apprentissage de l'éthique et de la pratique démocratiques par les différents acteurs tous trop longtemps ancrés dans la culture de l'allégeance/défiance.

A cet égard il semble important pour le Forum de lancer des études et d'organiser des échanges sur le thème de "Réforme Administrative, Démocratie et Sécurité en Méditerranée".

En plus du profit mutuel que peuvent en tirer les participants, de tels échanges pourraient avoir comme retombée positive la promotion de la coopération décentralisée qui a l'avantage inestimable du contact direct entre les vecteurs opérationnels du processus de construction démocratique que sont les acteurs de la vie politique locale.

Par ailleurs, tous les observateurs ont bien souligné le poids des opinions publiques sur les problèmes de sécurité que ce soit par les canaux d'expression démocratique lorsqu'ils existent ou bien que ce soit en dehors de ces canaux. Le cas de la guerre du Golfe est suffisamment éloquent sur ce point.

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Pourquoi dès lors ne pas lancer un projet d'études et d'échanges sur le thème suivant : "Partis Politiques, Société Civile, Médias, Construction Démocratique et Sécurité en Méditerranée".

3. VOLET ECONOMIQUE ET SOCIAL

Ce qui est stratégique pour le Méditerranéen de cette fin du 20^e siècle l'était déjà pour le Méditerranéen de l'ère préhistorique.

C'est le feu (la guerre du feu), l'eau et le territoire (sol et sous-sol).

La technologie, c'est-à-dire la relation de l'homme finalité du développement économique et social et de l'intelligence humaine, à ces facteurs naturels, change ; elle change même très vite ; mais en terme de sécurité la problématique reste la même : comment valoriser ces ressources pour assurer durablement le bien être des hommes ?

Comment faire en sorte que cette valorisation se réalise par l'échange pacifique et mutuellement bénéfique ?

Dans ce cadre, je voudrais articuler quelques idées d'études et d'échanges :

le Feu : Politiques Énergétiques et Sécurité en Méditerranée,

- l'Eau : Exploitation et valorisation des ressources hydriques et Sécurité en Méditerranée,

- la Terre : Sécurité Alimentaire en Méditerranée,

- l'Environnement : Coopération pour la Protection de l'Environnement et Sécurité en Méditerranée,
(il serait indiqué d'établir une passerelle avec le Plan Bleu),

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- l'Homme : les Aspects sociaux de la Transition vers l'Economie de Marché, la Libéralisation du Commerce et la Sécurité en Méditerranée,

. Emploi, Migrations et Sécurité en Méditerranée,

- Enfin thème intégrateur : les Programmes d'Ajustements Structurels, la Coopération et la Sécurité en Méditerranée.

4. LE VOLET CULTUREL

Le groupe de travail culture a recueilli et proposé un grand nombre de projets dont on ne peut que souhaiter qu'ils se réalisent effectivement.

Je suggérerai qu'on puisse concentrer les efforts sur les attributs lourds d'identité culturelle que sont les langues, le sacré et l'histoire.

Il serait indiqué de consacrer des études et des échanges sur les politiques d'aménagements linguistiques et la sécurité en Méditerranée et de réfléchir sur les voies et moyens de promouvoir la coopération en matière d'études historiques méditerranéennes.

Dans cette optique le Forum devrait prendre en charge la revendication légitime des Etats et des historiens des pays du Sud de la Méditerranée relative à la reconstitution de la mémoire de leurs peuples, dispersée avec leurs archives.

Enfin, last but not least il y a un thème qui revient fréquemment sous des formes souvent schématiques : c'est celui des élites nationales.

Ce thème traverse l'ensemble des volets du champ d'action du Forum puisqu'on pourrait énoncer la finalité de celui-ci en disant qu'il s'agit pour nous de réfléchir aux voies et

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moyens pour que l'intelligence et les qualifications s'insèrent mieux dans les processus de décision stratégique de nos pays respectifs et de nos échanges.

L'expérience et les déboires d'Ibn Khaldoun et de Voltaire, par exemple, avec les pouvoirs mais aussi avec la société de leurs époques respectives, suggèrent qu'il conviendrait de rechercher très loin pour reconstituer l'évolution des rapports de l'intellectuel au sens large avec le pouvoir et avec la société.

Ne pourrait-on pas mettre à l'épreuve l'hypothèse provocatrice selon laquelle la rupture entre le sous développement et le développement passe par une transformation radicale de ces rapports ?

5. PERCEPTION DES MENACES A LA SECURITE EN MEDITERRANEE

Il me semble que la plus grande menace qui pèse sur notre région réside précisément dans les perceptions mal fondées des menaces que nous représenterions les uns pour les autres et qui sont trop souvent amplifiées pour la consommation locale.

Trouver ensemble les voies et moyens de réduction de cette menace par une meilleure reconnaissance mutuelle est la raison d'être du Forum.

En second lieu, quand l'ancien gestionnaire de gazoduc que je suis pense au trafic intense de navires de guerre à armement nucléaire qui passe en Méditerranée au dessus de ces "amarres intercontinentales" que sont les gazoducs sous marins j'en tremble.

En troisième lieu, on ne peut pas rester insensible au fait qu'un pays et un seul en Méditerranée refuse de signer le Traité de Non Prolifération Nucléaire et même de soumettre ses installations nucléaires au contrôle de l'Agence Internationale pour l'Energie Atomique.

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En quatrième lieu, il est paradoxal de lire dans la presse que les réseaux des différentes formes de terrorismes (intégrisme, grand banditisme, drogue, armes traditionnelles et armes de destruction massive, prostitution, corruption, blanchiment de l'argent sale) coopèrent en toute quiétude au plan international et en particulier tout autour de la Méditerranée alors que les Etats de la Méditerranée semblent éprouver des difficultés à coopérer efficacement dans la lutte contre ces terrorismes entremêlés qui mettent en péril nos sociétés et en particulier notre jeunesse.


Il y a enfin les conflits locaux qui sont connus et dont certains pourraient resurgir de façon plus tragique si les solutions de légalité internationale tardent à se mettre en oeuvre.

CONCLUSION

Pour une région aussi petite, à l'échelle du Monde, la liste et l'ampleur des risques potentiels a de quoi effrayer !

Les tentations ne manquent assurément pas de jeter l'huile sur le feu, çà et là, pour tirer avantage, des vulnérabilités conjoncturelles des uns et des autres.

A ces approches tactiques finalement contre productives, sachons faire prévaloir la vision stratégique de l'indivisibilité de la paix et de la sécurité en Méditerranée.



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BIBLIOTECA

"The Mediterranean: Bridge or Divide?"
Proposals for non-military cooperative measures

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Introduction

We all note a resurgence of interest in the search for a viable form of dialogue and consultation to facilitate relationships between the peoples of the north and south shores of the Mediterranean. In itself, this is not a remarkably new phenomenon. Attempts at generating a dialogue among Mediterranean countries on issues of direct interest to states in the region have a fairly long and respectable history.

Indeed, today, the Mediterranean seems only to live on past memories, to glorify its "golden age". There is nostalgia even as we face modern crises demanding correct action.

The crises exceed those of the past: demographic explosion; a burgeoning technological divide; a population flow from the south to the north; religious fundamentalism; dwindling natural resources; devastating pollution; civil war; and the constant menace of regional conflagrations. These are issues which must be addressed in order to

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avert a bleak future for the region.

The "bridge" linking peoples and states must contain an important economic-technological dimension. Since the causes of the divide are not purely political in nature, but encompass deep economic differences, often arising from the gap in technology between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean, it stands to reason, that bridging solutions must offer economic and technological advancement.

Partnership through environmental cooperation.

Nowhere is our interdependence in the Mediterranean more evident than in the field of the environment. A combination of tourism, urbanisation and industrialisation is contributing at an alarming rate to desertification and pollution (some 15,000 kilometers of coastline are already beyond environmental repair). Seaboard cities are facing demographic explosion (the population around the Mediterranean is estimated to double by 2025). Water is in short supply. It is thought that northern cities will consume some 50% more water by the year 2025; while those on the southern shores will need 400% more water to cope with their needs.

The only solution is a multi-disciplinary approach to understand and better manage human impact on the environment, with the main objective of enhancing earth's natural and life-sustaining resources.

The recognition of this need was gradual, with the main area of success being protection of the marine environment. The Law of the Sea

Convention started strengthening the political regional cooperation to protect the sea. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) pioneered this cooperation with FAO (UN Food & Agriculture Organisation) and the WHO (World Health Organisation), which then evolved into the Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) in 1975. Its main objective was the collaborative and integrated planning of the development and management of the resources of the Mediterranean basin, backed by local initiatives in monitoring and research.

The *Barcelona Convention*, the legal instrument which binds almost all Mediterranean coastal states to take all appropriate measures to prevent, abate and control pollution of the Mediterranean Sea from discharges of rivers, coastal establishments or outfalls and other land-based sources, is a unique grouping of all the Mediterranean states.

In many ways, the Barcelona process of the mid-Seventies provides a useful model for successful cooperation in a region where states have as many concerns which divide them as they have ones which unite them. Its subject matter is well identified and circumscribed and the participation set on clearly-defined geographical grounds.

Although some reservations have been expressed, sustainable development is now likely to be brought inside the legal framework of the *Barcelona Convention* either directly or through the Mediterranean Action Plan. The process is already under way to restructure the Convention, perhaps by launching a Mediterranean Commission for Sustainable Development, to take account of contemporary thinking and needs. Such a Commission would identify the needs of the various Mediterranean countries in coastal management, sustainable agriculture and tourism - just a few of the potential areas for joint management. The state of the sea is directly influenced by the land

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(almost 80% of Mediterranean pollution is caused by land-based establishments). However, tensions have surfaced between those countries who see an action plan directed at land-based, albeit strictly coastal, development as a threat to sovereignty, and those who accept that the common sea resource may be rendered useless to all if littoral development is not planned with the environment in mind.

One area of cooperation already under way, is in fisheries, particularly under the auspices of the F.A.O. General Fisheries Council of the Mediterranean. Just this month, fisheries experts at a F.A.O.-sponsored meeting in Malta reached agreement to promote compliance with international conservation and management measures by fisheries' vessels on the "high seas" of the Mediterranean.

Similarly, ICAMAS, the International Centre for Advanced Studies in Mediterranean Agronomy, promotes not only agricultural cooperation but also aqua-culture. There is also, to the extent practicable, assistance provided by the EU's EUREKA projects. However, this has been limited to those few Mediterranean countries able to participate so far. The latter is a model for the creation, on a joint basis, of research and development between the North and the South and should be extended to provide technological cooperation in a number of areas. It seems to me that solar desalination could be a good first candidate on which to focus this sort of cooperation. Using those resources, the sea and the sun, which are plentiful would of course contribute in an important manner to the solution of one of the major problems in the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Middle East - the supply and distribution of water - itself a major source of potential and actual conflict.

In general though, cooperation in the management of the sea's

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resources is so far limited. Sea routes are non-existent in the sense that there are no agreed routes in the Mediterranean. Similarly, for emergencies at sea, there are to date inadequate resources for civil protection in the Mediterranean. There is no stock of equipment and southern countries would have to rely on assistance from France and Italy and to a lesser extent Spain and Greece.

The countries of the South also need important and urgent assistance to implement environmentally-sound measures to dispose of waste liquids and solids and regulate the transport of toxic waste, which still moves its way from north to south. The South can also learn from the experiences of the North about how to promote sustainable tourism. The South must be wary of explosive economic development which could endanger its indigenous lifestyles and cultures. For economic, as well as cultural and religious reasons, the South may find it difficult to adopt patterns of northern development even if its younger generations seem to want to see them.

Non-governmental organisations are also active in this field. Their advantage is that they offer flexibility and objectiveness to their issues. Due to their overlapping interests with major governmental institutions, cooperative efforts offer the most fruitful alliances: for example, by broadening the international linkages. Numerous collaborative projects are being proposed and circulated within a network of NGOs throughout the Mediterranean working on similar objectives every year.

The technological deficit between North and South

The above-mentioned fields of activity represent the common experience and needs for the coastal states and are therefore most likely to stimulate among them technical cooperation and exchange of know-how. For regional issues to be seriously addressed, the problem of technology calls for priority attention. There cannot be any durable development in the South unless technological progress is appropriately planned and directed.

The scope of potential cooperation is extensive - from soil to aquaculture, from tourism to new forms of energy, activating various disciplines for very specific projects. Training is also a long-term vital component in the investment of the human resources of the Mediterranean.

The thrust and rhythm of technological progress, first in the US and Japan and now the Asia-Pacific region, has spurred Europe to move even faster. The growth on the Mediterranean's northern shore, while stagnating in global economic terms since the late 1980s, still shows a large disequilibrium with that of countries to the South. The figures speak for themselves. The Maghreb countries conduct over two-thirds of their trade with the EU. Of that two-thirds, some two-thirds are conducted with the three southern EU countries, France, Italy and Spain. By contrast, the Maghreb only represents a mere 3% of EU external trade. In 1970, Arab countries represented 15% of EC imports; by 1987 they accounted for just 10%. These figures indicate the reality of some 20 years of non-dialogue between the southern and northern Mediterranean shores.

In the meantime, the countries of south-east Asia have managed to

make substantial inroads into EU markets. The so-called Asian tigers have managed to stem population growth and increase their GDPs at phenomenal rates while the countries of the southern Mediterranean remained in a relative economic backwater.

Realistically, there is little evidence to suggest that a position of technological equality could be achieved between North and South by the year 2025. What could be reached is a measure of technological "balance", whereby the South is not lagging behind the North in its adaptation of technological advancement to domestic and regional needs. The South may not, by then, have caught up with the North in an overall state of the art situation, but it may well have succeeded in identifying and developing technological processes satisfying its own specific demands in such crucial areas as energy, water production and agriculture. Small steps are being made which could widen to make a significant contribution to improving technical know-how in the South.

One such step is the technological cooperation among Mediterranean universities promoted by the EU's Med Campus network, and UNIMED, the University of the Mediterranean. Recently, a UNIMED initiative was launched to establish a Mediterranean Master's programme in environmental management. In addition, UNIMED has recently embarked on the MED-LAB project which aims to support and help implement cultural, economic, sociological and environmental proposals through the more formal MED FORUM process. In addition, the EU is considering extending its educational programmes, Socrates and Leonardo, and the Fourth Framework Programme for Research and Development to some non-member state countries.

The first necessity is technological cooperation, in particular through the identification of regional needs to which local regional solutions

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should be found. And here, Mediterranean countries are more able to know their needs than a pan-European organisation based in, and run from, the North.

The great success of the EUREKA project hinges precisely on the circumstances that it calls for joint (North-South) partnership in research leading to development of a commercially interesting product or process. Such an approach does away with the master-servant relationship inherent in conventional technology transfer with its inbuilt streak of continuing reliance on the North for further scientific and technological innovation. It fosters, instead, a "joint venture" spirit which permeates the whole philosophy of the process. Researchers from both parts of the region can work together in laboratories and research institutes which, linked to industry, can eventually produce the technology required to meet perceived domestic and regional needs.

The Malta initiative for the creation of a Mediterranean Marine Industrial Technology Centre was born out of these considerations. The important industrial and marine technological developments taking place in marine activities should open new avenues for all the Mediterranean littoral states. Cooperation in harnessing the common heritage of the Mediterranean Sea should be one of the major goals of developed and developing countries in generating or acquiring the technology for exploration and exploitation of their marine resources. Marine technology is an area which shows a tremendous technological gap between the northern and southern shore of the Mediterranean. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides a specific mandate for the establishment of regional marine scientific and technological research centres.

There has to be, for the proper execution of such projects, an attitude of convinced disposition from the North to join hands in such a venture. Unfortunately, when the idea was mooted to the EUREKA management to widen its mandate to the southern Mediterranean (apart from the southern countries already in its ambit), it received a lukewarm response. But, it is only through such an approach, that the North and South can progress together in the great adventure of a development that will be sustainable and durable because of a common endeavour and shared responsibility. Progress is being made now through the Mediterranean Forum to launch initiatives promoting joint programmes in such fields as gas supply, marine industrial technology and education and training (using the EU's many educational and cooperative schemes - such as MED-URBS, MED-CAMPUS and so on - as models). In looking to EU forerunners, the Mediterranean Forum must ensure that it does not re-invent the wheel and duplicate EU schemes overlapping their ideas and resources.

But any collaborative approach to managing our shared resources must avoid slipping into the colonial rut. For as long as the more technologically-advanced among us keep considering development of the South as a function of technology transfer, we shall not serve adequately the causes of the South in its quest for sustainable development.

The political-cooperative environment

Increasingly, I am drawn to advocating and actively encouraging institutional advancement, a mechanism, however simple and inexpensive, to bring together the countries of the Mediterranean. The Barcelona Convention, as it stands, and the Mediterranean Action Plan, despite two decades of successful operation, have not managed to nurture an ever-widening process of cooperation. The disappearance of the Cold War has lifted many of the constraints on regional cooperation in the Mediterranean as elsewhere. But, the end of bloc politics has also unleashed forces at national and sub-regional levels which constitute a new form of threat to regional peace and stability. The process of regional consultation may be easier to generate, but it is no less complex and intractable to deal with. Given the potentially volatile nature of the Mediterranean it is right that states within the sea's basin are actively exploring some ideas for regional cooperation. A Commission for Sustainable Development would act as an anchor for practical confidence-building measures.

Malta has also advanced, in different fora, the concept of a Council of the Mediterranean which could, as a first step, convene a standing committee foreign ministers of Mediterranean countries. At the same time, the Mediterranean Forum, held in Alexandria last year has now pointed to the possibility of greater cooperation in economic, political and cultural affairs. The principle aim is to generate a more structured process of expert consultations on set topics, but mainly at non-governmental levels.

From EU neighbours to the North has come the proposal to organise a Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in the second half of this year (27-28 November) in Barcelona under the Spanish Presidency. The

conference should hopefully allow an in-depth discussion of future relations between the Union and the Mediterranean countries, addressing all relevant political, economic, social and cultural issues. The conference should reach agreement on a series of economic and political guidelines for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation into the next century and will establish a permanent and regular dialogue on all subjects of common interest.

The offer of a Euro-Mediterranean initiative coming from the EU side must not inhibit moves by the Mediterranean states themselves to organise their own collaboration. The next Med Forum ministerial meeting taking place in Barcelona in June is a further indication that the desire within the Mediterranean states themselves for cooperation is still strong. Within this Forum, Mediterranean states need to define objectives and courses of action with sufficient clarity and determination to create the necessary long-term conditions for a viable Mediterranean security process to emerge.

Independently of the unilateral action which individual Mediterranean states will take with respect to the initiatives within the European institutions, some form of preliminary consensus must emerge at the collective level about decisions which a Mediterranean regional dialogue could take and whether indeed some form of extended dialogue is to become the mainstay of a Mediterranean security process or simply be a complement to a more restricted dialogue limited to littoral states.

It seems to me that we need an Assembly of the Mediterranean, eventually with representatives voted by direct suffrage, but initially with parliamentarians already elected to their national elective bodies, much in the same way as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of

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Europe. The difficulties in implementing such a proposal are real and there is no point in fudging them. A number of Mediterranean countries do not have parliaments in the accepted "Western" sense with the universal suffrage of a free electorate able to vote whomsoever they wish into power through a sovereign assembly. Democracy in the Mediterranean means different things to different men.

Yet, perhaps we should be bold in tackling these situations and not be frightened by the challenges they pose. Should we not consider that the very desirability of having such an Assembly might spur states lacking a parliamentary democracy to take steps to introduce one? The governance of the Mediterranean through such an institutional innovation would offer a potential cohesion of Mediterranean peoples and their leaders.

It will likely be necessary to circumscribe initially the content of a Mediterranean dialogue to manageable subjects. A whole range of issues, from those relating to economic and technical cooperation, to those dealing with the environment, the protection of human rights, the treatment of immigrant workers and of refugees and the fight against drug trafficking and organised crime readily come to mind. This Mediterranean dialogue has to be examined with a pragmatic approach and a great sense of realism. Despite the fact that the Mediterranean is the great crossroads of history, religions, cultures and civilisations, there have, in the past, been few issues of solidarity to bind the littoral states.

Solidarity would be the main benefit of such an Assembly: solidarity through political, economic, cultural and scientific cooperation. The Assembly could for example mandate directives on environmental issues, marine and land-based; it could offer inter-university projects

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for the Mediterranean; and it could, through an internationally-funded Mediterranean development bank, support collaborative projects with an intra-regional dimension, but with an extra-regional export-orientation. The Assembly could have its own human rights bodies - a Court - and its own social charter which could take into account the cultural and religious diversity of the Mediterranean.

Conclusion

We are facing in the Mediterranean a security problem reflected in the North-South divide; a north striving to maintain its quality of life, and a south facing unemployment, social unrest, population explosion, lack of strong democratic traditions and extremists instrumentalising religion for emotive political strategies. And the problems of the South are exportable to the North.

Ultimately, it seems to me that the real solutions in the immediate future lie in technological advancement, an area where cooperation between governments and universities, as well as industry and local and regional government on both shores especially in the field of research and development, can bring real solutions. For the South, this may not be an easy matter because few Southern countries have a tradition of this type of cooperation. But in a situation where the ratio of GNP donated to research funds is now in the range of 35/40:1 between North and South, the need for technological advancement is essential in order to motor the economic growth.

As regards security and cooperation, any confidence-building measures should not be one-way from North to South. Solutions must not be projected so as to convey an "imposition" of values. The question of

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Values lies at the heart of any nation and is deeply rooted in the ethnic, religious and cultural traditions, differences which it has been said, contribute to instability and insecurity in the Mediterranean.

Confidence must be generally inspired, among all peoples, for it to succeed. Cooperation should involve non-governmental organisations. After all, it is not only governments, perhaps not even primarily governments, which introduce, promote and instil confidence building measures. Confidence is a human resource and therefore cannot be imposed by governments. The ancient cities of the Mediterranean can help bridge the divide and cooperate once more as they did in the golden age of trade. But efforts at local and regional level may be undermined if the nation state is lagging behind in its commitment to a genuine cooperative dialogue.

But, through a common dialogue, we have a substitute for the past, the prosperity of the future. For this region has a potential which given the right political will can ensure its stability, can further cooperation, can envisage for the region a role for peace which can be determining, not only in the region itself, but also in its global efforts. The offer of cooperation between the North and South shores must be more than *tromp l'oeil*, a false promise offered by a richer north as a contemporary way to exploit and dominate the south. There has to be a dialogue if the two Mediterraneans are to enjoy again the prosperity and harmony which produced the ancient civilisations.

Europe needs to embrace for its own survival a value-orientated society that regards the raising of the quality of life in the South, not simply and exclusively as an insurance policy against the ills of immigration or against the potential threat to sociopolitical regional stability arising from the widening income gaps, but as an act of


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solidarity based on distributive justice.

It is only in this way that the North and South can progress together in furthering mutually-beneficial development that will be both sustainable and durable because it is born of a shared responsibility. The Mediterranean Forum, born in Alexandria last year, has now raised the possibility of greater cooperation in economic, political and cultural affairs. Indeed, its most recent meeting in Rome this month (March, 1995), was another step towards making formal dialogue among the amalgam of Mediterranean states more of a reality.

Forms of non-military cooperation in the Mediterranean and North Africa have traditionally been classical and conventional, that is, they are based on somebody in the North contributing something to the South. The time has come for the post-colonial era to end and an era of partnership and symbiosis to begin through equal dialogue on non-military confidence-building measures. I maintain that the environment, our shared resource, has the greatest potential in providing a route towards securing the confidence needed for an enduring pan-Mediterranean peace.

-Ends-



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