


**CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IN THE MIDDLE EAST**  
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)  
Antalya (Turkey), 14-19/XI/1994

- a. Agenda
- b. List of participants
- c. Addresses for participants
- 1. "Threat perceptions from the Maghreb point of view"/ Assia Bensalah Alaoui
- 2. "The Arab threat: the Israeli perspective"/ Shmuel Limone
- 3. "From geo-politics to geo-economics: Egyptian national security perceptions"/ Abdel Monem Said Aly
- 4. "Palestinian threat perceptions"/ Yezid Sayigh
- 5. "Overcoming prejudice: a threat perception from a Syrian perspective"/ Abdulhay Sayed
- 6. "Security and threat perception in Saudi Arabia"/ Saleh Al-Mani
- 7. "CSBMs in the Middle East: significant treaties and agreements"/ Christian Glatzl
- 8. "Peace negotiations, a NWFZ in the Middle East, and NPT"/ Shalheveth Freier
- 9. "The geographical Middle East concept" (draft chapter 4) / UNIDIR
- 10. "A Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction" (draft chapter 5) / UNIDIR
- 11. "Report of the Fourth and Fifth Meetings of the UN/OAU Group of Experts to prepare a draft Treaty on an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone"



UNIDIR PROJECT  
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IN THE MIDDLE EAST

*Agenda*

SUNDAY, 13 NOVEMBER 1994    Arrival Participants

21:00                                  Dinner at the Hotel

MONDAY, 14 NOVEMBER 1994

9h30-10h15                          Presentation of paper from the Maghreb, by Assia Alaoui. ✕

10h15-10h45                        *Discussion*

10h45-11h00                        *Coffee break*

11h00-11h45                        Presentation of paper from Israel, by Shmuel Limone ✕

11h45-12h30                        *Discussion*

12h30-14h30                        Lunch at the Hotel

14h30-15h15                        Presentation of paper from Egypt, by Abdel Monem Said Aly ✕

15h15-15h45                        *Discussion*

15h45-16h00                        *Coffee break*

16h00-16h45                        Presentation of paper from the West Bank, by Yezid Sayigh (✕)  
(Not present at this meeting)

16h45-17h15                        *Discussion*

17h15-18h00                        Presentation of paper from Jordan, by Abdullah Toukan (✕)

18h00-18h30                        *Discussion*

20h00                                  Dinner

TUESDAY, 15 NOVEMBER 1994

9h30-10h15                        Presentation of paper from Syria, by Abdulhay Sayed ✕

10h15-10h45                        *Discussion*

10h45-11h00                        *Coffee break*

11h00-11h45                        Presentation of paper from Saudi Arabia, by Saleh Al-Mani (✕)

11h45-12h30                        *Discussion*

12h30-15h00                        Lunch at the Hotel

**TUESDAY, 15 NOVEMBER 1994**

- 15h00-15h45                      Presentation of paper from Iran, by Sohrab Shahabi
- 15h45-16h15                      *Discussion*
- 16h15-16h30                      *Coffee break*
- 16h30-18h00                      (a) General discussion of "Threat Perceptions" in the Middle East  
   (b) Revision and publication of the papers.

**WEDNESDAY, 16 NOVEMBER 1994**

- Free time - cultural excursion ?*
- 20h00                                Arrival of participants for the large meeting
- 21h00                                Dinner at the Hotel

**THURSDAY, 17 NOVEMBER 1994**

- 9h30-11h00                      Report of the small meeting on "Threat Perceptions", by Jim Leonard
- 11h00-11h30                      *Coffee break*
- 11h30-12h45                      *Discussion*
- 12h45-14h30                      Lunch at the Hotel
- 14h30-16h00                      Report from the latest ACRS meetings:
1. Basic commandments, by Suha Umar;  
   2. Scope of CSBMs, by Suha Umar;
- 16h00-16h30                      *Coffee break*
- 16h30-18h00                      Report from the latest ACRS meetings contd.
3. Sequences, by Jim Leonard & Sverre Lodgaard.
- Discussion*

**FRIDAY, 18 NOVEMBER 1994**

- 9h30-10h30                      Chapter 2. - Relevant international law in force in the area, by Christian Glatzi
- 10h30-11h00                      *Coffee break*
- 11h00-12h45                      *Discussion* ← STATES, NATIONS, SOCIETIES  
   AND SECURITY IN THE M.E.  
   (by Laura GUZZONE)
- 12h45-14h30                      Lunch at the Hotel

14h30-15h30

Chapter 4. - Definition of the geographical domain of the Middle East for the purpose of the project, by Jim Leonard and Jan Prawitz

15h30-16h00

*Coffee break*

16h00-18h00

*Discussion*

**SATURDAY, 19 NOVEMBER 1994**

9h30-11h00

Chapter 5. - Removal of all weapons of mass destruction, by Jim Leonard and Jan Prawitz

11h00-11h30

*Coffee break*

11h30-12h45

*Discussion*

12h45-14h30

**Lunch at the Hotel**

14h30-15h30

Continuation of the project and possible adjustment of the project outline, by Sverre Lodgaard

15h30-16h00

*Coffee break*

16h00-18h00

Presentation contd. by Sverre Lodgaard  
Publication issues, by Sverre Lodgaard

\* \* \* \* \*

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## CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IN THE MIDDLE EAST

### UNIDIR Expert Group Meeting Antalya (Turkey), 14-19 November 1994

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Assia Bensalah Alaoui

## THREAT PERCEPTIONS FROM THE MAGHREB POINT OF VIEW\*

Defining threat perceptions from the Maghreb point of view is not an easy task. There is no regional structure that surveys the evolving security situation, while the emerging coordination in security matters remains extremely limited.

In the absence of official documents related to security and defense policies, and of national security debates, national perceptions, cannot themselves be systematically explored. The picture is further blurred by prevailing western analysis which tend to focus on radical Islam, demographic imbalance between north and south, risks of nuclear and ballistic missile poliferation in Libya and Algeria ... The appraisal of the region as a new "arc of crisis" in the South is presented itself as a "threat" to European security and to western values.

Despite some broad similarities, the nature of threats, risks, challenges to security varies considerably from Nouakchott to Tripoli. However, perceptions across the region are congruent with regard to the primacy of the domestic security concerns including their role as determinants of regional behaviours.

Could be perceived as well , some common concerns related to the future of North-South relations in the post-cold war era- This paper will outline briefly the regional trends before summarizing National perceptions.

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\*Draft.Not for quotation

## 1. Regional trends and common concerns.

With the end of the cold war, there is a growing tendency to see threats every-where. Apart from a few exceptions, risks would be a more appropriate term to qualify the challenges to the Maghreb security.

- After more than a quarter of a century of inter-states tension, security seems above all a matter of domestic stability.
- The new factors of instability seem political, economic and social rather than military.
- The growing strength of islamic opposition movements with an open crisis in Algeria and the growing pressure for democratization have brought internal challenges to the forefront. to whom?
- All the countries face demographic and economic problems of a long-term nature which have led to occasional violent consumers riots. One of the difficulties when defining threat perceptions is to determine what "threats" could reach the military level ?
- Tension between public and elite opinion with important implications for crisis behaviour is another feature of the region, which defeats the coherence of perceptions on the national level.
- Many of the "external" threats to the security of states in the region are actually based on the perceived vulnerability of regimes to externally inspired rebellion or turmoil. Art 15 of the Marrakech Treaty (February 1989) which founded the Maghreb Arab Union relates to this aspect.
- Terrorists attacks on internal security backed by another state have stopped to be unlikely since the summer 1994 ;

ex. Gulf  
war

(?)

- . Potential Moroccan or Tunisian clash with Algeria over attempts to export Islamic revolutions ;
- Leading flash points in the region are largely, but not exclusively South-South : Competition and territorial tensions and risks of conflict;
- . Between Algeria and Morocco mainly (including the Sahara issue) but also between Algeria and its other neighbours Tunisia and Libya ;
- . Libyan agressions against Tunisia ;
- . Mauritania - Senegal disputes ;
- . Spanish-Moroccan growing tension over the spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla...
- Less-likely, a post-cold war confrontation along North-South lines is however a source of concern in North African capitals and among elites.
- . The Mediterranean is perceived by North-Africans more as a barrier than a bridge.
- . The development of European defense identity and capability is viewed with some alarm .Its presumed orientation toward " out of area " risks seem specially directed to those emanating from the south .
- . The rise of xenophobic , anti-immigrant right in Europe and the debate over the " threat from the south " in moderate and security circles in the west, are matters of concerns and interrogations. Is a new post cold-war ideological confrontation daveloping between North and South and particularly between the west and Islam ? Is the crisis evolving inter-alia along muslim-christian lines ?

. There is a growing fear of deterioration of relations between the European Union and North - Africa. The Maghreb's overwhelming dependency on Europe is perceived as a source of vulnerability. Competing aid and investment priorities in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union coupled with the prospect for the E-U's enlargement to the Visegrad group marginalize the Maghreb. The outlook for development and stability is worsened by fears for future trading-status of the Maghreb countries (Morocco and Tunisia).

. The closing of the migration safety-valve, at a time when Maghrebi economies are facing uncertainties is another source of concern at the Government and popular level. Equally salient is the deteriorating situation of the Maghrebi Community in Europe .

## 2. "National " perceptions

Libya and Mauritania are actors on the periphery of the Maghrebi security environment, whereas Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia are at the core .

**Libya :** The closed and highly unpredictable character of Libyan regime makes analysis of the Libyan domestic scene the deserved field of specialists .

- The main threats identified by Colonel Qaddafi are external with clearly defined enemies .

. The USA is viewed as : the principal responsible of Libyan People mishaps , past aggressions notably the air-bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi -"El Dorado Canyon" operation, 14-15 April 1986 ; UN sanctions against Libya ; Potential preemptive attacks to prevent chemical and ballistic weapons capability.

- . Israel : a long standing threat to the whole Arab nation and to Moslems Libya has condemned the peace-treaties.
- . Europe and the West as a whole threaten Moslem values .
- The threat posed by Chad seems to be disappearing after the settlement of the dispute .
- Domestic concerns are not absent.
- . A potential military coup against President Qaddafi (an attempt conducted by young officers failed in October 1993 ) .
- . Despite the massive killing, in 1989, of Islamic apponents, the Islamic opposition is still perceived as a credible threat to Qaddafi's regime. The recent move towards more "islamic law" is meant to defeat the influence of such movements .
- There is a growing concern among the population about economic problems which are perceived as the result of the UN sanctions The high rate of inflation has eroded the purchase - power.
- The "threat" of an oil embargo (which would serverly hurt libyans' daily life) is taken seriously. Libya is a single export-dependent (Oil accounts for 98% of its total exports ) .

Mauritania's concerns about its own security stem from its very weaknes and vulnerability : A large desertic territory for 2,5 million inhabitants with scarce natural resources ( fishery and iron -ore ) and severe financial crisis .

The country's fears seem to have shifted recently from external " traditional " threats posed by Morocco , Algeria and Senegal to domestic risks .

- For the ruling President the prospect of a military coup ( a tradition in Mauritanian Politics ) is rather weak, since he has tightened his control over the army .



- Much more threatening for the Mauritanian regime is the rise of Islamic opposition, (60 Islamists have been sentenced to prison on September 1994) the persistence of ethnic divisions on a background of economic deterioration , imposed austerity and pressures for " more " democracy . Popular discontent has often been expressed in " food riots " and street unrest .

- Linked to the European Union by the Lome-Convention, and by a fishery-agreement, Mauritania's relations with Europe seem more " secure ". However the state's incapacity to control the adequate implementation of the latter is a source of concern for the future of the fishery resources .

Threat perceptions in Morocco have long been and still are largely shaped up by the central issue of territorial integrity : Frontier problems, western Sahara question and to a lesser degree the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Mellila. Domestic security is perceived to be further challenged by new risks.

- For both Moroccan officials and public opinion, Algeria remains, the source of the main threats to Moroccan security. Open conflicts , since the direct clash in 1963 with Algeria have been avoided thanks to the prevailing Moroccan strategy of "controlled Nationalism".

Despite the resuming of diplomatic relations in 1988 and the formation up of the Arab Maghreb Union (1989), Algeria is still perceived as the main obstacle to the settlement of the Sahara question. Its diplomatic hostility and its active and lasting support to a declining Polisario (as a political and military force) give credit to that perception.

. Since the assassination of President Boudiaf, Moroccans view the overt intervention of the military in Algerian Politics as a dismal development. After a terrorist attack, which killed last August 2 Spanish tourists in a hotel in Marrakech, the Algerian military security, has been expressly mentioned by Moroccan officials as the support of direct terrorist attacks planned to destabilize the country. Morocco fears, as well, the ripple effect of an Islamic regime in Algeria with internationalist objectives. This scenario is a leading concern in Tunisia.

. If Algeria's option of developing nuclear weapon capability is not explicitly criticised in Rabat -perhaps because it is part of broader arab aspirations- ballistic missile proliferation has attracted more attention in Moroccan military circles.

. There is a growing concern in Moroccan political and economic circles over Spanish attitudes towards Morocco.

. The presence of Spain in Ceuta and Melilla is perceived as a threat to Moroccan sovereignty and to the economic and social development of that whole region where black-market and drug-traffic thrive.

. Spanish fishermen, known to be hard-liners, destroy Moroccan fishery stocks through excessive exploitation which is hard to control by the Moroccan Navy.

. Spain appears, as well, as the main check to reach a more balanced comprehensive agreement between Morocco and the European-Union.

. Given its overwhelming dependency on the E.U. -60% of its foreign trade-Morocco fears for its future trading status in particular and for its global relations with the E.U. Much is much expected from this cooperation.

. Related to our subject, is the prospect of effective partnership, <sup>with Spain (200)</sup> through an ambitious project for the North (2 billions Ecu), to defeat drug-traffic and its far reaching implications including security ones . The deployment of heavy troops in that region indicates that this threat is taken seriously .

- The economic and social front is the cause of growing concerns.

The considerable improvement of Moroccan economy through the last decade is marred by the deteriorating social landscape and living standards. Economic and social frustrations have largely determined violent consumer riots in the past. They might as well in the future offer a touchstone for militant islam.

- Radical Islam does not represent a potent challenge in Morocco. It remains for many reasons a latent political force. The King's strong religious legitimacy, together with the careful attention paid in the Kingdom to that field rank first among these. The effectiveness of the Moroccan security apparatus in controlling islamist groups activities is fostered by the inability of disparate factions to form a united front .

From International activism, Algeria has turned inward to restore internal security and domestic stability highly endangered by the islamic "threat" and the deepening economic and social crisis combined Closely related to these concerns , the external challenges rank from defeating foreign backing for Islamics movements to raising adequate international support to curb the economic crisis.

- The interruption of the election process, after the stunning victory of the FIS at the first round in December 1991, has driven the FIS underground and strengthened the hand of its more radical factions. The vicious circle terrorism/repression has led to an escalation of violence which killed 20.000 people and which puts the country on the verge of civil war .

- Concerns are high for the army's own cohesion , since it has stepped in to lead the severe repression against the Islamists (september 1992) and mainly since it has moved to the political front-line (january 1994).

- The failure of the dialogue for power sharing between the army and the moderate elements of the FIS worsens the prospect for a population trapped between two kinds of "terrors".

- Nor is individual and (family security) the only concern of Algerians. Rapid population growth coupled with economic deterioration and financial crisis mean a daily struggle for a decent life.

- With the decline of the exported-oil single income , the gloomy outlook for foreign investment and slow results even for the most well managed strategy of economic reforms , Algerians fear the worst for the future. The food riots in october 1988 had actually launched the turmoil in Algeria .

- Looming on the future of Algeria as well, is the foreseeable exodus of westernized middle class, professional and skilled workers in the event of Islamic rule. Restrictions of legal migration in Europe-albeit a cause of concern at both government and popular level-might however check this potential move.

- Neither seems the unity of the Algerian Nation free from threats.

. The Berber Kabyl "separatist" movement pose a serious cultural challenge. A general three days strike is planned for mid November.

. On a secondary level, increasing pattern of unrest among Tuareg tribesmen minority in the far south is perceived to be encouraged by Libya's activism. The vast territory where The Tuareg nomades move seems hard to control by the limited ability of the military. To face this additional issue of concern, the military forces are interested in acquiring modern photographic and electronic intelligence equipment to maintain the order in the South and more important to monitor Moroccan activity along the border in the West.

. Perceived as the traditional rival for regional leadership, Morocco is under close watch in Algeriers.

. The Algerian are likely to seek more advanced aircraft (eg Mig 29 s) as a counter to the Moroccan purchase of F. 16s. This is only one exemple of the competition between the two neighbours "adversaries".

✓ . Algeria which suspects Morocco to be a potential conduit for arms for islamists closed its frontiers after the establishment, last summer, by Morocco of visa entrance for Algerians.

. Algeria fears as well external support for the Islamist movements presumably backed financially by Saudi Arabia and by Iran and Sudan for the logistics.

. In the absence of a superpower patron, a minimum nuclear and ballistic missile capability together with a more potent submarine force are perceived as a useful deterrent. Beyond the substantial boost to Algeria's strategic weight and regional influence, analysts point to Israel's arsenals as a justification

traditional  
Moroccan  
thinking  
about  
Morocco

for this stance.

Tunisia faces an active internal security problem which absorbs most of the country's limited security resources. Domestic stability is further challenged by external risks. No wonder in that context to see Tunisia maintain close relations with its leading security guarantors <sup>F US ?</sup> in the West, and try to foster tighter economic links with the E.U.

- Tunisia went through a period of turmoil, where militant Islam posed the main threat to the regime of President Ben Ali. Contrary to the initial Algerian strategy, Tunisia has chosen not to grant the Islamist movement -Ennahda led by Rachid Ghannouchi- the status of a political party. The vicious circle terrorism/repression was ultimately closed by the trial, in August 1992, of nearly 300 Islamists where 250 were sentenced to prison and 50 for life.

- <sup>but</sup> Tunisia remains highly concerned by the activities of the Ennahda abroad and by the role of Iran and Sudan in providing financial and material support for Islamic militants.

- Tunisia is convinced that the most effective answer to the Islamists' influence -which is fueled by economic and social problems- is the acceleration of economic development.

. If economic growth has scored over 8% of the GDP for three successive years, the tunisian export-driven economy remains vulnerable. Unemployment is high (16% of active population) and specially among the young and politically aware Tunisians.

- Just as Morocco, Tunisia fears for its future trading status with the E.U and is concerned by the loss of a safety valve due to restrictions on legal migration.

- There is as well some concern in Tunisia as elsewhere in the

Maghreb, about the tension between the elite's moderate , western orientation and public perceptions . The challenge to accomodate volatile public Opinion and pursue closer economic and strategic ties with the West was dramatically expressed during the Gulf-War.

- Tunisia is concerned by a potential heightened tension between North and South in the Mediterranean .

- Algeria and Libya are the leading sources of external risks as seen by the Tunisian foreign and security policy elite. And so was Israel to until recently.

These sources of risk have both an internal and an external dimension.

- The Treaty of friendship and Cooperation signed between Algeria and Tunisia's in 1983 settled the frontiers disputes and made of Algeria a possible guarantor of Tunisia security in the event of a Libyan attack. However, to the previous uneasiness about the intentions of powerful and Hegemonic Algeria has succeeded in Tunis a serious concern about the new instability and open crisis in the neighbouring Country .

- Beyond the present encouragement of Islamic activists in Tunisia, the advent of an Islamic regime in Algeria would pose the threat of an "Islamic axis" from Sudan to Algeria .

- Libya whose unpredictable behaviour and violent rhetoric has often been sources of embarassment for Maghrebi leaders, has been by far the leading source of external risks for Tunisia. A number of incidents has served to keep the Libyan threat at the forefront of Libyan concerns . The attack on Gafsa in 1980 by dissident Tunisians armed and trained by Libya ;

- Tunisian workers expulsions from Libya in 1985 and 1992 along

with concentration of troops across the border ;

. The dispute over the continental-shelf ...

. The chemical , nuclear and ballistic missile programs under way in Algeria and Libya have emerged as a concern in political and military circles . In that respect, Tunisians seem to have a mixture of worries. They fear that the West would be deterred from intervening against a potential attack on Tunisia. They fear also U.S preemptive attacks to defeat the deployment of mass destruction Weapons . They share the arab concern over the "double standard" approach of the West in these matters , which condemn technological progress in the Arab World while ignoring long-standing Israeli programs .

. The Israeli air attack on the PLO's headquarters at Hammam-lif (october 1 ,1985) which killed 20 Tunisians , and the assassination of PLO's number 2 in 1986 had provoked an intense emotion .The middle East settlement and the departure of PLO Headquarters and Charmain from Tunis has certainly eased the perception of security in Tunis .

The Maghreb countries have welcomed the peace process in the Middle-East in which some of them have played and still play a very active role as has shown the first Economic Summit on the Middle East and North-Africa -Casablanca 30 October/November-. The Maghrebi public opinion remains however highly concerned by the condition of the palestinians and by the achievement of a fair and comprehensive peace in the Middle-East.



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THE ARAB THREAT: THE ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE

by: Shmuel Limone

1. The environment of conflict in which Israel finds itself has unique characteristics. Throughout most of its history as an independent nation, Israel has confronted and dealt with a heavily armed Arab world, professing various degrees of hostility toward it. The agreements with Egypt, the Palestinians and Jordan and the current peace agenda with other Arab parties - have not convinced all Arab and moslem countries to recognize the right of a Jewish state to exist in their midst.
2. This unique international phenomenon - the existence of a small nation within a very large collective of hostile states - has long determined the nature of the confrontation and the psychological state of mind in which Israelis live. The Jewish people's long and bitter history of persecution, coupled with the memory and residue of the collective Arab opposition to the creation of the State of Israel, has imbued many Israelis with apprehension and a nagging sense of mistrust toward their Arab surrounding. Indeed, to many Israelis, what still affects their sense of security is an awareness that at stake is not only Israel's territorial integrity or political welfare, but its very legitimacy as a Jewish state.
3. The following presentation will deal with the parameters of threat that make up Israel's security concerns. Still, it should be emphasized that the present political process, reflecting, as it were, a widespread recognition among important Arab states of the futility of the use of force as a means to advance political goals, has blunted the immediacy and weight of these concerns. Although the current political process so far produced tangible progress, mainly in the Palestinian and Jordanian tracks, it nevertheless signaled a breakthrough in other Arab countries' attitudes toward Israel. It also stabilized the conflict, and served as a vital learning experience for all. Therefore, in a

broader historic context, Israel acknowledges the positive changes that have now been taking place in some key aspects of its "traditional" threats. Consequently, it is now willing to assume greater risks in order to achieve peace with its neighbours.

4. The strategic setting, or, more adequately, the general environment of threat in which Israel exists and operates, reflects some basic asymmetries that exist between Arabs and Israel. Most of these factors must be presumed to remain permanent features of the overall Arab-Israeli balance of power:-
  - a. First, Arab states completely surround Israel except for the sea. Their vast territories provide militarily important strategic hinterland. Israel is small, of not tiny, in size and is lacking in natural resources, including water. It possesses absolutely no strategic hinterland.
  - b. Second, Israel is dependent on outside sources of energy, and on sea and air lines of communication.
  - c. Third, The Arab world as a whole possesses great potential of oil and hence, of assured financial resources. Israel has yet to discover a viable oil field.
  - d. Fourth, the density of its population and industrial centers makes Israel vulnerable to attacks. Israel is extremely sensitive to casualties among its general population and its citizen-soldiers, a point well-understood and taken into account by those who wish to harm it.
  - e. Fifth, Israel is not capable of sustaining a long, drawn-out war because of such constraints as levels of inventory, time and space, and political constraints. The Israeli army relies mainly on reserve force whose mobilization and deployment consume critical time. In the past, this built-in asymmetry increased the temptation and odds to rely on surprise or to resort to a war of attrition in order to maximize the Arab advantage.

- f. Sixth, Israel is clearly outnumbered, and maintaining a military balance strains its economy and its available manpower pool. The Arab vast, absolute superiority in numbers entails a clear advantage in potential capabilities. True, modernization of Arab societies proceeds at a slow pace. Yet, a concerted effort, focused on selected areas can add - indeed, has added - an ominous dimension to some of their military capabilities.
  - g. Seventh, many Arab, and in a wider sense, Moslem countries, have been able to enlist religious considerations and arguments in their effort to isolate Israel. The rise and spread of Islamic fundamentalism, with its virulent anti Israeli ideology, exacerbated the religious dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It also created a new, indirect threat to Israel, in the form of radical Islamic subversion against regimes and other political factors seeking accommodation with it. In the long run, this phenomenon may pose the most severe threat to Israel and to the general cause of peace in the Middle-East.
  - h. Eighth, while many Arab and Moslem countries are subject to autocratic regimes (monarchic, dictatorial or fundamentalist), Israel is an open democracy, easily observed and watched from the outside. This asymmetry too enhances its sense of vulnerability.
5. Coming to grip with Israel's approach to its mideastern environment must, first and foremost, take note of the essence of its experience with the Arab countries that encircle it. For years Israel and the Arab states have been locked in a situation of ongoing conflict. The radical Arab states and movements, have seen and declared themselves as being in a state of war with Israel. To them, and in particular to those Arab movements and Iran which actively oppose any conciliation with Israel, a decision to move into actual warfare needs not be predicated on any specific grievance or dispute with Israel. In their view, the very establishment of Israel was in itself an act of aggression and hence the use of force against her - a legitimate course of action to ensure Moslem

rights. In the more extremist version of this ideology, that option has remained the only course of action. The upshot of all this was that the threats of war and violence have for years remained a permanent given in Israel and Israelis' mode of life.

6. That line of thinking underwent significant changes but was not entirely renounced by all in the Arab and in the Moslem world. It did produce an important bonus from Israel's perspective. The majority of Israelis do not anymore view war as an almost inevitable result of their existence in the Middle-East. Still, it is instructive to note that the prevailing consensus in Israel attributes Arab acceptance of Israel's existence as an independent, non-Arab state in the area, as an expression of realpolitik; that is to say - as an admission of Israel's strength, vitality and determination, not as an acknowledgement of a moralistic imperative.
7. Even so, that change in perceptions has not swept all segments of the Israeli society. Even those who attribute greater faith to Arabs' intentions, reserve their judgement on the irreversibility of the Arab change toward Israel. They, too, predicate their belief in <sup>the</sup> reality of the Arab change on a psychological and political need for reassurance. They too seek more concrete evidence to convince them that Arab intentions reflect more than just transient or utilitarian considerations.
8. Following is a summation of threats which, even if not imminent, are perceived in Israel as real. As such, they are reflected in Israel's defense policy and its force structure:
  - a. Existential threats: Weapons of mass destruction threaten the very existence of the state and its people, especially in view of the territorial and demographic asymmetries mentioned before. To Israelis that has meant that Israel cannot afford to lose a single major war. It also prescribed the employment of offensive tactics to preempt perceived imminent attacks.
  - b. Attritional threats: The same asymmetries do not allow engagement in a drawn-out conflict or a lengthy war of attrition. Israel must possess the capacity for an early decision.

- c. Strategic surprise: The need for mobilization makes Israel vulnerable to a surprise attack. Thus early warning and strategic intelligence are vitally important.
  - d. Threats against population centers: A few major cities comprise a significant share of the population, making missiles and other anti-population weapons an intolerable threat. Here too, the prime emphasis must be put on deterrence.
  - e. War on several fronts: Threatened by more than one state, Israel must consequently maintain a balance of power with a coalition of adversaries and not just with any one of its members.
  - f. Terrorism: Beside high-intensity warfare, Israel has had to contend with almost uninterrupted attempts to disrupt the life of its population, undermines its resolve and hurts its economy - all through the use of terror. Terrorism has assumed many forms: aggressive infiltration, sporadic shelling across the border; hostage taking, indiscriminate sabotage, hijacking, and other kinds of small-scale warfare. In the past, certain groups considered terror as the only mechanism with which to trigger a desirable chain reaction of blows and counter blows that would precipitate an all out military confrontation with Israel. That sort of rationale no longer holds true today. Still, in view of the prevailing division in the Israeli society, and the public mood in the country, the use of terror tactics does carry with it strategic implications. It adversely affects not only the government's political flexibility, but its very ability to conduct negotiations in a pressing atmosphere of violence and personal insecurity. At any rate, while Israel sees itself responsible for combatting internally generated terrorism, it has consistently held other countries responsible for activities based or planned in their territory.
9. Missing from this list of threats are two additional parameters: the economic and the political threats. Both have not entirely disappeared: officially, Arab economic boycott against Israel still remains on the books. Also, traditional anti Israeli suggestions are still routinely

circulated in international organs. Still, both kinds of threat have lost much of their vigor and efficacy. The secondary economic boycott has been renounced by important Arab countries and there is a lessening in the almost automatic resort to anti-Israeli rhetoric even in international fora.

10. To sum up: the current efforts to achieve peaceful settlements between Israel and its surrounding Arab states carry a potential for movement and change. Should they succeed, they stand to produce a far reaching, positive transformation in the political-military climate and relations in the Middle-East, and consequently in the external threat perceptions within Israel. Strategic peace dividends such as stability, predictability and shared interests may not be such far-fetched ideas in this possibly new evolving reality. Still, even such conditions will need a relatively protracted period of testing and adjustment, and will not necessarily eliminate other, even existential threats to Israel. In a paradoxical way, positive developments may even induce fundamentalists to multiply their attempts to subvert the trend for conciliation between Arabs and Israelis. Extreme Islam will therefore continue to play a crucial and from Israel's point of view, extremely dangerous, role in the political environment that will affect Israel's security in years to come. We speak not only of direct threats of terrorism against Israelis and Jews, but also of indirect threats, in the form of threats against Arab regimes which opted to resolve their differences with Israel through a diplomatic dialogue.
11. To conclude: in the long run, even in a positive negotiating climate, grave risks to Israel's security will not disappear. Even in a state of peace - as long as Arab countries maintain military strengths, in the absence of mutual arms control agreements, and as long as there remain Moslem regimes still loath of Israel's very existence - such risks will continue to persist.

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FROM GEO-POLITICS TO GEO-ECONOMICS  
EGYPTIAN NATIONAL SECURITY PERCEPTIONS  
BY  
ABDEL MONEM SAID ALY

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## I. INTRODUCTION

The major thesis of this paper is that Egyptian national security perceptions are witnessing a major transformation since mid-1970s from geo- political concerns to geo-economic ones .Geo-politics here is understood as the traditional national security threats that emanate from geography as well as history of the nation state .The survival of the nation and protecting its territorial integrity are the main objectives of national security policy .Power politics and the balance of power are the means to achieve these objectives .Geo-economics, on the other hand,is much more complex concept . The survival of the state and safeguarding its territorial integrity are not the subject of external threats but rather its economic well being, its social cohesion and ability to withstand economic competition .Raising productivity , economic reform ,integration into regional and international markets , and protecting sources of income are the means to protect national security in geo- economic terms.

This paper is going to present the argument that Egyptian national security perceptions are undergoing a fundamental change from the traditional geo- political national security perspective to the more complicated geo-economic perspective . However , this argument does not include that geo-political concerns have disappeared from the Egyptian national security calculations. More likely than not some of them will continue to influence Egyptian policy for some time to come.

## II.GEO-POLITICS : THE PAST

Geography as well as history has defined -to a large extent- the national security problems of Egypt .Situated at the south-east corner of

the Mediterranean Sea, at the crossroads of the three continents of the old world, and at the end point of the River Nile's long journey from the heart of Africa, Egyptian security has become sensitive to the moves and capabilities of external powers.

On the other hand, one of the main features of the Egyptian history is the unbroken unity of the country. Egypt has known the phenomenon of statehood for about six millenia. The independence of the Egyptian polity, however, has been a different story. Ever since the Persian conquest in 525 BC, foreign domination has been a marked feature of Egyptian history. In modern times, Egypt's evolution as a nation has occurred under the shadow of conflict with external powers. Both geography and history, then, have defined the "constants" of the Egyptian perception of national security.

First, contrary to most Third World countries, Egyptian autonomy and statehood- more or less within its present boundaries- have created a perception of minimum security needs in the face of external threats the country has to deal with. These perceptions were further enhanced by the nation-state building process which commenced in 1805, and the creation of the first Egyptian "national army".

Second, a long history of foreign domination has defined the "fronts" which the Egyptians have had to defend: from the north, over the Mediterranean, came the Macedonians, Romans, Crusaders, and later the French and British colonizing forces; from the north-east, over the African-Asian land bridge, the Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Byzantines, Arabs, Turks and finally Israelis, marched towards the Nile Valley. This legacy moulded the fears of the Egyptian polity.

In contemporary terms, the threats to Egyptian national security have been defined in terms of the fear of Western domination. The Egyptian struggle against British colonialism and US hegemony, operating under the guise of the Baghdad Pact or the Eisenhower Doctrine, were long the main features of Egyptian security policy. Even more important, the creation, with Western support, of the state of Israel in 1948 constituted a major security threat to Egypt. Egypt fought Israel in 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973. The facts that Israel had been created on the basis of a biblical notion of history, had a significant influence over Western policies, and until very recently had no defined borders had increased the Egyptian sense of insecurity.

Third, since Egypt's very existence depends on the water of the Nile,

the first consideration for any Egyptian government is guaranteeing that these waters are not threatened. As J. Waterbury stated "No other major river valley is shared by so many autonomous actors and no other downstream state utterly dependent for its livelihood as Egypt is upon its river". This means that ensuring that no hostile power is allowed to control the headwaters of the Nile or tamper with its flow into Egypt. However, owing to a combination of the political conditions and technological limitations in central and east Africa, for long time, fortunately, this threat did not materialize.

## II.GEO-POLITICS : THE PRESENT

The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979, and the current peace process in the Middle East that produced the Palestinian-Israeli and the Jordanian-Israeli agreements in 1993 and 1994 has reduced considerably the Israeli security threat to Egypt. The peace treaty did not only defined the Egyptian-Israeli borders, reduced the possibility of an Israeli surprise attack, but also made Egypt close to the US which has become the guarantor of a peaceful and secure Egyptian-Israeli relations. However, the peace treaty did not end the Egyptian fears regarding Israel. These fears are based on political as well as military reasons.

Politically, Israel continues to have a fanatic and fundamentalist right wing that has the support of about one third of Israeli public. This right wing looks at the Israeli position in the Middle East not only in biblical terms, but also emphasis fears and suspicions concerning Egyptian and Arab positions towards Israel. Military superiority and the use of the armed forces are its first tools to achieve Israel's political objectives. Since the peace treaty has imposed various military constraints on the Sinai Peninsula, the security of Sinai has become hostage to any Israeli change of mind.

More important, militarily, Israel has secured to itself a position of superiority in conventional and non-conventional weapons. Israel, with American support, has emphasised the need for its qualitative superiority not only against Egypt but also against the entire Arab World. Israel has been capable of producing a wide range of advanced weapon systems in addition to importing highly sophisticated ones. In fact, several tactics and technologies that have evolved from the US-Israeli defence relations are now used by the US and other Western armies. For example, today's US use of electronic warfare during preemptive assaults has several roots in

Israeli tactics of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Certainly this type of two-way street Israeli-US technological defence cooperation is completely different from that of the US-Egyptian relations. While the US has been able to obtain combat proven data and innovative technologies from Israel for development of US military items, Israel has received enough equipments, money, know-how to develop its own advanced fighter LAVI( the project was cancelled in an advanced stage ), its own modern MBT tank the MERKAVA, and a host of advanced missiles, to include the Jericho strategic missile, the BARAK anti-missile missile, and the upcoming ARROW ABM system.

Beside technological cooperation, Israel has succeeded to get all the key assets in the US conventional arsenal. Currently Israel's air assets include the F-16, the F-15 EAGLE, the F-4 PHANTOM II, the E-2c HAWKEYE, the C-130 HERCULES, the Boeing 707, the AH-1 and the COBRA HELICOPTERS and AH-64 APACHES and 20 BLACKHAWKS. It is likely that Israel chose to consider adding the F/A-18 to its multi-role inventory because of an expansion in tactical requirements. According to Israeli air force planners Israel might be called in the future to deploy multi role aircraft against targets demanding deeper penetration and higher altitudes, which the F/A-18 is uniquely suited. Also a clear preference was expressed by the Israeli fighter pilots to replace their McDonnell-Douglas F-15 EAGLES with the new Lockheed F-22 Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF). However, it seems that the Israeli government will not be able to afford the cost of the \$100 million F-22, unless the United States drastically boosts its military aid to Israel.

At Present, Israel is planning to deploy around five PATRIOT batteries before the middle of the 1990s. The ARROW missile system would, by the year 2000, provide Israel with roughly three times the ABM range, and a higher altitude, than that provided by the PATRIOT. The ARROW experiments conducted by US and Israeli technicians will contribute in the future to establish the larger ABM technology base necessary for future building of regional and theatre ABM networks.

The US air-to-ground AGM-144 HAVE NAP missile is essentially the Israeli POPEYE missile for which the US offered around \$33.6 millions for 32 systems. Israel has gained reputation in developing and producing the UAV (unmanned Aerial Vehicles), and has already contracts with the USN, USMC, US army to provide them with several systems.

Israel is now developing and producing the POPEYE (stand-off precision guided air-to-ground) missiles, the PYTHON III (short range air-to-air) missiles. BARAK (anti-sea skimmers) and ADAMS point defence missile interceptors, also a wide range of advanced electronic warfare

systems, reactive armour suits for armour (BLAZER). Israel is listed among a few number of countries producing a first line quality tank. MERKAVA which was developed to ensure that Israel would have a tank available regardless of world politics.

The current growth of the Israeli naval power is tending to deploy more capable upper class missile FACs, high performance submarines, and sea based long range ballistic and cruise missiles supported by a satellite surveillance network. Israel has increased its ship point defence capabilities against aircraft and missile attacks including sea skimmers by using the BARAK missile system. The unmanned helicopter HELLSTAR developed by IAI will soon be delivered to the Israeli navy, thus making Israel the first country to be operating such type of vehicles.

An Israeli naval expansion program calls recently for two attack submarines DOLPHIN-class and three SAAR 5 missile corvettes. The DOLPHIN submarines will clearly be far superior to what the Arab navies have today. These new built submarines are expected to carry long range missiles which means operationally the extension of the Israeli theatre of action and targeting capabilities.

In addition to the Israeli qualitative edge in conventional weapons over its adversaries, Israel has developed two areas of absolute superiority. First, during the 1980s, Israel has introduced the space arms race into the Middle East. The launching of the Israeli satellite 'Ofeq-1" on September 19, 1988 and "Ofeq-2" on April 2, 1990, started a new era in the technological race in the Middle East. At least in the Egyptian perception, Israel is developing its space assets to enhance the use of its conventional and unconventional machine through spying, jamming, reconnaissance, command, control, and battle management. . There is no Egyptian nor Arab program comparable to the Israeli one in space.

Second, if the conventional race covers most of the Middle East, the nuclear race is almost entirely one-sided. Most experts on the subject agree that Israel possesses not only a nuclear capability but nuclear warheads , and their delivery systems. With Iraq's nuclear program destroyed during and after the Gulf War, the Arab world has virtually no nuclear capability. In spite of all the predictions made in the 1970s that Libya and Iran would have a nuclear bomb by 1985 and Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, and Syria by 1990, and in spite of the prediction that Egypt, Iraq, and Libya would be small nuclear powers before the end of the twentieth century, the reality has proved to be quite different. With the exception of small research reactors in Libya, Egypt and Iraq, the Arab world has no nuclear capability.

If the Israeli arm racing continues to discomfort the stability caused

by the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in the Egyptian north-eastern front, the multilateral negotiations on regional security and arms control in the Middle East is expected, even over an extended period of time, to reduce the Egyptian fears of the military imbalance with Israel. In the southern front, however, there are more than one reason for an increasing sense of insecurity. During the past two decades, the internal instability of the Nile basin states-particularly Ethiopia and Sudan- and the regional rivalries among them have made the the threat to Egyptian security feasible. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Sudan has touched not only the territorial integrity of Egypt but also touched its internal stability. The Islamic government of Sudan has persistently questioned Egyptian sovereignty over the Hallaib strip in the south-east corner of Egypt, and offered assistance and sometimes declared support to Islamic radicals in Egypt. This reality, compounded by the sharp decline in the water level of the Nile throughout the 1980s as a result of climatic and economic developments has also heightened the Egyptian perception of insecurity.

### III.GEO-ECONOMICS : THE GULF

In addition to these traditional geo- political " constants " of Egypt's national security concerns, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed the rise of a new security dimension for Egypt. The growing Egyptian-Gulf interdependence has made the stability of the Gulf region an Egyptian national security interest. The well known phenomenon of labour migration to the Arab oil-producing countries has provided extensive employment opportunities as well as capital to Egyptian government and individuals. According to conservative estimates for 1974 to 1984, 3.3 millions Egyptians migrated to work in the Arab oil-producing countries. They transferred to Egypt \$33 billion in cash transfers, deposits in banking, goods and commodities almost three times the American economic aid to Egypt over the same period. The following years show that remittances seem to continue the same average. In 1985/86, they were \$3063, \$3012 for 1986/87, \$3387 for 1987/88, \$ 3522 for 1988/1989, \$3743 for 1989/1990, \$ 3775 for 1990/1991. The total for 1974-1993 reached \$72 billion.

Remittances are not the only source of income transferred to Egypt from its Arab-Gulf connection. In 1982, 613000 Arab tourists visited Egypt or about 43.41% of the total number of tourists. By 1992, Arab tourists were almost doubled to 1.1 million or about 34% of the total. The Arab share of Egyptian tourism is significant not only because of the number of tourists but also because they tend to stay longer and spend

more than European and American tourists. Suez-Canal rising revenues during the past two decades was largely due to the growth in the Arab-Gulf economics. Arab journalism, broadcasting, and television were dependent on Egyptians working in Egypt. Egyptian private sector hospitals were preferred by the middle income groups in the Arab oil producing countries. Arab investments in Egypt continued to be the largest in any Arab country. In mid-1994 , Arab share , mostly from the Gulf, of total private investment in Egypt(EL 25145 million) was 20% and 49% of total foreign investment(EL 10373 million ).

This economic dimension of national security has become more evident as Egypt has faced a growing economic crisis. The security and stability of the Gulf region has become vital to the Egyptian national interest. The Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 and the Iran-Iraq war two years later threatened this interest. Throughout the 1980s Iran was considered the sole destabilizing state of the Gulf area, and hence, as a threat to Egyptian national security. Consequently, even under President Sadat, Egypt did not hesitate to stand behind Iraq in the conflict, both militarily and economically.

As a result of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 the scope of Egyptian security interests in the Gulf became much larger than simply attempting to curb Iran. During and after the Gulf crisis and war, Egypt played a leading important role in the process that led to the defeat of Iraq and the liberation of Kuwait. Egyptian denunciation of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was strong and immediate. Egypt orchestrated through an Arab Summit in Cairo on August 10, 1990, an Arab coalition to participate in the international force to liberate Kuwait. Egypt contributed to Operation Desert Storm the 4th Armoured Division, 3rd Mechanized Division, and 20th Special Forces Regiment (Totalled 35000), all of which played a key role in the attack into Kuwait. Further, Egypt contributed considerable intelligence and logistical support to the allied war efforts. Also, Cairo became a center for Kuwaiti exiles; with Egyptian government support, Kuwait television, radio, and print media continued to report from Cairo on the crisis to its citizens throughout the Middle East and Europe. The first and the second Gulf wars proved the influence of geo-economic considerations over the Egyptian security policy.

#### IV.GEO-ECONOMICS : ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

The coming to power of Ayatollah Ruhallah Khomini in Iran in February of 1979 , the seizure of the Grand Mosque-*AL-KABBA*-in Mecca in November of 1979 , the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan of the same year

and the subsequent " Islamic resistance " to it , as well as the assassination of the Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat in October 1981 have brought to world politics the phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism. By 1990s the phenomenon has become wide spread in most Islamic countries and even some of its impacts reached Europe and the United States.

Scholars of the Islamic phenomenon in Egypt and the rest of the Islamic world have identified several causes for the rise of fundamentalism particularly in its most radical manifestations .

**First** , the Islamic radicalism appears to be an Islamic response to the shock of Westernization and modernization . As Islamic countries were exposed to modern day material life , religious response came to offer a salvation and psychological balance . This appears to be the case where the modernization process accelerated in the past few decades . Iran is usually the case in the point . Similar features of this appear in Egypt , Tunisia , and Algeria . Contrary to these cases , where the state identified itself with Islam or the religious institutions , as the case in Saudi Arabia and Morocco , Islamic radicalism and violence were reduced to the minimum .

**Second** , socio-economic factors like unemployment , inflation and corruption are seen to be influential in intensifying religious feelings and tendencies toward extremism . As the masses find themselves confronted with increasing social disparities and economic hardship , they resort to Islam in different ways which include the possibility of the use of violence to correct social and economic imbalance . Evidence of this argument could be seen in Egypt , Pakistan , Algeria , Tunisia , and Sudan . Contrary to these cases , where economic development is taking leaps forward , such as in Indonesia and Malaysia , Islamic fundamentalism is considerably contained .

**Third** , Islamic fundamentalism is a response to a crisis of identity in Islamic countries . As state nationalism appears to be failing to meet the internal problems of development and the external threats , Islamic nationalism comes to the fore to rescue Muslims from both the failing national elites and foreign intruders . It has been argued repeatedly that the failure of Arab nationalism in combating Zionism in Palestine has been a major factor behind the rise of Islamic radicalism in the Arab world . The rise of the Islamic fundamentalist organization , HAMAS , in the occupied Palestinian territories was considered to be a response to the failure of the nationalist and the secularist PLO in achieving the Palestinian national goals . Apparently , the Israeli recognition of the PLO is an attempt to reverse this trend . In some cases Islam appears to be the



only identity that can meet the aspirations of peoples who have been deprived for too long from developing their national identities as the case with the ex- Soviet central Asian republics .

In Egypt, Islamic fundamentalism dates back to 1927 when the movement of Muslim Brotherhood was created. From the garb of Muslim Brotherhood came most of the Islamic movements of the present time . Although the Brotherhood went into significant changes towards moderation , more radical and violent groups sprang out to manifest a significant force in the politics of the Islamic world . In Egypt , the last two decades has witnessed the frequent and systematic use of terrorism by political groups in the name of Islam . The Islamic Liberation Party , The Society of Muslims , *Al-Takfir wa al-Higra* (Repentance and Migration) , *Al-Jihad* (The Holy War) , and *Al-Najon Min Al-Nar* ( Those Saved From Hell) , in addition to more than thirty other small groups , have carried out violent acts not only against politicians but also against the Egyptian society as a whole . They made a mark in Egyptian history through events such as the Military Technical College incident in 1974 , the assassination of Sheikh Mohamad al- Dhahabi , the former minister of Religious Endowment in 1977 , and the assassination of President Sadat in 1981 . In 1987 they attempted the assassination of former interior ministers Hassan Abu Basha and Nabawi Ismail and the Editor in Chief of *Al- Musswar* magazine , Makram Mohamed Ahmad . By 1988 , they attacked every thing that they considered immoral in music and arts , parties in the universities , and even wedding parties in Egyptian villages particularly in the provinces of Upper Egypt .

Since the summer of 1992 , the level of terrorism reached new heights . Early in the summer , the liberal political writer Farag Foda was assassinated . By the end of summer , these groups started to attack violently the Egyptian Christians in some villages of Upper Egypt . In the fall they went further to target tourists in order to cause serious damage to the Egyptian economy . By the winter of 1993 , they exploded bombs indiscriminately in heavily populated areas which was followed by two failed assassination attempts against Safwat al- Shrief , minister of information , and Hassan al- Alfi , minister of interior . Early in 1994 they attempted to assassinate Atif Sidqi, the Prime Minister.

Although in the remaining months of 1994, Islamic radicalism has been reduced sharply, it has remained a threat to the socio-economic fabric of Egypt. In fact, and increasingly so, its considered as a national security threat to Egypt. As early as 1979, Defence Minister Kamal Hassan Ali stated that " the political and military goal of Egypt is to preserve the independence of Egypt, its territorial integrity, and protect constitutional

legitimacy". In October 1994, Defence Minister Mohammed Tantawy said that " the phenomenon of extremism is a challenge to Egypt's security and stability ". " We in the armed forces are following up this phenomenon, and as the last line of defence against internal threats and as a part of the part of the Egyptian texture, we cannot stay away from any threat to that texture. We hope that matters will not reach that end ". Protecting constitutional legitimacy as a goal for national defense policy and the armed forces as a line of defence against Islamic radicalism reflect the upgrading of internal domestic troubles to the level of national security threat.

## V. GEO-ECONOMICS : THE FEAR OF THE FUTURE

In the last two decades, Egyptian foreign and defence policy has gained to Egypt significant political and economic returns. By using its geo-political position, Egypt has been influential international and regional actor because of four factors : a) the Cold War; b) the Arab-Israeli conflict and peace process; c) Gulf security ; and d) the crisis in the Horn of Africa. These factors allowed Egypt to gain status and influence in the Arab World, the Middle East, Third World forums, and the UN, in addition to a listening ear in the major world capitals.

Of no less importance , Egypt gained considerable economic aid. The returns from the Arab-Gulf states has been outlined above . Between 1975 and 1992 the U.S. contributed over \$ 18 billion in economic assistance in addition to much more in military aid. Europe , Japan, and major industrialized countries have been no less generous to Egypt. The second Gulf War reduced the pressures on the Egyptian economy. The U.S. cancelled Egypt's military debts ( \$6.7 billion), the Gulf states cancelled all Egyptian debts ( \$7.1 billion ), and Egypt foreign debts were reduced by 50 percent.

The above mentioned factors have faced considerable change in the past four years. The Cold War not only came to an end but also world politics has transformed towards the primacy of economics and interdependence. The Arab-Israeli conflict, although did not come to an end, the threat of war has been reduced considerably after the Palestinian and Jordanian agreements with Israel. The prospects for an Israeli peace with Syria and Lebanon are more than real. More important the current peace process does not only resolve the political, security, and territorial aspects of the conflict, but also pave the road for normalization, economic interdependence, and even a Middle East common market. All emphasize the primacy of geo-economics over geo-politics. Gulf security is finally settled in U.S. hands. As the last Gulf crisis of the Iraqi troop deployment

near the Kuwaiti borders attest, it was the U.S. military action that deterred Iraq and ended the crisis without the help of the other coalition partners, including Egypt. The "Damascus Declaration" that Egypt hoped will continue its role in protecting Gulf security did not materialized. Finally, the crisis in the Horn of Africa has become irrelevant when the Cold War came to an end.

These international and regional fundamental transformations refers to a possible decline in the Egyptian regional and international status. As geo-economics is getting the primacy over regional and world politics, Egypt's power capabilities is less able to deal with the new situation. All economic indicators indicate that Egypt is less able to compete in the regional and international markets. This reality has been translated in the Egyptian national security circles into a growing fear of the future in which Egyptian market will be dominated by foreign powers particularly Israel. It has even been claimed that what Israel failed to achieve by military means will realized by economic ones.

## VI. CONCLUSIONS : FROM GEO-POLITICS TO GEO-ECONOMICS

The above review of the Egyptian threat perceptions shows that although geo-political factors continue to have a bearing on the Egyptian national security, geo-economic factors are increasingly coming to the front of Egyptian perceptions. Egypt is finally coming to face its weak internal power elements that have been for too long over shadowed by its geo-political position and concerns. Therefore, economic as well as political reforms have been not only essential to its welfare and progress but also fundamental to its national security. Discussing Egyptian efforts in this direction is not the subject of this paper. However, the rising fears in Egypt from the future reflect that these efforts are not enough nor sufficient in reducing these fears.

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## **PALESTINIAN THREAT PERCEPTIONS**

Yezid Sayigh

### **1. Introductory Remarks**

The Arab-Israeli conflict has undergone a sea-change since the signing of the PLO-Israel Declaration of Principles in September 1993. Definitions of security threats and requirements have shifted perceptibly as Israel and a growing number of Arab states have established direct contacts. Not that the governments concerned have already reduced their provisions for military defence, but that their needs will now be calculated on the basis of guarding the peace with their neighbours rather than of actively preparing for war. Besides, the emerging security construct contains major political and economic components, as well as the more traditional security ones.

The situation is different in the Palestinian-Israeli context, however. First and foremost is the fact that the two sides have entered only into an interim arrangement, in which the terms of the end-result have not yet been defined, let alone agreed. There is an immense asymmetry of power and other capabilities, moreover, unlike any other bilateral Arab-Israeli strategic relationship. More specifically, the Palestinians enjoy neither political sovereignty nor territorial integrity, and so their vulnerability to pressure is extremely high and their ability to determine their own security requirements correspondingly low. The overlap of historic and territorial claims and the intermeshing of economics and infrastructure not only makes separation or resolution highly problematic, but also complicates security calculations immeasurably. More to the point, the definition of security and threats becomes multi-faceted and interactive to a degree unprecedented in any other bilateral Arab-Israeli relationship.

It remains to make three further introductory remarks with respect to the Palestinians, before addressing the subject of threat perceptions in detail. The first is that transitions are by their very nature unstable, involving as they do shifts in structures and processes. Instability is

exacerbated when the final objective has not been defined, and so every move takes the parties concerned (and their domestic public) into more uncharted waters. It thus becomes inevitable that each party will fight over the finest technical or material detail, in order to maximize its advantages when negotiations eventually start on the permanent status. The situation lends itself to conflict, multi-layered "games", and coercion, even violence. Transition in and of itself heightens insecurity and threat perceptions, therefore, and the resultant instability may impede further steps towards a final peace settlement.

At the same time, secondly, each step that is actually taken forward breaks an old taboo or at least makes it more possible to contemplate compromises that were previously regarded not only as unacceptable but as unthinkable. Recognizing Israel and talking to the PLO are the most obvious examples, but more relevant here is the possibility that attitudes towards really contentious issues -- Palestinian statehood, border "adjustments", the status of Jerusalem, the "right of return" for refugees, the future of the settlements, water, and security -- may also become more accommodating. This is not based on idealistic hope or the expectation of changing psychological attitudes. Rather it assumes that successful application of each practical measure or phase will demonstrate that ways can indeed be found to reconcile conflicting political claims and security needs. Evidence of practicality encourages an "engineering approach" and a relaxation of ideological imperatives.

Thirdly, the Palestinians face two distinct courses: to seek their further aims and security through narrower, "national" control, or through wider, multilateral or regional arrangements. They are the weaker party, whether in relation to Israel or to their Arab neighbours, and will remain so especially if a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation is not formed. In conceptualizing their security dilemma and defining their future requirements the Palestinians will have to judge which framework for relations -- bilateral or collective -- offers greater defensive (or even deterrent) capability. This means far more than *military* security, of course, and refers to the ability to determine the contractual and strategic context within which the Palestinian can better balance or trade off the different components of security and national goals in favour of the best overall package.

## 2. General Definition of Threats

Palestinian literature that systematically defines security issues and discusses the nature of threats and responses is sorely underdeveloped. There is nonetheless a small body of writing on the subject, in which there is a clear consensus that the overall Palestinian security dilemma stems from an *existential* threat.<sup>1</sup> The debate remains confined within a narrow circle of academics and practitioners, but there have been numerous, unstructured references by policy- and decision-makers and by various Palestinian parties to the core issues. This makes it possible to identify and analyze the key areas and sources of perceived threats.

The existential threat is one that has been most discussed and developed by Palestinians, and so requires least introduction here. Briefly, the perception emanates from the history of subjection to a British mandate contractually committed to the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, of traumatic uprooting in 1948, and of subsequent dispersal, denial, and forcible subjugation by Israel and Arab host governments. Preservation of national identity and the physical continuity of the national community have been directly threatened, producing a powerful conviction that future existence can only be assured through the modalities of self-determination in a sovereign state.

It follows from the overall aim of statehood that specific issues, such as the extent of territory and siting of borders, gain special importance. The return (or compensation) of Palestinians uprooted and exiled in 1948 or displaced in 1967 is also fundamental to existential security by the same token. Asserting control over east Jerusalem, as a national center and eventual capital, is equally central to the success of the national self-image and state-building "project". Measures undertaken by Israel (especially) that create contrary facts on the ground are therefore perceived as direct threats not only to the eventual terms of peace settlement, but also, more fundamentally, to Palestinian core values and to the historic enterprise of national revival.

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<sup>1</sup> Prominent examples are Khalil Shikaki, "Palestinian Security Needs and Concerns", draft paper presented to UNIDIR workshop, Malta, April 1994; Ahmad Khalidi, "Middle East Security: Arab Threat Perceptions, Peace and Stability", in Ahmad Khalidi and Yair Evron, Middle East Security: Two Views, Cambridge MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Occasional Paper Series, 1990; and Yezid Sayigh, "Redefining the Basics: The Security of the Palestinian State", in David Wurmser (ed.), Regional Security in the Middle East: Arab and Israeli Concepts of Deterrence and Defence, Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, forthcoming (1994/5).

The settling of (Jewish) Israeli citizens across the 1949-1967 armistice lines or around east Jerusalem poses a threat at several levels, not least because <sup>it</sup> they point towards the ultimate reduction of the Palestinians to disparate population pockets. National communities cannot exist without clear and free continuity between the material and psychological dimensions; imposing separation<sup>4</sup> will turn the Palestinians into "townships" along South African apartheid lines, and ultimately produce alienation and violence directed both inwards and outwards. Severe imbalances in economic and security control only reinforce the perception that structural disadvantages in peace agreements will be actively used to increase Israeli gains and reduce Palestinian claims.

### 3. Specific Threat Perceptions

The discussion so far has blurred the time frame. That is, the precise nature of perceived threats on the Palestinian side will vary as the peace process moves from one stage to the next. The way (and urgency) in which the historically-perceived existential threat may itself be regarded differently now that the PLO and Israel have recognized each other and entered into the interim autonomy agreement. At the very least additional, detailed threats will appear relating to specific aspects of each current phase of the process. The fact of transitionality will tend to produce new, unexpected threats, although it may also reveal previous fears to be unfounded or exaggerated.

The Palestinian writings mentioned in footnote 1 have already suggested a typology of threats and referred to the distinctions between phases. Rather than repeating or summarizing that work, it is more useful here to categorize the threats according to the main actors or interested parties (ie, the *perceivers*) currently on the Palestinian side.

*The Palestinian National Authority (PNA):* The PNA is evidently the party that is the most concerned to attain its long-stated goal of Palestinian statehood. This is not because other Palestinian groups are less committed to this national objective, but simply that it is the "pragmatic" wing of the PLO under Arafat that has associated attainment of statehood with a particular policy, namely the Declaration of Principles and subsequent agreements. The PNA stands to lose the most if the process fails, and is equally the most directly threatened by Israeli measures that either undermine its credibility or impede the final objective.



Unilateral Israeli moves of any description, such as settlement expansion or separation of east Jerusalem, threaten the PNA and the entire Palestinian community.

By much the same token the PNA is constantly vulnerable to the threat that the next stage of the autonomy process might not come at all. This is a threat held over it by Israel, that uses its control over the timetable not only to present the PNA with performance tests but also to threaten it with the *reversibility* of previous steps. The PNA is in a double bind, moreover, since the Palestinian opposition can also threaten the timetable. With acts of violence the opposition can trigger Israeli counter-measures or slowdowns that in turn deprive the PNA of credibility and popular support. Ironically, activity by armed Jewish settlers is another double-edged threat, since it both threatens the Palestinians individually and collectively and also reveals the inability of the PNA to impose an end to this particular problem.

The potential for a spiral of violence and for a triangular punitive relationship involving Israel, the PNA, and the Palestinian opposition places the PNA right in the middle. Ultimately, the PNA has little *political* control over the terms of the peace or security relations with Israel, and at the same time lacks most of the material resources with which to offer real "peace dividends" to its public in the way of housing, jobs, and public services. Indeed, economic control in all its aspects, or lack of it, in itself presents a distinct threat to the PNA. Israeli resort to closing off the Occupied Territories (banning daily labourers) or to separating east Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank (strangling businesses and services) is only the most blatant example of the economic threat. There is a structural economic threat as well, namely the ability of Israel to use devices such as standards to prevent the marketing of Palestinian goods. These threats may not always be used purely "defensively", that is to prevent terrorist attacks, but also for plainly coercive purposes. The final result is to weaken PNA ability to maintain political stability and confront security threats in areas under its control.

The above is not meant to suggest that the PNA is a passive actor, solely a victim of the policies of others. To the contrary, the PNA actively contributes to its own security dilemma through the manner in which it governs and administers its affairs. Certain threats are the product only of the PNA's particular world outlook, and might not apply for a different leadership. For example, any challenge to the highly personalized management style and

concentrated power of Arafat is perceived as a threat not only to himself but also, ipso facto, to the broader aims he embodies. External pressures to induce a different approach to public administration, including manipulation of international assistance, are therefore taken as interference intended to impede further Palestinian political aims. Similarly, any constraints on the freedom of Palestinian action, including the freedom to fashion an autonomous security policy, are seen as deliberately designed to prevent successful Palestinian performance and thereby provide Israel with the pretext not to implement the next stage of the autonomy process.

*The Palestinian opposition:* The criticism above of the PNA suggests that it is worth looking at the threat perceptions of the Palestinian opposition. In particular, the opposition groups with a tangible presence inside the Occupied Territories (as distinct from those operating primarily in Damascus) fear exclusion from central Palestinian politics by the PNA. They are of course most concerned by the threats posed by Israel or other parties to long-term national objectives and core values, such as statehood, refugee rights, and the stake in Jerusalem. In the interim, however, the opposition face the immediate problem of securing their right to operate politically within the autonomous areas. Its fear is that the PNA will proscribe this right for its own reasons, as well as doing so in collaboration with Israel and outside powers such as the US. A corollary fear is being prevented from having any role or staking a share in the construction of the emergent economic system, public administration, and social management. It should be noted at the same time that other sections of the Palestinian population may in turn feel threatened by the opposition, disquiet at the social policies promoted by the Islamists being an obvious example.

*The diaspora:* A major category of Palestinians who have been all but written out of the peace script so far are those living in exile, outside the boundaries of what was Palestine until 1948. The threats faced by the Palestinian community in Lebanon are the most obvious: it has faced sustained violence and brutalization in the past, and now faces a systematic government policy (containing both formal or explicit and informal, implicit elements) designed to promote emigration. The general approach of the global powers (not to mention Israel) is implicitly to seek ways of resettling a majority of refugees in Arab states (with northeastern Syria and Iraq occasionally mooted). This is likely to be anything but a peaceful process, given the critical social and economic conditions of most prospective hosts.

Palestinians in Jordan are far more secure, but are increasingly presented with conflicting pulls on their identity and competing demands on their political allegiance. The state of Jordanian-PNA relations in any phase is a factor; in the long-term each of the policy options of confederation, merger under Jordanian rule, or separation and statehood threatens to provoke the fears of the native Jordanian population and to revive latent tensions between the two communities.

The prospect for Palestinians in the diaspora is increasingly insecure, therefore, and will eventually have a growing influence on relations and negotiations between Israel and the PNA. Throughout, the PNA is vulnerable to the risk that diaspora-based Palestinians may work actively against it or against the autonomy arrangements, threatening the transition to subsequent stages. Alternatively, its attempt to shoulder its responsibilities towards the refugees of 1948 and 1967 may put it onto a collision course with the Arab hosts or with Israel, besides adding to the material burden of providing housing, welfare, and jobs for any returnees who do come to the Palestinian entity. At the very least, the fate of the refugees will figure prominently in the permanent status negotiations between the PNA and Israel, and may provide the latter with additional means of pressure against the former.

#### **4. Sources and Types of Threat**

Three main sources of threats have been mentioned so far: Israel, Palestinian groups, and outside parties (including Arab governments or parties). The general assumption that any of these parties indeed poses a threat now needs substantiation and discussion.

*Israel:* Palestinians have historically perceived Israel as the single most threatening actor towards them. Its threat is the longest standing, going back to the turn of the century (in the form of Jewish immigration, land purchases, and Zionism), and operates on the largest number of levels. The Palestinians still live with the consequences of the "catastrophe" of 1948, as they call it, and of the Arab defeat in June 1967. Even after the Oslo Accord, Israel remains in control of the entire territory of mandate Palestine and retains the decisive say in every and all aspects of Palestinian life within those borders.

A number of the ways in which Israel is perceived by the Palestinians to threaten them have

already been described above. Non-military issues have been highlighted. Most important to reiterate here is the *structural* dominance Israel possesses, through which it can contain, impede, or direct Palestinian policy and behaviour in any functional sphere, be it security, economic, legal, infrastructural, or overtly political. Such control may be seen as a necessary defensive precaution on the Israeli side, and does not have to be threatening to the Palestinians, but the "grey area" is considerable and allows considerable room for cynical exploitation or mismanagement. Even with the best will in the world, the requirements of security as interpreted by the Israeli government may be fundamentally destabilizing for the PNA. Border closures and labour bans in response to terrorist attacks are the most obvious instance. It becomes apparent in this context that whatever impact the PNA might have on the process through better or poorer management of its own affairs, resources, and opportunities, it is Israel that continues to have the decisive influence in all cases.

Palestinian threat perceptions go further, however. At the most general level, there is the fear already stated above that Israel will seek deliberately to prevent further transfer of territory and responsibility to the PNA. Total dependence on Israeli goodwill and judgment causes Palestinian insecurity. What is to prevent a different Israeli government from reversing policy, or even from over-reacting or exploiting any pretext to reassert physical control over Palestinian autonomous areas? How, too, can the PNA react if the Israeli authorities decide that only a pro-active, covert security policy by undercover agents in Palestinian autonomous areas will work to prevent terrorism, although such activity might by the same measure undermine the PNA and irrevocably alienate its public? The Palestinians have little say in the matter, and their choice is little more than to accept or reject Israeli decisions on security matters.

At the wider level, the Palestinians also remain potential victim to developments in the Arab-Israeli arena or Middle East as a whole. Specifically, Israel might regard certain developments as sufficient cause to suspend the transfer of authority or even to reverse it because there is suddenly a heightened risk of war with one or more states in the region. It is also in such a context that strong opponents in Israel of the accords with the PLO might even be able to instigate "war" situations, if they wield sufficient government authority. The ability of then Defence Minister Ariel Sharon and Chief-of-Staff Rafel Eitan to drag the Israeli cabinet into a wider invasion of Lebanon than it had ordained in 1982 remains a

sobering experience.

Maverick Israeli officers might also mount covert operations with the aim of disrupting the peace process, as might the armed Jewish settlers in the Occupied Territories, who could number thousands. After all, it might take no more than a handful of Baruch Goldsteins (as well as Tel Aviv bus bombers) to destroy the process. The threat in all these cases is not merely to individual victims, but to the Palestinian national enterprise as a whole. Incidentally, the Hebron and Tel Aviv outrages and the official responses they led to reveal most graphically the radical discrepancy in deterrent and punitive capabilities between the PNA and Israeli government. They also indicate the asymmetry not so much of threats, as of possession of levers and ability to determine the response.

*Jordan:* The asymmetry of capabilities also helps to explain why the PNA and many (though by no means all) Palestinians regard Jordan as an actual or potential threat. There is a clear perception that Jordan possesses many material advantages, conferred on it by being a sovereign state with the executive apparatus and physical control that go with it, and there is the parallel belief that the kingdom's leadership will utilize its advantages at Palestinian expense. The Jordanian-Israeli accords signed between July and October 1994 fuelled this perception, and fed the deep-seated suspicion that there is a strategic coincidence of interest between Jordan and Israel to prevent the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

The threat in the Jordanian case is not one of direct physical assault, but existential nonetheless. The PNA is also aware that the Jordanian authorities are in a position to exert direct economic, demographic, and covert political pressure on it, and can deploy further indirect pressure by undermining the Palestinian negotiating position in future, especially with regard to Jerusalem, water, and external security. There may be something both of a mirror image of threat perceptions and of self-fulfilling prophecies here, since many in Jordan feel equally threatened by the Palestinians. This reciprocity, or mutuality, of threat perceptions is particularly problematic for future peace and stability.

*Other sources:* Although other threats are not nearly as serious for the Palestinians, it is worth mentioning certain special sources of insecurity. Syria, which in the past waged a bitter feud with the PLO, has reduced greatly in significance and impact since September 1993. The

Palestinian opposition groups housed in Damascus have lost virtually all their influence, and have not regained any despite the discrediting of the mainstream Fateh. Only those groups with an actual following in the Occupied Territories have any significance, and their strength is drawn from their local support rather than from Syria. Besides, the further that Syria moves towards peace with Israel, the more of a *status quo* power it becomes. Much the same might be said of Iraq or Libya, which in previous years backed Arafat's opponents but now suffer under international isolation.

The Palestinian opposition, largely the Islamists but also the secular PFLP and DFLP, may pose a threat to the PNA and, arguably, to Palestinian social cohesion. In this case the threat is primarily political, in the sense that the potency of the opposition lies in its ability to disrupt the autonomy process and antagonize PNA-Israeli relations. Failure to resolve internal differences may lead to civil strife on some scale or another, which would be a far more direct and damaging threat. Other sources of potential conflict relate to the presence of large numbers of former security prisoners (held by Israel for resisting its occupation) or PLO personnel who have either been left in exile or have been brought into the autonomous areas but lack housing, income, and status. It is easy to conceive resentment leading to violence or to covert operations on behalf of the opposition or outside parties. Latent regional or clan disputes may be aroused in such situations, increasing the risk of civil conflict.

### 5. Preliminary Outline of Confidence-Building

It is evident that while the danger of physical assault is always present, the main threats to the Palestinians are not military in the immediate sense. This does not make them any less menacing, as in combination they pose an existential threat. The obvious implication is that the sort of confidence-building measures (CBMs) that the Palestinians require tend to have a high political significance. Two further, conflicting practical implications follow. On the one hand, it should be easier for Israel, Jordan, or other parties to offer meaningful political CBMs without affecting their military security. On the other hand, the same parties might find it more difficult to offer political CBMs without affecting their own core interests and internal consensus.

That said, there is considerable scope for the sort of CBMs that are most likely to help defuse

tension within the Palestinian arena. Most obvious is to assist in the conduct of general elections in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, and furthermore to ensure that such elections are designed to produce a body with credible political representation and legislative capacity. This would mean enabling all parties to compete, in order to endow the process with real legitimacy, and enabling both the parties and the PNA to conduct all related activities without impediment (campaigning, for example). Israel should provide free access to population registers in order to prepare electoral rolls. Indeed, Israel needs to provide access to population and land registers, as well as other records (such as for water resources), as part of a more fundamental confidence-building exercise that would empower the PNA to assume a real influence in the management of public goods and socio-economic policy. Movement regarding family reunification or the return of persons displaced by the 1967 war is another major CBM.

The preceding is merely an indication. The PNA itself could usefully employ CBMs, not only towards Israel or Jordan but, and here it would have a greater demonstrable effect, towards its internal opposition. Clear policy statements regarding human and civil rights and the rule of law should be codified and, more importantly still, embodied in specific mechanisms and institutions (such as ombudsmen) designed to provide the public with independent channels for complaints and redress. Transparency in public appointments and contracts would also have a beneficial effect, as would a concerted effort to revitalize the education system in order to absorb resentment and restore hope among the youthful and unemployed population.

At the end of the day, however, the PNA has limited resources. Even with good management and sound policies, the Palestinians remain the weakest party in the strategic equation, and can do little to pressure or coerce their neighbours into altering negative policies. Besides, investment in the improvement of security can have unwanted costs, such as reduction in other forms of public expenditure and infrastructural investment which are urgently needed. Yet insufficient allocation of resources to security may encourage hostile attention. A graphic example of the difficulty of striking the right balance is that building a strong police force may make good sense at one level, but is very costly financially and unsustainable.

The implication is that external parties will probably hold the key to the balance between the threats to Palestinian security and Palestinian ability to deflect them. This is not a comfortable

position in which to be, but it may be unavoidable at least for the duration of the interim period. It is unlikely to change much even after a permanent settlement has been reached, however. Israel is unlikely to permit the PNA or any successor entity to maintain a credible military force even for purely defensive purposes, and the Palestinians simply do not enjoy the human and financial resource base sufficient to maintain a credible self-defence force anyway.

What this suggests is that the Palestinians should seek to provide a significant part of their defence and of their ability to deter aggression or subversion by promoting and joining regionally-based structures for security and cooperation. It may be the wisdom of weakness, but the best assurance that the Palestinians have in the long-run of protection against threats to their existence and well-being lies in the establishment of multilateral organizations that constrain the strong states as much as the weak ones.

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His most recent publications are Arab Military Industry: Capability, Performance and Impact (Brassey's London: 1992); Rejecting Defeat: The Beginnings of Armed Action in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 1967 (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992. In Arabic.); and Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990). His articles have appeared in academic and specialised journals including International Affairs, Middle East Journal, Third World Quarterly, Survival, RUSI Journal, Maghreb-Mashreq, Politique Etrangere, Journal of Palestine Studies, and MERIP Reports.



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# Overcoming Prejudice:

A Threat Perception from a Syrian Perspective

*Abdulhay Sayed*  
November 1994

*"Je ne conteste aucunement que le fâcheux blocus du golf d'Akaba était unilatéralement dommageable à votre pays et je ne méconnaissais pas que celui-ci eût lieu de se sentir menacé, étant donné la tension où était plongée la région palestinienne pas suite du flot d'invectives prodiguées à l'encontre d'Israël en même temps que le sort lamentable des Arabes réfugiés en Jordanie ou relégués à Gaza. Mais je demeure convaincu qu'en passant outre aux avertissements donnés, en temps voulu, à votre gouvernement par celui de la République Française, en entamant les hostilités, en prenant, par la force des armes, possession de Jérusalem, et de maints territoires jordaniens, égyptiens, et syriens, en y pratiquant la répression et les expulsions, qui sont inévitablement les conséquences d'une occupation dont tout indique qu'Elle tend à l'annexion, en affirmant devant le monde que le règlement du conflit ne peut être réalisé que sur la base des conquêtes acquises et non pas à condition que celles-ci soient évacuées, Israël dépasse les bornes de la modération nécessaire"*  
Private letter from President De Gaulle to Ben Gourion after the 1967 war (source: Henri Laurens, *Le grand jeu*, Paris, 1991, p.214.

## **Table of Content**

### **Introduction**

#### **I - Political Threats**

1. *Israel Initiation of the Conflict: The Palestinian Tragedy*
2. *Israel Continuous Aggression*
  - 2.1 *Israel Continuous Aggression Against Syria*
  - 2.1 *Israel Continuous Aggression Against Arab Neighboring Countries and Palestinian Population*
  - 2.1 *Israel Continuous Aggression Against Non-neighboring Arab Countries*
3. *Israel's Expansionist Aims*
4. *Concluding Remarks*

#### **II - Military Threats**

1. *Israeli Security Arguments Revisited*
2. *Israel's Conventional Superiority*
3. *The Israeli Nuclear Armament*
  - 3.1 *The Israeli Nuclear Arsenal*
  - 3.2 *World Support of Israel's Quest for Nuclear Weapons*
  - 3.3 *The Concern of the United Nations*
  - 3.4 *The Syrian Perception*

### **Conclusion**

## Introduction

The Arab-Israeli conflict has marked Syrian politics, since 1948, and largely influenced Syria's behavior in the regional and international contexts. To this effect, The present paper shall describe an Arab and particularly a Syrian perception of the sources of threat as the conflict developed over the years.

In this climate of conflict, security concerns and preoccupations and a threat perception from a Syrian perspective are yet to be understood and appreciated. A state, as part of a nation, that has long been pictured, by efficient propaganda, as inherently barbaric, aggressive, uncivilized and brutal<sup>1</sup> societies is yet to overcome such misperceptions in order to be accepted as a "civilized" partner in "humane" peace endeavors.

All efforts aimed at explaining Syrian security concerns have been faced with deliberate inattention. The resulting debate has always led to an impasse.

Two indispensable prerequisites have to be met, in order for the present exercise of cross examining threat perceptions of the different parties to the Arab Israeli conflict, to be useful. First, A disciplined effort from the party exposing its security concerns *not to overstate* the factual threats and the psychological perceptions of the self and the others in the Arab Israeli environment of conflict. Second, A corresponding effort from the "others" *not to lend confrontational deaf ears* to the adversaries' security preoccupation, but rather conciliatory open ones. Only such combination of realistic and conciliatory attitudes of the ones and the others can make the present exercise of analysing "threat perceptions" a fruitful one, in identifying possible gray zones of security for all. It is the intention of this paper to keep in mind "as much as possible" the above considerations. But to what extent is it possible?

It must be observed, in this context, that available literature on security and arms control in the Arab-Israeli region, influenced to a large extent by efficient propaganda, is considerably inundated by Israeli efforts of deconstructing whatever Arab and especially Syrian security concern, by characterizing it as technically or factually unfounded<sup>2</sup>, and their concomitant effort of overstating<sup>3</sup> factual threats and psychological perceptions<sup>4</sup>. Many Israeli arguments that are often tainted with gusts of "realistic approaches"<sup>5</sup> to security are, for most of the time, very remote from and badly reflective of reality.

Indeed, reality from a Syrian standpoint has often been deformed<sup>6</sup> and distorted to a degree that shows the oppressed an aggressor, the victim a "murderer", the defender of his rights, a harsh violent offender. Arabs and

especially Palestinians, in this environment of conflict, have constantly been presented to the world as the most violent of all peoples.

It was the Arabs and only the Arabs who initiated hostilities<sup>7</sup> in this region by refusing without any justification the "very existence"<sup>8</sup> of the peaceful and humane democratic "Israeli" State amongst them. It is specifically this rejectionist and certainly "cruel"<sup>9</sup> attitude, aimed at the elimination of the "Jewish democracy from the heart of the Arab nations"<sup>10</sup> that initiated the conflict and continued to aliment it. For Israeli "experts" and ruling elites, Pan Arabism<sup>11</sup>, Islamic fundamentalism<sup>12</sup>, in their militarism, xenophobia, irredentism and irreducible hatred of the existing order are indeed the sources of this massive hostility aimed at Israel and consequently the true core of conflict in the Arab-Israeli region. Arab hostility is indeed unequivocally evidenced by the huge Arab arms build up<sup>13</sup>, not only in conventional but also in non-conventional Mass destruction weaponry<sup>14</sup>, and missile capabilities. Indeed, It is extremely alarming to observe in the Arab countries that ample financial resources are still devoted to armament despite apparent economic difficulty. Similarly alerting would be any prospective emergence of a hostile Arab power with nuclear weapons and appropriate means of delivery<sup>15</sup>. This is something definitely not tolerable for people like Israel who suffers from "existential" threats.

Many Israeli "experts" argue that, security arrangements in the Middle East should only address the situation of Israel as "a minute island in a hostile Arab States"<sup>16</sup>. For them, not only is the violent unjustified hostility of the Arabs that is a source of their security preoccupation, but the vulnerability of Israeli society should also be taken into consideration in this respect. Figures, Charts, arguments, from whatever angle or criteria, compete and pile up to show how, disadvantageous in strategic depth<sup>17</sup>, inferior in population<sup>18</sup>, feeble to sustain long wars<sup>19</sup>, unsupported from any one<sup>20</sup> in the world yet dependent on all the world in every source of energy or income, is "the peaceful" Israel. All of these considerations have considerable direct repercussion on security. The debate or perhaps the overwhelming effort of persuasion often derails from the track of rational analysis, to exceedingly use the psychological element of the "threat perception", in invoking the memory of an extremely painful recent past, for the occurrence of which Arabs were certainly not responsible. Israeli "experts", often take off their "expertise" gowns to describe the spasmodic sense of insecurity that Israelis still suffer from. These "experts", conclude that, it is Israel and only Israel that is feeling insecure<sup>21</sup>, and that to a large extent the Arab violent hostile neighbors have always been the source of this insecurity. This egocentric perception of their security has consistently led to the conclusion that Israel is the only party in the region that needs confidence, and that the Arabs are the ones who should exert whatever effort possible to provide that confidence. Israeli "experts" often taint their proposition on future regional security arrangements with many affirmations of good faith pertaining to the equatability of any solution proposed, implying whereby recognition of

all parties' threat perceptions. Yet careful scrutiny, of those propositions, reveals very anxious egocentric views on regional security, not cognizant of any "others" perceptions of insecurity in the arena. Most of the solutions proposed required from the "hostile Arabs" more in terms of Confidence-Building Measures and Arms Control and less from Israel because she is the one that needs to be assured and perfectly understood<sup>22</sup>. God, our common god, knows how far such elastic argument can be taken to lead to a permanent situation of insecurity to the Arabs.

"Objective" literature on security and arms control in the region of the Arab-Israeli conflict, supposedly produced by "unbiased experts", "cognizant of the interests of all parties concerned", has also proven to be the most inattentive to Arab security concerns and the most considerate even ruminating and repetitive of Israeli concerns of security<sup>23</sup>. Western official positions<sup>24</sup>, and independent "experts" or institutions<sup>25</sup> are becoming more and more close-minded with regard to Arab concerns for security vis-à-vis Israel, and more and more cognizant and understanding of Israel's perceptions of security. In any event, it has been rightly observed that, the existing literature is not only too repetitive but also, "often boring to read, rarely imaginative and difficult to translate into political options"<sup>26</sup>.

The present paper is an analysis of the threat perception from a Syrian perspective. If this paper would agree with the above submissions, on any thing it would be on the idea that one party's sense of insecurity in this conflict is far greater than other parties. For different reasons that will be exposed thereafter, this paper will hold that it was and has always been the Arabs and not the Israelis who felt constantly insecure, and that any arrangement for peace in the region should primarily address their concern. The logic behind this submission lays in the argument that, unlike Europe where the environment of conflict has been shaped, essentially with a confrontation of equal values and alliances of societies, and thus a relative balance of force from both sides, the Arab-Israeli conflict, is on the contrary about aggression, and asymmetry in force, in which the Arabs are in "absolute" disadvantage. Unlike Europe, where confidence-building initiation, was mutual and concomitant, confidence-building initiation, in the Arabs-Israeli environment of conflict, should certainly be on the expenses of the initiator of aggression thus of conflict, and the superior Israel, in favor of the inferior, and the "encroached upon"<sup>27</sup> Arabs.

Two sources of threat can be identified from the Syrian perspective. They are Political and Military sources of threat. Political threats arise from the Israeli failure to respect the sovereignty and the rights of the Arabs to live in peace. The Military threats concern the very alarming Israeli military superiority in a way that destabilizes any Balance in the region.

Particular emphasis shall be devoted in the subsequent development to the Palestinian Tragedy, for it constituted the source that long alimented the

lack of confidence among the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It must be understood, at the outset that, due to the historical, cultural, and identity ties, all Israeli aggressions against the Palestinians were perceived by the Syrians as directed against them. Indeed any aggression against any Arab country has always been regarded by the Syrians as directed against them.

## **I - Political Threats**

Israel's initiation of the conflict and the continuous aggression on Arab basic rights, and her expansionist aspiration, are the main sources of threat to the regional security.

### ***1. Israel's Initiation of the Conflict : The Palestinian Tragedy***

For a long time, Jews have been the victims of anti-semitism at the hands of the Europeans. The heated debate over the *Dreyfus* case in France, revealed how deep is anti-semitism rooted in European culture. *Emile Zola's* anger in the "*J'accuse*" article did not certainly temper it. Even *Dreyfus'* acquittal did not manage to attenuate it. Hertzl soon concluded, that only through asserting Jewish national peoplehood, lays the salvation of the persecuted Jews. A Jewish State somewhere, a "*Jedenstaat*", in which all Jews of the world would find refuge from persecution, is thus indispensable. Political Zionism came thus into existence. Several proposals surfaced, as to where it might be possible to establish such self-governing community. The British advocated first, for Uganda<sup>28</sup>. Some Jewish businessmen, proposed, Argentina. Others favored Kenya, or Sinai<sup>29</sup>. But Orthodox religionist, seemed resolved to call for the return to the land of the ancient Hebrews, as envisaged in the Old Testament<sup>30</sup>. Anti-semitism climaxed under Nazi Germany resulting in the Holocaust that destroyed hundreds of thousands of humane beings just because they happen to have a Jewish faith, in the most barbaric, cruel, ways that "humanity" can ever create or imagine. People were often dispossessed of their homes, just because they were Jews, conducted to concentration camps, where "they deserve to leave", if they had the right to live at all. In most cases, Jews were massively murdered, in the most cruel undescriptive ways. "never again"...

Indifferent to the Jewish sufferance in Europe, in most cases ill-informed of any anti-semitism or persecution, because of stagnant pace of life due to long periods of occupation by the Ottomans, Arab society, in Mesopotamia, presented on the contrary perfect cohabitation, and spontaneous distribution of the economic activity, among its religious components, Muslims, Christians, and Jews. The latter were, specifically influential as money-lenders and bankers to the government or provincial governors, and as managers of Tax-farms; at another level, as craftsmen and dealers in precious

metals<sup>31</sup>. Jews detained a substantial part of the economic activities of the Arab cities.

Aspiring for whatever breadth of freedom from occupation, Arab hopes soon disappeared in the face of huge colonialist projects of greater *envergure*, that not only involved superpowers, such as France and Great Britain, but also a serious project of providing a national home for all Jews of the world, in Palestine.

Although many of the emerging Arab elite at the beginning of the century saw -rightly as it appeared thereafter- in the Zionist enterprise, a colonialist project aiming specifically at the dispossession of the land of Palestine from its inhabitants<sup>32</sup>, other Arabs were open for Jewish concerns and were ready for solutions recognizing both interests<sup>33</sup>. Zionists, nevertheless, betrayed the Arabs in supporting the British colonization of Palestine<sup>34</sup>. In the eyes of the Arabs, Zionists rather pursued a confrontational project of colonization, inspired by the helping European one<sup>35</sup>.

Needless to mention how much transfer of Palestinians, dispossession of their homes and lands such project would require, in order to settle the new comers, the victims of European persecution. Did not the pragmatist founder of Israel, Ben Gurion believe that, "for every transferred Arab, one could settle four Jews on the land"; and that "with the removal of the Arabs from the plains, we (Jews) are getting for the first time in history a truly Jewish State"<sup>36</sup> ? Did not he even tolerated compulsory transfer of the Arabs, in the area of the proposed Jewish state, granted by the Peel commission, for "it could give us (Jews) something which we never had, even when we stood on our own during the days of the First and Second Temples, a Galilee without Arabs...We are given an opportunity which we never dared to dream of in our wildest imaginings. This is more than a State, government and sovereignty - this is national consolidation in a free homeland"<sup>37</sup>. Was not it indispensable for Weitz, the director of the Jewish national fund, and a major settlement executive, to have a land of Israel without Arabs? Did not he declare back in December 1940 that "it must be clear that there is no room in the country for both peoples... If the Arabs leave, the country will become wide and spacious for us...There is no room here for compromises...There is no way but to transfer the Arabs from here (Palestine) to the neighboring countries, to transfer all of them...Not one village must be left, not one Bedouin tribe..."<sup>38</sup>.

A huge project of unexplained settlement of hundred of thousands of aliens in a land alien to them, was seen with great astonishment from the simple people inhabiting this land. All effort of asserting the right to self determination was violently oppressed by the British<sup>39</sup>, and then by a very organized and militarily superior Jewish militias<sup>40</sup>. Not a single town, not a single village, or home was saved from Jewish brutality to settle down. Simple people were dispossessed of there homes either because of fear of the impact of



brutality they witnessed<sup>41</sup> or because they were directly the subject of brutality<sup>42</sup>. Indeed Villages were mortared, shelled, and even bombed from the air. Houses were often demolished with explosives, and bulldozers<sup>43</sup>. Families in some villages, were slaughtered, and unarmed civilians of both sexes were murdered<sup>44</sup>. Deliberately<sup>45</sup>, Jewish commandment sought to expel the Arabs or make them flee, for it is indeed an indispensable measure, to any plan to settle the Jewish people of the world. The land is after all limited, and the rapid demographic growth of the Arabs living in this territory has a negative effect on the future existence of any Jewish State. Arabs, thus, must be evicted, by force if necessary.

An enormous sentiment of injustice reigned among Arabs for the atrocities committed against their fellow Arabs in Palestine. To defend what was left of Arab rights from the Israeli offense, Arabs exhausted from continuous colonization for centuries, could not, in 1948, repulse the injustice. They soon realized how backed from all superpowers was "the State of Israel", and how disadvantageous in all respects, were the Arabs, in 1948. Such project appeared to be simply insurmountable, for it is within it that many interests complement each others. The new objective should thus be the containment of the aggressive attitudes of Israel, as experience has recently shown, in order for the Arabs to have their fair share in development, to attain better welfare. As president Nasser of Egypt has put it, in 1955:

"The objection has often been made that if the Arabs were to receive military assistance they would immediately attack Israel. Egyptians feel that a great injustice was committed against the Arabs generally, and especially against the million or more Palestinian Arabs who are now refugees. Israel's policy is *aggressive and expansionist*, and Israel will continue her attempts to prevent any strengthening of the area. However, we do not want to start conflict. War has no place in the constructive policy which we have designed to improve the lot of our people. We have much to do in Egypt, and the rest of the Arab world. A war would cause us to loose much of what we seek to achieve<sup>46</sup>.

To that effect, many Arab States neighboring Israel sought conciliation. Syria<sup>47</sup>, Jordan<sup>48</sup>, and even Egypt of Nasser<sup>49</sup>, proposed conciliation that would recognize Arab rights. Israel responded with strong intransigence<sup>50</sup> for she was not prepared to make any concession, whatsoever, with regard to any territory conquered beyond the United Nations' General Assembly Partition plan<sup>51</sup>, or to resettle any group of refugees to their homes. Israel continued on the contrary its aggressivity against all Arab States, and against the Palestinian population. Many Arabs who had fled<sup>52</sup> their territories for fear of persecution, sought to return back to their homes and lands, but were faced with determined Israeli army denying them the right to returning back<sup>53</sup>, even if this

requires murdering them after torture and rape<sup>54</sup>. Those who tried to react against the injustice they felt have been persistently perceived as terrorists and criminals. Their repeated reactions against the Israeli aggression, however politicized<sup>55</sup>, and however negligible, have been efficiently used as pretexts to justify more aggressive Israeli actions. Not only are they denied from the simplest of their human rights, the right to their properties, but they also are denied from their right to self-determination.

## **2. *Israel Continuous aggression***

Not only did Israel aggressed the many rights of the Arabs of Palestine, but she also continued to exert aggression against the territorial integrity and the sovereignties of all Arab countries neighboring or not.

### **2.1. *Israel Continuous Aggression Against Syria***

Since the establishment of Israel on Arab ruins, Syria's sovereignty has been particularly violated by continuous Israeli aggressions. Immediately following the armistice agreement signed between Israel and Syria in 1949, Israel started violating the Armistice agreement, and the sovereignty of Syria, by inciting Israeli farmers to extend their bordered cultivation to areas assigned to Syria by the armistice agreement<sup>56</sup>. At the same period Israel denied also Syrian fishermen their rights of fishing and use of the Lake Teberias, whose northeastern shore defines the border between Israel and Syria<sup>57</sup>. Israel's provocation went too far to embark on a huge water project of diversion of the waters of the Jordan river and then of Lake Tebrias, in a way that specifically impinged Syrian territory<sup>58</sup>. Expulsion of Arabs from the Demilitarized Zones of the front between Israel and Syria continued<sup>59</sup>, and many Israeli air strikes against Arab villages inside Syria have also been conducted<sup>60</sup>. Palestinian and Syrian resistance and retaliation against the continuous aggression directed against them was faced with larger attacks and aggression from the part of the Israelis<sup>61</sup>.

### **2.2. *Israel continuous Aggression against Arab neighboring countries, and Palestinian populations***

Together with Syria, other Arab neighboring countries have tremendously suffered from Israeli aggression against their sovereignties<sup>62</sup>. Israel never saved any effort to provoke Egypt in 1956, to attack her, in order for Israel to justify a massive action of retaliation that would permit her to destroy Egyptian new acquired military capabilities<sup>63</sup>. Israel did not succeed in provoking Egypt, but efficiently succeeded in aggressing it<sup>64</sup>. Raids against entire villages continued against Syria Lebanon and also Jordan. Relying on largely questionable justifications<sup>65</sup>, Israel launched in 1967 a huge attack against all its neighboring States and occupied territories the surface of which

exceeded Israel's surface<sup>66</sup>. The outcome was also the dispossession of the remaining population of their homes.

In a desire for the ones (Egypt) to reactivate negotiation, and for the others (Syria) to end the occupation<sup>67</sup>, Arabs, reacted, in 1973, against the Israeli aggression of 1967, but were faced with more and more Israeli intransigence to keep the occupation.

The situation in the occupied territories worsened. More and more houses were demolished<sup>68</sup>, more and more civilians were deported. Even in their concentration (refugee) camps, Palestinians were systematically attacked by Israeli Defense -or should we better say Offense- forces. Unarmed civilians were systematically persecuted, because some of their fellow people are reacting to injustices persistently occurring. This even required Israel to launch large scale military attacks against the sovereignty of Lebanon killing not only Palestinians but also Lebanese, and Syrians<sup>69</sup>.

The deteriorating living conditions in the west bank and Gaza, Israel's refusal to recognize or to even lend any attention to Arab concerns and especially those of the Palestinian people led to the spontaneous uprising (Intifada) in 1987. "Breaking bones", demolishing homes, confiscating properties, murdering, illegal detentions of Arabs in prisons, torture, do not appear to have affected Israeli intransigence and egocentrism, neither did it temper its sense of superiority vis-à-vis Arabs<sup>70</sup>. Settler fundamentalism has also multiplied the effect of Israeli crimes against Arab populations in the occupied territories<sup>71</sup>. The recent Hebron massacre committed by an extremist settler against Arabs was the cowardest of all crimes. Israel never refrained, even in the middle of "peace" negotiations -where a climate of peace is supposed to reign- its aggression, against Arabs. Villages in Lebanese territory, are systematically attacked, and population are killed, because, they are simply not permitted to assert their rights. The recent air strike against the Lebanese village of Nabatiyeh al-Fwaqa, where Israelis used anti personal shells caused the deaths of many civilians including women and children<sup>72</sup>.

### ***2.3. Israeli continuous aggression against non neighboring Arabs Countries***

Attacks and acts of aggression against the sovereignties of many non bordering Arab States, have also been an important future of Israeli aggressivity. On June 7, 1981, Israel attacked Iraq and destroyed its Tamuz peaceful nuclear installation. She relied on very absurd understanding of Article 51 of the charter of the United Nations, claiming thereby to be exercising an inherent right of self defense<sup>73</sup>. The Israeli air raid on PLO headquarters in Tunisia not only caused heavy casualties in human life, (60 persons killed and many more wounded)<sup>74</sup>, but also constituted a flagrant

violation of the territorial integrity of Tunisia which in Israeli terms did not entertain any form of direct hostility<sup>75</sup>

### 3. *Israel's Expansionist Aims*

Nearly all Israeli sources continuously advance the argument that in no war launched by Israel against any Arab State or combination of many neighboring Arab States, "did Israelis ever engage with territorial ambitions in mind"<sup>76</sup>. All wars or any other act was purely defensive and had strictly reactionary nature against various acts of aggression directed against the existence of Israel and the life of its citizens. Nevertheless it has always been very difficult for Arabs, and especially Syrians, to conciliate such arguments with reality. Indeed experience confirms that The "self defense" argument, the "prevention" doctrine, the "security" pretext, or the "peace on the Galilee" pretention are all hypocritical justifications tainting "deep rooted" aggressive, but also expansionist intentions aiming specifically at territorial maximization.

"Deep rooted" intentions, for expansionism is indispensable to the Zionist enterprise as was perceived by its forefathers. After all, Jews around the world are part of one nation and constitute the same people wherever they are. Israel for them is a refuge and must be able to provide space and opportunity for all the ten million and so of world Jewry. As was clearly put, an objective of "greater Israel" reveal to be thus indispensable for otherwise Israel "will not be able to receive 10 million Jews in a territory of only 25.000 Km<sup>2</sup>"<sup>77</sup>. Indeed, the expansionist aim inherent to the existence of Israel at the expenses of others, finds its roots in the Old Testament, the teaching of the religious fundamentalists, the convictions of the founders of Zionism and the State of Israel, and in the practice of the present Israeli State.

It is in the *Genesis* (XV, 18) that god promised the descendant of Abraham "this land from the river of Egypt, to the great Euphrates river". Yehuda Elitzur, one of the most respected scholars among Jewish fundamentalists considers the "promised" Jewish State according to the biblical source as extending to the Euphrates river, southern Turkey, Transjordan, and the Nile delta<sup>78</sup>. For religious fundamentalists, Jews "have been commanded by the God of Israel and the creator of the world to take possession of this entire land, in its holy borders and to do this *by wars of defense and even by wars of liberation*"<sup>79</sup>. For Rabbi Kook, the first Ashkenazi chief Rabbi in mandatory Palestine, Jews are "commanded both to possess and to settle. The meaning of possession is conquest"<sup>80</sup>. Fundamentalist Rabbi Yisrael Ariel, from the Tzlia Association went further into expressing the conviction that the first and eternal order given to the people of Israel was to reach the borders of the covenant, and it remains an eternal commandment. We should not wait until we are attacked, we have to choose the right moment and start our own attack. It is crystal clear that we have the ability and the power to do so and it is therefore an obligation. the commandment is to attack to keep the territory and

to settle every possible corner of it"<sup>81</sup> Rabbi Ariel expressed his joy when Israel invaded Lebanon. For him "Lebanon is part of the land of Israel", and he recommended Israel to "declare that she does have no intention of leaving". He specifically added that "our leaders should have entered (long time before) Lebanon and Beirut without hesitation, and killed every single one of them. Not a memory or a trace should have remained... We should have entered Beirut at any price, without regards to our own casualties, because we are speaking of the conquest of the land of Israel... We should immediately divert the waters of the Litani to the Jordan"<sup>82</sup>

However may one argue about the little influence of such Statements in Israeli decision making, the striking compatibility of not only Zionist ambitions but also the subsequent Israeli action with the above prophecies, is indeed a source of deep concern for Syrians. Indeed The forefathers of secular Zionism did not really differ from all Jewish religious fundamentalists assertions through out the century. Did not Hertz himself intimated to his diary that the slogan of the Jews should be "the Palestine of David and Solomon"<sup>83</sup>, "the area from the river of Egypt to the Euphrates"<sup>84</sup>? Did not the Zionist organization claimed at the Versailles peace conference, back in 1919, territories that affects in actual terms, South Lebanon, Parts of Syria wholly including the Golan, a large part of Jordan, Northern Saudi Hijaz, and substantial parts of Sinai Egypt<sup>85</sup>. Is it not striking to note how concordant was the Israeli actions of aggression, from 1948 till 1982, with the original Zionist ambition.

Did not Ben Gurion, the pragmatic conciliatory founder of the State of Israel once said, that "It must not be our intention to maintain the *statu quo*. We have created a dynamic State, oriented towards *expansion*"<sup>86</sup>, or did not he affirmed to Students of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1950 that "the Israeli empire should include all territories situated between the Nile and the Euphrates", and that this should be realized either by invasion or even by diplomacy"<sup>87</sup>. Did not General Allon regretted, 1948, that Ben Gurion ordered to stop the war, after strong pressures from Truman, for otherwise they could have liberated "all their territory, from the Litani river to the Sinai"<sup>88</sup>?, or Moshé Dayan who also declared that if "we (Jews) possess the Bible, and if we consider ourselves the people of the Bible, we should also possess the land of the Bible, this of the judges and patriarchs"<sup>89</sup>, or that the first battle in the process of the establishment of Israel as an independent State has not yet been completed because we have not determined whether the spatial character of today's State is Final<sup>90</sup>? Did not Manahem Begin declare before the Kneset back in October 12, 1955, that he profoundly thinks that "Israel should launch a preventive war against all Arab States, without any hesitation. It is by such war that we can attain our two objectives: (1) the destruction of the Arab power, and (2) the expansion of our territory"<sup>91</sup>.

from an Arab and especially Syrian perspective, Israeli practice since the institution of the State of Israel seem to be the most compatible with Jewish

religious fundamentalists' aspirations and most Zionist leaders ambitions. From the small agricultural colonies to the Jewish National Home; from the Jewish State conceived by the UN to the unlarged State of 1948; from the aggressive Israel of 1956 to the "Greater Israel" of 1967, every stage has been marked with the realization of age-old prophecies and ambitions to expand. As has been advanced, "Israel is blithely following a plan which purely and simply imperils the very existence of several Arab countries as independent States"<sup>92</sup>, and Syria is particularly concerned and alarmed<sup>93</sup>.

For Syrians, all large scale wars initiated since the creation of Israel, all actions of aggression of smaller scale, but certainly not of lesser impact, were acts of aggression for the expansion of Israel. At each war Israel conquered territories, and was always reluctant to relinquish it by negotiation, for negotiation in Israel's eyes is about imposing recognition of the new expansion<sup>94</sup>. At each conquest Israel sought to expel the indigenous and settle new comers from all over the world. Israel's reluctance to recognize any Palestinian State in the occupied territories, Israel's annexation of the occupied Syrian Golan<sup>95</sup>, and finally Israel's actual refusal to return The Golan back are all conclusive indices for Israel aspiration for expansion. It follows that, all defensive pretexts or "security" justifications are and has always been, from Syrian perspective hypocritical arguments hiding below them deep anchored conviction in Israeli conscience of expansion on the expenses of other, and Syria is particularly concerned in this regard.

Syrian conscience is thus totally uncomfortable and indeed critical of the way the actual peace negotiations are conducted. By fragmenting the problem, Israel succeeded in consolidating its new expanded situation, and aims now at further strengthened expansion by assuring its domination through its centrality not only in security terms but also in all other sectors of life. Syrians regard with suspicions whatever call for more Israeli role in the development of the region. for Syrians what is instead true and alarming is the deep rooted long term strategy -as identified by the World Zionist Organization- aiming at expansionism through Arab disintegration<sup>96</sup>. For Syrians, no element or gleam of confidence has ever occurred from previous experience that proves that Israel is intending to leave in peace in this region without any aspiration for expansion. Israel has not showed any reassuring gestures to Syria and the people of Syria as to any renunciation of its expansionist doctrines. Israel still maintain its annexation of the Golan defying not only International Law, but natural elementary justice.

#### **4. *Concluding Remarks***

Three important realities must be understood in order to appreciate the Syrian perception of the political threats to its security:

1. By purposely disregarding the concerns of the Arabs, and their rights to self-determination, by colonizing through whatever confrontational means, the peace and security of simple societies, exhausted from centuries of occupation, by having literally applied the same Nazi treatments endured by the Jews on the Arabs and that through dispossessing hundreds of thousands of peoples of their homes, to murder them or throw them in refugee (concentration) camps, Zionists and Israel have been, from the Syrian perspective, the initial aggressors. They are indeed the initiators of conflict.

2. Furthermore, in all wars, in each and every incident, of large or small scale, Israel was the aggressor, and Arabs were the victims who suffered the larger casualties. In each war or small confrontation, Arabs suffered humane lives more than 4 times what Israel did suffer. Only the aggressor who is the more prepared to suffer less casualties, and only the relatively less armed victim who suffers more.

3. Arabs have always been pictured as a violent nation and inherently hostile to the "civilized" values that Israel is presenting. For Israel, this is the main source of conflict and the main factor of instability in the region. Arabs, and especially Syrians perceive themselves as victims of enormous injustice directed towards them, incomprehension of their concerns, total ignorance of their rights. They have been persistently subjugated, since the establishment of the State of Israel to persecution and deliberate ignorance of their aspiration. No people, can be inherently violent or hostile. Humane nature, seek to maximize peace, in time and in space. Some does it with conquest, imposition, hegemony, domination like Israel, and others do it through defense. Arabs whose peace and welfare have always been sabotaged by others, can not simply be considered as conquerors, or dominators, but rather defenders of their rights .

Israel continuous aggression based on its deep anchored expansionist ideology, have long constituted serious sources of threats to Arab and Syrian security, and were enormous factors of instability that marked the region since the creation of the State of Israel. Unfortunately, Israeli behavior from a Syrian standpoint, even in the midst of peace negotiations with discourses and logic of peace, does not lend but further confirmation of her aggressive and expansionist intentions.

## **II - The Military Threat**

After recalling Israeli Security arguments, It shall be advanced that since its establishment Israel enjoyed, with the help of the west, absolute conventional superiority at all times against all her Arab neighbors. It shall

thus be wondered whether, all of Israel security arguments about its vulnerability, in quantitative terms, are not after all highly questionable. An extensive discussion shall lastly be devoted to the Israeli nuclear threat. It shall be specifically asserted that unless Israel would not commit herself to the total disarmament of all her Nuclear as well as chemical arsenal, within a wider framework of mutual arrangements concerning weapons of mass destruction, in accordance with the spirit of the related international instruments, no genuine peace can be possible for the Arabs and especially Syria. An enormous sense of insecurity will continue to reign among the Arabs, and no peace is compatible with insecurity.

### *1. Israeli Security Arguments Revisited*

In very abstract reasoning detached from any historical context, the argument has repeatedly been made that since its establishment, Israel has always been surrounded by hostile population, not hesitant to employ whatever means possible for its elimination.

The effect of this "existential threat" has been multiplied through the years by increasing unjustified hatred from the part of the "inherently violent" Arabs, and concomitant increasing vulnerability, of the Israeli society. After all, inherent asymmetries in the attributes of force do naturally exist among the Arabs and the Israelis. The natural lack of strategic depth with all the problems related to the proximity of large Israeli population centers to the fronts, the natural quantitative asymmetry in numbers, and the psychological Israeli self-perception related to the painful recent past, are all concerns that have to be taken into consideration in times of war and peace and in absolute terms. Arab hatred entertain additional concerns when it is translated into the continuous and increasing Arab procurement of Arms of all sorts, be it conventional, non conventional, or delivery systems.

According to Israeli analysts, Israel must stress absolute qualitative superiority<sup>97</sup> to offset the existing asymmetry in number. Relying on a *Don Quichottian* "worst case" reasoning, that presupposes a joint Arab surprise attack aiming at eliminating it, Israeli "experts", dared even to justify the introduction of nuclear weapons as the "ultimate deterrent"<sup>98</sup> against the "hostile", inherently "violent" Arabs. For many Israeli commentators, nuclear weapons reveal to be indispensable for this is the only force that can remedy the inherent asymmetry in number existing between the Arabs and the Israelis. Shimon Peres reportedly believed that Nuclear weapons would "deliver unto Israel a guaranty of Nationhood"<sup>99</sup>. Opinion polls recently conducted in Israel shows that 88% of the Israelis believe that "their conscience would be clear" if their country used atomic bombs, in the sense that it is morally acceptable for them to incinerate millions of civilians to defend Israel<sup>100</sup>. To this effect, Nuclear weapons represent for Israel an advantage against its opponents that should be kept and defended by any means even through "preventive" actions.



A "nuclear Israel" Status should, in any event, be preserved in times of peace for it is the only force that can offset the inherent Arab quantitative advantage thus assuring sustained balance and stability to the region<sup>101</sup>.

## 2. *Israel Conventional Superiority*

While such line of reasoning appear to be logically sustained for Israeli "experts", it flagrantly defies any rationality from a Syrian perspective. The image for the Arabs, and especially the Syrians is that of an Israel, back, since its establishment, by all superpowers, armed to its teeth of state-of-the-art equipments, continuously harassing and aggressing the peace and security of the Arabs. For Syrians, Israel has never been vulnerable.

Indeed, since its establishment over the ruins of Arab homes, villages and towns, Israel enjoyed absolute military supremacy in all fields and against all Arabs. In 1948, Israel was quantitatively and qualitatively superior to all Arab armies that rushed to defend their fellow Arabs in Palestine<sup>102</sup>. Over the following years, at a time when "quality" was becoming as important if not more important than "quantity"<sup>103</sup>, Israeli actions of aggression that resulted in the military confrontations that marked the Arab-Israeli conflict assured total Israeli supremacy not only against individual Arab States forces but against any combination of Arab States. Israel who started all wars, inflicted casualties to the Arabs 4 times than what she suffered. Its continuous aggressivity has incited the arms race in the region and driven it to dangerous proportions. Many have argued that the combination of superior training, maneuver capability, and tactical and technical innovation have decisively contributed to this supremacy<sup>104</sup>. Yet, they refuse to consider that Arab forces seriously lacked access to many of the advanced Western Weapons and technology, as Israel had. The West simply denied weapons to the Arabs. The East and especially the former Soviet Union restricted the availability of many key systems to the Arab world, thus negatively affecting its defense capabilities vis-à-vis Israel.

Israeli officials always knew that they are at each moment in a position of total superiority against all Arabs. Indeed, a large part of the Israeli absurd "preventive" actions that had been taken against the Arabs were specifically about preserving superiority. In 1956, Israel could not permit Egypt to absorb the newly acquired weapon systems for it may have a slight chance of somewhat undermining Israeli superiority. In no way the new purchased arms would have destabilized the superiority had they been absorbed by the Egyptian Army, and the Israelis most probably knew it. But the slightest action was not permitted. Israel's provocations did not succeed in dragging Nasser into an all out war. She finally opted for participating more bluntly with France and Great Britain for destroying Nasser's newly acquired potential.

At no time has there been the slightest doubt among Israeli ruling elite or even in Israeli society that Israel's superiority was undermined from any or even from all of its Arab neighbors. Particularly reassuring, has there always been the commitment of many western countries, since the establishment of the State of Israel to its military superiority, and "qualitative edge". In his recent address to the Israeli Knesset, President Clinton recalled in this regard that:

"In times of war and times of peace, every president of the US since Harry Truman, and every congress has understood the importance of Israel...Our rôle in war has been to help you defend yourself by yourself. That is what you have asked. Now that you are taking risks for peace, our role is to help you minimize the risks of peace. I am committed to working with our congress to maintain the current levels of military and economic assistance. We have taken concrete steps to strengthen Israel's qualitative edge. The US-Israel Science and technology commission unprecedented Israeli access to the US high-technology market, and acquisition of advanced computers -- all these keep Israel in the forefront in global advances and competitive and global markets. I have also taken steps to enhance Israel's military and your capacity to address possible threats not only to yourselves, but to the region. F-15 aircraft are being provided, and F-16s transferred out of US stocks. We work closely with you to develop the Arrow missile, to protect against the threat of Ballistic Missiles.."105

Indeed, The West never saved any effort to provide Israel with state-of-the-art offensive weapon systems.

For Israel, the past four decades and so of its establishment were not really about acquiring the means of offsetting the Arab sheer mass but were really about gradually detaching Israel from its dependence on western powers to assure total superiority with independence. The Israeli anxiety to depend on indigenous production of different systems revealed, by the time, to be fruitful. Israel achieved some independence in, producing transport aircraft, multi role combat aircraft, fighter aircraft, armored vehicles including main battle tanks and warships<sup>106</sup>. It has been also reported that Israel's armament industry become large enough for the country to sell significant amounts of weapons abroad<sup>107</sup>.

Yet, still Israeli "experts" and "officials" feign crying their so called "vulnerability", and persistently underscore unfounded Arab sustained hostility. They still complain from Western discrimination against Israel with regard to the exports of Arms<sup>108</sup>. For some, "embargoes on arms sales have been directed against Israel and not the Arab States; there are a number of countries in the western world, like Great Britain, that will freely sell arms to

the Arab countries but not to Israel" After all, these are the only arguments that can cherish Western sympathy.

### 3. *The Israeli Nuclear Armament*

Particularly alarming for the Arabs in general and the Syrian in particular has been the gradually confirmed information that Israel does not only have the technical capability to manufacture nuclear weapons, but is indeed stockpiling large quantities of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons of different yields, and does indeed possess a significant number of indigenously manufactured delivery systems.

#### 3.1. *The Israeli Nuclear Arsenal*

Indeed, since the institution of Israel in 1949, at a time when its military superiority was confirmed vis-à-vis all Arabs, and long before any Arab country began acquiring any types of weapons, Israel initiated its nuclear program with the aim of manufacturing nuclear weapons<sup>109</sup>. Israel was indeed the first to introduce weapons of mass destruction to the Arab-Israeli region of conflict. Many reports, have gradually confirmed thereafter the existence of a serious Israeli nuclear program and the piling up of nuclear warheads<sup>110</sup>.

Israel did not confirm or deny<sup>111</sup>. It deliberately adopted a posture of "calculated ambiguity"<sup>112</sup> or a "secrecy without absolute secrecy"<sup>113</sup> of a so called "threshold" State, for the many advantages that such status would offer<sup>114</sup>. For many analysts such posture has a deterrent effect. After all nuclear weapons are weapons of "last resort". Over the years, its unsafeguarded Dimona reactor produced a full range of nuclear weapons in several sizes and configurations. While speculation is characteristic of most analysts account on Israeli nuclear capabilities because of her ambiguous attitudes, they all seem to agree, however, that since 1964, Israel produced, hundreds of Nuclear weapons of the "Nagasaki" yield of 20 kilotons or an explosive power of 20,000 tons of TNT<sup>115</sup>. Reports also indicate that Israel is also endeavoring to build thermonuclear H Bomb of yields exceeding 200 kilotons<sup>116</sup>. The Israeli nuclear test conducted on September 22, 1979 in the south Atlantic Indian ocean, that has been detected by the American Vela satellite was a test involving the triggering mechanism for a thermonuclear weapon.<sup>117</sup> It also became largely known that Israel manufactured tactical weapons of low yields not exceeding 2 kilotons<sup>118</sup>. Many reports indicate that Israeli artillery battalions are being equipped with nuclear shells for 155-mm howitzers and possibly 203-mm guns<sup>119</sup>. Particularly alarming was information to the extent that nuclear mines are even planted in the Golan heights<sup>120</sup>. The inventory of Israeli Mass destruction weaponry does not stop on the devastating nuclear weapons but also includes an important offensive Chemical and biological weapons capability<sup>121</sup>.

Analysts also agree that Israel possesses a sophisticated combination of missiles and advanced aircraft that could carry and deliver nuclear warheads. The Western made A-4 skyhawk attack bombers, the F-4 E Phantom fighter-bombers, the Mirage III B fighter-bombers, are aircraft possessed by the Israeli army and suitable for potential delivery of nuclear bombs<sup>122</sup>. The US made F-16 AS fighter striker and F-15 Eagle fighter/interceptor aircraft, that are part of the Israel Air Force, the indigenously made Kfir type aircraft which "can compete with the most sophisticated American technology"<sup>123</sup> can also be suitable for delivery<sup>124</sup>.

There are also convincing indication that Israel has deployed nuclear armed missiles on mobile launchers, somewhere in the 1970s. Most sources call the first of these indigenously made missiles the Jericho I, but Israel has never publicly named its long range missiles system<sup>125</sup>. Most likely Israel has now deployed about hundreds of these missiles. According to some sources, these missiles are even deployed on mobile erector launchers in the Golan<sup>126</sup>. It has also been reported that Israel had successfully test-fired in May 1987 -in the same year of the establishment of the Missiles Technology Control Regime (MTCR) which was set up by seven industrialized countries to restrain the exports of materials which could assist the production of missiles- an intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads<sup>127</sup>. The missile named, Jericho II, had been developed thereafter to reach ranges way over 900 miles. According to observers, as many as 100 Missiles of this type have been deployed in the Negev, but also in the Golan<sup>128</sup>. Following the launching on September 19, 1988, of the first Israeli Satellite Ofteq 1, on a Shavit booster, the latter particularly interested "experts", for it could also reach very distant targets. Analysts advance that , for a reduced size of a nuclear warhead of 650 pounds, Shavit's maximum range could be 5.500 miles<sup>129</sup>. Such Israeli capabilities put all Europe, Africa, and Asia except for parts of the Russian far East and Indonesia, within its striking range<sup>130</sup>. The basic Target , however of Israel's nuclear arsenal has been and will continue to be, even in "peace" time, its Arab neighbors. Should war break out in the Middle East for whatever provocation orchestrated by Israel as she always did, a nuclear escalation, which was presented as "unthinkable except as a last resort", would now be a strong probability, in which Tactical but also strategic weapons can be used. Indeed, since 1967, three Israeli nuclear alerts<sup>131</sup> have taken place during the four military confrontation that marked the region. Israel was, in fact, prepared, in 1967, 1973, and 1991 to use nuclear bombs against Arab population centers<sup>132</sup>.

### *3.2. World Support of Israel Quest for Nuclear Weapons*

Many have supported Israel in her quest for nuclear armament. France was particularly actively involved in the early years, in providing whatever assistance, be it financial, supply of materials, or sharing know hows with

Israeli scientists about tests and other experiences<sup>133</sup>. Argentina<sup>134</sup>, Norway<sup>135</sup>, South Africa<sup>136</sup> have also participated in different stages, in the Israeli nuclear program.

The United States policy of passive assistance<sup>137</sup> has vitally contributed to the development of such program. Indeed most of the of Israel's nuclear war-fighting capability -technology and equipment have "made in USA" stamped on it<sup>138</sup>. Huge funding not only from American very influential Jewry but also from the US government have largely contributed to the building up of this enormous nuclear superpower<sup>139</sup>. Israeli scientists have had the opportunity in countless occasions to visit Los Alamos or Livermore labs, or other research centers of the like, and had access to classified information<sup>140</sup>. Reports also indicate that Lobbying, is intensely underway to supply Israel with very high speed sophisticated American supercomputers that would permit Israel to reduce its testing requirements for nuclear weapons and missile designs<sup>141</sup>.

### *3.3. The Concern of the United Nations*

Over the years, the United Nations, repeatedly expressed its "increasing concern regarding the danger of the introduction of nuclear weapons" in the Arab Israeli region of conflict, arising from the Israeli nuclear ambitions. It specifically expressed its conviction that the development of nuclear capability by Israel would "threaten the international peace and security" and constitute a serious "danger to the cause of non-proliferation in General"<sup>142</sup>.

The United Nations also expressed its apprehension regarding the issue of "military and nuclear collaboration" between some States and Israel. The General Assembly specifically called "upon all States to end transfer of nuclear equipment or fissionable material or technology to Israel"<sup>143</sup>. Israel continues to defy the concerns of the International conscience, and the "cause of non-proliferation", by continuing to ignore repeated calls by the United Nations that she "should renounce, without delay, the possession of or any intention to possess nuclear weapons".

Israel never signed and still refuses to join the NPT, or to put the entirety of its nuclear installations and especially its very dangerous, old, but capacity increased, Dimona reactor under IAEA safeguard. For Israeli strategists, International organizations, including the IAEA, systematically discriminated against Israel in favor of the Arabs<sup>144</sup>. Such frameworks proved in practice to be inherently deficient for they could not control Iraq in its quest for Nuclear Power. They further assert that these frameworks always discriminated against Israel in favor of the Arabs and put Israel in disadvantage, and did no justice to the Israeli cause. An Arab observer would rather wonder whether there is not after all an enormous discrimination against the Arabs in favor of Israel, when the IAEA rigorously applies the "non-

proliferation spirit" on the embryonic Iraqi nuclear program, and modestly content to verbally condemning the Israeli aggression against Iraq, without taking any effective action concerning the real issue in the region which is the Israeli nuclear armament.

### 3.4. *The Syrian Perception*

Despite the hypocritical Israeli attitude of deliberate ambiguity, and its assertion that "it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons", the very alarming fact remains that Israel has effectively developed large quantities of nuclear weapons with the appropriate means of delivery. Inherently, the introduction by Israel of the nuclear weapons to the Arab Israeli region of conflict is a serious destabilizing factor in the already asymmetrical balance of force that exists among the neighboring Arabs and Israel.

A Syrian perception can not identify any deterrence element of defensive character from the Israeli huge effort of nuclear arms build up. Israeli nuclear armament, can not seriously be aimed at canceling out the Arabs' possession of it, because the latter simply do not possess it nor are they aiming at acquiring it at all, for it is contrary to the "non-proliferation spirit". In any event, they are not allowed to even think of acquiring nuclear weapons to offset Israeli superiority. Israel will be willing to aggress neighboring sovereignties as violently as possible in order to preserve its superiority in this domain. In such environment of conflict, where Israel enjoys absolute superiority in all times, and against all Arabs through conventional means, the Israeli nuclear armament does not taint but offensive goals aiming at furthering expansionism through aggression.

It also becomes more and more difficult from a Syrian perspective to accept the deterrent value of the Israeli nuclear weapons, when the Israeli actual capability way exceeds the deterrent satisfactory capability sufficient of destroying most of the Arab forces. For many "experts", a "last ditch" nuclear deterrent would be adequately provided by ordinary fission nuclear weapons targeted on the major Arab cities in Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Libya. A dozen or so<sup>145</sup>, may be 30-40<sup>146</sup> nuclear weapons with yields of 20 kilotons would do the job. Thermonuclear weapons would not be needed for such strategy. Such nuclear weapons can be used, according to experts, against all these targets with a minimal of damage to Israel<sup>147</sup>. Nevertheless Israel has built, and continues to manufacture, even within the peace process, nuclear weapons capable of twice totally incinerating the Arab world. Some have argued that this huge Israeli nuclear power is after all "political"<sup>148</sup> and not war-fighting. From a Syrian perspective, the only "political" element in such offensive nuclear arms build up that defies the regional norms, is certainly not "deterrence" but rather an Israeli determination not to renounce its nuclear superiority at all times, and to impose by force a long term Israeli hegemony in the region.

The Syrian concerns increase with the information that Israel has produced tactical battlefield nuclear weapons, thus lowering, for the Israeli army, the level of conflict triggering nuclear escalation. The Israeli nuclear devices are no longer weapons of "last resort", but rather war-fighting instruments that should confront Arab conventional forces<sup>149</sup>. In such environment of conflict where Israel has always been the aggressor, who declared during 4 military confrontations, 3 nuclear alerts in two of them the contiguous Syria was involved, the probability that Israel would not hesitate to use tactical nuclear weapons for whatever worthless reasons, is large enough to further increasing Syria's sense of insecurity.

Israel has become a *de facto* nuclear superpower<sup>150</sup>. Its defense capabilities with respect to chemical weapons or Ballistic missiles has largely increased. After all, the effect of Chemical weapons compared with nuclear warheads is highly unreliable and can be entirely neutralized with relatively inexpensive techniques<sup>151</sup>. The Israeli defensive capabilities are, in this regard, among the best in the world<sup>152</sup>. Similarly, the US committed itself to the continued assistance and funding for the (Arrow) , antitactical ballistic missiles system<sup>153</sup>. In general, Israel has a strong infrastructure in the cities to manage an all out war, and even to survive a nuclear war that may be triggered by a chimeric nuclear Arab threat. While Israel has become a veritable bunker, all Arab States, each and every important city, is within the target range of Israeli nuclear weapons<sup>154</sup>. They are absolutely vulnerable compared to Israel. Arab neighboring States, simply do not have the access to any similar defensive systems that Israel is acquiring. Israel is thus capable at any time, and according to whatever insignificant justification, of incinerating with a limited use of its nuclear capability two thirds of the Arab neighboring populations, because of the dense urban demographic concentrations characteristic of Arab societies. From a Syrian perspective, experience has shown that, this is not an unlikely situation, but rather a very possible one due to the combination in the Israeli phenomenon of expansionist ideology and aggressive intentions, thus irrationality with nuclear weapons. Indeed the worse can be expected.

Syria as did most neighboring Arab countries, persistently called upon Israel to more appreciate the sense of insecurity suffered by the Arabs from the Israeli nuclear threats. Syria as well as most Arab countries continuously demanded that Israel should renounce the possession of nuclear weapons<sup>155</sup>. They constantly affirmed the impossibility to achieve any durable peace in the region with the destabilizing effect of the Israeli nuclear arsenal<sup>156</sup>. Arab neighboring countries, persistently called upon Israel to provide some elements of confidence to assure that Israel want sincerely to live in peace within its Arab neighbors. Accession to the NPT regime by Israel appeared to be an important step to provide confidence for the insecure Arab neighbors. After all, a stable balance of force in the region, that would constitute the right framework for effective and balanced arms control measures would at least

require that Israel renounce *prima facie* all its nuclear capability, within perhaps a framework of weapons of mass destruction arrangements.

Israel, however does not seem to be willing to renounce its nuclear capability in any framework of Weapons of Mass Destruction mutual arrangements. With a nuclear arsenal capable of targeting nuclear powers, Israeli planners are most likely perceiving themselves as already a nuclear superpower that should be recognized in any future framework of global non-proliferation. For Israeli "experts" in any case, "efforts to force Israel to give up its nuclear option without major reductions in Arab conventional forces are interpreted by Israeli leaders as evidence that the Arab States wish to retain the option of waging wars against Israel"<sup>157</sup>. Israeli analysts would simply want the Arabs totally unarmed, before even discussing any Israeli nuclear weapons. However, Israeli "security" arguments are too stretchy. They can be taken too far. After all, it has been increasingly argued that hostility or hatred against Israel, is not only sensed from the part of Arab States, but it also is too present in the world of Islam<sup>158</sup>. If its flow within the Arab States seems to be rescinding, its effusion within the world of Islam is increasing to some alarming degrees etc..... Israel, it is repeatedly argued, must thus be superior enough to face all these and other potential threats, in the sense that as long as threats of the like continue, "nuclear weapon will continue to be seen as the Ultimate guarantor against existential threats"<sup>159</sup>. This is taken too far, and may also be taken further from any party whose only aim is to consolidate his hegemonic intentions. Unless there are some defined standards to halt such way of reasoning, Israel will continue to claim for a legitimate superiority in a manner that has been and will always be detrimental to all its neighbors, as well as to International peace and security.

### Conclusion

Israel egocentric and "selfish"<sup>160</sup> perceptions of the regional security have made her persistently fail to perceive or deliberately avoid to sense that the real reasons behind the uneasiness of the Arab world with the Israeli phenomenon was precisely the confrontational, aggressive, expansionist, and hegemonic attitudes of Israel. Israelis always refused to see that Arabs and especially Syrians have constantly sensed an enormous injustice when it came to addressing their concerns.

In this paper, It is submitted that the Zionist and then the Israeli disregard of the aspirations of the Arabs was the torch that triggered the conflict. The subsequent Israeli aggressions against the Arabs continued until now to aliment it. It is further advanced that, it was Israel that triggered the Arms race in the region, by introducing since its establishment state-of-the-art conventional weapons, and also non conventional nuclear weapons. All Arab reactions, thereafter, had purely defensive character and were natural efforts to catch up Israeli superiority. Arabs never succeeded in even approaching Israeli



capabilities. In fact, they are simply not permitted to do so. Ironically, these efforts have been exploited by efficient propaganda, to cherish more sympathy, justify more Israeli arms build up, warrant more expansionism through aggression, and even legitimize the acquisition of more nuclear weapons.

If the real issue in the actual peace process is the acceptance of the Arabs in the region of Israel living amongst them in peace, all efforts should be exerted to convince the Arab populations of the genuine Israeli intentions to live in peace. If Israel is sincerely intending to live in peace in this region, it should not be reluctant or hesitant to provide whatever reassurance of good faith.

Unfortunately, Israel does not seem to be willing to provide any reassuring signs that she does want to live in peace within its neighbors. She continues to harass neighboring Arabs, refusing to end the occupation of their territories conquered in 1967, and she is certainly not willing to adhere to the NPT in the foreseeable future. The actual fragmented peace process appears to be about consolidating past gains, rather than a quest for genuine peace. Such attitude is short sighted, and self destructive on the long run. No "territories of other States"<sup>161</sup> can guarantee security. Nuclear weapons can impose short term virtual peace, but promises long term disintegration due to increasing sense of dissatisfaction. As long as Israel would not be prepared to reconcile itself with its egocentrism and selfishness and demonstrate more open-mindedness, the actual "virtual peace" endeavor is bound to the gradual disintegration, in a way that can be detrimental to all.

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<sup>1</sup> Jewish religious fundamentalists discourses often assimilate Arabs to savage wild animals. For extremists, Arabs often are described as "dogs", "roaches", "Nazis", "murderers", "treacherous", or as snakes and as dangerous as wolves. Consider Kahana's statement that "Arabs are cancer, cancer, cancer in the midst of us", see **Sptinzak, Ehud**, *The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right*, Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 238; for analysts who have thoroughly studied Jewish fundamentalist phenomena, Jewish extremism remains ideologically the single most coherent and vigorous political force in Israel". In fact, its influence is reflected both in the actual obstacles to peace negotiations with Syria or the PLO, and in Israeli opinion polls, see **Lustick, Ian S.**, *Israel's dangerous fundamentalists*, Foreign Policy, 68 (1987), pp. 118-139, at p. 120. Such images, albeit tainted with less extremist language, are well anchored in the conscience of substantial parts of the Israeli political spectrum. Arabs are often seen as inherently "violent", "xenophobic", "aggressive", without any sense of civilized "democratic tradition", see **Natanyaho B.**, *A Place among the Nations: Israel and the World*, 1993, pp. 99-129.

<sup>2</sup> see for example **Meir, Golda.**, *Israel in Search of lasting Peace*, Foreign Affairs, 51, 3(1973), pp. 447-460, especially at p. 450; **Alpher, Joseph**, *Israel's security concerns in the peace process*, International Affairs 70, 2(1994) pp. 229-241, at p. 230.

<sup>3</sup> see in this sense **Salamé, Ghassan**, *Security Impossible to achieve, a Region Impossible to define*; Conference of Research Institutes in the Middle East, UNIDIR/49/6, 1994, pp. 15-27, at p. 19; and see for example, **Evron, Yair**, *Israel, in Security with Nuclear Weapons? Different perspectives on national security*, SIPRI, 1991, pp. 277-297, at p. 279;

<sup>4</sup> **Alpher, Joseph**, *Israel's Security Concerns*, Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> **Steinberg Gerald**, *A Realistic Approach to Arms Control: An Israeli Perspective.*, Conference of Research Institutes in the Middle East, UNIDIR, 1994, pp. 69-79.

<sup>6</sup> see in this sense, the speech of Mr. Farouk Al-Shara, the Syrian foreign minister, before the General Assembly of the UN at its 49th session (source, *Syria Times*, October 4, 1994).

<sup>7</sup> see for example, **Harrkabi, Yehoshafat**, *Arab Strategies and Israeli Response, 1977*, **Limone Shmuel**, *The Arab Threat: The Israeli Perspective*, UNIDIR, paper presented at the conference of Malta in April 1994, p. 1, unpublished; **Alpher J.**, *Israel's security concerns*, p. 231; **Gur, Mordechai**, *Destabilizing Elements of the Middle East Military Balance*, in Arms Control in the Middle East, Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, Study Number 15, 1990, pp. 9-26, at p. 13; **Pipes Daniel**, *Is Damascus Ready for Peace*, Foreign Affairs, (1990), pp. 34-52, at p. 38; **Levite Ariel**, *Israel's security Conception and its Attitude toward Arms Control*, in Arms Control in the Middle East, Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, Study Number 15, 1990, pp. 124-131, at p. 125; **Steinberg Gerald**, *A Realistic Approach to Arms Control: An Israeli Perspective*, UNIDIR, Conference of Research Institutes in the Middle East, 1994, pp. 69- 79, at p. 70; **Shalev, Aryeh**, *Israel and Syria: Peace and security on the Golan*, JCSS Study No. 24, 1994, at p. 11.

<sup>8</sup> **Freir, Shalheveth**, *A Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East and its Ambiance*, UNIDIR, paper presented at the conference of Malta in April, 1994, pp. 10, 12; **Begin, Ze'ev**, *The Likud Vision for Israel at Peace*, Foreign Affairs, Fall (1991), pp. 21-36, at pp. 26, 27, 28, 29, 33.

<sup>9</sup> **Begin**, *The Likud Vision...*, p. 28.

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- 10 Ibid.
- 11 Limone, S., *The Arab Threat*..., p. 8; Netanyahu, B., *A Place among the Nations*..., p. 115.
- 12 Limone, S., Ibid.; Netanyahu B., *A place among the Nations*, p. 113; Heller, Mark A., *The Israeli-Palestinian Accord: An Israeli View*, Current History, February (1994), pp.56-62, at p 58.
- 13 see for example Limone, *The Arab Threat*..., pp. 2, 6; Begin, *The Likud Vision*, op. cit., pp. 29, 33; Feldman Shai, *Security and Arms Control in the Middle East: An Israeli Perspective*, in *Arms Control and Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia*, (1991), Shelley Stahl and Geoffrey Kemp ed., pp. 75-91, at p. 77; Gur, M., *Destabilizing Elements*, at pp. 9, 13
- 14 Feldman, S., *Security and Arms Control*..., p 78.
- 15 Alpher, *Israeli Security Concerns*..., p. 231.
- 16 Freier, S., *A NWFZ in the Middle East*..., p. 12.
- 17 see for example Alpher, *Israel's security Concerns*..., p. 231; Limone, S., *The Arab Threat*, p.2, 4; Evron Yair., *Israel*, p. 279; Feldman, S., *Security and Arms Control*, p. 77; Gur, M., *Destabilizing Elements*..., pp. 9, 13.
- 18 see for example Limone, S., *The Arab Threat*, p.3; Evron Y., *Israel*, p. 279.
- 19 Limone S., *The Arab Threat*..., p.4.
- 20 Limone, S., Ibid, Arens M., *Towards a Strategically Stable Middle East*, in *Arms Control in the Middle East*, Dore Gold ed., Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, pp. 132-139, at p. 136.
- 21 Arens, M., *Toward a Strategically Stable Middle East*, p. 135.
- 22 Steinberg, G., *A realistic Approach*..., p. 78.
- 23 Shikaki, Khalil, *Palestinian Security Needs and Concerns*, UNIDIR, unpublished paper, presented at the Malta meeting on (Confidence-Building in the Middle East), April 1994, p. 2. For Shikaki, "Security concerns have usually been seen through Israeli perspective only. Palestinian long range strategic concerns have rarely informed security discourse"
- 24 see for example the speech of the American secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, before the American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), where he exposes the Clinton's administration awareness of the Israeli security concerns, he specifically expresses the commitment of the administration to "Israel's qualitative superiority", and to provide whatever needed "assistance". see *Mideast Mirror*, June 16, 1993. see also President Clinton speech before the Israeli Knesset, *Los Angeles Times*, 28 October 1994.
- 25 see for example the different solutions proposed in the work of the United States Institute of Peace Press, on *Arms Control and Confidence Building in the Middle East*, Alan Platt, ed., (1992).
- 26 Salamé, Ghassan, *Security Impossible to achieve*..., p. 15.

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27 **Salamé, Ghassan**, *Preliminary thoughts on the Middle Eastern Market*, in *New Middle Eastern Challenges and the Arab World*, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 1994, pp. 32-58, at p. 42, in Arabic.

28 **Weizmann, Chaim**, *Trial and Error - The Autobiography*, New York, 1949, p. 86; see also **Tessler Mark.**, *A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Indiana University Press, 1994, p. 55.

29 **Garaudy, Roger**, *L'affaire Israel, le sionisme politique*, Paris, 1983, p. 12.

30 **Naidu, M.V.**, *The Irrational Roots of the Middle East Crisis: An Analytical Background*, *Peace Research*, 25 3(1993), pp. 1-44, at p. 16.

31 **Hourani, Albert**, *A History of the Arab Peoples*, London, 1991, p. 235.

32 According to Tessler, anti-Zionism among the Arabs in Palestine, although increased in serious proportion, after 1908, remained relatively limited (**Tessler M.**, *A history...*, p. 133).

33 see for example **Tessler, M.**, *A History...*, p. 141-145.

34 In 1917, While they were exploring the option of an alliance with the Arabs, Zionists officials were also in contact with the colonizers, the Ottomans, because they believed that an accord with the Turks is more beneficial to their aspiration (**Tessler, M.**, *A History ...*, p 141). Similarly, while Weizman declared to the Arab leadership, in 1919, that he supported Arab claims vis-à-vis the West, he told the Paris peace Conference at Versailles, a couple of days later, that the Zionist favored a British trusteeship in Palestine, contrary to Arab aspiration. For Tessler, Weizmann did not see this as injurious to the Arabs. Zionists were always in favor of a creation of a hegemonic Israeli State. Tessler specifically states that "Under these circumstances, Faycal's vision of an independent Arab kingdom with a region available for Jewish development might have been attainable... Most Arabs...feared that increased Jewish immigration would mean the loss of their political rights and the transformation of their country's Arab character. These fears might have diminished significantly had Palestine been incorporated into an independent Arab Kingdom roughly coterminous with Greater Syria, since both the political rights and the cultural aspiration of the State's Arab inhabitants would then have been secure...It would also have been necessary for Zionist leadership to place less faith in Britain and more in the Arabs, especially the Arabs in Palestine. When Weizmann told the Paris Conference that the Jews favored a British mandate, and then coupled this Statement with his famous pronouncement that Palestine would ultimately become "as Jewish as England is English", all hope was probably lost" (**Tessler, M.**, *A History...*, p. 167).

35 Arab prime ministers summarized the Arab view of Zionist ambitions, in 1947 in Cairo. For them the ultimate aim of the Zionist appeared to be "the acquisition of all Palestine, all Transjordan and possibly some tracts in Southern Lebanon and Southern Syria" (**Morris, B.**, *The Birth of the Palestinian refugee Problem...*, p. 24).

36 see the source in **Simons, Chaim**, *International Proposals to Transfer Arabs from Palestine, 1895-1947, A historical Survey*, New Jersey, 1988, p. 13.

37 **Morris, Benny**, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem*, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 25.

38 **Morris, Benny**, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem...*, p. 27; **Garaudy R.**, *L'Affaire Israel...*, p. 17.

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<sup>39</sup> Arab fears of displacement, heightened by the mass Jewish immigration from Europe, have all led to the 1936 strike and Arab revolt. the revolt was firmly suppressed by the British; see **Morris, B.**, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem...*, p. 5.

<sup>40</sup> For a detailed comparison between the Arab weak capabilities and the strong Jewish ones, see **Morris, B.**, op. cit., p. 21.

<sup>41</sup> A Jewish Intelligence source described in October 1947, the situation in the area by saying: "The *Fellah* (the simple Arab peasant) is afraid of the Jewish terrorists...who might bomb his village and destroy his property...The town dweller admits that his strength is insufficient to fight the Jewish force and hopes for salvation from outside (i.e., by Arab States)...Moderate majority of the Palestine's Arabs, are confused, frightened...All they want is peace and quiet." **Morris, B.**, p. 21.

<sup>42</sup> According to estimates 631.036 Arabs were deliberately expelled from most of the villages in Palestine; for a detailed account on each and every village and how many were expelled see **Nakhleh, I.**, *Encyclopedia of the Palestine Problem*, London, 1991, Vol I, p. 369.

<sup>43</sup> According to Morris 350 Villages have suffered such destiny; **Morris, B.**, op. cit. p. 156. For Nakhleh, 425 villages were completely destroyed out of 833 existing villages in 1948, and 158.332 houses were completely destroyed out of 179.316 existing houses in 1948.

<sup>44</sup> This is specifically the case of the Deir Yassin village. According to Morris sources some 250 Arabs, mostly non-combants, were murdered. There were also cases of mutilation and rape. The surviving inhabitants were expelled to Arab held East Jerusalem, (see **Morris, B.**, op. cit., p. 113, **Nakhleh I.**, *Encyclopedia...*, p. 271); although the massacre was roundly condemned by the main stream Jewish authorities, including the Haganah, and Ben-Gurion, such condemnation appeared to be meaningless, with the deliberate policy to expel or let the Arabs flee. In another village, Zarnuqa, a graphic description of what happened was given to the *Al hamishmare* newspaper: "The soldier told me how one of the soldiers opened a door and fired a sten at an old man, an old woman and a child in one burst, how they took the arabs...out of all the houses and stood them in the sun all day in the thirst and hunger until they surrendered 40 rifles...in the end the arabs were expelled from the village..." **Morris, B.**, op. cit., p. 127; in the Dawayna village, a massacre resulted in the killing of 100 unarmed men, women, and children (**Nakhleh I.**, *Encyclopedia...*, p. 272); for a detailed account of the massacres committed by Jewish militias and the amount of casualties see **Nakhleh I.**, *Encyclopedia...*, p p. 269-293.

<sup>45</sup> see for example the attack on Safad, where the Palmah Militia "intentionally left open the exit routes for the population to facilitate their exodus...the Palmah moved into and secured the empty Arab quarters of Safad, (**Morris, B.**, op. cit., p. 104); It has been continuously argued that the inhabitants fled following directives broadcasted by Arab radios exhorting the population to leave in order to clear the way for Arab invading armies (see for example **Natanyhu, B.**, *A place among the Nations...*, p. 142). Nevertheless, Morris argues that there exist no contemporary evidence to show that the leaders of the Arab States encouraged by any way the mass exodus. For Morris, there have been some evacuations of women and children, and evacuation from military reasons. On the contrary the Arab States neighbouring Palestine launched public campaign to stem the outflow of refugees from Palestine and to induce those who had fled to return. Morris specifically submits that the atocity factor, has demoralized the Arab inhabitants and induced them to flee for fear of persecution (see **Morris, B.**, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem...*, p. 66, 68); see in general about the deliberate Zionist

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campaign to drive the Palestinian out **Tessler, M.**, *A History...*, especially at p. 29; **Laurens, H.**, *Le Grand Jeu...*, p. 84; **Nakhleh, I.**, *Encyclopedia...*, pp. 261, 369)

46 **Nasser, G.**, *The Egyptian Revolution*, 33 2 Foreign Affairs, (Jan 1955), pp. 199-211, at pp. 210-211.

47 see about Syria's peace proposal in 1949, **Laurens, H.**, *Le grand jeu...*, p. 91; **Morris, B.**, *Israeli Border Wars, 1949-1956*, Oxford, 1993, p. 17.

48 see about the repeated propositions from King Abdulah of Jordan to make peace with Israel, **Morris, B.**, *Israel Border Wars...*, p. 16.

49 see about Nasser readiness for negotiations that would guarantee Arab rights **Morris, B.**, *Israel's Border Wars...*, p. 272); According to Mahmoud Riad, Nasser's foreign minister in the 1950s, Nasser was prepared for peace with Israel on the basis of the 1949 armistice agreements (**Riad, Mahmoud**, *The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East*, London, 1981, at p. 7); some Israeli scholars concurred with this assessment see for example (**Evron, Yair**, *The Middle East: Nations, Superpowers and Wars*, New York, 1973, p. 34.

50 Israel refused Syria's peace initiative in 1949. The US Minister in Damascus commented in an angry message to his government that: "Unless Israel can be brought to understand that it cannot have all of its cake (partition boundaries) and gravy as well (area captured in violation of truce, Jerusalem and resettlement of Arab refugees elsewhere) it may find it has won Palestine but lost peace. It should be evident that Israel's continued insistence upon her pound of flesh and more in driving Arab States slowly (and perhaps surely) to gird their loins (politically and economically if not yet militarily for long range struggle" (**Morris, B.**, *Israel's Border Wars...*, p. 17); The repeated propositions from king Abdulah of Jordan to make peace have failed. General Glub identified the reasons for this failure. For him. "The Israelis, though apparently desirous of peace, wanted it only on their own terms. They were not prepared to make adequate concessions (**Morris, B.**, *Israel's Border Wars...*, p. 16; see also about the Israeli Intransigence in the Lausanne conference in 1949, **Laurens, H.**, *Le Grand Jeu...*, P. 84 and **Morris Benny**, *A second Look at the Missed Peace, or smoothing out History: A Review Essay*, Journal of Palestine Studies, Fall 1994, pp. 78-87.

51 Israel conquered after the war 77% of the land of Palestine, 21% more than had been allocated to it by the 1947 UN Partition plan, see (**Neef, Donald**, *Israel-Syria: Conflict at the Jordan River, 1949-1967*, Journal of Palestine Studies, XXIII, 4 (summer 1994), pp. 26-40, at p. 27).

52 According to Neef, and he does not disclose his source the 1948 war dispersed from their homes nearly 1.2 million people (**Neef, D.**, *Israel-Syria...*, p. 27). Arab sources spoke of a total of 900 000 people, while Israeli sources contends that the number is rather 520 000 people. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency put the figure at 726 000 people (see in this regard **Morris, B.**, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem...*, p. 297).

53 In his report, the UN mediator for Palestine, strongly supported the right of the refugee to return to their homes "at the earliest practical date. No just and complete settlement was possible, the mediator wrote, if the right of return was not recognized it would be an offense against the principles of elemental justice if these innocent victims of the conflict were denied the right to return to their homes while Jewish immigrants flow into Palestine and indeed at least offer the threat of permanent replacement of the Arabs refugees" (cited in **Morris, B.**, *The Birth ...*, p. 151.

54 According to Morris, "Israeli troops and police more or less routinely beat captured infiltrators, sometimes torturing them and occasionally raped and/or

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murdered them". Morris specifically cites specific cases of this sort. For more details see **Morris, B., *Israel's Border Wars...***, p. 167.

55 The Traditional Israeli view is that infiltration was all or generally state-organized and inspired and terrorist in intent. For Morris, the documentation available does not support such argument. At least through most of the period from 1949 till 1956, Arab governments and armies opposed infiltration into Israel and attacks by infiltrators against Israel, primarily because they feared Israel's reprisals. According to Morris, Syria, apart from the struggle over the Demilitarized zones created in the armistice agreement, opposed and almost completely prevented infiltration (**Morris, B., *Israel's Border Wars...***, p. 414).

56 Major General Carl von Horn of Sweden, who served as the fourth United Nations Truce and Supervision Organization chief of Staff, described all incidents on the Syrian-Israeli Armistice border, that occurred soon after the armistice in **von Horn, Carl, *Soldiering for Peace***, London, 1966, p. 115.

57 see for example **Tessler, M., *A History...***, p. 360.

59 In 1951, Israel embarked on the drainage project from the Jordan river. After repeated condemnations from the Syrian Israel Armistice Commission, as well as from the security council, Israel stopped to quietly resume soon thereafter the National Water Carrier Project draining thereby water from lake Teberias (see **Neef D., *Israel-Syria...***, p. 29; **Laurens H., *Le Grand Jeu...***, p. 126, 130-131); This plan was of concern not only to Syria but to other Arab States as well. In 1960 the Arab league called it an "act of aggression against the Arab" (see **Tessler, M., *A History...***, p.360).

59 In an Israeli raid on May 4 1951 for example, launched against the AL-Humma district in the southern Demilitarized Zone, about 1.200 Arabs were forced out. The United States strongly protested the Israeli air raid. The security council also demanded return of the Arabs evicted, (see **Neef, D., *Israel-Syria...***, p. 31-32). Israel completed the expulsion of Palestinians living in the Demilitarized Zones during the Suez war. As Israeli troops attacked Egypt, other Israeli forces were endeavoring to drive out the remaining Arabs in Kirad Al-Baqqara, and Kirad Al-Ghanama.. Commenting in the Arabs Driven out during that period, UNTSO Chief of Staff General Bull of Norway later observed: "I imagine that a number of those evicted are somewhere in the Golan Heights and that their children have watched the land that had been for their families for hundreds of years being cultivated by Israeli farmers. That of course was a violation of the Armistice agreement, though I could not help thinking that in similar circumstances Norwegian peasants would almost certainly have acted in the same way. In the course of time all the Arab villages disappeared". (see **Bull, Odd, *War and Peace in the Middle East: The Experiences and views of a UN Observer***, London, 1976, p. 50.

60 For exmple, in the raid inside AL-Hamma dstrict (*supra* note 59), 1200 Arabs were forcibly dispossessed of their homes, security council demanded the return of the original inhabitants (see UNSC Res. 93 (1951) of 18 May 1951 S/21579; in the raid laid by Ariel Sharon, in December 1955, 56 Syrians were killed, UN Security Council unanimously condemned Israel for its flagrant violation of the armistice agreement (see UNSC Res. 111 (1956) of 19 January 1956 S/3538); in 1962, on the raid against the village Nuqayb in the Central DMZ between Israel and Syria, 30 Syrians were killed, Security council condemned Israel's "Flagrant violation of the Armistice Agreement" (see UNSC Res. 171 (1962) of 9 April 1962 S/51119; (see in general **Neef, D., *Israel-Syria...***, p. 34; **Laurens, H., *Le Grand Jeu...***, p. 127).

61 The argument has often been made in Israeli sources that all Israeli attacks have deterrent value and were indeed indispensable for their security, as they were only reactions against hostilities from Arabs. Nevertheless experience has objectively shown that Israel's aggressivity is only indispensable to expansionist

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intentions. In the attack conducted by Sharon, against a Syrian village in 1955 (*supra* note 61), Israel justified its action by arguing that the raid was in retaliation of a previous day's incident where Syrian troops had fired (with no casualties) at an Israeli patrol boat on lake Tiberias. This argument was disbelieved by objective research. According to Benny Morris, the raid was a well rehearsed military assault with broader aims. For Morris "the thinking behind the strike was to provoke Egypt into honoring its recent mutual defense pact with Syria by attacking Israel, thereby igniting the war Israel sought with Egypt. (see **Morris, B.**, *Israel's Border Wars...*, p. 364).

<sup>62</sup> According to Tessler, on 1955 for example, 234 Arabs were killed as result of similar Israeli aggressions in the Jordanian and Egyptian borders, against 55 Israelis. (see **Tessler, M.**, *A History...*, p. 346). For an account on Israeli attacks against Jordan, Lebanon Syrian, and Egypt, including air strikes see **Nakhleh, Issa**, *Encyclopedia of the Palestine Problem*, New York, 1991, Vol. 1, p. 414.

<sup>63</sup> In response to Israel increasing efforts for armament, but especially to the Baghdad Pact, Nasser concluded the famous Czech arms deal in 1955. This was some thing that should not be tolerated in Israel. This deal immediately raised the specter of an Israeli preemptive war before Egypt absorbed the new weapons and become too strong. Nevertheless, Israel, according to Morris, could not launch an unprovoked all-out assault on the Egyptian army, for it would be branded the aggressor and lose Western support. The policy of trapping Nasser into war by provoking him by a series of "justified" air strikes on Arab and especially Syrian villages revealed to be thus indispensable (see **Morris, B.**, *Israel's Border Wars...*, p. 279; **Tessler, M.**, *A History...*, p. 346; **Laurens, H.**, *Le Grand Jeu...*, p. 139).

<sup>64</sup> According to some estimates 5000 Arabs were killed and wounded, against 1088-1109 Israelis, following the Israeli aggression of 1956 (see **Cordesman A.H.**, *The Lessons of Modern War*, London, 1990, p. 18).

<sup>65</sup> In the 1967 War, Israel justified its massive attack by invoking the argument that it acted in self defense in face of the growing threat posed by Syrian heavy artillery on the Golan heights. It was also posed by president Nasser's bellicus actions, of asking UN troops stationing in the Sinai as a result of previous Israeli aggression to leave, and his order to close the strait of Tiran (see for example **Freier, S.**, *A NWFZ in the Middle East...*, p.11). Nevertheless, it has been remarked from Objective reliable sources that the threat posed to Israel by Syrian heavy artillery on the Golan before 1967 does not appear to have had the prominence at the time that it subsequently acquired in Israeli pronouncements. Donald Neef, observed that none of the UNTSO chiefs of staff in their *mémoires* considered as especially menacing the Golan gun emplacements; For Neef, the heights themselves are seldom mentioned. Indeed, UNTSO Chief of staff von Horn was one of the few to make a direct reference to Syrian guns on the Golan, remarking "it is unlikely that these would ever have come into action had it not *been for Israeli provocation*" (emphasis added)(see **von Horn, C.**, *Soldering for Peace...*, p. 117). For Neef, "the efficacy of Syrian artillery on the Golan Heights was not great enough to deter Israel from taking over the DMZ and the water of the Jordan Valley, or to prevent Israel's capture of the heights. And while there appears to be no reliable record of Total casualties caused by Syrian guns aimed at Israeli civilians between 1949 and 1967, not a single Israeli civilian is reported to have been killed by Syrian artillery in the six months before the 1967 war, a period of intense skirmishes between the two countries"(see **Neef, D.**, *Israel-Syria...*, p. 38). As for the Egyptian front, it has been rightly observed that Nasser in all his moves preceding the Israeli aggression had defensive intentions. According to Tessler, "convinced that Israel was indeed preparing to attack Syria, Nasser, according to the Egyptian-Syrian mutual defense agreement, reasoned that Israel might be deterred by the prospect of having to fight on a second front, and it is with this in mind that a redeployment of Egyptian forces in Sinai had been initiated...If Israel did invade Syria, the intensity of its strike would perhaps be weakened by a need to hold forces in reserve for action on the southern front...All of these possibilities emphasize the *defensive character of*



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Nasser's intentions and assert that Egypt was acting so as to reduce the possibility of war"; (see **Tessler, M., A History...**, p. 390.

66 Israeli aggression caused far larger casualties in human life among the Arabs than Arab defense among Israelis. 4296 Arabs were killed against way less then quarters among Israelis (750-983)(see **Dupuy Trevor, Elusive Victory: The Arab Israeli Wars**, New York, 1978). About one third of a population of 900.000 inhabitants of the West bank before 1967, fled across the Jordan River, because of the Israeli aggression, many becoming refugees for the second time (see **Tessler, M., A History...**, p. 403; **Nakhleh I., Encyclopedia...**, p. 897). On the Syrian Golan Heights, about a quarter of the 139.000 Syrians living in the areas captured by Israel fled during the war. It has been also reported that in the next six months, the Israeli occupation forces expelled another 95.000 people by demolishing villages, cutting of water and food supplies, and by threats reinforced by torture and execution of those who refused to leave. Expelled were compelled to leave behind everything they owed, shops full of goods, sheep and goats, clothes and household possessions, as well as lands, homes, vineyards, and apple trees. ( see in particular **Muslih Mouhammad, "The Golan: Israel and Syria, and strategic Calculations**, 47 4 Middle East Journal, (1993), p..628; **Neef, D., Israel-Syria...**, p. 37).

67 As negotiation proved to be blocked because of Israeli intransigence, not to end the state of aggression, Egypt and Syria, reached the conviction that only a reaction by force would permit the liberation of the territory occupied by force. Although Sadat's objective revealed to be very modest, a war of shock in order to reactivate the negotiation process, president Assad sought the liberation of the Golan , before any just peaceful solution would be envisaged by negotiation thereafter. He specifically declared: "The goal was the retrieval of territory which Israel occupied in 1967" (see **Seale Patrick., Assad: The Struggle for the Middle East**, London, 1988, p. 786; see also **Drysdale Alasdair, Hinnebusch Raymond, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process**, New York, 1991, p. 6).

68 According to estimates, 1407 houses were demolished in the occupied territories, between 1967 and 1986 (see **Nakhleh I., Encyclopedia...**, p. 576.

69 According o the encyclopedia of Palestine Problem, "thousands of lebanese and Palestinian refugees were killed in wantom Israeli air stirkes and aartillery bombardments (see **Nakhleh I., Encyclopedia...**, p. 898) On June 1982, the head of the International committe of the red cross declared that a total of (10.000) Palestinians and lebanese had died as a result of Israel's invasion against Lebanon. (see **Tessler, M., A History...**, p. 576). For example On August 12, Israeli air forces carried out 72 uninterrupyed bombing raids on the Lebanese Capital Beirut, killing 128 and wounding 400, most of them civilians. This attack brought a sharp protest from everywhere including the Americans (see **Tessler, M., op. cit.**, p. 589); see also security counicile resolution 520 condemning he Israeli Incursion into Beirut of September 17, 1982 SC Res 520, 37 UN SCOR (23395 meeting), UN Doc S/INF/38 (1982); or Security Council resolution 518 calling for Israeli cessation of military Activities in Lebanon of August 12, 1982 UN Doc S/INF/38 (1982) or SC Res 509, 515...

70 According to estimates, since the beginning of the Intifada until 1990, 950 Palestinian men, women and children were killed by Israeli Army and Jewish settlers; 130.000 Palestinian men women, and juveniles were arrested and put in prisons and concentration camps; 86.000 Palestinian men, women, and children were injured; 1.228 Palestinian houses were demolished; 164 Palestinian houses were sealed, and 140.000 fruit and olive trees were uprooted (see **Nakhleh I., Encyclopedia...**, p. 784).

71 Estimates show that in a relative normal occupation conditions before the Intifada, the reported incident of settler violence against Palestinian property and persons in the years 1980-1984, for example were of 384 incident which resulted in

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23 deaths, 191 injuries, 38 abductions, 99 harassment, and 1154 crimes against properties (see **Nakhleh, I.**, *Encyclopedia...*, p. 709).

72 On October 21, 1994, the Secretary General of the United Nations condemned the attack, see UN press release SG/SM/5450, of 21, October 1994.

73 see Israel's statement before the security council concerning its actions regarding the Osirak reactor, on June 12, 1981, UN Doc S/PV. 2280 (1981). Israel specifically declared that "In destroying Osirak, Israel performed an elementary act of self preservation, both morally and legally. In so doing, Israel, was exercising its inherently right of self defense as understood in general international law as preserved in Article 51 of the UN Charter". The Israeli "premeditated" aggression on Iraq has been specifically condemned by the security council resolution 487, UN Doc S/INF/37 (1981), and by the IAEA, UN Doc S/14532 (1981)

74 see **Tessler M.**, *A History...*, p. 660.

75 This attack has been particularly condemned by the security council in its resolution 573 UN Doc, S/INF/ , (1985)

76 **Freier, S.**, *A NWFZ in the Middle East...*, p. 11

77 **Rabinowicz Oscar**, *Jewish Cyprus Project*, New York, Hrezl Press, 1962, p. 17.

78 **Lusrick Ian.**, *For the Land and the lord: Jewish fundamentalism in Israel*, New york, p. 105.

79 cited in **Lustick, I.**, op. cit., p. 106

80 Ibid.

81 cited in **Sprinzak, Ehud.**, *The Ascendance ....*, p. 271

82 cited in **Lustick I.**, *For the Land and the Lord...*, p. 108.

83 **Patay Raphael**, *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl*, Translated to English by Harry Zohar, Herzl Press and Thomas Yassilov, Part one, p. 432.

84 Ibid, Part II, p. 711.

85 see the UN Study of the "Origins and Evolution of the Palestinian Problem 1971-1988", UN, New York, 1990, p. 30, and especially the map at p. 93.

86 **Ben Gurion, David**, *Rebirth and Destiny of Israel*, The Philosophical Press, New york, 1954, p. 419.

87 cited in the *Palestine Question*, Seminar of Arab Jurists on Palestine, Algiers, July 22-27, 1967, excerpts of which published in **Moore John Norton**, *The Arab Israeli Conflict*, Princeton University Press, Vol 1, pp., 253-385, at p. 375.

88 cited in **Garaudy R.**, *L'Affaire Israel...*, p. 157.

89 *Jerusalem Post*, August 10, 1967.

90 **Morris, B.**, *Israel's Border Wars...*, p. 11.

91 cited in **Garaudy R.**, *L'Affaire Israel...*, p. 158.

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92 *Seminar of Arab Jurists...*, in **Moore**, p. 373.

93 **Muslih Mohammad**, *Dateline: Asad is Ready*, 96 Foreign Policy, 1994, pp. 145-164, at p. 153.

94 Immediately after the 1967 aggression, Moshe Dayan is reported to have said that Israel "cannot go back to the ridiculous frontiers of 1948". The then Israeli foreign Minister Mr. Abba Eban declared that he "does not believe that the map of June 5th can be reestablished, (see *Seminar of Arab Jurists*, p. 379).

95 On December 14, 1981, Israel promulgated a law according to which the Laws of Israel shall be applied to the Golan Heights. (see 21 International Legal Materials 163, 1982) Syria immediately protested considering in particular that this Israeli decision is an "affirmation of the aggressive and expansionist policy" of Israel. Syria specifically warned about the extent of how much repercussion this annexation has on the security and peace in the region (see 11 Journal of Palestine Studies, Spring 1982, p. 199) Jordan also vehemently protested. Excerpts of its Statement is worse quoting in this context: " Israel has taken a new step on its aggressive and expansionist policy aimed at judaizing and annexing the occupied Arab territories by deciding to enforce Israeli law in the occupied Golan heights; This measure, which, in effect, means the annexation to Israel of that section of Arab territory, is one more in the series of steps taken by Israel in its expansion at the expense of Arab territory and rights. These measures include the usurpation of precious parts of Palestine in 1948, the occupation of other Arab territories in 1967, the judaization and annexation of Arab Jerusalem, and the establishment of settlements. Further moves have been to initiate the project for the construction of a canal linking the Mediterranean and Dead seas, the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear installations, the violation of Arab airspace, Israel's continuous aggressions against Lebanon and the Palestinian resistance. To this list must be added Israel's inhuman treatment of the Palestinian Arab people living under its occupation, who are heroically and unceasingly resisting Israel's schemes aimed at pushing through the self government conspiracy, perpetuating the occupation and annexing Arabs territory. This decision lies within the framework of the aggressive and expansionist policy pursued by successive Israeli governments... (see 11 Journal of Palestine Studies, Spring 1982, p. 200); the security council, in its resolution 497, deplored the annexation, and reaffirmed that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible in accordance with the charter, and considered that the Israeli decision is "null and void and without legal effect" (UN Doc S/INF/37 (1981).

96 *A Strategy for Israel in the 1980s*, Yediot Ahronot, January, 15, 1982, quoted extensively in **Garaudy R.**, *L'Affaire Israel...*, p. 166.

97 **Gur Mordachai**, *Destabilizing Elements...*, p. 16.

98 **Cordesmann, Anthony**, *Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East*, London, 1991, p. 116.

99 **Burrows William, Windrom, Robert**, *Critical Mass, The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmenting World*, New York, 1994, p. 282.

100 **Burrows W.**, *Critical Mass...*, p. 313; **Steinberg S.**, *A Realistic Approach...*, p. 77.

101 **Gur, M.**, *Destabilizing Elements...*, p. 16; **Steinberg, Gerald**, *Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security*, Survival, 36 1(spring 1994), pp. 126-141, at p. 130.

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<sup>102</sup> According to Cordesmann the 1948 conflict was essentially an infantry artillery battle of attrition. All Arab ground forces were about 22.000 and Israeli ground forces were about 70.000 men (for a detailed analysis see **Cordesmann, Anthony**, *The Lessons of Modern Wars: The Arab Israeli Conflict*, Vol 1, London, 1990, p. 15).

<sup>103</sup> **Cordesmann, Anthony**, *After the Storm, The changing Military Balance in the Middle East*, London, 1993, p. 25.

<sup>104</sup> see for example **Cordesmann, A.**, *The lessons of Modern War*, p. 351.

<sup>105</sup> US Newswire 28 October 1994, White House Press Office. This speech reiterated the content of a letter addressed to the Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, by President Clinton that he is committed to guaranteeing Israeli qualitative edge. (see translation into Arabic, *Journal of Palestinian Studies*, Winter 1994, pp. 248-249); for a critique of this exaggerated help to Israel see **Burrows, W.**, *Critical Mass*, p. 303; for an account of the US-Israeli cooperation see for example **Cobban, Helena**, *The Superpowers and the Syrian-Israeli Conflict, Beyond Conflict Management*, New York, 1991, pp. 78-111.

<sup>106</sup> **Barnaby Frank**, *Arms Control After the Gulf War...*, p. 2.

<sup>107</sup> According to commentators, Israel is selling air-to-air missiles to Argentina; ship-to-ship missiles, surface-to-surface missiles, and missile-armed patrol boats to Chile; multi-role combat aircraft and ship-to-air missiles to Colombia; fast patrol boats to Sri Lanka; air-to-air missiles to Thailand; and transport aircraft to Venezuela. Israel has issued licenses to Belgium to produce Israeli battlefield radar and to the USA to produce point defense radar and air-to surface missiles (see **Barnaby F.**, *Arms Control after the Gulf War*, p. 4; see also the Middle East Military Balance, 1992-1993, Jaffe Center For Strategic Studies, pp. 268-269.

<sup>108</sup> **Arens, M.**, *Toward a Strategically Stable Middle East*, p. 136.

<sup>109</sup> **Burrows W.**, *Critical Mass...*, p. 281; **United Nations**, *Study on Israeli Nuclear Armement*, New York, 1982, UN Doc. A/37/434, p. 8.

<sup>110</sup> For an early account on the Israeli nuclear program see **Jabber Fuad**, *Israel and Nuclear Weapons, Present Option and Future Strategies*, London, 1971.

<sup>111</sup> Israeli official statements are viewed with a lot of suspicions from the part of the Syrians. On 24 December 1965, The Israeli minister of labor was quoted as saying that "Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East, but it will not be the second either". On September 7 1975, Mr. Rabin is reported to have said that Israel was "a non nuclear country" and "it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area; yet president Katzir had declared in 1974 that Israel (has the potential) to build nuclear weapons and could do so within a reasonable period of time (see UN Study on Israeli Nuclear Armement, p. 17). For Syria such statements that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in to the region is "a deceptive cover-up". see the letter of 29 July 1987 from the Chargé d'affaires of the Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General UN Doc. A/42/434.

<sup>112</sup> **Karem Mahmoud**, *A Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East, Problems and Prospects*, Greenwood Press, 1991, p. 76; others have characterized the Israeli attitude as a "deliberate ambiguity" policy see UN Study on Israeli Nuclear Armement, p. 17.

<sup>113</sup> **Abdel Salam, Mouhamad**, *Israeli Nuclear Warheads*, in Arabic, *Journal of International Politics*, 118, October 1994, pp. 24-46, at p. 25

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114 For an account on the advantages of a threshold status, in the nuclear realm, see **Karem M.**, *A NWFZ in the Middle East...*, p. 76; for an account on the advantages and disadvantages of a threshold status see **Feldman Shai**, *Nuclear Threshold States: Consequences for Deterrence*, in *Nuclear Deterrence: Problems and Perspectives in the 1990s*, UNIDIR/93/26, pp. 83-86.

115 While some argue that Israel possess 100-200 Atomic Bombs, and 35 H Bombs of yields not exceeding 200 kilotons (see for example **Barnaby, Frank**, *The Invisible, The Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East*, London, p. 25); others believe that the number of all nuclear weapons way exceeds 300 bombs (see **Hersh Seymour**, *The Samson Option, Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy*, Mew York, 1991, p. 198. Many may argue that Hersh's estimates are too exaggerated, however, it has been submitted that Hersh's book should seriously be taken into consideration in a "worst case" planning (see **Spector Leonard**, *Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East: The Next Chapter Begins*, in *Non-Conventional Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East, Tackling the spread of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Capabilities*, Efraim Karsh ed., Oxford, 1993, pp. 136-159, at p. 154; see also from the same book **Geoffrey Kemp**, *Arms Control and the Arab Israeli Peace Process*, pp. 241-260, at p. 247.

116 **Hersh S.**, *The Samson Option*, p. 198; **Burrows W.**, *Critical Mass...*, p. 308.

117 **Barnaby F.**, *The Invisible Bomb...*, p. 14; **Abdel Salam N.**, *Israeli Nuclear Warheads...*, p. 42.

118 **Abdel Salem M.**, *Israeli Nuclear Warheads*, p. 33.

119 **Sayigh Yezid**, *Middle Eastern Stability and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, in *Non-convnetional Weapons Proliferation in the Middles East...*, pp. 179-203, at p. 191.

120 *Ibid*; **Burrows W.**, *Critical Mass*, p. 284.

121 Israel is widely believed to posses an offensive Chemical Weapons capability and has not denied this in any official international forum (see **Herby Peter.**, *The Chemical Weapons Convnetion and Arms Control in the Middle East*, PRIO Oslo, p. 46).

122 **Karem M.**, *A NWFZ in the Middle East*, p. 81-83.

123 **Barnaby Frank.**, *Arms Control After the Gulg War*, p 4

124 *Ibid*.

125 **Cordesmann Anthony**, *Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East*, p. 129.

126 *Ibid*.

127 see for example UN Secretary General Report on Israeli Nuclear Armament, UN Doc. A/42/581, p. 13.


128 **Barnaby F.**, *The Invisible Bomb*, p. 23.

129 **Burrows W.**, *Critical Mass...*, p. 310.

130 **Burrows W.**, *Critical Mass...*, p. 311.

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- 131 **Burrows W.**, *Critical Mass...*, p. 282.
- 132 Ibid.
- 133 For an account on French active early involvement in the Israeli nuclear program, see for example **Karem M.**, *A NWFZ in the Middle East*, p. 67, see also **Cordesmann A.**, *Weapons of Mass Destruction...*, p. 120; **Hersh S.**, *The Samson Option*, p. 118; UN Study on Israeli Nuclear Armament, 1982, p. 9.
- 134 see on the supply of Uranium by Argentina **Cordesmann A.**, *Weapons of Mass Destruction*, p. 120.
- 135 see on the story of the supply of heavy water by Norway, **Cordesmann, A.**, *ibid*; **Barnaby F.**, *The Invisible Bomb*, p. 70.
- 136 On the extensive cooperation with South African see **Hersh, S.**, *The Samson Option*, p. 264; **Burrows W.**, *Critical Mass*, p. 294.
- 137 The policy of the United States with regard to the Israeli Nuclear armament has been characterized as the policy of "no policy" (see **Sayigh Y.**, *Middle Eastern Stability*, p. 197); Burrows also concluded that, the United States simply "turned a blind eye to, or to use another frequent metaphor, winked at, the development of the Israeli atomic weapons program" (**Burrows W.**, *Critical Mass*, p. 301; for Hersh, the American policy with indeed a "conscious policy of neglecting reality" (**Hersh, S.**, *The Samson Option*, p. 319..
- 138 **Burrows, W.**, *Critical Mass...*, p. 290.
- 139 **Burrows, W.**, *Critical Mass...*, p. 293
- 140 **Burrows, W.**, *Critical Mass...*, p. 304; **Hersh, S.**, *The Samson Option*, p. 206.
- 141 **Burrows, W.**, *Critical Mass...*, p. 303; **Abdel Salam, M.**, *Israeli Nuclear Warheads*, p. 41.
- 142 see for example General Assembly resolutions 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1978, 34/77 of 11 December 1979, 32/147 of 12 December 1980 which called upon all States of the Middle East to establish a Nuclear Weapons free Zone in the Middle East. The list of course is longer. For an account see **Karem, M.**, *A NWFZ in the Middle East*, pp. 136-157. All these resolutions invited the parties to the Middle Eastern Conflict to adhere to the NPT; see also the UN Study on the Israeli Nuclear Armament, 1982; the Note by the Secretary General on Israeli Nuclear Armament, 1985, UN Doc. A/40/520; the Report of the Secretary General on Israeli Nuclear Armament, 1987, UN Doc. A/42/581.
- 143 General Assembly Resolution 33/71 A of 14 December 1978.
- 144 **Freier S.**, *A NWFZ in the Middle East...*, p. 1; **Steinberg Gerald**, *Middle East Arms Control ...*, p. 133.
- 145 **Barnaby F.**, *The Invisible Bomb.*, p. 54
- 146 **Feldman Shai**, *Israeli Nuclear Deterrence*, Translated into Arabic, Amman, 1984, pp. 63-64.
- 147 **Cordesmann A.**, *Weapons of Mass Destruction*, p. 128.

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- 148 **Prawitz Jan**, *The Concept of NWFZ and the Middle East*, UNIDIR, paper presented at the Malta Conference on April 1994, p. 19.
- 149 **Barnaby F.**, *The Invisible Bomb*, p. 64; **Sayigh Y.**, *Middle Eastern Stability*, p. 191.
- 150 **Burrows W.**, *Critical Mass*, p. 293.
- 151 **Herby P.**, *The Chemical Weapons Convention*, p. 49.
- 152 Ibid.
- 153 **Cobban H.**, *The Superepowers...*, p. 82
- 154 **Hersh S.**, *The Samson Option*, p. 319.
- 155 see the Syrian foreign Minister Mr Farouk Al-Sharah's address before the General Assembly at its 49th session, *Syria Times*, 4 October 1994.
- 156 The Syrian representative to the United Nations once declared that the "Middle East region cannot live in peace and security as long as the Israeli nuclear weapon looms over it", UN GA Doc. A/42/434.
- 157 **Steinberg G.**, *Middle East Arms Control*, p. 129; **Freier S.**, *A NWFZ in the Middle East*, p. 4.
- 158 **Limone S.**, *The Arab Threat...*, p. 9.
- 159 **Steinberg G.**, *A Realistic Approach...*, p. 76.
- 160 **Levite Ariel**, *Israel Security Conception and its Attitude toward Arms Control*, in *Arms Control in the Middle East*, Dore Gold ed., Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, pp. 124-131, at p. 130.
- 161 see President Assad's remarks in the press conference held in Damascus with President Clinton on 28 October 1994, *New York Times*, 29 October 1994, p. 20.



## SECURITY AND THREAT PERCEPTION IN SAUDI ARABIA

BY: SALEH AL-MANI, Ph.D

Saudi Arabia is a large country ,extending 2,300,000 km ( 839,000 miles ) in territory , and encompassing almost eighty per cent of the Arabian Peninsula.It almost equals in size that of Western Europe , or one -forth the area of the United States. The Country is the birth place of Islam and contains within its boundaries, two of the Holiest shrines of the Moslem world, Makkah and Madinah. It has a special and reciprocal bond and affiliation with the world Moslem Community of one thousand million persons across the globe.

Beside Makkah and Madinah, the Jerusalem Mosque is the third Holiest shrine in Islam, from which all Moslems believe that Mohammed (Peace be - upon Him) ascended to heaven , and Jesus would descend upon it at the end of the would to bring back justice and equality to mankind.

In addition to those religious bonds that attach the people of Saudi Arabia to the holy sites in Makkah, Madinah, and Jerusalem, the country is the largest oil producing country in the world, and holds within its territory approximately forty percent of world proven oil reserves. It also produces five percent of the world petrochemical products.

Its economy is almost totally dependent on the extraction of this mineral resource , and it has always adopted policies that gives it continuous and secure access to oil markets.

Within the three parameters of geography, Islam and oil ,one can begin to understand the security policies of Saudi Arabia, and within these three basic factors of territory, society and economy, we can delineate issues that effects its foreign and defense policies . In addition, Saudi Arabia finds those factors to be a source of strength and confidence as it deals with the outside world . However, its security, like in many other states, exhibits certain limitations that requires the adoption of particular strategies to address peculiar problems of the Saudi security paradigm.



The large territory of the country required its leaders, since its unification by the late King Abdul Aziz in 1926, to seek to delimit and delineate the borders of a young state with neighboring countries. The existence of extensive oil deposits along some of these borders did not facilitate the delineation of those borders, and at times conflicted with the ambitions of neighboring states, as well. In few instances those such conflicts erupted into small open border clashes. This was the case with the British, during their occupation of the Southern Arabian Gulf, and the dispute for control of the Bruaimi Oasis (1949-1955), during the small border clashes with Southern Yemen, over the area of "Wadiah" in 1975, and in the most recent clashes between the tribes of Qatar and Saudi Arabia in 1992, over the shores of the Gulf Khor Al-Adeed. It is remarkable that in all of those clashes, Saudi Arabia succeeded in limiting the size of the conflict and accepted third party mediation; seeking always to find a just and a diplomatic solution to a sometimes difficult and competing national claims of border regions.(1) Thus the demarcation of borders by negotiations has been a whole mark of Saudi security policy, since the guiding principle of this policy is to arrive to a consensus with its neighbors, that enhances the security and stability of the region as a whole. In this regard, over the last seven decades the Saudi state succeeded in the demarcation of its boundaries with Bahrain, Kuwait(1922,1965), Jordan,(1925,1965), with Iraq(1922,1939,1975) with Iran, during the reign of the Shah. (the 1968 median line agreement of maritime boundaries and ownership of disputed islands, gas and oil fields in the northern parts of the Arabian Gulf). The boundary dispute with the United Arab Emirates was also settled in 1974, with Oman in 1986, and with Iraq in 1981. There remains however other boundaries that need to be demarcate and provisional arrangements are in place for parts of those boundaries, as the case with Yemen(1934), and Qatar (1965 and 1992). Parts of the eastern boundaries with Yemen still require further negotiations and demarcation.(2)

Another aspect of having a large landmass is the primary need to protect it against incursions by external forces. Most countries who are endowed by this attribute, have historically found it advantageous to build a large land army, and an extensive air force.

The dilemma in Saudi Arabia is the fact that in the past, the country did not have the financial resources to build a major army, and since the Seventies, it has sought to build a small all-volunteer force, that would be able to defend its boundaries and its territories. Obviously, this policy has failed to achieve its goal. There are many factors that have militated against the

achievement of this objective , chiefly, the limited size of the population ( 12.35 million ) the resistance of many middle class families to send their children to military schools, and their resistance for the adoption of a reservist or a draft system of recruitment, and the existence in the last two decades of a thriving business , and government employment in major cities for the new generation. Until recently, army recruitment was almost exclusively limited to those who had very little or no education. Only the Saudi Air Force , the Air Defense forces and the Engineers Corps have been able, through financial inducements and social status, to attract the best and most capable university graduates.

This limitation in the size of the population has forced the government in times of crises, to dig deep into the very young pool of the population. However, with the economic slow down experienced during the past two years, more and more capable graduates find it advantageous to join the forces, and to enroll in military academies. This allowed the government to increase the size of its forces from approximately sixty six thousands in 1990 to approximately 102,000 in 1994 ( IISS estimates )

#### ISLAM AND SECURITY

Saudi Arabia as the birth place of Islam, finds support and natural alliances in the family of Moslem States. Military cooperation in the past took place with Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan, and Bangladesh. A number of Islamic countries took part in the 1990-91 war with Iraq and some of them like Pakistan are reported, to continue until now its military cooperation with Saudi Arabia, with one division reportedly stationed in the country (3).

Despite changing governments and cabinets in those countries, there is popular support for continued military cooperation with Saudi Arabia, for religious and fraternal reasons. The existence of thousands of expatriates has also helped to cement this relationship.

It is by no mean that those relations with Moslem states have been always amicable. Relations with Iran have been marred by the 1980-88 Gulf war, by Iranian propaganda campaigns and marches during the Pilgrimage season, and by the incessant attempts by Iran to play the leadership role in the Moslem world . Thus relations with Iran since the revolution has always been competitive. Saudi Arabia views itself as the most imminent Islamic state, and this put a huge burden on Saudi strategic planners. They found themselves obligated sometimes to intervene in disputes and civil wars among other Moslem states.

This was the case in the past with civil conflicts in Lebanon, in Afghanistan, and most recently in Yemen. Mediators are expected to provide aid and comfort to the civilian population, and financial incentives to the leaders of different factions to arrive at a negotiated settlement. However, at times this might also be perceived as partial. Saudi diplomatic intervention succeeded along with the exhaustion of all sides to the conflict in bringing an end to the Lebanese civil war ( The Taif Agreement of 1989 ).(4) In the case of Afghanistan, the civil war continues ablaze despite Saudi and other Islamic states mediation effort.

Religion is also important in the historic attachment to the suffering of the Palestinian people, and continued occupation of their lands. Saudi Arabia works assiduously to bring about a just and durable resolution of the Arab Israeli conflict, and would do all what it can diplomatically to bring about the return of Jerusalem to Arab and Palestinian authority.

While support of Moslems throughout the world, and providing comfort and aid to those in need, the government seem to be worry of the continued civil disturbances and unrest visited by young Islamist radicals, whose poverty and disenchantment have impelled them to rebel against the existing political order, and threatens the state quo in the region. As a status quo state, Saudi Arabia sought to strengthen the existing regional and international order, and maintains regional security and stability. Only through a harmonious interaction between the positive precepts of Islam ("Zakah" or voluntary annual gifts to the poor, respect for the family and elderly, and "Trahum" or compassion ) can a moslem society progress economically, and enrich its moral values and virtues. The propagation of religious values in a peaceful way that is harmonious with economic development has been the hall mark of Saudi security policy. It has also sought to seek the abatement of radicalism and excessive political acts by the fringe religious right throughout the Arab world. } V

#### OIL AND ALLIANCE FORMATION

Since the discovery of oil in the country in 1938, Saudi Arabia sought the alliance of Western powers to enhance its military pasture, without losing its sovereignty in the process. Alliances with Britain and the United states since 1945 entailed at times, the presence of some military advisers in the country, and in times of crises such as the Iraq- Kuwait war of 1990-91, the temporary stationing of foreign forces. This brought about some backlash and resentment of some of the religious groups in the country. The country has never been invaded or occupied by an European power, and the stationing of foreign non-Moslem troops is

inadmissible in Islam. Saudi defense planners have therefore attempted to walk a very tight rope, of maintaining external alliances, chiefly with the US and minimizing the continuous presence of large allied troops over its territory. Several policies were pursued like over-the horizon force projection, the stationing of those forces in friendly neighboring states (e.g. Bahrain and Kuwait) or in bases away from population centers and keeping large alliance armament and weapons in storage for future access to those arms by airlifted troops , during periods of crises and / or turmoil.

While alliance formation with western powers have enhanced the security posture of the country through deterrence against regional aggressors, it has also helped to give the Saudi army, navy, and air force access to the latest modern equipments available on the international market. And while Saudi Arabia has today a small ground forces, it has a very good air force, and an emerging small navy that proved its capabilities during Desert Storm.(5) And while its air force might be on par with competing neighbors like Iraq or Iran, it is no match with the superior Israeli air force. |X

The alliance with the US has spared Saudi Arabian from any military confrontation with Israel, but the country looks with anxiety to the hegemonic role played by Israel and its air force over the adjoining countries of Lebanon and Syria. It has sought throughout the last two decades to avert, and /or to limit any aggression by Israel on Lebanon, and worked with the American administration and the UN to contain those military adventures (like in 1978,1982 and in July 1993 ) from escalation into large regional wars. Saudi Arabia has also signed all treaties and conventions limiting the use and proliferation of nuclear , chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. It has also supported Egypt call for the establishment of a nuclear free zone in the middle east, and to contain and roll back the nuclear arsenals in Israel.

As a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council ( The GCC ) , Saudi Arabia has created a security community with those states, with periodic consultation, and the creation of a small rapid deployment force, the Gulf Shield, for possible use in any part of the Gulf region.

The military leaders of the GCC have agreed in 1993 Summit to earmark certain naval and air force units for joint operations under a single military command. While all the GCC forces are very small in comparison to the big armies of their neighbors those states have always coordinated their diplomatic policies vis-a -vis

any acts of expansion by forces from neighboring countries. This was the case in 1990-91, and again in 1994 in Kuwait vis-a-vis Iraq, and through solidarity with the United Arab Emirates, over its demands against Iranian occupation of the Tunubs, Islands, and Abu-Musa.

The continued media campaigns emanating periodically from Tehran does not set well with neighboring Arab Gulf states. Other ideological issues have also marred Saudi Iranian relations. But it is the continued fear of military build-up through purchasing and home manufacturing of lethal weapons, ballistic missiles, and an ambitious nuclear program is what worry military planners in Riyadh and Other Gulf capitals.

Diplomatically, Tehran relations with Saudi Arabia have witnessed tensions and detente, but Tehran has always sought to increase its influence and intervene in regional squabbles. And while Iran may not invade other Gulf states outrightly soon, it has pursued salami-tactics regarding strategic Gulf states islands.

Another facet that oil seems to effect the security policy of Saudi Arabia, is the fact that it may have been able to buy friends and eschews possible enemies, in the past, through foreign aid. Thus Between 1970 and 1991, Saudi Arabia offered her Arab and Muslim brotherly countries approximately \$ 96 billion in loans and grants. Approximately 64% of it went to neighboring Arab states.(6) Some have argued that such aid has failed to produce good returns as the case with Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen testified during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. One may argue, on the other hand, that those contributions have kept the peace in the region for about two decades. Saudi Arabia, despite its continued support for regional funds and Islamic banking institutions, cannot afford to continue its large handouts as it had done in the past. And despite suspicious of foreign aid as a mechanism for influence, Saudi Arabia as a member of the Arab and Islamic community of nations finds it obligatory until now to extend approximately \$ 1.8 billion a year in direct aid, and to offer educational scholarships and to encourage physicians and medical specialists visits to needy Islamic societies in Asia and East Africa.

The existence of large expatriate workers in the kingdom from Egypt, Pakistan, Syria, Turkey, and India, gives further impetus for those countries to seek the continued security and stability of the country. It was natural, therefore, that most of those countries were ready to participate with allied forces to evacuate Saddam Hussein's forces from Kuwait in 1991. As a country with 1125 miles in coastline overlooking the Red Sea, Saudi Arabia has sought

to keep its water and islands away from the presence of adversary powers. In this regard, it had worked in the past very closely with the countries overlooking this closed body, Egypt, the Sudan and Yemen, to keep the Red Sea region away from external military projection, and / or occupation. The Saudi planners find it difficult to have a continued Israeli military presence in the Eriterean islands of Halib and Fatimah, close to the southern entrance of the Sea. Recently, Saudi Arabia signed a memorandum of understanding with Egypt regarding the security of Red sea shipping lanes, and to avert re-occurrence of the 1984 laying of mines in the northern lanes of that Sea.(7) The interest of the two states in the peace and stability of this water way stems from the fact that Saudi Arabia has the longest shores on this Sea (1125 miles), and Egypt hold the second longest shores (898 miles) . Thus the two countries have a 64.8% of all the territorial waters of this body of water with corresponding importance for their security , and the welfare their fishermen.(8)

At one point Saudi - Sudanese joint economic Commission had worked in the seventies to study the exploitation of mineral resources in the maritime area and coasts adjoining the two countries. Due to lack of adequate funding the work of this commission had been suspended since 1981.

As the Saudi economy picks-up and high industrial production gets into gear, exports to neighboring African states , particularly in East Africa will ultimately be increased. Jeddah the Saudi major port on the Red Sea, is already becoming a major interport for supplies to African countries all the way from the Sudan and Kenya in the east to Algeria, in the west. And Saudi Arabia would continue in the future to view the Red Sea, as its second arm to the outside world.

#### THE BALANCE OF REGIONAL POWER AND ITS IMPACT ON SAUDI SECURITY

Saudi Arabia as a middle size regional power has always found refuge in fostering a stable balance of power in the middle east. In the past Saudi Security reaped the benefits of a quasi balance between Egypt and Syria on one side and Israel, on the other . The decision of president Sadat in to 1979 to desert his Arab brothers and sign a sperate peace treaty with Israel opened-up the region for Israeli hegemony. Israeli hand was freed since 1978 to being havoc and instability to its neighbors in Lebanon, Tunisia, and Iraq.

Likewise, during the Iran Iraq war, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states provided logistics and humanitarian support to Iraq, in order to maintain a sort of balance of forces between the two warring states, and to stop any clear-cut victory for Iran. With the diminished power of Iraq after 1991, the Saudis sought a semblance of stability in the Gulf region. They may have urged Turkey to play a balancing role, but due to economic and internal political tensions, the Turkish government have shied away from filling the gap. Today and in the near future the continued existence of Iraq as a unitary state independent of Iranian influence will continue to draw the concern and attention of Saudi planners.

At this time American forces and marine presence in the Gulf seems to be playing a counter weight to the Iranian challenge. Other bilateral and multilateral security arrangements with Egypt and Syria, play largely a symbolic and secondary role. Understanding between Saudi Arabia, and the United States, Britain, and France, seems to be a permanent cornerstone in Saudi security policy. Self reliance in security matters is a cherished, but far away goal in the present time. And the Saudis would do well to manage their alliance framework with regional powers (The Damascus Declaration), and with western powers, in a way that would maximize gains, and minimize costs. Some of the larger allies would continue to use such alliances to maximize their economic gains and secure contracts for their respective companies. Such policy may not always be beneficial to the Saudi economy, as it would render this economy dependent and uncompetitive, in a world governed by economic competition for survival. Other economic and political policies advocated by those allies, like the privatization of certain sectors of the Saudi economy or limiting the trade and technical exchange with the small, but efficient, South Asian firms may run counter to the benefits of small consumers in the country, and to the efficiency of the economy, at large.

Ironically, while the stationing of foreign forces in the Gulf region would serve the short-term security interest of the regime. Over the medium to long term, it may weaken the legitimacy of those same governments. particularly if they fail to pursue independent policies regarding oil prices and / or economic policies that may adversely effect the welfare of individual citizens. It is precisely those policies that the Shah developed in the 1960's and 1970's and brought the degeneration of his legitimacy in the eyes of his people.(9)

## INTERNAL THREATS

Saudi Arabia is a self-assured polity, that has existed in some form of political and social organization since time immemorial. As the country developed, it has faced many internal and external challenges. Internally the country has developed social structures that tend to extend help easily to those who need it . Extensive family, tribal, religious and political edifices exist to lessen the weight of differentiated income between different classes. It goes without saying that the country's leaders must adopt new policies that would enhance mass participation and extend even further the benefits of economic development to new strata of the population particularly the young generation that comprises more than one-half of the populous. From time to time, small fringe political groups from the right seem to offer new ideologies that run counter to government line. However, through a system of control and inducements, the government has always been able to coopt and/or coerce potential leaders of these groups.

In addition, Saudi Arabia and its people have always prided themselves as the guardians of the two Holy Mosques in Islam. The security and sanctity of those two Holy mosques remain one of the basic objectives of Saudi national security . Any attempts by a foreign power, under whatever guise to gain access to control and /or administer the affairs of the two holiest mosques would be contrary to the country's basic sovereignty . While continuing to guarantee free access to all moslems, the Saudi government must fend-off any attempts by Iran or any particular group or any other state, to diminish its sovereignty and administration of the two holy cities of Makkah and Medinah, which are the spiritual heart of the nation.



### EXTERNAL THREATS

Externally Saudi Arabia lives in a region that is going through a flux, in terms of power, and challenges in the strategic environment. Collective ideological lines, such as Arabism and Islamic unity, that used to bind the Arabs and Moslem states in the past seem to be receding. In its stead, a new set of policies based on pure self interest and gains seems pervasive at the present.

In a sense the nation state, as an entity has succeeded in advancing its logic ahead of other ideological and ascriptive beliefs of the Arab publics. This secularization of traditional Arab politics has brought instability to inter-Arab state relations. Some traditional friends since 1990 have become adversaries. Saudi planners must therefore be always on guard against any potential regional threats, and must always be aware of emerging political movements in neighboring countries, such as Iran, that their creed or political programs would paint a potential direct or indirect threat to the country's security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

Potential threats may not always be limited to military means, but may also include ideological stances inimical to the ideology and belief system of the people of Saudi Arabia. The battle for a sympathetic public opinion, in the Arab and Islamic arena, is therefore of primary importance to the security of the state and its people.

Other immediate objectives of Saudi national security include the deterrence of any threats to its territory, ports, oil and petroleum infrastructure, major industrial complexes, and major city centers. Potential threats should not be assessed merely in terms of counter-force, but also in terms of counter-value. As more and more people tend to find education and employment opportunities in major cities, any attack or a threat to the livelihood of those people would be a blow to the ability of national forces to defend those cities.

Security forces in Saudi Arabia must always quickly mobilize and destroy the ability of adversary states and powers to impose an economic and naval embargoes against its ports, and / or its skies. The country is tied to international trade. Export of oil and other petrochemical products, and imports of agricultural produce, machines, and medicine are vital aspects of the country's well-

being. Any attempts to disrupt such vital exchange should be anticipated. While such embargoes may not be successful given the breadth and depth of the country's shorelines, it must be dealt with utmost urgency. While recent embargoes have not succeeded in their intended aims, the historical experience of the oil embargoes against Iran's Mossadeq's government testifies to the need of anticipating and defeating such policies even if it leads to an outright war.

The country must also be worry of any major transformation of the military posture that may effect the balance of forces in the region. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region would also present a danger to the security of the country. Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, even if used as " a bomb in the basement" strategy would adversely effect the strategic interests of Saudi Arabia, since it would lead to similar nuclearization of other states, with the intended result of undermining the stability of all states in the region. A policy of universal adherence to the Nonproliferation treaty (NPT) by all states in the region, coupled with the establishment of a Nuclear free zone encompassing all states in the Middle East , as prescribed in the UN General assembly Resolution number 46/30 (October 6,1991 ), and as also declared in the Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), which considers in its preamble.

"Recalling the objective of establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone in the region and the Middle East. Conscious of the threat which all weapons of mass destruction pose to peace and security in the area and the need to work towards the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of such weapons".(10)

Thus it is in the best of interests of Saudi Arabia , in reaffirming the primary of rules of international law and conduct and work assiduously for establishing a regional nuclear free-zone in the Middle East, encompassing all states in the region, with no exception. And strive to limit the manufacture and transfers of weapons of mass destruction and the production of interballistic missiles in adversary states. Any attempts to by -pass the edict of international law in this regard, through the establishment of Nuclear guarantees on a bilateral basis would be inimical to the future security of the country, since it would free an essentially unstable strategic imbalance.

TABLE 1 :

**A COMPARISON OF REGIONAL ARMED FORCES  
DEFENSE OF TERRITORIES AND POPULATION.**

<b>COUNTRY</b>	<b>TOTAL ARMED FORCES(ACTIVE)</b>	<b>SOLDIER(ACTIVE) /AREA(SQ.MILES)</b>	<b>SOLDIERS ACTIVE &amp; RESERVE/ AREA</b>	<b>SOLDIERS (ACTIVE) /CITIZEN</b>
<b>SAUDI ARABIA</b>	<b>102,000</b>	<b>0.120</b>	<b>0.120</b>	<b>0.0063</b>
<b>IRAN</b>	<b>528,000</b>	<b>0.830</b>	<b>1.380</b>	<b>0.0096</b>
<b>IRAQ</b>	<b>382,500 (APPROXIMATELY)</b>	<b>1.688</b>	<b>5.970</b>	<b>0.0210</b>
<b>ISRAEL</b>	<b>175,000</b>	<b>22.430</b>	<b>77.564</b>	<b>0.0350</b>
<b>EGYPT</b>	<b>410,000</b>	<b>1.062</b>	<b>2.620</b>	<b>0.0070</b>
<b>YEMEN</b>	<b>63,500</b>	<b>0.300</b>	<b>0.480</b>	<b>0.0050</b>
<b>SYRIA</b>	<b>408,000</b>	<b>5.700</b>	<b>11.300</b>	<b>0.0310</b>
<b>UAE</b>	<b>54,500</b>	<b>1.680</b>	<b>1.680</b>	<b>0.0310</b>
<b>KUWAIT</b>	<b>11,700</b>	<b>1.760</b>	<b>4.550</b>	<b>0.0300</b>
<b>OMAN</b>	<b>37,500</b>	<b>0.420</b>	<b>0.420</b>	<b>0.0200</b>

**SOURCES : IISS, The Military Balance 1992-93, London; IISS and  
Brassey's, 1992 and The world Almanac and Book of Facts, 1993, New  
York; World Almanac, 1993.**

## THE APPROPRIATE RESPONSE TO THOSE THREATS

Saudi Arabia, like other Arab Gulf states continues to suffer from an inadequate supply of personnel to its armed forces. It had strove to increase the forces from approximately 66,000 soldier in 1990 to 102,000 in 1994, but its army is still small compared to the large armies of its neighbors. The Saudi army is approximately one fifth of those of Iran, one -forth of Iraq's , and one- half of the Israeli army.

Although it has increased by 40% since 1990, its soldier to area ratio is still smaller than all the states in the region, even smaller than the ratio of the Gulf States(Table 1). Its soldier to citizen ratio is comparatively small also. As shown in table 1, every Saudi citizen is defended by 6 per thousand of a soldier. In Israel the ratio is 35 percent of a soldier for the defence of every civilian.

As Saudi Arabia has no reserve system of military service the difference in total soldier ratio per defence of a single mile is almost glaring. Even Kuwait with its reserve and active duty man force is almost four times better than Saudi Arabia in this category(Table).The need is therefore clear that the size and population of Saudi Arabia require the adoption of a reserve system of military service. If such service can only provide the ancillary medical, logistic, educational and administrative services required by a modern army, it is incumbent upon Saudi planners to consider such policy without delay.

The human resource problem of the services can also be enhanced through the efficient utilization of all manpower available in the country namely women, who make-up half of the population, and foreign work force who make up around 38%. X

Other gulf States, such as the UAE have already opened-up military academies for women to work in various para-military functions and are almost too dependent on foreign manpower in their armies. Saudi Arabia could do well to motivate foreign workers to join the services if those workers are highly -trained and hail from Arab and Islamic countries. Perhaps they could be rewarded with citizenship privileges, if they serve in the army for 12 years of continuous service. In addition Saudi Arabia must increase the intensive training and mobility of its forces and coordination among the services, in order to enhance the lack of adequate personnel in active service. The quality of the soldier and his total grasp of the function and maintenance of his machine can only enhance the capabilities of those soldiers.

Another aspect of responding to external threat is the ability of decision makers to manage foreign alliances in a way that continues the flow of needed hardware, without injuring the ability of the civilian economy to maintain a good and reasonable growth ratios (2 to 3% annual growth rates. There are political and economic cost for every alliance framework but such costs must be at all times reasonable and manageable.

#### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This paper has studied the underpinnings of Saudi Security System, area, Islam and oil. It has also noted the collapse of the old balance of power in the region, with all manifest fluidity in the political and military milieu, which had created unstable environment. The paper has also noted internal and external threats facing the Kingdom including ideological agitation that seeks to undermine the unity of parts of the country and, or the sovereignty over the holy cities of Makkah and Madinah.

The paper has concluded that the country has no alternatives except to increase the size of the army directly, and through a reserve system of service. The paper looked into ways of bringing women and foreign workers in service for providing adequate security to the country. And mentioned the need to manage external alliance frameworks in a way that minimizes costs and maximizes benefits.

## ENDNOTES

- (1) For a study of earlier documents concerning Saudi Arabian boundaries, see: Richard Schofield and Gerald Blake, Eds. Boundaries and State Territories in the Middle East and North Africa (Arabian Boundaries: Primary Documents 1853-1953), Buckinghamshire: England, 1988. For more recent boundary claims and those pertaining to Al-Buraimi Oasis, see John Wilkinson, Arabian Frontiers: The Story of Britain's Boundary Drawing in the Desert. London: Tauris, 1991. And Abdulrazak Abu-Dawood, Political of Saudi Arabia, A Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Kentucky, 1984. For those pertaining to Qatar, see: Abdul-Aziz Al-Mansour, Al-Taour Al-Siyasi li-Qatar (The Political Development of Qatar). Kuwait: That Al-Salasil, 1984. (Arabic)
- (2) For a text of the 1934 Taif Border Agreement between Saudi Arabia and Yemen and subsequent agreements, see Abdullah Al-Qabaa, Al-Alaqat Al-Saudiah Al-Yamanieh (Saudi Yemeni Relations), Riyadh: Al-Farazdaq, 1992, Appendices. (Arabic)
- (3) F. Gregory Gause III, Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994, p.125.
- (4) For a text of the Agreement, See: Ittifaq Al-Taif: al-Salam Al-Manshoud (The Taif Agreement: A Prospect for Peace) Beirut: Dar Al-Liwaa, 1991, pp.112-121. (Arabic).
- (5) See: General Norman Schwarzkopf's autobiography, It Doesn't Take A Hero (written with Peter Petre), London: Bantam Books, 1992, pp. 421-422.
- (6) See: Al-Taqrir Al-Iqtissadi Al-Arabi Al-Mohhad, 1993 (The Combined Arab Economic Report, 1993) Kuwait: The Arab Bank for Economic and Social Development, 1994, Table 8/3.
- (7) Al-Ahram, Oct. 21, 1994.
- (8) See: Abdullah Al-Sultan, Al-Bahr Al-Ahmar wa Al-Siraa Al-Arabi Al-Israeli (The Red Sea and the Arab-Israeli Conflict), Beirut: Markaz Dirasat Al-wahadah Al-Arabiyah, 1984, p. 36 (Arabic).

(9) It is precisely those policies that the Shah pursued in the 1960's and the 1970's and brought about the degeneration of his legitimacy in the eyes of his people, see Mark Gasiorowski, "Regime Legitimacy and National Security: The Case of Pahlavi Iran," in Edward Azar and Chung-In Moon, Eds. National Security in The Third World, Aldershot, Hants, England: Edward Elgar, and College Park, Md: University of Maryland Center for International Development and Conflict, 1988, pp. 227-250.

(10) See the text of the UN Resolution 687, in Serge Sur, Security Council Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991 in the Gulf Affair: Problems of Restoring and Safeguarding Peace. (UNIDIR research Paper No.12), New York: UNIDIR, 1992, Annex I.

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*CSBMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST*

*SIGNIFICANT TREATIES AND*

*AGREEMENTS*

*draft paper*

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## **CSBMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST - SIGNIFICANT TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS**

The aim and scope of this paper is to give an overview on the treaties and agreements relevant to Arms Control (AC) and Confidence- and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) in the Middle East.

It encompasses not only the law in force in the region, but certain expired - by legal or political standards - regulations as well, focussing on a panoply of regimes present and past.

Taking into account that the term "Middle East" as well as a definition of the region has to be a compromise, based on the various political concepts dealing with the region, for the purpose of this paper the following countries will be regarded as forming the "Middle East":

The member states of the Arab Ligue (i.e. without Palestine) as well as Iran and Israel.

The above definition of the Middle East was introduced by the IAEA and has enjoyed growing acceptance thereafter.

The term "Middle East" exists, despite its eurocentric origin, in the regional relevant languages as well. A certain overall acceptance can therefore be assumed.

All mentioned states are party to the UN.

### ***1.) Arms Control Treaties and agreements***

#### **1925 Geneva protocol on asphyxiating, poisonous weapons**

The Geneva Protocol bans the use of chemical and biological weapons in war; neither does it prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of these weapons nor their use in conflicts others than war (i.e. internal conflicts).

The Geneva Protocol has, according to standard interpretation of international law, become customary international law, binding both parties and non-parties; it has been ratified by 125 countries - some 70 % of all states.

Reservations towards the recognition of or the establishing of treaty relations with Israel were made by the following states having ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol : Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Syria..

Non-parties to the Geneva Protocol are Mauretania, Oman, SOMALIA AND the UAE.

#### **Chemical Weapons Convention**

On September 3 1992, the Conference on Disarmament adopted the text of the Convention of the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC).

The CWC was opened for signature on Jan 13, 1993 at a signing ceremony in Paris, being the first disarmament agreement negotiated within a multilateral framework that provides for the elimination of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction under universally applied international control.

The CWC consists of the Preamble, 24 Articles and 3 annexes - Annex on Chemicals, Annex on Implementation and Verification, Annex on the Protection of Confidential Information. It will enter into force 180 days after the deposit of the 65th ratification but not earlier than two years after its opening for signature.

The CWC will be implemented by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), The Hague.

The CWC has been signed by Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Iran, Israel, Kuwait, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen [12] Signature implies some commitment to fulfil the obligations of a treaty but is not legally binding.

None of the Middle East states has yet ratified the CWC.

### **Biological Weapons Convention**

Entered into force in 1975, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological weapons.

The BWC prohibits the acquisition of above cited substances by any means of the retention of microbial or other biological agents or toxins, whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that are not justified in prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purpose, as well as weapon equipment or means of delivery designed for the use of such agents and toxins for hostile purpose or in armed conflict.

Research on biological agents is not forbidden, as well as the acquisition of quantities justified for medical, protective or other peaceful purpose; the term "protective" applies to the development of protective masks and clothing, air and water filters, detection and warning devices and decontamination equipment.

The freedom to BW research opens a gate towards genetic engineering, discovering disease-carrying genes, enhance their lethality and allow these genes to be spliced in normally harmless bacteria.

The BWC has been ratified by 112 countries.

In the Middle East, parties to the treaty are Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Yemen.

Egypt, Morocco, Somalia, Syria and the UAE have signed but not ratified.

Algeria, Djibouti, Israel, Mauritania and Sudan have neither signed nor ratified the BWC.

### **Non-Proliferation Treaty**

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), coming into force in 1970, aimed at freezing the number of nuclear weapon states at the USA, USSR, UK, France and China - these states being also the permanent members of the Security Council.

The NPT's Art. I commits the nuclear weapon parties not to transfer nuclear weapons and not to assist in their manufacture by non-nuclear weapon states. Art. II NPT pledges the non-nuclear weapon states not to adhere to nuclear weapons. Art. III NPT ensures compliance by having member states sign agreements with the IAEA, submitting their nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards; to encourage ratification, Art. IV NPT envisages cooperation and assistance to non-weapon oriented nuclear programmes.

The NPT has to be seen as the main international instrument to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Therefore, its shortcomings are of primary importance, seriously weakening the effect and overall acceptance of the NPT:

Not only did the NPT divide the community of nations into two groups - those, who have access to nuclear weapons and those, who have not : The treaty is also weakened by the behaviour of the nuclear-weapon states having ratified the treaty - these states being legally obliged to take significant steps towards halting and reversing the nuclear arms race as well as towards nuclear disarmament (Art. VI, NPT)

The treaty has been ratified by more than 140 countries; a strong treaty by first impression, its efficiency is seriously questioned by a number of countries that did not join and are developing nuclear capacities as well as by countries using civilian nuclear programmes under IAEA safeguard to put forward nuclear weapon programmes.

As for the middle eastern non-ratifying powers to the NPT, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi-Arabia did sign the NPT.

Algeria announced his intention to adhere to the NPT in December 1993; as until now, no action has been taken; Israel declares it "will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East" and has undertaken no initiative [T3], [T4]

Oman as well as the UAE cite Israeli nuclear weapons capability for not joining the NPT [T5]. Non-parties to the NPT are Djibouti and Mauritania.

## *II.) Treaties and agreements related to CSBMs and regional security*

### **Arab Ligue**

A union of the Arab people(s) was envisaged during World War I, but under the Sykes-Picot agreement were later split into separate states and - with the exception of the Hedjaz (to become part of Saudi Arabia in 1925) and Yemen - placed under British or French mandate. Between 1932 and 1946 these territories succeeded in gaining de facto independence.

In 1943 and 1944 a series of bilateral meetings on the formation of an Arab union were held. Agreement was reached in these bilateral talks to convene a conference of Arab nations, then held in Alexandria, autumn 1944.

A protocol providing for the establishment of a Ligue of Arab States was signed by Egyptian, Iraqi, Lebanese, Syrian and Transjordan delegates.

The Pact of the Union of Arab States was finally signed on March 22, 1945 by representatives of Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan and Yemen.

State members of the Arab Ligue are Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the UAE and Yemen.

### **Collective Security Pact**

On June 17, 1950, a Collective Security Pact within the framework of the Arab Ligue was signed by Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Yemen; subsequent signatories were Iraq

(1951), Jordan (1952), Morocco (1961) and Libya, Sudan, Algeria and Kuwait (1964). The pact came into force in 1952.

The main provisions of the pact were:

- An armed aggression on one of the signatories will be regarded as an aggression against all pact members.
- A permanent Joint Defense Council, consisting of the Foreign and Defense Ministers will be established to coordinate defense measures. Its decisions, reached by majority vote, would be binding on all members.
- A permanent committee of the Chiefs of Staff would draft joint defense plans and give technical advice on matters of collective defense.

### **Arab Maghreb Union**

The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), established February 17, 1989 in Marrakesh, encompasses Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.

Basically an economy-oriented project, the Marrakesh Treaty encompasses the security-relevant Article 14 (mutual assistance and regional defense) and Article 15 (ensuring domestic security).

Art 14 Marrakesh Treaty states, that "any aggression to which a member state is subjected will be considered as an aggression against the other member states". The solidarity clause misses a clear definition of aggression.

The Algiers Summit, July 22-23 1991, has substantially extended the term "aggression" to include "economic encircling and political threats". On the same summit, a "council on Common Defense" was established, including the unions Foreign Affairs and Defense ministers, given the goal to work out common postures concerning foreign and defence policy issues [76].

### **Gulf Cooperation Council**

The GCC was founded on Feb. 14., 1981 in Riyadh by Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi-Arabia and the UAE. Primarily dealing with economic coordination, it also encompasses the coordination of the member states foreign and security policy, albeit without establishing authorized organs to do so.

Items of prior concern are stability in the Gulf region, establishment of a common defense strategy, coordinated response to terror and upraising.

The common Arab deployment force within the GCC-framework is known as Shield of Al Gezeira.

In the wake of the II Gulf war, the GCC emerged as the core Arab security body in the region, primarily by coordinating decision making processes and providing economic backup.

## **Security arrangements after Gulf II:**

### **Damascus Declaration:**

A week after the defeat of Iraq, the foreign ministers of the GCC countries, Egypt and Syria met in Damascus to discuss the establishment of a new security system in the region:

Egypt and Syria - having already military forces numbering over 70.000 in the Gulf - were meant to provide the military personnel required while the GCC agreed on financial responsibility for the maintenance of the troops.

Soon thereafter, enthusiasm got lost and reluctance was signalled by the GCC to Egypt and Syria.

Among the reasons were mistrust, Iranian opposition against this kind of security system (involvement of the non-Gulf states Egypt and Syria), financial shortcomings and a doubt about the efficacy of the system envisaged. Egypt and Syria ordered the withdrawal of a large part of their force in May / June 1991.

In August, a meeting of foreign ministers of the Damascus Declaration member states decided to amend the Declaration, the amended version granting the GCC countries to ask for Egyptian and Syrian help in case they believed such help necessary as well as to ask other countries for help as well.

### **Gulf States proposal, Iran proposal**

Besides the ill-fated Damascus Declaration evolved two more concepts - neither being realised: A system based on the Gulf littoral States and led by Iran and a system based on the GCC:

The first, advocated by Iran, primarily opposed the creation of a system with out-of-the -region ties, namely Egypt, Syria and the USA. An Iran participation was advocated by the UAE, Oman and Bahrain; in November 1991 the Iranian foreign minister met in New York with the GCC foreign ministers to discuss his proposal.

The GCC-based system was put forward in a study, recommending the formation of a 100.000-strong independent GCC defense force; the plan was set aside by GCC in December 1991.

A similar plan called for Saudi leadership in the defence of the Gulf, its major obstacles being incompatibility between the number of officers necessary and the loyalty-based recruiting process as well as the long-standing territorial disputes between the GCC members [7] (albeit most had been solved in the 1970s).

### **Foreign-dominated security system**

The actual system in being is a foreign - primarily american- dominated:

Though the presence of american forces - envisaged were six bases in Saudi Arabia, four in Kuwait and two in each of the other emirates - soon died away, the idea of an "over the horizon" american presence became reality by the signing of separate defense agreements with the emirates, giving the US the possibility to stockpile prepositioned equipment, train military forces and hold joint military exercises:

On September 19 1991, Kuwait signed a defence agreement with the US, Bahrain followed 1992, Oman already having signed an agreement before 1990 , the UAE and Saudi-Arabia following; similar agreements were concluded separately with Great Britain and France.

The system was put to a test in early October 1994, moving more than 25.000 soldiers over 6.000 miles, the Pentagon estimating the costs between 500 million and 1 billion USD.

#### **Other Agreements :**

Of less direct relevance to regional security from an in-region perspective are initiatives to strengthen european naval capabilities in the Mediterranean:

A coordination - centering on joint exercises, procurement and exchange of satellite intelligence - between the navies of Italy, France and Spain.

The establishment by April 1992 of a standing NATO naval force, albeit without french and spanish contribution. [18]

Further to be mentioned are security-related treaties overcome by political realities:

#### **1976 Egypt-Sudan joint defense agreement**

Egypt and Sudan signed a 25-year joint defence agreement in Alexandria on July 15, 1976, providing for mutual defence in case of an outside attack and setting up of a common defence council as well as a joint committee of chiefs of staff. The agreement came into force on Jan 5.1977 by the two countries defence ministers.

#### **1980 Libya - Syria Merger**

On Oct 10.1980 the governments of Libya and Syria announced the merger of the two countries , the new state providing for a full political,economic and military union; in December 1980 it was disclosed that the union would be a joint leadership until plans for unification and its institutions have been elaborated.

#### **Demilitarized / neutralized zones, areas and islands:**

The status of a demilitarized zone, its creation based on a formal treaty or an informal agreement between states, prohibits the maintenance of military forces or installations in the given zone. The status can be permanent or temporary.

Often, but not necessarily, demilitarized zones are at the same time neutralized.

The demilitarization of a given zone in peacetime does not imply the prohibition of military operations within, once a conflict between the contracting parties is in progress.

In a neutralized zone however, no military operations may be conducted.

When situated between the territories of rival parties, it also is called a buffer zone.[19]

Buffer zones and DMZs beeing part of either peace treaties and ceasefire agreements (ch.III), third party services (ch.IV) or regional CSBMs (ch.V) are not mentioned.

### **Neutral zone between Iraq and Saudi Arabia**

On July 2 1975, an agreement on the equal division of a neutral zone encompassing about 2.500 square miles to the west of the western end of Kuwait's frontier between Iraq and Saudi Arabia has been concluded.

The frontier between Iraq and Saudi Arabia has been defined in May 1922 by the Treaty of Mohammara; the neutral zone has been established later, and in May 1938 Iraq and Saudi Arabia had signed an agreement on its administration.[T10]

### **The Constantinople Convention on Free Navigation of the Suez Canal**

On October 29, 1888 Austria-Hungary, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain and Turkey signed the Convention respecting the Free Navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal, declaring the Channel being a permanent demilitarized zone, without restriction related to flag or character of the ships passing (i.e. also warships).

Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal Company in July 1956. Reopening the Canal in April 1957, Egypt declared to respect "the terms and spirit of the Constantinople Convention and the rights and obligations arising therefrom.

Under the Constantinople Convention, the Suez Canal became a permanently neutralized zone to ensure peaceful transit of vessels of all nations; the Canal is not demilitarized. The status, still in force, has been interrupted several times.

### **The status of certain Aegean Islands**

The eastern Aegean islands Lemnos and Samothrace are, as stated in Art. 12 of the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty, part of Greek territory.

The Turkish Government holds that according to the 1923 Lausanne Agreement on the Regime of the Straits, Greece is under obligation not to militarize the islands. In contrary, Greek authorities state, that any restriction according the islands - i.e. demilitarization - was abolished by the Montreux Convention regarding the Regime of the Straits of July 20, 1936.

The 1923 Lausanne Convention on the Regime of the Straits, being part of the overall Peace Treaty, provides in Art. 4 inter alia the demilitarization of the islands Samothrace, Lemnos, Imbros, Tenedos and Rhodos.

This regime was superseded by the 1936 Montreux Convention, as expressly stated in the preamble, the new regime not referring to the military status of the islands.[T11]

The Dodecanese are a group of islands - the biggest being Rhodes - in the south-eastern Aegean; the name Dodecanese referring to twelve, the group actually encompasses 35 islands. As a result of the 1913 Italian-Turkish War, the islands were, without any restrictions, placed under Italian sovereignty (Art. 15, Lausanne Peace Treaty).

After WW II, in the Peace Treaty between the Allied Powers and Italy (signed Feb 10, 1947 in Paris), the island group passed under Greek sovereignty.

According to Para 2, Art 14, the islands will be demilitarized and are to remain under this status.

Greece does not abide by this stipulation, invoking a justification similar to that used in the eastern Aegean islands case.

### **The status of certain Mediterranean and Adriatic islands**

Under the 1947 Peace Treaty between the Allied Powers and Italy, Pantellaria, the Pelagian Islands (Lampedusa, Lampione and Linosa) and the Adriatic Island Pianosa are required to remain demilitarized (Art.49).

### **Historical instances:**

#### **Tangier Zone**

The "Tangier Zone", part of Moroccan territory, was placed under a regime of permanent neutrality by a multinational convention of Feb 18, 1923. It was administered under a statute subsequently amended in 1928, 1945 and 1952, by an international body delegated by the Sultan of Morocco.

On Jan 1, 1957, the international Zone of Tangier was fully reintegrated in the sovereign Kingdom of Morocco.<sup>[112]</sup>

#### **Cap Spartel Lighthouse**

Under the 1864 Spanish-Moroccan treaty, Morocco established a lighthouse on Cap Spartel, near Tangier.

By a treaty of May 31, 1865, the lighthouse was entrusted to the Commission Internationale du phare du Cap Spartel (without prejudice to the rights, property and sovereignty of Morocco), the neutrality of the lighthouse having to be always maintained.

A Protocol of March 31, 1958 finally conferred the administration of the lighthouse to Morocco.

### ***III.) Peace treaties and ceasefire agreements including Arms Control measures and CSBMs***

#### **Egyptian - Israeli Peace Treaty**

A peace treaty between Egypt and Israel was signed in Washington, March 26 1979.

The signing of the treaty was the result of protracted negotiations, conducted with US participation, and had led to the conclusion of two framework agreements, establishing certain negotiation principles which would lead to a peace treaty (Sept 17, 1978, Camp David accord).

The five operative articles of the Peace Treaty encompass:

- The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces and civilians from the Sinai behind the international boundary between Egypt and mandated Palestine, Egypt gaining full sovereignty over the Sinai (Art.I).



- Both parties agree security arrangements including limited-force zones on Egypt and Israeli territory and UN forces and observers (Art.IV).

### **Security Council Resolution 598 (1987)**

Security Council Resolution 598 established a ceasefire between Iran and Iraq after an eight-year war, supervised by UNIIMOG (UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group). UNIIMOG was monitoring the Iran-Iraq border from August 1988 to February 1991.

Referring to Security Council Resolution 582 (1986), Resolution 598 deplores the use of chemical weapons contrary to the obligations under the 1925 Geneva Protocol (preamble), demands an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of all forces to the internationally recognized boundaries (Art. 1) and requests the Secretary General to dispatch UN observers to verify, confirm and supervise the cease-fire (Art. 2).

### **Security Council Resolution 687 (1991)**

Resolution 687 consists of a 26-paragraph preamble and 34 operative paragraphs in nine sections (A to I).

Relevant for the purpose of this paper are the following sections and paragraphs:

The first section (A, para 2 - 4) deals with the question of boundary between Iraq and Kuwait; the second (B, para 5 - 6) establishes a demilitarized zone on either side of the boundary and sets up a peace-keeping operation (UNIKOM); the third section, being the core of the operative parts (C, para 7 - 11), deals with disarmament measures imposed on Iraq and with the international implementation machinery; the last section (I, para 33 - 34) is pending the coming into force of the ceasefire between Iraq and the Alliance upon official notification by Iraq of its acceptance of the above stated provision.

### **Mutual PLO-Israel Recognition and Declaration of Principles**

The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangement came out of the so-called "Oslo track". It has been agreed between the Government of Israel and the PLO team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian Delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference).

It encompasses 17 articles, the ones of primary relevance for this study are:

Art VIII dealing with public order and security, Art IX on laws and military orders, Art XIII on the redeployment of Israeli forces, Art XIV and Annex II, dealing with Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

The mutual recognition between the PLO and Israel has to be seen as a major breakthrough in Israeli - Palestinian relations and in Middle East politics in general.

The declaration itself only concerns interim self-government: a first phase, came into force after a phase of delay in May 1994 (according to Art XVII, the Declaration would have entered into force in October 1993); a second phase has to be negotiated; the declaration sets aside the most crucial questions with Jewish settlement, refugees, the final status of the Occupied Territories and Jerusalem to be negotiated in the 1996 - 1999 period.

### **Peace Treaty between Jordan and Israel**

Signed in October 1994, the Treaty ends formally the status of war between Jordan and Israel.

The core part, set aside agreements on economic and resource (water) matters, concerns the reestablishing of Jordan sovereignty over all its territory according to the Palestine Mandate, albeit this land will be lent to Israel for a period of 25 years, contract extendable.

#### *IV.) Third Party services related to Arms Control and CSBMs*

Third party services in the context of AC and CSBMs are offered or established primarily by the United Nations as peacekeeping [T13] missions to supervise and monitor agreed armistices [T14]

In the Middle East, the following UN missions have taken or are taking place [T15]:

#### **United Nations Truce Supervision Organization / UNTSO**

Security Council Resolution 50 (1948) called for the cessation of hostilities in Palestine. The resolution formed the basis for the first UN peace-keeping mission, UNTSO.

While UNTSO was initially supervising the truce of 1948, it assisted, after 1949 with the conclusion of 4 Armistice Agreements between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, the application and observance of above agreements.

After the 1967 war, UNTSO established two ceasefire observation operations, in the Israel-Syria sector and in the Suez Canal zone. A similar operation was set up in 1972 in southern Lebanon.

UNTSO observers were attached to the UN operations in Sinai 1973, Golan Heights in 1974, and southern Lebanon in 1978.

UNTSO observers are attached to UNDOF and UNIFIL.

UNTSO maintains its presence in the Egypt-Israel sector as Observer Group Egypt (OGE) with headquarters in Ismailia, outposts in the Sinai and is patrolling most parts of the peninsula.

OGE maintains liaison with Egypt for UNTSO and maintains offices in Amman, Beirut and Gaza.

UNTSO headquarters are in Jerusalem, current strength is 220 military observers. The mandate has been extended from 1948 onward.

#### **United Nations Disengagement Observer Force / UNDOF**

In the wake of the 1973 war, US diplomacy undertook an initiative, resulting in the conclusion of an Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian forces [T16].

The Agreement provided for an area of separation and two equal limited force and armament zones as well as a UN observer force to supervise implementation; the Agreement was signed on May 31 1974.

Equally on May 31 1974, the Security Council adopted resolution 350 (1974) to set up UNDOF.

The UNDOF mandate was to maintain the ceasefire between Israeli and Syrian forces and to supervise the areas of separation and limitation.

The Security Council has periodically extended UNDOF's six-month mandate.

UNDOF conducts fortnightly inspections of armament and force structure in the area of mandate, carried out with the assistance of liaison officers from both parties, the findings being communicated to both parties.

UNDOF is located at the Syrian Golan Heights, headquarters are in Damascus. Duration is from June 1974 to present. Current strength is roughly 1.000 troops assisted by military observers of UNTSOs Observer Group Golan.

### **United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon / UNIFIL**

Security Council Resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), calling for immediate cease of Israeli military action and withdrawal of its forces from Lebanese territory and the establishment of a UN interim force, were adopted on March 19 1978.

UNIFIL was set up in southern Lebanon for an initial period of six month, subject to extension.

The UNIFIL mandate was to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon, to restore international peace and security and to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring or establishing effective authority in the region.

Up to now, it has not been possible for UNIFIL to carry out its full original mandate. After the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, UNIFIL remained for three years behind Israeli lines, its role limited to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to the local population. In 1985, Israel carried out a partial withdrawal, retaining control of an area in southern Lebanon manned by IDF forces and the "South Lebanon Army".

UNIFILs operations are based on a permanently manned position network. The Force maintains 45 checkpoints,, controlling the principal roads in the UNIFIL area, 95 observation posts to observe movement on and off the roads and 29 checkpoints / observation posts with double functions. Patrolling is by foot or vehicle.

In addition, UNTSO unarmed military observers under operational UNIFIL control maintain 5 observation posts and operate 5 mobile teams in the area under Israeli control.

UNIFIL is located in southern Lebanon with headquarters in Naqoura. Strength is some 5.300 troops , assisted by 59 military observers of UNTSOs Observer Group Lebanon and app.540 international and local civilian staff.

The mandate has been extended from March 1978 to present.

### **United Nations Iran - Iraq Military Observer Group / UNIIMOG**

On the basis of Security Council Resolution 598 (1987), calling for a ceasefire between Iraq and Iran, UNIIMOG was set up to control the armistice. UNIIMOG was kept in force from April 1988 to March 1990.

### **United Nations Iraq - Kuwait Observation mission / UNIKOM**

Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) established a demilitarized zone (DMZ) along the Iraq-Kuwait border, to be monitored by UNIKOM.

The mandate of the mission is to monitor the DMZ and to deter violations of the boundary.

UNIKOM military observers are unarmed. Responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in the DMZ rests with the governments of Iraq and Kuwait in their respective part of the zone. Police are allowed sidearms only.

Initially, to provide security during the set-up phase, UNIKOM included five infantry companies, drawn from UNFICYP and UNIFIL; these were withdrawn by end of June 1991. UNIKOM operates on a combination of patrol and observation bases, observation points, ground and air patrol, investigation teams and liaison with the parties to the ceasefire.

UNIKOM is located at the DMZ along the Iraq-Kuwait border with headquarters in Umm Qasr. The current strength is roughly 250 military observers, 900 troops and support personnel and 200 international and local civilian staff. The current deployment is well below the authorized strength of 3.645 military personnel.

The international border between Kuwait and Iraq has been officially recognized by Iraq in fulfillment of Resolution 687 (1991) on Nov. 11 1994.

### **United Nations Special Commission / UNSCOM**

UNSCOM is based on Section C, Security Council resolution 687 (1991), banning Iraqi possession of nuclear, chemical and biological weapon capabilities and long-range missiles. The ban extends to research and development, production, use, testing, support, repair and maintenance of above cited weapons, their delivery means, all sub-components and associated equipment.

While IAEA is tasked with nuclear monitoring [T17], UNSCOM is in charge of the non-nuclear part. [T18]

Plans by UNSCOM and IAEA for ongoing monitoring and verification were submitted to the Security Council and approved on October 11, 1991, in Security Council Resolution 715 (1991).

The mandate of resolution 715 (1991) entitles UNSCOM to the conduct of any number of unannounced inspections of any site, facility, activity, material or other item anywhere in Iraq and to conduct overflights of any area, location, site or facility in Iraq for the purpose of inspection, surveillance, transportation or logistics under such conditions as UNSCOM may decide.

The details of these provisions are enumerated in Annex I, resolution 715. Section C and Annex II, Section D and Annex III and Section E and Annex IV deal with details on monitoring chemical, biological and missile capabilities and outline Iraq's obligation to provide to UNSCOM information on sites, facilities, materials, equipment, documentation, imports, activities and intentions.

### **United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara / MINURSO**

On August 11 1988, the Secretary General and the Special Envoy of the Chairman presented to the parties of the Conflict in Western Sahara, namely Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO, a document referred to as "the settlement proposals", containing proposals for a solution of the conflict in conformity with 1960 General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), encompassing a ceasefire and holding of a referendum without military or administrative constraints.

Security Council Resolution 690 (1991), dated April 29 1991, decides to establish MINURSO. The Secretary General proposed in May 1991 the enter into effect of a ceasefire by September 6, a date both parties agreed to.

Due to delays and numerous hostilities, the implementation for the transition period had to be delayed [T19].

The primary function of MINURSO was restricted to verifying the ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, carried out by direct observation of military forces and activities of both parties. UN military observers were deployed to 10 team sites / observation posts in the northern and southern sectors of the territory., backed by mobile patrols and heli-borne patrols.

A liaison office has been established in Tindouf to maintain contact with Algerian authorities and the Frente POLISARIO.

MINURSO is located in Western Sahara with headquarters in Laayoune. Current strength is some 220 military observers, 100 military support personnel, 30 police officers and 180 civilian personnel.

Authorized strength is app 1.700 troops and military observers, 300 police officers and 900 civilian personnel.

#### *V.) Regional CSBMs*

Although most of the agreements quoted involve third party services (see ch.IV), the basic agreement on moving forces behind lines to be agreed can only be based on mutual acceptance of the security perceptions both sides endeavour.

Given the experiences with middle eastern peacekeeping operations, it can be stated, that the presence of UN forces per se does deter, but their setup as verification body to a disengagement agreement both parties estimate as valuable.

Therefore, the basic disengagement agreement is not seen as third party service, but as regional CSBM between opposing parties.

#### **1974 Israeli-Syrian Agreement**

The above agreement in the disengagement of forces is the basis for UNDOF.

The agreement mandates that within 10 km of the border each side is allowed only to deploy 6.000 troops, 75 MBT and 36 arty pieces.

In a zone 10 to 20 km from the border, each side is allowed an additional 450 MBT and 162 arty pieces with a maximum range of less than 20 km.

Air defense missiles are prohibited within 25 km of the border.

#### **1974 Sinai I Agreement**

Force separation in the Sinai was reached via a demilitarized buffer zone controlled by UN (the zone is a prerequisite to UN peacekeeping, not a demilitarized zone in its own right; therefore the zone is not mentioned in ch.II).

Limits on armament have been agreed, verification was carried out by NTMs of the parties as well as by UN forces [T20].

## 1975 Sinai II Agreement

The second Egyptian-Israeli interim agreement was an extended version of Sinai I, being in force until the signing of the Peace Treaty on March 29, 1979. It provided for the redeployment of forces and the establishment of a buffer zone between the forces. In addition, Israel left the Mitla and Gidi Passes, quitted the Abu Rudais oilfield and created a "limited force zone" on the eastern side of the buffer zone, appr. 30 km wide, Egypt undertaking the same manouvre down the eastern side of the Suez Canal. In the limited force zone, both sides were allowed to keep 8 standard infantry batallions, 75 MBTs, 72 arty pieces (up to cal. 120 mm, range less than 12 km) and up to 8.000 personnel [T21]

## Informal Agreements

Informal agreements are non-binding gentlemen's agreements, nevertheless of basic relevance, sometimes being the first steps to more formalized and longstanding agreements.

## Lebanon red line

In April 1976, Syria and Israel reached a secret agreement through US mediation to minimize unintentionary confrontation potential. Syria agreed to Israeli red line conditions allowing Syrian military intervention in Lebanon under the condition the syrian forces being restricted to ground forces, not moving south of a line between Zaharani / Mediterranean and Mashki in the Bekaa. As part of the agreement, Syria agreed to respect Israels security concerns in southern Lebanon and to avoid air attacks against Christian targets [T22]

## Jordan-Israel red lines

Jordans eastern and northeastern border being of constant concern for israeli strategists led to a Syrian-Israeli understanding, that forces entering Jordan fromn this border in significant numbers would lead to an automatic Israeli response.

A similar understanding was reached concerning the shared border along the Jordan valley, applied to infiltration.

It can be argued that above red line understandigs might well enhance security, but confidence in a lesser way.

## Saudi Air Force deployment

Israeli opposition to U.S. F-15s sold to Saudi Arabia led to a U.S.-Saudi understanding on the deployment of these fighters. 62 aircraft were sold, not to be stationed in northwest Saudi Arabia (Tabuk air field).   
*Informal : i.e. bet. US President and Congress based on oral understanding bet US President & Saudi King*

Enhancing regional stability, the agreement can also be perceived as supplier side policy: Also, the strike variant of a total of 72 F-15s agreed on in 1992, based on the F-15 E, will have its electronic and radar suites modified to ensure they cannot be used against US-type aircraft and have fewer waepons pylons [T23]

Unilateral politics not being subject of this paper, other examples are not quoted.

## *VI.) Non-regional CSBMs*

### **United Nations Conventional Arms Register**

Government Reports for 1992 on the transfer of major conventional weapons (seven categories) have been submitted to the Secretary General in compliance with General assembly Resolution 46/36 L (1991).

Of the 186 states invited (184 UN member states and the two observer states Holy See and Switzerland), 78 responded to the request: 24 countries reported arms exports, 37 reported imports, 41 nil reports on exports and 31 nil reports in imports were submitted.

Most arms exporters, but only two-thirds of all importers reported.

The exporters having submitted reports account for 98 % of the total value of major conventional weapon systems, the import data for 65 % of imports (SIPRI data) [T24].

The vast majority of countries not submitting export reports do not produce weapon systems compatible with the seven categories of the Register.

Key groups of arms importers did not report, particularly governments in the Middle East [T25]

### **1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS)**

Not being an AC agreement, several of UNCLOS provisions deal with security matters and are related to CSBMs.

The Convention has been signed on December 10 1982 and will enter into force requiring 60 ratifications, the date provisioned being Nov. 16 1994.

All ships, warships included, may exercise the right of passage through the territorial sea of other states, the passage being continuous, expeditious and innocent.

A passage is not considered innocent if, among other activities, a foreign ship engages in threat of use of force, in an exercise or practice with weapons of any kind, in collecting information hampering the security of the coastal state, landing or taking on board of an aircraft or any military device.

Submarines must navigate on the surface and show their flag.

Nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear or other inherently dangerous or noxious substances are required to special precautionary measures.

Aircraft have no right of overflight and may enter only under the consent of the coastal state.

UNCLOS empowers the coastal state to ask foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage to use lanes, to prevent non-innocent passage and to suspend innocent passage temporarily in specified areas of the territorial sea for security reasons. [T26]

Not being in force at the time of writing and taking into account the primarily non-AC-related character of UNCLOS, it is not part of ch.I, but figures under ch.VI.

Most parts of UNCLOS reflecting the general understanding of the law of the sea being in force, certain rules have acquired the status of customary law and have been incorporated into military manuals.

## ***VII) Supplier side agreements***

### **Australia Group**

The Australia Group, aiming at the control of key precursors to chemical weapons, encompasses Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, the UK and the USA.

The Australia Group has established the chemical weapons precursor export warning list, currently encompassing 50 substances. The list is handed by member states to their chemical industry, advising for caution because of potential military use of these substances.

A core list is formed out of nine central substances, for which the Australia Group countries have introduced or are introducing export controls.

It must be added, that export controls do not equal export bans, they bind export on certain conditions. Export control of precursors is made difficult by the the given legitimate commercial use of most substances (p.ex.: phosphorus oxychloride, phosphorus trichloride, thionyl chloride - all three being part of the core list).

### **Missile Technology Control Regime**

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an informal agreement that emerged originally between eight Western industrialized countries - Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, the UK and USA - to ban or restrict the export of ballistic missiles and associated technologies. It evolved in an evolutionary process, set up in the late 1960s, was negotiated in the mid- 1980s and made public in 1987.

*(Russia is about joining)*

At the December 1989 MTCR meeting membership was expanded to Denmark, Norway and New Zealand, Sweden, without joining the MTCR, has established similar export restrictions.

The MTCR's fundamental principles are:

- Emerging powers do not have the right to acquire ballistic missile or space technology from foreign suppliers.
- Potential suppliers must distinguish between economic and security interests in their export policies.
- There are practical limits to the obligation to control the spread of ballistic missile technology
- once a country has acquired the above technology, there is no way under international law to deprive it of that. [127]

Being the only multinational instrument to control the spread of missile technology certainly underlines the MTCR's relevance; nevertheless, serious shortcomings are the lacking of an



agency to detect non-compliance as well as the absence of any means of enforcement. Furthermore, MTCR is not comprehensible, with Russia and China among important countries not participating.

Suppliers of ballistic-missile technology to Middle East countries are / have been the USSR (to Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Syria, Yemen), France (to Egypt, Iraq, and Israel), China (to Iran and Saudi Arabia), Brazil (to Iraq and Saudi Arabia) and North Korea (to Egypt and Iran); Libya and Syria (to Iran), Egypt and Yugoslavia (to Iraq), USA (to Israel), and West Germany (to Libya)[T28]

### **London Club**

"London Club" emerged in 1975 at a London meeting of the seven major suppliers of nuclear material and facilities - USA, USSR, the UK, France, West Germany, Japan and Canada - as a loose understanding to implement tighter control on the nuclear market; the group of seven was joined by another eight suppliers - Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Sweden, East Germany and Poland

The London Club set up a list of nuclear-weapon related materials, equipments and technology, hereby formulating a "trigger list", aimed at triggering IAEA-safeguards in case of export. It also adopted guidelines for nuclear transfer, aimed at the importer states.

The London Club criteria and guidelines do not constitute a treaty, they are understood as a gentlemen's agreement between member states to act according to the above criteria when exporting nuclear material, equipment and technology.

A weakness of the London Club is not requiring importers of nuclear materials and facilities to adopt full-scope safeguards: IAEA safeguards are only implemented on those items imported, not on all the importers' nuclear facilities, as according to NPT rules

### **Conclusions**

In the field of **Arms control treaties and agreements**, the CWC seems, due to the number of state signatories, a promising initiative.

The correlation between adherence to NPT and BWC - the same argument might be turned up considering the ratification of CWC - is not legally, but politically based.

Therefore, any overall agreement to be concluded can hardly be based on the existence of the above treaties alone.

**The Treaties and agreements related to CSBMs and regional security** show a bias:

In the Maghreb, a consolidation with security implication can be observed (albeit depending heavily on the conduct of internal politics).

On the other hand, the Mashrek and Khalig seem to be tending towards external security links.

As for demilitarized / neutralized zones / islands, these tools have become widely applied, namely in connection with peace treaties, ceasefire agreements and third party services; never

the less, they hardly are suited to longstanding solutions, their capacity for short- to medium-term regional stabilisation unquestioned.

The regional **Peace treaties and ceasefire agreements including AC and CSBM measures** are, apart from the Egyptian-Israeli experience, too young to be analyzed in terms of longstanding contribution to peace and stability in the region.

**Third party services related to AC and CSBMs** have to be seen as an enterprise in stabilisation, hardly as instruments of longstanding conflict resolution; this perspective is congruent with the view of the Secretary General as laid out in Agenda for Peace, defining peacekeeping as necessary, but in itself hardly satisfying contribution to an overall conflict resolution.

This perception is hardend by the sober fact, that similarly conceptualized operations had a non-similar outcome in terms of securing peace and stability.

**Regional CSBMs** are not new to the region, quite the contrary: when the CSCE started to be taken serious in the context of bilateral security matters between the block powers - in the mid-80s - , the Sinai was quoted as example for CSBMs (the CSCE having relied up to this evolution on CBMs). In the Sinai agreements, the whole panoply of verification systems was applied.

As for **Non-regional CSBMs**, UNCLOS holds a promise for littoral states only, hopefully turning from partly applied customary law to treaty status.

The UN arms register failed to fullfill the hopes associated with its implementation, its future in the CD agenda beeing shaky at the moment.

The efficacy of **Supplier side agreements** largely depends on the committment of the state members and the internal regulations derived from this committment. Establishing common goals, they might largely influence regional stability - for the better or the worse.

Page: 1

[T1]"al sharg al usat" in Arabic, "ha mizrah a tikhon" in Hebrew, "khavare miyaneh" in Persian.

For the discussion see Boulding Elise (ed), Building Peace in the Middle East, Boulder 1993

Page: 2

[T2]Preparatory Commission for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons - Provisional Technical Secretariat. 26. 09.1994

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[T3]Arms Control Today. July/August 1994, p.28

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[T4]For an overview on Israel's estimated nuclear capacities, see Hough Harold, Israel's Nuclear Infrastructure, Janes Intelligence Review Nov 1994

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[T5]idem

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[T6]Assia Bensalah Alaoui. The Maghreb, in Dhanapala (ed), Regional Approaches to Disarmament, UNIDIR, Aldershot 1993.

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[T7]For details see Anwar -Ul-Haqahady. Security in the Persian Gulf after Desert Storm, International Journal 4/1993, S.227 ff

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[T8]see Laura Guazzone. The Politics of Mediterranean Naval Security, The International Spectator, Vol.XXVIII, No 4 1993

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[T9]For detailed information see Ronzitti Natailo. Demilitarization and neutralization in the Mediterranean, Italian yearbook of international law. Vol.6, 1985,p.33 ff

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[T10] Keesings Treaties and Alliances of the world, 3rd ed.,Detroit 1986, p.346

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[T11]Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Volume 1,Nort-Holland 1992, p.43 ff (Aegean Sea)

Page: 8

[T12]Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Volume 4, Nort-Holland 1982, p.31 ff (Neutralization)

Page: 10

[T13]In this paper, the long-standing term peace-keeping will be use; the term is roughly applicable also according to the scheme of the Agenda for Peace, albeit Middle East missions have also connotations to post-action strengthening of civilian infrastructure (medical services etc) and to peace enforcement (Gulf II).

Page: 10

[T14]For an in-depth record on the below cited UN missions, especially the ones with limited success, see Diehl Puf. International Peacekeeping. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1993

Page: 10

[T15]The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview on UN missions, centering on implementation and scope. Their setup-scheme will be dealt with in chapter V) as contribution to regional CSBMs.

Page: 10

[T16]For this Agreement, see chapter V).

Page: 12

[T17]For details see Blix Hans. Verification of Nuclear Non-Proliferation: The Lesson of Iraq, in The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1992

Page: 12

[T18]For details see Trevan Tim. Ongoing Monitoring and Verification in Iraq, in Arms Control Today, May 1994, p.11ff.

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[T19]For details on MINURSO see Durch William J., Building on sand - UN Peacekeeping in the Western Sahara, in International Security, Vol.17, No.4 (Spring 1993),p.151 ff.

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[T20]The verification regime of Sinai I and II inspired analysts in Europe as well; CSBMs being implemented on a large basis in Europe first (CSCE - process), ideas have been drawn from the Sinai experience to enhance European stability. See Barton David, The Sinai Peacekeeping Experience: a verification paradigm for Europe, SIPRI Yearbook 1985, London 1985 and Koulik Sergey, The Sinai Experience, in Kokoski Richard and Koulik Sergey. Verification of Conventional Arms Control in Europe, SIPRI, Boulder 1990.

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[T21]see also graphic added for the "Sinai Model", esp. its verification part.

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[T22]Darilek Richard, Kemp Geoffrey, Prospects for CSBMs,n.n.,p.33 f.

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[T23]Rathmell Andrew, Saudi-Arabias Military Build-up, Janes Intelligence Review Nov.1994

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[T24]Laurence Edward et.al., Arms Watch - SIPRI Report on the First Year of the UN Register of Conventional Arms, Oxford 1993

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[T25]For detailed figures on the UN Conventional Arms Register (and recent trends in Middle East arms aquisition) see also Laurence Edward and Wulf Herbert, An Evaluation of the First Year of reporting zo the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms, Monterey Institute of International Stadies, Monterey 1993 and Grimmett Richard, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World 1985 -1992, CRS Report for Congress, Washington 1993

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
[T26]Goldblat Jozef, Arms Control, op.cit, p.134 ff

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[T27]Neuneck Goetz, Ischebeck Otfried (Eds.), Missile Proliferation, Missile Defense, and Arms Control; Baden-Baden 1993. S.172

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[T28]Barnaby Frank, Arms Control after the Gulf War; Research Institute for The Study of Conflict and Terrorism, London 1992



### 1979 Peace Treaty zones in the Sinai Peninsula

Source: Barton, D., 'The Sinai Peacekeeping experience: a verification paradigm for Europe', SIPRI, *World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1985* (Taylor & Francis: London, 1985), p. 550.

# **PARTIES TO MAJOR ARMS CONTROL AND RELATED AGREEMENTS**

	UN member	1925 Geneva	CWC (s only)	BWC	NPT	UNCLOS (s only)
ALGERIA	1955	1992	1993 s			
BAHRAIN	1971	1988	1993 s	1988	1988 s	1985 s
DJIBOUTI	1977	1977	1993 s			
EGYPT	1945	1928		s	1981	1983 s
IRAN	1945	1929	1993 s	1973	1970	
IRAQ	1945	1931		1991	1969	1985 s
ISRAEL	1949	1969	1993 s			
JORDAN	1955	1977		1975	1970	
KUWAIT	1963	1971	1993 s	1972	1989 s	1986 s
LEBANON	1945	1969		1975	1970	
LIBYA	1955	1971		1982	1975	
MAURITAN	1961		1993 s			
MOROCCO	1956	1970	1993 s	s	1970	
OMAN	1971		1993 s	1992		1989
QATAR	1971	1976	1993 s	1975	1989 s	
SAUDI-A	1945	1971	1993 s	1972	1988 s	
SOMALIA	1960			s	1970	
SUDAN	1956	1980			1973	1985
SYRIA	1945	1968		s	1969	
TUNISIA	1956	1967	1993 s	1973	1970	1985
UAE	1971		1993 s	s		
YEMEN	1947	1971	1993 s	1979	1979	1987

MAIN SOURCE: GOLDBLAT, ARMS CONTROL, OSLO 1994, COMPILATION OF AUTHOR  
 DATES INDICATE THE ENTRY INTO FORCE S: SIGNED ONLY

# MEMBER STATES TO SECURITY AGREEMENTS

	ARAB LIGUE	COLL. SEPACT	UMA	GCC	DAMASC DECLAR	BILAT SEC.A
ALGERIA	X	X	X			
BAHRAIN	X			X	X	X
DJIBOUTI	X					
EGYPT	X	X			X	
IRAN						
IRAQ	X	X				
ISRAEL						
JORDAN	X	X				
KUWAIT	X	X		X	X	X
LEBANON	X	X				
LIBYA	X	X	X			
MAURITAN	X		X			
MOROCCO	X	X	X			
OMAN	X			X	X	X
QATAR	X			X	X	
SAUDI-A	X	X		X	X	X
SOMALIA	X					
SUDAN	X	X				
SYRIA	X	X			X	
TUNISIA	X		X			
UAE	X			X	X	X
YEMEN	X	X				

SOURCE: VARIOUS, COMPILATION OF AUTHOR

# ESTIMATED BALLISTIC MISSILE AND CRUISE CAPACITIES

	estim. Aweapon program	BallMis 40-150 km	BallMis 150-600 km	BallMis over600 km	Cruise Missile progr.	Missil techn. ass.by
ALGERIA	X	X				su
BAHRAIN						
DJIBOUTI						
EGYPT		X	X			su, fr, ch nk
IRAN	X	X	X	X		ch, nk, li nk
IRAQ	X	X	X	X	X	su, fr, br ju, eg
ISRAEL	X	X	X	X	X	us, fr
JORDAN						
KUWAIT		X				su
LEBANON						
LIBYA	X	X	X	X		su, nk, ge
MAURITAN						
MOROCCO						
OMAN						
QATAR						
SAUDI-A				X		ch, br
SOMALIA						
SUDAN						
SYRIA		X	X	X		su, nk
TUNISIA						
UAE						
YEMEN		X	X			su

PRIMARY SOURCES: n.n., FACTFILE, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, APRIL 1994  
(draws on ACA, ACDA, CEIP, CIA, CRS, CSIS, DOD, IDDS, IDR,  
JDW, JSIR, MIIP, OTA, ROK, RUSI, SIPRI, UCS sources).

LENNOX DUNCAN, MISSILE RACE CONTINUES, JANES DEFENCE  
WEEKLY, 23 JAN 1993



# MEMBER STATES TO SUPPLIER SIDE AGREEMENTS

	AUSTRALIA GR.	LONDON CLUB	MTCR
AUSTRALIA	X		
BELGIUM	X	X	
CANADA	X	X	X
CZECHOSLOVAKIA		X	
DENMARK	X		X
FRANCE	X	X	X
GERMANY	X	X	X
GREECE	X		
IRELAND	X		
ITALY	X	X	X
JAPAN	X	X	X
LUXEMBOURG	X		
NETHERLANDS	X	X	
NEW ZEALAND	X		X
NORWAY	X		X
POLAND		X	
PORTUGAL	X		
RUSSIA		X	
SPAIN	X		X
SWEDEN		X	(X)
SWITZERLAND	X	X	
UNITED KINGDOM	X	X	X
UNITED STATES	X	X	X

SOURCE: COMPILATION OF AUTHOR

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Stockholm, 6-9 October 1994

Peace Negotiations, a NWFZ in the Middle East, and NPT

Shalheveth Freier (Israel)

The Peace Negotiations

This paper is written in early October 1994. The report on the peace negotiations is necessarily dated. Israel's stance with respect to a NWFZ and NPT is likely to be of a less transcendent nature.

As far as Israel is concerned, it is the essence of the peace negotiations to assess whether a genuine desire for peace exists on the part of the regional states, and to take manageable security risks in assessing such desire. It is of course hoped that peace is not only on everyone's lips - which it is not yet - but also at the back of minds, and that unavoidable pitfalls on the road to peace can be successfully circumnavigated.

At this time of crowded activity, it worth dressing the balance of the progress in these negotiations.

There are two "tracks", as they are called, to these negotiations, the bi-lateral track and the multi-lateral track.

On the bi-lateral tracks, Israel negotiates with the Palestinians, Jordanians, Syrians and Lebanese.

On the Palestinian track, there is progress in the gradual transfer of authority to the Palestinian autonomy. Difficulties pertain essentially to the functioning of the autonomy, the means at its disposal and their judicious allocation, in order to register a visible upsurge in the economy. This is in everybody's interest. Another difficulty rests on the PLO charter which still insists on Israel's dismemberment as the ultimate goal, an injunction which has not yet been rescinded, and an increase of violence against Israelis, in Israel proper, and the decampment of the assailants into the autonomy, in the expectation of leniency on the part of the Palestinian security authorities. Yet, the autonomy continues to evolve and expand, supported by multiple, daily contacts on all levels.

On the Jordanian track, manifest good will is being invested on both sides, in order to arrive at a peace settlement, and extant problems on the delineation of boundaries and allocation of water resources - or joint plans for water management and production - will hopefully be solved.

On the Syrian and Lebanese tracks, it need first be recalled that Lebanon is ruled by Syria, and cannot move without Syrian acquiescence. These talks are ostensibly stalled, but much effort is being invested by the U.S. to reinvigorate them.

The Syrians demand complete Israeli withdrawal from the Golan heights in return for a peace agreement, the character of which is not clear, object to the separate initiatives of the Palestinians and Jordanians to seek accommodation with Israel, give succour to the rejectionist movements, and especially allow the Iranian-sponsored Hisbolla movement to maintain warfare against Israel across the Lebanese border. Iran and the Hisbolla movement are vowed to the destruction of Israel.

The Israelis, for their part, advocate a staggered and gradual withdrawal from part of the Golan heights, which dominate all of Northern Israel, in order to judge whether it is indeed peace the Syrians seek or improved positions for an eventual further onslaught on Israel.

The Lebanese demand that Israel relinquish control of the "Security zone" in Lebanon. This zone was established by Israel in order to keep the Hisbolla forces at a distance from Northern Israel, which would otherwise be under constant rocket attack.

The Israelis, for their part, do not wish an inch of Lebanese territory but insist that the Lebanese government assume full responsibility for keeping the frontier calm. The Lebanese might well be willing, but not so the Syrians.

On the multi-lateral tracks, all states of the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf participate, except for Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Syria and Lebanon. These talks are also attended by practically all states which exhibit an interest, including Europe, India, China, the UN and others.

These multilateral talks center on five issues:

Economic Co-operation

Environment

Refugees

Water

Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS)

Most are in the process of discussing diverse plans which are being submitted, all of course contingent on progress in the bi-lateral talks.

Of interest for this paper is the state of negotiations at the ACRS working group. It is agreed that confidence-building-measures are the first priority, but it is not agreed what these are supposed to be. There is definite progress on a number of useful confidence-building measures, like Sea and Air rescue operations, the establishment of a Communication Centre, and a Clearing House for Information Exchange.

"Mentors" from a number of countries guide these negotiations with much commitment (Rescue - Canada; Communication - Netherlands; Information - Turkey), and of course the entire peace process is guided by the co-sponsors, the U.S. and Russia, and were it not for the indefatigable U.S. efforts, the negotiations would have been stalled long ago. However serious differences have arisen in the order of confidence-building measures, by which the Israelis and some of the regional states wish to proceed. I shall return to these in the following section. But before then, I should like to make some summary comments on the peace negotiations.

The peace negotiations recognize the comprehensive character of any settlement. "Comprehensive" refers to issues and to states. They try to deal with issues concurrently, in the hope that progress in any area or with any partner will generate progress also elsewhere. They assume that such progress, and the evolving habits of talking matters over directly - face to face, will create a propitious climate for further advance also on matters which at the moment seem intractable, like Jerusalem.

Especially, these negotiations may induce states which do not negotiate in good faith - or not at all - to realize the benefits of peace instead of the maintenance of implacable hatreds.

Apart from the negotiating tracks set out above, we have recently learned that Morocco and Tunisia are establishing "interest sections" in Israel and vice versa, and that the Gulf states have decided to do away with the secondary boycott of Israel, i.e. they will not blacklist foreign firms trading with Israel, while yet maintaining the primary boycott - that of direct trading with Israel. But even the latter may be on the way of being relented.

However, let me now come back to the problems facing the ACRS and its relation to the nuclear issue.

#### Arms Control and Regional Security and the Nuclear Issue

For this purpose, a number of salient facts need be recalled.

- Except for Egypt, no regional state has yet agreed to make peace with Israel.
- Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Libya still deny Israel legitimacy and will not countenance peace with it, let alone agree to negotiate.
- The Syrians who are ostensibly partners to the bi-lateral negotiations still connive in irrendentist attacks on Israel and support peace-rejectionist movements.
- Even Egypt feels pressure ought to be kept up on Israel to submit its nuclear installations to IAEA inspection, before the peace talks are allowed to register further progress, and Egypt is dissatisfied with the easing of the economic boycott of Israel by the Gulf States. At this time, there is no Arab agreement yet on even "declaratory" confidence-building-measures.

Under these circumstances, it is the Israeli view that there is a natural sequence of confidence-building-measures (CBM) which need be negotiated, implemented, and tested over time for their vitality. And this is the sequence.

- CBMs which do not impair the security of the contracting parties.

Such measures can be concluded bi-laterally or multi-laterally with all states willing. They are not dependent on overall regional consensus. It need be stressed, that all such measures must stand the test of time. Confidence does not reside only in agreement on such measures, but on their vitality and durability. CBMs which I have mentioned before (Rescue, Communication, Information Exchange) fall in this category.

- CBMs of a more intrusive kind, such as do impinge on a state's security, and arms control.

Such CBMs really depend on a number of preliminary conditions. They assume that all states of the region have officially abjured war as a means of settling conflicts, that they all participate in the peace negotiations and that indeed confidence exists that outstanding issues will be settled peacefully.

It is not, by the way, a matter which touches only Israel and the Arab states - as a bloc. Indeed, the Gulf states have no fear of Israel at all, but are apprehensive of Iraq and Iran, and the states of the Maghreb have inter-state problems, and Israel does not figure in any adverse way in their security perceptions. Indeed UNIDIR has recognized that these problems need be addressed, if confidence-building and arms control in the Middle East and North Africa are to be realistically conceived.

- Concurrently with the above, formal peace and normal relations need be instituted among all states.

- It is only after such peace, proven over time, that Israel believes it can negotiate a NWFZ and relinquish the nuclear image it has. Such NWFZ would not only be directly negotiated among the states of the region, but include mutual inspection.

NPT, with occasional offenders (Iraq, N-Korea) and an international inspectorate - the IAEA - is just not good enough. Things look different if you are part of an onlooking, international community, or a next-door neighbour.

I have the impression, that many Arab states are ready to go along with this sequence. Egypt, however, has decided to put Israel's submission of its installations under full-scope inspection by the IAEA, or Israel's accession to the NPT, at the top of the list of confidence-building measures and to impede progress on other confidence building measures - even declaratory - as long as this demand is not satisfied.

If the reader looks again at the "salient facts" at the beginning of this paragraph, one cannot but interpret Egypt's attitude other than saying: First divest yourself of your nuclear image, peace with you can wait.

As the NPT extension conference is shaping up, the Arab states - some or all - have stated that they will not be party to an indefinite extension or, for that matter, ratify any arms control agreement (such as the CWC), unless Israel submits to IAEA inspection. I cannot conceive of Israel changing its nuclear posture, under prevailing circumstances, even in the face of such pressure.

In conclusion, let me make a few comments of a general nature on NPT.

NPT is a good treaty, in as much as it has caused states to assess their security situation and make up their minds on whether to accept the obligations which go with it. Irrespective of its manifest flaws - such as the division between the recognized nuclear powers and all the rest - it is a good treaty. No international morality attaches to it. Such morality does not exist, but solely the considered national interest of its members. The imbalance in the character of its nuclear and non-nuclear members simply reflects the fact that the world is not uniform. Such proclaimed uniformity in defence matters is also a



spurious notion in a world in which strife still abounds. It is evident that the "hold-outs" on NPT have problems which need be addressed in their overall context and that bland international dispositions limited to the nuclear realm and disregarding everything else, are just not helpful or useful. And I think of Israel's problems, and those of India (China) and Pakistan (India).

It is, I believe, necessary to acknowledge - and I think it is being increasingly realized - that comprehensive and tailored solutions need be sought in nuclear problem areas. Distinction need also be made between potential nuclear aggressors, such as Iraq or North Korea and possibly Iran, in the future, which subvert their undertakings under NPT, and the "hold-outs" who assume the burden of their stance, because they cannot help it.

In Israel's view, I believe, this means: first peace and then a credible NWFZ, more stringent than NPT.

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# The Geographical Middle East Concept

## Draft chapter 4 of the UNIDIR project on Confidence-Building in the Middle East (8 November 1994)

The Middle East is a wellknown and traditional geographical concept used in everyday political discussion. Defining the geographical extension of the Middle East for arms control application is not trivial, however.

Different definitions have for a long time been used for different purposes. One was introduced in 1989 by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) when discussing the application of safeguards in relation to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the area, i. e. "the area extending from the Libyan Arab Jamahiria in the West, to the Islamic Republic of Iran in the East, and from Syria in the North to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in the South"<sup>1</sup>. A UN study on the proposed nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East found the IAEA concept somewhat limited for its purpose and suggested an area that eventually could encompass "all states members of the League of Arab States (LAS), the Islamic Republic of Iran and Israel"<sup>2</sup>.

A definition adequate for legal application of a CSBM regime, including a zone arrangement free of all weapons of mass destruction, may or may not coincide with those used earlier for different purposes. Such a definition should encompass all states with a primary security relevance to each other. On the other hand, an ambition to include all states with any security relevance to each other would easily result in a Middle East concept that would include most of the Old World.

The area should thus at least include the actors central to the specific conflicts of the Middle East. The most publicized is the Arab - Israeli conflict. But there are also other conflicts involving many of the same states as demonstrated by the recent examples of the Iran - Iraq war, the Gulf War, and the Polisario conflict.

As a project definition must be based on the current political geography, it seems relevant, for the

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<sup>1</sup> *Technical Study on Different Modalities of Application of Safeguards in the Middle East*. Document IAEA-GC (XXXIII)/887, 29 August 1989. (On 22 May 1990, Democratic Yemen and Yemen merged to form a single state with the name "Yemen"). A similar definition was suggested in the 1975 UN study *Comprehensive Study on the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in all its Aspects*. United Nations Document A/10027/Add. 1, (UN Sales No. E.76.1.7). para 72.

<sup>2</sup> UN Document A/45/435 (1990); UN Sales No.E.91.IX.3.

purpose of this study, to define the basic Middle East area according to the UN formula mentioned above, i. e. the area represented by all the states members of the League of Arab states, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and Israel. But it should also be understood that the application of a CSBM regime may begin in a smaller area of a few core states and later expand to finally encompass the entire basic area. It could also be desirable to expand the application area further to include also some adjacent sea areas.

As such a Middle East area would have neighbours around almost its entire periphery, it might be desirable to invite neighbouring states, e. g. Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Chad, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Greece, Italy, Malta, Pakistan, Spain, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and perhaps others, to assume special commitments to respect and support the regime.

With those understandings, the definition would be self-contained, include all essential states, and give the area politically established limits.

#### **The limitation of the basic area**

The recommended definition excludes Turkey, Cyprus and Malta. But Turkey is a NATO member and all three states are participating in the CSBM regime of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). US nuclear weapons formerly deployed on Turkey's territory have been withdrawn. Cyprus and Malta do not host any such weapons, although there are two British military bases on Cyprus. Given these facts, those countries may best be thought of as neighbours to a future Middle East arms control zone, from which it would be reasonable to expect commitments to respect and support a zonal regime.

Afghanistan and Pakistan border Iran to the East and their inclusion in a Middle East regime has sometimes been suggested as desirable. However, their interests focus in other directions and their contribution to a Middle East regime may be best defined as neighbouring state commitments.

The same can be said about the newly independent states, former Soviet republics, of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan also bordering the prospective basic area.

Djibouti, Somalia and the Sudan are member states of the League of Arab States. While there may be substantial reasons for including the Sudan at an early stage, geography clearly makes Djibouti and Somalia peripheral. The current problems in Somalia also exclude that country from consideration for the time being.

On the western part of the North African coast, there are a few tiny enclaves of Spain which may be included in the basic area – Spain itself being outside for the same reason as Turkey – and be treated as dependencies are under Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Several sea areas may be considered for inclusion in a basic Middle East area. Both the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf would be enclosed within the area. Prospective parts of the basic area have coasts in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, and the north western Indian Ocean.

### **Special provisions for applying arms control in sea areas**

It should also be recognized that application of a Middle East CSBM-regime in adjacent sea areas would require a separate discussion not only of the local political and military implications but also of the legal consequences, as sea areas have a special status implying accessibility for all states of the world. Because of the legal status of sea areas, maritime arrangements should be prescribed in separate protocols.

Coastal states have full jurisdiction over their internal waters only. Their jurisdiction also extends to their territorial seas and archipelagic waters, except that flag states enjoy the right of innocent passage for ships in such waters. There is a more liberal regime of transit passage through international straits<sup>3</sup>. The prospective area is adjacent to a few international straits subject to the régime of transit passage, i. e. the straits of Gibraltar, Bab al Mandab, and Hormuz. In exclusive economic zones or on the high seas the coastal states have no jurisdiction related to the military presence of other states.

States in a specific region have no right according to international law to limit by agreement among themselves the rights of flag states to navigate ships or fly aircraft in such waters. Their regulation would require agreement in principle among all states having the right to use them or at least among important maritime states to make the regime effective.

The Law of the Sea does currently not apply to the Caspian Sea which used to be divided between Iran and the Soviet Union. As the Iranian part would probably be the only part to be included in a Middle East regime, a division of the Soviet part of the sea between the four new states of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan, would not matter. It has been suggested by some of the coastal states to the Caspian Sea, however, that the Convention of the Law of the Sea should apply also to this lake then introducing new legal concepts such as territorial waters.

Also important in this respect is the Suez Canal, an international waterway crossing through Egyptian territory open "in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag" according to the Constantinople Convention of 29 October 1888<sup>4</sup>. This convention is also referred to in the Egypt - Israel Peace Treaty of 1978, which provides, i. a. that the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are "international waterways open to all nations".

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<sup>3</sup> The legal concepts of "innocent passage" and "transit passage" are defined in the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Articles 17 - 33, 45, and 52, and Articles 38 - 44 respectively.

<sup>4</sup> Only a ship flying the flag of a state at war with Egypt can be prevented from passing the Canal.

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BIBLIOTECA

# A Middle East Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Draft chapter 5 of the UNIDIR project on  
Confidence-Building in the Middle East (8 November 1994)

## Table of Contents

<b>Introduction</b> .....	2
<b>Existing zones</b> .....	4
Latin America .....	4
The South Pacific .....	5
Antarctica .....	6
Three proposed nuclear-weapon-free zones .....	6
<b>Objectives and principles</b> .....	7
Definitions .....	7
Important objectives .....	9
Geographical Considerations .....	10
Basic measures and obligations for nuclear-weapon-free zones .....	11
Basic measures and obligations: Mubarak complements .....	13
Special provisions for denuclearized sea areas .....	13
<b>Complaints and Control Procedures</b> .....	14
<b>The Middle East as a NWFZ or WMDFZ application</b> .....	16
The UN report on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East ..	16
Nuclear programmes .....	17
Preliminary steps .....	19
Shared views .....	20

## Introduction

The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ), as it has emerged from the political deliberation since the mid-1950s, has come to cover a spectrum of arrangements, geographically ranging from whole continents like Latin America to a corridor in CentraEurope, and functionally serving purposes of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons as well as avoiding nuclear war. The NWFZ issue must, therefore, be studied both in historical and conceptual terms.

The first proposal on regional limitation of nuclear weapons, introduced in the United Nations, was tabled in 1956<sup>1</sup>. It referred to Central Europe. One year later Polen proposed the so called Rapachi-plan on permanent absence of nuclear weapons from the entire territory of several states in Central Europe<sup>2</sup>.

At that time two different approaches to military denuclearization were pursued in parallell. One was the open ended and global non-proliferation approach which started with the "Irish" resolution<sup>3</sup> and finally lead to the adoption, in 1968, of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)<sup>4</sup>. The purpose of that treaty was to prevent the number of nuclear weapon states to grow beyond the five existing at the time. The fact that since then no state has established itself as a nuclear weapon state is an important basis for the discussion of the prospects for creation of nuclear weapon free zones.<sup>5</sup>

The other approach was the regional or zonal. The first result in this category was the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 declaring the Antarctic continent a demilitarized zone and by implication also a zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

Two other multilateral agreements raising barriers to the deployment of nuclear weapons in new areas and environments were the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the 1971 Sea-Bed Treaty.

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<sup>1</sup> UN Document DC/SC.1/41.

<sup>2</sup> UN Document A/PV. 697.

<sup>3</sup> A/RES/1665 (XVI).

<sup>4</sup> A/RES/2373 (XXII) and S/RES/255.

<sup>5</sup> The five nuclear weapon states are China, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union (on 24 December 1991 succeeded by the Russian Federation) and the United States. India who is not a party to the NPT, did manufacture and explode a nuclear device "for peaceful purposes" in 1974 but is usually not considered a nuclear weapon power. It was revealed in March 1993 that South Africa had maintained a nuclear weapon program for some time and fabricated six nuclear explosive devices, but that these charges have now been fully dismantled. On 10 July 1991, South Africa became a party to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. Several other states which are not parties to the NPT, are sometimes referred to as "threshold states" as they are considered to have undertaken preparations for becoming nuclear weapon powers. However, none of them have declared an intention to acquire nuclear weapons. As of March 20th, 1994, the NPT had 164 parties including all five established nuclear-weapon states.



The first major achievement in the regional or zonal approach was the agreement in 1967 by states in the Latin American region to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their continent, the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

A similar contribution was made in 1985, when the countries members of the South Pacific Forum agreed to establish a nuclear-free zone ranging from Latin America to the West coast of Australia and from the Antarctic area to the equator, the Treaty of Rarotonga.<sup>6</sup>

Similar proposals have been made for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of Europe, in the Middle East, South Asia, Africa and the ASEAN area.

The possibility of including international sea areas in proposed nuclear-weapon-free zones has also been envisaged, such as the Baltic, the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the South Atlantic and the oceans surrounding Latin America; such arrangements would require a special legal basis taking into account relevant provisions of international law<sup>7</sup>.

In the literature, there is a rich supply of proposals for establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones ranging from local communities and cities to continent size areas and the entire globe. A new idea was introduced in 1982 with the proposal for the creation of a corridor in Central Europe from which tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons would be withdrawn. Unlike earlier proposals, the area of application would be unrelated to national borders of the states involved and no security assurances would apply. The rationale of the proposed measure is that it would reduce the risk of such weapons becoming immediately involved in any conflict or incident by geographically separating adversary tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons in the area.<sup>8</sup> The specific proposal for such a corridor in Central Europe has become irrelevant due to the recent development in the European political structure.

A number of areas have been declared demilitarized zones according to treaties concluded long ago, most of them before the atomic bomb was invented. Among such areas are a number of small islands in the Mediterranean. By implication such areas should today be considered denuclearized as well.

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<sup>6</sup> Texts of treaties and other important international documents referred to in this paper could in many cases be found in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements, Fourth Edition 1992, Volumes 1 and 2*, (UN Sales No. E.93.IX.11) which is up-dated to 31 December 1992; or in J. Goldblat, *Arms Control. A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements*. PRIO. Sage Publications. London. 1994, up-dated to October 1993.

<sup>7</sup> The political history of the existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and many of the proposed zones are described in the reports of two United Nations expert studies. The first report was prepared in 1975, *Comprehensive Study on the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in all its Aspects*. United Nations Document A/10027/Add. 1, (UN Sales No. E.76.1.7). The second report was almost but not entirely finalized in 1985. It "exists" as an annex to a letter of 9 February 1985 from the Chairman of the expert group, Dr Claus Törnudd of Finland, to the Secretary General. The formal status of this annex is subject to dispute. It is, however, very informative.

<sup>8</sup> *Common Security*. Report by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues. Simon and Schuster. New York 1982. p.147. UN Document A/CN.10/38.

Reference should finally be made to the possibility envisaged in the humanitarian laws of war to establish by agreement temporary demilitarized zones<sup>9</sup>.

A discussion of the role of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the post cold war era has been published by Wolfsthal<sup>10</sup>.

In 1990, President Mubarak of Egypt proposed the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The proposal was not intended to replace the earlier idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the area but rather to be pursued in parallel to the earlier proposal.

### **Existing zones**

Two nuclear-weapon-free zones have so far been established in densely populated areas<sup>11</sup>. The Tlatelolco Treaty<sup>12</sup> of 1967 and The Rarotonga Treaty<sup>13</sup> of 1985 created such zones in Latin America and the South Pacific respectively.

#### Latin America

The Latin American zone came into being as a result of a five year process between the first endorsement of the proposal by UN General Assembly in 1962<sup>14</sup> and the first signing of the treaty in 1967. The entry into force process is still going on. As of 30 August 1994, the treaty is in force for 28 states. It is not yet in force for 5 states. All dependencies are now subject to the zonal regime in accordance with Protocol I<sup>15</sup>. Protocol II, the guarantee-protocol, has been in force for all nuclear weapon states since 1979.<sup>16</sup> During the years 1990 to 1992, the treaty was amended in several respects.

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<sup>9</sup> Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), Art. 60.

<sup>10</sup> Wolfsthal, J.B., *Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Coming of Age?* Arms Control Today Vol. 23 (No 2) March 1993 pp 3 - 9.

<sup>11</sup> The term "densely populated" area is frequently used to distinguish the Latin American and the South Pacific zones from the Antarctica which some states for political reasons prefer to designate as a "populated" area rather than the "unpopulated" place it is otherwise considered to be.

<sup>12</sup> The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (UN Treaty Series, Vol. 634, No. 9068).

<sup>13</sup> The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (UN Treaty Series No. 24592).

<sup>14</sup> UN Documents A/C.1/L.312/Rev.2 and A/RES/1911 (XVIII).

<sup>15</sup> States with dependencies in Latin America are France, the Netherlands, UK, and USA.

<sup>16</sup> Document NPT/CONF. 1995/PC. III/10.

The central provisions of the treaty are undertakings by the zonal states to use nuclear material exclusively for peaceful purposes, not to possess nuclear weapons and not to permit any presence of such weapons in their territories. The parties also undertake not to engage themselves in or encouraging any nuclear weapon activity (Art. 1).

The geographical scope of the zone would comprise all Latin American and Caribbean states (Art. 25), all dependencies of extra-continental states (Protocol I), and also, when the treaty has fully entered into force, considerable adjoining Atlantic and Pacific sea areas (Art. 4:2). Protocol II prescribes that nuclear weapon powers would respect the status of the zone and that they would refrain from using or threatening the use of nuclear weapons against zonal states.

The treaty also establishes a verification system including both the application of IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities of zonal states and the possibility of "special inspections" in cases of suspected non-compliance (Art. 12-16).

It should also be noted that the treaty explicitly permits the parties to carry out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, but such explosions would be subject to special control procedures (Art. 18).

#### The South Pacific

The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone is the second to be established in a densely populated area. The proposal to establish such a zone was endorsed by the General Assembly in 1975<sup>17</sup> but it lasted to 1985 until the states members of the South Pacific Forum concluded the Rarotonga Treaty.

The entry into force process has been under way since. As of 12 July 1994, the treaty was in force for 11 out of the 15 Forum-members.

Annexed to the treaty are three protocols. Two are similar to those of the Tlatelolco Treaty. The third requests the nuclear weapon states to refrain from nuclear testing in the zone area. However, among the nuclear weapon powers, only China and the USSR have adhered to the protocols.

Geographically, the South Pacific zone encompasses a very large area, extending from the Latin American zone in the east to include Australia and Papua New Guinea in the west, from Antarctica (lat. S 60°) in the south to the equator in the north. Most of that area is ocean, while most treaty provisions apply to national territories only.

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<sup>17</sup> A/RES/3477 (XXX)

The central undertakings of the parties are not to possess nuclear weapons (Art. 3) and to prevent stationing of such weapons in their territories (Art. 5). The treaty explicitly prohibits nuclear testing (Art. 6, Protocol 3) and dumping of radioactive waste (Art. 7) within the entire zonal area.

A control system similar to that of the Tlatelolco Treaty is also envisaged. Unlike the Tlatelolco Treaty, the Rarotonga treaty is in explicit harmony with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, except that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes are not permitted at all.

### Antarctica

According to the Antarctic Treaty<sup>18</sup> agreed in 1959, the "white continent" was declared a demilitarized zone (Art. I) implying that Antarctica is also that the area would be free of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, the territorial claims in Antarctica were frozen (Art. IV)<sup>19</sup>. The Antarctic Treaty prohibits "any measure of a military nature" but does not explicitly forbid the introduction of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction into the continent, although the carrying out of nuclear explosions in the area is explicitly prohibited (Art. V:1). The Antarctic Treaty applies to all geographical area south of the latitude S 60° but does not limit the rights of any state under international law with regard to the high seas (Art. VI).

### Three proposed nuclear-weapon-free zones

Among the nuclear-weapon-free zones proposed but not established, two have been subject to investigations published in official reports. These are the proposed zones in the Middle East<sup>20</sup>, Africa<sup>21</sup>, and Northern Europe<sup>22</sup>.

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<sup>18</sup> The Antarctic Treaty (UN Treaty Series, Vol. 402, No. 5778) had 42 parties as of 1 August 1993.

<sup>19</sup> Seven states, Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom, have filed territorial claims in Antarctica. The Argentine claim overlaps those of Chile and the United Kingdom.

<sup>20</sup> *Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East*. UN Document A/45/345 (Sales No. E.91.IX.3.).

<sup>21</sup> The denuclearization of Africa has been an issue on the political agenda since 1964. For a long time the uncertainty about South Africa's nuclear activities and her refusal to adhere to the NPT were the main obstacles to progress. Since South Africa has now dismantled its nuclear explosion devices and become a party to the NPT, preparations for establishing a nuclear weapon free Africa could be finalized in the near future. An almost complete draft treaty, the so called *Addis Ababa Draft Text of an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty* (14 May 1994), is attached to the *Report of the Fourth and Fifth Meetings of the UN/OAU Group of Experts to Prepare a Draft Treaty on an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone*.

<sup>22</sup> *Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Nordic Area*. Report from the Nordic Senior Officials Group. March 1991.

## Objectives and principles

The concept of "nuclear-weapon-free" zone has been relatively well researched. Geographical, political and other circumstances related to nuclear-weapon-free zones would make different zones different. No such zone would be an exact copy of another. The term nuclear-weapon-free zone would, however, usually imply the fulfillment of certain objectives and the implementation of certain elements of arms control. United Nations expert studies<sup>23</sup> have contributed to establishing the scope and the frame of this concept.

The expansion of the concept to cover also other weapons of mass destruction is new but may easily fit into the legal frames already developed for nuclear weapons<sup>24</sup>. This paper, therefore, is primarily based on what has been worked out in terms of nuclear weapons. Consequences derived from adding other weapons of mass destruction are complemented as appropriate.

The general objective for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone would be to relieve a zonal area from the threat of being involved in nuclear war. The fulfillment of this objective would usually require cooperation both among prospective zonal states and between them and nuclear weapon states and some other extra-zonal states.

But there may be a variety of further objectives for the establishment of such zones in specific cases. Regarding proposed zones in Europe, the objective of geographical separation of the nuclear weapons of the blocks has been referred to as an important objective.

The fulfillment of such objectives shall also be considered as a process in time. History has shown that the establishment of the two densely populated zones is a process over decades. In addition, the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone would always be considered a temporary step and contribution to a process finally leading to general nuclear disarmament.

### Definitions

States participating in a nuclear-weapon-free zone are free to decide what measures they consider appropriate to the requirements in their specific region. Indeed, each zone established or proposed so far has been intended to serve purposes specific to each case and that will probably be so in the future as well. None the less, a need for general definitions of the zone concept has been met by the General Assembly and may be of assistance in formulating the arrangements for specific future zone projects.

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<sup>23</sup> Compare note 7.

<sup>24</sup> Weapons of mass destruction was defined by the UN Commission for Conventional Armaments already 13 August 1948 (UN Document RES/S/C. 3/30) as nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons.

The General Assembly in 1975 defined the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone as follows:<sup>25</sup>

*"I. Definition of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone"*

1. A nuclear-weapon-free zone shall, as a general rule, be deemed to be any zone, recognized as such by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which any group of States, in the free exercise of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or convention whereby:

- (a) The statute of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject, including the procedure for the delimitation of the zone, is defined;
- (b) An international system of verification and control is established to guarantee compliance with the obligations deriving from that statute.

*II. Definition of the principal obligations of the nuclear weapon States towards nuclear-weapon-free zones and towards the States included therein*

2. In every case of a nuclear-weapon-free zone that has been recognized as such by the General Assembly, all nuclear weapon States shall undertake or reaffirm, in a solemn international instrument having full legally binding force, such as a treaty, a convention or a protocol, the following obligations:

- (a) To respect in all its parts the statute of total absence of nuclear weapons defined in the treaty or convention which serves as the constitutive instrument of the zone;
- (b) To refrain from contributing in any way to the performance in the territories forming part of the zone of acts which involve a violation of the aforesaid treaty or convention;
- (c) To refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against the States included in the zone."

Three years later, in 1978, this concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone was again referred to by the Tenth Special Session of the UN General Assembly<sup>26</sup>.

The various categories of weapons of mass destruction are among the specific terms that may require an explicit definition in a treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

None of the multilateral treaties of world-wide scope concluded so far contains a definition of nuclear weapon. The regional Treaty of Tlatelolco, containing such a definition in its article 5, is the only treaty to do so. While there may be a general understanding of what a nuclear weapon is, the countries seeking to establish a nuclear weapon free zone may wish to define the scope of the nuclear weapon concept, in particular, whether the agreed measures would relate to nuclear warheads, to all nuclear explosive devices as is the case in the non-proliferation treaty, or whether to include the delivery vehicles carrying nuclear warheads.

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<sup>25</sup> A/RES/3472 B (XXX).

<sup>26</sup> Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly at paras. i. a.

"60. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure.

61. The process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account. The States participating in such zones should undertake to comply fully with all the objectives, purposes and principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the zones, thus ensuring that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons.

62. With respect to such zones, the nuclear weapon States in turn are called upon to give undertakings, the modalities of which are to be negotiated with the competent authority of the zone, in particular:

- (a) To respect strictly the status of the nuclear weapon free zone;
- (b) To refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone."

The term "a nuclear-weapon State" may also require an explicit definition in a treaty seeking to establish a nuclear weapon free zone, as such States may be requested to assume obligations specific to them. The term was defined in article IX:3 of the Non-proliferation Treaty as a State having manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967. This definition does not, however, cover a new country acquiring nuclear weapons after the stated date beyond the five established at the time. The possibility of "the rise of a new power possessing nuclear weapons" is referred to in article 28 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Another problem in this connection would be to refer to and accomodate potential zonal states who de facto are nuclear weapon states but who have not officially established themselves as such. They may have access to nuclear weapons through an alliance with a nuclear weapon state or have made advanced preparations necessary for independent acquisition of nuclear weapons. The latter category of states are sometimes referred to as "threshold states".

The concept of chemical weapons is defined in the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993, while the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention does not include an explicit definition of such weapons. There exists no convention prohibiting radiological weapons.

#### Important objectives

Within the context of "the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons", as set forth by the General Assembly in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, several other objectives having regional or, in some cases, also wider significance can be identified and, depending on the circumstances in each case, may be pursued or specified in a zonal agreement. The relevance and relative emphasis of such objectives may vary from one region to another. The subsequent evolution, i.e. development and improvement over time of a zone agreement, would also be possible and, in some cases, feasible. Without prejudice to other objectives, which may be added according to the needs in a specific case, the following general objectives would be important.

- (a) To spare the zonal States from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (b) To contribute to averting potential nuclear threats and, thereby, to reducing the danger of war, in particular nuclear war;
- (c) To contribute to the process of disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament;
- (d) To contribute to regional and world stability and security;
- (e) To contribute to preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons, horizontal, vertical as well as geographical;
- (f) To strengthen confidence and improve relations between zonal States;
- (g) To facilitate and promote co-operation in the development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in the region and between zonal and extra-zonal States.

The Mubarak plan outlined three general components:

- (a) All weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East should be prohibited;

- (b) All states of the region should make equal and reciprocal commitments in this regard;
- (c) Verification measures and modalities should be established to ascertain complete compliance by the states in the region;

In the proposal, Egypt pointed to certain terms to be taken into account:

- (d) A qualitative as well as quantitative symmetry of the military capabilities of individual states of the Middle East. Assymetries cannot prevail in a region striving for a juste and comprehensive peace;
- (e) Increased security at lower levels of armament. Security must be attained through political deliberations and disarmament rather than the force of arms;
- (f) Arms limitation and disarmament agreements should consider equal rights and responsibilities, and states should equally issue legally binding commitments in the fields of disarmament.<sup>27</sup>

#### Geographical Considerations

No precise requirements can be set as regards the suitable size of nuclear-weapon-free zones or other arms control zones, which could range from whole continents to small areas. Sometimes a zone may be initially established in a more limited area and later extended as other countries agree to join in. If large parts of the world are to be kept free from nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, the extension of such zones to whole continents would provide the best way to achieve that aim.

The extent of a zone has to depend on the specific characteristics of the region and the precise arms control objectives to be realized.

A single state could establish itself, or even part of itself, as a nuclear-weapon-free or other zone<sup>28</sup>. Normally, however, a zone would comprise the national territories of two or more neighbouring states including their territorial waters and airspace. It would also be possible for states separated from each other by high sea areas or otherwise to form a zone.

Furthermore, a zone might be extended into geographical areas not under the jurisdiction of any state, for instance sea areas beyond territorial waters.

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<sup>27</sup> Compare Mohamed Shaker, *Prospects for Establishing a Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East*, Director's Series on Proliferation, No. 6 Oct. 1994, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (UCRL-LR-114070-6), p 23.

<sup>28</sup> There are a number of cases in which only part of a state may be included in a zone. Obvious ones are:

1. A state has dependencies in another region than the mainland and such dependencies are included in a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The first protocols of both the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga treaties apply to this case.
2. A state belongs to a nuclear-weapon-free zone but a far away dependency does not.
3. A special part of a country is a denuclearized or demilitarized zone and the mainland is not. An example is the demilitarized Spitsbergen-archipelago, a dependency of Norway.
4. A nuclear weapon state has a military base in a country within a nuclear-weapon-free zone, but the host country has no responsibility for the base. An example is the US base of Guantánamo in Cuba.



One element of a zone arrangement could be "thinning-out", i. e. withdrawal or other measures regarding nuclear weapons, military forces or military activities in an area adjacent to the zone, the purpose being to enhance the security of zonal states and the credibility of the assurances extended to the zone by extra-zonal states.

Such security areas adjacent to the zone could be both land and sea areas. They would have to conform to specific conditions in each case and could be based upon agreements reached among the countries directly concerned. Measures of this kind could also be defined in functional terms, that is, in terms of the relations that relevant weapons, forces and military activities could have to the zone. In the latter case the extension of the "adjacency" would implicitly be related to the ranges of these weapons, forces and activities.

#### Basic measures and obligations for nuclear-weapon-free zones

There would be three measures of central importance for the achievement of the objectives of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the general case. These are

- \* the **non-possession** of nuclear weapons by zonal States,
- \* the **non-stationing** of nuclear weapons by any State within the geographical area of application of the zone, and
- \* the **non-use or non-threat of use** of nuclear weapons throughout the zone or against targets within the zone.

The meaning of these measures might seem clear enough. However, their legal representation could be complicated, as shown e.g. by the definition of "nuclear weapon" in the Tlatelolco Treaty (Art 5).

*The non-possession measure* would apply to zonal states. It could be codified in a simple manner if relying on the concepts of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, mainly its Article II<sup>29</sup>. If the zone encompasses only territories of non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT, non-possession would be established as long as NPT is in force<sup>30</sup>. If the zone is to encompass states which are not parties to the NPT or states which are nuclear weapon states, a special regime must be drafted. The same would be true in the special case that only a part of a state will be included in the zone. If the

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<sup>29</sup> Article II of the NPT provides that "each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".

<sup>30</sup> In 1995, the future of the NPT will be discussed at a special conference of the parties in accordance with the treaty's Art X:2. Probably, the treaty will remain in force.

whole of a nuclear weapon state is to be included, a procedure for abandonment of its nuclear weapons must be prescribed.

Also prescribed should be the right or non-right of zonal states to acquire and operate nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes. Because of the technological similarity of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes, the possession of such devices by some zonal states would significantly weaken a zonal regime. As the peaceful nuclear explosion technology now seems generally unfeasible, sacrificing the right to possess them would harm the parties very little while enhancing the effectivity of the zone very much.

*The non-deployment measure* would primarily apply to the zonal states as far as land areas are concerned. Zonal states could not, however, by agreement among themselves, prohibit innocent passage (or transit passage) by vessels of nuclear-weapon states in their territorial waters.

The founding legal instrument of the zone must also define whether it would be only the nuclear warheads that should not be present in the zone or if the prohibition should also include installations being integral parts of nuclear weapon systems.

Related to the non-deployment measure is "transit" of nuclear weapons through zonal territory. The transit concept would include transit over a limited period of time of nuclear weapons by a nuclear weapon state, on land, by air or in internal waters including calls at ports by ships carrying nuclear weapons.

The transit issue was extensively discussed when the Latin American zone was negotiated. The problem was solved by not being solved. Transit was left to the individual zonal states to permit or not permit in each case. The South Pacific zone has a similar transit regime.

A zonal treaty should prescribe if transit would be generally prohibited or arranged in a way similar to the Tlatelolco formula. Transit through zonal high sea areas or through territories belonging to nuclear weapon powers could not be permitted without making the zonal regime of such areas an illusion.

*The non-use measure* would be a commitment by states controlling nuclear weapons. Legally this provision has been given the form of a separate protocol to existing zone agreements. Reservations to the guarantee-protocol could not be avoided in the Latin American case.

Consideration of the non-use measure should be made against the background of ongoing negotiations on general negative security assurances at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. All five nuclear-weapon states have made unilateral declarations that they would not attack or threaten to attack with nuclear weapons states that possess no such weapons of their own or host

those of others on their territories. These declarations are not coordinated and include some conditions and reservations states<sup>31</sup>.

The reservations are linked to the question whether a state can be a member of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and also of a military alliance with a nuclear-weapon state simultaneously. This is certainly possible provided, however, that the two sets of commitments are not contradictory.

Linked to the non-use measure has been the idea mentioned above that this measure should be complemented by a "thinning-out" arrangement in areas adjacent to the proposed zone. The "thinning-out" idea implies that those nuclear weapons should be withdrawn that are targeted against the zone or that have short ranges and are deployed very close to the zone, thus making them usable primarily against the zone. If such weapons are not withdrawn, the non-use commitments would be less credible.

#### Basic measures and obligations: Mubarak complements

The non-possession, the non-deployment, and the non-use measures could easily be complemented to match the requirements of the Mubarak plan. The easiest solution would of course be that the states members of the zone subscribe to both the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons convention. The guarantees extended by outside states must also be complemented accordingly both by a commitment in terms of all types of weapons of mass destruction and by adding many more states other than nuclear weapon powers to the list of guarantor states.

#### Special provisions for denuclearized sea areas

There is a significant difference between applying arms control in sea areas as compared to land areas, because of different legal régimes. Almost all land is subject to the jurisdiction of one state, a well-known exception being Antarctica. As a consequence, adversary military forces on land are geographically separated from each other in peacetime. Naval forces of different states, on the other hand, may mix all over the sea, on the surface, in the water, under the ice, and on the sea-bed. Indeed, they frequently do so.

Coastal states have full jurisdiction over their internal waters only. Their jurisdiction also extends to their territorial seas and archipelagic waters, except that flag states enjoy the right of innocent passage for ships in such waters (there is a more liberal regime of transit passage through

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<sup>31</sup> The content of these unilaterally declared guarantees are summarized in *Compilation of Basic Documents relating to the Question of Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use of Nuclear Weapons* (UN document CD/SA/WP.15, 16 March 1993) and in *Developments with regard to effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons* (Document NPT/CONF.1995/PC.III/6, 12 July 1994). Compare also *The United Nations DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK* VOL. 14:1989 pp 179 - 180. Recently (2 November 1993), new "Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" were adopted (Decree No. 1833). The new doctrine does not include the USSR no-first-use declaration of 12 June 1982, however.

international straits)<sup>32</sup>. In exclusive economic zones or on the high seas the coastal states have no jurisdiction related to nuclear weapons.

Zonal states have no right according to international law to limit by agreement among themselves the rights of flag states to navigate ships or fly aircraft in such waters. Their denuclearization would require agreement in principle among all states having the right to use them or at least among the nuclear weapon states to make the régime effective.

## **Complaints and Control Procedures**

It is traditionally recognized that effective implementation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone agreement would require a system of verification to ensure that all states involved, zonal as well as extra-zonal, comply with their obligations. The same would certainly be true for a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction.

The precise scope and nature of such a system would vary from zone to zone and depend upon the nature of the obligations prescribed. Generally a zonal treaty would have to include provisions both for verifying compliance and a complaints procedure for settling issues of suspected non-compliance, should such cases arise.

In general, subject to verification should be:

- (a) All nuclear (biological, chemical) activities of zonal states to ensure that peaceful activities are not diverted to the manufacture of weapons;
- (b) the commitment that no nuclear (biological, chemical) weapons are present within the zone; special régimes would be required for sea areas;
- (c) the removal of nuclear (biological, chemical) weapons that may be present within the zonal area at the time of entry into force of the zone agreement, possibly also requiring an account of the weapons history of participating zonal states;
- (d) the implementation of other measures associated with the zone agreement.

Most verification related to peaceful nuclear activities of zonal states could be entrusted to the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA is now operating safeguards in very many states, including all non-nuclear weapon states parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This traditional safeguards system could require extension and reinforcement for the purpose of verifying a specific zone agreement by additional procedures especially defined and described in that agreement. While the provisions of the current NPT-related safeguards system was a compromise at the time of conclusion of the negotiations of the NPT and while the

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<sup>32</sup> The legal concepts of "innocent passage" and "transit passage" are defined in the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Articles 17 - 33, 45, and 52, and Articles 38 - 44 respectively.

system has been considered adequate and has been working well for long time, recent experiences has provoked a discussion about a possible revision of the system to make it more effective.

In some regions, the zonal parties may prefer to establish standing organs or special bodies for carrying out verification. In regions where sharp conflicts exist, entrusting the task of verification to an international organization, perhaps supplemented by bilateral arrangements, might be preferred.

IAEA could assume responsibility for safeguards subject to special agreements. However, to entrust all verification activities referred to above to IAEA may go beyond the Agency's current practices, although its statute gives the Agency considerable possibilities in that respect.

There is also the possibility that an agreement on a zone would provide to any party a right to undertake verification activities in other states parties to the zonal agreement, including on-site inspection. One model for such a system could be the verification system laid down in several arms control agreements adopted within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), i. e. the Stockholm and Vienna Documents on confidence-building measures and the CFE Treaty<sup>33</sup>. These treaties give each party the right to undertake inspections in the territory of any other party and obliges every party to receive and accommodate on short notice such inspections in its own territory. Another example of far-reaching on-site verification is included in the 1988 Treaty between the USA and the USSR on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty)<sup>34</sup>. Mutual verification of this obligatory nature could be particularly attractive to states, such as Israel, that might often find themselves outvoted within international arrangements where decisions are taken by majority votes.

Verification of arms control measures applying to sea areas would involve measures different from those applying on land. Every ship or aircraft has the right to navigate almost anywhere at sea and that would certainly facilitate national verification activities. On the other hand, under international law, warships are "immune" and agreements on onboard inspection seem unrealistic. Furthermore, several nuclear-weapon powers neither confirm nor deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on specific ships at specific times<sup>35</sup>. But such a policy would be difficult to reconcile with a denuclearization or "thinning-out" régime at sea if warships or aircraft of nuclear-weapon states would be permitted at all within the agreed zonal area. It is true that recent measures

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<sup>33</sup> The Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (1986), the Vienna Document 1990 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, the Treaty on conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and the Vienna Document 1992 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures.

<sup>34</sup> The text of the INF Treaty is reproduced in *The United Nations DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK*. Vol. 12:1987 pp 444 - 474.

<sup>35</sup> For an account of the consequences of these policies, see i. e. Prawitz, J., *The "Neither Confirming nor Denying" Policy at Sea* in Goldblat, J.(Ed.), *Maritime Security: The Building of Confidence*. Document UNIDIR/92/89 (Sales No. GV.E.92.0.31).

undertaken by the nuclear-weapon powers imply that most nuclear weapons are removed from ships in peacetime leaving only a few submarines cruising the seas with strategic nuclear missiles onboard. However, the nuclear-weapon powers would continue to practice the neither confirming nor denying policy. The problem will thus remain although scaled down.

### **The Middle East as a NWFZ or WMDFZ application**

The combination of open conflicts and nuclear programs of size in the Middle East does provide both the political incentives and a technological basis for nuclear weapon proliferation in the region. This has been understood for long time. This has also been considered unfortunate for long time. The current conflict pattern in the Middle East, while attracting the involvement of major powers, is regional. The possible ambitions of the countries in the area to acquire nuclear weapons have their roots in this regional context.

The issue of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East has been researched and studied by the Egyptian scholar and diplomat Mahmoud Karem<sup>36</sup>.

In 1990, President Mubarak of Egypt proposed the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East<sup>37</sup>. The proposal was not intended to replace the earlier idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the area but rather to be pursued in parallel to the earlier proposal.<sup>38</sup>

#### The UN report on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East

Political efforts to change this situation have focussed on the possibility to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the area. Back in 1974, Iran supported by Egypt raised the issue in the UN General Assembly. Since that time, the General Assembly has every year adopted a resolution recommending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East (NWFZME). Since 1980, this annual resolution has been adopted by consensus, i.e. with the support of all Arab states, Iran and Israel.

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<sup>36</sup> M. Karem, *A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East: Problems and Prospects*. Greenwood Press. New York. 1988. The same author has later published *A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East: A Historical Overview of the Patterns of Involvement of the United Nations* in T. Rauf (Ed.), *Regional Approaches to Curbing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia*, Aurora Papers 16. Canadian Centre for Global Security. December 1992.

<sup>37</sup> Document CD/989, 20 April 1990.

<sup>38</sup> The Mubarak plan has recently been described by Mohamed Shaker in *Prospects for Establishing a Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East*, Director's Series on Proliferation, No. 6 Oct. 1994, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (UCRL-LR-114070-6).

In the fall of 1988, the annual resolution<sup>39</sup> now initiated by Egypt, also requested the Secretary General to "*undertake a study on effective and verifiable measures which would facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East*". The report<sup>40</sup> was prepared before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, but submitted to the General Assembly after that invasion. It was, however, welcomed and adopted by consensus that same year.<sup>41</sup> The UN report includes a full account of the history of the issue in the United Nations.

### Nuclear programmes

Many countries in the Middle East have intentions to develop nuclear power production for peaceful purposes and to establish nuclear fuel cycle facilities, which in some cases also would have the potential to serve a possible nuclear weapon fabrication programme. In most cases, such peaceful programmes have been initiated but they are modest today<sup>42</sup>. Only Israel has a current capability to pursue a nuclear weapon programme. In addition, as was revealed in 1991, Iraq had undertaken very significant clandestine preparations to fabricate their own nuclear weapons.

It should be understood, however, that acquiring even a modest nuclear force without outside assistance is a major operation and that the time and effort required for various proliferation-prone states to join the atomic club is often grossly underestimated. The recently disclosed nuclear weapon programme of South Africa is very illustrative in this respect<sup>43</sup>.

It should also be noted that many countries in the Middle East are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and thus obliged to submit all their nuclear material to IAEA inspection. Significant countries which are not, include Algeria and Israel.

*Morocco* is a member of the IAEA and a party to the NPT (1970). Morocco has one 2 Megawatt research reactor under construction.

*Algeria* is a member of the IAEA but not a party to the NPT. Algeria has announced an interest in establishing a nuclear programme but the activity was limited. One 1 Megawatt research reactor

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<sup>39</sup> GA Res 43/65.

<sup>40</sup> UN Document A/45/435; UN Sales No.E.91.IX.3.

<sup>41</sup> GA Res 45/52 op.8.

<sup>42</sup> Facts about the nuclear programmes of individual countries used in this paper were found in the IAEA publications *Nuclear Power Reactors in the World* (April 1994 Edition) and *Nuclear Research Reactors in the World* (December 1993 Edition).

<sup>43</sup> In 1993, it was officially revealed that South Africa had fabricated six nuclear explosion devices of a simple guntype based on domestically produced highly enriched uranium. These devices have been dismantled and South Africa became, in July 1991, a party to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. For a description of the South African case, see W. Stumph, *South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Programme*, in K. C. Bailey (Ed.), *Weapons of Mass Destruction: Cost Versus Benefits*. Manohar Publishers, New Delhi, 1994; and J.W. de Villiers, R. Jardine, M. Reiss, *Why South Africa Gave Up the Bomb*, *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 72 (No. 5 November/December 1993) pp 98-109.

was commissioned in 1989 and is subject to IAEA safeguards. A second 15 Megawatt test reactor went critical in 1992 and will be subject to IAEA safeguards.

*Libya* is both a member of the IAEA and a party to the NPT (1975). Libya has one 10 megawatt research reactor subject to IAEA safeguards.

*Egypt* is both a member of the IAEA and a party to the NPT (1981). Egypt has one 2 megawatt research reactor subject to IAEA safeguards. A 20 Megawatt reactor is planned.

*Israel* is a member of the IAEA but not a party to the NPT. Israel has one 5 Megawatt research reactor and one 26 Megawatt reactor (Dimona). The former is subject to IAEA safeguards, the latter is not. The Dimona reactor is widely assumed to be the basis for production of plutonium for possible manufacture of nuclear weapons.

*Syria* is a member of the IAEA and a party to the NPT (1969). One 30 Megawatt research reactor is under construction.

*Iran* is both a member of the IAEA and a party to the NPT (1970). Iran has one 5 megawatt research reactor and three other small facilities, all subject to IAEA safeguards. A 30 Megawatt research reactor is under construction. Two power reactors of 1200 Megawatt(e) each was under construction, but have not been worked on for some time.

*Saudi Arabia* has planned to build one 10 Megawatt research reactor.

*Iraq* is a special case. Iraq is both a member of the IAEA and a party to the NPT (1969). Before the Gulf war in 1991, it was believed that the nuclear programme of Iraq was limited to one 5.5 and one 5 Megawatt research reactor. Both were subject to IAEA safeguards. They were shutdown during the Gulf war..

However, after the Gulf war, it was revealed that Iraq had for many years pursued a clandestine multibillion dollar nuclear weapons programme. This programme, involving also various uranium enrichment efforts, has been in direct violation of Iraq's obligations under the NPT. By Security Council decisions, Iraq is now ordered to destroy all facilities in its weapon program. This process is supervised and verified by a special commission appointed by the Security Council<sup>44</sup>.

<sup>44</sup> UN document Res S 687 (1991) 3 April 1991. The resolution establishes a Special Commission (UNSCOM, Op. 9 (b)) to execute i. a. the disposal of Iraq's capabilities regarding weapons of mass destruction including nuclear weapons and the setting up of a monitoring system to ensure that such weapons are not reintroduced in Iraq. The UNSCOM operations have substantially developed verification practices and accumulated experience of great importance for future arms control régimes. The UNSCOM activities during its first year have been described by its Executive Chairman, Ambassador Rolf Ekéus, in an article (including the text of the resolution) in *The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq in SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament*, Oxford University Press 1992, pp 509-530. Mr Ekéus continues his description in *The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq: activities in 1992 in SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament*, Oxford



The current nuclear programmes of the Middle East countries suggests that only Israel has a nuclear weapon capability, or as many experts believe, is already a nuclear weapon power. The Israeli government has many times declared that Israel will not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East. This policy of deliberate ambiguity has been said to serve Israel's security interests in three ways: Firstly, in times of gloom, it gives hope to the Israelis; secondly, it may provide caution to the enemies of Israel; and thirdly, it relieves other states from the delicate burden of taking an explicit position on the matter<sup>45</sup>.

The military programme of Iraq will now be eliminated. The programme of the other Arab states and of Iran cannot support a nuclear weapon programme, but may be able to do so in a not-so near future.

Many states in the Middle East are parties to the Biological Weapons Convention and have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention which has not yet entered into force. Among those which are not full parties to the Biological weapons Convention are Algeria, Egypt (signatory), Mauritania, Morocco (signatory), Somalia (signatory), Sudan, Syria (signatory), and United Arab Emirates (signatory). Among those which have not signed (as of 1 September 1994) the Chemical Weapons Convention are Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Syria.

#### Preliminary steps

The UN report suggests a catalogue of measures for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in order to serve as confidence-building measures and as steps to prepare for a régime that would finally become a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Obviously, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone would require cooperation among not only the prospective zonal states but also between them and nuclear weapon states and other outside states.

Among recommended confidence-building measures were a regional nuclear test ban, the applying of IAEA safeguards on nuclear facilities in the area not covered at present, the acceding to the NPT by states currently non-parties, and providing for transparency regarding all major nuclear projects in the area. International safeguard issues involved was explored at an IAEA workshop in Vienna

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University Press 1993, pp 691-703. See also T. Trevan, *UNSCOM: activities in 1993* in *SIPRI Yearbook 1994*, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp 739-758. The work of UNSCOM is also described including extensive quotations from official texts in *The United Nations DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK*, Vol. 16:1991 (UN Sales No. E.92.IX.1), 1991, pp 32-54; and in *The United Nations DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK*, Vol. 17:1992 (UN Sales No. E.93.IX.1), pp 248-258.

<sup>45</sup> Atterling Wedar, C., Hellman, S., Söder, K., (Eds.), *Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World*. Swedish Initiatives. (ISBN 91-972128-0-6) Stockholm 1993. p181.

4-7 may 1993 on Modalities for the Application of Safeguards in a Future Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East<sup>46</sup>.

Nuclear weapon powers could extend negative nuclear security assurances to prospective zonal states and commit themselves not to station nuclear weapons in the area. Any outside state could declare past, current, and future supply of nuclear material and equipment to recipients in the prospective zonal area in order to put light on projects now creating suspicion that they may have a military role.

The report also states that outside support for peaceful nuclear activities in the area would be especially appropriate when those activities have a multilateral or regional character. Joint projects on nuclear power might be of great interest to countries which are not rich in oil. The provision of international facilities for nuclear waste disposal would help to ensure against diversion of fissionable material to military purposes.

#### Shared views

Although negotiations to overcome the conflicts in the Middle East have been very difficult, indeed, to get started, the consultations undertaken when preparing the UN report in the summer of 1990 showed a surprising degree of common view on fundamental matters among many of the states in the area; Arab states as well as Iran and Israel. Among the shared views were

- \* The process to establish a NWFZME would take several years;
- \* The geographical concept suggested in the report was generally accepted;
- \* Positive security assurances beyond those outlined in Security Council resolution S/255 (1968) would be necessary. If a zonal state would be subject of aggression, guarantors should assist the victim, punish the aggressor and provide recovery support as necessary. It is intriguing to notice that such farreaching guarantees did apply just a few months later in order to liberate Kuwait after it had been annexed by Iraq.
- \* Verification procedures much more far-reaching than those prescribed under the NPT would be necessary. Again the IAEA operations later undertaken in Iraq under a Security Council mandate<sup>47</sup> show what will be necessary. (Israel wanted additional verification rights similar to those prescribed in the CSCE Stockholm Document in order not to be discriminated against in decision processes based on majority votes.)
- \* Initial confidence-building measures would be an effective method to support the process of establishing a NWFZME.

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<sup>46</sup> The Proceedings of the Workshop on "Modalities for the Application of Safeguards in a Future Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East" including the presentations made is available from the International Atomic Energy Agency, Division of External Relations, in Vienna.

<sup>47</sup> SC Res 687 (1991) 3 April 1991.

\* Although Israel was generally considered a nuclear weapon state, a view neither encouraged nor denied by Israel itself, nuclear weapons were considered political rather than war-fighting instruments.

Because of the above-mentioned common views, a NWFZME could be considered a realistic project, although the establishment of such a zone would most probably take some time. The immediate obstacle is rather to get talks started.

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INTERNAZIONALI - ROMA

n° inv. 14683  
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Report of the Fourth and Fifth Meetings of the UN/OAU Group  
of Experts to Prepare a Draft Treaty  
on an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone  
[hereinafter referred to as African NWFZ Treaty]

INTRODUCTION

1. In its resolution 48/86 of 16 December 1993, the General Assembly of the United Nations, bearing in mind resolutions CM/Res. 1342 (LIV) and CM/Res.1395 (LVI) Rev.1 of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), inter alia, requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity,

"to take appropriate action to enable the Group of Experts designated by the United Nations in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity to meet during 1994 at Windhoek and Addis Ababa, in order to finalize the drafting of a Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone in Africa and to submit the text of the Treaty to the General Assembly at its forty-ninth session under an agenda item entitled "Final Text of an African Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone."

2. Two meetings of experts, which were organized by the United Nations in cooperation with the OAU, took place in Windhoek from 16 -25 March, 1994, and in Addis Ababa from 11-14 May 1994 respectively. At Windhoek, the Honourable Theo-Ben Gurirab, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Namibia delivered the keynote address. At Addis Ababa meeting, Dr. M.T. Mapuranga, Assistant Secretary General of the OAU (Political), delivered the key note address on behalf of the OAU Secretary General, Dr. Salim A. Salim. This was followed by statements by H.E. Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji, Chairman of the Group of Experts, and by Dr. Sola Ogunbanwo, Senior Coordinator of the United Nations Disarmament Fellowship, Training and Advisory Services Programme.

3. At the fourth meeting in Windhoek, the following experts designated by the United Nations, in cooperation with the OAU, took part in the meeting: Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji, former Director-General of the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ambassador Fathi Marei, Adviser on Disarmament Issues to the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs; Mrs. Liberata Mulamula, Counsellor, International Cooperation and Legal Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Republic of Tanzania; Mr. Gift Punungwe, Minister Counsellor, High Commission of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Lagos, Nigeria; Ambassador Cheickh Sylla, Director, International Organizations Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Senegal; Mr. Joyker Nayeck, Africa Desk, Ministry of External Affairs, Port Louis, Mauritius; Ambassador Ibrahima Sy, Executive Secretary of the OAU Office in New York; and Colonel Gustave Zoula, Chief of Section, External Policy Coordination, Peace and Strategic Questions, OAU, Addis Ababa. At Addis Ababa, the same experts with exception of Mr. Gift Punungwe, took part in the meeting. In addition, Hon. Darga, Minister of Housing, Lands Town and Country Planning, Port

Louis, Mauritius, Mr. P. Goosen, Deputy Director, Disarmament Affairs, Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, South Africa, and Maj. Andre Hashiyana, Deputy Principal Staff Officer, Ministry of Defence, Namibia also took part.

4. Dr. Sola Ogunbanwo and Ambassador Ibrahima Sy participated as Chief Expert Advisers in both meetings.

5. Dr. Mohamed Elbaradei, Assistant Director-General for External Relations, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna, participated as an expert; and Ms. Bronte Moules, alternate Representative on the Australian delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, participated as an expert observer from a Party to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) in both meetings.

6. Ambassador Jeremy B. Shearar, Deputy Director-General, Multilateral Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, South Africa; Mr. Peter Goosen, Deputy Director, Disarmament Affairs, Multilateral Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria, South Africa; Mr. Patrick V. Manana, Assistant Chief Representative, African National Congress (ANC), Windhoek, Namibia; and Dr. Solly Skosana, Secretary for Environmental Affairs, Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), Johannesburg, attended the Windhoek meeting as expert observers.

7. At the request of the Group of Experts, the representatives of the following five nuclear-weapon States participated in a special meeting of the Group on 22nd March 1994: Mr. Jiang Benning, Second Secretary, Embassy of the People's Republic of China, Windhoek, Namibia; Mr. Christian Bader, Counsellor, French Embassy, Windhoek, Namibia; Mr. Andrei Stytsenko, First Secretary, Russian Embassy, Windhoek, Namibia; High Commissioner Henry Hogger, British High Commission, Windhoek, Namibia; Mr. David Fite, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington; Dr. Herbert Calhoun, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington; and Mr. Ray Meyer, Legal Advisor's Office, U.S. Department of State, Washington.

8. At Windhoek, the following representatives of the Host Government attended the meeting as observers: Mr. Jens Peter Prothmann, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Namibia; Mr. Evaristus Shikongo, Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Namibia; Mr. Andre Hashiyana, Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Namibia. The representative of Nigeria, Mr. O.O. Aluko, from the High Commission in Windhoek, also attended as an observer. At Addis Ababa, the representatives of the following OAU member states attended the meeting as observers: Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Zaire and Zimbabwe.

#### Election of officers

9. At the fourth Meeting of Experts in Windhoek, the meeting re-elected the following officers:

Chairman: Ambassador Oluyemi Adeniji  
 Vice-Chairman: Ambassador Dr. Fathi Marei  
 Rapporteur: Mr. Gift Punungwe  
 Chief Expert  
 Advisers: Ambassador Ibrahima Sy  
 Dr. Sola Ogunbanwo

At the fifth Meeting of Experts in Addis Ababa, the same officers were elected, except that Mrs. Liberata Mulamula was elected rapporteur in the absence of Mr. Gift Punungwe.

10. At Windhoek, after the re-election of officers, the experts adopted the following agenda: "Review of Harare Draft Text of an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty".

11. The meeting had before it an informal working paper entitled "Proposals for the Review of the Harare Draft Text of an African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty".

12. After deliberating on the various proposals submitted to it, the Group of Experts took the following decisions including:

- (a) The fifth meeting of the Group will take place in Addis Ababa from 11-14 May 1994, to be held in conjunction with the OAU Intergovernmental Group of African Experts established by the OAU Council of Ministers (ref. OAU CM/Res.1342 (LIV)).
- (b) The Windhoek Draft Text of an African NWFZ Treaty will be submitted as a working document for the above-mentioned joint meeting in Addis Ababa. The Group expressed the hope that the United Nations will translate and provide the document in English, French and Arabic languages. Sufficient copies of the document in those languages will be sent to Addis Ababa for the above-mentioned meeting.
- (c) The five Nuclear Weapon States were requested to submit their responses to the Windhoek Draft Text of an African NWFZ Treaty before the Addis Ababa meeting. Such responses will be co-ordinated by Mr. Sola Ogunbanwo who will convey them to the experts at the Addis Ababa meeting.
- (d) The need to approach an experienced cartographer to provide a map of the African NWFZ based on agreed guidelines.
- (e) The need to consult countries internationally responsible for territories which may lie in the African NWFZ. The Windhoek meeting identified those countries as France, Spain and Portugal.

13. In concluding their work at the Windhoek Meeting, the Group of Experts expressed their appreciation to the United Nations Secretary-General for the diligence with which the United Nations

rendered effective technical support and financial assistance for the work of the Group. The Group further expressed the hope that the United Nations will continue to provide support services until the final conclusion of the African NWFZ Treaty.

14. A Draft Text of an African NWFZ Treaty, which was considered and adopted by the experts during the Windhoek meeting was accordingly submitted to the fifth meeting of the Group of Experts in Addis Ababa as a working document.

## II. REPORT OF EXPERTS

15. At the beginning of its work, the Group of Experts meeting in Addis Ababa, expressed their determination and readiness to finalise the drafting of a Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in Africa pursuant to the UN General Assembly resolution 48/86 of 16 December 1993.

16. The Group had before it the following documents:

(i) Windhoek text of an African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty which was translated and provided by the United Nations in three languages, English, French and Arabic.

(ii) Written responses on the text from three nuclear Weapon States, namely, USA, UK and France.

17. After the introduction of the Windhoek text by the Chairman, the experts in conjunction with the representatives of the OAU member states in Addis Ababa invited to the meeting, made general comments and then reviewed the text sequentially, paragraph by paragraph, making amendments as necessary and giving consideration to the written proposals submitted by the nuclear weapon states.

18. Agreement was reached on all the provisions of the draft Treaty including the three Protocols addressed to the extra-territorial states. The only area which was left for further reflection was the zone of application of the Treaty as provided in Annex 1 of the draft Treaty. Specifically, the consideration of the listing of islands to be included in the zone, other than those that are members of the OAU, and drawing up the geographical map of the zone, was not conclusive at this meeting. It is recommended that care should be taken that the zone should encompass all islands between continental Africa and the farthest island Member State of the OAU, including any territory claimed by that island.

19. Bearing the above in mind, the Group of Experts reached the following conclusions:

(i) The Group of Experts requested its Chairman to submit its report and the draft text of the Treaty on an African NWFZ to the OAU Secretary General for submission to the Council of Ministers at its sixtieth ordinary session in Tunis, for consideration.



(ii) The Group also agreed that its report and the draft Treaty text be submitted to the UN General Assembly at its forty-ninth session in accordance with its resolution 48/86 of 16 December 1993.

20. Finally, in concluding its work, the Group of Experts expressed once again their appreciation to the United Nations Secretary General for the diligence with which the UN rendered effective technical support and financial assistance for the work of the Group. The Group further paid tribute to the OAU Secretary-General and his staff for the support extended to the Group at their meeting in Addis Ababa.

21. A Draft Text of an African NWFZ Treaty, as adopted by the experts at the Addis Ababa Meeting is hereby attached.

ADDIS ABABA DRAFT TEXT OF AN AFRICAN  
NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE TREATY

Preamble

The Parties to this Treaty,

Guided by the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa AHG/Res 11(1) adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity [hereinafter referred to as the OAU] at its first ordinary session, held at Cairo from 17 to 21 July 1964, in which they solemnly declared their readiness "to undertake, through an international treaty to be concluded under United Nations auspices, not to manufacture or acquire control of nuclear weapons";

Guided further, by the resolutions of the Fifty-fourth and Fifty-sixth ordinary sessions of the OAU Council of Ministers CM/Res. 1342 (LIV) and CM/Res. 1395 (LVI), held at Abuja from 27 May to 1 June 1991 and at Dakar from 22-28 June 1992, which affirmed that the evolution of the international situation was conducive to the implementation of the Cairo Declaration as well as the relevant provisions of the 1986 OAU Declaration on Security, Disarmament and Development;

Recalling United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3472 B (XXX) of 11 December 1975, in which it considered nuclear-weapon-free Zones as "one of the most effective means for preventing the proliferation, both horizontal and vertical, of nuclear weapons";

Convinced of the need to take all steps in achieving the ultimate goal of a world entirely free of nuclear weapons, as well as the obligations of all States to contribute to this end;

Convinced also that the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone will constitute an important step towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime, promoting general and complete disarmament and enhancing regional and international peace and security;

Aware that regional disarmament measures contribute to global disarmament efforts.

Believing that the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone will protect African States against possible nuclear attacks on their territories;

Reaffirming the importance of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [hereinafter referred to as the NPT] and the need for the implementation of all its provisions;

Desirous of taking advantage of Article IV of the NPT which recognizes the inalienable right of all states parties to develop research on, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and

technological information for such purposes;

Determined to promote regional co-operation for the development and practical application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in the interest of sustainable social and economic development of the African continent;

Determined to keep Africa free of environmental pollution by radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter;

Welcoming the co-operation of all states, governmental and non-governmental organizations for the attainment of these objectives;

HAVE AGREED as follows:

#### Article 1. Usage of terms

For the purpose of this Treaty and its Protocols:

(i) "African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone" means the continent of Africa, island States Members of the OAU and other adjoining islands listed in annex 1, and illustrated on the map attached.

(ii) "Territory" means internal waters, territorial sea and archipelagic waters and the seabed and sub-soil beneath, the land territory and the airspace above them;

(iii) "Nuclear explosive device" means any nuclear weapon or other explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the purpose for which it could be used. The term includes such a weapon or device in unassembled and partly assembled forms, but does not include the means of transport or delivery of such a weapon or device if separable from and not an indivisible part of it;

(iv) "Stationing" means implantation, emplacement, transport on land or inland waters, stockpiling, storage, installation and deployment;

(v) "Nuclear installation" means a nuclear power reactor, a nuclear research reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant, a separate storage installation and any other installation or location in or at which fresh or irradiated nuclear material or significant quantities of radioactive materials are present.

#### Article 2. Application of the Treaty

(i) Except where otherwise specified, this Treaty and its Protocols shall apply to the territory within the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

(ii) Nothing in this Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect

the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under international law with regard to freedom of the seas.

Article 3. Renunciation of nuclear explosive devices

Each Party undertakes:

(i) Not to conduct research on, develop, manufacture, stockpile or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere;

(ii) Not to seek or receive any assistance in the research on, development, manufacture, stockpiling or acquisition, or possession of any nuclear explosive device;

(iii) Not to take any action to assist or encourage the research on, development, manufacture, stockpiling or acquisition, or possession of any nuclear explosive device by any State.

Article 4. Prevention of stationing of nuclear explosive devices

(i) Each Party undertakes to prohibit, in its territory, the stationing of any nuclear explosive device.

(ii) Each Party in the exercise of its sovereign rights remains free to decide for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft, and navigation by foreign ships in its territorial sea or archipelagic waters in a manner not covered by the rights of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lane passage or transit passage of straits.

Article 5. Prohibition of testing of nuclear explosive devices

Each Party undertakes:

(i) Not to test any nuclear explosive device;

(ii) To prohibit in its territory the testing of any nuclear explosive device;

(iii) Not to assist or encourage the testing of any nuclear explosive device by any State anywhere.

Article 6. Declaration, dismantling, destruction or conversion of nuclear explosive devices and the facilities for their manufacture

Each Party undertakes:

(i) To declare any capability for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices;

(ii) To dismantle and destroy any nuclear explosive device that it has manufactured prior to the coming into force of this Treaty;

(iii) To destroy facilities for the manufacture of nuclear explosive devices, or, where possible, to convert to peaceful uses;

(iv) To permit the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as the IAEA) and the Commission established in Article 12 to verify the processes of dismantling and destruction of the nuclear explosive devices, as well as the destruction or conversion of the facilities for their production.

#### Article 7. Prohibition of dumping of radioactive wastes

Each Party undertakes:

(i) To effectively implement or to use as guidelines the measures contained in the Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa in so far as it is relevant to radioactive waste;

(ii) Not to take any action to assist or encourage the dumping of radioactive wastes and other radioactive matter anywhere within the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

#### Article 8. Peaceful nuclear activities

(i) Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as to prevent the use of nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes.

(ii) As part of their efforts to strengthen their security, stability and development, the Parties undertake to promote individually and collectively the use of nuclear science and technology for economic and social development. To this end they undertake to establish and strengthen mechanisms for cooperation at the bilateral, subregional and regional levels.

(iii) Parties are encouraged to make use of the programme of assistance available in the IAEA and, in this connection, to strengthen cooperation under the African Regional Cooperation Agreement for Research, Training and Development Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (hereinafter referred to as AFRA).

#### Article 9. Verification of peaceful uses

Each Party undertakes:

(i) That all activities for the peaceful use of nuclear energy shall be conducted under strict non-proliferation measures to

provide assurance of exclusively peaceful uses;

(ii) To conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA for the purpose of verifying compliance with the undertakings in paragraph (i) of this article;

(iii) Not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material for peaceful purposes to any non-nuclear-weapon State unless subject to a comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded with the IAEA.

Article 10. Physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities

Each Party undertakes:

To maintain the highest standards of security and effective physical protection of nuclear materials, facilities and equipment to prevent theft or unauthorized use and handling. To that end each party, inter-alia, undertakes to apply measures of physical protection equivalent to those provided for in the Convention on Physical Protection of Material and in recommendations and guidelines developed by the IAEA for that purpose.

Article 11. Prohibition of armed attack on nuclear installations

Each party undertakes not to take, or assist, or encourage any action aimed at an armed attack by conventional or other means against nuclear installations in the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

Article 12. Mechanism for compliance

(i) For the purposes of ensuring compliance with their undertakings with respect to both the activities prohibited in the interest of non-proliferation and those permissible for the promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology, the Parties agree to establish the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (hereafter referred to as the Commission as set out in Annex 3).

(ii) The Commission shall be responsible for the review of the operation of the Treaty, and in particular:

- (a) Collating the reports and the exchange of information as provided for in Article 13;
- (b) Arranging consultations as provided for in annex 4 as well as convening conferences of Parties on the concurrence of simple majority of state parties on any matter arising from the implementation of the Treaty;

- (c) Reviewing the application to peaceful nuclear activities of safeguards by the IAEA as elaborated in annex 2;
- (d) Bringing into effect the complaints procedure elaborated in annex 4;
- (e) Encouraging regional programmes for cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology; and
- (f) Promoting international cooperation with extra-zonal States for the peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology.

(iii) The Commission shall meet in ordinary session once a year, and may meet in extraordinary session as may be required by the complaints procedure in annex 4.

#### Article 13. Report and exchanges of information

- (i) Each Party shall submit an annual report to the Commission on its nuclear activities as well as other matters relating to the Treaty.
- (ii) Each Party shall promptly report to the Commission any significant event affecting the implementation of the Treaty.
- (iii) The Commission shall receive an annual report on the activities of AFRA.

#### Article 14. Meeting of Parties

- (i) A meeting of all Parties to the Treaty shall be convened by the depositary as soon as possible after the entry into force of the Treaty to inter-alia, elect members of the Commission and determine its headquarters. Further meetings of State Parties shall be held as necessary and at least every three years, and convened in accordance with article 12 ii (b).
- (ii) The meeting of State Parties shall adopt the Commission's budget and a scale of assesment to be paid by the State Parties.

#### Article 15. Settlement of Disputes

Any dispute arising out of the interpretation of the Treaty shall be settled by negotiation or another procedure agreed to by the Parties which may include recourse to an Arbitral Panel or to the International Court of Justice.

Article 16. Reservations

This Treaty shall not be subject to reservations.

Article 17. Duration

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration and shall remain in force indefinitely.

Article 18. Withdrawal

(i) Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized its supreme interests.

(ii) Withdrawal shall be effected by a Party giving notice, which includes a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interest, twelve months in advance to the Depositary. The Depositary shall circulate such notice to all other parties.

Article 19. Signature, ratification and entry into force

(i) This Treaty shall be open for signature by any State in the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. It shall be subject to ratification.

(ii) It shall enter into force on the date of deposit of the [twenty-eighth] [thirty-fifth] instrument of ratification.

(iii) For a signatory which ratifies this Treaty after the date of the deposit of the [twenty-eighth] [thirty-fifth] instrument of ratification, It shall enter into force for that signatory on the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification.

Article 20. Amendments

(i) Any amendment to the Treaty proposed by a Party shall be submitted to the Commission, which shall circulate it to all Parties.

(ii) Decision on the adoption of such an amendment shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of the Parties either through written communication to the Commission or through a conference of Parties convened upon the concurrence of a simple majority.

(iii) An amendment so adopted shall enter into force for all parties after receipt by the Depositary of the [twenty-eighth] [thirty-fifth] instrument of ratification.



Article 21. Depositary functions

(i) This Treaty of which the Arabic, English, French and Portuguese texts are equally authentic shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the OAU, who is hereby designated as Depositary of the Treaty.

(ii) The Depositary shall:

- (a) Receive instruments of ratification;
- (b) Register this Treaty and its protocols pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations;
- (c) Transmit certified copies of the Treaty and its protocols to all States in the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and to all States eligible to become party to the protocols to the Treaty, and shall notify them of signatures and ratification of the Treaty and its protocols.

Article 22. Status of the annexes

The annexes form an integral part of this Treaty. Any reference to this Treaty includes the annexes.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned being duly authorized by their Governments have signed this Treaty.

DONE AT \_\_\_\_\_

Annex 1. African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone

This will encompass the continent of Africa, island States Members of the OAU, and all islands considered by the OAU in its resolutions to be part of Africa as well as other islands between those islands and continental Africa. This is illustrated in the attached map.

Annex 2 IAEA safeguards

(a) The safeguards referred to in Article 9 (b) shall in respect of each Party be applied by the IAEA as set forth in an agreement negotiated and concluded with the IAEA on all source or special fissionable material in all nuclear activities within the territory of the Party, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere.

(b) The Agreement referred to in paragraph (a) shall be, or shall be equivalent in its scope and effect to, the agreement required in connection with the NPT (INFCIRC/153 corrected). Each Party shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that the Agreement referred to in paragraph (a) is in force for it not later than eighteen months after the date of entry into force for that Party of this Treaty.

(c) For the purpose of this Treaty, the safeguards referred to in paragraph (a) shall have as their purpose the verification of the non-diversion of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown.

(d) Each Party shall transmit to the Commission, for its information and review, a copy of the overall conclusions of the most recent report by the IAEA on its inspection activities in the territory of the Party concerned, and advise the Commission promptly of any subsequent findings of the IAEA in relation to those conclusions. The information furnished by a party shall not be, totally or partially, disclosed or transmitted to third parties, by the addressees of the reports, except when that party give its express consent.

### Annex 3. African Commission on Nuclear Energy

(i) The Commission established in Article 12 shall be composed of twelve Members elected by Parties to the Treaty for a three year period, bearing in mind the need for rotation as well as to include Members with advanced nuclear programmes. Each Member shall have one representative nominated with particular regard for his/her expertise in the subject of the Treaty.

(ii) The Commission shall have a bureau consisting of the chairman, the vice-chairman and the executive secretary. It shall elect its chairman and vice-chairman. The OAU Secretary-General, at the request of Parties to the Treaty and in consultation with the chairman shall designate the executive secretary of the Commission. For the first meeting a quorum shall be constituted by representatives of two-thirds of the members of the Commission. For that meeting decisions of the Commission shall be taken as far as possible by consensus or otherwise by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Commission. The Commission shall adopt its rules of procedure at that meeting.

(iii) The Commission shall develop a format for reporting by States as required under Articles 12 and 13.

(iv) (a) The costs of the Commission, including the costs of special inspections pursuant to annex 4 to this Treaty, shall be borne by the Parties to the Treaty in accordance with a Scale of Assessment to be determined by the Parties.

(b) The Commission may also accept additional funds from other sources provided such donations are consistent with the purposes and objectives of the Treaty.

(c) The budget of the Commission shall be adopted in accordance with Article 14 ii.

#### Annex 4. Complaints procedure

(i) A Party which considers that there are grounds for a complaint that another Party or a Party to Protocol III is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty shall bring the subject-matter of the complaint to the attention of the Party complained of and shall allow the latter reasonable opportunity to provide it with an explanation and to resolve the matter. This may include technical visits agreed upon between the Parties.

(ii) If the matter is not so resolved, the complainant Party may bring this complaint to the Commission.

(iii) The Commission, taking account of efforts made under paragraph (a), shall afford the Party complained of a reasonable opportunity to provide it with an explanation of the matter.

(iv) If, after considering any explanation given to it by the representatives of the Party complained of, the Commission considers that there is sufficient substance in the complaint to warrant a special inspection in the territory of that Party or territory of a party to Protocol III, the Commission may request the IAEA to conduct such inspection as soon as possible. The Commission may also designate its representatives to accompany the IAEA inspection team.

- (a) The request shall indicate the tasks and objectives of such inspection, as well as any confidentiality requirements.
- (b) If the Party complained of so requests, the inspection team shall be accompanied by representatives of that Party provided that the inspectors shall not be thereby delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions.
- (c) Each Party shall give the inspection team full and free access to all information and places within each territory which may be deemed relevant by the inspectors to the implementation of the special inspection.
- (d) The Party complained of shall take all appropriate steps to facilitate the work of the inspection team, and shall accord them the same privileges and immunities as those set forth in the relevant provisions of the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA.
- (e) The IAEA shall report its findings in writing as quickly as possible to the Commission, outlining its activities, setting out relevant facts and information as ascertained by it, with supporting

evidence and documentation as appropriate, and stating its conclusions. The Commission shall report fully to all States Parties to the Treaty giving its decision as to whether the Party complained of is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty.

- (f) If the Commission considers that the Party complained of is in breach of its obligations under this Treaty, or that the above provisions have not been complied with, States Parties to the Treaty shall meet in extraordinary session to discuss the matter.
- (g) The States Parties convened in extraordinary session under paragraph (vi) may, as necessary, make recommendations to the Party held to be in breach of its obligations and to the OAU. The OAU may, if necessary, refer the matter to the United Nations Security Council.
- (h) The costs involved in the procedure outlined above shall be borne by the Commission. In the case of abuse, the Commission shall decide whether the requesting State Party should bear any of the financial implications.
- (v) The Commission may also establish its own inspection mechanisms.
- (vi) Special inspections will not prejudice the rights and the power of the IAEA to carry out special inspections in accordance with the agreements referred to in paragraph (a) of annex 2 to this Treaty.

## Protocol I

The Parties to this Protocol

Convinced of the need to take all steps in achieving the ultimate goal of a world entirely free of nuclear weapons as well as the obligations of all States to contribute to this end;

Convinced also that the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty negotiated and signed in accordance with the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa (AHG/Res.11(1)) of 1964, OAU Council of Ministers Resolutions CM/Res.1342(LIV) of 1991 and CM/Res.1395(LV1) Rev. 1 of 1992 and United Nations General Assembly Resolution 48/86 of 16 December 1993 constitutes an important measure towards ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, promoting general and complete disarmament and enhancing regional and international peace and security;

Desirous of contributing in all appropriate manner to the effectiveness of the Treaty;

HAVE AGREED as follows:

### Article 1

Each Protocol Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use a nuclear explosive device against:

- (a) Parties to the Treaty; or
- (b) Any territory within the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone for which a State that has become a Party to Protocol III is internationally responsible as defined in annex 1.

### Article 2

Each Protocol Party undertakes not to contribute to any act which constitutes a violation of the Treaty, or this Protocol.

### Article 3

Each Protocol Party undertakes by written notification to the depositary, to indicate its acceptance or otherwise, of any alteration to its obligation under this Protocol that may be brought about by the entry into force of an amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 20 of the Treaty.

### Article 4

This Protocol shall be open for signature by the People's Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

Article 5

This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.

Article 6

This Protocol is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely, provided that each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Protocol if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter of this Protocol, have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the depositary twelve months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article 7

This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of its deposit with the depositary of its instrument of ratification or the date of entry into force of the Treaty whichever is later.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Protocol.

DONE at \_\_\_\_\_



## Protocol II

### The Parties to this Protocol

Convinced of the need to take all steps in achieving the ultimate goal of a world entirely free of nuclear weapons as well as the obligations of all States to contribute to this end;

Convinced also that the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty negotiated and signed in accordance with the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa (AHG Res. II(1) of 1964, OAU Council of Ministers Resolutions CM/Res 1342(LIV) of 1991 and CM/Res.1395(LVI) of 1992 and United Nations General Assembly Resolution 48/86 of 16 December 1993 constitutes an important measure towards ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, promoting general and complete disarmament and enhancing regional and international peace and security;

Desirous of contributing in all appropriate manner to the effectiveness of the Treaty;

Bearing in mind the objective of concluding a treaty banning all nuclear tests;

HAVE AGREED as follows:

#### Article 1

Each Protocol Party undertakes not to test or assist or encourage the testing of any nuclear explosive device anywhere within the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

#### Article 2

Each Protocol Party undertakes not to contribute to any act which constitutes a violation of the Treaty, or this Protocol.

#### Article 3

Each Protocol Party undertakes, by written notification to the depositary, to indicate its acceptance or otherwise, of any alteration to its obligation under this Protocol that may be brought about by entry into force of an amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 20 of the Treaty.

#### Article 4

The Protocol shall be open for signature by the People's Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.

**Article 5**

This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.

**Article 6**

This Protocol is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely, provided that each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this protocol if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter of this Protocol, have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the depositary twelve months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

**Article 7**

This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of its deposit with the depositary of its instrument of ratification or the date of entry into force of the Treaty whichever is later.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Protocol.

DONE AT \_\_\_\_\_

### Protocol III

The Parties to this Protocol

Convinced of the need to take all steps in achieving the ultimate goal of a world entirely free of nuclear weapons as well as the obligations of all states to contribute to this end;

Convinced also that the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty negotiated and signed in accordance with the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa (AHG/Res.II(1)) of 1964, OAU Council of Ministers Resolutions CM/Res.1342(LIV) of 1991 and CM/Res.1395 (LVI) of 1992 and United Nations General Assembly Resolution 48/86 of 16 December 1993 constitutes an important measure towards ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, promoting general and complete disarmament and enhancing regional and international peace and security;

Desirous of contributing in all appropriate manner to the effectiveness of the Treaty,

HAVE AGREED as follows:

#### Article 1

Each Protocol Party undertakes to apply, in respect of the territories for which it is internationally responsible situated within the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, the provisions contained in Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the Treaty and ensuring the application of safeguards specified in annex 2 of the Treaty.

#### Article 2

Each Protocol Party undertakes not to contribute to any act which constitutes a violation of the Treaty, or this Protocol.

#### Article 3

Each Protocol Party undertakes, by written notification to the Depositary, indicate its acceptance or otherwise, of any alteration to its obligation under this Protocol that may be brought about by the entry into force of an amendment to the Treaty pursuant to Article 20 of the Treaty.

#### Article 4

This Protocol shall be open for signature by France, Spain and Portugal.

#### Article 5

This Protocol shall be subject to ratification.

#### Article 6

This Protocol is of a permanent nature and shall remain in force indefinitely, provided that each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Protocol if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Protocol have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to the Depositary twelve months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

#### Article 7

This Protocol shall enter into force for each State on the date of its deposit with the Depositary of its instrument of ratification or the date of entry into force of the Treaty whichever is later.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their Governments, have signed this Protocol.

DONE at \_\_\_\_\_

