The eastward expansion of
the West European security-community

Budapest, 11-12 November 1994

THE EASTWARD EXPANSION OF
THE WEST EUROPEAN SECURITY-COMMUNITY
Western European Union. Institute for Security Studies
Budapest, 11-12/XI/1994

a. Programme
1. "National choices: European outcomes"/ Przemyslaw Grudzinski
2. "Whence the threat to the peace in Europe?"/ Pál Dunay
3. "National interest and the European interest" (chapter 3, "Spreading peace eastward: the expansion of the European security community")/Stefan Tafrov
4. "Civil society and security after communism" (chapter 4, "Spreading peace eastward: the expansion of the European security community")/ Dan Pavel
5. "The expansion of the European security community: limits and opportunities: the Baltic perspective"/ Andris Ozolins
6. "The future of the European security community" (concluding chapter, "Spreading peace eastward: the expansion of the European security community")/ Ian Gambles

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7 November 1994

THE EASTWARD EXPANSION OF
THE WEST EUROPEAN SECURITY-COMMUNITY
Seminar in Budapest on 11-12 November 1994

PROGRAMME

Friday, 11 November

a.m. Arrival at Budapest Ferihegy Airport. Transfer to the Hotel Korona

1300 Assemble in hotel lobby for transfer to seminar site

1315 Sandwich buffet lunch at seminar site

1430 Seminar opens
Welcome by Prof. Dr. András Blahó, Programme Director of the Budapest Institute for Graduate International and Diplomatic Studies

1445 **Session I:**   **National choices: European outcomes**

Introduction: Pryemyslaw Grudzinski (Marshal Center for Security Studies)
Discussant: Mathias Jopp (WEU ISS)

1600 Coffee break

1615 **Session II:**   **Whence the threat to the peace in Europe?**

Introduction: Pál Dunay (Eötvös Lorand University) → UNGVEUS
Discussant: Judy Batt (University of Birmingham)

1730 **Session III:**   **National interests and the European interest**

Introduction: Stefan Tafrof (Bulgarian Ambassador to Italy)
Discussant: Jutta Frasch (European Commission)

1845 End of day's sessions

2030 Seminar dinner at the Hotel Korona

0900 **Session IV:**   Civil society and security after Communism

     Introduction: Dan Pavel (University of Cuj, Romania)
     Discussant: Jacques Rupnik (CERI)

1015 **Session V:**   The expansion of the European security community: limits and opportunities (the Baltic perspective)

     Introduction: Andris Ozoliņš   (Latvian Institute of International Affairs)
     Discussant: John Pugh (NATO)

1130 Coffee break

1145 **Session VI:**   **The future of the European security-community**

     Introduction: Ian Gambles (Visiting Lecturer at BIGIS)
     Discussant: Rudolf Joo (WEU ISS visiting fellow)

1300 Closing remarks by John Roper, Director of the WEU Institute for Security Studies

1315 Lunch and close of seminar

PRZEMYSLAW GRUDZINSKI

NATIONAL CHOICES: EUROPEAN OUTCOMES

EUROPEAN SECURITY: NEW ELEMENTS

Five years after the Cold War the debate on the future of defense
arrangements has barely begun reflecting the mood of major political
actors. In the absence of a new consensus on international security
issues a tendency to procrastinate and to postpone making fundamental
decisions has become a dominant influence.

From Central European perspective each consecutive meeting of NATO's
decision making bodies is seen as a never-ending struggle on the
question of timing, between the majority thinking it is much too early
for the major decisions to be made and the minority group stressing the
need to come to an early decision.

The political situation in Western democracies is not conducive to bold
decision making. After all the very nature of a new Europe is still
disputed, in particular, the issue of whether the states formerly
belonging to the Soviet sphere of influence could now become part and
parcel of a European community of states.

It is quite natural to withhold one's judgement as long as the European
situation is transitional and uncertain. It is not obvious, however,
that the conservative approach to maintain the club of well-to-do
and secure states as it was in the past, with some minor adjustments,
will serve the cause of European security and stability in the longer
perspective. The question which should be asked is whether European
security could be strenghtened by the concerted effort to reconstruct
the existing European defense structures, including the new members
from Central-Eastern Europe, or whether this expansion will spell general
deterioration of the European security? Different answers to these
alternatives necessitate two different courses of action. The politicians
who believe taking on new tasks and forms is neither possible nor desirable

put into question the vitality and adaptability and, ultimately, the raison
d'etre of the institutions they would like to protect.

The efforts to bring more certitude into the play of European security
have been only partially successful. The newly independent states of
Central Europe have strongly supported the idea of taking full advantage
of existing collective defense organisations formed around the West
European core, as a best approach to proceed. But the institutions
themselves are in trouble. The elaborate arrangements serving so well
in the Cold War are not applicable to the requirements of today.

This difficult struggle of the Western defense institutions to survive
their victory reflects the new pattern of relations among Western states.
They are now less inclined than in the past to act as a coalition of
like-minded states, in particular, when faced with the difficult task
of shaping the future. The moment the great negative coordinator refused
to play its role in the East, the coordinator of the West refused to
provide additional leadership. As a result there is a deficit of leadership
in the present day Europe.

The burden has been shifted to the newcomers, which despite their
unprecedented situation, could not count either on massive help nor on
strategic blueprints for transformation. They must do it on their own.
They must chose their own ways to modernity and security. The West has
certainly been helpful as an advisor but unwilling to commit itself fully
to the task of integrating Central Europe.

Asking for comprehensive answers to new problems in the delicate realm
of security would be premature but insisting on more clarity and foresight
is not. It often looks like the goal of securing a decent and a safe
life for more than Western Europe (enlarged by the rich EFTA states)
is considered by many to be an exaggerated claim.

The West has chosen quite logically an approach of absorbing the fruits
of the collapse of the Soviet bloc one-by-one: the unification of
Germany, the rearrangement in the Middle East, the admission of the
willing EFTAns into European Union, the expansion of market economcy and
trade into Central-Eastern Europe and into the vast heartland of Russia.

It has been a well-taken, well-balanced, useful approach. In a situation when formulating far reaching realisitic prognosis borders on impossibility, when the most foreign policy objectives are of negative nature, when understandably caution reigns supreme, the evolutionary, step-by-step approach to security issues seems to be the only viable option left. The process of European integration has the inevitability of predetermined growth which could well lead to the gradual enlargement of the club, by admitting new members without the present members of the club being hard-pressed to come to a radical decision.

That would be the case if European security arrangements were a natural part of the larger whole moving in a parallel direction. It would be possible if not the problem with the principle of the "indvisibility of security" proclaimed in the Paris Charter and repeated endlessly ever since. This doctrine hampers specific efforts to overcome the devisive legacy of the Cold War.

A recent restatement of this position was laid down in the American "National Security Strategy of Enagagement and Enlargement":
   "The aim of NATO's future expansion, however, will not be to draw a new line in Europe further east, but to expand stability, democracy, prosperity and security cooperation to an ever-broader Europe".1
This and similar formulations mistake the instruments with ends and create more problems than solutions to them. To the extent it is possible for NATO to be instrumental in expanding security, stablity, democracy and prosperity, it would not draw a new line in Europe. The moralistic rule has been elevated to a point of giving legitimacy to the demands of those who claim that the new security regime be at once comprehensive and inclusive, equally open to all interested and non interested parties whereas the most probable scenario is that it will be fragmentary, ad hoc. and exclusive. As such this method is not realistic and not practical. If applied in a consistent manner it may well lead to the abandoning of gradualism considered to be realistic in the past.

There is no doubt that the European states and the whole regions will not enjoy equal access to the scarce pool of security resources in a federated Europe from Vancouver to Vladivostok. The well meant calls to avoid new

walls in Europe will not change the fact that this vast space is
a highly differentiated security area, the one of complicated and
many times conflicting interests, where applying the equal measure to
Hungary and Tajikistan will serve the interests of neither.

The arguments raised against new divisions amount, in practive, to
sanctioning the most dangerous split of Europein the name of one Europe.
It is of utmost importance to establish a security regime for the whole
of Europe as an integral part of the strategy of overcoming the
presistent European dichotomy. Such a strategy would involve naturally
constructing dense lines of communication on all possible levels of
governments and societies, intensive networks of linkages and
cooperation which will do justice both to the aspirations and the realities, a
as a consequence will actually upgrade the level of common security. These
new lines in Europe which should be drawn would not organize watertight
divisions and subunits, on the contrary, they could be sof and porous,
establishing better conditions for enhanced cooperation among the states
naturally configured along their particular interests.

Central Europe faces two sets of uncertainties: the hesitating West
unwilling to open itself up to admit new members; and Russia, Ukraine and
a host of other new states hesitating to define their futures, including
their eventuall European path. These are totally different challenges
but in a certain way they tend to reinforce each other making the
Central Europe' s search for moorings even more difficult. As long as
there is no reasonable reassurance forthcoming on the final perspective of
integration within a finite number of years the prevasive feeling of
non-belonging will remain a crucial destabilizing factor of overwhelming
importance. If the response Central Europeans receivecontinuously is:
"do not ask us to allow for your integration right now (because both you
and we are not yet ready for it), but in the meantime try to get rid
of your nationalistic tendencies", the long term reaction might come
in the form of anti-institutional backlash and nationalistic choice.

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THE INSTITUTIONAL MALAISE

The collapse of the Soviet bloc was inevitably followed by the
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. All other pre- and Cold War
institutions: UN, CSCE, Council of Europe, EC, WEU have passed into
post-Cold War Europe. The attempts to start from scratch have never
been convincing including the project to sign a general European
Treaty, which has never really got off the ground. It is fairly obvious
that the present day Europe has to deal with her security problems
using the old inherited tools (John Roper said: "Not necessarily the
ones we would like to have now"2), the new instruments will not be
available.

The well-proven institutions of Western defense underpinning the
well-functioning security community have all-of-a-sudden found
themselves overwhelmed by the consequences of their success and virtually
under siege from the former foes, now asking to become partners. NATO's
traditional framework has been subjected to pressures from different
political and geographical directions. One of the significant sources
of questioning of the status quo ante has been Central Europe urging
NATO to commit itself to the defense of that area at a time when the
crisis in former Yugoslavia has begun to unfold.

The internal and external pressures formed a formidable challenge exposing
not only potential for change but also: the interorganizational jealousies
and rivalries, slow responsiveness to the new types of conflicts (now,
often of intrastate nature), the conservative reactions to emerging
security needs, and the lack of momentum in the European integration
drive after Maastricht.

More importantly, both NATO and WEU, have not been willing to engage
in a decisive way in the task of management of the post-Cold War
international system beyond the perimeter of Western community. There
have been endless discussions of the "out-of-area" activities including
the mutual arrangements of respective fields of competence. But in
practice these discussions and resulting decisions have not yet given
Europe any assurance in case another major contingency challenges

European stability. It is highly questionable whether Europe would be able to continue its business as usual when yet another crisis erupts on top of former Yugoslavia. The opportunities for preparing itself against major adversities are simply not being used. The level of ambiguities and uncertainties has not been significantly reduced as a policy of reactivity, and post factum rather than preventive mode actions overshadow a desire to project stability.

Most of the current thinking concentrates around the issues of jurisdiction, interplay and the evolution of the institutions. Less attention is given to the question of the vital goals these institutions must be striving for in order to respond to the needs of an evolving security system. The process and procedural aspects are very important but are not ends in itself, and should not dominate the issue of major goals and core functions.

The list of vital objectives for the coming decade might include the following points:
1. Managing of transition of the system of European security from the bi-polar order to the multipolar system of reasonable stability;
2. Reducing the prospect of renationalization of European defenses both in the West and in the East;
3. Reducing the prospect of emergence of new hegemonic powers in Europe and the new form of satellitization and interventionism.
4. Preventing local conflicts and their escalation;
5. Protecting the rules of decent international and national conduct of states;
6. Preventing proliferation;
7. Helping soft states to become more solid; preventing economic and social break-downs which could lead to major human and migration dislocations and disasters.

It is a very extensive list of goals, that could not be given to the institutions of collective defense alone. But their contribution toward meeting these objective would be critical. The acheivements of transformation cannot be consolidated in absence of a security net.

Unfortunatly, the reverse trend from concerted action to fragmentation

is very prominent. The on-going renationalization of defense policies
has led to situations whereby the exisiting institutions are used
by member states to pursue other goals than European security. The national
security debates put a renewed accent on exclusive national security
interests, on historical roots of security and foreign policies. Such
a renationalization is in the making. It has not yet lead to the
significant break-ups of defense institutions but exerted a powerful
impact on their functioning.

The case in point is Bosnia where national interests, alternately with the
perception of absence of important national interests led to the
diminishing of the chances of stopping the war early. The first "unexpected"
European post-Cold War major crisis exposed dramatically the inefficiency
of crisis response mechanisms but, even more so, the reluctance of European
Powers to rush to remedy this deficiency.

This conflict has erupted at at time when Central Europe strongly believed
in a structural security and collective defense framework as the best
answer to its historical security dilemmas. Paradoxically, the new
nationalism of the Western states which is rooted in the perception of
enhanced security weakens the integrated defense mechanisms. The Eastern
states conditioned by insecurity have become more enthusiastic in developing
collective defense than the long-time practitioners.

It would be overstating the case to suggest that the disintegratory
tendencies have already led to the radical change in European collective
defense shield. It is nevertheless clear that the institutions have now
become to a greater extent, hostages to the particular national outlooks.
One of the constant worries of the prospective members from the east is
the messy nature of the evolution of these institutions they themselves
want to join. They would, of course, be quite satisfied to become part
of this messy process and even this untidy mixture. For them the
driving force is insecurity resulting from history and geography and
uncertainty of the future; it is hard to relax after two coups in
Moscow in less than two years and in view of forthcoming Russian
presidential elections. The Western states feeling comfortably protected
and separated from the possibly resurgent threat by the Central-Eastern
European filter have simply different sense of timing. They feel less the

urgency of new arrangements, knowing that as long as the threat might
resurface once again, the relaxed pace of collective defense mechanisms
could be shifted to a higher gear.

RUSSIA: FREEZING OTHER'S CHOICES

Following the end of the Cold War two contending views were expressed:
first, of the Western origins, that only Russia and her former allies
must radically change their international behavior; second, orignated
in Russia, that Russia and the West must undergo jointly equally
fundamental adaptations to meet the challenge of the new age. In fact,
both sides are in need of new approaches but on a rather different scale.
Although the West cannot simply carry on with the business of containment,
its old defense instruments trimmed and restructured seemed to be very useful.
Russia, on her part, has no menu of old instruments at her disposal except
sheer military power which is not readily usable asset in the present day Europ

Russia is currently in post-imperial shock. She has to cope with the
enormous burden of Soviet legacies resulting in political and social
imbalances. She is trying to concentrate on her overwhelming domestic problems
but is constantly sliding back to the questions of foreign policy, her
international status and influence.

The Russian problems are not going to be solved over the short term. It
will take more than one generation until Russia will be able to work out
her new identity. It will take a number of years until Russia identifies
her new national interests and objectives which enable her to develop as
a proseprous and respected Power. The choices being made right now when
so many aspects of her domestic and international behaviour are in flux
will inform her future. If she makes her choices right, then, and only then,
Russia will be in a position to overcome her genuine apprehension that
she is sought after as a partner not on her merits, but out of fear.

As events in Russia and in the former Republics evolve it takes a lot of
courage to foretell with any assurance that the demise of the Soviet
Union, as John L. Gaddis did, has been unprecedented as "a striking
example of abrupt but amicable collapse"3. It is too early in the process

to discount a less amicable turn of situation, the long struggle to
manage the post-imperial burden bringing to mind the long twilight of
the Ottoman Empire, hopefully, with the Russian Attaturk at the end of
the tunnel; Boris Yelcyn is not Attaturk.

It is precisely for this reason, because she is not able to foresee her
own future that Russia is not eager to see others fixing their security
problems immediately after the Cold War. Her sense of timing is again
different from Central European states: she would be glad to minimize action
in the secuirty dimension until she fully recovers, while the Central
Europeans are desperate to act now before that happens.

Russia, despite her vocal interest in the new European security system
seems to be much more interested and active in managing her post-Soviet
neighbourhood. Apart from former Yugoslavia which has become a domestic
issue, it is a minimalistic posture. Russian Central European policy
lacks esprit. Undoubtedly, Russia is a Power with important interests in
Central and Eastern Europe and Central Europe will be glad to do
substantial business with Russia. In reality, Russia loses no opportunity
to express her security concerns in Central-Eastern Europe, but the region
attracts hardly any attention in the Russian foreign policy circles.

The actual Russian policy, then, is a policy of passivity in the
region, and policy of active involvement toward the region leaving
the impression throughout Central Europe that its major aim is preventing
Central Europe's integration with European structures. This intention
is visible in the package of Russian proposals on the future system
of international security in Europe. The basic idea derives from the
presumption that the new Europe should be recreated as one democratic and
secure entity. The new order should be all-inclusive and free of the
spheres of influence. The antiquated Cold War instruments, most of all
NATO, have become largely irrelevant while others, like European Union
and Western European Union suffer from exclusiveness.

What is suggested instead is a regional version of the United Nations
in the form of an upgraded CSCE. New distribution of roles and missions
would relegate NATO through NACC to a technical tool while reconstructed
CSCE would operate as a two-tier body with the European Security Council
at the top.

Implementation of this scheme would multiply the volume of European
uncertainties in a watered-down collective security environment.
Moreover, it might create new dramatic divisions as the vast majority
of the CSCE members would be extremely reluctant to give up their
status of equality. The idea of the European Security Council carries two
distinctive threats; if it is based on the pattern of the original
UN set-up it would be clearly outdated, if not, than it will open
potentially explosive issues of European pecking order.

More importantly, the dynamics of a new European Concert of Powers is
difficult to foresee, except that it is inherently less stable than even
the present incomplete system. Ironically, it would also make pro-European
policy in Russia much less attractive, paving the way instead to the idea
of special axis between Moscow and Berlin, of which the last remaining
traces have only recently been removed from Germany.

Russian policy-makers argue that their intentions do not run counter to
the intersts of Central Eastern Europe aiming at stable security. Yelcyn
and Kozyriev have repeatedly stressed that Russia does not question
the right of independent states to protect themselves as they might wish
including the option of joining defense alliances. But, in principle,
Russia, reserves herself the right to judge such moves on it merits from
the point of view of the contribution to the overall stability. Expanding
NATO will not serve international stability well endangering, in particular,
the delicate domestic political balance of forces in Russia.

While the latter argument refers to the strength of the nationalistic
senstiments in Russia, the former one makes entire Europe including
Russia hostage to them.

The CSCE-based Collective Security is a recipe for importing instabilities
to Central Eastern Europe. As a result, Russia and her neighbours will
all come to share the same uncomfortable sense of the lack of the general
direction while Western Europe will certainly find effective ways to
protect itself by withdrawal to its safe shell.

In real terms, however, Central Europe per se is at the moment not high
on the Russian foreign agenda. The rethoric serves Russia most of all

to underlie her European position of influence. Many Russian policy-makers
tend to look at the European integration process as deeply harmful to
Russian intersts, as eliminating Russia from Europe, and, therefore fall back
its favourite, CSCE, the only pan-European institution which apparently
makes her position stronger.

To sum up Russian objections: the issue of NATO and WEU expansion is
more psychological than a matter of strategic choice. It could be
subject to bargain with Russia under certain conditions:
> Central Europeans should lobby their case not only in the Western
> capitols, but apply the same energy in Moscow as well. They should
> be able to substantiate the thesis that their defense integration
> is a complement of the economic and political integration and that
> their overall integration is the necessary step to further expansion
> of Western institutions east.
> The West might show more determination in carrying out the strategy
> of enlargement. It is essential to tell Russia unequivocally that
> the West is fully committed to integrating new members. The Russia
> veto on NATO's expansion in the Fall of 1993 served as as excuse for
> not doing something the NATO members would not have done anyway. It is
> even more important to to search after a unique formula for relating
> Russia to NATO. She could not have the same status as the states
> of Central Eastern Europe.
> Russia needs to make an honest reappraisal of her stand on the the
> future of Central Europe as a recreated buffer zone. Erasing the idea
> of such a zone from the Russian foreign policy will not only be of
> great service to mutual relation within the region, but to Russia's
> own prospects for European integration.

To facilitate the process of filtering through some of the deeply felt
Russian uncertainties whether Russia herself is welcomed in Europe her
serious concerns should be seriously addressed. That involves not only
accomodation but also speaking openly about the dangers of expansion,
about some aspects of her economic and national minority policies,
about full accountability of her policy toward neighbours.

The fundamental difficulty in dealing with European security is how
to subdivide it into cooperative subsystems meeting the standards of

international law and the effective crisis management. The on-going
process of reorganization of the post-Soviet space under the leadership
of Russia has acquired almost a certain inevitability. The final outcome
is unknown but it seems to fall in-between of the classic sphere-of-influence
and a voluntary association encompassing the majority of the former Soviet
Republics. Although both the Commonwealth of Independent States and Collective
Defense Organization are at the moment still more apparent than real the
trend toward reinforcing bilateral economic, political, and military ties
between Moscow and the new states (the exception make the Baltic states) is
steadily growing. This has been a result of Russian preponderant economical,
political and military position in the area, but also of the realization
of the independent states that both they and the West are not ready in the
near term to cooperate effectively on their transformation into fully
sovereign state structures.

It is crucial for the future of Russia that her management of the post-Soviet
space escapes the pitfalls of pseudo-imperialism. The Western involvement in
the process is to be very limited which will leave Russia to her own devices.
The evolution of post-Soviet recentralization will be a decisive test for
Russia's own maturity as a European partner. But whatever form the reintegration
will assume, it will strongly influence the extent of Russia's European
integration:

   Reintegration of the majority of former Soviet Republics into Euroasiatic
   Confederation. This outcome will make the future full integration of that body
   with the European core close to impossible;
   A "Union of European Republics" (mostly Slav) would be also too heavy to
   be considered as a good candidate for European integration;
   Loose political and military ties leaving each and every state (most
   importantly Ukraine) a full measure of independence will be the type
   of relations which in the longer run offer the best prospect for the
   future selective integration.

Judging from the present trends in the area toward recentralization the third
option seems less likely. Moscow actively promotes her leadership role vis-a-vis
her neighbours, and fights for recognition of her special role in the region
internationally. She considers her regional hegemony an indespensible
prerequisite to any future come back as a Super Power.While still hesitating
on the final shape of reintegration, Russia despite the lack of resources

is rather busy in trying to regain control over her neighbourhood. It
is more likely than not that Russia sees her role as a leader of
a new coalition of eastern states which will balance another coalition
of western states. These coalitions are not necessarily destined to
operate as hostile blocs, although such an outcome cannot be excluded.

THE UNITED STATES: SUSPENDING EUROPEAN CHOICES

The extent of the American participation in sustaining and shaping
the system of European security is of crucial importance. The level
of the future U.S. presence, however, is yet to be determined, a factor
unknown among other uncertainties in the European equation. There is
a parallel between the American withdrawal to isolationism after
Versailles and the neoisolationism of the 1990s. As Anthony Lake, the
National Security Advisor, observed, the U.S. faces today the similar
challenge that it did in the 1940s while the domestic circumstances
are more like in the 1920s. The American mood, strictly speaking,
"is not isolationist but is more hesitant about engagement abroad".
Without clear threat from the Soviet Union it became much harder to define
American strategy, and, after the break-up of the unusually solid Cold
War foreign policy consensus Americans reverted to arguing about basic
international issues: how deeply they should be engaged?4 And it seems
that many members of the Clinton administration answer "much less".

The tendency to disengage following strange victory deeply affected
American policy toward and in Europe. It has evolved slowly in the
direction of steady decline of European presence. It is not simply
a reflection of the Americans looking inwards. It is also a result of
a shift in perception of foreign policy priorities, of the emerging new
geography of American foreign interests. "Europe First" policy is on
the defensive as many Americans has come to believe that they had
already invested to much into European prosperity and security and its
time to reduce European committments and expenditures.

Thus it is quite probable that the diluted America's European presence
represents more then the passing phase of the current administration
leanings. The United States in the twentieth century always wanted to

make sure that no hostile Power would be able to control Western Europe
political, strategic and economic resources. This strategic objective
has been now fully achieved. The second contemporary strategic
interest, the management of nuclear deterrence, has been equally
met by the cooperation with Russia on that issue. Current problems
and the future challenges originating in Asia seem to require more
American attention and effort then the issue of the transformation of
Europe. As a result the U.S. attitude toward specofoc European
problems has become less clear and more hesitant. American leadership
is not forthcoming on important issues; the United States think that
Western Europe can and should take more responsibility for its security.

The receding U.S. presence, however, is not commensurate with the
Europe's readiness to determine its own security future. The Maastricht
process which theoretically envisaged the new framework of European
security based on own European resources without decisive American input
remains basically an unfulfilled promise. Common European foreign and
security policy, and to even greater degree commmon European defense, are
only abstract notions. It would take a tremendous amount of political will
and skill to realize this vision against the wave of national pragmatism.

The United States showed its desire to avoid conflicting national interests
suggesting to Germany that it might replace the American leadership in the
whole of Europe. But Germany is reluctant to step in immediately.

Russia is the American unequivocal choice in the area of the former
Soviet Union. The U.S. is willing to accept the right of Russia to
manage the process of recentralization, the right to create institutions
being the instruments of recentralization, and the right to intervene
militarily in order to prevent chaos and destabillization in this region
subject to the norms of international law. The absence of the American
reaction during recent Yelcyn's trip to the United States to the
Russian President spheres-of-influence therminology suggests a rather
wide mandate for Russian policies and activities.

Where does it leave Central-Eastern Europe? It is clear that the U.S.
blessing for the Russian regional hegemony covers the territory up to the

river Bug. This, on the other hand, does not imply the American immediate
support for the full integration of this region into Western security
structures. This is a welcomed long-term outcome but not at the expense
of the American-Russian relations. The United States do not know how
to resolve the differences between the Russians and the Central
Europeans. The rethoric "keeping the walls down" in the whole of Europe
responds to the Russian fears.

The United States hesitant attitude has put NATO to a difficult test.
It was an alliance which survived victory remarkably well. The question
 remains whether it could continue if its principal mission is to be
that of a hedge for Western Europe against resurgent Russian threat.
Looking forward it seems unlikely that a strong NATO with a strong American
military presence be sustainable in either American or German politics
without decisive steps to take on new relevant tasks.

NATO is still badly needed in Europe, although for different reasons than
in the past. It is a principal instrument of reducing uncertainties, it
is an important coordinating tool between the U.S. and Europe, it is
a policy insurance for Germany and its neighbours that they might
safely proceed with forging new network of cooperation, and, last but
not least, a crisis response mechanism for unforeseen situations in the
east and south.

It would be also imperative to retain NATO as a vehicle of the American
nuclear guarantee for the enlarged Europe, in view of the probable
Russian nuclear umbrella over the entire CIS area. If Central Europe is
allowed to drift in-between two nuclear zones, Russia will bring up the
proposal of a nuclear guarantee for that region as already mentioned in
the September 1993 Yelcyn's letter. The project of a joint Russian-NATO
security guarantee for the states of Central-Eastern Europe will invite
the ill-fated buffer zone pattern through the back nuclear door. Such
sentiments have their supporters also in the United States. Pat Buchanan
wrote recently that expanding NATO to the east would entail the willingness
of the United States to go to war with Russia on behalf of Central Europe.
He excluded this option as a nonsense and brought back the 1944 Walter
Lipmann's solution; assuming by the Central European states a policy

of neutrality hoping that it would become respected and supported
by Russia.5

The policy of current administration is not, however, toward making
second Yalta. Despite inconsistencies, it supports the notion of
larger Europe, occasionally even too amorphic. Europe, as a middle-
to long-range policy goal. It is also true that proposing a compromise
in the form of the Partnership for Peace programm it has succeeded
in creating a perfect tool for sending different signals to different
audiences. There is a reasonable chance, though, that the current
inter and intra-departamental disagreements over the expansion issue
could be smoothed out and the way to expand NATO will be paved in the
next 2/3 years.

At this juncture this trend is overshadowed by the U.S. privileged
relationship with Moscow over Central Europe. "And if anyone has had
a policy of "Moscow First", it has been the Clinton administration",
observed T.G. Ash adding that "In one of those curious transatlantic
role reversals that happen from time to time, the United States has
played Germany to Yeltsin's Russia, while Germany has played America
to east-central Europe".6

Nothing is more characteristic of this reversal than the indirect and direct
polemics between the German and the American Ministers of Defense, Volker
Ruehe and William B. Perry. This transatlantic exchange of views concentrate
around two issues: the expansion of NATO to include Central European
states and the possible Russian participation in this organization. Ruehe
speaks bluntly on these two counts. He wants to have the Visegrad Four
in NATO by the year 2000, and Russia excluded indefinitely from the
prospective membership. Perry considers the expansion premature (although
desirable in the longer run) and prefers to take an-inclusive approach.

It is a position of some Clintonities that Russia's bid for future NATO
membership is serious and should be treated as such. They tend to believe
the arguments as those forwarded by the former Vice Premier Boris Fyodorov
that the full Russian NATO membership would strenghten global security.
Fyodorov clearly does not represent the views of the Russian military

Whence the Threat to the Peace in Europe?

PÁL DUNAY

Introduction

Europe has never been a united continent. According to historians it had been historically divided into three regions: Western, Central and Eastern Europe.[1] Their frontiers had run through areas which were later identified as the western and eastern perimeter of *Mitteleuropa*. The territory of Prussia, Poland and of the Habsburg empire belonged to this Central area. The three traditionally distinct zones were overshadowed by the East-West division after the end of World War 2. Even though there were neutral countries in Europe which were celebrated by Easterners for that "on the other side of the border between East and West there are some countries which - although unambiguously belonging to the West - consistently pursue a policy of national interest and not a policy furthering bloc interests..."[2] this fact did not question the bipolar division of Europe. What one could suspect during the decades of the East-West conflict has become an undenied fact thereafter: Some neutral countries were *de facto* integrated in the West militarily as well. Contingency plans were prepared for their defence, funds were allocated for this purpose. Thus, one can conclude that bipolarity fully dominated the European landscape. As bipolarity came to an end in the late 1980s a broad variety of guesses emerged as to what should take its place.

Five years have passed since the fall of the Berlin wall. Even though a few years is not a long period of history there is no longer reason to reiterate that the world has become fundamentally different from the era of bipolarity. One has to get beyond this largely negative statement and deal with the emerging new international order. It is not the subject of this paper to extensively analyse the new world order. It is relevant for the analysis of post-Cold War military security in Europe that Europe has remained divided and the bipolar division has been replaced by fragmentation along more than two dividing lines. One may preliminarily conclude that Europe has been divided into three historic parts again closely resembling the three main historic regions. The frontiers of the three zones

are affected by the vanished bipolar order and thus cannot be precisely identified with the three historic regions.

Western Europe, including neutral democracies, is connected by multiple ties extending to legally regulated or *de facto* economic, political and military cooperation. The level of integration and the prevalence of democracy provides stability. It is largely impossible that historic tensions and rivalries reemerge in this region and endanger international security.[3] Despite continuing manipulation no state can credibly demonstrate that members of the western security community pose military threat to any country in Europe, apart from eventually implementing sanctions against an aggressor. The other region, *the former Central European zone* can be characterized with a certain political and socio-economic instability. It is difficult to list the countries belonging to this group. It is largely identical with the western periphery of the former East, encompassing probably ten countries. They are the former non-Soviet Warsaw Treaty member-countries, the three Baltic states and Slovenia. Even though the situation of these countries may differ widely in many respects, there has been some common elements present in their international policies. Namely, *they could avoid the military escalation of their international conflicts,*[4] *their political agenda has been dominated by non-military issues and all want to integrate in western security institutions that has had a significant impact on their international performance.* The third group consists of *those former republics of the Soviet Union that belonged to the Soviet state when it got dissolved and those former republics of Yugoslavia which have already been dragged into violent conflicts or that can happen to them any time.* The common characteristic feature of these countries is that *they fight local wars or have pending conflicts threatening with violent escalation, military issues play a significant role on their political agenda* and given the fact their integration into western institutions does not seem realistic in the foreseeable future *their conflict resolution culture is not affected by western patterns.*

If the above presentation of Europe's three regions is correct one can draw the conclusion preliminarily what we aim at in Europe is not the unification of the old continent but either the drawing of the new borders of East and West[5] or preserving and maintaining the current division. The reason for not unifying Europe is not that there are forces which oppose unification, it is much more the developments of the last years that proved *unification is impossible.* This paper dealing with the military aspects of European security will try to demonstrate that it is in the interest of the majority of the countries of CSCE Europe to integrate

those countries which can be integrated as soon as practicable in the western strategic community militarily for two groups of reasons. First, because many impediments of integration based either on pretexts or misperceptions and secondly, as the integration of those who have demonstrated their inclusion in the western strategic community does not involve unacceptable security risks and can contribute to the stabilization of the region neighbouring "the West" broadly.

Threat perceptions, strategies and doctrines

No credible strategy and military planning are conceiveable without identifying potential threats and rank them according to their importance. Following the revolutions of 1989 and even more after the termination of massive forward stationing of Soviet forces in Central Europe the whole strategic landscape changed fundamentally. The previous conflict based on ideological confrontation had a number of important characteristic features facilitating its understanding. First of all, it was a conflict that regardless the ups and downs in the process remained steady during the last decades and thus did not require quick adaptation to fast changing circumstances. Not even the new rhetoric of the Soviet leadership in the second half of the 1980s made a fundamental conceptual revision necessary. Secondly, it was concentrated in the hands of two blocs and more importantly their leaders. It meant the major players had sufficient time to learn the reactions of others and to develop some type of an "intimately adversarial" relationship. Apart from a few exceptions they proved to be rational international actors. Thirdly, though the conflict had a systemic nature and thus an all-embracing character it had a separable military component. In sum, it was comparatively easy to conceive such a conflict, develop concepts to deter its military escalation and elaborate the necessary strategic plans.

In sharp contrast with the previous decades the situation has changed constantly since the end of the East-West conflict. Hence, adaptation shall be a permanent feature of European security. Its formation is no longer concentrated in the hands of a very few actors. A bigger number of states play an active role in it and non-state actors (e.g. ethnic groups and their organizations) also have their input in the process. Not each of them are influenced by rational considerations. Finally, the conflict sources are diverse and even though some, most frequently ethnic rivalries and territorial claims, are made responsible for many of them it is

unlikely one could give an exhaustive catalogue of those potentials which will threaten European security in the long run. The difficulties have been reflected in the ambiguous analysis and the partially inadequate conclusions of the post-East-West conflict European environment.

The North Atlantic Alliance adopted a new strategic concept in November 1991. Participants of the meeting, having taken into consideration the "radically improved strategic environment", concluded the following: "Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe. The tensions that may result, as long as they remain limited, should not directly threaten the security and the territorial integrity of members of the Alliance. They could, however, lead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the Alliance."[6] Two conflicting interpretations of the statement seem equally convincing. On the one hand, it is a correct observation of the Alliance that either the potential sources of threat or their origin cannot be identified easily. On the other, however, the rather vague language on the possible threats reflects that the sixteen had no clear idea about realistic scenarios that could threaten the security of the member states. Neither was it entirely clear who the authors had in mind when they referred to the role of "outside powers" which could get involved in armed conflicts. The only power that might have thought of could be the then still existent Soviet Union. On logical grounds one should exclude such an interpretation as the strategic concept dealt with that country particularly in a separate paragraph stating "its conventional forces are significantly larger than those of any other European State and its large nuclear arsenal comparable only with that of the United States".[7] One may suspect the drafting of the strategic concept was not dominated by logical considerations rather by bureacratic and intergovernmental compromise. Thus, one can imagine the Soviet Union was mentioned in two capacities. As an outside power getting involved in armed conflicts and as a source of concrete military concerns. One could conclude the only identifiable though remote threat could emerge from the Soviet Union. It is clear from the statement that the Alliance did not deem any common action necessary if tensions in Central and Eastern Europe "remain limited" i.e., do not spill over to the territory of NATO members. Since

the latter has been rather unlikely, one can read the document so that the function of the Alliance remained unchanged: to defend the security of the member states only. Such an isolationist approach carried two dangers: Firstly, as a direct threat against the territory of the 16 members of the Atlantic Alliance seemed highly unlikely it could result in its marginalization and secondly, and more importantly the unwillingness of NATO to get involved in out of area conflicts in Europe could give a misleading signal to the new democracies. Namely, they could regard it as a message: if they face strategic intimidation they have to rely on their own means. Fortunately enough, it was clear from other NATO documents the organization was aware it has to cooperate with the democratizing former adversaries even if it wanted to avoid being drawn into the conflicts of the "East".

The new NATO strategy seems to have misunderstood the post-Cold War European environment. The Alliance made a false assessment of the potential threats. As a German analyst wrote: "NATO analysed the sources of crises in Central and South Eastern Europe and on the periphery of the CIS as potential threats of a classic type ... the same type as those in Northern Africa and Western Asia."[8] According to Borinski the threat assessment was unrealistic, since it was highly unlikely that the crises in the above areas would spill over to any member state of NATO. The war in former Yugoslavia, for example, has continued for more than three years. None of the neighbouring countries have got involved in this conflict and there was no sign whatsoever that the conflicts might pose a direct threat to any West European state. "Nothing was more alien from third parties, including all major European powers or security organizations, than to let themselves ... involved in these conflicts militarily, apart from a great deal of rhetorical threats and planning."[9] Even though this prediction did not prove entirely correct - international institutions, including NATO acting as a subcontractor of the United Nations, could not escape a certain, limited involvement in the Yugoslav conflict - the horizontal escalation of the war has been prevented. There was no reason that the limited conflicts in former Yugoslavia or in the CIS would basically affect NATO's threat perception.

In sum, if NATO interprets its security interests narrowly, limiting them to the territory of the member states and to traditional military threats it can be relaxed stating it is surrounded by friendly countries lacking both the capability and the intention to pose any risk to NATO. It has to contemplate only the long range power projection capacity of Russia which does not seem threatening now but can be regarded dangerous *in abstracto.* In light of the absence of a credible

military threat it is fairly difficult to conceive what kind of eventuality NATO military planners prepare for. It is a danger that under such conditions the legitimacy of the organization will diminish.

Military planners *in Central Europe,* contrary to their western counterparts, do not have to worry about the absence of a credible threat perception. Their problem is different. Namely, how to cope with the new challenges. There are a number of paradoxical features of the military security situation of Central Europe.[10] It is frequently emphasized that security has diminished in the region what may be regarded correct in the sense that during the East-West conflict under the "protective umbrella" of the Soviet Union noone risked (and wanted) to challenge the Central European countries militarily. Paradoxically, it was the Soviet Union that posed the biggest threat to the security of the region by imposing a regime on these nations they did not choose themselves. All international military conflicts in Central Europe between 1953 and 1968 occurred with the involvement of the Soviet Union. Countries of the region have presumed to face two sources of military risk since the end of the East-West conflict. One of them has been the reemergence of revanchism in the Soviet Union and later Russia, the other the military escalation of low intensity political conflicts present in the region. The intensity of the former concern has changed several times. It reached its peak during the August 1991 Moscow coup. The dissolution of the Soviet Union put the Central Europeans at ease temporarily as Russia, the "core" of the power of the Soviet Union was detached from most Central European countries. Later as Russia started to pursue an imperialist policy and has forcefully implemented it in the near abroad the fear of the Russian desire to be recognized as a great power among others in its former sphere of influence, in Central and Eastern Europe, has increased. In most cases it was not regarded a concrete military threat rather an abstract danger with a military component. The fears were largely due to the fact that the West would give in to recognize certain special rights of Russia in European affairs. This is certainly contrary to the interests of those states which all want to find their place in the future as close to the West and as far from the East as possible.

The threat perception does not even seem consistent in the individual countries of the region. As was stated by a Western analyst: "it is easy to get the impression that different threats are presented to different audiences, depending on the circumstances. One day the audience is confronted with a vision of domestic anarchy and foreign aggression. Another day the same politicians describe their

country as exceptionally stable and surrounded by peaceful neighbours ... the latter vision is usually presented to Western bankers and investors; the former to security experts."[11] This presentation has contributed to the impression prevalent in western thinking that the region East of the Elbe is to a large extent unstable as a whole. It seems obvious the primary purpose of presenting such a gloomy picture of the security situation of the region served for the purpose to attract the attention of the West, get support to modernize the defence sector of the Central European countries and give security guarantee to them by western security institutions via integration early on. This attempt failed since it verified western suspicion about instability in the region.

The emphasis on the existence of a security vacuum in Central Europe had similarly damaging consequences. If one assumes that the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty resulted in a security vacuum that had not existed before, this implies that the Eastern bloc provided security for its members. Such an assumption is certainly false since, as was mentioned above, for most members of the Warsaw Treaty it meant they were deprived of their right to self-determination. The semantic argument, according to which the notion of security vacuum implies that sooner or later something will take its place, most probably some great power will fill the vacuum, i.e. it is temporary, may seem convincing.[12] Rather than a security vacuum there is something similar to it, namely, an adaptation or decision-making vacuum. An "adaptation vacuum" in the sense that it is difficult to adapt to the new security constellation in Europe; a "decision-making vacuum" because most states of the region were deprived of formulating independent security and defence policies for decades. Consequently, the difficulty to adapt to the post-Cold War circumstances generally has been further aggravated specifically by the lack of knowledge in the military-security field. The difficulty caused by the shortage of modern, adequate military equipment has thus been exacerbated by the fact that no state of the former Warsaw Treaty had experience in national strategic-military planning. The Soviet Union/Russia and Rumania can be regarded exceptions since they have already had national defence planning during the years of East-West confrontation.

Whereas the West faced one difficulty that it was largely unprepared for the fundamental change of the European security landscape, the Central Europeans had multiple military-security problems. The politico-military change was accompanied by the apparent inadequacy of military means and the absence of relevant military knowledge. They have correctly assumed that under the new

conditions there is hardly any chance to solve the multitude of problems without external support. This would require integration or at least close cooperation with those states and institutions that possess the necessary equipment and knowledge to facilitate to solve some of them. What the new Central European establishments which have come to power following the revolutions of 1989 have not recognized is a paradox again. Namely, the more instability is present in and around a country and hence the greater the need to integrate in security institutions in order to get guarantees the less likely the integration effort will be successful. Hence, it is a precondition to integrate to credibly demonstrate the given country has made a genuine contribution to stability in its surroundings.

As the threat perception of the countries of Central Europe is largely similar it is not surprising that their defence policies have some common features as reflected in their defence doctrines and official pronouncements. They all declare that no country is regarded as their enemy and their military preparations are not directed against any country. Consequently, they are committed to the idea of a *tout azimuth* defence posture that would allow them to counter aggression from any direction. At least this is the conclusion that can be drawn from the documents publicly available. This is the official position in spite of that it is well known that *tout azimuth* is regarded a weak form of defence. It is probable, however, that in the confidential part of the defence doctrines and strategic plans the origin of eventual military risks are formulated more specifically, including the identification of countries, sources of priority concern. They all declare that they will continue to respect their obligations not to possess weapons of mass destruction. They are committed to decreasing the size of their armed forces, while improving their effectiveness by increasing mobility. The procurement of defensive weaponry, such as air defence, takes priority.

The third region, the area of the former Soviet Union differs significantly from Central Europe. Whereas in the former non-Soviet Warsaw Treaty countries military threats have remained abstract and remote, in the Commonwealth of Independent States they are real, many former Soviet republics are fighting interstate wars without much chance for a peaceful resolution of the conflicts. The decisive power of the region, Russia which can be regarded *the* country that suffered the biggest loss in the process of rearrangement of international power relations acts as a centre of gravity for those 12 countries which belonged to the Soviet Union when it was dissolved. Three years after the dissolution of the USSR many analysts tend to conclude that Russia attempts to reintegrate the former

Soviet Union, or more precisely put the so-called "new abroad".[13] I think this is somewhat misunderstandable as there is no reason to reintegrate a region that has not disintegrated apart from formal disintegration reflected in symbols of state sovereignty. It is better to speak about more visible signs of the efforts of an assertive Russia to tighten the community of the 12 former Soviet republics than about reintegration.

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the development of post-Soviet military cooperation which has significantly affected national military thinking can be divided into five distinct phases. Between December 1991 and February 1992, attempts were made to maintain the unity of the former Soviet Union in a military sense. They have failed, according to Russian analysts, because of the decision of Ukraine to put forces on its territory under national control. In the second phase, between February and May 1992, a differentiation was made between strategic and general purpose forces, retaining the former under joint command while "nationalizing" the latter. The third phase, between May 1992 and June 1993, has been the coexistence of two tendencies. On the one hand, nationalization got new impetus, and on the other, a collective security arrangement under the CIS umbrella was adopted, although without the accession of each CIS state to it.[14] The fourth phase that began following the abolition of the CIS joint military command on June 15, 1993 is the nationalization of defence in the former Soviet area. It will be supplemented by agreements on bilateral cooperation, among other things, in military affairs. A fifth phase of post-Soviet military cooperation has begun in October-December 1993 for two reasons. One of them were the events of early-October in Moscow when President Yeltsin had to rely heavily on the military in order to consolidate his power and get rid of his political rivals. The other was the result of the December 1993 elections to the Duma. The fact that the new legislative with a good portion of extremists and communists did not mean a disaster for the President could be attributed to two factors. To his powerful constitutional position but even more to the change of his political wisdom to put into practice a nationalist great power agenda very much in line with the position of many representatives of the legislative. Surprising as it may be, the very same political figures will try to implement this policy who were celebrated democrats not long ago. It is a matter of taste whether one regards the phase following the completion of Russian troop withdrawals from Germany and the Baltic countries (August 1994) a separate one. Even though it did not result in a significant change

of military thinking from that time on the Russian military can exclusively focus its activity on the 12 former Soviet republics.

Many one-sided analyses have been presented about Russia's role in the region. It is necessary to present both sides of the coin. On the one hand, official statements, among others the military doctrine of the Russian Federation adopted late 1993, recognized that the danger of aggression against the country decreased.[15] A fairly peaceful military posture could be developed from this. In fact, under the official military doctrine one could give credit that Russia has no imperialist intentions and prefers stability in the region. Given the fact the drafters of the document under such conditions faced great difficulties to present a credible description of the military threat they listed many potential dangers that might lead to military conflict. The document approved by President Yeltsin on November 2, 1993 contained specific reference to the protection of Russian minority in other countries among others as one of the directions of guaranteeing the military security of the Russian Federation. One has to understand that Russia can hardly remain neutral in case the rights of ethnic Russians are massively violated. It is doubtful, however, whether military means are the most effective to enforce minority rights.

On the other hand, there is the practice followed by Russia. According to some analysts the elements of "a new Russian foreign policy have begun to emerge" since mid-1992.[16] If this is correct one has reason to believe that after the shock of the dissolution of the Soviet Union the elements of a new Russian foreign and security policy could be summarized by a less pro-Western orientation, the insistence upon to recognize the special interests of Russia in the former USSR, and the right to protect the Russian minority living outside Russia, with force if necessary.

The image of the threatening West was difficult to maintain in light of the fact western powers extensively cooperate with Russia in many fields, including military security and regional conflict resolution. "[T]he enlargement of military blocs and alliances at the detriment of the military security of the Russian Federation" is the only adverse step that seems specifically referring to an eventuality easy to imagine from the western direction.[17] The ambiguous formulation may serve a deterring purpose, to prevent that the West would consider the enlargement of NATO with countries of Central Europe.

The "southern threat", the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, the eventual horizontal escalation of conflicts in former Soviet republics to the territory of

Russia could be presented more credibly. As wars continue at different places in the vicinity of Russia the country does not have to make special efforts to depict the situation as highly annoying. In this respect Russia claims exclusive rights in the management of crises in the former Soviet area. This is similar to the Monroe-principle, declared by the then U.S. president in 1823. One can regard Moscow's stance as imperialist in light of the fact Russia has engaged selectively in the management of conflicts from Moldova to Tajikistan through Georgia and Azerbaijan. Regardless the concerns that Russia abuses her power peacemaking has become an integral part of its military strategy. It has to be taken into consideration that on the one hand, Russia is very much willing to participate in conflict resolution in the "near abroad", on the other, noone else is ready to enter the post-Soviet quandary with the intention to solve violent conflicts in the South of the former USSR. Hence, either Russia under CIS umbrella, or noone else. Russia may be well aware of this. Before the 1992 Helsinki CSCE summit the Russian military somewhat anxiously expressed the position of the country. It has warned that it expects that "NATO 'blue helmets' will not participate in the resolution of conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Moldova and the Dniester region".[18] A year later the Russian delegate knowing the unwillingness of the West to get involved in peace-keeping in the CIS could express "the readiness of his country to welcome peace-keeping troops from NATO countries to the former Soviet Union on a case-by-case basis, should the CSCE mandate the operation".[19] If one is not so cynic to tolerate endless killing, it has to support the efforts of Russia. The questions: under what conditions and with what type of guarantees inserted remain open. It seems to be the most important in this respect to monitor conflict management in the former Soviet area in order to avoid it would take the form of aggression.

It is not the purpose of this paper to analyse the threat perceptions and strategies of each European country extensively. It has to be stated briefly that some other countries of the CIS either have had no time to develop a consistent security concept being busy to fight civil or interstate wars or have opted for cooperation with Russia in order to appease it. One has reason to assume that some of the latter also have vivid threat perception from Moscow but have had no alternative to cooperate with it both for military and non-military reasons. Ukraine has been the only contestant in the region whose strategic plans give priority to averting the domination of Russia. The official military doctrine of Ukraine is understandably laconic in this respect as to declare any country adversary in an

official document could prove to be a self-fulfilling prophecy easily. The tension between the two remained the decisive conflict of the region. Even though Kiev and Moscow were at loggerheads from time to time on different issues they have succeeded to prevent an open military conflict. Fortunately enough after two years of hesitation the world at large understood a nearly exclusive focus on Moscow's interests may be to the detriment of long-term stability in the former Soviet Union and since 1993 the West has paid an increasing attention to the security interests of Kiev.

It seems one cannot understand the post-Cold War European landscape of military security by analysing the official concepts and declared threat perceptions exclusively. Their analysis is necessary, however, to learn how countries of the three major regions of Europe evaluate their own security situation. In order to get closer to the real problems it may be necessary to focus on those problems which threaten security in different parts of Europe according to countries belonging to other regions.

Perceived security risks imposed by one region on countries belonging to the others

In order to focus on the real problem areas one has to present a one-sided picture. There is no reason to deal with the integrated western part of Europe[20] at great length. The whole area is regarded remarkably stable posing no military threat to any country either inside or outside the group of state. This observation is certainly correct if one is ready to neglect certain complicating factors. First of all, it is known that two members of NATO, Greece and Turkey have been involved in a pending conflict on Cyprus and have some pending territorial claims as well. Beyond the conflict dating back in history there are some more recent disturbing developments with the involvement of some other western countries. It is suffice to mention the attitude of Greece to the statehood of Macedonia and the Italian pretentions to Slovenia. Noone seems particularly worried about them. It is known market economy is stable in these countries, democratic political institutions have been functioning for quite some time and the countries are integrated in international institutions like NATO and the EC. Their military strategy is not offensive and in case of many countries integrated in that of an alliance. Not even the coming of neo-fascists to power in the Italian coalition government could

undermine the wide-spread conviction: there is no reason to be concerned about destabilization.

Contrary to western Europe the region East of the Elbe has been regarded unstable since the end of bipolarity. Two reasons of instability have been mentioned particularly frequently: ethnic conflicts and territorial claims. The observation is correct insofar as the Cold War order that suppressed ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe as ones which were inconsistent with the declared internationalist values of the so-called socialist countries but did not tackle them. Thus, there was no reason to assume that these conflicts would not reappear in the international scene whenever circumstances permit, i.e. the "cohesion" of the Eastern bloc weakens. Territorial claims were also unimagineable during the East-West conflict that resulted in a remarkably stable territorial status quo. The fact that state borders were imposed on many countries of Central and Eastern Europe by outside powers either by redrawing them (e.g. the borders of Hungary and Poland) or by "including" nations in bigger entities (e.g. the constituting entities of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia) could also give ground for concerns.

It is not the purpose of this paper to analyse in details either the role of nationalism in the region or the ethnic conflict potential of individual countries.[21] It has to be emphasized, however, that in the revolutions of 1989 nationalism served two purposes in Central Europe. It was used against foreign political and military domination, virtually against an empire, the Soviet Union, even though by that time the Soviet empire did not resist the strive for independence of Central European nations. Nationalism can also be regarded as a reaction to the internationalist ideology of the communist movement. If one does not share the internationalist "values" of the communist movement and the form it was given in Central and Eastern Europe, one can conclude that nationalism served positive aims. It is well-known that nationalism has a mobilizing role that can aid the new leaderships of the region which have begun to build parliamentary democracy under very severe economic conditions. There was need for an ideology that was easy to understand by broad strata of the populace and around which a consensus could be built. Nationalism and nothing else could meet these requirements. If one assumes nationalism served such positive aims in Central Europe the question emerges why the world at large has been so concerned about the reemergence of nationalism. Nationalism can take different forms, of course, from benign patriotism to malign chauvinism. The worry of the West stemmed partly from the fact it did not have an extensive knowledge of the political course of each country.

It was not clear either what form nationalism would take and the frequently harsh rhetoric of newly elected inexperienced political leaders gave ground for concerns. If one intends to acquire a more reliable knowledge about the dangers inherent in ethnic conflicts the following three factors have to be taken into consideration.

1. The nationalism of such ethnic minority groups which form the majority in another country carries more severe risks than the one of such groups which cannot count on the effective support of a nation represented by a state. Hence, ethnic conflicts e.g., with the involvement of the gypsy population of a country do not pose a direct threat to stability and security and may remain the concern of NGOs, like Amnesty International. They certainly do not go beyond the "traditional" human rights concerns. Ones for instance with the involvement of Russians in other CIS countries or Hungarians in Transylvania do have security political relevance and can endanger the fragile stability of the region.

2. There is a significant difference between minorities dispersed in a large geographic area, mixed with (an)other, in most cases majority, group(s), and ones which are settled down in separable entities in the vicinity of the mother nation. Whereas the former settlement is not prone to territorial solution by secession, the latter may be subject to dreams of nationalist politicians. That is why there is an increasing number of analysts, including the author, who are of the opinion that the risks associated e.g., with the approximately two million Hungarians in Transylvania has been largely overestimated.

3. Even though the five years that have passed since the fall of the Berlin wall has been clearly insufficient to draw conclusions of unquestionable lasting validity about the historic development pattern of Europe one can state the following preliminarily. The former Eastern bloc has not remained united after the end of the East-West conflict and can be divided into two parts as far as conflict potential and the way of their resolution are concerned. What we have experienced since the end of the Cold War is that though *ethnic conflicts both characterize the so-called former non-Soviet Warsaw Treaty area and the former Soviet Union and dominate their security agenda there is a fundamental difference between their management.* Despite the many times intolerant rhetoric *in Central Europe* concerning minorities and *ethnic issues conflicts remained exclusively political in the former non-Soviet Warsaw Treaty area, there was no danger of military escalation.*[22] *In the former Soviet Union,* on the contrary, *conflicts have nearly automatically escalated into military ones.*

It has to be taken into account that that country of Central Europe, Hungary whose statements were reasons of concerns between 1990-94 frequently at the second democratic elections voted for a government that obviously does not want to endanger its most important foreign policy priority, western integration, by making destabilizing statements concerning minorities. Hungary could be regarded a source of instability not only because of the misunderstandable statements of ranking politicians but also due to objective conditions. Namely, a country where only a little percentage of the population belongs to national minorities and that has more than three million ethnic brethrens in minority status in the neighbouring countries can be a *demandeur* due to this asymmetry. It has to be emphasized that for five years the issue of ethnic rivalry has never threatened even remotely with military escalation.

In the area of the former Soviet Union military escalation of ethnic conflicts (e.g. between Azeris and Armenians or different population groups of Georgia) has been a reality or a real danger. It has to be noted, however, that Russia has not used force specifically in order to guarantee the rights of ethnic Russians in other former Soviet republics and as she has other means at her disposal to enforce minority rights by the authorities in neighbouring countries it is hard to conceive a scenario where Russia has no other option than to employ military force in order to protect its ehtnic brethrens.

The other most frequently mentioned reason of instability is the emergence of territorial claims. One has to ask if there are states in Central Europe which manifestly or tacitly seek to annex territory from other states. Should that be the case, the question is would that country consider the use of force to attain such an end or would it rely exclusively on peaceful means? Based on official statements, one would tend to conclude that those states which declare they do not want to revise state borders either by peaceful or non-peaceful means contribute to stability whereas those which intend to change borders undermine it. No state has gone so far in Central Europe as to say that it wants to change borders by force. A certain ambivalence has been noticeable concerning peaceful border revisions. Most countries declared in their official documents that they have no territorial claims whatsoever. Poland emphasized that it "considers its borders to be immutable and has no territorial claims against its neighbours".[23] The Czech Republic has no reason to worry about the revision of its borders. The only issue that gives ground for certain limited concerns from time to time has been the Sudeten German problem. In this respect the Czech leadership makes a distinction

between the position of neighbouring countries and non-state actors, that would be good to follow by other countries: "[w]ith regard to the demands of the Sudeten German association, the Czech government will not allow any change in the legally determined frontier for purposes of restitution".[24] The other successor state of Czechoslovakia, the Slovak Republic, has seemed somewhat concerned of the eventual territorial claims of Hungary but was ready to proclaim that it "has no territorial claims on any nation's territory".[25]

The Romanian leadership faces a complex situation. On the one hand, it could formulate demands on Bessarabia and some forces would certainly be willing to do that, on the other, however, it could be the subject of territorial claims of another country. The leaders of the country have emphasized that Romania and Moldova are two independent states. Their concerns can be felt nevertheless. As state secretary of the Defence Ministry, Ioan Pascu emphasized "the Helsinki document stipulates that borders are not to be modified through the use of force; such changes are permitted only if the parties involved agree to them. The first such modification, in fact, already took place when Germany was permitted to reunify in October 1990. Other such territorial transformations, however, also took place. Former federal states - particularly the USSR and Czechoslovakia - have disintegrated. These processes were, at first, generally peaceful because existing internal borders were maintained and became, automatically, international borders. ... However, Yugoslavia is a special case. Not only has that country broken down violently; internal warfare, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, has further created a dangerous precedent. With the conflict raging on, an increasing number of voices are advocating territorial changes since no other solutions seem in sight. *Were such territorial shifts completed, a powerful legal precedent contradicting the Helsinki Final Act would be created, by which other (provoked or unprovoked) conflicts could be 'solved' in the future."[26]* It is worth analysing the position of the Romanian politician, among others for the reason one can assume it can be regarded a mainstream view in Bucharest. It is welcome Romania also rejects the revision of borders by threat or use of force as it does not give ground to be concerned about an eventual military escalation of territorial disputes. It seems it is ready to accept peaceful border changes in the form if the parties can agree on it. This reflects the realism of Romanian politics on the issue. Such an approach leaves the door open for an eventual unification of Romania and Moldova if the latter also finds this acceptable without risking to be challenged on similar grounds by Hungary.

The activity of the first post-communist government of Hungary on the territorial issue was ambiguous. On the one hand, the Antall government made clear it would not seek to change its borders by non-peaceful means. However, it was not ready to give clear-cut guarantees to each neighbour that it will not seek to revise borders by peaceful means. Its activity was often accompanied by an unfortunate, intolerant rhetoric that alarmed the leaders of Romania, Slovakia and Yugoslavia. On several occasions, the prime minister reiterated that he would like to be the premier of 15 million Hungarians in spirit.[27] On one occasion he specifically mentioned that Vojvodina belongs to Yugoslavia and not to Serbia; thus if the federation dissolved, the status of Vojvodina could be subject to reconsideration.[28] The concept on security policy adopted by the Hungarian Parliament in early 1993 by consensus of the six parties does not fully exclude territorial revisions, but contains an ambiguous sentence on the topic. After referring to the rights of Hungarian minorities, the text continues: "... we reject both the alteration *by force* of existing borders and artificial alteration of the ethnic consistency of the population by any means, not only in the Carpathian Basin but in the whole Central and Eastern European region."[29]

Hungary was nevertheless ready to conclude one treaty with a neighbour regulating the border issue in clear terms. The treaty of December 6, 1991, with Ukraine states that both parties mutually respect each other's borders, have no territorial claims either at present or in the future, which means borders cannot be revised either by peaceful or non-peaceful means.[30] The treaty was ratified by the Ukrainian Parliament on Jule 1, 1992. The ratification process in the Hungarian Parliament, postponed until May 1993, was not free of heated debates. Clauses which renounced eventual territorial revisions even by peaceful means were generally unacceptable to the extreme right, which was partly represented in the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the biggest party of the governing coalition at that time, and also by independent MPs. The government's explanations were not particularly convincing. The foreign minister presented the following arguments: "When we confirm in this treaty that we have no territorial demands against Ukraine ... we shall not only proceed in line with the system of norms of democratic states of law and the Helsinki Final Act, but we are also taking into consideration the particular aspects of the Ukrainian-Hungarian relationship. Rejection of territorial claims is the same as confirming in a specific form the rejection of the threat of the use of force - a move banned by international law. As a consequence, it cannot be interpreted as a renunciation of any legal act as

permitted by international law. Over and above this important interpretation of law, the specific treaty expands, rather than narrows our political scope for action."[31] Regardless what the foreign minister had to say it is clear from the text of the treaty that in this case Hungary went beyond the renunciation of border revision by force, giving up the possibility of peaceful border changes as well.

In the highly deplorable debate (not the debate was deplorable of course, rather its one-sided thrust) of the Parliament on the Ukrainian-Hungarian treaty it became clear those conservative forces mentioned above would not be ready to ratify further treaties renouncing peaceful border revisions as well. Then Prime Minister Antall declared that the treaty concluded with Ukraine is a unique exception in this respect. He referred to the fact that Hungary was ready to accept the insertion of the border clause because it would not have been possible to conclude the treaty without it and also for the reason the border between the two states was not fixed in the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947.[32] Unfortunately, the position of the Prime Minister does not hold water international legally either. The Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 clearly determined the borders of Hungary with every neighbour of the country.[33] One may put forward more convincing arguments as some experts of conservative circles did according to which if Hungary reiterated in a legally binding document the same commitment it took earlier, in this case many years ago, on the inviolability of the country's borders and the respect for the territorial integrity of each neighbouring country, it undermines the credibility of the previous legal regime. Such an approach sounds correct legally. There are important political reasons, however, why not to give priority to the legal argument in this case. Namely, if Hungary refuses to confirm its earlier position on the borders it gives ground to the highly annoying assumption that the position of the country has changed and it seeks to border revision eventually.

The government formed following the 1994 parliamentary elections recognized the importance to conclude the two most important pending basic treaties, the ones with Slovakia and Romania, including the renunciation of territorial claims and thus to contribute to changing the image of the country. A number of high level visits during the summer of 1994 demonstrated the new government's determination in this respect. Even though it may take much longer than expected before the elections to conclude the two treaties ranking politicians and official documents reiterated a number of times Hungary's willingness to conclude the debate on the borders. The foreign ministry declared officially that *"[a]part from recognition of existing borders and mutual renunciation of*

territorial claims, the basic treaties should contain recognition, guarantees and political assertion of the rights of national minorities living in each other's countries, in line with the norms of the Council of Europe and the CSCE".[34]

In contrast with Central Europe territorial conflicts and the violation of territorial integrity of states characterize the situation in the former Soviet Union. It seems the efforts of the West had to be constrained to damage limitation there. Persistent efforts have been made to stabilize the situation surrounding the Baltic states and help the three countries "escape" from the zone of instability. Recently there have some (unsuccessful) attempts been made to roll back the Russian invaders from Moldova. It seems, no resolution of the conflicts of the former Soviet Union is in sight generally.

The different cooperation frameworks developed by the West to engage the former East in most cases aim at developing cooperation between two "groups", certain countries of the West and those of the East, like the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the associated partner status offered by the WEU, or between a group of western states and individual countries of the East, like Partnership for Peace. *No specific programme was developed to tackle conflicts between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, conflict sources which were regarded by the West*, as mentioned earlier, *most severely endangering security in Europe.* Namely, *ethnic rivalries and terrritorial claims escalating into military conflicts.* The so-called *Balladur-plan* aimed at to fill in the gap. The idea was picked up by the EU. Following the late May 1994 inaugural conference of the pact on stability in a period of one year the nine Central European countries (the six former non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Treaty and the three Baltic states) invited to participate should conclude bilateral or regional treaties regulating *inter alia* good neighbourly relations "including questions related to frontiers and minorities".[35] The danger of disputes on territorial and minority issues must not be underestimated. It is one of the main arguments of this paper, however, that such a danger was exclusively political and remained abstract in the former non-Soviet Warsaw Treaty countries throughout the last years. It represented and continues to represent a concrete military threat only in two former federations of Europe, in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. That is why, though it is not irrelevant to initiate a programme to eliminate such conflict sources it is doubtful whether it was the most appropriate to address it only to the nine countries of Central Europe (the six former non-Soviet Warsaw Treaty countries and the three Baltic states). Stabilizing these countries is an excellent

idea and thus the exercise is not entirely useless. One can conclude, the treaty regulation of the above issues will eliminate a military risk that was not present in the region before the initiative was launched.

The danger of territorial claims and ethnic conflicts have been frequently mentioned as impediments of the security integration of Central Europe with the West. In light of the above said, this argument sounds more convincing for Eastern than for Central Europe. There is a third concern put forward many times, namely the danger of nationalization of security and defence policies. The (re)nationalization has been a fact since the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty - a fact not many deplore with the exception of hard line communists and Russian great power nationalists. After having got rid of an alliance of subjugation it is understandable the Central European countries did not want to enter another integrated structure threatening with a similar pattern. When the failure to introduce an effective collective security system in Europe became evident not much after the end of the East-West conflict the Central European countries had two possibilities. Either to rely on their own resources in military affairs or to try to accede to a western security institution. As the latter attempt has failed for the time being nationalization of security was unavoidable in Central Europe. Even though *nationalization carries certain dangers it depends on two factors whether they remain abstract or become real. On the content of the national military concept and strategy and the transparent nature of the military plans of others. As long as political relations are normal, military plans are defensive and they are mutually transparent there is no reason to be worried about the mere fact or (re)nationalization.* One has reason to conclude that *the danger of nationalization is another myth of European military security. A country with a nationalized defence policy based on peaceful intentions and without offensive military capabilities is certainly preferable to a denationalized offensive military bloc.*

Conclusion: The relevance of the debate on military security in the new Europe

This paper does not want to belittle the importance of military issues in the new Europe. It is a fact that *for certain countries on the Eastern perimeter of Europe and for some successor states of Yugoslavia military issues are the decisive ones. Neither for Western, nor for Central Europe are military questions decisive.* The

West can feel relieved it does not have to devote too much energy and extensive resources to provide for its own defence. Central Europe faces serious military problems though not ones stemming from severe imminent military threats.

The countries of Central Europe are unable to defend themselves. The forces available including their training and command structure are largely inadequate. To a certain extent they still reflect the characteristic features of large standing armies of World War 2 with some Soviet "flavour" inherited from the Warsaw Treaty decades. If one assumes that the danger of violent escalation of ethnic conflicts and territorial claims are largely exaggerated or practically non-existent in Central Europe then it could be concluded it is not much of a problem. It is a fact, however, that these countries do not perceive the situation so.

Given the abstract nature of military risks in Central Europe, on the one hand, and the severe domestic socio-economic problems in most countries, including budget deficits and the shortage of capital, on the other, when governments set their priorities the militaries turn out to be the regular losers of the budget debates. Even though it may seem to be a simplification to say that Central European governments have to decide whether to meet the expectations of the IMF to reduce budget deficit or to spend more on their armed forces there is an element of truth in it. The modernization of the armed forces has thus become a popular slogan without decisive steps to implement it. The West seems to understand gradually that in the absence of real sources of international instability in the region and the desire of the countries of the region to integrate in western security institutions, primarily in NATO, it can be the most important obstacle to integration that the armed forces are incompatible with those of the West and require significant development.

In this respect one faces a stalemate. Modernization requires investment in the defence sector and without modernization no resources will be made available for this purpose. States of the region will not allocate significantly bigger resources to this purpose than nowadays as they are of the opinion there are more urgent and important tasks. The break out from this vitious circle seems nearly impossible, though some countries certainly make bigger efforts than others to modernize. The West can, of course, facilitate the process but there are limits of western generosity as well. The Partnership for Peace programme was a clear message in this respect. It stated that the subscribing states "will fund their own participation in Partnership activities, and will endeavour otherwise to share the burdens of mounting exercises in which they take part".[36] Not much after the initiative was

launched it turned out some money has to be allocated to facilitate cooperation if NATO wants to integrate some countries of Central Europe. The U.S., as was announced on 7 July 1994, decided to allocate one hundred million dollar for the implementation of joint military programmes with 'democratic partners' of which 25 million will go to the programme with Poland. It has to be considered what type kind of further measures can facilitate the process. Cooperation in training, joint exercises are understandably high on the agenda. In the future ways and means have to be found to develop the armaments and the military infrastructure of those countries whose integration may be topical already in the medium run. These efforts of the West will have to be supplemented by making it clear to those Central Europeans who are considered to be the first to integrate that the incompatibility of their militaries is now a major impediment of integration.

The Central Europeans also have a lot to do. They will have to put their military reforms into practice without significant external financial support. They have to maintain the region as a low risk environment militarily as they have done it since the end of the East-West conflict. They also have to consider what type of NATO membership they seek to as it has not been clarified yet.

The integration of Central Europe into western security institutions is part of the broader integration goals of the region. The fact that countries of the region are not threatened militarily and their stability has been endangered much more by factors other than external ones since the end of the East-West conflict does not mean their integration is unnecessary for two reasons. First of all, because belonging to the "family of western democracies" in the field of security can carry the message to the world at large that economic cooperation with these countries does not carry unacceptable political risk. Now it may be more important than anything else. Secondly, because the integration of a part of the former East in terms of security more narrowly defined is a fair weather policy . Its real value will be proven if things go wrong.

For parts of Central and Eastern Europe which cannot be integrated in western security institutions in the first group or not at all in the foreseeable future a differentiated policy has to be developed. For those states that can be integrated later it has to be made clear that it depends on them when they can join. For those whose integration seems impossible a programme has to be developed "to sweaten the bitter pill".

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The danger of territorial claims and ethnic conflicts have been frequently mentioned as impediments of the security integration of Central Europe with the West. In light of the above said, this argument sounds more convincing for Eastern than for Central Europe. There is a third concern put forward many times, namely the danger of nationalization of security and defence policies. The (re)nationalization has been a fact since the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty - a fact not many deplore with the exception of hard line communists and Russian great power nationalists. After having got rid of an alliance of subjugation it is understandable the Central European countries did not want to enter another integrated structure threatening with a similar pattern. When the failure to introduce an effective collective security system in Europe became evident not much after the end of the East-West conflict the Central European countries had two possibilities. Either to rely on their own resources in military affairs or to try to accede to a western security institution. As the latter attempt has failed for the time being nationalization of security was unavoidable in Central Europe. Even though *nationalization carries certain dangers it depends on two factors whether they remain abstract or become real. On the content of the national military concept and strategy and the transparent nature of the military plans of others. As long as political relations are normal, military plans are defensive and they are mutually transparent there is no reason to be worried about the mere fact or (re)nationalization.* One has reason to conclude that *the danger of nationalization is another myth of European military security. A country with a nationalized defence policy based on peaceful intentions and without offensive military capabilities is certainly preferable to a denationalized offensive military bloc.*

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SPREADING PEACE EASTWARD
THE EXPANSION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY COMMUNITY
CHAPTER 3
NATIONAL INTEREST AND THE EUROPEAN INTEREST
(Abstract)

Stefan Tafrov

Introduction

Two major groups of factors underpin every security community:
1. Objective, that is the extent of the network of contacts among member countries, the level of their economic interdependence, the common values and culture;
2. Subjective, hence contingent upon perceptions and self-perceptions; in the final analysis a security community in the Deutschean sense can emerge only in the case of profoundly evolved mentalities of the respective societies generating responsible behaviours and policies of their political elites. The key concept here is collective identity as perceived by the national community. Along with the very survival and well-being of a nation, identity constitutes the core of the national interest. Integration security policies throughout Central and Eastern Europe are possible provided that the traditional national identities are not hurt by the partial relinquishing of national sovereignty which is inevitable in the process of security integration.

Double Identities

In the post-cold-war period the nine WEU partner states articulate their national interests on the basis of a double identity. They share the historic experience of communism. By virtue of this common post-communist identity they have the same domestic and foreign policy objectives. These include: political and economic reconstruction and European integration. The main thesis of this paper is that post-communist identities determine the foreign and security policy agendas of the nine WEU partner states.

It is important, however, to study the interaction of these fundamental post-communist identities with the traditional pre-communist-era

identities which re-emerged after the end of the Cold War. Throughout the region communism has been perceived as a form of alien (Russian) domination. Traditional national identities were suppressed causing widespread frustration. The "return to history" relevant also for Western Europe is basically a healthy reaction to the preceding order. Traditional national identities are a significant factor for the social cohesion of societies in transition and in this sense they are more important for the Eastern than for the Western European countries.

The difficulty lies in the fact that communism "froze" national identities and foreign policy agendas in a region abounding in territorial disputes, minority problems and mutual hatred. The most wide-spread myth of the self-identification of the Balkans is the one of a brave old nation harassed by its perfidious neighbours and victimized by the great powers' intrigues. The negative element in these self-identifications is very important. Thus, Romanians identify themselves as opposed to Hungarians and Russians; Bulgarians, as opposed to Serbs; Poles as opposed to Russians and Germans, etc.

This "world of yesterday" clashes with the harsh economic and social realities of the post-communist countries. In many cases (Albania is a typical example) assertive nationalistic foreign policies are made simply impossible by the lack of resources. Moreover, pre-cold-war traditional power politics have evolved so that an individual East-European country can no longer play one major power against another. For European-minded anti-nationalistic politicians in the nine countries the very hint of a vigorous re-nationalisation of the foreign policies of the major West European powers spells a real nightmare. The turning point in this respect was the recognition by the European Community of the four Yugoslav successor states. Germany took a different stance to disintegrating Yugoslavia thus embarassing some of its EC partners. What happened afterwards, however, proved that behind the German decision there was no desire to dominate the Balkans or some sort of "Drang nach Suden". German economic penetration of Croatia and Slovenia remains limited and these countries cannot be described as client states of powerful Germany. Despite its failure to stop the war in Bosnia and the minor differences among its member states the EC has been sending clear signals that the pre-war client system is inconceivable.

These are the basic pre-conditions of the possible eastward expansion of the Western European security community. The critical point is the way in which the new post-communist political elites handle these competing agendas in order to preserve the consensus in society over the priority national goal (joining Europe) and to strengthen the newly emerging European identity. Mild nationalism is generally the approach which responsible East European elites take towards sensitive emotionally charged issues. It is essential to encapsulate and put aside potentially destructive attitudes while encouraging economic and human contacts with neighbouring countries. Bulgarian-Greek relations are a case in point. Despite their sharply divergent attitudes towards the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Bulgaria being the first country in the world to recognize it while Greece keeps refusing to do so) Bulgaria and Greece have been increasing their trade. The latter being the second biggest investor in Bulgaria after Germany.

Are the Balkans doomed ?

The real test for a possible eastward expansion of the Western European security community are the Balkans. Cliches like the one describing the region as "the powder keg of Europe" are sadly justified both by history and by the present state of affairs. True, the war in former Yugoslavia is the major crisis of this fin-du-siecle in Europe. But the developments in the Peninsula should not be reduced only to simmering and raging conflicts. This unidirectional thinking tends to overlook the seeds of peace which have been sown elsewhere in the region over the past five years.

The sobering effect of the war in ex-Yugoslavia on its Balkan neighbours cannot be underestimated. The gloomy scenario of a chain reaction embroiling the rest of the region has simply not materialized. Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Greece and Turkey have all manifested various degrees of self-restraint with the exception of the Greek blockade of FYROM. Their policies towards the conflict were much less assertive than initially expected. Their behaviour by and large has been consistent with the UN Security Council resolutions. This pattern of behaviour was also adopted by Slovenia and FYROM which distanced themselves from

the group of the countries so entangled in the problems originating from the dissolution of former Yugoslavia that they cannot get themselves out: Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. The presence of a limited contingent of "blue helmets" along the border between FYROM and Serbia has been a psychological factor for preventing the spillover southwards.

The embargo has laid a heavy burden on the strained Balkan economies. These have been trying to offset the negative effect by intensifying their business contacts. In fact, the steady growth of inter-Balkan trade is about to emerge as a true local phenomenon. Consequently, human contacts tend to intensify and for the first time in many decades Balkan peoples are beginning to know each other better.

Network of bilateral arrangements as a stability factor

The last five years have witnessed a general improvement of relations between the Balkan countries outside the Yugoslav conflict.
Seeking integration in the European organizations, *Romania* entertains good relations with all Balkan countries. Its serious inherited problems concern countries bordering the area, such as Hungary because of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, and Moldavia. It seems to have applied the "encapsulate and put aside" technique in both cases.
Immediately after the fall of communism *Bulgaria* restored the rights of its ethnic Turks. Its relations with Turkey since then have been steadily improving. Apart from the differences over FYROM the links with Greece have been intensifying. Bulgaria was the first to recognize the Republic of Macedonia, thus emphasizing the absence of territorial claims. By helping the new state strengthen its sovereignty Bulgaria contributes to preventing Macedonia's embroilment into the Yugoslav conflict. Bilateral trade has been steadily increasing; suspicions and mistrust have been fading away slowly.
In *Albania*, Sali Berisha's government has been relatively moderate on the issue of its minorities in Kossovo and Macedonia, not encouraging extremist leaders.
Should *Macedonia* reach a compromise with Greece on the name and the flag and treat properly its large Albanian minority, its sovereignty would certainly be strengthened. The very existence of this new Balkan state

solves more problems than it creates. In this way it can become a stabilizing factor in the Balkans.

Wishful thinking as it may seem, a series of bilateral reconciliations between historical rivals must take place. The evident model has been provided by France and Germany after the Second World War. Serbia and Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey are expecting their De Gaules and Adenauers.

The role of the European institutions of integration

Romania, Bulgaria and Albania have clearly identified as their national goals accession to EU, WEU and NATO, the former two being eligible in the foreseeable future. Bulgarian and Romanian membership would undoubtedly enhance the prospects for peace in the region by making their political elites feel and behave responsibly. The region needs badly countries which can serve as success models, as a reference point for those who believe that the Balkans are not doomed.

SPREADING PEACE EASTWARD
THE EXPANSION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY COMMUNITY
(A research project of the Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union)

Chapter 4

CIVIL SOCIETY AND SECURITY AFTER COMMUNISM

Civil society had a strategic role in the collapse of totalitarian democracy, in the end of communism . namely the development of alternative movements from below, the grassroots activism that inspired the ethos of Solidarity in Poland, Charter 77 in Czekoslovakia, the Hungarian Democratic Opposition, and the crucial role of intellectuals in undermining the official ideological dogmas. The vision of the parallel *polis* and the rediscovery of the public sphere functioned as the psychological ingredient needed for the creation of a political (revolutionary) subject, who was able to perform the role of an independent actor. Now, there is much more room for this political actor in its confrontation with the old enemy and with new ones. As no revolution succeeded ever in the complete destruction of the ancient regime (the myth of total revolution), there are still different reminiscences of the communist regime. However, transition has its own inconveniences, which civil society have to face.

But the role of civil society was not the same everywhere (it was essential in Poland, Czekoslovakia, Hungary; it was minimal or even absent in Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, the former Soviet republics). It has to be shown in this chaptei that there are still some differences and why. But the question of civil society and strategy should not be addressed without some precautions.

If the concept of a security-community refers not to an institutionalized community of states, but simply to a region in which war is no longer contemplated as a possible way of resolving inter-state disputes, a community " in which there is a real assurance that the members of that community will not fight the each other physically, but will settle their dispute in some other way", then it is mandatory to explicit a kind of *a new "social contract"*. This is a more realistic approach than the idea of "the consolidation of liberal democracy as the sole form of government in the region". Anyway, there is a certain possibility of promoting a complete set of liberal-democratic set of habits and procedures in East and Central Europe : the region ought to be integrated in a web of complex networks of political and economic cooperation and interdependence among all of the states, and *the character of rules and procedures of this cooperation and interdependence have to be liberal-democratic.*

Strategies of integration

The history of these countries have been always dictated from outside. Their political fate was at least in two major occasions decided by geopolitics and wars (WW I &II). Both of those wars and also their outcomes were decided by the political will of the European and American powers and superpowers. If those powers, and particularly

Western Europe wants peace now, this is also a question of political will. It should be noticed that at least in some of these countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, the Baltic states), the practice of association with the European Community was more effective than the national or local democratic forces, than the opposition in promoting democracy in the region. For that reason, any gradualist approach is wrong. For other reasons (see below), the immediate integration strategy is a worthless risk. Therefore, **the strategy of integration should be dualistic** : *immediate* on any procedures able to force or determine East-Europeans governments to comply the rules of the international community, and particularly of the European community ; *gradualist* on any procedures that would endanger or expose the European community at risks.

The effort for security-community has to take into consideration the geopolitical and military aspects of the problem. A high degree of security integration is impossible without a serious analyse of the military doctrines of the states of Central and Easr Europe, and of Russia. After losing its superpower status and imperial hegemony, Russia is trying hard now to reconstitute herself as hegemon in the former Soviet space, and as a player in areas of traditional Russian interest, such as the former communist states from Eastern Europe. Boris Yeltsin and Andrei Kozyrev are the architects of the reborn Russian spheres of influence. Actually, in the Russian foreign policy there is a tendency of reversing the Clausewitzian pattern of the relation politics-army (the traditional principle says that war is a continuation with military means of the politics) : *policy is a continuation of the military doctrine*. The draft of the new Russian military doctrines (as well as studies published by Russian authors abroad) defines "Russian national interest" as being imposed by its huge geopolitical stature, which gives Russia a base for claiming that everything happening between Atlantic and Pacific it's her concern. The last two years showed how close followed the Russsian policy-makers the guidelines formulated by the geostrategists who conceived the draft of the new Russian military doctrine.[1]

The expansion of the European security community eastwards is not just a simple geopolitical and economical process. The whole process depends on two ambiguous developments : the consolidation of democratic institutions and that of the civil societies. Political scientists have tried to make analogies between the transition from authoritarian regimes to democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe.[2] But despite simmilarities, there are significant differences.

Varieties of civil society

Geopolitics and the rise and fall of empires, great powers, superpowers, political regimes and ideologies have essential influences on civil society. For that reason, East and

[1] the arguments for this thesis are elaborated in Dan Pavel. "New Leviathan. Nationalist Imperialism, Radical Strategy and Morality", in *Sfera Politicii*, nr. 14. 1994.

[2] (For transition from authoritarian regimes, see Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds.) *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Prospects for Democracy* (Baltimore and London : The John Hopkins University Press, 1986) and Geoffrey Pridham (ed.), *Securing Democracy. Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Eu rope (London and New* York : Routledge, 1990).

Central Europe is not only a space of geopolitical confrontation, but also a confrontationbetween different patterns of civil society : a liberal and democratic civil society and a xenophobic, nationalist, anti-semitic and tyrranical civil society [3]. Even the civil society in the East-European modern liberal sense, as was conceived by the generation of dissent and opposition in Poland, Czekoslovakia and Hungary, was different. As G.M. Tamas wrote [4], the idea of civil society in Western Europe, as was conceived by Locke, the Scottish Enlightenment, Burke. Hegel and Tocqueville was *political* : because in the liberal state. "where the power of the state, compared to its absolutist historical precedent. is inordinately weak", the civic order "cannot be sustained without the activity of the citizens". In Eastern Europe the idea of civil society was *anti-political* : because "the crushing preponjderance. the all-pervasive omnipresence of the police state, central plannig, capricious autocracy and the rest." the notion of civil society "was pitched *against* the state."

After the collapse of communism, the anti-institutionalist idea of civil society took different courses : in Poland. Hungary and the Czech Republic, the former dissent movement entered in politics. involved in elections and government. so the civil society became a partner for the state and its institutions; in Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, the former Soviet republics, and even Bulgaria, the liberal idea of civil society is still against the state, and particularly against people within government and bussines coming from *nomenklatura* and the former secret police, being an ally for the democratic political parties of the opposition. In the first case. there is an integrated civil society, in the second case, a dissenting civil society The problem in countries like Romania, Serbia, Slovakia. Bulgaria and the former soviet republics is that the part of civic society which is the natural ally of forces in power, which are encouraging, sincerely or demagoguelly its populist, xenophobic, nationalist, anti-semitic. anti-Western, and anti-capitalist tendencies. There are tensions not only between democrats and fundamentalists. but also between pre-modern anxieties (xenophobic, anti-capitalist and anti-Western movements) and post-modern expectations (an exaggerated belief in the all-powerful. almost magic effects of liberal reform, actually a naive liberalist "religion")[5]. From a geopolitical point of view, the danger is that the nationalist and anti-Western part of the civil society can be manimulated by Russia. in its attempt to reconstitute herself as hegemon. in accordance with the "Russian national interest", as it is defined in the draft of the new military doctrine.

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[3](see Tocqueville's concept of "tyranny of majority" or Adam Ferguson's warning, in An Essay on the History of Civil Society. about the danger that the civil society of his time was preparing the ground for despotism. As John Keane stresses. in "Despotism and Democracy. the Origins and Development of the Distinction between Civil Society and the State, 1750-1850". in John Keane. ed., *Civil Society and the State. New European Perspectives (London : Verso. 1988)*. Ferguson advocated a new type of civil society as the way to avoid this)

[4](in "The legacy of dissent. How civil society has been seduced by the cult of privacy", in *Times Literary Supplement. May 14, 1993*)

[5](see Peter Heltai and Zbigniew Rau. "From Nationalism to Civil Society, and Tolerance", in Zbigniew Rau. ed.. *The Reemergence of Civil Society in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (Boulder, Colorado : Westview Press, 1992). pp.129-145: also Adam Seligman, *The Idea of Civil Society* (New York : The Free Press, 1992)

The consequences for the strategy of encouraging the role of civic society in the expansion of peace, democracy and security eastwards would be different :

- an important part of the effort of Western Europe has to be directed for attracting the populist, xenophobic, nationalist, anti-semitic, anti-Western and anti-capitalist tendencies of the civil society in regional and European projects, in direct reletions with Western and other East-European countries. Those people and groups lived for years in isolation and pauperity. They have to travel and discover the "others", the foreigners", they have to find out that they are Europeans and what that means. It is a peculiar fact that xenophobic attitudes are limited mostly against neighbouring ethnic populations or individuals, not against western nations or individuals. A prove for this is that there is no racism among the population (excepting groups of *skin-heads*, which are a problem also in the West);

- the anti-institutionalist, but liberal part of the civil society must be won as partisan of European integration, as supporter for the institutions of CEE, NATO, etc. As it is already happening, the diversity of civic organizations, NGO must be encouraged in national and international projects in cooperation with Western NGO and governments;

- in order to display an efficient strategy to counter the anti-institutionalist and anti-procedural tendencies of the liberal part of civil society, and the nationalist tendencies of the anti-Western part of the civil society, another essential effort of Western Europe has to be focused on modifying the ambiguous way those governments are administrating the powers of the state. So, it must be a priority for the integration of the legislations of those countries within CEE, on imposing Western standards of liberal democracy on those governments, and on controling the concrete way those governments are respecting their commitments.

Even after a long time the empires and powers dominating the area dismantled, their effects on civil society lasted, without being insurmontable barriers for a liberal democratic civil society :

- there is an evident difference between the legacies of the Habsburg Empire and the Ottoman Empire; one consequence of it lays in the way those countries entered post-communism. In Central Europe, institutions were founded upon a western concept of law and individual rights; civil society was pretty strong. In Southern and Eastern Europe, civil society was underdeveloped and extremely fragile. Inside the communist bloc, in central-european countries, the awakening of the civil society was palpable in the activity of dissent and opposition; in Eastern Europeans countries the repression was wild enough to disrupt the continuity between the former civil society and the would be new civil society;

- the former difference between civil societies increased in the way those societies respondet to communism. Now, the cleavage within the region is also determined by the response to the past: Central-European countries had completely broken with the communist system and their former communist parties changed not only the names but also habits and it seems they have converted to the values of democracy, some of them succeding to win power by democratic elections (in Hungary and Poland) (this is the "test of irreversible democratization", how American political scientist Samuel Huntington called it); in Southern Europeans countries, the former communist parties managed to survive the first revolutionary shock, and remained somewhere in the middle

of the road between communism and democracy (Romania, Serbia, Bulgaria)[6]. There is a serious chance for changing these patterns through the international aspects of democratization. As Michael Bernhard pointed out, "civil society can coexist with milder forms of authoritarianism and thus the existence of a civil society in itself is not a sufficient condition for democracy"[7]. Being "a necessary condition for democratic government", civil society must be supported, but only in conjunction with a strong help for political democratization and market-oriented economical reform. At all of these levels, there is a special opportunity for the international and European community to intervene.

Defeat & Ambiguity

Historically, America's "most memorable experiences of promoting democracy overseas took place at the end of successful wars (1898, 1918, 1945) when, of course, international forces were in a position to overwhelm domestic political tendencies"[8]. Whitehead points out that in the experiences of Latin America and Southern Europe, where the transitions or potential transitions took place after 1945 and in conditions of peace, "one very important variant of <<democratization>>, namely, the case of impositionby conquest" was excluded. The variant of <<democratization>> for Eastern Europe is *imposition by defeat*. It was defeat in Cold War that provoked the collapse of Soviet communism. But here it is an ambiguity : for the liberal part of civil society the collapse of communis. both within party, government, military, secret police, and a considerable part of the population, the collapse of communism is perceived as a defeat. But the latter is a minority in civil society. Even if nostalgics of communism are still in the government, they never play the Russian or Soviet cared, but only the card of national-communism.

The civic society is the place of confrontation between different, contradictory tendencies. Even if it was under bad influences, East European civil society, despite significant differences among countries. had enough force to reject evil influences of tyrants, empires. foreign armies. ideologies, repression. totalitarianism. It is also a complex reality, with a variety of tendencies. It will be an intellectual error to take as a basis for policy-making some preconceived dogmas about East-European civil society. Such a prejudice was was, unfortunately, exposed by Samuel Huntington, in his celebrated essay "Will Civilazations Clash?". There is much debate now in Eastern europe about it. The map Huntington draws there (which, for example, divide Romania in two parts) put apart the Western Christianity and the Slav Orthodox Christianity. Even from a cultural point of view, this line is ignoring the reality : not all the Orthodox Christians are Slavs (Romanians aren't, as well as the Greeks); not all the Slavs are Orthodox (Croats, Poles, Slovenes. Czechs. Slovaks. a lot of Ukrainians are Catholics); not all the Romanians are Orthodox (in Transylvania, a large segment of the Romanians are Eastern Catholics, but

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[6](see Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Reinventing Politics. Eastern Europe from Stalin to Havel* (New York : The Free Press. 1992))

[7] (Michael Bernhard. "Civil Society and Democratic Transition in East Central Europe", in *Political Science Quarterly*, volume 108. N. 2, 1993, pp.307-326)

[8] (Lawrence Whitehead. "International Aspects of Democratization", in O'Donnell. Schmitter. and Whitehead. *op. cit.*, part III. *Comparative Perspectives*, p.3)

even so the majority of the population is Orthodox); for a variety of reasons, most of the East-Europeans are anti-Russians. From a moral point of view, you can not built something on negative, xenophobic reactions. But from the point of view of Realpolitik, these attitudes has to be taken into account . Anyway. Westerner are taking them into account when they are looking at anti-Western attitudes in Eastern Europe. The reality of civic society is that the legacies of Russian Empire and   of Soviet communism left in Eastern Europe a deep, entrenched, and radical anti-Russian sentiment. The Western values of liberal democracy have a strong appeal for most of the population ; the freedom to travel highly increased the admiration for Western Europe and motivated the civil society, as well as the political elites to be considered a natural part of the Europe.

The degree liberal democracy is established can be determined by taking into accout how communist political elites evolved and how civil society respondet. In Hungary and Poland, where the former communists came democratically to power, by free elections, liberal democracy came closer by Western standards. Also, the Czech Republic. But the criteria of communist come-back means something else in Slovakia and Latvia. There, as well as in the countries with entrenched former communist elites in central and local administration (Romania, the Baltics, or even in countries where the "democratic opposition" came to power, as in Bulgaria, Albania), liberal democracy is still an ideal.

The problem with the regional bureaucrats and politicians is that they learned "double speech" during communism : in the new context of European integration, they already developed the cooperative reflex, the habitual and stuctured practice of consultation and cooperation with other European governments - a visible fact in diplomatic and intergovernmental relations. But, on the other hand, when it comes to translate into internal terms the principles of integration, those politicians and regional bureaucrats speak another language. There are a lot of examples. Romania's commitment for association and after for membership in the European Union has to be proven by the gradual harmonization of Romanian legislation to thje European standards. This is a difficil process, but you don't need at least a generation before you can safely bring a country into the security community. By close assistance, controle and serious adjustment from Western Europe, most of the East Europeans countries can "catch-up" socio-political development. An European-adjusted legislation and a single European free market would definitively change the balance within civil society and the state in favor of liberal democracy.

The first changes needed to foster a closer cooperation of East_European governments with the other governments have to be taken inside the strategy for integration Western Europe adopted. The limits of expansion eastwards will be the Western limits for Russian interests. The prority given to Visegrad group (the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, with Slovakia being gently pushed outside), will leave the former communist states in a vacuum, at the disposition of Russia's national interest. With Russian pressure, with Western self-limiting integration, and with a strong determination for social and political stability, the only chance for the countries from Romania to the Baltics will be a nationalist option, an open space for reviving the legacies of Versailles, national forms of fascism and communism, for searching other international ties (with Turkey and Black Sea countries, with Middle East, which would open a huge opportunities space for Turkish-Arabic bussiness and Islamic fundementalism; with China,

Japan and other East-Asian countries: with USA, which is sometimes perceived as a more determined partner, at least in bussiness). But the point is that civil society has a strong commitment for European integration and Western liberal democratic values. In an unpublished yet report, realized by IRSOP (the Romanian Institute for Public Opinion, in Bucharest)for MAE (The Romanian Ministry for Foreign Relations), called "The public Image on International Climate and Romanian Foreign Policy", more than three quarters of the Romanian population perceived favorably the European Union and NATO, and perceived Russia as a threat ".

The tridimensional model

There is a pragmatic dimension of Western expansion eastwards, which can be measured sociologically : non-governmental organizations (NGO). There is a flow of NGO in Eastern Europe. a lot of them are officially registered. but a lot of others are informal (in Romania, there are more than 6,000, estimated NGO - because there are several ways of official registration - many of them have been sponsored by Western foundations; less than 1,000 NGO have a continuous activity, and less than 200 have a serious activity. measurable and accountable on Western standards). In conclusion, the activity of NGO is not yet easy to measure, but their presence increased in the civil society. Of course. there are also the Western NGO (International Foundation for Electoral Systems. Institut for Democracy in Estern Europe, Soros Foundation, National Forum Foundation and so on), mostly American, with a powerful impact on civil society and individuals. whose activities can be measured and evaluated. I haven't read yet any general report or evaluation neither on Estern European , nor on Western NGO operating in Estern Europe. Maybe. the only comprehensive report is on trade unions[10] , but the conclusion is that trade unionism is losing ground everywhere in Eastern Europe. But NGO are growing in number and influence on a variety of social, economic, cultural and political issues.

One of the most important dangers for democracy is not communist survivors and nostalgics. but the convergence between"wild capitalism" and "the emerging Mafia state". As Claire Sterling showed. Russia's mob has a growing power, which consists of "5,000 gangs and 3 million people who work for or with them". its reach "extends into allfifteen of the former Soviet republics, across eleven time zones and one-sixth of the earth's land mass. It intrudes into every field of Western concern : the nascent free market, privatization, disarmament. military conversion. foreign humanitarian relief and financial aid, even state reserves of currency and gold. And it has begun to creep toward the rest of Europe and the United States"[11]. According to some reports, this mafia controls a lot from the privatized enterorises (40,000). shops. storehouses. depots, services, hotels, and "collects protection money from 80 percent of the country's banks and private

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[9](after publication. I willquote in a later study the exact figures and other statistics)
[10](see "The Ressurection of Trade Unions in Eastern Europe". Central European University, coordinated by Kenneth Murphy. together with Roman Frydman and Andrej Rapaczynsky, conducted in Belarus, Bulgaria. Czech Republic. Estonia. Hungary. Letonia. Latvia. Macedonia. Poland. Romania. Russia, Ukraine)
[11] (see Claire Sterling. "Redfellas". *The New Republic*. April 11. 1974)

enterprises". At a smaller size. the phenomenon is present all along Eastern Europe, in conjunction with privatized former bureaucrats and secret service agents. Cohen and Arato pointed out that the spontaneous forces of capitalist market economy can be a serious danger for social justice. solidarity. and autonomy. a danger as big as the administrative power of the modern state. For Cohen and Arato only a concept which makes a careful distinction between the spheres of economy and the one of cuvil society can be the bulk of a critical theory both in the societies with a highly developed autonomous logic of the market economy, and the developing societies. So, only a tridimensional theoretical model (following Talcot Parsons and Antonio Gramsci) **state - economy - civil society** would give civil society the chance of playing a crucial role [12]. I would not enter into the theoretical debate on how the concept of civil society was the foundation for designing normative projects for liberalizatio and democratization. I want only to stress that Western support for civil society and NGO should not follow this distinction and encourage the autonomy of civil society. The consequence for integration would not be a direct involvement into the state relatioan with the mob-former secret services control of market economy. but rather on fair and legal practices of market economy, respecting Western standards: West European support for an autonomous civil society would not go to NGO controlled by the state. political parties. mob-former secret services economic interests. but for the NGO promoting individual rights, legality, pluralism. free initiative. This will make civil society a complex mediator inrelations with the state and the economy. rather than an antagonist, as it happens in EasternEurope (and it should happen when the mediation works).

Laurence Whitehead gave some insightful comments on the "international aspects of democratization" : one of them is that most successful "democratizations" are those from within, not the exported ones [13]. But for the countries where historical fate and policy-making were determined always by"export" or international context. it is crucialto encourage "democratization" and civil society from within with international support. Otherwise. civil society would be encouraged or pushed toward nationalism and radicalism. In Romania. the Baltics. Bulgaria. albania. Belarus, Moldova. Ukraine. Russia, liberal democratic civil society is deeply involved in a powerful struggle with central & local administration. mob-former secret services controlled privatized economy, nationalist civil society and radical. populist parties. In some of the cases. the only support comes from outside. As analysts pointed out. the historical role of civil society in fostering liberal democracy is still a chapter to be written.

Pathological and normal science methodology

Following Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter's warning about the inappropriateness of "normal science methodology" in "rapidly changing situations", I would stress some political and geopolitical consequences of theoretical distinctions (to follow in a later version of the chapter)

Dan Pavel

[12]< see Jean L. Cohen. Andrew Arato. *Civil Society and Political Theory* (Cambridge. Massachusstes : Massachussets Institute of Technology Press. 1992)>
[13](Whitehead. *op.cit.*.)

THE EXPANSION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY COMMUNITY:
LIMITS AND OPPORTUNITIES
(THE BALTIC PERSPECTIVE)

by Andris Ozoliņš

Since the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815, there have been five different international systems, corresponding to five different distributions of power and influence in international relations[1]. Today we are on the threshold of a new world order. Such periods of transition contain risks, but they also have always offered opportunities for new, constructive solutions solutions to international and national problems, especially from the perspective of those countries which remained dissatisfied by the artificial stability created by the previous world order.

The Baltic states have twice seized the opportunity during the 20th century. They gained their independence in 1918, at the close of World War I, and reinstated it in 1991, on the eve of the collapse of the Soviet empire. The present period of transition, when the elements of the international system have not yet crystallized in a set pattern, offers a unique opportunity for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, like many other Central and Eastern European nations, to assume a position in the European security structure which would secure their statehood on a permanent basis.

European security is currently no longer endangered by a potential conflict centered on the territory of Germany. Instead, Europe in the 1990s is threatened by two other "arcs of crisis". One arc is made up of the band of instability and uncertainty which exists between Germany, Northern Europe and Russia. It extends through Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia to the South. A second arc is the Southern one, including Northern Africa, the Mediterranean, and parts of the Middle East and Southwest Asia (see Asmus 1993: 29).

Most Central European countries believe that the only way to escape these arcs of crisis and to achieve the desired level of security is to achieve full political, economic and military integration into the West European order and its institutions, in order to become vested members of the European security community.

The background or context for these Central and Eastern European desires can be divided into three levels[2]:

• The level East-East, characterized by the threat of conflict which has taken the place of the earlier East-West conflict.

Statistical research has given evidence that Europe is one of the regions of the world with the highest number of conflicts. Most of these are waged in Eastern Europe. Jeffrey Simon of the U.S. National Strategic Research Institute has stated that many Western countries view Central and Eastern Europe as a security nightmare, shot through with religious, political, economic and ethnic hatred (Simon 1993: 21). This comparison seems somewhat

exaggerated, but only until we consider the war and heartlessness which have ravaged the former Yugoslavia.

East-East conflicts, which usually are based in national disputes, have created a new feeling of insecurity in the states of the region. The future effect of this feeling can be described as a security dilemma[3], one which can lead to the transformation of ethnic conflicts into armed, international conflicts.

• The level West-West, where there is a challenge of coherence. Upon the indirect defeat of the former enemy, the Western countries have lost one of the most important unifying aspects of the past.

In 1993, *Foreign Affairs* carried an article with the pretentious and symptomatic title, "The Collapse of the West". Author Owen Harries believes that the premise on which the "West" (meaning here a political and military union) can continue to exist is fairly doubtful. He believes that the concept "West" is not a natural one, but rather could survive only while there existed a necessary precondition for its existence - the "East" with its threatening and hostile character. The West is here seen as the creation of danger and fear. Even though most of the countries of the region have a common culture, history, political value system, and institutions, common civilization does not necessarily lead to political unity. The common values, for example, did not keep the West from fighting literally dozens of internecine wars in the period before the Cold War (Harries 1993). The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany signaled the end of the Cold War.

Even though at first Harries' line of thinking may seem nothing more than colorful and baseless futurology. Events in the early 1990s, however, have demonstrated that his argument is not entirely without merit. The Western countries have begun to review their interests under a new set of circumstances. One set of nations finds itself more worried about developments in the East, while others are more absorbed in events in the southern "periphery". In the war of former Yugoslavia, too, different Western countries sympathized with different parties to the conflict. The "under-the-table" activities of the Western countries are thus often aimed in different directions, creating greater or lesser tension and, ultimately, a split among allies.

• The level East-West, characterized by a challenge of cooperation. When the Iron Curtain fell, and the Soviet armed forces left most of Central and Eastern Europe, politicians and analysts, understanding the fragile security situation of nations in the region (not just militarily, but also in terms of politics, economics and institutional considerations), began an active foreign policy and diplomatic lobbying effort to fully integrate these countries into Western security structures. One of the goals of this effort was to avert a "security vacuum" in the region.

The term "security vacuum" gained broad currency in 1991 after it had been used several times by the Czechoslovakian president, Vaclav Havel, to describe the region's underde-

veloped democratic structures, weak economies, conflicting ethnic policies, potentially threatening relations with Russia, and inadequate connection with international structures. Many analysts doubt the metaphor inherent in the phrase and suggest that the region's security situation is more of a "pre-vacuum". They point to a number of bilateral and multilateral security-related agreements to which Central European nations are party (Frost 1993), but most agree with the core of Havel's phrase and believe that serious work must be done in achieving functional and possibly also institutional integration of these and other countries in the region into the European security structures.

Many politicians and analysts believe that the problems of the first two of these levels (East-East and West-West) can be resolved by uniting them with the third level, I.e., waging broad cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Some, like Jeffrey Simon, go even further to argue that in the case of NATO, "the resolution to the problems lies in merging them: NATO must expand its mission and include the states of Central and Eastern Europe" (Simon 1993: 21).

What are the most important arguments with which voices in Europe and especially in the Baltic Republics are seeking the expansion of the European security community, including the broadening of the scope of the Washington Treaty and the Brussels Treaty?

Arguments for expansion

1. The realist argument: The security vacuum in Central Europe will not last long. If the countries of the region do not achieve a reliable security shield in the near future, they may fall under the domination of other nations, probably ones with external or domestic policies which are reactionary and hostile to the West. In that case, the East's victory over communism and the West's victory in the Cold War will be short-lived. Resources which were invested in achieving these victories will be lost, and the West will find itself before a new East-West conflict (Andersen & Skak 1993). Central and Eastern European states, in turn, will partly or fully lose their newly won sovereignty.

The region's geopolitical situation, the experience of history, and the political rhetoric of leading contemporary politicians in Russia all combine to make this the most commonly used argument in the Baltic States. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are small countries located next to a great power, one which over the last two centuries has always tried to dominate in the region. Baltic independence lasted for a scant twenty years before the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (23 August 1939) led to the incorporation of the three countries in the Soviet Union in 1940. Present-day Russia is again advancing arguments about its special interests throughout the post-Soviet space and seeking rights to place Russian peacekeeping missions in the ex-Soviet Union[4].

2. The idealist argument: The Western countries and their organizations must facilitate the development of democracy, liberalism and free-market economic policies in Central

and Eastern Europe. This will not happen if the Central . . . . . m European countries remain uncertain about their security and if they are always threatened with becoming drawn into ethnic conflicts or subjected to direct military attack. Participation in Western institutions should not be seen as a prize for achieved stability and democracy, but rather a tool with which to reach these qualities.

Both idealists and realists point to Germany to bolster their argument, saying that the inclusion of the country in NATO, the European Union, the Western European Union, the Council of Europe, and other postwar organizations led to wise and favorable German policies after World War II (unlike the period after World War I) and helped to ensure Germany's development along the path of democracy and liberalism. The Baltic States also point to Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey in the same general vein.

3. The moral argument: The leading Western countries are morally liable for the half century of damage visited upon many European nations by the Yalta agreement and other deals with the Soviet U . . Therefore they must be open and forthcoming in their present-day policies, in order to expiate their guilt.

This argument, too, is often heard in the Baltic countries, especially among opposition politicians. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, like all of Central Europe, were fully independent states before World War II, and members of the League of Nations. The shady deals of the late 1930s and early 1940s led not just to the limited encroachment upon sovereignty which was visited on a number of other countries, but a completely destroyed chance of reestablishing independence after the war[5]. As a result a certain expression of insult and past harm is much more prominent in the thinking of some Baltic politicians than it is in their colleagues in Central Europe[6].

4. The time argument: This includes several considerations:

a) The European security community must be broadened institutionally before events in other parts of the region have not gone the way of the former Yugoslavia, because halting a conflict which has already begun is much more expensive (both in terms of resources and lost lives) and complicated than preventing the onset of conflict in the first place.

b) The Western security institutions must be broadened now, while Russia is not expressly hostile to such a step, even though the most opportune moment has already been lost. If reactionary forces take power in Russia, broadening of Western institutions might lead to aggressive counter-efforts. (These considerations are described in greater detail in the chapter on the Russian approach.)

The first of these considerations is more frequently cited by Western politicians and analysts, while the second has gained more currency among Central Europeans. The Baltic States, possibly sensing that they are not yet ready for de jure incorporation into the Western security institutions, have promoted this argument less frequently.

In my view these are the most significant arguments among those used in the West and

in Central Europe to promote the expansion of European security structures. Also deserving of consideration is a thought which the West tends to state with respect to NATO and which is also supported with a degree of self-interest by Central Europe. The argument is that the broadening of NATO is the only way for that organization to overcome its crisis of identity. The argument has emerged from the situation in which NATO has found itself at the end of the Cold War. Absent <u>direct</u> military threat and a definite external opponent, the very question of whether there is a reason for the alliance to exist comes to the fore. There has been much comment of a skeptical nature about the significance and future of NATO: Robert Keohane has written that if the body of analytical writings is to be believed, then NATO has stood on the doorstep of despair and destruction for the last 35 years (Keohane 1987: 169). But Glenn Snyder was right in offering the following argument against NATO's collapse in the mid-1980s: "... those who see the current NATO crisis as a sign of its possible demise, have confused the cause with the effect. ... NATO is the product of a systemic, bipolar structure, and it cannot collapse or change fundamentally until the structure has changed" (Snyder 1984: 494-495). Snyder calls this "a structural guarantee against disintegration". In the 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact, and the weakening of Russia, the structural guarantee has disappeared.

Before looking at the other side of the coin - arguments most often used to support a position against the broadening of the European security community - I believe it useful to briefly review Baltic experiences in developing relations with NATO and the European Union.

The Baltic states:
From neutrality to counter-alliance

Between 1989 and 1991, when Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were waging their battle for restored independence, the idea of Baltic neutrality was widely spread and popular. Soon after independence was regained, however, the neutrality concept was abandoned in all three nations as unjustified and unsatisfactory in light of Baltic security requirements. Neutrality was not seen as a satisfactory basis for security, and moreover, neutrality would involve a commitment that the Baltic states would never join alliances or allow foreign forces on their territory. In addition, there was growing uncertainty, and not just in the Baltic region, about what exactly neutrality meant in an age when East-West confrontation had diminished.

The deciding factor in rejecting neutrality, however, was played by the historical memory of the events which had led to the demise of Baltic independence in 1940 - a time when Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were all pursuing policies of neutrality.

In the place of neutrality, all three Baltic states have preferred and tried to pursue a strategy of counter-alliance. This has been the case since August 1991, when the formal

independence of the three republics was achieved. The goal of the three states has been full political, economic and military integration into the West European order and institutions. An implicit, sometimes vaguely formulated, but overriding concern behind the policy of integration has been to establish as close a cooperation with the West as possible in order to counterbalance Russia's influence.

Why did Baltic politicians view this counterbalance as necessary? If we look at a map of Europe, it becomes evident, that even if the Baltic states achieve their goals of integration, they will at best become a province of the European Union (or a province of a province, where the basic province is the Nordic countries) and a frontier zone of NATO. If, however, they manage to establish good neighborly relations with Russia, which in turn becomes integrated into European institutions and becomes part of the European security community, then the Baltic republics could take a relatively central, safe and economically advantageous place in Europe. To Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians, however, long-held and common experience dictates that this vision of the future seems analogous to Gorbachev's utopian dream of a common European home - desirable but unrealistic. This is equally true of less experienced Baltic politicians.

Russia's integration in Europe, whether we desire it or not, is not realistic because, as Konrad Adenauer once said somewhat cynically, Russia is too big, too poor, and too Asiatic. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev has formulated the situation more diplomatically: "It is more difficult for an elephant like Russia to get through the door than for a small poodle"[7].

The Baltic states feel that Russia poses two types of implicit threat. One stems from an aggressive Russia with an expansionist foreign policy based in nationalist/Slavophile sentiments. Such a Russia would be governed by a mixture of Russian chauvinists and former communists. Another type of threat stems from the possibility of extensive civil unrest or civil wars in Russia and neighboring countries. The results of Russia's 1993 elections, and especially the development of events in the Transcaucasus, Central Asia, Moldova and Ukraine, show that Baltic fears are not unjustified. Therefore, in order to seek opportunities to broaden their security, the Balts first and foremost turned to two key elements in the European security architecture - the Atlantic Alliance and the overall process of European integration as manifested in the EU and the WEU.

The Atlantic Alliance is widely regarded in the "former Eastern Europe" as the most successful of all security organizations, and this view is shared in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as well. By the beginning of 1992, all three Baltic states had informally but resolutely expressed an interest in joining NATO. Two possibilities were considered - full membership, or else some form of security guarantee of their independence.

But the West and NATO were far less enthusiastic about these ideas than were Baltic politicians. Although some NATO officials (e.g., Gen. Brian Kenney, who visited the

Baltics in 1992 while serving as deputy commander of NATO's allied forces in Europe) have foreseen eventual NATO membership for the Baltic states, it is always added that this will not occur as rapidly as many Balts hope[8]. The late NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner said in a March 1992 visit to Latvia that "although we don't exclude future membership ... it is not on the agenda"[9].

NATO has not changed this position with respect to the Baltic states since 1992, and even in the latter months of 1994, when talk has again arisen about the expansion of NATO, the Baltic states are hardly mentioned at all.

As far as the European Union is concerned, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have all expressed the will to become member states, but a painful defeat was experienced in 1993. After agreements on trade, commercial and economic cooperation between what was then still the European Community and the Balts came into effect on 1 February 1993 (they had been signed in May 1992), the Balts felt that the time was ripe to begin negotiating association agreements with the EC. In June 1993, meeting under the aegis of the Baltic States' Council in Jūrmala, Latvia, the presidents of all three Baltic republics signed a statement calling on EC member countries to start negotiations concerning the granting of EC associate member status to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania[33]. The European Council responded on June 21 and 22 with a resolution charging the EC Commission with the task of preparing proposals for a free trade agreement with the Baltic states. The refusal of the EC's Copenhagen Summit to start negotiations on association agreements was never fully explained and thus remained broadly misunderstood among Baltic policy makers and analysts, especially given the fact that the EC had concluded association agreements with Romania and Bulgaria at the beginning of the year.

These events serve to show that after their initial successes[34], the Balts learned in the second half of 1992 and throughout 1993 that there would be no more quick victories in the international arena and that the goals set by Baltic politicians in terms of "high politics" would not be reached as easily. It can be noted that in this respect, the three Baltic republics are no exception when one considers Central and Eastern Europe as a whole. Thus it is worthwhile considering the arguments which have been presented against the idea of broadening the European security community.

Arguments against expansion

1) The Russian argument. Concrete steps toward broadening (especially in terms of expanding the zone of operations of the Washington Treaty and the Brussels Treaty) the European security community at a time when there are no real threats against the security of NATO member countries, nor against that of Eastern and Central Europe, would provoke Russia and as a result, reduce rather than increase the security level in Europe. Supporters

of this view have argued that European security is guaranteed not by an increase in the number of states participating in NATO and other security institutions, but rather by the development of new, strategic partner relations in Europe.

I believe the "Russian argument" has had an enormous influence on the discussion which has surrounded this matter and has in fact carried the day in decisions which have been taken in this respect. For this reason, I have chosen to treat the problem in further detail elsewhere in this article, in a separate section.

2) The stuck-in-a-rut argument. Ethnic disputes and conflicts, territorial demands and political instability in Central and Eastern Europe might draw an unwilling West into conflict resolution situations which are heavy, "inconvenient", and uncharacteristic for Western countries.

The minority question is one of the most complex in Central and Eastern Europe. Hungarian political scientist Ferenc Gazdag has written that a historic feature of the region lying East of Germany and West and South of Russia is the presence of numerous ethnic minorities. To a certain extent this also applies to the Baltic states, where the proportion of Russians is sizeable, especially in Estonia (30% of the total population) and Latvia (33%).

It is important to understand, however, that these are not historical minorities in the Baltic republics, but rather the result of a planned, systematic action which began along with the annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1940. During the 1940s, the pre-war Latvian population was reduced by about 35% by death, Soviet or Nazi deportation, or flight to the West. Estonia and Lithuania experienced similar indicators. Vacated apartments were settled with soldiers and workers transferred from the Soviet Union. Since the Soviet occupation, the Russian-speaking population of Latvia has grown from 12% to 42%, in Estonia from 8% to 35%, and in Lithuania from 2.5% to 12%.

This Baltic experience does not exactly facilitate inter-ethnic harmony, but there is also no basis for charges from the Moscow that "mass violations of human rights" and "discrimination against ethnic Russians" are occurring. This has been shown by rapporteurs from the Council of Europe, by fact-finding missions from the United Nations and by the CSCE high commissioner on national minorities. Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt has written in *Foreign Affairs* that "given the brutal history of occupation and deportation, the smoothness of relations between native Estonians or Latvians and Russian immigrants is surprising" (Bildt 1994: 81). This observation has been confirmed by authoritative public opinion polls. Results published by the RFE/RL *Research Report* that more than 60% of Latvian residents, including both ethnic Latvians and Russian speakers, view inter-ethnic relations in Latvia as good or normal, while only one third of the population views them as poor (Rose 1994).

Territorial disputes and conflicts throughout the world have always been among those which last longest and are most difficult to resolve. There are unresolved territorial issues between Estonia and Russia and between Latvia and Russia which will continue to create

uncertainty in relations among these countries for some years to come.

Almost immediately after the second occupation of Estonia in September 1944, the Estonian government proceeded to carve up Estonia's territory, attaching the trans-Narva part of the Viru district and most of Petseri district to the *oblasts* of Leningrad and Pskov, respectively. Both territories became component parts of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. On 15 January 1947, the Supreme Council issued a decree taking over some 2,449 square miles of Estonian territory, amounting to some 5% of Estonia's pre-war area and including approximately 6% of the country's population. Latvia suffered smaller losses. About 1,201 square kilometers (746 square miles) were lost, containing approximately 52,000 Latvian inhabitants. This amounted to approximately 2% of the pre-war territory and population. In the 1990s, the matter of lost territory has reappeared on the agendas of Estonian and Latvian politicians. Although the problem of the "Eastern territories" is not high in the order of business in both countries (especially Latvia), formal claims against Moscow have been made, and the question is still very sensitive. One might agree with the majority of Western commentators, who argue that these claims are unwise both in political and practical terms, but there is reason to believe that this question will maintain low-level intensity at least until such time as Estonia and Latvia abandon it in favor of some greater political deal.

3. The institutional argument: The absorption into NATO of new countries which are incompatible in terms of military organization, structure and equipment would leave a negative effect on the deeply integrated NATO military system. A similar argument is presented in connection with the possible inclusion of Central European and some Eastern European nations into the EU and its deeply multi-faceted system of economic integration.

New member nations would not be economically, technically or financially prepared to carry out their obligations vis a vis the alliance or the union. The alliance and union, for their part, would lose much of their military and economic (and, therefore, political) unity. As a result, the structures would find it difficult to carry out their own obligations and reach their goals.

This argument is particularly appropriate with respect to the military preparedness of the Baltic republics. Unlike the formally sovereign countries of the Warsaw Pact, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had no national military forces at all for half a century. There were no defense ministries or military academies and, hence, no knowledgeable military and political elite to deal with defense and security matters. All that must be built from scratch in the Baltic republics, and in a time of deep economic crisis. The Atlantic Alliance, by contrast, has built a well-developed defense apparatus over the last 40 years. The command structure, the infrastructure (air and ground bases, oil pipelines, etc.), unified weapons systems, soldiers instructed in joint training and maneuvers — it is precisely these elements which form the basis for NATO security guarantees. There is no such basis in Latvia or Estonia, which

means that even if they were formally accepted into NATO, their security would still not be fully ensured, and that, in turn, would mean a failure by NATO to fulfill its obligations.

This argument logically leads to the next one:

4) The financial argument. The Western nations simply lack the resources to undertake new obligations in Central and Eastern Europe. Budgets suffering from economic recession cannot be expected to cover new and financially burdensome obligations.

5) The cohesion argument. There is no unanimity of opinion among Western nations concerning the possible membership of new nations in the security structures. Therefore, goes the argument, it would be unwise to move too quickly, for fear that this might increase differences of opinion and create splits among the member states of the existing European security community.

These arguments apply equally to all Central and Eastern European nations. But I believe that there are also several considerations which are applicable specifically to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and which make their situation all the graver when compared to the nations of Central Europe. The "Russian argument", for example, is much more pertinent to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania than it is to, say, the Czech Republic.

The desire of the West not to provoke Russia (some commentators in the Baltic have characterized this as a Western policy of appeasement) takes on a considerably different tone when it involves the Baltic republics, because on a de facto level, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, unlike the nations of the Warsaw Pact, were part of the Soviet Union. Moreover, and also unlike the states of Central Europe, the Baltic republics share a border with Russia. Some researchers also believe that the Baltic states are strategically important to Russia in that they are located on the Southeastern shore of the Baltic Sea. This not only offers access to the sea, but also means that the shore is uncomfortably close to Russia's second city, St. Petersburg.

From the Western viewpoint, moreover, Estonia and Latvia are faced with more than merely delicate ethnic relations between the indigenous population and some other ethnic group; in their case, the ethnic group in question is the Russians, whose defense has been undertaken by Russia, a country which is still a crucial factor in European security. It is precisely this country, furthermore, with which Estonia and Latvia are having territorial disputes.

Finally, it must be noted that some of the Central European countries are strategically important to the West in that they provide a buffer zone in the eventuality of a land attack on Western Europe. The Baltic states are much less important in terms of strategic defense considerations. Moreover, the Baltic republics are difficult to defend against aggression, and any NATO force, to choose one example, would find itself in uncomfortable beachhead positions in trying to do so.

Brought together, these conditions mean that the politicians of Central Europe have

much greater financial, intellectual and other resources at their disposal than do their Baltic colleagues, and they have had more time and experience to wage considered pressure against the Western countries on the question of possible membership in Western security organizations. The Baltic situation in comparison is difficult and inconvenient.

Functional Integration

Apparently the Baltic countries understand that fast, treaty-based, de jure integration into Western Europe is simply not in the cards for the time being, so Baltic politicians have been quite forthcoming with respect to the idea of gradual, functional integration. Speaking at a conference, Latvian Prime Minister Valdis Birkavs stated: "The real situation is that because of objective circumstances, we cannot receive firm security guarantees which would immediately solve all our problems ... We will have to resolve our security problems thread by thread, weaving together our own security blanket, instead of purchasing one ready-made"[35]. Birkavs said the "threads" of the system might include foreign policy and military cooperation with such organizations as NATO, the EU, the WEU, the CSCE and individual countries. In fact the prime minister chose a picturesque way of describing gradual, functional integration, which over time might lead to de facto integration.

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the WEU Forum of Consultation, the "Partnership for Peace" project, association with the WEU, the plan, free trade and association agreements with the EU - all these are milestones marking gradual integration of the Baltic republics into Western Europe.

Unlike some Central European countries, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have reacted rather positively to the creation and activities of the NACC, as well as the "Partnership for Peace" project. Again it is worth remembering that the Baltic republics have had to establish their national armed services after not having had them for fifty years. The newly created Baltic defense ministries have been understandably enthusiastic about prospects for practical cooperation, including the buildup and development of defense systems and their supervision in the Western tradition. The NACC and the WEU Forum of Consultation, in turn, have provided the Baltic states with a forum where they could sit at one table with other interested states and discuss the vital issues of the sub-region. The WEU Forum has also provided a more intimate sense of belonging to Europe.

At the end of 1993, after Russia's elections, Baltic officials were reluctant to accept NATO's "Partnership for Peace" proposal[36], but after the NATO leadership summit in January, mainstream politicians welcomed the PFP as the maximum which NATO could offer the Baltic states[37]. I agree with Birkavs' opinion that a geographical expansion of NATO which excluded the Baltic countries would probably be a worse option for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, because it might create a sharp change in Russian foreign policy which

...would not be favorable to the Baltic states and also it would estrange the Baltics from the group of six Central European countries along with which the Baltic states have the greatest chance to integrate into European economic and security structures[38].

Of course the PFP is just one of several efforts aimed at increasing security in Europe. Relations between the European Union and the Baltic states, and the Western European Union and the Baltic states, are equally significant in terms of security.

It appears that the WEU's policy toward Central and Eastern Europe differs from that which is pursued by NATO. NATO has preserved its policy of not formally differentiating among the countries of the region (although it is true that some vague elements of differentiation have appeared in the PFP program). The WEU, for its part, has generally tended to follow the example of the European Union, which has adopted the principle of differentiation in relations with Central and Eastern European countries. This principle implies expanded relations with those countries which have introduced far-reaching political and economic reforms. The NACC, which was established by NATO, includes all Central and Eastern European states and pays particular attention to the problems of Russia and the CIS. The WEU, by comparison, concentrates cooperation and consultation efforts on the countries of Central Europe and the Baltic states.

Occasionally the idea has been expressed that a "reduced European version of the NACC" contrasts with the idea of an undivided European security space and could cause dangerous consequences. In my view, policy and action along different lines is needed in order to secure against all risks. In this sense, the different policies adopted by NATO and the WEU are not contradictory but, rather, mutually complementary. Consequently, they lead to interlocking, not interblocking relationships.

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have placed considerable significance on their acceptance as WEU associated partner countries on 9 May 1994. This status permits them to regularly participate in meetings of the WEU council of ambassadors, and to have an equal voice in the council's political discussions. Associate partner countries receive regular information about WEU activities and have contacts with the WEU military planning center. They can also participate in joint peacekeeping, humanitarian and rescue operations.

The Baltic countries received associated status along with the six Central European nations, but only after detailed discussions in which some WEU member countries expressed doubts whether Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania should receive associate status in the WEU before the receipt of similar status in the European Union. The WEU's positive resolution of the matter was extremely important to the Baltic countries. As the WEU ministers declared after their meetings, the purpose of the partnerships is to prepare the Eastern Europeans "for their integration and eventual accession to the European Union, opening up in turn the perspective of membership in the WEU"[39]. The Associated Press declared[40] that the WEU's action meant that the future Eastern border of the EU had been delineated for the first time,.

and this view was largely shared in the Baltics, too.

I disagree with Latvian politicians who say associate partnership status in the WEU is first and foremost a "back door" approach to NATO[41]. The WEU itself plays and will continue to play a distinct role for the Baltic states, due to its institutional position - an element in developing the European Union. Although it must not be forgotten that the WEU is still a relatively weak and undeveloped institution, the Baltic republics should establish relations with it which are as close as possible, given the WEU's potential and eventual importance in the future.

Significant progress in 1994 was also achieved in terms of Baltic relations with the European Union. Free trade agreements between the EU and the three Baltic states were signed in Brussels on 18 July 1994. This occurred somewhat sooner than had been expected, and it opened the door to the next step in integration with the EU - negotiations on an associative agreement. The free trade pacts must still be ratified in the Baltic parliaments, but they provide several benefits: First, to facilitate economic ties with the EU, including trade relations with EU member nations (it is significant that Latvian trade with the European Community dropped in 1993 when compared to 1992), and second, to protect earlier free trade agreements with the several EFTA nations which are expected to join the EU in 1995. The practical effect of the EU agreements will be evidenced over time, but from a security perspective, the pacts offer an opportunity to increase Baltic economic independence, and this is one of the political security pre-requisites of any country. Moreover, the free trade agreements are a cornerstone for future associative agreements. These, in turn, will bring Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania closer to the Central European nations which already have similar pacts with the EU and will help neutralize Russia's "near-abroad" theories in their application against the Baltic republics. Of course, they will also help Baltic integration into Europe's political and economic systems, letting them participate in common security and foreign policy development and cooperate in juridical and domestic matters.

All this means that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania took several significant steps toward integration with Europe in 1994. This movement confirms that arguments against the institutional expansion of the European security community are ones which can be overcome gradually, given the will and opportunity to do so. It is possible that considerations which lead to an understanding that more openness is needed in terms of Eastern policies might prove the more convincing, and greater steps in this direction might be taken yet in 1994, were it not for the fact that Western political will is so decisively influenced by Russia's negative approach to these matters.

Russia and the broadening of the European security community

The question of whether the European security community should be broadened is actually a question about the type of *ostpolitik* the Western community should have in the post-Cold War period. One of the major cornerstones of Eastern policy is the West's approach to Russia, and therefore it is understandable that in considering the possible expansion of the Western security community, much attention is paid to such questions as how such a step would impact Russia, what might be Moscow's response to such a move, and what would be the best Western strategy in response.

Russia is not only the most powerful nation in the region, it is still one of the world's military superpowers (albeit weakened at this time) and is still able to at least start World War III, if not win it. Most Western politicians are therefore inclined to step very gingerly where their Eastern policies are concerned, for fear that Russia might be provoked into unpredictable, aggressive actions.

Some analysts see a comparison between Russia as the loser of the Cold War and Germany as the loser of both world wars. Gregory Treverton (Treverton: 1-2) has has compared the peace conditions which were forced upon Germany following each of the two wars. The victors of World War I were merciless in their approach to the losers: borders were changed (Germany lost Upper Silesia, Danzig and the Polish corridor), Germany felt isolated (a demilitarized zone termed the "iron curtain" was established between Germany and the West) and was condemned[43]. Nearly all of Germany's political spectrum was dissatisfied and thirsting for revenge, and that ended up meaning World War II. After the second world war, the Western allies, taught by bitter experience and menaced by new, Soviet threats, took a scant ten years to fully integrate Germany into the Western political, economic and military structures, thus helping to ensure democracy and economic well-being in Germany.

Integrating the enormous Eurasian entity called Russia into Western structures is virtually unrealistic, but the consequences of Russia's feeling defeated, humbled and isolated are threatening and incalculable[44]. Therefore Western *ostpolitik* in terms of relations with Russia has generally reduced the chances of Central Europe in becoming integrated into Western security institutions.

The fear of isolation has been raised by Russian politicians largely as a way of criticizing the possible enlargement of NATO through the accession of Central European nations. At first the argument was also presented in objections against a hypothetical joining of the Baltic nations to the alliance, but more recently the argument has shifted. On 8 September, in Denmark, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev announced that Russia would react sharply if any of the former Soviet republics, including the Baltic republics, tried to join NATO[45]. Explaining this statement, Grachev said that despite the fact that the Russian army

has now largely left the Baltics, he agreed with Russian President Boris Yeltsin's claim that the entire territory of the former Soviet Union, including Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania remain firmly within Russia's sphere of influence[46].

This term - "sphere of influence" - has appeared with increasing frequency in Russia's domestic political debates, and not only in relation to the territory of the former Soviet Union. Some Western analysts have bought into the term, as evidenced by Owen Harries, who has cited other arguments (beyond the possible isolation of Russia) about why Western security institutions, and first of all NATO, must not be expanded to the East.

Harries believes that "heading East" might well end in failure, and this leads him to an argument which is cynical in its pragmatism. Harries writes that NATO cannot thoughtlessly undertake responsibility for a region which has been in Russia's sphere of interest for centuries, is largely Slavic, and has been the site of numerous battles waged by Russia in the interests of preserving it. These have included battles against Great Britain and France during the Crimean Wars and with Turkey, the latter conflict ending in the Russian establishment of Bulgaria (Harries: 42). However, at a time when Russia is exceedingly unstable and chaotic, with a lost sense of identity and a damaged national self-respect, any attempt to take over East Central Europe would mean ignoring historical realities and committing a grave error.

Furthermore, a group of politicians (Kissinger, Shea) and analysts believe that NATO must not subsume strategically important decisions to the interests and imperialist nostalgia of Russia's reactionaries. NATO must first identify its own interests and then work with Russia to carry them out.

The establishment of a democratic, stable security alliance near the western border of Russia cannot be a threat to Russian security interests. The expansion of a zone of stability and well-being West of Russia would, indeed, only serve to strengthen the positions of democrats and democracy in Russia.

Assistance to Russian democrats must not remain at the level of empty phrases and principles. It must include specific programs and concrete steps offered to Russia in conjunction with any decision to expand NATO. For example, the idea of offering Russia a new system of strategic cooperation is under consideration (it has not yet moved beyond the conceptual level), as is the idea of Russia's becoming a member of the G-7 (G-8?) group of nations.

Generally, however, the Western democracies have been very cautious up until now, and the "Russian card" has dominated over the "Central and Eastern European card" in their policy making. The reason for this has to do with the hierarchy of interests in the Western security community. According to Dieter Mahncke, "First and foremost, the Western allies want to make sure that their security is maintained. Beyond that they are interested in overall European stability, primarily as a favorable environment for their own security. Only in the

third place is there the idea of extending the type of Western security regime eastward to benefit the East Europeans, again being aware that the extension of the regime would enhance stability, which in turn enhances Western European security"[47].

CONCLUSION

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, like any other small state, have very restricted abilities to influence the international system; they not only had to enter an international order which was determined without their participation, but they also have very limited possibilities to modify this order, including Europe's security structures, in a direction which is favorable to them.

Still, the Baltic states have managed to prove to the structures of this system that the Balts are worthy of acceptance as a component part of these structures.

First of all, the tempo of economic and political reform in the Baltic republics proves that these countries and their residents are prepared to undertake these reforms, no matter how painful they might not be, thus confirming that the area is economically, culturally and politically able to integrate into Europe.

Secondly, relations between the Baltic republics and Russia have demonstrated that they are ready to resolve any problems through peaceful and determined negotiation and to accept sometimes painful tactical compromises. Thus they have shown that they are able to limit their national ambitions in the name of European peace and that therefore they can be not just consumers but also suppliers of security.

Thirdly, in just a few years Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have developed successful and far-sighted sub-regional cooperation at the inter-Baltic and Baltic-Nordic levels. Within these alliances there are no fundamental contradictions or conflicts. A free trade zone involving Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania has been established, and free trade agreements have been signed with the Nordic countries. As a result, trade with the CIS makes up significantly less than 50% of annual Baltic trade at this time. This can be compared with 1990, when trade with the CIS made up more than 90% of all trade. This means that Baltic trade contacts have become more symmetrical, and moreover, cooperation among the three Baltic nations, and with the Nordic countries, has expanded. Cooperation in cultural, education, ecological and other spheres is increasing. Military cooperation is also developing slowly.

Sub-regional cooperation, however, cannot offer a solution to Baltic security concerns. The range and weight of these problems mean that the solution must be sought at a different level. That is why the most significant foreign policy line in the Baltic republics has to do with efforts to become integrated into the EU, the WEU and NATO. The possible entry of Finland, Sweden and Norway into these structures will help to facilitate this process.

The extension of the European security community cannot be a process taken unilater-

ally by the Western countries, and far less by the states of Central Europe. Neither can this be a momentary process. Gradually, step by step, the group of nations which are on the road to full integration into Western economic, political and security structures is becoming evident. Simultaneously, a group of former Soviet republics is congregating around the Russian nucleus. The Baltic republics have proved very visibly that they belong to the first of these groups.

It is important to coolly observe the processes which are taking place, analyze them and come to the appropriate conclusions, not to hide one's head in the sand with the excuse that new lines should not be drawn on the European map. There have always been lines and boundaries, and there always will be. What is important is that they not be allowed to become lines of confrontation. But a policy of appeasement is not a way to achieve this.

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[1] This perspective has been elaborated by Sverre Lodgaard (1992), p. 57.

[2] This separation of levels has been enunciated by Andersen and Skak (1993) in their analysis of the West's *ostpolitik* .

[3] This term was first used by John Hertz in his work "Political Realism and Political Idealism" (1951). In an anarchic international system, State A can increase its security expenditures solely for defensive purposs. Other countries, however, being unsure of the true aims of State A, can also increase armament expenditures, thus creating a feeling of insecurity in State A and forcing it into consideration of new and supplementary armanent expenditures. Thus State A, which started by increasing military expenditures with the goal of expanding its security, ends up feeling less secure, and an arms race is undertaken in the states of the respective grouping.

[4] See, for example, a speech by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev which was distributed to representatives at the Council of Europe and printed in the newspaper *Moskovskije novosti* (25 Septemnber 1994).

[5] It is important to note, however, that armed resistance to the Soviet occupation was carried on in the Baltic Republics all the way through the mid-1950s. The spirit of the partisans was largely bolstered by mystical hopes that Britain, Sweden and other countries would come to their aid.

[6] Still unresolved is the question of whether moral considerations play any role in the Western approach to the Baltic Republics. An interesting remark in this respect was made by the parliamentary secretary of the Latvian Foreign Ministry, Mārtiņš Virsis, saying that the events of 1940 were a moral trauma not just for the Balts, but also for Western Europe. The result is a moral debt which perhaps does not need to be advertised, but which should nonetheless be erased (*Diena* , 19 February 1994).

[7] *International Herald Tribune* .

[8] *The Baltic Observer* , 3-9 March 1992.

[9] *Ibid* ., 20-26 March 1992.

[33] *Current Latvia: Special Information Supplement* , issued by the Information and Press Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Latvia, March 1994.

[34] In Baltic policy concerning international institutions such as the CSCE, NATO and the WEU, emphasis was initially put on the need to regain independence and international recognition, to establish diplomatic contacts, and to represent Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in international fora. The Balts succeeded in their efforts to reestablish independence and gain international recognition, and this happened perhaps more easily and rapidly than had been expected.

[35] Birkavs, V., "Latvijas drošība ceļā uz 21. gadsimtu" (Latvian security on the road to the 21st century), quoted in *Diena* , 9 March 1994.

[36] Estonian President Lennart Meri was quoted as saying, "The Russian elections compel us to see the PFP proposal as nothing more than an empty bottle of Chanel perfume: empty, but

nicc to look at". Quoted in *The Baltic Observer* , 24 December 1993 - 6 January 1994.

[37] Lithuania was the second country (after Romania) to officially sign documents acceding to the Partnership for Peace program; Estonia was the fourth.

[38] *Diena* . 9 March 1994.

[39] *The Baltic Observer* , 12-18 May, 1994.

[40] *Ibid.*

[41] *Diena* , 13 May 1994.

[43] Treverton has quoted Churchill in this respect: "This is not peace; this is an armistice for about twenty years".

[44] I would posit, however, that it is impossible to isolate Russia; instead, it can only self-isolate — never before has the world been so open and cooperative with Russia. An objection can, however, be raised against my position, namely that it is too exact and based on logic and sense, while the Russian electorate tends to be governed by less rational tendencies.

[45] *The Baltic Observer* , 15-21 September 1994.

[46] *Ibid* .

[47] Mahncke, D., "Parameters of European Security". *Chaillot Papers* , No. 10, 1993, p. 7.

THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY-COMMUNITY

Concluding chapter of "Spreading Peace Eastwards: The Expansion of the European Security-Community"

First draft

This draft has been prepared for the Budapest seminar of November 11-12 without sight of the other chapters in the paper. It is therefore highly provisional, and for comment only; it should not be cited or circulated in any form.

Ian Gambles
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THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY-COMMUNITY

The central question of this study is how to manage the eastward expansion of the European security-community. What future does the European security-community have, and where should it be going?

The existing security-community

First, let us recall what the European security-community is. A security-community, as defined in this study, is an area in which the use of force to resolve disputes between states is permanently excluded, not only by political declaration and international law, but by a pervasive internal commitment reflected in the actual conduct of international relations. This is the internal aspect of a security-community. A security-community may also have an external aspect, an expectation, usually expressed in a treaty commitment, of mutual military assistance in the event of an armed attack from outside the security-community.

There is no necessary connection, either in Europe or elsewhere, between a security-community and an international institution, treaty, or alliance. A security-community cannot be created by fiats or secretariats, nor can it be sustained by promises alone. Thus the European security-community should not be confused with the European Union (EU), NATO, or any other organisation. An international organisation must make a visible distinction between members and non-members, although the current proliferation of associates, observers and partners is an attempt to qualify or conceal it. But a security-community is an intangible thing, a community in the spirit more than in the letter. Its membership cannot be offered or denied, only acquired or lost. Its boundaries are in the minds of peoples.

The European security-community developed in non-communist Europe and the North Atlantic in the years after the Second World War, from a combination of favourable historical circumstances and conscious political strategies. The favourable historical factors included the profound war weariness throughout Europe, the increasing density of economic interdependence, the growth of corporate and individual transnationalism, the unifying pressure of the Soviet threat, ad the conceptual shift brought about by the invention of nuclear weapons. The conscious political strategies included the creation of the European

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Economic Communities as the centrepiece of the Monnet-Schuman strategy for lasting Franco-German reconciliation, the Marshall Plan for European reconstruction, and the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to secure the defence of Western Europe and develop military co-operation and integration in the North Atlantic area. Soviet-Communist domination in Central and Eastern Europe excluded the countries of that region from almost all these changes, so that the European security-community was, in practice, a West European security-community.

The end of the Cold War has brought Central and Eastern Europe into a grey zone on the periphery of the security-community. The security of the western and eastern parts of Europe has always been linked. Now, as the Central and Eastern Europe states become Associate Partners of WEU, sign association agreements with the EU, and join NATO's Partnership for Peace, and as statesmen, businessmen, and ordinary travellers whittle away at the lingering iron curtain, what is to happen to that link? Can security be not just linked, but shared? Is there a pan-European security-community in becoming? If so, how can we make the expansion of the West European security-community real, viable and durable?

In analysing this issue, realism is essential. The basic distinction between 'is' and 'ought' must be preserved. To assert, for example, that European security is indivisible, or that the expansion of NATO or the EU is essential, serves only to cloud the issue. European security is divisible, as the undisturbed continuation of normal life in Western Europe during the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia clearly shows, even if some feel it ought not to be. NATO and the EU are obviously capable of snubbing Central and Eastern European applicants indefinitely if they so wish, although it might well not be in their interests to do so. We need a strategy for expansion, not a declaration of its historical inevitability. The real and the ideal are different.

The strategic background

Devising a viable strategy for managing the expansion of the European security-community would be a major breakthrough. For the general background is one of strategic immobilism and strategic failure. Western policy-makers are apparently so bemused by the new challenges of a world without the Cold War that they are showing all the courage and decisiveness of hedgehogs in headlights. The carefully nurtured consensual approach to

policy which sustained Western unity during the Cold War has proved inadequate for responding to the radically different challenges of the new era. Although the inertia of the status quo has so far resisted major upheavals outside Yugoslavia, the strategic initiative in Europe has passed into the hands of revisionists and opportunists.

There are three aspects to the strategic failure in Europe which materially affect the prospects for the expansion of the security-community, and help point to a viable strategy for expansion: the failure of *crisis management*, the failure of *globalism*, and the failure of *variable geometry*.

Crisis management was an essential survival skill in the Cold War, and we all have reason to be grateful that policy-makers have come to be so good at it. Notwithstanding the horrors of Vietnam and Afghanistan, and the rhetorical posturing of the Reagan presidency, the Cold War after the Cuban missile crisis was reasonably stable, each side working explicitly and implicitly with its adversary to keep the conflict bounded, and to prevent crises from escalating by following rules and procedures of crisis management. In the absence of a framework for international order and competition, the attempt to apply crisis management techniques and ideas to the situations in Yugoslavia, Azerbaijan, Somalia and Rwanda has produced only public derision and loss of international prestige for the poverty of its results. Averting World War Three was once rightly the supreme goal of policy; but it is no achievement at all when the danger is already passed. Ingrained caution serves merely to obstruct earlier and deeper engagement and the search for lasting solutions.

Crisis management is of course a wholly inappropriate tool for the expansion of a security-community. Ruling out the possibility of war between states means putting in place habits and mechanisms of co-operation that prevent the emergence of crises of a war-threatening character, obviating the need for crisis management skills. A strategy for expanding the European security-community must be proactive, designed to create peace not merely to avert war.

Globalism had, inevitably, a brief resurgence after the Cold War, and its pernicious effects linger on. Mistaking the disappearance of bloc politics for the disappearance of power politics, and the global collapse of Communism for the global triumph of liberalism, attempts were made to resurrect the strategy of collective security. Two organisations in particular, the United Nations (UN) and the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe

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(CSCE), each of which has made a significant contribution to individual rights and to world peace, have been overloaded with unrealistic aspirations and sent careering towards institutional death.

The fate of CSCE is particularly illuminating, for it reveals two cardinal errors to which any strategy for expanding a zone of peace is prone. The first is to reach beyond the pale of perceived fraternity, to attempt to fabricate international solidarity out of imaginary or insufficient material. CSCE, by admitting all the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, mistook the convenient Cold War fiction of a Eurasian space from Vancouver to Vladivostok for a lasting political reality. There is nothing to prevent Belgium and Uzbekistan from having amicable relations within an international institution, but there is no substance in these relations to make them more profound or more secure than the relations between any two remote members of the UN. Vain experiments with a Eurasian space distract energy from the task of forming a security-community in the Central European space.

The second cardinal error is to try to establish a security-community in the absence of peace. CSCE's constitutional gymnastics in trying to deal with war in Yugoslavia, most notably the charmingly named "consensus minus one" rule, were forced on the organisation because it was simply not structured to take action to handle that sort of contingency. This is not a problem of institutional design so much as a problem of institutional scope and intent. CSCE necessarily includes the Balkans, and that alone made it entirely unsuitable for a transformation from pan-European negotiating forum into collective security organisation. A collective security organisation can only succeed if it is founded in a security-community, and war in a security-community is a terminal condition. Only intervention can hope to bring peace into a war zone; a security-community cannot export stability to an area where even its foundations are missing. Any strategy for expanding the European security-community must reflect that constraint.

Variable geometry is one of those terms that gained wide currency among specialists while the non-expert, quite rightly, scanned it in vain for any sign of meaning. The idea, such as it was, was that no one institution had the right group of member states, or the right mandate, for all possible situations. Multiple institutions with overlapping memberships would defuse tension over particular inclusions and exclusions and ensure that the right team was on hand

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for each different type of international contingency. In practice variable geometry was just a lame defence for the proliferation of institutions; the more institutions there were, the less authority each was able to muster in its own right as an international regime among its member states. The much-discussed paralysis of the UN, the CSCE, NATO, the EU, the WEU and everyone else throughout the Yugoslav civil war owes something at least to the opportunities for indefinite temporising and buck-passing which this vacuous geometry afforded.

The lesson for strategists of security-community is that excessive concentration on institutional questions misses the point. At the moment of decision it will be the real ties between states which count. Institutional creativity is only sleight of hand, and can only create an appearance of security.

General principles of an expansion strategy

This rather gloomy tour d'horizon allows us to lay down a few basic principles for developing a strategy for managing the expansion of the European security-community. Such a strategy needs to be:

- **proactive**, actively engaged in creating the habits and structures of co-operation and peace, not waiting on the next crisis;

- **geographically limited**, restricting the area of core expansion to states and peoples with whom the existing members of the security-community have a clear consciousness of sharing a space and a society;

- **limited to areas of peace and stability**, acknowledging that stability can be consolidated and security strengthened from outside, but neither can be exported wholesale;

- **focused outside institutions**, aiming primarily at building firmer ties of international society in the area of expansion, and developing institutions as regimes based on these actual practices and loyalties rather than as themselves the principal agents of change.

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Expanding the internal security-community: is peace possible in Central and Eastern Europe?

Equipped with these general principles, let us turn to Central and Eastern Europe. I will consider first the internal aspect of security-community, and then its external aspect. First, can Central and Eastern Europe become definitively at peace with itself and with the West? Second, can Central and Eastern Europe join the West European-North Atlantic area where each is pledged to the other's defence?

The Central and East European inheritance

The most important historical factor in any question relating to the politics of Central and Eastern Europe is that the whole region has only yesterday emerged from a double subjection, to the geopolitical empire of the Soviet Union and the socio-political empire of the Communist Party. The legacy of this generation and a half of subjection will be impossible to assess properly for many years, and differs considerably from one state to another. Some tentative general observations can already be made, however.

First, this legacy of Soviet-Communist domination is of exceptional significance throughout the region, and will continue to influence the political culture of the Central and East European states in important ways for some time to come. Despite the thoroughness and swiftness of the eviction of Communist governments once their cover was blown, there has been no categorical, anguished rupture with the past such as was involved in the post-Fascist reconstructions after the Second World War. The electoral advances of former Communists in much of the region does not foreshadow a return to Communist policies or practices. But it does indicate a significant element of continuity in the governing elites, interest groups, social classes and political expectations antedating the revolutions and shaped in the period of Soviet-Communist domination.

Secondly, the legacy of Communism in domestic issues is a set of socio-political and socio-economic problems which sound distinctly familiar to West European ears and are sure to hamper the process of integration underpinning the security-community. Most important are the problems of obsolescence and inefficiency in industrial and agricultural production, leading to shrinking GDP in the short term and structural unemployment in the long term as

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the pressures of the market bite. The bitterness generated by the EU's reluctance to open export markets to Central and East European steel, textiles and agricultural produce is only the beginning. The EU states' continued reliance on expensive protectionism in precisely those areas may foster imitative policies in Central and East European states (to the detriment of their already difficult fiscal positions), but it will certainly not foster fellow-feeling across Europe. Welfare dependency and — at first sight surprisingly — political apathy are two other Communist legacies, well-known in Western Europe too, which tend to draw the state back in on itself, eroding social cohesion and sapping the confidence and resources of state and society to engage with a wider community.

Thirdly, the period of Soviet-Communist domination has left a legacy of inexperience and immaturity in foreign affairs. In most respects, most Central and East European states have not had the chance to formulate and carry out an independent foreign policy since the war. Whatever latitude was allowed in internal affairs, foreign policy was made in Moscow. This has not by any means led to universally bad post-revolutionary foreign policies; indeed the easy temptations of confusing a constructive re-assertion of autonomy with a destructive re-assertion of nationalism have for the most part been avoided with skill and responsibility. Far from falling into a sort of adolescent posturing, states have been so anxious to avoid a "loose cannon" label which might harm their prospects of integration into Western institutions that they have often seemed to slip the other way. This can lead to a rather unreal kind of communiqué conformity that conceals real and legitimate conflicts of interest under emollient rhetoric.

Failure to articulate interests and stand up for them in a consistent and reasonable way means that the foreign policies of the region cannot yet really be considered stable. The evolution of regional security policy in the Visegrad Group of countries is an illuminating example. In a five year period, policy has evolved from a declared goal of abandoning all military alliances in favour of a pan-European security order maintained by the CSCE, to ideas of regional neutrality between NATO and the Soviet Union, to a vogue of actual and speculative regional co-operation, and lastly to its current resting place of unqualified and competitive pursuit of NATO membership. This evolution was not arbitrary or whimsical, and certainly not a product of an active foreign policy debate, which is lacking in all the Visegrad countries. Rather it was purely a response to geopolitical developments - the end of

the Brezhnev Doctrine, German reunification, the Moscow coup and the break-up of the Soviet Union, and the re-assertion of Russian nationalism and great power claims.

Now there is nothing wrong, of course, with adjusting foreign policy to fit geopolitical realities. And even states with a mature foreign policy-making apparatus and a clear and consistent sense of the national interest are capable of vacillation and abrupt changes of mind. What is problematic is the unpredictability of Central and East European states' foreign policy in Europe in the long term. This is a legacy of subjection which makes it harder for them to offer the level of stability and assurance needed to develop the mutual confidence at the heart of the European security-community.

So there are inherited difficulties to be overcome. To assess whether in the course of time they really can be overcome. and Central and Eastern Europe brought into the security-community, at lasting peace with itself and with the West, we need to consider three questions.

- First, can these states, despite their unhappy political, social and economic inheritance, sustain a politics sufficiently stable, and an economy and society sufficiently open, to give the ties that bind the security-community time enough to be woven?

- Second, can they overcome the dissensions of a heterogeneous region and import home-grown networks and practices of international co-operation into the security-community rather than simmering strife?

- Third, can the vulnerability of the regional states' political orientation to the vagaries of great power politics be reduced and contained to allow them to be reliable members of the European security-community?

The first two questions are addressed in this section; the third forms the crucial link to the external aspect of security-community and the issue of mutual defence, and is considered in the next section.

Social stability and openness

Social stability and openness obviously varies from country to country, and analysis is made much more difficult by the lack of an autonomous political history more than five years old.

It is therefore all the more important to avoid the pitfalls of over-interpreting short-term phenomena, or falling back on vague typologies drawn from the politics of the period of combination or from ideas of national character.

There are two common mistakes which over-generalising on slender evidence in this way leads to. Trying to draw up a "league table" of the Central and East European states tends to over-emphasise starting-points at the expense of ongoing processes of transformation. To take just one example, it is not clear whether the strength of the second economy in Hungary, and the smoothness of the transition from the comparatively benign Kadar regime, justify an assumption that Hungary can remain at or near the top of a league table. The extent of socio-economic disengagement from the state, and the comfortable continuity of officialdom and the classe politique may turn out to be long-term liabilities in Hungary's "return to Europe". A close observation and study of each individual case is needed, and even then it may simply be too early to draw long-term conclusions.

A second common mistake is to look at the region as if it contained a built-in slope from West to East, a downward slide from the heights of German prosperity and rationality to the depths of Russian turbulence and Asiatic barbarism. Apart from smacking slightly of unwarranted cultural supremacism, the concept of a slope is also misleading. Although Poland and the Czech Republic have done much to justify their pole position in the integration race, the progress of state-building in Lithuania and in Slovenia, and the boldness of the Bulgarian transition deserve more attention than they tend to get because of the explicit or implicit acceptance of the slope metaphor.

With these caveats in mind, it is interesting to realise how many important generalisations it is still possible to make with considerable confidence about the internal situation in all nine WEU Associate Partner states.

- All are securely established as states. Barring outside intervention, all nine states have a robust sense of identity and the potential to maintain their independence. In this they are like the states of Western Europe, and unlike their neighbours in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), leaning willingly into the Russian orbit, and their neighbours in the Balkans (Slovenia excepted), lost in shifting identities and armed chaos.

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- All their democracies are almost as secure as democracy in Western Europe. The anti-democratic Right exists, of course, but has been conspicuously unsuccessful in finding any significant constituency in what ought to be fertile territory for them - growing economic insecurity and inequity combined with unresolved ethnic and religious hostilities. The Left, particularly in Romania, still has regressive centralist and monopolist tendencies, but its models are essentially social democratic, and there is no longer any significant legitimating alternative of anti-democratic socialism to justify deviating from the democratic norms the Left has adopted. Parliamentary government can seem sometimes outmoded both in the East and in the West, but there is as much or more reason to expect its eventual replacement to emerge from the United States or Italy rather than from Poland or Estonia.

- All seem irrevocably committed to economic openness. The costs of transition are high, but in no case does the move to capitalism seem to be in jeopardy. In no case are the anticipated fiscal and balance of payments problems, or the problem of high inflation and unemployment, likely to get out of control. All identify the EU as the locus of prosperity, and seek to emulate its generally conservative principles of economic and monetary management. There is no autarkic alternative available to orthodoxy; the pursuit of macroeconomic convergence, and the facilitation of foreign investment and domestic enterprise, are tenets of policy commanding cross-party support throughout the region.

The expansion of the security-community is necessarily gradual, and the Central and East European states currently in its grey zone will not move into the core until they have lain for longer on the democratic map, been drawn more comprehensively into the world economy, and closed some of the gulf of difference, real and perceived, which divides them from the West Europeans. But it is very unlikely that any radical upheavals in state or society will interrupt that process of assimilation and community-building.

Regional stability

The essence of security-community is co-operation and confidence, and the Central and East European states cannot be absorbed into the security-community unless they have established

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solid practices of co-operation to deal with the conflicts of interest arising within this heterogeneous region.

The central challenge here is the consolidation of inter-ethnic peace in the face of long-standing territorial disputes and significant discontented minorities. The catalogue of potential sources of conflict is very long, and includes both issues among the partner states (Hungarian minorities in Slovakia and Romania, Polish interests in Lithuania, and so on) and issues between partner states and states in the European security-community (Sudeten German claims on the Czech Republic, Bulgarian differences with Greece over Macedonia, and so on). Issues arising in relations with third parties, principally Russia, Moldova and Ukraine come into play as important constraints on the development of the external, mutual defence aspect of the security-community, discussed below.

Again, despite the particularities involved, it is possible to make some useful generalisations about these issues. Most importantly, there is nothing about any of them which necessarily precludes full participation in the security-community, and it is false logic to insist that they all be resolved first. The whole concept of community in Europe was created not out of unity but out of division, out of a need for lasting reconciliation between France and Germany, whose struggles had done more damage than those of the Central and East Europeans could ever do. And the security-community continues in being in the face of ongoing issues such as Northern Ireland, Gibraltar, and Alto Adige, controlling and quietening them rather than being overthrown by them.

The fact is that border issues and minority issues are rarely susceptible to solution or resolution. Methods such as population transfer or border changes, or more drastic expedients such as ethnic cleansing or wars of conquest, tend only to transfer the problem to the next generation. There are, in fact, no *solutions* to these questions, and only harm is done by initiatives which purport to be looking for them. Only attrition works. Through a long process of accommodation and a respectful dialogue founded in a mutual interest in and commitment to peace, both parties, and the people affected, come to view the issue as a thing of the past, no longer requiring a solution.

Whether an ethnic or territorial dispute debars a state from a security-community depends on how dangerous it is to peace and how dangerous it is perceived to be, which depends in turn on how it is managed. In general, regional leaders have recognised the futility and the

danger of a confrontational approach to international issues of this kind. One of the reasons why regional statesmen dislike the Balladur Stability Pact is that it singles out ethnic and territorial issues in Central and Eastern Europe as unresolved (as if those in Western Europe were different), and *lists* them, unintentionally forcing state representatives to adopt solution-seeking, and therefore confrontational positions.

As an illustration of this trend of prudent issue management, it is worth considering how remarkable it is, in historical perspective, that so little stands between Poland and the security-community. Despite the arbitrary and brutal way in which the borders and peoples of Poland have been pushed hither and thither over so many years, potential tensions at both the western and eastern border have been so carefully handled that military conflict is difficult to imagine. Western alarmism over the implications of the birth of Slovakia appear to be unjustified too, as the Czech, Hungarian, and Slovak establishments are all taking a constructive approach and discouraging nationalistic rhetoric. Hungary and Slovakia's decision to refer their Gabickovo dam dispute to the International Court of Justice is exemplary. The only poorly managed dispute, which therefore constitutes the most serious obstacle of this kind to the expansion of the security-community, is the Transylvanian question, on which Bucharest, not helped by a lingering Hungarian superiority complex and vestiges of 'Trianonism', remains extremely defensive, and reluctant to disown even the excesses of ethnic politics at Cluj. But even this case should respond to responsible management by both sides, and it does not contradict the general rule that the Yugoslav disease is not, as was at first assumed, contagious. Ethnic and territorial issues among the Central and East European states can be contained and managed well enough to permit their incorporation into the European security-community.

The realities of power politics also help discourage confrontation and encourage conciliatory strategies for the long term. It is, after all, hard to imagine what a war among the Central and East European states would look like. No state has armed forces sufficiently well trained, led, organised or equipped to conduct a war in isolation. No outside power has any interest in provoking or underwriting a military campaign in the region. Particularly given the long queue of countries, from Russia to the United States, which might, depending on the circumstances, be ready to intervene against an aggressor, none could be remotely confident of victory (least of all those with the biggest grievance, the Hungarians, who have one of the

weakest armed forces in Europe). With the prospects for an effective use of force so poor, and no reason to believe they will improve, the incentives for accepting the normative framework offered by CSCE and the Council of Europe and getting on with a quiet process of reconciliation are high.

Building a security-community is not just about suppressing sources of conflict, though; it is also about the development of co-operation. In this area too, the Central and East European states are hampered by misconceptions and inexperience. The misconceptions are in part those of the West, where there is still a tendency to overlook the fact that the only ties binding the former eastern bloc were those of domination, and all that those countries now have in common as a group is their struggle to leave that past behind. In part the misconceptions are their own, because they see co-operation too much as a means to an end, a tiresome precondition for negotiating passage to the Western havens of prosperity and security, the EU and NATO. Both the Western and the Eastern misconceptions were responsible for the decline and fall of the Visegrad Group; the West tended to see it as a convenient way of packaging totally different countries together, and the East as an antechamber to the EU and NATO, which the Czechs decided after the split of Czechoslovakia was more of a hindrance than a help to their own applications.

Inexperience - as well as the sheer diversity of the region - has showed also in the proliferation of tenuously based co-operative initiatives. But that is no disaster. It is probably only through trial and error, by experimenting with geographical and issue-based forums, forums within the region and forums extending east, west, south, and north beyond the region, that the most useful correlations will be identified. What matters most is to give substance to the forms of co-operation; the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA), an accelerating and expanding programme of regional tariff reductions, is a prime example of what is required. It is to be hoped that multinational exercises within the framework of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) programme can serve a parallel function in developing security co-operation among the region's isolated and impoverished armed forces.

More time is needed to allow sources of dispute artificially suppressed under Soviet domination to be openly acknowledged and managed into quiescence, and more time is needed for experiments in regional co-operation to take root and for the habit of international consultation to grow. But this is needed more to build confidence in the region and in the

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West rather than actually to avert any impending conflict. Peace among the Central and East European states, barring outside intervention, is already secure enough that they could become part of the wider European security-community.

Expanding the external security-community: protecting Central and Eastern Europe

What, then, of the third issue, the question of reducing and containing the exposure of Central and Eastern Europe to great power politics? In seeking answers to this we discover the link between what I have called the internal and external aspects of the European security-community.

Security-communities do not exist in a world of their own, set apart from regional and global power politics. The quality of their internal relationships does not make them into sanctuaries, cannot give their member states immunity from the rest of the world. Whether there could ever be a global security-community is a question beyond the scope of this study, but it is certainly not a possibility in the foreseeable future. Absent that, and given the inevitable failure of collective security projects, the states system will continue to find uneasy, temporary equilibria through the operation of the balance of power. And security-communities will, willingly or not, be part of a balance of power, and have to seek security within it.

The balance of power has no place, however, *within* the security-community. Of course states pursue their national interests in competition with others and more powerful states wield larger political influence, but that is axiomatic. One of the distinctive features of a security-community is that the definitive repudiation of all possibility of violence strips international politics within its boundaries of its coercive character, taming the Leviathans. To suppose otherwise is to commit what we might call the Mearsheimer error, drawing improbable and mistaken conclusions about European affairs from reductionist theories of international relations which assume nothing ever changes. Certainly the pacification of Western Europe, its transformation into a security-community, was facilitated by its confinement within the American sphere of influence, but the transformation is real nonetheless. The European security-community has grown and prospered as an integral part

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of the European balance of power in the Cold War period, but without a balance of power in the North Atlantic area.

This has important consequences. If power is balanced overall, but not within the security-community, then it follows that every state in the security-community, except those without any notable power or strategic significance, must be on the same side of the scales. This makes sense. A security-community is founded on intangibles, such as solidarity, confidence and trust. How can a people trust another if there is an ambiguity as to whether they are with us or against us? Solidarity is only possible between states which are not in hostile spheres of influence; permanent solidarity is only possible between states which can be defended against subjugation or coercion from a hostile power.

Here, then, is the crucial link between the two aspects of security-community, and it should be immediately obvious how strong it is in the case of Central and Eastern Europe. The internal aspect of security-community, the definitive exclusion of violence amongst its members, is implicit, resting on a dense network of individually insignificant connections and on intangibles. But where any form of threat, or even just competitive power politics, is nearby, the existence of the implicit, internal security-community is revealed by the forging of explicit ties of mutual defence, by the creation of an external security-community.

The Central and East European region is notoriously prone to becoming a literal or metaphorical battlefield of the great powers. No state in the region, therefore, can become a member of the European security-community in any meaningful sense unless its security in its relations with those powers can be assured. There, the internal and external aspects of security-community go hand in hand and are inseparable. Elsewhere, a country such as Ireland, for example, could be considered part of the European security-community despite its neutrality because its only engagement with great power politics was a history of troubled relations with the United Kingdom, latterly stable relations further stabilised by joint participation in the security-community. But a country such as Hungary, exposed throughout its history to pressure and domination from Turkey, Austria, Germany, Russia and Serbia, would be too dangerous a bed-fellow if the question of external security were not properly addressed.

The key question, then, is whether the states of Central and Eastern Europe can become part of a security-community with the rest of Europe which faces outward as well as inward, a

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community which assures their security. There is no obvious answer. It is important not to exaggerate the threats to Central and East European security which such a community would have to face. Germany is part of the security-community, and the security of the partner states in relations with Germany can be assured through membership, co-operation, and the practices of community without the need for defensive measures. The threat from the south is more imagined than real - Turkey is a friendly neighbour, and there is no reason to believe that Serbian expansionism threatens any state outside the former Yugoslavia. The only real danger is from Russia.

Even the Russian threat is easily exaggerated. The whole Russian establishment seems reconciled to the permanent disintegration of the Warsaw Pact. Troop withdrawals were completed with a minimum of trouble, good government to government relations have been a priority, and even on the sensitive issue of Central and East European states' membership in NATO, the conquering alliance, Russian objections are softening. Beyond the rhetorical excesses of Zhirinovsky, there is no reason to believe Russia has any interest or ambition to bring Central and Eastern Europe back within its sphere. Russia is driven not by revanchism but by the anxieties of a declining great power unwilling to relinquish its great power status.

The two outstanding problems are that of the Baltic States, and that of Russian military potential. Russian conduct towards the Baltic States remains overtly threatening, especially in the cases of Latvia and Estonia, where very substantial ethnic Russian minorities are the subject of tense disputes over citizenship rights and economic entitlements. There is also a disputed border between Russia and the two northerly Baltic States. Russian relations with Lithuania are complicated by the existence of the Russian enclave around Kaliningrad, heavily militarised and accessible by land only through Lithuanian territory. The Baltic States issue is likely to remain more difficult because it is a territorial issue. Even under Stalin, the Kremlin never thought of the eastern bloc as part of Greater Russia (except, of course, for those parts of historic Poland and Romania which were taken into the Soviet Union and remain part of Russia, Belarus and Moldova today); but the Baltic States were part of Greater Russia, and their loss cannot simply be accepted in Moscow as part of the loss of an ideological hegemony they have themselves rejected.

Russian military potential remains awesome. Even after the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty and the massive post-Cold War defence cuts, the Russian army is by far the

largest in Europe. No neighbouring state, standing alone, would be able to withstand an air-land assault from Russia. In addition, Russia will be the world's second nuclear power for the foreseeable future. The impact of this military overhang on security-community formation in Central and Eastern Europe cannot, unfortunately, be neutralised by expressions of goodwill or international commitments from the Russians, nor by the current political uselessness of nuclear weapons. Russia is so politically volatile, engaged in such a variety of conflicts within the area of the former Soviet Union, and exposed to such a range of Asian conflict sources that its membership in the European security-community cannot even be contemplated. Russia does not at present pose a threat to Central and Eastern Europe outside the Baltic States, but it poses a latent threat against which the Central and East European states must seek security.

Rightly, the partner states see NATO as the only possible source of that security. The prospect of a new integrated military alliance among the states to the east of NATO, running along the Western borders of Russia from the Baltic to the Black Sea, is extremely remote, and would in any event be inefficient and even counter-productive. Nor would guarantees from the WEU states alone - supposing they could be obtained - really be adequate unless WEU's links to NATO became so close (including double-hatting of all European NATO forces and command and control structures, and access to US airlift capability and intelligence resources) that it was almost indistinguishable from NATO from the point of view of deterrence.

But even NATO can provide this security only if its members are able and willing to do so. The Russian threat is sharply diminished since the end of the Cold War, but so too is NATO. Over-optimistic expectations of peace, and unwise talk of a "peace dividend" at a time when most Western countries have been facing structural fiscal deficits exacerbated by prolonged recession, have dealt mighty blows to NATO defence budgets and weakened the Alliance's war-fighting capability. The establishment of a Rapid Reaction Corps looks less impressive when one considers that it replaces a whole Army Group.

This does not mean NATO is suddenly vulnerable. But it does mean that NATO cannot realistically stretch itself too thinly. There would be no value in extending NATO membership to the partner states until two concrete conditions have been met. First, that NATO's own cycle of restructuring has been completed and its disarmament spiral arrested

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and even reversed; second, that the partner states' armed forces have developed through PFP-assisted reform and restructuring to the point where they can be integrated into the multinational units which are NATO's future. As David White has observed, the Central and East European states really want to join "the old NATO", but the West has abandoned it in favour of a "new NATO" which is still in the process of evolution; that process must be completed, and the partner states brought into it, before NATO can offer them real security.

Whether NATO states have the will to include the Central and East European states within their own security zone even then is another matter. If they do not, nothing is gained and much is risked by pretending otherwise. There is something uneasy and even ominous about increasingly commonplace formulations such as this: "The security of Slovakia is a matter of direct and material interest to the United States." Here is a consciousness of obligation, qualified by an awareness that, at least at the moment, the physical and moral power to fulfil that obligation is missing. Every unbankable promise made by NATO statesmen to the partner states, every "Dear John" speech reinforces the conviction in the region, which is an accurate one, that in their hour of need they would find themselves alone, far away countries of which we know nothing.

Only explicit treaty commitments will change this position. They are therefore the gateway to the whole security-community. But for that very reason they should not be entered into until the capacity and the will to extend security both exist. They should crown a process of engagement, involvement, entanglement between the political establishments, societies and economies of the eastern and western parts of Europe (and North America), and cannot substitute for it.

Conclusion

There is nothing inevitable about the expansion of the European security-community. The concept of a "security vacuum" in Central and Eastern Europe may be accurate in noting the absence of any security-providing structure in the region, but it is misleading if the inference is made that the security vacuum must somehow be filled. International politics does not necessarily abhor a vacuum. The current regional power structure, with small, diverse, and relatively weak independent states floating between Russia and the West without any permanent and binding associations with either or with each other, could continue

indefinitely. The perceived necessity of alliance politics is a peculiarly European phenomenon, and perhaps it is waning.

There are good reasons, however, why alliance politics is part of the European tradition. The resurgence of armed conflict in Europe since the end of the Cold War has been confined to areas previously governed in a multilateral state, but now floating outside any alliance or security-community. Weak European states such as Bosnia and Georgia are highly vulnerable both to instability arising from the clash of interests within the state, and to intervention from more powerful neighbours who perceive themselves as stakeholders. There is no security in Europe without solidarity.

The idea of solidarity bridges the concept of security-community and the concept of a sphere of influence. A security-community exhibits solidarity because its members share a commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes and a commitment to mutual defence. A sphere of influence exhibits solidarity because the hegemonic power - benign or malign - disallows conflict among the states in its sphere and acts to prevent external intervention in their affairs.

No framework or design for European security can succeed which fails to acknowledge Russia's great power status. Even the most moderate of Russian politicians are adamant that the Soviet Union's defeat in the Cold War does not mean the end of the Russian sphere of influence in the areas where it has or claims historic ties. While there need be no return to the confrontational politics of the Cold War, the power structure in Europe is likely to stabilise (to a degree) into a familiar-looking bipolar balance, between the Western security-community on the one hand and the Russian sphere of influence on the other.

Central and Eastern Europe is the spoils of war. This is an ugly way of putting it, and not to be commended to speech-writers, but it is true nonetheless. The end of the Cold War was partly about the defeat of a global ideology, but is was also partly about the defeat of a great power, and the peace settlement inevitably involves a geopolitical adjustment to take into account the new balance of power. The Central and East European states want to be out of the Russian sphere; Russia no longer has the power to hold them there, and at present does not wish to do so; they want to be part of the West European and North Atlantic order. In

the circumstances it would be obtuse and short-sighted for the West not to try to bring them into the European security-community.

Our analysis has shown that there are no fundamental obstacles to achieving this over time. In terms of the internal aspect of security-community, the partner states are within reach of the levels of domestic stability enjoyed in Western Europe, and face no insuperable obstacles in reaching the same level of pacification and co-operation in inter-state relations. In terms of the external aspect of security-community, the incorporation of the Central and East European states is inseparable from their inclusion in the mutual security guarantees of NATO, which will require a significant development of will and capacity before it can happen. The two aspects of security-community are linked in the case of Central and Eastern Europe, and the move from grey zone to core depends on progress in both.

Our analysis also points the way to a strategy for bringing the partner states into the security-community. The strategy for expansion comprises four elements:

1) consolidating the global and regional normative framework for expansion;

2) creating the geopolitical space within which expansion can occur;

3) facilitating co-operation and integration, building the security-community, through encouragement and pressure;

4) building integrated defence capacity within NATO and in Central and Eastern Europe.

1) Consolidating the normative framework

A security-community has its own normative framework, and does not necessarily need a wider normative framework around it. Moreover, I have emphasised in this chapter that placing an unwarranted faith in global or regional collective security projects can actually impede the development of a security-community. But consolidation of the normative framework provided by the UN, the CSCE and the Council of Europe, however rickety, contradictory, and in some respects ethically questionable it may be, is essential background work to the expansion of the European security-community.

The wider normative framework serves two purposes. Because (for obvious historical reasons) there is such a large overlap between the norms of the international community and the norms of the security-community, it facilitates the transition from grey zone to core by providing rules and standards to guide and evaluate state conduct during the transition. As full members of the wider organisations, the Central and East European states are already stakeholders in the normative framework, and through compliance with it draw closer to the security-community without having to appear subject to Western dictat.

Secondly, and more importantly, the wider normative framework serves to soften the border of the security-community. Any expansion of Western institutions beyond the existing border at the old iron curtain risks creating new cleavages in Europe - between Hungary and Romania, between Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, between Central and Eastern Europe and Russia. The non-institutional character of the security-community allows it to have a soft border, helping to lessen this problem and encourage peaceful coexistence between an expanded core and an expanded grey zone. But that possibility exists only because there is a wider normative framework moderating international politics beyond the security-community border. The writ of the UN and CSCE may be feeble, but it runs inside the security-community, inside the Russian sphere of influence, and among the states currently floating in between. This makes evolutionary change easier across the whole continent.

Even as the hour of globalism passes, therefore, and disillusionment and disgust with the impotence and injustice of globalist institutions reasserts itself, it will be important to protect the legitimating function of their principal covenants.

2) Creating geopolitical space

I have stressed that a security-community is not a sanctuary from power politics. Its own internal freedom from power politics has to be sustained within a balance of power in which its member states are counted. Expanding the European security-community involves a reappraisal of European geopolitics, and action to create a safe space for expansion without instability. This is realpolitik, and it is a matter of diplomacy more than of armaments. Expansion does not need Russia's sanction, but it must not provoke Russia to aggression or

towards a politics of revanchism. Tacit recognition of the CIS as the Russian sphere of influence - within, of course, the global normative framework - claims the spoils of war for the West without driving Russia prematurely out of great power status as if the Cold War had ended in unconditional surrender. Close involvement of Russia and Turkey (and, in due course, Serbia) in the management of the continuing problems of the Balkans helps to fence off the chaos, defining the space of the security-community without disowning Western responsibility for participation in the collective management of regional conflict.

3) Facilitating co-operation and integration

The future of the European security-community depends in part on the development of relationships among sub-state and non-state actors, and states can only facilitate, not command or direct this sort of integration. Governments (including the EU) can and should increase state visits, ministerial and official visits and contacts, official and educational exchanges, town twinning, and funding for parastatal and NGO networks spanning Central and Eastern Europe and the existing security-community. Professional and business contacts, and individual travel and labour mobility, tend to defy government influence, but it would at least behove eastern and western governments alike to work harder at dismantling the obstacles of bureaucratic procedure, tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and paucity of information which are slowing the spontaneous growth of these important ties. The transnational foundations of the security-community, including the will to stand together, are only built over time.

4) Building integrated defence capacity

Finally, the expansion of the European security-community would be an illusion if the community did not have the capacity to mount an effective defence of the area of expansion. Without the capacity to stand together, the will to stand together is meaningless, and falls at the first hurdle; if the security-community falls at the first hurdle, it is not a security-community. That does not mean that, in order to bring Lithuania within the security-community, NATO needs to station an army corps on the Lithuanian-Russia border. But it does mean:

- ending the decline in defence budgets in Western and Eastern Europe, not allowing national armed forces levels to fall too far below CFE limits, and keeping American troops in Europe;

- developing NATO multinational forces, integrated at the lowest practicable level, to include all member states, especially new member states;

- holding multilateral exercises under the aegis of PFP throughout Central and Eastern Europe, and shifting the focus from peacekeeping to combat operations;

- using the PFP programme to develop civilian control of the military, defence planning and operational capabilities in the Central and East European states to the NATO standard.

The Central and East European states must have no doubt that neither simply being Central and East European states nor simply being in Partnership for Peace puts them on a yellow brick road to security guarantees. Developing the ties of security-community, and an active programme of military restructuring and integration are prerequisites.

Expanding the European security-community is one of the most important and one of the most difficult challenges facing contemporary European security policy. In the year 2000, there may be no tangible evidence to tell the casual observer whether that expansion has occurred or not, but success or failure will be abundantly obvious by the end of the first decade of the next century. Success will mean lasting peace in the whole of Europe west of Russia and north of the Balkans, and a EuroAtlantic alliance with two generations of non-aggressive deterrence behind it. Failure will mean continued uncertainty and exposure in Central and Eastern Europe, an introspective and troubled Western Alliance, and, in all probability, the winds of war rising again.