


THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

Seminar for junior academics
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Cesky Krumlov, 1-6/XI/1994

- a. Tentative programme
- b. List of participants
 1. "Czechoslovak history 1918-1993"/ Tomas Kryl, Radoslav Kusenda
 2. "European security: a myth or reality? : a German point of view"/ Sebastian Bartsch
 3. "European security: a myth or reality? : a Ukrainian point of view"/ Andrii Droniuk
 4. "European security: a myth or reality? : a US point of view"/ Sean Kay
 5. "European security: with or without North America? : a Canadian point of view : keeping America in"/ Allen Sens
 6. "European security: with or without North America? : a Belgian point of view"/ Tom Sauer
 7. "European security: with or without North America? : a Russian point of view"/ Alexander Kaffka
 8. "European security: with or without Russia? : [a Lithuanian point of view]"/ Marius Laurinavičius
 9. "European security: with or without North America? : a German point of view"/ Frank Umbach
 10. "European security: from Vladivostok to Vancouver? : a Greek point of view"/ Marina Stavropoulou
 11. "European security: from Vladivostok to Vancouver? : an American perspective"/ Stuart Kaufman
 12. "European security: from Vladivostok to Vancouver? : a Russian point of view"/ Valery Sarychev
 13. "NATO: role in reshaping the future security of Europe : partnership for peace: a Western view"/ Niklaas Hoekstra
 14. "NATO: role in reshaping the future security of Europe : partnership for peace: an Eastern point of view"/ Alexander Duleba
 15. "Declaration of the heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO headquarters, Brussels, on 10-11 January 1994"



Tentative Programme
Seminar on Future of European Security

1 - 6 November 1994 - CESHY KRUMLOV, Czech Republic

Tuesday: Arrival in Prague and Transfer to CESHY KRUMLOV
1 Nov 94 Evening welcome drinks/dinner followed by:
 ~~Austrian-Hungarian Empire in the Czech and Slovak Republics~~ by Mr. Tomas
 Kryl (Czech) and Mr. R. Kusenda (Slovak).

Wednesday **European Security: A myth or reality?**
2 Nov 94

AM: A German point of view (Mr. Bartsch)
 A French point of view (Ms. Bloch-Lainé)
 A Danish point of view (Ms. Hansen)
 A Czech point of view (Dr. Sedivy)
 General discussion

PM: An Ukrainian point of view (Mr. Droniuk)
 A Turkish point of view (Ms. Bostanoglu)
 General discussion

Evening: Guest speaker:
 Mr. Hans-Jochen Peters, Head, Central and Eastern Europe & Liaison Section -
 Political Affairs Division, NATO Headquarters, Brussels -
 "European Security: Where are we heading?"
 followed by
 Reception hosted by the Mayor of the city of Cesky Krumlov

Thursday: **European Security: With or without North America?**
3 Nov 94

AM: A US point of view (Dr. Kay)
 A Canadian point of view (Dr. Sens)
 A Belgian point of view (Mr. Sauer)
 General discussion

PM: ~~European Security: With or without Russia?~~
 A Russian point of view (Dr. Kaffka)
 A Lithuanian point of view (Mr. Laurinavicius)
 A German point of view (Mr. F. Umbach)
 General discussion

Evening: ~~Poland and its neighbours~~ by Dr. Jazwinski (Poland)

-2-

Friday
4 Nov 94

European Security: From Vladivostok to Vancouver?

AM: A UK point of view (Dr. C. Constantinou)
A Greek point of view (Ms. Stavropoulou)
A US point of view (Dr. Kaufman)
A Russian point of view (Dr. V. Sarychev)
General discussion

PM: Free

Evening: ~~Hungary, its past and future~~ by Dr. I. Szönyi (Hungary)

Saturday
5 Nov 94

NATO: Role in shaping the future security of Europe

AM: Can NATO's enlargement be unlimited? (Dr. F. Moroni)
Partnership for Peace, a western point of view (Mr. N. Hoekstra)
Partnership for Peace, an eastern point of view (Mr. A. Duleba)
General discussion

PM: ~~Conclusions of conferences~~, by Mr. Knutsen (Norway) and Mr. Koster
(The Netherlands)

Evening: Farewell drink and dinner

Sunday
6 Nov 94

Transfer to Prague and return

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS
CZECH SEMINAR
1-6 November, 1994 - CESKY KRUMLOV

Mr. Dipl. Pol. Sebastian BARTSCH	Scientific Assistant, Dept. Political Science, Free University, Berlin	GERMANY
Ms. Amaya BLOCH-LAINE	Researcher, Centre d'Etude des Relations entre Technologies et Stratégies (CREST) - Ecole Polytechnique, Paris	FRANCE
Ms. Burcu BOSTANOGLU	Research Assistant and Lecturer, Dept. Intern. Relations, Gazi University, Ankara	TURKEY
Dr. Costas CONSTANTINOU	Lecturer, Politics Department, Hull University	UNITED KINGDOM
Mr. Andrii DRONIUK	Lecturer, Central European University, Prague	UKRAINE
Mr. Alexander DULEBA	Researcher, Slovak Institute for International Studies, PRESOV	SLOVAK Republic
Ms. Birthe HANSEN	Researcher and Lecturer Institute of Political Science University of Copenhagen	DENMARK
Mr. Nikolaas HOEKSTRA	Staff member, Atlantic Association, The Hague	THE NETHERLANDS
Dr. Krzysztof JAZWINSKI	Deputy Director, Institute for International Relations. University of Warsaw.	POLAND X
Dr. Alexander KAFFKA	Researcher, Center for Military Policies, Institute of the USA and Canada, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow.	RUSSIA
Dr. Stuart KAUFMAN	Assistant Professor, Dept. of Political Science. University of Kentucky	USA
Mr. Sean KAY	Consultant and Associate Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Massachusetts, Amherst	USA
Mr. Bjorn Olav KNUTSEN	Research Associate. Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, Oslo	NORWAY
Mr. Rolf KOSTER	Researcher, Center for Peace Research, Catholic University, Nijmegen	THE NETHERLANDS
Mr. Tomas KRYL	Diplomat, Ministry Foreign Affairs, Prague	CZECH Republic
Mr. Radoslav KUSENDA	Diplomat, Planning Dept., Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bratislava	SLOVAK Republic

Mr. Marius LAURINAVICIUS	Journalist "Lietuvos rytas", Lithuanian Daily Newspaper, Vilnius	LITHUANIA
Dr. Federica MORONI	Researcher, Institute of International Affairs, Rome	ITALY
Dr. Valeriy SARYCHEV	Head of Section, Russia's Institute for Strategic Studies, Moscow	RUSSIA
Dr. Allen SENS	Instructor, Dept. Political Science University of British Columbia, Vancouver	CANADA
Mr. Tom SAUER	Scientific Assistant, Dept. Intern. Relations, Catholic University of Leuven	BELGIUM
Mr. Jiri SEDIVY	Research Assistant, Inst. of Politicology, Faculty of Philosophy Charles University, Prague	CZECH Republic X
Mrs. Marina STAVROPOULOU	Lawyer and Researcher, Hellenic Centre for European Studies, Athens	GREECE
Dr. Istvan SZÖNYI	Researcher, Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, Budapest	HUNGARY X
Mr. Dipl. Pol. Frank UMBACH	Researcher, Federal Institute for Eastern & International Studies, Cologne	GERMANY



①

Czechoslovak History 1918 - 1993
Tomas KRYL, Radoslaw KUSENDA
Ladies and Gentleman:

Allow me to express my pleasure having a chance to report at this seminar briefly on the Czechoslovak history from the very beginning in the year 1918 till the end in the year 1993, when the independent Czech and Slovak Republics were established.

At the beginning of my lecture it is necessary to remind that the Czechoslovak foreign policy was older than the independent state itself. Our foreign policy began to form within the World War I. Our representatives of the foreign "revolt" began to form an extensive diplomatic activity, which consequently played decisive role in the formation of our state. It is possible to say that the Czech nation in its desire for the independence sought an ally, first of all in Russia due to slavonic origin of both nations and at the same time in France. It is necessary to state that the Czech nation considered the Slovak nation as the closest ally, which under the Hungarian oppression was threatened with a complete fall.

In the course of the World War I. the original Czech constitutional platform metamorphosed into the idea to form an independent state. They realized that a chance to gain the national independence depended on the defeat of Austrian-Hungarian Empire. So that main representatives professor Tomas Garrigue Masaryk, Dr Edvard Benes and Milan Rastislav Stefanik linked the future of the Czech and Slovaks with final victory of The allies and the formation of a new democratic Europe with Czechoslovakia as its component.

Czech Foreign Committee was formed in 1915, later this committee was changed into the Czech National Council in the head with professor Masaryk. The Council soon received a support from expatriates who lived abroad, especially in the United States and Russia. The aim to gain the independence for our nations gained weight among the members of volunteer units of Czechoslovak legionnaires in Russia, France and Italy. Their members were recruited from prisoners of war and soldiers of Austro-Hungarian armed forces. By the end of the war the legions represented a force of about 100.000 men at arms.

In the year 1917 political representation at home as a whole started to support the Czech National Council abroad. In 1918 this Council gained a support of foreign Powers, which recognised the Council as the representative of an allied nation as well.

So called Pittsburgh's Agreement about the future status of Slovakia in Czechoslovak state was achieved on 30th May 1918 between the representatives of Czech and Slovak organizations in the U.S.A and signed by professor Masaryk.

A preliminary Czechoslovak government in abroad in the head with Masaryk was formed on 26th September 1918.

On October 28th 1918 the independence of Czechoslovakia was declared. This foundation of the republic in 1918 ended an historic struggle of several centuries duration for their national liberation from the rule of the Habsburgs.

So October 28th marks the most memorable date of the country's modern history and is observed as a National Day of the present Czech Republic.

Czechoslovakia shortly afterwards was recognised internationally. Czechoslovakia comprised the Czech Lands, which had existed as such since the 11th century, Slovakia which had been until 1918 a part of Hungary and Ruthenia also previously attached to Hungary. Czechoslovakia occupied an area of 140.408 sq. km and in the year 1921 had a population of 13,6 million including Czechoslovaks 64,7% (Czechs 50%, Slovaks 14,7%, Germans 22,8%, Hungarians 5,1%, Ruthenians 3,7%)

T.G. Masaryk was elected Czechoslovakia's first president, who insisted on a concept of humanitarian democracy, which he derived from the combined traditions of Bohemian reformation and Anglo-saxon parliamentarism.

The assurance of its international safety was the main task of the foreign policy of a newly established state. The first possibility to secure it was at the peace conference in Versailles. Czechoslovakia belonged to the victorious states, so its signature under the truce treaty.

At this conference Dr. Edvard Benes the first minister of Foreign Affairs with his excellent diplomatic activity contributed very much to its success and helped to secure a full recognition of Czechoslovakia as well as all its frontiers including Ruthenia and the Southern Slovak frontier on the Danube, Ipel and from the town Rimavska Sobota upto the estuary of the river Uh to the Laborec and along the river Uh to the Carpathian ridge.

The frontier between Czechoslovakia and Poland was formally set, but the definite demarkation was to be set by a special committee of the Great Powers one year later. But some areas remained to be an apple of discord for the future.

The conclusion of Saint Germain Agreement was the key event for Czechoslovakia in the year 1919. Here Austria fully recognised the independence of Czechoslovakia. On the same date,

on the 10th September 1919 Czechoslovakia signed so called Little Saint Germain Agreement where it pledged to keep the rights of national minorities on its territory.

The negotiation about the peace agreement with Hungary dragged out a very long time due to the existence of the Hungarian Soviet Republic and with an aim of a new anticommunist government to keep all the areas of so called Saint Stephen crown though their plans were unrealistic. The peace agreement between Hungary and Czechoslovakia was signed not sooner than on 4th June 1920 in Trianon.

The signature on the Trianon agreement ended the 1th stage in the building of the independent Czechoslovak state.

At that time Czechoslovakia ranked among the world's ten leading industrial countries, was selfsufficient in agriculture etc. The years between the wars represented the most fruitful era of this state. The international status, a factor which depend on the system of international stability was for the existence of the newly established state very important.

In these years Czechoslovak foreign policy was especially oriented on France, with which Czechoslovakia had very friendly relations, France granted a help to Czechoslovakia as well. The membership in so called "Little Entente" Little agreement with Yugoslavia and Rumania played a very significant role especially towards Hungary (and consequently against Germany). This agreement was not fruitful but at the very moment strengthened their consciousness.

As it was said Poland was the whole time a problematic neighbour due to the dispute over the area Tesinsko. Czechoslovakia was not successful to establish friendly relationship with its northern neighbour.

But the main source of danger was Germany. Czechoslovakia tried to minimize this threat as much as possible. But following years showed that this fear happend to be fateful.

It is necessary to state at this point that Czechoslovakia played an active role in a newly established League of Nations. In the period between two world wars Dr. E. Benes, the first ministr of Foreign Affairs and later on a president of Czechoslovakia played there an outstanding role and became a politician of a high european repute.

Now I wish to speak about the break of the history which influenced not only the history of Czechoslovakia, but the whole world too. From the early "30s" Nazi Germany became the main source of danger for the world peace.

From the very beginning, German nationalists and captains of industry refused to accept the outcome of the World War I. They continued to consider "Central Europe" as their exclusive sphere of influence. They considered the whole situation as provisional, and which a strong Germany could only change to their favour. Germans living in the Czech border region were to play a significant role in the realization of these aggressive plans.

Until the rise of Hitler, there was no serious Sudeten political movement which could ask for more freedom. Then in 1933 when Hitler became a chancellor, the virus of national socialism struck the Sudeten Germans. They immediately formed the Sudeten German Party under the leadership of Konrad Henlein, fully accepted Hitler's instructions that demands should be permanently made in such a way which would be unacceptable by the Czechoslovak government. Or as Henlein summarized "We must always demand so much that we can never be satisfied". The German minority got full support from Germany but from other abroad too. Henlein visited the United Kingdom to see Mr Robert Vansittar, chief diplomatic adviser to the Foreign secretary and other British officials and nobleman. He spoke about the necessity of disintegration of the Czech political structure.

The British and French governments applied the pressure upon the Czechoslovak government with the aim to grant far reaching concessions to the Sudeten Germans. In 1937 during the visit of the French minister of foreign affairs in Prague proclaimed that France would do their utmost to prevent a new war, but refused to grant any guarantee to help Czechoslovakia as per the allied agreement in case of an attack on it.

Czechoslovakia as the only island of democracy in the centre of Europe began to stand alone. The year 1938 did not fortell Czechoslovakia anything good. A new French government in the head with Mr. Blume confirmed the validity of the mutual agreement, but this government was very quickly changed with the government headed by Daladier, who followed the steps of the British government which refused to express to the problem of Czechoslovakia. Both followed the policy of so called appeasment of Hitler's Germany.

On 20th February 1938 Hitler in his Berliner speech spoke about the requirment to liberate more than 10 millions of Germans from the oppression. It was clear he spoke about 7 millions Austrians and 3 millions Germans who lived in the Czech frontier area. In a short time Germany occupied Austria.

The Czechoslovak republic was prepared to defend itself against an attack by Germany which was manifested by mobilizing its armed forces on May 20th and Septembr 23rd 1938.

On September 19th British and French governments jointly presented proposals which Czechoslovakia would have to accept. All territories inhabited more than 50% by Sudeten Germans had to be turned over to Germany etc. They were rejected. But the British and French anxious to avoid war at any cost insisted on their proposals and increased their pressure and told that Czechoslovakia could not expect any help from France or Britain. Chamberlain and Daladier went to Munich to meet Hitler and Mussolini and to sign the shameful agreement that allowed the Nazis to march into Czechoslovakia without a single shot being fired. Deprived from the international backing president Benes and the cabinet bowed and accepted this dictate or as it was said in our country Munich betrayal. The country was deprived of its historical frontiers, as well as of a natural geographical border formed by a mountain range heavily fortified ridges which were essential for its defence.

Hundreds and thousands were forced to leave their homes and looked emergency accommodation in the middle of the country. This event and especially behaviours of France and Great Britain left for a very long time in the minds of Czechs and Slovaks a very big scar. It is necessary to point out that especially France disappointed very much owing to the fact that during the period of the "First republic" France was considered as the best and most closed ally.

The post-Munich Second Republic lasted only 6 months. On March 14th 1939 Slovaks nationalists from undemocratic Slovak People's Party proclaimed the establishment of the Slovak state, which was converted into a satellite of Third Reich. Hungary was allowed to occupy Ruthenia. On March 15th Nazi troops occupied the Czech lands which were transformed to German Protectorate Bohemia and Moravia. On this date Czechoslovakia as an independent and democratic state disappeared.

A total of 350.000 Czechoslovak citizens (including 130.000 Jews) fell on the battle fields and as members of resistance or were killed in Nazi concentration camps and jails during World War II. Czechoslovak soldiers fought on all World War II continents, pilots defended London, bombed enemy territories, land troops fought in the Middle East, North Africa and Ukraine.

Czechoslovakia was liberated on May 9th 1945, when the Red Army entered Prague. In Yalta the Allies agreed upon the liberation of Czechoslovakia by the Red Army. It is possible to say, that this decision cost plenty of Czech lives during the May revolution. Czech airmen, who helped to defend London to fly and help fighting Prague, the American troops which liberated Western part of Bohemia, were in Pilsen not allowed to continue in fighting and to liberate Prague.

The liberation of Czechoslovakia by the Red Army strengthened traditional sympathies for Russia and at the same time enhanced the prestige of the communist party, British and French stances at the time of Munich were still very much in living memory.

The communist party which became the country's leading political force after 1946 parliamentary elections. Stalin prepared Czechoslovakia's incorporation into the neo-colonist Soviet bloc.

Their election victory earned the Communists a strong power. Their leader became a prime minister. To achieve their goals of eliminating parliamentary democracy. Democratically minded cabinet members protested in February 1948 in a collective resignation. Gottwald used the threat of civil war to induce president Benes in accepting their resignation and appointing a pro-communist cabinet. President Benes bowed under this pressure. Parliamentary elections in May 1948 were no longer carried out according to democratic rules and consequently this regime won a 90% approval for its policy. In June 1948 ill president Benes resigned.

The Communist dictatorship ruled in Czechoslovakia for 41 years. It is not possible to speak about the Czechoslovak foreign policy in this period. It simply and without objections copied the Soviet policy.

The year 1968 was the only exception of these years, when Czechoslovak Communists tried to reform the system, demanded democratization of society etc. This period is called "Prague spring". Alexander Dubček the new trend's leading representative won a support of the majority of citizens for his concept of "Socialism with a human face", for a more liberal political system and more independent international standing.

The Prague Spring which represented a threat to the Soviet model of socialism was destroyed by the armed forces of the U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany and Poland on 21st August 1968. By this fact the Soviet Union lost the reputation, which had gained in 1945. The overwhelming majority of the population greeted the invasion with passive resistance. The leaders of Prague Spring were removed from their posts.

The new Communist party leadership headed by Husak, Bilak, Jakes and others were considered as traitors. The period of 1970's and 1980's of their ruling was called "Normalization" and meant the deepening of Czechoslovak economic, cultural and above all moral decline. The Czechoslovak foreign policy was much more obedient to the Soviet one. All reformist steps were revoked. The

only exception was the establishment of the Czechoslovak Federal Republic, with two states the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.

Plenty of people were deprived of the possibility to work at their posts, the Soviet invasion generated a new wave of emigration. The apathy spread in the Czech and Slovak nations for nearly 21 years. In the course of the 1980's the first civic initiative Charter 77, tried to awake the whole nation to defend human and civic rights, to observe Czechoslovak compliance with the Helsinki Charter etc.

The totalitarian regime crumbling internally and weakened internationally with the effects of the Gorbachov "Perestrojka", changes in Poland and Hungary influenced the people in our country especially our young generation. A mounting resistance which culminated with demonstrations held on the anniversary of Jan Palachs act in January 1989. On 17th November 1989 - international day of students, Prague students organized a demonstration which was very brutally suppressed by police forces. It provoked a student strike in the following days, which was joined by Prague actors. This strike gained sympathy of the whole nation. The wave of public discontent rapidly spread in the whole country. The existing human rights movement amalgamated in the Civic forum and represented the anticommunist feelings. The Communist government handed resignation and a new government where Communists and Civic forum had equal representation was formed. Communist power collapsed upon the election of a new president on December 29th. The office was assumed by Vaclav Havel, who had earned international reput as a dramatic, as one of the leader of Charter 77. Definite collapse of the Communist power was finalized by first parliamentary election in June 1990.

Unfortunately I am sorry to say no quiet development followed after the collapse of Communist power. Political life in Slovakia after the revolution took a somewhat different turn. The process of economic transformation caused a little more painful consequences, opened opportunities for platforms of populist and national orientations calling for the independence of Slovakia.

The result of the parliamentary elections of June 1992 showed the differences between the interests of these two republics. The Czechs voted the Civic Democratic Party headed by Vaclav Klaus, representative of radical transformation of the national economy. The Slovaks voted Vladimir Meciar's Movement for a democratic Slovakia, representative of a slower progress. Post-electoral talks between the two leaders soon revealed that their platforms are different to secure coexistence in a common state. The Slovak political representation made know its negative attitude towards federative form of the republic. So both representations agreed upon the split of Czechoslovakia as to December 31st 1992.

The division of Czechoslovakia was received in the Czech Lands with regret. It was performed in a peaceful and orderly manner. So the more than 70 year's history of the common state of Czech and Slovaks was closed. We can only hope that both states will gain a full respect on the international stage. As far as the Czech republic is concerned I am firmly convinced in it.

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European Security: A Myth or Reality?

A German Point of View

Sebastian Bartsch

Universität Potsdam
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Lehrstuhl für Internationale Politik
Postfach 90 03 27
D-14439 Potsdam

Phone: 49 - 331 - 977 32 20
Fax: 49 - 331 - 977 33 25

**Seminar for Junior Academics
November 1-6, 1994
Cesky Krumlov, Czech Republic**

Introduction

In view of the war in former Yugoslavia and profound internal and/or external insecurity which threatens stability and even political survival of various states in Eastern Europe, the term "European security" seems not well suited for a description of reality. Nevertheless, it should also not be too easily dismissed as a pure myth, for Western Europe has become the most pristine example of a democratic zone of stable peace. Thus, "European security" is at least a partial, i.e. regionally limited reality.¹

The current division of Europe into a compact region of stable peace and regions of instability, crises, violent conflicts and war signifies a marked difference from the era of East-West confrontation. Of course, in this era, too, states were fundamentally dissimilar with regard to their military and political capabilities, their geostrategic position, et cetera. While a number of states could feel relatively secure in the shade of superpower rivalry, others became victims of military intervention (e.g. Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Cyprus) or scenes of civil war (e.g. in Northern Ireland). However, nuclear stalemate between the two superpowers and a rough military balance between East and West lent a high degree of stability to the overall structure of the bipolar state system.² Moreover, the peril of large-scale nuclear annihilation represented an important element of equality in European security affairs.

As a result of the collapse of communism and the end of bipolarity, the scenery of European security has become much more diversified. For the states of Western Europe the situation has significantly improved owing to the disappearance of the military threat posed by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. (By the way, it is Germany who has won most in this respect.) The position of the former East European allies of the Soviet Union and the Baltic states is more ambiguous. Indeed, they have recovered freedom and independence, but they are also afraid of becoming isolated in a security vacuum between a stable but complacent community of West European states and an incalculable great-power in the East, namely Russia. Finally, some of the successor-states of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia exist in almost total insecurity with only a slim chance of consolidation.

Given this profound security differential - i.e. the existence of war zones side by side with a large area of stable peace or, as one of the most clear-sighted observers of European security affairs

1 In this paper the term "Europe" refers to the "CSCE-Europe", thereby including the United States and Canada as actors. If not otherwise defined in the text, "Eastern Europe" is used as a generic term describing the former communist states in Europe.

2 See John Lewis Gaddis, 'The Long Peace. Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System', in: *International Security*, Vol. 10 (1986), No. 4, pp. 99-142.

has put it, the remarkable high degree of "inequality in matters of war and peace"³ -, the task of enhancing European security can be easily conceived of in terms of preserving and extending the zone of peace which already exists in Western Europe.⁴ Unquestionably, progress has been made in this direction. A number of East European states are in a fair way to developing stable democratic political systems. Furthermore, the West European states are supporting the transition to democracy in Eastern Europe, for instance by transforming and opening their security institutions: NATO and WEU have taken on new tasks in view of new security challenges. They have also developed new forms of security cooperation with the states of Eastern Europe. While NATO seems ready to offer full membership to some of the former Warsaw Pact members - at least in a vague perspective -, WEU's future role is hard to anticipate because its development will be closely linked to the currently unforeseeable dynamics of integration in the European Union.⁵ The participating states of CSCE, the only genuine all-European security institution so far, have also developed new institutions and mechanisms, especially in the realm of conflict prevention and crisis management.⁶ Perhaps even more important, they have agreed on an extensive set of principles, norms and rules for the construction and working of constitutional states and democratic institutions. In the same field the Council of Europe is of growing importance, too.

But, simultaneously, the war in former Yugoslavia has become the most dismal symbol of the Western states' lack of political will and/or ability to export or "project" security to the crisis regions of Eastern Europe and the Balkans. In other words, the extension of the Western zone of peace turns out to be much more difficult than expected in 1989/90. Why is this so? As will be argued in the following paragraphs, all-European security strategies built on an extension of the Western zone of peace have their limitations. Among other things,

- * they provide no concrete answers to the special features of ethnic conflicts;
- * they run the risk of disregarding the fundamental change in the international (systemic) political context that has taken place in 1989/90;

3 Nicole Gnesotto, *Lessons of Yugoslavia* (Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper No. 14, March 1994), pp. 1-2.

4 For an excellent presentation of this view of European security see Michael Brenner, 'Multilateralism and European Security', in: *Survival*, Vol. 35 (1993), No. 2, pp. 138-155.

5 See Mathias Jopp, *The Strategic Implications of European Integration* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper No. 290, July 1994).

6 See Kari Mänttölä, 'Prospects for Cooperative Security in Europe: The Role of the CSCE', in: Michael R. Lucas (ed.), *The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Cooperation* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1993), pp. 1-29.

- * they tend to overlook structural problems of liberal democracies to pursue rational foreign and security policies.

New Types of Conflict and the Lack of Promising Counter-Strategies

Perhaps the most striking change in European security is the replacement of the risk of major war by a diffusion of risks and sources of instability. But this diversity notwithstanding, more and more conflicts in Europe take their rise from politically mobilized and radicalized sentiments of ethnic affiliation.⁷ Ethnic conflicts are extremely complex phenomena, not only with regard to their primary causes, but also because of the quasi-automatic involvement of third-party governments and organizations as patrons of one of the parties. Certain countries possess an ethnic mix so representative of regional rivalries that their domestic politics are nearly indistinguishable from regional quarrels. As a delicate mixture of internal and international conflict, most ethnic conflicts unfold in an ambiguous normative environment, characterized by the contradicting norms of state sovereignty and territorial integrity on the one hand and self-determination on the other.⁸ By their very nature they tend to turn everyone into participants and - at least potential - combatants. The objectives of adversaries in ethnic conflicts are mostly wholly incompatible. And, last but not least, ethnic conflicts are characterized by a seemingly irrational affective dynamic and strong personal and collective beliefs and solidarities.

Conflicts of this type raise serious problems for any attempt to build a new European security architecture. Obviously, traditional concepts of deterrence and defense are hardly helpful for ethnic conflict management. But non-military, political-diplomatic efforts of mediation by third-parties are often doomed to failure as well. They are complicated from the very beginning by the said contradiction of normative principles, by the multiplicity of actors involved and by dynamics of a seemingly irrational nature.

As the spread of democracy in Eastern Europe shows, democratization can both temper and exacerbate ethnic tensions. Certainly, democracy and the rule of law are necessary conditions of peaceful ethnic conflict resolution, but these conditions do not suffice in any single case.⁹

7 See John Chipman, 'Managing the Politics of Parochialism', in: *Survival*, Vol. 35 (1993), No. 1, pp. 143-170, 143-145.

8 See Hurst Hannum, *Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination. The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990), pp. 3-118.

9 See Renée de Nevers, 'Democratization and Ethnic Conflict', in: *Survival*, Vol. 35 (1993), No. 2, pp. 31-48.

After the End of Bipolarity:

Extension or Erosion of the Zone of Peace

Any conceptualization of European security as an extension of the Western zone of peace has to take into account that Western integration was facilitated - if not rendered possible at all - by at least two interrelated conditions: (i) the confrontation with communism and the existence of the Soviet Union as a common - i.e. unifying - enemy; (ii) the existence of the United States as an "Intra-Western European" balancer.

Western cooperation and integration - be it in political/economic terms in the framework of the EC or in political/military terms in NATO - has been essentially an attempt to concentrate and improve Western political, economic and military capabilities in view of the fundamental threat posed by communism. Only the confrontation between two antagonistic ideologies and modes of political organization, two (nuclear) superpowers and alliances put an end to European multipolar balance-of-power-policies and shifting alliances and permitted the development of a new mode of organizing security in Europe. Thus, it is important to remember that the political "West" is by no means a quasi-natural construct. "It took the presence of a life-threatening, overtly hostile 'East' to bring it into existence and to maintain its unity".¹⁰

Additionally, it is doubtful that West European integration would have developed that far without the active involvement of the United States in European security affairs. As Josef Joffe has put it, America "has acted as the indispensable catalyst of integration"¹¹ in that it protected the West Europeans not only against others (i.e. against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact), but also against themselves. Above all, it facilitated integration by reassuring Britain, France and other victims of German aggression in World War II against a renewed German threat.

Today the unifying force of a common enemy and threat is not at hand. "Instability" as such cannot compensate for this.¹² Furthermore, serious questions remain with regard to the future U.S. engagement in European security affairs.¹³ Thus, the "logic of develop

10 Owen Harries, 'The Collapse of "The West"', in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72 (1993), No. 4, pp. 41-53, p. 42.

11 Josef Joffe, 'Collective Security and the Future of Europe: Failed Dreams and Dead Ends', in: *Survival*, Vol. 34 (1992), No. 1, p. 47. See also by the same author *The Limited Partnership: Europe, the United States and the Burdens of Alliance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

12 See Joffe, 'Collective Security', op. cit., pp. 39-40.

13 For a discussion of competing options for U.S. policy see Phil Williams/ Paul Hammond/ Michael Brenner, 'Atlantis Lost, Paradise Regained? The United States and Western Europe After the Cold War', in: *International Affairs*, Vol. 69 (1993), No. 1, pp. 1-17.

ment" of the existing zone of peace has come to an end in certain respects since 1989/90. There is a fundamental difference between the (former) creation of a zone of stable peace in Western Europe on the one hand and the current and future task of extending this zone to Eastern Europe. Two conclusions should be drawn from this: First, even if transitions to Western-style democracies succeed in Eastern Europe, it is highly uncertain whether this enlarged zone of peace can become as coherent as the Western zone has been in the era of East-West conflict. Second, the Western zone of peace itself could seriously suffer from the loss of supporting conditions of the Cold War era. Currently, there are both indications of further integration and symptoms of renationalization.

Peaceful Democracies and the Spread of Peace

The argument that democratic political structures form a pre-condition for stable peace orders in international relations has become conventional wisdom among most Western political scientists and policy-makers. In fact, various studies have revealed that democratic states rarely fight each other.¹⁴ And although some serious criticism against this thesis has been launched,¹⁵ the empirical evidence seems compelling. Thus, democratization appears to be the most promising strategy of enhancing European security after the end of East-West conflict: if all states of Europe were democratic, war among them would be almost impossible.

Nevertheless, effusive optimism is out of place since - even if the correlation between democracy and peace holds - questions remain. For instance: How responsive are democracies to their mutual security needs in case they are threatened from outside, i.e. from a non-democratic state? (Note, that a group of democratic states is by no means equivalent to an alliance.) A related question is: In how far are liberal democracies able to safeguard their security "out of area"? Most of the research on "democratic peace" has shown janusfaced democracies: While they do not fight each other, they are frequently involved in military disputes and war with authoritarian regimes. But the question is whether this really holds for the liberal democracies of Western Europe at the end of the twentieth century. The Western states' reaction to the war in former Yugoslavia raises serious doubts.

14 On the state of the art see Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Steve Chan (ed.), special issue of *International Interactions*, Vol. 18 (1993), No. 3; *Democracy and Foreign Policy: Community and Constraint*, special issue of *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 35 (1991), No. 2.


15 See John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future. Instability in Europe After the Cold War', in: *International Security*, Vol. 15 (1990), No. 1, pp. 5-56, 48-51; Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', in: *International Security*, Vol. 18 (1993), No. 2, pp. 44-79.

All these questions point at a critical aspect of the "Democracies do not fight each other"-approach: It only covers relations and interactions *within* the club of democratic states. But from this does not follow that democratic states are equally well suited to fulfill their individual and collective (external) security needs. Modern democracies are faced with structural impediments for a rational foreign and security policy. For instance, because democratic governments are short-lived and can be removed periodically, democracies often lack the courage to embrace policies which reach beyond day-to-day crisis management. Furthermore, democracy, individualism and the economic (rather than military) orientation of Western societies make military action against non-democratic states difficult, especially if military operations promise to be lengthy and costly. Even clear-cut aggressions, ongoing atrocities and war crimes like those committed by Serbs in former Yugoslavia are not sufficient conditions for determined Western reactions.¹⁶ This tendency is reinforced by the fact that the use of force has become almost unthinkable in the era of East-West division owing to the rationality of nuclear deterrence. Today, managing crises and non-nuclear risks makes it necessary to accept as normal once again the possible use of punitive or even preventive force by the democracies themselves. But Western democracies and their publics have become unaccustomed to doing that.

Conclusion

"European security" is neither a pure myth nor perfect reality - it is a partial reality instead. Given the existence of war zones side by side with a large area of stable peace, the task of enhancing European security can be conceived of as an extension of the Western zone of democratic peace. However, political scientists and policy-makers must guard against wishful thinking and short-sighted historical analogies. Otherwise the European security debate runs the risk of becoming confused by a new myth.

16 According to Nicole Gnesotto, this is a symptom of a moral crisis of Western democracies: "The refusal to allow, in the new European order, the triumph of ethnic cleansing, (...) could have been a sufficiently common element for the West to put together a joint prohibition of barbarism in Europe. This was not the case. The truth of the Yugoslav conflict is that our democracies are in such a state of crisis themselves that they are no longer capable of differentiating between the manageable and the unacceptable, even in the case of Serbia"; Gnesotto, *Lessons of Yugoslavia*, op. cit., p. 11.



European Security: A Myth or Reality?

A Ukrainian Point of View

Andrii Droniuk

Department of International Relations,
Lviv University, Ukraine

Phone: 42 2 670.92.901

Fax: 42 2 270.280

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Seminar on Future of European Security.

EUROPEAN SECURITY: A myth or reality? /A Ukrainian point of view/

*by Andrii Droniuk, Department of International Relations,
Lviv University, Ukraine.*

The collapse of the Berlin Wall, and dissolution of the Soviet Union leading to the emergence of a number of newly independent states, suddenly made it evident to the West that Europe does not finish at the German and Austrian eastern borders. Feeling much more secure within the enlarged Europe, West European citizens even raised the questions of the purpose of the North Atlantic Alliance and the US presence in Europe.

However, War in the Balkans followed by general instability in the East-Central region proved that establishing a new post Cold War European political order is entirely connected with the problem of the future European security. Moreover, the permanent intentions of Central and East European states to join NATO and West European security institutions proves that possibility of armed conflict in Europe has not been eliminated.

What are the general reasons that force these countries to look for new security shade under the NATO "umbrella"? First and the foremost, is the historical thread of Russian imperialism and the possibility of new confrontation in the continent. The other two are probable re-emergence of local ethnic and latent border conflicts in the Eastern region, and fear of democracy failure in some countries. In the last case the government may be taken over by a narrow interest or extremely nationalistic group, which may pursue aggressive policies harming the larger society.

Under the present situation, characterized by the wide spread of democracy followed by rapid institutional growth, deep involvement of the West in Eastern transitional processes, and rising significance of international organizations, the latter outcome seems

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hardly possible, at least on the European territory. As to the regional conflicts, all of them have some historical base closely connected with previous imperial political order at the territory of the involved states. The War in the Balkan peninsula and regional tensions in the ex-USSR are the most vital examples with an imperial origin. The first is a consequence of Tito's mini-empire in former Yugoslavia, while the second are the result of imperial policy of Russia within the Soviet Union.

Quite the opposite situation is observed in Western Europe, where lack of any territorial claims between the countries may be explained by the rejection of imperial thinking after the Second World War. Furthermore, a multipolar balanced system proved to be much more efficient in providing for further integrational processes among the countries. On the other hand, revival of any empire in Europe would inevitably lead to the bipolar system of mutual confrontation. Therefore, contemporary return to multipolarity in Europe, although followed by a number of temporary regional conflicts, is much less dangerous in a long run, than returning back to the bipolar system, even when speaking about economic opposing.

This simple conclusion is unfortunately much more evident to ordinary Europeans than to political leaders of such superpowers as the United States and Russia. American political and economic policy over the last years demonstrated US preferences to deal with only one actor in the East European scene. From their point of view, Europe divided into two spheres of influence looks much more secure than when split into small independent areas. But that misses the point that if Russia does not follow the democratic route of development trying to establish new kind of empire, the possibility of large regional conflicts or even of global European crisis becomes inevitable. To all the above, the experience in managing the Balkan crisis proved the impossibility of the West to prevent the emergence of such conflicts, if they are out of the NATO's traditional area of control.

Assuming the worse possible outcome, Ukraine, being the most sensitive to Russian west-oriented intentions, may become the key to the future European security. Considering its important geopolitical location, even today the problems of European security can not be

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viewed separately from the issues of Ukrainian national security.

A short review of some historical facts is indispensable to prove the impact of imperial policy on general geopolitical situation in Europe. It may be particularly useful in interpreting the present content of Ukrainian-Russian relations. First of all the European experience proves, that only complete dismantling of empires which existed on its territory would provide for full security in the continent. For instance, there has been no threat from Austria since the Habsburg empire was ruined. Moreover, the neutral status of Austria after the Second World War contributed much to European security during the Cold War. The only mistake made was to leave Yugoslavian mini-empire alive. The painful results of it are quite evident. The other example is the Kaiser's empire. Its defeat in the First World War was not enough to prevent the second one. Only full collapse combined with the division of Germany assured international community in its security.

Unfortunately, this has not been true in the case of the Russian empire. After every defeat it found some means to establish new kind of "prison of nations". The final goal of imperial unity was reached by giving second-order benefits to the colonies or even by retreating from some territories. That gave a sign of giving up on international scene and gave the necessary time to recover. Here are some examples from the history. After the 1856 Crimean War defeated Russia had to abolish serfdom and to sell Alaska. The "October Manifest" giving some freedom to national movements, and retreat from Manchuria as a result of losing the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. Finally, the First World War and the year 1917, when Finland, Poland, Bessarabia and Baltic states succeeded in gaining independence, afterward the other colonies had to stand all the horrors of the Soviet empire.

The current geopolitical situation is nothing more than the result of the next Empire's defeat in the Cod War. However, the experience of conducting "peaceful" war appeared to be very useful. Today we are witnesses of "peaceful" recovering of the old empire under a new democratic image.

Encouraged by the tolerant position of the West European

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leaders, and much more by the direct support of the US officials, Russia consistently tries to bring up the parts of its previous possessions together, this time by means of more flexible policy, supported, however, by strong economic arguments, and much rarely by military ones. After escalating political and national tensions between or within the previous republics, it offers its "peacekeeping" services and introduces its troops in the area of conflict under the slogan of "defending the Russian-speaking minority". Combined with continuous economic pressure, this policy is aimed at persuading these countries that they are not able to survive independently of Russia. The scenarios of the events in Caucasus, Tadjikistan, Moldova, and even of Crimean attempts are quite similar. As a result some states themselves become initiators of reunification with Russia. Such is, for instance, the position of the current Belarus leaders. The recent declaration of the Kazakhstan president of the creation of the Euro-Asian Union including Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine demonstrates the new approach to the revival of the old Empire.

Unfortunately, the imperial politics carried out by Russian authorities has great support among the wide society. The results of the last elections to the Russian parliament is the most striking example. Statistic data also proves that the majority of Russian population still think that Russian borders match with the borders of the previous Soviet Union. Proclaiming the Ukrainian city of Sevastopol a part of Russian territory by the previous Russian parliament was approved by 51 percent of the population, while the President Yeltsin, who opposed this decision, found support of only 12 percent of the citizens.

Last but not least pillar of Russian imperialism is post-communist militarism. Happy with Russian troops' withdrawal from the Central Europe, the West forgets that the largest army in the world did not disappear. Thousands of servicemen used to the relatively high standard of living in Central Europe, who suddenly found themselves somewhere in Siberia with very slight future prospects, form a tremendous factor of social instability. Combined with insufficient development of civilian and academic institutions with military expertise, and high level of economy militarisation,

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militarism may become a real political threat to newly born Russian democracy. The October events in Moscow illustrated its high potential.

Economic decline and impoverishing of the population also contribute to rising social tensions. As a result people may become more open to authoritarian and even xenophobic influences. According to Mr. Popadiuk, previous Ukrainian ambassador to the US, the reason of both Washington and the West concentrating on Russia is based on the belief that its economic and political success will have a positive influence on other republics. This problem has two aspects. First, the failure of democratic forces in Moscow might create conditions conducive to the return of previous totalitarianism and the restoration of the empire. Secondly, even a democratic way of development does not guarantee Russia's appropriate behavior on international scene. All large countries, even democratic ones, have, and are ruled, first of all, by their national interests¹. Anyway, at least one thing is quite evident. In the case of possible confrontation, the political position of Ukraine will be crucial for all-European security.

Until now the political orientation of Ukraine was clear. Keeping strictly to the Declaration of Sovereignty, and trying to maintain its neutral status, it showed a permanent tendency towards Western democracies, followed by attempts to raise its international significance. Despite continuous pressure from the East and inner economic difficulties, Ukrainian diplomacy consistently shifted its priorities to the West. Establishing direct ties with neighbor countries and wide involvement in international and European organizations were the prior tasks of Ukrainian foreign policy. It became a full member of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), was the first Community of Independent States (CIS) country to sign the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union (EU), among the first joined NATO's "Partnership for Peace" initiative.

Ukrainian contribution to the international peacekeeping

¹Roman Popadiuk. Facts External, but Important. Uriadovyi Kurier, No 29, February 19, 1994.

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initiatives is also significant. Being among the founders of United Nations (UN), it takes an active part in its peacekeeping activity. Ukraine is also signatory to several regional security initiatives, such as the Subcarpathian Council of Interregional Cooperation, The Black Sea Regional Cooperation, and Baltic-Black Confederation. Moreover, it was the initiative of the Ukrainian's first President Leonid Kravchuk to establish Central European Security Zone.

The weak point in Ukrainian foreign policy was its position towards nuclear weapons located on its territory. The Ukrainian approach to the problem is explained by national state security goals, the country's international significance, and its extremely difficult economic situation. The myth about nuclear threat coming from Ukraine has no real background, as all the nuclear armaments still remain under Moscow's control. They endanger European security no more than nuclear power stations situated in Ukraine, which, however, can not be removed anywhere.

Nonetheless, after signing up Trilateral agreement in Moscow by Presidents Clinton, Yeltsin and Kravchuk, the attempts to create the image of the "Ukrainian nuclear monster" failed completely. As Mr. Michaylo Doroshenko, Ukraine's new President's Press and Information Service Director stated, "there is hope that Ukraine would adhere to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty until the end of this year"². The decision on removing all the nuclear weapons from its territory after receiving the necessary security guarantees fully proves peaceful intentions of Ukrainian foreign policy. However its impact on Ukrainian international significance still remains unclear.

Taking into account the recent changes in Ukrainian policy its future international position becomes particularly significant. The prevailing of the left-wing forces in the parliament, and the rather pro-Russian orientation of President Kuchma immediately influenced the content of Ukrainian foreign policy. For example, Foreign Minister Mr. Udovenko's statement about the priority of the relations with Russia and other CIS countries, and Mr. Kuchma's readiness to sacrifice national political interests in favor of economic ones,

²President's Declaration on NPT. Molod Ukrainy, No 111, September 24, 1994.

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evidently draws a new politic line to the East³. Such a shift may be more than dangerous for the future European security. Any attempts to establish new kind of Ukrainian-Russian union will, first of all, lead to the creation of new Eastern Empire, and, secondly, cause immediate reaction of nationally oriented Western Ukrainian regions. The current Balkan conflict may look like a children's game in comparison with the picture of possible confrontation in Ukraine. Escaping such an outcome depends to large extent on two factors: whether the present Ukrainian leadership would be flexible enough to balance the discrepancies between the East and the West of the country, and on the position of other European Countries and the US towards Ukraine.

Ukraine's future role will increase significantly if European states look at it from the position of long term European security. However, it is quite evident that direct involvement of Ukraine in contemporary European security order based on NATO and EU common defence policy is more than unreal. Moreover, mainly because of economic reforms failure, Ukraine is losing its chance to become a strong member of the Central European security system. On the other hand, reunification with Russia will encourage Russian imperialists to take further steps to approach its old borders and may result in the number of conflicts on the Ukrainian territory.

Therefore, the only possibility is to try to maintain an independent neutral status by means of balanced policy between East and West. Although, the prospect of being some kind of "buffer zone" is not the prominent one, it is much preferable to being a colony. It is also the best temporary solution of the security problem in the region. Development of the independent Ukraine will not only hinder the revival of Russian empire, but under favorable circumstances it may contribute to forming positive international role of Russia. Economic competition, rather than one-side dependent cooperation, will accelerate transitional processes in both countries.

Finally, establishing strong protected borders between Ukraine and Russia will be helpful in eliminating such matters violating

³Hennadiy Udovenko. Foreign Policy Must Be Unique.
Holos Ukrainy, No 176, September 16, 1994.

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European security as drugs trade, refugees, organized crime, contraband of armament and dangerous substances.

Strengthening present Ukrainian position demands, however, substantial efforts from the West. It is the turn of Europe to prove the significance of independent Ukraine. Even insignificant priorities shifting combined with economic assistance will raise the confidence of Ukrainian citizens, especially those from the East, and will prevent a chain of possible ethnic conflicts.

The final goal of complete European security should be approached both by establishing a set of bilateral agreements, and by rapid development and restructuring European political and security institutions. This will provide for wider involvement, up to full membership, of developing European democracies in different aspects of European being, for establishing multilateral balanced political order, and for compensation of reduced American presence in the continent. Mr. Max van der Stoep, CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, determines the significance of urgent Western contribution: "I do not think that Europe can afford more of the bloody conflicts that now devastate some of her regions. If we do not invest enough energy in preventing conflicts before they erupt, we will be presented with a much larger bill in the near future"⁴.

Predicting the future is not possible without some historical imagination. Referring back to the origins of the Soviet empire, suppose that some part of the costs which were spent by Western countries on unsuccessful attempts of tsarist generals, had been redirected to maintaining the independent Ukrainian state, that existed at that time. If so had happened, maybe the problem of European security would not be under discussion today.

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European Security: With or without North America?

A US Point of View

Sean KAY

Department of Political Science
University of Massachusetts at Amherst
United States of America

Phone: 1 431 545 2438
Fax: 1 431 - 549 3349

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THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY: WITH OR WITHOUT THE UNITED STATES?

by Sean Kay
Department of Political Science
University of Massachusetts at Amherst
United States of America

prepared for the NATO Seminar for Junior Academics
on "The Future of European Security"
Czech Republic: November 1994

Final Draft

Sean Kay is an American specialist in European Security and post-Soviet affairs. Currently a Lecturer and a Senior Doctoral Candidate at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, he has been a Research Assistant at the North Atlantic Assembly of NATO in Brussels and a co-recipient of a NATO Fellowship Grant. He has written and published a number of articles addressing the future of NATO and on Russian foreign and military policy.

THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY: WITH OR WITHOUT THE UNITED STATES?

by Sean Kay

THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN SECURITY: DOMESTIC PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIC GOALS

In December 1993 U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher wrote that: "The United States will maintain its military commitment and responsibilities in Europe, but President Clinton must be able to show the U.S. Congress that our Allies are contributing commensurately."¹ With the end of the Soviet threat, the U.S. Congress and the American people are focused on domestic priorities. Americans are increasingly wary about assuming new commitments abroad and are reserved about committing military or economic resources to conflicts that are not in the clear interest of the U.S. President Bill Clinton has established a European security policy which reflects these domestic constraints while seeking pragmatic ways to keep the U.S. engaged on the Continent through its commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Transatlantic leadership after the Cold War requires a coordinated effort to enhance the strategic priorities of the U.S. and its NATO allies, enlarge the community of democratic and free market countries to include former Warsaw Pact adversaries, and increase the ability of all Europeans to solve security challenges in a collective manner. The Clinton Administration is pursuing a delicate balance by combining a concrete perspective toward NATO expansion within a larger strategic context of assuring that Russia remains facing West through the Partnership for Peace. Also, the U.S. welcomes the emerging European Security and Defense Identity through the creation of Combined Joint Task Forces that are separable but not separate from NATO. Despite these creative American initiatives, differences over the pace of NATO expansion and the role of Russia in European security, political and operational questions relating to the

Combined Joint Task Forces, and the continuing crisis in the Balkans have the potential to do great harm to the transatlantic relationship.

THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE (PfP), NATO EXPANSION, AND RUSSIA

Expanding NATO when there is no strategic need would weaken the ability of the Alliance to act in a crisis. Moreover, premature expansion could have a negative impact on the main security challenge in Europe: supporting democratic reform in Russia. So long as Russia does not have the capability or desire to reimpose control over Central and Eastern Europe, there is no urgency to grant a security guarantee to Central and Eastern European countries. Yet historical fears of Russian imperialism and growing instability in the region make the passionate appeals for NATO expansion impossible to ignore. Sympathetic to these fears, the Clinton Administration proposed the PfP to provide perspective toward NATO membership via consultations in 16 plus 1 and other formats, permanent offices at NATO installations, and joint planning, training, and exercises for all non-NATO European countries which choose to participate and which meet certain standards (based on CSCE principles).

Critics charge that the PfP is an appeasement of strong Russian opposition to NATO expansion. Indeed, shortly after the PfP was approved at the Brussels Summit in January 1994, a senior advisor to Polish President Lech Walesa asserted that "we've gone from Chamberlain's umbrella to President Clinton's saxophone."² However, should the political and military situation in Russia change or other unforeseen events threaten the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, NATO membership could be expanded very quickly.³ Through full participation in PfP, Central and Eastern European countries will be better prepared for NATO membership if any contingency creates an urgent need for expansion. To stress

its commitment to this premise of the PFP, the Clinton Administration now addresses the issue of new members in NATO not as whether, but rather when and how to expand.

Assessing Russia's views vis-a-vis U.S. and NATO interests is not the same as conferring a veto over NATO policy. NATO is a defensive alliance and must be able to act when its interests are challenged. Thus NATO insists that Russia will not have a veto over Alliance activity. However, on 10 June 1994 at the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) Ministerial Meeting in Istanbul NATO deferred to Russian sensitivities about Alliance expansion to the point of appearing to confer an informal veto for Russia within the NACC. For five hours Russia haggled over the final communique and forced NATO and its NACC partners to drop any reference to expanding NATO membership from the text. This was in spite of Secretary of State Christopher's assurances that the U.S. remains "committed to NATO's expansion."⁴ There are good reasons to delay expansion of NATO though any form of a Russian veto is not one.

NATO brought Russia into the PFP in June 1994 and has deflected Russian efforts to empower the CSCE as a means of diluting the Alliance. However, NATO has yet to attain a long term consensus to guide its enlargement or its Russia policy. Specifically, the U.S. and Germany have strong differences as to whether or not Russia could eventually join NATO. This discord became public at a conference held in Berlin on 9 September 1994, at which German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe rejected Russian membership stating that it would "blow NATO apart, it would be like the United Nations of Europe, it wouldn't work."⁵ Ruehe added that some former Warsaw Pact countries could join NATO "before the year 2000."⁶ Responding to Ruehe, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry indicated that he would not rule out Russian membership but that it would not happen in the

foreseeable future. Moreover, Perry reiterated that NATO expansion would not happen in the "...near future."⁷ To complicate these differing views, Vice-President Al Gore told another conference held in Germany the same day that NATO would begin discussing when and how to bring in new NATO members this autumn.⁸ The Vice-President's comments support reports from Washington D.C. that the Department of State's head of European affairs Richard Holbrooke is gathering support within the Clinton Administration for a speedy entry of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into the Alliance. However, on 2 October Secretary Perry cautioned that: "... European security is best based on a practical and cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia, not by closing Russia out", and that the PFP should be managed carefully "to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe."⁹

Germany has an understandable geopolitical desire to accelerate the process of NATO expansion. The U.S. Department of State wants to use NATO expansion as a diplomatic tool. Yet the Department of Defense is concerned about the military implications of taking on new commitments at a time of strategic and budgetary uncertainty. If there is a path to NATO expansion, it must come through the PFP and thus it must be given a chance to work. Inter-alliance or inter-agency differences are to be expected. However, when displayed in public they are harmful to the process of making PFP strike the successful balance it was designed to create.

SHARING THE BURDEN: COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCES (CJTF)

At the January 1994 Brussels Summit the U.S. proposed, and NATO endorsed, the "development of separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security."¹⁰ To facilitate

the necessary relationship between NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) that would make any European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) operational, NATO approved the creation of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). CJTF would strengthen both NATO and the WEU by allowing a much higher degree of flexibility in military action and enhancing the ability of the WEU to carry out European-only contingencies using NATO common assets by wearing a dual hat within a NATO framework.

As the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) reports, the CJTF involves the "development of multinational, tri-service headquarters, based on deployable self-contained elements of the existing NATO command chain, but adapted further when necessary to incorporate elements from nations (both in and out of NATO) not currently within the integrated structure."¹¹ The NAA concludes that CJTF has four important implications for future NATO planning and the execution of operations: through the dual use of NATO forces and command structures and those of the WEU, strict consensus in collective decision-making need not be required in every instance through the concept of "coalitions of the willing"; it establishes a close linkage to the ESDI and gives real meaning to the concept by placing it within a NATO context; it enhances the PFP by using CJTF headquarters as a means of integrating partnership nations who decide to contribute to future out-of-area operations; and it facilitates the involvement of France and Spain in NATO's military planning.¹² However, a number of serious obstacles may inhibit the implementation of the CJTF concept. For example the operational status of NATO ACE Rapid Reaction Corps within the CJTF headquarters concept is unclear. Moreover, contingencies must be established to prevent "coalitions of the willing" from forcing other Allies into a conflict should a peacekeeping activity or other military operation confront problems while in action. Also,

the relationship between the 100 000 U.S. forces that will remain in Europe, the Franco-German Corps, and the PFP within a CJTF context must be defined.¹³

CJTF planning is done with all 16 NATO members participating. However, France has suggested creating a separate command structure for non-Article 5 NATO missions. This proposal is unacceptable to the U.S. as it raises serious questions as to the continued relevance of the NATO integrated military structure and why the U.S. should remain a part of it. Establishing an entirely new structure for non-Article 5 NATO missions would dilute the essence of NATO military planning by creating a potential scenario in which substantial NATO resources could be engaged outside the NATO integrated military command at a time when an Article 5 mission could be necessary. Also, France seeks to increase NATO political control over CJTF operations which is unpopular with military planners. The resulting confusion about the structure of the French political and military role has left the CJTF with an uncertain future. NATO military authorities have done all that they can to elevate the concept to an operational planning stage. However, with France obstructing the CJTF at a political level, it can not advance further.

France's participation in the 29-30 September 1994 meeting of NATO Defense Ministers in Seville may have been a positive step to bring France back into NATO military planning. French officials stress that its attendance was not a change in doctrine and that they went to coordinate French and NATO activities in the Balkans and to discuss Mediterranean security. Yet a key element of extended talks between Secretary of Defense Perry and French Minister of Defense François Leotard was to find ways to make CJTF work. For the immediate future, France insists that it will attend such NATO meetings on a "case by case" basis but as one senior official asserts "the line we cannot cross is that of reintegration

(in the military structure).¹⁴ Thus the prospects for constructive contributions by the French toward implementing CJTF are not favorable.

All European nations of the Alliance will have to slow the current decline in defense spending if any ESDI is to succeed. As Stanley R. Sloan of the Congressional Research Service asserts, it is essential that progress be made to promote standardization of military equipment, supplies, and operating procedures. European defense industries are not prepared to fulfill basic military requirements of non-NATO military action such as satellite surveillance, command and control, early warning capability and long-range air transportation.¹⁵ A potential solution to this problem would be for NATO and WEU military authorities to identify areas in which U.S. and European defense industries can benefit from direct cooperation. Increased cooperation among Allied defense industries would help make the ESDI and CJTF a workable concept, and could be a basis for a new understanding of the transatlantic economic relationship. Unfortunately national rivalries between industries remain a constant within the EU and in transatlantic military-industrial relations. Indeed, France's Defense Minister Leotard stated on 14 September 1994 that: "The U.S. is, and remains, a major ally with whom we must tighten common policy and develop cooperation...But we must differentiate between essential efforts at political coordination and the fact that American enterprises are and will remain rivals of European enterprises in the defense field."¹⁶

THE CURRENT FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

The U.S. has clear interests in a stable and prosperous Europe. With the enormous human and financial cost of winning WWII and the Cold War, it would be perilous for the U.S. to stand idle while Europeans remain unable to resolve


security challenges in the post-Cold War era. Neither the U.S. or its allies will have the luxury of reducing defense expenditure and resolving domestic issues should the rising tide of nationalism and ethnic conflict engulf Russia and the larger republics of the former Soviet Union. Moreover, the U.S. has a clear economic interest in maintaining and expanding its trading partnership with Europe. As new markets open to the East, the U.S. will only gain from increased stability on the whole continent.

The PFP and the CJTF are designed to meet future challenges and are not mechanisms that can resolve current crises in Europe. In the Balkans, the EC (now EU) sought to implement a common foreign and defense policy without having the military means to enforce it. It is imperative to the long term future of European security that the Allies attain functional crisis prevention and an operational ESDI within a NATO context. The PFP and the CJTF will meet both these needs if seen through to their full potential.

If Europeans should indicate that the U.S. is not wanted on the Continent, the U.S. may reduce the American troop presence and focus its interests on bilateral relations with Russia, NAFTA, and its growing partnership with Asia. The PFP and the CJTF must be implemented to their fullest possible extent to provide a new foundation for America's role in the future of European Security. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl has said: "We need a stable European house and the Americans need a permanent room in it for all time, with no ifs, ands or buts."¹⁷ By proposing the PFP and the CJTF, America has made very clear that it plans a strong but pragmatic role in the future in European security. What strong and pragmatic steps the European members of NATO are going to take to ensure a future for European security that includes the United States remains to be seen.

NOTES

1. NATO Review. December 1993.
2. UPI Wire Services. 11 January 1994.
3. The likelihood of rapid expansion in an emergency was articulated by a U.S. Senior Official speaking to reporters on background on 27 May 1994. The official noted that "should the situation deteriorate in the East and Russia and it became necessary at some step to draw the line between Eastern and Western...the Partnership for Peace...would put us in a better position to do that..." White House Office of the Press Secretary. 27 May 1994.
4. Reuters Wire Services. 10 June 1994.
5. Reuters Wire Services. 9 September 1994.
6. IBID.
7. IBID.
8. Associated Press. 9 September 1994.
9. Associated Press. 2 October 1994.
10. Declaration of the Heads of State and Government meeting in Brussels on 10-11 January 1994. Available from the NATO Office of Information and Press.
11. "After the NATO Summit: New Structures and Modalities for Military Cooperation." North Atlantic Assembly Draft General Report. Defense and Security Committee, Raphael Estrella Rapporteur. The North Atlantic Assembly. Brussels, Belgium.
12. IBID.
13. Because the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps and the Franco-German Corps are still in early stages of implementation, their role (if any) will be decided sometime in the future. The prospects for including the PFP countries are better in the short term. NATO military planners are currently assessing worst case and lesser case conditions for PFP activity and they are including assessments of the capacity to expand on CJTF staff to include Partner countries should the appropriate situation arise.
14. Reuters Wire Services. 30 September 1994.
15. Sloan, Stanley R. (1994) "Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) and New Missions for NATO." CRS Report for Congress. 17 March 1994.
16. Reuters Wire Services. 14 September 1994.
17. Reuters Wire Services. 9 September 1994.



European Security: With or without North America?

A Canadian point of View

Keeping America In

Allen SENS

Instructor
Department Political Science
University of British Columbia
Vancouver

Fax: 604 822 50 40

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Keeping America In

Allen G. Sens

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On October 23, 1954, the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) signed the Paris Agreements, a defining document in the history of the evolution of the Atlantic Alliance. ¹ The Federal Republic of Germany was recognized as a sovereign state by the United States, France, and Great Britain, and was invited to join NATO (while permitting the maintenance of foreign forces on its territory and accepting restrictions on its military forces). The United States (and Great Britain) undertook to maintain armed forces on the continent of Europe as long as was deemed necessary. ² A unified military command was established under a Supreme Allied Commander Europe, a post that was always to be held by an American officer. The relationship of the Alliance to other European security institutions was also evolving in the direction of NATO supremacy. ³ The Paris Agreements formalized the American commitment to European security through NATO, and the evidence of that commitment came in the form of US ground forces stationed in Europe. Throughout the Cold War, the Alliance would repeatedly grapple with several issues, including the credibility and salience of the transatlantic link, military strategy (especially nuclear policy), force structure and burden sharing, and approaches to East-West relations. Despite the contentious nature of the policy disputes that arose from these issues--which often pitted the US against its European allies--NATO, and the US commitment to Europe, remained strong throughout the Cold War. During the 1980's, US

¹ Many of the provisions of the Paris Agreements had been agreed to at the London Conference of September 28-October 3, 1954.

² This commitment was later confirmed by President Eisenhower on March 5, 1955.

³ The Paris Agreements provided for the accession of Germany and Italy to the Western Union (renamed the Western European Union), and provided for the close cooperation of NATO and the WEU. In addition, the London Conference and the Paris Agreements were signed against the backdrop of the collapse of the European Defence Community (EDC); the French National Assembly had effectively terminated the EDC on August 29, 1954.

force levels in Europe that were consistently maintained at approximately 350,000 personnel.⁴

However, with the end of the Cold War, the future of NATO and the transatlantic relationship is in some doubt. Despite public proclamations to the contrary, there is a persistent concern about the long term future of NATO and US presence in Europe. Lord Ismay, NATO's first Secretary General, maintained that at its inception NATO had three implicit functions: to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down. Today, after the Cold War, the Russians are down the Germans are in, and the Americans may be on the way out. The central point of this paper is that a continued American presence in Europe is a good thing for European security and a good thing for Canada. However, from the perspective of the United States, there are some compelling rationales for reducing or withdrawing the military presence in Europe and these may increase in salience in the future. Canada, and those European countries committed to the idea of a tangible US security presence on the continent, must make the case for this presence more strongly and must consider what incentives might be offered to maintain it in the future.

America's Presence in Europe: terms of reference

When scholars speak of a tangible US presence in Europe, it is typically meant as a reference to ground forces stationed in Europe. Stationed ground forces have always been regarded highly as they constitute visible and quantifiable evidence of a country's commitment to NATO. The Canadian experience is illustrative. Despite never having committed large numbers of ground forces to Europe (through much of the Cold War Canada contributed a brigade group to Germany and a brigade group to Norway), Canada encountered considerable opposition to the proposed withdrawal of Canadian Forces Europe under the Trudeau defence policy review in the late 1960's.⁵ Among the concerns raised was the precedent any Canadian withdrawal would set for the Americans.

During the Cold War, US ground forces were seen as necessary in Europe not only to ensure the defensive ability of NATO forces but also because they linked the US--and the US strategic nuclear arsenal--to European security. In

⁴See Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, Annual report to the President and the Congress, January 1994. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defence, 1994, p. C2.

⁵In the late 1980's, the Canadian commitment to Norway was terminated and Canada's contribution was consolidated in West Germany. The Trudeau defence policy review eventually reduced the size of Canadian stationed forces in Europe, but did not withdraw them altogether.

the event of war, US forces would be engaged in battle right from the outset. However, the end of the Cold War has nullified this political and military role of US forces in Europe, and US force levels will continue to decline from the levels of the 1980's. The US has decided to maintain a commitment of 100,000 stationed ground troops in Europe.⁶ For the Clinton Administration, this force level "...will allow the United States to continue to play a leading role in the NATO Alliance and provide a robust capability for multinational training and crisis response."⁷ Prepositioned equipment for three complete divisions will also be maintained in Europe.

However, the US does have options it may be tempted to consider in the future. It could choose to reduce its stationed ground forces by a significant number. There were proposals made in 1991-1992 calling for a stationed European force level of between 50,000 to 75,000 personnel.⁸ Or the US could decide to remove its ground presence entirely, and employ air and naval assets to the European theatre instead. Finally, it could forsake its commitment to Europe entirely, likely terminating the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in the process.⁹ This paper assumes that the latter contingency is highly unlikely. The paper also assumes that the first contingency--the maintenance of the 100,000 level--is also unlikely. This figure, after all, is a reduction from the Bush administration's force level plan which called for the maintenance of 150,000 US personnel in Europe.¹⁰ The question is how Canada and European countries can encourage the US to maintain a tangible, militarily significant force to the cause of European security.¹¹ For proponents of a continued US military commitment to Europe, one aspect of the logic of the Cold War remains intact; deployed ground forces are the ultimate expression of US commitment.

⁶At present, European Command (EURCOM) is composed of some 183,000 personnel.

⁷See Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, Annual report to the President and the Congress, January 1994. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defence, 1994, p. 20.

⁸See William W. Kaufmann and John D. Steinbruner, Decisions for Defense: Prospects for a New World Order (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991), p. 57, and Don M. Snider, "US military forces in Europe: how low can we go?" Survival, Vol. 34/4 (Winter 1992-1993), pp. 24-39.

⁹See Earl C. Ravenal, Designing Defense for a New World Order (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1991), p. 79.

¹⁰Colin L. Powell, "The American commitment to European security," Survival, Vol. 34/2 (Summer 1992), p. 1.

¹¹A "militarily significant" force, for the purposes of the paper, would be one of 75,000 US personnel, under the rationales outlined by Don M. Snider, in "US military forces in Europe" pp. 33-38.

Why Keep America in Europe?: Reassurance, Maintenance, and Insurance

There are three core rationales for maintaining a US security commitment to Europe after the Cold War. First, the United States plays an important reassurance role in Europe. The Clinton Administration describes this as a "...balancing role in European political relations,"¹² although it is not quite accurate to characterize the US role as that of an external balancer (a role often ascribed to Great Britain) for this presupposes a balancing function between European factions or blocs. The assumption of this reassurance or balancing role is that the US, through its presence in Europe, promotes stability on the continent by contributing to the permissive conditions for cooperative European relations. European countries want to maintain the US overlay as security against two shadows; the shadow of Germany and the shadow of a revanchist Russia. In effect, America will act as an ultimate deterrent in European affairs.

Related to this reassurance role is the maintainance of the strength of the transatlantic link. Political and diplomatic consultations and cooperation between Europe and America was strong during the Cold War; a continued US presence in Europe would maintain the strength of this important axis of cooperation after the Cold War. An American security commitment to Europe (and Japan) reinforces the ties between the Cold War allies, and contributes to efforts aimed at preventing an erosion in this cooperation. A continued US presence in Europe is therefore designed more to prevent a breakdown in current cooperative relations, than it is aimed at a specific threat.

A second reason to keep the US engaged in Europe is to keep NATO strong. NATO is the leading security institution in Europe, and acts as an anchor for stability in the west. It also acts as an anchor of stability for the east, as NATO is the foundation for the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Partnerships For Peace (PFP) initiative, which seek to promote cooperation between Eastern and Central Europe and the countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) and the West. The strength of this anchor rests with the fact that NATO is a US-led organisation, and that the diplomatic and military weight of the US is behind it. The effectiveness of NATO, and probably its very existence, is predicated on a close link between the security interests of the US and the security interests of Europe. Finally, the operational capabilities of the Alliance are also heavily dependent on the US, not only in terms of military units but particularly in the areas of logistics and intelligence.

¹²See "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," Final Draft, february 25, 1994, p. 48.

Third, a US presence in Europe, and the continued vitality of NATO, provides insurance against a failure to form a separate European Defence Identity (EDI). The attempt to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) under article J of the Maastricht Treaty has been one of the more disappointing aspects of the European process. Lack of unity during the Gulf War and the policy paralysis over the debate in Yugoslavia suggest that the emergence of a workable EDI is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. A US presence may be required in lieu of a common European policy. At best, the presence and engagement of the US in the security of Europe provides a hedge against the continued frustrations of these efforts. Paradoxically, the continued presence of the US in European security and the continued existence of the Atlantic Alliance may well be an impediment to the rapid development of an EDI, precisely because of the security reassurance that the US and NATO represent.

Why does Canada want the US to remain engaged in Europe?

There can be little dispute that maintaining an active US engagement in Europe is consistent with Canadian interests. In the first place, NATO binds the US into a multilateral framework with other Canadian allies. To the extent that NATO has had a moderating effect on unilateral tendencies in American behaviour, Canada would like this "entanglement" of the US to continue. Just as European countries find NATO's bindings around Germany reassuring, so Canadians feel the same way about NATO and its bindings on the US.

Second, Canada wishes to ensure the continued viability of the European counterweight. Throughout the Cold War, Canada pursued a close relationship with Europe at least in part to balance the enormous political, diplomatic, and economic might of its southern neighbor. The loss of this counterweight would result in even higher levels of dependence on the US, and would be a severe blow to Canada's diplomatic autonomy and flexibility. Canada always believed that the counterweight would be lost if it left Europe. It is also true, however, that if the US withdraws from Europe, the effectiveness of the European counterweight would be compromised, as much of its value is invested in cooperation with European countries to influence or moderate US behaviour.

Third, it is in Canada's interests to avoid a continental emphasis for US foreign and security policy. If the US contracts from Europe, continental policies might receive more attention in Washington. This would have implications for Canadian autonomy and sovereignty as a smaller political and economic entity living next to a political and economic giant. Furthermore, should the US pull out of Europe, this would pull Canadian policy inexorably in the same direction. During the Cold War, Canada made

the conscious decision to maintain an internationally oriented foreign policy. This is still in Canada's interests, and any move to a continental orientation in the Atlantic area by the US would place heavy pressure on Canada to do the same. A turn toward Asia does not offer the same advantages. While the economic importance of Asia now rivals Europe, Asia does not possess the level of political and military cooperation or institutionalization found in Europe, at least not at present. For Canada, a comparable, alternative Asian counterweight does not exist.

Why America might leave Europe

Concerns that America might contract, or even abandon, its European commitment are not new. In 1966, Democratic Senator Mike Mansfield proposed the first initial troop withdrawal program in the US Congress. Many more were to follow. In 1984, the proposed Nunn Amendment linked US troop levels in Europe to increased European contributions to the western defence effort. Through the 1980's, there was a concern about the "widening Atlantic" and the impact this would have on all areas of the transatlantic relationship.¹³ Some questioned the wisdom of the US contribution to European security, even in the context of the existence of the Soviet threat at that time.¹⁴

Such sentiments have arisen anew after the Cold War. Again, the Canadian case is illustrative. Canada terminated its stationed forces in Europe (Canadian Forces Europe) on February 5, 1992, for three main reasons: the end of the Cold War in Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet threat; the overstretched commitments of the Canadian Armed Forces; and cost, in the context of increasing fiscal constraints. The pressures on the United States are similar, if vastly different in scope.

The most powerful element in case for a US withdrawal is cost. Defining the cost of the US commitment to Europe during the Cold War was an exercise in alchemy. Figures (and justifications for them) varied wildly, from a low estimate of US\$50 billion to a high estimate of US\$200 billion, with percentage estimates varying from 15% to 60% of the Department of Defense budget.¹⁵ The burden-sharing debate of the 1980's has evolved through

¹³See, for example, Andrew J. Pierre, ed., A Widening Atlantic? Domestic Change and Foreign Policy (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986).

¹⁴See Earl C. Ravenal, NATO: The Tides of Discontent. Policy papers in International Affairs, No 23 (Berkeley: University of California, 1985).

¹⁵See Leo Reddy and David Jones, Burden-Sharing: The Wrong Issue. Significant Issues Series, Vol 11, No 5. (Washington, D.C.: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1989), esp. pp. 10-13; Jane M. O. Sharp,

burden-shifting to burden-shedding, but these debates are all based on the same premise. Budgetary pressures and the sentiment that Europe can defend itself combine for a powerful contraction logic. Europe has recovered, and more responsibility for European security should rest with the Europeans.

Second, changing priorities will have an impact on assessments of the relative importance of Europe. To the extent that the Clinton Administration remains committed to a strategy of enlargement, Europe has an important place given the priority assigned to democratisation and market reforms in Eastern Europe and in Russia. However, the administration has also identified regional conflicts, proliferation of nuclear and conventional weapons, domestic economic recovery, and transnational developments as dangers to the security of the United States. These involve attention to many other regions of the world. Increasingly, the eye of Washington may turn away from Europe.

The third motivation for US withdrawal is the overstretch argument. The fiscal resources expended on maintaining the European commitment might be better spent elsewhere in the DoD budget, and the forces deployed to Europe might be better employed elsewhere, for example in Asia, the Middle East, or in peace support operations consistent with US national interests. With ground forces committed to Korea, Kuwait, and Haiti, the US is having enough difficulty matching its capabilities to the Clinton Administration's "win-win" strategy as it is; keeping a large stationed force in Europe may be an overseas commitment the US cannot sustain within its own strategic framework.

Third, isolationist sentiment in the United States, which emerged in the last Presidential election campaign, remains a powerful affectation. This takes two forms with respect to a European commitment: a belief that the money spent on such a commitment could be better spent on efforts to reinvigorate the American economy; and an increasing aversion to risking casualties in overseas conflicts in the absence of larger interest. The US may in the future wish to avoid entanglement. During the Cold War, NATO was regarded as a strategic asset in the global deterrent effort against the USSR. After the Cold War, NATO could be seen as a strategic liability, with the potential to drag the US into European conflicts in which it has little direct interest.

"Summary and Conclusions," in Jane M. O. Sharp, ed., Europe after an American Withdrawal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 34-35; James R. Golden, NATO Burden-Sharing. Washington Paper Vol. 10/96 (Washington D.C.: Praeger, 1983), pp. 22-57; and Earl C. Ravenal, NATO: The Tides of Discontent. Policy papers in International Affairs, No. 23 (Berkeley: University of California, 1985), p. 71.

Finally, incremental policies could result in the contraction of US forces from Europe. If US forces in Europe come to be regarded as a symbol of US commitment, what is particularly sacrosanct about the 100,000 figure? If the military function becomes secondary to the political, why would not half that number suffice, or even less? Once the reason for their presence has been established as symbolic, actual force levels do not matter that much. This was the basis for the Canadian commitment; once the military sufficiency of the deployed forces declined below a certain level, their purpose became symbolic, and once their purpose became symbolic, numbers no longer mattered. This scenario could repeat itself with respect to the US stationed force regime in Europe.¹⁶

Conclusions: Keeping America In

How can European countries, and Canada, provide incentives for maintaining a stationed US force presence in Europe? The aim must be to emphasize the value of stationed forces in Europe for American interests while at the same time reducing the costs of that commitment. The US has made this later point clear:

A continued willingness on the part of the United States to act as a security partner and leader will be an important factor in sustaining cooperation in many areas. This requires that the United States remain the leading security partner in Europe, South and Central America, East Asia, the Near East, and Southwest Asia. However, America must find ways to sustain its leadership at lower costs. For their part, US allies must be sensitive to the linkages between a sustained US commitment to their security on the one hand, and their actions in such areas as trade policy, technology transfer, and participation in multinational security operations on the other.¹⁷

In short, the sentiments of the burden-sharing debate have re-emerged, only this time there is no threat "rug" under which these concerns can be swept. An incentive strategy must speak to continued US interests in Europe, as well as an alleviation of the incentives for US contraction. With respect to the former, the US does maintain security interests in Europe. Some of these interests are more consistent with European desires; others are less consistent with European desires. What measures can Canada and European countries

¹⁶This concept has been forwarded by David Haglund of Queen's University.

¹⁷See Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, Annual report to the President and the Congress, January 1994. Washington, D.C.: Department of Defence, 1994, p. 9.

adapt to encourage or strengthen US incentives to maintain a US force commitment in Europe?

Continue to promote stability, democracy, and market reform in Eastern Europe and the FSU. The US has a broad interest in a peaceful, stable, and economically robust continent, with an expanding membership of democratic, free market countries. In the Clinton Administration's strategy of enlargement, the successful transition of the countries of Central Europe and the FSU and Russia is important. NATO, and the US security presence in Europe, provides an important anchor for these countries, even those for whom membership is a distant prospect. European countries, and Canada, should contribute wherever possible to the success of NACC and PFP, and in doing so strengthen the relevance and importance of NATO and Europe to the American Grand Strategy of enlargement.

Continue the European integration process. The United states has an interest in the emergence of a strong European Union, able to act as a global partner, a guarantor of regional cooperation, and a safeguard against the resurgence of aggressive nationalism in Europe. A strong EU would also promote shared values, democratic and market reform to the east, and assist in the maintenance of a liberal trading order.

Assume more of the costs of the maintenance of US forces in Europe. The European allies must take all fiscal measures possible to undercut the argument of those in the US who argue that stationed US forces in Europe cost too much money.


Continued acknowledgement of NATO as the leading security organisation in Europe, and continued acknowledgement of American leadership in NATO. The continued affirmation of American leadership of NATO, and the continued primacy of NATO in European security affairs, will be required if the US is to remain meaningfully engaged in Europe. Despite the strengthening of European voice, NATO must remain US led if US forces are to remain.

Allied participation in US-led coalitions in out-of-area contingencies. The stationing of US forces in Europe should be regarded as a down payment for allied participation in contingencies elsewhere. Perhaps a new transatlantic contract will have to be negotiated, in which the US receives commitments from European countries for support and involvement in other contingencies in return for a US commitment and stationed presence in Europe.

Deepening and widening of European military cooperation. There should be increased European participation in the tangible benefits the US perceives from involvement in European security; namely, combined training,

integrated command structure, interoperable equipment and joint defence production agreements, access to air and naval base facilities, and security of the sea lanes of communication in the Atlantic and Mediterranean.

The maintenance of US stationed forces in Europe is not a foregone conclusion. However, it is in the interests of Canada and European countries to maintain such a presence. In order to ensure such an eventuality, Canada and Europe must work to accentuate the positive aspects of such a commitment in the context of American interests, while attempting to minimize the negatives.



European Security: With or without North America?

A Belgian point of View

Tom SAUER

Catholic University of Leuven
Scientific Assistant
Department of International Relations

Phone: 32 - 16 66 23 05
Fax: 32 - 16 28 32 53

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European security: with or without North America ? A Belgian point of view.

Europe does not need North America as a shield against the existing threats or 'risks' outside the Alliance. There is simply not such an overall threat at the moment¹. Nor does it need North America as a European pacifier (anymore).

Nevertheless, my hypothesis is that Europe needs North America more than ever (and vice versa). Continuing the historical process of creating an Atlantic security community should be the main objective for the future. The quality of life we Belgians enjoy is unique in the history of mankind and is for a considerable part due to the existence of the Atlantic Alliance.

International security today means '*common security*' which combines the 'realist' assumption of anarchy and "the idea that the only rational approach to security under contemporary political, military, economic and environmental conditions is through the logic of *interdependence*"².

After World War II, Europe and North America first connected their economies. The Marshall-plan was of absolutely necessity for the European reconstruction and laid the basis for *economic welfare* afterwards. The latter is what people in Belgium and other modern industrialized states mostly care. From a Belgian point of view, the Marshall aid was advantageous in absolute terms, but meant a failed opportunity to restructure its economic basis. As Belgium came relatively intact out of World War II, our neighbours benefited in the long term more from the economic and financial aid³.

Economic welfare cannot be attained in an autarkic economy. This applies by definition for small countries like Belgium. The BLEU (Belgian Luxemburg Economic Union) had already been established in 1921. Belgium was one of the first European countries that agreed with the American proposal to include Germany in the post-war European settlement. Minister of Foreign Affairs and future Secretary General of NATO Paul-Henri

¹However, there might be one in the future (cfr.infra).

²B.BUZAN, Is international security possible? In: K. BOOTH, 1991, 44.

³ CASSIERS, I (1993).

Spaak⁴ succeeded to convince France as well. In 1955 he was the driving force behind the Messina Conference which resulted in the establishment of the EEC.

The BLEU nowadays is ranked tenth as importer-exporter (if China has not jumped over yet); more than 70% of the Belgian production is consumed abroad. The share of the USA within it turns around 5%, which is six times less than Germany, but two times more than Spain and three times more than Japan. One third of the firms based in Belgium are foreign; two thirds of the hundred largest is American which corresponds with 8.6% of our GNP⁵ ! To conclude, Belgian 'security' (as defined above) is highly dependent on the USA and Canada.

The *political and military interdependence* between Western Europe and North America after World War II (which meant for Europe 'dependence'⁶) was formalized with the signing of the Treaty of Washington seven months after the famous 'Nous avons peur!' of Paul-Henri Spaak. For Belgium, both the negative experience of 1914 and 1940 when neutrality was infringed twice and the failure of Locarno led to the decision to join a credible security system. As Churchill had rejected the idea of a close relationship with Belgium just after the war and as the collective security system of the UN had been paralysed by the beginning of the Cold War, the Treaty of Brussels (1948)⁷ and Washington (1949)⁸ was the best alternative left. This signified a turn of 180° degrees in the

⁴ Paul-Henri Spaak was also the first president of the General Assembly of the UN, the OEEC, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, and the Assembly of the ECSC.

⁵ DAEMS, H. (1993), 36.

⁶ Although it has also been argued that the USA, struggling with a lack of internal demand, depended on Europe for its exports. See M. KALDOR (1990).

⁷ Truman wrote in his 'Mémoires - Years of Trial and Hope' (1956, 243): "It was from the three small nations that a counterproposal came for one regional arrangement rather than a series of two-party treaties. Mr. Spaak, the Belgian foreign minister, was largely responsible for this change and it was in this form that the treaty was made. I think to Spaak goes the credit for lining up the Europeans for the treaty".

⁸ Belgium decided to participate in NATO only after military aid had been promised by the USA. Economic imperatives have always been the underlying goal of the Belgian foreign policy.

Belgian foreign policy.

However, the key point that I would like to draw attention to is that Europe *today* does not only need North America for its security *because* of the linkages, but because of the *qualitative level* of these linkages. Europe and North America are bound together stronger than anyone else. It was the Atlantic Alliance which Karl Deutsch⁹ had in mind in 1957 as an example of a 'security community' that is defined as a community of states which feel not threatened by each other and which use non-violent means to resolve their internal conflicts¹⁰. The latter has to do with trust, perception of each other needs, mutual empathy, responsivity, collective identity formation, and communication in general.

Besides the already mentioned non-violent culture and economic welfare is *democracy* a third key factor with respect to the Atlantic security community. It is not by chance that the Partnership for Peace agreements include democracy as well.

The rise of political parties having extreme-rightist opinions, caused partly by an economic crisis, might eventually lead to a crisis of democracy¹¹ and a reversal of the proces building a transatlantic security community.

Collective defence organisation

Military security has not become irrelevant, however. Ken Booth is absolutely right when he points out that: "A state and its society can be, in their own terms, secure in the political, economic, societal or environmental dimensions, and yet all of these accomplishments can be undone by military failure"¹².

⁹ DEUTSCH, K and others (1957).

¹⁰ The use of non-violent means to resolve conflicts is also an explicit part of the Partnership for Peace agreements.

¹¹ For instance, the biggest political party in Antwerp (which is the biggest city in Flanders) is a nationalist, anti-migrants (if not racist) party ('Vlaams Blok') that obtained 28% of the votes in the communal elections of October 9, 1994. On the same day, the extreme rightist party in Austria obtained 23% of the votes in the parliamentary elections.

¹² BOOTH, K (1991), 35.

In 1949, the Soviet threat became insupportable¹³. Therefore, the key principle of the Washington Treaty consists in the fact that the security of the Alliance is indivisible: an attack on one is an attack on all (Art.5). The collective defence system had both a conventional and nuclear arm (cfr.infra).

In the meantime the Soviet threat has gone. And while today there is no reason to believe that a major external threat will appear in the near future, it can never be excluded. The necessary enlargement of NATO membership will not diminish that risk, on the contrary. Nonetheless, the maximum nuclear deterrence¹⁴ theory however still prevails. Do we not have to ask ourselves whether minimum deterrence (being deterrence without sub-strategic weapon-systems) would not suffice ?

Beside 'objective' risks, security has also a subjective dimension. I would argue that the enhanced (subjective) feeling of security thanks to Art.5 created the necessary context for the above mentioned process of building a security community. V.Havel alleges that: "If Western Europe can now enjoy such a measure of democracy and economic prosperity that it actually enjoys, it is undoubtedly due, among other things, to its having established together with the USA and Canada this security Alliance as a tool of protection of its freedom and of the values of Western civilisation"¹⁵. My main conclusion is that, partly as a result of this enhanced *feeling* of security, Art.5 should stay as it is, even when NATO membership will be extended in the future.

At the same time it should be clear that an attack on a member state that is not responded collectively in the future will degrade the credibility of the Alliance enormously, if not totally. A collective defence organisation remains, by definition, fragile. That is another reason why I would like to stress again that the main reason for the North American links to European security should not be the collective defence argument, but the security

¹³Although George Kennan, for example, saw the establishment of NATO as an over-reaction on behalf of the Atlantic community.

¹⁴Maximum nuclear deterrence means that sub-strategic nuclear weapons might be used against the enemy's forces (instead of against their cities). It corresponds with the concept of limited nuclear war.

¹⁵HAVEL H. Quoted by WORNER, M (1991), 4.

community argument. A collective defence organisation is simply not sufficient for a security community. Or in other words, NATO as a relic of the Cold War must undergo significant changes in order to survive. It is NATO's merit to have adapted itself already (with the New Strategic Concept, CJTF, RRI,...). Still, at least one debate has not yet been closed.

European security: with North America, but with a strengthened European pillar

The European security context in 1995 is totally distinct from that of 40, 20 or even 10 years ago. The *end of the Cold War* meant a break in international relations and "anyone who feels nostalgia for the Cold War ought to have his or her head examined"¹⁶. Today, the citizens of Western Europe enjoy nearly the same economic welfare as our North American colleagues, but still rely primarily on the USA for their defence, both nuclear and conventional. I would like to unravel these two elements furthermore because they both cause frictions within the Alliance.

From the moment the USSR could reach North America with ballistic missiles in 1957, the *nuclear* debate turned fundamentally around the credibility aspect of the extended deterrence theory. In other words, would the USA have used their nuclear weapons in the case Europe would have been attacked¹⁷? In Belgium, e.g., the cruise missile debate in the beginning of the eighties was the most debated political issue since decades.

With regard to conventional weapons-systems and troops, the demand on behalf of the USA for '*burden-sharing*' and '*responsibility-sharing*' is legitimate, having in mind the predictions of Paul Kennedy¹⁸ about over-stretching the economy. On the one hand, the European allies do not dislike the idea of an enhanced role for the *European pillar* within NATO, but on the other hand they are not keen to spend more on defence. Even in the past, most European states did not contribute a lot with regard to defence. Consequently,

¹⁶ US Ambassador Albridge. Remarks to the National War College. 23/9/1993.

¹⁷ Henry Kissinger acknowledged in 1979: "I would say, what I might not say in office that our European Allies should not keep asking us to multiply strategy assurances that we cannot possibly mean". In: J. SHARP: 'After Reykjavik: arms control and the allies'. KISSINGER, H (1987), 341.

¹⁸KENNEDY, P (1990).

the 'flexible response' theory missed some crucial steps in practice. Western Europe is not able to raise more than a few brigades. The end of the Cold War exacerbated even more the situation. In recent years defence budgets have been further cut down. NATO Headquarters, for instance, did not like the Belgian decision to give up its system of conscription. Italy had to hire British pilotes for defending their cities against possible Serbian attacks!

As long as Europe does not take up its responsibility, it reinforces the isolationist voices which always have existed in American foreign policy circles and may accelerate the process of withdrawal from Europe (as Canada already did).

In January 1994 the NATO countries declared: "We therefore stand ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their CFSP". These are the so-called Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). "For the Europeans this model could provide the continent with a measure of self-sufficiency, or the appearance of self-sufficiency, much sooner than they could otherwise afford"¹⁹. The only alternative would be the Eurocorps, which can be used for operations under WEU and NATO (as part of the Main Defence Forces); still, the Eurocorps would not be operational before 1995. "For the Americans the taskforces could be a crafty way of retaining a discreet veto over European operations while reducing the number of men and weapons that it deploys abroad"²⁰. The same remark applies for the Eurocorps used under NATO.

Notwithstanding all this, in principle all NATO states agree²¹: they have welcomed the Maastricht Treaty which clearly states that it is meant "to implement a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the eventual framing of a common defence policy,

¹⁹ CLARK, B (1994).

²⁰ Idem.

²¹ Already in June 1991 (Copenhagen) the NATO members agreed: "The creation of a European identity in security and defence will underline the preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for their security and will help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity".

which might in time lead to a common defence, thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world"²². The WEU will be both the defence arm of the EU and the means to strengthen the European pillar within NATO. In the meantime, the WEU however lacks the necessary infrastructure...

It is evident that the main problem is political. The crisis in ex-Yugoslavia made it clear to which extent Europe had a *common* foreign policy. J.Joffe, former editor of the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* poses it as follows: "In Europe there is not one sovereign; there are twelve. These sovereign do not obey the call of 'Europe' but listen to the voice of the national interests as articulated by the chorus of their domestic policies"²³. As long as the West-European states do not act together in concrete situations, nothing will be achieved. As long as Balladur's first principle with regard to France's foreign policy is: "Réserver la plus grande liberté de décision et d'action à la France"²⁴, there is not much hope. The French withdrawal from the military wing of NATO in 1966 seems not be amendable in the near future²⁵. The 'constructivist' school in International Relations would probably explain this behavior as a problem of identity.

When it really matters, however, even France acknowledges the primacy of the USA. President Bush asked explicitly in Rome in 1991: "If, my friends, your ultimate aim is to provide independently for your own defence, the time to tell us is today". The same mechanism turned up every time with respect to the nuclear issue. "Europe resent the fact they have entrusted their security, the ultimate responsibility of any nation-state, to a distant protector. Yet in the end, as the dénouement of the Euromissiles drama showed, the Western Europeans preferred the extra burden of the missiles to the uncertain rewards

²²Nevertheless, this inter-governmental pillar lies far behind the ideas flagged in the Tindemans-report of 1975 (in which majority voting was proposed).

²³ JOFFE, J (1987), 185.

²⁴ Le Figaro, interview with Premier BALLADUR, 30/8/1994.

²⁵ Anecdotaly, the move of the NATO Headquarters from Paris to Brussels also meant the end of the political career of Paul-Henri Spaak, as he did not agree with his party's opposition against the removal.

of autonomy"²⁶. As a consequence, the Europeans have to accept the counterpart of the deal: no more political leverage within the Alliance.

I also believe that concrete decisions by the different member states regarding conflicts around the world will have considerable more weight than the establishment of a new security architecture. History shows that the role of individual states and individual statesman do matter.

Global security

Besides the argument of the necessity of holding the transatlantic security community together and giving it even more impetus in the future, there is an other logic having implications in the longer term, namely the European interdependence with North America as well as with Latin-America, Asia and Africa with regard to the conservation of our *environment*. As J.Nye admits: "The solution to many issues of transnational interdependence will require collective action and cooperation among all states. Such issues include ecological changes such as acid rain and global warming, health epidemics such as AIDS, illicit trade in drugs, and control of terrorism"²⁷. Cooperation becomes not only more likely, but also necessary. I totally agree with Ken Booth: "If we do not bring the interrelated problems of climatic change, over-population and scarce resources under control within the next generation then all bets must be off regarding the prospects of an international community living in stable peace"²⁸.

²⁶ JOFFE, J (1987), 36.

²⁷ NYE, J (1990), 5.

²⁸ BOOTH, K (1991), 349. It is remarkable that over-population and degradation of the environment were the two mostly cited world problems in a survey organized by Prof. L. Reyckler at the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (KUL) in October 1994 for graduate students in international relations coming from different study backgrounds.

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European Security: With or without North America?

A Russian Point of View

Alexander KAFFKA

Institute of the USA and Canada,
Russian Academy of Sciences,
Moscow

Phone: 27 095 291 67 75

Fax: 7 095 200 12 07

**Seminar for Junior Academics
November 1-6, 1994
Cesky Krumlov, Czech Republic**

THE OUTLINE

1. The Cold War era

- The United States' role in sustaining the European security during the Cold War era
- The Europeans' perception of American troops as guarantors of their security
- The U.S. internal implications of their presence in Europe: the economical burden; the political gains of military action/presence overseas in the internal U.S. political situation

2. Post-Cold War

- is the U.S. presence in Europe adequate to the present/future security tasks?
- the American response to the European security challenges beyond the NATO's zone of responsibility (Yugoslavia and Iraq)
- the challenge from the East: the U.S. role in shaping the new NATO's policy towards the former WTO countries (PfP)
- (the bilateral U.S.-Russian aspect, especially in the strategic nuclear field
- the U.S. in Europe and the United Nations. The new potential members of the Security Council (especially Germany) and the European security

3. The United States and the new role of the nuclear weapons.

- the limitations of the deterrent power of the nuclear weapons in the modern world
- the end of ideological foundation of the atomic deterrence and the significance of the nuclear arms as a determinant of place in the international hierarchy of the distribution of forces

4. The modern tendencies in the relations between the U.S. and their European allies, especially France, Germany and Britain

5. The European security institutions: the perspectives of CSCE and European Union vs. NATO -any future for CSCE?

6. The official U.S. doctrinal attitude to their European role:

"The first and the most important element of our strategy in Europe must be security through military strength and cooperation. The Cold War is over, but war itself is not over"
<A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. The White House, July 1994 p. 21>

7. The U.S. defense expenditure cuts and the European presence.

Conclusion.

The need of sustaining the U.S. presence in Europe both on the military-political and perceptual grounds. The European wish to accept, and the American readiness to provide, the military presence in Europe. The halting of US/Canadian presence in Europe - an unrealistic scenario in the present situation of instability and change in Europe.

THE EUROPEAN SECURITY: WITH OR WITHOUT NORTH AMERICA?

by Alexander Kaffka,
Institute of the USA and Canada,
Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow.

1. The Cold War era

The United States' role in sustaining the European security since the end of the World War till the end of the Cold War has been undoubtedly critical. In the times of severe ideological confrontation, the North American troops in Europe had clear-cut political and military importance vis-a-vis the Warsaw pact's military contingents. More than that, having indeed very significant military strength, the American troops in Europe also had a remarkable psychological importance, being perceived by the West Europeans as a token of the firm U.S. commitment to their security. Both of these two aspects of the American presence in Europe contributed to the stability and peace on the continent, and it is challenging to assess now which one of them had a bigger impact on the situation. However, with the Cold War over and no ideological confrontation in place any more, the role of the US troops in Europe is changing, posing more and more questions and concerns both in America and in Europe.

The first aspect of the US presence in Europe has changed - they are not counterbalancing the WTO's forces any more - but the second aspect is still there: the Europeans' perception of the American troops as guarantors of their security is a fact of life. More to that, the disintegration of the WTO and removal of the Soviet troops from Central and Eastern Europe has not automatically increased the security of the Europeans, as instead of the hypothetical Soviet threat they had to face the very real military threat in the heart of Europe - in Yugoslavia - to say nothing about the threats coming from the outside of Europe (Iraq), and the risks and problems produced by the instability and turmoil in the former Soviet block. In fact, the U.S. troops in Europe had far more occasions to prove their effectiveness after the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty, then before. That is why it does not seem probable that the West Europeans will favor the removal of the American troops from Europe, although their tasks should be different from what they used to be, fully reflecting the transformed security needs of today and tomorrow's Europe.

2. After the Cold War

Nevertheless, it is not (or not solely) the Europeans' public opinion that determines the decision-making on the US' keeping troops in the Old World. Keeping forces stationed in Europe is costly: its cost had many times aroused concerns in the United States Congress even in the times of the Cold War - and it becomes increasingly difficult to explain the spending on the European presence with Russia and other former adversary

countries being partners of NATO's PfP program. The central role of the transatlantic relationship for the Allies was put under question. Bill Clinton's administration made an emphasis on the domestic needs, promoting the economic interests of the nation as the top priority in the US foreign policy.

On the other hand, the successful overseas operations of the US armed forces are known as a highly effective instrument for boosting the popularity and prestige of the Washington administration. The troops in Europe may thus become a subject of complicated political game between the Administration and the Congress, or between presidential candidates, or between departments within the executive branch. Thus, the internal political implications may have both positive and negative impact on the future of the American troops in Europe.

According to the official U.S. doctrinal attitude to their European role the U.S. remain strongly committed to providing security to the West Europeans:

"The first and the most important element of our strategy in Europe must be security through military strength and cooperation. The Cold War is over, but war itself is not over"

<A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, The White House, July 1994 p. 21>

However, some of the earlier statements of the US top officials led to the impression that the United States, while activating their efforts in Asia (last year's Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit) were moving the focus of their policy away from Europe. This followed, inter alia, from Secretary of State Warren Christopher' formula that "Western Europe is no longer the dominant area of the world" and that "Washington had been too "Eurocentric" for too long".

Such trends have led to understandable concerns of the Europeans about their security and eventually resulted in a more balanced US attitude towards its foreign policy priorities and dismissal of the "zero-sum" approach to choosing between the "Asian" and the "European" focuses.

The European NATO allies do remain in favor of the continued US presence in Europe. It is an open question whether the U.S. presence in Europe in its present form is really adequate to the current/future security tasks, but one may point out some of the obvious military and non-military reasons for this presence. For instance, in the times when nuclear containment is to a large extent loosing its deterrent force, the conventional military potential of the United States, represented by the troops stationed in Europe plus the efficient sea/airlift capabilities, is increasing its importance as a stabilizing factor in the uneasy European situation. The concerns over the economical growth of the unified Germany, seen by some Europeans as a worrisome development, and her aspirations towards greater role

in the international relations, including standing membership in the Security Council of the United Nations, may be appeased by continued substantial American presence, too.

3. The political U.S. involvement in the European security

All that was said above concerning the American role in sustaining the European security was connected to the actual US military presence on the continent and the external and internal implications of this presence. However, the theme outlined in the title of this paper suggests a broader interpretation of the America's significance for the security in Europe.

The pivotal US role in NATO may be seen as another critical aspect of this significance. Having led the Alliance during the post-war decades, the United States were also the first to originate the transformation of NATO towards better adjustment to its new tasks. Speaking about the US role in building the new European security architecture, one cannot help mentioning the "Partnership for Peace" idea, brought to the European security agenda by the Americans. The PfP system of agreements now encompasses virtually all of the former adversary states and vividly demonstrates the positive developments in building the new pan-European security structure. The new pattern of relationships, especially in the political and military fields, having been established between the NATO and the partner states

not long ago, is quickly reaching operational level in joint training, maneuvers and other activities directed at rapprochement of the Western and Eastern institutions.

Having briefly touched upon the American role in NATO, one should mention the other ways of the US participation in the European security matters through the international security organizations - such as CSCE and United Nations. While it is obviously beyond the framework of this paper to assess that participation in some detail, the role played by the United States in such developments of these organizations, as reductions of the conventional forces in Europe (CFE), confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), peace-keeping operations in former Yugoslavia, must be emphasized.

It is also worth recollecting the bilateral aspects of the US involvement in the European security arrangements. The agreements on bans, cuts and non-proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction, negotiated with the Soviet Union and Russia/Ukraine/Byelarus/Kazakhstan had a critical impact on the European security, and the level of activity of the United States in this domain remains very high. The United States, as well as Canada and the European countries play very significant roles in supporting the complicated and expensive programs of elimination of the treaty-limited armaments and military equipment in the NIS, solving the problems of doing away with the nuclear and chemical munitions and waste.

Thus, it would be unjust to limit the problem of the America's importance for the European security matters only to the U.S. and Canadian troops stationed in Europe. This problem is far more versatile and it is a challenging task to cover it within the limits of this paper. However, the above considerations seem to prove that the US role in European security is essential and the halting of US/Canadian presence in Europe or sharp decrease of the political involvement of America in the European security matters is an unrealistic scenario in the present situation of instability and change in Europe.

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EUROPEAN SECURITY: WITH OR WITHOUT RUSSIA?

Marius LAURINAVIČIUS,

correspondent for national daily Lietuvos Rytas (Lithuania)

Introduction

The answer to the question which the title poses could seem very simple. Every person who has common sense and who gives priority to pragmatic arguments and not to some nationalistic complexes or ideological prejudices would desire to build European security with Russia.

It is very natural. Despite the lost Cold War Russia remains the biggest and the strongest military power in Europe thus excluding it from the architecture of European security would mean permanent threat to it. It is obvious that in the case of isolation of Russia one can achieve stability in Europe through the so called balance of power but one can never achieve real security.

Lithuania's geographical and geopolitical situation makes the so called "question of Russia" the main priority of the national security. Our country is doomed to live in the neighbourhood of Russia and because of that our security needs especially require to include Moscow into European security system. There is no doubt that such inclusion could be the best solution of Lithuania's security problem which is very sensitive.

Though nowadays most of Western leaders often pledge their "unwavering support" for the efforts of the three Baltic countries to reestablish themselves as members of the international and European community, the people of the Baltics have heard it all before, and should have no illusions about Western support in a situation of crisis.

If the leaders in Moscow do decide to invade the Baltics for the third time in this century (a prospect which, fortunately, seems unlikely at the moment), the international community will watch idly from the sidelines. The Western powers might recall their ambassadors from Russia in protest, and send Russian diplomats home as well. A few speeches condemning Moscow's actions would be made at the UN General Assembly and other international forums. Some meaningless economic sanctions might also be taken as a symbolic gesture of support for the Baltics.

But there is no doubt that if Russia does decide to reassert itself, the Baltic countries should rely only upon their own resources and upon the will of God for protection. As one American journalist said, in the case of new occupation the United States (as well as all the other Western countries) would not recognize it for fifty years again.

We can find a very good argument for the "European security with Russia" in the history of Europe of the 20th century. Twice in this century European nations had to solve a very similar problem, i.e. "European security: with or without Germany". The outcome of two different solutions could show us which is better. Full integration of Germany and France, which were irreconcilable enemies for centuries, into one European community made any war or serious conflict after the World War II impossible not only between them but also between all Western European countries.

History proved that the best way to avoid any conflicts with an enemy is to make him a friend. In the long term, the best security is to make war impossible. Among countries that were once enemies or antagonists, such as in Western Europe, peaceful relations have been ensured by developing a web of economic interdependence. (1) And because of that the strong desire of Western community to integrate Russia into European and international democratic community and all economic and political organizations, which is clearly seen during recent years, is very understandable.

Maybe for the first time in centuries today's Russia has a real opportunity to play a constructive role in the world community. And certainly this opportunity must not be lost by the Western democracies. Isolation of Russia indeed could result in a hostile Russian military posture. On the other hand, including Russia into European organizations would mean new security commitments to Moscow.

Baltic states also want these efforts to be successful. Without any doubt we declare, that the Balts want "European security with Russia". But as it was mentioned by Estonian foreign minister Juri Luik in his address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 28, 1994, in order to be successful this policy must be mutual.

Mutuality of the policy of Russia's integration to democratic world community is the most serious problem in answering the question posed in the title of the present paper.

Does Russia want "European security with Russia"

Even some Russian analysts agree that to say the least Russia's intentions are still not very clear. "In the years to come Russia will stay suspended, yet constant

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security threat on the edge of Europe: a nuclear power and still a major military force with unclear intentions, complicated domestic policies, with multiple interest groups influencing foreign and security policy, producing scores of refugees and migrants, raising security concerns of the CIS states and Eastern Europe, and finally unable to cooperate with the West on security issues", wrote research fellow at the Institute of Europe of Russian Academy of Science Sergei Medvedev a year ago when Russian foreign policy still was still not so assertive. (2)

Some Russian analysts also agree that Russia still seeks to achieve its goals. "Since 1993, Russian policies have been openly pursuing the goal of reintegrating the area of the former USSR", Andrei Zagorsky admits. (3)

Greater or lesser imperialistic tendencies could be found in all known official and unofficial concepts of Russian foreign policy almost immediately after the break of the Soviet Union. Beginning from the well known Karaganov's doctrine which officially had nothing to do with Russian foreign policy (though it was published in an official Russia's foreign policy journal "Diplomaticheski vestnik") and ending with the official Russian foreign policy and military doctrines as well as Russian foreign intelligence agency report released on September 21, 1994, almost all the authors agree upon neoimperialistic policy goals and means to achieve them. To make a dream to create a new empire or at least a confederation Russia employs, Russian speaking community's card, wide political and economic pressure, economic and investment expansion and the wish for stability in foreign countries, on the basis of which it tries to get a peacekeeping mandate in the former USSR.

It is true that, almost all the authors of above mentioned concepts agreed that in regulating the situation in the former USSR and establishing other relations with the world it is necessary to apply the rules of CSCE and other international regulations. Nevertheless they declared that in case of the extraordinary circumstances Russia should not avoid one-sided decisions - political, economical sanctions and even the use of power.

Karaganov, who is a member of the President Council of Russia now, as well as most of the other authors of the foreign policy concepts, have also analysed the other ways which could be chosen by Russia. But almost all of them have rejected democratic policy, i.e. the formation and consolidation of national states in the former USSR and total non-interfering policy of Russia, as unrealistic. Karaganov stresses that Russia in any case will be forced to perform a postimperialistic role. According to the author, even if Russia rejected that role, the history would force it to assume it again.

It is important to mention that Karaganov as well as current Russian foreign policy makers are the representatives of the Atlantistic foreign policy school. But it is no

secret that other schools exist too, for example, the so called Euroasian school which is supported by quite influential forces in Russia.

This school is imperialistic by origin. Most Russian imperialists are anti-Western and anti-European. They have adopted the position of the slavophiles and Euroasians, who believed that Russia's main historical mission was to challenge the West. The Euroasians claim today that the disintegration of the USSR and the emergence of new states on Russia's western borders mean that the country has become geographically, and therefore spiritually, even more separated from Central and Western Europe. Though critical, many imperialists believe in Russia's optimistic future because they hope that Russia will gain back its colonies. The Euroasians state that Russian foreign policy should focus on developing relations with the USSR successor states rather than with the West. Russia, of course, claims the role of the suzerain. According to the view of Euroasians, Russia can overcome its current crisis only by creating a new state, i.e. Euroasian federation.

The statement made by Russian minister for Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev in Stockholm on December 14, 1992 should not be forgotten as well. During CSCE summit conference Kozyrev said that he had to make some changes in the Russia's foreign policy. Kozyrev declared that though Russia is not going to reject the process of approaching Europe, it should be understood that the most of Russian traditions are still connected with Asia. That is why Russia is going to support Serbia, to demand that all republics of the former USSR should join the CIS, and in case of necessity it would use military force and economic sanctions.

As is known, after an hour the statement was cancelled. But now we can find lots of similarities between the above mentioned statement and current Russian foreign policy. Some of Kozyrev's statements as well as earlier mentioned doctrines now seem to be translated into reality. In Russia's position to Armenian-Azerbaijani Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts and even in its relations with the Baltic states, where the standpoint of "divide et impera" is obvious, Russia still plays the card of the "problem" of Russian-speaking community and in case of necessity not only makes economic and political pressure but also uses military force.

So even if Russia followed the Atlantistic concept of foreign policy, certain imperialistic features could be easily traced. The situation could be described as follows: though President Yeltsin and minister for Foreign Affairs Kozyrev are supporters of Atlantistic concept, recently their positions keep getting closer to those of Euroasians.

Certainly, traditionally heavy-handed Soviet foreign policy has become more

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Though Moscow does not tell them what they should do, it has tried to tell them what they should not do. (4)

Options at the time of Russia at the crossroads

With Russia still at the crossroads, it is not clear whether it is possible to achieve the goal of Russia's integration into world democratic community. So it is also unclear if Europe will become a cooperative security environment or a competitive one.

To my mind in this situation a very important and probably a very decisive role should be played by Western democratic world. The achievement of the cooperative security environment is possible only gradually, using the means of the competitive environment.

The statement "now is not the time to draw new dividing lines in Europe" which western politicians like so much is absolutely true. But it is not the time either to do any essential concessions for Russia. Moscow tries to reestablish its aggressive foreign policy and any concession would be considered as its victory and a weakness of the oponent. History proved that all the concessions always encouraged Russia to seek new ones.

There are a lot of examples of such Russian behavior. To my mind it is enough to mention only one. Kozyrev himself declared that the fact that NATO was not expanded to the East should be considered as the victory of his foreign policy. When the programme of Partnership for Peace, which became a substitute for the wish of Eastern Europeans to enlarge NATO, was discussed, no special status for Russia was mentioned. But only a few months passed after the Kozyrev's victory when Moscow demanded such a status. Now the Kremlin goes even further. It wants to influence NATO's policy by subordinating it to CSCE.

I could also agree with the other statement which is also very popular in the West. It is true, an immediate move by NATO towards Russian frontiers today would probably trigger the antagonism vis-a-vis Russia. Such antagonism would be triggered even when the NATO states did not want either a new cordon sanitaire to isolate Russia or a resumption of the bloc policy. But at the time when the West hesitates Russia is pursuing its goals. Its desirable sphere of influence could grow with the growth of capabilities of the country. Today this desirable sphere of influence is the so called "near abroad", but tomorrow it could include other eastern countries.

policy". On the one hand the West should seek to integrate Russia to all Western institutions but there must not be any concessions to Russia in the usual requirements the other countries should meet. On the other hand the West should make clear to Russia that it could not expect to regain lost spheres of influence because the West would integrate new democracies in the East into all its institutions including security ones in the nearest future. It is also important not to give Russia any special status over the other East European countries.

Membership in the European Union backed by greater military cooperation among the countries of eastern and western Europe (the PFP could be useful in that sense) could be a kind of solution for some years until military threat is hardly imaginable. But even today it is time to think and make decisions concerning the timetable of the NATO expansion to the East.

From the point of view of the Baltic states it is also important not to leave any country behind this integration process. The Visegrad four thought and are still thinking that they must be the first to exit from Europe's grey zone. But the problem of a clear demarcation of NATO area in the East would remain unresolved if only the four Visegrad countries were to be integrated into NATO and/or WEU. All the eastern European countries outside NATO in that case could fall back into the Russian sphere of influence.

Moreover, it is not the interests of only the Baltic countries. De facto fixation of the new spheres of influence could not result in stable security environment of Europe. As Lothar Ruehl mentioned, the dissolution of the USSR has fundamentally improved the security situation of Western neighbouring countries. The Central European countries which once belonged to the "outer empire" have been separated from Russia through now independent states of former "inner empire" and have free access to Western Europe, where they can now find direct support, especially from Germany. This explains the major significance of the independence of Lithuania, Byelorussia and Ukraine for Poland's security. As long as these three countries remain independent Poland will not be exposed to any isolated Russian threat. (5).

Western Europe should realise that any crisis in eastern Europe would make immediate impact on its security. Thus while the division of spheres of influence by the USA and Russia can be viewed as feasible and understandable, such division by European countries is entirely impossible.

While the United States more and more often view Russia as a possible ally in helping to maintain stability in Asia and thus has a tendency to make concessions to it, Europe should draw a line at how far these concessions can go. In the interest of European security Russia should not have the right to interfere with the policies of the east European states. Europe holds the potential to use economic assistance and financial aid as leverage for a more constructive stance from Russia. At the

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same time Europe should redefine itself in order to include the countries of central and eastern Europe into its community. (6)

Notes

1. Dan Smith, "Between Urgencies and impossibilities: New Security Architecture for Europe", *Security Dialogue*, vol. 24, no.3, September 1993, p.310.

2. Sergei Medvedev, "European security after the cold war", *Security Dialogue*, vol.24, no.3, September 1993, pp. 319-320.

3. Androi Zagorski, "Reintegration in Former USSR?", *Aussen Politik*, vol.45, no.3, 1994, p.269.

4. Petr Lunak, "Security for Eastern Europe: the European option", *World Policy Journal*, vol XI, no. 3, 1994, p.129.

5. Lothar Ruehl, "European Security and NATO's Eastward Expansion", *Aussen Politik*, vol.45, no.2, 1994, p.115.

6. Petr Lunak, "Security for Eastern Europe: the European option", *World Policy Journal*, vol XI, no. 3, 1994, p.131.

European Security: With or without North America?

A German point of View

Frank UMBACH

Federal Institute for East European
and International Affairs (BIOst)
Lindenbornstr. 2
Germany

Fax: 49 - 221 5747 189

**Seminar for Junior Academics
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Cesky Krumlov, Czech Republic**

Frank Umbach
c/o Federal Institute for East European
and International Affairs (BIOst)
Lindenbornstr.22
Germany
Fax: xx-221-5747-189

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European Security: With or without Russia? - A German point of view

Europe stands once again at a crossroads in history. Almost all European conflicts or crises since 1815 have begun in Eastern Europe. Often they have led to war or to the brink of war. As the wars in the Yugoslav drama have shown over the last years, there is so far no real "*common European home*" for many reasons. A good example for the difficult balance between hopes and the strategic aims on the one side and a realistic and pragmatic course of the foreign policies of the European states on the other side provides the discussion of a full NATO and EU-membership for the Central and Eastern European (C&EE) states.¹ Considering these debates, the outcome of the initiation of NATO's PFP-program in January 1994² was on the one side rather disappointing for most of the states applying for a full NATO-membership. But it was certainly a step forward in view of the fact that both Central and East European (C&EE) states and the West have lost their political and strategic vision for the future. But it has neither solved NATO's dilemma (which was mainly a dilemma of its Russia policy) nor the security vacuum of Eastern Europe. It was a difficult compromise between proponents and opponents of a NATO enlargement and in this light perhaps the only logical middle course. The main factor impeding a NATO enlargement was and will also be in the near future Russia's opposition to NATO as the main security agent in Europe similarly as in the past. But nevertheless, also Russia has initiated a stronger political and military cooperation with the western alliance.

The question of "*European Security: with or without Russia*" has in my view at least three dimensions. First of all, I will try to point out that an important prerequisite of this question is a common European understanding of the specific roles of the main European security organizations such as the CSCE, the Western European Union (WEU)/EU and NATO within an European security architecture. In this regard, it is very important to recognize the different experiences of Western Europe, C&EE states and Russia which shape their policies of today. Secondly, I will analyze the Russian foreign policy and show that its understanding and the motivations of its policies nowadays differ from the rest of Europe. Finally, I will emphasize the reasons why the overwhelming German view is that Europe will create a real "*common European home*" only with Russia and not against it. But in this context it is also necessary to point out that not the West and certainly not Germany, given its long historical and cultural ties, will isolate Russia. It is rather our fear that Russia is on the way to isolate itself from the rest of Europe - something nobody wants.

¹ See, inter alia, Joshua B. Spero/Frank Umbach, NATO's Security Challenge to the East and the American-German Geo-Strategic Partnership in Europe, *Berichte des BIOst* 39/1994.

² See also Michel J. de Weger, "Ten Misunderstandings About PFP", *The Wall Street Journal Europe*, 24 May 1994.

Moreover, these discussions have revealed the growing mistrust of C&EE concerning the domestic developments and foreign policies of the former hegemon in the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union and today Russia. Will Russia once again dominate its former allies and will it in particular truly respect the sovereignty and independence of its former Soviet republics which is an important prerequisite for a new European security architecture?

Therefore, I will point out at first the institutional problems before analyzing the foreign and security policies of Russia and presenting my own rather than the official view of Russia's role in a "common European home".

The institutional dimensions and problems to a real "*European security architecture*"

Before government leaders determine Europe's security architecture, they need to define Europe by trying to answer the following questions: Did De Gaulle's "*Europe*" extend "*from the Atlantic to the Urals*"; did Thatcher's "*Europe*" characterize "*both sides of the Atlantic*"; did Gorbachev's exist "*from San Francisco to Vladivostok*"; or do none of these scenarios categorize Europe's future security?

One of the few points on which many governments increasingly tend to agree is the attempt to link some of the responsibilities of NATO, the CSCE, the WEU, and the EU in some way. The driving factor of the theoretical concept of "*interlinking institutions*" was the growing awareness among the West European political elites of the need to balance the specific strengths and weaknesses of the different existing European security institutions (EU/WEU, NATO and CSCE) by creating a new more coherent concept. The ongoing wars in former Yugoslavia have revealed in particular that these multinational institutions either have a role to play, but no means, or the means, but no role. But the rivalry between these institutions and the problem of duplicative functions and roles without concrete definitions of the responsibilities are not the only factors explaining why this concept has not been implemented up to now. Hence, such approaches often symbolize the dilemma between "*interlocking institutions*" and "*inter-blocking institutions*." Moreover, the continual problems and uncertain definitions stem also from the very lack of political will with the members of these security structures to combat new risks and instabilities. Thereby, the decisions made on the future of these security structures - whether defined as collective defense or collective security - emanate from the national capital cities, not the bureaucratic headquarters of international institutions or organizations themselves. In this light, it seems that a kind of renationalisation of the West European security policies is under way. The wars in former Yugoslavia might be a proof of this hypothesis. The British have always been more interested in regions of the British Commonwealth; during 1992-1993, France seemed more concerned with Germany's "*assertive policy*" and its future influence in the Balkan region and with keeping the Americans out of the Balkans rather than with stopping the Serbian military aggression. And the German position remained quite ambiguous, similar to its lower profile policies during the Gulf War: Germany advocated intervention to protect humanitarian convoys trying to travel throughout former Yugoslavia, but refused to take part because of its constitutional constraints. Moreover, Russia as one of the main actors, initiated a policy with the aim to rebuild its former ties to the orthodox "*Slavic brother*", Serbia. It has also used its policies for its own political ends, in order to bring its political weight back to a new European concert of "*great powers*". Indeed, all cases point to the great difficulties Europe has in finally surmounting historical patterns, experiences, and national interests. Consequently, the "*European policy*" of

hesitancy, impartiality, gesticulation and declarations have damaged the political and moral authority of the West, sometimes even the relations between Europe and America, and ultimately the credibility of the existing multinational security institutions (EU, UNO, CSCE).³ It was revealed that nowadays neither the United Nations are a real "international community" nor that the West, with the Cold War over, is any longer the West⁴ nor the European Union a real common and coherent political unit.⁵

One reality remains clear, however: NATO as a classical "collective defense institution" symbolizes not only for its current members the only security guarantor for Europe through its institutionalized and integrated military command structure. It alone possesses the network of bases, communications, equipment, logistical infrastructure and armed forces necessary for this task. NATO also contains the political and military decision-making bodies, power projection capabilities, command structure and the agreed crisis management procedures to handle a degenerating political situation that poses a threat to its security. This tradition combines internal conflict resolution and shared experiences in training and management. These are some reasons why the Visegrad-, the Baltic states, and others (Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine) are keen to join NATO in the foreseeable future.

The Russian foreign policy

Given the political framework of shifting power and influence, an constantly declining economic situation, arising conspiracy theories against the West as an imaginary explanation of the disaster and a tremendous increase in armed crime and corruption in all spheres of life have created a general sense of instability and unease in the Russian society. All these and still some other factors seem to have brought about a state of a "national psychosis" in Russia at a time where an increasing part of the population seems to be disappointed about a "capitalist" future. Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and the success of his "Liberal Democratic party" in the parliamentary elections last December are only a symbol for these difficulties of Russia to cope with the domestic and foreign policy challenges in the future.

In this light, liberal and conservative figures have debated since 1991/92 who are Russians, what role Russia should assume today and tomorrow and where *Russia's national interests* may lie. These discussions are part of the debate on a "rebirth of Russia" and its cultural and political heritage. At least three schools of thought emerged out of the debate in 1992/93: the Atlanticists, Eurasianists and the Great Russian nationalists.⁶ But there exist also myths surrounding these debates at least between *Eurasianists* and *Atlanticists*. No one can doubt that Russia is at once a European and an Asian power. However, in reality there is no civilisational incompatibility of Russia and Europe. This debate is merely often a secondary theatre of war. The controversy goes rather back to the question of Russia's main

³ Or as Nicole Gnesotto has raised the question in the right way, "... - it is not, *mutatis mutandis*, as a result of a confusion of values of the same order as that which previously led pacifists to proclaim 'better red than dead'". See Nicole Gnesotto, "Lessons of Yugoslavia", *Chaillot Papers*, 14 (March) 1994, here p.11.

⁴ As Owen Harris has argued, the political "West" was always highly artificial. Only an overtly hostile "East" could give it meaning despite the West shares vast commonalities like history, culture and political values and institutions. See his article: "With the Cold War is over, West is no longer West", *International Herald Tribune (IHT)*, 1 September 1993.

⁵ See also William Pfaff, "Nations Can Resolve to Act, But Europe Isn't a Nation", *IHT*, 10 February 1994, p.6.

⁶ See also Olga Alexandrowa, "Entwicklung der außenpolitischen Konzeptionen Rußlands", *BIOst-Bericht* 13/1993 and Emil Pain, "Russia and post-Soviet Space", *Moscow News* 8 (Febr. 25 - March 3) 1994, pp.1f. and Alexei G.Arbatov, "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives", *International Security* 2/1993, S.5-43.

choice between on the one side democracy and integration into the world economy and standing aside, choosing a specific Russian "*Sonderweg*" (a "*third way*") on the other side. When analyzing the Russian foreign policy, we can find without doubt that the current domestic and foreign policy debates in Russia have extended the distance between Russia and the rest of Europe. These shifts of foreign policies began already in the summer 1992 (long before V.Zhirinovskiy raised his status with his success in the parliamentary elections in December 1993), when Yeltsin had to cancel and to postpone his trip to Japan after strong pressure from the military side. The other important event was one of the first "*peacepeeking*"-missions in Moldova which was rather an open intervention for the pro-Russian separatists. Most interesting, Yeltsin's foreign-policy adviser, *Andranik Migranyan*, recently admitted that the West had failed to challenge Russia's intervention in Moldova in mid-1992 out of fear of undermining Yeltsin's precarious political base at home. It has disproved the argument of the "*radical democrats*" that Russia has to follow the internationally accepted principles and norms. Otherwise it has to pay some prices like Western economic assistance.⁷

While the external and internal empires are gone, the space of its internal empire - geopolitical, political, military, economic, cultural and intellectual - are certainly not. The "*common post Soviet civilisational space*" is for the near future indeed a reality. Vice-President A.Rutskoy, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, R.Khasbulatov, A.Volsky as the leader of the powerful Industrial-Lobby, the reactionary V.Zhirinovskiy as the leader of the so-called Liberal Democratic Party" and some others have called for a "*rebirth of Russia*" to restore the former Soviet Union before the bloody October events of 1993. Simultaneously, an alternative foreign policy program, based on the assumption that Russia is "*geopolitical encircled*", and in contrast to the foreign policy concept of the Foreign Ministry, had gained an increasing number of adherents since the summer of 1992. It predicted: "*It is highly possible that the territory of the former USSR will become a zone where military power will play an essential political role.*"⁸ According to the domestic arena, Kozyrev's foreign policy shifted step by step. In March 1993, one of the strongest opponents of Kozyrev, *Evgeniy Ambarzumov*, stated that there is no longer the need for Kozyrev's resignation. The signment of the official Russian foreign policy concept in April 1993 symbolized the growing policy of compromises of the Yeltsin administration and the Foreign Ministry. These steps in the Russian foreign policy have also determined the Russian policy toward the "*near abroad*" as well as the Yugoslav conflict over the last two years.

One reason for these shifts was the appointment of hardliners to key posts in the Russian Defense Ministry and the greater corporate identity of its interests (in contrast to the more divided political elites) which have given the army the power to react to ethnic conflicts along the fringes of the former USSR, defending its understanding of Russia's "*national interests*". They have also become increasingly vulnerable as violence spreads in Moldova, Georgia, Tadjikistan, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Based on an unofficial "*Russian Monroe-Doctrine*", defined according to geostrategic and political interests of Russia, the Russian military establishment condemned the "*parade of sovereignties*". The confusing signals at one time declaring the Russian withdrawal from the hotspots and the Baltic states while at another time pouring weapons into ethnic trouble spots and escalating these conflicts have shown that these issues are still being debated due to the internal power vacuum, the fragmentation of political and

⁷ See *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 18 January 1994, pp. 4-5, 8.

⁸ See *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 19 August 1992.

military authorities and the unsettled nature of the civil-military relationship in Russia where uncontrolled actions by the army or the tendency of local and regional pro-imperial forces have disavowed the more moderate policy of the Foreign Ministry.

The explanation for this policy had been drafted in Russia's new *Military Doctrine* (published in 1992) where protecting the rights and interests of Russians abroad including all "culturally connected" people with Russia (approximately 70 million in the view of *Sergey Karaganov*) were pointed out. Given the power vacuum and Yeltsin's need of the military establishment's support for the domestic power struggle, the Defense Ministry, its General Staff and possible local "warlords" like General *Alexander Lebed* had increasingly acquired the power to decide de facto the daily questions of the Russian policy for the "near abroad" during the last two years.

Although the draft military doctrine had not been officially introduced until November 1993, the Russian Defense Ministry had already implemented the military's understanding of its "near abroad"-concept with a specific Russian style of peacekeeping which is rather peacemaking or peace enforcement since the autumn of 1992. In this context it is necessary to underscore that it is Russia that is strongly against international peacekeeping missions within the CIS and has pushed forward the idea of "common" CIS-forces for peacekeeping - but dominated by Russian forces and under Russian command in order to preserve Russian influence in the former Soviet regions. But the CIS-agreements for peacekeeping exists only on paper. Considering the Russian interests, it is not surprising that the Russian understanding and the practise of peacekeeping is very different from Western approaches or UN-missions. Most of Russia's neighbours have interpreted this policy as the return of the "Russian gendarme" in Eurasia - an experience which they have made for several centuries. But the harsh economic realities in the former Soviet republics, the neglecting of their own responsibilities for the current social-economic crisis in their countries, and the often one-sided Western stance of finding close cooperation forms with Russia to resolve regional and global security challenges (like the proliferation risks) towards an open and critical discussion of the ambivalent Russian policies in the "near abroad" have contributed to some forms of "bandwagoning" of these CIS-states with Russia (a particular case is Georgia).

Since the early summer of 1993, a new political consensus has been reached at least concerning the question what Russian national interests are for the time being.⁹ As the discussion of a full NATO membership for the C&EE states or its policy toward the "near abroad" have revealed, Russia seems to follow its traditional interests in its geopolitical periphery as a "great power" (*velikaya derzhava*) as it has done during the past 250 years. This is the only issue on which all 13 blocs in Russia's parliament agree to a considerable extent. The Yeltsin decree of creating 30 military bases in the "CIS and Latvia" and the following domestic and foreign turmoil have indicated what Russia understands with defining

⁹ See in particular the statements of the Russian Foreign Ministry and its Minister Andrei Kozyrev concerning its policy toward the "near abroad" in: *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 22 September 1993, p.1; *Ibid*, 24 November 1993, pp.1,3; *Ibid*, 19 January 1994, p.1 and his support of a new confederation between the former Soviet republics, see *RFE/RL News Briefs*, 13-17 June 1994, p.5f. To some other issues concerning the growing consent in Russia's foreign policies see also "Russia's Foreign Policy Should be Multidimensional", in: *International Affairs (Moscow)* 5/1994, pp.79-92 and "Eastern Europe and Russia", in: *Ibid* 3-4/1994, pp.3-21; some explanations provides Suzanne Crow, "Why Has Russian Foreign Policy Changed", RFE/RL Research Report 18 (6 May) 1994, pp.1-6 and Idem, "Russia Asserts its Strategic Agenda", *Ibid*, 50/1993, pp.1-8.

and defending "Russian national interests".¹⁰ This dubious current Russian policy can partly be explained by the historical fact that Russia was always running behind the political and economic developments of the rest of Europe. This historical fact has created a feeling of inferiority towards Europe and the United States. Throughout the centuries it was often compensated by imperial policies using violent means (albeit Russia was not the only one). But in a nuclear age, such dangerous tendencies in its foreign and security policies are no longer acceptable. Russia cannot solve its domestic problems by external expansion. Moreover, the current short-sighted policy to defend the Russian national interests abroad runs also against its own economic and financial possibilities. The short-term goal of the Russian policy does obviously not automatically correspond to its long-term interests which are hardly discussed nowadays. Thus Vyacheslav Dashichev, former adviser of President Gorbachev and one of an ever-louder voice among Russian democratic intellectuals and "institutchiks", recently rejected any form of a "Russian Monroe Doctrine":

"It should be said that for more than two years, Russian policy has failed to establish relations of trust with a countries of the near abroad and Eastern Europe. These relations are very heavily burdened with old ideas held by those countries' political circles about Russian imperial aspirations. Moreover, these ideas have been reinforced by the use of outdated methods of exerting economic and military pressure on those countries and by a lack of tact and political skill in relations with them."¹¹

Symptomatic for another shift in Russia's foreign policies was the fact that even in the foreign policy concept of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs the Gorbachev-notion of the "common European home" had not found any place. Russia advocates also today an all European "collective security institution" (like CSCE) as the main European security agent and has proposed that NATO and Russia jointly guarantee the security of the states in between like in the past.¹² Moreover during the last months, Russia has proposed to single out NACC from NATO's umbrella and put it under the structures of the CSCE. Under these circumstances, NATO would lose its new "raison d'être" as alliance coping successfully with the changing security challenges and tasks of the future.

Another indicator for its foreign policy priorities is also the suggestion of Russian political leaders that Germany should join them in forming a geopolitical counterweight to the United States. The signed military agreements between Russia and Germany in 1992/93, for instance, have revealed the motivations of the *political* (not only economic) importance of Germany for Russia today. Moreover, it has shown maybe the ever-present hope of Russian politicians to create some "special relationships" with Germany, remembering the close bilateral military relationship between the two states in the aftermath of the Rapallo-pact in 1922.

But these Russian motivations dictating their foreign policies have increasingly backfired. The Central and East European (C&EE) countries and their new and old political elites (in particular in the Visegrad

¹⁰ See *Rosslitskiye vesti*, 7 April 1994, p.1; *Izvestiya*, 7 April 1994, p.3; *Ibid*, 8 April 1994, p.3; *Sevodnya*, 8 April 1994, p.1; *Izvestiya*, 9 April 1994, p.1 and 3 and Steven Erlanger, "Russia's Entangled Leadership. Signals Get Crossed, Again, on Bases", *III*, 8 April 1994, p.4.

¹¹ *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 23 April 1994, p.4. To the prospects of the relations between Russia and the west see also Alexei K. Pushkov, "Letter from Eurasia: Russia and America: The Honeymoon's over", in: *Foreign Policy* 1993, pp.76-90 and Georgi Arbatov, "Eurasia Letter: A New Cold War?", *Ibid*, Summer 1994, pp.90-103 and Yuri Afanasyev, "A New Russian Imperialism", *Perspective*, February-March 1994, pp.1, 7-10.

¹² See also Andrei Zagorsky, "Tilting From the CSCE to NATO? European Affairs Call for Closer Attention", *International Affairs* (Moscow), March-April 1994, pp.43-49.

states) have initiated foreign policy strategies to rebuild their former ties to the West following the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA. The driving factors are the historical lessons and the threat perception of an unstable Russia which is also today often viewed as a "*non-status quo power*" with "*imperial ambitions*".

Given its economic decline, its political instability and ambitious foreign policies to rebuild its status as a "great power", Russia is - as a western analyst has pointed out - "*in danger of becoming a supernova state, expanding slowly outwards on its periphery while collapsing internally*".¹³ In this regard, Russia carries enormous responsibilities for its own future as well as for the rest of Europe.

Conclusions

Germany's national and historic post re-unification commitment to increase stability by integrating Central and East European states (particularly its neighbors) into European multi-lateral institutions results from its geo-strategic position in the heart of Europe and its traditional regional ties. However, its own historical integration experiences during the 1950s, undergirded by America's leadership and NATO's determination, provided a stable security framework for internal democratization and economic reconstruction. In the light of that "*strategy for importing stability*", Germany recognizes both the need for regional stability and regional integration eastwards. But its "*export stability-strategy*" impresses upon German leaders that their capability to shoulder alone the burden and responsibilities for its Eastern neighbors remains limited. Hence it promoted a "*joint Western Ostpolitik*" with the other West European states and in particular with America.

There exists a widespread common sense in the West that it is certainly in its interest not to undermine the more moderate Russian government as long as *Boris Yeltsin* stays in power as the Russian president because real European security and stability can only be build with and not against Russia in Europe.

But if the Yeltsin government tries to follow a political strategy of competing with Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and other Russian nationalists, Russia - and not the West - will isolated once again itself - and with that the tragic history of Russia continues in the future. In this light, the West has to renounce and to withstand any veto-rights of Russia - no matter how diplomatically formulated - and even the appearance of a new Yalta or any "*theories of axis*"¹⁴ (like in the 20s with the Rapallo-treaty) between the West/Germany and Russia in order to avoid the associated perceptions of the rest of Europe. Moreover, it is disturbing when official and unofficial Russian commentators warn the West against a NATO (and its troops) on "*its borders*" which would de facto violate the respect for the sovereignty of Belarus and other CIS-states (in the case of Poland, there exists no common border with Russia, except with the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad). It is rather an indicator for Russian thinking today, already incorporating the other Slavic independent states of Belarus and Ukraine in a "*great Russian state*" (*velikoe gosudarstva*).


¹³ Renee de Nevers, *Russia's Strategic Renovation. Russian Security Strategies and Foreign Policies in the Post-Imperial Era*, *Adelphi-Paper* 289 (IISS), London 1994, here p.6f.

¹⁴ So the proposals of the Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev during the "Saama-discussions" with the German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel in December 1993, see "Rußland will die Trennlinie zwischen Ost und West aufheben - aber zu seinen Bedingungen," *FAZ*, 21 December 1993 and Friedbert Pflüger (member of the Bundestag and chairman of the German-Polish Association), "Das muß alle Alarmglocken läuten lassen. Über die Osterweiterung der NATO und den russischen Versuch, Einfluß auszuüben", *Generalanzeiger*, 24 December 1993.

Moreover, the Western one-sided attention to Russia to the neglect of the security interests of the other East European states and the national interests of the West itself in order to strengthen the Yeltsin government has resulted in hindering Western intentions to stabilize the region. The more radical Russian reformers see no possibility today to influence the domestic debate and how to live in a common European home because the Western "understanding" for Yeltsin's precarious domestic situation has de facto strengthened the hardliners inside and outside the Yeltsin administration, and with that the nationalistic and hegemonic re-directions of Russia's foreign policy in the last two years.

If NATO accepts a de facto veto-right of the Russians against full membership of the other East European countries under the current Russian need of Western economic support, why should Russia do it in the future when hopefully a better, stable domestic situation exists and not follow its 250 years traditional policy toward these states? What Western politicians and experts often fail to consider is the fact that Russia always tries - like other countries - to follow its "national security interests" which can at any time compete with those of other states. It is a natural political bargaining process in the life of international politics that needs compromises among all sides.

Thereby, the member states of NATO and EU have to remember the post-World War II experiences telling us that the political, economic and defense aspects for a stabilization and democratization (of the Central and East European states) are all interlinked: *without external security, no internal stability; without internal stability, no external security*. Only in this regard, is Russia's role in a "common European home" an open question. And only Russia can answer this question. In the meantime, the rest of Europe should not lose its patience. In which way Russia and the other former Soviet republics can be involved in an European security architecture - in contrast to a full NATO-membership - is still an open question. It depends mainly on the role and function of the existing security institutions in a system of "interlocking institutions" which has still to be defined. For the time being, the debate already occurs over the question where this expanding cooperation program will end and what defines its logical limits. In this light, it might be useful to remember the wellknown dictum of NATO's first Secretary General Lord Ismay: to "keep the Soviets out, the Americans in, and the German's down". Pause should be given perhaps to new a purpose: "Pull the Central and Eastern Europeans in, bring all Europeans together, and maintain American presence."



European Security: From Vlasdivostok to Vancouver?

A Greek Point of View

Marina Stavropoulou

Lawyer and Researcher,
Hellenic Center for European Studies
Athens

Fax: 30 1 321 41 99

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Cesky Krumlov, Czech Republic**

"EUROPEAN SECURITY : FROM VLASDIVOSTOK TO VANCOVER"

- 1) The Problem: European Security Order in Transition.
- 2) The CFSP in the Treaty on European Union: A Balance Sheet.
- 3) European Security Architecture and existing approaches.
 - a) WEU and European Security.
 - b) NATO and European Security.
- 4) Managing new security problems in Europe.

Paper submitted by **Marina Stavropoulou**

1) THE PROBLEM: EUROPEAN SECURITY ORDER IN TRANSITION

It has become a commonplace - but some commonplaces are true : fundamental changes occurred in Europe in the last few years which have changed the whole political landscape of the continent.

Today, after decades of relatively stable political-military structures, the post-1945 European Security order, based on bloc-confrontation and bloc integration has entered a phase of transition

First of all the perception of security changed: military power ceased to be the final argument in international policy. This is due to the fact that security orders, including their architecture and concepts are job related; they are no mean in themselves but find their rationale in defending territorial integrity, quality of the political system and collective self-determination against outside threats. Given the enormous cost of military defence and the security dilemma created by military potentials for other countries, security and especially defence policies and their organisation in alliances have to be regularly questioned, whether and to what degree they perform these functions and whether there are functional equivalents available.

It is generally accepted that security in the 90's has not only a military dimension but faces major political-economic threats. This means that one has to look for a security order, which covers not only the military but the political-economic dimensions of security as well. As a consequence, far reaching remodelling of organisation, substance and patterns of European security policies is demanded.

In the second place, one can't ignore the fact that ideological confrontation has disappeared and has been replaced by the co-operation on the basis of common shared values of European civilisation. The mutual deterrence of the comforting superpowers and, as a consequence, of the military blocks has disappeared together with the security system on the continent which was based on this mutual deterrence.

This means that the threat of a major military conflict no longer exists. However, it also means that many of the factors which prevented countries or political groups from trying to push their own interests against those of others have also vanished and that the way for many, relatively low level conflicts is now open. These conflicts are not a product of the post - Cold war period; they are deeply rooted in European history but, contrary to conflicts in the western part of the continent, conflicts in the Eastern part of Europe were not even allowed to come to the surface, even their existence was denied. So nowadays these conflicts are further away from their solution than at any time previously, since these forty years have simply fuelled the conflicts and resulted in their immediate upsurge after the collapse of the dictatorship. In addition to that, these countries also have to face the enormous problems stemming from the transition from totalitarian dictatorship and command economy to pluralistic democracy and free market economy. This transition inevitably brings social and political problems and raises the threat of a new economic and social division of Europe.

The challenge is clear: how can be established a well-functioning system of security - in its broadest sense - able to channel the changes and offer help and perspectives for those who need it ?

2) THE CFSP IN THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION

The Western Europe and especially the European Union represent an island of pronounced stability and opulence in a sea of poverty and ethnic and religious conflicts. Such a complex situation in proximity of the EC generates strong pressure and requests for action in the specific field of economics and the vaster and more general one of security.

It also puts Western Europe into an entirely new position. During Cold War, it could count on almost total security protection and was left unscathed by the today enormous difficulties and almost desperate need for financial assistance of some of the economies in its borders. The end of nuclear confrontation in Europe and the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact have stripped military threats of their global character and have opened the door to differentiated actions based on local and regional requirements rather than on traditional ideological confrontation.

Given the above mentioned facts, it is not surprising that one of the key elements of the Maastricht agreement is the establishment of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Four particular security topics are targets for co-ordinated policy, as asserted in Lisbon in June 1992 (the CSCE process ; the policy of arms control and disarmament in Europe, including confidence-building measures; nuclear non -proliferation issues; and the economics aspects of security, in particular control of the transfer of military technology to third countries and control of arms export).

Unfortunately, the truth is that the Maastricht Treaty itself is long on objectives and short on methods and priorities. Paragraph 2 of Article JI of the Treaty sets a series of targets. When it comes to how these objectives are to be attained, however, the Treaty refers only to the establishment of co-operation and joint action among Union members. It says nothing about which problems are seen as the most dangerous for the Union, about the overall place of military, economic and other instruments in a Common Foreign and Security Policy, about whether a CSFP envisages a global order with regional applications or a series of discrete regional orders in the world, or about the priorities of EC concern.

One must not forget though, that until recently not only has the idea of a supranational foreign and security policy been taboo, but also the idea of a state's sovereignty was inextricably linked to notions of independence and autonomy in the choice and pursuit of foreign policy options. At the heart of sovereignty is the idea that the state is capable of defending and maintaining its territorial integrity. While it is accepted that states may qualify this by collective defence agreements, their governments are still presumed to be the ultimate locus of political authority in foreign and security matters. In this

perspective, Maastricht broke new ground for EC's member states by implicitly challenging this and by setting aside the security taboo.

The Maastricht Treaty, despite its uncompleted and vague dispositions, hides some external and internal dynamics.

First of all, there can be little doubt that a major foreign policy preoccupation for the EU over the next few years will stem directly from the imperatives of judicial co-operation linked to the vexed questions of immigration and right of asylum. The Commission of the EC has already suggested to incorporate migration into EC's external policy through an appropriate, targeted co-operation policy designed to combat migration pressures.

Moreover, the enlargement of the European Union with member states like Austria and Sweden will make a fundamental reform of the EC's institutional capacities imperative. The changing security agenda and international demands reinforced the need for an urgent reappraisal of the nature and parameters of political co-operation.

While the member states could not be persuaded to integrate European Political Co-operation fully into supranational decision making by systematically applying the principle of unite and extending a role in foreign policy oversight to the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice, they were persuaded to confront the hitherto taboo subject of security defined in political and military terms. The operational capacity of the EC was raised as an issue.

But, power politics among the Twelve, the international positions of key member states like the UK and France and finally the financial implications of moving towards a European defence capacity at a time of civilisation of defence industries, shifting threat perceptions, falling defence expenditure and competing claims on the public purse, led to the victory of member state's reticence to proceed further.

The European Union must face its responsibilities vis-a-vis third countries. Central and Eastern Europe countries expect from the EU to speak and act with one single voice if it wants to play a role of regional security actor.

According to Jacques Delors, defence and security were an essential part of political union. As he noted, common foreign policy did not necessarily mean a single policy; the EC should set out the broad objectives and parameters of policy and the member states should be allowed room to interpret them in the light of domestic traditions and interests. Internal divisions will exist on almost every issue but there is enough commonality of purpose to allow the Twelve (or more) as a group to discern their common interest and to act to further it. The flexible response in the foreign policy field, though far from optimal, has the merit of allowing an evolutionary approach to continue.

3) EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AND EXISTING APPROACHES

In order to have a credible common foreign and security policy it must be backed up with a capacity to enforce goals, if necessary by military means. This the nub of the problem and raises the debate of what kind of role, if any, the EU should have vis-a-vis WEU and NATO.

a) WEU and European Security

Being at the same time the defence component of the European Union, the potential military tool of the emerging Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European pillar of the renewed transatlantic partnership on which our ultimate security continues to depend, Western European Union has a role rather like that of a hinge.

During the Maastricht negotiations, WEU was repeatedly put forward as a bridge of transitional arrangement between the EC developing its own politics independent of NATO or alternatively as a link between the EC and NATO. WEU was used as an organisational and operational umbrella for action taken by individual EC members in the Gulf. Moreover, when the EC became involved as an observer in Yugoslavia, WEU rather than the revived CSCE, was again seen as the organisation to provide logistical support.

As a consequence, in Maastricht the WEU was seen as the path of least resistance in that it gave expression to the US expressed desire of seeing the Europeans form a stronger European pillar within NATO without the concomitant threat of a competitive dual-headed arrangement. A further need was fulfilled, the need to organise out of area operations. In addition, WEU provided a means of exerting the EC's security rationale without threatening the defence sovereignty of the EC's member states.

Many scenarios came up about the future role that WEU was going to play.

According to the declaration on WEU appended to the Maastricht Treaty, WEU is to be developed as the defence component of the Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of NATO by formulating common European defence policy and implementing it accordingly.

The problem remains though, as defence cannot be separated from security policy whose formulation is subject to states some of them are in NATO but not in the WEU, some are in the WEU but not in NATO and all of whom are in the EU.

Further inconsistencies were caused by the overlapping responsibilities foreseen for the WEU and for the Union. It remains to be

seen what solution is going to be found in the next intergovernmental Conference of 1996, where merging WEU with the EC will be a point of discussion in order to reorganise European security architecture.

Of course, in my point of view, the idea to integrate WEU, the revitalised defence alliance of Europe's major military powers into European Political Union and to upgrade WEU's role in European security has some serious advantages.

First of all, WEU could be gradually enlarged towards the North and the East either through membership, association, or permanent guest status. Additionally, early associative or membership status of eastern European states like Poland, the CSFR, Hungary in WEU would ease pressures for immediate memberships in EU and their adaptation to democratic integrated structures. The problem of Non-Members (Ireland, Austria, Sweden) is solvable. After neutrality has lost its legitimacy and function, European issues have become more political-economic and less military ones and it can be expected from old and new EC-Neutrals to participation WEU in one way or another.

This approach provides a structural and comprehensive solution to European security problems, constitutes a logical continuation and modernisation of EU integration and offers major long-term security advantages against the disadvantages of major reform costs.

Once more, political will hinders the way to such an evolution. Political will to really transfer national security and defence sovereignties to integrated European Political Union bodies is limited in times when no direct and imminent military threat functioning as an outside federate exists and when NATO offers a politically more comfortable and financially cheaper solution. Unfortunately, very often political elites, plagued already by many domestic problems, when confronted with the choice either to begin costly structural long-term reforms or to continue with outdated but reliable status-quo against the costs and risks of structural change.

b) NATO and European Security.

Re-organisation of European security should be on existing, well know and effective structures in order to ensure a maximum of stability and acceptance.

The Maastricht Summit, echoing in this respect the conclusions of the Rome Summit, emphasised that the relation between European security and defence and the Alliance would be a complementary and transparent one. The strategic unity and indivisibility of security is going to be maintained and the integrated structure preserved. European security and defence identity is not seen as a competitor or substitute for the Alliance but on the contrary should lead to a net gain in security and to a strengthen transatlantic link. Common Foreign and Security Policy, as expressed in Art. J. 4 of the Maastricht Treaty and in the appended declaration on WEU, had to be compatible with NATO obligations and policy.

The Atlantic Alliance, on the other hand has repeatedly stated that aims at the establishment of a framework of interlocking organisations which will form together the framework of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture to

which mainly contribute. All three differ in their concept of security, geographic - political scope, level of sovereignty transfer, available instruments for power projection and political perspectives. But, what unites members is more important than what divides them. Common interest should be pursued for the common good. The framework of interlocking institutions can posse on its own. In this framework, the major European institutions would not only complement each other but also increasingly co-ordinate their activities and efforts. This may allow us one day to move from co-operative security to collective security.

In this framework NATO can provide for the time being the security and stability on which such a framework must rest. Weakening of the Alliance would make new security order inconceivable. The Atlantic partnership with the United States and Canada is Key for the Alliance and a balance among European nations.

Additionally, one cannot forget the dynamic role of the Alliance vis-a-vis the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the new states of the former Soviet Union.

The diplomatic liaison relationship established after the London Summit with these countries has proved a success. Though the Alliance made clear that it could not in the foreseeable future invite these countries to become members, offer them security guarantees, these countries perceived NATO as a security anchor in Western Europe that could provide also security to them.

At the Rome Summit the liaison relationship was raised to a new qualitative level in the North Atlantic Co-operation Council to consult with nations of Central and Eastern Europe security related issues. The NACC became thus the primary security forum for a future Euro-Atlantic community in which all states can express their security concern freely and in the presence of those which may be the cause of concern. The NACC can also meet in exceptional and emergency circumstances. It will thus become a key instrument in dealing with crisis situations or sudden security risks to its members. NACC is regarded as the right, politically necessary and low-cost approach to guarantee a high degree of intra-European stability and to act as an effective last resort military defence system.

Finally and most importantly, NATO can, for the time being and for a long time, provide the WEU with assets and logistics for its military operations. Between NATO and WEU the relationship will be increased in practical terms, including the harmonisation of working methods and the synchronisation of important meetings.

NATO of the future has to be first and foremost an organisation that provides for the common defence of its members. If it can evolve into a community of values and a forum of political consultation on vital issues of foreign policy and security it might become the core security organisation of a future Euro-Atlantic architecture in which all states, irrespective of their size or geographical location, would enjoy the same freedom, co-operation and security.

4) MANAGING NEW SECURITY PROBLEMS IN EUROPE


All the above mentioned reflections lead to one simple observation: The existing organisations in Europe were created in the era of Cold War confrontation and were designed to meet the challenges of that era.

There can only be one answer to challenges of today: co-operation in democracy. One has to look for a security order, which covers not only the military but the political-economic dimensions as well. This is a question both for legitimate competence and effective instruments to solve such inter-related problems.

But whatever grand european and global design is developed and whatever specific models for interrelating EU-WEU, NATO, CSCE are sought, one should keep in mind the lessons of European history, should regard European democratic values not as political rhetoric but as basic impetus, and look for a rationally organised and cost-effective organisation of European politics.

Compared with the situation after 1945, today Europe faces not only a window of opportunity but carry a responsibility, legitimised by the success of EC-integration, European detonate and democracy building in Eurore. Looking back into European political theory might help to clarify ideas and intentions and to find necessary motivation.

In the place of a conclusion I would like to put the words of Pericles in his speech to the Athenians as cited by Thucydides in the History of the Peloponesian War *"because I doubt our own mistakes more than the plans of our enemies"*. I too doubt our own mistakes, more than the plans of our enemies. Even more that our enemies are no longer here.



European Security: From Vlasdivostok to Vancouver?

An American Perspective

Stuart KAUFMAN

Assistant Professor
University of Kentucky
Department of Political Science
Kentucky

United States of America

Phone: 1 606 257 1771

Fax: 1 606 257 7034

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by Stuart Kaufman, Assistant Professor
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For the century ending in 1945, the dominant issue of European security was the German Question. However, by 1917 if not before, it had been joined by two other equally important issues, which I shall call the Russian Problem and the American Dilemma. During the Cold War, NATO provided a means of managing all three issues, but now that the Cold War has ended, they have re-emerged as the central issues for Europe's security. My contention here is that because of the Russian and American problems, Europe must be secure from Vladivostock to Vancouver if it is to be secure at all. Furthermore, I shall argue, NATO's contribution to that security remains essential.

What is the Russian Problem? At core, I believe, it is a problem of identity: What is Russia? And where is Russia? What is Russia's mission in Europe, and in the world? Russians themselves have long been uncertain. One view is that Russia is essentially a multinational gathering of nations--or, to put it less charitably, an empire--and has been so since Ivan IV conquered the Tatars in the 1550s. In this vision, what Russians take pride in is their state's power, and they see no natural boundaries for Russia. From this point of view, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's vision of Russian soldiers washing their boots in the Indian Ocean is no less justifiable than Russian geostrategists' attempt to defend Russia's borders in the Pamir mountains of Tajikistan; or than liberal Atlanticists' effort at drawing a border on the featureless steppes where the current Russian Federation meets Kazakhstan.

Another view proposes a moral, rather than imperial, mission for Russia. In Tsarist times, some Russians saw Russia as the Third Rome, the center of Christian purity; in Soviet times, it was the headquarters of the international Communist movement. Today, the heirs of Tsarist Russia's "Westernizers" would have Russia be the democratizer of Eurasia, building a liberal democratic Russian federation with Russian citizenship based on criteria of civic loyalty. But as attractive as this vision may appear from the West, it requires the abandonment of the tens of millions of the Russian diaspora--not an attractive prospect to most Russians. Furthermore, Russia is not yet ready for liberal democracy, so building one will require a long-term, inglorious effort which may well not be what the Russian people want.

The third vision, in some ways the intermediate one, is the Slavophile vision, which puts Russia at the head of the family of Orthodox Slavic nations in Europe. The trouble with this view is that it inevitably opens the door to ethnonationalist extremism. At the very least, Slavophiles must insist on the annexation of Russified areas on Russia's borders, such as eastern Ukraine and

northeastern Kazakhstan, if not of those entire countries. And the position of national minorities can only become tenuous in such a Russia: other Slavs are "little brothers", while non-Slavs are essentially foreigners. In the worst case, this vision could lead to something like Samuel Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations," an ethnonationalist revival with Russia at the head of all of Europe's Orthodox Slavs. The similarity between the Bosnian imbroglios of 1914 and 1994 provides a hint of the horrors that await Europe down that path.

As this brief and simplified survey makes clear, the Russian Problem matters. The Russians are 150 million strong--the largest and among the most dynamic of the nations in Europe--so the solution of their problem must affect everyone else in Europe. An imperialist Russia must expand or rot; a Slavophile Russia is by definition irredentist; and a democratic Russia must, for the medium term, remain unstable.

The American Dilemma arises from the imbalances in European security created by the Russian Problem and the German Question. While Americans agree that their historical role is as a sort of evangelist of democratic capitalism, they are not sure how best to play that role. On the one hand, the advice of the first American President and the experience of the nineteenth century suggested acting primarily by example while "avoiding foreign entanglements". On the other hand, the experience of the current century taught many that when the U.S. does not use its power judiciously to stabilize the European security systems, its interests later demand that it go to war to reestablish that system. Since Americans are uncomfortable with such judiciousness, they tend to swing between extremes of moralism and isolationism, in the process evoking an entirely justified skepticism among Europeans about American intentions and American reliability.

The continuing necessity of the American role is, I think, illustrated by ineffectiveness of Europe's response to the Yugoslav collapse. The mere shadow of the German and Russian problems, exacerbated by assorted other issues, was enough to paralyze European action in the absence of U.S. leadership. All are agreed that events, especially in Bosnia, are unfortunate and potentially dangerous; most agree that the Serbs are the primary aggressors; but an effective response has not been forthcoming. To be sure, even the most skillful U.S. leadership might not have been enough to construct an effective European policy regarding the former Yugoslavia, but in the U.S. absence, no leadership emerged at all.

To clarify: I am not arguing that the U.S. is a deus ex machina to save Europe from itself; I do not mean to suggest that Americans, in their superior wisdom, are the unique arbiters of truth and justice who must save Europeans from their own folly. Americans are at least equally capable of folly, as Vietnam at least made clear. But at least since 1941, American power has

provided the core around which European resistance to security threats coalesces, when it coalesces at all. One reason why is that American distance from the European continent usually prevents the U.S. from being distracted by historical rivalries from addressing immediate problems. Rather, American interests are in security and stability for Europe as a whole. All of this means, among other things, that Europe is likely to be secure only if Americans feel secure enough to act in Europe.

None of this yet addresses the question: what must Europeans and Americans together do? The start of the answer lies, I believe, in studying the reduction of the third core issue of European security: the German Question. As Ralf Dahrendorf formulates it, the German Question had little immediately to do with European security. Rather, he says, the question was, "Why is it that so few in Germany embraced the principle of liberal democracy"?

My point here--and also, I believe, Dahrendorf's--is that the root reason Germany disrupted European security was its undemocratic political system. Bismarck's expansionism, which upset the European balance, was the direct result of the defeat of the Liberals by Bismarck's policy of "blood and iron". Wilhelm II's expansionism was the direct result of a quarter century of Wilhelmine authoritarian militarist indoctrination. And Hitler's expansionism was the meaning of Nazism. In contrast, the cautious foreign policy of the Federal Republic is equally directly the result of the success of liberal democracy, and the painful exorcism of old ghosts encouraged by democracy.

In short, then, I subscribe to a variant of the "democratic peace" hypothesis, and even more to the hypothesis that the cause of wars--both international and internal--is aggressors. What this means is that the greatest threat to European security comes from the possibility of an aggressive government--most likely of the national chauvinist variety--coming to power in one or both of those countries. Thus the central goal of European security is to promote stable democratic, or at least liberal, solutions to the German and Russian problems. What is not so clear is how best to promote liberalism and oppose chauvinism.

As I suggested above, one reason for European near-paralysis on the issues of Balkan security--in Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, and elsewhere--is fear of awakening the German and Russian problems. "Are we really ready to trust the Germans, weakened by the reunion and plagued by an upsurge of neo-Nazi skinhead activity, to help lead European action in the Balkans?", some ask. Others worry that the Russians take any opposition to the Serbs to be against Russian interests; might not military support for Bosnia be taken as a new declaration of cold war, leading to the ouster of Yeltsin by national chauvinist hard-liners? If these bogeymen are real, the objections are decisive. But are they real?

There is a case to be made that the rise of extreme nationalism in the would-be interveners in Bosnia is a cause for concern. There are not only neo-Nazis in Germany; there is the National Front in France, a host of similar national extremists throughout East-Central Europe, and a revamped Fascist party in Italy which is part of the governing coalition. But these trends are not a reason to avoid effective action in Bosnia and elsewhere. Those who appease the Serbs, assuming that firm support for the Bosnian victims of aggression might lead to anti-foreign backlashes in the countries that intervene, have it exactly backwards.

In fact, to oppose Serbian expansionism in the Balkans is to oppose national chauvinism to the north and west, for two reasons. First, the national chauvinists in NATO Europe are, for the most part, more isolationist than expansionist, arguing for a turning inward, away from the concerns of Europe. Citizens in most European countries, as in the U.S., are currently in a mood to tend their own gardens, but giving in to the isolationist extreme right does not strengthen the position of internationalists of the center and left. Rather, by weakening the ties that bind Europe, they are opening the door for further European disintegration. Furthermore, by failing to refute the flawed assumptions at the base of nationalist chauvinist movements, the appeasers are simply ceding ground to their opponents, both in their own countries and in others.

This is true even in regard to the much more serious problem of nationalist chauvinism in Russia--the current incarnation of the Russian Problem. The Russian mood is currently one in which a general who dismembers a defenseless former colony of the Soviet empire--I have in mind General Lebed in Moldova--thereby makes himself a popular hero and a candidate for Defense Minister, and possibly even for President. This mood is fed by a Russian media which repeats the distortions of Serbian extremists (and Russian extremists in places like Moldova) as if they were factual.

In this context, it is entirely possible that NATO action against the Serbs would cause a reaction in Russia which would propel national chauvinists to power. Russia in fact has no national interests in supporting the Serbs, but since Russians think they do, Russian amour propre will be injured in case of NATO action. Yeltsin might not even have to be overthrown; forcing him to replace a few key ministers would be sufficient to turn Russian foreign policy decisively toward expansionism.

The trouble with using this fear to prevent action in Bosnia (or elsewhere) is that Russian foreign policy has essentially made this turn already: Russians are already moving toward a combined Slavophilic and imperialist answer to the Russian Problem. Russian expansionists start their argument from the truth that security and economic cooperation among the former Soviet states is necessary and inevitable. Since the non-Russian states, in the first flush

of nationalist enthusiasm, initially resisted such cooperation, an impatient Russia turned to coercion and force.

Already, Russian pressure has facilitated (or organized?) coups in Azerbaijan and Georgia, placing into power former Politburo members more sensitive to Russian concerns than their nationalist predecessors. The Russians also backed a Communist coup in Tajikistan and provided the military power for Russian separatists to secede (at least de facto) from Moldova. All this is in addition to the economic pressure and veiled threats used against other reluctant members of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Given this state of affairs, there is nothing more to be lost by Western opposition to Russian expansionism. It must be made clear to Russia that it has a choice: democracy and pursuit of cooperation, or a new Russian imperialism. It is not yet too late for Russia to choose the first. If it does, it should be welcomed, slowly but surely, into the European family along with its neighbors. But NATO should make clear that if Russia chooses imperialism, it will be opposing itself to Europe, and consigning itself to near-isolation in a repeat ("the second time as farce") of the Cold War. One credible deterrent threat would be to extend NATO eastward, to include at least the Visegrad countries, should Russian expansionism continue.

With Russian troops now out of Germany and the Baltic states, the tests of Russian intentions will be in Moldova, Akhazia, Tajikistan and Crimea. If Russia can be persuaded to remove its troops from the first three, or at minimum the first two; and if it can be persuaded to renounce coercive pressure in its policy regarding the last, it will have chosen the path of peaceful integration. This choice will make it possible for democracy to take root in Russia and the other former Soviet states. If, in the crunch, Russia's soldier-hero in Moldova succeeds in legitimizing the dismemberment of that unhappy country, it will be only a matter of time before democratic government in Russia ends and a new cold war begins. Obviously, in a nuclear-armed world, any opposition to Russia must be peaceful, or indirect; but making clear to Russia the costs of aggression will at least give Russian liberals an argument against expansionism.

Opposing prescriptions for European action come mostly from the ranks of liberal institutionalists, who argue in favor either of conflict resolution to end violence, or of collective security to oppose aggression, or both. My objection to this view is that the main security threat to Europe comes from aggressors, who are difficult to stop using either approach. As the failure of the League of Nations should have taught us, relying on an institutionalized collective security arrangement is unreliable at best, and positively dangerous if it leads to complacency in the face of aggression. Countries will try to "pass the buck" since

determined action is always inconvenient; and the more countries whose consent is necessary, the less likely action will be. The alternative liberal approach, conflict resolution, only works when both sides want to find a compromise resolution. For parties determined on aggression, mediation or peacekeeping merely provides a smokescreen behind which to hide their ethnic cleansing or their sieges of Sarajevo.

Rather, what Europe needs is a two-track security process--in essence, one for carrots, the other for sticks. For opposing aggressors, sticks are necessary. In dealing with the Serbs, for example, there is no substitute for NATO unity and NATO action which, for at least the current century, still requires American leadership. That unity must include a willingness to use force once the aggression has become sufficiently clear, as it is in Bosnia. The basis of that unity can only be more serious attention to these issues and a more respectful attitude toward allies than has been shown on either side of the Atlantic heretofore.

The best alternative in Bosnia, if it is not yet too late, is to allow the primary victims, the Bosnian government, the means to defend themselves. From the point of view of the rest of Europe, this has the advantages of aiding the victims and making the end of the war conceivable while avoiding the domestic stresses of war for NATO countries and mitigating the security risks of escalation. Assistance for Bosnia means not only the provision of arms, but also of training in their use. Ideally the training should begin immediately, inside NATO territory, so that future arms shipments, would have immediate effect once made. If such support is not enough, however, NATO soldiers will have to fight and die to oppose Serb aggression.

The costs of inaction are far higher. The complete dismemberment of Bosnia would be unavoidable, and would result in creation of Europe's own Palestinians: a displaced, stateless Muslim people with few hopes and a fully justified contempt for Western values. From the Bosnian Muslims the eventual reaction is likely to be terrorism, since they will have few alternatives. From the Serbs, the reaction is likely to be continued "ethnic cleansing," probably involving a new offensive in Kosovo, and eventually aimed at annexation of Macedonia.

Much worse, however, is the effect on Russia. Russian expansionists do look at Western action in Bosnia, and their conclusion is that the West is irresolute. Therefore, they believe, there is little cost to further aggression by themselves. Once Russia goes too far down that road, it will not be able to turn back, and Europe will have to face a new cold war. The only way to avoid it is to make clear to Russian moderates now that forcible expansionism is not acceptable to the rest of Europe--and that Russia has available an alternative way of pursuing its interests.


The alternative is peaceful integration within the CIS, and of the CIS with the rest of Europe. Both can be promoted by the "carrot" side of European security policy. The most important "carrot" would be economic aid to the former Soviet states contingent on their economic reintegration with each other. The greatest flaw of the economic aid packages offered to CIS states by the West was the neglect of one of the great successes of the Marshall Plan: compelling the Plan's participants to cooperate, and integrate their economies. Such a measure, if handled delicately, is most of all a carrot to Russia, since it would make clear that the rest of Europe does not oppose such economic reintegration, and does not oppose the exercise of Russian influence in areas obviously of vital interest to Russia--as long as that exercise is benign. At the same time, it should provide economic benefits to all participants, since many of the economic ties severed after 1991 were economically useful, and restoring them should help generate economic growth.

The second "carrot" is access for the eastern half of Europe to markets in the European Union and North America. As most scholars would agree, political stability (and resistance to the national chauvinist virus) is dependent largely on economic growth, and that economic growth is dependent largely on success in generating exports. The countries of the developed North have gotten away for decades with excluding inconvenient imports from the Third World because the security consequences of that exclusion were remote, both in time and space. The security consequences of continuing the same policy toward the eastern half of Europe will be more immediate.

The liberal institutionalist program has merit in providing additional "carrots" which directly contribute to security. CSCE structures are slowly being strengthened (providing, for example, a mediator in the talks on the future of Moldova). The Partnership for Peace provides the right balance, for now, between reassurance of Central Europe and reassurance of Russia. And the dispatch of United Nations peacekeeping troops to Macedonia is entirely appropriate, discouraging, at least temporarily, external aggression while providing enough reassurance to mitigate internal disturbance.

Implementing both halves of this policy, both the carrots and the sticks, will require much better leadership than has been forthcoming heretofore. I carry no brief for my own government in this regard: both the Bush and Clinton Administrations have all too often lacked the courage of their convictions, and neither has reliably provided good leadership. Partly, as noted above, this is the result of the public mood. But great leaders (not only in the U.S.) must, at least sometimes, educate their publics and take a stand on essential issues. A substantially better Europe is within our grasp; we need only expend the effort to reach for it.

That effort, to summarize, must be aimed at three goals. First, Russian expansionism must be deterred, and Russian cooperativeness encouraged, to increase the likelihood that the Russians will pursue a solution to their Problem consonant with security for the rest of Europe. Second, German democracy must be maintained, to ensure that the German Question remains a potential, not an actual, security threat. And finally, the European and American "pillars" of NATO must together manage the American Dilemma, finding a formula for U.S. participation and leadership that makes possible effective NATO opposition to national chauvinists throughout Europe.



European Security: From Vlasdivostok to Vancouver?

A Russian Point of View

Valery SARYCHEV

Head of Section,
Russia's Institute for Strategic Studies

Phone: 7 095 454 92 64

Fax: 7 095 454 92 65

**Seminar for Junior Academics
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Dr.Valery Sarychev,
Russia's Institute
of Strategic Studies

European Security: from Vladivostok to Vancouver ?

I.A New strategic environment

1.The events of the latest years has dramatically changed the global and European strategic environment. A New vision of the European security order has emerged replacing the structure of international relations forged during the Cold War period.

2.Nevertheless, it is important that we not let euphoria blind us as far as new threats and challenges are concerned. The New Europe offers great hope, but the greater uncertainty which we face puts us on alarm and requires active, concerted and versatile actions on the behalf of the international community.

3.It's obvious that at present the situation in the space from Vladivostok to Vancouver appears to be more unstable and less predictable than the former one which was based on the bitter bipolar confrontation. Indeed, the whole Euroatlantic region is only at the very beginning of the period of radical transformation.

4.In many cases the events are undergoing faster than it should.The factors of unpredictability and complexity have produced an extremely difficult environment for national governments and foreign policy experts. That's why governments and specialists are bound to make mistakes in their approaches to the strengthening and creation European security system.

5.Despite the obvious differences between the countries-members of the European Union and the newly independent states, the fierce political struggle and uncertainty over virtual aspect of socio-economic development of the eastern part of the Euroatlantic region it seems that the new security risks are equal for all nations from Vladivostok to Vancouver. Security is still indivisible notion and it is impossible to safeguard security just only for any single state in the Euroatlantic region. Insecure position of any state is a threat for the whole security system. In the long run, the Euroatlantic region could not remain half secure and half insecure. The Space from Vladivostok to Vancouver cannot be merely 50 percent stable and prosperous.

6.We need to consider together how Euroatlantic community can best respond to the challenges and hopes. It is Europe more than any other area that holds the to global peace and security and it is this continent more than others that is experiencing fundamental changes.

7.Keeping in mind the present risks and challenges the overall European security structure must be solid enough to withstand the existing turmoil in the eastern part of the continent and to prevent the possible isolation the West from the East.

II.Russia's concerns.

8.On my opinion the New European security order is that of a Common Euroatlantic Space with equal security and economic opportunities for all nations where use or threat of military force is no longer considered to be an acceptable political means.

9.The Russia's strategy in the Euroatlantic region should be intended to broaden pan-european cooperation in full accordance of the national

security interests of all countries regardless of their geostrategic position and belonging to any security and economic structures. The other Russia's priority in Europe is to avoid the rebirth of anti-Russian coalition and as a consequence of it further isolation from the European Union.

10. The Western leaders very like to repeat that the West is bound to give Russia a chance to become an equal partner in international affairs. But reality doesn't prove this statement. The hopes that Russia and the West would establish strategic partnership have fallen short. Now Russia is excluded from the most effective security and economic structures.

11. The development of the events from August 1991 has given evidence that the West is considering Russia exclusively as "Junior Partner" who should not have its own position on some important foreign policy problems.

12. At the same time many politicians and experts in Russia are experiencing anxiety when they hear that Russia even geographically is not a part of Europe. Russia is historically, politically, economically committed to enhance Euroatlantic stability and cooperation. Only with an active Russia's participation the workable and formidable security system comprising all nations from Vladivostok to Vancouver will be formed.

13. Besides, there is a mistake to see in Russia's peacekeeping and other actions within the CIS the rebirth of imperial trends in Russian foreign policy. The West should realize that in many aspects Russia's active involvement in CIS affairs is contradictable Russian national interests. However there is no doubt that the situation within the CIS, especially in Central Asia and Trans Caucasia will be the most serious threat to the stability in the space from Vladivostok to Vancouver.

14. Taking this into consideration the West should not interpret Russia's moves within the CIS primarily as attempts to restore its former empire. It should be much greater Western willingness to accommodate Russian foreign interests. Sharing the basic principles of civilized community Russia and the West could and should undertake concrete measures aimed at creation Euroatlantic security architecture.

III. Reshaping European Security System

15. In nowadays' circumstances it is necessary to rely upon those Euroatlantic institutions which in retrospect have proved their vitality and develop their peace-keeping and peace-enforcement capacities. At the same time we should not close eyes on the fact that neither NATO nor CSCE, WEU, EU have not managed to resolve existing military conflicts and neutralize ethnic tension in Eastern Europe and some CIS countries.

16. It would be noted that now, five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the new European Security system has not yet formed. There is a lack of coherent interaction and closed cooperation between the Euroatlantic security structures whose mandates in many cases are unclear. So it is necessary to provide an "interlocking" cooperation between them and an interoperable model for their joint efforts in crisis prevention and management. Such a European security system should "regulate" both the political and security related matters and the economic, environmental and other issues, which are of tremendous importance for Russia's process of radical reform.

A. North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

17. At present it seems clear that NATO is the only Euroatlantic institution which possesses military organization infrastructure and resources and is able to promote a stable security environment during

Europe's transitional period.

18. Certainly it's a mistake to consider that the Russia's national interests and those of NATO members are fully coincided. On some aspects of defence planning, attitudes towards crises management, especially in Bosnia and within the former Soviet Union, the priorities of Russia and NATO are more parallel than identical.

19. Besides, the majority of Russian politicians and experts are very attentive to Central and Eastern Europe and especially to the bilateral and multilateral relations it develops with the Euroatlantic security structures including the attempts to accept some countries of the region in NATO and WEU.

20. The situation within Russia is such that NATO's enlargement in the eastward direction will lead to the aggravation of political struggle in the country. NATO's enlargement may also destabilize the situation in the Ukraine and Belorussia - the scenario which is absolutely unacceptable for Russia.

21. However these factors don't create an insuperable obstacle on the route of promoting dialogue, cooperation and even partnership between Russia and NATO in such fields as non proliferation, arms control and disarmament, confidence and security-building measures, defence conversion, principles and key aspects of military strategy including defensiveness and sufficiency. Russia should be very interested in creating a solid and stable security system in the whole Euroatlantic community - from Vladivostok to Vancouver - with active NATO's participation.

22. Although I don't see any chances for Russia joining NATO in a short or even medium-term prospect a partnership between Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Organization has been becoming a reality. Despite the exited discussions on the NATO's "Partnership for Peace" it's obvious that PFP will contribute to joint euroatlantic security activities. But Russia should move up into more higher level of cooperation with NATO.

23. Together with PFP the North Atlantic Council for Cooperation appears to be appropriate forum for a broader political, military, economic and humanitarian cooperation in the space from Vladivostok to Vancouver. Although the NACC is in its beginning it has already developed a substantial agenda related to the real security challenges the Euroatlantic region faces today.

24. But it is necessary not to overestimate the value of military means in crises management. Military force should be strictly limited it the authorized mandate. Besides, NATO can't project stability alone. It must interact with other euroatlantic security structures, firstly CSCE.

B. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

25. From the point of the creation the political and economic entity the development of the CSCE potential seems to be efficient way by which existing and future conflicts could be resolved. CSCE remains unique in its membership (53 states) and scope among the other Euroatlantic institutions. And I think its benefits overweight its drawbacks and it showed its viability in the worst years of confrontation. CSCE gives an opportunity to create a truly effective Euroatlantic security system.

26. But it is evident, however, that CSCE mechanism has not been sufficiently developed to cope with the new security problems. There is an urgent necessity for reinforcing and restructuring the CSCE. It's just a time to enhance the CSCE capacity for conflict prevention and crises management. There is an urgent need to link CSCE's capabilities to the other Euroatlantic institutions - European Union, Council of Europe, Western

European Union and especially NATO. It should be noted that until now the CSCE-NATO institutional linkage has not been significantly progressed.


27.I consider the proposal to create Security Council of Europe which has been put forward by the Chairman of the French National Assembly Mr.Segan as one of the acceptable ways to transform CSCE to a more effective panregional organization.

28.The coming years are going to be momentous in the building of the new European security system. It must develop in tune with political, economic and military developments in Great Europe, including Russia. It seems that only this way is the most reliable and workable. Ultimately, however, security in the space from Vladivostok to Vancouver will depend mainly on the policy of governments. Neither CSCE nor NATO can force Euroatlantic states to make peace against their will.

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PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: A WESTERN VIEW

Niklaas Hoekstra

During the last couple of years, NATO has consistently tried to improve and intensify its relationship with countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Most countries in that region experienced a security vacuum as a result of developments like the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

NATO member states felt the need to accommodate Central and East European security concerns without jeopardizing existing Western security architectures. Many CEE states would like to join those organizations which have guaranteed Western Europe's security for nearly 50 years. The West however, aware of Russian sensitivities and not willing to expose itself to potential sources of instability in the region, remains reluctant to enlarge its security structures prematurely.

Enlargement with some countries in CEE, while leaving some others out, carries the risk of creating new dividing lines in Europe. NATO membership of countries close to Russia, may be perceived as hostile encirclement. If such negative developments were to occur as a result of admission to NATO of one or more countries, then, in spite of the fact that the move itself was intended to create security and stability in Europe, the Alliance and the prospective member countries would have failed to

achieve their objectives. So it is necessary to create an atmosphere that will not lead to suspicion and apprehension.

First steps

At the NATO Summit in Rome (November 1991) the Heads of State and Government proposed the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as a way to address some of the aforementioned problems. Through NACC regular contacts were established between the former enemies. However, participation in NACC is not linked to NATO membership and consequently does not provide CEE countries with concrete security links. Many regard NATO membership as vital for their external security as well as their internal stability.

At an informal meeting of the NATO ministers of defense in October 1993 in Travemünde, the Americans introduced the so-called Partnership for Peace (PfP) plan as an intermediate step between the current situation and full membership. The initiative was formally introduced during the Brussels Summit in January of this year.

Partnership for Peace

PfP is a bilateral agreement between NATO and a NACC country. Countries can sign the Partnership Framework Document, deliver a Presentation Document and negotiate Individual Partnership Programmes. So far 23 countries have signed the basic document, including the Russian Federation. PfP is meant to intensify political and military

cooperation between East and West, at a pace and scope desired by the individual participating states. PfP aims to promote compatibility of language, codes, equipment, bases, communications and logistical procedures. In addition, PfP offers a non-obligatory consultative process under Article IV of the North Atlantic Treaty.

One of the main features of PfP is self-differentiation. Partnership will not automatically lead to membership. Countries can show through their actions that they are worthy of admission, and even then it is up to NATO to decide whether or not to admit them.

At first PfP was seen by many (especially in the East) as a way of keeping the CEE countries out of NATO. Now that NATO has assured those countries that it will not remain an indefinite substitute for NATO membership, it is viewed much more favourably.

Different prospects of membership

During the first months of the implementation of PfP three different groupings have emerged in which the CEE countries can be divided.

The first group consists of countries that are eager to cooperate with NATO and having a good chance of being admitted first. They include the four Visegrad countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovak Republic) and possibly also Romania and Bulgaria and Slovenia

Second is a group of countries that may or may not join. It includes states like Belarus, Ukraine and Albania

Finally there is a group of countries unlikely to join in the foreseeable future, if ever. The most notable of this group is of course Russia, but it also includes the Asian Republics of the former Soviet Union. Russia has shown an interest in working with NATO on a number of issues and although the Alliance actively seeks to give substance to its relationship with Russia it is difficult to envisage the country as a full member. For the Asian republics it is primarily lack of interest and capacity to engage in concrete cooperation activities that minimise their chances of joining NATO.

Peace keeping

Both NACC and PfP offer a wide range of exchanges of views on security and other issues, high-level visits, intensified military contacts, staff talks as well as exchanges of experience between experts in various fields in the form of seminars, symposia and workshops. Amongst the concrete activities, cooperation in peace-keeping has assumed a role of prime importance. Against the background of developments in former Yugoslavia, the North Atlantic Council announced in Oslo in June 1992, the Alliance's readiness to support, in certain cases and in accordance with its own procedures, peace-keeping operations under the responsibility of the CSCE. It also stated that it would be willing to undertake such operations together with other countries. Later that year, at a meeting in Brussels in December 1992, the Alliance also confirmed its readiness to support peace-keeping operations under the authority

of the UN Security Council. At the same time, within the NACC, and Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peace-keeping was established with the aim of developing a common understanding on the political principles and practical aspects of peace-keeping. With the launch of PfP and the proposal made by the participants at the Brussels Summit to conduct peace-keeping exercises with partners beginning in 1994, the initiative received a further powerful impetus.

The Netherlands was the first to offer a training area for such an exercise. The last week of October The Netherlands hosted the exercise 'Cooperative Spirit' which saw some thousand troops from twelve countries training in basic peace-keeping skills together. The first joint peace-keeping exercises was held in Poland in September; early October the first naval peace-keeping exercise took place in the Atlantic, off Stavanger, Norway.


In all three cases, the exercises were not designed for the benefit of the participating forces only; careful attention was also given to a programme for observers as well as to a programme for high-ranking political and military officials with the aim of maximising the returns on the investment. The exercises were executed on a relatively small scale, so it is fair to say that the political importance of these exercises exceeded their military value.

Conclusion

It is clear that the majority of the PfP signatories regard it as an intermediate step, a compromise process which does not guarantee the assurances they seek, but which they acknowledge to hold the most promise for attaining them.

Moving beyond this compromise will not be easy. The desire to avoid drawing new lines in Europe is difficult to reconcile with the strong desire of CEE countries to join NATO. Any enlargement cannot be all-inclusive and will therefore unavoidably involve the drawing of new lines. It might be better for NATO member states to focus its attention on how to create an atmosphere conducive to dispelling any feelings of mistrust and suspicion with regard to NATO's intentions. Closer cooperation between Allies and Partners would be a crucial element to allay concerns. The preparation and conduct of crisis management operations, including peace keeping would be an excellent area for concrete joint undertakings.

We should be aware of the paradox that the more successful cooperation between Allies and Partners is, the sooner the Cooperation Partners will likely raise the membership issue again. This means that it is of great importance to reflect upon the future of the Alliance. Member states now have to start thinking how, when and with whom they would eventually wish to expand.



NATO: Role in shaping the Future Security of Europe

**Partnership for Peace,
an Eastern Point of View**

Alexander DULEBA

Researcher,
Slovak Institute for International Studies
PRESOV

Bratislava

Phone: 42 7 311 722

Fax: 42 7 315 317

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NATO: Role in shaping the future security of Europe.

Partnership for Peace, an eastern point of view

(Alexander Duleba, Slovak Republic)

- some discussion questions on topic presentation:

1. The PFP program is not the sufficient solution of security problems of CEE countries. It relates first of all to the states of Visegrad group. PFP is a "compromise" which respects much more interests of Russia than interests of Visegrad group states.

It is very regrettable that the clearly expressed will of CEE political leaders about obtaining full membership in NATO for their countries was not accepted. Inevitable make up the impression that these nations are only the subject of "high interests play" again. Herewith the sovereignty of "small" CEE nations and their equivalence in international community is indirect very questionable again (this situation, unfortunately, is not exceptional for the first time during their history).

Instead of the decision about granting the full membership of VG states in NATO, which would signify the definitive termination of "Cold War" period, results of NATO January Summit de facto only prolong the "chaos of temporary transition period" to new security architecture of Europe. The crucial question is as follows: has NATO aided to disperse the illusion of CEE countries that they are not more satellites of Moscow?

2. NATO PFP program is opened for each state which is capable to contribute to the stability and security of the

Euro-Atlantic Area (PEP Framework Document). The question does emerge - what are boundaries of Euro-Atlantic Area? Can we use the notion "Euro-Atlantic Area" as equivalent to the notion "North Atlantic Area" (e.g. Declaration of the Heads of State and Government having participated at the NATO January Meeting)?

Neither Framework Document nor Declaration of NATO January Meeting don't comprise the geographical definition of this space. On the other hand the notion "Euro-Aziatic Area" became quite real space definition at last time. Provided that "Euro-Atlantic Area" and "Euro-Aziatic Area" are not identical let us make the comparison.

CIS contains unambiguous military - defensive component in its integration structure which was clearly expressed by the Moscow CIS Topic Summit in April 1994 - only 3 months after the NATO PEP January Summit. Political leaders of CIS states (e.g. Nazarbayev, Lukashenko, Kutschma etc., regardless of Russian political leaders) use the notion "euroaziatic space" for the space designation of former Soviet Union.

It will be sufficient only, slightly to turn over the leaves of new military doctrine of Russian Federation to the understanding that the former states of Soviet Union can recover the guaranties of their security only provided that they will accede to the collective security system in the framework of CIS. Leaders of political elites of former Soviet republics are ever more compound with this inevitable solution of their security situation. They have not another alternative.

But Baltic and non-post-Soviet CEE states decline this alternative for themselves. What is being waited for them? What space are they belonging to - to Euroatlantic Area or to Euroaziatic Area or to both? PEP program doesn't differentiate

ALEXANDER DULEBA, SLOVAK INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL
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between CIS states which are ever more acceding to the economical, cultural and security organized space of Euroasia and other postcommunist states of Europe which in nature of law on the basis of historical, economical, cultural etc. reasons want to join to the Western Europe integration structures. What use is it for?

3. NATO is not only some kind of military structure for the non-post-Soviet CEE countries. These nations did unambiguous choice of freedom, democracy, civic community, market economic and legal state towards the end of 80-ies. It is necessary to understand that crucial political changes in CEE countries were no result of "political intrigues play" of community elite groups some years ago, but the result of mass-civic-movement which caused the crash of the old regimes. In this movement prevail part of ECE communities took participation.

It is impossible to affirm the same about the former Soviet republics with regard to the exception of Baltic republics and partly of Russia (but Moscow and S. Petersburg are not a whole country). The political changes in the contemporary CIS countries were more or less a "matter of political elites".

This is very important question, because non-post-Soviet CEE political elites can't do whatever foreign policy. The single CEE governments can have the differences by the tactics, but no one by the strategy of their foreign security policy. In this point of view NATO is not only some kind of military structure for them, but it is the organisation calling for keeping the fulfilment of historical commission to protect the values which were the object of CEE nations election in the end of the 80-ies. The endeavour of non-post-Soviet CEE countries for obtaining the full NATO membership is not only a "matter of

willingness of some governments", but this is a "matter of liberated nations".

One from weak sides of the PFP program is that it doesn't respect the whole scope of these aspects. The PFP program remains prevailing on the military level, but the question about NATO extension towards CEE and its new "east" boundaries is not ever only the military question.

4. The PFP program supposes an individual approach of NATO to each participating state. It is a great historical paradox to grant of "return chance" to countries which got under the domination of Stalin's Soviet Union in the end of Second World War through the "collective way". Their destiny to be accede to the "Soviet postwar sector" was caused by great power states policy, too. It wasn't their "guilt". This reality was not only the result of military development of war and ever no result caused by CEE economic capability. This was the first of all the results of international politics situation.

In accordance with the PFP program every participating state has to pay for its "individual return" itself. It doesn't bargain only that this approach respects of the financial problems of CEE transition economics. It bargains about another crucial question. In the case of non-simultaneous acceding of single CEE states to NATO it will continue the state of Europe East-West division. The finish of Cold War period would be dubious through this.

The unequal security position of CEE countries will be inevitable increase the tensions in CEE. The development in former Yugoslavia shows that its security influence towards the whole Europe is considerable. The possible NATO extension on the basis of "individual approach" upon PFP program framework

could contribute to the extension of "stableless zone" towards other parts of CEE.

For EU states it would signify the enlargement of their security costs as minimum. The NATO extension towards CEE countries has no other security alternative, to be ready in continuing with realization of their community transformation and refuse on principle the security guaranties in framework of CIS collective security system. is in conformity with the security interests of western Europe states as minimum. We must together pay for our mutual security, regardless of moral incentives of historical justice.

5. Can NATO's enlargement be unlimited? In my point of view only the negative answer is possible. It is unthinkable and useless. If the NATO's enlargement will be realized upon the framework of PFP program and NACC cooperation, it would only signify the NATO gradual transformation to CSCE. What's the use of it? NATO couldn't be some kind of efficient "security roof" of Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Aziatic Areas simultaneously. CSCE exerts partly this "roof function". The security questions can't be narrowed only on the military quetions level.

The development of world civilization during last decades has been demonstrating the origination of special world regions. Every region of world has only for its typical way of civic and power communication, system of values, history, traditions, morals etc. In framework of these regional spaces there have been arising nature economical, cultural and political integration structures. The security structures must be formated in conformity with this, too. In case that economical, cultural and security structures of world region are not uniform, there are always actual destruction processes

and the threat of tensions in international relations.

Cold War gave rise to an artificial security division of world. I think we must understand that CSCE is a platform for coming to the agreement, but not basis to form some comprehensive military integration structure. NATO could not be in future an integration security structure for CIS world region. It does not signify that NATO has not to reach the agreement with CIS security integration structure. But it is on principle the another question.

Crucial in this coherence is the position of non-post-Soviet but post-communistic countries as part of ever question about future development of Europe like the nature world integration region. Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria have received a status of associative membership with EU. These nations ever more are orientated on western Europe market themselves. They appreciate the same system of civilization values. Upon the Kirchberger Declaration from May 9, 1994 these nations and three Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) have received a status of associative membership with WEU. On the other hand in question about acceding to NATO these states got on the same level as post-Soviet republics of Central Asia.

Crucial question is as follows: does NATO want to conserve and reinforce the transatlantic linke or its transformation will be signify only that WEU will replace NATO in Europe? If NATO want reinforce the transatlantic linke, I think so, it has to change position in question about acceding of non-post-Soviet countries of Europe. NATO security integration structure has to develop in conformity with the development of Europe market, civilization and security structures. This

question is the crucial question about NATO role in shaping future security in Europe. In contrary case, the tensions in international relations will necessary be emerge.

The solution which does not lead to establishment of uniformity of economical, cultural and security structures of nature world regions, is no solution for Europe. The way towards the CSCE functions is no way for future of NATO and future of world stability.

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
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BIBLIOTECA

*Declaration of the Heads
of State and Government
participating in the
Meeting of the North
Atlantic Council
held at NATO
Headquarters,
Brussels, on 10-11 January 1994*



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*Declaration of the Heads
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Brussels, on 10 - 11 January 1994

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, have gathered in Brussels to renew our Alliance in light of the historic transformations affecting the entire continent of Europe. We welcome the new climate of cooperation that has emerged in Europe with the end of the period of global confrontation embodied in the Cold War. However, we must also note that other causes of instability, tension and conflict have emerged. We therefore confirm the enduring validity and indispensability of our Alliance. It is based on a strong transatlantic link, the expression of a shared destiny. It reflects a European Security and Defence Identity gradually emerging as the expression of a mature Europe. It is reaching out to establish new patterns of cooperation throughout Europe. It rests, as also reflected in Article 2 of the Washington Treaty, upon close collaboration in all fields.




Building on our decisions in London and Rome and on our new Strategic Concept, we are undertaking initiatives designed to contribute to lasting peace, stability, and well-being in the whole of Europe, which has always been our Alliance's fundamental goal. We have agreed:

- to adapt further the Alliance's political and military structures to reflect both the full spectrum of its roles and the development of the emerging European Security and Defence Identity, and endorse the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces;
- to reaffirm that the Alliance remains open to the membership of other European countries;
- to launch a major initiative through a Partnership for Peace, in which we invite Partners to join us in new political and military efforts to work alongside the Alliance;
- to intensify our efforts against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

2. We reaffirm our strong commitment to the transatlantic link, which is the bedrock of NATO. The continued substantial presence of United States forces in Europe is a fundamentally important aspect of that link. All our countries wish to continue the direct involvement of the United States and Canada in the security of Europe. We note that this is also the expressed wish of the new democracies of the East, which see in the transatlantic link an irreplaceable pledge of security and stability for Europe as a whole. The fuller integration of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and of the former Soviet Union into a Europe whole and free cannot be successful without the strong and active participation of all Allies on both sides of the Atlantic.

3. Today, we confirm and renew this link between North America and a Europe developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy and taking on greater responsibility on defence matters. We welcome the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht and the launching of the European Union, which will strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance and allow it to make a more coherent contribution to the security of all the Allies. We reaffirm that the Alliance is the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington Treaty.

4. We give our full support to the development of a European Security and Defence Identity which, as called for in the Maastricht Treaty, in the longer term perspective of a common defence policy within the European Union, might in time lead to a common defence compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance.



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
The emergence of a European Security and Defence Identity will strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance while reinforcing the transatlantic link and will enable European Allies to take greater responsibility for their common security and defence. The Alliance and the European Union share common strategic interests.

5. We support strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance through the Western European Union, which is being developed as the defence component of the European Union. The Alliance's organisation and resources will be adjusted so as to facilitate this. We welcome the close and growing cooperation between NATO and the WEU that has been achieved on the basis of agreed principles of complementarity and transparency. In future contingencies, NATO and the WEU will consult, including as necessary through joint Council meetings, on how to address such contingencies.

6. We therefore stand ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign and Security Policy. We support the development of separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security. Better European coordination and planning will also strengthen the European pillar and the Alliance itself. Integrated and multinational European structures, as they are further developed in the context of an emerging European Security and Defence Identity, will also increasingly have a similarly important role to play in enhancing the Allies' ability to work together in the common defence and other tasks.

7. In pursuit of our common transatlantic security requirements, NATO increasingly will be called upon to undertake missions in addition to the traditional and fundamental task of collective defence of its members, which remains a core function. We reaffirm our offer to support, on a case by case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise. Participation in any such operation or mission will remain subject to decisions of member states in accordance with national constitutions.

8. Against this background, NATO must continue the adaptation of its command and force structure in line with requirements for flexible and timely responses contained in the Alliance's Strategic Concept. We also will need to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance by facilitating the use of our military capabilities for NATO and European/WEU operations, and assist participation of non-NATO partners in joint peacekeeping operations and other contingencies as envisaged under the Partnership for Peace.



9. Therefore, we direct the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, to examine how the Alliance's political and military structures and procedures might be developed and adapted to conduct more efficiently and flexibly the Alliance's missions, including peacekeeping, as well as to improve cooperation with the WEU and to reflect the emerging European Security and Defence Identity. As part of this process, we endorse the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces as a means to facilitate contingency operations, including operations with participating nations outside the Alliance. We have directed the North Atlantic Council, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, to develop this concept and establish the necessary capabilities. The Council, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, and in coordination with the WEU, will work on implementation in a manner that provides separable but not separate military capabilities that could be employed by NATO or the WEU. The North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session will report on the implementation of these decisions to Ministers at their next regular meeting in June 1994.

10. Our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. The consolidation and preservation throughout the continent of democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion or intimidation are therefore of direct and material concern to us, as they are to all other CSCE states under the commitments of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris. We remain deeply committed to further strengthening the CSCE, which is the only organisation comprising all European and North American countries, as an instrument of preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, cooperative security, and the advancement of democracy and human rights. We actively support the efforts to enhance the operational capabilities of the CSCE for early warning, conflict prevention, and crisis management.

11. As part of our overall effort to promote preventive diplomacy, we welcome the European Union proposal for a Pact on Stability in Europe, will contribute to its elaboration, and look forward to the opening conference which will take place in Paris in the Spring.

12. Building on the close and long-standing partnership among the North American and European Allies, we are committed to enhancing security and stability in the whole of Europe. We therefore wish to strengthen ties with the democratic states to our East. We reaffirm that the Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe.




BRUSSELS, BRUXELLES
JANUARY 94 / JANVIER

13. We have decided to launch an immediate and practical programme that will transform the relationship between NATO and participating states. This new programme goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership - a Partnership for Peace. We invite the other states participating in the NACC, and other CSCE countries able and willing to contribute to this programme, to join with us in this Partnership. Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO.

14. The Partnership for Peace, which will operate under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, will forge new security relationships between the North Atlantic Alliance and its Partners for Peace. Partner states will be invited by the North Atlantic Council to participate in political and military bodies at NATO Headquarters with respect to Partnership activities. The Partnership will expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin our Alliance. NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security. At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating states, we will work in concrete ways towards transparency in defence budgeting, promoting democratic control of defence ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed.

15. To promote closer military cooperation and interoperability, we will propose, within the Partnership framework, peacekeeping field exercises beginning in 1994. To coordinate joint military activities within the Partnership, we will invite states participating in the Partnership to send permanent liaison officers to NATO Headquarters and a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programmes.

16. Since its inception two years ago, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council has greatly expanded the depth and scope of its activities. We will continue to work with all our NACC partners to build cooperative relationships across the entire spectrum of the Alliance's activities. With the expansion of NACC activities and the establishment of the Partnership for Peace, we have decided to offer permanent facilities at NATO Headquarters for personnel from NACC countries and other Partnership for Peace participants in order to improve our working relationships and facilitate closer cooperation.



17. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means constitutes a threat to international security and is a matter of concern to NATO. We have decided to intensify and expand NATO's political and defence efforts against proliferation, taking into account the work already underway in other international fora and institutions. In this regard, we direct that work begin immediately in appropriate fora of the Alliance to develop an overall policy framework to consider how to reinforce ongoing prevention efforts and how to reduce the proliferation threat and protect against it.

18. We attach crucial importance to the full and timely implementation of existing arms control and disarmament agreements as well as to achieving further progress on key issues of arms control and disarmament, such as:

- the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and work towards an enhanced verification regime;
- the early entry into force of the Convention on Chemical Weapons and new measures to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention;
- the negotiation of a universal and verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
- issues on the agenda of the CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation;
- ensuring the integrity of the CFE Treaty and full compliance with all its provisions.

19. We condemn all acts of international terrorism. They constitute flagrant violations of human dignity and rights and are a threat to the conduct of normal international relations. In accordance with our national legislation, we stress the need for the most effective cooperation possible to prevent and suppress this scourge.

20. We reaffirm our support for political and economic reform in Russia and welcome the adoption of a new constitution and the holding of democratic parliamentary elections by the people of the Russian Federation. This is a major step forward in the establishment of a framework for the development of durable democratic institutions. We further welcome the Russian government's firm commitment to democratic and market reform and to a reformist foreign policy. These are important for security and stability in Europe. We believe that an independent, democratic, stable and nuclear-weapons-free Ukraine would likewise contribute to security and stability. We will continue to encourage and support the reform processes in both countries and to develop cooperation with them, as with other countries in Central and Eastern Europe.




21. The situation in Southern Caucasus continues to be of special concern. We condemn the use of force for territorial gains. Respect for the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia is essential to the establishment of peace, stability and cooperation in the region. We call upon all states to join international efforts under the aegis of the United Nations and the CSCE aimed at solving existing problems.

22. We reiterate our conviction that security in Europe is greatly affected by security in the Mediterranean. We strongly welcome the agreements recently concluded in the Middle East peace process which offer an historic opportunity for a peaceful and lasting settlement in the area. This much-awaited breakthrough has had a positive impact on the overall situation in the Mediterranean, thus opening the way to consider measures to promote dialogue, understanding and confidence-building between the countries in the region. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to continue to review the overall situation, and we encourage all efforts conducive to strengthening regional stability.

23. As members of the Alliance, we deplore the continuing conflict in the former Yugoslavia. We continue to believe that the conflict in Bosnia must be settled at the negotiating table and not on the battlefield. Only the parties can bring peace to the former Yugoslavia. Only they can agree to lay down their arms and end the violence which for these many months has only served to demonstrate that no side can prevail in its pursuit of military victory.


24. We are united in supporting the efforts of the United Nations and the European Union to secure a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Bosnia, agreeable to all parties, and we commend the European Union Action Plan of 22 November 1993 to secure such a negotiated settlement. We reaffirm our determination to contribute to the implementation of a viable settlement reached in good faith. We commend the front-line states for their key role in enforcing sanctions against those who continue to promote violence and aggression. We welcome the cooperation between NATO and the WEU in maintaining sanctions enforcement in the Adriatic.


25. We denounce the violations by the parties of the agreements they have already signed to implement a ceasefire and to permit the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to the victims of this terrible conflict. This situation cannot be tolerated. We urge all the parties to respect their agreements. We are determined to eliminate obstacles to the accomplishment of the UNPROFOR mandate. We will continue operations to enforce the No-Fly Zone over Bosnia. We call for the full implementation of the UNSC Resolutions regarding the reinforcement of UNPROFOR. We reaffirm our readiness, under the



authority of the United Nations Security Council and in accordance with the Alliance decisions of 2 and 9 August 1993, to carry out air strikes in order to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo, the safe areas and other threatened areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this context, we urge the UNPROFOR authorities to draw up urgently plans to ensure that the blocked rotation of the UNPROFOR contingent in Srebrenica can take place and to examine how the airport at Tuzla can be opened for humanitarian relief purposes.

26. The past five years have brought historic opportunities as well as new uncertainties and instabilities to Europe. Our Alliance has moved to adapt itself to the new circumstances, and today we have taken decisions in key areas. We have given our full support to the development of a European Security and Defence Identity. We have endorsed the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces as a means to adapt the Alliance to its future tasks. We have opened a new perspective of progressively closer relationships with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and of the former Soviet Union. In doing all this, we have renewed our Alliance as a joint endeavour of a North America and Europe permanently committed to their common and indivisible security. The challenges we face are many and serious. The decisions we have taken today will better enable us to meet them.





BASIC FACT SHEET

NATO OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND PRESS

1110 - Brussels

APRIL 1994

Nº7

CHRONOLOGY OF KEY ARMS CONTROL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS (1963-1994)

At the 1994 Brussels Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government declared that they *attach crucial importance to the full and timely implementation of existing arms control and disarmament agreements as well as to achieving further progress on key issues of arms control and disarmament, such as:*

- *the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and work towards an enhanced verification regime;*
- *the early entry into force of the Convention on Chemical Weapons and new measures to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention;*
- *the negotiation of a universal and verifiable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;*
- *issues on the agenda of the CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation;*
- *ensuring the integrity of the CFE Treaty and full compliance with all its provisions.*

The following is a chronology of key arms control treaties and agreements which are most relevant to NATO member states.

1963 PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY (PTBT)

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. Parties to the Treaty agree to conduct nuclear weapons tests, or any other nuclear explosion, only underground. Signed 5 August 1963; entered into force 10 October 1963.

1967 OUTER SPACE TREATY

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Prohibits placing in orbit around the Earth, installing on the moon or any other celestial body, or otherwise stationing in outer space, nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. Signed 27 January 1967; entered into force 10 October 1967.

1968 NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT)

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, while promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. There are over 160 states party to the treaty. Signed 1 July 1968; entered into force 5 March 1970. (Expires in 1995, unless extended at the 1995 NPT Conference.)

1971 SEABED TREATY

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof. Signed 11 February 1971; entered into force 18 May 1972.

1972 BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC)

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Parties to the Convention undertake not to develop, produce, stockpile, or acquire biological agents or toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful purposes", as well as related weapons and means of delivery. Signed 10 April 1972; entered into force 26 March 1975.

1972 SALT I INTERIM AGREEMENT

Interim Agreement Between the USA and USSR on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Freezes existing aggregate levels of American and Soviet strategic nuclear missile launchers and submarines until an agreement on more comprehensive measures can be reached. Signed 26 May 1972; entered into force 3 October 1972.

1972 ABM TREATY

Treaty Between the USA and USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. Limits deployment of US and Soviet ABM systems. Signed 26 May 1972; entered into force 3 October 1972.

(A Protocol on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, further limiting each Party to a single ABM system deployment area, was signed on 3 July 1974; entered into force 24 May 1976.)

1974 THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY (TTBT)

Treaty Between the USA and USSR on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests. Prohibits underground nuclear weapons tests of more than 150 kilotons. Signed 3 July 1974; entered into force 11 December 1990.

1975 HELSINKI FINAL ACT

Concluding Document of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Signed by 35 nations, it provides, inter alia, for notification of major military manoeuvres involving more than 25,000 troops and other confidence building measures. Signed and entered into force 1 August 1975.

1976 PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY (PNET)

Treaty Between the USA and USSR on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes. Limits any individual nuclear explosion carried out by the parties outside US and Soviet weapons test sites to 150 kilotons. Signed 28 May 1976; entered into force 11 December 1990.

1977 ENMOD CONVENTION

Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. Prohibits the hostile use of certain environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting and severe effects. Signed 18 May 1977; entered into force 5 October 1978.

1979 SALT II TREATY

Treaty Between the USA and USSR on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Replaces the SALT I Interim Agreement. Signed 18 June 1979; the Treaty never entered into force and was superseded by START I in 1991.

1981 INHUMANE WEAPONS CONVENTION

Convention on the Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. Signed by 35 states, it includes three protocols. Signed 10 April 1981, entered into force 2 December 1983.

1986 STOCKHOLM DOCUMENT

Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures [CSBMs] and Disarmament in Europe. Contains a set of six concrete and mutually complementary CSBMs, including mandatory ground or aerial inspection of military activities, that improve upon those contained in the Helsinki Final Act. Adopted 19 September 1986; entered into force 1 January 1987.

1987 INF TREATY

Treaty Between the USA and the USSR on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. Eliminates and bans all (US and Soviet) ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range capability of between 300 and 3,400 miles (500 and 5,500 kms). Signed 8 December 1987; entered into force 1 June 1988. Fully implemented 1 June 1991.

1990 VIENNA DOCUMENT 1990

Vienna Document 1990 of the Negotiations on Confidence and Security-Building Measures Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Incorporates Stockholm Document of 1986, adding measures related to transparency on military forces and activities, improved communications and contacts, and verification. Adopted 17 November 1990; entered into force 1 January 1991.

1990 CFE TREATY

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Reduces and sets ceilings from the Atlantic to the Urals on key armaments essential for conducting surprise attack and initiating large scale offensive operations. Signed by the 22 NATO and Warsaw Pact states 19 November 1990; applied provisionally 17 July 1992. Entered into force 9 November 1992. To be implemented within 40 months of entry into force.

Final Document of the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Oslo Final Document). Enables implementation of the CFE Treaty in the new international situation following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union. Notes the 15 May 1992 Agreement in Tashkent among the successor states of the USSR with territory within the area of application of the CFE Treaty, apportioning among them the obligations and rights of the USSR, making them parties to the Treaty. Signed and entered into force 5 June 1992.

1991 START I

Treaty Between the USA and the USSR on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Establishes significantly reduced limits for intercontinental ballistic missiles and their associated launchers and warheads; submarine launched ballistic missile launchers and warheads; and heavy bombers and their armaments including long-range nuclear air launched cruise missiles. Signed 31 July 1991; has not yet entered into force.

Protocol to the Treaty Between the USA and the USSR on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Lisbon START Protocol). Enables implementation of the START I Treaty in the new international situation following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The protocol constitutes an amendment to and is an integral part of the START Treaty and provides for Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to succeed to the Soviet Union's obligations under the Treaty. Also, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine commit themselves to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapons states in the shortest possible time. In accompanying letters they commit themselves to eliminate all nuclear weapons from their territory within seven years. Signed 23 May 1992; all signatory states have ratified, with Belarus and Kazakhstan acceding to the NPT; final Ukrainian action pending.

1991 UN REGISTER OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS

Introduces greater openness and simplifies monitoring of excessive arms build-up in any one country. The Register requests all participating states to record their imports and exports of certain major weapons systems and to submit this information by 30 April of the following year. Created by a resolution of the UN General Assembly on 10 December 1991; members were called on to submit their information beginning 30 April 1993. (To date, more than 60 countries have provided information.)

1992 VIENNA DOCUMENT 1992

Vienna Document 1992 of the Negotiations on Confidence and Security-Building Measures Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document on the Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Incorporates the Vienna Document 1990, adding further measures related to transparency regarding military forces and activities, and constraints on military activities. Expands the zone of application for CSBMs to include the territory of USSR successor states which were beyond the traditional zone in Europe (i.e., all of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). Adopted 4 March 1992; entered into force 1 May 1992.

1992 TREATY ON OPEN SKIES

Commits member nations in Eurasia and North America to open their airspace, on a reciprocal basis, permitting the overflight of their territory by unarmed observation aircraft in order to strengthen confidence and transparency with respect to their military activities. Signed and applied provisionally 24 March 1992; will enter into force after 20 states have deposited instruments of ratification.

1992 CFE 1A

Concluding Act of the Negotiations on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. CFE states-parties declare national limits on the personnel strength of their conventional armed forces in the Atlantic to the Urals area. Signed 10 July 1992; entered into force 17 July 1992. To be implemented within 40 months of entry into force.

1993 CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. An agreement drafted by the 39 nations of the Conference on Disarmament to ban chemical weapons worldwide. Opened for signature in Paris on 13 January 1993 (to date, it has been signed by more than 150 nations). It will enter into force 180 days after deposit of the 65th instrument of ratification, but no earlier than 13 January 1995.

1993 START II


Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Further reduces US and Russian strategic offensive arms by eliminating all MIRVed ICBMs (including all "heavy" ICBMs) and reducing the overall total of warheads for each side to between 3,000 and 3,500. Signed 3 January 1993; will enter into force following ratification by the US and Russia and after entry into force of the START I Treaty of 1991.⁽¹⁾

1994 TRILATERAL NUCLEAR AGREEMENT

Trilateral Statement by the Presidents of the US, Russia and Ukraine. Details the procedures to transfer Ukrainian nuclear warheads to Russia and associated compensation and security assurances. Sets out simultaneous actions to transfer SS-19 and SS-24 warheads from Ukraine to Russia for dismantling and to provide compensation to Ukraine in the form of fuel assemblies for nuclear power stations, as well as security assurances to Ukraine, once START I enters into force and Ukraine becomes a non-nuclear weapon state party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Signed in Moscow, 14 January 1994.

0450-94

(1) A number of bilateral safety, security and disarmament agreements have been entered into between NATO member states and the successor states to the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons on their territory (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine), to facilitate the safe storage, removal or destruction of nuclear weapons under the terms of relevant arms control agreements (START I and II and the NPT).



BASIC FACT SHEET

NATO OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND PRESS

1110 - Brussels

JUNE 1994

Nº9

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE.

Partnership for Peace is a major initiative by NATO directed at increasing confidence and cooperative efforts to reinforce security. It engages NATO and participating partners in concrete cooperation activities designed to achieve these objectives. It offers participating states the possibility of strengthening their relations with NATO in accordance with their own individual interests and capabilities.

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At the January 1994 Brussels Summit, Alliance leaders announced: "We have decided to launch an immediate and practical programme that will transform the relationship between NATO and participating states. This new programme goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership - a Partnership for Peace".

The states participating in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)⁽¹⁾ and other CSCE countries able and willing to contribute to this programme have been invited to join the NATO member states in this Partnership. Partner states are invited by the North Atlantic Council to participate in political and military bodies at NATO Headquarters with respect to Partnership activities. The Partnership will expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin the Alliance.

NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security. At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating partners, NATO will work with its partners in concrete ways towards transparency in defence budgeting, promoting democratic control of defence ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed.

(1) There are 38 NACC member states, including the 16 members of NATO, as well as Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Finland is an observer. Austria, Finland and Sweden participate in the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping.



The first peacekeeping field exercises under the auspices of Partnership for Peace will be held in the autumn of 1994.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NACC AND PFP

The process leading up to the Partnership for Peace initiative can be traced back to the decisions taken at the London (May 1990) and Rome (November 1991) Summits relating to NATO's transformation in the post-Cold War era. A key aspect of this process was the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council - a forum for dialogue and cooperation between the Alliance and the emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union - which first met in December 1991.

Partnership for Peace has been established within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. It builds on the momentum of cooperation created by the NACC, opening the way to further deepening and strengthening of cooperation between the Alliance and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and other states participating in the Partnership, in order to enhance security and stability in Europe and the whole of the NACC area. Partnership for Peace activities will be fully coordinated with others undertaken in the NACC framework to ensure maximum effectiveness. NACC cooperative activities listed in the annual NACC Work Plan which cover fields in addition to those under Partnership for Peace, including regular consultations on political and security related issues, will continue to be implemented.

AIMS OF THE PARTNERSHIP

Concrete objectives of the Partnership include:

- facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes;
- ensuring democratic control of defence forces;
- maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE;
- the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed;
- the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the process of NATO's evolutionary expansion, which Alliance Heads of State and Government have stated they "expect and would welcome". Article 10 of the Washington Treaty provides for such expansion to include membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.

OBLIGATIONS AND COMMITMENTS

To subscribe to the Partnership, states sign a Framework Document in which they recall that they are committed to the preservation of democratic societies and the maintenance of the principles of international law. They reaffirm their commitment to fulfil in good faith the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; specifically, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, to respect existing borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means. They also reaffirm their commitment to the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent CSCE documents and to the fulfilment of the commitments and obligations they have undertaken in the field of disarmament and arms control.

IMPLEMENTATION

The procedure begins with the signature of the Partnership for Peace Framework Document by each participant. The next step is the submission by each partner of a Presentation Document to NATO, developed with the assistance of NATO authorities if desired, indicating the scope, pace and level of participation in cooperation activities with NATO sought by the partner (for example, joint planning, training and exercises). The Presentation Document also identifies steps to be taken by the partner to achieve the political goals of the Partnership and the military and other assets that might be made available by the partner for Partnership activities. It serves as a basis for an individual Partnership Programme, to be agreed between the partner and NATO.

Partners undertake to make available personnel, assets, facilities and capabilities necessary and appropriate for carrying out the agreed Partnership Programme. They will fund their own participation in Partnership activities and will endeavour to share the burdens of mounting exercises in which they take part.

A Political-Military Steering Committee, as a working forum for Partnership for Peace, meets under the Chairmanship of a senior member of the NATO International Staff, in different configurations. These include meetings of NATO Allies with individual partners to examine, as appropriate, questions pertaining to that country's individual Partnership Programme. Meetings with all NACC/PFP partners also take place to address common issues of Partnership for Peace; to provide the necessary transparency on individual Partnership Programmes; and to consider the overall programme of Partnership activities.


To facilitate cooperation activities, NACC partner countries and other PFP participating states are invited to send permanent liaison officers to NATO Headquarters and to a separate Partnership Coordination Cell in Mons (Belgium), where the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) is also located. The Partnership Coordination Cell is responsible, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, for coordinating joint military activities within the Partnership for Peace and for carrying out the military planning necessary to implement Partnership Programmes between NATO and individual PFP partners.

The Partnership Coordination Cell is headed by a Director whose responsibilities include coordination of Partnership activities with NATO's military authorities. Detailed operational planning for military exercises will be the responsibility of the military commands conducting the exercise. The Cell will also have a small number of permanent staff officers and secretarial and administrative support.

When NATO and NACC Foreign Ministers met in Istanbul in June 1994, at their regular Spring Ministerial meetings, they were able to review practical steps taken towards the implementation of Partnership for Peace since the January Summit. Ministers expressed their satisfaction with the significant number of countries which had already joined PFP⁽¹⁾ and looked forward to more countries joining, including other CSCE states able and willing to contribute to the programme. Three such CSCE countries which have joined PFP and are not members of the NACC - Finland, Slovenia and Sweden - participated in the deliberations on PFP issues and attended the rest of the NACC meeting in Istanbul as observers.

0705-94

(1) By 22 June 1994, 21 countries had signed the PFP Framework Document, namely: Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkmenistan and Ukraine.



BASIC FACT SHEET

NATO OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND PRESS

1110 - Brussels

JUNE 1994

N°10

DEFENCE CONVERSION UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL (NACC)

"Our consultations and cooperation will focus on security and related issues where Allies can offer their experience and expertise, such as the conversion of defence production to civilian purposes."

*Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation
8 November 1991*

In November 1991, NATO Heads of State and Government established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as a forum for dialogue and consultation on political and security-related issues and practical cooperation between NATO countries and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and of the former Soviet Union. In the economics field, considerably priority was given to identifying solutions to the problem of converting to civilian purposes industrial capacity formerly devoted to military production. The successful conversion of defence programmes is central to the economic reform process taking place in many NACC countries. Benefits can include improvements in living standards and reductions in unemployment as well as decreases in military expenditure and the freeing of resources for civilian use.

NATO has taken a lead in promoting practical cooperation in this area. A seminar on defence conversion was held at NATO in May 1992, with the participation of some 200 representatives of governments, the private sector and international organizations. Its purpose was to clarify the task of defence conversion facing Central and Eastern European countries, assessing prospects and obstacles, specifying government roles during the period of transition to market economies and identifying possibilities for cooperation. The Seminar also considered linkages between security and defence conversion, financial constraints and the "human conversion" problems of redeploying and retraining personnel formerly employed in defence industries.

The Seminar led to further investigations into the security aspects of conversion; more comprehensive information-gathering including the creation of a defence industry/defence conversion data base; research projects; and measures designed to promote consultation and practical cooperation.

Defence conversion is a key element of successive annual Work Plans adopted by the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Implementation has concentrated on the following aspects:

GENERAL CONSULTATIONS

The main purpose of consultation and exchange of information between the Allies and Cooperation Partners on Defence Conversion is to explore areas where concrete cooperation



can be implemented through seminars, colloquia, workshops and regular meetings of the NATO Economics Committee with Cooperation Partners.

DEFENCE CONVERSION PILOT PROJECTS

Pilot projects are being developed in order to explore opportunities for financing Defence Conversion activities in Cooperation Partner countries. Proposals for pilot projects submitted to NATO by Cooperation Partners are assessed in order to determine their feasibility, with a view, to implementation with the participation of interested Allies. Individual member countries of NATO, act as "pilot" or "co-pilot" countries in relation to specific projects, and may also contribute to the budget in order to reduce the financial burden on Cooperation Partners. The NATO Economics Directorate acts as a clearing house. Eighteen project proposals have been submitted to date. Of these, fourteen (submitted by five countries) are under review. Ten projects have generated interest in the private sector of NATO countries.

DEFENCE CONVERSION DATA BASES

The NATO Economics Directorate is collating information for a data base of defence conversion experts. This data base, containing about 140 references submitted by delegations to the Economics Committee with Cooperation Partners, has now become operational. References are regularly circulated and updated for the benefit of NACC member countries seeking appropriately qualified experts to advise on particular conversion issues.

A second data base is under consideration, designed to bring together data on defence sector firms in Partner Countries working on conversion projects and interested in establishing cooperation agreements with firms in Allied countries.

CALENDAR OF DEFENCE CONVERSION EVENTS IN 1994

- | | |
|---|--|
| 18-20 May 1994
NATO, Brussels | Economics Committee Meeting with Cooperation Partners. Topics discussed include "Conversion and Social Stability - Integration into the Civilian Economy of the Manpower Potential used in the Military and the Armaments Industry". |
| 29 June - 1 July 1994
NATO, Brussels | NATO Economics Colloquium on "Privatization Experiences and Policies in NACC Countries in the Field of Defence Industries, Taking into Account Privatization Experiences in Other Fields". |
| 30 June 1994
NATO, Brussels | Workshop on "Defence Conversion Pilot Projects". |
| 19-21 October 1994
Potsdam/Pinnow, Germany | Workshop on "Practical Defence Conversion Activities with Particular Focus on Problems Encountered in Restructuring Major Armaments Centres and Military Installations". |

For further information on this subject, contact NATO Economics Directorate, NATO, 1110 Brussels.

APPENDIX 1

Conventional Force Assets of Russia and Ukraine

	Tanks	ACVs	Artillery	Aircraft	Helos	Total
GOFs*	5587	11059	4591	1411	465	23113
RUSSIA	5017	6279	3480	2750	570	18096
UKRAINE	6204	6394	3052	1431	285	17366

* Russian Groups of Forces

Source: Douglas L. Clarke "Implementing of CFE Treaty". RFE-RL Research Reports 1, no.23 (5 June 1992): 50-55.

Forecast summary

(% change unless otherwise indicated)

	1992 ^a	1993 ^b	1994 ^c	1995 ^c
Real GDP growth	-13.7	-18.0	-10.0	-10.0
Industrial production	-6.4	-7.3	-10.0	-10.0
Consumer prices	1,445	3,310	2,000	1,000
Trade balance ^d (\$ m)	500	1,600	1,900	2,500

^a Actual. ^b EIU estimates. ^c EIU forecasts. ^d Non-CIS trade only.

Deputy Factions Registered

The election of more than 150 independent parliamentary deputies prompted the Rada to adopt a resolution on the restructuring of Parliament into deputy factions. The nine factions, organized along political party and ideological lines, can be categorized as follows:

Left		Center-Left		Center-Right		Right	
Communists	86	Unity	26	Center Group	38	Rukh	27
Socialists	25	Interregional Group	27	Reform	27	Statehood	26
Agrarians	33						

**The election splits
Ukraine down the
middle—**

Voting polarised entirely along nationalistic lines (see map), with the entire west backing Mr Kravchuk, and the mainly Russian-speaking east and south supporting Mr Kuchma. The geographical extremities of the country were their candidate's most ardent supporters. In the far west, in Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk, Mr Kravchuk won 93.8%, 94.8% and 94.5% of the votes respectively. In southern Ukraine, Sevastopol gave Mr Kuchma 91.9% of the votes, Crimea 89.7%. Luhansk, the most easterly province, gave him 88%. In central Ukraine voting patterns were less pronounced, although Mr Kravchuk marginally won in Kiev city, albeit on a relatively low turnout of 52.61%.

The lack of support in west Ukraine for Mr Kuchma is an ominous development in what is already a deeply divided country. Future stability depends on how far west Ukraine's anxieties can be allayed by Mr Kuchma. That depends upon the way in which he handles ties with Russia. In the unlikely event that he were to copy Belarus and call for monetary union with Russia, he would risk a major uprising in the west. In fact Russia's inability to help Ukraine will ensure that Russian-Ukrainian ties remain sufficiently distant and therefore not overly worry the nationalist west Ukraine.

