


**COOPERATION AND SECURITY IN EUROPE,
THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE BALKANS**
(Session 3: The European Union and its Eastern neighbours)
Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy
Halki, 10-17/IX/1994

- a. Programme
- b. List of participants
- 1. "The German debate on the enlargement of the European security institutions"/ Susanne Ott
- 2. "Lessons from the Yugoslav crisis: a view from Bulgaria"/ Dinko Dinkov
- 3. "Between ambition and paralysis: Germany's Balkan policy: 1991-1994"/ Michael Thumann
- 4. "Conflict and cooperation in the Balkans: adapting the national security strategies"/ Plamen Pantev
- 5. "Conflict management versus conflict solution: the case of Yugoslavia"/ Predrag Simic
- 6. "The role of small states in new Europe: Armenia in the CIS and CSCE framework"/ Anna Aghadjanian
- 7. "Bulgaria and Russia in the 1990s"/ Kyril Haramiev
- 8. "The role of Russia in Central and Eastern Europe: a Lithuanian view"/ Kestutis Sadauskas
- 9. "The Europe agreements: reshaping East-West European cooperation"/ Sorin Ducaru
- 10. "Political and economic co-operation between the Balkan countries"/ Bogdan Serban Popescu Necsesti
- 11. "Ideas for Balkan cooperation"/ Michael Bogojevic
- 12. "Possibilities for regional cooperation in the Balkans"/ Tanja Miscevic
- 13. "Human rights in the Balkans: a view from Bulgaria"/ Maya Hristova
- 14. "Les droits de l'homme et la situation des minorités dans la République Fédérative de Yougoslavie"/ Isabelle Misic
- 15. "Human rights and minorities in the Balkans: a view from Romania"/ Horia Barna
- 16. "Preventive diplomacy: crisis management in Kosovo: a simulation exercise"
- 17. "Small economies in transition making for the EU membership: the case of Slovenia"/ Zlatko Sabic



HALKI INTERNATIONAL SEMINARS 1994

"COOPERATION AND SECURITY IN EUROPE, THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE BALKANS"

SESSION 94.3:

The European Union and Its Eastern Neighbours

Programme

10 - 17 SEPTEMBER 1994
Halki / Rhodes, Greece

SATURDAY 10 SEPTEMBER

- 10:00-12:00 Assembly of all participants (Meeting Point: Rhodes Town Hall)
Seminar Registration
- 12:00 Departure by bus to Kamiros Skala harbour (from the Town Hall)
- 13:00 Stop over at the Airport
- 14:30 Departure from Kamiros Skala harbour
- 16:00 Arrival in Halki
- 20:00 **Seminar Orientation**
Prof. Thanos Veremis, Director, ELIAMEP, Athens
- 20:30 **Welcome Reception**

SUNDAY 11 SEPTEMBER

Morning: Free Time

Afternoon Session:

18:00-20:30 **The Transformation of European Security Institutions: The Evolution
of NATO and the WEU**

Dr. Maurizio Cremasco, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome

Dr. Fraser Cameron, DG Ia, European Commission, Brussels

Susanne Ott, Researcher, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Ebenhausen

Discussion

MONDAY 12 SEPTEMBER

Morning Session:

09:00-10:30 **The US, Russia and Europe**

Amb. Jim Wilkinson, Former Deputy Assist. Secretary of State for European Affairs

Dr. Sergei Karaganov, Deputy Director, Institute of Europe, Moscow

11:00-13:00 Discussion

Afternoon Session:

17:30-20:30 Workshop I: Russia, the CIS and Europe

Discussion Leader: *Dr. Fraser Cameron*, DG Ia, European Commission, Brussels

TUESDAY 13 SEPTEMBER

Morning Session:

09:00-10:30 The EU and its Eastern Neighbours (I): The Challenge of Enlargement

Dr. Franz - L. Altmann, Deputy Director, Suedost Institut, Munich

Dr. Plamen Pantev, Institute of International Relations, Sofia

11:00-13:00 The EU and its Eastern Neighbours (II): Coping with Conflict in Eastern Europe

Dr. Maurizio Cremasco, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome

Dr. Spyros Economides, London School of Economics (LSE), London

Dinko Dinkov, Counsellor, Council of Ministers, Sofia

Michael Thumann, Journalist, "Die Zeit", Hambourg

Afternoon Session:

18:00-20:30 Workshop II: The Challenge of Enlargement

Discussion Leader: *Dr. Franz - L. Altmann*, Deputy Director, Suedost Institute, Munich

WEDNESDAY 14 SEPTEMBER

Morning Session:

09:00-10:30 The Balkans: Conflict and Cooperation

Introductory Remarks: *Amb (ad.h.) Vyron Theodoropoulos*

~~*Dr. Agim Neshe*, Director, Albanian Foundation for European Affairs, Tirana~~

Prof. Plamen Pantev, Institute of International Relations, Sofia

Prof. Predrag Simic, Director, Institute of International Politics, Belgrade

11:00-13:00 Discussion

Afternoon Session:

18:00-20:30 Workshop III: Possibilities for Regional Cooperation

Discussion Leader: *Prof. Theodore Couloumbis*, President, ELIAMEP, Athens

Workshop IV: Human Rights in a Changing Europe

Discussion Leader: *Amb. (ad. h.) Vyron Theodoropoulos*

THURSDAY 15 SEPTEMBER

Morning Session:

09:00-13:30 Introduction to Negotiations

Andrea Kupfer-Schneider, Arent Fox Law Firm, Washington D.C.

Afternoon Session:

17:45 **Is Preventive Diplomacy Possible? Simulation Exercise on Kosovo -
Part I: Preparing Negotiating Positions**

Coordinator: *Anat Kurz*, The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS), Tel Aviv
[Consultants: *Dr. Agim Nesho* (Albania)
Prof. Predrag Simic (Serbia)
Prof. Yannis Valinakis (Greece)]

Instructions: Substance and Logistics

Negotiating Group Discussions

Reconvening of Negotiating Groups: Discussion of Methodological Problems

Simulation Exercise - Part II

Preparation of Negotiating Positions - Continued

Negotiations: First Session

Discussion of Methodological Problems

FRIDAY 16 SEPTEMBER

Morning Session:

09:00-13:30 **Simulation - Part III**

Consultations of Negotiating Groups

Negotiations: Second Session

Simulation Summary: General Discussion

Afternoon Session:

18:30-20:00 **Conclusions**

Discussion Leader: *Prof. Theodore Couloumbis*, President, ELIAMEP

20:00 **Keynote Address:** "Greece in the Era of Global Village"
Grigorios Niotis, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece

20:30 **Award of Certificates**

21:00 **Reception**

SATURDAY 17 SEPTEMBER

Early Morning Departure from Halki to Kamiros Skala and Rhodes Airport/Harbour

WORKSHOPS

MONDAY 12 SEPTEMBER

Workshop I: Russia, the CIS and Europe

Discussion Leader: *Dr. Fraser Cameron*, DG Ia, European Commission, Brussels

- ① Anna Agadjanian, "The Role of Small States in the New Europe: Armenia in the CIS and the CSCE Framework"
Armenia
- ③ Kiril Haramiev, "Relations Between Bulgaria & Russia in the Light of Recent Developments in the Balkans"
Bulgaria
- ② Namig Kamranov, "The Role of Small States in the New Europe: Azerbaijan in the CIS and the CSCE Framework"
Azerbaijan
- ④ Idrek Pajuma, "Security Considerations for Estonia"
Estonia
- ⑤ Kestutis Sadauskas, "The Role of Russia in Central and Eastern Europe: A Lithuanian View"
Lithuania
- ④ IGOR PILJAEV - *Ukraine*

TUESDAY 13 SEPTEMBER

Workshop II: The Challenge of Enlargement

Discussion Leader: *Dr. Franz - L. Altmann*, Deputy Director, Suedost Institute, Munich

- ① Sorim Ducaru, "Romania and the European Union"
~~Genc Gano, "Albania and the European Union"~~
 - ③ Michael Klosowski, "Poland and the European Union"
~~Nadejda Mihaylova, "Bulgaria and the European Union"~~
 - ④ Florin Rapan, "Romania and the European Union"
 - ⑤ Rain Rosimannus, "Estonia & Europe"
 - ⑥ Zlatko Sabic, "Slovenia and the European Union"
 - ~~Christina Terzieva, "The European Union and Bulgaria"~~
 - ② Kirsti Vilen, "The Enlargement of the European Union to Include Central East European States: Problems and Prospects"
- AMANDA BANKS (*Australia*) *in transition x EU - environment*

WEDNESDAY 14 SEPTEMBER

Workshop III: Possibilities for Regional Cooperation

Discussion Leader: *Prof. Theodore Couloumbis*, President, ELIAMEP, Athens

- ② POPESCU - ~~NESESTI~~
~~Arben Imami, "Possibilities for Cooperation in the Balkans"~~
- ① Michael Bogoevich, "Ideas for Balkan Cooperation"
~~Vesselin Nikolaev, "Regional Cooperation in the Balkans"~~
- ③ Tanja Miscevic, "Central Europe and European Integration"
- ⑤ Sonia Ruiz, "Prospects for Economic Development of the Former Communist Countries in the Balkans"
- ④ NIKOLAEV

Workshop IV: Human Rights in a Changing Europe

Discussion Leader: *Amb. (ad.h.) Vyron Theodoropoulos*

Alexander Cadreanu

"Respect for Human Rights & Conflict Resolution in the Former Communist Countries"

Maya Hristova

"Human Rights in the Balkans: A View from Bulgaria"

Isabelle Mistic

"Human Rights & Minorities in Eastern Europe"

Mihai V. Muresan

"The Right of International Humanitarian Intervention"

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"COOPERATION AND SECURITY IN EUROPE, THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE BALKANS"

SESSION 94.3

The European Union and Its Eastern Neighbours

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10 - 17 SEPTEMBER 1994
Halki / Rhodes, Greece

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
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The German debate
on the enlargement of the
European security institutions

Susanne Ott

Ebenhausen, 6 September 1994

The rationale for German's security policy

The interests on which Germany bases its action in the field of security policy are guided by the values laid down in the Basic Law which provides the constitutional mandate to safeguard peace, to work toward European unity, to settle conflicts by peaceful means and to join a system of collective security.

Based on these constitutional provisions the present German foreign and security policy is guided by five central interests as stated in the German defense department's 1994 White Paper:

- "Preservation of freedom, security and welfare of the citizens of Germany and the territorial integrity of the German state;
- Integration with the European democracies in the European Union, for democracy, the rule of law and prosperity beyond the borders of Germany mean peace and security for Germany, too;
- The lasting alliance, based on a community sharing values and similar interests, with the United States as a world power, for the potential of the USA is indispensable for international stability;
- The familiarization of our neighbours in Eastern Europe with Western structures in a spirit of reconciliation and partnership;
- Worldwide respect for international law and human rights and a just world economic order based on market principles, for the security of individual states can, in the long run, be guaranteed only in a system of global security of peace, justice and well-being for everyone."¹

As a member of major international security institutions (UN, CSCE, NATO, EU, WEU) Germany has a strong interest in improving them and their interaction. Bonn regards these institutions as designed to complement each other (interlocking institutions) to form a strong security order in and for Europe to contribute to extending stability to Central and Eastern Europe and into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The two main institutions which have helped shape West German foreign and security policy over the past 40 years -EU and NATO - still form the primary setting within which Germany adapts and reacts to international challenges. Bonn is keen on keeping these institutions dynamic.

To this end the governing CDU/CSU/FDP coalition has undertaken steps which help to underline the importance it places on German entrenchment in multilateral security organizations and activities. A few recent concrete examples may be enumerated here in addition to the fact that Bonn has been an active promoter of both the Maastricht process and the reform of NATO:²

- The establishment of two multinational corps with the United States;
- The establishment of the Eurocorps with French, will upcoming Flemish and Spanish participation;
- The proposed establishment of a German/Dutch corps 1994;
- The participation of German personnel on AWACS aircraft in the Balkan region.

In the German government's view the Eurocorps is a major strategic and political tool which is intended to serve three goals:

1. the establishment of a central building for European defense;
2. the development of an instrument for a Common Foreign and Security Policy;
3. the strengthening of the European foundation of the transatlantic bridge.

These three functions of the Eurocorps help Bonn to manage its perennial problem of keeping relations with Paris and Washington both compatible and constructive.³ It is therefore no surprise that all major German parties have been interested in specifying the division of labor between NATO and WEU and have welcomed the concept of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) as deliberated in the January 1994 NATO Summit.

The German security debate

Compared to the magnitude of change in both the international security constellation and the internal situation of the reunited Germany the debate in this country on security has been inadequate in quality and quantity. Today, in the German public, the notion "security" is associated first with job security, second with ecological security, third with internal security and crime (national overreactions, asylum seeker, immigration). In these issue areas security is mentioned in implicit terms, sometimes called "conflict", or "crisis" or "instability". To the extent that there is an open security debate in Germany it focuses on three subjects all of which have reference to the reform of international security institutions:

1. Most of the political discussion goes toward the question of whether the Bundeswehr would be allowed to take on military roles beyond its obligations in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Western European Union (WEU) and, if so, which size and qualities should it have.
2. The second item on Germany's current security agenda is the enlargement of the European Union (EU) and of NATO toward the East. Should security guarantees be extended beyond the Oder-Neiße river? As the large majority of the population agrees with enlargement the debate concentrates on the way in which it needs to be done.
3. The third security-related topic is the discussion on Germany's membership in the United Nations Security Council, a debate more nurtured by others than the Germans themselves.

The domestic debate in Germany regarding European security institutions is concentrating on different levels a practical as well as a constitutional level. Germany in a new shape and a new security context after the end of the Cold War, must take on a larger share of responsibility in world affairs. The nature of world affairs have changed, up it is necessary for Germany's role to change also. On the other hand the different pro- and groupings in Germany have a tendency to avoid engaging in a wide ranging political debate on strategic options and alternative paths to security. This is exemplified by the controversy over whether and under what conditions the Bundeswehr should be engaged in military missions other than (traditional) collective defense. They prefer to fall back to the Basic Law in order to justify their positions.

Enlarging Western institutions

The historic experience has great influence on today's German foreign and security policy. Despite the end of East-West antagonism and the bloc to bloc confrontation the security landscape in Europe presents an inconsistent picture. Europe is experiencing the simultaneity of integration and stability in one part and disintegration and instability (including war) in the other. While the complex system of interrelationship is being gradually deepened in the West, old ties are breaking up and new conflicts are breaking out in the East. The war in the Balkans demonstrates that, although the East-West conflict is over, Europe is not an island of peace in a world fraught with conflict.

The Germans are largely aware of this new security situation. Their former role as a frontline state has substantially changed since the end of the Cold War.⁴ Today's broad spectrum of acute and potential crises and conflicts have economic and social causes, stem from ethnic differences and from historic enmity. The risk of a major war in Europe has been replaced by a multitude of risk factors of a different nature with widely varying regional and local manifestations.

Germans get the feeling they continue to live at a frontline, this time characterized by open borders and major imbalances in terms of wealth, stability and political culture. German policy toward Eastern Europe, therefore, tries to reduce these imbalances, to relocate Germany in the middle of the continent. The consensus among all political parties is unanimous in this regard: after German unification, European unification is the next strategic goal. There is also the feeling that there is no time to be lost: just like German unification (at least in legal terms) was a matter of a few months, the uniting of Europe should be sped up in order to profit from the historic chance.

This widely shared background of thinking particularly reflected in Bonn's leading role to push the enlargement of EU and NATO toward the East and to intensify ties with all those in the East who are not candidate for accession, especially Russia and Ukraine. The EU Europe Agreements and the EU Partnership Agreements are both regarded as major contributions to this end. They allow for economic cooperation and political dialogue on a regular and structured basis. Especially circles in the SPD (opposition party) have favoured a concept of security which would stabilize East European democracies through opening up markets in the West, even if this runs counter to West European interests.

The aim here is to help to build up stronger economies and more reliable political systems in each of the countries in transition while at the same time dragging them into an international network which opens up perspectives for the future and establishes rules of cohabitation and interaction.

Beyond the economic and political spheres, Germany has established defense policy agreements with its direct neighbours to the East as well as with Ukraine and Russia. As the January 1994 NATO Summit has indicated membership for the East Europeans is not in the cards yet, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) concept allows countries to choose to be as closely

connected to NATO as they wish. PfP has been endorsed by all major parties in the Bundestag as a step in the right direction. To some it has not gone far enough. Bonn has concluded agreements of military cooperation with all former Warsaw Treaty Organization members. Such cooperation extends from mutual information to common exercises and from security dialogue to exchange of officers. These contacts form a substantial part of the German defense ministry's and the Bundeswehr activities in "security diplomacy" and seem to submerge many of the traditional tasks of politicians as well as military experts.

German defense minister, Volker Ruehe, does support a quick expansion of NATO to include countries like Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. His counterpart in the foreign ministry, Klaus Kinkel, as well as Chancellor Kohl are far more cautious. Their fear moving too quickly is mainly rooted in not wanting to upset Russia. It is a fine line to walk between creating stability in the Eastern European region, which is of interest to all the countries in Western Europe, especially Germany, and stepping on the toes of the Russian bear.

Similar considerations are being made among the opposition parties. They all want to increase the membership perspective for Central and Eastern European states and to solidify cooperation with Ukraine and Russia, while at the same time avoiding to cause new conflicts or to flare up old ones.

The position of foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel, on enlargement can stand for a general German orientation in this regard. He has invented what was called the "king's way to enlargement" which means that countries enter the EU first, then become members of WEU as, since the Maastricht Treaty, the two organizations are connected and have a common future, and finally, via the link between WEU and NATO, accession candidates will become members of NATO as well. The sequence could be as follows: first the EFTA members, then the Visegrad countries, then the Baltics and then Bulgaria and Romania. In Kinkel's view, neither Ukraine nor Russia qualifies for membership, but European security cannot be organized against these new democracies and a wide ranging partnership should be extended to them.

Those among the opposition parties (Greens and left wing SPD) who do not want to strengthen NATO put the emphasis on a more prominent role of CSCE in the European security, especially in crisis prevention and peacekeeping. They prefer a line which would enhance the link between NATO, NACC, PfP and CSCE with the latter in a directing position. Following their suggestions CSCE should be strengthened in many areas: security partnerships, conflict prevention, peace maintenance measures - including the implementation of CSCE Blue Helmets and the establishment of a CSCE security council. Some of these propositions derive from "old thinking" which is extrapolated from the times of the Cold War when CSCE represented the core of cooperative security. It is popular in East Germany and among pacifists in the Green Party and SPD.

Final remarks

Most of the security debate in Germany these days is conducted at the fringes rather than in the center of political mainstream. There is not much of a strategic discussion.⁵ No fundamental ideological rifts run through the population. The only area of major controversy, the combat mission of the Bundeswehr in cases of collective security, does not really stand the test. Even if the Constitutional Court allows such missions, the political mood of the German people tends to be against it. If there is an inclination for German power politics then it is much more subtle than military interventionism.⁶

The outside interest in the internal German debate on international security institutions is motivated by both the need for Germany's contribution and the fear of German nationalism. In both cases the strategic demand is to "tie in" the Germans. Bonn's partners will be disappointed in both respects. Given its historical political and actual economic constraints Germany is likely to contribute less than others had hoped and Germany will be less inclined to break out of multilateralism than other countries might do in the same situation. A Red-Green coalition government would not come into existence if the price was that Bonn leaves NATO as the Greens' programme provides. Germany has become a team player by conviction, its population has internalized multilateralism, not for reasons of altruism but for the sake of efficient foreign and security policy in an interdependent world. In this sense Germany is likely to follow a special path.

Notes

1. Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper 1994: The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Bundeswehr Now and in the Years ahead, Abridged Version, Bonn, April 1994.
2. The restructuring of NATO is a subject which has received a fair amount of attention in Germany. According to Defense Minister Volker Rühe, multinational crisis management must become the main function for NATO. This, certainly, implies the hope that such language will gradually move the debate within Germany toward a better understanding of the new type of collective security challenges which demand German military involvement in crisis management. Moreover, any German defense minister could count on a wider political acceptance at home of peace keeping measures were undertaken in a legitimized multilateral context such as NATO.
3. For the Bonn-Paris relationship, see Peter Schmidt (Ed.), In the Midst of Change: On the Development of West European Security and Defense cooperation, Baden-Baden, Nomos 1992. On the Bonn-Washington link, see Reinhardt Rummel, German-American relations in the setting of a new atlanticism, in: Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 4 (1993), pp. 17-31.
4. For a comprehensive and sober description see Ole Diehl, Eastern Europe as a challenge to future European security, in: Mark Curtis et al., Challenges and Responses to Future European Security: British, French and German Perspectives, European Strategy Group, 1993, pp. 15-68.
5. For such an attempt, see Paul B. Stares (Ed.), The New Germany and the New Europe, Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992.
6. For some analytical hints in this regard, see Susanne Peters, Germany's future defense policy. Opening up the option for German power politics, in: German Politics and Society, No. 26 (Summer 1992), pp. 54-74.

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LESSONS FROM THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS:
A VIEW FROM BULGARIA

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After the radical structural changes in the international system at the end of the 20th 1 Century the political thought is facing new challenges. The cold war ended and new political, strategic and economic realities are emerging. Until the end of the 80's it seemed that the Yalta system of international relations, established at the end of World War II, had predestined the nations to search for a place of their own within that everlasting order. Any attempt to shake its foundations threatened the existence of the world. The bipolar system provided for the human race almost half a century of cold war. Within it peace was guaranteed by mutually assured destruction. The place of all Balkan states within that system was strictly outlined - in the force field of one of the two poles. It seemed that the Yalta system of international relations had been projected on the Balkans in a miniature. By the end of the 80's the region reproduced on a smaller scale the structure of that system. Nevertheless, it suddenly collapsed, catching mankind psychologically unprepared, without any bases for alternative political solutions. Now policy-makers have to think the unthinkable. The complicated developments taking place in the contemporary world heated up the Balkan cauldron and it is boiling hard now.

The changes in the former Soviet Union and in 2 Eastern Europe altered the structure of the system of international relations and gave way to new trends in its development. They are interrelated with changes in the functions of the subjects of international interaction. The outlines of a new world are being drawn, but this time it is no longer on the bases of East-West contradictions. This in itself creates new challenges for countries like those from the Balkan region, which is one of the most sensitive to the trends in international relations. Not only do they have to face political dilemmas, they also have to work out their own state policy strategies in order to adapt to the new conditions. Altogether, this is an enormous challenge to the political maturity and wisdom of Balkan statesmanship.

At the end of the 20th century The Balkans revive the notorious characteristics they have obtained at the end of the 19th century. It appears that the Balkans are still the Balkans. As in the novels of Rudyard Kipling the war correspondents were opening their conversation with the news that "there would be trouble in the Balkans in the spring" now again every observer can predict with full confidence similar developments.

Unfortunately, the rest of the world has not changed its attitude towards the problems in the 3 region. The reaction continues to be just like in Kipling's books: "Never mind the troubles in the Balkans. Those little states are always screeching."

In the geopolitical chaos "the great ideas" of the period of national liberation have been revived. The unsolved national problems and well known balkan nationalism are going to put to hard tests the maturity of Balkan nations and peace-keeping potential of the international system.

For several years the main source of troubles is the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation. The Yugoslav crisis, the war in Europe at the end of the 20th century, may sound unbelievable, but it is a fact out of which can and should be drawn many lessons. If not, without any doubt, we can foresee that political observers of next century will start the news with "The last plan for peace in the Balkans failed."

Without any pretensions for exhaustiveness, I am going to propose several conclusions, drawn out of Yugoslav crisis from international prospect.

1. The international system after the cold war shows inability to cope with new regional crises,

which are connected with the changes of its structure. It appeared that there is a lack of 4 ideas how to tackle the problems, caused by the fact that the bipolar system has stopped history and preserved very old conflicts. The Balkans are sated with history. Now the international structures and institutions are facing the problems of neglecting the lessons of Balkan history. It is evident that the cold war institutions, which grinded down the old problems, are not able to help their solution. The emerging new world order has no mechanisms for resolution of conflicts of such kind.

2. The international structures, which survived the cold war and got the confidence of winners of that war, can not meet the expectations for their role in the new world order. The western world /NATO, EU, WEU, CE and the single members/ is not giving a response, adequate to the hopes which it created among balkan people during the cold war period. Led by its political and strategic interests the West created great expectations particularly among people in the countries, then belonging to the eastern block. Now the feeble political steps of the West, concerning the developments in the region, are causing great disappointments. They affect the badly needed process of democratization in the region.

3. The ongoing democratization of the 5 international relations and overcoming the ideological division created conditions for revival of problems, caused by historical injustice. The population is eager to take its own destiny in its own hands. In many cases these attempts are causing troubles. To some extent the Yugoslav federation was artificially created within the international system, established after World War I. Its external and internal borders were drawn with evident injustices. The acts of the winners then are brought to the court of history today. In recent times a peculiar event has been witnessed. There are attempts to establish "states-duplicates" on the basis of ethnic minorities. This might be a step towards unification with the "mother-states", but might be not.

4. The Yugoslav crisis changed the Balkans. The question is in which direction? Until now it is quite evident that there are no signs for their europeization. They are more likely to cause balkanization of Europe.

5. The processes in former Yugoslavia are proving that the principle of inviolable borders in Europe is a myth. Without accepting an

alternative of this principle the main factors in the international system are staying apart from 6 the new realities and they are making impossible a modern solution of the accumulated problems.

6. All efforts of the Great Powers to find solution of the Yugoslav crisis ignoring the other Balkan states and their potential for helping establishment of peace also proved to be irrational.

7. The attempts to apply preventive diplomacy in the Yugoslav crisis also do not give substantial results. The dislocation of EU observers along the borders of Yugoslavia is not a significant factor in shaping the policy towards the crisis. The UN sanctions are not giving the expected results. Their negative effect on the neighbouring countries is more tangible than that on Yugoslavia itself. One of the reasons for this is the refusal of UN Security Council to listen to the arguments of these countries. The resolutions of the Security Council were passed without consulting them. It is an obvious violation of art. 50 of UN's Charter.

The incredible changes in the world have found their Balkan concretization. The lessons, drawn by the Balkan people from the experience until

now, should be taken into consideration in the joint efforts of the world community to find 7 solution of one of the most dangerous crisis in the international system.

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Between Ambition and Paralysis: Germany's Balkan Policy, 1991-1994

Michael Thumann

The decay of Yugoslavia since 1990 has put an end to the experiment of a state of southern Slavs. At the same time, it has destroyed the myth of a peaceful and strong Western Europe. The continent that had displayed an impressive performance of cooperation and skillful diplomatic maneuvering during the last years of the Cold War proved to be incapable of coping with the problems in its southeastern backyard. Nearly three years ago, the European Community assumed responsibility of negotiating cease fires and a peace settlement for the embattled Yugoslav states. But all efforts were fruitless. In 1994, it was primarily the interference of the United States and Russia that brought about a truce in February for Sarajevo and in June for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Although not directly involved in UN peace-keeping or Security Council resolutions, Germany can be seen as a very significant example of the hampered European approach to the Yugoslav crisis. The country's Balkan policy has been criticised and even held in contempt by its allies. On the one hand, Germany has been reproached for its assertiveness in recognising the breakaway republics of Croatia and Slovenia; on the other, it has been chided for its inactivity in all military efforts undertaken by the United Nations. Ambition and paralysis seem to be the cornerstones of German policy towards the Balkans.¹ The purpose

¹ Despite the significance of this topic for German foreign policy, only a few articles have been published since 1990: Arthur Heinrich, "Neue deutsche Außenpolitik. Selbstversuche zwischen Zagreb und Brüssel", *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, No. 12, 1991, pp. 1446-1458; Alexander Mühlen, "Die deutsche Rolle bei der Anerkennung der jugoslawischen Sezessionsstaaten", *Liberal*, June 1992, pp. 49-55; John Newhouse, "The Diplomatic Round: Dodging the Problem", *New Yorker*, 24 August 1992; Heinz-Jürgen Axt, "Hat Genscher Jugoslawien entzweit? Mythen und Fakten zur Außenpolitik des vereinten Deutschlands", *Europa-Archiv*, No. 12, 1993; Martin Rosefeldt, "Deutschlands und Frankreichs Jugoslawienpolitik im Rahmen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (1991-

of this analysis is to depict the perception of the conflict by German political analysts and politicians and to trace the path to recognition and the implications drawn by German politicians thereafter. Finally, it examines the consequences of the German commitment not to send troops out-of-area confined by the borders of the North Atlantic Alliance.

This political and, above all else, military self-restraint is a legacy of the Federal Republic as part of a divided country throughout the years of the Cold War. Germans, the common judgment goes, had learned the lessons of their past actions. They tried to forge a completely new image contrary to the one depicted by the Roman historian Tacitus in *Germania*: "Whether on public or private occasions, they always show up in arms." Today, most young Germans prefer to show up in violet plaids and with white flags demonstrating against military performance around the world. Masses of demonstrators took to the streets during the Gulf War to call for an end to Western intervention.

German leaders enjoyed the limited scope of responsibility in their foreign policy in the clear-cut world of the Cold War. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, long-time Minister of Foreign Affairs, brilliantly represented his country as the reliable and stable partner of the West and, simultaneously, opened the path of cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Germany tried to be friends with everybody, critics argued, and the British historian Timothy Garton Ash described the ideal German approach as having "friendly relations with Heaven, a deepened partnership with Earth but also productive cooperation with Hell."² This corresponded nicely to the dream many Germans had about their own country: Neutrality and non-alignment appeared in the 1980s as a very attractive status — even to influential politicians in the Social Democratic Party. Polls found out that a majority of Germans wished to live in Switzerland during the Gulf War.

This dream ended abruptly in the summer of 1991, when Europe lost the

1993)". *Südosteuropa*, No. 11/12, 1993, pp. 621-654.

² Quoted by *The Times*, 26 April 1993, p. 64.

serenity of peace. The skirmishes of Croatian and Serbian militiamen in the Baranja and at the lakes of Plitvice destroyed the notion of a continent having overcome the demons of war more than a generation ago. Yugoslavia was no longer a remote country with dubious internal conflicts nobody had to care about. Yugoslavia became a European problem and thus a problem for Germany. War had broken out some 300 kilometres south of Munich, prompting the recollection of some very bad memories.

Historically, the Balkans had been an area of German interference and rivalry with other European powers. During the Second World War, the Wehrmacht established a brutal occupation regime in Serbia,³ whereas the Croats had the opportunity to build up their own state, the Independent State of Croatia run by the notorious Ustasha leader Ante Pavelic. The First World War was triggered by a Serb who assassinated the Austro-Hungarian heir to the throne Franz Ferdinand and his wife in Sarajevo in 1914. The Germans entered the war on the side of their ally Austria-Hungary with the battle cry *Serbien muß sterben* ("Serbia has to die"). This phrase is well known in Germany to this day and eludes the fact that Serbia has not always been Germany's adversary.

Before the First World War, there were close ties between the two countries both in the cultural and political spheres. At that time, most of Serbia's scientists and scholars educated abroad attended German universities. Berlin's foreign policy aimed at attracting Serbia to an alliance of Balkan states against Russia whose ambitions in southeastern Europe ran counter to German interests.⁴ In 1913, the German Emperor, the Chancellor and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs "tried to convince Austria-Hungary's leaders to alter their hostile policy towards Serbia" since the Germans saw Serbia as a key country to their envisaged *Ergänzungswirtschaftsraum* ("room for economic expansion") in the

³ Walter Manoschek, *Serbien ist judenfrei, Militärische Besatzungspolitik und Judenvernichtung in Serbien 1941-42*, München, 1993.

⁴ Wolfgang J. Mommsen, *Grossmachtstellung und Weltpolitik 1870-1914, Die Außenpolitik des deutschen Reiches*, Berlin, 1993, pp. 263-264.

Balkans.⁵ The notion of Germany's special economic interest in the Balkans persisted, but the means of implementation changed from economic to military expansion. The economic ambitions in the Balkans were "transformed into a permanent component of German foreign policy and remained active until the very end of the Second World War."⁶

Since then, German political and economic activity in southeastern Europe, especially in Yugoslavia, has been sharply diminished. Trade with Ljubljana, Zagreb and Belgrade showed negligible figures within the statistics of German exports. German trade with Croatia in 1988 for example did not exceed \$2.2 billion dollars.⁷ Analysts who still insist that economic interests underlie Germany's contemporary Balkan policy betray their ignorance of available statistical data. It has not been German businessmen who were preoccupied with Yugoslavia, but, rather, German tourists wishing to spend their holidays on the Dalmatian coast. Most of them came just for the sun and did not have a clue about what was going on in the country. Their indifference towards the internal situation of Yugoslavia was shared by the German political and intellectual elites. Before 1991, Bonn had no special interest in the Balkans. The number of scholars at universities and research institutes and the number of experts in the media who could actually explain Yugoslav history and politics in the summer of 1991 was surprisingly low for a country situated next to southeastern Europe.

This vacuum in Germany had to be filled quickly when the Yugoslav People's Army intervened in the battles on the side of Serbian paramilitary units against Croatian militiamen. What had been local clashes became an all-out war of the Yugoslav army against the Croats. Every night German TV stations delivered reports about new Serbian

⁵ Andrej Mitrovic, "Germany's Attitude Toward the Balkans 1912-1914". *East Central Society and the Balkan Wars*, edited by Bela K. Kiraly and Dimitrije Djordjevic.

New York, 1987, pp. 295-316 and p. 310.

⁶ See Mitrovic, p. 313.

⁷ *Financial Times*, 5 February 1992, p. 5.

attacks on towns populated mostly by Croats. Broadcasting stations extensively covered the shelling of Vukovar, Osijek and, above all, the old town of Dubrovnik. But most German correspondents had obviously better access to Croatian sources than to any other. Whenever they gave a judgment on who was to be blamed for the bloodshed, the Serbs were depicted as the aggressors, solely responsible for the war and all of its atrocities. The role of Croatian paramilitary groups was never discussed. *Bild*, the largest yellow press paper in Germany, served up stories of Serbs slashing open the stomachs of civilians and quoted a Croatian physician saying "These are the actions of beasts."⁸ One week later, *Bild* published the results of a survey among its readers which asked whether the German government was doing enough to help Croatia. Allegedly, 89.2% answered "no".⁹ And it was in this way that the Croatian question was introduced to the German public. Since Yugoslavia was only a nondescript spot on the political map for most Germans, the media played a very important role in shaping their ideas of the conflict.

Whereas *Bild* and German TV were delivering quick information to the masses, the conservative dailies *Die Welt* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* provided background for the political and intellectual elites. Both newspapers are highly influential within government and parliamentary circles. In editorials and commentaries, Serbia was called the "aggressor" that harboured "the obsession of a master race with conquests".¹⁰ Serbian troops were referred to as non-European "barbarians" or as *Chetniks*, the name for Serbs during World War II who fought brutally for the restoration of monarchy. In concluding their editorials in *Die Welt* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, the authors often demanded immediate recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, the latter of which had been fortunate in largely escaping the war except for a ten-day battle with the Yugoslav army. The calls for recognition became habitual in the months of August, September, October, and November of

⁸ *Bild-Zeitung*, 31 August 1991.

⁹ *Bild-Zeitung*, 9 October 1991.

¹⁰ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 19 November 1991.

1991. Western states that resisted these demands were suspected of sympathising with Serbia and of holding on to ideas of the past: "In France and Great Britain, parts of the intellectual class are still very attached to the established order of 1919-20, which was above all designed to punish and pin down Germany, Austria and Hungary; the Belgrade state of Greater Serbia was a cornerstone of this system."¹¹

Whereas these assertions were directed at the conservative establishment, Croatian authors such as Dunja Melcic published their call for recognition in the left-wing daily *Tageszeitung*.¹² Croatian organisations in Germany were very active in supplying journalists, public affairs administrators and, of course, officials in Bonn with material on the war. Most Yugoslav *Gastarbeiter* (guest workers) in Germany (numbering more than half a million) were Croats — a fact that also played a certain role in shaping the German view of the conflict. Furthermore, that most of the Croats were Catholic gave them some credit among Catholic circles in southern Germany, especially in Bavaria. Members of the conservative CSU were among the political pioneers to press Foreign Minister Genscher to grant diplomatic recognition to Croatia and Slovenia.

The conservatives were soon followed by foreign policy experts within the ranks of the opposition party SPD. Upon returning from a visit to Yugoslavia on 24 May 1991, MP Norbert Gansel presented a report to the Parliament. He called on the European Community to alter its attitude to the conflict and argued that the Balkan crisis areas could be controlled by recognising the people's right to "self-determination".¹³ This term met with a positive response in Germany where many

¹¹ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 16 November 1991. *Die Welt* contended "that American and British policy toward the Balkans and Yugoslavia was directed backwards". (14 October 1991 and 17 December 1991.)

¹² *Die Tageszeitung*, 17 December 1991.

¹³ However, he added, Croatian sovereignty could be accepted only if Zagreb grants cultural and political autonomy to the Serb minority. See *Archiv der Gegenwart*, 1 July 1991, p. 35796.

politicians and analysts had used it to characterise the country's reunification of 1990. What proved to be right in Germany could not be wrong in Yugoslavia. The idea of self-determination, invoked by the Balkan people already against the Osman empire and the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy in the 19th century, obviously appealed to the German Social Democrats as a suitable principle for settling the Balkan crisis at the end of the 20th century.

Many Christian Democrats thought the same thing, but as the Kohl government remained cautious on the Balkans in the summer of 1991, only outspoken MPs, such as the right-wing Heinrich Lummer from Berlin, openly called upon the government to recognise Slovenia and Croatia.¹⁴ It was only after granting recognition that the Social Democrats revealed their moral indignation at the war. MP Freimut Duve, speaking in the Bundestag, observed bitterly that the Serb army had only destroyed thousands of cultural landmarks and houses in Croatia, whereas "in Bosnia this army is about to exterminate a whole people". It was a mistake to believe "genocide became impossible after Auschwitz and Cambodia". Duve concluded: "Again and again one is requested in Bonn, Paris and London for neutrality. Those who ask for neutral balance between culprit and victim while murder is going on becomes accomplices."¹⁵ Duve's speech reflected a general feeling among Germans from the very beginning of the Balkan war that it was immoral to stand aloof and watch the atrocities from the comfort of a Western diplomat's velvet chair. Some sensed even a special responsibility to stand up against genocide since their forefathers had waged a murderous war against their neighbours only some 50 years before.

This was the German mood in the summer of 1991, when Hans-Dietrich Genscher had to decide which way to go in the Yugoslav crisis. Reluctant to deliver any official commitment, he reacted to public pressure by embarking on a frenetic schedule of travel. On 2 July 1991,

¹⁴ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 4 July 1991.

¹⁵ *Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographischer Bericht* (Bonn, 15 October 1992), p. 9635.

Genscher held talks in Belgrade with the Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic and President Stipe Mesic. While in the capital, he met Kiro Gligorov, President of the Yugoslav republic of Macedonia and the Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic. After Belgrade, he rushed to the Austrian town of Villach to meet the Slovenian President Milan Kucan. Genscher's talks had no evident effects on the war that began in Slovenia, but his solo effort caused ill-feelings between Bonn and some of its EC partners. It was primarily Dutch diplomats who felt duped because they held the EC Presidency at that time. This was the first misunderstanding of the partners since the war had started in Yugoslavia. Others were to follow.

In the first months of the crisis, Genscher had still lived up to his international reputation as an extremely cautious diplomat. On 19 June 1991, he ordered his State Minister in the Foreign Office, Helmut Schäfer, to report to the Bundestag the official German position: "Together with our partners we stand up for maintaining the structures of a whole Yugoslavia..."¹⁶ However, it seemed that Genscher changed his policy in the recognition case when the battles in Croatia intensified.¹⁷ He indicated in August 1991 that he would be ready to alter his position if somebody tried "to change the internal borders of Yugoslavia by force". Undoubtedly, he meant the Serb paramilitary groups supported by the federal army. They occupied the Baranja in Slovenia where a majority of Croats lived, they defended the area around Knin mostly populated by Serbs. Genscher contended that the war in Slovenia ended because Germany had "threatened (the Serbs) with recognition" of the most northern republic of Yugoslavia.¹⁸

Experts on Yugoslavia in the German Foreign Ministry had worked out a memorandum on the country's conduct in the conflict already in May 1991. The authors demanded a modification of the European

¹⁶ *Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographischer Bericht*, Bonn, 19 June 1991, p. 2564.

¹⁷ See for example Heinz-Jürgen Axt who calls it "Genscher's turn" ("Wende"). p. 354.

¹⁸ Interview with Genscher, *Die Zeit*, 30 August 1991, p. 5.

Community's policy of supporting the status quo in Eastern Europe. Germany should not categorically oppose any border changes and should support the declaration of belief in Western values demonstrated by Slovenia and Croatia in contrast to authoritarian Serbia. The German experts argued that the borders in Eastern Europe were the result of arbitrary diplomatic or military dictates, and that, therefore, demands to alter them would have to be reckoned with. The independent states in northern Yugoslavia could serve as a democratic and market-orientated bridge between the European Community and the Balkans. It was simultaneously emphasised, however, that the processes of self-determination and secession should be realised gradually and slowly. The ethnic structure of the region required the development of criteria for recognition, such as respect for minority rights, internal stability and the chances of economic survival as an independent state.

In the course of the Balkan crisis, Genscher's policy increasingly reflected these recommendations. Recognition of Croatia and Slovenia became a wishful political option to be implemented as soon as the allies were convinced. A discussion among the EC Foreign Ministers in The Hague in early July 1991, brought to the surface a dispute between France and Germany on the question of whether the Community should threaten the Serbs with recognition unless they stopped fighting. This question dominated the debate between the EC countries between July and December 1991, while the EC negotiator Lord Peter Carrington pursued his ill-fated mission of negotiating countless cease-fires that proved valid only on paper.

In these months, Hans-Dietrich Genscher "became nervous after every editorial in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*", according to one foreign ministry official.¹⁹ As a skillful player in the German political arena, he always attended carefully to ensure that his small liberal party did not lose public support. Genscher did not want to fall behind in the public competition to demonstrate who could do the most for Yugoslavia. A great majority of the Bundestag encouraged the government to get the EC partners to agree to the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. On

¹⁹ *Die Zeit*, 25 June 1993, p. 5.

November 27th, Chancellor Helmut Kohl announced a peculiar timing for recognition by Germany: he promised it would be no later than Christmas, a commitment received with considerable surprise and annoyance by the EC partners and the United States.

Now the way to recognising the breakaway Yugoslav republics was well paved. The Croatian Parliament responded to the German cue by amending the national Constitution on December 4th, to adopt a new law that protected the rights of minorities. After half a year of fighting, Zagreb finally reacted to justified criticism that they were ignoring the rights of the Krajina Serbs. It was clear that it would take the Badinter Commission on minority rights several weeks to examine whether the new Croatian law met EC demands. The report itself was to be presented on 15 January 1992. But already on December 16th, Germany had the opportunity to finally pin down its partners in Brussels on the matter of recognition. The actual consequences of this decision, however, hardly ever came up in discussion, writes John Newhouse. Kohl and Genscher "needed something that would play well in the German press and the Bundestag" to make amends for having in effect given up the Deutsch mark in the Maastricht Treaty, which had clearly been an unpopular step.²⁰

Meanwhile, an understanding was reached among the EC countries that recognition would be granted no earlier than 15 January 1992, after completion of the Badinter Commission's report. To the shock of the EC partners, however, Bonn ignored this understanding, and German diplomats handed over the recognition documents in Zagreb and Ljubljana on 23 December, two days before Christmas, as promised by Helmut Kohl. The Chancellor then represented this action to his party as "a great success for German policy".²¹

But the international reaction to this "success" also turned out to be a shock for Bonn's foreign-policy makers. Stephen Kinzer of the New

²⁰ Newhouse, p. 65.

²¹ *Die Zeit*, 25 June 1993, p. 5.

York Times misquoted Kohl as saying "a great victory for German policy" which sounded ominously like German statements 50 years earlier. Critics called Germany "an unpredictable giant in our midst" and asserted that the political "dwarf" was "gone forever"; Croatia and Slovenia were labeled as "Bonn's new babies".²² The "new German assertiveness" in pushing through the recognition was first criticised by journalists and publicists; diplomats were to follow.²³ In 1993, the Dutch diplomat Henry Wynaendts who coordinated the Carrington mission reprimanded the Germans for their role in the matter.²⁴ US Secretary of State Warren Christopher spoke of a "special German responsibility" for the situation in Bosnia. Former French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas articulated explicitly the private thoughts of many Western officials: Germany's diplomatic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia fueled the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Of course, these critics were being partly hypocritical. If they had realised in 1991 that recognition would have grave consequences for Bosnia, why would they ever yield to German pressure? By agreeing to recognition, all EC member states assumed responsibility for the political consequences of their decision.

The German Foreign Ministry reacted to the international criticism by addressing an internal memorandum to all German diplomats who could be possibly called upon to comment upon their country's action. This memorandum of 10 March 1993, contended that the Serbs were intent on destroying Bosnia-Herzegovina regardless of whether or not the new state was recognised. Serb nationalism was placed at the core of the conflict. To have abandoned the small Yugoslav nations to the mercy of Serb

²² *The New York Times*, 24 December 1991, p. A3; *The Times*, 19 December 1991, p. 16; *Time*, 30 December 1991, p. 13; *Newsweek*, 6 January 1992, p. 16.

²³ Even former German Ambassadors asserted that recognition added insult to injury in the Balkan crisis: Horst Grabert, former Ambassador to Belgrade, *Die Zeit*, 2 July 1993, p. 8, and Hans Arnold, *Der Balkan-Krieg und die Vereinten Nationen*, *Europa-Archiv*, No. 2, 1993, pp. 33-40, p. 38.

²⁴ Henry Wynaendts, *L'engrenage. Chroniques yougoslaves, juillet 1991 - aout 1992*, Paris, 1993.

nationalism, continued the memorandum, would have meant the "surrender to the logic of a master race". Poorly armed with these simplistic arguments, it is highly unlikely that German diplomats were successful in defending their country's decision.

Undoubtedly, the Serbian contention that Germany was responsible for the break-up of Yugoslavia lacks historical evidence. This official misrepresentation was designed to conceal the fateful role of Serbia's President Slobodan Milosevic since 1987, probably the most important "gravedigger" of Tito's Yugoslavia. But German policy in 1991 added insult to injury. Recognition was an ill-advised approach for solving the Balkan crisis. A Croatian scholar, Zarko Puhovski, maintains that the mere act of threatening the Serbs with recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in the autumn of 1991, carried a clear signal to the Croats: "If you go on fighting bravely we are going to recognise you."²⁵ The assumption that recognition would deter the Serbs from fighting proved erroneous both in Croatia and Bosnia. The right of self-determination was granted to the Slovenes and Croats, whereas the Serbian desire of achieving independence from Zagreb in the Krajina and later from Sarajevo in Bosnia was ignored.

In 1991, the Bosnians and the Macedonians opposed the recognition of the two northern republics of Yugoslavia because they knew this would leave them with no other alternative but to declare their own independence. Especially in Bosnia this declaration could only have dreadful consequences, since the Serbs (31% of the population) resisted any formal separation from the Serbian mainland. Of course, there had been local confrontations between Muslims, Croats and Serbs before the independence campaign and subsequent recognition of Bosnia by the EC and the United States. But the expected recognition indisputably intensified the fighting of the belligerents. To recognise the break-up of Yugoslavia while trying to maintain a multinational Bosnia was highly contradictory. The fact that its recognition came on April 6th, the anniversary of the German bombing of Belgrade in 1941, was merely one

²⁵ Zarko Puhovski, Professor of Political Philosophy at the University of Zagreb, in a conversation with the author on 31 March 1994.

more example of international indifference.

In early 1992, some Western media were mistaken in asserting that Germany was taking up the number one position in European policy. One British diplomat, however, judged the situation accurately: "After recognition Genscher went quiet, and then quit."²⁶ When Genscher's successor Klaus Kinkel followed the same low profile, it turned out that Germany had no consistent Balkan policy whatsoever. Foreign policy-makers in Bonn had been succumbing to a heated public debate over the Balkan war dominated mostly by moral considerations. Hans-Peter Schwarz, a foreign-policy analyst, was correct in saying that Germany was not able to define soberly its interests but instead tried to follow primarily moral principles.²⁷ Evidently, by recognising Croatia and Slovenia, German foreign policy was not assuming more responsibility for the Balkans. It simply used this highly symbolic action to escape further commitments in the peace-keeping effort. The apparent German ambition merely disguised the actual paralysis of its foreign policy.

Notwithstanding public statements to the contrary, Germany's political options in the Balkans have been and continue to be limited owing to the minor role that the country plays in the UN peace-keeping mission in Yugoslavia. And it is precisely through this function that Western policy on the Balkans comes into effect. Germany has no vote in the UN Security Council, and it has no troops on the ground in former Yugoslavia. Its most significant military involvement are the soldiers aboard the Awacs intelligence and coordination aircraft over Bosnia. What The Times wrote in 1869 about the Prussians seems also true today: They are always in place if wise counsel is required but are missing when something is to be decided; they are brilliant on conferences but absent where there is fighting. This account perfectly fits the reality of Bonn's policy today. Germans seem to have learned well the Bismarck lesson that the Balkans are "not worth the bones of one Pomeranian grenadier".

²⁶ Quoted by Newhouse. p. 66.

²⁷ Hans-Peter Schwarz. "Außenpolitik ohne Konzept". *Rheinischer Merkur*. 1 October 1993. p. 3.

From the very beginning, the mission of German soldiers aboard Awacs aircraft drew heavy criticism from the Social Democratic opposition and the minor coalition partner FDP. The Parliamentary factions of these parties took legal action against the government arguing that the out-of-area NATO missions conflicted with the constitution and would require an amendment of the constitution to be legal. Their petitions to withdraw the soldiers, however, were rejected by the German Constitutional Court in April 1993. The court is now expected to decide whether the German constitution permits German soldiers to take part not only in "blue helmet" peace-keeping missions out-of-area, but also in peace-enforcing operations ordered by the United Nations.

Meanwhile, Germany has been asked on several occasions by the UN Secretary General and the Western allies to contribute troops to the peace-keeping forces in Bosnia.²⁸ German politicians, including Chancellor Kohl, excuse the country's self-imposed restraint in participating in military actions by pointing to the war crimes committed during the Third Reich. NATO's Secretary General and former German Defence Minister Manfred Wörner, however, has referred to that explanation as "resting on past sins".²⁹ And since German soldiers were on duty in Awacs surveillance aircraft when NATO fighter aircraft shot down Serbian planes in February 1994, a precedent was established. With each new NATO attack carried out under Awacs protection, this German policy of self-restraint progressively loses credibility.

Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel was well aware of the inherent weakness in this argument and tried to compensate by demonstrating political determination. The difference between Genscher and Kinkel is the latter's accessibility to journalists and his inclination to use blunt language. After a Serbian attack on a Muslim town in Bosnia Kinkel

²⁸ At the annual Munich conference on security in February 1993, several Western officials publicly chided Germany for refusing to commit troops to peace-keeping. See *International Herald Tribune*, 8 February 1993, p. 2.

²⁹ See *Financial Times*, 10 February 1993, p. 12, and Thomas Kielinger/Max Otte, "Germany: The Pressured Power", *Foreign Policy*, Summer 1993, pp. 44-62, p. 53.

called for "forcing Serbia to its knees",³⁰ a remark that was directed more at the German public than at the Bosnian Serbs. It was highly unlikely that the Serbs would stop fighting at the threat of a German Foreign Minister who had not one soldier on the ground.

Nevertheless, Kinkel and Chancellor Kohl did not miss the opportunity to make one Serb politician pay for their frustration in dealing with the Yugoslav crisis. When the Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panic visited Bonn in December 1992, Kohl and Kinkel made no attempt to conceal their contempt for Serbian policy. Unfortunately, they punished the only promising adversary of Serbian President Milosevic. Panic ran against him in the election campaign in December 1992 and lost — a defeat that can be attributed in part to a lack of support from Western countries.

Following the reactions of shock to German recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, German leaders took care to be in line with the policy of either the United States or France in all their statements on the Balkans. When President Bill Clinton called for a lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims, Helmut Kohl was able to reiterate the same demand in the confidence that he ran no risk in appearing to have initiated it.³¹ Significantly, this proposal was put forward by two nations with no troops on the ground in Bosnia. As with so many other Western ideas for handling the Balkan crisis, it was a call for action serving as a cover for failing to act.

The joint German-French peace initiative of November 1993 was also a reaction to public pressure, but at least it represented an effort to reach a peace settlement before the second winter of war in Bosnia. The plan, initially a German idea, proceeded from the fact that the Serbs had by that time already achieved most of their strategic aims. So Foreign Ministers Kinkel and Alain Juppé of France called upon the Bosnian Serbs to give up a certain percentage of their controlled territory and sign a cease-fire for both Bosnia and the Krajina. In return, the Europeans

³⁰ According to a report of *Deutsche Presse Agentur*, 24 May 1992.

³¹ At the EC summit meeting in Copenhagen, 21 to 22 June 1993.

pledged support for a lifting of sanctions against what remained of Yugoslavia. The idea was cleverly timed to coincide with the elections in Serbia where Slobodan Milosevic was striving to attain a majority in the Parliament after his coalition with the extreme nationalist Vojislav Seselj had broken down. He could well have needed a Western commitment to lift sanctions. But on the other side of the coin, the German-French plan did not take into account the interests of the Croats and the Muslims. Firstly, they were involved in heavy fighting and the plan provided no solution to that and, secondly, the Bosnian government troops intended to start an offensive in spring 1994 to regain some of their territory. It took a long time to convince the Croats and the Muslims, too long in fact, because Milosevic lost interest in the plan after winning the December elections.

After this failed initiative, the German Foreign Minister continued to hold talks with the leaders of the Bosnian Muslims and the Croats. Kinkel called this an "offer of good services" and tried to discourage the impression that he was mediating between the parties. Nevertheless, on January 10 and 11, he invited Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic to negotiations in Bonn. As in previous cases, however, this meeting had little effect on the ongoing war between the Muslims and the Croats in Bosnia.

Meanwhile, Western diplomatic circles were discussing a new approach to negotiating with the parties.³² The idea was based on the fact that each of the Yugoslav nations seemed to have attracted a "protector" from among the greater European or global powers. The Americans were calling for a lifting of the arms embargo against the Muslims, the Russians obstructed military measures against the Serbs and the Germans impeded sanctions against the Croats. So why should not these patrons press their respective clients to move towards a peace agreement? This strategy was pursued in the spring of 1994. Following a NATO ultimatum, the Russians could convince the Serbs to put an end to the siege of Sarajevo, the United States persuaded the Muslims to relinquish their spring offensive against the Serbs and the Croats, and the Germans

³² *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 24 February 1994.

pressed on the Croats to go to Washington in March in order to negotiate a cease-fire with the Muslims.³³ Constant American pressure finally led the Croats and the Muslims to sign a treaty on a Bosnian federation in Washington.

But despite Germany's background activities since autumn 1993, Bonn's role in Western policy towards the former Yugoslavia was clearly limited. Whenever military aspects were raised in UN or NATO discussions, German politicians and diplomats were scarcely consulted.³⁴ Since becoming silent following the shocked reaction of the international community to its recognition of the two republics, Bonn's most important role in the war has been to provide assistance to the suffering people in former Yugoslavia. German aircraft were involved in the air drops over besieged Bosnian towns, and its planes are an elementary part of the air lift to Sarajevo. As of February 1994, Bonn had paid 612 million Deutsch marks for humanitarian purposes, representing a sum larger than that donated by any other country in Europe. In Croatia, the German office for humanitarian aid has provided housing for Croatian and Muslim refugees. And Germany itself became a shelter for almost 400,000 refugees from Yugoslavia, many of whom have asked for asylum in order to remain in the country permanently. In contrast, the number of refugees accepted by other nations, such as France or Great Britain, has been negligible. It seems that Western Europe has worked out a division of labour on the Balkans: Germany has taken in and cared for the refugees; France and Britain have sent troops.

For the time being, this division of labour will persist. Germany is still unable to contribute troops to the UN peace-keeping forces unless the Constitutional Court unambiguously declares this to be in accordance with German laws. It seems that even in this case Bonn will remain cautious. Foreign Minister Kinkel has recently made clear that he does not intend to alter the "culture of restraint in foreign and security

³³ Foreign Minister Mate Granic of Croatia in an interview with the author on 31 March 1994.

³⁴ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 15 January 1994.

policy".³⁵ In spite of that, with the developing Bosnian federation between Muslims and Croats, a new field for possible German activity is emerging. The former Mayor of the city of Bremen, Hans Koschnick, has started to conduct the reconstruction of administrative and political life in Mostar, a city of Muslims and Croats and a very small Serbian minority.

Nevertheless, German Balkan policy in the near future will adhere to the basic lines followed since early 1992. Bonn's foreign policy remains highly dependent on German public opinion — a fact recognised by Genscher in 1991 as he was preparing the way to recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. Since moral considerations play a very important role in any public discussion of the Balkan war in Germany, politicians face a difficult predicament in trying to find a clear solution. On the one hand, it is popular in Germany to call for military intervention (without debating the role of German troops); on the other, the public mood may change very quickly when the first soldier is shot.

In response to public demands, German's Balkan policy in most cases has produced ad hoc measures intended to cool down the overheated debate over Bosnia. Reacting to the daily changing events, the country has barely developed a consistent strategy. To be sure, Germany is no exception in this respect, because not one of the EC countries nor the United States has developed a consistent policy for coping with the Balkan crisis. Although the German drive to recognition in 1991 may have had the appearance of assertiveness and self-assurance, it was in reality a continuation of Bonn's erratic and volatile course since the very beginning of the war. In sum, Germany's policy of ambition suffered from the same lack of orientation as has its politics of paralysis since the granting diplomatic recognition to the breakaway republics.

³⁵ *Die Zeit*, 22 April 1994, p. 5.

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**CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN THE BALKANS: ADAPTING THE
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES**

Dr. Plamen Pantev, Bulgaria

1. Introduction

Very often in the learning process we fail to see or understand something because we do not expect it. In the case of the Balkans we do not always detect positive facts and trends because we are either unprepared or unwilling to do so. This deviation

from normal perceptions may be corrected. A greater effort to study facts and developments, and their roots and causes, is needed. An additional prerequisite for policy-makers is the political will to make that effort. A major factor in the learning process and in the creation of a new political environment in the Balkans is individual, collective and state activity. The political will to direct it in a constructive, peaceful and positive manner is needed in the complex social, ethnic, religious and security interrelationships in the area. Investing talent and capital in the "Balkan Conflict Clinic" today will pay off tomorrow.

2. The Balkan Conflicts – Complex, Controversial and Not Unmanageable

The Balkans are in the throes of instability, fragmentation, and violence. Still often policies are rooted in fixation on the past, the wish to re-establish control over former subject territories, religious fundamentalism and ethnic cleansing.

Democratisation is slow, the conflicts could escalate and involve other countries seeking to extend their influence in the region, prompting the major European countries to refocus their security and foreign policies on their national interests. At the same time, the Balkan countries seek integration into and acceptance by Europe as equals, reassessment of their historical national and regional interests with the aim of securing inviolable borders, religious tolerance and respect for the rights of ethnic minorities, development in the shortest possible time of comparatively stable societies, and restraint in adjusting the balance of power, the security and political vacuum, through active nationalist policies. The balance of power relationships can be newly adjusted in the institutional framework of Europe. The Partnership for Peace Program of NATO and the other European states, the newly adopted "associate status" of nine Eastern and Central European countries with the WEU (among them Bulgaria and Romania), the stable and treaty-regulated bilateral relations with Russia are steps in that direction.

The idea that Balkan countries with similar interests are uniting in opposing groups is basically incorrect – despite some declarations on the contrary. To form alliances based on specific national interests would be politically counterproductive, disregarding the role of values in the present and future international systems. Such notions as a Slavic-Orthodox Christian coalition pitted against a Muslim coalition, or Byzantine culture at variance with Western or Islamic principles, reflect a political and diplomatic incapacity to deal with the real issues.

While these concepts may represent possible trends and dangers, they can become reality only in the absence of the proper political interest. Indifference stemming from the Balkans' lack of oil and gas, the view that the region is of no interest or concern to Europe either now or in the long term, will invite the formation of local alignments and coalitions. It is difficult to say what form they may take. It will depend on the general configuration of present and potential conflicts, their level of intensity, their involvement of others, and the individual states' formulation of their direct interests and purposes in response to domestic and international pressure. Such alliances will be dependent on their access to high-technology weapons of mass destruction, their sources of supply, their military-technological know-how, their strategic resources, and so on.

This is really an area of practical preventive activity of the EU, NATO, WEU, UN, CSCE and the ad hoc alliance of the big European and world powers that may work. The Balkan countries should not miss the present crisis to issue the signals of the internal, regional need of a basic change in both the image and the future of the peninsula, its transformation into a normal, developed and compatible European region, a perspective in the short to medium term part of the enlarging EU, WEU and NATO, a stable and peaceful neighbour of Russia and the CIS.

In the light of the development of the Balkan conflicts to date, it is by no means improbable that they could escalate into a general Balkan war. The flashpoint could

be Kosovo and/or the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRM), where so many opposing interests are at stake. The participation of Turkey, a Balkan country, in the UN peacekeeping operations intensifies the risk. The probability of widespread conflict is heightened by such factors as continuing reluctance of the opposing sides to discuss and regulate their interests (Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo), provocative behaviour by the representatives of one of the parties (extremist Albanians in FYRM), inflammatory religious fanaticism (Muslim fundamentalists), publicly expressed views by significant factors outside the region that "the uncivilised Balkans" were doomed to disintegrate, and the inadequacy of the military measures, which does not necessarily imply offensive operations, but decisive moves aimed at deterrence and systematic extinguishing of the fire of the war. The flight of refugees and of armed groups into neighbouring states could eventually involve them in hostilities. It is difficult to predict which states may be the next in this chain reaction.

Besides Kosovo and FYRM, another potential originator of a general Balkan war, as perceived by a small country, is Turkey, although direct military aggression is not to be expected in the short or medium terms. Turkey's perception of itself as a regional superpower and its pursuit of Turkish economic interests from the Adriatic Sea to China or at least – to the Trans-Caucasus, fuel the ambitions of Pan-Turkish strategists and underlie the activities of the ministry, responsible for the 'outer Turks', which is conducting a low-profile, long-term strategy of establishing a Turkish consciousness amongst the Muslim populations of other countries, including after the electoral success of the Islamic fundamentalists. Turkey's armed forces are perceived as a latent threat and as a weight to the Turkish nationalist feelings fostered in other states such as Bulgaria, Cyprus, Greece, FYRM and Serbia. The next step might be agitation for autonomy, either administrative or territorial. That could be followed by Turkish demands for a more substantial presence in Europe. It is hard to predict the reactions of Western Europe, which in the past made no

made no attempt to protect the Balkan peoples from Turkish expansionism. It is easier to predict the reactions of the nations endangered by this mixture of economic, military, ethnic and diplomatic pressure: internal conflicts stemming from opposition to all such extremist Turkish claims.

A third scenario for escalation may begin with a large-scale UN or NATO military operation, causing casualties, inadvertently or not, in neighbouring countries and thus drawing them into the conflict.

Predictions concerning such complicated and interrelated conflicts as those in the Balkans can relate only to the immediate future. The real parameters for the development of these conflicts being subject to constant dynamic change, they provide insufficient information for looking any further ahead. The Bosnian and other Balkan conflicts are not likely to lead to more widespread hostilities in the short term. Given the nuclear plants and huge chemical production installations in the Balkan countries, their leaderships are sane enough to foresee the tragic outcome of such a war. The instruments of preventive diplomacy are still potent enough to deal with the conflicts in the region.

The warring parties are perceptibly fatigued, and there is mounting internal pressure to end the fighting and to engage seriously in peace talks. Economic needs can only be met in peaceful conditions. An important factor is that in geographical, geo-economic, geopolitical and geocultural terms, the Balkans constitute the shortest link between Europe and the Middle East. Destabilisation may have a direct damaging effect on Central and Western Europe as well. Experience in coping with destructive local nationalist aspirations in the region may be of benefit in dealing with similar trends in Western Europe. Containing the conflict must not be an end in itself, but a step towards bringing it to an end. EU, WEU and NATO, Russia and the United States are concerned to promote stability in the region. The total

destabilisation of this area serves the national interests of neither of these powers and of the constituent states of the latter organisations.

3. Stimulating Factors of Balkan Cooperation

The need for a therapeutic approach to the Balkan conflicts is obvious. Here are some of the important prerequisites and stimulating factors of an intensified Balkan cooperation in that direction:

a. A new philosophy of policy-making

In considering the national interests of the individual Balkan countries the geopolitical approach of redrawing the map should make way to an approach of geo-economics and human values. That implies overcoming historical differences and taking account of the interests of neighbouring countries and of the region as a whole. Emphasis must be placed on individual and regional efforts to arrive at a peaceful regulation of the situation, and on the need to observe the principles of the inviolability of national borders and respect of the individual rights of the ethnic minorities.

Next, national skepticism, historical memories and dreams of a more extended 'motherland' – all very likely ingredients of destructive nationalism – must be replaced by healthier, more realistic goals such as economic development and adaptation to the demands of a world economy.

The ethnic minority issue may never be fully solved to the satisfaction of all interested parties, but it could at least be dealt with in a more civilised, humane fashion. Ethnic cleansing, organisation of society on the basis of ethnic differences, is a violation of all international principles. Stressing the differences in the Balkans has precipitated many of the troubles now afflicting the region. The establishment of

ethnic political parties, whose primary aim is to transform a given ethnic minority into the dominant nationality of a particular country, has already produced the ethnic cleansing policy. Deliberately widening the cultural, linguistic and religious differences between ethnic groups, their purpose is to demonstrate to the world that their claim is a valid one.

The Greek professor of international relations, Theodore Couloumbis, proposes a sound rule of behaviour for the ethnically volatile Balkans: "Treat minority communities and other dual identity groups residing in your own country as well as you expect third countries to treat minorities and other dual identity groups that are ethnically related to you"¹.

The different religions must obey the laws and rules of secular states and societies, and curb all fundamentalist tendencies. Religious groups and their institutions can play a constructive part in fostering harmonious relations between ethnic minorities and the dominant nationality. A dialogue between Orthodox Christian and Muslim leaders in the Balkans should be initiated without delay.

The role of military power, while diminishing in international relations, is becoming a major factor in the Balkans. This trend must be reversed. Massive military intervention or larger-scale operations could precipitate a general Balkan war and create new militant, 'enemy oriented' attitudes. All variants of a military build-up – quantitative or qualitative, should be renounced. This also applies in respect of the ambitions behind military power. The details of the individual PFP Programs with NATO of Albania, Bulgaria and Romania, and of the "associate status" with the WEU of Bulgaria and Romania, together with the NATO (Greece and Turkey) members and WEU (Greece as a member and Turkey – as an observer) participants in the Balkans must be utilized in that direction too. Ending the war and preventing it from spreading further are the first priorities.

Lastly, respect for international law goes further than the principle of self-determination laid down in the UN Charter, which is endowed with meaning only in combination with such other principles of international law as respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and human rights.

b. Rapprochement and reconciliation

Local conflicts of all kinds need to be approached with a constructive concept designed to deal with historical stereotypes and syndromes, and psychological traumas. The problem of reconciliation is of particular importance in all Balkan countries today. The structure and substance of rapprochement plans must be tailored to the needs of the individual countries concerned, with the ultimate aim of eliminating the 'yoke' syndrome and the 'ethnic minority fifth-column' syndrome, and smoothing the way for constructive working relationships in a favourable political and psychological environment. The way Turkey – the former oppressor of the Balkan peoples, would play its role has a crucial meaning for the reconciliation and rapprochement policies in the whole area.

c. A 'security community'² in the Balkans

This may become a decisive regional arrangement in the context of a European security system evolved to overcome the Balkan conflicts and control their sources. It implies the active cooperation of the EU, WEU, NATO, CSCE and UN. The wars in the former Yugoslavia will be followed by either a more widespread Balkan war or a process of normalisation and peace-building. The security community will be based on a community of values, not on local alliances and axes or a status of neutrality. It will be strengthened by links with the interlocking security institutions UN, CSCE, NATO, EU, WEU, CE. Its specific purpose will be to make the use of force to settle disputes between Balkan states unthinkable. The security community concept should provide the various actors in the Balkan conflicts with an acceptable, practicable political program as a common denominator of political behaviour.

Supporting the reintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) into the international community would be a promising start.

d. Consolidation of societies, human rights and democratic institutions in the Balkan countries, and adapting their economies to the challenges of economic globalisation

The disparities inherent in the different starting positions and rates of transformation in post-totalitarian Balkan societies can be modified by effort, international understanding and support. Efficiently managed economies and internal stability are prerequisites for coping with the wide range of Balkan conflicts. The countries concerned can improve their economic situation by courageous inter-Balkan projects, such as the Black Sea economic cooperation, economic outlets on the Aegean Sea for Bulgaria, FYRM and Serbia as a logical step in the extension of the Danube-Aegean transport corridor, revival and extension of the east-west transport line, linking Turkey, Bulgaria, FYRM, Albania and Italy, which could stretch to Russia, Ukraine, Romania and Greece, including the oil pipe-line extension from Russia to Bulgaria and Greece.

e. Renewed leadership meeting the present-day needs of Europe and the Balkans

Solving the leadership problem of the Balkan countries, that would lead to conceiving of the regional interests as an element of the national security ones, to finding the formula of the compatibility of the national, regional and the evolving common European interests remains an important national task. It may either accelerate or slow down the developing processes in the Balkans during this period of history.

It is on the background of these factors of cooperation that the national security strategies of the individual Balkan countries should consider and take into account the need to formulate the priorities of the national, regional and common European

interests. The very formulation of the latter is a problem of a much broader range of countries in the Euro-Atlantic region.

3. Adapting the National Security Strategy: the Bulgarian Case³

The adaptation of the country to the structural transformations of the international system might be carried through four possible security strategies and their combinations.

First, **the strategy of national self-assertion**, of proving our national significance.

Second, **the strategy of interdependence**. It is supposed to compensate the economic and international limitations of the first one. An important aspect of the second strategy is the fixation of alliance relationship and placing into the framework of a broader security strategy.

Third, **the strategy of integration**. It would mean a qualitative change in the very mechanism of decision-making and transfer of the location of the sovereign power out of the national borders.

Fourth, **the strategy of flexible change of the strategic direction of activity**. It requires a sound balance of the costs and the profits. It is difficult to implement it by a country in the periphery of the world economy. As far as it would have a meaning for Bulgaria some time in the future, it is not discussed in the next paragraphs.

A useful combination of the first and the second strategy, developing the prerequisites of the full realization of the third one, is **the strategy of building-up a "security community" in the Balkans**.

a. Strategy of national self-assertion

It must have nothing in common with the traditional local Balkan destructive and aggressive nationalist concepts of greatness at the expense of neighbouring peoples and countries. This strategy can hardly demand an all-encompassing national sovereignty without realizing the need to give-up voluntarily some of its elements in the environment of a globalizing economy.

A full display and realization of those aspects of the national spiritual, cultural and historic heritage is needed, that bring the country close together with the long-lasting human values, respected in the world, Europe and the Balkans. A special attention is needed for the national human factor – the most stable and, probably – the staunchest support of the national specificity in a denationalizing world economy. Modern Bulgarian patriotism should seek its maximum realization on a spiritual, intellectual, creative and cultural basis.

b. Strategy of fixing the allies and operationalization of security interdependence

The question of the ally in the present post-Cold War world is not an easy one. Economic interests, national, cultural and historic peculiarities rather than certain structural predetermination are the factors, forming the new alignments and alliances. The alliances in their traditional Cold War sense are in a crisis and outdated.

Military alliance with one of the big centers of power – USA, EU or Russia, is an unrealistic strategy. Acquiring sufficient national military and economic potential as an alternative strategy is an unrealistic one in the short and the long term perspective too.

The same holds true about building a military alliance of several neighbouring small states for collective defense.

There is only one opportunity left for Bulgaria and for other non-aligned small countries to build-up material military guarantees – constructing through cooperation of a collective security system in the Euro-Atlantic region. The practical institutional formula would be dictated by CSCE, EU, WEU and NATO. The ideas of the Paris Charter for a New Europe (1990) should be the dominant ones.

c. Strategy of integration

The regional economic integration in the EU appeared to be highly wished and accessible, though without immediate results, security strategy. Despite of the erosion of the national sovereignty, the domestic economic hardships due to restructuring and agrarian problems, the tempting perspectives of a lasting economic stability, access to a broad market, equal participation in decision-making, and finally – integrating in the security system of the EU with the consequences of getting reliable military guarantees, strongly motivates the Central and Eastern European countries to follow the strategy of integration. Bulgaria has formally declared through its "Europe Agreement" with the EU, that the strategy of integration is the official and long-term security strategy of the country. It has been added with the signing of the bilateral Partnership for Peace Program with NATO and with the "associate status", granted to the country by WEU. All they show Bulgaria's effort to overcome its peripheral economic position and the danger of a total marginalization in international relations and the security policy.

d. Strategy of building-up "security community" in the Balkans

The concept of building-up a security community in the Balkans was already treated as an important factor of cooperation in the Balkan region.

Using the whole positive historic and political potential of bilateral and multilateral Balkan relations, intensification of economic cooperation, a gradual process of integration of the Balkan countries in the EU will stimulate the establishment of a

new community of relationships. The regional integration in the EU would be stimulated by the creation of a Balkan security community.

A special role in the creative process of constructing the "security community" in the region are expected to play the two medium-sized Balkan nations: Romania, to the North, and Turkey – to the South-East. Both of them, as peripheral participants in the process, which does not mean distant or isolated participants, are expected to be significant generators of stability and important factors in the practical process of constructing the Balkan security community. Active part in building the core of the security community relationships are expected to play all the countries in the region.

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The vacuum of knowledge and the political dilemma in which analysts and politicians at times find themselves in regard to the Balkans can be eliminated by a consistently peaceful, constructive approach. This is of particular importance at the present moment, for despite the prevailing entropy, the region is closer to finding a lasting stability than at any similarly 'open' period in the history. It is essential, however, that politicians, statesmen and intellectuals act now.

NOTES:

1. Theodore A. Couloumbis, "Greece and the European Challenge in the Balkans", in the *Southeastern European Yearbook 1991*, p. 85.
2. See Joseph S. Nye, *Peace in Parts. Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization*, Boston, Little Brown, 1971; John Roper, "Security Community" Between Concept and Reality, in *Revue Roumaine d'Etudes Internationales*, XXV, 5-6 (115-116) 1991, pp. 315-316; Jonathan Eyal, "Managing the Balkans", in *Defence Yearbook 1992*, RUSI and Brassey's, London, 1992, pp. 88-89; Plamen Pantev, "Security Community" in the Balkans: Prerequisites, Factors, Contents, the Role of Bulgaria, IIR Research Paper, Sofia, 1993.
3. Some of the suggestions in this paragraph are considered appropriate for application by any Balkan country, passing the criteria of a "small state". An effective compatibility of the national security strategies of these countries may successfully promote the security in the region and in the broader Euro-Atlantic area.

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Conflict Management Versus Conflict Solution: the Case of Yugoslavia

States use mediation as a foreign policy instrument. Their intervention as mediators is legitimized by the goal of conflict reduction, which they typically proclaim. The desire to make peace, however, is intertwined with other motives best described within the context of power politics ... Mediators are seldom indifferent to the terms being negotiated. Even when they seek peace, they try to avoid terms not in accord with their own interests, which usually allow a wider range of acceptable outcomes than the immediate interests of the parties.¹

Disintegration of the Yugoslav federation in the brutal inter-ethnic conflict and failure of international mediation 1991-94 opened one of the most complex international crises in Europe after the end of bipolarism. And while the international public became shocked by ethnic violence, policy-makers kept busy with complex geopolitical consequences of civil war, which threatened to spill over the borders of ex-Yugoslavia and enflame the entire European southeast. Although the Yugoslav crisis became internationalized ever since the first hostilities broke out in June 1991 and despite the fact that all important factors in Europe (CSCE, EU, WEU, NATO, UN, etc.) have been involved in its solution, international mediation failed in yielding the expected results. Quite the contrary, mechanisms for conflict prevention and solution developed during the Cold War proved largely inadequate in the case of the Yugoslav crisis.

Those were some of the reasons why this crisis, according to prevailing opinions, became a threat to international security stipulated in Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. This opinion is often supported by the following three arguments: *first*, threat of conflict spilling across the international borders of the former Yugoslavia, making it at least a Balkan, if not a European war; *second*, according to the "domino theory" war in the former Yugoslavia could become a precedent for similar conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe, above all in the territory of the former Soviet Union; *third*, this armed conflict endangers the basis of the international security system, because in the conditions of increased instability in the world after the end of bipolarism any local conflict in the world (in Europe in particular) poses a threat to international order. Therefore, various international actors in the 1991-94 period made repeated attempts at mediation and arbitration, which could be classified into the following five phases:

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¹ I. William Zartmann and Saadia Touval, *Mediation: The Role of Third-party Diplomacy and Informal Peacemaking*, in: *Resolving Third World Conflict: Challenges for a New Era*, United States Institute for Peace, Washington, D.C. 1992, Quoted after: Special Features Service 110, USIS, pp. 2-3.

- In the first, which preceded the outbreak of armed conflicts, many international factors (EC, CSCE, USA, etc.) tried with preemptive diplomacy to quiet the inter-republican conflicts in Yugoslavia, preserve the country's integrity and prevent the escalation of the crisis. Characteristic for this stage was that attempts to mediation have been sporadic, without adequate instruments and without broader coordination of the leading international actors.²
- The second stage started with the war in Slovenia in June 1991 and ended with failure of the Lisbon Conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina (*Cutillero's plan*) in March 1992. Although the EC led the international mediation in this phase, in December 1991 the US and the UN obtained a more active role. Their efforts contributed to stopping of war in Croatia (*Cyrus Vance's plan*). The international mediation in the conflict in this phase was mainly carried out within The Hague/Brussels and Lisbon conference under the EC auspices.
- The third stage started with active entry of the US into the Yugoslav scene in March/April 1992 and ended in April 1993 in failure of the American diplomacy to convince its West European allies into the need of NATO air strikes on Bosnian Serb positions after they refused the *Vance-Owen plan*. In this phase all international peace initiatives have been placed within the UN and Geneva peace conference framework.
- In the fourth phase the European Community (now already the European Union) played again the leading role. On the basis of *Kinkel-Juppe's initiative* and *Luxembourg Plan* it tried to end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This attempt fell through in December 1993 after Bosnian Muslims refused to endorse the *Owen-Stoltenberg plan* at the international peace conference in Geneva.
- The fifth phase started in February 1994 with NATO military involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Russia's diplomatic engagement in the solution of the Yugoslav crisis. Efforts of all three relevant international factors—USA, Russia and European Union (represented by the United Kingdom, France and Germany)—united in the so-called *Contact Group* which at the end of April assumed the coordination of international mediation and arbitration in the territory of ex-Yugoslavia.

Why Yugoslavia Fell Apart?

Similar to most multiethnic states in Europe, the Yugoslav federation relied on double consensus: *first*, on the consensus of ethnic groups which made it and which on two occasions—in 1918 and 1945—decided to live in the common state and, *second*, on international consensus, i.e. on the consensus of winners in the First and Second World War, which supported the creation of the Yugoslav state within the framework of the international order as defined in the Versailles and in Yalta. That is why it is wrong to support the thesis that “like most creations after World War One Yugoslavia was a dysfunctional hybrid”³ since this state reflected the realities in the Balkans and the Europe area and, with the exception of 1941–45 period, during 73 years relatively successfully managed the complex ethnic and political balance in the Balkans. This conclusion is also suggested by the fact that disintegration of this state

² By the end of 1990 CIA warned that civil war is imminent in Yugoslavia, but that assesment was based on the wrong assumption that war will break out in Kosovo, and not in Slovenia.

³ John Newhouse, *The Diplomatic Round*, The New Yorker, New York, August 24, 1992, o. 61.

in both cases—in 1941 and 1991—caused bloody inter-ethnic conflicts and deep geopolitical disturbances on the southeast of the continent.

The common state of South Slavs—Yugoslavia⁴—was created December 1, 1918 as the result of the political will of three south Slavic ethnic communities—Serbs, Croats and Slovenes—to implement their right to self-determination through this state and protect themselves from irredentist aspirations of the neighbors after the breakup of the Habsburg monarchy. Although the propaganda of secessionist republics even before 1991 tried to designate Yugoslavia as the “artificial state”, “the fruit of Serbian imperialism” and even as the “diplomatic mistake of the Allies in World War I”⁵, its creation came as the result of freely expressed will and national interests of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. The movement for unification of South Slavs emerged in the early 19th century in Croatia under the influence of liberal ideas of the French Revolution, brought to the European southeast by the Napoleon’s conquests in Dalmatia. In ethnically mixed and politically traditionally unstable area of the Balkans, the common state was the best alternative to the creation of nation states, since the two biggest south Slavic groups, Serbs and Croats, gathered most of their members within the borders of the new state, while the third, Slovenians, only within this state could exercise their right to self-determination at that time.

Although the *Yugoslav project* rested on European liberal and ecumenical ideas on which this multiethnic and multiconfessional community could only be based, unitary organization of the *first Yugoslavia* and profound economic, cultural and political differences among south Slavic nations⁶ destabilized the new state from its early days. While many Serbs considered Yugoslavia as extended Serbia, Croats often saw it as only a worse replica of the Habsburg monarchy and, at best, the transient stage toward creation of the Croatian national state. These differences, often encouraged from abroad, have been the cause of permanent political conflicts in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia which contributed to its rapid collapse before the Nazi attack in 1941 and brutal inter-ethnic conflicts during World War II.⁷ Although the communist victory in 1945 rendered possible the integration of Yugoslavia, by adopting the soviet model of the so-called *facade federalism*⁸ it rather suppressed than redressed the consequences of ethnic violence and *genocide* during World War II. And though the communist tried to decentralize the federation during the 1960’s and 1970’s, this could not lead to success without democratic transformation of the Yugoslav society. Instead, the *bureaucratic decentralization* only deepened the rivalry among the republican communist

⁴ The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes until 1929.

⁵ On this point see: Cristopher Cviic, *Remaking the Balkans*, Pinter for RIIA, London 1991.

⁶ Slovenes and Croats are Catholics who until the end of World War I lived in the Habsburg monarchy and naturally have been oriented to Central European area, while Orthodox Serbs, who lived under the rule of the Ottoman Empire from the 15th to the beginning of the 19th century, when they formed their own national state.

⁷ During World War II in Yugoslavia more people have been killed in the *civil war* than by the occupying forces. According to Lord Owen, for Western allies at that time “the crucial issue was how to encourage Yugoslavs to use their energy against the Hitler’s and Mussolini’s forces rather than for mutual killing”. *The 1993 Churchill Lecture Delivered by the Rt. Hon. Lord Owen on 25 November 1993 (mimeo)*, Guildhall, London 1993, p. 11.

⁸ Characteristic for this model is that in spite of formal decentralization, the power is concentrated in the hands of the communist party. On this point see: Vojislav Stanovčić, *Federalism and Pluralism in a Democratic Society*, in: P. Simić et al. (eds.), *American and Yugoslav Views on the 1990’s*, IJPE, Beograd 1990.

nomenclatures, which after the failure of liberal and market-oriented reforms in Yugoslavia in late 1960's increasingly turned to nationalism as the foothold of their power. In short, the rule of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was the only integrating factor of the *second Yugoslavia*, so that its breakup during the 1980's released all unsettled ethnic conflicts, which escalated into an open civil war in June 1991.

On the international scene, creation of the *first* and *second* Yugoslavia was possible due to the policy of winners in two world wars. American ideas on the right of peoples to self-determination, contained in President Woodrow Wilson's *14 points* also worked in favor of the creation of Yugoslavia. However, in the geopolitics of the Entente, the new state became a part of the *cordon sanitaire* in Central and Eastern Europe, i.e., chain of newly established states whose task was to prevent the expansion of the October Revolution toward the West, thwart German revanchism and restrain *balkanization* on the southeast of the continent. The *second Yugoslavia* was cast a similar role, becoming a *strategic buffer* between the East and the West after its breakup with Stalin in 1948. Owing to skillful maneuvering between the two blocs, during the Cold War it was the balancing factor in the Balkans and in Europe. The end of communism and bipolarism in Europe have fundamentally changed the internal and international framework which made Yugoslavia's existence possible and opened new options to the Yugoslav peoples. Two western republics, Slovenia and Croatia, discovered in these new circumstances the chance for creation of independent national states and association with Central European group of states (above all Germany and Austria), with whom they share common historic and cultural heritage and with whom they cooperated since 1978 within the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft Alpen-Adria*. Their leaving of federation, however, disturbed the ethnic balance, forcing the two republics which the common state probably suited the best, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, to follow suit. These changes endangered the remaining two republics, Serbia and Montenegro, and again raised the *Serbian national issue*, since approximately one third of Serbs used to live in the territory of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Victory of the militant-nationalist movements and parties on the first free elections in the Yugoslav republics after World War II and breakup of the federal state have deepened political differences and made ethnic conflict inevitable. The outbreak of hostilities in Slovenia and soon afterwards in Croatia started a chain reaction of demands for self-determination and brought former Yugoslavia into the situation of political anarchy in which numerous actors tried to achieve their extreme demands by force of arms. Entangled in endless conflicts among the republican communist *nomenclatures*, during the 1980's Yugoslavia fell increasingly behind the democratization processes on the European east, which in turn weakened its international position.⁹ This further disturbed the balance between the federation and republics and violated international consensus on Yugoslavia, offering the chance to secessionist movements to launch a thesis that getting out of Yugoslavia is instrumental for democratization of its republics. In such circumstances, the Yugoslav federation could only be preserved from outside, i.e. through preemptive diplomacy of the international community, which was interested in

⁹ "With ending of the cold war and reduction of interbloc confrontation in the second half of the eighties, Yugoslavia has lost its key role in the West's strategic thinking. The country was no longer the element of balance between the East and the West that no one could renounce. To the extent that reform processes in former Moscow's satellite states attracted attention on the West, the interest for Yugoslavia was gradually diminishing. Yugoslavia was no longer the problem of global importance for the two super-powers, but at best a European issue at the continent's periphery. The important factor was the pace of reforms on the East. What lasted nine months in Poland took only nine weeks in GDR and only nine days in Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia lagged enormously behind this process of democratic transformations." Jens Reuter, *Yugoslavia's Role in Changing Europe* in: D. Muller et al. (eds.), *Veränderungen in Europa - Vereinigung Deutschlands - Perspektiven der 90er Jahre*, Institut für Internationale politik und Wirtschaft, Belgrad 1991, pp. 115-116.

preventing its disintegration and start the process of democratic transformation and peaceful integration of Yugoslavia into the new European structures, which was the only way to the solution of ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia. However, international mediation and arbitration in the Yugoslav crisis faced numerous problems from the very beginning, which affected their outcome.

"The Hour of Europe"

The Yugoslav crisis broke out in a delicate moment in Europe, when the collapse of bipolarism faced all international institutions on the continent developed during the Cold War with need for redefinition of their role. That was one of the reasons why almost none among them was ready to face the new security threats and international crises. Disintegration of the WTO and Soviet Union and unification of Germany created a new situation in which the attention of the international community focused on changes in Central Europe and former USSR, while Yugoslavia lost its former importance of a *strategic buffer* and was pushed to the sidelines of European events. In such circumstances, the Yugoslav crisis did not enjoy priority in the strategic deliberations of the USA, which at first took the stand that the conflict is "a problem in the European backyard" and as such should be left to Europe.¹⁰ Thomas Pickering, then US Ambassador to the UN, stated bluntly that the UN had no role in Yugoslavia unless other international organizations failed.¹¹ Since the CSCE soon reached the limits of its influence in the Yugoslav crisis¹², the leading role in international mediating efforts was relinquished to the European Union, whose *good office* all sides in ex-Yugoslavia accepted by mid-1991.

As for the EC, at that time it had strong reasons to mediate in this conflict: the war in Yugoslavia threatened to destabilize the entire Southeastern Europe, two EC members—Italy and Greece—bordered with Yugoslavia, the other two neighbors—Austria and Hungary—were strong candidates for EC membership, while all former East European countries saw the EC as the pole of stability and prosperity in the continent, which was expected to assume the leading role in the development of a new system of international relations in the continent. Last, but not least, after its failure in providing unified participation in the Gulf War, the Community had to try to repair its image in the first major armed conflict in Europe after more than four decades. However, this role caught the Community amidst the preparations for the Maastricht conference, i.e. in a sensitive time of transformation from a primarily economic community toward a political union. This could explain the belated reaction of the Community to the American warnings that Yugoslavia is at the brink of civil war¹³ and initial underestimation of the complexity of crisis.¹⁴ Despite its desire to assert itself as the leading political factor on the

¹⁰ See: John Newhouse, *The Diplomatic Round*, *ibid*.

¹¹ See: *Washington Post*, July 4, 1991.

¹² On this point, see: Eric Remacle, *CSCE and Conflict Prevention: The Yugoslav Case*, paper presented at the Second European Peace Research Conference, Budapest, November 12-14, 1993 (mimeo).

¹³ "It is in many ways surprising that the EC stood idle as the crisis in Yugoslavia deepened. It took a strong, behind-the-scene US intervention early in 1991 before the EC was fully alerted to what was happening in the country ... Already in November 1990, the CIA had leaked to the press a report predicting war in Yugoslavia within eighteen months." John Zametica, *The European Community and the Yugoslav Crisis*, in: Hans Binnendijk & Marry Locke, *The Diplomatic Record 1991-1992*, Westview Press, Boulder-San Francisco-Oxford 1993, p. 56.

¹⁴ Former Italian foreign minister Gianni de Michelis was one of the rare EC officials who by the end of 1980's envisaged the possibility of the country's disintegration and proposed that signing of the so-called *Third Financial Protocol* with Yugoslavia be made conditional on holding of the federal multiparty elections, which

continent in connection with this conflict, at this time it practically did not have appropriate instruments for crisis prevention and crisis management, so that early mediating efforts did not go beyond generous offers of financial assistance in an attempt to preserve the Yugoslav federation.

In the EC Declaration on Yugoslavia of March 26, 1991 the following stands: "In view of the Twelve, a united and democratic Yugoslavia stands the best chance to integrate itself harmoniously in the new Europe", while in the Statement on Yugoslavia dated May 8, 1991 the following is underscored: "... only dialogue between all the parties concerned will provide a lasting solution to the present grave crisis and ensure a future for a democratic and united Yugoslavia".¹⁵ At that time, however, an opposite thesis also emerged, according to which preservation of the Yugoslav federation is impossible, while the Yugoslav republics must be treated as separate entities which would enter into relationship with the Community step-by-step. According to this opinion, only the most developed and ethnically homogeneous Yugoslav republic—Slovenia—at that time fulfilled conditions for association with the Community, which could sign an agreement on association with the Community together with the countries of the so-called *Visegrad group* (Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary), while other Yugoslav republics could get such an opportunity with the last group of European countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia and Baltic republics), which would become candidates for association with the EC only in the next century.¹⁶ Although all these proposals reflected then-time deliberations within the Community on the possibilities for integration of the former East European countries into the EC, they at the same time encouraged a *go-it-alone* approach in Slovenia and hard-liner positions in other republics, disturbing the ethnic balance in the country.

When constitutional crisis broke out in Yugoslavia in May 1991 because Serbia refused to endorse the appointment of the Croat Stipe Mesić to the position of the president of the collective federal presidency¹⁷, the Community sent to Yugoslavia Jacques Delors and Jacques Santer, who formulated the EC policy in four points: a) ending of the constitutional crisis with Mesić's election; b) peaceful solution to other conflicts; c) support to market reforms of the federal government, and d) improvement of human rights condition. The main Western actors—EC and US—have been already trapped by two contradictory principles of international relations in Europe: principle on inviolability of borders (3rd principle of the Helsinki Act) and principle on the right of peoples to self-determination (8th principle of the Helsinki Act). Positions of the Twelve soon polarized around these two principles, since for the Central European group of countries, above all for Germany which just united owing to the recognition of the right of peoples to self-determination, this principle has been priority, while for most other European countries, aware that peaceful "dissociation" of the Yugoslav federation is not possible, preservation of Yugoslavia was instrumental for safeguarding peace on the continent.

Advocates of the Slovenian "real-politik" first realized and took advantage of the contradictory positions of the Twelve, defining a clear strategy based on the following assess-

would probably strengthen the federal government's position and thwarted secessionist movements in Slovenia and Croatia. However, Ante Marković's federal government refused this demand.

¹⁵ Quoted after: Review of International Affairs, Belgrade, No. 995-7/1991, p. 19.

¹⁶ See: Wolfgang Wessels, *Deepening Versus Widening? Debate on the Shape of the EC-Europe in the Nineties*, in: W. Wessels & C. Engels (eds.), *The European Union in the 1990s - Ever Closer and Larger?*, Europa Union Verlag, Bonn 1993, pp. 17-56.

¹⁷ The reason was Mesić's statement that he intended to be "the last president of Yugoslavia", i.e. that he would use his position to support secessionist tendencies in Croatia.

ments. *First*, Slovenia was militarily prepared for armed conflict, since it disposed of considerable stocks of armament and trained police forces and territorial defense.¹⁸ *Second*, proclamation of Slovenia's independence rushed secession of Croatia and Serbian-Croatian conflict, moving the focus of the war away from Slovenia. *Third*, ability of Slovenia to resist the intervention of the federal army and perspective of the Serbian-Croatian conflict made interests of Ljubljana and Belgrade complementary. *Fourth*, Slovenia could count on the EC impatience on the eve of Maastricht, as it was in a hurry to attain visible results in the control of this conflict, as well as influential circles in the *Arbeitsgemeinschaft Alpen-Adria* (above all in Bayern, Austria and northern Italy). *Fifth*, these moves enabled Slovenia to assume a "principled" position toward the conflict in Croatia and rest of Yugoslavia, thus consolidating its international position and at the same time avoiding any commitment toward Croatia and other secessionist republics.

These were the reasons why contrary to the forecasts of Western intelligence services, the conflict first broke out in Slovenia rather than, as anticipated, in Kosovo or Croatia, where ethnic tensions have been much greater. However, this may explain mass violence in the Yugoslav conflict. *Above all*, until hostilities broke out in June 1991, none of the Yugoslav republics have reached consensus about the future of the Yugoslav community¹⁹ and it was unlikely that political agreement could be reached on division of the federation. *Second*, resistance of the international community had to be anticipated, because though precedent has been made in the implementation of the principle of self-determination by unification of Germany, it was carried out peacefully and in accordance with the principle on inviolability of borders, which is something Slovenia and Croatia could not count on because of the resistance by other republics. Although these two republics could count on support from Austria and Germany, position of the EC and the US could change only in the case of "aggression" against Slovenia and Croatia. In order to convince the public that living together is no longer possible, i.e. that "the old Yugoslavia became worn-out", that the "Yugoslav idea is dead" and that different opinions reflect "ignorance of the matter" and "lead the international community into tragic mistakes", it was necessary to get in conflict with the last federal institution capable of stopping secession—the federal army. Therefore, it has been systematically provoked with anti-army demonstrations, harassment of officers and their families, spreading rumors about "upcoming military coup", siege of barracks, etc.²⁰

The EC reacted to the first armed conflicts in Slovenia by sending a ministerial Troika (Gianni de Michelis, Jacques Poos and Hans van den Broek) with a task to convince Yugoslavs to accept the so-called "Luxembourg formula" (cease-fire and return of troops to barracks,

¹⁸ On this point, see: Anton Bebler, *The Yugoslav War of 1991-1992*, paper presented at the meeting of the Bertelsman Foundation Working Group on Central and Eastern Europe, Gütersloh 1993 (mimeo).

¹⁹ Despite pressures of the new nationalist elites, the Yugoslav option has not been completely rejected in any referendum held in the Yugoslav republics during 1990 and 1991. In spring 1991 the Croatian public has been divided between Yugoslavia and independent Croatia, and only destruction of Vukovar and siege of Dubrovnik by the federal army in the fall of the same year homogenized Croats around the policy of the ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). It is interesting that public in Serbia is still divided over national goals (28.8% are for restoration of Yugoslavia, 27.4% for "Alliance of Serbian States", while the rest are undecided).

²⁰ The initiative in this sense has been pioneered by Slovenia, although similar moves have been recorded in Croatia (attacks on the marine headquarters in Split, illegal import and distribution of arms to HDZ members, etc.). Predictions of secessionist republics about the conduct of YPA "army without a state" at the time of the crisis proved to be true.

three-month suspension of the Slovenian and Croatian declaration of independence and restoration of the federal presidency). Agreement of parties in conflict with this plan caused short-lived exuberance in Brussels which Jacques Poos commented with: "This is the hour of Europe". Only 48 hours later hostilities were renewed prompting the Community at the ministerial meeting in the Hague (July 5) to suspend economic assistance and introduce embargo on arms deliveries to Yugoslavia. Only during the next mission of the Troika to Yugoslavia (when Portuguese minister de Pinheiro replaced de Michelis) the so-called "Brioni formula" has been accepted, containing the following five elements: a) it was on the people of Yugoslavia to decide their future; b) a new situation had arisen in the country that required close monitoring and negotiations among different parties; c) negotiations should begin not later than August 1 on all aspects of Yugoslavia's future; d) the collective presidency should play its full political and constitutional role with regard to the federal army, and, e) all parties were to refrain from unilateral action, particularly from acts of violence. Despite later renewal of hostilities in Croatia, the "Brioni formula" remained one of the rare successes of European diplomacy in Yugoslavia, because it brought the war in Slovenia to an end.

Two events have had considerable influence on further mediation of the Community at that time. *First*, on August 15 an unsuccessful attempted coup in Moscow announced the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union, which for a time removed the Russian influence in the Balkans and changed international circumstances surrounding the Yugoslav crisis. *Second*, at that time profound cleavage occurred in the policy of the EC member states, above all Germany and France, toward the Yugoslav crisis. In the case of civil war in Yugoslavia, united Germany, for the first time since World War II, took its own way. According to some Western analysts, Germany was convinced at the time that *it only* understood the changes in Europe and Yugoslavia. After unification the right of peoples to self-determination was the only criterion for the German policy toward Yugoslavia, moreover so since on the one side were Slovenia and Croatia, republics with historic, religious and cultural connections with Germany, while on the other were Serbs, traditionally considered by right-wing circles in Germany and Austria as troublemakers on the Balkans. While, according to this opinion, historic, cultural, economic and political reasons have been in favor of German unification (*es wäst zussamen, was zussamen gehört*), in Yugoslavia people used to see only differences. Lack of a generally acceptable alternative and socialist character of the second Yugoslavia in the situation when socialism collapsed throughout former Eastern Europe, discredited all those in the West who tried to preserve Yugoslavia.

Different approach to the solution of the Yugoslav crisis—recognition of sovereignty of secessionist republics vs. preservation of a kind of Yugoslav community—confronted at that time Germany and France, two leading Community countries.²¹ The compromise had been found in convoking of The Hague Conference on Yugoslavia, setting up of the Badinter Arbitration Committee and French-German initiative to send to Yugoslavia some 20,000 soldiers of the West European Union to separate warring parties and oversee the cease-fire.²² The Hague

²¹ On this point, see: Hans Stark, *Dissonances franco-allemandes sur fond de guerre serbo-croate*, *Politique étrangère*, No. 2/92. The depth of then-time French-German cleavage over the war in Yugoslavia is illustrated by the reaction of the French foreign minister Roland Dummas to the information of his German colleague Hans Dietrich Genscher that he will propose to Bundestag to recognize Slovenia and Croatia: "By doing so, you will return French-German relations twenty years back." Quoted after: Pierre Laski, *Les Douze arrivent à saturation*, *Libération*, 8 Octobre 1991.

²² The initiative about WEU intervention has not been adopted because of opposition by the United Kingdom, which did not want to jeopardize the NATO role in Europe. Lack of political will of the Twelve Jacques De-

Conference started from the following three principles: a) unacceptability of the change of internal and international borders of Yugoslavia; b) any solution must protect the rights of peoples and ethnic minorities in all Yugoslav republics and, c) the Community will never endorse the accomplished fact policy. A five-member arbitration committee, chaired by the French lawyer Robert Badinter, was intended to provide legitimacy to the work of the Conference. In spite of that, the Yugoslav political leaders used the Conference as the stage for mutual conflicts and for soliciting international support.

Failure of The Hague Conference, escalation of war and approaching Maastricht conference led to the shift in the EC policy—from the role of the mediator to the role of arbiter. In such circumstances the Twelve could not allow escalation of differences regarding Yugoslavia, which was in favor of the thesis that the only way to end the war was to recognize Slovenia and Croatia, leading the federal army (*post festum*) into the position of an aggressor on foreign soil and implementation of mechanisms stipulated in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The conflict within the Community nevertheless broke out at the ministerial meeting December 16/17 in Brussels (a day after the Maastricht Conference ended) when German foreign minister ultimately demanded recognition, threatening that Germany will otherwise unilaterally recognize Slovenia and Croatia. His arguments seemed infallible: 14 signed cease-fires did not stop the war, destruction of cities and suffering of civilian population had not been prevented, while Lord Carrington with his moves “actually gave time to the *Serbian-federal army* to achieve its goals”. Attempting to preserve the Community unity, Roland Dummas proposed principles of recognition and invited Yugoslav republics “which so wish” to submit such an application to the Community. In this way, the last chance had been wasted to spare the rest of Yugoslavia, particularly ethnically mixed Bosnia-Herzegovina, of the tragic conflict. Without waiting for January 15, 1992, which was the deadline for submission of requests for recognition by the Yugoslav republics, without taking into account the findings of the Badinter Commission (according to which only Slovenia and Macedonia fulfilled the required conditions) and contrary to the US demands, Germany recognized Slovenia and Croatia on December 23, facing the Community with *fait accompli*.

The epilogue of conflicts within the Community was failure not only in mediating efforts in Yugoslavia, but also in attempts to use this case to define the *Common Foreign and Security Policy*. The cost of failure was first felt at the Lisbon conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the Community no longer had the power to put into operation the solution that even after a two-year war proved to be the only realistic (then-time *Cutillero's* and later *Owen-Stoltenberg* plan and plan of the international Contact Group are based on similar premises). The Brussels decision proved to be the Pyrrhic victory for Germany, since it was accused of jeopardizing Western unity and of driving Bosnia-Herzegovina into civil war.²³ Thus the Community was temporarily pushed to the sidelines of the war in Yugoslavia, while the US assumed the leading role, after a rather inexplicable shift in Spring 1992, when it started to guide the international politics in a new direction.

lors commented with: “The Community is like an adolescent facing the crisis of adulthood. If the Community were 10 years older there would have been an intervention force.” Quoted after: Financial Times, June 29, 1991.

²³ “Although the German action has been *successful* in that the European partners had to recognize Slovenia and Croatia, it ultimately remained without positive results, because Germany after that had to show indisputable reserve. December 1991 became Germany’s specific trauma.” Heinz-Jürgen Axt, *Did Genscher Destroyed Yugoslavia? - Myths and Facts on the policy of the United Germany*, Europa Archiv, September 1993.

The Olive and the Branch: USA and the Yugoslav Crisis

Long-standing US support to Yugoslavia as the factor of balance between the East and the West and Washington's cautious stand in the first stage of the Yugoslav crisis have been the reasons why Belgrade was convinced until early 1992 that the US will oppose its breakup.²⁴ However, the US policy toward Yugoslavia started to change during the 1980's due to its growing lagging behind the changes in Eastern Europe, leading by late 1980's to open confrontation with Serbian leadership over the Belgrade's policy toward Kosovo,²⁵ but also because of Serbia's leaders' statement that they will not hesitate to resort to force in solving inter-republican disputes.²⁶ According to experts on the US policy toward Yugoslavia, Washington was late in reacting to the crisis in the country, but the biggest mistake was made by mid-1980's when only economic rather than also political instruments have been used in an attempt to influence the events in Yugoslavia, missing the opportunity to prevent its crackdown by preemptive diplomacy. Aggravating constitutional crisis in 1991 prompted the Bush administration to define a new policy toward Yugoslavia, with the following five objectives: a) democracy; b) dialogue ("under which we understand that conflicts between republics, ethnic groups or individuals should be resolved only peacefully. We strongly oppose any use of force or threat for the purpose of solving political differences, changing outer or inner borders, stopping of democratic changes or imposing of undemocratic unity of the country"); c) human rights; d) market reform; e) unity ("territorial integrity of Yugoslavia within its present borders").²⁷

At this point already the US policy faced contradictory goals in Yugoslavia: while on the one hand it wanted to encourage democratic and market oriented reforms (which is why political support has been extended not only to reforms initiated by the federal Prime Minister

²⁴ This assessment has considerably affected Belgrade's policy, as illustrated by the fact that with the centennial celebration of Serbian-American relations and other moves in early 1992 Slobodan Milošević's regime tried to send a message to Washington that it expects its help in denouement of the crisis. On this point, see: Ranko Petković, *One century of the American-Yugoslav Relations*, Vojnoizdavački zavod, Beograd 1992.

²⁵ "The recent crisis in Kosovo and the reaction of the USA have had a negative effect on the traditionally good relations between USA and Yugoslavia. The Serbian press has attacked congressional resolutions in emotive language, describing them as unacceptable interference i Yugoslavia's internal affairs ... Although the situation with respect to human rights in Kosovo and elsewhere in Yugoslavia has been the subject of US concern in the past, its relative importance was reduced by many other factors. The most important of these was the fact that the USA saw Yugoslavia as a symbol of differences within the communist world. Its human rights policy seemed liberal in comparison with the countries of the WTO, while its foreign policy was one of non-alignment. Last year's fast changes in Eastern Europe have reduced the significance of these factors and thus brought human rights into the focus of American -Yugoslav relations." Steven J. Woehrel, *Yugoslavia's Kosovo Crisis: Ethnic Conflict Between Albanians and Serbs*, Congressional Research Service, Washington D.C. 1989, p. 19.

²⁶ The turning point occurred in the summer 1989, after the changes in the Constitution of Serbia, which limited the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina and, in particular, after the speech of Slobodan Milošević on the anniversary of the battle of Kosovo, after which estimates that his policy is leading towards the armed conflict prevailed in Washington.

²⁷ *US Policy Towards Yugoslavia, Statement Released by Department of State Spokesman Margaret Tutwailer*, US Department of State Dispatch, May 24, pp. 395-396. The main architect of the new policy was former US ambassador to Yugoslavia, Lawrence Eagleburger, then assistant secretary of state.

Marković, but to national movements in various republics). on the other had it feared that predominance of militant nationalism could lead to country's disintegration and threaten the stability on the European southeast. These differences have been particularly obvious in the attitude of the Congress and administration toward the Yugoslav crisis: while the Congress already in late 1980's considered that the end of the Cold War eliminated the need for a "buffer state" such as Yugoslavia and that nationalist movements should be supported without fear for the country's survival,²⁸ the administration was reserved until the beginning of 1992. When the war started, Washington thought that intervention would bear great risk and little benefit for the United States, and therefore it relinquished the initiative to the EC. However, within the administration there developed an argument not just letting the Europeans handle Yugoslavia but pushing them to do so; Secretary of State James Baker took that line strongly: "Many, if not most, senior and sub-Cabinet-level officials argued, further, that Europe would fail the test, and so, would be painfully reminded of its continuing need for a strong American presence. In that light, the test would be a useful one."²⁹

By the end of 1991 the US nevertheless became discretely involved in the Yugoslav crisis through the former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, whose plan brought long-awaited truce in Croatia, that kept until the present day. Although it was already apparent that feuding parties have been tired and ready for peace, the US torpedoed the Lisbon conference on Bosnia-Herzegovina, encouraging the Sarajevo government to reject Cutillero's plan on cantonization of this former Yugoslav republic.³⁰ Thus the last chance has been missed to preserve ethnic balance in Bosnia-Herzegovina and prevent the later tragedy. Accepting a dubious thesis that international recognition is the only move of preemptive diplomacy, the EC and USA recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina on April 6 and 7, 1992, despite the fact that the government in Sarajevo did not keep control over a larger part of the territory populated by Serbs and Croats, that there was no consensus of the three ethnic communities,³¹ that the Badinter Arbitration Commission assessed that this republic did not meet the requirements for international recognition and that the referendum itself was contradictory to the Yugoslav 1974 Constitution.³² Despite the complex and tangled history of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the origins of the war in that republic of Yugoslavia were not inordinately complex: "The true cause of the war was the

²⁸ For example, American senator Dennis de Conchini stated in Congressional debate: "A united Yugoslavia is perhaps less important to our national interests, since there does not seem to be any Soviet threat which might make a buffer state like Yugoslavia necessary". Quoted after: *Crude Meddling in Yugoslavia's Internal Affairs*, Politika, January 25, 1991.

²⁹ John Newhouse, *The Diplomatic Round ...*, op. cit., p. 61.

³⁰ Moves of the American diplomacy in Bosnia in spring 1992 caused numerous controversies, particularly after the statement of ex-US ambassador to Yugoslavia in "The New York Times" (August 28, 1993, p. 8) that he encouraged Alija Izetbegović to reject Cutillero's plan. On this point, see: Warren Zimmerman, *My Role in Bosnia*, Vreme, June 27, 1994, pp. 16-18.

³¹ Serbs boycotted the referendum on independence held in spring 1992, while Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats encouraged leaving of Yugoslavia as a step toward unification with Croatia, as confirmed during the Muslim-Croatian war during 1993. In then-time heated political atmosphere Bosnian Serbs saw an open challenge even in the date of the international recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina (April 6, 1992), since it coincided with the date of Hitler's attack on Yugoslavia (April 6, 1941).

³² That constitution had conferred a right to self-determination but made it dependent on the mutual agreement of the nations composing Yugoslavia. "It was based, that is to say, on the notion of a concurrent majority of the constituent nations, not on simple majoritarianism; to move to secession without the consent of the Serbs was a plain violation of its terms." Robert W. Tucker & David C. Hendrickson, *America and Bosnia*, The National Interest, Fall 1993, p. 16.

structure of reciprocal fears that existed within Bosnia on the eve of the conflict. Each group feared domination by the others, and not unreasonably so.³³ Feeling threatened, and at the same time militarily dominant,³⁴ Bosnian Serbs started extensive war operations against the government in Sarajevo (war between the Bosnian Serbs and Croats mainly ended by the beginning of May 1992 with territorial compromise agreed in Graz). Unlike Slovenia, where war was fought by regular federal army units and where the warring parties observed the rules of warfare, in Bosnia all three ethnic communities formed their military, paramilitary and, often criminal formations, making the war in this republic extremely brutal and contrary to any rules of warfare.³⁵

Mass-scale war crimes against civilian population and "ethnic cleansing" reported in detail by Western media as being committed solely by the Serbian side, have aroused the American public, which strongly pressured the Congress "to do something" to stop further civilian suffering. Under such pressure in Washington prevailed the view that the war was caused by "Serbian aggression against the internationally recognized state" despite the fact that it was indisputably a civil war between three ethnic communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and that its international recognition was doubtful from the legal point of view. "The indictment rested fundamentally not on the violations of the laws that the Serbs have undoubtedly committed on a lavish scale, but on the decision to use the force in the first place. In the US view, the war itself was a crime. Although the Serb's violations of *ius in bello* have been seen to confirm and compound their violation of *ius ad bellum*, the presumed existence of the aggression itself has played a decisive role in shaping the policy of the US. government."³⁶ Despite strong moralizing tone of the US politics, it is somewhat paradoxical that the US has been in fact prepared to do very little to stop the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, least of all to engage its land forces in peace-keeping or peace-making operations. Obnoxious propaganda war and diplomatic pressures on Serbs sent confusing signals to the government in Sarajevo and Bosnian Serb Republic—to the former that NATO military intervention in Bosnia is imminent and to the latter that only by force of the arms they may attain their political goals, since the West remained deaf to their legitimate security concerns—resulting in Muslim military defeat and Serbian control over some 68% of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

³³ *Ibid*, p. 15.

³⁴ Bosnia-Herzegovina was the backyard of the second Yugoslavia's defense system, which is why some 60% of the Yugoslav military industry is located there, in addition to a large number of strategically significant bases and enormous stocks of weapons. Since nearly 70% of the officer corps of the federal army have been ethnic Serbs, many of them from Bosnia, after the federal army fell apart most of these resources ended in the hands of Bosnian Serbs.

³⁵ According to preliminary estimates of the Sarajevo professor Ile Bošnjaković, the war took the lives of 139,000 Muslims (50.5%), 96,000 Serbs (34.9%), 28,000 Croats (10.2%) and 12,000 Yugoslavs (4.4%), which adds up to a total of 275,000 killed. Compared with the pre-war population count 7.5% Muslims, 7% Serbs, 3.7% Croats and 6.3% Yugoslavs have been killed. About 1.3 million former residents of Bosnia-Herzegovina became refugees, of which 543,000 (43.4%) Muslims, 388,000 (31%) Serbs, 222,000 (17.8%) Croats and 97,000 (7.8%) Yugoslavs. Since this republic had 4,384,436 inhabitants before the war broke out (43.7% Muslims, 31.4% Serbs, 17.3% Croats and 7.6% Yugoslavs) total war losses reduced the population to some 2,880,000 persons, of which about 2,050,000 in the territory of the Muslim-Croatian federation and about 830,000 in the territory of the Bosnian Serb Republic. R. Čuk, *Podaci o žrtvama rata*, Politika, Beograd, August 12, 1994, p. 2.

³⁶ Robert W. Tucker & David C. Hendrickson, *America and Bosnia*, op. cit., p. 16.

Since Bosnian Serbs refused the *Vance-Owen peace plan* in spring 1993, the US administration became for the first time trapped by its own policy toward Bosnia, since the only logical answer to Serbs' decision could be the NATO military intervention in Bosnia. When the Secretary of State Warren Christopher in spring 1993 tried to solicit an agreement of his European allies for air strikes against the Serbs, he was faced with resolute opposition by the United Kingdom and France, after which the US temporarily withdrew from the Yugoslav scene. After that, the US temporarily withdrew from the international mediating efforts, while the EC reassumed the leading role. It is worth noting that the US policy toward Yugoslavia, similar to the EC policy, made a full circle in 1991-92—from the initial support to preservation of the Yugoslav federation, in early 1992 the US resolutely endorsed the secession of Yugoslav republics and took in protection their newly acquired sovereignty.

"The Problem from the Hell"

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The failure of the American mediation in Bosnia, the outbreak of war between Muslims and Croats and approaching of November 1st, 1993 (coming into force of the Maastricht agreement) prompted France and Germany, but also the United Kingdom, for a more active role. The French and German foreign ministers launched an initiative by which territorial concessions of Bosnian Serbs in favor of the Muslims would be rewarded by partial lifting of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. The *Kinkel-Juppe initiative* has been accepted at the EC ministerial meeting of November 22, with the addition of demand for an agreement (*modus vivendi*) in UNPA areas (*krajinis*). According to Lord Owen, co-president of the international conference on former Yugoslavia, the shift from the policy supporting territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina to its territorial division was the consequence of the fact that "Washington has destroyed his plan for preservation of Bosnia as a multiethnic state". *Owen-Stoltenberg peace plan* for Bosnia reflected a new approach of the Community and proposed territorial division and creation of three national states in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while Germany tried to end the conflict between Muslims and Croats. None of these attempts, however, was fruitful, because of resistance by the Muslims, who believed that return of the USA to the BH scene in the next stage of international negotiation may bring them much bigger concessions.

→ The next stage of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina started in early February with the explosion on the Sarajevo marketplace, which killed many civilians. Although Serbs denied that the shell had been fired from their positions, and UNPROFOR could not determine the origin of the shell, the West blamed Bosnian Serbs for the tragedy. This event prompted NATO to put an ultimatum to Bosnian Serbs to dislocate their heavy weaponry at a distance of 20 km from Sarajevo under the threat of NATO air strikes against their positions. This move has been a precedent in many ways, since NATO for the first time went beyond the so-called *out-of-area* clause of the Washington agreement and it was the first ultimatum in the history of this organization. Tension that threatened to escalate into an armed conflict between the NATO and Serbs have been unexpectedly resolved by the Russian deputy foreign minister Vitaly Churkin, who offered a compromise solution to Bosnian Serbs—withdrawal from the 20 km exclusion zone and taking over of their positions by Russian forces within UNPROFOR, which have been transferred from UNPA areas. With these moves, the USA (which stood behind the NATO ultimatum) and Russia took the lead in international mediation in Bosnia. Such role casting has been confirmed during the next crisis which broke out in April over the Muslim enclave Goražde in eastern Bosnia, when NATO planes bombed the positions of Bosnian

Serbs.³⁷ Although in this case the Russian diplomacy has not been as efficient as in the previous Sarajevo crisis, Moscow secured its place in the efforts for the solution of the Yugoslav crisis.

In this way, the international mediation in Bosnia became a *trilateral effort*, reflecting the new balance of powers in Europe, since the international Contact Groups included diplomats from the USA, Russia and EU (represented by the usual Troika). Although the Contact Group for the first time managed to reach consensus of the relevant international factors in the solution of the Yugoslav crisis, it also burdened the negotiating process with their mutual relations, since all three sides embarked on this assignment starting from their own political and security concerns.

- In the USA the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina has occasioned the first significant debate over foreign policy of the post-Cold War period. Unlike the Cold War time, when in the Congress an interventionist Republican party was pitted against a non-interventionist Democratic party, in the case of Bosnia, the identity of the participants has changed: "The Democrats can no longer be identified with an anti-interventionist position. The same is true of a number of public figures who had once been reliably anti-interventionist. Indeed, some of the most insistent criticism of both Bush and Clinton administrations for failing to give military support to the Bosnian Muslims has come from those whose anti-interventionist disposition had long been taken for granted."³⁸ Debate over the American role in civil war in Yugoslavia stirred emotions of participants, who thought that the US failure to intervene for the Muslim side would be equal to defeat of all values on which the US wanted to base the new system of international relations after the collapse of bipolarism: "... the United States promised to stay in Europe after the Cold War in order to help keep peace and sustain the democratic revolution; but a war of aggression has been waged and won by a most undemocratic regime. The United States proclaimed principles of peaceful change for a new era; but those principles have been wantonly disregarded. We said 'never again'; but again the intolerable has happened in Europe."³⁹
- For Russia, which is painfully recovering from the consequences of the breakup of the USSR, the Yugoslav crisis came into the focus of internal political disputes (opposition has resolutely backed the Serbian side), the first test of its new international role and place at which they should have checked the expansion of the NATO's security role. However, support extended by Moscow to Bosnian Serbs has been limited by outbursts of Serbian nationalism and relative relation of power between Russia and the West. According to Russian foreign-policy experts in its policy toward the Yugoslav crisis the West should answer to the three and Russia only to one question. According to them, the West, above all the US, must answer the following: a) does it want to continue punishing the intransigence of Serbs at the cost of continuation of war or would it be willing to accept a compromise solution; b) is it ready to accept Russia as an unavoidable factor in conflict solution and, c) is it willing to commit itself militarily in peace-making in former Yugoslavia. Russia, by contrast, must find ways how to help Serbs without sending them wrong signals, i.e. it must avoid stirring the war option. According to Alexei Arbatov, "the US have found in small Serbia a repla-

³⁷ It was the first action of this kind in the history of NATO, which also in this attack suffered the first losses from anti-aircraft fire of the Bosnian Serbs.

³⁸ Robert W. Tucker & David C. Hendrickson, *ibid.*, op. cit., p. 14.

³⁹ David Gompert, *How to Defeat Serbia*, Foreign Affairs, July/August 1994, p. 30.

cement for the Soviet Union, which justifies the preservation of the NATO at the time when disappearance of WTO and the Soviet Union have made this organization superfluous.⁴⁰ Owing to this, the Russian diplomacy on two occasions during 1994 stopped the escalation of the crisis (in case of Sarajevo and Goražde), but achieved its biggest success in August, when it managed to persuade Belgrade into accepting the plan of the Contact Group for Bosnia and break political relations with Bosnian Serbs.

- Finally, through participation in the Contact Group, the EU has retained its place in international mediating efforts in the former Yugoslavia, avoiding conflicts among the Twelve that seriously jeopardized its political unit in 1991 and showed limited ability to handle security problems on the continent without the US and Russian influence. Since the focus of difference in the approach to this crisis has been transferred to the relations between Washington and Moscow, the EU obtained a comfortable position which allowed the leading members to increase their role in the solution of the most complex security problems in post-Cold War Europe and in the period to come get again the chance to influence the outcome of civil war in ex-Yugoslavia. Conducive to this is strong military presence of France and United Kingdom in UNPROFOR forces, as well as EU (German) administration in Mostar, which could only be jeopardized if "blue helmets" withdraw because of lifting of embargo on arms deliveries to the government in Sarajevo. This probably explains strong opposition of the West European countries to the US "lift and strike" strategy in Bosnia.

The turning point in international mediation in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina came with the *Washington agreement* which ended the war between Bosnian Muslims and Croats in spring 1994 and established the Bosnian Muslim-Croatian federation, which would get into confederate relations with Croatia in the future. The US diplomacy thus ended the process, started by Germany by the end of 1993 narrowing down the line of conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while Bosnian Serbs found themselves again in the focus of international pressure. Starting from the results of the *Washington agreement*, the Contact Group plan anticipates the creation of the *Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, whose members would be the Muslim-Croatian federation and Bosnian Serb republic, while the territory of this former Yugoslav republic would be divided in 51%:49% ratio. Although FR Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) accepted this plan, Bosnian Serbs rejected it on the referendum held by the end of August, dissatisfied with the quality of territories offered. According to their assessment, 49% of territory offered to them include less cities, natural resources and industrial facilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which made them fear that their republic could not survive economically. In addition, the reasons why the plan has been refused are absence of international guarantees that in the future they could enter into confederate relations with FR Yugoslavia (similarly to the confederation between the Muslim-Croatian federation with Croatia) and fragmentation of territories awarded to them. Dissatisfied with such position and overall policy of the Bosnian Serb republic, the government in Belgrade severed political relations with Pale and sealed the border toward Bosnian Serbs, thus causing further divisions within the international Contact Group.⁴¹ While Russia approved of the "courageous Belgrade position" demanding partial lifting of international

⁴⁰ Arbatov presented this opinion at the conference *CSCE as a Security Tool in Europe: Which Role for the CSCE?* held in Brussels, June 2-4, 1994.

⁴¹ The shift in Belgrade policy, in addition to international pressure, was affected by other factors, above all ideological differences which already at the beginning of 1993 caused serious cleavages between Belgrade and Pale.

sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, the US gave Bosnian Serbs a deadline until October 15 to accept the plan threatening that otherwise it will propose to the UN Security Council multilateral lifting of embargo on arms deliveries to the Sarajevo government, or else will undertake this measure unilaterally.

Conclusion

Though it is hard to anticipate the further course of events, one may assume that the *Washington agreement* and plan of the Contact Group laid the groundwork for geopolitical reshaping of the former Yugoslav area. If the international mediators managed to preserve the Bosnian Muslim-Croatian federation and persuade the Bosnian Serb republic to join the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose two members would be linked with confederate relations to FR Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Croatia, conditions for ending of war in this former Yugoslav republic would exist. Moreover, in this way the two main rivals in ex-Yugoslavia—Serbia and Croatia—would be indirectly linked, which would render possible the solution of another open problem—status of UNPA areas (krajinas)—either through broad and internationally guaranteed autonomy to Serbs in Croatia, or through territorial compromise. This would also stop spilling of war to other potential crisis spots in ex-Yugoslavia and create conditions for restoration of traffic and economic connections among the former Yugoslav republics, which would be the prerequisite for their future integration into Europe. However, the likelihood of such an outcome should not be overestimated not only because of deep differences between the parties in conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina and krajinas, but because of other potential crisis points in the territory of ex-Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Sandzak, FYR Macedonia, etc.) and quite opposite interests, ideological and geopolitical approaches of international factors in the Balkan region. The alternative would be division of the former Yugoslavia and Balkans into three antagonistic blocs—Catholic, Orthodox and Islamic—which would make the entire region the geopolitical frontier and area of international tensions over a long period of time.⁴²

Although the Yugoslav armed conflict is in fact a war of succession, a war of secession and finally a civil war, caused by the collapse of the communist regime and inter-ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia, internationalization of this crisis affected its specific dynamic and this is where the main causes of the failure of international mediation should be sought. While international mediators tried to stop the war without going into its causes and geopolitical problems caused by the breakup of the Yugoslav federation, the warring parties tried to take advantage of international mediation for their goals which considerably changed the political balance created in the Balkans after the First and Second World War. Particular obstacle to international mediation resulted from major differences in the assessment of the character of conflict (aggressive vs. civil war), contradictory interests of international mediators in the Yugoslav crisis (maintenance of *status quo* vs. geopolitical rearrangement of the former Yugoslav area and the Balkans) and mood of the international public, who shocked at the brutality of this conflict, demanded from their governments *immediate and just* ending of

⁴² This perspective is considered by numerous contemporary analyses of American authors. See: Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993.

the war, which limited the international mediating efforts and often guided them in wrong direction.⁴³

Becoming early aware of the importance of international support, limits of foreign mediation and different interests of foreign actors, the warring parties tried to take advantage of military, diplomatic and propaganda instruments to manipulate the international public and thus influence the views of international mediators.⁴⁴ Some of the most atrocious episodes in the Yugoslav civil war have been the consequence of the logic of psychological warfare, aimed as much to the direct opponent, as to the international community. Namely, the violence was aimed at severing historic connections among the Yugoslav peoples, to prove that living together is impossible (that the "idea of the Yugoslav community is finally dead") and that the only alternative to ethnic conflicts is creation of ethnically homogeneous national states.⁴⁵ On the other hand, long duration and complexity of this conflict have made Yugoslavia over time the scene of conflict between different interests and convictions, and hence catalyzer of broader changes in post-bipolar Europe. In short, internationalization of a basically local and anachronous ethnic conflict gave civil war in Yugoslavia two important and contradictory dimensions—*local and international*—which could be used to explain the failure of the international mediation in armed conflicts in the 1991-94 period: "The very fact that since the outbreak of the war (June 25, 1991) all propositions to reach a compromise for putting an end to the conflict have originated from the activities of the international mediators, while nothing similar and/or credible has come from warring parties - which preferred inviting foreign intervention, chiefly with the aim of crushing their enemies - may serve as a confirmation of the lack of real goodwill on the part of the Yugoslav leaders to start out along an alternative route, and not the road of war."⁴⁶

Although the international mediating effort in the Yugoslav crisis cannot be deemed a failure, limited results achieved in the 1991-94 period can be explained not only by the gravity of the crisis, but also by specific interests and different approaches of international mediators in the civil war in former Yugoslavia. Mediation in the Yugoslav crisis since 1991 evolved from rendering of good offices through conciliation and arbitration to peace-making attempts, wherein different international mediators followed different, often contradictory interests and objectives in the context of power politics in the post-Cold War Europe. Although most of these mediators tried to end the conflict in order to prevent its spill-over which could jeopardize the stability in the region, encourage nationalist forces in Central and Eastern Europe to

⁴³ "It was democracy vs. Communism and, of course, this definition of the situation tilted the sympathy of a significant part of West-European, and especially German public opinion towards the Croats and Slovenes, pressuring West-European governments towards a change of policy. This, naturally, stimulated the stubbornness of the 'break-away' republics, especially Croatia." Koen Koch, *Conflicting Visions of the State and Society in present-day Croatia*, in: Martin van den Heuvel & Yan G. Siccamo, *The Disintegration of Yugoslavia*, Rodopi, Amsterdam-Atlanta 1992, p. 197.

⁴⁴ "For example, when Lord David Owen, chief negotiator to the Balkans for the European Community, gives a press conference or an interview in New York at the United Nations, the Muslims and Serbs respond to it within a matter of hours, and the news media have to deal with that." Jan Vanden Heuvel, *Looking in the World in Motion*, in: *The Media and Foreign Policy in Post-Cold-War World*, The Freedom Forum Media Studies Center, New York 1993, p. 34.

⁴⁵ On this point see: Pavle Jevremović, *An Examination of War Crimes Committed in the Former Yugoslavia*, International Problems, Beograd, No. 1/1994, pp. , and: Predrag Simić, *The Former Yugoslavia: The Media and Violence*, RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3, No. 5/1994, pp. 40-47.

⁴⁶ Stefano Bianchini, *On the Threshold of "An Epochal Transformation"*, Balkan Forum, 1994, pp.103-104.

solve their disputes by armed conflicts and threaten the relations between the European and other countries, at the same time they tried to increase their predominance and influence internal politics and mutual relations between the countries in the region. In this sense, the role of non-Balkan factors in the Yugoslav crisis hardly differed from the traditional logic of power politics in the Balkans, since almost all local actors enjoyed open or concealed support by one of the leading international factors. In any case, civil war and international sanctions have destroyed the nascent civil society in former Yugoslavia and for many years postponed market and democratic reforms. This gives rise to the assumption that over a longer period of time the Balkans will remain the area of authoritarian regimes, ethnic tensions and region without self-stabilizing ability in Europe.

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HALKI INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR
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**THE ROLE OF SMALL STATES IN NEW EUROPE
ARMENIA IN THE CIS AND CSCE FRAMEWORK**

ANNA AGHADJANIAN
ARMENIA

THE ROLE OF SMALL STATES IN THE NEW EUROPE: ARMENIA IN THE CIS AND CSCE FRAMEWORK

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am going to start with a trivial statement, saying that the end of 80's and the beginning of 90's were crucial for the world and for Europe.

Four years ago the world was rejoicing, when the CSCE Paris Summit formally acknowledged the end of the cold war era, and through the signing of the Paris Charter, opened a new era in European affairs.

Millions of people all over the world could finally consider that a new world, free from the threat of a nuclear holocaust and able to concentrate all its tremendous potential in building a better world for every citizen was at last possible.

Yet today looking backwards one has to admit that winning the war was a relatively easier task than winning the peace.

In the short span of time since the Paris Summit more people have died in confrontations and many more have become refugees in Europe than in the two previous decades of the uneasy peace of cold war.

The challenges Europe is facing are real and crucial for the future of the continent and beyond.

History, it turned out, had not ended with the champagne party atop the breached Berlin Wall in November 1989, the reunification of Germany in October 1990, or the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. History in fact came back with a vengeance, and nowhere more fiercely than where it had been most suppressed: in the Soviet Union and in the state of Yugoslavia.

The return of history was not a mere accident. For 600 years European history has been written by states forming and reforming around the idea of the nation-state. In 1945 the saga suddenly ended. Two empires shouldered aside the notion of the nation-state- USA in the West and USSR in the East. But in December, 1991 the latter collapsed. In the East where nationality had been suppressed by an authoritarian regime and the alien universalist ideology, the end of the Empire spelled the immediate rebirth of nation-states, Armenia among them.

Simultaneously, the break-up of the Soviet Union brought about not only independent states, but also a new Commonwealth of Independent States.

This was not a new idea.

As early as 1991, even before the collapse of the Soviet Union Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrossian had put forward an idea of Commonwealth, to be created instead of the Union. The idea did not work then, since the members of the Union were much more concerned with their total independence. The former Soviet states were given an opportunity to govern their resources which was extremely important for these potentially really very rich countries.

However, when, after the abortive coup, the collapse of the Soviet Union became inevitable, the CIS was created. It was, probably, a logical development taking into account the close economic links between the former Soviet republics. Even the countries that refused to join the Commonwealth at the beginning later applied for it and were admitted.

The Commonwealth was first designed as a forum. Within its framework all the member states had a possibility to govern their foreign and internal policy, the economy.

Today the CIS is trying to activize its role as an organisation. The flow of documents, the numerous consultations indicate the desire of some member states to establish closer links, both economical and political.

Not all of these proposals are acceptable for every the states. Yet consultations and meeting are to continue to bring about common points, since today the necessity of different alliances hardly needs to be proven.

The world of today finds itself in rather a strange period when the Western part of Europe is evading into the European Community, which is since November 1993 even called Union, showing closer links between the member-states while the Easter part of it is deviant into separate states. Presumably, both of the process are more than logical.

Western European states have come to realise the necessity of economic alliances, probably, of joined foreign policy, although the process of realization is being more painful than expected. This became apparent with the problems the member-states had with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the monetary Union. However, the Union is there and one cannot underestimate the fact. The last Corfu summit which marked the end of the Greek presidency of the Union, welcomed the Four EFTA states into the Union and there are still applicants awaiting the next enlargement.

The former socialist block are also hoping to integrate into the Union some day. I am not going to review their chances here. I am afraid I have already devoted too much of your precious time to the EU.

Now let us look at the other part of the continent.

Here the collapse of the Soviet Union brought forward fifteen new states. I am not going to discuss when and how these countries had become members of the USSR, nor when and how they had lost their independence. The 'term new independent states', though not very precise seem to be universally accepted, so allow me to stick to it here.

For some reason or other these states are viewed as those capable of creating problems for Europe, integration processes, probably even for the security and peace.

Of course the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nagorno Karabagh, South of Russia, Georgia are facts. But look around at the Western Europe. Don't you see any problems, even bloodshed there?

The former communist states are really eager to integrate into the European and international community, probably even more than those who have never been under the communist suppression.

This is absolutely normal, if you take into account the 70, or in the case of Baltic states, the 40 years of dependence on someone else's will.

This necessity is particularly obvious for the 'small states'. I deliberately put this in brackets to invite you to concentrate for a short while on the concept of 'small states'.

Is Australia a small state?

Is Israel a small state?

The answer here depends on the specific sector of international politics.

If given the territory, the answer is 'no' in the first case and 'yes' in the second.

If given the political influence, don't you think the position would change?

Probably one can accept the concept 'small state' and 'small power', where the former is one with small territory and population and the latter is the one with small power resources. Power here meaning casual relationship between the wishes of the actor and the outcome of political actions. It goes without saying that the small powers do not exert much influence.

In the political field a small power should put an emphasis on international organizations - you must be there to influence the decisions and action that can be of your interest. From this point of view the principle of consensus which is the specific feature of the CSCE seems of extreme importance for these states. This is the reason a country like Armenia can hardly accept the proposal concerning the creation of CSCE Security Council with permanent and rotating members. There is a real danger that certain

decisions will be taken within the council thus depriving the other states of their place in the decision-making process.

A small state can become a really influential one if it knows what it wants and is able to deliver the message. These countries must have a constant and credible foreign policy message. But the foreign policy must be designed to serve the nations around you, and your proposals must meet the interests of the other states. Normally, nations become members of international organizations because they have similar problems.

A national image is of extreme importance for small states, probably even more important than for the big powers. Foreign Affairs is a matter of psychology. If you have a positive image you gain interest. Good ideas, sharp analysis, timing of proposals, good diplomacy make a nation influential even if it is small. If you are not strong you have to be smart.

Armenia's foreign policy has been driven by two broad principles - establishing friendly relations with all countries and pushing Armenia's quick integration into the international community.

By joining some two dozen major and minor international organizations, Armenia is well on its way to implementing the government's objective of integrating into the world community. Armenia's participation in the various regional organizations is necessary for its security interests and is a factor in the maintenance of a balance of powers in the region.

Membership in international and regional organizations came hand in hand with independence. And together with the benefits of belonging to the international community came the burdens of international rules set up to pursue specific global interests not always in tandem with the unique needs of a small, newly-independent country at odds with its neighbours.

It seems noteworthy that the political development in the fifteen states was extremely divergent. Not all of them became really democratic ones. Not all of them were used to democracy. Not all of them have stable internal situation. Which is worse, not all of them are devoid of armed conflicts.

The Republic of Armenia is one of the few happy ones.

The first thing that strikes an observer's attention in Armenia is the fact that it is in peace internally - a significant achievement in a region which has fallen apart since the demise of the Soviet Union.

Armenia is probably one of the very few states where the respect for human rights, other democratic principles has become the main concerns of the government.

I have already mentioned the significant importance the Armenian government attires to the membership of international organizations, namely the CSCE.

Armenia became a participant state on January 30, 1992. Ever since this country has been actively involved in the CSCE matters. Of course due to certain financial problems we cannot afford to send a large delegation to Hoffburg, but the representatives we have there are taking part in all the Meetings and permanent commissions.

At this particular stage an ad hoc group at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is working on the proposals for the Code of Conduct, determining the politico-military behaviour of states to be accepted at the Summit on December 5-6, 1994.

I assume that the adoption at the Budapest Meeting of a Code of Conduct covering military-political norms of mutual relations between the States in the field of security as well as issues of democratic control of the armed forces, protection of human rights and national minorities, economy, and ecology is the most essential action for today's Europe.

Recently, the Secretary General of the CSCE Dr. Wilhelm Hoyneck has put forward the concept of indivisible security.

One cannot but agree with this concept. The present situation in Europe, especially the armed conflicts prove the necessity of the cooperative conception of security, common approach to it.

The main task of the CSCE today must be further development of capabilities in conflict prevention and crisis management. When the conflict has already started the parties are not going to rely on the CSCE, they have to turn to the UN or NATO, although these two cannot do much as well. So the Conflict prevention is probably the best possible way of conflict management.

We have a comprehensive CSCE process through which we have achieved so much in the fields of security, cooperation and protection of human rights. The fact that we are now looking at the future is significant for the future itself.

Institutional building and institutional strengthening are necessary but like declarations, are not enough to take Europe out of the anarchic situation prevailing in the most part of the continent today. Only our resolve and timely actions can prevail.

The first task and the most important one must be to put an end to the everyday killing of innocent people. which not only does not solve any problem, but on the contrary creates new insurmountable difficulties for the future.

We must have the courage to take the initiative to intervene prior to the open eruption of a conflict. The cost of any action taken will be a fraction of the cost of continuous and indiscriminate killing of innocent people.

The choice we face is clear. we expect equal security for all states. Either we establish an efficient collective security system which will enable big and small European states as well as minorities within the states to live in peace and free from fear or we will end up in a new system of balance of power through aggressive alliances that will contain in itself the germ of war.

The CSCE must address itself and respond to the hazard inherent in change. The upraising of the Helsinki process which found expression at the Paris Summit with the creation of new institutions and structures has made the CSCE more dynamic. In the same way the CSCE must be

capable of responding and confronting challenges wherever they may arise in the continent.

Not only must the CSCE participant states focus their attention on the problems of security and stability on the commitment as well as the economic and political cooperation. Every single state must make an effort to resolve these problems.

While the process of disintegration in the Soviet Union, unlike the collapse of Yugoslavia, was not coupled with a significant amount of bloodshed, a serious malaise has been plaguing Transcaucasia which requires mediation and medication by the international community to find a cure.

Here I would like to touch rather briefly, upon the conflict in Nagorno Karabagh, which is one of issues Armenia is rather actively involved in, especially in the framework of CSCE.

While Armenia's responsibility toward the Armenians of Nagorno Karabagh may be moral and material, it does not and cannot politically speak on behalf of the population of Karabagh.

In January 1992, the NK Parliament declared an independent Republic. Despite calls for international recognition, to date, no country, including Armenia, has recognized this independent declaration.

There are several important reasons why Armenia has not recognized independent Karabagh Republic. First, Armenia has sought to avoid to be trapped into a war with Azerbaijan based on the pretext of its recognition of Karabagh. Second, the Armenian government has held that any attempt to determine the status of Nagorno Karabagh before the establishment of a cease-fire in the region would be premature and would harm the negotiation process.

Despite this lack of recognition, de facto, for the past year and a half, Karabagh has been conducting its own domestic, military, and foreign policy as would an independent country.

The Armenian government has made a concerted effort to appeal to the international community, particularly the CSCE and the UN, to become actively involved in finding a peaceful solution to the conflict.

The international community has already faced a similar problem in 1992, having to decide upon the intervention in Yugoslav conflict.

Then the question was : if we go in, how end when do we get out? From Paris to London, from Rome to Bonn, the unspoken answer was: in the absence of compelling interest and without the chance of a quick and easy success, we will not intervene, even though this war ought to be our war- it is not in a 'faraway country of which we know little', but lies on Western Europe's doorstep. By year's end the new Europe, so confident about mastering its own future in early 1992, had proven unable to coalesce around a single purpose.

In the security field the nine-member WEU remained a sleeping beauty that continues to resist the rousing kisses of innumerable princes. The Franco-German 'Eurocorps', put on paper on May 22, 1993, remains the object of suspicion among those Europeans who prefer an Atlantic rather than a purely European defense. And the CSCE proved unable to bring either security or cooperation to the Balkans; it looks destined for the oblivion that befell the League of Nations in 1936 when it could not reverse Italian aggression against Abyssinia. Ironically the only security institution that emerged halfway intact from the Cold War is NATO, the Euro-American compact designed to resist the Soviet threat. It acquitted itself well (though informally) in the Gulf War, and it alone seems ready to act under American leadership in Bosnia if the UN so mandates.

Coming back to the problem of Nagorno Karabagh.

The Armenian Government continues to view the Minsk Conference of the CSCE and the Russian Mediation plan as the possibilities best suited to directing and implementing the process that will lead to a lasting peace. Furthermore, the peace efforts of the CSCE and the solution reached within the Minsk Conference must be guided by two basic principles: respect for territorial integrity and recognition of the rights of the people to self-determination. The Russian Mediation Plan, also accepted by the

Government of Armenia, is another possibility for peace, with the additional provision deploying separation forces into the region, a measure that the CSCE plan lacks.

The best possibility, probably, is the combination of the two initiatives. So, there is a need for the international community to harmonize efforts of the CSCE and Russia, that would undoubtedly speed up the peace process. The United Nations can also play a constructive role by supporting and bolstering the CSCE efforts. The UN is actually a mandate-giver to the CSCE. For a long time, the CSCE lacked the necessary mechanisms to implement a cease-fire. The absence of mechanisms and perhaps some stereotypes within the CSCE hindered resolution of the conflict.

In short, Armenian Government's position is that the cessation of military activities is realistic if it is linked with the establishment of a cease-fire, a withdrawal of all forces, and the lifting of the blockade.

I am confident that in time peace will come to Nagorno Karabagh. The stakes are too high. The stability and prosperity of Armenia and the entire Transcaucasia region hang in the balance.

Ladies and gentlemen,

The time of mutual accusations has come to its logical end and if we fail to combine our efforts in establishing real security and cooperation we might find the eternal peace on the grave of the mankind.

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BIBLIOTECA

BULGARIA AND RUSSIA IN THE 1990S

A Traditional "Special Relationship"?

The basis for a "special relationship" between Russians and Bulgarians has been their linguistic and cultural interdependence and closeness. Between 10th - 18th c. both nations used one and the same literary language and shared a largely identical cultural heritage. The common literary language (originally called simply "Slavonic" and now known also as Church Slavonic, Old Slavonic or Old Bulgarian) had emerged in Bulgaria together with the simplified Cyrillic alphabet and a rich literature in late 9th - early 10th c.. Later these were adopted and further developed by the Russians. While initially (until 15th c.) Bulgarian influences largely shaped the emerging relationship, later the Russians became the driving force in bilateral interactions. It was the Russian variant of the common cultural tradition that played a crucial role in the renaissance of Bulgarian culture and language in late 18th - early 19th c..

The Russian role in Bulgaria's liberation from the Turks in 1877-1878 and later Russian activities in building the institutions of the new state paved the way for the establishment of a markedly unequal "special relationship" between Bulgaria and Russia ("The Big Brother"). Reaction against the Russians and reassertion of complete Bulgarian independence during the rule of prime minister Stambolov (1886-1894), however, could not remould or significantly change an already well-entrenched dependency culture vis-a-vis Russia. It remained largely intact until the 1940s and greatly facilitated the later Sovietisation of Bulgaria. The Soviet period led to even greater degrees of Russification and for the first time every facet of Bulgarian society was forcibly reshaped and made almost an exact replica of Russian-Soviet society. However, at this very time the Bulgarian elite enjoyed unique and unparalleled access to Soviet decision-making institutions, Soviet resources and to Soviet society in general. The Soviet-Bulgarian "special relationship" in the 1960s-1970s could be described as something in-between outright colonialism and a "special relationship" of the Anglo-American type.

The Soviet Legacy

During the period 1944-1989 Bulgaria gradually came to be perceived as the East European country closest to the Soviet Union. The main features of this Soviet-Bulgarian "special relationship":

- the Bulgarian ruling elite - the **nomenclatura** - had been thoroughly Russianized through education and intermarriage;
- the Bulgarian army was considered more reliable than the other East European armies by the Soviets and as a result military cooperation with it was secured without permanent stationing of Soviet troops in Bulgaria;
- Bulgarian intelligence personnel were treated as "insiders" by their Soviet

counterparts;

-- compared with other European CMEA members the Bulgarian economy had grown most dependent on the Soviet one (the USSR accounted for about 60% of overall Bulgarian trade throughout the 1970s and 1980s).

Bilateral trade was the first victim of changes and chaos in the USSR and Bulgaria. It fell from the traditional 60% in early 1990 to 40% in early 1991 - thanks largely to the collapse of central control in both economies, the abrupt halt or unilateral reduction of many essential Soviet supplies (such as oil) and the introduction of world prices denominated in convertible currencies in bilateral trade since 1.1.1991. Also, between August and December 1990 the traditionally pro-Soviet decision-making body in Bulgaria (the ex-communist Bulgarian Socialist Party leadership) was replaced by an elaborate mechanism for power-sharing centred on Zhelev's Presidency and including also the largely autonomous "non-party" government and the key parliamentary commissions (with some changes this mechanism has survived to this day). Thus the most important vehicle of traditional Soviet domination over Bulgaria was destroyed in the early 1990s but important parts of the huge network built for 45 years have remained in place:

-- the strongest party in the country - the ex-communist Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) has attempted a transformation from a fossilised apparatus into a traditional Russophile party;

-- members of the former pro-Soviet **nomenclatura** hold key positions in most government agencies and control the management of most public enterprises;

-- former members of the foreign trade and security establishments - often with longstanding KGB links - comprise the bulk of the new Bulgarian business class (which uses its political links to exert monopoly control over key sectors of the Bulgarian economy);

-- the army has been left to reform itself thus ensuring that its traditionally pro-Soviet command structure remains intact.

Thus it can be concluded that in comparison with other East European countries all these groups have been far less delinked from the former Soviet Union; coupled with their initially stronger Soviet connections it creates the picture of an unusually strong Moscow profile in Bulgaria.

The Collapse of the Soviet Union

Because of the greater resilience of the communist structures in South Eastern Europe in comparison with the Visegrad countries, the abortive Soviet coup in August 1991 was of somewhat greater significance for their internal developments. It also provided a crucial test for their fledgeling democracies.

Bulgaria was the only former Soviet satellite in Eastern Europe to be overtly

pressured by the local Soviet ambassador (a KGB general heavily implicated in the removal of Zhivkov in 1989 and in exerting pressure over the Bulgarian leaderships after that) to give expressions of support to the coup by sending a high level delegation for previously arranged economic negotiations due to take place in Moscow on 21/22 August. Despite being economically extremely dependent on preserving links with the USSR the Bulgarian leadership (president and government) expressed strong disapproval of the coup and postponed the impending negotiations in Moscow. In his address to the nation in the afternoon of 19 August president Zhelev became the first East European leader to express full solidarity with the stand and the statements of the Russian president Boris Yeltsin. He called the coup "a test for all democratic forces in Bulgaria" and pledged all political forces, trade unions and state institutions in the country to "support the restoration of the legitimate power in the USSR and the constitutionally elected president". Zhelev was the third foreign leader after Bush and Major to telephone Yeltsin on 20 August (in Hasbulatov's report about the coup presented to the Russian parliament after its collapse on 21 August alongside the major Western leaders gratitude was expressed only to Zhelev and Havel).

The initial news of the Soviet coup raised fears about hardening of BSP attitudes towards its opponents, possible recommunisation and attempts of regaining control over the country in case the coup in the USSR succeeded (the economic vulnerability and the situation with the military in Bulgaria and its links with the Soviet top brass seemed to justify these concerns). Thus of all former East European satellites Bulgaria was probably the biggest beneficiary of the collapse of the coup and the changes it unleashed in the USSR:

- the failure of the BSP to condemn the coup and the banning of the CPSU destroyed its credibility as the preferred partner of Moscow and exposed its latent communist sympathies and dependence on the "losing side" (the collapsing Soviet institutions) - which contributed somewhat towards BSP's narrow electoral defeat in the autumn 1991 parliamentary elections in Bulgaria;

- Zhelyu Zhelev, the first Bulgarian non-communist president, emerged as the preferred partner not only for the West but also for the leaders of new Russia.

The Emergence of New Russia

The emergence of Russia as a completely independent state and a nuclear superpower in late 1991 had immediate implications for relations within Eastern Europe. For Bulgaria the major result of the abortive August coup was to free Russian-Bulgarian relations from their post-1944 ideological and Soviet shell and to base them squarely on ethnic and cultural traditions and shared political and economic interests.

Between 21-23 October 1991 president Zhelev made an official visit to Moscow at the invitation of Yeltsin. The major results of this visit:

- with a joint declaration signed by the presidents of both countries Bulgaria became

the first country outside the former Soviet Union to establish full diplomatic relations with Russia at an ambassadorial level;

-- a barter trade agreement was signed regulating until the end of 1991 the severely disrupted economic relations between Russia and Bulgaria and securing 1 mln tonnes of oil deliveries to Bulgaria for the rest of the year (in exchange for meat and other agricultural surpluses of Bulgaria);

-- a protocol about resumed supplies of military equipment for the Bulgarian army and overdue Russian payments for Bulgarian military supplies;

-- both countries agreed to prepare a comprehensive trade and economic agreement and a Russian-Bulgarian treaty of "good neighbourliness and friendly relations" to be signed during Eltsin's official visit to Bulgaria that was initially scheduled for January 1992 but effected much later.

On a personal level the visit also proved extremely successful: Zhelev managed to charm his hosts both with his fluent Russian and his deep interest in Russian culture (on the last day of his visit he had a special meeting with leading Russian intellectuals). Both leaders spoke about the "centuries old links" between the two countries and Eltsin praised highly "the courageous stand" of Zhelev both during the coup attempt (the "warm gratitude" of the Russian leadership for this support was specifically stated also in the joint declaration) and in establishing full diplomatic relations with Russia. However the building of a "special relationship" between Bulgaria and Russia incurred the wrath of the Centre (i.e. Gorbachev) and other Soviet republics - notably Ukraine. Gorbachev postponed twice his previously agreed meeting with Zhelev and finally forced the Bulgarian leader to choose between meeting him or his host Eltsin; as a result the two leaders could not meet. Ukraine reacted even more drastically: on 29 October it stopped without warning Soviet power supplies and coal deliveries passing through its territory to Bulgaria (these give about 10% of the electricity consumed in this country) thus forcing the Bulgarians to save energy by power cuts every three hours. After pretending for two weeks that this was due to technical problems the Ukrainians finally declared that the supplies will be resumed only if Bulgaria signs a special trade agreement directly with the Ukraine (the relevant Bulgarian trade delegation left for Kiev on the same day).

The Russian-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendly Relations and Cooperation

Bulgaria became the last of the former Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe to sign a treaty with Russia replacing its previous treaty for mutual assistance with the USSR. The new Treaty of Friendly Relations and Cooperation between the Republic of Bulgaria and the Russian Federation was signed by the presidents of the two countries during an official visit of Eltsin to Sofia (3-4 August 1992).

Of all the treaties signed between Russia and the former Soviet satellites the treaty with Bulgaria had the longest and most turbulent history. The exchanges of drafts and negotiations dragged on for more than a year and a half and only last minute

diplomatic activities in late June and July 1992 managed to clear the way for its signing on the very day when the 1967 mutual assistance treaty between the two countries was bound to expire.

The most significant part of the earliest (Bulgarian-prepared) draft was the explicit mutual assistance mechanism enshrined in the text. It made this draft unique even in comparison with the much criticized Soviet-Romanian treaty (signed in April 1991 but never ratified by the Romanians). Actually at that time (March - May 1991) even the Soviets themselves were not prepared to go that far and their own project (based on the earlier Bulgarian draft) suggested an emasculated version of the Bulgarian mutual assistance mechanism plus what really interested the Soviets at the time - a clause precluding the signatories from joining alliances that might be deemed hostile to the other side (i.e. any form of Western security cooperation). However in May 1991 the already exchanged Bulgarian and Soviet drafts were leaked to the Bulgarian-language media and after internal and external pressure the then Bulgarian leadership was forced to give up its plans for a new mutual assistance treaty with the USSR. And after the failed coup in August the USSR itself had to drop its insistence on the above mentioned clause (dubbed "the Kvitsinsky doctrine" by Russian foreign minister Kozyrev) vis-a-vis its former satellites in Eastern Europe. As already mentioned, president Zhelev earned great respect among the leaders of Russia for being the first foreign leader to voice full support for Eltsin during the coup attempt in August 1991 and to extend full diplomatic recognition to Russia in October 1991. During Zhelev's first official visit to Russia in October 1991 Zhelev and Eltsin also agreed to prepare a Russian-Bulgarian treaty of "good neighbourliness and cooperation" to be signed during Eltsin's planned visit to Bulgaria in January 1992. However neither this visit nor the proposed treaty did materialise in January. After several months of examining the Russian draft the Bulgarian ministry of foreign affairs prepared its own variant which the Russians would not accept; in general, throughout the first half of 1992 Russian-Bulgarian relations stagnated.

It was not until a visit of Bulgarian Foreign Minister Stoyan Ganev to Moscow from 30 June to 2 July 1992 that the two sides managed to agree on all the clauses of the treaty, which was scheduled to be signed in August (Ganev's visit had been preceded by a ten-day visit of Bulgarian diplomats to Moscow to bridge the gap between the very different initial positions of the two sides). According to Ganev, this progress was a clear sign that the two states' "period of being reserved" was over. Commenting on Bulgarian parliamentary commissions' examination of the draft treaty, he spoke of "an unusually high level of openness" having marked the discussion process; but in the event, despite the months of work invested in negotiating joint formulations, the treaty was prepared and adopted by Bulgaria without much public debate on Bulgarian-Russian relations.

The treaty as adopted consists of 17 articles. After ratification by the two countries' legislatures and the exchange of the ratifying documents in April 1993, it will be valid for the following 10 years; thereafter it will be automatically renewed for successive five-year terms, unless either side withdraws by giving notice one year in advance of the expiry of each term. A special intergovernmental commission will monitor the implementation of its provisions and of any future agreement based on them.

Apart from the points regulating economic, scientific, technological and cultural exchanges, investments, tourism, joint measures against terrorism and Black Sea pollution, there are at least two articles that could have security implications not only for Russia and Bulgaria but for the Black Sea region and South Eastern Europe as a whole:

Article 4. "The contracting parties shall make contact whenever, in the opinion of one of the parties, a situation arises that endangers or violates the peace or might undermine the international order - especially in Europe and the Black Sea region - in order to hold consultations and take steps to resolve the situation."

Article 5. "None of the contracting parties shall allow its territory to be used for military aggression or other violent activities against the other contracting party. Should one of the contracting parties come under military attack, the other contracting party shall provide no military or other support to the aggressor and shall help to resolve the conflict in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and the documents of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. These obligations do not affect the rights and obligations of the two contracting parties stemming from the UN Charter."

Article 4 and the second sentence of Article 5 is the maximum that could be salvaged from the four-stage mutual assistance mechanism developed by Bulgarian experts in early 1991 and enshrined in the very first Bulgarian draft (the initially envisaged four stages were: 1) bilateral activities to sustain stability in the region; 2) bilateral activities to achieve a peaceful resolution of conflicts in the region; 3) immediate consultations for preventive measures in the event of a threat to one of the parties; 4) if one of the parties is attacked by another state or states, the other party would supply immediate military help; the specific measures to guarantee the visibility and effectiveness of this obligation were to be stipulated in a separate protocol). One probable reason why the Bulgarians chose to avoid any explicit security association with Russia at this stage (although Russia itself gave clear signals that it would be ready even to prolong the 1967 Soviet-Bulgarian mutual assistance treaty) is the understanding that this might undermine Bulgaria's eligibility for transfers of advanced technology from the West and for security cooperation with NATO and the WEU, which is greatly desired (other reasons might be doubts about the future of democracy in Russia and mistrust of Russian intentions towards Bulgaria). However it can be argued that as the nature of the measures "to resolve the situation" and - in case of aggression - of the "help to resolve the conflict" are not specified, these two articles implicitly leave open the possibility of Russian military assistance to Bulgaria (at least some Bulgarian politicians interpret them in this way). The bilateral military agreement signed during Eltsin's visit on the basis of those two articles (for a period of 10 years with the possibility of continuation) also gives some ground for such thinking: it preserves and codifies most of the practice of close cooperation between the two armies - the training of Bulgarian officers in Russia academia, Bulgarian use of Russian military facilities (including training and testing facilities), technological cooperation between the two military-industrial complexes (involving a Bulgarian obligation not to share Russian technological secrets with third countries without Russian consent), arms and spare parts sales to Bulgaria, even cultural exchanges between both armies.

The first sentence of Article 5 is a weaker variant of the much criticized "Kvitsinsky doctrine" and it gives guarantees to Russia that Bulgaria would never be passively or actively involved in activities of other countries or coalitions that Russia might consider threatening.

Eltsin's Visit to Sofia in August 1992

The most significant event preceding Eltsin's visit to Sofia was the change of the Russian ambassador in Bulgaria (it happened 3 days before the visit). The previous Russian ambassador Sharapov was a very controversial figure: a KGB general and a former close associate of Andropov, he was heavily implicated in the resignation of Zhivkov in November 1989 and his activities during the failed August coup could be interpreted as a pressure on the Bulgarian leaders to give a de-facto recognition of the putschists. The new ambassador Alexander Avdeev (a 46 years old graduate of MGIMO with extensive European experience and a deputy foreign minister between August 1991 and February 1992) had been selected personally by Eltsin and was meant to be emblematic of the new era in bilateral relations; he had to conform to three major criteria - to have never been to Bulgaria before, to speak several foreign languages and to be "a qualitatively new type of a diplomat" (his predecessor was for years heavily involved in Bulgarian internal politics, knew only Russian and was anything but a career diplomat). This change probably reflected Eltsin's awareness that Russian interests in Bulgaria would have to be defended with different means than in the past - not by sending KGB viceroys but on an equal footing and in intense competition with Western diplomats.

The visit itself lasted for about 20 hours on 3-4 August amid tight Bulgarian and Russian security measures (a special group arrived from Moscow several days earlier). As a Russian president and prime minister Eltsin was met at the airport by both the president and the prime minister of Bulgaria. He was accompanied by his wife, foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev, defence minister Pavel Grachov, deputy prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and the minister of industry Alexander Titkin. Eltsin had talks with Zhelev, signed the new bilateral treaty and the two leaders gave a joint press conference.

Two other agreements were signed by the respective ministers: an agreement about the creation of a Bulgarian-Russian intergovernmental commission for economic and scientific cooperation and the already discussed military agreement. Other topics that were discussed but left for future negotiations were: ways for settling the Russian debt to Bulgaria (0,5 bln. \$); a new direct ferry link between Bulgaria and Russia (Varna -Novorossiysk) and trilateral deals channeling Western help to Russia via Bulgaria. The two sides also declared their willingness to open the archives related to Bulgarian-Soviet relations - those of the CC of the CPSU, KGB, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs and their Bulgarian equivalents (an agreement to that effect was signed in December 1992 by representatives of the two governments).

Eltsin's visit to Sofia was highly symbolic: it was his first trip to an East European capital as Russia's leader, and also for the first time he had gone in person to

Eastern Europe to sign a treaty there. In general throughout the visit Eltsin went out of his way to please his Bulgarian hosts: in a public pronouncement he emphasised that "ancient Rus' had borrowed from Bulgaria the Slavonic alphabet presented to the world by the holy brothers Cyril and Methodius" (a very sensitive issue for the Bulgarians who suspect that many Russians neglect or belittle Bulgarian contribution to Russian culture); on Macedonia Eltsin stated that "Bulgaria feels the problem of Macedonia literally with every cell of its body and knows this question better than any other state including Russia, so we orient ourselves to Bulgaria, to the position of the Bulgarian leadership and support them". On several occasions Eltsin painted a highly idealized picture of the history of Bulgarian-Russian/Soviet relations: "There were problems only in Bulgarian-Soviet relations, in Bulgarian-Russian relations problems never existed. ...We have always been friends. If we remember history - when did we ever fight each other? Never. We always managed to find common ground. ...In the thousand years of their common history our peoples were helped each other and if they shed their blood it was in a common fight for freedom and independence. It was not their fault that after they overthrew the fascist dictatorship they could not come to their senses and get rid of the communist tyranny as well". Eltsin made it absolutely clear that Russia puts "history and traditions first" ("our bilateral relations can hardly be compared to our relations with any other nation"), the treaty as "the legal basis of our cooperation in all spheres" comes second and "agreements on specific questions: economic, social, on military cooperation" come third.

At the heart of the visit was Eltsin's personal relationship with his counterpart, Zhelev. This was their fourth meeting, and Eltsin explicitly stressed the importance of their personal rapport. He demonstratively preferred talks with Zhelev (who by under the constitution has no executive responsibilities) to talks with the Bulgarian prime minister. He also deliberately avoided meeting any of the leaders of the main political parties and coalitions in Bulgaria, which again underscored the importance of Zhelev. The fact that Russian-Bulgarian relations were so exclusively centred on the two presidents no doubt boosted the position of Zhelev and his team of advisers in the internal power struggles in Bulgaria.

The joint press conference of the two presidents, broadcast live by Bulgarian Television, was completely dominated by Eltsin who used it for making grand gestures to the Bulgarians - promises for large deliveries of oil in exchange for Bulgarian goods (similar promises were given in 1991 but they could not be sustained in full), supplies of armaments ("We shall give Bulgaria as much as it would ask for") and most important - a Russian pledge for the immediate diplomatic recognition of Macedonia (this was the only one of his statements that was greeted with spontaneous applause by the mostly Bulgarian journalists at the press conference).

Russia's Recognition of Macedonia

On his press conference in Sofia Eltsin outlined three major elements of Russia's stand on Macedonia: Russia would immediately recognize its independence; "its name would have to be determined by its own people"; Russia would orient its

position on Macedonia to the position of the Bulgarian leadership and would support it. He signed the decree recognizing Macedonia while flying from Bulgaria to his holiday destination in the Caucasus and on 5 August 1992 Russian deputy foreign minister Vitaliy Churkin went to Skopje and presented Macedonia's president and foreign minister with the decree and the official diplomatic note for the recognition of Macedonia. This diplomatic move of Eltsin came as a surprise to the Russian foreign policy establishment in Moscow who for one more day would neither confirm nor deny the recognition of Macedonia. Predictably, Russia's recognition of Macedonia was condemned by Greece and hailed by Turkey. It caused mixed reactions in the ruling circles of the Republic of Macedonia because of its explicit linkage to Bulgaria (a Radio Skopje comment on the very day of the Russian recognition expressed both warm gratitude to Russia and warnings that Russia might repeat its San Stefano mistakes by conceding Macedonia to Bulgaria). However, some opposition leaders in Macedonia publicly expressed gratitude not only to Russia but to Bulgaria as well.

The news of the Russian recognition of Macedonia came amid the scandal caused by Macedonian president Gligorov's consent to the idea of Yugoslav premier Panic about the creation of an economic union between Macedonia and Serbo-Montenegrin Yugoslavia as a part of a future wider Balkan economic union (Panic also promised a swift recognition of Macedonia by Yugoslavia but later reneged on his promise under Greek pressure). On 7 August president Gligorov was forced to report to parliament about his presumed shift to Belgrade but he was able to counterbalance that by announcing that the following week he was going on the first ever official visit of a Macedonian president to Bulgaria (the visit had been urgently arranged by Macedonian deputy foreign minister Nikola Todorchevski who visited Sofia earlier that very day). Gligorov's visit to Bulgaria materialised on 12 August (president Zhelev had to interrupt his summer holidays) and the two countries agreed to open consulates general and cultural centres in each other's capital and to conclude later a bilateral political treaty and trade and economic agreements. Thus Russia's recognition of Macedonia was one of the factors that triggered another round in the rapprochement between Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia. Also, the fact that Russia immediately recognized Macedonia when requested by Bulgaria gave practical proof to the Bulgarians that their interests could have priority in Moscow even when they clash with the interests of other Balkan states (which is hardly the case either with Brussels or Washington).

Berov's Visit to Moscow in April 1993 and Chernomyrdin's Return Visit to Sofia Planned for September 1994

On 19 April 1993 in Moscow the prime ministers of Russia and Bulgaria Victor Chernomyrdin and Lyuben Berov signed a protocol for the exchange of the ratifying documents and entering into force of the bilateral Treaty of Friendly Relations and Cooperation. Apart from the exchange of ratification documents Chernomyrdin and Berov also signed a cultural agreement and an agreement to combat organized crime (a particular worry for the Bulgarians due to the rapid penetration of Russian mafia groups in Bulgaria). The signing of two already approved agreements: on joint exploitation of the Yambourg gas field and the gas pipeline Yambourg-Bulgaria and

on the access of Bulgarian merchandise to the Russian market, to the annoyance of the Bulgarians were postponed in the last moment by the Russians and rescheduled for signing in mid-May (when the signing was postponed again). Also discussed were transport issues (previously the bulk of bilateral trade was handled by the ferry link Varna-Ilichovsk next to Odessa, which is now in Ukraine), the possible creation of a joint bank to service trade in national currencies, the completion of joint projects from CMEA times, military supplies for Bulgaria and cooperation between the defence industries of both countries. However, there was no progress on the most sensitive issue for the Bulgarian side - the Russian 500 mln.\$ debt to Bulgaria. A possibility to repay it by Russian military supplies was discussed but no specific agreement was reached.

During a meeting between Lyben Berov (who at that time was acting foreign minister as well) and Kozyrev an agreement for cooperation between the two foreign ministries was signed. The most discussed subject between both foreign ministers was the Yugoslav conflict, where unanimity of views on peaceful solutions was expressed. "Turkish policy on the Yugoslav problem" was also discussed and Turkish suggestions for the use of force" were rejected by both foreign ministers as "dangerous".

On balance Berov's two days visit to Moscow (19-20 April 1993) had mixed results:

- on the economic side it was a clear disappointment to the Bulgarians who wanted to improve their access to the Russian market after being given only a very limited access to EC markets as a result of the association agreement, and deprived of Yugoslav markets as a result of the sanctions;

- in contrast to that, cooperation in the political sphere looked much more promising after the ousting of the pro-Western UDF government in late 1992 and the appointment of the Berov cabinet.

After Berov's visit Bulgarian-Russian relations followed their usual post-1990 pattern: a long period of low-level visits and inconclusive negotiations on the problems that interest the Bulgarians most of all (the Russian oil and gas deliveries to other Balkan states via Bulgaria and the settlement of Russia's debt towards Bulgaria) with an expected breakthrough during Chernomyrdin's planned visit to Sofia in late September 1994.

Conclusion

Russian-Bulgarian relations in the 1990s are a far cry from the period of multi-faceted integration between Sofia and Moscow in previous times. Meetings between the top leaders of both countries are fairly incidental and they are invariably followed by long periods of stagnating relations. Still, Russia's fledgeling competition for influence with Turkey and its reliance on the Greek-Serbian axis in the Balkans presupposes active Russian presence in Bulgarian politics as well. Russia also retains a strong economic interest in Bulgaria, primarily as an entrepot of its oil and

gas exports towards Serbia and Greece.

Bulgaria needs good relations with Russia for its own reasons. Bulgaria feels neglected by the West - at best it comes a distant fifth in line after the Visegrad states and in some respects it is in a worse position vis-a-vis the West in comparison with Slovenia, Croatia and maybe even the Baltic states. Despite rapid improvement in bilateral relations Turkish activism from the Adriatic to China makes Bulgaria feel small and vulnerable; besides, in a clash of interests with either Greece or Turkey Bulgaria can hardly rely on any effective support from the West no matter how just its cause might be.

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**The Role of Russia
in Central and Eastern Europe:
A Lithuanian View**

**Paper for the Session
"The European Union and its Eastern Neighbours"
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A state normally has a single foreign policy. In a democratic society, it is an official position of a state approximating to the sum of public views freely expressed on an international issue. The state's position thus might represent a whole range of various opinions which sometimes are mutually incompatible.

Furthermore, people care little about remote issues which do not threaten their welfare enough as to bother themselves about the improvement of a particular situation. But when an external factor comes to affect vital interests of a state, entire nation, and, most importantly, those of an individual, everyone who has at least a drop sober mind finds oneself concerned to a great extent.

Those assumptions seem to be correct when analysing how a Lithuanian perceives the role of the world's largest state-Russia in the central and eastern part of the cradle of culture and civilization - our beloved Europe. Firstly, having become a democratic republic, Lithuania successfully yields one of the main characteristics of democracy - plurality of opinions. Diversity of public views is equally recognizable in the criticisms addressed to internal affairs and international affairs. So there is one official, sometimes boring and dull, Lithuanian position regarding this question. But it is far more interesting to see the whole "kitchen" of internal debates, arguments and simulations which are eventually "absorbed and digested" and summarized by the official figures of the Lithuanian state.

Secondly, the "Russian issue" is a primary issue for every Lithuanian who is at least a bit interested in what happens outside his or her country. Having recently escaped from the Soviet "swamp", which is in Lithuania largely perceived as originated from the extreme Russian nationalism, and still living in the unfortunate region of "vital interests" of Russia, very few Lithuanian people live in ignorance of our eminent neighbour.

Although being in full awareness of the implications which result from the presence of Russia by Lithuania's side, people of Lithuania often disagree about what are these implications. There is no and, fortunately, there can be no single opinion on what Russia is doing in the Central and Eastern Europe or can do or will do. But there is a total undeniable concern and tense feeling about Russia's external behaviour.

After the declaration of the inheritance of the rights and obligations of the "evil empire", Russia has confirmed the continuity of the policy of a big super-power the interests of which naturally diverge from those of small states. The concept of the sphere of Russia's vital interests surprisingly resemble the same notion that was used by the Soviet Union and Nazi's Germany when these two were splitting the map of Europe into two pieces before the outbreak of the war. It is understandable that a country does have vital interests. But when they deliberately become attached to a strictly defined geographic area which belongs to another sovereign state and make no reference whatsoever to the possibly existing counter-interests of the nations which fall under this category - one can easily smell the intentions of dominance and a danger to be sacrificed for the appetite of a giant.

The concept of an area of Russia's vital interests is frequently mentioned by Russia's officials both inside the country and in international fora. But one can hardly hear the explanation of how the "area" is defined. Is it a geographical proximity? Then Central Asian republics except for Kazakhstan should not hope for a Russia's special care which is currently so openly expressed. Are these then ethnic lands of Russian culture? Then Russia would not only have to denounce its special interests in the foreign countries but would also have to say good-bye to the status of the largest country in the world. Can these be the tightest economic links with the countries of the vital interests areas? Then Baltic countries would certainly fall out this category as they persistently try to re-orient their economic links towards the rest of the world. Forced economic links, as we know, are nothing but a colonial relationship. It is, therefore, not the economic relations but probably something else.

Having the consciousness of a superpower, Russia sees most of its neighbours as minipowers. Minipowers can be easily defeated if they are properly handled one by one. Moreover, some time ago, be it Tzar's Russia or Soviet Russia, she has ruled in the vast areas. And since there is no universal standard about how deep in the history one can go as to claim historical roots and hence the legitimate interests in a certain piece of land, Russia easily finds facts of its legitimate or illegitimate but still actual presence in the areas in which Russia now is vitally interested. An example? What legal even if vital interests can Russia have in Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania? It is the russians who are living there as a result of the occupation that lasted for half of the century. Russia has declared it's doctrine of the

protection of the ethnic russians (including belorussians, ukrainians and people of other nationalities) abroad. Since Estonia and Latvia has a big percentage of russian-speaking population they become the prime target of Russia's accusations about the violation of the legitimate rights of these people. Despite the numerous international missions (CSCE, Council of Europe, United Nations) which all have proven the absence of the violations alleged, (except for one still doubtful case - Latvian citizenship law), Russia persistently repeats what has already been many times denied.

Isn't it strange that Russia does find human rights violations in Latvia and Estonia (Lithuania, luckily has a much lower percentage of the russian-speaking population which can be used for accusations) whereas there has been no Russian condemnation voiced about the situation in the countries that Russia is de-facto in charge of: Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kirghystan, Kazakhstan? Do these countries fully comply with the standards of at least the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, or CSCE documents of Helsinki and Copenhagen? Not speaking about Russia itself!

What means of persuasion are normally adopted by Russia in order to make a "problem child" respect the standards of international law the human rights are part of which? Lithuanian view has inevitably been influenced by Russia's numerous threats to stop the withdrawal of its army which was illegally present in the territory of the sovereign states without the latter's consent. That is, personally perceived and, therefore, **doubtful** violations of international law are, in Russia's eyes, best prevented and punished by **obvious** violations of the international law. In other words, Russia tries to outweigh the unproven disrespect for human rights by express disrespect for the sovereignty of states and use of threats. It was highly improbable that Russia would stop withdrawal its troops from Germany despite of mass criminal attempts by neo-nazi's against people of foreign origin in this country. Even if russians experience misbehaviour towards them in Germany, the Russian doctrine of the protection of russians abroad will not apply. Estonia and Latvia, however, are a different case. It is the zone of vital interests. Luckily, the withdrawal has been completed from Latvia and Estonia. But the pressure against legitimate demands of Estonia and Latvia was enormous. Enough to say that Latvians were compelled to leave at Russia's disposition the

Skrunda's radio-location station which is of high strategic importance. Who will believe that Latvians willingly presented this station as a gift to country whose army was considered as a threat number one?

Lithuania is currently learning another explicit experience of the means employed by Russia to achieve its foreign goals. After the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuania and followed by the local euphoria, Lithuanian Government began active steps in order to alter the balance of foreign trade as to give equal weights both to east and west, with preferable dominance of the latter. This was the criterion adopted by the ruling Labour Democratic Party which belongs to the left political wing. Sufficient liberation of trade was expected to be settled through bilateral or multilateral agreements with major potential trade partners. Being quite successful in achieving trade concessions in the Nordic countries and after the remarkable improvements in the negotiations with other western countries, the Government could have hardly expected that a major obstacle would come from Russia - the neighbour whom we, Lithuanians, saw as a dominant power trying to tie up and draw us back if not by political force then at least through trade.

In November of 1993, Russia and Lithuania signed a series of agreements some of which would allow the Russian market to treat Lithuania as a most favoured nation and vice versa. Lithuanian Parliament ratified these agreements as a matter of priority while its Russian counterpart seems to have forgotten about them. One could normally understand that Lithuania's importance in Russia's foreign trade is far from latter's economic significance in the former. And Russian parliamentarians might have placed the ratification of these agreements at the end of their agenda. But Lithuanian officials soon discovered that it was far from that. The southmost Baltic republic is a geographical barrier separating Russia's mainland from its westernmost part of a super-strategic importance - Kaliningrad. This precious territory which is even smaller than Slovenia, Sicily or Albania could only be linked with Russia's mainland by air- or seaways. The land- transportation has to cross the territory of its neighbours. If the transit via Belarus Republic is almost guaranteed, there is still some distance to be covered either via Poland or Lithuania. Knowing that Kaliningrad region has one of the highest concentrations of the military equipment and personnel in Europe, transit to this area becomes of vital importance to Russia. The land through which

the transit is to be carried out is thus subjected to the "vital interests" of Russia: either Poland or Lithuania. Or both.

The real protection of the Russian "vital interests" was launched, following few months after the signature of the agreements, by demands addressed to the Lithuanian Government to allow the Russian military transit via Lithuanian territory. Moscow knew that it was aiming at an aching place of Lithuania. Over a hundred countries now enjoy the trading status of the most favoured nation except for the three Baltic states. Moreover, Russian authorities introduced the double tariffs for Lithuanian products since the 1st of July of this year, and it was the direct results of the delay in ratification by the Russian Parliament. A major part of the Lithuania's heavy industry still largely depends on the Russian market. And the double tariffs severely lower the capabilities of the industry which is, as a fact, a major job place for the non-lithuanian and especially for the russian-speaking population. Russia is thus shooting two rabbits with one bullet: putting pressure on Lithuanian authorities to create favourable conditions for the military transit to Kaliningrad and creating potential for the internal restlessness among the workers of Lithuanian factories. The latter "rabbit" though more latent is fairly cynic: having declared the doctrine of the protection of the rights of Russian nationals, Russia is deliberately worsening the situation of the potential target groups which later might be used as an excuse for a tougher action.

The purpose of these examples is not to illustrate Lithuania's mistakes in trade with Russia and to load all the responsibility for the failures on Russia. Russia is understandably undergoing similar or even greater economic difficulties which might be tackled without stepping out the margins circumscribing the decent methods of the foreign policy. The point here is to show that Russia is pursuing much more delicate goals using the methods, the decency of which could be easily questioned. One of the Russian tools of the foreign policy was an attempt to divide the Baltic states so they can not support each other in respect of realization of Russia's interests in this region. It has been more than one year since Lithuania has been freed from the presence of Russian troops in its territory while Latvia and Estonia had not been able to enjoy this situation. Quite clearly, Russia must have expected that Lithuania will denounce its solidarity with the other Baltic republics and will cease to support the withdrawal of the troops from the rest of the region. However, being one of the strongest

supporters of the Baltic solidarity, Lithuania sees its security and the security of the whole Baltic region jeopardized even when the Russian troops are only present in the neighbourhood - if the presence is illegitimate. The Estonian and Latvian demands to abandon their territory were always supported by Lithuania, for example, in establishing the criteria for Russia's accession to the Council of Europe.

Moscow's tactics and methods are differently perceived by various political groups of Lithuania. The right wing: conservatives, christian democrats as well as centrists - all see potential and actual danger for the Lithuania's security in Russia's foreign policy. Russia is a big state with remaining imperial interests that she is unable to give up. Russia's harsh internal problems can most easily be resolved by achievements in the foreign policy at whatever costs incurred to others. Russia, the heir of the Soviet Union, can not cope with the reality of the decline of its power and influence in the Central and Eastern Europe. Throughout the whole history, both in past centuries and during the Soviet times, the empire had been founded on the force-based dominance in vast regions. In the fear of exclusion from the political affairs of Europe as a Eurasian civilization, Russia's strategy hides the attempts to find its satellites among the European countries. Of course, those who have recently been in the traps of the empire are the most vulnerable. Little economic and political pressure might break their resistance or even affect their sovereign consciousness. And many of them could become a protective helmet of the fore-head of Russia's European policy.

The rightists of Lithuania tend to provide an example of the notion of the "near abroad" which is often used to describe the geographically both adjacent and remote regions perceived as Russia's "vital interests" zones. There has never been a clear definition what that "near abroad" is, but the most frequent association includes at least all former republics of the Soviet Union. No-one would probably be so paranoid about this notion like the Lithuanian right wing parties, if Russia had given up its use in the diplomatic meaning. But when the "near abroad" is subjected to a special treatment which is different from the usual one, then the target countries protest.

The unusual international creation - the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) - is certainly the "underwear" of Russia - the countries which are close to the "body". Most

of them have been integrated into Russia's economy and politics for about a century or more, and separation from the "mother's breast" for many of them seems too radical and scary. Those who attempt to break somewhat away are either brought back to the family (Georgia, Azerbaijan) or waste all their potential for further struggle of survival with eventual failure (Moldova, Ukraine). The countries of CIS are at least the "near abroad" but, in fact, their are much more than that. Russia's leadership in the attempts to create joint military forces and common economic space have an easily identifiable political context - struggle for the dominance in the territory of the former Soviet Union.

The situation of the Baltic republics is different. Deeply frightened, they sharply react to any step of Moscow which could explicitly or implicitly, covertly or overtly, imply any domination or excessive political influence. Lithuania even has a constitutional law on non-participation in any post-soviet creation. But the "near abroad" applies to the Baltics too. Russia's programme for the protection of its nationals abroad was mainly designed for these republics with a slight exception of Lithuania which has a considerably low percentage of the russian population. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have too important locations on the Baltic Sea as to be left to rest in peace. Even Peter the Great used to say that he would carve out a window for Russia to the Baltic Sea. His first window was Saint Petersburg. The second window is Kaliningrad. So why not make the whole terrace - from Saint Petersburg to Kaliningrad?

Although more modest but similar attempts of dominance the right wing parties find in Russia's foreign policy addressed to the other part of the Central Europe. The integration of these countries into the Western-European structures seems unstoppable. But if these structures bend under Russia's pressure then there is a chance to exert an influence onto the Central European states as well. Russia's reaction to the desire of the Central European countries' initiative to become members of NATO appears to have a considerable weight in the minds of the West-European politicians. When, in January of 1994, the Lithuanian President sent a letter to NATO Secretary General about the country's determination for a full membership, Russian foreign service immediately expressed its disagreement with a possible enlargement of the Alliance stating that such change might cause the return of the division of Europe similar to that of the Cold War. Awareness that Russia will be one of the

last successful applicants for a membership, if ever at all, forces the superpower to impede the Central European steps of integration into the Western defence structures. Moreover, Russia has not expressly denounced its strategy of the creation of its own the defence block. The Council of Ministers of Defence of the CIS with all its doubtful future is one of the first bodies of such block. In fact, in all levels of diplomatic contacts, Russia persistently indicates that the Western community will face serious difficulties if it tries to resolve international issues without Russia's participation. The discontent openly addressed against the military actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina against serbs without Moscow's permission and then the approval of the same actions followed by Russia's consent reveals the fact that this particular case was yielded by Russia to demonstrate her importance in similar issues instead of deep concern with the situation in Balkans.

A more worrisome for Lithuanians trend has shown through after Russia's efforts to obtain an ad hoc mandate of peace-keeping operations in the "near abroad" from the Security Council of the United Nations. Two points are striking in this case. First is that Russia wants to become a regional policeman before even any conflict started in the region. Many Lithuanians, for instance, believe that one of the biggest source of instability in the Baltic region is the concentration of the Russian army in it. And then Russia wants to justify its presence by receiving a mandate! The second point is that Russia itself is not a stable country as to be a key force in the peace-keeping operations in the "near abroad". Having internal and external problems with its southern territories and with, for instance, Ukraine, Russia is still very far from being a reliable and impartial peace-keeper, especially in the light of slow reforms within the Russian military forces.

The rightists of Lithuania then rethorically ask: what else could these facts suggest about Russia's intentions in the Central and Eastern Europe rather than a search for a dominance?

A somewhat different is the position about Russia's role in the Central and Eastern Europe and the means and methods of the Russian foreign policy can be heard from the leaders of the currently ruling Lithuanian Labour Democratic Party which considers itself a left socialdemocratic wing movement. During the successful elections in 1992 and now, the

Party members keep placing emphasis on its foreign policy criteria serving as a main distinguishing line from the right wing. One of the criteria is rationality, another - commonsense. What do they stand for?

While Lithuanian Conservative, National, Christian Democratic politicians stress the need of total re-orientation of the policy towards the West, the Labour Democratic Party highlights the advantages of the equilibrium balance in the foreign policy. The former position has occurred due to the long heritage of the soviet occupation, the remaining imperial interests and high unreliability in partnership of Russia, absence of the possibility in the East to become civilized in a European sense and the presence of a danger of the expansion of the Asiatic culture which, if found in excess, could become detrimental to the Lithuanian culture. An emotional accent of this issue is added by a rethoric question: how shall we look in the westerner's eyes if, after a hard and painful struggle for the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Lithuania, we eventually give legitimacy to their presence on our own initiative? The latter view has been adopted in the light of the changing situation in the territory of the former Soviet Union, democratic processes in Russia, domestic needs of economy, inevitable influence of Russia due to geographical proximity and so on.

Russian demand for a permission to carry out military transit is not considered as a potential or actual danger to the Lithuania's sovereignty. The arguments for the justification of such position are based on the equality of the treatment of all states: if we ban Russia's military transit from and to Kaliningrad in respect of the Constitutional provision which prohibits presence of military bases of any state in the territory of Lithuania, how can we then allow NATO, which is perceived as a friendly factor in Lithuania, forces to ever be in Lithuania? What we must do, says the ruling party, is establish rules for the transit applicable to all states concerned provided that these rules are assessed by the experts of competent international structures. Rules must be strict enough as to guarantee safety and security in the Lithuanian territory.

Another argument in favour of transit under stringent regulation is the support of the demilitarization of the Kaliningrad region - a call for a common interest. This argument possibly suggests a compromise between left- and right-minded politicians which might be

reached upon a "one-way" transit. But such decision would certainly be unsatisfactory for Russia who tries to retain its legal and actual control over the Kaliningrad region.

The Labour Democratic Party, however, has declared its disagreement with the methods of economic pressure used by Russia in order to achieve a desired transit. Moscow's negative reaction to the Lithuania's declaration on its readiness to become a full member of NATO has also been disapproved by the current officials of Lithuania. Moreover, the Labour Democrats unconditionally supported withdrawal of the strange army from Latvia and Estonia. These are the common points shared by the opposite political streams of Lithuania.

One of the most important initiatives that a Lithuanian Government has been forming a position on is the Stability Pact. Disputes arising between European states in two main stability corner-stones - borders and national minorities - have been offered by the Pact for a settlement in international fora. Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe has been chosen as a central forum for implementation of the Pact. And the internal mechanism of the Pact was envisaged as round-tables composed of the countries which agree to place a disputed issue upon the table for a joint settlement. Two round-tables projected are largely designed for the Central and Eastern Europe - the Central European Round Table and the Baltic Round Table. Lithuania sees a possibility to bring about issues of international importance to the stability in Europe in the Baltic Round Table. And one of the issues that could be best addressed in the framework of the Pact is that of Kaliningrad region. But in order for an issue to be considered in a round-table, there must be a consent of all parties concerned. Moscow is unlikely to give an approval to discussion about the Russian territory when the outcome of such discussion is very likely to limit free actions of Russia. The likelihood furthermore diminishes when we remember that one of the tactical methods of Russian foreign policy is avoiding of internationalization of problems. Resistance from the Russian part against the raising up a question of the unlawful presence of the Russian army in the neighbouring countries was enormous. But it was doomed to failure due to crucial importance of this issue for the European security. The pre-war history reminds us of the main Soviet method of the foreign policy: individual treatment of any rival and total resistance to the collective consideration. "One-by-one" principle has many times proven to

be successful, so why not try this time?

Russia's sceptical opinion about close cooperation between main West-European structures (NATO, European Union, Western European Union) can be explained by the loss of control over the Central and Eastern Europe as these countries entrust their security and expectations to the other powers. Too ambitious about its missionary role in the centre of the Old Continent, Russia can not cope with its decreasing reliability as a partner among the former members of the Warsaw Pact. Yeltsin's team has been slow to join the Partnership for Peace programme designed for the countries which seek membership in NATO. Russia's desire to be a member is not that strong, but the fear of exclusion from the game forced this country's positive decision about the programme. Similar mood can be observed in the case of the Stability Pact: Russia has been emphasizing its doubts about the leading role of the countries of the European Union in the settlement of the issues considered under the Pact. Notably, the criticisms that have been addressed by the countries of the Central Europe to the idea of the Pact were substantially different: they were trying to demonstrate the absence of border and minorities problems in their territories, but there hardly was a negative opinion about the role of the European Union. Russia, on the other hand, disliked the idea of the West-european "judge" and was emphasizing the increasing role of CSCE. Why CSCE? Because that is the main forum of which Russia is a member and through which a greater influence could be channelled. This reason, however evident, is left unspoken while the justification for such position is very successful: we should strengthen the already existing structures. Who can disagree, especially after the USA opinion in which Russia found support for her ideas and which are likely to be of the same origin? The idea of the Pact is exactly like the one that Russia is voicing; the background, though, is different.

Russia's persistent offer to be as a moderator or as an active participant in resolving international issues is strikingly contradictory to the reality of such precedents. How can a state take an active and even leading role in delicate international issues if it has problems on almost every step of its borders with neighbours as well as internal spots of conflicts? Russia's role in the cases of Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Chechenia, disputes with Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia can hardly be called successful and serve as a good teacher of peace. The problem here is that even countries of the Western Europe are subjected to the

pressure of the nuclear superpower the wishes of which must from time to time be satisfied at the expense of a decision, rational and fair to all European Countries. The Western fear of Russian fury can be seen by the eyes of a blind. Only the most insolent demands of Russia are not satisfied. In the rest of the cases a Lithuanian always notices mediocracy in the form of waiting for "what will Moscow say".

These are the main observations in the eyes of a Lithuanian on what are the means and methods, objectives and aims of the Russian policy in Europe. The role of Russia in the Central and Eastern Europe can be easily derived from these points - one does not have to read between the lines. The role of Russia thus seems to have many aspects. On the one hand, we have a new democracy which officially denounced the principle confrontation and stresses the cooperation and partnership. The potential for the economic cooperation between Russia and Central-Eastern Europe is enormous and if deprived of selfish political taste, it could be an unprecedented source of positive growth in the region.

On the other hand, Lithuania is the country which still encounters an unfair treatment from the Russian part. And most of it originates from exaggerate ambitions of Russia as a big state which deserves an exceptional attention and care. In relations with Russia, a small state like Lithuania always feels the that the principle of the equality of states is severely downgraded, and efforts to make changes in such situation consume a lot of energy and sources which could otherwise be used for more reciprocally useful purposes.

Russia's steps towards Europe are still very clumsy and heavy. Participation in the European structures is in all ways useful for learning how to respect the interests of the others. That is why Lithuania supports Russia's efforts to become an active contributor to the peace, stability and prosperity in the whole continent through the international bodies like CSCE or the Council of Europe or related programmes. But this participation should not be abused for the unilateral advantage at the expense of the others. Such trend is easily identifiable but hardly rectifiable. With the help and supervision of all states Russia could be major factor in the promotion of a favourable political climate in the Central and Eastern Europe. Otherwise we would waste all our time just to go back to the past from which we have so painfully escaped.

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THE EUROPE AGREEMENTS

Reshaping East-West European Cooperation

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Introduction

The collapse of the totalitarian communist political systems and of the rigid command economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union brought about a good deal of enthusiasm and hope, not only in the respective countries, but also in Western Europe. It was not long after the dismantling of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany, however, that people in Europe painfully realized that the end of the Cold War did not mean the end of Europe's East-West division.

This paper attempts to analyze the evolution of relations between the EC and post-communist Eastern Europe mainly from an economic perspective. The analysis will focus on six East European countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria), which seem to be at this moment politically and economically, (as well as geographically), closer to Western Europe than the other ex-communist states. Furthermore, these are the East European countries which have currently the closest and the most interesting relations with the EC.

The first part of the paper will comprise a historical overview of the relations between the EC and Eastern Europe.

The relationship between the EC and the six East European countries, provided by the second generation of association agreements - the Europe Agreements, concluded in the last three years, is examined in the second part.

The third part will focus on a critical economic evaluation of the E-W European relations resulting from the Association Agreements.

Some aspects regarding future perspectives in the evolution of these relations will be presented in the final part.

The analysis will lead to the conclusion that although Eastern Europe's relations with the EC have been characterized by a significant progress in the last five years, they have still a long way to go in order to bring about significant gains to the partners' and to meet Eastern Europe's development requirements.

1. A Historical Overview of EC - East European Relations

At the time it was created, the European Community (EC) had to inherit the patterns of East-West relations pre-determined by the emergence of the Cold War. In political and military terms, the division of Europe into two antagonistic blocks had been institutionalized already at the end of the 1940s by the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). In economic terms, the redirection of East-West European relations had been started by the political and economic regime imposed by the Soviet Union in the territories it was occupying and administrating after the end of the Second World War. The Marshall Plan and the creation in 1948 of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) gave a further impulse to E-W economic division of Europe.¹ At the end of 1948, trade between Western and Eastern Europe was 30% of its pre-war level², while capital flows collapsed due to the nationalization programs supported by Moscow in Eastern Europe. In 1949, the USSR led its East European Satellite states in the formation of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in response to the OEEC, thereby institutionalizing Europe's economic division.

The economic relations of the East European countries with the Community have been dominated by their CMEA membership. Although the CMAE had not been an organization with supra-national powers, therefore not being able to impose institutional constraints to East European countries' external economic relations, economic, political and also military pressure strongly shaped these countries' foreign policy behavior. This is reflected, among other ways, by the fact that Romania, which was the only Soviet satellite country with no permanent Soviet troops stationed on its territory also was the only East European country able to pursue quite independent and much closer relations with the West in the 1970s and early 1980s³. The means of Soviet influence within the CMEA shifted from military and political pressure in the 1950s and 1960s to economic incentives (due to favorable access of CMEA members to Soviet energy and raw-materials resources) in the last two decades of the CMEA's existence.

Over the forty years period between the establishment of the EC and the collapse of the CMEA, the relations between these two institutions had been mainly cool and sometimes quite frosty. There are several periods that can be distinguished in the evolution of the EC-

¹ Pollard, Robert (1985), *Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1985.

² Ibid., p.163.

³ The Red Army has been evacuated from Romania at the end of the 1950s, following the Romanian governments insistent requests under the argument that the country is anyway surrounded by the Soviet troops in other countries. This gave Romania a significant freedom of maneuver in its foreign policy, allowing it not to join the WTO troops which ended the "Prague Spring" in 1968 and to have special economic relations with the West until the late 1980s when the autocratic Ceausescu regime reached its extremes.

CMEA relationship. These periods largely reflect the dynamics of political and economic realities of the bipolar world.

1.1. The 1960s - From open hostility to reciprocal ignorance

The initial reaction of the Soviet Union to the creation of the EC was open hostility combined with ideological dogmatism. Soviet leaders described the Community as the economic arm of NATO, while predicting its eventual collapse due to its inherent internal capitalist contradictions.⁴ (Ironically, it was the CMEA that eventually disintegrated in 1990.)

As it was becoming clear the Community was far from disintegrating, but instead gathering economic and political strength, the Soviet bloc countries shifted their policy of non-recognition of the EC away from sound anti-Community propaganda to that of ignoring its existence. Nevertheless, the USSR did its best to block EC participation in international organizations. As for the EC, it had even fewer reasons to award any attention to the CMEA since the latter was considered to be just another instrument of Soviet dominance over its sphere of influence. Furthermore, CMEA's competence were by far less significant than that of the Community.

During this period trade between Western and Eastern Europe was very modest, although it constantly improved relative to the extremely low (almost insignificant) levels reached in the 1950s (see Appendix Tables 2 and 3). The form in which these commercial relations had been conducted was barter-trade. The EC used various mechanisms, such as quotas and selective safeguards in regulating imports from the east. For the East European countries that became members of the GATT, the EC applied Most Favored Nations (MFN) treatment.⁵ Agricultural products and textiles were excepted from MFN treatment within the GATT.

1.2. The 1970s - The rise and fall of detente

A new trend in EC-CMEA relations emerged at the beginning of the 1970s with the onset of detente, the inauguration of Chancellor Willy Brandt's "Ostpolitik" and the coming of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Apart from the favorable East-West political atmosphere, there were some significant economic reasons for cooperation. East European countries needed trade concessions especially after their agricultural products had been driven out of the EC market by the Community's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The EC, on the other hand, especially as a consequence of the oil shocks in the 1970s, was committed to reduce its dependency on Middle East oil, and thus interested in more favorable access to Soviet fuel resources, as well as raw materials. Another reason for concern by the EC was the fact that East European countries had run, for a number of years, current account deficits and accumulated huge foreign debts (most of them in European banks), which they appeared not to be able to repay. There was an obvious

⁴ Fraser, Perdita (1992), *The Post-Soviet States and the European Community*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chameleon Press Ltd., Great Britain, p.4.

⁵ Czechoslovakia has been a founding member of the GATT, although it remained, until recently, a kind of "sleeping member" by not participating in GATT negotiations. Poland acceded to the GATT in 1967, Romania in 1971, and Hungary in 1973.

necessity to open EC markets for East European exports in order to create conditions for the payment of the huge foreign debts of East European countries and the possibility to further import western products.

Table 1
Sectorial Trade Agreements between the EC and the CMEA
(as of March 1988)

CMEA partner	Product	Type of Agreement	Duration
Romania	Steel	ERA-price monitoring ¹	1978-89
	Industrial Products ²	Trade	1981-86
	Textiles	VER/MFA	1987-91
Bulgaria	Steel	ERA-price monitoring	1978-89
	Textiles	VER	1987-91
Czechoslovakia	Steel	ERA-price monitoring	1978-89
	Textiles	VER/MFA	1987-91
Hungary	Steel	ERA-price monitoring	1978-89
	Textiles	VER/MFA	1987-91
Poland	Steel	ERA-price monitoring	1978-89
	Textiles	VER/MFA	1987-91
GDR	Textiles	Import Quota	1987-89
Soviet Union	Kraftliner and Board	ERA-and minimum price undertaking	1983-88

Notes:

¹ While price monitoring system do not imply export restraint, they are operated by means of bilateral consultations during which the admissible level of exports is indicated.

² Excepting steel and textiles.

Symbols:

ERA - Exports Restraint Arrangement

VER - Voluntary Export Restraint

MFA - Multi-fibre Arrangement

Source: Harriet Matejka (1990). The table is based on GATT, *Developments in the Trading System*, October 1987 - March 1988, L/6366, August 1988.

In 1972 the EC Commission proposed to each state trading country in Eastern Europe individually an outline of an overall trade agreement providing a system of quantitative restrictions and quota openings on exports from Eastern Europe. Moscow, which was emphasizing the CMEA as the appropriate channel for relations with the EC, opposed the Commission's proposal. In 1974, the USSR proposed the conclusion of agreements between the EC and the CMEA and between their respective member states. Strong disagreements occurred however, on the nature and extent of such an agreement. Three main problems triggered extreme caution in the EC's approach towards an EC-CMEA institutionalized relationship. First, the EC did not want to support Soviet domination on East European politics by the legitimization of the CMEA through the establishment of formal links. Secondly, the EC and the CMEA had no comparable competence since international agreements signed by the CMEA were not automatically binding on its member states, and could not be imposed on them by the CMEA. Thirdly, since CMEA trade was not subject to market forces, but rather governed by centrally determined plans, a comprehensive EC-CMEA relation would have brought a lot of economic complications. The EC suggested, therefore, that the EC-CMEA relation should include only some areas of economic cooperation, such as standards, statistics and environment, while bilateral trade agreements should be signed separately between the EC and individual CMEA member states. Moscow's uncompromising position against this proposal brought negotiations to a deadlock.⁶

Against this background only *sectorial agreements*, relating to agricultural products, textiles and steel, were concluded or renewed in the following period (see Table 1). In 1975, the Community's renewed offer to sign comprehensive trade agreements with individual CMEA countries was met with silence at that time. The only exception was Romania which at the end of the 1970s started negotiations and in 1980 concluded a fully fledged *trade agreement* with the EC.⁷

1.3. The 1980s - Toward the post-communist era.

A second cold war emerged in East-West relations after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Although the EC opposed the 1981 US embargo against the Soviet Union, it did cut its imports from this country and abandoned the approach towards cooperation with the CMEA begun in 1970.

In the 1980s, the progress of East-West European relations was defined by two features: it was slow and driven mainly by the initiatives of Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe. This situation can be explained, politically by the increasing East-West tensions after the Afghanistan invasion, and economically, by the structural aspects of trade between the EC and the CMEA countries. The economic aspect deserves a special attention. There is an asymmetry between the importance of East-West trade for the EC, on the one hand, and the CMEA, on the other hand. While the CMEA was generally accounting for only 6-7% of EC trade, the EC accounted for roughly 20% of CMEA trade.⁸ As a proportion of GDP, the EC trade with the whole of CMEA accounted for less than 2% of EC GDP, similar to the

⁶ Frazer, *supra* note 4, at p.5.

⁷ Nello, Suzan Senior (1991), *The New Europe. Changing Economic Relations between East and West*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, 1991, p.23-41.

⁸ Nello, *supra* note 7 at p.22.

magnitude of EC trade with Sweden (which has only 2% of CMEA population).⁹ Since the political atmosphere was tense after the invasion of Afghanistan and the EC had no major commercial interest in the CMEA, progress in East-West relations could not be but slow.

Moreover, Table 2 shows that the EC market was much more important for the East European countries than for the USSR (with the significant exception of Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria). This was especially the case with Poland, Romania and Hungary. In addition, while USSR exports to the EC consisted mainly of energy products and primary goods, which had generally an open access on the Community markets, central-east European exports to the EC were represented mainly by agricultural products, textiles, steel and some manufactured goods, which were heavily protected by the Community. The East European Countries had, therefore, much stronger economic reasons to tighten the relations with the EC. After Romania, in the early 1980s other smaller CMEA countries had been negotiating *comprehensive trade agreements* with the Community. The process of economic reforms and democratization started in Poland and Hungary represented a strong political incentive for the EC to cultivate the relations with these countries in order to drive them out of the Soviet orbit, a policy adopted toward Romania in the 1970s.

Table 2

The EC Share in Trade of the Central-East European Countries
(per cent based on US\$ values)

	Imports			Exports		
	1985	1986	1987	1985	1986	1987
Bulgaria	8.4	9.4	9.5	6.4	6.4	4.9
Czechoslovakia	9.5	9.7	10.6	9.0	9.6	9.5
Hungary	21.6	22.5	24.3	16.0	17.3	19.7
Poland	18.5	17.0	18.1	22.6	23.6	23.4
Romania	10.1	11.6	10.2	24.6	26.1	24.1
Soviet Union	12.2	11.5	14.4	18.1	13.2	11.4

Source: Adapted from Nello, Suzan Senior (1991), *The New Europe. Changing Economic Relations between East and West*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, 1991, p.79. Original source: Eurostat

The coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in the USSR signalled a new era in East-West relations, especially in Europe. In 1985, Gorbachev called for the establishment of official relations between the EC and the CMEA. A Joint Declaration on Mutual Recognition was signed in 1988, followed by the establishment of diplomatic relations with the EC by all

⁹ Frazer, *supra* note 4 at p.6.

European members of the CMEA (including the USSR).

In September 1988, Hungary was the first eastern country to sign a *Trade and Cooperation Agreement* with the Community. By the end of 1990, all Central-East European countries concluded such "*first generation agreements*" with the EC.¹⁰

Although these agreements provided only for limited trade liberalization, they represented the first concrete response to the demands of the Central-East European countries. Furthermore, the Trade and Cooperation Agreements opened the way for negotiations carried out in the context of joint committee meetings and the PHARE programme leading to the "second generation association agreements" concluded between 1991 and 1993.

Three important results of this historical overview of the Community's relation with Eastern Europe, are worth to be emphasized. First, political elements have played a significant role in the evolution of East-West European relations after World War II. Secondly, in economic terms, the EC-CMEA relationship has been extremely asymmetrical, the Community being a far more important trading partner for the CMEA than vice versa. This largely explains why the reasons for closer East-West relations were in the case of the CMEA mainly economic, while for the EC they were rather political. It also implies that, in purely economic terms, the Community's bargaining power has been significantly superior than that of the Eastern block. Thirdly, within the CMEA, there always has a much stronger drive among the smaller CMEA countries in Central and Eastern Europe towards cooperation with the EC, due to their natural geographic, historical cultural and economic contact with the West, which were artificially disturbed after the Second World War. These elements are especially important due to their relevance and impact on present E-W European relations.

¹⁰ A Trade and Cooperation Agreement has been signed in 1990 between the EC and the Soviet Union. In this agreement, for the first time, the European Atomic Energy Community (EUROATOM) was included. After the disintegration of the USSR, the agreement has been replaced with new treaties with the new independent states.

2. The Europe Agreements

The "*Second Generation of Association Agreements*" also called "*Europe Agreements*", represent, at present, the principal framework for the European Community's relations with the Central and East European countries. The Association Agreements, concluded at the end of 1991 with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary and, at the beginning of 1993, with Romania and Bulgaria, have replaced the former trade and cooperation agreements, and are considered by these countries to be, both in economic and political terms, their first major step in the process of a "return to Europe".

The legal basis of these agreements was Art.238. of the Treaty of Rome, which provides for the possibility of the Community to "enter into agreements with a third party State or an International Organization which create an association characterized by mutual rights and duties, by common action and particular procedures". The association agreements can be included in the category of *mixed agreements*, since they do not address purely economic problems, but also political and other issues for which the Community has no express or implied powers. In the case of such mixed agreements, the 12 EC member states are partners individually, as well as collectively. Therefore, the agreements require the ratification of the European Parliament, the parliaments of each EC member-state, and the parliament of the associated state.¹¹

The association agreements concluded so far with the five East European states are drawn along the same lines. Differences occur mainly with regard to the specific allocation of quotas in trade of "sensitive products" and the timetable of trade liberalization (since not all the agreements were signed at the same time).

The main principles defining the association relation, included in the agreements (Art.6), are related to the rule of law, the respect of human rights, political pluralism and market economy. The Europe Agreements are aimed "to provide an appropriate framework for the political dialogue between Parties", [...] "the expansion of trade and the harmonization of economic relations", increased economic, social, financial and cultural cooperation throughout Europe, greater support for East European countries efforts to develop market economies and democratic systems (Art.1). The preamble of the agreements also includes the fact that the agreements aim to provide a framework for the "gradual integration" of East European countries into the community provided that

¹¹ The ratification procedure of the Europe Agreements is, thus, a very lengthy process. In the case of Poland and Hungary the ratification procedures will be completed until the summer of 1993. The division of Czechoslovakia in two independent republics implies the renegotiation and the conclusion of two separate agreements. In the case of Romania and Bulgaria the ratification procedures are likely to be completed around mid-1994.

In the period between the signing of the association agreements and their entering into force the relations between the Community and each East European partner country are regulated by *interim agreements implementing trade and related provisions*.

Table 3

The main features of the Europe Agreements

1. **Free movement of goods and services** leading ultimately to the creation of a free trade area within a period of 10 years from the entering into force of the agreements. Some very important aspect with regard to trade liberalization have to be noted:
 - There will be an asymmetric reduction of trade barriers with the EC proceeding more quickly, while East European countries are permitted a slower pace of trade liberalization in order to cope with restructuring problems and become more competitive;
 - The so called "sensitive products" (agricultural goods, textiles, steel) will continue to be highly protected by the EC and subject to quota trade;
 - Other exception from free trade have to be transparent and temporary. In the case of the East European countries these exceptions can be based only on very precise criteria such as the infant industry argument or restructuring exigencies. Additional safeguard clauses have been included mainly for the sake of EC producers and relate to the situations mentioned in the GATT safeguard clauses. ("serious injury to domestic producers or disturbances in any sector of the economy").
2. **"Phased" liberalization of persons' and capital movements.**
 - In the first phase, a special attention will be given to creation of favorable conditions and the stimulation of W-E capital flows, as well as to the creation of social security systems in eastern countries.
 - In the second phase, measures will be taken aimed at an improved movement of capital and workers and the creation of conditions for the further gradual application of EC standards in this sense.
3. **The approximation of legal systems** in particular relating to company law, company accounts and taxes, financial services, competition, health and safety regulations, consumer protection, the environment, transport, and intellectual and commercial property.
4. **An institutional framework for cooperation** including:
 - an *Association Council* as discussion and decision making body;
 - an *Association Committee* to assist the activity of the Association Council;
 - a *Parliamentary Association Committee* as a consultative body.
5. **Economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation** and exchange of information.
6. **EC financial aid and technical support** in fields such as environment, transport, telecommunications, agriculture, energy, regional development and tourism. Provisions regarding the assistance of small and medium size enterprises in Eastern Europe and encouragement of private investment, are included.
7. **Common projects aimed at improving infrastructure** within East European countries and the creation of E-W links. The projects will relate to roads, railways, waterways and gas pipelines and telecommunication systems.

Source: Adapted from Suzan Senior Nello (1991), *The New Europe - Changing Economic Relations Between East and West*, p.207.

these countries will fulfill the "necessary conditions".¹²

A brief picture regarding the main features of the association agreements is provided by Table 3. The most important and interesting aspects of the agreements will be a further analyzed.

2.1. Free movement of goods

The provisions relating to the free movement of goods and services are very precise. A *free trade area for non-sensitive products* shall gradually be established over a transition period not longer than 10 years. The transition period is asymmetrical in the sense that it provides for a faster opening of EC markets, while giving East European countries more time for opening their markets. In principle, the Community undertakes to abolish all customs duties, tariffs, quotas or ceilings by the end of the fifth year from the day of the entry into force of the agreements, while the East European partners will do the same at the end of the ninth year.

Sensitive products (agricultural products, textiles and steel) are subject to special arrangements included in separate protocols attached to the agreements.

In these areas the EC seemed not to be prepared to liberalize its trade.

In the case of steel, quantitative restrictions, or other measures having a similar effect are abolished on the day of entry of the agreements into force, while tariffs are to be reduced from the present levels (approximately 5%) to zero within five years.

The tariffs on textiles are to be reduced by the EC over a period of six years from the entry into force of the agreements, while quantitative arrangements continue to be governed by the bilateral agreements on trade in textile products that are already in force since the end of the 1980s. There is a commitment in the protocols of the Europe Agreements to negotiate an additional protocol, once the present GATT Uruguay Round is successfully concluded. The additional protocol will provide the dismantling of quantitative restrictions over a period that is half the period decided upon at the GATT level for world textiles trade. This depends, however, on successful outcome of the Uruguay Round.

Agriculture will continue to be seriously protected under the Community's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Some modest concessions are made for certain East European agricultural exports like those of meat, fruit, dairy goods and vegetables which are allowed to rise by 10% per year for a period of five years. There is, however, nothing within the agreements that would provide for a complete liberalization of agricultural trade, not even after the 10 years period.

¹² General conditions for accession to the Community are established by the EC Treaties. They include:

- the capacity of the country concerned to assume the obligations of membership (the "acquis communautaire");
- the stability of institutions in the candidate country, guaranteeing: democracy, the rule of law, human rights;
- the existence of a functioning market economy;
- the candidate's endorsement of the objectives of political, economic and monetary union;
- the candidate's capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the European Union;
- the Community's capacity to absorb new members while maintaining the momentum of European integration.

(Source: *Towards a Closer Association with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe*, Report by the Commission to the European Council, Edinburgh, 11-12 December 1992, p.3.)

2.2. Liberalization of capital and persons' movements

The liberalization of *capital movements* is linked to the payments problem and the currency convertibility issue and the creation of competitive financial sectors in the eastern countries which are to be addressed in the first stage following the entering into force of the association agreements (the first five years). In the second stage the parties shall take measures to create the necessary conditions for the farther gradual application of Community rules on the free movement of capital.

With regard to the *movement of people*, the agreements provide for an improved access in the EC for reasons like tourism and professional training. The movement of workers remains generally subject to the regulations of the individual member states, and a phased liberalization in this sense is envisaged for the second stage (after five years) of the association. Provisions relating to the non-discrimination of legally employed East European workers within the EC, or EC workers within the East European partner country, are included. An important element represents the Community's commitment to contribute to the creation of social safety nets in eastern countries.

2.3. Approximation of laws

The Europe Agreements provide for cooperation on the approximation of legislation, as this is an important condition for economic integration. A legal environment compatible with Community law is a major incentive for foreign investment and a vehicle for improved access to Community markets. Partner countries recognize that it is in their interest to make the most of this provision, which could prepare them for eventual Community membership. The community has offered to make available to its partners technical assistance and other forms of support to enable them to adapt their legislation to that of the Community.

2.4. Economic, technical and financial cooperation

The PHARE programme¹³ is the main instrument for economic and technical assistance under the Europe Agreements. The guidelines characterizing PHARE assistance reflect the priorities of the recipient countries. The main objectives are the support for economic reform and structural adjustment, with an emphasis on consolidating reform.

Financial cooperation is also an important feature of the Europe Agreements. In addition to PHARE, the Community should provide macro-economic assistance, as a complement to balance of payments support from the IMF and play an active role in inviting other industrialized countries and international institutions to provide this type of support.

2.5. The institutionalization of political dialogue

The institutional framework of cooperation is provided by three main bodies:

- *The Association Council*, which consists of the members of the Council of the EC and members of the government of partner-countries, has the power to take decisions in issues provided, in the agreements and to implement the decisions. Furthermore, the Association

¹³ The PHARE programme ("*Pologne, Hongay Assistance pour Reconstruction Economique*") was launched in 1989 as an economic assistance programme for Poland and Hungary. Since its inception, the number of countries covered by PHARE has grown from two to ten and the volume of finance has tripled.

Council has a role in dispute settlements relating to the interpretation and application of the agreements;

- *The Association Committee* has the role of assisting the Association Council (preparing the meetings etc.) or to carry out some of the latter's duties in the case of delegation of powers. The Association Committee consists of members of the Council of the EC and of members of the Commission of the EC on the one hand, and members of the government of the partner country, on the other hand.

- *The Association Parliamentary Committee* includes members of the European Parliament and members of the parliament of the partner country. Its powers include the right to be informed with regard to all the decisions of the Association Council and the right to make recommendations to the Association Council.

3. A Critical Analysis of the Relations between the European Community and Eastern Europe

According to the classical theory of international trade (based on the concept of "comparative advantage" - the most influential up until now), the greater the differences between trading partners are, the higher the gains from free trade. Since the difference between the West and the East of Europe is, unquestionably, quite substantial when measured in economic terms, it should follow that very optimistic results are to be expected due to the Association Agreements.

The Agreements include indeed some positive elements: they create a free trade area for "non-sensitive" manufactured products within ten years, they provide for special arrangements, like the asymmetrical opening of the Western and the Eastern markets implying a slower pace of import liberalization for the Eastern countries, they deal with a wider range of problems than just trade in goods, including trade in services, the flow of capital, economic, political, scientific, environmental and cultural cooperation, and finally they recognize the East European countries' aim to become full members of the EC.

However, some aspects regarding the Agreements and the current global reality might make us worry of the "misleading charm" of some international trade agreements economic theories, and thus, change our expectations.


3.1. The "sensitive products" issue

The Association Agreements do not provide for complete free trade not even at the end of the 10 years period. There is a clear distinction between "sensitive and "non-sensitive" products in the Agreements. In the case of non-sensitive products, the EC abolished all tariffs and quotas on the day the agreements came into force, which is not the case with the sensitive products like agricultural goods, coal, steel and textiles. These products are considered of "primary interest" for the EC and which are subjected to market regulation policies (like the Common Agricultural Policy - CAP, for example). The problem is that these are exactly the sectors in which East European countries have a clear comparative advantage. Thus a very important source of trade creation and expansion is wasted, limiting the export potentials and welfare gains through trade especially for the East European countries for which the range of export-competitive products is quite narrow.

The problem of agriculture deserves special attention. As it is shown in Figure 1, agriculture represents an extremely important sector for the East European countries, both in terms of its contribution to their GNP and in terms of the share of the labor-force employed in this sector. The significant discrepancy between the relative share of the agricultural sector in the value of total output in Western Europe (5%), on the one hand, and Eastern Europe (15% to 32%), on the other hand, suggests that the comparative advantage in agricultural production should belong to Eastern Europe. Some western supporters of agricultural protectionism have strongly attacked the idea of East European agricultural comparative advantage putting forward arguments related to East European lower yields per hectare and higher number labor hours per value of agricultural output, as compared to the West. Things have to be clarified at this point. First, the yields per hectare, as such, do not accurately express the cost efficiency of agricultural production. The much higher labor costs, the intensive use of fertilizers and the increasingly important environmental costs in

Figure 1

GNP by sector in 1990 for the East European countries, the EC and EFTA (in per cent)



Source: *Plan Econ*; *The Economist Intelligence Unit*; *Eurostat*; *EFTA - Economic Affairs Dep*

the West may lead to much higher total costs of agricultural production in spite the fact that the yield per hectare might be superior to those in Eastern countries. Secondly, the argument of East European agricultural comparative advantage refers to an analysis in relative terms as defined by the classical trade theory. Even if Western Europe would have an absolute cost advantage in all sectors, including agriculture, it would be better off if it specialized in that sector where its relative advantage *vis à vis* the trade partner is greater. Finally, the best way to get rid of endless arguments, and to find out the true patterns of comparative advantage is removing the trade barriers.

Some historical data might bring further insight on the degree to which the CAP has been (and is) distorting E-W European agricultural trade patterns. The CAP is estimated to have caused a 30% fall in Hungarian agricultural exports to the Community over the period 1973-76. The suspension of beef and cattle imports to the EC after 1974 was held to be particularly damaging as these accounted for 52% of CMEA agricultural exports to the Community. The share of the CMEA in the Community's total agricultural imports, fell from almost 5%, in 1962, to just 1.7% in 1987. The fall was extremely serious for Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the USSR. The transformation of the EC from a net importer to a net exporter of major temperate agricultural foodstuffs, and the successive enlargements of the EC have entailed considerable trade diversion with the share of intra-EC imports in total agricultural imports rising from 31.6% in 1962 to 60.7% in 1987.¹⁴ The CAP is affecting East European countries also indirectly by its dumping of agricultural products on

¹⁴ Nello, *supra* note ?, at p 143.

the world market and depressing the world price of these products, which has a negative effect on East European countries' terms of trade.

A recent study conducted by two British economists¹⁵ has put forward some meaningful conclusions with regard to the welfare effects that would be determined by EC's liberalization of agricultural trade with Eastern Europe. According to this study, Eastern Europe's farm exports to the EC would double as compare to their pre-1989 levels provided that all barriers to agricultural trade will be eliminated. This would bring net benefits both for the EC and Eastern Europe. Although EC farmers would lose almost £ 3 billion a year, EC taxpayers and consumers would gain, between them, about £ 4.5 billion, and Eastern Europe's exporters would gain about £ 1.5 billion. Provided that these figures would match reality, it would be possible to compensate western farmers for their losses, in full, improve Eastern Europe's hard-currency earnings, and still leave EC taxpayers and consumers £ 1.5 billion a year better off.¹⁶

3.2. The use of safeguard clauses, anti-dumping procedures and other trade instruments.

Very difficult problems might arise with regard to the use of the safeguard clauses, anti-dumping procedures and other trade measures to protect EC industry. In the association agreements the safeguard clauses are related to measures that can "only be adopted in conformity and under the conditions laid down by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade".¹⁷ It implies that safeguard clauses might be used only in such cases where trade may cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers, or might cause serious disturbance in any sector of the economy.¹⁸ This is obviously raising serious questions of interpretation.

Reacting to the complaints on the lack of access to the Community market and the use of safeguard clauses, Sir Leon Brittan, vice-president of the EC Commission with responsibility for external trade relations, communicated in Prague on March 12 that he intends to interpret safeguard clauses of the Europe Agreements narrowly, to the letter. Such instruments should be weapons of last resort and should be used sparingly. They cannot be used to claw back the concessions that have been made.¹⁹ However, the current recession in the EC has led to sound calls for temporarily limiting the trade concessions made in the Europe agreements, either through the use of the safeguard clauses, or through "normal" anti-dumping procedures or voluntary export restraints under the pressure of anti-dumping measures.

It is important to stress that there is a longstanding "tradition" in the EC's application

¹⁵ Rollo J. and Smith A., "The Political Economy of Eastern Europe's Trade with the European Community: Why so Sensitive?", *Economic Policy*, 16 April 1993.

¹⁶ *The Economist*, 1 May 1993, p.34.

¹⁷ Article 64 of the association agreements.

¹⁸ Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

¹⁹ "Trade Instruments - A Weapon of Last Resort", *Together in Europe - EC Newsletter for Central and Eastern Europe*, No.25, 15 March 1993, Bruxelles.

of anti-dumping procedures towards Eastern Europe. Table 4 gives an image with regard to the number of anti-dumping cases initiated by the EC against East European countries in the 1980s. The statistics show that the East Europeans, usually, accounted for a considerable share of all the EC-initiated anti-dumping cases. Dumping usually refers to price discrimination which entails *selling products on a foreign market at a price which is lower than that of the domestic market*. The inexistence of a genuine domestic market in the case of the former socialist economies implied, according to the EC perspective that any kind of exports of the planned economies could be considered potential dumping cases. Moreover, the domestic price in a non-market economy was considered not to be an appropriate basis for an anti-dumping procedure. This has led to the idea of using an "analogue country" to derive the so called "normal domestic value" of products subject to anti-dumping cases. Although, theoretically, the choice of an analogue country was supposed to be based upon certain similarities²⁰ with the country under investigation, in practice it has been determined by the willingness of producers in the analogue country to cooperate with the Community, and the Commission's commitment to consider only analogue countries for which the assessment of normal value was likely to yield a reasonable result.²¹ Between 1980 and 1986 the analogue countries used most often in EC anti-dumping cases against planned economies were: Austria, the United States, Yugoslavia, Spain, Norway and Japan (all countries with higher levels of income than the non-market countries under investigation). The anti-dumping procedure using an analogue country implied that the non-market economies can never produce at costs lower than those of the analogue countries. The possibility of East European countries having a comparative advantage in certain types of production (due to low labor costs, certain natural resources or other relative favorable conditions) was ruled out.²²

While this kind of politico-economic masquerade may have found its place among the so many peculiarities of the Cold War era, it cannot be continued today. The East European countries have by now completed their price liberalization programmes, eliminated virtually all state subsidies and substantially eliminated barriers to trade, hoping that the market mechanism and free trade will open their way towards economic development. Using anti-dumping procedures in the context of the new conditions is a clear sign of the EC's hypocrisy, a way of denying the basic market principles which the West promoted for such a long time.

Meanwhile the temptation to use safeguard and anti-dumping measures seems to be growing. A meaningful example in this sense is the never-ending "battle on steel". After the surge of East European steel exports in the first half of 1992, the Commission decided, in August that same year, to restrict exports of three types of Czechoslovak steel into four EC countries. Then the Commission slapped provisional anti-dumping duties on Polish and

²⁰ The similarities were supposed to be related to the size of the country's industries and market, access to raw materials, techniques of production, the general level of economic development etc

²¹ Nello, *supra* note 7, at p.55. See also the House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee Second Report (1989), p.xvi.

²² Hirsch (1988) quotes a case in which the Soviet Union asked for a 15% allowance to take account of differences in the costs of producing electric motors between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia due to economies of scale and rationalization. This was rejected by the EC authorities on the ground that "the concept of economies of scale is specific to market economies".

Table 4

EC anti-dumping cases involving East European countries in the period 1980-1988

Country	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988
Bulgaria	-	1	-	-	2	1	-	-	1
Czechoslovakia	-	8	5	3	4	1	2	-	1
GDR	-	6	6	2	3	2	3	-	1
Hungary	1	5	1	1	4	1	-	1	1
Poland	-	6	1	1	4	1	-	-	1
Romania	-	4	3	3	2	2	1	2	2
USSR	1	3	3	3	4	1	1	2	1
East European total	2	33	19	13	23	9	7	5	8
All countries' total	25	48	58	38	49	36	24	39	40
Eastern Europe as % of all countries	8	69	33	34	47	25	29	13	20

Source: Annual Reports of the Commission on the Community's Anti-dumping and Anti-subsidy Activities: 1980-1988

Czech steel tubes. In April 1993, The Commission agreed on a proposal that would limit imports of six types of Czech and Slovak steel at about their 1992 level until 1995.²³ These are serious moves away from the letter and purpose of the association agreements, which were supposed to eliminate quantitative restrictions and provide more open access on EC markets.

Of course the east Europeans could also the safeguard clauses included in the agreements.²⁴ This would do nothing more than to create a deadlock and a return to the pre-1990 non-trade situation, and E-W economic division, which the East Europeans are keen leave behind - so keen that it leaves them without the necessary negotiating power to conclude favorable agreements. Safeguard clauses, anti-dumping procedures and the other trade instruments become therefore exclusive EC weapons.

3.3. The political economy of international trade - Income distribution effects

International trade and especially trade due to comparative advantage has strong domestic income distribution effects. Together with the adjustment costs mentioned above, these income distribution effects provide strong arguments for various pressure groups against trade liberalization, being actually the source of EC's protection of "sensitive products". The

²³ "The two Europes - Poor Relations", *The Economist*, 1 May, 1993, p.33.

²⁴ Some special safeguard provision have been, actually, designed for the sake of eastern countries and relate to the exigencies of restructuring or the infant industry argument.

phenomenon is explained quite extensively by the modern theory of political economics²⁵, which is based primarily on the workings of domestic pressure groups. Social groups that are the losers from trade liberalization -- the producers in the import competing sectors -- gather usually in strong, cohesive and well organized groups, influencing the government's trade policy decisions through political pressure and lobbying.²⁶ On the other hand, those who can gain from free trade -- the consumers -- are normally less cohesive and less organized social groups than the pro-tariff lobbies and, therefore, not fighting enough for their interests. Furthermore, the gains are spread over a much larger number of people (the consumers) while the losses are concentrated upon much smaller groups (the producers in the specific import competing sector) which can explain their significant cohesion and commitment to defend their interests.²⁷ Given this situation, the perspectives that the EC will give up its protection policies are rather unpromising.

3.4. Comparative advantage and non-comparative advantage driven trade. The chances of intra-industry trade.

A further source of disappointment for those who have very optimistic expectations from the Agreements, comes from the new patterns in international trade and foreign investment which are strongly challenging the classical theory of international trade. The data presented by the Human Development Report (1992, p.35) show that in 1989, 81.2 % of world trade corresponded to the OECD countries and only 1.0 % is trade share of the least developed countries.

Since trade among very similar developed countries is mainly intra-industry, while trade between developed and developing countries is mainly inter-industry, the presented data prove that *the importance of inter-industry trade, which is due to comparative advantage is declining compared to that of intra-industry trade, which has non-comparative advantage sources (like economies of scale-imperfect competition, accumulated knowledge - the learning effect)*.²⁸

One reason for this very low profile of trade between developed and developing countries, might be the fact that technological progress (a dynamic effect which the classical theory does not take into account) has developed cheaper capital intensive substitutes for traditional labor intensive products and even some raw-materials which are traditional sources of comparative advantage for developing countries.

²⁵ Frey, B.S. (1986), *International Political Economics* (Blackwell, Oxford)

²⁶ Their main argument (which is intuitively and politically most appealing) is that trade liberalization will necessary lead to higher unemployment and lower domestic output, whereas a tariff might secure high levels of profits and employment.

²⁷ Vousden, N. (1990), *The Economics of Trade Protection*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, cap.8.

Another group of potential winners from trade-liberalization are export producers. In this case we could have significant gains concentrated upon a much smaller social group than the big mass of consumers. However, the gains, in this case are, "potential gains" depending, among others, upon the trade policy of partner countries, which can be influenced only through complicated negotiations.

²⁸ The idea of non-comparative advantage trade is the central element of the "new trade theory". Expounded originally in a series of papers by Dixit and Norman (1980), Lancaster (1980), Krugmann (1981 and 1991), Ethier (1988) and others the new theory has become increasingly influential due to its efforts and contribution in explaining the patterns of trade and filling a logical gap in the standard trade theory.

Classical trade theories may reflect trade patterns among former "extensive economies" shaped mainly by relative factor endowments characteristics, but surely not the "intensive economies" of today, characterized mainly by their technological level creating opportunities for significant economies of scale and learning effects.

The idea is that Eastern Europe would have much more to gain if it would have access to "the big piece of the cake", which is intra-industry trade, since trade due to comparative advantage seems to get an increasingly low profile, and since it is anyway blocked for products which represent Eastern Europe's comparative advantage. Unfortunately, at the present moment there is a significant technological and economic development difference between the West and the East of Europe, which implies rather modest possibilities of intra-industry trade between the two regions.

3.5. Participation in decision making and the need for improved "positive integration"

Finally, provisions regarding other aspects than trade in goods like: foreign investment, services, technological and scientific cooperation, regional, social and environmental policy, are rather modest and sometimes vague. Although a certain number of important elements of Community policy will be introduced in East European economies due to the Agreement, **there is still a significant need for more elements of "positive integration"**²⁹ in W-E European relations, oriented especially toward the requirements of the Eastern countries. The problem of the international distribution of welfare gains from open trade (distribution which might be rather unequal due to the negative terms of trade effects of EC's protectionist policy in certain areas on East European countries) will support the idea of much closer and committed institutionalized cooperation.

Extremely complex and difficult problems might arise from the process of institutionalization of political dialogue. According to the agreements, associated countries have an observer status with regard to the process of EC decision-making. The main question which arises in this sense relates to how far the East European countries should be allowed to have a voice in shaping Community policies which ultimately directly influence them.³⁰

²⁹ While "negative integration" relates to the elimination of obstacles against trade, the concept of Positive integration" is more involved and relates to the creation of equal conditions for the functioning of the parts of integrated economies. This is implying policies in the direction of allocation of resources, stabilization, redistribution of income, etc. (Molle, 1990, p.11-28)


³⁰ Nello, *supra* note 4 at p.208.

4. Estimating the Outcome of East-West Trade-Liberalization

The potential of East-West trade has been, in the last years, an important point of interest.

In two recent studies Wang and Winters³¹ and, respectively, Collins and Rodrik³² suggest that East-West trade flows in a free trade Europe could expand dramatically. The results of these studies are presented in Figure 2. Wang and Winters base their study on a gravity model.

Figure 2



Source: EFTA News, Nr.4/93, 18 June 1993, p.4.

Gravity models assume that trade flows between countries are determined primarily by the economic mass of countries and by the economic distance between them. The variables considered in this study are the size of the countries, their GNP, their geographical and


³¹ Z.K. Wang and L.A. Winters (1991), "The Trading Potential of Eastern Europe", *Discussion Paper No.610, Center for Economic Policy Research, London*

³² Suzan M. Collins and Dani Rodrik (1991), "Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the World Economy", *Policy Analyses in International Economics*, No.32, May 1991, Institute for International Economics, Washington DC.

cultural distance, and the unnatural trade barriers between trade partners. If trade between all European countries will be determined by the same regime as trade between the West European countries, then Wang and Winters estimate that the East European countries' trade should be roughly two to three times higher what it was in their base year 1985. Collins and Rodrik reach quite similar results, using a different model of prediction. In a 1992 study, based again on the gravity model, Hamilton and Winters³³ reach the conclusion that East West trade increases under the Association Agreements, will be far from its potential under a genuine free trade regime.

Further conclusions with regard to the impact of the Europe agreements upon East European countries can be drawn from the evolution of trade patterns in the case of the three Central European countries which in 1992 have benefited from the interim agreements implementing trade and related provisions of the association agreements.

Figure 3



Source: "The Iron Trade Curtain", *Time*, 17 May 1993

³³ Hamilton, C.B. and Winters, L.A. (1992), 'Opening-up International Trade in Eastern Europe', *Economic Policy*, p.14.

It should be noted, that the Europe agreements were designed to be asymmetrical in favor of Central and East European countries. Behind the asymmetry there was the idea, that Eastern Europe would grow by exporting to the EC and that the EC might wait for a period to have duty-free access in Central and Eastern Europe.

Recent trade developments show, however, a different pattern of trade emerging. The balance of trade is moving in Western Europe's favor. The EC runs a trade surplus with Eastern Europe and in 1992 its exports to the region expanded much more than did its imports from it (see Figure 3). EC exports to ex-Czechoslovakia, for example, expanded in 1992 by 60%, while imports rose by only 39%.³⁴ Hungary's exports plunged in the first quarter of 1993 after running a negative trade balance with the EC in 1992.³⁵ This might prove that, on the aggregate, Eastern Europe has liberalized its trade with the EC much more than the Community has reciprocated. It is not surprising since the EC opened its markets mainly for products in which it does not face serious competition from the east. The asymmetric trade liberalization provision is therefore practically nullified.

³⁴ *Together in Europe*, supra note 16 at p.1.

³⁵ "One Wall Replaces another", *The Economist*, 1 May, 1993, p.34.

Table 5

Romania's Trade with the European Union: 1989-1994

(The trade-volume figures are expressed in millions of US\$)

			1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994 (Jan-Jul)
Total	Exports (fob)		5990	3502	3537	4285.6	4882.2	2463.2
	Imports (cif)		3470.5	5223.1	5290.1	5886.1	6248.4	2499
	Trade Balance		2519.6	-1720.4	-1720.4	-1600.5	-1336	-35.7
EU	Exports to the EU	Volume	2658.1	1669.9	1434	1399.5	1924	1062.7
		% of total	44.4%	47.4%	40.5%	32.6%	39.4%	43.1%
	Imports from the EU	Volume	476.9	1215.2	1380.4	2212.4	2740.5	1329
		% of total	13.7%	23.2%	26.0%	37.5%	43.9%	52.2%
	Trade Balance		2181.2	454.7	54.2	-812.9	-816.5	-166.2

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Political and economical co-operation between the Balkan countries

The Balkans have always been one of the most sensitive and political unstable area of the European continent. If we think back at the political and military events like the Balkan War and mainly the World War One, we can notice that the name powder keg is unfortunately justified.

Romania, in its capacity as a Central European country which is adjacent with the Balkans has constantly been a part of the peacekeeping efforts in the region. During the period between the two world wars, Romania's efforts to prevent possible conflicts in the Balkans took very concrete forms.

The first attempt was The Pact of the Little Agreement. At first, it was the expression of an association which was conceived as a limited defensive military association among Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania against a possible aggression from the part of Hungary, acting alone or in association with other countries. This alliance was completed by a defensive alliance, concluded between Romania and Yugoslavia against a possible aggression from the part of Bulgaria which may, at its turn take action alone or together with other states.

The whole system of agreements concerning the defensive alliance agreed upon among Romania, Yugoslavia and the Czech Republic was a means of expressing the determination of the three states to be opposed to any revisionist claims and to defend the territorial status quo established by the peace treaty from Trianon of June 1920 and Nully sur Seine of 27 November 1919.

As Mr. Nicolae Titulescu, a famous Romanian diplomat, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the period between the two world wars, stated in his book "Romania's Foreign Policy", "Only in the Organisational Pact of the Little Agreement signed in Geneva on the 16th

of February 1933, signed by Mr. Benes and Jevnic and myself we decided to consolidate the unity of action of the states which are members of the Little Agreement stipulating that none of the three states can conclude treaties with other states or to take actions which may modify their present international situation or to sign economic agreements which might have important political consequences without the approval of the other two partners”.

Article 1 of the Agreement stipulates that there shall be created a Permanent Council of the states of the Little Agreement composed of the ministers of Foreign Affairs of the three countries or of the special representatives appointed to this end as a co-ordinating body of the common policy of the group of the three countries. The decisions of the Permanent Council will be taken unanimously.

Article 7: There will be founded an Economical Council of the Little Agreement in order to progressively co-ordinate the economic interest of the three states either among them or in their relationship with third countries. It will consist of specialists and experts in economic, commercial and financial domains and will function as an auxiliary advisory body of the Permanent Council in its general policy.

The Pact of the Balkan Agreement signed among Romania, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece in Athens on the 9th of February represents another step towards securing peace in the Balkans which was taken by Romania with other countries in order to prevent conflict and aggression in the Balkans.

Article 1 stipulates Romania, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece mutually guarantee themselves the security of all the Balkan borders.

Article 2. The High Contractors commit themselves to concentrate on the measures that are to be taken if some events should occur that could effect their interests as defended in the present agreement. They commit themselves not to take any political action towards other Balkan countries which did not sign the present agreement without a previous mutual agreement and any political

These were the major agreements which were meant to ensure the security in the Balkans for some of the Balkan countries between the two world wars.

The political developments after World War II, were summarised briefly by Pedrag Simis in his article "After the Cold War: Europe, the Balkans and Yugoslavia", published in the "International Spectator", no. 4. October-December 1992: "During the Cold War, the geopolitical configuration of the Balkans was expressed by the 2+2+2 formula: Romania and Bulgaria (Warsaw Pact), Turkey and Greece (NATO), Yugoslavia and Albania (non-aligned or not par of either block). This configuration was essentially accepted by both superpowers although the Soviet Union occasionally made efforts to bring Yugoslavia back into the Eastern block".

The end of bipolarism is one of the major consequences of the changes which occurred in Eastern Europe after 1989. As Pedrag Simic observed in his article, mentioned above, "the changes resulted in a power vacuum in the Central, Eastern and Southern areas of the continent." (In this area new ethnic and border conflicts many almost forgotten were reasserted in Europe: the integration of Yugoslavia, ethnic and territorial disputes in Czechoslovakia, the Romanian Hungarian dispute in Transilvania and above all the disputes on the territory of the former USSR have become the source of significant threats to peace and security in the region with repercussion on the Western part of the continent as well.)

Under these circumstances, the regional and subregional co-operation among the European countries has gained a tremendous importance.

Two major political concepts have been redefined and revived lately: Mittel Europa and the Balkans. The first indication of the renaissance of Mittel Europa was Milan Kundera's article "Tragedy of Eastern Europe" published in New York in 1984. This concept was clearly linked with two factors: the declining of the global influence of the US particularly on the European continent and the German unification which was a sign for the starting of the strengthening process of Germany's international position. This has encouraged the revival of a specific Central European identity.

On the other hand, the term Balkans has a very precise meaning for the West as "a backward area of Europe marked by clashing interests of numerous small nations and ethnic minorities".

IV Romania's Initiatives concerning Political and Economical Co-operation in the Balkans before the Outburst of the Yugoslav Crisis

Taking into account the traditions of over 60 years of collaboration (the organising of the Balkan Conferences from 1930 to 1933, the signing of the Pact of the Balkan Agreement which functioned between 1934-1940, the pursuing of the collaboration after the Second world war in spite of the existing ideological differences lead the six states Albania, Bulgaria, Greece Yugoslavia, Romania and Turkey to a reshaping of their multilateral relations in the area during the period after the Second World War and at the end of the Cold War. They reached also a peak of collaboration in 1991.

The common statement which was adopted at the Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Balkan states which took place on 24-25 October 1990 in Tirana, was the sign for a start of an institutionalisation process. It was agreed to organise every year the conference of the foreign

ministers of the Balkan countries. The position of co-ordinator was established. At the reunion of the high ranking officials of the Foreign Minister of the Balkan countries were in favour of the continuation co-operation in the economic and cultural domains and for the extension of this co-operation in the political domain in the future at the military level.

The Balkan collaboration assumed also a parliamentary dimension as a consequence of the reunion at the Foreign Affairs Committees of the parliaments of the Balkan countries which took place in Bucharest between the 7-8 of May 1991.

It was decided to institutionalise this type of reunion. On an annual basis. It was also decided to create the Permanent Group for Balkan Co-operation (composed of 3-5 members from every foreign affairs committee which were meant to represent the respective parliaments to the future parliamentary reunion of the Balkan states. The intensifying of the political and diplomatic relations in 1990-1991 enhanced the co-operation on various levels.

Among other things it was decided to

- organise annual meetings of the ministers of foreign trade or of the economy;
- create a research Institute for Economic Co-operation of a Balkan Bank and of a Chamber of Commercial and Industry;
- create free trade areas in the region;
- annual meetings of defence ministers;
- elaborate some confidence measures of a code of good neighbourhood;
- install direct telephone connections among the foreign ministers of the Balkan countries for rapid communications.
- elaborate a Convention concerning the cultural, scientific and educational co-operation;
- elaborate a code of co-operation among all the Balkan states in ethical problems and those of minorities and to create a Balkan Institute on these problems.

Romania has set itself as an aim to develop the co-operation actions in the Balkan area according to its traditional role in the region taking into account the possibility offered by the subregional co-operation in the perspective of the European integration. We shall mention only a few actions in this respect.

Romania was the host of many working groups like those for the organisation of an Inter Balkan Co-operation on economic problems similar to the CSCE conference in Romania (Bucharest 5-6 November 1991), the organising of an Agricultural data for the co-operation in the domain of economic exploitation of the mountain area (Paltinis 17-18 May 1991) and those concerning the small and medium size enterprises (26-28 November 1991).

V. Balkan Co-operation after the Yugoslav Crisis

At the end of 1991, the Balkan co-operation was blocked. This fact led to the postponing or cancellation of political and economic reunions. The decision making factors from the Balkan countries decided to "freeze the actions of Balkan co-operation. They are going to be resumed after the political and negotiated solving of the post Yugoslav crisis. It was considered that it is only them that all the interested parts from the Balkans will be offered the possibility to participate in this co-operation, including those which cut themselves loose from Yugoslavia and express their clear choice in this respect.

Though the efforts of restructuring the regional co-operation have not been put an end to the most significant in this respect being the following.

The Bulgarian proposal launched in February 1992 concerning the convening of an International Conference (Forum) about the Balkans. This initiative aimed subsidiary to obtain pledges from the part of the countries adjacent to Bulgaria that they will have no territorial claims towards that country. Finally, the Bulgarian proposal was rejected by the Federate Republic of Yugoslavia.

The other proposal was the one advanced by the ex-prime minister of Yugoslavia, Milan Panic during the tour that he made in August 1992 in a number of Balkan states concerning the foundation of a Balkan Economic Union (among Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria) which should start with an EFTA type of co-operation. The other aim should be the solving on completely modern basis of the problem of the national minorities. Panic's initiative was also aiming to get Yugoslavia out of isolation.

Another important action was the round table organised by the American Helsinki Chamber of Commerce and the Greek government in Athens on the 4th of December with the topic "The Balkans Co-operation and or Confrontation.

The reunion which took place at a time when the post Yugoslavian crisis was deepening underlined contradictory positions of the countries from the area towards the Balkan co-operation.

While the Greek representatives proposed the summoning of a Conference on Peace and Co-operation (with an obvious political contents linked with the Bosnian conflict and the potential conflictual situations from Macedonia, Kosovo, Sandjay and Voivodina).

The Turkish representative stated in a very point-clack manner that "the conditions for mutual trust in the Balkans are not met, but he explained Turkey's interest for the co-operation in the Black Sea area and with the ex-Soviet republics from Central Asia.

VI. Perspectives of the Balkan Co-operation

- A Romanian Point of View

Objectively speaking, the pole of gravity of the relations in the Balkan region has moved away towards the ex-Yugoslav space. Any type of new form of co-operation in the region will be closely linked to the developments from the ex-Yugoslavia space, to its economic recovery and the anchorage of the new states in the region in a normal network of relationships among themselves and the adjacent countries.

This is why instead of the former Balkan co-operation now we have a new outline of the co-operation area situate in south-eastern of Europe which encompasses Serbia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Austria, Italy and Turkey.

Among the preliminary measures which are bound to be taken in order to create a new co-operation area, two would be of utmost importance: one aiming at stopping the hostilities and the acts of violence, the re-establishing of trust and stability, and the second one oriented towards economic reconstruction. The reconstruction must be conceived by all the factors involved: the new republics, the neighbouring countries, the European Union, USA and the international institution.

The adjacent countries would confirm their position of equal distance towards all new republics, they will also pledge that they will take actions in order to restore trust and stability in the ex-Yugoslav space, that they will not be involved in any way in the internal conflicts and they will not contribute to their spreading. The neighbouring countries might present proposals in order to reintroduce the new republics in the normal web of relations in the area and in a broader sense in the international community. The process of creating a new south-eastern co-operation area could start by conveying a Conference for the Economic Reconstruction of the ex-Yugoslav Republics.

Romania, which has good relationships with all the five republics, might become a dynamic factor of the process, according to

the following scenario. One could propose the summoning in Bucharest of a Conference for the Reconstruction of the New States, the neighbouring countries would be interested because the ending as soon as possible of the Yugoslav crisis is also their interest.

A second stage, which would depend on the way in which an initiative would be met and on the results of the conference would be that of promoting the idea of setting up of a more stable co-operation framework in order to put into practice the conclusions of the conference. This idea could be promoted theoretically in some seminars, round tables or by studies made by experts. Diplomatically, this is possible at the reunion of the European and international institutions (CSCE, NATO, UEO, UNO).

The neighbouring countries might organise themselves in a group of actions as "Friends of the People from Former Yugoslavia" which will support the come-back of Serbia and Montenegro in the European and international organisations, the raising of the sanctions that could still exist, the examination in the international bodies of the problem of the compensation of the damages created by the embargo, the diplomatic recognition of all the new states, the enhancement of mutual relations.

A special place should be reserved to the opportunity of adopting by the states in the region for a Statement of Stability Life Together and Peaceful Co-operation. The need to set-up a framework of stability and co-operation in the most sensitive area from Europe will be promoted mainly in the environment of the North Atlantic Treaty Co-operation Council.

After creating the premises, we might propose the summoning of a Conference for Security and Co-operation in south-eastern Europe. The Conference could be conceived on three levels:

- the elaboration of a Political Statement which might sketch the framework of living together and co-operation among the participant states according to the international law

- the recognition of territorial integrity and of the newly established borders;
- the identification of areas of common interest (economic trade and transportation activities);
- the establishing of a solid system of political dialogue and consultations which will contribute to the increasing of mutual trust and of the perception of security.

The conference is aiming to establish a co-operation mechanism and programme of activities and concrete projects which would lay the foundation of a new co-operation system.

Another important element of the co-operation in the south-east Europe could be the idea of creating a Balkan Forum.

The Balkan Forum could become a form of institutionalising the Balkan co-operation, and the expression of a new political partnership in the Balkans. It might represent not only a sign of the important political, economical and social changes occurring in Europe, but also an instrument which might be used by the countries involved in order to contribute to the strengthening of security and co-operation in the new political juncture by flexible integration in the structure of the new European architecture.

Romania supports the idea that the Forum must have as a top target the re-assertion of the will of firm compliance by the Balkan states ^{Top} of the principles and provisions included in the Final Helsinki Document and in the Charta from Paris for a New Europe.

A possible General Statement of Principles signed by the heads of the states and governments of the Balkan states must refer also to the past achievements of the Balkan co-operation. The document may include also an official denial of any type of territorial claims. This might have the value of a commitment.

The next step might be the Balkan summit. Apart from the states in this area which will sign the statement, there are other states which are situated very closely geographically and representatives of

some European and international organisations might participate to the conference as observers.

Romania expresses its total openness towards the participation of all the independent states from the Yugoslav space which are internationally acknowledged. But it must be taken into account the fact that the presence of some states should not determine the absence of others.

The future Balkan summit might also approach the idea of setting up a permanent secretariat of the Balkan Forum in Bucharest, for instance, which might include public servants from all the countries.

But ultimately, only the clarification of the situation in Yugoslavia could allow the development of an effective Balkan institutional co-operation on multiple levels.

VIII Conclusions

As Daniel Nelson states in his article "Balkan Insecurities", published in the International Spectator no.4, October-December 1992, "This is a region where any attempt to obtain or enlarge military or economic strength will threaten others, requiring protection from external powers and/or resorting to authoritarian solutions from within. Both alternatives are indicative of internal insecurity which greatly heightens sensitivity to perceptions of external threat. The attempts made by any state to enlarge security via enlarged capacities at the aid of an external benefactor thus initiates a threat cycle, a slippery slope of perceived peril and fearful reaction that resolutely pulls the Balkans back into the cauldron of its past."

This quotation not only summarises the political developments that have been taking place in the Balkans for a long time, but it indicates also the type of changes needed in order not to repeat the same pattern of political, social, economical and military behaviour that leads inevitably to confrontation.

In my opinion, political changes must occur at international level. They have to affect the institutions, the political culture and mentality together with the behaviour of the political actors.

A new institutional approach is needed in order to avoid new tensions in an already tensed international situation.

I think that the key word is co-operation in competition among European and non-European countries. This type of co-operation aims to ensure in the end the integration of as many countries as possible in the European Union.

But, this integration process presupposes a number of stages of development on political, economical, and social level for all the European countries.

The co-operation in the Balkans area that one regarding the Danube Basin and mainly the economic co-operation in the Black Sea area are opportunities which prepare the countries for their future integration.

This regional and subregional co-operation reasserts the importance of political and economical entities like Mittel Europa, the Balkans and the Black Sea.

On the other hand, these types of co-operation are an attempt to help at closing the gap between East and West and, at the same time, they represent an important part of the new architecture of the European security.

The institutional, cultural and behavioural changes are also required from the Western partners.

They have to find new ways for protecting and promoting their interests without imposing a relationship of domination to other European countries.

The openness of the European institutions and the fair treatment which constantly avoids the doubled standards and states very clearly the rules and regulations for the admittance in the international organisations could be an important factor which might change mentalities, moderate political behaviours and consolidate institutions in Europe.

These changes might change at their turn the political, culture of the European states to the extent to which confrontation and war may be replaced by competition, co-operation and integration in a politically and economically strong European entity.

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IDEAS FOR BALKAN COOPERATION

The last five years in the development of mankind saw a dramatic removal of total confrontation and the bipolar model as well as of the international relations the latter had fostered. The events which put an end to the Cold War were welcomed, raising hopes and imparting a new meaning to notions such as "a new world order" but at the same time they posed a series of questions the answers to which proved rather complex and ambiguous.

The problem of the content, dynamics and parameters of Balkan cooperation once the conflict in the former Yugoslavia is over is part of the greater problem concerning the future of the Balkan peoples and the place and role of the Balkan states in the architecture of uniting Europe and the emerging system of international relations in general. Today it is clear more than ever that the aspiration of the Balkan states towards the European structures is not sufficient for them to be admitted as equal members of the European "family". What is needed are joint efforts to build the integrative profile of the Balkans, a profile to turn the peninsula into an integral part of the common European political, legal, economic, ecological and humanitarian space. This presupposes the development of a European-standard based regional cooperation which is to serve as a means of "civilizing" the region and a starting point of an equal Europartnership.

The alternative option is to seek the achievement of this goal individually and in strong rivalry, which would push some Balkan states to the periphery, contributing to the establishment of the "concentric circles" principle. The very logic of this would produce new division and contradictions.

The collapse of the bipolar system of international relations supported by its two main centres of balance definitely, although temporarily, has made the world considerably less stable.

and predictable. The removal of the rigid constraints of bloc opposition has released the potential of the trend towards internationalization and globalization but has also set free the vicious spirit of nationalism. The UN activities, the GATT negotiations, the processes related to the ratification of the Maastricht Agreements - they all manifest these two tendencies. And if internationalization and globalization nevertheless tend to prevail for the time being on a global and a European level, this cannot be said about the former Soviet space and the hotbeds of instability in Asia and Africa, let alone the Balkans.

The end of the Cold War and bloc opposition eliminated certain barriers in the Balkans but erected new ones. The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact created a huge vacuum space in regional security. Bulgaria and Romania lost their Warsaw Pact guarantees; Yugoslavia's buffer status became devoid of meaning which also largely contributed to its disintegration as a state formation. Albania found itself in an obvious military "weightlessness" in immediate proximity to the raging conflict in the former Yugoslavia. At the same time, the NATO Balkan member-states, having their NATO guarantees, continued to modernize their weapons using the compensations they have received for the use of their territories by the coalition troops for combat and support operations against Iraq and at the expense of the force level cuts underway in Central Europe. In fact, the reduction of conventional forces in Europe balanced on a bloc basis, in the Balkans has assumed the shape of a sharply increased military imbalance, both quantitative and qualitative, between the former Warsaw Pact states and the NATO member states.

Regional military balance has also been changed as a result of Yugoslavia's disintegration. The new state formations on its territory have created armed forces of their own greatly surpassing the former JNA in strength, while the escalation of the war despite the embargo imposed has attracted large amounts of weapons from abroad, some of them banned by international conventions.

Bearing in mind the painfulness of the transition to democracy, accompanied by an extremely severe and deep economic crisis, and the unprecedented national disunity reaching the point of political, ethnic, religious, economic, social, etc. antagonism, it becomes clear that the thresholds of the so called internal determinants of national security in most Balkan states have been strongly lowered in every respect. I would like to dwell

in more detail on some of the above-mentioned factors of instability.

I would place the ethnic factor topmost. The right to ethnic-religious self-determination at the expense of the inherent human right to life and peace stretched to the point of absurdity in Bosnia-Herzegovina is a precedent which could become an all-Balkan tragedy. Against the background of West European integration and the tendency towards elimination of national borders the wave of separatism and drawing new, not just national but ethnic and religious division lines on the territory of the former Yugoslavia is another paradox which, following the principle of interconnected vessels, may grow into a general Balkan syndrome. The contradictory development of democratization processes in the former socialist countries in the region has created possibilities for the formation of parties on an ethnic-religious basis, for ethnocentricity, for a sharp and extremely dangerous politization of ethnic problems and radicalization of autonomy claims. The claims to be treated as a separate ethnic-religious entity are almost everywhere encouraged by interested foreign actors thus becoming particularly dangerous to both the sovereignty and territorial integrity of certain Balkan states.

As far as the religious factor is concerned, numerous examples can be found in history of peaceful movements related to the church and faith. In peaceful, and I would add, normal, conditions, religion with the exception of its extreme fundamentalist schools, has fulfilled a positive social function. It teaches a view of life which reflects centuries-old and historically established moral values. Unfortunately, in case of an international conflict religion has almost always played a negative role, since it has inspired a sense of absolutism in people, ruling out any compromise. Therefore, religion cannot solve conflicts once they have erupted because it is absolute. If we take the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is obviously not a theological dispute but a conventional antagonism and struggle for land, representing however a part of the religious heritage of both groups, neither of which is willing to compromise. The things in today's Bosnian conflict is very much the same. As far as the effect of religion on the life of ordinary man is concerned, the situation is quite different and this effect is largely positive.

The economic and social factors of instability have been too widely discussed for me to enter into details here. I would just like to stress the problem of conforming to the economic embargo imposed on Serbia and Montenegro. Although of temporary

significance, this embargo, especially at the present moment of transition carried out in some countries of the region, represents a factor accumulating considerable negative effects. Thus Bulgaria alone has incurred losses amounting to over \$2 billion so far which is a very high figure bearing in mind the indebtedness of this country to foreign creditors and the state of its economy.

It should be added besides that the Balkans today still represent a crossroads of divergent interests and ambitions of powerful actors outside the region and this once again divides the peoples on the peninsula. Should this tendency be pushed further forward, the imposition of an order and climate similar to those after Yalta could be the outcome. In this perspective, very symptomatic are the results of the efforts by German, French, American and Russian diplomacy to manage the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, efforts which more than once during the crisis went into different directions. The "signals" for biased attitude towards one warring party or another made their positions more rigid, unyielding and unwilling to compromise, thus continually putting off the end of bloodshed. The powerful wave of public criticism in the face of daily rising numbers of innocent victims and the ever more frequent mutual accusations remind the "great powers" with increasing insistency that they have not only great interests but also great responsibilities and that common responsibility calls for common action. In the long run, the Yugoslav lesson could prove very instructive as far as the drawing of the outlines of the new international order is concerned. In this process the Balkan states too should bear their responsibilities. If they do not want to become just objects in high politics once again, the states in the region must declare categorically enough their consciousness of their regional identity, their common interests and common will for overcoming the renascent syndrome of "Balkanization", for lowering the risk potential in the region and increasing the compatibility of the region with the single European space being built.

The conflict between the Balkan paradoxes outlining a wide range of real and potential threats to security on the one hand and the general aspiration of the Balkan states to the European centres imperatively demands intensive Balkan cooperation. The complexity and diversity of Balkan cooperation makes it a dynamic system having many dimensions: political-military, humanitarian, ecological and economic.

As military imbalance increases, the vacuum space in regional security also increases, making it necessary that the

political-military dimension should become a priority trend in the regional cooperation. In my opinion, efforts should be made to create a network of bilateral treaties and agreements for friendship and cooperation in confidence-building in the defence area, which would undoubtedly be a step in the right direction. Thing however should not stop here. This network ought to include all the new state formations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. As we know, neither Yugoslavia, not her legal successors have entered any obligations under the CFE Treaty. I must emphasize that with this network approach the possible creation of new axes or the revival of old ones should be strictly avoided.

While not underestimating the significance of bilateral efforts to stabilize the regional climate, a parallel drive to set up a regional subsystem of security compatible with the Euroatlantic system would have a far more stabilizing effect. Although indirectly linked with NATO and WEU such a subsystem would create conditions for active cooperation with these organizations, while remaining open and retaining the possibility to be incorporated into a possible continental or a wider Euroatlantic security system.

Here I should like to remind you that an idea has been launched to have a postwar Balkan Conference which is becoming an imperative in view of the new realities. This idea has been motivated in the first place by the necessity to guarantee the inviolability of state borders in the changed political configuration in the region. This conference could also revive the all-Balkan process. The all-Balkan cooperation would become an important link between the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the Central European Initiative.

The signing of a treaty on the principles of regional relations and the revival of the mechanisms of the all-Balkan dialogue would boost the chances of reaching an agreement on the adoption of specific regional measures of confidence and security building and setting up a control mechanism for their implementation as well as of establishing a Balkan Conflict Prevention Centre.

I would point out the humanitarian dimension as the next area of regional Balkan cooperation. In view of the emerging new realities the postwar cooperation on the Balkans has both the unique chance and responsibility to unify the national legislations of the Balkan states concerning the establishment and maintenance of viable institutions and mechanisms which would

provide guarantees for the democratization process according to European standards and rules. This can be achieved through close Parliamentary cooperation. No doubt, the creation of a common regional humanitarian legal space is also one of the most important prerequisites to universality of the approaches to the very explosive and delicate ethnic-religious issues. The close relationship between security and these issues makes it imperative to seek a balance between the foreign policy and the humanitarian dimension of the regional security. I would like to quote this example. The possible signing of a treaty on the principles of regional relations and guarantees of border inviolability should be accompanied by relevant agreements on the principles of cooperation and ethnic-religious problems, including a special clause of nonadmission of taking unfair advantage in bad faith of minority problems in the interstate relations; the adoption of specific regional confidence and security building measures should be concurrent with the establishment of all-region structures and mechanisms for monitoring and settlement of minority issues.

Focusing attention on the problems of immigration, refugees, terrorism and organized crime, arms smuggling and illegal drug-trafficking is another cooperation area, these humanitarian in essence issues being closely interwoven with security issues.

The cooperation in the economic area - the disintegration of CMEA, the adoption of the logic of market economy and the general orientation of all Balkan states towards the European economic structures has not brought down the economic barriers between the Balkan states. The unique transition to market economy in all former socialist states in the Balkans is characterized by extreme difficulties, lasting and strong declines in production, shortages of raw materials, technologies and financial resources, soaring inflation and large-scale unemployment, increased foreign indebtedness accompanied with losses of foreign markets and limited access to new markets and a necessity to "tighten the belts. The association agreements with the EU do not compensate for the loss of the markets within the former CMEA, nor attract fresh influx of capital. This makes it necessary to seek new forms of economic integration and cooperation such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation on which I would rather not go into detail.

I would like to draw special attention to one relatively new aspect of cooperation - the information exchange. It has become next to impossible to keep secrets; the information on political movement and other events throughout the world have a

contagious effect and we are not in a position to control our borders, i.e. one practically cannot control radiowaves. This information effect was detrimental in the former socialist states but on a global scale it can only be positive. The world has grown smaller and better known which, bearing in mind the level of modern technology and the deepening of this tendency makes imperative the adoption of new approaches in the area of information cooperation eliminating borders. Finally, I would mention the disastrous ecological situation in the region. This is a challenge having many aspects and necessarily requires a complex approach and concerted efforts by all parties concerned.

I would like to finish with the conclusion that the new realities in the world and the region put the Balkan states to a maturity test. They give the historic chance to demonstrate that the negative experience of the past, the sweeping changes of the present and the good will shown are in a position to change the idea of this part of the world as a "powder keg", to do away with notions such as "Balkanization" and to show categorically that the Balkans indeed are an inseparable part of the new integrated and civilized Europe.

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**POSSIBILITIES FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION IN THE
BALKANS**

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When one starts research (dealing) with the Balkans, first expression that one step on is "the gun powder keg" or " the barrel of powder ". Indeed, the Balkans has, over the centuries, been regularly involved in the most significant developments which have marked the history of the European continent and left traces on the process of formation and whole course of our civilization. Nowhere else as in the Balkans is there such evidence of the intermingling of different civilizations, cultures, religions and nations within diverse historical formations and socio-political systems. That diversity has been the cause of many clashes throughout history, until the present.

Although often neglected in favour of other elements, historical heritage and traditional ties have always been important factors in the development of relations between neighboring states especially in such vulnerable regions, as the Balkans.

In the Balkans Peninsula, relations between states have further been complicated by factors of a political, national and national-minority nature to which those of an ideological character were added after the second world war. Each of these factors has been reflected in its own way on overall developments in the Balkans and on relation between peoples living in this region.

It seems that historical ties and traditional friendship have always been of the utmost importance in this area. It has always been easy to anticipate the conduct of individual Balkan actors in historical circumstances and situations in which such ties have been at stake. Some, guided by their national interests and ambitions, found themselves as a rule on opposite sides and for years after they had been at war with each other; relations between them remained burdened with mistrust and animosity. Others, again, sharing a similar destiny or similar historical experience, regularly found themselves on the same side of the barricades and in times of peace enjoyed a sense of security and mutual trust that enabled them to foster stable relations of cooperation and friendship.

HISTORIC BACKGROUND FOR COOPERATION

If we agree that the problems and new challenges that the countries in the world are facing, are definitely inter depended, that this interdependence and intermingling are particularly great in Balkan region. History has left a legacy of differences, but, in the same time these historic currents have resulted in great movements and links among peoples of this area. This fact is a national, cultural and civilization assets of the Balkans, and it must become a strong link and factor of rapprochement of Balkan peoples and countries. This goal has its preconditions: "respect of the principles of goodneighbourly relations, non-interference in international affairs, equality, mutual respect and full recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and dignity of every people and country."¹

During the history there were frequent and profound changes that decisively the position and relations of peoples living in these areas and attitude of outside actors in the Balkan events. These changes were in the connection with the changes in the neighborhood - the Mediterranean, Central and Easter Europe, but also with changes in the balance of force

¹ Final communiqué of the Meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Balkan Countries, Belgrade, 24-26 February 1988; Review of International Affairs, Documentation No. 910, pp 32

between great powers. Division lines, also, were often drawn in the Balkan area as the consequence of conflict. Known as the struggle and the division of spheres of interests between the East and the West. After World War I disappearance of most of the main factors of the Eastern Question (Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary and tsarist Russia) it seemed that division along east-west line will disappear on the Balkans.

However, the new changed balance of powers after World War II again brought about division of interest spheres in the Balkans and Cold War. During the Cold War, the stability of the Balkans was contained in the so-called 2+2+2 (1+1) formula (Greece and Turkey are NATO members, Romania and Bulgaria were Warsaw Pact members, Yugoslavia non-aligned, while Albania was in self-proclaimed isolation). This made the region a "strategic buffer zone", and its stability were interested both superpowers and their alliances.

Strategic and geo-political position of the Balkans started to change after disappearance of real socialism and Soviet Union sphere of interest. Changes in global balance of forces and in relations between superpowers after Bush-Gorbachev meeting in Malta, marked the end of spheres of interest (Yalta). Essential changes were preceded by internal process of disintegration among Yugoslav republics, exhibits through affirmation of national economies and national parties.

But, there were numerous problems and conflicts existing in relations between the Balkan countries even before changes that brought about the breakup of Yugoslavia. Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus, Aegean aspirations of Turkey and Turkish minority issue in Greece make their relations extremely difficult, urging Greece to state that threats to this country do not come from the north, but from the east. Former Albanian indirect aspirations toward Kosovo are now even more obvious, while exceptionally high natural increase of Albanian population in Kosovo contributed to extreme nationalism and separatism, that is no longer willing to settle for autonomy within Serbia, but demands independence and annexation to Albania and enjoys support by Islamic and some Western factors in these demands. Bulgaria's concealed aspirations toward Macedonia were the cause of strained Yugoslav-Bulgarian political relations, which is now transferred to relations toward Serbia. This factor affected formerly good relations between Greece and Bulgaria based on anti-Macedonian element (denying of the Macedonian nation). Now Bulgaria recognized the Macedonian state, but still disputes the existence of the Macedonian nation.

Balkan nations are facing again the alternative between radical clashes - wars, and unification of the forces for technological and economic process. The principle of cooperation in the previous period failed to achieve level of cooperation which could ensure that the nationalism in this region would be made impossible.

After the end of the Cold War conditions become favorable for internal emancipation, but also for the upsurge of nationalist and secessionist currents which fomented and escalated in chauvinism, which had been suppressed by former regimes. The contemporary tendency to build up unitary national states (so-called "big" states: Big Serbia, Big Albania, etc.) has made it incumbent to protect the minorities, to grant a special status to minority nations and grant them some kind of autonomy. In most Balkan countries (only two can be considered relatively homogenous in the national sense) there are many national minorities. Its number in the Balkan countries is one of the vital components in appraising the problem as a whole: from 19,8% in Romania to even 42,4% in Macedonia, or average scale around 33% of total national minorities in the Balkans countries. The greater their number , the more important are as a political factor. The size of minority shows us a way to some problems on Balkan soil:

- the conflict between the Serbs, Croats and Muslims in Bosnia,
- the Serbian-Albanian conflict in Kosovo,

- the Albanian minority in Macedonia,
- the Serbian minority in Macedonia,
- the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina,
- the Bulgarian-Macedonian conflict, claim that ethnically the Macedonians are Bulgarians,
- the Macedonian minority in Greece,
- the Turkish minority in Greece,
- the Greek minority in Albania (northern Epirus),
- the Albanian minority in northern Greece,
- the Turkish and Muslim minorities in Bulgaria,
- the Hungarian minority in Romania (Transylvania),
- the Greco-Turkish conflict over the Aegean islands,
- the conflict on Cyprus and
- the Bulgarian-Romanian border conflict.

The minority question is in the first place a question of trust (minority toward majority, and vice versa), and ethnic problems in the Balkans will represented a significant factor in the future development of this region.

PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE BALKANS COUNTRIES

There are many motives for regional association - political, economic, ecological, cultural, ethnical, linguistic and so on. On the broader international scale, one might say that regionalism means a more or less well defined collective sense of belonging to a certain region or geographic area with certain similarities an common historic legacy. Regionalism are not in themselves progressive or retroactive, but that their character depends on the time at which they emerge, on objective political relationship in a national or multinational state.

Nine Balkan's countries (included Turkey) has an area of 1,6 million sq. kilometers, and a population of 125,398.000 - the most numerous being Turks, followed by Romanians, Serbs, Greeks and Bulgarians. Those people "create" every year a GNP about 313,400 billion dollars. Foreign debt of all nine states now amounts to 104.010 billion dollars, and the per capita income in the Balkans is under 5,000 dollars. Also have to be stress that the percentage of illiterates or the number of emigrants who head for the West in order to find work is depressing.²

So, we can conclude that the Balkan's problem is underdevelopment and that Europe, world and (especially) the Balkan states should finally realize that.

It is evident and logical that poverty and the continuing war may easily result in social unrest and revolt which would not be conflicted to the territory of one country or region (the Balkans), but might in time spread much further and become a reality. Security in the Balkans cannot be restored at once, and completed in a short time. There is a possibility and the need to map out the program of peace, security and stability which will include economic factor and economic interest.

We wish to stress that the economic factor might play a positive role, complementary with the process of Balkan stabilization, and meet the economic interests of the Balkan states. The economic interest of all the countries in this region needs cooperation, in the first

²Figures taken from the article "The Balkans as a Destiny" by Milos Drobnjakovic, published in Review of International Affairs, No 1016-17, Belgrade 1993.

place regional cooperation, which must be preceded by restoring the links which have been severed by the blockade (imposed to Yugoslavia).

The interaction between economics and politics is evident not as only a interesting problem, but as the hard and fast task of diplomacy and policy tending to translate potential possibilities into reality. Real facilities should be sought in economic cooperation with the one-time COMECON countries.³ In that case, as necessary preconditions for cooperation, the countries of the Balkans must look to the process of private ownership, market economy and all that is distinctive to the transition period.

MINISTRY MEETING OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES

All formerly mentioned problems initiated meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Balkan countries, which was held in Belgrade from 24 to 26 February 1988. The Ministers underlined that Meeting constitutes a significant contribution to the "relaxation of tension and to the creation of a friendly atmosphere and dialogue in the Balkans, which also serves peace and security in the region, Europe and the world".

However, it would be hard to classify the Balkan conference as a typical regional meeting; it was regional in geographical terms only, not in political. The label "regional" must be used conditionally for two additional reasons: first, matters of consequence such as disarmament, denuclearized zones, environmental problems, cannot have pure regional implications. Second, the concept of region has expanded today due to technical and technological development and the results in the military-strategic field, in economics and communications. Today the Balkans merge with the broader zone of the Mediterranean Basin.

The Balkan conference can be utilized as the beginning of a patient search for new elements of stability that have been successfully achieved in Europe, both in mutual relations and as a continent in relationship to the two superpowers. An essential component in this process is removing the tension in bilateral relations. It should not be disregarded that numerous factors imperil the stability and friendly relations.

Attention was given at the Meeting to the proposals to transform the Balkan into a zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons, economic cooperation among the Balkan countries. They stressed the need for greater utilization for development of mutual cooperation in the fields of trade, including the exchange of commodities and services, border trade, transport, industry, tourism, banking, energy, science and technology, agriculture and water resources, telecommunications, environment, health, culture, sports and information.

Unfortunately, ideas from this meeting have never lived: Yugoslav crises (on the first place) and "new world order" disturbed this development toward closer Balkan cooperation. Current consultations between individual Balkan states are designed to work out a policy towards the crisis in former Yugoslavia and promote a common interest rather than to create a comprehensive system of security in the Balkan area.

SECURITY IN THE BALKANS

At the end of the 20th century the security situation in the Balkans was marked by the disintegration of the Yugoslav federation, with the former republics clashing over its legacy and the big powers over new spheres of influence in region.

The Balkans are now in the limelight for the following reasons:

³Ph.D. Vera Pilic-Rakic- The economic factor on the Balkan, Belgrade, 1993, pp 44.

- The crisis in the area of former Yugoslavia reflects negatively on the process of European integration and the establishment of the new world order;
- The crisis in former Yugoslavia introduces new rivalries in the Balkan area and threatens to grow into a wide Balkan and European conflict;
- The crisis in the area of former Yugoslavia has in some respects confirmed that the big European and world powers share common interests but has also heightened their differences of approach and interests.

Balkan security system already exist as part of the European security system within the CSCE and of the world security system within the United Nations. This is why a comprehensive regional system in the Balkans should be viewed as a kind of pact or alliance of all the Balkan countries, which might be institutionally linked to the CSCE or included in regional agreements envisaged in Chapter 8 of the United Nations Charter.

To create such security system the Balkan countries should imply a prior resolution of territorial and ethnic problems which are "the apple of discord" among them, or, as another solution, a call for the creation of such a political atmosphere in relations among the Balkan countries as would make it possible by establishing a joint security system to sweep away their disputes over territorial and ethnic questions and thereby secure peace and stability in the region.

Conditions should be created to settle some disputes (concerning territory and ethnic minorities) and to come to common realization that in the last analysis such questions cannot be solved on the basis of any Balkan country's programs, but only if they were recognized.

The Balkan countries should give priority to the economic factor and would see the fulfillment of their national interests primary in economic and technological development and not in dreams about territories as has almost always been case in the past. At the same time, the Balkan countries would enter an institutionalized integration system in which the common interests are king and whose norms would be binding for all.

Should not be forgotten another possibility, and that is membership of the Balkan countries in NATO. The roads is likely to be taken by the states emerging in the territory of former Yugoslavia. But, there are two questions: would NATO want to embrace the Balkan states outside the area of its original activity, and the another, will NATO survive the end of bipolarism.

Anyway, the post-bipolar international situation, that gives the United States a favorable position in comparison to the EU which, despite the Maastricht Treaty, is still far away for political union and in facing the Eastern Europe instability and crisis.

INTEGRATION OF THE BALKAN COUNTRIES

In the current constellation of relations in Europe, the Balkans represents probably the most representative segment of the continent, on whose 16 per cent of territory intervene, confront, but also sometimes harmonize, the forces of East and West.

Romania and Bulgaria as well as Albania, are undergoing a process of economic transformation unprecedented in world economic history, with certain changes in the political outlook in their states as well.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia has slowed down transformation processes almost on the entire formerly uniform territory. The country which by the level of its economic development was far ahead of the former members of the COMECON has now descended to the level of the development of this group with the tendency to sink even lower. Greece, an EU member, is an active participant in the processes taking place within this integration, and she represents a very important bond in the Balkan cooperation and this region's linkage with Europe. Turkey (territorially the largest Balkan, as well as only Islamic, country in the

region) added characteristic which makes cooperation more complex. However, the position of Turkey may have both positive and negative effects of cooperation in the Balkan region.

Cooperation between the Balkan countries is both necessary and needed. It is natural as it is always natural between neighboring countries. The integration as a higher, more sophisticated and institutionalized level of cooperation can be realized at the Balkans only as the end of long-lasting and fruitful cooperation. It has to be the result of many bilateral and multilateral arrangements, and could never be the goal itself.

It is obvious that Balkan countries are aiming to approach democratic societies of Europe. The transformation and transition will be the main Balkan features for some times. What would be the outcome of that efforts is very difficult to say. Greece has many difficulties to overcome development gap and even to secure its participation in the future advance towards the European Union. It seems that the EC would hardly ever have in mind Turkey with some of its enlargements. More likely it is that the EC would persist in keeping Turkey as an economic associate and North-Atlantic ally.

What would be the appropriate ground and adequate framework for the successful cooperation and integration between the Balkan countries in such a situation is very difficult and complex question. The possibilities for successful integration at the regional level become even more clear when we revoke the old Balkan realities:

- the Balkan countries are more similar to developing countries than to developed ones, according to their economic performances,

- in the field of industry and technology, the Balkans could not fulfill its own needs. But, with a better use of the existing potentials could be more developed and exploited in respect of the accomplishment of regional needs,

- their economic and socio-political development has been specific in comparison with European development of the time. The communist inheritance will lead those Balkan societies on a very specific road. Their achievements would not be comparable for some time with European ones, especially in economy, and finally,

- ideological, political and even economic division between the Balkan states was strong, stronger than in other European sub regions.

Having in mind all this, one can say that Balkan countries need the mutual cooperation. At the same time, we have to be aware that there is no example in the world of a successful integration between colonial power and its colonies. However, for a successful cooperation Balkan countries have to fulfill at least three preconditions. First, the existence of the political will; second, the existence of a consensus upon the common goals; and third, the existence of means for realization (institutional framework, financial resources and a period of needed time).

In other words, dealing with first precondition - political will, we only have to say that it is obvious that maturity of the state is one of the first things for state's participation in any process of international integration, and precondition for political stability. About second precondition - the common goal, it have to be said that Balkan countries could hardly compare their main immediate targets. Their short run occupations are different, but their long term goals could be complementary even coinciding.

Third precondition is the most interesting one: searching for suitable institutional form for cooperation. We think that a suitable pattern for integration Balkan countries have to search among the successful projects of the Third world, especially, the project "oriented integration". This is integration between states with a task of realizing only one project, usually in the field of infrastructure.

That means that the Balkan countries should have the approach of small steps. They are not yet mature and ready to form integrations and confederations, and, certainly, have to avoid the forms of integration with supranational aims.

The Balkan countries have to start mutual cooperation and integration with a common approach in developing some of their obvious potentials as it is energy. Other projects could be linked to the improvement of traffic networks of any kind, common projects of irrigation and so on.

Small steps, like these ones, could help the Balkan states to overcome animosities which separated them for centuries; once a "peoples network" of the Balkans arises, the Balkans would never more be a "powder keg".

Economic potentials of the Balkans guarantee possibility of any kind of integration, but history and policy do not guarantee the same. First steps in integration have to be successful ones, they have to be the basis for further improved steps through the process of integration leading even toward Balkan confederation.

Any other approach to Balkan integration would not lead to the success—it could not be welcomed among the big powers for different reasons, and especially in the EC. Secondly, it would only serve political and other elites whose interest would prevail in the name of Balkan people. Third, it would lead to new conflicts, because many relevant factors at the Balkans are not yet unveiled.

An ambitious and unsuitable approach towards the Balkan integration could make even the Balkan cooperation an utopia rather than reality.

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"Human Rights in the Balkans: a View from Bulgaria"

by MAYA HRISTOVA, journalist at the "168 hours" Pressgroup, Sofia, Bulgaria

Bulgaria has adopted the highest standards in the field of international protection of human rights. In 1992 Bulgaria became party to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Bulgaria is a party to all major United Nations conventions in the field of human rights. In 1992 my country withdrew its reservations to the jurisdictional clauses of a number of human rights conventions. Moreover, Bulgaria has adopted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

Bulgaria accepted with satisfaction the peaceful solution of the long-lasting conflict between the State of Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, as well as the successful completion of the multiparty negotiating process in South Africa and the conclusion of agreements on an interim constitution and electoral bill, which resulted in holding the first multiracial elections and electing the first black president in the history of the country.

Along with these accomplishments we cannot ignore the fact that today the world is faced with challenges that require urgent practical actions on the part of the international community. In different parts of the world we still witness flagrant and mass violations of human rights which result from extreme nationalism and even radical hatred, xenophobia, ethnic and religious intolerance, the latter becoming at times extreme fundamentalism. We witness events that seriously threaten international peace and security; children;

women and men every day fall victim to "ethnic cleansing", illegal and arbitrary executions, torture and physical violence, inhuman and cruel treatment and involuntary disappearances, detention and persecutions on religious, ethnic, political or other grounds.

An example to this effect is the tragic situation of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

Bulgarian minister of foreign affairs in his statement before the 50-th Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, held on in February 1994 in Geneva, pointed out: "We are deeply concerned that despite the continuing efforts of the international community we are still facing a tragedy of unprecedented scale in the heart of Europe. The continuing conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia generate serious concern in my country for at least two reasons: the threat of extension of the conflict to new regions thereof, and the dangerous precedents for the Balkans and for the existing system of maintenance of international peace and security, resulting from the policy aimed at tolerating accomplished facts and ethnic cleansing. Ethnic cleansing is still going on in Bosnia and Herzegovina and now it is being practised by all parties involved in the conflict. The fact that the initial perpetrators of ethnic cleansing remained unpunished served as a signal to the other parties that that was "the winning" policy to pursue."

My country is particularly concerned about the situation of human rights of the Bulgarian minority living in the Eastern part of Serbia. The Bulgarian government shares the view that the brutal violations of fundamental human rights and especially the constitutional rights of minorities in the former

Yugoslavia endanger the democratic processes in neighbouring countries and may revoke exaggerated nationalistic fears and ambitions on the Balkans. Bulgaria is seriously concerned about the intensifying practice of intimidation and pressure on minorities in many parts of the territory of the former Yugoslavia, which encourages similar developments in other Balkan countries as well. Bulgarian authorities express the opinion that the UN Commission on Human Rights should pay attention not only to minority situations representing an immediate threat to the regional and international peace and security, but also to the situation of other minorities in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, including the ethnic Bulgarian population. This would be a preventive measure which could well inscribe itself in the philosophy of the UN Commission not to merely register incidents of human rights violations, but to lead to prompt and concrete measures which would benefit the victims of such violations.

There have been many attempts to intimidate the representatives of the Bulgarian minority in the Republic of Serbia. The Bulgarian government has warn the UN Commission of Human Rights that public life and media in the Republic of Serbia are dominated by ethnic hatred and ultra-nationalist ideology. Thus a climate encouraging acts of discrimination has been created, notwithstanding the existing legal base, banning the rousing of racial and national hatred. The laws have not been implemented and perpetrators of violations have not been brought to justice. In Serbia, many of the ethnic Bulgarians do not venture to declare their ethnic affiliation because of the practised psychological pressure, direct intimidation and other violations

connected with the tolerated local administrative arbitrariness towards those who actively identify themselves as Bulgarians. The authorities systematically oppress any free and public expression of their opinions. Fundamental cultural rights and institutions of the Bulgarian minority have been practically done away with or there is an actual ban on their establishment.

We are convinced that a lasting solution to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia can be achieved only through respect for the principles of international law, in particular the inviolability of internationally recognized frontiers and respect for the universally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The Bulgarian authorities are deeply concerned also about the systematic violations of human rights in other turbulent areas close to our borders, such as in the Caucasian region and in Cyprus. Post-totalitarian intolerance towards political opponents mixed with ethnic and religious hatred inherited from the past has led to everyday loss of innocent lives and human sufferings.

The Republic of Bulgaria regards human rights in general, and considers tolerance and non-discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief of particular importance, as fundamental elements of any contemporary democratic society.

The post-totalitarian realities in Eastern Europe are characterised by a dramatic transformation of human values, leading sometimes to bitter disillusionment. Many people are looking for a new faith and a certain renaissance of traditional religion and an emergence of new denominations is observed. On the other hand, these processes are often accompanied by

manifestations of intolerance towards other minds and beliefs. In these countries, where the majority of the population was, and to some extent still is, atheist, religious clashes are often but inverted forms of ideological and political conflicts., and consequently have very little to do with faith in itself. Religious fundamentalism, emerging in the region, and mass and flagrant violations of human rights along religious lines in Bosnia and Herzegovina and elsewhere, are the outcome of extreme nationalism, and generate a serious threat for peace and stability and for the democratic process in the region as a whole.

The right to denomination in Bulgaria is stipulated in the Constitution of the Republic. The right to denomination is inviolable, personal and fundamental. It includes the right to free choice of denomination and the opportunity to freely profess one's denomination, including the expression and dissemination of opinion by means of words and the media and the forming of associations.

At present there are 29 religious entities in Bulgaria, registered under the Law of Denominations. Some other communities have been registered under the Law of Persons and Family as non-profit organizations.

Bulgaria is a country of traditional religious tolerance. There has never been any antisemitism in this country. Nowadays all religions existing in Bulgaria can freely exercise their activities. All religious temples function freely. But our government is concerned about the situation of the religious freedoms of minorities in the territory of the Republic of Serbia. Bulgarian churches and monasteries in the Eastern part of this country, apart from

those pronounced Serbian, are in a wretched condition, some of them being in ruins. The services of the insignificant number of functioning temples, administered by the Serbian Patriarchate irrespective of the clearly manifested preference of the Bulgarian minority to the administration of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, are held by Serbian priests only in Serbian. Even the gravestones and the obituaries of ethnic Bulgarians are also written in Serbian only.

A problem of utmost importance facing my country also is the refugee situation in the Balkan area. Recent world developments proved that refugee related problems go far beyond the boundaries of individual states and require joint international action and effective cooperation.

The tragic developments in the former Yugoslavia had affected more than 3,5 million people, including refugees and displaced persons. Bulgarian authorities are therefore seriously concerned about the deteriorating refugee situation in the region and the prospective of a mass flow of refugees into Bulgaria. Our government accepts the principle of burden sharing, adopted by London conference on the former Yugoslavia, but within the available resources and in accordance with the present economic situation of the country. Notwithstanding the generally fair conditions in Bulgaria for reception of refugees in terms of infrastructure, supplies and possibilities for accommodation and humanitarian assistance, serious economic constraints exist due to the painful transition to market economy and the heavy losses sustained as a result of the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. That is why Bulgaria relies much on an increased financial assistance under the

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees programmes in order to meet present and future care and maintenance expenses.

The Republic of Bulgaria holds the view that the radical changes that have shaken the world during the recent years reveal new perspectives for us to strengthen what we have already achieved. The seriousness of the challenges we are facing urges us to adopt a critical, constructive, pragmatic and complex approach to the quest for efficient means for overcoming the existing problems in the strife to effectively encourage and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms. Critical, for the realities of our time have taught us that self-deception on the ground of the successes achieved often leads in practice to the accumulation of problems and their turn to crisis phenomena with a long-lasting effect and a threat for their multiplication. Constructive, not only because the experience of the past decades proved that group confrontation has not always been the best way to facilitate the advance in the sphere of human rights, but also because of the diversity and complexity of the existing problems., which are capable of being solved by involving the majority of the members of the international community. Pragmatic, because the victims of the human rights violations call not only for sympathy on our behalf, but for specific assistance.

My country is firmly committed to the cause of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Thank you, for your attention!

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B BLIOTECA

LES DROITS DE L'HOMME ET LA SITUATION DES MINORITES DANS LA REPUBLIQUE FEDERATIVE DE YUGOSLAVIE

Le sens de la constitutionalité et la substance même de la Constitution se portent garants de la liberté et des droits du citoyen, car ils les définissent et sont la garantie de leur réalisation. Les droits et les libertés de l'homme ont un sens large et une portée universelle pour tout homme de la communauté internationale. Ils ne dépendent plus aujourd'hui, du pays dans lequel vit l'individu, mais de la communauté internationale.

Le principe de *l'égalité des citoyens*, en tant que principe fondamental, mais aussi des plus larges, de toutes les constitutions modernes est appliqué différemment dans les divers pays. Le traitement particulier des minorités nationales en tant que fragment du principe d'égalité se conçoit, lui aussi, de manière différente dans les divers pays, malgré les nombreuses déclarations et les appels de la communauté internationale en faveur de l'unification des droits dans ce domaine, aujourd'hui particulièrement sensible. Nous sommes témoins d'une *croissance inquiétante du nationalisme* en Europe et surtout dans certains de ses états. Les minorités, en raison de cette tendance, y ont *une situation peu enviable* et même d'une instabilité alarmante.

Cet exposé a pour but de présenter le traitement des minorités nationales, tel qu'il est prévu *dans les textes normatifs* de la République Fédérative de Yougoslavie et *nos suggestions* quand à ce qui devrait être entrepris à ce sujet dans le plus proche avenir, afin de prévenir les problèmes potentiels dans ces régions.

La République Fédérative de Yougoslavie est un pays dans lequel *environ 37 % de la population* peut être assimilée à cette catégorie des *"minorités nationales"*, et l'abîme se creusant entre les autorités et les minorités peut conduire à une aggravation du conflit et, dans le *Kosovo et en Méthodie*, en raison de la montée accélérée du chauvinisme de la minorité albanaise face à celui de la majorité serbe, il pourrait même aboutir à la guerre civile. Tout cela ajouté aux nombreux problèmes économiques, et à la chute précipitée du niveau de vie ralentit la démocratisation de la République Fédérative de Yougoslavie et son ouverture vers l'élément incontournable du développement aujourd'hui - La Communauté Economique Européenne et ses institutions.

Etant donné que le traitement des minorités nationales est un indicateur significatif du niveau de la démocratie dans un pays, ce sujet est incontestablement des plus actuels et de toute première importance dans tous les pays d'Europe de l'Est après la chute des régimes socialistes, dans leurs premiers pas vers une démocratie bourgeoise.

Quand on parle de la protection des minorités nationales on pense avant tout à *la sauvegarde de l'identité nationale* de la communauté ethnique, de sa culture, de sa langue, de sa religion et de ses traditions. Le besoin de protection des minorités dans la République Fédérative de Yougoslavie est d'autant plus grand qu'il s'agit là d'un pays particulièrement plurinational et dans lequel on parle plusieurs langues. Dans la République Fédérative de Yougoslavie il existe *une vingtaine de groupes ethniques* dont chacun a sa propre histoire, sa propre culture, ses propres traditions, religion et langue. Il n'est pas déplacé de rappeler qu'une des raisons de la guerre actuelle sur le territoire de la Bosnie et Herzégovine réside justement dans le fait que les Serbes n'acceptaient pas d'être considérés comme une minorité sur ces territoires.

Pourquoi cette peur phobique du statut de minorité ? Existe-t'il une tradition de violation des droits des minorités dans les Balkans ? *L'unique solution* de longue durée pour une telle situation est bien *la discrimination positive* des minorités nationales sur la base de normes internationales suprêmes, qui permettrait de traiter les diversités nationales comme une richesse et non comme un défaut.

La République Fédérative de Yougoslavie est définie par sa nouvelle ***Constitution du 27 avril 1992*** comme l'Etat de l'ensemble de ses citoyens.

Article 1

"La République Fédérative de Yougoslavie est un état fédéral souverain fondé sur l'égalité des citoyens et l'égilité des Républiques membres."

Article 8

"Dans la République Fédérative de Yougoslavie le pouvoir appartient aux citoyens. Les citoyens exercent le pouvoir directement ou par l'intermédiaire de représentants élus librement."

Une telle définition élimine la division entre *peuples "constitutifs"* et *"non-constitutifs"* et la République Fédérative de Yougoslavie devient un état rassemblant des citoyens et non pas des peuples et des groupes ethniques.

La pleine affirmation du concept "*d'Etat civique*" devrait, cependant, être mieux codifiée et appliquée grâce à une *loi sur les groupes ethniques*, qui n'existe encore pas en Yougoslavie.

Tout ce qui concerne les droits des minorités touchant les libertés, les droits et les devoirs des citoyens a été *attribué exclusivement à la compétence de la Fédération* par la Constitution de la République Fédérative de Yougoslavie.

Article 11

"La République Fédérative de Yougoslavie reconnaît et garantit le droit des minorités à conserver, développer et exprimer librement leurs particularités ethniques, culturelles, linguistiques et autres ainsi qu'à utiliser leurs symboles nationaux, conformément à la loi."

La loi qui réglerait le statut des minorités nationales devrait elle aussi être élaborée au niveau fédéral.

Article 77

"La République Fédérative de Yougoslavie, par l'intermédiaire de ses institutions définit la politique, érige les lois et les règlements, assure la protection des droits au Conseil d'état et au tribunal dans les domaines suivants:

1. Les libertés, les droits et les devoirs de l'homme et du citoyen définis par cette Constitution...."

La Constitution fédérale consacre *quatre articles* aux minorités nationales. Elle leur garantit la liberté d'expression de l'appartenances nationales, leur permet de perpétuer leur culture et d'utiliser librement leur langue écrite et parlée, de se scolariser et d'être informé publiquement dans leur propre langue. En ce qui concerne ce droit, il devrait y avoir des règlements au niveau fédéral, mais étant donné que l'enseignement appartient à la compétence des Républiques ces questions sont en fait règlementées par les lois des républiques.

Les généralités de la Constitution donnent le droit aux minorités nationales de fonder des institutions ou des associations scolaires et culturelles, le droit d'instaurer et d'entretenir des rapports au sein de la République Fédérative de Yougoslavie et hors de ses frontières avec des ressortissants de même nationalité, et enfin le droit d'avoir une activité dans des organismes internationaux indépendants de l'état.

Article 45

"La liberté d'exprimer son appartenance ethnique et culturelle est garantie, tout comme la liberté d'utiliser sa propre langue écrite et parlée. Personne n'est tenu de se prononcer quant à son appartenance ethnique."

Article 46

"Les ressortissants des minorités nationales ont le droit à l'enseignement dans leur propre langue, conformément à la loi. Les ressortissants des minorités nationales ont le droit à être informés publiquement dans leur propre langue."

Article 47

"Les ressortissants des minorités nationales ont le droit, conformément à la loi, de fonder des institutions ou des associations scolaires et culturelles financées bénévolement, et elles peuvent être aidées par l'état."

Article 48

"Il est garanti aux ressortissants des minorités nationales le droit d'instaurer et d'entretenir librement des rapports entre elles, au sein de la République Fédérative de Yougoslavie et hors de ses frontières, avec les ressortissants du même groupe ethnique dans les autres états et d'avoir des activités dans les organisations internationales non-étatiques, mais seulement si ce n'est pas au dommage de la République Fédérative de Yougoslavie ou des Républiques membres.

C'est là, tout ce que la Constitution fédérale dit des droits dont disposent les minorités nationales (37% de la population), qui d'ailleurs ne sont pas garantis de manière satisfaisante car leur élaboration et les mécanismes de protection ont été confiés par la Constitution à la loi fédérale (qui n'a pas encore été promulguée).

La Constitution de la République de Serbie, datant du 28 septembre 1990, consacre aussi quelques articles aux minorités nationales.

Un d'entre eux est consacré à *l'enseignement*, un autre aux *communautés religieuses*, et enfin le dernier à *la liberté d'expression* des ressortissants de minorités ethniques et à *l'utilisation de leur langue*.

Article 32

"L'enseignement est accessible à tous, sous des conditions égales. L'école primaire est obligatoire.

Pour l'enseignement régulier financé par le budget les citoyens ne paient pas leur scolarité.

Les ressortissants des autres groupes ethniques minoritaires ont le droit à l'enseignement dans leur langue nationale, conformément à la loi."

Article 41

"La liberté de religion est garantie, qui comprend la liberté de croire, de pratiquer et de célébrer les cérémonies religieuses.

Les communautés religieuses sont séparées de l'état, elle sont libres dans l'exercice de leur fonction et leurs sacrements.

Les communautés religieuses peuvent fonder des écoles confessionnelles et des organisations de bienfaisance.

L'Etat peut aider matériellement les communautés religieuses."

Article 49

"La liberté d'exprimer son appartenance ethnique et culturelle et d'utiliser sa langue écrite et parlée est garantie à tout citoyen.

Les citoyens ne sont pas tenus de se prononcer quant à leur appartenance ethnique."

Cela met bien en évidence le *caractère defectueux* de la réglementation constitutionnelle en ce qui concerne les minorités nationales. On peut se demander pour quelle raison L'Assemblée constituante n'a pas tenu compte des expériences d'autres pays dans ce domaine lors de l'élaboration de la Constitution.

En *Finlande*, par exemple, la Constitution reconnaît expressément le suédois comme langue officielle (en tant que langue d'une minorité nationale). Au *Canada* le droit à la scolarisation en langue de la minorité est réglé dans le détail par la Constitution. En *Espagne* les divers langues des minorités font l'objet d'une protection spéciale et du plus grand respect. Quant à l'*Italie*, la Constitution précise: "Par des règlements spéciaux, la République protège les minorités et leur langue" - ce qui donne l'obligation à la République de promulguer des lois spéciales sur les minorités, et ce terme de lois spéciales suppose sans doute loi constitutionnelle ou organique.

L'Assemblée constituante de la République Fédérative de Yougoslavie comptait sans doute régler plus complètement et plus en détail la situation des minorités nationales par une loi spéciale.

Cette loi devrait, du fait qu'il s'agit là des droits et des libertés de l'homme, être *de nature constitutionnelle ou organique* (bien que la Constitution de la République Fédérative de Yougoslavie n'exige pas la majorité des 2/3 pour que la loi passe).

Si l'on considère ce problème sous cet angle, alors la Constitution de la République Fédérative de Yougoslavie présente une base *correcte* permettant de légiférer sur la situation des minorités nationales en Yougoslavie et en Serbie.

En *Serbie*, les droits des minorités nationales sont aussi réglés par la Loi sur l'enseignement primaire (1992), la Loi sur l'enseignement secondaire (1992), et la Loi sur l'enseignement universitaire (1992). Les droits dans le domaine de l'information seront, plus largement, fixés par la Loi sur l'information publique.

Ce qui existe déjà au niveau fédéral et devrait contribuer à l'accélération du règlement de la situation des minorités nationales, c'est *le Ministère fédéral pour les droits de l'homme et les droits des minorités*, institué par le Décret sur les Ministères de la République Fédérative de Yougoslavie.

Les travaux de préparation de la Loi sur les droits des minorités nationales en sont encore à leur phase d'élaboration et de négociations.

Le Gouvernement fédéral a formé en octobre 1992 un *groupe d'experts* ayant pour tâche de poser les bases pour l'élaboration de la Loi sur les libertés et les droits des communautés minoritaires et de leurs ressortissants. Les travaux de ce groupe d'experts ont été terminés en février 1993. avec des *Thèses* pour l'élaboration de la Loi, qui sont, en fait, un modèle achevé de Loi. Ces Thèses représentent un modèle relativement développé de règlement des questions relatives aux minorités nationales dans la République Fédérative de Yougoslavie et contiennent des mécanismes visant à réduire les conflits inter-ethniques, à leur trouver une solution démocratique conforme à l'idéal démocratique de paix, de tolérance, de coopération et d'intégration fondée sur le principe de l'égalité et du fédéralisme.

Le texte des Thèses commence par un Préambule qui précise les raisons de l'élaboration de la Loi et le but de cette Loi.

Par la suite, des *Dispositions fondamentales* de la partie générale ou sont définis les notions utilisées dans les Thèses (la notion de citoyen, de communauté minoritaire, de ressortissant d'une communauté minoritaire - notion subjective ou une grande part est laissée à la volonté et à la conscience de l'individu, et la notion de particularisme national et ethnique).

Après cela, viennent les *Principes fondamentaux* de la partie générale parmi lesquels on peut distinguer diverses parties ayant trait à:

l'égalité; le droit au particularisme national et ethnique et au libre choix de l'appartenance ethnique, la prévention des conséquences néfastes entraînées par le (non) usage des droits, les obligations générales de l'Etat envers les communautés minoritaires et leurs ressortissants, les obligations particulières de l'Etat envers les communautés minoritaires et leurs ressortissants, l'usage des droits par les communautés minoritaires et leurs ressortissants, les devoirs des communautés minoritaires et de leurs ressortissants, et les obligations particulières des communautés minoritaires.

Dans une autre partie, le Premier chapitre est consacré aux *libertés et droits fondamentaux* parmi lesquels les plus importants sont: le droit à l'association et à l'activité politique, le droit à la participation dans les organismes des pouvoirs publics et d'autonomie locale, le droit à l'autonomie d'organisation et d'administration des communautés minoritaires, la liberté de presse et des autres moyens d'information publique, le droit à perpétuer les traditions, le droit à la conservation du particularisme et du patrimoine culturels, le droit à la fondation d'institutions, de sociétés et d'associations dans les domaines culturel, artistique et scientifique, le droit à l'usage de sa langue maternelle, les droits relatifs aux noms des localités et aux inscriptions sur la voie publique, le droit au libre choix et à l'usage du prénom, les droits relatifs à la scolarité, à la fondation d'établissement d'enseignement, les droits relatifs à la pratique de sa religion et à l'usage de symboles religieux, à l'usage de symboles nationaux, le droit de marquer les fêtes, d'établir des rapports internationaux et de les entretenir, et le droit à l'aide financière.

Le Deuxième chapitre de cette partie s'attache aux *droits particuliers des minorités* nationales dans le cadre des administrations locales, c'est à dire, la fondation d'administration minoritaire, les rapports entre les organes de l'Etat et ceux de l'administration locale avec les administrations minoritaires, la situation des conseils des administrations minoritaires, de leurs comités, de leurs unions et de leurs assemblées.

Le Troisième et le Quatrième chapitres sont consacrés aux *mécanismes de protection des droits* des communautés minoritaires, c'est à dire la protection assurée par les organes de l'Etat (Conseil d'Etat et tribunaux) et les autres formes de protection (politique générale de protection des communautés minoritaires, le Conseil du gouvernement fédéral pour la question des minorités, l'Ombudsman, le Fond d'encouragement à la créativité des minorités nationales, et le droit des communautés minoritaires de s'adresser directement aux organisations internationales pour la protection de leurs droits et de leurs libertés).

Suivent les dispositions pénales et le processus d'amendement de la Loi.

Les Thèses pour l'élaboration de la Loi sur les libertés et les droit des communautés minoritaires et de leurs ressortissants ont été faites à la demande du gouvernement dont le mandat a expiré en mars 1993.

Depuis lors des *négociations* permanentes ont lieu entre les autorités, les ressortissants des communautés minoritaires et autres personnages politiques signifiants tant au sujet de la teneur de la Loi que de la nécessité même de son élaboration.

Etant donné que les Thèses ont été publiées et sont donc devenues accessibles au public, un grand nombre de débats publics professionnels et politiques ont eu lieu sur le thème des problèmes des minorités et de la façon de les résoudre.

Il semble cependant que la Loi soit encore loin d'être promulguée, et que les efforts pour trouver le juste statut des minorités et la solution optimale pour elles, efforts très intensifs pendant une certaine période, soient maintenant bien ralentis.

Maintenant que les négociations et les interventions internationales regardent surtout le territoire de *la Bosnie et Herzégovine* en raison de la guerre qui y a éclaté, la question des minorités dans la République Fédérative de Yougoslavie n'est plus aussi prioritaire.

Cela semble normal, vu les dimensions et le tragique du conflit en Bosnie et Herzégovine. Pourtant, nous pensons que justement, pour prévenir et éviter de nouveaux conflits sur le territoire de l'ex-Yougoslavie la question des minorités reste d'une importance primordiale.

Toute concession faite à la République Fédérative de Yougoslavie sur le plan de la levée des sanctions imposées par la Communauté internationale devrait être conditionnée par la *résolution du statut des minorités*.

Seule, une Loi sur les minorités qui serait appliquée sous *le contrôle de la communauté internationale* pourrait se porter garant de la paix dans les Balkans.

La question du *Kosovo et de la Méthodie* ne peut plus être longtemps ajournée si l'on veut vraiment éviter une nouvelle tragédie. La *méfiance* de la minorité albanaise envers les autorités Yougoslaves, et il y a de bonnes raisons de le croire, envers la communauté internationale, ne cesse de croître. Cette relation résulte de circonstances subjectives mais aussi de circonstances objectives. Cet état des rapports sera mis en évidence quand les négociations deviendront plus énergiques.

Nous souhaiterions donc que la question des minorités en République Fédérative de Yougoslavie soit au plus vite remise à l'ordre du jour et qu'elle donne lieu à un dialogue en Yougoslavie et plus largement si nécessaire.

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I. General lack of human rights in the Balkans

I.1 - The Balkans - a mine planted deep in the battlefield of the empires

The Turkish, the Russian-Soviet and the Austro-Hungarian German Empires had their successive or simultaneous hard influences on the Balkans. Sometimes we forget or neglect this, thinking that the present course of the history has already changed radically, along with the balance of the powers, also the mentalities of the Balkan populations.

That is why - in my opinion - the specialists, the politicians and the Media are trying in vain to describe and explain the tense and even violent bloody situations in this region. The Balkans remains quite unstable, isolated, economically poor (even Greece, compared to the western countries), agitated in relation with the minorities and their rights.

Though close to one another, we do not know much in terms of specific and significant details about human rights in Balkan countries. Therefore I decided to address to you a rather unusual paper on the subject, insisting more on the mechanism and backgrounds than on the facts and statistics - the common method for the journalists to treat these issues.

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Though close to one another, we do not know much in terms of specific and significant details about human rights in Balkan countries. Therefore I decided to address to you a rather unusual paper on the subject, insisting more on the mechanism and backgrounds than on the facts and statistics - the common method for the journalists to treat these issues.

But, beyond my profound concern for a positive evolution of the Balkans, ~~there~~ was also another reason which has determined me to choose this approach to the subject. Especial in the last years, I was confronted many times with a very peculiar but full of significance situation: a lot of different people (family, friends, neighbours, occasional acquaintances...) were asking me explanations about the German Unification, the Gulf War, the Palestinian territories and - more than everything - the former Yugoslavia War. Even if they had the habit of listening ^{to the} radio, watching TV or reading newspapers, they all confessed that they really didn't understand WHY this atrocious war is still continuing, WHY nobody can stop it, WHY is it exploding, on and on, here and there, and lately not only in Bosnia, but also in other Balkan areas.

Knowing that I am a journalist specialised in foreign policy, they expected from me a clear, more "accurate" and different answer. The persistence of the WHY instead of WHAT or WHO became rellevant day after day. "WHY the Bosnian Serbs cannot cope with the Bosnian Muslims; or the Albanians with the Greeks ?..." "But WHY - I asked back - some of us, the Romanians, cannot cope with the Hungarians, those from inside the country, as well as those from Hungary?" "Because they are bad and they want to take again a part of the Transylvania province from us !" came their candid answer most of the times and from generally kind normal people.

Therefore, I assume that in the mentality of too many in the Balkan countries lies a potential "explosive mine", implanted there by the empires on their passing by and mantained genetically, develloped through a certain education or occasional exterior influence, ready to burst as a "natural" reaction of different types.

I.2 - "Divide et impera !" or other voices, the same rooms

All along the last centuries and until recently the Balkans were conquered, abandoned, reconquered and divided between the neighbouring big powers. From the East, the Turks were advancing to central Europe, imposing their Muslim religion and civilization. Austrians, Hungarians and Germans, representing the western European christianity, were responding, advancing too, when possible, to defend and then to impose their Catholic or Protestant Faith by breaking at their turn the Balkan orthodox faith, breaking their own faith promising freedom and rights for the orthodox states here. And then, coming from the North, the pan-Slav brothers, the Russians, "saviours" of the Ortodoxy, saving the people here from the pagans or false faith slavery; Slav Soviets turning to slavers, good wise tender slave-drivers, bringing communism and the faith without faith for the mice trapped in a new huge laboratory.

These violent words and epithets above, all this retained fury of the expressions are not mine. You can find them, often unclearly arranged, deep down in the mentality of quite a large number of persons living in the Balkans; and that represents a sort of detonation push button.

They all know and can tell you the bitter neverending story of the Balkan people, no matter their ethnic origin: Greek, Latin or Slav. All of us were too many times in the position of minority on our own land. Without human rights, without decent and normal life. "Divide et Impera !" was the most efficient method applied here, at the edges of the Empires. Dividing by moving constantly the frontiers, by moving the faiths, by engendering new ethnic conflicts, replacing policy with ideology. Insecurity, poverty and fear were offered as human rights.

It is true that the Balkan people rose and fought for their

rights. They had moments, even decades of glory and autonomy or independence. But they were conquered again and again, sold again and again. And this left marks for a long time deep inside. How to convince a Greek overnight not to see any longer in a Turk the eternal enemy and invader? The same goes for a Bulgarian, or even a Romanian and a Serb toward the Turks. How to convince overnight a Croatian or a Bosnian Muslim that the Serbs are not the most ferocious enemies of their faiths but also of their political systems ? And viceversa, of course.

How can I TRULY convince many fellow Romanians that the Hungarians are not in the position of taking us a part of Transylvania, at least now...? How can I ask them to accept the necessity of according equal human rights for the minorities precisely because we have suffered the same and it is time to put an end to this and start changing radically the situation?

II. Do we need more time or another strategy ?

II.1 - Phase one: Thriller-instinct

The revival of national consciousness destroyed the insane communism, the last huge empire - USSR. The nationalism in Romania Bulgaria, Yougoslavia and Albania was in fact, in those times, was the undercover for the tough communist ideology.

Ceausescu, Jivkov, the inheritors of Tito and Enver Hodja wanted - especially after the perestroika appeared - a neat separation from the Soviet Empire, but not from the communism. In the late '80, they believed that Gorbaciov was a traitor of the ideals of the communism and they were probably right, because the Kremlin leader was interested more in saving a perishing empire, than guarding a falimentary ideology.

In those four countries human rights were obviously ignored, while the stress of insecurity, poverty, hunger, cold and fear reminded of a thriller, or better saying a horror movie. "Smile, tomorrow will be worst !" was the slogan that had to be experienced by everyone.

The minorities, also victims of the system, became step by step the symbole of a microbe inside country's body, which had to be either eliminated or "asimilated". In Bulgaria, Jivkov forced the Turk minorities to change their identity receiving bulgarian names. The Hungarians from Romania, always considered a danger to Transylvania, was now viewed as active militants imerged fröm the Hungary's strategy of "Dinamic absorption" and Ceeusescu acused them of provoking the Revolution of december '89 with the intention of invading the country, knowing that the Romanian were sensible to this kind of statements. Once again, he tried to preserve his system by pushing the detonation button and not pulling the strings.

He didn't succeded because thriller-instinct became exacerbate and it was asking for a sudden liberation followed by the necessary "Katharsis". And because, like in Bulgaria, the strings were pulled by others faster and more efficient.

Later, it became obvious that the thrilling fascinatäng feeling of breaking the Soviet chaines consolidated the detonation button of those nations. For instance, Yugoslavia was at her scale a kind of Soviet Union. Although in conflict and separated of the soviet ideology, its communist federalism ressembled the USSR structure and was ready to explode also.

Meanwhile, the thriller-instinct was inherited by the new leaders of Romania, Bulgaria and Albania. It is more "thrilling" to have an incert transition with mutinies and coal-miners, with tolerated instigations against minorities, delaying sine die impor-

tant laws concerning basic human rights and minorities.

II.2 - Phase two: Killer-instinct

Is the worst phase and is already active in a large area of the Balkans, many signs showing the high risk of an extended conflict. Finally convinced that the communism entered in the history of dead utopies, the Yugoslavian federations decided to recuperate their memory and lands. Only that here, the new independent enemy is a former minority and this war was: master fighting against new masters, now independent neighbours. Or better yet, new corners and islands of minorities suddenly without rights, invited either to integrate or to leave, who rose to fight and reconquered the lost power and land. And so on. And nobody can stop it, it seems...

Ideology cannot be a substitute for policy, the system "which gets which" was proved to be innoperating and only a democratic practice could offer to all of the ethnics from a country a normal life. Peacefull open nationalism appears later, when a nation is already ⁽¹⁾launched in his development. The problem and the danger are now the fact that in the former communist balcanic countries is deliberately delayed the transition to democracy and free market economy. Therefore, the possibility of ethnic conflicts is bigger. The lack of rights and the effects of the inflation "invite" more and more people to push the detonation button as a last hope.

Also religions could become intolerant, starting modern crusades or jihads. An alarming exemple is the recent Greek-Albanian conflict combined with the Greek-Turkish one for the sea boundaries; the Muslims from Tirana are, no doubt about it, backed by some leaders from Ankara as well as ~~the~~ [others] from muslim countries, the same that claimed the lifting of the arms embargo for their brothers in feith from Bosnia.

And then, the old "game" could start again, with the Russians backing the Serbs, the EU assisting helpless and withdrawing his keeping/peace forces. Then the Balkans would become again "The Ashes of the Empires" and what human rights anyone would expect with the guns pointed at you ?

II.3 - Phase three: Dealer-instinct

That is the question ! How to develop THAT at the nations level ? How to deal with such a mentality ? Can anyone imagine the Balkans without minorities ? Is that possible ? What kind of fantastic frontiers could somebody imagine and draw on the maps without making explode forever every village in the Balkans ?

No, of course this is clearly impossible and useless after all. But, as I said, the time is the major factor here. Acting like we did till now, we cannot accelerate the process of obtaining a stable democracy and ^{of} changing on a larger scale the mentalities. It is not only something regarding the minorities and their human rights; many majoritarian Balkan people are expecting the same.

It is a question of general survival, recovering and rapid normalization and development of the whole region. Real human life will bring real human rights, but it has to be faster than expected (or permitted ?!), or will soon be tragic. The "game" played now in the former communist balkan countries - DATEING EUROPE, REJECTING EUROPE ! - has to stop, but on the other hand western Europe, the EU, must reconsider somehow his "JUST DO GET READY, BUT DON'T CALL US, WILL CALL YOU !".

What we need is a new strategy with a fast efficient application, because once again the time has no longer patience. Let's admit that the great decisions are into other hands, but those have

been already taken at the end of the '80. No one but us could do something better in the effort to change faster . Only we have to make this effort together and we have to make it now. We have to know each other properly, to understand each other profoundly and then to be able to find the direct and appropriate way toward the minds and hearts of everyone here.

Therefore, by this, I challenge the Halki International Seminars and ELIAMEP to set the primar conditions for a Balkanic Commission to work imediatly and constantly, with EU assistance and advisors when necessary, for an imergency Plan called "PHASE THREE - DEALLING WITH THE BALKANS NOW !". I am volunteering.

september 1994

iai Istit. Ut. Affari
Internazionali - Roma

n° Inv. 14677
21 NOV. 1994

BIBLIOTECA

**PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY:
CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN KOSOVO: A SIMULATION
EXERCISE**

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AIMS OF THE SIMULATION

The simulation's aims are:

1. To identify political and security issues that are expected to confront decisionmaking echelons in national groups, governments and international organizations, in the face of the eruption of violence in Kosovo.
2. To develop negotiating skills relevant to crisis management.

METHOD

The simulation is divided into two stages.

The first is dedicated to studying the issues on the agenda by the various teams separately, and to the preparation of positions and tactics for the ensuing negotiations.

The second stage comprises interactions and negotiations among the various teams, aimed at identifying obstacles to a settlement, as well as possible courses of action and means of advancing agreement concerning the concrete issues on the agenda, specified below. (see: topics on the agenda for negotiations, p. 7).

The simulation is supervised by a Control Team, and will be conducted according to a predefined program and specified issues for discussion.

STRUCTURE: PARTICIPATING TEAMS AND SUPPORT MECHANISM

STATES AND SUB-NATIONAL GROUPS *

1. Kosovo Albanians
2. Kosovo Serbs
3. Albania
4. Serbia
5. Greece
6. Bulgaria
7. Turkey
8. USA
9. Russia
10. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)

INTERNATIONAL TEAMS *

11. European Union
12. NATO
13. UN

THE SIMULATION MANAGEMENT

14. Control team
 Assistants
15. Media - attached to Control
16. Advisory team - A forum of Experts on issues relevant to the negotiations, will advise the teams and the simulation's control, upon request.

.....

* Each of the teams will consist of up to 4 members, including a chairman, who will also be the spokesman for the team, and a secretary who will take notes during the Intra-group and inter-group discussions. The distribution of the Seminar participants among the simulation groups will be announced separately.

CRISIS IN KOSOVO: PREMISES AND SCENARIO FOR THE SIMULATED NEGOTIATIONS

- A basic premise guiding the simulated negotiations is that violence has already erupted in Kosovo.

- Otherwise, all relevant factors and developments are structured along the realistic conditions of the scene, i.e. fighting continues in Bosnia Herzegovina; truces have not been strictly observed; international efforts to reach a settlement continue; the positions of interested actors are identical to those formally declared and practiced by them; etc.

Events preceding the simulated negotiations

Intense fighting between the military federal forces under Serbian control and local guerillas erupted in Kosovo and spread rapidly throughout the province, stimulated by international recognition of the evolving challenge.

Violence began as extremists of both the Albanian and Serbian sides embarked on concerted terrorist campaigns. Serbian extremists resorted to attacks targeting the public at large, designed to provoke the army to assume tighter control over the province, while extremists of Albanian ethnic origin initiated a series of attacks against military personnel and Serbian political figures.

Serbian forces in Kosovo were immediately reinforced.

The leader of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo made a formal declaration of "an end to the Serbian occupation" and announced the independence of the province.

Mass demonstrations, met with harsh reaction by the Serbian controlled security forces, engulfed large areas of Kosovo. Dozens of people were killed.

Pristina was heavily bombed, and masses of refugees began leaving the city, heading toward the Albanian border. Reports concerning convoys of ethnic Albanians fleeing Kosovo, pictures of victims of the fighting as well as of material damage inflicted by the army's actions immediately became prime international news items.

Initial responses of the international community

The President of Albania publicly recognized the declared sovereignty of Kosovo.

Albanian military forces, positioned along the border with Kosovo, were reinforced. In response to requests for clarification of its intentions, put forward by the US State Department and European governments, Tirana claimed the reinforcement to constitute merely a show of force aimed at deterring the JNA from taking military measures against the population in Kosovo at large.

The international community is alarmed: Western states' leaders issue appeals to the rival sides calling upon them to halt the violence.

Athens urged other European governments to take into account probable ramifications of recognizing the sovereignty of Kosovo, and launched intense diplomatic efforts aimed at convincing Belgrade to practise restraint in face of the challenge posed by the Albanians in Kosovo.

Urgent appeals were made by various heads of state, mainly European, for the UN Security Council to convene. Leaders of the EU members met in Brussels for consultations concerning the Kosovo's declaration of independence. However, no unified stance was reached.

The White House issued a call for a ceasefire, and warned Belgrade against resorting to an allout military offensive in reaction to the political moves and violent acts conducted by ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.

TIME TABLE

THURSDAY 15 SEPTEMBER

Morning Session:

09:00-13:00 Introduction to Negotiations

Andrea Kupfer-Schneider, Arent Fox Law Firm,
Washington D.C.

Afternoon Session:

17:45 Is Preventive Diplomacy Possible? Simulation Exercise
on Kosovo

Coordinator: *Anat Kurz*, The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS),
Tel Aviv

Instructions: Substance, Methodology and Logistics:

Georgios Kostakos, ELIAMEP

Intra-Group Discussions and Preparation of Negotiating Positions

Negotiations: First Session

FRIDAY 16 SEPTEMBER

Morning Session:

09:00-13:30 **Negotiations: Second Session**

**Simulation Summary and Conclusions: General
Discussion**

AGENDA FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS

1. The question of recognising of Kosovo's independence.
2. The issue of external intervention - diplomatic, economic or military - aimed at halting the fighting.

PROCEDURAL NOTES

- The preparation of negotiating positions will be concluded in the formulation of a one-page statement of policy, regarding the two issues on the agenda, to be publicly declared by each team.

- A file containing the "official" declarations will be compiled by the Media team and distributed to all, providing the teams with the initial information concerning their counterparts' positions.

- Inter-group contacts should focus on the issues on the agenda. Teams are allowed to decide which party to approach, which forum to join, and for what purpose.

Participants may present queries to Control, requesting information or advice concerning any aspect of the simulation. Press communiques may be released at any time.

Requests for clarification of position, warnings and offers, as well as invitations to meet, messages to the public (through the Media), and requests for background information, will be written on the special "Memorandum" sheets (see attached form). Upon approval by Control, the memoranda will be delivered to their destination.

NO DIRECT COMMUNICATION IS ALLOWED BETWEEN TEAMS WITHOUT PRIOR NOTIFICATION TO CONTROL.

Towards the end of the negotiations' second phase, the teams will formulate notes for the concluding assembly and phrase a communique for the press, summarizing their views.

MEMORANDUM

From:

Date:

To:

Time:

Type of Message: (more than one may be marked)

☐ invitation

☐ diplomatic statement

☐ declaration

☐ request for military
assistance

☐ press release

☐ cooperation\resolution
proposal

☐ other, please specify:

Message:

Do not write below this point; for the use of the coordinator only

Cleared: ☐ Yes

☐ No (To be returned as
unacceptable; see remarks)

1) See changes to message and resubmit

2) See coordinator

3) Alternative suggestion:

Initials of Coordinator: _____

Zlatko Šabič*

SMALL ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION MAKING
FOR THE EU MEMBERSHIP: THE CASE OF
SLOVENIA¹

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1. Introduction

The present international community may be designated, *inter alia* also as a community of "small states". There are at least 115 states that may be designated one way or another as "small". Such a vast community includes countries like Costa Rica with only 3,088,000 inhabitants, or, a typical case of "micro states" as they are often called, the Independent State of Western Samoa with just 166,000 inhabitants. In Europe, one may find states such as Luxembourg, with 380.000 inhabitants, or Norway (4,2 million)¹.

The criteria for defining a "small state" is in some sense a matter of choice (Senjur, 1993). We have already indicated, that one criterion may be the size of population; in this respect, it is reasonable to distinguish, for instance, "small states" from "micro states", but the question seems to remain as to what criteria should be applied for such a distinction.²

The issue of small states in Europe became more important after the tectonic changes in the beginning of the 1990s, when the process of dissolution took place in two large political entities: Yugoslavia and Soviet Union. Many new countries emerged as the result of that process and many of them can be characterised as "small countries"; e.g. the Baltic states that used to be part of the former Soviet Union, or for instance Slovenia and Croatia, formerly part of Yugoslavia. At the risk of simplification, we would maintain that the basic reasons for break-ups in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were essentially of political nature and that economic consequences were not studied to a necessary extent by those thinking of the secession. In terms of "secessionists' strategies" this was not such a mistake, for the history and the practice of

¹ The data are for 1992.

²As to the population size, the 10 million limit seems to be quite widely accepted (Senjur, 1993), though suggestions for 5 million also have their rationale: developed countries with population near 10 million and with large areas (e.g. Sweden) are economically large countries (Hughes, 1984). It seems reasonable to combine the area and the size of population, in order to determine a small state. Though we are aware of arbitrariness of such distinctions, we decided to use Senjur's (1993) criteria of defining a small state. According to these criteria, such a state should have a surface between 10,000 and 100,000 square kilometres and should have a population between 1 and 10 million.

international (economic) relations show that small states can survive in the global economy, as long as they opt for an international trade. In fact, the basic disadvantage of small states is not so much economic, or social - it is political (e.g. the issue of security), especially when important global changes take place (the fate of the Baltic states after the WW II).

The fact, that small countries have to opt for an international trade (autarchy, by an individual option or enforced by others, is clearly a disaster for a small state; Senjur, 1993: 25), implies that the basic goal of countries, seceding from larger entities, is basically the political disintegration, whereas the economic disintegration can be seen more in terms of "divorcing a partner", and trying to find a new one as soon as possible. This is all the more truth for small countries in transition, such as Slovenia. Of course, finding a new partner for an integration is not always an easy task. We believe, however, that this task should be easier to deal with for smaller than for larger countries. In other words, provided that their economy do not substantially lag behind the economy of larger countries, small countries have more chances for a successful integration in short term into new, larger markets. This assumption is particularly important in the circumstances, where the world economy is in recession, and where there is not enough capital to "cover" such an integration. If we presume the economic situation as described above, political circumstances can in this respect prove the only obstacle in the process of integration.

By means of a comparative analysis of the Slovene economy with the economies of three Central European applicants for the EU membership - Hungary, The Czech Republic and Poland - we shall see to what extent such assumptions meet the reality. This analysis does not mean to be comprehensive. Some important aspects such as an analysis of restructuring of enterprises, privatisation and bank rehabilitation process will be omitted and not dealt with in detail respectively. It may, however, provide for a starting point in already quite extensive academic efforts in evaluating the international position of Slovenia, both in economic and political terms.

2. Slovene priorities in the foreign policy

Slovenia is still on the way of defining its long-term foreign policy, although its current actions give observers an idea as to what such a definition may be consisted of. Apart from the issues connected with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, relationships with

the neighbouring countries, membership in the Council of Europe, etc.,³ an important set of priorities in Slovene foreign policy is connected with the relationship with international economic organisations and involves close relationships with European integration processes in particular.

As far as international economic organisations of a global nature are concerned, Slovene actions met success. It became a member of the IMF in January 1993, and joined the World Bank Group in February 1993; in December 1993, Slovenia was admitted to the membership of IDB (Inter-American Development Bank), and by the end of 1994, Slovenia is expected to become a GATT member.⁴

As far as its international position in Europe is concerned, Slovenia is better off with regard to other republics of former Yugoslavia, but lags behind the "Vishegrad Group". Slovenia was admitted to the membership of EBRD in October 1992. In September 1993, Cooperation Agreement with the EU, together with the Financial Protocol and the Transport Agreement, came into effect and enabled Slovenia to start "exploratory talks" for an Association (Europe) Agreement - the status, members of the "Vishegrad Group" already have. In addition and interestingly enough, Slovenia also negotiates the free trade area with EFTA, and has ratified in 1994 the free trade agreements with the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Similar agreements with Poland and Hungary are expected to be concluded as well.

This random list of international activities shows that economic integration indeed presents one of the highest priorities in Slovene foreign policy. As we tried to imply in introduction, every country, which has seceded from a larger political entity and has thereby suffered a loss of the market in the framework of such an entity, has to find a substitution for it, if it wants to survive economically. Slovenia is no exception in this regard. This fact calls for assessment of Slovene capabilities to meet the challenges of integration such as the EU, perhaps with a comparison to other candidates to enter.

This will be the task of the following chapters. First we will introduce a brief look into Slovene position in the global economy. Then we will try to assess the position of the

³On Slovene foreign policy see, e.g. Türk, 1993 and Bučar, 1993.

⁴"Slovenia: Towards a Full-Fledged Market Economy", p. 3.

Slovene economy in Europe, compared with the economic position of the most advanced countries in transition, i.e. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic.

3. Global position of the Slovene economy

With GDP per capita of USD 6,185 in 1992, Slovenia ranks among upper middle income countries. The analysis of development indicators does not change this position particularly. Ješovnik (1994) has clustered 102 countries according to their population, territory, GNP per capita, life expectancy, literacy, IMF quota in SDR per capita, share of agriculture in GDP, share of industry in GDP, export per capita and import per capita, as they are presented in World Development Report. His analysis shows us that Slovenia is ranked into a group, which consists mostly of semi-peripheral European countries and newly industrialised countries: South Korea, Greece, Portugal, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Spain, New Zealand and Ireland. This group is ranked on the second place, next to the group of developed countries (see Figure 1 on p. 6).




Figure 1: Slovene position in the world according to the selected development indicators (a cluster).

(Source: Ješovnik, 1994: 37)

Of course, such an approach of indicating Slovenia's position in the world economy may not entirely comply with the reality.⁵ Yet it should not be neglected as well, in particular because some other analyses give similar impression of Slovene's economic position. According to the EIU analysis of GDPs of ex-socialist economies in 1993, Slovenia with its GDP per capita over 6,000 USD by far exceeds other Eastern European countries (Hungary follows by GDP of 3,500 USD per capita).




Figure 2: Eastern European countries; GDP per capita.

(Source: Poland: Country Report. The Economist Intelligence Unit 1994: 14)

⁵See the comments on the approaches used in Ješovnik, 1994: 27 ff.

4. Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia compared; an analysis of economic indicators

As expected, the economies of Central Europe have so far done the most to approach their Western partners. The experience with what is being commonly known as the "transition period" is however different from case to case. Poland has entered the market economy with the foreign debt that in 1993 increased to 49 bn USD (1,273 USD per capita).⁶ The inflation rate is decreasing, though it is still relatively high (35.3 %). The unemployment rate is 16 % (February 1994). Given the fact that Poland has the population of 38.5 m, this means that almost 3 m of people (2,953,000 - one- and-a-half of population of Slovenia) are unemployed. The good news is that in 1993 Poland had the GDP growth of 4 % - one of the highest rates in Eastern Europe.

Hungary (population: 10.3 m) had entered the market economy on a gradual basis, though e.g. in terms of foreign investments, quite aggressively.⁷ Hungary's foreign debt rose to USD 26.1 bn (USD 2534 per capita), whereas the inflation decreased to 22.5 % (compared with 23.0 % in 1992). Real GDP growth in 1993 was estimated on -1.0 %, with expected 1.0 % growth this year. The unemployment rate is 11.8 %.⁸

The Czech Republic is almost generally accepted as the most successful among Eastern European countries in transition. The inflation reached 10 % in 1992,⁹ rose to 20.8 % in 1993, but the EIU expects a decrease to only 9.0 % in 1994. The GDP growth is expected this year (3.0 %, -0.3 % in 1993). The Czech Republic has rather low unemployment rate: 3.5 % in 1993, with the forecast of slight increasing this year and a year to follow (4.0 % and 5.0 % respectively). The foreign debt of Czechoslovakia in 1992 was accounted to USD 9.5 bn (USD 633 per capita).¹⁰

⁶However, Poland won a relief on almost USD 13 bn of outstanding debt to Western commercial banks. See Poland: Country Report, 2nd Quarter. EIU, 1994: 19.

⁷See Business International Study: "Joint Ventures, Acquisitions & Privatization in Eastern Europe & the USSR: A Practical Guide to Investment" (Report No. 210: 59).

⁸Hungary: Country Report, 2nd Quarter. EIU, 1994: 3, 5.

⁹Figures for 1992 and 1993 are for Czechoslovakia.

¹⁰Czech Republic, Country Report, 3d quarter 1994. EIU, 1994.

Recent economic trends indicate, that recovery might be under way in Slovenia as well. After a six year period of permanent recession, accelerated by a slump of economic activity in the first years of Slovene independence, 1993 ended up with 1 % GDP increase, whereas in the first half of 1994 it increased to 3.7 %.. Inflation is still not under complete control; it sharply decreased in 1993 to 22.9 % (compared to 92.9 % in 1992) and it was projected to 13.0 this year. Yet this projection is likely not to come true. It is expected that this year's inflation rate will decrease only slightly, to 20.4 %. The unemployment rate in 1993 was 9.1 %, but in 1994 it substantially increased - to 14.6 %. The foreign debt of Slovenia accounts to USD 1,956 bn (USD 982 per capita).¹¹

Of course, these data cannot entirely explain the economic trends in the selected former socialist countries, yet they give us some sort of an idea as to the international position of a particular economy (see Figure 3 on p. 10). The Czech Republic seems to be on a good way to returning to the market economy, but Slovenia, Hungary and Poland do not lag behind substantially. The fact that these four economies appear the most prosperous in Eastern Europe would probably not change much if some other indicators were included as well.¹²

¹¹The Bulletin of the Bank of Slovenia, June-July 1994.

¹²Take, for instance, the indicators of the attractiveness of Eastern European countries for foreign direct investments (FDIs); In Dunning's analysis of 1992 Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland (alongside with East Germany) appear as the most attractive locations for FDIs (Dunning, 1992: 23a). If Slovenia were included into this analysis, it would, according to our own assessments, be placed on the third position (after East Germany and Hungary). On FDIs and the competitive position of Slovenia see Rojec, 1994, and Svetličič, 1993.

	GDP Growth	Inflation	Unempl.	For. Debt	AVER.
POLAND	1	4	4	3	3
HUNGARY	4	3	2	4	4
THE CZECH REPUBLIC	3	1	1	1	1
SLOVENIA	2	2	3	2	2

(1 = the best, compared to others in the group)

4 = the worst, compared to others in the group)

Figure 3: The assessment of economic trends in selected states according to the selected economic indicators.

5. Complying with the EU membership conditions - a problem for larger Eastern European countries?

The issue of membership of Eastern European countries in the EU became the reality when Hungary applied for a full membership on 1 April 1994. Poland followed suit a week later, whereas the Czech Republic, while delaying its application, made it clear that it expected to be admitted no later than the two first applicants (Lavigne, 1994: 2). It has been predicted quite before 1994 that applications for a membership by former communist countries, as much as inevitable, would bring to the fore several problems. As regards the newcomers from Scandinavia plus Austria, the costs and benefits analysis shows that the EU will have benefits from them (Sweden has calculated that it will be net contributor to the EU). The economic and environmental problems of Eastern European countries do not provide a basis for such an optimistic costs-benefits analysis, which opens the issue of helping from EU's structural fund, and therefore the question of redistribution among current member states of the European Union (Sbragia, 1992: 16). In other words, the question is whether the present EU members are able to provide for a financial cover of the adaptation of the

Eastern European countries *inside* the EU. The most characteristic example for such a dilemma is probably agriculture. The agricultural potential of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary suggests that the present EU members would have to face increased competition and very high costs arising from the CAP being extended to these new members, where agriculture has a much larger share in the GDP than the EU's average (3 %; slightly less than 6 % in the Czech Republic, over 7 % in Hungary and Poland). This would probably lead to a collapse of the CAP with far reaching consequences on several EU members (Lavigne, 1994: 7). Are members of the EU ready to take that challenge?

Another important issue in terms of fulfilling conditions for the EU membership is the Maastricht criteria for fiscal and monetary convergence. As to the requirement for a public debt not exceeding 60 percent of the GDP, Lavigne estimates that it is for various reasons (such as a clear-cut separation between state budget accounts and state enterprise accounts) very difficult to assess (Lavigne, 1994: 4). Regarding the requirement that a public sector deficit should not exceed 3 percent of the GDP, it seems that only the Czech Republic, with 0 percent deficit estimated in 1993, would comply with this criterion. The conditions connected with inflation and interest rates¹³ have not been met by any of the applicants for the EU membership. As to the stable exchange rate, the Czech Republic would be the only country to comply with this criterion (Lavigne, 1994: 5).

It seems that in terms of meeting the Maastricht criteria for fiscal and economic convergence, Slovenia faces more or less the same situation as the Eastern European countries - applicants for the EU membership. The conceptualising of the public debt is still under way, whereby the main issues are the privatisation of state enterprises, bank indebtedness and the non-allocated debt of the former Yugoslavia. On the other hand, Slovenia complies with the public sector deficit criterion. It is estimated that the public sector deficit will be 1.0 % this year (+ 0.5 % in 1993).¹⁴ Slovenia seems to comply with the requirement of a stable exchange rate, but has still unsatisfactory results in terms of inflation and interest rates differentials.

¹³Whereby inflation rates differentials should not exceed 1.5 % and interest rates differentials should not exceed 2 % over the respective rates of the three member states by the lowest inflation.

¹⁴The Bank of Slovenia, Bulletin, June - July 1994, p. 52.

Given the present economic situation in the EU, it is not likely that the EU would "hurry" with accepting Eastern European countries as new members. According to the costs and benefits analysis as regards new members, we would even assume that there will be no "package admittance", as in the case Sweden, Norway, Finland and Austria. If the pressure for admitting new members grows (even regardless the economic conditions of applicants, or the economic situation in general), it is likely that smaller economies will be admitted first. It may even happen that other small countries, "outsiders" (like Malta, or Slovenia), which may not present a benefit for the EU, but may also not be expensive in terms of restructuring, would be admitted with less problems than the larger countries.

6. Conclusion

At present none of the Eastern European Countries comply with the EU membership conditions (Lavigne, 1994), so does not Slovenia (Lavrač, 1994). We tried to show that four Eastern European Countries, Slovenia being among them, are achieving significant progress in entering the market economy. It may happen that regardless the success they make on their way to the market economy, the issue of membership of the Eastern European countries in the EU will soon become quite relevant. In other words, as it is unlikely that any of Eastern European countries would be able to surmount the development gap of 40 years in relation to the Western Europe in only one decade, it may happen that these countries will be admitted regardless the negative result of the costs-benefit analysis. In such circumstances, smaller states like Slovenia may be better off in terms of eligibility for membership as some larger states (whereby the latter would imply larger costs for the EU and open the question of redistribution among current members). In our contribution we do not assess other equally important issues as regards a future enlargement of the EU membership, such as the reform of the decision-making process of the EU, or the political situation in Europe (e.g. Slovenia and its relations with neighbouring states). We have showed, however, that Slovenia tends towards the EU membership and that this is one of the top-priorities in Slovene foreign policy. As a small country, Slovenia cannot afford itself any kind of autarchy, and should keep up with the open economy. This implies that Slovenia, as well as other Eastern European countries, will co-ordinate its foreign activities in trying to reach as higher degree of integration with European markets as

possible. The question remains though, whether the EU, or Europe in general, is ready for such an integration. In a way, part of the solution may be offered by 1996, i.e. if the EU's institutional problems are solved, but many answers will have to be given by non-members and particular members of the EU itself as well.

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1. Prof. Dr. Lenard J. COHEN, Simon Fraser University, Toronto, Canada - Leading Speaker on "SECURITY ON THE BALKANS"
2. Dr. Carl-Gustaf STROEHM - Balkan Correspondent of The German daily "DIE WELT" - with contribution on "THE CONFLICT YUGOSLAVIA"
3. Prof. Theodore COULOUMBIS - Chairman of the Board of THE HELLENIC FOUNDATION FOR EUROPEAN & FOREIGN POLICY - on "COOPERATION AND SECURITY ON THE BALKANS"
4. Mrs. D. BOBEWA - HEAD OF THE FOREIGN INVESTMENTS COMMISSION, A COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
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12:30 Lunch
13:30 Discussions, Workshops on special problems/items
15:00 Coffee/Tea

SOCIAL EVENT

16:00 Visit to Melnik
Sightseeing, Meeting the City
Council Authorities, Wine Tasting
at the Greek House, Traditional
Dinner
23:00 Return to Bansko

DAY THREE, October 15th (Saturday)

9:00 Consultation mechanisms of
the Balkan and Black Sea
Cooperation. Research activities
supporting the business in the Region.

Chairman: Prof. Zachari Zachariev,
President of Slaviani Foundation,
Sofia

With contribution from: Russia,
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Romania, Yugoslavia

10:30 Coffee/Tea
10:45 General conclusions of the Symposium
Reports of Chairmen.
12:00 Official closing.
12:30 Press release
13:00 Lunch
14:00 Return to Sofia
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Sunday in the open

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in the open) **

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6:00 Visiting the National park of Pirin
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18:00 Return to Bansko
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