


**BUILDING GLOBAL AND REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS  
FOR PEACE AND PROSPERITY: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC  
SECURITY IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER**

Japan Institute for International Affairs  
Institut français des relations internationales  
Tokyo, 2-3/VI/1994

- a. Agenda
- b. List of participants
- 1. "Continuity and change in the international system: security, economics and ideology"/ Yoshinobu Yamamoto
- 2. "Continuity and change in the international system"/ Joachim Krause
- 3. "Beyond peacekeeping?: reflections on the evolution of international peacekeeping after the Cold War"/ Mats Berdal
- 4. "Beyond peacekeeping: new departure for the U.N. peace-keeping and the role of Japan"/ Takahiro Shinyo
- 5. "United Nations reform and Japan"/ Yozo Yokota
- 6. "United Nations reform"/ Maurice Bertrand
- 7. "Strengthening non-proliferation"/ Mitsuru Kurosawa
- 8. "Strengthening nuclear non-proliferation"/ Christophe Carle
- 9. "Strengthening non-proliferation: Southeast Asia: an arms race, or just equipment upgrade and modernization?"/ Christian Lechervy
- 10. "Strengthening non-proliferation: nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and Japan"/ Umemoto Tetsuya
- 11. "Enhancing economic and security cooperation in Europe: the new East-West relations in Europe"/ Marco Carnovale
- 12. "Enhancing economic and security cooperation in Europe"/ Takako Ueta
- 13. "Emerging political and economic security issues in Asia"/ Akio Watanabe
- 14. "Emerging political and economic security issues in Asia"/ François Joyaux
- 15. "Creating an Asia-Pacific security architecture"/ Satoshi Morimoto
- 16. "Creating an Asia-Pacific security architecture"/ Stefano Silvestri
- 17. "Two perspectives on Euro-Japan relations: foundations for peace and prosperity: perspectives on relations between Europe and Japan"/ Jean-Pierre Lehmann



*JIIA-IFRI JOINT CONFERENCE*

Building Global and Regional Frameworks for Peace and Prosperity:  
Political and Economic Security in the New World Order

Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo  
June 2-3, 1994

**AGENDA**

**WEDNESDAY, JUNE 1**

18:00 Welcome dinner at the Hotel Okura  
[Banquet Room "Chelsea," 12/F, South Wing]

**THURSDAY, JUNE 2**

•Session 1: The Role of the United Nations in a Changing International System

*Morning Session*

*Chair: Nobuo Matsunaga (JIIA)]*

9:40-9:45 Opening Remarks

9:45-11:15 1. Continuity and Change in the International System

*Presentations:*

Yoshinobu Yamamoto (Univ of Tokyo)  
Joaquim Krause (DGAP, Bonn)

*Discussions*

11:15-11:30 coffee break

11:30-13:00 2. Beyond Peacekeeping

*Presentations:*

Mats Berdal (IISS, London)  
Takahiro Shinyo (Osaka Univ./JIIA)  
Pierre Conesa (Defence Ministry, Paris)

*Discussions*

13:15-14:30 lunch  
[Restaurant "Kamogawa,"  
B1/F, Shin-Kasumigaseki Bldg]

*Afternoon Session*

*Chair:*

14:45-16:15 3. United Nations Reform

*Presentations:*

Yozo Yokota (International Christian Univ)

Maurice Bertrand (Graduate Inst. of Int'l Studies, Geneva)

*Commentator:*

Yoshio Hatano (Former Permanent Representative  
to the U.N.)

*Discussions*

16:15-16:30 coffee break

16:30-18:00 4. Strengthening Non-Proliferation

*Presentations:*

Christophe Carle (IFRI, Paris)

Mitsuru Kurosawa (Osaka Univ)

Christian Lechervy (Defence Ministry, Paris)

Umemoto Tetsuya (Univeristy of Shizuoka)

*Discussions*

19:00- Dinner  
[Chinese restaurant "Man Fang,"  
B1/F Shin-Kasumigaseki Bldg]

**FRIDAY, JUNE 3**

•Sessions 2: Regional Political and Economic Security Frameworks

*Morning Session*

*Chair:*

9:15-10:45 1. Enhancing Economic and Security Cooperation in Eastern Europe

*Presentations:*

Marco Carnovale (IAI, Rome)

Takako Ueta (International Christian Univ/JIIA)

*Discussions*

10:45-11:00 coffee break

11:00-12:30 2. Emerging Political and Economic Security Issues in Asia

*Presentations:*

Akio Watanabe (Aoyama Gakuin Univ)

Francois Joyaux (ITALCO, Paris)

*Discussions*

12:50-14:20 Reception and Lunch at the French Embassy\*

*Afternoon Session*

*Chair: Akio Watanabe (Aoyama Gakuin)*

14:45-16:15     3. Creating an Asia-Pacific Security Architecture

*Presentations:*

Satoshi Morimoto (Nomura Research Institute)  
Stefano Silvestri (IAI, Rome)

*Discussions*

16:15-16:30     coffee break

•Session 3: Foundations for Peace and Prosperity

16:30-18:00     Two Perspectives on Euro-Japan Relations

*Presentations:*

Jean-Pierre Lehmann (EJIS, Stockholm)  
Yukio Satoh (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

\*Involves transportation



*JILA-IFRI JOINT CONFERENCE*

Building Global and Regional Frameworks for Peace and Prosperity:  
Political and Economic Security in the New World Order

Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo  
June 2-3, 1994

**LIST OF PARTICIPANTS****Europe**

BERDAL, Mats R.	Research Associate International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London
BERTRAND, Maurice	Guest Professor Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva
CARLE, Christophe	Research Associate French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), Paris
CARNOVALE, Marco	Head of Eastern European Studies Italian Institute of International Affairs (IAI), Rome
CONESA, Pierre	Deputy Director Delegation for Strategic Affairs (DAS) French Ministry of Defence, Paris
GHAUSSY, Saadollah	Director Institute of Comparative Culture, Sophia University, Tokyo
GODEMENT, François	Senior Research Associate Asia-Pacific Affairs, French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), Paris
JOYAUX, François	Professor of International Relations National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilisations (INALCO), Paris
KRAUSE, Joachim	Deputy Director Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Affairs (DGAP), Bonn
LECHERVY, Christian	Delegation for Strategic Affairs (DAS) French Ministry of Defence, Paris

LEHMANN, Jean-Pierre	Professor & Director European Institute of Japanese Studies (EJIS), Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm
MORIZET, Pierre	Professor, Maison Franco-Japonaise
SILVESTRI, Stefano	Vice President Italian Institute of International Affairs (IAI), Rome

## Japan

HATANO Yoshio	Ambassador, Former Permanent Representative to the United Nations
HORIMURA Takahiko	Acting Director, JIIA
HOSHINO Toshiya	Research Fellow, JIIA
KIKUCHI Tsutomu	Associate Professor Nanzan University, Nagoya Visiting Research Fellow, JIIA
KOJIMA Seiji	Director, Regional Policy Division Asian Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
KUNUGI Tatsuro	Professor International Christian University, Tokyo
KUROSAWA Mitsuru	Professor of International Law Osaka University
MATSUNAGA Nobuo	President, Japan Institute of International Affairs
MORIMOTO Satoshi	Senior Researcher Center for Policy Research Nomura Research Institute, Tokyo
NAKAI Yoshifumi	Research Fellow, JIIA
OKAMOTO Yukio	President, Okamoto Associates Inc
SATOH Haruko	Assistant Research Fellow, JIIA
SATOH Yukio	Ambassador to the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
SEIKI Katsuo	Executive Director Global Industrial and Social Progress Research Institute (GISPRI)
SHINYO Takahiro	Professor Faculty of Law, Osaka University Visiting Research Fellow, JIIA

SHOJI Ryuichi	Director of Research Coordination, JIIA
TAKAGI Seiichiro	Professor Graduate School of Policy Science Saitama University
TOMODA Seki	Professor Asia University, Tokyo Visiting Research Fellow, JIIA
UCHIDA Takeo	Senior Academic Officer (International Relations) United Nations University
UETA Takako	Associate Professor Division of International Studies International Christian University, Tokyo Visiting Research Fellow, JIIA
UMEMOTO Tetsuya	Associate Professor Faculty of International Relations University of Shizuoka Visiting Research Fellow, JIIA
WATANABE Akio	Professor School of International Politics, Economics and Business, Aoyama Gakuin University, Tokyo
YAKUSHIJI Taizo	Professor, Faculty of Law, Keio University, Tokyo
YAMAMOTO Yoshinobu	Professor University of Tokyo
YOKOTA Yozo	Professor International Christian University, Tokyo
YOSHIKAWA Motohide	Director, United Nations Policy Division Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

### **Observer**

ROY Valérie	National Institute of Oriental Languages and Civilisations (INALCO), Paris
SHIROYAMA Hideaki	Lecturer, Faculty of Law University of Tokyo
TAKEBAYASHI Tadao	Manager, Dept of Planning and Research Global Industrial and Social Progress Research Institute (GISPRI)

# **Curricula Vitae of Participants**

**JIIA-IFRI Joint Conference**

**June 2-3, 1994**

## CURRICULUM VITAE

Dr. Mats R. Bardal, B.Sc.(Econ), D.Phil.(Oxon)

Address: International Institute for Strategic Studies  
23 Tavistock Street  
London, WC2E 7NQ  
Tel. 071 379 7676

Date of Birth: 5 October 1965

Current Status: Research Associate  
International Institute for Strategic Studies,  
London

### Education:

1984-85 History (grunnfag), University of Oslo

1985-88 B.Sc. (Econ.), International Relations,  
London School of Economics and Political Science,  
University of London (First Class Honours)

1989-92 D.Phil., International Relations, St Antony's  
College, University of Oxford

### Research Appointments:

1994- Research Fellow  
International Institute for Strategic Studies,  
London

1992-94 Research Associate  
International Institute for Strategic Studies,  
London

1990-92 Research Associate (Seniorstipendiat),  
Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo

1988-89 Research Assistant,  
Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo

### Publications:

'John F. Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War' (Review Article),  
*The Oxford International Review*, Vol. 2, No.1 (1990)

*Maritime Power in Transition: British Naval Policy and Norwegian Security, 1951-60* (Oslo: IFS, March 1992)

'US Military and the Drugs War', *Defence and Security Review*, Vol. 3, No.1 (1993)

*Forging a Maritime Alliance: Norway and the Evolution of American Maritime Strategy 1945-1960* (Oslo: IFS, June 1993)

'Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts', written jointly with Robert Cooper, *Survival*, Vol.35, No.1 (Spring 1993)

'The UNTAC Test: Peacekeeping in Cambodia', written jointly with Gerry Segal, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 5. No.3 (1993)

'The Evolving Military Requirements of Peacekeeping', *Defence and Security Review*, Vol. 3, No.2. (Autumn, 1993)

'The Resumption of Civil War in Angola', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 5. No.5 (1993)

*Whither UN Peacekeeping?*, Adelphi Paper 281 (London: Brassey's for the IISS, October 1993)

'Cambodia: The Shortcomings of Success', written jointly with Professor Michael Laifer, in *The New Interventionism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 1994).

'United Nations Peacekeeping at a Crossroads: The Challenges of Management and Institutional Reform', *IFS Notat* (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 1994)

'Peacekeeping in Europe', in *European Security After the Cold War*, Part I: Papers from the 35th Annual Conference of the IISS, *Adelphi Paper 284* (London: Brassey's for the IISS, January 1994)

'Fateful Encounter: The United States and UN Peacekeeping', *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (1994)

#### Teaching Experience:

Undergraduate Tutor in Modern History and International Relations, Magdalen College, University of Oxford, 1989-92

Tutor to visiting American students for The Oxford Overseas Studies Centre, Oxford, 1989-92

Seminars and lectures given regularly at the London School of Economics and Birkbeck College (University of London)

#### Editorial Experience:

Member of International Editorial Board of *International Peacekeeping*  
(London: Frank Cass)

Founding co-editor of *The Oxford International Review*, 1990

External Editor of *Defence Studies*, Norwegian Institute for  
Defence Studies, Oslo

#### Consultancy:

Author of *United Nations Command and Control Study* commissioned by  
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, New York (UN HQ), April  
1994.

Drafting sections of report by the *Commission on Global Governance*,  
Geneva/New York, September/November 1993.

Research Coordinator/Consultant for the Regional Security Programme  
of *The Norwegian Institute for Applied Social Sciences* (FAFO), Oslo,  
June-December 1993.

#### Other Relevant Experience:

President and co-founder of the *LSE Scandinavian Society*, 1986-88

Secretary, *Oxford University Strategic Studies Group*, 1990-91

President, *Oxford University Strategic Studies Group*, 1991-92

#### Broadcasting:

Regular contributor to current affairs programmes for the BBC  
World Service, Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation and other  
news corporations based in London.

#### Languages:

English

Norwegian

German (working knowledge)

Spanish (working knowledge)

#### Scholarships, Prizes and Grants:

British Council/Foreign Office Award for Postgraduate Studies in  
Britain, 1989-90

Overseas Research Student Award, academic years 1990-92  
(Awarded by Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals of the Universities of the United Kingdom)

Andrew E. and Norman Wigeland Fund, academic year 1990-91  
(Awarded by the American-Scandinavian Foundation to support research in the United States)

Cyril Foster Award, November 1990  
(Awarded to support research in the United States)

Research Scholarship, academic year, 1989-90  
(Awarded by Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo)

Institute for Defence Studies Senior Scholarship, academic years 1990-92

**Professional Memberships:**

- The International Institute for Strategic Studies
- The British International Studies Association
- The Oxford Strategic Studies Group (Standing Committee Member)
- The Academic Council of the United Nations System

**Referees:**

- Professor Robert O'Neill  
Chichele Professor of the History of War  
All Souls College  
Oxford OX1 4AL  
Tel: 0865 279385
- Professor Adam Roberts  
Montague Burton Professor of International Relations  
Balliol College  
Oxford OX1 3BJ  
Tel: 0865 277804
- Mr Philip Windsor  
Reader in International Relations  
London School of Economics and Political Science  
Houghton St  
London WC2A 2AE  
Tel: 071 955 7398
- Dr John Chipman  
Director  
International Institute for Strategic Studies  
23 Tavistock Street  
London WC2E 7NQ  
Tel: 071 379 7676



### Christophe Carle

Christophe Carle, born in 1960, is a Cambridge graduate (BA, M.Phil, Ph.D) and joined the Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI) in Paris in 1988 as a Research Fellow and as executive secretary to the European Strategy Group (ESG). As of 1993, he is a Senior Fellow in charge of coordination of the Security Studies department at IFRI.

His major research interests are security issues broadly conceived in the post-Cold War world, with special emphases on French foreign and defence policy, nuclear politics on a global and regional scale, as well as arms and technology transfer issues.

Carle has led IFRI's research programme on regional arms buildups and prospects for arms control, contributes op-ed pieces to the International Herald Tribune and is the author of a number of publications, including "Des armes pour le Tiers-Monde", *Ramses 90*, IFRI ; "L'Afrique sub-saharienne", *Ramses 94*, IFRI ; "Mayhem or deterrence ? Regional and global security from non-proliferation to post-proliferation", in Geoffrey Kemp ed. *Arms Control and Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia* ; "France, the Mediterranean and Southern European security", in Roberto Aliboni ed. *Southern European Security in the 1990s* ; "Future roles of ballistic missile defences : the North-South dimension" in T. Marshall and J. Paolini eds, *What future for Nuclear Forces in International Security ?* ; "Proliferation and the 'new world order'", (Aspen Strategy Group - European Strategy Group papers).

# CURRICULUM VITAE

NAME: **Marco Carnovale**

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 18 December 1959 in Rome, Italy

CITIZENSHIP: Italian

DATE UPDATED: April 1994

HOME ADDRESS: Via Anneo Lucano, 42 - 00136 Rome, Italy.

TELEPHONE/FAX: (39-6) 345-3670

WORK ADDRESS: Istituto Affari Internazionali

Via Angelo Brunetti, 9 - 00186 Rome, Italy

TELEPHONE: (39-6) 322-4360; FAX: (39-6) 322-4363

## ***CURRENT POSITION:***

**Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome - Italy: Senior Fellow, Head of Eastern European studies.**

**N.B.: On 1 July 1994 will leave IAI to take up a position as Officer for Central and Eastern European Relations, Political Affairs Division, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium.**

## ***EDUCATION***

***1983-1989: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.I.T.).***

Ph.D. in Political Science. Major fields: Defense and Arms Control, Soviet and Eastern European politics. Minor Field: International Energy Issues. Dissertation on *The Control of NATO Nuclear Forces in Europe*, published by Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado, 1993.

***1978-1981: School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.***

Bachelor of Science in Foreign Service, cum laude.

Major in International Politics. Dean's List and Second Honors.

Phi Alpha Theta (Honors Society in History).

***1981: Humboldt Universität, Berlin, German Democratic Republic.***

Summer course in East German politics and German culture.

***1980: Central School for Planning and Statistics, Warsaw, Poland.***

One-semester curriculum in East European economics and politics.

## ***OTHER PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE***

### ***1989-present: Institute of the Italian Encyclopaedia "Giovanni Treccani"***

Author of several entries and editor of international security studies.

### ***1990: Alpbach European Forum, Austria***

Lecturer of a seminar on "Human Rights and East-West Relations".

### ***1988-1989: General Staff of the Italian Ministry of Defense***

Director and co-author of a research project on "Air, naval and nuclear forces and the conventional forces negotiations in Vienna", commissioned through the Military Center for Strategic Studies.

### ***Spring 1985: Department of Political Science, M.I.T.***

Instructor of a course on the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

### ***Fall 1981: Government Department, Georgetown University.***

Teaching assistant in Western European politics.

## ***LANGUAGES***

Italian	(mother tongue)
English	(mother tongue level)
German	(advanced)
Russian	(elementary)

## ***MISCELLANEOUS***

Lived and travelled extensively throughout Eastern and Western Europe, North Africa and North America. Other interests: Classical music, photography. Glider pilot and SCUBA-diver.

## ***PUBLICATIONS***

See attached list.

## *LIST OF PUBLICATIONS*

Carnovale, Marco and Cesare Merlini: *Situazione e Prospettive delle Politiche di Nonproliferazione Nucleare (con particolare riferimento ai paesi esportatori)*, (Roma: ENEA, 1983).

Carnovale, Marco: "Il Dibattito su Energia e Strategia", in Cesare Merlini (ed.): *Energia e Strategia*, (Milano: SugarCo, 1983).

Carnovale, Marco: *Energia e Materie Prime*, paper prepared for the Italian Confederation of Industry (Roma: Iai, 1983).

Carnovale, Marco: *Prezzo del Petrolio ed Energia*, paper prepared for the Italian Ministry of Foreign Trade (Roma: Iai, 1983).

Carnovale, Marco: "La Politica dell'Energia" in *L'Italia nella Politica Internazionale, 1981-1982*, (Roma and Bologna: Iai and Il Mulino, 1984).

Carnovale, Marco: "La Politica dell'Energia" in *L'Italia nella Politica Internazionale, 1982-1983*, (Roma and Bologna: Iai and Il Mulino, 1985).

Carnovale, Marco: "US Nonproliferation Policies Toward Pakistan and South Africa" in *Nucleus*, Vol. 7, No. 4, (Cambridge, Ma: Union of Concerned Scientists, 1985).

Carnovale, Marco et al.: *A Comprehensive Test Ban*, (Cambridge, Ma: Union of Concerned Scientists, 1985).

Carnovale, Marco: "La Politica dell'Energia" in *L'Italia nella Politica Internazionale, 1983-1984*, (Roma and Bologna: Iai and Il Mulino, 1986).

Carnovale, Marco: "Strategic Defences and the Warsaw Pact" in *The International Spectator*, Vol. XXI, No.4, October-December 1986.

Carnovale, Marco: "L'Iniziativa di Difesa Strategica" in De Andreis, Marco and Paolo Miggiano (eds.): *L'Italia e la Corsa al Riarmo*, (Roma: Franco Angeli Editore, 1987).

Carnovale, Marco (ed.): *The Media and Security: Foreign and Defence Policy, Terrorism and the Media*, also published in Italian as *Sicurezza ed Informazione: Politica Estera, Difesa ed Informazione nei Mass Media* (Milano: Il Sole - 24 Ore, 1988).

Carnovale, Marco e Merlini, Cesare: "East-West Relations and Arms Control Negotiations: Current Status Options for the Future", in *The International Spectator*, Vol. XXIII, No.2, April-June 1988.

Carnovale, Marco and William C. Potter (eds.): *Soviet - East European Relations: Continuity and Change*, (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1989).

Carnovale, Marco: *Non Primo Uso e Congelamento delle Armi Nucleari*, (Roma: Istituto per il Disarmo, lo Sviluppo e la Pace, 1988).

Carnovale, Marco: "Le Relazioni Est-Ovest e la Politica Sovietica" in *L'Italia nella Politica Internazionale, 1986-1987*, (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1989).

Carnovale, Marco: "Le Relazioni Est-Ovest" and "La questione degli F-16" in *L'Italia nella Politica Internazionale, 1987-1988*, (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1989).

Carnovale, Marco e Stefano Silvestri: *Rapporto sull'Andamento della spesa militare e degli armamenti in Europa e nel Mediterraneo*, preparato per il Servizio Studi della Camera dei Deputati, Gennaio 1989.

Carnovale, Marco: "The Methodology of Force Correlation and Conventional Arms Control", in *The International Spectator*, Vol. XXIV, No.2, April-June 1989.

Carnovale, Marco: "Nuclear Politics in Italy" in Müller, Harald (ed.): *A Survey of European Nuclear Policy 1985-1987* (Hong Kong: Macmillan, 1989).

Carnovale, Marco: "Nuclear Decision-Making in Italy" in Müller, Harald (ed.): *Nuclear Decision-Making* (Hong Kong: Macmillan, 1991).

Carnovale, Marco: "Gli aiuti ai paesi dell'Europa orientale" in *L'Italia nella Politica Internazionale, 1989-1990*, (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1991).

Carnovale, Marco: "Why NATO Europe Needs a Nuclear Trigger", in *Orbis*, Vol. 35, No.2, Spring 1991.

Carnovale, Marco: "In the Wake of a Failed Coup: Moscow and the Fate of the Union", in *The International Spectator*, Vol. XXVII, No.1, January-March 1992.

Carnovale, Marco: "The Soviet Union", in *The International Spectator*, Vol. XXV, No.4, October-December 1990. Versione italiana pubblicata in Guazzone, Laura (a cura di): *L'Europa degli Anni Novanta: La Geopolitica del Cambiamento* (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1991).

Carnovale, Marco: "Naval Arms Control in the Mediterranean: An Italian Perspective", in SIPRI: *Europe and Naval Arms Control in the Gorbachev Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

Carnovale, Marco: "Gli aiuti ai paesi dell'Europa orientale" in *L'Italia nella Politica Internazionale, 1990-1991*, (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1992).

Carnovale, Marco: *The Control of NATO Nuclear Forces in Europe* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993).

Carnovale, Marco: "Gli aiuti ai paesi dell'Europa orientale" in *L'Italia nella Politica Internazionale, 1991-1992*, (Roma: SIPI, 1993).

Carnovale, Marco: "Preventing the Internationalization of the Yugoslav War", *Balkan Forum (Skopje, Macedonia)*, Vol. 1, No.5, December 1993.

Carnovale, Marco: "Naval Arms Control in the Mediterranean: Military Aspects", article in a Special Issue, edited by Marco Carnovale, of *The International Spectator*, Vol. XXXVIII, No.4, 1993, dedicated to "Maritime Security and Naval Arms Control in the Mediterranean".

Carnovale, Marco: "La Crisi Jugoslava nel Contesto Internazionale" e "Russia e Turchia; Le Potenze al Margine", in Carnovale, Marco (A Cura di): *La Guerra di Bosnia: Una Tragedia Annunciata* (Milano: Franco Angeli, 1994).

## CURRICULUM VITAE

Pierre, Philippe, Tony CONESA

4 août 1948 (Algérie) Algeria

Deputy Director : Délégation aux Affaires Stratégiques (Delegation for Strategic Affairs) in charge of Regional Questions

Agrégation d'Histoire (1974) Highest Competitive examination for Teachers (History)

ENA French National School for administration (1982)

Prime Minister Office, senior civil servant

Curriculum Vitae:

SAADOLLAH GHAUSSY

Office:  
Sophia University  
Ichigaya Campus  
4 Yonbancho  
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 102

Tel: (03) 3238-4022  
Fax (03) 3238.4081

Residence:  
Arusu Seta  
2-31-1-301 Seta  
Setagaya-ku, Tokyo 158

Tel: (03) 3709-0792

Date of Birth: September 20, 1933  
Place of Birth: Kabul, Afghanistan  
Nationality: Afghan  
Family: Married, three sons  
Current Status: Living in Japan since 1976

EMPLOYMENT

Academic

Sophia University, Tokyo:  
Tenured Professor 1984 - Present.  
Shokutaku (Full Time Lecturer) 1982 - 1984.  
Hijokin-Koshi (Part Time Lecturer) 1978 - 1982.  
Lecturer 1977 - 1978.  
Institut Supérieur de Gestion (I.S.G.), Paris, ISG/IMUA Tokyo Office: 1987 - Present.  
Academic Advisor  
University of Paris - Sorbonne, Paris: 1991 - 1992.  
Visiting Professor  
Tokyo University, Tokyo: 1985 - 1987.  
Visiting Professor  
International University of Japan, *Nigata* 1984.  
Visiting Professor  
Institute of International Affairs and Training, Shizuoka: 1978 - 1988.  
Visiting Professor  
University of Kaboul, Afghanistan: 1960 - 1973.  
Lecturer

*Director of Institute of comparative culture  
Sophia University - Tokyo*

*Since 1993*



## Curriculum Vitae: SAADOLLAH GHAUSSY

### Diplomatic

Embassy of Afghanistan, Tokyo: <i>Minister Plenipotentiary</i>	1976 - 1978.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Afghanistan: <i>Advisor</i>	1973 - 1976.
<i>Chief of Protocol</i>	1970 - 1973.
<i>Director, Political Affairs</i>	1967 - 1970.
<i>Desk Officer of American and Western European Affairs</i>	1962 - 1963.
<i>Desk Officer of Middle East and North African Affairs</i>	1960 - 1962.
Embassy of Afghanistan, Pakistan: <i>First Secretary</i>	1963 - 1966.

### International Activities

Member of Afghanistan delegation: <i>Law of the Sea Conference; New York - Caracas - Geneva</i>	1974 - 1975.
<i>XXIX Session of U.N. General Assembly - New York (6th Committee of UNGA)</i>	1974.
<i>XXIIIth Session of UNGA, New York</i>	1968.
<i>Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, Yugoslavia</i>	1961.
Human Rights Conference on Youth: <i>Belgrade, Yugoslavia, Reporter</i>	1969.
International Human Rights Conference: <i>Tehran, Iran, Reporter of the political committee</i>	1968.

---

### EDUCATION

<i>Baccalaureat - Lycee Esteklal - Kaboul</i>	1951.
Military Academy, Kaboul, Afghanistan <i>Reserve Officer</i>	1960.
University of Paris, Faculty of Law: <i>Ph.D.(Doctorate) in International Law</i>	1959.
Institut des Sciences Politiques - L'Universite de Paris (Sciences-po): <i>Diploma of International Relations</i>	1955 - 1958.
Faculty of Law, University of Paris <i>Diplome d'Etudes Superieures (D.E.S.) - Public &amp; International Law</i>	1958.
L'Universite de Geneve, Switzerland: <i>Licence-es-Science Politiques</i>	1953 - 1955.
Lycee Esteklal, Kaboul, Afghanistan <i>Baccalaureate</i>	1952.

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## TEACHING CURRICULUM

Sophia University, Tokyo: Undergraduate School

- International Relations in the XXth Century.
- Political Theories from Plato until Now.
- Introduction to Political Science.
- Third World Countries and International Relations.

Sophia University, Tokyo: Graduate School

- International Law (In the time of peace and in the time of war).
- Foreign Policy of Japan from 1951 until Now.
- Theories of International Relations.

Tokyo University

- Government and Politics in West Asia.

International University of Japan

- Middle East & International Relations.

The Institute of International Affairs and Training

- International Relations of Middle East.

The University of Kabul (prior to 1976)

- International Relations in the XXth Century.
- 

## PUBLIC SPEAKING

Universities:

Sophia University, Tokyo; Tokyo University; International University of Japan; Soka University, Hachioji, Japan; Yokosuka Naval Academy; University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign; Harvard University; University of Paris; INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France; University of Quebec in Montreal, Canada.

Institutes & Foundations:

International Management University of Asia, Tokyo; Institut Supérieur de Gestion, Paris; Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Bonn; I.I.S.T., Fujinomiya, Japan; Saint Gallen Foundation, Zürich; Institute of Developing Economies, Tokyo; Centre des études Stratégiques, Paris; Institut Universitaire des hautes études internationales, Geneva; Foreign Policy Research Center, Philadelphia; Toastmaster Club, San Diego.

Miscellaneous:

Saint Anselm Church, Tokyo; Club 44, Chaux de fond Neuchâtel, Switzerland; N.E.C. Training Center, Tokyo; Institut Henry Dunant, Geneva; Foreign Relations Dinner, International House of Japan, Tokyo; International Symposium on Middle East, Japan Foundation, Tokyo; Women's College Association of Japan.

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## MEMBERSHIPS

Japan Middle Eastern Studies (JAMES), Tokyo.  
International House of Japan, Tokyo.  
Foreign Correspondent Club of Japan (FCCJ), Tokyo.

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## DECORATIONS

Second Class Order of the Sacred Tresor, Japan.  
Knight Commander of the Victorian Order (K.C.V.O.), England.  
Officer de l'ordre de Merite, France.  
Officier de la croix de Merite, Germany.

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## LANGUAGES

Fluent in English, French, Pashto, Persian, with some Italian. & Japanese

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## PUBLICATIONS

*The Problem of Kashmir and International Law*, Ph.D. Thesis: 1959,  
Faculty of Law, University of Paris.  
*The Report of Human Rights Conference*, Tehran: 1968.  
*Political Theories from Plato Until Now*, Polycopy: 1969, University of  
Kaboul.  
*Afghanistan and International Relations*, Tokyo: 1980, Chuo Koron.  
*Afghanistan Problem*, Tokyo: 1980, Bungei Shinju.  
*The Kurdish Problem*, Tokyo: 1984, Sophia International Review.  
*The Tragedy of Lebanon*, Tokyo: 1984, Sophia International Review.  
*Saudi Arabia in the 80's*, Tokyo: 1984, Sophia International Review.  
*Situation in Afghanistan*, Tokyo: 1984, Hoseki.

Curriculum Vitae  
of Ambassador Yoshio HATANO  
Former Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations

1932: Born in Tokyo

1951-1953: Studied at Tokyo University, Faculty of Law

1953: Passed Diplomatic and Consular Service Examination, and entered Diplomatic Service

1954-1956: Studied at Princeton University (Woodrow Wilson School) and graduated with B.A.

1956-1958: Third Secretary, Embassy in the United States of America

1962-1964: Second Secretary, Embassy in Thailand

1964-1966: First Secretary, Japanese Delegation to OECD (in Paris)

1968: Director of the Europe Division, Economic Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

1969: Director of the Second Economic Affairs Division, Asian Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

1969: Director of the Second Southeast Asia Division, Asian Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

1970: First Secretary, Embassy in the United Kingdom of Great Britain (Seconded to International Institute of Strategic Studies as Senior Research Fellow)

1971: Counsellor, Embassy in the Republic of Indonesia

1973: Director of the Foreign Capital Division, International Finance Bureau, Ministry of Finance

1975: Deputy Director-General of the Treaties Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

1975: Director of the Personnel Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

- 1977: Director of the General Coordination  
Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- 1979: Minister, Embassy in the United States of  
America
- 1981: Envoy Extraordinary and Minister  
Plenipotentiary, Embassy in the United States  
of America
- 1982: Director-General of the Middle Eastern and  
African Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign  
Affairs
- 1984: Director-General for Public Information  
(Spokesman), Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- 1987: Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary,  
Permanent Representative of Japan to the  
International Organizations in Geneva
- 1990: Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary,  
Permanent Representative of Japan to the  
United Nations in New York
- 1994: Returned to the Ministry in Tokyo

Martial Status: Married and two children

## **BIOGRAPHICAL DATA**

**NAME:**           Takahiko HORIMURA

**BIRTHDAY:**     May 25, 1945

### **ACADEMIC BACKGROUND:**

1969           Finished in Faculty of Law, Tokyo University

### **PROFESSIONAL CAREER:**

1969           Joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

1979-81       Embassy of Japan in Washington D.C.

1981-83       Embassy of Japan in Indonesia

1985           Director of the Regional Policy Division, Asian Affairs Bureau

1985-87       Director of the Human Rights and Refugee Division,  
United Nations Bureau

1987-90       Counsellor, Embassy of Japan in Spain

1990           Counsellor, Embassy of Japan in Republic of Korea

1993           Minister, Embassy of Japan in Republic of Korea

August, 1993   Acting Director, The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)

### **PRESENT POSITION:**

**TITLE:** Acting Director

**AFFILIATION:** The Japan Institute of International Affairs

**ADDRESS:** Toranomiya Mitsui Bldg., 3F  
3-8-1, Kasumigaseki, Chiyoda-ku,  
Tokyo 100 JAPAN

**PHONE:** 03-3503-6625

**FAX:** 03-3595-1755

## Curriculum Vitae Dr. Joachim Krause

born: 1951, Feb. 7

nationality: German

status: married, 1 child

present position: Deputy Director, Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Affairs, Bonn (since October 1993)

former positions: Senior Research Associate and Director of Studies, *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*, Research Institute for International Affairs, Ebenhausen, Germany (1978-1993);

Advisor to the German Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva (1988-1989)

Consultant United Nations Special Commission - UNSCOM (1991)

Resident Fellow, Institute for East-West Security Studies, New York (1986 - 1987)

recent publications: Kernwaffenproliferation und der internationale Wandel (*Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and International Political Change*), Baden Baden: Nomos Publ. 1993;

(together with Charles Mallory), *The Role of Chemical Weapons in Soviet Military Doctrine - Military and Historical Experience 1915-1991*, Boulder, Col.: Westview 1992

together with W. Heydrich, U. Nerlich, R. Rummel, *Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands (Germany's Security Policy)*, Baden Baden: Nomos Publ. 1992

*Security Implications of a Global Chemical Weapons Ban*, Boulder, Col.: Westview 1991

## CURRICULUM VITAE

May 1994

### PERSONAL INFORMATION

Name	Mitsuru Kurosawa
Date of Birth	January 17, 1945
Nationality	Japanese
Home Address	5-29-37, Minami-tanabe, Higashi-sumiyoshi-ku, Osaka 546, JAPAN
Home Telephone and Fax	+81-6-698-5848
Current Position	Professor of International Law, Faculty of Law, Osaka University
University Address	1-6, Machikaneyama-cho, Toyonaka-shi, Osaka 560, JAPAN
University Telephone	+81-6-844-1151 (ex. 3356)
University Fax	+81-6-857-3097 (Faculty of Law)

### EDUCATION and DEGREES

1967 - B.A in Sociology, Faculty of Literature, Osaka University  
1969 - B.A in Law, Faculty of Law, Osaka University  
1971 - M.A. in Law, Faculty of Law, Osaka University Graduate School  
1974 - Completed Doctoral Course in Law, Osaka University Graduate School  
1980-1982 - Visiting Scholar at School of Law, University of Virginia, U.S.A.  
1993 - Ph.D in Law, Faculty of Law, Osaka University Graduate School

### EMPLOYMENT

Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Niigata University, 1976-1978  
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Niigata University, 1978-1984  
Professor, Faculty of Law, Niigata University, 1984-1991  
Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Sophia University, Tokyo, 1985-1988  
Professor, Faculty of Law, Osaka University, 1991-present

### SCHOLARSHIPS, AWARDS OR GRANTS

Ministry of Education Grant for Scientific Research, 1978  
Ministry of Education Grant for Scientific Research, 1980  
United States-Japan Educational Committee (Fulbright Committee) Scholarship  
to study at the University of Virginia, 1980-1982  
Ministry of Education Grant for Scientific Research, 1983-1985  
Adachi Mineichiro Memorial Award for my book on International Disarmament Law,  
A New Framework: A Study of the Regime for Non-Proliferation of Nuclear  
Weapons, 1987



Faculty Enrichment Program of Canadian Government, 1990  
 Canada-Japan Research Award of Canadian Government, 1991  
 Osaka University Fund to research in Canada, 1992  
 Osaka University Faculty of Law Fund to research in Europe, 1993  
 Canada-Japan Research Award of Canadian Government, 1993  
 Ministry of Education Grant for Scientific Research, 1993-1994

## ACADEMIC WORKS

### BOOKS

1. Contemporary International Law on Disarmament, 1986, Nishimura-Shoten, 356p.
2. International Disarmament Law, A New framework: A Study of the Regime for Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1986, Yushindo, 278p
3. Nuclear Disarmament and International Law, 1992, Yushindo, 300p.
4. 'Legal Problems of the Armed Conflict at Falkland(Marvinas) Islands,' Legal Affairs Division, Treaties Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Report of the Study Group on the Law of Armed Conflicts, 1986, pp.33-52.
5. 'Development of Contemporary International Law on Disarmament: From NPT Regime to SALT Process,' H.Hayashi, H.Yamate and S.Kozai(eds.), New Development of International Law, 1989, Toshindo, pp.389-414.
6. 'Peace-Keeping Operations' and 'Disarmament', H.Takabayashi, H.Yamate, S.Kodera and Y.Matsui(eds.), International Law II, 1990, Toshindo, pp.162-182.
7. 'Toward a Nuclear-Free World: Nuclear-Free Zones in Three Levels,' N.Banba and K.Mushanokouji(eds.), A Comprehensive Paradigm for Structuring Welfare International Society, 1991, pp.159-169.
8. 'Semi-Enclosed Sea and International Law,' H.Tagu(ed.), Transboundary Experience: Rim-Japan Sea Project, 1992, Yushindo, pp.133-153.
9. 'Nuclear Disarmament and Nuclear Non-Proliferation' and 'Disarmament and Japan', R.Imai and S.Sato(eds.), Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons, 1993, Denryokushinpousha, pp.41-54 and 55-67.
10. 'The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime beyond 1995,' Trevor Taylor and Ryukichi Imai(eds.), The Defence Trade: Demand, Supply and Control, 1994, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, pp.56-72. [in English]
11. 'U.N. Peace-Keeping Operations and Canada,' T.Kunitake(ed.), Canada's Constitution and Foreign Policies, 1994(forthcoming), Doubunkan.
12. 'New International Security Order and Nuclear Disarmament,' M.Kurosawa(ed.) Search for New International Order--Peace, Human Rights and Economy, March 1994, Shinzansha, pp.1-19.
13. 'New World Order and Non-Proliferation,' S.Yamakage(ed.), Design for New

World Order, March 1994, Nansousha. pp.39-62.

#### BOOKS TRANSLATION INTO JAPANESE

1. Joseph Rotblat(ed.). Scientists, the Arms Race and Disarmament. (Taylor & Francis. London, 1982), Nishimura-Shoten, 1986, 474p.
2. James Thompson, Psychological Aspects of Nuclear War. (British Psychological Society, 1985), Nishimura-Shoten, 1988, 210p.

#### ARTICLES

1. 'The Formation of Contemporary International Law on Disarmament and its Characteristics,' Osaka Law Review, No.93, December 1974, pp.85-160.
2. 'The Verification of Compliance with the Treaty Obligations on Disarmament,' Osaka Law Review, No.96, December 1974, pp.157-234.
3. 'Legal Aspects of Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere,' Osaka Law Review, No.101, January 1977, pp.77-119.
4. 'The Balance of Obligations between Nuclear-Weapon States and Non-Nuclear-Weapon States: A New Point of View concerning Contemporary International Disarmament Law,' Journal of Law and Politics (Niigata Univ.), Vol.10, No.3, March 1978, pp.1-67.
5. 'Significance of the Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to Disarmament: Examination of the Final Document,' Jurist, No.674, October 1978, pp.88-93.
6. 'The Legality of Atmospheric Nuclear Weapon Tests: Nuclear Test Cases,' Journal of Law and Politics, Vol.11, No.1, October 1978, pp.1-22. [in English]
7. 'Disarmament and Security Guarantees of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States,' Journal of International Law and Diplomacy, Vol.78, No.4, September 1979, pp.1-36.
8. 'Security Guarantees to Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: A Study of the Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,' Journal of Law and Politics, Vol.12, No.3, February 1980, pp.106-188.
9. 'From Positive to Negative Guarantees of Security: Security of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States in the Nuclear Age,' Kobe Law Journal, Vol.30, No.2, September 1980, pp.397-437.
10. 'The Legal Concept of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones,' Journal of Law and Politics, Vol.13, No.3, March 1981, pp.156-182.
11. 'The Second Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to Disarmament,' Jurist, No.776, October 1982, pp.92-96.
12. 'The Origin of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Regime,' Journal of Law and Politics, Vol.15, No.3, March 1983, pp.15-55.

13. 'The Basic Structure of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Regime,'  
Journal of Law and Politics, Vol.16.No.1, October 1983, pp.30-95.
14. 'The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Regime and Safeguards,' Journal of Law and Politics, Vol.16.No.2, January 1984, pp.60-120.
15. 'The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Regime and Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy,' Journal of Law and Politics, Vol.16.No.3, March 1984, pp.43-104.
16. 'The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Regime and Nuclear Disarmament,'  
Journal of Law and Politics, Vol.17.Nos.1-2, September 1984, pp.127-196.
17. 'Content and Significance of South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty,' Jurist, No.850, December 1985, pp.90-94.
18. 'The Legal Structure of South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty,' Journal of Law and Politics, Vol.18.No.4, March 1986, pp.1-51.
19. 'The Legal Structure of the ABM Treaty,' Journal of Law and Politics, Vol.19, No.4, March 1987, pp.1-61.
20. 'Interpretation of the ABM Treaty and SDI,' Journal of Law and Politics, Vol. 20.No.3, January 1988, pp.47-114.
21. 'Japanese Participation to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,' Jurist, No.900, January 1988, pp.246-247.
22. 'Conclusion of INF Treaty,' Jurist, No.901, February 1988, pp.50-55.
23. 'The Legal Structure of the INF Treaty (1),' Journal of Law and Politics, Vol.21.No.1, July 1988, pp.69-114.
24. 'The Legal Structure of the INF Treaty (2),' Journal of Law and Politics, Vol.21.No.3, January 1989, pp.49-113.
25. 'The Legal Restraints on Strategic Offensive Arms,' Journal of Law and Politics, Vol.22.No.3, March 1990, pp.1-88.
26. 'Noncompliance with the SALT Agreements,' Journal of Law and Politics, Vol.23.No.1, October 1990, pp.1-52.
27. 'Disarmament and International Organizations,' Yearbook of World Law, No.10, October 1990, pp.30-42.
28. 'Comparative Japanese and Canadian National Security Policies in Connection with the United States,' Journal of Law and Politics, Vol.23.Nos.3-4, March 1991, pp.413-424. [in English]
29. 'The START Treaty: History and Content,' Jurist, No.988, October 1991, pp. 83-88.
30. 'The Role of the United Nations in Disarmament: Reexamination of the United Nations Functions in the Post-Cold War Era,' Osaka Law Review, Vol.41, Nos.2-3, November 1991, pp.167-195.
31. 'Future of the NPT Regime and Japanese Policy on Nuclear Disarmament',  
a paper submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, January 1992, 34p.

32. 'Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime and its Future,' Osaka University Law Review, No.40, February 1993, pp.21-43. [in English]
33. 'Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Problems and Challenges,' The Kokusai Mondai, April 1993, pp.2-14.
34. 'Nuclear Disarmament in the New World Order,' Osaka University Law Review, No.41, February 1994, pp.7-22. [in English]

#### MATERIALS

1. 'The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, 'Comprehensive Study of the Questions of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in All Its Aspects,' ' Journal of Law and Politics, Vol.10.No.1, September 1977, pp.178-198.
2. 'Final Document of the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament,' Journal of Law and Politics, Vol.11.No.2, December 1978, pp.192-225.

#### BOOK REVIEWS

1. 'Mohamed I.Shaker, The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origin and Implementation, 1959-1979,' Journal of Law and Politics, Vol.14.No.1, November 1981, pp.175-198.
2. 'Stockholm International Peace research Institute, Postures for Non-Proliferation,' Journal of Law and Politics, Vol.14.No.3, March 1982, pp.165-181.
3. 'Hisakazu Fujita, International Law on Disarmament,' Journal of International Law and Diplomacy, Vol.84.No.4, October 1985, pp.48-51.
4. 'Hisakazu Fujita, International Regulation of the Use of Nuclear Weapons,' Journal of International Law and Diplomacy, Vol.87.No.5, December 1988, pp.111-115.
5. 'Eiichi Sato, Contemporary Arms Control and Disarmament,' Peace Research No.16, October 1991, pp.140-141.

#### PRESENTATIONS

1. 'Disarmament and Security of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States,' Japanese Association of International Law, May 1979.
2. 'Interpretation of the ABM Treaty and SDI,' Japanese Association of International Law, May 1987.
3. 'INF Treaty: History and Contents,' Japan Peace Studies Association, November 1987.
4. 'Disarmament and International Organizations,' Japanese Association of World Law, May 1990.
5. 'Role of the United Nations in Disarmament,' Japanese Association of Inter-

national Relations. May 1991.

6. 'Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Disarmament,' U.S.-Japan Study Group on Nuclear and Security-Related Cooperation, November 1992, Tokyo. [in English]
7. 'Nuclear Disarmament and Nuclear Non-Proliferation,' Conference on Post-Cold War Cooperative Denuclearization and Plutonium Issues, April 1993. Tokyo. [in English]
8. 'The NPT Review Conference: The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime beyond 1995,' Conference of Controlling Defense-Related Technology after the Cold War, June 1993, Tokyo. [in English]
9. 'Toward 1995 Review Conference,' U.S.-Japan Study Group on Nuclear and Security-Related Cooperation, September 1993. Washington, D.C. [in English]
10. 'Japanese and Canadian Peacekeeping Participation, 1956-1993: The American Dimension,' Review Conference of Canada-Japan Research Award Project--Adjusting America: Canadian and Japanese Perspectives, December 1993. Tokyo. [in English]
11. 'Regions of Proliferation Concern,' Asia-Pacific Regional Seminar on the NPT, March 1994. Canberra. [in English]

#### ACADEMIC MEMBERSHIPS

1. Japanese Association of International Law
2. Japan Peace Studies Association
3. Japanese Association of World Law
4. Japan Association of International Relations
5. Japanese Association for Canadian Studies
6. American Society of International Law
7. International Law Association
8. Arms Control Association

#### COURSES TAUGHT

##### Undergraduate Courses

- International Law II (4 units)
- International Institutions Law (2 units)
- Seminar (International Peace and Security) (4 units)

##### Graduate Courses

- International Law II (4 units)
- International Law on Disarmament (2 units)

Christian Lechervy is official representative on the Strategic Commission in the French Ministry of Defence <sup>(14)</sup>. Lecturer at the Paris Political Institute, he is responsible for courses at the Institute for Oriental Languages and Civilisations. In 1993-4 he published *Action humanitaire et Solidarité internationale: the ONG* (Hatier), *Les Cambodgiens face à eux memes?* (FPII) and *Cambodge: de la paix à la démocratie* (La Documentation Française).

Biography of  
His Excellency Nobuo Matsunaga

1923: 1.16      Born in Tokyo, Japan

1944:            Graduated from Tokyo University, Faculty  
                 of Law

1945:            Passed Higher Civil Service Examination

1964:            Director, Treaties Division, Treaties  
                 Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

1967:            Counselor, Embassy of Japan in France

1971:            Director, Personnel Division, Ministry of  
                 Foreign Affairs.

1973:            Deputy Director-General, Treaties Bureau,  
                 Ministry of Foreign Affairs

1973:            Director-General, Treaties Bureau

1976:            Deputy Vice-Minister, Ministry of Foreign  
                 Affairs

1978:            Ambassador Extraordinary and  
                 Plenipotentiary to the United Mexican  
                 States

1981:            Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs

1983:            Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs

1985.4.2:       Ambassador Extraordinary and  
~1989.11.18      Plenipotentiary to the United States of  
                 America

1990.3           Retired from MOFA

1990.4.           Adviser to the Minister for Foreign Affairs

1990.4:           President and Director, The Japan Institute  
                 of International Affairs.

Marital Status: Married with three sons

## Curriculum Vitae

Mr. Satoshi MORIMOTO

Date of Birth : March 15, 1941

Present Address: ARUSU-Kamakura A-404,  
19-2 Ueki, Kamakura-shi, Kanagawa Pref.,  
JAPAN (〒 247)

- 1965.3      Graduated from National Defense Academy  
              Joined the Self Defense Air Force
- 1975.7      Graduated from Air Force Command and Staff College
- 1977.3      Assigned the National Security Division,  
              American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
              (MOFA)
- 1979.8      Joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
              Deputy Director, 2nd South East Asia Division,  
              Asian Affairs Bureau, MOFA
- 1980.9      Senior Fellow, Fletcher School  
              Tufts University, Boston, U.S.A.
- 1981.3      Senior Guest Researcher, Brookings Institution in  
              U.S.A.
- 1981.11     First Secretary, Embassy of Japan in U.S.A.
- 1985.9      Counselor, Embassy of Japan in Nigeria
- 1987.9      Director, the Security Policy Division,  
              Information Analysis, Research and Planning Bureau,  
              MOFA (Tokyo)
- 1991.2      Director, the Consular and Migration Policy Division  
              the Consular and Migration Affairs Department, MOFA
- 1992.2      Senior Researcher, Nomura Research Institute





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## CURRICULUM VITAE

Yukio Okamoto  
President, Okamoto Associates, Inc.  
Tokyo, Japan

1945	November 23	Born in Kanagawa Prefecture
1968	March	Graduated from Hitotsubashi University, Faculty of Economics
	April	Entered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1969	April	Attaché, Embassy of Japan in the United States
1971	June	Third Secretary, Delegation of Japan to the OECD
1973	August	Served in various posts in the Bureaus of Economic Affairs and North American Affairs dealing with trade negotiations and Japan-U.S. relations
1981	January	First Secretary, Embassy of Japan in Egypt
1983	May	Political Counsellor, Embassy of Japan in the United States
1985	August	Director, National Security Affairs Division
1988	July	Director, First North America Division
1991	January	Resigned from the Ministry
	April	Founded Okamoto Associates, Inc., an international consulting firm
<i>Additional Activities</i>		Write as a regular contributor to major newspapers and magazines in Japan and appear as a political commentator on Japanese television

## RESUME

Yukio Okamoto

Mr. Yukio Okamoto was born in 1945. Immediately after graduating from Hitotsubashi University, he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where he has served in various capacities, including the posts of Director of the National Security Affairs Division of the North American Affairs Bureau and most recently, Director of the First North America Division. From 1983 to 1985, he was Political Counsellor at the Embassy of Japan in Washington, D.C.

During his twenty three years of service in the Ministry, his career was mainly focused on U.S.-Japan relations, particularly with reference to the politico-military and economic aspects. He resigned from the Ministry in January, 1991 to form his own company.

Mr. Okamoto is now president of Okamoto Associates Inc., an international consulting firm. He is a regular contributor to major newspapers and magazines in Japan and a political commentator on Japanese television.

When he has time, he is an avid underwater photographer.

## HARUKO SATOH

### Permanent Address

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### Work Address

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Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100  
(tel) +81-3-3504-0334  
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### EDUCATION:

#### **The Johns Hopkins University**

**Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Bologna Center,**  
*Bologna, Italy*

M.A. in International Affairs expected May 1993; thesis topic: *Impact of the Gulf War on Japanese and German Foreign Policy Orientation*

#### **Mount Holyoke College, South Hadley, Massachusetts, U.S.A.**

B.A. European studies conferred May 1988

#### **Roedean School, Brighton, Sussex, U.K., 1980-84**

General Certificate of Education Advanced Levels: Art, Geography and Mathematics

### EXPERIENCE:

#### **The Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, Japan**

*September 1993 - present*

- Assistant Research Fellow: In charge of overseeing and coordinating JIIA projects on European affairs and environmental issues. Responsible for drafting study group proposals and coordinating seminars for environmental policy-making issues and Europe-Japan relations.

- Carrying out own research on Europe-Japan cooperation in development and related areas.

- Responsible for installing information and data-base processing facilities within JIIA in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' research division.

#### **The Japan Center for International Exchange, Tokyo, Japan**

*February 1990-August 1991; June-September 1992*

- Publication & conference organization: responsible for preparation [translation and DTP work] of pre- and post international conference publications and research papers in both Japanese and English. [8th Shimoda Conference, Hakone Conference, Trilateral Commission Tokyo Plenary and other exchange programmes and conferences]

- Creation of data base for *NIRA Monitor*

- Editing the Japanese and English of JCIE research project: *Reports on 25 States Regional Underpinnings*

*Summer 1987*

- Translation of a Japanese research paper on regional underpinnings in Japan into English

*Summer 1986*

- Research Assistant: Conducted research on British opinion of Japan for the Toyota Foundation, using issues of *The Economist*, 1983-86 as primary source.

#### **Nihon Hoso Kyokai (NHK, Japan Broadcasting Corp.), Tokyo, Japan**

*August-September, 1992*

- Translator: Translated David Chandler's *The Tragedy of Cambodian History* for the Cultural Programme Division in preparation for a documentary of the region.

**Asahi Weekly, (division of *Asahi Shinbun*) Tokyo, Japan**

*Since 1989-*

- Freelance writer: Contributed articles in English and photographs for this English weekly publication, published by *Asahi Shinbun*, with a circulation of approx. 15,000 targeted for Japanese students of the English language.

**Hong Kong Trade Development Council, Hong Kong**

*January 1989-December 1989*

- Assistant Writer: Responsible for the language supervision of the *Japanese Quarterly* and other translation and writing of articles on Hong Kong products aimed for export to Japan.

## **HONOURS & OTHERS:**

**School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Bologna Center, 1992-93**

Research assistant for Professor David Schoenbaum

**Mount Holyoke Campus Program Council, 1987-88**

Executive Board member; Manager of Rathskeller Bar

**WMHC, 91.5 FM South Hadley, Disc Jockey; FCC licence holder**

**Roedean School House Games Captain, 1982-83**

**Roedean School Prize for Art, 1984**

## **LANGUAGES & SKILLS:**

Bilingual in written and spoken Japanese and English; Basic competence in Italian  
Desktop publishing on the Macintosh (QuarkXpress; PageMaker 4), word processing, graphics (Adobe Photoshop; Illustrator; Superpaint) and data base programmes;  
Competence in IBM-compatible MS.DOS computer programmes including Japanese wordprocessing.

**Date of birth:** 5 February 1965; **Citizenship:** Japanese

## BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Name: Yukio SATOH

Date of Birth: Oct. 6, 1939

### Career in Outline:

1961: Joined the Foreign Service

1961-1963: Edinburgh University

1963-1976: Served in Tokyo, Washington, D.C. etc.

1976-1977: Director, Security Affairs Division,  
American Affairs Bureau

1977-1979: Private Secretary to the Minister  
for Foreign Affairs

1980-1981: Research Associate, the International  
Institute for Strategic Studies  
(IISS), London

1981-1984: Counsellor, Embassy of Japan, UK  
Consul-General, London

1984-1985: Chief of the Prefectural Police,  
Miyazaki Prefecture

1985-1987: Director, Policy Coordination  
Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

1987-1988: Assistant Vice-Minister for  
Parliamentary Affairs, Ministry of  
Foreign Affairs

1988-1990: Consul-General, Hong Kong

1990-1992: Director-General, Information  
Analysis, Research and Planning Bureau

1992-1994: Director-General, North American  
Affairs Bureau

~~(Assuming the Post Abroad Soon)~~

1994.5 ~

Ambassador, the Netherlands

## Profile

	first name	last name
Name:	Katsuo	SEIKI
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Position:	Executive Director, Global Industrial and Social Progress Research Institute (GISPRI)	
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Career:	1965 Graduated from the University of Tokyo (Faculty of Law) 1965 Joined Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) 1981 Director, Development Program, General Coordination Department, Agency of Industrial Science and Technology, MITI 1982 Coordination Officer, Large-Scale Retail Store, Industrial Policy Bureau, MITI 1984 Director, International Energy Policy Division, Director General's Secretariat, Agency of Natural Resources and Energy, MITI 1986 Director, West Europe-Africa-Middle East Division, International Trade Policy Bureau, MITI 1989 Director, General Affairs Division, International Trade Policy Bureau, MITI 1990 Deputy Director-General, Global Environmental Affairs, Minister's Secretariat, MITI 1992 retired from MITI  1992 Executive Director, GISPRI	

SHINYO Takahiro

Born in 1950. Graduated from Osaka University with a degree in law. Has served as director of the United Nations Policy Division and of the Disarmament Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Is now serving on loan from the ministry as a professor of law at his alma mater.

Co-author of *Atarashii kokusai chitsujo o motomete—Heiwa, jinken, keizai* (*Calling for a New World Order—Peace, Human Rights, Economics*), and author of *Proliferation of Weapons and Arms Control in the Asia-Pacific Region*, and other works.

## BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

NAME : **Ryuichi SHOJI**

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### ACADEMIC BACKGROUND :

March 1975 Graduated from Tokyo University  
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### PROFESSIONAL CAREER :

April 1975	Entered Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
1978-1980	Second Middle-East Division, Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau, MOFA
1980-1984	First International Organizations Division , Economic of Affairs Bureau, MOFA
1984-1985	Second Latin-America and Caribbean Division, Latin American and Caribbean Affairs Bureau, MOFA
1985-1988	First Secretary, Embassy of Japan in Bruxelles, Belgique
1988-1990	First Secretary, Embassy of Japan in Vietnam
1990-1992	First Secretary, Japanese Mission to the United Nations
1992-1993	Counsellor, Japanese Mission to the United Nations
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### PRESENT POSITION:

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## Curriculum Vitae

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### **Personal:**

Date and Place of Birth: February 1, 1943; Tokyo, Japan  
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### **Education:**

1967-1977: Stanford University (Graduate School)  
Political Science; Ph.D., 1977; M.A., 1969  
1965-1967: University of Tokyo (Graduate School)  
International Relations  
1961-1965: University of Tokyo  
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### **Professional Experiences:**

#### **<Principal/Continuous Appointments>**

June 1986-present: Professor  
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April-June 1986: Associate Professor  
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April 1979-March 1986: Associate Professor  
School of Liberal Arts and Graduate School  
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January 1978-March 1979: Assistant Professor  
School of Liberal Arts and Graduate School  
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#### **<Concurrent/Temporary Appointments>**

August 1991-December 1992: Director for the Japanese Side  
Contemporary Japanese Studies Program  
Beijing University  
May 1987-August 1988: Guest Scholar, The Brookings Institution  
July-September 1985 and July-October 1983: Visiting Scholar  
Northeast Asia-United States Forum on  
International Policy, Stanford University

### **Awards:**

1988: Ohira Masayoshi Memorial Foundation Research Grant  
1987: Fulbright Senior Researcher Grant  
1971: Ford Foundation Special Research Grant  
1967: Fulbright Graduate Fellowship

## Recent Publications:

### (In Foreign Languages)

- 1992 "Japan and China: Repairing bridges," Look Japan, Vol. 38, No.437 (August), pp.8-10.
- 1991 "Die Politik Chinas gegenüber der UdSSR und den USA-- Kontinuität und Wandel," Symposium: "Das nach-maoistische China aus japanischer und deutscher Sicht. Japanisch-Deutsches Zentrum Berlin
- 1990 "Sino-U.S. Relations Since The Tiananmen Incident," China Newsletter, No.88 (Sept.-Oct.), pp.2-9.
- 1989 "From Anti-Soviet Coalition to Cooperation for Modernization: Changing Rationals of the U.S.-China Relations," in China's Reform in crisis (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London).
- 1986 "From Concerned Skepticism to Active Interest: The Evolution of Chinese Attitude Toward Pacific Basin Cooperation," in Japanese-American Relations and Comprehensive Security (World Economic Information Service, Tokyo).
- 1986 "Variations sur les Concepts du Discours Officiel Chinois de Politique Extérieure," in Stratégie Chinoise ou la Mue de Dragon (Autrement, Paris).

### (In Japanese)

- 1994 "The Foreign Relations of China as the 'Economic Big Power'," Kokusai Mondai, No.406 (January) pp.60-76.
- 1993 "The Post-Cold War International Structure and the 'New stage' of the Chinese Foreign Policy," Kokusai Mondai, No.394 (January), pp.18-32.
- 1992 "The World in Structural Transformation and the Chinese Perception of the International Situation," Kokusai Mondai, No.382 (January), pp.2-12.
- 1991 "The Collapse of the Cold War System and China's Foreign Relations," Kokusai Mondai, No.370 (January), pp.14-29.
- 1990 "The Response of the United States and Western Europe to the Tiananmen Incident," in The Democracy Movement and the Chinese Socialism (Iwanami-shoten, Tokyo).
- 1990 "The Chinese Foreign Policy After the Tiananmen Incident," Nitchu Keizai Kyokai Hou, No.203 (August), pp.5-11.
- 1989 "The Basic Structure of the Sino-U.S. Relations," in International Environment of China (Iwanami-shoten, Tokyo).
- 1989 "The U.S. Position on the Sino-Soviet Rapprochement," Kokusai Mondai, No.354 (September), p.32-47.
- 1987 "The High Technology Transfer Issue in the U.S.-China Relations," Kokusai Mondai, No.323 (February), pp.26-44.
- 1986 "The Steady Development of the U.S.-China Relations," in The International Relations of China, (Japan-China Economic Council, Tokyo).

Ph.D. Dissertation: An Analysis of Chinese Behavior Toward Japan, 1950-1965  
Stanford University, 1977.

## Current Research Interests:

- 1) The foreign relations of China in general, and its relationship with the U.S. and Japan and its role in the Pacific Basin Cooperation in particular.
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## *Profile*

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         1969 Completed Master Course of Graduate  
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         1969 Joined Tekkosha Co.  
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         1975 Joined Toyo Soda Manufacturing Co.  
         (Tekkosha was merged by Toyo Soda  
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         1988 Manager, Advanced Material Research  
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## Curriculum Vitae

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1965 M.A. in Public Administration, International Christian University, Tokyo  
1966 M.A. in International Affairs, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, Mass. USA  
1967 M.A. in Law and Diplomacy, -ditto-  
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### Employment:

1970-72 Programme Assistant, Division of Application of Social Sciences, Dept. of Social Sciences, Unesco, Paris  
1973-82 Programme Specialist, Division for International Development of Social Sciences, Sector of Social Sciences and their Applications, Unesco, Paris  
1982-1986 Programme Officer, Regional and Global Studies Division, the United Nations University (UNU), Tokyo  
1986(March) - present Senior Academic Officer, UNU  
1985 & 88 Guest lecturer at Chuo University, Tokyo (Four serial lectures on "Japan and Asia")

### Membership in Scientific Organizations:

Member of the International Political Science Association  
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Member of the Japan Peace Research Association  
Member of the Japan Association of International Relations  
Member of the Peace Research Liaison Committee of the Science Council of Japan (1985-88)

### Publications:

"The social sciences in Asia: A view from outside" (in Japanese), *Asia Review*, 1975

*Political Science in Asia and the Pacific* (editor with introduction), Unesco, Bangkok, 1984

"Towards an International Community of Scholars" in *To live with the United Nations* (in Japanese), 1985

"The Limit of Functional Approach: The Case of Unesco," in *To Reform the United Nations* (in Japanese), 1986

Twelve sections contributed in *The United Nations: A Handbook* (in Japanese) edited by K. Mushakoji, 1986

"The Age for the United Nations" (in Japanese) in *Shinro*, April/May 1988

A book review "United Nations and NGO" in *Heiwa Kenkyu*, vol. 13 Nov. 1988 (in Japanese)

"International Exchange", "United Nations University" in *Encyclopedia of Education, Daiichihoki*, 1989 (in Japanese)

"Origin and Renaissance of the World Society" (Vol. I) and "Pluralism, Co-existence, International Network" (Vol. II) in *New Global Science: From Chaos to Order*, co-edited with H. Usui, (in Japanese), Yushindo-Kobunsha, Tokyo, 1990

"Perceptions of the state in postwar Japan", *Asian Exchange* (ARENA Bulletin, Vol. 7, Nos. 1/2, 1990), ARENA, Hong Kong, 1990

"Kokusai Rengo no Henbo to Atarashii Yakuwari" (Changes in the United Nations and its New Roles), *Kokusai Mondai (International Affairs)*, No. 379, October 1991, Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyu-jo, Tokyo

"Post Reisen Jidai no Kokuren Kaikaku" (Reform of the United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era), *Hohgaku Seminar*, No. 443, November 1991, Nihon Hyoronsha, Tokyo

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Other Experiences:

1985-1987: Visiting Research Fellow, The Graduate  
Institute of International Studies, Geneva

1990-1993: Special Assistant to the Embassy of Japan  
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NATO and European security issues.

July 1992: Member of the Japanese Guest Delegation of  
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Dec., 1992: Member of the Japanese Delegation of the  
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Major Publications:

The Development of the Regional Security Systems under the  
League of Nations, Yamakawa Publishers, Tokyo, 1989  
(in Japanese).

(Co-editor and co-author) The CSCE 1975-1992, The Japan  
Institute of International Affairs, 1992, Tokyo. (in  
Japanese). Prof. Ueta wrote chapters on the CSBMs, the  
institutionalization of the CSCE, and recent development.

(contributor) "The Genoa Conference and Japan," C. Fink,  
et al., eds., Genoa, Rapallo, and European Reconstruction  
in 1922, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991, 217-226.

(contributor) "Should the CSCE Model be Applicable to Asia  
and the Pacific?" Defense Study Centre, ed., C. S. C. E. :  
Results and Prospects, Brussels, 1991, 151-160.

(contributor) "Global and Regional Security and  
Disarmament," Japanisch-Deutsches Zentrum Berlin, The  
Role of the United Nations in the 90s, Berlin, 1991,  
151-160.

(contributor) "Japan: A Case of Non-Control Regime,"  
F. Tanner ed., From Versailles to Baghdad: Post-War  
Armament Control of Defeated States, United Nations,  
New York, 1992, 101-113.

(contributor) "Japan and the CSCE," M. Lucas, ed., The CSCE  
in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Co-  
operation, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, 1993, 207-222.  
Foreword by Hans-Dietrich Gensher.

(article) "A Comprehensive Test Ban Issue in the Conference  
on Disarmament 1986-1988," Kokusai Seiji, No. 90, 1989,  
120-138 (in Japanese).

(article) "The Evolution of the Cooperative Security  
Systems in Europe," Kokusai Seiji, No. 100, 1992, 126-151.

(article) "The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the  
European Union," Kokusai Mondai, April, 1994, 17-38. (in  
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(essay) "The Future of Japan-Europe Security Cooperation,"  
Mainichi Daily News, Japan-EC Special Issue, May 9, 1993.

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#### Academic career

BA (Japanese History) University of Tokyo, 1958; MA (Japanese History)  
University of Tokyo, 1960; Ph.D. (International Relations), Austral-  
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#### Professional career

Lecturer, History Department, University of Hong Kong, 1966-1971;  
Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and Economics,  
Meiji University, 1971-1973; Associate Professor, Department of  
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Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Universi-  
ty of Tokyo, 1975-1978; Professor, Department of International  
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Other positions include: Member of the Board, The Japan Association  
of International Relations (JAIR); Editorial Advisor of the Japan  
Review of International Affairs published by The Japan Institute of  
International Affairs (JIIA); Member of the Board, The Foundation for  
Advanced Information and Research (FAIR), Visiting Fellow at the  
Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) from April  
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for Scholars from September 1988 to August 1989.

Major publications in English include: The Okinawa Problem: A chapter  
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public opinion and foreign affairs" in Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), The  
Foreign Policy of Modern Japan (University of California Press, 1977);  
"Foreign policy-making, Japanese style", International Affairs vol.54  
No.1 (January 1978); "From enmity to cold partnership: Japanese view  
of the United Kingdom", in Ian Nish (ed.), Anglo-Japanese Alienation,  
1917-1952 (Cambridge University Press, 1983); "Japanese Diet and  
foreign policy" (co-authored with Dr. Saburo Okita), in Manohar L.  
Sondhi (ed.), Foreign Policy and Legislatures: An Analysis of Seven  
Parliaments (New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1988) and Government and  
Politics in Modern Japan (Tokyo: International Society for Education-  
al Information, 1989); "The End of the Cold War and the Asia-Pacific  
Region" in Japan Review of International Affairs Vol.5, No.1 (Spring/  
Summer 1991); "Japan's Foreign Policy-Making in Crises: China(1989-90)  
and Kuwait(1990-91)" (University of Tokyo, Department of Social and  
International Relations, Working Paper No.34, April 1993); "Asia-  
Pacific Regionalism and Japanese Diplomacy" in Foreign Press Center  
(comp.), The Global Trend Toward Regional Integration (Tokyo: Foreign  
Press Center, Reference Reading Series No.25, 1993), pp.43-54.

He has written numerous articles and books in both English and Japanese. His publications include: *Reshuffling Firms for Technologies?* (1984), *The American and Japanese Auto Industries in Transition* (1984, coeditor), *Policy, Corporate Ideology and Auto Industry* (1986), *The Politicians and Bureaucrats* (1987, Japanese), *The Dynamics of Techno-Emulation* (1985), *The Techno-Hegemony* (1989, Japanese), *Europe and Japan Facing High Technologies* (1989, coauthor), *Beyond Interdependence: Meshing Earth's Ecology and Economy* (1991, coauthor), *The Techno-Detente* (1991, Japanese).



Motohide YOSHIKAWA

1951	Born in Nara, Japan
1969	Graduated from Le Roy High School, Illinois, U.S.A.
1974	Graduated from International Christian University in Tokyo. B.A. in Social Sciences
1974	Joined Japanese Diplomatic Service
1974-1975	Latin American Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo
1975-1976	Universidad de Valladolid, Spain
1976-1977	Escuela Diplomática, Madrid, Spain
1977-1980	Second Secretary, Japanese Embassy in Argentina
1980-1982	Assistant Director, First Latin American Division, Latin American Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo
1982-1984	Assistant Director, Personnel Division, Minister's Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1984-1986	Deputy Director, Grant Aid Division, Economic Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1986-1988	First Secretary, Japanese Embassy in the United Kingdom
1988-1992	Counsellor, Japanese Delegation to the OECD, Paris
1992-1993	Director, Second International Organizations Division, Economic Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo
August 1993 -present	Director, United Nations Policy Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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June 1959      Graduated from Media High School, Media, Pa.

March 1960      Graduated from High School attached to Tokyo  
University of Education (now the University of  
Tsukuba)

March 1964      Graduated from International Christian  
University, Tokyo, with B.A. in International  
Relations

March 1966      Graduated from the Graduate School of Law and  
Politics (Master Course), the University of  
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March 1969      Graduated from the Graduate School of Law and  
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Professional Experience:

April 1969      Instructor, International Christian

University

April 1971      Assistant Professor, International  
Christian University

April 1974      Associate Professor, International  
Christian University

April 1979      Professor, International Christian  
University

Experience Abroad:

August 1958 - July 1959

Exchange student to Media High School, Pennsylvania,  
under the sponsorship of the American Field Service

September 1971 - July 1972

Fulbright exchange scholar at Columbia University,  
School of Law

October 1974 - December 1976

Attorney (later Counsel) at the Legal Department of the  
World Bank

March - December 1983

Visiting Professor at the University of Adelaide,  
South Australia

January - August 1984

Visiting Professor at the University of Michigan,  
School of Law

September 1984 - March 1985

Visiting Professor at Columbia University, School  
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Participation in International Conferences:

August - September 1979

Participated as a legal expert in a United Nations  
Conference on the Development of the Mekong River  
held in Bangkok

May - July 1970

Attended as an observer at the annual session of the  
International Law Commission of the United Nations held  
in Geneva

May - August 1971

Attended as an observer at the annual session of the  
International Law Commission of the United Nations held  
in Geneva

May 1973

Participated as a member of the delegation in a  
conference of the United Board of Christian Higher  
Education in Asia held in Seoul

May - July 1978

Attended as an observer at the annual session of the  
International Law Commission of the United Nations held  
in Geneva

July 1988 - August 1991

Alternate expert of the Sub-Commission on the  
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of  
Minorities of the United Nations

Membership in Professional Associations:

The Japanese Association of International Law (Member of the Board of Directors)

The Japanese Association of World Law (Member of the Board of Directors)

The Japan Association of International Human Rights Law (Member of the Board of Directors)

The Japan Association of International Economic Law (Chief Editor, Member of the Board of Directors)

The Japan Association of International Relations (Councilor)

The American Society of International Law

International Law Association

PROFESSIONAL PUBLICATIONS

(Major works only)

1. Book: International Society and Law - Conditions for Peace and Development, Association for the Promotion of Education through the University of the Air, 1986 (in Japanese)

Twentieth Century and International Organization, Institute for Basic Studies in International Relations, 1989 (in Japanese)

2. Co-authored books:

Case Studies on Territorial and Border Disputes, Tokyo University Press, 1979 (in

Japanese)

Lectures on International Law, Yuhikaku Publishing Company, Tokyo, 1982 (in Japanese)

Japanese International Law Cases - State Recognition,  
Institute of International Affairs of Japan,  
1983 (in Japanese)

International Economic Law, Seirin-Shoin Publishing Company, Tokyo, 1987 (in Japanese)

International Law, United Nations and Japan,  
Kobundo Publishing Company, Tokyo, 1987 (in Japanese)

International Organizations, Kokusai Shoin Publishing Company, Tokyo, 1992 (in Japanese)

3. Translation:

Kenneth E. Boulding, A Primer on Social Dynamics, The Free Press, New York, 1970 - Japanese translation published by Kodansha Publishing Company, Tokyo, in 1979

Maurice Bertrand, The Third Generation World Organization, -Translation published by Kokusai-shoin Publishing Company, 1991.

4. Articles and Notes in English:

"Japan's Participation in International Organizations", Proceedings of the 69th Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 1975.

"Non-political Character of the World Bank",  
The Japanese Annual of International Law,  
No. 20, 1978.

"Legal Aspects of Japan's Foreign Aid  
Program", Proceedings of the 71st Annual  
Meeting of the American Society of  
International Law, 1977.

"The Boundary between Deep Sea-bed and  
Continental Shelf", The Frontier of the  
Seas, The Ocean Association of Japan, 1981.

"Legal Character of International  
Organizations". The Journal of Social  
Sciences, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1982.

"How Useful is the Notion of 'International  
Public Corporation' Today?", Essays in  
International Law in Honour of Judge Manfred  
Lachs, 1984.

"Toward a Pacific Community - Who will take  
the initiative?", The Journal of Social  
Sciences, Vol.23, No. 2, 1985.

"Human Rights and Humanitarian Issues in  
Regional and Global Perspectives",  
Publications of the Japanese - German Center  
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## CURRICULUM VITAE

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## SELECTED PUBLICATIONS

"Amerika Gasshukoku Gikai to Tainichi Kowa (The U.S. Congress and the Japanese Peace Settlement)," in Watanabe Akio and Miyasato Seigen, eds., Sanfuranshisuko Kowa (University of Tokyo Press, 1986).

"Comprehensive Security and the Evolution of the Japanese Security Posture" in Robert A. Scalapino, Seizaburo Sato, Jusuf Wanandi, and Sung-joo Han, eds., Asian Security Issues: Regional and Global (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1989).

"Senryaku Heiki Sakugen Kosho to Beikoku no Senryoku Taisei (START and the U.S. Force Posture)," Gaiko Jiho, 1261 (September 1989): 18-32.

"Anzen Hosho (National Security)," in Watanabe Akio, ed., Nihon no Gaiko (Kozu Kokusai Seiji, Vol. IV) (University of Tokyo Press, 1989).

"Beikoku Kakusenryaku no Tenkai to 'Senryaku-teki Antei' (The Evolution of U.S. Nuclear Strategy and the Concept of Strategic Stability)," in Sato Seizaburo, ed., Tozai Kankei no Senryakuron-teki Bunseki (Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1990).

"Beikoku no Daisenryaku to Kakusenryaku: 'Reisengo' e no Mosaku (U.S. Grand Strategy and Nuclear Strategy for the Post-Cold War Era)," Gaiko Jiho, 1272 (October 1990): 37-50.

"'Kakudai Yokushi' to Zaiou Sen'ikikaku ('Extended Deterrence' and the Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe)," ibid., 1283 (November 1991): 58-74.

"'Reisen-go' Beikoku no Kaku Seisaku (U.S. Nuclear Policy for the Post-Cold War Period)," Shin-Beoi Ronshu, 20-1 (June 1992): 23-36.

"Reisen to Kakuheiki (The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War)," Kokusai Seiji, 100 (August 1992): 54-70.

"Anzen Hosho Kankyo no Hen'yo to Taibei Domei no Sai-Teigi (Changes in the Security Environment and the Redefinition of the Japan-U.S. Alliance)," Kokusai Mondai, 401 (August 1993): 9-21.

"START Joyaku no Tokushitsu to Kongo no Kadai (The START Treaty and the Changing Nature of Strategic Arms Control)," in Miyasato Seigen and Kokusai Daigaku Nichibei Kankei Kenkyujo, eds., Kurinton Seiken no Naisei to Gaiko (Dobunkan 1994).

# **Session 1 - 1**

**Continuity and Change in the International System**

*presented by Professor Yoshinobu Yamamoto*

**JIIA-IFRI Joint Conference**

**June 2-3, 1994**

## **Security, Economics, and Ideology: Continuity and Change in the International System**

Yoshinobu Yamamoto  
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### **Introduction**

The aim of this paper is to analyze the continuity and change in the international system since the Second World War, particularly focusing on the differences between the international system under the Cold War and the one currently emerging after the Cold War, and to clarify the problems and issues before us to solve. I will pursue the task by:

- (a) choosing three areas that comprise the international system—namely security, economics and ideology (or value systems);
- (b) seeing how these areas had been organized within each area and between different areas in the Cold War international system and have been, and will be, reorganized after the Cold War; and,
- (c) particularly delineating the structure, and changes therein, of conflict and cooperation among nations in the three areas.

### **The Cold War International System**

In the Cold War system, security, economics and ideology were intimately inter-linked. That is, under the Cold War, the world had been bifurcated in all these three areas consistently. As far as ideology was concerned, “capitalism” and “socialism” were the major dividing factors in the international system. “Capitalism” was based on political democracy (competitive elections for public offices, political and civil liberty, etc.) and

on a decentralized market economy. "Socialism" was based on one-party (communist party) dictatorship and a centrally planned economy. Both ideologies were not only belief systems in people's minds but also materialized in the concrete political and economic systems in the real world. Also, the two ideologies were claimed to be international and universal and provided legitimacy not only for domestic political and economic institutions but also international behavior. The international competition between these two ideologies was very serious and they competed to capture people's minds.

Based on the differences between these two ideologies, the world economy was also bifurcated. There was a group of nations whose economic system was basically socialist, while the other group of nations adopted forms of capitalism. Each of the two groups created its own international economic system. The socialist nations created COMECON and the capitalist camp forged the liberal international economic system called the IMF/GATT regime. These two groups waged fierce competition in terms of economic performance.

On top of the competition in ideology and economics, the strategic competition was very serious. The strategic competition between the East and the West made the United Nations dysfunctional and thus the international system in the security area turned into a version of balance-of-power. The world was basically divided into two overarching alliance systems: one alliance system comprised capitalist nations and the other was composed of socialist nations. Thus, each alliance system was not merely based on strategic expediency and security but also built upon ideology and economic systems. Furthermore, due to the development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, this strategic competition turned itself into a system of mutual nuclear deterrence or mutual assured destruction.

Given this basic structure, the Cold War developed and finally destroyed itself.

In the strategic area, even with the high tensions that occasionally erupted between the two groups, the Cold War system produced what is called the Long Peace—for nearly half a century the major states never fought directly even though there were many violent regional and domestic conflicts. The conviction had deepened that nuclear weapons are not to be used but are effective only for deterrent purposes. The strategic relations between the East and the West were highly stable due to the bipolar structure, as well as nuclear weapons, and a set of behavioral rules developed over time, such as non-interference into matters vital to the other side. As far as the strategic area alone was concerned, there was not much possibility that the structure of the Cold War would be transformed.

The factors that transformed the Cold War structure must thus lie outside the strategic area. On this point, I would like to argue that the major factors that changed the Cold War structure lie in the areas of economics and ideology.

During the Cold War, the West, including the developing countries, had successfully developed, as stated earlier, a liberal international economic order. Under that liberal international economic system, the West experienced an unprecedented economic growth through the 1960's (i.e., the golden age of economic growth). Even in the 1970's and 1980's, despite high inflation and unemployment and with the structural conflicts between the North and the South, the economic performance of the major countries in the liberal international economic system was better than the East.

Furthermore, the volume of trade increased at a much higher rate than the gross national products (GNP) throughout the postwar period and thus

economic interdependence grew to historically unprecedented levels. And, the age of economic development based on heavy industry gave way to the age of post-industrialization based on information technology and services industries.

The socialist international economic system centering around the Soviet Union exhibited a high economic growth in the 1950's and the 1960's. Indeed, President Tito of Yugoslavia claimed that his country would catch up with England economically in a few decades; and Khrushchev claimed likewise of the Soviet Union with the United States. However, in the 1970's and the 1980's, the socialist, centrally planned economic system failed to adapt itself to the age of information and high technologies and to an ever increasingly interdependent world economy. In addition to this, the heavy military burden caused by the Cold War dragged down the Soviet economy much more than it did the United States. Thus, the socialist economic system had to be reorganized sooner or later.

The ideology of political and economic liberalism provided the West with political coherence and background of economic cooperation, and, the ideology of political and economic liberalism enhanced its legitimacy through economic performance. The socialist ideology argued for equality rather than liberty and for economic development through the rational allocation of resources by a God-like government rather than by a free market. It possessed a great appeal within and without the socialist camp. The Soviet Union argued that the North-South problem was basically caused by the capitalist system and that the Soviet Union had no responsibility in this regard. For this reason, the Soviet Union did not do much about helping the developing countries in general, even though the Soviet Union had tried to develop close relationships with some of the

developing countries for political and strategic reasons. Nevertheless, the appeal of the socialist ideology was very significant in the developing south.

However, as time passed, the foundations of the socialist ideology began to falter. Instead of equality, economic and political inequality became widespread within the socialist countries, exemplified by the nomenklatura, and it became obvious that communist dictatorship could not be congruent with civil liberty. Furthermore, as I have stated already, the economic performance of the centrally planned economy became marginalized over time. Thus, the peoples within and without the socialist camp were alienated from socialist ideology. In other words, the socialist camp lost the war of winning people's minds.

### After the Cold War

If the structure of the Cold War is defined by the severe military and strategic confrontation based on ideological conflict with an international economic bifurcation along the East-West divide, the sea-changes have indeed occurred. We do not now have any serious strategic confrontation between the East and the West. The world economy has become one, at least institutionally. The IMF/GATT/World Bank system is now the sole global economic institutional arrangement. The ideological divide between the capitalist and socialist camps has become only a historical fact. While there are some legacies and remnants of the Cold War, we are now in the new era. However, there exists continuity in the international system, both in the reality and in our ways of thinking about international politics, while new problems and issues have arisen after the collapse of the Cold War system.

#### (1) Security



Even after the Cold War, some still maintain a traditional ways of conceptualizing international politics. For example, some of the neo-realists argue in the following way. If the strategic stability in the Cold War was indeed maintained through the bipolar structure and strategic nuclear deterrence between the two superpowers, then the international system after the Cold War will be unstable since the international system would become multipolar in nature. They further argue that the only way to make a multipolar system stable is for each of the major powers to possess enough nuclear capabilities to sustain stable nuclear deterrence (in the real world, this argument would suggest that Germany and Japan go nuclear)<sup>1</sup>. More traditional realists, such as Henry Kissinger<sup>2</sup>, argue, for example, that assuming that the international system after the Cold War will become multipolar in nature, the United States must employ a balancing strategy lest any one nation dominate the Eurasian land mass and challenge American vital interests. Others, such as Joseph Nye<sup>3</sup> and Samuel Huntington<sup>4</sup>, argue that the international system even after the Cold War would most probably be unipolar if we take into account all possible elements of power, ranging from military capabilities to "soft" power elements, such as domestic political and value systems. Of course, to them, the United States is the country which will be placed on the top of the unipolar international system. To maintain primacy in the international system is crucial to promote American interests, they contend.

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<sup>1</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," *International Security* 15, Summer 1990, pp 5-56. Kenneth Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security*, 18:2, Fall 1993, pp.44-49.

<sup>2</sup> Henry Kissinger, "Balance of Power Sustained," in Allison & Treverton (eds), *Rethinking America's Security*, New York, 1992.

<sup>3</sup> Joseph Nye Jr, *Bound to Lead*, New York, 1990.

<sup>4</sup> Samuel Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," *International Security*, 17:4, Spring 1993.

Power transitionalists, such as Charles Doran,<sup>5</sup> contend that what matters to international stability does lie not in the *static* distribution of capabilities among the major powers but in the rates of changes in the distribution of capabilities or in the relative power relations between and among major powers. If their argument is right, the most rapidly changing power relations seem to be found, now and in the future, between China on the one hand and other major powers including Japan, the United States and Russia on the other. Thus, the focal point of stability in major power relations in the post-Cold War era would be in the triangular or quadrilateral relations among China, the United States, Japan and Russia.

Another scenario regarding the major power relations in the post-Cold War international system is a revival of a concert system.<sup>6</sup> In a concert system, it is assumed that serious and persistent conflicts of interests that divide major powers do not exist, that the major powers maintain a system of regular consultative mechanisms, that all the major powers participate in the major decisions, that no major power will behave in a way that damages vital interests of others or that causes other major powers to feel a loss of face, and so on. If the major powers act according to these assumptions, stability in the major power system will be effectively maintained and enhanced.

Even though what will actually develop in the major power system in the future is still wideopen, the major powers seem to have been making serious efforts to create a concert system and to stabilize it. A concert system in the major power system seems most congruent with a global collective

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<sup>5</sup> Charles Doran, *Systems in Crisis*, New York, 1991.

<sup>6</sup> See, for example, Richard Rosencrance, "A New Concert of Powers," *Foreign Affairs*, 71, Spring 1992, pp 64-82; Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert," *World Politics*, 38, October 1985, pp. 58-79; and, one of the best analyses of the future major power relations will be: C.W. Kegley, Jr and Gregory Raymond, *A Multipolar Peace?: Great-Power Politics in the Twenty-first Century*, New York, 1994.

security system centering on the United Nations, which will be discussed later.

I have so far been discussing the security and strategic relations among the major powers. The security relations among major powers are horizontal in nature in the sense that they deal with relations between nations with more or less equal capabilities. However, in the currently emerging international system, the salient security problems are not really concerned with the direct relations between the major powers. They are concerned with violent eruptions emanating from domestic ethnic and religious conflicts, such as those seen in the former Yugoslavia, Ukraine, Somalia, etc. and with regional military powers, such as Iraq and North Korea. Of course, violent domestic conflicts due to ethnic and religious divides are not new—they have existed ever since modern international history started. The ending of the Cold War, however, has accelerated such conflicts and we have to find a new international framework to cope with them. The end of the Cold War means the collapse of the socialist empire. The socialist empire comprised the multi-ethnic and multi-religious states, and the integration of such multi-ethnic and multi-religious states had been maintained by the universalist socialist ideology and by the political and military power of the communist parties and states. With the socialist ideology and the powerful communist states gone, it is not so surprising that violent disputes would surface due to ethnic and religious conflicts in the ex-socialist empire. As history demonstrates, there is no quick fix to the instabilities occurring after the collapse of an empire.

As a matter of fact, there is much domestic and regional violence outside the ex-socialist empire. In the Cold War, most domestic instabilities and regional conflicts were seen from the context of the East-West strategic competition. The United States and the Soviet Union did, in many cases,

intervene in such conflicts directly or indirectly. Thus, the regional and domestic conflicts tended to be internationalized and escalated vertically and horizontally. However, both the United States and the Soviet Union tried successfully to contain or "encapsulate" the regional conflicts lest they trigger direct military confrontation between the superpowers or lest they jeopardize the vital interests of the other. Both the United States and the Soviet Union possessed the will and capabilities to contain the regional conflicts. However, the end of the Cold War led to a situation in which the United States and the Soviet Union lost the will and/or capabilities to control and contain regional conflicts by themselves; Russia lost both the will and capabilities while the United States lost the incentives, even though it still possesses extremely large capabilities.

The end of the Cold War let the major contenders off the hook of extremely high military expenditures. The United States, Russia and the other major powers (except China) are now in the process of arms reduction in terms of fiscal expenditures and weaponry, including nuclear arsenals. However, there exist some nations and regions where we witness increases in armaments and military preparedness. Such trends may change the configuration of military capabilities in the long run and have great impacts on international politics in the future. However, even in the short-run, such trends will bring about serious problems.

One of the most serious problem is what may be termed regional hegemonic powers. A regional hegemonic power is a nation with the following characteristics:

- (a) it has a high military preparedness;

(b) it possesses (potential) military projection capabilities, such as medium-range ballistic missiles, with weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear, and/or chemical/biological weapons; and,

(c) its political and strategic intentions are unclear and oftentimes suspicious due mostly to its domestic political system and ideology.

Regional hegemonic powers are thus possible threatening factors, of course, to regional neighboring states, but they are also threatening factors to the major powers and to the peace and stability of the entire global system, not only since regional conflicts that are triggered by regional hegemonic powers would spread outside the regions and would have serious economic and political impacts on a global scale, but also since regional hegemonic powers would be able to make direct military strikes and inflict serious physical damage upon major powers.

I have raised two of the most pressing security issues after the Cold War—one is concerned with violent domestic/regional conflicts arising from the ethnic and religious divides within national communities; the other is concerned with regional hegemonic powers. How can the international community cope with these security threats? Of course, the fundamental cures most likely lie in domestic political, economic and cultural arrangements that the international community cannot effectively control. Let us, however, categorize possible international responses along the following two dimensions: one is concerned with whether an international response (objective) is minimal or maximal, the other is concerned with whether an international response is preventive or reactive.

An international response is said to be preventive if the act (including the act of establishing international frameworks) is taken to prevent the violent domestic/regional conflicts from occurring or to prevent a regional

hegemon from launching aggression. If the act is taken after the violence has erupted, it is said to be reactive. An international response can be said to be maximal if it tries to eliminate the root-causes of the problems as much as possible by mobilizing a huge amount of fiscal, military and human resources. If the act is taken not really to solve the root of the problem and if not many resources are utilized, the response would be considered minimal. Hence, we have four categories of responses: minimal-preventive, minimal-reactive, maximal-preventive, and maximal reactive. The response of the international community against the Iraqi invasion in 1990 is an example of a maximal reactive response. A minimal reactive response would be a response by which the international community tries to contain violent conflict, once it has erupted, from spreading vertically and horizontally and to take the measures lest the international community itself be divided regarding the conflict. A minimal preventive response would be, for example, to develop a system of confidence building measures bilaterally and multilaterally or to establish an early warning system to detect possible eruptions of violent conflicts. A maximal preventive response would be to develop and establish international arrangements to prevent such mass-destructive weapons as nuclear and chemical and biological weapons (plus related technologies and carrying capabilities such as missile) from spreading particularly to conflict-prone areas and to regional hegemonic powers, *with strong enforcement mechanisms* (rather than gentlemen's agreements).

We have to develop a whole range of systems for these four responses (objectives) so that the international community can prevent, and respond to, regional/domestic violent conflicts and possible aggressive behavior of regional hegemonic powers, effectively and flexibly. Of course, it depends on the actual circumstances which measures and mixtures thereof are most

effective. Therefore, even when the maximal reactive measures are available, it may not be effective nor wise to utilize such measures automatically.

We are now in the process of establishing a variety of international measures to prevent, and react to, regional/domestic violence and possible aggressive behavior of regional hegemons, through a set of principles and by trial and error. Such international frameworks have been evolving globally (such as the United Nations system, NPT, etc) and regionally (such as CSCE, ASEAN Regional Forum, etc.). Close collaboration between global and regional frameworks are needed for the international community to cope effectively with important security issues after the Cold War.

The multilateral and multi-level frameworks to cope with regional/domestic violence and possible aggressive behavior of regional hegemonic powers have to be very complex and intricate in contrast to the simple bipolar security structure of the Cold War and this is, indeed, a new experience for the international community. Such multilateral and multi-level frameworks would take the form of vertical security relations rather than the horizontal security relations seen in the relations among major powers. That is, the security relations in multilateral/multi-level frameworks to cope with regional/domestic conflicts and with possible aggressive acts by regional hegemonic powers are such that the international community as a whole and particularly major powers cooperate against regional threats so that the relationships are basically asymmetric in terms of power and economic and technological capabilities. However, asymmetric relations do not necessarily produce the desired outcomes for the international community. The international community may lack the will or have difficulties marshaling multilateral cooperative efforts, while the targeted parties, be they ethnic groups or regional

hegemony, would have a strong will due to their causes and grievances against international pressures.

I have demonstrated that we have two kinds of security problems after the Cold War. One is concerned with the direct security relations among major powers. The other is concerned with the vertical security relations between the international community or major powers on the one hand and regional and domestic groups (be they states or ethnic and religious groups) on the other. These two kinds of security relations are closely linked. If the vertical security relations function well in coping with regional threats, it will stabilize the major power relations and promote major power cooperation as well as international collaboration in general. However, if the vertical security frameworks do not work and if regional and local violence flourishes, then it would eventually trigger conflicts among major powers (some animosities have developed recently between Russia on the one hand and the western powers on the other in their dealing with Bosnia) and destabilize major power relations.

On the other hand, a stable major power relationship is *sine qua non* for the successful operation of a multilateral/multi-level framework to cope with regional conflicts, either in preventive or reactive manners. If a serious rupture occurs between major powers in their direct strategic and political relations, multilateral efforts to cope with regional conflicts would be bound to fail, just as the Cold War system has amply demonstrated.

In the Cold War system, the strategic relations between the major powers (i.e., the United States and the Soviet Union) did have an autonomous mechanism and dominated regional conflicts. In the post-Cold War era, though, the relationship between security relations among major powers and regional security problems has become more interactive in nature.



## (2) Economics

To repeat, in the Cold War era, the world economy was organized into socialist and capitalist camps. Within the capitalist camp (including developing countries), a liberal international economic system (the IMF/GATT regime) was established mostly based on American leadership. Under this system, economies grew and economic interdependence increased tremendously. Thus, we can say that the liberal international economic system has been basically successful and that its success has led to the ending of the Cold War since the liberal international economic system out-performed the socialist economic system. However, there have been two problems that would lead to destabilization of the international economy. First, within the liberal international economy, multipolarization has been a persistent trend among major economic powers, as the American economic hegemony has been declining over time. Multipolarization in the economic power distribution ended the fixed exchanged rate system in the early 1970s and has brought about sometimes serious economic conflicts among major economic powers. In response to multipolarization and in order to stabilize the world economy, the major western economic powers have established, for example, the G-7 Economic Summit in the 1970s.

There seem to be two contrasting hypotheses regarding the relationship between economic interdependence and security relations. One hypothesis contends that economic interdependence has an its autonomous mechanism to develop and that it brings about peaceful relations among the participants through economic interdependence. The other hypothesis states that economic interdependence can only develop among those states which have common security threats. If the first hypothesis is true, we can be optimistic about future developments in economic relations among the

major industrialized nations, even though we must expect many serious economic strifes among major economic powers in the future.

However, if the second hypothesis has any truth, the end of the Cold War has serious implications for the future of economic relations among major industrialized nations. They no longer have a common security threat so economic conflicts among them could easily lead to political deterioration and that political deterioration, in turn, could lead to the acceleration of economic conflicts. Under the bipolar structure of the Cold War, the differences in domestic economic systems and policies could not become major political issues among the Western nations, given that they were not communist or socialist. However, with the Cold War gone, the differences in domestic systems have become points of contention among them, particularly when they are related to trade imbalances and to obstacles to policy coordination. The major industrialized nations now seem to tend to emphasize narrow national economic interests when economic interdependence has become so deep that they have to put more emphasis on international economic adjustments than on maintaining domestic economic structures. There exists some possibility that they might shift their attention from economic universalism to economic regionalism.

The second problem in the liberal international economic system that could destabilize the world economy has been the North-South problem. The North-South problem was a source of conflict through the 1970s. The developing countries employed a protective import-substitution strategy and were suspicious about foreign penetration, such as foreign direct investments. They took such aggressive political strategies as the NIEO. However, during the 1980s and through the 1990s so far, the trend has been completely reversed and many developing countries have democratized their political systems and liberalized their economic systems. Now, they are

trying to compete globally and to introduce foreign direct investment as much as possible to develop their economies. Many of them have been trying to participate in what will be termed "mega-regionalism" (such as NAFTA and APEC) in order to secure access to the vast markets of, and foreign direct investments from, the major industrialized countries in the region. The political and economic stability of the developing countries, and the solution of the North-South problem, now partly depends on the success of these liberalized policies and systems of the developing countries. Therefore, the developed nations must forge some effective international economic frameworks to accept and further invite the liberalization of developing countries. However, there are some problems we have to face in the future. Firstly, not dependence of the South on the North but fierce economic competition between the developed and developing countries would come about. The developing countries will be employing an export-led development strategy and their targets will be the markets of developed countries as well as NIEs. Thus, in the future, the developed countries could become protectionist, which would suffocate the economic development of the developing countries and would bring about a new North-South problem, or, as the developing countries try to secure market access to the developed countries, the major industrialized nations, alone and together, would try to secure export markets and investment outlets in the developing countries by political means. If this happens, we will witness a renewed imperialism at the global level once again and fierce economic competition among major economic powers in the developing countries.

Another problem has appeared since the Cold War. That is, the ex-socialist countries, such as the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, have been trying to transform both their economic and political systems. (I think China and Vietnam are different. They have been trying to

liberalize their economies under communist dictatorship, which seems a version of state-led/export-led strategy taken by other developing countries.) Some of them will be successful, but many of them, including Russia, will not be so successful or at least will take decades to become politically and economically stable. They will not only be political hot-beds but also full of domestic economic troubles. Thus, what the international community and particularly the major industrialized nations should be doing is, on the one hand, to coopt them into the international community as much as possible and, on the other hand, to ward off the negative political and economic impacts emanating from within them as much as we can. Balancing these two factors is not easy. Take the problem of Russian membership to the G-7 economic summit as an example. To invite Russia as one of the regular and permanent members of the G-7 summit is a good way to treat Russia as a member of the international (major power) community, but Russia could be a destabilizing factor in the G-7 summit due partly to its domestic economic and political problems. Furthermore, the G-7 nations would take different attitudes toward Russian membership. European nations, particularly continental nations, would take more favorable attitudes to the problem because of their geographical and perhaps cultural proximity to Russia than the United States and Japan.

It is interesting to compare the security and economic areas in terms of the major actors. In the security area, the major powers can be considered to be the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France and China. All of them are publicly claimed nuclear powers and P-5 members of the United Nations Security Council. The economic major powers are the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany and Japan. All of them are members of the G-7 economic summit.

Among the major powers in the security area, the United States, Great Britain and France are major industrialized countries; China is one of the rapidly developing countries and Russia is in the midst of political and economic transformation with great uncertainties. They are, in short, very heterogeneous. Germany and Japan are now striving for permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council in order partially to solve their status inconsistency, even though they most probably will not opt to go nuclear.

The post-Cold War international system will become more multipolar in the security and economic area. Seven nations—the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, China, Germany and Japan—would probably lead the world. They are, however, quite heterogeneous and many of them suffer status inconsistency—Russia, China, Germany and Japan. Thus, the multipolar system in the post-Cold War era will not be so similar to the multipolar world historically seen in classical European international politics.

### (3) Ideology

The end of the Cold War is indeed a victory of Western ideology over socialist ideology. In other words, democracy, human rights, and civil and economic liberty won over one-party dictatorship by the communist party. Some argue then that Western liberalism achieved final victory over anti-liberalism or illiberalism and that democracy, human rights and civil and economic liberty have now become the only universal values. They further argue that the major policy goals of the major industrialized and democratic countries should be based on promoting the liberal values on a global scale. This kind of argument has been supported by a group of academicians who advocate the democratic peace thesis. The democratic peace thesis states that

even though countries with democratic political systems fight war as often as non-democratic nations do, the democratic nations rarely fight each other. Thus, if the democratic countries increase in number and if they prevail in the world, global peace will come about.

Even though no one can deny liberal values as some of the most important values to be pursued, liberal values cannot be achieved within a short-time in many of the developing countries and will most probably clash with other values and traditional systems. Liberal values will oftentimes be inconsistent with such social values as economic development and traditional political systems. Sometimes the liberal values are denied outright by some ideological and religious systems. The victory of liberalism over (Stalinist) socialism does not necessarily mean its simultaneous victory over systems of values other than socialism (in this vein even the liberal victory over the socialist values is in doubt, as we witness China's and Vietnam's maintenance socialism and the resurgence of socialist parties in some of the Eastern European countries).

Let us consider some of the possible conflicts that would come out of the differences in value systems after the Cold War. First, there will be some value conflicts among the major industrialized countries, particularly due to the differences in their economic systems. As I stated in the previous section, the economic and political systems among the major industrialized countries are different and such differences, when they are perceived to be linked to, say, trade imbalances and economic competitiveness, become causes of political conflicts. Second, even though most of the developing countries have been liberalizing their economies and democratizing their political systems, there will still exist differences in values between the developed democratic countries and the developing countries, such as human rights and even democracy itself. And, there will occur political and

diplomatic conflicts between the developed and developing countries based on such differences in values. Usually, this kind of conflict is episodic, i.e., if some event occurs that seems to violate, say, human rights in the eyes of advanced democratic countries, that event becomes the focal point in the conflict. The political system of the country which "violates" human rights is not, or at least is very unlikely to become, the focus of international conflicts. While it is unreal to deny the possibilities of conflicts occurring from differences in basic values, it would be an overstatement to say that the basic dimension of the conflicts after the Cold War will be the differences in value systems, such as civilizations (e.g., clashes of civilizations *a la* Samuel Huntington).<sup>7</sup>

Third, the progress and stabilization of democracy will be a persistent issue in the relationship between the Western democratic states on the one hand and Russia and some of the Eastern European countries on the other. Even within the Western democratic states, the resurgence of neo-Nazi groups and of anti-foreign movements are challenges to the liberal value system.

Fourth, as I touched upon in the first section, ethnic and religious groups in the ex-socialist countries have been trying to consolidate themselves politically in seeking their identities as well as political and economic advantages after the collapse of the universalist socialist ideology and of the communist party's power. We must expect that there will be many ethnic and religious conflicts in future, while we still do not have effective mechanisms to control them.

Unlike in the Cold War, we do not have a dominant ideological split on a global scale. We do have many different potential conflicts due to differences in value systems among major industrialized countries, between

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<sup>7</sup> Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs*, 72, Summer 1993, pp.22-49.

developed and developing countries, between ethnic and religious groups, and even within democratic states. Value systems and ideologies are still some of the most important factors affecting international peace and stability.

## Conclusion

Some of the most important conclusions and implications of this paper are the following:

(1) The international security system after the Cold War will be a two-track system: one track is horizontal security relations among the major powers; the other track is vertical security relations between the international community (the major powers) on the one hand and regional powers and ethnic and religious groups on the other.

(2) Horizontal security relations among major powers will take many different forms depending upon the future distribution of capabilities and the configuration of conflicts of interests among them: they could take the form of a unipolar system, a competitive/conflictual multipolar system, or a concert system.

(3) Vertical security relations will be constructed on the basis of multilateral/multi-level international frameworks both for preventive and reactive purposes.

(4) The two tracks are interactive. The stability and smooth functioning of the horizontal security relations among major powers is *sine qua non* for the vertical security relations to work out well. If the vertical security relations fail to work effectively and if regional and local conflicts rage, it will most probably split the major powers and destabilize the major power system as well as the entire international system.



(5) Even though economic cooperation among the major industrialized countries throughout the Cold War made the liberal international economic system function well, providing great benefits to the participating nations, and outperform the socialist economic system, the economic conflicts among major industrialized countries are not non-existent but have become more salient due to economic competition and to the loss of a common enemy. Thus, serious efforts must be made to maintain the liberal international economic system.

(6) The liberal international economic system must be maintained not only for the major industrialized countries but also for the developing countries which have been liberalizing their economies. If we fail to maintain the liberal economic system on the part of the developed countries, we may face a new North-South problem.

(7) The international system after the Cold War will become more multipolar in the areas of security and economics. Seven nations—the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, China, Germany and Japan—will probably lead the world, but they are quite heterogeneous and many of them suffer from the status-inconsistency—Russia and China are among the P-5 but not the G-7; Germany and Japan are among the G-7 but not among the P-5. Thus, the multipolar system in the post-Cold War era will not be so similar to the multipolar world historically seen in classical European international politics and will be full of uncertainties and of potential instabilities.

(8) Unlike in the Cold War, we do not have a dominant ideological split on a global scale. We do have, however, many different (potential) conflicts due to differences in value systems. Among major industrialized countries, we have differences in economic systems that could trigger serious political

conflicts, particularly when they are perceived to be linked to trade imbalances and to competitive advantages. Between the advanced democratic countries and the developing countries, there will occur some conflicts centering upon human rights and democracy. The progress and stabilization of democracy will be a persistent issue between the Western democratic countries on the one hand and the ex-socialist countries on the other. Ethnic and religious groups, particularly in ex-socialist countries, have been trying to consolidate themselves politically in seeking their identities as well as political and economic advantages after the demise of the universalist socialist ideology and of the all-mighty communist party. Value systems and ideologies are still some of the most important factors that affect international peace and stability.

# **Session 1 - 1**

**Continuity and Change in the International System**

*presented by Dr Joaquim Krause*

**JIIA-IFRI Joint Conference**

**June 2-3, 1994**

**Joachim Krause\***

## **Continuity and Change in the International System**

This session's main theme is the role of the United Nations in an international environment that has undergone substantial changes during the past five years. The purpose of my presentation is to start with an analysis of the nature of this change. How can the structure of the international system be adequately described in the fifth year after the end of the Cold War? Analysing the nature of today's international change and of the resulting structures is certainly a daring undertaking in view of the rapid changes we went through over the last years, in any case it is a fundamental intellectual challenge. At least one thing seems to be clear: The current international structure cannot be described along concepts such as "change" and "continuity" alone. More complex analytical tools are needed. Since a thorough and comprehensive analysis of the changes of the international system surely needs more time and space than is available today, I have to concentrate on the basic features and highlights.

I will hence focus on those questions which are relevant to the subject under discussion in our session, i.e. the role of the United Nations. The basic notion behind the United Nations system is that the states are called upon to forgo the use of military means in solving their disputes (except for self-defense) and that the UN shall be instrumental in mediating and brokering between warring parties or that it shall help states that have become subject to an armed attack by imposing political, economical and even military measures of punishment on the aggressor. The UN-system needs not only an adequate organization, it needs strong and powerful states that work together in order to implement the system, and it should fit into - but also shape - the developing international state system.

There are four pertinent questions that we have to deal with in this regard. First, what changes do we have to take into account with respect to relevant *international actors* and what can be expected from them? The United Nations are only as good as their members are, especially those who are strategically relevant. Thus we have to look at who are these states and how able and willing they are to play an international role and whether they are prepared to do this within the UN-system. Since these states have to cooperate, the issue is, how far the *international constellation* is conducive for such a cooperation. This is followed by the question to the *organizing principles of the*

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*international system* - something often not quite rightly referred to as "the international order"? What is coming after the old Cold-War-order has fallen apart? Will we have one organizing principle again or will there be a rather fluid and open situation continue? As a fourth step, the relevance of collective security and nuclear nonproliferation within the UN system will be addressed, since these issue seem to be of crucial character for the emerging of new international structures and organizing principles. This presentation will end with a rather sober note on the fate of internastional efforts to let the United Nations play a major role.

### *New and old international actors*

In international politics there was always a small group of relatively large and influential states that virtually shaped the international system. In the past, these were the major European powers, since 1941 the Soviet Union and the United States took over from them. Since the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union a new picture is emerging which is rather variegated. If taken together, the impression is not very auspicious in terms of an increased role for the United Nations. In fact, most major powers are struggling with sometimes extremely difficult internal problems. Two of them are facing the possibility of disintegration. The resources needed for assuming responsibilities for peace and cooperation are rather shrinking than increasing.

The *United States* will remain the most dominant power in the world, most likely they will stay as the only power with a real global reach and a political elite that is able and willing to act as a strategic actor. Thus, many expected after the end of the Cold War that Washington - as it did in the late 1940s - would take over global leadership and act as an omnipresent mediator, umpire or peace-maker. Only few of these expectations actually materialized, in fact this took place only in 1991 when a US led international military operation defeated Iraq in operation Desert Storm. Since then the limits of American leadership have become evident:

- The relative strength of the US in comparison to the rest of the world is considerably lower than in the late 1940s where the United States made up for more than 50 percent of global GNP. Today their share is less than 27 percent. The same is true with respect to military power. There is no force in the world that was able to project so much military power all around the world as the US is, however there are growing regional and local military powers in most parts of the world with capabilities that would make it increasingly costly for the US Administration to project military power.
- The United States is less able and less willing to exert global leadership. It is still in the midst of a major budgetary crisis, its economy faces major structural and cyclical problems and it is governed by a political elite whose basic attitudes were moulded through the Vietnam-war experience and who are more and more wary about the use of military force outside the United States or its alliances and reluctant to take on too many responsibilities all around the world. The military capabilities of the US are, as a consequence of the end of the Cold War, in a process of major reductions.

This does not imply that the United States are up to retreat from world politics into a new era of isolationism. Rather, a concentration on certain regions of interest and a growing demand for burden-sharing with friends and allies all around the world will take place. This can contribute to major political and military shifts in various regions, including Europe and Asia-Pacific.

*Western Europe* could play a major role in world politics - provided it would have the unity and strategic determination necessary for that. During the recent years, the member states of the European Community/Union have demonstrated how far away they are from anything similar to a common foreign and security policy (as it was stipulated by the Maastricht Treaty). Plenty of time and resources were wasted instead in the years since 1990 to devise ways and means to balance the alleged oversized re-unified Germany. As often in its history, Europeans are mainly busy in dealing with - and watching over - each other than in exerting strategic political leadership in adjacent regions. The best example of the failure of the Europeans to adequately react to external crises was the attitude towards the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. The amount of ignorance, internal bickering, useless show-activities and buck-passing displayed by the Europeans over the last three years is simply a shame. The post-Yugoslavia-wars have shown that the Europeans, as one observer put it, were economically a giant, politically a dwarf and militarily a worm.

Individual European countries such as *France, Great Britain or Germany* are only partially able to make up individually for these shortcomings.

*Germany* is a power with the potential of becoming a factor of regional stability (a so-called *Ordnungsmacht*). In fact, the government in Bonn was rather successful in calming down the nationalistic excitements that did spread all around Germany after re-unification. Today Polish and Czech fears about German domination or territorial claims have been alleviated due to the steadfast policy of cooperation and consultation practiced by the government in Bonn. The fact that Eastern Central Europe today is such a relatively quiet place could to a great deal be credited to the German policy of reliable partnership and economic and political support for their Eastern neighbors. Germany's main instruments are economic means and political support, which includes a clear renunciation of any kind of claims for territorial changes. The ability of Germany to use its economic power in order to further developments in Eastern Europe will, however, rather decrease than increase in the years to come. In light of the severe budgetary crisis that was caused by the failure of the current coalition to assess the real costs of unification in time, the economic - and military - room of manoeuvre for Germany will become extremely narrow in the years ahead. Militarily, Germany not only binds itself in a way hardly understandable for most of its neighbors, for the time being it possesses virtually no capabilities for projecting military power. Germany will acquire such capabilities in the years to come, however it will restrict itself only to military involvements together with others and legitimated by the United Nations. There will be no unilateral military role of Germany. Thus, Germany will always be a proponent of multilateralism, however, with limited capabilities to take over responsibilities.

*Great Britain* is still acting under the notion of being a big power. In fact, the basis for such a big-power claim is constantly eroding. Her economy is still in major troubles. In terms of economic indicators it already trails Italy, parts of England are in a

quiet desperate economic situation. Her military capabilities are impressive at least in the field of maritime power; yet, the resources are shrinking and the capabilities for projecting forces individually are declining further. If the current trends continue, in the years to come Great Britain will be only a shadow of what is once was. Great Britain as a permanent member of the UN Security Council will retain the status of a great power - especially as it still disposes of strategic nuclear weapons - however its reluctance to take over responsibilities as part of this role will grow.

*France* is economically much better off than Britain and keeps military forces stronger and more versatile than those of Britain or Germany. French leaders have a stronger sense of international leadership than their counterparts in Bonn or London have and thus often many hopes were addressed to Paris in the past few years. However, the French political class has a distinct tendency to get bogged down over purely procedural questions (such as whether WEU should precede NATO) or to follow traditional power instincts that since long have lost their validity and that lead them to waste time and energy on rather secondary debates. An example of this was the obsession of the political elite with the alleged German quest for supremacy in Europe after 1990. This led to many strange moves in French foreign policy during the Socialist rulership. Since the landslide victory of the centrist and gaullist forces in the last election, this tendency has subsided considerably.

France is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and considers this - as does Great Britain - as a symbol for its great power status. As with Great Britain, the material basis on which this claim is built on is more and more the possession of nuclear weapons. The ability of France to take over international responsibilities and to act as an international leader is rather shrinking. Due to budgetary restraints and in line with the end of the Cold War France too is reducing its military forces and is not enhancing its abilities to act independently outside her own territory or that of her longtime allies.

The proclivity of the French leadership to take over international responsibilities is thus rather small. Often French leaders, under pressure by public opinion, tend to resort to symbolic politics (such as Mitterand's visit to Sarajevo in 1992). There is, however, a growing apprehension in France about destabilizing developments in North Africa and the resultant consequences for France.

*Japan* is, as Germany, a potential power with regional and global reach that is restraining itself in international military affairs and that is pursuing a policy of cooperation, multilateralism and silent diplomacy. However, there are marked differences between both states: While Germany is, as Joseph Joffe once put it, "encircled by friends", Japan is more or less without any ally or friend in the region. This is in part due to geography. Another reason might be the failure of the Japanese leaders to show the same kind of regret and to lead the same kind of frank discussions on their own war-crimes and genocides committed during World War II as the Germans did. The confidence that is trusted today to the new Germany to a great deal stems from this often self-destructing debate.

Japan has to rely on the US as its only ally - an alliance that is increasingly strained by the conflict over trade issues. These strains are in part a consequence of the inertia of Japan's political system. Since the regional situation in East-Asia might entail some major disruptions and crises (either resulting in China or in Korea) Japan, unlike

Germany, might get into a situation in which is general cooperative and multilateral approach to international affairs could come to an end.

So far, Japan is fully supportive of an increased role of the United Nations in world affairs. Yet, as in Germany, the domestic situation restrains Japans ability to take responsibilities for international peace-keeping or peace-enforcement activities.

After Japan the next important international actor is *China*. She owes her relevance mainly to her sheer size (1.2 billion people) and her amazingly fast growing economy. If the current growth rates in China continue, she might become the third largest economy in terms of GNP at the beginning of the next century. China is permanent member of the UN Security Council, yet her ability to assume an active role in this forum is - and will remain - rather limited. First of all, the Chinese openly contradict the universal validity of most of those values that should constitute any international order built in accordance with the UN system. This applies to human rights as well as to the universal goal of nuclear non-proliferation. Secondly, in the field of international politics, China seems to be more interested in a traditional regional approach than in a global one. Thirdly, the domestic stability of China is, due to the enormous economic strides that were made so far, in a transitional phase that might entail many uncertainties and instabilities. There are already huge differences in lifestyle and wealth between the new economic zones in the South and the East on the one hand and rural areas on the other hand. These differentials have already led to various local clashes and might further spread. There are also many who question whether China still can be considered an integrated state. They point to the many regional and local power centers that have emerged over the past (including factual borders with border control posts between the various provinces and autonomous regions). The question thus raises itself: How far is the gerontocratic leadership in Beijing actually able to control the resources of this huge country for foreign policy purposes?

Even much more than China is the future international role of *Russia* determined by its domestic instabilities. It is highly questionable whether Russia is still (or ever was) controlled by the Moscow government. The impression prevails that the huge country is in a state of dissolution, that her main institutions are becoming defunct and that in international affairs she is considered to be primarily a problem than a problem-solver and equal partner. Even the Russian military, often quoted as the last remaining institution of some functional value, is under huge strain. The actual strength of the Russian army might be below 1 million men, large parts of the Russian weapons and ammunition have become useless and the ability of the remaining forces to project power is relatively low and continues to decrease.

Russia as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council is hardly able to assume major international responsibilities within the UN system. Since the domestic stance of the current government has become increasingly strained, the internal instability of Russia becomes a factor that is hampering United Nations peacekeeping and other security related activities (such as in Bosnia-Herzegovina or in Iraq). Moscow gets more and more into the position of a veto power that is blocking or even undermining actions undertaken or mandated by the world organization. The Clinton administration so far has tried to court the Russian government in international fora (such as the sudden, and by the way absolutely superfluous, appearance of Russian



Foreign Minister Kozyrew at the Cairo ceremony for the Israely-Palestine Agreement on Self-Determination in early May this year), in order not to weaken President Jetzin's domestic stance further. Yet, there are limits to this cooperation, as Russia will become an increasingly difficult partner even with democrats in power.

Besides these these strategically relevant powers, there are hardly any other states that could have the ability to shape the future international system and the international order. *India* might be an exception, due to its size, its military power and its determined political elite. However, most likely India's international position will remain relatively low since her main security problems continue to lay with her domestic instabilities. Another case could be a country such as Iraq if it would have been successful in occupying Kuwait and subsequently other Gulf-states, thus granting Baghdad control over large parts of the worldwide oil resources. Provided Iraq would have acquired or produced nuclear weapons, this would have led to a new strategic actor of major relevance for the future international system. Thanks to the courageous intervention by a group of states led by the United States and mandated by the UN Security Council this did not take place. However, the possibility cannot be excluded that either Iraq is reemerging as a major military power in the region or that Iran could try to gain such a control.

### *The coming international constellation*

In history the nature of the international system and the prevailing order was dominated by the constellation among the major powers. In most instances this constellation was characterized by competition among these powers. The constellation behind the balance-of-power order was that basically all states could cooperate with or fight against each other. The constellation of the Cold-War system was the bipolar competition between the US and Russia or the Western world and the Socialist world.

Today, everything is different, since there is no basic conflict between these actors. The main security problem among them stems from the internal instabilities in Russia and China.

This is not indicate that there are no potentials for major conflicts. There are various fault-lines along which competitions and conflicts could emerge or re-emerge, such as a conflict between Russia and the West, a conflict between the USA and Japan, between Japan and China, or the emergence of trade blocs in Europe, Asia/Pacific and North America that might turn into political-military alliances. Most actors are aware of such possibilities and most of them are doing everything to avoid such outcomes. In this respect the world is quite different from the one we knew from the last century which was shaped so much by the parochial intra-European conflicts. Today more mundane aspects such as economic and social welfare are standing in the center of attention of both politicians and the public politics.

One other element of this global constellation is that most major players have the tendency to create zones of special interest and influence around them. Russia's policy of special relations with the "near abroad" is a clear indication. Western Europe is establishing its kind of special relationship with the Eastern Central European countries

with a view to their eventual accession to the European Union. It also will become increasingly interested into developments in North Africa. The USA has defined various zones of interest all around the world (NATO, Japan, Israel, individual Arab allies and Southeast-Asian states), and China is increasingly active in establishing bilateral relations with their immediate neighborhood (which is a considerable part of East- and Southeast-Asia).

Whether these processes of zone-building will lead to conflicts among the major power centers is open. It might happen that all sides have an interest to avoid such conflicts. On the other hand, there are regions in which the potential for clashes is high, such as the Baltic states, the Ukraine, the Balkans, Northeast Asia and even Southeast Asia.

An other element of change are those states that are outside this group of strategically relevant states but that might assume a relatively higher status by acquiring nuclear weapons or by building new coalitions. They could serve as an element of unrest and might result in a major change of international constellations.

### *Is a new international order emerging?*

From what was said above, it becomes evident that the world after the end of the Cold War is not shaped along a concept of international order. The notion of "international order" is a relatively traditional concept stemming from the 19th century. It defines a state of international affairs in which a set of simple organizing principles are prevalent in a principally anarchic international society. Their main purpose was to prevent major wars from breaking out even if they might allow for some kinds of limited conflicts to occur. The Cold War system was the last international order of that kind.

It is doubtful whether we need a new set of simple organizing principles as we had before. Given the current international constellation, it would be somewhat odd to try to re-invent a new one based on a principally conflicting system. But if such old concepts were no longer adequate, what will be the future organizing principles of international affairs?

Most likely we have to live with different organizing principles that are overlapping and either supporting or, conversely, undermining each other. At least three categories of organizing principles are discernable:

- In the shadow of the Cold-War-order the Western states were able to devise a new quality of interstate system based on free trade, free movement of people and ideas, on cooperation and integration, and on common values both domestically and internationally. They created a *zone of peace and cooperation* among themselves which was much more able to create a solid state of peace than any preceding order based on "balance-of-power". For many, any revival of traditional concepts of international order seems to be futile in light of a better model available that already seems to spread to other areas than the OECD-world.

- There is a set of global organizing principles that are shared by most of the above mentioned strategically relevant actors. These are: the prevalence of the UN Charter (with the security system built in it), and the wish not to allow for a further spread of the control over nuclear weapons and to outban chemical and biological weapons at all.
- In the absence of global organizing principles, regional and even subregional international orders might emerge with very different outcomes. Some might look civilized as they were based on the above mentioned Western zone of peace and cooperation, some might be zones dominated by an individual power and some might be an anarchic international society in which the brutal use of force is the only lasting organizing principle.

How do these different systems could match together? There is no principal reason why the future international world should have a composite structure made up of regional and global elements. The qualitative nature of that composition, however, is the most important thing. Here, various scenarios are imaginable:

- The best case scenario would be the one in which the Western zone of peace and cooperation will expand, where regional balances will develop in accordance with this model and where the adherence to the global principles mentioned above is guaranteed by some of the strategically relevant states (for instance organised by NATO or within the framework of the UN).
- The worst case scenario would be the one in which anarchic regional orders prevail while the remaining global principles falter. The Western zone of peace and cooperation might become jeopardized - or even fall apart - as a consequence of such detrimental political developments outside.

Whatever the outcome might be, the degree to which the few global organizing principles (adherence to the UN Charter and nuclear non-proliferation) are actually heeded and implemented will have a decisive impact. If the civilized variants of international order should prevail, they need to be buttressed by a functioning global security system that keeps nuclear proliferation at bay and that guarantees the survival of states not member to an alliance and not member to the nuclear weapons states club. It is my concern, as will be outlined below, that the odds are not good to make progress in this regard.

### *Collective security and nuclear nonproliferation*

Why do collective security and nuclear nonproliferation belong together? The answer is relatively simple: because national security is at the heart of both. As the old security equations of the Cold War era do not apply anymore and new security challenges might occur for non-nuclear weapons states, the continuation of the current state of control over nuclear weapons can in the long run only be maintained if the nuclear weapons state take over a larger and more serious responsibility for the security of others within the UN system or - based on broad UN mandates - in cooperation with NATO or WEU. This issue is highlighted by the coincidence of two developments:

- the coming extension conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in April/May 1995 which will go along with a debate on the pros and cons of extending the Treaty indefinitely;
- the obvious failure of the Security Council to deal with the armed Serbian aggression against a UN member - Bosnia-Herzegovina.

One should not forget that the main reasons for the success of the nuclear non-proliferation efforts undertaken in the late 1960s and early 1970s (NPT, INFCIRC 153; NSG) was the link between the renunciation of nuclear weapons possession or control on the side of the non-nuclear weapons states and positive security guarantees given by nuclear weapons states to those highly developed industrial states such as Japan, FR Germany, Italy and others that were at that time considered to be the most likely candidates for nuclear proliferation. This scheme eventually linked together a group of at least 25, actually much more industrial countries in a security/nonproliferation regime. As to the Non-nuclear weapons states involved, it gave them enough security to forgo possession of or control over nuclear weapons (combined with an intense consultation mechanism, at least on the side of NATO) and it left leverage enough for commercial activities in the field of the civilian use of nuclear energy.

Meanwhile the nature of the nuclear proliferation problem has changed. While in the 1960's Germany, Japan, Italy and Sweden were considered to be the most likely candidates for nuclear weapons proliferation, today the most probable candidates are either Third World nations or former Soviet republics that might strive for nuclear weapons for reasons of regional hegemony or in anticipation of rather desperate situations (such as war with Russia or other superior neighbors). In the 1960's, the potential proliferators Japan, Germany and Italy were seen as a source of instability and the 5 known nuclear weapons states were considered to be cornerstones of stability. Today it is the decay of at least one (Soviet Union/Russia) and the possibility of the decay of a further nuclear weapons states (China) as well as the danger of the disintegration of India, Pakistan, and South Africa (three states with major nuclear weapons programs) that pose major stability problems as these developments open up opportunities for instant or at least rapidly accelerated proliferation in many parts of the world - even among those states that so far were deemed to be unable to form a proliferation risks due to their lack of expertise. As a corollary, the role of nuclear weapons in the hands of these proliferators may also differ from the traditional functions that were attributed to nuclear weapons since their invention. For many possible candidates, their main strategic value might lay in attracting world attention to their possible desperate situation - nuclear proliferation is then rather a means to extort international support. For others, nuclear weapons might be an insurance policy against otherwise superior neighbors, while for some states possession of nuclear weapons might give them a means at hand to fend off international military action - for instance in case this state just had conquered a neighboring country.

Both the G-7 and the permanent members of UN Security Council took up this issue. At the London meeting of the G-7 in summer 1991 the heads of state affirmed their commitment to "the ideal of a peaceful, just and democratic and prosperous world" and they declared that the following principles were essential to the civilized conduct of relations between states:

- taking collective measures against threats to peace and to suppress aggression;

- settling disputes peacefully;
- upholding the rule of law;
- protecting human rights.

The UN Security Council in its special session in January 1992 associated itself with the idea of a new and unprecedented role of the United Nations for preserving peace in the world and instructed the Secretary General to draw up a device for an agenda for peace. It also called the occurrence of nuclear weapons proliferation a "threat to peace" under chapter 7 of the UN Charter (which would spell more or less immediate reaction by the members of the Security Council).

Two years later, the picture is as bleak as it could be. Two major UN operations - those in Somalia and in former Yugoslavia - have turned out to be catastrophic failures. In Somalia, it needed a determined local warlord with a small tribal army to scare off the US troops and subsequently others; in Bosnia-Herzegovina the UN continued to treat a blatant case of aggression against one of its member states as if this were a quite normal civil war. Instead of helping the multi-ethnic Bosnian state to survive and to repel the Serbian aggression, it aggravated the situation by imposing an arms embargo on all belligerents - which went only to the disadvantage of the underarmed government troops of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The next failure might be the North Korean case, where intensive diplomatic activities and negotiations have not brought about a solution. Further steps that are needed to compel the North Korean leadership are not undertaken, in part because of Chinese resistance in the Security Council, in part because the USA is afraid of getting drawn into another Korean war. As a result, the 5 permanent member states of the UN Security Council have obviously not lived up to the standards they set themselves. Even worse, with imposing the indiscriminate arms embargo they also denied the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina the right of self-defense thus violating Art 51 of the Charter.

It is hard to imagine how the permanent member states of the UN - who happen to be the five legitimate nuclear weapons states under the NPT - will succeed in convincing the states of the Islamic world that the indefinite extension of the NPT is in their security interest, when in the case of Bosnia they have demonstrated so vividly their unwillingness and their inability to come to the help of a state that is in deep trouble. One could rather expect, that a new impulse was given for Third world states to look again at the role of nuclear weapons in a changed security environment. This must not necessarily involve that a large group of Third world states would start to ponder nuclear weapons options, yet the enthusiasm for an indefinite extension of the NPT might subside.

The reasons for the failure of the Security Council have already been described above: lack of strategic leadership, shrinking resources, domestic instabilities and an increasing tendency to act only on the basis of mainly regionally defined areas of interests. In some cases, pure ignorance and cynicism were also involved.

It seems that we are entering a phase of *nuclear complacency*, i.e. a period in which the nuclear weapons states on the one hand are less inclined to shoulder international responsibilities, while on the other hand they are cooperating in the field of nuclear nonproliferation. This could lead to a bog-down of international non-proliferation efforts, since these efforts can only be successful, when it is guaranteed

that they are supported by a broad consensus involving non-nuclear weapons states. And the support non nuclear weapons states are giving to nuclear nonproliferation is depending on how their security situation will be affected. If among the non nuclear weapons states the perception prevailed that there is no one or no international organization or community outside caring for their security, many of them might change their minds as to the virtues of nuclear nonproliferation. Unlike the 1960s, where mainly developed Western states were opposing the NPT, new powers from the Third world might be the main challengers against the continuation of the NPT - and they might be much more arduous candidates to convince than the above mentioned Western states.

The damage done so far to the concept of collective security under the UN-system and to the efforts to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation might be enormous. I am not quite sure whether or not this damage can be repaired; in any case it would take years to rebuild confidence in collective security and into the viability of the international nuclear nonproliferation system. Thus, my outlook for the future of the international system is not very bright, I hope that today's discussion might bring about new aspects that could lead to a more upbeat perspective.

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# **Session 1 - 2**

## **Beyond Peacekeeping**

*presented by Dr Mats Berdal*

**JIIA-IFRI Joint Conference**

**June 2-3, 1994**



**BEYOND PEACEKEEPING?**  
**Reflections on the Evolution of International Peacekeeping After the Cold War**

**Dr. Mats Berdal,**  
**International Institute for Strategic Studies**

**JIIA-IFRI JOINT CONFERENCE**

**on**

**Building Global and Regional Frameworks for Peace and Prosperity: Political and  
Economic Security in the New World Order**

**Japan Institute for International Affairs, Tokyo**  
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## INTRODUCTION

The view that the "international community" should move "beyond peacekeeping" has been a persistent theme of academic and policy discussions about the role of the United Nations in international relations since the revival of UN peacekeeping in the late 1980s. The central premise underlying the call for a more proactive approach to international peace and security on the part of the UN, whether explicitly stated or merely implied, has always been that the end of the Cold War represented a historical disjunction between periods of world politics. According to this view, the end of superpower bipolarity meant that the UN would cease to be what Hans Morgenthau had dismissively described as no more than a "new setting for the old techniques of diplomacy"<sup>1</sup>. While the goal of world government is still conceded as unrealistic even by the most ardent proponents of a UN-centric "world order", the end of East-West confrontation meant that the organisation could, at the very least, provide the basis for a more "centrally regulated and well ordered international system"<sup>2</sup>.

The record of UN involvement in the settlement of regional and internal conflicts between 1988 and 1992 lent some support to this view, and was used to justify the optimism expressed at the first ever Security Council Summit meeting held in January 1992.<sup>3</sup> The UN's role (albeit peripheral and modest) in facilitating the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan (UNGOMAP), its involvement in the transition process from South African rule to independence in Namibia, and its contribution to the peace process in Central America, were all seen as foreshadowing a more constructive pattern of UN involvement in conflict resolution. The UN's legitimising role in support of military action against Iraq in 1991, and the apparent convergence of views among members of the Security Council on issues of international security, convinced many that the paralysing influence of the Cold War would no longer impair the effectiveness of the Security Council as the organ with "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security."<sup>4</sup>

It was also partly against the backdrop of these developments that "peacekeeping" - described as a "growth industry" by the Secretary General in late 1992<sup>5</sup> - came to be seen as an instrument whose further development would give the UN an even more prominent role in the field of international peace and security. Attempts by academic analysts to develop concepts for operations "beyond peacekeeping" went hand

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<sup>1</sup> Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, p.497

<sup>2</sup> Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, "The UN's Role in International Society Since 1945", in A. Roberts and B. Kingsbury, *United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Roles in International Relations* (Second Edition) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p.4.

<sup>3</sup> "UN Declaration - World Leaders Optimistic on Future", *Financial Times*, 1 February 1992.

<sup>4</sup> UN Charter, Article 24 (1).

<sup>5</sup> Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 5, 1992, p.89.

in hand with the actual tendency to downgrade the requirement of consent as a basis for UN action, thus going beyond the "established principles, procedures and practices of peace-keeping"<sup>6</sup>.

This earlier optimism has been profoundly shaken by the experiences of UN forces in the former Yugoslavia, Angola, Somalia and Rwanda. To many observers, the course of events in these places has been taken as evidence of a broader failure on the part of the UN to adapt to the changing circumstances of the post-Cold War era and, in particular, to reform its peacekeeping management practices. It is the contention of this paper, however, that the alleged inability of the UN to adjust itself to the changing character of the international political system is merely one aspect of the current malaise of UN peacekeeping. The question of whether one should or can realistically expect to move "beyond peacekeeping" is more complex than it may at first seem. To address it, I propose to examine three sets of questions:

(i) Does the recent experience of UN peacekeeping, especially in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia, suggest that the *fundamental* character of peacekeeping as a distinctive form of neutral, third party intervention, has lost its relevance in contemporary international relations? If, as I shall argue, the principles of impartiality and minimum use of force remain central to peacekeeping after the Cold War, what are the implications of this when forces operate in situations where consent is fragmentary and incomplete at the tactical level?

(ii) Is the UN, as an institution, capable of providing the kind of executive direction and management of peacekeeping operations which the present range and variety of UN field operations demand? Have the reforms introduced so far effectively addressed the major weaknesses in the UN system for managing peacekeeping operations?

(iii) What are the broader "world order" issues raised by the expansion and conduct of UN peacekeeping operations in internal conflicts? Is peacekeeping likely to remain the kind of "growth industry" envisaged by the Secretary General in late 1992? In particular, what are the obstacles, apart from the narrow institutional ones, which will continue to limit the role of the UN in the realm of peace and security even after the passing of the Cold War?

## **I. PEACEKEEPING AND THE "MIDDLE GROUND DEBATE"**

### ***The Debate over Doctrine***

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<sup>6</sup> Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of United Nations Peace-keeping", Cyril Foster Lecture, University of Oxford, 4 March 1993.

The failure of "forceable pacification" in Somalia in 1993 and the continuation of ethnic war in Bosnia have highlighted the need for a reassessment of the *doctrinal* implications of operating in politically fragile and divided communities, in which clear front lines or legitimate political authorities cannot easily be identified, and where consent among the warring faction is often sporadic and patchy. Within military establishments and, to a lesser extent, among civilian analysts, the debate about "peacekeeping doctrine" or "operations other than war" has come to focus on the question of whether it is possible to conceive of an area of military activity between "classic" peacekeeping and enforcement based on traditional war-fighting doctrines.

On the one hand, attempts have been made to develop a concept of "second generation multinational operations", in which the key assumption has been that an outside force need not *necessarily* rely on or be guided by the requirement of consent from the parties to a conflict.<sup>7</sup> Instead, a military force that is properly equipped, trained and governed by the right operational concepts can engage in various intermediary "levels" of enforcement.<sup>8</sup> It is this rejection of *consent* and *impartiality* as determinants of operational activity which has been at the heart of the calls for action "beyond peacekeeping".<sup>9</sup> Proponents of this view argue that a "middle ground" of military activity exists between "classical" peacekeeping and large-scale enforcement, and that both intellectual and practical efforts should be geared towards developing the requirements for "aggravated" or "muscular" peacekeeping. Among the countries that have participated in recent peacekeeping operations, the United States has been the most receptive to the idea that there is indeed an area of military activity "beyond peacekeeping" (this, curiously, in spite of the debacle in and ignominious withdrawal from Somalia).

While this debate has been conducted, there has over the past two years been a very real tendency to downgrade the importance of consent as a basis for UN involvement; a tendency taken to its ultimate conclusion in Somalia.

The question of whether there is an area of military activity between "classic" peacekeeping and enforcement should be approached from two perspectives. In the first place, it requires a closer look at the actual nature of the changes in peacekeeping since 1988, because a key assumption of those who argue in favour a "middle ground" is that Cold War peacekeeping has little relevance to contemporary operations. Second, it is necessary to examine the operational consequences of the

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<sup>7</sup> John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, *A Draft Concept of Second Generation Multinational Operations* (Providence RI: The Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, 1993), pp.4-5.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> In the words of Richard Connoughton, "consent and impartiality are too fragile to serve as a fulcrum around which a sensible doctrine can be built", see Richard Connoughton, "Time to clear the doctrine dilemma", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 9 April 1994.

downgrading of consent which has taken place in recent operations, most notably in the case of UNOSOM II.

### *The Changing Nature of UN Peacekeeping Since 1988*

Viewed from a historical perspective, the evolution of UN peacekeeping since 1988 have involved two significant developments. First, a very considerable increase in the "scale, participation and hybrid nature" of operations has taken place. Between 1948 and 1987 a total of 13 operations were launched by the UN; since 1987, 20 new operations have been undertaken.<sup>10</sup> At the same time, the permanent five members of the Security Council have become more directly involved with military personnel on the ground.<sup>11</sup> While there has also been a notable increase in so-called "multi-dimensional" operations, few of the tasks and problems facing peacekeepers in the 1990s are in fact qualitatively new.<sup>12</sup> For example, many of the specific difficulties in the areas of command and control and logistics support posed by the juxtaposition of civilian and military operations occurred also, albeit on a smaller scale, in the Congo operation between 1960 and 1964.<sup>13</sup>

Second, as a general trend the operational environment in which UN forces operate has become increasingly volatile, complex and "more prone to violent escalation".<sup>14</sup> This development stems from the growing involvement of UN peacekeepers in intra-state conflicts. One aspect of this has been that at the tactical level peacekeepers have often been forced to operate with only partial or sporadic consent from warring parties. It has also meant that peacekeeping forces face greater risks and are now much more likely to sustain casualties.<sup>15</sup>

While both these developments have exposed major deficiencies in existing structures for mounting and sustaining UN operations, they do not in themselves indicate that the defining characteristics of peacekeeping - consent, impartiality and its essentially non-threatening character - have no relevance for operations after the Cold

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<sup>10</sup> In 1987 some 10,000 military personnel were involved in 5 UN operations. By early 1994, the UN is running 17 operations and deploying about 72,000 military and police personnel.

<sup>11</sup> There were some exceptions to this "rule" non-participation by the P5 in UN operations during the Cold War. Britain, France and the USSR all provided some personnel for UNTSO, while Britain also contributed to UNFICYP.

<sup>12</sup> For an excellent analysis of the elements of continuity in "non-quantitative terms" of peacekeeping before and after 1987, see Alan James, "The History of Peacekeeping: An Analytical Perspective".

<sup>13</sup> D.W. Bowett, *United Nations Force: A legal Study of United Nations Practice* (London: Steven & Sons, 1964), pp.387-415.

<sup>14</sup> *Wider Peacekeeping* (Army Field Manual, 3rd Draft).

<sup>15</sup> As of 9 March 1994, the total number of fatalities from on-going missions was 677, of which 201 occurred in 1993.

War. The object of deploying a peacekeeping force remains that of assisting and reinforcing a political process towards the resolution of a conflict; it is not in itself designed to impose a solution. For this reason, local support, sustained and encouraged by the impartial character of UN activities, is essential if a peacekeeping force is to carry out its tasks. Although consent in civil wars is unlikely ever to be absolute, it is the conscious promotion of it - through adherence to principles of minimum force, constant liaison and negotiation - which separates peacekeeping from enforcement. Consent at the *strategic* and *operational* level remains a requirement for effective peacekeeping, while operations at the tactical level should be geared towards sustaining, promoting and expanding the margin of consent that exists. In short, the philosophical framework of traditional peacekeeping, retains its viability and provides the basis for thinking and planning future operations.

This conclusion has, misleadingly, been taken by some as evidence of a lack of moral resolve or a shortage of intellectual imagination in the face of seemingly intractable civil wars. The fundamental point here, however, is that the military and political requirements of enforcement are wholly different in character from peacekeeping and that any attempt to combine peacekeeping (the objectives of which rely ultimately on building a maximum of local support) and enforcement in one operation is certain to destabilise the operational environment in which forces are deployed. Moreover, the need to maintain the distinction between peacekeeping and enforcement is also based on a recognition of both the inability of the UN to engage in enforcement and the paucity of political will among member states to take action except where a compelling "national interest" can be seen to be at stake.

Applying these considerations to the UN operation in Bosnia in 1994, it becomes clear that to caution against precipitate military action does not stem from a view that "peacekeeping" has always been the *only* option available to the international community in the former Yugoslavia.<sup>16</sup> The central problem throughout the Yugoslav conflict, however, has been the lack of political will among the Permanent Five for action beyond that of relieving the humanitarian consequences of the war. It is in light of this *political reality* that maintaining impartiality remains a critical determinant of operational activity.<sup>17</sup> The difficulty with the "lift and strike" policy (air strikes and the selective lifting of the arms embargo) promoted by the US under President Clinton, was that it would destabilise the operational environment to such a degree that only withdrawal *or* an escalating level of involvement in favour of one party could be pursued. Given the US administration's persistent refusal to send ground troops into the area *before* a comprehensive settlement was agreed in Yugoslavia, withdrawal would have been the

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<sup>16</sup> Indeed, a strong case can be made for the idea of a UN 'trusteeship' for Bosnia, especially in the earlier stages of the evolving conflict. See Jane M O Sharp, *Bankrupt in the Balkans: British Policy in Bosnia* (London: Institute for Public Policy Research, 1993), pp.17-19.

<sup>17</sup> Reflecting on the "lessons of Yugoslavia", Cedric Thornberry, former Head of Civil Affairs in Zagreb, has noted that "without impartiality, the primary virtue, a UN peacekeeping operation will self-destruct". Cedric Thornberry, "The Lessons of Yugoslavia", Paper Presented to Centre for Defence Studies seminar, King's College, London, 7 December 1993.

only option.<sup>18</sup> The history of UNOSOM II since May 1993 highlights these lessons even more starkly.

### *UNOSOM II and "the dynamics of war"*

The continuing precariousness of the humanitarian situation in Somalia in early 1993, the abundance of weapons, and the general state of anarchy characterising many aspects of Somalian society, were all deemed to require a more forceful mandate for the UN forces preparing to take over from UNITAF in May 1993. Consequently, the Second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) was "endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the Charter" and became the "first operation of its kind to be authorised by the international community".<sup>19</sup>

The overall task of the UN in Somalia was to assist "the Somali people in rebuilding their shattered economy and social and political life, re-establishing the country's constitutional structure; achieving national reconciliation, [and] recreating a Somali State based on democratic governance".<sup>20</sup> Clearly, these objectives could only be achieved with the support of the Somalis themselves, and it was essential, therefore, to ensure that military operations were subordinate to and closely coordinated with the broader political process. This in turn meant that the third party, neutral and impartial status of UNOSOM II had to be preserved.

In early 1993, following the death of more than 20 Pakistani soldiers at the hands of "forces *apparently* belonging to the United Somali Congress (USC/SNA)"<sup>21</sup>, UNOSOM II became largely a US-directed operation. The enforcement provisions of the mandate and Security Council Resolution 837 were interpreted by the US military leadership in Mogadishu as requiring a significant escalation in the use of force, including the targeting of the top hierarchy of the SNA loyal to Aydeed.

This course of action was fully endorsed by the Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who claimed specialist knowledge of the situation in Somalia. The new phase of operations began on 12 June 1993 with a series of night and daytime attacks by US attack helicopters of the US Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and AC 130 SPECTRE gunships in an effort to destroy SNA weapons sites and Radio Mogadishu. Throughout the entire operation in Somalia, the QRF remained under the direct tactical command of the Deputy Force Commander, US Lt. General Thomas Montgomery.

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<sup>18</sup> "America welcomes Russian troops for Bosnian mission", *Times* (London), 18 February 1994.

<sup>19</sup> S/25354, 3 March 1993, paras. 58 and 101.

<sup>20</sup> Report by the Secretary General, S/25354, 3 March 1993, para. 91.

<sup>21</sup> Security Council Resolution 837 (1993) (my emphasis). USC/SNC were loyal to clan leader Mohamed Farah Aydeed.

More damaging in terms of undermining the overall objectives of the operation, however, was the attack on 12 July on the house belonging to Abdi Abdiid, described as "a major SNA/Aydeed militia command and control centre, serving as a militia meeting site, staging area and rally point". Described immediately afterwards by Admiral Jonathan Howe (SRSG) as a "clean, surgical attack", the operation was estimated by the ICRC to have killed more than 50 Somalis and injured a further 170, including key religious and clan elders. The high casualty figure in this attack stemmed from the fact that, unlike previous QRF actions in the month of June, no warning had been given before the attack. The aim had been quite simply to "eliminate the SNA command centre and its occupants"; consequently the policy of prior notification designed to minimise collateral damage had to be abandoned in favour of preserving the element of surprise.<sup>22</sup>

By the time of the Abdi House attack, the SNA had already gone on the offensive and in UN communications references were now made to "enemy" rather than "hostile" forces, as had hitherto been the case. The US-UN forces had been drawn irretrievably into the clan warfare of Somalia, being seen as anti-Hawiye and pro-Majerteen by the SNA.

A confidential report completed in late February 1994 by a Commission of Enquiry, established to investigate the circumstances surrounding the death of UNOSOM II personnel in Somalia, concluded that after the 5 June incident the UN had gradually become involved in what amounted to a "war" against Aydeed's SNA. The commission noted that Resolution 837 (authorising the hunt for Aydeed) was interpreted as providing the basis for an offensive against all of the SNA's power bases. Although, as noted above, attempts were initially made to avoid collateral damage, the commission members still did not feel that Resolution 837 had really envisaged the bombing of houses, radio stations and meetings. As the report perceptively added, however: "presumably the war, when it started, followed its own dynamics".

The dynamics of war reached its tragic climax on 3 October, when 18 American soldiers were killed and 78 wounded in a firefight which also killed anywhere between 300 and 800 Somali civilians.<sup>23</sup> After this, the relationship between US forces and Somalis in Mogadishu deteriorated further, to the point where the US forces had become completely estranged from the local population. Indeed, the final withdrawal of US troops in late March 1994 was aptly described by the *Washington Post* as a "guns-cocked withdrawal".<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> The attack so enraged a crowd of local residents that four international journalists covering the scene were turned upon and killed.

<sup>23</sup> This is a Red Cross estimate and is extremely difficult to verify. It is worth noting that an apparent reason for withholding the aforementioned report by the commission of enquiry is that it recommended that *ex gratia* payments should be considered by the UN for innocent Somali civilians killed or injured as a result of implementing Resolution 837. See, "Intern FN-rapport kritiserer alle og foreslar erstaning til somalierne", *Information*, 8 April 1994.

<sup>24</sup> "US to Leave Somalia With Its Guard Up", *The Washington Post*, 8 December 1993.



It is worth noting that non-US forces operating outside Mogadishu were markedly more successful in encouraging the process of reconciliation and were even able to disarm local factions. In Kismayo, initially one of the most fiercely contested battlegrounds, one Belgian battalion and two companies of Botswana soldiers conducted patrols on foot, consulted with community leaders, hoisted the UN flag and created a local police force. As a result, they were able to stabilise a large sector.<sup>25</sup> Similarly, in Baidoa - known as the "city of death" during the crisis of 1992 - French troops were successful in reestablishing order, disarming factions and alleviating large-scale human suffering.

For future peacekeeping operations the principal lesson that emerges from the Somalian debacle has been succinctly summarised by Charles Dobbie who, well before the US decision to pull out had been made, observed that UNOSOM II demonstrates:

...what seems likely to happen in theatre if a peacekeeping force crosses the impartiality divide from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. If perceived to be taking sides, the force loses its legitimacy and credibility as a trustworthy third party, thereby prejudicing its security. The force's resources will then become ever more devoted to its need to protect itself. It actually joins the conflict it was there to police and is likely to become embroiled in activities that are irrelevant to the overall campaign aim. Such a situation will almost certainly result in the loss of popular support, a loss of control and uncontrolled escalation upwards in the ambient level of violence which will heighten political tension and foreclose opportunities for resolving the conflict. To cross the impartiality divide is also to cross a rubicon. Once on the other side, there is very little chance of getting back and the only way out is likely to be by leaving the theatre.<sup>26</sup>

## **II. THE DIRECTION AND MANAGEMENT OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS**

### ***The U.N. Headquarters In New York***

Reforms introduced by Boutros Boutros-Ghali since February 1992 have not addressed the root cause of the peacekeeping management problems: the growing

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<sup>25</sup> The Belgians, it should be added, were not adverse to using force when this was deemed necessary. Thus when Kismayo was attacked by a SPM-SNA faction of Colonel Jess on 7 May, Belgian soldiers repulsed the attempt and killed or wounded an estimated 40 Somalis. The use of force was, however, discriminate and measured.

<sup>26</sup> Charles Dobbie, "Wider Peacekeeping - A Peace Support Operations Doctrine" (Presentation Script), ND.

decentralisation of peacekeeping functions in the Secretariat and the consequent diffusion of authority in the management of operations. Indeed, recent developments within the Secretariat appear, rather ominously, to have reinforced a process of fragmentation of decision-making power.<sup>27</sup> Although progress has been made in certain areas, the management of UN field operations - much like the in Cold War period - continues to rely to an unusual degree on improvisation, *ad hoc* arrangements and "close working relationships" among members of the Secretariat and between officers and civilian personnel in the field.

There are two aspects to the issue of enhancing the machinery for peacekeeping in New York: (1) *vertical integration* - streamlining procedures and decision making within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; and (2) *horizontal integration* - improving overall coordination among the key departments, offices and divisions involved in various aspects of UN field operations, i.e. the DPKO, the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), and the Department of Administration and Management (DAM).

#### ***The Department of Peacekeeping Operations: successful vertical integration***

Since March 1993, a number of initiatives aimed at upgrading the DPKO in New York have produced significant results by UN standards. The initiatives include: an expansion of staffing levels<sup>28</sup>; the creation of an embryonic Planning and Coordination Cell headed by a newly appointed Deputy Military Advisor; and the establishment of the Situation Centre. The Situation Centre was set up in April 1993 with a view to monitoring UNITAF/UNOSOM II operations in Somalia and has since been upgraded and now operates in accordance with proper and regularised staff procedures. Steps have also been taken to enhance the flow of information into the UN HQ from member states through the installation of an intelligence processing system in the DPKO (JDISS). The value of the Situation Centre is now widely recognised and accepted (by member states, officials in the field and at UN HQ) though its capacities for collection and dissemination of information are still underdeveloped.

Most encouragingly, however, the important step of incorporating the Field Operations Division (formerly located within the DAM) into the DPKO has finally been taken. Sensibly, it has been relocated within the newly created Office of Planning and Support (DPKO), to be headed by an Assistant Secretary General for Planning and Support. His role will be critical in effecting the necessary integration within DPKO. The

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<sup>27</sup> I am thinking here of the increasingly important role of the Secretary-General's immediate circle of advisors, reflected in the expansion of the Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG), with both geographical and functional responsibilities accorded to USGs in the EOSG. See below.

<sup>28</sup> This includes both contract and seconded personnel with specialist officers given responsible for training and coordination, demining issues and civilian police matters.

incorporation of the FOD should help to remedy the old problem of dual lines of reporting between the administrative and logistic aspects of an operation and the military.

These are all steps in the right direction and the DPKO should be encouraged to further improve its ability to engage in *mission support, force generation and planning*. The Department (and indeed UN HQ more generally) should not, however, aspire to become an "operational headquarters" in the strict military sense. The exercise of command functions - i.e. "the authority to assign force elements to tasks and direct their actions on a day-to-day basis" - should not come from New York but instead be delegated to the Special Representative/Force Commander in the field. The reasons for this are both practical and political. From the practical point of view, the ability of New York to direct nearly 20 separate operations is bound to be fragmentary and selective. More crucially, no government and especially not the Permanent Five wish to see the UN HQ given responsibilities for "Mission command" as opposed to "Mission support".<sup>29</sup>

### ***The Failure of Horizontal Integration***

While measures of vertical integration have undoubtedly enhanced the ability of the DPKO to coordinate activities in the field, the problem of horizontal integration persists. The nature of the problem is well illustrated in the long-awaited report of the Secretary General on "Improving the Capacity of the United Nations for Peace-Keeping", requested by the Security Council in May 1993 and released by the Secretariat in March 1994.

In an attempt to clarify reporting channels and delineate the respective roles of key departments (DPA, DPKO, DHA, DAM), the report embodies a formula which reflects bureaucratic interests as much as any desire to rationalise decision-making procedures. Under this "new order", the DPA is described as the "political arm" of the Secretary-General, the DPKO his "operational arm ... for the day-to-day management of peacekeeping operations", while the DHA is responsible for "coordination and humanitarian operations". Peacekeeping operations, however, by their very nature, encompass overlapping political, military and humanitarian components, and it is simply not possible to separate the "political" and "operational" aspects of a mission from each other. Within a bureaucratic structure such as the UN, this contrived allocation of functional responsibilities makes effective decision-making particularly contingent on close working relationships between Departmental heads and officers further down the hierarchy. At present relations at the USG level appear smooth, though current arrangements ensure that the potential for future conflict is built into the system. More worryingly, it also means that unity of reporting and, therefore, unity of strategic instructions from UN HQ to the field remains deficient.

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<sup>29</sup> Terms are used by David Ramsbotham, "UN Operations: The Art of the Possible", *RUSI Journal* (December 1993).

As indicated above, there is a further development that since 1992 has complicated the management of operations in New York. This is the increasingly important role of the Secretary-General's immediate circle of advisors, reflected in the expansion of the Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG), with both geographical and functional responsibilities accorded to his immediate advisors (the geographical distribution of responsibilities took effect from mid-January 1994). This has resulted in a top-heavy structure in New York and has, in effect, created another layer between the Secretary-General and the substantive departments of the Secretariat. At the very least, this development increases the potential for policy differences in New York to slow down decision-making. This may in turn create critical delays in making decisions of urgent concern to Special Representative of the Secretary General or the Force Commander in the field.

### ***Problems In The Field***

As noted above, the scale and hybrid nature of many contemporary peacekeeping operations have placed severe strains on traditional UN practices for initiating and supporting field operations. Recent and on-going operations have shown that many of the self-imposed restraints which have come to characterise UN peacekeeping - ad hoc mounting procedures, the lack of pre-deployment planning, a complex procurement system, and restrictions on the collection and use of intelligence material - are undermining the ability of multinational forces to carry out their missions. Whilst differing markedly in the complexity and the nature of their mandates, contemporary operations all point to certain basic weaknesses that have been accentuated by the necessity of operating in the context of actual or latent civil war with only sporadic consent from the parties on the ground. Four areas of weakness merit particular attention<sup>30</sup> :

(i) *Logistics planning and support.* The limited logistic capabilities available to the UN and the absence of an effective planning agency to coordinate and direct logistics support continue to bedevil operations.<sup>31</sup> The creation of a Planning Division within the DPKO and the incorporation of the FOD, should begin to address the problem of planning.

(ii) *Command, control, coordination and intelligence (C3I).* The failure to establish an efficient command and control system in the field and to provide Force and unit Commanders with intelligence of a political and military nature, have plagued all missions. The command and control issue, however, is not merely a "UN problem".

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<sup>30</sup> I have addressed these and other problems in much greater detail in *Whither UN Peacekeeping ? Adelphi Paper 281* (London: Brassey's/IISS, 1993). I have singled out these four areas in this paper as they appear particularly important in terms of improving future operations.

<sup>31</sup> For a discussion of UN logistics problems, see *ibid.* pp. 32-39.

On the one hand, reliable communications are notoriously difficult to establish in any multinational coalition because of differences in staff procedures and training, language barriers and equipment incompatibilities among participating forces. These problems have been magnified in the UN context by the increasingly broad geographical spread of contingents involved in peacekeeping. On the other hand, the tendency for national governments to intervene directly in the chain of command of a peacekeeping mission has become a growing obstacle to command, control and coordination by the UN. This tendency has increased in proportion to the perception of danger to soldiers involved in operations, and has been facilitated by the ease with which contingent commanders can now communicate confidentially with national authorities. As a result, the formal command status of contingents (under the Operational Control of the FC) has often been more apparent than real and the "United Nations-ness" of operations has been called into question. This problem has been particularly acute in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia.

(iii) *Training and lack of specialised units.* Peacekeeping operations also continue to suffer from inadequate training of many participating contingents and, especially, from the acute shortage of specialised units and personnel in three areas: logistics, communications and engineering.

(iv) *Tactical mobility and procurement.* Lack of tactical mobility (especially air assets) to support operations and outdated procurement regulations continue to create major complications on the ground as recent events in Mozambique illustrate. In late February 1994, the grounding of 8 MI-8 heavy transport helicopters after contracts expired threatened to derail the entire demobilisation schedule in the country. Although the UN headquarters knew about the problem for some time, procurement regulations prevented a rapid resolution of the problem. When the UN did eventually hire some more helicopters, these turned out to be unsuitable (i.e. there were too few crews per helicopter; they did not have night-flying capability; and their range and loading capacity was too limited for operations in Mozambique).

In addition to these four areas, the UN's financial predicament remains very serious indeed. The most immediate problem in terms of the organisation and support of peacekeeping operations stems from the structural delays that have been built into the budgetary allocation procedure.<sup>32</sup> The apparent difficulties of addressing this issue owe much to the reluctance of the General Assembly to relinquish its prerogatives in the financial sphere.

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<sup>32</sup> See Shijuro Ogata and Paul Volcker (et al), *Financing an Effective United Nations: A Report of the Independent Advisory Group on UN Financing* (New York: Ford Foundation, 1993), p.16.

The picture which emerges from this overview of UN peacekeeping practices points to the need for centralisation (or, at least, increased coordination) of management functions within the Secretariat on the one hand, and greater delegation of operational, financial and administrative responsibility to the field on the other. Delegation to the field does not imply that the UN HQ's overall political and strategic control of operations will be lost; such control must remain firmly with the Secretary-General under the authority of the Security Council. The delegation of administrative and financial authority will certainly, however, increase the operational efficiency of peacekeeping forces.

### **III. THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING**

The recent expansion of peacekeeping operations in the context of internal conflicts cannot be divorced from the broader issues that these conflicts have raised and which are central to the debate about a "new world order". Even if the institutional weaknesses outlined above are effectively remedied, there are other factors which suggest that peacekeeping is unlikely to remain the kind of "growth industry" in which so much hope was invested only two years ago. Two factors in particular are worth highlighting.

In the first place, the sheer complexity of the issues raised by contemporary intrastate conflict is reflected in the absence of an international consensus as to how such conflicts should be approached. An increasingly salient aspect of this is the problem of "selectivity" (or indifference) on the part of the Security Council with regard to which conflicts deserve priority and attention. This has been powerfully illustrated by the limited interest shown in Angola after the resumption of civil war and, more recently, in the response (or lack of) to the genocide in Rwanda.

Second, and closely related, "there are unmistakeable signs of fatigue among the international community as it continues to be called upon to extend ... assistance through the United Nations".<sup>33</sup> This diminishing political will of member states has been particularly pronounced in the US.

#### ***Outside intervention in internal conflicts***

Violence in the international system, especially after the collapse of multiethnic federal state structures, occurs primarily at the sub-state level. The UN Charter, however, is a document essentially about inter-state conflicts, and as such does not include provisions "by which the Security Council or General Assembly may relate to non-state agencies such as liberation movements, communal minorities, or political

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<sup>33</sup> S/1994/12, 6 January 1994, para.46.

parties".<sup>34</sup> The UN -or rather the member states that compose it - have yet to examine how it may effectively intervene in civil wars. The much-vaunted *Agenda for Peace* did not address this issue as it placed its analysis explicitly "within the framework and provisions of the Charter".<sup>35</sup> An important reason for this was undoubtedly an awareness of the sensitivities involved. Indeed, the mixture civil and international conflict in the former Yugoslavia and changes in the law on humanitarian intervention since 1989 have raised issues on which there are few signs of a common approach.<sup>36</sup> The Yugoslav conflict and the break-up of the Soviet empire, for example, have highlighted the potentially violent consequences of basing the principle of self-determination rigidly on the principle of the inviolability of frontiers with regard to internal borders (i.e. within federal states) when these boundaries are highly artificial and largely administrative in character.

With regard to the question of intervention, Hedley Bull, writing on the subject, observed that the "way forward ... lies not in seeking to replace the rule of non-intervention with some other rule, but rather in considering how it should be modified and adapted to meet the particular circumstances and needs of the present time". He noted further that the "rule of non-intervention should not be allowed to obstruct" developments in the "field of human rights, and the wider changes in moral attitudes to international relations ...". Bull then posed the question of how the rule of non-intervention could "best be formulated so as to meet the requirements of world order in the closing decades of the twentieth century ?".<sup>37</sup> The relevance of this question and the divergent responses it elicits among member states of the UN, are even more obvious in the mid-1990s than they were when Bull explored the subject in the mid-1980s. Ever since the revival of international peacekeeping in the late 1980s, non-aligned and developing countries have expressed deep concern about the tension between the new-found activism of the UN with regard to internal conflicts and the cardinal principle of international society of states, namely, the sovereign equality of states and its corollary that there is a duty of non-intervention by states in the internal affairs of other states. On the Security Council, the People's Republic of China has been a champion of these concerns. Thus, whilst supporting the decision to send Task Force to Somalia in December 1992, the Chinese delegate to the Security Council made it clear that the military operation authorized by the Council was "an *exceptional* action under the *unique* situation in Somalia."<sup>38</sup>

<sup>34</sup> Sydney Bailey, "The United Nations and the Termination of Armed Conflict 1946-1964", *International Affairs* (Summer 1982), p.469.

<sup>35</sup> *An Agenda for Peace*, United Nations, June 1992.

<sup>36</sup> On changes in the law of humanitarian intervention, see Christopher Greenwood, "Is There a Right of Humanitarian Intervention ?", *The World Today*, vol.49, no.2. February 1993.

<sup>37</sup> Hedley Bull, "Conclusion", in Hedley Bull, ed. *Intervention in World Politics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp.187-189

<sup>38</sup> "Statement by Ambassador Li Daoyu, Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations, at Security Council in Explanation of Vote on Somalia Questions", Press Release, 3 December 1992, (my emphasis).

With respect to the future of peacekeeping, the Indian submission to the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping in April 1993 succinctly summarises concerns widely felt among developing countries. It is worth quoting *in extenso*:

... the new dimensions of peacekeeping have resulted in ... a new responsibility for the UN and its member states to ensure that these new departures in peacekeeping operations are in conformity with the principles and provisions of the UN Charter ... Most important amongst these principles and guidelines are respect for the sovereignty of the State, none-interference in matters under the domestic jurisdiction of a State and the requirement of consent of all concerned parties for such operations.<sup>39</sup>

Further echoing the concerns of developing countries, the Indian submission to the Peacekeeping Committee concluded that:

The focus, it would seem, has shifted from development to peacekeeping. We hope and trust that this is only a transient phenomenon and that in the not too distant future, the UN can dedicate its energy and resources to the realisation of wider objectives of the UN charter and its intrinsic balance.<sup>40</sup>

### ***Diminishing Political Will***

The second reason alluded to above why the growth of UN peacekeeping in recent years may have reached a ceiling has to do with the increasing reluctance of member states to support peacekeeping involvement in internal conflicts as distinct from passing resolutions about them. This lack of political will has been reflected in a growing unwillingness of member states to commit troops to situations which may involve casualties. This is not surprising: it remains difficult for any government (though particularly so it would appear for Western governments) to explain why its own nationals should risk their lives in conflicts where the warring factions themselves appear far from anxious to end the fighting and where no obvious "national interest" appears to be at stake.

The diminishing political commitment to UN peacekeeping has been most striking in the United States. For military, financial and psychological reasons this development is also certain to have the most far-reaching consequences for the future of international peacekeeping.<sup>41</sup> It is worth recalling, for example, that the US decision in

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<sup>39</sup> Statement by Permanent Representative of India, "Comprehensive Review of the whole question of peace-keeping in all their aspects", 20 April 1993.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> I have discussed the present state of US-UN relations in greater detail in, 'Fateful Encounter: the US and UN Peacekeeping', *Survival*



October 1993 to pull out all of its troops from Somalia by the end of March 1994 was quickly followed by similar announcements by Belgium, Canada, Australia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Turkey and Sweden.

Before assuming office, President Clinton had openly committed himself to reversing the UN policies of preceding Republican administrations. Indeed, in April 1992 he even called for a "rapid deployment force" at the UN to conduct operations such as "standing guard at the borders of countries threatened by aggression, preventing mass violence against civilian populations, providing humanitarian relief and combatting terrorism".<sup>42</sup> This initial idealism, however, was gradually reversed under the impact of events in Bosnia, Haiti and, above all, Somalia. As a result, the contents of a Presidential Policy Review, ordered in February 1993 with a view to strengthen US-UN ties, has undergone a drastic change in the course of 1993 and the first half of 1994. At present, US conditions for participation in UN operations are arguably more restrictive than they were under President Bush.<sup>43</sup> The basic elements of US policy which have emerged from the process of enforced introspection have now finally codified in "Presidential Decision Directive 25" and can be summarised as follows:

- the objectives of an operation must be clearly defined, in "America's own national interest" and assured of "continuing public and Congressional support";
- the commitment of US troops cannot be "open-ended" and consequently an "exit strategy" must be in place before troops are deployed;
- operations involving US forces must have "satisfactory command and control arrangements".

Even a cursory survey of the conflicts in which the UN has become involved illustrates the inherent difficulties of applying these criteria. A narrow definition of national interest, rigid adherence to the principle of "no open-ended commitments" and continuing public support are certain to limit the scope for involvement in a world where communal and ethnically motivated hatreds are major sources of violence. It is ironic that the successful deployment of US troops in Macedonia would not have been possible if the criteria for participation in peacekeeping enshrined in current US policy had been applied. As for "satisfactory command and control arrangements", the Somalia experience, where all US combat troops remained under the direct control of US commanders, is hardly satisfactory from a UN point of view.

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Spring 1994.

<sup>42</sup> Quoted in Elaine Sciolino, "US Narrows Terms for its Peacekeepers", *New York Times*, 23 September 1993.

<sup>43</sup> "The Peacekeeping Front: Clinton Is Pulling Back", *International Herald Tribune*, 7 May 1994.

## CONCLUSION

There has been a strong tendency to attribute the failures of the UN peacekeeping since 1992 to the UN itself and, in particular, its perceived inability to articulate a coherent doctrine and equip itself for operations "beyond" classical peacekeeping. This, however, is to simplify a much more complex reality. While the UN's record of reform after the Cold War leaves much to be desired, recent setbacks ultimately reflect the nature of an international system which - whilst no longer paralysed by East-West rivalry - remains profoundly divided by conflicts of *interest* and *value*. Moreover, as Conor Cruise O'Brien perceptively notes and as events over the past two years confirm, "taking the blame for the mistakes of national leaders (especially the US) is one of the things the UN is *about*, and is a large part of its utility to national governments..."<sup>44</sup> Although the UN is, and will probably remain, more central to questions of international security than it was during the Cold War, states still think in terms of interests and no consensus has emerged (nor is it likely to emerge) among "major powers about the basis for international security".<sup>45</sup> For this reason alone, to assume that peacekeeping can ever "become the linchpin in developing an overall strategy for reducing the role of military power in international relations", is to misunderstand both the actual and potential role of peacekeeping and to disregard important elements of continuity in international politics after the Cold War.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Conor Cruise O'Brien, "Faithful Scapegoat to the World", *The Independent*, 1 October 1993.

<sup>45</sup> Adam Roberts, "The United Nations and International Security", *Survival*, vol.35, no.2 (Summer 1993), p.3

<sup>46</sup> Robert C. Johansen, "UN peacekeeping: the changing utility of military force", *Third World Quarterly*, April 1990, p.53.

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# **Session 1 - 2**

## **Beyond Peacekeeping**

*presented by Professor Takahiro Shinyo*

**JIIA-IFRI Joint Conference**

**June 2-3, 1994**

## New Departure for the U.N. Peace-keeping and the Role of Japan

Takahiro Shinyo

### The gap between ideals and reality

After the cold war the U.N. sprang into prominence as the major forum for resolving regional conflicts, and suddenly the organization found its prestige resting upon its hitherto ancillary PKO. These have had a mixed record. The success of the mission in Cambodia was like a beacon in the dark, but the debacle in Somalia has shaken the U.N.'s prestige, and the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina has escalated beyond the U.N.'s ability to cope. If things continue in this fashion, pessimism over the U.N.'s *raison d'etre* could eventually prevail.

This has long been called "the age of the U.N." Why is it that the gap between the ideal of a U.N.-orchestrated peace and the reality is so very wide? The organization's means of conflict resolution are limited, for all practical purposes, to multinational forces and PKO. Multinational forces, however, are drawn on a voluntary basis from a certain cluster of nations, including the United States, Britain, and France, and are extremely costly, so they represent an option that cannot be exercised too often. As an alternative, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali proposed the formation of "peace-enforcement units" in his 1992 work "An Agenda for Peace," but there has not yet been any substantive debate on the idea in the Security Council or the General Assembly, so its feasibility remains unknown.

Until this issue is resolved one way or the other, the U.N.'s ace in the hole, the only way it can provide a realistic short-term response to the world's unreasonably high expectations, is peace-keeping operations. Thus they have effectively become the *de facto* centerpiece of the organization's collective security system. To establish its authority and credibility as the organization charged with resolving post-cold-war regional conflicts, which spring from a tangle of factors, the U.N. has had to stretch the functions of PKO to the limit in its attempt to respond to widespread demand. In Somalia, for example, the operation has been obliged to take on functions very like those of peace enforcement. The impasse there, however, has revealed the difficulty of peace enforcement under U.N. command and the need to revert to the traditional PKO format.

During its two years as a nonpermanent member of the Security Council, a term that expired at the end of 1993, Japan did play a part in addressing the issues involved in the creation of peace under the U.N.'s aegis, including participation in PKO for the first time ever. Nevertheless, my firsthand experience of Japan's U.N. diplomacy at the time left me with three strong impressions: that the U.N. may have overstepped the bounds of its competence, that overemphasis on humanitarian concerns drives the Security Council

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to make decisions based on sentiment, and that perception of the propriety or impropriety of using force has become dulled. It seems to me that it is time for the international community to stop a moment and take a good steady look at these considerations, which tend to be swept from view by the tide of events.

#### Areas in need of reform

The need for "selective engagement": Fatigue from the cold war, as well as concern for national interests, has led the permanent members of the Security Council and other major powers to call increasingly on the U.N. to act as a peace keeper. At the same time, these countries have used the U.N. to conceal their own tendency toward preoccupation with domestic issues. Suddenly called upon to play a more active role, the U.N. has overextended itself and sometimes responded inappropriately. This could bring about a revival of pessimism about the organization's *raison d'être*.

To avoid rash action, and also to keep from damaging its authority and credibility, the U.N. needs to distinguish carefully between problems that warrant a concerted response and those that do not. This is far from easy for an international organization whose guiding principles are neutrality and universality. Nevertheless, the limits to the human, material, and financial resources that nations can provide to the U.N., and to the U.N.'s own responsiveness, make it important to distinguish between ideals and reality and adopt the approach of "selective engagement."

In particular, the U.N. should give the most rigorous thought to determining which issues the Security Council ought to address, since the council's decisions have a grave impact on the world's peace and security. The U.N. needs rational guidelines if it is to avoid being swayed by the emotionalism that tends to characterize media coverage of events. It should set up a working group in the General Assembly to establish guidelines for the engagement of the U.N. in regional conflicts. These should include a variety of options, such as a division of labor between the U.N. and regional organizations, efforts on the part of the countries directly involved in conflicts, and cooperation by neighboring countries.

Clarification of the process of engagement and disengagement is especially important with regard to PKO. The operation's political objectives and mandate, its time frame, and the extent of U.N. expenditures all need to be articulated in advance. In the event of a prolonged operation, the principle that the beneficiary pays and the introduction of a system for review of the operation are options worth considering. Kuwait, for example, is bearing two-thirds of the cost of the U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission, while Cyprus and Greece together are defraying half the cost of the U.N. Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus. It is also important to encourage the parties to conflict to engage in independent efforts to achieve a political settlement.

Politicism versus legalism: The use of military force, and its limits, is the problem most difficult for the U.N. to deal with, and the one bearing most directly upon the organizations's credibility. As is well known, the U.N. forbids member states all use of force; meanwhile, it reserves the right to take enforcement action (use of armed force)

against nations that violate the rules if all else fails. In short, it has a collective security mechanism with teeth. According to the collective security arrangements set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, when enforcement action is unavoidable it is to be carried out under the command of the U.N. itself; but in an international community comprising a great many sovereign states and dominated by "relative justice," the U.N. has not yet been able to establish its authority, so that if it takes premature or ill-prepared coercive action its own credibility is damaged, as we have seen in Somalia.

There are two patterns of U.N. enforcement action. One is "U.N.-controlled action," where the forces are under the direct command of the world body; this is the pattern envisaged for future U.N. forces and peace-enforcement units under Chapter 7 of the Charter. The other is "U.N.-authorized action," whereby the Security Council empowers certain member states to exercise the use of force, as in the case of multinational forces. It is the former pattern that tends to present problems with regard to the U.N.'s credibility. Some critics challenge the legality of multinational forces, as well, since they are not expressly stipulated anywhere in the Charter. Nevertheless, the Charter confers on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and places no restrictions on the type of action it may take when it determines "the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression" (Chapter 7, Article 39), as long as this action accords with the Charter's objectives and principles of action.

Generally speaking, the approach known as legalism narrowly defines an organization's actions; anything not expressly permitted is forbidden. Politicism, by contrast, represents a more flexible approach, emphasizing the judgment of an organization's decision-making apparatus. The U.N. is considered to be an organization based on politicism because although it stipulates security-related procedures, it gives the Security Council broad discretionary powers in determining specific actions. Therefore actions authorized by Security Council resolutions, even if not expressly stipulated in the Charter, are not perforce illegal. Even with this as the basic premise, U.N.-controlled actions, precisely because they are carried out directly in the organization's name, will naturally be scrutinized even more closely for consistency with their political objectives, compatibility with international law, and legitimacy and credibility. Therefore, leaving aside U.N. forces, which are provided for in the Charter, any future enforcement actions to be conducted by peace-enforcement units under U.N. command, even if motivated by humanitarian concerns, must be evaluated even more carefully and rigorously in the light of the following three guidelines before a decision is made.

First, the Security Council must carefully evaluate the proposed action for consistency with its political objectives. This entails rigorously determining whether the situation the proposed action is to address truly constitutes a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression."

Second, the council must carefully determine whether the U.N. has sufficient political power to command peace enforcement and whether it can expect active and sustained support from the member states. When Lieutenant General Francis Briquemont resigned as commander of the U.N. Protection Force in Bosnia and

Herzegovina on January 4 this year, he was harshly critical, saying that there was a clear gap between reams of Security Council resolutions, the will to execute them and the resources to be made available for the UNPROFOR commander. This demonstrates clearly the distance separating ideals and reality in the U.N.

Third, the council must demonstrate the existence of clear legal grounds for enforcement action under U.N. command.

Emphasis on legalism: The third guideline, the issue of legalism, is so important that I wish to elaborate on it in a more detailed manner. We can easily surmise that somewhere, sometime, there will occur another "breach of the peace, or act of aggression" that the U.N. will be required to address and that the organization will not be able to deal with by means of traditional PKO. If the U.N., with all its flaws, is to conduct successfully an unavoidable enforcement action on the basis of Chapter 7 of the Charter, "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression," it is of crucial importance that there exist a framework clearly and legally assuring that the Security Council possesses the political legitimacy to determine the action to be taken (that is, that it has the authority to make political decisions in the name of the U.N. member states) and that its decision is based on the consensus of the member states.

The Charter invests the Security Council with leadership, in accordance with the concept of politicism. Even if the council would function as it should if equipped with both nominal and actual authority and capability, it lacks sufficient grounds to insist on the correctness of its decisions and actions at present, when its efficacy and legitimacy are being severely questioned. Therefore, two things are necessary in regard to future enforcement actions conducted with the use of peace enforcement units under U.N. command. One is political efforts to rebuild the Security Council's authority. The other, based on a legalistic viewpoint, is the concrete provision of grounds for the council's authority to enable such enforcement action on the basis of the Charter, grounds recognized as representing the consensus of the U.N. member states following full debate in the General Assembly.

Boutros-Ghali invokes Article 40 of the Charter, which deals with provisional measures, as grounds for creating peace-enforcement units. The pros and cons of this position should be fully debated, and, depending on the outcome, efforts should be made to supplement the Charter's collective security provisions so as to create a deterrent that gives nations that breach the peace no excuse for their actions. This can be done either by adding a new provision to the Charter between Article 41, which stipulates economic sanctions, and Article 42, which specifies military action by U.N. forces, or by drawing up a separate international agreement on conflict settlement as was the case with the 1924 Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes endorsed by the League of Nations.

The exceptional peace-enforcement-type PKO measures undertaken on the basis of Chapter 7 of the Charter should also be integrated into the activities of future peace-enforcement units. PKO proper should be limited to traditional operations falling into an



area called "Chapter 6 1/2" somewhere between that covered by Chapter 6, "Pacific Settlement of Disputes," and that covered by Chapter 7. In addition, clear legal grounds should be provided for obliging all member states to pay at least their assessed contribution to the costs of the U.N.-controlled actions specified in Chapter 7, which have greater coercive power than PKO and are also vastly more expensive.

Some observers argue that a provision specifying the grounds for traditional PKO should also be added to the Charter. But there seems no urgent need for such a step, since these operations have become an established practice in the course of almost half a century and, to avoid interference in nations' internal affairs, are conducted with the consent and cooperation of the country where PKO is to be conducted. Moreover, revision of the Charter should be kept to a minimum to ensure stable continuity of the legal order.

The need for a paradigm shift: In view of the limits to the U.N.'s human and economic resources and its political power, and the limits to the cooperation of member states underwriting these resources, the organization's ability to make and maintain peace is also limited. (According to Boutros-Ghali, peace-making includes both the peaceful settlement of conflicts and enforcement of measures to end conflicts.)

As peace-keeping operations have grown larger in scale, they have become more expensive. UNTAC required the expenditure of about \$1.6 billion over an 18-month period, and total PKO costs for 1993 came to \$3.6 billion, about three times the U.N.'s regular budget of roughly \$1.2 billion. The multinational force in the gulf is reported to have entailed the massive outlay of more than \$70 billion in six weeks. The cost to the international community of restoring peace, once it has been breached, is staggering. Meanwhile, Canada and the Scandinavian nations, which have traditionally provided PKO personnel, have already stretched themselves to the limit. Moreover, the United States, Britain, France, and other permanent members of the Security Council are leaning more heavily toward the idea of selective engagement.

For these reasons, limiting engagement to conflicts that truly possess global significance and concentrating efforts on conflict prevention and early warning systems are much more effective, both in terms of cost performance and in terms of ensuring the U.N.'s credibility and effectiveness. The U.N. should give priority to allocating human and financial resources to conflict prevention and at the same time strive to develop methods of prevention and improve the organization of the Secretariat.

Australia has already offered a concrete plan for such measures, including the establishment of an early warning system in the Secretariat, the creation of regional conflict-prevention teams, early resolution of conflicts through utilization of former foreign ministers, and the establishment of conflict-prevention centers around the world. At the 1992 General Assembly, Japan suggested setting up a "conflict information clearinghouse" in the Secretariat. Japan should step up diplomatic efforts in this area, in cooperation with Australia and other like-minded nations, and should also make conflict prevention the centerpiece of its U.N. diplomacy, a paradigm shift that is also likely to attract public support.

Boutros-Ghali's "An Agenda for Peace" also suggests preventive deployment of an appropriate United Nations presence in areas of crisis. This has already been implemented in Macedonia, which has been helping prevent the conflict in what used to be Yugoslavia from spreading to the entire Balkan Peninsula. Active utilization of preventive deployment could also be effective in other regions, given the right conditions.

Permanent membership and military contribution:

The open-ended working group established in accordance with a General Assembly resolution last year to study the restructuring of the Security Council is expected to complete its deliberations and come up with concrete report on the progress of its work by autumn this year. A certain amount of disagreement may be expected in regard to such issues as the number of permanent members to be added to the council, the specific candidate countries, and the question of veto power, but it is safe to say that the die has been cast for Japan's inclusion as a permanent member. Within Japan, following up on "Views of the Government of Japan on Reform of the Security Council," a position paper submitted to the U.N. Secretariat last July, and Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro's speech at the General Assembly last September, the government must lose no time in studying concrete measures for putting in place the domestic apparatus required for permanent membership and for dealing with Security Council and U.N. reform. The pros and cons should also be debated in the Diet and among the public in order to establish a national consensus.

The greatest concern of those among the Japanese who oppose or have reservations about permanent membership is that it will entail a commitment to a military contribution. But commitment to a military contribution, including PKO, is not a condition of permanent membership, either in the Charter or politically. The criteria are the will and ability to play a long-term, global role in the cause of international peace and security to the extent that national conditions permit and the establishment of the necessary domestic apparatus. When Boutros-Ghali visited Japan for the second time as U.N. Secretary-General in December 1993, he repeatedly expressed the opinion to both the prime minister and the media that a military contribution is not a condition of permanent membership, a clear indication that this is the perception of the U.N. itself. According to him, there is no obligation even to participate in PKO; Japan itself, he said, should determine its contribution to world peace and stability within the framework of its Constitution.

On January 28 this year the U.S. Senate unanimously passed an amendment sponsored by Senator William Roth declaring that neither Japan nor Germany should be admitted as a permanent member until each is capable of discharging the full range of responsibilities accepted by all current permanent members of the Security Council. This amendment, which was tacked on to an appropriations bill, states the "sense of the Senate" but has no binding power. It reflects doubt about the propriety of Japanese and German involvement in decisions on PKO that may endanger the lives of U.S. and other countries' soldiers even though those two countries' own forces could play no part in the

operations. But the notion expressed in the preamble of the amendment that any country accorded permanent membership must be capable of participating in any U.N. military operations is mistaken. This must be made clear. The administration attached no such condition when it announced its support of Japan's becoming a permanent member, nor has it changed its position since then.

Though the United States and other countries have expressed the hope that Japan will participate in PKO, there have been no demands for any greater military contribution than that. Our participation in PKO on the basis of the five principles alluded to earlier quite adequately fulfills our responsibilities, whether as a permanent member of the Security Council or as an ordinary member of the U.N.

Given all this, in the course of debate on the restructuring of the Security Council, Japan should present its blueprint for the restructuring process and explain in concrete terms the meaning of its assurance, expressed in the 1993 government position paper and elsewhere, that it is prepared to "do all it can to discharge its responsibilities on the Security Council." At the time the paper was submitted to the U.N., Foreign Minister Muto Kabun told a press conference that the government of Japan would explain to the U.N. that it would "fulfill its responsibilities within the framework of the Constitution." Leaving this point vague does more harm than good, however; Japan should not hesitate to explain its position and determination clearly and initiate debate.

As long as we take a passive approach of waiting to be called on to act, we cannot choose our own timing for advancing our point of view or lead international opinion in the direction we would like.

Ending the present freeze on the core activities of PKF is frequently discussed within Japan as if it were a condition for permanent membership in the Security Council, but there is no connection between the two; it is important to take the time and care to build a national consensus on the lifting of this freeze as a separate issue.

#### What to do about PKO

Needless to say, the scope for international cooperation by Japan is not confined to PKO, which, as Boutros-Ghali observed when in Japan, represent only 20% to 30% of the U.N.'s activities. But in the more than 35 years that have passed since Japan joined the U.N., our contribution in this area has been almost nil. In view of the meagerness of our efforts so far to maintain the framework of the international order based on freedom and democracy from which we ourselves have benefited so greatly, we should not begrudge devoting 20% or 30% of our international cooperation to this area from now on. In doing so, however, we need to be careful not to become overeager, feeling that contributing to PKO means that we are doing something special. From the viewpoint of the rest of the world, we will just be fulfilling a natural obligation as a U.N. member.

In this connection, the December 28, 1993, issue of the newspaper Sankei Shimbun reported that a survey by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a

U.S. think tank, revealed that participation in UNTAC had greatly alleviated other Asian countries' wariness of Japan.

With PKO now at a turning point, it seems to me the time has come for Japan to speak out, both at the U.N. and in bilateral talks with other major powers, on the fundamental problems regarding the U.N. that I have touched on here: the limits to engagement, military action, humanitarian intervention, and so on. This, I believe, is one way in which we can contribute in a concrete manner to strengthening the U.N.'s credibility and can encourage constructive debate as a post-economic power.

Meanwhile, in anticipation of next year's review of the International Peace Cooperation Law, it is time to think calmly about our future involvement in peace-keeping operations, taking into consideration the UNTAC experience and other countries' reaction to our participation. This issue deserves the same animated discussion as the consumption tax or Japan-U.S. trade. On the basis of the national consensus that emerges through such debate, the administration and Diet have a duty to address responsibly the critical situations that are bound to arise in future. In this connection I would like to set forth three points for consideration.

First, in the light of the Somalia experience, the trend toward reversion to traditional PKO is likely to strengthen. In that case, Japan should be responsive to traditional PKO that meet the criteria of our five principles, and should also be fully aware that no "moratorium" on participation will be allowed. Both political responsibility and public acceptance are necessary.

Second, Japan's approach to peace-keeping operations should emphasize conflict prevention. This hypothesis is expressed parenthetically in Article 3 (1) of the International Peace Cooperation Law. Participation in preventive deployment is legally feasible as long as the host country agrees, and Japan should be responsive when conditions permit.

In this connection, serious consideration should be given to contributing military observers or logistic support to the preventive-deployment units in Macedonia. A joint unit from Scandinavia, a U.S. unit, and military observers are now in the field. So far, no conflict has erupted, and the units are there with Macedonia's consent. This preventive deployment is being carried out in accordance with a Security Council resolution that is not based on Chapter 7 of the Charter, as in the case of Bosnia. Japanese involvement in this PKO is important not for the sake of cooperation with Japan's own Akashi Yasushi, who is serving as special representative of the Secretary-General for the former Yugoslavia, but for the sake of playing a global security role. Preventing the conflict in Bosnia from spreading to the entire Balkan Peninsula is an important mission for world peace and is also an effective way of strengthening U.N. credibility and efficacy.

Third, one of the two pillars of the International Peace Cooperation Law, "humanitarian international relief operations" (contribution of personnel to international organizations' humanitarian activities other than PKO), has never been utilized. Japan

should send personnel to help out in regions truly in need of humanitarian assistance. A problem remains even in the case of this kind of assistance, however: Because such cooperation is subject to the same five principles as PKO, including the existence of a cease-fire agreement, we cannot send even civilian personnel to places like Bosnia, where cease-fire agreements are shaky. When the law is reviewed, thought should be given to finding a way around this problem.

\*The five principles are (1) the existence of a cease-fire agreement, (2) consent to the deployment of the PKO mission by the countries in conflict, (3) the neutrality of the mission, (4) withdrawal of Japanese units if any of these conditions are not met, and (5) limitation of the use of weapons to the minimum required to protect the lives and persons of the mission members.

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"United Nations Reform  
and Japan"

Yozo Yokota

1. Introduction

Recent debate in Japan regarding the reform of the United Nations and the possible Japan's permanent membership in the Security Council seems to be based on the following perceptions of the United Nations and the world :

(a) In the post-Cold-War period, there are many instances where the United Nations is called upon to play a role in solving the problems.

(b) The structure and procedure of the United Nations in general, and those of its Security Council in particular, are outdated to deal with the problems effectively.

(c) Some countries, notably Japan and Germany, which now have the willingness and capability to contribute to the work of the United Nations, are not given proper status and power within the decision-making mechanism of the United Nations.

As a conclusion, it is asserted that Japan, possibly together with Germany, should be given the status of a permanent member of the Security Council. The Japanese Government has expressed its willingness and readiness to assume the post of a permanent member in the Security Council, somewhat carefully initially but more outspoken recently.

There is also criticism in Japan vis-a-vis the assertion that Japan should be a permanent member of the Security Council. The reasons for such criticism are multiple:

(a) Some say that, being an aggressor in the Second World War, Japan should never seek a military role in the world, which is inevitable when Japan becomes a permanent member of the Security Council.

(b) If Japan becomes a permanent member of the Security Council, Japan will have to contribute to various U.N. activities in the field of maintenance of international peace the security in the form of sending military units as a part of the U.N. force or U.N. sponsored force. However, Japan cannot contribute in this manner under

Article 9 of the Constitutional Law. Therefore, legally under Constitutional Law, Japan cannot become a permanent member of the Security Council.

(c) If Japan becomes a permanent member of the Security Council, this will ignite the already-existing movement to amend the Constitutional Law to legalize the existence of the Self-Defense Force and its activities overseas.

The above arguments on both sides have good political motives and emotional appeals. Nevertheless, they seem to ignore the reality of the United Nations and the world politics in the historical context and lacks adequate legal analysis of both the Charter of the United Nations and the Japanese Constitutional Law.

This paper is an attempt to present some historical backgrounds and legal analysis relevant to the question of the reform of the United Nations and Japan's position therein.

## 2. Historical Background

When the United Nations was created in 1945, the creators' idea of the new international organization was quite clear. They intended to give the new organization the following characteristics:

(a) It will be created by the United and Allied powers of the Second World War, and the Axis powers, like Japan and Germany, should not have any role therein.

(b) While the new organization was to be of general nature in its objectives covering widely from prevention of war and maintenance of peace to economic and social problems, its main purpose was to be the maintenance of international peace and security.

(c) In dealing with the question of maintenance of international peace and security, collective security was to be the basic principle. This means that, if an aggression occurs, the Security Council will apply forceful sanctions, which could be economic or military.

(d) The United Nations decisions and actions will be taken by the Security Council composed of 11 members (later expanded to 15) and the General Assembly composed of the representatives of all the member States, which in normal circumstances would be regarded as a supreme organ of an international organization, would have lesser power and responsibility.



(e) In this powerful Council, the five big States of the United and Allied Powers, i.e., the United States, United Kingdom, France, Soviet Union and China, would play the major role as its permanent members with a veto on substantial questions.

In short, the United Nations was initially conceived of as a political organization controlled by the five big powers. These characteristics of the United Nations were implanted in the words of the Charter of the United Nations.

Almost immediately after the starting of the new organization, it became obvious that the structure and mechanism of the United Nations did not work because of the irreconcilable confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union which resulted in paralysis of the Security Council. During the Cold-War era which ensued, a number of changes took place within and around the United Nations:

(a) Many political issues were handled outside of the United Nations. Berlin crisis in the late forties, Vietnam War in the sixties and seventies, and Afghanistan War in the seventies and eighties are typical examples of this sort.

(b) Many member States of the United Nations relied more on collective self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter rather than collective security under Chapters 6 and 7 of the Charter. Many regional arrangements and organizations were created under Article 51 such as Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO).

(c) In place of the paralyzed Security Council, the General Assembly began to assume greater roles and responsibilities including action-oriented programs in the area of maintenance of international peace and security. The Uniting for Peace Resolution of 3 November 1950 was the legal basis for the General Assembly to act in place of the Security Council. Along the same line, in place of enforcement force envisaged in Chapter 7 of the Charter, the so-called "peace-keeping operations" has become a usual modality of U.N. activities in the field of maintenance of international peace and security.

(d) In the sixties, many newly independent States began to join the United Nations, and the General Assembly, where the resolutions can be passed by a two-thirds

majority (on substantial matters) or simple majority (on procedural matters) majority on the basis of one-State one-vote system, began to be controlled by the newly independent, developing member States (in the late sixties, they formed the so-called "Group of 77" and exercised substantial power of influence in the decision-making process in various deliberative organs of the U.N., particularly the General Assembly).

(e) The United Nations, which cannot provide effective mechanism for solving international conflicts, started to involve itself more and more in the areas of economic cooperation, economic assistance, human rights, and humanitarian activities. The creation of various U.N. organs in these fields such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), just to name a few, is good evidence of this trend.

(f) Some former enemy States, Japan, Germany, and Italy notably, became world powers, particularly in terms of economy, and the power of the big five relatively went down.

Because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and eventual termination of the Cold-War, it has become possible for the United Nations to revive the Security Council where the agreement among the five permanent members was the prerequisite for any decision to be taken. At the same time, due to the removal of the heavy lids of the two super-powers, many local, ethnic conflicts began to erupt. Consequently, the United Nations started to operate more or less on the same basis as its creators had it in mind.

Many observers hailed when the United Nations decided to take firm decisions in the Gulf crisis by saying that "finally the United Nations recovered its original function - to enforce peace by the decision of the Security Council". Is it so? Superficially, it appear to be so. But, the world is totally different now as compared with it fifty years ago. Conditions for agreement among the big five may have been met but at the same time the relative power of the big five decreased dramatically. Consequently, the Gulf War could not be carried out without the military involvement and financial commitment of non-permanent members of the Security Council, particularly Japan and Germany.

In fact, in today's world, after the collapse of the

Cold-War regime, collective security system, composition of the Security Council, veto of the big five, emphasis on political function, are all questioned whether they are still valid in today's and tomorrow's world where many global issues (maintenance of peace, disarmament, development, human rights, environment, population, etc.) have been presented for the world organization to tackle and solve and where the demand for participation by smaller States and peoples in the decision-making process of the world organization is ever more strong. This is the challenge to the United Nations today and this is the background and context that we have to consider the reform of the United Nations including the possible permanent seat for Japan and Germany.

### 3. Legal Analysis

#### (a) The duty of the permanent members of the Security Council

Does the permanent seat of the Security Council entail legal obligation to contribute to the United Nations' military activity by sending units? The answer from legal point of view is "No". In the Charter, there is no explicit provision requiring the permanent members of the Security Council to contribute military unit to U.N. military action. In fact, Article 43 specifically assumes that there must be a separate agreement between the Security Council (U.N.) and a particular member for the contribution of "armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security". An agreement is an essential element in the provision of military units to the U.N. activity. This applies to the enforcement force stipulated under Chapter 7 of the Charter as well as the peace-keeping operation developed through the practice of the U.N.

#### (b) Sending of the Self-Defense Force as a U.N. force

There is no provision in the Japanese Constitutional Law explicitly prohibiting Japan from sending units of the Self-Defense Force as a part of the U.N. force. Consequently, legally, there is no constraint for Japan to contribute militarily to the U.N. operations.

However, a big question is whether the existence of the Self-Defense Force is constitutional or not. This has been a big political and legal questions since the creation of the Self-Defense Force in 1954. If the existence of the Self-Defense Force is unconstitutional to begin with, its corollary

is that we cannot contribute to the U.N. something which cannot legally exist. Then, is the existence of the Self-Defense Force really unconstitutional? There have been some court cases (Eniwa, Naganuma Nike, and Hyakuri Cases) where this question was at issue. The Court of Japan in all cases refrained from making a clear legal judgement by saying that the issue is beyond the power of the court to decide (something similar to "act of State doctrine").

If we take the elements such as (a) the court has not clearly decided that the Self-Defense Force is unconstitutional, (b) the Self-Defense Force was created by a law passed by the Diet which is stipulated by the Constitutional Law to be the "supreme power of the State", and (c) it is now in existence for 30 years and its budget has been approved by the Diet every year, it is difficult to accept the interpretation of the Constitutional Law provision stating that the Self-Defense Force is unconstitutional. Once the existence of the Self-Defense Force is legally accepted, there is no constitutional limitation with regard to its use. The limitations come from the law passed by the Diet.

(c) Application of the legal analysis

As the above legal analysis indicates, there is no legal obstacle for Japan to become a permanent member of the Security Council. First of all, Japan does not have to assume more duty under the law when it becomes a permanent member of the Security Council. Secondly, if the United Nations requests and Japan decides, she can send Self-Defense Force to participate under the United Nations authority to its peace-keeping or peace enforcement activities. There is no legal restriction. The only consideration Japan should carefully give is a political one, not legal.

4. Japan's Permanent Membership in the Security Council

I do not need to argue extensively the benefits the permanent seat of the Security Council would bring to Japan. Japan does not have to seek election for non-permanent seat. She will always be consulted by other permanent members and the Secretary-General on important security matters. Japan's seat in other important organs of the United Nations would become almost automatic.

Furthermore, as discussed above, there is no legal restriction for Japan to become a permanent member. So, the natural conclusion seems to be that Japan should now try to pursue a permanent seat. But, is that so?

As I have described briefly, the issue of the reform of the United Nations must be seen, analyzed and discussed in the historical and legal perspective. Or, to say it from a different angle, the discussion should not be focused only on whether and to what extent Japan would benefit from getting the permanent seat and what price she should be ready to pay. More important way to look at the issue is a global one such as:

(a) What reform is necessary today in the concept of collective security where the element of force is essential and the role of the Security Council paramount.

(b) What reform is necessary today in the structure (number of permanent and non-permanent members), power (relationship with the General Assembly and member States) and procedure (votes necessary for decision including the veto power of the permanent members) of the Security Council.

(c) What reform in other United Nations structure and procedure (weighted voting in the General Assembly, a separate Congress of representatives of peoples, etc.)

(d) What is Japan's policy on the foregoing issues. What contribution Japan's permanent seat in the Security Council would make to produce and realize a feasible reform plan of the United Nations in the direction supported by the majority of the member States.

It is the first responsibility of the Government of Japan to try to protect and increase national interest of Japan. However, today, Japan has become too big to be self-indulgent. Japan's small move, in whatever direction, causes a big wave in the world. Japan must take the responsibility for the result of any such move. Accordingly, Japan has to always look at the community interest of the world even when she is trying to pursue her national interest. Japan's permanent seat of the Security Council must be discussed and sought in the context of community interest of the United Nations as a whole.

If we take this broad view, it is clear that we must first begin discussion about the reform of the United Nations in the world, and place the debate of the Japan's position in relation to such discussion. Otherwise, Japan's policy to seek a permanent seat could only be seen as Japan agenda and will fail to mobilize general support.

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# **Session 1 - 3**

## **United Nations Reform**

*presented by Dr Maurice Bertrand*

**JIIA-IFRI Joint Conference**

**June 2-3, 1994**

## **United Nations reform.**

*by Maurice Bertrand*

During the fifty years of the life of the UN, the ideas on UN reform have evolved in relation with the type of problems this institution was supposed to address.

During the cold war, suggestions for reform dealt with the management of the Secretariat and with the economic and social activities. Little was said on security matters, it being understood that the efficiency of the Security Council was considered greatly limited by the East West confrontation.

This period is characterized by the creation of numerous expert groups (1) which suggested changes in the organisation chart of the Secretariat and made numerous recommendations on a system of planning, programming, budgeting and evaluation, on personnel policy, on the definition of priorities, on the coordination of the activities of the UN system, on the structure of the intergovernmental machinery, particularly on "revitalizing the Economic and Social Council"... The results obtained have been meager and have not improved the efficiency of the organisation. The only meaningful change has taken place in the field of security, the invention by Lester Pearson and Dag Hammarsköld of the system of peacekeeping. But curiously this has never been considered as a reform.

Towards the end of the Cold War, after 1985, some more ambitious views of reform (2) began to emerge, but mainly outside the UN, by private commissions grouping independent personalities. They included the idea of the creation of an Economic Security Council, of a regional system of representation and of Regional Agencies. But they did not concern the security system. The merit of these proposals has been to begin to put into question the existing structure, but they had no influence on the conservative attitude of governments.

After 1988, the new rôle of the UN in the field of security, characterized by the support given by the Security Council to the US intervention in the Gulf and by the multiplication of the so-called "Second generation peacekeeping operations" has brought the attention of the international community on security aspects, i.e on the rôle and composition of the Security Council, on the efficiency of peacekeeping, on the possibility of more preventive action, and thus opened a new field to reflexion.

Even during this short period, one may distinguish an optimistic phase -1988 1991- due to the first successes of appeasement (Salvador, Nicaragua, Namibia) and to the Gulf War, (which led to believe that agreement among the five permanent members of the Security Council was opening a new era for "collective security"), and a pessimistic one, since 1991 due to the accumulation of failures -Angola, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Haiti, Rwanda etc- leading to very different ideas on the needs and possibility of reforms.

The Secretary General himself, at the request of the Security Council produced a report - "an Agenda for peace" (3) - which suggests some new reform ideas (notably on



"peace enforcement"). The idea of a possible enlargement of the Security Council has made progress and has received the support of the US, in order to permit the entrance of Japan and Germany as permanent members.

At the same time, far more radical views began to develop, putting into question the very concept of "collective security" and suggesting a complete reshuffling of the world institutions, including the UN as well as the other Agencies, notably the Bretton Woods ones.

The situation we are witnessing today, at the eve of the UN 50th anniversary, is characterised by an opposition between:

- a conservative approach, which leads to limited reforms.
- a radical one which proposes an overhaul of the present system.

### **I. The conservative approach.**

There are several conservative approaches. They have common features; they still consider the existing Charter as practically untouchable, they still believe that "collective security" as defined in Chapter VII, is the only possible security system but they have suggestions for improving it; they minimize its present failures; they still believe in the possibility of better management. They differ however on the rôle the UN should play and on various specific points. One may distinguish: the US position, the Secretary General's position, and the various academic conservative positions.

#### *1.- The US position:*

It is the position of an hegemonic power which believes its leadership is indispensable for the correct functioning of the organisation, and at the same time that the organisation should serve its own interests. It shows also some distrust of this organisation. (The Clinton administration in this regard is not different from the Reagan one).

In order to keep the UN under its authority, the US is still in arrears for the paiement of its contributions, particularly for peacekeeping operations; and still criticizes the management of the organisation. In a statement before the Council of Foreign relations, on 11 June 1993, Mrs Madeleine K Albright, US representative to the UN, explained that the failures of the peacekeeping operations in Yugoslavia, Somalia, Angola, etc, were due to the "amateurism" of the United Nations.

So suggestions for reform supported by the US consist of:

- recommending better management, even if the post of Director of management is always held by a US citizen and requesting the creation of a post of Inspector General..
- supporting the idea of an enlargement of the membership of the Security Council, in order to offer Germany and Japan permanent seats ( mainly to facilitate the financing of peacekeeping),
- favouring association of the UN with regional organisations for security matters, particularly with NATO for peace enforcement.

The US remain opposed to the creation of special "peace enforcement" units put at the disposal of the Secretary general. And more generally, while believing that peacekeeping operations, combined with humanitarian interventions, and with the organisation of free elections are the solution to appease the intrastates conflicts, they remain reluctant to give too much authority to the Secretary General, to allow the application of collective security as defined in Chapter VII ( military staff committee etc), and to develop too many interventions. This policy has been officially presented by the President Clinton in the "presidential directive n° 13" of May 5th 1994 which defines in a very restrictive manner the conditions permitting to the US to participate in peacekeeping operations: existence of national US interest, necessity of clear objectives, sufficient financial and manpower backing of the international community, limited duration of the intervention. Comments made by the State department underline that "neither the US nor the international community have the mandate, nor the resources, nor the possibility of resolving every conflict of this kind". In fact it is the sentence of death of collective security.

## *2. - The Secretary General's position.*

The Secretary General Boutros Ghali's position is very different. He considers he has achieved valuable management reforms by reorganizing the Secretariat with a new organisation chart and by reducing the number of top posts. On security matters, he has stated his position mainly through the publication in July 1992 of the report intitled "An Agenda for Peace" which summarizes the traditional conservative diplomatic attitude towards the UN and its rôle in security matters. The main ideas of this report are:

-the implementation of a full system of "collective security" as envisaged in 1945, and defined in the Charter, i.e the revitalization of the machinery described in the Chapter VII, full use of article 42 of the Charter, "the conclusion of the "special agreements" foreseen in article 43, whereby Member States undertake to make armed forces, assistance and facilities available to the Security Council for the purposes stated in art 42. The report adds candidly: "The ready availability of armed forces on call could serve in itself as a means of deterring breaches of the peace since a potential aggressor would know that the Council had at his disposal a means of response. Forces under art 43 may perhaps never be sufficiently large or well enough equipped to deal with a threat from a major army equipped with sophisticated weapons. They would be useful, however in meeting any threat posed by a military force of a less order". This is an official recognition of the incapacity of the Security Council to deal with threats which could come from aggressive attitude of any great power. So the SG's conception comes back to the one of Roosevelt and his "four policemen" in charge of guaranteeing world peace. It is consequently perfectly logical that the report also recommends the use of the Military Staff Committee of article 47 (composed by the Chiefs of Staff of the five permanent members) for the direction of such operations.

These military arrangements are completed by the proposal to create "peace enforcement unit in clearly defined circumstances and with their terms of reference specified in advance". These units would have to be "more heavily armed than peacekeeping forces and would be under the command of the Secretary General".

- Finally the report advocates a larger use of "preventive diplomacy" or "peacemaking activities" (4). But it describes a very traditional conception of prevention. It is not question of acting on situations which lead to conflicts, with the necessary leverage, but to convince actors decided to go to war to sit around a table and to begin discussions. This type of diplomatic action has in fact practically never succeeded and can be considered as a phantasm of diplomats.

The report does not deal with the question of enlargement of the membership of the Security Council, but the Secretary General has let it known that he was supporting the US position on this matter.

### *3. - the various conservative academic positions.*

The majority of conservative academics seem to share a general skepticism on the possibility of reforms, experience having shown the difficulty of getting consensus on any type of change, and the taboo of the Charter remaining very strong. Those who believe nevertheless that some reforms are necessary favor in general the proposals which are supported by the US or by the SG as having more chances of being considered. Some others add ideas of reform on minor points or old ideas which have never succeeded (methods of financing, revitalisation of ECOSOC), but acknowledge that even minor changes will be difficult to achieve.

## **II. The radical approach.**

The radical approach is relatively recent and does not have a complete theoretical framework. But it is developing. Various articles and books are reflect a growing uneasiness with the performance of the existing institutions, severely criticise the ideas and principles on which the present system has been built, make new institutional proposals and even develop a new theoretical approach. This includes:

a/ an evolution of the explanations given for the present process of change. Clichés on the post cold war era, the development of interdependance, the "global village", the globalisation of values, the "end of history", the development of democracy and the efficiency of the market economy are more and more considered as insufficient for explaining the present situation, the growing unemployment, the development of intrastates conflicts, the new threats which are developing.(5)

b/ increasing doubts are formulated on the value and the possibility of a collective security system of the type as the one defined in the Charter. This is perceptible in the numerous articles written on the difficulties encountered and on the failures of the so called peacekeeping operations of the UN. The remarks made by Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury in "United Nations, Divided World" summarizes these doubts: "Differences of perceptions and interests among states, prominent in the cold war period, continue to be pronounced, making united action on security issues uncertain and difficult. Peacekeeping works well only when there is some peace to keep. In some situations the cost of trying to impose peace is too high. In civil conflicts in particular, peacekeeping and enforcement action may be close to impossible especially where communal hatreds have become deep seated, there are no viable geographical lines

separating combatants, and the types of weapons used are easily available and difficult to control. The Charter scheme does not deal specifically with the question of breakdown of order within states and the outbreak of communal war."

c/ the already mentioned proposals (2) for reorganizing the Economic and social activities and the structures and the UN system are now becoming more popular, and the possibility of modifying the Charter, which would be indispensable for enlarging the membership of the Security Council is now considered with less reluctance. For example the idea of the establishment of an economic Security Council has been taken up by M.Jacques Delors, the President of the Commission of the European Union (6)

d/- the constitutionalist approach which, without proposing a new constitution for the world underlines the necessity of a "political statute of humanity". (7)

d/- The federalist views at the global level, which have been until recently generally considered as totally utopian are now more commonly developed. For example in the European Parliament, the Trivelli report (doc A3.331/93) on the future of the United Nations recommends the creation of a consultative parliamentary Assembly at the world level.(8)

e/-the development at the world level of another type of global security system than the one embodied in the Charter is now considered as becoming possible. Particularly the idea of enlarging the CSCE system to the Mediterranean area (CSCM) or to create other regional security system of the same type (CSCA in Asia) have been seriously studied.

So many convergent new ideas are developing which give to the radical approach a new credibility. It is true that this approach has not got a very coherent framework, but it is likely that the search for it will develop, due to the importance of the subject itself, to the pressure of public opinion, to the need for more efficient institutions, to the present failures of the collective security system, and their likely development.

It is already possible to sketch the main lines of what could be a coherent approach to a new world constitution. It would include the principles of a new global security system,

a new theoretical explanation of the process of global change, a vision of a new institutional setting.

### *1. a new global security system.*

The starting points of the radical approach are the fundamental criticism of the present "collective security" system and the conviction that it is now possible to establish a more efficient one at world level. The idea that a collective security system of the type defined in the Covenant of the League of Nations and in the UN Charter could work in a world composed of sovereign States is totally unrealistic. Winston Churchill in 1943, when the content of the UN charter began to be discussed had already made this diagnosis, saying that only the countries whose interests were directly affected by a dispute could be considered as ready to involve themselves with sufficient vigour to obtain a settlement. The practice of the League of Nations, and the history of the UN have shown that the idea that all the Members states of an organisation would accept to participate actively in repressing an aggression or an attempt of aggression against any one of them was purely mythical. The system has never worked. The only two examples of collective action against aggression, the Korean war in 1950 and the Gulf war in 1990

were merely the result of the use of the organisation by an hegemonic power to justify a military intervention in defence of its own interests. All the other aggressions, many of them by the permanent members of the Security Council have never been subjected to collective sanctions or to collective military action. And the failures of the system today for preventing all aggressions or breaches of peace in Angola, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Cambodia, Rwanda, Haiti or elsewhere should not permit to continue to believe that such a system is viable, and would help to stop existing conflicts or prevent future ones, if only the politicians would accept to use it.

It is not because of a lack of leadership that the system does not work today. It is not because the heads of States would be lacking courage or determination that massive military interventions are not even planned to deter aggressions in the various existing intrastates conflicts. It is because no head of government would accept to put at risk the lives of his soldiers in conflicts or disputes which do not threaten directly the vital interests of his country.

And the idea that an international army could be more dissuasive than the contingents provided by Members states divided on the methods and on the issues at stake, is a purely utopian view, due to the fact that the very existence of such an army is inconcievable without an important degree of supranationality, which does not exist and is not considered as imaginable by existing governments. The presidential directive of President Clinton quoted above shows exactly the present situation in this regard.

In summary it is clear that no decision of collective military action will never be taken to stop an aggression or a conflict, even for giving some answer to a public opinion impressed by some spectacular violations of human rights publicised by the media, if the vital interests of the major powers are not directly threatened. These conditions existing only in exceptional cases, it is an illusion to believe that collective security has any chance in helping to stop existing conflicts or prevent future ones.

Such a belief is dangerous because it contributes to the survival of conceptions which lead to maintain important and sophisticated military forces, in order to be able to face all possible threats. This belief in collective security gives an excuse for not considering the possibility , even the necessity of defining a totally different type of global security system.

Now, as already mentioned, such a system is perfectly conceivable. The CSCE experience has shown that it was possible to increase international security by the establishment of measures of verification and inspection on a reciprocal basis of the military forces between potential adversaries and that it was conceivable to reduce the level of armaments in a very important proportion by maintaining an equilibrium at a far lower level than the one previously existing. If it was undertaken to expand the CSCE system at the global level, this would provide an answer to the risks of interstates conflicts, which are not for the moment the most important threat, but the possibility of which has not been definitively excluded.

But it could also provide an answer to the development of intrastates conflicts for two reasons: First it could permit to consider seriously the interdiction of arms trade and the international control of arms production. The existing conflicts could not develop, if a rigorous embargo was observed on arms trade, which is not the case at present, the most sophisticated weapons being utilised in intrastates conflicts in countries where these weapons are not manufactured. The reasons which are advanced for excluding such an interdiction and such a control- economic interests, risks of unemployment in the

industries concerned, difficulties for implementing regulations in this field- are not valid in terms of security and are, moreover, perfectly immoral. The development of production and trade of arms is a great danger in itself, because the availability of sophisticated weapons aggravate and lengthen existing conflicts and because the very existence of some type of weapons, like anti personnel mines, create thousands of innocent victims, even when wars are over.

The second reason why the extension of a CSCE type of security system would be efficient is that the maintenance of enormous military forces is costly and that the financial resources which are attributed to them cannot be used for more useful purposes, in particular for addressing the underlying causes of the development of intrastates conflicts.

If financial resources were available, it would become possible to define and implement real strategies of prevention, i.e, as the Agenda for Peace put it (but without indicating any method for it) "to address the deepest causes of conflicts: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression". Preventive "Marshall plans" would be more efficient and less costly than the inefficient policies which are trying to appease conflicts.

But such a transformation of the present system of security would imply the acceptance by public opinion and governments of a different philosophy.

## *2. A different explanation of the present process of global change.*

The acknowledgement of the necessity of establishing a new security system at world level will not be possible if in parallel another explanation of the present process of change does not replace the present one. But the existing clichés are now, as mentioned, put into question and many people are looking for a more systematic and deeper explanation.

What we have now is in general mainly descriptive. Since the first oil crisis in 1973 there is a general recognition that there is no way of establishing independant national strategies in the economic and social fields, or to ignore the strategies, methods and principles accepted by the rest of the world. Third world debt, international migrations, nuclear accidents, ozone layer depletion, climate change, the spread of international terrorism, exchange rate variations, and the activities of transnational corporations have permanently demonstrated that countries are no longer protected by their borders. Since 1987 everyone is puzzled by the positive and negative effects of the end of the cold war. The end of communism, the spread of global values, the development of democratic regimes, the rapid economic development of South East Asia, the beginning of reduction of armaments, the end of apartheid in South Africa, the building of peace in the Middle East, could permit some optimism. But at the same time the rapid development of intrastates conflicts, the impossibility of stopping or preventing them, the growth of refugees and migrations flows, the growth of unemployment, the development of racist and fascist movements, etc leads to pessimism.

Moreover, there is no systematic explanation proposed for all these changes. What we have instead is a mixture of techno-economism and "realism": technical progress would be the reason of economic transformation, the military might of the West would have been the cause of the failure of the communism in USSR, the end of the cold

war itself would explain the present changes, and finally the present difficulties would be caused by the resistance of existing cultures to the process of change...

There is now some uneasiness about this lack of sound explanation and the search for a more systematic one has begun. The feeling is developing that we are witnessing a social transformation of major amplitude and that it concerns not only the economy and the end of communism, but the whole structure of the global society. If this is so, the phenomenon would not be correctly described by the word "interdependance", but rather by the word "integration" and this would mean that.

- the type of integration which is going on is driven by the model of the dominant countries. The western model of society is imposed to the rest of the world through the economic might of the transnational firms, the information process of the media. This integration leads to disintegration due to the impossibility for the underdeveloped peoples to reach the level of development of the West.

This impossibility creates identity problems, because, confronted with the success story of the Western prosperity, poor people cannot accept to be humiliated and look for identities allowing them to recover their self respect and their pride. This is nurturing the identity crises which are the origin of the development of intrastates conflicts.

At the same time this complex integration- disintegration process is considerably reducing the powers of the nation state. Attempts to compensate this process are made through the building of regional federations or confederations (like the European Union), the establishment of free trade areas (like NAFTA), the functioning of global directorates (like the G7 and the security Council), but these attempts are not succeeding and in fact it is the concept of nation state which is more and more put into question. The political organisation of the world is changing: the present international society of some 200 states of various sizes and powers, is being replaced by another type of political organisation of the world space. Something comparable to the emergence of the nation state from the 14th to the 19th century, replacing the feudal society, is now happening, replacing the nation state system by a global political system, and a large part of the powers and functions of nations will be transferred to a global organisation.

If this comparison is valid, it should be obvious that this transformation has some chance of being cataclysmic and consequently that it would be indispensable to control it. This would mean that it is indispensable to have a clear vision of the new configuration and to define the process which could lead to it peacefully.

### *3. a vision of a new institutional setting.*

In order to define a new institutional setting which could be acceptable to public opinion, it would be indispensable to take into account.

- the flaws and shortcomings of the present institutional system and notably the verbalism and hypocrisy of the principles enumerated in the Charter (on human rights, social development, rights of peoples etc) which are not verifiable, the contradiction of these principles with the notion of absolute national sovereignty (clearly expressed in Art 2§7 of the Charter), the inefficiency of collective security, the absence of a global answer to global economic and social problems, the diffusion of responsibilities between various institutions, the lack of democratic representation of peoples.

- consequently to devise a system able to provide international verification of accepted principles, a more realistic and just representation of countries and peoples, and

a correct global answer to global problems.

- the possibility of taking some inspiration from successful experiments already made at the regional or intercontinental level, in particular from the European Union and from CSCE,

- the necessity of progressing step by step towards an ideal organisation.

If these conditions were respected, this would lead to define:

*a/ verifiable principles.* the member states of this new organisation should accept at the same time principles concerning human rights, rights of peoples or minorities, democracy, reduction of armaments, interdiction of arms trade, and precise measures permitting the international verification of their implementation.

*b/ a credible and representative global directorate:* a kind of G20, including direct representation of the great powers and regional representation of minor and middle countries, in charge of global security as well as of economic and social global problems.

*c/ a global democratic representation,* i.e a world parliament, which could at the beginning be only consultative but could become progressively more powerful.

*d/ the establishment of global taxes* which should provide enough resources to permit to the new institution to act efficiently for controlling the global change

*e/ the creation of an executive secretariat* composed of exceptionnally competent international staff, under the authority of a Commission comparable to the one of the European Union.

### **Conclusion:**

The general skepticism regarding the possibility of reforming or changing global institutions to day is perfectly justified. Governments, particularly the governments of the great powers are for the moment satisfied with the present inefficient system, and public opinion, preoccupied by many other problems, is not, even when it shows its uneasiness, informed about any possibility of improving the situation. So there is no chance existing at present for any reform or radical change.

But this situation could change. It is true that this would imply the advent of an intellectual revolution. But the western civilisation has been characterized by successive intellectual revolutions like the Reform, the Renaissance, the democratic revolution, the scientific revolution etc, and all these revolutions have been triggered by the acknowledgement of the absurdity of previous situations.

At the end of the twentieth century the conditions for such an acknowledgement are met: enormous military forces are maintained despite the fact that it is impossible to use them; arms trade is continuing to nurture existing conflicts that diplomats are trying to appease; the market economy develops unemployment by organising a competition between the workers of the countries of the North and the workers of the South instead of establishing a complementarity of their interests; new global values are developing at the world level but realpolitik continues to inspire international relations. These absurdities will perhaps some day become difficult to be accepted any longer.



Consequently it is not paradoxical to pretend that the development of the radical approach to the reform of the international system is far more realistic than the conservative one, because it offers the only chance to obtain some results, i.e explaining to public opinion that a solution exists for solving some apparently intractable problems

#### Notes.

1) a list of these various experts groups and of their main proposals can be found in "The historical development of efforts to reform the UN" by Maurice Bertrand in "United Nations, Divided world" edited by Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury, Clarendon Press Oxford 1993. Pp. 420 -436. See also, in french, Maurice Bertrand "L'ONU" collection Repères. Ed La découverte Paris 1994 p. 109.

2) -"Some reflexions on reform of the UN" by Maurice Bertrand. Report of the Joint Inspection Unit. UN document A/40/ 988 of 6 December 1985.

- UNA USA. A successor vision. The United Nations of to morrow. ed by Peter Fromuth. (New York 1987)

- UNDP. Human development report. Chap. V. 1992. This document lists a number of other reports and projects.

3) An Agenda for peace. report of the secretary general pursuant the statement adopted by the summit meeting of the Security Council of 31st January 1992. ( DPI 1247.june 1992)

4) It is difficult to find a distinction between the definition given in the Agenda for *peacemaking*: "action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations". and for *preventive diplomacy*: "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur".

5) cf edited by John Renninger. The future rôle of the United Nations in an interdependent world.

Maurice Bertrand. La stratégie suicidaire de l'Occident. Bruylant. Bruxelles, 1993.

Yoshikazu Sakamoto. Editor's introduction to the UNU volume Global transformation. (to be published in 1994)

6) President Delors speech at IISS Conference of september 10 1993. Mention should also be made of the proposals of Mickail Gorbachev in 1987: "Realities and guarantees for a secure world". Novosty press agency. The fact that these proposals have been rejected, or ignored by the West, does not diminish their importance and their interest.

7) See in particular: Richard Falk, R Johansen, and Samuel Kim: The constitutional foundation of world peace. State University New York. New York 1993.

8) see also Marc Nerfin. The future of the UN system. Some questions at the occasion of an anniversary. Development Dialogue 1985.

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# **Session 1 - 4**

## **Strengthening Non-Proliferation**

*presented by Professor Mitsuru Kurosawa*

**JIIA-IFRI Joint Conference**

**June 2-3, 1994**

## STRENGTHENING NON-PROLIFERATION

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### I. Introduction

With the demise of the Cold War accompanied by the disappearance of the confrontation between the United States and the former Soviet Union, the nuclear arms race between them since the end of WW II has stopped and the United States and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation have agreed to reduce their strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces substantially through the INF Treaty of 1987, the START I Treaty of 1991 and the START II Treaty of 1993. The relationship between these two countries has changed from one of confrontation to friendship and partnership.

With these positive developments on the global level, many had expected a general improvement in international peace and security. However, in spite of and/or because of these developments, new problems have emerged on the regional level through new phenomena like the Persian Gulf war, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and various regional or ethnic conflicts.

The efforts for arms control and disarmament in the Cold War era mainly focused on nuclear weapons possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union, for fear of a direct nuclear exchange between the two. In the post-Cold War era, the main issue of arms control and disarmament has shifted to non-proliferation. It is true that nuclear non-proliferation has been one of the main issues since the 1960s, but it was not given top priority. In the post-Cold War era, non-proliferation includes not only nuclear weapons but also chemical and biological weapons, as well as missiles.

In his address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 27, 1993, President Bill Clinton said, "One of our most urgent priorities must be attacking the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, whether they are nuclear, chemical or biological; and the ballistic missiles that can rain them down on populations hundreds of miles away. ....I have made non-proliferation one of our nation's highest priorities. We intend to weave it more deeply into the fabric of all our relationships with the world's nations and institutions."

The first UN Security Council summit in January 1992, which discussed a new world order after the Cold War and asked the Secretary-General to prepare a report for revitalization of the

UN function on international peace and security, recognized the importance of the problem of non-proliferation in the post-Cold War era. The declaration by the Security Council President includes the phrase "proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constitutes the threat to international peace and security". The phrase comes from Article 39 of the UN Charter and this determination of a threat to international peace and security is the first necessary step toward UN sanction under Chapter VII of the Charter. This is a strong expression of the Security Council against proliferation.

In this paper I will first discuss some of the background for the growing importance of non-proliferation, then deal with nuclear, chemical and biological non-proliferation, missile non-proliferation and regional non-proliferation, including ways to strengthen these structures. Finally, I will elaborate on the non-proliferation regime in the new world order.

## II. New Situations after the Cold-War

In the 1960s when the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was negotiated and concluded, the main target of the NPT was such industrialized countries as West Germany, Japan, Canada, Sweden and Italy. However, these states have voluntarily abandoned their nuclear option by joining the NPT. States that refused to join the NPT and were suspected of developing nuclear weapons were India, Israel and South Africa, followed by Brazil, Argentina and Pakistan. Among them, South Africa acceded to the NPT in 1991, and Brazil and Argentina have accepted the IAEA full-scope safeguards.

The first and most notorious case of an attempt to develop nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War era was the revelation of Iraqi clandestine nuclear weapon development programmes. This was disclosed as a result of on-site inspections by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the IAEA in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution 687 on the conclusion of the so-called Gulf War. This case is so flagrant as an example of a violation of international norms, because unlike the Israeli, Indian or Pakistan cases, Iraq has been a party to the NPT since 1969 and has accepted the IAEA full-scope safeguards accompanied by the IAEA assurance of no-problem in Iraq.

As Iraq had been known of its possession of chemical and biological weapons and missiles for them, the Security Council resolution decided their dismantlement.

The second event with deep proliferation implications was the collapse of the Soviet Union, leaving a tremendous nuclear weapons capability in some states. Although tactical nuclear weapons deployed out of Russia had been withdrawn to Russian territory by May 1992, strategic nuclear weapons still remain in the Ukraine, Khazakhstan and Belarus. Even though these three states agreed to join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states and return all nuclear weapons to Russia within seven years by signing the Lisbon Protocol to the START I Treaty and related letters, these promises have not been completely accomplished yet.

Another concern in connection with the Soviet dissolution relates to the ownership and control over nuclear weapons. In the midst of social transformation and confusion, the possibilities of seizure by terrorists or the smuggling of nuclear weapons are increasing. In addition, there is the fact that many scientists and technologists, who had been employed for nuclear weapon development and lost their jobs will become employed by states that are eager to develop nuclear weapons. The Soviet dissolution also entails a possible proliferation of chemical weapons and technology.

Thirdly, in the Korean Peninsula, North Korea, which joined the NPT in 1985 but refused to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA for six years, has been suspected of clandestinely developing nuclear weapons. After the United States had withdrawn their nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea and these two states had announced a cancellation of the joint military exercise 'Team Spirit', North Korea concluded a safeguards agreement and the IAEA started its inspections.

Following initial inspections, the IAEA asked North Korea to accept special inspections at undeclared facilities, based on the discrepancy between the result of the inspections and North Korea's own reporting as well as suspicion arising through intelligence by the United States. North Korea refused the request and announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT in protest against the request of special inspections. While the withdrawal has been suspended for a while, the resolution of the problem remains to be seen.

In South Asia, a traditional confrontation between India and Pakistan continues including the development of nuclear weapons and missiles, and in the Middle East, Israeli nuclear weapons and Arab chemical weapons are said to be a main issue for a comprehensive peace programme.

Generally speaking, in the regions where conflicts were restrained because of the two superpowers' influence, new conflicts tend to emerge because of the demise of the Cold War. This trend has also contributed to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles.

### III. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

#### (1) Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

At the centre of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation regime exists the NPT whose parties have increased to 163, the greatest number among the arms control and disarmament treaties. In spite of its increasing universality, such states as India, Israel and Pakistan will not join the NPT soon. In addition, as shown in the Iraqi and North Korean cases, even parties to the Treaty may develop nuclear weapons in violation of the obligations under the Treaty.

The NPT, which has been criticized because of its discriminatory nature stipulating different obligations for nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states, has been supported by a great majority of states and become one of the fundamental norms in international society.

Toward a NPT extension conference held in 1995, it is urgent to strengthen the NPT by mitigating its discriminatory character. First, the United States and Russia have to implement the START Treaties as soon as possible. Second, the five nuclear powers should negotiate and conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), preferably before the extension conference. Third, a treaty to ban the production of nuclear materials for weapons should be eagerly pursued. Fourth, the nuclear powers should give negative security assurances in legally binding form to non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT and further consider the possibility of a no-first-use pledge. These measures are indispensable to strengthen the NPT.

## (2) Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ)

The establishment of NWFZs, which ensures a total absence of nuclear weapons in a zone, is supplementary to the NPT. The Tlatelolco Treaty in Latin America, which has been lacking important states like Argentina, Brazil and Chile, is gaining greater universality with those states becoming parties. The Rarotonga Treaty in the South Pacific, protocols to which were ratified only by Russia and China, will be more strengthened with the accession to the protocols by the United States, the United Kingdom and France.

With the demise of the Cold War structure, prospects for establishing NWFZs in several regions are getting brighter. Firstly, in Africa where South Africa and front-line states recently acceded to the NPT, the OAU/UN Group has started to prepare a draft treaty on an African NWFZ and it is expected to complete its work within a few years. Secondly, in the Southeast Asia or ASEAN region, the establishment of a NWFZ which has been proposed for a long time is becoming near to being realized with the superpowers' withdrawal from the region.

On the Korean Peninsula, where the Declaration of Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was signed and ratified by both Korean states in December 1991 and February 1992, the efforts to establish a NWFZ should be continued, though the situation now is very gloomy. In South Asia and the Middle East, as prospects for creating NWFZs are not bright enough now, confidence-building measures should be pursued first.

While the initiative for establishing NWFZs must come from within the region, cooperation of nuclear-weapon states is indispensable for its success.

## (3) The IAEA Safeguards

Iraq, which was a party to the NPT and obliged to submit all nuclear materials under the IAEA safeguards, was developing nuclear weapons at facilities which were not declared to the IAEA. This made a weakness or limitation in the safeguards system quite clear, although this was not the fault of the IAEA itself. The Board of Governors of the IAEA, in February 1992,



reconfirmed the Agency's right to undertake special inspections in Member States with comprehensive safeguards agreements, when necessary and appropriate, and to ensure that all nuclear materials in peaceful nuclear activities are under safeguards. The Board further reaffirmed the Agency's rights to obtain and to have access to additional information and locations in accordance with the Agency's Statute and all comprehensive safeguards agreements.

The Board also called on parties to provide preliminary information as early as possible on programmes for new nuclear facilities and activities. The Secretariat of the IAEA proposed a reporting and verification system of the export, import and production of nuclear materials and sensitive equipment.

These measures all purport to get more transparency in the nuclear activities of non-nuclear parties to the NPT. A special inspection was requested for the first time to North Korea, in order to clarify significant inconsistencies in samples and measurements and to gain access to two undeclared sites in the DPRK.

Indeed it is necessary and possible to improve and strengthen the power of the IAEA in connection with safeguards, but we should not forget that these measures apply only to non-nuclear-weapon state parties to the NPT. Here appears the fundamental discriminatory character of the regime.

#### (4) The Control of Nuclear Exports

While since 1975, the nuclear suppliers group has adopted a series of guidelines to control nuclear exports and to apply safeguards, these measures proved to be inadequate, as was shown in the Iraqi case. In addition, with the end of the Cold War, COCOM regulations were also ameliorated and later COCOM was disbanded.

In April 1992, the nuclear suppliers group agreed to guidelines for transfers on nuclear-related dual-use equipment, material, and related technology, establishing export licensing procedures and listing 65 items for control. They also agreed on a policy that the transfers should not be authorized unless full scope safeguards are applied.

### IV. Non-Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons

#### (1) The Australia Group

With the use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, the so-called Australia Group was formed in May 1985, as an informal multilateral group to coordinate the export control policies of chemical weapons and materials. They agreed to a warning list of 50 chemical precursors and a core list of nine precursors.

In the early 1990s, with the initiative of the President Bush of the United States, these export controls were strengthened and widened. This was because during the Gulf War many countries were afraid of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq, Iraqi chemical and biological weapons development depended on exports from western firms, and Iran, Libya and Syria were developing chemical weapons.

## (2) The Chemical Weapons Convention

The Chemical Weapons Convention, which was signed by more than 130 states when opened for signature in Paris on January 13, 1993, stipulates the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and their destruction.

After negotiations for more than two decades at the Conference on Disarmament, the Convention was signed. There were many factors which contributed to this achievement. On the one hand there was the improvement in East-West relations, as evidenced by the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the resulting drastic change in U.S. policy. On the one hand there was the extremely high possibility of the use of chemical weapons in the Gulf War and the knowledge that developing countries had a strong desire to get chemical weapons as 'poor countries' nuclear weapons'.

To facilitate a multilateral convention on banning chemical weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union concluded the Agreement on Destruction and Non-production of Chemical Weapons in June 1990, and undertook to start the destruction of chemical weapons by the end of 1992, to destroy at least half by the end of 1999 and reduce their stockpiles to 5000 tons by 2002.

Under the Chemical Weapons Convention, parties undertake not only never to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain, and use chemical weapons, but also to destroy chemical weapons in ten years in principle. In addition, it includes a procedure for challenge inspections, to resolve concerns about possible non-compliance. This is mandatory on-site inspection any time, anywhere with a few exceptions.

The most salient characteristic of the Convention is that it imposes the same obligations to any party, in sharp contrast to the NPT; that is, there is no distinction between states which have chemical weapons and ones which have not, and there is no discrimination among parties. The Convention will be very useful for non-proliferation if it enters into force soon and secures universality.

## (3) The Biological Weapons Convention

The Biological Weapons Convention, which was opened for signature in 1972, entered into force in 1975 and now has 126 parties, prohibits to develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise

acquire or retain biological weapons, and orders the destruction of them within nine months. The Convention had been highly evaluated because it stipulates a true disarmament for the first time.

However, after the end of the Cold War it turned out that Iraq, which was a party to it, possessed biological weapons, and the Soviet Union which was also a party had massive biological weapons. These facts raised doubts about the effectiveness of the Convention.

In order to meet these challenges, at the third review conference of the Convention in 1991, parties agreed to implement eight confidence-building measures to improve the openness of biological research activities and strengthen the implementation of the Convention. They also agreed to establish an ad hoc committee to consider the introduction of verification measures to the Convention, and experts are examining 21 potential verification measures.

In addition, the Australia Group introduced a list of 65 biological agencies and a list of dual-use facilities which should be under export control.

## V. Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

In April 1987, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Italy and Japan agreed to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), since many developing nations started to develop missiles in 1980s, as shown in the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War. The MTCR is not a treaty, but a voluntary arrangement among states which have a common interest in the non-proliferation of missiles and their technology.

The purpose of the MTCR guidelines is to limit the danger of missile proliferation by controlling the transfer of items and technologies which can be used to make delivery systems for nuclear weapons. Items included in Category I are in principle prohibited to transfer, and those in Category II are required to refrain from transferring.

Members of the MTCR, in January 1993, amended the guidelines to expand the control regime and included missiles which are capable of delivering biological and chemical weapons.

## VI. Regional Non-Proliferation

### (1) The Middle East

Although progress in peace processes is being made, the Middle East is one of the most dangerous places in the world as the recent Gulf War witnessed, and a regional non-proliferation initiative there is badly needed.

A Middle East arms control initiative proposed by President Bush in May 1991 included a freeze on the acquisition, production and testing of surface-to-surface missiles, a ban on the

production and acquisition of nuclear materials usable for nuclear weapons, participation in a chemical weapons convention, and full implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention.

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council met in July 1991, and agreed to support the idea of establishing a Middle East zone free from weapons of mass destruction, and to make efforts for a comprehensive programme for arms control in the region.

Non-proliferation is very complicated in the region because Israel is believed to possess nuclear weapons, Iraq and Iran are pursuing nuclear development and some Arab states possess or develop chemical and biological weapons. For these reasons non-proliferation should be handled as a whole, the peace process in the Middle East should be developed and mutual confidence should be built.

## (2) The Former Soviet Union

In the former Soviet Union, the danger of nuclear proliferation was very high because the collapse of the Soviet Union, the implementation of the START Treaties and the withdrawal of tactical weapons happened almost at the same time. To meet these situations, the United States first decided to procure \$400 million from its defense budget to help dismantle nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union, and then added further \$400 million. It is called the Safe and Secure Dismantlement(SSD) Initiative, whose main purpose is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

The United States and the Russian Federation concluded an Umbrella Agreement for cooperation in June 1992, and then agreed to seven subsidiary agreements to implement concrete assistance. In April 1993, they also agreed to three other measures to assist Russia. The U.S. concluded the same agreement with Belarus and Kazakhstan. Recently the relationship with the Ukraine was improved.

Not only the United States but also other G-7 countries agreed to assist in dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union. Japan promised to procure \$100 million and concluded agreements for assistance in nuclear dismantlement.

Assistance for the safe dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union is quite necessary for international peace and security and for nuclear non-proliferation but it does not provide adequate conditions for these goals.

## (3) The Korean Peninsula

In the Korean Peninsula, while after the end of the Cold War the relationship between the North and the South had improved, now it is much worse because of North Korea's suspected nuclear aims. The Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, agreed in

December 1991, includes not only the prohibition of the testing, production, receipt, possession, stockpiling, storage, deployment and use of nuclear weapons, but also the non-possession of facilities for nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment. In addition, it provides for mutual on-site inspections to verify these obligations.

The declaration goes beyond the NPT, as it includes the prohibition of deployment and use of nuclear weapons and further the prohibition of reprocessing and enrichment. It means they agreed not to have plutonium and enriched uranium which are both material for nuclear weapons. Plutonium can be used either in reactors for peaceful purposes or as material for nuclear weapons.

Efforts should be made to resolve the current stalemate regarding the international community's nuclear suspicions of North Korea and proceed to implement the Denuclearization Declaration.

#### (4) South Asia

In South Asia, confrontation between India and Pakistan appears not only in historical and religious aspects but also in nuclear weapon and missile fields. India has long refused to join the NPT because of its discriminatory nature, and Pakistan would not accede to the Treaty without India's participation. Although the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia has been proposed for years, the prospect is gloomy.

A proposal to hold a five nations conference on non-proliferation (India, Pakistan, the United States, Russia and China) has been opposed by India. Export control against India and Pakistan has had effect of retarding their weapons development, but not enough for non-proliferation.

In South Asia, confidence-building and crisis-prevention measures should be taken prior to non-proliferation measures, and here a global approach like a nuclear test ban or prohibition of the production of nuclear materials for weapons purposes should be pursued in parallel with a regional approach.

### VII. Non-Proliferation in the New World Order

A non-proliferation regime consists of multifaceted elements, including multilateral and bilateral treaties, and multilateral and unilateral export controls covering nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missiles. In the post-Cold War era, the importance of non-proliferation can not be overemphasized. Non-proliferation measures may be divided into two categories; cooperative measures mainly established by treaties and confrontational measures mainly created by export control policies.

The former include the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. Sovereign states are free to join a treaty or not, and to be bound by a treaty is decided voluntarily by individual states. In this sense, regulations by treaties are cooperative. The latter consists of export control policies arranged between main exporting countries like the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime, and applied against recipient countries without their consent. This is confrontational against states which want to receive assistance.

Generally speaking, regulations by treaties are cooperative and more acceptable to states, so that compliance with the regulations may be secured more easily because of voluntary participation in the treaty.

However, in the case of the NPT, its discriminatory character has been criticized by both parties and non-parties alike because it distinguishes nuclear-weapon states from non-nuclear-weapon states, imposes different obligations to these two categories, and all substantial obligations are imposed on the latter states. This is one reason for some states to refuse to join the Treaty. It is urgent to mitigate this discriminatory character as much as possible by taking nuclear disarmament measures and giving security assurances to non-nuclear-weapons states. These measures are important both for parties to confirm their pledges to non-proliferation and for non-parties to join the treaty.

The Biological Weapons Convention(BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention(CWC) are better than the NPT because they make no distinction among parties. In these treaties, it is essential to secure effectiveness and universality.

Some states, in spite of being parties to the BWC, are possessing and developing biological weapons in violation of their obligations. One reason for this is that the Convention has no verification provisions. It is necessary to secure more transparency in biological research and development and prepare measures which can assure that parties are abiding by the obligations by introducing a verification mechanism.

The CWC, which has already been signed by more than 130 states and is supposed to enter into force in early 1995, provides for precise verification measures including a challenge inspection for the first time. Although we have to wait and see an actual implementation of these verification measures, the concern in the Convention is rather how to secure universality of participation. In the Middle East in particular, some Arab countries are not willing to abandon a chemical weapons option, in order to counterbalance Israeli nuclear weapons. The solution of the problem must be concerned with not only the CWC universality but also nuclear weapons in the Middle East, and further peace processes in general in the region.

Initiative to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones comes from the states in the region, by voluntarily abandoning the option of nuclear weapons and prohibiting the introduction of nuclear weapons into their area. This is very positive for regional peace, security and stability. The Tlatelolco Treaty is going to have full operation with the accession by Argentina, Brazil, Chile and some other states. The Rarotonga Treaty will have much effectiveness with the

signature and ratification of Protocols to the Treaty by the United States, the United Kingdom and France.

Possibilities to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones should be explored in every region in the world. In Africa, Southeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula, there appears to be some progress towards it. Efforts should be made even in the Middle East and South Asia, though it will be much more difficult. With the exception of Russia, the states of the former Soviet Union could belong to a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

The safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union is taking place cooperatively between the United States and other industrialized nations on the one hand and the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus on the other. This process depends on bilateral treaties and subsidiary agreements. In the case of "rolling back" or nuclear disarmament, the states which have economic and human resources should help proceed in its implementation.

In contrast with these cooperative measures, non-proliferation measures may be confrontational through export controls in connection with weapons of mass destruction and missiles, and are taken unilaterally by a group of exporting countries against recipient states.

Formal members of these groups are mainly Western industrialized nations and their membership has expanded since their inception but is still relatively small; from 7 original members to 28 in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, from 19 original members to 25 in the Australia Group and from 7 original members to 23 in the MTCR. Members of these three groups are overlapping. The United States has been at the centre of these initiatives and is taking unilateral control measures in addition.

The first weakness in these export control policies is their lack of effectiveness. In order to secure greater effectiveness, other countries, in particular Russia and China, should be formal members and secure universality. In addition, with the improvement of science and technology in developing countries, the effectiveness of the export controls will be eroded because these countries will be able to develop the weapons indigenously.

The second weakness in these export control policies is their validity. It is argued that these policies introduce a new pattern of confrontation between industrialized nations in the North and developing countries in the South. It is true that the export policies do not necessarily deny the transfer of materials and technologies if certain conditions are met by recipient states, but in practice there is sometimes a denial of technology.

Export control policies should entail some measures which provide for positive incentives for developing countries to refrain from proliferation. For example, in missile control there should be assistance in developing peaceful uses for missiles like Article IV of the NPT.

Although the usefulness of these export control policies should not necessarily be denied, they should be transformed into measures based on consensual decisions like by treaty forms in order to be effective for the longer term and acceptable to a wider number of states.

Non-proliferation measures will be done through cooperative and confrontational forms for a while, and both are necessary in the short term. However, in the long run, we need to take measures which resolve fundamental problems on a consensual basis and this requires cooperative measures for non-proliferation.



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# **Session 1 - 4**

## **Strengthening Non-Proliferation**

*presented by Dr Christophe Carle*

**JIIA-IFRI Joint Conference**

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## **Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation**

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The issues raised by weapons and sensitive technology proliferation rank higher on the international security agenda than at any time in the past. Several reasons account for this. One is by default: the top slot formerly taken up by the East-West process of arms racing and arms control has been left vacant. Horizontal proliferation now occupies much of the time and energies of specialists and officials who used to deal with bipolar strategy. As the nuclear inventories of the USA and Russia decrease, the visibility and significance of other countries' nuclear weapons increases. A second reason is that part of the legacy of the East-West arms race presents itself in terms of horizontal proliferation since the collapse and fragmentation of the USSR. The perceived risks of Soviet successor states assuming control over nuclear weapons based on their territories, and of unauthorized transfer of nuclear warheads abroad raised the new risk of instant proliferation within the former Soviet ambit and beyond.

In addition to these factors directly linked to the end of the cold war, several contextual events also contributed to the rising saliency of proliferation issues. One is the hindsight of how successfully Iraq had managed to circumvent non-proliferation regimes up to the second Gulf war, non-spice of its membership of the NPT and the implementation of IAEA safeguards. Another is the unprecedented move by North Korea to threaten withdrawal from the NPT<sup>1</sup>, and the tensions which have developed in and around the Korean peninsula. Third, and of central importance, is the imminence of the NPT extension conference, after 25 years of the Treaty's entry into force.

### **The Many Faces of Proliferation...**

As is well known, arms proliferation issues range across various (and vastly different) weapons categories. Those that receive the broadest and most intense attention are nuclear and other so-called "mass destruction" weapons, which are more accurately described as "non-conventional": missile delivery systems (both ballistic and cruise), and chemical or biological agents and munitions. In comparison, in spite of the now suspended P.5. talks and the United Nations Arms Trade Register, conventional weaponry gets relatively succinct treatment, even where "major" systems are concerned. This leaves open an all too often forgotten aspect of the proliferation of small arms, the

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<sup>1</sup> By virtue of Article X1, giving "each party (...) in exercising its national sovereignty (...) the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country", pending three months' notice.

most difficult to control, but also the most often used in warfare across the world. Yet, the "least glamorous" and "most deadly"<sup>2</sup> category of light armaments, from assault rifles, machine guns, mortars, grenades, to landmines, explosives and shoulder-fired anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles not accounted in the UN Register, have caused and will likely continue to cause more daily victims than ballistic missiles ever have.

On a geographical basis too, diversity is clearly apparent. Different regions pose problems all of their own, which do not necessarily lend themselves to the same types of analysis or remedial measures. This applies to the Middle East, to the Indo-Pakistani nexus in the shadow of China, as well as to the Korean peninsula. Likewise, the renunciations of nuclear options (and capabilities in the first case) by South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil, require explanatory reference to domestic politics, to regional settings, and to the specific impact of international influence. The issues raised by the successor states of the former Soviet Union further increase the range of issues to be addressed by non-proliferation policy.

### **...And of Non-Proliferation**

As for non-proliferation itself, it is made up of an equally great variety of levels of policy-making, coordination and implementation, as well as of legal and technical means. In addition to national export decisions and export control legislations, one may identify treaties and organizations designed for universal membership (NPT and IAEA, Convention on Chemical Weapons and OPCW<sup>3</sup>), supply-side arrangements and regimes of limited membership (NSG, Zangger Committee, MTCR, Australia Group, the P.5. talks on conventional arms exports, the former COCOM and its future successor) which deal with more or less specified weapons and technologies, regional arrangements and negotiating fora (the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga treaties, the Middle East multilateral talks on arms control and regional security), more or less tentative bilateral frameworks (as between Argentina and Brazil, India and Pakistan, or North and South Korea), not forgetting initiatives under the aegis of the UN (the Arms Trade Register), and negotiations underway at the Conference on Disarmament and its various ad-hoc committees in Geneva. Moreover, general competence groups such as the UN Security Council and the G.7. have also produced statements and recommendations aimed at strengthening non-proliferation.

The bewildering complexity of the resulting configuration has prompted some analysts to discuss whether and in what way the various non-proliferation regimes might be combined<sup>4</sup>. Appealing as it may seem to try and simplify matters somewhat, the problems of non-proliferation policy are fundamentally of a political rather than organizational nature. Moreover, whatever the diversity of regimes and organizations, issues of global significance are raised by non-proliferation across the board, in the shape of the legitimacy and feasibility of binding commitments, the balance of obligations

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<sup>2</sup> See Aaron KARP "Arming Ethnic Conflict", *Arms Control Today*, September 1993, :8-13.

<sup>3</sup> Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

<sup>4</sup> See L. SPECTOR and V. FORAN, *Preventing Weapons Proliferation; should the regimes be combined?*, (The Stanley Foundation, October 1992).

across different categories of states, and the acceptability and practicability of stringent controls and verification.

With this setting in mind, the present paper discusses a range of options for seeking to strengthen non-proliferation with prime (though not necessarily exclusive) reference to the nuclear dimension.

### **Four Approaches to Non-Proliferation**

There are essentially four ways in which the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation can be envisaged. The first is outright denuclearization, the second is to prepare for the breakdown of the existing non-proliferation system, the third is to try and reinforce the current status-quo, and the fourth is to attempt to conceive of a new global nuclear regime. Each strand rests on different evaluations of post-cold war strategic changes, and on diverging conceptions of the future role of nuclear weapons in international security.

### ***The Zero Option***

An appealing solution to a problem is to eradicate its symptoms, especially if the latter is also considered to be the cause. General and complete, or unilateral nuclear disarmament has a long history of advocates, traditionally confined to activist fringes and shunned by policy-makers and by most specialists. From Bertrand Russell to Gorbachev's proposal in 1986 to eliminate all nuclear weapons within 15 years, the idea has seldom, if at all, been given serious consideration.

With the end of the cold war, however, advocacies for denuclearization have been revived with thought-provoking studies on "security without nuclear weapons", on the concept of a "nuclear-free world", and on the "end of the nuclear era"<sup>5</sup>. According to these analyses, the reduced significance of nuclear weapons after the cold war provides a unique opportunity to press for denuclearization. The very notion of nuclear deterrence is held to be a specific product of the bipolar cold war, and to have become both superfluous and detrimental after the passing of the East-West divide. In a nutshell, in the absence of anyone left to be deterred, the existence of a few nuclear powers is an incentive for others to follow suit. In McGwire's words, "proliferation has been driven by the need for a countervailing nuclear capability" therefore, "the explicit goal of an NWF (nuclear weapon-free) world (...) would make it easier to halt proliferation"<sup>6</sup>.

### ***Coercive Counter-Proliferation***

A second line of argument proceeds from a similar diagnosis to diametrically opposite conclusions and recommendations. It also considers that nuclear deterrence is a

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<sup>5</sup> See: Regina COWEN KARP (ed) *Security Without Nuclear Weapons*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 1992); J ROTBLAT, J. STEINBERGER and B. UDGAONKAR (eds), *A Nuclear Weapon-Free World: desirable? feasible?*, (Boulder Colorado, Westview, 1993); and Michael McGwire, "Is there a Future for Nuclear Weapons?", *International Affairs*, 70 (2), 1994 :211-228.

<sup>6</sup> M. McGwire, *op cit*, 220, 222.

thing of the past, made possible by a bipolar configuration and by a long learning process by both "rational" antagonists of the prudent management of nuclear capabilities. After the cold war, it is argued, new and future threats are likely to be "undeterrable".

Moreover, little faith is placed in existing non-proliferation regimes, hence the likelihood that the United States or other northern industrialized states will face threats to their homelands or to their interests from developing states equipped with non-conventional weapons and possibly nuclear ones. The new enemy is portrayed as uncaring of his population and therefore immune to the inhibiting calculus of deterrence, and is personified as the "rogue state" leader, a ghastly composite picture of Saddam Hussein, Kim Il Sung, Colonel Kaddafi, and Imam Khomeiny all rolled into one. Not only is preventive non-proliferation deemed a failure, but it is considered likely that new nuclear capabilities will be used.

The recommendations that flow from such analyses are that although deterrence may be obsolete, nuclear weapons are not. But their characteristics and roles are to be recast in a new way. Thus, most notably in the United States and in France, a series of analysts urge that nuclear weapons of low yield and high accuracy should be incorporated into arsenals designed for preventive, preemptive or punitive strikes in counter-proliferation mode against military and nuclear installations, and in decapitation mode against hostile leaderships in "rogue" developing countries.

### *Buttressing the Status-Quo*

This approach is expressed in the majority of specialist literature on non-proliferation, and broadly reflects the orientations shared by the G7 countries. Proponents of this approach willingly recognize that the existing system, embodied in the Nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and more select clubs like the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) has undergone a number of challenges and been found wanting in several respects.

But in spite of its shortcomings and loopholes of the NPT, its preservation is considered essential, and its reinforcement both desirable and feasible. The logical consequence of this approach is to seek an extension of the NPT for an indefinite period, to seek early ratifications and entry into force of the CWC, broaden the membership of the MTCR and promote the observance of its provisions.

With respect to existing declared nuclear arsenals, the watchword is minimal deterrence, without the prerequisite of an identified foe, and sounding more and more like an insurance policy against unpredictability than deterrence strictly speaking. While recognizing the reduced significance of nuclear weapons in the post-bipolar world, outright denuclearization is not contemplated. Instead, efforts persuasion and cautious pressure are advocated to elicit a "roll back" of threshold and de-facto nuclear states, leaving untouched the nuclear possession rules enshrined in the NPT.

## **Illusions and Pitfalls**

Each of the three approaches just summarized have been subject to mutual criticism, the first as wishful thinking, the second as scare-mongering, and the third as ineffectual tinkering.

If proponents of a nuclear free world were light-hearted enough to suggest overnight denuclearization, they could indeed be dismissed as day-dreamers. But their argument is more sophisticated than that, and recognizes that even in the most optimistic of scenarios, denuclearization is a time-consuming, difficult, an expensive process; as both Americans and especially Russians have begun to find out through experience. Instead, what is claimed is that by subscribing to the long term objective of denuclearization (whether a target date is specified or not) the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) could substantially affect the readiness of Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) to consent to renouncing nuclear options under a long term or indefinite extension of the NPT.

Among the genuine difficulties with these arguments, one may outline a few as follows: First, it is far from clear to what extent nuclear proliferation is -if at all- a consequence of nuclear possession by the five declared NWS. On the contrary, there is strong reason to maintain that regional threat perceptions and/or ambitions matter more to proliferation than global nuclear configurations. Secondly, even a commitment to a future zero option would not eliminate the need for managing existing (and decreasing) nuclear capabilities during a necessarily lengthy transition period. Thirdly, and more prosaically, there is little if any chance that in current and future conditions of predictable unpredictability, any -let alone all- of the five NWS or the three de-facto nuclear powers would take the quantum leap of faith into a binding commitment to a zero option.

A zero option is also sometimes presented as the only way of alleviating conclusively the discriminatory nature of the NPT and of most other non-proliferation arrangements (except the CWC). But at the risk of a tautology, the litmus test of a security policy is its ability to provide security, rather than its discriminatory or egalitarian character. Besides, a world hypothetically bereft of nuclear weapons would hardly be one of strategic equality. Vastly different economic, technological, industrial, conventional-weaponry, and power-projection capabilities would continue to constitute a starkly hierarchical international pecking order<sup>7</sup>. Furthermore, and for the same reasons, vastly different mastery of nuclear technology and levels of past experience with nuclear armaments would remain in the background. In a denuclearized world the current nuclear "haves" (whether openly avowed or not) and the most industrially advanced countries would be far more capable than others of re-constituting nuclear devices should they feel impelled to do so by adverse circumstances.

Fundamentally, after the cold war as before it, there are only two envisageable scenarios in which a policy of denuclearization might become palatable to the NWS: One

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<sup>7</sup> In this light, some of the American specialists who most willingly envisage the option of long-term denuclearization are no doubt comforted by the US's unique global reach and qualitative superiority in conventional power-projection.

is a technical scenario in which the advent of some new technology superseding nuclear weapons would make them obsolete and disposable. The other is a political scenario, in which the norms and processes of international relations would become so radically transformed, and security so credibly assured by other means, that nuclear weapons could be relinquished by all who possess them.

The more sanguine versions of counter-proliferation rest on utter disillusionment with the preventive aspects of non-proliferation, and on a somewhat nostalgic assessment that future nuclear (and other non-conventional) threats are, if anything, more serious than during the cold war. The customary way of presenting this view is to state that the cold war threat used to be predictable in form and in its options but of a low order of probability, whereas new threats may be more diffuse but more likely to erupt. Hence dire predictions that "somewhere, sometime in this decade, someone is going to set off a nuclear weapon in deadly earnest"<sup>8</sup>.

To recall an earlier point, it is not clear that threshold or de-facto nuclear states can be positively influenced by build-downs on the part of NWS. What is unfortunately clearer is that they can be negatively influenced by defence policy statements and force postures which portray them as the new post-cold war enemy. The more southern nations feel themselves cast in the awkwardly-fitting role of prime post-bipolar threat, the more some of them are likely to draw the most counter-productive "lesson" of the Gulf war -namely, that the military might of the industrialized powers can only be checked with nuclear weapons.

The leap from preventive non-proliferation to coercive counter-proliferation thus runs the risk of turning its alarming premises into a self-fulfilling prophecy<sup>9</sup>. Current American policy, struggling as it is to find some cogent meaning for the "counter-proliferation" label it has coined, is already beginning to show signs of back-pedalling from the crusading "North versus South" arguments used not so long ago to justify the ill-fated GPALS<sup>10</sup> programme. But the debate is far from sealed and shut, either in the United States or in France, for that matter. Thus, there exist vocal French advocates of increasingly usable for nuclear weapons, essentially in a North-South framework, seeking to replace the traditional concept of French deterrence "from the weak to the strong" with strike options "from the weak to the mad"... A much more cautious line is taken by the first French Defence White Paper in two decades, which states that "relations between North South, which, according to many, were to replace the East-West antagonism, cannot constitute a substitute frame of reference"<sup>11</sup>.

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<sup>8</sup> Rear Admiral Edward Scheafer Jr. head of US Naval Intelligence, quoted in Ted Galen CARPENTER, "Closing the nuclear Umbrella", *Foreign Affairs*, March-April 1994 :13.

<sup>9</sup> On the artificiality of an antagonistic North-South strategic divide, see Shahram CHUBIN, "The South and World Order", *The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 1993 :87-107; Christophe CARLE "Proliferation and the New World Order", European Strategy Group-Aspen Strategy Group, October 1992; and CARLE, "Future Roles of Ballistic Missile Defences; the North-South Dimension", in *What Future for Nuclear Forces in International Security* (Marshall and Paolini eds), CNSN-IFRI Workshop report, (Washington and Paris, 1992).

<sup>10</sup> Global Protection Against Limited Strikes.

<sup>11</sup> *Livre Blanc sur la Défense*, Chapter III, section 4.



The status-quo approach described earlier has much to commend it as far as it goes...but fails to go far enough. Its proponents repeatedly point to the near-universal adherence to the NPT as a clear sign of success, and add up with relish the 162 parties to the most widely-subscribed of non-proliferation arrangements. As tends to be the case with specialists and biographers enamoured with their subject, seasoned experts of the NPT system are seldom well-inclined to taking even constructive criticism of the established framework. The reaction is often a flurry of legal argument and footnote-artistry, aiming to show that any alteration or amendment by foolhardy outsiders threatens to unravel the entire edifice. In much of the specialized literature, policy recommendations are a litany of injunctions to "strengthen", "reinforce", or "tighten up" the existing system. But incantation does not constitute a policy.

Of course, the NPT cannot be criticized for not having 100% effective, which arguably no arms control or non-proliferation mechanism can be. It is also beyond doubt that in spite of its shortcomings, the NPT has helped to prevent some proliferation, has embodied a fundamental and broad consensus against the further spread of nuclear weapons, and has overall been a net positive contribution to international security. But the NPT embodies a particular bargain between NWS and NNWS, struck in the late sixties. Can the same bargain stick for a second prolonged period, or even for an indefinite one? Strengthening nuclear non-proliferation for the future rests less on technical means than on their political acceptability to as many states as possible. Thus, before envisaging measures designed to strengthen IAEA safeguards, for example by more systematic resort to such procedures as "special inspections"<sup>12</sup>, the first and foremost step is to ensure that such controls are at least accepted as legitimate by NPT members.

### **Issues for April 1995**

The issues before next April's NPT extension conference have been well-documented and may be outlined briefly.

The original bargain of the NPT was for NNWS to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons and accept safeguards on their nuclear activities, in return the assistance provided by NWS with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy (Article IV). In 1995, it is probable that the matter will be a subject of controversy. A number of developing states indeed maintain that that pledge has not been fulfilled, and that instead additional restrictions have been placed on civilian nuclear trade by the Nuclear Suppliers' Group decision of 1992 on dual-use items. The manner in which the United States has sought to enforce a total embargo on any nuclear supplies whatsoever to Iran can also be expected to be raised as a specific instance of contradicting the letter and spirit of the NPT.

In addition, the stated objective by G.7. countries of indefinite extension of the Treaty is likely to complicate preparations and negotiations. The contentious issues

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<sup>12</sup> By using the provisions of the INFCIRC/153 safeguards document, or even reinforcing them.

raised at past review conferences and in open debate will be more difficult to resolve if the resulting bargain is supposed to stick ad-infinitem.

One such issue is that of nuclear possession itself, and the entailed criticism of the discriminatory nature of the NPT. To accept that 5 countries alone are entitled to nuclear deterrents for a fixed period is one thing. But asking the vast majority of the international community to renounce nuclear weapons forever and entrust them for all time to five states which happened to have tested nuclear devices by 1967, is quite another. Already, proposals have been voiced for committing the NWS to eliminating their nuclear weapons according to an agreed timetable as a condition for indefinite extension.

The preamble to the Treaty does mention "the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons" as an ultimate objective. In addition, the well-known Article VI commits "the parties to the Treaty to (...) negotiations in good faith on (...) nuclear disarmament". Here again, the record can be expected to be a matter of controversy. Russia and the United States can claim the START treaties as unprecedented breakthroughs, France and Great Britain can point to recent unilateral nuclear reductions and claim that theirs are "minimal" deterrents anyway. But some NNWS might well argue that totals of 3000 and 3500 warheads for Russia and the US after START II, and several hundred for France, Britain and China may not be unchallenged forever.

In addition to difficulties linked to the goal of indefinite extension, issues linked to -but arising outside- the NPT framework may affect its extension:

The NPT mentions the goal of an end to nuclear tests in its preamble, but there are no grounds in the Treaty for arguing that a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) can be made a condition for extension. Regardless of the legalisms involved, however, it is clear that the current moratoria observed on testing by France, Russia, the United States, and (by way of consequence) by Great Britain, are largely aimed at forestalling criticism on that score.

In the same vein, there have been recurring calls from NNWS parties to the NPT for the NWS to provide assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used against them (negative security assurances), and that assistance will be forthcoming should a nuclear threat or attack ever take place (positive security assurances). Existing positive assurances (by the three repository states of the NPT, the US, the UK, and Russia) made in 1968, commit them to no more than acting in keeping with their obligations under the UN Charter. Negative assurances exist only in the form of qualified and non-binding declarations by the five NWS to the UN General Assembly. The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has established an ad-hoc committee to study the matter, and although the idea of "no first use" pledges has re-entered security debate, no notable new initiative has been taken by any of the NWS in this regard. It is worth recalling, incidentally that the issue of security guarantees is neither new, nor related exclusively to developing countries. Thus, Germany based its adherence to the NPT on the clear

condition that security guarantees (including nuclear ones) were provided through NATO.

Contrary to a -still- widespread misconception, the NPT does not expire in 1995. The purpose of the conference is not to decide if the Treaty will be extended, but for how long. Article X.2. specifies that the conference is mandated to decide "Whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods". The only case in which the Treaty can lapse is thus at the end of a single extension period of fixed duration. Whether any of the matters for controversy outlined above can suffice to derail the NPT extension conference remains to be seen. But the likelihood is strong that not all of these issues can be resolved in time for April 1995, in the space of less than a year.

With hindsight, it may become apparent that it was a mistake to aim for no less than indefinite extension, if only because any result short of that will be tantamount to a climbdown. But most of all, even if an indefinite extension can be secured against the odds, its genuine value will be open to question. At a minimum, the non-NPT threshold and de-facto nuclear states will remain outside the Treaty, and states that do sign up in spite of residual reticence will retain the option to withdraw.

### **Towards a New Nuclear Weapons Regime?**

The long-term strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation on the sole basis of the NPT as it stands is an illusion. The NPT is arguably a necessary element of minimal nuclear stability, but it is not a sufficient condition. At heart, the future course of nuclear proliferation will not be a result of specific measures undertaken to strengthen safeguards, export controls and verification, but will depend on the broader evolution of the international strategic context, and on the evolution of the role of nuclear weapons in international security. Fundamentally, nuclear (and other) proliferation is a world order<sup>13</sup> issue.

The propensity to treat proliferation as a technical problem amenable to technical and procedural fixes, obscures the underlying dimensions of the issue. In a world of growing insecurity, the propensity of certain states to seek to acquire nuclear options or capabilities will continue unabated. On the face of it, post-cold war uncertainties might seem to make the NPT all the more valuable; but on the other hand, those very same uncertainties also make it more difficult for non-nuclear states to renounce the nuclear option forever.

As a result, and because as outlined earlier, nuclear weapons are here to stay for the foreseeable future, what is most crucially needed is a new conception of the role of nuclear weapons as contributions to international and collective security. But NWS have only just begun to try and grapple with the significance of the end of the cold war for their nuclear capabilities, for nuclear stability and deterrence. Moreover, the trials and

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<sup>13</sup> However unfashionable the term of international "order" may have become in recent years.

tribulations of attempted collective security enforcement in the last few years hardly augur for an easy task.

In this connection, the 1995 conference simply comes too soon... It is called upon to settle a long-term formal arrangement affecting a crucial area of security at a time of rapid and intense flux, and the odds are that the result will be an expedient rather than an enduring solution.

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# **Session 1 - 4**

## **Strengthening Non-Proliferation**

*presented by Mr Christian Lechervy*

**JIIA-IFRI Joint Conference**

**June 2-3, 1994**

## **Southeast Asia : an arms race, or just equipment upgrade and modernisation?**

There seems to be broad agreement, according to the international press, that the countries of Southeast Asia have been engaged in an "Arms race" since the end of the 80s. The central question however remains: why rush to acquire and modernise weapons in Southeast Asia in an era of relative peace? Motivated by a fear of US disengagement from Asia, by a new conventional Chinese threat, especially maritime, and by affirmation of Japanese international ambitions, as yet ill defined, such an arms race would be even more worrying in this particular region that is both economically active and whose territorial difficulties and inter-state rivalries persist despite the end of the cold war. As a result, some claim that Southeast Asia will be the last great international arms market.

While this lecture has as its foundation the signing of relatively large equipment contracts which have received extensive media coverage, it remains to be seen if this is part of an arms "race" like that in the Middle East in the 70s or merely an upgrading and modernisation process for weapons that until now have been limited in numbers and largely obsolete. To resolve this, the following need to be examined:

- \* The type of threat that could justify this procurement effort;
- \* the transformation taking place in national military organisations;
- \* the consequences of procurement programmes on the regional strategic balance.

And because we are in a Franco-Japanese dialogue, I will outline a few unofficial thoughts on the role and attitude that France might adopt on this Southeast Asia question.

### **I/ The type of threat that could justify such a procurement effort**

#### **A) Recent geostrategic developments**

In the past weapons were bought by Southeast Asian countries (sometimes with external support) *primarily for use within their own national borders for the protection of their national identity and the structure of the regime. Some commentators have found evidence of interactive arms acquisitions in the contemporary Southeast Asian system of states, in which inter-state territorial disputes and political suspicions linger on. The long sequence of conflicts* (1) which we have seen in the region means that a tradition of conflict is deeply engrained in a still recent past. This past includes a strong guerrilla heritage born and nurtured abroad. For more than a century, Southeast Asia has been little more than a confused area of deadly confrontation between rival great powers - the dividing up of colonial areas and the Second World War - and of border adjustments by victorious nationalist movements. None of these Southeast Asian conflicts has been in any way comparable to those that affected Europe over the last two centuries. In Europe there have been wars between neighbouring states and wars between military alliances, i.e. inter-state conflicts on an intra-regional scale.

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(1) C. Lecharvy - N. Regaud : *Un millénaire de guerre en Indo-Chine*, PUF (to be published)

Southeast Asia herself considers that she has only seen internal conflict (wars of national liberation, ethnic rebellions, civil wars), or those resulting from action by outside parties (the Second World War, the three Indochina conflicts). Casualties may have been high, but these conflicts have been of low intensity - apart from the US war in Vietnam in which small calibre weapons have played a much more important role than more sophisticated weapons systems. A term analysis of the strategic context in Southeast Asia <sup>(2)</sup> leads to the following conclusions:

### 1) Internal conflicts cool down <sup>(3)</sup>

From Myanmar to Indonesia, and from the Philippines to Cambodia, armed insurrections no longer threaten the immediate existence of the ruling regime. Those involved are even, with varying degrees of goodwill, negotiating their re-entry into the traditional political arena. Those who want to continue the battle are now fighting alone with no hope of help from any third country, and therefore sometimes follow the dangerous criminal path (NPA, CPB, Aceh Merdeka are some examples). The traditional supporters of guerrillas, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and the USSR, no longer accord the same priority to this in their international activity, the PRC because it is committed to a long term strategic policy aimed at being accepted as a super power by the USA; and Russia, with the disappearance of the USSR, and now beset by her enormous internal problems, is according a low priority to the countries of Southeast Asia.

### 2) Some persistant dangers

The states concerned have not yet managed to create a regional identity. Although heterogeneous from almost all points of view - ethnic, religious, cultural, economic - Southeast Asia is seen by the international community as a coherent entity. But it remains divided into three sub-groups: ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations which includes Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand); the countries of the old French Indochina (Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam) and two "independent" states: Myanmar and Taiwan.

Having created an institutional framework that enables them to negotiate with the greater powers and to insinuate themselves into the international community, the ASEAN countries now have an appropriate diplomatic vehicle at their disposal. But this does not give the region an exclusive identity, and the economic success of certain countries has led them to lay claim to greater status and power in their own right, thus feeding individual ambitions at a regional level. Thailand is an example of this type of regional policy. In some cases, this process of (re)building an identity might provoke a "conflict" with outside powers that have influence within the region: recent signs of annoyance from the Malaysian Prime Minister at remarks made by his Australian opposite number and with the British press concerning the affair, or again the reticence of Kuala Lumpur on the subject of APEC <sup>(4)</sup> illustrate the consequences likely to result from an appetite for national and regional affirmation.

(2) As usually agreed, Southeast Asia includes the following States: Burma, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam as well as Taiwan

(3) C. Lechervy : Pour une construction sinusoidale de la paix en Asie in C. Lechervy - R. Petris : Les Cambodgiens face à eux-mêmes ? FPH, Lausanne, 1993, pp9 - 24

(4) APEC: Asia-Pacific Economic Conference, bringing together 15 Asian and American Pacific seaboard states.



As far as the countries of Indochina are concerned, they have yet to join the new wave of economic dynamism that is such a media success in Southeast Asia. Their relative vulnerability is the result of their internal political and economic difficulties which are greater than those of their ASEAN neighbours: Laos is an enclosed and poorly developed nation, Viet Nam is still caught in the death throws of an outmoded communism that lacks external support, Cambodia is a country ravaged by twenty years of conflict, and wracked by the strife of civil war, whose reconstruction incites covetous thoughts amongst her immediate neighbours.

Myanmar and Taiwan are uniquely different within this geographical area. Myanmar, a country enclosed and relatively self sufficient under an ageing military junta (SLORC), seldom seeks to join in regional exchanges. By contrast, Taiwan, a country with an open economy, is one of the driving forces behind the dynamism in Southeast Asia (7.3% growth in 1991, 6.1% in 1992).

### 3) The states of Southeast Asia dread being faced with a strategic void

Political and defence discussions are increasingly dominated by the fear of a destabilising power vacuum resulting from the end of the cold war, giving rise to a resurgence of low intensity conflicts after the withdrawal of the US and the Soviets from the region. Whether real or imagined, the power of China is increasingly acting as a new catalyst for regional strategic unity, inciting widespread fear of territorial expansion by the PRC (at sea or on land). While the USA is still by far the largest global military power, and will remain so for a long time to come, the countries of Southeast Asia are already considering the future regional strategic situation in terms of rivalries between the new Asian powers which are Japan and China (plus India if it manages to escape from its lethargy). A unilateral or combined response by Japan and other regional countries to the Chinese military posture will mark a new era of Great Power rivalry in Southeast Asia. This strategic analysis can also be found almost word for word in the 1994 edition of the French Defence White paper.

### 4) Continental China incites fear

Despite persistent lack of a stated policy, the new defence policies of the ASEAN countries seem to be being built around this new perception. Although the naval modernisation programme of the PRC <sup>(5)</sup> seems to be bogged down and their air force modernisation still relies essentially on the import and manufacture under licence of Soviet equipment (at an apparently low rate of less than 24 aircraft per year between now and the year 2000), the forecast growth in Chinese military potential is already inciting fear. Already, the capabilities and progress of her military forces have been exaggerated almost to the point of a disinformation campaign (cf. the *Varyag aircraft carrier affair which the Chinese may have tried to buy*).

(5) C. Leclercy: Les incohérences du programme naval de la PRC. IRIS, 17 June 1994 [?]

The provisional conclusion that can be drawn is that within this new geostrategic context the probability of a major inter-state conflict remains low. Despite the continuance of sovereignty disputes over the alignment of land or maritime frontiers, a classical conflict between the armed forces of two or more countries seems barely credible. Amongst these sovereignty disputes, that concerning the Spratley archipelago (in the South China Sea) is the most likely to take on a military dimension, not least because of its sino vietnamese dimension. However a possible confrontation would probably be of low intensity and remain limited in both time and space.

#### B) The risk of conflict in Southeast Asia

For more than half a century Southeast Asia has been almost permanently at war. It became an Asia knowing nothing but war, as it is here more than anywhere else that the paroxysmal East/West "proxy wars" have been contested. In other terms, Southeast Asia might now require a permanent state of tension in order to exist, to grow, and to push forward into the future. The Southeast Asian region has for so long been the victim, but it may yet see new forms of conflict.

##### 1) From micro-conflict to endemic mini-wars

This variety of armed struggle, which has only recently ended in Malaysia, continues to affect Myanmar, Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia, Laos and Indonesia. Armed disputes over inter-ethnic relations have admittedly reduced since the start of the decade, and now may even be coming under some degree of control, as witness the cease-fires signed between the SLORC and the Kachin and between the MNLF and the Manila government, and the negotiations between Jakarta and the Timor insurgents, but these exchanges do not so much mark an end to armed conflicts as bring opportunities for further negotiations to build a lasting agreement. For peace campaigners such forms of violence are the most difficult to handle as at the origin of the fighting there is always vengeance, hatred, even fear, but also mistrust, which is the most difficult to master politically.

These forms of conflict most often occur at countries' geographical (border, maritime area) or ethnic limits. Ethnic or religio/ethnic insurrections are by their nature defensive, confined to an area within which those involved hope to gain, if not independence, then at least autonomy or special rights recognising and guaranteeing their identity. They have no aspirations for power at a national level. This antagonistic nature requires a specific conflict management technique. The armed forces' internal security tasks overshadow or even eclipse all others. As peace moves in these forms of conflict are relatively recent, the armies of Southeast Asia want to remain ready for any eventuality. They will be even more so inclined where these armed movements still retain a positive nuisance value. Development since the end of the 1980s and the end of a bipolarisation resulting from the criminalisation of certain armed struggles (the ex CPB in Myanmar, Aceh Merdeka in Indonesia, FMLN in the Philippines), who increasingly use earnings from drug trafficking and terrorism, justifies the maintenance of an efficient territorial military organisation. This evolution from *Homo Bellicus* to *Homo Economicus* risks endangering certain modernisation processes (such as the possibilities of an attack on the Total pipeline in Mon territory). Any insecurity, however small, discourages investors, especially foreigners who cannot run the risk of being kidnapped as now happens in the Philippines.

At a time when the ideological thrust of insurgent movements appears largely to have dissipated (perhaps only temporarily?), some observers fear a (re)birth of movements of a religious nature such as in Thailand or in the Philippines. Nevertheless, this ethnic thrust, which is the stronger and more active, should yield in the face of economic interdependence and the development of an urbanised consumer middle class, and consequent greater prosperity.... These movements do however explain the persistence, both in the military and culturally, of the territorial model and the importance attached to internal security forces.

The progressive occupation of new parts of the territory, along with urbanisation, improvements to infrastructure (especially roads and airports) and the modernisation of the armed forces (helicopters, communications and detection) should also lead to the end of that other archaism, the private army. In the Philippines President Fidel Ramos has been using one, and not without effect, for several months. Despite economic and internal security improvements, countries in the region continue to maintain paramilitary forces <sup>(6)</sup>, set up a decade ago to help the army in current and residual counter insurgency operations and in anticipation of future threats. However to succeed in this change of function, the economic and social reintegration of leaders and members of these private armies must be carefully monitored. The UN operation in Cambodia and the Philippines experience have taught us that these armies can very easily mutate into limited or wide-ranging bandit operations. It remains to be seen if the weapons they have acquired legitimately over recent years give them the capability to develop into multinational mafias, profiting from the growth in trade, "warlordism" (which is rampant), corruption (which is routine) and piracy.

These new confrontational possibilities result mainly from the search for, and the rate of, regional economic development. Maritime piracy, which has risen so significantly in recent years, appears linked to increased maritime trade, using ships that are largely automatic and often manned by highly exploited crews, but also to wealth differentials amongst Pacific rim countries. In the eyes of maritime populations this part time piracy of opportunity yields results that are significantly more profitable than fishing, coastal trading or even smuggling, without being to them in any way contradictory. This activity against ships passing by on the horizon, who are strangers or worse still, refugees (the boat people are easy prey, and have not been spared by the resurgence of the phenomenon) does not unduly concern governments with the possible exception of Singapore and Thailand, who wish to present themselves as guardians of the straights. However we must not forget that the disappearance of ships and the theft of cargoes are rare events. More often the target is the captain's safe and the currency it contains. In some cases piracy or its presence can however be used as a means of covert action by a government. Hong Kong and Malaysia accuse, discretely, the PRC of such practices, either to exercise pressure (on Hong Kong) or to legitimise her military presence by citing examples of the disorder provoked thereby (around the Spratleys). It thus remains to be seen if Southeast Asian economic development will be an added political stabilising factor. This optimistic hypothesis, put forward by such authors as Samuel Pizar, might lead to thoughts of commerce replacing war, of economic integration reducing ethnic tension and of co-operation between states substituting for power politics. In such a situation military questions become secondary and limited to problems of policing.

(6) Isaac Zulkarnen: Paramilitary Forces of Southeast Asia, *Asian Defence Journal* no 2/94

## 2) The Spratley question

On a strictly geostrategic level, this would appear to be on a different scale. It is an obvious example of the type of conflict that accords well with that most widely anticipated in the region. A few observations and a reminder of some of the facts may be useful. The Paracel question, often linked to that of the Spratleys, seems to have been settled. The PRC took them over in 1974 practically without opposition and will not give them up. This is undeniably a worrying precedent not only for Viet Nam but also for all countries in the region. However, the territorial stake in the Spratleys seems limited. These islands are minute and totally lacking in known resources and for the most part have never been inhabited. The maritime territorial stakes (economic exclusion zone, oil exploration and extraction rights, and secondarily those for fishing) are a much more serious matter, but the results of current explorations may well modify completely the regional geostrategic outlook. With the desire of the PRC to get itself accepted as a great power and to regain all its national territories, its past grandeur and its sphere of influence, it must be remembered that in China's maritime history the Southern Sea represented an area of opportunity and success (in contrast to the Eastern Sea, the Pacific Ocean, the unknown, and that in the North, the sea of dangers from whence might come the Russian or more likely Japanese aggressors). For the future it may thus be necessary to face up to the possibility of a "Tibetisation of the China Sea". A brutal occupation of the Spratleys is already a military possibility thanks to the amphibious naval capabilities of the PRC, not forgetting heliborne commandos and landings from submarines. Widely differing rumours have been circulating concerning conversion of at least one container ship into a helicopter carrier. In such a situation the major problem would not be the defeat of the islands but holding them, and then supplying them along a supply line that would be very exposed to possible action from Vietnam and Malaysia. Such an operation could not be initiated and continued without air superiority, a challenge taken up by the other regional powers, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand. The distances involved prevent Chinese aircraft from operating over the islands. Although the Peoples Liberation Army is learning the techniques of in-flight refuelling, it seems unlikely that this has yet reached the stage of being a usable operational capability (requiring a fleet of tanker aircraft, probe equipped combat aircraft and trained pilots). Faced with a relatively small air threat (24 Su-27), opponents of such an operation who are better placed geographically have chosen to equip themselves with air forces with superior capabilities (AWACS, fourth generation fighters, and sophisticated air-to-air missiles).

Finally, maybe Beijing will decide to "blow cold" and thereby take the risk of discouraging the growth process (of which it is the principle beneficiary, and on which the regime seems to be relying in its attempts to buy longevity). This would be a extremely political decision, catastrophic at an economic level, which could only be taken for pre-eminent and irresistible internal reasons. Also relevant, between now and 1997, is the policy of the PRC towards the Hong Kong question, which should give valuable clues, and will need to be closely watched. Opponents of Chinese claims to the archipelago seem to have opted for a policy of military prevention (priority to air and naval forces) and of economic deterrence, through an intensification of exchanges and co-operation.

### 3) The danger of a Sino/Chinese confrontation: the PRC against Taiwan

It must not be forgotten that the two Chinas, or the separate parts of a single China, simultaneously maintain very different relations on at least four levels:

Increases in economic co-operation (Taiwan investment in the PRC), exchanges and the movement of personnel are undoubtedly stabilising factors whose importance must not be underestimated. As a sign of this relaxation, if it were needed, we have seen the start of tourism to Quemoy and Matsu and the project to transform them into the "Sino-Disney of the cold war". This economic realism has not however made the diplomatic guerrilla war between Beijing and Taipei go away, as the former wants to maintain the diplomatic isolation of the latter. An isolation that the increasing regional economic role of the latter is tending to diminish, as witness the recent holiday by the President of the Republic and his retinue in the countries of ASEAN. Both Chinas still consider each other as rivals, even as potential adversaries as in the Spratleys where Taiwan occupies the island of Itu, an old Japanese submarine base during the Pacific war. However it must not be forgotten that, when faced with claims from Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines, both Beijing and Taipei affirmed the same inalienable rights of China. In this context, acquisition by the PRC of modern combat aircraft (24 Su-27 confirmed), and the plans which are assumed (48 to 72 further Su-27 and 150 MiG 31), plus the navy's genuine but slow progress and its alleged plans (the *Varyag* buy), have triggered (or been used as a pretext for) ambitious modernisation programmes for Taiwan air and naval forces. Faced with these programmes, the attitude of Beijing seems to us to be fairly ambiguous, relying more on diplomatic protests and economic pressure than on any willingness to take up the challenge and match them, thus embarking on an arms race. Over the two years to date the international media and the specialist press have detected no signs of any acceleration in China's military effort which could be linked to the Taiwan programmes. For the moment, the effectiveness of the method used by the PRC suffices to limit the arms race in the region as it influences the attitude of France and probably also that of the US (who have refused to sell the latest C and D versions of the F16). It continues to prevent purchase by Taiwan of submarines, probably one of the most destabilising weapons in the current context. Finally it is known that the PRC has drawn a set of "red lines", the crossing of which by Taiwan would provoke rapid if not immediate response. There is also a willingness to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivery (especially surface-to-surface weapons); these plus the formal proclamation of independence are all arguments that might exercise a moderating influence on electoral behaviour, on bargaining between Taiwan political parties and on arms purchases by the latter.

Complex and ambiguous relations these may be, but as in the rest of the region, they are relations in which in our view, stabilising factors should outweigh destabilising ones. A Sino-Chinese conflict, representing the "maximum conceivable accident" would have immense repercussions: a cold blast throughout the region, the spectre of general destabilisation, the draining away of foreign investment, disruption to maritime trade, cessation of growth and a return of outside influences (Japan, Russia, even the US) reversing all the Asianisation that so many want. No-one in the region wants such a development nor would it be in anyone's interests. However we are left with the specific internal problems of the PRC (economic development, politics, the succession of Deng Xiaoping) which mean that the possibility cannot be completely ruled out. So what forms could such a confrontation take? Firstly, the size and power of the army and the (relative) weakness of their amphibious

and airborne transport capabilities exclude any thought of an invasion; except perhaps in the final stages of a conflict in which one of the protagonists had become seriously weakened by damage to their military capability or perhaps by a "socio-political implosion" arising from the conflict. The most often used hypothesis is that of a blockade of Taiwan by the PRC which would use submarines, aircraft and surface vessels, the mining of ports (using aircraft and submarines), and attacks against merchant vessels (using all the above means, with all the risks of international intervention that such action would involve). During such a crisis Taiwan would most probably take all possible steps to re-establish the integrity of her maritime approaches (mine clearance, ASW, ASV and air defence operations), leading inevitably to a battle for air superiority over the maritime approaches. The intrinsic advantages of an attack "at source" could perhaps be pursued at this stage with a series of actions against opposing naval and air bases, using surface to surface missiles (from the PRC) or air attacks (from both sides), thereby extending the air superiority battle into the territory of the protagonists. Commando raids on specific targets, terrorist attacks (perhaps on the territories of third parties) could accompany these various operations. This overview would not be complete without a mention of some technical and tactical factors. With the current state of the two respective arsenals, it is clear that Beijing has an enormous quantitative advantage: about a hundred submarines (but how many are operational?) against two, a few thousand (ageing) combat aircraft against a few hundred (old but modernised). Taiwan already possesses a qualitative advantage, but her weapons replacement programme and the pace of modernisation seem much faster and more intensive than in the PRC. It appears to us that (at the currently announced programme rates) her qualitative advantage should fairly soon make Taiwan safe from the risk of having its defences saturated, creating a de facto conventional deterrence situation. Finally, and to conclude this chapter on a sino-chinese crisis, we must examine the hypothesis of the two countries coming quickly closer together, perhaps even reuniting.

At a regional level this hypothesis appears extremely destabilising, with the fusion of the complementary capabilities of the PRC (market, manpower, raw materials) and of Taiwan (technological know-how, organisational capability and a higher level of socio-economic development) could make the whole greater than the sum of the two parts. Militarily the juxtaposition of the two weapons inventories, which are not only complementary (both qualitatively and quantitatively), but also oversized compared with others in the region, would create a new colossus. This new deal of the pack would unite the whole disparate Chinese nation around a common pole, whose commercial influence, financial resources and ability to provide mutual support should not be underestimated.

## II / Modernisation of national defence systems

This modernisation of conventional arms inventories in the 1990s (and even earlier (7)) coincides with a scaling down of domestic security concerns but also with a concomitant emphasis on equipment upgrade to meet possible external threats as well as replacing ageing or obsolescent hardware. In more specific terms, this can also be seen as a changeover from counter insurgency to conventional defence plus a quest for self reliant defence. ASEAN defence modernisation and expansion, despite the absence of any imminent external threat,

(7) Some of these programmes in the Malaysian mould originate from the communisation of Indochina and the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia in 1979.

cannot however be attributed solely to an arms race phenomenon. It results from a combination of external and internal factors.

#### A) A slow evolution

At a human level, the increase in military personnel during the 1980s, +23.5% between 1980 and 1992 <sup>(8)</sup> see Annex 1) required the ASEAN countries to pay more attention to equipment for their new soldiers which should have resulted in an enormous market opportunity. However, equipment purchases in no way followed the rise in numbers, even in the more technically advanced armies (see Annex 2). As such armies are being transformed from "shotgun" forces into mechanised infantry, it is understandable that improved surface naval platforms are also being purchased and that air defence capabilities are being enhanced with technologically sophisticated aircraft and other air defence assets. Nevertheless, certain geographical and human factors remain as obstacles to this modernisation process and, de facto, to any proliferation. The jungle and the divided and mountainous terrain mean that lines of communication are rare, of poor quality and very vulnerable. Such a region is thus totally unsuitable to mobile warfare, to "modern" combat techniques and to bringing military operations to rapid conclusions. This is certainly not "tank" country. Air power is also constrained by difficulties arising from the Asian monsoons. But economic modernisation is slowly changing this environment that is so unsuited to warfare, at least in its modern and European sense. Lines of communication are being extended, improved and interconnected, as witness this year the opening on the Laos/Thailand border of the Friendship bridge which will ease exchanges all the way from Singapore into Continental China. Joining the ranks of industrialised nations means that the country's geography closes in around new poles of industrial production and urbanisation. This reinforcement of the urban network, characteristic of any rise in a state's power, has as a corollary the opening of new military windows of opportunity. New areas are thus created, accessible to modern warfare techniques, and especially to weapons of mass destruction. For the moment this change in landscape and territorial development has not introduced radical changes into the framework of military organisations, but who can say if this will always be so.

#### B) Persistence of military organisation models

At the moment, while everyone is enjoying listing possible peace dividends flowing from the end of the cold war, one has the impression that some European arms suppliers have stepped up their sales efforts to this region following the fall off in demand elsewhere. The region's armies are now responding in very different ways to the new "threats" (real or imaginary), and this enables us to draw clear comparisons between two main types of defence policy which form the basis for all defence concepts in countries in the region:

##### 1) A few rare conventional models (Taiwan and Singapore)

Taiwan, who still largely defines her international position by comparison with her powerful continental neighbour, is the Southeast Asian country that has achieved the most spectacular increase in military power: 360 combat aircraft ordered or planned between now until the year 2000 (i.e. F-16, Mirage 2000-5, ?), 19 frigates in build or ordered, 10 others planned, plus submarines if a European country refuses to give way to PRC pressure. But this

<sup>(8)</sup> Brunei: +56%, Indonesia: +17%, Malaysia: +93.1%, the Philippines: -5.5%, Singapore: +32%, Thailand: 22.5%

phenomenon has roots which must not be forgotten. Taiwan must make up for a gap of more than 30 years in military supplies and its naval and air force equipment is still largely obsolete. The proposed military power is also far from incompatible with her economic development (defence expenditure equivalent to 5% of GDP, against 4.1 for the UK and 5.4 for Greece).

The city-state of Singapore is also pursuing a comparable defence policy, although its most likely "enemies" are very different as they are its Malaysian and Indonesian neighbours. At the start of the 1980s Singapore modified its concept of the "poisonous shrimp" to go for a more conventional, mainly air, superiority over its two neighbours, and now has some of the most modern equipment in the region to compensate for its limited population (2.8 million) and small size (622 km<sup>2</sup>). Despite these detail differences, Singapore is following a defence policy that is very comparable with that of Taiwan, albeit on a reduced scale.

## 2) The adoption of a territorial model: the other Southeast Asian states.

The ASEAN countries such as ex-French Indochina adopt as a pattern for their armed forces one which could be described as a "territorial model", characterised by the fact that their armed forces (land, sea and air) are totally occupied by internal security missions both civil and military (repression, surveillance, support for the administration and infrastructure projects). As frontier regions of China are seen as a direct threat to territorial integrity, the maintenance of a classical component with modern equipment favours the coexistence of a two tier army.

Despite this perpetuation of a territorial model, it can be seen however that the states are seeking to create the nuclei of modern conventional military forces, perhaps even with an external intervention capability: the purchase of F-16 and air defence systems, deep sea capable combat vessels, increases in fire power and mobility for land forces dominated by the infantry and the creation of small scale rapid reaction forces. However, these tendencies seem more associated with the countries' economic and technological growth than to any concept of a genuine threat. When compared with their surface areas and populations, they appear essentially symbolic and for now, to have little real military significance. To achieve the status of extra-regional power, the initial force ratio appears so unfavourable for the Southeast Asian nations that no "hold the line" defence of territorial integrity or frontiers seems possible. Only a prolonged fighting response in depth over difficult terrain seems likely to reverse the situation.

The "new generation" of equipment also does not seem to be shifting the general balance of military programmes which are still dominated by the territorial model. For example between now and the year 2000 the ASEAN states expect to buy 163 ultra light type aircraft (Hawk, S 211, Albatross) against 121 from the intermediate range (F-16, Mig 29): the dual role of ground attack/training has taken priority over air superiority and penetration missions. This territorial model is the legacy of a still recent past when the ASEAN states still belonged to the third world. Development has transformed them into "emerging industrial nations", a change which one might think would ultimately bring with it changes in the threat and alterations in the way risks are viewed and assessed. But this is a phenomenon that will evolve only slowly, which explains the persistence of the territorial model. In other words, the risks of proliferation are more plausible for the middle of the next century than for today.



If nothing unexpected happens this situation seems unlikely to change much before the year 2000 or even 2005. Until then, and remembering the Taiwanese and Singaporean exceptions, the arms race in Southeast Asia will remain, if not mythical, at least a phenomenon of limited magnitude, too erratic in its behaviour and too far from the practical requirements of the European theatre to be a realistic outlet for the crisis-hit European arms industry; nor is it likely that it will provoke - through a massive accumulation of modern weapons systems - the emergence of a politically unstable zone where inter-ethnic differences will be settled by force of arms as in the Middle East. In this market the Europeans will also be in competition with the Russians who are trying to sell off a large part of the stocks of weapons they have inherited from the cold war.

### C) Outlook for Southeast Asian armed forces

Since the middle of the 1980s, armed forces based on the territorial model have entered a transition period, requiring them to make decisions to acquire new defensive or even offensive capabilities. All these capabilities are all still only in embryonic form. They have not yet achieved a militarily significant "critical mass": what do between 12 and 20 F-16s, between 2 and 6 warships and an airborne or amphibious battalion really represent for a country the size and population of Indonesia (180 million inhabitants and nearly 2 million km<sup>2</sup>) or Myanmar (42 million inhabitants and 676,000 km<sup>2</sup>)? In Southeast Asian countries, the balance between the three arms is, for the moment, well and truly in favour of the army.

Within any armed force two force structures often coexist, symbolising two distinct eras. On the one hand we have large and often over-manned battalions which are the legacy of the post-colonial territorial system. On the other, we have "embryonic" elements of a modern armed force combining fire power and radius of action (examples are multi-role combat aircraft, missile carrying ships, air defence systems) which exist in very limited numbers, especially when related to surface areas and populations, making them appear no more than "toy armies" with inevitably very limited operational effectiveness and a largely symbolic vocation (capability demonstration, and national prestige) or with roles that are yet to be defined.

This duality results in a juxtaposition of three types of military organisation. In the first, (Taiwan and Singapore) one finds, unusually for this region, the presence of main battle tanks (MBT), of antitank missiles and self propelled artillery, and a certain priority accorded to mechanised and self propelled armour. These states' doctrinal option is thus to be capable of undertaking high intensity and highly mobile combat operations. These characteristics are reminiscent of the European model and certainly represent one of the rare examples of conventional arms proliferation.

On the transition point from the dominant territorial model are Thailand and Vietnam. If Hanoi's economic and political situation had been better, one might have seen a true arms race between these two rivals on the Indochina strategic stage. Each capital has in fact simultaneously developed a certain offensive *blitzkrieg* capability and a workable strategic defence for tight control of the territory. However, since the decline of Vietnamese power and the withdrawal of the PAVN from Cambodia and Laos, giving priority to the development of airmobile forces (such as the creation of an air cavalry division) no longer makes sense. Only a threat reassessment, covering the range from ideological influences to demographic

invasion (*Nam Tien/Chinh Nghia*), might make it possible to keep alive an interest in such a model <sup>(9)</sup>.

In summary, the territorial model continues to be dominate in Southeast Asia. If published equipment programmes are examined carefully, one can only note - I will not say regret - the absence of heavy and sophisticated equipment. Offensive and defensive capabilities, except against insurrections, are therefore very low. It is true that in all such cases one can still see "regional" commands, sometimes joint service, predominating over functional commands. The Indonesian army is the archetypal example of this model as it gives the priority to district forces (81 battalions out of 105), and to paramilitary forces (1.7 million men in the Kamra and Wanra forces against 270,000 men in the regular forces) and in equipment terms to armoured troop carriers (630) over tanks <sup>(10)</sup>. A strong infantry domination still persists over "technical" arms (artillery and armour) which are merely "sprinkled" amongst infantry units (with grave implications for maintenance and ability to adapt to sophisticated weapons). This situation explains the absence of a military doctrine extending further than simple close tactical control and psychological warfare and there is thus a strong tendency amongst units to become settled in one place, and a lack of a general reserve and no units with a deployment capability, apart from "special forces". The latter are more highly trained infantry, specialised in infiltration operations in a hostile environment and in the pursuit of rebel forces, in contrast to the largely static infantry and artillery units.

To the relief of those who were too eager to believe in a new Asian Eldorado, the re-equipment of the armies follows on from the modernisation of air and naval forces which are more likely to play a role in containing terrorists.

#### D) The Naval/Air stake

The first phase of the conventional build-up was set back by the economic recession of 1985 and 1986, but quickly picked up again when ASEAN economics improved in the late 1980s, although this time with a distinctly maritime emphasis. Besides the economic recovery, other regional factors account for the current ASEAN bias towards maritime forces. Amongst these factors we can concentrate on three <sup>(11)</sup>:

- \* the absence of land based threats following the downgrading of the so-called "Vietnamese threat", together with the virtual disappearance of major internal insurgency operations following the defeat of the armed communist movements;

- \* the three UN conferences on the Law of the Sea in the 1970s (UNCLOS I-III), which culminated in the United Conventions on the Law of the Sea of 1982, contributed to the creation of new maritime regimes and frontiers in the region. It became necessary to assert sovereignty over these new maritime areas, and new maritime disputes arose as a result of differing interpretations of UNCLOS regarding maritime boundaries;

(9) C. Lechervy : Demography and Security : The Asian Wagers, IIRI, 3 November 1993

(10) The 155 tanks are all light tanks; there are no heavy tanks nor even any antitank missiles.

(11) I N Mak : ASEAN Defence Reorientation 1975 - 1992 : The Dynamics of Modernisation and Structural Change, Australian National University, Canberra, 1993, p 5

\* the availability of technologies to economically exploit living and nonliving ocean resources and the increasing economic importance of these resources (i.e. hydrocarbon reserves), as well as the need to protect them.

Earlier than any other country, Taiwan and Thailand paid particular attention to this strategic dimension which could well consume a lot of money in the decades to come. The Republic of China (ROC) plans to replace all its warships between now and the years 2000 to 2005, or a timescale of 6 to 10 years, which is a replacement rate four times as fast as a normal fleet replacement rate. This modernisation programme which involves 10 submarines in 1994, while undoubtedly of use for maritime blockade, appears to be difficult to put into practice. The Netherlands has only delivered 2 out of the 4 ordered, Germany has decided against selling 4 of its own, and France, since the declaration of 12 January 1994 can, by rights, hardly consider it. If the balance of forces with continental China does not change, it appears unlikely that any country with the necessary technical expertise for submarine construction would act differently. Unless South Korea, who now seems to have entered the market as a submarine manufacturing country, takes on the project for its own strategic reasons (i.e. connivance between the PRC and North Korea on military nuclear applications). It must not be forgotten that a tradition of co-operation in fact already exists between the two navies especially for missile equipped patrol craft. But *mutatis mutandis*, the only solution, but a difficult one, consists in developing an autonomous capability in Taiwan possibly helped by covert technology transfers. Any proliferation may thus not so much result from the export of equipment but of technological capability, and in particular of dual technology.

For similar reasons it is important to pay close attention to the role played by Thailand. For the moment the international press is concentrating on the collusion between the Thai army and the Kmer Rouge or again between the military in Bangkok and the Junta in Yangon. However Thai military plans are much more ambitious and are usually fairly obscure. Thailand is also well on the way to becoming a regional maritime power with her plans, for 1997, to buy an aircraft carrier built in collaboration with Spain, and even two submarines. This aircraft carrier and its escorts, equipped for the anti-air role and for ASW, are destined to be deployed most often in the South China Sea. For this project to be fully effective and for Thailand to acquire a true light naval/air group, she must strengthen her logistic capabilities. Such a formation could not operate without support from multi-role supply ships. We must therefore expect Bangkok to order between one and three such vessels between now and 1997. Until details of these new procurements are known, we will not be able to confirm if Bangkok is really seeking to develop a regional strategic advantage. Meanwhile the amphibious component is also being replaced, more or less on a one-for-one basis. From this angle any risk of destabilisation seems low. The formation of this small naval/air intervention group certainly demonstrates a more offensive posture but this exercise still appears relatively insubstantial and undecided, lacking rationale and objectives.

Singapore and Indonesia for their part are also following coherent policies to control their inshore waters using complimentary and coherent methods which the aims of defensively oriented local maritime power demand. Jakarta accords high priority to the Indonesian navy, both for internal security reasons and for essential defence against aggression, requiring island-to-island mobility for the army and its equipment. The leasing of ex-East German naval vessels is probably a good bargain for the Indonesian navy, if maintenance problems and spare parts and munitions supply for the ex-soviet weapon systems do not scupper the project. Certainly this commercial operation will be followed with great

interest by several navies. In any case this development does not correspond to an increase in power of another ASEAN player or even of the Chinese world. As for other regional navies, the Malaysian one <sup>(12)</sup> is still embryonic, and the others completely obsolete. They have no military value except perhaps for internal security missions. The only modest signs of modernisation (i.e. Cambodia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Myanmar) involve close-in defence frigates for coastal combat and an amphibious component. They are however burdened by uncertainties with financial consequences.

When considering air forces as force multipliers, we must again remain cautious in our assessment and be realistic. Taking Taiwan as an example, which as you know is of interest to France at the highest level. The ambitious programme to renew front line aircraft in less than ten years - with a minimum of 360 aircraft and a maximum of 520 - seems to be monopolising both attention and resources. But this programme can only be justified because most of their air fleet dates from the 1950s (i.e. the F 104) or the beginning of the 1960s. Even if the purchase of 4 Hawkeye seems more or less settled, the other force multipliers still seem somewhat hypothetical. In the EW field, while they may buy the specialised aircraft, the capability would only become a reality when "pods" were mounted on their new combat aircraft. They are a long way from that stage. As far as an in-flight refuelling capability is concerned, this would appear to be ruled out in the current political context. Taiwan's only option is thus to obtain these technologies illegally or to develop her own aviation industry resources. For the moment only Indonesia possesses such a capability.

### III/ French policy in Southeast Asia

The boom in the regional arms market is caused as much by competition amongst suppliers as by any contest amongst the buyers. It can be said with little or no exaggeration that the real arms race in Southeast Asia is a race between western suppliers, rather than between recipients. Bilateral relations within Southeast Asia are generally too stable to fit into the arms race pattern. Major arms suppliers in the West and the former East face a need to compensate for the loss of home and Middle East markets, and to unload surplus equipment abroad to ensure domestic job security. This has led to the creation in Southeast Asia of what has been described as the world's largest buyer's market. In this context, the purchaser countries can follow through their military improvement programmes at minimum cost, while at the same time strengthening their image of an economic area full of promise. Indigenous national defence industries in Southeast Asia are also small compared with those in Northeast Asia. The transfer of conventional weapons should thus enable countries lacking adequate defence manufacturing capabilities to guarantee their own security.

#### A) The French rules

In the face of this situation France subscribes to certain principles on this subject, which the tensions remaining both in Europe and the Middle East after the cold war only serve to justify. In arms exports, the principles that France imposes or to which she subscribes centre around four main texts (the statutory order dated 18 April 1939 <sup>(13)</sup>, the declaration of the European Council of Luxembourg dated 29 June 1991, the guiding principles of the p 5

(12) D. Carnroux - C. Lechervy: *La Malaysia : ouverture au monde*. L'Harmattan, Paris, 1994

(13) The Official Gazette 13 June 1939, Amendments of 17 June, 14 and 19 July 1939, 8 October 1958, 13 June 1972, 4 January 1977, 31 December 1977

process, the French plan for arms and disarmament monitoring dated 3 June 1991). In accordance with these texts, French policy is not to agree to conventional arms exports unless this does not create excessively high levels of geostrategic imbalance - which I admit is very difficult to judge -, not to hinder efforts to limit conventional weapons, to place weapons sales within a global policy of co-operation with the purchasing country and not to put at risk the credibility of the French deterrent nor, of course, the safety of French troops. To avoid making a strategic theatre more unstable than it would otherwise be, it is important that France does not help in the creation of a militarily dominant state in Southeast Asia. At the same time, it is important not to help build up weapons stocks that quantitatively or qualitatively exceed the self defence requirements of the purchaser. But how is this to be assessed in a difficult industrial context? Perhaps we should consider that the defence share of GDP should be kept at a reasonable level, i.e. within the normal European bracket of 3 to 4%.

At the same time we must not deceive ourselves. Some European companies, in the face of the US competition, are operating a veritable "kill or leave" strategy in Southeast Asia.

To avoid running counter to conventional arms control efforts, the purchasing country must not be under any national or international embargo and it must respect the basic tenets of international law. All of which implies that for the moment France cannot export conventional arms to Myanmar or to mainland China. In a climate trying to counter proliferation this means that sales to possible resellers must be avoided, and in this context Singapore may be considered as a sensitive country. To avoid the unexpected, it is desirable that sales should be conditional on a non-re-export clause, and only involve weapons compatible with the buyer's current stock. Similarly, weapons ordered should not correspond to the needs of a sensitive country that has ties with the purchaser.

As the weapons delivered must be intended only for defence against external threats, which is a very important stipulation at a time when King Norodom Sihanouk is preparing to ask France for weapons for use against units of the Party of Democratic Kampuchea, it is essential that weapons sales are included in an overall policy of co-operation with the purchasing country. Over and above the commercial aspects of the sale, there is the more less accepted concept of initiating or continuing some form of long term military co-operation with the client country. Thus the signature of an MOU with Malaysia has now resulted in operational co-operation in Bosnia. Perhaps it will be the same tomorrow when France will have signed another MOU with the Sultan of Brunei. Nevertheless [one must] still avoid weapons transfer into zones where French troops may find themselves in action.

#### B) Are there risks for France?

We know that most Southeast Asian countries are in a situation where sophisticated weapon systems have not only become more readily available, but also increasingly affordable. It remains to be confirmed that governments seeking legitimacy through economic prosperity value too much the importance of a stable regional environment to indulge in arms races. The true strategic nature of certain programmes is still obscure. What are we to think of Thailand's programmes and Bangkok's intentions to strengthen co-operation between the air force and the army in all its various forms (fire support, tactical transport, airmobile heliborne operations) when it is known that there are in fact 250 aircraft either on order or planned, and split between the army and the air force? Similarly why has Indonesia decided to accelerate its combat aircraft acquisition programme in this decade? It is of course advisable to replace a

somewhat obsolete fleet (A-4, F-5) but to go on from there to place orders or take options for almost as many aircraft as they have currently in service, that must hide an ambition of some sort. These realities mean that France is running a certain number of risks. But to assert that what is happening in Southeast Asia is nothing less than a fully fledged arms race, where individual ASEAN countries are directly responding to others weapons acquisitions, is a step that I am unwilling to take. I do not in fact believe that the modernisation process we see now is something that could eventually result in conflict, at least not through deliberate state policy, but only through inadvertence or accident. Similarly we must not believe the widely publicised declarations of ASEAN officials who explain that what is happening in Southeast Asia is not an arms race but merely a defence modernisation process for the benefit of overall regional security. Putting aside generalisations, we must not lose sight firstly of the important role the military continues to play in the domestic politics of a few countries, which is reflected in the sizeable budgets allocated to their defence ministries, and secondly that modern and sophisticated armed forces are also seen as reflecting a country's standing in the regional hierarchy. In this context elements of friendly and, sometimes, not so friendly competition in the defence field translate into some semblance of an arms race, albeit still at a minor and manageable stage.

Having arrived at this point in our presentation, I feel that it is time to remember that from the buyer's and the arms salesman's point of view there are no valid criteria available to differentiate between offensive and defensive weapon systems. Weapons are tools at the disposal of those who use them, and it is they who decide what that use should be. While an AWACS system may be an indispensable part of an airspace defence system, it is also vital when gaining air superiority within enemy airspace. The same can be said of anti tank missiles and ships armed with ASV missiles. The distinction between destabilising weapons and the rest may be more precise; although destabilisation (of the balance of forces) may take many and varied forms: quantitative, qualitative, associated with employment etc. Amongst all these risks, three seem to me to require avoidance by the seller: firstly to find ones weapons being used as tools for internal repression, secondly to be faced with the boomerang effects of ones mercantile activity by exposing ones own troops to your own weapons in hostile hands, and thirdly the risk of technological theft. Even before discussing proliferation one must be fully aware of this risk of technological theft (i.e. the sale of Italian weapons to the PRC). In Southeast Asia one worries that technological theft must not be mentioned as it is already a strong possibility. Southeast Asian client states attach great importance to technology transfer and to the acquisition of know-how for the benefit of their emergent defence industries. According to certain "observers", it is even a prime criteria when making a choice. In addition, it must never be forgotten that the balance of advantage in a regional defence market is currently very much in favour of the client, and that his requirements will continue to grow day by day. This is a factor that must certainly be taken into account at a time when French salesmen feel that they have a considerable potential margin for progress in this part of the world. Up to 1990 France had about 2% of the Far East market, and on average she has about 10% of the world-wide export trade. France should therefore be able to export 5 billion Francs worth of arms in the years to come instead of only 1 billion. The continuation of joint ventures or the setting up of co-operative programmes has without doubt become the only route for market penetration in Southeast Asia but with the attendant risk for the beginning of the next century of finding, not new regional conflicts, but the emergence of serious export competitors in world markets.

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# **Session 1 - 4**

## **Strengthening Non-Proliferation**

*presented by Dr Umemoto Tetsuya*

**JIIA-IFRI Joint Conference**

**June 2-3, 1994**

## Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Japan

Umemoto Tetsuya

The end of the Cold War has at once contributed to the strengthening the international regime for the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and created new types of difficulties for that regime to cope with. This paper reviews the impact of the termination of the East-West confrontation on the nonproliferation picture in both those aspects and briefly explores Japan's place in it in the post-Cold War environment.

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The conclusion of the Cold War has solidified the foundation of the international regime for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the following ways.

First, as the concern over global war between the Cold-War protagonists diminishes, the spread of nuclear armaments has come to be viewed as one of the most pressing challenges to international security. For example, every meeting of the G-7 heads of government since 1990 has addressed this issue. The summit conference of the U.N. Security Council that took place in January 1992 warned against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, referring to it as a "threat to the international peace and security."

Moreover, the growing attention to nuclear proliferation has conduced to almost universal acceptance of the basic principles of the present nonproliferation regime. Some of the most prominent holdouts have recently joined the NPT: South Africa in July 1991, mainland China in March 1992, and France in August 1992. Argentina and Brazil, while still refusing to sign the NPT, have instead agreed to take steps to bring the Treaty of Tlatelolco into force and also consented to full-scope safeguards administered by the IAEA.

Second, the separation of regional conflicts from the East-West confrontation has allowed the United States and the former Soviet Union to give priority to nonproliferation over strategic partnership with Third World states that present a high proliferation risk. Most notable, the Soviet invasion of Afganistan prompted the United States to resume military and economic aid to Pakistan, which had been suspended because of the allegation that the Pakistanis were pursuing a nuclear weapons program. The flow of U.S. assistance continued throughout the 1980s, even though Pakistan brought its first uranium enrichment facility into operation in the middle of that decade. In 1990, however, with Moscow having begun to withdraw its forces from Afganistan, Washington again froze its aid on the ground that it could no longer certify that Islamabad did not possess nuclear explosive devices.

The decline in the competition over the hearts and minds

of the developing world has enabled Washington and Moscow further to join forces to contain the spread of nuclear weapons. Thus, at the June 1990 summit meeting, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev referred to "closer and more concrete cooperation" in this field; and, in January 1994, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin likewise pledged "close cooperation" to "strengthen nonproliferation policies."

Third, as the conclusion of the Cold War has given new life to joint action by the international community, the scope of multilateral cooperation for nonproliferation purposes has been considerably expanded. Most important, the IAEA safeguards system has been undergoing substantial improvements. In light of the discovery of the Iraqi nuclear program following the Gulf War, the IAEA in February 1992 reaffirmed its right to special inspection of undeclared sites and asked the NPT parties to submit the design information of nuclear facilities at planning stages. Availing itself for the first time of information provided by U.S. reconnaissance satellites, the Agency requested special inspection of two facilities in North Korea in February 1993.

At the same time, the involvement of the U.N. Security Council in nonproliferation questions has been on the increase. The revelation of the Iraqi program was itself due to the Council resolution dictating the terms of peace after the Gulf War. Moreover, the Council has figured as a major actor

in the disputes over the alleged development of nuclear weapons by North Korea, which have been intensified since the IAEA demand for special inspection triggered the announcement by Pyongyang of its intention to withdraw from the NPT. Apart from the fact that the Council formally requested Pyongyang to return to the NPT fold in May 1993 and to ensure the continuity of safeguards in April 1994, the possibility that it might decide on economic sanction has always been in the background of the diplomatic game.

Furthermore, international cooperation for export control has made steady progress. A new set of policy guidelines, referred to as the London Guidelines, Part II, have been agreed upon to restrict trade in certain dual-use items. Britain and France have decided to act in concert with other major nuclear suppliers in requiring the recipients that are nonparty to the NPT to accept the full-scope IAEA safeguards. In addition, spearheaded by the United States, supplier states have started to put into practice the so-called "catch-all" or "know" control system, which focuses more on the actual usage of a given item than on its inclusion on a control list.

Fourth, the end of the East-West rivalry and especially the decline of extended deterrence in Europe have provided a strategic rationale for a radical reduction of nuclear arms by the United States and the former Soviet Union and for greater

restraints on nuclear testing. The drastic curtailment of U. S. and ex-Soviet nuclear arsenal is likely to help relieve the NPT regime of the usual charge of inequality. Washington and Moscow agreed to cut back their strategic forces by roughly one-third in the START I Treaty (signed in July 1991) and by more than two-thirds in the START II Treaty (signed in January 1993). By the end of 1992, the United States completed withdrawal of its ground- and sea-based nonstrategic forces; and, according to Moscow, the tactical nuclear weapons of the former Soviet army were all in Russian hands, while those of the former Soviet navy had been removed from warships.

Self-restraint by the nuclear powers on testing will probably contribute more to strengthen the nonproliferation regime, however, in view of the fact that many Third World nations placed such an emphasis on comprehensive test ban at the 1990 NPT Review Conference that they were willing to see the Conference end in a rupture. In this regard, the former Soviet Union has refrained from nuclear testing since October 1991; France since April 1992; and the United States since October 1992. Moreover, in July 1993, the United States reversed its long-standing opposition to total prohibition of nuclear testing, giving impetus to negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

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On the other hand, the post-Cold War international environment imposes irksome burden of distinct nature upon the nonproliferation regime.

First of all, the disintegration of the Soviet Union has spawned a number of independent states that are physically in possession of nuclear forces of the former Soviet Union. As noted above, all the ground-based tactical nuclear weapons have supposedly been transported to Russia. Of the three non-Russian republics in whose territories former Soviet strategic forces have been deployed, Belarus and Kazakhstan (but not Ukraine) are on their way to carrying out their pledges to ratify the START I Treaty and to adhere to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states. The decision to release the nuclear forces of the former Soviet Union, whether within or outside Russia, is to be made by the Russian President with the "consent" of the above three and in "consultation" with the other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Ukraine, however, has thus far steadily refused to denuclearize itself, citing military threat from Russia and demanding greater economic compensations. Moreover, Kiev may be pursuing the capability independently to launch the strategic forces that exist within its jurisdictions. The achievement of this capability by the Ukrainians would mean an sudden emergence of a state with the third-largest nuclear arsenal

in the world.

Second, the rapidity of nuclear arms reduction by the United States and the former Soviet Union has made it an urgent necessity to find appropriate ways to store and dismantle nuclear warheads as well as to lay up and dispose of fissile materials recovered from warheads. Laxity of management in this field will broaden the opportunity for some adventurous states or terrorist groups illicitly to obtain nuclear weapons or weapons-usable materials. In light of this, the United States has prepared itself to spend 400 million dollars annually since 1992 mainly to assist in the elimination of nuclear forces in Russia and has recently pledged to buy up highly-enriched uranium that will come out of warheads that are dismantled there.

Given Russia's ability to disassemble nuclear weapons, however, which is currently projected at no more than 1,500 warheads per year, it will take much longer than a decade to dismantle all the warheads now scheduled for elimination. Besides, estimations vary considerably as to the number of warheads as well as the amount of highly enriched uranium that the former Soviet Union has produced; accordingly, it may never be known for sure at a given point of time what proportion of warheads and weapons-grade uranium have been disposed of. While highly enriched uranium can readily be diluted for use in power plants, the bulk of plutonium must either be



kept in storage in anticipation for civilian application in the future or be buried in the earth essentially as nuclear wastes; and technical difficulties surround both these alternatives. In passing, it may be noted that the proposal for global reduction in the stockpile of highly enriched uranium and plutonium put forward by President Clinton in September 1993 set its sights at peaceful as well as military use of those materials.

Third, political and economic disorder in the former Soviet Union has heightened the danger of nuclear materials and equipments finding customers, and of nuclear scientists and engineers finding employment, in nations with a high proliferation risk. As a matter of fact, more than one hundred cases of smuggling of radioactive materials from ex-Soviet republics and Eastern Europe were exposed in Germany in 1992, while fewer than thirty such cases had been uncovered the year before. There has been no end to reports on the alleged attempts by "problem countries" such as Iran, Libya, Algeria, and North Korea to procure nuclear warheads and related materials and/or to hire nuclear specialists for generous remuneration.

In order to hold this tendency in check, the West and Japan have offered assistance to the states that used to belong to the Soviet bloc. Having proposed a "Brain Gain" initiative in January 1992, the United States, in cooperation with

the European Community and Japan (as well as Russia), put together an agreement in November of that year to set up a "Science and Technology Center" near Moscow in order to enlarge employment opportunities for the nuclear scientists and engineers. The advanced industrial nations have also sought to get the former Soviet and Eastern European countries to streamline their export control system in return for loosening up the COCOM regulations. The exodus of nuclear specialists and the outflow of relevant materials can be stopped, however, only when economic reforms succeed and political stability returns in Russia (and in other ex-Soviet states). Efforts from outside, valuable as they are, cannot bear fruit unless developments inside the former Soviet Union provide a proper context. For instance, the Science and Technology Center could not begin operations for nearly a year and a half on account of the power struggle between President Yeltsin and the Russian parliament.

Fourth, the decline in the ability and will of the United States and the former Soviet Union to intervene in other people's conflicts has decreased the sense of security on the part of their (former) allies and friends and at the same time diminished the restraints imposed on their behavior. As U.S. extended deterrence recedes, the possibility of nuclear armament by Germany and especially Japan has become a matter of interest (more in Washington than in Bonn or Tokyo) essentially

for the first time in more than two decades. It will not be surprising if some of the Eastern European and ex-Soviet nations, finding themselves in the power vacuum between the West and Russia and fearing the resurgence of expansionism in Moscow, should turn to nuclear weaponry for safeguarding their independence. If Russia had as much influence on North Korea today as the Soviet Union did when it prodded Pyongyang into ratifying the NPT in 1985, Kim Il-sung would probably be much more prudent in pursuing his putative nuclear ambitions.

Moreover, the reduction of nuclear forces by the United States and Russia (along with the other acknowledged nuclear powers) down to the level deemed absolutely necessary for basic deterrence, if it should take place, may well tempt some Third World states to seek entrance into the nuclear club. While those states may be able to manufacture only a small number of warheads, the prestige that presumably goes with their nuclear status will be greater when no nation retains more than a few tens or hundreds of warheads than when Washington and Moscow can parade tens of thousands. In addition, their nuclear weapons will serve as a powerful deterrent to U.S. intervention in regional conflicts, so long as they can establish conventional preponderance in their region.

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As long as it accepts the "logic of inequality" (in the

parlance of Joseph S. Nye, Jr.) underlying the present nonproliferation regime. Japan will be able to play a vital role in promoting the nonproliferation efforts, while minimizing the possibilities that its policies might complicate such efforts. According to that logic, most nonnuclear states desist from seeking an equal status with the avowed nuclear powers because they would rather renounce nuclear armament in return for, or in anticipation of, a similar action by their neighbors and regional adversaries than engage in nuclear arms competition with them.

As a matter of fact, Tokyo has already taken an active part in the international endeavor to put teeth into the IAEA safeguards and to institutionalize the export control of dual-use items. It has also laid down the principle of linking its foreign aid to the recipients' nonproliferation records; committed to spend 100 million dollars to assist in the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union; and announced the policy of supporting the indefinite extension of the NPT. Moreover, the Japanese Government is about to decide on slowing down its plans for plutonium use, in consideration of proliferation concerns abroad. Finally, the admittance of the nonnuclear Japan as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council will symbolize the declining role of nuclear weapons in international politics.

In order to grasp the nature of Japan's involvement in the

nonproliferation regime, however, an inquiry must first be made about the persistence of conditions that have so far underpinned Tokyo's subscription to the "logic of inequality." With both Russia and China already nuclear-armed, the applicability of that logic will be seriously challenged if North Korea attains nuclear capabilities. The logic will become almost devoid of meaning as nuclear armament spreads into South Korea and other nations in the Asia/Pacific region.

Of course, it is not certain or perhaps not even likely that such a turn of events should instantly push Japan to go nuclear. The Japanese people may cling to the nonnuclear principles that they have held so dear for so long, irrespective of changes in the strategic situation. The security guarantee extended by the United States may be robust enough to allay whatever anxiety the Japanese may feel about the dispositions of neighboring states.

It must be admitted, however, that the hold that the nonnuclear creed has taken on the Japanese mind may not be so firm as often assumed, as is suggested by the heated domestic debate in the mid-1970s over the ratification of the NPT as well as by Tokyo's hesitation in 1993 before coming out for the indefinite extension of the NPT. Moreover, given the American inclination to disengage from overseas conflicts, in conjunction with the loss of confidence in each other as a result of acrimonious economic disputes between the United States

and Japan. it will not be easy for whatever security tie Washington and Tokyo may retain to provide the Japanese with sufficient reassurance against nuclear-armed regional adversaries.

Tokyo's attitude toward the nonproliferation regime will also critically depend on whether participation in it as a non-nuclear-weapon state will reward or punish Japan in terms of peaceful application of nuclear energy. The NPT stipulates "fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information" to substantiate the parties' "inalienable right" to peaceful use. Japan joined the NPT on the assumption that doing so would at least not hinder, and hopefully facilitate, its quest for energy security through the development of nuclear industry. That assumption has so far proved correct for the most part; and presumably this has been a major factor in the general acceptance of the NPT in Japan. To take for example, had Japan been outside the NPT, it is doubtful if the United States would have consented to reprocessing of the spent fuel of the U.S. origin in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Nowadays, however, the view appears to be gaining influence that nonproliferation of nuclear weapons requires tight control (or even prohibition) of civilian as well as military use of fissile materials. The Clinton proposal of September 1993 mentioned earlier was an embodiment of such outlook.

This tendency is in direct conflict with Japan's long-standing nuclear energy policy, which has revolved around the prospect of ever greater use of plutonium. To be sure, Tokyo could decide to worry less about its energy security and cheerfully abandon plans for plutonium recycle as well as for the development of the fast breeder reactor. As long as the Japanese feel vulnerable about their energy supply, however, such a decision could be extremely controversial and, if it should be forced on the public through gaiatsu (foreign pressure), it might well arouse antipathy toward the nonproliferation regime itself.

Moreover, one way of controlling the use of plutonium that would be compatible with nonproliferation goals would be to allow only the acknowledged nuclear powers to conduct reprocessing, as proposed by the Rand Corporation in November 1993. Such an arrangement would most certainly alienate the Japanese because not merely would it constrain their search for energy security but it would also carry the inequality aspect of the current nonproliferation regime rather bluntly into the domain of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

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# **Session 2 -1**

**Enhancing Economic and Security Cooperation in Eastern**

*presented by Dr Marco Carnovale*

**JIIA-IFRI Joint Conference**

**June 2-3, 1994**



IAI

# *Istituto Affari Internazionali*

## **The New East-West Relations in Europe**

by Marco Carnovale

first draft

Prepared for JIIA/IFRI conference on

**Building A Global and Regional Framework for Peace and Prosperity: Political and Economic Security in the New World Order**

Tokyo, 2-3 June 1994

## **Premise**

Since the end of the Cold War, the security of Central and Eastern Europe (C&EE) is a necessary (though not sufficient) *conditio sine qua non* for the security of Western Europe. This is not entirely new. Already during Cold War, the West had recognized that its security was contingent upon that of the other half of Europe (of course, as perceived by Moscow). This resulted in some degree of hypocrisy on the part of the West. For example, the USSR got its first bout of detente and the start of CSCE negotiations right after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Today, there is complementarity in place of hostility in new East-West relations, but Europe is far from "whole and free"—as George Bush, among others, proclaimed it as early as 1990. C&EE is increasingly fragmented and, far from being free, many parts of it are at or near war. Paradoxically, after the virtual disappearance of any significant military threat, security is an ever rarer commodity in most of Eastern Europe.

In Western Europe, the disappearance of both the massive Soviet deployments in C&EE and (more importantly) of their even more massive reinforcement capabilities, have not produced the expected results. The perception of security has not improved. Yet, while war is being waged in parts of the continents, and tensions are high in others, the danger of conflagration is not clearly definable or predictable, and therefore it is not sufficient to mobilize public opinions, but it is clear and present enough to worry most observers. Increasing or nascent threats from Europe's southern periphery only make things worse.

Under these circumstances, this paper argues first, that the C&EE states are dangerously reverting to nationalist approach in foreign policy; second, that in today's Europe vital interests are no longer national interests, and vice versa; and third, that, therefore, international institutions should play a pivotal role if C&EE are to be integrated into a future peaceful order in Europe.

## **East-West (?) Relations in the New Europe**

To the extent that it indicated the confrontation between the blocs, the term "East-West" is now obsolete. The very word "Eastern" Europe is generally considered demeaning; to refer to "Balkan" states or peoples is taken as insulting even by those who geographically belong to those areas. This is considered terminology from Cold War, reflecting obsolete bipolar concepts. The new commonly accepted term, which will be used here, is C&EE, but changing their definitions rarely solve problems, and declarations of intent do not change geography.

In fact, the term "East-West", though perhaps impolitic in the current parlance, is still valid in some respects. While there is no longer an adversarial relationship between its main components, European countries are not yet parts of a group of states definable as such except in the purest (and least significant) geographical terms. They do not form a working system, let alone a coherent whole.

The hope for the future, of course, is that cooperation and integration replace confrontation, most importantly between Russia and the rest of Europe. The lack of a solid cooperative relationship between Russia and the rest of Europe is the most serious

threat to the stability of the continent in the years to come. That is why the West, regardless of who is in charge in Moscow, will have to continue to devote special care to the security perceptions and economic condition of this country. The recent NATO declaration that Russia will enjoy a yet undefined "special role" within the Partnership for Peace can be interpreted as a step in this direction. The relationship with Russia is the most delicate for the West, but not the only preoccupation of post-Cold War Europe.

A second source of potential instability lies in relations among Central and Eastern Europeans themselves. In the immediate aftermath of the 1989 revolutions, political euphoria overshadowed economic concerns, but it soon faded away as harsh economic realities became clear. Initial illusions about cure-all capitalism settled in. Five years into democracy, a crucial question in C&EE is whether political enthusiasm will be enough to overcome prolonged economic disappointment and hardship. Alternatively, economic disappointment undermine political achievements? A race between economics and politics is now going on: it is not yet clear whether the post-1989 political capital still available will suffice to overcome the yet more economic hardship that is on its way. As can be seen in chart 1, unemployment is both high and rising in C&EE, while chart 2 shows how GDP is rising very slowly, and is slowing down, while the absolute rate is still barely above zero. As a result, it is not surprising that, as shown in chart 3, discontent with the political systems is increasing (the exception being the Czech republic) while chart 4 shows how most people are disappointed with the regime transformations which have taken place since 1989.<sup>1</sup>

New cleavages have come to the fore after the fall of the wall. Some new cleavages are actually revived old ones, i.e. from the pre-World War II era. Culturally, most of C&EE has long been anti-Soviet and anti-Russian. Other regional and local cleavages include that between Hungary and Romania, Czechs and Slovaks, Serbs and Hungarians, beyond, of course, those within former Yugoslavia itself. One may add an anti-South of the world prejudice, particularly as competition for aid becomes more acute. If economic realities beat political sentiments in the race described above, these cleavages might be ignited beyond the plane of peaceful confrontation into violent conflict.

The best hope to avert such an outcome lies in integrating C&EE in the continental economic, political and security structure of Europe, as well as of a global character. For four decades C&EE peoples have been forced to look at international integration (and, more in general, at any form of internationalism) as one representation of the division of Europe into two integrating blocs (theirs being under USSR). The so-called "fraternal" relations with Warsaw Pact and Comecon partners, a euphemism for Soviet controlled economic and security planning, has left deep scars. There is a strong tendency among them to equate nationalism with freedom and independence.

Consequently, C&EE electorates and leaderships have little sympathy (or understanding) for true international interdependence. Nationalism (whether it is real or, as is often the case, it is built-up spuriously around "imagined communities"<sup>2</sup> instead of real nations) has blossomed, and nationalism is likely to be associated with

war. Such nationalism may be a cause or a consequence of war. Most often, and most dangerously, it is used by political *élites* as a catalyst for the channeling of military and other resources toward the achievement of war aims.<sup>3</sup> Dangerously, C&EE often look to past rather than to future, longing for a restoration of pre-communism, the Soviet occupation being seen as a historical aberration.

The only magnet for them was initially the EU, which is seen as a locomotive to pull them up from the doldrums of economic stagnation, mainly through infusions of German funds. Subsequently, this enthusiasm dwindled as it became clear that membership was not in the cards for the short term—see chart 5. A EU widening to C&EE is in the agenda of Western diplomacies; one problem is that of market access but it is not the only one, and perhaps not even the most important. To some extent, but not enough if one compares it with the nationalist forces mentioned above, the EU is also a potential source of political identity and cultural belonging. Subsequently, a strong interest developed for membership in NATO. These two issues will be further discussed below.

### **National and Vital Interests in Europe**

Like most political paradigms (both domestic and international) the concept of "national interest" has changed since the Cold War. This is especially true in security affairs. There are genuine national interests which are perfectly compatible with a cooperative multinational approach to security. These may be economic interests (e.g. milk or steel production capacity; or agricultural import quotas in the EU). They may be related to the environment (e.g. the regulation of international transit rights for cargo, or control of pollutants that are not usually very respectful of national borders).<sup>4</sup> National interests may also be political, as country A may jostle for political advantage *vis-à-vis* country B by establishing special bilateral ties with country C, (e.g. to push its export products, to obtain special access to C's economic resources or technologies or to foster the rights of its affiliated ethnic community in country C). Finally, there may even be military-related national security interests, as might be the case in future contingencies similar to the Falklands war, the US-Libyan clashes of 1981 and 1986, and the US intervention in Grenada or Panama. But the national interests involved in this type of operations can hardly be described as vital.

These interests are definable and defensible at the national level, but they are not vital. In light of this contradictory trend to look at security problems from an international perspective while nationalist pressures build, it seems appropriate to refer no longer to "national" interests, but, rather, to "vital" interests in the contemporary European landscape.<sup>5</sup>

The most fundamental vital interest for post-Cold War European states remains the protection of the physical safety and territorial integrity of nation states against the danger of attack from resurgent, residual or wholly new military threats—including internal threats from within existing states. While the Soviet threat is gone, a variety

of actual or potential military threats still exists. Newly independent Russia seeks to become a security partner today, and in some circumstances it has proved that it is able to be one, but it is far from certain that this will be true in the future. While the danger of post-Soviet proliferation is usually exaggerated in the press, other nuclear powers might emerge from the ashes of the USSR. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a distinct possibility around Europe's southern periphery. Any of these developments could threaten the vital security interests of European states. As for threats from within existing states, the example of Yugoslavia speaks for itself: while not likely to be replicated in the same scale, it might not be the last European state to break-up violently, and the repercussions might yet be felt outside of Yugoslavia itself.

The second vital interest is to maintain a minimum standard of living and economic development. This implies, among other things, the preservation of a free market economy, unimpeded access both to sources of raw materials and to foreign markets, and freedom of navigation over the high seas. Recent events in the Gulf have demonstrated (if there had been any doubt) that the defense of this vital interest can not quite be taken for granted even after the end of the Soviet threat to NATO sea-lines of communication.<sup>6</sup>

The final, and most important, vital interest lies in the protection of the Western way of life. Despite all its shortcomings, is increasingly accepted as a pan-European model. This translates into the preservation of a pluralist democracy, which in turn means freedom of movement for people and information (and hence open borders) but also support for the social order of civil society (and hence regulation of migration flows).

Other formulations could be devised, but the above are by and large what the general consensus within the Western civilization has come to define as "vital interests". But these are not synonymous with "national" interests; none is nationally definable or defensible, by any state, but especially not by European medium powers. The following paragraphs will discuss why this is true now even more than during the Cold War.

When two blocs divided Europe, Western nations had to join up forces to counter the Soviet Union. The possibility always existed, however, that one or more could try to strike a deal with Moscow, in extreme circumstances, for example in order to avoid the escalation of nuclear war on its territory. This possibility applied to the Allies on both sides of the Atlantic: the US at times feared that the Europeans might rather be "red than dead"; the Europeans feared that the US would fight a limited war in Europe but not challenge the Soviets to the point of a reciprocal nuclear exchange. Such fears were based on rational calculations of national interests which took into account the probable behavior of concerned parties, *bona fide* allies as they might have been. Today, sources of resurgent, residual or new threats (nuclear, conventional, or anything in between, as they might come) are unlikely to be as amenable to the same rational thinking as was the centralized and monolithic Soviet state; hence, it is unlikely that the freedom of "opting out" would still be available to any party in a future continental crisis.

A detailed discussion of increasing international economic interdependence is beyond the scope of this paper; suffice it to say that the end of the Cold War has opened far greater opportunities for international economic exchanges and therefore for growth. As recent vicissitudes in the Gulf have demonstrated, however, free access to raw materials must sometimes be guaranteed by collective efforts, including by means of armed force. On a different plane, the GATT negotiations demonstrate how, *mutatis mutandis*, an equal degree of collective political commitment is necessary to ensure free access to markets, the other essential ingredient of world economic growth and prosperity.

As for the third of the vital interests considered here, during the Cold War, it was possible, indeed obligatory, to protect democracy in the West while avoiding any determined effort to promote it in the East. Today, without the Iron Curtain, consolidating democracy in the East is increasingly becoming a pre-condition for maintaining it in the West. Indeed, as European borders are wide open to flows of people and information, it would be utopian to think that a privileged island of prosperity and freedom can be maintained only in selected parts of the continent. Again, multilateral effort are indispensable, for it is unthinkable that any single state, however influential, could pursue such an ambitious goal single-handedly.

The foregoing does not suggest that national interests no longer exist in Europe today; nor does it lead to a prescription of exclusively multilateral solutions. There are interests that can and should be defined at the national level, just as there are other interests that can be defined at the regional, provincial or municipal level. In fact, it is not a coincidence that this time of increasing nationalism is also a time of increasing demand for regional and local autonomy throughout Europe, both East and West.

What is sometimes referred to as the rebirth of "nationalism" in reality is often tribalism, parochialism or fanaticism decorated with a patina of religious fervor. In post-Cold War Europe, the nation-state is in some cases as much in crisis than international alliances and organizations, if not more so. More Europeans are rediscovering the value of local autonomy than are revamping that of national independence. The recent support build-up garnered by Flemish separatists and Northern Italian secessionists are the latest additions to what seemed to be the isolated exceptions of Northern Ireland and the Basque Country. The nineties are more likely to go down in history as a decade of threats to nationhood than as a decade of nation-building.

### **The Agenda for the West**

Eastern requests for integration in Western institutions translate into some degree of Western embarrassment. C&EE states are in a position of *demandeur* for economics and security, political identity, and most of all wants to join Western institutions, as only solution to all three issues. They by and large realize that no single state is equipped to address these new types of problems. They understand that, as the West

has often been preaching, the solution to these risks and challenges requires multinational approach, contribution from both East and West. This is true in security as well as in economics.

The answers to the questions posed in the preceding paragraphs carry important implications for Western Europe for its possible repercussions in international relations. If the cleavages discussed above are not resolved, conflict might well spread beyond the region of C&EE. Under these circumstances, the risks to common European security that are coming from this new Europe today can be categorized into four groups. First, there is a danger that local conflicts may lead to region-wide conflagration. As of mid-1994, this is the case, most seriously, in the Balkans, but to a lesser extent also in the Caucasus.

Second, these conflicts, and the destruction and disorder that they carry along, may provide ammunition to reactionary and/or nostalgic power groups, and thus provoke a backfiring of authoritarianism. This may not be of a communist character, but it may be ultra-nationalistic and perhaps involve the armed forces. There are dangers of renewed authoritarianism in some Mediterranean countries as well.

Third, Western Europe may become the target of terrorism, as frustrated extremist groups may seek to attract international attention to this or that ethnic or territorial cause. Connections with Western European terrorist organizations, such as the IRA or ETA, are to be expected.

Finally, and most seriously, Eastern European conflicts come at a time of delicate transition in the foreign policy relations among Western nations. Cleavages in the East have already provoked diverging attitudes in the West, and may result in a weakening of Western cohesion. The handling of the Yugoslav crisis has already resulted in some damage to the developing process of harmonization of Western European foreign policies. To the extent that this will delay the process of West European integration it will also damage those countries which stand to benefit from a stronger Community; these include most Mediterranean countries.

After having outlined in the preceding section the "demand" side of the new economic and security equation in post-Cold War Europe, this section will address the "supply" side. What can and should the West do to address C&EE's demands, since on the answer that will be given to them depend also our own interests? The West has three instruments for the creation of security conditions around its periphery: wealth, advanced know-how and institutions. Wealth is the least useful one. It can only provide emergency relief, but can not provide economic stability and hence security in the medium-long term. Reforms and time are necessary for this, and too much aid can even be counterproductive if it allows for artificial life-support to be administered to inefficient economic mechanisms. Of course, Western wealth can not buy military security, since all Eastern countries must, on the contrary, reduce their military commitments. As for Western military intervention, in conflicts in Eastern Europe or in the Mediterranean region, the problems there are hardly of a financial nature.

Advanced know-how is potentially more useful than wealth because it helps create an indispensable basis for long-term efficiency and thus social stability. In this



respect, managerial know-how will be more relevant than advanced technology. But it, too, does nothing to alleviate immediate political security problems. Much time will be required before organizational restructuring and technology injections will produce appreciable results in the societies of the East.

Institutions remain the only instrument to prevent and perhaps repress European conflicts before they spread too widely. This paper will sketch what three of these institutions (the EU and the WEU, which for the purposes of this paper are considered together; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) could contribute toward continental security. It will also mention to the hypothetical role of a Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean.

The nature of the questions involved immediately points to the fact that the required approach will be multidimensional: for analytical purposes, divide analysis in security, economics, politics, clearly interconnected.

### *Economic Cooperation*

Economic interdependence, long established in Western Europe, is difficult to replicate in the continent as a whole. No doubt, it will be profitable (and in any case probably inevitable) in the long run if Western Europe is to be competitive with the US and Japan. But, as John M. Keynes put it, in the long run we will all be dead. The economic integration of Eastern Europe in the pan-European (and therefore world) market can not wait so long.

Therefore, when discussing the extension of economic interdependence to C&EE, the question is not whether, but when and how to do it. The argument that Eastern Europe is not yet ready is only partially true, or, rather, it only explains one half of the problem. The other half is that it is Western Europe which fears losing important markets to cheaper Eastern labor. This is true, first and foremost, in those very sectors in which C&EE economies are stronger: textiles, agriculture and steel. On the one hand, to allow C&EE producers into EU markets might spell the end (or at least a drastic down-sizing) of those industries in the EU. On the other hand, it would both make those products available at cheaper prices (and thus boost productivity) and stimulate competition.

Of course, this approach runs directly against the grain of EU subsidization policies. But the dilemma between narrow-minded national protection and opening to the East will once again have to be faced in the near future: the consequences of the choice that will be made are going to have a strong and lasting impact on the economic relationship between Western Europe and C&EE states. In the latter, it will also have profound political and social consequences which the governments of EU member states will do well to consider before giving in to domestic lobbying and pressures for continued protection.

EU membership remains a coveted ambition for C&EE states, not only for economic but also for political and (in perspective) security reasons. It may provide

some degree of political reassurance, but certainly it does not have the tools for any military-related task. This may change in the future with the realization of a common security policy and a then of a common defense, but the time frame is far longer than is necessary. For the next several crucial years, most instruments of security policy will remain in the hands of national governments, while the process toward the creation of a common security and foreign policy continues, hopefully, to overcome national and bureaucratic hurdles.

In any case, even when such a common policy will exist, caution will be imperative, because for the Community to provide security to third parties would probably mean to grant accession: "extended deterrence" by the Community or the WEU is definitely not in the cards for the foreseeable future. Accession to the Community presents formidable economic and institutional problems, that fall beyond the scope of this paper, but which are probably going to retain a higher degree of priority with respect to security concerns. A common concern is that enlargement of the Community will jeopardize its "deepening": therefore, extension of security guarantees, to the extent that it will hasten enlargement, might weaken the very institution that these guarantees should emanate from.

In conclusion, the EU is most useful for cooperation with the C&EE in the economic, and specifically trade, arena. This cooperation will involve short-term costs, but these will be outweighed by long-term benefits for current EU members as well.

#### *Human Rights and Political Stability*

Relations with C&EE and post-Soviet states have another, purely political, dimension: human rights. Of the various "categories" of human rights, those of concern here are the so-called "first generation" human rights, i.e. those undisputable rights of the individual such as the personal inviolability and freedom of information and expression and movement of each citizen. These rights are most easily definable, are the same for all states, and juxtapose the individual citizen (as opposed to, for instance, the member of a given nationality) to his/her government. They are inalienable, or, as they are sometimes referred to, "static". Therefore, they can be considered independently of local political factors of diversity which may be specific of a given state.<sup>7</sup> During the Cold War, the West had to ignore them.

For a long time, the West sacrificed human rights ideals for the sake of peace and stability: but, in 1989 communist oppression exhausted its ability to produce stability. The lack of democracy was source of stability in Soviet bloc, today it is a source of instability in post-communist Europe. On the contrary, the energies which dictatorship had long repressed were about to explode and create instability and threatening peace. Since the end of the Cold War, most of Europe has accomplished much toward the realization of first category rights, but not enough.

The West, and particularly the US, has not always been consistent. It traditionally followed one of three policies in this field. Sometimes, the West has been content with letting its point of view be known, without doing anything about it (this

was, for instance, the Nixon approach of pure *Realpolitik*).

Alternatively, it tried to persuade violators to change their course, but without offending them with public accusation or much fanfare. This approach produced important results, (for example under Carter) using the carrot more than the stick. The problem here was that this policy was intermittent and unpredictable.

The third approach has been to accuse violators (or, rather, those who happened to be political adversaries) publicly, to apply diplomatic pressure upon them, to link progress on human rights to other negotiations such as those on arms control or trade (the so-called "linkage" policy). This approach produced little results.

Today, human rights are once again an important factor of foreign policy based on *Realpolitik*, and as such must be given their just priority. As former US Secretary of State put it, "human rights must always be on the foreign policy agenda, but never by themselves".<sup>8</sup> In this respect, interference in internal affairs justified and necessary. The UN charter and article 56 stipulate that violations "oblige members to take joint and separate action" to achieve this purpose. This, of course, also justifies interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states.

### *Military Stability and Security*

In this field, again, interdependence has been an long established concept, but it is now moving from a confrontational to a cooperative type of interdependence. Europe has shifted its attention from the avoidance of war to the building of peace.

Virtually all of Eastern Europe, including most former Soviet republics, is asking to join NATO. On the one hand, this testifies to the success of NATO. On the other hand, it is a symptom of a widespread illusion that this success would be easily replicated by simply bringing in new members. That is far from being the case. First of all, it would be economically expensive (restructuring of allied commands, re-deployment of forces, additional official languages, harmonization of procedures, etc.) and therefore NATO members would not be likely to accept it. Public opinions would not support such an expansion of responsibility at a time of reduced threat perceptions and declining defense budgets.

More importantly, it might be difficult to establish whom to accept into the Alliance: In other words, who would be defended against whose threat? If this were a way for Central and East Europeans to gain a military security guarantee against Russia, this would signify a perpetuation of the logic of the two blocs. Some advocated this also in the West, particularly during and immediately after the failed August 1991 coup in Moscow, but such a stand does not seem to fit into the current status of political relations with the successor states of the USSR.

One could argue that the logic of the blocs is perpetuated by maintaining one the two blocs as a self-contained exclusive entity separated from the now no longer antagonistic remnants of the other bloc. If the Eastern bloc is gone, this logic goes, the Western must offer its umbrella to former enemies who have now embraced its values and goals. A more cogent argument, however, is that the logic of the blocs would be

perpetuated by trying to artificially extend one against another that no longer exists. Besides, NATO could not and would not wage war against Russia to save Eastern Europe more than it would have during the Cold War. Russia remains a nuclear state, and for NATO's nuclear powers to provide "extended deterrence" to the Eastern Europeans against Moscow would hardly be credible; it would be more likely a *bluff*. Let us not forget that even Western Europeans have had this problem of credibility of extended deterrence for forty years; for the new democracies of the East the problem would be much worse.

A second possibility is that NATO should accept all those who might want to accede, Russians included, and offer a security guarantee to all. The question then would be who to guarantee against whom. If one wanted to guarantee everybody against everybody else, this would probably be a recipe for disaster. It is easy to imagine rather difficult dilemmas emerging from any number of crisis situations. It is also easy to see how false expectations could be created and these could blow on the fire of the nationalist ambitions that were repressed by forty-five years of communism and are now rekindling wildly.

In that context, some argue that NATO might play a moderating role similar to that played between Greece and Turkey, but that bilateral confrontation was easier to deal with than the multilateral situations of Eastern Europe would be. This was because of the common threat that Greeks and Turks both had to face; moreover, the preponderant role of the US in the Greek-Turkish relationship would not be there in Eastern Europe.

As the opinion became more common that NATO should, in one way or another, take on the task of providing security to its former enemies, the organization created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). The creation of NACC was the subject of some debate. First, NACC ran the risk of duplicating the confidence-building role of the CSCE. In fact, the exclusion of neutral and non-aligned states makes it less credible than the CSCE for that purpose. The United States argues that CSCE was not sufficient because it lacked the resources; logically, the answer then should have been to give it those resources. But Washington clearly feels it can control NACC better than the CSCE, and has, so far successfully, played a prominent role in the *de facto* down-playing of the latter organization. Second, NACC is fuelling expectations for full membership. As this is not likely to happen soon, it will create even more frustration than would have resulted from an outright rejection of any membership at this time.

Still, NACC can play a very useful role. One area where NACC might indeed be useful is in providing military expertise to those nations wishing to restructure their armed forces toward a more defensive model, both to reduce the defense burden and to avoid friction with neighbor states. Eastern European officer corps must be "de-indoctrinated" from Marxism-Leninism. NATO could address all of these concerns through its existing (and expandable) information, scientific and cultural programs, without even addressing the issue of membership.

In addition, as offered by NATO itself in 1992, NACC could be used to

harmonize NATO forces and infrastructure with those of C&EE states which could then be offered for peacekeeping actions under the CSCE auspices. Initiatives along these lines would tap on NATO's comparative advantages, provide support to the current soul-searching effort in the Alliance, and avoid the danger that acrimonies among Eastern Europeans might clog NATO's own operations. NATO could provide the necessary infrastructure and logistical base, as has been offered recently. Non-NATO troops could be employed and be supported by the NATO infrastructure, early warning systems, etc. Even armed forces from non-European states might be called upon, as been the case already in former Yugoslavia. The old prejudice for which Europeans could serve to keep the peace among non-Europeans, but non-Europeans would not be needed to come and help in "civilized" Europe seems, alas, to be fading away.

From a political point of view, the CSCE might also contribute security for Eastern Europe. So far, however, it has not been given the necessary instruments, either military or political. The Vienna-based Center for the Prevention of Conflicts (CPC) is woefully unprepared to deal with the fermenting European problems, as it is understaffed, underbudgeted and underpowered. It should be strengthened, both financially and in terms of political endorsement by the member states. Its competence should be expanded to include a capability for political action toward crisis prevention, as its very name suggests it should, and not only crisis management.

It would not be fair to suggest, as some have done, that the CSCE has failed in the Yugoslav crisis: it simply never had a chance to even try a meaningful intervention. Had the Center for the Prevention of Conflicts been endowed with greater resources early on, it might have operated more effectively than others did after the crisis had expanded out of manageable proportions.

The growing membership in CSCE dilutes the effectiveness of the decision-making process. The consensus rule is less and less adequate. There is a need to move to majority rule, at least for some kinds of decision, among which perhaps there could be the dispatch of peace-keeping forces to troubled areas. For this purpose, some have proposed the creation of a CSCE Security Council, and to allow it to take operational decisions without waiting all other member states to agree, and if necessary against the wished of some of them.

This body might include the UK, the US, Germany, France, Russia, as permanent members with a veto right. Perhaps Italy, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Spain could enjoy some kind of semi-permanent status. This Council would eliminate the unpredictability associated with China's behavior in the UN, while at the same time including the absolutely essential role of Germany. Its powers would be rather circumscribed at the start, but it could sanction conflict-prevention initiatives and peace-keeping operations, including those that may involve military force. Its chances of being effective could be encouraging in a time where the end of the East-West division of Europe has created a high degree of convergence in the political goals of the major powers in the continent.

## Conclusions

The solution to the problems of the new geopolitical situation in Europe will require an approach that must be both multilateral and multidimensional. International security institutions are indispensable for an adequate approach to the post-Cold War security problems of Europe. One does not need to be an "idealist of the post-Cold War mend-the-world school"<sup>9</sup> to realize that no single state can address, let alone begin to resolve, the complex intricacies of resurgent nationalistic cleavages, civil struggles and potential conflagrations across borders. Nevertheless, because of the new strength gained by old pre-Cold War (rather than new post-Cold War) thinking, multilateralism is still all too often seen as an unaffordable luxury.<sup>10</sup> But it is *Realpolitik*, not idealism, which calls for a wider and more structured pattern of international cooperation in order to best serve the vital interests of European democracies (both old and new).<sup>11</sup> It would be naïve idealism to presume that those interests can be served through the romantic restoration of the nation-state to its pre-Cold War prerogatives, cultural, political or moral as they may be.

To pursue this multilateral approach, all countries of Europe (but the principal responsibility inevitably falls upon Western Europe) need to both deepen and widen international cooperation. In this, Europe does not have to start from scratch; much was done during the Cold War which can still be utilized if it is properly built upon. NATO is the obvious place to start to maintain a collective security and collective defense apparatus, the first of the three vital interests considered in this study. The WEU has been revived after the end of Cold War, and there is no question that, in time, it might work as the future European pillar of the transatlantic alliance if the political will is there to make that happen. The member states of these two organizations (together, but not individually) clearly possess the necessary military, technological and economic resources to face the new risks of the post-Cold War world in which C&EE is no longer an enemy but an increasingly effective security partner.

As of mid-1994, however, partnership with the former Eastern adversaries is still fragile. Collective security bridges to Eastern Europe are being built, among others through the NACC and the WEU's Forum for Consultation, but success is not guaranteed. It is not enough to pile economic, military, and technological resources, to organize conferences and sign agreements. There is a much deeper need to build up political coherence among states and peoples which have long been suspicious of and estranged from one another. This will take time, but there is no reason to think that the successful construction of a collective security system in Western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s could not be replicated, in the late 1990s and beyond, across the whole continent.

The second vital interest has been defined here as the maintenance of unimpeded access to raw materials and the fostering of market economy. Here, too, there are useful precedents that make good examples: the energy sharing schemes of both the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the EU have proven largely successful. The European system of pipelines guarantees that energy security is a preeminently

international end, which will require international means to achieve and maintain. They could be further improved to guarantee access to primary sources and provide a safety net in case of emergency.

Here, too, there is a need to expand the multilateral approach to Eastern Europe. Again, there is some degree of similarity to what was done in Western Europe in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, when the democracies, threatened by rising prices and the two oil crises, effectively overcame their narrowly defined national interests in order to foster the common good.

The strengthening of democracy, the on-going gradual opening of frontiers to movement of goods, people, and ideas strengthen democracy, the third vital interest considered in this paper is concerned. The CSCE and the Council of Europe have contributed to achieve this, and their further strengthening will be useful to accomplish more. But their action, particularly in the case of the CSCE, will need the backing of adequate military force by other institutions if necessary. The EU, on its part, should accept short-term economic costs (in the form of granting greater market access) for long-term political (stability) and economic (efficiency) gains.

Unlike during the Cold War, when the West had to close its eyes to human rights violations because of overriding security concerns, ignoring violations of those human rights today can be a determinant to political instability. During Cold War, stability was a synonym for preservation of the *status quo*; today, on the contrary, stability can only be maintained through a careful management of change, and there is a change toward increased democracy; change must be actively assisted.

## Notes

1. All five charts attached to this paper have been prepared by Dr. Mangott of the Austrian Institute for International Relations of Vienna, to whom I am indebted.
2. Kitromilides, Paschalis M.: "«Imagined Communities» and the Origin of the National Question in the Balkans", in Blinkhorn, Martin and Thanos Veremis (Eds.): *Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality* (Athens: ELIAMEP, 1990).
3. Posen, Barry S.: "Nationalism, the Mass Army and Military Power", *International Security*, Vol. 18, No.2, Fall 1993.
4. The discussion of national vs. vital interests presented here has been adapted from the author's: "National Security Interests After the End of the Cold War", in Carnovale, Marco (Ed.): *European Security Institutions After the Cold War*, (London: Macmillan, forthcoming).
5. For a discussion of this issue, see Zelikow, Philip: "The New Concert of Europe", *Survival*, Vol. 34, No.2, Summer 1992. For a slightly different set of definitions, see also Cucchi, Giuseppe: "Gli Interessi Vitali che l'Italia Protegge", *Relazioni*

*Internazionali*, June 1993.

6. For an extensive discussion on maritime security after the Cold War, see the special issue of *The International Spectator*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 4, 1993.

7. "2nd generation" rights are economic and social rights, the right to work, to housing, to proper nutrition, to education, etc. These, however, must always be considered in the context of the political system prevailing in each state, with its rules and cultural traditions. More recently, "3rd generation" rights have been discussed, and they have to do with things such as the right to a clean environment, to collective health protection, minority rights, etc.

These distinctions, however, are more academic than real. If 1st generation rights are respected, then the others are too, almost automatically. 2nd and 3rd generation "rights" are actually not always definable as such, because not all states are able to provide them. Often, an alleged defense of 2nd generation rights has been used as an excuse not to provide 1st generation—notably in countries governed by dictatorships. On the contrary, all states which do not provide 1st generation rights do not provide 2nd generation as well.

8. Vance, Cyrus: "The Human Rights Imperative", *Foreign Policy*, No. 63, Summer 1986.


9. *The Economist*, 2 October 1993, p. 13.

10. International Institute for Strategic Studies: "Perspectives", *Strategic Survey 1992-1993* (London: Brassey's, 1993), p.14.

11. Smith, Tony: "Making the World Safe for Democracy", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No.4, Autumn 1993.




# Registered Unemployment CEE-5 1991-1994




Source: WIIW, 1994.

# Gross Domestic Product real change in % against preceeding year




Source: WIIW, 1994.

## Discontent with political system 1990-1993




# Assessment of Regime-Transformation 1993

Expectations ...



Plasser/Ulram (1993)

# Image of European Union Visegrád-Countries



Source: Eurobarometer 1-4, 1991-1994.

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# **Session 2 - 1**

**Enhancing Economic and Security Cooperation in Eastern Europe**

*presented by Professor Takako Ueta*

**JIIA-IFRI Joint Conference**

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SECURITY FRAMEWORKS

1. ENHANCING ECONOMIC AND SECURITY COOPERATION IN EASTERN EUROPE

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(1) INTRODUCTION

This paper tries to build a bridge between the European institutions and fora, and those of Asia and the Pacific. What this paper attaches importance to is that in reality, there is a link between European and Asian frameworks in two ways. One is its membership; the United States, Russia, Canada and Japan are involved in the European frameworks. This helps Japan to contribute to the enhancement of economic and security cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe. The European Union attends the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meetings and the Senior Officials Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

The other point is a theoretical one. In Asia and the Pacific, this region has not been organized, and is gradually on its way to framework-building. In this case, the question is whether European frameworks could serve as an example for this region.

The first part of this paper makes clear the characteristics of the European frameworks. The second part explains the role of Japan in enhancing economic and security cooperation in Europe. The last part discusses the relevance of European models in Asia and the Pacific in a future perspective.

In order to make clear the characteristics of security institutions and fora, it is necessary to define the following academic concepts: "collective defence," "collective security," and a new concept of



"cooperative security." "Collective security" was a newly introduced concept of organizing peace after the First World War[1]. At that time, the entangling alliances and balance of power system was blamed as the origins of the War. The League of Nations, and later the United Nations were established on the basis of this idealistic concept of "collective security." A collective security system consists of two elements: non-aggression among participating states, and mutual assistance among participants in case of aggression by the participant(s) of the system.

"Collective defense" has enemy its outside. During the Cold War, NATO and the Warsaw Pact Organization were collective defense organs. A multilateral alliance is based on this concept. Sometimes "collective security" is employed to signify "collective defense" in order not to be confused with "entangling alliances." Whether a "regional(partial) collective security system" is realistic or not is an arguable point. We may call the Locarno-type arrangement a "regional collective security system."

The negotiators of the confidence- and security- building measures in the CSCE introduced the "cooperative security" concept in the early 1990's. German Foreign Minister Genscher was one of the champions of employing this concept in his speech. This concept has not got "citizenship" in academic circles because "cooperative security" has been a working and operational concept which means to enhance and reassure security by way of non-confrontational means such as security dialogue, consultation and cooperation. "Cooperative security" does not exercise "sanctions" while sanctions are tools for collective security system in order to eliminate aggressors[2]. The CSCE and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council embody cooperative security concept.

## (2) European Frameworks from a Japanese Viewpoint

European countries have been used to setting up institutions in order to organize peace, security and cooperation since the 19th century. This is a significant characteristic of Europe. No other regions in the globe are organized as such. Multilateral conference diplomacy and institution-building symbolizes European politics.

After the Second World War, the Western part of Europe established regional institutions. One rationale was to institutionalize Franco-German

cooperation in European organizations. These institutions, NATO, WEU, EC, etc., were a part of the Cold War system. The only overall European framework, the CSCE, promoted East-West cooperation.

Europe has undergone sweeping changes since 1989. Europeans are trying to build a new order by way of transforming Cold War institutions. For Europeans it seems that their priority is "stability projection" to the Eastern part of Europe. The Western European institutions are tools of stability projection. There are some ways of using these tools: adding new missions; setting up institutionalized cooperation; enlargement of membership.

Until mid-1992, European and trans-Atlantic institutions were competing and diplomats on the spot were complaining about inter-blocking institutions. They tried to set up division of labour on a basis of "mutual reinforcing institutions." The major institutions, EU(EC), NATO, WEU, CSCE, and the Council of Europe try to project stability in Central and East European(CEE) countries. Developing contact with the former Eastern bloc, and peacekeeping is their new mission.

The CEE countries try to be re-integrated into certain Western structures, and here comes the institutions' "enlargement to the East" issue. NATO members have no consensus on this issue. "The Partnership for Peace (PFP)" proposes their provisional solution which followed the establishment of the NACC. The CEE countries had no alternative but accept this unsatisfactory offer. Recently, the WEU Council has created a new status, "Association Partner", which enables the CEE and the Baltic States to participate in the WEU meetings and activities. The European Union tries to project stability by way of Europe Agreement and reinforced exchange. Last March, the EU set up an enhanced dialogue on foreign and security policy issues with the six CEE countries which have signed the Europe Agreement. On May 26, Mr. Balladur and Chancellor Kohl proposed to have a EU joint summit with CEE countries that submit application for its membership.

It is questionable to what extent these efforts are effective in projecting stability to the East. The West has difficulty in offering economic stability because of its own depression. These structures do not provide a real security guarantee. However, several links with the West may project a positive psychological effect in the CEE countries.

This institutional approach for projecting stability seems to be useful. This approach includes concerted action and coordination, which has set no room for creating "entangling alliances" between Western countries and the CEE states. These existed and caused the First World War. If the joint action of the European Union prevents and contains "unilateral action", it might be a success.

The Council of Europe projects democratic security to the East. The CSCE, the cooperative security institution, sets standards and values, and projects stability by way of preventive diplomacy and crisis management. These efforts will set a favourable security environment in this region.

### (3) Japan-Europe Cooperation

For the several years, Europe has been so devoted to intra-European politics(Maastricht exercise and the EU enlargement to the North) and to re-integrating the CEE countries that non-European countries have had difficulty in developing ties with European institutions. In late 1989, Japan set out to strengthen its relations with Europe, judging that the importance of Europe in the international arena would be increased by the emergence of a new Europe since Europe had been divided for the last four decades. Not only strengthening relations with European countries, Japan also turned its attention to its exchange with the major institutions and fora in Europe. Japan tries to be involved in the political process in Europe by way of these efforts. As one of the main concerns of the European institutions is stability projection to the East, it is the agenda for Japan-Europe cooperation.

Japan took the institutional approach and the outcome was the Hague Declaration(The Joint Declaration on Relations between Japan and the European Community and its Member States) in July 1991, and its special participation in the CSCE process since July 1992.

The Hague Declaration(Appendix 1) set a broad agenda of cooperation and dialogue that covered international security, cultural exchange, environmental cooperation, and other areas. For the purpose of maintaining on-going dialogue, it institutionalized and strengthened several regular contribution mechanisms including the annual consultation of the Japanese Prime Minister, the President of the European Council, and the President

of the Commission.

The European political leaders and EU commissioners are too busy to set meetings and sometimes it is physically impossible. Vis-a-vis Japan, the dialogue framework has been implemented and is gradually promoting mutual understanding. The first concrete outcome of this Declaration was that Japan and the EC member-states jointly drafted the UN register system of a conventional arms transfer. The EC member states also submitted a draft formula which enabled Japan to participate in the CSCE activities, during the CSCE Helsinki Follow-up Meeting in summer 1992 under Portuguese presidency.

The framework for institutionalized dialogue between Japan and the CSCE was established at the CSCE Helsinki Summit in July 1992. There were two major reasons why Japan asked to establish that institutionalized dialogue. One is the significant potential role of the CSCE in stabilizing Europe after the Cold War. Japan has been participating in this effort as a member of the G7, the G-24, the EBRD, the OECD, etc., and is contributing to the economic conversion of the former USSR and CEE countries.

Another reason is that it was necessary for Japan to be present at that forum lest the CSCE should affect its legitimate security interests since Japan is surrounded by the CSCE space which covers most of the Northern Hemisphere, ranging from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

One example is the zone of application of the CSCE CSBMs. In the past, for example, the idea of deploying intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Asia after their total elimination in Europe, as well as the Soviet transfer of military equipments which were to be eliminated from Europe under the CFE Treaty to areas East of the Urals caused Japanese concern. It was argued that as long as Japan showed no explicit security interests in the CSCE space, the CSCE states would conduct consultation and negotiations among themselves without taking Japanese interests into consideration.

The Helsinki Summit Document enabled Japan to be invited to various meetings of the CSCE with the right to contribution though not able to join its decision-making in a direct way[3](Appendix III).

In the CSCE Forum of Security Cooperation, which is a body for security consultation and negotiation, the Japanese delegation made a

contribution on the situation of Asia and the Pacific. Japan has participated in helping the CSCE mission activities. Japan sent Serbian language experts to the CSCE long-duration mission to Vojvodina. Recently Japan decided to send a Bulgarian language expert to the CSCE spill-over mission in Macedonia. Japan made a contribution for satellite communication facilities for the CSCE missions in former Yugoslavia. Japan has tried to participate in the CSCE crisis management effort although the Yugoslav conflict does not cause a direct security threat to Japan.

Japan and NATO have been developing contacts since 1990. In June 1990, the NATO Information Service and the US Mission to NATO organized an academic seminar in Knokke in which Deputy Foreign Minister Owada and other Japanese experts participated. In the following year, NATO Secretary General, Mr. Worner, paid a first official visit to Japan. The second Japan-NATO seminar was held in Tokyo in November 1992. The number of exchanges of views is increasing between officials from the Japanese government and parliamentarians, and the NATO Secretariat and the SHAPE.

As Japan-Europe political cooperation has begun from zero, it will take some time to produce its fruits. The first-stage positive effect is that the Japanese Government is well-informed on the situation in Europe and which enables Japan to react properly. Japan has already contributed economic and technical assistance to the CEE countries and the NIS. With regard to the CEE countries, Japan contributed approximately 5.9 billion US dollars until the end of 1993, which represents around 8.7% of total G-24 assistance (For further detailed information, see Annex II of this paper). According to May 1994 data, Japan's bilateral assistance to the Russian Federation and the New Independent States on commitment base amounted to around 5 billion US dollars, which includes humanitarian assistance, technical assistance, and loan assistance. Japan is the third largest contributor to the Russian Federation on a bilateral basis, next to Germany and the United States.

According to the background paper of the Japanese Foreign Ministry (Appendix II), the rationale of the Japanese Government of this operation originated from the following idea. ① The success of the reform of the CEE countries is vitally important for the success in Russia and other countries. ② Japan shares the values of democracy and the free-market system. Japan considers it appropriate in every way to assist the CEE

countries' effort. ③Japanese involvement in the reform will strengthen its relations with Europe because these countries are involved in the unification process in Europe.

Japanese involvement in the European Institutions and political process made its decision-making on policy toward Europe easier. If Japan had had no status in the CSCE, there would have been no idea to despatch Japanese experts to Vojvodina and then Macedonia. The Stability Pact exercise might offer another chance for Europeans. If the French Government had issued an invitation to Japan, which has special participating status in the CSCE, on the occasion of the inaugural conference on May 26-27, Japan could have had an opportunity to support the European Union's joint action.

#### (4)The Future Perspective

When Japan requested the CSCE member states to set a dialogue framework, some Europeans argued that Japan should think about establishing the CSCE in Asia and the Pacific and it was not appropriate to come to the European CSCE. This paper explains the reasons of Japanese participation in the CSCE.

In Asia and the Pacific, they have not usually taken an institutional approach in organizing cooperation. This region did not need to set up a multilateral framework for cooperation. Free flow of capitals and trade enlarged prosperity there.

In 1993, there was a growing consensus to set up a multilateral security dialogue in this region. This was mainly due to the increase of Chinese military modernization, and the US policy shift. Officials of the Clinton administration have expressed US support for multilateral "regional security dialogues" in Asia and the Pacific while continuing to stress the importance of existing bilateral security arrangements. It is noteworthy that everybody is talking about a security dialogue that means open-ended exchange of views and does not mean the European CSCE type structured negotiation and cooperation.

The ASEAN Regional Forum is expected to enhance military transparency. This is not comparable to the CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation which sets structured consultation and negotiation. The ARF will be similar to the first stage NACC which had no operational capability but participants raised their security concern. In order to enhance military transparency,

the ARF may gradually introduce CSBMs which might be similar to the European third generation CSBMs. The post-Cold War European CSBMs attach importance to military contact.

In order to build cooperative security in Asia and the Pacific, it is necessary to include sources of danger. If many countries are concerned about North Korea and the future of China, the cooperative security forum needs them. In Europe, the CSCE process started after the "Ostpolitik" of West Germany. The CSCE had two Germanies and all European countries except for Albania. The problem in Asia and the Pacific is that the security dialogue starts without covering all the parties in this region thus lacking an important condition of "cooperative security." The APEC may be in a better position to enhance cooperation, however it began with economic issues.

Lessons in European institutions shows that regional institutions are useful in organizing cooperation and enhancing stability. However, Europeans recognize that bureaucratic institutions cost a lot and sometimes block each other and delay decisions and actions. The CSCE tries to avoid heavy bureaucracy, which may be a model in Asia and the Pacific.

The end of the Cold War in Europe coincided with the decline of the two super-powers. In the post-Cold War era, Japan and Europe have more responsibility in managing and solving world-wide problems. In order to achieve this objective, it is necessary to pursue "open regionalism." Japan and European countries should have free access to and exchange in regional institutions and fora in both areas which promote mutual understanding and cooperation. Japanese participation in the European institutions has proven to be beneficial for enhancing economic and security cooperation in Europe.

(1) See I.L. Claude, Power and International Relations, New York, 1962, pp. 110-115.

(2) H. Vetschra, "The Security Policy Role of the CSCE in the New European Architecture," Manuscript 1992; "The Future Role of Arms Control for European Security," W.F. Danspeckgruber, ed., Emerging Dimensions of European Security Policy, Boulder, 1991, 147-168.

(3) See T. UETA, "Japan and the CSCE," M. Lucas, ed., The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Cooperation, Baden-Baden, 1993, 207-222.

# Appendix 1

## **Joint declaration on relations between the EC and its member states and Japan, July 1991**

On 18 July the following joint declaration was published in The Hague, Tokyo and Brussels at the end of the European Community-Japan summit meeting in The Hague:

### *Preamble*

The European Community and its Member States on the one part and Japan on the other part, conscious of their common attachment to freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights; affirming their common attachment to market principles, the promotion of free trade the development of a prosperous and sound world economy; recalling their increasingly close ties and acknowledging growing worldwide interdependence and, consequently, the need for heightened international cooperation; affirming their common interest in security, peace and stability of the world; aware of the importance of deepening their dialogue in order to make a joint contribution towards safeguarding peace in the world, setting up a just and stable international order in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter and taking up the global challenges that the international community has to face; mindful of the accelerated process whereby the European Community is acquiring its own identity in the economic and monetary sphere, in foreign policy and in the field of security; have decided to intensify their dialogue and to strengthen their cooperation and partnership in order that the challenges of the future may be met.

### *General principles of dialogue and of cooperation*

The European Community and its Member States and Japan will firmly endeavour to inform and consult each other on major international issues, which are of common interest to both parties, be they political, economic, scientific, cultural or other. They will strive, whenever appropriate, to coordinate their positions. They will strengthen their cooperation and exchange of information both between the two parties and within international organizations.

Both parties will likewise consult together on the international situation and on regional matters with a view, in particular, to joining their efforts to bring about an easing of tensions and to ensure respect for human rights.

### *Objectives of dialogue and cooperation*

The two parties will set out to explore together areas of possible cooperation, including where appropriate common diplomatic action. They will endeavour to strengthen their cooperation



in a fair and harmonious way in all areas of their relations taken as a whole, in particular with respect to the following:

promoting negotiated solutions to international or regional tensions and the strengthening of the United Nations and other international organizations;

supporting social systems based on freedom, democracy, the rule of law, human rights and market economy;

enhancing policy consultation and, wherever possible, policy coordination on the international issues which might affect world peace and stability, including international security matters such as the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, the non-proliferation of missile technology and the international transfer of conventional weapons;

pursuing cooperation aimed at achieving a sound development of the world economy and trade, particularly in further strengthening the open multilateral trading system, by rejecting protectionism and recourse to unilateral measures and by implementing GATT and OECD principles concerning trade and investment;

pursuing their resolve for equitable access to their respective markets and removing obstacles, whether structural or other, impeding the expansion of trade and investment, on the basis of comparable opportunities;

strengthening their dialogue and cooperation on various aspects of multifaceted relations between both parties in such areas as trade, investment, industrial cooperation, advanced technology, energy, employment, social affairs and competition rules;

supporting the efforts of developing countries, in particular the poorest among them, to achieve sustained development and political and economic progress, along with fostering respect for human rights as a major factor in genuine development, with due regard for the objectives set by international organizations;

joining their efforts in meeting transnational challenges, such as the issue of environment, the conservation of resources and energy, terrorism, international crime and drugs and related criminal activity, in particular the laundering of the proceeds of crime;

strengthening cooperation and, where appropriate, promoting joint projects in the field of science and technology with a view to contribution to the promotion of scientific knowledge which is essential for the future prosperity of all mankind;

developing academic, cultural and youth exchange programmes aiming to increase knowledge and improve understanding between their respective peoples;

supporting, in cooperation with other States or organizations, Central and Eastern European countries engaged in political and economic reforms aimed at stabilizing their economies and promoting their full integration into the world economy;

cooperating, in relation with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, for the promotion of peace, stability and prosperity of the region.

*Framework for dialogue and consultations*

Both parties are committed to engage in continuous dialogue to give substance to this declaration. To this end, in addition to the full use of all existing regular consultation mechanisms, both parties have decided to strengthen their mechanisms for consultation and substantial cooperation on global and bilateral issues:

- (i) especially they have decided to hold annual consultations in Europe or in Japan between, on the one hand, the President of the European Council and the President of the Commission and, on the other, the Japanese Prime Minister;
- (ii) an annual meeting continues to be held between the Commission and the Japanese Government at ministerial level;
- (iii) six-monthly consultations continue to be held between the foreign Ministers of the Community and the Member of the Commission responsible for external relations (troika) and the Japanese Foreign Minister;
- (iv) the representatives of Japan are briefed by the Presidency of European political cooperation following ministerial political cooperation meetings, and Japan informs the representatives of the Community of the Japanese Government's foreign policy.

In order to give substance to this declaration, both parties will make use of existing and above-mentioned forums with a view to regularly reviewing its implementation and to provide a permanent stimulus to the development of EC-Japan relations.'

# Appendix II

## Japanese Assistance to Central and Eastern Europe -- Basic Thinking and Facts

7. March 1994  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

### 1. Basic Thinking

Reform in the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), which heralded the end of the Cold War, is of historic significance. The CEECs have set precedents for the transition of the former socialist countries, including Russia and the other newly independent states (NIS), to democratic and market-oriented societies. It is, therefore, vitally important that CEEC-reform efforts should succeed, not only for the attainment of a humane and prosperous life for the people in Central and Eastern Europe, but also for the success of reform in Russia and the other countries that started their reform processes later and under even more difficult circumstances. Japan shares the values of democracy and the free-market system and, notwithstanding its historical and geographical distance from the CEECs, considers it appropriate in every way to assist the CEECs in their reform efforts.

The CEECs are becoming increasingly involved in the ongoing unification processes transpiring in Europe, central to which are, of course, the coalescing activities of the European Union. Japan's future relations with the CEEC countries, therefore, should evolve within the context of an overall strengthening of Japan's relations with Europe as a whole, a Europe that should be open to all other countries and regions of the world.

### 2. General Features of Japanese Assistance

Japanese assistance to the CEECs G24 up to the end of 1993 (including Japan's capital contribution to the EBRD) was, in total, in excess of US \$5.9 billion. This amount represents about 8.7% of total G24 assistance, according to the list issued by G24 secretariat.

Japan endeavours to duly coordinate with the United States, the EU, and other donor countries in the implementation of its assistance to the CEECs. Japan attaches considerable importance to policy coordination through the G24 process. It also strives for bilateral cooperation with the US.

### 3. Different Areas of Assistance

#### 3-1 Assistance during the Early Stages of Reform

During the beginning stages of reform, emergency assistance for macro-economic stabilization and humanitarian purposes, and assistance for the development of human resources, which is essential for the reforms to succeed, are the priority areas.

##### 3-1-1 Support for Macro-economic Stabilization

a) Japan's pledges for this type of assistance to the CEECs consist of untied loans provided by Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) and the Japan Export-Import Bank (JEXIM) and amount to US \$1.17 billion. The breakdown is shown in the table below

Poland (Currency stabilization fund)	US \$150 million
Hungary	US \$500 million
Former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic	US \$200 million
Bulgaria	US \$100 million
Romania	US \$100 million
The Baltic countries	US \$100 million
Albania (agriculture sector adjustment programme)	US \$ 20 million

b) In the form of OECF loans, Japan has provided US \$150 million as part of the Polish currency stabilization fund, and negotiations between Japan and Albania on E/N are now under way to provide US \$20 million as part of its agriculture sector adjustment programme to Albania.

Japan has provided untied JEXIM loans to Hungary, the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Bulgaria, Romania and the Baltic Countries which amount to US \$1 billion.

c) The rate of disbursement is constantly increasing and, at present, amounts to 72.4%. (Already disbursed: US \$150 million for the Polish currency stabilization fund; US \$430 million for Hungary; US \$200 million for the former CSFR; US \$62.5 million for Romania; and US \$4 million for Estonia.)

d) With regard to Polish debt restructuring, Japan concluded a bilateral agreement with Poland in February 1992. The US \$1.24 billion debt owed by Poland to Japan will be reduced by 50% on a net present value basis, under the terms and conditions specified in the Paris Club's multilateral agreement.

### 3-1-2 Humanitarian Food Aid

a) Japanese assistance in this category is shown below:

Poland (1989, for the purchase of wheat)	US \$25 million
Bulgaria, Romania and Albania (1991-92, for the purchase of skimmed milk)	US \$3.8 million

b) To aid refugees and displaced persons in the former Yugoslavia, Japan had contributed US \$82.7 million to such international humanitarian organizations as the UNHCR, WFP, ICRC.

As a part of an enhanced Japanese policy toward the former Yugoslavia, the Government of Japan will make available additional US \$10 to 15 million for humanitarian aid to this region.

### 3-1-3 Technical Cooperation

a) The development of human resources is a crucially important factor if economic reform in the CEECs is to succeed, and Japan is expanding its technical cooperation, both in scale and scope.

b) A US \$50 million, five-year programme of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has been actively in progress since 1989. In FY 1992, 322 trainees were received (in FY 1993, 335 trainees are expected to be received).

Similarly, an Association for Overseas Technical Scholarship Scheme (AOTS) has enabled trainees from Central and Eastern Europe to be accepted for instruction by Japanese companies operating in Western Europe. From FY 1990 through 1993, 338 trainees have been accepted within this scheme.

c) Other programmes, such as scholarships awarded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture, are also being implemented. The number of foreign scholars studying under these Ministry of Education Scholarships has been increasing steadily, as indicated in the table below.

	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Number of scholars	26	34	49	61	69

d) Japan also contributes to international organizations in the area of technical assistance programmes. For example, Japan actively participates in the OECD's technical assistance programme for Central and Eastern Europe, contributing 22.5 % of its total financial cost. Japan also has established the Japan-Europe Cooperation Fund in the EBRD, the amount of the grant provided through this Fund currently being US \$13 million annually.

### 3-2 Priority Areas for Present and Future Assistance

More than four years have passed since the start of reforms in the CEECs, and in many of the CEECs, positive results from this transition to the market economy already can be seen. However, it now has become increasingly necessary to consider assistance from a medium- to a long-term perspective, for it is expected that the recipient countries will begin to bear an even greater responsibility in the implementation of economic policy and/or the use of external assistance. In this context, Japan attaches particular importance to the following three areas.

#### 3-2-1 Private-Sector Development

##### 3-2-1-1 Japanese Enterprise Facility

a) In May 1992, Japan announced the establishment of a scheme known as the Japanese Enterprise Facility, the purpose of which is to foster the development of small and medium-size private enterprises in the region by funding such enterprises with loans and equity investment. The sources of funding for this Facility are JEXIM for loans and the Japan International Development Organization Ltd. (JAIDO\*) for equity investment.

This Japanese Enterprise Facility seeks, through established mechanisms, cooperation with the Enterprise Funds of the U.S. that engages in similar activities in some of the CEECs. Some concrete cases of cooperation are already under way, as indicated in the table in c).

\* JAIDO was established in April 1989 by the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) and the Japanese Government. JAIDO's mission is to promote foreign currency-generating projects, in which private Japanese and local enterprises jointly invest, in the developing countries.

b) JEXIM loans are in the form of untied two-step loans. By "two-step" is meant that JEXIM extends untied loans to the central bank or other appropriate financial institution of the recipient country, after which that financial institution then provides loans to individual enterprises in the recipient country with the purpose of fostering the growth of small and medium-size enterprises.

The total amount of such JEXIM loans is to be expanded to US \$300 million for the entire region. Loan Agreements for US \$200 million were already concluded and US \$110 million have been disbursed. The breakdown is shown in the table below.

Country	Amount	Disbursement
Hungary	\$100 million	\$ 70 million
Czech Republic	\$ 67 million	\$ 40 million
Slovak Republic	\$ 33 million	

c) JAIDO equity investment will be made directly in individual enterprises. Following the May 1992 announcement referred to above, Japan increased JAIDO funding by US \$10 million. JAIDO funds may be used for equity investment in projects anywhere in the CEE region, and Japanese commercial participation is not a prerequisite for such financing. The table below shows 8 JAIDO-financed projects, amounting to a total of US \$10.93 million. JAIDO is now considering a replenishment of this funding, so that it will be able to continue its activities.

Country	Projects	Funded by JAIDO
Hungary	glass wool production	\$1.00 million
	fast food restaurant	\$1.00 million★
	office building construction	\$2.85 million
	office building construction	\$4.00 million
Czech Republic	ferrovanadium production	\$0.70 million
	ceramic substrate production	\$1.00 million★
Slovak Republic	fertilizer production	\$0.14 million★
	oligosaccharide production	\$0.24 million★

★ indicates a co-financed project in cooperation with the U.S. Enterprise Fund.

### 3-2-1-2 Transfer of market economy know-how resulting from Japan's post-war experience

a) In response to numerous requests from the CEECs for transfer of expertise and guidance, based on Japan's post-war experience, in such areas as industrial policy, productivity improvement, management systems, and other related matters, Japan has developed various technical cooperation programmes, and intends to strengthen such assistance.

b) Salient points regarding these programmes are:

- Japan has initiated cooperative endeavours with Poland and Hungary in productivity improvement by dispatching experts. Japan also sends experts from the Japan Productivity Center to other CEECs and continues to identify areas for cooperation.
- Seminars on privatization organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were held in Tokyo in 1992 and 1993 for high-ranking officials from the CEECs with jurisdiction for

their relevant fields. Similar seminars have been organized by other ministries and agencies.

- Seminars on Japan's post-war economic policies, organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have been held in Central and Eastern Europe.
- From fiscal year 1993, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been implementing the Adviser Assistance Programme for CEECs. The basic concept of this programme is to create a network of Japanese experts interested in economic reforms in the CEECs, and to assist such reforms by utilizing this network. Specifically, Japan will dispatch teams of experts to CEEC ministries dealing with economic matters, and to governmental organizations, economic research institutes, and similar organizations in the CEECs and will provide advice in form of reports. It is anticipated that in the future these experts will be able to serve as economic advisers to the Governments of CEECs.

### 3-2-2 Environmental Protection and Improvement

CEECs suffer from some of the worst environmental devastation in the world, which has resulted in widespread health problems, a considerable loss in productivity, and a general lowering of the quality of life in this region. In view of the seriousness of this problem, Japan attaches great importance to cooperation in this field. The main schemes of this cooperation are outlined below.

a) Financial assistance to environmental projects are extended through two institutions, namely OECF and JEXIM.

As a result of strenuous efforts, many promising projects have emerged recently. The Government of Japan has already decided to finance a project in Hungary through OECF and 4 other projects are reaching a mature stage of preparation. Details are shown in the table below.

OECF Loans

Country	Project	Amount	Remarks
Hungary	Varpalota Region Environmental Improvement Programme *	US \$ 42 million	pledged
Slovak Republic	Kosice and Presov Region Air Pollution Prevention Programme	US \$147 million	being prepared

\*Improvement of the regional heating system, water supply, and drainage



## JEXIM Loans

Country	Project	Amount	Remarks
Hungary	Varpalota Region Environmental Improvement Programme *	US \$100 million	being prepared
	Borsod National Chemical Company Mercury Leakage Prevention Programme	US \$120 million	being prepared
Czech Republic	Melnik Coal Thermal Power Plant De-sulphurization Programme	US \$230 million	being prepared

\*Disposal of industrial waste water, eradication of air pollution

b) JICA, in addition to providing training courses and development studies in the environmental field, is providing technical assistance to assist the CEEC governments to prepare for such cooperative projects. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs organizes seminars on Japan's experience in dealing with environmental problems.

c) Japan has been a major supporter of the Regional Environment Center for Central and Eastern Europe in Budapest ever since this center was founded in 1991. One of the Center's seven Executive Directors is a highly experienced expert, Mr. Hiroyuki Ishi.

d) Based on a proposal of Japan, to ensure that environmental assistance to the CEECs is more effective, Japan and the U.S. are now coordinating their activities. The basic concept of this cooperative endeavour is to maximize the merit of the existing schemes of each country by enhanced policy cooperation. To this end the Governments of Japan and the U.S. will establish a Joint Committee to coordinate project development for the CEECs.

In addition Japan will make available up to US \$1 billion for the financing of projects emerging from this Committee.

### 3-2-3 Promotion of Trade and Investment

The economic status of its private sector provides a basis to measure a nation's economic health, and good business relations with other countries play a vital role in developing the national economy. Therefore, the task of each government is to facilitate smooth business transactions, including trade and investment. From this viewpoint, the Government of Japan, within the context of assisting the CEECs to achieve economic reform, has been endeavouring to facilitate and support private-sector activities in the CEECs by working for the establishment of desirable legal and institutional frameworks. Some concrete examples are:

a) Systems and facilities to promote exports from the CEECs to Japan are as follows.

- Japan applies the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) to all CEEC exports. As a result, CEEC goods enter the Japanese market at lower tariff rates than those of western industrialized countries.
- Japan promotes CEEC exports to Japan by applying preferential treatment for certain goods from the CEECs. For instance, if a manufacturer in Japan increases its import of certain goods by more than 2%, up to 5% of the increased amount will be exempt from taxation.
- Japan also provides low interest loans (4.1%) for improving the facilities needed for the import of goods (e.g. warehousing).
- Japan promotes imports through the activities of the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), e.g. by dispatching trade experts, organizing trade fairs, and similar promotions. JETRO has established a business support center that provides foreign businessmen with trade information, product and promotional advice, and office facilities for short term use. JETRO currently maintains offices in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and in the Czech Republic.

b) Japan also has entered into negotiations aimed at concluding investment-protection treaties with certain CEECs. Japan hopes that such treaties will guarantee Japanese investors most-favour ednation (MFN) status, and that these investors will receive the same treatment accorded that nation's citizens. Japan considers that treaties ensuring equitable conditions for foreign investors will provide the political green light that these investors are waiting for, thereby facilitating even greater investment in the CEECs by the private sector.

c) For humanitarian assistance to Russia and other NIS, Japan makes use of the "triangular operation" modality by purchasing food and medicines in the CEECs with Japanese grant aid. As the former Soviet Union was a traditional export market for the CEECs, promoting this traditional trade relationship enables the citizens of the NIS to continue to use products well known to them and helps the CEECs to retain their traditional eastern market.

The total value of goods purchased from the CEECs on the basis of this method, as of December 1993, was approximately ¥1269.3 million. The breakdown is shown in the table below.

Poland	¥736.0 million
Hungary	¥362.6 million
Slovenia	¥ 79.9 million
Former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (up to Dec. 1992)	¥ 44.8 million
Czech Republic (up to Jun. 1993)	¥ 31.0 million
Bulgaria	¥ 15.0 million

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# The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Cooperation

Edited by Michael R. Lucas



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## Japan and the CSCE: Toward the Extended Euro-Atlantic Community from Tokyo to Vladivostok via San Francisco

### Introduction

*"The CSCE is becoming not only a forum of utmost importance in Eurasia but also an organ of great significance to Japan. It is because the CSCE, although created basically as a regional forum with its geographical scope set in Europe, is endeavoring to uphold and promote the common aims and values which are shared and have been pursued by Japan as an advanced industrialized democracy in the northern hemisphere, and because, I believe, Japan's participation in this process can add to the effectiveness of the joint work to achieve the aim of the CSCE."*

*Ambassador Nobuo Matsunaga, the  
Envoy of the Government of Japan,  
at the CSCE Helsinki Summit  
Meeting, July 9, 1992.*

The Helsinki Document 1992 established a framework of "institutionalized dialogue" with Japan. Since August, 1992, Japanese delegates have participated in the CSO and the FSC. Although the Helsinki Document did not name the Japanese status, it formalized special cooperative relations with Japan as a non-member country.

In what follows, the process leading to the CSCE's institutionalization of its dialogue with Japan will be traced by examining Japan's evolving policy approach to the CSCE and the negotiations on Japan-CSCE relations during the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting (HFUM). The problems of a possible CSCE-type forum, a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia and the Pacific (CSCAP), will then be briefly discussed. An attempt will be made to show that Japanese involvement in the CSCE does not directly influence and nor is it linked to the various conceptions of the CSCAP. The usefulness of organizing a CSCAP in the future and its relationship to the growing tendency toward increasing multilateral security dialogue in Asia and the Pacific will also be taken up.

## *I. Japan and the CSCE*

### *1. Cooperative linkage with the Euro-Atlantic Community*

Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu visited Europe in early 1990 following Japan's decision to pursue a more active policy towards Europe. During the CSCE Bonn Conference on Economic Co-operation (March 19- April 11, 1990), the Japanese media discussed the question of Japan's "observer status" in the CSCE. At that time, Japan still tended to define its role as that of an economic power with links to major economic institutions. Japan's somewhat reserved attitude changed with the end of the East-West conflict, which strengthened Japan's desire for a wider role in international cooperation that would go beyond mere economic support for the West during and after the Gulf War. Japan's new policy may be characterized as a strategy of linkage with the rest of the world.

From mid-1990, Japan has gradually developed its relations with European and trans-Atlantic institutions. In June, 1990, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Hisashi Owada participated in an academic conference on global security co-sponsored by the NATO Information Service and the US Mission to NATO.<sup>1</sup> In September, 1991, NATO Secretary-General Manfred Wörner paid an official visit to Japan.

Another important step was the "Owada initiative." Following tough negotiations it resulted in the "Joint Declaration on Relations between Japan and the European Community and its Member States." Also referred to as the "Hague Declaration," the Joint Declaration was launched July 18, 1991, on the occasion of the official visit of Prime Minister Kaifu to the Hague during the Netherlands' presidency of the EC. The Hague Declaration set a broad agenda of cooperation and dialogue that covered international security, cultural exchange, and other areas. For the purpose of maintaining on-going dialogue, it institutionalized several regular consultation mechanisms, including

- annual consultations of the Japanese Prime Minister, the President of the European Council, and the President of the Commission
- annual meetings between the Japanese Government and the Commission at a ministerial level
- consultations every six months between the Japanese Foreign Minister, the EC Foreign Minister, and the Member of the EC Commission responsible for external relations (Troika)
- briefings by the Presidency of European Political Cooperation (EPC) for Japan following EPC's ministerial meetings and Japanese briefings on its foreign policy for the representatives of the Community<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Eric Grove, ed., *Global Security: North American, European and Japanese Interdependence in the 1990s*, (London: Brassey's, 1991).

<sup>2</sup> "Joint Declaration on Relations between Japan and the European Community and its Member States," July 18, 1991.

As early as May, 1990, former Japanese prime minister Yashuhiro Nakasone contributed an article, entitled "Japan Should Join in a Wider Europe," to the *Los Angeles Times*, a translation of which was published in *Yomiuri Shimbun*. Mr. Nakasone cited Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis: "I [de Michelis] strongly favor finding a way to end Japan's political isolation from Europe. Japan, excluded by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 41 years ago, should be brought into the Helsinki Conference. Everyone should benefit from this closer political association." Attaching importance to Japan's global role as a member of the West, Mr. Nakasone concluded that "insofar as the CSCE is of major significance to global security, it is inconceivable that Japan not engage itself, directly or indirectly, in that process."<sup>3</sup>

Although de Michelis submitted a proposal to involve Japan in the CSCE during the CSCE Council Meeting in Berlin, June, 1991, the Japanese Government needed more time to work out a policy. On the other hand, because of its dispute with the Soviet Union over the Kurile Islands, Japan had maintained a reserved attitude toward the CSCE, which the Soviets viewed as an institution that recognized the existing borders of the USSR. On the other hand, the terms "from Vancouver to Vladivostok" and "Euro-Atlantic Community" caused an uneasy feeling of isolation among Japanese because Japan is encircled by CSCE space.

Japan's Foreign Ministry reviewed CSCE's international role and recognized its growing importance in enhancing European stability. The CSCE's institutionalization facilitated Japan's efforts to begin consultation. Japan's interests in the CSCE include: Firstly, in order to participate in building a new order, it is important to have formal relations with the CSCE. As Japan is a member of the Group of Seven Leading Industrialized Nations (G-7), the Group of 24 Industrialized Nations (G-24), the OECD, etc., and is contributing to economic stabilization of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, the CSCE surely needs Japanese cooperation to achieve its objectives. Such cooperation must include not only Basket 2, but all Baskets, since Japan shares all basic CSCE principles and values, such as those of democracy and the market economy. Secondly, CSCE arms control and confidence-building measures (particularly their area of application) may affect Japan's security. In the past, for example, the idea of deploying intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Asia after their elimination in Europe and also the Russian transfer of military hardware eliminated from Europe under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) to areas East of the Urals caused concern. It was argued that as long as Japan showed no explicit security interest in the CSCE space, the CSCE states would conduct consultations and negotiations among themselves without taking Japanese interests into consideration.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup> *Los Angeles Times*, May 7, 1990; *Yomiuri Shimbun*, May 8, 1990.

<sup>4</sup> Matsunaga, op. cit.

In order that CSCE fora consider Japanese interests, Japan tried to formalize a framework of "institutionalized dialogue" with the CSCE in order to participate in building a new international order and to prevent the CSCE from unilaterally deciding issues vitally affecting Japan. Japan considered attending the meetings of the CSCE Council and the CSO and possibly other fora as well. Japan attached importance to presenting its views when necessary, without, however, participating in the formal CSCE decisionmaking process. During the spring of 1992, Japanese interests in the CSCE were not far-reaching enough to warrant becoming a full member.

During Japan's high-level, bilateral consultations from February to April in 1992, with several CSCE countries, which were widely covered by the Japanese press, Japan expressed interest in establishing a formal link with the CSCE and received favorable responses and support from German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, US secretary of state James Baker, Czech President Vaclav Havel, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, and Austrian Foreign Minister Alois Mock. As mentioned above, de Michelis, in Berlin in June, 1991, put forth informally his own idea for dialogue with Japan.<sup>5</sup> Taking into account the on-going negotiations at the HFUM, Japan launched a formal demarche to CSCE member states in late April.

## 2. On to Helsinki

In its institutionalization process, the CSCE was deepening and widening its relations with non-participating states and international organizations, although traditionally this had not been a CSCE priority. In the Paris Charter of 1990, the section, "The CSCE and the World," describes the CSCE approach as follows:

*"The destiny of our nations is linked to that of all other nations. We support fully the United Nations and the enhancement of its role in promoting international peace, security, and justice. We reaffirm our commitment to the principles and purposes of the United Nations as enshrined in the Charter and condemn all violations of these principles. We recognize with satisfaction the growing role of the United Nations in world affairs and its increasing effectiveness, fostered by the improvement in relations among other states. Aware of the dire needs of a great part of the world, we commit ourselves to solidarity with all other countries. Therefore, we issue a call from Paris today to all the nations*

<sup>5</sup> See Gianni de Michelis, "Japan and Europe. New Interdependence Requires Trust," *The Daily Yomiuri*, July 15, 1991, and *Yomiuri Simbun*, July 15, 1991.

*of the world. We stand ready to join with any and all States in common efforts to protect and advance the community of fundamental human values."*<sup>6</sup>

The Berlin Council Meeting in June, 1991, also took up this idea. Although the Italian Foreign Minister suggested linking Japan with the CSCE, paragraph 19 of the Summary of Conclusions of the Berlin Meeting reads as follows: "They [the Foreign Ministers of the CSCE] stressed that the CSCE must remain open to dialogue and co-operation with the rest of the world and noted the interest of other countries in the CSCE. In this regard, they requested the CSO to explore this idea and to report to a future meeting of the Council."<sup>7</sup>

In the course of the preparatory work of the Prague Council Meeting at the end of January, 1992, Italy had circulated in late October, 1991, a proposal in the CSO for establishing a dialogue with Japan. "The Prague Document on Further Development of CSCE Institutions and Structures," adopted by the Council, contained the following paragraph on "Relations with non-participating States": "The Council requests the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting to recommend practical ways to establish a flexible dialogue between the CSCE and interested non-participating states or groups of states, for example, through contacts between the said States and the Chairman-in-office of the Council or of the Committee of Senior Officials."<sup>8</sup> Although not specifically mentioned, Japan was clearly in the minds of the authors of this paragraph just as it was in Czech President Havel's statement to the Prague meeting.<sup>9</sup>

## 3. The HFUM and the Summit

*"The development of the CSCE as an institution is arousing increasing interest among the non-participating states. The CSCE principle of dialogue and cooperation must also be practiced in relation to other countries. Japan has announced its interest in closer links with the CSCE. I am in favor of this and hope that Helsinki will send a signal of partnership both to this important country and to other states in the region."*

*Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, at the*

<sup>6</sup> Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Paris, 1990.

<sup>7</sup> Berlin Meeting of the CSCE Council, 1991, Summary of Conclusions, June 19-20.

<sup>8</sup> Prague Document on Further Development of CSCE Institutions and Structures, Prague, January 30-31, 1992.

<sup>9</sup> Statement by H.E. Vaclav Havel, President of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic at the Second Meeting of the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Prague, January 30, 1992.

Instructed by the Council, Working Group I of the Follow-up Meeting dealt with CSCE relations with non-participating states. The crisis in former Yugoslavia caused a delay in the preparatory work for the Summit. The first draft, dated May 6, was submitted by Portugal on behalf of the EC and its member states. This proposal, entitled "Dialogue with non-participating States," defined non-participating states, with which the CSCE "should find appropriate means to entertain a fruitful dialogue," as follows:

*"[Non-participating States which] share ideals, standards and objectives of the CSCE, including respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law, have shown an interest in a close, permanent dialogue with CSCE participating States, in particular through common membership in relevant institutions and organizations, and are adjacent to the CSCE geographical area."*

This wording could only be applicable to Japan, although Japan is not explicitly mentioned. The EC proposal tried to create a new status differing from that of the non-participating Mediterranean states as defined in the Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations of 1975. While the Final Recommendation's definition of observer states applies to future participating states, the EC proposal called the new status of non-participating states "special guests."<sup>10</sup>

In order to promote dialogue with special guests, the EC's first proposal put forth the following three points for enhancing dialogue:

- "1) The said States could be invited, on an *ad hoc* basis, to make contributions, as appropriate, to future CSCE activities, including Follow-up Meetings and specialized fora within the framework of the CSO. Meetings at ministerial level could be agreed upon as required.
- 2) Contacts could be entertained between the authorities of the interested States and the Chairman-in-Office of the Council or the CSO in order to establish regular information exchange. The Chairman-in-Office could report on such contacts, as appropriate, respectively to the Council of the CSO.
- 3) Contacts could also be established between the said States and the CSCE institutions in order to ensure a timely notification of official CSCE documents and the exchange of other relevant documentation."<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> CSCE/HIM/WG1/6.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

The difference between the Japanese request and the EC proposal was that the latter provided for Japanese participation on an *ad hoc* and invitation basis. The revised EC proposal of June 16 amended the first point as follows: "The said States could be invited to be present as special guests at Summit Meetings and Council Meetings and in this capacity to make contributions, as appropriate, to future CSCE activities, including Follow-up Meetings and specialized fora within the framework of the CSO."<sup>12</sup>

The United States, the only ally of Japan, supported Japanese association with the CSCE and in late June presented a paper which suggested "associate membership" and that Japan be entitled on a permanent basis to attend CSCE fora and have the right to speak. The United States sought to come up with a formula that could also be applicable at some future point to Australia and New Zealand. The proposed formula for Japan caused concern among Mediterranean countries, and, as a result, some member states tried to upgrade the status of the non-participating Mediterranean states by referring to the discussion on Japan.

Finland recognized the importance of involving Japan in the CSCE process and assisted it in drafting the Japan formula. Ambassador Aarno Karhilo, the Head of the Delegation of Finland, speaking as host of the Helsinki Meeting following consultations with the delegations, stated: "We have concluded that there would be no objections to invite a representative of the Government of Japan to attend the Helsinki Summit as a special guest."<sup>13</sup> The Government of Japan welcomed this invitation.

On July 6, CSCE states agreed on the Japan formula, which was incorporated into Chapter IV of the "Helsinki Decisions." Finland received a number of proposals and prepared a compiled draft for the summit document. The first part, the "Helsinki Summit Declaration," contains the following paragraph on non-participating states: "We have expanded dialogue with non-participating States, inviting them to take part in our activities on a selective basis when they can make a contribution."<sup>14</sup> The second part of the summit document, "Helsinki Decisions," which defines in greater detail the relations between Japan and the CSCE, establishes a permanent place for Japan in the main CSCE bodies and enables Japan to present its views:

*"In accordance with paragraph 45 of the Prague Document, the participating States intend to deepen their co-operation and develop a substantial relationship with non-participating States, such as Japan, which display an interest in the CSCE, share its principles and objectives, and are actively engaged in European co-operation through relevant organizations. To*

<sup>12</sup> CSCE/HIM/WG/6/Rev. 1.

<sup>13</sup> Statement by Ambassador Aarno Karhilo, Head of the Delegation of Finland in the Committee of the Whole, Helsinki Summit, July 10, 1992.

<sup>14</sup> CSCE Helsinki Document 1992, The Challenges of Change, Helsinki, 1992.



*this end, Japan will be invited to attend CSCE meetings, including those of Heads of State and Government, the CSCE Council, the Committee of Senior Officials and other appropriate CSCE bodies which consider specific topics of expanded consultation and co-operation.*

*Representatives of Japan may contribute to such meetings, without participating in the preparation and adoption of decisions, on subjects in which Japan has a direct interest and/or wishes to co-operate actively with the CSCE."*<sup>15</sup>

During the drafting process of the summit document, the above agreement was not highly controversial. There was a general consensus to create a link between Japan and the CSCE. The Helsinki Document 1992 was adopted July 10th. Ambassador Matsunaga, the Envoy of the Government of Japan, attended the summit meeting, the working lunch and official dinner, and bilateral talks, which provided an opportunity to exchange views with CSCE heads of state.

## II. The CSCE in Asia and the Pacific?

### 1. From the CSCE to the NACC Model

The achievements of the CSCE have aroused interest in applying the CSCE model beyond Europe. But it has been recognized that there are different definitions of the "CSCE model" and the CSCE's three-basket structure cannot be simply transplanted to other parts of the world.

As the CSCE has evolved, it has been transformed. The CSCE prior to the Charter of Paris of November, 1990, was the only permanent forum for on-going dialogue between the two confronting systems. This CSCE had little operational capability but tried to develop a spirit of cooperation and to set common standards of behavior among the participating states. Following the end of the Cold War division of Europe, the CSCE has been expected to play a stabilizing role. For this purpose, the CSCE began a process of "institutionalization" and has become better equipped to actively engage in preventive diplomacy.

Which CSCE model do proponents of transplantation of the CSCE want to apply to other regions? In case of Asia and the Pacific, proponents usually propose some combination of CSBMs among the states of the region, convening summits, and foreign minister meetings on security issues. This model can be referred to as a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia and the Pacific (CSCAP).

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

The most consistent advocate of a CSCAP, the former Soviet Union and Russia, have met with reserve from the United States and Japan. Security talks in Asia and the Pacific on possible naval arms control and disarmament had been systematically opposed by the United States. Secretary of state James Baker's article in *Foreign Affairs*, "America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community," did not refer to the CSCE as a model and noted: "What has fostered stability and secured economic dynamism in East Asia for the past four decades is a loose network of bilateral alliances with the United States at its core."<sup>16</sup> Baker put forth a sub-regional and issue-oriented approach: "At this stage of a new era we should be attentive to the possibilities for such multilateral action without locking ourselves into an overly structured approach. In the Asia-Pacific community, form should follow function.... While Asian security concerns have a diverse, decentralized character, burgeoning intra- and trans-Pacific trade and investment provide areas of broad common interest. Commerce offers the most natural approach to foster greater regional cohesion."<sup>17</sup> In this regard, Baker attached importance to the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC)<sup>18</sup> and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC).<sup>19</sup>

As most other states in the region, Japan regards the forward presence of the US Navy as a source of stability. At the same time Japan has had reservations concerning a series of Russian CSCAP proposals largely because of Soviet and Russian occupation of the Kurile Islands since 1945. Misunderstanding prevailed even among intellectuals in Japan that the Helsinki Final Act recognized the European *status quo* that resulted from the Second World War. They did not pay attention to the possibility of peaceful change of borders as defined in the Final Act's Principle I.

In Asia and the Pacific, there has never been a clear-cut East-West confrontation as in postwar Europe. China has been an independent player. "Asia" has never been an operational concept based on the degree of cohesion and integration associated with "Europe." Europe has dismantled its Cold War structures and is reorganizing itself. As a result of the collapse of Communist regimes, Europe as a whole is now articulating the same values. In Asia and the Pacific, various social and value systems co-exist, and the legacy of the Cold War persists, especially on the Korean Peninsula and the Kurile Islands.

<sup>16</sup> James Baker, "America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 5, Winter 1991/92, pp. 1-18.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> APEC's member countries are Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, the six ASEAN countries (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand), China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.

<sup>19</sup> PECC is a non-governmental forum with representatives from Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the six ASEAN countries, China, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Russia, and Pacific Island Nations.

Despite of these factors, however, Japan has not fallen into immobilism. At the Post-Ministerial Conference of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN-PMC)<sup>20</sup> in July, 1991, Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama proposed that the ASEAN-PMC should serve as a framework for political dialogue.<sup>21</sup> In January, 1992, the ASEAN Summit in Singapore decided to promote security dialogue with non-participating states through the ASEAN-PMC. This move also reflects the skepticism of ASEAN countries concerning the proposals initiated by the great powers for an overall security structure (CSCAP) and extended APEC with political dialogue.<sup>22</sup>

Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa's address at the National Press Club in Washington DC, in July, 1992, suggested "a two-track approach" to Asia Pacific security, "the promotion of sub-regional cooperation to settle disputes and conflicts and region-wide political dialogue to enhance the sense of mutual reassurance."<sup>23</sup> The ASEAN-PMC is such a region-wide framework for a political dialogue. Prime Minister Miyazawa also referred to the APEC ministerial meeting as a possible framework for dialogue and subsequently, on September 21, 1992, he supported Australian Prime Minister Paul John Keating's proposal to convene an Asian and Pacific Summit on the basis of APEC in order to enhance regional cooperation, including political dialogue.<sup>24</sup> On December 25, the Japanese Prime Minister's advisory body on foreign policy planning submitted a report in which it declined to endorse a far-reaching overall security structure, but did recommend establishing a security dialogue in the ASEAN-PMC framework which would also include Russia and China.<sup>25</sup>

In this context it should be mentioned that China, as reported in 1992 by the Japanese Defense Agency, is "moving to expand the sphere of its maritime activity by reinforcing its activities on the Spratly and Paracel Islands and enhancing its presence in the region."<sup>26</sup> It was also noted that Taiwan and ASEAN countries are rapidly modernizing their military forces. The territorial dispute over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea is a source of tension and potential destabilization in relations between China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. The dispute clearly demonstrates the need for a multilateral forum for security dialogue. While such a forum should be modeled after the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), it would not be

a forum with former enemies, but for the purpose of an open-ended security dialogue not related to significant operational capabilities. In Asia and the Pacific, it is appropriate to begin with a NACC-type cooperative security structure in which participants can address their different security concerns.<sup>27</sup>

In the Asian and Pacific Region, in which most states are still to be considered developing countries and do not have the resources for setting up and maintaining a large bureaucracy, it is indispensable to avoid institutional duplication and unnecessary competition between different institutions. Precisely for this reason substantial links with the United Nations are necessary.

## 2. The Evolution of Proposals

The Soviet Union was a primary advocate of a "Collective security system" in Asia. In 1969, Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev emphasized the importance of creating such a system. The Soviets saw the basis of an Asian Collective Security System in the following principles: non-use of force in inter-state relations; respect for sovereignty; inviolability of frontiers; non-intervention in internal affairs; development of economic and other cooperation based on equal rights and on mutual benefit; recognition and observation of the rights of self-determination of peoples; non-recognition of territorial annexation by means of aggression; peaceful settlement of all international disputes; establishment of the sovereign rights to natural resources of each country, and of non-deprivable rights of exerting social and economic reform.<sup>28</sup>

Non-aggression pacts and friendship and cooperation agreements were regarded by the Soviets as political initiatives on the road toward an Asian

20 The participants were ASEAN plus Japan, the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Korea, and the European Community. Vietnam, Laos, China, and Russia became observers in July 1992.

21 *Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 25, 1991.

22 See Leszek Buszynski, "ASEAN Security Dilemmas," *Survival*, Vol. 34, No. 4, Winter 1992-93, pp. 90-107; Kazunori Tamaki, "ASEAN in Search of New Regional Order in the Post Cold War Era," *The Japan Association of International Relations, International Relations*, No. 100, August 1992, pp. 184-198 (in Japanese); *Revue Diplomatique*, No. 1286, March 1992 (Japan).

23 Address by Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa at the National Press Club, July 2, 1992.

24 *Asahi Shimbun*, September 22, 1992.

25 *Asahi Shimbun*, December 26, 1992.

26 Defence Agency of Japan, *Defense of Japan 1992*, p. 48.

27 On the NACC, see: North Atlantic Assembly, Sub-committee on Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, Draft Interim Report, *The North Atlantic Cooperation Council*, November 1992; Takako Ueta, "The Evolution of the Cooperative Security Structure in Europe: The CSCE and NACC," *The Japan Association of International Relations, International Relations*, Vol. 100, August 1992, pp. 126-151 (in Japanese). Dr. Vetschera defines "cooperative security policy" as follows: "Cooperative security policy refrains from the very idea of enforcing stability in a confrontational way. It rather aims at promoting cooperation in order to prevent either the emerging of conflicts in the political sphere or to reduce the danger of armed confrontation. More specifically, cooperative security policy aims at preventing emerging conflicts from escalating .... In this context, emphasis is given to improved predictability by increased openness and transparency. Inasmuch as cooperative security policy is not aimed at enforcement but depends on the cooperation of all, it does not require any special structures for decision-making against one or the other state (Heinz Vetschera, "The Role of the CSCE in European Conflict Prevention," Paper presented at the Conference on "The Art of Conflict Prevention: Theory and Practice," Helsinki, June 2, 1992, revised October 10, 1992).

28 Ivan Ivanovich Kovalenko, *Sovietski Sojuz v borbe za mir i kolektivnuju bezopasnost v Azii*, Moscow, 1976, Japanese translation, *Soren to Ajia no Shudananzenshoshu* (Tokyo: Kobunsha, 1977), pp. 236-237. See A. Sergeyev, "Problems of Collective Security in Asia," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 8, August, 1975, pp. 48-56.

Collective Security System.<sup>29</sup> India, Sri Lanka, Iran, Afghanistan, and Mongolia were reported to be in favor of this initiative.<sup>30</sup> China, however, opposed the Soviet idea, believing that the Soviets aimed to use such a system to encircle China.<sup>31</sup>

In July, 1986, in Vladivostok, Soviet general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev proposed a Helsinki-type Pacific Conference in Hiroshima.<sup>32</sup> In August, 1988, he submitted a seven-point proposal on security in Asia and the Pacific in his speech in Krasnoyarsk. The seventh point called for considering the establishment of a consultative organ on security.<sup>33</sup>

In September, 1990, at the Second International Conference in Vladivostok, Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze proposed that the Soviet Union should invite all Foreign Ministers in Asia in the Autumn of 1993 to Vladivostok. He suggested adopting documents on agreed policy principles related to emerging change in the region, the elimination of confrontation, and deepening partnership. He added that confidence- and security-building measures were applicable to Asia.<sup>34</sup>

President Gorbachev proposed in December, 1990, in an interview in *Asahi Shimbun* an All-Asian Summit that would be followed by an All-Asian Foreign Ministerial Conference in Autumn 1993. He attached importance to the participation of Japan, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.<sup>35</sup> Under Gorbachev, Soviet economic reform interests shifted from "Asia" to "Asia and the Pacific." Gorbachev also proposed in Tokyo April 17, 1991, a trilateral conference on CSBMs with Japanese, US and Soviet participation and a conference of the above-mentioned three countries, plus India and China, to promote broader cooperation. Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia has actively supported similar proposals. During the first Japanese-Russian Foreign Ministerial Consultation on the Peace Treaty, March 20-21, 1992, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev suggested an Asian security conference. Mr. Michio Watanabe responded that after the signing of the Japanese-Russian Peace Treaty, establishing of a broader security conference in Asia that would include the United States, should be considered.<sup>36</sup>

When Russian President Boris Yeltsin paid an official visit to South Korea, November 19, 1992, he proposed a multilateral expert conference on enhancing security in North-East Asia and the establishment of a Conflict Prevention

Center.<sup>37</sup> Two month later, President Yeltsin signed a joint statement with China, in which the two powers agreed to promote bilateral and multilateral cooperation to enhance mutual understanding and economic development in North-East Asia.<sup>38</sup> In April, 1993, Foreign Minister Kozyrev during an official visit to Japan put forth the idea of "an all-region 'security commonwealth,'" which would include transparency of military activities, early-warning mechanisms for dealing with multilateral conflicts, and naval CSBMs.<sup>39</sup>

Canada and Australia are also proponents of a CSCAP-type model. For economic reasons, these countries are trying to identify themselves as Pacific powers. At a luncheon hosted by the Victoria Chamber of Commerce, July 17, 1990, Canadian Foreign Minister Joe Clark suggested creating a body for an open security dialogue among North Pacific Nations and a "Pacific adaptation of the CSBMs" modeled after the CSCE, including "military maneuver notification and Open-Skies regimes."<sup>40</sup>

In March, 1990, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Gareth Evans, launched the idea of CSBMs "not just in the Indian Ocean region, but also in other areas of tension such as the North Pacific."<sup>41</sup> The *International Herald Tribune* published excerpts of his speech, July 19, on the CSCAP at Monash University entitled "What Asia Needs is a Europe-style CSCA," including the following: "Why should there not be developed a similar institutional framework, a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Asia, for addressing the apparently intractable security issues which exist in the region?... It is not unreasonable to expect that new Europe-style patterns of cooperation between old adversaries will find their echo in this part of the world."<sup>42</sup>

Because of its geographical remoteness, it is difficult for Australia to launch a proposal to integrate itself into a North-East Asia-Pacific Community for dealing with security issues. Furthermore, the proposals on CSBMs for this region had not been supported by the United States and Japan. The first generation of CSCE-type CSBMs for ground forces (the Stockholm CSBMs) may be applicable to the Korean Peninsula.<sup>43</sup> After having settled the problems of the Eastern part of their frontiers in May, 1990, Russia (at that time still the Soviet Union) and China are trying to enhance military confidence and communication.

29 Ibid., p. 464.

30 Ibid., pp. 462 ff.

31 Ibid., p. 454.

32 Foreign Ministry of Japan, *Soviet Monthly Review* (in Japanese), No. 517, July 1986, p. 32.

33 Ibid., No. 543, September 1988, p. 20.

34 Address by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, September 4, 1990, Second International Conference in Vladivostok, September 4, 1990.

35 *Asahi Shimbun*, December 30, 1990.

36 Press Conference of Foreign Minister Watanabe, March 21, 1992.

37 *Asahi Shimbun*, November 20, 1992.

38 *Asahi Shimbun*, December 18, 1992.

39 Statement of Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev in Japan, April 14, 1993.

40 Trevor Findley, *Asian/Pacific CSBMs: A Prospectus*, Working Paper, Australian National University, Peace Research Centre, No. 90, August 1990, pp. 6-7. See Stewart Henderson, *Canada and Asia Pacific Security. The North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue*, Policy Planning Paper No. 91/8, November 1991.

41 Findley, op. cit., p. 3.

42 *International Herald Tribune*, July 27, 1990.

43 See Hideya Kurata, "Progress Toward a System of Confidence-Building Measures on the Korean Peninsula," *Japan Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 6. No. 1, Spring, 1992, pp. 82-97.

In September, 1990, at a meeting of foreign ministers, Shevardnadze proposed a series of CSBMs for Japan and the Soviet Union, including politico-military dialogue, prior notification of large-scale military maneuvers, invitation of observers to military exercises, and exchange and contact between the Soviet Defense Ministry and the Japanese Self-Defense Agency. *Asahi Shimbun* reported that at the same meeting, Foreign Minister Nakayama submitted a counter-proposal for high-level policy planning consultation between their Foreign Ministries, which would cover the Soviet CSBM proposals. Shevardnadze agreed.<sup>44</sup> The joint statement, issued on the occasion of Gorbachev's official visit to Japan in April, 1991, marked the enlargement of bilateral dialogue and exchange on a variety of issues, including security. Emphasis was placed on the policy planning consultation scheduled for December, 1991.<sup>45</sup> The first meeting took place June 15-16, 1992. It was reported that the participants, who included representatives from the military, exchanged views on their national security and defense policies, Asian security, and non-proliferation of armaments, including nuclear weapons.<sup>46</sup> In February, 1993, at an academic conference organized by the Japanese Defense Agency Institute and the Russian Defense Ministry staff, both countries explained their defense policies and exchanged views. This development indicates that Russia (in continuity with past Soviet policies) is trying to establish bilateral security dialogues with Japan and China. These security dialogues could be characterized as cooperative measures and a new type of CSBM.

The Vienna Document 1992 includes a variety of cooperative measures. Based on the mandate of the Helsinki Summit, the FSC, which is responsible for arms control negotiations and security dialogue, had its first session in September, 1992. The Soviet and the Russian CSCAP proposals appear to have been modeled on past CSCE achievements. In terms of security dialogue and military-to-military contact, the NACC process also influences other parts of the world, through Russia, which is a NACC member.

It appears that a consensus is gradually developing in Asia and the Pacific for a forum for security dialogue that would be created by extending the mandate of existing fora. Because of the difficulties linked to naval CSBMs, a loose cooperative security forum is more likely than formal talks on detailed military CSBMs. But there are still uncertainties on the Korean Peninsula and problems between China and Taiwan which will surely hinder convening such a forum. Although the geo-strategic situation in this region differs from that of Europe, there are lessons to be learned from Europe, in particular, from the experience of the United States, Russia, and Canada in the CSCE and NACC. Also, since Japan has participated in the CSCE process since the Helsinki Summit, it has become more familiar with cooperative security structures.

44 *Asahi Shimbun*, April 13, 1991.

45 *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, April 19, 1991.

46 *Asahi Shimbun*, June 17, 1992.

Officials of the Clinton administration have expressed US support for multilateral "regional security dialogues" in Asia and the Pacific while continuing to stress the importance of existing bilateral security arrangements.<sup>47</sup> A number of countries in the region are in favor of establishing a multilateral security forum, and in the coming years one can expect ideas and proposals along these lines.

### III. After Helsinki: The Future Perspective

Japan has participated in the CSO since August, 1992. After procedural consultations among CSCE participants, Japan has also attended the FSC plenary in Vienna since late October and envoyed Deputy Foreign Minister Kunihiko Saito to the Stockholm Ministerial Council, December 14-15. In an address on the opening day, he expressed Japan's wish "to be associated with, and contribute to, activities of the CSCE which have global implications." In this regard, he stressed non-proliferation and arms transfer issues. He also referred to other areas that directly affect Japan, in which it would like to cooperate with the CSCE. He underlined Japan's "special interest in the geographical aspects of arms control and disarmament negotiations within the CSCE." Lastly, he indicated that Japan, sharing common values with the CSCE, "can make useful contributions to various activities of the CSCE" as a non-member. "Japan can support CSCE's efforts in establishing means of cooperation with other international organizations and in facilitating task-sharing among different organizations. I also believe that Japan, not being a member state of the CSCE, may sometimes be in a better position to assist the organization in a constructive way, for example, by encouraging favorable international public opinion."<sup>48</sup>

Japan has contributed to CSCE activities. On December 10, 1992, Japan envoyed a Foreign Ministry official, who is a Serbian language expert, to the CSCE mission of long duration in Vojvodina. Several days later at the Stockholm Council Meeting it was officially announced that Japan was prepared to provide 800,000 Austrian Shillings to set up satellite telephones for the mission because of the urgent need for such facilities.

47 Opening Statement at Confirmation Hearings for Ambassador Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State-Designate, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, March 31, 1993; Remarks by U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry; and Informal Remarks by Winston Lord at the Asia Society Conference, Tokyo, May 13, 1993. Ambassador Lord clearly rejected the idea of transplanting "formal CSCE-type structures" to Asia and the Pacific because "surely Asia is not Europe" (Informal Remarks at the Asia Society Conference...ibid.) At his confirmation hearings, Ambassador Lord suggested the following: "It is time to step up regional discussions on future security issues. We are open-minded on the arenas. We will heed the ideas of others, like Japan, Australia, and ASEAN, which have been particularly fertile in this domain. Together we can explore new Asian-Pacific paths towards security."

48 Address by Kunihiko Saito, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, December 14, 1992.

Japanese participation has not only enriched the CSCE process but also deepened Japan's interest in European developments and provided Japan with direct information indispensable for its global policy-making. Until quite recently, the G-7 Economic Summit was the only forum of "political consultation" in which Japan participated. As a result, Japan tended to unduly emphasize the importance of G-7.

The Gulf Crisis and Gulf War and the drastic changes in Europe and the Soviet Union obliged Japan to review its foreign policy. After a long and contentious debate, Japan sent its Self-Defense Force to the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1992. Japan is also trying to develop links with the EC, NATO, and CSCE. In November, 1992, the second Japan-NATO seminar was held in Tokyo where experts exchanged views on global and regional security issues. History clearly shows that an isolated Japan was destabilizing for world peace. In the extended Euro-Atlantic Community from Tokyo to Vladivostok via San Francisco, Japan interfaces with Europe and has become part of this new, evolving community. In the future, Japan's experience in the CSCE may also serve as a conceptual framework enabling it to participate in organizing a security dialogue in Asia and the Pacific.

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## **Session 2 -2**

**Emerging Political and Economic Security Issues in Asia**

*presented by Professor Akio Watanabe*

**JIIA-IFRI Joint Conference**

**June 2-3, 1994**

# JIIA-IFRI JOINT CONFERENCE

Building Global and Regional Frameworks for Peace and Prosperity:  
Political and Economic Security in the New World Order

Emerging Political and Economic Security Issues in Asia  
Akio Watanabe, AGU

3 June 1994 at Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo

1. Globalism and New Regionalism
2. Expanding Concept of Security
3. Shifting in Power Relations
4. New Asia
5. New Security Agenda

## 1. Globalism and New Regionalism

The cessation of the Cold War and the fading out of the East-West conflict have brought about two seemingly conflicting trends in international relations: the rise of international cooperation for peace and welfare on a global scale on the one hand and the more emphasis than before on regional solutions of political and economic problems on the other. The latter does not necessarily lead to inter-regional rivalry but, if not properly handled, it may create new types of international cleavage, i.e. a struggle for exclusive blocs. Religions and civilizations should not be allowed to become a leading factor in shaping an emerging international order in the 21st century.

Likewise, the logic of geo-economics will turn out to be counter-productive in our efforts to enhance the economic welfare of the people over the world. A regional approach can be beneficial to the world so long as it helps people to broaden their mind and entertain an international outlook. If it can be said that an enlightened nationalism can get along with internationalism, the same can be said about the relationship between open-minded regionalism and globalism. Moreover, without being accompanied by healthy nationalism and open-minded regionalism, any global scheme including the United Nations can not be very effective. This was attested by the so far successful UN intervention in Cambodia (UNTAC), although the post-conflict construction (peace-building) in that country still depends on further efforts by the regional members in the Asia Pacific. The painful experiences in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia demonstrate in their respective ways that we should endeavor to find out an appropriate method by which regional cooperation can reinforce global approach. Some of the lessons that we can learn from these three examples



(Cambodia, Somalia and Bosnia) are that (a) one of the necessary conditions for any successful UN peace keeping operations is the existence of those interested but neutral states which can play an intermediary role (e.g. ASEAN countries for Cambodia) on the way to the negotiating table; (b) once formula is agreed upon (e.g. the Paris Agreement of October 1991 for peace in Cambodia), necessary resources (peace keepers, materials, money etc.) can be assembled on ad hoc basis from within as well as from outside of the region even if there does not exist any sophisticated regional mechanism specifically geared up to the need; and (c) that the Security Council of the Permanent 5 members of it are not necessarily adept in handling regional conflicts of this sort and there need to take advice from qualified states (what are the qualified states are to be decided depending on the situation).

## 2. Expanding Concept of Security

Although the protection of individuals from physical violence in any form still is the first requirement of a state and therefore the military security constitutes a core of the concept of security of any version, the security issues of today take a variety of forms, necessitating a variety of methods. In addition to the traditional method of military preparedness, one has to be prepared against various types of hazards such as famine, diseases, poverty, drug trafficking, piracy, environmental destructions and other forms of social abuses as well as natural disasters. What lies at the bottom of all this is the capacity of a state to preserve and improve the health of the body politic. The task of the state is not limited to provision of physical security and material welfare of its citizens but can and does involve their spiritual health, such as political freedom, human rights etc. In short, the performance of a state in all of these fields will make a criterion upon which to assess the country's "good governance". The purpose of international cooperation, either on a regional or a global base, should be to encourage leaders of all nations to aim at "good governance" in this sense, and international security depends among other things upon the degree of "good governance" of each member state.

## 3. Shifting in Power Relations

While many of the security issues today are assuming a "transnational" character, the international political system is still structured in such a way as nation-states are the fundamental units of decision-making. This means that power and interests of nation-states have to be taken into considerations in one way and another when we make an attempt to tackle with those transnational problems. Especially the G-7 countries which take two-thirds of the GNP of the total world and the P-5 nations which spend about 60% of the sum of the world-wide military expenditures have high responsibility for making the world safe for the man and the earth. In cooperation with each other they can create a safe world, but in conflict they can destroy it. To what extent the major powers can cooperate among themselves will be therefore a critical determinant for a new world order.

There are both encouraging and discouraging signs in this respect. The major powers which fought each other in great wars at one time or another during the past century (WWI, WWII and, perhaps the Cold War can be included) are now at peace. It would no be very absurd to assume that a minimum degree of cooperation can be maintained among the permanent 5 members of UN Security Council on many important issues, without which the UN would not be able to function adequately. In

Asia Pacific, it is very significant, for example, that the leaders of the three major powers across the Pacific -- United States, Japan and China -- met face to face in one same place at the same time recently in Seattle, which was indeed an unprecedented event in world history. It is still too early to predict that these three big powers (plus Russia?) will constitute the core of a Pacific Concert in the 21st century, but the possibility can not be ruled out. On a global stage also, we do not foresee a great war, i.e. a war in which major powers are engaged, in the near future. If the United Nations can help these major powers avoid military conflicts, that may be the single most important contribution which that organization can make for the international peace. These facts represent a bright side of the picture.

On the other hand, there are not so encouraging trends in the recent behavior of the major powers. Both the United States and Russia (which is supposed to have succeeded the former Soviet Union) feel that their national strength and prestige are on the decline as compared with some other countries such as Germany, Japan and China, which are making a rise on the stage of world politics and economy. It would naturally take time for either declining or rising parties to adjust themselves, both psychologically and pragmatically, to the new realities of foreign politics. With the end of Pax Americana (or shall we say Pax Russo-Americana), no one is likely to replace their positions. Pax Japonica, Pax Germanic or Pax Sinica are neither likely nor desirable to anybody (At least two of these three, Japan and Germany, do not aspire to such a status). Unlike the previous great wars in history, the Cold War ended without any victorious powers left which can claim unrivalled leadership in reconstructing a post-war world order. This explains the degree of uncertainties which we are now witnessing in world politics. One might say that we should not entertain too great expectations of these major powers in building a new world order because they are simply wearied of wars and not necessarily eager to take initiative for world peace.

#### 4. New Asia

The rising of Asia imparts another aspect to the international situation in the last decade of the 20th century. The 15 members of the APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) produced 52% of the world total of GNP in 1991 (of which North America accounts for 29%), exceeding by far that of the EU (29%). The impressive economic growth in recent years of Western Pacific and East Asia is undoubtedly a contributing factor. Their economic growth has brought about a change, for instance, in the composition of the U.S. trade by geographic areas: as of 1992, its trans-Pacific trade was 1.5 times as much as its trans-Atlantic trade, while 54% of its export and 64% of its import were with the APEC members. The US direct investment in the APEC area still remains at the modest level of 30% of its total FDI, but such countries as China and South East Asia (including Vietnam) will most likely attract more U.S. investors in the near future.

Also on the diplomatic front, the United States has redressed its traditional Europe-centered policy, trying to pay an equal amount, if not more, of its attention to Asia as compared with Europe. As the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher remarked in Seattle last November, Europe is not the center of the world any longer, making Europe-centered diplomacy anachronistic. One should not take it, however, that the United States is withdrawing from Europe. It is likely that the Americans would direct in the next century as much attention to Asia as to Europe, while

Europeans would concentrate most of their energies on "domestic" (i.e. European) affairs and Japanese would 70 of their diplomatic energies to Asia and the rest to the other parts of the globe.

Some of the Western intellectuals are, it seems, perplexed over the new realities in Asia, regarding its increasing wealth and power as a bad omen for their fate. To them the new Asia means more dangers than opportunities. Their ambivalent attitude towards Asia characterizes the U.S.'s Asia policy in recent years. Its China policy is a case in point. The Clinton Administration has made strenuous efforts in recent months to repair the hitherto strained US-China relations with some success. Human rights and many other issues are still awaiting, however. The future of the relationship between these two powers would be a single most important factor, bearing upon the shape of an emerging Asia Pacific community.

#### 5. New Security Agenda

The future of China is, however, a matter of serious concern not only to the United States but also to all its neighbors. It is true that, with its rapidly developing economy and the absence of internal and external wars, China today is enjoying a degree of economic welfare and political stability unknown during the so many decades of its most recent history. This bright aspect aside, however, China imposes manifold problems. The sheer size of its population (estimated at the neighbourhood of 1.16 billion, or one fifth of the total population of the world) can be by itself a destabilizing factor even if it is contained within the state boundary and much worse if it happens to flood out into the neighbouring areas. As far as Asia in the 21st century goes, Karl Marx (1818-83) is not so much a menacing prophet as Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834) is. One can not be sure about whether the Chinese government will be able to cope with many difficulties pertaining to the massive transformation of the society in the next decade or two. Its neighboring countries should be mindful of all consequences of the on-going process of Chinese modernization. In addition there is a problem of China's military power. The military modernization of China should not be grossly exaggerated, but the fact remains that it is one of the five largest nuclear powers (and for that matter the sole Asian country with a significantly large nuclear capability). This fact, coupled with the not impossible social and political turmoil, makes tomorrow's China a matter of grave concern among the rest of Asia.

One cannot rule out the possibility of unwarranted arms race in Asia. Some of the Asian leaders, now increasingly more confident of their economic success, might be tempted to make an unwise use of their newly obtained power and wealth, given the nebulous security environment in the post-Cold War era. It is therefore of crucial importance for Asian countries to make consistent efforts to create a sense of mutual assurance, without which they might readily succumb to the temptation of arms race. Non-proliferation of ABC weapons and the creation of an international regime to ensure the reasonable degree of transparency of defense build-up of the countries concerned should be given the highest priority.

The recent experience of UNTAC has taught us a valuable lesson about the way in which Asian nations, with assistance of extra-regional countries, can cooperate toward peaceful solutions of political conflict in the regional countries. That was an example of successfully implemented exercise of "international intervention" of a new

type. The painstaking efforts of ASEAN countries together with those of Australia and Japan were essential conditions for the success of the UNTAC. With no imminent crises in sight, the regional states can and should devote their energies to foster the habit of international cooperation for peace-keeping and peace-building, while not necessarily excluding contributions from the outside participants.

There are many other issues which can be handled more effectively than otherwise if tackled collectively on a regional basis such as disaster relief, environmental protection, maritime safety, controlling diseases and etc.

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From a political and security point of view, East Asia, since recent years, is in a very paradoxical situation. On the one hand, like the rest of the world, the region, at least to a certain extent, is in a post-cold war situation. Like in Europe, the end of the US-Soviet confrontation has, here, huge consequences in the security field. However, on the other hand, East Asia is still in a situation of cold war. The region is still divided between a continental socialist sphere; some countries remain divided as they were during the cold war; and some potential flash-points are still very worrying

From an economic point of view, East Asia is also in a very paradoxical situation. On the one hand, the rate of economic growth remains very high, even if local situations are often very different. However, on the other hand, economic tensions, in some cases, are very acute, and become source of deep internal or international disturbances.

So, the general picture is quite complicated and, certainly, very different with what we know in Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Consequently, when thinking about possible new



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regional frameworks for East Asia, there is to keep in mind both the new worldwide background and its general implications, but also -- and maybe, first -- the very special and paradoxical background in the region.

The end of East-West confrontation : some impacts for East Asia

One of the general consequences of the end of the Cold War is certainly the growing importance of economic factors in the international life. This trend is not really new, but the end of the ideological, political and military confrontation between East and West has considerably strenghtened this trend. More and more, the scale of power will be appreciated in terms of economic growth and financial capabilities. The present controversy about the GNP of People's China is a good illustration of this trend. The strong interest of the business community for the Chinese market since the last two or three years is one another example. The pressure of United States on Asian countries during the end of the Uruguay Round or inside the APEC is also an example.

In a certain sense, this growing importance of economic factors puts East Asia in a comfortable position on the international scene. The strenght of Japanese economy (despite present bad conditions), the attractivness of Chinese market, the good performance of the Asian NIC's are important trump cards for the region, in front of NAFTA and European Union. However, we cannot ignore the bad side of

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story : a growing economic confrontation between East Asian countries and between East Asia as a whole and the rest of the world. The danger is to replace cold war with economic war. Or more precisely, as far as cold war has not really ended in East Asia, the risk is to add economic war to existing political and security problems.

But first, the end of cold war, in Asia as in the rest of the world, means the end of military competition between the US and USSR, now Russia. At the moment, the positive side of the new situation is quite clear. China and Russia have normalized their relations : this is an important flashpoint which has disappeared. Russia has almost completely abandoned Vietnam, contraining Hanoi to a negotiated solution in Cambodia. The Soviet "bases" in Vietnam are reduced to almost nothing. But, like in the economic field, the process has also by-effects which could be very destabilizing. At least, three of them are evident. First, the soviet threat has been replaced by a Russian instability which is also a threat, first for Western Europe, but also for East Asia, particularly China and Japan. Second, the end of the soviet "control" on North Korea has paved the way for new problems with Pyongyang. Third, the disengagement of Russia and, to a certain extent, of the US, makes the place free for new regional competitions which could become, also, very destabilizing, including between Japan and China. Specially, an important military disengagement of the US from East Asia -- under the pressure of internal politics or financial necessities -- could lead to a certain destabilization of the region. Don't

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forget that the departure of American troops in Korea, in 1949, had encouraged North Korean aggression in 1950, or that the "deneutralization" of the Taiwan straits in 1954 had paved the way for the first Taiwan crisis. Four decades later, in the absence of regional security framework, the problem is still there.

Our purpose is not, of course, to regret the time of the stabilizing role of the cold war, but to underline the destabilizing by-effects of the end of the cold war, a problem we know too much in Europe, with the present Yugoslavian war. When thinking to a new world order or to a new regional framework, this is a priority not to be ignored.

A cold war which has not ended in East Asia : some consequences

But the specificity and paradox of the East Asian situation is that this region has to deal with both problems of the end of the cold war and problems of a cold war which is still going on. Of course, this is a situation which is completely different with what we know in Europe.

Despite the opening of China and, to a certain extent, of Vietnam, the growing trade and investment flow between China and Taiwan, agreements signed by both Korea in 1992 or settlement reached in Indochina, East Asia is still in a situation of cold war.

I would like, here, to make a special mention about China. Of course, the so-called

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"socialist system of market economy" seems to be, in fact, the end of the socialist system and the beginning of a market economy in China. Anyway, this is the feeling of the majority of the business community. However, it seems to be a very optimistic interpretation of what is presently going on in China. In the field of ideology, PRC remains a supporter of the "peaceful coexistence". It means that the only ambition of the country, by opening its economy, is to reinforce it, in order, at the end, to reinforce the state itself. The real aim of the present PRC government is not to integrate China into international community, but to reach, through international opening, a certain rate of growth in order to make the State able to oppose perverse influences coming from western world. The Chinese project remains fundamentally revolutionary, despite the present conversion to the market economy. In other words, if the economic reform succeeds in China, the final result will not be a progressive integration of the country into the international community, but, on the contrary, by the way of the reinforcement of the State, a growing contestation of the current world order. In fact, People's China, at the end of this century, is not very different with the Imperial China of the last century, when the leitmotiv of the Reformists was : "Reinforce the State in order to resist foreign countries". In this sense, Teng Hsiao-ping is a reformist mandarin of the XIXth century. Today as yesterday, the ambition of China

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is to develop its economy only to be able to refuse and reject any world order imposed to her.

To a large extent, the situation is the same in other socialist countries. In Vietnam, the opening is in progress, but the final similar to the Chinese one : to reinforce the socialist State by means of foreign trade and investments.

Finally, the question is : even if we think in terms of economy, is it really possible to create a new post-cold war and peaceful regional order with such States ? It seems to be doubtful.

In security matters, the problem is still more serious. The trend, everywhere in the western world, is to reduce the military budgets; in East Asia, it is just the contrary. The fact is well known about People's China since 1989-1990, but the trend is similar in many other countries, specially in Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Indonesia, etc. )

The case of People's China is particularly disturbing. China is surrounded by major powers, like Russia or India, in which security expenditures are decreasing. In the PRC, they are increasing. The nuclear program remains a top priority, along with the space program. The idea is to build an air and naval force able to intervene far away from Chinese coasts, specially in South China Sea. But the more disturbing is probably the ballistic, nuclear and, chemical proliferation, both in East Asia and Middle East. PRC has signed the NPT in 1992 and

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promised to respect the MTCR. Doing so, China expects to reduce the pressure coming from the international community. But in fact, Peking denies to this community any right to "legislate" in such matters which are exclusively related with the sovereignty of the State. Moreover, this proliferation is obviously linked with the private interests of the military-industrial nomenklatura, i.e. with the stability of the political regime. This situation means that it will be very uneasy, and maybe impossible, to cooperate with PRC in this field. The present reluctance of Peking to put any pressure on North Korea about its nuclear program is a perfect example of this difficulty.

To sum up, East Asia is presently confronted with two kinds of problems, those related with the end of the cold war at the worldwide level, and those related with a limited continuation of the cold war at the regional level. In the first category, the main ones are probably the risk of a growing economic confrontation, inside and outside East Asia (with some very destabilizing by-effects, such as possible social turmoils in China), political and social unrest in Russia, growing competition between Asian States for regional or subregional leadership, american disengagement leaving the region without any power able to maintain a certain balance in case of crisis. In ~~this~~ <sup>the</sup> second category, the main ones are probably the existence of unsolved problems related with the cold war (division of China and Korea for instance), the

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persistence of some potential flashpoints (like the Cambodian problem, the South China Sea), and the very ambiguous position of People's China which radically contests the international order and still intends to impose its views by military build-up.

About a new regional economic framework

When thinking about the different ways to deal with this complex situation, a few remarks are possible.

First of all, in the economic field. Here, a difficulty arises from the very beginning. For some circles, non-socialist countries have obviously an interest to use their economical, financial and technological strength to obtain some significant political and security changes in the last socialist countries, particularly in the field of human rights. This is the case in US and France. But for other circles, the main question is to avoid internal crisis in these countries, particularly in China, which could dangerously threaten the security of the region. For them, the real question is the stability of these countries and consequently, the true interest of the international community is to reject any economic pressure on them. This is, apparently, the opinion of the majority of East Asian States, notably Japan. As long as the cold war has not ended in East Asia, this debate will be an important obstacle, in the region, to any constructive policy of economic cooperation.

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A second difficulty is that East Asian economies have reached very different stages of development. Roughly, it is possible to distinguish three kinds of economies in this region. In itself, Japan constitutes a category, the more advanced one of course, characterised by high technology. At the lower level, we find the coast areas of the socialist countries, China and Vietnam, characterised by manpower industries. At the intermediate level, we find the NICs. Between each of these categories, the gap is about twenty five years, i.e. a generation. It seems very unrealistic to try, even leaving aside political problems, to organize them inside an homogeneous and unified regional framework. Even if we consider only the non-socialist countries, differences of interest are too much important between the various categories of economies, for instance between Northeast and Southeast Asia, to imagine a structured regional economic organisation. In this respect, the decision of Southeast Asian countries to create an ASEAN Free Trade Area is perfectly understandable.

The difficulty is even greater when we think about the possible role of the US in an hypothetical economic framework in East Asia or Asia-Pacific. Everybody understands the huge importance of the American market for developing and developed Asian economies. It is absolutely vital for East Asia, socialist and non-socialist, to avoid any American isolationism within the NAFTA. And many East Asian countries need the strategic presence of the US in the region, a presence which would be greatly affected by the exclusion of the US. In this sense, the membership of US in APEC seems to be appropriate. But on



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the other side, some Asian capitals are reluctant :  
in Southeast Asia, Dr. Mahatir is not isolated. Many  
other political leaders think as he does, even if  
they don't say it with the same strenght. The risk is  
real to see APEC becoming a framework dominated by the US, just  
useful to make easier American trade in Asia behind the so-called  
defense of free-trade, but unable to organize any  
harmonious development of the region. Moreover, the  
permanent tendency of the US to mix up economic,  
political and security matters, would make such a  
"Community" uneasy to deal with.

The conclusion is that the three main  
existing projects of Asia-Pacific economic frameworks  
-- ie AFTA, EAEC of Malaysia and APEC -- have, all of them,  
there own "raison d'être". AFTA, because Southeast Asia-  
including Indochina- is a group of small and medium economies  
having specific problems in common. EAEC because it is  
perfectly legitimate to try to organize East Asian economies  
between Asians, without any interference of the American  
superpower. APEC, because it is true that nothing can be  
done in East Asia, against the U.S. and even without them;  
in the economic field, every country needs access to the  
American market. So, for the time being, this situation  
calls for a pragmatic approach, i.e. the juxtaposition  
of the three forums. What East Asian countries need is not  
to let those projects to compete each other, but on the  
contrary, to accept all of them and to try to coordinate  
them. The difficulty is to make them complementary in order  
they fit into each other; this is obviously the interest  
of East Asia.

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Some remarks about possible security frameworks in East Asia.

Now, let us turn to the political and security chapter.

A first remark is to underline how unrealistic it is to think about an unified security organization for East Asia in the present regional conditions. Some obstacles come from history: for instance, the former colonial situation of Korea and Taiwan towards Japan. Others come from the division of China and Korea, or from the antagonism between socialist and non-socialist countries, or from the huge differences of strength and situation among Asian States. Even in Europe where homogeneity is much higher, an unified security organization has proved to be impossible until now. Therefore, the only realistic perspectives seem to be, on the one hand, to improve the existing peacekeeping organization of the U.N., specially concerning East Asia, and on the other hand, to organize very cautiously various consultative forums, each of them with limited scope and ambition.

The first point, in fact, is related with the reform of the Security Council and directly concerns Japan. My opinion is that it is no longer possible to ignore within the U.N., the international role of some big powers: Japan, obviously, is one of them. As far as East Asia is concerned, I think it is absolutely impossible to let this region permanently represented in the Security Council by the only PRC. People's China remains a socialist country in a time of general collapse of the Communist system, and, for most part of it, an underdeveloped country in a region counting one of the major economic powers along with four or five NICs. How could PRC alone represents this region in the Security Council? An issue like Cambodia has shown the peacekeeping contribution Japan was able to make. It is obvious that the universality of the UN would be reinforced by the permanent membership of Japan in the Security Council, at least if it turns out that Japan has the political capability on the long term, to participate in important peacekeeping operations. However, the Japanese case cannot be isolated from the general problem of the UN reform.

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The second point is the organization of security forums in East Asia. As we already pointed out, an unified security framework, right now, seems to be impossible. The disparities between political regimes and security interests of East Asian States are too important. Subregional forums like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) or the South Pacific Forum, are very challenging experiences. However, it is doubtful this kind of forum could be created in Northeast Asia. It would need the presence of both Japan and People's China, side by side, in the same framework. This is probably too early to envisage such a possibility. The example of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has often been cited as a model for East Asia. In fact, the CSCE has been possible in Europe because it resulted from the converging willpower of the two alliances - the Warsaw Pact and the NATO- and from the two superpowers. Today, the picture is completely different. In East Asia, the determinant factor would be an agreement between Peking and Tokyo on such a framework. This direction is probably the good one, but the way will be long before reaching the point where a "CSCA" will be possible. This is why it is important for East Asia, in a first stage, to tend towards a better representation of the region in the Security Council, a possibility which does not seem out of reach.

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## **Session 2 - 3**

### **Creating an Asia-Pacific Security Architecture**

*presented by Mr Satoshi Morimoto*

**JIIA-IFRI Joint Conference**

**June 2-3, 1994**

## Creating an Asia-Pacific Security Architecture

1. These days, it is no longer necessary to stress the fact that the Asia-Pacific region has enjoyed an unprecedented level of peace and stability, that is notably lacking in other regions.

However, this has not been a natural progression but the result of joint efforts by most of the countries in the region. On the other hand, there is no denying that beneath the present surface stability and prosperity, we are able to detect several sources of potential instability. Ironically, these sources are only just beginning to take on some kind of a definite form the post Cold War era.

In terms of security, although devising a formula for promoting stability and controlling potential flash points would seem to be a relatively simple task, the solution is in itself extremely complicated.

2. Over the past three years, various countries throughout the Asia-Pacific region have cooperated in trying to establish some sort of dialogue framework for dealing with these potential sources of instability in the region and at the end of 1993, their efforts finally began to see some rewards.

In July 1993, at the ASEAN-PMC Meeting, it was agreed that an Asian Regional Forum (ARF) be established. It was also unofficially decided to upgrade the November APEC Meeting later that year to heads of the government level and to outline a dialogue framework, incorporating both economic and political & security issues. There has also been a significant increase in the number of meetings at various levels in both official and unofficial areas. It would appear that international meetings are being held somewhere

in the region almost every week and in particular, meetings at both government and business levels in all areas of policy such as PECC, PBCC, CSCAP and the Pacific Roundtable are flourishing.

The first round of the ARF has been scheduled for July 1994 and there has already been a Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) in connection with the Forum. The APEC Summit Meeting has also been scheduled for November this year. In this sense, 1994 earmarks the launching of a dialogue framework for Asia-Pacific. Future dialogue will focus on (1) defining the necessity and objectives of a regional framework and what such a framework should incorporate (2) it will explore what forms of concrete mutual reassurance measures (MRMs) are to be agreed upon and introduced for maintaining stability throughout the region.

3. To date, it has been impossible to form any consensus on a regional framework for the Asia-Pacific region. The problem has been further aggravated by the fact that many of the countries in this region are geopolitically distinct from their neighbours, which has meant that the region as a whole is highly diverse in nature. A situation that is not likely to change in the near future.

However, this kind of problem will need to be fully addressed if the region hopes to preserve its present level of stability. Once such problems are overcome, we should be able to see some kind of blueprint for a regional framework forming. What is more, it is no longer appropriate to question the need for such a framework or in the other extreme, to try to devise a completely new regional framework for the Asia-Pacific region. Contrary to popular belief, it would be a mistake to envisage a single newly-formed organization

as being capable of managing the new world order in the post Cold War Period.

Consequently, we need to aim at establishing a framework, based on existing organizations, who will expand their roles and functions in response to the changing nature and present-day circumstances of the region to maintain regional peace and stability. APEC is probably Asia-Pacific's best alternative. APEC was originally established as a system of mutual cooperation to promote the region's economic benefits but recently, it has explored and is expected to expand its role and functions to include a wide range of issues not only on the economy but also the environment, investment, finance, education, transportation, telecommunications and political and security issues.

If APEC becomes officially recognized at the international level, there is no reason to believe that the leaders of individual countries will limit their talks to economic matters. It is hoped that APEC will develop into a regional body of cooperation, addressing a wide range of economic, political, and security issues and expand its interests in environmental, human rights and energy. Moreover, we may witness these developments in the not too distant future.

APEC is considered the most effective body for promoting activities to maintain the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore, of all the approaches recommended for promoting a dialogue framework, APEC would be the most appropriate choice for developing a loose joint regional framework.



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## CREATING AN ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

by Stefano Silvestri (IAI - Rome)

This issue is as intricate as it is pressing. Two years ago, Sir Michael Howard has observed that <<Although the Far East has never lacked for conflicts of its own, most of those that have been waged there over the past two centuries have resulted, directly or indirectly, from the impact of the West...International politics in the Pacific and the Far East are no longer a sub-system of those in the West, and are unlikely ever to be so again>><sup>1</sup>. This does not mean, however, that from now on Asia will be a peaceful continent. On the contrary, it may suggest a reversal of the old pattern with Asia exporting, instead of importing, conflicts and crises of a global dimension. A distressing signal may come from the repercussions of the end of the old military security regime, caused by the disappearance of the Soviet bloc and the fragmentation of the Soviet Union. These events have added a crucial new element of instability to the fragility and complexity of the Asia-Pacific region, accelerating the process of change and fostering new imbalances

The Soviet Union exerted a powerful military threat on the continent, but it was also an essential factor of stability. Among other things, it secured the Northern borders of China, it vouched for the security and permanence of North Korea, it balanced the Chinese thrust toward South and South-East Asia, it was the main justification of the American military presence on Asian territories and of the security pacts and alliances regulating that presence. Finally, the Soviet Union was a powerful ally of the United States on nuclear non-proliferation. While Russia may want to sustain similar roles, it does not command the same capabilities nor can guarantee that it will experience the necessary domestic continuity and stability.

As far as Asia and the Pacific are concerned, the Russian policy in the region will depend from the future of Siberia and the role that Moscow will play in the Central Asian Republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). It seems unlikely that Siberia will be able to cut its political dependence from Moscow. Yet, it is also unlikely that Russia will be able, in the near future, to collect the huge amount of capital and to acquire the modern technical skills needed to effectively develop this immense area. At the same time, the permanence of some territorial disputes (notably with Japan) diminish the likelihood that international cooperation schemes may be set up. Even in the oil sector, the major Companies seem bound to avoid Siberia *per se* and to concentrate instead on other CIS Republics (a policy that can increase their strategic dependence from Russia, unless alternative export routes can be established, through the Middle East or China).

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<sup>1</sup> Professor Sir Michael Howard, *Old Conflicts and New Disorders*, Conference Papers: Asia's International Role in the Post War Era, Adelphi Paper N. 275, IISS, London 1993, p. 5 and 13.

At the same time Russia is increasingly committed to peace-keeping, crisis management and political intervention in the CIS Asian Republics - the so-called *near abroad* of the international security policy of Russia. This commitment, coupled with the fragility of domestic consensus in those Republics and with the growing permeability of their borders, may bring Russia directly in conflict with other Asian states like China, Afghanistan or Iran. Also, the fact that these Republics have growing relations with states of the Middle East and South-Western Asia could precipitate a widening of the vital interests of Russia toward this region.

The other major international actor of the Asia-Pacific is the United States. It is quite evident that the Clinton administration is increasingly interested in the Pacific, as the natural economic and political counterpart of the new North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA). It is also clear, however, that the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) does not have the institutional complexity, the political ambitions nor the security dimension of other regional organizations like the Atlantic Alliance or the European Union.

Moreover, the United States are not trying to mould APEC on the model of the older Atlantic Community. They seem to be unwilling to take up similar multilateral security commitments, to identify clearly friends and foes and even to accept the development of autonomous integration schemes (on the European model) among their Asian partners - with the possible exception of the countries of ASEAN.

This American unwillingness fit with equal reserves from the Asian side. While some of them (notably Japan) seem quite happy to maintain a bilateral security relationship with Washington and support a strong military American presence in the area, they also seem much less interested in the perspective of creating new multilateral security alliances, which may dilute the unique American commitment to their national security or (even worst) may require their own military commitment to the defence and security of other countries of the region.

Such major changes increase the urgency to establish a new security framework in the Asia-Pacific Region. The problem is that all the major regional actors holds different security perspectives and are undergoing a process of reappraisal of their international security policy.

Almost all major Asian countries are increasing rapidly their defence budgets. According to the IISS<sup>2</sup>, between 1985 and 1992, in constant change with the dollar, China has increased its budget by 12.6%<sup>3</sup>, Japan 28.5%, North Korea 22.4%, South Korea 63.5%, Malaysia 31.2%, Singapore 36.2%, Taiwan 29.9% and Thailand 27.6%. The only major

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<sup>2</sup> *Strategic Survey 1993-1994*, Brassey's for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London 1994, p. 44.

<sup>3</sup> There is a major debate about the true size of Chinese defence spending, with some suggesting figures three times larger than those chosen by the IISS.

Asia-Pacific countries with a negative increase are Australia (-7.1%) and Vietnam (-27%). In comparison, the European members of NATO have collectively decreased their defence budgets by 0.7% and the USA by 5.7%.

The most intriguing factor is represented by the People's Republic of China (PRC). Its impressive economic growth (+13% GDP growth last year, the highest of Asia) joins with the maintenance of a significant military force, especially on the ground and in nuclear terms. While in absolute terms, its defence budget (according to the IISS) is significantly inferior to the Japanese one, China's military might largely exceeds the capabilities of other regional powers like India or Vietnam. Moreover, the conservative and nationalistic policies of its leadership maintain a relatively high level of conflictuality on some of its borders: Taiwan, South China Sea, Hong Kong, possibly also Central Asia. While China has some vested interest in the maintenance of a cooperative and stable international framework, in particular in the trade area<sup>4</sup>, it holds also a number of territorial and political claims against its neighbours and its economic partners.

A second instability factor is North Korea. Its particular blend of domestic political rigidity, economic and social underdevelopment, international isolation and antagonistic relations with South Korea increase the risks linked with the possibility of nuclear proliferation, to the level of an international crisis of major, possibly global, proportions.

Some other countries have less contentious foreign policies, still they are going through a process of reappraisal of their international and security role. The most important of these is Japan. A major economic power, Japan is cautiously acquiring a greater international profile by contributing in various ways to some UN peace-keeping missions and especially by asking for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Japan is undergoing a confused process of domestic political change, which may slow down the pace of its foreign policy change. Still, the Japanese role in the G-7 and in other international fora (like the OECD) has become quite relevant.

This contradiction, between a high level of economic interdependence, a low level of multilateral political cooperation and a relatively high possibility of international military conflicts or security breakdowns, is worrying. In some instances, the United States have made some attempts to utilize their economic leverage for political purposes (i.e., the defence of human rights in China). In other instances, they have exercised political pressures to curb Japanese trade practices. On many occasions, however, the incoherence between the economic and the security regimes, typical of the Asia-Pacific, has complicated the crisis management increasing the stakes to the point of creating worst problems than those perceived at the beginning of the exercise.

If we compare the Asia-Pacific situation with the Atlantic Community, it is easy to see how the existence of a strong multilateral security alliance has played a fundamental crisis management role between Europe and the US, also on economic matters. For decades NATO

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<sup>4</sup> China's exports in 1993 have reached the value of 88 billion dollars: more than Taiwan (86) or South Korea (79), but inferior to Hong Kong (128) and Japan (354).

was primarily engaged in balancing games among allies and against the USSR. The success of these exercises over the years has guaranteed the primacy of security cooperation and has tended to downgrade differences on trade. Nowhere this effect was more visible than in the case of the United States, for decades the main generator of security though with modest exports of goods and a declining share of Western economic wealth.

Today, the new international security situation is rapidly changing these patterns and both the United States and the European allies are reverting to national security policies (and national export strategies) less coherent with the aim of maintaining a stable and strong allied framework. Still, on the Atlantic side, a number of automatism remain, together with important multilateral organizations and alliances capable to manage and reduce the impact of re-nationalization.

The complete absence of similar structures in the Asia-Pacific means that the tasks ahead of the possible participants in a multilateral security structure are much harder. Various models have been put forward, from the CSCE one (on the table since Gorbachev's time) to sub-regional cooperation and integration schemes (as in the ASEAN case or, more difficult, in the case of the Sea of Japan). Their limits are important, however.

In the CSCA case, two major difficulties arise. The first is that the interest of the CSCE model was in its mixture of political, humanitarian, economic and security measures. In the Asian case it seems very difficult that the political-humanitarian basket could receive unanimous consent<sup>5</sup>. Without it, however, the CSCE model would lose most of its long-term political relevance.

The second difficulty derives from the fact that the CSCE was made possible by the diplomatic interaction of various major multilateral groupings: NATO, the European Community, the Warsaw Pact and the Neutral and Non-aligned countries (which were able to play an important mediatory role, as a group). While the ASEAN countries may hope to play in Asia a role similar to the one played by the NNA countries in Europe, the situation in the Asia-Pacific remains greatly different and each country seems bound to concentrate on its own national interests and perceptions, thus immensely complicating the scene.

A possible alternative could be built around a strong leadership, which could be granted only by the United States. The question, however, is if the USA is really able and willing to play such a demanding role, which would inevitably require the sacrifice of many national objectives and grievous security and political commitments. Also, in the Asia-Pacific, the USA confront a much wider and different set of problems than in Europe. In order to bring together in a multilateral security pact such different countries as Russia, China, Japan, the two Koreas, the South-East Asian states and possibly also some Southern Pacific and other Asian powers, it would have to perform almost a miracle.

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<sup>5</sup> Even ASEAN has strongly opposed an attempt of the European Community to establish some recognition of the human rights issue.

This does not mean that a CSCA scheme may not be useful. It could for instance help to defuse some minor crises, to establish alternative diplomatic communications, to agree on a number of military, relatively low level, confidence building measures. All these measures and many others could be worked out among all, or a majority of the participants, without confronting squarely the political and strategic fragmentation of the region, and could alleviate the atmosphere.

In a way, a relatively modest CSCE-like exercise could be seen as a first step toward more ambitious aims, a kind of educational exercise to start a process of melting together national perceptions and priorities and to establish a more sophisticated network of multilateral diplomatic contacts on security matters. The interest shown by many countries toward the ASEAN post-ministerial meetings demonstrate that a low degree of multilateralism not only could be accepted but may even be sought for by many regional actors, and should be encouraged.

Still, for a CSCA exercise to have some hope of success it would be important not to overcharge it with excessive ambitions, which may antagonize some key players (like China) and would be bound to fail miserably whenever confronted with major crises (like in Korea). The experience of the CSCE in the former Yugoslavia should be remembered. Its complete failure has been shadowed (or partially averted) only because NATO, the European Union, the USA and Russia have been willing to take up greater responsibilities. Without such a shifting of the burden the CSCE would have been unable to avoid a very dire reappraisal of its significance (and still may be unable to do so in the future).

The other option (sub-regional groupings) is very interesting, but also difficult. The main advantage of this option is the possibility of building security architectures that do not necessarily emulate Europe and the Atlantic, more in line with the specific perceptions (or even the *styles*) of the regional actors themselves. The main problems of these options, however, can be identified as follows:

- the fact that no sub-regional security architecture should include either the USA or Russia (or, to put it differently, that the inclusion of one should entail also the inclusion of the other). Thus, the new structures will have to confront the difficult problem of defining their relations with both nuclear superpowers, especially in North East Asia;
- the fact that, throughout this century, all the major countries of Asia, Russia and the USA, have at one time or another been at war with each other: domestic perceptions of threat and security are likely to be substantially influenced by these negative historical experiences;
- the fact that, at least in North East Asia, two main geostrategic actors, China and Korea, may assume for some reasons a *revisionist* attitude toward the international security system.

This last point is the most difficult to tackle. A unified Korea, for instance, would certainly upset the existing balance of power in North East Asia, establishing a new powerful regional actor both in economic and in military terms. While the division between the two

Koreas maintains a situation of military confrontation and risk, it is also true that no international stability framework has been conceived yet to manage the reunification of Korea (as it was established for Germany). Moreover, the political reunification of the peninsula would certainly entail the retreat of the American forces from the South and eventually greatly reduce the American military presence and political influence in the North Pacific area.

The Chinese question depends from the role that this great country wants to play in the international system. It is not clear yet if China will be more interested in stability or in the revision of the balance of power. It is certainly true that Beijing has a vested interest in the maintenance of its unique nuclear power status among the other Asian Countries, and in the preeminence of its international role in the UN Security Council: both these advantages, however, are presently under threat because of nuclear proliferation and of the plan to revise the Security Council composition. Also, China is committed to significant territorial and political changes (i.e., Taiwan, Hong Kong, etc.) that may upset the existing regional balance.

The answer to this uncertainty will depend from the evolution of the domestic situation. It is possible that a new period of "troubles" will characterize the transition from the present *old* regime to a new one, thus diminishing Chinese capabilities on the international scene. Yet, should China take an inward looking approach and be plagued by domestic instability and conflicts, this situation would negatively affect the general international situation in the Asia-Pacific. In fact, a new multilateral security system for the area will certainly require China's active participation.

Similar problems can be found in other sub-regions (South Asia, South East Asia, etc.), thus severely limiting the prospects for the building of new multilateral security frameworks, even if a new organization (ECO, the Economic Cooperation Organization) has been recently established by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, which has been joined by the Central Asian Republics of the CIS.

Thus, a consistent and stable multilateral security system for the Asia-Pacific can only be based on a relatively loose system of reciprocal commitments, which must take into account the fact that this region is not experiencing a process of political integration, even if it is increasingly integrated with the international economic market.

Should we conclude that Asia is too big and complex to be conducive to multilateral security arrangements? A positive answer to this question, however, entails the likelihood of very negative and risky scenarios, up to nuclear war. In fact, it may be possible to confront this question along different lines, taking into account both the fact that Asia is not, and cannot be Europe, and the fact that, this notwithstanding, the Asia Pacific countries recognize their common interest to live in peace among themselves. Probably, a combination of different initiatives should be attempted.

On one side, as we said in the previous pages, it may be possible to work out still a relatively loose, but significant, system of confidence building measures among a relatively high number of Asia-Pacific countries. To such a system it may be added the attempt to strengthen and to establish some sub-regional arrangements and organizations, which, on the



ASEAN model, should probably start in the economic field, but should have also larger political ambitions in the field of foreign policy coordination (and possibly security).

But the most important part of the entire construction should take into account the fact that Asia and the Pacific are too large and too crucial for World security to be left alone. Their security problems entail a high level of deterrence and security commitments from both Russia and the USA. The incredible risks that may grow out of a generalized Asian conflict interest the entire World. On the economic level, regional political actors like Japan, the Four Dragons, China, and so on, play in fact a global role.

Thus, a coherent and stable security system for the Asia-Pacific should have a strong global component. This is not new. When the Atlantic was at the centre of the World, also the European-Atlantic security system was at the centre of the global balance and was regarded as such by all global actors. The fact that the evolution of the international system has put forward a number of new regional actors and powers does not mean that the World has become less interdependent. On the contrary, it means that a number of better global institutions and policies should be worked out, to make it possible the reasonable interplay among the new international actors in a stable and secure framework.

Thus, the Asia-Pacific security system will largely depend from two evolutions:

- the ability of the UN system to grow and to become an effective crisis management mechanism,
- the possibility that the G-7 (or the G-7 plus) system will evolve to become the focus of common global political decisions and of international consensus on major issues.

The stability of the international system, in other words, will depend from the ability to establish a new and effective regime based on the hierarchical structure created by the changed economic balance and by the political willingness of the major actors to take up new responsibilities. Only such a change can be the foundation of a credible and stable new Asia-Pacific security regime.

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## **Session 3**

### **Two Perspectives on Euro-Japan Relations**

*presented by Professor Jean-Pierre Lehmann*

**JIIA-IFRI Joint Conference**

**June 2-3, 1994**

**"FOUNDATIONS FOR PEACE AND PROSPERITY:  
PERSPECTIVES ON RELATIONS BETWEEN EUROPE AND  
JAPAN"**

**Jean-Pierre Lehmann  
Professor & Director  
European Institute of Japanese Studies  
Stockholm School of Economics**

**Paper Presented to the  
Joint Conference of  
the Institut Français des Relations Internationales &  
the Japan Institute of International Affairs**

***BUILDING GLOBAL AND REGIONAL FRAMEWORKS  
FOR PEACE AND PROSPERITY***

**Tokyo, 1-3 June 1994**

## The International Context

The most marked characteristic of the current environment is how unfamiliar it has become. Gone or seemingly gone are such former landmarks of our era as: the Berlin Wall; the Soviet Union and its satellite states; apartheid; entrenched and "eternal" enmity between the PLO and Israel; the encrusted positions of the endemically corrupt Christian Democrats in Italy and the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan; and so on. The converse of these disappearances are new -- and occasionally bordering on the miraculous -- "appearances": a black president in South Africa; Arafat and Rabin shaking hands on the White House lawn; political uncertainty in Japan; etc.

As welcome as the disappearance of these and other pernicious features of our era may be, the questions naturally arise as to what the new appearances will be and/or what they will lead to. While there have been a number of discontinuities in the course of the postwar decades, at no time has the world experienced until very recently such a marked series of simultaneous discontinuities. These in turn produce the somewhat awesome spectacle of the global community entering into seemingly turbulent and definitely uncharted waters. It was at a meeting convened by IFRI in 1990 that the director, Thierry de Montbrial, countered George Bush's (pious) definition of a "new world order", with his own description of the current *zeitgeist* as that of a "chaotic transition to the unknown". It is with this fuzzy backcloth that Euro-Japanese relations and their possible contribution to establishing and developing peace and prosperity need to be assessed.

### *Fin de Siècle*

As historians generally establish 1914 as the end of the nineteenth century and beginning of the twentieth -- in the sense of what constitutes the characteristics of an era -- the simultaneous discontinuities that have erupted since 1989 may serve to mark that particular year as representing the transition from the twentieth century to the twenty-first. The fall of the Berlin wall, the emancipation of the Soviet satellite states and the eclipse (in Europe) of communism mark the final chapter of the second volume of the twentieth century -- the first volume is from the outbreak of world war one to the end of world war two, while the second corresponds to the cold-war era. What we are experiencing at present encompasses the epilogue of the twentieth century and the prologue of the twenty-first.

The previous turn of the century was marked by: (a) the collapse of empires, namely the Ottoman, the Austro-Hungarian and the Chinese; (b) the decline of empires, ie those of Western Europe which would finally be destroyed after world war two; and (c) the emergence of new empires, viz the American, the Japanese and the Soviet. While the twentieth century experienced an unprecedented internationalization of geopolitical affairs, indeed as gruesomely described in the sequential eruption of two "world" wars, and although the new empires were located distant from or on the periphery of Europe, nevertheless the centre of political, economic and intellectual gravity throughout the twentieth century remained the Atlantic. It began to shift towards the Pacific in the decade or so preceding 1989.

One should of course resist the temptation to read too many repetitive patterns in the unfolding of history. Nevertheless, the epilogue of the twentieth and prologue of the twenty-first centuries do suggest some variations on fairly closely comparable themes. Thus we are witnessing: (a) the collapse of the Soviet empire; (b) the decline of the American empire<sup>1</sup>; (c) on the basis of current trends, possibly the resurgence of the Chinese empire. The Atlantic is still a reasonably prominent ocean in the affairs of the world, though the continued, indeed intensified and accelerated shift of certainly the economic centre of gravity from the Atlantic to the Pacific seems pretty irreversible on the basis of current trends, as may also be the case in the intellectual<sup>2</sup> and political<sup>3</sup> domains.

The collapse of anything implies disorder, and all the more so on a grand scale when empires are at stake. The Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian and Chinese empires certainly left a good deal of disorder in their wake, as is occurring now with the Soviet. Similarly, the emergence or resurgence of phenomena inevitably incur an element of disruption of the established order. This was obviously very much the case as the American, Japanese and Soviet empires sought their place in the firmament in the previous *fin de siècle*, as is already and will almost certainly be the case with the passage of time in regard to the Chinese empire. For all of China's four-thousand year history, the position in which the country now finds itself is unprecedented.

### ***American Power***

As fashionable as it may be to describe the world in terms of a triangle, a triad, etc, and the emergence of three "regions", the fact remains that for the time being and foreseeable future the world is dominated by one power, the United States, and that it alone can be described by whatever criterion as a global player. This point cannot be stressed enough. It refers not only to the global financial, industrial, technological, political, ideological and military reach of the United States, but to other attributes which are not only characteristics of the country and its place in the world, but indeed ones that are, if anything, becoming more powerful, rather than declining, reflected especially in what has been termed as the United States' "soft power"<sup>4</sup>.

With universities in Europe in a generally parlous state and those in Japan remaining insular and conservative, the better American universities have a virtual monopoly as global centres of learning and academic excellence. Thus, while it was suggested above that the centre of gravity, including at the intellectual level, is moving to the Pacific, it is America's universities, and very much including those on the country's Atlantic seaboard, that act as a major magnet attracting the world's best brains to study, research, instruct.

Hard-working, bright East Asians are in a position best to exploit academic opportunities and display their talents in the laboratories, lecture rooms, libraries of American campuses, than in the universities of their own countries. On this really crucial level not only is the United States second to none, but there is no discernible challenge emerging on even distant horizons. Thus, while the United States may be in a state of relative decline according to some measurements, as a global centre of academic learning and innovation it retains absolute predominance. The quality of a country's universities can have many different

implications in terms of its potential roles in the world, not only on the cultural front, but also economic, political, military, and so on.

Following the Plaza Agreement of 1985 and as both the yen and, consequently, Japanese overseas investments, soared, it became fashionable to paraphrase the title of the 1967 book by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, from *défi américain* (American challenge) to *défi japonais*, and thereby to equate the phenomenon occurring from Japan in the 1980s with that which had occurred from the United States in the 1960s. Although both the American and Japanese "*défis*" were driven by their financial clout, superior management techniques and advanced technology, one major difference was the role that education in the United States played in helping foreigners to understand the sources and dynamics of American industrial and social organization, thus making the *défi américain* accessible, indeed transparent.

The world of Japanese academe, by contrast, has remained far more closed, and consequently the sources and dynamic of Japanese industrial and social organization have remained opaque. This imposes a major constraint on the degree of "soft power"<sup>5</sup> which Japan is capable of extending in the world, not only in comparison to the United States, but also to middle-ranking European countries such as France and Great Britain. It also limits the effective "multi-nationalization" of the Japanese multinational. In other words, the fact that students from throughout the world flocked to American business schools meant that American multinationals were provided with human resources who understood the American multinational firm and were educated in its "ways".

Japanese companies, in spite of their recent globalization, have had much more difficulty achieving local social and cultural integration and in recruiting and keeping high quality international managerial talent. Thus the Japanese "multi"-national is still perhaps somewhat of an oxymoron. As Susan Strange has written: 'their exclusivist, not to say racist, habits of restricting senior management jobs to Japanese and keeping out the indigenous workforce may prove a handicap in the long run'<sup>6</sup>. One reason for this state of affairs is that, in contrast to the American multinational, the lack of cultural familiarity with and pre-recruitment education on Japanese industrial and corporate organization for foreigners make it far more difficult for Japanese multinational employers and their foreign management recruits to achieve a common wave-length<sup>7</sup>. Consequently, mutual suspicion may more quickly come to the fore.

With Japanese education not having provided a particularly effective role in interpreting its own society, it is even in less of a position to provide interpretation on the broader region. The role of bridge between Europe and East Asia, or even more broadly between West and East, could be a major foundation that Japan could set in preparation for the twenty-first century. A reform of its tertiary education system, however, would probably have to be a prerequisite for achieving that particular goal. Thus, education may be an important area to which Japan could contribute in bringing about peace and prosperity, but one that has tended to be neglected so far.

A second and partly related feature of American globalism refers to that country's racial heterogeneity and ethnic mix. The United States is global not simply because

it contains races from throughout the globe, but also because the American establishment includes individuals from various ethnic backgrounds. This is especially true and possibly especially relevant in the context of the rapid ascension up the American meritocracy of East Asians and the more genuinely "multi-national" and "multi-cultural" characteristic of American multinational firms, than is the case certainly with Japanese, but even with European multinational enterprises. Thus, for example, the managers of American multinational firms responsible for Chinese business and/or posted in China are as often as not ethnic Chinese, whether of Chinese-American origin, recent migrants from either the Chinese mainland or its diaspora, eg including Taiwanese "brain-drainers".

A third aspect of the fairly dramatic increase in America's soft power is the extension and intensification of the globalization of American culture -- using culture here in the broad sense of the term. One quick illustration might be to note the mind-boggling speed with which American fast-food has conquered the earth! The universal attraction and impact of American culture is far greater now than in the heyday of American military and economic hegemonism.

### *From Class-warfare to Clan-warfare*

While it may well be that one of the causes of the collapse of communism in Europe was that its reality failed to live up, by a glaring gap, to its rhetoric, and on many different subjects, it remains nevertheless the case that one of the leading ideological hallmarks of the twentieth century was that of class-war. The rallying call of the Bolshevik revolution was to unite the proletariat of the world against rapacious owners of capital. Societies were analyzed and political discourse was couched in the language of struggle emanating from the horizontal social divisions between the oppressors and the oppressed. Marxism had the pretence of being a universal doctrine, and one which enjoyed legitimacy, indeed popularity, among many sectors of the populations throughout the globe and the decades of the twentieth century.

Although tribal, racial, religious, linguistic and other forms of inter-communitarian strife certainly persisted throughout the twentieth century and on all continents, the current turn of the century will undoubtedly be written in stark letters of intensified ethnic warfare. The great conflict between communism and liberalism has given way to an ideological vacuum, emphatically so in so far as universal principles are concerned. Thus the ideological restraining forces of the past have crumbled, leading to increasingly untrammelled expressions of racism virtually everywhere. In contrast therefore to the buzzwords of the "global community", "global village", etc, reality sees a seemingly ceaseless proliferation of ethnic, linguistic, sectarian, etc, divisions and antagonisms.

The unfolding of these recent dramatic pages of history have led to contrasting Francis Fukuyama's "end of history" thesis, with the seemingly more tenable one of the "return of history" -- and with a vengeance! For all the razzmatazz of contemporary technology propelling the world into the twenty-first century, the seemingly incredibly mighty forces of atavistic clannishness on a global scale present this turn of the century with a very strong sense of *déjà vu* from the previous turn of the century.



The complex and rather deadly panorama that the world presents is one which contains various layers of clan warfare. These occur at the very local level, ie between neighbours in the same country, but of different religions, languages, whatever: as witnessed not only in the extreme case of Bosnia, but in neo-Nazi and National Front violence against immigrants in Germany and France respectively, oppression of Indians in Mexico, Guatemala, etc, anti-Chinese riots in Medan, Indonesia, not to mention fratricidal murders between fundamentalist and moderate Muslims in Algeria, Egypt, and other countries of the Middle East, etc.

Hostilities and suspicion between nations in the same region continue to exist: eg the strong atavistic antipathy towards "Europeans" expressed by and through "Euro-sceptic" British Tory MPs. In East Asia, views such as those recently expressed by former justice minister Nagano regarding the Nanking massacre presumably illustrate not only attempts to vindicate Japan's past, but also the contempt with which Japanese of Mr Nagano's persuasion still hold their Asian neighbours as racial inferiors. And superimposed on these different layers of cultural antagonism rests what has been described as the "clash of civilizations".

One of the more acute disruptive means through which the collapse of the Soviet empire is being felt has been the sales of arms and mercenaries emanating from Russian, Ukrainian, or other stockpiles and armies. The proliferation of clan wars can no longer be seen as superpower proxy confrontation on a global chess-board, but in a sense that makes them even more anarchic. Furthermore, the ending of the Cold war has, if anything, increased the globalization of arms sales and hence the ease of access to sophisticated technology to nourish primitive hatreds. The proliferation of tensions is exacerbated by the proliferation of accessibility of both conventional and possibly nuclear weapons. The outcome of the showdown with Pyongyang clearly has critical implications with respect to the management of the "international order".

As to the use of the term, "clash of civilizations", it is taken from the title of Samuel Huntington's highly controversial piece in Foreign Affairs<sup>8</sup>. Although he has been criticized from various quarters on different aspects of his thesis, and certainly the idea of the Islamic-Confucianist alliance in particular appears highly farfetched, the view of the turn of the century presenting an increasing degree of seemingly irreconcilable tensions between different value-systems, especially those of the West, Islam and East Asia, appears to be accurate.

For example, although many of the "frictions" the United States has with East Asian countries are on the surface economic in nature -- including not only trade, but also investment imbalances and violations of intellectual property rights -- their causes are increasingly being perceived as cultural. Therefore the trade deficit between the United States and Japan is presented as a reflection of different value-systems, while the "human rights" dispute with China takes on all the proportions of an ideological showdown.

## *Poverty vs Wealth Among Nations*

Following his earlier brilliant analysis of five centuries of the broad sweep of history, the forces behind the rise and fall of nations, and consequently the probable evolution and ebb of the powers to the end of this century, Paul Kennedy has produced a perhaps somewhat less remarkable, but nevertheless succinct and incisive analysis of the more awesome issues facing the world as it advances towards the twenty-first century<sup>9</sup>. The massive demographic increases, indeed explosions, in many of the world's poorer countries both fuel an acute exacerbation of the clan tensions, mentioned above, within the countries concerned, and, as Paul Kennedy stresses, result in enormous pressure on (and indeed within) the borders of the richer countries.

In the course of the postwar decades and in spite of (or because of?) the numerous international and national organizations established to provide development aid to the Third World<sup>10</sup> countries, the fact remains that there are still probably only four cases of clear graduation: ie of a quantum leap from absolute poverty of the majority to relative prosperity for the majority. These are, of course, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, which together amount to a total population of some 73 millions, less than one-tenth the population of India!

Even among the allegedly more "successful" countries of the Third World, eg Thailand or Malaysia, the prosperous middle class, though it may be increasing, remains nevertheless a very small proportion of the overall population. Similarly, while the achievements of China may be spectacular, the disparities in the fruits of growth are wide, and, it would seem, widening, reflected, among other things, by the growing rural unrest and the current migration of over one hundred million people from agrarian to urban industrial areas<sup>11</sup>.

The objective in repeating these well-known litanies is simply to stress that the prospects for any one of the poor countries to achieve prosperity within the next couple of decades or so must be deemed to be highly remote. And here one must reiterate the point that the technological gap between the advanced countries and the poorer countries can only accelerate, in view of the mind-boggling speed with which the state-of-the-art of technologies are changing, and the huge costs, highly sophisticated human skills, and other forms of investment into R&D that are required<sup>12</sup>. The division and distance between industrialized and developing nations will remain, and almost certainly deepen.

The environmental issue presents a typical Catch-22 situation. So long as countries remain poor, resources to improve environmental conditions, apply environmental technologies, etc, will be limited and as often as not given to other perceived priorities. As countries industrialize and their populations are enriched, new needs arise in the form of energy consumption, etc. Thus the consumption of cheap coal for industrial purposes in China causes acid rain to fall on Japanese forests, while, if China were to prosper along Western lines and, for example, have a dramatic increase in the household rate of automobile ownership, the effect on petroleum reserves would be colossal. At this stage the noble notions embodied in the Rio conference and the programme of "sustainable development" remain something of a pie in the sky.

Without belabouring this particular theme, the point can nevertheless be made that while prosperity may not be a guarantee of peace, it is somewhat of a prerequisite. And the absence of prosperity not only fuels tensions between the have and the have-not populations of the poorer countries, but also between the have and have-not nations. This arises not only from growing disparities in objective conditions, eg standard of living, calorie consumption, availability of technology -- including, eg, medical technologies -- but also in subjective phenomena and priorities. The disputes between advanced and poorer countries on such critical issues as environmentalism and labour conditions are likely both to proliferate and to intensify in the coming years and decades.

On the trade front, this may include the prospect that the battles apparently won at the end of the Uruguay Round for establishing a more genuinely global and free trade environment may turn out to be Pyrrhic in nature. Marrakech seemed to announce that while the game may have been temporarily settled, the future could see the goal-posts being shifted. The near future will also tell whether the American debates on and subsequent modifications of NAFTA were a preamble to what is about to occur in Congress with regard to the Uruguay Round. Deprived of a free-trade environment, the prospects for the developing countries become obviously far bleaker.

In any case, these urgent issues are, arguably and perhaps paradoxically, less likely to elicit attempts at solutions from the advanced industrialized countries in the post-Cold war era, because of the proliferation and intensification of tensions between industrialized countries. Thus the politicization of economic rivalries and tensions between the rich countries detract from the attention and resources that should be focused on facing the more acute crises of the world economy.

### *Geoeconomics*

The concept of geoeconomics emerging as the predominant feature of relations between states in the post-Cold war era is, so the theories go, a reflection of the new targets set by countries and governments. With the collapse of the Soviet empire and thus the eradication of geographic spheres of influence, it is clear that in the competition between states, technology, market share, and other forms of economic gain, become more important than politics and ideology. The objectives of conventional diplomacy have been replaced, even if many of the tools remain the same: market intelligence, strategic alliances, etc.

Advocates of the "new geoeconomics"<sup>13</sup> may somewhat overstate their case. Economic rivalry has been a constant function and feature of geopolitics. Trade and flag meshed in the state rivalries of the past, and indeed, especially in its early stages, the confrontation between the American and Soviet empires was as much about economic systems and global economic reach, as it was about ideology and armaments. The point, however, may be well taken that increasingly the battlefield would appear to have changed from military confrontation to acute industrial and especially high-technology competition.

It is also in this context that consideration can be given to the peculiar Japanese position in and contribution to the twentieth century. Thus, while it was suggested at the

beginning of this paper that historians generally identify 1914 as the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, 1905, the year of Japan's victory over Russia, might be seen as a preface. In any case, ten years earlier through the defeat of China and the subsequent engagement in carving out colonial territory and spheres of influence, Japan was clearly announcing its intention of joining the global imperial club.

In spite of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, it was fortunate in having had few military commitments to engage in during World War I, and the ones that did occur were exclusively in the East Asian region. Thus the first world war was not a "world war" for Japan from the military perspective. Japan was able, however, to benefit from the devastation of Europe, and hence from the decline of European competitiveness on global markets, especially in the lucrative Asian markets. The hand-over from defeated Germany to Japan of its territories and spheres of influence was one of the benefits. In these and other respects, Japan, as noted earlier, emerged as one of the three "victorious" new empires of the world, following the collapse of the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian and Chinese empires, and accompanying -- indeed hastening -- the decline of the British, French and Dutch.

By the beginning of the century Japan was not only one of the world's major powers, but it was also, in reference to today's debate about Japan's international role, in most respects a "normal" power. In other words, Japan was an economic power, it was an awesome military power, it had a considerable degree of political influence in the East Asian region, a couple of colonies, membership in the League of Nations, and so on. From the late nineteenth century to its defeat in 1945, Japan was a fairly conventional geopolitical power engaged in and influencing global geopolitics. It was after 1945 that Japan became *sui generis*.

In September 1945 Japan's military empire had clearly been destroyed and Japanese troops had to abandon positions gained during world war two, but also earlier acquisitions such as Korea and Taiwan, as well as ceding the Ryukyu islands to the United States until they were returned in 1972. The so-called Northern territories, which were invaded by Russia, remain a subject of contention between the two states. The fate of Japan, however, can hardly be said to have mirrored that of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman or Chinese imperial eclipses of the late nineteenth century. On the contrary, the momentum of Japan's "rise" after the war seemed to assume the quality of a phoenix, and consequently got a new lease of life, and thereby was not only sustained, but indeed accelerated.

In using the word "empire" here in the broad sense of the term -- ie encompassing economic as well as political power, indirect as well as direct control -- it is clear that the Japanese empire does not cease to exist in 1945. It ultimately re-emerges in a somewhat different and certainly less belligerent, indeed benign, form. Empires collapse from either external force or internal decay and exhaustion, or a combination of the two. Though the Japanese militarily-acquired empire was defeated by American military force, Japanese society had quite obviously, in view of its future exploits, not run out of steam. The Japanese got back on their feet and, albeit with an inordinate amount of help from the United States, proceeded to march on to new (this time commercial) victories. In the course of the decades ahead, Japan became a geoeconomic superpower, ie a commercial empire without the

military and political accoutrements that are normally part of what being a "great power" is all about.

It may be appropriate to pause here briefly to address the question as to why the term empire -- in the indirect control and economic power sense of the term -- will be readily applied to Japan, and not to Germany. There are several reasons. One is that while Germany is of course the major economic power in Europe, this is only marginally so, ie especially when compared with the way that Japan, at least at present, dominates in every respect and so overwhelmingly its own neighbourhood. Also, while Germany is a bigger *per capita* exporting nation than Japan, its exports are far more spread across a broad range of goods than the laser-beam oriented nature of Japanese exports which tend to be concentrated in a limited number of sectors. Germany also imports a great deal.

More significant in the case of Japan and the world economy is the huge disparity between its outward investments and its inward investments. Thus, whereas on a *per capita* basis there is 2.2x more outward investment than inward investment in the case of Germany, the corresponding figure for Japan is 16.8x. Through its foreign direct investments Japan has acquired global vested interests, whereas few foreign players have vested interests in Japan. This applies even regionally: there are, for example, more Korean and Taiwanese investments in North America and in Europe, than there are in Japan.

Another aspect which distinguishes the Japanese economy from the German economy is that whereas the latter has generally been seen as complementary to the industries of other advanced economies, and especially to that of the United States, the former is seen as much more engaged in a head-on collision, in particular in regard to the United States and especially in high-technology sectors. Thus, whereas some authors, for example Lester Thurow and Jeffrey Garten<sup>14</sup>, depict the geoeconomic battlefield as consisting of three sides, the overwhelming body of literature on the subject concentrates on the two-sided rivalry between Japan and the United States.

The geoeconomics of the current environment, therefore, correspond, not necessarily exclusively, but certainly primarily, to the intensifying commercial, industrial and especially technological competition and possible confrontation between the United States and Japan. Europe is not in the same league. Economic battles between Europe and the United States, with the exception of aerospace, concentrate mainly on agriculture. While Europe might be bitterly attacked by American policy makers and other opinion leaders for its protectionism, Europe in general or Germany in particular do not appear to threaten American economic hegemony. Similarly, Europeans are less susceptible to getting worked up about a perceived Japanese threat to European economic supremacy, because Europeans have no presumption of such a station in global economic life<sup>15</sup>. Certain sectors, automotive in particular, may feel more exposed, and are consequently more vocal.

### ***Capitalism vs capitalism***

The demise of communism, and hence the termination of the battle between communism and capitalism, has dissolved the glue that bound the various capitalist powers together. Consequently, competing economic interests appear more susceptible to spilling

over into increasingly bitter trade conflicts, for the reason that restraints emanating from geopolitical, security, and other considerations no longer apply, or certainly no longer apply with quite the same effect.

The term "capitalism versus capitalism" was coined by Michel Albert<sup>16</sup> whose main objective was to contrast Anglo-Saxon capitalism with Rheinal capitalism -- to which he associated the Japanese variant, as a sort of extension. In the meantime, the application of the concept to a trans-Pacific rivalry between two divergent systems has gained ever greater currency. Publications by prominent American policy-makers or influential opinion leaders, such as those by Laura d'Andrea Tyson and Fred Bergsten<sup>17</sup>, pose the question whether convergence -- or in Bergsten's vocabulary, "reconciliation" -- is possible and what needs to be done to achieve it; what tools, whether of a defensive or offensive nature, should be deployed. It is from these considerations that the current debate regarding numerical indicators for measuring the "progress" in reducing Japan's trade surplus originated.

It is correct, of course, to state, indeed to stress, that communism may be dead in Europe, but that it is not in Asia, just as the cold war may be over in Europe, but not in Asia. The idea of the end of communism and of the final victory in the Cold war is Euro-centric. In so far as the economic battlefield is concerned, however, communism has become irrelevant everywhere. In other words, the attraction of China as a market and possibly ultimately its challenge as a competitor arises most emphatically not from communism, but from the conversion of its economy to capitalist principles and practices. The growing allure of Vietnam among foreign investors arises from comparable considerations.

As the term "challenge" evokes both perceptions of opportunity and perceptions of threat, it is in this context that the clash of culture and the clash of capitalism find a common focus. There is a general presumption that the dynamic drive of the East Asian economies is in good part derived from the lessons learned from the success of the Japanese economic model. This in turn has led to the view that there is such a phenomenon as an East Asian form of capitalism, something which its critics point to as a late twentieth century Western Pacific variation of mercantilism: exports are boosted, imports are impeded, the market is more passive, the government more active, producers are promoted, consumers are deprived, etc<sup>18</sup>

In this perspective, therefore, the battle between "American-style" capitalism and "Japanese-style" capitalism, or liberal capitalism versus mercantilistic capitalism, assumes much higher, indeed global, stakes, than simply a skirmish between Washington and Tokyo. The reason is clearly that ultimately the winning capitalist ideology will be the one that will determine the system that will characterize the twenty-first century: a generally open trading system where corporations, rather than countries, compete, as opposed to a conflict of national or cultural systems which promote national rather than corporate competitiveness and consequently engender economic conflict.

It is in that sense, that the competition between the United States and Japan represents one of the key elements in the epilogue to the twentieth century and prologue to the twenty-first. If Japan can be seen to be converging towards open markets and free trade, then the resurgence of the Chinese empire will occur on a basis of an economic system and

atmosphere that are conducive to cooperation and a liberal global environment. If, on the other hand, convergence does not occur, or, alternatively, protectionist measures are taken as a means of seeking to counter a perceived Japanese offensive today and a possibly greater East Asian economic threat tomorrow, then the system and atmosphere that will prevail will be conducive to confrontation and a mercantilistic global environment.

Japan may have to face the option of whether it chooses to act as a bridge for East Asian nations towards a liberal economic order, or whether it chooses, whether by decision or by default, to erect economic walls and ideologies between the East Asian and Western economies. The fast escalation of Japan's trade surplus with its East Asian neighbours -- the sum of which has now surpassed Japan's trade surplus with the United States -- is not a good omen. A greater propensity on the part of the Japanese economy to absorb the exports of developing East Asian countries would have a stimulating effect on the global economy. A failure to do so will almost certainly lead to exacerbated trade tension not only between Japan and the West, but between East Asian and Western economies.

The issues emerging therefore regarding the Japanese market and the contest between Japan and the United States are of far greater significance than the interests of the two parties concerned. Future global peace and prosperity will very much depend on the degree to which economic differences between Japan and the United States can be resolved. A critical priority in Europe's relations with Japan, therefore, is the role that it may play and the influence it may have on the evolution of the relationship between Japan and the United States.

### **Europe and Japan: the Current State of Play**

There are clearly many issues facing Europe and Japan, many subjects on which communication and possibly concerted action are called for. The urgency is all the more acute for the reasons given and stressed above, namely the uncharted and turbulent state of the waters that lie ahead. As things currently stand, however, the barriers to Euro-Japanese communication and thus constructively complementary contributions to global peace and prosperity are somewhat formidable.

### ***Reconcilable Indifference?***

Adapting and transforming the title Reconcilable Differences? of the book by Fred Bergsten and Marcus Noland on the United States-Japan relationship to "reconcilable indifference?" seems an accurate description of the relationship between Japan and Europe. The common comment in relation to the "triangular" global community is that whereas the axis between the United States and Japan is strong, as is the one between the United States and Europe, the Euro-Japan link is very weak indeed. Thus although the "strong links" between the United States and Europe and between the United States and Japan may include frictions, even occasionally very acute ones, at the very least communication occurs. It is the silence between Japan and Europe that is eerie.

The silence may occasionally be briefly broken. For instance, on the subject of Japan, Edith Cresson during her brief (even if far too long) tenure as prime minister was very boisterous indeed. But then Mrs Cresson was pretty boisterous about many things, not only Japan. And in any case her vituperative vendetta against Japan failed to elicit much interest and very little following. So after the unseemly din caused by the woman, the silence returned. European noise about Japan is rare. The converse is equally true, namely a mute atmosphere in Japan with regard to Europe: for all the "America-bashing" books that appear in Japan, the "Europe-bashing" *genre* is rather underdeveloped.

It is of course necessary to add, even if by way of parenthesis, that there is a degree of artificiality in writing about "Europe" and Japan, in that Europe, even if referring only to Western Europe, does not yet exist, and hence cannot be said to talk in one voice -- whether on the subject of Japan, or any other. In an earlier publication<sup>19</sup> I suggested that there were possibly three strands in individual European nations' approach to the Japanese economic challenge: competition on the part of Germany, confrontation on the part of France, collaboration on the part of the United Kingdom.

While this may stand as a general proposition, the point must repeatedly be driven home that there is in fact very little debate in Europe about Japan. This is partly because there would be few contenders able to engage in debate on the subject. The search for prominent European politicians, captains of industry, academics or other opinion leaders who have evinced more than a passing interest in Japan would be somewhat akin to the search for the proverbial needle in a haystack. European myopia and arrogance may be most to blame for this state of affairs. Hence there is a European problem of reception.

At the same time, without wishing to minimize the myopic nature of the European vision, it must also be recognized that there is a problem of transmission on the Japanese side. The many delegations to Europe of spokesmen on behalf of Japan of one form or another often consist of individuals who come across as wooden, inarticulate, uninteresting and insincere. This would seem to arise from both cultural and linguistic problems. Thus, whereas, for example, not only is it considered permissible in Japan to spend time saying nothing, but it is in many cases a preferred and indeed polite form of (non)-communication, it is a trait which can cause either bemusement or irritation in Europe.

As for language, in spite of tremendous progress having been made in the last decade or so in making English, as it is in Asia, the *lingua franca* in Europe -- notwithstanding the childish antics of the French government -- Japanese political, academic, industrial or other interlocutors are often either unable or unwilling to communicate fluently or effectively in English<sup>20</sup>. The frequent need of having to speak through interpreters adds to the sense of artificiality in the Euro-Japanese "dialogue".

The point has also been made that whereas, for example, the representative directors abroad of such institutions as the British Council, the *Alliance Française* (or other French institutes), the *Goethe Institut*, etc, are often academics, writers, artists, etc, their counterparts from the Japan Foundation are generally functionaries, hence unable to inspire cultural interest and especially communication. The prevalence of bureaucrats and the consequent absence of Japanese academic and artistic types as directors of Japan Foundation



offices abroad and hence more genuine "representatives" of Japanese culture further contribute to imposing limitations on the spreading of Japanese "soft power"<sup>21</sup>.

On the economic front in Euro-Japanese relations, although it is the case that Brussels has assumed responsibility for devising and implementing European trade policy, this does not apply to all other aspects (eg investments). In any case, however, the Commission will be guided by whatever consensus may emerge from the different national and sectorial tendencies and pressures. Hence, it would be misleading to assume that there is or will be in the immediate future in regard to relations with Japan a European concerted or consistent economic policy<sup>22</sup>.

The general absence of a broader, more globally rather than purely bilaterally oriented European economic policy or vision for Japan, and the absence of such a Japanese policy or vision in regard to Europe, can be illustrated, among other possible examples, from the years of the protracted Uruguay Round negotiations. The pretty much exclusive point of reference for both Japan and Europe was the United States. Discussions, negotiations, etc, between Europe and Japan on the issues were conspicuous by their absence. No Euro-Japanese global trade initiatives were promoted, indeed none were discussed.

Certainly until very recently, whatever relationship did exist between Europe and Japan, was pretty much exclusively in the area of trade. The somewhat special nature of the relationship between the United Kingdom and Japan constitutes perhaps a marginal exception to this particular rule. Certainly Japan's cultural presence in the United Kingdom has been more intense, illustrated, for example, in such events as the "Great Japan Exhibition" and the "Japan Festival".

In economic affairs, whereas the UK-Japan relationship in the seventies focused on trade and contained an element of tension, by the eighties it was much more focusing on inward investments. As Britain has been successful in attracting the lion's share of Japanese investment in Europe, and in view of the apparent positive effect of these investments on the British economy, relations between Britain and Japan have quite dramatically improved.

In 1986 Lord Young, at the time Secretary of State to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), launched the first "Opportunity Japan" campaign, which has been pursued over the years in the United Kingdom and subsequently emulated by some of the other European countries -- eg prime minister Bérégovoy's campaign on the theme of "*Le Japon C'est Possible*". Efforts have been directed at seeking to deepen and broaden the relationship between Britain and Japan. While the results remain relatively modest, Britain and Japan are probably in a somewhat different league from the other relations Japan has with individual European countries.

Even in the case of Britain, however, it should be noted that the scope of affairs that falls within the bounds of the relationship is limited. Japan is not conspicuously present on British horizons not only in regard to European, trans-Atlantic, and other affairs, but even in regard to East Asia. One is not aware, for example, of any close consultation between Governor Patten and Tokyo in regard to questions arising from Hong Kong and the UK's policy vis-à-vis China.

To suggest that, albeit with a few minor qualifications here and there and with the possible marginal exception of the United Kingdom, the relationship between Japan and the European Union can be described as a "non-relationship" -- neither friend nor foe -- would be hitting the nail pretty close to the head. Breaks in this pattern are more often than not constituted by the occasional bout of trade friction. Beyond that, Europeans and Japanese do not seem to have much to talk about. A breakthrough of sorts was heralded when on 18 July 1991 Japan and the European Community signed in the Hague what is known as "the Joint Declaration". This piece of paper calls on, among other things, both parties to meet regularly and exchange views on political and international matters.

A measure of the impact of the Joint Declaration on European public opinion, however, can be gathered from the fact that although, for example, reasonably-read Europeans (ie those who read the *Financial Times*, *Economist*, or comparable continental publications) will, for example, be aware of the "Framework" talks between Japan and the United States, and the breakdown that occurred in the Hosokawa-Clinton meeting, very few Europeans, no matter how well read, are likely to be even remotely aware of the existence of the Joint Declaration. And even if they are aware of it, they are not likely to care very much. The same would hold even truer in Japan, ie in terms of comparing awareness of the "Framework" with the "Joint Declaration". Apathy may perhaps be the most defining characteristic, still today, of the reciprocal feelings between Japan and Europe.

In view of the many challenges facing the globe, as described in the first section of this paper, the silence which reigns between Europe and Japan is dangerous. The mutual indifference needs to be overcome. It would be foolhardy, however, to underestimate the obstacles that lie in the way.

### *The Japanese-American Connection*

It is possible to spend a day, indeed even several days, of discussions in Washington without talking about Japan. It is impossible to spend several minutes of discussion in Tokyo without talking about the United States. While obviously the United States is important to everybody and while it is also, as noted above, the only global player, the level of obsession in Japan regarding the United States is extraordinary and ultimately unhealthy. At the time of the Gulf War, for example, it was noted how in the Japanese media there was in fact hardly any discussion about Baghdad, Kuwait, or other local players, but that all concentration focused on Washington -- there was no Gulf crisis in Japan, just another Washington crisis. In the last year or so, as the escalation of the Clinton administration's trade offensive against Japan has occurred, the obsession has intensified.

The monumental omnipresence of the United States in the Japanese psyche represents a major obstacle for Europeans -- and, for that matter, virtually anyone else -- to have a sensible and mature dialogue, and consequently relationship, with the Japanese. As Japanese commentators have been often prone to discuss the US-Japan relationship using the metaphor of marriage, there is indeed a feeling of intrusion on the part of a third party, including when the couple appear to be going through a stormy patch, which is the situation at present. Certainly it is difficult to think of any historical precedent when one sovereign

nation had such an exclusive and highly emotional relationship with another sovereign nation with which it is at peace.

Although the United States proved highly generous both to Europe, including Germany, and to Japan in the postwar settlement, it is often not realized by Europeans the extent to which the latter, ie Japan, was showered with the most extraordinary and unrequited favours. American policy towards Japan in the course of the latter part of the Occupation years and the two decades or so that ensued may have been more dictated by geostrategic *realpolitik* than by altruism, but it nevertheless remains the case that truly remarkable and extraordinary was the speed and the extent to which Japan was transformed from defeated enemy to pampered protégé.

The Americans lavished upon Japan technology, capital, skills; they permitted the Japanese to keep their market closed in order to protect and promote infant industries, while throwing American market doors wide open to Japanese exports; and the latter was of course also accomplished through the maintenance, at American initiative, of an undervalued yen until the early 1970s; numerous educational schemes were set up providing both for Americans to come to teach to Japan and for Japanese to study in the United States; and, of course, to top it all, the Americans unilaterally provided Japan with military security. The first two chapters of Shigeto Tsuru's new book on Japanese capitalism present the most incisive recent assessment in the English language of the extent to which American assistance in various forms permitted and indeed paved the way for Japan's economic reconstruction<sup>23</sup>. History does not seem to offer any precedent whereby one nation did so much for another under any circumstance, let alone a former enemy.

While marriage was referred to above, equally accurate would be the analogy of a child-parent relationship, and especially a protected child. The combination of several elements resulted, in pursuing this particular analogy, in making Japan somewhat of a child prodigy at one level, but with the invariable irresponsibility and immaturity that often accompany that particular condition. Article Nine has protected the Japanese from having to shed any blood abroad, while the security treaty has protected them from having to think about complex international issues. Consequently, the national effort has been directed at exclusively commercial goals, which, having been by and large achieved, have elicited admiration from other nations, but also, not surprisingly, accusations of Japan being characterized by a heavy dosage of national selfishness. This is the essence of the "free ride" syndrome.

Although Germany and Japan are occasionally put under the same light in some of these respects, the contrasts more than the comparisons stick out. Germany, unlike Japan, was divided. For that reason, as well as because of its general eastern neighbourhood, Bonn had to think through complex international issues and act accordingly. Germany has also had to play an active, indeed leading, role in Western European affairs. While Germany has undoubtedly also benefitted from American sponsorship, this has not been anywhere near the extent of protection and promotion that Japan has received. One of the consequences has been that Germany has produced statesmen with global visions. Willy Brandt, for various well-known reasons, may have been exceptional in that respect by any standard, but there are other cases, eg Helmut Schmidt<sup>24</sup>.

The United States' military protection of Japan has allowed the country to put all its eggs (and most of its brains) in the commercial basket. One consequence, therefore, is that Japanese industry has been able to forge ahead. The country has not been distracted by debates about international affairs or having to make decisions on key foreign policy or security issues. One rare example that comes to mind where Tokyo acted on a foreign policy matter quite independently of Washington was in adopting the Arab boycott vis-à-vis Israel following the 1973 Yom Kippur war. This too, however, can be put down more to the pursuit of national self-interest than global concern or a sense of national empathy for the Palestinian cause<sup>25</sup>.

Another natural consequence of the insulation by the United States of Japanese society from critical global political and geopolitical issues is the lack of interest and sophistication in Japanese society in regard to the outside world. Thus the fact that the Japanese tend not to be consulted by Europeans on international, or even regional, political issues is to a considerable extent due to the assumption that the Japanese have little to contribute.

So far as the contemporary setting is concerned, although it could appear to be the case that the post-cold war era will decrease Japan's dependence on the United States, in fact the opposite is probably true. As stated at the outset of this article, the world is entering very uncharted waters. Japan, as we have seen, did not have to be at its own helm even during the decades when the world was in the familiar setting of the Cold war. For Tokyo all of a sudden to take hold of the helm in the current turbulence, ie from having had virtually no practice when the sea was smoother, is difficult.

Furthermore, in light of the fact that there is no regional multilateral framework to address security questions in the Asia Pacific, the bilateral relationship with the United States becomes all the more important as the anchor -- not only for Japan, but also for other nations, either in terms of their bilateral security links to the United States, or, as the Economist recently noted, 'to keep Japan in check'<sup>26</sup> and thus less of a potential regional threat. With the key actor in the region now being China, and with the script not being at all clear, in view of Japan's ambiguous and uneasy relationship with Beijing, the protective mantle of the United States becomes all the more essential. The issue is all the more poignant in light of the possible irredentist tendencies of the present Chinese government -- eg in regard to the South China sea -- the arms race currently occurring in the region, the North Korean situation, and the uncertainties regarding the succession in Beijing, or, for that matter, in Pyongyang.

A fundamental dimension of the Euro-Japanese relationship is, therefore, the United States, or, as in the words of the sub-title to this section, the Japanese- American connection. While various documents, such as the Joint Declaration, and others<sup>27</sup> emanating from Tokyo may earnestly identify areas of mutual interest and exhort Japanese and Europeans to closer communication, collaboration, and so forth, it would seem that under the present circumstances there is little prospect of these efforts producing much more than fine words. Too many fine words, however, with no or relatively little action following may

ultimately prove counter-productive and thereby diminish rather than increase the chances of Europe and Japan overcoming their mutual indifference.

There is no prospect, nor should there be, for Europe to come to replace the United States in the Japanese firmament, or even for Europe to gain equal status with the United States. The same applies in reverse, namely nor for Japan to come to represent an equal power in Europe to that of the United States. This is the case for many obvious reasons, including the one often cited that the United States is and remains the only global player. Indeed, the priority for both Japan and Europe must be to support the United States by sharing its burden in the global community and thereby strengthening its position and resolve<sup>28</sup>.

The current character of the relationship between Japan and the United States, however, undoubtedly acts as a major impediment in bringing about closer Euro-Japanese consultation on global issues and to means of bringing about peace and prosperity. The term "unhealthy" was used in introducing this subject and as a description of the US-Japan relationship. Certainly, the unilateral actions that Washington occasionally envisages in sorting out its bilateral relationship with Japan both make a mockery of and seriously weaken the multilateral trading system. Consequently, as much as the US-Japan relationship in the past may have contributed to peace and prosperity, today, as trade sabres rattle across the Pacific, the same relationship may be undermining peace and prosperity. Europe, Japan, and the United States, need to sort out a new trilateral relationship as well as their respective bilateral relationships.

### *Centrifugal Regionalism and Nationalism vs Centripetal Globalism*

There is only superficial evidence to sustain the fashionable thesis that the world economy is being divided into three regional blocs. It is natural that neighbours should be trading more and investing more with each other than with distant markets. This has been the case with North America and Europe for some time, though the phenomenon may be intensifying as a result of the establishment of NAFTA in the case of the former and of the single market in the case of the latter. The fact that recently a comparable phenomenon is taking place in East Asia is above all a reflection of the economic evolution of the region. While protectionist regional tendencies do exist, the spectre of the emergence of a "stockade America", a "fortress Europe", an "East Asian caucus" is definitely premature and will probably fail to materialize.

One major reason for the more centripetal, rather than centrifugal, nature of the world economy arises from the dynamics and often divergent roles of the multinational corporations (MNCs) from those of the nation-state. MNCs in the current economic environment can generally be expected to pursue profits and markets rather than the national interest. This is not to deny that collusion between MNCs and their national governments does not exist. It does exist, everywhere, though among OECD countries it is perhaps the French and the Japanese that have the unfortunate custom of being more blatant promoters of national corporate champions.

In the meantime, however, and in light of the many forces that are occurring, it may not always be clear whether it is companies or governments that are in the driving seat. The growing power of the MNC, the rapid rise especially in the most recent decade of international direct investments, the various technologies that accompany and accelerate that particular trend, and the generally globally receptive climate to MNC investment, all combine to represent some of the most potent trends of this *fin de siècle*.

The point regarding the receptive climate to MNC investment needs to be stressed. One could, and probably should, include among the simultaneous discontinuities that have occurred recently the degree to which the perception of the MNC in Third World countries has changed. From having been perceived as a "bad thing", reflecting capitalistic neo-colonial exploitation, it is now generally perceived as a "good thing" by virtue of bringing jobs, technology, capital. As John Stopford and Susan Strange have described in their recent book on MNCs and developing countries<sup>29</sup>, as corporations compete for market share, countries compete for their share of inward investment, irrespective of origin.

What all this also means is that an intensification and acceleration of the convergence between international relations and international business occurring at an unprecedented level. Businesses in Europe, as business elsewhere, recognize that the most dynamic action in the world economy today is in the East Asian markets. European corporations want to be part of the action, and get their share of the action. Consequently, the captains of European industry will seek to ensure that their governments do not engage in activities or policies vis-à-vis countries which may be to their detriment. The dismay expressed by British companies over the row with Malaysia following the publication in the Sunday Times of what Kuala Lumpur judged to be an inflammatory article is a case in point. Another is the ambivalence felt by the foreign business community in Hong Kong about Chris Patten assuming the role of bull in a China shop. The fact that the government of Helmut Kohl -- not otherwise known for the distance of its vision -- has sought to define a policy vis-à-vis China may be another case in point, ie reflecting the strategic objectives of Germany's corporations.

To suggest, however, that the convergence of objectives, or indeed even of perceptions, between governments and corporations is solid and sustained would be false. No matter how global some of the key economic actors from the United States, Europe and Japan may have become, it is astonishing how parochial its politicians remain, though of course this in turn reflects the preferences, priorities and intellectual interests and capabilities of voters. Thus, while the convergence of international relations and international business may be occurring in certain circumstances, under certain conditions, and at certain levels, the divergence between the globalization of individual national economies and the parochialism of national psychology must also be recognized as a major force. It is the divergence which drives the greater introspection and introversion discernible among Americans and Japanese. The same phenomenon is occurring in Europe not at a regional, but at a national level, as is illustrated by the various national reactions towards Maastricht.

The centrifugal nationalism of Europeans and Japanese is at the same time exacerbated by their regional preoccupations. Occasional rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding, the instinct of both Europeans and Japanese is to focus more on their

respective regional environments on an independent basis, rather than to fit these into a global framework that may lead to a more interdependent approach. The observer status gained by Japan on the CSCE may be a step in a different, and more positive, direction, though at this stage how substantial a measure this is remains open to question. As to instances of European participation in Asian security deliberations, these are few, far between, and fleeting.

Nor is there much communication on the regional issues of other parts of the world. To give a fairly obvious example, European and Japanese consultation over the driving forces, trends and implications of Islamic fundamentalism is conspicuous by its absence. Europeans and Japanese do not talk about these things, though surely the outcome of the Islamic world's search for its identity and role in the contemporary world will prove to be one of the most critical challenges to the future foundations for peace and prosperity.

As things currently stand, the dream of an outward-looking dynamically cohesive Europe has become somewhat mired. The problems that are plaguing the European economies, unemployment in particular, have resulted in an acute tendency toward introversion. This in turn has been accentuated by the intra-European squabbles over the construction (or otherwise!) of the European Union. The tragedy of Bosnia operates at many levels. Aside from the enormous suffering of the nation concerned, Europeans realize that in betraying Bosnia, they have betrayed themselves.

In so far as external challenges to Europe are concerned, these appear on the near horizon primarily from the central and eastern parts of Europe, in various guises, and from North Africa and the Middle East. The situation in Algeria may be one of the most alarming of recent decades. The combination of introspection and the clouded near horizons prevents European political leaders from extending their vision to the more distant challenges emanating from the shift in the centre of gravity to the Pacific and thereby from engaging in constructive dialogue with the Japanese.

It must of course also be recognized, to add to the general gloom, that the current political situation in Europe in general and European countries individually could hardly be described as conducive to imaginative or courageous policy initiatives. While Italy presents its own disaster scenario, most other European governments are either weak or in a state of limbo. In the case of France, the repeated retreats of the Balladur government have led to a state of semi-paralysis, and one which is unlikely to be changed prior to the presidential elections of 1995. Aside from the political scene, the depressing statement can also be made that rarely has Europe been so lacking in intellectual and cultural fecundity. Ideas used to be something Europeans could be counted on producing, but this hardly seems to be the case in the 1990s.

As paralytic as the political and infecund the intellectual and cultural scenes may be in Europe, both the paralysis and the infecundity in Japan are, if anything, worse. The absence of political leadership in Japan may not be a new situation; under the "1955-system" -- ie the one set through the establishment of the Liberal Democratic Party and the political and industrial organization that developed under its aegis -- it was of relatively little importance. At present, however, as Japan faces both new and unfamiliar internal challenges

and external pressures, there is a disconcerting spectacle of there being no-one in command, the change of prime ministers and other ministers every few months -- or in some cases every few days! The total absence of continuity exacerbates the internal problems and Tokyo's external relations<sup>30</sup>.

Part of the difficulty in getting a more dynamic kick-start in the Japanese environment is the prevalence of a gerontocracy especially in the corporate world. The boards and other decision making bodies of Japanese companies, as well as the industrial organizations, eg the Keidanren, are suffocated by the numerous septuagenarian or octogenarian company chairmen, "senior advisors", and other veterans, whose more positive contribution to Japan and to the country's relations with the outside world would be to retire<sup>31</sup>.

The situation in the early *Heisei* period is somewhat reminiscent of that in early *Taisho*. In so far as the latter is concerned, while there can be no doubt that the Meiji "oligarchs" and other architects of modern Japan did a very good job in their prime (ie when in their thirties, forties and fifties), their staying on as *genro* (elder statesmen) did more harm to the country, and therefore undid a good deal of the positive elements that they had contributed in the past. The same syndrome appears to be occurring now. Rather than going off to play with their grandchildren or cultivating their gardens, these elderly corporate warriors remain, thereby stifling innovation and especially failing to allow new, younger, and more dynamic blood to pour into the veins of the Japanese economy and body-politic.

By being placed on all sorts of committees meant to deal with international issues, they in fact succeed in impeding dialogue, not necessarily because they are senile, but because they are so accustomed to being treated with obsequiousness by their Japanese subordinates, that they have lost the capacity to listen and to engage in genuine discussion. This may in part account for the comment often heard from members of the European establishment that meetings with their Japanese counterparts are a waste of time because nothing ever gets said -- ie it is all style and protocol and no substance.

Yoichi Funabashi has identified 'the Japanese obsession with social status' as a major structural defect of Tokyo's foreign policy<sup>32</sup>. In view of the fact that the obsession with social status is more acute among the gerontocracy, letting the "gerontocrats" loose, so to speak, to deal with international affairs is bound to increase the opaqueness of the Japanese position, rather than enhance communication flows. A forty-two year old (or thereabouts) chairman of Keidanren would send a powerful message both to corporate Japan and to the outside world.

While the stakes in the global challenges facing Europe and Japan are indeed very high, the intention in this section was to stress the extent to which the barriers to genuine and enhanced communication exists between European and Japanese leaders. The barriers are, indeed, all the more formidable in light of the current leadership crisis afflicting both Europe and Japan. While the barriers themselves may pose dangers in getting Europeans and Japanese to engage in cooperation for laying the foundations for peace and prosperity, there is a much greater risk in underestimating them. Unfulfilled expectations might cause greater bitterness.



## An Agenda for Japan and Europe

### *The Condition of Self-Centredness*

Yoichi Funabashi, in the article cited earlier, describes as another major structural defect of Japanese foreign policy what he calls 'Japan's self-centredness'. 'The Japanese', he writes, 'are highly sensitive only to issues that have a direct bearing on themselves'<sup>33</sup>. Although, as noted earlier, it is true to say that leaders with global vision are few and far between anywhere, in Japan arguably more than elsewhere there has been a conspicuous absence of this particular species. Among other things, this has hampered the process of having more Japanese involved in higher positions in international organizations.

Sadako Ogata is a startling exception, though the fact that she is a woman may not be irrelevant. For whatever reason, there seems to be a class of women in Japan who appear more at ease in international surroundings than men and who often also have a better command of sensitive foreign issues and foreign languages. As they may also have had extended periods of study abroad, many have developed networks and a capacity to analyze issues from a broader, more international perspective.

One feature which distinguishes Japan from European countries, and also to some extent from the United States, is the absence in Japan of genuine interest, concern and engagement in international issues, and especially with regard to crises and tragedies that occur in different parts of the world among the population at large and the different professional groups.

For example, in the course of the protracted and somewhat labyrinthine debate that preceded and accompanied the PKO bill to the Diet, arguments were couched more in political terms, ie Japan assuming its international responsibilities, than in humanitarian terms. What seemed to be lacking was a groundswell of popular opinion and pressure in favour of seeking to ensure that the Japanese should do something constructive to help the Khmer people. And once the PKO forces were in Kampuchea, the impression they conveyed hardly contributed to giving Japan a more positive image of willingness to engage in national self-sacrifice to for the world order and to alleviate the sufferings of others.

Funabashi's point about the Japanese people lacking sensitivity with regard to issues that do not have a direct bearing upon themselves may be related to the interpretation - or, one could say, misrepresentation -- of Japan's past. This applies not only to the devastation caused during world war two, a proper national assessment of which might induce a sense of indebtedness to society, but also the history of the country's postwar economic reconstruction. As was indicated above, Tsuru's recent book is quite exceptional in the recognition given by a Japanese author to the absolutely crucial role of the United States in protecting and promoting Japanese industry.

The impression more often conveyed is that the Japanese people had to suffer and ultimately raised themselves to economic prosperity through their own efforts. If the

truth were made more widely known and the immense assistance provided by the United States in the past war decades more widely recognized, this could have a salutary effect on the Japanese people's view of the outside world. A major foundation of Japan's contribution to peace and prosperity, therefore, might be the recognition of the immense assistance it received from the United States and consequently a sense of national obligation to repay this debt through assistance to less fortunate countries than Japan.

This could on the one hand change the national ambience in which the foreign policy debate occurs, and on the other perhaps bring about among certain sectors of the Japanese population a greater sense of interest, concern and engagement vis-à-vis the world. Compared to the other rich countries Japan seems to be lacking in private and professional groups engaged in humanitarian causes. There is no prominent Japanese organization, for example, comparable to Britain's Oxfam or France's *Médecins Sans Frontières*<sup>34</sup>, while Japan's membership in and contributions to international organizations such as Amnesty International are modest.

The national mythical self-image of victim rather than aggressor during world war two and of having had a tough rather than cushy time in the course of the years of economic reconstruction may, as suggested, account for what appears to be the Japanese rather hard and uncaring attitude toward the problems of the outside world. Rectifying this self-image by substituting reality for mythology might bring about a change in popular attitudes and the establishment of internationally oriented private and professional organizations.

The priorities and occasional initiatives of Japanese foreign policy often tend to reinforce, rather than weaken, the image of what Funabashi calls Japanese self-centredness. The issue of the Northern Territories is one of the more glaring illustrations. At the time when the world was facing fairly monumental disruptive forces on a very large global canvas, the persistent Japanese preoccupation with a few small islands seemed out of place and in bad taste.

Another priority, which currently seems to be momentarily shelved, refers to Japan's expressed desire for a permanent seat on the Security Council of the United Nations. Though there is a general recognition that the rationale for being a member of the P-5 may have become obsolete, the manner in which the Japanese case was presented again appeared to be based on narrow national considerations rather than a broader global vision on the structure, role and future of the United Nations.

On the global economic front, while the generally passive, indeed taciturn, role of Japan in the course of the Uruguay Round negotiations has frequently been noted. A similar remark can be made with regard to former prime minister Morohiro Hosokawa's position vis-à-vis the Framework talks with president Clinton. Although most Europeans supported Hosokawa's refusal to give in to Washington's demands for numerical indicators, the disappointment was not, therefore, that the Japanese prime minister should have said no, but that he had nothing else to say or any positive initiative to put forward.

## *The Globalization of Japanese Pacifism*

The general gist of those priorities and initiatives taken by Tokyo not only convey a fairly blatant and narrow pursuit of national self-interest, but also ones very much in accordance with conventional parameters of diplomacy and international politics. Yet Japan is in a position where it could be making an innovative contribution to establishing foundations for peace and prosperity. For example, the debate about revision of Article Nine is centred around whether or not Japanese "peace-keeping" forces should or should not be sent abroad. Pacifism and international engagement, however, need not be mutually exclusive.

In an earlier article that appeared in *Foreign Affairs*, Funabashi urged that "[the] emergence of a more internationalist and actively engaged Japanese pacifism could play a constructive role in making Japan a global civilian power"<sup>35</sup>. In this scheme of things, one could envisage a situation whereby Japan would not send conventional troops abroad, but "armies" of medics, para-medics, teachers, technicians, and other such professional or semi-professional groups that could bring not only succour but constructive assistance to regions experiencing warfare, droughts or famines, and other man-made or natural tragedies. Rather than being recruited by the Self-Defense Agency these civilian armies could, for example, be placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health and Welfare.

Such an initiative would achieve many objectives, including the maintenance and indeed extension of Japanese pacifism, the internationalization of health and welfare -- something which would have a beneficial effect on a ministry not otherwise known for its globalism -- not to mention the objective of providing genuine assistance to areas in distress.

It would also stamp a Japanese imprint on a paradigm of international affairs still too dominated by Atlantic conventions. It would possibly destroy and certainly erode the image of what Funabashi laments as Japanese self-centredness. By virtue of gaining Japan the respect in the world which still eludes it, however, it would not be sheer altruism but enlightened self-interest.

The role that Japan has played in the Third World has tended to be primarily in Asia. This is reflected, for example, in the fact that still about 70% of Japanese aid goes to Asian developing countries. Whether in terms of the "civilian armies" described above, aid, or other forms of actions undertaken by Japan, there would be much to be said in favour of Japan expanding its role to be more prominent in Africa and the Middle East. Not only would there be a net contribution towards establishing peace and prosperity, but Japan's presence in these areas should be welcomed both by Europeans and the countries concerned for various reasons.

A major reason is that in Africa's or the Middle East's relations with Europe, as well as with the United States, tension can easily appear due to the past colonial or neo-colonial relations. Thus, while Japan's relations with countries such as Korea, China, Indonesia, etc, may be prickly because of Japan's imperialistic and militaristic past, that past did not extend to the Middle East or Africa. By virtue of being neither a Christian nor a Western country, Japan should be especially well placed for active engagement in the Islamic world, since acrimonious suspicions based on past animosities would not apply. Especially if

Japan's presence around the world were to consist of armies of doctors, dentists, nurses, teachers, etc, rather than soldiers, the impact on the various troubled places of the world should prove to be pacific.

In the first section it was stressed that conflict between ethnic groups or cultures prevails, risks further proliferation, and may be a defining characteristic of the twenty-first century. Resolution of ethnic conflicts is obviously an area which Japan should establish as a priority, for a variety of generally obvious reasons, but particularly because Japan should have an original contribution to make based on its own experience. Lessons might, however, be useful from European countries: for example from Norway with respect to its contribution to bringing about a dialogue between Israel and the PLO, and from a number of European leaders in regard to the roles that they played in facilitating and encouraging the opening up and development of talks between Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk. If Tokyo could bring about a process of peace between, for example, the Tamils and the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, this would definitely be hailed as a major contribution to peace and prosperity in this poor island and ultimately on the continent of southern Asia.

There would seem to be many more reasons for Japan to warrant elevation to the P-5 than simply the fact that it happens to be footing a good deal of the UN's bills. The establishment of "civilian armies", of Tokyo sponsored peace negotiations between Tamils and Sinhalese, of extended engagement in poor and devastated areas of the world, etc, should lead to Japan receiving an invitation to a permanent seat on the Security Council, rather than having to ask.

### *Models & Measurements of Sustainable Development*

There are other original contributions to be made, either at Japanese initiative or on the basis of combined Euro-Japanese action. One area frequently cited by Japanese experts and commentators on the subject of Japan's contribution to peace and prosperity is that of environmentalism. There is, however, a risk that environmentalism will become something akin to motherhood and therefore that fine and pious words will substitute for incisive analysis and forceful and intelligent action.

In his book, to which reference has already been made, Tsuru strongly advocates that Japan's role in this respect would especially be one derived from its own experience, in that: 'In Japan, probably more than in any other country, that familiar abbreviation "GNP" could stand for Gross National Pollution'. He cites in particular the example of the Inland Sea, and that 'what was once a pride of Japan's natural beauty has become a problem area of the first order from the environmental viewpoint'.

This in turn raises questions of economic measurement. A country's growth and development is generally measured on the basis of annual increases (or decreases) of gross national product *per capita* and through other economic indicators -- value added component of exports, industrial output, etc. Tsuru's point, however, is that while on the basis of conventional measurements it is the case that Japan became "enriched" in the course of the heady days of economic growth, surely it has also become "impoverished" through the

loss of the Inland Sea and the many other acts of environmental brutality and devastation that have occurred.

Thus Tsuru argues that accounting for national enrichment should include cognizance of the depletion of social wealth. 'We could', he writes, 'compile an index of Net National Welfare as an overall measure or welfare index based on specific indicators, such as hospital beds, park areas, the literacy rate, sewage facilities, per-family housing space, etc'<sup>36</sup>. Especially in light of the manner in which neighbouring East Asian countries are emulating the pace and stampede nature of Japan's earlier "economic miracle", the compilation of such an index could possibly serve a key purpose. The problem with the North preaching to the South about "sustainable development" is that it often sounds hypocritical. It is also delicate, to put it mildly, to argue that "poor" countries should not get "rich" because of environmental concerns. If measurements could be used, however, both to add conventional items of economic growth and subtract the environmentally or spiritually polluting effects of untrammelled industrialization, a more accurate measure of a country's progress or regress would be obtained, and also a more sensitive and sophisticated approach to developing countries could be deployed.

Another area that has been targeted as a priority in Euro-Japanese collaboration in bringing about peace and prosperity is that of aid to developing countries. Although it will not be the intention to address this subject in any detail here<sup>37</sup>, two points might be noted. The first is that while Japan's total disbursement of aid in dollar terms now establishes the country as first or second among donors (ie just before or after the United States), as a percentage of GNP Japan's contribution is well below the level recommended by DAC and indeed also below the DAC average. Since Japan has no foreign military expenses to bear, few burdensome international commitments, a very small handful (compared to Europe) of immigrants and/or refugees to care for, relatively few (again compared to Europe, let alone the United States) foreign students from developing countries to educate, and few (at present) private professional organizations involved in assistance to developing countries, the low proportion of the country's wealth committed to helping the poor can indeed appear miserly.

As with other areas, however, perhaps more disappointing than the paucity in numbers from Japan has been the paucity in ideas. It is generally recognized that much of the aid devised and doled out by the Western countries was both a practical waste and conceptually weak<sup>38</sup>. While Japan is a relative newcomer as a major donor, it has nevertheless adopted a conventional approach, hence there is little original contribution or innovation to ways in which rich countries might help poor countries<sup>39</sup>.

### *Global Transitions: A European and Japanese Division of Labour*

From an overall global perspective, there are two major transitions among those currently occurring in this turn of the century that stand out. One is the transition from dictatorship to democracy, not only among the former communist countries of the Soviet empire, but also in South Africa, certain countries of Latin America, etc. The second is the transition, as described on a number of occasions in this paper, of the centre of economic gravity from the Atlantic to the Pacific and the resurgence of the Chinese empire. In

conjunction with these two transitions, there may well be a synergistic division of roles between Japan and Europe.

On the first transition from dictatorship to democracy, the point has been made by a number of Japanese policy makers and opinion leaders that Japan has very little to contribute. Since Japan's dictatorship was ended by defeat in war and democracy came as a gift from the Americans, thereby not something the Japanese people had to fight for themselves, there is no reservoir of knowledge or experience, let alone recipes, that can be drawn upon. On the other hand, apart from democracy having far older and firmer roots in a number of Western European countries, others have more recently experienced successful transition from dictatorship to democracy, eg the manner in which Spain and Portugal disposed rapidly and completely of fascism as recently as the 1970s.

Japan's lack of experience in this area is one reason why little attention has been given to a possible Japanese policy initiative in the central or eastern European countries. Although clearly the humanitarian civilian armies from Japan described earlier would have very useful contributions to make in Bosnia and other areas of deprivation or destruction, and capital and technology should be transferred, little actual policy guidance can be expected from Tokyo on how these and other countries going through a comparable transition should organize their institutions and mobilize their forces for democracy. The Japanese experience of defeat, invasion, reform, enrichment and democratization by the United States cannot easily be replicated!

An exception could be made in the case of Myanmar. It is more difficult for European countries, Britain in particular, to intervene here, given the colonial past, and the United States remains perceived as a hostile, imperialist force. While Japan was, of course, present in Burma during world war two, it caused perhaps less destruction there than in other countries it occupied, and hence less resentment. The Burmese have an important page of their history of collaboration with the Japanese imperial army against the British, and indeed a page in which figures the father of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu-kyi. For these reasons, but also in light of Japan's significant economic interests and clout among Myanmar's neighbours, it could be an interesting and potentially fertile case for Japan to assume a more active and constructive political role in the region.

In the second transition, Japan's role could, and certainly should, be crucial. While the modern history of the country can in many ways be written in terms of the tension between "Asianism" and "Westernism", the extraordinary opportunity presents itself today for Japan to play a truly historic role in acting as interpreter and intermediary between Europe and Asia and as the midwife to the birth of the new Pacific dominated and possibly China oriented century. This would include not only efforts in the field of education, as noted earlier, but also in providing leadership and initiatives in international forums such as the G-7, the OECD, and the new World Trade Organization (WTO), etc.

All of these organizations must become less Atlantic-centric, hence more oriented towards the emerging centre of global economic dynamism, and more open to increasing the number of members and/or the level of influence of Asian countries such as China, Korea, and possibly India. As Gerald Segal pointed out<sup>40</sup>, it was extraordinary that the

G-7 summit of 1993 should invite Moscow to attend and not Beijing, and all the more so in view of the fact that the meeting was held in Tokyo!

This will not necessarily be an easy task for Japan to accomplish. For one thing, rhetoric to the contrary notwithstanding, Japan's "Asian roots" are not always apparent. Not so much the recent history of the war, but the carryings on of the likes of former minister Nagano and the tendency of the Ministry of Education to determine what history should be, render the task of interpreter and intermediary difficult and raises questions regarding the legitimacy and credibility of Japan's policy in Asian as well as in Western eyes.

However, it must also be noted and emphasized that Europeans are afflicted by cultural myopia and a not so quickly diminishing degree of arrogance. Hence while it may be difficult for Japan to talk, it will be equally difficult to get Europe to listen. Considerable efforts will be called for on the part of both parties to overcome the mutual indifference described at some length in the previous section.

**Conclusion: *The Sine Qua Non for Foundations of Peace and Prosperity***

In concluding, emphasis must be given to the major dimension *par excellence* which has so far only been raised implicitly or mentioned in passing. It is, however, the *sine qua non* of any meaningful European and Japanese contribution to foundations for peace and prosperity. In other and in what must be forceful words, if this particular objective is not met and adhered to, all the rest becomes totally irrelevant. And the *sine qua non* refers of course to trade.

On the one hand, all efforts must be directed at maintaining the multilateral trading system. In the dispute between Washington and Tokyo, the current position in Brussels is that while Europe shares with the United States the perception of the problem -- ie Japan's seemingly endemic trade surplus -- it disagrees with the American solution, namely resorting to managed trade. The policy and mood in Brussels at present favour close adherence to the spirit and the letter of the new trade organization in resolving disputes between the United States, Japan and Europe. This is good. As has been emphasized repeatedly in this paper, however, Japan must take and be seen to be taking bold global economic initiatives.

Then there is the urgent and critical issue of opening markets to the developing countries' exports. As Tsuru writes: 'Japan, in particular, having been a late-comer in her industrial maturity ... should be the first to appreciate the importance of freer trade and to take steps deliberately to carry out structural transformation of her industries in accordance with changing patterns of comparative advantage'<sup>41</sup>. It is not unreasonable to expect that Japan, having benefitted so much from the open trading environment which prevailed in the postwar years and which allowed it to achieve its export-oriented development, should today become the champion and paragon of free trade.

It must be emphasized that unless and until Europe and Japan not only maintain open markets to the developing countries, but also proactively promote those countries' exports to their home markets, ultimately, no matter how imaginative the other measures for achieving peace and prosperity may be, the foundations will be very weak indeed.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>. There is a degree of controversy regarding the theme, indeed even the legitimacy, of the American "decline". Paul Kennedy in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, (New York, 1987), has been interpreted as presenting a thesis of the historical destiny of American decline, while others see the usage of the term as exaggerated, certainly premature, possibly a self-inflicted weakness of national wallowing. Although it will also be argued here that the United States is and for the foreseeable future remains the world's only global player, the term decline would nevertheless appear appropriate, legitimized if only by the application of the modifier "relative", or indeed on the basis of perceptions. The perceptions domestically and abroad are that America is in decline.

<sup>2</sup>. These are difficult things to measure. On the intellectual front, and depending how one defines and what one includes in "intellectual", certainly in the area of education and academia in fields such as engineering and the sciences, the "East Asian challenge" looms significantly -- a theme stressed by François Godement in the introduction of his book, La Renaissance de l'Asie (Paris, 1993). Other indicators could be cited: the increasing numbers of East Asian instrumentalists in the world of classical music, the films coming out of China, etc.

<sup>3</sup>. The political front also gives rise to ambiguity. Whereas the people of East Asian societies seem to aspire to what are generally presented as "universal" principles of democracy, human rights, freedom, etc, East Asian leaders, notably former Singaporean prime minister Lee Kuan-Yew, Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad, and others, are becoming increasingly assertive in insisting upon an Asian, some would say "Confucianist", conception of political management and political legitimacy. The stress is on human welfare and human obligations rather than human rights, and with a far more authoritarian, possibly arbitrarily so, mode of governance. Japan often finds itself in an uncomfortable position, including that of possible conflict of loyalties between the American-style of democracy which it espoused following 1945 and its Asian "roots". In his visit to Beijing, then prime minister Hosokawa sought to assure his hosts that Japan took a more sympathetic view of China's social situation. Earlier, however, Tokyo had refused to endorse an "Asianist" interpretation of human rights at the Bangkok conference convened for that purpose.

<sup>4</sup>. Still perhaps the best refutation of American decline and including a redefinition of the concept of



power is Joseph S Nye, Jr, Bound to Lead: the Changing Nature of American Power (New York, 1990).

<sup>5</sup>. As can, for example, be seen and exerted through alumni clubs.

<sup>6</sup>. Susan Strange, "Status, Firms and Diplomacy", International Affairs, vol 68, no 1, January 1992, p. 13.

<sup>7</sup>. Linguistic atavism on the part of the Japanese makes the situation worse. Thus, also in contrast with the many business schools in the continent of Europe (ie in France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium, etc) that offer MBA or other core diploma programmes in English -- ie where both natives and foreigners are in the same class room, taking the same courses, etc, often in Japan, for example at the Keio Graduate School of Business, courses are given in English but specifically to foreigners, with the latter therefore finding themselves in a ghetto and consequently unable to inter-act and network effectively with their Japanese classmates.

<sup>8</sup>. Samuel P Huntington, "The Clash of Civilization?", Foreign Affairs, summer 1993, p. 22-49.

<sup>9</sup>. Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century (New York, 1993).

<sup>10</sup>. The problem of nomenclature is one that has not been resolved. The "Third World", always too much of a vague hodge-podge, presumably, in any case, no longer exists, ie given the collapse of the Second World. "Developing countries" seems injudicious in view of the fact that many of these countries, especially on the African continent, are not developing, but indeed getting poorer in every respect. "Poor countries" may also be a bit of a misnomer in that some of the richest people in the world emanate from the "poor countries". Unable to solve the problem and in recognizing the unfortunate lack of rigour that arises, the various terms will be used here.

<sup>11</sup>. On these and other aspects of the traumas of transition being experienced by China and the trends that are emerging, one of the more recent assessments is to be found in Gerald Segal, China Changes Shape: Regionalism and Foreign Policy (London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 287, London, 1994).

<sup>12</sup>. The R&D expenditure of one of the bigger multinationals in the advanced countries is greater than the total R&D budget of most individual Third World countries.

<sup>13</sup>. See, for example, Edward N Luttwak, "From Geopolitics to Geoeconomics", National Interest, vol. 20, Summer 1993, and Jeffrey E Garten, A Cold Peace:

America, Japan, Germany, and the Struggle for Supremacy (New York, 1992).

<sup>4</sup>4. Lester Thurow, Head to Head: the Coming Economic Battles Among Japan, Europe, and America (New York, 1992) and Jeffrey Garten, *op cit.*

<sup>5</sup>5. On the other hand, there is a view in some European quarters that the epic economic battle between Japan and the United States may be a forerunner of what might occur in Europe. In other words, European policy makers must learn from and guard against Japanese encroachments at the expense of American industry. This is the theme of the book by the German diplomat, Konrad Seitz, Die japanisch-amerikanische Herausforderung: Deutschlands Hochtechnologie-Industrien kämpfen ums Überleben (Munich, 1991.)

<sup>6</sup>6. Michel Albert, Capitalisme contre Capitalisme (Paris: 1991).

<sup>7</sup>7. Laura d'Andrea Tyson, Who's Bashing Whom? Trade Conflict in High-technology Industries (Washington DC, 1992) and C. Fred Bergsten & Marcus Noland, Reconcilable Differences? United States-Japan Economic Conflict (Washington DC, 1993).

<sup>8</sup>8. See, for example, Chalmers Johnson, "Capitalism: East Asian Style", published as the Panglaskin Memorial Lecture, Jakarta, December 1992.

<sup>9</sup>9. Jean-Pierre Lehmann, "Japan and Europe in Global Perspective", in Jonathan Story, ed, The New Europe: Politics, Government and Economy Since 1945 (Oxford, 1993).

<sup>10</sup>0. One example, among many, can be cited here. In October 1992 at the "Tokyo Colloquium" sponsored by the Yomiuri Shinbun held in London on the theme of "the New Europe in Global Perspective", there were government, academic and industrial leaders from Russia, France, Hungary, Germany, the Czech Republic, some Asian countries, as well as Americans, British, and of course Japanese. While all the participants of different nations, apart from Japan, spoke in English, the Japanese insisted on having simultaneous interpretation for themselves. This impedes a freer flow of exchange of ideas between Japanese and non-Japanese participants.

<sup>11</sup>1. I have been arguing this point for some time; eg see Jean-Pierre Lehmann, "Japan's Failure in Europe: the Cultural Deficit", The Japan Society of London Bulletin, November 1979, p. 6-12.

<sup>12</sup>2. The case of Japanese automobiles in Europe may be a rare exception to this rule.

<sup>13</sup>3. Shigeto Tsuru, Japan's Capitalism: Creative Defeat and Beyond (Cambridge, UK, 1993).

<sup>14</sup>4. The late Dr Saburo Okita may be one rare example of a Japanese statesman with global vision. Dr Okita's tenure as foreign minister, however, was very

brief, and it is debatable whether it left a marked stamp on the subsequent conduct or philosophy of Japanese foreign policy.

<sup>5</sup>5. It is true, however, that a good number of Japanese publications of an anti-semitic nature, in some cases of a quite extraordinarily vitriolic nature, have enjoyed booming sales; see Ben-Ami Shillony, The Jews and the Japanese: the Successful Outsiders (Tokyo, 1991). Whether, however, there is a link between Japan's boycott of Israel and its anti-semitic literature is not clear.

<sup>6</sup>6. "Japan in Denial", the Economist, 14 May 1994, p. 16. In the same article, the Economist (which generally comes across as a rather pro-Japan magazine) also stressed, as have so many European commentators, that Japan could also help 'ease the anxieties [of its neighbours] by undertaking the sort of self-examination that enabled Germany to admit, accept and move on'.

<sup>7</sup>7. One of the more interesting is Political Cooperation with Europe: Japan's Agenda for 21st Century, consisting of the policy recommendations by the Japan Forum on International Relations and signed by some eighty prominent Japanese from the worlds of academe, industry and government, issued in Tokyo in November 1993.

<sup>8</sup>8. I have written about this aspect of the Euro-American-Japanese relationship in greater detail in "Reorganizing Western Alliance Cooperation: America, Europe & Japan -- A Prescription for Collective Pax Americana", to appear in the forthcoming issue of Pacific Affairs. Also the document cited in the previous endnote, "Political Cooperation with Europe ...", stresses (p.1) that 'a deeper cooperative relationship between Japan and Europe, both being America's closest partners, is critical in maintaining US involvement internationally and in eliminating any chance that the US might withdraw from this involvement'.

<sup>9</sup>9. John Stopford and Susan Strange, Rival States, Rival Firms: Competition for World Market Shares (Cambridge, 1991).

<sup>10</sup>0. Most of the participants attending the G-7 meetings, not only heads of government, but finance ministers, trade ministers, etc, are people who have got or get to know each other over the years and hence are able to establish a rapport. Japanese prime ministers and other ministers, on the other hand, tend to make such a fleeting appearance on the world stage, that there is no possibility of establishing personal relationships with their counterparts.

<sup>11</sup>1. Part of the problem is the limitation of space in the countryside that does not allow elderly Japanese captains of industry and others to retire in a state

of comfort that can be obtained in the properties of the many regions of Europe, while at the same time providing scope for activities such as gardening. There had been a project enunciated by the Japanese government in the eighties, known as the *Silver Columbia Plan*, whereby old age Japanese pensioners would be "shipped off" to more spacious foreign pastures, notably Australia, California and southern Spain. It was subsequently shelved, though perhaps, for the sake of establishing foundations for peace and prosperity, it could now be revived.

<sup>2</sup>. Yoichi Funabashi, "Structural Defects in Tokyo's Foreign Policy", Economic Eye, Summer 1993, p.27.

<sup>3</sup>. Yoichi Funabashi, *op cit*, p.28.

<sup>4</sup>. The founder of *Médecins sans Frontières*, Bernard Kouchner, former minister of health in the French government, is currently leading a humanitarian rescue mission to Rwanda.

<sup>5</sup>. Yoichi Funabashi, "Japan and the New World Order", Foreign Affairs, Winter 1991/92, p.65.

<sup>6</sup>. Shigeto Tsuru, *op cit*, chapter 5, with the three quotations taken successively from pages 129, 130 and 145.

<sup>7</sup>. The European Institute of Japanese Studies at the Stockholm School of Economics is currently undertaking a couple of major projects on the subject of Japanese ODA.

<sup>8</sup>. As was recently argued by the Economist: "Foreign Aid: the kindness of strangers", 7 May 1994, p. 21-24.

<sup>9</sup>. It is correct, however, to say that at the very least Tokyo did cause the World bank to question some of its assumptions on the economic conditions for development, through a project which culminated in the publication of The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (Washington DC, 1993).

<sup>10</sup>. Gerald Segal, "The Group of Seven Should be Paying More Attention to China", International Herald Tribune, 25 February 1993.

<sup>11</sup>. *ibid*, p. 233-234.

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