


# **NORTH AFRICA: CURRENT TRENDS AND POLICY CHALLENGES**

Institute for National Strategic Studies

Tunis, 3-4/V/1994

a. Conference agenda

1. "The causes of instability: an American perspective"/ William H. Lewis
2. "Les causes d'instabilité: une perspective nordafricaine"/ Khalifa Chater
3. "The roots of instability in North Africa"/ I. William Zartman
4. "The proliferation of mass destruction weapons and the changing Mediterranean regional balance"/ Jed C. Snyder
5. "Social change, Islam and the modern world: origins and prospects of the Islamist movements in North Africa"/ Lisa Anderson
6. "Le codéveloppement: un nouveau modèle de la coopération euro-maghrebine"/ Habib Slim



Version of April 4, 1994

# ***International Symposium***

Organized by

**THE INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES  
OF THE  
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY**

(Washington, D.C.)

in Collaboration with

**THE GOVERNMENT OF TUNISIA**

"North Africa: Current Trends and Policy Challenges"

to be held in

***Tunis, Tunisia***  
3-4 May, 1993

Proposed Conference Agenda

**DRAFT**

Version of April 4, 1994

## DAY ONE (May 3)

### 9:30 am OPENING SESSION

Welcoming Remarks by

Mr. Ben Dhia  
Minister of Defense, Tunisia (**Confirmed**)  
and  
Lieutenant General Paul Cerjan, USA  
President, National Defense University (**Invited**)

### 10:00 am FIRST SESSION: "Political Instability and Regional Conflicts"

Chairman: (**Tunisian Responsibility**)

- ✗ Paper: "The Causes of Instability: An American Perspective" by:  
Professor William Lewis, George Washington Univ (**Confirmed**)
- ✗ Paper: "The Causes of Instability: A North African Perspective" by:  
(**Tunisian Responsibility**)

Commentator: His Excellency Husnain Derar, Egypt, MFA (**Invited**)

### 12:00 pm LUNCH (Tunisian Military Officers' Club)

Address: "North Africa's Role in the Mediterranean Region" by:  
Dr. Osama El Baz, Chief of Cabinet to the President for Political Affairs and  
First Under Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Egypt (**Invited**)

### 2:30 pm SECOND SESSION: "Political, Cultural and Geographic Boundaries: The Disputes"

Chairman: Dr. Stuart Johnson, Director, Regional and Operational Security Analysis, INSS

Paper: "Political and Cultural Issues" by:  
Professor Abdul Aziz Said, The American University (**Confirmed**)

Commentator: TBA (**Tunisian Responsibility**)

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4:00 pm **THIRD SESSION: "Differing Perspectives on Regional Problems"**

Chairman: Dr. Tashin Bashir, Egypt (**Invited**)

- ✗ Paper: "The Roots of Instability in North Africa" by;  
Professor I. William Zartman, School for Advanced International Studies,  
Johns Hopkins University (**Confirmed**)

Paper: "Economic Factors" by;  
TBA (**Tunisian Responsibility**)

Commentator: Professor Lofti Ben Rejeb, University of Tunis (**Tunisian Responsibility**)

## **DAY TWO (May 4)**

9:00 am **FOURTH SESSION: "Security, Stability and Weapons Proliferation"**

Chairman: MG John Sewall (Ret) USA, INSS/NDU (**Confirmed**)

- ✗ Paper: "Proliferation and the Changing Regional Balance" by:  
Mr. Jed Snyder, INSS/NDU (**Confirmed**)

Commentator: Dr. Abdel Aziz Hamzou, Dir, Tunisian National Center of Strategic Studies (**Tunisian Responsibility, confirmed**)

Commentator: Dr. Barbara Egbert, Science Appl Int Corp (**Confirmed**)

10:30 am **FIFTH SESSION: "Shifting Social and Demographic Patterns"**

Chairman: Dr. Phebe Marr, NDU/INSS (**Confirmed**)

- ✗ Paper: "Social Change, Islam and the Modern World" by:  
Lisa Anderson, Columbia University (**Confirmed**)

Commentator: Ambassador Elbaki Hermassi, Tunisian Ambassador to UNESCO (**Tunisian Responsibility**)

Commentator: Arthur Lowrie (**Confirmed**)

12:00 pm **CONCLUDING SESSION: Remarks by**

Ambassador McCarthy, U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia (**Confirmed**)  
Mr. Habib Ben Yahia, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tunisia (**Confirmed**)

**DRAFT**

# ***International Symposium***

**"North Africa: Current Trends and  
Policy Challenges"**

***"The Causes of Instability: An  
American Perspective"***

*By*

Professor William H. Lewis  
The George Washington University  
Washington, D.C.

***Tunis, Tunisia***

***May 3-4, 1994***

The Causes of Instability: An American Perspective

By  
Professor William H. Lewis  
The George Washington University  
Washington, DC

The earthquake that shook the world in 1989 has continued to send seismic shock waves throughout the international community. The demise of communism and the attendant collapse of the Soviet Empire have carried in their wake a weakening of international security structures and political-military coalitions. For the United States, in particular, troubling challenges to its national interests have emerged necessitating fresh assessment of national purposes and priorities during the remainder of this decade and well into the 21st century. For expectations that the post-Cold War world would be characterized by relatively harmonious readjustments and realignments have not been realized. At present, there is vast uncertainty about the volatile forces at work in the international arena and the roles the United States should play in seeking to channel them in directions which meet the need for stability and orderly change.

As the United States begins to address emerging post-Cold War challenges, its policies will be shaped by several precepts and prescriptions. Among the more important are likely to be the following: (a) the need to avoid a return to global politics based major powers competing for influence and pursuing narrow national interests; (b) the need to distinguish between security threats (that require a military response) and diverse security challenges (that, most often, will

necessitate non-military responses); and (c) the desirability of building new "security communities" that address political and economic issues, as well as military concerns and options. An excellent point of departure for fashioning new "security communities" has been outlined by Karl Deutsch, who has noted that the guiding principle for such a community is the understanding that among its members "it is impossible to conceive of force being used to settle disputes". Within these constellations emphasis would be placed on development of complex networks of interdependence in which boundaries between member states would be porous to a historically unparalleled degree. As a consequence, traditional distinctions between domestic and international politics (as well as economics) within such "communities" would diminish and eventually vanish.

The relevance of North Africa to this perspective is of singular importance since the potential for a "security community" linking much of northern Africa with southern Europe cannot be ignored. Shared political-military interests, economic and commercial ties, and the bonds of history are well-established. Ferdinand Braudel has traced these ties and relationships back to the sixteenth century--"this in a religious age of the fall of Constantinople to the Turks and of Grenada to the Spanish". In Braudel's words:

"Men passed to and fro, indifferent to frontiers, states and creeds. They were more aware of the necessities for shipping and trade, the hazards

of war and piracy, the opportunities for complicity or betrayal provided by circumstances."<sup>1</sup>

While there were promising signs of interest in the formation of a Western Mediterranean "security community" several years in the past, there appears to be little enthusiasm for such an effort in the present. The reasons are not difficult to discern. Potential European and North African member states are currently distracted by a pressing array of domestic difficulties--some threatening rising instability and social disorder--all of which detract from efforts to form sub-regional groupings. Yet, in other regions constructive efforts to fashion transnational ties are underway, despite endemic distractions. One need only take note of such efforts in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Southeast Asia, and West Africa. The focus of each may be one-dimensional at present, but the hope of participants is for the creation of communities of intersecting common interest. With respect to the Mediterranean basin, it is not unreasonable to ask whether the U.S. wishes or is even capable of playing a facilitative role in sponsoring a Western Mediterranean "security community". Conversely, and perhaps perversely, would the potential participants in such a "community" wish to have American involvement?

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1. Ferdinand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II. Vol I(I, New York: Harper and Row, 1976, p.759. Cited by Fouad Ajami, "The Summoning", Agenda 1994: Critical Issues in Foreign Policy. New York: Foreign Affairs, 1994, p.153.

From the perspective of this conference's participants, I have not yet seen emerge from Washington a clear set of policy statements that define the American position on sub-regional "security communities" that are needed to foster regional stability and economic growth.

### Competing U.S. Perspectives

At present, one must conclude that U.S. foreign and national security planning processes with respect to the Mediterranean region are either incomplete or, at best, en rodage. Within the U.S. government several significant issues, and the extent to which the Western Mediterranean region is associated, are only now being sorted out. Key among them are the ongoing Arab-Israeli negotiations, the development of norms for accommodating competing economic goals in international trade and commerce (as exemplified in the historic pact signed on April 15, 1994 at Marrakesh, Morocco, commemorating the formation of the World Trade Organization), contributions that might be made to the United Nations peacekeeping efforts, and measures to be taken to slow (if not end) proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Firmly established U.S. strategies that would prove of interest to this conference have yet to emerge. However, within the U.S., one salient question has begun to crystallize--should the U.S. narrowly define its national interests in order to deal with urgent domestic requirements or is the U.S. required by virtue of its previous role of leader of "free nations" impelled to assume new international responsibilities.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the Bush administration and now its successor were expected by friends and allies to provide a road map on how the U.S. proposed to manage the peace. This would be a daunting task under any circumstance, but the issues and conflicts that abound in the world at large assure that the assignment verges on "mission impossible." In 1994, armed conflicts--some new, some old--were underway in Peru, Angola, Burundi, Somalia, Liberia, Western Sahara, Sudan, Uganda, Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Northern Ireland, the former Yugoslavia, and the former Soviet republics of Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and Tajikistan. "Ethnic cleansing" or fighting intended to eliminate ethnic communities, was the catalyst for conflict in Bosnia, Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan, Kenya, and Burma. Hindu-Moslem riots in India, Islamic militant warfare in Algeria, and comparable problems in Egypt threatened the weakening of government authority in these countries. A vast array of peoples today are embarked on rewriting boundaries or constitutions, reconstituting political orders, or seceding from existing political and state "systems."

The disappearance of a unifying, universally understood threat, in the form of the Soviet Empire, requires the U.S. policymaking community to redefine the nation's purposes and goals. Gone is the requirement that the United States lead Western democracies in a global effort to protect the Eurasian land mass from communist domination. In the United States, most Americans are turning their attention to domestic concerns--What strategies to adopt in coping with

burgeoning crime? How to provide fresh opportunities for economic advancement for the youth of decaying inner cities? How to accommodate health and medical needs at costs sustainable within limited budgets? What priorities for the nation in education, technology, welfare and protection of the environment? In the minds of many concerned with public policy, international security should be downgraded in importance to permit addressal of problems at home that impinge on national well-being and cohesion. The Clinton administration's announced foreign policy stance--"enlargement of democracy" through development of free markets and support for democratic processes--contains within it the prospect of limitless intervention in the affairs of countries with little history or experience of power sharing and representative government. For these people, the U.S. appears to be tilting in the direction of unwanted burdens, when the national need is to impose severe limits on security and political commitments abroad.

At the opposite end of the American spectrum are a substantial number of citizens and foreign policy specialists who feel uneasy that opportunities for U.S. leadership in the international community are fast slipping away. They point to the Mediterranean basin as a region of dynamic challenge, one in which U.S. and local interests intersect and in which constructive partnerships are possible. They point to the record of history to validate their assertion.

### The Historical Ties

The Western Mediterranean region has long been considered an important geo-strategic zone by American policy planners. Its significance was first underscored during World War II when Operation Torch was launched with the landing of U.S. and Allied troops in Morocco and Algeria, hallmarking the beginning of the liberation of northern Africa and Europe from Nazi domination. In due course, North Africa would serve as a springboard for the insertion of Allied forces into southern France and Italy. The U.S. attached more than military significance to these operations, however. President Roosevelt himself travelled to the region to meet with North African leaders to pledge American support for nationalist aspirations to end colonial rule in the post-war world, a pledge his successor, President Truman, sought to honor.

The first opportunity to support North African aspirations arose in Libya, a former Italian colony, where the U.S. opposed Soviet efforts to subdivide the country among the victorious European "powers". The question was resolved within the United Nations where the U.S. prevailed in securing independence for Libya in 1951. The American record seeking the end of protectorate rule in Morocco and Tunisia also is well-known, as was American intervention to insist on the withdrawal of British, French and Israeli forces from the Suez salient in 1956. Noteworthy as well was the U.S. role in securing major political concessions on the part of France in the Algerian war for independence immediately after the Sakiet Sidi Youssef tragedy of 1958. The dispatch of the

senior U.S. diplomat, Robert Murphy, to Tunis and Paris led to dramatic events in the French capital and the ultimate granting of independence to Algeria by President de Gaulle.

The notion of a "strategic community" linking much of North Africa with Western Europe and the U.S. was at the center of American thinking during the 1960 and beyond. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations, conscious of the need to encourage economic growth and political stability on the part of the newly independent states, fashioned special economic and technical support programs. Attracted to the "progressiste" policies of President Habib Bourguiba, Tunisia was designated a bellwether recipient of U.S. assistance, a collaborative initiative intended to demonstrate that the two countries could create pragmatic programs to foster economic growth and development. The hope and expectation in the U.S. government was that Tunisia would serve as a model for other Arab nations as well as for African nations below the Sahara.

Of more contemporaneous importance, the U.S. has welcomed the formation of the Arab Maghreb Union (1989) and applauded local efforts to design a geo-strategic architecture strengthening economic and military ties amongst nations in the Western Mediterranean region. France, Italy, Egypt, and Tunisia are to be acknowledged for their leadership in efforts to launch projects aimed at fostering closer cooperation on the part of governments on both shores of the Mediterranean, most notably, the "five plus five group" consisting of five European countries (Spain, Portugal, Italy, France and at a later stage Malta) and five

countries of the extended Maghreb (Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya). Egypt, as in the case of Malta, should properly become a part of a future dialogue, if efforts are renewed.

Progress in forming a coherent Mediterranean-wide "security community", initially lodged in its western reaches, has been painfully slow, however. Part of the difficulty may be ascribed to inappropriate timing or excessive ambition. Economic recession within the potential membership, understandable but obsessive concern with developments in Eastern Europe, the restrictions and claustrophobia of the European Union, and even the formation of the Arab Maghreb Union have all conspired to slow the impulse to fashion another regional sub-grouping. A subsidiary impediment might have been the tendency of the scheme's proponents to become overly fixated on military concerns.

Today, the time is propitious to revisit the question of a Western Mediterranean "security community". The center of gravity for discussion should be the networks of interdependence that have emerged amongst potential participants. The networks are the product not only of geographic propinquity but also of mutual problems and growing realization that nations in the region can not resolve them without consideration of the consequences for their neighbors. At the initial stage of formation, the founders of a "security community" will necessarily not view members as having equal status. However, they will seek a common goal of equity as relationships mature. For example, heavy dependence was placed on U.S. military capabilities during the formative stages of the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), but all members envisaged ultimate creation of a second, purely, European security pillar. During its formative stage, shared burdens and interests helped to ensure successful implementation of NATO's containment strategy. While asymmetries in military and economic power could not be ignored, mutual trust helped to mitigate historic jealousies and rivalries.

The process of "security community" formation today may be even more challenging since the impetus arises not from purely military considerations but from economic and social factors as well. It might be possible to hypothesize that the state and its attendant security organizations could become somewhat lesser "actors" in due course. A considerable body of academic literature has emerged on the subject of interdependence. One of the seminal writings has been by Professor Joseph Nye of Harvard University who has postulated that: (a) As economic and social pressures mount both in industrialized and modernizing societies transitional forces and groups will vie with the state for decisionmaking authority on key issues; (b) As this process unfolds, the impulse to create transnational institutions (multilateral networks of association) will also grow; and (c) Security will be viewed through the lens of welfare of national constituencies.' The corollary will be diminished traditional roles for military institutions. The Western Mediterranean "security community" would be predicated on the desire of North African countries to avoid marginalization in the economic and related architectures currently envisaged for Europe. To successfully overcome marginalization several major problem areas will have to

be addressed. Not the least of these are cultural and economic misunderstandings about North Africa that influence opinion in the U.S. as well as in Western Europe.

### Islam As A Starting Point

Several American academics have proclaimed that the fundamental line of cleavage in the post-Cold War era will be neither ideological nor economic but cultural. Professor Samuel Huntington, an eminent political scientist, has recently written that the "Fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future."<sup>2</sup> The West, now at the "peak of power", will find itself increasingly at odds with the "Moslem states"; the contest will be focused largely, although not exclusively, on "nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; ballistic missiles and other sophisticated means for delivering them, and the guidance, intelligence, and other electronic capabilities for achieving that goal".<sup>3</sup> The West is perforce engaged in a strategy of denial--presumably according to Huntington, because Western and Islamic values are incompatible--whereas the Islamic political-military objective must be to achieve status and parity with the West through the accumulation of weapons of mass destruction and means for their delivery. Islamic fundamentalism is the cutting edge, once in power, its adherents will

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<sup>2</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clashes of Civilizations", Agenda 1994: Critical Issues in Foreign Policy, Ibid., pp.120-147.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 143

embark on efforts to de-Westernize Europe's influence and presence in the Middle East and North Africa.<sup>4</sup>

Despite general criticism of the Huntington hypothesis, his meditation has resonated amongst some U.S. defense community specialists. For example, a troika of RAND savants recently expressed similar concerns in an article, "Building a New NATO", in the widely read journal, Foreign Affairs--their essential thesis being that NATO confronts two "arcs of crisis"--one to the east, extending through Eastern Europe, Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia; the second, a southern "arc" running through northern Africa and the Mediterranean into the Middle East and Southwest Asia. They propose early admission into NATO of nations in the eastern "arc" and, by contrast, treatment of the southern region as a future threat to the security and stability of Europe. Without reservation, the authors urge an exclusionary policy as regards NATO membership for the northern African nations.<sup>5</sup> The concerns of the RAND specialists was echoed in the mid-February 1994 edition of the respected London Economist which noted with some lack of acumen that the "upsurge of Muslim revanchism in the south" is one of the major "challenges" confronting NATO today.

With the overthrow of the Pahlevi monarchy 1978-1979, a growing number of Western scholars have underscored the perceived dangers of revitalized

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 145

<sup>5</sup> Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Building a New NATO", Foreign Affairs, September/October 1993, pp. 28-42.

religious fundamentalism in the Moslem "world", ignoring the important distinction between groups that promote a political role for Islam through peaceful participation in democratic processes and radicalized fringe groups that resort to conspiratorial approaches and violence to achieve political destabilization. Some challenge the view that all Islamic activists are inherently radical, contending that violence arises because they are not accorded political recognition--i.e., the opportunity to participate as organized political parties. Not to be ignored, in their view, is the traditional belief in the Arab world that church and state are inseparable--hence, a religious leader is required to play secular-political, as well as spiritual roles--either at the local, national or regional level. Other Western scholars observe that this situation is not unique to the Arab world. Christian and Jewish fundamentalists are active forces in Israel, the United States and several European political arenas. In all instances, the primordial issue is the nature of the political dialogue--in particular, the predisposition of parties involved to engage in exchanges that are not threatening to the institutions of the state, and do not undermine the cohesion of society.

Algeria, may prove the ultimate testing ground for accommodation between secularists and radical fundamentalists. State institutions and an important segment of Algerian society are embroiled in a power struggle that could have farreaching ramifications for the future cohesion of that country. Should the F.I.S. continue to perpetuate its campaign of violence, three related outcomes might be anticipated:

- Further descent of the country into anarchic violence with deep lines of cleavage developing within the security services, as well as between moderate secularists and militant fundamentalists;
- Reciprocal pressures within Morocco, Egypt, and possibly Tunisia should F.I.S. militants gain ascendancy; and
- The entire region a cockpit for militant-secularist struggles which threaten to overflow into southern Europe and the remainder the Middle East

Europe and the U.S., in search of new policy approaches to the region, could indeed come to regard northern Africa as an "arc of crisis", one whose fate as a "security community" would have to be read in international obituary columns. It may well be that this vision of the future is too stark. Contrary to the speculation of many Western academics, the Islamic revival does not find expression in a monolithic movement. Even in Algeria, serious fissures are becoming evident as the F.I.S. comes under growing counterpressures from government security services. Nevertheless, Algeria increasingly is coming to be viewed in the Western media as a clash between Western and Moslem civilizations.

The press and other media flourish with the spectre of militant Islam posed as a "dual threat," first to regional stability and orderly change, and second to the cherished values of Western civilization. Militant Islam also is perceived as anti-democratic, devoid of respect for human rights, and opposed to individual

freedoms--prizing instead the obligation of the individual to adhere to strict interpretation of Sharia law and traditional norms. The media all too often ignores the fact that "fundamentalism" is a term that applies only to a narrow range of religious political action, that not all politically active Moslem groups are fundamentalist in the militant sense; nor are all religious fundamentalists Moslem.

#### Economic and Social Underpinnings

Accompanying Western angst over Islamic resurgence is a growing awareness that the revivalist agenda--to bring state and society into conformity with classical standards of an Islamic polity--is predicated on widening economic and social challenges confronting most governing institutions in northern Africa, as well as governments in southern Europe. In the former, demographics, widespread unemployment and underemployment, together with failure of some governments to generate effective programs to meet awakening expectations on the part of a youthful, burgeoning population provides the touchstone for radical political forces. For the relatively more affluent Europeans, the future relationship might well resemble the classical neo-colonial paradigm--i.e., interdependence of unequals. In a partnership of unequals, the seeds of discontent, fanned by religious extremists, are certain to prosper. Yves Boyer, Deputy Director of the Centre d'Etude des Relations entre Technologies et Stratégies in Paris, recently offered the following gloomy assessment:

"The abundant structural limitations to political stabilization and economic development in the states to the south will . . . continue to limit cooperation. Weak infrastructure, the lack of a significant private sector, a shortage of investment in industry, and bureaucratic roadblocks compound the political risks that inhibit West European economic involvement south of the Mediterranean."<sup>6</sup>

As Boyer underscores, European and U.S. intellectuals conversant with the Maghreb have a sense that the region confronts a period of deepening economic and social crisis that may ultimately undermine the credibility of government policies and generate widening political disequilibrium. In such circumstances, the natural recourse of governments would be to adopt draconian measures to ensure domestic stability and political order, rather than embrace power sharing strategies. But, in due course, the crisis of authority would lead ineluctably to a crisis of legitimacy. President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia has pointed to the present era in Maghrebian relations with Europe as critical, one in which "liberty, democracy, and human rights" must be protected. In a recent article, published in Mediterranean Quarterly, the president also observed that "There can be no democracy without development."<sup>7</sup> With these rights safeguarded, he went on to call for dialogue with Western Europe:

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<sup>6</sup> Yves Boyer, "Europe's Future Strategic Orientation", The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1993, pp. 150-151.

<sup>7</sup> Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, "The Maghreb and the European Community", Mediterranean Quarterly, Winter 1994, pp. 1-11.

"I would call on the European Community and its member states to convene a conference on development in the countries of the Arab Maghreb, with the purpose of concluding a contract for progress and solidarity that would set in motion mechanisms for cooperation based on a political, economic, social, and cultural partnership between the two communities. It also would serve as a springboard for a wider and closer set of relationships extending to all countries of the southern Mediterranean for the purpose of promoting development and democracy in the entire southern region of the basin. Such an initiative naturally calls for an increased effort in confidence building and interest sharing and hence for duplicating the Helsinki security and cooperation process in North-South Mediterranean relations.<sup>8</sup>

The U.S. government has joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in applauding the "impressive steps" taken by Tunisia in developing a "vibrant, outward-looking economy." Its "transformation" has been achieved, in the words of the IMF, through "wide-ranging structural and macroeconomic policies" that have stimulated economic activity, lowered inflation, and reduced the country's external debt and debt-service ratios.<sup>9</sup> At the same time, the demographic growth rate has been lowered to 1.9 percent, the lowest in the African continent. Robert

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<sup>8</sup> Ibid., pp. 8-9.

<sup>9</sup> See "Tunisian Adjustment Offers Lessons for Other Reforming Economies", Survey: Publication of the International Monetary Fund. December 13, 1993, pp.369.

Pelletreau, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, recently underscored Tunisia's economic achievements in congressional testimony (March 6, 1994), noting they were the result of a "well-educated and hard working population with a vigorous middle class". Clearly, Tunisia is well positioned to seek constructive dialogue with the EC membership in general and southern European governments in particular.

Elsewhere in northern Africa the outlook is more somber, however. Demographics are outpacing economic capability, with the spectre of unemployment, social dislocation and inadequate housing, becoming worrisome realities. Unemployment levels in Algeria and Egypt had reached 25 percent and 22 percent respectively by early 1993; if underemployment is included, Algeria confronted a nightmarish 35 percent, with the overwhelming majority derived from a labor force population of 30 years of age and under. Housing shortages in rapidly proliferating urban areas is also reflective of troublesome social dynamics. In 1985, 133 million people lived in urban agglomerations; the figure is expected to rise to between 195 and 217 million by 2025, far exceeding the absorptive capacities of existing population centers.<sup>10</sup> In Egypt alone, more than one million people are born into a population pool exceeding 60 million, requiring the government to provide housing on the order of a small city each year. The situation in Cairo, as well as other urban centers along the western reaches of

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<sup>10</sup> Boyer, Op.Cit., p. 142.

North Africa, threatens to become unmanageable in the decade immediately ahead.

In previous periods, North African workers looked to southern Europe for employment opportunities. (An estimated 2.5 to 3 million Moroccans, Algerians and Tunisians currently reside in Spain, France and Italy.) However, economic recession in traditional "host" countries together with rising unemployment, fears of Islamist politics touching their shores, and rising nationalist-exclusionist sentiment within European communities (recent local elections reflect a drift toward conservative political parties) have all served to constrain employment opportunities for Arab workers. A 1993 incident in France when a female teenager wore a foulard (head scarf) to class resulted in a national debate over the need for restrictive immigration policies, the maintenance of separation of church and state in education policies, and the "threat" to Republican, secularist values emanating from the Moslem world. This sentiment is emblematic of the climate of relations between North and South.

From the North African perspective, the Maghreb suffers as well from the collapse of the Soviet empire, which has compelled much of Western Europe to concentrate attention and economic resources on former Warsaw Treaty Organization states. Geographic proximity and history have propelled Germany into the forefront as an economic and trading partner with states in the western reaches of the former Soviet empire. Its East-West vocation has made Germany the biggest Western trading partner with virtually all of the former WTO nations.

In 1993 alone, Bonn imported \$6.1 billion in commodities from Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary and the Czech Republic combined; it exported \$7.6 billion in German products. German investment in all six countries range from 14 percent in the Czech Republic to 25 percent in Hungary. When Germany assumes the EU presidency in mid-1994, the government at Bonn has indicated that it intends to place incorporation of its new trading partners into the European Union on the EU agenda.

This eastern vocation on the part of Bonn is troubling to other EU members, particularly France. A recent poll conducted by the RAND Corporation indicated that a majority of the German population currently believes that Eastern Europe and Russia have replaced Franc as "preeminent among Germany's vital interests." This view is distressing to the French government and others, despite Bonn's protestations that it is seeking inclusion of Central Europe in multilateral framework to stabilize the situation in that region. The concern is that Bonn will base its future priorities in an eastern sub-regional "security community" dominated by Germany. These perceptions may impel France, Italy and Spain to lend serious consideration to their own geographic-historic vocation, a "security community" with northern Africa.

#### Future Strategies

The European Union, in theory, could provide a measure of relief to rising difficulties in North Africa. Over the next five years, the EU has offered 5.5 billion

ECUs to Arab countries (and Turkey) with Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco the principal beneficiaries. However, North African membership in EU is precluded and on trade matters a near exclusionist posture has been adopted weakening the market for northern African non-petroleum exports. Technocrats shaping policy in Brussels are greatly influenced by special European interest groups, as is the European Parliament seated at Strasbourg. The Arab Maghreb Union, in theory, should have formed a united front in dealing with Brussels, but the Union's diverse membership, the weakened position of the Algerian government, and the near isolation of Libya have all conspired to weaken its bargaining position and to lead some of its members to initiate separate demarches to Brussels--thus, further eroding the negotiating position of the Union and leading some European governments to surmise the UMA is a relatively dormant entity.

Europe, especially its southern constituency, is aware of the need to develop a new dialogue with Maghrebian countries. Egypt, together with the latter, is cognizant of a similar imperative. For the Europeans part, a return to President de Gaulle's politique Francais de la Arabe would represent little more than an escape from reality. Whatever, strategy is fashioned must be anchored to a tripartite relationship--one part Maghrebian, one part European, and one part "Atlanticist". For northern Africa's statesmen, the regional requisite is to form a constellation of like-minded states, seeking common goals and gains, prepared to address pressing issues with Europe and the United States. Some

painful public policy agendas may be required, ranging from ways to limit population growth to sharing political responsibility, and, closely associated, acceptance of privatization as an essential strategy for economic development.

American involvement may prove somewhat less prepossessing, initially. The distractions of the U.S. government may not prove an unwelcome reality, however. Many Arab leaders have viewed with dismay the collapse of the Soviet Union, less because of ideological considerations than because of Moscow's equanimity role vis a vis Washington. The presence of the former Soviet Union as a role player in the Middle East, including North Africa, helped Arab governments to project an image of nonalignment--as well, in some instances, as serving as a potential source for military equipment. The emergence of the United States as the sole "surviving" superpower has awakened fears of American hubris, in some quarters, the dawning of a new Victorian age of imperialistic domination. Certainly past, U.S. actions in the eastern quarter of the Arab world served to reinforce such unworthy premonitions. The reality of a United States concentrating on its own domestic issues and problems--characterized by some American pundits as a turn towards "neo-isolationism"--should lay aside such concerns. The United States today does not always and everywhere seek an intrusive, hegemonic role for itself.

The official American perspective will require broadening geo-strategically--the existing emphasis on a constellation stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals is too one-dimensional. West Europeans should be encouraged to recognize a

traditional southern Euro-Maghrebian vocation, one not anchored on a colonial past. At the same time, as Ellen Laipson has noted, with respect to northern Africa in the respected Middle East Journal, the U.S. must recognize that "Europe has, and is likely to continue to have, a more sustained and durable political, economic, and cultural presence in the region than . . . the United States . . ."<sup>11</sup> Recognizing its limitations, the U.S. should avoid overcompensation in the form of moralizing lectures and intrusive dedication to values which, however laudatory to Americans, do not address meaningfully North African public policy issues. For example, posturizing on the verities of democracy and human rights--both of the highest value in the U.S. and Western Europe--is received by recipients, in many Third World regions, as Western neo-imperialism. As Dr. Chester Crocker of Georgetown University, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, recently warned:

"We are more aggressively than ever exporting our deeply held convictions about all sorts of wonderful values: democracy, human rights, market economics, women's empowerment, environmental protection--all very worthy causes--but, in doing that, we are further weakening governments against whom the balance of power is shifting. The response

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<sup>11</sup> Ellen Laipson, "Europe's Role in The Middle East: Enduring Ties, Emerging Opportunities", The Middle East Journal, Vol. 44, No. 1., Winter 1990, p.7.

of governments in some cases is to collapse. In other cases, it is simply to resist and to hunkerdown.<sup>12</sup>

In the present era of post-Cold War adjustment, a more realistically grounded strategy of reinforced constructive relationship is required. The relationship should take into full account the necessity of shared perceptions, i.e., the importance of full understanding of each party's preoccupations and concerns.


Possibilities do exist upon which to build a special "security community". The "five plus five" formula may offer an opening point for renewed dialogue but its foundations will require reinforcement if it is to serve a useful purpose. The first requirement is to acknowledge that the notion of a future "security community" rests not exclusively on military foundations, but rather on a judicious mix of economic, cultural and military elements. Second, any future constellation must be predicated on the principle of equal partnership and equal responsibility. And finally, the touchstone should be interdependence, respect for each nation's cultural heritage, and a commitment to shared responsibility in the realm of military security.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's summit 1994 approach to eastern Europe calling for a "Partnership for Peace" may serve as a useful point of departure for those seeking to form a Mediterranean based "security community". The generalized guidelines for "Partnership for Peace" are instructive. They

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<sup>12</sup> The Honorable Chester Crocker in "Anarchy in the Third World", Special Conference Report in National Security Law Report. The American Bar association, Washington, D.C., February 1994, p.3.

include shared security responsibilities and common military doctrine--but, of even greater weight perhaps, dedication to democratic principles, civilian control over military institutions, and support for crisis management and peacekeeping. These are not onerous standards for a Mediterranean based "security community" in process of formation.



## LES CAUSES D'INSTABILITES : UNE PERSPECTIVE NORD-AFRICAINE

- Professeur Khalifa Chater

L'étude du problème de l'instabilité politique en Afrique du Nord intéresse l'historien et le politologue. Les successions dynastiques et les différentes constructions politiques qu'elles ont impliquées, l'alternance des périodes d'ordre et de turbulence, qui s'inscrivent dans les relations Etat-sociétés conjoncturelles ou structurelles mais toujours si complexes, la problématique *bled el-makhzen* (région soumise) - *bled Es-Siba* (région rebelle), donnée de base de toute approche méthodologique, appréhendent l'historien, suscitent son intérêt et sa réflexion. Une lecture des constructions-déconstructions des Etats-dynasties nord-africaines, fondée sur les phénomènes *underground* du jeu tribal et de l'évolution des dynamiques internes a permis à Ibn Khaldoun, notre historien-sociologue du XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle de conceptualiser et de théoriser ces processus politiques de l'alternance dynastique et de la problématique de l'instabilité politique.

Mais l'analyste avisé constate que dans l'histoire immédiate nord-africaine, la stabilité fut souvent la règle et non l'exception. La monarchie chérifienne au Maroc, le Destour-RCD en Tunisie et le FLN-ALN en Algérie ont gouverné les pays, dans la stabilité générale. En dehors de périodes de crises ponctuelles (émeutes de 1981 et de 1984 au Maroc, crises de 1978 et de 1984 en Tunisie, séisme de 1988 en Algérie), qui se manifestèrent comme des situations d'exceptions, le Maghreb se distinguait jusqu'à une date récente, par sa stabilité. Alors que les émeutes étaient chroniques, structurelles, dans certaines aires géopolitiques, elles étaient au Maghreb plutôt exceptionnelles. Dans le cadre des mutations politiques normales, les *Establishments* nord-africains ont certes introduit des rééquilibrages, des restructurations. Le vieillissement de dirigeants et l'usure des régimes ont permis des relèves d'équipes. Le changement dans la continuité et la reconstruction du consensus en Tunisie, en 1987 fut une mesure de restauration de la stabilité.

Mais la montée des périls en Algérie, la déstabilisation des structures gouvernementales, l'assassinat du Chef de l'Etat, Boudhiaf, l'institution de la terreur, comme arme de prise de pouvoir par les intégristes, l'instauration d'un climat général d'insécurité attestent que la question d'instabilité politique doit être posée, puisqu'elle ne relève point du domaine des spéculations non fondées. D'un point de vue maghrébin, la question des velléités intégristes et les risques d'instabilité qu'elle peut induire (menace immédiate, dangers de proximité et de voisinage, effets de contagion et d'entraînement) doit être balisée, étudiée, évaluée à sa juste mesure. Le Maghrébin ne peut se permettre de sous-estimer les aléas d'une telle dérive ou de perdre de vue ses enjeux.

L'examen des situations d'instabilité (crises ponctuelles ou chroniques) permet une re-évaluation salutaire. L'éclairage historique nous donnera la possibilité de situer ces faits, dans la dynamique géopolitique globale maghrébine.

Privilégiant l'analyse des dynamiques propres des communautés, nous excluons de notre étude les crises de l'ère coloniale. Nous estimons, en effet, que les mouvements de contestation qu'elle alimenta sont spécifiques, qu'elles relèvent essentiellement des phénomènes de résistance et de lutte nationale, bien entendu, dans un *background* de crise sociale.

## I- Construction-déconstruction des Etats et cycles d'instabilité<sup>1</sup>

Observateur perspicace, conscience critique de son temps, l'historien-sociologue et pourquoi ne pas le dire le père fondateur de la science politique au Maghreb, Ibn Khaldoun (Tunis 1332 - Le Caire 1406) a élaboré, à partir de son vécue, sous des régimes politiques de déclin et son examen de l'histoire mouvementée du Maghreb et des cycles de construction-déconstruction des Etats-dynasties, la théorie de *la açabiya - Etat*. Saisissant l'importance de la dynamique socio-politique, soucieux de dégager les facteurs de rupture et les mutations qui en découlent, accordant la priorité à l'évolution globale, aux déterminants de profondeur, plutôt qu'aux événements de surface, Ibn Khaldoun examina la genèse et les transformations des structures socio-politiques, en dégageant le modèle des itinéraires de construction-déconstruction des Etats et les cycles d'instabilité qu'ils supposent.

La dynamique socio-historique de l'alternance des dynasties a, selon Ibn Khaldoun, comme fondement la *açabiya*<sup>2</sup>, cet esprit de corps et cette solidarité de clan qui se développent, pour constituer une force morale et politique de solidarité et d'intégration. La açabiya est originellement la cohésion familiale et parentale, qui lie les membres d'un même clan de tribu<sup>3</sup>. Par un dépassement volontaire et très élaboré, le sentiment particulariste du groupe fondateur, du noyau solide de la tribu, allié au chef de la dynastie en formation, couvre l'ensemble des communautés de l'aire politique du nouvel Etat-Dynastie. La açabiya est désormais la capacité de réagir collectivement "pour se défendre, se protéger, revendiquer, et (prendre) toute position de consensus"<sup>4</sup>. Cette promotion-élargissement de la collectivité est la condition *Sine-Qua-None* de la création et de la consolidation du nouvel édifice.

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1-. Voir notre étude "Eléments pour une approche de certains phénomènes de Açabiya, dans la Tunisie du XIXe siècle (Sahel et Basses Steppes), in *Les Cahiers de Tunisie* , t.XXV / 1977, pp.61-73.

2-. Voir Mohamed Abed El-Jabri, *El-Açabiya wd-Dawla* , Casablanca, Dar eth-Thaqqaqa, 1971, 486 pages. Voir aussi Jean-Paul Charnay, "Modèle théorique de l'histoire socio-culturelle musulmane des dialectiques maghrébines d'Ibn Khaldoun" in *Actes de premier congrès d'études des cultures méditerranéennes d'influence arabo-berbère* . Alger 1973, pp. 234-250. Charnay note judicieusement le rôle d'Ibn Khaldoun en tant que témoin, enquêteur qui a ressemblé une collection exhaustive de certaines notations anthropologiques, économiques et politiques précieuses (*Ibid.*p.237 ).

3-. Selon la définition Khaldounienne de la " açabiya itiham" (cohésion) qui assure la cohésion entre les membres d'une même communauté (tribu, village, ville, quartier ethnique etc...). Ibn Khaldoun, *La Moukaddima*, Edition Maktabat al-medressa et dar al-kitab allobnani, Beyrouth 179, livre 1, chapitre 8, p.225.

4-. *Ibid.*, livre 1, chapitre 17, p. 244.

La construction de la nouvelle dynastie, se réalise par cette mutation de l'Etat-açabiya<sup>5</sup>. La notion de açabiya khaldounienne est d'ailleurs une notion complexe et dynamique qui " n'exclut pas la hiérarchie mais la suppose plutôt"<sup>6</sup> puisqu'elle paraît être " sous la forme la plus achevée et la plus opérante, le résultat de l'assimilation de plusieurs açabiyas secondaires"<sup>7</sup>. Tout en faisant valoir que la *açabiya - nassab* la solidarité lignage, qui lierait les descendants d'un ancêtre commun est mythique, illusoire mais utile pour consolider les relations et affirmer la cohésion<sup>8</sup>, Ibn Khaldoun cite judicieusement les *açabiya - hilf* (alliance entre un ensemble de communautés) et la *açabiya- wala* (sujetion, obéissance politique) qui régit les rapports avec le pouvoir<sup>9</sup>, ainsi que les autres formes de *açabiya* secondaires : *naçab* (allégeance), *jiwar* (voisinage), etc... qui peuvent être ramenées aux trois définitions principales.

De la *açabiya*, facteur de fractionnement, Ibn Khaldoun dégage les principales articulations de l'édifice politique maghrébin et éclaire, sous un nouveau jour, ce réseau d'unités socio-politiques fractionnées qui parviennent, par le jeu de leurs multiples types d'alliances, à créer une construction étatique originale. "La açabiya a comme fin le moulk-pouvoir "<sup>10</sup>, le processus de formation des Etats-dynasties, se réalisant grâce à l'intégration des *açabiya*, dans la *açabiya* dominante<sup>11</sup>. Mais ce sentiment de cohésion et de solidarité de la communauté étatique implique nécessairement le consensus, puisque " l'humiliation et la sujétion sont des facteurs de rupture de la *açabiya*".<sup>12</sup> En d'autres termes, la conquête du pouvoir se réalise grâce au soutien énergique d'une communauté fondatrice, engagée dans une solidarité à toutes épreuves - nous dirions même une alliance organique, avec le pouvoir naissant. Cette nouvelle autorité qui s'érite élargit sa base et étend l'aire du consensus. L'usure du pouvoir s'expliquerait par l'affaiblissement de la *açabiya*, c'est-à-dire la démobilisation, le désengagement-défection de la communauté des partisans, parvenue à un stade de satisfaction matérielle, qu'on pourrait définir, par un anachronisme non permis par l'historien, le stade de la consommation fut-elle élémentaire. Parallèlement un nouveau groupe politique , porté par une *açabiya* jeune et vigoureuse, se lance à la conquête du pouvoir. Plus que le cycle des Etats: genèse, age adulte, vieillesse, qui relèvent de considérations d'un autre temps, nous privilégions les conditions de l'affirmation et de l'élargissement de la *açabiya*, au profit des acteurs politico-sociaux, l'impératif du consensus par la *açabiya*. Une sorte de contrat s'établit entre le pouvoir et les habitants, présentés comme des soutiens, des alliés, des partenaires politiques et non de simples sujets, puisqu'ils sont solidairement liés au pouvoir par cette açabiya-solidarité-alliance sinon complicité.

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5-. Voir Ali Oumlil, *L'histoire et son discours, essai sur la méthodologie d'Ibn Khaldoun*, Casablanca, Les Editions Techniques Nord-africaines, 1979,249 pages. Voir particulièrement p. 145.

6-. Mohamed Talbi, *Ibn Khaldoun*, Tunis, MTE,1973, p.46.

7-. *Ibid.*

8-. Ibn Khaldoun, *La Moukaddima, op. cit.*, livre 1, chapitre 8, p.226.

9-. *Ibid.*

10-. Ibn Khaldoun, *La Moukaddima, op. cit.*, livre 1, chapitre 17, p.244-246.  
p.244-246.

11-. *Ibid.* .

12-. Ibn Khaldoun, *La Moukaddima, op. cit.*, livre 1, chapitre 19, p.247-250.

On a de plus en plus tendance à appréhender la société précoloniale maghrébine, en appliquant la théorie de la "segmentarité" qui met en valeur des réseaux de communautés autonomes, d'unités politiques fractionnées, qui semble définir le système politique précolonial maghrébin<sup>13</sup>. A cette grille d'interprétation réductrice, qui adapte la théorie des sociétés sans Etats (*stateless society*<sup>14</sup>) et qui explique tout *modus vivendi*, entre les collectivités, par l'équilibre de pouvoirs, entre solidarités nécessairement parentales, nous préférons le système d'explication khaldounien de la *acabiya* qui permet de mieux cerner ces rapports complexes et spécifiques qui rapprochaient ou opposaient les différents groupes humains vivants au Maghreb et explique les itinéraires des Etats-dynastie, en faisant valoir les conditions de la sauvegarde du consensus dynamique ou *acabiya*.

Ibn Khaldoun nous permet de dresser une grille d'articulations, qui définit ces rapports de groupes, révèle les coexistences plus ou moins conflictuelles des différentes communautés et dégage ce mouvement de pendule, ou cet équilibre peu stable que détermine le jeu des facteurs d'intégration et des forces centrifuges. Il identifie ainsi, dans ces successions de construction-déconstruction des Etats, les cycles et les conditions d'instabilité.

## II- Bled el-makhzen et bled *es-siba*, ou l'instabilité institutionnalisée ?

La géographie politique des Etats-dynasties du Maghreb moderne puis précolonial était constituée d'auréoles successives, où la domination du gouvernement est de plus en plus lâche. De la cité-Etat ou la tribu - Etat originelles soumises à une gestion directe du pouvoir, à la domination plus ou moins formelle des périphéries, la carte historico-politique présentait de nombreuses situations intermédiaires, des transitions entre la soumission et l'autonomie de fait. Un système pragmatique, partageant les espaces gouvernementaux, en aire de gestion permanente et directe, dans la capitale et les plaines avoisinantes et en aire de contrôle saisonnier, de pouvoir de recours, par l'intermédiaire de la *méhalla* ou *harka*, s'était érigé en mode de gouvernement. La *méhalla* était avant tout la tournée du souverain ou son représentant dans son royaume, pour contrôler l'arrière-pays qui lui échappait, consolider les liens d'allégeance, lever les impôts et au besoin, soumettre les tribus réfractaires. Mode de gouvernement original, elle était au XXVIII<sup>e</sup> et au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle, le principal instrument de surveillance de l'ensemble des sujets dispersés dans les régences nord-africaines, bien qu'elles accordaient, de plus en plus, la priorité à la lever des impôts, à la fois symbole et signe de la fidélité au pouvoir établi<sup>15</sup>.

13-. Voir, en particulier Jean-Claude VATIN qui a essayé d'appliquer à l'Algérie la théorie de la segmentarité de Gellner, Vatin donne dans son étude les références bibliographiques essentielles de la théorie de la "segmentarité". J.C. Vatin. *L'Algérie politique, histoire et société*. Paris, 1974, pp.57-60.

14-. Voir par exemple, "Stateless societies, in the history of West Africa", in *History of West Africa*, edited by J.F. Ade Ajayi et Michael Crowder, T.1, Harlow Essex, Longman, 2em édition 1976, pp.72-113.

15-. Voir notre étude, *Insurrection et répression dans la Tunisie du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle: la mehalla de Zarrouk au Sahel (1864)*, Tunis, Publications de l'Université, 230 pages. Voir aussi Robert

"Ordre dans le désordre", cette définition d'Edmond Burke de l'Etat traditionnel est, dans une certaine mesure, pertinente<sup>16</sup>. Nous remarquerons cependant que les autorités traditionnelles réussissaient, par l'exercice d'un jeu très subtil de l'équilibrage politique des communautés, à construire des réseaux d'allégeance et à limiter les tendances centrifuges qui se développaient régulièrement : les tribus du drapeau et les tribus makhzens, en Tunisie et en Algérie, les tribus *gich* (militaires), au Maroc, étaient les alliées du pouvoir. Plus ou moins soustraites à l'impôt et jouissant de priviléges certains, elles devaient, fournir au besoin, des contingents et intervenir contre les tribus en dissidence<sup>17</sup>.

Cas extrême, popularisé par l'historiographie marocaine, la division du pays en *bled el-makhzen*<sup>18</sup>, zone soumise et *bled es-siba*, qui échappait à l'autorité, s'appliquait, à des nuances près à l'Algérie et à la Tunisie. "Règne du *ourf*, la coutume", "cette menace coexistante avec le makhzen depuis qu'il a été organisé"<sup>19</sup> - Laroui rejoint ici les cycles d'instabilité d'Ibn Khaldoun - la *siba* traduit ces rapports d'équilibres-déséquilibres entre les velléités d'expansion de l'autorité et les moyens dont elle disposait réellement pour assurer sa prise en charge, des communautés qui relevaient de ses prérogatives.

"Trop faible de par ses seules forces, l'Etat vit des divergences qui existent et survit grâce à celles qu'il crée"<sup>20</sup>." Ce diagnostic de Jean-Claude Vatin, relatif à l'Algérie, s'applique certes à l'ensemble du Maghreb. Mais n'ignorons guère la dynamique socio-historique évidente depuis la fin du XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle. Le développement du pouvoir central, fut-il encore embryonnaire, les créations d'armées nouvelles en Tunisie (1831) et au Maroc (1910), la consolidation des autorités régionales annonçaient les prémisses d'une plus grande stabilité, sans toutes fois ramener la *siba*, à ses justes proportions, sinon lui mettre fin. Une certaine évolution se dessinait. Encore timide en Algérie<sup>21</sup> et rapidement brisée par la colonisation qui bloqua ce processus interne dès 1830, elle restait, en dépit de progrès certain, très aléatoire au Maroc<sup>22</sup>. Mais les progrès de la dynastie husseinite, évidents en

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Montagne, *Les berbères et le makhzen, dans le Sud du Maroc*, Casablanca, Editions Afrique Orient, 403-404)

16- Edmond Burke, *Precolonial protest and resistance, 1860-1912*, Chicago et Londres, Univresity Of Chicago Press,1976, 306 pages. Voir p.11-12.

17- Voir Jean Ganiage, *Les origines du protectorat français en Tunisie (1861-1881)*, 2em édition , Tunis, 1968, MTE, p. 144. Voir aussi Robert Montagne, *op. cit.*, p.400)

18- "Le "Makhzen, magasin indique, par son étymologie même, l'idée d'une institution faite avant tout pour conserver une réserve permanente d'argent, d'armes et de munitions, de vivres et de provisions de toutes sortes, rassemblées dans de vastes chambres, à l'abri du pouvoir" (Robert Montagne, *op. cit.* , p.396)

19- Abdallah Laroui, *Les origines sociales et culturelles du nationalisme marocain (1830-1912)*, Paris, François Maspero, 1977, 481 pages. Voir, pour l'étude de la *siba*, pp.178-182.

20- Jean-Claude Vatin, *L'Algérie politique, histoire et société*, Paris. A. Colin,p.103.

21- Voir Hussein Khodja, *al-Miraat* (le miroir), traduction en arabe de Mohamed Ben Abdelkrim, Edition Maktabat al-Hyat, Beyrouth, 1972. Voir W. Shaler, *Esquisse de l'Etat algérien* , Boston, 1826.

22- Voir Edmond Burke, *Precolonial protest and resistance, op. Cit.* , Abdallah Laroui, *Les origines sociales ...., op. cit..* Voir aussi Montaigne qui fait valoir la décadence progressive

Tunisie depuis Hammouda Pacha (1782-1814), se consolidaient au XIXe siècle<sup>23</sup>. Signe des temps nouveaux, les *siba* traditionnelles se mutaient en "révoltes actives"<sup>24</sup> qui exprimaient davantage des attitudes de contestation politique, révélant cette tendance nouvelle, de relayer les oppositions traditionnelles, les "attitudes de coutume", par des réactions politiques nouvelles. Les émeutes-rebellions de l'ère moderne, intégreront cependant des constantes traditionnelles et des expressions politiques nouvelles.

### III- De l'instabilité "institutionnalisée" à l'expression du mécontentement:

"Le contestataire contre l'officiel, le périphérique contre le central", cette définition des soubresauts traditionnels du Maghreb, au cours de l'ère moderne, de Jacques Berque<sup>25</sup> est trop générale, trop réductrice pour constituer une grille d'interprétation pertinente. La lutte pour le pouvoir, entre prétendants, les conflits entre l'autorité centrale et sa *siba* effective ou éventuelle et probable sont à l'origine de crises chroniques qu'une conjoncture de mécontentement, des particularismes régionaux ou ethniques permettent d'exacerber.

Des règles de gouvernement, des codes et des normes permettent aux autorités du Maghreb de contrôler, de s'assurer la soumission ou du moins la docilité et de maîtriser les populations qu'elles administraient. Il fallait connaître les chefs des tribus et entretenir avec eux des rapports cordiaux, être à l'écoute des doléances des communautés et éviter les excès fiscaux, les mesures vexatoires. Ce mode de gouvernement traditionnel idéal a été scrupuleusement suivi par le célèbre bey tunisien, Hammouda Pacha (1782-1814), qui avait tissé un réseau de connaissances dans les tribus et tenu à entretenir les meilleurs rapports avec les notables des différentes communautés. Fut-il innocent, tout caïd qui suscitait des plaintes était destitué, "car il n'avait pas su conduire, avec habileté et souplesse, les cœurs vers l'obéissance". Hammouda Pacha appliquait cette maxime du Calife rachidien Omar<sup>26</sup>. Même règle de conduite en vigueur au Maroc: "Attache-toi, dit un souverain, le coeur des Arabes, sache de quoi ils sont capables et alors tu sauras sûrement ce que tu peux attendre de chaque tribu"<sup>27</sup>. Mais lorsqu'elles trahissent, il faut pénétrer avec des troupes sur leurs territoires et prendre des mesures de dissuasion et châtier pour l'exemple. Ultime grief, à l'encontre des chefs, signe incontestable d'incapacité de gouverner, selon les normes traditionnelles, "ne pas avoir des contacts et des relations étroites avec les cheikhs des tribus", à l'instar du Bey d'Oran Mustapha el-Manzali, qui a suscité le soulèvement de Derkaoui, au début du XIXe siècle<sup>28</sup>.

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des unités sociales anciennes, dans l'ensemble du Haut-Atlas (*op. cit.*, p.408) et la disparition des institutions berbères (*op. cit.*, p.418 et suivantes).

23- Voir notre étude, *Dépendance et mutation précoloniale, la Régence de Tunis de 1815 à 1857*, Tunis, Publications de l'Université, 1984, 660 pages.

24- Selon l'expression de Abdallah Laroui, *Les origines sociales ...*, *op. cit.* p. 180.

25- Jacques Berque, *Ulemas, Fondateurs, insurgés du Maghreb*, Paris, Sindébad, 1982, 297 pages. Voir p.233.

26- Ibn Abi Dhiaf (vulgo Ben Dhiaf), *Ithaf ahl ez-zaman fi akhbar tounis wa ahd el-aman*, Tunis, 8 vol., 1963-1965. Voir t.3, p. 83.

27- *Nezoh et Hadi*, traduction Houdas, p. 424-425, cité par Montagne *op. cit.* p.405.

28- Hemdane Khodja, *op.cit.*, p. 139.

La rébellion des Ouled Msahil, de la tribu des Majeurs, au Nord Ouest de la Tunisie, en 1795, sous la direction de Hamed Ben Chérifa, exprima des velléités de se soustraire à l'autorité beylicale, selon les normes de la *siba* traditionnelle<sup>29</sup>. L'insurrection de l'Aurès, en 1804, prit la dimension d'une sécession berbère et d'une remise en cause de la légitimité du pouvoir établi<sup>30</sup>. En arrière-fond de la contestation, l'expédition de Bonaparte en Egypte (1798-1801) qui a mobilisé le chef de l'insurrection, Mohamed Ben Harche, qui a pris connaissance des événements égyptiens, lors de son pèlerinage<sup>31</sup>. La révolte de la province d'Oran, qui la suivit, s'inscrivait dans une problématique similaire : rébellion tribale, contestation du pouvoir de l'oligarchie turque et direction "chérifiene" du mouvement. Il s'agissait, dans ces différents cas, de luttes de communautés, d'ethnies ou même de régions entières, à la faveur de l'affaiblissement du pouvoir, de son incapacité à gérer les rapports de *aṣabiya* précités, à veiller à maintenir et à reconstruire constamment des compromis de gouvernement, avec les communautés, sinon les sujets.

Lorsque la menace européenne se précise, la contestation prit la dimension d'une résistance primaire, puisqu'elle reprochait au pouvoir sa défection, face aux puissances.

L'insurrection de 1864, qui a embrasé la quasi-totalité de la Régence de Tunis<sup>32</sup> et la révolte de Bou Hmara<sup>33</sup>, au Maroc (1902-1909), se déclenchèrent dans un contexte d'expansion européenne, d'interférences étrangères, de réformes modernistes, à l'occidentale, qui remettaient en causes les priviléges des notabilités traditionnelles et de remise en cause des gouvernements, "défaillants" de la Tunisie et du Maroc.

Tout en étant spontanés et très insuffisamment organisés, ces deux mouvements de rébellion ne se réduisaient guère aux deux sentiments fondamentaux qui définissent les révoltes à savoir "le sentiment de l'intolérable et l'accusation"<sup>34</sup>. Nous devons, en effet, reconnaître que les insurgés de Tunisie et du Maroc se proposaient d'effectuer, d'une certaine façon, une restructuration socio-politique des Etats-dynasties traditionnels. Ils esquissaient, ne fut-ce à gros traits, le profil d'un système socio-politique original qui réalisait une synthèse entre les valeurs tribales et les normes traditionnelles du pouvoir, tout en refusant les contraintes et les velléités d'interventions de l'Etat qui tentait vainement de consolider son autorité... Triste retournement de situations, ces mouvements d'insurrection et de résistance plus ou moins déclarée ou même consciente, précipitaient la mise en

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29- Ibn Abi Dhiaf, *Ithaf*., *Op.cit.* t.3, pp. 31-32.

30- D'après un manuscrit arabe, cité par A. Papier, *Histoire d'un soulèvement kabyle; en 1804, suivi de considérations historiques et politiques sur les insurrections de l'Aures, depuis la domination romaine, jusqu'à nos jours*. Bone, Imprimerie Dagan, 1879, 43 pages.

31- Voir H.D. Grammont, *Histoire d'Alger sous la domination turque (1515-1830)*, Paris, Ernest Leroux Editeur, 1887, p. 363-365.

32- Voir Pierre Grandchamp, *Documents relatifs à la révolution de 1864, en Tunisie* , 2 vol., Tunis, 1935. Voir aussi Bice Slama, *l'insurrection de 1864 en Tunisie* , Tunis, 1967. Pour une réactualisation de l'analyse de cette insurrection, voir notre étude, *la méhalla...*, *op. cit.* et Taoufik Bachrouch, *Rabia al-orbaane (Le printemps des bédouins)*, Tunis, 1991.

33- Voir Abdallah Laroui, *les origines ...*, *op. cit.*, pp.. 354-367. Voir aussi Edmund Burke, *Precolonial protest ...*, *op. cit.* , p. 62-67.

34- Voir J. Ellul, *Autopsie de la révolution* , Paris, Camann-Levy, 1969, p. 14.

dépendance et la vulnérabilité des Etats, gouvernés par des *establishments* désormais plus affaiblis.

Fait nouveau, la contestation urbaine rejoint la *siba* rurale dans ces phénomènes de "résistance primaire". Alors que les événements de Kairouan, en 1832, s'expliquaient par la révolte d'une communauté privilégiée, contre le développement du pouvoir central, qui osait remettre en question son traitement de faveur, dans les domaines de la fiscalité et de la conscription<sup>35</sup>, les manifestations de Tunis de septembre 1861, contre les nouvelles lois constitutionnelles (Pacte Fondamental de 1857, Constitution de 1861, lois judiciaires etc.), qui furent essentiellement le fait des artisans, des commerçants et des lettrés, exprimaient un mécontentement bourgeois<sup>36</sup>.

L'insurrection de Fès en 1818, les manifestations de Tunis, en 1861 et l'insurrection des villes du Sahel, en 1864, ont été bel et bien le fait de la *amma*, les hommes du commun, le menu peuple, sous la direction rarement avouée de leurs chefs traditionnels, les *ouléma*. Nous souscrivons à ce scénario, explicité par Laroui, lors de son analyse de la révolte de Fès qui dévoile le rôle de la bourgeoisie makhzénienne et commerçante, qui "trempe dans le complot politique puis se retire du jeu, dès le début des désordres<sup>37</sup>".

### III- Les soubresauts de l'histoire immédiate: Emeutes conjoncturelles ou instabilité chronique ?

Comment peut-on définir les crises nord-africaines qui relèvent de l'histoire immédiate (crises de 1978 et de 1984 en Tunisie, émeutes marocaines de 1981 et de 1984, séisme algérien de 1988 etc.), par rapport aux insurrections de la période moderne et contemporaine, en Algérie, en Tunisie et au Maroc ? si la *siba* traditionnelle doit être appréhendée en tant que crise d'ancien régime, les insurrections de 1864 en Tunisie et de 1903-1910 au Maroc s'inscrivaient dans une nouvelle problématique, puisqu'elles se déclenchèrent dans une conjoncture de mise en dépendance et firent valoir les velléités des rebelles de dénoncer la soumission et l'incurie des autorités officielles. De ce point de vue, il s'agissait d'attitudes nouvelles, de réactions politiques, plus ou moins conscientes et volontaires.

Crises conjoncturelles, moments de rupture d'une stabilité nord-africaine effective, dates-repères dans l'histoire de l'Afrique du Nord indépendante, les crises des décennies 1970 et 1980, ces événements tragiques expriment des malaises confus ou l'irraisonné, le psychologique et sociétal se développent bien souvent à la faveur de mesures impopulaires, de décisions unilatérales ou mal comprises. La lecture de ces soubresauts révèlent également que le mécontentement sinon le rejet peuvent traduire indifféremment des états d'aggravation de misère, pendant une conjoncture de crise socio-économique ou simplement des réactions de frustration d'acteurs sociaux, jugeant leur promotion insuffisante, pendant une conjoncture d'expansion. Dans tous les cas, les crises révèlent des clivages sociaux puisqu'elles mobilisent davantage les strates sociales les moins favorisées, les habitants des banlieues périphériques, les nouveaux venus de l'exode rural.

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35- Voir notre étude, *Dépendance et mutation précoloniale...*, op. cit., pp. 473-475.

36- Voir notre étude, "le constitutionnalisme, en Tunisie, au 19e siècle", in *la Revue tunisienne des Sciences Sociales*, CERES, Tunis, avril 1975, pp.253-264.

37- Voir Abdallah Laroui, *les origines ...*, op. cit., pp., 129-131.

Crises tardives - se déclenchant 22 à 26 ans après l'indépendance - elles se développèrent à la faveur de l'usure des pouvoirs établis, des scissions des équipes dirigeantes et de la dynamique interne des sociétés maghrébines en mutations. Les décennies 1970 et 1980 marquent la fin des ères de grâce, furent elles affectées, par des luttes intérieures : Yousséfisme en Tunisie, incidents au Rif (1958-1959), luttes entre les dirigeants algériens de l'exil, en 1962, ou une certaine émergence sporadique mais sans lendemain, puisqu'elles ont été en fin de compte bien gérées, des oppositions ethniques et culturels (arabophones et berbérophones, en Algérie et au Maroc).

#### a) Le cas tunisien :

Jouissant d'un large consensus, fondant sa légitimité sur la direction du Néo-Destour de la lutte nationale, le nouveau régime tunisien réussit à assurer au pays une longue ère de stabilité ( 1956-1978). La politique sociale et éducative réussissait le pari d'assurer une large intégration nationale. La *ourouchiya* (tribalisme), principal facteur de désunion institutionnelle, appartenait à un passé désormais révolu. D'autre part, le grand flux migratoire, de la campagne à la ville, a permis le développement spectaculaire de banlieues nouvelles, des périphéries-étapes d'insertion, qui pouvaient constituer des zones de malaise ou de tension. Elles requerraient, bien entendu, la mobilisation des structures étatiques de développement social.

La construction de l'Etat, la réalisation des grandes réformes (unification de la justice, Code du Statut Personnel, réformes de l'enseignement etc.), dans le cadre institutionnel du Parti unique - le néo-Destour qui était lors de l'indépendance plutôt un rassemblement des différentes composantes de la nation qu'un parti, au sens strict du terme - l'exercice du pouvoir, selon des choix idéologiques, cela va de soi, suscitaient l'émergence de courants d'opposition minoritaires très divers ( traditionnalistes, progressistes choqués par l'orientation pro-occidentale, libéraux hostiles à la planification).

Le complot de décembre 1962 - projet de prise de pouvoir, sans assise populaire et accident de parcours sans lendemain - dont les auteurs appartenaient aux diverses tendances de ce mécontentement, relève davantage de la mouvance d'arrière-garde.

Hostile à tout dogmatisme, l'Etat tunisien s'adaptait aux aléas de la conjoncture, restait à l'écoute et corrigeait volontiers le tir, afin d'éviter toute fracture. C'est dans ce cadre que s'inscrit la remise en question, en 1969, de la planification autoritaire et le recours au libéralisme économique.

L'apparition de clivages politiques ( libéralisme économique, socialisme étatique, modes de gouvernement, problèmes de succession) et une certaine usure du pouvoir bourguibien, expliquaient l'effritement du consensus national.

#### La crise du 26 janvier 1978 :

Déclenché à la suite d'un conflit entre le pouvoir et le syndicat, l'Union National des Travailleurs Tunisiens (l'UGTT), cette crise traduit, d'une certaine façon, la division de l'*Establishment* et la lutte entre deux sensibilités du mouvement national, puisque le leader du syndicat Habib Achour était un militant du néo-Destour et que l'UGTT était l'une des composantes du Front National. Mais la centrale syndicale avait bien évolué, depuis lors. Structure de

maîtrise de la contestation sociale, de compromis et de négociation, elle était davantage perçue, dans le cadre de cette escalade, comme un adversaire politique.

L'ordre de grève général, lancée par la centrale syndicale, à la suite d'une demande d'augmentation salariale jugée excessive par le gouvernement Nouira, suscita des troubles violents à Tunis et dans les principales villes du pays, un certain "jeudi noir", le 26 janvier 1978<sup>38</sup>. Une certaine distanciation historique dans l'analyse de ces émeutes, montre que ce conflit inhabituel entre le pouvoir et la centrale syndicale, a été le révélateur d'un mécontentement diffus. Manifestations de frustration, mais nullement réactions de misère<sup>39</sup>, ces événements eurent lieu lors d'une conjoncture d'expansion, de progrès social. Elles mobilisèrent essentiellement les habitants des nouvelles banlieues, les strates sociales en quête d'un rapide mieux être. Une analyse lucide, dans un débat nécessairement dépassionné, révélerait un évident dépassement des protagonistes de la crise originelle (le syndicat et le pouvoir), par l'apparition sur la scène de nouveaux acteurs sociaux, "les foules en colère", à la suite d'un mécontentement conjoncturelle, dramatisé par les circonstances.

L'ordre fut rapidement restauré. Mais le conflit avec le syndicat avait certainement affaibli les assises du pouvoir. Alors que les séquelles de la crise n'avaient pas encore cicatrisé, l'opération de Gafsa, menée par un commando de jeunes Tunisiens, entraînés en Libye, dans le cadre des tensions de voisinage, était une tentative de déstabilisation du pouvoir de l'extérieur. Opération de complot, sans appui populaire, elle fut rapidement mise en échec (26 janvier 1980).

### La "révolte du pain"<sup>40</sup> (1984)

L'augmentation du prix du pain, de la farine, des semoules et des pâtes, près de 70 %, en décembre 1983, fut un véritable détonateur. Du 29 décembre 1983 (premiers incidents, dans les oasis du Sud) au 3 janvier 1984 (soulèvement de Tunis), des émeutes éclatèrent dans les différentes régions du pays. L'argument invoqué, l'augmentation du prix du pain, une donnée socio-

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38- Analyse effectuée d'après nos propres observations. Voir, parmi les analyses effectuées dans le cours terme, Issa Ben Dhiab, " Tunisie: chronique politique", in *Annuaire Economique de l'Afrique du Nord, AAN*, 1978, pp. 411-432.

39- Le taux de croissance du PIB a été de 4,1% en 1977 et de 8,9% en 1978. (Voir Issa Ben Dhiab, *AAN*, 1978, *op. cit.* p. 418). Mais un décalage entre le rythme de la consommation (taux moyen de l'accroissement de 8 % par an, en 1977-1978) et le rythme de croissance de la production (taux moyen de la croissance du PIB de 5,7% par an, en 1977-1978)(*Ibid.*) montre que la population tunisienne revendique une participation plus grande à la consommation, à la satisfaction des besoins, autre que ceux de première nécessité. L'expansion met à l'ordre du jour un embourgeoisement naturel et une consommation démonstrative ou de promotion.

40- Analyse effectuée d'après nos propres observations. Voir, parmi les analyses effectuées dans le cours terme: Sophie Bessis, "Tunisie, l'explosion" , in *Jeune Afrique*, n° 1204 du 11 janvier 1984 pp. 30-32, Jean-Louis Buchet, " Tunisie, ce n'est pas fini", in *Jeune Afrique*, n° 1202, du 18 janvier 1984, p. 22. Voir aussi le dossier Jeune Afrique, *ibid.* , pp. 22-35.

Voir aussi Jean-Philippe Bras, " Chronique politique : Tunisie", in *Annuaire Economique de l'Afrique du Nord, AAN*, 1984, pp. 957-992.

Voir aussi l'étude plus tardive, plus distanciée, mais plus idéologisée de Serges Adda "Enjeux : le possible et le probable", in *Tunisie au présent, une modernité au-dessus de tout soupçon ?*, direction Michel Camau, Editions du CNRS, Paris, 1987, pp. 402-414. Voir pour la crise du pain pp. 402-405.

émotionnelle réelle en Tunisie, devint le catalyseur d'un mécontentement profond, d'un mouvement de rejet du gouvernement Mohamed Mzali, nommé à la suite de la maladie de Hédi Nouira, en 1980. Ce mouvement de protestation générale, dénonçant une mesure jugée intolérable, mobilisa, selon les dynamiques des émeutes, le sous-prolétariat urbain, les habitants des périphéries, les populations rurales fragilisées. L'annulation de cette augmentation des prix du blé et de ses dérivés, le 6 janvier 1984, par le Président Bourguiba, agissant en ultime recours, permit de restaurer l'ordre.

### b) Le cas marocain :

La monarchie chérifienne sortait consolidée de l'épreuve de la lutte nationale. *L'Istiklal* s'était investi dans la résistance, tissant un réseau de cellules qui encadraient le pays. Soutenant les revendications de son peuple, assumant les risques de la confrontation avec les autorités du Protectorat, Mohammed V confortait la légitimité dynastique par son aura de héros de l'indépendance.

Le nouveau régime issu de ce contexte de compromis historique - une monarchie constitutionnelle - permettait une certaine participation au pouvoir du mouvement national. Mais la scission de *l'Istiklal* (1959) et la naissance de nouveaux partis (UNFP, ancienne aile gauche de *l'Istiklal*, le Parti Démocratique de l'Indépendance, le Mouvement Populaire de Mahjoub Ahardane, d'obédience berbère réalisaient un équilibrage de fait au profit de la monarchie. A la mort de Mohammed V, en 1961, son fils Hassen II lui succéda.

Stabilité du régime, participation plus ou moins effective des partis, selon un jeu subtil d'alliances, qui n'excluait pas des conflits plus ou moins déclarés, entre le pouvoir et l'opposition et des moments de rupture (relations mouvementées avec l'UNFP), la monarchie chérifienne dut faire face aux complots de palais: Skhirat, le 10 juillet 1971 et l'attaque du Boeing du roi, le 16 août 1972.

Les émeutes de 1981 et de 1984, furent davantage l'expression de mouvements populaires spontanés, de contestations sociales

### L'émeute de Casablanca<sup>41</sup> ( 1981)

L'augmentation des prix des denrées principales (14 à 77 %, selon les produits), le 28 mai 1981 suscita un tollé général. Exprimant ce mécontentement, les syndicats UMT et CDT appelèrent à une grève générale de 24 heures, respectivement les 18 et 20 juin. A Casablanca, la grève dégénéra en une grave émeute. Le caractère "soudain et spectaculaire de ces explosions<sup>42</sup>", atteste que les mouvements d'opposition et les syndicats, qui ont présenté les doléances des populations, ont été dépassés par les vagues de fonds d'une opposition d'envergure, jusqu'ici contenues. Les laissés-pour-compte de la

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41- Voir, par exemple, Jean-Claude Santucci, " Chronique politique : Le Maroc", in *Annuaire Economique de l'Afrique du Nord*, AAN, 1981, pp. 567-582.

42- Voir Larbi Talha " Révoltes urbaines, dépendance alimentaire et endettement extérieur", in *Annuaire Economique de l'Afrique du Nord*, AAN, 1984, pp. 528-531. Voir p. 529.

croissance, "la foule des déshérités, des sans-métiers et des jeunes<sup>43</sup>", l'*underground* s'insurgeait contre les nantis et tout ce qui incarnait l'Etat officiel, dans un pays où les clivages sociaux sont évidents. Ce fut la *siba* des périphéries urbaines.

### Les "émeute de la vie chère"<sup>44</sup>"1984 :

Des grèves et des manifestations de lycéens ont entretenus une agitation sporadique, à Marrakech, Agadir, Safi, Rabat et Meknes, Kénitra, ( fin décembre 1983 - début janvier 1984). A Marrakech, la fronde scolaire fut relayée, dès le 5 janvier, par l'agitation sociale, qui mobilisa les quartiers populaires. La grave crise économique marocaine et son dur impact sur les populations défavorisées, expliquaient la disponibilité de ces catégories sociales. Même scénario, dans les autres villes où les lycéens étaient rejoints dans la rue par les désœuvrés, les mécontents, tous azimuts. Plus tardives et plus violentes, l'agitation riffaine, qui se déclencha à Nador, ne prit fin que le 22 janvier 1984. les Riffis, critiquaient les mesures douanières, menaçant les échanges clandestins, si lucratifs, qu'ils entretenaient avec les présides espagnols<sup>45</sup>.

### c) Le cas algérien :

Le nouvel Etat algérien, " La République démocratique et socialiste", fit valoir sa légitimité révolutionnaire. Présidé par Ahmed Ben Bella, appuyé par l'armée des frontières, commandée par Houari Boumediene, le régime algérien réalisait une synthèse originale de ses trois principales composantes : L'Etat, le parti unique FLN et l'Armée Nationale (AN), dominée par les forces militaires de la résistance.

La prise du pouvoir par Houari Boumediene, le 19 juin 1965, renforça les options tiers-mondistes et révolutionnaires, érigés en principes fondateurs. Faisant valoir "la voie socialiste", se présentant comme l'héritier du combat du tiers-monde, pour un nouvel ordre économique international, le régime algérien opta pour un système collectiviste et accorda la priorité à l'industrialisation. Ces choix socio-économiques, dans la mouvance des idéologies radicales et progressistes coexistaient néanmoins avec un néo-traditionalisme dans le domaine du choix de société, de la condition de la femme, de la promotion de la modernité. L'exploitation des richesses pétrolières permit d'occulter la crise du système économique ( paralysie du secteur agricole, difficultés des industries naissantes). Ravitaillements incertains, pénuries des produits manufacturés et même des denrées agricoles, le bien-être relatif des Algériens, financé par la distribution de la rente pétrolière, était menacé.

A la mort de Boumediene, en 1978, Chadli Ben Jdid est confronté à une situation préoccupante. Après une longue ère d'hésitations, d'attentisme, le nouveau Président opta pour une libéralisation économique, rendue

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43 . Jean-Claude Santucci, *AAN*, 1981, op. cit., p. 577.

44. Voir, par exemple, Hamid Berrada, " La faim et les moyens", in *Jeune Afrique*, n° 1204, du 1 février 1984, pp. 25-28 et François Soudan " Comme une traînée de poudre", *ibid.*, pp. 23-25 et Jean-Claude Santucci, " Chronique politique :Maroc" in *AAN*, 1984, op. cit., pp. 899-917.

45 . François Soudan " Comme une traînée de poudre", *op.cit.* , p. 25.

nécessaire par la chute des prix des pétroles depuis 1985 (98 % des recettes en devises du pays). L'affaiblissement du pouvoir d'achat, le développement du chômage, la paralysie de l'Etat-Providence, la mise à nu des contradictions du système (entre les discours égalitaires et les faits) expliquaient l'entrée de l'Algérie dans une zone de fortes turbulences.

### Le séisme<sup>46</sup> de 1988

Mouvement soudain, sinon spontané, le séisme algérien semble induire une évolution particulièrement grave, une dynamique de non-retour. Déclenché dès l'après-midi du 4 octobre par des rassemblements de jeunes et des désœuvrés à Alger, le mouvement se poursuivit jusqu'au 11 octobre, embrasant les différentes villes algériennes: Grèves des commerçants, manifestations de rues, attaques des édifices publiques, scènes de pillages des supermarchés qui étaient simultanément des pôles attractifs et répulsifs des manifestants, puisqu'ils assuraient la vente des produits de luxes, mais aussi les denrées de premières nécessité, distribués parcimonieusement et à des prix inabordables : semoule, beurre, café etc. D'une certaine façon, le séisme d'Algérie, est une réaction d'une "population en manque", qui connaissait, à l'instar des démocraties populaires les "émotions de subsistances". L'ampleur du chômage, mais aussi l'inégalité criante, résultant de l'émergence d'une *nomenclatura* bien aisée exaspéraient les passions et creusaient davantage le fossé entre l'Etat-FLN et la société.

Exploitant cette crise, les intégristes d'Alger organisèrent une manifestation, le 7 octobre, après la prière du vendredi. Cette volonté des intégristes de récupérer les crises sociales - fait également constaté dans les événements de Tunisie et du Maroc de 1984 - montre la gravité des enjeux. L'émergence de l'intégrisme sur la scène nord-africaine remet la question de la stabilité à l'ordre du jour.

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46\_ Pour le récit détaillé des événements, voir "la semaine sanglante", correspondance particulière, *Jeune Afrique*, n° 1450, pp. 10-16.

## Conclusion

L'étude des émeutes - moments d'instabilités évidents - atteste qu'elles ne constituent guère un phénomène cyclique en Afrique du Nord<sup>47</sup>, depuis l'indépendance. Il s'agit d'événements datés, dans des conjonctures données, des réactions à des situations explosives ( séisme algérien de 1988), à des mesures impopulaires (augmentation des prix des denrées au Maroc en 1981 et en Tunisie en 1984 ), lorsque le mécontentement atteint des seuils d'intolérance. L'usure du pouvoir, la contestation des discours de légitimité et par conséquent l'érosion du consensus concourraient à créer des conditions propices. La stabilité en Afrique du Nord est le corollaire d'un régime de consensus ( consensus des Etats de l'indépendance et de l'ère de grâce qui la suivit, crédibilité des discours de légitimités etc.), plutôt que d'une démocratie formelle.

L'émergence de l'intégrisme faisant valoir des paradigmes postmodernistes ( repli par rapport au monde, culture de nostalgie, dénonciation de toute dynamique d'évolution et de progrès, condamnation de toute approche humaniste ou universaliste, remise en cause des principes de liberté individuelle, tentatives de discrépance des institutions modernes, dans le cadre du rejet de toute innovation, par rapport, à l'Etat musulman naissant du VII<sup>e</sup> siècle ) perturbe la situation politique, en Afrique du Nord. S'érigent en alternative, les intégristes du Maghreb adoptent des programmes de désstabilisation générale et tentent d'instaurer le désordre, dans leur stratégie de conquête du pouvoir. La stabilité est désormais sérieusement menacée par ces programmes de "désociologisation", puisque les nébuleuses intégristes renient les mutations sociales, ignorent les citoyens-acteurs de la scène politique et remettent, en fait, en cause toutes les revendications du quotidien, dans les approches politiques contemporaines.

L'usure du pouvoir bourguibien ( maladie et vieillesse du Chef de l'Etat), les scissions au sein de l'équipe gouvernementale, les luttes pour la succession, avec en arrière plan des politiciens qui se positionnaient en forces de recours, affaiblirent le régime. La reconstruction du consensus (novembre 1987), permit d'instaurer une ère de stabilité certaine. La dynamisation de la politique de promotion féminine, la réactualisation des programmes de développement social, la remise à l'ordre du jour de la modernité condamnaient l'intégrisme, discrépante aux yeux de l'opinion, depuis l'attentat de Bab Souika, fin février 1991.

Au Maroc, la menace intégriste est plus ou moins contenue. Mais de sanglantes batailles opposent régulièrement islamistes et militants de gauche, dans les lycées et les universités de Fès et de Casablanca. Expression de la gravité de la situation, l'un des chefs intégristes, Abdeslam Yassine conteste énergiquement la monarchie chérifienne.

Bénéficiant de conjonctures politico-économiques meilleures, la Tunisie et le Maroc ont pu mettre en échec la contestation intégriste. Une analyse de leurs systèmes politiques, leurs performances économiques et sociales, atteste

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<sup>47</sup>- Voir René Galissot, " Les émeutes, phénomène cyclique au Maghreb", in AAN, 1986, pp.29-39.

que leur stabilité ne semble pas être sérieusement mise en question. Nous partageons, dans ce même ordre d'idée, l'évaluation de Jeune Afrique<sup>48</sup> (mars 1994), qui estime que la Tunisie occupe une position meilleure, sur l'échiquier maghrébin, puisqu'elle est "en passe de retrouver ses équilibres fondamentaux". Nous relevons, d'autre part, que l'option moderniste de la Tunisie rassemble tous les alliés objectifs du pouvoir et mobilise les femmes tunisiennes, impliquées dans cette lutte, pour la défense de leurs acquis.

En Algérie, la faillite de l'Etat -FLN, précipitée par son incohérence, ses ambiguïtés idéologiques (progressisme socio-économiques et passéisme civilisationnel), aggravée par l'explosion démographique, mobilisa les forces idéologiques alliées de l'intégrisme. En l'état actuel de la situation, le climat d'instabilité générale, les attentats contre les symboles de la société civile, l'assassinat des intellectuels, des journalistes, des artistes, des femmes émancipées, révèlent l'ampleur de la tragédie. La terreur tient lieu de programme politique de la contestation intégriste.


Si l'Algérie bascule !!!, nous souhaitons ne pas envisager cette éventualité, qui constitue une sérieuse menace pour l'aire méditerranéenne et aura son impact sur le devenir de l'humanité, puisque l'homme devient l'otage de l'homme.

Khalifa Chater

( 2 avril 1994)

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48- François Soudan et Nabila Berrada Gouzi, "Maroc/Tunisie, le match, in *Jeune Afrique*, n° 1731, pp. 28-37..



## The Roots of Instability in North Africa

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Political stability is an unstable concept. The more stable a polity appears, the more that stability is vulnerable to the challenges of change, the tests of time, and the vulnerabilities of apparent solidity. Stability is filled with paradoxes. Centralized system of consolidated power stand tallest and fall hardest, whereas diversified and decentralized system have the lowest profiles and the least far to fall. Political stability is best exemplified by the bicycle or the weighted doll. Like the bicycle, political stability of apparently unstable systems is achieved by maintaining motion and can no longer be maintained when the movement stops. Like the weighted doll, if the center of gravity of the system is well planted at the base, gyrations at the top will continually return to an upright position, no matter how low it rolls with the punch or bends with the wind.

Stability then has more to do with the characteristics of the system than with the challenges, tests, punches and winds, and the sources of instability are to be found both inside and outside the political system. They have to do with the availability of resources, and with the performance of the government as a source of legitimacy. They also have to do with direct attacks on internal security, a

primary responsibility of government and with divergences in political projects within the body politic. In addition, sources of instability, as well as stability, can be found in the interrelations of the states in the region, and their relations with the outside world. These six sources find specific application to the states of North Africa, and more particularly to their condition in the mid-1990s.

#### Domestic sources of Instability

Whatever the claims on government performance, it must be recognized that the basic raw material for stability and instability is found in the resources available for performing. The politics of performing in penury are different from those of abundance (Weiner 1962, Barnet 1980), and a major source of instability has been found to lie in the movement from one to the other (Davis 1960; Gurr 1966). Thus, like stability itself, resources constitute a dynamic category, with the relative position being even more important than the absolute level.

The ranking among North Africa states has been constant since independence, but the crucial watershed date for politics and performance in the region was 1985, when the bottom fell out of oil prices. Morocco, lowest-ranking of the three states, was affected as a non-producer of oil only to the extent that its energy imports became somewhat cheaper. Tunisia, as a small producer, was moderately affected; while the correlation with instability during the following years was high, the government had already begun a program of economic

restructuring, and the decline in an important source of income spurred an effort already begun to seek further ways of stabilizing the economy and augmenting other sources of revenue. For both countries, the change was a positive impetus to growth.

Table 1: Per capita GNP (constant 1981 \$; 1991 \$)

	1960	1970	1982	1991
Algeria	1460	1570	2130	2020
Tunisia	570	720	1290	1510
<u>Morocco</u>	<u>530</u>	<u>630</u>	<u>820</u>	<u>1030</u>

source: OECD 1985 Report, pp 264f; 1992 Report, pp A94f

For Algeria, the change was catastrophic. Resources fell dramatically for an economy that was single-export dependent, just at the moment when expectations for a consumer-oriented policy had been raised by the new regime. The following year saw Algeria's first consumer riots, in the student demonstrations at the University of Constantine, and 1988 marked the collapse of the state in the riots fomented from within its own apparatus. Long used to an assured resource base, with plenty of cushions for mistakes, and arrogant in its assurance that it contained a model for Third World emulation in all fields, the Algerian leadership was embattled, bewildered, unprepared, and inadequate. All the other sources of

instability in Algeria stem from its previous dependency on a single windfall resource and its sudden withdrawal. The polity has never recovered.

Resources of course are not merely a matter of external control by the world economic system; they depend on government stewardship in economic management and on the productiveness of society. In addition to the level of resources, their distribution within society and their allocation as a result of government policies is also a multiple source of stability and instability. In the extreme, distributional questions are the furnace of revolutions, and in a special situation, the pressure-cooker of anticolonial movements (Zartman, Entelis & Paul 1971) Thus, the appearance of conspicuous consumption in Tunisia for the first time in Tunisian history was perceived by many as the source of the 1984 riots, triggered by the rise in bread prices. Distributional questions have also been ingredients in the Moroccan riots of the same year and in the general alienation of the Algerian population from their rulers. However, after the great distributional revolt against colonial rule in the mid-century, North African societies have scarcely been revolutionary. Even in the instability of the mid-1990s, it is the sudden deprivation of resources for a whole society used to riding high, and not the internal distribution of those resources, that has been the main source of internal disorders.

Government performance is the basis of legitimacy in the contemporary world, and legitimacy itself is a particularly elusive requisite of stability. While traditional sources of legitimacy are still operative in North Africa, even for those who claim religious basis for their political appeal ground their own right to rule on the inadequate performance of the incumbents and promise better performance on their own part. Charismatic and revolutionary sources of legitimacy are merely shortlived transitional modes, inherently unstable in their very nature. (Weber 1956) Thus, with a slight exception to be discussed below, the search for the sources of legitimacy returns to performance.

While resources can be measured, tabulated and graphed in either their absolute or their relative dimensions, there is no objective measure of government performance in the eyes of society. It may be associated with efficiency, for which some indicators could be concocted (Table 2). By comparing the proportion of government expenditures devoted to social services (education and health) and to economic programs (business and agriculture) with the proportion devoted to government operating costs (general public services), a government efficiency index can be constructed. Based on figures for the 1980s, Tunisia receives a high grade of 8:1 and Morocco a middle grade of 3:1, and the state-run economies of Algeria and Libya for which figures are (conveniently) not available would presumably receive a very low score. But that would present a very economicistic

perception of a factor that is essentially political, where elements of equity--or, more properly justice or distribution--need to be brought in to temper a measure of productivity.

Figure 2: Government Expenditures--Efficiency Index (% of total budget)

	education	health	business	agriculture	total	operating	ratio
Algeria	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Tunisia	170-142	81-65	355-277	184-77	66	1180-487	8:1
Morocco	<u>194-162</u>	<u>3</u>	312-276	70-55	56	190-155	3:1

Source: IBRD/UNDP African Economic & Financial Data 1989, pp 124-33.

Figures indicate high and low years, superscript indicates year of the 1980s

While such figures are an interesting indicator of an aspect of government operations, they are not indices of the performance basis of legitimacy. In the absence of public opinion polls, however, such indices are hard to find. North African politicians are only slowly discovering that it is a useful thing to know--in the words of Mayor Koch of New York--"How'm I doing?" Tunisian leaders of the Socialist Destourian Party (PSD) turned Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD) in 1988 were hard pressed to decide whether the public saw them as illegitimate holdovers from the old regime or new brooms sweeping clean, and regretted the absence of polls which could tell them the public's mind (Zartman 1989). If North

Africa is really to enter the democratic era for which it proclaims itself ready, it needs to overcome its objections to polling and learn of its own public opinion.

In the absence of polls, random interviews indicate that the basic source of instability in Algeria in the post-1988 era is the public disillusion with the performance of the leadership caste in the country. More visible manifestations of that phenomenon, such as the votes given to the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the 1990 and 1991 elections or the even larger number of abstentions, are merely signs of the basic cause. This recognition is particularly important for finding correctives, since a response to the symptom is useless without a remedy for the cause. A reshuffling of the leadership whose past record of performance has alienated its population is doomed to being an inadequate response. Such recognition was the source of strength of the late president Mohammed Boudiaf, and of the jealousies which finally eliminated him, and has posed the dilemma in the subsequent search for a legitimate regime.

In the absence of more reliable indicators, it is hard to evaluate the performance of the other governments of the region. It is, however, clear that the current criteria of legitimization themselves pose problems of stability which did not weigh on earlier regimes. While traditional sources of legitimacy ultimately rested on popular acceptance of the ruler as a just representative of God over the community (Lahbabi 1958; Zartman 1963; Salem 1962), that acceptance was

reviewable and retractable only in unusual circumstances, if at all.

Accountability--"How'm I doing?"--was not a shortterm event. Current notions of national self-determination and then national democracy put a larger burden on government to justify itself repeatedly before its public. Traditional government resting on divine approval did not have to worry about human rights groups, Amnesty International, investigative journalists, or regular elections, and the need to do so in the contemporary era of democratization undeniably affects government stability. When such measures threaten stability by posing accountability, government reactions are often to cancel the accounting rather than measure up to it. The result is even worse, since the cancelled accounting is publicly assumed to be proof of a deficit account.

The most specific source of instability is the challenge to the state's most basic, security function through terrorism. Terrorism's nature as an illegal and illegitimate activity has been dulled by much arcane debate over its justification by higher causes and by the need to respond to state terrorism. The fact remains that there is no justification for attacks on civilian targets for the purpose of intimidation, no matter who carries them out. Other facts should be beyond controversy as well. One is that civil rights judgments on the use of violence can properly be addressed to governments, but should equally and concomittantly be addressed to anti-government activities. North African governments are

frequently--and rightly--scrutinized for the use of torture or the sponsorship of vigilante squads, but such evaluations often imply that the militant opposition is somehow thereby justified in its use of terror. Neither justifies the other. Another basic fact is that the state is the institution with the legitimate monopoly of violence and with the responsibility of assuring its citizens' security. This means that the state has the right to use violence against its enemies, just as it has the obligation to use it with wisdom, discrimination, and restraint. That right does not justify excesses, but neither can a state be blamed for using violence to defend itself and its citizens.

Terror is a major characteristic of the militant Islamicist opposition in Algeria, not as a reaction to government attempts to control the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) but as the chosen tactic of one of its wings. Violent street demonstrations in June 1991 and the attack on the military garrison at Guemmar in November 1991 preceded the cancellation of the elections in December, and the assassination of government agents of order (military and police) as well as of over 3,000 intellectuals, women, and even imams continues to be the hallmark of the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) composed of the Armed Islamic Movement (MIA) and the Armed Islamic Groups (GIA). To a much lesser extent, the Renaissance (al-Nahda) Movement in Tunisia has been engaged in terror, and probably lost much of its public appeal because of it.

On the anti-terrorist side, hit squads and vigilante groups have become commonplace in Algeria, indicating above all a breakdown of law and order as government functions. The desire for citizens' groups to take security in their own hands is understandable when it cannot be assured by government, but it is a significant characteristic of instability. Similarly, government use of torture, as occurs across North Africa, is never justified, neither by the individual excesses of insubordinate subordinates nor by the information for the greater protection of the citizenry that is claimed to be obtained thereby.. Misuse of the government's security function is itself a source of instability, since it alienates and discredits government in the eyes of its citizens.

It is not terrorism per se that is the source of instability, since terrorist activity should be able to be quickly and legitimately brought under control by the state's police and security mechanisms. The source of instability lies, on one hand, in public attitudes that legitimize the resort to terror and, on the other, the delegitimizing excesses of government in dealing with it. When the terrorist steals legitimacy from the government, the government responds by stealing terror from the terrorist. The circle is particularly vicious and, once begun, is usually broken only when one side prevails.

Behind terror, however, is a more pervasive source of instability plaguing North Africa today, the presence of incompatible political projects. The challenge

from political Islam to the secular state in many ways stems from the same objectives, the desire to provide a better life for the citizenry; indeed, that common starting point is the characteristic of all competing political groups and the basis of democratic elections campaigns (Ayubi 1992, Butterworth & Zartman 1992). Their difference from the current Islamicist challenge lies in the fact that the challenge is not competitive, on the basis on a common understanding of the nature of the state, but monopolistic, denying the current understanding of the nature of the state.

The current understanding of the state throughout North Africa (and throughout much of the world) is as a secular institution responsible to its citizenry in the pursuit of their security and welfare according to programs continually under study, debate and revision. It sees a world based on change and competition and seeks appropriate responses on the same basis. Anyone can enter the competition of ideas and persons in search of appropriate programs as long as he subscribes to the openness and repeatability of the contest. Religion, in this understanding, is both personal and social but not political. This understanding, like all political projects, is of course an ideal, rarely attained in perfection by an imperfect humanity. Ironically but not surprisingly, the more reality deviates from this understanding, the more its practitioners are vulnerable to exclusion by a counter-project that also deviates in the same direction.

The counterproject of the Islamicists sees a world frozen in its essential aspects at the time of the final revelation and appropriate responses based on faith in millenial verities. Only those who subscribe to the same restricted view of the political system can enter it. Religion is personal, social and political, and the imposition of this project is God's will, not to be allowed to fail. Although the implementation of this project too is an ideal, efforts to impose and defnd it are not; they are justified as part of the divine plan and are therefore subject to no higher limitation.

Each of these two projects denies the other, and, despite the best effortsa of those pluralists who would reach out to the monopolists in the name of tolerance, there is no overlap. Religious individuals (of any religion) can easily subscribe to the tenets of the secular state as long as they do so, that is, as long as their religion is personal and social but not political and as long as they can admit the legitimacy (even if not the desirability) of non-religious individuals coming to power until the next election. On the other hand, secular individuals cannot fit anywhere within the tenets of the religious state; they can only find their place outside, as followers of satan. Thus, efforts to have Islamicists accept a position as just another party within a pluralist polity depend on a basic change in the Islamicists' views, not so much about the importance of religion in life but about the legitimacy of the non-religious in politics. Of course, efforts

in the other direction, to have secularists accept a role in the religious project, do not take place.

There is no need to dwell on the destabilizing effects of this current attack on the Maghribi state. It is clear that when the nature of the state itself is under question, the normal operations of security and welfare are put on hold, as the current situation in Algeria illustrates. It is important to note, however, that the Islamicist alternative arises because of the failure of past and current projects, as noted in the first-named source of instability. Thus current regimes operate under two holds from the Islamicist attack: their constitutional project is illegitimate and their efforts to defend it are carried out by illegitimate governors. In this view, there is no reform, only replacement. To be sure, in no country is this view the unanimous or even dominant one, but to the extent that it exists, it undermines government efforts to deal with the problem.

What needs consideration, therefore, in addressing the Islamicist sources of instability is the possibility of reconciliation, compromise, and negotiation, in a situation where each party's basic tenets deny the legitimacy of the other. In Tunisia, efforts were made between 1987 and 1992 to induce the formation of a party of religious inspiration that would not claim a religious monopoly of legitimacy. A deft combination of inducements and restrictions brought some tangible results but none that were judged satisfactory by the government. In

1988, a representative of the Islamicist current (but not of the unrecognized party, al-Nahda) signed the National Charter containing commonly subscribed principles of the secular state (Anderson 1989; Zartman 1989), but the endorsement was not seen as sufficiently engaging to allow recognition of the party. In 1992, one of the two leaders of the movement, Abdelfattah Mourou, split with the other leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, under the pressure of state security controls, but he was not able to arrive at an agreement with the authorities which would permit him to organize a recognized party.

In Algeria, the same question faces a government strongly divided over the issue of reform. Although the government of Gen. Lamine Zeroual has undertaken secret contacts and possibly even cooperation (notably in the elimination of GIA leaders in February 1994) with the FIS, these contacts remain as unconsummated as the contacts with the Islamic movement in Tunisia. Furthermore, the conditions for negotiation are even less promising in Algeria. In Tunisia, there was a possibility after 7 November 1987 of admitting a party based on the Movement of the Islamic Way (MTI) into a competition where it would emerge a party among others and probably among other minority parties; the PSD/RCD had firm control of the administration, the electoral law weighed heavily against minority parties, and the public in 1988 rallied strongly in favor of the accomplishments of the old regime, notably the Code of Personal Status under

attack by the MTI. In Algeria, none of these conditions obtain. The FIS already won the 1990 municipal elections and the 1991 round of the parliamentary elections; the FLN has already collapsed as either a governing force or an electoral counterforce; the terrorist pressure against the state and society is intense; and the government leaders operate under a pall of illegitimacy never experienced in Tunisia. In sum, if an Islamicist party is to be admitted into the political system, to be tamed by competition and responsibility, it has to occur under conditions where the government is still in control of the system, as in Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, or even Tunisia, but not when the control of the defenders of the system over the system is tenuous, as in Algeria.<sup>5</sup>

In the current situation in Algeria, two imperatives are competing for the agenda of negotiations, in order to overcome the current instability. One is to construct a polity that encompasses the greatest part of society. The other is to construct a polity--the political system--based on a workable project. This means, ultimately, a choice of one project or another, since as seen the two cannot be combined in a coherent result, and submission of the two to a voters' choice threatens to consecrate the second through the procedures of the first. The basic imponderable of any such negotiations is whether they serve only to put the foxes in charge of the hencoop. Their challenge is to overcome the incompatibility between the two imperatives of inclusion and control. More specifically, what

items would be covered in such negotiations? What would be the trade-off between substantive and procedural demands, that is, between current items of powersharing such as specific portfolios to be attributed to a participating Islamicist organization and the conditions of future electoral contests such as dates, electoral laws, restrictions on participation, and so on. A third level of concerns involves the degree of control that political negotiators would exercise over militant Islamicist groups. Would negotiations only serve the purpose of including currently self-excluded parts of the population in the polity or would it also be able to reduce or eliminate the security threat of terrorism?

#### International Sources of Instability

In addition to internal sources of instability are those which originate outside the individual states, either from other states and their relations within the region or from outside the Maghrib. External relations of either sort are important stabilizing mechanisms. The institutionalized system of relations of the region within the Arab Maghrib Union (UMA) since 1989 as well as the informal system of interactions which predate the UMA and on which it is based serve to contain conflict, promote cooperation, channel contacts, provide both collective security and collective defense mechanisms, and consolidate goals and identities. Similarly, external relations, from the postcolonial ties to the metropole and to its multilateralized extension in the European Union, on one hand, to the global

system in the bipolar and post-bipolar eras, on the other, have provided safety valves, control mechanisms, inputs of power and resources, and mediators.

Therefore to focus on their nature as a source of instabilities is to emphasize only one part--and probably a secondary part--of their activities.

Nonetheless, regional relations do contain important sources of instability in the rivalries over rank, relations and roles which characterize any such system. Primary among these is the structural rivalry between Algeria and Morocco. Absolute equals in population and wide unequals--as noted above--in economic resources, the two neighbors are condemned to play out their struggle over uncertainty over rank and relation in the region (Zartman 1989, Zartman 1990). Their structural rivalry is reinforced by an ideological difference deeply rooted in their histories, and focussed by a geopolitical dispute over the status of the Western Sahara. When this issue disappears, other will rise to symbolize the rivalry between the neighbors, but short of direct subversion, they will be hard pressed to have the acuity of the current dispute. It is remarkable that, despite all the twists of Algerian internal politics, each new turn provides a new justification for renewed support for a victory of the Polisario Front over Moroccan control of the territory. To Col. Houari Boumedienne, it was a matter of personal honor and national calling; to Col. Chadli Benjedid, it was the last indication that not all of Boumedienne's policies were being rejected; to the

current military regimes, it is a sign that the state has not totally collapsed.

To Morocco, the current regime represents the Algerian army (ANP), the ultimate support and commitment behind the Polisario; thus, any policy that weakens the army hits at the Polisario's patron and any action to strengthen the current regime against its internal opponents strengthens the supporters of Morocco's external opponents. Similarly, the Islamicist opposition is based on a basic element in the legitimacy of the monarchy, the political role of Islam, and therefore Islamism is seen as no threat to the Moroccan polity. As a result, Morocco has given refuge to Algerian Islamicist opponents, while maintaining cordial official cooperation with the Algerian government. The UMA has continued to function according to one of its primary founding purposes, as a coordinating body for internal security concerns, but with differing degrees of coordination among its members (Mezran 1994).

The other countries of the region are less affected by regional relations as a source of instability. The phenomenon was very important in determining Libya's role when it had resources, but the same economic decline that destabilized Algeria had a powerful effect in limiting Libya's international role and curbing its ambitions in the region (Deeb 1990). Tunisia's geopolitical position removes any possibility of rivalry and instead imposes a delicate defensive position on it between two activist regional giants, now in the throes of internal uncertainty.

and unrest. Where once Tunisians feared the export of revolution and dominance from their neighbors; they now fear the export of destabilisation and subversion. But this too is a regional source of instability.


Finally, the external world, and particularly the European continent across the river from the Maghrib, is a potential source of instability. In reality, it has this function only to the extent that it can no longer play a stabilizing role. France has long played on the rivalry for rank and relations within the region, but in the 1990s both sides have pulled away from their interrelations to concentrate on domestic and intraregional concerns. While the European source of instability has therefore diminished, the stabilizing role that it long played as a safety valve in receiving excess Maghribi population has also been curtailed. In the mid-1990s, as the pressure to receive unemployed labor from all North African countries was augmented by the pressure to handle an exodus of the modernized middle and upper classes of Algeria, Europe served as a source of instability by closing its gates to Maghribis. Instead, it saw the immigrants as a source of instability for the social systems of Europe.

#### Conclusion

It is not misguided or pessimistic to focus on the sources of instability, for it is from that quarter that the challenges to governance come. Against these must be arrayed the sources of stability and the skills and resources that the

government of the region have at their disposal. Together, the three categories determine how well the states of the region will emerge from their current challenges to face new ones. But it is clear that the challenges of the mid-1990s are particularly serious--chronic resource deficits, uneven leadership performance, severe attacks on citizen security, dissent on the nature of the state, and ongoing conflicts of rank and relation within the region. The time is thus a turning point in the region. It can either provide a strengthened reassertion of the trends of postcolonial evolution, if resources are revived, leadership legitimacy is reaffirmed, security is reassured, consensus is reestablished about the project of governance, and the regional maneuverings are harnessed to undergird cooperation rather than conflict. Or it can mark a sharp turn in the road, marked by downswings in development, radical leadership shifts, continued insecurity, the imposition of a new governance project, and the exacerbation of intraregional conflict.

In fact, reality usually chooses a lumpy mix of the two logical extremes, in which the new coherence is only evident after the fact. Not only may different sources of instability turn out differently, but they may do so differently in different countries, with the result that the intraregional disparities and conflict based on them would be accentuated. That possibility only accentuates the importance of wise and decisive responses to the current sources of instability.



# *International Symposium*

"North Africa: Current Trends and  
Policy Challenges"

***"The Proliferation of Mass  
Destruction Weapons  
and the Changing Mediterranean  
Regional Balance"***

*By*


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**Tunis, Tunisia**

**May 3-4, 1994**

## **Northern Africa and the Middle East**



D R A F T

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**The Proliferation of Mass Destruction Weapons and the Changing Mediterranean Regional Balance**

by

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**INTRODUCTION**

The end of the Cold War and the erosion of the alliance system which defined East-West competition for four decades, has forced nations to explore new frameworks to address security requirements. The Mediterranean countries are among those in search of new relationships and alignments. While that task is being addressed by virtually all states, an acute sense of urgency is attached to the search among Mediterranean nations.

The demilitarization of the East-West competition has shifted attention toward long-dormant but simmering inter- and intra-state rivalries which could present security threats affecting entire regions. The current crisis in the Balkans is an obvious example. With this shift in attention will also come a slow but certain transformation in regional political-military balances as new security challenges surface and new alignments evolve over time to address them.

With the decline in relevance of the superpower nuclear balance as a barometer of global strategic relations, the state of the superpower nuclear balance has also become less relevant to the security of allies who benefitted from what Albert Wohlstetter referred to as the "delicate balance of terror." As a result, the constraints on the use of military force and of weapons of mass destruction which were to a large extent imposed by the U.S.-Soviet nuclear standoff, have been loosened and in some cases removed altogether.

The Mediterranean nations are exploring the new security environment of the post-cold war world and assessing the instruments available to secure their position in what NATO and the West had generally regarded as a peripheral strategic theatre. Within this theatre, the nations of the Maghreb -- Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya and Mauritania -- face the same dilemmas and uncertainties afflicting the vast majority of states in the post-Cold War era. In the Mediterranean, however, there is an unusual concentration of emerging security concerns: proliferation of mass destruction weapons; population growth; economic distress; demographic imbalances and the potential for mass intra-state migration; radicalization of Islamic political movements, and instability in adjacent regions. With the exception of the proliferation issue, none of these threats seem likely to be immediately susceptible to treatment by orthodox security regimes or measures.

The standard geographic truism, that the Mediterranean serves as a bridge linking Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa also explains the region's

variable and indistinct security circumstance. To a large extent, Mediterranean security is hostage to the political-military relations of countries located on its fringes - on the northern and southern littoral, in the Levant and the Persian Gulf, and notably of late, in the Balkans. The key countries of the Maghreb -- the North African states of Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco -- as a sub-theatre of the Western Mediterranean will, similarly, find themselves directly affected by events occurring in other parts of the Mediterranean basin.

None of the emerging Mediterranean threats identified above can be described as traditional security concerns. Even the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), while not a new phenomenon, had not been an urgent security issue for most nations (including the United States) until the early 1980's. Until relatively recently, "vertical proliferation" (the expansion of strategic weapons possessed by the U.S. and Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent by China, France and Great Britain) consumed the energies and attention of governments and defense research communities to a far greater degree than the secondary strategic problem of "horizontal proliferation" (the spread of nuclear weapons beyond the group of acknowledged nuclear weapons states).

The U.S. commitment to Mediterranean security since the second World War has been epitomized by cold war symbols of military power - NATO's Southern Command (AFSOUTH), the uninterrupted presence of the U.S. Sixth Fleet and a network of military installations supporting bilateral and multilateral security guarantees. How and whether the United States will: bolster or reduce;

reassess, restructure, realign or withdraw from that commitment will directly affect the regional security environment and thus the strategic choices that North African and other Mediterranean countries make. Clearly, this will vary dramatically from one regime and nation to another, but the effect of changes in the U.S. presence in and approach to the region on both radical and moderate states must be regarded as a primary contributing factor in the defense and security orientations and calculations of virtually all of the Mediterranean states. The key difference is that these calculations must now be evaluated in the context of a state of non-Soviet/American confrontation.

In what has generally been regarded as the first post-cold war military crisis, U.S. regional leadership succeeded during the Gulf War in cobbling together an effective military and political response to a regional hegemon without the specter of Soviet intervention. The Gulf war against Iraq displayed the determination of an allied coalition led by the United States to address blatant security threats of the classic variant - invasion by a rogue state unimpressed by the bounds of international law. Yet, it is unlikely that such a classic military campaign, which brings together a broad Western-aligned coalition characterized by unity of purpose and political solidarity, will materialize again.

The only other overwhelming threat to regional security which might bring about a concerted response effort is the specter of WMD proliferation. As the diffusion of military technology continues and the security dilemmas of smaller

states in a new and uncertain security environment increase, the attraction of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons will likely be enhanced.

This paper will examine the problem of WMD proliferation in the Mediterranean region. The assessment will be made within the context of changing regional political-military balances and the continuing evolution of North African security concerns.

## I. THE NORTH AFRICAN PROFILE

The North African political profile has been altered significantly by the rise of militant Islam and its potential as a radical force for political change on a grand and possibly destabilizing scale. The rise of Islam as a political force in the region comes largely as the result of economic decay, fueled by a population which in the four key states of Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya is growing at an average annual rate of nearly 3%. If that rate continues, the region's population will more than double before the year 2025.<sup>1</sup> The rate of population growth in Algeria alone is even higher; 70% of the Algerian population is under the age of thirty.<sup>2</sup> Over 50% of the Moroccan population is under twenty years of age.<sup>3</sup> The North African population rates can be compared to that of Spain, for example, whose rate of growth is less than 1%.

Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria have a common colonial experience having been part of the French Empire. Relations between Morocco and Tunisia have

been generally cordial despite societal and political differences which distinguish the two states. Morocco is one of the few remaining traditional monarchies, ruled by King Hassan, who ascended the throne on the death of his father in 1961. His survival of two assassination attempts in the early 1970's and his claim as a direct descendant of the Prophet Mohammed have given him extraordinarily strong legitimacy as a leader and a solid standing with the population and the country's governing elite.

Tunisia retains much of its French cultural heritage, encouraged first by President Bourguiba and then by his successor, Mr. Ben Ali. Both emphasized a strong secular state policy; Bourguiba was an important figure in the non-aligned movement; Mr. Ben Ali has focused on Tunisia's African and Arab roots as well as the importance of Maghrebi integration. This emphasis on Tunisia's regional position comes as Tunisians debate the advisability of closer ties to Europe vs those with the Arab world and sub-Saharan Africa. This European-Maghrebi balance has been strained as the Tunis-Brussels channel struggles to accommodate to a new European Union (EU) policy even as the EU adjusts to one common market. The EU has encouraged greater investment in the Maghreb as a hedge against the possibility that disaffected populations on Europe's southern flank might seek a better standard of living up north. This was evident in the EC's revised Mediterranean Policy as early as 1989.

Both Tunisia and Morocco have followed a generally pro-Western foreign policy, although Morocco's history of bilateral security relations with the U.S. is

much stronger than Tunisia's. Morocco has struggled with an insurgency in the Western Sahara, refusing to cede sovereignty to the Polisario Front. King Hassan has found little support from his Maghreb neighbors for his pleas that Moroccan sovereignty over the area be formally recognized. There is a broad consensus among the Moroccan population, however, and the governing elite that the Polisario must not be surrendered to.

The Algerian post-colonial experience differs from that of Morocco and Tunisia, beginning with the long and bloody war to achieve its independence from France which lasted seven years, from 1954-1961. Algeria took a leading political role among Third World countries in the 1970's which contributed to its relative diplomatic isolation from the West, encouraging an autarkic economic model of development and reinforced a heavily centralized economy. Algeria's inability to make its currency fully convertible (like those of Morocco and Tunisia) illustrates this isolation, contributing to Algeria's difficulty in establishing broader and deeper trade relationships. Despite enormous reserves of gas and oil, Algeria is unable to earn sufficient foreign exchange to support its burgeoning population.

The current crisis in Algeria has its roots in a series of initiatives from 1989-1991 designed to open the country's political system to a more democratic and pluralistic model. The immediate provocation for political and economic reforms was a series of food riots in late 1988. Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid hoped that freer political expression would encourage economic development and greater Western investment. Algeria had been governed by one

party since its independence from France in 1962 - the National Liberation Front (FLN) and since 1965 by army officers who were instrumental in securing Algeria's independence. At the time, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), which supported a government ruled by Islamic Law rather than by a secular constitution, was legalized as a legitimate political party in opposition. At the time, Tunisian and Moroccan leaders expressed skepticism of Benjadjid's reforms, believing them to be ill-planned. His Maghreb neighbors believed that he was moving too far too fast, and that the result would destabilize Algerian society.<sup>4</sup> During municipal elections in 1990, the FIS was victorious in over half the contests. During parliamentary elections in December 1991, the FIS won 188 out of a total of 430 seats and seemed certain to gain a majority in the second round.<sup>5</sup> The army forced a cancellation of the second round, however, and President Benjadjid resigned as the military instituted a one-year state of emergency. The country would be governed by a Higher State Council, installed by the Algerian military.

There have been few significant changes in the Algerian leadership since the resignation of President Benjadjid and the assumption of power by the army-backed government. On January 30, the Defense Minister, Liamine Zeroual (a retired General), replaced a collective leadership as President. His appointment is to last for a "transition period" of three years at which time the nation is expected to hold general elections. General Zeroual, a former Chief of the Armed Forces, is the fourth Algerian head of state in just two years.<sup>6</sup> Zeroual's biggest

challenge will be to end the violence which has taken more than 2,000 lives in two years.

Libya has been an Islamic state since 1969 when the Sanusi monarchy of King Idris was overthrown by an obscure Lieutenant Colonel, Mohammar Qaddafi, who led the Young Officers Movement. Whereas Iran's Khomeini used Islam as a religious force of legitimacy, Qaddafi focused on the political power of Islam as an instrument of pan-Arabism and a weapon to ultimately remove Western influences from the Mediterranean region. Unlike Khomeini's revolution which was Shi'a, Qaddafi's was dominated by the Sunni sect. Although Qaddafi has at various times sought forms of union with Egypt, Tunisia and the Sudan as well as closer relations with Morocco, none have come to pass. Qaddafi has been more successful in infiltrating regimes, concentrating on Chad, Niger and Senegal, all of which were sympathetic to France's post-colonial position in Africa.

While the states of North Africa are distinctly different in political, economic, and societal terms, the governments have struggled to integrate their countries into a loose confederation through the Arab Maghreb Union, referred to by its French acronym (UMA). Established in 1989 by Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania, the UMA has sought a heightened regional dialogue among the Maghreb states and with neighboring powers as well. It has increased its contacts with other multinational organizations, founding the 'Five Plus Five' Grouping which brings the UMA members together with the four Western Mediterranean EU nations -- France, Italy, Spain Portugal -- and Malta.

Economic desperation was a key factor in creating the UMA. Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia had all suffered large losses during the oil glut of the mid 1980's and the consequent drop in world oil prices which contributed to mounting debt. By the mid-1980's, Algeria's foreign debt was \$22 billion; the annual debt service payments were nearly \$6 billion. Even more worrisome for the Maghreb countries was the enlargement of the (then) European Community (EC) in 1986 to include Spain and Portugal which would give Spanish and Portuguese products an advantage over those coming from North Africa.<sup>7</sup> One scholar has argued that while economic incentives may have driven the other UMA nations to found the union, Algeria's motivation was principally political, seeing the UMA as a forum for political consultations, particularly regarding the Islamic challenge to regional governments.<sup>8</sup>

As Table 1<sup>9</sup> shows, the military forces of the North African states are relatively small, but there is a significant disparity between them in virtually all six categories of military capability. Tunisia has the smallest active duty military; Algeria has the region's largest. As might be expected, both Libya and Algeria have benefitted from the acquisition of Soviet-era equipment, while the Moroccan and Tunisia militaries have been supplied principally by the U.S. Tunisia and Morocco both lack surface-to-surface missiles, but can defend against air attack with SAM systems.

With the exception of Libya, the North African states have invested more heavily in defensive weapons than in power projection forces, reflecting their

general proclivity toward protecting rather altering the regional military balance and the political status quo.

**TABLE 1****North African Military Snapshot**

	<b>Armed Forces (Active)</b>	<b>Tanks</b>	<b>Artillery Pieces</b>	<b>SAM</b>	<b>SSM</b>	<b>Combat Aircraft</b>
<b>Algeria</b>	198,500	T-72, T-62 T-54, T-55	Tow - 152mm SP - 122mm	SA-3 7,8,9	Frog-7 Frog-4	MIG25 MIG-23
<b>Tunisia</b>	40,000	M-60A3 M-48A3	Tow - 105mm SP - 155mm	RBS-70 M48	---	F-5 E/F
<b>Morocco</b>	195,000	M-60A3 M-48A5	Tow - 155mm SP - 155mm	M54 SA-7	---	F-5 Mirage F-1
<b>Libya</b>	100,500	T-72, T-62 T-55, T-54	Tow - 155mm SP - 155mm	SA-7,9 SA-13	Frog-7 SCUD-B Nodong (Order)	MIG-25 Mirage F-1

Sources: The Military Balance, 1993-1994 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies), 1993; The Middle East Military Balance, 1992-1993 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies), 1993.

## **II. EMERGING SECURITY TRENDS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION**

In evaluating the potential challenges to security in the Mediterranean region,<sup>10</sup> four sets of issues can be identified: (1) non-military threats to stability; (2) the diffusion of military power and weapons proliferation; (3) multilateralism and collective security, and (4) the evolving U.S. role in Mediterranean security.

*o Non-Military Threats to Stability*

Long dormant ethnic and nationalistic ideologies have now risen to the surface to challenge the post-war paradigms that have defined inter-state relations for nearly five decades. National borders throughout the Mediterranean are no longer sacrosanct and are increasingly seen as obstacles to realizing the full benefit of deeply held ethno-nationalist aspirations among many peoples, including: the Kurds in Turkey; the Basques in Spain; the Moslems, Croatians, Slovenes and Serbs in the former Yugoslavia, the Sahrawis in the Western Sahara; the inhabitants of the Spanish enclaves in Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco, and the Palestinians.

All of these ethno-nationalist disputes are internal to the Mediterranean region but effectively outside of the jurisdiction of the Western Alliance, in that NATO was not designed to address issues of internal stability or trans-national disputes. While the Alliance has often acted to contain rivalries between and among member nations (e.g. the Greek-Turkish dispute), these problems are

beyond its raison d'etre. It is therefore difficult to imagine how NATO, even if significantly restructured and reoriented, could effectively address the range of ethnic and national disputes that have surfaced since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

A second regional challenge to stability is the emerging demographic patterns in Southern Europe and the Middle East, and the management of population growth. There is an increasing problem of emigration from poorer states (in the Middle East and North Africa, principally) to the more affluent Economic Union (EU) nations on the Mediterranean's northern littoral. The rate of population growth is highest among the poorer regional states -- Morocco, Algeria, Egypt and Turkey. If current trends continue, the EU nations could constitute a minority of the Mediterranean populace by the beginning of the next century. This could reduce the influence of the more affluent Mediterranean states in planning for the region's security, as their political clout is reduced.

Emigration trends have already served as the catalyst for creating alliances among rightist political parties throughout Europe (most successfully in France and Germany). They have exploited fears of an uncontrolled flood of disaffected and generally unskilled laborers into economies already stressed by prolonged recession. Increases in the flow of Albanian immigrants to Italy and of Algerians to France have fueled renewed political debate in Paris and Rome over future immigration regulation.

The Italian decision to deploy a logistics brigade to Albania in 1992 to stem the tide of immigrants following the fall of the Soviet-era Albanian Communist regime suggests that Italy sees a role for its military in managing the immigration issue. It also illustrates the potential for Mediterranean nations to act unilaterally -- and outside an alliance umbrella -- against threats to their *national* security. Unilateral action by states contributing to the NATO southern command (Allied Forces Southern Europe - AFSOUTH) could threaten NATO's solidarity, particularly in a crisis when allied cohesion would be especially important.

The potential for radical regime change in North Africa (particularly in Algeria and Tunisia) raises the prospect of mass migration toward the Northern littoral countries, creating an unwelcome and destabilizing refugee flood. Should the host nations decide to interdict these refugees using national naval forces, for example, the NATO Commander in Chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe could face a situation where a significant component of the AFSOUTH naval order of battle has been diverted from its normal peacetime mission. In this case, a refugee situation could create a military problem for the Alliance and thus for the U.S.

Disaffection by increasingly large segments of the population in less affluent societies over the failure of regimes to govern effectively has kindled political radicalism. Among Moslem countries, this has materialized most notably among those militant Islamic political groups adopting rejectionist political programs, who seek through both peaceful and violent means to capture governing

authority. Professor I. William Zartman, a noted specialist on Africa, describes the rise of Islam in North Africa as a means to "give an ideological and organizational expression to the urban and lower middle classes left homeless by the ingrown political parties."<sup>11</sup>

The attraction of Islamic fundamentalism as a justification for radical political change, particularly during the current period of transition, has grown among a number of Middle Eastern countries, most notably in Algeria, but also in Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan. The point should be stressed, however, that militant political Islamic groups do not constitute a monolithic unified movement. Nor are the growing number of adherents of Islamic fundamentalist doctrines militant. There is at least one conspicuous example of a fundamentalist Islamic regime cooperating with the West - Saudi Arabia.

Whether Islamic revival movements will grow in strength among the North African littoral states (Algeria in particular; such parties are outlawed in Tunisia and Morocco) is a subject of debate among experts. William Zartman (who notes that "there is no single, united Islamic movement in any North African country") expects the movements to split as they assume a more active role in national politics.<sup>12</sup> Regardless, it is doubtful that the movements will soon be strong enough to force overt anti-Western foreign and defense policies. In several cases, Islamic parties have achieved impressive electoral results over the last several years (in Egypt, Jordan and Algeria, for example), without steering a fundamentalist course that immediately threatens the stability of the regime or

the region. Radical Shi'ism of the Iranian variety has not swept the region as some had feared, and with the exception of Lebanon (where rival Amal and Hizballah elements compete for the allegiance of the Shi'a community) there has been virtually no export of Shiite revolution. Bitter rivalries between leaders of the Sunni and Shi'a movements have further retarded the spread of militant Islamic political groups.

In a number of Muslim countries, secularized elites in the military and the governing bureaucracies oppose radical fundamentalist takeovers. This was the case in Algeria where the military prevented the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) from coming to power by cancelling the second round of elections, in which the FIS would have won a commanding majority. This setback has not, however, halted the FIS efforts to increase the influence among the Algerian public. The FIS remains a political force to be reckoned with in Algeria and therefore could still conceivably engineer a regime change. Indeed, the cancellation of the second round of elections seems to have had the effect of making the FIS a more militant movement. Two noted scholars have concluded that the politically repressive policies of the governments of Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria have emboldened the fringe elements of certain Islamic movements. "To the Islamist troops, the way the results of the elections were dismissed has underlined the poor credibility of the democratic discourse held both by the regimes and their foreign supporters. Inside the movements, it has therefore given more power to the backers of radicalization.<sup>13</sup>

Finally, Arab nationalism, which still has residual strength (although it was dealt a serious blow by Saddam Hussein's behavior toward Kuwait and the subsequent Gulf War), has moderated the appeal of radical Islamic political movements. Ironically, Arab solidarity in the Gulf War provided a political boost to some pan-Arab sentiments.

While it would be simplistic and inaccurate to adopt a monolithic approach to assessing radical Islamic political movements, it is difficult to imagine that a pro-Western position would be part of their platform.

One immediate effect of Islamization in the Mediterranean will be to decrease the willingness of North African and Middle Eastern governments to cooperate militarily with the West in planning or implementing Mediterranean military operations. The institutional mechanisms for such cooperation will be critical to national decisions on whether and how to pursue military planning with the West. Multilateral mechanisms that serve to dilute the political risk of associating with the United States, for example, may be more attractive for our Western Mediterranean friends. The inherently anti-Western character of fundamentalist Islam could over time influence more moderate Islamic or even secular Arab regimes toward rejection of pro-Western stances on security. Consequently, should the United States adopt an aggressive policy against a radical Arab regime, it could lose some support among more moderate Arab and Islamic states. As an example, concern for Islamic sensitivities inclines the

secular regimes in Algiers and Cairo to criticize the possibility that the West may again use force against Colonel Gaddafi in Libya.

The diversity of the region (Europe, Asia, Africa) has prevented greater regional cooperation which could address non-military concerns more effectively.

o *The Diffusion of Military Power and Weapons Proliferation*

The end of the Cold War has created a new security dilemma, particularly acute for smaller states: whether to invest in alliance security relationships or to seek security through independent military programs. In the past, these choices were not regarded as mutually exclusive, but in the evolving strategic environment, national leadership may increasingly perceive them as such. This is due in large part to the unifying threat and its replacement by a number of diverse threats, which are not interpreted uniformly by the members of the old Alliance structure. Further, the superpowers no longer act as regional security patrons to the same degree as they did during the cold war period.

The emerging military balance in the Mediterranean will present the NATO Alliance with new military missions, although continued contribution to Alliance programs by some NATO members will be problematic. The key security challenge in the region - the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is likely to fall outside of the Alliance's purview. While there is some prospect that NATO members may cooperate within the formal Alliance structure to address the WMD

threat, the NATO imprimatur could act to deter broader cooperation either for reluctant NATO members or non-members.

There is little prospect that pending regional arms control proposals will get a sympathetic hearing in the region, largely because of a growing belief that arms control is unlikely to increase regional security. New generations of weapons' technologies will be far more attractive than regimes designed to control them.

The most urgent security concern for the Mediterranean region is undoubtedly the threat posed by the slow but certain spread of WMD systems to states whose leaders may have different inhibitions against using them than those with which we became familiar in the Cold War. There are two types of proliferation threats facing the region:

- (1) the development of *indigenous* military programs designed to build either the launchers or develop the warheads to deliver chemical, nuclear, or biological payloads over substantial distances with increasing accuracy, and
- (2) the acquisition from outside suppliers of ballistic missiles and the technologies required to adapt them for regional use.

The spread of WMD systems appears to have been slower than predicted. The pace of proliferation may suddenly rise, however, because of the increasingly covert nature of many military programs. Great confidence has been placed in the past in the ability of the non-proliferation regime (the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty, NPT, and the systems of safeguards implemented and monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA) to monitor programs

of its signatories effectively. A combination of factors, however, including Iraq's nearly successful program to deploy nuclear weapons in contravention of the NPT (which it signed) and IAEA safeguards (to which it subscribed), and the current crisis over North Korea's refusal to adhere to the NPT regime, to which it is also a signatory, have effectively eroded confidence in the ability of the regime to detect, let alone, deter acquisition of a military nuclear capability. There is now reason to doubt the effectiveness of the NPT/IAEA system which was developed nearly three decades ago when proliferation incentives were much less attractive than they are today.<sup>14</sup>

A full discussion of the changing motivations for aspiring proliferants is beyond the scope of this article.<sup>15</sup> It is the author's contention that an effective strategy to deter, retard and counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is unlikely to be achieved unless greater attention is paid to changing regional security motivations which propel aspiring proliferants toward development of these weapons. This is likely to mean reduced reliance on global arms control accords which by definition must rely upon a least-common denominator approach, often catering to the concerns of those states who would utilize the accord as a shield to protect covert military programs. An argument can be made that Iraq saw the NPT and IAEA system as a means of protective cover for their nuclear weapons effort. It is difficult to conceive of a more cynical use of arms control.<sup>16</sup>

Beyond Iraq's (and North Korea's) manipulation of the international non-proliferation regime is the issue of whether reliance on broadly gauged arms control accords as a security instrument is anachronistic. In the Mediterranean, for example, virtually all of the region's states have signed the NPT and have accepted IAEA safeguards (including Syria, Libya, Iran and Iraq; only Israel and Algeria have not), yet nearly all of the states pursuing either covert ballistic missile programs or WMD initiatives (which have been publicly identified by the U.S. Director of Central Intelligence) are located in this region.<sup>17</sup>

There appears to be little potential for cooperation among Mediterranean nations on non-proliferation, let alone a more pro-active counter-proliferation stance, as enunciated by the Clinton administration.<sup>18</sup> The countries of greatest concern (Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Algeria) have all developed covert programs, some in violation of existing agreements. Israel's nuclear program remains of great concern to the western Mediterranean nations and is seen as compromising efforts to stem proliferation of nuclear technologies throughout the region.

*o A Possible Proliferation Scenario*<sup>19</sup>

Proliferation would pose particular dangers for U.S. and NATO interests and, therefore, must be considered by American policymakers. A possible scenario would be the covert development of nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) weapons by an Iraq-like regime in a state where a radical Islamic government has come to power. The worst-case scenario of an anti-Western government acquiring

weapons of mass destruction has usually focused on the implications of a radical Middle Eastern regime whose leadership is hostile to U.S. interests, pursuing programs to develop nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Among such potentially radical regimes, a fundamentalist Islamic government raises the most alarming prospect. The regional trends is toward more militant Islamic political movements. This trend, linked with internal and external ethnic and confessional strife, ambitious and hegemonic leaders, territorial disputes, and the penchant for holding the West responsible for the ills besetting the region, could well be a catalyst for some of the regional states in seeking to acquire these weapons.

Concern has been expressed among some quarters in the West over an "Islamic bomb." The concept had its origins in the 1970s, when the first indications of a Pakistani nuclear program surfaced. Although there is a real threat that a militant, radical Islamic regime such as that in Iran could seek to develop WMD systems to spread its revolutionary political doctrine, the notion of an "Islamic bomb" per se is probably misleading. For example, Pakistan's desire for a bomb was based on its confrontation with India (which had already developed nuclear weapons), not on its Islamic doctrine. Moreover, alarm over Islamabad's clandestine effort was muted since President Zia's government was closely allied with the United States in its efforts to expel Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and because of India's close relationship with the Soviet Union. Proliferation as a policy concern was therefore subordinated to regional security priorities and political imperatives. In addition, it was widely felt in the U.S.

Government and among the community of independent analysts that Pakistan's nuclear program was directed principally against the Indian effort, rather than toward the U.S. or its allies (i.e. Israel) or as a result of Islamic doctrine. Nevertheless, the possibility that another regional government less friendly to the U.S. and less supportive of American foreign policy objectives could covertly develop WMD systems, was highlighted.

Anticipating the spread of WMD systems within the Mediterranean region is only half of the policy issue for the United States. A fundamental problem for Washington is how to neutralize Israeli nuclear capability as a motivation and justification for other regional states to acquire a similar capability. The more delicate crisis question may be how to restrain Israeli tendencies toward preemptive military action against aspiring regional nuclear weapons states, or worse, how to react to an Israeli "fait accompli." This would be particularly difficult in cases where Washington determines that Israeli action is either not warranted or politically more costly than any benefit from extinguishing a burgeoning covert program.

The prospect of a nuclear-armed Mediterranean state, allied with one of Israel's historic enemies, has preoccupied Israeli defense and security planning for decades. Israel's preemptive air strike against the Iraqi nuclear installations at Tuwaitha in June 1981 illustrated Tel Aviv's determination to act unilaterally when it perceives generally that its security interests are threatened.

Should Israel learn of a covert WMD program, the pressure for it to act preemptively before the United States has an opportunity to assess the situation would be considerable. The U.S. might then find itself in a difficult position, particularly if it interposes itself between Israel and a nuclear-armed Islamic state. Should the FIS come to power in Algeria and continue that nation's pursuit of a nuclear weapon, the pressure on Washington to take remedial action to prevent Tel Aviv from pre-emptying could become irresistible.

The scenario might not end there, particularly if a covert weapons capability is acquired by a regime sympathetic to terrorist tactics. It would be prudent to consider the planning requirements should U.S. commanders in Southern Europe be asked to take additional precautions to protect American installations in the Mediterranean against the threat of a nuclear-armed terrorist organization that was attempting to resist American pressure by itself pressuring an allied government to remove U.S. military facilities. One measure, which over time could have a deterrent effect on aspiring proliferants, would be the construction of an anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) system which could lessen the appeal of acquiring a tactical nuclear capability. The Theatre High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system now under development by the United States could provide effective theatre-wide coverage against medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles now being developed by several nations in the Mediterranean region.

ATBM does present a promising cooperative opportunity for Mediterranean nations, including the North African states. A regional consortium to finance the

deployment of such a system (perhaps involving Tunisia and Morocco) and linking this system with an Eastern Mediterranean net to cover Egypt and Israel, for example, deserves consideration. NATO members would be likely to support such a regional ATBM net, as it is endorsed in the Alliance's New Strategic Concept and in MC 400.

*o Multilateralism and Collective Security*

The Mediterranean nations, like virtually all of Europe, are struggling with the transition between the Cold War and an uncertain future security environment. They are considering a range of institutional alternatives to NATO. Decisions regarding how the Mediterranean states choose to organize for collective security will be based upon four assumptions:

- (1) the absence of a well-defined and urgent security threat around which the Mediterranean states can structure a defensive security alliance;
- (2) the expectation of significant withdrawals of American forces from Central Europe and the assumption that America will become increasingly reluctant to use military force anywhere in Europe;
- (3) the vague but politically attractive notion that a new confederation of European states could deal with a range of threats to their security through a network of regional associations, and
- (4) the expectation that European security will be essentially a "peacekeeping" or "peacemaking" mission, rather than one which emphasizes

deterrence of conflict and border defense. Therefore, the argument goes, NATO will become inappropriate to the postwar European security structure.

Most discussions of how to transform NATO or of how it might be replaced or supplemented by other multinational institutions including new regional associations like the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) are infused with the same ambivalence regarding the American role evidence during the Cold War. Here, many Southern Europeans do not differ markedly from their Central European and Nordic counterparts. Those institutional alternatives which, some argue, are more suited to cooperative and consultative approaches (i.e. CSCE, EU, WEU) in the new security environment would marginalize or effectively eliminate a U.S. role. The ambivalence lies between the European desire to assume a defense posture (though not necessarily an adequate defense budget) independent of the United States and wishing to have the U.S. guarantee their security. In the emerging security environment, without the Soviet threat, this tension cannot be ignored and alternatives which promise security without dependence on the United States will appear to Europeans to be increasingly attractive.

There has been some discussion of emerging multilateral groupings within the Mediterranean (i.e. CSCM, UAM, the Group of Nine), the lack of progress on moving these initiatives forward toward the adoption of concrete security planning illustrates the political fragmentation of the region. Simply stated, there is no

security identity among the Mediterranean nations and, thus, less chance for the creation and sustainability of a cooperative multinational security regime.

The post-cold war environment is likely to widen political-economic cleavages in the Mediterranean basin, rather than narrow them. As these states seek solutions to national security concerns, historic rivalries are likely to resurface which will also highlight divergent approaches to regional security priorities. Therefore, it will be difficult to craft regional groupings that strengthen the link between the Western and Eastern Mediterranean in addressing increasing tensions between the northern and southern littoral nations. The Maghreb countries are unlikely to oppose a continued NATO security role in the region, but will see it as largely irrelevant to their security concerns: growing militant Islamization; low rates of economic growth, and the flight of potential future business and government leaders. The Eastern Mediterranean nations will be principally concerned with the spill-over of regional conflicts, sustaining the Arab-Israeli peace process, and the potentially incendiary ethno-nationalist trends among the five Turkic-speaking nations of Central Asia and the Caucasus regions. The Azeri-Armenian conflict over the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan and the continuing civil war in Tajikistan are examples. The former holds the potential of a clash among Russia, Turkey and Iran while the latter could lead to renewed Russian involvement in Afghanistan.

All Mediterranean nations share an historic (if subliminal) suspicion of outside powers that is likely to affect their national security calculations. This is

- o The Evolving U.S. Role in Mediterranean Security

NATO's Mediterranean members generally recognize that they must share the security burden in the region more equitably in order to preserve the U.S. strategic commitment to the area. While the tension between the two is recognized, most observers of the region argue that this formulation will be the best prescription for addressing what is fast becoming the U.S. dilemma globally, reducing forward presence while continuing to exert substantial regional influence and power. In considering the range of security organizations that could replace or supplement NATO, the central question remains how to create such a structure without marginalizing or eliminating the U.S. role.

The Mediterranean nations recognize that their security choices are less stark than their Central European colleagues generally believe. There is no immediate necessity to erect new security alliances in Southern Europe, because no imminent American departure from the Mediterranean is expected. It should be noted that alternatives are, nonetheless, being explored. The desire to establish a CSCM, for example, illustrates the search among Mediterranean nations for security alternatives appropriate to the region should domestic pressures in either Europe or the U.S. result in a reduced American military presence beneath what is regarded as adequate.

This assessment is also colored by the assumption that a withdrawal of American air and ground units from the Mediterranean theatre would have less impact on the region than it would elsewhere in NATO due to the fact that the

evident even among two of the closest U.S. allies in the Mediterranean: Turkey and Italy. Recent electoral events in both countries have added to the uncertainty regarding the future of bilateral security ties with the U.S. and continued strong allegiance to the Western Alliance. While the victorious rightist coalition of the Forza Italia, Lombardy League and neo-Fascist parties could move the Rome government closer to Washington, the resulting governing coalition is likely to be too fragile to raise new proposals for increased defense cooperation with the U.S. The immediate focus on this new government is likely to be the sprawling "*Mani Pulite*" scandal which has implicated literally hundreds of Italian parliamentarians and political leaders including a number of former ministers and five former Prime Ministers.

U.S. access to bases in Italy could be critical during a crisis as the earlier operations against Libya illustrated. The context in which Washington requests such access has strained even the closest bilateral security ties. The sensitive distinction of "NATO" vs "non-NATO" contingencies has provoked heated debate on a number of occasions, most notably during the Achille Lauro incident where American fighter aircraft sought to force the landing at the Italian air base at Sigonella, of an aircraft carrying suspected terrorists. The image of the U.S. military dictating terms to the Italian government remains fresh in the minds of many Italian politicians. Installations in Italy and Turkey are ideally located for operations in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, a fact which the U.S. government is careful not to over emphasize.

U.S. military presence in the region is heavily naval (the current U.S. air contribution to the *Deny Flight* operation in Bosnia, notwithstanding). Although withdrawing ground forces traditionally sends a more direct political signal than does the removal of air and naval forces, with the exception of the reinforced U.S. battalion in Vicenza (part of the Allied Command Europe -- ACE -- Mobile Force), there are no ground units assigned to AFSOUTH.

It is also generally recognized by nations in the region that the strategic cost of a total withdrawal would be immense for the U.S. because the Mediterranean is a key basing hub for U.S. naval forces, affecting power projection capabilities in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. The AFSOUTH nations assume that a Mediterranean withdrawal would have a devastating ripple effect throughout the Middle East, weakening the perception of American commitments to key regional allies with whom we have conducted a very successful military campaign in the Gulf War. In addition, military leaders in the countries of the region understand that U.S. defense planners would be reluctant to remove the Sixth Fleet from the Mediterranean because of the flexibility of naval forces generally. The Sixth Fleet is understood to perform a wider range of deterrent missions geographically than other U.S. units deployed in Europe. The perception that the strategic reach of the Sixth Fleet has protected Mediterranean interests beyond simply supporting NATO's Central region strategy gave it considerable political importance in the Middle East. In addition, the flexibility of naval forces (e.g. rapid projection of air

power over a wide area where access to land-based facilities may be in doubt), reinforces their attraction as an instrument for stability in a highly volatile region.

There is reason to question, however, how tolerant of an American naval presence the southern littoral states will remain in the future. In the absence of a well-defined threat, justifying continued naval deployment (including base access and host nation support) solely on the basis of "insurance" against unspecified contingencies will not be sufficiently persuasive to all of our friends and allies. A countervailing incentive, however, could develop in the event of heightened concern over the threat posed by acquisition of WMD systems by Algeria and Libya.

## NOTES

1. United Nations, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank annual statistical surveys for 1992.
2. International Security Review, 1994. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), p. 278.
3. Ian O. Lesser, Security in North Africa: Internal and External Challenges, (1993), p. 21.
4. The Tunisian Islamic Party, the Ennahda, was outlawed in 1989 as was its Moroccan counterpart, the Al Adal Wal Ihsan.
5. Carol Migdalovitz, CRS Report for Congress, "Algeria in Crisis: Situation Update" (Washington, D.C. Congressional Research Service, March 15, 1994), p. 1.
6. "Algeria Appoints A New President" New York Times, January 31, 1994, p. A-3.
7. Mary-Jane Deeb, "The Arab Maghrebi Union and the Prospects for North African Unity," in I. William Zartman and William Mark Habeeb (eds.) Polity and Society in Contemporary North Africa (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 193.
8. Robert A. Mortimer, "Algerian Foreign Policy in Transition" in John P. Entelis and Phillip C. Naylor (eds.) State and Society in Algeria (Boulder: Westview, 1992), pp. 253-254.

9. This table is meant only to highlight certain key indicators of military capability. It is not an exhaustive listing.

10. For a discussion of these issues, see Ian O. Lesser, Mediterranean Security: New Perspectives and Implications for U.S. policy. (Washington: RAND Corporation, 1992).

11. I. William Zartman, "15/21: The Maghrib into the Future" in I. William Zartman, op cit., pp. 246-247.

-- 12. Ibid.

13. Francis Burgat and William Dowell (eds.) The Islamic Movement in North Africa (Austin, TX: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Texas, Austin, 1993), p. 306.

14. For the author's views on how the NPT and IAEA could be strengthened, see Jed C. Snyder "The Nonproliferation Regime: Managing the Impending Crisis," in Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia, ed. Neil Joeck (London: Frank Cass, 1986). See also Kathleen C. Bailey, Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).

15. For discussions of emerging proliferation threats and changing security motivations, see Robert D. Blackwill and Albert Carnesale (eds.) New Nuclear Nations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1993; Wolfgang H. Reinicke "Cooperative Security and the Political Economy," in Janne E. Nolan (ed.) Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century (Washington: Brookings Institution), 1994.

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For two very useful studies on weapons technology and the changing supplier networks, see respectively, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington: Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress), 1993; William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jencks (eds.) The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers Network (Boulder: Westview Press) 1994.

16. For a summary of the author's earlier work on the Iraqi nuclear program, see Jed C. Snyder "The Road to Osiraq: Baghdad's Quest for the Bomb" Middle East Journal (Volume 37), Autumn 1993.

17. This point was made by the author in an earlier article. See Jed C. Snyder "Proliferation Threats to Security in NATO's Southern Region," Mediterranean Quarterly (Volume 4, Number 1), Winter 1993, pp. 102-119.

18. The Clinton Administration's approach to the problem of WMD proliferation is embodied in its Counterproliferation Initiative. This is a pro-active, multidimensional strategy emphasizing the development of non-nuclear forces utilizing new technologies. For a discussion of the strategy's components, see Les Aspin, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, Government Printing Office), pp. 34-50.

The security challenges posed by WMD proliferation were an important factor in the Defense Department's recent comprehensive review of its force structure. See Report on the Bottom-Up Review, Department of Defense (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993).

19. The RAND corporation has held a series of simulations examining WMD proliferation scenarios in several regions, including the Mediterranean/Middle Eastern theatre. See the report, by Marc Dean Millot, Roger Mollander and Peter Wilson (eds.) "The Day After..." Study: Nuclear Proliferation in the Post-Cold War World (Washington, D.C. RAND Corporation, 1993, Three Volumes.

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# ***International Symposium***

**"North Africa: Current Trends and  
Policy Challenges"**

***"Social Change, Islam and the  
Modern World:  
Origins and Prospects of the  
Islamist Movements in North Africa"***

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***Tunis, Tunisia***

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D R A F T

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Social Change, Islam and the Modern World:  
Origins and Prospects of the Islamist Movements in North Africa

by  
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In preparing this paper, I was asked to assess the strengths and weaknesses of Islamic political formations in North Africa, and to speculate about their likely administrative capacity were they to come to power; the possible consequences of conceding them a role in a governing coalition; and the reactions that might be anticipated within society if they gained significant positions of political authority, either alone or in partnership with other groups. To approach these questions, I briefly examine the contemporary Islamist movements in North Africa from three perspectives: their origins, their constituents, and their programs. In the final section of the paper, I explore the implications of this examination for their prospects both in and out of power.

The Contemporary Islamist Movements in North Africa: Origins

Islamic precepts, officials, and institutions have never been far from the corridors of power in North Africa. During the precolonial period, of course, the very rationale of government was the administration of the Community of the

Faithful. Subsequently, although we usually characterize the anti-imperial nationalisms to which the current regimes in North Africa owe their existence as secular and Western-oriented ideologies and movements, they all also borrowed from and built upon Islam.<sup>1</sup> In Morocco, where the French protectorate lasted a mere forty-five years (1912-1956), the sultan retained his title as Commander of the Faithful and Islam remained an important element of the rationale of good government throughout French rule. When, in 1930, the French administration declared that it would recognize the "customary Law" of the Berbers, the decree was met with nearly unanimous condemnation; efforts to remove the Berbers from the jurisdiction of Islamic law were seen by Berbers and Arabs alike as a shameless device to divide them and to undermine Islam. The ensuing protests were the crucible for the Moroccan nationalist movement, and national unity was henceforth equated with defense of Islam. In Algeria, the equation of Islam and nationalism was equally important, for it would be Islam that ultimately permitted the Algerians to distinguish themselves from the colons, to endow themselves with a positive identity and to envision themselves as independent. For the leadership of the Tunisian nationalist movement, Islam was less an ideological symbol or ethnic identity than an organizational device; members of the nationalist party swore their allegiance on the Qur'an and for many of its followers, the party resembled nothing so much as a religious brotherhood. In Libya, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that the nationalist movement was a religious brotherhood,

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<sup>1</sup>Parts of this discussion are drawn from Lisa Anderson "Obligation and Accountability: Islamic Politics in North Africa," Daedalus 120:3, Summer 1991.

for the Sanusiyyah spearheaded much of the initial resistance to the Italian invasion and eventually produced the first ruler of the independent country.

After independence, far from insisting on the separation of the spheres of religion and politics, the new governments attempted to harness and control the religious establishment and religious discourse. Everywhere from Morocco to Egypt and well beyond, religious officials soon became salaried employees of the state, and the texts of their Friday sermons were provided by the government. Far from conveying that religion has no place in politics--as some governments now argue to justify refusing to legalize Islamist political parties--this "nationalization" of Islam served to reiterate the association between religion and politics. Thus did the Moroccan and Libyan kings work to discredit the traditional, independent ulama (whose adherence to the nationalist cause was said to have been too weak) and to arrogate to themselves and their loyalists the prerogatives of religious symbolization and exegesis.

The appropriation of religion was not only for monarchs, however; even the ostensibly socialist republics embraced religion in both word and deed. The adamantly secular President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia willingly entered theological debates about the interpretations of Islamic prescriptions--whether the fast of Ramadan might be optional rather than obligatory, for example--demonstrating by his example that individuals with no formal education in Islamic law and theology may take it upon themselves to interpret how Islamic law pertains to public life. In advocating that because the demands for high

productivity imposed by the struggle for development constituted a modern jihad, Tunisians were exempt from observing the fast. Bourguiba was not relegating religion to the realm of personal choice but suggesting instead that government should provide and promote what he called " a healthy interpretation of the religious law."<sup>2</sup> Similarly in Algeria, the 1980 five year plan called for the creation of two universities and three institutes of Islamic Sciences, a mosque and Qu'ranic school in each of the 160 dairat in the country; an Islamic cultural center in each wilayah that did not already have one; and 5,000 new jobs in religious education.<sup>3</sup>

Thus the notion--now associated with illegal Islamist movements--that Islam rightfully speaks to political affairs and should have an intimate role in political discourse is not simply a revival of archaic precolonial practice but is consistent with the policies of the post-independence governments themselves. Naturally, these governments utilized religious rhetoric and institutions assuming--as modernists throughout the world did--that religion is merely superstition and its adherents easily manipulable and, moreover, that its influence was on the wane. Thus could Algerian President Boumedienne sarcastically observe that "a people that is hungry does not need to listen to verses, with all the respect that I pay to the Qur'an that I learned when I was ten"

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<sup>2</sup> in a 1961 speech, cited in Mohammed Tozy "Islam and the State," in I. William Zartman and William Mark Habeeb, eds., Polity and Society in Contemporary North Africa (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 110.

<sup>3</sup> Francois Burgat, with William Dowell, The Islamist Movement in North Africa (Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Texas At Austin, 1993), p. 88.

while, at the same time, authorizing a state- organized annual seminar on Islamic thought and publication of the proceedings.<sup>4</sup> Indeed, in a much remarked irony, it is the secular nationalist governments in Algeria and Tunisia that find themselves most vulnerable to dissent couched in religious terms, in part because they neither acknowledged nor resolved the place Islam was to play in their polities. Morocco and Libya, whatever other problems their governments have created for themselves, are less fertile ground for Islamist opposition because the governments appropriated the rhetoric of religious probity.<sup>5</sup>

Thus, whether overtly as in Morocco and Libya or less deliberately as in Algeria and Tunisia, the regimes themselves laid the groundwork for the casting of political opposition in religious terms. As most Islamist activists readily concede, however, much of the substance of the Islamist brief against the governments derives from singularly mundane discontents. As elsewhere in the Third World, governments flush with the victory of independence "overpromised," and they were destined to disappoint. Throughout North Africa population growth rates outstripped job creation; social services were poorly distributed and fast deteriorated in the face of burgeoning demand; economic privatization and adjustment programs often hit the poorest first and hardest.

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<sup>4</sup>quoted in Tozy, "Islam and State," p.109.

<sup>5</sup>See Henry Munson, Jr., Religion and Power in Morocco, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 199x); Lisa Anderson, "Religion and State in Libya: The Politics of Identity," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 483, January 1986; Lisa Arone, "Libyan Islamists pose little threat to Qadhafi," Maghreb Report 2:3, May-August 1993.

Yet many of the governments seemed reluctant to admit that there were legitimate complaints against their policies. Through much of the last thirty or forty years political debate has been discouraged and press censorship the norm; contested elections have been either non-existent or transparently manipulated. Regime unwillingness to discuss the small-scale discontents and everyday problems faced by their people magnified and transformed the resentment. Grievances came to be cast not in terms of material demands but in the idiom of moral responsibility and ideological commitment. Having demanded continued sacrifice "for the good of the nation," the governments found themselves facing a challenge that redefined the boundaries of sacrifice, rejecting an ill-fitting Moroccan, Algerian, Tunisian, or Libyan "nation" for the far more venerable Islamic ummah.

#### The Contemporary Islamist Movements in North Africa: Constituents

The best known of the Islamic movements in North Africa began as small groups of like-minded professionals, students and intellectuals. By the standards of their countries, these early Islamists were unusually cosmopolitan, well-connected within and well-informed about, developments elsewhere in the world. Much of their original inspiration was found in the works of activists elsewhere in the Islamic world, such as the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb and the Pakistani A. A. al-Mawdudi, and in the influence of movements like the pan-Islamic group

founded in Pakistan, Jama'at al-Tabligh wa al-Dawa, that was particularly active in the Maghribi communities in Europe.<sup>6</sup>

Foreign influences were important in providing models to emulate and money to spend. The oil price rises of the 1970s gave an enormous boost to the visibility, prestige and patronage of the conservative monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula. To counteract the influence of leftist ideologies and movements that had earlier bedeviled them, the Gulf monarchies used their new wealth to support what seemed at the time more conservative causes. Not only did the Saudi government build mosques and training centers for imams throughout the Islamic world, for example, they also provided discreet support for Islamic "study circles" and discussion groups.<sup>7</sup> By the end of the decade the success of the Iranian revolution gave an enormous boost to the Islamist political cause, seeming to serve as proof of both the righteousness and feasibility of imposing religious standards in politics.

By and large, however, the Islamic movements in North Africa, as elsewhere, reflect the local circumstances in which they developed. Although the movements in each of the countries of North Africa shared similar (though not identical) outlooks, adopted similar discourses and enjoyed many of the same external financial patrons, they were specific products of the circumstances created for them by the policies of each government. This was to be reflected in

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<sup>6</sup>See Gilles Kepel, La Revanche de Dieu (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1991)

<sup>7</sup>Nazih N. Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London: 1992), p. 179 et seq.

the relative strength of the movements in Tunisia and Algeria, as opposed to Morocco and Libya, as well as in specific elements of their programs, including the apparent willingness of the Tunisian and Algerian movements to entertain democratic institutions as a vehicles for political participation--something few Moroccan or Libyan Islamists deemed worth considering.

Although they have a widespread appeal in the lower strata of society, the active adherents of the Islamist movements tended to be French-speaking (except, of course, in Libya) university graduates--first generation members of the white collar salariat, whose fathers had been workers or peasants. Francois Burgat tells us that:

The vast majority of militants appear in reality to come from the modernist stratum of society (university teachers, low-level civil servants, etc., ) and the young....The cadres of the movements, notably in Tunisia, tend to be urban professionals. They are high school teachers, accountants, small businessmen, artisans....Their family background appears to be mostly from poorer levels of society, small salaried workers or subproletariat. Forty-eight percent of the fathers of the militants [who were studied in Tunisia] were illiterate...<sup>8</sup>

These lower middle class Islamists profited from the activities of their movements both in spreading the word and providing concrete benefits. In providing free medicine, distributing school equipment, organizing garbage collection, offering

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<sup>8</sup>Burgat, The Islamist Movement, p. 99; also see Ayubi, Political Islam, pp. 158-177.

legal and administrative advice, organizing scouting groups, the Islamists played roles in social life that the governments had once claimed but then deliberately or inadvertently abdicated.

Observers argued, for example, that much of the support for the Front islamique du salut (FIS) in Algeria was a protest against a single-party regime that had grown rigid, self-seeking and out-of-touch; the claim of the Front de liberation nationale (FLN) to legitimacy as the spearhead of the revolution against France carried little weight among the seventy-five percent of the population under thirty years old. For the segments of the population who operated on the margins of the formal economy--and some estimates put half the work force in the "black market" or "informal economy,"--economic insecurity was exacerbated by legal ambiguity and FIS was quick to understand and exploit this. FIS activists not only provided emergency relief services after floods and earthquakes far more quickly and efficiently than the government, but they guaranteed law and order where the government could or would not, providing policing, for example, of the illegal but ubiquitous flea markets where contraband imports from Europe were sold.

Thus, although both FIS and its opponents framed the debate in ideological terms, FIS represented more than simply an ideological challenge to the status quo. The party was often better organized, more efficient, and less corrupt than the government administration. As such, it not only effectively discredited the regime by providing services in its stead but--and this critical to their capacity to

seize the terrain of opposition--they also out-performed the secular political opposition. With the partial exception of ethnically-based parties like the Front des forces socialistes in Algeria, the secular legal opposition defined its mandate in narrowly political terms such as contesting elections or publishing newspapers and eschewed social and economic activities, and as a result developed little or no grassroots following. Although through the late 1980s, neither the urban sub-proletariat nor the rural peasantry appeared to have significantly mobilized by Islamist groups anywhere in North Africa, the popularity of FIS before its prohibition suggested that the support for Islamist movements was increasingly crossing social class. In 1990, a young Algerian explain his support for FIS in the following terms:

...you have only four choices: you can remain unemployed and celibate because their are no jobs and no apartments to live in; you can work in the black market and risk being arrested; you can try to emigrate to France to sweep the streets of Paris or Marseilles; or you can join the FIS and vote for Islam.<sup>9</sup>

#### The Contemporary Islamist Movements in North Africa: Programs

In a survey done in Algiers at the end of 1991, only half of those who claimed to support FIS declared themselves favorable to the installation of an

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<sup>9</sup>quoted in Mark Tessler, "Anger and Governance in the Arab World: Lessons from the Maghrib and Implications for the West," Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 13:3, p. 17.

Islamic Republic.<sup>10</sup> The widespread support for Islamist movements among individuals who do not support what would seem key elements of their program is both a cause and a consequence of the ambiguity of the program itself. Like political parties and movements out of power elsewhere, the Islamists attempt to win and keep the widest possible public sympathy through vague and often emotional appeals to popular sentiments rather than detailed and specific policy proposals that might alienate some of their followers. Moreover, it is a truism of political science that political parties with no prospect of gaining power often advocate positions they know to be untenable, contesting elections solely to advertise their positions. These characteristics of political opposition with little hope of participation in power makes analysis of the "true" ideological positions of Islamist movements difficult.

Because, with the brief exception of FIS, they have been excluded from competing legitimately for power, the movements themselves have had little incentives to develop detailed practical programs--and ample motive to exaggerate their claims. Therefore some of the confusion and ambiguity in their platforms must be attributed to the government policy that refuses them the opportunity to put programs to a test, at the polls or in power. In the same vein, although Islamist leaders frequently condone the use of violence--Abd al-Salam Yasin, for example, has argued that "Islam gives him who spends the night hungry the right

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<sup>10</sup> cited in Burgat, The Islamist Movement, p. 100.

to bear arms against him who has deprived him of the bounty of God,"<sup>11</sup>--the quick resort to violence for which the Islamists are so often noted must be at least partly attributed to the violence visited upon them by their governments.<sup>12</sup>

One element of the Islamist position is fairly and consistent across movements: rejection of the West and things associated with the West.<sup>13</sup> For some Islamists (as for some analysts) this incompatibility is a timeless and essential feature of the relationship between Islam and the West. For others, such as Rachid Ghannouchi, leader of the Tunisian Mouvement de la tendance islamique (MTI), it is a historically-specific reflection of the modern era:

Our problem is that we had to deal with the West from both a position of psychological and material weakness....But I maintain that this unequal and perverse relationship with the West is not fatal. Japan piously conserves its traditions and culture, its civilization, and participates nonetheless in the universal development of modernity....To tell the truth, the only way to accede to modernity is by our own path, that which has been traced for us by our religion, our history, and our civilization.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>quoted in Munson, Religion and Power, p. 164.

<sup>12</sup>for an expansion of this argument, see Lissa Anderson, "Lawless Government and Illegal Opposition: Reflections on the Middle East," Journal of International Affairs, 40:2 Winter/Spring 1987.

<sup>13</sup>See, for a good analysis of one movement, Abdelasiem El-Difraoui, "Le critique du systeme democratique par le Front islamique du salut," in Gilles Kepel et Remy Leveau, eds., Exils et Royaumes: les appartenances au monde arabo-musulman aujourd'hui (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1994).

<sup>14</sup>quoted in Burgat, The Islamist Movement, p. 63.

From this more historically contingent perspective, the Islamist movements are natural continuations of independence movements that have stalled before attaining their final goal. As such they reflect the ambiguities in the nationalist movements themselves. As Algerian sociologist Lahouari Addi puts it:

The eventual accession of a religious regime in Algeria would represent a logical extension of the nationalism of the National Liberation Front (FLN), which was itself fundamentally religious....The Western left--and ultimately Moscow--lent Algerian nationalism the veneer of post-capitalist revolutionary virtue. The nationalist leaders permitted this ideological ambiguity to persist in order to attach to the regime the trappings of modernity. Beneath the surface, the radical nationalism of the FLN borrowed only the exterior forms of modernity while reproducing traditional society's political categories.....The downward leveling [the Nasirist-type regimes] carried out, the egalitarianism they promised, the aspirations and individual liberties they promised, the critical sensibility they fought, the cult of the leader-for-life, the confiscation of public space--these were so many elements which perpetuated the colonial social model and reactivated traditional social structures. The Islamic opposition does not reject this model; it rather accuses the leadership of being incapable of realizing it.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>Addi, MERIP, p.36; also see his "Religion and Modernity in Algeria," Journal of Democracy, 3:4 October 1992.

For many Islamists, apparent political independence did not produce freedom, either for the country in the international system or for the individual at home, nor did it lead to economic prosperity or cultural renewal. Indeed, Western languages, political institutions, economic strictures, and cultural influences continue to be strong.

Moreover, to add insult to injury, dependence upon and fascination with things Western in the Islamic world is almost completely unrequited. As the behavior of the Western tourists, the structure of the Western oil market, the policies of Western strategic planners all testify, Western interest in North Africa is more a function of its physical than its human or cultural resources. While the governments do not--indeed, cannot--acknowledge the psychological dilemma created by this disparity because they cannot bite the hand that feeds their countries, the Islamists openly express the widespread popular resentment of the lack of interest shown by Westerners in the peoples and cultures of the Islamic world.

For a significant number of Islamist leaders, the reciprocal rejection of Western influence is absolute, and notions of popular sovereignty, majority rule, pluralist democracy are equated with exploitation and inauthenticity. Abd al-Salam Yasin of Morocco advocates a "just imam" to guide the people and calls for the banning of political parties.<sup>16</sup> Ali Belhadj, of Algeria's FIS argues that:

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<sup>16</sup>cited in Henry Munson, Jr., Religion and Power in Morocco, p. 169.

The ruler is not qualified to modify the law...That right belongs neither to the ruler nor to the people, but to scholars who know the rules of the Ijtihad at the same time as the temporal conditions existing in the societies to which they belong.... Those who followed the Prophet were a very small number, while those who followed idols were a multitude.<sup>17</sup>

Others, even in the same movement at the same time are more pragmatic, equivocal, or eclectic. Abbassi Madani, for example, who is Belhadj's colleague at the head of FIS, suggests about elections that:

Our position will be to accept and respect the will of the people...there exists in this country some people who demand Islam and others who do not. As a consequence to avoid "Lebanization," we understand each other on a minimum, that is to say the will of the people.<sup>18</sup>

As a general rule, the closer the movements are to the prospect of sharing power, the more pragmatic they appear. This may be duplicitous moderation or genuine political compromise but Burgat, for example, argues that "sensible corrections" or a moderation of early doctrines is visible in a number of movements:

The dominant logic is to reduce the distance between the two different universes of reference (between classical Muslim thinking and the supposedly Western universe of political modernity), whose contradictions were too hastily considered impossible to overcome. The ideological

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<sup>17</sup> cited in Burgat, The Islamist Movement, p. 125.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 128.

itinerary followed by the Tunisian [MTI] from 1975 to 1990 was such that the group has fully adopted today a number of proposals (on democracy, women, and all the major issues which the media concentrates on today) that only a short while earlier had been so strongly rejected that their original promoters had ultimately quit the movement.<sup>19</sup>

Are such expressions of growing moderation merely trojan horses? Are those who call Abdelfatah Mourou, ex-secretary of MTI, "Mr. Valium," for his efforts to be moderate and reassuring (thereby presumably lulling the otherwise vigilant to sleep) right? Among the fears voiced by FIS opponents was the possibility that the willingness of the Islamists--whose attachment to democratic rhetoric and values was never more than qualified--to participate in democratic elections was merely tactical, designed to produce the now famed outcome of "one man, one vote, one time."

It is impossible to tell for sure but the Tunisian experience of the early 1980s lends credence to the proposition that the Islamist movements are reactionary not only ideologically but also tactically--they "react" to the strategies adopted to confront them. When the government of Prime Minister Mohammed Mzali challenged the Islamist movement of the day with quasi-legal status and the prospect of participation, much of the original rhetoric of the movement moderated and although there were divisions, including the break-off of the "progressives" associated with the magazine 15/21, there was far more realism.

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<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 82.

The return to repression after Mzali's demise as prime minister served to radicalize the movement.<sup>20</sup> This would seem to argue for a policy of inclusion rather than the position now adopted by all the governments of North Africa to exclude and harass the adherents of Islamic political ideologies.

#### *The Contemporary Islamist Movements in North Africa: Prospects*

The prospects for the Islamist movements are not fully within their control, and it is probably fair to say that, in the current political climate, they can only come to power as a result of a violent overthrow of the current regime in all of the countries of North Africa. What kind of administrative capacity would they be likely to display?

As we have seen, unlike the other opposition movements in North Africa the Islamists have been willing--indeed, insistent upon--undertaking social and economic projects in direct competition with the state. This reflects their commitment not merely to seize political power but to transform society. As such they have more administrative experience than any other group outside the state, but they are also more prone than any other group to aspire to replace rather than rely on the existing civilian and military bureaucracies. Indeed, neither they nor the regime see the existing administration as a neutral instrument--a "permanent civil service;" for both the regime and its Islamist opponents, the public bureaucracy is an extension of the government, profoundly implicated in

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<sup>20</sup>Burgat, The Islamic Movement, p. 224.

the government's policies. This is why the state as a whole can be characterized by the Islamists as corrupt even if many of its incumbents are conceded to be honest, well-intentioned, and competent.

Thus, despite the relatively high levels of administrative experience in the Islamist movements, a period of considerable instability and uncertainty would be virtually inevitable after an Islamist takeover, as the old administrative structure is dismantled and replaced with an administration that in policy and personnel more closely reflected the ideological complexion of the new regime.

For the same reasons, it is difficult to foresee a stable power-sharing arrangement. Unlike the secular opposition--the signatories of the Tunisian National Pact, for example<sup>21</sup>--the Islamists do not see themselves as partners in so much as alternatives to the current regimes. Students of liberal democratic theory may not be fazed by the Islamist position--after all, alternation in power is one of the hallmarks of a working democracy--but, as the governments' own policies demonstrate, no regime in North Africa is prepared to cede control of the state apparatus they constructed in the decades after independence to another political formation, particularly one that threatens to dismantle it.

Indeed, this was an essential feature of the contest between the FLN and the FIS. Obviously, the FLN, particularly that part of it that supported the coup, was no more democratic than the much-reviled FIS. In fact, there was considerable irony in the debate about which party was more (or less) attached

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<sup>21</sup>see Lisa Anderson, "Political Pacts, Liberalism, and Democracy: The Tunisian National Pact of 1988," Government and Opposition 26:2 Spring 1991.

to democracy since it pointed up the remarkable extent to which FIS was a product and reflection of the FLN itself--"le fils du FLN". It was a similarly monolithic movement, providing an alternative rationale for a virtually identical system of government patronage. The beneficiaries were to be different, the system of benefits the same. Indeed, like the gas-fed FLN regime, FIS was even a recipient of important externally generated revenues. Well after they lost their aid from the Saudi and Kuwaiti governments in the aftermath of the Gulf war, FIS and other Islamist movements were believed to receive funds from private Saudi benefactors as well as local business interests who, as it was reported, "out of faith or opportunism are putting their money--or some if it--on an Islamic future."<sup>22</sup>

It is not clear that a FIS victory would have fundamentally altered the character of Algeria's rent-based large-state welfare system. Although FIS, like most Islamist movements, was more tolerant of private ownership and enterprise than the Arab socialists who ruled during the construction of the large states than now prevail in North Africa, they were far better at identifying how they would spend money once in power than in determining where it would come from.

If the system was not likely to change in structure, however, the beneficiaries clearly would be different under an Islamist regime, in Algeria and elsewhere. This was the basis of the disquiet among the many social groups--


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<sup>22</sup>Tom Porteous, "The crisis in Algeria: what chance democracy? Middle East International, 404, 12 July 1991 p. 17.

religious minorities, upper-class women, the favored ethnic groups, families and regions--who were so adamant in their opposition to the Islamists. The social and economic elite in North Africa won their status and wealth after independence in large measure through their political standing among the ideologically or ascriptively favored. As a result, political change threatens far more than their access to policy-making; it imperils everything they have come to expect of life, including their social position and economic well-being. Hence they have little to lose and much to preserve in a stance of implacable hostility to the Islamist movements.

Will such policies succeed? Harsh repression of Islamist movements, like harsh repression of other movements, inhibits open expression of support, both moral and material; divides the leadership, weakening the moderates and radicalizing the extremists; and encourages resort to violence. What it does not do is solve the problems to which the movements originally spoke. As the failure of the Nasirist repression of the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1960s to eliminate either the sentiments or the organization in Egypt should suggest, political Islam is an exceptionally resilient ideology and movement. Insofar as economic problems feed the discontent upon which the movements draw, economic development may shrink their potential constituency. The relative weakness of the movements among the very poor suggests, however, that economic grievances are not the sole issue to which Islamic movements speak. Some of the dilemmas to which they give expression--questions of justice,

accountability, limits on government arbitrariness that are raised in the Islamists' call for the rule of law (as well as the human rights movement), for example--are political problems that admit only of political solutions, and for these the governments must search within themselves.



## 5

## Le codéveloppement

*Un nouveau modèle  
de la coopération euro-maghrébine*

par Habib Slim

De tout temps, la Méditerranée a été un espace de rencontre, de dialogue, d'échanges et de commerce, au sens le plus large du terme. Mais, cet espace a été, parfois aussi, un théâtre de confrontation entre les hommes. Ces luttes fratricides n'ont pourtant jamais pu empêcher la circulation des hommes et des idées et les interférences entre les peuples. D'une façon magistrale, Fernand Braudel (1) et Germaine Tillion (2) ont su montrer, l'un dans le domaine de l'histoire des civilisations et l'autre dans celui de l'ethnographie, l'unité remarquable du monde méditerranéen.

Il est vrai que celle-ci se trouve de plus en plus masquée, voire occultée par une exploitation des phénomènes de masse, provoqués par toutes sortes d'extrémismes religieux ou politiques qui tentent de dresser des barrières entre les deux rives de la Méditerranée. Une telle situation a été facilitée par le fait que l'espace méditerranéen est devenu un espace extraverti, transformé en espace de confrontation stratégique, non seulement sur le plan militaire, mais aussi sur le plan politique, social, culturel, religieux. La Medi-

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(1) Fernand Braudel, le grand historien de la Méditerranée, écrivait : « Le passé méditerranéen, à dire vrai, c'est une histoire accumulée en couches aussi épaisses que l'histoire de la Chine lointaine », in *La Méditerranée, l'histoire et l'espace*, Flammarion, Paris, 1985, p. 157.

Voir aussi : Fernand Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen à l'époque de Philippe II*, A. Colin, Paris, 1966.

(2) Germaine Tillion, *Le Harem et les Cousins*, Seuil, Paris, 1965.

terranée est devenue, comme le disait si bien Jean-Marie Crouzatier, « le type même de l'espace éclaté où les intervenants extérieurs, les relations bilatérales avec d'autres zones, l'emportent sur les relations multilatérales internes » (3).

Cependant, comment peut-on oublier tout ce que le Nord et le Sud de la Méditerranée ont en commun et que Jacques Berque appelle les *Andalousies*? (4) Comment peut-on oublier que les éléments essentiels de la civilisation européenne proviennent du monde méditerranéen? Comment peut-on oublier, enfin, que toute la richesse de la Méditerranée provient du fait qu'elle constitue non seulement un carrefour stratégique, mais aussi un carrefour de civilisations et de cultures? N'est-ce pas pour cela qu'Albert Camus a chanté, dans ses *Noces à Tipasa*, « cette "race méditerranéenne" née du soleil et de la mer, vivante et savoureuse, qui puise sa grandeur dans sa simplicité et, debout, adresse son sourire complice au sourire éclatant de ses ciels »?

Certes, à l'heure actuelle, il n'existe aucune entité méditerranéenne et aucune organisation internationale ne reconnaît une région méditerranéenne homogène. Pourtant, comme l'affirme Jean-Marie Crouzatier, « par-delà la diversité, l'unité méditerranéenne est évidente : les riverains sont liés entre eux par une mer intérieure assez étendue pour permettre la variété des cultures, mais pas assez pour les séparer ».

...Et il ajoute : « Un climat caractéristique (le climat méditerranéen), des paysages comparables, une histoire faite d'interactions, une certaine communauté de destin, sont les bases de cette unité qui imprègne la conscience des Méditerranéens » (5).

Au surplus, entre les pays sud-méditerranéens et les espaces défavorisés du sud de l'Europe, comme l'Andalousie, le Mezzogiorno, la Crète, la Corse et même certaines régions industrielles durement affectées par le déclin des activités traditionnelles, comme l'Irlande et le Pays de Galles, il existe des parentés, voire des similitudes accusées : taux de chômage élevé, forte fécondité, prépondérance de l'agriculture, faiblesse des réseaux de communication, émigration, etc.

Il est certain que les pays du nord de la Méditerranée ne peuvent se désintéresser du sort de leurs voisins du Sud. Leur situa-

(3) Jean-Marie Crouzatier, *Géopolitique de la Méditerranée*, Publisud, Paris-Toulouse, 1988, p. 17.

(4) Jacques Berque, *Le Maghreb entre deux guerres*, Seuil, Paris, 1962.

(5) Crouzatier, *Géopolitique de la Méditerranée*, pp. 11-12.

tion géopolitique, comme leurs intérêts stratégiques le commandent. Si bien que l'on ne peut envisager sérieusement, dans l'avenir, la prospérité de l'Europe du Sud, sans un Maghreb assuré d'un minimum de croissance économique et donc susceptible d'investir plus pour acheter plus d'équipements, créer plus d'emplois pour ses inactifs, et améliorer le pouvoir d'achat de ses actifs. C'est dire que la prospérité du Maghreb doit être considérée comme un élément essentiel de la future prospérité de ses partenaires de l'Europe du Sud. Il y a là une donnée majeure pour l'avenir des relations euro-maghrébines.

La seconde donnée majeure qui va conditionner, dans les prochaines années, l'évolution de la coopération euro-maghrébine, consistera à savoir comment réduire les distorsions et les inégalités trop flagrantes dans les niveaux de vie entre le Nord et le Sud. Si l'on veut que l'espace méditerranéen devienne un espace de complémentarité, d'enrichissement mutuel, d'intérêts communs et non d'antagonismes et de confrontation, il est capital de trouver les moyens adéquats pour diminuer les écarts d'ordre socio-économique, devenus trop excessifs et donc insupportables entre les deux rives de la Méditerranée (6). A l'heure actuelle, une telle volonté existe et a été clairement exprimée par tous les gouvernements concernés par le processus de coopération entre les cinq pays de l'Union du Maghreb arabe (UMA) d'une part, et, d'autre part, les quatre

(6) Les pays de la rive nord ont un revenu moyen par tête de l'ordre de 6 000 dollars, alors que ceux du Maghreb n'atteignent qu'un revenu de l'ordre de 2 000 dollars, soit un rapport de 1 à 3 entre les revenus du Sud et du Nord. Encore ces chiffres moyens masquent-ils, en réalité, d'énormes écarts entre les extrêmes. Voir :

- Bernard Ravenel, *Méditerranée : le Nord contre le Sud*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 1990, p. 15.
- Claude Nigoul et Maurice Torrelli, *Menaces en Méditerranée*, Fondation pour les études de défense nationale, Paris, 1987, p. 13.
- Bichara Khader et autres, *Marché unique européen, Méditerranée, Maghreb*, vol. II. « Le développement économique et les investissements au Maghreb dans la perspective du Marché unique », étude réalisée pour le Secrétariat d'État à l'Europe 1992, Bruxelles, non publié, p. 98.
- Chedly Ayari, *Enjeux méditerranéens : pour une coopération euro-arabe*, Les Éditions de la Méditerranée, Alif, Tunis, 1992.
- Charles Reynaud, Abdelkader Sid Ahmed (sous la direction de), *L'avenir de l'espace méditerranéen*, Publisud/Crédit Mutuel Méditerranéen, Paris, 1991.
- Paul Balta, *La Méditerranée réinventée*, La Découverte/Fondation René Seydoux, Paris, 1992.
- Ch. Ayari, A. Cartapanis, X. Greffe, J.L. Reiffers et autres, *Les économies méditerranéennes : premier rapport général sur la situation des riverains au début des années 90*, Economica, Paris, 1992.
- Bichara Khader, *Le Grand Maghreb et l'Europe. Enjeux et Perspectives*, Paris/Bruxelles, Publisud-Quorum-CERMAC, 1992, pp. 73 et suivantes.
- Crouzatier, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-46.

pays de l'Europe du Sud (Espagne, France, Italie et Portugal), plus Malte. Elle vise à transcender la Méditerranée et à en faire, non une zone de fracture, mais une « nouvelle frontière », au sens kennedyiste du terme (7).

Dans cette optique, les États riverains de la Méditerranée occidentale doivent mettre au point, ensemble, une politique de développement accéléré pour les pays du Sud, dans laquelle les pays du Nord devraient s'impliquer davantage. Cette politique de développement devrait s'efforcer d'apporter une réponse satisfaisante aux problèmes et aux contraintes économiques, financières, sociales, impliquées par une croissance rapide et nécessaire des pays du Sud.

### **Les fondements et les objectifs du codéveloppement**

Le concept de codéveloppement est apparu à la fin des années 70, dans le discours des socialistes français sur le Tiers monde. La formule a été, semble-t-il, lancée surtout sous l'influence de l'ancien Premier ministre Michel Rocard, puis reprise par Jean-Pierre Cot. Elle exprimait, selon celui-ci, « le désir de donner une traduction concrète, immédiate, permanente à la solidarité » de la France avec certains pays africains avec lesquels elle possède des relations préférentielles, en combinant « la nécessité d'ajustements structurels dans un nouvel ordre économique international » (8).

L'idée a été reprise par Claude Cheysson, lorsqu'il était Commissaire européen, pour essayer d'en faire l'un des axes principaux de la politique méditerranéenne de la CE dont il était chargé, mais sans succès. Car cette politique méditerranéenne, même rénovée, est restée fidèle à l'approche classique de la coopération économique bilatérale, à travers son volet commercial et son volet « aide au développement ». C'est dire que, comme l'affirmait Habib El Malki avec force, malgré la politique méditerranéenne rénovée, « l'Europe, (...) dans cette zone, reste orientée par une sensibilité marchande qui ne dépasse pas le court terme » (9).

(7) Ravenel, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

(8) Jean-Pierre Cot, *A l'épreuve du pouvoir : le tiers-mondisme, pour quoi faire ?*, Seuil, Paris, 1984, p. 69.

(9) Habib El Malki, « La coopération entre les deux rives de la Méditerranée à l'épreuve dans les années 90 : le cas des relations CEE-UMA », Communication au Colloque de Madrid, décembre 1989, polycopié, p. 8.

Tenter d'établir une théorie générale ou même une définition du codéveloppement n'est pas chose aisée. Il est sans doute plus facile d'esquisser une typologie empirique des expériences de codéveloppement. A cet égard, Henri Regnault a pu distinguer trois catégories d'expériences de codéveloppement : un codéveloppement entre grands pôles économiques (États-Unis, Japon et Europe), un codéveloppement régional homogène entre pays à niveau économique similaire (la CEE à neuf, avant l'entrée de la Grèce) et un codéveloppement hétérogène entre régions ou pays à niveau économique contrasté (régions nord et sud de la CE, l'Amérique du Nord et Mexique, la CE et les pays de la Méditerranée) (10).

Dans la pratique, le codéveloppement a été lancé, semble-t-il, par les États-Unis au Viêt-nam et en Corée, pour contrecarrer le péril communiste. Il a été, ensuite, largement utilisé dans la zone Pacifique où il a, sans doute, contribué à la prospérité des « dragons » asiatiques dont la réussite n'a pas été uniquement le fruit d'une politique d'aide extérieure, mais aussi et surtout de mécanismes de transferts de capitaux et de technologie, dans un sens, et de flux de marchandises, dans l'autre sens.

Jean-Pierre Cot, qui a tenté de définir le concept de codéveloppement dans un livre où il exprime son tiers-mondisme, s'est heurté à son aspect nébuleux et polymorphe à la fois. Mais, il affirme :

« Si l'expression doit conserver un sens, elle doit s'appuyer sur une véritable coplanification des efforts économiques. Elle implique une maturité de transactions, une régularité de relations, une volonté de part et d'autre d'affirmer la nature privilégiée de la relation et d'en tirer les conséquences » (11).

C'est dire qu'on ne peut concevoir une stratégie de codéveloppement pour le Maghreb sans la réunion d'un certain nombre de conditions relatives aux fondements et aux objectifs d'une telle stratégie.

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(10) Cette typologie a été dégagée par Henri Regnault, président du Groupe de recherche sur les économies régionales du Bassin méditerranéen (Faculté de Droit de Pau), dans une conférence donnée à la Faculté des sciences humaines et sociales de Tunis I.

(11) Cot, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

*Le codéveloppement est une œuvre de solidarité*

Cette solidarité est dictée par la proximité géographique aussi bien que par les héritages communs et par l'interpénétration des intérêts économiques. Il faut rappeler que les deux tiers des échanges extérieurs du Maghreb se font avec l'Europe des Douze et près de 50 % avec les pays de l'Europe du Sud. A l'inverse, le Maghreb ne représente que 2 à 3 % des échanges de la Communauté. Ce qui illustre la forte dépendance des économies maghrébines vis-à-vis de la CE. A titre de comparaison, les États-Unis ne représentent que 42 % environ des échanges de l'Amérique latine, et le Japon 20 % des échanges asiatiques. En revanche, l'Amérique latine absorbe 12 à 13 % des échanges américains et l'Asie 24 % des échanges japonais. Ce qui montre que les relations États-Unis-Amérique latine et Japon-Asie sont plus équilibrées que les relations CE-Maghreb (12). En participant davantage à l'œuvre de développement du Maghreb, l'Europe aura, en même temps, à diminuer ces déséquilibres, devenus insupportables.

Par ailleurs, il faut noter que plus de 80 % des touristes qui passent leurs vacances au Maghreb viennent d'Europe. En fait, les réseaux de communication et d'intérêts communs sont si denses entre l'espace européen et l'espace maghrébin que l'on peut considérer la complémentarité entre les deux espaces comme une donnée géopolitique fondamentale. Autrement dit, comme l'a si bien affirmé Jean-Louis Roy, délégué général du Québec à Paris, dans son livre, 1992, *l'Europe du XXI<sup>e</sup> siècle* : « La CE et le Maghreb ont besoin l'un de l'autre ».

L'histoire et plus particulièrement la prochaine décennie démontreront que cette donnée géopolitique fondamentale et incontournable implique que les deux ensembles s'entendent pour gérer d'une manière plus équitable et équilibrée les besoins et les intérêts mutuels, de manière à éviter les phénomènes pervers, les tensions ou les explosions qui deviendraient inévitables, si le grave et intolérable déséquilibre actuel devait persister. Il faut se rendre à l'évidence des faits et des réalités et admettre que les lois européennes les plus sévères ne pourront jamais arriver à bout de l'immigration clandestine, tant que l'on n'aura pas attaqué, ensemble, le mal à sa racine, en investissant le plus possible dans des projets créateurs d'emplois et de valeur ajoutée. De même, le problème de la dette restera insoluble, tant que l'on n'aura pas trouvé le

(12) Voir Khader et autres, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

moyen de soulager la balance des paiements du service de la dette, grâce à un système de recyclage de celle-ci et grâce à l'investissement direct.

Le codéveloppement n'est pas une œuvre de bienfaisance. Il est fondé sur les solidarités d'intérêt entre le Maghreb et la Communauté européenne. Celle-ci pourrait mobiliser, canaliser et faciliter l'installation au Maghreb des industries européennes, devenues non compétitives et donc condamnées, par le jeu des restructurations de l'espace économique européen ou bien du fait de la nouvelle division de la production imposée par l'internationalisation de celle-ci. Cette délocalisation des entreprises en difficulté offre des avantages aux deux parties. Pour le Maghreb, elle permet de créer plus d'emplois, d'augmenter la capacité de production et d'exportation, d'accroître le potentiel de savoir-faire et de technologie, de développer l'investissement direct. Pour l'Europe, elle permet de sauver des entreprises en difficulté, de les rendre compétitives et donc aptes à se tailler de nouvelles parts de marché, de retenir la main-d'œuvre locale sur place, de vendre plus d'équipements et même de créer de nouveaux types d'emploi en Europe, soit en amont, soit en aval des activités délocalisées.

#### *Le codéveloppement : une œuvre basée sur un changement d'approche dans les relations Maghreb/CE*

Depuis 1969, les relations du Maghreb avec la CE ont été marquées par le sceau d'une vision mercantiliste, centrée sur les relations commerciales et financières. Ainsi, en plus des protocoles financiers, ni les accords de 1976, ni les protocoles d'adaptation de 1987 n'ont su, ou pu, aller au-delà du schéma classique dans lequel la Communauté européenne a toujours accordé aux pays tiers méditerranéens un certain nombre de préférences, pour faciliter l'entrée sur le territoire de la CE de leurs produits industriels et de leurs exportations agricoles traditionnelles. Mais, naturellement les premiers pouvaient buter contre les clauses de sauvegarde ou les accords d'autolimitation, comme il en a été dans le domaine du textile. Quant aux seconds, ils devaient franchir les obstacles des prix de référence, des calendriers, ou des contingents fixés arbitrairement, en fonction de moyennes de production, elles-mêmes largement tributaires des aléas climatiques.

A titre d'exemple, on peut citer le cas du contingent de 28 000 tonnes d'agrumes, accordé à la Tunisie et correspondant à une

moyenne calculée à partir des exportations de quatre années de sécheresse qui ont provoqué non seulement un grave déficit pluviométrique, mais aussi une baisse dangereuse de la nappe phréatique, rendant difficile l'irrigation. A partir de l'année 1987, la reprise d'une pluviométrie normale et la mise en service du canal Medjerda-Cap Bon ont permis à la Tunisie d'accroître sa production et son potentiel d'exportation d'agrumes et notamment d'oranges maltaises, ces dernières n'étant connues et appréciées que sur certains marchés européens, en particulier en France.

On peut donc considérer qu'en dépit de ses efforts, tendant à développer son économie agrumicole, la Tunisie a été pénalisée par la Communauté européenne, par le jeu des contingents d'exportation fixés arbitrairement et sans tenir compte des impératifs de développement économique et social. De même, les exportations tunisiennes de vin sont pénalisées par le jeu des prix de référence, calculés en fonction des prix d'intervention et non en fonction des prix du marché. On peut multiplier encore les exemples montrant à quel point les impératifs de développement du Maghreb ont été sacrifiés aux contraintes purement commerciales imposées par les pays de la CE, alors qu'il fallait « trouver les moyens de concilier la mise en œuvre de la politique agricole commune, avec les objectifs légitimes du développement des économies agricoles des pays du Maghreb » (13).

Certes, on sait qu'avec l'adhésion de la Grèce, de l'Espagne et du Portugal, le taux d'autosuffisance de la CE est passé de 88 à 109 % en huile d'olive, de 51 à 89 % en agrumes, de 94 à 99 % en tomates, de 99 à 100 % en pommes de terre, de 98 à 104 % en vin (14). Ces chiffres indiquent que la Communauté à Douze peut largement se passer des exportations agricoles des pays du Maghreb, qui représentent, pourtant, 30 % des exportations marocaines et plus de 10 % des exportations tunisiennes vers la CE (15).

En conséquence, jamais la politique méditerranéenne, même rénovée, de la Communauté n'a été axée sur une approche de développement. Au contraire, les obstacles de tous ordres qui s'éri-

(13) Voir Habib Slim, *Réalités et perspectives des relations entre les pays européens de la Méditerranée occidentale et les pays du Maghreb associés à la CEE*. Actes du Colloque, 1<sup>er</sup> Forum méditerranéen, 25-26-27 févr. 1988. Éd. Échanges-Méditerranée. Marseille, p. 332.

(14) Khader et autres, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

(15) Mohamed Raki, « Les échanges agricoles euro-maghribins », in Actes du Colloque *Réalités et perspectives des relations entre les pays européens de la Méditerranée occidentale et les pays de l'UMA*. 2<sup>e</sup> Forum méditerranéen, 23 au 27 mai 1989. Éd. Winsoft. Tanger, Grenoble, p. 212.

gent devant les exportations agricoles traditionnelles, sont en train d'étrangler les économies agricoles des pays du Maghreb. De même, les producteurs de textiles ont fait les frais des accords d'autolimitation imposés aux pays du Maghreb.

Il est temps de rompre avec une telle approche étriquée et inefficace pour le développement et la croissance des économies maghrébines, pour lui substituer un véritable contrat entre les deux ensembles portant sur un programme global de développement pour le Maghreb.

La Communauté européenne semble en être désormais consciente. Puisque c'est précisément sur la base d'un constat analogue, fait à partir des graves insuffisances de sa politique globale méditerranéenne, que la Communauté a entrepris, entre 1988 et 1990, l'élaboration d'une nouvelle approche de cette politique. Celle-ci a été formulée sur la base de propositions faites par le Comité économique et social (16) et à la suite d'un mandat émanant du Conseil européen de Strasbourg, en décembre 1989. Et c'est sur la base d'un excellent diagnostic de la situation que la Commission a établi, le 22 mai 1990, une version définitive de la Politique méditerranéenne rénovée (PMR) (17), dans laquelle elle affirme qu'une aggravation des disparités économiques et sociales entre l'Europe des Douze et les pays tiers méditerranéens, mettrait en jeu sa sécurité, au sens large. Et elle conclut que la « proximité géographique et l'intensité des rapports de toute nature » entre la Communauté et les pays tiers méditerranéens font de la stabilité et de la prospérité de ces pays, des éléments essentiels pour la Communauté elle-même.

Le problème qui reste posé par la PMR, c'est que le remède qui a été prescrit par le médecin ne correspondait pas au diagnostic de la maladie, notamment en ce qui concerne la coopération financière. « Il existe un fossé », écrit Roberto Aliboni, entre les déclarations de la CE sur l'importance de la Méditerranée et son rôle effectif dans la coopération financière avec cette zone » (18). Dans ce

(16) Voir Avis du Comité économique et social sur la politique méditerranéenne de la Communauté européenne. Bruxelles, 12 juillet 1989. CES, 835/89. Supplément d'avis du CES sur la politique méditerranéenne de la Communauté européenne. Bruxelles, 26 avril 1990. CES, 512/90.

(17) Voir CEE, la Commission propose une politique méditerranéenne rénovée, Bruxelles, 22 mai 1990.

(18) Roberto Aliboni. « The Mediterranean Scenario : Economy and Security in the Regions South of the EC », in *The International Spectator*, n° 2, A quarterly journal of the Istituto Affari Internazionali, Fratelli Palombi, Roma, avril-juin 1990, 144.

domaine, la Communauté n'a fait qu'administrer « un cautère sur une jambe de bois » (19).

En réalité, la PMR n'a pas du tout apporté un changement d'approche dans la coopération avec les pays méditerranéens. Celle-ci reste marquée par sa globalité. Et, au nom du globalisme, le statut préférentiel initial des pays du Maghreb a été sacrifié sur « l'autel » de la politique agricole commune, des objectifs purement commerciaux et des impératifs du « saupoudrage » financier (20). Au surplus, comme on l'a fait remarquer, il manque à la PMR une dimension véritablement régionale, puisque, « à la différence de la Convention de Lomé, les protocoles relatifs à la coopération financière et technique entre la CE et ses partenaires méditerranéens ne prévoient aucune affectation spéciale en faveur de la coopération régionale » (21).

C'est dire que, déçus par les tares de la PMR, les pays du Maghreb dont les économies sont solidement amarrées au marché européen, attendent de leurs partenaires méditerranéens un renouvellement hardi de leur coopération régionale ou sous-régionale.

#### *Le codéveloppement basé sur un modèle de développement concerté*

Tous les pays du Maghreb sont, à l'heure actuelle, engagés dans des programmes d'ajustement structurel, destinés à assainir et à moderniser leurs circuits économiques et à leur donner plus d'efficacité. Ces programmes, marqués par le modèle libéral, visent à libérer l'initiative privée, à encourager l'esprit d'entreprise, à stimuler les exportations et, corrélativement, à libéraliser les importations, enfin à rendre les entreprises suffisamment compétitives pour pouvoir affronter le marché mondial et se tailler des parts de marché.

Partout, même en Libye, la devise est : « Moins d'État, donc moins d'entreprises publiques ». Celles-ci sont en cours de privatisation. Il s'agit donc là d'un processus qui engraine sans aucun doute

(19) Voir Jacques Huntzinger, « Cadre et instruments d'une nouvelle coopération euro-maghrebine », Colloque sur *L'avenir de la coopération entre l'UMA et la France au sein de la CEE*, Marseille, juin 1990.

(20) Voir Fathallah Oualalou, « La problématique de la coopération maghrébine face au dynamisme de la Communauté européenne », in *Cahiers du CERMAC*, n° 66-67, Louvain-la-Neuve, 1989.

(21) Ntumba Luaba Lumu, *La CEE et les intégrations régionales des pays en développement*, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1990, p. 385.

le modèle libéral. Et il est inséparable des processus de transition démocratique qui se développent, avec des fortunes diverses, un peu partout au Maghreb (22). Tous ces processus de transition sont encore éminemment fragiles et ont besoin d'être renforcés. Car, il ne peut y avoir de démocratie sans développement, ni de développement sans démocratie. Ce sont là deux termes d'une même équation.

C'est dire toute l'importance qu'il faut accorder aux expériences de libéralisation économique en cours, menées dans le cadre des programmes d'ajustement structurel et se traduisant par un recul de l'étatisme et un développement de l'économie de marché. Un échec de ces processus d'ajustement, sous la pression conjuguée des contraintes démographiques et sociales, pourrait être fatal pour les processus de transition démocratique qui s'esquisse au Maghreb, non sans difficultés. Le cas de l'Algérie est, à cet égard, très significatif. Le raz-de-marée provoqué par le FIS, au premier tour des élections du 26 décembre 1991, du fait d'un vote-sanction, la démission du président Chadli Benjedid, la décomposition du FLN et le coup d'arrêt au processus démocratique relèvent de cette logique : trop longtemps contenues, les réactions sociales peuvent se déchaîner contre certaines implications de la politique économique libérale (vérité des prix, inflation, flexibilité de l'emploi, etc.) et provoquer une véritable implosion de systèmes en voie de transition démocratique (23).

L'Europe doit être attentive à ces risques qui sont réels et qui peuvent provoquer des réactions en chaîne difficilement contrôlables. Il est temps pour l'Europe du Sud de se concerter avec ses partenaires du Maghreb pour déterminer la contribution qu'elle peut apporter ainsi que le rôle qu'elle peut jouer pour assurer le triomphe du modèle de développement économique et politique fondé sur la liberté de l'esprit et de l'initiative privée.

Dans cette perspective, les pays du Maghreb sont en train de démontrer à l'Europe qu'ils constituent de bons élèves. Dès lors, ils trouvent anormal que l'Europe continue à les diluer dans la notion en fait hétérogène de pays tiers méditerranéens, comme ils considèrent comme inéquitable d'être alignés sur les pays du Machrek. Le Maghreb ne mérite-t-il pas une place à part en Méditerranée ?

(22) Voir Ayari, Cartapanis, Greffe, Reiffers et autres, *Les économies méditerranéennes : premier rapport général sur la situation des riverains au début des années 90*, chap. VIII, pp. 449-492.

(23) Voir Khader et autres, pp. 100-104.

née ? Comme le fait remarquer M. Abdallah Lahlou, ambassadeur du Maroc auprès de la CE : « Regardez les États-Unis, ils établissent des liens de libre-échange très intenses avec le Mexique. Le Maghreb, c'est un peu le Mexique de la Communauté, mais celle-ci n'en a pas encore pris conscience » (24).

*Le codéveloppement : moteur d'intégration  
d'un espace maghrébin lié à la CE*

Le Traité de Marrakech, signé le 17 février 1989 entre les chefs d'État des cinq pays du Maghreb (Algérie, Libye, Maroc, Mauritanie et Tunisie), a créé, contrairement aux tentatives précédentes, un édifice institutionnel assez complexe, ordonné autour d'un organe central qui se réunit tous les six mois et qui détient le pouvoir de décision. Il s'agit du Conseil présidentiel, formé par les chefs d'État, aidé dans ses tâches par un Conseil des ministres des Affaires étrangères, une Conférence des Premiers ministres, des Comités ministériels spécialisés, un Comité de suivi et un Secrétariat général. Ce schéma institutionnel comprend également une Assemblée consultative, représentant les parlements nationaux, ainsi qu'une Cour de justice qui doit trancher les litiges entre les États membres, concernant l'interprétation et l'application du Traité constitutif de l'Union (25).

Par ailleurs, le Traité de Marrakech a prévu clairement, dans son article 2, que ces institutions doivent faire évoluer, progressivement, l'Union vers la constitution d'un espace économique intégré, par la mise en œuvre de politiques communes et par la réalisation graduelle de la liberté de circulation des personnes, des biens, des services et des capitaux entre les pays membres. Conformément à ces objectifs, le Conseil présidentiel a entrepris, parallèlement à la mise en place et à l'organisation des autres institutions, l'établissement d'une stratégie et d'un calendrier pour la réalisation d'une Union économique orientée vers le développement com-

(24) Voir *Le Monde*, 12 mars 1991. Voir aussi, au sujet de la future zone de libre-échange américano-mexicaine : « Le rêve contrarié du Rio Grande », *Le Monde*, 17 déc. 1991.

(25) Voir Riadh Saada, *L'Union du Maghreb arabe : institutions et objectifs*, mémoire pour le DEA en droit public, Faculté de droit et des sciences politiques de Tunis, 1989-1990.

Abdelkader Kadiri, « Réflexions sur le Traité de Marrakech constituant l'Union du Maghreb arabe », in *Revue générale de droit public*, tome XCV, Paris, 1991, pp. 70-89.

Habib Slim, *Le Traité de Marrakech et l'évolution de l'Union du Maghreb arabe (1989-1991)*, dactylographié (à paraître).

mun. Et cela au cours de ses cinq sessions, tenues successivement à Tunis, en janvier 1990, à Alger, en juillet 1990, à Ras-Lanuf (en Libye), en mars 1991, à Casablanca, en septembre 1991 et à Nouakchott, en novembre 1992. Et c'est au cours du sommet de Ras-Lanuf que le Conseil a adopté les grandes lignes de la stratégie maghrébine de développement commun, échelonnée en quatre étapes :

— Première étape : établissement d'une zone de libre-échange entre les États membres, à partir de la fin de l'année 1992, grâce à la suppression des barrières douanières et non douanières qui paralysent la libre circulation des marchandises originaires des pays de l'UMA.

— Deuxième étape : constitution d'une union douanière, à la fin de 1995, grâce à une unification des taxes douanières, des régimes et des réglementations douanières.

— Troisième étape : établissement d'un marché commun, à l'horizon 2000.

— Quatrième étape : constitution d'une union économique impliquant une unification des politiques et des stratégies de développement économique, sur la base de fondements et d'objectifs communs.

Parallèlement, le Conseil a adopté également une série de dix conventions, dont les plus importantes sont : la Convention portant sur la création d'une Banque maghrébine d'investissements et du commerce extérieur, dotée d'un capital de 500 millions de dollars ; la Convention commerciale et tarifaire, établissant la libre circulation pour une liste de produits industriels et agricoles originaires des pays de l'Union (avec 40 % au moins de valeur ajoutée locale) ; ainsi que la Convention relative à une liste de produits agricoles libérés des restrictions non douanières.

A l'heure actuelle, la marche de l'UMA vers la constitution d'une zone de libre-échange semble freinée et la tenue de la cinquième session du Conseil présidentiel a été retardée du fait de la crise intérieure algérienne et du différend entre la Libye et les États-Unis, causé par « l'affaire Lockerbie » (26). Mais il n'est pas interdit d'être optimiste, en considérant que « le verre est déjà à moitié plein » et que cet arrêt n'est qu'une halte, imposée par des raisons conjoncturelles.

Dans ces conditions, la Communauté européenne doit tenir compte de cette nouvelle donnée et considérer l'UMA comme un

(26) « Pourquoi l'UMA n'existe pas », in *Jeune Afrique*, n° 1640, 11-17 juin 1992, pp. 18-21.

partenaire privilégié à la réussite duquel elle doit contribuer. En particulier, elle doit s'employer à faciliter la gestation de cet espace de libre-échange, bénéfique pour tous, en dynamisant les économies maghrébines et en favorisant l'installation, sur cet espace, des entreprises européennes. Celles-ci disposent déjà d'avantages comparatifs considérables : proximité, facilité des communications, similitudes dans le comportement des agents économiques, garantie totale de l'investissement, régimes d'accueil variés et très favorables, qu'il s'agisse du statut de l'entreprise non résidente (*off shore*), ou de celui de l'entreprise conjointe (*joint-venture*), ou encore celui de l'entreprise totalement exportatrice. Sans omettre de signaler le fait que les entreprises délocalisées pourront bénéficier aussi des avantages de cette nouvelle zone de libre-échange maghrébine qui comptera plus de 70 millions de consommateurs.

### Les mécanismes et les moyens du codéveloppement

A l'ouverture d'un colloque international sur les perspectives des relations Maghreb-CE, le président Ben Ali affirmait :

S'agissant du codéveloppement, il faut, nécessairement, s'employer à établir une approche efficiente d'un développement solidaire entre les régions maghrébine et européenne. Cela peut se concrétiser à travers certains instruments dont notamment un contrat fixant un programme unifié et déterminant les engagements des deux parties autour d'un plan précis, touchant les domaines de la technologie, de l'industrie, de l'agriculture, du commerce et autres, afin d'éviter l'élargissement du fossé séparant les deux partenaires et de servir leurs intérêts communs, dans le respect des spécificités régionales et nationales (27).

C'est dire que l'œuvre du codéveloppement doit être constituée par un programme volontariste de développement régional qui doit dépasser les actions ponctuelles ou conjoncturelles, orientées essentiellement vers l'assistance. Elle pourrait prendre la forme de deux types de programme de réformes structurelles, orientés vers l'efficacité et la croissance économique : d'une part, des programmes intégrés de développement et, d'autre part, des programmes de

(27) Voir *Le Renouveau*, n° 140, 18 novembre 1990, 8.

modernisation et de développement des petites et moyennes entreprises (PME), grâce au partenariat.

#### *Les programmes intégrés de développement*

Ces programmes doivent être élaborés sur la base des potentialités régionales et doivent viser à promouvoir l'investissement productif dans les différentes régions de l'UMA, à développer les infrastructures et à valoriser toutes les ressources humaines dans les principaux secteurs des économies régionales : agriculture, pêche, industrie agro-alimentaire, industrie manufacturière, artisanat, bâtiment et travaux publics, énergie, services, y compris le tourisme, etc. (28).

Dans ces différents secteurs, les programmes intégrés de développement (PDI) doivent s'inspirer des programmes intégrés méditerranéens (PIM), élaborés et mis en œuvre dès le début des années 80 et constamment améliorés depuis pour permettre la modernisation de l'économie des régions méditerranéennes attardées de l'Italie, de la France, de la Grèce, de l'Espagne et du Portugal.

En effet, pour corriger les disparités entre les régions riches de la Communauté et les régions déshéritées — les écarts entre elles étant de l'ordre de 1 à 5 — le Fonds européen de développement régional a dépensé, entre 1975 et 1988, 20,7 milliards d'écus, pour financer près de 35 000 projets d'investissement. Mais, les moyens d'action mis en place n'ayant eu que peu d'effets, deux types de réformes ont été apportés à ces aides. D'abord, des opérations intégrées, bénéficiant d'une priorité de financement et tendant à rassembler, dans les régions pauvres ou en difficulté, à la fois les aides communautaires, les aides nationales et les aides régionales, autour de deux types d'action : les PIM, disposant d'une enveloppe de 12 milliards d'écus pour la période 1986-1993, et les Opérations intégrées de développement destinées surtout aux régions enclavées. Ensuite, une réforme des fonds structurels, adoptée par le Conseil des ministres, en juin 1988, et prévoyant, grâce à une plus grande

(28) Rachid Sfar, *Le Marché unique européen à l'échéance 1992/1993 : ses principales répercussions sur la Tunisie et les autres pays du Maghreb arabe et l'esquisse d'une nouvelle politique de codéveloppement*, Ambassade de la République tunisienne, Bruxelles, 17 octobre, polycopié. Voir surtout le chapitre VI de cette étude, intitulé : « Promotion concrète pour une esquisse de politique de codéveloppement entre l'UMA et la CEE », qui contient des idées intéressantes et dont nous nous sommes inspiré.

concentration des aides sur un nombre limité d'objectifs, d'éviter le saupoudrage et, donc, d'accroître l'efficacité des interventions (29).

Dans une approche analogue, il s'agit de concevoir, pour les pays du Maghreb, des programmes spécifiques de soutien au développement, ayant un caractère ambitieux et tournés vers des objectifs dont on peut retenir au moins quatre qui sont essentiels :

- Soutien à l'emploi et au revenu.
- Modernisation des structures de production, notamment des structures agricoles.
- Développement et rééquilibrage des différentes régions, de façon à réaliser une répartition aussi harmonieuse que possible des fruits du développement et de la croissance.
- Contribuer à la réalisation de l'intégration économique des pays de l'UMA et au développement des complémentarités avec les pays de la CE.

En ce qui concerne les domaines d'action, quatre peuvent être considérés comme prioritaires :

— Le secteur agricole : les PDI doivent viser à moderniser et à intensifier les moyens de production, à développer de nouvelles spéculations, à améliorer le revenu des agriculteurs, grâce à des mesures d'ordre structurel, à faciliter l'installation des jeunes agriculteurs et leur promotion sociale, à développer la vulgarisation et l'irrigation, à moderniser les infrastructures rurales, les structures foncières, ainsi que les circuits de commercialisation et de transformation.

— Le secteur de la pêche : il faudrait orienter les actions vers la restructuration et la modernisation des flottes de pêche, l'amélioration des infrastructures et des installations portuaires, le développement des unités de conservation, de transformation et de commercialisation des produits de la pêche et leur mise à la disposition des pêcheurs, enfin la multiplication des structures et formation. Sans oublier le développement des structures de recherche-développement, dans le domaine halieutique et le recours à l'aquaculture pour augmenter les ressources halieutiques nécessaires à l'amélioration de la sécurité alimentaire des pays de l'UMA et à l'accroissement des exportations.

— Le secteur de l'industrie et des services : il faudrait viser essentiellement, ici, le développement et la modernisation des PME, grâce à l'aménagement et à la promotion de zones industrielles, à la diffusion du management, de l'innovation et des nouvelles tech-

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(29) Voir Conseil économique et social, *L'expérience PIM*. Bruxelles, mars 1989.

nologies, par le canal de centres de recherches et d'assistance technique qui doivent aider les entreprises à améliorer, constamment, leur compétitivité. Ce rapprochement entre les entreprises et les centres de recherche qui est de nature à stimuler la recherche-développement, peut être favorisé par la création de technopoles et de parcs technologiques.

— Le secteur des ressources humaines : l'objectif consistera à développer les actions de formation professionnelle, en particulier pour les jeunes, les femmes et les cadres moyens, afin de mieux répondre aux besoins des entreprises en agents de maîtrise, conducteurs de travaux, chefs de chantier, techniciens moyens de gestion, etc. Il s'agit là d'un véritable goulot d'étranglement des entreprises maghrébines où la rationalisation des méthodes et des normes de production souffre, souvent, d'un manque d'agents techniques qui constituent un relais indispensable entre les agents d'exécution, à la base, et les cadres supérieurs, responsables, au sommet, de la décision, de la direction et de la fixation des stratégies de l'entreprise. Pour vaincre ce mal, il faudra non seulement lancer des plans d'action importants en matière de formation professionnelle pour les jeunes, mais aussi de formation permanente et de valorisation des carrières des cadres moyens, grâce à des plans de carrière et autres avantages qui sont de nature à stimuler la valorisation des ressources humaines dans l'entreprise.

Le financement de ces programmes devrait être assuré par un Fonds de développement qui serait alimenté par des contributions nationales, mais aussi par des lignes de crédits budgétaires additionnelles, ainsi que par les ressources provenant du recyclage de la dette publique des pays de l'UMA. Cette idée a été défendue par le président de la République tunisienne, dans le cadre des Nations unies, et vise à alléger le fardeau de la dette des pays maghrébins, en transformant le produit du service de la dette en lignes de crédits utilisables pour le financement de projets de développement rentables (30).

L'on sait que les quatrièmes protocoles financiers proposés ou déjà signés avec le Maroc, l'Algérie et la Tunisie — la Mauritanie étant partie à la Convention de Lomé, conclue avec les ACP —

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(30) Le volume de la dette des pays du Maghreb dépasse les 54 milliards de dollars, alors que le service de la dette représente 25 % des exportations tunisiennes, 33 % des exportations marocaines et 55 % des exportations algériennes. En Tunisie, les flux nets de capitaux ont été négatifs en 1991 ; en effet, 1 200 millions de dinars tunisiens ont été payés, contre 1 000 millions de dinars reçus. D'où un déficit de 200 millions de dinars.

Voir Khader et autres, *op. cit.*, pp. 75 et 119.

réservent à ces trois pays, pour la décennie 1992-1996, une enveloppe de 1 072 millions d'écus d'aide budgétaire et de prêts de la Banque européenne d'investissements (BEI), sur une enveloppe de 2 375 millions d'écus destinée aux huit pays de la Méditerranée-Sud et Est, et une somme totale de 4 405 millions d'écus consacrée aux pays tiers méditerranéens (voir annexe, tableaux 1 et 2). Ainsi, pendant les cinq prochaines années, le montant de l'aide financière qui sera consacrée par la Communauté européenne aux trois pays du Maghreb central atteindra, en moyenne, 162 millions d'écus par an. Malgré l'accroissement enregistré, par rapport au montant des protocoles financiers précédents, il est certain que cette aide est loin de correspondre aux besoins du Maghreb en flux de capitaux nécessaires à son développement. On a estimé, en effet, qu'en plus de cette enveloppe, la contribution additionnelle de la CE, pour 1992-1996, devrait se situer autour de 1 milliard d'écus par an, compte tenu des besoins de capitaux nécessaires pour le financement des investissements, mais aussi des déficits cumulés des balances des paiements et des balances commerciales pour les dix dernières années. Si une telle somme peut être difficilement mobilisable par les pays du Maghreb par leurs propres moyens, par contre, le concours de la Communauté, dans le cadre d'une optique de codéveloppement, peut permettre la mobilisation d'un volume suffisant de ressources pour faire face aux besoins des pays du Maghreb en capitaux. La tâche n'est pas impossible, au regard des efforts qui ont été accomplis par la Communauté pour mobiliser près de 30 milliards d'écus consacrés aux PIM et aux fonds structurels.

Sur le plan pratique, plusieurs formules ont été envisagées, dans le cadre d'une réflexion qui s'est engagée sur les deux rives de la Méditerranée, pour la création d'une institution financière spécifiquement méditerranéenne. Le premier projet, en ce sens, a été présenté en septembre 1987 par le Dr. Ibrahim Shihata, vice-président de la Banque mondiale, sous la forme d'une Agence méditerranéenne pour le commerce, l'investissement et le développement. On peut citer également, l'idée d'une Banque de développement régional lancée par M. Gianni de Michelis, à l'occasion d'un colloque de l'Aspen Institute, tenu à Marseille en décembre 1989. Cette idée a été reprise et développée dans une étude publiée en décembre 1990 par l'Institution pour la coopération économique internationale et le développement, liée au ministère italien des Affaires étrangères. Puis, en avril 1990, le ministère tunisien des Affaires étrangères a proposé, parmi les « éléments d'une réflexion

tunisienne pour une approche de codéveloppement en Méditerranée», la création d'un Fonds méditerranéen de développement à plusieurs guichets, qui jouerait le rôle des fonds structurels communautaires. Enfin, le 28 avril 1991, la France a proposé au Conseil des ministres des Affaires étrangères de la Communauté, réuni au Luxembourg, la création d'un Fonds pour la coopération économique avec le Moyen-Orient et le Maghreb. Tous ces projets ont pour objectif de soutenir le développement et promouvoir la croissance des pays de la région (31). C'est dire qu'il existe, à l'heure actuelle, une véritable prise de conscience de la nécessité de créer une BERD méditerranéenne, capable de mobiliser les capitaux nécessaires à un développement accéléré des pays du Maghreb.

#### *Le partenariat*

Il a été lancé, en 1988, à l'initiative de M. Claude Cheysson, alors Commissaire européen chargé de la politique méditerranéenne, dans le but d'inciter les promoteurs d'entreprises, dans les pays du Nord et Sud de la Méditerranée, à la création de joint-ventures et de favoriser, ainsi, les transferts, vers le Sud, de valeurs ajoutées et de technologie ou de savoir-faire. Dans ce but, des lignes de crédit spécifiques ont été réservées au partenariat, sous forme de ce qu'on a appelé les « facilités Cheysson » et grâce à un instrument financier dénommé « European Community International Investment Partners » (ECIIP). Ces crédits peuvent financer quatre types d'opérations :

- La prospection et l'identification de projets de joint-ventures et de partenaires, sous forme de subventions, à raison de 50 % seulement du coût de chaque opération.
- Les études techniques, financières, commerciales, préalables, sous forme de subventions remboursables en cas de réalisation du projet.
- La participation au capital, pendant la phase de démarrage de l'entreprise, grâce à des capitaux de la BEI.
- Le financement d'actions de formation à la gestion, sous forme de crédits remboursables.

Malheureusement, les « facilités Cheysson » n'ont pas réussi à stimuler les créations d'entreprises conjointes, notamment pour deux

(31) Voir *Méditerranée-Développement*, n° 1, juillet 1991, Paris, Club financier méditerranéen, pp. 3-4.

raisons. En premier lieu, ces facilités restent méconnues des PME des pays du Nord auxquelles elles sont destinées, afin de favoriser leur extension ou leur délocalisation. La seconde raison tient aux conditions assortissant le système de crédit, en particulier le taux d'intérêt pratiqué qui est à peu près équivalent à celui du marché, c'est-à-dire de l'ordre de 15 %.

Il faudra donc revoir les conditions d'accès aux « facilités Cheysson », notamment le taux du crédit dont le niveau n'est guère attractif pour les promoteurs d'entreprises conjointes. Ensuite, il sera nécessaire de multiplier les opérations de diffusion, destinées à faire connaître aux entreprises ces mesures d'incitation à la création de joint-ventures dans les pays du Maghreb. Si ces deux conditions sont réalisées, le partenariat entre les promoteurs européens et maghrébins peut connaître un grand essor.

Cette conclusion est tout à fait confirmée par la réussite que sont en train de connaître deux autres systèmes de crédit au partenariat, établis à un niveau bilatéral avec la Tunisie. Il s'agit du système italien et du système français.

Le premier a été lancé par le protocole financier tuniso-italien du 22 octobre 1988 qui met à la disposition des promoteurs d'entreprises conjointes tuniso-italiennes une enveloppe de 60 millions de dollars, assortie de conditions d'imputation des crédits assez favorables et, en particulier, de taux d'intérêt très attractifs :

— Un taux de 4,75 % si le bénéficiaire final assume lui-même le risque de change, ce qui est le cas pour une entreprise exportatrice qui vend en devises.

— Un taux de 7,75 % lorsque l'utilisateur final ne peut pas assumer lui-même le risque de change. Néanmoins, il est dommage que le délai de remboursement assez court (13 semestres, avec un délai de grâce de 48 mois) constitue un inconvénient et un frein pour les utilisateurs.

Quant au second système, il a été lancé par le protocole financier tuniso-français du 21 août 1989 qui a ouvert aux promoteurs d'entreprises conjointes l'accès à une enveloppe de crédit — appelée « ligne de crédit Bérégovoy » — assorti d'une période de remboursement beaucoup plus longue (10 ans, dont 4 années de différé d'amortissement) et de taux d'intérêt attractifs : 8 % hors risque de change et 5 % si le bénéficiaire final assume lui-même le risque de change.

Le protocole tuniso-français a prévu une enveloppe de crédit de 300 millions de francs, accordée en trois tranches annuelles de 100 millions de francs chacune. La seconde tranche a été accor-

dée le 30 novembre 1990. L'imputation de ces tranches de crédit est déjà fort avancée, puisqu'au bout de 30 mois, 97 projets ont déjà été déposés, dont 41 ont été retirés ou refusés. Il reste donc 56 dossiers « vivants » (en cours d'étude ou approuvés), représentant un potentiel d'investissement de 853,7 millions de francs et un volume de 2 028 emplois potentiels. Sur ce total, 36 projets ont été approuvés, représentant un investissement potentiel de plus de 525 millions de francs et un volume de 1 451 emplois potentiels (voir annexe, tableau 3).

Ce système de partenariat a pu réaliser un double avantage pour le pays d'accueil : être suffisamment attractif pour les promoteurs des deux pays, tout en provoquant une diversification importante du secteur industriel tunisien. En effet, sur un total de 56 projets approuvés ou en cours d'étude, c'est le secteur des industries mécaniques et électriques qui se taille la part du lion, avec près de 50 % des projets, suivi par le secteur des services (18 %), puis celui de la chimie et du plastique (16 %). Alors que le textile et le tourisme, secteurs déjà en pleine expansion, ne représentent qu'une part réduite du total des projets (voir annexe, tableau 4).

Il faudrait donc s'inspirer de ce système de partenariat français et promouvoir un système analogue dans le cadre communautaire. Si la Communauté veut créer — comme l'implique le codéveloppement — une véritable dynamique de partenariat entre les entreprises européennes et maghrébines, dans un esprit d'intérêt mutuel, il est indispensable de fixer, pour les entreprises, des conditions suffisamment attractives de crédit et de remboursement, ainsi que des conditions souples et rapides de gestion des dossiers de projets. Comme il est nécessaire d'entretenir, constamment, une campagne de diffusion auprès des entreprises de toutes informations sur le partenariat.

En conclusion, on peut considérer que le codéveloppement ne peut jouer pleinement son rôle dynamique dans le fonctionnement de la coopération euro-maghrébine, que s'il est pris en charge par des institutions communes qu'il faudra créer, tels une Banque méditerranéenne d'investissements, une Commission des relations économiques et commerciales, une Commission des relations financières, une Commission des relations sociales et culturelles, une Commission des relations politiques, etc. Ces institutions constitueraient, non seulement un cadre nécessaire de réflexion commune, et de négociation sur les actions à entreprendre, dans le cadre du partenariat, mais aussi et surtout un relais très utile pour effectuer le suivi de ces actions et en faire l'évaluation.

Par ailleurs, la constitution d'une zone de libre-échange en Méditerranée permettrait de lever les obstacles à un fonctionnement harmonieux du codéveloppement. Elle serait, en effet, de nature à lever les barrières actuelles à l'indispensable liberté de circulation des capitaux et de la technologie, dans un sens, des marchandises et des biens, dans l'autre sens, entre le Nord et le Sud de la Méditerranée.

Certes, le libre-échange n'est pas exempt d'inconvénients qui ont été mis en lumière, depuis longtemps, par la théorie économique. On peut les résumer de la façon suivante :

- Les gains du libre-échange peuvent être souvent inégalement répartis entre les partenaires, en particulier lorsqu'il s'agit de partenaires à niveau de développement hétérogène, comme c'est le cas entre la Communauté européenne et le Maghreb.

- Le libre-échange et la théorie des coûts comparés peuvent provoquer des modifications structurelles dans l'appareil productif et l'emploi, qui peuvent être jugés inadmissibles ou difficiles à mettre en œuvre par certains partenaires.

- Le libre-échange entraîne toujours une certaine interdépendance et, donc, une spécialisation qui peut avoir un coût, pour certains partenaires, dans la mesure où elle joue, naturellement, au profit des pays les mieux placés, du point de vue des coûts comparés.

- Enfin, le libre-échange repose, peu ou prou, sur une certaine homogénéisation des modes de production et de consommation, entre les différents partenaires dont certains peuvent difficilement en supporter les conséquences (32).

Il faut donc se méfier d'une perception quelque peu naïve du libre-échange et admettre qu'une telle option peut présenter des avantages, dans le cadre d'une politique de codéveloppement du Maghreb, à condition qu'elle soit conçue et mise en œuvre avec des correctifs destinés à en atténuer les effets pervers sur les économies fragiles, notamment grâce à des actions bénéfiques sur les structures.

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(32) Voir Maurice Allais, *La libération des relations économiques internationales*, Gauthier-Villars, Paris, 1971, pp. 93 et suivantes ; *La théorie générale des surplus*, Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, Grenoble, 1989, 421 ; *L'Europe unie, route de la prospérité*, Calmann-Lévy, Paris, 1960, pp. 290 et suivantes.

## ANNEXE

Tableau 1

**L'aide financière de la CE au Maghreb (en millions d'écus)**

		Budget	Prêts BEI	Total
1 <sup>er</sup> protocole (1978-1981)	Algérie	44	70	114
	Maroc	74	56	130
	Tunisie	54	41	95
	TOTAL	172	167	339
2 <sup>e</sup> protocole (1981-1986)	Algérie	44	107	151
	Maroc	109	90	199
	Tunisie	61	78	139
	TOTAL	214	275	489
3 <sup>e</sup> protocole (1986-1991)	Algérie	56	183	230
	Maroc	173	151	324
	Tunisie	93	131	224
	TOTAL	322	465	778
4 <sup>e</sup> protocole (1992-1996)	Algérie	70	280	350
	Maroc	218	220	438
	Tunisie	116	168	284
	TOTAL	404	668	1 072

Tableau 2

**Répartition de l'aide CE-Maghreb (en % et en millions d'écus)**

Prêts BEI	Aides non remboursables	Prêts à conditions spéciales	Capitaux à risques
1 <sup>er</sup> protocole	362	164	143
	54	25	21
2 <sup>e</sup> protocole	600	260	155
	59	26	15
3 <sup>e</sup> protocole	1 003	615	37
	62	38	2
4 <sup>e</sup> protocole	3 100	1 305	
	70	30	

Tableau 3  
Les projets de partenariat tuniso-français (1989-1990)

Dossiers déposés ou pris en considération	97
Dossiers retirés ou refusés	41
Dossiers vivants	56
Investissements potentiels	853,7
Emplois potentiels	2 028
Dossiers approuvés	36
Investissements potentiels	525,2
Emplois potentiels	1 451

Tableau 4  
Répartition des projets par secteurs (en %)

Agriculture, aquaculture	14
Agro-alimentaire	4
Chimie, plastique	16
IME et divers	43
Textiles	4
Tourisme	4
Services	18

