CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IN THE MIDDLE EAST
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)
Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies
Malta, 15-18/IV/1994

a. Agenda
b. List of participants
1. "Project proposal"/ United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)
2. "Middle East peace process"/ Suha Umar
3. "Evaluation of the continuing process aimed at achievement of peace, arms control and creation of the climate of confidence"/ Oleg Sokolov
4. "Non-offensive defence and the Arab-Israeli conflict"/ Bjorn Moller
5. "Non-offensive defence as a strategy for small states?"/ Bjorn Moller
6. "Palestinian security needs and concerns"/ Khalil Shikaki
7. "The Arab threat: the Israeli perspective"/ Shmuel Limone
8. "A Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East and its ambience"/ Shalheveth Freier
9. "The concept of NWFZ and the Middle East"/ Jan Prawitz

Agenda

Expert Group Meeting

Confidence-Building in the Middle East

*Malta**

15 - 18 April 1994

* *Expert Group Meeting organized by UNIDIR with the co-operation of the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta*

19h15 Welcome Drink

FRIDAY, 15 APRIL 1994		Arrival of participants
	20h15	Dinner at Hotel

SATURDAY, 16 APRIL 1994

9h30-10h30	Objectives and methods of work. Presentation of initial ideas for discussion by the group.
10h30-13h00	**I. Security in the Middle East: Approaches and delimitations**
	a) Principles of security and cooperation in the Middle East.
11h00-11h15	*Coffee break*
11h15-13h00	*a)* Principles cont. Delimitations of the region the actors
	b) Participating states: other actors.
	c) Regional institutions.
13h00-14h30	**Lunch at the Hotel**
15h00-18h00	**II. Policies and measures to alleviate security concerns.**
	a) Weapons of mass destruction.
	b) Policies of Non-Offensive Defense (NOD).
16h30-16h45	*Coffee break*
16h45-18h00	*b)* NOD cont.
	c) CSBMs
	d) How to address the concerns of non-governmental movements and actors.
18h30	Departure for Valletta - Reception in honour of the expert group hosted by His Excellency Professor Guido de Marco, Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Valletta.
20h30	**Dinner** in Saint Julians.

SUNDAY, 16 APRIL 1994	
9h30-11h00	II. Policies and measures, cont.
11h00-11h15	*Coffee break*
11h15-13h00	**III. The role of CSBMs and arms control as integral parts of broader peace processes: A medium-term perspective.**
13h00-14h30	**Lunch at Hotel**
14h30-17h30	III. The role of CSBMs and arms control, cont.
16h15-16h30	*Coffee break*
16h30-17h30	The next steps: project planning for the months ahead. Identification of focal points and modalities of work. Commissioning of papers; planning of the next expert group meeting; preparation of publications etc.
18h30	Departure for Mdina - **Dinner** in Mdina
MONDAY, 18 APRIL 1994	Participants depart

It should be noted that the project centres on politico-military affairs. While being mindful of the confidence-building effects that economic and environmental cooperation may have, in the opening stages of the project we deem it desirable to treat these dimensions as parameters for the analysis of politico-military CSBMs/arms control. Later, we may wish to examine them **per se**, for their confidence-building effect and their impact on the arms control agenda. This is essentially a matter of how much we can realistically accomplish. In the end, we may find it more prudent to leave economic relations and environmental issues as important contextual elements.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IN THE MIDDLE EAST

List of Participants
UNIDIR Expert Group Meeting, Malta

Saleh AL-MANI, Chairman, Department of Political Science, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
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UNIDIR

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Christian GLATZL, Consultant to the Project
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MEDITERRANEAN ACADEMY OF DIPLOMATIC STUDIES
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UNIDIR

Geneva, December 1993

Confidence-Building in the Middle East

Project Proposal

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Confidence-Building in the Middle East

Background

In April 1993, UNIDIR convened a Conference of Research Institutes in the Middle East.[1] Scholars and diplomats from a dozen countries in the region attended the Conference together with experts from other parts of the world. An important agenda item centred on confidence-and security-building measures (CSBMs). UNIDIR would like to pursue this subject, drawing on European experiences with CSBMs while taking Middle Eastern realities as points of departure.

The research will be undertaken in parallel with the work of the multilateral arms control group of the peace process, which has CSBMs uppermost on its agenda. However, while the arms control group is an exercise in diplomacy and politics, UNIDIRs work will follow the ground rules of independent scholarship.

European CSBMs have inspired confidence-building efforts in many other parts of the world. Similar measures have been adopted in regions such as South Asia and the Middle East (p.9). However, each region must be considered on the basis of its own characteristics. After the Cold War, regional variations are greater than ever. Therefore, we are not hypothesizing that European CSBMs can be transplanted to the Middle East in wholesale fashion. But we are seeing great merit in using the European experience as a heuristic tool in phrasing constructive questions, identifying new opportunities, and elaborating specific measures tailored to regional security needs.

The peace process launched in Madrid held great promise. It soon appeared, however, that the bilateral and multilateral talks could not easily progress in the absence of a constructive approach to the question of a Palestinian homeland. This autumn, the Oslo Accord took a significant step in that direction. While there are a number of difficult hurdles to pass in the implementation of it, this is a landmark agreement that opens the door to constructive discussions of measures to alleviate mutual suspicions and fears.

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[1] Conference on Security, Arms Control and Disarmament in the Middle East, convened in Cairo, 18-19 April 1993 in co-operation with the Egyptian Institute for Diplomatic Studies.

Preconditions

In Europe, the first modest CBMs were introduced in the context of the Helsinki Final Act. The Final Act recognized the borders and the territorial integrity of all participating states, and committed the parties to non-use of force and non-intervention in internal affairs. The Final Act - which was politically binding - reiterated and elaborated upon important provisions of the UN Charter, and became the basis for progress over a wide range of East-West affairs. In the Middle East, these preconditions still do not exist. Confidence-building in this region is therefore an issue that must be approached in a careful, fundamental manner. The first steps are essential. They set the trends.

In the Middle East, military CSBMs must be combined with cooperative measures in the political, economic and environmental fields. This is particularly pertinent for geographically contiguous sets of actors. If military CSBMs are implemented in isolation, continued animosity and mistrust may short-cut the confidence-building process and neutralize the positive influence of CSBMs on perceptions of hostile intent. While a major part of this study will be devoted to military CSBMs, it therefore sets out to examine the possibilities and modalities of confidence building in a variety of inter-related fields.

With some notable exceptions from recent years, European states are relatively well entrenched. Shifting governments are pursuing state interests that do not change so frequently. The slow but persistent evolution of CSBMs helped the transformation of East-West relations along: the Stockholm Document of 1986 brought glasnost to the military sphere, especially by allowing observation from the air and on-site inspection. In the Arab world, states matter less and regimes more. Threats are often something regimes pose to each other, or something ruling elites are facing from within. Authoritarian regimes often try to legitimize themselves in reference to cross-border visions (arabism, islamism, persianism etc.) rather than through processes of democratic legitimation. External threats are credited with a degree of seriousness which is proportional to their internal effects rather than their actual seriousness. Transformed to the state level, a coup d'etat may mean that a friend suddenly becomes a foe. In the Middle East, therefore, the interaction between states tends to revolve around the present and the near future while in Europe, well-established states are pursuing long-term strategic interests. State interaction is guided by the *raison de régime* as much as by the *raison d'état.*[2] This is another factor complicating the promotion of CSBMs in the Middle East.

Therefore, while CSBMs traditionally apply to inter-state relations, in the Middle East *internal* instabilities also enter security equations in a major way. So CSBMs must address these instabilities as well. The long-term ambition must be to encourage the evolution of democratic practices. In the shorter term, the goal must be to make the parties accountable so that the predictability that is at the heart of CSBMs is not undermined by radical shifts in ruling elites. Stronger common interests in the application of CSBMs must be forged, *inter*

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[2] Ghassan Salamé, "The Middle East: Elusive Security, Indefinable Region", *Security Dialogue*, No. 1, 1994 (forthcoming).

alia by involving third parties. Only this way can CSBMs become effective in removing military activities from the area of contention between states.

It is commonly assumed that a condition for the adoption of CSBMs - as well as for arms control and disarmament measures - is that none of the parties want to change the territorial and political status quo by military means, and that this condition applies irrespective of region. However, relations between Pakistan and India suggest that this may not always be the case. There may be situations in which the parties have not discarded the possibility of using military force for political ends, but where CSBMs may help prevent inadvertent escalation into war. The situation in the Middle East, where some CSBMs have been practised for a long time, underlines this point. Drawing on diverse experiences from many parts of the world, it is worth while examining how CSBMs can go beyond the limited function of preventing conflicts nobody wants to building tangible reassurances of non-aggressive intent, eliminating whatever residual ideas the parties may harbour about using military force for political ends.

The Declaration of Principles between Israel and the PLO invites - per implication - a broad range of measures to consolidate gains and guard against losses. The viability of this accord rests very much on Israeli-PLO cooperation in quelling terrorism; on the development of strong economic links between Palestinians and Israelis; on the evolution of democratic practices on the Palestinian side, in particular on the effectiveness of the electoral processes; on the ability of Palestinian authorities to manage the administrative responsibilities assigned to them; and on the adoption of military CSBMs between Israel and surrounding states. Today, Israel has obvious interests in pursuing CSBMs because of the uncertainties associated with territorial withdrawal. In the Arab view, CSBMs are entirely negotiable once Israel has agreed to tackle the core issues and swap land for peace. The preconditions for application of more advanced CSBMs are now more propitious than before.

While military in content, European CSBMs were developed in the broad context of the CSCE. The creation of separate baskets facilitated trade-offs between political, economic and human rights problems. Over time, both sides realized the value of more significant CSBMs. In the Middle East, the peace process initiated in Madrid provides a similarly broad setting for discussion of CSBMs and arms control. In this respect, the preconditions for a comprehensive, practical approach to confidence-building already exists. It remains to bring all parties into the arms control deliberations. So far, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Libya are missing. Being an autonomous research institute within the framework of the United Nations, UNIDIR hopes to involve experts also from these countries in a scholarly examination of regional CSBMs.

Political change

In Europe, confidence-building measures were introduced in a *status quo* context - modified by the right and duty of states to hold each other accountable as far as compliance with human rights and freedoms were concerned. In the Middle East, CSBMs must be

conducive to political change. In particular, their contribution would be to enhance the likelihood that desired changes are pursued by non-military means.

The elaboration of European CSBMs was in large measure a technical exercise. The speed depended on the progress of CSCE work in general - there had to be a certain balance between its component parts - but like so much of arms control at the time it aimed at making the political status quo between East and West less dangerous. In the Middle East, the order is taller. Here, CSBMs must at least be compatible with, and preferably conducive to the political changes that the peace process tries to engineer. This makes the pursuit of CSBMs for the Middle East qualitatively different from the European endeavour, and a more demanding task both intellectually and politically.

The Helsinki Final Act gave the CSCE states the right and duty to examine each other's compliance with civil, political, economic, social and cultural *rights* and *freedoms*. At the same time, they were obliged not to interfere with each other's political, social, economic and cultural *systems*. For the Eastern participants, the latter provided a degree of reassurance that facilitated their acceptance of the former. However, when exercised, the right to speak, publish and organize has obvious implications for the development of political systems - in a democratic direction. This trade-off therefore helped to pave the way for the great transitions in the end of the 1980s.

It is worth while exploring whether mutual accountability based on this distinction between *rights/freedoms* and *systems* would make sense in the Middle East. In order to work, it presupposes a certain commonality of norms and traditions to build upon (although between the two ideological camps in Europe, the differences were more strongly emphasized than the commonalities). In Europe, however, there was military parity based on mutually recognized borders - which may be taken to suggest that such a trade-off has to await a stabilization of relations and more mature stages of cooperation. If so, what it could then do would be to reduce subversive activities, i.e. externally inspired threats to the regimes of participating countries, while promoting democratic practices. By addressing regime insecurities, this is the kind of political change that can enhance self-confidence, and self-confidence is an important pre-requisite for the building of international confidence. Over the long haul, promotion of democratic procedures is, moreover, basic to the evolution of predictability and trust.

This project will examine the roles and modalities of confidence-building at the level of regimes as well as at the inter-state level.

Functions

Having reviewed the prevailing conditions for CSBMs in the Middle East, it would seem logical to proceed by examining the *functions* that such measures may serve. On the one hand, this is a matter of identifying security needs in the region; there is a glaring lack of public literature on threat perceptions. On the other hand, the identification and analysis of

needs should be limited and focused by some conception - however wide - of what CSBMs can do. In this respect, the functions of European CSBMs are worth recalling.

European CSBMs have five main functions. First, they provide reassurances of non-aggressive intent. By casting military activities in a predictable and more transparent pattern, they make them less worrisome. Second, they act to reduce the scope of political intimidation by military means. The provisions for prior notification introduce a certain rigour into the timetables which removes the option of staging exercises, on short notice, to exert political influence. Third, CSBMs reduce the scope for biased perception of regular activities, and for their deliberate misrepresentation for political ends. The flow of reasonably accurate and verifiable information diminishes the range of such possibilities. Fourth, CSBMs reduce the likelihood of inadvertent escalation. If a large exercise were to coincide with a serious international crisis, the fact that it had been notified a long time in advance would indicate the arbitrary nature of the coincidence. In such a situation, CSBMs serve to extend peacetime conditions and to raise the crisis threshold. Fifth, the idea in Helsinki was not merely to limit the *use* of military force: also, it was to prepare the ground, politically and psychologically, for real arms control and disarmament measures. This would apply to the Middle East as well. Confidence-building measures should also be instrumental in relation to political endeavours towards peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building.

Furthermore, it may be recalled that from the mid-1980s on, the functions of European CSBMs tied in with the notion of non-offensive defence, which *inter alia* influenced the CFE agreements. In practice, CSBM proposals for constraints on force deployments - such as withdrawal of heavy combat vehicles from border areas and geographical constraints on the location of ammunition and POL (petroleum, oil, lubricants) depots - either complement proposals for non-offensive defence or overlap with them. Also in the Middle East, the objective is not merely to use CSBMs to pave the way for disarmament: to enhance stability, the disarmament process ought to have a non-offensive defence profile.

Scope

Military CSBMs

In the Middle East, examination of military CSBMs should not be confined to conventional forces, but should comprise weapons of mass destruction as well. The Arab states and Israel have different capabilities to protect and different interests to promote. By including military assets across the board, possible trade-offs across sector lines can be explored. Trade-offs may also be sought between the various options and capabilities regarding weapons of mass destruction, i.e. involving chemical and biological as well as nuclear weapons.

In the nuclear field, a UN study published three years ago chopped the nuclear weapon-free zone proposal for the Middle East up into its component parts, and then chained

the elements together in a confidence-building process for the region.[3] A key point in this connection is the idea of a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials applying, in practice, first of all to the activities in Dimona. As matters stand today, Israel finds it hard to accept this proposition. While a proper unilateral confidence-building measure involves a *calculated* risk, this one is likely to be a slippery slope: if a cut-off were agreed, the Israeli's would immediately be asked "and what have you been doing between 1963 and 1993?".

To come around this difficulty, political changes for the better would always help, and so would an international cut-off regime into which an Israeli cut-off could fit. Other possibilities would be to trade the move against other elements of a larger package, or to put it into a process perspective meaning that if and when the question of past production becomes focused, it would no longer be so difficult to handle.

Israel may consider its long-term options in the perspectives of pre-emption, mutual deterrence and nuclear arms control.[4] At first glance, US and UN priorities may seem to enhance its nuclear monopoly.[5] If there is no further proliferation, there will be no need for pre-emption either. However, progress in the peace process is likely to create stronger pressures for nuclear arms control including Israel as well. In this perspective, it will be for Israel to signal a genuine interest in arms control by accepting some kind of militarily significant CSBM in the nuclear field. Arab states would be well advised to take a greater interest in defensive restructuring of their conventional forces. For in the Middle East like in Europe, this is one of the best ways to defuse the rationale for weapons of mass destruction.

The European experience suggests three basic conditions for the adoption of postures of non-offensive defence: (1) the parties may harbour no ambition of changing the political status quo by military means; (2) they must have approximately the same amount of resources available for military purposes, for in the relationship between a small state and a big power, even a minor big power deviation from a predominantly defensive posture may be of great concern to the small state; and (3) the geography should be advantageous to the defender: mountains, rivers, forests and urban areas usually are. In the Middle East, political aggrandizement by military means has not disappeared from the strategic considerations of states; their resource bases are more varied than those of the Cold War blocs; and the Middle Eastern geography is less advantageous for defence. Still, there seems to be no better alternative than moving in this direction.

The project will therefore examine CSBMs in a process perspective aiming at a defensive restructuring of military forces in the region. Furthermore, it will address the

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[3] *"Effective and Verifiable Measures which would Facilitate the Establishment of a Nuclear-weapon-free Zone in the Middle East"*, by Jim Leonard, Jan Prawitz, and Ben Sanders, ODA Study Series 22, United Nations, New York, 1991.

[4] Geoffrey Aronson, "Hidden Agenda:US-Israeli Relations and the Nuclear Question": *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 46, No.4, autumn 1992.

[5] Re. the US-led actions against Iraq; the work of UNSCOM; and the statement of the Heads of State and Government of the Security Council of January, 1992, declaring the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction a threat to international peace and security.

question of how to dovetail step-by-step adoption of CSBMs in the field of weapons of mass destruction and in the conventional sector, to make the Israeli, the Egyptian and other Arab agendas compatible with each other. Finally, it will examine developments in a number of non-military areas, in particular with a view to maximizing the confidence-building effects of cooperative arrangements in the fields of environment and development.

Non-military CSBMs

International cooperation does not always enhance peace: this will depend on the content of the cooperation and the way in which it is organized. As for the content, it is important that all parties gain from the cooperation. As for the organization, it is important that the gains are distributed in line with prevailing perceptions of justice.

Economic assistance and cooperation is key to implementation of the Oslo Accord. Economic assistance will flow to Gaza and the West Bank, and to the Palestinian refugees and refugee camps, helping those in greatest need.[6] Economic cooperation will be urged and encouraged between Palestinians and Israelis in order to forge cooperative ventures where in the past, hostile relations prevailed all over the place. This is vital in order to reassure the Israelis that the West Bank will not be used as a platform for attacks against Israel. Economic cooperation between Palestinians, Israelis and neighbouring countries will also be encouraged. The confidence-building potential inherent in such cooperation is quite significant. The project will examine how best to maximize it in practice.

In the environmental field - where availability of water is a critical issue - CSBMs can to some extent be applied in a fashion analogous to military CSBMs.[7] Environmental CSBMs would mean that states should notify each other of planned interference with ecological systems; they should invite other governments concerned to undertake on-site inspections - i.e. acquaint themselves with new developments on the spot; and exchange information about ecological developments that may have major cross-boundary effects. All of this to enhance transparency and predictability so that more effective countermeasures may be taken and undue concern avoided.

The "S" in CSBMs - Security - was adopted in reference to constraints on military activities. It seemed logical to proceed from notifying the activities of major formations capable of aggression, to actually doing something about them. Similarly in the environmental field: transparency may be helpful, but it is not enough to warn others of planned, unilateral diversion of water, of environmental degradation that may create major refugee flows, or of the siting of new polluting industries in border areas. Something must be done to constrain shared hazards and to optimize the utilization of shared resources. In order to do this in a rational, effective manner, steps need to be taken jointly in the spirit of common security.

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[6] The Palestinian diaspora also includes rich Palestinians living in other parts of the world and rendering support to fellow Palestinians in the Middle East.

[7] Sverre Lodgaard, "Environment, confidence-building and security" in Anders Hjort af Ornäs & Sverre Lodgaard, eds., *The Environment and International Security*, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 1992.

Confidence-building in this enlarged sense of the term is, therefore, a matter of peaceful cooperation in the management of shared hazards and shared resources. Positive experiences from cooperation in one field may encourage cooperative solutions to common problems in other fields, including in the military area.

Area of application

Initially, it seems that the area of application for CSBMs should be a wide one, including Iran in the East and the Maghreb countries in the West. In the military field, modern, long-range means of delivery strongly suggest that. Politically, so-called subversive activities carried out in other countries - more or less well documented; sometimes deliberately exaggerated for internal political purposes - suggest the same. Simultaneously, measures of particular interest for smaller sub-sets of countries should be examined. CSBMs must be tailored to different circles of participation: it remains to define their political and geographical perimeters. The convergence of interests in the region is not quite clear, and it would be one of the tasks of this project to determine which countries could be involved in early efforts towards CSBMs. In practice, pursuits in the wider domain may facilitate and legitimize the exploration of measures to meet the concerns of smaller groups of countries.

Regional experiences

Twenty years ago, thin-out zones were negotiated along Israel's borders with Egypt and Syria, and multinational peacekeepers were deployed to monitor the arrangements. The United States routinely carries out aerial monitoring of the disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria. Code-named Olive Harvest, these flights are welcomed by the states overflown. In 1974, Israel and Egypt agreed to allow mutual, national reconnaissance flights with 6 hours advance notification along the median line separating Israeli and Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula. In 1975, Israel and Jordan established a hotline between their intelligence services, the Mossad and the Mukhbarat, as part of a general understanding to cooperate in combating terrorist incidents across the Jordan river. These measures were tacit and informal.

The forms adopted for CSBMs can be as important as their substance. The measures may be codified and publicised or informal and tacit: in principle as well as in practice, CSBMs are quite flexible in these respects. Initially, we shall therefore make it an open question to what extent CSBMs for the Middle East would have to be negotiated and to what extent they might be reciprocal, unilateral undertakings, and how progressive patterns of increasingly more significant CSBMs might look like.

So far, CSBMs in the Middle East have been instituted for the purpose of *conflict avoidance*, i.e. to avoid inadvertent resort to arms. Now, the region appears ripe for more ambitious measures aiming at *conflict resolution*. As core issues are being tackled, CSBMs are well suited to consolidate the gains; to provide buffers against set-backs; and, also, to

facilitate further steps towards peace-making, arms control and disarmament. An integrated approach comprising non-military as well as military measures would seem advantageous. So far, however, a broadening of the confidence-building effort and trade-offs between the baskets are impeded by the lack of diplomatic recognition between Israel and many Arab states.

Concepts

European experiences over the latest 30 years speak to the significance of conceptual innovations and new security philosophies. Thirty years ago, arms control was introduced to reduce the risks of East-West confrontation, Europe being in the center of it. Twenty years ago the first, feeble CBMs were elaborated. Ten years ago, the Palme Commission had just introduced the concept of common security, urging that the policies of nuclear deterrence be transcended. A little later, the concept of non-offensive defence was developed. These conceptual and philosophical developments had a great impact on the formulation and conduct of specific security policies.

This project will not be limited to empirical analyses of specific CSBMs applicable in the Middle East. We will seek to develop region-specific conceptual tools and theoretical underpinnings as well, realizing that good concepts and theories are important preconditions for good applied research. Such efforts must therefore go hand in hand with empirical analyses.

Prospects

The Oslo Accord has raised the interest in CSBMs for the purpose of conflict resolution as well as conflict avoidance. The new approach to the core issue of a Palestinian homeland presents new horizons for peace-making in a wider Middle Eastern domain. All parties realize, however, that the Declaration of Principles defines the procedural framework for a precarious process that may or may not succeed. There is a sense of urgency, therefore, in the pursuit of CSBMs to add momentum to the process and to consolidate the gains. To enhance the policy relevance of its work, UNIDIR would like to start the project as soon as possible and finish it in 18 months.

Implementation

UNIDIR would like to recruit two consultants from among the best in the academic community, knowledgable about CSBMs and the Middle East. They will work at UNIDIR in Geneva. One of them will be chief responsible for the daily conduct of the project. We are in the process of sorting out candidates for these positions.

The consultants will issue working papers and prepare the draft final report on the basis of a division of labour to be agreed between them. They will cooperate closely with the Director and Deputy Director of UNIDIR, who will themselves take an active part in the project.

The Directors of UNIDIR and the consultants will meet with a reference group of some 20 experts from the Middle East - tentatively in Malta - twice during the 18 months the project is scheduled to last. Among the experts, two or three will be from among the participants in the arms control group of the peace process, to secure the necessary communication between the two endeavours. In addition to the working papers produced by UNIDIR out of Geneva, the experts may be asked to prepare inputs of their own. They will be paid a small honorarium for their contributions and, generally, for their involvement in the working process. Enclosed please find a tentative list of experts to be invited to the meetings.

The project will start *ultimo* 1993, or as soon as the necessary financial support has been secured and the consultants are ready to start working.

One of the consultants will take up his work at UNIDIR in the beginning of 1993. He will stay at the Institute till the project is finished, and will be paid by UNIDIR. Furthermore, we may wish to recruit two visiting fellows from the Middle East - for 3-5 months each - to work on the project: they will both be paid by UNIDIR.

The Institute claims no compensation for the time that the Directors of the Institute devote to the project. UNIDIR also accounts for the printing costs and the free distribution of a significant number of copies of the final report. The same goes for interim reports, which may be published in the Institute's Research Paper series.

Provisional Budget

Breakdown of calculations for 1994 (including 1 meeting in Malta)

		US$
A.	Main Consultant, 9 months in Geneva	51,430
B.	Expert Group Meetings	
	• Travel of 21 participants from the Middle East and 6 from GVA to Malta - 1 meeting, including terminal expenses	37,200
	• Per diem in Malta $ 111 per person, one meeting of 4 nights	12,000
C.	Honoraria	7,000
D.	Secretarial costs and rental of Conference facilities	2,700
Sub-Total		110,330
Overhead, including Programme Support Costs due to the United Nations (13%)		14,343
Grand total		**124,673**

Provisional Budget

Breakdown of calculations for 1995 (including 1 meeting in Malta)

		US$
A.	Main Consultant, 5 months in Geneva	28,570
B.	Expert Group Meetings	
	• Travel of 21 participants from the Middle East and 6 from GVA to Malta - 1 meeting, including terminal expenses	37,200
	• Per diem in Malta $ 111 per person, one meeting of 4 nights	12,000
C.	Honoraria	7,000
D.	Secretarial costs and rental of Conference facilities	2,700
E.	Language editing	3,000
Sub-Total		90,470
Overhead, including Programme Support Costs due to the United Nations (13%)		11,761
Grand total		**102,230**

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Provisional List of Participants
UNIDIR Expert Group Meeting in Malta

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Saleh AL-MANI, Chairman, Department of Political Science, King Saud University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia

Mohamed BACHROUCH, Director, Ministry of Foereign Affairs, Tunis, Tunisia

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9-10 Malta
10-17

(2)

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
ARMS CONTROL AND REGIONAL SECURITY GROUP
"CONFIDENCE BUILDING IN THE MIDDLE EAST" *

Suha Umar
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The multilateral leg of the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) has been designed to complement and help the complex bilateral negotiations between various parties in the long standing conflict in the Region.

Keeping in mind some of the basic issues which are of relevance to the success of the process, when the multilateral talks have opened in Moscow in January 1992 five Working Groups were delegated with the task of tackling with; Economic Cooperation, Refugees, Water, Environment and the Arms Control and Regional Security issues. It was then thought that if the directly involved parties to the conflict could be brought together to discuss these issues and if progress could be achieved in the multilaterals, it would have a positive and complementary effect on the bilaterals.

Extra regional parties, together with the Co-sponsors of the MEPP were expected and encouraged to contribute to the work of the Group with a view to making their experience in the matter available to the participants thus alleviating doubts and reticence.

The reason for this rather very prudent and indirect approach was the fact that there was a deep-rooted lack of confidence in the region and that unless this could be eliminated the participants would not be able to engage in serious negotiations.

The very first meetings of the Working Group were organized as seminar-type talks with extra regional parties a rather substantial role to play by relaying their experience on what happened in the past, especially in Europe. They also tried to explore ideas which in their mind could lead to more concrete discussions on confidence building measures (CBM's). Turkey was one of them.

In fact Turkey had a lot in common with the regional countries due to her geographical location and her position vis-à-vis the then Soviet Union. Canada, the Netherlands even India have also contributed.

After this first stage, the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) Working Group have decided in May 1993 that the time was ripe to proceed to a more structured working method. Thus were formed four workshops with mentors to organize and lead the discussions.

Turkey was trusted with the Workshops on Exchange of Military Information and Prenotification of Certain Military Activities (a very thorny issue indeed); Canada was designated as mentor for Search and Rescue, Incidents at Sea while the Netherlands was asked to tackle with the issue of Communication Centre.

The basic principles of any CBM regime, "Declaratory CBM's" as they are called, was a subject for the Co-Sponsors to mentor.

All of the workshops have immediately set to work and each mentor organized a meeting to discuss the subject matter. When the ACRS Plenary met in Moscow in 3-4 November 1993 there was already some concrete progress in all of the workshops to be presented to the Plenary.

In Moscow it was decided that the Declaratory CBM's together with verification and inspection issues and definition of the area of application should be dealt with in "Conceptual Basket" while the other three workshops be brought together under the title "Operational Basket". This in fact is a fine resemblance of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) if we remember that CSCE had also Baskets.

The Operational Basket includes workshops and other follow on activities on communications, information exchange and maritime measures. Upon the request of the ACRS Working Group, the Netherlands, Turkey and Canada have resumed the mentorships of the above-mentioned topics, Turkey being the general coordinator.

The Conceptual Basket includes workshops and other follow on activities on long term objectives and declaratory measures on verification, establishment of a conflict prevention or regional security center, definition of the region for arms control and regional security purposes and development of a Middle East Data Bank.

The ACRS Conceptual Basket Meeting was held in Cairo on January 30 - February 3/94 In this meeting :

A draft text of a declaration of principles and statement of intent on arms control and regional security was discussed extensively.

Broad support was expressed to continue discussion of a regional conflict prevention/regional security center with a focus on its potential near-term functions and its possible connection with the proposals of setting a date bank and a regional communications network.

In order to facilitate further intercessional work, it was considered appropriate to prepare a paper on the (subject of considerations) and (criteria believed to be needed for) delineation of the region for the purpose of arms control and regional security.

Another area to facilitate further intercessional work, is the paper which will be prepared by Egypt. It will contain the list of elements that might be helpful to start up negotiations on arms control measures in different areas such as conventional arms, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles.

ACRS Operational Basket Meeting on the other hand was held in Antalya on 20-24 March 1994 under the chairmanship of Turkey.

Maritime confidence building measures (Canada as mentor) was the first topic discussed within the framework of this basket. It consisted of two parts, namely Search and Rescue (SAR) and Incidents at Sea (INCSEA). SAR aims at enhancing the effectiveness of search and rescue in the region in order to promote humanitarian goals. SAR coordination and cooperation can be facilitated by exchanges of information on requirements, points of contact and communications arrangement. INCSEA is another important element of enhancing confidence building in the region, which requires and enhances contacts between naval authorities.

Exchange of Military Information and Prenotification of Certain Military Activities (Mentor Turkey) are of considerable importance in the way of the confidence building.

for rumore Antalya : Oct. 93

Less sensitive and complicated areas in the area of exchange of military information were considered as a realistic starting point such as information on aggregate numbers of military personnel, information on unclassified military publications and educational or training manuals, information on the administrative and organizational charts of military establishments, information on the organizational structure of defense forces and Ministries of Defence forces and Ministries of Defence, information on CV's of senior military personnel, sharing information submitted to the UN Register. Draft texts on these specific CBM's were prepared by Turkey and put to the consideration of the participants.

In addition, the following areas were considered to be of a more sensitive and complex nature :

Information on the new acquisition of military equipment through transfer, procurement and indigenous production, on military stockpiles and storage, on location of certain military forces, on military budgets, on overall military holdings.

Voluntary hosting of visits to military installations, including air base visits, and military contacts and dialogue for purposes of mutual familiarization and confidence building were also found worthwhile to discuss. (It is expected that in addition to Turkey who offered to host an air base visit activity in Turkey, some regional countries (i.e. Israel) may extend similar invitations.)

The second area under this section is Prenotification of Certain Military Activities, of which, the following criteria constitutes the basis for discussion :

- Thresholds, timeframes
- Specification of types of activities to be covered such as exercises, movements, concentrations, etc.
- Area of application
- Mechanisms for clarification
- Voluntary invitations for observation.

The establishment of a Communications Network (The Netherlands acts as mentor of this activity) is aimed at enabling direct communications among the participants. In this context, efforts are directed to establish an ACRS Communications Network as such. For the time being, there is a standing CSCE offer which will enable the participants to use the infrastructure of its network temporarily. As soon as regional parties agree, a permanent network in the region is aimed to be set up. The work undertaken in this area is also concentrated on selecting the system that would suit all participants.

The conclusions in the form of reports by mentors of Cairo and Antalya meetings and texts that were worked out will be submitted to the ACRS Plenary meeting to be held in Doha in May. We hope that the decisions to be taken at the Doha Plenary will pave the way for a more concrete and structured work.

There is a good possibility that the ACRS produce a draft text on regional CBM's for further discussion and consideration by the participants towards the end of 1994.

* This summary as well as the views expressed in this paper are only of the author's.

For the Malta conference

EVALUATION OF THE CONTINUING PROCESS AIMED AT ACHIEVEMENT OF PEACE, ARMS CONTROL AND CREATION OF THE CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE. ROLE OF CONFIDENCE - BUILDING AND SECURITY MEASURES AND OF CONTROL OVER ARMAMENTS AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF BROAD PEACE PROCESS

(Points for discussion)

by Oleg Sokolov

I would like to share my impressions about the activities of the Group for Arms control and regional security in the Middle East and to ponder over some issues and prospects.

- In order to evaluate this process and the degree of the progress achieved thus far it is necessary first of all to take stock of the peculiarities of the situation in the region and its specific characteristics:

a) no other Arab country, except Egypt, maintains diplomatic relations with Israel; the negotiations are conducted under conditions of formal continuation of the state of war between the parties concerned; apart from the Arab-Israeli conflict there are other conflicts and problems in the region;

b) huge stockpiles of armaments are accumulated in the region; in terms of their concentration the Middle East seems to hold the first place in the world; moreover, the states continue to build up their military potential;

c) international non-proliferation regimes for mass destruction weapons have restricted validity in the region: some countries do not participate in their enforcement while others are accused of implementing programmes of development of mass destruction weapons and their delivery vehicles in violation of the commitments undertaken;

d) mutual mistrust continues to be legacy of decades of confrontation;

e) the negotiation process is characterized by ups and downs; it is influenced by various factors including those beyond control of the participants; for example, the Hebron incident has nearly derailed the peace process, putting off resumption of talks for a month.

- The Group's work continues to be influenced by these and other special circumstances. Its progress reflects the efforts of both regional and extra-regional participants, frequently taking form of rather sharp and lengthy discussions. For example, it would appear that elaboration of fundamental principles governing security relations among regional participants should not give rise to major problems taking into account that corresponding language is already established in the UN Charter and the Helsinki principles. In practice, however, attempts to harmonize the language resulted in difficult discussion on the "conceptual basket" during the Cairo meeting that lasted for days. Still, some wordings have never been agreed upon.

Take another example: confidence-building measures are well defined within the CSCE and implemented in practice. But within the Group the parties do not go beyond exchange of non-sensitive information such as data on carriculae vitae of top-ranking commanders, total strength of armed forces, data on arms supplies, records in the UN Resister, etc.

- Despite all these problems, substantial success has been achieved within the Group (a fundamental agreement on the text of the Declaration of Principles and Statement of Intentions Concerning Arms Control and Regional Security; prospects for achieving agreements on confidence-building measures at sea in the near future; progress in the area of information exchange). These facts can be seen as a good sign of serious intentions of the parties.

- All members of the Group share the view that its work and political negotiations are interdependent and complementary. This is true in practice as well. For example, the Israeli-Palestinian agreements concerning Jericho paved the way to a more detailed elaboration of particular confidence-building measures (the last meeting of the operative basket held in Antalya was marked by significant progress). At the meeting of the conceptual basket

held in Cairo the parties began talks concerning the process evolution: the question of establishing a centre for conflict prevention is now under discussion; the parties have stated their positions and are seeking to work out a common denominator for long-term objectives of arms control and regional security, etc.

- As I have already noted, the work proceeds with difficulty. At the same time we see the desire of the parties to find mutually acceptable compromises. The work of the Group is characterized by the normal and business - like atmosphere. The very fact that all members of the Group know each other well contributes significantly to the progress of our work. Disputes which flare up from time to time are resolved in a proper manner without prejudice to inter-State relations or jeopardizing the will of the Parties to achieve positive results.

- Inclusion of a Palestinian group as a separate delegation was a major result, indeed, of the progress reached "bilaterally". Participation of Palestinians is, of course, absolutely indispensable and useful as it ensures that due regard is taken of their position.

In turn, progress within the Group undoubtedly tends to "spur" political negotiations by creating a more favorable background. Thus, the agreed and signed Declaration of Principles and Statement of Intentions Concerning Arms Control and Regional Security, which is to lay the basis for future political relations between the Middle East countries, will provide an impetus to the whole negotiating process.

The same is true as far as confidence-building and regional security measures are concerned. For understandable reasons the parties are not yet in a position to resort to measures currently applied, for example, within the CSCE. What is needed now, it seems, are the simpliest steps or measures that have humanitarian value. They should be aimed at encouraging cooperation in the Middle East as a matter of habit or norm. However, these are only the

first steps to provide the basis for the arms control and regional security process.

- Step-by-step approach, one of the main principles governing the Group's work, is, perhaps, the most comprehensive reflection of current developments. It also determines the nature of future activities of the Group. It is obvious that in the beginning a foundation for future agreements should be laid on which to build principal elements of the structure later.

- Now about the role of the co-sponsors. In all modesty it should be said that, as practice has repeatedly proved when the Middle East process reached a deadlock, only active participation of the co-sponsors who proposed compromise options, helped find necessary solutions.

Repercussions in the Middle East reach other regions affecting the situation in different parts of the globe. Therefore the states beyond the region are also interested in early establishment of peace in the Middle East. In this connection the interest in the work of the Group shown by many States from different continents is quite understandable.

Besides the co-sponsors, new states become actively involved in the process playing a role of "patrons" or organizing various activities in their territories to share the experience acquired by the world community with the Middle East counterparts. This is a welcome process. A more active part played by the extra-regional participants will also be evident from the fact that member countries of the European Union and EFTA will participate in the meetings of the Group not as members of joint delegations but as independent entities.

- In conclusion, let me express confidence, reinforced by the experience acquired during negotiations, that the peace process will gradually gain momentum and that hopefully soon enough we will witness specific results of our on-going work.

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NON-OFFENSIVE DEFENCE AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Paper for the UNIDIR Expert Group Meeting on
Confidence-Building in the Middle East
Malta, 15-17 April 1994

Contents:

Preliminary, and much too hastily written, version
Not for quotation. Comments are welcome
*****
Based on research conducted under the auspices of
the Global Non-Offensive Defence Network
generously supported by the Ford Foundation

The author of the following has specialized in non-offensive defence (NOD) for a number of years, yet almost exclusively dealt with it in a European context—just as practically everybody else. Nevertheless, besides a presentation of the general outline of the concept of NOD (which readers familiar with the concept can safely skip), the following paper also contains several suggestions for an application of the same principles to the Arab-Israeli conflict—on which the author is very far from being an expert. This is a very daring venture, especially when addressing a specialist audience such as the present one. The qualifications on the front page thus do not reflect the author's modesty, but are meant to be taken literally: the thoughts are indeed preliminary, and the paper much too hastily written. In fact, by sheer coincidence most of it is written in a hotel room in Jerusalem in the light of, yet undigested, impressions from a visit to the Israeli frontposts on the Golan Heights.

A further caveat seems in order, especially when dealing with a conflict as complex as that of the Middle East: There is no military solution to the Middle East conflict, which is profoundly political. However, there may be military obstacles in the way of a political solution, and there may be military ways of removing such obstacles. This is where the idea of non-offensive defence (NOD) may become relevant: as a precursor or companion of a political peace process. This, in its turn, presupposes that the parties to the conflict have tired of it and have come to want peace, in which case a change of military strategy and/or posture may facilitate 'stepping down'.

1. The Basic Idea of NOD

As a defence strategy NOD was originally designed for the Cold War environment. More specifically, it was designed with NATO in general, and Germany in particular, in mind[1].

With the exception of a few authors who came to endorse NOD for reasons of sheer military efficiency, the reasoning behind the advocacy of NOD has been political. It has been based on the assumption that individual states would be better off pursuing policies of 'common security', and that the international system as a whole would become more stable and peaceful if all states were to do so[2]. 'Common security' simply denotes the attempt at overcoming the well-known security dilemma by taking one's respective adversary's legitimate security concerns into account.

To seek security at an adversary's expence would simply be counterproductive, because it would activate malign security dilemma-type interactions, thereby damaging both arms race and crisis stability. Were one state, for instance, to increase its armaments to meet a perceived threat, this would be perceived (correctly, regardless of intentions) by its adversary as a growing threat. The latter state would feel forced to reciprocate with a rearmament that would only make the former state feel even more insecure, etc. The result might well be a spiralling arms race with no inherent point of saturation, i.e. a very low degree of arms race stability. Crisis stability would likewise suffer if, in a political crisis, states were to respond without consideration for their adversary's security concerns. Without such concern,

mobilization and other defensive measures might be mistaken for attack preparations, which would provide the respective adversary with strong incentives for preventive war and/or pre-emptive attack[3].

In the more parsimonious interpretations, the principle of common security thus implies little more that the need for taking the security dilemma into account by acknowledging that the security of an adversarial dyad needs to be viewed as a whole: The is no security at the expence of one's adversary. This simple maxim should also be applied to defence policies, where it immediately translates into the concept of NOD[4].

NOD might either be defined structurally (i.e. in term of military capabilities) or functionally, i.e. in terms of military operations. The best known structural definition is that of Frank Barnaby and Egbert Boeker:

> 'The size, weapons, training, logistics, doctrine, operational manuals, war-games, manoeuvres, text-books used in military academies, etc. of the armed forces are such that they are seen in their totality to be capable of a credible defense without any reliance on the use of nuclear weapons, yet incapable of offense'[5].

The present author would, however, suggest a simpler, but functional definition, which also highlights the fact that NOD is not an either/or, but a matter of degrees, i.e. that 'noddiness' is a continuum:

> 'NOD is a strategy, materialized in a posture, that emphasizes defensive at the expence of offensive military operations'.

Because NOD is an idea, it should come as no surprise that there are no perfect real-life materializations of it—even though some states come closer than others to the NOD ideal (*vide infra*). A near-universal consensus is, however, emerging about the desirability of progress in this direction—if only in the sense that all states would prefer their respective adversaries to be as non-offensive as possible. The mandate for the CFE (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) negotiations reflected this consensus about the need 'to limit, as a matter of priority, capabilities for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action'[6].

Were a state to conform, more or less precisely, to the above criterion, the two aforementioned problems, of low arms race and crisis stability, might be avoided. First of all, a state's acquisition of strictly defensive armaments would not necesaarily lead to reciprocation on the part of its adversaries, unless these were to have aggressive intentions. By implication, NOD would unmask prospective aggressors, while allowing states without aggressive intentions to reduce their level of armaments.

Secondly, unmistakably defensive steps in a crisis situation would not invite pre-emption, simply because they could not possibly be mistaken for attack preparations. This would not 'merely' reduce or eliminate the risk of pre-emptive attacks and preventive war, it would also allow states to defend themselves more effectively against premeditated attack. Since they would not need to fear that their

defensive precautions might provoke an otherwise perhaps avoidable war, they would have no reason to postpone mobilization.

These principled, but very abstract, observations immediately raise several questions:

- Is it possible to distinguish reliably between offensive and defensive strategies and/or postures?
- If so, is it possible to abstain from offensive capabilities without critically diminishing the ability to defend oneself?
- If so, are there any universally applicable guidelines for the design of such a defence?
- Could it stand alone, or would it require an underpinning, say in the form of nuclear deterrence, alliance security guarantees, and/or collective security?

2. The Offence/Defence Distinction

Many suggestions have been made for how to distinguish between offence and defence, yet most have suffered from serious flaws and inconsistencies. The reason may be that a distinction of universal validity has been sought through generalization rather than abstraction. Also, analysts may have sought for the answer at the wrong level of analysis.

In the following, I shall seek to bring some clarity to the subject, if only in the sense of making readers 'confused, but at a higher level'. I shall do so by analyzing the pros and cons of distinctions along a continuum of levels of analysis, ranging from individual weapons to political intentions, via intermediate levels of military formations and total postures, and strategic, operational and tactical conceptions.

The most common misunderstanding about NOD—to which a few NOD proponents have, admittedly, contributed—is undoubtedly that it envisages a ban on 'offensive weapons' in favour of 'defensive weapons'[7]. Not only is such a distinction meaningless, it may also prove harmful, as was the case during the League of Nations' notorious 1932 World Disarmament Conference, where states sought to conceal their quest for supremacy with proposals for banning 'offensive weapons', which tended to be precisely those categories in which their opponents were superior[8]. On closer analysis, it has to be acknowledged that both offensive and defensive operations require a whole panoply of weapons categories, many of which are identical: Tanks may, for instance, be very valuable for a defender, just as anti-tank weapons are indispensable for an attacker. Mines may not only be of use to a defender, but also to an attacker. Indeed, even fortifications (such as the Chinese Wall, or the Maginot Line) may facilitate attack, simply because they free forces for offensive use that would otherwise be required for defensive duties.

This should not be taken to mean that weapons do not matter at all. Under concrete historical and geographical circumstances, weapons are not useful or indispensable to quite the same extent to an attacker and a defender. Even though,

in a European context *anno* somewhere between 1945 and today, tanks would be of use to both an attacker and a defender, they would only be indispensable for the former, whereas the latter would be absolutely dependent on anti-tank weapons, etc.[9]. By implication, military formations (e.g. divisions) tend to differ with respect to their offensive capabilities according to their weapons mix. There was, for instance, little doubt that the Soviet tank armies were more capable of offensives than their motorized rifle divisions, even though the latter were still too tank- and artillery-heavy for the West's taste.

However, an attack would not merely call for heavy, mechanized and armoured formations, suitable for a breakthrough operation, but also for infantry-heavy units by means of which to 'mop up' bypassed pockets of defending forces, to defend conquered ground, etc. Likewise, a defender would need some heavy armoured forces for evicting an invador forcefully, only fewer of them than an attacker. Also, a defender with international obligations (say, for UN peace enforcement operations, *vide infra*) could not dispense completely with offensive-capable forces.

A reliable offence/defence distinction can therefore only be made at the level of the total postures of states, say by an assessment of the distribution of total strength between predominantly offensive and largely defensive units. As a very crude 'rule of thumb', the strategic reach of an offensive posture would be longer than that of a defensive one, for the obvious reason that an attacker would seek to conquer ground whereas the defender would seek to defend his home territory. However, what should count as long or short would depend on the context, *inter alia* because distances are relative: Whereas only truly long-range mobility would matter between, say, Russia and Ukraine, countries in the 'crowded' Middle East might well be concerned about their respective adversaries' ability to traverse much shorter distances. The strategic depth (measured in the distance between the frontier and the capital or major population centres) of Israel is, for instance, less than 50 kms., whereas that of Russia is in the range of 1,000 kms. But states differ even more than this geostrategically: Island states, for obvious reasons, only need to worry about enemies in possession of navies (and/or long range air forces), etc., whereas land-locked states such as Switzerland need not worry too much about naval powers[10].

Indeed, in the case of alliances, the analysis may have to proceed beyond the state level, to the alliance level itself. Here (as well as on lower levels of analysis) other factors than the weapons mix determine the overall offensive capabilities: NATO's organizational structure and the intermingling of different national force contingents along the Central Front (the 'layer-cake structure') thus undoubtedly detracted from the Alliance's offensive capability, whereas the structure of the Warsaw Pact was more suitable for offensives: with the NSPFs tightly integrated with, and clearly subordinated to, the Soviet armed forces, deployed well forward, etc.[11].

These analytical complexities clearly imply that no distinctions between weapons can be made with universal validity, but they do not warrant any complete agnosticism. It is not the case that 'everything is in the eye of the beholder'. Just like elephants, offensive postures may be hard to define yet are easy to recognize on sight.

For a particular region at a particular point in time, informed expert opinion would have no trouble reaching agreement on at least the basic criteria. Hence, for instance, the consensus among the states participating in the CFE negotiations on a focus on reductions of MBTs, ACVs, artillery, subsequently also combat aircraft and helicopters[12]—a focus that may, but need not, be appropriate for other regions, such as the Middle East (*vide infra*).

Whereas the configuration of the armed forces is thus of considerable significance, what ultimately matters is, of course, what states do with their military might, i.e. whether they have offensive or defensive intentions and political ambitions. So long as states feel confident that their neighbours are peaceful and defensively minded, they will not care about their armaments at all—just as, for instance, Denmark does not care about Sweden's military superiority, or Canada about that of the USA. Except for such 'security communities'[13], however, states will worry about their neighbours' intentions. States tend to be much more comfortable when their neighbours are saturated and status quo-oriented, i.e. defensive, than if they are 'revisionist', irredentist, or expansionist, i.e. politically offensive.

The problem is, of course, that intentions are not immediately observable, but have to be inferred on the basis of circumstantial, but tangible, evidence. One manifestation of whether states are politically defensive or offensive is their definition of 'vital national interests', in defence of which their military power might be used. One might rank such definitions along a (primarily spatial) continuum, denoting the required military reach.

The most defensive level of ambition is (A) to defend only territorial integrity and national sovereignty. Slightly more offensive is the inclusion of (B) overseas possessions, the defence of which may require global reach. The same is the case for a defence of (C) nationals abroad, even though their defence (or rescue) will usually call for, at most, long-range expeditionary forces. It is even more offensive to envisage a defence also of (D) overseas 'economic interests' (such as oil), to which states may have no legal entitlement, but the defence of which may require global reach of substantial proportions. Equally offensive is it (E) to envisage what might (euphemistically) be called an 'expanded perimeter defence', which encompasses a 'buffer zone' comprising other states. Most offensive of all are, of course, (F) ambitions of territorial aggrandizement, such as those of the Third Reich or of Iraq *vis-a-vis* Kuwait.

The former Soviet Union seems to have defined its national interests somewhere in the range from C to E—at least as encompassing the entire Warsaw Pact region—something that was regarded by the West as offensive, and rightly so. Also, the West has not been entirely happy with the recently promulgated military doctrine of the Russian Federation, *inter alia* because it envisages a defence of Russian nationals abroad—a level of ambition that may be very conflict-prone because of the presence of large Russian minorities all over the former Soviet Union. Also, the notion of the 'near abroad' seems to envisage a kind of *droit de regard* concerning the security policies of the former Soviet allies, and at least over ex-Soviet republics. If so, it might

also require military forces capable of exerting pressure on these countries[14].

Another relevant rank-ordering of political intentions might be along a temporal continuum, i.e. according to the envisaged timing of military operations (which brings us to the level of strategy or 'grand strategy')[15]: It is, of course, more offensive to launch a premeditated attack than to defend oneself, but the intermediate stages also matter: Preventive war (i.e. a war motivated by the threat of deteriorating power ratios) is thus clearly offensive, even though the underlying motivation may be defensive. It is also more offensive to defend oneself in an anticipatory mode (i.e. before being actually attacked, as has been Israeli policy, *vide infra*) through a pre-emptive attack than to merely respond to an actual attack. An active, immediate defence is entirely defensive, but one might go one step further: by chosing a reactive defence, which only responds to the attackers actions at each successive step of the war.

Important though they certainly are, neither political ambitions nor grand strategies are ever completely transparent, and states therefore prefer more tangible evidence of the goals pursued of other states, say in the form of their strategies and operational concepts. Such evidence is available in different forms. Postures might, for instance, be seen as 'frozen strategies', i.e. as reflecting how states intend to fight a future war—or rather how they intended so, at some point(s) in the past when the choice(s) resulting in the present posture was (were) made, because of the considerable (and unfortunately for the analyst, differential) time-lag[16]. When the USSR, for instance, created the GSFG (Group of Soviet Forces, Germany) as a very offensive-capable formation, this must have reflected an intention to fight a future war offensively, i.e. by 'carrying the war to the enemy' as swiftly as possible[17]; and when their ship-yards began constructing aircraft carriers, this must have reflected 'blue water' ambitions[18]. Fortunately, because of the revolutionary progress in information technologies, postures are already today clearly observable by various 'national technical means', but they will become even more transparent as a result of the recent arms control accomplishments, above all the Open Skies Treaty[19].

Another reflection of strategies is the pattern of exercises. A state that, for instance, never trains its forces for break-through operations probably does not plan to be on the offensive in a future war, and it will almost surely fail if it were to attempt such operations in the 'fog of war'. Hence the rationale for making military manoeuvres transparent, as has been the purpose of the various confidence-building measures, CBMs, negotiated under the auspices of the CSCE[20].

Finally, states may willingly reveal their military doctrines and war plans, as was the very purpose of the Vienna Seminars held under the auspices of the CSCE[21]. Such revelations do, of course, lend themselves to deception. Should a state, for instance, have plans to attack others, it would undoubtedly do its utmost to conceal these intensions, say by claiming to have a strictly defensive military doctrine. However, it would surely be unmasked if the 'pieces' did not fit together, i.e. if its posture and/or its manoeuvre practices seemed to contradict the proclaimed intensions. If was thus precisely because the pieces *did* fit together, i.e. formed a coherent pattern, that the West eventually came to believe that the USSR had in fact

adopted a defensive doctrine[22].

It is thus possible to discern (the outline of) the war plans of other states, with the implication that a distinction between offensive and defensive strategies, operational concepts and tactics is possible. This leaves us with the question where to 'draw the line', i.e. at which level to demand strict defensiveness.

'Pure defence', i.e. a renunciation of even tactically offensive operations, is close to a contradiction in terms—and in any case unlikely to be effective. However, this is not at all what is being suggested by NOD advocates. On the contrary, an NOD strategy and posture would tend to allow the defenders to fight more rather than less offensively in the tactical sense of initiating a greater number of individual engagements. The reason is that by taking advantage of shielded positions, well-prepared defenders will be able to gain the upper hand in the concealment/detection contest, also because the attacker could not possibly renounce movement but would have to expose himself by traversing open ground[23].

Defensiveness must therefore be located at a higher level of analysis than tactics, where it is largely a matter of the timing and scale of counter-offensive operations[24]. Here, a very clear line of demarcation might be defined as separating offensive from defensive levels of ambition, namely the border: An NOD-type defence would need the ability to forcefully evict an invader (presupposing that the forward defence has been penetrated) and restore the *status quo ante bellum*. However, even though it would serve no purpose to entirely exclude 'hot pursuits' across the border, strictly defensive forces would certainly not need the ability to pursue the invader onto his own territory in order to enforce an unconditional surrender. Large-scale ('strategic') counter-offensives would thus have to be ruled out, also because 'punishment' as a strategic objective is neither defensive, nor likely to achieve other objectives than revenge. Whatever 'punishment' might be required would have to be administred through international authorities acording to international law, and would largely consist in reparations[25]. Even though a few NOD proponents have flirted with the notion of 'counter-invasions' (couched in terms of 'conditional offensive superiority'[26]), this is thus both unwarranted and entirely incompatible with NOD, above all because the 'counter-' would tend to be invisible, and the required capabilities hence indistinguishable from genuine offensive ones.

3. Defensive Strength

Having by now, hopefully, established that meaningful distinctions can be made, both in principle and in practice, between offensive and defensive strategies and postures, we are left with the question whether the two can actually be disentangled without detrimental effects on defence efficiency: Does the relinquishment of offensive capabilities for the sake of crisis and arms race stability inevitably come at the expense of defensive strength? If so, many states might be well-advised *not* to adopt NOD as their guideline.

Fortunately, as a general rule (with allowance for possible exceptions), it is in

fact possible to strengthen one's defences while building down offensive capabilities, simply because the defensive form of combat is inherently the strongest, as already pointed out by Clausewitz[27]. However, it is only inherently so, and to make it actually stronger requires skills and specialization, which is what NOD is all about:

First of all, there are capabilities which a 'pure' defender no longer needs (or at least needs much less). To relinquish them will (in the medium-to-long term, at least) allow for savings that may be utilized for enhancing defensive strength: Examples of such largely superfluous capabilities are long-range mobility (including logistics), the ability to move about under enemy fire (requiring armour, mobile air defence, etc.), and long-range striking power (including C^3I systems, etc.). Since these capabilities happen to be among the most costly, quite a lot of defensive strength (say, in the form of anti-tank weapons, mines, or whatever) may be purchased from the savings.

Secondly, a number of material 'force multipliers' will automatically be available to a defender, but not to an attacker, amounting to inalienable 'home ground advantages': Interior lines of communications and supply; the option of creating widely distributed depots; of building various types of fortifications and of constructing barriers (the Bar Lev line, for example, *vide infra*); and even of a certain landscaping[28].

Thirdly, the immaterial ('moral') advantages are considerable: The defenders will enjoy the support (morally, materially and otherwise) of the population. In many countries, this support may be personified in militia-type home guard forces, which will add considerable to the available manpower pool[29]. However, the implied 'arming of the population' may not be advisable under all circumstances, especially not in countries torn by internal strife, as illustrated by the Yugoslav example (as well as by the equally terrifying massacre in Hebron).

Fourthly, the defenders will be able to exercise under more realistic conditions than a prospective attacker, since they know exactly where they will have to fight.

Fifthly, command structures may be decentralized to a certain extent, hence made more robust than the very hierarchical ones that an aggressor would tend to rely on[30].

Finally, certain trends in the development of modern weapons technologies tend to benefit the defender disproportionately: The revolutionary development in micro-electronics, for instance, allow for miniaturization which, in its turn, may render the large weapons platforms superfluous for defensive purposes, whereas they remain indispensable for offensive operations. Even though it is certainly premature to write off the tank or the major surface combatants as obsolete, they may nevertheless be facing obsolescence (in the sense of declining cost-effectiveness) in the coming decades[31].

4. The Span of Models

Whether or not NOD will in fact be effective enough depends, of course, on which

particular models (or mixture of models) would be selected for implementation. Just as they are not equally defensive, NOD models are also not equally effective[32].

The variety of NOD models is immense, even though by far the majority of those available deal with one particular country[33]. It is nevertheless possible to bring some order into the panoply, since NOD models can be roughly divided into three archetypal models. Most other models are, in fact, eclectic in the sense of combining elements from these three types.

1. Area-covering territorial defence, along the lines of the seminal proposal of Horst Afheldt[34], or the more effective 'spider and web' model of the SAS. The latter envisages a combination of a stationary, area-covering defence web with mobile forces ('spiders'), including tanks and other armoured vehicles. Even though the latter are *per se* suitable for offensive operations, they should be made dependent on the stationary web to such as extent as to be very mobile within, but virtually not beyond, the confines of the web[35].
2. 'Bastion'-type defences (also known as 'selective area defence' or 'stronghold defence'), as suggested by members of the SAS group, especially for the Middle East and other regions with low force-to-space ratios and/or long borders[36]. This would imply concentrating a state's defence on certain areas that are politically important (typically the approaches to the national capital or other major populations centres) and/or which will allow for a cohesive defence. The fire coverage afforded by the units in the strongholds will, at least, channel the attack, thereby making it more manageable for the mobile forces.
3. Strictly defensive forward defence, for instance by means of a 'fire barrier', as suggested by Norbert Hannig[37] and/or by means of fortifications and fixed obstacles. This would tend to be a very capital-intensive type of defence, relying to a very large extent on automated fire by high-technology means. Notwithstanding the missile strikes into enemy territory that would be permissible acording to this model, it would still be non-offensive because of the (virtual) absence of mobile ground forces.

Besides these, we have what might be called an approach rather than a model, because it says nothing—not even in abstract terms—about the actual configuration or deployment of forces, but only about their inherent synergies:

4. The 'missing link approach', according to which an otherwise offensive force posture may be rendered strictly defensive simply by deliberately omitting one or several components, for instance long-range and/or mobile air defence capability, mobile anti-tank defence, or river-crossing equipment[38].

All three-and-a-half models have their strengths and weaknesses, hence the attraction of combining elements of them into, hopefully, more effective conglomerates.

The mode of combination that has attracted the greatest attention in Europe has been the following, which may also prove most immediately relevant for the Middle East.

5. Disengagement, implying the withdrawal of certain forces (usually the most offensive-capable ones) from the border area to rearward locations, combined with a forward defence by strictly defensive means: typically tantamount to a tank-free zone in the border region, which would be defended by means of infantry armed with anti-tank weaponry, or otherwise[39].

The attractions of disengagement derive from the fact that it would eliminate options of surprise attack and contribute to confidence-building. The depletion zone would simply serve as an early warning device, since the deployment of proscribed weapons and forces into the zone would alert the other side to the impending attack and allow him to mobilize and prepare for combat. The same logic might suggest the following, that might be called

6. 'Stepping down', implying that the general level of readiness should be reduced: forces should be cadred (e.g. through a shift to a reserve army system) or otherwise prevented from launching surprise attacks, say by a separation of munitions from weapons.

However, the advantages resulting from disengagement as well as from 'stepping down' have to be weighed against the risk of malign interactions which might ensue in a crisis period. If the forces withdrawn from the forward line would be those possessing the greatest offensive capability (as in most proposals), to redeploy them into the zone for defensive purposes in an intense political crisis could easily be misinterpreted as preparations for an attack. Counter-intuitive though it may seem, stability might thus require that offensive-capable forces be stationed close to their envisaged combat positions and maintained in a high state of readiness, whereas the unmistakably defensive forces could safely be cadred and stationed in the rear.

The present author's experience with debates on NOD suggests that a caveat is in order at this point: Most of the models above have either been designed for a particular context, or remain very abstract. Were one to simply transpose them to quite a different setting (as has occasionally been done by NOD critics) one is bound to arrive at absurd results. As all abstract defence models, NOD models are not to be confused with actual defence planning, for which they are merely conceived as politico-military guidelines. Also, whereas modelling is a legitimate task for 'armchair strategists', actual defence planning should remain a prerogative for professionals, i.e. general staffs, albeit under political control.

5. Nuclear Weapons and/or Collective Security

All of the above has only applied to conventional forces, raising the question how

nuclear weapons come into the picture. Even though some NOD advocates have portrayed their proposals as alternatives to deterrence, others (including the present author) would argue that NOD is a way of making the best of a situation of general or 'existential' deterrence, which will never go away. The nuclear genie is out of its bottle and can never be reliably put back again, since the knowledge of how to produce nuclear weapons is readily available to everyone. The experience with IAEA controls so far (Iraq, North Korea, for instance) also does not warrant complacency about the detection of clandestine nuclear weapons programs in the future. Practically every state hence has to reckon with the possibility that its respective adversary just might have some nuclear weapons, by means of which he might 'snatch mutual annihilation from the claws of defeat'. The implication is that war can no longer be won in quite the same sense as before, in the 'Clausewitzian era' of 'absolute war', but that limited wars fought in the 'shadow' of nuclear weapons, i.e. in a 'subnuclear setting' are the name of the game[40]. Deterrence is thus a 'a fact', from which observation some have drawn the conclusion that nuclear disarmament is impractical. This is, however, a *non sequitur*: that the *fact* of deterrence is unchangeable leaves states with a considerable margin of choice with regard to the doctrine and materialization of deterrence (an observation with implications for Israel, *vide infra*). Some would suggest that 'minimum deterrence', accompanied by policies of no-first-use would be all that would be required for 'existential deterrence'. Others (including the present author) would go even further and suggest that weaponless, 'blueprint deterrence' would suffice, i.e. a deterrence based on the potential of nuclear weapons, yet without their actual deloyment or existence[41].

Whether to opt for one or the other is probably a matter of conjecture, since there is no empirical evidence of either one or the other. As succinctly pointed out by Bruce Russett:

> 'When deterrence fails, you know it; when deterrence succeeds, you may not know why it succeeded, and you may not even know that it succeeded.'[42]

Be that as it may, there would in neither case be any need for nuclear weapons for military, i.e. war-fighting purposes, in which sense the conventional forces should be seen as 'stand-alone' forces.

Whatever underpinning the conventional power of a small state might need *vis-a-vis* larger states would have to be provided by other means, say in the form of alliances and/or collective security arrangements. Alliances, however, are either directed against somebody else (often for good reasons), i.e. adversarial; or they are superfluous; or they may, finally, be something completely different *in embryo*, namely collective security arrangements[43].

There is nothing wrong with adversarial alliances as such, but they tend to simply transpose the problems providing their *raison d'être* to a higher level, because alignment breeds counter-alignment. Instead of security dilemma-type malign interactions between states, we tend to end up with the same type of interactions,

accompanied by the same type of risks and costs, only between alliances. This may well be a short-term solution for individual states, but it is hardly a long-term solution for neither the international system as such, nor any of its regional subsystems.

Non-adversarial alliances directed against no serious external threat are utterly superfluous (which does not mean that they will automatically cease to be, because of institutional inertia). They face the choice between finding another credible threat against whom or which to direct the common effort of their members, or of undergoing a profound metamorphosis: from alliances to collective security arrangements. The latter should preferably incorporate former adversaries, ideally be all-encompassing, if only within a region. This would seem to be a rather accurate description of the choices NATO is presently facing after the dissolution of the USSR. With the establishment of first NACC and subsequently PFP, NATO seems (according to a benevolent interpretation at least) to be slowly transforming itself into a future all-European collective security arrangement[44]—a solution also recommended by most NOD advocates, including the present author. It would allow all states parties to the system to feel secure with much less military power than if they were to field a 'stand alone' defence, which would be prohibitively demanding for most states under conditions of multipolarity[45]. A collective security arrangement would consist of two elements:

- An obligation to refrain from the use of military force between member states.
- A binding commitment to assist other members who are nevertheless victims of aggression, whether from the outside (i.e. non-members) or the inside, i.e. by member states, in violation of the former obligation.

Since this would be a very attractive arrangement, measured by almost any standards, disputes have tended to focus on whether it might be politically feasible[46]—a profoundly political question that I shall bypass at this stage. Whether global or regional, and regardless of its political nature, such a collective security system would need to have armed forces at its disposal, the more so the more it would move beyond mere peacekeeping[47] to 'peace-making', as seems to become increasingly realistic.

Such 'collective security forces' might consist, first of all, of a standing contingent of truly multinational interventionary forces, above all for 'flag-waving missions' along the lines of NATO's AMF. However, it does not appear realistic, for the near future, to envisage such multinational forces numbering more than tens of thousands. Such forces might prove valuable, especially if deployed preventively in areas threatened by impending attack.

As far as militarily more demanding 'peace enforcement' operations are concerned, such as a restoration of the territorial integratity of the state under attack, the system would probably have to rely on larger forces that are under national command in peacetime, but earmarked and trained for multinational operations[48]

—say, along the lines of the 'International Brigade' being established by the present author's home country, Denmark. Preferably they should be under direct UN command and their deployment should be planned in advance, e.g. by a refurbished UN International Staff Committee[49]. As far as the near future is concerned, however, it may be more realistic to envisage regional organizations such as NATO operating on behalf of the UN.

One problem with pragmatic solutions such as this is that countries could not possibly come to each other's rescue with only defensive forces, specialized in fighting from prepared positions on their home territory. On the contrary, they would need long-range mobility, the ability to repulse an aggressor and reconquer lost territory with a view to a restoration of the *status quo ante bellum*. These offensive capabilities would have to be considerable, also because an aggressor would benefit from the inherent defensive supremacy: After an invasion, he might assume defensive positions on the conquered piece of land, construct minefields etc., thereby forcing the 'real defender' to operate offensively, i.e. at a disadvantage[50].

The paradox that stability and peace thus requires, at the same time, a thorough defensive restructuring and significant offensive capabilities represents a real dilemma. Moreover, no obvious solution is to be found in either qualitative or quantiative terms: it is not enough to have 'just a little offensive capability', when the liberation of conquered territory may require a lot, and when even a little may frighten one's small neighbours. Nor is it adequate to limit oneself to 'only slightly offensive' forces, which might well be so offensive as to constitute a threat to one's immediate neighbours, yet insufficiently so to liberate more distant collective security partners.

Defensive Restructuring-cum-Collective Security



An answer to this dilemma might be sought in the political framework: Collective

security does not presuppose that states possess offensive capabilities, only that the collectivity as such does so. Furthermore, offensive capabilities are a reflection of synergies: tanks, for instance (often erroneously regarded as 'offensive weapons' *par excellence*), are not offensive if operating on their own, since they need air cover, shielding infantry, a functioning C^3I (command, control, communications, intelligence) system, a logistic 'tail' to provide them with fuel and ammunition, bridge-building equipment to cross water obstacles, etc. Combat aircraft, even fighter bombers, are unable to 'consummate' a victory, hence (according to many analysts, at least) constitute no offensive cability unless combined with land forces able to take and hold ground. Navies are even less in a position to invade and conquer ground, unless they contain amphibious forces and are followed by real land forces that are able to exploit a bridgehead for a full-scale invasion, etc.

If all states were to abandon one or several elements of what would otherwise be tantamunt to an offensive capability, they would be defensive to all practical intents and purposes (cf. above on the 'missing link approach'). They might, on the other hand, contribute to a multinational offensive capability by providing indispensable elements thereof, as illustrated in the chart above. The teaming up of, individually defensive, forces from several nations for offensive-capable joint task forces would, of course, require planning and drill. However, the required exercizes might come to replace those of the former alliances, thus not involving 'new' expenses. Indeed, they might constitute 'confidence-building measures' in their own right, since they would force former adversaries to collaborate. Furthermore, the force contingent from each state would tend to be rather small, hence not prohibitively costly.

6. The Mode of Implementation

Were a state to come to the conclusion that NOD (*cum* collective security) was worth implementing, it would be facing a choice between several possible modes of implementing the desired shift of strategy and posture. In principle, there would be three different modes of implementation—apart from that of enforced defensive restructuring, as occasionally seen after major wars[51]: Negotiated arms control, strict unilateralism, and what might be called 'Informal arms control'.

NOD proponents have traditionally been sceptical (to say the least) about negotiated arms control, because of the many pitfalls inherent in this approach, above all the unwarranted emphasis on 'balance'[52]. Even in the bipolar environment, a balance was hard to define, *inter alia* because of the incommensurability between different types of forces and weapons, the asymmetrical structure of Eastern and Western forces, and the undeniable importance of unquantifiable factors such as the quality of weapons, the morale of troops and the reliability of allies. Balance would be even harder to recognize than to define, because of the propensity for worst-case analysis and 'double standards'. States would, for instance, tend to compare their standing forces with an opponent's mobilizable potential, etc. Finally, even if it were

to be definable and recognizable, balance would constitute both to little and too much for all concerned: too little, because between a surprise attack might overwhelm any defence, also in the case of evenly matched forces. Too much, because a well-prepared defender could do with less than parity, because of the intrinsic advantages of the defence—sometimes simplistically referred to as the 'three-to-one rule' (*vide supra*). Until around 1987, this theoretically founded scepticism about the prospects of arms control seemed to receive empirical support from the meagre accomplishments of East-West arms control negotiations[53], hence the attraction of option two.

Strict unilateralism has been recommended by several NOD proponents, who have recommended states to simply adopt an NOD strategy without further ado, simply because it is the most effective. Furthermore, regardless of the respective adversary's response, the situation would be stabilized because incentives for pre-emptive attack would be removed. The main problem with such suggestions was, however, that they were addressed to the wrong side, namely NATO, i.e. the clearly most defensively oriented of the two opposing alliances. What would really improve the situation in Europe would, however, be a Soviet abandonment of its very offensive strategy[54]. Nevertheless, in the light of the Soviet intransigence until Gorbachev's take-over, it seemed futile to directly urge the Soviet Union to change strategy, hence the attraction of option three.

The latter would imply making limited unconditional conciliatory ouvertures, say in the form of a limited arms build-down, accompanied by an invitation to the respective adversary to reciprocate, with a promise to proceed along the same path if reciprocation would be achieved. In the East-West conflict, NOD might presumably be one element in such a gradualist strategy of confidence-building, tension reduction and disarmament: By abandoning certain offensive elements in its own strategy and posture, NATO might presumably induce the USSR to reciprocate in the form of a gradual abandonment of her offensive strategy[55].

* * * * *

Having by now provided a fairly elaborate account of the general concept of NOD, the question remains whether it might be applicable (*mutatis mutandis*) to the context of the Middle East, more precisely to the Arab-Israeli conflict, regardless of its having been conceived for Europe under conditions of bipolarity. I shall approach this question via a comparison of the two regions along several dimensions: the political, the geographical, the economical, the cultural and the military dimension.

7. The Middle East and Europe Compared

Even though the European and the Middle Eastern contexts have features in common, the differences between the two are equally obvious:

Politically, the European countries were saturated and had acquiesced in the territorial status quo, codified inter alia in the German *Ostverträge* and in the Helsinki

document of 1975, and manifested in the policies of détente pursued by all significant states through the 1970s and 1980s. In the Middle East, however 'status quo' has remained 'an essentially contested concept':

- When should one start 'counting'? In 1947, 1948, 1967, or at some other juncture, the choice between which has profound territorial implications, above all for Israel and the Palestinians, but also for Syria, Egypt and Jordan.
- It is far from obvious to its neighbours, that Israel is territorially saturated, even within the post-1967 borders, because of the Likud's and orthodox and/or extremist groupings' continuous murmuring about 'greater Israel'[56].
- The stateless Palestinians are also committed to overturn the status quo, by establishing either a Palestinian state or, as a minimum, some statelike political structure. In either case, it will almost inevitably be at the expence of Israel[57].
- This is not merely a question of *realpolitik*, but also of rights and entitlements: Palestinians and Jews have conflicting historical and/or religious 'rights' to the same territory (not least Jerusalem[58]).

Compatibility between Israeli and Palestinian claims to statehood	*The* Pal. State	*A* Pal. State	Pal. Autonomy in: Israel	Confedc-eration	'Interna-tional'
'Greater I.'	No	No	?	n.a.	No
Post-1967 I.	No	No	?	?	?
Pre-1967 I.	No	?	No	Yes	Yes
Jewish Auto-nomy in: Pal. state	No	Yes	No	n.a.	n.a.
Jewish Auto-nomy in: Confederation	?	n.a.	?	Yes	n.a.
Jewish Auto-nomy in: 'International'	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	Yes

- Furthermore, 'rights' are a function of time: Historical entitlements aside, the right of inhabitants change gradually, reflecting generational change: It was clearly (in the present author's eyes, at least) the right of the Palestinian refugees to return to their home[59], say in 1970 or 1980, even if this might have entailed an eviction of settlers. However, it is less obvious that their children (who may never have set foot on the lost territory) have the same right to expel jewish settlers who may have lived there all their lives. As far as the grandchildren (etc.) are concerned, the question of rights becomes increasingly 'metaphysical'. Still, it should be kept in mind that the settlement policy of successive Israeli governements relating to the occupied territories constitutes a clear violation of international law[60].
- It is thus less obvious than in Europe that a policy of common security makes sense, since the conflict is, at least *prima facie*, more of a zero-sum game than the East-West conflict ever was.
- It might nevertheless be the case that a mutually acceptable solution could

be found by 'updrading common interest', say in the form of confederation between Israel, Jordan and the Palestine yet to be—or via other forms of internationalization[61].

Europe and the Middle East further appeared to resemble each other with regard to their bipolar structure (Arab states-versus-Israel, East-versus-West). However, on closer analysis, bipolarity was merely an overlay concealing a latent multipolar security complex[62]. In fact, the Middle Eastern security complex was concealed beneath a 'dual overlay', which was not even internally consistent: Most, but not all, Arab states were (informally) aligned with the Eastern superpower, whereas Israel was (at least since around 1960) an ally of the USA, whose regional clients, however, also included states very hostile to Israel. Whereas the lifting of the 'single overlay' in Europe produced fairly predictable results, IR theory really has no answer to what happens after the successive lifting (or perhaps only transformation) of two overlays: What happens, for instance, to the Iraqi-Syrian relations when the East-West conflict is resolved? Would this merely strengthen the effect of the second overlay of Arabs versus Israel? Or would it reinvigorate the contest between the two Arab rivals? And what would happen if the Arab-Israeli conflict is resolved?

Politically, Europe was also divided between democracies and totalitarian regimes, a division that coincided almost perfectly with the fault line between East and West. The implications were that democratic forms of government served as an inhibition against aggressive war in the West—and totally precluded West-West wars[63] (with the exception of the two least democratic countries, namely Greece and Turkey). The further implication was that with the spread of democracy to the whole of Europe in the wake of the 1989/1991 revolutions, wars between European states have become nearly inconceivable.

The situation in the Middle East is very different: with Israel standing out as the only democracy (perhaps not even a perfect one[64]) in a world of more or less authoritarian regimes—and with rather bleak prospects for fundamental change in this situation[65]. The implication is that domestic structure—type inhibitions against aggressive war cannot realistically be counted upon in the Middle East, whereas they can in Europe. Hence the higher saliency of other inhibitions against war in the former region, for instance in the form of NOD-type military reforms, *vide infra*.

Institutionally, Europe was far ahead of the Middle East, even during the Cold War. Although institutional ties tended to follow the East-West fault line, the density of institutions (personifying functional cooperation in numerous fields) was very high, especially in the West. Besides these, all-European institutions did exist, as well as a plethora of negotiation fora—with the CSCE standing out as the most prominent and elaborate, which started out as a mere process, but has been institutionalized since 1990[66]. After the Cold War, many of the previously Western institutions have been openened up for newcomers, and new ones have been established on the fringes of the old, with NACC and PFP as merely two examples. More will undoubtedly follow in due course. There was thus never any shortage of institutional frameworks for whatever

collaborative ventures states might comtemplate, and the CSCE was, for instance, available for the NOD-like arms reductions of the CFE (*vide supra*).

Not so in the Middle East, where collaboration between the Arab and/or islamic states is very weak institutionally[67], and where no all-regional institutions are in existence that might provide the auspices under which to establish an NOD (or any other arms control) regime. Hence the numerous suggestions for establishing, for instance, a Middle Eastern counterpart of the CSCE (*vide infra*), which is, however, hampered by the weakness of actual interdependence, economically and otherwise.

Geographically, the Middle East is more spatious than the crowded Europe. However, since most of the territory consists of deserts, the inhabited and/or cultivated space is much smaller, implying that the effective population desity is actually comparable; indeed that of Israel is larger than that of many European countries (216 inhabitants/km^2, as compared with Germany's 223). Also, even though distances might, at first glance, seem longer, closer analysis reveals that the central areas tend to 'cluster': The distances between the capitals of Israel, Syria and Jordan are thus short, and all three capitals lie within 60 kms. from the border[68]: a position not so different from that of Hamburg or Frankfurt during the Cold War in Europe.

The abundance of space notwithstanding, most countries in the Middle East may thus be in no better position to 'trade space for time' in a future war than was the FRG. On the other hand, the existence of wide spaces of uninhabited territory may well make a difference for military operations, say by rendering manoeuvre-type warfare less destructive than it would have been in Europe. Let us recall T.E. Lawrence's description of the 'battle ground':

> 'The decision of what was critical would always be ours. Most wars were wars of contact, both forces striving into touch to avoid tactical surprise. Ours should be a war of detachment. We were to contain the enemy by the silent threat of a vast unknown desert, not disclosing ourselves till we attacked. The attack might be nominal, directed not against him, but against his stuff; so it would not seek either his strength or his weakness, but his most accessible material. In railway-cutting it would be usually an empty stretch of rail; and the more empty, the greater the tactical success. We might turn our average into a rule (..) and develop a habit of never engaging the enemy.'[69]

Furthermore, uninhabited territory may possess intrinsic value for other reasons, primarily by containing (or otherwise yielding control over) the region's two most precious resources: oil and water[70].

Economically, the East-West demarcation line in Europe nearly coincided with that between the poor and the rich. Furthermore, that of the two sides least likely to start a war (the West) was also the richest. This had both positive and negative implications: Positively, it meant that the West had considerable 'staying power', both in the sense that it would be sure to ultimately prevail in a protracted war of attrition where mobilization potential would be decisive[71]; and that arms racing for the sake of exhausting its means was no viable substitute for 'hot war' for the other side. Negatively, it might (according to, not very realistic, worst-case analyses) provide the East with a spur to launch an aggressive war for the sake of conquest.

The situation in the Middle East is almost the exact opposite: Even though wealth is distributed very unevenly among the Arab states, they are with few exceptions more prosperous than Israel—not because of their superior economic system, but thanks to nature (oil). Hence, Israel would almost surely be economically exhausted by a protracted 'real' war of attrition—as opposed to the War of Attrition, which was more a substitute for 'real war', even though the costs were considerable[72]. The only comfort for the economically inferior party in this respect would be that it would surely enjoy the support of most of the rich world, above all the USA.

Economically, the links between East and West (underdeveloped though they were) all through the Cold War had a certain dampening effect on the conflict. Furthermore, an end to the Cold War in Europe promised great returns, if only in the medium-to-long run. In the Middle East, by comparison, the economic links between Israel and the Arab states have always been very weak, thus doing very little to dampen the conflict. An end to the conflict might, on the other hand, hold considerable promise, both in the negative sense of escaping from an economically damaging arms race, and in the positive sense of opening possibilities for economic integration[73].

Culturally, Europe was relatively homogeneous, in the sense of almost entirely belonging to the Christian culture—with the Muslin enclave in ex-Yugoslavia and certain ex-Soviet states as well as the ambivalent Turkey as the only exceptions. Moreover, this was a rather secular culture, with only very sporadic instances of fundamentalism—even though the ideological fervour with which the Cold War was occasionally 'fought' to some extent made up for this 'deficiency'. Generally, however, culture and religion/ideology rarely stood in the way of pragmatic solutions that served national interests.

The Middle East is far more heterogeneous, with Islam, Judaism and Christianity cohabiting the region, and with more widespread fundamentalism, among muslims as well as jews. The present author does not believe in the inherent supremacy of one religion over the others, nor accepts that some are, by their very nature, bellicose[74]. Nevertheless, the higher saliency of the religious factor may well serve to cement conflicts and to make wars more ferocious by imbuing war aims with other-worldly significance, be that in the shape of islamic *jihad* or of zionist wars for the survival or aggrandizement of 'the promised land'.

Militarily, both regions were highly militarized. The table below gives a rough idea of the degree to which the Middle East is militarized, in terms of the military share of available resources (milex/GNP), of force and tank densities, measured in active armed forces and MBTs per km^2, respectively. These yardsticks, moreover, underestimate the actual density, because of the large tracts of desert. It further shows the the share of population under arms (AF/population) and the tank-heaviness of the armed forces, i.e. MBTs per 1000 active troops[75]. It also shows the wide spread, with Israel standing out as by far the most 'militarized' of the states in the region, in most respects.

	Milex/ GNP	Active AF/km^2	AF/ Pop.	MBT/ 1000 AF	MBT/ km^2
Israel	11%	8.47	12%	22.50	0.19
Jordan	11%	1.10	3%	11.30	0.01
Syria	8%	2.20	6%	11.03	0.02
Egypt	7%	0.43	1%	7.37	0.00
Iraq	43%	0.88	6%	5.76	0.01
Lebanon	5%	3.94	1%	8.54	0.03
Average	14%	0.88	3%	9.96	0.01

In both regions, the same categories of weapons systems have been regarded as especially important: tanks, APC and IFVs, artillery, combat aircraft and helicopters, i.e. those singled out for limitation in the mandate for the CFE negotiations. In fact, the entire Middle East—but especially Israel—is very 'tank-heavy', both in terms of MBTs pr. km^2 and of the ratio between tanks and ATGWs. However, force disparities were greater in the Middle East between Israel and the Arab states than between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe, with Israel being outnumbered in most respects, albeit only quantitatively.

Military Balance Israel/Arab States	Active Forces	Reserve Forces	Total AF	MBT	ATGW
Israel	176	430	606	3,960	980
Jordan	101	35	136	1,141	640
Syria	408	400	808	4,500	4,900
Egypt	430	304	734	3,167	2,580
Iraq	382	650	1,032	2,200	-
Lebanon	41	0	41	350	20
Arab States (-Leb.)	1,321	1,389	2,710	11,008	8,120
Arab States/Israel	7.51	3.23	4.47	2.78	8.29

The table above also shows that mobilization schedules will be of the utmost importance, since the Israeli inferiority would become much more manageable upon a call-up of the reserves. Also, the importance of alignments is striking, since Israeli inferiority would only materialize in the (very unlikely) case of a joint atack against her by all neighbouring states.

Just like in Europe, conventional forces would operate in an environment featuring weapons of mass destruction, albeit in a significantly different distribution. Whereas there was a nuclear 'balance' of sorts in Europe, Israel is the only country in the Middle East in possession of nuclear weapons[76]. Chemical weapons are more widely distrubuted, intelligence sources having it that both Israel, Iran, Iraq (until

1991). Syria and Libya hold stocks. Furthermore, some sources have conjectured that Syria may have biological weapons in her inventory, as Iraq may have had 'in the pipeline' prior to her defeat in 1991.

Furthermore, in addition to aircraft several countries possess other suitable means of delivery for such weapons of mass destruction in the shape of long-range SSMs: Israel, Egypt, Iran, Iraq (until 1991), Libya, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen[77]. It remains disputed how great a threat these missiles pose. Some analysts (including the present athour) hold that they should be regarded more as psychological terror weapons that as actual millitary weapons. In the former capacity they have the ability to appear 'out of nowhere' and without warning, thus causing panic, similar to the World War 2 'V2 scare'. Without nuclear (or perhaps biological) warheads, however, the actual destruction they can wreak (even with chemical weapons) is clearly inferior to that of aircraft, because of the latter's greater payload and cability of multiple sorties.

8. NOD Models Applied to the Middle Eastern Context

As already mentioned, the bulk of NOD literature has dealt with Europe, and only very few authors have tried to apply the same principles to the Arab-Israeli conflict[78]. Let us therefore begin the analysis of the potential application of NOD to the Middle East by simply transposing the archetypal models mentioned above from the Cold War Germany for which they were conceived to the Middle East of today. This prelimiary and tentative ('armchair') 'assessment should be made, at least, according to the following criteria:

A. The envisaged defence restructuring should make, at least, one side more secure without making any of the other sides less so: what might be called 'the common security criterion'.
B. It should not necessitate additional military expenditures, ideally allow for a transfer of resources from military to civilian consumption: 'the affordability criterion'.
C. It should combine a high likelihood of war prevention with the ability to wage a non-suicidal war of defence in case of a war: 'the deterrence and defence criterion'.

Since there is no *a priori* reason why all states involved (if any) should adopt the same NOD model, I shall tentatively apply each of them to the central states in the conflict: Israel, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and the 'Palestine' yet to be.

1. Area-covering territorial defence, in the shape of the SAS's 'spider and web' type.
2. 'Bastion'-type defences, i.e. a 'selective area defence' .
3. Strictly defensive forward defence, e.g. by means of fire barriers or of fortifications and fixed obstacles.
4. Defence postures with one or several 'missing links', without which they are incapable of offensive use.
5. Disengagement.
6. Stepping Down, either by shifting to a reserve army or by otherwise reducing the capability for surprise attack.

I shall contast these with the following:

0. Offensive defence, much like the present postures extrapolated into the future according to 'conservative', i.e. pessimistic assumptions.

In order to escape the fallacy of unwarranted precision, I have merely assigned the values Y, N and ?, implying compatibility, incompatibility and uncertainty, respectively, with brackets signifying qualifications. The table should be read as indicating what would be the results if, say, Israel were to adopt either of the 6+1 models: Would it adversely affect either Israel's own or her neighbours' security (A)? Would it be affordable for Israel herself (B)? And would it provide adequate war prevention as well as defensive capability for Israel (C)?

Offensive Defence is pretty much what is being practiced at the moment, with certain qualifications (*vide infra*). The fact that the region has already seen, at least, one war launched with a pre-emptive strike (the Six Day War in 1967) seems to imply that neither criterion A nor C would not be met. Israel struck against the Arab states because she feared an attack was impending, and would probably do so again under similar circumstances. This clearly indicates that the security of everybody does indeed suffer from the predominance of offensive strategies. The N under criterion A for Palestine is perhaps even more emphatic than the others, since it would seem to be a precondition for the actual establishment of this state (on the West Bank as well as in Gaza) that it would constitute no military threat to Israel.

The rather dire economic straits of all regional countries seems to indicate that the present level of military expenditures is unsustainable in the long run (depending, of course, on the oil prices, as far as Iraq is concerned). Hence, criterion B is not met by the offensive strategy either, also because it tends to perpetuate the conflict, thereby causing cumulative deficit spending and growing public debt. The only question-mark indicates that nuclear weapons, at least according to Israeli assumptions, provide a 'bigger bang for the buck', thus perhaps allowing Israel to 'make ends meet'. Still, even Israel's defence expenditures are shrinking.

NOD-type **territorial defence** would, beause of its incapability of border-crossing operations, clearly meat criterion A, regardless of what state were to adopt it. The only qualification would be that it should not envisage 'trading space for time' (as in some German models), since neither Israel, nor Jorden, Syria or the future Palestine will have space to trade away because of the short distances from the border to the capital. Egypt, on the other hand, has (the Sinai) as does Iraq at the border

facing Jordan—yet not at that facing Iran. In order to make it clear to a would-be aggressor that there would be no 'easy grab', all states (with the possible exception of Egypt) would therefore have to combine territorial defence with, at least elements of, forward defence (*vide infra*) in order to meet criterion C.

NOD Models Applied to the Arab-Israeli Conflict	Israel			Egypt			Syria			Jordan			'Pal.'			Iraq		
	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C
Terr. Defence	Y	Y	?	(Y)	(N)	Y	(Y)	(Y)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	(Y)	Y
Bastion Defence	N	Y	(N)	Y	Y	Y	(Y)	Y	(Y)	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	(Y)	Y	(Y)
Forward Defence	(N)	(Y)	(Y)	(Y)	Y	(Y)	(Y)	Y	(Y)	(Y)	(N)	N	N	N	N	(N)	(N)	(N)
Missing Link	Y	Y	Y	(Y)	Y	Y	(Y)	Y	Y	(Y)	Y	Y	(Y)	Y	Y	(Y)	Y	Y
Disengagement	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Stepping Down	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Off. defence	N	?	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N

As will be apparent from the table below, the manpower requirements of territorial defence schemes such as that of the SAS would not be prohibitive for any state (except perhaps Egypt), but the same force densities could be achieved without expansion of the total number of armed forces. This is, of course, not a very realistic comparison, since differences of terrain and of the distribution of the population would have to be taken into account. However, because population density is much more even in the FRG than in the Middle East, factoring in these features would, if anything, tend to lower force requirements. There simply is no need to defend large tracts of uninhabited and uncultivable desert.

State	Area km²	Act. AF	Res.	Total AF	SAS Act.	Total SAS	Diff. A	Diff. B
FRG	248,580	308	717	900	265	800	-14.0%	-11.1%
Israel	20,770	176	430	606	22	67	-87.4%	-89.0%
Jordan	91,880	101	35	136	98	296	-3.0%	+117.4%
Egypt	1,001,449	430	304	734	1,068	3,223	+148.3%	+339.1%
Syria	185,180	408	400	808	197	596	-51.6%	-26.2%
Iraq	434,924	382	650	1,032	464	1,400	+21.4%	+35.6%
Legend:	FRG: Federal Repuplic of Germany pre-unification (army only) Act. AF: Active armed forces (thousands) Res.: Reserves (thousands) Total AF: Total armed forces (thousands) SAS: SAS army forces per km2 for FRG * area of country in question Diff. A: SAS Act. - Active AF Diff. B: Total SAS - Total AF							

By imlication, criterion B might be satisfied if a reserve force system similar to that of Israel were to be adopted by the other states. This might, however, be incompatible

with 'internal security' as the rulers in Damascus and Bagdhad see it. Furthermore, the need for large quantities of weapons to arm the called-up reserves would seem to imply that states would have to go for rather primitive, or at most 'bronze-plate' technologies.

A **bastion-type defence**, as suggested by members of the SAS group for Saudi Arabia[79], would be strictly defensive, thus posing no threat to other states in the region. Also, it would tend to be rather inexpensive (the less one defends the cheaper), thereby meeting criterion B in all instances.

However, the implied 'selective area defence' would not be satisfactory seen from in Israeli point of view because of geography. The strategic depth of pre-1967 Israel was much too shallow to allow this type of defence to meet neither criterion A nor C—also because of the shortage of natural defence lines[80]. Israel's security would suffer, and the war prevention effects might well be insuficient. It may be another matter with post-1967 Israel, however, where the former state of Israel enjoys a 'shield' in the form of the disengagement arrangements in Sinai and the Golans[81], and where Jordan is (almost officially) counted on as additional strategic depth. However, even if criterion C might be met in this manner, it would clearly violate criterion A to treat others states (Jordan and the Palestine to be) as an extended *glacis*[82]. Neither would these countries seem to be in a position to rely on a bastions, because their strategic depth is comparable to that of Israel, that of Palestine probably even shallower.

As far as Egypt is concerned, however, there seem to be no reason why this type of defence should not meet both criteria A and C, and the same may be true for Iraq in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Syria, however, may be slightly a different matter because of the exposed location of Damascus, implying that a bastion-type defence around the capital would be nearly tantamount to a forward defence along the border facing Israel.

Strictly defensive **forward defence** is an imperative for Israel because of her shallow strategic depth. Within the present boundaries, this problem is largely solved by the command of the mountain ridges in the Golan and by the command of the West Bank where quite effective (and very cheap, cf. criterion B) fences have been erected along the 'border' with the Hashemite Kingdom, making up for the fact that the Jordan really is not much of a river[83]. These arrangements are already largely defensive in themselves, and might actually allow Israel to considerably reduce, ideally abandon, her offensive-capable ground forces without further ado, whereby criterion C would be met. Criterion A, however, would clearly require Israel to withdraw behind the pre-1967 lines, which would be an entirely different matter: No strong natural defence lines, and no obvious possibilities of erecting an (ideally impenetrable) wall along the eastern border—as has actually been suggested[84]. Also, a complete relinquishing of the Golan Heights to a hostile Syria would severely weaken the north-eastern front—a problem that might, however, be solved by an elaborate disengagement arrangement, *vide infra*. Along her sourthern front, on the other hand, Israel would not seem to be facing major problems, presupposing that the Sinai is not

used as a stationing area for Egyptian forces—which seems highly unlikely and would violate the Camp David aggreements.

To the extent that Israel were to withdraw, the frontiers might be strengthened in a non-offensive manner (consistent with criteria A and C) by proceeding with fencing, combined with the laying of minefields and the mining of the few access roads to the central parts of Israel that would be passable to tanks. Also, the idea of a wall might be taken seriously and materialize in the creation of concrete tank obstacles. However, behind the thus created defence line, there would be a need for mobile forces able to meet whatever enemy concentrations might break through (no linear defence is impenetrable). This might, in its turn, call for the construction of roads along the border suitable for lateral reinforcement. It is beyond the ability of the present author to estimate the costs, but he would not be surprised if they were to be high, thus perhaps violating criterion B.

As far as the Arab states are concerned, Egypt is clearly secure behind the present borders, i.e. as long as the Sinai is not remilitarized by Israel. Syria is not in quite as fortunate position, however, but might still be secure with forward defences shielding Damascus against an Israeli attack, yet only on the precondition of a demilitarization of the Golan Heights. Jordan enjoys some protection by the Jordan river, its narrow width notwithstanding. Moreover, there seems to be no reason why she should not follow the Israeli example and establish fences and minefields as a further insurance, in this case as a protection against the future Palestine as well as against an Israeli attack via this country. Palestine would in any case be in a very awkward position, squeezed between two, not entirely friendly states who just might end up at war with each other. Forward defence against Israel would appear nearly impossible, whereas it might be feasible *vis-a-vis* Jordan. In either case, it would probably be economically far beyond the meagre means of a newly created state. Iraq, finally, may well need a forward defence, but the length of her borders would make a comlete coverage prohibitively costly, in which case she might have to decide against whom to defend the country. Neither Syria nor Jordan would probably be the first choice.

The creation of a **missing link** clearly implies doing less than before, and would thus automaticaly be affordable (at least more so than before), thus meeting criterion B for all states concerned. Also, as far as Israel is concerned it would clearly improve the security of her neighbours if she were to make herself deliberately incapable of offensive operations into their territories. This could, by definition, be done without damaging her own defence capability, thus satisfying criterion A. The same would hold true for the Arab states, only with the qualification that it would need to be a 'joint missing link', taking into account that Israel's worst fears are, of course, an attack by an Arab coalition, not by individual states. Moreover, history shows these fears to be far from groundless.

The question remains what 'links' might be omitted without thereby seriously eroding defensive capabilities. It strains the imagination to envisage Israel abandoning her air power, in which she has achieved such excellence. And to wave goodbye to the

Israeli navy really would not make enough of a difference. Hence we have to look at ground forces, where such capabilities as anti-tank defence beyond Israeli borders might be a relevant limitation. The Arab states might, for instance, reciprocate by scaling down their offensive-capable air forces in favour of SAMs—thereby making it clear that they would not enjoy command of the air beyond Arab airspace. In neither case would defensive capabilities necessarily suffer, and war prevention might even be improved, thus meeting criterion C.

The last two NOD 'models', **disengagement** and stepping down are both fairly unproblematic when applied to the Arab-Israeli conflict, as is apparent from the many Y's in the table above. In fact, the former has already been applied in practice in the disengagement agreements reached between Israel and Egypt as well as Syria, and in the Camp David agreement of 1978 (*vide supra*).

An Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory in the Golan would undoubtedly also have to be accompanied by a more elaborate disengagement arangement, say in the form of a complete demilitarization, to be supervised and monitored by UN forces. The interposition of impartial forces would ensure both sides against surprise attacks launched by the respective other much more reliably than would the creation of a military vacuum in an area of such centrality to both sides (not only militarily, but also because of its water resources). Because of the importance of the mountain ridges for surveillance purposes, Israel might have to be further 'compensated' for her withdrawal by some kind of 'open skies' arrangement.

Disengagement would also have to accompany the Israeli withdrawal from the Western Bank and the establishment of a Palestinian state. This arrangement would have to be agreed upon during the autonomy phase about to begin. Indeed, one might even think of a 'finlandization' of Palestine, in the sense of a treaty similar to the FCMA Treaty between Finland and the former Soviet Union. It would commit Palestine to permanent neutrality, prohibiting her from launching an attack against Israel, and oblige her to prevent (to the best of her abilities of course) an attack against Israel via Palestinian territory or airspace. This would certainly not be an ideal solution, seen from a Palistinian point of view, but Finland was able to live with something similar for several decades[85]. Even though it amounted to a somewhat circumscribed sovereignty, Finland was nevertheless a sovereign state, at liberty to orient herself westwards in all but the military respect. But above all, such finlandization may be the best that the unfortunate Palestinians can realistically hope for, at least in the near to medium term.

Just like disengagement, **stepping down** would serve the purpose of hampering surprise attack. One manifestation thereof might be a shift from large standing forces to a reserve army, as far as the Arab states are concerned. An Israeli reciprocal concession might be a shortening of the term of conscription, which should certainly be possible in view of the much improved balance of power created by the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War.

9. The Nuclear Factor

Having by now, hopefully, established that NOD-like arrangements, albeit of different sorts, might be suitable for the Middle East, we are left with the same vexing question as in the introductory account of NOD as such: What about nuclear weapons? Or more bluntly put: would arrangements such as those sketched above allow, or perhaps even require, Israel to relinquish her nuclear capability? And what are the implications in this respect of the disappearance of the bipolar nuclear stalemate between the two superpowers? The answer to these question will inevitably be based more on speculation than on hard facts and empirical evidence, since nuclear deterrence is a realm of uncertainty and conjecture (*vide supra*).

On the one hand, it must be acknowledged that nuclear weapons are not excluded *per se* from any NOD-type arrangement. They 'only' represent offensive capability in the sense of being able to inflict harm on an opponent, they cannot defeat him militarily. What the can do, however, is to negate any conventional victory over a nuclear-armed (or otherwise nuclear-protected) victim of attack. This is probably precisely why Israel has 'gone nuclear': because this seemed to offer a way out of her 'existential predicament'.

On the other hand, there are several drawbacks to nuclear weapons. Generally, the present author remains unconvinced of their stabilizing effects, the allegations of which are largely based on conjecture and unwarranted extrapolations from Cold War Europe to others regions in the post-Cold War era[86]. Also, the assumed Israeli possession of nuclear weapons did not deter the Arab states from launching an attack in 1973, and they may even have motivated (*sic!*) the Iraqi Scud attacks during the Gulf War[87]. Furthermore, nuclear weapons are prone to accidents which, if they happen, can be extremely destructive; a war between two contestants armed with nuclear weapons will either be a tie (because of mutual deterrence) or lead to reciprocal annihilation. Finally, one state's possession of nuclear weapons is likely to constitute a spur to its opponents to likewise gain possession of them. If unavailable, they might seek comparable means of mass destruction, such as chemical or biological weapons, which are almost as destructive, and at least equally accident-prone. Moreover, nuclear proliferation 'in the making' carries serious risks of preventive war (illustrated by the Israeli attack against the Iraq's Osikak reactor in 1981), as well as of setting in motion chain reactions[88] (as the North Korean case illustrates all too well). Since 'controlled proliferation' is thus unlikely, the world is probably better off with a less than with a more nuclearized military environment[89], especially if alternative 'stabilizers' should be available. Also, even a post-proliferation Middle East might be very unstable, because predictability is notoriously low in this region where miscalculations have been frequent, on the part of both regional states and external powers, and where 'rationality' is a very ambiguos notion[90]. Finally, let us not forget that most countries feel entirely comfortable without nuclear weapons[91].

Even if a state were to value the benign deterrent effect of nuclear capability

over the malign side-effects, it does not automatically follow that it should seek to acquire its own independent nuclear force, since adequate protection might perhaps be had under the 'umbrella' of another state's extended nuclear deterrence[92]. The credibility of the USA's extended deterrence was probably reduced by the nuclear stalemate—hence tended to be more effective in deterring than in compelling action. This was, for instance, the case with the only known instance of US brandishment of its nuclear threat in defence of Israel: during the 1973 war, when the Soviet Union was about to come to the aid of Egypt[93].

With the disappearance of the Soviet Union, one might hope (or fear) that the USA might be less constrained in these respects, hence that the credibility of its extended deterrence would be greater, at least *vis-a-vis* non-nuclear opponents. If so, Israel would surely be among the beneficiaries thereof, since it strains the imagination to envisage the USA sitting idly by while the jewish state was whiped off the face of the earth. On the other hand, since the Arab states have now been deprived of their nuclear 'benefactor', one might fear a more determined effort on their part to gain possession of nuclear weapons with which to neutralize the Israeli and/or US nuclear deterrence. Even in this (not at all unlikely) case, however, it may not make all that much of a difference whether Israel is an independent nuclear power or not. And she would surely be better off with the drive towards nuclear proliferation is halted, than if everybody goes nuclear. Hence the rationale for a nuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ) and for strenghening the NPT regime, more about which below.

10. NOD and Middle Eastern Arms Control

As mentioned above, NOD was not originally envisioned for implementation via arms control. Furthermore, some of the inherent flaws in the arms control approach to European security apply *a fortiori* to the Middle East:'Balance', for instance, makes even less sense when applied here than it ever did in Europe, because the environment is more multipolar. Geoffrey Kemp is probably right in his rather sombre view of the conflict environment of the Middle East:

> 'Most of the key countries in the region believe they are surrounded by enemies, facing a military threat from virtually every direction, and thus, must arm accordingly. Second, the resultant arms races that have evolved from this perspective interact with one another, in part because of the extended range and lethality of modern weapon systems'[94].

This leaves us with three unanswered question of central importance: Who should negotiate with (or rather against) whom? About what? And what might be a mutually acceptable outcome: 'Balance'? If so, between whom? Or an imbalance or asymmetry of sorts? If so, in which force categories, between whom and how large? There is unquestionably a need for asymmetrical solutions, i.e. some kind of package deals, also because the threat perceptions of the parties involved differ widely:

- Israel is primarily concerned about the prospects of a joint Arab attack, as

well as about the *Intifada*, i.e. internal security—both of which pose truly existential treats to the survival of the state[95].

- The Palestinian nation is, above all, concerned about the prospects of never achieving statehood.
- Syria and Iraq may be concerned about an Israeli pre-emptive strike, just as they may be concerned about Israel's crossing the nuclear threshold in some future war. Furthermore, Syria feels (and is in fact) under constant Israeli surveillance. Whereas this may be motivated by the Israeli need for detecting Syrian attack reparations, it could probably also be used for target acquisition purposes, i.e. in preparation of an air or missile strike against Damascus.
- All Arab states, furthermore, fear internal instability, e.g. in the form of fundamentalist revolt.

In the narrow military sphere, the best available solution to these intricacies may be to couch the final solution in terms of a 'balance of incapabilites', such as suggested by various NOD advocates. Rather than comparing capabilities which are really incommensurable, it might be possible to define a condition of 'mutual defensive superiority', i.e. a formula according to which neither Israel nor the Arab states would stand to lose a war unless they were to start it themselves. A short-hand formulation of this highly stable condition is the following, suggested by the late Anders Boserup, inspired by Glucksmann and C.F. von Weizsäcker[96] (where O stands for offensive and D for defensive power, I for Israel and A for the Arab states):

$$D^A > O^I \ \& \ D^I > O^A$$

This simply describes a situation where either side's ability to defend itself surpasses the other's ability to attack. To define such a condition in abstract terms is, however, infinitely easier than to operationalize the variables. Also, to apply the same formula to a multipolar setting raises numerous problems—indeed may be tantamount to squaring the circle[97]. Syria should, for instance, be strong enough to defend itself against Israel or Iraq, yet not so strong as to be able to defeat Jordan. This is where the need for an underpinning of collective security will become essential, a point on which I shall elaborate slightly below.

The problem is, however, even more complicated than this, because the military sphere is so tightly interwoven with the political one. The present format of the Madrid Talks pays tribute to these intricacies by the conduct of several parallel and separate yet linked sets of negotiations[98]. One of the problems is that of timing: A might be willing to contemplate X once B has done Y, but not before this; B just might be willing to do Y once X has already been accomlished, yet only under conditions Z, for which C and D are responsible, etc.

The Arab preference seems to be to take the nuclear and withdrawal issues first, followed by the signing of a peace treaty and some conventional disarmament, whereas the Israeli preferences are almost the exact opposite: peace first, followed by

withdrawal (the 'land for peace' formula); CBMs and conventional disarmament first, nukes later; and everything subject to very rigid and intrusive verification (with which the Arab states are far from happy). The only way out of the impasse would seem to be 'wrapping' the entire 'package' from the beginning, finetuning the successive steps later, and making sure that there is 'something in it' for everybody at each stage, albeit not necessarily equally much and almost inevitably different types of benefits[99]. The table below shows some of the main ingredients of a 'package' in which there would indeed be something for everybody.

ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE AND ARMS CONTROL 'PACKAGE'

Israeli Concessions	Joint Measures	Arab Concessions
Withdrawal from the Golan, Gaza and the West Bank		Peace treaties Demilitarization of the Golan 'Finlandization' of Palestine
Nuclear abolition	Ratification of the NPT, NWFZ and CWC	Conventional force reductions
(More) defensive strategy	Open Skies regime Doctrine seminars	CSBMs
Limitations on fighter-bombers		SSM Constraints
Shared Benefits		
Economic Cooperation -> Greater Prosperity		
Water Management Regime -> Averting Disaster		

The Israeli withdrawal from territory conquered in the 1967 war is a matter of principle: Global respect for international law suffers from the blatant, and largely uncontested violation thereof, which the continued occupation represents. On the other hand, Israel holds on to the territories for a reason, namely in order to ensure hereself against an Arab attack, hence the need for combining the withdrawal with reciprocal steps on the Arab side. One such step, especially on the part of Syria, would be the signing of formal peace treaties, wherein Israel's right to exist within her pre-1967 borders should be unequivocally acknowledged. Pending that, a set of non-aggression treaties (in conformity with the UN definition of 'aggression'[100]) might consitute a significant first step. There is, incidentally, a very ancient regional precedent for such treaties, namely the peace and nonaggression treaty between Ramesses II of Egypt and the Hittite ruler Hattusilis III, dated 1280 B.C.[101].

The question of the future military status of the West Bank and Gaza are, of course, central. It seems highly unlikely that Israel would ever accept the emergence of a hostile military presence here. However, it is probably also in the best interest of the Palestinians themselves not to be perceived as a military threat by the (inevitably superior) Israel. An 'Austrian style' neutralization[102], or even the aforementioned

'finlandization' of Palestine would be a contribution to this end (*vide supra*). This would, however, rule out complete demilitarization[103] and rather point in the direction of NOD-type armed forces, that should emphasize counter-mobility operations and air defence. Since this would be quite compatible with an extensive reliance on reserve forces, it might also be the most cost-saving solution. However, because of the serious risk of internecine violence, an all-the-way militia structure (with weapons distributed among the general population) would seem an unwise choice—also because it would legitimate the reciprocal arming of the Jewish settlers.

As far as the Golan is concerned, Israel would obviously need some insurance against a Syrian surprise attack, which (as already mentioned) might come in the form of a complete demilitarization of the area, except for the interposition of UN forces.

As argued above, Israel would need to follow the example of South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan by getting rid of her undeclared, but effectively undisputed[104], nuclear 'bombs in the basement'. In reciprocation, the Arab states might abandon their, so far unsatisfied, nuclear ambitions as well as their chemical weapons potential. These reciprocal concessions might be conveniently tied up in a simultaneous accession to the NPT and CWC regimes[105].

A parallel road to the same goal might be the establishment of a NWFZ, as first proposed by the Shah of Iran in 1974. It was subsequently endorsed by Egypt and other regional powers, including Israel (with certain reservations). Egypt took a new initiative to the same effect in the wake of the Gulf War (4 July 1991), and resolutions have been passed by the UN General Assembly in 1991 and 1993 endorsing the concept. Indeed, it was even mentioned in Resolution 387 on Iraq. It thus appears that there are no real opponents of the idea *per se*, not even the traditional 'spoil-sport', the USA who has also lent its support to the notion, albeit with certain qualifications[106]. Even though to simulataneously establish an NPT regime and a NWFZ might be regarded as 'overkill', the latter would add some limitations on external powers operating in the region or its vicinity, which might be appreciated, especially by the Arab states. The unfortunate link between vertical and horizontal proliferation might thus be severed, i.e. between, on the one side, the introduction of nuclear weapons into the region or its immediate surroundings by the nuclear powers, and the drive for horizontal proliferation among the regional states themselves[107]. An additional reason for establishing a NWFZ would be to provide for more reliable safeguards than presently offered by the (understaffed and underfunded) IAEA. By explicitly linking up with the NPT, the NWFZ might even contribute to strengthening the latter[108].

The proposed bargain would still be somewhat uneven, since Israel is presently the region's only nuclear power, hence the need for some further Arab reciprocal measures. The most obvious one would be to accept limitations on conventional forces, especially tank and artillery holdings, as well as a build-down of the standing armies in favour of a greater reliance on reserve forces, the implications of which would be a reduced capability for surprise attack[109]. As a step in this direction, serving the same goal, the Arab states might accept some constraints on their

deployment, i.e. a form of disengagement regime. Informal agreements to the same effect already exist, in the form of the 'red lines' regulating the deployent of forces on the border between Israel and Syria (also in Lebonon) as well as Jordan[110]. This, in combination with the availability of an increased strategic depth in Jordan and the future Palestine[111] should provide Israel with the 'margin of security' she might need for her to feel secure without her nuclear potential. It might also allow Israel to abandon her unfortunate doctrine of 'taking the war to the enemy' as well as of pre-emption[112] (in blatant violation of international law). Forward defence could still remain the guideline, in which context Israel might place greater emphasis on defensive measures, such as air defence (*vide infra*), barriers and 'landscaping'—for instance similar to the Bar Lev line[113].

However, one of the main reasons for the offensive doctrine of Israel is, of course, uncertainty about the intentions of her neighbours, whose closed and autoritarian regimes provide for very little transparency with regard to military measures. One of the most important reciprocations that the Arab states might offer would therefore be democratization. Pending that, however, they might accept a set of CBMs to bridge the transparency gap. There is, for instance, no reason why they should be unable to accept the same type of obligations that the USSR and other communist regimes accepted in the context of the CSCE, including rules about prior notification of, and invitation of observers to, military manoeuvres[114]. This might be complemented by an Open Skies regime for the entire region, that would also partly compensate Israel for relinquishing the Golan. One might also think of establishing a Crisis Prevention Centre where 'unusual military activities' might be investigated and discussed, with the modest (yet perhaps significant) purpose of avoiding inadvertant war[115].

A side-effect of such a centre would be that it would initiate day-to-day contacts between the military staffs of both sides, thereby probably promoting mutual trust, at least in the sense of removing misperceptions. The same purpose would be solved by the establishment, preferably on a regular (say, biannual) basis, of a doctrine seminar along the lines of the Vienna Seminars between NATO and the Warsaw Pact[116].

Most of the above would concern the land forces, which may seem paradoxical considering that the last major wars in the region have been decided by air forces. Also, the threat that features highest in the press as well as in the academic literature is that of ballistic missiles[117]. This is, indeed, a problem, especially in view of the short ranges between borders and capitals in the entire region. However, presupposing that the above constraints on the development of weapons of mass destruction are enforced, it is the present author's sincere opinion that the missile threat is vastly exaggrerated. Aircraft are what really need to be limited for the sake of military stability, since they are the most suitable means of surprise attack with military significance.

Nevertheless, warranted or not, the missile scare is a fact that has to be reckoned with, and it was amplified by the (largely unsuccesful) Iraqi Scud attacks

during the Gulf War[118]. Israel might thus appreciate what would really be a poor bargain, namely between Arab constraints on long-range ballistic missiles on the one hand, and Israeli limitation on aircraft (especially fighter-bombers) on the other. This would also remove the rationale (if there is any) for Israel's development of indigenous ATBM and/or the purchase of American Patriot missiles with an aggressively advertised, yet very dubious ATBM capability[119].

The outlined arms control package would benefit everybody, albeit not necesarily to the same extent. Even though it would not create peace, it should at least remove some of the obstacles in the way of a genuine peace. By so doing, it would, hopefully, also open some doors for regional cooperation in the non-military spheres which alone can make a peace arrangement durable and dependable.

An obstacle may, however, be that peace would impact on the social contract in the affected countries, who have been geared towards war ever since the 1940s[120]. Likewise, it would create problems in the quite sizable arms industries of some of the countries involved in the process. These problems should, of course, not be accepted as valid grounds for not proceeding. They do, however, point to the need for a determined conversion effort to accompany the arms control and peace process.

11. The Role of External Powers

Even though peace in the Middle East has to be the primary responsibility of the regional states, external powers have always been deeply involved in the region, and their continued participation in the peace process will remain essential.

It still remains to be seen whether the elimination of the East-West conflict will facilitate conflict resolution. Even though there have been some instances of US-Soviet cooperation in the Middle East[121], competition between the two superpowers was much more frequent, and usually not particularly helpful. Furthermore, the remaining superpower has all along had a propensity to 'go it alone'[122]-and, indeed, some success with doing so, with the Camp David agreement standing out as the most impressive accomplishment[123]. Its present sponsorship of the Madrid talks is thus in direct continuity with the past.

One important contribution which extra-regional powers can make is to establish effective arms trade regulations[124]. One might even argue that they have a special responsibility for doing so, since they are partly to blame for the high intensity and destructiveness of wars in the region (not least the horrendously bloody Iran-Iraq war) which was a result unconstrained massive arms transfers to the region[125]. In belated recognition thereof has recently come a new awarenes of the need to curtail, or at least regulate, the arms trade. The attempt at doing so is, however, up against some important 'structural' obstacles.

First of all, a arms transfer control regime involving merely the exporting countries is faced with a special version of the well-known prisoner's dilemma:

The Arms Trade Prisonners' Dilemma I: Short Term, no import constraints		B	
		Export constraints	No export constraints
A	Export constraint	+1,+1	-1,+2
	No export constraints	+2,-1	-1,-1

If A bans his arms exports, while other supplier(s) do not, A's ban will have no significant effect on stability. The other(s), however, will be able to take over his market share (value +2), leaving A at an economic disadvantage (value -1). If the other(s) impose a ban on arms exports, they will lose market shares (value -1), unless the ban is 100 percent effective, since A is able to step in (value +2). If everybody continues to sell, neither will stability improve, nor will they be able to increase their market shares. If everybody were to agree on, and actually comply with, a ban on exports, the outcome is uncertain. If the former recipient were simply to shift to indigenous production, stability might not improve significantly (it might even deteriorate, in the form of a proliferation of 'dirty bombs' and unsafe technologies). Moreover, the former suppliers would clearly lose lucrative foreign sales, without much prospect of making up for this in terms of civilian exports, since militarization would continue. Since everybody would stand to lose, and mobody to gain from it, such a supplier-imposed arms export ban is probably a non-starter.

A further problem stems from the differential vulnerability to arms embargoes: Countries with easy access to hard currency and/or indigenous skills (Iran, Iraq, Israel, Egypt) are generally less vulnerable than countries lacking these assets (such as Syria, Jordan, Yemen). In the entire region there is quite a large indigenous production[126] which would undoubtedly be strengthened by supplier-imposed embargo.

The Arms Trade Prisonners' Dilemma II: Long Term, with import constraints		B	
		Export constraints	No export constraints
A	Export constraint	+2,+2	0,0
	No export constraints	0,0	0,0

The payoff structure would, however, be significantly different in a long-term supplier-plus-recipient arms trade control regime, i.e. a regime regulating not merely exports (the supply side), but also the demand side, i.e. imports. Everybody (but more than anybody else the regional states) would stand to gain from the improved stability.

The former suppliers would, of course, lose their arms exports (value -1), but they would not have to worry about losing shares in a no longer existent market. Moreover, a replacement of the revenues from arms sales with those from civilian exports for development purposes would be a distinct possibility (value +2).

Arms trade regulations—even in the context of a combined supplier and recipient regime—must be based on a consensus about what to limit and to what extent. Here, the desirability of limiting arms transfers have to be weighed against respect for the legitimate need of states to defend themselves. Logically, there are two main approaches to arms transfer regulations: the discriminatory and the non-discriminatory.

Discriminatory arms trade regulations might, for instance, consist of a ban on the trade in weapons of mass destruction, such as already implied by the NPT and the Australia Group's regulations[127]. A similar regime already exists for long-range and high payload surface-to-surface missiles in the form of the MTCR, pertaining to missile systems with a payload exceeding 500 kg and a range over 300 km[128].

The latter might, for instance, be extended to an integrated 'transfer regime' covering both ballistic missiles and advanced strike aircraft[129]. It has also been suggested to use the CFE's categorization of tanks, artillery, APCs, combat aircraft and helicopters as the matrix for arms trade regulations[130]. The curtailment of the trade in such especially destabilizing weapons would be combined with unconstrained supplies of more defensive types of armaments, such as anti-tank and sea mines[131], ATGMs, air defence weapons and the like.

Pessimists have questioned the practicality of such regulations, and recommended more 'blunt instruments', such as an across-the-board moratorium on arms transfers to the entire region[132]. There are, however, certain precedents for disriminatory regulations, such as the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 between the USA, France and the UK to the effect that they would only supply arms for self-defence purposes[133]. Also, there seems to be a growing recognition among the major suppliers of, first of all, the need for curtailing the arms trade and, secondly, for giving first priority to such weapons as contribute to offensive capabilities. This was reflected, *inter alia*, in the 'Big Five Initiative' of 1991, wherein it was stated that

> '... the transfer of conventional weapons, conducted in a responsible manner, should contribute to the ability of states to meet their legitimate defence, security and national sovereignty requirements .... They recognized that indiscriminate transfers of military weapons and technology contribute to regional instability ... They also recognize that a long term solution to this problem should be found in close consultation with the recipient countries.'

In the subsequent communique from the meeting in London, 18 October, the Big Five singled out the following categories of weapons as requiring mutual information: tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, military aircraft and helicopters, naval vessels and certain missile systems. More generally, they pledged to 'avoid transfers which would be likely to ...be used other than for the legitimate defence and security needs of the recipient state'[134].

Not much has been actually accomplished, however, and the main constraint on the arms trade still seems to be the limited purchasing power of the would-be recipients. One modest achievement is, however, the conventional arms register which will promote enhanced transparence[135].

12. Perspectives

Even besides the aforementioned new attitude of the arms suppliers, the external environment may be rather conducive to initiating the gradual shift to 'noddy' (or at least 'noddier') strategies and postures in the Middle East.

One might, paradoxically, argue that the midwife of peace in the Middle East may turn out to have been Saddam Hussein, because the Gulf War acted as a catalyst in several respects :

- By effectively rendering the largest and strongest anti-Israeli force unsable[136], it significantly improved the regional balance-of-power, seen from an Israeli point of view, hence afforded the requisite 'margin of security' for new initiatives.
- It resulted in deep cracks in Arab unity, with Egypt and Syria siding with the 'Western' coalition against Iraq (which also included Israel and Saudi Arabia), while the PLO and most of the Maghreb took the opposite position, whereas the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was caught in the middle. On the other hand, it resulted in a certain rapprochement between the two (or three) leading Arab states, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia[137].

Internally as well, circumstances may be favourable. Above all, war-weariness seems to be spreading, also because of the economic exhaustion caused by the several decades of 'virtual war'. This holds true for both Israel (where defence budgets are shrinking because of the perennial 'guns or butter' struggle), and the Arab states[138]. Whereas these are 'negative' inducements, there are also more 'positive' ones at work, however, such as the promises of peace, *inter alia* in the form of the perspectives of economic gains from a comprehensive peace-cum-economic reform. Also, the need for joint management of the scarce water resources may act as a spur for the peace process[139].

We may therefor now be facing an unprecedented 'window of opportunity', which may be exploited by the peace process that has been underway since October 1991 (the Madrid Conference), and the Israel-PLO agreement on autonomy in the Gaza and Jericho of September 1993[140]. In view of this, the time may have come to analyze the more long-term perspectives, i.e. the question: What would peace in the Middle East be like, if it were possible, say ten or twenty years from now.

One of the most attractive prospects would be that of a 'security community' (i.e. a regional subsystem, between the members of which was has become, to all practical intents and purposes, inconceivable) such as suggested by authors such as

Efraim Karsh and others. This may well be worth pursuing, hopelessly utopian though it may seem today. However, the associated notion of neutrality has, in the present author's opinion, better be abandoned, if only because it of its very fuzzy implications as applied to a community of states, as opposed to individual states[141]. Rather, some thought had perhaps better be given to the opportunities of collective security arrangements for the region (the diametrical opposite of neutrality)[142], which alone could provide security for states such as Jordan, Lebanon and the future Palestine. A very modest, but not insignificant, step in this direction was the formation of Egyptian and Syrian peace-keeping units in the wake of the Gulf War.

One subregional manifestation of such a security community might be an Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian confederation, representing an intermediary stage in the process from pluralism to 'amalgamation'. Such an arrangement might solve several sets of problems for all three founding parties: The Palestinians would enjoy a statehood of sorts. Israel would be relieved of the fear of Arab irredentism and of the 'internal', yet existential, threat represented by the *Intifada* (which is surely going to continue otherwise). The Hashemite Kingdom, finally, would be relieved of its present fears of an odd Israeli-Palestinian rapprocement that would put the very survival of Jordan at serious risk. In the confederation, domestic policy, including control of the police force, should remain the prerogative of the three constituent parts, while foreign and defence policy should be that of the confederate authorities. In addition, the control of the water resources would perhaps be best managed by the confederation. Such a confederation might come to be seen as the nucleus of something larger, especially if it were to become (as seems likely) the economically highest developed subregion in the entire Middle East. We might therefore (as a rather long-term perspective) envisage a 'concentric circles' institutional 'architecture' in the Middle East, similar to that apparently in the making in Europe.

An intermediary stage might be that of a regional 'security regime', resting less on formal agreements, but based on the powerful 'reciprocity principle', making it rational for states to observe self-imposed restraints in the expectation (and presupposing) reciprocal behaviour on the part of their adversaries (likely to become less and less so with the passage of time[143]. Whereas such an arrangement need not necessarily be institutionalized at all, it would certainly be facilitated by the availability of appropriate institutions, which might be a precondition for proceeding beyond the (inherently fragile) security regime stage[144]. There is a long way to go yet, because the region of today is clearly underdeveloped institutionally, both on the regional and subregional level (with the Arab League, and the GCC constituting the few, and not really impressive, exceptions). A first step in the direction of a security community might be the institutional one of establishing a Middle Eastern counterpart of the CSCE[145], in the framework of which the various collaborative arrangements might conveniently be both negotiated and implemented, preferably under the UN auspices[146].

13. Notes

1. See e.g. Møller, Bjørn: *Resolving the Security Dilemma in Europe. The German Debate on Non-Offensive Defence* (London: Brassey's, 1991); idem: 'Germany and NOD', in idem & Wiberg (eds.): *Non-Offensive Defence for the Twenty-First Century* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 153-165.

2. Palme Commission (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues): *Common Security. A Blueprint for Survival. With a Prologue by Cyrus Vance* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982). See also Väyrynen, Raimo (ed.): *Policies for Common Security* (London: Taylor & Francis/SIPRI, 1985); or Bahr, Egon & Dieter S. Lutz (eds.): *Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Idee und Konzept. Bd. I: Zu den Ausgangsüberlegungen, Grundlagen und Strukturmerkmalen Gemeinsamer Sicherheit* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1986); idem & idem (eds.): *Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Dimensionen und Disziplinen. Bd.2: Zu rechtlichen, ökonomischen, psychologischen und militärischen Aspekten Gemeinsamer Sicherheit* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1987).

3. On the security dilemma, see e.g. Herz, John M.: *Political Realism and Political Idealism. A Study in Theories and Realities* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1951), passim; idem: 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma', *World Politics*, no. 2, 1950, pp. 157-180; Jervis, Robert: *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 58-93; cf. idem: 'Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma', *World Politics*, vol. 30, no. 2 (1978), pp. 167-214; Buzan, Barry: *People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, Second Edition (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 294-327. On crisis stability, see e.g. Holsti, Ole R., Richard A. Brody & Robert C. North: 'The Management of International Crisis: Affect and Action in American-Soviet Relations', in Pruitt, Dean G. & Richard C. Snyder, eds.: *Theory and Research on the Causes of War* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), pp. 62-79; Lebow, Richard Ned: *Between Peace and War. The Nature of International Crisis* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 7-13; Snyder, Glenn H. & Paul Diesing: *Conflict Among Nations. Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises* (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977); Frei, Daniel (with Christian Catrina): *Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War* (Totowa, N.J.: Allanheld, Osmun/UNIDIR, 1983), pp. 31-36. On arms race stability, a classical statement of the theory of the 'action-reaction phenomenon', see Rathjens, George: 'The Dynamics of the Arms Race', in Herbert York (ed.): *Arms Control. Readings from the Scientific American* (San Fransisco: Freeman, 1973), pp. 177-187. For competing explanations of the armament dynamics, see Nils Petter Gleditsch & Olav Njølstad (eds.): *Arms Races. Technological and Political Dynamics* (London: Sage, 1990); especially Wiberg Håkan: 'Arms Races, Formal Models and Quantitative Tests', pp. 31-57.

4. On the link between NOD and CS see Møller, Bjørn: *Common Security and Non-Offensive Defense. A Neorealist Perspective* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992); Bahr, Egon & Dieter S. Lutz (eds.): *Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Konventionelle Stabilität. Bd. 3: Zu den militärischen Aspekten Struktureller Nichtangriffsfähigkeit im Rahmen Gemeinsamer Sicherheit* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1988).

5. Barnaby, Frank & Egbert Bocker: 'Non-Nuclear, Non-Provocative Defence for Europe', in P. Terrence Hopmann & Frank Barnaby (eds.): *Rethinking the Nuclear Weapons Dilemma in Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), pp. 135-145, quotation from p. 137.

6. See e.g. Sharp, Jane M.O.: 'Conventional Arms Control in Europe', in *SIPRI Yearbook 1991*, pp. 407-460, with appendices, including the treaty itself, on pp. 460-474. On the background, see e.g. William J. Durch & Kevin P. O'Prey: *NATO's Stake in the New Talks on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1990); Wittmann, Klaus: 'Challenges of Conventional Arms Control', *Adelphi Papers*, no. 239 (1989); Dean, Jonathan: 'Defining Long-Term Western Objectives in CFE', *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 13, no. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 169-184; idem: 'The CFE Negotiations, Present and Future', *Survival*, vol. 31, no. 4 (July-August 1990), pp. 313-324; Freedman, Lawrence: 'The Politics of Conventional Arms Control', *ibid.*, no. 5 (September-October 1989), pp. 387-396.

7. An example is Galtung, Johan: *There Are Alternatives. Four Roads to Peace and Security* (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1984), pp. 172-176. Galtung does, however, recognize the existence of 'gray areas' and does acknowledge that 'it would be naive to believe that any component of a weapon system is inherently defensive or offensive: it depends on the total system' (p. 176), unfortunately without abandoning his suggested definition of 'defensive weapons' as combining short range with small-radius impact area, as opposed to 'offensive weapons', possessing the opposite characteristics. Another, less simplistic, yet still misleading, example is the definition of 'offensive weapons' as such that reward striking first. See Quester, George: 'Security and Arms Control', in idem: *The Future of Nuclear Deterrence* (Lexington MA: John Wiley & Sons, 1986), pp. 1-25, definition p. 23. In the article 'Avoiding Offensive Weapons and Strengthening the Defensive' (*ibid.*, pp. 229-250), the author does, however, modify this definition somewhat by adding terrain specialization and other factors to the defensive chacteristics.

8. See e.g. Noel-Baker, Philip J.: *The First World Disarmament Conference, 1932-33* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1979); Neild, Robert: *An Essay on Strategy as it Affects the Achievement of Peace in a Nuclear Setting* (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 137-144; Borg, Marlies ter: 'Reducing Offensive Capabilities-the Attempt of 1932', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 29, no. 2 (May 1992), pp. 145-160; Zubok, Vladislav & Andrei Kokoshin: 'Opportunities Missed in 1932?', *International Affairs* (Moscow), no. 2, 1989, pp. 112-121. On the futile attempts at qualitative naval arms control in the inter-war period, see Kaufman, Robert Gordon: *Arms Control During the Pre-Nuclear Era. The United States and Naval Limitation Between the Two World Wars* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).

9. In 1974 the U.S. Army thus assigned the following values to various weapons categories for offence and defence respectively: Tanks 64/55; Armoured personnel carriers 13/6; Anti-tank weapons 27/46; Artillery 72/85; Mortars 37/47; Armed helicopters 33/44. See William Mako, quoted in Snyder, Jack (1987): 'Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options', in Steven

Miller & Sean Lynn-Jones (eds.): *Conventional Forces and American Defence Policy*. An International Security *Reader*, Revised Edition (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), p. 312.

10. There may, however, be a tendency for maritime power to become increasingly oriented to the land battle, which already provided one rationale for the US Navy's Maritime Strategy. See e.g. Watkins, James D.: 'The Maritime Strategy', *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 112, no. 1 (January 1986), pp. 2-17; Friedman, Norman: *The US Maritime Strategy* (London: Jane's, 1988); Brooks, Linton F. (1986): 'Naval Power and National Security. The Case for the Maritime Strategy', in Steven E. Miller & Stephen van Evera (eds.): *Naval Strategy and National Security. An* International Security *Reader*, (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 16-46. For a critique, see Mearsheimer, John J. (1986): 'A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe', *ibid.*, pp. 47-101. In the post-Cold War era, the US Navy has adopted new guideline with an even clearer inland orientation. See, for instance, '...From the Sea. Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century' (US Navy, September 1992). According to some analysts, 'the Navy's preoccupation in the foreseeable future will be land control, not sea control'. See Breemer, Jan S.: 'Naval Strategy is Dead', *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 120, no. 2 (February 1994), pp. 49-53.

11. See e.g. Holloway, David & Jane M.O. Sharp (eds.): *The Warsaw Pact. Alliance in Transition* (London: Macmillan, 1984), especially Jones, Christopher D.: 'National Armies and National Sovereignity', pp. 87-110. See also Johnson, Alfred Ross, Robert W. Dean & Alexander Alexiev: *East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1980); MacGregor, Douglas: *The Soviet-East German Military Alliance* (Cambridge: University Press, 1989).

12. For a very detailed analysis of the implications of Soviet unilateral reductions in these weapons categories, as well as of the envisaged CFE reductions, see Epstein, Joshua M.: *Conventional Force Reductions: A Dynamic Assessment* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1990).

13. On the concept 'security community', the seminal work was Deutsch, Karl W. *et al.*: *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957). See also Rittberger, Volker, Manfred Efinger & Martin Mendler: 'Toward and East-West Security Regime: The Case of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 27, no. 1 (1990), pp. 55-74.

14. 'Zur Militärdoktrin der Russischen Föderation', *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, vol. 32, no. 1 (January 1994), pp. 75-82. On the background, see e.g. Konovalov, Alexander A.: 'Russia: Security in Transition', in Regina Owen Karp (ed.): *Central and Eastern Europe. The Challenge of Transition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 196-224; Raevsky, Andrei: 'Development of Russian National Security Policies: Military Reform', *Research Paper*, no. 25 (New York: UN/Geneva: UNIDIR, 1993); Trenin, Dmitri: 'NOD in the USSR and Successor States', in Møller & Wiberg (eds.): *op. cit.* (note 1), pp. 127-137.

15. On the terms, see e.g. Hart, Basil Liddell: *Strategy. The Indirect Approach*, second, revised, edition, 1967 (New York: Signet Books, 1974), pp. 321-322, 352-360; cf. Luttwak, Edward N.: *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976); idem: *The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983); Kennedy, Paul M. (ed.): *Grand Strategies in War and Peace* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991).

16. For excellent analyses of Soviet strategy based on this methodology, see MccGwire, Michael: *Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987); idem: *Perestroika and Soviet National Security* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991).

17. Lippert, Günter: 'GSFG, Spearhead of the Red Army', *International Defense Review*, vol. 20, no. 5 (May 1987), pp. 553-562; Hines, John G. & Phillip A. Petersen 1984: 'The Soviet Conventional Offensive in Europe', *Military Review*, vol. 64, no. 4 (April 1984), pp. 2-29; Petersen, Phillip A.: 'Soviet Offensive Operations in Central Europe', *International Defense Review*, vol. 20, no. 8 (August 1987), pp. 26-32. For an apparent empirical validation of the hypothesis, based on archived from the ex-GDR, see Rühl, Lothar: 'Offensive Defence in the Warsaw Pact', *Survival*, vol. 33, no. 5 (September-October 1991), pp. 442-450.

18. Bathurst, Robert B.: 'The Soviet Navy Through Western Eyes', in Philip S. Gillette & William C. Frank, Jr. (eds.): *The Sources of Soviet Naval Conduct* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990), pp. 59-80; Rohwer, Jürgen: 'Alternating Russian and Soviet Naval Strategies', *ibid.*, pp. 95-120; Daniel, Donald C.F.: 'Alternate Models of Soviet Naval Behaviour', *ibid.*, pp. 237-248. The most outspoken advocacy of such a naval strategy for the USSR was Gorshkov, S.G.: *The Sea Power of the State* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1979); cf. MccGwire, Michael: 'Soviet Naval Doctrine and Strategy', in Derek Leebaert (ed.): *Soviet Military Thinking* (London: George Allan & Unwin, 1981), pp. 125-184; idem: 'Gorshkov's Navy', I-II, *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 115, no. 8 (August 1989), pp. 44-51, and no. 9 (September 1989), pp. 42-47.

19. Kokoski, Richard: 'The Treaty on Open Skies', *SIPRI Yearbook 1993*, pp. 632-634. The treaty itself is appended *ibid.*, pp. 653-671.

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1987); Lutz, Dieter S. & Erwin Müller (eds.): *Vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen. Zur Theorie und Praxis einer sicherheitspolitischen Strategie* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1982); Ghebaldi, Victor-Yves: 'Confidence —Building Measures Within the CSCE Process: Paragraph-by-Paragraph Analysis of the Helsinki and Stockholm Regimes', *Research Paper*, no. 3 (New York/Geneva: UNIDIR, 1989).

21. Krohn, Axel: 'The Vienna Military Doctrine Seminar', *SIPRI Yearbook 1991*, pp. 501-511; Lachowski, Zdzislaw: 'The Second Vienna Seminar on Military Doctrine', *SIPRI Yearbook 1992*, pp. 496-505. See also Hamm, Manfred R. & Hartmut Pohlman: 'Military Strategy and Doctrine: Why They Matter to Conventional Arms Control', *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 13, no. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 185-198.

22. On the Soviet defensive doctrine, see e.g. Holden, Gerald: *Soviet Military Reform. Conventional Disarmament and the Crisis of Militarized Socialism* (London: Pluto, 1991); Garthoff, Raymond: *Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990); MccGwire: *op.cit.* 1991 (note 16). Much more sceptical, yet reluctantly convinced, is Wettig, Gerhard: *Changes in Soviet Policy Towards the West* (London: Pinter, 1991); cf. Diehl, Ole: *Die Strategiediskussion in der Sowjetunion. Zum Wandel der sowjetischen Kriegsführungskonzeption in den achtziger Jahren* (Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitätsverlag, 1993).

23. See e.g. Neild, Robert: 'The Implications of the Increasing Accuracy of Non-Nuclear Weapons', in Joseph Rotblat & Ubiratan d'Ambrosio (eds.): *World Peace and the Developing Countries. Annals of Pugwash 1985* (London: Macmillan, 1986), pp. 93-106.

24. See Kokoshin, Andrei A. & Valentin Larionov: 'Four Models of WTO-NATO Strategic Interrelations', in Marlies ter Borg & Wim Smit (eds.): *Non-provocative Defence as a Principle of Arms Control and its Implications for Assessing Defence Technologies* (Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1989), pp. 35-44. For a terminological clarification (which need not bother us in this connection, where the term is used in an all-embracing sense), see Reid, Brian Holden: 'The Counter-Offensive: a Theoretical and Historical Perspective', in idem & Michael Dewar (eds.): *Military Strategy in a Changing Europe* (London: Brassey's, 1991), pp. 143-160; Mackenzie, J.J.G.: 'The Counter-Offensive', *ibid.*, pp. 161-180.

25. On the deterrence by punishment v. by denial distinction, see Snyder, Glenn: *Deterrence and Defense* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961).

26. Müller, Albrecht A.C. von: 'Structural Stability at the Central Front', in Anders Boserup, Ludvig Christensen & Ove Nathan (eds.): *The Challenge of Nuclear Armaments, Essays Dedicated to Niels Bohr and His Appeal for an Open World* (Copenhagen: Rhodos International Publishers, 1986), pp. 239-256, especially pp. 253-254. This notion is very reminiscent of, probably inspired by, the proposals in Huntington, Samuel: 'Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe' (1983), in Steven E. Miller (ed.): *Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy. An International Security Reader* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 251-275. The latter was criticized as beyond NATO's means in Dunn, Keith A. & William O. Staudenmaier: 'The Retaliatory Offensive and Operational Realities in NATO', *Survival*, vol. 27, no. 3 (May-June 1985), pp. 108-118.

27. Clausewitz, Carl von (1832): *Vom Kriege*, Ungekürzter Text nach der Erstauflage (1832-1834) (Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1980), pp. 360-371 (Book VI.1-3), especially p. 361; pp. 357-366/358 in the English translation: *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984). See also Gat, Azar: 'Clausewitz on Defence and Attack', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 11, no. 1 (1988), pp. 20-26; Aron, Raymond: *Clausewitz. Philosopher of War* (London: Routledge, 1983), pp. 144-171. The point about defensive supremacy has occasionally been couched in terms of the presumed 'Three-to-One rule', according to which an attacker will need a superiority in excess of 3:1 in order to break through prepared defences. See e.g. Mearsheimer, John J.: 'Numbers, Strategy, and the European Balance', *International Security*, vol. 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 174-185; idem: 'Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics', *ibid.* vol. 13, no. 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 54-89; Epstein, Joshua M.: 'The 3:1 Rule, the Adaptive Dynamic Model, and the Future of Security Studies', *ibid.*, pp. 90-127; Posen, Barry R., Eliot A. Cohen & John J. Mearsheimer: 'Correspondence: Reassessing Net Assessment', *ibid.*, pp. 128-179.

28. On the effect of barriers, see e.g. Epstein: *op.cit.* (note 12), pp. 67-72; cf. Kaufmann, William W.: 'Nonnuclear Deterrence', in John D. Steinbruner & Leon V. Sigal (eds.): *Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1983), pp. 43-90, especially p. 68; Simpkin, Richard E.: *Race to the Swift. Thoughts on 21st Century Warfare* (London: Brassey's, 1986), pp. 57-77; Gupta, Raj: *Defense Positioning and Geometry. Rules for a World with Low Force Levels* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993). On landscaping, i.e. terrain modification for defence purposes, see e.g. Webber, Philip: *New Defence Strategies for the 1990s. From Confrontation to Coexistence* (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 197, 211; cf. Garrett, James M.: *The Tenuous Balance. Conventional Forces in Central Europe* (Boulder: Westview, 1989), pp. 213-230. On the Bar-Lev line, see Cordesman, Anthony H. & Abraham R. Wagner: *The Lessons of Modern War*, 1-3 (London: Mansell, 1990), vol. 1, pp. 39-44. For numerous suggestion to NOD-like modifications of Israel's defence system, especially as far as the Golan Heights are concerned, see Levite, Ariel: *Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine* (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post/Boulder: Westview, 1990), pp. 126-139.

29. On the Swiss militia, see e.g. Cramer, Benedict: 'Dissuassion infra-nucléaire. L'armée de milice suisse: mythes et réalités stratégiques', *Cahiers d'Etudes Strategiques*, no. 4 (Paris: CIRPES, 1984). On proposals for German militias, see Bald, Detlef (ed.): *Miliz als Vorbild? Zum Reservistenkonzept der Bundeswehr* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1987); idem & Paul Klein (eds.): *Wehrstruktur der neunziger Jahre. Reservistenarmee, Miliz oder ...?* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1988).

30. Grin, John: *Military-Technological Choices and Political Implications. Command and Control in Established NATO Posture and a Non-Provocative Defence* (Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1990).

31. It was, in fact, the good performance of anti-tank PGMs in the 1973 Yom Kippur war that spurred interest in NOD in the mid-1970s. See e.g. Digby, James: 'Precision-Guided Munitions', *Adelphi Papers*, no. 118 (1975). See also Herolf, Gunilla: 'Anti-tank Missiles', in *SIPRI Yearbook 1983*, pp. 245-266; idem: 'New Technology Favours Defence', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 44, no. 7 (September 1988), pp. 42-45; Canby, Steven L.: 'New Conventional Force Technology and the NATO-Warsaw Pact Balance: Part I', *Adelphi Papers*, no. 188 (1985), pp. 7-24; idem: 'Conventional Weapon Technologies', in *SIPRI Yearbook 1987*, pp. 85-95; idem: 'Weapons for Land Warfare', in Møller & Wiberg (eds.): *op.cit.* (note 1), pp. 74-84; Ischebeck, Otfried: 'Der Kampfpanzer der Zukunft', in Erwin Müller & Götz Neuneck (eds.): *Rüstungsmodernisierung und Rüstungskontrolle. Neue Technologien, Rüstungsdynamik und Stabilität* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1991), pp. 233-248; idem: 'Evolution of Tanks and Anti-Tank Weapons: Assessment of Offence-Defence Dynamics and Arms Control Options', in Wim A. Smit, John Grin & Lev Voronkov (eds.): *Military Technological Innovation and Stability in a Changing World. Politically Assessing and Influencing Weapon Innovation and Military Research and Development* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1992), pp. 177-196. For an only slightly more sanguine view, see Simpkin, Richard E.: 'Tank Warfare. The Last Decades of the Dinosaurs', in Ken Perkins (ed.): *Weapons and Warfare. Conventional Weapons and Their Role in Battle* (London: Brassey's, 1987), pp. 165-192.

32. For a comparison of various NOD-type force components with traditional military units, see e.g. Hofmann, Hans W., Reiner K. Huber & Karl Steiger: 'On Reactive Defense Options. A Comparative Systems Analysis of Alternatives for the Initial Defense against the First Strategic Echelon of the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe', in Reiner K. Huber (ed.): *Modelling and Analysis of Conventional Defense in Europe. Assessment of Improvement Options* (New York: Plenum, 1986), pp. 97-140; Huber, Reiner K. & Hans Hofmann: 'The Defence Efficiency Hypothesis and Conventional Stability in Europe: Implications for Arms Control', in Anders Boserup & Robert Neild (eds.): *The Foundations of Defensive Defence* (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 109-132.

33. The most comprehensive account of NOD, in the form of a reference work, is the present author's *The Dictionary of Alternative Defence* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming 1994). For an analysis of all the German models (which remain the majority of all available proposals), see idem: *op.cit.* 1991 (note 1).

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35. SAS (Studiengruppe Alternative Sicherheitspolitik): *Strukturwandel der Verteidigung: Entwürfe für eine konsequente Defensive* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1984); idem: *Vertrauensbildende Verteidigung. Reform deutscher Sicherheitspolitik* (Gerlingen: Bleicher Verlag, 1989). Good introductions to the SAS model, written by its chairman, are Unterseher, Lutz: 'Defending Europe: Toward a Stable Conventional Deterrent', in Henry Shue (ed.): *Nuclear Deterrence and Moral Restraint, Critical Choices for American Strategy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 293-342; Grin, John & idem: 'The Spiderweb Defense', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 44, no. 7 (August 1988), pp. 28-31.

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37. Hannig, Norbert: *Abschreckung durch konventionelle Waffen: Das David-und-Goliath Prinzip* (Berlin: Berlin-Verlag Arno Spitz, 1984).

38. Müller, Erwin: 'Dilemma Sicherheitspolitik. Tradierte Muster westdeutscher Sicherheitspolitik und Alternativoptionen: Ein Problem- und Leistungsvergleich', in idem (ed.): *Dilemma Sicherheit. Beiträge zur Diskussion über militärische Alternativkonzepte* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1984), pp. 53-170; idem: 'Konventionelle Stabilität durch Strukturelle Angriffsunfähigkeit', in idem & Götz Neuneck (eds.): *Abrüstung und Konventionelle Stabilität in Europa* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1990), pp. 75-80.

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40. Neild: *op. cit.* (note 8), pp. 46-73.

41. On 'existential deterrence', see Bundy, McGeorge: 'Existential Deterrence and its Consequences', in Douglas Maclean (ed.): *The Security Gamble*, (Totowa N. J.: Rowman & Allanhead, 1986), pp. 3-13. See also Russett, Bruce M.: 'Between General and Immediate Deterrence', in Aharon Klieman & Ariel Levite (eds.): *Deterrence in the Middle East. Where Theory and Practice Converge* (Tel Aviv: Jafee Centre, Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post and Boulder: Westview, 1993), pp. 34-44. On existential deterrence without nuclear weapons, i.e. 'blueprint deterrence', see Schell, Jonathan: *The Abolition*, (London: Picador, 1984), p. 119. See also Miller, James N.: 'Zero and Minimal Nuclear Weapons', in Joseph S. Nye Jr., Graham T. Allison & Albert Carnesale (eds.): *Fateful Visions. Avoiding Nuclear Catastrophe*

(Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988), pp. 11-32; and Booth, Ken & Nicholas J. Wheeler: 'Beyond Nuclearism', in Regina Owen Karp (ed.): *Security Without Nuclear Weapons? Different Perspectives on Non-Nuclear Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 21-55.

42. *loc.cit.* (note 41), p. 38.

43. On the theory of alliances, see, e.g. Liska, George: *Nations in Alliance. The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1962); Riker, William H.: *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); Walt, Stephen M.: *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NJ: Cornell University Press, 1987); Snyder, Glenn H.: 'The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics', *World Politics*, vol. 36, no. 4 (1984), pp. 461-495; Christensen, Thomas J. & Jack Snyder: 'Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity', *International Organization*, vol. 44, no. 2 (1990), pp. 137-168.

44. Gerosa, Guido: 'The North Atlantic Cooperation Council', *European Security*, vol. 1, no. 3 (Autumn 1992), pp. 273-294. The background for the NACC was, *inter alia*, the North Atlantic Council's statement on 'Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe', issued by the 6-7 June 1991 meeting in Copenhagen, see *NATO Review*, vol. 39, no. 3 (June 1991), pp. 28-29; and the subsequent 'Rome declaration', adopted by a NATO Summit on 7-8 November 1991, *ibid.*, vol. 39, no. 6 (December 1991), pp. 19-22. See also the evaluation of the latter by Secretary General Manfred Wörner: 'NATO Transformed: the Significance of the Rome Summit', *ibid.*, pp. 3-8. The inaugural meeting of NACC took place on 20 December 1991, and in Brussels, 10 March 1992, a 'Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation' was adopted, reprinted *ibid.*, vol. 40, no. 2 (April 1992), pp. 34-35.

45. See e.g. Møller, Bjørn: 'What is Defensive Security? Non-Offensive Defence and Stability in a Post-Bipolar World', *Working Papers*, no. 10 (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1992); Huber, Reiner K.: 'Military Stability of Multipolar International Systems: An Analysis of Military Potentials in Post-Cold War Europe' (Neubiberg: Institut für Angewandte Systemforschung und Operations Research, Fakultät für Informatik, Universität der Bundeswehr München, June 1993); idem & Rudolf Avenhaus: 'Problems of Multipolar International Stability', in idem & idem (eds.): *International Stability in a Multipolar World: Issues and Models for Analysis* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1993), pp. 11-20. For an interesting analysis of multipolarity in the former eastern bloc, see idem & Otto Schindler: 'Military Stability of Multipolar Power Systems: An Analytical Concept for Its Assessment, exemplified for the Case of Poland, Byelarus, the Uraine and Russia', *ibid.*, pp. 155-180.

46. I have elaborated on this theme in Møller, Bjørn: 'Multinationality, Defensivity, Collective Security', *Working Papers*, no. 20 (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1993); idem: 'A Common Security System for Europe?', *ibid.*, no. 6/1990, also in Hanna Newcombe (ed.): *Hopes and Fears. The Human Future* (Toronto: Science for Peace/Samuel Stevens, 1992), pp. 1-26; See also Lutz, Dieter S.: 'Auf dem Weg zu einem System Kollektiver Sicherheit in und für Europa', in idem (ed.): *Kollektive Sicherheit in und für Europa: Eine Alternative? Beiträge zur Utopie und Umsetzung einer neuen Friedens- und Sicherheitsprogrammatik. Pro und Contra* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1985), pp. 22-44; idem: *Sicherheit 2000. Gemeinsame Sicherheit im Übergang vom Abschreckungsregime zu einem System Kollektiver Sicherheit in und für Europa* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991); Senghaas, Dieter: *Europa 2000. Ein Friedensplan* (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1990); Chalmers, Malcolm: 'Beyond the Alliance System', *World Policy Journal*, vol. 7, no. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 215-250; Brauch, Hans Günter: 'From Collective Self-Defence to a Collective Security System in Europe', *Disarmament*, vol. 14, no. 1 (1991), pp. 1-20; Johansen, Robert C.: 'Lessons for Collective Security', *World Policy Journal*, vol. 8, no. 3 (Summer 1991), pp. 561-574; Kupchan, Charles A. & Clifford A. Kupchan: 'Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe', *International Security*, vol. 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 114-161; Weiss, Thomas G. (ed.): *Collective Security in a Changing World* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 1993). For a more sceptical view, see Betts, Richard K.: 'Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe', *International Security*, vol. 17, no. 1 (Summer 1992), pp. 5-43; Joffe, Josef: 'Collective Security and the Future of Europe: Failed Dreams and Dead Ends', *Survival*, vol. 34, no. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 36-50.

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Dimensions in International Security' Part I), pp. 30-40; Gerlach, Jeffrey R.: 'A U.N. Army for the New World Order?', *Orbis*, vol. 37, no. 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 223-236; Urquhart, Brian: 'The UN: From Peace-keeping to a Collective System?', *Adelphi Papers*, no. 265, Winter 1991/92 ('New Dimensions in International Security', Part I), pp. 18-29; idem: 'For a UN Volunteer Military Force', *New York Review of Books*, vol. 40, no. 11 (June 10, 1993), pp. 3-4. Sur, Serge: 'Security Council Resolution 687 of 3 April 1991 in the Gulf Affair: Problems of Restoring and Safeguarding Peace', *Research Papers*, no. 12 (New York: UNIDIR).

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58. Lustick, Ian S.: 'Zankapfel Jerusalem. Plädoyer für einen neuen Status', *Europa-Archiv*, no. 24 (1993), pp. 701-710; Odeh, Adnan Abu (Chief of the Royal Court in Jordan): 'Two Capitals in an Undivided Jerusalem', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 71, no. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 183-188.

59. For an exhaustive analysis of the situation of the refugees, see Peretz, Don: *Palestinians, Refugees, and the Middle East Peace Process* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 1993).

60. Art. 49 of the Geneva Convention IV on the Protection of Civilians in Times of War (1949) clearly states that 'The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own population into the territory it occupies'. See Falk, Richard: 'World Order Conceptions and the Peace Process in the Middle East', in Elise Boulding (ed.): *Building Peace in the Middle East. Challenges for States and Civil Society* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 189-196 (quote from p. 196). See also McCoubrey, H. & N.D. White: *International Law and Armed Conflict* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1992), pp. 279-294; Green, L.C.: *The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), pp. 246-257. On the Israeli settlement policy, see e.g. Tessler, Mark & Ann Mosley Lesch: 'Israel's Drive into the West Bank and Gaza', in Ann Mosley Lesch & Mark Tessler (eds.): *Israel, Egypt and the Palestinians. From Camp David to Intifada* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), pp. 194-222. For some interesting historical parallels, including the Assyrian occupation of territories in the Middle East, see Carlton, Eric: *Occupation. The Policies and Practices of Military Conquerors* (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 123-133.

61. In an op-ed in *The Jerusalem Post*, 8 April 1994, the chairman of the Likud Bejamin Netanyahu thus mentions the possibility of 'association with Jordan' as an alternative to the Rabin government's alleged plans for 'the establishment of a PLO state in Judea, Samaria and Gaza' that would quickly 'topple the Hashemite regime in Jordan', thereby creating a Palestinian-Islamic state

that would, in its turn, 'inexorably lead to the formation of an emboldened Arab Eastern Front, stretching from Teheran to Israel's coastal plain'.

62. On the concept, see Buzan: *op.cit.* (note 3), pp. 186-229; idem, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre, Ole Wæver & al.: *The European Security Order Recast. Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era* (London: Pinter, 1990), pp. 31-44.

63. The most elaborate argument to this effect is Russett, Bruce M.: *Grasping the Democratic Peace. Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). The classical formulation of the thesis (not referring explicitly to democracies, but to representative government in general) is Kant, Immanuel (1795): *Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1963). A general survey of the idea is provided by Gleditsch, Nils Petter: 'Democracy and Peace', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 29, no. 4 (November 1992), pp. 369-376. The recent revival of interest in the thesis may be traced back to Doyle, Michael: 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 12, no. 3-4 (1983), pp. 205-35, 323-353. See also Rummel, R.J.: 'Libertarian Propositions on Violence Within and Between Nations: A Test Against Published Research Results', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 29, no. 3 (September 1985): 419-455; idem: 'Political Systems, Violence, and War', in W. Scott Thompson & Kenneth M. Jensen (eds.): *Approaches to Peace. An Intellectual Map* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute for Peace, 1991), pp. 350-370.

64. See, for instance, Yaniv, Avner (ed.): *National Security and Democracy in Israel* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993).

65. See, e.g. Amjad-Ali, Charles: 'Democratization in the Middle East from an Islamic Perspective', in Boulding (ed.): *op. cit.* (note 60), pp. 69-77; Osseiran, Sanàa: 'The Democratization Process in the Arab-Islamic States of the Middle East', *ibid.*, pp. 79-90; Nakhleh, Emile A.: 'The Arab World After the Gulf War: Challenges and Prospects', *ibid.*, pp. 111-120.

66. Lucas, Michael R. (ed.): *The CSCE in the 1990s: Constructing European Security and Cooperation* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1993).

67. See e.g. Faour, Muhammad: *The Arab World After Desert Storm* (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1993), pp. 55-97. On the Arab League, see e.g. Perthes, Volker: 'Innerarabische Ordnungsansätze', in Albrecht Zunker (ed.): *Weltordnung oder Chaos? Beiträge zur internationalen Politik* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1993), pp. 347-360. On the GCC, see Tow, William T.: *Subregional Security Cooperation in the Third World* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1990), pp. 45-56 *et passim*.

68. Kemp, Geoffrey (with Shelley A. Stahl): *The Control of the Middle East Arms Race* (New York: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1991), p. 2.

69. Lawrence, Thomas Edward: *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom. A Triumph* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1935), p. 194. See also the apt comparison between desert and naval warfare, *ibid.*, p. 337. See also idem: On Lawrence of Arabia as a strategist, see Hart, Basil Lidell: *T.E. Lawrence—in Arabia and After* (London: Faber, 1934).

70. One reason for Israel's clinging on to the Golan Heights may thus be the need for an ensured supply of water. Since her neighbours have precisely the same requirement, however, there is no long-term alternative to a joint water management regime, covering the entire region, (including Turkey).

71. Hence the Soviet need for a swift and decisive victory. See Vigor, Peter: *Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983).

72. Korn, David A.: *Stalemate. The War of Attrition and Great Power Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1967-1970* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992).

73. El-Naggar, Said & Mahamed El-Erian: 'The Economic Implications of a Comprehensive Peace in the Middle East', in Stanley Fischer, Dani Rodrik & Elias Tuma (eds.): *The Economics of Middle East Peace. Views from the Region* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 205-226; Diwan, Ishac & Nick Papandreou: 'The Peace Process and Economic Reforms in the Middle East', *ibid.*, pp. 227-255; Clawson, Patrick: 'The Limited Scope for Economic Cooperation in the Contemporary Levant', in Steven L. Spiegel (ed.): *The Arab-Israeli Search for Peace* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1992), pp. 81-101; Fischelson, Gideon: 'Regional Economic Cooperation in the Middle East', *ibid.*, pp. 103-120; Anani, Jawad: 'Areas of Potential Economic Cooperation in the Context of the Middle East Peace Process', *ibid.*, pp. 121-125.

74. On the attitudes of the different religions to war see, for instance, Smock, David R. (ed.): *Religious Perspectives on War. Christian, Muslim, and Jewish Attitudes Toward Force After the Gulf War* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1992).

75. Calculated on the basis of *The Military Balance 1993-1994* (London: Brassey's/IISS, 1994), pp. 107-133.

76. Evron, Yair: 'Israel', in Regina Cowen Karp (ed.): *Security With Nuclear Weapons? Different Perspectives on National Security* (London: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1991), pp. 277-297.

77. Kemp: *op.cit.* (note 68), pp. 71-88, 186-189.

78. In addition to the article by Conetta, Knight & Unterseher (note 36), examples are Glicksman, Alex: 'Defensive Defence in the Middle East', in UNIDIR (ed.): *Nonoffensive Defense. A Global Perspective* (New York: Taylor & Francis, 1990), pp. 145-151; 'Commission Document on Peace Building in the Middle East', in Boulding (ed.): *op. cit.* (note 60), pp. 7-66, pp. 49-50 *et passim*; Wiberg, Håkan: 'The Dynamics of Disarmament in the Middle East', in Balazs, Judit & idem (eds.): *Peace Research for the 1990s* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó), pp. 181-195.

79. See above, note 36.

80. As illustrated by the three-dimensional maps of Israel's strategic geography in Kemp: *op. cit.* (note 68), pp. 203-214.

81. Quandt, William B.: *Peace Process. American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution/Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 183-222 (on the post-Yom Kippur War disengagement), and pp. 275-283 on the Camp David treaty. See also Kemp: *op.cit.* (note 68), pp. 158-159; Dessouki, Ali E. Hillal: 'Strategic Balance and Disarmament in the Middle East', in Boulding (ed.): *op. cit.* (note 60), pp. 197-203, especially pp. 199-200.

82. Alpher, Joseph: 'Security Arrangements for a Palestinian Settlement', *Survival*, vol. 34, no. 4 (Winter 1992-93), pp. 49-67.

83. Based on personal observations along the border, as well as a briefing by an Israeli intelligence officer in the Golan, 7 April 1994.

84. Oral communication to the author by Professor Martin Van Creveld (Hebrew University, Jerusalem), 8 April 1994.

85. See e.g. Allison, Roy: *Finland's Relations With the Soviet Union, 1944-84*, (New York 1985: St. Martin's Press, 1985); Mouritzen, Hans: *Finlandization: Towards a General Theory of Adaptive Politics*, (Aldershot: Gower, 1988).

86. An example of such extrapolation is Beres, Louis René: 'Israel, Palestine and Regional Nuclear War', *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, vol. 22, no. 2 (June 1991), pp. 227-234; and Carus, W. Seth 1992: 'Weapons Technology and Regional Stability', in Shelley A. Stahl & Geoffrey Kemp (eds.): *Arms Control and Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia* (New York: St. Martin's Press & the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), pp. 9-16. The classical example of the belief in the stabilizing effect of nuclear power is Waltz, Kenneth N.: 'The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better', *Adelphi Papers*, no. 171 (1981). On the adequacy of other stabilizers, above all the general war-weariness, see Mueller, John: 'The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World' (1988), in Sean Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller & Stephen Van Evera (eds.): *Nuclear Diplomacy and Crisis Management. An* International Security *Reader* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 3-27.

87. Evron, Yair: 'Deterrence Experience in the Arab-Israeli Conflict', in Klieman & Levite (eds.): *op.cit.* (note 41), pp. 98-121, especially pp. 113-116. The logic was, of course, that the missile attacks would force Israel to strike back (most likely with nuclear weapons), which would force Egypt and Syria (perhaps also Saudi Arabia) to shift sides.

88. The last few years has seen a multitude of works on nuclear proliferation. Examples are: Spector, Leonard S. (with Jacqueline R. Smith): *Nuclear Ambitions. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989-1990* (Boulder: Westview, 1990); Bailey, Kathleen: *Doomsday Weapons in the Hands of Many* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992); Barnaby, Frank: *How Nuclear Weapons Spread. Nuclear-Weapon Proliferation in the 1990s* (London: Routledge, 1993); Creveld, Martin Van: *Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict* (New York: Free Press, 1993).

89. Booth & Wheeler: *loc.cit.* (note 41); Rotblat, Joseph, Jack Steinberger & Bhalachandra Udgaonkar (eds.): *A Nuclear-Weapon-Free World. Desirable? Feasible?*. A Pugwash Monograph (Boulder: Westview, 1993).

90. Parker, Richard B.: *The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993); and Paul, Thaza Varkey: *Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, vol. 33 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 126-145. On 'rationality', see e.g. Nicholson, Michael: *Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). On the ambiguity when applied to the Gulf conflict, see Renshon, Stanley A. (ed.): *The Political Psychology of the Gulf War. Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993); Ben-Dor, Gabriel: 'Arab Rationality and Deterrence', in Klieman & Levite (eds.): *op.cit.* (note 41), pp. 87-97.

91. On the 'almost' nuclear states, i.e. states that have at some stage seriously contemplated going nuclear, but chosen not to, see e.g. Quester, George: 'Unilateral Self-Restraint on Nuclear Proliferation: Canada, Sweden, Switzerland, and Germany', in Bennett Ramberg (ed.): *Arms Control Without Negotiation. From the Cold War to the New World Order* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp. 141-157; Wallin, Lars B.: 'Sweden', in Regina Owen Karp (ed.): *op.cit.* 1991 (note 76), pp. 360-381.

92. On extended deterrence, see e.g. Huth, Paul K.: *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Ravenal, Earl C.: 'Coupling and Decoupling: The Prospects for Extended Deterrence', in P. Terrence Hopmann & Frank Barnaby (eds.): *Rethinking the Nuclear Weapons Dilemma in Europe* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), pp. 59-70; Buzan, Barry: 'The Evolution of Deterrence Theory: Lessons for Israel', in Klieman & Levite (eds.): *op.cit.* (note 41), pp. 19-33; Cimbala, Stephen J.: *NATO Strategies and Nuclear Weapons* (London: Pinter, 1989); Daalder, Ivo H.: *The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response. NATO Strategy and Theater Nuclear Forces Since 1967* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Jervis, Robert: *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); idem: 'The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World', in Sean Lynn-Jones, Steven E. Miller & Stephen Van Evera (eds.): *Nuclear Diplomacy and Crisis Management. An* International Security *Reader* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 28-38; idem: *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution. Statecraft and the Prospects of Armageddon* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); idem: 'Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence', *World Politics*, vol. 41, no. 2 (January 1989), pp. 183-207. On the post-Cold War situation, see Dembinski, Matthias 1991: 'Tactical Nuclear Weapons after the End of the East-West Conflict: the Concept of Minimized Extended Deterrence', in Vilho Harle & Pekka Sivonen (eds.): *Nuclear Weapons in a Changing Europe* (London: Pinter, 1991), pp. 98-128; Kaysen, Carl, Robert S. McNamara & George W. Rathjens: 'Nuclear Weapons After the Cold War', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 70, no. 4 (Fall 1991): 95-110; Bundy, McGeorge: 'Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf', *ibid.*, pp. 83-94; Glaser, Charles L.: 'Nuclear Policy Without an Adversary: U.S. Planning for the Post-Soviet Era', *International Security*, vol. 16, no. 4 (Spring 1992), pp. 34-78.

93. Blechman, Barry M. & Douglas M. Hart: 'The Political Utility of Nuclear Weapons. The 1973 Middle East Crisis', in Steven E. Miller (ed.): *Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence. An* International Security *Reader* (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 273-297.

94. Kemp: *op. cit.* (note 68), pp. 15-16. See also Wiberg: *loc.cit.* (note 78); 'Commission Document', *loc.cit.* (note 78), 22-26; Gazit, Shlomo: 'After the Gulf War: The Arab World and the Peace Process', in Spiegel (ed.): *op. cit.* (note 73), pp. 17-25.

95. Lesch & Tessler (eds.): *op. cit.* (note 60); Lockman, Zachary & Jopel Beinin (eds.): *Intifada. The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1990); Hunter, F. Robert: *The Palestinian Uprising. A War By Other Means* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); McDowall, David: *Palestine and Israel. The Uprising and Beyond* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1989).

96. Boserup, Anders: 'Non-offensive Defence in Europe', in Derek Paul (ed.): *Defending Europe. Options for Security* (London: Taylor & Francis, 1985), pp. 194-209. The same idea is to be found in Glucksmann, André: *Le Discours de la Guerre* (Paris: l'Herne, 1967), pp. 42-43; and in Weizsäcker, Carl Friedrich von: *Wege in der Gefahr. Eine Studie über Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft und Kriegsverhütung* (1976) (München: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1979), pp. 150, 116, 165-166. See also Møller: *op.cit.* 1992 (note 4), pp. 84-89.

97. See e.g. Møller, Bjørn: 'What is Defensive Security? Non-Offensive Defence and Stability in a Post-Bipolar World', *Working Papers*, no. 10 (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1992); Huber, Reiner K.: 'Military Stability of Multipolar International Systems: An Analysis of Military Potentials in Post-Cold War Europe' (Neubiberg: Institut für Angewandte Systemforschung und Operations Research, Fakultät für Informatik, Universität der Bundeswehr München, June 1993); idem & Rudolf Avenhaus: 'Problems of Multipolar International Stability', in idem & idem (eds.): *International Stability in a Multipolar World: Issues and Models for Analysis* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1993), pp. 11-20. For an interesting analysis of multipolarity in the former eastern bloc, see idem & Otto Schindler: 'Military Stability of Multipolar Power Systems: An Analytical Concept for Its Assessment, exemplified for the Case of Poland, Byelarus, the Uraine and Russia', *ibid.*, pp. 155-180.

98. Good overviews are Steinberg, Gerald M.: 'Middle East Arms Control and Regional Security', *Survival*, vol. 36, no. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 126-141; IISS: *Strategic Survey*, 1991-1992 (London: IISS/Brassey's, 1992), pp. 84-94; *ibid.* 1992-1993, pp. 109-119. See also Indyk, Martin: 'Watershed in the Middle East', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 71, no. 1 (America and the World 1991/92), pp. 70-93; Bannerman, M. Graeme: 'Arabs and Israelis: Slow Walk Toward Peace', *ibid.*, vol. 72, no. 1 (America and the World 1992/93), pp. 142-157.

99. Steinberg: *loc.cit.* 1994 (note 98); Golan, Galia: 'Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations: An Israeli Perspective', in Spiegel (ed.): *op. cit.* (note 73), pp. 37-47; Heller, Mark: 'Middle East Security and Arms Control', *ibid.*, pp. 129-137.

100. 'UN General Assembly Resolution on the Definition of Aggression', in Goldblat, Jozef: *Arms Control. A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements* (London: SAGE Publications/Oslo: PRIO, 1994), pp. 398-402. This definition explicitly outlaws, *inter alia*, 'bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of any weapon by a State against the territory of another State' (art. 3b).

101. See Burstein, Stanley M.: 'Arms Control in Antiquity', in Burns (ed.) *op.cit.* (note 55), vol. 2, pp. 551-561, especially p. 552.

102. See Rotter, Manfred: 'Bewaffnete Neutralität. Das Beispiel Österreich', *Militärpolitik Dokumentation*, no. 38 (1984); Vetschera, Heinz: 'Der Weg zu Staatsvertrag und Neutralität', *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, no. 3, 1985, pp. 223-228; idem: 'Die Rüstungsbeschränkungen des Österreichischen Staatsvertrages aus rechtlicher und politischer Sicht', *ibid.*, no. 6, 1986, pp. 500-505.

103. Suggested by Alpher: *loc.cit.* (note 82), p. 54. For a critique, see Diab, M.Z.: 'A Proposed Security Regime for an Arab-Israeli Settlement', in Spiegel (ed.): *op.cit.* (note 73), pp. 159-172, especially p. 169.

104. Cohen, Avner: 'Nuclear Weapons, Opacity, and Israeli Democracy', in Yaniv (ed.): *op.cit.* (note 64), pp. 197-226.

105. On the CWC, see eg. Robinson, Julian Perry, Thomas Stock & Ronald G. Sutherland: 'The Chemical Weapons Convention: the Success of Chemical Disarmament Negotiations', *SIPRI Yearbook 1993*, pp. 705-734. The convention itself is appended on pp. 734-756. See also Findlay, Trevor: 'Peace Through Chemistry. The New Chemical Weapons Convention', *Pacific Research*, vol. 6, no. 1 (Canberra: Peace Research Centre, ANU, February 1993), pp. 3-7; Müller, Christoph: 'Das Chemiewaffen-Übereinkommen vom 13. Januar 1993. Endpunkt oder Neubeginn multilateraler Rüstungskontrolle?', *Europa-Archiv*, vol. 48, no. 11 (10 June 1993), pp. 327-337; Thraenert, Oliver: 'The International Chemical Weapons Convention—Problems Involved', *Aussenpolitik. English Edition*, vol. 44, no. 3 (Autumn 1993), pp. 222-231.

106. *The Arms Control Reporter*, 1-94, 453.A.1-4. Resolution 387 is reprinted in Burns: *op.cit.* (note 55), vol. 3, pp. 1403-1406. See also Aly, Abdel Mohem Said: 'Arms Control and the Resolution of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: An Arab Perspective', in Spiegel (ed.): *op. cit.* (note 73), pp. 151-158; Steinberg, Gerald M.: 'The Middle East', in Burns (ed.): *op. cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 169-186, especially pp. 182-183; idem: *loc.cit.* 1994 (note 98), pp. 131-133; Redick, John R.: 'Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones', *ibid.* vol. 2, pp. 1079-1091, especially pp. 1085-1086. The central documents are reprinted in Beker, Avi (ed.): *Arms Control Without Glasnost: Building Confidence in the Middle East* (Jerusalem: Israeli Council of Foreign Relations, 1993), pp. 199-250. See also idem: 'Denuclearization Without Glasnost', *ibid.*, pp. 161-196.

107. Lodgaard, Sverre: 'Vertical and Horizontal Proliferation in the Middle East/Persian Gulf', *Bulletin of Peace Proposals*, vol. 22, no. 1, 1991, pp. 3-10.

108. Ham, Peter van: *Managing Non-Proliferation Regimes in the 1990s. Power, Politics and Policies* (London: Pinter, 1993); Fischer, David: *Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. The Past and the Prospects* (London: Routledge, 1992); Carasales, Julio 1993: 'Nuclear Non-Proliferation After 1995', in Joseph Rotblat (ed.): *Striving for Peace, Security and Development in the World. Annals of Pugwash 1991* (London: World Scientific Publishers, 1993), pp. 54-62; Gardner, Gary: *Nuclear Nonproliferation: A Primer* (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner, 1994); Roberts, Brad: 'From Nonproliferation to Antiproliferation', *International Security*, vol. 18, no. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 139-173; Quester, George 1992a: 'Nuclear Proliferation and the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons', in Karp: *op.cit.*, pp. 202-226.Müller, Harald: 'Maintaining Non-Nuclear Weapon Status', *ibid.*, pp. 301-339; idem: 'Nukleare Nichtverbreitung: Ein umfassender Strategieentwurf', *HSFK-Report*, no. 7 (Frankfurt: Hessische Stiftung für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, 1993).

109. Heller: *loc.cit.* (note 99), p. 132.

110. Kemp: *op. cit.* (note 68), pp. 157-158.

111. Alpher: *loc.cit.* (note 82). For all its merits, and the perfectly legitimate concern for Israeli security notwithstanding, the author probably goes too far when he suggest to prohibit the new Palestinian state from taken measures to prevent an Israeli reoccupation in an emergency.

112. Beres, Louis René: 'Striking Preemptively: Israel's Post-Gulf War Options Under International Law', in Beker (ed.): *op.cit.* (note 106), pp. 129-160; Levite: *op.cit.* (note 41), *passim*. See also the May 1991 speech by present prime and defence minister Yitzhak Rabin: 'Deterrence in an Israeli Security Context', in Klieman & Levite (eds.): *op. cit.* (note 41), pp. 6-15, in which he *expressis verbis* rules out pre-emption, albeit on pragmatic grounds (p. 8), while maintaining the need for an offensive strategy (p. 10).

113. See e.g. Cordesman & Wagner: *op.cit.* (note 28), pp. 37-44; Smart, Ian: 'Untangling the Priorities: Weapons, Vehicles, and the Objectives of Arms Control', in Stahl & Kemp (eds.): *op. cit.* (note 86), pp. 145-164, especially pp. 149-151.

114. On CSBMs, see Lachowski, Zdzislaw: 'The Vienna Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in 1992', *SIPRI Yearbook 1993*, pp. 618-631. The Vienna Document itself is appended *ibid.*, pp. 635-653. On CSBMs in general, see e.g. Brauch, Hans Günter (ed.): *Vertrauensbildende Massnahmen und Europäische Abrüstungskonferenz. Analysen, Dokumente und Vorschläge* (Gerlingen: Bleicher Verlag, 1987); Borawski, John (ed.): *Avoiding War in the Nuclear Age. Confidence-Building Measures for Crisis Stability* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986); idem: *Security for a New Europe. The Vienna Negotiations on Confidence and Security-Building Measures 1989-90, and Beyond* (London: Brassey's, 1992).

115. Diab: *loc.cit.* (note 103), p. 166.

116. On the first Vienna Seminar, see Krohn, Axel: 'The Vienna Military Doctrine Seminar', *SIPRI Yearbook 1991*, pp. 501-511; cf. Hamm, Manfred R. & Hartmut Pohlman: 'Military Strategy and Doctrine: Why They Matter to Conventional Arms Control', *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 13, no. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 185-198. On the sequel in 1991, see Lachowski, Zdzislaw: 'The Second Vienna Seminar on Military Doctrine', *SIPRI Yearbook 1992*, pp. 496-505. No such discussions have taken place between the states in the Middle East, although the Multinational Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security established under the auspices of the Peace Talks, might be an approximation. See, e.g. Steinberg: *loc.cit.* 1994 (note 98), pp. 135-136.

117. Carus, W. Seth: 'Ballistic Missiles in the Third World. Threat and Response', *The Washington Papers*, no. 146 (New York: Praeger & The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1990); Karp, Aaron: 'Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World', in *SIPRI Yearbook 1989. World Armaments and Disarmament* (Oxford: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1989), pp. 287-318; Nolan, Janne E.: *Trappings of Power. Ballistic Missiles in the Third World*, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1991); Fetter, Steve: 'Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What is the Threat? What Should be Done?', *International Security*, vol. 16, no. 1 (Summer 1991), pp. 5-42; Navias, Martin: *Going Ballistic. The Build-up of Missiles in the Middle East* (London: Brassey's, UK, 1993); Neuneck, Götz & Otfried Ischebeck (eds.): *Missile Proliferation, Missile Defence, and Arms Control* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1992).

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Working Papers 5 · 1994

Centre for Peace and Conflict Research
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Non-Offensive Defence as a Strategy for Small States?

by

Bjørn Møller

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ISSN: 0907-6530

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NON-OFFENSIVE DEFENCE AS A STRATEGY FOR SMALL STATES?

Paper for the Conference on
The National Security of Small States in a Changing World

Organized by
The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations,
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

and the

BESA Center for Strategic Studies,
Bar-Ilan University

Jerusalem, 5-7 April 1994

Preliminary version,
Not for quotation
Comments welcome

Contents

In the present paper I shall venture some general observations about 'small states' in general, and about their defence strategies and postures in particular. In this connection, I shall argue in favour of defensive strategies on the level of individual states, underpinned by (elements of) a collective security system on the regional and/or global level.

I. PROLIFERATION OF 'SMALL STATES'

"The Caterpillar was the first to speak.
"What size do you want to be?", it asked.
"Oh, I'm not particular as to size," Alice hastily replied;
"only one doesn't like changing so often, you know"[1]

'Small states' is a very roomy and heterogeneous category, raising the question whether generalizations are at all justifiable.

- Smallness itself is relative: Whereas Austria or Switzerland are small compared with great powers such as Germany or France, and even more so vis-à-vis superpowers such as the USA or ex-superpowers (or 'very great powers') such as Russia—they are large in comparison with Liechtenstein.
- The degree of 'smallness', to a certain extent, reflects the orientation of states: If they are located, and position themselves in relation to, a regional or subregional, as opposed to a global framework, they may be 'big' in the sense of constituting regional great powers.
- Size may differ according to the dimension one is concerned with: States that are small in terms of population (e.g. Denmark with 5 mill. inhabitants) may be large in terms of territory: If one includes Greenland (under the Danish crown), Denmark is, for instance, geographically huge: 2,218,670 km^{22}.
- Even speaking in traditional political terms (cf. Waltz and other neorealists), 'power' is multi-dimensional[3], and a correspondence between the various dimensions is more of a coincidence than a rule. Israel is e.g. militarily stronger, but (in some respects at least) politically weaker, and economically clearly weaker than, say, Saudi Arabia.
- Even military power is multidimensional, and its components may be incommensurable: How does one, for instance, compare a major naval power with practically no land forces with a power possessing a large army but only a green-water navy? And how do nuclear weapons enter into the comparison?

For the purposes of this paper, I shall proceed from an entirely arbitrary definition of 'small states' as states with between 1 and 10 million inhabitants. According to this criterion, both Denmark and Israel are clearly 'small', whereas neither the Netherlands

nor Iceland belong to this category, the former being 'not quite small enough' with her 15 million inhabitants, and the latter being 'too small' with a mere 260,000 inhabitants.

Small states have been proliferating through the post-war period, primarily as a result of the anti-colonial movement. After a certain stabilization when virtually all colonies had gained independence, it seems that we are presently witnessing the birth of a new generation of small states, being formed through the dissolution of empires and multinational states: The Soviet Union has broken up, with the former union republics opting for statehood, but fragmentation has continued beyond that. The Russian Federation is thus, for instance, almost bound to dissolve further, or at the very least to transform itself into a looser, confederate rather than federal, structure[4]. Yugoslavia has likewise dissolved, as has Czechoslovakia.

There is no telling when this will end, and the principle of 'national self-determination' provides only a very rough guideline to where it should[5]: Nationalities tend to be intermingled to such an extent that homogeneous 'nation states' are hard to envision, and even more difficult to create, in most parts of the world[6]. What is certain, however, is that we are going to see a greater number of small states in the future, as will be visible, for instance, in the number of seats in the United Nations General Assembly and the CSCE.

Whether this is a good or a bad thing is an open question, since there is no such thing as 'the right size' of a state. Even though the international system as a whole would tend to benefit from a predominance of 'strong states' (Buzan), strength in this connection is not so much a function of size as of cohesion[7]. It is, for instance, far from obvious that an Israel comprising the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights is stronger than one without it. A stable international system composed of a multitude of small states is thus no contradiction in terms. However, regardless of how stable such a system might be once created, the path from here to there may be fraught with dangers, hence the likelihood of a growing number of bloody wars of cessation in the years ahead.

It does not really speak against the postulated trend towards fragmentation that there is also an opposite trend towards integration, as manifested in the European Communities, now EU. Even though integration will, hopefully and most likely, continue, thereby creating a very large political entity, this entity will almost surely not be a state. Rather, it might be a confederation, perhaps a federation—or, most probably, a new type of political structure, where sovereignty is diffused across levels. Similar developments are imaginable, though much less likely, elsewhere in the world, but nowhere are there strong tendencies in the direction of larger states.

II. MULTIPOLARITY AND ORDER

The resultant picture, say ten or twenty years from now, might be an international system quite different from the bipolar one to which we have grown accustomed: It may be a system featuring overlapping sovereignties, and comprising, at most, one superpower (the USA), a few great powers ('large states', including Russia, China and Japan), and a multitude of medium-sized, small and micro-states. In addition, the system is likely to feature a plenitude of non-state actors, some of which may well be larger and more powerful than some states. They may range from international and supranational institutions of a global or regional scope (EU, ASEAN, etc.), through transnational corporations and INGOs (international non-governmental organizations) to regional and local authorities; cross-boundary regional bonds may become as important as national citizenship. In short, what some analysts have described as 'neomedieval system' may (partly or completely) have supplanted the 'Westphalian system' of sovereign territorial states[8]

What is clear by now is that this would definitely not be a bipolar system, at least not in the traditional sense, with its much-lauded predictability, hence stability[9]. What is less clear is what other structural shape it may assume: Unipolar, with the USA at the pinnacle of global power[10]; tripolar, with the USA, the EU and Japan/East Asia constituting the three poles; or multipolar, i.e. characterized by shifting alliances; or something completely different, say 'diffused' or 'disjointed', i.e. divided into regional constituting self-contained systems with little contact between the regions[11].

It is equally disputed whether the possible multipolarity will be tantamount to disorder and instability with a high propensity for war. However, before succumbing to pessimistic horror visions *á la* John Mearsheimer[12], one should remember the numerous inhibitions against war presently in force, either globally, or in special regions:

- War-weariness is very widespread in large parts of the world, including Europe, as a result of the two world wars fought in this century[13].
- 'Existential' nuclear deterrence influences all conceivable war-versus-no war calculations to the extent of making most wars appear unprofitable[14].
- Several groups of countries already constitute 'security communities', between the members of which war have become inconceivable: Examples include the Nordic region, USA/Canada, and the entire EU[15].
- The global spread of democracy, especially among the leading nations of the world (with China remaining an unfortunate exception) makes the residual number of possible wars progressively smaller, since democracies do not wage

wars against each other[16]. The 'zone of peace' thus tends to grow, while the remaining 'zones of turmoil' are likely to continue shrinking[17]. This will not merely reduce the number of possible wars, as well as their likelihood; it will also reduce the risk of wars spreading beyond the region in question.

One might hence almost be tempted by this to deny the need for any defence at all[18], or to opt for strictly non-military means of national defence[19]. Even though this may well be a prospect for the future (and perhaps a genuine options even today for some countries[20]) it would, in the present author's opinion, be premature to pin one's hopes on this already. There remains a need for—as well as, of course, an inalienable right to—national defence, even of the military kind.

III. COMMON SECURITY AND NOD

NOD was a defence strategy designed for the Cold War environment, characterized by bipolarity and predictability. More specifically, it was designed with NATO in general, and Germany in particular, in mind[21].

The principal guiding idea was political, namely that states would be better off pursuing policies of 'common security'[22] (henceforth CS). A security policy that did not take the respective adversary's legitimate security concerns into account was simply bound to be counterproductive, because it would activate malign security dilemma-type interactions: Were one state, for instance, to increase its armaments, even if only with defence in mind, this would be perceived by its adversary as a growing threat, hence lead to reciprocal rearmament, whence would ensue a spiralling arms build-up with no inherent point of saturation. Furthermore, in a political crisis, the defensive precautions undertaken by states might easily be misinterpreted as preparations for an attack, hence would give its adversaries strong incentives for preventive war and/or pre-emptive attack with[23].

There is nothing revolutionary in a policy of CS, in fact all states (including the two rival superpowers) have pursued such policies, albeit more or less consistently[24]. The Nordic countries, as a matter of fact, pursued such policies through the entire Cold War period, as manifested in their alliance, stationing and national defence policies[25], thereby probably contributing to limiting tension in their surroundings, and making a modest, yet significant, contribution to East-West détente in general.

One element in security policies, to which this guideline should also apply is defence policy, where the logical manifestation of CS is NOD[26]. NOD might either be defined structurally or functionally. The best known structural definition is that of Frank Barnaby and Egbert Boeker:

> 'The size, weapons, training, logistics, doctrine, operational manuals, war-games, manoeuvres, text-books used in military academies, etc. of the armed forces are such that they are seen in their totality to be capable of a credible defense without any reliance on the use of nuclear weapons, yet incapable of offense'[27].

The present author would, however, suggest a simpler, but functional definition', which also highlights the fact that NOD is not an either/or, but a matter of degrees.

> 'NOD is a strategy, materialized in a posture, intended to maximize defensive while minimizing offensive capabilities'.

Just as there have never been any perfect real-life materializations of NOD (even though some states came closer than others to the ideal, *vide infra*), there probably never will be. Nevertheless, that a move in this direction is desirable has been nearly universally acknowledged, *inter alia* by the participants in the CFE (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe) negotiations, who were in agreement about the objective of these negotiations: to limit, as a matter of priority, capabilities for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action[28], i.e. precisely what NOD proponents had been suggesting for a number of years.

Were a state to conform, more or less precisely, to the above criterion, the two aforementioned problems, of low arms race and crisis stability, might be avoided. A build-up of strictly defensive armaments need not lead to reciprocation on the part of its adversaries; and unmistakably defensive safeguards in a crisis situation would not invite pre-emption, simply because they could not possibly be mistaken for attack preparations. These principled but abstract observations immediately raise several questions:

- Can distinctions in fact be made between offensive and defensive strategies and postures?
- If so, would the abstention from offensive capabilities not inevitably also diminish a state's ability to defend itself?
- If not, are there any universally applicable guidelines for the design of such a defence?
- For whom, if any, would such a defence be suitable?
- Could it stand alone, or would it require an underpinning, say in the form of nuclear deterrence, alliance security guarantees, and/or collective security?

IV. THE OFFENCE/DEFENCE DISTINCTION

Attempts at distinguishing between offensive and defensive capabilities have often been made, however most often unsuccessfully, with the 1932 World Disarmament Conference as the most obvious failure[29]. The explanation may be that distinctions have been sought at the wrong level of analysis:

1. Offensive/Defensive Weapons?

At one extreme, it is, of course, meaningless to categorize the weapons themselves as either offensive or defensive, since both offensive and defensive operations require a whole panoply of weapons categories, many of which are identical: Tanks may, for instance, be very valuable for a defender, just as anti-tank weapons are indispensable for an attacker.

However, weapons are not useful or indispensable to quite the same extent to an attacker and a defender. The US Army thus, for instance, assigned offensive and defensive values to various categories of weapons, as set out in the table below

U.S. ARMY ESTIMATES OF WEAPON STRENGTH (*anno* 1974)[30]	**Value in:**	
	Offence	**Defence**
Tanks	64	55
Armoured personnel carriers	13	6
Anti-tank weapons	27	46
Artillery	72	85
Mortars	37	47
Armed helicopters	33	44

The implication is that one could distinguish between offensive and defensive postures: An offensive posture would, for example, tend to be tank-heavy (such as was that of the former Soviet Union), whereas a defensive one would usually be heavy on anti-tank weapons. It might also make sense to distinguish between largely offensive and predominantly defensive military units (e.g. divisions). There was, for instance, little doubt that the Soviet tank armies were more capable of offensives than their motorized rifle divisions, even though the latter were still too tank- and artillery-heavy for the West's taste. However, different types of military formations are useful for different types of missions, and a prospective attacker would not only need heavy, mechanized and armoured formations for his breakthrough, but also infantry-heavy units for the consummation of his victory, for defence of conquered land, etc.

We therefore have to look at total postures, say the distribution of total strength

between predominantly offensive and largely defensive units. Furthermore, what should count as one or the other would depend on the context: whereas only truly long-range mobility would matter between, say, Russia and Ukraine, countries in the 'crowded' Middle East might well be concerned about their respective adversaries' ability to traverse much shorter distances. The strategic depth (measured in the distance between the frontier and the capital) of Israel is, for instance, only around 50 kms., whereas that of Russia is in the range of 1,000 kms. But states differ even more than this geostrategically: Island states, for obvious reasons, only need to worry about enemies in possession of navies (and/or long range air forces), etc., whereas land-locked states such as Switzerland need not worry too much about naval powers[31]. The focus of the CFE negotiations on MBTs, ACVs, artillery, combat aircraft and helicopters[32] might also not be appropriate for military environments quite different from that of Europe, such as the Middle East (with large desert tracts) or Central America (with, for as long as they last, rain forests).

That no distinctions between weapons can thus be made with universal validity should not be taken to imply that 'everything is in the eye of the beholder'. For each particular region, expert opinion would probably be in agreement on at least the basic criteria. This may well become very relevant, for instance in connection with prospective arms trade regulations that would probably materialize in lists of prohibited weapons. Whereas the guideline 'Thanks, but no tanks' may be relevant for some regions, elsewhere a focus on ballistic missiles, ground-attack aircraft or naval aviation may be more appropriate[33].

2. Policies and Grand Strategies

Whereas weapons mixes are thus of considerable significance, it is also true that what really matters is whether states have offensive or defensive intentions, i.e. political ambitions. If states are confident that their neighbours are peaceful, they will not care about their armaments. States thus tend to be much more comfortable when their neighbours are saturated, status quo-oriented states than if they are 'revisionist', irredentist, or expansionist, i.e. 'lean and hungry' in the Shakespearean sense:

> 'Let me have [states] about me that are fat. (...)
> Yond [NN] has a lean and hungry look (...) such [states] are dangerous.'
> (Shakespeare, William: *Julius Caesar*, I, ii).

One manifestation of whether states are one or the other is their definition of 'vital national interests' in defence of which their military power might be used. One might rank such definitions along a (primarily spatial) continuum, as illustrated in the table below.

The former Soviet Union seems to have defined its national interests somewhere in the 'E' category (at least as encompassing the entire Warsaw Pact region), something that was regarded by the West as offensive, and rightly so. Also, the West was not entirely happy with the recently promulgated military doctrine of the Russian Federation, *inter alia* because it envisaged a defence of Russian nationals abroad—a level of ambition that may be conflict-prone because of the presence of large Russian minorities all over the former Soviet Union[34].

Another relevant rank-ordering of defence plans might be along a temporal continuum, according to the envisaged timing of military operations: It is, of course, more offensive to actually attack than to defend oneself, but it is also more offensive to defend oneself—as has been Israeli policy[35]—in an anticipatory mode (i.e. before being actually attacked) than to do so reactively.

'Vital National Interests' to Defend		Timing of the Defence
Defensive Pole		
A.	Territorial integrity and national sovereignty	(Surrender)
B.	A plus overseas possessions	Reactive defence
C.	B plus nationals abroad	Anticipatory defence (Pre-emptive attack)
D.	C plus overseas economic interests	Preventive war
E.	B plus a 'buffer zone' comprising other states	Surprise attack
F.	Aggrandizement	
Offensive Pole		

Important though they certainly are, intentions are never completely transparent, and states therefore tend to look for tangible proof of the objectives of other states, say in the form of actual weapons deployments, or in manoeuvre practices. Hence the advisability of finding an intermediate level between those of weapons and of intentions at which to establish the decisive offence/defence distinction.

3. Strategy, Operational Art and Tactics

As a combination between the material (structural) distinction (focusing on weapons and postures) and the completely immaterial distinction between intensions, it might make sense to distinguish between different ways of waging wars, something which may lend itself to rather rigorous objective analysis.

Postures could be seen as 'frozen battle plans', i.e. as reflecting how states

intend to fight a future war—or rather how they intended so, at some point in the past when the decision for the present posture was made, because of the considerable (and unfortunately for the analyst, differential) time-lag[36]. When the USSR, for instance, created the GSFG (Group of Soviet Forces, Germany) as a very offensive-capable formation, this must have reflected an intention to fight a future war offensively, i.e. by 'carrying the war to the enemy' as swiftly as possible[37]. And when their ship-yards began constructing aircraft carriers, this must have reflected 'blue water' ambitions[38]. Fortunately, because of the revolutionary progress in information technologies, postures are already today clearly observable by various 'national technical means', but they will become even more transparent as a result of the recent arms control accomplishments, above all the Open Skies Treaty[39].

Another reflection of battle plans is the pattern of exercises. A state that, for instance, never trains its forces for break-through operations probably does not plan to be on the offensive in a future war, and it will almost surely fail if it were to attempt such operations in the 'fog of war'. Hence the rationale for making military manoeuvres transparent, as has been agreed upon under the auspices of the CSCE under the general heading of confidence-building measures, CBMs[40].

Finally, states may willingly reveal their military doctrines and war plans, as was the very purpose of the Vienna Seminars held under the auspices of the CSCE[41]. Such revelations do, of course, lend themselves to deception. Should a state, for instance, have plans to attack others, it would undoubtedly do its utmost to conceal these intensions, say by claiming to have a strictly defensive military doctrine. However, it would surely be unmasked if the 'pieces' did not fit together, i.e. if its posture and/or its manoeuvre practices seemed to contradict the proclaimed intensions. If was thus precisely because the pieces did fit together, i.e. formed a coherent pattern, that the West eventually came to believe that the USSR had in fact adopted a defensive doctrine[42].

It is thus possible to discern (the outline of) the war plans of other states, with the implication that a distinction between offensive and defensive strategies, operational concepts and tactics is possible. This leaves us with the question where to 'draw the line', i.e. at which level to demand strict defensiveness.

'Pure defence', i.e. a renunciation of even tactically offensive operations, is close to a contradiction in terms—and in any case unlikely to be effective. However, this is not at all what is being suggested by NOD advocates. On the contrary, an NOD strategy and posture would rather allow the defenders to fight even more offensively in the tactical sense of initiating a greater number of individual engagements. The reason is that by taking advantage of shielded positions, well-prepared defenders will be able to gain the upper hand in the concealment/detection contest, also because the attacker could not possibly renounce movement but would have to expose himself by

traversing open ground[43].

Defensiveness must therefore be located at a higher level of analysis than tactics, where it is a matter of timing and of the scale of counter-offensive operations[44]. Here, a very clear line of demarcation might be defined as separating offensive from defensive levels of ambition, namely the border: An NOD-type defence would need the ability to forcefully evict an invader (presupposing that the forward defence has broken down) and restore the *status quo ante bellum*. However, it would not need the ability to pursue him onto his own territory in order to enforce an unconditional surrender. Even though a few NOD proponents have flirted with the notion of 'counter-invasions' (couched in terms of 'conditional offensive superiority'[45]), this is entirely incompatible with NOD, above all because the 'counter-' would tend to be invisible, and the required capabilities hence indistinguishable from genuine offensive ones.

V. DEFENSIVE STRENGTH

A decisive question is, of course, whether the relinquishment of offensive capabilities for the sake of crisis and arms race stability inevitably comes at the expense of defensive strength, in which case many states might be well-advised not to adopt NOD as their guideline.

Fortunately, as a general rule (with allowance for possible exceptions), it is in fact possible to strengthen one's defences while building down offensive capabilities, simply because the defensive form of combat is inherently the strongest, as already pointed out by Clausewitz[46]. However, it is only inherently so, and to make it actually stronger requires skills and specialization, which is what NOD is all about:

- There are capabilities which a 'pure' defender no longer needs (or at least needs much less). To relinquish them will (in the medium-to-long run, at least) allow for savings that may be utilized for enhancing defensive strength: Examples of such superfluous capabilities are long-range mobility (including logistics), the ability to move about under enemy fire (requiring armour, mobile air defence, etc.), and long-range striking power (including C^3I systems, etc.). Since these capabilities happen to be among the most costly, quite a lot of defensive strength (say, in the form of anti-tank weapons, mines, or whatever) may be purchased from the savings.
- A number of material 'force multipliers' will automatically be available to a defender, but not to an attacker, amounting to inalienable 'home ground advantages': Interior lines of communications and supply; the option of creating widely distributed depots; of building various types of fortifications and of

constructing barriers (the Bar Lev line, for example); and even of a certain landscaping[47].

- The immaterial ('moral') advantages are considerable: The defenders will enjoy the support (morally, materially and otherwise) of the population. In many countries, this support may be personified in militia-type home guard forces, which will add considerable to the available manpower pool[48]. However, the implied 'arming of the population' may not be advisable under all circumstances, especially not in countries torn by internal strife, as illustrated by the Yugoslav example (as well as by the equally terrifying massacre in Hebron).
- The defenders will be able to exercise under more realistic conditions than a prospective attacker, since they know exactly where they will have to fight.
- Command structures may be decentralized to a certain extent, hence made more robust than the very hierarchical ones that an aggressor would tend to rely on[49].
- Certain trends in the development of modern weapons technologies tend to benefit the defender disproportionately: The revolutionary development in micro-electronics, for instance, allows for miniaturization which, in its turn, may render the large weapons platforms superfluous for defensive purposes, whereas they remain indispensable for offensive operations. Even though it is certainly premature to write off the tank or the major surface combatants as obsolete, they may nevertheless be facing obsolescence (in the sense of declining cost-effectiveness) in the coming decades[50].

Whether or not NOD will in fact be effective enough depends, of course, on which particular models would be selected for implementation. Just as they are not equally defensive, NOD models are also not equally effective[51].

VI. A PANOPLY OF MODELS

The variety of NOD models is immense, even though by far the majority of those available deal with one particular country[52]. It is nevertheless possible to bring some order into the panoply, since NOD models can be roughly divided into three archetypal models. Most other models are, in fact, eclectic in the sense of combining elements from these three types.

1. Area-covering territorial defence, along the lines of the seminal proposal of Horst Afheldt[53], or the more effective 'spider and web' model of the SAS[54]
2. Strictly defensive forward defence by means of a fire barrier, as suggested by Norbert Hannig[55].

3. 'Bastion'-type defences, as suggested by members of the SAS group, especially for the Middle East[56].

Besides these, we have what might be called an approach rather than a model, because it says nothing—not even in abstract terms—about the actual configuration or deployment of forces, only something about their inherent synergies:

4. The notion that by deliberately omitting one or several components, an otherwise offensive force posture may be rendered strictly defensive[57].

All three-and-a-half models have their strengths and weaknesses, hence the attraction of combining elements of them into, hopefully, more effective conglomerates. One of the modes of combination that has attracted the greatest attention in Europe has been that of disengagement.

5. Disengagement would imply the withdrawal of some forces from the border area to rearward locations, usually combined with a forward defence by strictly defensive means: typically tantamount to a tank-free zone at the border, defended by means of infantry armed with anti-tank weaponry[58].

The attractions of disengagement derive from the fact that it would eliminate options of surprise attack and contribute to confidence-building. The depletion zone would simply serve as an early warning device, since the deployment of proscribed weapons and forces into the zone would alert the other side to the impending attack and allow him to mobilize and prepare for combat. The same logic might suggest that forces should be cadred or otherwise prevented from launching surprise attacks, say by a separation of munitions from weapons.

However, the drawback is that malign interactions might ensue in a crisis period. If the forces withdrawn from the forward line were those possessing the greatest offensive capability (as in most proposals), to redeploy them into the zone for defensive purposes could easily be misinterpreted as preparations for an attack. Counter-intuitive though it may seen, stability would thus require that offensive-capable forces be stationed close to their envisaged combat positions and maintained in a high state of readiness, whereas the unmistakably defensive forces could be cadred and stationed further back.

The present author's experience with debates on NOD suggests that a caveat is in order: Most of models above have either been designed for a particular context, or remain very abstract. Were one to simply transpose them to quite a different setting (as has occasionally been done by NOD critics) one is bound to arrive at rather absurd

results. NOD models, as all abstract defence models, are not to be confused with actual defence planning, for which they are merely conceived as guidelines. Also, whereas modelling is a legitimate task for 'armchair strategists', actual defence planning should remain a prerogative for professionals, i.e. general staffs, albeit under political control[59].

VII. NOD FOR WHOM?

Having by now, hopefully, established 'beyond any reasonable doubt' that NOD may under certain circumstances be an adequate defence, the question remains whether all or only some states should adopt it as a guideline.

It is an empirical fact that the countries in Europe whose defence posture have come closest to the NOD ideal have been the neutral states (Austria, Finland, Switzerland, Sweden, in that order[60]). It would, however, be unjustified to conclude from this that NOD is only suitable for neutrals. As a matter of fact, most NOD proposals have focused on (West) Germany, i.e. the least neutral of all countries.

The fact that the Euroneutrals also belong to the category of 'small states' as defined above might also lead to the erroneous conclusion that NOD is a prerogative for small states. Not so, however. In fact, Japan's defence posture—and even more so the strategy and security political guidelines behind it—is a rather close approximation to NOD, only 'writ large'[61]. India (the world's second-largest state) also comes rather close to an NOD-type posture[62], whereas Israel (no offence to our hosts intended) is very far from the NOD ideal, its smallness notwithstanding.

To the extent that there is any connection between smallness and 'NOD ripeness' it is probably merely a negative and indirect one: Great powers ('large states') tend to have more offensive political objectives (say, in the range from 'B' to 'F') than small states, who are usually content with levels of ambition ranging from 'A' to 'B' on the scales above. Hence great powers might be expected, more often than small states, to politically foreclose the option of NOD-type restructuring.

Should they chose to do so, however, no states would probably have lesser trouble devising a strictly defensive strategy than the USA or Russia, because of their immense strategic depth and/or the absence of close-by enemies[63]. Paradoxically, what would really matter for stability and world peace would be such a defensive restructuring on the part of great or super-powers such as the USA, Russia or China, whereas the defensive stance of Austria (laudable though it certainly is) does not make all that much of a difference.

This may seem like a rather lukewarm recommendation of NOD for small states. When it is actually sincere, the reason is that small states have a particular problem, to which NOD may provide a partial solution: their very smallness, which tends to be

reflected in small (or at least smallish) defence budgets. For countries the size of, say Denmark, to continue emulating the great powers by fielding state-of-the-art weapons platforms in all categories is a recipe for 'unilateral structural disarmament'. Much more cost-effective defences would become attainable by abandoning the quest for general-purpose armed forces and opt instead for a strictly defensive, i.e. NOD-type, posture. As a matter of fact, the aforementioned closest approximations to NOD in Europe, Austria and Finland, ranked very low in terms of defence expenditures, with the implication that NOD may come rather cheaply[64].

VIII. NOD, NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, ALLIANCES AND/OR COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Small states have yet another problem, namely that not all states are their size, but some are orders of magnitude bigger and stronger. Hence, it has to be acknowledged that there are, of course, situations where defence is close to a futile endeavour, because the superiority of the aggressor is simply too overwhelming. The situation of the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) facing Russia may be a case in point. Suggestions have been made for relying entirely on non-military forms of defence, i.e. a sort of 'social defence' or civilian-based defence—such as actually been practised by these states before.

Others (including the present author) would, however, not regard this as an entirely adequate substitute for military defence (but still a highly recommendable supplement). In the words of two Estonian scholars, 'a combination of the regular army, civilian involvement and well-trained partisan forces could make the Baltic states an unattractive target for a potential aggressor from the East. They could not stop the Russian Army, but they could give it two black eyes, a broken nose, and a headache'[65]. Valuable (or at least gratifying) though this might be, it nevertheless highlight a problem that is insoluble at the state level: some states simply cannot defend themselves in any meaningful sense against their most likely aggressors, either because of size or for other reasons (such as geography). Hence the choice between several options:

- A policy of appeasement.
- A reliance on nuclear deterrence.
- Alignment with a great power, capable and willing to provide security guarantees, either on a bilateral basis or in the framework of an alliance.
- Collective security.

I shall only deal very superficially with the first three options. 'Appeasement' is a pejorative term, as a synonym for which has sometimes been used the tern

'Finlandization'—quite unjustly, since Finland was actually the only 'Western' country (apart from Germany, of course) that ever actually fought the Soviet Union, and rather successfully in fact[66]. To the extent that small states are so unfortunate to be close neighbours of not entirely peaceful great powers, a certain accommodation of the great power's security concerns may be the vest available choice, which may, incidentally, be an additional argument in favour of an NOD strategy.

Nuclear deterrence is an option foresworn by all small states, with the exception of Israel[67]. In the present author's opinion, the case for the war preventing effects of the possession of nuclear weapons is weak, and the drawbacks of such possession considerable, *inter alia* in the form of spurring a quest for nuclear status on the part of one's adversaries. Whatever the intrinsic merits of a nuclear status may or may not be, however, it is an empirical fact that most countries feel quite secure without it.

Alliance membership is the obvious answer to the aforementioned problems of small states with large hostile neighbours, which is precisely why Denmark and Norway opted for NATO membership in 1949, and why most of the former Warsaw Pact member states are eager to join as well. However, there are drawbacks to this option as well as advantages. First of all in the form of the 'abandonment-versus-entrapment dilemma', according to which states face a choice between tight alliance bonds, entailing a risk of entrapment and embroilment in conflicts of which these states might otherwise stay aloof; or loose alliance ties, implying a risk of abandonment[68]. Secondly, regardless of the underlying intentions, alliances tend to be perceived as hostile by the state against which they are directed, hence may lead to counter-measures. This is precisely what an enlargement of NATO at the present juncture might lead to, hence the reluctance to admit new members. Finally, precisely for these reasons, NATO membership will simply not be available to the new applicants for several years[69].

Most would probably agree that the last option, collective security, would be preferable, if realistic. Disputes therefore tend to focus on whether it might be the latter, which is, of course, above all a political question (which I shall bypass on this occasion)[70]. If the political will is there, however, collective security would go along way towards solving the problems stemming from size differentials. A collective security arrangement would consist of two elements:

- An obligation to refrain from the use of military force between member states.
- A binding commitment to assist other member states that are nevertheless victims of aggression, whether from the outside (i.e. non-members) or the inside, i.e. by member states, in violation of the former obligation.

The latter component raises a military problem, in addition to the political one: For

states to actually come to each other's assistance, states would need armed forces with almost exactly those characteristics that are undesirable according to the NOD criteria: long-range mobility, the ability to take and hold ground, etc. Without it, an aggressor state could rest secure with his conquest.

Furthermore, after an aggression, the attacker would enjoy many (but not all) of the defender's inherent advantages, whereas the true defender, seeking to restore the status quo ante would be forced to operate in the attacker's role, with most of the ensuing disadvantages. Hence, the defenders, and by implications, the collective security system as a whole, would require quite substantial offensive capabilities.

The solution to this dilemma might be found in multinationality, i.e. force integration and role specialization. Individual states might e.g. contribute elements of an offensive posture, without thereby becoming capable of offensives on a national scale. This would in fact be a special application of the aforementioned 'missing link' approach to defensive restructuring. It would not necessarily imply that states would end up with 'emasculated' defences, since they would merely have to omit one component, without which their armed forces would be rendered non-offensive, ideally without any detrimental effects on the capabilities for national defence.

Defensive Restructuring-cum-Collective Security



The implied role specialization would also allow small states to make sense of their defences, without seeking (inevitably in vain) to emulate great powers. It would, however, require that small states become more assertive and abandon some of their traditional reservations against operating beyond their own borders. Several small states do, however, already have ample experience from UN peacekeeping operation.

and might be just as well adapted for peace-making and peace enforcement operations[71] in the future as the great powers—perhaps even more suitable, because they would rarely be suspected of having ulterior power motives.

IX. NOTES

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16. For the most elaborate argument to this effect, see Russett, Bruce M.: *Grasping the Democratic Peace. Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). The classical formulation of the thesis (not referring explicitly to democracies, but to representative government in general) is Kant, Immanuel (1795): *Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1963). A general survey of the idea is provided by Gleditsch, Nils Petter: 'Democracy and Peace', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 29, no. 4 (November 1992), pp. 369–376. The recent revival of interest in the thesis may be traced back to Doyle, Michael: 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, vol. 12, no. 3–4 (1983), pp. 205–35, 323–353. See also Rummel, R.J.: 'Libertarian Propositions on Violence Within and Between Nations: A Test Against Published Research Results', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 29, no. 3 (September 1985): 419–455; idem: 'Political Systems, Violence, and War', in W. Scott Thompson & Kenneth M. Jensen (eds.): *Approaches to Peace. An Intellectual Map* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute for Peace, 1991), pp. 350–370; Russett, Bruce M.: 'Politics and Alternative Security: Toward a More Democratic, Therefore More Peaceful, World', in Burns H. Weston (ed.): *Alternative Security. Living Without Nuclear Deterrence* (Boulder & London: Westview, 1990), pp. 107–136; idem & William Antholis: 'Do Democracies Fight Each Other? Evidence from the Peloponnesian War', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 29, no. 4 (November 1992), pp. 415–434; Ember, Carol R., Melvin Ember & Bruce M. Russett: 'Peace Between Participatory Polities: A Cross-Cultural Test of the "Democracies Rarely Fight Each Other" Hypothesis', *World Politics*, vol. 44, no. 4 (July 1992), pp. 573–599; Weede, Eric: 'Democracy and War Involvement', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 28, no. 4 (1984), pp. 649–664; idem: 'Some Simple Calculations on Democracy and War Involvement', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 29, no. 4 (November 1992), pp. 377–384; Starr, Harvey: 'Democracy and War: Choice, Learning and Security Communities', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 29, no. 2 (May 1992), pp. 207–213; Czempiel, Ernst-Otto: 'Demokratie und Frieden. Theoretische und politikstrukturelle Aspekte einer europäischen Friedensordnung', *S+F. Vierteljahresschrift für Sicherheit und Frieden*, vol. 10, no. 2 (1992), pp. 72–76. Somewhat more sceptical are Chan, Stephen: 'Mirror, Mirror on the Wall ... Are Freer Countries More Pacific?', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 28, no. 4 (December 1984), pp. 617–48; Archibugi, Daniele: 'Peace and Democracy: Why Such an Unhappy Marriage?', in Vilho Harle (ed.): 'Studies in the History of European Peace Ideas', *Research Reports*, no. 37 (Tampere: TAPRI, 1989), pp. 33–86.

17. See e.g. Singer, Max & Aaron Wildawsky: *The Real World Order. Zones of Peace/Zones of Turmoil* (Chatham: Chatham House, 1993).

18. Recent advocates of this option include, for instance, the German BoA (*Bundesrepublik ohne Armee*) movement and the Swiss *Gruppe Schweitz ohne Armee*. On the former, see Buro, Andreas: 'Die Zivilisierung Europas steht noch voran. Zur Begründung der Kampagne "Bundesrepublik ohne Armee" (BoA)', *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, no. 9 (September 1990), pp. 1106–1115; on the latter, see Gross, Andreas *et al.* (eds.): *Frieden mit Europa. Eine Schweitz ohne Armee als Beitrag zur Zivilisierung der Weltinnenpolitik* (Zürich: Realutopia 1989).

19. Recent arguments to this effect include Sharp, Gene: *Making Europe Unconquerable. The Potential of Civilian-Based Deterrence and Defence* (London: Taylor & Francis, 1985); idem (with the assistance of Bruce Jenkins): *Civilian-Based Defense. A Post-Military Weapons System*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); Mellon, Christian, Jean-Marie Muller & Jaques Semelin: *La Dissuasion Civile* (Paris: Fondation pour les Etudes de Defense Nationale, 1985); Muller, Jean-Marie: *Vous avez dit "pacifisme"?. De la menace nucleaire a la defense civile non-violente*, (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1984).

20. Examples of completely demilitarized states include Costa Rica and Iceland.

21. See e.g. Møller, Bjørn: *Resolving the Security Dilemma in Europe. The German Debate on Non-Offensive Defence* (London: Brassey's, 1991); idem: 'Germany and NOD', in idem & Wiberg (eds.): *Non-Offensive Defence for the Twenty-First Century* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 153–165.

22. On CS, the authoritative work is Palme Commission (Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues): *Common Security. A Blueprint for Survival. With a Prologue by Cyrus Vance* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982). See also Väyrynen, Raimo (ed.): *Policies for Common Security* (London: Taylor & Francis/SIPRI, 1985); or Bahr, Egon & Dieter S. Lutz (eds.): *Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Idee und Konzept. Bd. 1: Zu den Ausgangsüberlegungen, Grundlagen und Strukturmerkmalen Gemeinsamer Sicherheit* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1986); idem & idem (eds.): *Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Dimensionen und Disziplinen. Bd.2: Zu rechtlichen, ökonomischen, psychologischen und militärischen Aspekten Gemeinsamer Sicherheit* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1987).

23. On the security dilemma, see e.g. Herz, John M.: *Political Realism and Political Idealism. A Study in Theories and Realities* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1951), passim; idem: 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma', *World Politics*, no. 2, 1950, pp. 157–180; Jervis, Robert: *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 58–93; cf. idem: 'Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma', *World Politics*, vol. 30, no. 2 (1978), pp. 167–214; Buzan: *op. cit.* 1991 (note 7), pp. 294–327.

24. See e.g. George, Alexander L., Philip J. Farley & Alexander Dallin (eds.): *U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation. Achievements, Failures, Lessons* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Kanet, Roger E. & Edward A. Kolodziej (eds.): *The Cold War as Competition. Superpower Cooperation in Regional Conflict Management* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991).

25. See e.g. Møller, Bjørn: 'The Nordic Regional Security Complex. A Preliminary Analysis', in Ohlson, Leif (ed.): *Case Studies on Regional Conflicts and Regional Conflict Resolution* (Gotenburg: Padrigu Peace Studies, 1989), pp. 45–82; idem: 'Gemeinsame Sicherheit und strukturelle Angriffsunfähigkeit aus dänischer Sicht', in Dieter S. Lutz & Elmar Schmähling (eds.): *Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Internationale Diskussion. Bd. V: Beiträge und Dokumente aus Ost und West* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1990), pp. 217–243; Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Bjørn Møller, Håkan Wiberg & Ole Wæver 1990: *Svaner på vildveje? Nordens sikkerhed mellem supermagtsflåder og europæisk opbrud* (Copenhagen: Vindrose, 1990).

26. On the link between NOD and CS see Bahr, Egon & Dieter S. Lutz (eds.): *Gemeinsame Sicherheit. Konventionelle Stabilität. Bd. 3: Zu den militärischen Aspekten Struktureller Nichtangriffsfähigkeit im Rahmen Gemeinsamer Sicherheit* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1988); or Møller, Bjørn: *Common Security and Non-Offensive Defense. A Neorealist Perspective* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992).

27. Barnaby, Frank & Egbert Boeker: 'Non-Nuclear, Non-Provocative Defence for Europe', in P. Terrence Hopmann & Frank Barnaby (eds.): *Rethinking the Nuclear Weapons Dilemma in Europe* (New York 1988: St. Martin's Press), pp. 135–145, quotation from p. 137.

28. See e.g. Sharp, Jane M.O.: 'Conventional Arms Control in Europe', in *SIPRI Yearbook 1991* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 407–460, with appendices, including the treaty itself, on pp. 460–474. On the background, see e.g. William J. Durch & Kevin P. O'Prey: *NATO's Stake in the New Talks on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe* (London: Macmillan, 1990); Wittmann, Klaus: 'Challenges of Conventional Arms Control', *Adelphi Papers*, no. 239 (1989); Dean, Jonathan: 'Defining Long-Term Western Objectives in CFE', *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 13, no. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 169–184; idem: 'The CFE Negotiations, Present and Future', *Survival*, vol. 31, no. 4 (July-August 1990), pp. 313–324; Freedman, Lawrence: 'The Politics of Conventional Arms Control', *ibid.*, no. 5 (September-October 1989), pp. 387–396.

29. See e.g. Noel-Baker, Philip J.: *The First World Disarmament Conference, 1932–33* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1979); Neild, Robert: *An Essay on Strategy as it Affects the Achievement of Peace in a Nuclear Setting* (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 137–144; Borg, Marlies ter: 'Reducing Offensive Capabilities–the Attempt of 1932', *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 29, no. 2 (May 1992), pp. 145–160; Zubok, Vladislav & Andrei Kokoshin: 'Opportunities Missed in 1932?', *International Affairs* (Moscow), no. 2, 1989, pp. 112–121. On the futile attempts at qualitative naval arms control in the inter-war period, see Kaufman, Robert Gordon: *Arms Control During the Pre-Nuclear Era. The United States and Naval Limitation Between the Two World Wars* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).

30. William Mako, quoted in Snyder, Jack (1987): 'Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces: Soviet Proposals and Western Options', in Steven Miller & Sean Lynn-Jones (eds.) 1989: *Conventional Forces and American Defence Policy. An* International Security *Reader*, Revised Edition (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1989), p. 312.

31. There may, however, be a tendency for maritime power to become increasingly oriented to the land battle, which already provided one rationale for the US Navy's Maritime Strategy. See e.g. Watkins, James D.: 'The Maritime Strategy', *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 112, no. 1 (January 1986), pp. 2–17. Friedman, Norman: *The US Maritime Strategy* (London: Jane's, 1988); Brooks, Linton F. (1986): 'Naval Power and National Security. The Case for the Maritime Strategy', in Steven E. Miller & Stephen van Evera (eds.): *Naval Strategy and National Security. An International Security Reader*, (Princeton N.J.:

Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 16–46. For a critique, see Mearsheimer, John J. (1986): 'A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe', *ibid.*, pp. 47–101. In the post-Cold War era, the US Navy has adopted new guideline with an even clearer inland orientation, see e.g. '...From the Sea. Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century' (US Navy, September 1992),. According to some analysts 'the Navy's preoccupation in the foreseeable future will be land control, not sea control'. See Breemer, Jan S.: 'Naval Strategy Is Dead', *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 120, no. 2 (February 1994), pp. 49–53.

32. For a very detailed analysis of the implications of Soviet unilateral reductions in these weapons categories, as well as of the envisaged CFE reductions, see Epstein, Joshua M.: *Conventional Force Reductions: A Dynamic Assessment* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1990).

33. See e.g. Myrdal, Alva: *The Game of Disarmament. How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race* (New York: Pantheon, 1976), pp. 148–149; Klare, Michael T. 1993: 'Application of Arms Control to Regional Conflicts in the Third World', in Joseph Rotblat (ed.): *Striving for Peace, Security and Development in the World. Annals of Pugwash 1991* (London: World Scientific, 1993), pp. 107–116. See also Anthony, Ian (ed.): *Arms Export Regulations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 1991). Numerous proposals for arms trade regulations pertaining to the Middle East are contained in Kemp, Geoffrey (with Shelley A. Stahl): *The Control of the Middle East Arms Race* (New York: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1991); Stahl, Shelley A. & Geoffrey Kemp (eds.): *Arms Control and Weapons Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).

34. 'Zur Militärdoktrin der Russischen Föderation' 1994, *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, vol. 32, no. 1 (January 1994), pp. 75–82. On the background, see e.g. Konovalov, Alexander A.: 'Russia: Security in Transition', in Karp (ed.): *op. cit.* 1993 (note 4), pp. 196–224; Raevsky, Andrei: 'Development of Russian National Security Policies: Military Reform', *Research Paper*, no. 25 (New York: UN/Geneva: UNIDIR, 1993); Trenin, Dmitri: 'NOD in the USSR and Successor States', in Møller & Wiberg (eds.): *op. cit.* 1994 (note 21), pp. 127–137.

35. For a (moderate) critique thereof, see Levite, Ariel: *Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine* (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post/Boulder: Westview, 1990).

36. For excellent analyses of Soviet strategy based on this methodology, see MccGwire, Michael: *Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987); idem: *Perestroika and Soviet National Security* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1991).

37. Lippert, Günter: 'GSFG. Spearhead of the Red Army', *International Defense Review*, vol. 20, no. 5 (May 1987), pp. 553–562; Hines, John G. & Phillip A. Petersen 1984: 'The Soviet Conventional Offensive in Europe', *Military Review*, vol. 64, no. 4 (April 1984), pp. 2–29; Petersen, Philip A.: 'Soviet Offensive Operations in Central Europe', *International Defense Review*, vol. 20, no. 8 (August 1987), pp. 26–32; Rühl, Lothar: 'Offensive Defence in the Warsaw Pact', *Survival*, vol. 33, no. 5 (September–October 1991), pp. 442–450.

38. Bathurst, Robert B.: 'The Soviet Navy Through Western Eyes', in Philip S. Gillette & William C. Frank, Jr. (eds.): *The Sources of Soviet Naval Conduct* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990), pp. 59–80; Rohwer, Jürgen: 'Alternating Russian and Soviet Naval Strategies', *ibid.*, pp. 95–120; Daniel, Donald C.F.: 'Alternate Models of Soviet Naval Behaviour', *ibid.*, pp. 237–248. The most outspoken advocacy of such a naval strategy for the USSR was Gorshkov, S.G.: *The Sea Power of the State* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1979); cf. MccGwire, Michael: 'Soviet Naval Doctrine and Strategy', in Derek Leebaert (ed.): *Soviet Military Thinking* (London: George Allan & Unwin, 1981), pp. 125–184; idem: 'Gorshkov's Navy', I–II, *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, vol. 115, no. 8 (August 1989), pp. 44–51, and no. 9 (September 1989), pp. 42–47.

39. Kokoski, Richard: 'The Treaty on Open Skies', *SIPRI Yearbook 1993* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 632–634. The treaty itself is appended *ibid.*, pp. 653–671.

40. Among the best analyses of CBMs are still two classics: Alford, Jonathan: 'Confidence-Building Measures in Europe: The Military Aspects', *Adelphi Papers*, no. 149 (1979), pp. 4–13; and Holst, Johan Jørgen: 'Confidence-Building Measures: A Conceptual Framework', *Survival*, vol. 25, no. 1 (Jan-Feb. 1983), pp. 2–15. See also Borawski, John: *From the Atlantic to the Urals: Negotiating Arms Control at the Stockholm Conference* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1988); idem 1992: *Security for a New Europe. The Vienna Negotiations on Confidence and Security-Building Measures 1989–90, and Beyond* (London: Brassey's, 1992); idem (ed.) 1986: *Avoiding War in the Nuclear Age. Confidence-Building Measures for Crisis Stability* (Boulder: Westview, 1986); Brauch, Hans Günter (ed.): *Vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen und Europäische Abrüstungskonferenz. Analysen, Dokumente und Vorschläge* (Gerlingen: Bleicher Verlag, 1987); Lutz, Dieter S. & Erwin Müller (eds.): *Vertrauensbildende Maßnahmen. Zur Theorie und Praxis einer sicherheitspolitischen Strategie* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1982); Ghebaldi, Victor-Yves: 'Confidence-Building Measures Within the CSCE Process: Paragraph-by-Paragraph Analysis of the Helsinki and Stockholm Regimes', *Research Paper*, no. 3, New York: UNIDIR, 1989).

41. Krohn, Axel: 'The Vienna Military Doctrine Seminar', *SIPRI Yearbook 1991*, pp. 501–511; Lachowski, Zdzislaw: 'The Second Vienna Seminar on Military Doctrine', *SIPRI Yearbook 1992*, pp. 496–505. See also Hamm, Manfred R. & Hartmut Pohlman: 'Military Strategy and Doctrine: Why They Matter to Conventional Arms Control', *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 13, no. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 185–198.

42. On the Soviet defensive doctrine, see e.g. Holden, Gerald: *Soviet Military Reform. Conventional Disarmament and the Crisis of Militarized Socialism* (London: Pluto, 1991); Garthoff, Raymond: *Deterrence and the Revolution in Soviet Military Doctrine* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990); MccGwire: *op.cit.* 1991 (note 36). Much more sceptical, yet reluctantly convinced, is Wettig, Gerhard: *Changes in Soviet Policy Towards the West* (London: Pinter, 1991); cf. Diehl, Ole: *Die Strategiediskussion in der Sowjetunion. Zum Wandel der sowjetischen Kriegsführungskonzeption in den achtziger Jahren* (Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitätsverlag, 1993).

43. See e.g. Neild, Robert 1986: 'The Implications of the Increasing Accuracy of Non-Nuclear Weapons', in Joseph Rotblat & Ubiratan d'Ambrosio (eds.): *World Peace and the Developing Countries. Annals of Pugwash 1985* (London: Macmillan, 1986), 93-106.

44. See Kokoshin, Andrei A. & Valentin Larionov: 'Four Models of WTO-NATO Strategic Interrelations', in Marlies ter Borg & Wim Smit (eds.): *Non-provocative Defence as a Principle of Arms Control and its Implications for Assessing Defence Technologies* (Amsterdam: Free U.P., 1989), pp. 35-44. For a terminological clarification (which need not bother us in this connection, where the term is used in an all-embracing sense), see Reid, Brian Holden: 'The Counter-Offensive: a Theoretical and Historical Perspective', in idem & Michael Dewar (eds.): *Military Strategy in a Changing Europe* (London: Brassey's, 1991), pp. 143-160; Mackenzie, J.J.G.: 'The Counter-Offensive', *ibid.*, pp. 161-180.

45. Müller, Albrecht A.C. von: 'Structural Stability at the Central Front', in Anders Boserup, Ludvig Christensen & Ove Nathan (eds.): *The Challenge of Nuclear Armaments, Essays Dedicated to Niels Bohr and His Appeal for an Open World* (Copenhagen: Rhodos International Publishers, 1986), pp. 239-256, especially pp. 253-254. This notion is very reminiscent of, probably inspired by, the proposals in Huntington, Samuel: 'Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe' (1983), in Steven E. Miller (ed.): *Conventional Forces and American Defense Policy. An International Security Reader* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 251-275. The latter is criticized as beyond NATO's means in Dunn, Keith A. & William O. Staudenmaier: 'The Retaliatory Offensive and Operational Realities in NATO', *Survival*, vol. 27, no. 3 (May-June 1985), pp. 108-118.

46. Clausewitz, Carl von (1832): *Vom Kriege*, Ungekürzter Text nach der Erstauflage (1832-1834) (Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1980), pp. 360-371 (Book VI.1-3), especially p. 361; pp. 357-366/358 in the English translation: *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984). See also Gat, Azar: 'Clausewitz on Defence and Attack', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 11, no. 1 (1988), pp. 20-26; Aron, Raymond: *Clausewitz. Philosopher of War* (London: Routledge, 1983), pp. 144-171. The point about defensive supremacy has occasionally been couched in terms of the presumed 'Three-to-One rule', according to which an attacker will need a superiority in excess of 3:1 in order to break through prepared defences. See e.g. Mearsheimer, John J.: 'Numbers, Strategy, and the European Balance', *International Security*, vol. 12, no. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 174-185; idem: 'Assessing the Conventional Balance: The 3:1 Rule and Its Critics', *ibid.* vol. 13, no. 4 (Spring 1989), pp. 54-89; Epstein, Joshua M.: 'The 3:1 Rule, the Adaptive Dynamic Model, and the Future of Security Studies', *ibid.*, pp. 90-127; Posen, Barry R., Eliot A. Cohen & John J. Mearsheimer: 'Correspondence: Reassessing Net Assessment', *ibid.*, pp. 128-179.

47. On the effect of barriers, see e.g. Epstein: *op.cit.* (note 32), pp. 67-72; cf. Kaufmann, William W.: 'Nonnuclear Deterrence', in John D. Steinbruner & Leon V. Sigal (eds.): *Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1983), pp. 43-90, especially p. 68; Simpkin, Richard E.: *Race to the Swift. Thoughts on 21st Century Warfare* (London: Brassey's, 1986), pp. 57-77; Gupta, Raj: *Defense Positioning and Geometry. Rules for a World with Low Force Levels* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993). On landscaping, i.e. terrain modification for defence purposes, see e.g. Webber, Philip: *New Defence Strategies for the 1990s. From Confrontation to Coexistence* (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 197, 211; cf. Garrett, James M.: *The Tenuous Balance. Conventional Forces in Central Europe* (Boulder: Westview, 1989), pp. 213-230. On the Bar-Lev line, see Cordesman, Anthony H. & Abraham R. Wagner: *The Lessons of Modern War*, 1-3 (London: Mansell, 1990), vol. 1, pp. 39-44. For numerous suggestion to NOD-like modifications of Israel's defence system, especially as far as the Golan Heights are concerned, see Levite: *op.cit.* (note 35), pp. 126-139.

48. On the Swiss militia, see e.g. Cramer, Benedict: 'Dissuassion infra-nucléaire. L'armée de milice suisse: mythes et réalités stratégiques', *Cahiers d'Etudes Strategiques*, no. 4 (Paris: CIRPES, 1984). On proposals for German militias, see Bald, Detlef & Paul Klein (eds.): *Wehrstruktur der neunziger Jahre. Reservistenarmee, Miliz oder ...?* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1988); idem (ed.): *Militz als Vorbild? Zum Reservistenkonzept der Bundeswehr* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1987).

49. Grin, John: *Military-Technological Choices and Political Implications. Command and Control in Established NATO Posture and a Non-Provocative Defence* (Amsterdam: Free University Press, 1990).

50. It was, in fact, the good performance of anti-tank PGMs in the 1973 Yom Kippur war that spurred interest in NOD in the mid-1970s. See e.g. Digby, James: 'Precision-guided Munitions', *Adelphi Papers*, no. 118 (1975). See also Herolf, Gunilla: 'Anti-tank Missiles', in *SIPRI Yearbook 1983* (London: Taylor & Francis, 1983), pp. 245-266; idem: 'New Technology Favours Defence', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 44, no. 7 (September 1988), pp. 42-45; Canby, Steven L.: 'New Conventional Force

Technology and the NATO-Warsaw Pact Balance: Part 1', *Adelphi Papers*, no. 188 (1985), pp. 7–24; idem: 'Conventional Weapon Technologies', in *SIPRI Yearbook 1987* (London: Taylor & Francis, 1987), pp. 85–95; idem: 'Weapons for Land Warfare', in Møller & Wiberg (eds.): *op.cit.* (note 21), pp. 74–84; Ischebeck, Otfried: 'Der Kampfpanzer der Zukunft', in Erwin Müller & Götz Neuneck (eds.): *Rüstungsmodernisierung und Rüstungskontrolle. Neue Technologien, Rüstungsdynamik und Stabilität* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1991), pp. 233–248; idem: 'Evolution of Tanks and Anti-Tank Weapons: Assessment of Offence-Defence Dynamics and Arms Control Options', in Wim A. Smit, John Grin & Lev Voronkov (eds.): *Military Technological Innovation and Stability in a Changing World. Politically Assessing and Influencing Weapon Innovation and Military Research and Development* (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1992), pp. 177–196. For an only slightly more sanguine view, see Simpkin, Richard E.: 'Tank Warfare. The Last Decades of the Dinosaurs', in Ken Perkins (ed.): *Weapons and Warfare. Conventional Weapons and Their Role in Battle* (London: Brassey's, 1987), pp. 165–192.

51. For a comparison of various NOD-type force components with traditional military units, see e.g. Hofmann, Hans W., Reiner K. Huber & Karl Steiger: 'On Reactive Defense Options. A Comparative Systems Analysis of Alternatives for the Initial Defense against the First Strategic Echelon of the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe', in Reiner K. Huber (ed.): *Modelling and Analysis of Conventional Defense in Europe. Assessment of Improvement Options* (New York: Plenum, 1986), pp. 97–140; Huber, Reiner K. & Hans Hofmann: 'The Defence Efficiency Hypothesis and Conventional Stability in Europe: Implications for Arms Control', in Anders Boserup & Robert Neild (eds.): *The Foundations of Defensive Defence* (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 109–132.

52. The most comprehensive account of NOD, in the form of a reference work, is the present author's *The Dictionary of Alternative Defence* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming 1994). For an analysis of all the German models (which remain the majority of all available proposals), see idem: *op.cit.* 1991 (note 21).

53. Afheldt, Horst: *Defensive Verteidigung* (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1983).

54. SAS (Studiengruppe Alternative Sicherheitspolitk): *Strukturwandel der Verteidigung: Entwürfe für eine konsequente Defensive* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1984); idem: *Vertrauensbildende Verteidigung. Reform deutscher Sicherheitspolitik* (Gerlingen: Bleicher Verlag, 1989). Good introductions to the SAS model, written by its chairman, are Unterseher, Lutz: 'Defending Europe: Toward a Stable Conventional Deterrent', in Henry Shue (ed.): *Nuclear Deterrence and Moral Restraint, Critical Choices for American Strategy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 293–342; Grin, John & idem: 'The Spiderweb Defense', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 44, no. 7 (August 1988), pp. 28–31.

55. Hannig, Norbert: *Abschreckung durch konventionelle Waffen: Das David-und-Goliath Prinzip* (Berlin: Berlin-Verlag Arno Spitz, 1984).

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Draft
Shikaki-CPRS/UNIDIR/Malta/
Apri, 1994

PALESTINIAN SECURITY NEEDS AND CONCERNS

I. Introduction

The Palestinian-Israeli Declaration of Principles, signed on September 13, 1993, has ushered a new era in Palestinian-Israeli relations marking the beginning of an interim period that might last for five years. The agreement and the subsequent PLO-Israeli mutual recognition greatly improved Palestinian-Israeli relations and introduced mutual expectations of a future characterized by cooperation and understanding, rather than conflict and violence. However, given the current configuration of stake, interest and power structures in the Middle East, the Palestinian side remains, no doubt, the most sensitive, and the most vulnerable, to the terms of this and any plausible future agreements, particularly in the security issue-area. Needless to say, they are today sensitive and *vulnerable* to the security policies and decisions taken by Israel and neighboring countries.

Security arrangements in the Middle East are part of an exchange, a package in which political, economic and military dimensions interact and in which territorial and political concessions are offered within an accepted security framework. A security regime that seeks to find answers to political problems in a certain military arrangement is not likely to be viable - - this is true at both the regional and the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian levels. A focus on security arrangements alone is likely to be dangerous and counterproductive. Security arrangements should facilitate and enhance the prospects for resolving political conflicts. They are the mechanics, and not the essence of the solution.

For the Palestinians the essence of the solution is their independence and self determination. This is also the essence of their security. Our concern for our existential security, the threat to our national existence as a nation, has haunted us since the First World War. The establishment of Israel, the many wars since then, and the continued

Israeli occupation and military control of two million Palestinians since 1967, have all deepened this existential security concern.

II. Palestinian-Israeli Security discourse:

Security discourse has suffered from the following:

* Security concerns have usually bee seen through Israeli perspectives only. Palestinian long range strategic concerns have rarely informed security discourse.

* Palestinian-Israeli security discussions have, for the most part, been casted in terms of a Palestinian-Israeli security interdependence, while in reality security concepts and arrangements are being created in the shadows of an Israeli security hegemony.

* Palestinian security is seen as independent of security policies of Arab neighbors; in reality Palestinian security is also interdependent on Jordanian, Syrian, and Egyptian security policies and decisions.

* Internal Palestinian dynamics have not been fully addressed. In the early stages, they might constitute a significant factor affecting Palestinian security.

* Security discourse should also view bi-lateral Israeli-Palestinian concerns and arrangements in relationship to multi-lateral regional concerns and arrangements, and particularly to Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian tri-lateral security relationship.

III. The political-security context (three phases/scenarios):

* *The Gaza-Jericho phase* (a transition phase within the context of Gaza and Jericho first):

The Palestinian-Israeli Declaration of Principles provides for an interim period that starts in the Spring of 1994, after the Israelis have completed a military withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. During this phase, external security remains under Israeli control; internal security in Palestinian controlled areas in the Gaza Strip and Jericho area comes under Palestinian (PLO) control; internal security in the rest of the West Bank

(excluding Jerusalem) is gradually transferred to Palestinian hands; the security of settlements and Israelis in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip remains an Israeli responsibility.

**A short term scenario* may involve the emergence of an independent Palestinian entity, with restricted sovereignty, in the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, and continued control of the self-governing (autonomous) are of the West Bank. This scenario envisages the emergence of de facto Palestinian "state", in Gaza and Jericho, within five years, with Israeli settlements in Gaza being dismantled. Internal security remains under Palestinian control, while the Israelis continue to control external security.

**An independent Palestinian state* in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank: internal security in the statehood phase in a sovereign Palestinian matter; Palestine is de-militarized and part of regional and sub-regional security regimes. A Jordanian-Palestinian confederation with initial Palestinian control over internal Palestinian security and joint Palestinian-Jordanian control over external security might be a next step. The confederation is one between two sovereign states. All security related matters are gradually consolidated under central control.

IV. Current and future Palestinian Security Concerns:

During the interim period and early statehood, Palestinian strategic concern is likely to focus on the threat of an Israeli military reoccupation of "liberated" areas (areas from which Israel had already withdrawn). Major internal concern is likely to be internal strife and civil war, which may be identified as the single most dangerous internal security threat. such threats may include threats by Palestinians against other Palestinians with different political views, threats to PISGA's officials, bureaucracy, and security forces, threats to areas, and institutions controlled by PISGA, etc. A related internal threat might be identified as that posed by the existence of settlers who mights seek to destabilize the existing Palestinian authority in order to deepen the involvement of the Israeli army in their defense.

Specifically, Palestinian concerns can be divided into current, transitional, and final status concerns and requirements:

(1) Current Palestinian Security Concern

a) existential threats to the Palestinians as people (nations) and as individuals and community,

b) current threats emanating from:

1) continued Israeli military deployment in Palestinian territory and involvement in internal and external Palestinian security,

2) continued terrorism and provocative presence of armed settlers in the midst of Palestinian populated areas and their free movement on Palestinian roads and towns.

3) polarization of Palestinian society and the presence of a determined opposition willing to resort to violence and terror in order to achieve its goals.

(2) Transitional and post-transitional concerns and requirements:

a) transitional strategic concern: an Israeli reoccupation of "liberated" territories;

b) Israeli failure to take any further redeployment measures and refusal to transfer further internal security responsibilities to Palestinians;

c) settlers provocations and violence leading to a vicious cycle of violence and counter violence and the deepening of the involvement of the Israeli army in Palestinian internal security;

d) further polarization of Palestinian society, with all sides resorting to violence, leading to internal strife and civil war; and,

e) neighbors' interference in Palestinian security..

(3) Major sources of threat to the future Palestinian entity including;

a) *major structural threats,* such as limitations on sovereignty (e.g. demilitarization), unfavorable balance of power, geographical constraints (e.g. need

for a land corridor to link the two parts of the entity), etc.

b) *short and medium-term threats*, which can be divided into three categories:

1) internal Palestinian-against-Palestinian threats leading to internal strife, dissatisfaction of refugee, alienation of Gaza, etc;

2) Palestinians-against-Israelis threats involving use of terrorism and leading to the deepening of Israeli involvement in Palestinian security arrangements and possibly Israeli retaliation,

3) Settlers-against-Palestinians leading to use of terrorism by settlers, destabilization of the Palestinian entity, and greater Israeli interference in internal Palestinian security.

c) *long range strategic threats*, which can be divided into three categories:

1) a shift to the right in Israeli politics bringing to power idealogues who may question the legitimacy of the Palestinian entity and may seek to challenge its right to exist; the Palestinian entity will be living dangerously under the shadows of a superior military power which may find in Palestinian weakness an invitation for interference, exploitation and even attack;

2) a neighboring Arab country, turned radical or fundamentalist, may seek to restore Arab or Islamic control over Palestine, thus turning the country into a battle ground;

3) a neighboring state may see internal Palestinian changes as representing a threat to its security and stability and may seek to dominate the Palestinian entity.

V. Palestinian objectives in area of perceived threat:

During the interim period, a Palestinian objective in the security area, at the strategic level, would be the consolidation of security control over the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and the gradual extension of that control over the rest of the West Bank. A second objective would be to restrict Israeli military deployment to one or two locations in the West Bank.

At the internal security level, the objective would be to create conditions conducive to internal Palestinian peace and security, i.e. to create stability in security relations within the community.

In the related example given above, the goal would be to create conditions that neutralize threats from Israeli settlers in Palestinian territory acting separately or in collusion with Israelis inside Israel, i.e., create conditions encouraging the creation of stable security relations with Israel.

VI. Strategies designed to meet objectives:

*Palestinian success in enforcing security and maintaining peace and order in areas under the control of Palestinian security forces could neutralize threats of an Israeli military reoccupation of "liberated" areas.

*One strategy designed to meet and neutralize the internal Palestinian threat might be a combined strategy of multi-dimensional measures: political (e.g., elections and a democratic system of government), economic (e.g., an immediate and huge economic investment program), and security (the establishment of a large security, intelligence and police forces with expanded functions and responsibilities and adequate training and equipment incorporating PLO forces from the inside and the outside).

* The dismantling of isolated Israeli settlements and the imposition of restrictions on the movement of settlers in Palestinian controlled areas could minimize threats from, and to, settlers.

VII. Plans of actions: (policies to be formulated; structures and institutions to be built; forces to be trained and mobilized; and postures and doctrines to be adopted):

In regard to threats mentioned above, the early and gradual transfer of security functions to Palestinians (in the rest of West Bank) is a policy matter of utmost importance; a Palestinian intelligence unit is an institution that might be established; a

sizable (10,000 local men, and 10,000 PLA soldiers) security force could be created and trained (in Jordan, Egypt, and elsewhere); security functions could be specified and liaison procedures (with Israelis, Jordanians, and Egyptians) might be worked out as part of agreed upon CBMs; issues of command and control, deployment, and jurisdiction might be discussed; etc.

Problems and Obstacles:

Palestinians and Israelis have different approaches to security. From the Declaration of Principles and from what had emerged so far in the negotiations, the differences reflect a conflict of priorities.

The Israeli approach to security is restrictive, demands immediate results, may be short-sighted, and military in nature. It is also based on conditionality, asymmetry, and military domination. The Palestinian approach to security is more comprehensive, long-term,less militarily inclined. It is also based on transitionality, mutuality and interdependence. Perhaps, above all, the Palestinians see security, in the interim period, as part of their concern for existential security.

The comprehensiveness of the Palestinian approach could be seen for example in the issue of the settlers security in Gaza and the issue of the use of military force against the opposition. We tend to emphasize socio-economic and political means; we see these as playing the fundamental role, hopefully the only role in this regard, with coercive force being the weapon of last resort. These socio-economic means will include: 1) Reconstructing an independent economy; 2) Social development and rehabilitation including the absorption of refugees and displaced persons; 3) An open and democratic political system of government. In this sense, security for settlers is seen as an outcome and not a precondition. The implication is, if Israeli military deployment preempts these Palestinian socio-economic and political means, then neither side gains security in the long or even short term. Furthermore, we think emphasis on military means and military arrangements may create regime instabilities for the Palestinians in the long term.

The Israeli approach to security is based on the notion of conditionality: that measures agreed upon will only be experimental and reversible. For the Palestinians, the approach is based on the notion of transitionality (i.e. transition from occupation to end of occupation to independence). Therefore,Israelis talk of redeployment, we of withdrawal. Withdrawal, we hope, is irreversible; redeployment, we fear, is tentative and reversible. While we see Gaza, and the Palestinian security performance there, as an opportunity for both sides to develop stable security relationship of mutual understanding and cooperation, Israelis talk of Gaza as a testing ground. If there is to be failure in the test, it is built-in that only the Palestinians can be seen as failing, never the Israelis.

Such as Israeli conditionality poses to us a strategic threat. It is the threat to our semi-independence in the interim stage, and that is the threat of re-occupation of areas the IDF has already withdrawn from. The concept of withdrawal is important to us because it implies an end to the occupation of a certain part of territory; it entails, by definition the drawing of borders, no matter how temporary these might be.

The Israeli approach is based on asymmetry of power and power relationship with the Palestinians. Despite the clear mention, in the DOP, of *mutual* rights and *mutual* dignity, such a new dimension to Palestinian-Israeli relations is yet to be translated in the security area. The language is one of common interest, but the structure of power is heavily skewed in favor of the dominant Israeli military. Will the security arrangements, for example, create a process leading to mutual security, or will that process serve only to maintain and legitimize Israeli military domination. While "control" and military domination may have been the normal expectation in the context of conflict, occupation and confrontation, Israeli failure to adjust to the supposedly new context is highly surprising and disheartening.

The Palestinians are concerned about this because when Israel reduces the Palestinian-Israeli relationship to just security relationship (talk of economic and peaceful cooperation notwithstanding), security requirements take precedence over other factets of the relationship. In such a case military capabilities and presence determine the nature of the relationship. In

such a case, the powerful makes the rules: the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must. This is a relationship characterized by conflict.

But these are new times; change has taken place, or at least this is how Palestinians perceive the DOP and the exchanged letters of mutual recognition. If a gap between Palestinian expectations of change and Israeli inability to change is created, such a gap will only foster misperception and the infusion of bad faith.

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THE ARAB THREAT: THE ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE

by

Shmuel Limone

1. The environment of conflict in which Israel find itself has unique characteristics. Throughout its 46 years of independence Israel has confronted and dealt with a heavily armed Arab world, professing various degrees of hostility toward it. The peace with Egypt, and the peace talks now finally taking place notwithstanding, some Arab and Moslem countries still openly adhere to their refusal to recognize the right of a Jewish state to exist in their midst.

2. This unique international phenomenon - the existence of a small nation within a very large collective hostile states - has long determined the nature of the confrontation and the psychological state of mind in which Israelis live. Indeed, to many Israelis, what still affects their sense of security and insecurity is an awareness that at stake is not only Israel's territorial integrity or political welfare, but its very legitimacy as a Jewish state.

3. The following presentation will deal with the parameters of threat that make up Israel's security concerns. Still, it should be emphasized that the present political process, reflecting, as it were, a widespread recognition among important Arab states of the futility of the use of force as a means to advance political goals, has blunted the immediacy and weight of these concerns. Although the current political process so far produced tangible

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progress, mainly in the Palestinian track, it nevertheless signaled a breakthrough in other Arab countries' attitudes toward Israel. It also stabilized the conflict, and served as a vital learning experience for all. Therefore, in a broader historic context, Israel recognizes the positive changes that have now been taking place in some key aspects of its "traditional" threats.

4. A discussion of the strategic setting, or if you will, the general environment of threat in which Israel exists and operates, ought to begin with a reminder of the basic asymmetries and advantages which the Arabs enjoy over Israel. Most, if not all, of these factors must be presumed to remain permanent features of the overall Arab-Israeli balance of power:

a. First, Arab states completely surround Israel except for the sea (which they share). Their vast territories provide militarily important strategic hinterland.

b. Second, some Arab states will continue to grow in wealth due to oil. Despite widespread economic difficulties, ample financial resources are still available to key Arab countries for the purchase of weaponry and military equipment.

c. Third, being the center of the Moslem world, and professing to belong to a community of nonaligned nations, the Arabs have often been able to solicit an almost unchallenged support of Third World countries to their cause. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the changing weight of third world countries in world politics have

greatly reduced the impact of this factor. Still many Arab, and in a wider sense, Moslem countries, have been able to enlist religious considerations and arguments in their effort to isolate Israel. The rise and spread of Islamic fundamentalism, with its virulent anti Israeli ideology, exacerbated the religious dimension of the Arab Israeli conflict. It also created a new, indirect threat to Israel, in the form of radical Islamic subversion against regimes and political elements seeking accommodation with it. While Islamic fundamentalism in itself does not pose an existential threat against Israel, the fact that its proxies openly declare their intention and attempt to undermine the stability and legitimacy of key Arab regimes, most notably that of Egypt, must be figured in the overall calculus of potential risks that confront Israel.

d. Fourth, the Arab vast, absolute superiority in numbers entails a clear advantage in potential capabilities. While modernization of Arab societies proceeds at a slow pace, a concerted effort, focused on selected areas can add - indeed, has added - even in the short run, a definite qualitative dimension to some of their military capabilities. A conspicuous case in point, one that needs no elaboration, is, of course Iraq.

5. These factors are of course supplemented by some deep-rooted, also permanent, Israeli disadvantages. Their importance lies in the fact they are also perceived by the Arabs, and hence become a part of the strategic equilibrium in the Middle East:

a. One, Israel is not capable of sustaining a long, drawn-out war because of such constraints as levels of inventory, time and space, and political constraints.

b. Two, Israel is clearly outnumbered, and maintaining a military balance strains its economy and its available manpower pool.

c. Three, the density of its population and industrial centers makes Israel vulnerable to attacks. Also, its major urban areas are close to two fronts. Israel is extremely sensitive to casualties among its general population and its citizen-soldiers, a point well-understood and taken into account by its enemies.

d. Four, Israel is small in size and is lacking in natural resources, including water.

e. Five, Israel is dependent on outside sources of energy, and on sea and air LOC's.

6. The following outlines the nature of the military confrontation between Israel and the Arab states. Israel and the Arab states are in a situation of ongoing conflict. The radical Arab states and movements, have seen and declared themselves as being in a state of war with Israel. To these radicals, and in particular to those Arabs and Iran which oppose any conciliation with Israel, a decision to move into actual warfare needs not be predicated on any peculiar grievance or dispute with Israel. In their view, the very establishment of Israel was, in itself, an act of aggression and hence the use

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of force against her - a legitimate course of action to ensure Arab rights. In the more extremist version of the rejectionist camp, that option has remained the only course of action.

7. Thus, the threat of war is still a permanent given in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In a matter of principle, important segments of the Arab elites and leaders, have long viewed the decision to actually start fighting - although obviously conditioned by the overall political and military situation - to be nevertheless primarily dependent on the Arabs' capability to coordinate and gear themselves to a single, concerted war effort, on a scale of their choice, and to create the most favourable opening conditions for themselves. Before the commencement of the peace negotiations, threats of war and military action were not incompatible with political proceedings; the military option was well a part of the politico-military strategy and not necessarily the alternative to peace negotiations.

8. That sort of thinking underwent significant changes but was not entirely renounced by all in the Arab world. True, the Arab parties to the political process demonstrate today that they have decided to resolve their differences with Israel through a political dialogue, rather than an armed conflict. Still, not all of them succeeded in convincing Israelis of the irreversibility of their decision. In other words, that they may not resort to the use of force, should they not be able to fully realize their objectives through a political dialogue with Israel.

9. There is another aspect of this state of affairs. Arabs have large standing armies, that face, on Israel's borders, an Israeli militia army. That

army relies mainly on reserve force, whose mobilization and deployment consume critical time. In the past this built-in asymmetry increased the odds and temptation to rely on surprise attack in order to maximize the Arab advantage, and exploit Israel's weak points. This risk has now been moderated. Yet, without verifiable commitments that will assure Israel that this fundamental discrepancy between its and the Arabs' regular armies ceased to be relevant to its security - Israel's sense of potential vulnerability will continue to be an inevitable result of its threat perceptions.

10. A third aspect concerns the Arab ability to devote part of their collective wealth to the purchase of advanced arms both in the East and in the West. It is precisely because advanced technologies can offset and, indeed overcome, human deficiencies, that the radical qualitative leap forward in weaponry, either currently under way or expected, in most Arab armies, poses a real threat to the main basis on which Israel can maintain credible deterrence vis-a-vis its enemies. Since Arab superiority in sheer numbers will always remain a given constant which Israel could hope to check only with superior qualitative capabilities, the Arab's attainment of even a state of parity in these qualitative parameters, is viewed by Israel as increasing its sense of vulnerability.

11. A fourth permanent feature of the Arab threat against Israel is terrorism. Unable to overcome Israel militarily, some Arabs and even non-Arabs, hope to disrupt life in Israel, demoralize its population, undermine its resolve and hurt its economy, through the use of terror. In the past, certain Palestinian groups considered terror as the only mechanism with which to trigger a chain-reaction of blows and counter blows that would precipitate

an all-out military confrontation with Israel. Though today not an existential threat against Israel, the use of terrorism as a means to advance political ends is considered a legitimate course by radical Arab countries. It will therefore continue to impose a heavy and daily drain on Israel's human and financial resources.

12. To sum up these parameters, and in view of the analysis so far, one may postulate certain assumptions about the future threat environment which defines the spectrum of risks - and opportunities, that Israel will continue to face. The more critical assumptions are:

a. The concept of Arab nationalism will play an important part in Arab ideology. The dynamics of the inter-Arab and intra-Arab systems suggest further instability in relationships. Radical elements will continue to play an important role in the inter-Arab competition. Thus, the general Arab political scene promises to remain unstable and therefore unpredictable. The struggle between moderate and radical currents is liable to take different forms and to manifest itself in varying degrees of intensity and violence. Though contradictory Arab approaches to the conflict with Israel are likely impede the formation of a war fighting coalition against it, they also still severely inhibit the formation of an all-Arab coalition for peace - essential if a comprehensive settlement is to be attained. Thus, Israel expects to be a target of hostile rhetoric, aspirations and planning, by radical mid-eastern states and organizations. In the long range, however, one should hope that the

moderate forces, those interested in accommodation and conciliation, will be the ones who prescribe the strategic agenda in the region.

b. Arab countries - all of them - will be governed by autocratic rulers, many of them dictators, enjoying the full independent, sometimes erratic, decisionmaking power of that status, and supported by the military. They are expected to continue to devote a sizable amount of resources to the procurement of military hardware.

c Many Arab oil producing states will continue to enjoy large incomes, with its attendant prestige and political leverage, in the international arena.

d. Technology, as well as military buildup and infrastructure will continue to mature, both in confrontation states and, from Israel's point of view, in peripheral countries. Consequently, the distinction between these two categories of threats will have a diminishing significance over time. The lessons of the Gulf War and changing strategic perspectives have already induced all the radical states in the Middle East to enhance their efforts to acquire non-conventional capabilities and long range means to deliver them. Long range risks to Israel's security will therefore increase in magnitude even while the peace negotiations produce new gains.

e. The use of terrorism, be it group, individual or state terror, as a means to advance political ends and to harass or demoralize Israel, will continue.

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f. The forces of extreme Islam will continue to threaten the status quo, undermine stability of regimes in the Middle-East, and serve as the dominant unifying ideology against Israel. Their strength and influence will be determined by social and economic conditions obtaining in Arab societies, and on the strength and wisdom of the Arab regimes that contain them. Yet, one could assume, with a reasonable degree of confidence that Fundamentalist Islam will continue to play a crucial - and from Israel's point of view - mostly negative, role in the political environment that will affect Israel's security in years to come.

g. Lastly, the current efforts to achieve peaceful settlements between Israel and its surrounding Arab states carry a potential for movement and progress. Should they succeed, they stand to produce a far reaching, positive transformation in the political-military climate and relations in the Middle-East, and consequently in the external threat perceptions within Israel. Stability, predictability and shared interests may not be such far-fetched ideas in this possibly new evolving reality. Still, even such conditions will need a relatively protracted period of testing and adjustment, and will not necessarily eliminate other, even existential threats to Israel. In a paradoxical way, positive developments may even induce radicals double their efforts in the attempt to subvert the trend for conciliation between Arabs and Israelis.

13. To conclude: in the long run, even in a positive negotiating climate, threats to Israel's security, including risks of war, will not disappear. Even

in a state of peace - as long as Arab countries maintain military strengths, in the absence of mutual arms control agreements, and as long as there remain Moslem regimes still loath of Israel's very existence - such risks will continue to persist.

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14 July 1993

A Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East and its Ambience

Shalheveth Freier

Introduction

This paper is being written in July 1993. It sets out what I believe to be Israel's policy on a NWFZ in the Middle East, with which I identify. It is a personal statement and is not written on anyone else's authority. It is the statement of an Israeli and reflects an Israeli point of view. Any statement reflects a point of view.

Even as the peace talks are toiling ahead laboriously - it cannot be otherwise - they have yielded so far more progress than tens of years of resolutions in international organizations, intended to discomfit Israel.

For Israel, as I see it, it is a matter of singular importance to ascertain, what its partners to the talks have at the back of their minds. If it is peace and a genuine acceptance of Israel in the Middle East, matters of detail should be tractable; if, however, claims on Israel are designed to detract from its ability to withstand a future confrontation, the augury for the talks is less propitious. We do not know, I think, what is at the back of the minds of Israel's partners to the talks; we do know the answer, for the time being, with respect to the countries which refuse even to be party to these talks.

For the purpose of this dicussion, I single out two elements of which the Israelis hold views which differ from those of the Arab and some other states participating in the peace talks, the one of a general nature, the other of pertinence to the nuclear issue.

On a general level, Israel places all its expectations on the peace talks, for the simple reason that they try to address all problems in context, that all parties talk to each other and that agreement is sought between them. Israel is especially wary of initiatives and interferences by international organizations. These lift preferred issues out of context and pass resolutions by majority votes, a situation which does no justice to the issues raised, and puts Israel at an almost automatic disadvantage. In fact, using majority votes on specific issues in the U.N. or its specialized agencies, in disregard of the agenda of the peace talks, seems to the Israelis injurious to these talks, and casts doubt on the good faith of the participating states.

On the nuclear issue, the Arab states wish this issue to be pushed to the top of the agenda of the multilateral talks on Regional Security and Arms Control; i.e. for Israel to place its nuclear installations under full-scope safeguards. Israel for its part believes that confidence-building measures of a general nature ought to be at the top of the agenda, and that the nuclear issue should eventually be taken up within the negotiations for a NWFZ. Time will be ripe for such negotiations towards the successful consummation of the peace talks, and a NWFZ will be concluded once peace in the Middle East is assured. The Arab states try to enlist the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.) to pass resolutions designed to put international pressure on Israel. As I said before, Israel views with misgivings the engagement of international organizations on select matters pertaining to its security, which cannot but increase its wariness with respect to the intentions of the states participating in the peace talks, Arab states and others.

The first part of this paper is dedicated to the issue of a NWFZ proper and its general political and security ambience. In the second part, I shall dwell at some length on perceptions, self-image and hopes. They are more important in assessing a country's character and conduct, than the endorsement of, say, the Charter of the UN or the formal adherence to the NPT. It is their drawback, as compared with the endorsement of formal instruments, that they are more elusive of comprehension and discernment. Nonetheless, I claim, they are ever so much more important.

Israel and Nuclear Non-Proliferation.

In the late sixties it became known that Israel was engaged in nuclear activities which it refused to submit to international inspection. The most Israeli governments would say was the delphic statement that Israel would not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East. Israeli governments did not elaborate on this statement and have not done so to this day. As I understand it, the purpose of such statement is to give a sense of reassurance to Israelis in times of gloom, to serve as possible caution to states which contemplate harming Israel by dint of their preponderance in men and materiel, and to relieve states which do not wish to take up definite positions in this matter, from doing so. I am aware, of course, of all speculations on the state of Israeli nuclear developments, but abide by the authoritative statements of Israeli governments. I claim, in fact, that any more detailed knowledge is intrinsically irrelevant to what follows.

It was clear to the Israelis, that nuclear proliferation was in itself a bad thing and that they need pursue a positive policy in order to remove the danger of a nuclear arms race from the Middle East. They refused to go along with repeated international

injunctions to sign the NPT or submit to full-scope IAEA inspection. The Arab states urged resolutions in this sense in every conceivable international forum, and these fora went willingly along with these urgings, singling out Israel and disregarding any other country, similarly presumed to have nuclear capabilities. It was the Israeli understanding that the Arab states wished Israel to be well-controlled in the nuclear realm, and maintain the option of waging wars against it, at a time of their chosing, with nothing to worry about. Israelis saw further justification for their apprehensions, as time went along, when their concerns with the Iraqi nuclear enterprize were brushed aside by the supplier states on the grounds that Iraq was a signatory to NPT, and when Israel was roundly condemned and punished after it had put the Iraqi reactor out of action in 1981. Had it not been for the invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent acknowledgement of Iraq's military potential, Israel might still be left to contemplate its situation, alone.

However, in their quest for a positive policy, the Israelis were inspired by certain facets of the Tlatelolco Treaty, by which a NWFZ was established in Latin America. Especially, they realized that the Treaty of Tlatelolco had its beginnings in the initiative of the states of the region, had been negotiated by them directly and freely, and included the posibility of mutual inspection. They read particular virtue not only into the Treaty's goals but, no less, into the modalities, as well. Their reasoning was simple. The Arab states had made much of Israel's "nuclear threat and capabilities" and had easily ensured massive majorities at the UN and the IAEA, on resolutions censuring Israel, requesting it to put its installations under international safeguards, and enjoining all states to cease co-operating with Israel. The Israelis had not threatened a single state, and all references to Israel's nuclear activities were made by others, and not by Israelis.

The Israelis, therefore proposed as their positive policy, the establishment of a NWFZ, freely negotiated between the parties and including, for firm reassurance, the mutual verification of the agreed safeguards by the parties themselves. The Israelis surmised that if the Arab states really consider Israel's nuclear stance a threat, they would wish to test the earnest of Israel's invitation. Instead, the Arab states said, Israel's proposal was a "gimmick", because Israel could not expect all Arab states to sit down with it and negotiate. Thereupon, the Israelis said, they were ready to start discussing the establishment of a NWFZ with any Arab country, willing to come forward. Not a single Arab state has responded to this invitation, since it was formally proposed some 12 years ago, and repeated each year. Instead, the Arabs insisted, a NWFZ in the Middle East should come about by the accession of all states of the region to the NPT or the acceptance of full-scope safeguards, and corresponding resolutions are passed by the UN, year by year. Even negotiation between the parties is expressly ommitted from these resolutions. Israel joins the consensus, because it identifies with

the goal, but it registers its reservations on the modalities, which the Israelis understand to be the acid test of what the Arab states really want. As I said earlier on, the Arab refusal to negotiate a NWFZ with Israel and the continued insistence that Israel be internationally controlled in the nuclear realm, convey to Israel two messages. Despite protests to the contrary, Israel is not really perceived as a threat, and the Arab states wish to retain the option of waging wars against Israel, with no cause for restraint.

Under these circumstances, it seems clear to me that the Israelis cannot entertain any measure of confidence that the Arab support for a NWFZ amounts to more than the removal of a presumed Israeli nuclear capability. In the light of these experiences, the Israelis were convinced, that the establishment of a NWFZ could not be seperated from concurrent attempts to deal with military postures and capabilities of all kinds, and of the underlying political and emotional causes which fueled them. In fact, so little confidence do the Israelis entertain, for the time being, that the conclusion of a NWFZ, based on free negotiation and mutual reassurance, can only be credible, once war against Israel has been renounced as a way of settling differences with it. Rather than promoting my own views, let me quote from the "Study on effective and verifiable measures which would facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East" submitted by the Secretary General of the UN to the General Assembly in 1990. It is a remarkably unbiased document.

This is what it says on the precariousness of Israel's situation.

(Para 97)

Nevertheless, there are indications that Israel's relative conventional strength may be diminishing. In this connection, one factor that should be pointed out is the acquisition by potential opponents of ballistic missiles with a relatively long range and high accuracy. This gives those States a means of striking at a longer distance and enables them to participate in a conflict, even if their territory does not directly abut on the opponent's. As its population is small and becoming smaller in proportion to those of the other nations in the area, Israel has also become more vulnerable to a situation of prolonged warfare leading to a high number of casualties among its civilians or its military.

(Para 98)

Against this background, it is appropriate to point out that Israel's security position is characterized by three features which cannot but play a part in determining its attitude towards the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone; the relatively small size of its territory; the sustained hostility between itself and the great majority of States of the region; and the fact that it has no military allies in

the region and that the one State that might support it in a conflict is geographically remote.

On the need to deal with all security issues, comprehensively, and not with the nuclear aspect alone, the study says:

(Para 105)

....However, it is most unlikely that Israel will give up the security it believes it now derives from its nuclear anbiguity, its presumed deterrent and its eventual weapon of last resort, without a much higher degree of assurance that such a conflict will not occur, as well as compensation in terms of arrangements to enhance regional security in all of its multiple and complex dimensions, conventional as well as chemical and nuclear, political as well as military.

(Para 151)

The close relationship - the "linkage" - among all the elements that affect security is well known. Nuclear capabilities are linked to chemical weapons, chemical weapons to conventional arms, conventional arms to political conflict. And all these threads are woven into a seamless fabric of fear and insecurity. If the area is to become and remain truly nuclear-free, then this fabric must be cut into pieces and dealt with piece by piece. The problem in much too complex and unyielding for any comprehensive settlement to solve all at once. Yet all the separate elements must be worked on concurrently, for it will not be possible to settle any one piece of the problem unless it is clear that progress is being made on the other pieces as well. A radical transformation, step-by-step, must be effected in the military and political relationships of the entire area. The peoples of the Middle East must develop confidence that the political conflicts which surely will long remain are going to be settled - and settled equitably - without resort to force or the threat of force.

In the light of the foregoing, it seems to me that the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East cannot but follow a peace settlement, proven over time. The next section spells out what I believe to be the natural sequence of events.

The Peace - Talks

It is an outstanding achievement of the US to have convened the parties to the Middle-East conflict and to have engaged them in face to face bilateral and multilateral negotiations, and to seek progress wherever it can be made in the hope that progress in one area may lead to progress in others.

There is a natural sequence of events which I visualize as desirable from an Israeli point of view.

First, I should like Israel to be accepted as normal by the Arab states, after prolonged and futile attempts to dispose of it.

Normalcy means
- a public recognition and acceptance of any state of the region as an integral part of the region. Israel has throughout affirmed its recognition of the Arab states.
- a public declaration on the part of all states of the region that they will not resort to force in the settlement of their differences. Israel, for its part, is ready to reaffirm its repeated pledges to this effect.
- a public renunciation on the part of all states of the region of attempts to enforce a boycott of any of them or to delegitimize the international standing of any of them. Israel, for its part, has never employed such measures and undertakes never to resort to them in the future.
- Accredited representations by all states in Israel and vice-versa.

No price should be exacted from Israel for its acceptance as a normal state.

Second, in parallel with negotiations for a political setlement, confidence and security building measures should be put in place and tested over time. Confidence is built on time, and there are no short cuts.

Let me quote the Secretary General of the UN, once again, on the primacy of creating confidence:

(Para 110)

..... Confidence must be built on all sides: confidence that declaration of desire for a just and lasting peace are not merely a smoke screen, confidence that military solutions to political problems are excluded, confidence that military postures that are perceived as threatening can be avoided or adjusted. Renunciation of hostile acts and of threatening, inflammatory declarations would do much to increase confidence as well. Most important of all, there must be progress in solving the fundamental conflicts in the region. Without such progress, technical measures in the nuclear area or on other security problems will hardly be given serious thought, much less will they be developed to provide a meaningful barrier to

tension and even war.

Third, regional co-operation should be engaged on hazards (environment, diseases) and critical shortages (water) which threaten all the states of the region. Such co-operation need not be based on good will, but becomes more urgent for all parties, as time progresses.

Fourth, attempts need be made to induce also rejectionist states (such as Iraq and Libya) to join the peace process. I cannot conceive of practical arms control measures, unless all confrontation states are committed to a peace process, involving not only Israel and the Arab states, but also the Arab states among themselves.

As long as Iran is staunchly vowed to Israel's destruction, Iran cannot eventually be ignored in arms control and security measures in the Middle East. The Gulf states might feel the same way, although for different reasons.

Fifth, once everyone joins the peace process, practical discussions on arms control can yield results.

As an Israeli, I would insist that arms control bear in the first instance on conventional arms and that Israel attach its signature to a NWFZ only once peace is assured.

Even as the peace process is underway and all issues are on the agenda of the bilateral and multilateral talks, I am perturbed, as I said in the beginning, by the Arab insistence to have the nuclear issue lifted out of context and arrogated by the UN and IAEA, where they dispose of majorities, and where majority resolutions take the place of negotiations, envisaged in the multilateral talks. It reinforces my opinion, that Israel should not allow this item to be either arrogated by international organisations or be pushed to the top of confidence building measures. There is no confidence for Israel in such strategems.

Sixth, hopefully peace agreements will be concluded.

Especially, it will become apparent during the transitory period, if the Palestinians wish to make the autonomy a success. If they do, it is my conviction that all options are eventually open for an enduring settlement. If they chose otherwise, peace may elude both them and the Israelis.

Peace would be followed by

Seventh, a NWFZ comprising the States of the Middle East, North Africa and Iran, much in line with the suggestions for the extent of the region contained in the study of the Secretary General of the UN.

There should be no problem with Israel's accession to the NPT after that.

As I contemplate what I believe to be the natural sequence of topics to be taken up in the peace talks, I know it is and will be otherwise. There may be a variety of reasons. The most unpalatable reason would be that the Arab states still do not wish to accept Israel as an integral part of the region, and that it is not peace they really seek. As an Israeli, I feel I need be wary before I can entertain confidence.
Also, I can conceive of auspicious developments, such as occurred in Europe. All the negotiations conducted by the US and the late USSR over decades did not remove the spectre of a global war. They turned out to have been useful, however, when Mr. Gorbachev came to power and radically changed the priorities of his country. It seemed then that all the weapons that had accumulated had lost their purpose, and all the preparatory work of the past stood the negotiators in good stead. But Mr. Gorbachev could not have been planned or foreseen. He could only be acknowledged in retrospect. It is of course possible, that a similar discontinuity in ingrained paradigms occur also in our area. But those cannot be foreseen and planned. They can be hoped for. If such radical changes occur, they will put an entirely different aspect on the hitherto weary progress of the peace-talks.

There is one more issue I wish to address, in this context.

As we approach the 1995 NPT Review Conference, it is assumed that pressure will mount, once again, for Israel to join the NPT, especially since the Arab states will make their support for an indefinite extention of the NPT dependent on Israel's accession.

Under present circumstances, I cannot conceive that Israel can yield to pressure. It continues to be sole guarantor of its security. If the Arab states will hold the extension of the treaty or Israel to ransom, they should not in my view, be permitted to do so. All they need to do is to make peace with Israel. It is by way of peace, that a NWFZ will come about, followed, as I believe by Israel's accession to the NPT.

States are not uniform in their intentions or performance, nor can situations be dealt with uniformly. I feel this should be recognized and acknowledged also with respect to Israel. As long as intentions and performances follow different criteria, different criteria ought to apply to the states which hold, and act upon, them.

At the beginning of this paper, I invited the reader's indulgence, if I were to dwell on perceptions, self-image and hopes, as essential components in assessing a country's attitudes. I judge these to be vital and wish to take up this theme, in what follows.

Perceptions, Self-image and Hopes, in general

All three ingredients - perceptions, self-image and hopes - have an enduring and a transitory aspect. The transitory aspects are the ones conveyed by a perusal of the daily newspaper which tend to obscure the more enduring aspects which are, in the final count, the ones which matter.

Let me illustrate some of these points by three examples.

In the beginning of World War II, Britain was inundated by adverse news. The British were perceived to be vacillating and did not know their own mind clearly, until Churchill made them realize they really wanted to stand up to Hitler rather than negotiate with him.

During Cold War times, the Americans were often perceived to be compromising the values they ostensibly held dear, in their effort to curb the expansion of the Soviet empire. In this effort, they also supported corrupt and dictatorial regimes in order to deny the Soviets a foothold in them and paid a heavy price in lives and in the distortion of their national priorities. It was often difficult to discern that their sense of identity and pride really resided in what they called "the American way of life", the boons of which they wanted the rest of the world to applaud and adopt. An outsider may not feel totally enamoured of the American way of life, but would certainly embrace its essential elements, of a government accountable to its people, of realizing one's innate potential, and of the pursuit of one's international interests tempered by a sense of propriety and fairness. All these are the enduring aspects of the image the Americans have of themselves and as the embodiment of which they wish to be perceived.

With the end of the Cold War, it became immediately apparent that these were the values by which the Americans set the most store. It seems to me that such affinity as exists between Israel and the U.S. does not rest on convenience, but on what is called "shared values", those innermost convictions which seem at times the victim of adverse circumstances, but reassert themselves whenever they are given the chance.

Nearer home, Mr. Begin who was commonly perceived to be an assertive Prime Minister, withdrew from Sinai, and evacuated the city of Amit

which had been built there, in return for a peace agreement with Egypt. This act of faith was contrary to all appearances and had massive popular approval. To my mind, this was testimony to an over-riding and enduring desire for peace, when the opportunity presented itself..

The Israeli Self-image, Hopes, and Perception of their Situation.

In the spirit of the foregoing, let me set out the image most Israelis have of themselves and how they perceive their circumstances.

Let me say straight away that my presentation may be decried as sanctimonious, and that I should know better. Palestinians, to whom the Israeli occupation is odious, surely will feel this way and I shall not take issue with them. Yet, all I say in the sequel I hold to be basically true, and I am charitable with the Israelis because they truly find themselves in an unenviable situation, politically and militarily.

The Israelis share the goals, common to all democracies, of promoting their well-being by virtue of their internal exertions. They have no national ambitions, detrimental to other countries, or designs on them. They wish to live in peace and seek their sense of distinction in successfully integrating a heterogenous population, in doing good and pioneering work in education, science, industry and agriculture, and in being internationally recognized for the spirit and the quality of such assistance as they can render to countries engaged on their own indigenous development. And they wish to be able to travel freely in the area and visit those landscapes and places with which the history of their people is bound up. This is simply a modern version of the Zionist message, and the only one which makes sense. If I am right - and I believe I am - and the Israelis were allowed to live in peace with their neighbours, all I have said above would turn out to be the sum total of their goals. Indeed, even under adverse circumstances, these goals exercise and sustain them.

Circumstances, however, were not benign. From its inception in 1948, the State of Israel was denied its very existence, unconditionally, by all the Arab states in the Middle East and the North-African littoral until its Atlantic coast. All wars fought - in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973 - were about the existence of Israel and not about any specific issue of contention.

(With respect to 1956, this statement may be strongly contested. Israel joined the Suez campaign only, in order to stop the Egyptians from constantly dispatching Palestinian irregulars from Gaza into Israel with the object throwing life in the country into disarray. Indeed, buses to the south had to be protected by armed

guards and the situation was bad. Israel had no other purpose).

The Lebanese campaign - beyond the establishment of a security zone against rocket attacks - was the only questionable campaign initiated by Israel. It was meant to make Israel's Northern border secure and enable a Lebanese government to assume control of Lebanese affairs, and in particular of the militias committed to war against Israel. It did not achieve its objective and the Israeli army withdrew under popular pressure. In no war did the Israelis ever engage with territorial ambitions in mind. In particular, when in 1967 President Nasser closed the Tiran straits, asked the UN troops to leave the Sinai peninsula and put in his own divisions and promised "streams of blood in Tel-Aviv", and when the U.S., Britain and France would not live up to the guarantees they had given for the status-quo in the Middle East, the Israelis were very uncertain about their fate in what became known as the "Six-Day War" of 1967. They grimly determined to withstand the expected onslaught. They had no other ambition in mind. As it turned out, they found themselves in control of the "occupied territories". They were immediately ready to return most of them in exchange for peace, but were rebuffed by the three "nos" of the Khartoum summit of Arab leaders: No recognition, No negotiation, No peace.

Thus they have been in occupation of these territories and their restive population, since 1967, and cannot let go as long as these territories could serve as deployment areas for hostile forces, as they have in the past.

There was one signal and significant exception.

When President Sa'adat came to Jerusalem in 1977 and said clearly: "No more war" and offered peace in return for the Sinai peninsula, his offer was taken up - as I have mentioned before - with alacrity.

Indeed, I wonder, and so do many, what price for peace would be exacted from the Israelis nowadays, had it not been for the inadvertent occupation of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza in the Six-Day War.

Let me remind the reader, that it is not history I am writing but the perception the Israelis have of it.

In the mid-sixties, the Palestinian identity began to assert itself, vigorously. Until 1967, the Palestinians had been ruled by Jordan and Egypt and the establishment of a Palestinian state was not on the agenda. The establishment of a Palestinian state - in the whole of Palestine, as stipulated in the Charter of the P.L.O. - became the pivotal issue in the Middle East, after the Israelis found themselves in control of the "occupied territories". The Israelis were in a deep dilemma. It was utterly anathema to them to rule an alien population, yet they could not just withdraw and contemplate one more hostile

Arab state next to them. They appreciated how much the Palestinians wished to be rid of Israeli control, but could not lay themselves bare, faced, as they were, with the unrelenting enmity of all the Arab states and no prospect in sight of genuine peace, on any condition. The Israelis made efforts to placate their uneasiness, by promoting the development of a civilian infrastructure in the territories, the foundation of six universities and the introduction of intensive agriculture, in the hope that these developments would make for eventual co-operation, once peace in the area would enable the Israelis to relinquish control. Yet, it was fallacious to assume that these initiatives could make for tolerance and patience on the part of the Palestinians, juxtaposed as they were with Israeli suppression of attempts by the Palestinians to rid themselves of Israeli governance.

Until the late sixties, the Israelis saw themselves - as they were, and are - a minute island in a hostile sea of Arab states. They had a problem with the world, but not with their self-image. Yet, once they ruled an alien population and saw no way of relinquishing their control, under prevailing circumstances, they were and are beset with a dilemma which they alone are unable to resolve.

Until the late sixties, also, the Arab states had pursued their designs on Israel unconditionally, just for its being there, and brought to bear the clout of their numbers, their market potential, and the oil-wealth of some, in order to enforce an economic boycott of Israel, the severance of diplomatic ties with Israel by many states with no conceivable interest in Middle Eastern affairs, massive and automatic resolutions against Israel at the UN and the specialized agencies, and altogether not sparing any attempt to ostracize Israel from the international community. However, until the late sixties, all these attempts lacked any moral underpinnings.

After the Six-Day War, and with Israel in control of the occupied territories, the moral underpinnings presented themselves, and a large part of the international community was relieved to think that there was now justification for the pursuit of Israel by the Arabs which until then they had condoned with some misgivings. The picture of Israel sitting pretty in its area, suppressing a Palestinian minority, because they wanted to rule another few ten-thousands of square kilometers, was attractive to much of the international community. The willing support given to countless UN General Assembly resolutions against Israel serves as stark evidence for this statement. The fate of the Palestinians and the rights denied to them, became the central issue of the Middle East and of peace in the world, judging by the perpetual attention given to it by the Security Council. Arab designs on the existence of Israel were completely ignored, and Israel was left to contemplate its situation, alone.

The frustrations engendered in Israel for being denied any peace, or acknowledgement of its precarious situation, produced also

distortions in the thinking of many Israelis. It is the nature of frustrations to seek ideological outlets. Movements sprang up wich advocated the retention of the occupied territories, based on the emotional ties of the Jews to the localities in which their history took shape, and Jewish settlements were set up for similar emotional reasons. These developments may seem offensive to some, and are certainly resented by the Palestinians. I, however, understand, as I have said, that it is frustrations which engender these movements.

And the frustrations are not of Israeli making. As I mentioned before, the moment President Sa'adat convinced Mr. Begin, he wanted peace and no more war, Sinai was returned to Egypt. This was a sterling affirmation of what the Israelis really want. It is my opinion that they would react in a similar spirit - but not necessarily similar extent - if they were offered genuine peace and all ideological extravagances would fade in consequence, especially those which contrast sharply with the image the Israelis have of themselves and the sense of achievement they seek.

I have recapitulated at some length the way the Israelis perceive the history of their state since its inception, of their Arab environment and of the at best tenuous reliance they can place on the equitability of the international community.

More importantly, I have tried to convey what, I am certain, is the enduring image the Israelis have of themselves and of the character of their state. If they are given the chance, transitory appearances would yield to the affirmation of their true sense of identity.

Conclusion

Even though the assessments in this paper are personal, they reflect, I believe, a large body of opinion in Israel. This is the only justification for inviting their perusal. If these assessments are challenged, a burden of persuasion rest on the challenger.

(9)

The concept of NWFZ and the Middle East*

by
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Table of Contents

Abstract. Against the background of the "theory" of nuclear-weapon-free zones as developed in two United Nations expert studies and of another UN expert study on the issue of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the technical factors involved that have to be acted upon beside the political and diplomatic problems, have been referred to and discussed. It is suggested that a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East should be built upon a core group of countries and that the core zone might later be extended to a wider area. A surprising degree of common view was noted when the author in the summer of 1990 had an opportunity to visit some of the countries in the area as member of a UN study group.

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* This paper is a **draft not for quotation** updated as of **29 March 1994** of a paper presented at the 3rd Pugwash Workshop on the Middle East at Tynningö near Stockholm, Sweden, 10 - 12 December 1993. Views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not imply the expression of any position on the part of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs.

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Introduction

The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ), as it has emerged from the political deliberation since the mid-1950s, has come to cover a spectrum of arrangements, geographically ranging from whole continents like Latin America to a corridor in Centraleurope, and functionally serving purposes of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons as well as avoiding nuclear war. The NWFZ issue must, therefore, be studied both in historical and conceptual terms.

The first proposal on regional limitation of nuclear weapons, introduced in the United Nations, was tabled in 1956[1]. It referred to Central Europe. One year later Polen proposed the so called Rapachi-plan on permanent absence of nuclear weapons from the entire territory of several states in Central Europe[2].

At that time two different approaches to military denuclearization were pursued in parallell. One was the open ended and global non-proliferation approach which started with the "Irish" resolution[3] and finally lead to the adoption, in 1968, of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)[4]. The purpose of that treaty was to prevent the number of nuclear weapon states to grow beyond the five existing at the time. The fact that since then no state has established itself as a nuclear weapon state is an important basis for the discussion of the prospects for creation of nuclear weapon free zones.[5]

The other approach was the regional or zonal. The first result in this category was the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 declaring the Antarctic continent a demilitarized zone and by implication also a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Two other multilateral agreements raising barriers to the deployment of nuclear weapons in new areas and environments were the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the 1971 Sea-Bed Treaty.

The first major achievement in the regional or zonal approach was the agreement in 1967 by states in the Latin American region to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their continent, the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

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1 UN Document DC/SC.1/41.

2 UN Document A/PV. 697.

3 A/RES/1665 (XVI).

4 A/RES/2373 (XXII) and S/RES/255.

5 The five nuclear weapon states are China, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union (on 24 December 1991 succeded by the Russian Federation) and the United States. India who is not a party to the NPT, did manufacture and explode a nuclear device "for peaceful purposes" in 1974 but is usually not considered a nuclear weapon power. It was revealed in March 1993 that South Africa had maintained a nuclear weapon program for some time and fabricated six nuclear explosive devices, but that these charges have now been fully dismantled. On 10 July 1991, South Africa became a party to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. Several other states which are not parties to the NPT, are sometimes referred to as "threshold states" as they are considered to have undertaken preparations for becoming nuclear weapon powers. However, none of them have declared an intention to acquire nuclear weapons. As of March 20th, 1994, the NPT had 164 parties including all five established nuclear-weapon states.

A similar contribution was made in 1985, when the countries members of the South Pacific Forum agreed to establish a nuclear-free zone ranging from Latin America to the West coast of Australia and from the Antarctic area to the equator, the Treaty of Rarotonga.[6]

Similar proposals have been made for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of Europe, in the Middle East, South Asia, Africa and the ASEAN area.

The possibility of including international sea areas in proposed nuclear-weapon-free zones has also been envisaged, such as the Baltic, the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the South Atlantic and the oceans surrounding Latin America; such arrangements would require a special legal basis taking into account relevant provisions of international law[7].

In the literature, there is a rich supply of proposals for establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones ranging from local communities and cities to continent size areas and the entire globe. A new idea was introduced in 1982 with the proposal for the creation of a corridor in Central Europe from which tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons would be withdrawn. Unlike earlier proposals, the area of application would be unrelated to national borders of the states involved and no security assurances would apply. The rationale of the proposed measure is that it would reduce the risk of such weapons becoming immediately involved in any conflict or incident by geographically separating adversary tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons in the area.[8] The specific proposal for such a corridor in Central Europe has become irrelevant due to the recent development in the European political structure.

A number of areas have been declared demilitarized zones according to treaties concluded long ago, most of them before the atomic bomb was invented. Among such areas are a number of small islands in the Mediterranian. By implication such areas should today be considered denuclearized as well.

In recent years local authorities in various countries have declared cities, towns, counties or other subnational areas nuclear-weapon-free zones. Generally, such authorities have no legal competence for decisions of this kind and would have no possibility to get their "zones" internationally recognized. Such "zones" should therefore be considered expressions of opinion rather than arms control measures.

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[6] Texts of treaties and other important international documnets referred to in this paper could in many cases be found in *Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements, Fourth Edition 1992, Volumes 1 and 2*, (UN Sales No. E.93.IX.11) which is up-dated to 31 December 1992; or in J. Goldblat, *Arms Control. A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements*. PRIO. Sage Publications. London. 1994, up-dated to October 1993.

[7] The political history of the existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and many of the proposed zones are described in the reports of two United Nations expert studies. The first report was prepared in 1975, *Comprehensive Study on the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in all its Aspects*. United Nations Document A/10027/Add. 1, (UN Sales No. E.76.1.7). The second report was almost but not entirely finalized in 1985. It "exists" as an annex to a letter of 9 February 1985 from the Chairman of the expert group, Dr Claus Törnudd of Finland, to the Secretary General. The formal status of this annex is subject to dispute. It is, however, very informative.

[8] *Common Security*. Report by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues. Simon and Schuster. New York 1982. p.147. UN Document A/CN.10/38.

Reference should finally be made to the possibility envisaged in the humanitarian laws of war to establish by agreement temporary demilitarized zones[9].

A discussion of the role of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the post cold war era has recently been published by Wolfsthal[10].

Existing zones

Two nuclear-weapon-free zones have so far been established in densely populated areas[11]. The Tlatelolco Treaty[12] of 1967 and The Rarotonga Treaty[13] of 1985 created such zones in Latin America and the South Pacific respectively.

Latin America

The Latin American zone came into being as a result of a five year process between the first endorsement of the proposal by UN General Assembly in 1962[14] and the first signing of the treaty in 1967. The entry into force process is still going on. The treaty is now in force for 24 states. It is not yet in force for some 10 states, but an effort was made in 1992 to speed up the accession process for the remaining states in order to attain the full entry into force of the treaty. All dependencies are now subject to the zonal regim in accordance with Protocol I[15]. Protocol II, the guarantee-protocol, has been in force for all nuclear weapon states since 1979.

The central provisions of the treaty are undertakings by the zonal states to use nuclear material exclusively for peaceful purposes, not to possess nuclear weapons and not to permit any presence of such weapons in their territories. The parties also undertake not to engage themselves in or encouraging any nuclear weapon activity (Art. 1).

The geographical scope of the zone would comprise all Latin American and Caribbean states (Art. 25), all dependencies of extra-continental states (Protocol I), and also, when the treaty has fully entered into force, considerable adjoining Atlantic and Pacific sea areas (Art. 4:2).

Protocol II prescribes that nuclear weapon powers would respect the status of the zone and that they would refrain from using or threatening the use of nuclear weapons against zonal states.

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9 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict (Protocol I), Art. 60.

10 Wolfsthal, J.B., *Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Coming of Age?* Arms Control Today Vol. 23 (No 2) March 1993 pp 3 - 9.

11 The term "densely populated" area is frequently used to distinguish the Latin American and the South Pacific zones from the Antarctica which some states for political reasons prefer to designate as a "populated" area rather than the "unpopulated" place it is otherwise considered to be.

12 The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (UN *Treaty Series*, Vol. 634, No. 9068) had 33 parties as of 1 July 1993.

13 The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (UN *Treaty Series* No. 24592) had 13 parties as of 1 August 1993.

14 UN Documents A/C.1/L.312/Rev.2 and A/RES/1911 (XVIII).

15 States with dependencies in Latin America are France, the Netherlands, UK, and USA.

The treaty also establishes a verification system including both the application of IAEA safeguards to all nuclear activities of zonal states and the possibility of "special inspections" in cases of suspected non-compliance (Art. 12-16).

It should also be noted that the treaty explicitely permits the parties to carry out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, but such explosions would be subject to special control procedures (Art. 18).

The South Pacific

The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone is the second to be established in a densely populated area. The proposal to establish such a zone was endorsed by the General Assembly in 1975[16] but it lasted to 1985 until the states members of the South Pacific Forum concluded the Rarotonga Treaty.

The entry into force process has been under way since. The treaty is presently in force for 11 out of the 15 Forum-members.

Annexed to the treaty are three protocols. Two are similar to those of the Tlatelolco Treaty. The third requests the nuclear weapon states to refrain from nuclear testing in the zone area. However, among the nuclear weapon powers, only China and the USSR have adhered to the protocols.

Geographically, the South Pacific zone encompasses a very large area, extending from the Latin American zone in the east to include Australia and Papua New Guinea in the west, from Antarctica (lat. S 60°) in the south to the equator in the north. Most of that area is ocean, while most treaty provisions apply to national territories only.

The central undertakings of the parties are not to possess nuclear weapons (Art. 3) and to prevent stationing of such weapons in their territories (Art. 5). The treaty explicitely prohibits nuclear testing (Art. 6, Protocol 3) and dumping of radioactive waste (Art. 7) within the entire zonal area.

A control system similar to that of the Tlatelolco Treaty is also envisaged. Unlike the Tlatelolco Treaty, the Rarotonga treaty is in explicit harmony with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, except that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes are not permitted at all.

Antarctica

According to the Antarctic Treaty[17] agreed in 1959, the "white continent" was declared a demilitarized zone (Art. I) implying that Antarctica is also a denuclearized area. At the same time, the territorial claims in Antarctica were frozen (Art. IV)[18]. The Antarctic Treaty prohibits "any measure of a military nature" but does not explicitely forbid the introduction of nuclear weapons into the continent, although the carrying out of nuclear explosions in the area is

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16 A/RES/3477 (XXX)

17 The Antarctic Treaty (UN Treaty Series, Vol. 402, No. 5778) had 42 parties as of 1 August 1993.

18 Seven states, Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom, have filed territorial claims in Antarctica. The Argentine claim overlaps those of Chile and the United Kingdom.

explicitely prohibited (Art. V:1). The Antarctic Treaty applies to all geographical area south of the latitude S 60° but does not limit the rights of any state under international law with regard to the high seas (Art. VI).

Two proposed zones

Among the nuclear-weapon-free zones proposed but not established, two have been subject to investigations published in official reports. These are the proposed zones in the Middle East[19] and Northern Europe[20].

Objectives and principles

Geographical, political and other circumstances related to nuclear-weapon-free zones would make different zones different. No such zone would be an exact copy of another. The term nuclear-weapon-free zone would, however, usually imply the fulfillment of certain objectives and the implementation of certain elements of arms control. United Nations expert studies[21] have contributed to establishing the scope and the frame of this concept.

The general objective for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone would be to relieve a zonal area from the threat of being involved in nuclear war. The fulfillment of this objective would usually require cooperation both among prospective zonal states and between them and nuclear weapon states and some other extra-zonal states.

But there may be a variety of further objectives for the establishment of such zones in specific cases. Regarding proposed zones in Europe, the objective of geographical separation of the nuclear weapons of the blocks has been referred to as an important objective.

The fulfillment of such objectives shall also be considered as a process in time. History has shown that the establishment of the two densely populated zones is a process over decades. In addition, the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone would always be considered a temporary step and contribution to a process finally leading to general nuclear disarmament.

Definitions

States participating in a nuclear-weapon-free zone are free to decide what measures they consider appropriate to the requirements in their specific region. Indeed, each zone established or proposed so far has been intended to serve purposes specific to each case and that will probably be so in the future as well. None the less, a need for general definitions of the zone concept has been met by the General Assembly and may be of assistance in formulating the arrangements for specific future zone projects.

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19 *Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East.* UN Document A/45/345 (Sales No. E.91.IX.3.).

20 *Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Nordic Area.* Report from the Nordic Senior Officials Group. March 1991.

21 Compare note 7.

The General Assembly in 1975 defined the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone as follows:[22]

"I. *Definition of the concept of a nuclear-weapon -free zone*

1. A nuclear-weapon-free zone shall, as a general rule, be deemed to be any zone, recognized as such by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which any group of States, in the free exercise of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or convention whereby:

(a) The statute of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject, including the procedure for the delimitation of the zone, is defined;

(b) An international system of verification and control is established to guarantee compliance with the obligations deriving from that statute.

II. *Definition of the principal obligations of the nuclear weapon States towards nuclear-weapon-free zones and towards the States included therein*

2. In every case of a nuclear-weapon-free zone that has been recognized as such by the General Assembly, all nuclear weapon States shall undertake or reaffirm, in a solemn international instrument having full legally binding force, such as a treaty, a convention or a protocol, the following obligations:

(a) To respect in all its parts the statute of total absence of nuclear weapons defined in the treaty or convention which serves as the constitutive instrument of the zone;

(b) To refrain from contributing in any way to the performance in the territories forming part of the zone of acts which involve a violation of the aforesaid treaty or convention;

(c) To refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against the States included in the zone."

Three years later, in 1978, the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly referred to the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone as

"60. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure.

61. The process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account. The States participating in such zones should undertake to comply fully with all the objectives, purposes and principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the zones, thus ensuring that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons.

62. With respect to such zones, the nuclear weapon States in turn are called upon to give undertakings, the modalities of which are to be negotiated with the competent authority of the zone, in particular:

(a) To respect strictly the status of the nuclear weapon free zone;

(b) To refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone."

"Nuclear weapon" is among the specific terms that may require an explicit definition in a treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone. None of the multilateral treaties of world-wide scope concluded so far contains a definition of nuclear weapon. The regional Treaty of Tlatelolco, containing such a definition in its article 5, is the only treaty to do so. While there may be a general understanding of what a nuclear weapon is, the countries seeking to establish a nuclear weapon free zone may wish to define the scope of the nuclear weapon concept, in particular, whether the agreed measures would relate to nuclear warheads, to all nuclear explosive devices as is the case in the non-proliferation treaty, or wether to include the delivery vehicles carrying nuclear warheads.

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22 A/RES/3472 B (XXX).

If delivery systems are to be prohibited, "nuclear-weapon system" may be another term to define when seeking to establish a nuclear weapon free zone. Here the question of so-called dual capability systems, which can be used for both nuclear and other weapons, poses particular problems of definition and verification.

The term "a nuclear-weapon State" may also require an explicit definition in a treaty seeking to establish a nuclear weapon free zone, as such States may be requested to assume obligations specific to them. The term was defined in article IX:3 of the Non-proliferation Treaty as a State having manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967. This definition does not, however, cover a new country acquring nuclear weapons after the stated date beyond the five established at the time. The possibility of "the rise of a new power possessing nuclear weapons" is referred to in article 28 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Another problem in this connection would be to refer to and accomodate potential zonal states who de facto are nuclear weapon states but who have not officially established themselves as such. They may have access to nuclear weapons through an alliance with a nuclear weapon state or have made advanced preparations necessary for independent acquisition of nuclear weapons. The latter category of states are sometimes referred to as "threshold states".

Important objectives

Within the context of "the ultimate objective af achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons", as set forth by the General Assembly in the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session, several other objectives having regional or, in some cases, also wider significance can be identified and, depending on the circumstances in each case, may be pursued or specified in a zonal agreement. The relevance and relative emphasis of such objectives may vary from one region to another. The subsequent evolution, i.e. development and improvement over time of a zone agreement, would also be possible and, in some cases, feasible. Without prejudice to other objectives, which may be added according to the needs in a specific case, the following general objectives would be important.

(a) To spare the zonal States from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

(b) To contribute to averting potential nuclear threats and, thereby, to reducing the danger of war, in particular nuclear war;

(c) To contribute to the process of disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament;

(d) To contribute to regional and world stability and security;

(e) To contribute to preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons, horizontal, vertical as well as geographical;

(f) To strengthen confidence and improve relations between zonal States;

(g) To facilitate and promote co-operation in the development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in the region and between zonal and extra-zonal States.

Geographical Considerations

No precise requirements can be set as regards the suitable size of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which could range from whole continents to small areas. Sometimes a nuclear-weapon-free zone may be initially established in a more limited area and later extended as other countries agree to join in. If large parts of the world are to be kept free from nuclear weapons, the extension of nuclear-weapon-free zones to whole continents would provide the best way to achieve that aim.

The extent of a zone has to depend on the specific characteristics of the region and the precise arms control objectives to be realized.

A single state could establish itself, or even part of itself, as a nuclear-weapon-free zone.[23] Normally, however, a nuclear-weapon-free zone would comprise the national territories of two or more neighbouring states including their territorial waters and airspace. It would also be possible for states separated from each other by high sea areas or otherwise to form a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Furthermore, a nuclear-weapon-free zone might be extended into geographical areas not under the jurisdiction of any state, for instance sea areas beyond territorial waters.

One element of a zone arrangement could be "thinning-out", i. e. withdrawal or other measures regarding nuclear weapons, military forces or military activities in an area adjacent to the zone, the purpose being to enhance the security of zonal states and the credibility of the assurances extended to the zone by extra-zonal states.

Such security areas adjacent to the zone could be both land and sea areas. They would have to conform to specific conditions in each case and could be based upon agreements reached among the countries directly concerned. Measures of this kind could also be defined in functional terms, that is, in terms of the relations that relevant weapons, forces and military activities could have to the zone. In the latter case the extension of the "adjacency" would implicitly be related to the ranges of these weapons, forces and activities.

Basic measures and obligations

There would be three measures of central importance for the achievement of the objectives of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the general case. These are

* the **non-possession** of nuclear weapons by zonal States,
* the **non-stationing** of nuclear weapons by any State within the geographical area of application of the zone, and

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23 There are a number of cases in which only part of a state may be included in a zone. Obvious ones are:

1. A state has dependencies in another region than the mainland and such dependencies are included in a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The first protocolls of both the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga treaties apply to this case.

2. A state belongs to a nuclear-weapon-free zone but a far away dependency does not.

3. A special part of a country is a denuclearized or demilitarized zone and the mainland is not. An example is the demilitarized Spitsbergen-archipelago, a dependency of Norway.

4. A nuclear weapon state has a military base in a country within a nuclear-weapon-free zone, but the host country has no responsibility for the base. An example is the US base of Guantánamo in Cuba.

* the **non-use or non-threat of use** of nuclear weapons throughout the zone or against targets within the zone.

The meaning of these measures might seem clear enough. However, their legal representation could be complicated, as shown e.g. by the definition of "nuclear weapon" in the Tlatelolco Treaty (Art 5).

The non-possession measure would apply to zonal states. It could be codified in a simple manner if relying on the concepts of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, mainly its Article II[24]. If the zone encompasses only territories of non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT, non-possession would be established as long as NPT is in force[25]. If the zone is to encompass states which are not parties to the NPT or states which are nuclear weapon states, a special regime must be drafted. The same would be true in the special case that only a part of a state will be included in the zone. If the whole of a nuclear weapon state is to be included, a procedure for abandonment of its nuclear weapons must be prescribed.

Also prescribed should be the right or non-right of zonal states to acquire and operate nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes. Because of the technological similarity of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes, the possession of such devices by some zonal states would significantly weaken a zonal regime. As the peaceful nuclear explosion technology now seems generally unfeasible, sacrificing the right to possess them would harm the parties very little while enhancing the effectivity of the zone very much.

The non-deployment measure would primarily apply to the zonal states as far as land areas are concerned. Zonal states could not, however, by agreement among themselves, prohibit innocent passage (or transit passage) by vessels of nuclear-weapon states in their territorial waters.

The founding legal instrument of the zone must also define whether it would be only the nuclear warheads that should not be present in the zone or if the prohibition should also include installations being integral parts of nuclear weapon systems.

Related to the non-deployment measure is "transit" of nuclear weapons through zonal territory. The transit concept would include transit over a limited period of time of nuclear weapons by a nuclear weapon state, on land, by air or in internal waters including calls at ports by ships carrying nuclear weapons.

The transit issue was extensively discussed when the Latin American zone was negotiated. The problem was solved by not being solved. Transit was left to the individual zonal states to permit or not permit in each case. The South Pacific zone has a similar transit regime.

A zonal treaty should prescribe if transit would be generally prohibited or arranged in a way similar to the Tlatelolco formula. Transit through zonal high sea areas or through territories

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24 Article II of the NPT provides that "*each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices*".

25 In 1995, the future of the NPT will be discussed at a special conference of the parties in accordance with the treaty's Art X:2. Probably, the treaty will remain in force.

belonging to nuclear weapon powers could not be permitted without making the zonal regime of such areas an illusion.

The non-use measure would be a commitment by states controlling nuclear weapons. Legally this provision has been given the form of a separate protocol to existing zone agreements. Reservations to the guarantee-protocol could not be avoided in the Latin American case.

Consideration of the non-use measure should be made against the background of ongoing negotiations on general negative security assurances at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. All five nuclear-weapon states have made unilateral declarations that they would not attack or threaten to attack with nuclear weapons states that possess no such weapons of their own or host those of others on their territories. These declarations are not coordinated and include some conditions and reservations. The Soviet Union has also generally pledged not to be the first power to use nuclear weapons in a conflict.[26]

The reservations are linked to the question whether a state can be a member of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and also of a military alliance with a nuclear-weapon state simultaneously. This is certainly possible provided, however, that the two sets of commitments are not contradictory.

Linked to the non-use measure has been the idea mentioned above that this measure should be complemented by a "thinning-out" arrangement in areas adjacent to the proposed zone. The "thinning-out" idea implies that those nuclear weapons should be withdrawn that are targeted against the zone or that have short ranges and are deployed very close to the zone, thus making them usable primarily against the zone. If such weapons are not withdrawn, the non-use commitments would be less credible.

Special provisions for denuclearized sea areas

There is a significant difference between applying arms control in sea areas as compared to land areas, because of different legal regimes. Almost all land is subject to the jurisdiction of one state, a well-known exception being Antarctica. As a consequence, adversary military forces on land are geographically separated from each other in peacetime. Naval forces of different states, on the other hand, may mix all over the sea, on the surface, in the water, under the ice, and on the sea-bed. Indeed, they frequently do so.

Coastal states have full jurisdiction over their internal waters only. Their jurisdiction also extends to their territorial seas and archipelagic waters, except that flag states enjoy the right of innocent passage for ships in such waters (there is a more liberal regime of transit passage through

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26 The content of these unilateral guaranties are summarized in *Compilation of Basic Documents relating to the Question of Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use of Nuclear Weapons* (UN Document CD/SA/WP. 15, 16 March 1993) Compare also *The United Nations DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK* VOL. 14:1989 pp 179 - 180. Very recently (3 November 1993), the Russian Federation has adopted a defence doctrine which does not include the USSR no-first-use declaration of 12 June 1982.

international straits)[27]. In exclusive economic zones or on the high seas the coastal states have no jurisdiction related to nuclear weapons.

Zonal states have no right according to international law to limit by agreement among themselves the rights of flag states to navigate ships or fly aircraft in such waters. Their denuclearization would require agreement in principle among all states having the right to use them or at least among the nuclear weapon states to make the regíme effective.

Complaints and Control Procedures

It is traditionally recognized that effective implementation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone agreement would require a system of verification to ensure that all states involved, zonal as well as extra-zonal, comply with their obligations. The precis scope and nature of such a system would vary from zone to zone and depend upon the nature of the obligations prescribed. Generally a zonal treaty would have to include provisions both for verifying compliance and a complaints procedure for settling issues of suspected non-compliance, should such cases arise.

In general, subject to verification should be:

(a) All nuclear activities of zonal states to ensure that peaceful nuclear activities are not diverted to the manufacture of nuclear weapons;

(b) the comittment that no nuclear weapons are present within the zone; special régimes would be required for ses areas and for nuclear-weapon-state controlled areas that may be included in the zone;

(c) the removal of nuclear weapons that may be present within the zonal area at the time of entry into force of the zone agreement, possibly also requiring an account of the nuclear history of participating zonal states;

(d) the implementation of other measures associated with the zone agreement.

Most verification related to peaceful nuclear activities of zonal states could be entrusted to the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA is now operating safeguards in very many states, including all non-nuclear weapon states parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This traditional safeguards system could require extension and reinforcment for the purpose of verifying a specific zone agreement by additional procedures especially defined and described in that agreement. While the provisions of the current NPT-related safeguards system was a compromize at the time of conclusion of the negotiations of the NPT and while the system has been considered adequate and has been working well for long time, recent experiences has provoked a discussion about a possible revision of the system to make it more effective.

In some regions, the zonal parties may prefer to establish standing organs or special bodies for carrying out verification. In regions where sharp conflicts exist, entrusting the task of verification to an international organization, perhaps supplemented by bilateral arrangements, might be preferred.

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27 The legal concepts of "innocent passage" and "transit passage" are defined in the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Articles 17 - 33, 45, and 52, and Articles 38 - 44 respectively.

IAEA could assume responsibility for safeguards subject to special agreements. However, to entrust all verification activities referred to above to IAEA may go beyond the Agency's current practicies, although its statute gives the Agency considerable possibilities in that respect.

There is also the possibility that an agreement on a nuclear-weapon-free zone would provide to any party a right to undertake verification activities in other states parties to the zonal agreement, including on-site inspection. One model for such a system could be the verification system laid down in several arms control agreements adopted within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), i. e. the Stockholm and Vienna Documents on confidence-building measures and the CFE Treaty[28]. These treaties give each party the right to undertake inspections in the territory of any other party and obliges every party to recieve and accomodate on short notice such inspections in its own territory. Another example of far-reaching on-site verification is included in the 1988 Treaty between the USA and the USSR on the Elimination of Their Intermidiat-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty)[29]. Mutual verification of this obligatory nature could be particularly attractive to states, such as Israel, that might often find themselves outvoted within international arrangements where decisions are taken by majority votes.

Verification of denuclearization applying to sea areas would involve measures different from those applying on land. Every ship or aircraft has the right to navigate almost anywhere at sea and that would certainly facilitate national verification activities. On the other hand, under international law, warships are "immune" and agreements on onboard inspection seem unrealistic. Furthermore, several nuclear-weapon powers neither confirm nor deny the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on specific ships at specific times[30]. But such a policy would be difficult to reconcile with a denuclearization or "thinning-out" regime at sea if warships or aircraft of nuclear-weapon states would be permitted at all within the agreed zonal area. It is true that recent measures undertaken by the nuclear-weapon powers imply that most nuclear weapons are removed from ships in peacetime leaving only a few submarines cruizing the seas with strategic nuclear missiles onboard. However, the nuclear-weapon powers would continue to practice the neither confirming nor denying policy. The problem will thus remain although scaled down.

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28 The Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (1986), the Vienna Document 1990 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, the Treaty on conventional Armed Forces in Europe, and the Vienna Document 1992 of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures.

29 The text of the INF Treaty is reproduced in *The United Nations DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK*. Vol. 12:1987 pp 444 - 474.

30 For an account of the consequences of these policies, see i. e. Prawitz, J., *The "Neither Confirming nor Denying" Policy at Sea* in Goldblat, J.(Ed.), *Maritime Security: The Building of Confidence*. Document UNIDIR/92/89 (Sales No. GV.E.92.0.31).

The Middle East as a NWFZ application

The combination of open conflicts and nuclear programs of size in the Middle East does provide both the political incentives and a technological basis for nuclear weapon proliferation in the region. This has been understood for long time. This has also been considered unfortunate for long time. The current conflict pattern in the Middle East, while attracting the involvement of major powers, is regional. The possible ambitions of the countries in the area to acquire nuclear weapons have their roots in this regional context.

The issue of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East has been researched and studied by the Egyptian scholar and diplomat Mahmoud Karem[31].

The UN report on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East

Political efforts to change this situation have focussed on the possibility to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the area. Back in 1974, Iran supported by Egypt raised the issue in the UN General Assembly. Since that time, the General Assembly has every year adopted a resolution recommending the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East (NWFZME). Since 1980, this annual resolution has been adopted by consensus, i.e. with the support of all Arab states, Iran and Israel.

In the fall of 1988, the annual resolution[32] now initiated by Egypt, also requested the Secretary General to "*undertake a study on effective and verifiable measures which would facilitate the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East*". The report[33] was prepared before Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, but submitted to the Genral Assembly after that invasion. It was, however, welcomed and adopted by consensus that same year.[34] The UN report includes a full account of the history of the issue in the United Nations.

What is the Middle East?

A precise geographical definition of the Middle East does not exist. However, for the purpose of discussing issues of nuclear non-proliferation, international safeguards and development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has

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31 M. Karem, *A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East: Problems and Prospects*. Greenwood Press. New York. 1988. The same author has later published *A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East: A Historical Overview of the Patterns of Involvment of the United Nations* in T. Rauf (Ed.), *Regional Approaches to Curbing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia*, Aurora Papers 16. Canadian Centre for Global Security. December 1992.

32 GA Res 43/65.

33 UN Document A/45/435; UN Sales No.E.91.IX.3.

34 GA Res 45/52 op.8.

outlined the definition that the Middle East would include "the area extending from the Libya in the West, to Iran in the East, and from Syria in the North to Yemen in the South"[35].

This could be considered the core area of the Middle East that for various purposes might be extended.

This IAEA-defined core area would encompass the major conflict areas in the region, i.e. the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iran-Iraq conflict and the Iraqi south-bound expansion ambitions.

To delimit a zonal area is always a delicate problem. The geographic limits of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should normally be established by agreement among the states concerned. A discussion of the limits of a Middle East zone can, therefore, only be preliminary. Such a discussion is nevertheless essential in order to develop a generally accepted list of countries the participation of which would be necessary to make the zone meaningful in military and political terms.

A zone could be developed in stages, beginning with the core countries as defined by the IAEA formula and later extended to encompass all states directly connected to current conflicts in the region, i. e. all contries members of the League of Arab States (LAS), Iran and Israel.

As to the specifics, the IAEA definition clearly excludes Turkey, Cyprus and Malta. But Turkey is a NATO member and a candidate for a proposed nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Balkans. US nuclear weapons formerly deployed onTurkey´s territory are reported to have been withdrawn. Cyprus and Malta are generally considered not to host any nuclear weapons, although there are two British military bases on Cyprus. Given these facts, those countries may best be thought of as neighbours to a future Middle East zone, from which it would be reasonable to expect commitments to respect and support a zonal regíme.

Afghanistan and Pakistan border Iran to the East and their inclusion in a Middle East zone has sometimes been suggested as desirable. However, their interests focus in other directions and their participation in a Middle East zone may not be essential.

The same can be said about the newly independent states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan also bordering the prospective zonal area. The latter three states are outside the IAEA formula for the obvious reason that they were part of the Soviet Union at the time the formula was drafted.

Djibouti, Somalia and the Sudan are members of LAS not included in the IAEA definition. While there may be substancial reasons for including the Sudan , geographical reasons clearly make Djibouti and Somalia less important. The present problems in Somalia also excludes that country for the time being.

The group of states situated west of Libya could be considered in a similar way. While it may seem reasonable to include Algeria in the core group, the participation of Tunisia, Morocco, and the westernmost LAS state Mauritania could be politically desirable while in a military sense not immediately essential.

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35 *Technical Study on Different Modalities of Application of Safeguards in the Middle East.* Document IAEA-GC (XXXIII)/887, 29 August 1989. A similar definition is suggested in the 1975 UN study *Comprehensive Study on the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in all its Aspects.* United Nations Document A/10027/Add. 1, (UN Sales No. E.76.1.7). para 72.

On the western part of the North African coast, there are a few tiny enclaves of Spain. If a zone would extend to that part of North Africa, those enclaves may be treated in the same way as dependencies are covered by Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Several sea areas may be considered for inclusion in or for "thinning-out" measures in relation to a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Both the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf may be enclosed or semi-enclosed within the zonal area. Prospective zonal areas have coasts in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic, and the north western Indian Ocean. Because of the legal status of sea areas, maritime arrangements should be prescribed in separate protocols to a zone agreement.

The Law of the Sea does not apply to the Caspian Sea which used to be divided between Iran and the Soviet Union. As the Iranian part would probably be the only part to be included in a Middle East zone, the division of the Soviet part of the sea between the four new states of Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kasakhstan would not matter.

The prospective zonal area would include a few international straits subject to the regíme of transit passage, i. e. the straits of Gibraltar, Bab al Mandab, and Hormuz. Also important in this respect is the Suez Canal, an international waterway crossing through Egyptian territory open "in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag" according to the Constantinople Convention of 29 October 1888[36]. This convention is also referred to in the Egypt - Israel Peace Treaty of 1978, which provides, i. a. that the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are "international waterways open to all nations".

Inclusion of international waters in a nuclear-weapon-free zone would essentially effect the nuclear weapon powers having the legal right to frequent such waters with nuclear weapons. While recent withdrawals of all nuclear wepons from ships except strategic ballistic missiles onboard submarines have made the issue less sensitive than before, such inclusion would still be problematic and should be judged together with all the commitments that nuclear weapon powers would be expected to assume in relation to the zone.

A Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone would be different from the Latin American zone and the South Pacific zone in one important respect. It would have neighbours around almost its entire periphery. It might be desirable to invite neighbouring states, e. g. Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Cyprus, Malta, Greece, Italy, Spain, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Chad, Ethiopia, and perhaps others, to assume a commitment to respect and support the zonal arrangments.

It should be noted that the suggested core zone would border both NATO territory (Turkey) and countries members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). As nuclear weapons are reported to have been withdrawn from the territories of these states, there may still be an interest in codifying this situation by means of a "thinning-out" protocol. Securing such measures would seem useful for the success of the zonal agreement although not fundamental.

Nuclear programmes

Many countries in the Middle East have intentions to develop nuclear power production for peaceful purposes and to estasblish nuclear fuel cycle facilities, which in some cases also would

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36 Only a ship flying the flag of a state at war with Egypt can be prevented from passing the Canal.

have the potential to serve a possible nuclear weapon fabrication programme. In most cases, such peaceful programmes have been initiated but they are modest today[37]. Only Israel has a current capability to pursue a nuclear weapon programme. In addition, as was revealed in 1991, Iraq had undertaken very significant clandestine preparations to fabricate their own nuclear weapons.

It should be understood, however, that acquiring even a modest nuclear force without outside assistance is a major operation and that the time and effort required for various proliferation-prone states to join the atomic club is often grossly underestimated. The recently disclosed nuclear weapon progamme of South Africa is very illustrative in this respect[38].

It should also be noted that many countries in the Middle East are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and thus obliged to submit all their nuclear material to IAEA inspection. Significant countries which are not, include Algeria and Israel.

Morocco is a member of the IAEA and a party to the NPT (1970). Morocco has one 2 Megawatt research reactor under construction.

Algeria is a member of the IAEA but not a party to the NPT. Algeria has announced an interest in estasblishing a nuclear programme but the activity was limited. One 1 Megawatt research reactor was commissioned in 1989 and is subject to IAEA safeguards. A second 15 Megawatt test reactor went critical in 1992 and will be subject to IAEA safeguards.

Libya is both a member of the IAEA and a party to the NPT (1975). Libya has one 10 megawatt research reactor subject to IAEA safeguards.

Egypt is both a member of the IAEA and a party to the NPT (1981). Egypt has one 2 megawatt research reactor subject to IAEA safeguards. A 20 Megawatt reactor is planned.

Israel is a member of the IAEA but not a party to the NPT. Israel has one 5 Megawatt research reactor and one 26 Megawatt reactor (Dimona). The former is subject to IAEA safeguards, the latter is not. The Dimona reactor is widely assumed to be the basis for production of plutonium for possible manufacture of nuclear weapons.

Syria is a member of the IAEA and a party to the NPT (1969). One 30 Megawatt research reactor is under construction.

Iran is both a member of the IAEA and a party to the NPT (1970). Iran has one 5 megawatt research reactor and three other small facilities, all subject to IAEA safeguards. A 27 Megawatt research reactor is under construction. Two power reactors of 1200 Megawatt(e) each was under construction, but have not been worked on for some time.

Saudi Arabia has planned to build one 10 Megawatt research reactor.

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[37] Facts about the nuclear programmes of individual countries used in this paper were found in the IAEA publications *Nuclear Power Reactors in the World* (April 1993 Edition) and *Nuclear Research Reactors in the World* (December 1993 Edition).

[38] In 1993, it was officially revealed that South Africa had fabricated six nuclear explosion devices of a simple guntype based on domestically produced highly enriched uranium. These devices have been dismantled and South Africa became, in July 1991, a party to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. For a description of the South African case, see W. Stumph, *South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Programme* (to be published); and J.W. de Villiers, R. Jardine, M. Reiss, *Why South Africa Gave Up the Bomb*, Foreign Affairs Vol. 72 (No. 5 November/December 1993) pp 98-109.

Iraq is a special case. Iraq is both a member of the IAEA and a party to the NPT (1969). Before the Gulf war in 1991, it was believed that the nuclear programme of Iraq was limited to one 5.5 and one 5 Megawatt research reactor. Both were subject to IAEA safeguards. They were shutdown during the Gulf war..

However, after the Gulf war, it was revealed that Iraq had for many years pursued a clandestine multibillion dollar nuclear weapons programme. This programme, involving also various uranium enrichment efforts, has been in direct violation of Iraq's obligations under the NPT. By Security Council decisions, Iraq is now ordered to destroy all facilities in its weapon program. This process is supervised and verified by a special commission appointed by the Security Council.

The current nuclear programmes of the Middle East countries suggests that only Israel has a nuclear weapon capability, or as many experts believe, is already a nuclear weapon power. The Israeli government has many times declared that Israel will not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East. This policy of deliberate ambiguity has been said to serve Israel´s security interests in three ways: Firstly, in times of gloom, it gives hope to the Israelis; secondly, it may provide caution to the enemies of Israel; and thirdly, it relieves other states from the delicate burden of taking an explicit position on the matter[39].

The military programme of Iraq will now be eliminated. The programme of the other Arab states and of Iran cannot support a nuclear weapon programme, but may be able to do so in a not-so near future.

Preliminary steps

The UN report suggests a catalogue of measures to serve as confidence-building measures and as steps to prepare for a régime that would finally become a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Obviously, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone would require cooperation among not only the prospective zonal states but also between them and nuclear weapon states and other outside states.

Among recommended confidence-building measures were a regional nuclear test ban, the applying of IAEA safeguards on nuclear facilities in the area not covered at present, the acceding to the NPT by states currently non-parties, and providing for transparency regarding all major nuclear projects in the area. International safeguard issues involved was explored at an IAEA workshop in Vienna 4-7 may 1993 on Modalities for the Application of Safeguards in a Future Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East[40].

Nuclear weapon powers could extend negative nuclear security assurances to prospective zonal states and commit themselves not to station nuclear weapons in the area. Any outside state could declare past, current, and future supply of nuclear material and equipment to recipients in the

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39 Atterling Wedar, C., Hellman, S., Söder, K., (Eds.), *Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World.* Swedish Initiatives. (ISBN 91-972128-0-6) Stockholm 1993. p181.

40 The Proceedings of the Workshop on "*Modalities for the Application of Safeguards in a Future Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East*" including the presentations made is available from the International Atomic Energy Agency, Division of External Relations, in Vienna.

prospective zonal area in order to put light on projects now creating suspicion that they may have a military role.

The report also states that outside support for peaceful nuclear activities in the area would be especially appropriate especially when those activities have a multilateral or regional character. Joint projects on nuclear power might be of great interest to countries which are not rich in oil. The provision of international facilities for nuclear waste disposal would help to ensure against diversion of fissionable material to military purposes.

Shared views

Although negotiations to overcome the conflicts in the Middle East have been very difficult, indeed, to get started, the consultations undertaken when preparing the UN report in the summer of 1990 showed a surprising degree of common view on fundamental matters among many of the states in the area; Arab states as well as Iran and Israel. Among the shared views were

* The process to establish a NWFZME would take several years;
* The geographical concept suggested in the report was generally accepted;
* Positive security assurances beyond those outlined in Security Council resolution S/255 (1968)[41] would be necessary. If a zonal state would be subject of aggression, guarantors should assist the victim, punish the aggressor and provide recovery assistance as necessary. It is intriguing to notice that such farreaching guarantees did apply just a few months later in order to liberate Kuwait after it had been occupied by Iraq.
* Verification procedures much more far-reaching than those prescribed under the NPT would be necessary. Again the IAEA operations later undertaken in Iraq under a Security Council mandate[42] show what will be necessary. (Israel wanted additional verification rights similar to those prescribed in the CSCE Stockholm Document in order not to be discriminated against in decision processes based on majority votes.)
* Initial confidence-building measures would be an effective method to support the process of establishing a NWFZME.
* Although Israel was generally considered a nuclear weapon state, a view neither encouraged nor denied by Israel itself, nuclear weapons were considered political rather than war-fighting instruments.

Because of the above-mentioned common views, a NWFZME could be considered a realistic project, although the establishment of such a zone would most probably take some time. The immediate obstacle is rather to get talks started.

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41 The resolution was adopted in June 1968 to support the NPT. It calls upon the Security Council to take immediate action, should a party to the NPT be subject to nuclear aggression or the threat of such aggression.

42 SC Res 687 (1991) 3 April 1991.