# THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS:
# THE MEDITERRANEAN DIMENSION
MeSCo Annual Meeting
Mediterranean Study Commission
Istituto affari internazionali
Roma, 25-26/II/1994

**Mediterranean Study Commission
- MeSCo -**

First Meeting

Rome, February 25-26, 1994

Under the Patronage of the
Regional Council of Latium

**Commission d'Etude de la Méditerranée
- CodEMe -**

Première Rencontre

Rome, 25-26 Février 1994

Sous le Patronage du
Conseil Régional du Latium

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# The Middle East Peace Process: the Mediterranean Dimension

# Le Processus de Paix au Moyen-Orient : la Dimension Méditerranéenne
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Conference Programme\Programme des travaux

Conference site: Italian Office of the EC Commission, Via Poli 29, Rome
Tel. 06\69999242 - Fax. 06\6791658

9:00    Welcome
*Gerardo Mombelli,* Director of the Italian Office of the EC
Commission
*Rodolfo Gigli,* President of the Regional Council of Latium

9:15    **First Session:**
**Mediterranean Study Commission initiative: goals, scope, rules of
the Commission** - Chairperson: *Rachid Driss,* Association des Etudes
Internationales, Tunis

Introductory remarks by *Roberto Aliboni,* Istituto Affari Internazionali,
Rome

Discussants: *El-Sayed Yassin,* Al-Ahram Center for Political and
Strategic Studies, Cairo
*Álvaro Vasconcelos,* Instituto de Estudos Estrategicos e
Internacionais, Lisbon

10:45   Coffee break

11:15   **Second Session:**
**The post-Cold War debate on security and security institutions in
Europe and the Arab World: implications for the Middle East and
the Mediterranean** - Chairperson: *Theodore Couloumbis,* Hellenic
Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, Athens

Papers presented by *Josef Janning,* Forschungsgruppe Europa,
University of Mainz & *Jamaleddine Maazoun,* Association des Études
Internationales, Tunis

13:00   Lunch

14:30   **Third Session:**
**The emerging European Union: past policies and future
implications for the Middle East and the Mediterranean**
Chairperson: *Joseph Alpher,* The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel
Aviv University

Paper presented by *Álvaro Vasconcelos,* Instituto de Estudos
Estratégicos e Internacionais, Lisbon

Discussant:   *Assia Ben Salah Alaoui,* Centre d'Etudes Stratégiques de
Rabat

16:00   Coffee break

16:30       **Fourth Session**:
**North-South relations in the Mediterranean area within the framework of the «new world order»: the right of intervention and the role of the UN** - Chairperson: *Seyfi Tashan*, Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara

Paper presented by *Naser Tahboub*, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan

Discussant: *Bassma Kodmani Darwish*, Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Paris

18:00       Conference adjourns

20:30       Dinner

## Saturday, February 26

9:15       **Fifth Session**:
**Arms control and limitation in the Middle East peace process**
Chairperson: *Miloud El-Mehadbi*, Mediterranean Studies Centre, Tripoli

Papers presented by *Shai Feldman*, The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University

Discussants: *Maurizio Cremasco*, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
*Hamdy Saleh*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo

10:45       Coffee break

11:15       **Sixth Session**:
**The Mediterranean Study Commission initiative: The future work**
Chairperson: *Salvino Busuttil*, Foundation for International Studies, Malta

Closing remarks by *El-Sayed Yassin*

13:00       End of the Conference

13:30       Lunch

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# The Middle East Peace Process: the Mediterranean Dimension

# Le Processus de Paix au Moyen-Orient : la Dimension Méditerranéenne
\*\*\*

List of the Participants\Liste des Participants

1 - <u>MeSCo's Members</u> [white badge]


Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, CAIRO, Egypt:
Dr. El-Sayed YASSIN, Director

Association des Etudes Internationales, TUNIS, Tunisia:
Amb. Rachid DRISS, President

Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, AMMAN, Jordan:
Dr. Naser TAHBOUB

CERI - Centro Español de Relaciones Internacionales, MADRID, Spain:
Prof. Fernando RODRIGO RODRIGUEZ, Deputy Director

CESR - Centre d'Etudes Stratégiques de Rabat, Université Mohammed V, RABAT, Morocco:
Prof. Assia BEN SALAH ALAOUI

ELIAMEP - Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy, ATHENS, Greece:
Prof. Theodore COULOUMBIS, President

Foreign Policy Institute, ANKARA, Turkey:
Dr. Seyfi TASHAN, Director

Foundation for International Studies, VALLETTA, Malta:
Prof. Salvino BUSUTTIL, Director

IAI - Istituto Affari Internazionali, ROME, Italy:
Dr. Roberto ALIBONI, Director of Studies

IEEI - Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, LISBON, Portugal:
Dr. Alvaro VASCONCELOS, Director

IFRI - Institut Français de Relations Internationales, PARIS, France:
Dr. Bassma KODMANI DARWISH

INESG - Institut National des Etudes de Stratégie Globale, ALGIERS, Algeria:
Dr. Dahmane NAIDJA, General Secretary

JCSS - The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, TEL AVIV, Israel:
Dr. Joseph ALPHER, Director

KYKEM - Cyprus Research Center, NICOSIA, Cyprus:
Dr. Nikos KOUTSOU, President

Mediterranean Studies Centre, TRIPOLI, Libya:
Dr. Miloud EL-MEHADBI, Director

PASSIA - Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, EAST JERUSALEM:
Dr. Rochelle DAVIS


2 - Guest speakers [yellow badge]

Dr. Maurizio CREMASCO, Istituto Affari Internazionali, ROME, Italy

Dr. Shai FELDMAN, The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, TEL AVIV, Israel

Dr. Josef JANNING, Forschungsgruppe Europa, University of MAINZ, Germany

Dr. Jamaleddine MAAZOUN, Association des Études Internationales, TUNIS, Tunisia

Min. Hamdy SALEH, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CAIRO, Egypt


3 - IAI Representatives [blue badge]


Dr. Laura GUAZZONE, Senior Researcher

Prof. Cesare MERLINI, President

Dr. Stefano SILVESTRI, Vice-President


4 - Observers [green badge]

Dr. Nadejda ARBATOVA, Head of Section on European Studies, IMEMO - Institute for World Economy and International Relations, MOSCOW, Russia

Dr. Alberto BIN, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta, VALLETTA, Malta

Prof. Khalifa CHATER, Vice-President, Association des Etudes Internationales, TUNIS, Tunisia

Gen. Brig. Giuseppe CUCCHI, Director, CEMISS - Centro Militare di Studi Strategici, ROME, Italy

Prof. Yves GHEBALI, InterParliamentary Union and Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, GENEVA, Switzerland

Dr. Rodolfo GIGLI, President, Regional Council of Latium, ROME, Italy

Dr. Martin KOHLER, Friederich Ebert Stiftung, ROME, Italy

Amb. Mohamed Sharif MAHMUD, Head of Mission, League of the Arab States, ROME, Italy

Dr. Gerardo MOMBELLI, Director, Italian Office of the European Community Commission, ROME, Italy

Dr. Selim NASR, Programme Officer, The Ford Foundation, CAIRO, Egypt

Prof. Fred TANNER, Director, Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta, VALLETTA, Malta

Min. Roberto TOSCANO, Directorate General for Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROME, Italy

Dr. Roberto ZADRA, Institute of Security Studies, West European Union, PARIS, France

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# Le Processus de Paix au Moyen-Orient : la Dimension Méditerranéenne
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Speech by/Discours de
**Rodolfo GIGLI**
Consiglio Regionale del Lazio, Roma

## Speech by Dr. Rodolfo Gigli, President, Regional Council of Latium

I would like, first of all, to welcome the representatives of the Mediterranean institutes of international and strategic studies, the observers from international institutions, and other foreign guests who are here to participate in the work of the Mediterranean Studies Commission.

A special welcome goes to the members of the Mediterranean Studies Commission, which meets for the first time today. I am very pleased to be here and to contribute to the inauguration of this Commission here in our Region of Latium. This meeting is very important for three reasons:

First, the end of the Cold War ushered in an era of profound and unexpected changes. In the new context, the notions and policies of cooperation and security are changing, but it is not always possible to foresee the direction of these changes. Therefore, the creation of a forum that gathers Mediterranean institutes which study these issues is an extremely positive development, as it enables them to join forces within a framework of dialogue on security and cooperation that the Mediterranean needs.

Second, the Mediterranean area is very important for the countries which border it. Of course, the Arab countries are Arab before they are Mediterranean; similarly, the European countries are European first and then Mediterranean; and Israel seems to be beginning to become integrated with its Arab neighbors within an economic cooperation zone that could include the entire Near East. Despite these strong solidarities, the fact remains that the countries lying on the Mediterranean have a significant Mediterranean dimension. The Mediterranean countries have strong ties and common interests; alongside their Arab or European policies, they cannot but have a Mediterranean policy. And they must also ensure that this Mediterranean dimension is given its due importance in the security and cooperation policies of the institutions to which they belong (for example, the European Union and the Arab League). As an Italian and as a European, I believe that all the members of the European Union must give the Mediterranean area the attention it deserves, and that the current tendency to devote greater attention to the countries of Eastern Europe must not be at the expense of the Mediterranean.

Finally, I would like to underline the fact that Rome has always been one of the great cities of the Mediterranean -- together with Algiers, Istanbul, Athens, Alexandria, etc-- and is thus characterized by both the grandeur and the serious problems that these cities and surrounding areas have in common. I believe, therefore, that the inauguration of the Commission in Rome has a high symbolic value.

I am speaking as President of the Regional Council of Latium, that is of the Legislative Assembly of the Region. Italy is divided into Regions. The existence of the Regions is an important element in Italian democracy: not only do they reflect historical and cultural differences which must be respected, they are charged with bringing the public administration closer to the people and govern many important economic and social sectors.

Since these economic and social sectors of Regional competence are being increasingly integrated into common policies of the European Union, the Regions now find themselves managing important sectors of these common European policies. Thus, the Regions have become international actors and are involved in the mechanisms of foreign policy.

The international action of the Regions has had to be increased in the last few years because of the waves of migrants and refugees caused by the tensions arising from the end of the Cold War and the increasing income gap between Western European countries and those in the Mediterranean, Africa and Eastern Europe. The Regions are on the front line in the concrete management of the social, cultural and economic problems deriving from this sudden increase in the population within their boundaries.

For these reasons, in addition to more general cultural and geopolitical considerations, the Region of Latium is interested in the Mediterranean and believes that its Mediterranean interests are bound to increase. Thus, we are attentively following the numerous initiatives in progress among the Regions of the Mediterranean--the most recent being the Seville Charter--and is participating in several of these. Many projects on the Mediterranean have also been undertaken within the Region of Latium, such as the establishment of Unimed, a network of Mediterranean universities.

The Region of Latium's interest in the Mediterranean is reflected in our interest in your Commission to study security and cooperation in the Mediterranean area. We are therefore very interested in following the progress of this initiative and we hope that your activities will continue and gain strength.

In conclusion, I would like to thank the Istituto Affari Internazionali--an institute which belongs to our Region--for having taken the initiative to launch the Mediterranean Studies Commission. Thus, on behalf of the Region of Latium, I extend my best wishes to the Istituto Affari Internazionali and to the Mediterranean Studies Commission for a productive meeting and future success.

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*«Mediterranean Study Commission Initiative:*
*goals, scope, rules of the Commission»*

*«Initiative de la Commission d'Etude de la Méditerranée :*
*composition et objectifs de la Commission»*

by/par

**Roberto ALIBONI**
Istituto Affari Internazionali, Roma

# WHY A MEDITERRANEAN STUDY COMMISSION? SOME SUGGESTIONS ABOUT MESCO GOALS AND RULES

by
*Roberto Aliboni*, Director of Studies

## The Mediterranean Today

The institution of a Mediterranean Study Commission (MeSCo) requires a definition of the Mediterranean area and a rationale for Mediterranean solidarity or identity. Why get together and who should get together?

These two questions are partly inter-related and the debate about them is long-standing.

Let me start with the last question: who should get together? For those, like the Egyptian economist Samir Amin, who advocates the "delinking"[1] of the Mediterranean region from the dominance of the great international capitalist powers, principally the US, in order to create a kind of co-prosperity sphere between Southern Europe and the Arab countries the Mediterranean sea, the countries which should get together are more or less those around the basin.

But this is a Mediterraneo-centric approach, that is, one which considers the Mediterranean area as its focus or center; another approach considers the Mediterranean basin as a frontier or a boundary towards which many internally cohesive areas gravitate. This second approach includes initiatives such as the following:

1. The Arab-European dialogue, which began between the European Community and the Arab League after the 1973-74 oil crisis;

2. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) in the Mediterranean), which originated as a proposal put forward by the Spanish and the Italian governments in September 1990, included the US, Russia (then the Soviet Union), Western Europe, the Arab countries on the Mediterranean and on the Gulf as well as Iran. Today the 1990 initiative is heralded by the Inter-Parliamentary Union and other international bodies.

In the few years which elapsed since the CSCM proposal, there has been a trend toward expanding the scope of the CSCM and changing the Mediterranean frontier.
- the East-West dimension within the Mediterranean has disappeared;
- Russia's leadership is now committed to taking the country westward and to establish firm links with the Group of Seven;
- Central Asia has emerged as a gray area which has to find its way

between its Islamic background and the "westernization" it underwent within the USSR;
- the US interest in the Mediterranean area, as the southern flank of the Atlantic Alliance, is shifting increasingly eastward, to the Near East, where the US is committed to help solve the Arab-Israeli crisis, and to the Gulf, where its military presence after the Gulf war of 1990-91 definitely increased and stabilized.

As a result of these changes, the frontier is today exclusively North-South and it stretches through what international security analysts refer to as the southern branch of a wider arc of crisis (the "new arc of crisis"), including in its eastern branch the areas east of Western Europe, from the Balkans to Russia-- an area which goes well beyond the Mediterranean basin, very similar to the "big game" area envisioned by the Victorian promoters of the British Empire.

This leads to the question of whether we should enlarge the CSCM to include Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and if so, should we enlarge the notion and the membership of the Mediterranean Study Commission accordingly?

To answer this question, it is useful to return to a geographical notion of the Mediterranean basin. During the Cold War, as many other times in its history, the Mediterranean area was unified by a an overwhelming global conflict and by the American dominance. With the end of the Cold War, there has been a tendency toward fragmentation. Relevant strategic stakes and goals in relation to the new arc of crisis in the South and its Mediterranean branch are in flux. On one hand, there are trends, like unconventional proliferation and Islamism, which go beyond the Mediterranean and the new arc of crisis in the South; on the other hand, there are trends towards sub-regionalization and localization.

In the Arab countries I visited in order to prepare this session of the Mediterranean Study Commission, I perceived feelings that reflect a very divided Mediterranean: to put it very briefly, the Near East is focussing on peace negotiations, debating the possibility of establishing a regional economic cooperation and looking at the US as its essential interlocutor; in contrast, the Maghreb feels less involved in these negotiations and considers its main external problem as being related to reshaping or streamlining its relations with Europe and the European Union.

In all the Mediterranean Arab countries I visited, the European Union is regarded as impotent and egoistic. This is not to suggest that there are warmer feelings toward the US. But there is the acknowledgement of an American commitment (to bomb the Serbs and lift the arms embargo on Bosnia; to further the Arab-Isreali negotiations; to integrate migrants in the American society; etc.), whereas Europe seems totally absent, indifferent and sometime even hostile (though many Arab and American judgements are definitely unfair).

This general Arab feeling aside, The European role is perceived very differently in the Maghreb and in the Mashreq: for the Maghreb, the European Union remains the natural, unavoidable interlocutor; in the Near East the European Union is somehow regarded as a more distant and loose option. A similar feeling is growing in Turkey, but both Turkey and Egypt (and Italy)--as always at the juncture of different worlds--seem interested in keeping a fair balance betwen Western Europe, the US, Africa and the Near East.

To conclude this discussion, it seems to me that the main trend in the Mediterranean today is fragmentation, because of the absence of unifying factors--be they internal or external-- and because of the presence of trends working beyond the Mediterranean area proper (e.g. the new arc of crisis, unconventional proliferation, Islamism). For the time being, two main inter-regional arrangements seem to be emerging:

   (i) a Middle Eastern area, probably heading towards the establishment of cooperative regional links, in association with a strong political and military American presence, and a strong economic European and Japanese assistance; Turkey tends to be part to this arrangement, politically, militarily and economically;

   (ii) in addition, there is a North African area (to which Egypt is equally part) which is seeking to shape closer economic (and, perhaps, political) ties with the European Union.

## Questions About MeSCo Membership

Now, to return to the question of who should participate in the Mediterranean Study Commission, I thought that the Commission should neither accommodate too many or too distant members, nor to limit itself to the Middle East or to the Maghreb. In the end, I felt that the simplistic geographic notion of Mediterranean had to be adopted. Consequently, I addressed invitations to Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Palestinians, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Cyprus, Greece, Malta, Italy, France, Spain and Portugal.

This decision is based, first of all, on the wish to make the MeSCo a manageable, affordable and workable entity. It is also based, however, on several more substantive reasons:

Despite changes over time in the strategic environment and their implications for the international role of the Mediterranean, the area remains fundamentally unified by a deep cultural and ecological homogeneity. Though characterized by cultural and religious differences, the Mediterranean cannot be divided accordingly, because these differences spring from a very ancient shared cultural and ecological background.

Moreover, geographic proximity and a number of evident economic and financial complimentarities are potentially factors for a strong synergy for economic development. This potential was not exploited in the crucial modernization stage in postwar Europe because of a set of political and

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ideological cleavages. Unless Islamism emerges as another such cleavage, the end of the Cold War and the settlement about Palestine should allow Mediterranean interdependence to start working and to yield dividends.

Finally, it is precisely because the Mediterranean is a frontier between changing, powerful forces and because the countries bordering the basin find themeselves exposed to these changes and powers, that they are interested in developing forms of cooperation and transparency to provide as much prevention, stability and security as they can to their area. This is not to say, as advocated by the Mediterraneo-centric schools of thought, that their Mediterranean solidarity will precede their fundamental loyalties towards Europe or the Arab world or Islam, and so on. However, no Mediterranean country can sensibly ignore the fact that it has a Mediterranean dimension and that this dimension consitutes an important interface between cooperation and conflict.

## Former Yugoslavia and Other Non-Mediterranean Countries

Two points on membership still merit attention: what should we do with respect to the former Yugoslav countries bordering on the Adriatic sea? How should we account for external or distant countries with ties to the Mediterranean area, like Russia, the US, Saudi Arabia, Iran and so on?

Apart from geography, Mr. Matvejevic's essay on the Mediterranean[2] reminds us that the Slav peoples on the Eastern side of the Adriatic sea feel no less Mediterranean than do Italians on the western side. Still, despite Muslim involvement in Bosnia, the present crisis in the former Yugoslavia is only remotely related to the set of security and cooperation issues that prevail in Mediterranean North-South relations. In a sense, there are elements of intra-European and East-West conflict in the former Yugoslavia that are totally absent from the Mediterranean stage. In any case, the on-going crisis and its unpredictability make it difficult to decide on the possible MeSCo membership of Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia and Albania.

The question remains open. My suggestion is that the next MeSCo Secretary, one of the member Institutes, or a non-Mediterranean scholar could address the question and report to next meeting.

As for non-Mediterranean countries and institutes, many would be interested in participating. But, once again, the risk is that the MeSCo could become unmanageable and financially unsustainable for the hosting institute. The solution I suggest is already clear from the structure of this first meeting of the Mediterranean Study Commission. The MeSCo should feel free to invite guest speakers and observers. This would not only be a way to meet requests from non-Mediterraneans entities to participate, but, most of all, it could be a way to account for the fact that Mediterranean destinies are influenced to a large extent by external factors. A closed club of Mediterranean institutes would clearly be a mistake.

## Other Questions Related to Membership

There are other questions related to membership. What types of institutes should be members of the MeSCo? The Italian International Affairs Institute (IAI) which initiated this exercise, is a private, non-profit, non-university institute of international relations, interested in international security and cooperation and strategic affairs. It is an independent association with the aim of carrying out research work and to make it available to decision makers in the government, political parties, the business world, and the military to contribute to policy making and to improve inter-action and cross-fertlization among them. This kind of institution already exists in Southern European countries, from Portugal to Turkey, and in Israel. Though there are similar institutions in the Arab countries, those existing in the Arab countries are either part of universities or tied to governments.

In preparing the first MeSCo meeting, I did made my best to identify the most suitable institutes with the help of my colleagues in the troika. I may have made mistakes, for which I wish to apologize. These mistakes can be corrected by future MeSCo secretaries. I would, however, keep strictly to the above requirements because they will endow MeSCo with a distinctive identity and expertise. As a frequent participant in "Mediterranean" meetings, I am convinced that reference to the "Mediterranean" is almost invariably too general, and meetings become irrelevant and rhetorical. Consequently, sticking to a well defined kinds of institutions is crucial for Mesco's effectiveness.

Another requirement to preserve the viability of MeSCo is that no more than one institute should represent each member country. I have already received many complaints from countries in which there is a multiplicity of (often very distinguished) institutes. As MeSCo institutes are meant to be private, it is not easy to identify a "national" institute. Clearly this is a very difficult question, which should be left to the experience and diplomatic tact of the Secretary. My suggestion is that institutes which become MeSCo members should act as "national" representatives: they should not necessarily send their staff members to MeSCo meetings; rather they would be expected to identify and send participants from their country who have expertise in the research subjects and themes dealt with by the Commission.

The implementation of this proposal would be facilitated if members could send more than one participants. This in turn depends on funds available to hosting institutes, which are generally insufficient. In sum, it will be up to each member institute to find a sensible solution on this point.

## MeSCo Goals

I have three models in mind in order to help to define MeSCo's goals:
- the former IISS European Study Commission;
- the former East-West Conference of the European Directors of the Institutes of International Relations;

- the Trans-European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA).

In all of the above, there are aspects which may be relevant to MeSCo.

The European Study Commission had the task of giving Europeans a framework for discussing security questions in a non-Atlantic circle. Though it was a European "club", it was very much open to Americans and other guests. The Commission singled out issues that seemed important for Europeans to have their own debate on. It was devoted to encouraging the birth of a European security identity.

The East-West West Conference aimed at making encounters and discussions possible between European Institutes in the framework of the Cold War (which in the sixties was very cold). The official nature of the Eastern institutes made the exercise almost useless, until the emergence of the CSCE process allowed this club to work more freely and make its contribution to the overall process that brought Europe to the end of the Cold War and the signing of the Paris Charter.

TEPSA's task is to organize joint research among its member institutes (and other individuals from other institutes or universities) on subjects broadly relevant to European integration and Europe's external relations.

Borrowing from these experiences and taking Mediterranean circumstances into account, I think that the Mediterranean Study Commission should be a club of Mediterraneans--open to contributions from other sides-- which should organize an annual meeting on issues relevant to Mediterranean cooperation and security. This exercise should foster a Mediterranean consciousness and, most of all, understanding, rather than a Mediterranean identity.

Consciousness and understanding should allow the MeSCo to reach another goal: to contribute to any CSCE or CSCM-like process which may eventually start in the Mediterranean--perhaps even to contribute to its implementation.

One MeSCo feature which seems to me to be very important is its private nature. As an example of non-governmental cooperation -- cooperation at the level of civil societies-- it would seem more apt to foster democracy and dialogue than pressure on governments to adopt Western-like democratic institutions. The debate on cultural differences ought to pass through private institutions to be fruitful. The dialogue will never be the result of international conditionality. The MeSCo may do good work in this field.

As for joint research, it could be a very useful form of cooperation. If MeSCo stabilizes, it should be very attractive for Foundations and acquire the necessary authority and credibility to attract funding. This should become an important task for MeSco's leadership. However, I do not believe that MeSCo

will be able to reach the same level of activity as say, TEPSA in the short term. TEPSA activity in Western Europe is sustained by an intense institutional network and by an integrated political and economic environment which for the time being is non-existent in the Mediterranean. Consequently, I think that MeSCo must try to organize joint research, but should not be too ambitious; it should be very flexible and avoid making the mistake of dealing with problems of systemic coordination among Mediterranean institutes that cannot be solved at the momement.

But MeSCo should not be too pessimistic either. We have successful examples of research cooperation in the Mediterranean. For example, the Institute for International and Strategic Studies in Lisbon is organizing a research project among the Western Mediterranean institutes dealing with security in that area. In the past, the IAI and the Al-Ahram CPSS organized a number of successful joint research projects.

Two more important goals should be indicated for MeSCo: mutual information and institution-building. Exchanging information is a very difficult task, because very often institutes have scarce resources and are so committed to accomplishing their activities that they have no resources left to list and analize their own activities. Also, institutes receive so many questionnaires that in order to fill all of them, they would have to devote one person to the job and not every institute can afford to do so. Nevertheless, the Secretary must put pressure on MeSCo members to send information about their activities. This is important in itself, but also because it would be the basis for setting up the appropriate agenda for the annual meeting. Issuing a newsletter, as IAI i doing, can be helpful.

Finally, MeSCo should be an incentive for the creation of new think tanks or the improvement of existing ones. Thanks to many training programmes funded by Foundations, governments and Western international institutions, like NATO and the European Community, Western institutes have hosted a good number of collegues coming from Eastern European and Russian institutions in the last few years. Such a programme could be encouraged and managed by MeSCo and its member institutes.

## MeSCo's Functionig and Continuity

The way the Commission may work was already set out in the first issue of the "MeSCo Newsletter".

The MeSCo should be managed by a Secretariat based at the institute responsible for organizing the annual meeting of the Commission. This responsibility should be assumed by a different institute each year. The host institute should cover the on-site expenses; each participating institute should cover the travel expenses of its representatives.

The main function of the secretariat should be to organize the annual

meeting. Its primary objective should be to serve as a link between the member institutes in order to prepare an agenda for the annual meeting. The secretariat should also designate the paper writers for the annual meeting.

Thanks to the grant obtained from the Ford Foundation, I was able to travel and personally visit most of the institutes involved in the Commission. I believe that personal contact made by the Secretariat, whenever possible, is crucial to the success of the exercise.

The MeSCo secretary should be assisted by his/her predecessor and successor. This troika is designed to ensure continuity in the MeSCo. Whether the troika is sufficient to for this purpose is something that the Rome meeting of the MeSCo institutes should carefully take into consideration. The rotation system among institutes is the most logical one. However, past experiences show that this may fail to provide continuity. In the case of TEPSA, for example, rotation had to be replaced by a permanent Secretariat in Bruxelles. But it seems to me that a permanent Secretariat for MeSCo is inappropriate. MeSCo was born to promote cooperation and exchanges and I think that rotation is an important element in this process. In conclusion, I think that this is an open issue and I hope the institutes' gathering in Rome will make constructive suggestions.

The Newsletter may work as an important factor in ensuring continuity (and, of course, information exchange). The IAI has published two issues (the second one is being distributed during the Rome meeting) and will publish a third issue to report on the first meeting of the Commission. Then we will stop. I think it is difficult, though not impossibile to rotate the responsibility for publishing the newsletter, though it is not impossible. This is the last question we have to address at this meeting.

With this, I conclude my report and thank you all for coming and collaborating in the the MeSCo initiative.

**Questions to be dealt with at the 1st MeSCo meeting and responses suggested by the out-going Secretary**

(1) <u>Which countries should be members of MeSCo?</u>
   At present, it seems that the geographic notion of Mediterranean should be the criteria for membership: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Palestinians, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Cyprus, Greece, Malta, Italy, France, Spain and Portugal.

(2) <u>Should former Yugoslav countries bordering on the Adriatic sea be members of the MeSCo?</u>
   The next MeSCo Secretary, one of the member Institutes, or a non-Mediterranean scholar should address the question and report to next meeting.

(3) <u>Should external or distant countries with links to the Mediterranean, like Russia, the US, Saudi Arabia, Iran and so on, be included in the MeSCo?</u>
   They should be invited as guest speakers and observers.

(4) <u>What types of institutes should be members of the MeSCo?</u>
   Preferred members should be private, non-profit, non-university institutes of international relations, interested in international security and cooperation and strategic affairs. They should be independent associations with the aim of carrying out research and making it available to decision makers in the government, political parties, the business world and the military in order to contribute to policy making and to improve inter-action and cross-fertlization among them.

(5) <u>How many institutes should represent each member country?</u>
   No more than one institute. Institutes becoming members of MeSCo should act as "national" representatives. They should not necessarily send their staff members to MeSCo meetings; rather they should send participants from their respective countries with expertise in the research subjects and themes dealt with by the Commission.

(6) <u>Should MeSCo organize joint research among its members?</u>
   MeSCo must try to organize joint research, but should be flexible and avoid making the mistake of dealing with problems of systemic coordination among Mediterranean institutes that cannot be solved at present.

(7) <u>How should continuity be provided to MeSCo?</u>
   No suggestion is provided by the Secretary.

(8) <u>Should the newsletter, if any, be rotated along with the Secretariat?</u>
   No suggestion is provided by the Secretary.

1. Samir Amin, *Delinking. Towards a Polycentric World*, Zed Book Ltd, London & New Jersey, 1990.

2. Predrag Matvejević, *Mediteranski Brevijar*, GZH, Zagreb, 1987.

Josef Janning


# European Security beyond the East-West Conflict.
# Implications for the Mediterranean


Paper prepared for the
Mediterranean Study Commission


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First Draft
- do not quote -
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The new Europe is at present living in an age that has no name, and which is not characterized by a distinctive political constellation. The rationale of the old order does not apply any longer, and the architecture of the coming epoch has not as yet materialized. Instead, Europe is simultaneously experiencing integration and relative stability on the one hand, and disintegration and instability on the other. In the West a highly complicated system of interdependence is in the process of being negotiated, and yet at the same time the area is witnessing a degree of disintegration. The markets for goods and services throughout Europe are becoming international, and yet at the same time the number of states, national markets and currencies is on the increase. In Central Europe command economies have disappeared peacefully, and yet at the same time there is an outbreak of archaic violence, destruction, alienation and hatred in the Balkans. The phenomenon of these conflicts, which go back to the inter-war period, being fought with a post-war arsenal of weapons emphasizes the importance of shaping an all-European order after Communism. A diffuse feeling of insecurity has become endemic among the Europeans.

The continent is in search of an appropriate form. Constellations dating from the time when Europe was divided into East and West are rapidly disappearing, and all the possible kinds of order -- European integration, nation state and region -- are being critically examined with regard to efficacy, integrative effectiveness and ability to shape the future. Patterns long considered obsolete have returned to the political arena: the religiously and culturally demarcated parts of Europe, processes of renationalization and the ethnically based striving for power. The static nature of the East-West conflict has been followed by numerous conflicts of an explosive and dynamic nature. There are nationalist and economic conflicts, conflicts involving territorial claims, power struggles based on religion and ethnicity, conflicts involving minorities, and crises of governmental authority.

The static nature of European security has been replaced by a flux of risk perceptions, institutional changes, conceptual re-definitions and political manoeuvering.

After the East-West conflict, the making of foreign policy and security policy in Europe is confronted with a set of new variables. The overall security relationships have moved from a structure of confrontation to a diffuse non-order in which alliance membership is shifting and different levels of security have emerged. In relative terms, the conflict rationality of the Cold War has been extremely high -- at least much higher than within the present situation of a relative unpredictability of conflict behavior. On the continent, war-fighting has once again become a means to pursue political goals.

The high defense-technological impulse of the past era has given way to a non-regime of as of yet uncontrollable military action: in the former Yugoslavia and the Southern parts of the CIS the peaceful revolution of 1989 has shown its ugly post-dictarorial face. In the light of 1989, the issues of hard security seem to have lost most of their importance. In hindsight, however, it has become apparent that security in times of fundamental change still remains a precious item and a highly political issue. After all, most of the old defense postures and security doctrines in the West have proven to be irrelevant for the containment of the ethnic, territorial or religious conflicts on Europe's periphery.

Beyond the Cold War, security policies in Europe are confronted with fundamental changes that are not new to Western politics but have assumed a new quality after the end of the East-West conflict.

Security and defense can hardly be legitimized with reference to a clear cut threat. Currently, no political ideology and no military potential poses an imminent threat to the territorial integrity and normative stability of the democracies of Europe. This change is all the more important because the rationale of military forces along the central front has been largely built on the evidence of such a threat. As a result, the relatively large and well equipped conventional ground forces in Western Europe lack a credible definition of their purpose.

Furthermore, security and defense policies in Europe have to be supported by electorates that are increasingly less outward looking. In hindsight one might conclude that both the tensions of the inter-war period and its in-built potential for revisionism and the nuclear threat of the antagonistic structure of the recent decades have worked towards the conservation of a foreign policy orientation dating back to the days of the Concert of Europe. For the first time in this century, no overriding international constellation or threat predetermines the policy of governments in Western Europe. Though this situation may just be the characteristic of a transition period, the focus of West European publics has nethertheless shifted to the domestic agenda.

Finally, security and defense policies in Europe have to be conceived against the background of instant media coverage and communication. The CNN mode of consuming interantional affairs has replaced the world view as communicated by the forewign policy elites in our political systems. Any new crisis and any attempt to deal with it are subject to a continuous assessement on the global TV screen.

Against this background, the current issues of security policy are but attempts to react to the new challenges:

- the old and new ways to think about risks and threats,
- the new questions of keeping peace in Europe,
- the means to modernize integrated security and defense structures of the democracies of Europe,
- the paradigm changes in the international system and the prospects for cooperation and conflict,
- the emergence of the Mediterranean as 'the other strategic problem' of Europe.

## I.    Geopolitics and the Balance of Power

The end of the East-West Conflict has led to clearly apparent shifts in the political map of Europe. Old ties are losing their significance and are being supplanted by new political allegiances. In the long term foreign policy orientations will change and adapt themselves to the new lines of gravity. Most visibly, the new Europe changes the role of the central regions in Europe:

From being at the center of Western Europe, France, seen in a European perspective, has shifted to the edge of the continent. This will become even more apparent as democracy and free market economies establish themselves to the east of Germany. From being on the periphery of the eastern bloc, Czechoslovakia first shifted directly towards the West European center, and nevertheless subsequently fell apart into two states. Before 1989 Europe did not possess a center that was of any importance in political terms, and thus did not have the problems associated with a constellation grouped around such a center. In the meantime old concepts have had to be reassessed. Germany, which sees itself as part of the West, though under different preconditions, is nonetheless situated between the East and the West. Austria is presently confronted with claims, expectations and opportunites for influence in its immediate neighbourhood that used to be taboo in Viennese foreign policy deliberations. Nor can Italy afford to turn a blind eye to the conflicts on the Balkans. The Adriatic does not only separate it from them; it also forms a link. Other such regions are:

- Southern Europe: the poorer member states of the European Union. They perceive their financial expectations as being in direct competition with the financial transfers to the East;
- the part of Western Europe that includes the two nuclear powers of the old constellation, whose nuclear-based assertion of power and role in the maintenance of international order are declining;
- Western Central Europe, including Germany and Austria, who, as part of the West, are most directly affected by the developments in the East;
- the Adriatic area and Italy, which feels most directly affected by the upheavals in

Southeastern Europe;
- Central Eastern Europe, including Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, whose capacity for reform has increased the distance to their former Comecon partners, though this is currently insufficient in political and economic terms to enable them to participate in West European integration;
- Northern Europe, where the soft transition from West to East and partial neutrality have become meaningless, and which will become part of the European Union;
- Eastern Europe in the vicinity of the European part of Russia, whose perspectives are conditioned by the political distance and the physical proximity of Russia;
- Southeastern Europe, whose distinct separation from Western and Central Eastern Europe is the result of ethnic conflict and the partly latent and partly manifest territorial ambitions of its key states.

These areas have no political organization but their 'members' share some important interests and policiy preferences. With a few exceptions -- like Italy -- these geographic and geopolitical positions explain the context of national and integrative political strategies. Here, the different rationales for deepening and widening of the European Union may be found; and this is also the starting point for national concepts of integration, control and the distribution of resources within the European Union.

The aftermath of the NATO ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs will demonstrate this approach. Little will have been changed, a 'bad peace' will be the only solution and Russia has managed to return as a power player -- the rules of this game being very familiar in the Kremlin.

## Balance of Power Tactics

Not just Russia but many European states make use of a well-tried political device in the present interim period. Balance of power policies which aim to preserve and restore an equilibrium have once again become a dominant feature of European politics.

Behind the multilaterist rhetoric of the CSCE, the conflicts between the heirs of the former Soviet Union, the attempts to form a Hexagonale and the cooperation of the Visegrad states stand national assessments of how to balance off the potential of one's neighbours. In Western Europe the process of European integration has become a vehicle for new balance of power policies. France countered the shift in the internal balance of power brought about by German reunification with an offer for further integration. The United Kingdom countered the idea of a European Union with the prospect of widening its membership, thereby hoping to reduce the level of integration. The southern members of the European Union have taken West European financial transfers to the reform states as an opportunity to make new financial demands.

In the western and the eastern parts of the European continent the recourse to balance of power politics provides the key to understanding both conflicts and cooperation. Yet in the present context this process should not be seen as a return to the kind of high-level European cabinet diplomacy that used to exist in the past. Of course, politics and societies sometimes take their bearings from ancient conflicts or strategies. However, they cannot evade the conditions and the instruments of economic and political interdependence. The peculiar nature of present-day balance-of-power politics thus derives from the unusual combination of classical diplomacy and modern integrative procedures. It is also possible to pursue policies of national interest within the European Union, within its legal framework and in the context of its political dynamism. Union institutions and forms of joint decision-making are just as much suited to integration, control and balancing.

As the process of reordering of the continent continues, such balance of power tactics will affect the security structures in Western Europe in three ways:
- First, there will be a significant increase in distributional conflict among the European states. One of the premises of the balance of power is a degree of mistrust of the capabilities and ambitions of one's neighbours. In this light, integration is also seen as a zero-sum game in which the aim is to hold on to what one has.
- Secondly, balance of power politics favor the tendency to renationalization as a way of ensuring freedom of action. In particular in the case of the smaller European states,

further steps towards integration raise fears with regard to the loss of participation rights within the Union.

- Thirdly, this pattern creates structures without leadership, for leading powers and leading roles are immediately suspected of striving for hegemony. This is also the reason for the widespread acceptance of an American role in Europe. The United States can check leadership ambitions and arbitrate power rivalries.

The Western dealing with the wars in former Yugoslavia gives ample evidence to support these assumptions. What is more, the recent events demonstrate how the whole continent is playing out the balance of power tactics: While parts of public opinion still seem to believe in the normative value of post-antagonist European politics, crisis management has long shifted to the minimization of one's own risks and to the containment of the conflict's externalities.

## II.    Western Strategy and the Transformation of Russia

Focal point of security policies in the new and extended definition of security is the transformation in Central and Eastern Europe. In perspective, the relevance and the prospects of the new relationship between West and East in Europe have to be assessed on the assumptions of two basic scenarios, both being based on the somewhat ambivalent notion of 'Western interests'. The first scenario would emphasize the importance of stability and stabilization in the regions east of the western community. The second would move beyond and refer to the Western interests in order-building including the issues of extending the integration processes eastward.

With regard to the first scenario, the crucial question is whether the present measures are sufficient in order to stabilize pluralistic democracies and market economies in the East. The key European interest in this respect calls for the establishment of systems operating on compatible values and structures that would thus not be hostile to the West in the broader sense, i.e. including for example the prevention of mass migration flows. The scope of future cooperation, aid and transfers, so the assumption goes, would be limited by this self-interest of the West. It follows that the amount of those transfers will be subject to competing stability interests vis-à-vis other regions, not to overlook the internal debates about fund allocation within the European Union.

In this context, the issue of 'sufficient help' can hardly be settled on objective terms. Diverging perceptions persist on the state of transformations in the East as well as on the risks and dangers arising from a failure of reform policies. As of yet, the states immediately neighboring the Central and Eastern European regions -- most visibly, Germany -- have been advocating increased stability efforts extending beyond the spheres of economic change. It can be assumed that this 'camp' inside the EC will be strengthened by the first phase of enlargement: Austria, Sweden, Finland and Norway bring in important if not vital interests with regard to democratic stability in the East. The South-Western states of Europe have been more reluctant, with France being closer to the German position -- if not for substantive reasons than at least in order to not alienate Germany from the Union. In this sense, the rejection of the Franco-German initiative in the intergovernmental conference on Political Union in 1991 to formally assign the *Ostpolitik* to the Common Foreign and Security Policy falls back on the reforming states: For quite some time to come, the Western Community will not force itself into joint assessment and joint decision-making with regard to its stability and security interests in the East.

Obviously, the developments inside the Russian Federation and the Commonwealth of Independent States have the greatest potential to offset this interest-based scenario. Should Russian politics continue to be blocked over reforms and, furthermore, should Russia's self-definition center on a great power-status set apart from Europe, the strategic interests of the West vis-à-vis the Western neighbors of Russia will be re-focused. Apart from the dilemma of potentially aiding a future rival or opponent that would seriously influence Western transfers to Russia, policies based on the medium term Western interest would

probably differentiate: On the one hand, those states closest to the West could receive greater support and new ways of closer association with the West might be offered; on the other hand, those states closest to a 'neo-imperial' Russia might be regarded as 'buffers', receiving support but being excluded from closer association or membership.

The developments since December 1993 reveal the short term orientation of the West's *Ostpolitik*. The Partnership for Peace program remains a fair weather concept because it denies the associated states in Central and Eastern Europe a clear message on full membership in the Western Alliance. Any conditions that may lead these countries to want such a signal, will most likely be worse than the conditions of today. If it was impossible to at least assure full participation and full protection in the event of membership in the EU because of Russian security interests, these interests would certainly prevent membership in the future.

This oberservation leads to the second scenario. It is based on the assumption that a policy of interest alone will not be sufficient for two reasons: First, the strategy of order-building aims at institutionalizing levels of Western support to the transformation process and thus to communalize both the interests and the risk assessments in the West. Second, order-building takes into account that the Eastern democracies themselves need institutional commitments for political reasons. Neither popular support for economic reforms that impose high social costs on the people nor popular consensus on domestic and foreign policy conflicts in the transformation towards democracy or the break-up of states can be taken for granted however strong the disillusionment with the old order might be felt. Governing elites in the new democracies are constantly over-burdened by the simultaneouty of challenges. Moreover, their leadership is increasingly challenged by nationalist factions of the political specter. In this sense, order-building implies mutually re-enforcing relationships and commitments.
Measured in these terms of order-building, the current relationship is overshadowed by doubts -- doubts about the credibility of the membership-component in the Europe Agreements; doubts about the willingness of the West to extend not only its access to markets but also the solidarity of its structural funds; doubts about the reliability of Western norms in light of the Western reaction to the Yugoslav crisis. Similar doubts certainly exist on the Western side, with regard to the responsiveness, adaptability and steadiness of the new democracies.

Thus, both the policies of interest and the policies of order with regard to the transformation in Central and Eastern Europe reveal serious shortcomings and face obstacles that will continue to burden the transition of the antagonistic security system towards an all-European security area built on shared principles and mutual interests. These issues will absorb a high proportion of the political attention and the available resources for years to come. In addition, political energy will time and again be wasted on quarrels over status and policies of individual countries from the West. The renationalization of security policies in the wider sense of the word has progressed considerably.

## III.   European Union, NATO and WEU  --  in Search for a New Mix

The inclusion of foreign policy and security policies into the *deepening* of the European Community was based on a range of motives and interests among which three were probably most important:
-   the risk of a falling apart of the foreign policy priorities and orientations as a result of the recasting of Europe and a tendency of de-solidarization under the new conditions among essential member-states,
-   the interest to maintain and develop an integrated framework for security issues and

defense, which could also adequately reflect the security challenges and the growing political responsibility of the West Europeans for the organization of their own security,

- the perception of the emergence of new risks and challenges to the stability of the political, economic and social systems in Western Europe, their territorial integrity and normative qualtity that would not or insufficiently be protectable through the old instruments.

These motives were not and are not shared by all of the member-states. For France and Germany, however, all of them were of special importance. Based on their respective national interest, both states articulated an interest to integrate the other into a common framework. In the inter-governemental conference on Political Union, these considerations shaped the style and substance of the negotiations.

With regard to the results, the Franco-German position has by and large prevailed both in the EC and within NATO: the development of foreign policy making, security and defense in Western Europe was to conceive complementary to the other areas of European integration and that this result could not be achieved through the partial identity of the actors in different organizations.

In the Maastricht treaty, the provisions on a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) continue the experimental and pragmatic approach of integration policies since the 1970s. Based on the *aquis* within the European Political Cooperation (EPC) the treaty moves one step forward. In perspective, the provisions sketch out the option of a security union in which the Western European Union (WEU) organizes a common and potentially integrated defense under the roof of the European Union. The treaty language carefully avoids to interfere with any of the rights and obligations within the existing security institutions in Europe. The specific duties and limitations of individual member-states are not touched by the treaty. In principal, however, the Twelve have at least clarified their intentions in two directions:

- The deepening of European integration will not proceed on the basis of a *civilan power* that abstains from the conflicts in international politics.
- Within the future development of the Atlantic Alliance, the 'European Pillar' will be made up by a WEU which is integral part of the European Union. Thus, an old debate within NATO has been settled from the European side. In addition, the West Europeans have offered a complimentary model for both their continuing interest in NATO and the necessities of integration within the EC.

The Maastricht Treaty thus offers a framework for future action. As a blueprint for further developments, the steps outlined below appear to be in line with the initial concept. In the field of foreign and security policies the following points require clarification:

- the responsibility of the Union for Eastern, Mediterranean, aid and development, CSCE and UN policies.
- the formulation of common positions or doctrines with regard to the principles, criteria and goals of Union policies towards certain states, regions or topics.
- the development of an appropriate foreign policy infrastructure which will also make it possible to provide a continual assessment of the situation.

In the more specific areas of security and defense policies, the next steps would focus on the development of credible instruments for the protection and defense of European interests. This would require making decisions on collective defense and collective security.

With regard to clollective defense the issue is the adaptation, modernization and cost effectiveness of (integrated) defense structures in Western Europe to deter external aggression. In future, the West Europeans will have to assume greater responsibility in the Western context, and carry out these tasks with reduced manpower and smaller budgets. The unclear and simultaneous existence of different security institutions should give way to a system of Western security that takes into account the security needs of both the United States and Western Europe. Such a system could consist of defense planning and military

integration on different levels:
- On the European level WEU would organize integrated territorial defense. Its planning and command structures need to be compatible with those of NATO.
- The WEU -- as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance -- would combine the resources and define the responsibilities of member states in the NATO context.
- A nuclear deterrent -- the Alliance's ultimate insurance policy -- would be retained by the USA in North America and the United Kingdom and France in Europe.
- Joint units set up on a bilateral or multilateral basis would be assigned to the WEU or NATO according to their function.
- When they join the European Union, the states of Central Europe would become members of the WEU, participate in defense integration, and enjoy the complete protection of the Alliance. Early membership of these states in the CFSP would necessitate early integration into the WEU and NATO.

On this scheme the adaptation of the transatlantic partnership with the United States could also be organized. It would then consist of a bilateral arrangement of the US and the EU with a couple of other member states and associated members as well as special roles for individual West European participants.

With regard to collective security in Europe, the continuation of defense integration in the European Union seems to be a crucial precondition for the establishment of a pluralistic security community based on non-aggression and the peaceful settlement of disputes. However, developments in the recent past have shown that the kinds of defense integration and security diplomacy employed so far cannot in themselves effectively maintain peace in Europe. The continent as a whole needs a European order in which peace can be restored on the basis of clearly defined rules, and an escalation of conflict can be stopped by the use of preventive measures. For this purpose it would make sense to strengthen the CSCE as a regional organization recognized under the UN charter. Acting within the framework and in accordance with the rules of the UN, the CSCE could ensure compliance with European peace norms as defined by the CSCE Paris Charter, by the European Convention on Human Rights, by a Minorities Charter, and by EC guidelines on the recognition of new states. If and when required, it would need to be in a position to enforce compliance against the will of an aggressor, and also within a certain state. If other measures prove insufficient, the Europeans should be able and have the will to resort to military intervention. For this purpose the West European Union should equip and have at its disposal integrated bi-and multi-national units. The United States should participate in these in a NATO context. Without a credible conventional deterrent of every kind of aggression directed against the European norms, peace diplomacy and crisis management in themselves will not be able to prevent a return of war and violence to Europe.

However desirable, little speaks for the implementation of any such security arrangement in the course of the next years. Apart from the persisting divergences over foreign policy interests among European states, the national strategies reveal some common shortcomings. Most of them show a imbalance between strategic and military thinking. While defense integration is maintained to function as a reinsurance against a renewal of the Soviet threat, the foreign policies seem to disregard the risks and build upon the stability of the status quo. While on the strategic side the capacities for peace keeping and peace enforcement are gradually built up, the development of respective foreign policy capacities for analyses and decision-making lags behind. In sum, the wide definition of security has not been followed by a widening of the security instruments and the necessary changes in policy planning. The broader notion of security requires a preventive thinking ahead, and it implies the ability to allocate the adequate resources for security policies from a large spectrum of policy areas.

The effects of these shortcomings can be studied in the Mediterranean. The region poses security challenges in the wider sense that are probably of equal weight to the transformation of Eastern Europe. So far, selective attention and short term policies on the

part of many states have led to a low profile in this region. A closer look shows, however, the urgency of action, and a sketch of goals and interests to pursue indicates the amount of political energy required to realize preventive strategies.

## IV.    The Mediterranean -- the 'other strategic problem' of Europe

The problems of the Mediterranean area are becoming more acute. Europe's southern neighbours are faced with economic and social challenges which surpass their ability to deal with them. Rapid population growth tends to swallow up any kind of economic progress. Unemployment is on the increase. Environmental fundamentals and traditional lifestyles are in danger. The process of urbanization creates new social conflicts. The results of these developments include legitimacy deficits in the political systems, an increase in authoritarianism and growing political extremism fuelled by religious fundamentalism. There is a danger that unstable governments will try to divert internal political pressures into the area of foreign policy.

Western Europe cannot stand aloof from the problems of the Mediterranean area. The consequences of internal development and conflicts between states brought about by territorial disputes, a striving for supremacy or resources will affect Europe directly. Waves of migrants, environmental damage and violence in the Mediterranean area constitute a danger to security and stability. At the same time there appears to be an emerging conflict of values between Europe and the Islamic-Arab world. As a political ideology, Islamic fundamentalism is currently the only system of values that is in conscious opposition to Western values.

The transition to a new order will also alter the conflict constellations in the Mediterranean area. The Middle East conflict has changed from being a conflict between systems, to which there was no solution, to become a regional conflict which, after the end of superpower confrontation, can be resolved on a regional basis. Syria, now without the backing of the Soviet Union, has become a regional power in search of balance and compromise. The defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War has shifted the PLO in the direction of a negotiated settlement for the Palestinians living in areas under Israeli occupation. This process of regionalization opens up new prospects for regional cooperation and integration in the Middle East. In both cases Turkey can play a key role. In regional terms it possesses the potential of a great power, has a crucial interest in development and stability, and can serve as a model of the co-existence of religion and modern society.

It is in the interests of the Europeans to defuse economic and social conflicts to the south of them and to prevent relations from hardening into a 'conflict of civilizations'. In the past European responses to the challenges of the Mediterranean area have been characterized by diverted attention, conceptual fragmentation and weak instruments. A strategic approach would seek to support peace, development and democracy in the context of an overall concept which brings together development, security and cultural policies:

- European policies should promote economic reconstruction in the Mediterranean area, and should earmark a part of the gross domestic product of the Union as European development aid.
- On a societal level, what needs to be encouraged is a just social order and mutual cultural understanding. Thus European policies should establish a link between financial and technical aid and observance of human and minority rights and social norms.
- The European Union should organize measures to prevent further environmental damage. This could be achieved through a joint Mediterranean Environmental Agency and aid targeted at improving environmental administration, legislation and observation.
- Europeans should strive to maintain a social and cultural balance between their populations and immigrants from the Mediterranean area. Immigration policies need to be embedded in a European concept, and the integrative ability and willingness of

immigrants require specific improvement.
- In political conflicts Europeans should play an active role in promoting peaceful settlements, in supporting the implementation of give-and-take solutions, in developing democratic systems in Southeastern Europe, in the Middle East and in North Africa, and in establishing a lasting cooperation with regional integrative institutions.
- The Europeans also need to support the current peace process in the Middle East. In the medium term they shoukd prepare for the guarantee of the political and economic security of Israel and a Palestinian state once the region has arrived at a consensus.
- It would finally be necessary to include peace and stability in the Mediterranean area in European security policy as a whole, to work towards the effective control and destruction of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons in the region, to maintain the military balance, to initiate an arms control and disarmament process and to establish common rules governing the export of armaments.

These measures would establish a multi-faceted array of instruments to further political influence. They should be complemented by larger structures of coordination and consensus-building through the formation of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM). It would provide an opportunity to achieve a balance between the different interests and motives by holding out the prospect of stability and security in exchange for economic cooperation. It could serve to control conflict in crisis situations and promote a consensus in defining norms and values. In the light of the dynamic social tensions in the region, a CSCM based on a common understanding of human rights might also provide a means of ensuring compliance. In the long term, the CSCM could become a system of collective security, a way of organizing economic and ecological development, and the framework for a viable cultural area.

## V.    Resume

In sum, security politics and security policies in Europe are burdened with unaccomplished duties: The trend towards renationalization and power politics has weakened the institutions of political and military integration with no clear path towards a new order in sight; the biggest single issue on the new security agenda, the transformation to market economies and liberal democracies in the East, lags behind; the restructuring of Western defense institutions in order to bring in line political and military structures wih the new strategic challenges is at best stagnating.
All of these factors divert the attention of Western Europe from the challenges in the Mediterranean. Time that is needed for thinking ahead and for preventive action is thus being lost.
Furthermore, this eurocentric preoccupation weakens the sensitivity of the West towards the conflict potential of the larger international political environment. Namely in Africa and in Asia, conflictual constellations loom on the horizon that would imply hard choices for the West should they break up. Four examples may illustrate the wider foreign policy issues for Europe:
- Among others, European policy-makers might have to re-examine their assessment of nation-building and territorial revisionism. The changes in Central and Eastern Europe and the ways and means by which new states have come into being suggest to the outside world a fundamental legitimacy of national organization and territorial revisionism and send the signal that the use of force is paying off. On the other hand, these processes demonstrate to the authoriarian regimes in the world that a repressive aggressiveness could be the only way to try to secure one's rule.
- Also, European preferences in the choice between stability and democracy need to be reconsidered. Up to now, the preference has clearly been in favor of stability in part because of the different notions of democracy that prevail in non-Western countries in the process of transition. Pro-Western authoritarian rule is still preferred over a regime that assumed power through democratic processes but seems incompatible to Western

democratic norms. Coming to terms with ethnic or religion-based governments may turn out to be unavoidable. Currently, European policy-makers have limited experience on how to moderate political systems of this kind.

- Thirdly, European policies need to take into account the fundamental dependence of non-Western countries on outside aid and to calculate those policies pursued to attract attention and to generate support from the First World. Three strategies seem to be obviuos: a) to aim at the fullfillment of those normative standards that are compatible to Western values -- this strategy could prove to be counter-effective as the post-election coup in Algeria has demonstrated -- b) to take over regional balancing duties that are in the interest of the international resp. the Western community or c) to attract attention and support by creating fears about the consequences of progressive worsening -- a strategy which is also used by Russian politics in the attempt to secure aid.
- Finally, careful preparation for the reappearance of ideological antagonisms seems indispensable. What are the challenges to pluralistic and democratic value systems? The notion of socialism as an alternative mode of governing a society seems to be discredited in the world, but collective ideologies that claim a 'third way' still seem to be operable. The attractiveness of large models, however, has become questionable -- China will most likely make this experience in the years to come. The European events suggest that nationalism and even racism might be successors to the forms of authoritarian socialism. Religious fundamentalism remains an option for collective regimes. Also, personalized authoritarian rule in the form of charismatic leadership has to be taken into account.

The outlook for the emergence of an international system that will be predominantly organized along cooperative lines appears to be rather dim. With the level of social tensions on the rise, the conflict rationality of political actors remains unsure. Most likely, it will be shaped by:
- a sizable degree of insensitivity to global issues; environmental warfare or black-mail seem to be entirely possible as a source of power;
- a significant degree of political aggressiveness as a result of social frictions;
- a relative low level of predictability on the part of fundamentalist or para-ideological regimes;
- a high probability of gradual proliferation of weapons for mass destruction and respective carrier systems.

On the part of the European democracies, the willingness to take up high commitments can be expected to remain low for publics as well as elites. It is hardly imaginable that political actors engage on issues which could become a challenge to their own security only in the medium and long term.
With respect to the domestic and the international constraints, the European conflict behavior will be limited: It will most likely require obvious conflict structures and apparent violations of European interests, action will have to be calculabe in terms of scale and time, they will need prior legal and political legitimation and -- as in the case of the Gulf war -- material compensation. In conclusion, it may well be asked if European publics are willing to react to conflictual turns in world affairs and how well equipped European political systems are to meet these challenges. Unwillingness and inability will result in the errection of fences and walls to encapsule incompatible parts of the international system. Muddling through the security issues on a short term basis today could become the source for insecurity and conflict tomorrow.

| | |
|---|---|
| **Mediterranean Study Commission**<br>**- MeSCo -** | **Commission d'Etude de la Méditerranée**<br>**- CodEMe -** |
| First Meeting | Première Rencontre |
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# The Middle East Peace Process: the Mediterranean Dimension

# Le Processus de Paix au Moyen-Orient : la Dimension Méditerranéenne
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*«The post-cold War debate on security and security institutions*
*in Europe and the Arab World:*
*implications for the Middle East and the Mediterranean»*

*«Le Débat de l'après-guerre froide sur la sécurité*
*et les institutions sécuritaires en Europe et dans le monde arabe :*
*les implications pour le Moyen-Orient et la Méditerranée»*

by/par

**Jamaleddine MAAZOUN**
Association des Etudes Internationales, Tunis

Le débat sur la sécurité en Europe et la nécessaire
approche méditerranéenne.


JAMEL EDDINE MAAZOUN


la communication que je fais se présente en deux étapes :

- En une première partie, une espèce de passage en revue
  des divers types, de problèmes et

- Je finirai par les voies d'une meilleure sécurité
  en Méditerrannée

Il ya trois types de problèmes.

- Le premier type de problèmes concerne les questions
  frontalières au niveau des pays du Maghreb.

- Le dexième type de problèmes concerne les idéologies
  maghrébines.

- Le troisième type de problèmes concerne l'armement des pays
  du Maghreb.

## 1/ LES PROBLEMES DE FRONTIERES

J'en cite rapidement quelques'un pour dire, qu'il n'ya pas

un seul pays maghrébin qui n'a pas de question de frontière

non résolue avec le voisin. Il ya eu un accord à propos de Figuig

de Tindouf et de Touat mais la ratification de cet accord

dépend dans l'esprit marocain de la résolution du conflit

du Sahara Occidental alors que dans l'esprit algérien,c'est

une ratification qui devait être automatique.


La Tunisie et l'Algérie ont connu des problèmes frontaliers

à l'accusion de la découverte des puits pétrolifères d'El BOURMA.

C'est une question qui a été résolue avec le fait de brandir

des menaces militaires à l'epoque. La Tunisie et l'Algérie

ont eu également des discussions à propos d'une nappe d'eau

située à la frontière et qui irrigue un grand projet agricole

de culture de dattes développé par la Tunisie au REJIM MAATOUG


La Tunisie et la Libye ont eu des problèmes de frontières dans

le domaine du plateau continental et c'est le concours de la Cour

Internationale de justice qui a été utile dans la résolution de

ce conflit et je tiens à signaler que la libye -quand la question

est apparue sur la scène publique- a demandé aux entreprises de

forage, de travailler et a fait un déploiement maritime en sous

marins et en bâtiments de surface pour protéger les dites

entreprises.

Ces éléments montrent et entre autres, que l'utilisation du militaire en vue de la persuasion ou de la memace a été la règle pendant quelque temps entre les pays maghrébins.

Entre la Libye et l'Algérie, (region de GATT) il ya aussi un problème de frontières et Algériens et Libyens ne sont pas encore prêts de régler ces problèmes.

Tout ceci montre qu'il ya un certain mombre de questions en suspens qui concernent les frontières et que personne ne prend en considération dans un esprit de règlement.
POURQUOI ? Parce qu'on a énormément de difficultés à poser ce genre de problèmes et quand ces problèmes se posent, la suspicion apparait immédiatememt.

Et dans plusieurs cas, le militaire a été brandi comme étant un facteur en quelque sorte d'obtention de la décision.

Il est important dans ce cadre-là que chacun de ces pays sâche ce qui lui appartient et ce qui ne lui appartient pas. C'est plus facile pour mener à bien la coopération qui est recherchée par tout le monde. Donc que les objectifs et que les intentions soient clairs à ce niveau là.

Rappelons-nous la Libye par exemple, a toujours utilisé ce qu'elle considère comme étant sa puissance militaire pour régler un certain nombre de questions frontalières. Le cas du Tchad, ou le cas des stratégies de persuasion qu'elle a essayé de mettre en oeuvre à l'occasion de différends frontaliers avec ses voisins le montrent.

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## 2/ LES IDEOLOGIES

Le deuxième type de problèmes - nous signalons rapidement les
choses - concerne les idéologies d'une manière générale dans la
rive sud du bassin méditerranéen.

Et pas mal de dirigeants dont certains du Maghreb ont essayé de
se présenter comme les porte paroles de certains types de pensée
ou comme les promoteurs de certaines idéologies qui doivent donner
à la nation arabe ou bien à certains pays arabes l'image et la
situation que les Arabes avaient il ya quelques siècles.

Et ceci n'a pas manqué de poser énormément de difficultés.

Considérons la perception de l'U.M.A.

* la notion de l'Union sur le plan du principe n'est pas
  comprise et n'est pas pensée de la même manière.
  Les Libyens par exemple considèrent que l'Union est une
  nécessité absolue et doit être un phénomène qu'il faut
  atteindre quelque soient les conditions - et pourquoi pas
  à la manière de "Tarak Ibn Ziad" ? -

* les Marocains, les Tunisiens considèrent que c'est un projet
  pour lequel il faudrait oeuvrer selon des étapes mais sans
  exprimer l'empressement qui est l'apanage de quelques-uns.

* L'organisation de "l'U M A" : Chacun considère que sa
  position géographique, l'état de son armement surtout lui
  donnent le droit de se considérer comme étant le leadership.
  C'est le cas de la Libye.

Ce sont là des facteurs qui ajoutes aux questions de frontières
constituent des conflits latents ou qui peuvent se transformer en
conflits manifestes.

La Libye considère qu'elle est créatrice d'une théorie tout à fait
nouvelle, tout à fait inédite : la troisième théorie. Et c'est
cette théorie qui est capable de sortir et les pays arabes et le
monde arabe et le monde entier de toutes les difficultés que le
monde connait.

Ce qui fait que sur le plan idéologique il ya un certain nombre
de problèmes qui continuent à se poser et qui font tout pour que
les situations en matière de sécurité ne soient clarifiées et ne
fassent l'objet d'un accord entre les différents pays.

## L'ARMEMENT DANS LE MAGHREB

la conjonction de tous ces facteurs que nous venons de citer, a
instauré une situation d'armement qui est annormale dans la région.

On peut comprendre le niveau d'armement atteint par
l'Algérie et le Maroc par l'opposition entre ces deux pays
concernant le conflit du Sahara occidental. Depuis 1974

l'accroissement de l'effort militaire marocain et algérien a été soutenu et ceci s'est traduit par des chiffres extrêmement importants par rapport aux économies de ces pays.

Mais quand on voit la Libye on est étonné par la situation qui se présente. Utilisons un certain nombre de ratios. En prenant par exemple le budget militaire par rapport au P N B on constate que la libye dépense 5,7 % de son P N B dans le domaine du militaire, l'Algérie 2,15 % , la Tunisie 3,8 % . Quand on compare par exemple cette situation avec celles de certains pays européens riches, on constate la France 3,66 % , la R F A 2,8 % , la Belgique 2,5 % c'est dire l'importance de l'effort en matière de finacement qui est consenti par la libye et également par les pays du Maghreb, qui, quoi qu'ils fassent, sont obligés de poursuivre d'une manière ou d'une autre.

Prenant un autre ratio, celui des effectifs militaires par rapport à la population : La Libye a sous les drapeaux presque 2 % de sa population (1,89 %). C'est un chiffre qui est extrêmement important quand on le compare a d'autres niveaux. Le Maroc par exemple, a sous les drapeaux 0,77 % , la Tunisie 0,5 % . Alors que la France par exemple a 0,8 % , l'Allemagne 0,77 % la Belgique 0,9 % . Donc si vous voulez tout ceci montre que sur le plan niveau d'arment, c'est une situation qui est extrêmement dangereuse et qu'il est extrêmement important de signaler.

Pour prendre d'autres niveaux de comparaison, nous constatons sur le plan des équipements militaires,que la Libye

dispose de 2 300 chars, alors que les autres pays du Maghreb
possèdent respectivement :

la Tunisie 98 chars, l'Algérie 900 chars, le Maroc 224 chars. Faisons
la comparaison avec certains pays européens :
la France possède : 1340 chars, la Belgique : 334 chars,
la R F A : 5 000 chars. On peut rétorquer, que la France détient un
arsenal nucléaire qui peut lui permettre de réduire le nombre de
certains types d'armes. Certes à condition de signaler que le
nucléaire est fait pour la sonctuarisation du territoire français,
pour la dissasion et quand il s'agit d'actions de types différents,
l'armement classique est considéré comme étant capital.

Sur le plan de l'aviation par exemple, la Libye dispose de 513 avions
de combat, le Maroc de 93, l'Algérie de 257. Par rapport maintenant à
certains pays européens, la Belgique dispose de 126 avions ,
la France de 597, la R F A de 503.

Tout ceci montre jusqu'à quel point, l'armement libyen est-il
situé, il l'est à un viveau hautement important. Pour continuer par
exemple, la libye dispose de missiles sol-sol : des S C U D
fondamentalement, en suite de F R O G d'une portée inférieure.

Tout ceci encore une fois montre que le niveau d'armement libyen est
d'un niveau considérable quand on le compare d'une part à la région et
d'autre part quand on le compare à certaines puissances européennes

qui ont atteint des normes acceptées par tout le monde en matière de part du bugent militaire par rapport au P N B ou bien en matière par exemple de part des effectifs militaires par rapport à la population.

Ceci a fait que les menaces ont été perçues dans la plupart du temps imminentes et la Libye n'a pas hésité par exemple à traiter militairement un certain nombre de problèmes dont ceux que nous venons de citer. Ce qu'il faut peut-être remarquer en le déplorant, c'est que la menace au niveau maghrébin est essentiellement intermaghrébine, c'est là une anomalie qu'il est extrêmement important de cogiter.

De ce fait là, les pays du Maghreb ne peuvent pas éviter entre eux de s'engager dans ce processurs cybernétique qui consiste à essayer d'atteindre d'une manière ou d'une autre, un équilibre pas en termes d'équinuméricite mais en termes de capacité de résistance, ou de capacité de faire du mal, le cas écheant.

là c'est une question qui se pose avec beaucoup d'insistance. Elle n'est pas publique mais les Etats Majors de l'ensemble des pays ne peuvent pas ignorer ce problème là. Nous l'avons signalé, La Libye a utilisé la menace militaire pour résoudre certaines questions frontalières et il n'est pas impossible à ce que cela se reproduise à d'autres niveaux ou à d'autres périodes.

Bien que le niveau d'armement maghrébin soit coûteux, il ne donne pas la sécurité aux pays maghrébins entre eux. Il faut à n'importe quel avion suspersonique , et il y en a dans la région, de 10 a 20 mn pour

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atteindre n'importe quelle concentration démographique, urbaine ou industrielle importante. Ce qui fait que pour dire rapidement les choses, il n'ya pas un seul pays arabe à l'intérieur du Maghreb qui est capable d'assurer par exemple l'inviolabilité de son espace aérien, même la Libye, ou bien d'assurer l'inviolabilité de ses frontières. A tel point que l'ensemble de ces pays sont logés dans une situation de destruction mutuelle assurée. Chaque pays est capable de faire énormement de mal à l'autre sans pour autant obtenir la décision et par la même sans pour autant avoir la sécurité. C'est une situation qu'il importe énormément de penser.

A cela, il faut ajouter le fait que cet armemet abondant, extrêmement nombreux - sur le plan de l'origine - n'est pas en train de profiter à l'Europe. Ce sont les Américains et les Soviétiques qui en ont tiré les profits. Si l'on excepte la France, qui a pu s'introduire au niveau de certains pays, aucun pays européen n'est en train de profiter du flux commercial d'armement dans la région.

Pour illustrer cela avant tout, retenons que pour les chars, l'équipement marocain est américain, l'équipement algérien est soviétique, la Tunisie s'est équipée aux Etats-Unis, la Libye en Union Soviétique et l'Egypte en Union Soviétique et ensuite aux Etats-Unis depuis l'avènement des accords de Camp David.

On peut continuer, la France et les U S A ont fourni le Maroc, l'U R S S a fourni l'Algérie, les Etats-Unis ont founi la Tunisie, l'Union Soviétique et la France ont équipée la Libye etc...

L'Europe a posé le problème de la sécurité au Maghreb mais d'une

manière incomplète. Le souci mageur de l'Europe, est qu'il n'y ait pas

d'armes chimiques, c'est qu'il n'y ait pas d'armes balistiques, c'est

qu'il n'y ait pas de programmes nucléaires dans ces régions. Mais

l'Europe n'a posé le problème que dans des termes qu'elle craint elle

même. Or ceci ne peut pas être considéré comme étant une approche

réaliste de la situation. Pourquoi ?

Parce que le balistique - et là on pourra s'engager dans un discussion

stratégique - à tête conventionnelle est l'arme qui permet une

certaine crédibilité de la dissuasion de certains pays qui

cherchent à dissuader et qui n'ont pas de velléité hégémonique et

expantionniste. Alors dire aux pays maghrébins que le balistique ne

doit pas faire partie de leurs arseaux nucléaires nécessite énormement

de temps pour l'expliquer, ce n'est pas du tout acceptable pour ces

pays . Parce que de l'autre côté s'engager par exemple dans

l'équimunéricité en matière d'aviation, en matière de chars, c'est

s'engager dans une ruine pure et simple sans pour autant obtenir la

sécurité.

La notion de transparence est une notion qui n'est qu'unilatérale et

qui a du mal à se faire accepter dans la mesure où elle est à la base

inégale .

Il importe de considrer que l'Europe peut - et c'est dans le cadre des

voies d'une meilleure sécurité - promouvoir une espèce de débat dans

le cadre de la conférence sur la sécurité et la cooperation en

Méditerranée par exemple, concernant un certain nombre de points.

Un niveau de réflexion assez profond concernant la notion d'armement ou plutôt la notion de surarmement est nécessaire. A partir de quel moment est- ce qu'on peut dire qu'un pays est surarment. A partir de quel moment est- ce qu'on peut dire qu'un pays dispose d'un armement à un niveau acceptable sans qu'il soit un élément de persuasion ou un élément de coercition ? C'est une question difficile. On peut rétorquer que c'est chercher la quadrature du cercle, mais ce n'est qu'en posant des questions de fond que l'on pourrait éventuellement engager la Méditerranée Occidentale - dans une dynamique sécuritaire.

Ensuite, pourquoi ne pas essayer de faire admettre la notion de dissuasion conventionnelle comme étant le concept stratégique de l'ensemble de ces pays là ?

Amener ces pays à réfléchir en termes de dissuasion et non en termes de persuasion . D'autant plus que l'idée de contrôle  des armements est une idée minée à la base. Pourquoi ? Parce que le contrôle de commerce de armements d'aujourd'hui jusqu'à l'an 2000 ne va que consacrer une situation de fait qui peut être qualifiée par une dissymétrie stratégique entre divers pays qui n'ont pas entre eux de consensus en matière d'approche des relations internationales.

Sans la sécurité la coopération et le développement sont impossibles.

L'Europe pourrait jouer un élément de dialogue à condition qu'elle ne pose pas les problèmes uniquement en termes de transparence de balistique, de nucléaire et de chimique.

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# The Middle East Peace Process: the Mediterranean Dimension

# Le Processus de Paix au Moyen-Orient : la Dimension Méditerranéenne
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*«The emerging European Union: past policies and future implications
for the Middle East and the Mediterranean»*

*«La nouvelle union européenne : les anciennes politiques
et les futures implications pour le Moyen-Orient et la Méditerranée»*

by/par

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* Draft *

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE MEDITERRANEAN

Álvaro de Vasconcelos


How will the policies of the European Union affect the Mediterranean, particularly in what concerns stability? Any answer to this question is inevitably overshadowed by a big question mark: how will the EU shape its external action? Will it remain largely constrained by the present feeble degree of political unity, or will it adopt a course of action commensurate with the economic power it represents?

All things considered, however, this is certainly not a time for immoderate optimism concerning the role of the European Union with regard to Mediterranean stability, or rather stabilisation.

Up to the beginning of 1992, when optimism was still the prevailing sentiment, the democratic capitals of Europe, namely those of the original Six, but also Madrid and even Lisbon, shared the firm belief that the Community would soon become not only a great single market, but that they were about to witness the birth of a decidedly political Europe, laid on firm foundations of cultural diversity among member states. A Europe able to face the formidable challenge of transition in its central and eastern parts, while at the same time contributing to create a sea of dialogue and modernity in the Mediterranean basin.

Such optimistic feelings were justified, when one considers how the intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) were progressing and the climate that made it possible to draft the Treaty on European Union (TUE), as well as the

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initiatives that were undertaken with a view to compensating
the EC's eastward pull with a new Mediterranean policy —
CSCM and the cooperation process in the Western
Mediterranean — which were also made possible by the new
atmosphere which characterised relations between Rabat and
Algiers, which had led, a few years before, to the Treaty of
Marrakesh and the inception of the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA),
in 1987.

Although the European Council held in Lisbon in June 1992
coincided with the first signs of the present crisis, when
the recession and the European 'reflux' were beginning to
hit the markets and the minds of most Europeans, the final
statement nevertheless retained the important notion of an
East/South equilibrium that should be kept (this is quite
obvious in the regions defined as priority areas for joint
action: central and eastern Europe, the Middle East and
North Africa), and also the no less important notion that a
'comprehensive policy' should be sought in relation to those
areas.

At the beginning of the present decade, the Community was
still capable, as Edgar Morin has pointed out, of 'facing
Islam as a part of itself', of its own diversity, either
because of the emigrants settling in from North Africa,
either because of the prospect, remote as it remains, of
Turkish membership (Turkey's application was put forward in
1987), or because a democratic coexistence of European
Islamists and European Christians was expected to take shape
in the Balkans[1].

Political union — the European Union, in other words, that
all the laboriously achieved intricacies and often

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ambiguities of the Maastricht Treaty should have brought
about — has not been achieved, even if it is long overdue.
The EU remains largely a common market, and has so far been
unable to design common policies to effectively face up to
the three-fold crisis that began to develop in 1992.

First, a multifaceted internal crisis — economic and social
(unemployment rising to alarming proportions), and also
institutional on account of a perceived democratic deficit.
Secondly, a crisis in the East, caused by the lasting
difficulties of transition processes and by the resurgence
of aggressive nationalism, which is principally to blame for
the war in the former Yugoslavia. Thirdly, a crisis in the
neighbouring South, in the Mediterranean, where a number of
countries are seriously threatened by Islamic radicalism, an
acute form of intolerance, reaching the verge of civil war,
as in Algeria.

As a consequence, the Mediterranean initiatives of the EU
were largely affected. The project of a CSCM, in spite of
its underlying 'cooperative' approach to security, collapsed
precisely because it was too ambitious. The cooperation
process in the Western Mediterranean, the so-called
Five+Five which was intent on becoming Twelve+Five is in a
state of utter paralysis, owing not only to the problems
with and sanctions against Libya but also to the fact that
its southern interlocuteur, UMA, is itself paralysed due to
the serious situation in Algeria. And Algeria is perhaps
only the more lethal stage of the political and economic
crisis several Arab and Islamic countries are now
experiencing, e.g. Egypt. Contrasting positive signs also
exist in the Mediterranean which should be brought into the
picture: notably the peace accord between the Israelis and

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the Palestinians, the importance of which cannot be overemphasised.

What kind of action should the EU be expected to undertake to face the serious problems afflicting the different Mediterranean regions in diverse ways, if one considers the most probable trend in European integration itself? The course the EU will take from now on is far from certain and open to much debate. Is it to remain a 'civilian power', little more than a common, single market? Or will the change in name actually correspond to a greater degree of political unity among its members, capable of translating into coherent external action, as the words 'European Union' would seem to imply? At present, the EU remains a 'civilian power', one that definitely privileges economic instruments in its foreign relations, although these should increasingly become subject to 'conditionality' and have incorporated the notion of stability through 'inclusion' and support to integration/cooperation.

## A preventive strategy

Today, it is generally accepted as a fact in the EU that in North African countries existing problems are of a predominantly social and economic nature, and that political problems such as domestic instability are generated principally on that basis. The same is not generally felt in relation to the Middle East, where existing problems were viewed until quite recently from an almost exclusively strategic angle, although the Israeli-Palestinian peace accord may have begun to change perceptions in this regard. It is also widely recognised that no real military threat is

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posed to Europe originating in the southern shore of the
Mediterranean. Islamic (or any other form of religious or
cultural fundamentlism) "can only gain ground by exploiting
underdevelopment, unemployment, flagrant inequality,
poverty": Jacques Delors's "word of warning" to those "who
are already searching for the next enemy".[e] The lack of
basic freedoms, bad governance and poor resource-management
should also be added to the list. However, from Lisbon to
Berlin, most would say that economic and social problems are
the core issue, from which all other ills more or less
directly ensue.

Even if they could claim no other merit, this at least the
Five+Five and the CSCM project will have accomplished:
recognition of the need for a 'preventive' strategy, a
'contextual' approach, designed to meet challenges before
they have developed into outright dangers, which one of its
promoters, Roberto Toscano bluntly justifies: "if today we
should prove unequal to the task of fostering development
through cooperation, tomorrow we will have to cope with
dangers to security, threats and very costly remedies"[2]
(doubtfully effective, however costly, one might add).
European policy-makers make no secret of the dangers they
have in mind, massive illegal immigration, refugees and
asylum-seekers in growing numbers, terrorism, drugs and arms
proliferation being among them.

The chief policy instrument available, the so-called renewed
Mediterranean policy (RMP), approved by the European Council
in December 1990, contemplates a 4,400 million ecu funding
(1,300 million from the EC budget and 3,100 in EIB loans)
for the five-year period 1992-96.[4]

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The European Union is the largest trade partner by far in the Mediterranean, and with its RMP the largest donor of development aid and cooperation partner. According to the relevant declarations of the European Council, the RMP is designed as a means of supporting economic and political reform -- the underlying objective being quite obviously to check immigration overflows and containing radical Islam. The latter is not dissimilar to one of the major driving forces behind the Marshall Plan, i.e. fostering the conditions of sustainability of European democracies and thus preventing the fundamentalists of the day -Communist parties- from actually attaining power. RMP, and the combined efforts of member states individually, however, fall far too short of their goal. More than any other factor, the effectiveness of economic support lies primarily with the recipient countries and their governments, and their ability to promote reform, thus becoming less vulnerable to radical political alternatives.

European policies are therefore in fact directed towards and more effective in countries which have performed better. Such is the present case of Morocco and Tunisia, who "continue to lead the way", according to the World Bank, "as far as monetary and budgetary discipline is concerned, resulting in controlling inflation (down to 6%), as well as implementation of structural reform,"[3] and has allowed a significant inflow of foreign investment. Countries where the political and economic situation is more difficult, especially when facing acute forms of radical Islam, like Algeria, the present Mediterranean policy can have little effect, not least because they are not in a position to absorb the social consequences of readjustment; the

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unavoidable conclusion being that EU policies are less
effective precisely where they are most needed.


### 'Coherence' and 'conditionality'

On the side of progress towards a 'comprehensive' external
action, the notion of 'coherence', as set forth in the TUE,
i.e. the linkage of foreign economic and trade policies and
development aid and cooperation with decisions made within
the framework of political cooperation/CFSP, should be
listed as a significant progress. In other words,
'conditionality' and political objectives should preside
over economic cooperation.

As a consequence of 'coherence', EU cooperation policies may
in future be made increasingly dependant upon the success of
political and economic reform in the region. The European
Parliament has given a clear signal that it will be more
exacting in this regard, and a shift in the orientation of
cooperation policies in the Commission has also taken
effect.

Greater emphasis on human rights and democratic institution-
building on the part of the EU may therefore reasonably be
expected. Not to the point of liberal triumphalism of the
early days of the present decade, and not without due regard
for the specifics and particular pace of each transition
process (where there is one). Furthermore, it is painfully
clear from the Algerian experience that democratic
transition means a lot more than seeing elections through,
however free and fair.

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'Conditionality' is certainly not intended as, and should not be made to look like interference. Anti-western sentiments need no further fuelling as it is.

However, unconditional support to Islamic states who cooperate with the West can also reinforce anti-Western radicalism because this support goes by and large to repressive regimes, as Roberto Aliboni recently pointed out, "and on the other hand, pushing these regimes, as repressive as they may be, to make an unconditional opening to radical Islam would often correspond to a mere shift from secular repressive regimes to religious ones."[6]

## Stability through integration

The partnership agreements with Maghreb countries — Morocco first,[7] Tunisia next and perhaps in time Algeria — as well as the customs union established with Turkey due to take effect in 1995, are to a limited extent a part of the 'policy of inclusion' which remains the number one method to face up to political transition in Europe in the last couple of decades: integration of the new democracies. The EU also tends to project its own integration model as a stabilising factor in those regions with which it establishes a relationship, clearly privileging group to group relations. That the emergence of UMA corresponded to increased interest in the region on the part of the EC is no coincidence. Be it in the Middle East, the Maghreb, or even the Gulf, Europeans are generally convinced that their own experience proves that greater economic integration and regional cooperation institutions are fundamental factors in overcoming tension between neighbours and dispel rivalry and antagonism,

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burdensome legacies of the past. In particular, high
expectations are placed in the role of regional cooperation
in the reconciliation between Israelis, Palestinians and
their neighbours. Jacques Delors has suggested this regional
cooperation could follow the model, that has worked so well
for Europe, of the European Steel and Coal Community. The
joint action towards the Middle East decided by the European
Council (Brussels, December 1993) contemplates the
establishment of a regional cooperation framework to deal
with economic development, arms control and security among
priority support areas.

Regional cooperation should indeed be encouraged, even if
the present picture of fragmentation in the Mediterranean
and the fragility of the existing process tends to make
bilateral agreements more feasible.


**EU external action in the Mediterranean and its constraints**

For the time being, the EU remains a provider of 'soft
security', acting chiefly through economic instruments.
Enlargement to EFTA neutrals will in principle reinforce
this trend and strengthen the argument that it should so
remain. That was the logic of the Five+Five, from which
'hard security', i.e. security issues proper, were excluded.
The Libyan problem, partly as a result of which the
Five+Five process has been frozen, should count as an
example of why a discussion of security issues such as
proliferation of armaments should not be absent from the
EU/Mediterranean debate, why issues such as confidence-
building and transparency will have to be addressed if any
cooperation process in the Mediterranean is to succeed.

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The problem is that there can be no real 'comprehensive policy' that does not integrate security, including military issues. In order to be coherently 'comprehensive', this means that while in the Middle East the economic dimension should be further emphasised, in the Western Mediterranean the security dimension should not be avoided.

Irrespective of their soundness, economic arguments later coupled with economic sanctions, were proven insufficient to deter and least to stop Serbian aggression in the former Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the circumstance of being the major actor — economically — in the region has not prevented the EU from being largely marginal to the Middle East peace process.[8] And again today its political role is not commensurate either with its interests, its geographical proximity or even the sizeable programme towards the Palestinians.

The preponderance of the 'civilian power' approach and the search for stability mainly through market integration will naturally prompt attentions to focus increasingly on the east and centre European democracies, looked upon as natural candidate members and potentially sizeable markets, especially by Germany. The difficulties of ongoing political processes in the Balkans, North Africa and the Middle East call for a predominantly political project, capable of going beyond basic selfishness, priorities dictated by market interests alone, i.e. a broader vision of self-interest if nothing more. The gradual expansion of the EEA towards central and eastern Europe and Turkey will in time create a free-trade area of some 800 million, and may constitute an equally vast opportunity for the economies of the southern

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shore, provided they are willing and able, to become a part
of that market.

Integrating the countries of North Africa would be by and
large a political gesture, one that can only be accomplished
by a political Europe, one that moreover sees itself as an
outward-looking, multi-cultural, multi-religious area; a
Europe of values, with a universalist project set on the
basis of the very diversity between present of future member
states. Should it remain essentially a big market, and lack
a truly political dimension, the south of the Mediterranean,
together with the Balkans and part of eastern Europe will
increasingly tend to be regarded as sources of conflict
which should be contained within their geographical space,
within a 'cordon sanitaire', lest they be allowed to
contaminated the EU equilibrium. This was the general
attitude towards the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the
same attitude of those who say that the triumph of radical
Islam in Algeria, or in Egypt, would be terrible for their
own citizens, but not a problem for Europe since it will
only improbably generate a global threat to its security.

A political Europe?

Although the situation in the Mediterranean will almost
certainly not develop into a global military threat to
European security (the same cannot be said of the Balkans
and eastern Europe, where that risk cannot be totally
discarded), it does however command from the EU a
predominantly political vision and action in a foreign
policy, security and even defence capacity. It remains to be
seen whether this will actually happen, and much debate is

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to be expected on the issue, particularly in the context of
the 1996 IGC.

A politically-driven EU will tend to balance opening up to
centre and east Europe with a reinforcement of initiatives
towards the South, the Mediterranean south in particular.
That the South should be counted in European priorities is a
precondition of maintaining the European equilibrium itself.
Bonn is indeed satisfied that this is so, as the Franco-
German proposal (October 1991) to the IGC on political
union, defining the Mediterranean within the priority areas
for joint action, seems to indicate. North Africa and the
Middle East were again formally included, with central and
eastern Europe, among top priority areas for joint action in
June 1992, as mentioned above.

While a political Europe will tend to privilege the
Mediterranean, a 'civilian' Europe will increasingly
concentrate on an expanding European economic area, and the
European Union could soon become a vast free-trade area and
little else. Enlargement to EFTA neutrals will facilitate
such a development, if nothing is done to counter it.

Common foreign and security policy — which is
intergovernmental — and what it will be able to achieve
depend strictly on the combined political will of member
states. It would unarguably be in the interest of at least
certain member states, France, Italy, Spain and Portugal
among them, to propose a policy 'package' for the
Mediterranean, aimed at countering radical Islamism, and
finding the mechanisms for cooperation between the EU and
the Mediterranean countries that would enable them to
develop some kind of common security culture.' In the

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present context, policies should be aimed at different
constellations, both of countries and of issues. Both
policies and initiatives should follow other criteria than a
rigid geographical divide between eastern and western
Mediterranean. Even if the Western Mediterranean does make
some sense as a region, especially if the Arab Maghreb Union
is brought back into existence and if it comes to correspond
to a free-trade area, including at least Morocco, Tunisia
and Algeria, this should not hinder the development of
initiatives such as Egypt's proposal of a Mediterranean
Forum, including eastern and western Mediterranean countries
(narrower in scope than the CSCM project but wider than the
Five+Five), aiming at strengthening relations with the EU
through a CSCM-type approach, or an initiative towards a
core group of countries in the Middle East directly
interested in the successful outcome of the peace process.

It would be to the benefit of all that such a policy package
should be coordinated with the EU's North African
neighbours. This should aim at bringing about their
integration in the world economy, seek to foster increased
political convergency and would have the additional effect
of making the WEU an interlocuteur of the countries of the
southern shore of the Mediterranean in terms of security, in
such relevant issues as arms control, proliferation and
confidence-building, which might best be described as mutual
trust.

Such a comprehensive or integrated Mediterranean policy
should be seen as an effort to 're-launch' the external
political dimension of an outward-looking European Union.
And should therefore be discussed also in the context of

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future enlargements, so  that these will not  make the Union
drift farther apart from its Mediterranean shores.

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| First Meeting | Première Rencontre |
| Rome, February 25-26, 1994 | Rome, 25-26 Février 1994 |
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# The Middle East Peace Process: the Mediterranean Dimension

# Le Processus de Paix au Moyen-Orient : la Dimension Méditerranéenne
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*«North-South relations in the Mediterranean area within the framework of the "new world order": the right of intervention and the role of the UN»*

*«Les relations Nord-Sud en Méditerranée dans le cadre du "nouvel ordre mondial" : le droit d'ingérence et le rôle des NU»*

by/par

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## THE NEW WORLD ORDER:

Significant changes in the structure of the world following the end
of cold war, the breakup of the Soviet Union , and the Gulf was
have affected the basis of different aspects of international
relations. Political scientists face the challenge of understanding
these changes and adapting policies to suite the new age.
The paper will address north south relations in the mediteranean
within the framework of the " New World Order ".
It is important to define the concept order to arrive at suitable
answers to such questions.

## THE CONCEPT OF THE WORLD ORDER:

The different points of view researching a certain concept even
when it causes complication sometimes enriches and explores its
depth.   The concept international order is susceptible to such
mental mechanism.  However, Charles Maclelland defined order as a
structure, having elements related and interacting with each other,
and having definite limits seperating it from its structure and
environment.
The order is considered an analytical tool which introduces a
particular perspective to human behavior at all levels.   In such
terms, order tends to have specific functions which ought to be
performed, in as much as order (any order) can mentain its
existance through its own mechanisms of adaptation, and in as far
as it can perform its role and achieve its objectives.   The process
turns to be more complicated when its is applied to the
international environment, i.e. to the world order.

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Charles Maclelland, adds that the concept of order and the world order specifically is simultanously abstract, attributive and theoretical.  It is therefore abstract because it represents an analytical tool which can be used within the framework of several approaches to the study, including the specific historical approach, and the scientific approach.  This is so because it is used to indicate a particular status or situation, which characterizes international relations in a specific period of time.  For instance, it has been generally stated that the world order in the post war period was bipolar.  Bipolarity is a theoretical concept, which introduces a number of presumptions and hypothesis which are interrelated in a deductive way.

Distribution of international power shapes the nature of international order, and determines its characteristics.  Thus international order can serve as a mechanism for distribution of power in the world.  This understanding of the nature of international order from a political point of view is of great importance in analyzing as well as understanding international order objectively and realistically.  Therefore, the constructive concept of international order is based on the reaction of the fundamental units in the international order and on the nature of distribution of power in the world.  Thus, we find a number of specific forms or patterns.  We learn a lot on this subject matter from history.

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Distribution of powers in the world assumes one of the following specific forms:

1)    Unipolar order:    In which the power is centralized in one political unit.

2)    Bipolar order:    Distribution of power in the world is divided into two specific centers.

3)    Multipolar order:    Power is distributed among more than two countries.

This understanding of the nature of international relationships and the international order, leads to the inference that the concept of equality among countries, from legal aspects, as is the case with the United Nations Charter needs to be reviewed.

A realistic assessment of international relations requires us to distinguish between actors who create political relationships and affect behavior, and countries that feel obliged to accept them based on the concept of power and adaptation.   Interstate interaction should be focussed into two questions:

-   The first, is the manner of distribution of power.

-   The second, represents the pattern of relationships between these powers.

While the first question relates to the structure of the international order, the second question relates to the means or the mechanism by which international relations are managed.   Thus, it addresses the manner by which the international order realizes its stability and existance.

If we want to answer the inquiries proposed at the outset, which relate to the new world order, and the concept of power, we must address the changes that have occured to this concept; so that we can link between the old and new international orders.

## THE CONCEPT OF POWER

International relations is characterized by decentralization. No single actor can monopolize the authority of issuing orders. Nationalism which is legally named "sovereignty" emerges as an obstacle facing the rising of an organization and have supremacy over national loyalties in such situations and over the instinct of survival and self protection. Thus, the state tends to secure protection to itself. No authority other than the state can secure its survival at the level of international relations. This underlies the concept of power as a motivation and interpreter of international relations and its complexcities. The concept of power in political ethics goes back to the time of Aristole. Today, this concept is applied to three levels:

1)  The individual

2)  The community

3)  The state and the international order; where such concept of power represents a corner stone in the study of inernational relations. The concept of power is expressed by the ability of actors to influence the behavior of others.

Analysis of this concept reveals a number of fundamental variables relevant to the subject of power, such as: Threat, warning, forcing, detering and the like.

Leith Hamid defines power as the use of force which compels others
to adapt themselves to govern their acts in consistence with norms
of behavior prefered by key actors. However, according to Burtrand
Russel, power accumulates from the possession of the ability to
influence. According to Right Mills, the concept of power is the
possession of the ability of actors to make decisions despite the
opposition of others. However, in the field of international
relations, Morganthau propounds that international politics is a
conflict for power regardless of its ultimate objectives. This,
political power is a sort of psychological relationship between
those who exercise it and those against whom it is exercised. It
grants the former the control over the acts performed by others
through influence, which might be practiced in a manner of order,
or by threat or persuation or by a combination of them. Based on
this understanding of the concept of power, many theorists in
international relations used to describe the international order,
before the collapse of the Soviet Union as bipolar, based on the
consideration that power is a channel of relations that influences
and compels. It is basically expressed by military force, since
power is materialized by military force, and since this military
force is possessed by two parties with overwhelming qualilative
characteristics. So logic points out that the distribution of
power is based on a bipolar system, and consequently, order is
based on a limited bipolarity. This analysis, even if it is
apparantly based on the understanding of power, it is considered to
be incapable of explaining international reality in depth.

Changes in the areas of technology and electronics have had an impact on the fundamental concepts of social behavior. The concept of power in international relations was most affected. The fall of the Soviet Union teaches us one significant lesson in history and raises the following question: What is the cause for the collapse of a  powerful military force without a military defeat? Limiting the concept of power to military capability causes an imbalance in the intellectual structure of policies. The first thing that has to be understood is the difference between potential power and actual power. Potential power has access to all resources available to the state which could be utilized in shaping its relations with other states. Actual power stems from the conversion of the states entire power resources that are transformed into military capability.

The new meaning of the concept of power stems from analyzing the attempts of influence that the states tend to exercise in framing their relations with each other, in a manner that power governs the relationshp between two parties or more, and aims at making a change in their behaviour, not necessarily through the coersive use of power, in the sense that coerion does not always represent the most effective or sole way for the demonstration of power, whereby the materialization of power or adaptation to its infuence is considered one of the element of power. This leads us to the stement that states power does not necessarily lie in the size of its military capability but in the number of choices and

alternative actions available. The more political options afforded

to the state the greater its strenght in international realations

and its influence upon others. Domestic factors, such as technical

and an economic base, largely determines the range of options

available to states and their ability to affect substantial change

in international relations.

Therefore, there is an urgent need to review the interpretation and

analysis of the international order existing from the second world

war to the present day. Addressing the concept of power, in terms

of its theoretical structure, provides a framework for examining

international relations. Therefore if world order is defined in

terms of the distribution of power in the world, and power is

defined according to the degree options available based on a states

economic capability, including the options of deterence and

coercion, then , how is power distributed in the world today?

The bipolar system dominated the interntional order following world

war 11 . In terms of military power, the U.S. and the USSR

dominated international relations. However, Henry kissinger

correctly pointed out that the world is considered bipolar in terms

of distribution of military power,  but multibipolar by the

criteria of economic and political strength.

Since the 1970's and 1980's the technological and economic base of

state power began to exceed the importance of military power,

especially following the emergence of detente, reduction of

military threat and the end of the cold war. The rise of Japan as

an economic power along with the political and economic ascendency
of a unified Europe are two examples which demonstrate that
international relations today can be best explained by the
distribution of power representative of a multipolar system.
The international order of today may be considered new in the sense
of the existing ditribution of power.
The dominance of a multipolar regime necessitates the inquiry as to
how this system is maintained and the distribution of capability in
terms of deterence and coercion to influence international
relations. Furthermore, queries must address not only the nature of
international relations in a multipolar system, but qualilative
relations between the rich north encompassing ( 85% ) of the worlds
production and the poor south. Also about the future of territorial
, racial and religious conflicts in addition to the problems of
development, democracy, human rights and proliferation of amss
destruction weapons. Such world problems form a challenge to the
methods by which international relationship are managed, and both
levels i.e. between the major world powers , and between these
powers and the remaining countries of the world.
One of the most significant weaknesses of conventional diagnosis of
world statemanship is the tendency to overstate military sources
of power, and to consider them as permanent basic standard for
measuring and comparing all other forms of power. Economic and
technological power in fact have become the most important aspects
of a state's strength. They stand for the final featuring factor of
global state's structure which shall become a field for commercial

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and financial rivalry. In other words, a state's stature shall
spring from its economic achievements rather than its military
capabilities, bacause no power can maintain survival if relying on
violence alone.


## THE MIDDLE EAST

The Middle East has gained a significant importance in world
relations.  At the time when geography was responsible for such
geostrategic importance of the Middle East region, the factor of
resources and the nature of the world struggle however,
subsequently formed and are still forming the springhead for the
increasing importance of the region in world politics.  Today,
studies of this region became increasingly intensive due to its
involvement with changes befalling to centers and peripheries in
international relations. Although the study of such changes is
circumpassed by too many difficulties and complications, arising
from the intimate circumstances of the region, such study yet seems
demanding and necessary for the purpose of forming an obvious
conceptional idea about how international changes infulence world
relations, and for functional purposes dealing with the methods
that the region has to adopt in order to adapt with such
developments.

The basic difficulty faced by any researcher of the Middle East
region lies with the systematic approach he has to follow, and
whether the study should beon geographical basis, on racial basis,
or through its functional aspect, i.e. the function of ingredient

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units comprising the region's order with their various machineries

for attaining stability and balance.

The concept of regional or provincial order was developed in the

sixties and seventies.  Its origin relates to two basic sources of

the international literature.

The first is regionalism, which represents a doctrine arising

against internationalism that preached the construction of a new

international order for peace keeping and stability.  Where as

propagandist of regionalism considered the establishment of

regional conglomer-actions as the best and most feasible means for

maintaining international peace and security.  Internationalists on

the other hand called for the establishment of a universal

government comprising all states for that purpose.

The second origin for the concept of regionalism stems from

integration research with all its diversities, particularly

economic integration.  Besides these two ideological origins of

the regional order concept, there existed new world developments

that contributed to the concept.  In this context, Oran Young

introduces the discontinuties norm of international order and

provides practical data for the rising of regional systems.  The

Young's norm reflects how some universal influencing forms of

regionalism are marked with conformity and others with

discontinuity.

This is followed by the emergence of conformity in the norms of

relations and types of benefits from both the universal as well as

the regional frameworks.

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There are certain zones of unique characteristics which distinguish
them from others.   In addition to the international influence of
factors in all zones of the world, there are also private
factors which affect the type of relations and reactions existing
in each zone as opposed to other zones. · One of the reasons that
added to the importance of adopting the regionalism concept as a
means of political analysis, is the absence of a world war leading
to international coalition, the thing that allowed each zone to
evolve its own characteristics in one way or another, and also
allowed the revival of super and regional powers, the remarkable
increase of independent states especially in Africa and Asia. In
this very context, many scholars and researchers have produced
various identifications of the regional order. Examples
are:  The sub-order or the regional sub-order, the partial
international order or the world sub-order, etc.   However, the
theoretical framework given by Lewis Cantori and Stephen Spegil is
considered the most decisive and comprehensive identification.
Both scholars considered the regional order as comprising one, two
or more adjacent and interactive states having religious,
linguistic, cultural, social and historical ties in common, and
their emotional feeling towards their regional identity is
occasionally increased by actions and stances of outside countries.
The two writers further divided the regional order into three
parts:  The core zone, the margin, and the penetration zone.  The
core (heart) includes the countries which are far from the core
of the order to some extent as a result of social, political,

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economic or organizational factors.  But nontheless, they play a
certain role in the regional order policy.  The penetration zone
includes outside countries which perform political roles within the
international order.  Within the three foregoing classifications
the locations of countries is determined by four categories of
variables as follows:

1)  Nature and standard of cohesion in the order.

2)  Nature of communications

3)  Level of power or capabilities of the order, and the structure
    and types of relations.

However, the region is defined by three main trends:

1)  One concentrates on the geographical nearness considerations.

2)  One concentrates on the availability of cultural, social,
    economic and political cohesion between the states.

3)  One concentrates on the interaction element.   This trend
    argues that the regional order is based on the existence of
    political, economic, social, and cultural interactions
    between neighboring or identical states.

As for the Middle East region, neither of the paths adopted for its
study will find the unique characteristic distinguishing this
region.  Some geographists argue that it extends from Mococco to
Paksitan.  This definition projects an effective role for the
region in international politics.  However, if an ethnic feature
were adopted, the Arab World will constitute the heart (core) of
the region.  The Arab World has a specific importance in the
international order by reason of its resources and fortunes.

Whereas the functional dimension shall necessitate the inclusion of Turkey, Iran, Etheuopia and Israel as effective and significant elements. The Middle East region has a special strategic importance within world politics. It links three continents encompassing most of what is known as the third world.

The region was pulled back and forth by three ideologies that stand for the general concepts of socialism, capitalism, and nonalignment. From here erupts oil which is fundamental for world industry, and in it pours the latest innovated weapons which render it an indispensible experimental field.

This strategic importance of the region has attracted the sights of international powers, and lead to their struggle for spheres of influence in it, so as to adjoin it to the areas of their influence from which they practice their dangerous games in some collisions of international balance. In order to probe the position of the Middle East in the international order and its relation therewith, we should geographically define the Middle East for analytic purposes, and bring about the general features of its importance in international politics.

The geographical area covered by the Middle East extends from the Nile Valley in Africa including Egypt, Sudan, Etheuopia, Eritria and Libya; and from Asia all the Arab Peninsula, and the fertile crescent; and Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus from Europe.

The Middle East thus appears as a plain plateau lying between Africa, Asia and Europe. The region is characterized with the following:

1) Its location in the junction of the major continents of the ancient world.

2) Its projection on the largest water area comprising the Mediterranean the Black Sea, the Arabian Ocean, the Caspean Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Gulf, Hermuz Strait, the River Tigriss and the Euphrates, Jordan River Bab-elMandeb, the Suez Canal, and the Straits of the Bosforus.

3) Vastness of its area that secures depth for production, dispersion of military bases and diversity of agricultural crops.

4) Abundance of resources particularly oil where it contains over two third of the world oil reserves.

5) It is a traverse bridge between land and both marine and air passages between the Far East and Europe. In other words, it is one of the busiest areas of world services, and the richest in production and manufacturing.

The research of Middle East regional order's relation with the international order is the core of this work. Based on the international order's concept set on the norm and distribution of world powers, the Middle East cannot qualify as a central part in power relationships. In this measure however, from a more obtuse angle, the significant value of the region to the international order can be explained by two regards:

**First:**

Since the Middle East constitutes a critical strategic area for world powers, and because of its special characteristics of oil resources, its relative preponderance to polars of the international order shall increase with the possibility of forming a homogenous regional unity called the Middle East market.

**Second:**

Though the Middle East is outside the international power bloc, i.e. outside the international order, it is yet essential for interrelations between those powers. Such interrelations are necessarily influenced by changes in the region and according to the density of their ties with it. Conflicts and duels of the Middle East region pose a challenge to international relations management which thus has to find some solutions for, them if it were to maintain steadfastness of the international order. If we add to this regard the fact that the Middle East is a laboratory for relations between the deprived and destitute south, suffering the burden of indebtness besides the failure of development plans, and between the rich north representing central powers of international order, then care of the Middle East becomes a requisite imposed by the national interest of rich countries themselves.

Due to its geographical and economic importance, the middle east forms a vital region to the international order. Probability of middle eastern market remain outstanding despite the areas racial,

sectarian, and intellectual conflicts. Such market would impact the nature of relations between the region and international order, as with such volume and capacity, it sure will entice international participation.

The picture of future ties between the middle east and the new international order, or the position of middle east region in that order, will become clearer when we discuss these ties through the new role of the United Nations. There are underdevelopment problems, political and water conflicts, proliferation of mass destruction weapons, all these cases roughly tell the main features of the foreseen relation.

## NEW ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

Our main objectives here is to explain two fundamental problems:

First : Trying to perfect a vision of a possible role for the United Nations in world politics. The changes that effected the world introduced a chain of new pending problems require specific mechanical thinking for their circumvention and solving, and demanding the introduction or displaying of a comprehensive picture of the actual prevailing international relations.

Second : Finding the dialectic relations which connects the middle east with the international order, and displaying this regional zone as a pattern of probing the UN ability to practice its required role of being the suitable tool for administering international relations and creating

the manners needed to maintain stability and

steadfastness of the international order.

The idea that struck many people about the possible new pyramidal international organization in which the international government would monopolize authority, must have been supported by the ideas of previous scholars who studied the social vault of the states organization. Finding a global organization with authorities beyond the national loyalties is strongly connected with the concept of an international social vaul, but having states not persons at the ends this time.

The nature of complication featuring todays international relations,changes suspition about the continuation of the absolute supremacy notion. This notion today seems as if it has exhausted its specific historic role which attempted to augment the existence of the states and their strenghtering. As the probability, that any state today can attain its vital aims and benefits without a dense network of relations with other countries had faded, therefore, the prophecy that international relations should take a central trend seems reasonable, mainly because the opinions of legists calling and supporting the idea of international organizations emergence argue that solutions for international duels, no matter how inconsistent, can be found though legal adaptation. Neverthless, the nature of the dominating international order is in fact the factor which controls the manner in which a legal institution acts. Both international and regional organizations arise by dedication of a political state of affairs.

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Their policy is confined within the frame of upkeeping the existing

situation by lawful methods without being able to create a new

interntional state of affairs.  Such conservative nature of

international organization does not nullify their central

importance in innovating suitable means and methods for a better

management of international relations.

The fact disclosed by the fall of the Soviet Union does not relate

to the distribution of world powers, but to the nature of prevalent

international relations, and the ideological struggle which had

camouflaged the reality of the international order does no more

exists in its former shape. Competition in economical and technical

advancements has stepped to a significant position in

international relations.  However, the intensity of this

competition will necessarily determine the nature of relations

that we expect to watch at the beginning of next century.

In this course, the dense relation network which connects the

polars of international order, and the economic nature of power

in the world today, and the tremendous technological developments

that make influential a change in the type of production and

management in a certain location, and eventually influences the

rest of the order, , all press towards finding a high

level of international cooperation, with guaranteeing security,

stability and spreading peace for the freedom of trade and

bartering. This opinion will look more reasonable when we imagine

the volume of possible joint interests in case of cooperation on

one hand, and on the other hand the volume of huge loss which shall

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be tantamount to the order's collapse in case collision,

especially when realising the capability of each party to inflict

damage no others. However, the query that seeks an answer relates

to the relation of interntional order polars with other political

units in the world community.The huge volume of interests that

links the polars of international order and fasten them together,

warns the danger of possible negligence of other regions of the

world. Also adaptation necessities needed by each of the

international order polars for management of self internal affairs

may lead to negligence of other world regions which suffer acute

stalemates and sanguine struggles, and as such it becomes

impossible to find solutions to these problems.

This state of affairs reveal the new challenge before the

international order, and clearly manifests the disparity problem

between the north and south.  If the world were destined to rule

with such norm of thinking, humanity would suffer critical

difficulties that threatens extinction of human race.

The problem before the world require, for the sake of joint

interests of humanity, international efforts. Top priority for the

international order is to know how and design problem solving

methods if trying to maintain survival and stability.  Pollution,

poverty , proliferation of mass destruction weapons , development,

and epidemics are problems facing the whole world, and the

international order will not be able to achieve interests of its

polars unless it deals seriously with this case.

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Technology has shortened geographical distances between countries,

while it set apart between classes ( casteism ). Since changes are

of international nature, they require tremendous international

efforts, it is this that renders the argument of new UN role

acceptable and essential together.

The Middle East region therefore, occupies an important position in

the world order. Represented by a majority of third world

countries, this region suffers serious and threatening problems.

Possession of vital resources for international civilization gives

the region an increasing importance, but there remain the query

about how the region will be dealt with through the new role of

the UN in the world order.

No region of the world has gained the concern of the United Nations

since its establishments like the Middle East.  The Palestine issue

was one of the first politial casuses tackled by the UN, and the

general Assembly, Security Council, and a number of UN commission,

particularly the special political one, However, the attention of

the UN towards, the middle east was not limited to the palestine

issue and its remifications , but also included cases of other

states and peoples of the region. For example, an international

mandate system was formed for a group of Arab States before given

independence like Libya, Somalia and other issues of dispute

between Arab states and foreign countries like the foreign

intervention in Lebanon, the French aggression against Tunisia, and

the Egyptian cause with Britian, also other forms of conflicts like

the Iraq - Iran war and the recent Gulf war. Actually the task of

making international peace and security ( the reason for UN

establishment according to its charter), warding the world off war

calamities, and solving conflicts peacefully is an essential

mission for nation and peoples in order to enable them practice

their basic tasks.  The UN charter is a document greatly effected

by the events seen by the 1930's era.  It is based on the

experiment exercised by the allies during world war 11. The charter

had assumed that the major allies won the war would be honest to

each other in their capacity as trustees or the responsible, if

necessary, for achieving peace.

This assumption was expressed by the consensus rule indicated in

the charter and which is known for " Vito " or the right of

objection. It is incontestible that the deadly blow for the UN

credibility and effectiveness was represented by the curbs which

limit the feasibility of the Security Council as a result of

permanent disputes between its permanent members of the super

powers. The obstacles that limit the Councils ability to develop

and cooperate for discharging its mission of international peace

and security, were considered as negative attitudes in

its capacity as a political organization. The world which had to be

seen by the UN is largely different from that which the charter was

made.  Only two months after the meeting in San Francisco, the

appearance of nuclear weapon had heralded the occurence of radical

change in relations between the super powers, and the management of

international affairs.

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The fast collapse of colonization had demanded the redrawing the

map for a great part of the world dominated by a vast and new human

bloc that was forgotten by the charter and was not foreseen by the

originators thereof.

The increase of the world population, almost twice as much in

fourty years, the technological revolution, and the increasing

correlation of nations, all represent revolutionary changes, and

the list of problems blows up increasingly year after another so

that no single state can achieve its objective independently no

mater how big it was. Non of these matters were envisaged or

obvious when the charter was formulated.

With these consideration in mind, and with the exigent facts of our

era in regard, it seems that the query is not only about whether

the UN would be able to save interntional security and peace, but

the query should be how that can be attainable , and would the UN

be able to do it under the variable political circumstances ? If it

were unable, is there any other serious alternative ?

As regards to the first question, there is only one situation where

all governments look seriously to the UN as a political

institution, this is when there is a confrontation danger

threatening major nuclear powers, and warning outbreak of nuclear

war, as happened during the middle east crisis in 1973. This leads

us to contemplate how can we make the UN capable of saving peace ?

Also prior to the investigation of specific ideas, it is worth

questioning whether it is possible in our current development

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situations expect from the member states to coexist with the

charters principles and ascend to its level.  The UN charter

requires:

1 - That governments should not use military power in other than

joint interest.

2 - That members should settle their disputes peacefully and

refrain from using or threatening the use of force.

3 - That the Organization should jointly take measures to

prevent causes which jeopardizes peace, and to prevent aggressive

action.

4 - That the organization shouldn't interfere with the internal

affairs, that are exclusively a sovereignty prestige of any

government.

The UN however , played an important role in preventing the

outbreak of a nuclear confrontations . The Security Council has

introduced a number of methods that alleviate and circumvent

acuteness of conflicts, as a peace keeping instruments, offering

its good offices, reconciliation  and other activities of siezing

apportunities , and facesaving methods that had helped governments

to change courses of action and crisis into a less violent and less
dangerous trend.

The UN system lacks the basic authority and the major source of

effective pressure. As a result, a number of other means were

introduced, but they do not relate to the collective peace

system empowered by the charter.

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This once again leads to the arguments that the effectiveness of
the UN system is determined by two factors:

The first being the general international attitude, i.e the shape
of international relations particularly between influencing units.
The second being the way by which the member states wish to avail
the possibilities created by the UN. The new role of the UN thus
encounters many challenges on the international level as well as in
the Middle east region, the most important of which being :

1 - Termination of the cold war and international confrontation
have changed the pattern of international relations and transformed
it into cooperation and understanding between various parts of the
international order with the possibility of marginalizing  or
ignoring other areas. The UN thus will have to restore balance to
such thought and to concentrate on the unity of human interest.

2 - Intensive regional conflicts especially in the Third World
which were controlled to some extent by the patterns of prevalent
relations between the powers of international order, and for
his own reasons that shaped each conflict with its special
specifications both locally and regionally. This necessarily
requires active movement for settling varaible conflicts in harmony
with the international trend towards negotiations, and peaceful
settlements so that the UN becomes the center of coordination and
management between the contradicting interests of international
politics.

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3 - Aggravating economic problems due to the shortage of
resources, collapse of the structure , population explosion,
shortage of food , and drought.

This imposes a new role on the UN by concentrating on the
reconnaissance of the South, on political development to activate
dialogue with the north, on removing obstacles before international
trade, and on producing plenty of alternatives for  the
developmental role of the UN.

4 - The phenomenon of the flaring of minor conflicts about
initiative inceptions ( ethnic, racial, sectarian, and religious )
during the dissolving circumstances of major political entities (
like the Soviet union, Yugoslavia, and Africa ). This requires
special care for human rights and anchoring the democratic
movements as priorities of the new mission of the Organizations .

5 - The revolution of accelerating change in management and
communications system, requiring the updating of the administrative
structure of the Organization, and mobilization of its human  and
financial resources accordingly.

Such developments lay on the UN shoulders the task of evolving
dialectics between North and South or between South and South, and
of alleviating the burden of indebtedness which encumber the third
world, of contributing to the efforts of protecting the
environment, combating addictions, prohibiting proliferation of
mass destruction weapons, and restricting the armament race.

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All these challenges apply to the existing state of affairs in the
middle east. The UN will have to deal with these issues with more
care and seriousness . The argument that the legal international or
Domestic conditions, should not limit the UN effectiveness as a
legal international order, for the sake of achieving peace security
and welfare.

The experience of UN in dealing with middle east issues however,
doesnt seem satisfactory nor prompts that it will occupy a leading
position in managing international relations independently. This
becomes obvious by examining the management of the Gulf crisis on
the one hand, and the Bosnia - Hertzgovania or the Somalian crisis
on the other . However it was sucessful in dealing with the
Cambodian case . This matter denotes to basic patterns of
comtemporary world policy.  They show that much of the UN
res and behaviours are principally controlled by
the interests and considerations of super powers rather
than those of international peace and security, resulting in many
suspicions about the right of interferring legally given
to the UN , and whether such right is aimed at resolving
disputes which threaten international peace and security, and
towards combating aggression, or whether it is a pretence seeking
legality to achieve super powers interests. The world is willing to
give the UN a larger role in confronting international crisis, and
to equip it with political and economic tools of sucess, if we want
to evade inevitable disasters.

Such a change requires a new intellectual readiness as well as

a new perspective of reassessment, and a conscious awareness of

the facts that the ability of mankind to survive is greatly

dependent on the richness of man's imagination and his power of

creation and presentation .

| Mediterranean Study Commission<br>- MeSCo - | Commission d'Etude de la Méditerranée<br>- CodEMe - |
| --- | --- |
| First Meeting | Première Rencontre |
| Rome, February 25-26, 1994 | Rome, 25-26 Février 1994 |
| Under the Patronage of the<br>Regional Council of Latium | Sous le Patronage du<br>Conseil Régional du Latium |

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# The Middle East Peace Process: the Mediterranean Dimension

# Le Processus de Paix au Moyen-Orient : la Dimension Méditerranéenne
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«Arms control and limitation in the Middle East peace process»

«Le contrôle et la limitation des armements
dans le processus de paix au Moyen-Orient»

by/par

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# THE MIDDLE EAST ARMS CONTROL AGENDA: 1994-1995

by Shai Feldman*

## Introduction

The agenda for arms control in the Middle East is heading towards a collision of timetables. On one hand, during the past two years, some of the region's states have been engaged in a remarkable and unprecedented effort to launch a regional arms control process. Led by Israel, Egypt and Jordan, the multilateral talks on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) launched in Moscow in early 1992, have made considerable progress. Indeed, by the beginning of the third year of their talks, the ACRS participants succeeded in negotiating a draft "declaratory statement." The document accorded the various parties' priorities by addressing their future political relations, the need to establish mutual confidence, and their commitment to arms reductions, including the transformation of the Middle East to a zone free of weapons of mass destruction.[1]     Thus, following a period of mutual adjustment to their different and somewhat conflicting priorities, the parties to the ACRS talks acknowledged not only the significance of addressing the proliferation of weapons in the region but also the enormous sensitivity of the issues involved. Hence, they adopted a cautious "go-slow" approach, based on the gradual building of mutual confidence and successful conflict resolution, so that a regional environment more conducive to eventual arms reductions might be created.

At the same time, at the region's doorstep is a global arms control agenda dictating a much more urgent timetable. During 1994

the Chemical Weapons Convention needs to be ratified and major
decisions regarding the possible extension or extinction of the
1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty would have to be made before
the NPT Review Conference is convened in 1995. Also, discussions
are to be launched regarding the US-proposed Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, and a convention banning the further production of nuclear
weapons-grade material. Finally, the possibility that the UN Arms
Transfers Register might be expanded to include additional
categories and activities, is likely to be introduced and
discussed. For some of the region's states, the issues involved in
these treaties affect the very foundations of their national
security. Yet these states would have to formulate their positions
with respect to these treaties during the coming months. At this
point, it is difficult to ascertain how this 'collision of
timetables' would be resolved.

## Multilateral Arms Control Talks

Initial seeds of the future application of confidence building
and arms reduction measures in the Middle East have been planted
during 1992-1993. The Middle East multi-lateral conference held in
Moscow in January 1992 for the purpose of addressing the region's
problems, led to the convening of the multi-lateral working group
on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) in the Middle East.
Israel and some 12 Arab countries -- Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
Morocco, Algeria, Oman, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates --
are taking part in these talks. As of May 1993, the Palestinians

have joined the working group as well.

During the initial rounds of discussions held within this framework in Washington and Moscow, the talks were plagued by fundamental disagreements on priorities, primarily between Israel and Egypt. The latter attributed the highest priority to arresting the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East and, within this context, to focusing on Israel's nuclear weapons first. Accordingly, Egypt called for an early consensus regarding the end-products of a Middle East arms control process, and pressed Israel, directly as well as indirectly, to commit itself to de-nuclearization.[2]

Within this context, Egyptian spokesmen -- including Foreign Minister Amr Musa in a March 1993 interview with Defense News -- urged that Israel adopt a long list of declaratory, political, and legally-binding measures, expressing Israeli willingness to transform the Middle East into a nuclear-weapons-free-zone and to sign the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.[3] Repeatedly, these spokesmen emphasized that Egypt would not be able to accept Israeli possession of nuclear weapons as an indefinite proposition.

Explaining their approach, Egyptian officials and scholars stressed that the ACRS process should deal first with nuclear arms, because they comprise the most destructive and, hence, the most destabilizing weapons. They stressed that while they are satisfied that Israel's present government can control such weapons responsibly, they cannot be confident that this would similarly apply to any future Israeli government. Finally, they emphasized

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that Egypt cannot voice its opposition effectively against the nuclear ambitions of Iran and Iraq as long as Israel's nuclear program is ignored.

Conversely, Israel stressed the prevailing profound mistrust and the impact of conventional weapons with which all Middle East wars have been waged and which have taxed the region's nations heavily in human lives and financial resources, and the resulting importance of addressing the asymmetries of the conventional forces in the region.  Israel's approach also implied that sensitive issues involving the various parties' central strategic systems should be implemented only after these parties develop a minimum measure of self-confidence and mutual trust.[4]   Accordingly, Israel proposed the application of a wide range of regional confidence building measures designed to prevent mis-perceptions, mis-assessments, and unintended escalation, and to reduce mutual fears of surprise attack.  Behind this approach was Israel's conviction that during the long and uncertain transition to reconciliation in the Middle East, and until the stability of peace will be assured, Israel should continue to maintain a credible deterrent.

The working group's September 1992 meeting held in Moscow settled these conflicting agendas by adopting a US-proposed compromise, incorporating both Israeli and Egyptian priorities.[5] In effect, the US urged a joint effort to define long-term objectives ('a vision') for the process, but argued that progress toward the realization of these goals must be build "brick by

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brick," through the gradual growth of mutual confidence.[6]  Thus, the early implementation of regional confidence building measures was stressed.  Within this framework, the parties were requested to indicate their attitude toward a long list of confidence building measures, submitted by their American and Russian co-sponsors.[7]

At the closing of the Moscow talks, the parties agreed to present the following meeting of the working group suggested definitions of the desired end-results of the process, as well as lists of confidence building measures that might be implemented initially.  Consequently, between September 1992 and May 1993, Israel and Jordan launched an internal effort to define ultimate purposes for the region's arms control process.[8]  In Egypt a definition already existed in the form of the April 1990 Mubarak initiative.  The initiative called for the transformation of the Middle East into a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  Variations on this theme were also expressed in a document distributed earlier by the chairman of Egypt's delegation, Nabil Fahmy.

Following complex internal negotiations during late 1992, the Israeli government produced a draft defining its approach to the end-goals of arms control in the Middle East.  The essence of the approach was made public in the framework of a speech delivered by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres on January 13, 1993, to the international conference convened in Paris to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention.  In effect, Israel adopted the Mubarak Initiative, but made it clear that the establishment of a WMD-free-

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zone in the Middle East requires the prior establishment of peace and the application of mutual verification measures.[9] It was clear that the two conditions are closely related. Thus, for example, Israeli and Syrian inspectors are unlikely to be allowed to examine sensitive sites in each other's territory except in the context of peaceful relations between the two countries.

In emphasizing the second condition, Israel had adopted the approach taken earlier by the US and the Soviet Union in the framework of East-West arms control. The two superpowers refrained from delegating to third parties or international agencies the responsibility for verifying compliance with agreements reached. Rather, they insisted that these agreements will be subjected to mutual and reciprocal verification procedures, through the employment of National Technical Means (NTMs) as well as on-site inspections.

Thus, the Israeli position stressed an evolutionary approach, in which the materialization of the ultimate objectives is seen as conditional upon the prior establishment of peace and complete reconciliation among all the region's states. Indeed, Israel's formulation differed from the Mubarak initiative in three additional respects: first, it incorporated ballistic missiles into the definition of mass destruction weapons; second, it stressed the importance of reducing the arsenals of conventional weapons in the region.

At the multilateral working group meeting held in Washington in May 1993, draft definitions of the 'visionary goals' were

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presented by Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Oman, and a number of proposals for confidence building measures were discussed.[10] One proposal developed called for cooperation between the Israeli and Arab navies of Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and the Gulf states to avoid incidents at sea. The proposal focused particularly on the Red Sea as a possible laboratory for the implementation of Arab-Israeli CBMs.[11]

Subsequently, an agreement was reached in Washington to the effect that inter-sessional meetings by sub-working groups will be held, each entrusted with a particular task. External sponsors were nominated to escort the parties through the complexities of these tasks. Thus, the US and the Russia were to co-sponsor the effort to define both the ultimate purposes of a Middle East arms control process as well as a set of declaratory confidence building measures; Canada was asked to sponsor the effort to explore maritime confidence building measures and the means of avoiding incidents at sea; Turkey was nominated to co-sponsor the effort to explore alternative methods of exchanging military information and pre-notification of military exercises and large-scale military movements; and finally, the Netherlands were asked to lead an effort to examine the utility and functioning of a crisis communication network.

Within this context, all the region's parties were urged to reach beyond their short lists of arms control specialists and to send to these meetings military officers who, in the future, might be instructed by their governments to help implement confidence

building measures. In July 1993 Egypt hosted the members of the ACRS working group for a workshop devoted to verification.[12] This was the first meeting of its kind conducted in the region itself. The seminar included presentations and discussions held in Cairo as well as a visit to the Sinai -- where verification measures applied in the framework of the 1979 Israel-Egypt peace agreement were observed.

Subsequently, two of the ACRS sub-working groups were convened in September 1993: a meeting on maritime confidence building measures was held in Nova Scotia, and a seminar on crisis communication was held in the Hague. In early October, the first meeting on the exchange of military information was held in Turkey. Within this period, the parties involved were also invited to observe inspections of a Royal Air Force base in Britain and a NATO exercise in Denmark, both conducted in the framework of CSCE.

Finally, in mid-October, meetings on the ultimate goals of the process and on declaratory confidence building measures were held in Vienna. These comprised the only truly confrontational talks held within the 'inter-sessional' framework, with Egypt's representatives stressing the urgent need for nuclear arms control, while Israel's representatives emphasized political accommodation and the need to apply an evolutionary confidence-building approach.

The array of inter-sessional activities conducted in mid-1993 was impressive and significant. Only a few years earlier, the willingness of a large number of Arab states to cooperate with Israel in examining alternative region-wide confidence building

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measures was considered a dream. Moreover, such cooperative examinations themselves comprised an important confidence building measure, since they provided excellent opportunities for a growing number of Israeli and Arab military personnel and government officials to inter-act informally with one another and to develop an understanding for each other's perceptions and security concerns. Thus, the cumulative effect of these developments must be considered -- especially by Middle East standards -- a dramatic breakthrough.

The next ACRS plenary meeting took place in Moscow on November 3-4, 1993. After surveying the previous 'inter-sessional' workshops, difficult negotiations regarding the future course of the process took place. Again, Egypt emphasized the need to implement nuclear disarmament, while Israel stressed the importance of conflict-resolution and confidence-building.[13] Tension rose as a consequence of the intensity with which these two principle parties adhered to their positions. Some Arab delegations were unhappy about the degree of coordination and prior consultation exercised by Egypt's representatives. The latter subsequently complained that the time constraints imposed by the co-sponsors in Moscow made a dispassionate review of the issues nearly impossible. And, the two co-sponsors were unhappy about the extent of posturing exercised by 'some parties.'

Nevertheless, the Moscow meeting ended in an important agreement to divide the ACRS future activities into two 'baskets': first, a 'conceptual basket' in the framework of which an effort

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would be made to agree on the principles that would guide the future relations of the region's states, on the ultimate objectives ascribed by the parties to the arms control process, and on a set of declaratory measures which may provide the parties with effective mutual reassurances. In this context, the parties were also expected to define the region's boundaries, to articulate their threat perceptions, to elaborate generic verification methods, to design crisis prevention mechanisms, and to produce menus of confidence building measures.

By contrast, the 'operational basket' was designed to comprise various practical mechanisms for increasing transparency and reducing the danger of unintended escalation. These included maritime confidence building measures and mechanisms to prevent incidents at sea; procedures for military-to-military contacts and the exchange of military information; arrangements for pre-notification of major military exercises and movements; and, the establishment of a regional communications network. Indeed, by mid-January 1994, representatives of the parties to the ACRS talks met in the Hague (Netherlands) and decided to establish a Middle East communication network. This was to be done by employing the CSCE network located there, and was to comprise the 'flag project' of the 'operational basket.'[14]

The first meeting of the ACRS 'conceptual basket' talks took place in Cairo in early February, 1994. While witnessing some tough negotiations, the Cairo meeting was successful in producing a draft declaration of principles on peace and security in the

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Middle East. The document accorded the various parties' priorities by addressing their future political relations, the need to establish mutual confidence, and their commitment to arms reductions, including the transformation of the Middle East to a zone free of weapons of mass destruction.[15] The document comprised an enormous achievement: while remaining at the level of generalities, it contains the first multi-lateral Arab-Israeli agreement on the principles which should guide inter-state relations in the Middle East. The meeting concluded by referring the document for approval to the various governments taking part in the ACRS talks.

If the Cairo document will comprise the basis for the entrance of future participants in the ACRS talks, such as Syria -- and, in the more distant future, possibly Iran and Iraq as well -- it might eventually assume the same importance attributed to the 1974 Helsinki Final Act in the history of US-Soviet relations. Yet by early 1994 Syria remained resistant to joining the process and continued to insist that greater progress in Israeli-Syrian bi-lateral talks must first be achieved.[16] At the same time, some of the region's key proliferation concerns -- Iraq, Iran, and Libya -- have not even been invited to take part in these multi-lateral discussions. Thus, at this writing, even the limited gains made in establishing the basis for a regional arms control process remained confined to only parts of the Middle East.

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## Regional Implications of Global Efforts

As noted already, during 1994-95, Middle East states would have to formulate their positions with respect to a number of arms control treaties. These old, new and proposed treaties and measures comprise the global arms control agenda. The agenda includes the Chemical Weapons Convention which needs to be ratified; the 1995 NPT Review Conference which needs to determine whether the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty would be extended indefinitely or for a fixed period or periods of time; and, two US-proposed treaties that need to be negotiated: the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and a convention banning the further production of nuclear weapons-grade material. In addition, suggestions are likely to be raised to the effect that the UN Arms Transfers Register should be expanded to include additional categories and activities. While the CTBT, proposed by the Clinton administration in mid-1993, is unlikely to present major difficulties to any of the region's states, the other four treaties and measures will require them to make some difficult choices.

(a)   The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

Article X-2 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signed in 1968 stipulates that 25 years since becoming effective in 1970, its members should meet to determine whether it should be extended indefinitely or for a fixed period or periods. This issue and the questions related to it will comprise the agenda of the NPT Review Conference scheduled to meet in 1995.

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In recent years, the NPT has come under increasing criticism. Most frequent have been complaints about the treaty's discriminatory nature, pointing the asymmetry of the obligations undertaken by nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. While the latter assume clear obligations not to acquire nuclear weapons, the former are merely required to enter negotiations leading to the elimination of their nuclear arsenals "in good faith." Indeed, it was pointed out often that throughout the first 20 years since the treaty became effective, the nuclear weapon states have been in clear violation of its stipulations: judging from the intensity of the nuclear arms race which they conducted, they could hardly have been said to be negotiating nuclear disarmament "in good faith."

A second focus of criticism has been the treaty's schizophrenic nature. That is, it is characterized by constant tension between two inherently contradictory purposes: preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and encouraging the peaceful use of nuclear technology. The problem from the treaty's inception has been the dual-use nature of nuclear technology; peaceful and weapons-related nuclear technologies are related and convertible. Thus, while Japan's post-war nuclear program has been strictly peaceful, it is now widely considered to be able to transform its capability to an enormous nuclear arsenal almost overnight.

As the example of Japan illustrates, a related weakness of the NPT is that within its framework, a country can develop an advanced nuclear capability 'for peaceful purposes' and then withdraw its

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treaty membership with or without providing the stipulated three-month advanced notice. North Korea has already threatened to exercise this right, leaving the withdrawing state with the facilities and source material required to assemble nuclear weapons quickly.

A final central focus of the NPT's weakness is its reliance on the inadequate verification mechanisms and procedures of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Like the NPT, the IAEA is also torn between two somewhat contradictory missions: encouraging the use of 'peaceful' nuclear technology and discouraging the spread of nuclear weapons. Until recently, it has limited its inspections and application of safeguards to nuclear facilities which have been declared as such by the member states. It has given much prior notice to the relevant governments before launching inspections, thus leaving them ample opportunity to conceal forbidden activities. Thus, it refrained from conducting 'short notice' and 'challenge' inspections of sites where the conduct of weapons-related nuclear activities was suspected.

The IAEA is also regarded as chronically under-funded and hence under-staffed to perform its global mission. It is also accused of having mis-allocated its sparse resources between safeguarding the vast number of nuclear facilities of advanced industrial countries such as Germany and Japan, and countries which are of more immediate nuclear proliferation concern, such as Iraq, Iran, South Africa, and North Korea. The cumulative effect of these shortcomings has been to allow Iraq to develop an advanced

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nuclear weapons program under the framework of the NPT and under the eyes of the inadequate IAEA inspection mechanism. Calls for strengthening IAEA have been widespread, but the organization has recently announced a further 12 percent cutback in its activities as a consequence of budgetary constraints.

The NPT regime has gained increasingly wide membership. In recent years, its global application received a significant boost by the separate decisions of France, China, and South Africa to sign the treaty. More recently, Algeria also declared its intention to join. In the case of South Africa this involved a further decision to liquidate its nuclear program.

Yet the treaty's application remains short of universal. Important states widely believed to possess nuclear arsenals, notably India, Pakistan, and Israel, remain outside the treaty framework. The common reference to these states as 'undeclared nuclear powers' also makes the NPT's definition of nuclear weapon states seem outdated, thus challenging the potency of the regime.

Israel continued to resist suggestions that it sign the NPT, although it supported global nonproliferation efforts in the nuclear realms. Largely, its position seemed to be guided by the notion that until Middle East peace is achieved and stabilized, Israel should avoid any measure which might lead to an erosion of its ambiguous nuclear option. In addition, Israel did not regard the NPT as a significant barrier to nuclear proliferation, and the dimensions of the nuclear programs developed by NPT signatories such as Iraq and North Korea illustrated Israel's concerns.

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In recent years, Israel had not experienced significant pressure to sign the NPT.[17]  Indeed, during the past two years US officials urged Israel to do so in only a small number of occasions.[18]  One such instance was a press briefing given by US Assistant Secretary of State Robert Galluci.[19]  On the contrary, a study released in October 1993 by the US Congress Office of Technology Assessment cautioned against pressing Israel "to give up its nuclear weapons," arguing that such pressure might "endanger Israel's survival."[20]

More important, on January 16, 1994, in a joint press conference with Syria's President Hafez al-Assad, US President Bill Clinton was asked whether Israel's refusal to sign the NPT did not contradict the concept of peace toward which Clinton was striving. The President responded that "the best way to arrest the proliferation of mass destruction weapons -- which includes not only nuclear weapons but chemical and biological weapons as well -- and to slow the conventional arms race in the Middle East is the successful conclusion of the [peace] process."[21]

Preparations for the convening of the 1995 NPT Review Conference will present a number of dilemmas to Middle East states. The difficult dilemma of the Arab states that are signatories of the NPT would be whether to vote for the indefinite extension of the treaty despite the fact that Israel has not signed -- and by 1995 will not yet likely to sign -- the NPT. Within this context, one possibility is that the Arab states would vote for the extension of the treaty for a fixed period, stating that if by that

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time Israel would sign the treaty -- they would support indefinite extension.

A second dilemma concerns the future status of the aforementioned "undeclared" nuclear states -- India, Pakistan, and Israel. Some distinguished international scholars and former statesmen have called for the incorporation of these states within the NPT framework in order to constrain them from contributing to further proliferation.[22] Yet granting these parties NPT membership as 'nuclear states' requires that the Treaty's definition of such states be altered. Led by the US, supporters of the NPT might be reluctant to do this, fearing that once a single facet of the treaty is amended -- the entire treaty would become open to an endless re-negotiation process, as parties will present the many objections they have developed over the years regarding different facets of the treaty.

From Israel's perspective, the main question is whether obtaining an official 'nuclear' status would serve its interests. In this context, one Israeli concern will be that such a change might accelerate the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East by placing Arab governments under new domestic pressures to produce a response to Israel's now explicit nuclear capacity. Israel might also fear that its adoption of an overt nuclear posture would grant legitimacy to Arab efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, thus making it more difficult to dissuade nuclear technology suppliers from transferring such technology to Arab states. And, Israel will be concerned that an 'official' nuclear

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status might trigger the application of some US nonproliferation legislation nearly automatically, thus threatening important facets of US military, economic, and technological assistance to Israel.

From the Arab states' perspective, the possible ramifications of the proposed change are equally monumental. Most important, the proposed amendment to the NPT would make Israel's perceived nuclear capability unambiguous and legitimate. Granting such recognition to Israel's advanced nuclear capability while continuing to apply the NPT's nonproliferation clauses to all Arab countries would require that the latter accept that the present disparities in nuclear capabilities in the Middle East would remain indefinitely. The Arab states are most likely to view such a change as unacceptable from a strategic, political, and technological-cultural standpoint.


(b)   The Chemical Weapons Convention

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), signed in Paris on January 13, 1993, bans any acquisition, production, storage, and use of chemical agents. Like the INF Treaty, it is unique in that it calls for the eventual elimination of an entire category of weapons. The treaty includes the most intrusive verification measures ever adopted to assure treaty compliance. It created a potentially powerful mechanism -- the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) -- solely devoted to implementing and verifying compliance. And, its future inspectors

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were granted unprecedented authority to conduct short-notice as well as challenge inspections.

By September 1992, the new Labor-lead Israeli government decided to sign the CWC unconditionally. Israel's previous Likud-lead government made clear that its ratification of the treaty would be made conditional upon prior universal Arab adherence to the regime and the implementation of adequate verification measures. By contrast, Egypt urged all Arab states to refrain from signing the CWC until Israel would commit itself to signing the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[23]   Indeed, under Cairo's orchestration, this linkage was adopted by the Arab League. US officials have made their displeasure with Egypt's position clear but failed to persuade the Mubarak government to abandon this linkage.[24]

Meanwhile, many members of Arab League have abandoned the linkage. By mid-1993, a large number of these states have joined the CWC:  Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Yemen. Somewhat surprisingly, Iran also decided to join the CWC. Having suffered a number of Iraqi chemical attacks in the mid-1980s during the later stages of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran publicly welcomed the conclusion of the treaty.[25]   Indeed, since signing the CWC, Iran has taken an active part in the process of its implementation, particularly in the framework of the Asian group of the OPCW.

Partly due to the high profile Iranian activity in this framework, the Asian group of the OPCW refused to grant Israel

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membership in the group. At the same time, largely due to Britain's opposition, Israel was also refused alternative membership in the "Western" group, which also includes Canada, New Zealand, and Australia.[26] Thus, Israel found itself by the end of 1993 the only signatory of CWC that did not belong to any of its regional groupings. This was important because as is the case with UN institutions, most management posts at the OPCW were to be granted according to regional groupings.

Yet the CWC is unlikely to have a significant immediate effect in the Middle East, although its 'base-line' transparency requirements apply immediately following ratification. The convention will become effective no earlier than 1995, and the region's states will not be expected to destroy their inventories of chemical weapons before the year 2005. Indeed, in some cases the convention allows a further five-year delay in implementation. Although Egypt's efforts to create a united Arab refusal to sign the CWC have failed -- all Gulf and Maghreb states have meanwhile signed the treaty -- the continued refusal of the Arab states surrounding Israel to sign will limit the treaty's impact on the proliferation of chemical weapons in the Middle East.

The 1995 deadline for the ratification of the CWC is likely to present Middle East states with a number of dilemmas. From the perspective of Israel's neighbors, the main question is whether they should continue to resist signing and ratifying the treaty. Given the fact that Israel's reluctance to sign the NPT is tolerated by the international community, the linkage created by

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the Egyptian-led Arab group between Israel's membership in the NPT
and their membership in CWC will only leave them outside the CWC
framework.

On the other hand, a number of Arab states have adopted the
view that given the Israelis' vulnerability -- particularly their
psychological vulnerability resulting from their experience with
holocaust -- chemically-tipped ballistic missiles can provide them
a form of counter-deterrence that might balance Israel's perceived
nuclear superiority. This may lead such states to judge that as
long as Israel continues to resist de-nuclearization, they should
refrain from giving up the chemical weapons option. The
implication of such judgement is that as long as Israel remains
outside the NPT framework, these Arab states will opt to remain
outside the CWC framework.

Ratification of the CWC presents Israel with a number of
dilemmas as well. The first question is whether it should ratify
the CWC despite the fact that non of its immediate neighbors has
done so. Under such circumstances, such ratification may provide
Israel's Arab neighbors a one-sided advantage. By using Arab
signatories from the Gulf to demand the implementation of
"challenge inspections" in Israeli facilities, they may gain access
to such facilities without exposing their own facilities to similar
"transparency."

A second issue is whether Israel should condition its
ratification of the CWC on the prior definition of clear limits on
the conduct of inspections. The purpose of such limits would be to

assure that inspections conducted by the OPCW are not abused to gain access to non-chemical facilities. Primarily, Israel might fear that the "challenge inspections" conducted within the CWC framework would be abused in an effort to make Israel's nuclear complex in Dimona transparent.

Finally, Israel would have to determine whether it should ratify the CWC despite the fact that it continues to be prevented from membership in its natural grouping at the OPCW -- the Asia group of the OPCW. If Israel's membership in the OPCW's "western group" is not settled by the deadline for the CWC's ratification, this dilemma would be all-the-more stark. But the issue would remain a difficult one even if only the first question remains open. Israel's continued rejection by members of the Asia group implies an unwillingness to grant it full legitimacy. Under these circumstances, it is even less clear that Israel should take the aforementioned risks of asymmetric transparency involved in its membership in the CWC.


(c) A Convention 'Capping' the Production of Weapons-Grade Material.

The difficulties entailed in applying the more ambitious objectives of nuclear arms control in the Middle East -- such as universal adherence to the NPT, the application of IAEA safeguards to all nuclear facilities in the region, and\or the transformation of the Middle East into a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone -- have lead the Bush administration to propose an interim objective: the

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application of a freeze on the production of weapons-grade
materials in the Middle East. The proposal -- announced on May 29,
1991, in the framework of the 'Bush Initiative' on arms control in
the Middle East -- called upon the "regional states to implement a
verifiable freeze on the production and acquisition of weapons-
usable nuclear material (enriched uranium or separated
plutonium."[27]

In July 1992, the Bush administration announced a global arms
control initiative that included a call for the application of the
ban on the production of fissile material to other regions as well.
The initiative singled out the Middle East and a number of other
regions as primary focuses of non-proliferation concerns, where
emphasis on the application of the ban should be placed.

Finally, in September 1993, President Bill Clinton took the
Bush proposal a step further. In a statement of his
administration's approach to arms control, Clinton called for the
institutionalization of the weapons-grade production cut-off in the
framework of a global treaty. Thus, the initiative committed the
US to "propose a multilateral convention prohibiting the production
of highly enriched uranium or plutonium for nuclear explosive
purposes or outside of international safeguards." It contained a
separate promise that the US would "encourage more restrictive
regional arrangements to constrain fissile material production in
regions of instability and high proliferation risks."[28]

The principle strength of all three 'capping' proposals is
their realistic approach. Recognizing that under prevailing

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political and strategic circumstances some states will continue to refrain from rolling-back their nuclear capabilities, the proposed bans will at least freeze such capacities at their present levels. Thus they comprise a 'next best' alternative to unrestrained nuclear arms-racing. Since this can accord with the interests of nuclear weapon states, non-nuclear weapon states and undeclared nuclear weapon states alike, the proposed cut-off treaty might also enjoy universal participation -- another dimension of its potential attractiveness.

Yet the latter advantage of the suggested ban also harbors its fundamental weakness -- it promises to institutionalize the existing three-level nuclear cast system. As such, it is likely to be labeled as discriminatory by the same non-nuclear states like Mexico, who have repeatedly called 'foul play' with respect to the NPT. Moreover, the proposed ban presents serious verification dilemmas that comprise a serious threat to the future viability of the NPT. If the 'undeclared' nuclear status of states like India and Pakistan is not to be violated, the absence of present and future uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing must be verified without making past activities transparent. If such discriminatory verification procedures are technically impossible, the 'capping' proposal cannot be implemented without destroying the NPT facade that recognizes only five nuclear weapon states.

In contrast to the proposals advanced in this realm by the Bush administration, the Clinton initiative contains a number of somewhat complicating qualifications. First, the formulation

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describing the suggested convention implies that the production of plutonium or highly enriched uranium would be permitted if such production is subject to international safeguards or is unrelated to nuclear explosive purposes. As such, the convention will suffer the same weaknesses of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: under its framework a country would be able to produce such weapons-grade material under international safeguards, and would be able to escape such safeguards once it would deem necessary or advantageous to develop a military nuclear capability. By that time it may be in possession of a large quantity of plutonium or highly enriched uranium with which nuclear warheads could be produced.

Second, the formulation describing the suggested convention also implies that for a state to be found in non-compliance with the convention, it would be necessary to demonstrate not only that it produced plutonium or enriched uranium, but also that the production of these materials was intended "for nuclear explosive purposes." Yet conclusive evidence regarding such intentions will not be found easily. Hence, verifying non-compliance with the suggested convention will not be easy.

In the Middle East, the proposed "capping" convention will entail dilemmas that are somewhat similar to those involved in the aforementioned proposal to amend the NPT by formalizing the nuclear status of India, Pakistan, and Israel. From the Arab perspective, the main objection is likely to be that such a "freeze" would make Israel's perceived nuclear superiority permanent and legitimized.

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In Israel, two very different concerns might be raised. The first, is that verifying the proposed convention would be difficult, hence leaving open the same danger of non-compliance suffered by the NPT. The second is that the convention would be enforced by an extremely intrusive verification system, similar to the one adopted for the CWC. In the latter case verification of present and future activities might "spill-over" to past activities, the resulting in a level of "transparency" that might make Israel's nuclear status unambiguous, yet under worst political conditions than those implied in the proposed institutionalized incorporation of Israel within the NPT as a "nuclear state."

(d)   The Conventional Arms Transfers Register

Another global non-proliferation measure worth noting is the UN Arms Transfer Register, established by the General Assembly in December 1991. The creation of the register was suggested by Britain's Prime Minister John Major in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, and won endorsement by the G-7. The resolution establishing the Register requires arms exporters and importers to inform the UN of all transfers of major weapon platforms, and defines seven categories of weapons that must be registered.

The Register does not contain a mechanism for verifying the parties' compliance with its reporting requirements other than through an examination of its cross listings. Indeed, the "transparency" achieved through its mechanism was merely designed to add an "embarrassment dimension" to such transfers, hoping that

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the political costs entailed would increase correspondingly.  Once
the Register became effective in April 1993, and following internal
debates in both countries, Israel and, later, Egypt, both submitted
to the UN lists of arms transfers in which they were engaged.[29]
At least in Israel's case, the list was quite short, since most of
the weapons it exports comprise systems and subsystems that are not
within the categories required for reporting to the register.[30]
At this writing, most other states in the Middle East have not yet
fully complied with the Register's requirements.[31]

As could be expected, Arab spokesmen argued that the UN
register places the Arab states at a disadvantage vis-a-vis Israel,
since their armament is nearly totally dependent on exports while
Israel produces much of its weaponry endogenously.  This has
recently lead Egyptians to urge that the scope of the Register be
expanded to include indigenous arms production.

The proposed amendment would confront Israel with an
interesting dilemma.  On one hand, since its aggressive arms
exports policy induces it to advertise most of its endogenously
produced weapons anyway, expanding the Register's reporting
requirements would not necessarily expose Israel to new risks.
This is particularly the case since the Register does not include
a verification mechanism that might expose Israel to one-sided
"transparency."  On the other hand, given that Israel enjoys the
most advanced indigenous production capability in the region, it is
not clear what reciprocity it would be able to expect from its
neighbors if it consented to the proposed expansion of the Register

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scope.


## Prologue

A long-standing truism about the prospects for arms control in
the Middle East was that since the region's states are engulfed in
unresolvable conflicts, they are unlikely to adopt voluntary arms
control measures.   Moreover, some Arab states have repeatedly
rejected the application of regional confidence building measures,
arguing that this would grant Israel recognition and legitimacy.
They stressed that such CBMs would be unacceptable unless the Arab-
Israeli conflict is first resolved.   Hence the widespread
conclusion that in the Middle East, arms control measures that
depend on the recipients' cooperation are unlikely to be adopted --
let alone to function effectively -- and that, consequently, the
odds of arresting proliferation in the region would depend on the
suppliers' willingness to apply effective export controls.

Developments in the Middle East in recent years seem to both
confirm and defy this common wisdom.  On one hand the pariah states
of the Persian Gulf -- Iran and Iraq -- continue to remain outside
the multi-lateral arms control talks.  This is likely to prove a
continuing limitation on the ability to arrest the proliferation of
arms in the Arab-Israeli conflict area as well.  Libya also remains
outside the regional arms control process;  and, so far, Saudi
Arabia has also shown very limited interest in this realm.   In
addition, major disagreements over priorities in the arms control
continue to plague Arab-Israeli relations.

On the other hand, an increasing number of Arab states seem to have abandoned their long-standing rejection of regional confidence-building measures in the absence of a prior resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the framework of the ACRS talks, a large number of these states have been engaged with Israel in a common effort to explore the possibilities of applying various forms of regional confidence building measures in the Middle East. Indeed, if the regional CBMs examined in the framework of the ACRS talks will be applied, and if the progress recently achieved toward Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation will prove in 1994-95 a path-breaker towards a comprehensive resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute, the political climate in the Middle East may sufficiently improve to allow serious consideration for applying arms reduction measures by the region's states.

One key to the relative success of the ACRS process has been the willingness of the participating Middle East states to adopt a cautious "go-slow" approach. This, however, may soon collide with developments in the global arms control agenda that may require the region's states to formulate responses on a more urgent basis. These include the 1995 NPT Review Conference, the ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, the negotiation of the US-proposed Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the convention banning the further production of nuclear weapons-grade material, and finally, the possible expansion of the scope of the UN Arms Transfers Register. The dilemmas involved in determining these responses are considerable, because the issues involved may affect these states'

basic security.  At this point, it is difficult to ascertain how

this `collision of timetables' would be resolved.

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END NOTES

1. Aluf Ben "Arms control working group meeting will end today with joint declaration of principles." Ha'aretz, February 3, 1994; Aluf Ben "Draft declaration of principles formulated in arms control talks." Ha'aretz, February 6, 1994.

2. Egypt's Foreign Minister Amr Musa quoted by MENA from Cairo January 28, 1993. See DR ME/1600 January 30, 1993, p. A/7.

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8. Aluf Ben "Cornerstone for building trust." Ha'aretz January 26, 1993.

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21. See transcript of the Clinton-Assad joint press conference held following their meeting in Geneva on January 16, 1994, translated and printed in <u>Yediot Aharonot</u>, January 17, 1994, p. 5.

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## ARMS CONTROL AND LIMITATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS.

**MAURIZIO CREMASCO.**

MESCO CONFERENCE, ROME 26 FEBRUARY 1994.

**Let me** start with a short premise, which may seem deja-vu and thus unnecessary. However, I feel it is important in the particular context of the Middle East security environment.

The notion of arms control is not and was never meant to be a substitute for national security and defence; rather it should be conceived as a complement to strategy. The goal of arms control is to find ways to stabilize the arms race and not to address the causes of war "per se".

In fact, arms control should be seen as one of the many imperfect ways that add up to a strategy intended to improve security perceptions.

Obviously, arms limitations and reductions work best under good political conditions and suffer deadlocks under bad conditions, an equation which demonstates that peace is ultimately dependent on politics and not military, technical or legal arms control factors.

**Turning now** to the paper presented by Shai Feldman, I think it is a very good assessment of the present situation and of the issues and problems which are still impending the establishment of a comprehensive arms control structure in the Middle East.

**I would like to touch** on only a few points, and I apologize if my presentation may appear somewhat schematic or fragmented.

**First,** conventional arms control. In the past the Middle

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East was one of the biggest importers of conventional armaments, sometimes techonologically very sophisticated. Let me give you only a couple of figures for the period from 1988 to 1991. In this period, Soviet and then Russian arms transfers to the region (Gulf included) totalled 11.1 billion dollars, while U.S. arms sales reached 36.5 billion dollars. Even though there has been a dramatic decrease in Russian arms sales (a drop of 71 per cent compared to the previous four-year period) this was compensated by an increase in U.S. Sales (a 208 per cent increase over the previous four years).

If you consider that these data reflect only one element -- albeit important -- of the complete picture, and that European and Third World industries arms sales should be included in the total, it appears clear why I feel that there is little hope to stem the tide by acting solely on arms exports. Something has been achieved with the Missile Technology Control Regime (a point I will touch upon later on), but this is only a small part of arms exports to the region. The U.S. arms industry -- and particularly the European arms industry -- needs an external market to survive, and the drive of these industries to sell their products cannot be easily constrained or controlled. The answer lies in the establishment of a virtuous circle in the region based on confidence-building measures intended to promote trust and stability, which, in turn, are expected to encourage further and more far-reaching confidence-building measures which will add to stability and perceptions of security, capable of leading to true arms control agreements.

**In terms of CBMs** applied to the Middle East strategic environment, I feel that very little has to be invented. All the issues about possible measures, control techniques, systems for verification etc. Have been fully addressed in the recent past in the framework of the arms control process in Central Europe and I think that similar solutions could be applied to the Middle East, with minor modifications. The same is true for arms control measures applicable to naval forces. In this field, there are naval CBMs which could be derived from the agreements reached in

the past by the United States and the Soviet Union, agreements specifically aimed at preventing incidents at sea.

**One word about the Missile Technology Control Regime** (MTCR). I think that when we talk about weapons of mass destruction we should include ballistic missiles. Of course, combat aircraft can carry nuclear and chemical weapons at even longer ranges than those of the ballistic missiles presently operational in the Middle East. But ballistic missiles are the only potential carriers of nuclear and chemical warheads for which there is basically little or no defence. True, the MTCR has not been very effective in preventing the spread of ballistic missiles.

On the other hand, we should consider the following:

- Argentina has abandoned its CONDOR 2 missile program, and has become a new member of the MTC regime;

- the total number of MTCR full member states is now 25 -- a significant increase from the first seven which founded the regime in 1987;

- some 30 important suppliers from higly industrialized and developing countries are complying, de jure or de facto, with the MTCR;

- the list of materials and technologies controlled by the regime has recently been expanded to cover any rocket or air delivery system (other than manned aircraft) able to travel 300 Km. or more, regardless of its payload weight;

these are all indications that there is an intention to render the regime more restrictive and more effective. It would not be sufficient to stem the spread of ballistic missiles entirely, but it is another step forward.

**A short comment on the U.N. Conventional Arms Transfer Register,** another subject addressed in Shai's paper. One could argue the following:

- the register is not a very adequate instrument of transparency because it is based on the voluntary reporting of UN member states about their arms imports and exports, military holdings and arms procurement through national production;

- certain arms contracts may never be revealed for sensitive political and/or industrial reasons;

- the register cannot give early warning of military build-ups since the reported data relate to arms that have already been deliverd;

- and there is a wide range of weapons that do not need to be reported.


On the other hand, the register should be seen as another, simple step toward a more comprehensive system of cooperative security allowing a crosschecking through which declared data can be compared with other information and assessed within a broader framework. Considering that the register provides the first set of **"official"** information, it fullfils a useful role.

The next step should be to expand the register, something which is supposed to be done in 1994. New categories of conventional weapons are considered for inclusion, such as fuel-air explosives, cluster bombs, remotely delivered mines and less conspicous weapons systems such as multiple-launch rocket systems. However, listing every item on the military inventory will make the register too cumbersome and the states more concerned about disclosures of militarly relevant information and then less willing to provide data. The register should list those weapons systems which have military significance in terms of impact on regional stability and balance of power.

One could also argue that what it is really needed is a "code of conduct" in the field of arms transfer to bind all supplier and recipient states politically, if not legally. But, in my opinion, this is for the time being and for the foreseeable future an impossible target to reach.


**Shai's paper deals at length** with the problem of nuclear weapons in the framework of an arms control system in the middle east. Let me add few words to this issue which is indeed a very touchy one. Neither the "access denial approach" typical of the MTCR, nor the "conditioned access approach" characterized by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have worked well in this field,

as the Iraqi and North Korean case have clearly demonstrated.

**As Shai pointed out,** the problem is complicated by the inherently contradictory elements of the NPT: preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and, at the same time, permitting and encouraging the peaceful use of nuclear technology.

**I think that, at present,** conventional weapons in the Middle East are more important than nuclear weapons, and that the arms control efforts of all Middle Eastern states should concentrate on those weapons and on measures capable of building confidence and trust.

Moreover, it is difficult to see how a **Nuclear Weapons Free Zone** could be established in the Middle East without taking into consideration the parallel establishment of similar zones in the Gulf, in North Africa and perhaps even on the Indian subcontinent.

**One last word.** I would place less emphasis and importance on what Shai calls the collision of timetables. I think that progress in the arms control process in the Middle East is more dependent on political factors than on technical elements and that a further boost to the results already reached, clearly outlined in Shai's paper, would come from the successful completion of the peace process, constantly endangered by Arab and Israeli radical forces.

**However,** it is difficult to imagine a true arms control system in the Middle East without the full participation first of Syria and then of those other Arab countries that are still reluctant to consider Israel an undeniable reality in the region.