


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The Ottoman Rule in Europe From the Perspective of 1994

by

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1. Introduction

The disintegration of the USSR in 1991 was followed by the rise of eight independent states in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Six of these states have a predominantly Muslim and Turkic population. All these areas had historical relations with the Ottoman state dating back to the fourteenth century and climaxing in a multifaceted interaction in the nineteenth century. The emergence of the Balkans rekindled the western interest in Turkey. The Balkans was mainly an Ottoman dominion until after 1878-1913 and remains an area of direct interest to Turkey strategically, economically, and culturally. In its unforeseen and unpredictable ways history has resuscitated the Turks' cultural, religious and historical legacy and interweaved it into Europe's contemporary politics. There is no question that the Caucasus and Central Asia are becoming rapidly part of the global economic and political system and the western cultural sphere, not only because of their own need for survival but also because they are a vital part of the emerging balance of power between Asia, Europe, and the USA. Most of the new Muslim republics of the ex-USSR have decided to accept the Latin alphabet, in large measure because of pressure from Turkey. Thus, the millenary relationship of the Turks of Turkey with their coreligionists in Asia, interrupted for seventy years, has been resumed in a new frame of reference, as shall be indicated later.

The West saw Turkey as an oasis of stability and democracy and expected the country to serve as a model of democracy, secularism, free enterprise, and national independence for the newly independent states. The Black Sea economic cooperation project added additional weight to Turkey's diplomatic attractiveness and model role. The Turkish government accepted these self-devised and/or assigned roles without much hesitation or reflection, and without paying much attention to the contradiction between her expected role and her own poor record in dealing with Asia and Muslims in the past. Practically from the inception of the Republic, the Turkish government has abstained rigorously from becoming involved or even displaying interest in the history, culture, languages, etc., of the Central Asian and the Azeri peoples, although many Turks, as individuals, were greatly interested in the area, as indicated by the extraordinary success of the documentary film, "The Silk Road." The government remained aloof for seventy years, not only towards the Turks and Muslims in Central Asia but also to those in the Balkans, lest it be accused of

irredentism, panturkism and panislamism.¹ In the post-1991 period both the Turks and the West expected Turkey to play the role of a model for Central Asia primarily because of the very primordial historical, ethno-religious appeal to the Central Asians that Turkey wanted to ignore in the past and also because of her secularism, democracy, and relatively developed market economy. One may note immediately that the modern features that were, it was hoped, to make Turkey attractive as a model were all adopted from the West. In other words, the West expected to use Turkey as a relay station to transfer these acquired western values and modes of life to the newly emerging cluster of Islamic countries in the ex-USSR. Had these Muslim countries of Central Asia been Christian, as in the case of the Baltics—or had the West found another Muslim country to act as a better model and intermediary—Turkey might have been promptly discarded. At the same time, Europe appeared ready to ignore the Turks' seven decades of relentless effort to modernize and westernize themselves and re-embraced its old image of Turkey as a Muslim country likely to promptly fall prey to fundamentalism, islamism, or any other supposedly anti-western movement existing more in the imagination of some reporter than in fact.

There are two points to be noted in the above succinct presentation. First, the key consideration behind the foreign policy plans centered on Turkey in the post-cold war period revolves around Islam: Turkey plays, or is expected to play, a role in Central Asia because she shares both the Muslim faith and the ethnicity of the Turkic peoples of Asia and the Caucasus. Second, if suitable to her interests the West is prepared to consider Turkey to be sufficiently acculturated to the western ideas of democracy, secularism, and capitalism as to trust her to pass them on to her Asian ethnic coreligionists. Thus the West calls upon Turkey to pass the western values to her Caucasian and Central Asian coreligionists but without accepting the Turks as real partners of European culture and civilization because of their Islamic religion, while realizing perfectly well that Turkey couldn't play any meaningful role in the Caucasus and Central Asia if she were not Muslim. Europe has never considered, either on the basis of the historical record or empirical observation, that Islam, which plays a key role in the life of the average Turk, has developed in practice unique Turkish cultural and behavioral characteristics that make it more liberal than its Christian counterparts. It seems therefore that Turkey can indeed play a role in her region only by retaining her Asian, Muslim Turkish legacy. These two points have vital relevance to the subject of this paper.

There is, however, one more point to be made before entering into the discussion of the topic. The Central Asian countries seem to place great importance on their Islamic and ethnic Turkic background, which they—different

from the nomenklatura of Turkey—openly assert. D. Kunaev, the first secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan for twenty five years, was emphatic about it.² Islam Kerimov and his associates have stated clearly that what brought Uzbekistan close to Turkey was history, religion, and culture; and because of this closeness, Uzbekistan was willing to accept Turkey as a model. Uzbekistan has also appeared intent on reconstructing "the unique one thousand year old state structure while taking into account the effects of the immense change" which occurred in the public mind, culture and mores during the Soviet rule.³ The leader of Kyrgyzstan, Askar Akaev, proposed to insert in the constitution a reference to Islam as a source of moral values, and went to perform the umra (the off-season pilgrimage to Mecca), as did Kerimov. No Turkish sultan or president ever went to Mecca, except for the late Özal, while he was premier. The Islamic and historical ties between Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Central Asia, along with the latter's commitment to change and modernization, provide the bricks and mortar for the building of a firm structure of cooperation between the Turks of Turkey and the newly independent states. (The collapse of the democratic regime and dismissal of E. Elchibey as President of Azerbaijan has dealt a severe blow to Turkey's position, but it did not eliminate the bases of her future relations with Central Asia and the Caucasus.) In sum, Turkey cannot divorce herself either from Islam and her Turkishness or from her modernism in western garb. The commitment to modernism was and remains a cardinal point in the life of modern Turkey. It was stated repeatedly by Atatürk himself and was enshrined in the old constitution of 1924 as inkılâpçılık (devrimcilik in the new language), one of the six key principles of the Republic. Today, the western ideas of modernism and progress have become an integral part of the culture of society and could not be phased out any more than Turkey could be induced to abandon Islam.

The debate about the role to be played by Turkey in Central Asia and the Caucasus went hand in hand with the controversy over the admission of Turkey as a full member into the European Community. For years the Turkish application was delayed and then was essentially rejected supposedly because of the country's low level of economic development, high rate of population growth, huge foreign debt, inflation, low tax revenue, high state expenditures, colossal state sector, human rights violations, etc. However, the main reason for the European failure to admit Turkey into the EC was, as Ian O. Lesser put it plainly, not a question of economics. "The fundamental issue for many Europeans is," states Lesser, "whether Europe can or should embrace an Islamic country of 57 million. Significantly, the issue is being posed at a time of mounting intolerance and xenophobia in Western Europe, much of it directed against Muslim immigrants from the Maghreb and Turkey."⁴ Indeed, with the tacit nodding of the Vatican, Europe

has refused to accept Turkey as a true partner in the Community while warmly opening its arms to the countries of East Europe, the fifty year friendship with the Turks notwithstanding. Thus, when necessary and suitable to her interests, the West invokes and magnifies Turkey's shortcomings and does not hesitate to impose sanctions on her when and if Turkey fails to fulfill her assigned role, even if her national interest is at stake. Turkey's leaders have navigated the ship of state in such a way as to remain marginal to Europe and to the Muslim Middle East, while claiming to belong to both of them. Thus, in the end the Turks remain unable and unwilling to define their position on the religious, cultural and ethnic map of the world and act accordingly. The practical-minded Turkish elites want the country to be both European and Asian-Muslim, and end up being neither.

Turkey today is a Muslim country converted to the civilization of the West, and with the zeal of a new convert is ready to proselytize for her new faith—secularism, democracy, ethnic nationalism—among other Muslims, a role she cannot carry out as long as her leaders keep the society in this ambivalent cultural and historical position and continue to delude themselves with meaningless euphemisms. This paper, in effect, will deal with the Turks' historical image in the eyes of Europe, their association with and involvement in European politics especially in the nineteenth century, the special conditions imposed on Turkey for admission into the concert of Europe in 1856, the continuous impact of differences of religion, the staying power of the Turkish historical-Islamic identity, and the efforts to overcome religious differences by seeking common non-religious cultural grounds of unity with the West.⁵ The conclusion will deal with the prospects for the future.

There were several possible methodological approaches for dealing with this rather complex issue. We shall treat Turkey's relations with Europe in a historical framework, by conceptualizing the various qualitative changes that have occurred in the Turks' political, cultural, and economic outlook.

2. The Making of an Image and the Struggle for Romania

Turks of all ethnic and linguistic denominations started by moving westward towards Europe in the third century (if not before), as though attracted by an invisible magnet. The Huns, Pechenegs, Cumans (Kipchaks), Uzes, and, finally, in the thirteenth century, Tatars (Mongols) came westward, following the route along the northern shore of the Black Sea. Most were baptized as Orthodox Christians—the main body of Cumans became Catholic—and rapidly assimilated almost without a trace into the local population of central and southeast Europe. Those who converted to Islam during the time of the Golden Horde or before (Bulgars accepted Islam in 880) stayed in central

Russia or retired to the east of the Urals. Religion appeared from the very start as the key factor in distinguishing, for the West, "them"—i.e., the Turks—from "us"—the Christians.

The southern Turks began arriving in Anatolia as nomadic tribesmen as early as the eighth century. Those who had not accepted Islam or did not internalize it as their basic identity accepted Christianity and some, such as the Karamanlis, retained their Turkish language but were considered Greek: in 1926 these were exchanged for the Turks of Greece (and Crete), some of whom were actually converted Greeks. Thus religion had determined nationality. The bulk of the Turks moved into Anatolia in the tenth and eleventh centuries after their mass conversions to Islam ca. 950. After the Selçuki sultan Alp Arslan defeated the Byzantine emperor at Manzikert in 1071 and proceeded to conquer Jerusalem—more because of political and economic calculations than religious zeal—the old negative image of Islam was revived, and with a vengeance. Already by the eighth century John of Damascus, among others, had declared that Muhammad was the enemy of Christianity and a false prophet and that his followers pursued a path of vice, promiscuity, and decadence. Thus the Turks became part of an already existing image of Islam. The anti-Muslim image would be revived from time to time, reinforced, and perpetuated with new arguments, regardless of the circumstances.⁶ The fact that Turks hindered the march of the crusaders through Anatolia, and later sultans like Zangi, Nur al-Din (Saladdin was his subordinate), Qutuz, etc. forced them out of Syria and Egypt certainly did not endear the Turks to Europe.

The Turks who founded the Ottoman state moved to western Anatolia not to confront the Christians but to escape the pressure of the Mongols (Cengiz han's descendants). They crossed into the Balkans in 1354 in order to help Sultan Orhan's Byzantine father-in-law gain the throne of Constantinople. In due time the early Ottoman sultans and their companions (some of whom, such as the Mihalogullari, were of Greek origin) took the name gazis (holy warriors) and developed the ideology of gazavat (holy war) in order to justify their conquering march westward.⁷ However, what the Turks conquered in the Balkans was the territory of the East Roman Empire (contested now by Bulgarians, Serbians, and other groups, who reestablished their medieval states only because in 1204-61 the fourth crusade not only had devastated the peninsula but also had kept Constantinople under occupation for sixty years trying to convert the Greeks to Catholicism). Thus, the Turkish conquest not only liberated the Balkans from western domination and put an end to their feudal order in what is today's Greece but also assured the survival of Orthodox

Christianity; and thus the Turks unwittingly became involved in the struggle between Orthodox Christianity and Rome and were eventually accused of perpetuating their schism.

The good will felt toward them by the Orthodox helped The Turks secure their own rule in the peninsula. The Orthodox Christians became the Turks' allies against western Christianity, for religion-culture, as each side understood it, became the dividing line between East and West. The failure of several western crusades, such as Nicopolis (1396) and Varna (1444), was due not only to the Turks' prowess as fighters but also to the animosity of the native Orthodox Christian population toward the West. Many Greeks, in particular, openly declared that they preferred "the turban of the Sultan to the tiara of the Pope." Even today there are still a few Greeks who regard the Ottoman state as a joint Turkish-Greek political enterprise and do not hesitate to state this publicly when it is expedient to do so. In fact, some Greek orthodox prelates, such as Anthimos of Antioch, wrote as late as the eighteenth century that the Turkish sultan was a God-sent gift to protect and benefit the Orthodox Christians.

The Orthodox church was divided into two groups; the unionists favored the union with (and submission to) Rome, while the anti-unionists, the "nationalists," sided with the Turks. The division deepened after the rulers of Byzantium accepted the union with Rome at the fateful Council of Florence in 1439; the act persuaded the new Ottoman sultan, Mehmet II (1451-81), to expedite the conquest of Constantinople (1453) in order to forestall its possible occupation by the West. The Turks had thus, without any specific intent to do so, intervened in the bitter five-hundred-year-old struggle between the eastern and western Christian churches and had prevented their fusion into a single whole—at least it so appeared. The frantic efforts of contemporary Greece to prevent the fusion of Turkey into Europe gives a rather ironic twist to the history of the area.

These events, publicized widely and unfavorably by Greek scholars who fled to Italy, further colored the image of the Turk as the enemy of Christendom. Greek scholars eventually reached the Muscovite court and pleaded with the czar to "liberate" the second Rome; already Ivan III had married Zoe Paleologus and staked a claim for Moscow as the third Rome. (Today, the Greek Patriarchate in Istanbul is seeking partners in Russia in the hope that a rebaptized Russia would assume her traditional role as the defender of the Orthodox against the Turk and thus mask her reviving imperialist nationalism.) The situation was aggravated further after Venice, which for centuries enjoyed a privileged trading position in the Balkans, was replaced under Ottoman pressure by the local merchants and lords. This city-state became the ally of the Roman church and the financier of its crusades. Venice remained an active

player in Balkan and Mediterranean politics until the middle of the eighteenth century and was a major European source of information about Ottoman affairs, thanks to the baglios (consuls) stationed in the main Mediterranean ports. In exchange, it is worthy of note, the Turks had the right to station their own representative in Italy. The fierce Catholic opposition to the Muslim and Turkish presence on their soil was so intense that the Turks had to defend their basic commercial interests in key Italian ports such as Ancona by appointing Christians as their representatives there, most of whom originated in the Balkans. In the eighteenth century the Habsburgs finally allowed the Muslim to work in Vienna. Out of some ninety Ottoman commercial representations in Vienna, some 18-20 were manned by Muslims, including Turks. (The current presence of over two million Turks in Europe, including some of the most extremist fundamentalist groups, cannot be treated in this paper, despite its significance).

Over a century and a half—that is, from the emergence of Osman's small principality in 1286 (or 1299, when he minted coins in his own name), to the conquest of Constantinople by Mehmet II—almost the entirety of Romania (Rumili) was brought under Turkish rule.⁸ After the conquest, Constantinople's position as the administrative capital of the territory of the East Roman Empire was reasserted, and henceforth the city assumed the Turkish name of Istanbul. (The name actually derived from the Greek "Is-t-an polis" (to the City), not "Islambol" (City of many Muslims). The Slavs called it "Tzarigrad," or "the Ruler's City," for, indeed, whomever ruled Constantinople was considered the ruler of the Balkans and Anatolia. The conquest created outrage in the Christian world, but there were many who regarded it as a divine punishment for the Greek schism from Rome. The Turks did not try to convert the Christians of the Balkans (the Bosnian and Bulgarian Bogomils and, to a very large extent, the Albanians, converted voluntarily) but established a pluralist cultural and religious system that took into consideration the mixed character of the peninsula and preserved it as such until 1878, when the newly established states in the Balkans embarked on a policy best described by Tudor Zhvikov of Bulgaria as "edinstvo," or the ethno-supremacy of the dominant ethnic group, in this case the ethnic Bulgarians. Indeed, the Ottoman Empire developed a well-balanced socio-economic and political structure and a pluralist cultural-religious corporatist structure and legalized it during the reign of Mehmet II (1451-81). This was accomplished through the issuance of kanunames, which were in essence secular regulations, formally sanctioned by the religious fetva, that laid down an Ottoman constitutional order that lasted until the collapse of the empire.⁹ It is clear that there was no Byzance apres Byzance, as the Romanian historian of Greek parentage Nicolae Iorga put it, but a new Turkish Muslim order created specifically to suit the multi-ethnic, multi-religious structure of

the Balkans and Anatolia. The reforms of the nineteenth century were simply a revision of the constitutional order of Mehmet II.¹⁰ (In the nineteenth century Fuad paşa created in Lebanon a similar multi-confessional order that lasted until 1975.)

Thus, the reign of Mehmet II marked the full emergence of the Ottoman Empire as the major regional power in the eastern Mediterranean. He and his successor, Beyazid II (1481-1512), consolidated the northern flank of the Empire by turning the Black Sea into a sort of Ottoman mare nostrum. These military moves were accompanied also by the uprooting of Venice and Genoa as the dominant commercial powers of the eastern Mediterranean and their eventual replacement by France and England, and by the rise of a powerful Ottoman middle class of merchants and craftsmen in the service of the state.

The encounters between the Ottoman Empire and western Europe during this first period (the dwindling city-states of Italy aside) were sporadic and accidental. The arrival after 1492 of the Jews expelled from Spain and Portugal, who had been invited initially by Mehmet II, provided the Turks with an excellent source of knowledge about Europe and a skilled pool of professionals, merchants, and craftsmen. The exchange of letters between Mehmet II and the pope, in which the former claimed to be caesar, khan, and sultan and asked for political submission and the latter tried to convert the sultan to Christianity, produced no lasting results, the painting school established by Gentile Bellini notwithstanding. While Mehmet merely asked the Pope to accede to Ottoman power, the pontiff seemed to regard the conversion to Christianity as the first condition for western rapprochement with the Turks. The papacy remained the implacable foe of Islam and the Turks until the twentieth century, when it recognized Islam as a revealed religion. The act went rather unnoticed and was later forgotten.

3. The Ottoman Contact and Relations with West Europe

The conquest of Hungary in 1526, the first siege of Vienna in 1529 and the annexation of Hungary and its direct administration as a paşalık with an appointed governor in 1541 brought the Ottoman Empire into direct conflict with the Habsburgs and turned it overnight into an active player in European politics. Hungary had been for centuries the major seat of Catholicism in east central Europe and an active contender for power and influence in the Balkans. The Habsburgs developed a claim to Hungary through their usual method—that is, through marriage with Hungarian royalty. Consequently, after the death of King Louis on the battlefield at Mohacs in 1526, his brother-in-law, Ferdinand of Habsburg (brother of Charles V), managed to get himself elected king by the nobles of Bohemia, whom

he had bribed. He was opposed by nationalist Hungarian nobles, who subsequently turned pro-Turkish, but this did not improve the image of the Turks. The two most powerful rulers of Europe, Suleyman the Magnificent (1520-66) and Charles V (who became the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire in 1519) found themselves engaged in a deadly rivalry, apparently as Christian against Muslim but in reality for power considerations. The Ottoman-Habsburg rivalry, which lasted to the end of both empires in 1918, carried an extraordinary significance for the history of Europe that will be dealt with shortly.

Concomitant with the drive into Central Europe, Suleyman faced the challenge of Persia, whose shiite rulers, despite a crushing defeat suffered in 1514, arose again and continued to challenge the Turks. (All the Iranian rulers, until as late as 1925, were of Turkish origin, but religion proved to be stronger than ethnicity.) By conquering Syria and Egypt (1516-17) and assuming custody of the holy Muslim sites in Hicaz, the Turks further consolidated their position as the champions and defenders of sunni Islam—a role they had begun to play as early as the eleventh century when in 1055 Tugrul bey, leader of the Selçukids, liberated Baghdad from the rule of the shiite Buyids and restored the caliph to his throne as the supreme head of the Muslim community. According to reliable sources, after his conquest of Syria and Egypt, Sultan Selim invited Caliph al-Mutawakil to Istanbul (ca. 1517) and had him transfer his caliphal title to the sultan.¹¹ The Ottoman sultan thus formally became the head of the Muslim community but, not being Arabs of the Prophet's Kureyish family, they never claimed to be the actual caliphs: their official title was hilafet penahi, or the shelter (refuge, asylum, etc.) of the caliphate. (It is for this reason probably that the Ottoman sultans seldom used their caliphal title, until in the second half of the nineteenth century, mainly under Sultan Abdülhamid, the caliphate became a bastion against the threat of the West.) The caliph had the obligation to keep Mecca and Medina in proper condition and assure free access to all the Muslims who wanted to make their annual pilgrimage—the hac or umra—to the Muslim holy lands.

The rise of shiism as a state religion in Iran early in the sixteenth century gave the old ethnic relations between the Ottoman and Central Asian Turks a political twist. Throughout this study we have referred to the early Islam of the Ottoman Turks as a "frontier religion" and to the dominant position of the mystic popular orders, whose language was mainly Turkish (or Slavic in the Balkans) or Persian (in some quarters of Buhara and Samarkand). This mystic popular Islam, developed chiefly by Ahmet Yesevi (d. 1166) and his followers, resulted from the incorporation of the native culture, including elements of shamanistic rituals, into the faith, although Turks remained faithful to the

basic doctrine of Islam. It was this Turkified, liberal and humanistic Islam which was brought into Anatolia by the migrating Turkic tribes and which was disseminated by such leading figures of Turkish popular Islam as Hacı Bektaş, Veli, Sarı Saltuk, and Yunus Emre (whom UNESCO recognized as a world figure). The Saltukname (the epic describing Sarı Saltuk's exploits and the dissemination of Islam in the Balkans which was put together in book form following the orders of Cem Sultan, the son of Mehmed II) describes Sarı Saltuk as a follower of Yesevi. Eventually Bahauddin Nakşbandi (1318-1389), who was linked to Yesevi, gave this Central Asian Islam a systematic, Orthodox interpretation more suitable to the urban areas than to the nomads among whom Yesevi mostly preached. From the fourteenth century onwards, hundreds and even thousands of Nakşbandi şeyhs of one sort or another came and preached in Anatolia and the Balkans and established their lodges (tekke or zaviye), popular places of worship and sermons. In turn, many Turks went to the famous schools of Buhara and Samarkand not only to study the religion but also the positive sciences in which Central Asia excelled. The Muslim discoveries in philosophy, mathematics, medicine, etc., attributed today to the "Arabs" and "Persians," belonged to the Central Asians, such as Avicenna (Ibn Sina), Farabi, and Biruni, schooled in the seminaries of the area. Kuşçu Ali, who established the Ottoman observatory, was a colleague and friend of Ulug bey, the grandson of Timur. He was an astronomer and the ruler of Samarkand, whose telescope and mathematical treatises can be seen in the museum established at his place of study.

The rise of Shiite Iran under Shah Ismail (d. 1525) forced the Shaybanids—who had established their first Uzbek state under Muhammad Shayban—to seek Ottoman support. (The name Shayban derives from Shibān, one of the descendants of Cengiz han's eldest son Jochi, and is indicative of a certain political imperial continuity in Central Asia.) The Kazakhs and the Uzbeks emerged as proto ethno-national groups after the Timurid empire collapsed following that leader's death in 1405. Timur (Tamerlane) stressed the ethnic Turkic character of Central Asia and laid the foundations—in fact speeded up—the emergence of Chagatai, the Turkic lingua franca of the elites which gradually replaced Persian and survived in various forms until the twentieth century. Thus the Turkish-Persian confrontation which began on the linguistic-cultural level in the fifteenth century assumed a religious dimension in the sixteenth century. The Uzbek rulers (they ruled most of Central Asia), notably Abdullah II (de facto ruler after 1561) along with his uncle Pir Muhammad, sought Ottoman help against Iran, which they attacked repeatedly. The Ottoman sultans relied heavily on the Uzbeks to keep the pressure on the Persian rulers, and it was under the insistence of the Uzbek rulers that the Ottoman sultan launched an expedition into Russia in 1557-59 in order to open the roads of

Astrahan (conquered by Russia in 1556) to the passage of Central Asian pilgrims on their way to Mecca. The Uzbek embassies to Istanbul and vice-versa continued throughout the centuries. As late as 1914 both Buhara and Khiva, although forced to accept the Russian protectorate after the mid 1860s, still maintained their diplomatic representatives in Istanbul until the Republic; the şeyh of the Uzbek lodge in Istanbul was usually the representative of his country to the Porte. The Central Asians' diplomatic tradition was maintained even after they became "turkified," *à la république*. The son or nephew of the last Uzbek şeyh was appointed as the first ambassador of Republican Turkey in Washington after Turkish-US relations were established in 1930. One of the Turkish ambassador's sons, namely Ahmet Ertegun, is a prominent Turkish-American figure who some years ago repaired and restored his ancestors' lodge located in Uskudar, Istanbul, although he may like to keep quite about it.

The relations of the Ottoman Turks with Central Asia from roughly 1100 to 1917/8 were continuous, intense and multisided. In fact, by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries some Central Asian rulers asked the Ottoman sultan to legitimize their rule by confirming their appointment, and some, such as Yakup bey (d. 1877) of Kashgar (now in Chinese Sinkiang), agreed to mint coins and cite in the hutbe (Friday sermon) the Ottoman sultan's name as their superior. Today the historical relations between the Turks of Turkey and Central Asia are being revived, while the common legendary traditional figures are being nationalized. Ahmet Yesevi has become a Kazakh national figure while the Uzbeks have appropriated B. Nakşbandi, largely because the tombs of these luminaries are located in their respective national territories: Yesevi is buried in Turkistan in Kazakhstan, in the magnificent mausoleum built by Tamerlane (now being repaired by Turkish architects with funds from Turkey), while Nakşbandi is buried in his native village near Buhara, Uzbekistan. A Yesevi university for all Turks under the aegis of Kazakhstan is expected to open soon in the town of Turkistan (the former Yesi, from where Yesevi derived his name). The significance of the general information concerning the connections between the Turks of Turkey and Central Asia, the intense diplomatic, political, commercial and touristic traffic which followed the Central Asians' declaration of independence after 1991, and the foreign policy implications of all these developments are too obvious to warrant further elaboration.

Meanwhile some extraordinary changes had occurred in the old cultural-religious premises that had underlaid the confrontation between Turks and Europe. Prior to 1515-41, the confrontation was not far outside the borders of the Balkans. Now that the scene of the struggle had moved to central Europe and the western Mediterranean, new credence was given to the long-held papal view—expressed by Pius II, Leo X, and Pius V—that if the Turks

conquered the Hungarians, then the Germans and Italians would be rapidly subdued and the Christian faith extinguished. Consequently the Papacy aligned itself solidly with the Habsburgs who, in order to justify their already contested rule in Western Europe and Spain, portrayed their struggle with the Turks as the fateful encounter of Christianity with Islam. The military encounter between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs acquired religious and cultural overtones that were reflected in hundreds of thousands of anti-Turkish books, pamphlets, plays and paintings that flooded the European book stalls.¹²

The struggle between the two ruling titans of Europe, Suleyman and Charles V, was accompanied and eventually superseded by the Reformation and the rise of France and England as national states and their establishment of commercial-military relations with the Turks. Western writers have dismissed the contribution of the Turks to the making of a new Europe in the sixteenth century as accidental, inconsequential and interested. True, the Ottoman sultans supported—militarily, economically, and politically—the rise of France as a national state in order to counterbalance the Habsburgs, but in the process they helped make national statehood the basic form of political organization of the new Europe. Ultimately they would accept the same form of organization. The French-Turkish entente started mainly under Francis I of France, who began his royal career as the champion of a crusade against the Turks but, after losing the Battle of Pavia in 1525 and being taken prisoner by Charles V, sent his envoy Frangipani to Suleyman to ask for help. Eventually the Turkish galleys went up the Rhone and the Muslim soldiers from Anatolia and the Balkans battled the Habsburgs to help France keep her identity and independence. In 1536 the French were allowed to establish the first resident ambassadorship in Istanbul and were given extensive trading privileges, known as the Capitulations, and specific rights in the Christian holy places. Thus the French gained a solid foothold in the Middle East and maintained it until their final ejection from Syria and Lebanon in the period 1943-6.¹³ France would constantly abuse the Turks' trust, but the Turks proved unable to maintain a grudge or seek revenge against any of their enemies; in the early twentieth century Celal Nuri, one of the nationalist writers of the period, declared that Turks possessed no ability for national hatred, while the Balkan Christians based their national revival on religious hatred. (Another writer answered Celal Nuri that noble characteristics, such as forgiving and forgetting past injustices, did not better the Turks' image in the eyes of Europe).

In 1538 Francis I made his peace with Charles V at Aignes-Mortes and promised to take part in the crusade against the Turks. However, the pressure put on the Habsburgs and the Pope by the Turks gave the protestants a

respite and a certain freedom of action that aided their struggle. It also prompted Martin Luther to question policies of the papacy. It is well known that the papal effort to raise money to support the crusades against the Turks, which included Tetzel's selling of indulgences, was a key factor in bringing Luther to issue the famous theses that condemned the war against the Turks as "impious resistance to the judgement of God."¹⁴ Like Erasmus, Luther saw the Turks as God's sending to remind Europe to atone for its sins.

The role played by the Turks in the relations between the new Europe, represented mainly by France and England, and the old Europe, embodied in the Habsburgs, the Papacy, and the wealth of their lands, produced some curiosity about their society and faith. Queen Elizabeth I and Suleyman the Magnificent discussed their faith—among other things—and Protestantism was likened to Islam.¹⁵ The Protestants were fascinated by the Turks' attitude towards religion. According to them, the Turks' concept of faith resembled their own, but they were bewildered that the Turks persisted in following Islam, which, in their view, was "incomplete" and not "fully revealed." (The Protestant view of Islam and the Turks had its impact in the Turkish reform movement.) These talks between Elizabeth I and Suleyman eventually culminated in the sending of William Harborne to Istanbul in 1578 (he later became ambassador), the granting of trading privileges for the English such as those given the French and the Venetians, and in the establishment of the Levant Co. in 1581.¹⁶ The Ottoman sultan gave the English economic aid in order to enable them to oppose the Habsburgs and to reinforce Protestantism against the papacy, thus creating a new Turkish-European relationship.

The letter from the Queen empowering the Levant Co. to engage in trade expressed the double purpose of England, which was interested in "trade and merchandise and traffiques into lands...of the Great Turk, whereby there is good and apparent hope and likelihood both that many good offices may be done for the peace of Christendom...and also good and profitable vent and utterance may be had of the commodities of our Realme."¹⁷ At the same time the English tried to bring the Turks into the war against Spain, hoping that the two would weaken each other so much that the true church and doctrine—that is, Anglicanism—could grow to such strength that it could suppress both of them.¹⁸ Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Ottomans provided steady support for the Protestants: Calvinists were allowed to spread freely in Hungary and Transylvania;¹⁹ this raised a certain good will towards Turks that still survives, even in their churches. (The Calvinists inhabit the eastern part of Hungary, where most of the Kipchak or Cuman Turks, who converted to Christianity in 1241-2, were settled, in order to avoid being slaughtered

by their own kin, the Turko-Mongol army.) Along with their interest in trade within the Ottoman lands, England, France, Austria, and Venice developed a scholarly interest in Turkey. The Germans, despite the warnings of Luther, who forsook his earlier views and stated publicly that Turks and Catholics were the arch-enemies of Christendom and the flesh and spirit of the anti-Christ, were very curious about the Turks. They had translated several Ottoman chronicles and dispatched in 1575 Salmon Schweigggle from Tübingen to Vienna and then to Istanbul to collect materials and information about them. The works of Richard Knolles and O. Busbecq, just to mention the more important ones, were among the first serious writings about Turks.²⁰ None of these writers, mentally preconditioned as they were, liked the Turks; but they were objective and rational in describing Turkish qualities and weaknesses and suggested ways to correct the shortcomings of their own European compatriots with the ultimate purpose of defeating the Turks.²¹

In contrast to the continuous and growing European curiosity and increasing knowledge about Turks and their country, the Turks made practically no move to know Europe or the European society, despite several and much touted exceptions like Piri Reis' map of the Americas of 1513, probably bought from sailors in the Mediterranean. During this period the Mediterranean had become a sphere of intensive commercial and human interaction between the European and the Turks, so well described by Braudel in his classic work on the reign of Phillip II. Although disturbed by naval warfare—such as the inconsequential Battle of Lepanto in 1571—this interaction continued well into the next centuries in the form of extensive commerce and personal relations. The first permanent Turkish embassy abroad, however, despite some short missions in the seventeenth century, was established in London only in 1793.²² In the sixteenth century, the Turks, as described by Knolles with some timid admiration and considerable awe, were proud and sure of themselves and held the rest of the world in scorn "with a full persuasion in time to rule over all" without limits or bonds. The negative image of the Turk in Europe, which had arisen in the late fifteenth century, had scarcely changed by the end of the seventeenth century, intensive commercial relations notwithstanding. As long as the Turks remained powerful, the belief in the superiority of their system remained intact, as did the arrogant pride of the sultan's court, which found Europe unworthy of much attention.

The Treaty of Zsitva-Torok, signed with Austria in 1606, marked the end of the Ottoman military advance into Europe. It is true that there were a series of other Turkish conquests during the century—in the Caucasus, the Mediterranean (Crete), and Poland—but none of these was of major consequence. From the signing of the Treaty in

1606 to the Küçük Kaynarca Treaty in 1774, there was a balance between Europe and the Ottomans. The crushing Ottoman defeat at Vienna in 1683, despite its psychological impact, did not undermine the Ottoman military might as profoundly usually described, and by 1739 the Treaty of Belgrade restored the Ottoman sovereignty over most of the Balkans, though not for long. The greatest Ottoman weakness was not in the military field but in the structure of its society. The price of maintaining the Empire was a constant expansion of the statist economic system and autocracy needed to run it. Individual freedom became more and more circumscribed. The civil or semi-civil institutions (guilds) were subverted by the state, and only in the mystic religious brotherhood did some sense of private, inner freedom survive. Thus, popular religion became the haven of freedom, although the state controlled most of the religious institutions through bureaucratization and manipulation. The conflict with Russia brought to the surface the Ottoman weaknesses and opened a new chapter in the Turks' relations with Europe. The eighteenth century saw also an intensification of commercial connections between the Turks and Europe due to the demand for agricultural commodities and a variety of Ottoman products which were in growing demand in the urbanizing West and central Europe (Moravia) ready to step into the industrial age. The interaction between the Ottomans, both Muslim and Christian, and Europe was so intensive as to induce the Ottoman sultan Ahmed III (1703-1730) and his handpicked grand vizier, Nevşehirli Ibrahim, to attempt to introduce a sort of state capitalism. The attempt, which is still awaiting proper study, was nipped in the bud by the urban revolution of 1730 (the first of its kind, heralding the approach of modern conflicts), but individuals both Muslim and Christian continued their commercial relations with their European counterparts. The drive to commercialize agriculture intensified. A great variety of European goods, along with scant influences in fine arts, architecture, and sciences, began to enter the Ottoman empire, notably into areas along the Mediterranean littoral, and can be seen in the plans of buildings and even mosques, including the baroque style of the Nuru Osmaniye mosque in Istanbul, and palaces built by ayans (local powerful lords) in Anatolia, the Balkans, Syria, Egypt, etc.

4. The Qualitative Differences between the Ottomans and Europe

The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1774 marked the full emergence of Russia as a world power and the rapid decline of Ottoman military power. This treaty, and the following ones of Iași (1792) and Bucharest (1812), left all the Ottoman lands along the northern Black Sea, including Crimea and its Muslim population, in the hands of Russia. The Ottoman trade monopoly in the Black Sea was broken, and the czar received the right to make representation to

the Porte on behalf of the Orthodox Christians, while Russia's Muslims were permitted to acknowledge the caliph as their religious head. The newly acquired rights gave each ruler the means to incite nationalist sentiments in their respective communities, but only the czar made use of this, until Abdülhamid decided also to make some use of his prerogative. However, Russia justified her drive into Ottoman lands as a move designed to liberate the Orthodox Christians and used religion to incite, in fact to transform the faith into what became the Balkan Slavs' nationalism. Orthodox Christianity had become a political ideology and, overnight, Russia had become its promoter and an immediate threat to Ottoman existence.

The emergence of Russia as a great power profoundly affected Turkish relations with Europe and placed England and France—and to a lesser extent the Habsburg empire—in the position of brokers between the sultan and the czar, for which service they were granted concessions. Meanwhile Egypt became the scene of rivalry between France and England, and Ottoman power and prestige in the Middle East was further undermined. In 1798 Napoleon occupied Egypt, prompting the Turks to abandon their old friendship with France, which had helped them check the Russians, and conclude a de facto alliance with the British. The Turks' fateful political association with England thus began. Napoleon's armies were pushed out, but Egypt became autonomous, and in 1805 the rebel Turkish officer Mehmet Ali was recognized as viceroy. He eventually obtained French support. England intervened on behalf of the Ottomans once again in the period 1839-41, driving the Russians out of the Bosphorus and restoring Ottoman sovereignty over Syria, Hicaz, and the rest of Arabia—which was occupied by Mehmet Ali's armies. In anticipation of this service, London secured in 1838 the first batch of economic privileges to be granted it by the Porte (more were forthcoming in 1860-61) as well as a pledge that the archaic statist economic and trade system of the Ottomans would be liberalized. Finally, in 1840-43 Palmerston pledged to maintain the territorial integrity of the Ottoman state. This was a fundamental foreign policy decision with far-reaching consequences for the Turks. It guaranteed the survival of the Ottoman Empire but also indirectly assured the survival of the British Empire and gained for England an extraordinary position of influence in Ottoman life. The reform movement, which was started in 1839 in return for British help, produced fundamental changes in the Turks' culture and society. (Great Britain was at this point in a position to decide the destiny of the last great Muslim empire—that is, the Ottoman empire. It had reduced the once-mighty Moghul Empire to a mere colony, but she was never able to do the same to the Turks. This was a bitter defeat for the British which, coupled with their debacle at Gallipoli in 1915, still bothers their mind. The British

attributed their defeat to Islam and became the greatest critics of Islam, not for any basic theological reason but rather a political one. Yet the closer the British and Europeans came to know the Turks, the more alienated they became, for fundamental philosophical—not religious—reasons. The Muslims' utter subservience to their community and to their ruler was anathema to the Europeans' own individualistic view of religion and society, as shall be dealt with later.

The actors, the parameters, and the philosophy of the Turks' new relations with Europe thus emerged early in the nineteenth century. Russia was an aggressor on the move, and its aim was the Mediterranean, which was becoming rapidly the choicest market for the goods produced by the industries of England and, as well, a strategic bulwark to India, which was coveted by both France and Russia. In 1840-~~3~~ the guaranteeing of the integrity, survival, and friendship of the Ottoman Empire appeared to offer the British the best way to defend its interests. As it turned out it was a benefit to Europe as a whole, too. By this time the Turks and the British appeared to agree tacitly that the Ottoman traditional form of government, institutions, and socio-economic structure were dysfunctional and inadequate to meet the Russian challenge. No country in the Muslim world which had not experienced the industrial revolution and had not established a political communion between the state and its population in the form of a nation-state as had been the case in Western Europe, and was governed by bureaucrats, did not provide a model for change. The Ottoman bureaucracy, however, which had been the backbone of the classical Ottoman state and had developed a pragmatic, rational attitude towards the affairs of society, appeared ready to undertake any measure necessary to assure the survival of the state and thus to safeguard its own position and status, regardless of the cultural costs. The bureaucracy, headed by the sultan, envisaged the state as the instrument of change, although the state itself required change, particularly in the area of its relation with the individual. The Ottoman governing elite had recognized this need for change as early as the 1780s, and Sultan Selim III (1789-1807), who spoke French and engaged in correspondence with the French king, seemed inclined to adopt France as a model, as demonstrated in his drive to centralize the government and to create a modern army under the command of French officers. However, with the French invasion of Egypt and the defeat of Napoleon Turco-French relations cooled, and England became for a while the main influence on the Ottoman reform movement, as both promoter and judge. Indeed, the verdict of England about the success and sincerity of the Ottoman reforms would be accepted by the rest of Europe, often at face value, and was significant in conditioning attitudes and policies towards the Turks. Soon, the old historical image of the Turk as the enemy of Christendom was revived and supplemented with a new view of the Turks as unwilling and

unable to understand and absorb civilization of the European type. Consequently, Europe embraced wholeheartedly Czar Nicholas I's (1825-1855) characterization of the Ottoman Empire as the "sick man of Europe."²³ This characterization was wholeheartedly adopted by the European media and, although proved wrong in every way, is still used today.

Each major European country expected the Turks to undertake reforms and create a government and society much like its own. Prince Metternich (d. 1859) advised the Ottomans not to follow the European—that is, the English and the French—model but to stick to their own traditions, probably in order to safeguard the multi-ethnic character of his own state, but in the end both England and France became the models for the reforms, although they were unsuitable, for several key reasons. They were both nation-states, while the Ottoman Empire was a corporatist structure composed of religious-ethnic communities linked to the person of the sultan; there was no Ottoman nation with an identity of its own, but the structure and identity of each major ethno-religious group could potentially enable it to become a nation. Furthermore, the two model states were diametrically opposed to each other as far as their basic political philosophy was concerned. England viewed the state-nation as an association of free individuals imbued with civic nationalism and regarded each individual as worthy of dignity and respect—especially if they were English and belonged to the proper social set: Anglicanism as a faith reinforced this individualistic philosophy. In France the individual was liberated from the dual prison of church and state by a myth of nation with a will of its own and the transference of the authority of the king to the state.²⁴ Rousseau drew the picture of the nation with free will in its own right, the national will being the expression of a will of the collectivity to which the individual surrendered his will (Atatürk had read Rousseau, and in a speech urged the intellectuals to read and understand why the French philosopher had to invent the fiction of "national will.") The French remained attached to the collectivity, displayed ethnic nationalism, and had a propensity for authoritarianism as much as for sharp rationalization and formal logic. Whatever their differences, both the English and French nation-states were alike in putting the individual at the center of their political system, whereas in the traditional Ottoman system the situation was dichotomous. The individual enjoyed unlimited physical and ethnic-religious freedom within the confines of his community but had no autonomy, freedom, or rights vis-a-vis the political system, although there were some limitations on the ruler's authority that stemmed from Islam. The rank-and-file individual in the Ottoman traditional community had a deeply imbedded respect for tradition, precedent, social ranking, etc. and a pragmatic, practical outlook that was similar to the British.

The ruling elites, on the other hand, were deeply committed to the maintenance of the collectivity and the faith under state supervision and thus resembled the French. The community obeyed and respected the elites to the extent that they served and maintained the faith—the famous din-u devlet, the unity of faith and ^{state} religion. The Ottoman modernizers deprived the state of its traditional legitimacy but retained, increased, and exercised absolutely the state authority in the name of some haphazardly conceived idea of modernization, which became in practice a form of vulgar materialism. The Turkish "modernists" did not understand that Europe continued to dislike them primarily because under their glittering costumes made in Paris and their accentless mastery of European languages they continued to be the same despots as were their traditional predecessors whom they had dethroned. They saw themselves as the absolute representatives of the nation, much the way the old sultans saw themselves as the absolute representative of the community. ^{and state} In other words, they continued to act as the masters of one uniform, monolithic collectivity rather than as the representatives and spokesmen of a nation made up of free individuals. The modernizers, most of whom were bureaucrats, could not understand that blind obedience to their authority exercised on behalf of an authoritarian state had less value than the dissent of a truly free individual, regardless of his faith.

The dichotomy between state and society, which existed in embryo throughout the Muslim world, developed into a major rift in the Ottoman Empire because of the reforms. The reforms came to be viewed by a large group of Muslims as being detrimental to the society's faith and thus placed the state in the awkward position of betraying its mission and undermining its legacy as the custodian of Islam. The Ottoman state had always acted to defend its worldly interests with relative freedom from criticism, thanks to its control of the legitimizing mechanism—that is, the office of the Şeyhulislam (created in the sixteenth century and appended to the bureaucracy). However, the Islamic revivalist movements had strengthened the sense of individuality and encouraged freedom of individual inquiry in the spirit of ictihat, which had been the intellectual backbone of Islam in its golden age and appeared to challenge the state's supremacy. Paradoxically, the European brand of individualism that was making its way into Ottoman thought provided a considerable philosophical boost to revivalist thought, despite the fact that Europe and Islam appeared to be political enemies. The Edict of Tanzimat of 1839, for example, was an instrument that catered to the individual, offering guarantees for their life, property and equality regardless of faith and thus limiting the sultan's absolute authority. It bore the imprint of Britain all over it.

The Tanzimat Edict was drafted and publicly read, with the consent of the ruling sultan Abdülmecid, by Mustafa Reşit paşa, who had just returned from his post as ambassador to London, where he seemed to have been deeply impressed by the British system and society. Reşit had become convinced that the Ottoman state could not survive without drastic reforms and without the backing of a strong European power, preferably England. He appears to have persuaded the new eighteen-year-old Sultan Abdülmecid (1839-61) of the wisdom of his reformist views, which were shared also by a westernist group in the foreign ministry. Stratford Canning (Stratford de Redcliffe), sporadically the British ambassador to the Porte during the period 1825-58 and exceptionally knowledgeable about Ottoman society, supported Reşit and eventually gained also the friendship of the sultan and exerted profound influence on him. (The ruler fondly called him "büyük elçi," "great ambassador," and granted him unlimited access to his palace.) It was Canning who, anxious to strengthen the Ottoman state against Russia, had persuaded the Porte to initiate the reforms by making the individual and his freedom the centerpiece of reform. He presented concrete proposals for creating "equality" as individuals among the sultan's subjects regardless of religious differences.²⁵ The sultan referred the equality issue to a high committee composed of religious men, who advised against the acceptance of the proposal on the grounds that it would undermine the essence of the Ottoman Empire, which was based on the separation of the faiths and communal cultural-religious autonomy. Canning, a good Protestant, held the view that the stagnation of the Ottoman state was because Islam had a strong hold on the government, and that Islam, being a backward (and even fake) religion, prevented progress in society and government. His proposed remedy was to free the government from the hold of Islam and he often held talks with Ottoman officials at his home, where he elaborated on his ideas.²⁶ The refusal of the ulema to support his proposals convinced Canning that he was correct in his view that Islam was the cause of Ottoman decline; but, thanks to the Crimean War of 1853-56, Canning's point of view eventually prevailed. This war, and the ensuing Paris Treaty of 1856, was a turning point in Turkish relations with Europe, causing also a revision, albeit a temporary one, of Europe's image of the Turks.

The Crimean War was preceded by the Revolution of 1848 in Central Europe, and thousands of Hungarian and Polish revolutionaries under Louis Kossuth, pursued by the Austrian and Russian forces, took refuge in the Ottoman lands. Sultan Abdülmecid (1839-61), backed by England, refused to surrender the revolutionaries to Austria, despite threats of war. This caused the sultan and the Turks in general to be portrayed by the European press as the champions of freedom and civilization. This new, positive image of the Turks resulted from their courage in defying

powers that were then the enemies of England and France; in other circumstances this "courage" was considered "intransigence," and the good impression was soon to fade, but not before Europe and the Turks entered, for the first time in their history, into an alliance against Russia. This Crimean alliance, which brought together with the Muslim Turks the Catholic French, Sardinians, etc., and the Protestant British, inflicted a crushing defeat on Orthodox Christian Russia. Muslims all over the world, especially in the Middle East (there were many Arab voluntary units in the Ottoman army) and India became convinced that the Europe headed by England was indeed a friend of Islam; consequently the level of mistrust towards Europe, with its Christian culture and civilization, dropped considerably. After 1856 the European influence, which began as a trickle into the Ottoman state, became a torrent. Ambassador Canning, who disliked the Russians as much as Islam, had gone back to England in 1852; but, alarmed by the Menshikov mission (Menshikov was a rough Russian soldier sent to Istanbul to secure formal recognition for the czar as the protector of all the Orthodox Christians), he returned to Istanbul in April 1853 and played a leading part in frustrating Russia's demands and launching the war. When the allies won the war, Russia was forced to retreat—temporarily—from the Black Sea and the Romanian principalities, and the Turks' part in this defeat—the memory of which continues to hurt the Russian pride until now—has never been forgotten or forgiven. Neither did the Russians forget the picture of Christian Europe—Catholics and Protestants alike—allied with the "infidel" Turks against Orthodox Christian Russia. The issue bothered many believing Englishmen, too.

The Ottoman state was a signatory of the Paris Treaty and also of the Reform Edict of 1856, eulogized as a major act of reform. The edict had been prepared without Ottoman participation by England, France, and, partly, Austria, and the sultan had to accept it wholesale without even a chance to propose amendments, for it was presented as an intrinsic part of the peace arrangements in the Treaty of Paris.²⁷ In return for accepting the Treaty and the Reform Edict, the Ottoman Empire was formally accepted into the comity of nations and made subject to international law. Thus, after five hundred years of existence as a political and religious outcast despite its physical presence in Europe, the Ottoman Empire was finally accepted—unwillingly, and simply because they did not want her to fall to the Russians—as a partner by the "civilized" nations of Europe and expected to live up to their standards. The first and most important test of the Turks' compatibility with European civilization was the enforcement of the Reform Edict which, if shorn of a few general provisions, dealt almost entirely with the status of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire. The edict sought to deprive Russia of a pretext on which to intervene in Ottoman affairs, and in practice it

gave the Orthodox Christians in the Empire a truly privileged status and turned the European powers into their patrons, a position Russia had aspired to for a century. England had already begun opening consulates in 1843 and now had about two dozen established in the Ottoman areas inhabited by Christians (at least five offices, manned by military officers, were opened in the areas inhabited by Armenians). The consulates became in due time a sort of parallel government and coexisted with Ottoman administrative offices, and often superseded them. The edict aimed also at creating equality between individual Muslims in a system that was built ideologically and organizationally on a corporatist basis and was alien to the individualistic mode of political organization of the West.

Included in it were all of the provisions that had been rejected earlier by the ulema council. Its wholesale adoption created sharp opposition and reaction against the sultan and his advisors as having acted under European guidance and having undermined the essence of the state—"devletin esasına halel geldi;" the objections came from both religious conservatives and progressive-minded intellectuals and led to the first organized opposition to the sultan—a secret revolutionary society—in 1859.

Although not exclusively responsible, the edict gave momentum to a profound socio-economic development which had gotten underway after the beginnings of economic liberalization in 1838 and was best represented by the Land Code of 1858. The code played a seminal role in expediting the transition of the Ottoman economic system to a capitalist economy, but it also aggravated the Christian-Muslim division of the population. The Land Code sought to increase agricultural production by regularizing the chaotic situation of land ownership. Most of the arable lands in Anatolia and Rumili were state lands and had been used for centuries as the economic basis of the military establishment and the provincial bureaucracy. Above all, they gave the government leverage for its social and political control over the society. The trend toward commercialization of agriculture in a market economy, which grew consistently after 1774, had led to the constant piecemeal appropriation of state lands by individuals. This had not resulted in the emergence of a truly feudal land system, although such a development was incipient at the end of the eighteenth century when the breakdown of the central authority led to the sudden emergence of the free agrarian private sector. Unable to reestablish its previous control over the land after 1840, the government began accepting as de jure owners those in possession of the land, if they could produce concrete proof that their possession derived from legitimate authority. Only very flimsy evidence was rejected, and only upon such claim and rejection did the land

revert to government ownership. The Land Code of 1858 played a major role in expanding the scope of private ownership and in regularizing land relations; and it indirectly stimulated the growth of an agrarian middle class.

The production end of the commercial agriculture sector—including the land ownership—was dominated by Muslims, while the marketing end, which included export-import and offered possibilities for huge profits, was dominated by Christians. A true commercial bourgeoisie rapidly arose and played a vital role in the distribution of European goods throughout the Empire and in fostering the French and British influence, including the dissemination of such European modes of life as dress, leisure activities, etc.²⁸ The Edict of 1856 sharpened the socio-economic differentiation between Muslims and Christians which was brought to a climax in the Tuna province after the area was selected in the 1860s as a pilot area for reforms. The Porte appointed its most capable administrator—Mithat paşa—as governor of the province, and a huge investment reinvigorated it and enabled the Bulgarians, who were less than 50 percent of its population but to whom the government had given preference in order to show its impartiality, to emerge as a powerful group. The social tensions inherent in such a situation soon acquired an ethno-religious and political dimension, already evident in the uprisings which had begun in the 1800s. These were not bonafide "national" uprisings but, rather, social upheavals that immediately took on political-national overtones. Nationalism proved to be anathema to the multi-ethnic, multi-religious Ottoman empire. The Greek uprising of 1821 had the effect of ending what may be called a "de facto" Greek-Turkish coalition that had begun when Istanbul was conquered in 1453 and the Greek patriarch was made the sole spokesman for the Orthodox Christians. With the rise of ethnic nationalism in the Ottoman Empire—it was preceded by the neo-Byzantinism of the Phanariotes (1760-1821)—the Christians of the Ottoman Empire began to view Europe as a civilization that they could regard as their "own" because it was Christian; but when reminded that they belonged to a different and often despised brand of Christianity, they would invoke the universal, secular, and humanist dimensions of European civilization. A Serbian revolt in 1805 had little philosophical impact on the Ottomans but the Greek uprising of 1821, which had the support of Britain, despite her presumed friendship with the Ottomans, was a warning that the old religious identity, which had been the backbone of the traditional system, was being replaced by a political national identity and all it entailed.

The Muslim popular reaction against the edict and England started soon after 1858 and became increasingly vehement as the Christian Orthodox bourgeoisie grew in size and wealth and its educated offspring became the leaders of the ethnic nationalist movements. The objection on the part of the Muslims to the enforcement of the edict grew,

as did the demands of the Christians for additional rights. With the active support of Austria and Russia, the situation degenerated into open revolt, first in Bosnia and Hercegovina in 1875 (this revolt was fueled by some legitimate social grievances) and then in Bulgaria in 1876. These revolts, especially the one in Bulgaria, the leaders of which had been educated in Russia, acquired from the very start anti-Islamic, anti-Turkish overtones. By this time the terms "Muslim" and "Turk" had become synonymous in the Balkans (as they still are today). The wanton massacre of 300 Turkish villagers at the beginning of the Bulgarian uprising produced a violent reaction on the part of the local irregular Ottoman troops, who killed 2,100 innocent Bulgarians. Overnight Batak, the village where the massacre occurred, became famous and was subject to numerous visits by missionaries (E. Schuyler, among others), and came to be cited as the proof that Turks were unable to come to terms with the western civilization, values, and standards.²⁹ The rapidly growing European dissatisfaction with the Turks intensified after the government of Mahmud Nedim paşa, under advice from Ignatiev, the Russian ambassador, announced a 50 percent reduction in the interest paid to the European (mostly British) holders of Ottoman bonds. The storm of indignation climaxed in W. E. Gladstone's famous pamphlet, "Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East," in which he accused the Turks of killing 60,000 Bulgarians. The pamphlet reportedly sold 50,000 copies in a few days.

All of this gave an aura of legitimacy to the demands for autonomy from the Balkan Christians. Lord Salisbury wrote B. Disraeli, the Prime Minister, that:

it is clear that the traditional Palmerstonian policy is at an end. We have not the power, even if we were to wish, to give back any of the revolted districts to the discretionary government of the Porte....The opportunity should...be taken to exact some security for the good government of the Christians throughout the Turkish Empire. The Government of 1856 was satisfied with promises....We must have something more than promises.³⁰

The Constantinople Conference, which met in December 1876, was called to find a solution to the Balkan crisis—that is, to provide autonomy to the Christians.³¹ The Ottoman nationalists, including the reformist Mithat paşa, saw the conference as an attempt to dismember the Ottoman state and as a symbol of the Christians' victory over the Turks, as indicated by its name and place of meeting. In response, the Ottoman nationalists produced the Constitution of 1876. It assured the non-Muslims representation in the administration of the country and would render autonomy unnecessary. The constitution and the two parliaments which convened subsequently, in 1877 and 1878, provided the new middle classes with direct access to power and the opportunity to criticize the bureaucracy (and, indirectly, the sultan) and politically mobilized the population. It was probably the first and most important act of democratization

and political westernization in the history of the Muslim world; yet the conference participants and the western press treated the constitution as a trick intended to derail the conference and deceive Europe.

The conference disbanded without achieving its goal but left the Ottoman government isolated and stigmatized as being determined to keep the Christians enslaved and oppressed forever. England realized the extremely dangerous position of the Ottoman government and made a last-minute attempt to amend the conference proposals in favor of the Porte; but the nationalists in the Ottoman cabinet rejected the compromise in the belief that they had won the upper hand and had enough military capability to defeat the Russians if the czar decided to launch a war. Russia promptly took advantage of the extreme isolation of the Ottoman government and attacked and defeated the Turkish troops. England declared her "neutrality" and refused even to sell weapons to the Ottoman government; however, faced with the enormity of the Russian victory, for which the English government possibly had advisedly prepared the ground, London intervened again and pushed Russia to agree to the revision of the San Stephano Treaty, which had made Russia the most influential power in the Balkans thanks to the overwhelming influence it could exert over Bulgaria. The Treaty of Berlin of 1878, drawn up with the Ottoman delegation not even allowed to participate as negotiators, allowed the sultan to preserve Macedonia and Thrace but awarded independence to Serbia, Romania and Montenegro, and autonomy to Bulgaria; Bosnia-Herzegovina was occupied by Austria.³² For all practical purposes the Ottoman presence in the Balkans was eliminated and the Empire reduced to the status of a secondary Middle East state. During the war, according to the British consular reports, about 300,000 Muslims, mostly Turks, in the Balkans were killed and one million uprooted and forced to emigrate. Great Britain, having played the major role in both the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and in preventing it from collapsing entirely at the hands of Russia, took Cyprus as a sort of payment, promising to defend the sultan against further Russian advances. Behind the negative British attitude towards Turkey that commenced in the late sixties were a number of international and domestic events not necessarily connected with each other. A few can be cited. The rise of Germany and her defeat of France in 1870 compelled England to come closer to Russia so as to counterbalance Bismarck and his powerful army; the defeat also weakened the anti-Russian coalition led by France and worsened the strategic position of the Ottoman Empire. In 1870 Russia announced that she would militarize the Black Sea, an open violation of the Paris Treaty. This action, along with several violations—including the occupation of eastern Rumili by Bulgaria in 1885, despite the Berlin treaty provisions meant to safeguard Ottoman rights—met with no opposition by England.

On the domestic front, the question of England's relations with the Ottoman state had been thrown into the political arena. The general suffrage, the increasing power of the press, and other such developments had given the English commoner new political weight and made him subject to the politicians' courtship. Gladstone, of the Liberal Party, wrote his famous anti-Turkish pamphlet of 1876 not out of moral indignation at the killing of the Bulgarian civilians but because the event provided him with an excellent opportunity to question the commitment of Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, the Conservative Party leader, to Christian causes. Indeed, Gladstone eventually accused Disraeli, a converted Jew, of remaining silent to the fate of the Balkan Christians because of his sympathy for the Turk. The subsequent British national election of 1880 was fought mainly on the issues of British foreign policy towards the Ottoman Empire, and Gladstone won easily. His was an anti-Turkish, and anti-Muslim platform.³³

Gladstone thus became prime minister and quickly recalled Henry Layard, the British ambassador in Istanbul, who believed in maintaining the territorial integrity of the Ottoman state and who had very positive views about the Turks' prospects for and dedication to modernization and progress. The new ambassador, George Goschen, a rather abrupt person (he used the British navy to force the sultan to cede Dulcigno to Montenegro), acted under strict instructions from London to enforce immediately, among others, Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty, which charged the Ottoman government with the carrying out of reforms, under British supervision, in east Anatolia. The new sultan, Abdülhamid (1876-1909), believed that Gladstone's purpose was to set up an independent Armenia in eastern Anatolia, and he did his best to frustrate the British in this goal. The Turkish relations with England that had started on an auspicious note in 1839 thus came to an unhappy end by 1880. In place of the Palmerstonian doctrine of Ottoman integrity, England adopted the new view that the Turkish Empire was doomed to disintegrate and that England should oversee and try to control the collapse in such a way as to secure for herself the best morsels of territory. The Foreign Office was prepared to let Russia take over the Turkish ports of Trabzon and fast-developing Samsun, for the czar would stimulate the trade with England as he did in Crimea and along the Black Sea littoral where Odessa became the leading port. Sultan Abdülhamid immediately recognized the change in the British policy and tried to pressure London to revert to the Palmerstonian policy, knowing only too well that the survival of the Ottoman Empire was dependent on England. He felt also that in the long run the survival of the British Empire, at least its Middle Eastern components, was tied to the continuation of the Ottoman state. Abdülhamid used an Islamic policy, as shall be discussed in the next section, to put pressure on England to revert to the Palmerstonian policy, only to alienate her

even further. Caught in her own imperialist ideology, England ignored the essential fact that special structural features made empires dependent on each other for survival; she dismembered the Ottoman Empire along with France, and took possession of its Arab provinces only to be dismally forced out of the Middle East two decades later by G. Nasser of Egypt and the Hashemites of Jordan, whom London had used effectively against the Turks in 1916.

The change in England's foreign policy towards the Ottomans occurred without much regard for the internal intellectual transformation of the Empire that England, paradoxically enough, had helped to accelerate and direct. Indeed, during the period of Tanzimat from 1839 to 1878, Turkish society was deeply involved in a multi-sided, forward-oriented change that made the return to the past impossible. "Ottomanism," a European-type, bureaucratic centralization, and its accompanying policies centered around common citizenship, were unsuccessful in keeping the Christians in the fold of the Empire but had succeeded in undermining the old communal system and the religious identities it nurtured. Ottomanism created a degree of homogeneity and an awareness among individuals about their social, ethnic, and cultural identities—in effect it instituted a new type of political culture—and was transforming the Muslims into a sort of proto nation under the label of Islam—an Ottoman Muslim nation in which the non-Muslims were no longer viewed as members of autonomous religious communities but as individuals belonging to minority groups, whose rights and freedoms were being determined by a worldly government rather than a state asserting divine legitimacy. Europe had forced the Turks to abandon their own Islamic frame of reference for dealing with and assuring the unlimited freedom of culture and religion in favor of European secular formulas that depended on elected governments.

5. Sultan Abdülhamid and Islamism as the Ideology of Self Defense

The reign of Abdülhamid II (1878-1909) and his domestic and foreign policies have left a permanent mark on the Turkish society and the Muslim world as whole. It is essential to note that his policies were determined almost entirely by his perception of the European designs and plans to divide his realm, and by his relentless search for some means to oppose those plans and assure the survival of his state. Abdülhamid came to the throne amidst grave internal turmoil. Mithat paşa and his followers, who had forced Abdülaziz from the throne, eventually forced Abdülhamid to promulgate a constitution (1878, but Abdülhamid soon ousted and exiled Mithat paşa and then suspended the constitution and the parliament. He centralized all government authority in the hands of a small staff and used it to rule the country from his Yıldız palace. He has been labelled an autocratic dictator, "red sultan,"

reactionary bigot, etc., by both his numerous Turkish and his European critics. This image of the sultan has persisted to our day, despite attempts by some western scholars, such as Stanford Shaw, to point to Abdülhamid's extraordinary modernist achievements. Today he is viewed as a towering Muslim leader by the growing number of his islamist defenders in Turkey and abroad. This section of the paper shall concentrate, to the extent possible, only on some of the features of Abdülhamid's policies relevant to understanding Turkey's relations with Europe.

Abdülhamid had an extraordinarily sharp intelligence, an enormous capacity for work, and a born instinct for politics; he was, as well, suspicious, secretive, and ruthless in dealing with his adversaries. He was also a devout, sincere, practicing Muslim and believed that Islam was a forward-looking religion that was compatible with science, technology, and progress; as an individual in his private business, however, he preferred to work with Christians (his personal doctor and banker were Greeks) and admired the Jews for their intelligence and perseverance—Arminius Vambery was his friend—but not Zionism. His state policies were oriented toward the Muslims because, as he explained it in his memoirs, in the new order of things—that is, a state based upon the individual—the government was to abide by and follow the cultural tendencies of the majority of its subjects. The Ottoman state being made up mostly of Muslims, its government should abide by Islam, very much as the French government abided by the Catholic culture.³⁴ The despot thus developed individualistic views of the society, much as his arch opponents, including the Young Turks and Atatürk, used authoritarianism in the mistaken belief that it was the only way to build a modern society and create a free individual.

During the initial years of his reign the Empire suffered the crushing defeat in the War of 1877/78 (he wanted to avoid war with Russia but Mithat paşa prevailed) and lost its best provinces and much of the army with the weapons acquired from Europe by his predecessor. He inherited a heavy foreign debt and in 1882 had to accept the authority of the Foreign Debt Administration set up by European debtor countries to collect their loans.³⁵ The population of the Empire, meanwhile, following the loss of the Balkan provinces, had come to consist predominantly of Muslims whose ethnic and linguistic differences had long been superseded by their common Islamic faith and Ottoman culture. The idea of nation-state had been formalized in the Berlin Treaty and applied rather arbitrarily to the heterogeneous Balkan society. It was obvious that if the Muslims in the Ottoman Empire, especially the Arabs, adopted ethnic-linguistic identity as a principle of political organization, the disintegration of the Ottoman state was inevitable. Moreover, the sultan was well aware that the Muslims abroad, notably in India, had developed a keen

sense of solidarity with their coreligionists in the Ottoman Empire. Indeed the murder and ousting of millions of Muslims from their ancestral homes in the Balkans in 1877/78 outraged the Indian Muslims to the extent that they petitioned Queen Victoria to stop the carnage and also sent money, mobile hospitals, and even volunteers to support the Turkish war effort. As early as the 1850s, Muslim rulers on the periphery of the Islamic world—such as Yakup bey of Kashgar and the sultans of Ache in Sumatra and of the Comoro Island in the Indian Ocean, etc.—had asked the Ottoman sultan in his person as caliph to defend them against European occupation, promising in return political allegiance and unity with the Ottoman Empire. The Turks' role as the defenders of Islam was reinforced once more. The same threat of foreign occupation and fear of loss of cultural identity had generated at least twenty four militant Muslim revivalist movements in the nineteenth century, in areas stretching from India (Syed Ahmet Barelvi) to Caucasia (Şeyh Shamil) to Africa (Muhammad al-Sanusi), etc. These revivalist movements represented also the search of the Muslim masses, according to their region and ethnic culture, for ways to come to terms with the profound changes taking place in the socio-economic structure of the Muslim societies while still remaining faithful to the Koran and the Prophet's Sunna. The English had become aware of the potential threat of these movements: they had battled Barelvi's followers in India over ten years from 1825 to 1835 and beyond, and had temporarily lost control of India during the Sepoy revolt in 1857. At that time they asked Sultan Abdülmecid, as caliph, to counsel the rebels to cease their attacks on the British; the sultan obliged but met with adverse reaction from the Muslim leaders.

Sultan Abdülhamid's islamist policy, initiated after 1878, must be analyzed within the framework of the above. His primary aim was to maintain the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire by creating cohesion and solidarity among his Muslim subjects, who formed about 80 percent of the population. Consequently he stressed the importance of Islam not only as a religion but also as a system of social beliefs, mode of life, and family organization shared by all Muslims. He promoted Islam not as simply a faith but as an ideology of political unity. His central idea, which was also that of the popular revivalist movements and of the Nakşbandis, the ideological spokesmen of the new Muslim middle classes, was sincere devotion to the iman—the faith. Abdülhamid emphasized this idea by a strict observance of Islamic customs and rituals. He, like many of his advisors, was keenly aware that the Muslims at home and overseas were increasingly looking towards the caliphate as a central Muslim institution which could mobilize resistance to foreign occupation and help them maintain their Muslim way of life. The question was not one of freedom of religion. Actually, the English in India and, less so, the French in Africa had recognized Islam as a faith

and allowed the Muslims to practice their rites; the Muslims of Calcutta declared India under the British to be dar ul-Islam—Muslim land—and that the Muslims could accept the British authority as long as the Raj did not prevent their Islamic worship. But the goal of most Muslims was not just to obtain freedom to practice their own faith on their own land but to create an integral Muslim way of life, even though the economic and social bases of the institutions that had supported such a life in the past, such as the autonomous yakıf and the imaret, had been undermined by the global capitalist system.

Sultan Abdülhamid turned the caliphate into a universal Muslim central institution with himself at its head as the spokesman for the religious rights of the Muslims of the entire world. Thus, once more the Turks asserted their role as the defenders of sunni-Orthodox Islam but did not leave the caliphate to others (as in 1051) or by give^{ing} it a relatively neutral status (as in the period 1517-20) but, rather, revitalized it and politicized it in the role of representative and spokesman for the entire Muslim community. The Turks were considered a regional Muslim power—the Moguls of India and Iran being others—until the nineteenth century, when they became a universal Muslim state, because of their full identification with Islam. Abdülhamid turned the caliphate into a powerful, universal Muslim institution and used it, first, as a means to strengthen internal unity and forestall the emergence of ethnic nationalism among Muslims. He specifically dreaded the uprising of Kurdish nationalism based on a European type of ethnicity. The endless and diverse methods used by Abdülhamid to enhance the caliphate's position for this internal purpose falls outside the scope of this study and shall not be dealt with. His second purpose in turning the caliphate into an all-Muslim body was related to the Turks' international position.

Abdülhamid's islamism was labelled "panislamism" by Europe and defined as a movement aimed at uniting all the Muslims in the world in a single body and at declaring the cihad (holy war) against the West and its civilization. Actually, Abdülhamid was too intelligent and sophisticated even to consider seriously such an act as the unleashing of a religious war against Europe. Aside from considerations of the slimness of the chance for success for such a war, Abdülhamid knew that such an action would make him an international outcast and deprive him of the protection of Europe against Russia. Thus it is easy to understand why he ignored all the calls for Islamic action and refused to establish a formal Muslim union (Ittihad-ı Islam) or use the Ottoman diplomatic offices as outlets for propaganda and subversion. However, he did not hesitate to use these offices to collect information about overseas Muslims and to convey to them his personal concern about their freedom to practice the faith and to make representations on their

behalf to the proper European governments. Abdülhamid made it clear that, in making such representations, he was acting as caliph—that is, as the religious spokesman of the Muslims in the world—but not as their political leader, knowing full well that such each representation won him political credit among Muslims. Gladstone had found his match in the ruler of an empire that every European leader expected to expire in just a few years.

Abdülhamid's ultimate purpose in enhancing the visibility and influence of the caliphate among world Muslims was to make the Europeans aware that his call to cihad, if he were forced to issue it, could pose a deadly threat to the British, French and Russian authority in the Muslim lands they had conquered. He did not try to incite rebellion but, rather, used the threat of cihad to put pressure on the British, French, and Russians not to usurp additional Ottoman territory and interfere in its domestic affairs. The sultan waged a truly psychological war by recognizing that the threat of cihad was more effective than its actual use. In large measure, Abdülhamid's so-called panislamic policy developed as a reaction to the French occupation of Tunisia in 1881 and British invasion of Egypt in 1882. The sultan believed that England and France were ready to solve the Eastern Question once and for all by dividing the Ottoman lands among themselves, as they eventually did after World War I. At the same time, Abdülhamid still believed that England had too many interests in common with the Ottoman Empire to wish for its immediate disintegration. He would play for time while strengthening the Empire from inside. He even tried to persuade England that a strong caliphate could help their cause. Indeed, in 1878 the Viceroy of India and the British ambassador in Istanbul persuaded Abdülhamid (or were themselves persuaded by the sultan) that a high level embassy should be sent by the caliphate to Amir Sher Ali in Afghanistan to induce him to accept British protection. The mission was unsuccessful, the amir asserting to the Ottoman envoy, Ahmet Hulusi efendi, that the English, not the Russians, were his main enemies; but the sultan continued to hope that somehow Great Britain might still be induced to return to its Palmerstonian policy. He clung to this hope until 1889, when Gladstone firmly dashed these rather unrealistic hopes. He did not hesitate to use his caliphal powers to reward his western friends—in this case the Americans, whom he perceived as having a more balanced view on religion, including Islam.

The Gladstone government and the French initially took the sultan's threats of Islamic cihad seriously and launched a virulent counterattack against him, the caliphate, and Islam that lasted well into the twentieth century. The English first challenged the legitimacy of Abdülhamid's claim to the caliphate and sought to establish an Arab caliph (as they ultimately succeeded in doing when they installed their man, the Şerif of Mecca, Huseyin, as caliph for a

short while in 1924). They also tried to undermine the caliph's influence in Africa and among Russia's Muslims. The French had begun to develop suspicions about the caliphate's threat to their rule over the North African Muslims well before Abdülhamid's time. As early as 1872 they accused Istanbul for having aided the Algerian revolt of 1871—the Bishop of Alger had engaged in a campaign of conversion. In 1881 they charged Istanbul (and they were partly right in this) with inciting the tribesmen of south Tunisia to migrate to Tripolitania and engage in guerilla warfare against France. England regarded Colonel Urabi's revolt in Egypt in 1881 and the Mahdi's uprising of the same year in the Sudan as a result of Istanbul's meddling, although Sultan Abdülhamid disliked both militants: he had a profound antipathy towards revolutionaries, regardless of their faith and devotion to Islamic causes. Nonetheless the sultan was blamed for any unrest anywhere in the Muslim world that was aimed at Europeans. Russia did her best to perpetuate the image of the sultan as an inveterate enemy of Europe and its civilization. Russia actually became exceptionally suspicious that the nationalism rising among her Muslim subjects was instigated by Istanbul. Consequently, the European press forgot the Turks' past alliances with the West and began attacking the caliph, Islam, and the Turks as the permanent enemies of the West and of civilization. The old historical image of the terrible Turk was revived and enhanced by additional negative features. Some Englishmen, regretting their alliance with the Turks in 1853, began to advocate ousting of the Turks from Europe, a view expressed publicly by Lloyd George at the time of WWI. *Others took a different view.* By 1890 many French and English (including Lord Curzon) came to regard Abdülhamid's panislamism more as a political scarecrow than a real threat, and some even began to consider Abdülhamid and the caliphate as a bulwark against the new militant, anti-colonialist, nationalist Muslim movements rising among the Muslim masses. The American ambassador persuaded Abdülhamid to send word through the Mecca pilgrims to the revolutionaries in the Philippines, telling them not to fight the Americans, since the Yanks were not fighting against Islam but against the Spanish. An American general subsequently expressed the view that the sultan's intervention in the Philippines saved the lives of 20,000 U.S. soldiers. Lt. Col. John P. Finley, who had been for ten years the United States' governor of the district of Zamboanga Province in the Philippines, wrote:

At the beginning of the war with Spain the United States Government was not aware of the existence of any Mohammedans in the Philippines. When this fact was discovered and communicated to our ambassador in Turkey, Oscar S. Straus, of New York, he at once saw the possibilities which lay before us of a holy war....he sought and gained an audience with the Sultan, Abdul Hamid, and requested him as Caliph of the Moslem religion to act in behalf of the followers of Islam in the Philippines....A telegram to Mecca elicited the fact that they not only visited Mecca in considerable numbers, but that at that very time there were Moros from Sulu in the Sacred City....The Sultan as

Caliph caused a message to be sent to the Mohammedans of the Philippine Islands forbidding them to enter into any hostilities against the Americans, inasmuch as no interference with their religion would be allowed under American rule.

President McKinley sent a personal letter of thanks to Mr. Straus for the excellent work he had done, and said its accomplishment had saved the United States at least twenty thousand troops in the field. If the reader will pause to consider what this means in men and also the millions in money, he will appreciate this wonderful piece of diplomacy in averting a holy war.³⁶

It was too late, however, for the caliphate to clamp down the militants; by 1900 Abdülhamid's brand of religious islamism was being overtaken by a new brand of secular Islamic nationalism under which religion became just a source of cultural identity, though a major one. Abdülhamid's passive Islamic nationalism, which he helped define and used to mobilize the world Muslims against European expansionism, was superseded by a militant nationalism aimed at liberating the Muslims from foreign rule. That liberation finally came, beginning with Turkey in 1919-22 and followed by the rest of the Middle East and North Africa over the period 1943-62. Russia's Muslims failed to achieve independence in 1920, in part due to the fact that their modernist leaders supported the Bolshevik Revolution, notably in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan, in the vain hope that the revolution would bring them economic progress, democracy, and independence—that is, exactly what Turkey would like to offer them today. The modern Turks, whoever they were and wherever they went, appeared more interested in living a good life on this earth rather than wait for the bliss of Paradise in the next.

Sultan Abdülhamid initially was cool to Germany's efforts to make inroads into the Middle East. However, in 1889 he changed his policy overnight, in inviting the German kaiser for an official visit to Istanbul. The reason for this about-face can be found in a speech made by Gladstone to the Parliament. Citing the troubles in Crete, Gladstone sought to prove that Turks were the same "cruel," "bloodthirsty" opponents of Christians, Europe, and its civilization that he had described with such destructive efficacy in 1876. He was simply trying to regain control of the British government. In 1885 he had resigned in disgrace because the Mahdi of Sudan defeated the British army and killed General Gordon of Khartoum. (Later, of course, Kitchener avenged Gordon. An implacable foe of Islam and the caliphate, Kitchener himself in the end lost his prestige and influence due to his ill-conceived policies, inspired by his subjective view of Islam, in the Middle East during WWI. Lord Kitchener and his group believed that Muslims acted in unison at the order of the caliph, and he actively defended the idea that the caliph should be an Arab and placed under British control—or possibly the caliphate eliminated.) Shortly after reading Gladstone's speech in the Parliament (and mistakenly attaching too much importance to it) the sultan issued his invitation to the kaiser, who was prompt to

accept it and came hurriedly to Istanbul in November 1889, despite the inclement weather that nearly killed him with pneumonia. The die was cast. The Turks were moving closer to Germany, although to the end of his reign Abdülhamid conducted a neutral foreign policy, since he expected a war stemming chiefly from European conflicts and ambitions to erupt soon and deemed that an Ottoman entry into such a war would not help the country. Abdülhamid's foreign policy was pacifist, neutral, and to some extent isolationist (he also declined to associate with Iran). He leaned slightly towards Germany and achieved a rapprochement with Russia while maintaining correct relations with France and England. He managed to stay on friendly terms with all the Great Powers, including Russia, but without any commitment to follow their policies; this was also Republican Turkey's policy until 1939, when she allied herself with France and England. Abdülhamid knew also that Europe would feel no real respect for a society which was ready to shed off its basic culture, history and personality for the sake of immediate political gratification.

The internal and international policies of Abdülhamid were successful, if success can be measured by the achievement of the goals he had set for himself: namely, to maintain the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and to consolidate its internal unity. The Ottoman Empire lost no territory during his reign, except for the period 1876 to 1878, when Abdülhamid's power was limited. He registered success also in developing the country. He adopted to the greatest extent possible the material and scientific achievements of Europe but rejected its political ideas, notably democracy. Abdülhamid did not rescind or abolish any of the major reforms of the Tanzimat or abolish any of the modern institutions. He openly advocated the adoption of science and technology; in fact, he speeded up the educational reform, the transportation improvement program, including the railways, and the fiscal reorganization; he stabilized the foreign debt (34% of the annual revenue went to pay interest and principle), established a series of professional schools, and increased the level of literacy from about 5 to 15 or 18 percent. Modern Turkish literature, such as the novel, the short story, plays, etc., which played a major role in the intellectual modernization of the Turks, developed fast during Abdülhamid's reign.³⁷ A great number of western books in all fields of endeavor were translated during his reign. The press was also modernized and expanded freely "within the limits of law": that is, it could publish anything as long as it did not indulge in political debate (discuss freedom, constitutionalism, the parliament, etc.). It was during his time, in part due to his support for a market economy and foreign investment, that a Muslim middle class consisting of a large agrarian sector and a small commercial-manufacturing wing emerged. It was this class that built most of the modern schools in the countryside and asked the government to supply the teachers. A

sizeable Ottoman modern elite, made up of people of all the Muslim nationalities living in the Ottoman Empire, came out of this class and played a seminal role in the 'Turks' modernization. Notwithstanding the religious-Islamic garb clothing them, Abdülhamid's schools created a new brand of rational, pragmatic, and individualistic elite, whose mental attitude and world philosophy, paradoxical as it may appear, began to resemble that of Europe. Atatürk, İnönü, and other republican reformist leaders were the products of these modern schools. Probably the greatest development taking place during Abdülhamid's reign was the culmination of the nation formation process that had started during the Tanzimat and ended by producing what became, after the 1920s, the Turkish nation of today.

The nation is the consequence of a willful act. The ruling elite used various elements at their disposal, such as culture, language, history, etc., to reconstruct the old society in a new image and endow it with a new identity, that of the nation. The process began with the Tanzimat, received its ideological baptism during Abdülhamid's reign, and was concluded by Atatürk, who added the ethnic ingredient while trying, unsuccessfully, to eliminate its religious content. Sultan Abdülhamid, in his quest to maintain the Ottoman territorial integrity, employed Islam in a totally new capacity—as an integrative political ideology to create what he hoped would be an Ottoman Islamic nation. The group conflicts caused by social transformation, the traditional state-society dichotomy, and the fact that the language of the state and of the dominant political elite was Turkish, produced, under the cloak of religious unity, ethno-linguistic differentiation and two separate macro political social systems, one Turkish and the other Arabic. However, the most important intellectual development of Abdülhamid's reign, which occurred both despite and because of his Islamic policy, was the Turks' drive to achieve a communion with the civilization of Europe without losing their historic identity as Muslims and Turks.

The Tanzimat reformers had recognized that the reforms and the close collaboration with Europe as members of the European concert of nations compelled them to introduce into their Turkish-Muslim society foreign elements in law, social organization, ethics, art, literature, etc. These innovations did not destroy the Turks' basic Islamic identity—as the Muslim conservatives claimed—but forced it into a syncretic innovation. However, as long as the western and Muslim elements in this syncretism were presented in an exclusive relationship because of their different religious origin, they could not be accepted by either the masses or the educated elite. In order to be made acceptable, modernization had to be presented within a new framework, one that did not reject Islam, the Islamic culture of society, or the Turks' historical identity. The issue was tackled first during Abdülhamid's reign by intellectuals such as

Samipaşazade Sezai, who, as an aristocrat, had all the necessary social and political credentials to insure official trust. Sezai, among others, claimed that civilization and culture were different. Civilization comprised mainly the material achievements of a society, while culture defined the unique moral, ethical, and aesthetic characteristics of that society and was rooted in religion, among other things. In effect, Sezai claimed that if the Muslims formed a worldwide union and thus assured the survival of their culture, they would then feel no inhibition in adopting the civilization of Europe and in joining the march of humanity towards a global civilization. The culture-civilization relationship was taken up later and debated extensively by Ziya Gökalp and became a cardinal point in his definition of the modern Turk. In Gökalp's view, the identity of the modern Turk rested on three pillars: Islam (in its Ottoman version), ethnicity and modernity. (This meant modernity inspired by Europe, although Gökalp did not say this openly, calling it instead "contemporary civilization." Incidentally this three-dimensional view of modernization, which is today more or less accepted by a large number of Turks, probably with the exception of a small group of die-hard westernists, was put forth first by Huseyinzade Ali, a reformist from Azerbaijan.) Gökalp's identity definition was the basis of Turkish nationalism and has played a seminal—both negative and positive—role in Turkey's modernization until today. Under it, the Turks might become modern (and European) without losing their identity. They could absorb the essence of European civilization but maintain their historical identity and their faith. The Turkish reformists, however, did not follow his views but accepted ethnic nationalism and secularism (a form of governmental irreligiosity) as their policy.

Europe did not note, or did not care to acknowledge, the fundamental changes in the Turks-Muslims' self-definition that occurred under Abdülhamid's reign and had begun to move the Turks closer to Europe; she continued to criticize the sultan as a reactionary and bigot. In a way, this was to be expected, as democracy, individual freedoms, and rights were becoming the practical faith of Europe and the sole—almost exclusive—criterion by which it judged the other societies. The Turks were seeking a modus vivendi for coexistence, while Europe demanded a total cultural surrender, if not to Christianity, at least to democracy. Ultimately the judgement on Abdülhamid was written by the Young Turks' opposition movement, which arose among the elites in the 1880s. This opposition judged Abdülhamid not on the basis of his multi-sided achievements but on the basis of a single subjective criteria: his record on freedom and democracy. The restoration of the constitution and parliament of 1876—ignored by Europe—became the linchpin of opposition to Abdülhamid, and it marked the end of his reign when he was compelled to reinstate these institutions in 1908.

6. The Young Turks and Europe

The Young Turks represented a synthesis of the centuries-old Turkish relations with Europe. They supplied the example of a group to enter into relations with Europe not as the representative of an historical Ottoman state with its own traditions and identity but as a young group of reformers who claimed to share the political values of the West and wanted to be accepted at any cost, although they soon discovered the impossibility of this desire. They began by denouncing the islamist policy of Abdülhamid and his use of the caliphate for his personal despotism. They concocted a doctrine of anti-religious secularism to prove their good faith and attempted to Turkify the empire. The immediate effect of this policy was to end the modus vivendi established by Abdülhamid among the Muslim ethnic groups and undermine the international status quo: Austria annexed Bosnia and Hercegovina; Bulgaria declared herself to be independent; in 1911/12 the Italians occupied Libya and Albania declared itself independent, the first Muslim group in the Ottoman fold to do so. Finally, the Balkan War of 1912/13 ousted the Turks from Macedonia and Thrace, where more than fifty percent of the population was Turkish and Muslim. The Young Turks envisaged the Ottoman Empire another European power in the naive expectation that it would be treated as such and would enjoy the benefits of the basic western principles concerning national sovereignty and human rights, regardless of the Turks' old historical-cultural image. The Young Turks considered themselves a part of the European system of checks and balances and acted accordingly. They accepted as a truism the idea that England and France were determined to occupy the Middle East, and thus sought to prevent this by siding fully with Germany. They also harbored the irredentist hope of recouping the Ottoman provinces in the Balkans. Increasingly pursuing an ethnic nationalism in the hope of finding a more effective ideology than Islam to galvanize the ethnic Turks, the Union and Progress Government opted for Turkism, which took the form of an expansionist panturanism aimed at Russia. Abdülhamid, while encouraging relations with and the modernist-nationalist aspirations of Russia's Muslims, had opposed panturanism and thus assuaged the czar's fears that the caliph encouraged the fast-developing ethnic nationalism among Russia's Muslims.

The entry of the Ottoman Empire into the First World War on the side of Germany was managed by Enver paşa and a few military officers against the wishes of the cabinet and the overwhelming majority of the population. The war led to the final collapse of the Ottoman state, after the British army, supported by some Arab tribes, defeated the Ottoman army in Palestine. History records few instances of large political entities such as the Ottoman Empire brought to ruin by a few inexperienced zealots. The Young Turks ignored the wealth of historical experience of the

Ottoman Empire, its true foundation of strength, and speeded up its disintegration because they cast aside democracy that enabled them to come to power in 1908. They committed the army to a war that grew out of the expansionist aims of Europe. The Young Turks government, with German prodding, induced Caliph Mehmed V to issue the cihad urging the world Muslims to rise against England, France, and Russia with the ultimate purpose of securing the victory of Germany. True, Germany had adopted a rather friendly attitude towards Muslims, following the advice of its experts on Islam who, like the British in India, exaggerated the potential of panislamism; the kaiser declared during his second visit to the Ottoman land that he was a protector of the Muslims. The ultimate truth was that Germany was a Christian power and the use of a cihad to help one Christian power fight another could only denigrate the caliphate. The English on the other hand came to the conclusion, after failing to install Şerif Huseyin, the amir of the holy lands of Mecca, as a credible Arab caliph, that the Muslim world regarded the caliphate as an Ottoman-Turkish institution in the service of Islam and that it represented a perennial danger to their hold in India. Meanwhile the Young Turks disappeared from the world scene, and Mustafa Kemal abolished the caliphate in 1924.

7. Conclusion

The basic theme of this paper has been fully spelled out in a historical frame of reference in the previous sections. The Turks moved into the orbit of Europe gradually, first as a strong, even superior, enemy, and then as its ally, and finally as a dependent client to ward off the Russian threat. In the process they converted—and I am using the term advisedly—to the civilization of Europe in order to retain their independence and nationhood. In the process they transformed themselves into a modern type of nation and a nation-state. The Turks' ideological-cultural transformation is not historically unique. Many states and ethnic groups adapted a new religion and/or civilization in order to safeguard their group existence and identity, sometimes under a new name if at all possible. The Bogomils of Bosnia and Bulgaria accepted Islam from the Turks in order to maintain their ethnicity and social order threatened by both the Catholic and Orthodox churches. The Turks converted from Shamanism and even Buddhism in the six to tenth centuries to Islam in order to reassert their group identity in a new political form. After the middle of the eighteenth century they gradually accepted the West as a civilization with multiple forms in order to fight the Russians and remain independent. The political association with the West in the nineteenth century and the concept of nation-state made ethnicity (and the faith) the foundations of a new powerful identity. The Turks thus adopted ethnicity as the basis of political organization and gained their current national identity through association with the West. The

governing elites failed to understand the place of Islam in the life of their nation and committed a series of costly blunders, some of which are being addressed. Yet, the Turks are unique among Muslims peoples to have openly accepted modernization in its European dress as state policy. Theirs is the first example in the long encounter between Islam and the West whereby a Muslim people accepted the civilization of Europe as its guide for modernization and political identification. Was the Turks decision an act of betrayal of Islam or an astute move to change in order to become a better Muslim and Turk? I believe the latter is true. The West has invoked the Turks' Islamic faith whenever suitable to her own interests as the key impediment to the Turk's full acceptance as a European partner regardless of Turkey's repeated proof of good will. Actually, Europe regarded and hoped that modernization would be a convenient vehicle to convert the Turks to Christianity. The Christian missionaries of all denominations, who invaded the Ottoman Empire after the Paris Peace of 1856, regarded the reforms as the beginning of the Turks' conversion to Christianity and wanted to expedite it through every possible means. The islamist policy of Abdülhamid was, in part at least, a reaction to the missionaries' proselytizing. But the missionaries' hopes were revived as they came to regard Atatürk's reforms as a resumption of the de-islamization process. The West, and some Turks, subscribe silently to this expectation for conversion, although everything which has happened to Islam and Turks during the past half a century has contradicted this hope. Today Islam in Turkey is more powerful than ever and yet the least militant, because it is individualized. It is strong also because religiosity or its alternatives are matters of true individual choice guaranteed by a democratic constitution. The Turks' association with Islam is a constitutive, intrinsic part of their identity and personality and a basic force which has defined their place in history. The Turks who stayed outside of Islam perished, and those who survived, such as the Gagauzes, Chuvash, etc., remained marginal to world history and civilization. Turks without Islam would cease to be Turks.

The Turks can play a substantial role in the emerging new world only if they remain Muslims and Turks but also democratic, individualistic and economic minded. The Turks have a very highly respected place throughout the Muslim world because of their historical record and their sincere devotion of their people to the faith. The average Turk is as committed to the maintenance of his/her faith as to his/her ethnic identity. But what kind of faith?

Professor Bernard Lewis was probably correct in stating that the Turks' emerging faith may be a form of Islamic protestantism. *e.g. individualistic faith* To repeat, Turkey can play the model role for democracy, free enterprise, and independence for the Azeris, Uzbeks, Kazakhs and other Turkic groups only if she remains Muslim and Turkish but also democratic and

progressive. Turkey suffered a major setback in Azerbaijan and, because of this, in Central Asia. However, Turkey retains practically all the cards, which confers upon her a future role, since the direction of development in these areas is nationalism rooted in ethnicity, language, and democratized Islam, and not anti-western militancy. If Turkey is to play a role in Central Asia (and make up for her rejection by the European Community), she must better her relations with the Islamic countries, including Iran and Iraq, but without establishing a formal Islamic alliance. So far, in order to please her European allies and her own domestic anti-islamist bureaucrats, Turkey has refrained from approaching her potential Muslim allies.

It is high time for Turkey to use her reputation as the most advanced Islamic country to strengthen her international position and play her mission as a democratic progressive force. All this would, in the long run, facilitate the acceptance of the West in the Islamic world and help the democratization of Russia. So far the West has done its best to alienate the Muslims, including the Turkish masses. The West has not been helpful to the Muslims of Bosnia and Azerbaijan, despite their just cause and despite Turkey's frantic efforts to do something about her beleaguered conationals. The West abandoned Turkey shortly after 1856 fearing that a strengthened Turkey and growing Muslim militancy against colonialism threatened its long range interests. The situation today at the end of the Cold War resembles the one prevailing after 1856.

Russia played a decisive role in compelling the Turks to seek first a political and then intellectual alignment with Europe. Russia became keenly interested in the ultimate fate of the Ottoman Empire after she conquered Central Asia in 1865-73 and had to deal with a large number of Muslims who became increasingly susceptible to the caliph's influence. This fear was aggravated further by the rising tide of nationalism among Russia's Muslims, especially in Kazan and Crimea. Muslim nationalism in Russia was partially fueled by the modernization reforms and the modern school system in the Ottoman Empire. By the 1890s a large number of Muslim students from Russia began to arrive for study in Istanbul. All this made Russia, and later the Soviet Union, exceptionally fearful that the Turks could use the Muslims of Russia to incite national revolts the way the czar had used the Orthodox Christians to undermine the sultan's rule in the Balkans. Now that fear is being revived in an Islamic garb. There are at present approximately 8-9,000 Central Asian students enrolled in Turkish universities, and their tuition is paid by Turkey.

Today Russia has begun to view Turkey's endeavors in Central Asia and especially in Azerbaijan as a veiled form of panturkism and even expansionism. In the nineteenth century Russia launched panslavism rooted in Christian

Orthodoxy in order to undermine the Ottoman Empire's existence. Unfortunately, Russia still appears to view the world as still being divided by religious differences. She seems to have accepted Orthodox Christianity as capable of filling in the spiritual vacuum created by Communism and as a force likely to consolidate national unity among Russians. The Orthodox Church in Russia is quietly courting the Orthodox Christians in the Balkans, including Greece, which is looking increasingly towards Russia as the only power which can create a united Christian Orthodox front against Turkey. Boris Yeltsin's visit to Greece a few months ago may be attributed, in part at least, to Russia's efforts to sound the prospect for such a front and to undermine Turkey's efforts in Central Asia, and even neutralize her as an international player. All this cast very serious doubts about Russia's willingness to become a stable democracy respectful of the independence of other nations. The well-planned forced demise of democracy in Azerbaijan was manipulated by Russia not only to reassert her influence in the Caucasus but also to show all the Muslims in the CIS that Turkey cannot act as a model of democracy and free enterprise and less as an ally. As expected, Europe did little to salvage Turkey's reputation. Ultimately the role to be played by Turkey in Asia will be determined not so much by Europe but by Turkey herself, and by the ultimate stand taken by the United States in rearranging her relations with Asia and Europe.

The future position of Turkey in Asia and among her immediate neighbors will be determined by America's world policies. The question is how to define Turkey's position versus the American and European policies to be developed in Asia. These policies may begin as collaborative but are destined to become adversarial. If Turkey is able to maintain her image as a developing, progressive democracy dedicated to freedom and progress and prove indeed that she carries certain weight in the Muslim world, then she may be able to play a role in Asia both towards the USA and Europe. Yet there is always the danger that Europe will ignore Turkey's real democratic achievements and insist on unacceptable compromises, as already seen in the Kurds' case. Anyway, democracy is bound to remain a permanent feature of the Turkish system. The emergence of democracy, and the establishment of the individual freedoms and rights stemming from it, signaled the apparent victory of the individualistic philosophy of the West over the collectivist-communal philosophy of the Ottoman state, and thus a western criterium is in order. Paradoxically, however, Islam could not be and was not abandoned by the modernists. It was more important than ever because it became not only the creed of the community but also the irreplaceable source of spiritual nourishment for the individual Turk. In an individualizing society, everything from ethics to politics had to be individualized. In a

strange and tortuous way many Turkish elites—except for a small group—managed to accept the individualism of Europe (more in its French rather than its English form), although Europe insisted on the Turks' total surrender, either through their conversion to Christianity or their departure from Europe. Europe did not pay much attention to democratization in the non-western world. Indeed, England and France seemed to regard democracy as uniquely western, stemming from the unique history, culture, and faith of the West. After WWII, the United States gave democracy a universalist scope of ~~a universalist scope~~ as a value that coexisted with religion without necessarily being derived from it. The American concept of democracy, different from the initial class-oriented British concept of it, was egalitarian and individualistic from the very beginning. Turkey adopted this American-type democracy in 1946-47, in large part in order to be accepted into the European coalition of democracies being formed against the Soviet Union.

I have studied the democratization process in Turkey for over thirty-five years, for I believe that Turkey's full modernization in all its material, moral, and spiritual aspects is possible through the acceptance of a full democracy with its basic individualistic philosophy, and the average Turk appears to fit this description. Today, democracy in Turkey, defined by the individual's freedom to choose and participate his government, is part and parcel of the Turks' culture. Democracy has permitted Turks to redefine their relation to Islam. Democracy has rejuvenated the Turkish society, partially freed it from the bureaucratic-militarist philosophy of statism, and allowed the Turks to seek or to redefine their true identity. Today more than ever the Turks are part of Europe because they have started absorbing the true individualistic spirit of Europe by redefining their own historical identity in European terms. The West has come to terms with the Jew because the Jews modernized and accepted the European democracy and its spirit, regardless of the surviving Orthodox Jewish religious extremism. There is no reason why the West cannot come to terms with the Turks, who have done the same.

Notes

1. The Turkish government began to defend the case of the Turks in Bulgaria quite late, in 1985, due to mounting domestic pressure and after the West indicated that it was critical of Bulgaria's actions and would use the case of the Turks in Bulgaria to stress the communist regime's violation of human rights. For the case of the Bulgarian Turks see Kemal H. Karpat (ed.), The Turks of Bulgaria, Istanbul 1990.

2. In an interview with the late Kunaev (he died in August 1993) at his home in Almaty early in December of 1992, I asked him whether he considered himself first a Kazakh, a Muslim, or a Communist. He replied that he was all of them at once, but added that he believed in God. He then proudly showed the picture of his grandfather dressed in Muslim attire that was taken just after the latter returned from pilgrimage to Mecca. Kunaev added as an afterthought that he could not ignore his family ties and his own personal past, and all this made him feel close to Turkey. He claimed that he was not dismissed by Gorbachev from his post as First Secretary but resigned.
3. See declarations of Kerimov and Akaev in Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (Central Eurasia), 27 December 1991 and 11 March 1993.
4. Ian O. Lesser, "Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War," reprinted in Graham Fuller, Turkey's New Geopolitics, Boulder, Colorado 1993, p. 105.
5. This theme is developed further in the last three sections of this paper.
6. Brandon H. Beck's statement dramatizes the enduring power of the ancient images, as follows: "Today's traveller to Turkey...will encounter personal friendliness and warmth...but he can hardly step down on the platform at Sirkeci Station...or even alight from his plane at Yeşilköy Airport without some of the images from the early writing in mind." From the Rising of the Sun—English Images of the Ottoman Empire to 1715, New York 1987, pp. ix-x.
7. Paul Wittek, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire, London 1938; Fuad Koprulu, Les Origines de L'Empire Ottoman, Paris 1935 (there is a Turkish and English version of Koprulu's work); W. L. Langer and R. P. Blake, "The Rise of the Ottoman Turks and its Historical Background," American Historical Review XXXVII (April 1932): 468-505. For the manner in which Turks penetrated Byzantium gradually see R. S. Atabinen, "Les Turcs a Constantinople du V^e au XV^e Siecle," Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique (October-December 1953): 338-364.
8. Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, Romania and the Turks (c. 1300-c. 1500), London 1985.
9. See Halil İnalcık, Studies and Documents on the Reign of Mehmed the Conqueror (in Turkish), Ankara 1954 and The Ottoman Empire, The Classical Age 1300-1600 (tr. N. Itzkowitz, C. Imber), New York 1973, pp. 66-75.
10. The most extensive treatment of Mehmed II, despite its shortcomings, is still Franz Babinger, Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time, Munich 1953. (There are expanded Italian, French, and English translations.)
11. The existence of such a formal transfer has been long debated. As late as the 1880s the Ottoman government issued a formal declaration that the transfer document existed and was annually viewed by the population of Istanbul. This and many other related issues are debated in the writer's forthcoming work, as is the Ottoman relations with Central Asia.
12. This literature has been made subject to numerous studies. Probably the best and most unique source is Normal Daniel, Islam, Europe and Empire, Edinburgh 1966; see also C. D. Rouillard, The Turk in French History, Thought and Literature, 1520-1660, Paris 1938; C. Chew, The Crescent and the Rose, New York 1937; J. W. Bohnstedt, "The Infidel Scourge of God, The Turkish Menace As Seen by the Pamphleteers of the Reformation Era," Transactions of the American Philosophical Society LVIII/9 (1958).
13. Probably the best source on Turkish relations with Europe is Dorothy M. Vaughan, Europe and the Turk—A Pattern of Alliances 1350-1700, Liverpool 1954.

14. Ibid., pp. 106-7.
15. See L. B. Baumer, "England, the Turk, and the Common Corps of Christendom," American Historical Review (October 1944): 26-48; S. A. Fischer Galati, The Turkish Impact on the German Reformation 1520-1555, Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1949; K. M. Setton, "Lutheranism and the Turkish Peril," Balkan Studies III (1962): 133-66 and "Leo X and the Turks," Proceedings of the American Phil. Society CXIII (1969): 367-424.
16. S. A. Skilliter, William Harborne and the Trade with Turkey 1578-1583, Oxford 1977.
17. Quoted by Beck, p. 31.
18. Ibid., p. 32.
19. Halil Inalcik, "The Turkish Impact on the Development of Modern Europe," The Ottoman State and Its Place in World History (Kemal H. Karpat, ed.), Leiden 1974, p. 53.
20. Richard Knolles' The General Historie of the Turks... (the full title is very long), though written in the Elizabethan period (probably around 1580) was published much later (1605) and went rapidly through several editions; the fifth edition was published in London in 1638. It served as a basis for other writers who provided information for additional years. For instance, Paul Rycaut, consul in Izmir, brought Knolles' history to 1687. See also O. Ghiselin Busbecq, The Turkish Letters of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq (E. S. Forster, tr.), Oxford 1968.
21. For information see Vaughan, op. cit. See also Daniel, op. cit., passim.
22. There were frequent embassies between Vienna and Istanbul. For instance, a Turkish embassy visited Vienna in 1615 and agreed to revise the Zsitva-Torok Treaty of 1606 and allowed the Jesuits to build churches in the Ottoman Empire. The reciprocal Jesuit embassy came to Istanbul the next year and carried banners displaying the crucified Christ and caused a huge popular reaction.
23. See Stanford and Ezel Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, New York 1977, p. 134.
24. For an extensive discussion of five types of nations and nationalisms in Europe see Liah Greenfield, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, Cambridge 1992.
25. The literature on the reform movement is abundant and well known; it also is repetitive. For a relatively new approach see Cyril E. Black and L. Carl Brown (eds.), Modernization in the Middle East: The Ottoman Empire and its Afro-Asian Successors, Princeton 1992.
26. It is obvious that Canning had his history wrong. The original Ottoman state was at the beginning an enterprise of freemen whose faith was a "frontier Islam," that is, the folk religion of mystic brotherhoods which were in fact truly civil associations of free individuals. The popular tarikats preserved this characteristic throughout the duration of the Ottoman Empire and were periodically persecuted, closed, and their leaders jailed by the central government—both in Ottoman and Republican times—for being opposed to the government. It was the government which took control and used religion for its own purposes. The practice continues in today's Turkey.
27. The provisions of this treaty are treated at length by R. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, Princeton 1962.
28. The well-known Ottoman historian Ahmed Cevdet provides an excellent description of this change of mind towards Europe. He even gives a personal example of this extraordinary love for

everything European: he states that the high-ranking Ottoman families abandoned the three-legged, several-inches-tall traditional "sofra" and adopted French-style dining tables. The historian borrowed money to buy a table and make peace with his demanding wife. Tezakir 1-12 (prep. Cavid Baysun), Ankara 1986.

29. W. Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, 1871-1890, 2nd ed., New York 1950, and D. Harris, A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878, Stanford, California 1968.

30. Quoted by L. S. Stavrianos, The Balkans Since 1453, New York 1958, 404.

31. R. Shannon, Gladstone and the Bulgarian Agitation 1876, London 1963; David Harris, Britain and the Bulgarian Horrors of 1876, Chicago 1939.

32. W. Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After, London 1938.

33. Even the Slavophile R. W. Seton-Watson, despite his well-known dislike of the Turks, could write that "the Bulgarian atrocities became what they never ought to or need have become—a burning issue between the two great parties in the state...issues of foreign policy came to be considered not on their merits, but from the angle of party prejudice and with a passion and bias such as is almost unequalled in our history since the days of Queen Anne." Disraeli, Gladstone and the Eastern Question: A Study in Diplomacy and Party Politics, London 1935, p. 57.

34. These views are found in various versions of the sultans Hatirat (Memoirs), which have been reviewed critically in a forthcoming study.

35. Ahmed Cevdet paşa, the great historian, could not hide his indignation that money played such a great role in European life. In one of his memoranda to Abdülhamid he wrote that the "real religion of the English was money." This negative Ottoman image of Europe as a materialistic civilization was reinforced by other historical memories. Greeks remembered that Andronikus, the Byzantine ruler who had gone to Florence in 1439 to seek unity in the name of a common Christian faith, was jailed by some merchants because of some old debts. The Turks also remembered that prince Cem, the brilliant poet and son of Mehmed the Conqueror, was sent by the Knights of Rhodes, where he had sought refuge, to Rome, where he lived in captivity for a long time and was finally was poisoned in order to prevent his capture—and exploitation—by the French. During his long stay in Rome, his brother, Sultan Beyazid II (1481-1512) paid 100,000 ducats annually to Cem's captors so that he would not be released and therefore able to start a revolt against his brother.

36. Oscar S. Straus, Under Four Administrations, From Cleveland to Taft (Boston and New York 1920), p. 46.

37. From 1820-76 a total of 3,185 books were published in the Ottoman Empire. Of these, a total of 1,356 were in literature, 902 in the positive sciences, 741 in religion, and 186 dealing with government matters. During Abdülhamid's 32-year reign (1876-1908), a total of 9,124 books were published; 2,950 in literature, 3,891 in the positive sciences, 1,307 in religion, and 976 in official issues. See Orhan Goloğlu, Abdülhamid Gerçeği, Istanbul 1990, p. 406.

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Turkey and the West Since World War II

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The relationship between Turkey and the West since World War II is enormously complicated and requires a much more extensive and wide-ranging perspective than that permitted in this short essay. Turkey's internal politics, however, as well as its relationship with the European Community, are the subject of other chapters and will be covered by Ilkay Sunar and Heinz Kramer. This makes it possible to address these issues, but to focus primarily on the most fundamental aspect of Turkey's relationship with the West in the post World War II era, which has essentially been rooted in mutual security concerns. Because the most significant partner for Turkey in its security relationship with the West was the United States, this chapter will examine the geopolitics of that security relationship from the beginning to the end of the Cold War, identifying the crucial benchmarks, and elaborating upon the assumptions--both implicit and explicit--that undergirded the relationship. Finally, it will attempt to identify the emerging forces that, in the aftermath of the Cold War, have modified Turkey's geopolitical imperatives; it will also discuss the extent to which these forces--which both draw Turkey to, and threaten to separate it from, the West--provide a useful framework for thinking about the question of Turkey's international role in the post-Cold War world.

At the end of World War II, Stalin's attempts to acquire the Turkish Straits, his support for Georgian and Armenian irredentism in Kars and Ardahan, and Soviet pressure on Turkey to accommodate Soviet desires, all had a profound effect on Turkish-American relations.¹ In spite of Soviet attempts to distort the record of Soviet relations with Turkey, former Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs give some indication of what may have motivated Stalin's policies toward Turkey. According to Khrushchev, Lavrenti Beria, head of Stalin's huge police network, and, like Stalin, a Georgian, teased and goaded Stalin into demanding the return of Turkish territories that briefly (from 1878-1921) had been part of Georgia (it was Stalin who negotiated the Soviet border with Turkey in 1921). Beria's argument was that Turkey was weakened diplomatically by World War II and would be unable to resist such demands. As Khrushchev acknowledges, Beria and Stalin "succeeded in frightening the Turks right into the open arms of the Americans."²

During the crisis over Turkey in August 1946, in what he considered to be his most important decision since the decision to bomb Hiroshima a year before, President Truman concluded that it was in the vital interest of the United States that the Soviet Union, neither by force nor the threat of force, obtain control over Turkey. He decided, therefore, that the United States must resist with all means at its disposal, including American arms, any Soviet aggression against Turkey.³

This key decision on Turkey resulted in the reformulation of U.S. policies not only towards Turkey, but toward Iran and Greece as well.⁴ It also led to the establishment of what later became the U.S. Sixth Fleet, and in the wake of Britain's withdrawal from the region, to a clear recognition within the highest circles of the U.S. Government that the United States had undertaken an unprecedented commitment to maintain the balance of power in the Near East. US policy was publicly articulated by the president in March 1947 (a month after after the British, who had been informed of the August 1946 decision, had made the decision to withdraw their forces from Greece and Turkey). What was not understood at the time the Truman Doctrine was enunciated was what that commitment meant in practice.

The Turks, in the face of a prolonged Soviet war of nerves, and suffering from the enormous cost of continued mobilization, repeatedly sought unequivocal support that had more substance than the rhetoric of the Truman Doctrine. The primary mission of Turkey's large standing army at this time was to deter aggression. Turkey's mobilization plan, according to General Omar Bradley, was not complicated: "Everyone turns out to fight, and that is all the plan amounts to."⁵ Turkey's determination to deploy its army, if necessary, suggested that its defeat could be realized only through a costly war. This was something that was recognized by the Nazis and the Soviets during World War II. The early post-war years had made clear to the Turks, however, that the Soviets had other means short of war by which to achieve

their ends. As a result, Turkey's postwar ambassadors to the US made repeated representations regarding the provision of a U.S. guarantee to Turkey's security in order that the Soviet Union not misjudge the situation.

The United States, however, confronted with competing priorities, had been forced to turn its immediate attention away from the balance of power in the Near East and toward the problem of restoring the balance of power in Europe (via the Marshall Plan and NATO). Hence, while US officials continued to regard Turkey as critical to U.S. security interests, they put Turkey on a back burner until the balance of power in Europe had been restored. Subsequently, as these officials attempted to cope with the Soviet acquisition of atomic weapons and pondered over what to do about the victory of the People's Republic of China, the question that remained was how far they should go in accepting their new responsibilities in the Near East. One answer, provided by the Deputy Chiefs of Staff in January 1950, was that U.S. military/strategic interests in the area were now viewed as almost negligible in light of interests in other areas. Major General Lyman Lemnitzer, Director of the Office of Military Assistance in the Department of Defense, and later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, confirmed the trend in the thinking of the Joint Chiefs. The importance of the area had not changed, he explained; simply put, higher priorities in other areas made it impossible to devote any substantial portion of the U.S.'s limited resources to the region.⁶

The North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950 raised anew the question of Turkey's strategic importance.⁷ British plans in the region during this time were to concentrate on the defense of what they called the Middle East's "inner core," or "inner ring," centered in and about the 38,000-man garrison at Suez. Available forces made defense of the "outer ring"--a line running from the Mediterranean coast above Selifke in Turkey, along the Taurus Mountains and the rim of the Turkish plateau to Lake Van, and then along the arc of the Zagros Mountains to Bandar Abbas at the Strait of Hormuz in Iran--extremely difficult. The United States, in the event of an attack on Turkey, was prepared to deploy what were referred to as "available" forces.⁸ The fact was that the United States was not in a position to deploy much of anything. Its armed forces, numbering twelve million in 1945, had been cut to three million in 1946, and to 1.6 million by 1947. This problem would be remedied within a year, as the U.S. defense budget, which had been reduced to \$13 billion before the Korean War, shot up to \$50 billion.

In the interim, the Turks committed a combat brigade to the war in Korea. The Turkish combat commitment,⁹ while symbolic of Turkish support for the principle of collective security, a concrete indication of Turkey's solidarity with the United States, and a clear demonstration of its potential contribution to NATO, was motivated by a desire for admission to NATO, and for a security guarantee from the U.S.--just as it its abadonment of

one-party rule in the early post-war years was motivated in part by a desire to underscore its allegiance to the West. The Turks did not come begging, however. What they had to offer in exchange for a security guarantee was a strategic role in the defense of Europe that was only gradually coming to be appreciated. Their plans, at this time, in the event of a Soviet attack, envisaged a delaying action in Thrace, withdrawal to Anatolia, and successive delaying actions in the mountains back behind the "outer ring" to Iskenderun in the Southeast. The potential deterrent value to NATO of Turkey's role was far more significant than these preparedness measures might suggest. That role, however, would take time to be worked out.

Among the factors that increased Turkey's strategic importance to the West at this time, and indeed made it vital, was that the Middle East was supplying 75% - 80% of all European oil requirements. The region's proven reserves--estimated in 1950 to be approximately 40 billion barrels--were equal to those of the rest of the world, and were almost double those of the United States. If "probable" or "possible" reserves were taken into account, estimates approached 150 billion barrels. Denial of Middle East oil, it was recognized, would seriously jeopardize the ERP. But while "vital" was applied freely to the region in planning, in practice the U.S. seemed to question whether a large part of it could be defended.

The Turks, meanwhile, as NATO took shape, saw themselves as even more threatened than the NATO countries and less able to

protect themselves. Because they were not protected by a treaty, they were concerned that the Soviets might be tempted to repeat their previous pressures.

Within the United States, there were serious differences over the value of Turkey's role in an alliance. Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, saw Turkey and Greece not only as the northern flank of the Mediterranean, but also as tied to the problem of Western Europe as well. Previously, Sherman observed, the United States had thought of the two countries in a Middle Eastern context; the current situation required that they be re-grouped as an entity, and not always linked up with the Middle East. Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins, on the other hand, saw Turkey as part of the Middle East and therefore a British responsibility. His concern was to encourage the Commonwealth to do more for the Middle East. The United States was kidding itself, he asserted, if it did anything that indicated it was going to put forces in the area. From the standpoint of the Turkish Army, he noted, Turkey was a part of the Middle East. In the event of trouble, it would have to pull out of European Turkey almost at once, falling back to Southeastern Turkey. He acknowledged that the Turks could fight and be of considerable help, but his focus was on Western Europe --"First, last, and always."¹⁰

Whether Turkey should have been viewed in a Middle Eastern context, or in a European context, or both, presented serious command problems. It would be the subject of extended debate.

The fact that proponents of one or another argument often reflected a bureaucratic perspective in no way diminished the sincerity of their convictions. When the Korean War expanded the US defense budget fourfold, difficult choices between these two groups were no longer required and categorical conceptions of Turkey's geographical locus were no longer necessary or useful. The debate would not be resolved; rather, the economic framework which constrained it--the U.S. defense budget--would be changed by the Korean War. Once the defense budget had been increased, the decision was much easier, and in the final analysis, it was General Eisenhower, in his role of Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, who would determine Turkey's role and the relationship between Turkey and the West in Allied thinking.

While Eisenhower's developing conception of the relationship between Turkey and the West would take time, and would be complicated by difficult bureaucratic and political problems, his strategic conception of the defense of Europe, outlined for President Truman in January 1951, gave some indication of the role he envisaged for Turkey. Europe, Eisenhower told Truman, was shaped like a long bottleneck with Russia the wide part of the bottle, Western Europe the neck, and Spain the end of the bottle. The West controlled bodies of water (the North Sea and the Mediterranean) on either side of the bottle, and had land on the far side of the water (England and North Africa) good for bases. The West had to rely on land forces in the center, and apply great air and sea power on both flanks. As far as the

Mediterranean was concerned, this meant giving arms to Turkey and Yugoslavia, and supporting them with a great fleet of air and sea power. If the Russians tried to move ahead in the center, he would hit them awfully hard from both flanks, allowing the center to hold and forcing the Russians to pull back.¹¹

Up until this time Turkey had been seen as the only country in the Eastern Mediterranean capable of sustained resistance to the Soviets. It constituted a deterrent to Soviet aggression and provided something of a protective screen for the region. Loss of Turkey to the Soviet Union, it was recognized, would give the Soviets a valuable strategic position in the region, and threaten not only Western oil interests in the Persian Gulf, but Europe's economic viability as well. What was new in Eisenhower's developing conception, which favored the perceptions of the Air Force and Navy over the Army, was the conviction of a mutuality of benefits in the Turkish-American relationship.

For the United States to obtain Turkey's full cooperation in international security issues, or to assure its cobelligerence in the event of an attack on Europe, a U.S. security commitment was required. If the Soviets attacked Iran, and Turkey remained neutral, the Soviet right flank would be protected. If Bulgaria attacked Greece, Turkey would not oppose Bulgaria unless intervention was dictated by the requirements of a larger security framework that included the United States. A U.S. security commitment was also necessary to secure access to Turkey's valuable bases, and to close the Straits. Without a

security commitment from the United States, there was a concern that Turkey would drift toward neutrality, as it had in World War II, and as Iran appeared to be doing under Mossadeq (who had become prime minister in April 1951).

If Turkey drifted toward neutrality, officials reasoned, the United States and Western Europe would lose the assistance of a potentially useful ally. As a member of NATO, on the other hand, Turkey would be important to SACEUR--both as a deterrent to a Soviet attack on either Europe or the Middle East and as a threat to the Soviet Union's Southern Flank. If the region's military potential were integrated in a security framework, the Soviet Union would have to commit significant forces to protect its Southern Flank and its vital oil fields around Baku. These were some of the reasons why, in May 1951, President Truman decided that the United States should press for the inclusion of Turkey and Greece as full members of NATO.¹² In September 1951 the NATO Council unanimously voted to extend invitations to Turkey and Greece, and in February 1952 the two countries were formally admitted to full membership in NATO.

In looking at the early years of the post-war Turkish American relationship, I would argue that one of the requirements that had to be met before the United States and Turkey could become allies was a sense of reciprocity. A conviction that there were mutual benefits in such an alliance were necessary to make credible and, therefore, possible, the mutual obligations that were essential if the alliance were to endure. By the

early 1950's this requirement had been met and Turkey was able to join NATO. The United States felt that it needed this commitment and so did the Turks, whom experience had taught the value of a credible deterrent. They had, moreover, something to contribute. As President Celal Bayar told Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee, Turkey "wants to give a guarantee, and it would like to receive a guarantee."¹³

Stalin, Ankara knew, harbored little love for the Turks. That there was substance to Turkish concerns is evident not only in his actions in the early postwar years, but in his successors' mea culpa less than three months after his demise. In a May 30, 1953 note, the Soviets informed the Turks that the governments of Armenia and Georgia had renounced their territorial claims against Turkey; they also stated that, after reconsidering the question of the Straits, they believed Soviet security could be assured by conditions acceptable to Turkey--an unusual public retraction and tacit admission of Stalin's past sins.¹⁴ By then, however, Turkey was a member of NATO, and Soviet attempts to alter Turkey's alliance relationship fell on deaf ears.

The process of thinking seriously about the defense of Europe and the incorporation of Turkey into that process, meanwhile, if it had been necessitated by geopolitical factors, was facilitated by Turkey's strong desire to acquire an explicit security commitment and by its willingness to reciprocate for that commitment by making an important contribution to Europe's defense. U.S. support for Turkey and for the balance of power in

the Near East, to put it another way, was reciprocated by Turkish support for the balance of power in Europe. If Turkey were part of the outer "ring" of concentric circles whose locus was at Suez, it was also a part of the southern flank of a front whose center was in Western Europe; the two were interconnected and Turkey was the linchpin.

Under the Eisenhower administration, assumptions that undergirded Turkey's accession to NATO were reinforced and Turkey's role in US defense policy was strengthened. In 1955 Turkey joined the Western sponsored Baghdad Pact and, in the aftermath of the Suez crisis, joined CENTO. High-altitude U-2's were stationed at Incirlik air base near Adana beginning in 1956 and important electronic installations for gaining information from the Soviet Union were set up along the Black Sea. In accordance with an agreement reached in 1957, the United States stationed American strike aircraft equipped with tactical nuclear weapons in Turkey. Turkey granted extensive military facilities to the United States and made it possible to extend US capabilities to mount effective air strikes against the Soviet Union.¹⁵ Turkish bases were potentially useful for contingencies in the Middle East and were used by US forces (who notified rather than consulted with Turkish authorities about their plans)¹⁶ as a staging area for the crisis in Lebanon in 1958.

During the Eisenhower administration, military assistance averaged approximately \$200 million a year.¹⁷ In 1951, when he was SACEUR, General Eisenhower had underscored Turkey's strategic

value and advocated giving arms to the Turks in a briefing for President Truman and his cabinet. Four years later, as President, Eisenhower pointed out to Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey that it was still better and cheaper to assist the Turks to build up their own armed forces than to create additional US divisions. Economic assistance to Turkey, he believed, was the best possible way to buttress US security interests in the Near East.¹⁸ These thoughts were echoed by his cabinet. When we go to the Hill on defense matters, Secretary of State Dulless told the Turkish Ambassador Feridun Erkin in 1955, "Turkey is our No. 1 exhibit."¹⁹

When Sputnik dramatized the Soviet long-range missile threat to the United States in October 1957, the United States effected a decision at the NATO Heads of Government Meeting in December (attended by the Prime Minister of Turkey who participated in the decision) to deploy missiles and stocks of nuclear warheads on the continent in order to respond to what the Eisenhower administration perceived was a potential loss of confidence in the US commitment to Europe. General Norstad, as SACEUR, determined the siting requirements--a euphemism, apparently, for finding countries that would accept the missiles. While most members of the alliance were reluctant to take on this additional burden, the Turks were not--in spite of strong opposition to their stand by the Soviet Union.²⁰

In October 1959 the United States and Turkey reached agreement on the deployment of a squadron of Jupiter missiles,

although they agreed to make no public comment. The almost two-year delay in reaching an agreement apparently was due to the complicated details involved.²¹ By the end of 1959 the Turks had selected the fields for their deployment outside of Izmir and the Turkish Foreign Minister Fetin Zorlu, who in December expressed his appreciation to Eisenhower for the Jupiters, looked forward to getting them up as soon as possible.²² The missiles were not installed until the Fall of 1961, apparently became operational in July 1962,²³ and were formally handed over to the Turks only on October 22, 1962, in the midst of the Cuban missile crisis.²⁴ The missiles, which were owned by Turkey, were under the operational control of SACEUR, who could make the decision to use them only with the agreement of the Turkish and US governments--the United States retained custody of the warheads. The delay in deployment was due to the technical complexities of the problem, to the specialized training that was necessary before the Turks could man the missiles,²⁵ and to the fact that the Jupiters were already obsolete before they were deployed; hence, they were the subject of second thoughts on the part of both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.

John McCone, then Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, visited the Turkish bases in the Fall of 1960 with a subcommittee of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and recommended to President Eisenhower that the Jupiters be removed from Turkey and replaced with Polaris submarines, but administration officials felt that the Turks would resist.²⁶ In April 1961 President

Kennedy asked for a review of the Jupiter deployment to Turkey.²⁷ In June, a response drafted by George McGhee, Chairman of the Policy Planning Council and former US Ambassador to Turkey, concluded (with General Norstad's concurrence), that cancellation of the deployment might be seen as a sign of weakness in the aftermath of Khrushchev's hardline position at Vienna. When Secretary of State Rusk had discussed the matter with the Turkish Foreign Minister Sarper at a CENTO meeting (in April 1961), McGhee observed, the latter reacted very negatively. McGhee saw any attempt to persuade the Turks to abandon the project as unlikely to succeed because General Norstad himself, in discussing the matter with Sarper, had emphasized their military importance.²⁸

The Jupiter missiles were liquid-fueled (hence slow in their reaction time), "soft" in their configuration, and therefore vulnerable. As such they were obsolete relative to submarine-based Polaris missiles that were solid-fueled, mobile, and therefore relatively invulnerable. But while they have been disparaged, particularly in retrospect, by former officials such as Dean Rusk who assert that Turkish motorists could strike them with a BB-gun or a .22 caliber rifle and that they were so out of date the US could not be certain which way they would fly,²⁹ they were thought by some administration officials at the time, including General Norstad and Secretary of State Rusk himself, to be a significant military asset. Eighty percent of the missiles were maintained in a state ready for deployment on short warning,

Rusk observed in a memo to the president shortly after the crisis. This meant that tactical warning of a Soviet attack would permit the Turks to launch twelve of their fifteen 1.45 megaton warheads at targets inside a 1,500 mile radius within 15 minutes. The three squadrons of Jupiters (two in Italy and one in Turkey), moreover, were targetted on over one third (45 of 129) of the Soviet MRBM-IRBM sites facing Europe. Of significance to the rest of their NATO allies in Europe was the presumption that Turkey and Italy would divert Soviet missiles otherwise aimed at other targets in Western Europe.³⁰

The Turkish attraction to the missiles, US Ambassador to NATO Thomas Finletter observed, was that, whatever the custodial arrangement, the Turks felt more assured by a weapon on their own territory and somewhat in their own hands. Even if they didn't control the warheads and the missiles were subject to a dual key arrangement, it was important from their point of view that they could participate in the process and share control. The Turks saw the Jupiters as symbols of the alliance's determination to use atomic weapons against a Soviet attack on Turkey--this, Finletter asserted, was "a fixed GOT view"--and hence they saw them as symbols of the US commitment to deter such an attack.³¹ As Robert Komer observed in a memo to McGeorge Bundy about their removal shortly after the crisis, "I fear that in looking at the JUPITER question we may be far too rational and logical about a problem which is really high in subjective emotional content. McNamara knows the JUPITERS are of no military value. But the

Turks, Italians, and others don't--and that's the whole point."³²

Given Turkish perceptions, and in spite of the rational arguments for not deploying Jupiters in Turkey, the missiles **had** been deployed. Their removal during the Cuban missile crisis, were it necessary, presented the Kennedy administration with even greater problems than reversing the earlier decision because of the conclusions that the Turks, NATO allies, and adversaries might draw. It was not enough to say that such weapons invited attack and held the US hostage in major crises; that their removal would enhance national security, and strengthen deterrence; that removal had been proposed earlier and would have been effected sooner or later anyway, and that it could contribute to a face-saving solution to the crisis.

As administration officials knew, it was the United States who had sold the Turks on the military value of the missiles, and the Turkish parliament had only recently appropriated money for their deployment. The Soviet ambassador to Turkey had told the Turks that a nuclear war was on their doorstep.³³ Under these circumstances, to withdraw the missiles under pressure risked creating the impression that the US move was a sell-out, a bargain at Turkey's expense, a weakening of Europe's defenses to remove a threat in the Western Hemisphere. Withdrawal could establish a precedent for other concessions and raise profound questions about the credibility of the US commitment to deter Soviet adventures in Europe. At the very least, US officials recognized, the Jupiters would have to be replaced by hardened

land-based nuclear missiles, a seaborne nuclear force, or substantial economic and military assistance.³⁴

It is not the purpose of this essay to discuss the origins of or possible explanations for Khrushchev's Turkish missile trade proposal on October 27, 1962, or to examine the negotiating strategies involving the missiles in Turkey that the Kennedy administration considered during the Cuban missile crisis. These questions have been addressed in some detail elsewhere.³⁵

The role of Turkey's Jupiter missiles in the Cuban missile crisis clearly was central, however limited our understanding of some aspects of the crisis may be. Even today, as two scholars have recently observed, "It is clear that the full story of the technical status of the Jupiters has yet to surface."³⁶ Beyond technical details, it seems clear that the Jupiters were far less important in and of themselves than the fact that they were perceived as important by the Turks. US officials were less worried about their military value than they were about their psychological value: how the decision to remove them would be interpreted by allies such as Turkey, the assessments that adversaries such as the Soviets would make of that decision, and the affect of the decision on our allies's beliefs in the US commitment to deter a Soviet attack. To the extent that the Jupiters invited attack and were obsolete by the time they were installed, and to the extent that assurances regarding their removal were consistent with strategic plans, strengthened deterrence, and in no way compromised Turkish trust in the United

States, their removal appears to have been a wise decision. What happened--however one chooses to characterize the understanding that was reached--permitted the United States to assert that in fact there had been no deal and allowed Khrushchev not only to avoid complete humiliation but also to argue (at least within the Kremlin) that the Soviets had in fact achieved some concrete gains. Private understandings sometimes permit such felicitous interpretations. Defusing a difficult situation was imperative, and while the Jupiters were important enough to deploy (at least at the time that the decision was taken), they were not so important as to stand in the way of resolving a confrontation they were designed to deter in the first place.

In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, a seed of doubt about NATO commitments was planted among the Turks, who began to appreciate the fact that possession of particular weapons systems, while providing certain assurances and addressing some of their security needs, could also make them a target and render them vulnerable to decisions that were made in Washington. From now on they would be far more sensitive to the possibility that the alliance could pull them into a crisis that was of no direct concern to them. These concerns were widely discussed in the Turkish press, where assumptions about Turkish foreign policy, more freely questioned in the aftermath of the 1960 revolution, had an impact on official attitudes. With the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles from Turkey, Ankara's importance in US nuclear strategies diminished and an impediment

to Turkey's better relations with Moscow was removed. Official visits were exchanged with the Soviet Union, and improved Turkish-USSR relations slowly followed.³⁷ This does not mean that US-Turkish relations immediately deteriorated. In fact, when President Kennedy was assassinated in November 1963, public places of entertainment were closed, a street was named after him, and there was an outpouring of sympathy for him in Turkey.³⁸ What really complicated US-Turkish relations in subsequent years was not the Cuban missile crisis, but the Cyprus crisis that began in late 1963, **after** the death of President Kennedy.

In Turkish eyes, the culprit in the Cyprus crisis was President Johnson, who warned Prime Minister Inonu in a June 1964 letter that he should not use any US supplied equipment to invade Cyprus. In that letter, Johnson called into question US obligations under NATO if Turkey took a step that resulted in Soviet intervention. This so-called "Johnson letter," as it was being drafted by Dean Rusk (with the assistance of Harland Cleveland and Joseph Sisco), was described at the time by Under Secretary of State George Ball as "the most brutal diplomatic note I have ever seen," and produced what he subsequently characterized as "the diplomatic equivalent of a time bomb."³⁹ The extent to which Rusk's willingness to draft such a harsh letter was influenced by his having been overly concerned about the Turkish reaction to the withdrawal of Jupiter missiles during the Cuban missile crisis is an interesting if unanswerable historical question. It is fair to say, however, that after the

Cyprus crisis of 1963-64, US-Turkish relations were clearly less tied to the axioms and enforced solidarity of the early post-war years.⁴⁰ A clear example of this shift can be found in the statements of Prime Minister Inonu, who as late as August 1963 could deny that any "deals" had been made on the question of Soviet missiles in Cuba, but who by January 1970 was complaining that a bargain had been made and the Turks never notified.⁴¹

Historical judgments are extraordinarily complicated, since the past requires time to play out before one can make informed judgments. How something turns out matters. History, moreover, has no control groups, and one cannot replay it under different scenarios. It is also fair to say now that with the Cuban missile crisis, the Cold War reached a critical turning point. From Khrushchev's point of view, the "agreement" to remove Jupiter missiles "was primarily of moral significance...Kennedy recognized that the time had passed when you could solve conflicts with the USSR by military means."⁴² Kennedy could have said much the same about Khrushchev. Common interests were more easily perceived, and rapprochement between East and West became possible although it would take almost 30 years before the Cold War would end. As the Cold War turned the corner, doubts about the US commitment to Turkey, first generated by the Cuban missile crisis and reinforced by the Johnson letter, however problematical at the time, did not destroy the US-Turkish alliance. Rather, they produced a Turkish response to the emerging international situation that was desirable if not

inevitable: a more realistic assessment of Turkey's problems and a more independent, multifaceted conception of its options than had been possible in the early Cold War years. Such a conception was encouraged by Soviet President Podgorny, whose visit to Turkey in January 1965 picked up on an earlier theme sounded by Stalin's successors; this time, Soviet apologies found a far more receptive audience.

On January 5, 1965, Podgorny told the Turkish Grand National Assembly that a shadow had been cast over Turkish-Soviet relations for some time after World War II, and acknowledged that inappropriate and incorrect statements made in the Soviet Union had played a negative part. The Soviet Union, he noted, stated openly that those statements were not correct; such events should be a thing of the past.⁴³ Podgorny's comments came during the first visit to Turkey by a Soviet parliamentary delegation in more than 25 years. They were seen in Turkey as an indirect admission of Soviet responsibility for strains in relations with Turkey in the late 40's and 50's, and they paved the way for better relations between the two countries.

While the Turks continued to distrust the Soviets, their policies clearly were more flexible and less structured by the earlier assumptions of a bipolar world. Improvement in Turco-Soviet relations was marked by visits, principled agreements, and economic assistance, and complemented a diminishing level of grant assistance from the United States, which was increasingly mired in the war in Vietnam. Freedom from the ideological strait

jacket that had characterized early postwar policies resulted in a somewhat more independent international posture, as indicated, for example, by the decision in 1965 not to participate in the U.S.-sponsored proposal for a multilateral nuclear force in Europe.

The new balance that was evident in Turkish policy could be seen by comparison with earlier events. During the war in Lebanon in 1958, for example, the United States had used Turkish bases to support its intervention. Following events of the early 1960s, the Turks were more guarded about their use of Turkish facilities for non-NATO contingencies. During the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the United States was allowed to use communication stations in Turkey, but was not allowed to use Turkish bases for refueling or supply activities. In the course of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the United States was not allowed to use Turkish bases for direct combat or logistical support, although it was allowed to use communication stations in Turkey during the resupply effort. The United States was also allowed to use Turkish bases for the evacuation of American citizens during the Jordan Civil War in 1970 and the Iranian Revolution in 1979.

The Cyprus crisis in 1974, meanwhile, again tested mutual obligations and responsibilities. In July, Turkey occupied the island to protect the Turkish minority from the "Hellenic Republic of Cyprus"--led by an international terrorist, installed by a coup, backed by the military dictatorship in Athens, and bent on union with Greece. A second Turkish action

in August--to consolidate vulnerable positions according to the Turks, to expand their base according to the Greeks--precipitated the U.S. Congressional embargo on transfers of military equipment to Turkey (effective February 5, 1975), and resulted in a subsequent decision in Ankara to suspend US operations at the military installations in Turkey (as of July 26, 1975). These developments made explicit what had been implicit until then: access to facilities was directly related to decisions on military assistance. Blunt assessments of the problem called into question fundamental assumptions on both sides and forced discussion over the merits of continuing the special relationship.

In the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis (and the opening of Turkey's political system following the Constitution of 1961), Turkey's economic relations with the EEC markedly improved--particularly with Germany. The "Ankara Agreement" of 1963 associated Turkey with the EEC, while a supplementary agreement in 1971 provided for a transitional stage toward full integration in the EEC. Europe's economic growth created a demand for Turkish labor, eased unemployment in Turkey, and through remittances from Turkish workers eased foreign exchange shortages and balance of payments deficits. Turkish workers in Germany, which numbered 22,054 in 1963, doubled in 1964, again in 1965, again in 1969, again in 1971, and by 1973 numbered 528,474 workers whose remittances totalled 2.5 billion DM.⁴⁴

The oil crises of 1973-74 and 1978-79, however, and Turkey's lack of developed indigenous energy resources, caused Turkey's oil bill, which was only \$124 million in 1972, to rise to \$1.2 billion in 1977 and to \$3.86 billion in 1980.⁴⁵ High oil bills and a recession in Europe (which led to the halt of Turkey's labor migration), led Turkey to drain its foreign exchange reserves, to rely on state economic enterprises as a short-term solution to job creation, and to borrow on the short-term credit market--a set of policies that contributed to a vicious cycle of hyperinflation, stagnation, and huge balance of payments deficits that ultimately, proved unsustainable.⁴⁶

Relations between Ankara and Moscow, meanwhile, continued to improve. By 1978, the Soviet Union was aiding 44 different development projects in Turkey, and by the end of the decade Turkey received more Soviet economic assistance than any country in the third world except Cuba. If Prime Minister Ecevit could declare in May 1978 that Turkey felt "no threat" from the Soviet Union,⁴⁷ however, that statement required qualification, particularly in December 1979 after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (which worried the Turks far more than the fall of the Shah).

During the first Reagan Administration, relations between the US and Turkey improved markedly as the East-West conflict raised the specter of a new Cold War and appropriations for Turkey's defense needs correspondingly increased. Even under conservative estimates, U.S. assistance to Turkey in its various

forms throughout the 1980's amounted to well over \$1 billion a year.⁴⁸ But perceptions of the international balance of power began to change during the second Reagan administration as the result of a number of factors: the accession to power of General Secretary Gorbachev, the gradual thaw in US-Soviet relations, the impending Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the INF agreement. Under these circumstances, appropriations for Turkey's defense needs, while significant, became less urgent to the United States; Congressional committees, faced with serious budget constraints, were increasingly confronted with the problem of contracting their interests to meet available means or expanding current means to meet interests that no longer seemed as pressing as they had earlier.

During the Bush Administration, US-Soviet relations continued to improve following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union increasingly suggested that the threat previously posed by the Soviet Union had been fundamentally altered. In Turkey, meanwhile, anger over Congressional debate on the so-called Armenian resolution, which proposed a day of commemoration for the alleged genocide of 1.5 million Armenians by the Ottoman Empire, exacerbated US-Turkish relations. The source of Turkish concern, aside from a belief that judgments on the matter are best left to historians, was a concern that the resolution, if passed by the U.S. Congress, would give legitimacy to future claims by Armenians for compensation and territory in Turkey.

U.S. port visits and training missions were halted; restrictions were put on the modernization of facilities, and meetings on military cooperation were suspended. The cancellation of the US-Turkish Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement was threatened, and the US-Turkish relationship itself was called into question, before the resolution was narrowly defeated in early 1990--on the eve of the Gulf War and as the Cold War was drawing to a close.

The bottom line in the US-Turkish relationship during the Cold War was that when US-Soviet relations were troubled (as they had been in the late 1940's and 1950's, and as they were during periodic crises), relations between the United States and Turkey were generally good. Good relations were founded on U.S. military and economic assistance as well as a US guarantee of Turkey's security--a guarantee that served as a deterrent against a Soviet attack--in exchange for the use of Turkish facilities and bases, and an important Turkish role in the defense of the West.⁴⁹ But as US-Soviet relations improved, the US-Turkish relationship became more troubled as first one and then another party raised questions about the relationship and challenged the other's notion of their reciprocal obligations. This development was virtually inevitable after the relationship had achieved its primary goals and the threat that bound the allies together began to recede.

The Cuban missile crisis, in a sense, served as a catalyst for changes already underway and signalled the beginning of the

end of the Cold War. It legitimized a new generation of leaders in the United States and the Soviet Union who, learning from experience, were prepared to take steps necessary to reduce the potential for catastrophic conflict; it underscored both the challenges and opportunities provided by a more sober assessment of the new weapons systems at their disposal--an assessment that included a greater appreciation of their vulnerabilities and limitations as well as their potential for destruction.

The US-Turkish relationship was central to Western security in the early Cold War years and it was crucial to Turkey's survival. But as changes occurred, adaptive measures were necessary and even desirable. The demise of Stalin, the advent of Khrushchev and his campaign of de-Stalinization, the gradual acquisition of new weapons systems in the Soviet Union and the United States, and the gradual evolution of the international balance of power toward a rough parity--all contributed to a new climate of opinion in which thoughtful voices would articulate new points of view and help pave the way for a relaxation of tensions, Turkey's focus on the evolution of its own internal political problems, the ascendance of economic issues, and the more complicated international environment of the post-Cold War era. The road would not be smooth, and one could argue about the milestones, but the direction was clear.

Over 30 years ago, on February 19, 1963, Robert Komer, who would later become the US ambassador to Turkey, wrote Assistant

Secretary of State Phillips Talbot an insightful memo in which he noted:

"We have never really decided in our own minds whether to treat Turkey primarily as a NATO partner (whose main need was military aid for the defense of Europe) or as an underdeveloped country whose primary need was to become a going concern. As a result we have pursued both aims--and fully succeeded at neither. My own bias is well known: i.e., that the threat to US interests from Bloc aggression involving Turkey is less urgent than that arising from Turkey's failure to become a going concern...."

"Can we (and our European allies) afford to alter the proportions of our assistance sufficiently to get Turkey well on the road to self-sufficiency (except for the major hardware) over the next decade, without incurring unacceptable military risks? This, to me, is the nub of the problem and one on which we ought to make up our minds."⁵⁰

This observation characterized differences in official thinking about Turkey toward the end of the Eisenhower administration, as well as in the Kennedy administration, and it would continue to characterize differences among US officials who were unable to make up their minds on the question until the end of the Cold War, when Turkey could worry less about unacceptable military risks and begin to focus much more directly on the difficulties of becoming "a going concern."

Throughout this period, Turkey continued to play a crucial strategic role--albeit against what was in retrospect a

diminishing threat. It helped to deter a Soviet attack on NATO's central front because its forces posed a threat to Warsaw Pact forces in the Balkans and the Transcaucasus. If deterrence failed, it was believed that the potential threat from Turkey would impede Soviet capacity to reinforce the central front. Installations in Turkey, meanwhile, made it possible to detect, intercept and limit the projection of Soviet airpower into the Eastern Mediterranean. At sea, Turkish control of the Bosphorus blocked the projection of Soviet naval power into the Aegean. As for contingencies outside the European theater, Turkey's land mass and its bases deterred Soviet ambitions in the Persian Gulf. In their absence, Soviet support for and accessibility to such countries as Syria and Iraq would have been much more pervasive and potentially threatening to U.S. interests in the region and would have created serious problems for Israel. Finally, as NATO's only Muslim country, Turkey also provided a cultural bridge between Europe and the Middle East.

If Turkey's security relationship with the West was solidly grounded in mutual interests, its economic relationship, while increasingly significant in terms of trade, nevertheless ran into serious obstacles as Turkey sought integration into the world economy and attempted to contribute to the restructuring of a greater Europe--of which it increasingly aspired to be a part. The process of overcoming these obstacles began in 1980, when the Demirel government began to address some of Turkey's serious economic problems by introducing the first of a series of broad-

based economic stabilization measures under Turgut Ozal. Placing great reliance on market forces, subsequent Turkish governments eliminated subsidies to inefficient public-sector enterprises, curtailed imports, increased exports by devaluing the lira, cut oil consumption, introduced a tight monetary policy to limit inflation, and removed barriers to foreign investment. Over time these economic measures, while not all successful, would begin to turn around Turkey's economy. By 1987, they had tripled the export share in the GNP to 20.4%.⁵¹

In the 1980's, Turkey's exports rose from \$2.9 billion to \$11.7 billion. Exports to the EEC averaged 40% of total exports throughout the decade, with Germany by far the greatest recipient of Turkish exports--importing an average of 17.5% of total Turkish exports. By 1991, the EEC received over 50% of Turkish exports, of which Germany received over half, or over 25% of the total.⁵²

In 1987, meanwhile, Turkey applied for admission to the EC. With the decline of the Soviet Union, the EC began to give priority to economic and political concerns over NATO's military priorities, with the result that it was less responsive than it otherwise would have been to the Turks' application. The Turks, in turn, began to look to other mechanisms--and in particular to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation initiative--to help modernize their country.

Specific concerns addressed by the EC Commission in its 1989 decision to postpone consideration of Turkey's application were

Turkey's size, population, and substantially lower level of development than the European average, Purchasing power in Turkey was one-third that of the EC average, while the country suffered from high inflation rates and high unemployment. More than 50 percent of the labor force in Turkey was employed in agriculture, and the Community was concerned about the access of Turkish labor to the EC labor market at a time when unemployment was a problem for the 12 associated economies.⁵³

While the Turks saw the lack of a commitment to Turkey's entry as the denial of a right that it had earned through its commitment to the NATO alliance and a rejection of Turkey's commitment to Europe, they were not surprised. The government, putting on its best face, emphasized the report's affirmation of Turkey's qualification to become a full member and its call for a customs union between Turkey and the EC by 1995. Membership in the EC, Turks believed, would guarantee the continued westernization of their country and cement its identity in Europe. Rejection of Turkey's membership, President Ozal warned, would push Turkey away from Europe and encourage the spread of religious fundamentalism throughout the region. Islamic fundamentalists had never captured more than 10 percent of the vote in Turkey in recent years, but their cause clearly would be fueled by such rejection.

On the geopolitical level, meanwhile, as reduction of the Soviet military threat to Europe diminished Turkey's importance to the NATO alliance, Turkey's foreign policy began to reflect

changing realities. In Vienna in December 1989, Foreign Minister Mesut Yilmaz met with 17 Turkish ambassadors to examine the implications of better relations between East and West and construct a broad outline of future foreign policy. Turkey, the ministers concurred, should definitely stay in NATO, but establish closer ties with the East. If it was to be accepted as a member of the EC, it would have to take greater steps toward democracy and improve its human rights record. The ministers noted that while Turkey's strategic importance was lessened by East-West detente, it was not eliminated. Its geographical location would dictate its continuing strategic importance to the alliance. The major threat to Turkey, however, was no longer seen as coming from the North, but from the southeast.

The Gulf war corroborated the wisdom of Turkey's latest threat assessments. It also underscored its continuing (although changing) geopolitical influence. While the decline of the Soviet Union had diminished Turkey's role in NATO, it had enhanced Turkey's relative influence in the Persian Gulf region, where the end of the Cold War created an environment that was less stable. Turkey's contribution to the anti-Iraq coalition included: closing the Iraqi pipeline; allowing the allied coalition access to its military bases, from which Iraqi targets were bombed; and deploying the Turkish Army along the Iraqi border, which forced Iraq to deploy its troops to the north and raised the prospect of a two-front war. The crisis underscored once again the value to the United States of the U.S.-Turkish

alliance and corroborated estimates both within the Turkish government and the U.S. Department of Defense of Turkey's continuing--albeit, once again, changing--geopolitical importance.

With the end of the Cold War, meanwhile, both Turkey and the West are continuing to feel their way in the international environment that has emerged in its wake. Where notions of the balance of power after World War II were little changed from those which preceded it, the post-Cold War era already looks very different. The Soviet Union's demise has ended the stabilizing effect of a bipolar balance of power and unleashed numerous regional/ethnic conflicts. The world that evolved after World War II underscored the threat posed to Turkey by the Soviet Union and required that it undertake a mutual security arrangement with the West. The end of the Cold War, on the other hand, has diminished the threat posed by Russia, whose territory no longer borders Turkey, and has unleashed wars among Turkey's neighbors--in the Balkans, in the Caucasus, and in Iraq--none of which would have been likely during the Cold War and each of which has the potential to draw Turkey into bloody conflicts.⁵⁴

One of the best historians of the Cold War, John Gaddis, has noted that the rivalries of the Cold War have given way to a new contest: that between the forces of integration and fragmentation in the international environment.⁵⁵ On the one hand, political, economic, technological and cultural forces are breaking down barriers that have historically separated nations and peoples;

the logic of these forces, undergirded by support for the open market, suggests economic integration. These forces for integration are compelling to Turkey, which has actively sought to associate itself with them: the Western European Union; the European Community; the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region (which the Turks initiated); and the Economic Cooperation Organization, to name a few. Whether for security (the WEU and NATO), economic prosperity (the EC, the BSECR, and the ECO), or management of common environmental problems (the BSECR), such organizations promise to improve Turkey's lot.

On the other hand, forces such as religion, self-determination and nationalism are exacerbating old frictions and creating new barriers--in some cases where none existed. The logic of these forces suggests political fragmentation. Such forces are also gnawing at Turkey, threatening to undermine not only its aspirations for integration with the international economic community, but its very national identity. It is Gaddis' belief that the end of the Cold War has resulted not in an end to threats, but in the diffusion of them; that the problems nations will confront are more likely to arise not from the kinds of competing ideologies that existed during the Cold War, but from the competition between the forces of integration and fragmentation.⁵⁶ The contradiction between abandoning control of our economic lives (suggested by market theory) and taking control of our political lives (suggested by democratic theory) is profound; according to Gaddis, the fault line between the

forces of integration and fragmentation may be "as long, as deep, and as dangerous...[as] the one between democratic and authoritarian government that preoccupied us through so much of the twentieth century."⁵⁷

Whether or not Gaddis is right, it is clear that the new international environment that Turkey confronts is much more complicated and very different from that which it faced during the Cold War era, when the legacy of Ataturk reigned supreme. From the very beginning of the modern Turkish state, eliminating ethnic differences by fiat was a means to an end: creating the cohesion necessary for the modern Turkish state. Such cohesion, fostered through both persuasion and repression, helped to create a national identity that enabled Turkey to withstand threats to its territorial integrity and sovereignty in the years following Lausanne and throughout the Cold War.⁵⁸

In recent years Turkey has come into its own as a regional power. More secure about its identity, it has begun to address some of the existential problems that were submerged in the process of nation-building and to reconcile itself with its past. Where the immediate threat to Turkey's existence during the Cold War was geopolitical, those most prominent in the post-Cold War era are fundamentally different: cross-cutting forces that can be construed as being either integrating or fragmenting--pan-Islam, pan-Turkism, and Kurdish separatism and nationalism in its many manifestations.⁵⁹

Selim Deringil has argued that, since the disappearance of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey has had a recurring "identity crisis" that emerges in times of economic, social, and political strife, and recedes when Turkish elites feel sure of themselves and their future.⁶⁰ If that is the case, it is reasonable to assume that among the problems that Turkey currently confronts, the Kurdish problem will be the cause for a profound identity crisis. Even under the best of circumstances it would take a lot of self-confidence to deal constructively with such an enormous problem. The very act of addressing it will not only raise profound questions about Turkish identity; it will also severely challenge the self-confidence that is required to deal with the problem in the first place.

In coping with the so-called forces of integration and fragmentation--and we should be clear about the fact that the terms are no more than heuristic attempts to capture a number of complex trends that defy simplification--caution is clearly warranted. Jumping to conclusions that either one or the other is desirable, Gaddis argues, could be a mistake. Many might assume that any force for integration--the EC, for example--is a good thing. But forces for integration (the international markets in oil and armaments) were also what made possible the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. The logical consequence of a fully integrated world, to cite another example, could be the loss of national sovereignty and identity, submerging state autonomy within a larger economic order. The consequence of a

fragmented world, on the other hand--and the Kurdish question if badly managed could go in this direction--could be a state of virtual anarchy, shattering state authority. It is Gaddis' conclusion that instead of balancing states and ideologies, what must now be balanced are processes that tend toward integrationist and fragmentationist extremes; nations must weigh the advantages and disadvantages of these processes.⁶¹

The conflict between these two processes--and the object of their struggle is no less than the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation state--constitutes a fundamental challenge to the international state system. It means that individual countries must reassess who they are, the assumptions upon which they have been founded, and the mechanisms by which their citizens have organized themselves. In Europe and the United States, debates over the Maastricht Treaty and the North American Free Trade Agreement have raised precisely these questions. In the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, movements for self determination have led to the dissolution of those states, while the new "states" they have spawned must work out the question of whether or not, and if so the extent to which, they, too, must be further divided.

Such questions are not always so apocalyptic for every country. Nonetheless, the questions posed are very difficult and have no simple answers. In the United States, the question of secession, and the decision of the North to oppose it, led to a civil war--a war which, even 130 years later, did not totally

resolve some of the fundamental problems that contributed to it. The debate in the United States over NAFTA, as noted, has gone to the very heart of how we think of ourselves as a nation, the responsibilities and obligations of our leadership, and the relationships between our nation and the larger economic and political international order. Nation building isn't easy. Nation saving isn't either.

For Turkey, the problem of balancing processes that tend toward integrationist and fragmentationist extremes means supporting those that advance its general interests; opposing, modifying, or accommodating those that threaten its sovereignty or territorial integrity, and, where action is necessary, doing what has to be done to restore its equilibrium and make possible its ability to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War era. If in the past the basis for its relationship with the West was geopolitical, with common values being important but of secondary concern,⁶² the basis for the future will increasingly reverse the priority of these two factors. While the Turks have begun to explore their ties to the East with much greater energy and dynamism, their strategic and economic ties, and, ultimately, their common values with the West will remain fundamental.

1. For greater detail, see Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

2. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, Strobe Talbot, trans. and ed. (Boston: Little Brown, 1974), pp. 295-296.

3. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Vol. VII, pp. 840-842. Hereafter, the Foreign Relations series will be referred to as FRUS.

4. For the policy statements on Greece, Turkey, and Iran, see: FRUS, VII, pp. 240-245, 894-897, 529-536.

5. FRUS, 1951, V, p. 31. Parts of the following discussion draw on Bruce R. Kuniholm, "U.S. Policy in the Near East: The Triumphs and Tribulations of the Truman Administration," The Truman Presidency (Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and Cambridge University Press, 1989), Michael Lacey, ed., pp. 299-338; and Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Rings and Flanks: the Defense of the Middle East in the Early Cold War," The Cold War and Defence (New York: Praeger, 1990), Keith Neilsen and Ronald Haycock, eds., pp. 111-135.

6. FRUS, 1950, V, pp. 122-123.

7. For new light on the origins of this war, see the discussion in Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 3 (Fall 1993), Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars, Washington, D.C.

8. See, for example, FRUS, 1950, I, p. 387; for the problem of assessing "vital" interests, see FRUS, 1950, III, p. 1693, and 1951, V, pp. 10-11.

9. In the course of the Korean War, almost 30,000 Turks served in Korea, where approximately 10% suffered casualties, and where their actions led General Douglas MacArthur to characterize them as "the bravest of the brave."

10. FRUS, 1951, V, pp. 27-42.

11. FRUS, 1951, III, p. 454.

12. The relative strategic importance assigned to Turkey over Greece is indicated by NSC 109 (on Turkey) and NSC 103/1 (on Greece), which shows that in February, U.S. policy toward Greece did not include support for Greek membership in NATO; this policy was amended in May in light of the decision to press for Turkish membership in NATO.

13. FRUS, 1951, V, p. 470.

14. Ferenc Vali, Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1971), pp. 174-175. Vojtech Mastny suggests that Molotov was interested in improving relations in order to weaken the recently-concluded Balkan Pact.

15. Francis Powers, Operation Overflight (Tower: New York, 1970), p. 41; George Harris, "Turkey and the United States," in Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition: 1950--1974, Kemal Karpat et al. (E.J Brill: Leiden, 1975), p. 56; NSC 5708/2, June 29, 1957, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Vol. XXIV (USGPO: Washington, D.C.), pp. 720-721; and NSC 6015/1, "U.S. Policy Toward Turkey," October 5, 1960.

16. George Harris, Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971 (American Enterprise Institute: Washington, D.C., 1972), p. 67.

17. Financial Appendix to NSC 6015/1, "U.S. Policy Toward Turkey," October 5, 1960.

18. January 31, 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Vol. III, Part 1, p. 454; January 5, 1955, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Vol. XXIV, p. 608.

19. Ibid., p. 643

20. Memorandum from William Brubeck (Department of State) to McGeorge Bundy (The White House), "Jupiters in Italy and Turkey," Oct. 22, 1962, John F. Kennedy Library; State Department memorandum from William R. Tyler to Secretary Rusk, "Turkish and Jupiter IRBM's," Nov. 9, 1962; and memorandum from Secretary Rusk to President Kennedy, "Political and Military Considerations Bearing on Turkish and Italian IRBM's," November 9, 1962, Lyndon B. Johnson Library.

21. Ibid.; Department of State Telegram 1085 to American Embassy, Ankara, Oct. 7, 1959, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. Much of this section is drawn from a paper, "Turkey's Jupiter Missiles and their affect on U.S.-Turkish relations," presented at a conference sponsored by the European University in Florence in October 1992.

22. Memorandum of Conference with the President, December 6, 1959, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

23. Barton J. Bernstein, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiters in Turkey?" Political Science Quarterly Vol. 95, Number 1, Spring 1980, p. 100.

24. Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Brookings: Washington, D.C., 1987), p. 37.
25. George Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 92.
26. Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), Volume XV, Eighty-eighth Congress, First Session, 1963 (USGPO: Washington, D.C., 1987), p. 104.
27. National Security Action Memorandum No. 35, "Deployment of IRBM's to Turkey," April 6, 1961.
28. Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy from George McGhee, "The Turkish IRBM's," June 22, 1961. See also Raymond Hare, Oral History Interview, September 19, 1969, p. 22. John F. Kennedy Library.
29. David Welch and James G. Blight, "The Eleventh Hour of the Cuban Missile Crisis: An Introduction to the ExComm Transcripts," International Security (Winter 1987/88) 12:3, p. 17, n.36; Michael R. Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963 (Edward Burlingame Books: New York, 1991), p. 439.
30. See the Rusk memorandum, cited in fn. 20. See also the memo from William R. Tyler to Secretary Rusk, "Turkish and Italian IRBM's," November 9, 1962. As Welch and Blight observe in "The Eleventh Hour of the Cuban Missile Crisis," p. 18, "It is clear that the full story of the technical status of the Jupiters has yet to surface."
31. See State Department telegrams from Secretary Rusk to Thomas Finletter in Paris (2345) and Raymond Hare in Ankara (445), Oct. 24, 1962, and from Finletter to Secretary Rusk (Polto 506), October 25, 1962.
32. See memo from Robert Komer to McGeorge Bundy, November 12, 1962.
33. Ferenc Vali, Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey (Johns Hopkins: Baltimore, 1971), p. 129.
34. See, for example, the memorandum from Roger Hilsman, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to Secretary Rusk, October 27, 1962, John F. Kennedy Library; and the memorandum from Walt Rostow to McGeorge Bundy, "Turkish IRBM's," October 30, 1962, John F. Kennedy Library.
35. See, for example, McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (Random House: New York, 1988), pp. 428-439; and Bruce J. Allyn, James Blight, and David Welch, "Essence of Revision: Moscow, Havana, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," International Security (Winter, 1989/90),

Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 157-159, 163-165. See also "Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings, October 27, 1962," Presidential Recordings, President's Office Files, John F. Kennedy Library.

36. Welch and Blight, "The Eleventh Hour of the Cuban Missile Crisis," p. 18.

37. Harris, Troubled Alliance, pp. 93-95; and "Turkey and the United States," in Karpas et al., pp. 58-59.

38. Paul Hare, Diplomatic Chronicles, pp. 132-133.

39. George W. Ball, The Past has Another Pattern: Memoirs (W.W. Norton & Co.: New York, 1982), p. 350.

40. Much of the section that follows is drawn from Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Turkey and NATO: Past, Present, and Future," ORBIS, Summer 1983, pp. 421-445.

41. Harris, Troubled Alliance, p. 93n19.

42. Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, Jerold Schecter, trans. and ed. (Little, Brown and Co.: Boston, 1990), p. 179.

43. See the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily-Report, January 6, 1965, pp. M1-3, January 7, 1965, pp. M1-5, and January 11, 1965, pp. M1-4.

44. Z.Y. Hershlag, The Contemporary Turkish Economy (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 86; Tosun Aricanli and Dani Rodrik, The Political Economy of Turkey: Debt, Adjustment and Sustainability (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 231-232; Nermin Abadan-Unat, Turkish Workers in Europe, 1960-1975: A Socio-Economic Appraisal (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976), pp. 387-389.

45. Kuniholm, "Turkey and NATO: Past, Present, and Future," p. 430.

46. Aricanli, pp. 234-235; Bent Hansen, Egypt and Turkey: The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth (Oxford: Oxford University Press/The World Bank, 1991), p. 383.

47. See Bulent Ecevit's address to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, May 15, 1978, in Survival, Vol. 20, No. 5 (1978), pp. 203-208.

48. See Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Rhetoric or Reality in the Aegean: U.S. Policy Options toward Greece and Turkey," SAIS Review, Winter-Spring 1986/Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 137-157, especially the discussion on pp. 155-156.

49. For a detailed discussion of Turkey's strategic role in the defense of the West in the 1980's, see: Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Rhetoric or Reality in the Aegean: U.S. Policy Options toward Greece and Turkey," SAIS Review, Winter-Spring 1986/Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 137-157; and Bruce R. Kuniholm, "CDI in NATO, the Southern Flank, and Alliance Defense," in The Future of Conventional Defense Improvements in NATO (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1989), Steve Szabo, ed, pp. 263-286.

50. Memorandum for Phillips Talbot from Robert Komer, February 19, 1963.

51. Kuniholm, "Turkey and NATO: Past, Present, and Future," p. 431; Anne O. Krueger & Okan H. Aktan, Swimming Against the Tide: Turkish Trade Reform in the 1980s (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1992), pp. 148-149.

52. These figures are extrapolated from various OECD Economic Surveys.

53. Portions of this section are drawn from Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 2 (Spring 1991), pp. 34-48; and "After the Gulf War: Turkey and the East," in The Persian Gulf War: Views from the Social and Behavioral Sciences (University Press: Lanham, MD: 1993), Herbert H. Blumberg and Christopher C. French, eds., pp. 453-467.

54. Much of the discussion that follows is drawn from Bruce R. Kuniholm, "The Lausanne Conference and the Post Cold War Era," a paper presented at a conference sponsored by the Inonu Foundation in Istanbul in October 1993.

55. John Lewis Gaddis, "Toward the Post-Cold War World," Foreign Affairs, Spring 1991, Vol. 70, No. 2, pp. 103-122.

56. Ibid. See the discussion of some of these themes in President Clinton's address to the United Nations, September 27, 1993.

57. John Gaddis, "The Tragedy of Cold War History," Diplomatic History, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 1-16.

58. Eric Rouleau, "The Challenges to Turkey," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 5, November/December 1993, pp. 110-126.

59. For discussion of Pan-Islam and Pan-Turanism, see Bruce R. Kuniholm, "The Lausanne Conference and the Post-Cold War Era."

60. Selim Deringil, "Turkish Foreign Policy Since Ataturk," in Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects (Cambridgeshire, England: The Eothon Press, 1992) pp. 1-8.

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The Turkic and Other Muslim Peoples of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans

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The central Asian, Caucasus, and Balkan regions are distant geographically and distinct culturally. They are nonetheless related by shared historical legacies and by common contemporary problems. These regions form part of the great arc of Islamic civilization stretching from Africa and Europe across the heart of Asia. All experienced communist rule, and all have been victimized by considerable instability following the collapse of the Soviet and Yugoslav communist federations. The civil or inter-state wars in Tajikistan and Georgia, between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, and in former Yugoslavia have claimed hundreds of thousands of lives over the past several years, and in several cases show no sign of abating. Though the term "arc of crisis" that is sometimes used to describe the areas in question may be misleadingly broad, it is certainly not without any foundation.

The geographical and civilizational hub of these strife-torn regions is Turkey. In some cases links are historical, derived from centuries of common governance within the Ottoman empire. In some cases they are ethnic, resting upon the presence of indigenous Turkish minorities. In other cases they are linguistic and cultural, shaped by a common Turkic identity or by the context of Islam. Geopolitical concerns also attach Turkey to what are in most cases contiguous areas of considerable strategic importance. The Kemalist tradition demanded a pro-Western orientation in international policy and discouraged involvement in regions defined as peripheral to the main--European and American--focus of modern Turkey's aspirations. But events associated with or accompanying the end of the Cold war have enhanced Turkey's status as a regional power, complicated its policy agenda, and called many of the long-standing dogmas of Kemalist foreign policy into question. These events include the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of quasi-independent states in central Asia and the Caucasus as

a new field of interest for Turkish foreign policy, the Yugoslav implosion and the defeats suffered by the Muslim peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the partial isolation of Iran as a consequence of its Islamic revolution, and the effacement of Iraq's regional ambitions after its defeat in the 1990-1991 Gulf War. In central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans Turkey has discernable interests at stake, and would seem to be well-positioned to pursue them.

The factors encouraging a more active Turkish foreign policy are balanced by a number of important cautions. In no individual case may Turkey's interests in the central Asian, Caucasus, or Balkan regions be described as truly vital. The attraction of central Asia or the Caucasus as a field for Turkish engagement must be weighed against a prudent concern for guarding stable relations with the still-powerful Russian Federation, with whom Turkey maintains important commercial ties. The Balkan region is caught up in a frightful chaos, intimidating to any outside actor contemplating involvement, and here too Ankara must balance its priorities with the sometimes conflicting agendas of its American and European allies. Turkey's economic performance over the past decade has been impressive, but Turkey is still a developing nation whose achievements remain fragile--economic and technological limitations place significant constraints upon aspirations to a more dynamic regional role. Turkey's international agenda is also extremely demanding. The major challenges are still the familiar dilemmas of relating to Europe, managing friction with regional neighbors in the Middle East, overcoming the pattern of confrontation with Greece including the unresolved Cyprus problem, and most of all handling the escalating rebellion in Kurdistan, the attempted suppression of which is presently estimated to absorb about 30% of Turkish military assets.¹

In the long term the most significant barrier to an expanded role for any external actor in central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans may prove to be the complex realities of the regions themselves. Widely separated geographically, ethnically and culturally diverse, possessed of considerable economic potential, and located at sensitive geostrategic crossroads, these regions are not without indigenous resources, the potential to attract diverse external sponsorship, and the capacity to play off contenders for influence one against another.

Central Asia and the Caucasus

Central Asia has always been a crossroad of cultures, home to a succession of distinctive civilizations over several millennia prior to its absorption by the Russian empire from the 1860s onward. Geographically, the region is divided between a belt of steppe and grassland in the north including the great lakes of Aral, Issykkul, Balkash, and Baikal; a rim of oases and fertile valleys further south in central Asia proper; and the imposing mountain chains of the Pamir knot. 60% of the region is desert, and the struggle with aridity has been a constant throughout its history. Traditionally economic activity was divided between the steppe customs of nomadry and transhumance, sedentary agriculture in the oases and river valleys, and a commercial culture thriving in the great cities of the "Silk Road," the key commercial link between Asia, Europe, and the Middle East from classical times through the early modern period.

A first critical turning point in the history of the region came with the arrival of the conquering Arabs bearing the banner of Islam in the eighth century. Thereafter central

Asia was drawn inexorably into the orbit of Islamic civilization. The Mongol conquests initiated by Chingis Khan in the 13th century attached central Asia to a succession of Mongol khanates, stretching at their height from China to central Europe, but the ruling Mongols soon adapted to the dominant Turkic and Persian cultures. Under Tamerlane (Timur i-link) (1336-1405) the region was brought under central control, and during his reign and that of his successors the Timurids (1405-1507) a classical central Asian civilization with its centers at Samarkand and Herat reached its pinnacle. The fall of Herat to the Uzbeks in 1507 was accompanied by a phase of cultural regression, that in some ways has continued into the twentieth century.

The decline of central Asia is usually associated with the gradual loss of importance of the silk road following Vasco de Gama's successful pioneering of a naval route to India via the Cape of Good Hope in 1498. Economic decline was accompanied by social stagnation, sometimes related to the influence of Islam itself or to the persistence of traditional clan and extended family social structures. Chronic political fragmentation may also be cited--the Uzbeks and their successors failed to overcome the gap between nomads and sedentarists around which much of the region's history revolves and no new centralizer of the stature of Tamerlane was to appear.

By the eighteenth century the Kazakh Small, Middle, and Great steppe hordes served as a shield between Russia and the backward central Asian emirates of Khiva, Bukhara, and Kokand. From the reign of Peter the Great (1689-1725) onward Russia probed into the steppe, building fortresses and striking transitory alliances with local rulers. Between 1822-1848 the Kazakh hordes were conquered and the steppe belt absorbed into the

Russian empire. Now directly confronted by an expanding Russia and with very few internal resources, between 1865 and 1884 the central Asian emirates were absorbed piecemeal into the empire as well.

Perhaps more important in the long term than the conquest of the region was the linkage with Russia that developed in its wake. Ties were originally military and administrative. Beginning in 1865 new governor generalships of "Turkestan" in the south with its capital at Tashkent, and of "the Steppe" in the north including the territories of the modern republics of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were created and placed under direct Russian military administration. Demographic ties followed, on the basis of a policy of Russian settlement on promising agricultural lands and an expanding commercial and administrative presence. The growth in the Russian population was accompanied and accelerated by economic ties, especially those born of the movement toward intensive cotton cultivation that followed the American Civil War, and the Baku oil boom across the Caspian sea from the 1870s onward. Closer economic ties led in turn to the creation of a transportation infrastructure tying central Asia to the Russian north, keyed to the construction of great rail lines. The iron roads that bound central Asia to the north, writes S. A. M. Adshead, "put Russia in a position to dominate the economy of its share of Central Asia and, for a time, its demography too. A considerable inflow of Russians and Russian industry followed, particularly to Kazakhstan and Tashkent."²

By the dawn of the twentieth century railroad construction and industrial expansion had created a unified, regionally specialized national economy spanning the entire territory of imperial Russia, including export-oriented agriculture in Ukraine, oil industry in the Baku

area, mining and metallurgy in southern Ukraine, and textile industries in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Lodz that already received more than a third of their raw materials from the central Asian provinces. Central Asia also served Russia as a geostrategic buffer with the British Raj in south Asia. The "great game" for influence that accompanied Russian penetration of the region was resolved by the Anglo-Russian entente of 1907, a sphere of influence arrangement with an essentially strategic logic based upon a partition of Persia that reinforced the importance of Russian dominance in the Caucasus and central Asia proper.³

Resistance to Russian rule among the Muslim peoples of the empire was concentrated intellectually within the more open Tatar communities of the Volga region and the Crimea. The Kazan Tatar Shihabeddin Mardjani (1818-1889) forwarded a modernist (Jadist) movement influenced by reform currents within the Ottoman empire that sought identity within a larger community of Turkic speaking peoples. The Crimean Tatar publicist Ismail Bey Gasprinskii (Gasprali) (1851-1914) looked to the emergence of a confederation in which a Muslim-Turkist state and a Russian state would coexist.

"Russians and Turks," he wrote in 1905, "are bound together in a huge common plain extending from the foothills of the Altai and Pamirs to the swamps of the Baltic Sea ... Such it was in the past, and in the future these peoples will understand that they must work hand in hand in order to find the way of life they both need."⁴ The Volga Tatar Rizaeddin Fahreddin (1858-1936) argued for a pan-Islamic community inspired by the social ideals of the Persian intellectual Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897). Such currents cannot be said to have struck deep popular roots prior to 1914. The Russian revolutions of 1917 were preceded in the summer of 1916 by a Kazakh uprising, but it

was provoked almost exclusively by worsening living conditions and military conscription and was put down unceremoniously by tsarist troops.⁵

The years of revolution and civil war extracted a terrible toll in central Asia due to systematic resistance to Soviet power and concomitant repression, as well as to famine and epidemic disease occasioned by a breakdown of transport and disintegrating public health standards. One western historian speaks of a "genocide" in Turkestan between 1917-1920 perpetrated by Russian settlers with the connivance of callous local authorities, responsible for the deaths of up to a quarter of the region's population.⁶ For most of central Asia, however, the White armies and the Russian imperial tradition that they embodied did not offer a positive alternative to Soviet power. Organized resistance took the form of the *Basmachi* rebellion (the term literally means "outlaw" with the connotation of "freedom fighter") in the Fergana valley, launched in 1918 and continued sporadically through the 1920s. The death of the former Young Turk leader and pan-Turkist Enver Pasha while fighting with the Basmachi in a local engagement during August 1922 indicates some general sentiment within the movement on behalf of a larger regional identity, but it remained essentially confined to its base in Fergana. By the mid-1920s the Basmachi had been contained and the way cleared for the Sovietization of Turkestan.

What exactly Sovietization would entail was at first not altogether clear. The Bolsheviks came to power with a liberal nationalities policy based upon a critique of Russian imperialism that including a promised right of succession, but these pledges were not consistently respected. The Bolshevik activist and Volga Tatar Mir Said Sultangaliev

(1892-1940) aspired to a united Turkestan within a Soviet federation and espoused a variant of Islamic socialism, but his ideas were condemned in 1923 and in 1940 he was executed by Stalin.⁷ During the 1920s the official policy of *korenizatsiia* (nativization) encouraged cultural self-assertion linked to the emergence of an indigenous, pro-Soviet administrative and intellectual elite, but drew the line at national separatism. In 1926 the Latin alphabet was adopted in place of the traditional Arabic script, but between 1935-1939, in line with the spirit of centralization characteristic of the Stalin years, it was in turn replaced by the Cyrillic script. The effective Russian dominance that was so resented a legacy of the imperial period seemed to have returned almost unaltered.

In 1922 Turkestan was associated with the Soviet Union as one of its four founding republics. 1925 saw the first in a series of administrative restructurings that would eventually result in the division of the region into the five union republics of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The decision to create smaller administrative units is often described as a classic example of "divide and rule" imperial logic, though it may also be regarded as a sincere effort to find a reasonable pattern of administrative sub-division corresponding to really existing patterns of identification.⁸ In the event, no apportionment could have been satisfactory to all, and the legacy of Soviet administration in central Asia has left numerous unresolved problems in place.⁹

The Soviet impact upon central Asia included a dynamic of modernization that brought impressively higher educational and public health standards in its train.¹⁰ Soviet power also provided a context for rapid population growth (the population of central Asia has tripled since 1913), encompassing both an expansion of indigenous village populations and

an increase of the Slavic populations in cities and industrial areas. Economic development was real but also quite unbalanced. The colonial pattern of cotton monoculture was maintained and extended, and almost all modern sectors and urban conglomerates tended to be dominated by Russians. At the end of the Brezhnev period the four central Asian republics excepting Kazakhstan, which contained 11.4% of the Soviet population, produced only 6% of the Soviet gross social product. With a poverty line fixed at 75 rubles income per month (in 1988 rubles), 36 million Soviet citizens lived below the poverty line of whom 17 million were central Asians, that is 43% of the total.

Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan occupied the last five places among Soviet republics for educational outlays, public health, and social services per capita, and the infant mortality rate in the region was approximately double the very high Soviet average. Nor were the severe regional imbalances characteristic of the Soviet economy being closed. Between 1965 and 1987 central Asia's share of Soviet gross social product remained stagnant.

By the 1980s central Asia was caught up in the long-term structural problems that were to some degree also those of the Soviet Union as a whole. Its cotton monoculture, based upon widespread use of chemical fertilizers and intensive irrigation, had contributed to an ecological disaster of immense proportions, including the poisoning of ground water due to runoff from improperly built and maintained canals and the progressive desertification of the Aral sea.¹¹ Its expanding population confronted shrinking economic opportunity within the region, but felt a strong, culturally-based disinclination to seek employment outside it. Population growth without a corresponding increase in water resources posed a long-term dilemma for which no reasonable solution was in sight. Lack of employment

opportunities had created a tendency toward flight from the cities, making central Asia one of the few world regions where the relative proportion of the urban population was stable or diminishing.¹² The area's entrenched elites, represented by bastions of the Soviet establishment such as Sharif Rashidov (first secretary of the Uzbek Communist party from 1959-1983) and Dinmukhamed Kunaev (Kazakh party boss from 1959-1986), presided over rigid and corrupt patronage systems. Despite the real achievements of Soviet power as a context for development, central Asia, like the Soviet Union of which it was a part, appeared to cry out for change.

Perestroika provoked new tensions in central Asia, including outbreaks of communal rioting in the densely populated Fergana valley. In May/June 1989 clashes between the indigenous Uzbek population and Meskhetian Turks deported to the region after World War II left 112 dead and over 15,000 displaced. Disputes over land and water rights between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz provoked even more destructive rioting in Kyrgyzstan's Osh province during June/July 1990, with a death toll of 320. Popular mobilizations also accompanied the replacement of Brezhnev-era leaders such as Kunaev, who portrayed themselves as champions of local rights against overbearing control from the "center." The "Uzbek Cotton Affair," a series of legal processes between 1983 and 1987 attempting to expose endemic corruption in high places, which led to the replacement of 40 of the 65 Uzbek communist party secretaries, was deeply resented within Uzbekistan as a form of external meddling. Kunaev's retirement in December 1986 (and initial replacement by a Russian) sparked street fighting in the Kazakh capital of Almaty, with up to two hundred reported injured. Though destructive, these tensions were not particularly destabilizing, and they were not accompanied by a substantial movement for national independence. The

first variant of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), set up hastily during a meeting at Belovezhskaia Pushka near Brest in December 1991 and including only the Slavic republics of Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, literally left the central Asian republics out in the cold. Led by Nursultan Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan, the central Asian republics were able to insist upon their inclusion in the new variant of the CIS created one week later at Almaty. The entire clumsy episode did not speak well, however, for the future of a long-term association of between the peoples of central Asia and their former Russian patrons.

The situation which the republics of central Asia confronted upon achieving nominal independence was unenviable. More than a century of Russian domination had left all the marks of colonial oppression in its train. The October Revolution offered an alternative based upon decolonization, development, and self-determination, but did not live up to its promises. Under Soviet power central Asia modernized rapidly, but as an appendage of the Soviet economy and in a context of pervasive discrimination. Though blessed with certain inherent assets, including a young and skilled work force, important petroleum and mineral resources, and its situation as a *carrefour geopolitique*, the region was totally unprepared to stand on its own.

First reactions to the prospect of independence tended to emphasize the dynamics of decolonization and regional integration. The cultural and civilizational divide between Russia and central Asia was wide and enduring. Russian imperial rule had undermined economic self-sufficiency, enforced political domination from an external metropole, and practised systematic discrimination against local nationals. Under the circumstances it was

not surprising that for many independence meant first of all the challenge of "beginning the process of decolonization and nation-building," including rapid movement toward full national autonomy, the consolidation of new sovereignties, and eventually, perhaps, the elimination of artificial internal boundaries on behalf of a larger regional entity.¹³

The image of an integrated central Asia with a dominant Islamic and Turkophone character, capable of playing an independent role on the stage of world affairs, is an appealing one that should not be ignored as a long-term aspiration. For the foreseeable future, however, it has revealed itself to be a chimera. Though the idea of Turkestan is ancient, the only modern experience of central rule in the region occurred under Russian and Soviet domination. Post-Soviet elites in power have demonstrated little interest in surrendering the prerogatives of leadership to some kind of federative entity, and several generations of shared political experience appear to have created a certain national affiliation among their varied citizenries. On the sub-national level, extended family, clan, and regional affiliations are also strong and potentially divisive among a population 80% of which still lives in rural districts.¹⁴ Nor are central Asia's major national groups in an approximate balance. Any project for integration would risk becoming a recipe for control by the demographically dominant Uzbek community, and would be resisted as such by others. Not least, dependence upon Russia in the economic, political, and security areas is such as to make any kind of sharp rupture highly unpalatable. James Critchlow concludes that "the establishment of a united Turkestan would be possible only through a cataclysmic political upheaval."¹⁵ The creation at Tashkent on 4-5 January 1993 of a common market linking the five central Asian republics was a positive, but also a limited gesture which to date has not reduced a trend toward heightened economic competition

between the republics themselves.

In view of the incapacity of central Asian polities to move decisively toward full sovereignty or meaningful federation, and given the "geopolitical vacuum" left behind by the decline of Russian/Soviet power, some analysts have suggested that a modern variant of the "great game," a rivalry for influence between regional powers with potentially destabilizing consequences, is about to take hold in the region.¹⁶ Of the various regional actors perceived as candidates for influence according to this scenario, Turkey is usually considered to be the best placed. The region's predominantly Turkic character creates an obvious civilizational link. For many Turks, disappointed with Europe's decision to adjourn discussion of their country's application for membership in the European Community in 1989, the opportunity to assert a leadership role in a major world region which was also the bercer of the Turkish nation seems irresistible. Turkey's special relationship with the USA and membership in NATO are likewise posed as advantages. Analysts troubled by the potential for an expanding Iranian presence, or with a presumed threat of Russian neo-imperialism, have presented a "Turkish Model" of secular democracy, market economics, and a pro-Western geostrategic orientation as a positive alternative. In search of leverage since the collapse of the Soviet Union reduced its value to the West as a strategic partner, Turkey itself has also sought to emphasize its capacity to play the role of bridge between east and west. Indeed, in the wake of the Soviet collapse enthusiasm for Turkey's "bold bid for leadership and influence in the region" often seemed to know no bounds.¹⁷

Turkey has undertaken a good number of positive initiatives in post-Soviet central Asia. It

was quick to extend diplomatic recognition to the former Soviet republics, and on 30-31 October 1992 a summit of the six predominantly Muslim Soviet successor states was convened in Ankara as a symbol of commitment to expanding cooperation. Ankara has signed over 160 protocols and cooperative agreements with the six Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union, pledged more than \$1.5 billion in export credits, and worked to build infrastructural ties in transport and telecommunications, to extend financial and business contacts, and to reinforce cultural relations by developing scholarship and student exchange programs. Over 5000 Turkish small businesses have launched activities in central Asia and helped to create a fast growing commercial market.¹⁸ Turkey has also sought to encourage the adoption of the Turkish variant of the Latin script (with success to date in Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan) as a basis for language reform. Nonetheless, the original exaggerated enthusiasm for Turkey's role in the region has already been replaced by what might fairly be called an equally exaggerated disillusionment.

Turkey's economic weaknesses place constraints upon its ability to provide economic aid and assistance. Its initiatives have therefore of necessity been concentrated in areas of special interest. The most important interactions have been with Azerbaijan, with whom Turkey shares a small common border (a twelve kilometer border with the Azeri enclave of Nakhichevan), close linguistic and cultural affinity, and important economic interests (50% of Turkey's trade with the six Muslim republics of the former USSR in 1992 was with Azerbaijan). The natural gas and hydrocarbon reserves of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan are also attractive, but the lack of a common border with central Asia proper makes Ankara to some extent dependent upon regional partners in developing infrastructural ties. Cultural ties, while they have created enthusiasm on all sides, have

also been inhibited by the significant differences that exist between Anatolian Turkish and the various Turkic languages of central Asia. For their own part, the central Asian republics may be expected to remain cautious about reducing their leverage by embracing external sponsorship too onesidedly. Philip Robins is correct in concluding that "hard decisions based on interests rather than fanciful notions of ethnic solidarity are informing decisions on both sides."¹⁹

Turkey also confronts competitors for influence. Iran's common borders with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan enables it to offer access to the Indian ocean to landlocked central Asia, as well as overland transit via Turkey to Europe. It too has ethnic and linguistic ties, with the Persophone Tajik community and with the predominantly Shi'a Azeris, and motives for engagement, both as a means for overcoming international isolation and in order to preempt potential threats posed by Azeri separatism to its territorial integrity. For these very reasons Teheran's policies have not, by and large, been geared to the export of Islamic radicalism, but rather to the pursuit of specific state interests pragmatically defined.²⁰ The original "great game" of the late nineteenth century was a projection of the European balance of power system into colonial domains, and was importantly conditioned by central Asia's weakness and passivity. These conditions no longer apply. The newly independent states of central Asia have much greater autonomy than their nineteenth century predecessors, and their interests are best served by diverse patterns of regional interaction. These interests help to explain the proliferation of regional organizations to which the central Asian states have become attached, including the Turkish-sponsored *Black Sea Cooperation Project* (which includes Azerbaijan but not the republics of central Asia); the Iran-inspired *Caspian Sea Council* (Azerbaijan, Iran,

Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan); the Russia-led *Commonwealth of Independent States*; a revived *Economic Cooperation Organization* (with Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan joining charter members Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey); and the *North Atlantic Cooperation Council* (linking NATO and former Warsaw Pact members with the Soviet successor states in a loose framework for security cooperation). The Economic Cooperation Organization has been described by one observer as "a first step towards a potential common market of three hundred million people," but for the moment all regional organizations in central Asia remain relatively weak and uninfluential.²¹

The only regional power in a position to dominate central Asia and the Caucasus remains Russia. A more pessimistic, and increasingly more prevalent view of the region's future has come to accept the conclusion that some kind of *reattachment* to Russia in the context of the CIS is unavoidable. There is much to be said for this conclusion from the point of view of both the Russian Federation and the individual central Asian republics. Economic links are strong, and in many cases Russia is able to offer the region advantages that it cannot obtain elsewhere, notably guarantees of internal and external security. Moscow has also become more aware of its own vested interests in the region, and is apparently committed to defend them.

Amidst the disarray that followed the destruction of the Soviet state, central Asia was to some extent ignored by a new generation of Russian policy makers anxious to prioritize relations with the USA and Europe. Subsequent disillusion with the West, political resistance to the policies pursued by Boris El'tsin and his foreign minister Andrei

Kozyrev, and institutional resistance from the "power ministries" responsible for national security affairs have contributed to an important change of priorities. One may now speak of a new Russian engagement in central Asia and the Caucasus, perhaps best symbolized by the decisive role played by Russian armed forces in shaping the outcome of the civil war in Tajikistan during 1992 and in contributing to the collapse of the pro-Turkish government of Ebulfaz Elçibey in Azerbaijan in the summer of 1993.

Tajikistan's first post-Soviet presidential election in November 1991 was won by Rakhmon Nabiev, a conservative leader of the Tajikistan Communist party. Urban unrest in March-May 1992 led to the creation of a coalition government in which the opposition Popular Front (combining nationalist, democratic, and Islamic parties) obtained eight of twenty-four portfolios. The compromise satisfied no one, and by the summer a full-fledged civil war between contending factions was underway. The outcome was determined by the Russian 201st Motor Rifle Division stationed in Dushanbe, which intervened at the decisive moment against opposition forces, and by Russian patrols along the Tajik-Afghan border, which waged daily battles to prevent the Islamic opposition from being supplied and reinforced by Afghan *mujahedin*. After a protracted conflict that may have cost up to 50,000 lives, in November a new, pro-Russian government took power under the leadership of Imomali Rakhmonov. From its base in Khodjent, Rakhmonov's movement had already signed a bilateral Friendship Treaty with Russia in May 1993 that envisioned close military cooperation. In power, it suppressed the organized opposition, appointed the Russian general Aleksandr Shishliannikov as defense minister, and proceeded to rebuild Tajik armed forces under Russian and Uzbek tutelage.²² These forces are likely to be needed. Ongoing resistance staged from base

areas in Afghanistan, where a large indigenous Tajik population has now been joined by more than a hundred thousand embittered refugees, will pose a continuing threat to Tajikistan's territorial integrity and reinforce its dependency upon Russian support.

Russian intervention in the Tajik conflict served to bolster the authority of a sympathetic government challenged by domestic opposition. In Azerbaijan, Russia's involvement contributed to the ouster of a leader whose priorities sharply contrasted with its own. Indeed, Russia's meddling in Azerbaijan was only the latest in the long series of interventions that have characterized its relations with the Caucasus since the subjugation of the region in the first decades of the nineteenth century. The tsarist presence in the Caucasus dates from victories in the two Russian-Iranian wars of 1804-1813 and 1826-1828. The *treaty of Gulistan* of 1813 fixed the Russian-Iranian border at the Araz river, thereby dividing the area's Azeri population between the two states, and the *treaty of Turkmanchai* of 1828 extended Russian territories to include the Erivan and Nakhichevan khanates. From 1840 Azerbaijan was subject to direct military rule during Russia's campaigns to subdue the rebellious north Caucasian tribes. Between May 1918 and April 1920, against the background of the Russian civil war, an *Azerbaijani Democratic Republic* asserted a tentative right to independence, but it could not hold out against the consolidation of Soviet power.²³ From 1922-1936 Azerbaijan was associated with the Soviet federation as part of a Transcaucasus republic including Armenia and Georgia, and in 1936 it became a republic in its own right, but its subordination to the Kremlin remained intact. In the Caucasus as in central Asia, the essentially colonial relationship born under the tsarist autocracy was in important ways reasserted in the context of the USSR.

The breakup of the USSR seemed to renew the promise of Azeri independence, but, preoccupied by its ongoing conflict with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, Baku has not been in a position to consolidate new state structures. In January 1990 the pro-independence Azeri Popular Front was suppressed by Soviet armed forces in the midst of pogrom-like anti-Armenian rioting in the streets of Baku. Following the demise of the USSR, the Front returned to seize power in a bloodless coup of May 1992, ousting Ayaz Mutalibov, a representative of the old Soviet establishment whose government had been discredited by military defeats. The new government of Ebulfez Elçibey moved to assert a pro-Turkish and pan-Turkist orientation, accused Russia of abetting the Armenian side in the Karabakh conflict, and in October 1992 refused Azerbaijani membership in the CIS. Within a year, however, Elçibey's movement had exhausted its political capital, and in June 1993 he was overthrown in turn by the rebel warlord Suret Huseinov. In a surprising turn of fortunes, after occupying the capital Huseinov issued an invitation to Gaidar Aliev, first secretary of the Azerbaijani Communist party from 1969-1987, to return to power as president. Aliev pledged his government to uphold Azeri independence, but also asserted the need for close relations with Moscow. In the space of six years, Azerbaijan seemed to have moved full circle.

Elçibey's defeat was to some extent of his own making. His government proved to be as prone to corruption and administrative incompetence as its predecessors. The failure to hold promised elections alienated a good part of the democratic intelligentsia, originally an important source of support. Meanwhile continuing economic decline, which struck hardest at the urban poor and Karabakh refugees, undermined the government's social base. Decisive, however, was the failure to reverse the course of events on the Karabakh

front. When, after another series of defeats between February and May 1993, Huseinov set his private army on the march toward Baku in June, he encountered almost no serious resistance.

Elçibey envisioned Azerbaijan as a part of an emerging Turkish sphere of influence in the Caucasus, but in the end Ankara could or would do nothing to reverse the course of events that led to his fall. In contrast, quiet support by Moscow for the Armenian campaign in Karabakh helped to subvert the Popular Front, and the Russian military command in Azerbaijan clearly sided with Huseinov during the power struggle. The Aliiev government, solicitous of Russian interests, has brought Azerbaijan back into the fold of the CIS, and may prefer the Russian-sponsored pipeline project for the exploitation of Caspian Sea oil (with the terminal at Novorossiisk) over Turkey's proposal for a Baku-Yumurtalik pipeline. News of Elçibey's fall was greeted by protests in Turkey, but in September 1993 prime minister Tansu Çiller paid a conciliatory visit to Moscow. The outcome of the Azeri crisis was a disappointment for Turkish diplomacy, though perhaps not an irremediable defeat. Aliiev has been anxious to ensure Ankara that its vital interests will not be threatened, Turkey has an obvious interest in avoiding open confrontations with the Russian Federation, and Baku and Ankara would both be well-served should a more even-handed Russian policy toward the Karabakh conflict emerge.

In the Tajik and Azeri cases, in the breakup of Georgia culminating with the armed secession of Abkhazia, and in other armed conflicts on the periphery of the former Soviet Union, a pattern of manipulative engagement based upon policies of destabilization, selective intervention by military forces in place, and the establishment of spheres of

influence or *de facto* Russian hegemony has emerged.²⁴ These initiatives seem to reflect an emerging consensus within the political establishment concerning Russian interests in the near abroad that may be summarized with regard to central Asia in three issue areas.

The first area is ethnic solidarity with the large Russian populations of central Asia, a significant part of the twenty-five million strong Russian diaspora now living outside the confines of the Russian Federation. Approximately 27% of the total population of the five central Asian republics, or 13 million citizens, are non-Muslims, including 9.5 million Russians. Russians constitute 8% of the population in Tajikistan, 10% in Uzbekistan, 12% in Turkmenistan, 24% in Kyrgyzstan, and 38% in Kazakhstan. This is essentially an urban-based, skilled work force that plays an important economic role, and the tendency toward flight from the region that has seen up to 10% of the Russian population depart over the past two years is disturbing to Russian and central Asian leaders alike. Russia has repeatedly asserted its right to defend the interests of Russian residents outside the boundaries of the Russian Federation, and in so doing has created a permanent pretext for interference in the affairs of its neighbors. Kazakhstan, whose large Russian population is concentrated in the north, and which has been described by one well-placed commentator as "an area of vital Russian interests for ethnic, economic, and security reasons," is particularly exposed to Russian pressure.²⁵

A second issue area is concern for the Islamic factor, manifest as a desire "to prevent Islamic radicals from coming to power in the Central Asian republics and to quell the rise of Islamic feelings among the Muslim nationalities in Russia itself."²⁶ There is a highly visible Islamic revival in progress in central Asia, though it may be argued that it is

primarily cultural in content, and really no more than a normal reaction to several generations of Soviet-inspired official atheism. A politicized Islamic movement with an ideology broadly comparable to fundamentalist currents elsewhere in the Islamic world has also emerged, but it remains fragmented and weak.²⁷ The *Islamic Renaissance party*, originally created as a region-wide organization with a pan-Islamic ideology, had by 1992 splintered into autonomous national sub-units.²⁸

Russian concern for the dynamic of Islamic fundamentalism in central Asia and the Caucasus nonetheless has a solid objective foundation.²⁹ The worsening material situation of the central Asian republics is bound to create social tensions, and as elsewhere in the Islamic world, one channel for the expression of these tensions will be politicized Islam.³⁰ The widespread perception that fundamentalism menaces the Russian population and encourages migration puts pressure on the authorities in the Kremlin to keep the problem under control.³¹ Islamic movements represent a significant part of the organized political opposition to central Asian leaders in power, in almost every case former communists recast as nationalists whose exercise of authority rests upon more or less severe authoritarian controls. There is also the potential for a spillover effect within Russia itself. The large Muslim community of the Russian Federation is well represented in major cities as well as in a series of autonomous national units that stretch from the north Caucasus along the Volga to Tatarstan and Bashkiria in the Russian heartland. Although the effective secession of the republic of Chechenia during 1992 under the blustering leadership of general Djokhar Dudaev is grotesque in its external aspects, it is potentially the tip of an iceberg that no Russian government can afford to ignore.³² Since the days of Shamil the northern Caucasus has been a focus for resistance to Russian

domination as well as of Islamic extremism. The Muslim peoples of the northern Caucasus have been politically organized since November 1991 in a *Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus*, and have adopted a sequence of positions challenging Moscow's prerogatives. Tatarstan, spanning the central Volga at Kazan and one of only two Russian autonomous republics where the indigenous population forms a relative or absolute majority (48% of the population is Tatar against 43% Russian--the other case in point is that of Tuva) conducted a referendum on sovereignty on 21 March 1992 which carried by 61.4%. The oil-rich republic of Bashkiria beyond the Volga in the Urals, where Muslim Bashkirs constitute 22% of the population and Tatars 28.4%, has likewise used the threat of secession to negotiate concessions.

A final area of concern for Moscow relates to its broader geostrategic interests in inner Asia. The difficult legacy of Soviet engagement in Afghanistan has made this a sensitive problem, but the motives that led the Brezhnev leadership to the decision to intervene in Kabul in December 1979 have not lost all their cogency.³³ It is not in Moscow's interests to permit an important external penetration of the region, nor to allow central Asia to devolve into "a new arena for external rivalry and intervention" outside of its effective control.³⁴ Central Asia is a seismic zone in international relations where the interests of major powers including Russia, Turkey, Iran, India, Pakistan, and China have the potential to conflict and overlap.³⁵ The Russian Federation's emerging security doctrine makes a priority of maintaining a *droit de regard* upon the affairs of the near abroad, and this is likely to be reflected in central Asia and the Caucasus by the maintenance of Russian armed forces in place, by a strengthening of cooperative security mechanisms on a bilateral level and within the context of the CIS, and by strong reactions

to real or suspected external sponsorship of anti-government forces, such as seems to be occurring in Tajikistan.³⁶

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The long-term outlook for the predominantly Muslim republics of central Asia and the Caucasus points inexorably toward a gradual distancing from Moscow, greater cultural self-awareness, and growing autonomy in the context of increasing regional interactions. Turkey, along with other interested regional actors, should have an important role to play in encouraging this kind of process, not as the sponsor of a pro-Western "model" but as a good-intentioned neighbor and partner anxious to encourage cooperation in practical and mutually beneficial ways. In the medium term, however, short of a catastrophic breakdown, there is probably no future for central Asia and the Caucasus outside of a close, positive, but hopefully not too constraining relationship with the Russian Federation. Accommodating Russian interests need not mean surrendering to the logic of neo-colonialism. There are countervailing tendencies that work to limit Russian influence, including deeply-rooted resentments toward Russian tutelage, bitterness concerning the Soviet legacy, Russia's own economic dilemmas, and disputes within policy circles about what kinds of sacrifices and commitments Russian interests in central Asia really demand. For the time being, however, it is the logic of a "special relationship" with Moscow that is likely to prevail.

The Balkans

The modern historical experience of the Muslim peoples of central Asia and the Caucasus has been that of subordination to Russian rule. The Muslim peoples of the Balkans, up to the collapse of Ottoman rule at the end of the First World War, were the privileged representatives of a theocratic empire. The troops of the Osmanli dynasty first crossed the Bosphorus to Europe in 1345. Under sultan Murad I (1359-1389) Ottoman armies marched through the valley of the Maritsa into the Balkans, reaching the Vardar in 1372, Sofia in 1385, Nis in 1386, and defeating the armies of the Serbian tsar Lazar at the mythic battle of Kosovo Polje near Pristina in 1389. Murad I died on the battlefield of Kosovo Polje, but his conquests brought Ottoman authority into the heart of the Balkans, where it would remain for the next five centuries. The fall of Constantinople to sultan Mehmed II "the Conqueror" in 1453 made the Ottomans the heirs of Byzantium, and reinforced what would become the empire's essential historic character: a centralized imperial state spanning Asia Minor, Europe, and northern Africa with a broadly multinational character. Waves of Ottoman conquests broke against the walls of Vienna in 1527 and 1683. It was not until a series of defeats culminating with the *treaty of Karlowitz* in 1698 had forced the Ottomans back from the marches of Hungary that pressure against Europe was finally reversed.

The Ottoman empire was divided territorially into the Asian and European regions of Anatolia and Rumelia, each administered by a governor general. These were in turn subdivided into districts (*sanjaks*) controlled by military governors. The peoples of the empire were distinguished, not on the basis of ethnicity or language, but rather

confession. Non-Muslim minorities were designated as *rayas* (flocks) and organized into *millets* (nations) on the basis of religious affiliation. Thus, alongside the Muslim *ulama* in Constantinople sat the Greek Orthodox Patriarch, the Armenian Patriarch, and the Jewish Chief Rabbi, each representing a particular confessional group.

Compared with the Christian civilizations of early modern Europe, the Ottoman empire practised an admirable religious tolerance. Non-Muslim minorities were nonetheless subjected to various kinds of discrimination sufficient to create a sense of disadvantage. Inevitably, over centuries of interaction in a common political framework, a certain portion of the Christian population of the Balkans opted for conversion to Islam.

Conversions notably affected a majority of the Albanian peoples and the *Bogomil* (*Pataren* in the preferred usage of contemporary Bosnia-Herzegovina) Christian communities concentrated in northern Herzegovina (whose Manichaean convictions were condemned and repressed as heresy by the Orthodox church). Ottoman patterns of administration and control, including the refusal of a policy of assimilation, combined with the tortured geography of the Balkan peninsula to encourage fragmentation and localism. The Ottomans remained the masters, however, and their overlordship inevitably generated resentment which, often exaggerated in popular memory, continue to poison relations among the region's peoples to this day. "The Turk," writes the Bosnian novelist and Nobel Prize winner Ivo Andric in a passage fairly reflective of these resentments, "could bring no cultural content or sense of higher historic mission, even to those South Slavs who accepted Islam; for their Christian subjects, their hegemony brutalized custom and meant a step to the rear in every respect."³⁷

Three parallel dynamics during the course of the nineteenth century helped to create the context for the dilemmas of contemporary Balkan politics. The first was the failure of reform efforts within the Ottoman empire, initiated in tragedy by the frustrated reforms of sultan Selim III (1787-1807) and continued in fits and starts by his successors, but never capable of reversing the empire's long historical decline. Simultaneously, the rise in national consciousness of the Christian peoples of the Balkans, in part under the influence of the French Revolution and in part as a reaction to increasing fiscal pressures exerted by the Ottoman authorities, created a climate of general instability. Serbian uprisings in 1804 and 1815 initiated a period of national agitation that would continue unabated up to and beyond the creation of autonomous Balkan nation states. Accompanying the rise of Balkan nationalism was the increasing intervention of the European great powers, concerned for the implications of Ottoman weakness for the European balance of power. The waning of Ottoman authority, constant national agitation, and chronic great power interference combined to create the "Eastern Question" and to produce the spark that would set off the Great War.

The collapse of the Ottoman empire left the Balkan Muslims on their own. The new Turkish Republic resolved a part of its minority problem with Greece by carrying out a reciprocal forced transfer of populations following the latter's expulsion from Asia Minor in 1922, but these extreme measures did not eliminate the Muslim presence altogether. The *treaty of Lausanne* of July 1923 which concluded Turkey's war of independence left ethnic Turkish settlements in place in Thrace and on certain Aegean islands.³⁸ Small Muslim communities were scattered throughout the Balkan region, and larger, compact communities remained in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Bulgaria.

In Sarajevo a *National Muslim Organization* sought to represent the cultural and spiritual interests of the Bosnian Muslims in the radically changed postwar environment. In the difficult circumstances of King Aleksandr's Yugoslavia it looked increasingly to the Croatian national movement for support against Serbian domination. When the German occupation of the Balkans during the Second World War brought the fascist puppet state of Ante Pavelic to power in Zagreb it promptly absorbed Bosnia-Herzegovina, declared Bosnian Muslims to be citizens of the Independent State of Croatia, and proceeded to collaborate with Muslim extremists in massacring hundreds of thousands of Serbians, Jews, and Romanies (Gypsies). Reprisals by the Serbian-nationalist *Chetniks* rivaled these atrocities in ferocity if not in extent. These were extravagant horrors, and their disastrous and enduring legacy can hardly be exaggerated.

Immediately after the Second World War official hostility on the part of the new communist authorities caused a certain amount of emigration of Muslim peoples from Bosnia and the Sanjak district of southern Serbia, and a self-defense organization entitled *Young Muslims* (one of whose members was the young Alija Izetbegovic) was outlawed by the Yugoslav federal authorities. Tito's Yugoslavia nonetheless resurrected a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina and worked to integrate the Muslim peoples into a Yugoslav family of nations. Muslims were granted their own religious administrations and publications, offered constitutional pledges of freedom of religion, and beginning with the 1971 census recognized as an official "nation of Yugoslavia". Fundamentalism or Islamic radicalism hinting at the need for some kind of exclusionary Islamic republic was however severely repressed. In 1983 thirteen Muslim leaders, with Izetbegovic as prime defendant, were tried in Sarajevo on charges of propagating Muslim nationalism, and sentenced to long

prison terms.

On the eve of the collapse of Soviet communism and the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the situation of the Muslim peoples of the region was not all that different from what it had been in the wake of the Ottoman collapse.³⁹ For the most part minorities living in discrete areas and surrounded by latent hostility, subject to a wide range of inherited prejudices but with potentially potent sources of external sponsorship, the Balkan Muslims were a volatile element in the region's confrontational politics. The breakdown of the Balkan state system has posed the question of their status anew, and J. F. Brown is correct in asserting that in the recasting of Balkan order that is underway the role of the Balkan Muslims "is likely to be divisive and could be decisive."⁴⁰

Bulgaria: Bulgaria was geographically proximal to the seat of the Sublime Porte at Istanbul, and it continues to contain the Balkan's largest relative Muslim minority. Bulgaria's population of 8,500,000 includes 822,000 ethnic Turks (9.7% of the total population) and 150,000 Bulgarian Muslims, often referred to with the mildly derogatory term *Pomak*. There is also a Roma minority of 288,000, 40% of which is estimated to affiliate with Islam. Altogether, about 13% of Bulgaria's population is Muslim.⁴¹

Ethnic Turks began to settle in Bulgaria after the Ottoman conquests of the fourteenth century, and they have been permanent residents ever since. The majority live in distinct areas of settlement in the tobacco growing areas around Kurdzhali in the southwest and in the northeast around Razgrad, though there are also areas of Turkish settlement in the Stara Planina (Balkan) mountains of central Bulgaria, and in the Rhodope mountains in

the south. The traditional homes of the Pomaks are small, compact, and isolated communities in the valleys of the Rhodope and Pirin mountain ranges.⁴²

The large Muslim minority has been a consistent source of concern for Bulgarian authorities. As is the case with many of the Christian cultures of the Balkans, a part of Bulgaria's national identity is built around the myth of resistance to Turkish domination, a theme that is vividly reflected in Bulgaria's national novel, Ivan Vazov's *Under the Yoke*, which portrays the national uprising of 1876-1877 and its brutal suppression. Since 1990 Bulgaria as a whole has had a negative birth rate, but the growth rate for ethnic Turks, Pomaks, and Romanies is considerably higher than that for the Christian population. The Muslim population also has a more youthful profile, and its share of the population is increasing both absolutely and as a proportion of the active work force. The predominantly ethnic Turkish areas of the southwest are immediately adjacent to the Turkish border (ethnic Turks outnumber Bulgarians two to one in the Kurdzhali area), and concern for the possible emergence of separatist movements with encouragement from Ankara, often invoked with reference to the Turkish military occupation of northern Cyprus or to the calls for the creation of a greater Albania that have accompanied the Kosovo crisis in Yugoslavia, is commonly aired.⁴³

These kinds of fears have led to periodic campaigns of intimidation and repression directed against Muslim minorities. A culmination of sorts arrived with the "name-changing campaign" of 1984-1985, during the first phase of which all ethnic Turks of Bulgaria were required on pain of prosecution to adopt Bulgarian names. Follow up measures included official propagation of the argument that the Turks of Bulgaria were

not Turks at all, but rather converted Slavs; the use of force to block access to Mosques; the introduction of administrative measures designed to discourage the circumcision of male children; bans on the speaking of Turkish in public places; and the forceful repression of popular resistance. By the summer of 1989 such measures had provoked a mass flight of ethnic Turks across the border to Turkey. Accompanied by the forced expulsions carried out by the Bulgarian authorities, over 300,000 ethnic Turks are estimated to have left Bulgaria.

The fall of the communist regime of Todor Zhivkov in November 1989 made it possible for a new, democratically chosen Bulgarian government to seek to put these painful episodes behind it. Since 1989 procedures have been developed for the restitution of names, overt forms of discrimination have been eliminated, and some restitution has been provided for victims. The "Turkish question" in Bulgarian politics is far from having disappeared however. Politically organized since 1990 as the *Movement for Rights and Freedoms* (MRF) under the astute leadership of Ahmed Dogan, Bulgaria's ethnic Turkish minority has come to play a central role in the post-communist political system.

Parliamentary elections of October 1991 gave the former communists, rebaptized as the *Bulgarian Socialist party* (BSP), 106 of 240 mandates, while the opposition *United Democratic Front* (UDF) won 110 mandates. As the third largest Bulgarian party (the MRF is designated as a "movement" in order to avoid a constitutional ban on ethnically-based political parties), with 7.6% of the popular vote and 24 parliamentary mandates, support from the MRF was critical to the creation of any kind of stable government. During 1991 and 1992 the MRF lent support to the UDF minority government of Filip Dimitrov, but relations between the two organizations soured as the impact of the UDF's

reform program proved to be particularly damaging to the economic interests of Bulgaria's ethnic Turks. At the end of October 1992 the MRF brought down the Dimitrov government by supporting a no confidence vote, and has since backed a non-partisan "government of experts" headed by Ljuben Berov.⁴⁴

The Movement for Rights and Freedoms presents itself as a "democratic social organization of Bulgarian citizens whose goals include support for the unity of the Bulgarian peoples, prevention of all forms of discrimination, and the full and unconditional recognition of the rights and freedoms of all ethnic, religious, and cultural groups in Bulgaria."⁴⁵ Its leaders go out of their way to emphasize the organization's multi-ethnic character, commitment to the integrity of Bulgaria, and rejection of any special relationship with Turkey.⁴⁶ Given Bulgaria's poor human rights record as concerns the Turkish minority there is clearly a place for such an organization and the movement has by and large performed its role credibly. Though it cannot be attributed entirely to the influence of the MRF, Bulgaria has made progress in stabilizing relations with Turkey over the past several years, including expanded economic ties and the conclusion of a military cooperation agreement. The Muslim minority within Bulgaria is often evoked by Bulgarians as a potential source of problems, but it may also serve as a positive link between the Bulgars and their eastern neighbors. There is no lack of divisive issues to exploit, however, and tension between Christian and Muslim communities in Bulgaria remains high.

Albania: At the end of the Second World War approximately 70% of Albania's population was Muslim. Of the remainder 20% were Orthodox Christian, including an ethnic Greeks

minority in the northern Epirus region around Gjirokastër, and 10% were Roman Catholic Albanians concentrated in the north in Shkodër and environs. The bizarre dictatorship of Enver Hoxha from 1945-1985 hermetically sealed off the country from the world around it. In 1967 Albania was officially declared an atheist state and all forms of religious observance were banned, and in the constitution of 1976 religion itself was formally outlawed. Since the fall of Albanian communism in 1991 these measures have been rescinded and a religious revival is in progress. Modern Albania's population of over three million is still approximately 70% Muslim, 20% Orthodox, and 10% Roman Catholic. What these formal designations actually mean in terms of social and cultural identity, and how much weight, under the circumstances, Albania's Muslim heritage should be presumed to carry, are of necessity open questions.

With a per capita GDP of \$350, approximately equal to that of Sri Lanka or Indonesia, Albania has the most severe poverty and the highest birth rate in Europe. Under the government of Sali Berisha and his *Democratic party of Albania*, in power since March 1992, it has struggled with the dilemmas of post-communist transition, experiencing severe declines in agricultural and industrial production and unemployment of over 35%. In dire need, Albania has sought fraternal aid from the Muslim world and has increased cooperation with Turkey on all levels.⁴⁷ Its single most important external sponsor, however, is the European Union, whose assistance package includes implementation of the PHARE program, balance of payments assistance, and humanitarian and food aid.⁴⁸ Albania will continue to develop its Islamic ties, but its severe underdevelopment and economic dependence upon Europe places limits upon the extent to which it can hope to pursue independent policies.

The Yugoslav Republics: Between two and three million Albanians live outside the boundaries of modern Albania in the republics of former Yugoslavia. The combined population makes the Albanians the sixth largest (and fastest growing) Balkan nation. Small communities of ethnic Turks are scattered throughout the region, and Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina also contain large Slavic Muslim populations.

Montenegro's population of about 600,000 is 14.6% Slavic Muslim and 6.6% Albanian. The population of Macedonia, just over two million, is 4.8% ethnic Turkish, 21.1% Albanian, and 2.5% Slavic Muslim. Serbia's population of ten million is 17.2% Albanian (including about 100,000 Albanians resident in Serbia proper) and 2.4% Slavic Muslim. Finally Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a population of 4.3 million prior to the civil war, had a population divided between Slavic Muslims (43.7%) (the 1.6 million Bosnian Muslims made up 80% of the Muslim population of former Yugoslavia), Serbs (31.4%), and Croats (17.3%). Economic hardships, the collapse of political order, the unrestrained fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the frightful legacy of atrocities and forced population transfers, and the continual reinforcement of intolerant integral nationalisms have combined to make the status of the Muslim peoples of former Yugoslavia one of the most critical issues in European politics.

Heartland of the medieval Serbian kingdom, site of the great defeat at Kosovo Polje and setting for the powerful Kosovo legend that lies at the foundation of Serbia's national identity, home to magnificent monasteries that are the glory of south Slavic culture, Kosovo has understandably held a special place in Serbian self-perception. Slobodan

Milosevic consolidated his power in Belgrade during 1988 and 1989 by promising to defend the Serbian minority in Kosovo, and he has made good on his word by suspending the region's autonomy and subjecting Kosovar Albanians to harsh military repression. The Kosovar opposition, operating from the underground, conducted a referendum on independence in October 1991, and in a secretive election in May 1992 the *Democratic League of Kosova* and its chair Ibrahim Rugova won large majorities. Aware of his community's isolation and exposure, Rugova has crafted a strategy of passive resistance, seeking to build up an infrastructure of governance within Kosovo and to internationalize the conflict as much as possible in search of leverage against Belgrade.⁴⁹ Rugova has been quite successful in using traditional clan structures and family allegiances to enforce discipline and maintain control at home. Kosovar Albanians have successfully boycotted Belgrade-sponsored institutions and elections, and avoided provocative armed challenges. Hopes to encourage international action on behalf of the Kosovo have to date led to little of consequence. The Berisha government in Tirana has attacked Belgrade rhetorically, but its weak domestic position and international exposure (with disputed regions adjacent to Kosovo, and in the northern Epirus region bordering Greece) do not make the option of aggressive engagement particularly attractive. Berisha's cautious policies have been attacked by more aggressive national groups with a greater Albanian ideology, but to date the government has succeeded in neutralizing them. The Kosovo problem is far from resolved however, and is certain to continue to provoke major instabilities.⁵⁰

Serbia also confronts potential instability with an Islamic dimension in its southwestern province of Sanjak. Well-known to students of diplomatic history as the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, the largest single Ottoman administrative unit in the Balkans, Sanjak was

garrisoned militarily by Austria-Hungary after the congress of Berlin in 1878 as a means of blocking Serbian access to the sea. Today this small and isolated region retains considerable strategic importance. Of its 440,000 residents at least 60% are Muslim. The Muslim majority in Sanjak is tempted by scenarios for autonomy or separation, but its territory blocks the major communication routes between Serbia and Montenegro, the two component parts of the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and its retention must therefore be considered a vital interest by Belgrade. Moreover, like the Kosovo, Sanjak contains important Serbian cultural sites (the Milesevo and Sopocani cloisters).

Bosnia-Herzegovina: The tragedy of contemporary Bosnia-Herzegovina has attracted a great deal of international attention to its once-neglected Muslim community, whose capital at Sarajevo, in addition to its much-touted multinational character, may be described as the cultural focus of the Muslim presence in Europe. Yugoslav Muslims were highly secularized, with only 17% describing themselves as believers in polls conducted during the 1980s.⁵¹ The importance of Islam as a source of cultural identity has nonetheless proved to be considerable.

In May 1990 Alija Izetbegovic founded the *party of Democratic Action* (PDA) as a political forum for Bosnian Muslims with a secular program but also a clear Islamic orientation. Izetbegovic was tried and convicted by the Yugoslav regime in 1983 for the dissemination of a fifty page *Islamic Declaration*, a vague appeal for a resurrected Islamic identity in Bosnia, and was only released from prison in 1988.⁵² His party split in September 1990 as a rival *Muslim Bosniak Organization* led by the émigré entrepreneur Adil Zulfikarpasic broke away in protest against the extent of Islamic influence within the

Izetbegovic faction. But in the elections of December 1990 Izetbegovic's movement swept the Muslim vote. The outcome, with the three main national communities voting on strictly confessional lines, did not bode well for Bosnia-Herzegovina's viability. The PDA carried 86 of 240 seats in the new bicameral assembly, the *Serbian Democratic party* linked to Milosevic in Serbia carried 72 seats, and the *Croatian Democratic Community* with an allegiance to the government of Franjo Tudjman in Zagreb carried 44 seats, representations closely approximating the relative size of the Muslim, Serbian, and Croatian components of the electorate. By the summer of 1992, granted recognition by the international community but denied the kind of effective support that would have been necessary to maintain national integrity, Bosnia-Herzegovina was pulled into the maelstrom of the Yugoslav civil war.

The question of the identity of Bosnia's Muslims lies at the heart of present restructuring in the Balkans. Izetbegovic's embattled government has insisted upon its commitment to a multinational, multicultural, multiconfessional, and integral Bosnia-Herzegovina resting upon a distinctive Bosnian national identity. It has also actively sought international sponsorship in Muslim forums, and when convenient has echoed Muslim portrayals of its cause as that of an embattled Islam pitted against an indifferent or hostile West. "What is occurring in Bosnia is not only a question for the Bosnians," writes the Bosnian spiritual leader Mustafa ef. Ceric. "The war in Bosnia is a global conspiracy against Muslims, this is something that all Muslims should know. What is occurring is not only the suffering of the Muslims of Bosnia, but humiliation for all the Muslims of the world."⁵³ Convictions such as this have become more widespread as both suffering and humiliation have intensified, and Islamic influence upon Izetbegovic and his entourage has clearly grown

stronger. The shift in emphasis has increased tensions within the Bosnian Muslim community itself, and was one of the reasons behind the attempted secession of the Bihac enclave in the autumn of 1993.

Through 1993 a divided Europe demonstrated a great capacity for coexisting with the unconscionable war in former Yugoslavia. After more than two years of fighting, however, patience with the frustrating search for diplomatic solutions seemed to have reached its limits. Moreover, the configuration of forces in the Balkan region that the Bosnian conflict had called into being was a source of increasing concern.

Though the idea of a "Muslim axis" in the Balkans, from Istanbul through Sarajevo to Tirana, is a bit far-fetched, by the winter of 1993-1994 there had clearly come to be an important civilizational component to the fighting in Bosnia. Sarajevo's resistance to a UN-brokered peace plan that would effect a partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the creation of a Muslim rump state corresponding to about 30% of the republic's territory, rested upon the conviction that it could count upon moral and physical support from the Muslim world at large, as well as upon a guarantee of survival from the USA. The Americans, it was presumed, solicitous toward their Middle Eastern allies, would not allow the imposition of a Carthaginian peace at the Bosnian Muslims' expense. The Clinton administration's policy toward the Yugoslav conflict seemed to encourage such conclusions. For all its hesitations and inconsistencies, it was firm in assigning primary responsibility to the Serbian side, and kept US initiatives broadly aligned with those of Turkey and other key Muslim states.⁵⁴

For its part, the Muslim world was vociferous in defense of the cause of the martyred Muslims of Bosnia, though somewhat more chary with material support.⁵⁵ The Turkish ambassador to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sükrü Tufan, did not mince words in promising Sarajevo that "we stand behind you, we support you," and in condemning the purported double standard employed by the West in its dealing with Muslim nations.⁵⁶ Turkey's support for an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina conflicted with its preference for an approach based upon community rights in Cyprus, but in both cases engagement on behalf of the rights and dignity of beleaguered Muslim peoples confronting hostile Christian majorities defined the substance of policy. Albania, with an eye to pressuring Serbia on the Kosovo question, had also aligned itself with Sarajevo, signing a military cooperation agreement with Ankara and offering the Americans access to military facilities in close proximity to the conflict zones.

The other side of the coin was represented by the community of interests established between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Greece, and the Russian Federation, all countries with Orthodox Christian cultures, important historical associations, and shared regional priorities. Even in their phases of greatest compliance with Western council, the Soviet and Russian governments of Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris El'tsin refused to abandon the role of lobbyist for Russia's "historic ally" Serbia. Despite the absurdity of its haggling over the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Greece had important differences with Albania over northern Epirus and was concerned about what it perceived as the potential for expanding Turkish influence in the Balkans. These concerns were to some extent shared by the Slavic peoples of the region, and belligerent extremists did not fail to give vent to them. The Bosnian Serb commander general Ratko Mladic

went on record warning of an "infernal plot" between Muslims and the West "to disunite and destroy the Orthodox world, with the next target Russia," and Russia's Vladimir Zhirinovskii, speaking at the symbolic site of Vukovar and at Bijeljina in Bosnia during January 1994, refuted the legitimacy of any kind of Bosnian entity, growled that "an attack on Serbia would be an attack on Russia," and invoked the creation of "a union of Slavic states from Knin to Vladivostok."⁵⁷ Unfortunately, this kind of rhetoric could not be laughed away. It was informed by substantial issues whose resolution would be determined, not only by the outcome of the battle for Bosnia and an eventual settlement of the Kosovo and Macedonian questions, but also and more importantly by a sweeping geopolitical reconfiguration in the entire Balkan area. The Belgrade-Athens and Istanbul-Sarajevo axes cross in Macedonia, and by the winter of 1993-1994 Ankara was hinting that should the Yugoslavia conflict extend into this region it would be difficult for Turkey not to become involved.⁵⁸ Such assertions could be taken with a grain of salt. The potential for the war in Yugoslavia to escalate into a general regional conflagration, with completely unforeseeable consequences, was nonetheless only too real.

The logical third party to the Balkan conflict was Europe itself. Both Slovenia and Croatia went to great lengths to emphasize their Catholic and European heritage, and status as bastions of Western civilization "on the edge of the Orthodox and Muslim abyss."⁵⁹ Germany was commonly viewed as a kind of patron for the western republics, though its influence could easily be overestimated.⁶⁰ But Europe as a whole was badly divided over options for Yugoslavia, and the results of its diplomatic efforts during the first two years of fighting were modest. The European Union cooperated with the United Nations to keep negotiating forums alive, and supplied armed contingents to carry out peacekeeping and

humanitarian assistance responsibilities.⁶¹ These were important but also minimal initiatives that aimed at containing the conflict rather than grappling with the key underlying issue of the kind of new regional order would eventually prevail.

Given the extent of embitterment and vengefulness that have been created by years of savage warfare it is highly questionable whether any government purporting to represent the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina could avoid a partisan identification with one or another of its communities. As 1994 dawned Europe seemed to have reached an accord that some kind of partition of Bosnia, with international guarantees for the Muslim zone including the stationing of UN peacekeeping forces, was unavoidable. If accompanied by compromise arrangements on other outstanding issues, including, perhaps, the reattachment of an autonomous Macedonia to some kind of Yugoslav confederal entity or common market, and partition arrangements in Kosovo and the Kninska Krajina, a partition might provide a foundation for pacification and gradual reconstruction, or at least it was hoped. Backed by Washington, however, Sarajevo resisted the logic of what it defined as capitulation, and promised to fight on. Meanwhile the weakened government of Boris El'tsin in Moscow issued dire warnings about the implications of external military action directed against the Serbian side alone. The nightmare scenario of a "clash of civilizations" in the Balkans with Europe, the USA and Turkey, and Russia in opposing camps seemed almost to have been realized.

The conflict in Bosnia conjured up an all-too-familiar image of Balkan diplomacy reminiscent of the era of the Eastern Question, with a confrontation between irreconcilable integral nationalisms opening the door to external interference and

manipulation. There were a number of counter-trends, however, that made worst-case scenarios less likely. The Muslim factor in Balkan politics was not so evolved as to represent a decisive source of cohesion among Muslim communities with their own important internal divisions and dilemmas. Nor were the Balkan Muslims, if they were ever asked, likely to prefer to stand in permanent opposition to the Christian and Slavic cultures surrounding them. "Dreams of integration with Greater Europe," writes H. T. Norris with reason, "are shared by Muslim Bosnians as well as Albanians, who see no inherent conflict between this wish and their own Muslim identity."⁶² There was no indication that Russian support for Serbia was (or had ever been) anything less than instrumental, useful as a source of leverage in Europe but not so important as to motivate significant risks. Germany's priorities were still those of national unification and European integration, not foreign policy adventurism in an area of secondary concern. Although Europe had struggled with the Yugoslav problem it had not broken apart, and its search for a formula for peace seemed in the end to lead to an approximate accord. A younger and more self-confident Turkish leadership, less preoccupied with the elusive goal of joining Europe, less dependent upon NATO as a security anchor absent a clear and present Soviet danger, and of necessity sensitive to the increased salience of Islamic consciousness in domestic politics as well as to the political weight of the large communities inside Turkey of Albanian and Bosnian heritage, had good reasons for positioning itself as an ally for the Muslim peoples of the Balkans. To leap from this conclusion to the assertion that some kind of neo-Ottomanism had become a decisive influence in Turkish foreign policy was completely unjustified. All external actors were constrained both by the tangible but limited nature of the interests that are at stake, and by the terrible complexities and unpredictabilities of the Balkan political environment.

Regardless of how it is resolved, the Bosnian conflict will leave deep traces. In addition to the heavy cost in lives and damage wrought, it has poisoned relations between the neighboring peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina, peoples who had lived together in harmony for generations and who will eventually have to turn back to the challenge of coexistence under much more difficult circumstances. Disputes over the proper diplomatic responses have aggravated ill-feeling and mistrust between the major European powers and set back the process of European unification. European-American relations have been affected, and relations between the West and an unstable Russian Federation in the midst of its own open-ended crisis threaten to disintegrate irremediably. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina has likewise widened an unfortunate rift between the Islamic and Christian civilizations of the Mediterranean and Balkan areas. The greatest tragedy is that this has occurred precisely in the region that might once have seemed to be best placed to serve as a model for the harmonious intermingling and coexistence of cultures.

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The Muslim peoples of central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans all confront, to a greater or lesser degree, the challenge of redefining themselves culturally against a background of painful economic decline and severe political disorder. The breakdown of the Soviet and Yugoslav communist federations has set a process in the works that is no doubt irreversable, but that is also historically unique and will require a good deal of time to complete. It is a great mistake to presume that such complex transitions can somehow move forward in a linear fashion toward predestined ends. There are no models for changes on so vast a scale, and those who would seek to impose them are no doubt

doomed to frustration.

Turkey is at the hub of these complicated transitions and has much to contribute to their success. It also has much at risk. Modern Turkey is a developing country with a complicated international agenda and pressing social problems. Ankara's initial enthusiasm for the challenge of engagement in adjacent regions whose populations are in some measure struggling to refind a common cultural heritage requires no justification. But commitment also brings the danger of costly entangling engagements, neglect of more pressing responsibilities elsewhere, and increased tension with other aspiring regional influentials.

The long historical associations and powerful interdependencies that still bind the peoples of central Asia and the Caucasus to the Russian north, and the Muslims of the Balkans to their Slavic neighbors, cannot and should not simply be abandoned overnight. This is so even in the catastrophic circumstances that exist at present in Bosnia-Herzegovina (where in 1991 27% of all marriages were mixed). The changes underway in these regions are chaotic and unpredictable, and have the potential to generate almost unlimited violence. Under the circumstances, if Russia is capable of playing the role of a stabilizing force in central Asia and the Caucasus it should be encouraged to do so. If conflict resolution in the Balkans demands concessions to the interests of all parties to the conflict, including those who bear particular responsibility for the original descent into coercive conflict behavior, then those concessions should be made. Forums for regional cooperation such as the Economic Cooperation Organization or Black Sea Development Project can help generate a climate of positive interaction and should be carefully cultivated. Emotion-

laden rhetoric invoking the destinies of entire peoples and cultures has already wrecked considerable havoc, and should be avoided at all costs. A minimum of order is a prerequisite for eventual geopolitical reorientations, and the best way to encourage order will be through accommodating policies that make a priority of patient, non-dogmatic, pragmatic cooperation.

In the end new regional orders and patterns of affiliation in central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans will rest upon the expanded self-confidence and increased self-sufficiency of the region's peoples themselves. Turkey, along with other influential regional actors, can contribute to those ends by emphasizing positive interactions and by avoiding the trap of a confrontational conflict of interests where narrowly defined state interests are substituted for larger commitments to multilateral cooperation and regional pacification.

Endnotes

1. Morton I. Abramowitz, "Dateline Ankara: Turkey after Ozal," *Foreign Policy* 91(Summer 1993): 165.
2. S. A. M. Adshead, *Central Asia in World History* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 218, and the discussion on pp. 217-219.
3. See the classic evaluation by A. J. P. Taylor, *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 442-446.
4. Cited in Serge A. Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 33.
5. See the account in Martha Brill Olcott, *The Kazakhs* (Stanford: Hoover Press, 1987), pp. 118-126.
6. Marco Buttino, "Politics and Social Conflict during a Famine: Turkestan Immediately after the Revolution," in Marco Buttino, ed., *In a Collapsing Empire: Underdevelopment, Ethnic Conflicts and Nationalisms in the Soviet Union. Annali 1992* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1992), p. 258.
7. The enduring appeal of these ideas is evoked in Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal

Quelquejay, *Les Mouvements nationaux chez les musulmans de Russie: Le 'Sultangalievisme' au Tatarstan* (Paris: Mouton, 1960).

8. Robin Wright, "Islam, Democracy and the West, " *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1993): 139 gives the traditional interpretation.

9. On the problematic legacy of Soviet-drawn borders see I. Rotar', "Izderki sovetskoi kartografii (mina zamedlennogo deistviia dlia Srednei Azii)," *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 25 February 1992, p. 4.

10. Michael Rywkin asserts that the "Soviet educational record in Central Asia is as good as humanly possible given the objective circumstances and the low starting point." Michael Rywkin, *Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia* (London: Hurst, 1982), p. 105.

11. See the special issue of *Post-Soviet Geography* 5(May 1992) devoted to the Aral Sea crisis, and *Aralskii krizis (istoriko-geograficheskaia retrospektiva)* (Moscow, 1991).

12. Between 1979 and 1989 the urban population fell from 33% to 31% in Tajikistan, from 48% to 45% in Turkmenistan, and from 39% to 38% in Kyrgyzstan. In Uzbekistan it remained stable at 41%. Alain Gresh, "Lendemain indécis en Asie centrale," *Le Monde diplomatique* (January 1992): 6.

13. Citation from James Rupert, "Dateline Tashkent: Post-Soviet Central Asia," *Foreign*

Policy (Summer 1992): 176.

14. According to the Soviet census of 1989, 60.3% of the population of central Asia lived in rural districts, including 80% of the indigenous population. *Naselenie SSSR, 1988: Statisticheskii ezhegodnik* (Moscow, 1989), pp. 24-26.

15. James Critchlow, "Will There Be a Turkestan?," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report* no. 28, 10 July 1992, p. 50.

16. Boris Z. Rumer, "The Gathering Storm in Central Asia," *Orbis* (Winter 1993): 89.

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37. Ivo Andric, *The Development of Spiritual Life in Bosnia under the Influence of Turkish Rule* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990), p. 38. This is the text of Andric's doctoral dissertation, written in 1924 for the University of Graz.

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39. The best general modern history of the Balkan Muslims is Alexandre Popovic, *L'Islam balkanique: Les musulmans du sud-est européen dans la période post-Ottomane* vol. 11 (Berlin: Osteuropa Institut an der Freien Universität Balkanologische Veröffentlichungen, 1986).
40. J. F. Brown, "Turkey: Back to the Balkans?," in Fuller and Lesser, eds., *Turkey's New Geopolitics*, p. 150.
41. Population figures are based upon a preliminary sample of the Bulgarian census of 1992, the complete results of which have yet to be published. I am grateful to Mr. Ivailo Partchev, National Statistic Institute, Republic of Bulgaria, for supplying me with this data.
42. A thorough history of the ethnic Turks of Bulgaria is provided by Bilal N. Simsir, *The Turks of Bulgaria (1878-1985)* (London: K. Rustum & Brother, 1988). See also Wolfgang Höpgen, "Türken und Pomaken in Bulgarien," *Südosteuropa Mitteilungen* 2(1992): 138-148.
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44. Sabine Riedel, "Die türkische Minderheit im parlamentarischen System Bulgariens,"

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45. Cited from *Pressluzhba "Kurier"*, 5 June 1990, pp. 6-7.

46. Interviews with Ahmed Dogan and the MRF parliamentary delegation, 16 June 1990 and 26 June 1992, Sofia, Bulgaria.

47. Robert Austin, "What Albania Adds to the Balkan Stew," *Orbis* (Spring 1993): 274-276.

48. See "Aid to Continue," *Balkan News and East European Report*, 16 January 1994, p. 4.

49. Fabian Schmidt, "Kosovo: The Time Bomb That has not Gone Off," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report* no. 39, 1 October 1993, pp. 21-29.

50. Michel Roux, *Les Albanais en Yougoslavie: Minorité nationale, territoire et développement* (Paris: Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 1992) gives a rich analysis of the roots of the Kosovo problem, focused on the failure of Yugoslav development policies.

51. Hugh Poulton, *The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict* (London: Minority Rights Publications, 1993), p. 43.

52. The text of the declaration is available in Alija Izetbegovic, "Dichiarazione Islamica," *Limes* 1/2(1993): 259-274.

53. "Ima Bosne i Bosnjaka," *Bosna Press*, 2 December 1993, p. 2.

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55. Fredy Gsteiger, "Grosse Töne, kleine Taten," *Die Zeit*, 18 September 1992, p. 14.

56. See the interview with Sükrü Tufan, "Trostruki standardi," *Bosna Press*, 18 November 1993, p. 5.

57. Florence Hartmann, "Vladimir Jirinovski en tournée chez les Serbes," *Le Monde*, 2 February 1994, p. 3.

58. "Turtsiia shte prati voiski, ako voina obkhvane Makedoniia," *Kontinent*, 10 November 1993, pp. 1 and 6.

59. Mark Thompson, *A Paper House: The Ending of Yugoslavia* (London: Hutchinson Radius, 1992), p. 286.

60. See the triumphalist but well-documented account by Nenad Ivankovic, *Bonn: Druga Hrvatska Fronta* (Zagreb: Mladost, 1993).

61. Geoffrey Edwards, "European Responses to the Yugoslav Crisis: An Interim Assessment," in Reinhard Rummel, ed., *Toward Political Union: Planning a Common Foreign and Security Policy in the European Community* (Boulder: Westview, 1992), pp. 161-186 gives a balanced evaluation through the outbreak of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

62. H. T. Norris, *Islam in the Balkans: Religion and Society between Europe and the Arab World* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1993), p. 275.

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BIBLIOTECA

State, Society and Democracy
in Turkey

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The disintegration of Leninist regimes has provoked both hopes and anxieties. "The New World Order" is the expression of hopes, while "New World Disorder" is the symbol of anxieties. The simultaneous presence of hope and anxiety signals a crisis situation; the Chinese, apparently, write crisis with two characters: one of which stands for challenge, the other for opportunity. Optimists focus on the opportunities, pessimists on the challenges. Francis Fukiyama, for instance, believes that in a world without Leninism, the best of our hopes will be realized through the universalization of liberal democratic capitalism.¹ Ken Jowitt, on the other hand, warns that the worst of our fears may materialize in a world in which old boundaries and identities are in question. Fukiyama welcomes the "end of history"; Jowitt dreads the maelstroms that may accompany its "beginning".²

Surely, both images are overdrawn. Still, the question is which error is more helpful in assigning meaning to the world we have just entered. I am personally more inclined to err on the side of Jowitt, at least for the foreseeable future. But then, again, a beginning does not depart from a void. The present world is neither "nameless" nor without boundaries. There are, after all, a few "distinct types", and

secular (liberal) democracy is one of them. In the new world, will democracies rise to the challenges posed by the old and new opponents: the ethnic nationalists, the religious fundamentalists, the military dictators, and the rage of the poor and the estranged?

In this essay, I am concerned with only one of those democracies: the case of Turkey. How resilient is secular democracy in Turkey in the face of the new challenges; what are its weaknesses and strengths; what, in other words, are its problems and its prospects? In short, how viable and irreversible is secular democracy in Turkey?

The resilience of a democracy may best be judged by the degree of its habituation and the level of cultural entrenchment. Socioeconomic development may put democracy on the agenda, but it cannot guarantee its irreversibility. To be sure no level of entrenched democratic cultural habits can withstand persistent and consistent failure in problem-solving and socioeconomic performance. Nevertheless, the resilience of democracy is proportional to its capacity to withstand socioeconomic stress. No doubt, socioeconomic performance and a high capacity for problem-solving reinforce cultural habituation and the two together allow the sustained and stable growth of democracy. It is in this sense that democracy is a rarity, a "miracle" where culture is enjoined by affluence. And, again, it is in this sense that the "miracle" was largely confined to Northwestern Europe.³ But, what has been a "miracle" for Western Europe is a "model" for

others. Turkey, for some time now, has adopted the miracle as its model: "the West" has been its "reference society".

In the context of the Middle East, the record of secular democracy in Turkey is exceptional, and a story of success. From a Western European perspective, the record is checkered and not so up to contemporary standards. How exceptional, then, is the exception if judged by the standards it has set for itself?

Nation-Building From Above: Transformation and Consolidation

The answer to this question requires a context: the context within which the first democratization occurred in Turkey. As Martin Shefter has suggested in an interesting article, the way in which the first democratization takes place in a country is a "critical experience" with "character-forming" consequences.⁴ The experience itself bears the birthmarks of the conditions under which it is born. Such conditions shape and are, in turn, shaped by democratic politics. In the case of Turkey, democratization was part and parcel of a particular phase of a particular strategy of nation-building. The strategy was nation-building from above under the auspices of a vanguard elite (organization), and the phase involved was the moment of inclusion that followed the moment of exclusion. Let me now define some terms and chart the conceptual territory involved.⁵

By the moment of exclusion, I mean the creation and consolidation of the nucleus of a new (modern) political community that attempts to alter the values, structures and behavior of actually and potentially alternative centers of political power, and "to prevent the existing (traditional) social forces from exercising any uncontrolled and undesired influence over the development and definition of the new community", or, regime. By the moment of inclusion, I mean the attempt "to expand the internal boundaries of regime's political, productive and decision-making systems, to integrate itself with the unofficial...sectors of society rather than to insulate itself from them".⁶

In what follows, I suggest that the story of the Turkish Republic and its democratic experience can best be told within the framework of nation-building from above. Nation-building from above is itself a response to the problem of national dependency and underdevelopment and the attempt to transform tradition. "Kemalism", named after the founding father of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, was the specifically Turkish response to underdevelopment and to the problem of tradition; and, it corresponds to the transformation and consolidation stages of nation-building in Turkey. The inclusion-cum-democratization phase departed from, built upon and was shaped by the legacy of Kemalism.

What lies at the core of Kemalism are its charismatic and ideological qualities. Ideological components of Kemalism are profoundly modern. Namely, they are secularism, nationalism, rationalism and republicanism. And yet, Kemalism is also

informed by a charismatic-heroic ethos initially forged during the War of Independence and eventually directed against the "enemy" of underdevelopment and toward the mission of national reconstruction.

What shaped the organizational-institutional character of the Kemalist regime and its relations with society is the enmeshment of the modern quality of its ideological tenets with the charismatic quality of its spirit in a specific context defined by the following: 1) The incongruence between the ideological constants of Kemalism and the sociocultural infrastructure of (traditional) society (which the Kemalist republican vanguard was intent upon transforming); 2) The strategy of national reconstruction through control rather than mobilization; and, 3) A culturalist approach to social transformation instead of a socioeconomic one.

Each of these dimensions of the Kemalist regime had significant structural consequences. First, the conflict between the ideological tenets of Kemalism and the traditional sociocultural environment led to the creation of a nucleus elite community charged with the mission of transforming (traditional) culture and society. This elite nucleus was, in turn, consolidated by a sustained policy of "separating the elite and regime sectors from...the rest of society".⁷ Moreover, the assumption that comprehensive and direct responsibility for national development required "the corresponding concentration of decision-making powers" within the vanguard elite organizations of nation-building led to the monopolization of the public domain by the official regime.

In sum, Kemalism as a strategy of nation-building from above entailed the dichotomization of regime and society and the fusion official and public domains. An autonomous public realm apart and aside from that which was monopolized and commanded by the official regime was conspicuous by its absence.

Second, the control strategy of transformation and consolidation was based on the principle of priorities. Unlike a revolutionary regime, the radical nationalist Kemalist elite did not attempt to simultaneously transform all areas of social life. Instead, the strategy was the transformation of critical, nodal points of the old, traditional society, and the prevention of existing social forces from mobilizing their resentment against the regime at any level of society. The consequences of this strategy was uneven change: while transformation was undertaken in priority areas, non-priority areas were left to their own traditional devices. Rural areas in particular experienced more control than transformation.

Third, the culturalist conception of transformation produced uneven change yet in another way. Kemalists conceived socioeconomic change as derivative of cultural transformation. Hence, while emphasis was put on the instruments of cultural change, such as education, the legal system, the changing of the Arabic script, the Muslim calendar, and the code of dress, etc., the transformation and development of socioeconomic institutions were relegated to second place and conceived as the products of cultural change.

Thus, the "unreconstructed" society was left to wait until cultural transformation would catch up with it; in the meantime, it would continue to be governed by its customary and traditional ways.

The outcome of this culturalist conception was not only uneven development in the cultural and socioeconomic realms but also a ritualistic, formalistic quality to cultural change. In education, for instance, the correct application of ritual and rote learning tended to take place the interiorization of knowledge and critical, empirical thinking. Such dogmatic formalism, in turn, led to the separation of cultural rituals from private life which remained largely untouched by them.

The consequences of these core components of Kemalism had further effects with interesting and critical implications for the political culture of both the regime and regime-society relations. These structural and cultural components, on the other hand, together constituted the over-all profile of the early Republican regime and the legacy of Kemalism from which democratization departed. Let me now turn to that legacy and the impact it had on the inclusionary-democratic phase of nation-building in Turkey.

The Kemalist Legacy and Democratization

The legacy of the early Republic was an interesting and curious mixture of modernity, tradition and charisma. As I have noted above, the ideological constants of Kemalism were

modern as would befit a scientific-industrial civilization: it was secular, analytic-empirical (scientific), impersonally procedural, universalist, egalitarian, and nationalist with a civic emphasis. These ideological tenets of Kemalism were in a relationship of elective affinity to what Max Weber called the "passive democratization" of culture. And, this modern ideological set, despite the aforementioned formalistic qualities of cultural change, made, although in a selective and partial manner, significant inroads into the "personalistic" and religious nature of traditional cosmology. The "carriers" of this modern ideology were the state-affiliated stratum of cadres: the judges, the secondary school teachers, the military officers, the provincial governors, the university professors, and the "enlightened" (aydin) intelligentsia in general. And, yet alongside this "modern" Turkey, there was another one. This was the "unofficial country" of tradition, partly untouched, partly controlled but untransformed, and partly (and ironically) reinforced by the structural-organizational character of the early Republican regime.

The mission of the Kemalist elite was the secular rationalization of state and society. But, as the state was insulated and segregated from society, it took on the characteristics of a (traditional) corporate status group equipped with exclusive powers and privileges. In this regard, there was more of a continuity with the Ottoman past than a break with it. The political center was more status-embedded than role-governed. It took its cues more

from its substantive goals than from impersonal procedures. And, since its substantive goal was based on the mission of national development, it took on the qualities of a heroic-savior of charismatic proportions. Born within the struggle for national liberation and now charged with the mission of overcoming dependence and underdevelopment, the Kemalist state bore the characteristics of a puritanical, "gazi" state, so to speak. The outcome was a mixed product: The early Republican state combined a modern ideology with a charismatic ethos and a neo-traditional structure.

This composite character of the vanguard-state regime had also interesting implications for the political culture of the "to-be-reconstructed" society. The impact of the status-embedded, charismatic-savior state upon society involved both the transformation of traditional culture and its re-enforcement. Against the intrusion of the modernist ideology of the Republic, one defensive adaptation of society was to cast tradition into modern "discourse" with an Islamic "idiom" on the one hand, ³ and to adjust to the charismatic-traditional features of regime organization with relative ease, on the other. The response to the monopolization of the public domain and the exclusive dichotomization of public (state) and private (social) domains continued to be what it was in the past: the perception of state-society relations as a zero sum game, a calculative approach to the state with a "treasure-found" attitude, and a dissimulative strategy that used external formalism and ritual

for compliance in order to preserve internal identity and defiance."

The Dilemmas, Uncertainties and Limits of Democratization

As I mentioned above, the orienting hypothesis of this paper is that the achievements and shortcomings of secular democracy in Turkey can best be told within the framework of "nation-building from above" under the auspices of a vanguard elite. The first stage in such an approach is the transformation of old society; the second is the consolidation of the new regime; the third is inclusion when the regime seeks reconciliation and integration with society rather than segregation and insulation from it. The idea is to shift from the regime of the elite to the regime of the people. At this moment, the vanguard elite confront a fundamental dilemma and experience a deep uncertainty. The dilemma involves finding a modus vivendi between the conflicting imperatives of regime consolidation and democratic inclusion, and the uncertainty involves the possibility of such an accommodation. The vital question is: how to adapt to democratic participation within the parameters of the regime's core ideological constants? How to gain social support, and thus enhance and enlarge the legitimacy of the regime and yet uphold and preserve the ideological core of the Republic? In short, how to gain support and control it at the same time?

A new task requires a new contract. And, so, in the Turkish case too, a new contract was drawn with the following terms once Turkey began to undertake democratization in the aftermath of World War II.

1. In order to guard against the contamination of the regime, and the insurgence of ideological "polytheism", the "unreconstructed" society was politically enfranchised but ideologically disenfranchised. Communism, fascism, theocratic and fundamentalist religion, royalism, ethnic nationalism, internationalism, cosmopolitanism, etc., were declared out of bounds.

2. In order to elicit support without mobilization that might disrupt the regime, inclusionary politics would tap not ideological but economic resources. In other words, to the problem of incorporation without ideological mobilization, the political economy of growth would be the solution. Instead of socioeconomic change being the derivative of cultural transformation, cultural change would be the function of socioeconomic transformation.

3. There would be a division of labor between those who would guard the ideological heights of the Republic and those who would attend to the business of political economy. The new actors of the new inclusion regime, the political parties, would provide "legitimation from below" and be accountable to the "people" for socioeconomic performance, while the core state elites, would continue to provide ideological-cultural "legitimation from above" and be accountable to the mission of the Republic.

4. The representative institutions of the Republic would be upgraded without, however, forfeiting the vigilance necessary for the preservation of the secular-national Republic. A representative state, on the one hand, and a vigilant guardian state, on the other, would co-exist and cooperate.

These were the basic terms of the charter, the social contract, or, the elite pact which underwrote the transition from authoritarian consolidation regime to democratic inclusion regime. As I have noted elsewhere, this was "democratization from above", negotiated among the regime elite to define the parameters of democratic politics.¹⁰ It is not surprising, then, that the story of Turkish democracy since 1950 turns out to be the story of the conflict between and accommodation of the imperatives of (republican) consolidation and (democratic) inclusion. In examining this conflict-accommodation pattern, we are studying the contours and detours of Turkish democracy.

The Cultural and Performance Consequences of Democratization From Above

As I have proposed above, the inclusion phase of nation-building requires the expansion of the consolidation regime's political, social, productive and decision-making boundaries. There are two sets of dilemmas here: one concerns the emergence of political actors (i.e., politicians

and parties) that would be both loyal to the regime and elicit support from the population; the other, the creation of an intermediate social stratum of core supporters that would mediate between the new political actors and the "to-be-reconstructed" people.

In the context of Turkey's transition to democratic politics, the solution to the first problem led to the emergence of a political class of entrepreneurs who acted upon empirical premises rather than dogmatic ones, who used skills of persuasion and manipulation rather than command and coercion, and who had greater appreciation of discussion, experimentation, concertation, and problem-solving. The solution to the second problem of eliciting social support that would be consistent with the ideological core tenets of the Republic (and which would avoid the insurgence of a plurality of ideological and cultural definitions and identifications) led to the emergence of a clientelist class of socio-occupational entrepreneurs that served precisely the function that was expected of them: intermediation between the political class and the "unreconstructed" people. This stratum was the core of social support, and was drawn from occupational groups that were not directly affiliated with the state.

The transition to democracy was, in sum, premised on a set of compromises: the guardian elite would allow an area of discretion to the political class of party leadership in return for allegiance to the ideological core of Kemalism; and, the political class of party leadership (of the new

representative state) would adopt the intermediate (middle) class as its clients in exchange for ideological compliance. In sum, the recognition and influence of ~~the~~ the class of political and occupational entrepreneurs were pegged to their ideological conformity.

In the presence of charismatic-modern state and an unreconstructed traditional society, there was no other effective way to gain social support outside the framework of patron-client relations. Patronage was a way of incorporating the unreconstructed "people" without re-traditionalizing the state and upholding the modern tenets of the Republican state without getting isolated from the people. Thus, a character-defining outcome of democratization (from above) was the emergence of a state-dependent patronage system equipped with parties of patronage and a (party-constituted) representative "patron" state.

Patronage as an incorporative politics was put to great effect by the center-right parties that dominated democratic governments between 1950-1980. It was, however, a costly weapon in terms of its performance and cultural effects. As I have suggested elsewhere,

"coalitions built on patronage thrive on the disposition of resources on a particularistic basis: goods and services are exchanged for loyalty and support. What underlies clientelist distribution of resources is a logic of partisan loyalty, not a logic of productivity. What lies, therefore, behind a coalition of patronage is a 'soft' state and a 'soft' market. Clientele groups are subject neither to the planned discipline of the state nor to disciplinary competition of the market. A patronage coalition survives best under conditions of economic growth and begins to become undone in economically troubled times..." that is partially of its own doing.¹¹

Clientelism, however, is more than mere exchange with implications for socioeconomic performance, it is more fundamentally a culture. As Ernest Gellner has pointed out, patronage offends both our sense of egalitarianism and universalism. "Patrons and clients are generally unequal. Patronage relations are highly specific. They fail to illustrate the principle that like cases should be treated equally."¹² They are unstandardized, personalistic, partisan, and based on mutually exclusive status. What favors patronage relations is an incompletely impersonalized state and market.

To sum up, the initial consequences of an elite-negotiated democratization from above within the context of nation-building was a regime profile with the following structural characteristics. 1) The re-socialization of the charismatic center into the role of the vigilant guardian; 2) the bicephalous nature of the inclusion regime centered around the vigilant guardian and patronage functions of the interventionist state; 3) the emergence of a non-official public domain in the form patronage politics and client society; 4) the expansion of the productive system as political capitalism that was the counterpart of patronage politics and client society.

The eventual consequences of this post-charismatic-post-traditional regime structure, on the other hand, were following.¹³

The basis of the new politics rested on the provision of state-mediated "material want-satisfaction" which, in turn, shifted the basis of legitimation from cultural legitimation

to performance legitimation. Legitimation was no longer provided from above by an elite-defined truth and mission, but by the capacity of the regime to produce efficiently and to deliver fairly. This performance was subject to ratification from below by the people.¹⁴

The counterpart to the bicephalous nature of the inclusionary state was a bifurcated regime constituency. The one wing of this constituency was made up of the old, state-affiliated, salaried bureaucrats dedicated to the ideological principles of the Republic and to state autonomy, the other was the new class of market-based occupational strata of clients that were attending the business of business, and in pursuit of patronage and economic growth. The etatist constituency was supportive of the old Republican People's Party (RPP), the patronage constituency was incorporated into the new Democratic Party (DP).

The upshot of uneven socioeconomic performance was the ascendance of the client entrepreneurial strata, the descendance of the salaried, etatist class, and the frustration of a motley of aspiring groups who could not achieve the level of "material want-satisfaction" they thought they deserved. The result was anger and rage of the excluded and the marginalized, and the explosion of mobilization politics initially led by the disaffected, radicalized splinter groups of the etatist constituency and eventually picked up by the "dispossessed" of the "society-under-reconstruction."

The very design that had been drafted to avoid ideological conflict and mobilization politics had, ironically, produced what had been most feared. Clientelism begot mobilization and ideological polytheism. Turkish politics was deeply fragmented in the 1960s and 1970s by the insurgence of mobilization politics and ideological "polytheism". Charismatic politics was now back in new form: the role of the heroic-savior had been democratized and ideology was dragged to the streets as Marxist-Leninism, religious fundamentalism, populism of all shapes and colors, and ethnic nationalism.

During the 1950-1980 period, Turkish politics went from incorporative to mobilization politics, on the one hand, and swung from both to the "neo-consolidationist" politics of the military wing of the guardian class and back because it lacked integrative civic politics. Both clientelism and mobilization are antithetical to civic politics. Clientelism instrumentalizes the public domain and exploits it for private purposes as it is based on partisan rather than procedural logic. Mobilization attacks the public domain and aims to disrupt it as it is based on combat ethos and "heroic-savior" logic. Together they resist the emergence of a civic state, a civil society and an entrepreneurial economy all of which are governed by the cultural logic of impersonal rules, norms and procedures.

Clientelist incorporation and a mobilizational style of opposition are not "modern" but neither are they traditional; rather, they partake of both and are, in this sense, post-

traditional and perhaps even pre-modern. What post-traditional politics lacks is "a culture of impersonal measured action."¹⁵ Nevertheless, the post-traditional politics of the 1950-1980 era in Turkey had more the characteristics of an evolving modern performance culture than the devolving features of re-traditionalization.

The Liberalizing and Civil-izing Effects of Post-Traditional Democratic Politics

The attempt to win society from within as opposed to controlling it from an insulated position from above had far-reaching consequences for the regime and regime-society relations. The nature of authority relations changed from the command/control mode of an authoritarian bureaucratic regime in which regime and society were dichotomized and opposed to each other to a persuasion/performance mode that was consistent with the shift to an inclusionary, reconciliation regime. A brief examination of this change in terms its impact upon authority relations between regime and society provides us with the regime profile of the post-traditional democratic politics in Turkey.

1. With the transition to inclusionary-democratic politics and the expansion of the political and decision-making boundaries of the authoritarian consolidation regime, a new type of political actor emerged: In contrast to the cadre of political bureaucrats of the consolidation period, there emerged a class of political entrepreneurs who

staked their influence not on charismatic mission or status-embedded power but on winning social support. Hence, this new political class was constrained by the concerns, aspirations, values and norms of society. Its action-orientation and policy initiatives were, therefore, empirical, pragmatic, calculative and conciliatory rather than dogmatic and ideologically-informed. They relied on discussion, persuasion, manipulation, experimentation, consultation/concertation, and problem-solving. The new political class, in sum, staked its existence on performance, accountability, and legitimation from below (even though they relied on the resources of the state to elicit clientelist support from society).

2. With the expansion of the productive boundaries of the consolidation regime, a new class of social actors emerged. They were the occupational entrepreneurs that constituted the middle class and the core social support group of the new regime. They were differentiated from the old support group of state-affiliated cadres with official status and relied on individual initiative, achievement and competition. They were, as mentioned earlier, the clients of the new patron state, dependent on its largesse; nevertheless, their relations to the state was defined not in terms of their status-standing but in terms of their capacity for initiative, enterprise, and functionality.

3. The combined effects of political and socioeconomic entrepreneurialism on regime-society relations were the decline in status-governed interaction based on mutual

exclusivity, ritualistic-formalistic and dissimulative forms of behavior based on mutual suspicion, and estrangement, and the increase in functional-rational modes of interaction based on utility, initiative, contract, performance and skill (even though such interaction had also a mutually manipulative and collusive aspect to it).

4. A new political space, a political-public domain differentiated from the official-public realm and the primordial-private domain governed by an ethos of impersonal rules and norms and expressed in the role of active and equal citizenship, began to make inroads into popular consciousness, and life-forms of everyday existence. The effect was to diminish the distance between regime and society and to pave the way for integrative forms of inclusion and a sense of shared public identity (even though that public domain was partly exploited for private gain and partly the target of the combat troops of charismatic-mobilizational politics).

Needless to say, these were not the dominant and determinative characteristics of the post-traditional political culture in Turkey. They were beginnings and

potentialities that were the possible harbingers of a breakthrough to new forms of politics, society and economy. Interestingly, they were the liberalizing and civil-izing effects of a state that acted more like a patron than a liberal arbiter and manager, a society that bore less the characteristics of a civil society and more those of a client one, and a neo-mercantile (state-dependent) economy that was governed more by the political logic of patronage than the impersonal logic of a competitive market or planned economy. What predominated the scene was patron-client relations and political capitalism, and what opposed this dominant form of politics was mobilization politics governed by a charismatic combat ethos.

The impact of post-traditionalism was double-edged: one edge undermined tradition, the other modernity. Its modern aspects were at odds with its traditional components. The conflicting imperatives inherent in post-traditionalism bred periodic crises, the response to which was military intervention at roughly ten-year intervals between 1950 and 1980. In the 1980s, a massive attempt was made to break out of the crisis spiral of post-traditionalism by effecting a breakthrough to liberal modernity. When, therefore, Turkey stepped into the post-Leninist world, it confronted a new set of challenges while it was struggling with a set of its own. The internal challenge was posed by its own efforts to undertake a "liberal revolution", the external one by the breakdown of the global Post-War Settlement.

The Second Transition:

From Post-Traditional to Liberal Democracy?

Viewed from the perspective of nation-state building, Republican Turkey has been undergoing a second transition since the early 1980s. The first was the transition from the charismatic early Republic to the post-War, post-traditional Republic; the second has been (and continues to be) from post-traditionalism toward liberal modernism. In what follows, I shall examine the problems and prospects of liberal democracy in Turkey from the perspective of this second transition.

The issues of the late 1970s post-traditional crisis were political fragmentation, ideological polarization, and a fast escalating economic disintegration and terror. The response to these problems was once again a "neo-consolidationist" military repossession of the public domain (1980-1983). The solution was political and economic reconstruction under the auspices of the military and re-democratization and Ozalism (1983-1993) (named after the late Turgut Ozal, the "czar" of economic restructuring first under military rule and later as prime minister and president). The consequences have been significant--perhaps less than a revolution but certainly more than mere tinkering.

The immediate issue of the 1980s was economic. The issue of economic performance was related to the deconstruction of the inwardly-oriented, state-interventionist "bargain economy" (political capitalism) and the construction of an outwardly-

oriented market economy (entrepreneurial capitalism). The profound issues, however, were political and cultural, for while economic performance was pegged to the liberalization of the economy, economic liberalization required the transition from patron to liberal state and from client to civil society. The agenda of the 1980s demanded, in essence, a breakthrough from post-traditional to modern liberal democratic culture.

On the agenda of the second transition were (are) also the civic-ethnic issue as well as the problem of secular religion. These issues, however, are not unrelated to the problem of the liberal breakthrough. The problems of liberalization (with its economic, political and social components) and the problem of primordialism (i.e., ethnic nationalism and fundamentalist religion) are mutually related in the sense that the resolution of the one is related to the resolution of the other. The problem is circular: primordialism endangers the consolidation of liberal democracy, and the absence of liberal democracy aggravates primordial politics. Let us break into this circular causation with the liberal economic reforms.

The economic reforms of the second transition have neither succeeded nor failed. The record shows that they have advanced, stumbled, retreated, advanced again, and stumbled again. Ziya Onis has aptly shown in this studies of the liberalization efforts in Turkey where there have been advances, vacillations and retreats.¹⁶ There have been advances in the reduction micro-level state interventionism, changing priorities in public spending, financial

liberalization, competitive exchange rates, trade liberalization, deregulation and export-promotion. There have been, however, little or no advances in fiscal discipline, tax reform, foreign direct investment, privatization, capital and labor employment, monopolization, and reduction in the bloated bureaucracy. Moreover, there have been retreats in income distribution, in welfare systems, inflation, and domestic and foreign debts

The record of economic performance is clearly spotty, and erratic. Despite the decline in state interventionism, for instance, considerable protectionism and intervention continue to exist, hence, "rent-seeking" and "rent-giving", in other words, patron-client relations, have by no means disappeared. Liberalization and growth have been fitful, relative incomes volatile and inflation chronic. The net record shows advance but one marked by inconstancy, irregularity and variegation.

Without belaboring the point, let me just say that there are two contrasting strategies and styles of implementing reforms and managing the economy. One draws on political participation and social support, and requires democratic consensus; the other requires insulation of governments from popular demands and management from above, and undermines democracy. Turkey has tried both strategies of implementing reforms and managing the economy with the consequences summarized above.

Since the transition from military rule, the economic record have been spotty and erratic because the styles of reform implementation and economic management have been

inconstant. Governments have vacillated between the two styles because reforms from above with adverse distributive consequences engender opposition and conflicts; the participatory approach, on the other hand, compromises economic soundness and effectiveness. In the final analysis, reforms and reform strategies have been inconsistent and erratic because the political system and civil society they draw upon have been inconsistent and erratic. There is a vicious cycle here, and breaking out of it requires a breakthrough to liberal democratic political culture; a liberal economy, civil society and democratic political system are interrelated.

Liberal political regime, civil society and market economy are inconsistent and incomplete in Turkey because what shapes the regime profile of democracy in Turkey today is not only the breaks with the past but also continuities. Despite the breaks, the residues of the past continue to exercise significant influence on the style of leadership, and the nature of institutions and orientations. Ideological polytheism and mobilization politics, for instance, have receded and given way to a spectrum of pragmatic parties. And yet, patronage and corruption, conceived as antidote to ideological-mobilizational politics in the past, continue to be popular with a party system that is fragmented and weakly institutionalized. The new society is vibrant, dynamic, oriented toward achievement, professionalism, productivism, consumerism, and money, and yet, it continues to approach the public domain with a "treasure-found" attitude, as an

instrumental arena to be exploited for private-selfish gain. Progress has been made from conceiving secularism as state control of religion to separation of state and religion, and yet both continue to suspect each other of intentions to dominate. Ethnic differences are no longer denied but a sense of shared civic consciousness and integrative politics have not yet matured. The absolute level of wealth in the country has increased significantly, and yet it is poorly distributed, and, hence, the object of anger and resentment. Political leadership is young and energetic, and yet it lacks experience and party roots, relying on media-sponsored imagery and gimmicks. In sum, Turkey is a new amalgam of old and new elements; there is, however, no denying that it has come a long way, and that it has also some distance to cover before it emerges as a distinct type of liberal society.

NOTE: The very last paragraph of this paper needs further elaboration and expansion in the space of a few more pages. However, I stop here so as not to further delay the submission of the paper, and inconvenience the organizers of the conference and the discussants of the paper. The needed expansion will appear in the finalized version of the paper.

(1 February 1994)

FOOTNOTES

1. Francis Fukiyama, "The End of History?" The National Interest, No. 16 (Summer 1989).

2. Ken Jowitt, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), see especially Ch.9.

3. See John Hall, Powers and Liberties (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985).

4. Martin Shefter, "Party and Patronage: Germany, England, and Italy" Politics and Society, 7/4 (1977).

5. This part of the paper draws upon the conceptual framework which Ken Jowitt developed (in Jowitt, op. cit.) for the analysis of what he calls the "system-building" approach to modernization. In structural terms, there are interesting similarities, and differences, between the "system-building" and "nation-building" strategies of modernization. It seems to me that it would be fruitful to examine the current problems of post-Leninist countries with democratization and liberalization in the light of the Turkish experience after World War II.

6. Ibid., pp. 56-57, 88.

7. Ibid., p. 59.

8. See Serif Mardin, Religion and Change in Modern Turkey (New York: State University of New York Press, 1990).

9. I elaborated on these themes on several occasions. See, for instance, Ilkay Sunar, "Democracy in Turkey: Problems and Prospects" in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds.), Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). And, also "Populism and Patronage: The Demokrat Party and Its Legacy in Turkey" Il Politico: Rivista Italiana Di Scienze Politiche, LV/4, (Ottobre-Dicembre 1990). The same theme is found in Jowitt, op. cit., Ch. 2.

10. Sunar, op. cit.

11. Sunar, "Populism and Patronage", p. 750.

12. Ernest Gellner, "Patrons and Clients" in Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury (eds.), Clientelism in the Mediterranean Countries (

13. The charismatic Republic could be said to correspond to Ataturk's leadership; after his death (1938), under the leadership of Ismet Inonu, it could be said that the regime took on the characteristics of "neo-traditionalism".

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TURKEY IN THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
IN THE BALKANS AND THE BLACK SEA REGION

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January 15, 1994

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TURKEY IN THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
IN THE BALKANS AND THE BLACK SEA REGION
(Dr. Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer)

INTRODUCTION

The fulcrum of the developments and currents generated by the radical changes of the last several years in the international system have been the Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Asian (Eurasian) worlds. In geographical, political and cultural terms Turkey sits along the axis where these two worlds blend into one another. Given this central location, the challenges and tasks of adaptation to the post-Cold War era have been at one and the same time highly promising as well as highly demanding for Turkey.

It has been promising essentially because the colossal Soviet threat has disappeared. And, the post-Communist world in the Balkans and the post-Soviet world in Eurasia seemed to offer expanded space for mutually beneficial bilateral and multilateral cooperation with numerous new independent actors freshly joining the international system.

On the other hand, the ethnic, national and irredentist upheavals that have seized the two regions adjoining Turkey, namely, the Balkans and the Black Sea Region (BBSR) in the wake of the phasing out of the Cold War have brought to Turkey's doorstep some of the most painful repercussions and ramifications of the geostrategic transition to the post-Cold War era. These primordial conflicts have bequeathed to their respective regions great instability and insecurity. Given the persistence in both regions of dynamic forces that are pressing for a reordering in the regional political, economic and military hierarchies,

uncertainty seems likely to remain the hallmark of international politics in the BBSR for some time to come.

This study will investigate the evolving interaction between Turkey and the emerging security environment in that stretch of geopolitical space from the Adriatic in southern Europe to around the Caspian region in Western Asia. It will not deal with the security environment to the south and southeast of Turkey where it has mutual borders with Syria, Iraq and Iran -- even though no study of Turkey's role within the larger region in which it is situated can be complete without taking into account this vital aspect. Nor will it include a section on the foreign and security policy implications of the Kurdish question.

Section I of this study will look at how and in what ways the post-Cold War era has impacted on the geopolitical environment around Turkey. Section II will offer a conceptual framework as a guide to the fundamental forces that have steered Turkish foreign and security policy thinking more or less continuously since the foundation of the Republic, and how they are being redefined today. Section III will focus on the specific positions and policies of Turkey in the Balkans. Section IV will focus on the southern Caucasus and Central Asia. The study will end with Concluding Remarks.

II. TURKEY'S NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The strategic retreat of Soviet power has been the determining event that has led not only to the end of the Cold War, but simultaneously with it, to the downfall of Communism in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet/Russian

Empire. The global power configuration and dominant patterns of behavior that had prevailed since the October Revolution in 1917, and later since the end of the Second World War have been, radically altered as a result.

Turkey has been directly and immediately affected by this geostrategic change for several reasons. It is geographically contiguous to those theaters like the BBSR where change has been most marked, and, it has powerful historical, cultural and ethnic bonds with many of the peoples in those lands who all of a sudden have found themselves freed from Communism and Soviet/Russian hegemony of, in some instances, close to two centuries.

More specifically, in the new geopolitical setting one sees that the centuries old common Turkish-Russian borders have ceased to exist. This is a development of historic significance for Turkish security. Coming in the wake of important arms control agreements of the last few years, especially the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE, 1990), the new political map in Turkey's north and northeast has seemed to offer the kind of security unprecedented in Turkey's modern history. The lessons of Ottoman-Russian history inform Turks that security between the two predecessor-states was a rare quality in any case since the time of Peter the Great -- a point which shall be raised again in the next section.

Related to the strategic retreat of Soviet power has been the fragmentation of power around Turkey. Gone is the single, monolithic power of Moscow on the northern and eastern shores of the Black Sea, divided now among the Ukraine, (holding the longest shores), Georgia and Russia. An independent Ukraine

claims an equal right to a major maritime role in the Black Sea. How the naval balance between the Ukraine and Russia will evolve will have a direct bearing on Turkey for reasons that go beyond an exclusive concern for military balance. For example, the Montreux Convention (1936) that defines the Straits regime will be affected by the evolving maritime situation in the Black Sea, in turn possibly raising the difficult question of its revision. The relevance of the Montreux Convention had been a subject of debate in the West following the transit by the Soviet Union of Kiev-class helicopter carriers through the Straits beginning in (1) 1976.

The viability of the Montreux regime in the post-Cold War era is likely to acquire greater salience in the near future in the context of anticipated increases in the volume of merchant shipping through the Straits. For, among other things, the Black Sea and therefore the Turkish Straits are among the major alternative routes under consideration by the international business circles engaged in negotiations with the government of (2) Azerbaijan for the transport of Azeri oil to Western markets.

In the southern Caucasus, Soviet/Russian sovereignty has been replaced by three relatively small independent states: Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Further to the east, Turkic-speaking republics in Central Asia have been freed from roughly 150-year old Russian rule. Except for Armenia, all the newly independent former Soviet Republics in the south and Turkey share several common attributes such as ethnicity, language, culture and history, altogether presenting a potentially dynamic force in

(3)
favor of bonding if not political community.

In the Balkans, too, liberation from Communism and the phasing out of the Warsaw Pact (and the CMEA) have meant the emergence of an entirely new, and a seemingly secure regional politico-military landscape. As in the northeast, in the Balkans, too, the signing of the CFF treaty had already generated the anticipation of an improved security environment. Like the West in the first wave of post-Cold War euphoria, Turkey also looked forward to the liberalization of political, cultural and economic relations in the region to mutual benefit.

Most importantly, perhaps, geopolitical change in the post-Cold war era has involved other elements in addition to physical things like military power, geographic assets, possession of raw materials, etc., as Graham E. Fuller reminds us.⁽⁴⁾ The "neo-geopolitics", in his terminology, has activated psychological and cultural dynamics among nations and countries. It has aroused sentiments, perceptions and aspirations about group identities, preferred lifestyles as well as memories concerning cross-national and cross-cultural experiences. Fuller's following statement clearly captures the spirit of the neo-geopolitics: "Without history and psychology, for example, the Balkans is meaningless. It is language and myth, not rivers, mountains, or raw materials, that link the Turkish shores of the Mediterranean to the shores of Lake Baikal over the rivers of Western China --
(5)
in a real political sense."

The neo - geopolitical undercurrents have indeed mobilized powerful processes of mutual awareness and sympathy among the Turks of Turkey, their ethnic and linguistic kins in the Caucasus

and Central Asia, and Balkan peoples with a Muslim identity who looked to Turkey as a source of moral and material support in the formidable task of transition to post-Communist societies. In this spirit, leaders of the Turkic-speaking republics in Central Asia and Azerbaijan in the east and of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania in the Balkans rushed to Ankara in 1991 and 1992, first to get acquainted, and then to tap the power of the recently energized emotional bonding for their respective political and economic needs as newcomers to the international system.

The new mood in Turkey of enthusiasm for and interest in these peoples in far off lands was in many respects startling.⁽⁵⁾ For, the cognitive world especially of the majority of the political elite in Turkey had been quite exclusionary when it came to the Turkic-speaking world. Behind this near taboo was the ultimate wish not to jeopardize relations with Moscow. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's vision of Turkey saw Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism as dangerous and unrealistic ideologies. In succeeding decades they became politically and socially incorrect. Only among ultra nationalists references to "captive Turks" served as points of ideological contact with the Turkic world in the former Soviet Union and China. By and large, mainstream political elite viewed the Turkic-speaking population in the Soviet union, "as good Soviet citizens (who) would probably be gradually Russianized."⁽⁷⁾

A similar revival of mutual enthusiasm has taken place with Bosnian Muslims and the Albanians. In their case, the common bond of Islam, a sense of shared history and mutual concern with the

Balkan balance that was being challenged by Serbian irredentism formed the essential forces of mutual attraction.

The neo-geopolitics in the BBSR has also been instrumental, in bringing about a new domestic force in Turkey, namely the formation of foreign policy constituencies and lobbies representing different ethno-cultural backgrounds and interests among the population. Several million people in Turkey are descendents of North Caucasians and Abkhaz who fled the Russian conquest of the North Caucasus in the late 1850s and 1860s, followed by later arrivals. They include Chechens, Kabardans, Karachays, Nogays, Kumyks, Lezgins, Avars and Azeris.⁽⁸⁾ Among the descendants of Balkan peoples who migrated to Turkey during Ottoman times, Turks of Albanian and Bosnian origin number two to three million. By and large these different ethnic groups have been successfully assimilated into Turkish life. Now, when the kins in the Caucasus or in the Balkans of any one of these groups are caught in conflict with an adversary, as the Georgians, Abkhassians and Bosnian-Muslims have been and Albanians in Kosovo might be, Ankara is pressured to take a position in support of the respective kins' rights and interests. In the case of the separatist war in Georgia, for example, the former Prime Minister Demirel's own party found itself caught in the crosspressures exerted simultaneously by two groups of deputies, one of Georgian origin, the other Abkhasian.

The disappearance of the Soviet threat has had enormous adverse repercussions on an entirely different front, too: cohesion in the Western world. In the case of Turkey, this has meant, first, less confidence about the willingness and ability

of major NATO allies to do business as usual with Turkey, and, second, the exclusion of Turkey from European integration. The Turkish bid for admission into the European Community had already been rejected in December 1989. Developments in the east outpaced whatever meager prospects Turkey might have enjoyed in West European eyes. The rebirth of "A Europe whole and free" pushed Turkey-the-step-child to the bottom of the list of the strategic priorities of West European capitals. Hence, the year when the Berlin Wall came down was a lonely year for Turkey. As one observer of Mediterranean security has put it, "Turkey, as a full participant in neither the EC nor the WEU, and whose prospects for full membership in both organizations remain poor, is increasingly isolated from this process of Europanization affecting the rest of NATO's Southern Region."⁽⁹⁾

In summary, then, the new geopolitical environment in the early post-Cold War era presented the following features of immediate strategic relevance to Turkey: A fragmentation of power along Turkey's northern and northeastern borders subsequent to the strategic retreat of Soviet/ Russian power; the entry into the international community of nations numerous political entities in Asia and Europe -some old, some new- with several common attributes shared with Turkey, such as ethnicity, language, religion, culture and history; the simultaneous emergence of local conflicts with the potential to escalate into larger regional conflicts; and, the general diminution of Western solidarity concomitantly with the disappearance of the Soviet threat at the same time as Turkey was further isolated from

mainstream European developments and movements.

II. ENDURING FORCES BEHIND TURKISH APPROACH TO THE WORLD

Three fundamental considerations seem to have exerted a profound and sustained influence on foreign and security policy choices and orientations of Turkish decision-makers throughout the Republican period.⁽¹⁰⁾ Undoubtedly, specific priorities and instruments have been subject to change over the years. Different regional and global circumstances in different phases of world politics necessarily called for different policies and positions. And, the exact balance among them has shifted over time in response to the circumstances prevailing domestically and externally. Nevertheless, one does detect several continuities in essentially how interests and goals have been conceptualized. A review of Turkish foreign and security policy indicates that only the strategy of how to preserve the values and rationales embodied in these considerations have changed while their determining weight has survived.

The following influences appear to have determined the broad parameters of policy: An acute consciousness of the geostrategic importance of Turkey's location especially in relation to the regional and global power distribution; the inherent vulnerability of Turkey's relations with its neighbors to the legacy of history, i.e., the Ottoman rule over most of them; and third, the relative precariousness of its ideology of Westernization/modernization and commitment to a liberal political regime to possible shocks from an environment which has been unreceptive if not outright hostile to Westernization

and the West for most of modern Turkey's seventy years of existence.

Only in times of deep systemic change in the world system has strategy been redefined in a qualitatively new direction. Between 1923 and the end of the Second World War, these influences dictated for the most part an isolationist and neutralist strategic orientation. The end of the Second World War changed that strategy drastically. Turkey came out of its shell to join the Western Alliance in order to protect the geostrategically positioned country against the Soviet threat, and, to safeguard and further consolidate its Westernizing/modernizing domestic regime. In this stage, the neighborhood presented insecurities not on account of the Ottoman legacy but largely because of the Soviet influence in the Balkans and the northern Middle East. Today, when the international system has been subjected to another structural revision of historical proportions, the Turkish strategy required by these forces has been redefined, this time in the direction of greater activism and involvement in the issues as well as the power balances of the regions around Turkey.

The following pages in this section will elaborate the nature of these influences. The subsequent sections will describe the specific positions and policies that reflect the scope of the transition in the strategic orientation of Turkish foreign and security policy thinking in the post-Cold War era.

Geostrategic Considerations

The first consideration in the approach of the Turkish political elite to the world outside is almost invariably in

geostrategic terms. Turkey's location at the crossroads between Europe and Asia, occupying in the east a commanding position over northern Middle East and the Gulf and, in the west, over the lines of communication from the Black Sea through the Mediterranean to the Gibraltar, and vice versa, have instilled a strong awareness of the country's potential strengths and weaknesses in influencing the regional and possibly the global power balances.

The specific military and political implications of Turkey's geostrategic attributes are dynamic, taking on new meanings in response to structural changes in the international and regional systems, as well as to changes in the sophistry of militarily-relevant technologies. Most importantly, however, lessons of history are powerful components in this geostrategic preoccupation.

From a historical perspective, one of the constants in Turkey's geostrategic position has been the Russian factor. The strategic importance of a certain geographical location is enriched above all else by its proximity to centers of power. In the Turkish case geostrategic significance has been related to its proximity to Soviet/Russian power and to the oil-rich Gulf region. With this location, Turkey has been potentially capable of influencing Soviet/Russian interests as well as global interests in and around the Gulf. History also provides formative experiences. Turkish-Russian history had been one of a seemingly unending series of wars since the time of Peter the Great for Russian expansion into Ottoman lands in the northern Black Sea, the Balkans, and the Caucasus. It is common knowledge that the

Straits were regarded by Tsarist statesmen as "the 'key' to the
(11)
Russian house which properly belonged in the Russian pocket."

In the post-Cold War era, the precise nature and scope of Turkey's geostrategic significance has once again been subjected to a new reassessment in the light of the profound alterations in the global and regional power balances. Despite the fluidity in this era of transition, however, Turkey's potential ability to influence the course of developments in several of the world's most troubled regions to its north, east and west continue to assign it considerable strategic importance. This reappraisal has been reaffirmed most powerfully during the Gulf crisis in 1990-91.

The Gulf War has crystallized a tendency to view Turkey's strategic significance in the post-Cold War era overwhelmingly within the context of the Middle East/Gulf region. The collapse of the Soviet Union has further reinforced this perception. In the meantime, however, the security of the Mediterranean in general and of NATO's southern flank in particular has turned into one of the central concerns of European security. The growing importance of the Black Sea for anticipated increases in the foreign trade turnover of the riparians, projections for its use to transport Azerbaijani oil to its final destinations in Western markets, the unsettled nature of the security relationship between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, and general instability into which the Balkans have been thrown since the breakup of the former Yugoslavia are developments that warn against a simplistic notion about the warning strategic relevance

of the Turkish Straits in particular and the Black Sea - Mediterranean system in general in the still evolving post-Cold War era.

Historical Considerations

The second consideration has been historical and has to do with the legacy of the Turkish-Ottoman rule in the regions immediately neighboring Turkey. Except for Iran, all of Turkey's current neighbors had remained either fully or in part under Turkish/Ottoman rule for long periods. Differing doses of resentment against this historical experience in ex-Ottoman neighboring countries as well as territorial, boundary, ethnic and property questions inherited from the past have not been conducive to the establishment of unblemished mutual trust. An unarticulated but almost constantly present apprehension in Turkish security policy conceptualization is the specter of anti-Turkish coalitions among its ex-Ottoman neighbors, as it happened in the First Balkan War. Nevertheless, modern Turkish diplomacy has generally succeeded in introducing and sustaining an important degree of stability in its relations with the former Near East, with the exception of Greece in later decades.

Today, however, when the Balkans, the southern Caucasus and the Middle East are undergoing a painful transition in reordering the regional power balances, historical passions and perceptions of mistrust, rivalry and threat have been revived in order to serve respective national positions and policies. For example, speculation about alleged neo-Ottomanist and pan-Turkist aspirations by Turkey has been heard in Moscow, Athens, Belgrade and even Teheran, reflecting dynamic forces that have revived

collective memories filled with images from the past. Assertions largely for domestic consumption by high-level Turkish officials, and opposition leaders, in the wake of the breakup of the Soviet Union about "the rebirth of the Turkic World from the Adriatic to China," must also have played their share in encouraging perceptions of Turkey in a neo-Ottomanist light.⁽¹²⁾ Clearly, intellectual and political interest in Ottoman history has manifested itself especially in the first years of the post-Cold War era, but the nature and scope of that interest can hardly qualify as an emergence of Turkish irredentism and expansionism.⁽¹³⁾

The policy corollary to the inner Turkish trepidation about possible revanchism, especially one coordinated among several of Turkey's erstwhile Ottoman lands, has been the repudiation by Turkey of irredentist aspirations. The National Pact (1920) which defined the boundaries of the new Turkey for which the nationalist forces under Mustafa Kemal's leadership conducted the War of Independence, and the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, which sealed the birth of the new Turkey -and hence the end of the Ottoman state- together form the standard basis for consensus-building in favor of an anti-revisionist, status quo foreign policy. Turkey's detractors do not always agree, however. Domestic detractors argue that Mosul in northern Iraq and the Dodacanese Islands in southeastern Aegean should not have been lost. Greece, Turkey's major foreign detractor, argues that the eventual accession of Hatay to Turkey and the Turkish policies on Cyprus are obvious examples of Turkish irredentism.

Ideological Considerations

A third more or less constant consideration has been ideological, addressing the felt need by the political elite to protect the internal order in Turkey predicated on Western ideas and models of socio-political organization against turbulences, or, worst still, direct challenges from the outside.

Founded, and led until 1938, by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, an enlightened professional soldier, the new Turkey's domestic order and international purposes and role were defined in radically different terms by the Kemalist regime from those that had characterized the state and society in the Ottoman Empire which it succeeded.

A narrowly defined new role in Turkey's external orientation was primarily a function of domestic exigencies. Its isolationist foreign policy was pragmatism at its best, for Turkey needed to devote its energies to internal development. It was their mutual isolation from the West that largely helped foster Soviet-Turkish cooperation. Yet, Turkey was at all times careful to confine the relationship to state matters, foreclosing the possibility of ideological interaction.

A thorough transformation of an essentially Islamic society on the model of the West was a formidable task. From the very beginning, the new regime had to cope with the inherent tension between the Westernizers/Modernists and the Traditionalists/Islamists. However, under the direction of one-party government the reforms ultimately prevailed, paving the way

for the political and social modernization of Turkey at a steady pace.

A discussion of Turkey's chosen philosophical-ideological world view as a factor in its security thinking is critical to a study of Turkey's approach to changes in the international and regional systems because of the close interdependence between the sustainability of the socio-political order it has inspired and the nature of the external environment. This aspect of Turkish security thinking has been stressed in more detail than the first two factors mainly because its relevance may not be as readily apparent as those of the former. The Turkish case of a traditionally Moslem country which has chosen to modernize on the Western model through abrupt political and social engineering was unique in its time and continues to be unmatched today in its comprehensiveness.

In its turn, this singularity is inherently precarious. It needs a hospitable external environment to sustain and reinforce itself. It breeds systemic international vulnerabilities by depriving Turkey of a clearly defined socio-cultural identity that would be a source of strength in resisting potential adverse influences from the external environment and that would serve as a basis of solidarity and affiliation with others in the international arena sharing similar values. In other words, because Turkey is neither a fully Westernized nor an orthodox Islamic society, its domestic regime has been

pro-Westernism in the full sense of the term had been anathema in the surrounding regions for very long - except belatedly in Greece - has made the Turkish task of safeguarding its internal system against external challenges all the more difficult.

Turkey's domestic socio-political order has been tested severely by external forces. The first test originated in Moscow. The goal of the export of Communism was a major threat to the Turkish domestic order throughout the seventy years of the ideological drive of Soviet foreign policy until its formal denunciation by General Secretary Gorbachev in 1987. The rise in the political power and geographical spread of Islamic radicalism, and in particular the anti-Western domestic and foreign policies of neighboring Iran under the Mullahs since 1979, comprise a new source of strain on the systemic vulnerability of the Turkish domestic regime.

Accordingly, the preservation of Turkey's unique domestic order and socio-political identity as a modernizing "European" country but with an Islamic cultural mold has comprised a fundamental element of Turkish foreign and security policy thinking. This ideological imperative has been almost invariably present in the process of decision-making -- promoting, restraining, or constraining Turkey's relations with other actors especially in the region. Turkey's inward looking posture in the inter-war years was intended to focus the country's energies to the consolidation of the process of domestic transformation, as noted before. Later, the initial Turkish decision to join the Western Alliance in post-World War II period was driven as much by this ideological preoccupation as it was by

the military dimension of the Soviet threat. Turkey endured the criticism and resentment launched from multiple quarters in the largely anti-Western Muslim and Asian worlds. In the Fifties, Sixties and Seventies, it confronted the ideological affront of the Non-Alligned.

More recently, when Turkey has approached the newly independent republics in the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia as well as some of the post-Communist states in the Balkans, the same impulse has been at work, but in a thoroughly altered international context. Today, the Turkish drive to safeguard its system of domestic values based on Western ideas of secularism, democracy and market economics by "exporting" them to the newly liberated republics in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia is generally encouraged by several leading Western circles-- much to the resentment of radical Islamic forces. The potential of Turkey to act as a role model especially in the Turkic/Muslim world in the East has been seen as serving the broader interest of world peace and stability.⁽¹⁴⁾ For, while Western ideals, regimes and systems seem to have prevailed over Communism, and the Second and the Third Worlds have seemingly embraced them in principle, most political analysts agree that the road ahead for their firm entrenchment in these societies is beset by formidable unknowns if not roadblocks.

In conclusion, the three fundamental sources of Turkey's approach to the world outside have recently undergone substantial refocusing, direction and strategy. Neither singly nor collectively do they any longer dictate a narrow, inner-directed focus and

strategy in the pursuit of what might be perceived as Turkish interests. They preclude isolation from the world as the best insurance against possible foreign interference and involvement.) Equally significantly, they no longer confine foreign and security policy thinking merely to politico-military elements but involve a much expanded economic and information and communications aspect. Domestic political and economic change within Turkey as well as the dynamics of the new geopolitical environment have allowed the Turkish leaderships who were at the helm when the Cold War era ended, namely the former Prime Ministers Turgut Ozal and Suleyman Demirel, to reinterpret the vitality of these formative concepts behind the Turkish foreign and security policy thinking in extraterritorial terms.

In externalizing their guiding impact Turkey has not turned into irredentism or expansionism, as argued before. It has merely assumed a greater willingness to play the role of a regional arbiter, intermediary and role model while simultaneously attempting to take advantage of opportunities that promised to expand Turkish political and economic influence. Turkish leaderships have talked about influence but have repeatedly rejected notions of political and/or territorial hegemony. (15)

Potentially the most important initiative that Turkey has taken in the post-Cold War era, indicating its resolve to be a positive force for regional peace and stability in the long-term, has been the leadership it has displayed in putting together the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone among eleven countries (including Greece, Albania, Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan which are not Black Sea riparians.) Its participation in various

international efforts of conflict resolution -- i.e. in the Minsk Group under the auspices of the CSCE to help find a negotiated solution to the Armenian - Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabagh, and, in the NATO operation to enforce the no-fly-zone sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council over Bosnia-Herzegovina -- are clear indications of the strategic change in Turkey's approach to the world outside in the direction of greater responsibility for regional stability. The following pages will use the analytical framework presented above to describe policies in the post Cold War era in the BBSR.

III. BALKAN POLICIES

Turkish Interests

Three considerations have defined the nature and scope of Turkey's interests in the region: Turkey is a Balkan country geographically, historically and culturally. This sense of belonging to the region leads decision makers and public opinion to perceive legitimate Turkish interests and concerns, especially in times of change, in the nature of the political regimes and the distribution of power that affect the region. Second, the Balkans are a strategic link between Turkey and Western Europe which occupies a dominant position in the whole gamut of political, economic, security and cultural bonds that Turkey has formed with the outside world. Two and a half million Turkish citizens live in Western Europe. And, more than half of Turkish foreign trade is with that region. A reordering of the political boundaries and affiliations in the Balkans in a way to encourage a potential regional hegemon to enhance its dominant

position would put at risk Turkish security interests as well as its freedom to cultivate both traditional and new interests and relationships at the regional level.

Finally, there is a powerful sense of affinity between Turks of Turkey and some peoples throughout the Balkans, i.e. ethnic Turkish minorities. Bosnian-Muslims, Albanians and others who have managed to remain friendly towards Turkey contrary to the general trend of negative collective memories concerning Turkish-Ottoman rule in the region, a strategic element in Turkish thinking discussed in some detail in the proceeding section.⁽¹⁶⁾

Briefly, the first two considerations are geopolitically motivated perceptions of Turkish interests. The last one, which I shall call the human dimension, has been inspired by emotionally charged perceptions of common cultural and historical bonds. These friendly peoples and countries at the same time serve an implicit and potential strategic function in that their pro-Turkey leanings have the potential power to complicate if not forestall the implementation of possible anti-Turkey coalitions and policies in the Balkans at any one time on the pretext of avenging the legacy of the Turkish/Ottoman rule.

Turkish Policies

The Yugoslav conflict has dominated the post-Cold War Balkan politics. Therefore, Turkey's Balkan policies will be discussed through the prism of the Yugoslav crisis.

Turkey was satisfied with the broad outlines of the political status quo in the Balkans. Yet, it was especially

relieved at the dissolution of Communist and Soviet/Warsaw Pact power.

On the simmering Yugoslav crisis, it adopted a conservative position, hoping that the union could be maintained through internal negotiations and compromise. It had its own combination of reasons in not wishing to see the dismemberment of former Yugoslavia. In Turkish eyes the former Yugoslavia had been a moderating power in the Balkan balance in general. Belgrade had been a benign ruler over its relatively small ethnic Turkish and large Muslim populations. Viewed through the lenses of a state-as-rational-actor paradigm, therefore, the possible fragmentation of the former Yugoslavia could be seen to serve neither regional nor specific Turkish interests.

Once disintegration ensued and Bosnian-Muslim majority in the internationally recognized republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina became the victims of the policy of "Greater Serbia", the Turkish position changed.

The new policies were designed to serve three immediate and interrelated objectives: to help bring an end to the bloodshed in Bosnia-Herzegovina; preserve its independence and territorial integrity, and, prevent the escalation of the war into a broader Balkan war by engulfing Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, the Sandjak, and Vojvodina, thereby dragging along other powers with interests in the unfolding regional politico-military balance. The threat of a Balkan war has loomed heavily in Turkish perceptions.

Premised on these objectives, Turkish policies have essentially sought to help put in place an international strategy

of containment of the Serbian aggression. According to Turkey, the government in Belgrade was the prime force behind the Bosnian-Serbian aggression against the Bosnian-Muslims, and its several brutal manifestations such as ethnic-cleansing.

On August 7, 1992, Turkey elaborated the details of an Action Plan to be implemented by the United Nations Security Council. In the face of persistent Serbian aggression and the ineffectiveness of the United Nations sanctions, Turkey called for the selective lifting of the United Nations arms embargo in order to allow the Bosnian-Muslims to procure weapons and equipment for their self-defense, and, for resort to a limited military engagement by the international community in order to enforce the United Nations sanctions.

On the other hand, Turkey has consistently shunned the option of a unilateral use of force -- despite pressures by the domestic opposition to exercise it.⁽¹⁷⁾ Speculation outside Turkey that it intended to exploit the Bosnian conflict through a show or use of force apparently has failed to weigh the total domestic situation in Turkey. For, the Turkish government would not risk unilateral military involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially knowing that the geographical and logistical constraints would seriously complicate a sustained power projection operation.

Turkey engaged in an active diplomatic campaign in order to mobilize the international community to take a more resolute stand against Serbian aggression. In April 1993, it joined the NATO operation for the enforcement of the seven-month old no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Turkish policies have failed to help bring about the objectives mentioned at the beginning because of a complex set of other forces whose combined impact has been to allow the Serbian dream of a Greater Serbia and the Croatian dream of a Greater Croatia to be achieved at the expense of Bosnian-Muslims. The international community has allowed Serbian aggression to be rewarded. It is possible that the "Muslim" identity of the Bosnian-Muslims has been at the heart of the unwillingness of the major European powers to lift the arms embargo that unequally deprived the Muslims of the weapons of self-defense against a disproportionately armed "Christian" Serbian adversary.

The question of Kosovo looms as the most serious next challenge in the Balkans.

Turkey's bilateral relations with several Balkan countries have flourished in the meantime. Two consecutive agreements on confidence-building-measures in 1991 and 1992 between Bulgaria and Turkey as well as the restoration of the rights of the ethnic Turkish minority have had an enormous positive impact on the qualitative transformation in bilateral relations away from mutual distrust towards a much increased dialogue and sense of security.

Albania has received priority attention and assistance in its drive to consolidate its post-Communist transition. Turkey was the first state to recognize Macedonia, at the same time as Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were recognized in January 1992. The Macedonian leadership has appealed to Turkey, as did the leaderships of the Bosnian-Muslims and Albanians, to

defend their respective causes both in international fora and through direct assistance. Turkey has been rendering economic, technical and humanitarian assistance to these countries, including Bulgaria.

The Role of the Greek-Turkish Conflict

The Yugoslav conflict is a product of intra-Yugoslav dynamics and tensions. On the other hand, external factors have affected its course, scope and regional impact in important ways. One of these factors has been the adversarial and deeply competitive nature of Greek-Turkish relations.

The record of the past behavior of Greece and Turkey towards regional issues indicate that even as allies they tended to approach such issues, i.e. proposals for Balkan denuclearization in the Cold War era, economic cooperation schemes, the question of minorities, etc.- primarily with the "other" in mind, and built their respective strategies on the basis of zero-sum calculations. The Yugoslav crisis has offered them the most recent and dramatic occasion around which to structure their mutual competition so as to maximize their respective national interests.

Research findings indicate that the pro-Serbian policies of Greece during the Yugoslav crisis was based to a large extent on its calculation concerning how the evolving situation might or might not work to the advantage of Turkey.⁽¹⁸⁾ Above all else, Greece was uncomfortable with the idea of a new Muslim state almost next door. However, the presence of such an entity aroused worst-case scenarios in the Greek mind specifically because

of the almost foregone conclusion that a Muslim state, with positive roots in Ottoman history, would be friendly to Turkey. Accordingly, Serbia and Bosnian-Serbs were seen to deserve the full support of Greece in their struggle against what Bosnian-Muslims have stood for politically and culturally. Greece was the key element of support to Serbia and Bosnian-Serbs in the international arena. Russian support was less critical. The pro-Serbian Greek position has been heavily instrumental in complicating the development of a coherent and effective Western strategy to protect the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which they had recognized, against Serbian aggression. In other words, Greater Serbia owes its present position to a very large extent to Greek diplomacy whose central concern was to deny Turkey the opportunities for new friends and potential allies.

The destruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina as originally recognized by the international community in Spring 1992 and the informal Greek-Serbian entente, together with the attempt by both Greeks and Bosnian-Serb leaderships to evoke the common bond of Orthodoxy as the emotional basis of their cooperation, have reinforced Turkish concerns that the Balkans might come to be dominated by a strong anti-Turkish/Muslim coalition, with Greece playing the decisive role in it.

The Yugoslav crisis might have evolved differently had Greece and Turkey chosen to cooperate rather than compete in the new geopolitical environment in the Balkans. They might not have been capable of preventing the breakup of former Yugoslavia, but they might have contained the conflict from radicalizing and polarizing Balkan politics to the extent that it has been.

Finally, if this argument is correct, then one of the key elements of a new approach to Balkan security in the new era would be a radical new look at Greek-Turkish relations.

IV. THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

"Turkic" Diplomacy Begins

As in the former Yugoslavia, in the case of the Soviet Union, too, Turkish thinking about the future of the Soviet Union did not seem to entail its final disintegration nearly until it actually occurred. The tradition of assigning highest priority to correct relations with Moscow and abstinence in relations with the Turkic peoples were sustained until almost the very end of the USSR.

Following the decision to change policy taken in Fall 1991, however, Turkey moved fast. In September 1991, teams of Turkish diplomats visited the capitals of each Soviet Republic who, upon return, recommended the granting of formal recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations. "By the end of 1991, Turkey had totally abandoned its Moscow-centered stance and embarked on a program of active relations with the Soviet
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successor states."

Turkey became the first country to recognize Azerbaijan and the Central Asian Republics. In Fall 1991 and Spring 1992, the presidents of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgystan and Kazakhstan paid visits to Turkey upon the invitation of President Turgut Ozal. Mr. Ozal had stopped in Alma-Ata during his visit to the Soviet Union in March 1991. Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel crowned the budding relationship at its early stages by a high-

powered visit to the four Central Asian Republics on April 27 - May 4, 1992. He pledged financial assistance to the tune of \$ 1.2 billion.⁽²⁰⁾ His scheduled visit to Dushanbe was cancelled at the last minute due to the sudden escalation of domestic crisis in Tajikistan. On April 4-15, 1993, Turkish President Turgut Ozal went on an official tour, stopping in Uzbekistan, Krygystan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan.

A series of inter-governmental meetings were held between Turkey and the Turkic countries throughout 1992-93, culminating in numerous cooperation agreements. The Summit Meeting held on October 30-31, 1993, in Ankara among the Heads of State of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Turkey committed the six countries to the institutionalization of their contacts at all levels, including the Summit and to the establishment of Joint Working Groups in several functional fields. The Ankara Declaration issued at the end of the summit constitutes the most important expression until today of their will to work together. Another development of major significance, offering substance to the so - far rather vague concept of the "Turkic World", has been the agreement reached on March 10, 1993, among the six on the creation of a Common Turkish Alphabet based on the Latin Alphabet. The decision of the Conference on Eurasian Economic Cooperation held in Ankara on May 6-7, 1993, to found the "Eurasian Chamber of Commerce and Industry" is another milestone step. And, Turkey pledged in 1992 to have 10.000 students admitted into Turkish Universities soon.

Turkey also hosted the Second Summit Meeting of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in Istanbul on July 6-7, 1993. The ECO, originally composed of Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, was enlarged in 1992 by the admission of all Muslim Republics of the former Soviet Union and Afghanistan. The ECO is generally perceived to be the major forum where Turkish and Iranian philosophies of political and social organization subtly compete with each other. Former Prime Minister Demirel refused to define the ECO as a "Moslem Common Market," insisting that it had only an economic cooperation dimension not political. (21)

Turkish Objectives

On the basis of the hindsight gained from two years' of experience, one might be better placed today to explore the answers to the following critical questions: What were, and are, the fundamental Turkish objectives in the southern Caucasus and Central Asia? And, to what extent have they been fulfilled?

First and foremost, Turkey appears to have hoped for the consolidation of the independence and democratic transition of the former southern Soviet republics. Democracy and independence would serve two interlocking purposes simultaneously: they would contribute to peace and stability in Eurasia, and they would allow Turkey to deepen its own relations with a newly opened-up region of the world that was anticipated to be inherently friendly, responsive as well as profitable.

Did Turkey entertain hegemonial aspirations? Was it motivated by pan-Turkist and pan-Turanian dreams? The answer

should be a categorical "No". There is no question that "the historical embrace of the Turkic world", as Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel described it upon his return from the visit to Central Asian Republics, was accompanied by a heavy dose of sentimentality on both sides. Behind this screen of initial exuberance, however, high-ranking Turkish officials have given evidence of their awareness that the newly evolving relationships needed to be defined and managed as one among equals. Prime Minister Demirel underlined this point repeatedly, saying, "Our cooperation with those republics does not mean we will put our mortgage in their economic and political policies. If we do that, they would move further away from us. Respect for their identity (22) should be the main principle of Turkey."

On the other hand, it is in the nature of the international system that states compete for political and economic influence and advantage. Such competitive behavior is an accepted norm of international behavior so long as it is carried out peacefully and on the basis of respect for sovereignty, independence and equality. The very fact that these states were young and weak -however rich in natural resources- theoretically made them appear vulnerable to the political domination of external powers determined to exploit such weaknesses. The record so far indicates that Turkey was not motivated by an intention to dominate the "Turkic World"; nor did it have the capability to do so even if it wished to. Besides, leaderships in each one of the new republics looked sufficiently competent, nationalistic and independence-minded from the very beginning not to have aroused such illusions in external powers interested in the

region--except perhaps in the Russian Federation which has some objective reasons on its side. In fact, from a short term perspective, the relationship until now has been on the debit side of the balance for Turkey. If one takes a narrow, short-term perspective. Turkey has not only allocated greater resources to the domestic development of the new republics than it has received so far in terms of actual returns from economic links with the Turkic countries but has strived hard to facilitate their incorporation into the network of international diplomacy, especially its powerful and prestigious Western front.

Pan-Turkism or Pan-Turanianism enjoys neither official nor (23) broad popular support in Turkey. The National Action Party (MAP) of Alpaslan Türkeş represents the major organized political movement identified with ultra nationalism. Even with this party, however, the territorial dimension and political modalities of the "Turkish World" remain unclear. The MAP has 13 deputies in the 450-member Turkish Grand National Assembly. Its vote-getting potential is presently estimated to be around 2.5-3 percent of the electorate. There are extreme nationalist groups within the two major center-right parties, namely the True Path Party in power and the Motherland Party founded by Turgut Ozal. The Great Unity Party, a splinter party formed by breakaway deputies from the MAP, has only six deputies in the parliament.

In short, ultra nationalism has persistently been a marginal force in the Turkish political-ideological spectrum. Yet, the inherent power of nationalism to mobilize the people for expansionist or irredentist causes cannot be underestimated in

principle especially in the post-Cold War era. Ultra nationalism might find new recruits in Turkey less in response to the calling of the so-called "Turkic World" but more in response to a combination of domestic and foreign developments: mass frustration with rising PKK-terror, anti-Turkish Kurdish nationalism, Armenian advances in Azerbaijan and the plight of the Bosnian-Muslims. Coupled with mounting economic stresses at home, these issues may even facilitate the merger of Turkish nationalism with Islamic radicalism, as appears to be insidiously occurring already.

Turkey's specific goals in approaching the former Soviet Republics seem to have been the "export" of its own ideology and regime based on Western ideas and ideals, and the cultivation of cultural and economic relations.

The first objective is very much in line with the constant sensitivity of Turkey to its position as the single and most persistent Westernizing state in the entire Islamic World, as elaborated in Section II in some detail. The deteriorating regional climate over the last decade has made the Turkish liberal and secular system seriously vulnerable to external challenges. The adoption of the "Turkish model" by the former southern Soviet Republics would offer Turkey a new security space by expanding the liberal-democratic-secular belt to the borders of China. Turkish thinking and anticipation in this regard was reinforced, and possibly took cues from, the encouragement given by several leading Western circles.

Expanded relations with these countries seemed to

simultaneously offer new possibilities for cultural and economic enrichment, especially at a time when Turkey's position in Europe was faltering. It is important to remember that the post-Cold War era brought out to the surface the inner tensions and incompatibilities between Turkey and its Western allies. Its "European" identity was questioned as Europe and the U.S. began to redefine their historical purposes and responsibilities. Turkey needed to develop new ties and relationships in an era of geostrategic change that threatened to leave it isolated. While the newly opened up geopolitical space to the east could not offer a real strategic option to Turkey in the foreseeable future, at least it could help cushion the impact of a seemingly approaching exclusion from an evolving united Europe.

The Special Position of Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan has enjoyed special importance in Turkish perceptions and policies for several reasons.⁽²⁴⁾ Historically, culturally, linguistically, and geographically, the Azerbaijanis have been the closest among the Turkic peoples to the Turks of Turkey. Former nationalist leader President Abulfaz Elcibey's admiration for the Turkish model, which he reiterated in powerful words before the Turkish Grand National Assembly in an address during an official visit to Turkey in June 1992, also seemed to complement the Turkish vision of a rising new liberal-secular-democratic geopolitical space to the east all the way to China.

Only the small autonomous enclave of Nakhichevan directly borders on Turkey, as well as Armenia and Iran. Azerbaijan's potential

natural resource wealth, including most importantly oil, is clearly another source of interest for a country like Turkey who is a net importer of fossil fuels to meet its energy needs. The richness of the common heritage and the importance attached to relations with Azerbaijan have recently led Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin to describe the essence of the relationship as one between "one nation but two states" (25)

Azerbaijan's post-Soviet domestic development has traced a turbulent course primarily under the strain of the conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, which in turn has put a great stress on Turkey's regional diplomacy and bilateral relations with Azerbaijan. While giving political support to Baku's position that Nagorno-Karabakh is Azerbaijani territory, Turkey has urged a negotiated settlement. It has desisted from direct military assistance to Azerbaijan -a source of deep frustration to the Turkish nationalists- of the sort that would alter the balance of power between the belligerents.

The difficulty of maintaining a balance between Turkish sympathies for Azerbaijan and the desire not to get directly involved in a conflict with regional implications of rivalry and influence has ultimately satisfied no one. The defeat of Azerbaijani forces and the occupation of over twenty percent of the country by Armenian forces reversed domestic balances in Azerbaijan radically, leading to the downfall of Abulfaz Elçibey, the first elected president, by a military leader whose choice for the next president was to be Gaider Aliyev, an ex-KGB and Politburo official under Brezhnev.

The venue for a negotiated settlement in principle has been

the 11-nation (among which are the United States, Germany, Russia Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan) Minsk Conference mandated by the OSCE's Council of Ministers on March 24, 1993. Pending the convening of the Conference, its members have been meeting as the Minsk Group since June 1993, concomitantly with the advances by Armenian forces deep into Azerbaijan. Turkey has undertaken an active role in this first conflict-resolution mission by the OSCE in one of the most troubled regions of the former Soviet Union. It has appealed for a special dialogue with Moscow on the basis of their mutual interest in and responsibility for peace and stability in the region. However, there were basic differences in their approach concerning the first steps. Turkey insisted on a cease-fire and the withdrawal of Armenian forces from occupied territories while Russia merely demanded a cease-fire.

Bilateral Relations and Regional Rivalry in the Southern Caucasus

The fallout of the armed conflicts in the southern Caucasus on Turkey's interests and policies in this region has been extremely unfavorable. The initial Turkish goal of assuming a role of responsible leadership in order to act as a positive force in the difficult period of transition to the post-Soviet stage has been frustrated. Scenarios that have counted on fostering regional peace and stability through bilateral and multilateral economic and commercial cooperation have had to be scaled down, perhaps indefinitely. In earlier and more promising times, Paul B. Henze, a close Turkey watcher, had anticipated that Turkish mediation efforts could be a responsible and

effective force for regional peace.

At the bilateral level, the prospects for the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations has received a major setback. Despite the heavy legacy of history, Turkey had looked forward to a new stage in Turkish-Armenian relations, and in that spirit extended diplomatic recognition. The moderate tone of the Armenian leadership under President Levon Ter-Petrosyan did play a positive role in encouraging Turkey to forego its initial demand that Armenia formally and publicly renounce irredentist claims on Turkish territory as a precondition for recognition.

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Turkey also invited Armenia to join the BSECZ. It extended humanitarian assistance in the form of wheat deliveries in Fall 1992 while at the same time allowing the delivery of international humanitarian aid across its territory. Bilateral talks were held in Winter 1992-1993, for the supply of electric energy, which, however, failed to materialize largely due to the project's adverse impact on Turkish-Azerbaijani relations.

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The course of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict through 1993 reversed the momentum achieved in Turkish-Armenian relations early on in laying the building blocks of normalization. The Armenian refusal to agree to a cease-fire and withdrawal from the occupied Azerbaijani territory remains an extremely serious challenge to regional peace and to Turkish security interests.

The civil war in Georgia has become another source of frustration for the Turkish vision of regional peace and stability through cooperation. The demographic fabric of the Turkish society comprising Turks of Georgian and Abkhasian origin

as well as the friendly attitude towards Turkey of the Georgian leadership under Eduard Shevardnadze have fostered a positive image in Turkey about Georgia in general, reconfirmed by Prime Minister Demirel's visit to Tbilisi on July 30, 1992. There are no conflicts of interest between the two countries except for the indirect implications of the civil war on Turkey's regional diplomacy. Turks of Abkhasian origin also form a positive link with their separatist countrymen, creating a delicate situation for Turkey not only in its formal diplomacy but in its overall approach to the issue of ethnic separatism. The Head of State of Abkhasia paid a visit to Turkey in late July 1992, to obtain Turkish recognition of the declaration of independence by the (29) Abkhas parliament.

The impact of the conflicts in the southern Caucasus has perhaps taken its biggest toll on Turkish-Russian, and to a lesser but still important extent on Turkish-Iranian relations. Turkey's interest in post-Soviet Azerbaijan and the Turkic countries in Central Asia appear to have swiftly triggered almost automatic apprehension in Moscow and Teheran about presumable Turkish intentions in search of a monolithic Turkic world centered around Ankara. Conversely, Turks tend to see Russia more and more in the role of an actual party to the local conflicts than one of an arbiter. Iran is perceived as the major force behind the increased penetration of fundamentalism in Central (30) Asia.

The importance attached by Moscow especially to the "south" within the "near abroad", the dominant voice of the Russian military on the question of security in the "near abroad", and

overt and covert pressures on former Soviet republics not members of the CIS to join in are seen as clear indications that Russia has not been permanently resigned to the loss of empire. Clearly, Russia has important interests in the former Soviet Republics, i.e. the welfare of 25-30 million ethnic Russian minorities, and, the security of its borders in areas of local conflicts. On the other hand, these conflicts might have offered Moscow the opportunity to gradually reestablish its political and economic control along its periphery. Recent developments in Georgia and Azerbaijan support this assessment. After having openly charged Moscow throughout 1993 of direct military involvement on the side of the separatist Abkhazians, President Shevardnadze finally joined the CIS last September in a move to elicit the former's support to his cause.

The forced removal of former President Elcibey, a strong nationalist and a vocal anti-Russian, from office and his successor Aliyev's decision to reorient Azerbaijan towards Moscow may be seen as indications of the resumption of a predominant influence by the Russian Federation in the region.

The change of government in Baku in early Summer, 1993, had seen the de facto suspension of the preliminary Turkish-Azerbaijani agreement signed on March 13, 1993, for a pipeline to transport Azeri oil from Baku through Turkey to the Ceyhan Terminal on the Mediterranean. The state-owned Turkish Petroleum Company (TPAO) holds a 2.5 percent share in the consortium. Turkish authorities argue that the Baku-Ceyhan route would be the most cost-efficient among all the alternative routes. (31) The

Turan news agency in Baku has reported that according to the most recent Russian-Azerbaijani agreement, Azeri, Kazakh and Turkmen oil would be transported to Western markets through Russia. (32)

The armed conflicts in the southern Caucasus has strained Turkish-Russian relations above all else because of the former's repercussions on the presumable politico-military stability achieved by the CFE treaty negotiated in 1990. They have allowed Moscow to claim that the ceilings established by the CFE treaty in the flanks fail to meet its security needs in the new circumstances. Turkey rejects the Russian arguments, maintaining that any tampering with the CFE treaty would pave the way to its ultimate collapse. (33)

V. CONCLUSION

Formidable problems lie ahead for the principal foreign policy objective of Turkey in the early years of the post-Cold War era with regard to the BBSR: The restoration of peace and stability so that the plethora of ethnic, national and territorial conflicts and wars that have seized the region would not spiral into a regional war. The radicalization and polarization that have distinguished Balkan and southern Caucasian politics since the breakup of the Yugoslav and Soviet federations threaten regional war.

A most worrisome aspect of the developments in the BBSR from the perspective of Turkish foreign and security policy interests has been the revival of the power of the Muslim-Christian dichotomy in Balkan politics and to a lesser extent -at least for the moment- in the southern Caucasus. Religious militancy against

"the other" has become an important element of Balkan politics. The Serbian nationalist leaderships have invoked the traditional enemy image of "the Muslims" in order to sustain their irredentist war. Greece has joined.

Moreover, one can detect the outline of an anti-Muslim Orthodox coalition among Athens, Belgrade and Moscow. While the trend seems to take more subtle manifestations in the southern Caucasus, there is no question that pro-Armenian sympathies among Russians are shaped to an important degree by the sense of sharing the same Christian identity and culture. The pro-Armenian positions and policies in the Western world certainly reflect the power of the common Christian identity, too.

The intensification of these trends and developments would be especially detrimental to long-term Turkish interests essentially on account of two reasons. They could eventually mobilize a more powerful movement in the spirit of "the Crusades" against Turkey, the only major Muslim country in the Balkans, a region which in general has not come to terms yet with its Ottoman past. And, they could further penetrate domestic politics in Turkey generating new dynamics to strengthen the power base of radical Islamic politics and to support movements for the fashioning of a stronger Muslim identity among the Turkish population.


Developments in Central Asia do not look promising, either, for long term Turkish interests. Instability in the region of the former southern Soviet Republics as well as the scale of the problems within each individual republic present fundamental

obstacles to the development of meaningful, long term relationships. And, Turkey's overall resource base is too limited for it to be able to act singly as a major force for change.

In contrast, Russia seems to be well-positioned to regain its preeminent influence in this region. For one thing, powerful patterns of economic dependence of the republics on the Russian Federation inherited from the Soviet era demand by default the return of Russia. Second, the West seems to have little interest in the long-term independence of the Central Asian republics if that goal were to imply the deterioration of relations with Russia. And, the establishment of security and stability in the former Soviet republics by the Russian Federation through a reassertion of its influence as the peace-keeper appears to be the only alternative to the possibility of permanent instability.

Iran is likely to be the major outside influence next to Russia basically for two reasons. First, Russia seems to be less apprehensive about the long-term implications of Iran's growing influence and role in Central Asia than about the implications of the revival of the idea of the Turkic world. Second, Iran's contiguity and oil wealth place it at an inherently advantaged position. In the two years since independence, it looks as if the southern Soviet Republics' options in developing in a Westwardly direction have considerably narrowed down. Turkey might have been the fundamental force to help lay the domestic and external basis of that orientation. Turkey's own inherent limitations and vulnerabilities, the scope of the regions's needs and problems, and the preeminence of Russian influence have greatly constrained

the potential power of Turkey to serve as a role model for a liberal-democratic and secular reconstruction of the states and societies in the former southern Soviet republics.



Turkey and the European Union¹ : A Multi-Dimensional Relationship With Ambiguous Perspectives

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The European Union is that part of the world into which Turkey today is most strongly integrated although she is not a member of the Union. In economic terms, the EU covers about half of Turkey's trade relations: in 1992, 51,7 per cent of Turkish exports went there and 43,9 per cent of her imports came from there. These figures can be taken as being roughly representative of the magnitude of trade relations between the two sides over the last twenty years, with a short exceptional period in the early 1980s when trade relations with Middle Eastern countries covered a significant share in Turkish foreign trade.²

What, however, has changed tremendously during that period is the composition of Turkish exports. In the early '70s Turkey was an exporter of agricultural produce and raw materials whereas since the mid-'80s the country's exports to the EC are concentrated in manufactured goods. Textile and clothings still represent the bulk in this respect but over the last ten years Turkey has been able to considerably diversify the composition of her industrial exports.³

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- 1 As the Europeans have changed the name of the institutions for their political efforts at regional integration for the third time with the coming into force of the Maastricht Treaty on 1 November 1993, a note on terminology seems to be appropriate. In the following, the term 'European Union' (EU) is used with regard to developments in Turkey's relation with western Europe since that date whereas the term 'European Community' (EC) is used in relation to all events up to that date. For purposes of simplification, we generally refrain from using the term 'European Economic Community' (EEC) although the existing contractual relations have been established between Turkey and that Community.
 - 2 Figures are taken from State Planning Organization, *Main Economic Indicators - Turkey*, August 1993, Ankara: SPO, 1993. For a detailed assessment of EC-Turkey trade relations in the past, see Canan Balkir, "Turkey and the European Community: Foreign trade and direct foreign investment in the 1980s", in Canan Balkir/Alan M. Williams (eds.), *Turkey and Europe*, London/New York: Pinter Publ., 1993, pp. 100-139 and Heinz Kramer, *Das wirtschaftliche Element in den Beziehungen der EG zur Türkei - eine Bestandsaufnahme*, Ebenhausen: SWP 1987.
 - 3 For a concise analysis of structural change in Turkish foreign trade during the 1980s, see Anne O. Krüger/Okan H. Aktan, *Swimming Against The Tide. Turkish Trade Reform in the 1980s*, San Francisco: ICS Press, 1992. As regards trade with the EC, see

As to direct foreign investment in Turkey, the Union's share is about 55 per cent with respect to total foreign capital approved. As regards the number of firms with foreign capital, the EU countries account for about 43 per cent; and the Union is the area in which most Turkish firms abroad exist and where most Turks outside Turkey live. Hence, it is only natural that most Turks travelling abroad also go to European destinations.

Besides this strong economic integration there exists a considerable number of narrow political bonds as well. First and most prominent ranks the Association Agreement with the EC followed by NATO membership and the association status in WEU. Furthermore, Turkey is a member of other politically relevant European institutions like the Council of Europe and the CSCE. This network of bonds between Western Europe and Turkey offers a wide range of possibilities for intensive co-operation and dialogue with the Union and its member states.

This points to the more fundamental bases of the relationship which never have been economic in character but essentially political and strategic. In the Cold War-years, EC members wanted to bind closer to the West a country deemed to be an indispensable ally in countering the strategic threat from the East. The Turkish political and economic elite, on their side, saw EC membership as the final objective which would make irreversible Turkey's "Westernization", cherished so much by the founder of the republic, Mustafa Kemal, called Atatürk. Hence, Turkey's relations with the EC have always been influenced to the same degree by strategic and political factors as by economic developments. With the approaching possibility of an eventual Turkish membership of the EC, cultural and religious considerations have increasingly been added to the picture pointing to the issue of Turkey's Europeanness.

In the following analysis, I will try to depict this complexity by, first, concentrating on the development within the contractually based framework of the association relationship. This is followed, by an analysis of the impact of the most important intervening dimensions like the 'Greek factor' and Turkish domestic political issues which tended to disturb west European political public. This short essay is concluded by a view on the perspectives of overall EU-Turkey relations taking into consideration the recent tremendous changes in the international environment and their

likely repercussions on these relations. It is in this context that the issue of Turkey's Europeanness tends to be of growing importance.

1. The contractual framework

Relations with the EU are basically governed by the stipulations of the Association Agreement of 1964 (Ankara Agreement) which has been supplemented and specified by an Additional Protocol in 1972.⁴ Today, this is the oldest association relationship in which the Union is engaged. The objective of the Association Agreement is the establishment of an extended customs union between Turkey and the Community. Furthermore, in its article 28 the agreement foresees the possibility of an eventual Turkish membership of the EC if and when Turkey is able to keep all obligations resulting from such a step. Hence, association can be regarded as a preparatory measure for membership. There is, however, no automatic accession to the EC foreseen once the customs union has been fully established. For this to happen, another decision by the institutions of the Union will be necessary.

Contrary to common ideas about a customs union, the Ankara Agreement does not only cover the issue of trade in manufactured goods. It includes also trade in agricultural products, free movement of workers, freedom of settlement for professions, freedom of trade in services and capital transactions, and stipulations about the harmonisation of tax systems, rules of competition and other legal regulations concerning economic life. Furthermore, EC transport policy shall be made applicable to Turkey, trade policy vis-à-vis third countries shall be coordinated, and the general economic policy of both sides shall be guided by the same principles. Hence, this type of customs union comes fairly close to the establishment of a common market between the EC and Turkey. This is an additional indication of that the relationship was not intended to stop with the establishment of the customs union.

The stringency of the stipulations covered by the agreement varies, however, with regard to the various subject areas. As regards trade in manufactures, it is foreseen that Turkey stepwise abolishes customs duties and equivalent barriers to trade until 1995 at the latest. Until that date,

⁴ For the text of the Ankara Agreement, see *Official Journal of the EC*, No. 217, 29 December 1964, for the text of the Additional Protocol, cf. *Official Journal of the EC*, L 293, 27 December 1972. Whereas the Ankara Agreement sets the framework and guiding principles of the relations, the Additional Protocol regulates the details of the establishment of the customs union.

Turkey is also obliged to stepwise apply the EC's common external customs tariff in her trade with third countries. For the bulk of manufactured products, however, both measures were already to take effect, again in a stepwise manner, by 1985. The EC, on its side, would abolish all barriers to trade in manufactures – with some temporary exceptions concerning textiles and petroleum products – at the coming into effect of the Additional Protocol.⁵

In all other areas covered by the agreement and the Additional Protocol stipulations are less stringent. However, the Association Council as the governing body of the agreement had been asked to take actions in order to secure the timely implementation of the foreseen measures which were regarded as necessary complements to the establishment of the customs union for manufactures. Exceptions to this are the free movement of workers which should have been established by 1 December 1986 and the agricultural sector where Turkey should organize its agricultural policy until 1995 in such a way that free trade in agricultural products would then become possible.

2. *The implementation of the Ankara Agreement: a story of failure and misperception*

The implementation of the Ankara Agreement and the Additional Protocol never really took off until fairly recently.⁶ The EC abolished all customs duties and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) for Turkish manufactures by 1973. An important exception, however, was trade in textile and clothing which later came under the regime of the EC textile policy in the framework of the international Multi Fibre Agreement. Presently it is regulated by so-called voluntary self-restraint agreements concluded between the Turkish textile exporters and the Brussels authorities. As the political task of aligning Turkey's agricultural sector with the Community's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) never has been taken up by the

5 A short, but fairly comprehensive overview of the stipulations in the Ankara Agreement and the Additional Protocol is given by Haluk Günugur, "Customs Union with the European Community", in *Economic Dialogue Turkey*, No. 39, September 1993, pp. 112-116.

6 For a comprehensive account of the (non-)realisation of the customs union scheme, see Heinz Kramer, *Die Europäische Gemeinschaft und die Türkei. Entwicklung, Probleme und Perspektiven einer schwierigen Partnerschaft*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1988 (Internationale Politik und Sicherheit, vol. 21), pp. 30-150; for a Turkish view of the issue see Mükerrrem Hiç, "The Evolution of Turkish-EEC Relations and Prospects of an Early Application for Membership – a General Survey", in *Dis Politika/Foreign Policy*, 9 (1981) 1/2, pp. 49-80.

association's institutions, trade in agriculture is still restricted by CAP's very effective NTBs although the EC in 1987 abolished all customs duties for agricultural imports from Turkey. Hence, until today, the European Union restricts imports from Turkey in those sectors where the country's actual export potential is the greatest.

Another issue of Turkish concern is the non-fulfillment of obligations concerning free movement of labour. At the beginning of 1973, the German government issued a ban on the recruitment of migrant workers from non-EC countries and the other member-states soon followed suit. This was later supplemented by the introduction of visa requirements for Turks visiting Germany and other EC countries. Since then, immigration into the EU is possible for Turks only when an already legally settled worker is later joined by members of his family. The German government, with silent agreement of all its partners in the Community, did its utmost to prevent the terms of the Association Agreement from taking full effect.

As about four fifth of all Turkish migrant workers in the EC lived and continue to live in Germany, the issue actually became less of a Community policy affair and much more of a bilateral German-Turkish one within the multilateral framework of the association relationship. Hence, Germany's partners in the EC were only too ready to leave the issue to the Germans and did not really develop a position of their own.⁷

As a result, what could be achieved was only a stepwise improvement of the situation of Turkish workers and their families who were already legally living in the Community.⁸ In November 1986, the EC proposed to the Turks a definite regulation of the issue of freedom of movement of labour according to which immigration of new workers would be virtually suspended for the duration of the association relationship, i.e. for an unlimited time. Of course, the Turkish government rejected this proposal and since then the issue is pending.

7 For details of the EC's efforts at preventing the full implementation of the association's stipulation concerning free movement of labour, see H. Kramer, *Die Europäische Gemeinschaft und die Türkei*, op. cit., pp. 216-233 and Nusret Ekin, "Turkish Labour in the EEC", in Werner Gumpel (ed.), *Die Türkei auf dem Weg in die EG. Möglichkeiten und Probleme einer Vollmitgliedschaft der Türkei in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft*, München/Wien: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1979, pp. 77-98.

8 A fairly comprehensive overview of the present legal state of Turkish workers in the EU, also taking into consideration the most recent judgements given by the EU's Luxembourg based European Court of Justice, is given by Christian Rumpf, "Freizügigkeit der Arbeitnehmer und Assoziation EG-Türkei", in *Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft*, (1993) 3, pp. 214-223.

In the beginning, it was basically economic and social concerns which motivated the German government in adopting its restrictive attitude towards free movement of labour. In a time of severe economic difficulties, a constant inflow of low skilled labour was regarded as an unwelcome burden on the German economy and the German welfare system.⁹ In the more recent years, however, the issue of free movement of labour for Turks has increasingly become intermingled with European domestic political issues like policy towards asylum seekers and the resurgence of racist xenophobia in Germany and elsewhere in the European Union. Added to this is the religious or cultural factor in the form of a strong public rejection of Islam becoming a legitimate element of "European civilization". This will make a solution of the problem much more difficult than it was fifteen years ago.

If one adds to all this the inability of the EC to pass the fourth Financial Protocol agreed upon in principle already in 1981, which foresees Community aid to Turkey of an amount of 600 million Ecu, one can easily come to the conclusion that the EC and its member-states did not undertake strong efforts at making the Ankara Agreement and the Additional Protocol a success. Financial aid was intended as a means in order to prepare the Turkish economy for customs union and to ease expected negative repercussions of that development on Turkish industry. Until 1980, the EC provided financial aid of a total amount of 705 million dollars in the form of three consecutive Financial Protocols of five years duration each, which were concluded in the framework of the Association Agreement.¹⁰ The 1980 Financial Protocol became victim of the consequences of the third coup of the Turkish military leadership of 12 September 1980 for Turkey's relations with the EC. Later, after political normalization in Turkey since 1983, its implementation was constantly blocked in the EC's institutions by Greece for reasons originating from the perennial Greek-Turkish conflict.

But it is not only the Community and its members that are to be blamed for the non-performing of the Ankara Agreement and the Additional Protocol. The Turkish side, on her turn, did even less in order to implement the provisions foreseen for the establishment of customs union.

9 See for details of Germany's policy on migrant-workers of the time Ray C. Rist, "Migration and marginality: guestworkers in Germany and France", *Daedalus*, 108 (1979) 2, pp. 95-108.

10 For details of this aid, see European Investment Bank, *25 Years (1958-1983)*, Luxembourg: EIB 1983, pp. 75-6.

Only two reductions of tariff rates for imports from the EC, in the magnitude of 10 per cent each, were executed in 1973 and 1976 respectively. The adjustment to the EC's common external tariff was not begun at all and the process of reducing quantitative restrictions on imports from the EC also came to an end in 1976 after hardly having taken off. Furthermore, Turkey pressed for greater EC concessions in agricultural trade without, however, showing any signs of readiness with regard to an adaptation of her agricultural policy to the conditions of Community's CAP. In 1978, finally, as the EC did not respond favourably to Turkey's demands, the Turkish government even proposed a five-year moratorium of the association in order to reassess the whole undertaking.

The main reason for the Turkish behaviour was that the goal of establishing a customs union with the EC came under severe criticism in Turkey during the 1970's. The Turks suddenly realized that the stepwise opening of the Turkish economy towards European competition ran contrary to the established policy of planned or guided national economic development by way of import substitution. The discussion became increasingly exacerbated by its intermingling with the quickly deteriorating general domestic political and economic situation in Turkey.¹¹

The Turkish debate showed that a large part of the country's political and economic elite had a somewhat misleading idea of the goals and mechanisms of a customs union. In their view, this undertaking basically was a mutual exchange of economic sacrifices and benefits which should support Turkey, as the weaker part, in her economic development by granting her a lasting preferential position in the EC's pattern of foreign trade relations. Hence, the establishment of a customs union was regarded as an element of national economic development.

This position, however, did not take into account that a customs union is not an instrument of guided national economic development. The underlying logic of a customs union is to indirectly promote economic

11 This issue is discussed by Atila Eralp, "Turkey and the European Community in the changing post-war international system", in C. Balkir/A.M. Winters (eds.), *Turkey and Europe*, op.cit., pp. 28-31. For details of the Turkish debate, see Erol Esen, *Die Beziehungen zwischen der Türkei und der Europäischen Gemeinschaft unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der innertürkischen Kontroversen um die Assoziation 1973-1980*, Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus-Verlagsgesellschaft 1990, pp. 92-166 and, as a most recent Turkish publication, İlhan Tekeli/Selim Ilkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu*, Vol. 2 (*Ulus Devletini Asma Çabasında Avrupa'ya Türkiye'nin Yaklaşımı*), Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık 1993, pp. 166-238, who also comprehensively cover EC-Turkey relations during the 1970s.

development in the whole area of the union by improving the efficiency of allocation of economic productive factors through trade liberalization and, hence, improving the general welfare and the production structure in the union. This logic does not say much about how resulting development gains are distributed among the participants of the customs union. Hence, the establishment of a customs union does not guarantee that Turkey will get more, in relative terms, than the EC. This, however, was exactly what the Turkish side was (and is) looking for.¹²

When the EC started to grant similar trade concessions to other countries, especially in the framework of its "global Mediterranean policy" established after 1975¹³, Turkey saw herself deprived of the expected benefits from the EC's trade liberalization measures of 1973. She increasingly perceived her own obligations for measures of trade liberalization as one-sided sacrifices without any beneficial reciprocal measures from the EC. This argument, however, has never been proven empirically¹⁴ and should be regarded more as a political argument in order to justify Turkish reluctance in fulfilling her obligations under the agreement. It can hardly be taken as an indication that real harm was inflicted upon Turkey's foreign trade with the EC by the fact that third parties might have been involved in the same field of trade on similar conditions as granted to Turkey.¹⁵

12 For an overview of the economic theory of customs union, see the classical text of James E. Meade, *The Theory of Customs Union*, Amsterdam: North Holland Publ. 1955; for a more actual overview, see Willem Molle, *The Economics of European Integration (Theory, Practice, Policy)*, Aldershot: Dartmouth Publ. 1990, pp. 83-113. The Turkish debate about the compatibility of Turkey's development strategy with the intended establishment of a customs union with the EC is reflected in Osman Okyar, "Turkish Industrialization Strategies, the Plan Model and the EEC", in Osman Okyar/Okan H. Aktan (eds.), *Economic Relations Between Turkey and the EEC*, Ankara: Hacettepe University 1978, pp. 14-53 and Mükerrrem Hiç, "The Importance of Turkey's Development Strategy for Her Integration into the EEC", in W. Gumpel (ed.), *Die Türkei auf dem Weg in die EG*, op.cit., pp. 19-46.

13 A short introduction into this issue and its link to EC-Turkey relations is given by Heinz Andresen, "The European Community's Mediterranean Policy", in O. Okyar/O.H. Aktan, *Economic Relations*, op.cit., pp. 60-71.

14 Turkey's continually growing trade deficit with the EC, which was put forward as a substantiation of their arguments by Turkish circles, most likely was a result of the country's rigid policy of import substitution. This policy systematically discriminated against exports and, hence, undermined the international competitiveness of Turkish producers in general.

15 See, for an argument along these lines, for instance, Erol Manisali, "Turkey and the EEC – an assessment of obligations and interests", in Institute of Economic Development, Istanbul University (ed.), *Problems of Turkey's Economic Development*, Istanbul: I.U. Faculty of Economics, n.d., pp. 129-142.

After the economic policy turn-around in Turkey of 24 January 1980, the Turkish attitude towards the development of the association relationship was more influenced by political events and considerations than by economic interests. Hence, Turkey in the 1980's opened its economy towards international competition without, however, giving any special attention to its obligations under the Ankara Agreement. This approach was mainly justified by pointing to the non-compliance of the EC with regard to financial aid, free movement of workers, and trade restrictions for textile and clothing. On a broader level, it was the Turkish anger at recurrent EC criticism of Turkey's domestic political record as regards democracy and human rights which guided Ankara's policy towards Brussels. Added to this was a deep Turkish disappointment about the EC members' inability to stop Greece from using her membership of the Community to undermine EC-Turkey relations.

3. Turkey's application for membership of the EC: a premature attempt at changing the rules of the game

By the mid-1980's the establishment of the customs union seemed to have become a failure, free movement of labour seemed to be impossible, and financial aid was recurrently blocked by Greek veto in Community institutions. Hence, the association relationship seemingly had reached an impasse. In this situation, voices in Turkey grew which proposed a policy switch into the direction of application for membership.

It was mainly the country's Istanbul based business community that advocated such a move.¹⁶ It expected from such a development a lasting improvement of its position in the EC market which had become more attractive for Turkish business as a result of the general policy of economic liberalisation. Contrary to the situation of the 1970's, this time all parties, including the Social Democratic Party (Sodep), also supported this policy approach although less for economic but more for reasons of protecting and stabilizing the just regained civilian democracy. Initially the Özal government, and especially the prime minister himself, favoured foreign policy alternatives and tried to establish closer links with the Arab Islamic countries of the Middle East and with the U.S. When this orientation did

16 This big-business attitude was clearly revealed during a special "hearing" of the Great Turkish National Assembly on 18 May 1984 and it was also expressed during a visit of a delegation of representatives of Turkish industry to the EC Commission in November 1985; see for this *IKV Magazine* (Istanbul), June 1984, special issue on "Relations Between Turkey and the EEC" and *Turkish Daily News*, 10 November 1985, p. 4.

not bring about the expected results, the Turkish government joined in the general opinion of the Turkish economic and political elite concerning membership of the EC.

The new Turkish attitude was met with great reluctance on the side of the Community. Here, all members were of the opinion that, for various reasons, a Turkish application for membership of the EC was untimely. The Twelve had only begun the process of digesting the so-called southern enlargement, i.e. accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal. In addition to that, the Community had just started the process of overcoming a long period of internal stagnation, the so-called "Eurosclerosis", by initiating the establishment of a common internal market by the end of 1992 and by streamlining its internal decision-making procedures with the adoption of the Single European Act in 1986. Under such circumstances, hardly anyone in the EC's political circles was ready to contemplate another enlargement and even less so if this would mean the membership of a large and economically less developed country like Turkey. This only promised new financial burdens and further complications for the internal functioning of the EC, i.e. new problems of the kind the Community was just about to overcome.

Turgut Özal, however, had made up his mind and was determined to become the one Turkish politician after Mustafa Kemal who actually anchored his country in Europe. Hence, on 14 April 1987, the Turkish minister of state for relations with the European Community, Ali Bozer, officially presented Turkey's application for membership to the acting president of the Council of the European Community, Belgian prime minister Leo Tindemans.¹⁷

Turkish expectations to become a member of the EC, however, did not materialise. In spite of strong Turkish lobbying at various levels in order to convince EC members of the necessity and profitability of a Turkish accession, on 5 February 1990, the Twelve declared that the country was not yet ripe for accession. This position of the EC Council of Ministers was basically a confirmation of the official "Opinion" of the EC Commission on the Turkish application, which had been published on 18 December 1989.

In it, the Commission put forward a series of social and economic circumstances which prevented a positive prognosis for the success of a

17 For a more detailed account of EC-Turkey relations which led to the application for membership, see A. Eralp, *op.cit.*, pp. 31-36 and H. Kramer, *Die Europäische Gemeinschaft und die Türkei*, *op.cit.*, pp. 84-111 and 120-150.

Turkish EC-membership at the time. More in passing and in very general terms, the Commission also pointed to some political problems which additionally complicated a positive reply to the Turkish request. Instead, the EC proposed an intensification of relations based on the existing Association Agreement.¹⁸ For this purpose, the Commission following a request of the EC Council, in June 1990, presented a comprehensive package of measures in the fields of trade relations, economic and industrial cooperation, financial aid, and political dialogue in order to improve EC-Turkey relations.¹⁹

4. *Almost back to square one: new attempts at finalizing the customs union*

It took, however, until November 1992 – and it required the complete turnover of the European political landscape and a change of government in Turkey – for this proposal to be implemented. After the opening of the "iron curtain" West Europeans' foreign policy preoccupation turned east. Furthermore, the end of the strategic East-West confrontation seemed to significantly reduce the political importance of Turkey for West European security policy interests. It was only after the second Gulf War and after the demise of the Soviet Union that Turkey's geographic location gained a new geopolitical value for Western interests. This was acknowledged by a declaration of the European Council, i.e. the biannual summit-meeting of the EC's heads of state and government, at its Lisbon meeting in June 1992 which stated that "the Turkish role in the present European political situation is of the greatest importance ..."²⁰

As a consequence to this change of attitude, the Community undertook serious efforts at getting relations with Turkey back to normal. This was reciprocated by the new Turkish coalition government under prime minister Süleyman Demirel which had succeeded to the Motherland Party government in the Turkish elections of November 1991. As a result of Turkey's newly enhanced strategic image and upgraded geopolitical

18 Commission of the European Communities, *Commission Opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Community*, Brussels, 20 December 1989 [SEC (89) 2290 fin./2] and Commission of the European Communities, *The Turkish Economy: Structure and Developments*, Brussels, 18 December 1989 [SEC (89) 2290 final, Annex]

19 For details of this so-called "Matutes-package", named after the member of the EC Commission in charge of relations with Turkey, see Commission of the European Community, *Commission Communication to the Council concerning relations with Turkey and a proposal for a Council decision about a fourth financial protocol*, Brussels, 12 June 1990 [SEC (90) 1017 final].

20 "Conclusions of the Presidency", *Agence Europe*, No. 5760, 28 June 1992, p. 5. Since then, this position has been repeated by EC authorities at various other occasions.

position, Demirel and his socialdemocratic coalition partners took a more pragmatic approach in relations with the Community. For them, the new situation offered a chance of strengthening Turkey's bonds with the West in general, and the EC in special. Hence, at a meeting of the Association Council at ministerial level on 9 November 1992 both sides agreed to restart the implementation of the provisions laid down in the Association Agreement.

The Turkish government confirmed its readiness to finalise the establishment of a customs union with the EC by 1995 as foreseen in the agreement. The Community, on its side, agreed to the creation of an intensive political dialogue with Turkey on the highest level, i.e. including heads of states and governments, and it showed its willingness to enhance economic and industrial co-operation. Since then, both sides have been busy to implement these basic decisions in order to improve the bilateral relations which had gone through a period of severe political problems and enstrangement during the last decade.

Political dialogue started in February 1993 with a visit of Turkey's deputy prime minister, Erdal İnönü, to Brussels where he met with the president of the EC Commission and the presidency of the Council of the EC. In March, a common Steering Committee between the EC and Turkey was set up in order to prepare for the completion of the customs union. Its work resulted in a list of topics to be discussed and solved in order to meet the 1995 deadline. This list has been formally agreed upon as a working program for both sides at another meeting of the Association Council in November 1993.

The list contains the following items:

- the free circulation of goods, the abolition of all existing customs duties and equivalents, the removal of quantitative restrictions, and provisions applying to processed agricultural products as well as to products coming under the legal regime of the European Coal and Steel Community;
- the implementation of the Community's common external tariff on goods from third countries and the cooperation between customs authorities;
- common trade policy, i.e. adaptation of Turkey's trade regime to the preferential and other trade agreements concluded by the EC with third countries as well as to special EC trade-regimes in certain industrial sectors (textile, coal and steel etc.)

- cooperation on the harmonisation of agricultural policy and provisions for reciprocal preferential market access;
- mutual minimisation of restrictions on trade in services, especially concerning telecommunications, financial services, transport and tourism;
- harmonisation of commercial legislation as regards competition policy, state aids, anti-dumping legislation, intellectual and industrial property rights, and public procurement;
- institutional provisions concerning decision-making and procedures of dispute-settlement;
- financial issues and investment promotion;
- social issues;
- economic, industrial, monetary, environmental, scientific and cultural cooperation and cooperation in respect to drug-trafficking.²¹

This working program is a Herculean task. It amounts to nothing less than doing everything necessary for the implementation of a functioning customs union between Turkey and the EC that has not been done since the conclusion of the Additional Protocol in 1973. It seems highly unlikely that all which has been neglected over the past twenty years could now be made up for within one year's time. If this could really be done, it would be an indication of either a huge developmental progress which Turkey has made since then or that the EC and Turkey had overestimated the difficulties for establishing their customs union and chosen an unrealistic long time-table in the Additional Protocol.

A closer look at the topics of the working program, however, shows that this fresh start of relations can fairly quickly run into serious problems. This will not so much be the case with regard to trade liberalization towards the Community. Turkey has made substantial progress in general trade liberalization during the 1980's and even concerning its obligations under the Additional Protocol has resumed the process of stepwise tariff reductions towards the EC in 1988. Hence, in 1994, there remains to be done a last step of 10 or 20 per cent. Problems could, however, arise with regard to some still highly protected sectors with a strong economic and political position like automobiles and pharmaceuticals.

21 For a short account of the November 1993 meeting of the Association Council see *Briefing* (Ankara), No. 965 (22 November 1993) and *Agence "Europe"*, 10 November 1993, pp. 9f.

The establishment of a customs union under the present circumstances, however, cannot be reduced to the complete abolition of customs duties between the two sides plus the implementation of the Community's common customs tariff (CCT) by Turkey. There are, at least two more issues involved.

First, all internal barriers to trade have to be abolished. This means that Turkey has to completely eradicate her system of import levies being raised for the financing of the Mass Housing Fund. This fund is the last one remaining of a whole system of extra budgetary fund-raising for various purposes introduced by the former Motherland Party government of late president Turgut Özal when he held the position of prime minister. Fund levies and customs duties, however, still are important contributions to the Turkish budget which, nevertheless, is constantly running a rising deficit. Hence, the Turkish Treasury may face some problems in finding compensations for the loss of income caused by the establishment of a customs union. Turkey has already indicated that she expects some type of financial compensation from the EC and presented a figure of about 3 billion dollars for the sake of discussion.²²

However, the Community, too, has to make some corrections in its trade policy applied to Turkey. This mainly concerns trade in textile and clothings. The practice of imposing voluntary trade restraints on Turkish exporters clearly contravenes the stipulations of the Additional Protocol and will have to be abolished until 1995. Hence, Community authorities may face some problems with respect to EC textile policy unless the coming negotiations during the implementation of the working program lead to a re-confirmation of the safeguard clause of article 60 of the Additional Protocol in such a manner as to further provide a legal base for trade restrictions.

Second, the establishment of a customs union not only means the application of the EC's common customs tariff by Turkey. Above that, it would also imply the application by Turkey of all preferential trade agreements which the EC has concluded with third countries and the adaptation of all Turkish trade agreements with other countries to the respective EC situation. Otherwise, there would be the possibility for firms

22 It seems doubtful whether the problem can be solved by simply declaring the Mass Housing Fund a means of fiscal tariff, which, according to the Additional Protocol, under certain conditions could be maintained for some time, as has been suggested by a Turkish scholar; see Haluk Günugur, "Customs Union with the European Community", in *Economic Dialogue Turkey*, No. 39 (September 1993), pp. 112-116.

from third countries to circumvent Community and/or Turkish import regulations to the detriment of either EC or Turkish producers unless technically very complicated procedures concerning rules of origin would be implemented.

The opening of the Turkish market towards the Community, however, has proceeded much faster than the adaptation to the CCT. Here, steps of 40 to 50 per cent still have to be taken. A full compliance with the necessity to adapt the Turkish customs tariff to the generally much lower CCT and to apply the EC's preferential trade regimes with third countries within one years time may cause even more serious problems to Turkish industry than those created by abolishing trade restrictions for EC-exports. EC trade preferences are granted to a number of third countries which are direct competitors in sectors of industry which are still strongly protected in Turkey as, for instance, textile and clothing, processed agricultural goods and household appliances.

In short, the establishment of a customs union between Turkey and the EC as one of the strongest trading blocks in the world is about to create severe adaptational problems for Turkey's industry. It may, however, not be well prepared to shoulder this burden given the fairly short period of time until the realization of the scheme and the still high level of protection for some very important sectors of Turkish industry. Vivid complaints by industrialists of the sectors which are expected to be more seriously affected, about the scope and speed of the realization of the customs union scheme can already be heard in Turkey.²³ What could be expected as a "solution" to this problem is, for one, a prolongation for the adaptation of Turkey's customs tariffs with regard to preferentially treated third countries and, secondly some negotiated exceptions for the full implementation of the customs union scheme by 1995. What most probably will happen anyhow is an increase in the sophistication of Turkish NTBs for certain sectors or across the board in order to diminish negative consequences of a formally open market.

Another problematical issue will be trade in agricultural produce which, according to the Association Agreement, shall be included in the customs union. For this to happen, however, Turkey would have to adapt its national agricultural policy to the Community's Common Agricultural

23 Representatives of these sectors of industry are among those who already advocate a less speedy and more phased approach towards the completion of the customs union; see for this *Briefing*, No. 966 (29 November 1993), p. 14

Policy (CAP) in such a way as to allow for the abolition by the EC of its non-tariff trade barriers in agricultural trade. In essence, this would mean that Turkey, more or less, would have to apply Community market regulations and price policy in most of its agricultural sectors without, however, taking part in the CAP. It is hardly foreseeable that the country will be ready and able to drastically change its national agricultural policy until the beginning of 1995. This to happen will definitely take much more time and a lot of complicated negotiations between Turkey and the EC.²⁴ Hence, by 1995, we may only have a somewhat limping customs union restricted mainly to trade in manufactured goods between the EC and Turkey and with a lot of transitional measures and/or exceptions concerning other aspects of the issue.

The creation and full functioning of a customs union, however, does not only require trade related measures. Of equal importance are activities concerning the regulatory framework of production like anti-trust policy, state aid, and taxation in order to enable undistorted competition between industries within the large market. In these areas, a lot of work remains to be done in EC-Turkey relations until the start of a fully fledged customs union even for industrial products. There is, for instance, at present no Turkish equivalent to the EC's competition policy although legislation in that direction has been prepared since years. The same holds true for the issue of industrial and intellectual property rights which gained increasing importance over the recent years with the establishment in Turkey of a large business of industrial counterfeit products.

Given the fairly short time span until the end of 1994, it is now being very negatively felt that the functioning of the association actually has been interrupted for fifteen years. It is doubtful whether the Turkish and the EC-administrations will be able to make up for that delay. In 1994, the Community already has to undertake great efforts in order to bring to a successful conclusions its entry-negotiations with four EFTA members. Taking up the whole range of measures needed for the timely completion of the customs union with Turkey could create administrative bottlenecks. In the same regard, it is doubtful if the administrative measures taken by prime minister Tansu Çiller who created three new bodies for coordination

24 An idea of what will be necessary and how much change and adaptation may be involved can be inferred from State Planning Organization (ed), *Turkish Agriculture and European Community Policies - Issues, Strategies and Institutional Adaptation*, Ankara: SPO 1990 (Report of a Study by Wye College, University of London; Middle East Technical University, Ankara; State Planning Organisation, Ankara).

and supervision of relations with the EC, will really enhance efficiency on the Turkish side.

It should be noted that the new approach for completing the customs union between Turkey and the EC only marginally includes the issues of free movement of labour and financial aid. As concerns the former, a change of the EC's position is not in the books given the deterioration of the Community's labour market and the climate of xenophobia in some member states. Turkey, however, seems to be ready to accept this for the moment being. This attitude may, however, change fairly quickly if as a result of fully opening the Turkish markets to foreign competition redundancies would become a large scale phenomenon in Turkish industry.

A similar argument would apply with respect to financial aid. As a result of the economic development of the last decade, Turkey is no longer in a position to depend on foreign aid for the financing of its economic development. For this purpose it can now use the international financial markets. Hence, the implementation of the fourth financial protocol has predominantly become an issue of the political climate of the relationship and a test case for the willingness and ability of EC members to overcome Greece's stubborn attitude as regards a lasting and fundamental improvement of EU-Turkey relations. What will, however, almost certainly become an issue in negotiations about the completion of the customs union is the question of compensation for the financial disadvantages, in budgetary terms as well as in terms of current account balance, which Turkey is about to experience as a consequence of completely opening its market to imports from the EU and other countries.

It is already argued by Turkish officials that Turkey would be the only country to have established a customs union with the EU before becoming a member and, hence, being deprived of the financial privileges all new member states like Portugal, Spain, and even Great Britain enjoyed during their transitional period of the accession process. For this reason, Turkey, too, should benefit from Union financial assistance for a certain period during which Turkish industry fully adapts to the consequences of the customs union. If the EU is ready to accept this argument, member states would have to look for ways of overcoming Greece's principal resistance against larger financial transfers from the EU to Turkey.

5. *Elements of a politicisation of the relationship: the "Greek factor", Turkish democratization, and the Kurdish problem*²⁵

The preceding short review of the likely problems which may arise in the process of completing the customs union clearly shows that this issue cannot be regarded as a basically technical one. It is embedded in the broader political framework of Turkey-EU relations as has always been the case with the development of the Association Agreement. From the Turkish point of view, the customs union is still strongly related to the question of Turkish membership of the EU as has been confirmed by minister of foreign affairs, Hikmet Çetin, during the meeting of the Association Council in November 1993. From the point of view of the EU, the completion of the customs union cannot disguise serious concerns of the Twelve with regard to the Cyprus issue, Turkish democracy and eventual Turkish accession as has been stated by Çetin's EU-counterpart on the same occasion.²⁶

With regard to all three of these sets of issues, Turkey's and the Community's position constantly differed and none of these problems today can be regarded as completely solved. At the level of official relations, however, they have been thrust into the background to a certain extent due to new international developments after the demise of the Soviet empire. As no real political efforts at coming to terms on these issues have been and are undertaken by both sides, however, a deterioration of Turkey-EC relations due to developments external to the association framework proper can always occur. Hence, a closer look at these issues of contention seems to be appropriate in order to fully understand the complexity of the relationship.

The "Greek factor" and the Cyprus issue

The perennial Greek-Turkish conflict became an issue in Turkey-EC relations after Greece's accession to the Community.²⁷ The majority of the Turkish political public is convinced that Greece abuses its membership of

25 In this paragraph, I rely on earlier research which first has been presented in a conference paper at a CEPS-conference on "European Community and the Mediterranean", Brussels, 22 January 1993.

26 See *Briefing*, No. 965 (22 November 1993), pp. 9f and *Agence "Europe"*, 10 November 1993, pp. 9f.

27 One has to note, however, that Greece has always been an important factor for shaping Turkey's policy towards the EC. This can, for instance, be very clearly shown with regard to the Turkish decision of applying for association in 1959; see Mehmet Ali Birand, "Turkey and the European Community", in *The World Today*, 34 (1972) 2, pp. 52-61.

the Community for spoiling EC-Turkey relations. It is equally convinced that the EC institutions as well as Greece's partners do not show enough resistance against this.

In general terms, this Turkish view is not completely unfounded given, for instance, Greece's stubborn resistance against the application of the EC-Turkey Association Agreement and the Additional Protocol on its bilateral relations with Turkey. It took the Community more than seven years after the Greek accession on 1 January 1981 and it needed a temporary Greek-Turkish rapprochement, the so-called "Davos process", to reach Greece's consent in signing the respective protocol for the application of the Association Agreement.²⁸ This is but one example of Greece's continuous attempts at blocking any new movement in EC-Turkey relations by pointing to the unsolved Cyprus problem and to the, in Greek eyes, still unsatisfactory human rights situation in Turkey.

What is, however, either a fundamental Turkish misconception or an exaggeration of facts is the description and evaluation of the reaction of Greece's partners to Athens' behaviour. It is misleading to interpret this reaction as an active support of Greek ambitions. More than often, the eleven have tried hard to change the Greek attitude, but they are bound by the Community's decision-making rules. Most of the decisions for the implementation of Community activities within the framework of EC-Turkey association need unanimity in the EC Council, i.e. Greek consent. There is also no chance of changing the rules because this, too, requires an unanimous decision of the Council. This situation, certainly, is deplorable from the Turkish point of view but it seems unfair to blame Greece's partners in the EU.²⁹

Greece's attitude is strongly linked to the Cyprus issue.³⁰ Since her entry into the Community, Greece sought to rally her EC partners behind her

28 For details, see Constantine Stephanou/Charalambos Tsardanides, "The EC Factor in the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus Triangle", in Dimitri Constan (ed.), *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s. Domestic and External Influences*, Houndmills/London: Macmillan 1991, pp. 207-230 and Heinz Jürgen Axt/Heinz Kramer, *Entspannung im Ägäiskonflikt? Griechisch-türkische Beziehungen nach Davos*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag 1989, (Aktuelle Materialien zur internationalen Politik, vol. 22) pp. 54-5.

29 See for a similar view from a Turkish scholar, Haluk Günugur, "Certains problèmes juridiques qu'entraînera l'adhésion de la Turquie à la CEE", in *Turkish Yearbook of Human Rights*, Vol. 7/8 (1985/1986), Ankara, 1987, pp. 119-136, esp. p. 122.

30 As with regard to the issues of the bilateral Greek-Turkish conflict, I also refrain from analysing any substantial issue of the Cyprus question proper. I content myself in this paper with discussing the implications of these issues for the development of EC-Turkey relations.

national position in the struggle with Turkey. This effort was not successful until the late 1980s. It was only in the preparation for the meeting of the Association Council of 25 April 1988 that the Greek government succeeded in getting a formula included in the EC's opening statement that "the Cyprus problem affects EC-Turkey relations". This, in return, led to the cancelling of the meeting by the Turkish foreign minister. Since then, the issue of the "Cyprus formula" in the EC opening statement became a point of disagreement between Turkey and the EC. The Community, nevertheless, hardened its position by including this formula in the Presidency's Conclusions of the Dublin meeting of the European Council of 25/26 June 1990. Today, it can be seen as part of a Community *acquis* in EC-Turkey relations.

The Turkish government immediately denounced the EC's position by repeating its opinion that the Cyprus question is not connected to EC-Turkey relations and by declaring that the Community has given up its constructive approach with regard to the Cyprus issue and sided with Greece, thus losing any political credibility concerning the international process for a solution of the Cyprus problem.³¹

A new facet has been added to the Cyprus issue in the context of Turkey-EC relations with the application for the accession of Cyprus to the Community by the (Greek-)Cypriot government, dated 3 July 1990. This move may have been induced by the mentioned position of the Dublin European Council meeting. The Turkish-Cypriot government supported by Ankara argued that the application was illegal both from the point of view of Cypriot constitutional law and from the point of view of international law.³² As the Council ignored the Turkish concerns and passed the Cypriot application to the Commission for the preparation of an "Opinion", the Community added another element of complication to the already very complex situation regarding its political position in the Eastern Mediterranean area.

31 See the statement of the undersecretary of state of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Turgay Özceri, *Newspot*, No. 28 (12 July 1990), pp. 3 and 6.

32 See the text of the Turkish-Cypriot memorandum of July 12, 1990 and the text of a complementary note of September 3, 1990 in Necati Münir Ertekün (ed.), *Le Statut de deux peuples à Chypre*, Lefkosa: L'office d'information publique de la République Turque de Chypre-Nord, 1990, pp. 31-45. This position, of course, has been fully supported by the Turkish government in a letter of Turkey's foreign minister, Mr. Ali Bozer, to the Italian foreign Minister as the acting president of the EC's Council of Ministers; see *Newspot*, No. 30 (26 July 1990), p. 2.

In its "Opinion" of 30 June 1993³³ the Commission declared that Cypriot membership of the Community is possible in principle and would most likely not pose any special problems in the social and economic field. It was, however, also of the opinion "that Cyprus's integration with the Community implies a peaceful, balanced and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question ..." in order to "create the appropriate conditions for Cyprus to participate normally in the decision-making process of the European Community and in the correct application of Community law throughout the island."³⁴ In the meantime the EC is ready to immediately start talks with the Cypriot representatives for the preparation of smooth negotiations once the situation mentioned has occurred. If, however, future intercommunal talks under the auspices of the UN would not lead to a political settlement of the Cyprus question, the EC should reassess the situation "in view of the positions adopted by each party in the talks" and reconsider the issue of Cyprus's accession to the Community in January 1995.³⁵

The EC Council of Ministers, at its session on 4 October 1993, accepted the Commission's "Opinion" without qualifications and late November the same year, a first round of preparatory talks between Commission's officials and the (Greek) Cypriot government took place in Nicosia. Furthermore, the European Union decided to attach an observer to future intercommunal talks without, however, having been able to define her or his task beyond the general idea of in this way getting first-hand informations about the behaviour of the Cypriot parties during the negotiation process. In order not to upset Turkey too much by this decision, the Council of the EU, however, explicitly stated that "observer" does not mean "participant" or "interlocutor".

Nevertheless, these developments in EU-Cyprus relations have created a new situation in the triangle EU-Turkey-Greece which may soon have serious repercussions on the development of overall EU-Turkey relations. What seems evident is a coming of growing cross-pressures on the EU from Athens and Ankara with Greece still being in the advantaged position of EU membership. It seems doubtful, however, if this situation, in itself,

33 See Commission of the European Communities, *Commission Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership*, Brussels, 30 June 1993, Doc. COM(93) 313 fin.

34 Ibid., point 47, p. 22

35 Ibid., point 51, p.23. One should note that this will be after Greece's period of EU-presidency which covers the first half of 1994 and during which Athens will undertake serious efforts at promoting a Cypriot membership, has come to an end.

would contain enough incentives for both, Athens and Ankara, to take serious bilateral efforts in order to find a comprehensive solution for their conflicts. In the long run, as an unwelcome result of this situation, the Union's status as an international political actor could be further considerably damaged.

For Turkish spectators, however, this situation will continue to evoke the impression of a partisan EU position with regard to Greek-Turkish relations and of a certain application of double-standards by the Union with regard to Turkey and Greece respectively. This impression, to a certain degree, is objectively justified but the underlying situation cannot be changed since Greece is a member of the Union and Turkey is not.

Turkey's process of democratization and the Kurdish problem

Over the last decade, the situation of democracy and human rights in Turkey has been another recurrent issue intervening into EC-Turkey relations. This contrasts sharply with the situation that prevailed during most of the first fifteen years of the association relationship. Although the respective negotiations leading to the Ankara Agreement of 1964 and to the Additional Protocol of 1972 took place in the immediate aftermath of military interventions which were accompanied by restrictions of human and political rights, this did not significantly influence the negotiating climate. Nor did the serious deterioration of the domestic political situation in Turkey during the second half of the 1970s, which was also accompanied by a general loss of personal security for many citizens, create major concerns in West European political circles, not to speak of repercussions on EC-Turkey relations.³⁶

This changed almost overnight with the third military intervention in September 1980. Since then, Western Europe's public, especially the German one, the EC's institutions, especially the European Parliament, and other West European organizations like the Council of Europe have continually monitored the human rights situation in Turkey. For a long time, they found many reasons for complaints about Turkey's human rights record even after the return to civilian political rule with the elections of November 1983. These, for instance, were not regarded as having been fair

36 Cf. for a more detailed account of the developments in the late 70s Lucille W. Pevsner, *Turkey's Political Crisis*, New York: Praeger Publ., 1984 (The Washington Papers, No. 110); Clement H. Dodd, *The Crisis of Turkish Democracy*, Huntingdon: Eothen Press, 1990 (2nd. ed.) and Mehmet Ali Birand, *The Generals' Coup in Turkey: An Inside Story of 12 September 1980*, London: Brassey's, 1987.

and free. Hence the EP refused the reestablishing of official contacts with the newly elected Turkish parliamentarians. Furthermore, many stipulations in the new Turkish constitution of 1992 were regarded as being undemocratic, especially those concerning parties and trade unions. Added to this was a recurrent complaint by Community institutions and in the general West European political public about severe violations of human rights by Turkish authorities, especially concerning regular torture of persons detained for political reasons.³⁷

These constant complaints seriously hampered a rapid normalization of EC-Turkey relations during the 1980s, if only in the form that it tended to support Greek endeavours to the same end. Many in the Turkish political public regarded these reservations on the side of the Community as unfounded and a result of misinformation or as a sign of political bad will with regard to an improvement of the relationship between Brussels and Ankara.

It should be noted, however, that such criticism was never a one-sided West European affair. Up to the present, there has always been a strong domestic criticism of the democratic and human rights standards in Turkey, which was not only the expression of "separatists" or "radicals" but could be found in circles of the Turkish "moderate left" as well. Hence, West European complaints about the situation in Turkey also were, to a certain extent, a reflection of the domestic Turkish political debate as far as this was not suppressed by the state authorities. In this sense, the sometimes harsh rejection of West European criticism by Turkish officials always also was directed at certain domestic groups.

In the very recent past West European general criticism about insufficient human rights and democratic standards in Turkey has somewhat calmed down. It is acknowledged that during the last years Turkish governments have brought about significant improvements in this respect. Nevertheless, the situation is widely regarded as being not fully satisfactory.³⁸ There still is concern in EU-circles about how effectively and

37 Details of this West European reaction to the domestic political situation in Turkey can be found in H. Kramer, *Die Europäische Gemeinschaft und die Türkei*, op.cit., pp. 84-111; see also contributions in Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (ed.), *Die Türkei – ein demokratischer Rechtsstaat*, Ankara: KAS 1989.

38 A short account of the re-consolidation of Turkish democracy is given by Metin Heper, "Consolidating Turkish Democracy", in *Journal of Democracy*, 3 (April 1992) 2, pp. 105-117; see also Turkish Democracy Foundation, *Development and Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey*, Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1989. For a differing position, see Mehmet S. Gemalmaz, *The Institutionalization Process of the "Turkish Type of*

how rapidly further progress can be made given a severe resistance from parts of the bureaucracy and the "law and order"-apparatus of the state. The position of these groups is strengthened by the fact that they also find support in the Turkish parliament, even in parts of the Socialdemocratic Populist Party. However, optimism still prevails in the Community as can be seen, for example, in the latest "Turkey-report" of the EP, submitted by Belgian MEP Raymonde Dury.³⁹

Strongly related to the issue of "democratization" is the problem of the Kurdish minority in Turkey and its treatment by the Turkish authorities. This issue, over the last years, almost outranked the "democratization" issue in the hierarchy of West European public's concern with regard to EC-Turkey relations.⁴⁰ A satisfactory reconciliation of West European and Turkish views of this problem seems to be very difficult. There certainly are some misunderstandings or misjudgements on the side of the West Europeans, as Turkish official and public opinion suggest time and again. The main underlying factor, however, seems to be conceptual differences with respect to the substantial content of the notions of "minority" and "nation-state" and the inherent relationship between them.⁴¹

Democracy". A Politico-Juridicial Analysis of Human Rights, Istanbul: Amaç Yayıncılık, 1989.

39 Cf. European Parliament, Doc. A3-0193/92 (with Annexes), 21 May 1992, in which it is stated in the explanatory part that relations between the EC and Turkey, which "in future will play an ever more important, even a decisive, political role in an especially endangered region, should be strengthened and revitalised." (p. 29) The Belgian MEP sees the necessity of fully supporting the Turkish government in order to enable it to realize its promises made in the election program. Due to controversies between the groups in the EP over how to react to the latest anti-Kurdish moves of the Turkish government, the report had been removed from the EP's agenda twice since its presentation in committee. It was finally approved at the November 1992 session of the EP after a fairly controversial debate. For the text of the final resolution, see *OJ*, No. C 337, 21.12.1992, pp. 218-225.

40 Cf. for a short and comprehensive overview of the history of the Kurdish issue in Turkey, Michael M. Gunter, *The Kurds in Turkey. A Political Dilemma*, Boulder, CO etc.: Westview Press, 1990; the best treatment of the Kurdish issue in a broader perspective is Martin van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh, and State*, London: Zed Books, 1992.

41 In taking this position, the author denies Turkish claims that West European opinion leaders are victims of disinformation campaigns of Kurdish separatist organizations and their fellow travellers in Western Europe. A careful reading over time of, for instance, the leading West European daylies like *Le Monde*, *Financial Times*, *The Independent*, *The Times*, *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, or *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* gives no justification to the claim of one-sided reporting about the Kurdish issue in Turkey. At least, there can be found no significant difference to the coverage of the Kurdish problem in Turkish publications like *Turkish Daily News* or *Briefing*.

The other Europeans have difficulties in sharing the Turkish view that there are no minorities in the country except those explicitly stated in the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. This is a narrow legal approach to the phenomenon of minority which is mainly based on the Turkish state doctrine of the indivisibility of the Turkish nation and Turkish state. It should be noted, however, that this approach does not deny the existence of Kurds in Turkey; it only denies their legal status as a minority.

In the prevailing and overwhelmingly accepted Turkish doctrine the nation and the nation-state form an inseparable whole⁴² which, if coupled with the principles of political democracy and rule of law, renders meaningless any differentiation between citizens based on ethnic criteria. This Turkish (majority) position with regard to the links between "minority", "nation", and "nation-state" is, however, but one possible view of the substantial meaning of these concepts and its linkage. It mainly holds true for nation-states which are organized after the principles of a "unitary state" whereas nation-states that are organized after the principles of a "federal state" display a different understanding of the terms and their linkage.

The majoritarian European approach to the issue of minorities and their relation to the state does not always and automatically mean that each and every group which is termed a minority is also granted the right of different treatment in contrast to the majority. Generally speaking, in most of the West European countries, however, there is a certain public acceptance of the argument that any minority has a right that its claim to different treatment is open to public political debate and, if necessary, democratic political decision.

In this perspective, the behaviour of the Turkish state authorities as regards the treatment of persons and groups, be them Kurds or Turks, that deviate from the official line comes under criticism and not so much the official position defending the principle of the unitary state. That the state authorities' reactions to the various concrete forms of the Kurdish issue go far beyond fighting separatist terrorism and include severe violations of human rights is an evaluation which can also be found in the Turkish press. It is even indicated in an report about the (in)famous "Newroz" events of

42 This Turkish state doctrine is embodied in the Turkish constitution of 1982 in article 3 which, according to article 4, is not open to amendment; even a proposition towards that end is prohibited.

March 1992, which has been published by the Socialdemocrat Populist Party, a member of the governing coalition.⁴³

The Turkish approach towards the Kurdish problem also contrasts with another emerging consensus in most EC countries about the treatment of ethnic minorities, which has been accelerated by the end of the East-West conflict with its freeing of longtime suppressed ethnic conflicts in various central and east European states. Today, the majority of the West European public is of the general opinion that every ethnic group of a certain size should have a right to maintain, develop and express its specific ethnical identity. Opinions vary, however, in and between EC member states as to the ways and means with which this should be accomplished. The spectrum of possibilities, offered in public debate on the issue, varies from a general right to political self-determination to granting certain rights with regard to "cultural autonomy". The practice of the treatment of ethnic minorities within EC member states varies accordingly.

The preceding reflections put into perspective the most prominent issue in West European-Turkish disagreements on the Kurdish problem: the activities of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and the reactions of the Turkish state on these activities. The government of EC member-states, the leading parties of these countries, and other officials of the Community and its member states generally never have shown any sympathy for the PKK and its terrorist activities. Official and other political criticism which has been directed at anti-terrorist activities of Turkish authorities, always complained about overstepping the limits set by the rule of law and about violations of human rights with respect to the civilian population in Southeast Anatolia. It did, however, never deny Turkey the legitimate right of defending its political and territorial integrity against separatist terrorism.

It would, however, be misleading if the Turkish government and Turkish public would interpret the most recent ban on the PKK and other Kurdish organisations in some EU countries as an unconditional official support of the established Turkish policy as regards the Kurdish problem. West European official and political public opinion will continue to differentiate between a legitimate fight against separatist terrorism on the one hand and

43 Detailed descriptions of the criticised behaviour of the Turkish state authorities, especially the Turkish army, can be found in Ismet G. Imset, *The PKK. A Report on Separatist Violence in Turkey (1973-1992)*, Ankara: Turkish Daily News, 1992, passim.

an overstepping of the limits of the constitutional state and violation of human rights on the other.

As long as the Turkish government continues with its present approach to curbing separatist terrorism of the PKK mainly by means of large scale military operations which also tend to severely affect large portions of the civilian population in the region, West European criticism will not stop. The same holds true with regard to a continuation of repressive state measures in other parts of Turkey like censorship and closure of press media, which are mainly justified as necessary concomitants to the fight against Kurdish separatism. Generally speaking, it is hardly conceivable that the West European political public will ever accept a military solution as the last word on the Kurdish problem.

All this, certainly, then will continue to negatively affect the political climate of official EU-Turkey relations. It remains to be seen, however, if and how far such intervening political factors are pushed into the background as regards the level of official relations due to overriding strategic and political considerations deriving from a re-evaluation of Turkey's position in the emerging new "European architecture".

6. The new "European architecture" and the future of EU-Turkey relations

The basic decisions of completing the customs union within the framework of the Ankara Agreement, of establishing a comprehensive political dialogue between Turkey and the EU at the highest level, and of granting Turkey association status in the WEU can all be interpreted as a decision to continue with relations between Turkey and the EU on the paths which have been set in the last forty years. This, by implication, would mean either that the formative basic conditions behind the relationship continue to be the same or that a change in the formative conditions, in the opinion of both sides, does not justify a change of the conduct of the relationship.

Given the dramatic changes of the international framework which has guided EC-Turkey relations in the past, only the second assumption could hold true unless, for one reason or another, both sides refrained from a reassessment of the new international situation and its impact on their relationship and, perhaps for the sake of convenience, preferred to continue as if nothing serious had happened.

The approach of EU's member-states to relations with Turkey is still dominated by strategic considerations. Under the present international situation, it is, however, no longer the sensible and real Soviet threat which determines Western Europe's interest. This has been replaced by a more diffuse idea of European strategic interests and a related Turkish role with regard to the situation in the Middle East and to possible developments in Central Asia. In this new environment, Turkey is ascribed the role and function of a stabilizing element and a political and societal model in order to curb fundamentalist Islamic tendencies in both regions as well as more far reaching strategic ambitions of radical members of the Islamic world.

It is, however, unclear how far this new role of Turkey is the result of a genuine West European strategic analysis or how much it is simply a West European adaptation to U.S. analysis and interests within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance.⁴⁴ Given the fact that EU member-states, within the framework of their special system of foreign policy cooperation, have hardly been able to devise strategic positions with regard to the future European architecture it would be a real surprise if this would have taken place with regard to a reassessment of European strategic interests in Turkey. Official public statements of EU's representatives in this respect show, in any case, a certain vagueness in defining specific interests of their own beyond upholding the principles of peace and international cooperation.⁴⁵

A closer look at the broader political issues and the actors involved with regard to this new Turkish role gives rise to some doubts about the validity and coherence of the new strategic approach of EU's members in their relations with Turkey.⁴⁶ Moreover, it seems more plausible that in the longer run relations between the EU and Turkey will be much more

44 This new view on Turkey's strategic role after the end of the Cold War was first developed in the U.S. and heavily promoted by the U.S. government. For a comprehensive account, see Graham E. Fuller/Ian O. Lesser (with Paul B. Henze and J.F. Brown), *Turkey's New Geopolitics. From the Balkans to Western China*, Boulder, CO etc: Westview Press (for RAND Corp.) 1993.

45 This can, at least, be inferred from the draft papers which the British presidency of the EC prepared in summer 1992 in order to further the process of normalization in relations with Turkey prior to the November meeting of the Association Council. See for this, reports in *Agence "Europe"*, 4 May 1992 and 20/21 July 1992.

46 See for this Philip Robins, "Between Sentiment and Self-Interest: Turkey's Policy Toward Azerbaijan and the Central Asian States", in *Middle East Journal*, 47 (1993) 4, pp. 593-610; idem, "The overlord state: Turkish policy and the Kurdish issue", in *International Affairs*, 69 (1993) 4, pp. 657-676 and Heinz Kramer, "Die Türkei: Eine Regionalmacht mit Zukunft?", in Albrecht Zunker (ed.), *Weltordnung oder Chaos? Beiträge zur internationalen Politik*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag 1993, pp. 109-125

influenced by developments within Europe and within Turkey than by possible or likely strategic roles Turkey could play in the Middle East and/or Central Asia. Given Turkey's continuing strong interest in becoming an undisputed part of Europe, the strategic choices and substantial political decisions with respect to building a new European architecture will become the decisive issues for the fate of EU-Turkey relations.

The complete break-down of the system of bipolar East-West strategic rivalry withdrew the basis on which West European governments, in the past, tended to evaluate the necessity of close EC-Turkey relations within the larger framework of the Western alliance system. It also tremendously altered the circumstances under which Turkey, after the Second World War, decided about the details of how to implement her basic political goal of "Westernization". At the same time, both sides are confronted with a new international environment which contains new fundamental challenges with important implications for the future of their mutual relationship. A simple continuation of old strategic choices does not seem to be possible any longer.

For the EU and its member-states, the new situation poses the fundamental two-fold challenge of a redefinition and a reconstruction of the "European order". This, finally, comes down to the task of comprehensively defining Europe's identity. The first task, among others, implies an answer to the questions about the borders of Europe as well as to the question of the organizing principles of the new order or architecture. To be more precise, it is mainly the question of the eastern border of Europe that has to be answered whereas the question of the organizing principles has to do with the choice between a system based on the politics of "regional community building" and a system built on nation-states, alliances, and power balances.

The second challenge has to do with the political and economic substance of strategies which are devised in order to implement guidelines established according to answers to the first challenge. In more concrete terms, this comes down to the issue of in what way the EU, in the longer term, can and should co-habitate with the rest of Europe. In a somewhat

superficial and misleading manner, this issue actually is discussed within the EU under the heading of "deepening and/or widening".⁴⁷

For Turkey, too, the change of the international situation tends to raise anew and in a comprehensive manner the issue of identity. For one, the creation of a universe of Turkic republics in Central Asia and Transcaucasia on the remnants of the Soviet empire together with a renewed public awareness in Turkey, as a result of the post-Yugoslavia warfare, of the existence of kin-groups in the Balkans have put into question the restriction of a "Turkish identity" to the Anatolian heartlands. Secondly, one could add to this new constellation of identity-creating factors in Turkey the revival of Islam. The struggle between "moderates" and "fundamentalists" about the shape of a proper Islamic society in most countries of the Arabic-Islamic world does not remain without effects on the Turkish population as is shown by growing tensions between "secularists" and "Islamists" within and between various strata of Turkish society.

At the same time, Turkey is confronted with the necessity of a fundamental reorientation of her security related foreign policy. The immediate strategic threat from the north has gone but it has been replaced by a variety of low to medium-scale violent conflicts mushrooming between Turkey's new immediate neighbours in Caucasia and Trancaucasia. And in the not too distant neighbourhood, a possible extension of the post-Yugoslavia war in the Balkans, the still unresolved issue of regional hegemony in the Gulf area, and the continuing Russian strategic interests in the Black Sea and Central Asian regions tend to increase Turkish feelings of uneasiness. And it raises the question of the reliability of past strategic alliances as regards these new security challenges, which can hardly be regarded as being clear-cut NATO emergencies.

It is the possible intersection of both these simultaneous processes of (re)definition of identity plus (re)orientation of strategic foreign policy in Western Europe and in Turkey which creates the challenge for the future shape and conduct of EU-Turkey relations beyond the already complicated matters of the establishment of the customs union. The more "community-like" the future European architecture will be organized the more

47 For the basics of a much more intelligent approach to the two-fold challenge, see William Wallace, *The Transformation of Western Europe*, London: Pinter (for RIIA), 1990, esp. pp. 92-107.

restricted its geographic scope has to be. This would leave as outsiders a number of other European states, among them Turkey. The more such an image of Europe will determine the respective political perceptions of Turkey's public the greater is the chance that the Turkish process of (re)defining the national identity will go into the direction of a greater emphasis on "Turkishness" and "Islam". Hence, extremes in the respective (West) European and Turkish process of identity-building would reinforce each other and lead to increased mutual enstrangement.

On the other hand, a European architecture which is more "European" in geographic terms and less of a "Community" in political terms than the present EU-system could eventually incorporate all European countries but Russia. Turkey's inclusion, too, would not pose unsurmountable difficulties as long as the country can keep its basically secular political and societal system. This would, moreover, indirectly be supported by the perspective of becoming part of the European political order. The crucial feature of such an architecture, however, would be its ability of ensuring enough economic and political cohesion to guarantee the implementation of common rules for a peaceful settlement of conflicts among its constituent parts.

This is basically an abstract discussion of similar fundamental political issues which simultaneously confront Western Europe and Turkey as a result of the Eurasian political turnover after the fall of the Soviet empire. As such it can only give a meagre idea of where the strategic choices for the development of the EU-Turkey relationship in the years to come are situated. Simply following the lines of the past may be the best choice for the time being given the high degree of uncertainty connected with the future developments. This, however, will hardly relieve the responsible politicians of both sides of the necessity of a thorough reassessment of the goals and the structure of the mutual relationship once the future conditioning framework of this relationship will have assumed clearer and more predictable patterns. This reassessment would be a primary task for the newly established high-level political dialogue between Turkey and the EU.

In any case, the political process of redefining the basis and the broader substance of the relationship will be highly influenced by the general attitude in EU countries concerning the issue of Turkey's Europeanness. The questions if Turkey really is an integral part of Europe and if Turks really can be regarded as being genuine Europeans pose the most intricate

and delicate problem for the conduct of the relationship. This problem goes far beyond the question of an eventual Turkish membership of the EU although it is one of the thorniest but almost unspoken-of issues in that context.

For the sake of clarification it seems necessary to remind ourselves that the question of membership has been decided in principle long ago. The stipulations of article 28 of the Ankara Agreement in which the possibility of a Turkish accession to the Community is regulated do not mention the issue of Turkey's Europeanness as a prerequisite of membership. Nor does the "Opinion" of the Commission on Turkey's request for accession mention this topic as being of any relevance to the problem. Nevertheless, many Turks feel that the final decision about their exact place in the emerging new European order will be highly influenced by this problem – and they rightly do so.⁴⁸

It can hardly be denied that quite a majority of the West European politicians and even more among the general public are of the opinion that, in a cultural and historical perspective, Turks are not really Europeans and that Turkey is not an integral part of Europe. This perception can be regarded as the result of a process of European identity-creation which took place since the Middle Ages and in which, over centuries, "the Turk" and the Ottoman Empire took on and have been assigned the role of "the Other", i.e. the non-European.⁴⁹ The more recent political experiences with Turkey as a reliable partner of the Western security alliance and a country associated to the European Community together with a multitude of personal contacts with "Western Turks" at the elite level have hardly contributed to a substantial revision of this deeply rooted European view of "the Turk".

48 This Turkish concern is an expression of the broader problem of defining Turkey's and the Turks identity as "Western". It goes back to the foundation of the new republic by Mustafa Kemal as a political and social entity which should be completely different from the former Ottoman Empire and its society which were basically founded in Islam. A representative contemporary example of this Turkish endeavour in the context of the application for membership of the EC is the book of the then Turkish prime minister; see Turgut Özal, *La Turquie en Europe*, Paris: Plon 1988. For a more scholarly but similar approach to the problem, see the contributions to Metin Heper et al. (eds.), *Turkey and the West. Changing political and cultural identities*, London: I.B. Tauris Publ. 1993.

49 For an elaboration of this argument, see Iver B. Neumann/Jennifer M. Welsh, "The Other in European self-definition: an addendum to the literature on international society", in *Review of International Studies*, 17 (1991) 4, pp. 327-348.

This position can correctly be regarded as highly irrational but it still constitutes an important "objective" factor for the evaluation of the perspectives of Turkey's relations with the rest of Europe, especially with the European Union. As long as this mixture of cultural prejudices and religiously motivated fears of an "Islamic threat" to the "Christian occident" influences West European perceptions of Turkey, Turkish wishes to become an integral part of the European Union will meet with additional difficulties unknown to other European states.

The basically reluctant-to-negative general approach towards Turkey consciously or subconsciously tends to negatively influence the evaluation of other issues that are of political or economic relevance to the question of an eventual Turkish membership of the EU. Economic problems, democratic deficiencies, and political conflicts, in this view, tend to become welcome scapegoats for a much more fundamental unwillingness to accept Turkey as a member of a "European" Union.⁵⁰ It seems at least doubtful that Turkey's new geopolitical and strategic position together with the general uncertainty about the future development of the Eurasian political landscape will in themselves generate enough momentum to change the negatively biased European perception of Turkey's Europeanness.

50 Although public comments on the issue of Turkey's membership seldom are explicit on this point, one should note that it is only with regard to Turkey that the "cultural issue" is mentioned as a problematic factor in the context of the enlargement debate; see for instance European Parliament, EP 141.136/fin./add. (Opinion of the Committee on External Economic Relations for the Political Committee on enlargement of the European Community and relations with other European countries), Luxembourg, 14 May 1991, pp. 5-6.

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Black Sea Economic Cooperation

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1. Introduction

The venture to a regional integration of countries surrounding the Black Sea, was initiated by Turkey, in 1991. On June 25, 1992 Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine signed the declaration of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) committing themselves to a new multilateral cooperation in the region based on the principles of market economy. The principal purpose of the BSEC is to improve political stability and the economic welfare in the region through economic cooperation. Economic cooperation is likely to lead welfare gains for participating countries, taking advantage of their geographic proximity and complementary economies, and the new opportunities created in the region through the continuing reform process and structural adjustments taking place. The BSEC is regarded as a contribution to the shared aspiration of the members for integrating with the world economy. For this reason BSEC is established not to be contravening with other international and regional organizations. The Article V and VII of the Declaration of BSEC explicitly states that it is not an alternative to any existing integration projects but it is a complementary process to achieve a higher degree of integration to European and World economy. While BSEC will help the economies to develop and improve the necessary institutions of well- functioning market economies, it will also serve as an instrument to signal to the rest of the world that the members are committed to the outward oriented economic policies.

The economic cooperation will be promoted gradually, given the economic conditions and the problems of the member countries that are in transition to market economy. The cooperation

does not discriminate against the third countries in the sense that any state who recognizes the provisions of the Declaration can become a member of BSEC or partially involve in the realizations of the projects.

The cooperation among the member countries was to be provided in the fields of economics, including trade and industrial cooperation, of science and technology and of environment in a very wide range of areas such as, transportation and communication, information technologies, the exchange of economic and commercial data, standardization, energy, mining, tourism, agriculture and agro-industries, veterinary and sanitary protection, health care and pharmaceuticals.

The BSEC assumes the initiatives of the private sector as the driving force for the cooperation among the members. The role of governments is to provide the necessary legal, economic, commercial and fiscal framework to promote the free trade of goods and services in the region by removing any kind of barriers to trade; to improve the business environment by facilitating the prompt entry, stay and free movement of businessmen; to provide an appropriate environment for the free flow of capital by taking precautions to prevent double taxation. The governments will also take active role in the implementation of joint projects for the development of the infrastructure in the region and the protection of environment, particularly preservation of Black Sea.

Section 2 summarizes the economic costs and benefits of regional integration and the past

experience of recent regional integration arrangements. Section 3 presents the current state of economies in the member countries. Section 4 concludes the paper by evaluating the possible achievements of BSEC in the light of past experiences on the regional integrations.

2. Regional Integration Arrangements

Since 1957, The Treaty of Rome, which had set out a common market model for the Western European countries (European Economic Community), regional integration has been a vivid issue in the agenda of policy makers. The success of EEC is followed by the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) formed by six European countries in 1960, Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA) signed in 1983 and the Canada - US. free trade agreement (CUSTA) which now is restructuring itself as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) including Mexico as a third member. There has been many other regional integration attempts among developing countries such as LAFTA (Latin American Free Trade Association) , Andean Pact, CACM (Central American Common Market), ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) , however, these regional integrations have shown slow progress compared to the regional integration arrangements among developed countries.¹

Since 1960s the world economy had experienced the integration of North- North such as EC and CUSTA, of South-South such as LAFTA and CACM, and recently the integration of

¹*For a detailed review of present regional integration arrangements see de la Torre and Kelly, 1992.*

North-South with NAFTA but BSEC has a distinct feature by embracing countries which are in transition to market economy from command based system. Even though the economic achievements may take a long time to realize the political side of the agreement attracts attention, leading to the cooperation among countries with long standing disputes.

The different forms of regional integration, in terms of the level of development of the member countries, were driven by different motives. In the case of integration of the industrial countries, the basic motive behind the regional integration was the well known axiom that "free trade increases the welfare ". The slow progress made in GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs) negotiations at that time led the industrial countries to seek for liberalization through regional arrangements.² In contrast, the reason for regional integration became very popular among developing countries in 60s, was to extend import-substitution development strategy to a larger region than the national boundaries.³ With the emergence of the debt crisis in 1980s, the import-substitution development strategies were abandoned, subsequently causing lesser interest to regional integration. However, in recent

²*It should be noted that free trade agreements on regional basis can not be perceived as a substitute to multilateral negotiations. It is well known that, unless free trade is attained on a global basis there will be some countries left out and might be affected negatively from the formation of free trade areas. In particular the formation of free trade area improves the region's terms of trade at the expense of the rest of the world by diverting trade from outside. This is what Krugman (1991) calls the beggar-thy-neighbor effect, in which the rest of the world get hurt from the formation of free trade area without any overt increase in protectionism. another point which makes free trade area undesirable from world's welfare point of view is that the area will have more market power than its components leading them into warfare, which will leave everyone worse off in a Prisoner's dilemma type situation.*

³*The regional integration arrangements among developing countries also emerged as a reaction to the regional integration in Europe in order to gain a bargaining power in multilateral negotiations.*

years, the interest to regional integration revived, this time, supporting an outward-oriented and market-based development strategies. In terms of its purpose, BSEC resembles to the latter in aiming to help economies in transition to open up themselves to the world economy.

2.1. The Economics of Regional Integration

The regional integration arrangements may assume several forms in which the degree of integration increases as we move from preferential trading area to economic union. Free trade area (FTA)⁴ lies in between these two extreme mode of integration, in which member countries abolish all tariffs and quantitative restrictions in intra-regional trade, retaining their individual trade policies against non-member countries. Although the intra-regional trade may increase as a result of FTA, as Viner (1950) suggested part of the increase in the volume of trade may be diverted.⁵ The typical example of a trade diversion was the effect of EC enlargement on agricultural trade. After their participation in EC, the Southern European countries end up importing grains from costly Northern European sources in exchange of exporting costly Mediterranean products to them, which had been supplied by cheaper Northern African sources previously. Therefore, the increased bilateral trade among

⁴We will mainly consider the economics of FTA, since this is the most common mode of integration considered in the beginning phase of regional integration arrangements.

⁵Viner (1950) suggested that the increase in the volume of trade after the liberalization of trade in the region consists of two distinct effects, namely, trade creation and trade diversion effect. Trade creation occurs when high-cost domestic production is replaced by low-cost imported goods from member country. trade diversion occurs when low-cost imports from outside world is replaced by high-cost imports from member country after removal of tariffs. Then it is said that free trade arrangement is economically efficient if trade creation is greater than trade diversion, and inefficient otherwise.

members can not be a good criteria in assessing the success of a FTA. Generally, the trade creation / trade diversion ratio tends to be high if tariffs of outside countries are high before the formation of FTA, tariffs of prospective members are high before the formation of FTA and the tariffs on external trade is low after the formation of FTA, or put differently, if member countries are natural trading partners. For this reason, inclusion of Mexico in NAFTA will not cause so much of trade diversion since 71 percent of Mexico's imports were from US and 82 percent of her exports were to the US in 1991 (Hufbauer and Schott, 1992). FTA can also avoid the possible trade diversion by not forcing its members to have a common external trade policy.⁶

There are some other potential gains that can be obtained through the formation of free trade area. Meade (1955) and Lipsey (1957) pointed out that, FTA will provide less distorted consumption patterns in importing country, for the price of the imported good will decline with the removal of tariff even though the cost of production is high. Hence from consumers' point of view FTA may be desirable. This argument can further be extended to the case of imported intermediate goods which will improve the productive efficiency by reducing the cost of production.

There also dynamic gains from FTA. With the establishment of FTA, the competition in the region will increase as tariffs are reduced and markets expand. As monopolistic and

⁶*A country can always unilaterally reduce the tariffs to nonmembers and continue to import from the lowest cost country.*

oligopolistic market structures become exposed to outside pressures inefficient firms will disappear. Competition will encourage research and development, stimulating new investments. With an access to a larger market, especially small countries will enjoy the economies of scale created by a greater degree of specialization, greater utilization of plant capacity, learning by doing, development of a pool of skilled labor and management. These cost reductions can reduce trade diversion in the long-run.

In theory, the gains from FTA can be increased with the following different trading patterns. If the countries are complementary then inter-industry trade may expand on the basis of differences in resource endowments, hence comparative advantage. If they are competitive, in other words if they are similar in terms of factor endowments, production structures and consumption patterns then trade creation can be achieved on the basis of intra-industry trade, product differentiation and economies of scale.

2.2. The Experience with Regional Integration

The past experience showed that the regional integration attempts among industrial countries has been more successful than those among developing countries. This contrast is explained not only by the differences in the purpose of regional integration but also by the different techniques used in implementation, the differences in the level of development of the member countries and the conflicting national policies pursued by the member countries. The success of regional integration among industrial countries is partly due to the similarities of their economies. Trade liberalization in these arrangements mostly led to an intra-industry trade

specialization, that is trade in differentiated products. With the exception of ANZCERTA, the industrial countries that are engaged in regional trade agreements have previously been each other's major trading partners. This had a potential impact in reducing trade diversion in Vinerian terms.

On the other hand, the performance of regional trading agreements among developing countries was very weak. This was attributed to both structural elements limiting the scope for potential gains and the low degree of implementation. In terms of implementation mistakes, initial deadlines for the removal of barriers to intra-regional trade were postponed. In addition, there was a differential treatment in tariffs depending on the country of origin. Also, the reductions on trade barriers were made on a product-by-product basis (as opposed to the across-the-board elimination of barriers used in industrial country's regional integrations) which required periodic negotiations and consensus. This lack of automaticity in implementation often resulted in biased selection of products, giving enough power to member countries to exclude the relatively sensitive sectors. Among all the regional integrations within developing world CACM is the only one that showed a significant progress in terms of the increase in the intra-regional trade. Intra-regional exports in CACM increased from 7 percent to 26 percent in 1960-70 period (de Melo and Panagariya, 1992). Its relatively successful performance was attributed to the usage of across-the-board tariff reductions, establishment of common external tariff and the initially weak position of import competing sectors in the member countries (Edwards and Savastano, 1989).

There were also inherited structural elements that limited the scope for potential gains from

regional integration among developing countries. First, the member countries had highly protected industries with a little intra-regional trade occurring prior to the agreement. Secondly, developing countries were similar in factor endowments which overruled the trade creation based on comparative advantage. Besides they couldn't exploit the advantages of intra-industry trade based on economies of scale and product differentiation like the industrial countries, as their markets were smaller and the per capita incomes were lower. Finally, underdeveloped capital markets, barriers to entry, differential tax and regulatory environments among member countries have seriously constrained the capacity to reallocate resources. A thorough survey on regional integration by de la Torre and Kelly (1992) concludes that the two key conditions had to be met to maximize the gains from regional integration. First, the maintenance of outward oriented economic policies and secondly the provision for across-the-board intra-regional liberalization with an automatic time table. The BSEC countries had declared their commitment to the first condition. The second, perhaps, should be kept in mind when the free trade area is established

3. The economies of the members of BSEC

At present BSEC has eleven members. Six of them are the republics of the Former Soviet Union (FSU), Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. Three of them are the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania. And the rest are Greece and Turkey which adopted outward looking development strategies more than a decade ago.

Insert Table 1 here.

Table 1 gives the selected economic indicators for the member countries in 1992. The total population of the region is around 325 million, per capita GDP for 1992 is \$2,650. Greece has the highest per capita GDP with \$7637 and Albania has the lowest with \$....From 1991 to 1992 all the post-communist countries had experienced a decline in their GDP. Among the members only Greece and Turkey recorded a positive growth rate of 1.3 and 5.5 percent, respectively. The drastic fall in the output in the post-communist countries is mostly due to the collapse of CMEA trade. With the overnight liberalization of prices, the rate of inflation increased dramatically in these countries during 1992 and it still continues. The comparison of the economies of the member countries based on the data from recent years would not lead to meaningful results, as the post -communist countries are in the midst of an economic chaos. However, one result is very clear that all the countries in the region have open economies with a high total trade to GDP ratio. This ratio is especially very high for the republics of the FSU carrying the legacy of the centrally planned Soviet system.

3.1. Former Soviet Union Republics

The breakup of USSR in 1992 had a very disruptive effect on the economies of the republics. Under the centrally planned economic system of USSR, each state had a role in the economy where she specialized on certain industries, not necessarily those on which she had comparative advantage, and supplied these products to the rest of the republics.

Armenia's role in FSU was to process intermediate goods and materials procured from other republics and to supply a wide range of consumer and non-specialized producer goods. The country developed substantial capacity in the light industry (textiles, knitwear and shoes), food processing and also heavy industry. For this, country was dependent on imports of energy, agricultural and chemical inputs, wood and paper and other intermediate goods. Armenia also had a disproportionate share of Soviet military industrial complex, supplying high technology lasers and electronics.

Azerbaijan is a major supplier of agricultural products producing a wide range crops and has a large oil supplies. She, also, has a broad based industry which accounts for 48 percent of its NMP, in 1992. The industry operates in the areas of ferrous and non ferrous metallurgy, petroleum equipment, electrical engineering, chemicals, petrochemicals and light and agro-industries.

Georgia is endowed with a highly-educated and low-cost work force, a well-developed industrial base, fertile agricultural conditions. Its main industrial activities include engineering, aircraft and car manufacture, light and food industries, chemicals, cement, computers, ferro-alloys, fuel pipes and fertilizers. Industry accounted for 35 percent of NMP, following agriculture and forestry with 37 percent. As it is the case in other republics, both in industry and agriculture the economy heavily depends on inter-republican trade.

Moldova is the major supplier of agricultural products in FSU. It's economic role was one of producer of raw and processed foodstuffs (primarily grapes, grains, wines, vegetables and livestock). Agriculture alone accounts for 42 percent of NMP; agro-industry contributes approximately half of the almost 40 percent of NMP accounted for by the industrial sector, which also produces household appliances and high technology electrical goods, in part for the defense industry.

Russia is the second largest energy producer in the world. 14 percent of world commercial energy production is provided by Russia. She exports 40 percent of its total energy production . 36 percent of its GDP is accounted by industry of which energy production constitutes the largest part. Industry is followed by agriculture which accounts for almost 16 percent of GDP.

Ukraine is endowed with significant amount of coal deposits, fertile agricultural and skilled labor force. She has a large and diverse industrial sector which represented 61 percent of GDP in 1990 and dropped to 43 percent in 1991. The major sectors in the industrial sectors are machine building, food processing, metallurgical industries (primarily steel production) which all together constitute 63.5 percent of industrial output and, textile, chemical industries, fuel and energy related industries and building materials which comprise 13.5 percent of total industrial output.

Insert Table 2 here.

The centrally planned system in FSU created very large scale and dependent industries in each of the republics which in turn had made inter-republican trade an essential part of economic growth and development. Most of the republics are dependent on Russia for the supply of energy and to each other for the supply of intermediate inputs. Among all the republics Russia is the least dependent on interstate trade with such trade accounting for 59 percent in 1990. In contrast, for the other republics inter-republican trade constituted more than 80 percent of the total trade. For all of them Russia was contributing almost 60 percent of the inter-republican trade. Russia was followed by Ukraine with a share of around 20 percent on average. Table 3 gives the distribution of inter-republican trade by destination.

Insert Table 3

The major macroeconomic imbalances which had arisen after the breakup were aggravated by disruptions in inter-republican trading patterns with the FSU. In addition, the collapse of trade as a result of dissolution of the CMEA (Council of Mutual Economic Assistance) affected them severely, particularly Russia whose imports from non- FSU sources (primarily CMEA) fell by 46 percent in 1991. For example in Armenia, the inter-republican exports as a percentage of NMP fell to 12.43 percent in 1992 from 29.49 percent in 1991. On the imports side this decline was from 36.14 percent to 18.03 percent. The disruptions in the inter-republican trade led to shortages of many essential inputs, and left all of the republics with a slump in production. Related to this, the export markets have collapsed, too. In all republics of the FSU, 1992 was characterized by a drastic fall in economic activity, and large

increases in prices. The decline in real NMP in 1992 was 50 percent in Armenia, 26 percent in Azerbaijan, 24 percent in Moldova and 16 percent in Ukraine. In Georgia output fell by 28.3 percent in 1991. In Russia output has continued to fall in 1992 and is estimated to be 15 percent below the level of mid-1991 which itself represented a substantial drop from 1990.

3.1.1. The Trade Regime in FSU Republics

Although the inter-republican trade was very high in volume in the FSU, there were strict state regulations and restrictions to trade. The major obstacles were the restrictions on exports for convertible currency trade, excessive regulation of inter-republican trade and the imperfections in the payments/settlements system.

Export licenses were being vastly used as a trade barrier for both inter-republican and convertible currency trade. The inter-republican trade was carried by state orders. The bilateral agreements among republics determined the prices (which were substantially lower than the world prices), the types of goods, the quantities of export and import, trading enterprises, origin, destination and timing. This system lacked necessary incentive mechanisms, so it often caused delays in the deliveries of goods which had compounded the decline in the output. It also prevented economies from gaining their comparative advantage in the respective industries vis-à-vis the third countries.

Barter trade in the FSU republics is still very common. The lack of hard currency and strict price controls prevailing in bilateral agreements are the immediate reasons for its common practice. In addition, the inefficiencies in the payments/settlements system usually caused late payments for transactions which obviously had adverse affects in the highly inflationary environment.

The trade with non-FSU countries were subject to severe restrictions. Export taxes, licenses and the surrender system for hard currency were the common practices in all the FSU republics. For example, export taxes in Azerbaijan were between 5 and 50 percent, which had an unweighted average of 28 percent . In Ukraine, export taxes were averaging about 45 percent through 1992. Also exports to non-FSU countries were subject to surrender system where firms had to pay a percentage of the hard currency earned from their exports. The exchange rates used have been considerably lower than the market exchange rates, imposing an implicit export tax. Even though Russia started to use the market rate after July 1992, the traders tended to use barter trade as a means of transaction in order to avoid holding rubles in high inflationary environment. Export licenses were required on the export of strategic goods which constitutes 80 percent of exports in Azerbaijan. Imports from rest of the world was still subject to high tariffs. Azerbaijan has eliminated tariffs on existing imports originating from non-FSU countries in August 1992.

The strong economic interdependence of FSU republics to each other calls for an immediate reform in the trade pattern. The present trading system contains elements deterring trade,

especially various restrictions of exports for convertible currency and excessive regulation of interstate trade relations. In the immediate future these countries are dependent on each other for energy or other intermediate input imports. Further disruption in trading patterns would compound existing supply constraints and could undermine the reform process. So there is need for transitional regulation to restore and sustain the inter-republican trade. At the same time, however, these economies need restructuring and reallocation of resources. Most of the sectors of the economy are not in a position to compete in the foreign markets. The trade that is taking place through state orders assumes heavily controlled prices which is substantially lower than the world prices. Also very low transportation costs distorted the trade substantially. In the transition period, the introduction of world prices in the valuation of tradable goods and services will leave republics with terms of trade gains and losses. The case of oil pricing in Russia is particularly important since most of the republics depend on Russia for oil supply. However, introducing the world prices will also give the right signals to the industries in terms of their competitiveness and lead to the restructuring and the reallocation of resources. As we mentioned before the established industries in the FSU republics does not necessarily reflect the comparative advantage of the economies. For example the World Bank country report on Ukraine examines the competitiveness of the existing industries in the country. The composition of output at the world prices reveals engineering, food processing, agriculture, iron and steel, and chemicals as the most important industries in the economy. They use the net value added at the world prices as a measure of the competitiveness. The result is that food processing has negative value added at the world prices while metallurgy and engineering are among the most competitive

industries in Ukraine. Overall, 16 percent of the total output at the domestic prices is comprised by negative value added sectors at the world prices. Furthermore they found that almost one-twelfth of all inter-republican exports of Ukraine are from negative value added sectors, where sugar refining is the most striking example.

3.2. More Economies in Transition: Albania, Bulgaria and Romania

Besides the six republics of the FSU, three members of the BSEC, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania are in transition to market economy as well. Therefore they are facing more or less the same problems that the republics of FSU are facing, with the exception that they have much more independent economies than the states of FSU. Similar to the inter-republic trade in the FSU, the post communist countries had very strong trade links with each other. This institutionalized trade relation was provided through CMEA which was a regional arrangement facilitating trade and investment among communist countries. While providing a ready market for countries' growing economy, it insulated the economies from international competition. As in FSU, the trade was directed by state orders. This led to an inefficient allocation of resources. Brada (1993) wrote that the CMEA did not increase the welfare of the members in Vinerian sense because bulk of the trade was diverted. It helped to the industrialization of these economies but by 1980s they lagged the pace of industrial progress in the West. With the collapse of the communist rule, the CMEA lost its importance but left the socialist countries with uncompetitive and inefficient industrial structure.

Since 1980's there was a persistent decline in GDPs of most of the communist countries.

Albania's GDP has declined 30 percent and 15 percent, respectively, in 1991 and 1992. Bulgaria experienced a decline of 2.9 percent and 7.7 percent in the same years. And in Romania these figures were 13 percent and 15.4 percent. They all suffered from balance of payments problems especially with convertible currency countries. To solve these problems are not easy since these countries exports are not likely to be competitive in convertible currency markets in the near term. CMEA countries are negotiating to straighten the trading relations again but this time trade will be based on international prices which will obviously create terms of trade deterioration for most of these countries.

Insert Table 4 and 5.

Although Albania is the poorest country in the region, it has a diversified industrial production. Electricity generation, primarily derived from hydroelectric stations, and mining of chromium are very important. Also chemicals, light and fuel industries contribute substantially to the economy. Albanian economy heavily depends on imported fuel and materials. Since March 1992, prices and foreign trade were liberalized, more realistic exchange rate has been introduced, most of the land is distributed to peasantry, and retail and service sectors have been privatized. In 1989 agriculture had the largest share in NMP and still stays so. 75 percent of Albanian exports are industrial goods such as oil, minerals, ferrochrome, copper wire, nickel and electricity and some consumer goods and handicrafts. The rest is agricultural products. Capital goods dominated the imports with some consumer goods. The structure of the trade has been fairly stable over the last two decades.

Greece and Turkey are among the important trading partners of Albania.

Under the communist regime over the past 50 years, Bulgaria turned into an industrial economy from an agricultural economy. In 1990, agriculture accounted for 14.2 percent of total NMP whereas industry contributed to 57 percent of the NMP. These figures were 65 and 15 percent, respectively in 1939. The shift in the composition of Bulgaria's NMP was also reflected in CMEA trade. Bulgaria's foreign trade with CMEA countries accounted for almost 65 percent of total trade, non-CMEA trade (primarily OECD countries) and developing countries accounted for 25 percent and 10 percent respectively. Throughout the 1980s, the USSR had the largest share in Bulgaria's CMEA trade, accounting for 76 percent of CMEA exports and 71 percent of CMEA imports in 1989. Both on export and import side the share of capital goods grew consistently. Bulgaria has been an exporter of fuels, minerals and metals to both CMEA countries and convertible currency market. This in turn, mostly depended on oil imports from USSR. The changing regime in Eastern Europe and the collapse of CMEA gave rise to a new foreign trade pattern for Bulgaria. Greece and Turkey became fastest growing foreign trade partners.

Romanian economy had experienced an extreme version of the import-substituting industrialization strategy. This had resulted in a heavy importance on industry at the expense of agriculture. Now industrial production especially on heavy industry such as fuels, metallurgy, machine building, chemicals and non-metallic mining, accounts for 45 percent of GDP, 80 percent of export earnings and 45 percent of employment.

Manufacturing had been severely affected by energy and other hard currency import shortages. The changes in relative prices and falling demand contributed to the worsening of manufacturing sector. In 1991 industrial output declined by 21.7 percent and in 1992 by over 23 percent. Since 1989 there has been an attempt in modernization of the energy sector, agriculture, infrastructure and services. The economy opened up to foreign capital in order to upgrade the existing capital stock, and transfer technology and managerial know-how.

3.3. Two Market Economies: Greece and Turkey

Greece and Turkey are the two members of the BSEC which had adopted the institutions of well-functioning market economies more than a decade ago. Although this difference in the institutional level postpones the integration in many areas, it gives the opportunity to the economies in transition to benefit from the experience of these two countries.

Greece has been a member of EC since 1981. The 1991 data on the structure of the GDP shows that agriculture accounted for 16.3 percent of GDP at factor cost, industry, including construction accounted for 27.4 percent and the service sector contributed to 56.3 percent. The growth in the economy was interrupted in 1973 and 1979 with the two oil shocks.. During the '60s, GDP growth was 7.2 percent on the average. With the first oil shock in 1973 there was a decline in GDP for the first time. During the period of 1975-79, it averaged 5.2 percent. But this time rising inflation rate accompanied to the growth. In 1979 the economy worsened again and hit by the second oil shock. Continuous stabilization

policies in '80s did not respond as expected and left the country in 1986 with inflation rate of 2.3 percent, public sector deficit of 84.1 percent of GDP and external debt of 46.9 percent of GDP. By 1988, the current account deficit pulled down 1.8 percent of GDP and outstanding external debt fell to 38.9 percent. In 1990, due to political instability, the stabilization program was loosened, which in turn caused high inflation (25 percent) and public sector deficit (104 percent of GDP).

Greece depends heavily on agriculture and textiles on her exports. In 1991, 26.1 percent of the dollar value of the exports were accounted by fresh and processed foods while 23.6 percent provided by textiles and clothing. Since she joined the EC, the exports has been moved away from fresh produce to processed foods and beverages. On the import side, automotive industry, fuel, meat and dairy product, electrical equipment and appliances are the important items. Greece mainly trades with EC partners (mostly with Germany, Italy and France) which accounts for two -thirds of its total trade.

Insert Table 6

Turkey became predominantly an industrial country, in the last decade. The share of industry in GDP has increased to 26 percent in 1992 from 19 percent in 1970. These figure for agriculture was 16 percent and 31 percent , respectively. In 1991, manufacturing accounted for 78 percent of exports and it has been the fastest growing sector of the economy throughout the 80s. Turkey has a well diversified manufacturing base even though there are

efficiency concerns of the production taking place in State Economic Enterprises (SEE). Textile industry is the largest sector contributing around 20 percent of the output and employing one-third of all workers in manufacturing. Partly due to wrong economic policies and partly due to the external shocks, Turkish economy was in a crisis at the end of '70s. Starting in 1980 Turkey had a series of economic reforms; devaluation of Turkish Lira and transition to flexible exchange rate regime, increases in the prices of the SEE's products. In 1983, Turkey quit the long lasting import-substituting development strategy of the last 50 years. The reform package of this year had included the elimination of the quantitative restrictions on imports, the promotion of exports through subsidies, the improvement of efficiency in the SEE, the liberalization of credit markets and the banking sector. Turkey became a follower of export led growth strategy, taking the South Korea as a model. Exports as a percentage of GNP rose from 6 percent in 1970 to 12 percent in 1991. Besides the increase in the trade volume, the composition of traded commodities has also been changed as well after the reform program. Before 1980, two-thirds of the exports were agricultural. In 1991 industrial products provided 78 percent of the total exports. OECD countries have been the largest foreign trade partners to Turkey, accounting for over 60 percent of Turkey's foreign trade, after mid- 1970s Turkey also opened up its market to Middle East. Despite of the geographic proximity and the complementary features of their economies, Turkey had a negligible trade with FSU. Although Turkey had recorded high rate of growth in exports over the last decade, it won't be easy to maintain this trend due to the recession in Western Europe and increasing competition from Asian producers in textiles and clothing. In 1992, 53 percent of total exports went to EC, of which 26 percent was to

Germany. Turkey needs to diversify the geographic distribution of its foreign trade. Eastern and Central Europe is becoming a competitor to Turkey in Western European markets. But the other side of the coin is that they offer new export opportunities for Turkey as well.

4. Potential gains from economic cooperation

The BSEC consists of countries complementing each other. Except Greece and Turkey, rest of the members had close trade relations with each other in the past which still continue. However, this close relation is not a correct indicator of them being a natural trading partners. Under the communist rule, these countries had protected industries and all the trade was taking place through state orders. Some of the industries are not competitive in international standards. Some of the current trade that is taking place in the region is diverted trade. So new trade patterns that would be established through the cooperation in the region could even overcome this trade diversion which had taking place for so long.

Insert Table 7.

There are opportunities in the region that can increase the current trade volumes. For example in the case of Turkey, she had a very little trade occurring with FSU and the other post-communist countries before. Table 7 gives the data on Turkey's trade with the other members of BSEC. The largest trade volume is with Russia which only accounts for 3 percent of Turkey's total exports in 1992 and 4.5 percent of her imports. The total trade of

Turkey in the region accounts for around 7 percent of her total trade in 1992. At present, the restrictive trade regime of FSU could be one of the reason of such a low trade. Also the current financial situation in the republics of FSU constrains the trade in convertible currency substantially as we discussed in the preceding sections. It will take some time for the trade in the region to vitalize since it requires the financial problems to be solved in the region. There is yet to be no legal infrastructure which facilitates the transfer of money and capital within the region. For this reason, the countries gave the priority to the establishment of Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB). The BSTDB, in the beginning will finance both the intra-regional trade and the extra-regional trade and facilitate the transfer of foreign capital into the region. The account unit of Bank's capital was agreed to be SDR, half of which could be paid in own currency by the countries in transition. The share of the capital of each country was decided as 16.5 percent for Greece, Russia and Turkey, 13.5 percent for Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine, 2 percent for Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova. As the countries complete their transition they are allowed to increase their capital share so that each member can have equal share in the Bank eventually. Since the paid-in capital of the Bank is quite low initially, it is decided that it will finance trade rather than investments. In this way the Bank could help to raise the potential trade in the region which is blocked due to the convertible currency shortage. As the Bank gains its reputation in international finance community it can allocate the credit available to the short and long term projects in the region. The Bank will also function as a guarantor. This is very important since the region is observed as a high risk region from outside. The warranty provided by the Bank would increase the foreign funds channelled to

the region.

So far the BSEC countries has been exchanging information in various fields of cooperation. A unit was created within the State Institute of Statistics of Turkey to compile and analyze the data. This initial information on BSEC members are required for harmonization of foreign trade and preparations of conditions for the adoption of free trade agreements.

Concerning cooperation in transformation, there is a proposal for creation of a "ring" corridor along the coast of the Black Sea, as well as a radial network emerging to the ring corridor from all different orientations. They will also undertake a project for enlargement, modernization and construction of new sea ports and the development of port structure.

In telecommunications, there still continuing projects in the region started before the establishment of BSEC. Two of them are fiber-optic submarine cable system, one of them connecting Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania and Turkey, and the other is connecting Russia, Turkey, Ukraine and Italy. Both projects are planned to be finished by 1995.

The key purpose of all the past regional integrations was to provide free trade in the region. Seven years of Uruguay rounds finally ended by the end of 1993, promising freer trade in the world by reducing tariffs by an average of 40 percent worldwide and including agriculture, services, textile and clothing in multilateral discipline. Therefore regional integration seems to lose its importance as a provider of free trade. But for BSEC an

establishment of a free trade area seems to be a far prospect, any way. First of all, the membership of Greece to EC and the fact that Turkey will enter into the EC customs Union by 1995 limit their trade regimes against third countries. One possibility is to adopt EC standards in trade regime. This could be a sufficient progress for the beginning. After all, the members of BSEC are looking forward to join EC eventually.

When we evaluate the future prospects of BSEC we should be careful in determining the other available alternatives. In the near future, these countries except Greece do not have the opportunity to join to EC. Therefore, they have two possibility; either they unilaterally liberalize trade as Chile did successfully, or they will attempt to increase the gains from free trade through cooperation. There are some arguments that unilateral trade liberalization may dominate the free trade areas (See de Melo, Panagariya, Rodrik, 1993 for a detailed discussion). However in today's economic environment, regional integration may contribute to the welfare of the region through cooperation in areas where significant externalities and public goods (education, R&D, infrastructure, environment) exists. The BSEC could provide a favorable ground to undertake such projects in the region, and we believe this is a much important role than the provision of free trade in the region.

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Table 1: Members of the BSEC: Selected Economic Indicators, 1992

	Population ('000)	Per Capita GDP (US \$)	Real GDP Growth	Inflation (Consumer Prices)	Total Trade/ GDP
ALBANIA	3,400		-15.00%		15.69%
ARMENIA	3,645	2,000.00	-37.40%	1500%	84.45%
AZERBAIJAN	7,202	2,370.00	-26.00%	1350%	103.57%
BULGARIA	8,470	1,051.98	-7.70%	110%	108.86%
GEORGIA	5,478	2,000.00	-35.00%	1000%	56.99%
GREECE	10,200	7,636.87	1.30%	16%	56.15%
MOLDOVA	4,360	2,762.00	-21.00%	1277%	54.13%
ROMANIA	22,760	777.58	-15.40%	210%	55.37%
RUSSIA	148,770	4,325.00	-20.00%	1350%	44.00%
TURKEY	58,584	2,637.30	5.50%		24.33%
UKRAINE	51,900	3,560.00	-16.00%		36.00%

Georgia's data are for 1991 except for inflation rate.

Armenian trade data is for 1990.

Albania and Azerbaijan's trade data is for 1991.

Romanian, Bulgarian inflation rate is over retail price.

Ukraine's data is for 1991 and total trade ratio to GDP only includes intra-regional trade.

Russia's trade data is for 1989.

For the republics of FSU, per capita GDP is calculated by purchasing power parity standards

Source: World Bank Country reports

EIU Country Profile

Table 2. FSU Republics: Structure of NMP in 1991

	1991					
	ARMENIA	AZERBAIJAN	GEORGIA	MOLDOVA	RUSSIA	UKRAINE
NMP (M rubles)	12,253	20,370	16,981	18,753	425,200	210,800
Real Growth rate in NMP	-11.80	-1.90	-25.00	-18.00	-5.00	-11.00
NMP by origins (%)						
Agriculture	32.21	41.10	41.80	41.70	18.34	28.70
Industry	43.18	37.10	34.40	44.50	43.13	43.10
Construction	14.37	8.40	10.10		12.32	13.80
Transportation & Communication	2.55	3.30	5.90	3.80	7.57	4.50
Other Material Services	7.89	10.10	7.80	10.00	18.64	9.90

NMP (Net Material Product) is in current prices.

For Moldova, the share of Industry in NMP also includes the Construction

Source: World Bank Country Report

Table 3. FSU Republics: Total Trade and Distribution of Inter-republican Trade by Destination and Origin

	ARMENIA		AZERBAIJAN		GEORGIA		MOLDOVA		RUSSIA		UKRAINE	
	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import
TOTAL TRADE	3,733	5,810	12,199	11,010	6122	7266	8,141	8,444	109,600	144,300	49,410	45,390
Inter-republic	3,613	4,428	11,455	8,837	5,990	6,511	7,809	7,237	75,100	70,700	49,410	45,390
Extra-republic	120	1,382	744	2,173	121	755	332	1,207	34,500	73,600		
TRADE AS A % of NMP	30.47%	47.42%	59.89%	54.05%	36.03%	42.83%	43.41%	45.03%	25.78%	33.94%	23.46%	21.55%
Inter-republic	29.49%	36.14%	56.24%	43.38%	35.31%	38.38%	41.64%	38.59%	17.66%	16.63%	23.46%	21.55%
Extra-republic	0.98%	11.28%	3.65%	10.67%	0.71%	4.45%	1.77%	6.43%	8.11%	17.31%	0.00%	0.00%
TOTAL TRADE	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%			100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Inter-republic	96.80%	76.40%	93.60%	80.30%			95.92%	85.71%	68.52%	66.14%	82.10%	82.00%
Armenia							0.90%	0.90%	2.38%	2.75%	2.10%	1.80%
Azerbaijan	2.40%	9.30%					1.40%	1.10%	3.00%	5.50%	14.90%	4.90%
Georgia	3.60%	5.60%	6.10%	2.00%			0.80%	1.70%	3.61%	5.29%	1.70%	1.90%
Moldova	1.20%	2.80%	1.20%	0.70%					3.30%	5.19%	1.60%	1.40%
Russia	54.00%	50.70%	59.70%	56.10%			60.50%	42.50%			60.30%	69.60%
Ukraine	15.90%	18.80%	13.10%	28.30%			18.20%	25.70%	37.87%	37.53%		
Others	22.90%	12.80%	19.90%	12.90%			18.20%	28.10%	49.84%	43.74%	19.40%	20.40%
Extra-republic	3.20%	23.60%	6.40%	19.70%			4.08%	14.29%	31.48%	33.86%	17.90%	18.00%

TOTAL TRADE data is given in million of rubles at the current prices.

For Armenia, the share of extra-republic export and import are for the year 1990.

For Russia, all entries are for the year 1990 and the starred ones are for the year 1989.

Source: World Bank Country Reports

Table 4. Albania, Bulgaria and Romania: Structure of NMP in 1991.

	ALBANIA	BULGARIA	ROMANIA
<hr/>			
NMP by origins (%)			
Agriculture	44.60%	14.20%	22.70%
Industry	32.70%	56.80%	45.20%
Construction	6.40%	9.10%	5.20%
Transportation & Communication		9.40%	5.40%
Other Material Services	16.30%	10.50%	21.50%

Bulgaria's data is for 1990

For Romania structure of GDP is provided

Albania's data is for 1989 and transportation and communication is included in other material services

Source: World Bank Country Report

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Table 5. FSU Republics: Total Trade and Distribution of Inter-republican Trade by Destination and Origin in 1992

	ALBANIA		BULGARIA		ROMANIA	
	Export	Import	Export	Import	Export	Import
TOTAL TRADE (million \$)	208	612	2,592	2,973	4,036	5,582
Geographic distribution of trade						
Central & Eastern Europe			17.39%	16.64%	13.30%	1.50%
EC	34.13%	63.39%	40.84%	53.23%	36.02%	37.49%
Industrial Countries	41.34%	72.22%	49.76%	59.22%	46.65%	50.16%
Middle East	1.92%	2.12%	14.67%	3.51%	15.01%	15.51%
Former USSR					14.44%	14.52%

Source: IMF, *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1993*

Table 6. Structure of GDP and the distribution of Trade in 1992

	GREECE	TURKEY
GDP by origin		
Agriculture	16.3	15.72
Industry	20.8	26
Construction	6.6	6.72
Transportation & Communication	7.4	12.32
Other services	48.9	39.24
Total Trade		
Export (million \$)	9540	14468.6
Import (million \$)	23152	22879
Export by Destination (% of total)		
Germany	23.11%	26.49%
Italy	18.01%	13.96%
France	7.22%	5.66%
UK	6.92%	5.31%
US	4.04%	6.72%
EC	64.11%	53.35%
Middle East	6.52%	15.69%
Central and Eastern Europe	10.13%	6.18%
Former USSR	1.29%	4.43%
Imports by origin (% of total)		
Germany	20.20%	18.26%
Italy	14.21%	4.02%
France	7.84%	6.00%
UK	5.52%	5.39%
US	3.66%	9.86%
EC	62.74%	46.71%
Middle East	8.40%	14.24%
Central and Eastern Europe	2.76%	4.88%
Former USSR	1.85%	4.60%

The data on the structure of GDP of Greece is for 1991

Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1993

Table 7. Turkey's trade with the members of BSEC (million \$)

ALBANIA	19	0.9	12.3	0.4
ARMENIA	3.2	0	3.8	0.1
AZERBAIJAN	99.8	35	34.5	17.3
BULGARIA	70.5	222.2	24.2	100.1
GEORGIA	10.6	5.6	7.2	14.1
GREECE	142.5	87.3	56.3	62.4
MOLDOVA	0	1.7	0.2	11.9
ROMANIA	170.8	254.6	72.4	139.6
RUSSIA	438.3	1035.7	224	721.6
UKRAINE	34.5	89.4	19	149.6

The data for 1993 presents only the first half of that year.

Source: Central Bank of Turkey

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**THE STATE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
IN CONTEMPORARY TURKEY: FROM ETATISM TO
NEOLIBERALISM AND BEYOND**

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INTRODUCTION

has
The collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe ~~have~~ created a series of new opportunities for Turkey in the post-cold war era. One major possibility in this context concerns the expansion of trade and investment links with Eastern Europe, Russia, plus the newly independent ex-Soviet republics in the Black Sea region and Central Asia. Particularly significant is the emergence of countries in the former Soviet bloc with close cultural, linguistic and religious ties to Turkey. In fact, during the past few years Turkey has been making a major attempt to develop close links with its northern neighbors, as testified by the Black Sea Economic Co-operation Agreement, a regional scheme in which Turkey has played the leading role both in the formulation and the early implementation stages. Similarly, Turkey has been trying to establish close contacts, both in the economic and cultural spheres, with the "Turkic" republics. In the context of such developments, the idea of the "Turkish model of development" has increasingly come into the forefront of public discussion, as a possible path that the newly independent republics of Central Asia, in particular, could follow in their quest for the simultaneous transition to a market-oriented economic system and democratic forms of governance.

My objective in the present paper is to evaluate the claim that the Turkish example of political and economic development could constitute a "model" that many countries in Central Asia or the Middle East could learn, borrow from and try to emulate over the coming years. What precisely do we mean by the Turkish model? In rather broad terms, the essence of the Turkish model is a pattern of development based on a mixed economy in the context of a democratic and secular polity. When we talk about the Turkish model in purely political terms, what we typically have in mind is a democratic and secular vision of Islam which sharply differentiates it from alternative visions of Islamic fundamentalism.

Turkey's claim to be a model of political development also rests on the durability of its democratic regime, in spite of intermittent breakdowns, over a period of more than forty years which again makes a fundamental contrast with the vast majority of the Islamic world as well as most countries in the middle income category. Starting from the premise that the political dimensions of the Turkish experience are quite well-known and rather firmly established, the present paper will try to abstract as much as possible from the purely political component of the Turkish model and will seek to concentrate explicitly on the relevance of the Turkish model as a model of economic development. The question posed is whether it is possible to talk about Turkish model of economic development along the same lines as the Turkish model of secular democracy.

The central principle underlying Turkey's economic development efforts during the post 1923 Republican era is the idea of a mixed economy in which the state would play a leadership role during the early stages of development but would recede into the background as private enterprise develops, matures and becomes the dominant economic actor over time. Turkey has managed to achieve a substantial degree and depth of industrialization on the basis of a mixed economy model with the relative contribution of private capital expanding quite drastically over the course of the development process. Growth has also been quite rapid. Turkey has achieved growth rates of 5-6 percent per annum on average, among the highest in the developing world, particularly if we exclude the East Asian hypergrowth cases.

The growth performance is even more striking, in comparative perspective, taking into consideration the fact that it has been established in a predominantly democratic setting in the post-war period. More recently, Turkey has managed to accomplish one of the more successful cases of transition from an over-regulated and highly inward-oriented economy to an economy which is for more open and integrated into the world markets, a process which started in the early 1980s, a decade or so before the ex-Soviet republics found themselves on a similar path. Judged on the basis of recent growth performance, as well as the growth trajectory over longer periods of time Turkey is the most dynamic economy in the region. During the course of the 1980s, important steps have been taken in terms

of the development of an infrastructural base, in the context of which the most striking development has occurred in the field of communications. The depth of industrialization and development is also evident by the presence of a flourishing private sector, no longer content with investing at home, but is increasingly involved in investment activities in neighboring countries either individually or through joint ventures, notably in major construction projects. Furthermore, Turkey is rapidly moving away from a position of a passive recipient of technology to becoming an exporter of technology itself. Yet another feature of Turkey's economic trajectory recently concerns the development of closer links with the European Community. While the objective of full-membership is not in sight, a major step towards closer relationship with the Community has been established with the onset of the customs union agreement which will become effective in 1995. The development of closer links with the post 1992. Europe, even though it may fall short of full membership, is likely to strengthen the Turkish economy during the coming years and will also create new avenues for investment and joint ventures among the Turkish and European firms which in turn, will generate novel opportunities for growth both in Turkey and in the surrounding regions.

All these positive factors justify a close examination of the Turkish development experience with a view to its possible transferability to countries undergoing economic and political transitions. The Turkish development experience during the course of the present century is worth studying and represents one of the more successful cases of development to emerge during the post-war period. Clearly important positive lessons might be deduced both from the Turkish experience with reforms in the post-1980 era as well as the broader development trajectory over time particularly. Striking in the context of the reform process, for example, is the timing and sequencing of reforms with export promotion receiving priority in the early stages, with the liberalization of the import regime and the capital account coming much later, once a major export push has been successfully established. Yet, to present the Turkish case as a model of successful development might be an exaggeration considering that Turkey's development experience also contains a number of important shortcomings, notably in the sphere of income distribution. A more sensible judgement would be to argue that Turkey embodies the potential to emerge as a "model" case of economic development. The poten-

tial, however, remains to be realized. Important structural weaknesses still persist in the Turkish economy which tend to constrain the possibilities of converting an adequate or moderately successful performance to a case of outstanding success. The paper seeks to elucidate some of the key factors which prevent the achievement of hypergrowth or outstanding performance, the type of performance which would justify the claim of the Turkish model of economic development. A constraint which will receive particular attention in the present context concerns the nature of the public sector and the mode of state intervention, that characterize the Turkish economy even after a period of substantive reforms.

The central message is that a major restructuring in the economic role of the state plus the nature and operation of the public sector constitutes an important precondition for improvement in performance, judged both in terms of efficiency and equity objectives. What is required, however, is not simply a "retreat of the state", but a restructuring involving a change in the mode of state intervention, a shift in the composition of the public sector as well as the rules governing public sector activity.

State Intervention In The Turkish Economy In Historical Perspective

The origins of modern industrialization in Turkey can be traced back to the "etatist" era of the 1930s. Although the beginnings of an industrialization drive were evident in the immediate aftermath of the formation of the Republic in 1923, the real breakthrough occurred in the context of the 1930s. In order to develop a proper perspective on the present structure of the Turkish economy it is important to stress, therefore, that rapid industrialization in Turkey is a comparatively recent phenomenon. Moreover, it is important to emphasize that the Republican Turkey started its development trajectory from a position of major weakness, namely the virtual absence of an indigenous entrepreneurial elite. Due to the peculiar structure of the Ottoman society, the Turkish elite occupied top positions in the bureaucracy and the military, while business and commercial activities were relegated to the Armenian, Greek and Jewish minorities. The dissolution of the Empire and the mass migrations which accompanied the war of Independence during the early

1920s resulted in a major reduction in the minority population. Consequently, the Republic started its economic development from a very weak entrepreneurial base.

The Great Depression of the 1930s, as in the case of many Latin American countries, eliminated the trade links with the external world and provided a major sport in the direction of import-substitution in basic consumer goods industries in a predominantly primary exporting economy. The state emerged as the principal entrepreneur during this period and a number of key state economic enterprises (SEEs) were founded during this particular era. Private enterprise also began to develop alongside the state industry and a process of private capital accumulation started to manifest itself through contracts with the state. This specific phase in Turkish economic history is labelled as "etatism".

From a liberal or pragmatic perspective, etatism was interpreted as a development strategy in which the state is forced to undertake an active entrepreneurial role out of necessity rather than for any ideological commitment to state industry per se. The corollary of this reasoning is a progressive reduction in the weight of state involvement in the economy as private capital matures and assumes the leadership role in economic affairs. A qualification is called for in the sense that were also intellectuals who interpreted etatism in a different light, namely as an alternative, non-capitalist path of economic development, inspired to a certain degree by the relatively successful Soviet experience at a time when the major industrialized countries of the west experienced the deepest crisis of their history. What this group of intellectuals had in mind was a vision of etatism as an "intermediate regime", a path of independent development in the periphery somewhere in between the capitalist and Soviet models of development. In retrospect, it is clear that the liberal or pragmatic conceptualization of etatism characterized or dominated the approach of the bureaucratic elite who played role in key role in initiating the modern industrialization process in Turkey during the interwar era(1).

The etatist drive of the 1930s came to a sudden halt, however, with the onset of the Second World War. Although Turkey did not actually participate in the war, the mobilization of labor and resources had detrimental effects on economic activity and, hence, the 1940s proved to be a lost decade or a decade of relative stagnation in economic terms. Nonetheless, the process of private capital accumulation continued during the early 1940s, in an environment characterized by severe shortages of many basic commodities.

The late 1940s marked the demise of etatism. The single party regime dominated by the military-bureaucratic elite came under increasing challenge both from domestic and external sources. At the domestic level, private enterprise, which had started to reach a certain degree of maturity, wanted to translate this economic power into political power and, hence, to break down the power monopoly of the bureaucratic elite. The drastic shifts in the geo-political context in the immediate post-war period, involving the establishment of the United States as the hegemonic power and the emergence of the cold war, were also key influences which tended to undermine the very foundations of the etatist regime and accelerated the shift to a more liberal economic order.

1950 marked the transition to parliamentary democracy in Turkey. The Democratic Party (DP) which gained an overwhelming majority in the general elections represented a broad alliance of private industrialists, commercial groups, landed interests and peasants. The transition to democracy also signified a shift in the direction of a more liberal economic order. Trade liberalization, emphasis on agriculture and infrastructural development, and the encouragement of foreign capital emerged as the central pillars of the new economic strategy. The shift to a novel economic strategy, accompanied by significant inflows of U.S, implied a reduced role for the state in economic affairs. In fact, privatization appeared as an item on the policy agenda for the first time during the early 1950s. In retrospect, the 1950s constituted a paradoxical case of liberalism. Contrary to original expectations, privatization did not materialize during the decade. In fact the opposite happened; new SEEs were founded and the overall weight of the state in economic affairs experienced an expansion rather than a contraction during this period(2). What started to change, however, was the nature of state in-

volvement in the economy. A new division of labor began to emerge between the public and private sectors. After 1950 private industry was increasingly concentrated in the production of final consumer goods, while the SEEs were given the role of producing key inputs of intermediate and capital goods for the private sector. Hence, the economic role of the state was steadily transformed from a leadership position to a complementary or supportive role marked by a progressive shift of focus to the subsidized provision of basic inputs and key infrastructural activities.

The liberal decade of the 1950s, came to an end, however, due to a process of careless and uncontrolled expansionism which culminated in 1958 with the first major macroeconomic crisis that Turkey experienced during the post-war period, a crisis which also marked Turkey's first ever encounter with the IMF. An unfortunate repercussion of the stabilization episode of the late 1950s was the collapse of the democratic regime. Yet another dramatic implication of the crisis was a reversal of the liberal economic liberal and a reencarnation of etatism, in the form of a combination of import-substitution and development planning. Import substitution under heavy protectionism was established as the dominant economic strategy during the 1960s and the 1970s in the context of successive five year plans. The basic objective was to replace the era of unplanned and uncontrolled expansion of the "Menderes era" during the 1950s with a new approach involving controlled and planned industrialization.

The division of labor between public and private continued under import-substituting industrialization (ISI), corresponding to the 1960-1979 phase. Turkey managed to achieve high rates of economic growth under ISI. Yet, the strategy proved to be inherently unsustainable due to its heavy domestic market bias and a fundamental neglect of exports. Planners' approach to economic policy was based on the false assumption of low elasticities or export pessimism. Both the trade and the exchange rate regime operated against exports on foreign exchange earning activities, as a of which exports stagnated during the period. Moreover, contrary to planners' expections, import substitution in intermediate and capital goods could not be accomplished on the desired scale, and imports of raw materials, intermediate and capital goods expanded rapidly during the later

years of the ISI era. The structural trade gap which steadily deteriorated over time due to the stagnation of exports and expansion of necessary imports, coupled with the major external shocks of the mid and late 1970s, rendered a payments crisis inevitable. In the midst of acute instability and crisis during the late 1970s, ISI was abandoned followed by a forced transition to a more liberal economic regime. Again, as in the case of the late 1950s, the crisis was accompanied by a breakdown of the democratic order.

The 1980s marked attempts to renew economic growth on the basis of an export-oriented strategy. Following the stagnation of the late 1970s, growth recovered due to a combination of exports push and foreign capital inflows and respectable rates of economic growth were achieved during the decade, although macro instability started to manifest itself once again in recent years(4).

In retrospect, the striking fact about the Turkish development experience is that it has not been a smooth process. Industrialization has occurred and private capital has matured under state guidance. Yet, the process has been highly uneven, characterized by intermittent economic crises, which have also been accompanied by the breakdown of the democratic order, albeit for relatively short intervals. Another interesting aspect of the Turkish experience is a pattern of policy cycles as opposed to a smooth unilinear path of development. In retrospect, it is possible to identify "etatist" and "liberal" policy phases in Turkey's contemporary economic history (Table 1). In that respect, it would be misleading to single out 1980 as the beginning of the liberalization efforts in Turkey, since similar projects were also evident in the context of the 1920s and the 1950s. What seems to differentiate the "liberal" and "etatist" phases is not only the nature of the trade regime and the attitude towards foreign direct investment (FDI), but also the mode of state intervention in the economy.

The typical pattern is that during the liberal phases the state tends to retreat from its position as a producer of manufactured goods and concentrates its energy in the provision of infrastructural activities, directly complementary to the private sector. What is interesting, however, is that the overall weight of the public sector in economic activity does not seem to be much affected by radical policy

shifts that occur during the development process. In fact, a marked change in the composition of public sector activity, without a corresponding shift in the overall weight of the public sector in the economy, constitutes a pattern which appears to be common to both the "liberal" decades of the 1950s and the 1980s. Nonetheless, in spite of these policy cycles and the intermittent crises which gave rise to radical shifts in economic policy, rapid industrialization has occurred coupled with the development of a significant private entrepreneurial base.

To accept that significant development has occurred over time, however, does not rule out the possibility that development would have even more rapid if the policy makers had the power or the capacity to take appropriate decisions to avoid, for example, the crisis of the late 1950s or to engineer the transition to an outward-oriented strategy during the early 1970s. Hence, our brief excursion into Turkey's economic history is illuminating because it not only illustrates the successes of the Turkish development experience but also some of its principal weaknesses, the notable weakness being the incapacity to undertake fundamental reforms, on a voluntary basis, in the absence of a major economic crisis.

Table 1

Principal Policy Phases or policy Cycles in Turkey's Economic Development

Phase 1: The liberal era of the 1920s. Supportive of foreign investment. Indirect measures to encourage industrialization rather than direct state involvement in the economy. Liberal trade regime.

Phase 2: 1930-1949 Etatism. State emerged as the principal entrepreneur and the dominant agent in the industrialization process. First five year plans introduced during this period.

Phase 3: Liberalism of the 1950s. 1950-1959. Liberalization of trade and the foreign investment regime. Emphasis on agricultural development. The major focus of the state shifts to infrastructural development.

Phase 4: The import substitution-planning era of 1960-1979. Inward-oriented industrialization based on heavy protectionism. Export pessimism and restrictive attitude towards FDI. The primary focus of state activity is on industrialization via production in intermediate and capital goods industries.

Phase 5: Neoliberalism of the post-1980 period. Emphasis on export expansion. Progressive liberalization of the trade regime and the capital account during the course of the decade. Liberal approach to FDI. Focus of state activity increasingly shifted away from manufacturing to infrastructural activities.

State Intervention Under ISI And During The Neo-Liberal Era: Changes and Continuities

The import-substitution-cumplanning era in Turkey was characterized by a highly dirigist mode of state intervention. A large public enterprise sector existed which confined its economic activities to intermediate goods industries. The public enterprise sector provided subsidized inputs to private industry which, in turn, was primarily concentrated in the manufacture of consumer goods and consumer durables. In addition to the direct involvement of the state as an entrepreneur in the industrialization process, a major distinguishing feature of the period involved heavy indirect or micro-level intervention in the operation of the market mechanism. The state attempted to influence the pattern of industrialization through an extensive set of instruments including tariff and quota restrictions on imports, controls over the capital account, overvalued exchange rates, low interest loans plus subsidized inputs provided by the SEEs. The planners had a direct leverage over the pattern of investment through their control over the trade regime (i.e import licences) and the system of investment incentives (i.e investment certificates).

These indirect interventions by the state rendered production for the domestic market extremely profitable. Yet, the system of incentives erected under ISI created not only a major bias against exports but also, rather ironically, blocked the path for successful import-substitution in more complex branches of industry. Instead of reducing the degree of dependence on imports, the underlying rationale of the ISI strategy, the country became more dependent imports while exports stagnated. In spite of the comparatively rapid growth which occurred over the 1960-1977 era, on average by 6.3 percent per annum, due to the perverse nature of the incentive structure the strategy proved to be unsustainable. Furthermore, the perverse system of incentives created widespread opportunities for rent-seeking and unproductive forms of investment as economic agents tried to take advantage of the variety of controls and regulations imposed on the price mechanism. In retrospect, Turkey could have improved its performance significantly and could have avoided the inefficiencies of ISI, if it could have nationalized its incentive regime and move to a more liberal, outward-oriented strategy during the early 1970s, a process which actually started with the devaluation of 1970 but was unfortunately reversed during the subsequent part of the decade.

The reform process, however, became inevitable following the acute balance of payments and debt crisis of the late 1970s. The reforms of the 1980s managed to achieve a fundamental break with the ISI era, via a considerable reduction in the degree of micro level interventionism practiced by the state. Import quotas were eliminated and tariff rates declined substantially. Key relative prices such as the exchange rate and interest rates on bank deposits became flexible and were increasingly determined through market forces. The principal change on the SEE front involved the deregulation of their product prices and the elimination of the automatic link to the central government budget as the enterprises were increasingly exposed to market discipline. Parallel to the liberalization of the trade regime, restrictions over the capital account were progressively removed and a liberal foreign investment regime was introduced.

Hence, what we observe in the context of the 1980s is a much more market-oriented system, plus a system for more favorable to the expansion of exports compared with the pre-1980 regime. Thus, in terms of the degree micro-level interventionism by the state in economic affairs a fundamental break was established with the past in the post-1980 period. Yet it would be rather simplistic to characterize the post-1980 reforms as a transition from one extreme of a heavily regulated and controlled mixed economy to the opposite extreme, the neoliberal ideal of a "free market economy".

In fact, in spite of considerable liberalization achieved during the course of the decade, a significant element of control continued to exist in terms of microlevel state interventionism. For example, export subsidies, the major example of which were export tax rebates, which remained intact until the end of 1988, became the principal instrument on which the export drive of the early and mid-1980s was based. Similarly, while key relative prices such as the exchange rate and interest rates were deregulated, the state continued to exercise considerable leverage over the determination of these key relative prices during the course of the decade.

It is interesting that "rent-seeking" also manifested itself under an outward regime, although perhaps on a smaller scale compared with the pre-1980 period. By the late 1980s, increasing complaints emerged concerning overinvoicing of exports, frequently described in popular terms as "fictitious exports"(5). The presence of "rent-seeking" under both ISI and the neoliberal regimes, in retrospect, embodies two major implications. First, in spite of substantial liberalization, the policy regime which emerged during the 1980s was not a free market regime. Considerable micro-level interventionism continued to characterize the Turkish economy, albeit in a different form involving the use of new instruments.

Second, the presence of rent-seeking under both policy regimes illustrates the paradox of the Turkish state, namely its relative incapacity, compared with the prototype East Asian or the South Korean state for example, to exercise discipline over private business in return for the subsidies provided. In other words, although the Turkish state provided considerable incentives to the private sector under both import-substitution and export-oriented regimes it lacked the capacity to monitor performance and avoid the abuse of the incentive regime by private economic agents(6).

In spite of these qualifications, however, what is quite striking is that the inward-oriented regime of the pre-1980 era, based on extensive controls, was transformed to a more liberal and outward-oriented system during the course of the 1980s. Another striking change in the nature of state investment in the post-1980 period involved a drastic shift in the composition of public investment. Public investment increasingly shifted away from manufacturing to infrastructural activities such as transport, communications, and energy, fields which are complementary to private sector activities. The striking continuity with the past, however, continued to manifest itself at the macro front. In spite of a drastic change in the nature of state interventionism at the micro level, the overall weight of the public sector in economic activity did not change significantly during the course of the 1980s.

In fact, growing macro instability and chronic inflation associated with heavy fiscal disequilibrium started to dominate the policy agenda from the late 1980s onwards. Chronic fiscal disequilibrium poses a fundamental challenge be-

cause of its negative effects on the level and composition of private investment, both domestic and foreign (Table 2).

Table 2

**Fiscal Disequilibrium and Macroeconomic Instability: A Comparison of the
Pre-1980 and Post-1980 Periods**

**Public Sector Borrowing Requirement as a Proportion of
Gross National Product (%), 1975, 1992**

	PSBR/GNP^(a)	PSBR/GNP^(b)
1975	6.1	4.8
1976	8.7	6.8
1977	10.4	8.2
1978	4.1	3.2
1989	9.4	7.3
1980	10.5	8.7
1981	4.9	4.0
1982	4.3	3.5
1983	6.0	4.9
1984	6.5	5.3
1985	4.6	3.5
1986	4.7	3.6
1987	7.8	6.0
1988	6.2	4.7
1989	7.1	5.2
1990	10.5	7.5
1991	14.4	10.4
1992	12.6	9.0

(a) according to old GNP series.

(b) according to new GNP series.

Source: Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı: **Temel Ekonomik Büyüklükler**, 1993 (State Planning Organization: Main Economic Indicators, June 1993)

In that respect, the sustainability of the reform process plus the justification of the claim that the Turkish experience could serve as a "model" for the surrounding region depends crucially on the ability to create a stable macroeconomic environment. The interesting problem to pose, therefore, is why macro-instability has been an endemic problem in the Turkish economy in recent decades and why it is proving to be an elusive goal for the policy makers.

Dilemmas of Public Sector Reform

Turkey's inability to achieve fiscal equilibrium in recent years may be attributed to three primary causes: (a) inadequate tax revenues, (b) the heavy burden of domestic and external debt, (c) chronic deficits of the state enterprise sector. Increasingly, in the context of the early 1990s, a consensus is emerging on the desirability of radical reform of the public sector involving both the taxation system and the public enterprise sector.

Tax reform constitutes a crucial component of the reform package for the following reasons. First, the level of tax revenues is inadequate; the ratio of tax revenues to GNP happens the lowest in the OECD area(7). This pattern may be explained by the fact that the average tax rate is too high. Furthermore, various loopholes and exemptions are built into the system. Both of these factors encourage widespread tax evasion and the growth of an extensive informal and underground economy. Second, the tax burden is distributed in a highly inequalitarian manner. A disproportionate burden of the income tax, for example, falls on low income groups such as wage and salary earners. A tax reform is crucial, therefore, not only for raising additional revenues for government, but also for reducing the burden of taxation on low income groups in society. The key components of a radical tax reform package would involve both a reduction in the average tax rate and also an improvement in tax administration which would help to overcome widespread tax evasion and to extend the tax net to the rapidly growing underground or informal economy.

An interesting parallel might be drawn at this point between the Turkish case and "the latin American state", the typee of state which is associated with Latin American countries which have also passed through a similar phase of prolonged import-substitution followed by a major crisis and a forced transition to a liberal economic order. The common element involving the. Turkish state and the prototype "Latin American state" is the inability, in both cases, to tax effectively high income groups in society(8).

Public enterprise reform constitutes the second major component of public sector reform. The endemic problems associated with the SEEs concerning excess employment, low productivity growth, heavy burden on the state budget and contribution to the growth of external debt are issues which have occupied the public agenda for many years. In fact, the recent economic history of Turkey is full of attempts to reform the public enterprise sector. During the ISI-planning era, the emphasis has been on the introduction of greater autonomy to public enterprises, thereby pressurizing them to operate on the basis of commercial criteria. Attempts to introduce greater autonomy in decision making, however, have not been very successful in practice. The principal reason for this has been the reluctance of the politicians to delegate real authority or autonomy to enterprise managers, as long as ownership rights remained with the state. It has become increasingly evident, therefore, that in an environment where pervasive pressures for rent-seeking exists attempts to introduce greater autonomy for public enterprises are likely to be frustrated. Hence, "privatization" – a transfer of ownership – and "closure" (or partial closure), depending on the specific cases, emerge as the principal alternatives to the solution involving the introduction of greater enterprise autonomy. The underlying logic here is that the overload on the state needs to be reduced and the state needs to withdraw from its position of an entrepreneur or direct producer and focus its activities exclusively on fields which are complementary to the private sector.

The solutions, in principle, appear to be fairly well-established. Why then are these reforms not quickly implemented and continue to be postponed into the indefinite future? One obvious answer to this dilemma concerns the presence of political constraints⁽⁹⁾ There exist important, powerful and well-organized groups in society whose immediate interests would be hurt by an extensive tax reform or a widespread privatization program. The interest group explanation has probably somewhat greater relevance in accounting for the delay in tax reform than the delay in the privatization program. Increasingly opposition to privatization is fading. Private business used to be a key component of the pro-public enterprise coalition in the past because of the benefits derived in the form of subsidized inputs. Yet, more recently business has broken away from that coalition and is favoring extensive privatization. The reason for this is that in the context of a much more open and liberal foreign trade regime, it is possible to import inputs at a cheaper price from external sources. Hence from the business point of view, the costs associated with chronic deficits and the uncertainty created by high and variable rates of inflation tend to outweigh the possible benefits to be derived from the continued existence of SEEs in terms of the provision of key inputs. Even labor unions are increasingly favoring privatization provided that safeguards concerning employment and social security are built into the program.

The highly fragmented nature of the party system in Turkey acts as a major political constraint on extensive and rapid privatization in the context of the early 1990s. The interesting pattern which has emerged in Turkey in recent years concerns the gradual convergence of the principal political parties of the right and the left on the desirability of market-oriented solutions, although differences remain on specific issues or over the choice of specific instruments. In spite of the convergence on basic solutions, in a fragmented party system and especially in an environment of coalition government, no party in government is willing to shoulder the costs of transition associated with an extensive privatization program such as the increase in unemployment which would inevitably result from the sale of the enterprise or its closure in the short-run.

Apart from the political factors which constrain radical reform of the public sector, there are some fundamental economic considerations which also work

against the speedy reform of the public sector. One important factor is the institutional constraint concerning the availability of domestic savings to absorb a large public enterprise sector. This is accentuated by the fact that the capital market, in spite of its rapid surge in recent years, is still in its early stages of development.

Another important factor to take into consideration is that the success of privatization itself depends crucially on the environment in which it is implemented. It is increasingly recognized that macroeconomic stability and an effective regulatory framework against monopolistic practices are crucial ingredients of a successful privatization program. Thus, even if we agree that privatization and a reduction in the entrepreneurial role of the state are desirable objectives, the way that the privatization program is implemented and the environment in which it is implemented are crucial for its effectiveness and also its sustainability. This point may be illustrated by several examples. Privatization implemented in an environment of chronic fiscal instability may lead to sales which fail to reflect the true valuation of the assets sold. Furthermore, the use of privatization proceeds to close budget deficits is a dangerous practice because it is a short-term solution. In the long-run, the public sector may find itself confronted with larger fiscal deficits, as profitable enterprises are gradually sold off and the more problematic enterprises are left within the orbit of the public sector. It is imperative, therefore, that privatization proceeds are directed towards activities such as productive investment or reduction in external debt which will make a permanent rather than short-term contribution to economic welfare⁽¹⁰⁾. Successful privatization requires prior reforms to reduce macro-instability in the first place. In other words, a major tax reform or selective government expenditure cuts must precede an extensive privatization effort.

A second major requirement for successful privatization involves the introduction of a more competitive environment and a regulatory framework designed to eliminate monopolistic practices. Otherwise sale of public monopolies, in the absence of adequate safeguards, are likely to decrease social welfare by worsening income inequality and failing to contribute to an improvement in economic efficiency. Finally, a crucial precondition for success and durability of the reform process concerns the design of adequate safeguards or social safety needs. It is imperative that a social insurance system is created to protect the losers of the

privatization program. In the absence of such safeguarding mechanisms, an extensive privatization program is likely to generate widespread resentment and may jeopardize the future of the program.

The important message which emerges from this discussion is that the desirability of privatization per se does not guarantee that a privatization program will necessarily be successful in terms of realizing its ultimate objectives of increasing social welfare. Rapid or shock-treatment approaches to privatization, without the necessary pre-conditions, may result in highly perverse outcomes. A gradualist path to public sector reform may, therefore, be preferable to a shock-treatment approach. It is quite clear that fiscal instability in the Turkish economy, as in many other contexts, is a structural problem, namely an issue which can only be addressed effectively over a period of time. To expect quick or immediate solutions to public sector reform are, not realistic given the dilemmas that we have outlined. The fact that the problems cannot be solved over a short period of time, however, does not justify a delay in the reform process which may well aggravate the problems of fiscal disequilibrium over time.

THE TRANSITION FROM POPULISM TO POST-POPULISM: A NEW ECONOMIC ROLE FOR THE STATE

Chronic fiscal instability has been an endemic problem in the post-war period. Turkey has experienced two major macro-economic crises during the late 1950s and the late 1970s respectively. Fiscal disequilibrium has reappeared as a major problem during the neo-liberal reform. This is not to suggest that a third major crisis is inevitable. Both the crisis of the late 1950s and the crisis of the late 1970s were balance of payments crises as much as fiscal crises. Hence, fiscal instability in the present context may not lead to a similar crises considering the much greater foreign exchange earning capacity of the economy compared with the earlier periods. Nonetheless, the fact that a crisis is not inevitable does not reduce the importance of achieving macro-economic stability. A stable macroeconomic environment will have a positive impact on both productive investment, a key source of rapid and sustainable economic growth, as well as on the income distributional profile.

From a political economy perspective, the origins of endemic fiscal disequilibrium might be traced to the "overload" imposed on the state during the industrialization process. Originally, in the absence of a private entrepreneurial base, the state emerged as the principal entrepreneur and became the engine of growth during the primary phase of import-substitution in the statist era of the 1930s. Following the transition to democracy and a multi-party system in 1950, the state was progressively forced to undertake additional functions. In addition to a direct entrepreneurial role, the state emerged as a key provider of subsidies to the nascent private industry. The public enterprise sector, in the post 1950 period, increasingly concentrated its activities in the intermediate goods industries and made an important contribution to private accumulation through the provision of subsidized inputs. During the import-substitution era the functions of the state were enlarged as the state sought to influence the pattern of industrialization through an extensive set of controls and micro level interventions. While the liberalization of the post-1980 period led to a significant decline in the degree of intervention by the state over the functioning of the price mechanism, considerable micro-level interventionism has continued to prevail during this particular era.

In addition to intervention designed to influence the production and accumulation process, the state has also needed to deal with explicitly income distributional objectives. The transition to parliamentary democracy in the 1950s, in the context of a highly unequal distributional profile, implied that the state was confronted with significant populist pressures for redistribution. An interesting comparison is called for, at this juncture, with the Latin American and the East Asian newly-industrialized countries (NICs). East Asian NICs like South Korea and Taiwan possessed a major advantage over Turkey in the sense that their major take-off phase, in terms of rapid economic growth, started from a position of a low income inequality. The initial set of land reforms in both countries played a key role in terms of creating a relatively equal distributional profile. The combination of the egalitarian distributional pattern plus the existence of an authoritarian state which could repress pressures from labor and other subordinate groups meant that the South Korean or the Taiwanese state could concentrate its attention almost exclusively and singlemindedly on the longer-term objectives of growth and productivity. Turkey, in contrast, did not possess this comfortable option of abstracting itself

from distributional considerations. In this respect, significant parallels may be discerned with Latin American cases such as Brazil which also experienced comparatively early transitions to parliamentary democracy in the context of high income inequality. Turkey's Gini coefficient during the post-1950 period has consistently exceeded the 0.5 mark and as a result pressures for income redistribution has been an endemic feature of its political economy(12).

What is striking, however, is that the response to these pervasive distributional pressures involved the development of a form of "underdeveloped welfare state". In an environment where electoral constraints became particularly pressing, governments used the large public sector as an instrument for the dispensation of patronage and the erection of an electoral base of support(13). The SEE sector, itself, was allocated a premier role in this process of populist redistribution. A good illustration of the way in which this type of underdeveloped welfare state operated involved the creation of excess employment in the SEE sector in response to political pressures. Such practices were clearly in conflict with both efficiency and productivity objectives. High support prices for the numerically very significant farming community constituted yet another example of a populist redistributional practice. In fact, populist redistribution mechanisms became particularly important in an environment where direct redistributional measures such as tax reform proved to be politically infeasible. The result was pressures in the direction of expanding government expenditures without a concomitant increase in government revenues. Given the populist pressures for expanding government expenditures, successive governments have resorted to short-term solutions such as high rates of monetary creation and/or heavy domestic and external borrowing at unusually high cost which, in turn, have contributed to growing fiscal instability. The problems that the SEE sector have confronted also become more readily comprehensible when they are interpreted in the light of these political economy considerations. In other words, the origins of the perennial problems of the SEE sector might be traced to the fact that they were given contradictory objectives in the first place. In their entrepreneurial role, they were expected to be, in principle, to be commercially profitable and to operate according to market-oriented criteria. But, at the same time, they were expected to contribute to private accumulation indirectly through the provision of subsidized inputs. The realization of this objective necessitated underpricing of their products which clearly was in direct contradic-

tion with the initial objective. Furthermore, the SEEs had to satisfy explicit social or redistributive objectives through their pricing, employment as well as location policies. Not surprisingly, these contradictory objectives proved to be incompatible and the result was a marked deterioration in their performance the most visible manifestation of which was chronic operating deficits and the burden they imposed on the government budget.

The long-term solution this dilemma clearly involves the reduction of the overload on the state and a move to a new equilibrium or to a new type of state. We might label this new equilibrium or the new type of state as the "post-populist state", a type of state which can intervene in the economy more effectively by concentrating on a small number of well-defined objectives. The important point to emphasize is that the overextensive state which characterized the ISI era, and continued to exist during the neo-liberal era in a modified form, was not a "strong state" in economic forms, compared with the East Asian developmental states for example. This is not to suggest, however, that the East Asian developmental state, in its pure form, was ever feasible in the Turkish context. Clearly in an environment where democracy is a major objective, in its own right, and where income inequality has reached unacceptably high levels, a government cannot withdraw itself from redistributive considerations and focus all its energy on longer-term productivity and accumulation objectives. While the prototype East Asian development is not the natural alternative, fundamental restructuring of the state and its mode of intervention is, nonetheless, desirable in the Turkish context, a process which we describe as the transition from "populism" to "post-populism".

The key question is what type of state should emerge in the "post-populism" phase and what type of new functions should it be asked to perform. First of all, a reduction of the overload on the state requires the state to withdraw gradually from its direct entrepreneurial role. In this respect, a well-designed privatization program, which is sensitive to the pitfalls described earlier, constitutes a necessary condition for transforming the state and helping it to play a more effective role in terms of supporting an externally competitive market economy. In the new system, the state would seek to contribute towards the realization of productivity and accumulation objectives by performing a complementary or supportive

role as opposed to a direct entrepreneurial role. This does not imply, however, a transition to a minimalist state since there exists considerable scope for state intervention in this complementary or supportive role. The key functions of the state in this context may include investment in infrastructure human capital formation, the support on restructuring of key infant industries through selective on strategic intervention as well as collaborative arrangements with the private sector over the introduction on dissemination of new technologies. What is crucial for the success of the new form of state interventionism is that the system of support and subsidies to be truly selective such that both the private and public sectors are forced to operate in a genuinely competitive environment under tight budget constraints. The logic of state intervention in this schema involves the imposition of equal conditions or standards on both private and public sector. Clearly, a push for privatization in the public sphere, while at the same time maintaining pervasive soft budget constraints for private firms through an extensive set of subsidies constitutes double standards. Dual standards of this type would help to maintain a heavy burden on the budget and would also have negative repercussions for productivity growth. In the new system proposed, the private sector would be expected to share some of the functions of the government to a much greater degree. For example, private firms would be expected to share the burden of investment in education and research and development effort rather than imposing the whole burden of human capital formation and R and D effort on the state.

Another key function of the post-populist state would be to set standards of performance. The institutional capacity of the state needs to be improved in order to better monitor private sector activities. An improvement in state capacity is essential in terms of being able to exercise discipline over the private sector and to close off avenues for rent-seeking in response to the subsidies provided on a highly selective basis. The state has a crucial regulatory role to perform, in terms of setting legal and quality standards, which are crucial to the performance of a competitive market economy. In fact, the persistence of an entrepreneurial role inhibits the state from focusing more explicitly on such regulatory activities which may contribute more in the long-run towards the achievement of both efficiency and equity objectives. To enable the state to perform this regulatory role more effectively two types of institution building process is necessary. First, building up strong institutions within the state bureaucracy is a critical component of

the process of restructuring the state and helping the state to realize its regulatory goals. Also important in this context is the development of civil society or non-governmental institutions. The development of civil society institutions, meaning a more active and participatory role for interest associations, is also crucial in terms of making the state institutions more accountable and also in terms of providing a democratic constraint on rent-seeking activities.

Finally, does the transition from a "populist" to a "post-populist" state imply that the state should not concern itself explicitly with income distributional objectives? In contrast to neo-conservative writers like Buchanan and Tullock, who also argue for a reduction in the size of the state and also change in the scope of state activity, the position adopted in this essay is that a better income distribution should definitely be one of the priorities of the post-populist state⁽¹⁴⁾. Two important considerations are relevant in this context. First, an improvement in the income distributional profile should emerge as a clearly defined long-run objective of the newly transformed strategy as opposed to an objective which can be realized over a very short period of time. Second, the instruments to be used need to be quite different from those associated with populist or the underdeveloped welfare state. As opposed to the artificial creation of employment within the public sector, direct instruments ought to be utilized in order to accomplish income distributional goals. Examples of such "direct" instruments would include tax reform, expansion of educational opportunities and health care, the institution of a well-developed system of social security and employment insurance as well as regional policy. An attempt can be made to develop a broad consensus on the post-populist approach to welfare by demonstrating the costs and contradictory outcomes associated with populist measures of income distribution which, in fact, tend to aggravate rather than reduce income inequality. Hence, in the new environment, the public sector would continue to play an important role in a mixed market economy context, but the nature of the public sector and the composition of public sector activity would be radically different from the previous era.

Table 3

**A New Role for the State in Comparative Perspective:
Nature of State Intervention under three Policy Regimes**

ISI	Neoliberal-Populist	Post-populist
Extensive public enterprise sector plus heavy indirect state interventionism to assist inward oriented industrialization	Somewhat reduced but still extensive SEE sector.	Significantly reduced direct, entrepreneurial role for the state.
Key instruments: tariffs, quotas, price controls on SEEs, subsidies	Significant reduction in the degree of indirect interventionism over the price mechanism.	Liberal trade regime supported by highly selective, strategic interventionism.
Inward-oriented trade regime.	Outward-oriented, but not a free trade or free market environment.	Outward-oriented.
Populist redistribution mechanisms.	Export subsidies important.	Highly selective system of subsidies.
Widespread rent-seeking in a heavily controlled environment	Populist redistribution mechanisms still in force.	Direct redistribution mechanisms.
	Export-oriented rent-seeking	Emphasis on the elimination of unproductive forms of rent-seeking. High degree of government accountability.

Conclusions

A basic premise of this essay is that the Turkish development experience is worth investigating from a comparative perspective. A number of reasons might be offered to justify this claim. First, it represents an interesting case in the dynamics of economic development in which the weight of public and private changes quite drastically over time. Second, it represents a case of rapid

industrialization in the context of a broadly democratic environment. Third, it constitutes a case of comparatively successful transition from a heavily regulated and inward-oriented economy to a more liberal economy with a high degree of exposure to the discipline of the world market. Fourth, the country has been the most dynamic in the region in which it is located in recent years. The co-existence of rapid development and democratic polity is particularly striking. Whilst one may claim that the economic performance of the East Asian NICs have been superior to Turkey on the basis of various economic criteria including growth, income inequality and the absence of macroeconomic crises, in one crucial respect their performance has been inferior. Their outstanding growth performance has been established in a highly authoritarian setting and the transition to democracy in these countries has been a very recent phenomenon, in fact a feature of the late 1980s.

A relatively successful case of economic development, however, does not necessarily justify the label of a "model". Leaving aside the questions of context and transferability, the central problem with the concept of the Turkish model of economic development is that the Turkish development experience, in addition to its major strengths, also embodies a number of important structural deficiencies. Turkey is still a country trying to emerge from a semi-peripheral status and graduate into the ranks of NICs or the core group of advanced industrialized countries. It is still in the transitional stage in the sense that some of the key structural problems that one tends to associate with semi-industrial, semi-peripheral economies continue to manifest themselves in the Turkish case. These include, among other others, an overextended public sector, chronic inflation, inadequate investment in manufacturing and in technology creation, high degree of income inequality, unemployment, and major regional imbalances plus low levels of welfare provision. An excessive proportion, namely more than forty percent of the labor force, is located in rural areas although the contribution of the agricultural sector to GNP is less than a half of this figure. Furthermore, the reform process which successfully began in the early 1980s is still incomplete, particularly with respect to public sector reform. Considering these weaknesses, it might be more appropriate to describe the Turkish case, as a country which is in a transitional stage, a country which is on the verge of transformation from a

peripheral status and joining the core or the near-core group of industrialized countries or the NICs in the world economy.

One of the central claims of this essay is that whilst Turkey is in the midst of a transitional process, the transition from a peripheral to a core status will not necessarily be a smooth process, a process that can be established over a short period of time, with little or no social dislocation. In retrospect, one of the central pre-requisites for the transformation from a semi-peripheral to a core status involves a transformation of the state. As argued in some detail, the transformation of the state does not imply simply a retreat of the state but rather a new mode of state intervention and a novel composition for public sector activities. The central objective of this new type of "post-populist state" would not necessarily be the achievement of a high rate of economic growth *per se* but the generation of "balanced growth", a type of growth which is also sensitive to key social objectives such as income distribution, environment and interregional balance. The restructuring of the state in the transition to a new type of state, associated with the move from a semi-peripheral to a core or near-core economy, also necessitates a strengthening of the civil society and its institutions to render the operation of the public sector and state intervention in the economy, in general, more accountable. In other words, the type of regulatory discipline exercised by a highly centralized bureaucratic machinery in the East Asian setting, might be accomplished jointly by state institutions and institutions of civil society, namely interest associations, in a more democratic environment.

Defining the contours of a new type of state, however, does not mean that the transition to such an equilibrium will inevitably be a smooth, and relatively painless process. The dynamics of the reform process requires serious attention in this context. A good example concerning the specific dynamics of the transition period concerns the debate over the privatization of the SEEs. Privatization is a highly desirable instrument in terms of reducing the excess load on the state in the medium or the long-run. Yet, the manner in which privatization is implemented or the type of environment in which it is put into practice will have crucial bearing on its effectiveness, judged in terms of both efficiency and equity objectives.

Hence, Turkey is a country which embodies the potential to emerge as a "model", but a number of important shortcomings of its economic structure need to be overcome before it can claim to be a leading example of economic development. In one respect, however, the label, "the Turkish model of development" serves a useful purpose. The need to present itself as a model to neighboring countries, and particularly to the Turkic republics, might act as a type of collective self-discipline in the domestic sphere which might, in turn, have positive consequences in terms of speeding up and completing the reform process over the coming years. In that respect, the psychological repercussions of the notion of the term "the Turkish model", in terms of a society setting new standards for itself and trying to realize those standards, should not be underestimated.

NOTES

1- On the broad economic history of Turkey in the twentieth century, see Barkey (1990), Boratav (1989), Hale (1981) and Keyder (1987). On the different interpretations associated with the term "etatism", see Hale (1980).

2- For a detailed account of the 1950s, dominated by the Demokrat Party, and for evidence concerning the expansion rather than the contraction of the state enterprise sector, see Hale (1981).

3- Important investigations of the Turkish ISI experience from a variety of theoretical and ideological perspectives include Barkey (1990), Boratav (1989), Hale (1981), Keyder (1987) and Krueger (1974). For an analysis of the major macroeconomic crises in the post-war period, see Öniş and Riedel (1993).

4- Comprehensive analyses of the Turkish experience with neo-liberal reforms include Arıcanlı and Rodrik (1990) and Celasun and Rodrik (1989). On the political economy of the neo-liberal era see, Öniş and Webb (1994, forthcoming).

5- For evidence concerning the overinvoicing of exports, see Celasun and Rodrik (1989).

6- The nature of the East Asian state has been extensively investigated. Key contributions include Amsden (1989), Deyo (1987), Johnson (1987), Jones and Sakong (1980), Wade (1990) and Woo (1991). For a comparison of "the East Asian" and "the Latin American" state see Cammack (1991) and Jenkins (1991).

The key characteristic associated with the East Asian state, namely a high degree of state autonomy plus highly institutionalized business-government collaboration has been absent in the Turkish case. In retrospect, the Turkish case is much closer to the Latin American cases. As opposed to the East Asian state and rather like the Latin American cases, the Turkish state has enjoyed, comparatively low degree of autonomy and correspondingly limited ability to discipline the private sector and close off avenues for rent-seeking.

7- For evidence on this point, see the recent OECD reports on Turkey (OECD, various years). Detailed examinations of the nature of the tax system and its principal deficiencies include Karataş (1993) and Önder et al. (1991).

8- For evidence concerning the relative weakness of the Latin American State to tax upper income groups and the characterization of the Latin American state, in general, see Fishlow (1990) as well as Cardoso and Helwege (1992), Carnmack (1991) and Jenkins (1991). From a comparative perspective, striking similarities may be detected between the development experiences of key Latin American cases, such as Brazil, and the Turkish case. The experience with prolonged import-substitution, followed by a crisis and forced liberalization that one tends to associate with Latin American Countries like Brazil is also rather typical of the Turkish case. Two key differences, however, deserve emphasis. First, foreign capital has played a much more important role in countries like Brazil and Mexico compared with the Turkish case. Second, the democratic regime in Turkey proved to be far more durable, in spite of periodic breakdowns, compared with the Latin American cases (excluding the unique case of Mexico), characterized by long periods of military rule.

9- For a coalitional analysis of the slow pace of privatization in Turkey, see Öniş (1991).

10- For detailed examinations and evidence on the Turkish privatization experiment so far see Karataş (1992) and Kjellstrom (1990). Kjellstrom argues that privatization proceeds in Turkey in the late 1980s has been used primarily to cover the budget deficit and suggests that this objective came to dominate the more fundamental objectives of privatization such as improvement in economic efficiency.

11- For evidence concerning income distribution in East Asia and the importance of this factor for the developmental state's ability to concentrate almost exclusively on the long-term economic growth objective, see Deyo (1987).

12- For evidence on income distribution in Turkey, see Kazgan (1990). Turkey is again closer to the Latin American high income inequality cases such as Brazil and Mexico, rather than the East Asian low inequality cases of Taiwan and South Korea.

13- For an excellent discussion of the populist-clientelistic practices in Turkey which started during the Demokrat Party era of the 1950s and continued to manifest itself in subsequent periods, see Sunar (1990).

14- On the public choice perspective on the state and arguments in favor of a minimalist state, see Buchanan (1989).

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