THE INTERACTION OF THE EU AND NATO
ADAPTING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION
TO THE NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE

Istituto affari internazionali
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
Roma, 21-22/I/1994

a. Programme
b. List of participants
1. "European security challenges"/ Ettore Greco
2. "European/Atlantic security institutions: current state and future prospects"/ William Wallace
3. "Security risks in Russia and the CIS"/ Sergei Medvedev
4. "Security challenges: the case of Hungary"/ Istvan Szonyi
5. "The role of European/Atlantic security institutions: perceptions from the CSCE countries : a view from Ukraine"/ Vladimir A. Manjola
6. "The role of European/Atlantic security institutions: perceptions from the CSCE countries : a view from Latvia"/ Atis Lejins
7. "The role of European/Atlantic security institutions: perceptions from the CSCE countries : a view from Austria"/ Hans-Peter Neuhold
8. "The role of European/Atlantic security institutions: perceptions from the CSCE countries : a view from Bulgaria"/ Plamen Pantev
9. "The role of European/Atlantic security institutions: perceptions from the CSCE countries : a view from Finland"/ Esko Antola

Istituto Affari Internazionali | Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik

Under the auspices of the Volkswagen Foundation

First Conference on

THE INTERACTION OF THE EU AND NATO: ADAPTING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION TO THE NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE

Center for Higher Defence Studies (CASD)
Palazzo Salviati
Piazza della Rovere 83
(tel. 39/6/46913240-46913195)

Rome, 21-22 January 1994

Programme

Friday January 21, 1994

16.00	Departure bus from Hotel Raphael to CASD
16.15	Coffee
16:30	Welcome: General **Carlo Jean**, President of CASD
16.40	Introduction. Remarks by conference organizers: **Gianni Bonvicini - Reinhardt Rummel**

First Session: New Risks for European Security and the State of Transatlantic Relations

Chair: **Gianni Bonvicini**

17:00	Presentation of the paper on: *European Security Challenges*, **Ettore Greco** (IAI, Rome)
17:30	Respondents : **Vladimir Baranovsky** (SIPRI, Solna); **John Holmes** (World Peace Foundation, Boston)
17:50	Discussion
19:00	Conference adjourns: departure bus from CASD to Hotel Raphael
20.30	Dinner

Saturday, January 22, 1994

8.30	Departure bus from Hotel Raphael to CASD

Continuation of First Session

Chair: **Peter Schmidt**

9:00	Presentation of the paper on: *European/Atlantic Security Institutions: Current State and Future Prospects*, **William Wallace,** (St. Antony's College, University of Oxford)

9:30	Respondents : **Antoni Kaminski** (Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warsaw); **Marco Carnovale** (IAI, Rome)
10:00	Discussion
10:45	Coffee break

Second Session: Security Challenges and Transatlantic Relations

Chair: **Maurizio Cremasco**

11:00	Presentation of the paper on: *Security Risks in Russia and the CIS* , **Sergei Medvedev** (IAI, Rome);
11:30	Respondents : **Roy Allison** (Chatham House, London); **Arnold Horelick** (EAC-RAND, Delft); **Giancarlo Chevallard** (EC Commission, Brussels)
12:00	Discussion
12:45	Lunch

Chair: **Marco Carnovale**

14:30	Presentation of the paper on: *Security Challenges: The Case of Hungary,* **Istvan Szonyi** (SWP, Ebenhausen)
15:00	Respondents: **Mathias Jopp** (WEU-ISS, Paris); **Gilles Andreani** (NATO, Brussels); **Maurizio Cremasco** (IAI, Rome)
15:20	Discussion
16:00	Coffee break

Third Session: The Role of European/Atlantic Security Institutions: Perceptions from the CSCE Countries

Chair: **Reinhardt Rummel**

16:15	Round table: **Vladimir Manjola** (Kiev State University); **Atis Lejins** (Latvian Institute for International Affairs, Riga); **Hans-Peter Neuhold** (Austrian Institute for International Affairs, Laxenburg); **Plamen Pantev** (Institute of International Relations, Sofia); **Esko Antola,** (Institute for European Studies, Turku)
17:15	Discussion
18:30	Concluding remarks
19:00	End of the Conference: deparure bus from CASD to Hotel Raphael
20.30	Dinner

Working languages: English and French

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Rome, 21-22 January 1994

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Conference on

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EUROPEAN SECURITY CHALLENGES

by

ETTORE GRECO

Center for Higher Defence Studies
Palazzo Salviati
Rome, 21-22 January 1994

1. **The evolving security structure in Europe and Western dilemmas**

The collapse of the Eastern bloc brought about fundamental changes in the security structure of Europe. Several models of international relations, often drawn from past periods of European history, have been used to illustrate these changes. However, the explanatory power of these models - their ability to capture the new realities - is challenged by the apparent fluidity of the security environment in Eastern Europe as well as by the clash between contradictory factors operating throughout Europe, chief among them the drive towards interdependence and integration and that towards political fragmentation.

According to a widely discussed scenario, the end of the bipolar system could lead to a mere return to the old balance-of-power games. Some analysts have drawn the conclusion that Europe is moving towards this scenario from the discouraging experience of the international response to the Yugoslav crisis. The sharp contrasts between the Western countries over the ways to deal with the crisis - contrasts manifestly prompted by conflicting interests - have indicated that the crises in Eastern Europe may easily become a major divisive factor within the West. However, Western countries have constantly sought to prevent their divergencies over the Yugoslav crisis from transforming into irreparable breaks in the alliance. In addition, the Western policy on other security issues that have emerged in the post-

Cold War Europe - such as the crisis in the Baltic states, the management of the nuclear heritage of the former Soviet Union or the security links to be established with the Eastern countries - has proved to be more consistent and effective. One should thus not underestimate the importance, as cohesive factor, of the political and institutional links established both within the West and at the pan-European level.

It is nevertheless clear that the security structure of Europe is characterized by a greater diffusion of influence and power among states. Furthermore, if the current security vacuum in the Eastern part of the continent should persist, the temptation of the most powerful countries to pursue policies aimed at establishing, or re-establishing, hegemonies and spheres of influences may increase.

The Unites States will probably remain a key actor on the European scene, but it lacks the means to exercise the same equalizing and pacifying influence on the whole continent that it had on the relations among the Western countries after the Second World War. Rather, there is much evidence that Washington is moving towards a partial disengagement from Europe. The only alternative is a collective Western leadership based on a new form of partnership between the US and the EU contries.

The extent to which the Western countries will be able to project stability eastwards will depend on two critical factors: their capacity to overcome the anti-integrationist forces operating within the West itself; and the creation of effective security arrangements with the Eastern countries.

Indeed, profound differences exist in the security

structures of the individual zones of Europe. A first distinction has to be made between Western and Central-Eastern Europe. The former is an area of stability, benefitting from a considerable level of integration, a common institutional framework and proven conflict prevention and crisis menagement mechanisms. In this area the risk of armed conflicts is very low. The latter is an area of instability, where rivalries and contrasts of interest have already led to the eruption of open conflicts. Referring to these higly different degrees of security,Lawrence Freedman has argued that «Europe still remains divided along the line of the old Iron Curtain» (1).

But remarkable asymmetries also exist in the Eastern part of the continent, where three different areas can be identified. In the first area, which includes the four countries of the Visegrad Group, the process of internal reform hs achieved significant results and the security challenges appear to be manageable. In particular, Poland, The Czech Republic and Hungary are on the right track for a gradual integration in the Western institutional framework, although it is still unclear how much time this integration will take. In the second area, the Balkans, the security situation is much more unstable. The risk of a spillover of the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia to the other areas of the former Yugoslavia is very high. This may, in turn, precipitate an all-out Balkan conflagration. Even if the international efforts manage to contain and stop the war, the re-establishment of a secure environment in the Balkan region would remain a very demanding task. Finally, the European part of the former Soviet Union continues to be subject to strong drives

towards further political fragmentation. A variety of ethic conflicts, often involving boundaries, make this third area disturbingly conflict-prone and it is likely to remain so for some time to come.

The Western countries look at the security situations in the East with mixed feelings. On the one hand, there is a widely diffused fear of becoming strategically embroiled in intractable ethnic and intra-regional conflicts. This fear is reflected, at the institutional level, in the concern that an enlargement of the existing Western cooperation arrangements eastwards could lead to their weakening or could even threaten their survival. The destabilizing potential of a closer integration with the Eastern countries has been made evident by the problems created within the EC by German unification. On the other hand, there is a growing awareness that complete dissociation from Eastern security problems is not feasible, as the instabilities in the East cannot be fully contained. They would in any case have significant repercussions on the Western countries. As has been noted, during the Cold War the threat of a general war in Europa, coupled with the isolation of Eastern Europe paradoxically made West Europeans feel less exposed to the developments in the East, and this contributed to nourish a sense of security (2).

The individual Western countries are not equally exposed to the crises in Eastern Europe. This factor considerably complicates the efforts to develop a coordinated response to those crises. Institutional inaction may indeed prompt the countries which feel more vulnerable to engage in unilateral moves. This, in turn, is destined to disrupt the climate of

confidence within the Western institutions as illustrated by the row over Germany's unilateral recognition of Croatia in December 1991.

More generally, the role of Germany appears to be crucial. Given its geographic location and its close links with several Eastern countries, it is directly affected by many of their problems. It has thus a keen interest in a stabilization of the security environment east to their borders. For the German government there are no viable alternatives to growing involvement in the problems of Eastern Europe. To characterize this German attitude a group of American scholars have spoken of a «Zwang nach Osten» as opposed to the much feared, but actually absent, «Drang nach Osten» (3). Far from being attracted by the prospect to establish its own hegemony on the East, Germany has so far shown a keen interest in a concerted Western effort to integrate the Eastern countries. It is also providing by far the largest share of economic aid to Eastern countries. However, the lack of an effective common Western policy towards the East may induce Germany to become increasingly unilateralist, thus damaging its relationship with its allies and partners (4). On the other hand, some European countries oppose the German idea of a rapid integration of the Eastern countries - in particular, those of the Visegrad group - into the EU. France and the South-European countries are concerned about the economic competition on the part of the Eastern countries, as well as about a further shift of the EU towards the centre of Europe.

As the experience of the Yugoslav conflict is showing, the Western countries are facing even more acute dilemmas with regard

to military intervention options. The major Western powers have rightly been defined «reluctant interveners» (5). This is particularly true for the current and potential crisis contingencies in Eastern Europe. The choice of limited intervention in the Yugoslav case has proved to be ineffective. The Western countries have abstained from any serious threat to engage in military escalation for fear of indefinite involvement in an intractable quagmire. The prospect of an «enlarged humanitarian intervention» which has re-emerged from time to time was not more than an illusory attempt to escape from the logic of military intervention, which necessarily entails escalation readiness. During the last year, the opposition has grown in the US to a dispatch of American forces for intervention abroad in the absence of a set of guarantees: sufficiently limited strategic objectives to permit a rapid withdrawal once the mission is accomplished; the involvement of vital interests; a substantial participation of the allies; the establishment of a chain of command ensuring a central role for the US or NATO. In the end, the Clinton administration has accepted this approach. The emphasis placed by George Bush at the end of his presidency and by Bill Clinton himself on the importance of humanitarian intervention has thus gradually faded.

The US seems to have renounced playing a systematic leadership role in the security issues of the European continent. It has demonstrated a clear wish to concentrate only on those problems which involve direct American interests. It is emblematic, in this respect, that Washington opted to leave the initiative on the Yugoslav crisis to the Europeans, while

developing an intense diplomatic action on the problem of the nuclear arms dispersed in the territory of the former Soviet Union (6).

The multiplication of crises and trouble spots has induced the US to place growing emphasis on the need for a more active and substantial contribution of the European allies to crisis management activities. This explains the US insistence on the concept that the Yugoslav crisis represents a problem of primary European responsibility. On the other hand, the Yugoslav crisis itself has made it evident that the US role remains decisive. All the parties involved have in fact looked more to Washington than to the European governments as the actors which could actually change the situation. Whenever the possibility of a US intervention seemed to become concrete, the negotiating flexibility of the Serbs has substantially increased. In the final analysis it seems clear that the Europeans have to accept a greater burden for the promotion of European security, if they want to obtain the more active involvement of the US they have repeatedly invoked.

2. **The nuclear issue**

As a result of the dramatic changes in the geo-strategic environment, the importance of nuclear weapons has radically reduced. With the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Central Europe, NATO no longer needs nuclear weapons to avoid the risk of being defeated by a massive conventional attack. However, NATO

nuclear forces mantain a stabilising function. They can contribute significantly to preserving an overall military balance in Europe.

There is still a need in Europe for a system of deterrence that only nuclear weapons can ensure. The main source of concern for Western countries, as well as for many Central and Eastern European Countries, is a new political upheaval in Moscow leading to an authoritian and ultra-nationalist regime which may be tempted to use nuclear weapons as a means of intimidation and coercion against other states. Western nuclear forces can certainly be a crucial deterrent against the risks associated with a resurgent Russian hegemonism.

NATO continues also to hold onto the principle that the presence of US nuclear forces in Europe is essential to maintain the strategic link between the two sides of the Atlantic. An effective and credible participation of the US in the deterrence system in Europe indeed seems to require the maintenance of some US theater nuclear capabilities in Europe (7). The adoption of a «reconstitution strategy», based on the idea of a prompt redeployment in Europe of the US nuclear forces in times of crisis (8) would present the insuperable disadvantage of complicating crisis management efforts at both the diplomatic and military levels.

The US nuclear guarantee is also of crucial importance against the risk of nuclear proliferation in the West. Admittedly, this risk is negligible today, but it could grow in the future, if the security environment in Europe deteriorates further. The possible alternative is the establishment of a new

form of nuclear deterrence based on West-European cooperation. This option is, however, rather irrealistic in the foreseeable future.

France has repeatedly emphasized its interest in a systematic intra-European consultation on nuclear matters. But its proposals do not in fact go beyond the level of consultation. Furthermore, the UK remains strongly reluctant to accept any nuclear arrangement which could weaken the strategic and political link with the US. Finally, the other European countreis show a pronounced preference for the US nuclear umbrella. They are sceptical of an extended deterrence based on the two national deterrents of the UK and France. Germany, in particular, has so far shown that it is by no means eager to acquire a nuclear status. It has, at the same time, reaffirmed its desire for a nuclear protection provided by the US.

During the Cold War, the nuclear non-proliferation regime remained highly stable in Europe (the nuclearization of the UK and France had no destabilizing effects). Today, however, the risk of its progressive erosion, or even collapse, is far from negligible. Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, this risk was regarded mainly as being associated with the possibility of a chain reaction fuelled by the acquisition of nuclear status by one or more Soviet successor states other than Russia. At the moment Ukraine is the greatest cause for concern. Even after the recent agreement with the US that Ukraine would give up nuclear weapons on its territory, serious doubts remain about which choice Ukraine will finally make, as the parliamentary opposition to the agreement is likely to be strong.

In addition, it cannot be excluded that states involved in open conflicts or acute disputes could also try to acquire nuclear weapons in the future as a means to protect their security.

Applying to this situation the neo-realist Waltzian arguments in favour of nuclear proliferation (8) some analysts have argued that the West should adopt a policy aimed at ensuring a «well-managed proliferation» (9) or at establishing «a system of distributed deterrence» (10). This school of thought moves from the assumption that the drives towards horizontal nuclear proliferation, in the post-Cold War era, can be at best controlled, but not completely stopped. It has also been suggested that, in some circumstances, the availibility of nuclear forces can play a useful role in reducing or eliminating the security dilemmas connected with the newly emerging ethnic or nationalistic rivalries (see par. 3) (11).

This line of reasoning has been applied, in particular, to the Ukrainian case (12). For Kiev, so the argument goes, the acquisition of nuclear capabilities is the only effective ways to deter a possible Russian aggression because the provision of credible security guarantees by the Western countries is unlikely. In addition, the tensions between the two countries are destined to deteriorate in the future, given the large number of controversial bilaterial issues still unsolved. An Ukrainian nuclear arsenal would thus have a stabilizing effect on the relations between Moscow and Kiev and indirectly on the sorrounding area, whose security largely depends on the future evolution of those relations.

However, the arguments against the denuclearization of

Ukraine and, more generally, any enlargement of the nuclear club in Europe and elsewhere are, on balance, much more compelling. First, the idea of a «managed» nuclear proliferation is very controversial. Any increase in the number of nuclear powers entails the risk of seriously undermining the global non-proliferation regime, particularly the prospect of the extension of the the NPT in 1995. Furthermore, looking back to the history of the East-West relations during the Cold War, it appears evident that strategic stability was ensured not so much by the existence of nuclear weapons in itself, as by the fact that the nuclear factor operated in a bypolar sustem. In a non-bipolar environment, however, it is very doubtful that a diffusion of nuclear power would have a stabilising effect (13). Finally, account should also be taken of the fact that the period of transition in which the development of nuclear capabilities takes place very often entails a variety of dangers, especially if the proliferator state is surrounded by a hostile environment. The acquisition of a nuclear status by Ukraine, for example, could have two dangerous implications. First, it could induce Russia to take back the commitments undertaken under the START disarmament process. Second, it could provoke negative reactions also in other countries, such as Poland (14).

It is true that the Western countries are not ready to offer Ukraine all the security guarantees it is seeking. Nevertheless, their action could prove decisive in convincing Kiev to relinquish the nuclear assets on its territory. They can effectively use economic leverage by making the economic aid Ukraine urgently needs conditional on the ratification of the

NPT. Furthermore, they can create a climate of confidence by developing the cooperative denuclearization programmes which are already being implemented with Moscow. Some measures included in these programs, such as an international supervision on the storage of dismantled warheads, the assistance to Moscow for an accelerated START implementation timetable and the establishment of an international plutonium depository can contribute significantly to alleviating Kiev's security concerns.

3. **The rise of nationalism and ethnic conflicts**

According to a rather widely held interpretation, rising nationalism in the Eastern part of Europe has to be regarded as an historically unavoidable development resulting from the political and cultural vacuum left by the fall of the communist regimes. It would thus derive basically from an «emancipatory thrust» of societies whose national identies had been suppressed for decades. Nationalism would represent the only ideological resource at the disposal of Eastern countries for the development of modern civil societies. The scholars who hold this view prefer to speak of «national awakening» or «national rebirth», a phenomenon which would be very similar to the historical movement leading to the formation of nation-states in Western Europe during the nineteenth century: «As experienced by the Western part of the continent in an earlier phase in history, the countries of Eastern Europe must go through the development of nationalism before they can work towards goals which lie further

afield» (16).

Many authors, however, do not share such a benign interpretation of the current rise of nationalism in Eastern Europe; rather, they insist on the elements of ethnicism and tribalism present in such phenomenon. Referring to its disgregative effects, Pierre Hassner has used the term «neo-medievalism» (17). Far from being a natural phase in the process of the formation of new nation-states, the nationalistc tendencies in the East would be an aspect of a more general crisis of the traditional nation state concept.

Two main elements make nationalism a major factor of instability in Eastern Europe. First, it manifests itself in areas where many ethnic groups live in the same state and where, therefore, the basic principle of nationalism - the congruence between nation and state - can only be realized after bloody and prolonged ethnic conflicts. A second but clearly related point is that the concept of nation-state which prevails in Eastern Europe is based more on ethnic elements than on political and constitutional values. In fact, the «official nationalism» is generally weaker there than the other, more ethnically characterized, forms of nationalism (18). However, there is clearly a complex interaction between the two. Governments can, for istance, appeal to patriotism and mount propaganda campaigns against alleged external threats with the goal of counterbalacing the ethnicist drives.

Ultra-nationalistic political parties with strong xenophobic attitudes have been gaining ground in many Eastern European countries. Although they have so far failed to win a majority of

the votes, they have become central political actors in many of those countries. A further growth of their political and electoral weight could hinder democratic development, jeopardize domestic stability and compromise relations with neighbours and Western countries. On the economic plane, these parties oppose a rapid transformation to a market economy, favour a strong role of governmental bodies in economic activities - advocating a third way between capitalism and communism - and warn against the risks associated with the openness to the international market and with the involvement of foreign capital and enterprises in the economy. Furthermore, in some countries they have shown the propensity for building alliances with the former communists.

The political fragmentation following the collapse of multi-ethnic states (such as the Soviet empire and the Yugoslav federation) has created the conditions for the emergence of security dilemmas among the new political units. If a country is in a more advanced stage of state formation than a neighbour with which it has hostile relations, this can easily «create window of opportunity and vulnerability» (19). The new states inevitably tend to concentrate on self-defense, and this is often seen as a sign of an aggressive attitude.

Another major source of instability connected with the disintegration of the multi-ethnic poltical units is irredentism. In some cases, the sense of solidarity with minorities living abroad is stimulating expansionist tendencies and territorial claims in their countries of origin, particularly in the case of the Russians and the Serbs which had benefitted from an hegemonic position over neighbour peoples in the past. But a similar

phenomenon is also visible in much weaker countries, such as Hungary and Albania. In turn, the new states in which large minorities live feel their political integrity threatened. This can induce them to adopt repressive policies towards those minorities. A spiral of actions and reactions, extremely difficult to stop, can thus occur.

Some analysts see nationalism as a phenomenon which, far from being confined to the Eastern countries, is spreading to the whole continent. Some new forms of regionalism in the Western countries present evident elements of ethnicism and tend to transform into secessionist movements. Western countries however appear to be in a far better position than the Eastern ones to contain these drives. Given the greater solidity of their political and institutional systems, they are able to develop an effective action from above, adopting, for istance, a policy of decentralization of powers.

A more concrete risk in Western Europe is a progressive renationalization of foreign and security policies. A traumatic event, such as the collapse of the West-European and trans-Atlantic institutional framework is highly unlikely. The West could however be threatened by a progressive erosion of its internal solidarity, which would undermine the effectiveness of its institutions, in particular their role as a pole of instability for the whole Europe.

4. **Concluding remarks**

The crucial challenge the Western countries are facing is the transformation of their institutions from instruments for promoting their own stability and well-being into instruments for projecting stability and the fundamental features of the Western world, such as democracy and market economy, into the Eastern part of the European continent.

The first key condition to achieve this goal is that a new form of partnership be established between the EU countries and the US. The Europeans have a strong interest in having the US continue to play a central role in dealing with security issues in Europe. To this end, they should commit themselves to taking over a greater responsibility and to bearing a larger share of the costs associated with the promotion of security in Europe. NATO will have to concentrate on crisis management activities. At the same time, NATO forces - in particular, the nuclear ones - will have to provide, by virtue of their deterrent capacity, an overall guarantee against possible acts of aggression or coercion.

The second condition is a relaunching of the project of the European Union after the serious crisis of 1992 and 1993. The political unity of the West-European countries is probably the single greatest external factor which can contribute to maintaining or restoring stability in Eastern Europe, containing the drives towards further political fragmentation. The East-European countries have to meet a set of demanding requirements before being fully integrated into the West-European

institutional framework. These requirements concern economic as well as security aspects. But the Western countries, in turn, should show a greater readiness to compromise on some of their immediate interests. In particular, it is essential for the stabilization of the Eastern countries that they can rely on a increasingly larger access to the West European market. Finally, it is also of crucial importance that the Western countries maintain and strengthen their lead in the efforts to deal with the new challenges connected with rising nationalism and ethnic conflicts. To this end, they should promote a further strengthening of the early-warning and crisis management instruments already existing at the pan-European level, especially in the CSCE framework.

Notes

(1) Lawrence Freedman, «The Politics of military intervention within Europe», in Nicole Gnesotto (ed.), *War and Peace: European Conflict Prevention*, October 1993, Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies, 1993 (Chaillot Papers 11), p. 37.

(2) François Heisbourg, «L'Europe condamnèe a l'insécurité», *politique internationale*, n° 61, automne 1993, pp. 286-287.

(3) Ronal D. Asmus et alii, «Building a New NATO», *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1993, p. 34.

(4) See on this point Juergen Noetzold, «The Eastern Part of Europe - Peripheral or Essential Component of European Integration?», *Aussenpolitik*, Vol. 44, No 4, 1993, p. 330; Jan Zielonka, *Security in Central Europe*, London: Brassey's for the IISS (Adelphi Paper 272), pp. 55-56.

(5) Lawrence Freedman, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

(6) See Marc Brenner, «Les Etats Unis et la crise yougoslave», *Politique Etrangére*, 57e année, n. 2, été 1992, pp. 329-338.

(7) See on this point David S. Yost, «Europe and Nuclear Deterrence», *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 3, Autumn 1993, pp. 97-120; Walter B. Slocombe, «The Continued Need for Extended Deterrence», *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1991, pp. 157-172. For the opposite view, see Ivo H. Daalder, «Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Why Zero is Better», *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 23, No. 1, January/february 1993, pp. 15-18.

(8) Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better*, London: Brassey's for the IISS, 1981 (Adelphi Paper 171).

(9) John J. Mearsheimer, «Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War», *International Security*, Vol. 15, No 1, 1990, pp. 5-56.

(10) Gordon Adams, Paul Taibl, «Share Technology for 'Safer

Weapons'», *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 48, No 4, May 1992, pp. 38-40.

(11) See Barry R. Posen, «The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict», *Survival*, Vol. 35, no 1, Spring 1993, pp. 27-47.

(12) See John J. Mearsheimer, «The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent», *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No 3, Summer 1993, pp. 50-66.

(13) On this point see Steven E. Miller, «The Case against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent», *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No 3, Summer 1993, p. 69.

(14) On the Ukrainian case see also Yost, *op. cit.*; William H. Kincade, «Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine: Hollow Threat, Wasting Asset», *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 23, No 6, July/August 1993, pp. 13-18.

(15) For an analysis of cooperative denuclearization programmes see Graham Allison et alii, *Cooperative Denuclearization. From Pledges to Deeds*, Cambridge, MA: Center for Science and International Affairs, 1993; Peter Bardehle, «Kooperative Denuklearisierung. Ein Neues Konzept der amerikanischen Sicherheitspolitik und seine Probleme», *Europa-Archiv*, 48. Jahr, 10. März 1993, 5. Folge, pp. 140-148.

(16) Gerhard Wetting, «Shifts Concerning the National Problems in Europe», *Aussenpolitik*, Vol. 44, No. 1, 1993, p. 70. See also Noetzeld, *op. cit.*, pp. 327-328.

(17) Pierre Hassner, «Beyond Nationalism and Internationalism», *Survival*, Vol. 35, No 2, Summer 1993, pp. 49-65.

(18) See James G. Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, London: MacMillan, 1993, chapt. 10.

(19) Posen, *op. cit.*. See, also, Dieter Senghaas, «Ethnic Conflicts, or the Revival of Nationalism», in Gnesotto, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-24.

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THE INTERACTION OF THE EU AND NATO: ADAPTING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION TO THE NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE

EUROPEAN /ATLANTIC SECURITY INSTITUTIONS: CURRENT STATE AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

by

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How fundamental a change in the European order have we been living through since the summer of 1989? The position each of us takes on this question shapes our assessment of the current state of transatlantic institutions, of the nature of the challenges we face, and of the future prospects for those institutions. Most of us accept that the cumulative impact of the changes in central and eastern Europe between 1989 and 1993 amounts to a transformation of the European international system comparable to those of 1914-19, of 1938-41 or of 1945-50: a geopolitical shift in the European landscape, altering the central focus of the region and the balance among its major states, as well as the boundaries of the regional system and its relations with external powers.

Some (like Michael Howard) would go further, comparing the revolutionary implications of post-1989 with the revolutionary transformation of Europe between after 1789: the collapse of an established domestic as well as inter-state order, leading to a prolonged period of disorder and political instability out of which eventually emerged a very different regional (and global) system. On the other side there are a significant minority, particularly in Brussels, who see the shift as significant but not fundamental: requiring some adjustment of West European policies and institutions, and also of Atlantic policies and institutions, but containable within the existing assumptions and Acquis developed over the previous 40 years.

Those who adhere to the first and second of the above perspectives should logically look for as fundamental a recasting of the institutions of European order in the early 1990s as took place between 1948 and 1952 (or, less happily, between 1938 and 1941, or 1789 and 1800 - neither of which however led to the successful establishment of an imposed regional order). The stable nineteenth century order which collapsed in 1914 was based upon a balance between the major powers within Europe: Britain, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Prussia-Germany and (after its unification) Italy. The United States in the decades before the

First World War saw its interests as focussed on the Western hemisphere and the Pacific, not on Europe; drawn into the general European conflict in 1917-18, Congressional and public perceptions of America's interests forced peacetime withdrawal from commitment to the (Europe-centred) League of Nations system.

After the failure of the European states themselves to achieve a stable order in the following twenty years, the USA was again drawn in; and in the postwar years reluctantly agreed to reverse the rundown of US forces and maintain a conventional and strategic military commitment to Europe until its West European allies had successfully rebuilt their economies and their military capabilities. But this was American leadership, establishing a benevolent US hegemony over a war-devastated and politically-unstable Western Europe in the face of the clear and present danger of Communist subversion and Red Army aggression. Now that the first fear is only a distant memory, and the second preoccupied 1-2000 kilometers further east, the foundations on which Western security institutions for the cold war era were built have been swept away - and it is time to rebuild from the ground up.

Institutional reconstruction is however possible only under conditions of evident crisis: most commonly after a major war, or a crisis close to war. The underlying contradiction of present-day West European politics, and even more of present-day American foreign policy debate, is that policy-makers recognize intellectually the immensity of the changes we are facing, but have to operate within constraints imposed by electorates who themselves feel no sense of crisis nor any transformation of their political or social worlds. Popular appreciation of the significance of the end of the cold war, both in Western Europe and in North America, is coloured by the domestic preoccupations of affluent societies: calls for the diversion of expenditure from defence to welfare, investment or tax cuts, fears over employment and disappointment over income expectations.

All Western governments have therefore underplayed the radical implications of the changes under way, even though recognizing in private that sharper changes of policy and of institutions are necessary. The prevailing institutional consensus within the EC and NATO, at the end of 1993, was compatible only with the third of the positions outlined above - despite the rhetoric of NATO meetings and European Councils about the fundamental transformation of East-West relations. This is partly explicable in terms of the extraordinarily peaceful way in which the cold war ended; with regime changes across central and eastern Europe taking place with only minor outbreaks of violence, and with Soviet forces withdrawing voluntarily from the states west of the Soviet/CIS border. The conflict in former Yugoslavia has so far been contained within those borders, with little direct impact beyond Yugoslavia's immediate neighbours. The conflicts in the Caucasus and central Asia remain - to Western eyes - distant and irrelevant, hardly meriting even the dispatch of television crews to record the reality of suffering, brutality and death for the half-shut eyes of Western viewers. Western Europe is, after all, more secure from threat in 1994 than any of its inhabitants, young or old, can remember; for them the old order has not collapsed, it has succeeded sufficiently well to be maintained on a more modest and economical, care and maintenance, basis.

Public and political perspectives across eastern Europe are radically different - for self-evident reasons. For them the experience of 1989-1993 <u>has</u> been one of crisis, collapse and transformation: more painful in some countries than others, with a greater sense of domestic insecurity or external threat in some than others, but representing for all an unquestioned period of systemic change. From which has followed the intense frustration of central and east European governments with their western counterparts: expressing a sense of urgency which their western counterparts do not share, meeting an apparent Western self-preoccupation which seems to them unforgiveable.

Logically the governments emerging from the former socialist bloc should ask not for absorption into existing western institutions but for the construction of new all-European institutions within which they would play from the outset an active part. But all the Europe Agreement countries are politically insecure, economically weak, and - with the exception of Poland - small. Nor do the six Europe Agreement countries, or even the 'inner' four Visegrad states, perceive sufficient common interest among themselves as a group to think in terms of bargaining with the West on the terms of transition. They see themselves as moving from dependence on the East to incorporation into the West: leaving the CMEA for the EC, and the Warsaw Pact for NATO.

In more settled circumstances Russia and Ukraine might carry sufficient weight to bargain for a more explicitly all-European institutional reordering. But economic and political confusion in both those countries has not made for clear or confident foreign policies, with the Ukrainian government in the first months of independence even looking to EC and NATO membership as mechanisms for safeguarding its independence from Russia - or, more bluntly, of transferring its unavoidable dependence from the unfriendly East to the supposedly-welcoming West. Disillusion with the CSCE has increased the pressures from the east to be given the promise of membership in the Western institutions - NATO and the EC - which appear to offer the best prospects of net gains in security and prosperity. Individual approaches to Western institutions, reluctantly coordinated only under Western pressure, have disguised from these competing applicants how far enlargement to incorporate them would in itself transform those institutions, or how far NATO has already been transformed by developments since 1989 and by its members' responses to those developments.

Don't tell the children: political transformation and domestic consent.

In a period of uncertain transition from the hostile stability of the cold war order to the hoped-for friendly stability of a wider European order the outlines of which can so far be only dimly foreseen, it is rational to work through existing institutional frameworks to engineer and manage change - provided there is a clear understanding that the end of the process will involve substantial institutional reconstruction. It is not however evident that there is any such understanding among western governments, let alone any willingness among western governments to prepare opinion within their Parliaments and publics for such reconstruction. The impression given is of continuity, of modest adjustment, and of eventual - but not immediate or early - enlargement. 'Partnership' is a deliberately ambivalent term: implying something less than a full commitment, open to interpretation either as a preliminary to closer relations or as a substitute for closer relations.

The argument of what follows is that this political stance in Western Europe and North America falls far short of the security and economic challenges facing the European region, and far short too of the institutional transformation which will be needed within the next decade if we are successfully to construct a stable wider European order. The illusion that NATO can be maintained, even enlarged, much beyond the year 2000 allows governments and publics to postpone confronting the question of how to construct an alternative European security order, instead of using the prolongation of NATO beyond the expiry of its original rationale as a limited period within which to prepare its eventual replacement. The illusion that the EC can respond to the demand for a doubling of membership - and a trebling of geographical area - within the next ten years without a radical recasting of its Acquis and institutional balance allows its present member governments to postpone explaining these awkward changes to their domestic publics; but is leading to a widening gap between the commitment to enlargement in principle and the willingness to make enlargement acceptable to potential entrants.

This paper is written before the outcome of the NATO Summit of January 10th-11th 1994. It is written in deliberately stark terms, in the belief that too much of the current debate on rebuilding European order avoids the underlying contradictions in Western policies, and that it also underplays the difficulties of absorbing the Europe Agreement countries into Western institutions within a timescale acceptable to those countries. We will not construct a stable post-cold war order by pretending to our publics that it can be acheived painlessly, without raising taxes or transferring jobs and resources. The example of the unification of Germany already offers us a sober warning of what happens when governments prefer to tell their publics that change can be achieved without significant cost.

Largely unreported in national newspapers, some significant developments are indeed under way - in the further integration of national forces, in the provision of a basic structure for WEU, in closer consultations between Britain and France, France and NATO, alongside those already developing between Germany and France, and in the evolution of consultative processes with former Warsaw Pact countries. But the very abstruseness of these developments, and the impenetrability of their acronyms, operate to obscure their implications from most national politicians and almost all national publics. Defence ministries and foreign ministries pursue one set of policies, while finance ministries and trade (and agriculture) ministries pursue another, without public scrutiny examining the contradictions and inconsistencies involved. Half-promises are being made about institutional enlargement without accompanying efforts to prepare Parliaments - or Congress - to accept the principle of enlargement and the additional obligations it would bring, let alone to persuade voters to support the idea. West European and American agricultural interests battled to the end of the Uruguay Round without a whisper - in France, or in Kansas - that a successful transition to efficient agricultural production in Poland, Hungary, Romania or Ukraine would (unless rigorously excluded from Western markets) transform the balance of European

agricultural supply and demand, and substantially affect the pattern of world agricultural trade.

Governments have to satisfy different audiences. Of political necessity, they obscure longer-term choices under the pressures of shorter-term elections. The role of the intellectual, the policy adviser, is however to clarify choices, to point out contradictions. The politician may feel impelled to pretend that the Emperor's new suit is remarkably fine; the policy institute can only justify its existence by pointing out when he is naked. The gap between domestic expectations and international negotiations has now grown sufficiently wide for the entire public debate about Europe's future institutional structure to be riddled with ambiguities and contradictions: about the depth and sustainability of America's foreign policy and security commitment; about the willingness of West European governments to sustain defence efforts, and to agree on an appropriate allocation of the burdens of military commitment and financial contributions among them; about the seriousness of the proclaimed commitment to a 'Common Foreign and Security Policy'; about the practicability of enlarging NATO, the EC or WEU. This conference will, I hope, examine some of these contradictions. In the sections which follow I intend only to sketch out some of the background to this current confusion.

The 'West' as a cold war construct: are we now witnessing the decline of 'the West'?

The whole idea of an 'Atlantic Community' was a product of the ideological conflict between 'East' and 'West' which followed the Second World War: deliberately fostered by American policy-makers and their West European allies to strengthen the sense of solidarity against the Communist threat. Ideas of a 'Third Force' between the capitalist USA and communist USSR were widely received within postwar Western Europe - even, briefly, within the British Labour Government - and were forcefully revived by President de Gaulle in the early 1960s; against which the Atlanticist idea of a coherent Western civilization was carefully

cultivated. There were older traditions to build on, of the civilized West against the civilized East; in effect these were reinterpreted to exclude eastern Europe from Western civilization, and to include the USA within it. 'Central' Europe disappeared from Europe's mental map; 'Asia', in Adenauer's famous phrase, 'now reached the Elbe.' The immense impact of American culture on Western Europe in the postwar years contributed to this sense of a transatlantic link stronger than the ties which bound Britain to Bohemia, or France to Poland; so did the immense impact on American culture of the great wave of intellectuals from central Europe which hit American universities in the 1930s, and remained a powerful force until the 1970s. The most desired destination for any West European student pursuing an advanced degree from the 1940s to the mid-1980s was not France, or Britain or Germany, but the United States. Supported by a network of scholarship schemes developed in the postwar years, successive generations of European elites were trained in the United States, returning to Western Europe with the underlying preconception that Washington was closer than Warsaw, Boston than Budapest.[1]

West Europeans in later years preferred to downplay the extent of American influence over West European integration. It was more comfortable to depict the reconstruction of Western Europe in terms of the idealists who envisioned the European Communities and the autonomous efforts of Western Europe's own political leaders. Opening of the archives is now reminding us how direct the American influence - and even the American financial input - was in promoting proposals for West European Union, and in supporting those who were prepared to promote closer union against faint-hearts and inter-governmentalists.[2] In the heated atmosphere of the postwar years, most West Europeans were willing disciples of the new Atlanticist religion. Forced to take sides between democracy and communism, they embraced democracy; and with it embraced the idea of the USA as the citadel of democracy, inheritor of the European Enlightenment and leader of the West.

It takes now a massive feat of imagination to conjure up the confrontational atmosphere of 40 years ago, the sense of sharp ideological conflict between two opposed camps. Precisely because the attraction of authoritarian socialism has melted away, the idea of a monolithic West built upon shared values is less overwhelming. The differences between different models of social democracy, or market democracy, are now apparent. The costs and benefits - economic, social and political - of the different models is debated across the Atlantic and within Western Europe, against the background of hard-fought negotiations on competition rules and permissible levels of state intervention and subsidy.[3] And the states in transition to market democracy are offered a bewildering variety of advice on the model of capitalism to follow, on the proper role of the state and the balance between public and private systems of welfare.

Within the USA, too, the coherence of 'Western civilization' has increasingly been questioned, together with the implication that North America and Western Europe are linked by common values which distinguish these two regions from the rest of the world. Increasing ethnic diversity, the shift of demographic balance from the Atlantic coast towards the Gulf and the Pacific, the passing of the generation of European exiles from American intellectual life, the increased importance of Asian markets, the re-emergence of old themes of American identity - of separation from the 'Old World' and of fascination with the Pacific: all these have contributed to a weakening of the assumptions of the 1950s, '60s and '70s that the Atlantic Community was a community bound together by values which were inherently 'Euro-Atlantic', which were understood in the same fashion on both sides of the Atlantic, and which formed the basis for an Alliance which represented an ideological expression more than a combination of national interests.

Thirty years ago the Atlantic Community <u>was</u> 'the West': the focus for world trade, the central American strategic commitment. In the 1990s any definition of 'the West' must also include at

least some of the far 'East'. Japan and the Asean countries, Korea and Taiwan have become important players in the world economy and important components of the 'Western' security system. Korea, like Mexico, is moving towards OECD membership. APEC and NAFTA excite American policy-makers as much as - if not more than - the reformulation of transatlantic partnership. The idea of a coherent Atlantic Community, born in the wartime Atlantic Charter and fostered through the postwar Atlantic Alliance, has disappeared. With Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey among America's favoured allies, and with the Arab-Israeli conflict no longer open to portrayal in terms of pro-Western Israel and Soviet-sponsored Arab nations, the elision between 'Western' and 'Judaeo-Christian' civilization so often made over the past 25 years now carries exclusive connotations unhelpful in relations with the Muslim world.

The Cold War was in some ways a clash of civilizations. Attempts to portray the post-cold war world in such starkly defined conflictual terms look more like attempts to prolong American intellectual and political hegemony than careful analyses of the fault-lines of an emerging regional and global order.[4] If the boundaries of the West are to be drawn on the old boundaries of Western Christendom, the Orthodox states of south-eastern Europe will be excluded from the Western camp, together with Muslim Turkey, Morocco and the countries arouond the southern Mediterranean. The substantial (and rising) Muslim population of Western Europe in this concept become an alien presence. Russia is defined out of Europe into Asia. The boundaries of the West can be moved eastwards a few hundred kilometers, to take back into the Western fold (the EC and NATO) Poland, Hungary Bohemia and Slovenia, and perhaps also the Baltic states, Slovakia and Croatia, before re-erecting the defences of the West against the barbarian hordes beyond. Such a redefinition is present as a half-conscious assumption in Christian Democratic circles. It would command widespread popular support within western Europe; it would delight opinion in Hungary, as well as a good many in the Czech Republic and Poland. But it would be disastrous as a basis for reordering European

institutions, privileging some former socialist states and rebuffing others to the south and east.[5]

It would be wiser therefore to moderate our value-laden rhetoric, to accept that 'the West' is a concept which needs treating with care, and that for both Western Europe and the United States the end of the cold war era has reopened other cultural interconnections, requiring different mental maps. West Europeans need to recall the Muslim contribution to Western civilization, the importance of interactions across the Mediterranean, the role of Byzantium in European history, perhaps even the ethnic and religious balance of the Ottoman empire. Americans are giving more emphasis to their interaction with the Hispanic world and with East Asia. Neither of these shifts of emphasis denies the reality of closely shared assumptions - and of lively differences within those shared assumptions - across tbhe Atlantic. But they do indicate that redefinition of the Atlantic relationship needs to take place within a much broader, global, framework, in which the interests and assumptions of Europeans and Americans overlap but are not identical.

Western Institutions, Western assumptions.

Institutions help to shape and direct policy. But to maintain their effectiveness they must also fit the international context within which they operate. NATO and the EC were designed to fit a divided Europe, contained within a US-led Atlantic framework. They were also designed to contain a rehabilitated but divided Germany, mistrusted by its neighbours and uncertain of its own appropriate role. The defence of Germany - the central front - was the central purpose of the Atlantic Alliance, the theatre within which its forces were concentrated. The northern and southern 'flanks' were secondary concerns: the Mediterranean more clearly dominated by American military power, as Britain withdrew from its Mediterranean commitments and France withdrew from the integrated alliance structure.

NATO in its original American conception was intended to provide an American security commitment until its devastated West European partners were economically robust enough to shoulder the burden of their own defence, within the framework of a transatlantic strategic nuclear guarantee. Between 1957 and 1963 the major players on both sides of the Atlantic therefore attempted to redefine the basis for Atlantic partnership. The USA saw the development of the EEC as the basis for the 'European pillar' of the Atlantic Alliance, and exerted sustained pressure on British governments to apply for membership. Britain and France jostled for privileged places within the alliance: Britain to maintain its 'special relationship' with the USA, France first proposing a three-power Directoire, then attempting to strike an alternative bargain with Federal Germany, and finally adopting a position of semi-detachment within the Alliance. As German forces were built up, US conventional forces in Germany were run down: a process halted and then reversed by the Berlin crises of 1958-61, which led to the commitment of substantial US troops to central Europe for a further 30 years. Germany once rearmed pressed for a more equal status in the alliance. President Kennedy's 'Grand Design' envisaged an enlarged EEC, an Atlantic partnership within which West European governments would take on a much larger share of the military and financial burden of supporting Western objectives in the confrontation with the East, while nevertheless continuing to follow American political leadership.

The inability of the British, French and Germans to sort out an appropriate balance between their status and influence in these multilateral institutions - a failure for which all three governments must share responsibility - led to the collapse of this redefinition of Euro-Atlantic institutions. Faced with a stalemate between Gaullist France and the United States as alliance leader, with German leadership deeply ambivalent about Atlantic versus European priorities, and with British politics torn apart by divisions within both major parties on the issue, the Alliance managed to postpone most of the difficult questions

the Kennedy Administration had intended to raise, many of them successfully postponed until after the Berlin Wall came down.

In summary: the USA continued through the 1970s and 1980s to provide a disproportionate contribution to the maintenance of European and global security, allowing West European governments to underspend - or, 'to live in luxury behind an American shield', as Flora Lewis once put it. Burden-sharing was a repeated issue in transatlantic relations - but discussed primarily in transatlantic terms, not in terms of an equitable share of defence commitments and contributions among the West Europeans themselves. In return for a disproportionate contribution to security, the USA maintained a disproportionate influence over security policy: a linkage which Henry Kissinger bluntly spelt out in his 'Year of Europe' speech of April 1973. West Europeans complained about American unilateralism and policy inconsistencies, and developed their own consultative mechanisms for 'European Political Cooperation' to lessen their dependence on foreign policy consultations within NATO; but made little progress beyond diplomatic declarations over 20 years towards the declared aim of a common foreign policy. There were in parallel a number of developments in closer defence cooperation among West European states, both within the NATO framework (standing forces, joint training) and outside (the Franco-German brigade); WEU was revived, even enlarged, but given little real significance. The balance of influence among Germany, France and Britain remained unresolved, moderated by the continuing primacy of the United States. Each of these three leading European powers - who accounted between them for 75% of European defence expenditure within the Atlantic Alliance - maintained the internal contradictions of their national foreign and defence policies through to the collapse of the DDR regime and beyond.

NATO was a vehicle for American leadership of, and protection for, the West. American hegemony in NATO and over NATO, with its European allies playing a secondary role, is built into the structure of the Alliance. Access to an American security guarantee, not just to whatever less dependable promises

West European governments might offer, is central to the attraction of NATO membership to former socialist states. But the American security guarantee, and the American military commitment, were linked to the Soviet threat and the cold war system. It was linked also, less explicitly, to the containment of Germany within the western system, a guarantee for all European states against the fear of a Sonderweg in pursuit of unification. But Germany is now united, peacefully and unthreateningly; re-emerging as the central power and the dominant economy within a wider Europe, round which any stable post-cold war order must be built.

Institutional adaptation, political and economic transformation: is incrementalism enough?

An optimistic interpretation of institutional adaptation over the past years would point to a number of creditable achievements. The EC developed its Phare programme, rapidly expanding Commission staff, activities and expenditure on the former CMEA countries; followed this up by negotiating Europe agreements with the Visegrad states, Bulgaria and Romania, and by exploring closer relations with the Baltic states. The Council of Europe played a useful ancillary role in educating these new regimes in multilateral diplomacy and in the norms of Western democracy. NATO has developed NACC into a valuable forum for consultation, providing the basis for future closer links. The CSCE, it is true, has failed to live up to the hopes of some of its members, but retains a moderately useful position in this network of overlapping organizations. The WEU has enlarged again, to become the explicit link between the EC and NATO and the consultative mechanism through which the smaller states of central and eastern Europea can talk to their Western counterparts without either the USA or Russia to dominate the discussions.

A more cynical interpretation would focus on the intense absorption with procedures and with consultations, to the detriment of policy-making and commitments. Organizational confusion and inter-organizational rivalry has been compounded by

governmental incoherence and reluctance either to commit funds or to take decisions. The EC has offered the Europe Agreement states the minimum concessions possible, leading a substantial trade surplus in favour of Western Europe as economies in transition import investment goods and desired consumer products from the West but struggle to export the agricultural produce, textiles and steel with which they could compete on western markets in return. Phare and related programmes have offered a bonanza for western consultants, with more modest benefits for the recipient states. There is as yet little sign that the EC or its member states have begun to prepare for enlargement to include any central or east European country; current indications are that the difficulties of adjusting the Acquis even to accommodate the rich EFTA countries and their marginal (but highly subsidized) agricultural sectors may lead to the failure of the enlargement negotiations which the EC needs to conclude before it turns its attention to the eventual incorporation of eastern Europe. Financial assistance has been disappointing, shaped by western preoccupation with budgetary deficits and popular resistance to additional taxation. The inertia of the EC negotiating process provides Ireland with financial transfers which are anticipated to rise within the next five years from 5% to 7% of GNP, while member governments find it impossible to conceive of transferring a comparable sum to the six Europe Agreement countries as a group.

NACC offers continued activity for international officials, and the opportunity for constructive consultations among military officers and civilian officials from previously hostile countries; but it does not provide a new rationale for NATO, which is likely to follow the path of CENTO 30 years before, of gentle decline into irrelevance. US officials, and the American President, make brave speeches about the continuity of the American commitment and the continuing vitality of NATO, while others in Washington insist that it is up to the West Europeans to 'pay for' transition in central and eastern Europe and while Congressional willingness to support a continuing commitment of ground troops in large numbers in Europe - let alone an

enlargement of NATO which might commit ground troops to eastern Europe - remains strongly in doubt. The CSCE and the Council of Europe are distracted by battles over their turf and territory. The WEU is making only slow progress towards building an effective organization, hampered by divergent national views on its role and relationship with the EC and NATO and by organizational jostling over territory, command and role with NATO. Within Western Europe the proposed NATO multilateral forces are competing for national attention and resources with the developing Eurocorps; while national defence budgets within the smaller West European states exhibit what Manfred Woerner has called 'free-fall structural disarmament.' Little even of these modest developments have been explained to national parliaments or publics, who remain equally unaware of the developing contacts between military units and defence ministries across the old dividing line of the cold war.

There has been substantial institutional adaptation since 1989, without any major institutional innovation (unless NACC is seen in that light, or the strengthening of WEU, or the ambiguous terminology of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty). The question is, has that adaptation been adequate to the challenges it faces, and does what has been achieved so far provided the basis for future successful institutional construction on a wider all-European basis?

Your answers to that question will depend on your perception of the nature of the current political and economic revolution in Europe, and on your preferred final outcome. Here I have deliberately avoided considering the sad example of the Yugoslav conflict as a test of institutional adaptation to new security challenges, preferring to concentrate on the broader picture and the longer-term perspective. What institutional structure do you enivsage will be needed to manage a stable European order in ten years time - or in 15? What role do you think it realistic to anticipate that the USA will play in that institutional structure? How do you see it accommodating Russia and the former

CIS, and accommodating also the security concerns and the insecurity risks of the countries around the Mediterranean? From where do you see leadership and initiative coming within that institutional structure? How will it apportion rights - and security guarantees - and obligations? Which states will be the providers of security, and which the consumers - and the free riders?

I offer here for discussion a number of points which are contained within the current debate, but which the current debate has so far done little to clarify. I suggest that failure to clarify them will only widen the gap between half-commitment and public consent, between rhetoric and reality, which we already face. Adaptation is a dynamic process; it is successful only if it leads towards a new and coherent formulation, rather than an unsatsfactory compromise among incoherent governments still influenced by outdated assumptions.

1) The United States no longer has a domestic constituency for substantial military commitment to European security; certainly not for substantial commitment of conventional forces on the ground. Ex-socialist states pressing for NATO membership should appreciate this sea-change; the security guarantee which they are seeking may not be achievable within the terms they seek. Nor does the USA have a domestic constituency for substantial financial transfers to eastern Europe - except to Russia and the Ukraine in return for nuclear disarmament , and perhaps to Russia as a potential threat and possible global partner.

2)This being the case, there is no longer the foundation for continuing American hegemony over European security and political institutions. The basis for continuing American leadership now lies in the unwillingness of any European state to accept that any other European state should assume that role, or to develop mechanisms within Europe for collective leadership capable of replacing the US role. European observers should note the gradual emergence of an American 'Three Circles' doctrine, comparable to that which British policy-makers evolved at the end of the Second World War, in which global influence is to be maintained despite declining economic and military capacities through influence in different regional systems which interact through the central linking power: for Britain, the transatlantic special relationship, the Commonwelath and Empire, and the European commitment, for the United States the transatlantic link - and the influence which that provides over the evolution of the European Community - the Western hemisphere, and East Asia, institutionalized in their turn through an expanding NAFTA and a developing APEC. The British Three Circles doctrine proved to be

a self-satisfying illusion; the American doctrine may well serve a similar role.

3)Construction of a new and stable European political and security order is impossible without accommodating the central position of Germany; or without the German Government accepting thwat central role, and persuading its public to accept it too, and its partners not to see it as threatening. The history of European disorder over the past century has shown how difficult it has been to accomodate German interests and its neighbours' fears without bringing in external powers to provide the balance which the European region alone has failed to achieve. Germany is the 'natural' hegemon of the European region, in terms of population, economic weight and geographical position; a stable European order cannot be built without recognizing that reality. Collective leadership was the American answer in its 1960s grand design, with France and Britain joining Federal Germany in a concert of powers itself contained within the integrated structure of the European Community. Collective leadership within a broader institutional framework, to which in time Spain, Italy and Poland should be added, is the necessary foundation for institutional advance.

4)The whole issue of burden-sharing must now be addressed within the European context. The artificial separation of military burden-sharing debates conducted across the Atlantic and EC budgetary wrangles conducted among the 10 or the 12 can no longer hold in a post-cold war order, in which the smaller members of the EC are cutting their defence budgets far faster than their larger partners and in which the transfer of substantial financial resources to eastern Europe should be seen as part of the overall security contribution. There are some awkward issues here. The Netherlands is emerging as one of Western Europe's leading free riders, for example, alongside Denmark. On an equitable share of defence spending among WEU members Germany would now contribute almost twice as much as Britain, Italy almost as much as France - unless differential financial contributions to the development of Eastern Europe were weighed in the same balance, to the credit of Germany and the embarrassment of several of its neighbours.

5)Some indication must be given to potential applicants - and to confused or inattentive publics within the present member states - of the likely limits to the expansion of those West European institutions which are now under pressure to incorporate new members. Those states too distant, too large and too complex in the problems they present to envisage as members of the integrated institutions which Western Europe has evolved - Ukraine, Russia, Turkey - should then be offered different forms of partnership and association, to act as a bridge between this wider European region and other regional orders. Those states which have no alternative to dependence on central Europe - the countries of south-eastern Europe - must either be brought in or provided with a stable and closely-associated sub-regional alternative. The EC has to take a more active approach to enlargement; it is no longer a club which others may join if they

are willing to accept the rules, but the central institution within an evolving regional order.

6)If the governments of western Europe are serious about their rhetorical commitments to a common foreign and security policy, to economic and security partnerships with eastern Europe which will evolve into full membership, then they must also be serious about the costs involved, the painful sacrifices of national autonomy, and the difficult task of carrying their reluctant publics with them. One of the most demanding security challenges which faces Europe today is the challenge of convincing the affluent and aging voters of Western Europe (as also of North America) that there are security risks and dangers, and that policy and expenditure has to be altered to meet them.

But behind all the rhetoric of NATO summits and of European Councils, are any of the democratic governments of Western Europe serious about the declarations they agree to or the half-promises they give to impatient delegations from their neighbours to the East?

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1. Louis Halle, The Cold War as History (1967); Alfred Grosser, The Western Alliance (1978); Harlan van B.Cleveland, ed., The Atlantic Idea and its European Rivals (1966); William Wallace, The Treansformation of Western Europe (1990).

2. I am indebted to a recent paper to an Oxford conference by Richard Aldrich , 'European integration and the American Intelligence Connection', for information from US archives on the American transfer of financial support within the European Movement in 1949 from Duncan Sandys to Paul-Henri Spaak.

3. See for example Michel Albert, Capitalism against Capitalism? (1991).

4. Samuel P.Huntington, 'The clash of civilizations?', Foreign Affairs Summer 1993. The concept of intellectual hegemony is taken from Gramsci via Joseph Nye, Bound to Lead (1991).

5. This is not to deny the contemporary political and cultural significance of the historical fault line between the countries of the former Western Christendom and those of the Orthodox and Muslim worlds; rather to urge that it be treated as one of the many fault lines within Europe rather than as the defining border. Huntington's map of this 'fault line between civilizations', after all, is taken from William Wallace, The Transformation of Western Europe (1990) - though characteristically the thin dotted line of the original has been replaced by a thick solid line in Huntington's preferred image.

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THE INTERACTION OF THE EU AND NATO: ADAPTING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION TO THE NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE

SECURITY RISKS IN RUSSIA AND THE CIS

by

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Center for Higher Defence Studies
Palazzo Salviati
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CONTENTS

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Security Risks in Russia and the CIS

INTRODUCTORY NOTES [2]

After the end of the cold war the European security is challenged from a number of regions, like East Central Europe, the Balkans, the Mediterranean. However, the greatest uncertainty and the principal security risk are brought by transformations in the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Enormous landmass, the population of roughly 300 million people of 150 nationalities, gargantuan and obsolete economy, a major army, military-industrial complex and stock of nuclear and conventional weapons, inherent conflicts in the society and ethnic relations, and finally, the historical tradition of Russia's influence on the European stability make "the Soviet legacy" a paramount security concern.

The course of events in the FSU will largely influence the future shape of the Euro-Atlantic security system. This once again became evident in the wake of unpredictable and threatening developments in Russia in late 1993: the attempted military coup in Moscow on October 3-5, which resulted in a civil war in the Russian capital, and the parliamentary elections on December 12, in which the electorate favored ultra-nationalist parties of the extreme right and the extreme left. These events have risen

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[2] This is a short version of the bigger case study undertaken in the framework of the project *"Interaction of the EC and NATO: Adapting Transatlantic Cooperation to the New Security Challenges in Europe"*, carried out by Istituto Affari Internazionali (Rome) and Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (Ebenhausen) and sponcored by Volkswagen-Stiftung. This report has been presented and discussed at the First Project Conference in Rome in January 1994.

serious security concerns in the West, just on the eve of the NATO summit in January 1994.

This work aims to outline principal security risks in the Former Soviet Union. It is hardly possible to give a general picture of the situation in a small study, but it is feasible to point out "bottlenecks", major deficiencies in political, ethnic, economic, military spheres that shall become the matter of concern for the West. Hence the specific, "risk-seeking" point of view. This is not an account of recent developments, but rather a conceptual framework, a method for assessing whatever new trends and security risks will emerge in the FSU.

Part I of the case study deals with security risks in Russia and the CIS. These are divided into four groups:

a. Security risks brought by political instability and inherent weakness of political regimes in Russia (Section 1) and in the CIS states (Section 2).

b. Security risks brought by disintegration in the FSU. Section 3 examines reasons and principal forms of disintegration, Section 4 deals with disintegration and separatism in Russia, and Section 5 treats on ethnic conflicts in the CIS area.

c. Security risks brought by the economic crisis (Section 6).

d. Security risks in the military sphere, including the military-industrial complex (Section 7).

Part II is composed of two sets of alternative scenarios: the five "Russian scenarios" and the four "Commonwealth scenarios". Security implications of each contingency are examined. It is concluded by a forecast which predicts the most likely combination of scenarios for the next few years.

I. CURRENT TRENDS AND SECURITY RISKS IN RUSSIA AND THE CIS

1. Political Risks in Russia

1.1. Uncertainty and fragility of the post-Soviet political environment are symbolized by inherent weakness of the political regime in Russia. This was once again proved in late 1993, with Boris Yeltsin's dissolution of the old parliament in September, the attempted military coup in Moscow in October, that claimed at least 150 dead and hundreds of wounded, and the hasty elections for the new parliament

in December in which the majority of the Russian voters rejected the incumbent leaders and economic reform, and turned to communist and fascist parties.[3]

The fact is, after two and a half years of proclaimed sovereignty Russia has not yet developed its statehood. There are at least four major deficiencies that prevent the current or future Russian leadership from effective (or even satisfactory) exercise of state power:

- weakness of legislative, executive and judicial branches; their continuous struggle for power;
- separatist trends in the provinces, and the development of alternative mechanisms of power;
- weakness of the system of political parties, most of which lack identities and constituencies;
- lack of the social base of the current regime.

1.2. Artificial implantation of the principle of the division of powers in Russia has been contributing to the fragmentation of a single authority, and instead of "checks and balances" the opposing power branches have been consistently seeking to destroy each other. This culminated in open confrentation in September-October 1993, when President Yeltsin dismissed the Russian legislature, and parliamentary leaders attempted a military coup. Elections to the new parliament (the Federal Assembly) and adoption of the new constitution on December 12th[4] do not necessarily lay the basis for a stable Western-like constitutional process, and the future of all three power branches is still far from clear.

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[3] The latest available results of the December 12 elections are as follows:

Anti-reform parties:

1. **Liberal Democratic Party of Russia** (a flat-earth, neo-fascist, populist party led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky) - 23.2 %
2. **Communist Party of Russia** (electoral home for nostalgic party hacks and old faithfuls, led by Gennady Zyuganov) -11,89 %
3. **Agrarian Party** (voice of the "red barons" of Russia's collective farms and the rural poor) - 9 %

Pro-reform parties:

4. **Russia's Choice** (mainstream economic reform party led by Yegor Gaidar) - 15.74 %
5. **Yabloko** (the "Apple" coalition of market reformers led by economist and politician Grigory Yavlinsky, a potential coalition partner for Russia's Choice) - 8 %
6. **Party of Russian Unity and Consensus** - 6.5 %
7. **Democratic Party of Russia** - 6 % (both minor parties, supporting the reform, but a slower pace)

Issue parties:

8. **Women of Russia** (the fight-for-your-rights party of Russia's over-worked and under-paid women, led by Alevtina Fedulova) - 7%

(Sources: *Financial Times*, December 14, 1993; *International Herald Tribune*, December 21, 1993; *Economist*, December 18, 1993)

[4] The new Russian constitution was adopted by 58.4 per cent of those who cast ballots. The turnout was 58.2 million people, or 54.8 per cent of Russia's 106 million registered voters. (Source: *International Herald Tribune*, December 21, 1993)

1.3. **The executive**, composed of the President and his apparatus and the Cabinet of ministers seems to be the winner in the political battle of late 1993. Boris Yeltsin has achieved the stated objective of winning popular aproval for the new constitution which gives him extensive powers and severely restricts the power of parliament to prevent him using them. He now has the constitutional strength, and the incumbent prime minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, has already shown some of the political skills, reqiured to manage a weak and fractious parliament.

However, in Russian politics constitutional advantage does not matter so much. It is political leverage and cohesion of the authority that matter, and the executive in its current shape clearly lacks all three. The president is now in a weaker position than ever. He can not any longer be confident of beating opponents in a presidential election. One exit poll carried out on December 12th found that 39 per cent would vote for Mr.Yeltsin as president, but 52 per cent would vote for "someone else".[5]

Another problem is that the new parliament is likely to be even less cooperative than the old Supreme Soviet, and Mr Yeltsin will be permanently tempted to override the new opposition. This will prove extremely dangerous. Should Boris Yeltsin try to dissolve the parliament once again by decree, Vladimir Zhirinovsky's impressive vote count among the military raises the specter of civil war. The president's new opponents are not likely to be as isolated, or as easy to defeat,as defenders of the old congress.[6]

Furthermore, though Mr Yeltsin has given himself the right to dissolve the Duma and call new elections if it rejects his candidate for prime minister three times, the right to dissolve after a no-confidence vote does not apply in the first year of the new parliament's life. Most likely, this will force the president to remain above the conflict (as he already did during the election campaign) by constructing a cabinet which draws its membership from the most wide constituency of views, with ministers coming directly from the neo-fascist and communist parties, or reflecting their position.

That means that the current contradictions within the government, in which, citing Grigory Yavlinsky, "a third is building communism, a third is building capitalism, and a third are looking after their personal affairs"[7], will stay intact, preventing the executive from pursuing consistent politics. The government will be severly split among few reformers and a conservative majority, composed of former nomenklatura cadre. Reformist ministers will stay in a small and embattled minority. Furthermore, though the executive now has the right to control the central bank of

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[5] *Economist*, December 18, 1993

[6] Dimitri Simes. Bad Choices, Bad Advice, and Now a Different Russia. *International Herald Tribune*, December 16, 1993

[7] Cited in *Financial Times*, December 15, 1993

Russia, it will most likely stay in the hands of the anti-reformist chairman Victor Gerashchenko.

Finally, side by side with the weakened executive, alternative "vertical" (i.e. going from Moscow through regional centers to the localities) structures of power emerge. This process has been made especially dangerous by the rapid "vertical" development of criminal and other illegal networks, penetrating the post-Soviet state system ("chains" of corruption, lobby networks, etc.).

In other words, the executive branch is bound to stay largely ineffective and divided in itself. The inherent contradiction between few reformers at the top and the majority of nomenklatura cadre will stay intact, and reliable "vertical" power structures are not likely to emerge soon.

1.4. The **legislative power** is now vested in the Federal Assembly elected on December 12th 1993 and composed of the upper house, the Federation Council, made up of two representatives from each of the 89 Subjects of Federation, and the lower house, the 450-seat Duma elected from constituencies, where half of the deputies were elected by proportional representation by party lists, and another half - on a first-past-the-post basis.

The parliamentary elections showed a deeply divided nation, tired of political struggle in Moscow and beset by economic hardships, caused by reform. This was mostly a vote of protest, with few constructive elements. It is therefore highly probable that the new legislature will yield to the "obstructionist temptation" right from the outset, renewing the power struggle at the top and bringing political instability.

Russia's Choice has picked up enough seats in the individual races to give it the largest number of any bloc in the Duma, the lower house, but it is far outnumbered by opponents of political and economic reforms.[8] As a matter of fact, the new parliament is unlikely to have a majority for either pro or anti-reform parties, as there will be about 140 independent deputies, fence-sitters of various sorts. However, the anti-reformers are likely to be the largest single bloc - and they are already trying to work together. The threat from the far right and the old left may finally compel the reformers to coalesce, but it will probably strengthen the gradualists. Indeed, some reformers are already backtracking.[9]

The second problem is that the composition of the parliament is largely non-party: members of the 178-strong Federation Council, or upper house, were elected

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[8] According to Itar-Tass projections on December 20, Russia's Choice would wind up with 103 seats, the Liberal-Democratic Party with 66, the Communists with 62, and the Agrarian Party with 49. Four other blocs would split 99 seats, and unaligned independent candidates would get 70 seats.
(Source: *International Herald Tribune*, December 21, 1993)

[9] *International Herald Tribune*, December 20, 1993

from the regions and republics on the basis more of their local status than their ideology. The same, to a slightly lesser extent, applies to the half of the lower house elected on the first-past-the-post system. The result is likely to reproduce what was evident in the previous Supreme Soviet - a *boloto*, or marsh, in which the deputies roll this way and that. The threat is that the marsh hardens in the opposition to a president and a government which ignore their wishes.[10]

The third problem is that the big winners in the elections on December 12 might prove to be regional politicians elected individually in local districts. This is especially true of the upper house, the Federation Council, that is overwhelmingly filled with representatives of the former nomenklatura.[11] Of different persuasions, they are all there, above all, to lobby for their regions. This will further complicate the power struggle in Moscow, obscuring the prospects for national consesnsus and constructive cooperation of the executive and the legislative.

It will be almost as hard for President Yeltsin to get a coherent program of liberal economic reform through the new parliament as it was through the one he blew away in October 1993. The new constitution does not give the legislature much power, but the parliament still has the last word on the budget, and it can still make its voice heard in other economic arguments. This possibly foreshadows a stalemate for reform effort - and insofar as economic reform is the centerpiece of Russian politics - a continued politial stalemate in Russia. Summing up, the legislative branch can not have the final say in the power struggle; in the meanwhile, it can substantially contribute to instability, confronting the executive, appealing for support to regional leaders and legislators, or to the army, and further dividing the nation.

1.5 **The judicial branch**, according to the new constitution, is represented by the Constitutional Court (which resolvs cases arising from the constitution, state treaties and disputes between the Subjects of the Federation), the Supreme Court (the highest judicial body on civil, criminal and administrative law), and the Supreme Arbitration Court, dealing with economic disputes. In the desired system of checks and balances a special role is attached to the Constitutional Court.

To begin with, this body is still non-existent, as the old Constitutional Court was banned by president Yeltsin for the entire transitional period between the dissolutiopn of the old parliament and the elections to the new one. But even with the new Constitutional Court in place, its role as an independent arbiter and mediator raises strong doubts. The post-Soviet experience shows that the truly independent judiciary is absolutely not rooted in the Russian political culture. The old Constitutional Court and its chairman Valery Zorkin have been the object of political

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[10] John Lloyd. Bitter Harvest of Disunity, *Financial Times*, December 14, 1993

[11] Many of them are Boris Yeltsin's personal foes: Aman Tuleev, leader of Kemerovo; Eduard Rossel, the former governor of Yekaterinburg; Vasily Starodubtsev one of the leaders, and Anatoly Lukyanov, the master-mind of the failed August 1991 coup; Kirsan Ilyumzhinov, the millionaire president of Kalmykia, to cite just a few. (*Financial Times*, December 15, 1993)

manipulation over the entire period of its existence, and in 1993 it has completely sided with the parliament and the communist and nationalist opposition. It is difficult to imagine that the new Constitutional Court will manage to walk a fine line between the executive and the legislative, especially since all of the judges will be appointed by the president (with parlimentary consent). Most likely, the Court again will be compelled to take sides in political struggle, thus finally ruining any hope for the system of checks and balances (if such hope ever existed).

1.6. There are two other key actors in the power game, waiting on the sidelines. The first one is **the Army and security forces**. (Though president Yeltsin dismissed the Security Ministry, which was the inheritor to the KGB, by a special decree in late December 1993, its "hard core", composed of the former KGB cadre, networks of agents, etc., will definitely stay intact.) Poor performance of Interior Ministry forces, including riot police, during the attempted military coup in October 1993, and apparent unwillingness of the Army to take sides in the conflict until the very last moment showed at least three things. First, the "power ministies" can not be reliable partners for any of the political forces. Second, political preferences of the army are far from clear, and it becomes increasingly divided along political lines. (See Section 7). Third, the army is becoming anxious of the power struggle at the top, that runs the risk of breaking the country and the army itself, and under certain circumstances can be compelled to act on its own in order to prevent this development. This was given proof in the December elections, when the army gave clear signs of discontent, allegedly voting heavily for the nationalist Liberal Democrats.[12]

Another major force on the sidetracks are **regional leaders**. With the election of a new parliament they have got a podium and a vehicle for pressing on the federal authority. They will be the decisive weight that will define the balance of forces in the coming months, but their political preferences still remain a big question mark. Most likely they do not have clear preferences at all, except for winning concessions from Moscow in exchange for weak and conditioned support for the president.

What makes the situation even more complicated and unstable, is that while regional political elites are getting a higher leverage in federal politics, the center still does not have reliable instruments of controlling the regions; and federative relations in Russia risk to become a one-way street. Though the new constitution proclaiming Russia a federation received support, low voter turnout (see footnote 4) makes the result much less than a ringing endorsement. In a number of regions and republics, the 50 per cent barrier of the voter turnout was not passed at all.(*See Section 4.6*) It will be a future point of conflict with those areas which are claiming sovereignity under their own constitutions.

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[12] Though early reports claimed that the army went in large numbers for Vladimir Zhirinovsky, later estimations put the number between 18 percent in the Black Sea Fleet to 43 percent among Russian troops in Tajikistan. (*Segodnya*, December 17, 1993)

Summing up what has been said, there's no balance of forces, or consensus, or even the domination of a single force on the Russian political scene. The situation can be described as a *growing power vacuum, the fragmentation and dissolution of authority*, with weak institutions unsuccessfully struggling with each other. Instability is innate to such a political regime. Even though president Yeltsin managed to get his new constitution through, "trench warfare" in the high echelons of power with periodical showdowns of opposing forces (at least twice a year) is going to continue.

1.7. Another deficiency of the Russian political system, resulting in high instability, is **the weakness of political parties.** Thirteen parties have registered for the December 12th elections, of which only eight passed the 5 per cent barrier to get representation in the parliament. (For numbers, see footnote 3.) However, all these parties are relatively new and hardly organized. In the elections most constituencies had many candidates, very few of whom advertised a party affiliation on the ballot paper. Voters appear to have been unaware of such affiliations or uninfluenced by them.

The majority of parties have been formed not on the basis of common interest, but rather on a vague proximity of opinions, and as a rule, have consolidated around certain political figures. The activity of most parties is limited to Moscow, St.Petersburg, and several major cities, and is increasingly restricted by growing regional separatism. As a matter of fact, all existent parties are crippled due to their small size, scarce financing, the lack of state support, limited intellectual potential, the absence of prominent leaders, and the weakness of party structures.[13] They did not take their time to become sound political forces, and actually remain "protoparties". The last elections did little to change this situation.

1.8. In a word, *the entire political spectrum in Russia can not adequately express the vast variety of interests of the populace and the existing social trends.* Neither the current political regime (legislative, executive, and judicial powers), nor the majority of political parties and movements possess of a stable social base. There's a striking and dangerous gap between the sharpening power struggle at the top and the growing political passivity of the population.

In this sense, contemporary Russian politics are "hanging in the air", becoming self-sufficient, sort of a trade for several thousand politicians in Moscow, that are growingly alienated from their constituencies. Instead of providing a framework, in which conflicting interests could be settled and channeled in a constructive way, the present political system in Russia is becoming one of the factors of destabilization.

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[13] The only exception is probably the Russian Communist party, which boasts strong organization, discipline and a steady number of faithful supporters (around 10 per cent of the electorate) among the poorest, particularly among the lumpen part of the population. On the other side of political spectrum, the mainstream democratic "Russia's Choice", though clearly lacking organization and ideology, has a sound social base in the emergent "middle class" in Moscow and St.Petersburg, where it got over 35 per cent of the vote.

The continuing political stalemate, and apparent inability of authorities and major political forces in Russia to resolve it create a highly risky security environment. In the months to come, the West might be facing at least five major security challenges:

a. Irrelevance of existing political structure can lead to a **radical reshuffle of all current political tendencies**, parties and coalitions, in which there will be hardly any continuity. The results of parliamentary elections on December 12th will hardly spark off such a development, but they clearly prompt that this scenario is possible. This is even more probable, given the shrinking popularity of president Yeltsin and most reformers, and a striking absence of any centrist force in current Russian politics. New leaders, unknown to the West, like Vladimir Zhirinovsky (though not necesserily Mr Zhirinovsky himself) can come to the forefront, and start the revision of Russian security policy.

b. Political passivity of the populace against the background of extreme social tension often foreshadows a **social upheaval**. Massive social and economic protests can grow into a politically indifferent (like in 1917), or a politically biased riot, inclined towards the most radical political tendency on offer. (*See Scenario 1.3*) The December 1993 elections were useful in a sence that they chanelled the popular resentment against reform in a parliamentary form, but given the lack of democratic tradition in Russia this will not always be the case.

c. On the other side, in the situation of total political indifference the public might not even notice **the institutional coup at the top**, leading to the establishment of an authoritarian regime, or rather installing an oligarchy at the top. (*See Scenario 1.2*)

d. Further degeneration of the central authority, the absence of political force or ideology that could consolidate the nation, and atomization of political life can result in **the final breakup of a single political space** and the emergence of a loose confederation on the territory of Russia. (*See Scenario 1.5*)

e. The most probable risk, however, is that due to growing ineffectiveness of power structures, the weakness of political parties, and political apathy of the electorate **the current political stalemate will endure**, and no force in the nearest future will be able to break it. There will be temporary gains and compromises, economic reform will proceed by leaps, followed by setbacks, foreign policy and security relations with the West will be fluctuating from warmer to colder terms, depending on the domestic political situation at the moment, but there will be no final solution in either of these fields. (*See Scenario 1.1*). In a certain sense, this scenario is the most challenging for the West, as it will require an extremely flexible strategy and security policy, adaptation to living with permanently unstable political regime in Russia. In this contingency security environment in the Euro-Atlantic system will be characterized if not by hostility towards Russia, then at least by increased tension and awareness. This will require adequate military and institutional buildup on the Euro-Atlantic level, that will be safeguarding Europe until a proper and trustworthy political arrangement takes place in Russia.

2. Political Risks in the CIS Countries

2.1. The political situation in the CIS states and their relations with Russia are marked by a key contradiction: it was the Soviet state that broke up in December 1991, but not the country. This created a dangerous security environment, in which present political structures (both CIS and national) do not correspond to the economic, political, military and psychological interlinking inherited from the old days. Moreover, obtaining independence, the majority of republics are yet incapable of effective exercise of essential state functions and still have a long way to go before sound political systems are built and a stable popular constituency of regimes is established.

2.2. The political situation in the **Slavic republics of the CIS (Ukraine and Belarus)** is similar to that in Russia. The former nomenklatura majority in parliaments and local authority bodies has retained its positions, but increasingly loses its political capacity. The anti-nomenklatura "democratic" opposition splits even before coming to power. The centrist forces of a moderate reformist kind gather momentum. The political scene is dominated by leaders of the state, the public profile of political parties is low, and the growing social discontent is accompanied by political passivity of the population.

In the meanwhile, anti-nomenklatura and "democratic" forces in Ukraine ("*Rukh*") and Belarus (The Byelorussian Popular Front) are, in contrast to Russia, nationalist-minded and patriotic-oriented. Given the close affinity of the three Slavic nations, Ukrainians and Byelorussians are asserting their national identity at the cost of cultural, linguistic and political separation from Russia.

However, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravtchuk had to realize the actual limits of nationalism (21 percent of Ukraine's population are Russians). Though the episodes of confrontation will be repeated, in the short- and medium-term perspectives Ukraine will be bound to "pendulum movement" of approaching and moving away from Russia while staying on the "Moskvocentric" orbit. This becomes even more true, as the catastrophic state of the Ukrainian economy in 1993 (inflation beyond 40 per cent a month, a three-time drop in industrial production, etc.) make the people realize the real cost of independence.

As far as present trends are concerned, the political situation in Ukraine and Belarus does not pose an immediate threat to the European security, though the upcoming parliamentary elections in Ukraine, due on March 27, 1994 may well follow "the Russian scenario", with extreme nationalists (the Ukrainian National Assembly) making substantial gains. There's a more serious conflict potential in Russian-Byelorussian and especially Russian-Ukrainian relations, though it is not going to explode right away. These are other issues, like nuclear arms on Ukrainian territory (*See Section 7.7*), that should be of major concern for the West.

2.3. **In Moldova,** too, the post-Soviet political system took shape of a neo-nomenklatura regime with authoritarian features. The anti-nomenklatura Popular Front that barked on forced unification with Rumania, has lost its appeal.

Future developments will be mostly determined by the course of settlement in the strategically important Transdnestria[14] (and also in the rebellious Gagauz Republic in the South of Moldova). In case Kishinev reaches political compromise with Transdnestria, it will be bound to stay in the CIS milieu. In case the armed conflict recommences, the unification of Moldova and Rumania (actually the absorption of Moldova by "Greater Rumania") will be emerging as the only alternative. Russia and Ukraine will be facing hard choices concerning the future status of Transdnestria.

The "Transdnestria knot" is also a serious security challenge for the West. This is a conflict area on the ex-USSR territory that is the closest to the Western security zone. The possible conflict could also involve Rumania. The dangerous link Russia-Ukraine-Transdnestria-Moldova-Rumania can well become a "bridge" by which instability and crises could be spreading westward, provoking conflicts in Central Europe. Any change in territorial or administrative status quo in Transdnestria can cause chain reaction of destabilization and the emergence of an "arc of instability" from Moldova to Serbia and Kosovo, that will be even more dangerous for the European security than the current Balkan crisis. Finally, Transdnestria currently seems to be one of the very few, if not the only place in the FSU, where international institutions can effectively intervene, and that makes this region rank even higher on the Western security agenda.

2.4. The situation in the **Transcaucasian region** is essentially different. The price of revolutionary changes in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia has been high. With the "national-democratic" forces in office, the existent ethnic tensions quickly developed into full-fledged military conflicts: in Nagorny Karabakh, partly in Nakhichevan, in South Ossetia, Abkhazia. The internal stability has been ruined, and this overshadows the prospects for economic and institutional reform. Ousting of the "democratic" president Abulfaz Elchibei and return of Geidar Aliev's nomenklatura regime in Azerbaijan is a sign of times.

While democratic procedures have been formally introduced, the political life in the three Transcaucasian nations is actually determined by the balance of forces between armed units. This is especially vivid in Georgia, where Edouard Shevardnadze found himself captive to paramilitary criminal groups, and with ascension of Georgia to the CIS in November 1993 - to the Russian troops. With armed conflicts expanding all over the region, the army and law enforcement authorities emerge as key actors on political scene. The militant psychology of

[14] Transdnestria makes up 37 per cent of the industrial potential of Moldova, and produces 83 per cent of electric power. (*Izvestiya*, June 5, 1992)

national mobilization prevails in all three states, contributing to authoritarian trends in domestic politics and further deepening the conflicts.

The conflict potential in the area should be of major security concern for the West. The risk is much higher, than just a war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, between Georgia and the separatist province of Abkhazia, etc. The situation in Transcaucasian region threatens the European security system on two fronts: Eastern (as far as Russia is already deeply involved) and Southern (as far as Turkey, a NATO member and the EC associate is on the verge of more-than-just-humanitarian engagement, and Iran appears seriously concerned). As a matter of fact, a system of territorial trade-offs, including Azerbaijan, Nagorny Karabakh, Nakhichevan, Armenia, Turkey and Iran is being discussed undercover for a long time. If any territorial redivision takes place, this will have most serious security repercussions in the wider area, probably including the Middle East and the Gulf.

2.5. In the **Central Asian republics of the CIS**, the breakup of the Soviet Union has only removed the upper ideological veil that was covering the traditional Oriental hierarchical power structure. Given ethnic tensions in the region, further complicated by tribal and clannish contradictions, the only guarantee of political stability is the conservation of neo-nomenklatura regimes of two basic kinds: a "soft" authoritarian regime, inclined to economic reforms, with a relatively free press and multi-party democracy (Nursultan Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan, Askar Akayev in Kyrgyzstan), and a "hard" authoritarian regime, with heavy censorship on press, a token opposition, and obscure perspectives for economic reform (Sapurmurad Niyazov in Turkmenistan and Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan). The fall of these regimes will inevitably lead to civil war and ethnic armed conflicts of the Afghan type, as clearly shown by upheaval in Tajikistan.

The Central Asian republics could be moving towards state capitalism of the African type, with elements of foreign investment, and private enterprise in agriculture, retail trade and handicraft. Political life will then be mostly determined by competition of tribal, criminal, drug business, etc. groups, with frequent military coups.

Islamic presence in Central Asia (with an exception of Tajikistan) does not pose an immediate threat for security of Russia and Europe. Moreover, most countries in the region appear to be more inclined to "lay model" represented by Turkey or to "Islamic capitalism" of the Gulf kind, than to fundamentalist ways of Iran. It is important that the overwhelming majority of the Central Asian Muslims are sunnites.

Security environment in Central Asia is extremely dangerous and conflict-prone. Due to the complicated ethnic structure of the Central Asian states and artificial nature of borders between them, local conflicts in any of republics can easily spread across the borders and become the hotbed of instability for the entire region. Lack of arable land and water, and overpopulation will be permanently giving rise to conflicts even in a relatively stable environment. From this point of view, the most risky and unstable area is the rich and fertile Ferghana valley, where the borders of

Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan meet, and where three murderous ethnic conflicts nave already taken place over recent years. One shall also keep in mind the conflict potential in Northern Kazakhstan, a mostly Russian-populated area, where recent
gains of nationalists in the Russian elections (and the very fact that Mr Zhirinovsky was born in this area) have immediately provoked an upsurge in ethnic separatism and claims of reunification with greater Russia.[15]

Civil wars in Tajikistan and the neighboring Afghanistan,[16] that have deep impact on all states of the region, mark the beginning of a dangerous conflict period, in which no one, including Russia, will be immune, and means of this war (extreme cruelty, mass murder of civilians, disregard of neutrality of certain parties, like the Russian troops, etc.) point to the impossibility of limited peace-keeping or peace-making intervention, unless this is a massive military operation, like the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan (which, in turn, also proved ineffective). In general, feudal, overpopulated and ethnically mixed Central Asia is the place where the danger of Hobbesian "war of all against all" is most clear and present. In case such war is unleashed, it will have deep negative impact on Russia and the CIS, and its repercussions (mass migration involving mostly ethnic Russians, proliferation of arms, military buildup in Russia, changes in Russian security and foreign policies, etc.) are certain to affect European security.

3. Emergence of Local Elites in the Post-Soviet Area

3.1. Disintegration has emerged as a principal security risk in former Soviet Union. It threatens both inter-state relations, sometimes drawing them into military confrontation, and domestic legitimacy and stability of post-Soviet regimes.

3.2. Current political and economic disintegration resulted from the breakup of centralized power system in the USSR. As far as the Soviet Union was essentially a single giant corporation, the crush of its hard core (the CPSU) left its key elements autonomous. These key elements were not former quasi-state entities (Union and Autonomous Republics), but those who possessed of real local power: the regional political elites.

3.3. Local elites are generally composed of the following six elements:
a. The traditional clan and tribal system;

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[15] *Financial Times*, December 20, 1993

[16] 4.2 million Tajiks and 1.8 million Uzbeks live in Afghanistan, while the entire Afghan population is ethnically and linguistically akin to Tajiks. (Bruk S.I. *Narody SSSR v strane i za rubezhom* (Peoples of the USSR in the country and abroad), Moscow, 1991, pp.25-26)

b. The former party functionaries that still make up a sort of a common cadres network;

c. Heads of major industrial and agricultural enterprises;

d. Influential representatives of the private sector, connected with the old nomenklatura;

e. Local heads of armed and security forces;

f. The representatives of central republican authority.

3.4. Local elites emerge on specific territories, such as:

a. In historically-specific areas, either ethnic (Chechnya, Turkic and Finno-Ugric lands of the Volga region in Russia), or in areas with local peculiarities in language, mentality, habits and ways (Galitia in Ukraine, Menghrelia in Georgia, etc.);

b. On wider traditional territories: Western Ukraine, Western Georgia, the Ferghan region in Uzbekistan;

c. In economic regions, possessing of large natural resources (Komi and Yakut-Sakha Republics, Kuznetsk and Vorkuta coal fields, etc.);

d. In large cities, administrative and industrial centers (Moscow, St.Petersburg, Kiev, Sverdlovsk, Tomsk, Dnepropetrovsk, etc.).

3.5. From the regional point of view, the territory of the former Soviet Union is divided into a number of areas with well- established, emerging or latent centers of power. According to some calculations, there may be over 300 actual or potential local elites, including the smallest, those of a district level, on the territory of the former USSR. A substantial part of them is or may be seeking autonomy, and some may feed instability and provoke regional conflicts.

4. Disintegration in Russia

4.1. The new ambitions of local elites in Russia emerged in the wake of the abortive August 1991 coup. This was accompanied by declarations of sovereignty in a number of republics (Tatarstan, Chechnya, Bashkortostan, etc.), and by sharpening of ethnic territorial disputes. Moreover, even Russian-populated regions started to seek greater economic and political autonomy.

The "regionalization" in Russia is aggravated by a visible usurpation of authority in the localities.[17] The functions of state power are assumed by local political, social, ethnic, military and sometimes even criminal groups. It is bluntly demonstrated by the evolution of the politically-charged Cossack movement that has finally become an issue of big-time politics.

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[17] See: *Strategiya dlya Rossii* (A Strategy for Russia: Report of the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy), *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, August 19, 1992

There are at least four main areas, or "belts" of actual or possible instability in the Russian Federation:[18]

a. The North Caucasian area
b. "The Volga belt"
c. "The Transbaikal belt"
d. "The Northern belt"

4.2. The situation in the **North Caucasian area** can be described in terms of long-term instability and gradual moving away from Moscow. The common fear of "Lebanonization" of the North Caucasus is largely exaggerated, too. In order to become a "second Lebanon", North Caucasus still has to be united in a sort of federation or confederation, which now seems almost impossible, given ethnic, religious and economic contradictions in the area. The most probable scenario for the North Caucasus holds that there won't be any sort of a long "trench warfare" between several major opposing forces, but rather occasional outbreaks of conflicts all over the area.

Security risks in this region are relatively high. Firstly, conflicts will produce mass migration and terrorism. Secondly, proliferation of arms in this region, already heavily charged with weapons, will continue. Thirdly, Russia will probably have to keep a large military contingent in or near the area.

4.3. As to the **"Volga belt"** (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Mordovia, Chuvashia, Mariy-El), the key security risks are connected with separatist policies of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, that have large resources of oil and gas and a tangible industrial potential (military, chemical, electronic industries, etc.).

Though internal tensions in the "Volga belt" are relatively low, the "Volga separatism" is potentially the most dangerous form of separatism in Russia. As far as it concerns an essential "nucleus" of Russia, that was formed in 16th century, it arouses bitter popular resentment and is actually a very sensitive issue for Russians, that tend to see it as a threat to the very existence of the Russian state. The secession of the Volga republics from Russia could virtually disrupt major transport and power lines going from East to West and from North to South. Therefore the reaction (or overreaction) of Moscow can create a dangerous security environment in Russia.[19]

4.4. Concerning the **Transbaikal belt** the only candidate for real self-determination and probably secession from Russia is Tuva, where the titular

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[18] See: Alexander Salmin. *Dezintegratsia Rossii?* (Desintegration of Russia? Report of the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy), *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, December 10, 1992

[19] Salmin, Op. cit.

ethnic group accounts for 2/3 of the population, and Russians are mostly forced to leave.

The possible separation of Tuva is hardly going to have major destabilizing effect on the situation in Russia. However, the process of self-determination in this part of the Russian Federation can be tempting for: (a) China, now entering the phase of economic and political expansion; (b) national minorities in the bordering provinces of China, seeking self-determination (mainly in Tibet). Therefore, developments in the "Transbaikal belt" are risky from the point of view of the Russian-Chinese relations, and general stability in the Far East.

4.5. Destabilization in "**the Northern belt**" is provoked mainly by "natural resource" separatism of wealthier regions: Yakut-Sakha, Komi, the Yamalo-Nenets District. The biggest security risk in this area is connected with Yakut-Sakha. Though full separation of this republic will hardly ever take place, greater economic independence of Yakut-Sakha will cast a heavy blow to the Russian economy and finances. The "Northern belt" can also contribute to the possible disintegration of Russia by loosening the financial and taxation system, the economic links in the country, and by promoting **Siberian and Far Eastern regional separatism**.

If this occurs, security risks will run high. The territorial change of such scale will completely ruin fragile geopolitical balance in the Far East. China and Japan will be largely tempted (or even compelled) to come into play. Japan, for example, can see this as a unique chance to get back its part of the Kuril chain. This, in turn, will provoke frictions within G-7 and the strategic alliance of industrial democracies.

4.6. Most probably, disintegration in Russia will continue. Added to the emergence and separatist ambitions of local elites is the growing inability of Moscow to keep the situation under control. Recent parliamentary elections and adoption of the new constitution of Russia endorsing a single federation are not likely to ease the tension: regional leaders have obtained a greater say in the Russian politics, while many of them interpret the clauses of the new constitution as non-abiding, due to the low voter turnout in their regions. In a significant number of regions and republics, the 50 per cent barrier of the voter turnout was not passed at all.[20] What is even more important, there's still no distinct division of competence and power between Moscow and subjects of the Federation.

4.7. In theory, provided the current trends continue, decentralization can proceed until it finally determines all economic subjects that will be able to take

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[20] These Subjects of Federation include Chechnya (no voting was allowed); Tatarstan (13 percent turnout); Sverdlovsk region (where Mr. Eduard Rossel, the former governor, had atempted to change the region into the Urals Republic and where fewer than 50 per cent voted on the Russian constitution), as well as Ingushetia, Udmurtia and Komi republics, Kemerovo and Khabarovsk territories, Chelyabinsk and Perm regions and others. (*Financial Times*, December 14, 1993)

possession of the former state property, or, in case of economic collapse, the optimum-sized economic and territorial units that will prove most viable in a crisis environment. In the meanwhile, at the present moment regional, ethnic and territorial movements in Russia are disunited and asynchronical. They are still lacking the "critical mass" to lead to the breakup of Russia. *One can rather speak of progressing decentralization and regional differentiation, but not of virtual disintegration of Russia.*

4.8. Most likely, in the years to come the West will be dealing with a single Russia. However, decentralization brings about other security challenges, of which at least two must be mentioned:

a) Russia will remain a single, but substantially weakened and unstable country, with internal regional contradictions casting a shadow on its domestic perspectives, foreign and security policies and on economic performance. The nation can plunge into the "state-of-war" psychological atmosphere, favorable for authoritarian and chauvinist trends and fascist-like demagogy.

b) The division of Russia into regions is also sort of a dangerous temptation for many countries and ethnic groups outside Russia. Firstly, **the ex-USSR states** will possibly try to profit from decentralization of Russia in terms of direct access to natural resources, upgrading their political positions and exerting greater strategic influence, and weakening Moscow.

Secondly, the **countries bordering Russia or the FSU area**, too, can perceive some of Russia's provinces as parts of their "spheres of interest". All of these countries can be willing to exert larger influence on Russia, but in the case of Japan territorial reasons may also be involved.

Thirdly, the temptation to "profit" from disintegration of Russia stays valid for **Western Europe and the United States** (though it is not too likely to be translated into reality). It does not concern territorial acquisitions or the aim to weaken the potential strategic rival, but rather can be described in terms of "introducing democracy" and gaining a larger influence on the post-Soviet political scene through a sort of "direct diplomacy" over the head of Moscow.[21]

Fourthly, separatist movements in Russia can prove an inspiring example for national minorities all over the world and notably in the countries of Eastern Europe.

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[21] John Mroz. Russia and Eastern Europe: Will the West Let Them Fail? *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1993, P.53

5. Ethnic Conflicts in the CIS Area

5.1. The underlying reason of ethnic conflicts is the breakup of centralized power structure. Emancipating from authoritarian rule, national and local elites, most of which are lacking any tradition of independence and statehood, start to define their specific interests and put emphasis on construction of an independent state.

Other conflict-bearing factors include:
- intricate ethnic and demographic situation;
- decomposition of the Soviet army, with large units, like 14th Russian army in Pridnestrovye, finding themselves at the heart of conflict regions;
- proliferation of arms all over the former Soviet territory;
- disruption of economic ties, leaving many areas without supplies of vital products and making them seek economic security by military means;
- involvement of "third parties" (*mojahed* units from Pakistan and Afghanistan in Tajikistan, mercenaries from the Middle East in Karabakh, etc.).

5.2. Ethnic conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union can be divided into several main types:[22]

a. **Riots and pogroms**. Such were the pogroms of Meskheti Turks in Ferghana (Uzbekistan) in 1989, of Uzbeks in Osh (Kyrgyzstan) and of Armenians in Dushanbe (Tajikistan) in 1990, and a number of other cases. These can be triggered by demographic and economic problems, especially by unemployment. The major problem is that in case of sharp aggravation of the social and economic crises riots and pogroms can be taking place virtually anywhere, including major cities, though most explosive will be places with a high concentration of refugees. There's actually little possibility to predict or prevent such conflicts, unless a general state of emergency is introduced in certain areas. Riots and pogroms produce a large number of refugees and migrants.

b. **A conflict between native ethnic group and non-native population on territories that have obtained independence**. In such conflicts mainly the rights of non-native (mostly Russian-speaking) population are concerned (the Baltic states, Moldova, some Autonomous republics of Russia, etc.).

In the Former Soviet Union, some 70 million people are living outside their etno-historical regions. A substantial part of them can potentially become subject to discrimination or even Bosnian-type "ethnic cleansing". This concerns in particular 25 million Russians, who are often treated as "occupants". The status of Russians in the new independent states has already become an issue of big-time Russian politics, with passivity of the government challenged by chauvinism and imperialist campaigns of the nationalist opposition. Protecting Russians in the "near abroad" was one of the hottest issues in Vladimir Zhirinovsky's election campaign.

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[22] See: Emil Pain. *Etnopoliticheskiye konflikty* (Ethno-political conflicts), *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, April 15, 1992

The major risk is that yielding to public pressure, Moscow will become growingly imperialistic, using "diplomacy of force" to protect compatriots. In the "Baltic case" the means of pressure will be mostly suspension of Russian troop withdrawal from the territory of Baltic states. In other cases, Russia's actions can be ranging from economic sanctions (e.g., against Ukraine or Tatarstan) to military intervention (e.g. in Central Asia or Tuva). The challenge for the West is considerable. In certain cases (the Baltic states, Transdnestria) it can effectively step in, offering its good offices, human rights mechanisms and mediation. If the West fails to do so, Russia will be turning more suspicious of the outside world. In the years to come it can well become a country haunted by "Weimar syndrome", like Germany after World War I.

c. **A conflict as a delayed consequence of Stalinist deportation of nations in 1937-1941**. Such conflicts appear in places where these nations were forced to settle (as in the case of the Meskheti pogroms in Ferghana), or on their return to the land of origin (e.g., the return of the Crimean Tartars to the Crimea). Such conflicts run relatively low security risks, as they will concern minor ethnic groups. However, they largely contribute to general instability on the Southern periphery of the FSU.

d. **An open armed conflict between local political elites within one republic** (Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, etc.). Security challenges involved are extremely high. In the years to come, the West will have do deal with a number of regimes (especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and possibly also in Moldova), preoccupied by internal power struggle, and locked in between dictatorship and internal instability. Russia will probably have to secure its military presence on its Southern rim, which requires a certain military buildup.

e. **A conflict concerning the status of ethnic territory** (this usually involves upgrading the status of the territory first to self-determination and then to actual independence): South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia; Transdnestria and Gagauzia in Moldova; Chechnya and Tatarstan in Russia, etc. As shown by ex-Yugoslavia, such conflicts are most common, and tend to evolve into major military confrontation. The greatest risk is the involvement of "third parties" (e.g. Russia in Transdnestria and Abkhazia), internationalization of the conflict. Another danger is that the drive of ethnic minorities in the CIS area towards autonomy can provoke a "domino effect" of separatism in other regions, most notably in Eastern Europe.

Dealing with this type of ethnic conflicts, the West has more ability for action, in the sense that there are more or less recognized international legal procedures for self-determination of nations and ensuring minority rights.

f. **A conflict concerning disputed territories, that each of the conflicting parties considers a part of its historical homeland** (the dispute between Inghushis and Ossetians over Prigorodny District of Vladikavkaz, etc.). The problem is, internal frontiers in the USSR were rather arbitrary, and now they do not correspond to actual settlement of ethnic groups. Some calculations hold that there are about 70 potentially disputed territories in the FSU. There's a possibility of the conflict between Moscow and Kiev over the Crimea, between Moscow and Alma-Ata over the Russian-populated North Kazakhstan, etc. Particularly troublesome for the West is

the fact that there's a number of potentially disputed territories in the Western part of the FSU: Kaliningrad region of Russia (formerly East Prussia), Vilnius region of Lithuania, parts of Western Belarus and Western Ukraine, South Bessarabia, North Bukovina, etc.; possible contenders include East European states: Poland, Hungary and Rumania.

g. **An interstate conflict.** Currently there's a single interstate military conflict under way between Armenia and Azerbaijan. (With Karabakh and mainland Armenians now controlling the entire territory of Nagorny Karabakh, it is virtually over.) In the meanwhile, taking "interstate conflict" in a broader sense, which implies economic and political tension, one has to admit that the entire post-Soviet political environment is penetrated by such conflicts, actual or latent. The most dangerous is the one between Russia and Ukraine, permanently sharpening over such issues as the division of the Black Sea fleet, nuclear status of Ukraine (*See Section 7.7*), supplies of Russian oil and gas to Ukraine, etc.

Interstate conflict can originate in any of the forms, described above, but later it acquires a different quality, and becomes institutional, sort of a long-term strategy of both conflicting parties. Further escalation of interstate conflicts will inevitably lead to strong tension in the FSU, can result in the total breakup of the CIS and other fragile mechanisms of integration, strong militarization of post-Soviet politics, and even in interstate wars, leaving thousands of casualties and millions of refugees. Given the scope of warfare, territories and masses of people involved, any Western engagement, including military intervention will most probably prove ineffective. The West would rather have to isolate the conflict area.

5.3. Paradox as it may sound, ethnic conflicts are in a certain sense *a necessary political instrument in post-Soviet environment.* With centralized power structure broken and the old rules of political game no longer valid, ethnic conflict becomes a new temporary rule of politics, the only means to establish subjects of political power and to set a new balance of forces on the post-Soviet scene. The post-Soviet political environment will continue to produce conflicts as a transitory (and highly dangerous) form of post-Soviet political life.

5.4. This leads to the conclusion that while attempting to prevent ethnic conflicts in the FSU and to eradicate their inner reasons by diplomatic, economic and security means, the West will also have to get used to living with conflicts, that seem to be unavoidable in the nearest future. *The art of conflict prevention shall be complemented by a more sophisticated art of living with conflict,* preventing its escalation from low to high intensity and minimizing its effects.

5.5. Most consequences of ethnic conflicts are likely to affect Western security. Masses of refugees from conflict zones will bring permanent pressure on Europe even under the most strict immigration regime. The risk of nuclear terrorism is feasible, as well as of "conventional" mass terrorism spreading beyond the borders of the FSU and Eastern Europe. A desperate social and psychological atmosphere in the areas of

ethnic conflicts may give birth to fanaticism akin to that of Irish, Palestinian, or Tamil militants.

The major threat is that separate low-intensity conflicts, currently under way, can be fusing first into large high-intensity conflict areas (in the South of Central Asia, in North Caucasus, in Transcaucasian region, etc.) and finally - into one enormous conflict zone. The entire territory of the former USSR can become a hotbed of permanent instability, sort of a geopolitical "black hole", sucking in neighboring regions, including the Far East, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Middle East, the Balkans and Eastern Europe. However, the probability of this scenario is relatively low.

6. Economic and Social Risks

6.1. Deep economic crisis, inherent in outdated and unbalanced economic system of the USSR, has sharply aggravated in 1992. The current economic situation is characterized by five principal failures that shape the dimensions of crisis:

- failure of industrial production;
- failure of the financial system;
- failure of foreign trade;
- failure of the first round of economic reforms;
- failure of the first Western aid package.

6.2. **Failure of industrial production.** Due to the sharp reduction of demand the industrial production in Russia decreased by 25-28 percent in 1992. Consequently, Russian GDP shrank to 65 percent of its 1989 level. Most affected by this trend were promising and technologically advanced sectors, that could be Russia's "bridges" to world economy. The vital oil sector was no exempt.[23]

This trend will have serious long-term social, political and security implications. Firstly, the Soviet Union had a heavily industrialized economy, with tens of millions of people vitally dependent on the situation in industrial sector. Therefore, social risks at stake are high. There have already been signs of social unrest in declining miners' areas in Russia and Ukraine. Another major risk is mass unemployment, that has not yet been translated into reality: Russia is rather an economy of underemployment, with a number of major industrial enterprises working part-time.

Secondly, decline in industrial production also promotes regional separatism. Facing the crisis, large enterprises reorient production lines to local needs, becoming regional vital centers. The spread of "natural economy" in the localities and the

[23] Source: *Izvestiya*, March 5, 1993

rupture of economic ties contribute to political instability and accelerate disintegration in Russia and other CIS states.

Thirdly, economic austerity brings greater dependence on oil. Main oil-producing regions (Chechnya, Tatarstan, Tyumen) showed greater proclivity to separatism. In interstate relations on former Soviet territory, too, oil has been a major conflict-bearing factor. Oil deficit compels certain states to look for new partners outside the CIS: for instance, Ukraine has been seeking contacts with Iran.

Finally, the current decline in industrial production leads to dangerous structural changes in Russia's economic and social profile. "Getting rid" of processing industries, as originally proposed by reformers, the country will sink to a principally different economic level, where it will face competition with Third World countries. Russia is certain to lose, as its competitors have large resources of cheap labor force and masses of population, used to living in much poorer conditions than those in Russia. Besides unacceptable social costs, a lower profile of Russia in the world economy (especially its retreat in high-tech sectors), turning it into mostly resource-producing area, will run high security risks. Due to its unique strategic situation at the heart of Eurasia, its historic identity, military and nuclear potential and social standards, Russia can become a "Third World economy" only at the cost of posing immense security threat to the Euro-Atlantic system.

6.3. **Failure of the financial system.** Inflation reached 1,300 percent in 1992, and in 1993 monthly average has been 15 to 27 percent. Consumer prices increased 25 times in 1992, whereas income increased merely 7.4 times.[24] "Chicago School-styled" monetary reform has completely failed: during 1992, when the Gaidar government was supposed to be consistent with "tight money", Russia's central bank printed money equal to 40 percent of GDP.[25]

Current mood in Russia, even among the reformers in the Cabinet, give virtually no hope to balance the budget. In the wake of parliamentary elections in December 1993 which showed that the population is not ready to accept the cost of even the slightest attempts at financial stabilization, it is quite clear that in 1994 the government is going to abandon its financial goals and spend more on subsidies to unefficient industries and agriculture.

Collapse of the financial system runs serious political and social risks. As inflation raged, the overwhelming majority of people in Russia saw a drastic decline in their living standards, and no social program can compensate for this. Social programs themselves suffered major setbacks, including health care, housing and pensions. Used to living with modest but firm social guarantees, people now see no support from the state and become largely disillusioned.

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[24] Source: *Financial Izvestiya*, February 13, 1993

[25] Source: *Financial Izvestiya*, March 12, 1993

Another result of collapse of the rouble is the shrinking of the rouble zone, and the introduction of national currencies by most of the CIS countries. The political effect is further disintegration and growing inter-state tensions within the CIS.

Any Russian government with a weak rouble will be facing the same dilemma: either it has to further curb down social programs and living standards of the population in order to balance the budget and draw financial resources for investment and restructuring - or it has to bark on inflationary stimulation of economy (which seems to be much more likely). Both choices mean Latin American type of transition (Chilean or Argentinean ways), which is either accompanied by authoritarianism, or by high political and social instability, caused by hyperinflation.

6.4. **Failure of foreign trade**. The collapse of the rouble also brought about the situation, when Russia can no longer afford to import what it needs. 1992 imports fell down to 40 percent of those in 1990.[26] Since domestic industry and agriculture are growingly incapable of producing enough basic goods, living standards suffer.

The collapse of Russian imports from Eastern Europe poses another challenge for the West. With the breakup of trade ties with the former Soviet Union, some sectors in the Eastern European economies (e.g., Polish and Hungarian agriculture) started overproducing. This puts additional economic and social pressure on Eastern Europe, as well as on the EU market.

Russia's performance in exports is no better. Its net exports declined nearly 50 percent in 1992.[27] The major reason was the severing of economic ties between Russia and other CIS states. Exports to the West also did not see any improvement, running into protectionist barriers.

Apart from evident economic and social costs, further decline in Russia's foreign trade will create a more conservative political environment in Russia, its foreign and security policy will become more aggressive and/or isolationist. In this contingency Russia might reverse its current foreign policy orientation and seek to strike a strategic deal with alternative partners, like China or India. At the same time, striving for new markets, it can start pursuing an expansionist policy within the CIS, regarding it as a "natural" sphere of its economic interests. In general, the failure to involve it in Western trade circuit can contribute to the emergence of a hostile and imperialistic Russia, or a Russian alliance with traditional rivals of the West.

6.5. **Failure of the first round of economic reforms**. The economic policies of the Gaidar government in 1992 and of the successive Chernomyrdin cabinet in 1993 were mostly reactive, responding to the crisis. Actually none of the goals put forward

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[26] *Economist*, May 1, 1993

[27] Ibid.

by reformers have been achieved. Liberalization of prices did not lead to price stabilization. Industrial production collapsed. The only element of reform giving some hope is the privatization program.

The "postponement" of reform in Russia, which could well be the option after the December 12 elections, is a major security risk. Russia and other CIS states, highly dependent on the pace of the Russian reform, can simply stick in the midway between socialism and the market. In this case, they get worst of both worlds: factory managers don't care much about efficiency, as in the preserved system of state regulation government and banking will bail them out; in the meanwhile the population suffers from inflation, unemployment and social insecurity, inherent in the crippled market. This situation will result in social and political instability, and destroy the fragile system of cooperation of Russia and the West.

6.6. **Failure of the first Western aid package**. As a matter of fact, of the headline-seizing $ 24 billion, that the West had promised to Russia in 1992, less than $ 2 billion of actual assistance has been disbursed. The glamorized 1992 Western assistance package was at best futile; but one can also argue that it has had a negative impact, as it has resulted in disillusionment among Russian elites. In the meanwhile, this issue has been picked up by the hard-line nationalist opposition in Russia, which stresses the futility of any cooperation with the West.

The breath-taking $ 43 billion second Western aid package, agreed upon in Tokyo in April 1993, seems to have been of exactly the same nature: many promises, but no new cash, no new investment, no money for restructuring and for covering the social costs of reform. The underlying problem is that *both aid packages have to do more with politics than with actual economic problems*. Aid to Russia has become a prime-time issue in internal political debate both in Russia and in the West. Unless economics prevails over politics aid to Russia will be going down the drain, while public suspicion will be growing in Russia.

Another problem is that the Western aid delivered through international lending institutions is heavily conditioned, and these conditions sets unrealistic targets - like bringing inflation down to 5 per cent a month. Meeting these criteria would mean choking off credits to already shaky Russian enterprises, devastating the industrial heartland and causing mass unemployment. Supposed to be a lubricant, Western aid to some extent became an irritant, as shown by the results of December 12 elections. This has already prompted harsh criticism of the current strategy of Western aid (particulary the "insensitivity" of the IMF and World Bank to Russia's problems)[28] in late Decemer 1993 from a number of U.S. officials.

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[28] *Financial Times*, December 17, 1993

6.7. Economic crisis in the post-Soviet area brings about grave **social risks**. Societies in all post-Soviet nations find themselves in a dangerous vacuum, when previous model of social roles is gone, and the new one hasn't yet taken shape.

Economic chaos results in the dramatic growth of social inequality. The public reaction to it is becoming growingly negative. Processes of marginalization are gaining momentum, surfacing in various forms of anti-social behavior: the dramatic growth of criminality, suicides, prostitution, unprecedented corruption on all levels. Finally, social atomization, with extreme individualism, hostility and fear, and social apathy are prevailing among the majority of the Russian population, obscuring the prospects for the emergence of the civil society. Such a social environment is favorable for the development of populist, radical, chauvinist and fascist trends.

7. Military and strategic risks

7.1. Though the breakup of the Soviet army, along with radical reduction of nuclear and conventional arms, was supposed to remove the Soviet military threat and enhance European security, this never came true. The uncontrolled split of the Soviet military structure can create a security environment as dangerous as in the days of the Cold War. The post-Soviet military threat is no less substantial than the Soviet military threat, as the "debris" of the crumbled military structure include:

- a number of national armies (including the Russian one), decaying and far less controlled than the Soviet army;
- groups of forces, armed formations, bases of the Red Army located outside the Russian territory in a different and often hostile environment;
- disillusioned officers' corps, divided along national and political lines, with a dramatically declined social status;
- a growing number of paramilitary units and groups of mercenaries;
- the nuclear potential, the future of which is far from certain and the control of which has become an issue of heated intra-CIS debate, with Ukraine apparently willing to remain a nuclear power;
- stocks of conventional arms, that now are spreading all over the ex-Soviet territory and sold to the Third World;
- the decaying military-industrial complex, employing millions of people and representing one of the major political forces on post-Soviet scene;
- the developed system of arms trade, trying to accomodate itself in the new security and economic environment, and much less controlled than in the Soviet days.

7.2. The formal establishment of **national armies** in all ex-USSR states marked the beginning of a long transitory period, in which armies are seeking to define their

identity and place in domestic affairs.[29] Most likely, this period will be marked by conflicts, ranging from disputes over the division of Soviet army property to open military confrontation.

All new-born armies are currently overridden by the same problems, of which the lack of security identity and military and strategic doctrines is the most troubling one. The CIS, too, failed to define its security identity, as the May 1992 Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security by no means forms a military alliance.

Lack of security identities of post-Soviet states, including the nuclear ones, and the absence of a comprehensive structure that could somehow reconcile their national security interests leave a dangerous vacuum in which the West can not be sure of future security arrangements in the former Soviet Union.

7.3. **Obscure prospects of military reform in Russia and the bitter state of the Russian army** add to strategic uncertainty. Prospects for military reform are overshadowed by economic and social crisis and the continuing power struggle in the Russian political establishment. In reforming the army any Russian leadership will have to get to grips with the huge deficit of financial and material resources.[30] Yet another is the personnel problem. At present the army suffers from low morale, depletion of the officer corps, internal ethnic tensions, and growing shortage and declining quality of conscripts.[31] Added to this is the decaying social profile of the army, with a large part of the armed forces (notably the officers' corps) becoming growingly marginalized.

From the point of view of European security, such armed forces pose a lesser threat in terms of major organized warfare. However, a major war involving large groups of forces is not likely to be fought in Europe in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, as ethnic tensions and low-intensity conflicts are mounting, such army, lacking command, control, communications and discipline can be regarded as a threat. The risks of unwarranted participation of separate units in local conflicts (in Moldova, the Baltic states, Kaliningrad area or even in the Balkans), proliferation of arms, or nuclear blackmail are considerable. Furthermore, the decaying army poses a social and political threat.

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[29] The new military doctrine of Russia, approved by the president and made public in November 1993, still leaves out many question marks and raises serious concerns, especially in the part defining external security challenges to Russia ("enlargement of military blocs and alliances at the cost of security intersts of Russia" (p.2), etc.). See: *Osnovnye polozheniya voennoi doktriny Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (Guidelines of the military doctrine of the Russian Federation), *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Special Issue, November 19, 1993

[30] See: Mostvarona. The Revision of Russian Military Policy and the Military Industrial Complex. *International Spectator*, N 2, 1993, p.108

[31] See: *Voyennaya mysl*, Special edition, July 1992, p.47

7.4. **The political stand of the Army** still remains a major question mark. Participation of the elite divisions in suppression of the attempted coup in Moscow in October 1993 and substantial losses among the personnel seem to have further embitterd the army and alienated it from current leaders. Also conspicious was the hesitation of the top-ranking generals to get involved on Mr Yeltsin's side. Furthermore, political preferences of the leadership of MOD are not those of the entire army. There's a growing gap between generals in Moscow and local commanders; among the officers there's also wide-spread mistrust of MOD and Gen.Grachev, who are regarded incompetent and corrupt.

On the contrary, political differentiation begins to prevail in the army, and political organizations and movements emerge, most of which are of nationalist and pro-Soviet orientation. On the grass-root level, the armed forces are getting politically charged. Officers' assemblies emerge that tend to get out of commanders' control.[32]

If dragged into politics, the Russian army will pose considerable security challenges. One can envisage the following threats:

- following the next showdown of political forces in Moscow, or an institutional coup, the army takes power to replace discredited politicians and to prevent the breakup of Russia;
- the army is used either by the president or by the opposition as an instrument to impose authoritarian rule in Russia;
- the army splits between the "presidential party" and the opposition, which can provoke the civil war;
- the army units, overwhelmed by political unrest and social problems are "acting locally", completely breaking with Moscow, taking full possession of arms at their disposal and forming alliances with local authorities in separatist regions. This will result in growing disintegration of Russia, and a system of war lords can emerge on its territory.

7.5. Another fragment left after the split of the Soviet military structure and posing a security threat are **groups of forces, armed formations, bases of the Red Army located outside the Russian territory**. The first problem concerned is the unclear future of the troops scheduled to be withdrawn into homeland. There are no facilities or housing for them, no special programs for accommodating them in Russia.

Another risk implies the status of the Russian troops in the areas of ethnic conflicts (Central Asia, Transcaucasian region, Moldova). In the second half of 1993, with imperial trend in Russian politics in the "near abroad" gaining momentum, these troops started to act in a more assertive manner than before. Currently Russian troops are a major force upholding pro-Moscow regimes in Georgia and Tajikistan. In Georgia, this contributed to relative stabilization, but in Tajikistan, when high mountain passes open in Spring 1994, the armed conflict will recommence with new

[32] See: Nina Bachkatov. Une armée deboussolée et divisée, *Le Monde diplomatique*, Avril 1993, p.16

strength (especially if it spreads to the territory of Gorny Badakhshan), reviving the specter of the Afghan War of the 1980's.

As far as Baltic states are concerned, Russia interlinks troop withdrawal with the civil rights situation of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltics. This argument holds even more true after nationalists' landslide in the December 1993 elections in Russia. So far, this situation has raised security concerns not only of Baltic states, but also of Germany, Poland, Sweden and Finland. Not that there's a fear of direct military threat from Russia, but rather an increased feeling of insecurity in the region.

7.6. Another security threat is posed by **multiple illegal para-military groups** that infest the territory of CIS. Such illegal armed groupings will grow in number, motivated by mounting political, economic and ethnic problems, and by the easy access to weapons stocks. This can result in the emergence of the system of "war lords" in certain areas of the former USSR.

7.7. The future of **the Soviet nuclear potential** is far from certain. The breakup of the USSR left nuclear weapons in four republics: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. All but Ukraine have ratified the July 1991 START-1 Treaty. Belarus, which has also pledged to adhere to 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, seems to be committed to becoming nuclear-free. Kazakhstan has ratified START-1, and signed the NPT in December 1993.

The situation is much more complicated in Ukraine. The major problem lies in the rift between the moderate line of president Leonid Kravchuk, who has already pledged to the US to ratify both START-1 and NPT, and the vocal hard-line nationalist opposition, with a stronghold in the parliament, which insists that Ukraine remains a nuclear state, in order to deter "Russian expansionism" and serve an important counterbalance for all of Eastern Europe against Russia. Mr Zhirinovsky's impressive performance in the recent Russian elections further strengthened pro-nuclear sentiment in Kiev. Unless Ukraine ratifies both treaties (and also the 1992 Lisbon protocol, covering the remaining 46 ICBMs in Ukraine), there's no way Moscow and Washington will ratify a follow-up January 1993 START-2 treaty. As a matter of fact, given the tough Ukrainian stand on the nuclear issue, the whole network of international disarmament accords, designed for the last 25 years, could unravel.[33]

With uncertainty about Ukraine's nuclear status, Russia's security policy is at stake, too. The failure of Ukraine to ratify the arms control agreements will provoke certain shifts in the Russian security doctrine, not only on the "Ukrainian front", but on the European direction in general. The military posture can be reorganized, with a heavier concentration of troops in the Western part of Russia.

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[33] Chrystia Freeland. A New World Impasse, *Financial Times*, May 3, 1993

Furthermore, with the breakup of centralized control over nuclear weapons, multiple technical problems appear. One of them is the lack of proper maintenance of missiles in new nuclear states, as most of qualified personnel and know-how are concentrated in Russia.

Finally, there's a number of civilian plants producing enriched uranium and other nuclear fuels in Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The lack of basic nuclear and export regulation in the post-Soviet area has encouraged shopping runs by aspiring nuclear states (mostly by Iran), and smuggling schemes by networks of criminals with access to nuclear materials.[34]

7.8. Much in the same way, the loss of centralized control over **the Soviet potential of conventional arms** has turned into a major security problem. The situation has been sharply aggravated by the dubious decision of the Russian leadership on sharing out the military assets of the former Soviet Union. This results in uncontrolled proliferation in unstable regions and states, both on the CIS territory and beyond.

7.9. Economic and political changes under way rendered autonomous another key element of the Soviet military structure: **the military-industrial complex.** It has been deeply affected by recent developments, especially by the breakup of the USSR, and has turned into independent economic, social and political force, that can influence the course of transformations in Russia and pose considerable security threats for the West.

The military-industrial complex has preserved its high economic and political leverage, forming the most effective lobby in the post-Soviet political system (the "Civic Union"). The major risk concerned is that this enormous economic and political force finds it difficult to adapt to the new situation.

In the economic sphere, the military-industrial complex has considerably suffered from reconversion, that has been imposed on it since late 1980s. The attempts at reconversion were taken in a chaotic and voluntarily manner, sometimes ruining advanced production lines, threatening the existence of entire industrial areas and raising discontent among the military, industrial bosses and workers. Furthermore, the military-industrial complex has been the most vulnerable to the rupture of economic ties within the former Soviet Union, as its production has been much more diversified and distributed among the regions of the country than that in the civilian industries. There's a drastic reduction in military orders, caused by budget constraints and economic austerity. Finally, there's a clear lack of financial resources and economic incentives for reconversion (reduction of demand for durable

[34] *International Herald Tribune*, May 17, 1993

goods), that questions the possibility of integrating the military sector into the nascent market economy.[35]

Another risk is the irretrievable loss of much of the former Soviet Union's technological and scientific potential, that was concentrated in the military-industrial sector. Companies cancel a large part of their R&D programs. If this devastating process continues (along with the massive "brain drain" of Russian scientists and engineers to other countries, including military regimes in Asia), Russia will degenerate into a Third World economy, with unpredictable consequences in social, political, and security spheres.

The political future of the military-industrial complex is far from certain. The most likely scenario is that while not directly coming to power, it will stay a major force behind Russian politics. It will probably preserve enough leverage to influence decision-making in Moscow and in the provinces, to "correct", and sometimes to formulate the political, economic and military course of the government. It will strive to slower the pace of economic reforms, and to leave as much as possible of the state planning. In foreign policy, it can give full hand to its traditional distrust of the West, and favor the restoration of a "strong" Russia (or even a part of the Soviet Union), contributing to the emergence of imperial and militarist trends within the Russian leadership.

7.10. The breakup of centralized military structure and planning resulted also in the **"liberalization" of arms trade on the former Soviet territory**. A new model of arms trade emerges, that is much less "discriminating" in terms of clients and means of trade.

On the state level, the support and expansion of weapons exports have been declared top priorities.[36] Encouraging arms trade, the Russian authorities claim to enhance regulations on the export of arms, technology, licenses and sensitive materials. In the atmosphere of crisis and corruption, though, any control is largely nominal.[37] State trade monopoly erodes, and agencies specializing in the arms trade proliferate all over the territory of the former USSR. Control over final destinations of arms exports becomes dangerously loose.

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[35] Mostvarona, Op. cit., pp.114-120

[36] Cf. President Yeltsin's interview in: *Izvestiya*, February 22, 1992

[37] Mostvarona, Op.cit., P.125; *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, N 11, 1992

II. ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS

1. The Russian Scenarios

1.1. **Continuation of present trends.** In this contingency the political stalemate in high echelons of power will endure, parties will maintain their low profile, and there will not be a political force or a positive ideology that could consolidate the society and win the upper hand in the power struggle. Even though president Yeltsin has got his constitution adopted, "trench warfare" with the opposition will continue. The Russian leadership itself will hardly win massive popular support, or even possess of a stable social base; a strategic perspective and prominent new leaders are not likely to appear soon; and politics of the Kremlin will be a far cry from democratic: ambiguous, hesitant, and formulated behing the scene.

Regional separatism will be gaining momentum. This will probably lead not to full political and economic separation of autonomous republics and provinces, but rather to the situation of "dual power", when nominal rights will be vested in Moscow and real authority will be concentrated in the provinces.

Economic reform will proceed in uneven manner, strongly complicated by cabinet struggle, regional separatism and claims from decaying industries. There will be some gains in the process of privatization, but monetary mechanisms will hardly start working. Russia will be balancing on the brink of hyperinflation. Social differentiation will grow, accompanied by growing marginalization and social tensions. However, mass unemployment can probably be avoided or compensated by greater social dynamism.

The foreign policy of Russia will acquire a lower profile, compared to late 1980s - early 1990s. Cooperation with the West will be restricted by domestic problems. As a matter of fact, the West can be gradually "getting bored" of Russia's unsurmountable problems and losing interest to Russia. Only most urgent issues will stay on the agenda: control of the army, nuclear facilities, etc. In conflicts in the FSU, some of them concerning the status of the Russian-speaking population, Russia will be using its political leverage and economic sanctions, occasionally resorting to military force (while trying to win moral support of the West and endorsement of international institutions, like the UN and the CSCE, for its actions).

All this means that **current unstable balance will preserve in almost all spheres**: political, administrative, economic, social, military, and that immobility will prevail. Given current extreme tensions and instability in Russia, this statement may come as a surprise. However, over the last three years Russia (as well as some other post-Soviet states) showed unprecedented degree of adaptability to crisis. It carries on in the situation when any other state would have collapsed. As it happened many times before in the Russian history (the Tartar yoke, interregnum of early 17th

century, reforms of Peter the Great, the Civil War of 1918-1922, World War II), **economic and social shock is being absorbed by the populace without any visible political change.** A rather shapeless social structure (according to some estimations, 30 to 40 per cent of Russia's population can be counted as marginal) and the age-old tradition of tolerance make Russia highly adaptable to crisis.

This leads to an ambiguous forecast: **Russia will not collapse, but there also won't be any positive solution in the foreseeable future.** Slow decay and painful transformations will go hand in hand. This process can be called a **crisis development of the state** (which, more or less, was taking place in many Latin American countries, with their unstable regimes, populist tendencies, and hyperinflation), and it may take at least a decade, or even two, until Russia emerges as a democratic country with market economy and a reliable security partner.

In security terms, this scenario is not the worst one, but it does not promise stability and predictability. In the years to come Russia will stay a suspended, yet constant security threat on the edge of Europe: a nuclear power and still a major military force with unclear intentions, complicated domestic policies, with multiple interest groups influencing foreign and security policy, producing scores of refugees and migrants, raising justified security concerns of the CIS states and Eastern Europe, and finally, unable to cooperate with the West on security issues.

Assessment of probability on the 10-point scale: 8 points.

1.2. **Authoritarian/oligarchic regime, "corporative capitalism".** The seeds of this scenario are contained in the present situation, with the new constitution, carefully tailored for Mr Yeltsin, already in place. The president is both head of state and chief executive, with the power to nominate all senior officials and judges. The rights of the new legislature are largely suspended. Given the traditions of Russian history, fragility of democratic mechanisms, and clear authoritarian inclinations of Boris Yeltsin, this might mark the beginning of a fundamental breach of the fragile balance of powers, total decay of the legislative branch, and, finally, the gradual move towards a harsh authoritarian (or even totalitarian) regime. If such a regime is established, it could even sacrifice reforms in order to stay in power and to protect what it has introduced.

However, a one-man, "tzar Boris" authoritarian scenario is hardly feasible, as here the interests of the ruling political elite come into play. Strong presidential authority will strengthen the executive, and in particular the state bureaucracy, of which the military is the key part. In the absense of strong political parties, effective representative institutions and a powerful private sector, the bureaucracy will become the leading political force.[38]

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[38] Alexei Pushkov. Trouble to Come if Yeltsin Can't Build Consensus. *International Herald Tribune*, December 3, 1993

Hence the inevitable transformation of authoritarianism into oligarchy. It will be a regime representing state bureaucracy, the military, state military industry, resource industry, having strong connections with trade and finance capital as well as underground criminal business, and with a developed system of corruption and state bribes. Such oligarchy, lasting 15 to 20 years, would mean a slow and crippled variant of capitalist transformation, hampered by obsolete post-totalitarian political institutions and underdeveloped infrastructure. Once again, this revives memories of a "Latin American way".[39]

Surprising enough, this scenario suits well both the current regime in Moscow and a part of the opposition, which could be effectively integrated into the ruling elite. Ideologists of the opposition (like Sergei Kurginyan) have been long speaking of the "corporative state", the "stock socialism" ruled by the big capital.

Authoritarian/oligarchic trends will be inevitably projected into foreign policy and security sphere. This will hardly result in open aggressiveness of Russia, but rather in a state of mind, characterized by isolationism, and a more suspicious attitude to the outside world. Institutional links with the West will probably be restricted. The security profile of authoritarian Russia will be not like that of Pinochet's Chile or Franco's Spain, that were medium-sized states on the edge of South American and European landmass, but rather like that of China: a nuclear power at the heart of Eurasia, with regional and global ambitions.

The probability of this scenario is slightly lower than that of the first one ("continuation of present trends"), exactly for the reasons described in the first scenario. Whatever political regime takes shape in Moscow, it will face the same problem: disintegration, regional separatism, low manageability of the country.

Assessment of probability on the 10-point scale: 6-7 points

1.3. **The "red and brown" alternative and/or a military coup.** This scenario implies the violent (or probably institutional) ascent to power of the "united opposition" (extreme right and extreme left), in conditions of rising popular discontent with governmental policies. It also implies strong support, or even the dominant role of the armed forces. The driving force of the coup could become the lumpen part of the working class, a part of peasantry, and the old nomenklatura, supported by many representatives of the military-industrial complex, and of the security structures. Recent parliamentary elections in Russia clearly indicated that such possibility exists, and its social base is widening.

This scenario implies the abandonment of economic reforms and introduction of the state-dominated economic and administrative system, curbs on democracy, oppression of the internal opposition, and a general drift towards totalitarianism.

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[39] Leonid Batkin, in: *Uroki oktyabrya* (The Lessons of October), *Literaturnaya gazeta*, N 41, October 13, 1993

"National-patriots" view global developments as a continuation of confrontation of Russia with a hostile international environment. They favor the retention of a strong nuclear potential (this implies the revision of START-1 and START-2), the rupture of links with the West (which, according to them, are used to destroy the Russian statehood, enslave Russia, and turn it into a Western colony, producing raw materials), and military opposition to "Western imperialism". Nationalists' foreign policy agenda also envisions raprochement with China on an ideological basis, though it is highly doubtfil that Peking itself could welcome such a development.

In the December 1993 elections, these forces enjoyed varied support, from 10-15 per cent in Moscow and St.Petersburg, to 30-40 percent in Siberia and the Russian Far East, to even 50-60 percent in the conservative rural "non-black-earth" belt around Moscow.[40] However, three things must be taken into consideration. First, this was mostly a protest vote, which does no indicate sound popular support to the nationalists' program (rather slogans, as there's hardly any program at all). The number of real faithfuls is probably not more than 15 per cent of the populace. Second, the opposition is split, as well as the army, that will hardly be capable of coordinated action on the national level. Mr Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democrats are not likely to extensively cooperate with Communists and the like. Third, the opposition will still be lacking political leverage on the national level: it does not have a clear-cut majority in the legislature, and will hardly have a strong say in the government (unless its representatives abandon their radicalism). The political future of Russia in the next few months will be that of a centrist kind, and both left and right radicals will stay somewhat marginal.

In the meanwhile, staying on the margins of political life can be exactly the goal of the opposition: it will not take responsibility for the hard economic choices and inavoidable further decline of living standards, while having the opportunity to criticise the government in the parliament, and to consolidate its social base. This is especially true of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who will stay a political, but not a governmental figure: a critic from the sidelines. Rather than be tarred with responsibility for the hard times ahead, he will use his power base in the new Duma to launch a bid for the presidential election, which must be held by June 12, 1996.

This means that **the "red and brown" threat could become a reality not in the coming months, but later**, probably by 1995-1996, provided the government proves incapable to cope with the economic and social crisis. Instead of "saving" Russia, the coming to power of the opposition will result in a new catastrophic international isolation of the country, sharpening of internal conflicts, and probably in civil wars and military conflicts with neighboring states. However, this regime will have to concentrate on suppressing the internal opposition, rather than on external expansion and most probably will have a short life-term.

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[40] Source: *Financial Times*, December 15, 1993

From the security point of view, this is a bitter scenario, returning the Euro-Atlantic system to the times of the Cold War. This time the front line of military-political confrontation will be drawn not in Central Europe, but on the Western frontiers of Russia, which will require a much more hostile military posture in Russia (including the return of troops, that were withdrawn beyond the Urals in early 1980s, to the European part of Russia), and deployment of Western forces in East Europe, along with firm security guarantees to the states of the region.

Assessment of probability on the 10-point scale: 3 points

1.4. **Economic collapse, social chaos, complete disintegration of Russia**. The short-time probability of this scenario is extremely low; but this does not mean that it can not emerge in the longer run. As a matter of fact, most of the forenamed scenarios can develop into this one. If events in Russia take such a chaotic turn, they will inevitably provoke similar developments in other ex-USSR states, including Ukraine. The entire FSU could turn into a geopolitical "black hole", and instability will be spreading in all neighboring regions, including Europe.

Security risks for the West will be as high, as in the previous scenario, if not higher. The nationalist regime can be deterred by military means, but it is much more difficult to prevent the spread of instability. A massive military and institutional rearrangement of the Euro-Atlantic system, possibly including the erection of a new "Iron Curtain" between Europe and the FSU, area will be the most realistic option. Strategies of containment and roll-back will be taken from the archives, though this time it will be containment and roll-back of instability.

Assessment of probability on the 10-point scale: 2 points

1.5. **Breakup of Russia into separate regions**. This scenario is totally different from the other ones, as it implies the radical change of rules in the post-Soviet political game. "Regionalization" could contribute to the development of a totally new political system in Russia. The regions can become that long-awaited "third force" that will be able to fill the power vacuum and slow the conflict-bearing trends. Given that self-determination of regions will proceed in a non-conflicting manner, in a number of years a new political structure can take shape in Russia, based on the principle of division of three major state functions: providing for security, providing for social stability (including the interests of ethnic, religious, regional, political, etc. groups), and providing for economic development. This will be sort of a single three-tier structure:

- **the security level** (a strong monocentric vertical structure, unitarian integration);
- **the economic level** (a horizontal network structure with a limited number of administrative centers, federative integration);
- **the level of social, political, regional, administrative, ethnic and cultural relations** (a polycentric structure, confederative integration).

There are powerful attractions in such a model as it provides sort of a reliable security framework (acceptable for the West, too). However, it might take a number of years before such structure appears, which will be a turbulent and risky period of adjusting conflicting interests of provinces and the center. Therefore, immediate security risks in the "regional scenario" are rather high.

Assessment of probability on the 10-point scale: 3 points

2. The Commonwealth Scenarios

2.1. **Dissolution of the CIS under conditions of relative stability.** This scenario may become a reality in case a substantial number of countries (Ukraine, Moldova, Turkmenistan), due to changes of the regimes, or to general disappointment in the effectiveness of the CIS, will start to gradually reduce their level of participation in the Commonwealth, and to re-orient their foreign policies on relations with other countries. But most probably, dissolution the CIS could not take place unless Russia causes it.

Security implications of this scenario are relatively low. So far, the CIS has failed to provide a security framework for post-Soviet states, and dissolution of this loose structure wouldn't change much in security terms. The only risk in this contingency is "multipolarization" of post-Soviet foreign and security policies. As their membership in the CSCE is largely nominal, a number of countries, like the Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan, will be seeking their security identities outside of Euro-Atlantic security framework, and the West will be losing leverage in these regions. In this case, the only possible link with these unstable countries could be Turkey. However, Turkey itself can be tempted by such an opportunity: the nationalist opposition is already promoting pan-Turkic ideology. Such a development could endanger the unity of NATO, and weaken the Euro-Atlantic security system on the Southern rim.

Assessment of probability on the 10-point scale: 3 points

2.2. Breakup or radical transformation of the CIS caused by Russian imperialism. These events could be prompted either by imperial ambitions of the authoritarian regime in Moscow (*See Russian Scenario 1.2*), or, what is more likely, by the establishment of openly imperialistic hard-line regime in Russia (*See Russian Scenario 1.3*).

The new regime could attempt to restore the Soviet Union, first of all, by some sort of annexation of territories, the population of which expressed their wish to join Russia (South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transdnestria, North Kazakhstan, etc.). The driving force of this scenario can be not only imperial policy, but even imperial ambitions and statements of the Russian leadership. Possible consequences of such a policy,

implying changes of the present borders within the CIS, are quite evident: complete disintegration of the Commonwealth, dramatic deterioration of relations of Russia with neighboring countries, militarization and the establishment of authoritarian regimes in most of post-Soviet countries. Restoration of the Soviet Union is hardly possible (especially in the West of the FSU: in the Baltic states, Moldova), but "Greater Russia" could prove to be a viable option, especially since imperial trends started to gain momentum in Russia in late 1993.

Assessment of probability on the 10-point scale: 4 points

2.3. **Economic collapse, civil wars and chaos on the territory of the FSU.** As far as the entire post-Soviet area, including the Baltics, is vitally dependent on the course of events in Russia, this scenario is mostly contingent on the Russian scenario 1.4 (*Economic collapse and chaos in Russia*).

In the result of such developments the entire post-Soviet area will turn into a geopolitical "black hole", a hotbed of instability, "sucking in" neighboring regions, including Europe. In this contingency security risks for the West will be the highest, demanding a massive military and institutional rearrangement of the Euro-Atlantic system, and the development of mechanisms to contain instability.

Assessment of probability on the 10-point scale: 2 points

2.4. **"Freezing" the CIS on a low level, and emergence of alternative mechanisms of integration, with Russia playing the dominant role.** This an extrapolation of the Russian Scenario 1.1 (*Continuation of current trends*). As a matter of fact, that's exactly what is taking place now, when the Commonwealth exists in a "suspended" form. In the meanwhile, much of real political cooperation takes place on a bilateral basis. In the security sphere, alongside with unbinding and non-working Collective Security Agreement of May 1992, a series of bilateral security/military and friendship/cooperation agreements have been concluded (the recent one between Russia and hitherto irredentist Georgia). Finally, a great deal of economic and political links in the post-Soviet area are restored on the "grass-root" local level (treaties between separate regions, districts and enterprises).

The most likely tendency will be the preservation of the "low-profile" CIS as a symbol and possibly an instrument for slowing disintegration, while alternative bilateral and "grass-root" mechanisms of cooperation (or even re-integration) will be emerging. Once again, this scenario will be strongly stimulated by neo-imperialist trends in Russia, which of late have been taken to the level of official policy. Using stick and carrot - low prices on oil, or simply writing off debts (Ukraine), direct subsidies (Kyrgyzstan), indirect support to Russian minorities (Moldova, Kazakhstan), military support of shaky regimes (Georgia), direct intervention to rebuff the "Islamic threat" (Tajikistan), etc. - Russia will be pursuing its "Monroe doctrine" and gradually moving to restore what it claims to be its natural sphere of interests.

Assessment of probability on the 10-point scale: 8 points

3. Forecast

Actual developments in the former Soviet Union will be much more complicated, than described in the scenarios above. However, one can try to envisage the most likely combination of scenarios for the next few years.

For Russia, this will be **a combination of Scenario 1.1 (continuation of present trends) and Scenario 1.2 (authoritarian/olygarchic regime, corporative capitalism).** Although a strong presidency has been established, with authoritarian powers granted to Mr Yeltsin; but this regime will be challenged by growing inefficiency of power mechanisms and by independence of Russia's provinces. There will be certain authoritarian trends, but no instruments to implement them, and Russia will continue along the same lines of slow decay, painful transformations, and what was earlier called "the crisis development" of the Latin American kind. Most likely, the situation of "dual power" will be preserved, when authoritarian/olygarchic regime in Moscow will compromise with independent elites in the provinces, and both will not be challenging each other's authority. Meanwhile, a crippled corporative market will be emerging, accompanied by high inflation and latent social unrest. It will take at least two decades to complete these transformations.

As for the CIS, **Scenario 2.4. ("Freezing" of the the CIS on a low level, and emergence of alternative mechanisms of integration, with Russia playing the dominant role)** is the most likely one. Exactly as in Russia, painful transformations will continue, with no real institutional progress, and no political force to break the inter-state stalemate. Occasional economic, political and low-intensity military crises (including ethnic conflicts) will be taking place, setting a new balance of forces on the post-Soviet scene. Meanwhile, bilateral and local level cooperation will continue, weaving a delicate network of new economic and political links. The post-Soviet area will be emerging as a complex and highly dynamic system of old animosities, new fragile links, and temporary bargains, in which Russia is bound to play a dominant role and to ensure its presence by economic, diplomatic and military means.

In 10 to 15 years a more stable configuration strongly influenced by Russia (though not necessarily a Soviet Union, or a Russian Empire) will emerge on the territory of the CIS, with a sort of a strategic balance. Until then, security environment in the former Soviet Union, in Europe, and in the wider Euro-Atlantic milieu will be overshadowed by uncertainty und unpredictability, which seems to be the main security challenge for the West.

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THE INTERACTION OF THE EU AND NATO: ADAPTING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION TO THE NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE

SECURITY CHALLENGES: THE CASE OF HUNGARY

by

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The situation in the region to the east of NATO is often referred to as a security nightmare. This reference is not restricted only to the Balkans or the former Soviet Union, it is also applied to the Visegrad countries. The question arises to which of the Visegrad countries the description of a security nightmare best applies. Considering that a major, if not the major, element of this security nightmare is largely viewed as the potential for ethnic conflict, that the Czech Republic and Poland are confident to be able to sort out their nationality problems and that Slovakia is small enough not to be perceived as a major security problem, the description of a security nightmare seems to best apply to the situation of Hungary.

The following analysis is to examine how far Hungary in its regional setting means security challenges for Western Europe. The assumption has to be made in this respect that security challenges will have to arise first for Hungary so that they can then arise for the "West" as well. This means that in order to assess the security challenges for the "West", the security challenges for Hungary itself have to be assessed. Another problem is what is understood by security challenges. There are two distinct ways of approaching this problem. It can be said, for instance, that security implies more than "warding off peril". Security also has a clear dimension of prosperity as well as of peace and social stability. In this regard, security cannot be equated with capacity against threats.

[1] Although this approach admits that security means a balance between threats and capabilities, it also allows for a wide conception of threats as far as they are related to economic strength, social cohesion, political consensus, social and political stability, pluralism, tolerance and rule of law.[2]

The other way of approaching the problem is more restrictive. According to this approach, threats to the "fabric of society", including burdensome and costly international developments, ecological threats, mass migration, international terrorism threats to the welfare of the society (like for instance the disruption of the supply of raw materials or a shrinking of markets) are too wide a framework for security considerations. This approach of the problem restricts considerations of securtity to issues which ultimately imply the use of military force.[3] Admitting that these narrow and wide approaches to security are intertwined, it seems to better suit the task to stick to the narrower approach. The following analysis is to examine the economic, political and military aspects of security. This means that these aspects will be considered as far as they are related to security taken in a strict sense, that is as far as they are potentially related to the ultimate use of military force. These aspects are certainly overlapping to some extent but for analytical purposes it seems better to look into them separately.

Economic aspects of security

Beginning the analysis with the economic aspects of security is well justified in the sense that for Hungary (for the political elite and for the public at large as well) relancing and revitalizing the economy is a high priority. Economic recovery is a major domestic and foreign political goal. Within the realm of economic recovery, relations with the EC are ranked as of strategic importance. Yet the linkage between economy and security is not as much obvious as it could be expected.

For the political leaders, the linkage is quite clear. As Bela Kadar, the minister of foreign economic relatins explained, there is no security without political stability, no political stability without social security, no social security without appropriate levels of employment, no

appropriate levels of employment without economic growth and finally no economic growth without without markets and resources.[4] In this respect, the responsibility of the EC is also clear. This way the EC can be dragged into the security aspirations of Hungary. The President of Hungary, Arpad Göncz explained for instance that the "West" is confronted with a choice. It can either contribute to strengthening and expanding the market in Eastern Europe or it can stick to short term economic advantages and make steps to simply protect its own markets. The stake for Western Europe is that it can contribute to establishing an East European market of a hundred million people which would offer a sound market for Western products as well but it can also refuse to help the region and contribute this way to its instability.[5]

The implication of these arguments is that without a stable and sound economic partnership between Hungary and the EC Hungary and the wider region of East-Central Europe could end up in a state of instability. Two remarks should be made in this respect. One of them is that as far as the prospect of political (and economic) instability cannot be seriously discounted, Hungary can hardly expect to become integrated into the EC (or the European Union). Membership in the EC does look like a way of preventing instability in Hungary and its region but this is not the way things will work out. The prospect of membership can be taken seriously only as long as stability can be taken for sure. The other remark is that the linkage between instability and security is not clear. As far as a country with huge conventional and nuclear military potential is concerned, there is less of a need to specify the linkage but as far as such a small country as Hungary is concerned (which can be viewed from a NATO as well as from a Russian point of view as belonging to the security "periphery"), the linkage cannot be taken for granted.

In discussions on the security implications of economic instability three arguments come

up most frequently. The weakness of the economy could trigger a massive flood of refugees from Eastern Europe to Western Europe, it could boost the emergence of extremist political tendencies and it could sharpen ethnic tensions. As far as migration is concerned, migration itself does not constitute a problem of security. Migration does not raise the prospect of armed conflict if not only in the sense of anti-foreigner movements and police operations but this is still far from the realm of security policy. Beside that, no major migration could be recorded so far from the Visegrad countries into Western Europe.

As far as the emergence of extremist political forces is concerned, they are almost unavoidably linked to the worsening of the economic situation. This phenomenon is certainly not restricted to Eastern Europe. Extremist tendencies have emerged in Western Euorope as well. They are not a major concern of security, however. It is also noteworthy in this respect that the major representatives of extremist tendencies in Hungary, Istvan Csurka and his followers who had been observed with great alarm in Western Europe and North America were restricted to the periphery of the political scene when the economic decline was approaching its bottom. It should also be mentioned that in spite of the economic difficulties only the Hungarian government and parliament have remained in office in East and Central Europe since their coming into office.

The sharpening of ethnic tensions is more closely linked to problems of security because ethnic tensions could trigger armed conflict even between states which could then involve Western Europe in a number of ways ranging from stepping up military preparedness to engaging in conflict-management. This is not a real danger in Hungary, however. There is a wide perception that for the Hungarian public economic recovery is much more of an urgency than any so called "national" issues. The president of the Hungarian Socialist Party, Gyula Horn rightly observed in an interview that the main preoccupation of the Hungarian public is the

economic recovery and not at all any "national" issue or the issue of national minorities. The dire economic situation does not favor the solidarity of the public with Hungarian minorities abroad either. The Hungarian society has been most tolerent with refugees of Hungarian nationality arriving from Romania. Yet the tolerence with them has declined sharply over the past few years. The perception of their contribution to the "national feeling" has declined dramatically while they are more and more seen as turning their back to the Hungarian minority they leave behind, taking the jobs from Hungarian citizens, not even being genuine Hungarians and eating up everything (almost one fifth of the population agrees with this last very sharply phrased point).[6]

The search for a linkage between the economic situation and security also has to rely upon the assumption that the economic situation is only worsening and worsening. When ambassadors of EC countries in Budapest were received by prime minister Jozsef Antall, they were not very much concerned by the Hungarian economy but much more by the developments in the domestic political scene.[7] Underlying their concern was most likely the consideration that a worsening economic situation could easily trigger social instabilities and this way even political uncertainties. However, the assumption of an ever declining economy does not seem to be correct. According to an economic research institute in Hungary, 1993 will be the first year for many years when a minimal 0-1% economic growth can be expected.[8] A leading advisor of the government on economic issues is also of the opinion that the Hungarian economy hit the bottom at the turn of 1992 and 1993.[9] According to a recent prediction by the minister of industry and trade, the growth of the industrial production is in the range of 3-5% in 1993 and it will be in a similar range in 1994. The growth of economic output is certainly not a reliable indicator of the health of the economy. The above mentioned small growth of the industrial production has been accompanied by a decline of 10% in industrial employment. The number of unemployed

people in the whole economy is in the range of 700.000. The point is, nevertheless, that an economic decline similar to that following 1989 and the collapse of the eastern markets is not likely to happen again.

Another point is that Hungary has no chance to become member of the EC in the short term. The question is whether a delay in joining the EC could contribute to political instabilities. Neither the politicians, nor the public expect quick Hungarian membership in the EC. There are no major illusions around in this respect. If political developments so far are any indication, the lack of the prospect of quick membership will not lead to political instabilities. A major indicator of political stability has been the death of the prime minister Jozsef Antall in early December 1993. His death did not lead to a crisis of government. A new prime minister (Peter Boross, interior minister in Antall's government) was approved by the parliament within one week (by a vote of 201 against 152 with 5 abstentions; that is the prime minister received more votes than just those of the coalition). Antall's government remained intact except for the interior minister, because a new interior minister had to be appointed to replace Boross.

It is also true that the popularity of the governing coalition has declined, not least because of a lack of a quick improvement of the economic situation which could be felt by the population. But voter sympathy went to opposition parties (like the Alliance of Free Democrats and Alliance of Young Democrats or the Socialist Party) which are equally committed to market reform. All the parliamentary parties are committed to privatization just as there is no important public opposition to it. The point is that even as the economic situation is quite burdensome for the population, there is no sizeable opposition to market reforms and there is certainly no opposition against the democratic political system itself.

This way, even if there is no quick improvement in the economic situation, the support for democracy and for market reforms will most likely not decline. Even if Western Europe considered political instabilities with a potential of threatening the democratic system in Hungary as a security challenge (taken in a wider sense), it would probably not have to expect any major instabilities in this sense. The consideration of the economic aspects of security (in a strict sense) can therefore come to the following conclusion. The state of the economy and economic recovery does confront Hungary with challenges. These callenges, however, are not security challenges either for Hungary or for Western Europe.

Military aspects of security

Russia

If the military aspects of security challenges are to be assessed, Russia and Hungary's close neighbors have to be taken into account. There is an underlying nervousness in the Hungarian political elite as far as Russia and the military threat it could pose are concerned. The prime minister, Jozsef Antall warned for instance about the danger of the revival of the Russian threat. In a speech to a meeting of his party he explained that it was in the interest of some forces in Russia to destabilize the region. According to him, not all Russian generals left the country without the wish of later returning. Once the Russian bear will have slept enough, it could again target the region from Königsberg to the Baltics to Central Europe.[10] Later, in a letter to the Russian president Boris Yeltsin he repeated his warning in a less outspoken way. He spoke of the importance of a new Atlantic (security) system in counterbalancing any possible hegemonic aspirations by any European country.[11]

The worries of Antall seem to be shared by the foreign minister, Geza Jeszenszky as well. At a forum the foreign minister said that if NATO was ready to demonstrate its willingness to come to the defense of the countries of East Central Europe than it could prevent the need of doing so later. A worsening of the situation in Russia was listed by him among the dangers possibly threatening security in the region.[12] A high ranking official of the foreign ministry could not avoid the problem of Russia in regard to an enlargement of NATO either. For him, the Russian problem has to be addressed so as Russia does not feel itself threatened.[13] Underlying this concern is partly the consideration that without NATO membership Hungary could also feel itself threatened by Russia.

A little bit later, however, by drawing an analogy between Finland and Hungary as far as the Russian threat is concerned, this high ranking official admits that the Russian threat is no longer a major problem and it is not very likely to become so.[14] But at some point the foreign minister himself admitted that a military attack against the country was very unlikely and that his worries were not related to the possibility of a major military attack.[15] We are this way confronted with a serious ambiguity as far as the assessment of the Russian threat is concerned.

Is there anything, however, on the Russian side that could feed the ambiguity mentioned above? Until recently, two main points came up usually in discussions. One of them is the Soviet intervention in the Baltic states in January 1991 and the other one is the attempted coup in Moscow on August 19, 1991. Although these two events could easily trigger fears of a revival of expansionist tendencies in Russia, it should not be lost of sight that these two events marked the decay of the Soviet Union. While Central and Eastern Europeans still had to take into account the Soviet Union at the time of these events, they no longer have to do so.

To these two points a third and a fourth one can be added as well. In the Fall of 1993 president Yeltsin raised the hopes of the Visegrad countries by reportedly admitting that Russia did not have any objection to extending NATO membership to Poland. It is less known that Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozirev also declared several times that Russia did not have any major objection against Hungarian membership in NATO. According to the Hungarian foreign ministry spokeman, Janos Hermann, Kozirev made it clear that leaders in Moscow acknowledged and understood Hungary's aspirations to join NATO.[16] Russia's revision of its position (the Yeltsin letter) was again well suited to spark uncertainties about Russia's intentions.

The revision of Russia's position should be seen in the context of the stand-off in Moscow between Yeltsin and his opponents led by Rutskoi and Khasbulatov. Before breaking this deadlock, Yeltsin made the tour of important military barracks and installations around Moscow. Considering the Russian military's deep-seated suspiciosness of NATO, the retreat on the issue of NATO enlargement was most likely a concession made by Yeltsin to the military for their support.

This retreat should not be considered, however, as a manifestation of the expansionist tendencies of the Russian military. They rather seem to be mostly worried by an expansion of NATO which they still consider as a military alliance and a remnant of the Cold War.[17] The new military doctrine of Russia can stand here as a proof. Allowing for the first use of nuclear weapons when a state which has an agreement with a nuclear state or an alliance of a non-nuclear state and a nuclear state attacks Russia points to Russia's fears of being encircled by a vigorous and expanding military alliance.[18] Although this fear is understandable to some extent politically, in the sense of Russia's isolation from the rest of Europe, it does not make very much sense militarily. NATO would be quite simply unable to encircle Russia.

Beside Russia's intentions there are many other points to underline that Russia is no longer in a position to set out on an expansionist course. First of all, Russia is surrounded by the other successor states of the former Soviet Union. If Russia was to reestablish some sort of a "Greater Russia", it would first have to confront these successor states. The Russian army itself is no longer in a very good shape. The morale is low, defense procurements have been cut drastically, the army is plagued by corruptions, the line of command is disrupted on some occasions with decisions often taken by military commanders in the regions whose main preoccupation is to take care of the "welfare" of their troops. In an important move, Russia finally decided on June 15, 1993 to abolish the joint command of the Commonwealth of Independent States.[19] According to generals Grachev and Gromov, the main difficulties the Russian army has to cope with are the grave social problems. In the words of the commander-in-chief of the Russian air forces, the Russian military are well aware that their task is exclusively the defense of Russia.[20] There is also an awareness in Russia that an attempt to reestablish a "Greater Russia" would be more costly than beneficial and it would lead to a complete economic disaster.[21]

The fourth point to promote suspicions about the potential of a Russian military threat is the strong showing of the extreme right wing party of Zhirinovsky. The electoral results of this party have aroused intensive worries both in Eastern and Central as well as in Western Europe. No wonder, since Zhirinovsky spoke very irresponsibly of being a dictator and wanting to restore the Russian empire in the boundaries of the former Soviet Union.[22] At some point he even played with the idea of recreating a Russian empire incorporating Poland, Finland, Afganisthan, Turkey and Alaska. After the elections, however, he revised very much his earlier statements claiming that Russia did not have any intention of changing its borders and that Russia would not use military force against the successor states of the former Soviet Union. (At

least some of these states would rather ask for readmission into "Russia" in his view).[23]

The strong showing of Zhirinovsky should not be taken in an alarmist way. Although his party scored well on party lists (24% of the votes), on the list of individual candidates it could send only 3 representatives to the Parliament.[24] Beside that, it is not any less important that the new constitution has been adopted. That is, Yeltsin's political line has been backed by the population with a clear warning of discontent regarding the economic reform. Gorbatchev is most likely right in arguing that the Russian people did not vote for a program of reoccupying Poland and Finland and extending Russian borders to the warm seas or transforming Ukraine and the Caucasus into Russian protectorates. It would also be going too far to take the success of Zhirinovsky as a fasciste threat for Russia.[25]

More disturbing is the recent toughening of Russian foreign policy. The director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence warned, for instance, that NATO enlargement would lead to military countermeasures by Moscow while Yeltsin declared that it would hurt Russian strategic interests.[26] This toughening of Russian foreign policy does not raise, however, the prospect of Russian expansionisn. Russia looks, for instance, ready to withdraw its troops from the Baltics and shift some of them to "hot-spots" in the trans-Caucasus and central Asia.[27] Even if a more radical and expansionist tendency was to gain the upper hand in Russia some time from now (like that of Zhirinovsky), Russia would find it extremely difficult to restrore at least partially the former Soviet Union, not to speak of any further expansion westward. Such a political tendency would not have to forget that Russia's main security risks arise from Transcaucasia and central Asia.[28] A separate task would be to keep Russia itself together. The 25 million ethnic Russians in the "near abraod" are a further difficulty. Taking care of the Russians or assuming a peace-keeping or self-assigned conflict managing role could, however, work only where

resistance is weak (like Georgia) or where there is consent (like Tajikistan). Russia would not have much chance of assuming these roles in a rather hostile environment (like the Baltics or Ukraine). If there is, this way, a threat of resurrecting Russian power throughout the remnants of the Soviet Union, the direction of this threat would not be mainly and primarily westward.

Beside that, even if Russia's expansionist threat was to be reconstituted, the serious problems of the Russian military would have to be tackled first. Russian military spending in 1992 was down 84% compared to its 1985 level.[29] Arms purchases are down some 67% from 1991 while the officer corps is shrinking by over 50%. Conscription rates are at about 16% of the draft pool. Beside shortages of troops, officers and arms, there is also a serious shortage of fuel and spare parts.[30] This way, a reconstitution of a potential expansionist Russian threat would certainly take some time. It would not come from one day to another. This potential threat would certainly not be directed specifically against Hungary. Hungarian fears of a Russian threat in terms of an invasion of Hungary as in 1956 are therefore untenable. If there is a potential Russian threat to come, it is not likely to be around the corner and Hungary would be only part of a wider equation, and probably not even the main part.

Closer neighborhood

As far as Hungary's closer neighborhood is concerned, mainly three relations come into account, Slovakia, Romania and the former Yugoslavia.[31] To take Slovakia first, the prime minister Vladimir Meciar seems all too ready to evoke the danger of an alleged Hungarian military threat against his country. He repeatedly alleged that Hungary conducted massive military manouvres in border areas and that these manouvres endangered Slovakian sovereignty. (He did not only take on Hungary, he also threatened the Czech republic of closing oil pipelines

reaching it through Slovak territory).[32] Meciar also repeated his accusations that the delivery to Hungary of Russian MiG 29 aircraft was to trigger an arms race between Slovakia and Hungary.[33] What is more, after the reburial of the late governor of Hungary, Istvan Horthy, a Slovak newspaper close to the circles of Meciar published a military analysis about the possibility of an armed conflict between Slovakia and Hungary.[34]

The military relations between the two countries are, however, in sharp contrast with these allegations. At an early meeting between the two defense ministers Imrich Andrejcak offered that his country would undertake the servicing of Hungarian aircraft and give the possibility to the Hungarian air-defense forces to conduct exercises in the Tatra mountains. Lajos Für proposed his counterpart that the military leaders of the two countries should meet regularly and inform each other on troop movements in border areas. He also proposed the mutual inspection of manoeuvres in border areas. The Slovak defense minister assured his Hungarian counterpart that the Slovak military leadership did not by any "misinformation" about a general mobilization in Hungary or about troop concentrations in border areas.[35]

The Slovak defense minister later also made it clear to the commander of NATO's European forces that Slovakia did not have any objection against Hungary's procurment of MiG 29s. These aircraft fit well into the CFE limitations and they serve only a long overdue modernization in his assessment.[36] His ministry's declaration also reiterated that Hungary's arms procurements would not trigger an arms race between the two countries, what is more, Slovakia dismantled in the first half of 1993 134 tanks, 124 armored transport vehicles and 178 pieces of artillery in accordance with the CFE treaty.[37] In October 1993 the two defense ministers signed a military cooperation agreement which calls for immediate consultations in case the slightest problem should emerge.[38] According to the Slovak defense minister, military

experts of the two countries are preparing an open-skies agreement as well.[39] The Hungarian defense minister also rejects any prospect of an arms race between the two countries.[40]

The military relations between Hungary and Romania are also on good terms and they do not raise the prospect of any military confrontation between the two countries. The relations between the two defense ministries are admittedly excellent.[41] There is also an open-skies agreement between Romania and Hungary. The agreement allows for four flights a year without any option of surprise inspection, however. Each flight can last three hours over a route of 1.200 kilometers.[42] According to Hungarian military experts, the Romanian army does not mean any threat to Hungary. The level of supplies of the army is very low, most of its technical equipments are outdated, a considerable part of its tanks are run down T-34s, the discontent of the officer corps has increased recently while the army would like to avoid playing any political role.[43] The low level of the combat readiness of troops and equipment has been confirmed from other sources as well.[44]

The case of Yugoslavia is more serious especially if we consider the border incidents (like minor violations of the border, shootings across the border line from former Yugoslav territories into Hungarian territory), air-space violations and even a minor bombing incident (when a cluster bomb was dropped on the border town of Barcs on October 27, 1991 although the bomb did not explode and nobody was hurt) in the early stages of the conflict. Yet the likelihood of any organized attack on Hungary was never high even if according to some earlier assessments of the military intelligence there may have been in the early stages of the conflict political and military leaders who might have been tempted to include Hungary somehow into the Yugoslav conflict.[45]

The point is that there has not been anything for Serbia to gain by attacking Hungary (or for that matter Austria and Italy which some radical Serb politicians also threatened). There would be no political capital or military advantage to be gained this way. The only sense of attacking these countries would be in revenge for their part in applying the sanctions against Serbia. Such a revenge would not be likely to be conducted centrally because it would amount to a centrally planned offensive in which Serbia would certainly not be interested. Revenge would only make sense if it was to be carried out in a "decentralized" way, that is by extremist political forces escaping to some extent from under the central authority. But again, this revenge could be directed most successfully against the Hungarian minority in Voivodina rather than against Hungary itself. And although Serb radicals (like Seselj and Arkan and their respective followers) issued at some point warnings for the Hungarian minority to leave Voivodina once they come to power, the Socialists of Milosevic and the democratic opposition lead by Vuk Draskovits would certainly by against any outright reprisals against the Hungarian minority. The main concern of the Serbian nationalists is not likely to be the Hungarian minority in Voivodina also because Serbia has a firm grip on the province with no secessionist tendencies to cope with. Their main concern would still remain Bosnia, the Serb Krajina in Croatia and Kosovo. This way, although the chance of minor, "decentralized" incidents cannot be fully discounted as far as the war in former Yugoslavia drags on, Hungary is not likely to be exposed to the threat of a centrally planned military aggression.

A state secretary of the Defense Ministry is confident, however, that the Hungarian army could halt any major organized attack from the Southern direction until the arrival of international help while in case of smaller incursions the army would be able to counter them.[46] In case of any such attack Hungary could certainly expect international help. NATO officials, including the secretary general, have repeatedly given assurances to Hungary that NATO would

not remain indifferent should Hungary be exposed to any attack in connection with its help given to the UN operation there. According to NATO assessments, however, Hungary is not seriously exposed to any military threat from the Yugoslav region. This assessment is also shared by the Hungarian military intelligence which suggests that the tensions have greatly eased in former Yugoslavia and that the likelihood of the Republic of Yugoslavia (i.e. Serbia and Montenegro) attacking any of its neighbors has become even lower.[47]

Beside that, in testimonies given before the foreign affairs committee of the Parliament experts confirmed that the country was not threatened by the danger of "state level" aggression. Although the Serbian army is strong and it could threaten militarily Hungary, Serbia had no aims vis a vis Hungary which could be achieved by the use of military force. The economic background of an eventual attack against Hungary was also poor and the population's burden-bearing capabilities had already been stretched to their limits. Hungarian officials did not know of any Serbian plans which would consider any attack against Hungary. The president of the committee added that the Hungarian minority in Voivodina was not exposed to any immediate danger either.[48] There is one more point that should be made here. Foreign observers often ask whether Hungary would be willing to resort to the use of military force should atrocities be committed against the Hungarian minority in Voivodina. For one thing, the likelihood of this happening looks low. Second, responsible Hungarian diplomats and high ranking military officers flatly rule out that Hungary would let itself be dragged into any sort of armed conflict even over the issue of the Hungarian minority. The worst scenario they could envisage would be the opening up of the borders to refugees but they also add that this worst case scenario is rather unlikely in their assessment.

In sum, Hungary does not seem to be confronted with any serious security challenges

in terms of the military aspects of security.[49] This means in turn that Hungary itself is not likely to confront Western Europe with any serious security challenges either.

Political aspects of security

This title covers mainly the issue of Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries. Hungarian foreign policy itself has to find its way between its double goals of contributing to the improvement of the situation of the Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries and improving at the same time its relations with these countries or supporting the rights of the minorities beyond the borders and maintaining Hungary's international reputation as well as further integrating Hungary into the European institutional structures. In the following, the cases of Slovakia and Romania are going to be considered.

Slovakia

The issue of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia came into the international limelight on the occasion of Slovakia's application for membership in the Council of Europe. The controversies centered around the issues of the use of the original Hungarian version of names (first and family names), the use of Hungarian language signs alongside the Slovak language signs of streets and localities, the establishment of a full-scale Hungarian language school system, the revocation of the post second world war decree on the collective guilt of the Hungarians in Slovakia and the redrawing of the bounderies of administrative districts in Slovakia.[50]

The Hungarian government decided to intervene diplomatically in the issue by considering

that it would not support its own demands but the demands made by the Hungarian political parties in Slovakia. The president of one of the Hungarian political parties (Coextistence), Miklos Duray made it clear that the Hungarian government had committed itself to support the demands made by the representatives of the Hungarian minority and which were in conformity with international documents.[51] A deputy state secretary of the Hungarian foreign ministry also underlined that the Hungarian government decided to support the demands made by the four Hungarian parties in Slovakia (and sent to the Council of Europe) after the proposals regarding the new Slovak constitution put forward by the representatives of the Hungarian minority were simply rejected by the Slovak parliament.[52]

After all, Slovakia was adopted as member of the Council of Europe. The Hungarian government did not veto the vote (it abstained) because the Council decided to initiate a controlling mechanism over the issue of Slovakia, it adopted the proposal to exclude the decree of collective guilt from the Slovak legal system and also adopted some other recommendations.

Controversies have remained, however, even after Slovakia's adoption as member of the Council. A new law on the names was adopted and then withdrawn and made less permissive. A controversy erupted over the removal of Hungarian language signs of public places (like streets and localities). The issue of schooling is still far from settled just like the issue of redrawing the administrative districts. The Slovak prime minister used sharp tones against the representatives of the Hungarian minority. Before the vote in the Council he called on them to support Slovakia's membership in a public declaration which they refused to do. He then accused them of undermining Slovak interests.[53]

It is important to see, nevertheless, that the Hungarian minority can legally speak for

itself. It is represented in the Slovak political scene by four parties and in the Slovak parliament by two parties. There is also no wish among the Hungarians in Slovakia to rejoin Hungary.[54] Beside that, this minority would be the first to resent any revival of nationalist tendencies in Hungary.[55] The law on the names which was withdrawn later had been approved by a considerable majority in the Slovak parliament.[56] The Slovak foreign minister pledged that Slovakia would meet the recommendations of the council of Europe and president Meciar asked the secretary general of the Council for experts to cooperate in redrawing the administrative districts in Slovakia.[57]

Yet Slovak-Hungarian relations are not restricted to the issue of the minority. There is, for instance, close cooperation between the border guards, agreement has been reached to open new border crossings, to strengthen industrial cooperation including cooperation in the field of energetics. The Hungarian and Slovak governments have set up a joint committee to deal with minority issues. There is also a clear reluctance on the Hungrian side to subordinate everything to the issue of minorities and also to the issue of the controversial dam on the Danube.[58] This controversy over the dam may be serious but it is far from being threatening. For Jozef Moravcik, the politically sensitive problem of the dam has been appropriately dealt with by its being submitted before the International Court in the Hague.[59] For the state secretary of the Hungarian Defense Ministry the issue of the dam gives rise to many problems but they have no military implications whatsoever.[60]

We can this way come to the conclusion that the major danger with respect to the issue of the Hungarian minority is that prime minister Meciar (as well as the Slovak National Party which is close to Meciar) could be tempted to divert public discontent by using this issue.[61] The use of this issue could not, however, yield much political capital considering that the ruling

Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (that is Meciar's party) itself has to cope with a lack of overall coherence within the party while other political players (like the Christian Democratic Party or the Party of the Democratic Left) are most likely less inclined to misuse this issue. If the misuse of the issue could not yield very much domestic political capital, it could yield even less political capital internationally.[62] Even if it came to the misuse of this issue by some political players, the resulting tensions would still be very far from triggering armed conflict between Slovaks and Hungarians in Slovakia and they would be highly unlikely to trigger any armed conflict conflict between the two countries at all.

Romania

The issue of the Hungarian minority in Romania was highlighted by the application of Romania for membership in the Council of Europe. It has also been highlighted by the relations between Hungary and Romania as well as by the delay in signing a basic treaty between these two countries. The preparation of this treaty has been stalled by a lack of agreement regarding the inclusion into the treaty of two articles. One of them would provide for border guarantees while the other would provide for the protection of minorities. The problem is that Budapest would not include an article on the guarantee of borders if an article on minority protection is not included as well while Bucharest would not include an article on minority protection without the inclusion of an article on border guarantees. Harmonizing these two positions seems to be quite a difficult task although there has been some improvement in the stalemate. The main difficulty lies in the wordimg of these two articles and mainly of the article on minority rights. In the words of Hungarian government officials the difficulty lies in that the problem of the borders has already been setlled by international treaties while the international legal framework for minority rights has been missing.[63]

This stalemate, however, is far from a controversy. There are simply no territorial disputes between the two countries. The Hungarian Foreign Ministry and Geza Jeszenszky himself have repeatedly emphasized that Hungary does not have any territorial demands vis a vis Romania. The peace treaties of 1920 and 1947 as well as the Helsinki principles and the Paris Charter are a sufficient guarantee regarding the borders.[64] A state secretary of the office of the prime minister also emphasized that Hungary's acceptance of the principle that violent border changes are unacceptable did not mean that Hungary would engage in any attempt to change its borders.[65] What is more, even Teodor Melescanu acknowledges that Hungary does not have any territorial demands.[66] Beside that, even the Hungarian minority made it clear that they would not seek secession at all.[67] If the geopolitical situation in Transylvania is considered and secessionist drives are assumed, it can be seen that they would have no chance at all with a portion of Romanians to Hungarians in Transylvania of the order of 7 to 2, with compact Hungarian populations scattered all through Transylvania and the most compact clusters (like the counties of Hargitha and Covasna where the Hungarians are in a regional majority of the order of around 70 and 85 %) located well within the country.

The problem of the Hungarian minority in is not at the center of the main fault lines of politics in Romania and it is not likely to come there. Far from that. It is useful to remeber here that the 1989 upheaval leading to the fall of the Ceausescu regime was sparked by the opposition staged by a Hungarian (reformed priest Laszlo Tökes who has been promoted bishop since then) who was protected in Timisiora (Temesvar) by an interethnic group. And although there were unarmed clashes between Romanians and Hungarians after the revolt (see for instance the Marosvasarhely/Tirgu Mures clashes in March 1990), the government did not hesitate to crush in June 1990 by crude force a peaceful demonstration (which had nothing to do at all with the

Hungarian minority) staged mainly by students. Soon after the revolt in December 1990 there were also attacks against opposition parties. The political scene has calmed down to some extent since then but the minority problem has not come closer to the center of political fault lines (in spite of repeated accusations and slenders made by some smaller political players like the Vatra Romaneasca, its party wing the National Union Party of Romania or the Greater Romania Party) as a recent opinion poll shows. According to the poll, only 2% of the population considers "the relationaship with the Hungarians" as a central political problem in Romania.[68]

The Hungarian minority in Romania has, of course, a whole series of complaints.[69] The government has, nevertheless, set up a Council on National Minorities (which the Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania has left since in protest). Not least, the minority is represented via the HDFR in both houses of the Parliament. Teodor Melescanu has also pledged to include the HDFR into consultations on the preparation of the Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty. The Council of Europe has adopted Romania and made its recommendations taking into account the complaints of the Hungarian minority as well. It is also important to note in this respect that the Hungarian minority rejects any tutoring or meddling into its affairs by the Hungarian government or any other political party. The HDFR reserves for itself the task of working out and implementing its own policy even if at some point it expects the support of the Hungarian government (as before international fora or in working out bilateral guarantees between Romania and Hungary).[70]

A major difficulty of the issue of the Hungarian minority is that for the Romanian government the situation of the minorities will improve with the development of democracy in Romania,[71] while for the representatives of the Hungarian minority no development of the democracy can be expected without a major improvement of the situation of the minorities.

These two positions do not seem to be easily coordinated. Another aspect of this problem is the autonomy aspiration of the HDFR. At its January 1993 congress, the phrasing of the demand for autonomy was somewhat scaled down.[72] Yet the HDFR does not reject its demand for autonomy. When, however, it comes to the territorial aspects of autonomy or to passing from the sphere of individual rights to collective rights, the party meets the clear resistence of even the opposition parties grouped in the Democratic Convention.[73] This is a sad curse for the party because it feels itself obliged to define itself in terms of an opposition, i.e. opposition vis a vis the government but to some extent vis a vis the democratic opposition as well. This means that the party is kept together by national considerations and it is not allowed to organize itself according to traditional party political considerations. This way it is unwittingly an element of nationalism in Romanian politics, exposing it to attacks by extremist parties and also to the danger of serious tensions within the party.

The issue of the Hungarian national minority, once again, is not at the center of the political fault lines in Romania. The main danger regarding this issue is that government circles can be tempted to misuse it in order to divert public discontent. The point that they can be tempted to do so (even by way of relying for this on extremist political forces) is shown, for instance, by Iliescu's praise for the Vatra Romanesca. Iliescu was recently reported as saying that the Vatra Romaneasca had a major role in promoting national pride and that it contributed to the improvement of tolerence.[74] The Vatra Romanesca (together with its party wing the National Union Party of Romania and the Greater Romania Party) has made fame by its anti-Hungarianism. There is not very much political capital to be gained this way, though. Beside that, such attempts are not likely to lead to armed conflict between Romanians and Hungarians and they are even much less likely to lead to any armed conflict at all between Hungary and Romania.

Challenges for Western Europe

We can, after all, come to the conclusion that Hungary is unlikely to be confronted with any serious security challenges in either of the aspects of security examined above. This means, in turn, that Hungary in its regional setting does not mean any serious security challenges for Western Europe. This does not mean, however, that Western Europe is not confronted with challenges at all although these challenges are far from emerging as security challenges.

Attempts at giving account of these challenges (and giving account of them as security challenges) have not been missing. One could argue for instance that instabilities emerging in Eastern Europe today will have a stronger and stronger impact on the security of Alliance members in the future. This impact would mean a growing burden of refugees fleeing conflict, economic hardship and ethnic persecution. Violent unrests have also erupted in some West European cities while political extremists are making gains at the polls. Countering crises situations would draw scarce resources away from the tasks of overcoming the divisions of the Cold War.[75] One could add in a similar vein that tensions in the Eastern half of Europe could damage European integration and evebn lead to domestic right wing extremism.[76]

To this one could add the danger for Western Europe to lose much of the investment it had made during the Cold War.[77] The danger of an all European (not to say worldwide) conflict has also been evoked.[78] Left to fester, regional conflicts are also considered as expanding insecurity and instability across Europe and eventually even provoking just the kind of international cconflict that has been left behind.[79] Accordingly, ethno-national disputes, if left to fester, could easily engulf all aspects of inter-state and intra-state relations.[80]

According to another observer, ethnically and/or religiously based local conflicts could threaten the integrity of the rules, norms and standards which have been agreed upon in Europe as a basis for an open and cooperative security order.[81] Likewise, the greatest threat to European security would emerge from a situation in which NATO members would be drawn into new alliances which might even confront them with each other.[82] In the same sense, new conflicts would trigger a rebirth of power politics in Europe which would threaten to undermine European cooperation.[83] For yet another observer, the major threats to West European security would pose a real danger only if Western Europe shows itself incapable of dealing with them.[84]

As far as the case of Hungary is concerned, these above attempts seem to be mistaken.[85] What applies to Franco-German relations, that is that "we have more to lose by figthing each other than by getting along"[86] also applies to the case of Hungary. This also implies that the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts has a much greater international support than it was supposed previously.[87] If the real security regime in Western Europe is that military power in a direct sense does not play any role in the relations of Western European states with each other, then this very same security regime applies to the Hungarian case as well.

Here lies the major challenge for Western Europe. The Hungarian case does no longer give any pretext for Western European institutions to maintain the usual division between Western Europe and East-Central Europe on any principled basis. The point is that both NATO and the EC are based on principles which are not exclusive. NATO, can be considered, and it considers itself, as much more than an exceptionally durable version of the so called "security community". It looks rather like an evolving civic community committed to the maintenance of pacific relations and to the observance of institutionalized norms.[88] The same is the case with the EC. The original idea of Monnet and Schuman was not that of a club of West European

states but that of an institution for all Europe.[89]

NATO's selective enlargement would, however, raise the issue of its further enlargement. An enlarged NATO would also have to cope with decision-making difficulties. The same applies to the EC. If it is difficult to conduct a common foreign and security policy of twelve states, it will be much more difficult to do so in the case of sixteen or twenty member states. It would run against NATO's and the EC's own legitimacy to be committed to exclusiveness, yet they have so far proven successful due to their exclusivity. The major challenge for them is to overcome somehow this dilemma. As far as the case of Hungary is concerned, the stake of this challenge is not that much European security, not even East Central European security but rather the future role of NATO and the EC/EU in a context in which security challenges in a strict sense are less prominent.

1.. Daniel N. Nelson, "Democracy, Markets and Security in Eastern Europe", Survival, Summer 1993, p. 156.

2.. ibid, p. 157.

3.. Dieter Mahncke, Parameters of European Security, Chaillot Papers, 10 (WEU: Paris, 1993), p. 8.

4.. Magyar Hirlap, April 3, 1993.

5.. Nepszabadsag, June 9, 1993.

6.. Poll taken by Szonda/Ipsos in Nepszabadsag, April 2, 1993.

7.. Nepszabadsag, June 5, 1993.

8.. Nepszabadsag, June 12, 1993.

9.. Pesti Hirlap, June 10, 1993.

10.. The speech of Antall quoted in Nepszabadsag, April 27, 1993.

11.. Nepszabadsag, September 24, 1993.

12.. Nepszabadsag, September 27, 1993.

13.. Istvan Gyarmati, head of the Department of Security Policy and European Cooperation quoted in Magyar Narancs, June 17, 1993.

14.. ibid.

15.. Nepszabadsag, May 18, 1993.

16.. Nepszabadsag, October 2, 1993.

17.. In a statement sounding very much like the Russian military hierarchy, Yeltsin warned Manfred Wörner that NATO's enlargement would revive Russia's old fears of encircelement. International Herald Tribune, December 10, 1993.

18.. The point that an inclusion of the first use of nuclear weapons into Russia's miliatry doctrine is directed against NATO enlargement is also underlined by Grachev's statement that the doctrine says nothing in regard to those states which have nuclear weapons. The Times, November 4, 1993.

19.. Russia's Armed Forces, The Economist, August 28, 1993.

20.. Nepszabadsag, October 2, 1993. Of course, this committment to the exclusive defense of Russia can even sound like a public relations exercise. This is the case of Geogia where there is strong apprehension of a renewal of Russia's imperial games under the disguise of peace-keeping. (International Herald Tribune, October 30-31, 1993) Nevertheless, Russia would have to restrict the controlling of regional conflicts under the disguise of peace-keeping to post Soviet areas where it would meet little resitence. As far as the controlling of regional

conflicts is concerned, Russia looks interested in the Caucasian and Central Asian regions (like Tajikistan). Russia's attempts to amend the CFE treaty in the sense of moving more heavy weapons southwards also seem to underline this point. (Time, October 18, 1993). Russia would clearly have much less chance of embarking on the "management" of regional conflicts in the Western regions of the former Soviet Union like the Baltics and Ukraine. What Yeltsin can try to work out is a belt of friendly states, but a belt of friendly states does not have to mean a belt of satellites and much less an integrated military structure. What looks like the main role of the Russia armed forces beside controlling regional conflicts is to keep Russia itself together. (See Yeltsin's remarks in The Times, November 4, 1993 and Le Monde, November 5, 1993). The point is that the military has no interest in rsurrecting the Cold War and there is not even much chance for that either. (See for instance U.S. News and World Report, October 18, 1993).

21.. An expert of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy quated in Nepszabadsag, September 22, 1993.

22.. International Herald Tribune, December 14, 1993.

23.. Le Monde, December 16, 1993.

24.. Le Figaro, December 16, 1993.

25.. Liberation, December 16, 1993.

26.. International Herald Tribune, December 13, 1993.

27.. The Financial Times, December 2, 1993.

28.. Islamic militancy and extremism threatening to infact Uzbekistan and Kyrgizstan is a major concern for Russia. Kozirev quoted in International herald Tribune, December 1, 1993.

29.. International Herald Tribune, November 30, 1993.

30.. John W. R. Leppingwell, "The Russian Army's Uncertain Future", The Wall Street Journal, Decmebr 17, 1993.

31.. The Hungarian Army is 100.000 strong (with 26.000 civilians and 74.000 soldiers out of which 54.000 conscripts); the Army of Slovakia is 46.700 strong; the Army of Romania is 200.000. Instead of the CFE limit of 835, Hungary had at the end of 1992 1357 tanks. Interms of artillery pieces, the respective numbers are 810 and 1040. As far as Romania is concerned,

it had 2875 tanks (CFE ceiling 1.375) and 4009 pieces of artillery (CFE ceiling 1475). The Czech Rpublic and Slovakia had together 3.208 tanks (CFE ceiling 1.435) and 3.414 pieces of artillery (CFE ceiling 1150). As far as aircraft and helicopters are concerned, Hungary had 143 arcraft of which 70 operational (that is the delivery of 28 MiG 29s still does not reach the CFE limit which is 180). Instead of the CFE limit of 108, Hungary has 39 helicopters. In the case of Romania, the stock is 486, while the CFE ceiling is 430 in terms of aircraft while the respective numbers are 220 and 120 in terms of helicopters. The same figures for the Czech Republic and Slovakia together were 402 and 345 in terms of aircraft. The rump Yugoslavia has about 500 aircraft and 160 helicopters. WEU Assembly Report, (Defense: Central Europe in Evolution), November 5, 1992; Alfred A Reisch, "The Hungarian Army in Transition", RFE/RL Research Report, March 5, 1993; Nepszabadsag, February 26, 1993.

32.. Nepszabadsag, July 31, 1993.

33.. Nepszabadsag, October 25, 1993.

34.. Nepszabadsag, October 4, 1993.

35.. Nepszabadsag, April 24, 1993.

36.. Nepszabadsag, June 24, 1993.

37.. Nepszabadsag, July 21, 1993.

38.. Nepszabadsag, October 5, 1993.

39.. ibid.

40.. Nepszabadsag, October 22, 1993.

41.. The state secretary for political affairs of the Defense Ministry, Laszlo Szendrei quoted in Uj Magyarorszag, April 21, 1993.

42.. Jeffrey Simon, "Central Europe: 'Return to Europe' or Descent to Chaos", in Strategic Review, Winter 1993, p. 22. and Daniel N. Nelson, "A Balkan Perspectiv", in Strategic Review, Winter 1993, p. 32.

43.. Magyar Hirlap, February 27, 1993.

44.. Daniel N. Nelson, ibid, p. 33.

45.. Major general Janos Kovacs, head of the Military Intelligence Office of the Army's General Staff until February 28, 1993 in Magyar Nemzet, March 1, 1993.

46.. Uj Magyarorszag, April 21, 1993.

47.. See under footnote No. 40.

48.. Nepszabadsag, June 3, 1993.

49.. This point may seem to be somewhat in contradiction with efforts to modernize the Hunagrian armed forces. These efforst include the procurement of MiG 29 aircraft, the modernization of the friend or foe identifying system and of the air traffic control system, the procurement of anti-tank and anti-armor weapons. These efforts include to some extent the deliveries of military spare parts by Russia and Germany although these deliveries do not serve mmodernization but rather the sheer maintenance of the combat readiness of the armed forces. These efforts are not motivated, however, by any specific security challenge but rather by the salient weaknesses of the armed forces. Beside that, Yugoslavia was the instance when Hungary came closest to a security challenge. After all, a decision was made to set up 28 new "action squadrons" within the framework of the border guards (of which 19 have already been set up) to counter any violations of the border by irregular forces in the South. Once a Hungarian military aircraft even chased a military aircraft arriving from former Yugoslavia back to former Yugoslav airspace. There were also reports of Hungary seeking guarantees from NATO in connection with the implementation of the UN embargo. Some of the Hungarian politicians even warned that Hungary should not allow the use of its air-space to NATO aircraft if it came to peace enforcement, that is to fighting. (Motivations behind this warning included considerations of the Hungarian minority in Voivodina as well as eventual provocations in reprisal against Hungary). If under the use of military force we understand not only military operations (even if on small scale) but also the show of a country's readiness and capability to defend itself then of course the use of military force has played a role with respect to the Yugoslav crisis. Nevertheless, the prospect of a serious confrontation was never very likely and this likelihood has declined even further as the conflict has dragged on.

50.. See for instance the intervention of the Hungarian Ambassador in Strassburg quoted in Nepszabadsag, June 21, 1993.

51.. Nepszabadsag, June 22, 1993.

52.. Ivan Baba in Nepszabadsag, July 8, 1993.

53.. Nepszabadsag, June 22, 29, 1993.

54.. George Schöpflin, Hungary and its Neighbours, Chaillot Papers (7) (Paris: WEU, 1993), p. 24.

55.. Karoly Toth, vice president of the Hungarian Civic Party in Slovakia quoted in Nepszabadsag, June 21, 1993.

56.. 77 votes for, 13 gainst, 15 abstentions. Nepszabadsag, July 9, 1993.

57.. Nepszabadsag, October 11, 1993.

58.. Deputy state secretary Ivan Baba in Nepszabadsag, February 8, 1993.

59.. Nepszabadsag, May 27, 1993.

60.. Rudolf Joo in Nepszabadsag, September 6, 1993.

61.. Schöpflin, ibid, p. 25.

62.. If Slovakia's strategic goal is the full integration of the country into the main European political, economic and security structures (as confirmed by Jozef Moravcik in Nepszabadsag, May 27, 1993), then it can hardly afford itself a loss in terms of its international political reliability.

63.. Le Monde, Decmber 10, 1993.

64.. Geza Jeszenszky quoted in Nepszabadsag, September 15, 1993.

65.. Tamas Katona quoted in Nepszabadsag, June 30, 1993.

66.. See the interview with the Romanian foreign minister in Nepszabadsag, september 14, 1993.

67.. The Kolozsvar (Cluj) declaration of the Hungarian Democratic Federation of Romania states that the Hungarian minority does not want to secede from the country or chose the way of emigration because it considers Romania as its homeland. MTI, Magyar Dokumentacio,

October 1992.

68.. The poll quoted in Nepszabadsag, April 10, 1993.

69.. These include tbe issue of people sentenced to imprisonment for political reasons, the lack of a minority law and a new law on education, the strict governmental control of the Television, the loss of leading positions by the Hungarian minority in all fields of politics (like the removal of the Hungarian governors of the two largely Hungarian populated counties of Covasna and Hargitha), issues of education, the problem of the nationalized property of churches and citizens. They have also outlined a clear criticism of the Romanian constitution.

70.. See for instance Bela Marko, president of the HDFR in Nepszabadsag, October 15, November 5, 1993.

71.. Teodor Melescanu, Nepszabadsag, July 10, 1993.

72.. In the new program of the party the territorial aspect of autonomy, i.e. territorial autonomy was phrased as local and regional self-government (or administration). MTI Magyar Dokumentacio, January 1993.

73.. See Bela Marko, Nepszabadsag, July 24, 1993.

74.. Nepszabadsag, September 13, 1993.

75.. General James P. McCarthy, USAF (ret.), "Strengthening Security in Central and Eastern Europe: New Opportunities for NATO", Strategic Review, Winter 1993, p. 55.

76.. Daniel N. Nelson, "A Balkan Perspective", Strategic Review, Winter 1993, p. 26.

77.. Jeoffrey Simon, "Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO?", Orbis, Winter 1993, p. 23.

78.. Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Building a New NATO", in Foreign Affairs, September/October 1993, p. 28.

79.. Manfred Wörner, "A Vigorous Alliance - A Motor for Peaceful Change in Europe", NATO Review, December 1992, p. 3.; Joseph Kriendler, "NATO's Changing Role - Opportunities and Constraints for Peacekeeping", NATO Review, June 1993, p. 16.

80.. George Schöpflin, ibid, pp. 1, 33.

81.. Johan Jorgen Holst, "European and Atlantic Security in a Period of Ambiguity", The World Today, December 1992, p. 220.

82.. Lawrence Freedman, "The Need for NATO - A Constitutional Alliance", NATO's Sixteen Nations, December 1991, p. 10.

83.. Rolf Falter, "Bosnia: Let's Hear the Low Countries", International Herald Tribune, September 13, 1993.

84.. D. Mahncke, ibid, p. 13.

85.. We can also find in almost all of these attempts references to the analogy of the Yugoslav crisis. Yet, this analogy is not as evident as it is supposed to be. For one thing, the crisis has failed so far to extend beyond the borders of what was Yugoslavia. Second, If in some quarters of Europe the West's weakness in accepting ethnic cleaning was studied thoroghly, at least one of the lessons could be that engaging in a venture of territorial aggrandizement or ethnic cleansing also implies the danger of falling into a situation of serious backwardness.

86.. A French government official quoted by Time, August 16, 1993.

87.. Howard E. Frost, "Eastern Europe's Search for Security", Orbis, Winter 1993, p. 38.

88.. MIchael Brenner, "Multilateralism and European Security", Survival, Summer 1993, p. 141.

89.. "Eastern Europe: The Old World's New World", The Economist, March 13, 1993 (Survey), p. 22.

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Conference on

THE INTERACTION OF THE EU AND NATO: ADAPTING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION TO THE NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE

THE ROLE OF EUROPEAN/ATLANTIC SECURITY INSTITUTION: PERCEPTIONS FROM THE CSCE COUNTRIES

A view from **Ukraine** by

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I - SITUATION STRATEGIQUE

Depuis la fin de la guerre froide, la dissolution du Pacte de Varsovie, la dislocation de l'Union Soviétique, la désintégration de la Yougoslavie, la réunification de l'Allemagne ont produit une mutation profonde de l'espace stratégique européen. L'idée de menace centrale et globale qui articulait les règles du jeu stratégique et bouclait le partage du continent est disparue. Cette division forcée de l'Europe par l'ordre de Yalta a été supprimée. Le démembrement sanglant de la Yougoslavie et le partage pacifique de la Tchécoslovaquie ont enterré même l'ordre de Versailles. L'Europe du XX° siècle n'est plus. A l'aube du XXI° siècle, une nouvelle Europe reste à inventer.

On a pu oser imaginer une recomposition calme - dans la stabilité et la sécurité - du continent européen à ses frontières géographiques naturelles et historiques, de l'Atlantique à l'Oural. Or, les grandes plaques tectoniques se sont remises en mouvements et produisent leur dynamique destructive : multiplication des Etats, réveil de tous les nationalismes, remise en question des frontières, conflits et crises multiples, plusieurs lignes de fractures (anciennes et nouvelles) du continent. Cette logique de décomposition et de parcellisation entre en contradiction frappante avec des promesses récentes de l'unité européenne de l'Atlantique à l'Oural, voire de Vancouver à Vladivostok.

La fin de notre siècle est marquée par une instabilité difficile à gérer et par une insécurité commune difficile à détecter, à localiser et à parer à cause de l'imprévisibilité de l'émergence des risques pour la sécurité européenne. Les risques potentiels pourraient découler de violences nationalistes et intégristes, de l'éventuel retour aux réflexes néo-impériaux et à des régimes autoritaires, du fait de l'abondance des stocks d'armes classiques et de destruction massive, du chantage économique, militaire et nucléaire, de la faillite économique, des secousses politiques et sociales et des migrations humaines.

Autant aucun de ces risques pris isolemment ne constitue nécessairement une menace majeure pour la sécurité de l'Europe, autant leur concentration et leur superposition dans les deux régions européennes les plus sensibles (l'ex-Yougoslavie, voire les Balkans et l'ex-Union Soviétique) constituent un mélange explosif avec des conséquences éventuellement catastrophiques pour la sécurité européenne dans son ensemble :

- l'extension des conflits dans l'ex-Yougoslavie vers le Sud et vers le Nord pour finalement déboucher sur une nouvelle guerre blakanique où toutes les puissances européenne seraient directement impliquées ;
- la propagation du virus ethnique des Balkans vers le Centre et l'Est de l'Europe risque d'ouvrir la voie aux rivalités nationales ouvertes en Europe ;
- des querelles de frontières, d'ethnies et de pouvoir dans la plus grande partie de l'ex-Empire soviétique et le risque de voir la Russie et l'Ukraine prendre le scénario des rapports entre la Serbie et la Croatie ce qui pourrait enterrer pour longtemps n'importe quelle architecture de sécurité en Europe ;
- le caractère imprévisible et inquiétant de l'évolution interne de la Russie, de sa politique extérieure et sa doctrine militaire, le regain d'expansionnisme et d'autoritarisme. Il suffit pour s'en convaincre de suivre l'interminable pantomime politique, parfois sanglant de Moscou.

Les conséquences conflictuelles au Sud et à l'Est de l'Europe sont évidentes: réapparition de très anciennes lignes de fractures, de Saint-Pétersbourg à Sarajevo, des Balkans au Pamir via la Transnistrie, la Crimée, la Géorgie, le Nagorno-Karabach et la Tadjikistan. Les zones d'affrontements séculaires se disséminent à nouveau, les rivalités se réveillent.

Cet arc-de-crise balkano-transcaucasien est un lien stratégique avec un fameux arc-de-crise allant de l'Afrique du Nord-Proche-Orient-Golf-Moyen-Orient vers l'Afghanistan. Cet ensemble stratégique constitue le flanc Sud de l'Europe et reste une poudrière. L'Europe d'aujourd'hui est beaucoup plus ouverte aux risques, crises et conflits venant de son flanc Sud et se superposant avec ceux des Balkans ou du Caucase. La coexistence de deux arcs-de-crise et les perspectives évidentes de leurs enchaînement circulaire ouvrent la voie à la circulation libre des armes conventionnelles, balistiques et chimiques, des "cerveaux" et de la haute-technologie, des matériels

nucléaires ainsi que du nationalisme, de l'intégrisme, du terrorisme et de l'immigration. Le flanc Sud et l'Europe non seulement affecte directement la sécurité européenne, mais fait partie intégrante du paysage stratégique européen.

L'exemple de l'Ukraine montre que toute approche purement technique de la prolifération nucléaire est largement insuffisante. Pour empêcher la dissémination des armes nucléaires, il faut tout d'abord comprendre les motifs qui poussent certains Etats à en conserver (cas de l'Ukraine) ou à en acquérir. Tant plus qu'ils ne font d'ailleurs que suivre l'exemple des cinq membres permanents du Conseil de Sécurité, cinq grandes puissances nucléaires et les premiers exportateurs d'armements. Sans avoir atténué le caractère discriminatoire du T.N.T., le risque pèsera lourd sur sa révision prévue en 1995.

Des éléments, des facteurs fondateurs du futur espace stratégique de l'Europe s'articulent autour des tendances bien opposées : celles de décomposition et de désintégration et celles de recomposition et d'intégration politique et économique du continent.

Parmi les facteurs politiques on trouve les forces profondes des bouleversant le jeu stratégiques européen : multiplication et diversification des Etats et des communautés non-étatique, augmentation croissante des espaces stratégiques et l'émergence des zones à la sécurité très inégale, la réintroduction du phénomène de jeu des nationalismes et de balance des puissances, la "renationalisation" des politiques d'Etats.

En dépit des prévisions, la puissance militaire continue de jouer un rôle très important. Elle demeure et demeurera une carte maîtresse pour plusieurs Etats et régimes. D'énormes quantités d'armes de toutes natures y compris de destruction massive sont déployées en Europe alors que s'affaiblissent (et parfois même disparaissent) les pouvoirs ayant vocation à les contrôler et à appliquer les accords de désarmement. La prolifération des conflits locaux met en valeur les atouts militaires aux yeux des régimes ayant une ancienne culture de conflit armé et un savoir-faire jouer la force militaire.

Un développement économique anarchique dessine en Europe des zones très différenciées : monde riche, zones de décollage économique, zones d'économie chaotique, trous noirs de faillite économique. Les lignes de fractures économiques peuvent compromettre l'avenir du continent et sa sécurité. Dans ce monde divisé et opposé, le facteur économique et la puissance économique peuvent facilement se transformer en instrument de domination, d'hégémonie, de blocus, d'embargo et de guerre économique.

Pour des raisons très différentes, la Russie et les Etats-Unis, deux grands acteurs de la stratégie européenne, sont de fait marginalisés et ont perdu leur centralité politique absolue en Europe. Bien qu'ils y restent en tant qu'acteurs les plus importants. Certes, la Russie est et restera la puissance continentale. Mais autant elle conserve les moyens politiques, économiques et militaires d'imposer son ombre à l'espace ex-soviétique, autant pour les années à venir elle ne dispose plus des possibilités d'imposer sa volonté à tout le continent.

La présence et l'influence des Etats-Unis en Europe sont en profonde modification. Militairement, économiquement et politiquement, le poids américain eu Europe diminue et les Etats-Unis s'estiment plutôt extérieur à plusieurs conflits, crises et problèmes européens. On voit se dessiner les objectifs stratégiques américains en Europe : éliminer toute menace liée avec l'avenir des armes nucléaires stratégiques de l'ex-U.R.S.S. par le dialogue privilégié avec Moscou et éviter l'émergence de pôles de puissance rivaux de l'hégémonie américaine (la Russie, l'Europe de l'Ouest ou l'Allemagne).

Marginalisation relative de deux grands acteurs et le vide géopolitique au Centre et au Sud-Est de l'Europe favorisent l'émergence de deux nouvelles puissances-clées pour la sécurité européenne : l'Allemagne et la Turquie dont ressources économiques, dynamique politique, traditions historiques et situations géostratégiques représentent une base solide de l'influence/domination (?) à exercer/imposer (?) en Europe Centrale, dans les Balkans et dans le bassin de la Mer Noire.

Enfin, au fur et à mesure que l'Union Européenne se constitue en entité politique pouvant avoir une stratégie pour le continent tout entier, elle se transforme en acteur majeur du Destin de l'Europe.

II - LE SYSTEME DE SECURITE EUROPEEN.

Dans l'état actuel des choses, aucune institution européenne n'apporte de solution pleinement satisfaisante aux nouveaux défis en matière de sécurité. Chacune d'entre elles fût créée pour intervenir sur une situation qui a disparu : l'Alliance Atlantique pour répondre à la menace soviétique, la Communauté Européenne pour gérer la reconstruction d'une Europe bornée par le rideau de fer, la C.S.C.E. pour aménager la confrontation entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Dans cette mutation du continent, la C.S.C.E. a échoué à occuper une place centrale, la Communauté Européenne est en profonde autoredéfinition encore inachevée, l'O.T.A.N. cherche son visage nouveau qui lui échappe toujours. Malgré les transformations parfois frappantes de ces institutions, leur activité s'est révélée marginale et parfois incohérente au regard des véritables problèmes de sécurité en Europe. Le cas de l'ex-Yougoslavie est plus évident. Le cas plus lourd par ses conséquences pourrait être l'impuissance contre le défi d'une recomposition indispensable de l'Europe Centrale et Orientale, de la reconstruction de tout l'ensemble européen.

La complexité de la situation européenne à venir laisse peu de place aux grands concepts. Mais l'objectif d'une recomposition générale des rapports entre les unités politiques (surtout à l'Est du continent) doit en dépit de tout être maintenu. Il a fort peu de chances de se réaliser rapidement, mais il est le seul mouvement rationnel pour stabiliser un espace explosif et prendre en charge ses problèmes de sécurité, de développement économique ou de transition politique.

Le grand débat sur l'architecture européenne est difficile. On peut imaginer une recomposition du continent qui affirmerait à la fois l'unité de l'Europe et sa diversité. Telle architecture pourrait se constituer non comme une structure hiérarchique ayant un "organe dirigeant" (que ce soit l'O.T.A.N. ou la C.S.C.E.), mais sur une base multi-institutionnelle. Il ne manque pas de références à l'exigence de complémentarité et d'imbrécation entre les institutions de sécurité. Mais autant cette approche du "concert" ou du "consensus" institutionnel est viable, autant il est difficile d'harmoniser la redistribution des tâches et des fonctions stratégiques entre les organismes de sécurité en vue du jeu complexe des contradictions et des rivalités existantes, surtout pour ce qui concerne les relations euro-atlantiques et le rôle de la Russie. Le problème de rivalité renvoie à des enjeux stratégiques liés aux divergences d'intérêts nationaux des puissances impliquées. D'autant

plus, la dérive évidente vers l'occidentalisation institutionnelle en matière de sécurité européenne (bien qu'aujourd'hui elle est bien naturelle et même désirable) pourrait provoquer demain un nouveau shisme du continent.

A cet égard, la C.S.C.E. (bien qu'elle demeure avec 52 membres une organisation lourde, dont l'action reste compromise par l'absence des moyens d'intervention propre) constitue pour l'instant l'amorce la plus équilibrée et cohérente du système de sécurité paneuropéenne avec des liens transatlantiques, la C.S.C.E. pourrait se transformer en un encadrement généralisé de stabilisation et de recomposition du continent. Dans le cadre du système général peuvent s'articuler l'O.T.A.N., le C.O.C.O.N.A., l'U.E.O. en tant que des piliers de sécurité indispensables ; un certain nombre d'ententes économiques et politiques régionales constitueraient des acteurs relativement homogènes - dont l'Union Européenne représente l'archétype et le centre de gravité - en voie de rapprochement réciproque ; une institutionalisation très diversifiée et complexe des accords régionaux, organisations spécialisées. Le croisement entre ces plusieurs niveaux et volets pourrait constituer un ciment de l'architecture européenne.

La C.S.C.E. mérite d'être revitalisée. Sa qualité d'organisation régionale de sécurité collective associée aux Nations Unies conformément au chapitre VIII de la Charte, la C.S.C.E. pourrait à terme prendre le relais de l'O.N.U. comme principal maître d'œuvre d'éventuelles actions de maintien de la paix en Europe. Des solutions très diverses peuvent effectivement être envisagées pour la mise sur pied de mécanismes de prévention et de gestion des conflits en Europe. D'aucuns pensent à la mise sur pied d'un Conseil de Sécurité Européen et des "Casques Bleus" européens. D'autres à faire confier ou céder le déploiement des troupes du maintient de la paix à l'O.T.A.N., à l'U.E.O. ou à la Russie. Mais toute dérive vers l'unilatéralisme (russe, américain, occidental) contient le risque de glissement d'une opération de sécurité collective vers une confrontation pure et simple, autrement dit, de faire s'élargir le conflit au lieu de le réduire. La présence de l'O.T.A.N. ou de l'U.E.O. serait difficile à faire admettre dans les territoires de l'ex-U.R.S.S. où se situent les crises qui pourraient être confiées à la C.S.C.E. La dérive russe peut laisser jouer le rôle de "gendarme" dans l'ex-U.R.S.S. A cet égard, le C.O.C.O.N.A. peut servir un cadre plus équilibré au fur et à mesure de son renforcement, universalisation en tant qu'une organisation paneuropéenne, "autonomisation" (sans séparation) de l'O.T.A.N. et rapprochement même institutionnel avec la C.S.C.E.

C'est aussi à l'intérieur de cette C.S.C.E. revitalisée qui pourrait être poursuivi par un autre objectif stratégique : la mise sur pied d'un véritable statut des minorités en Europe. La proposition de l'Union Européenne sur "la stabilité en Europe" qui traiterait de la question des minorités nationales en Europe Centrale et Orientale, fournit une occasion de conjuguer l'initiative française avec le travail de longue haleine de la C.S.C.E.

Le troisième objectif est d'accélérer le processus de désarmement et de reconstitution des appareils de défense. La C.S.C.E. pourrait avoir, ici aussi, en coopération avec le C.O.C.O.N.A., un rôle essentiel pour mettre sur pied une organisation régionale de désarmement.

L'Alliance Atlantique a démontré son efficacité comme mécanisme collectif de défense contre un adversaire commun. Après la disparition de ce dernier, l'O.T.A.N. n'évite guerre sa marginalisation et perd progressivement sa légitimité. Pour l'instant, l'Alliance conserve sa fonction de réassurance contre la menace "résiduelle" de l'Est ou la réapparition éventuelle d'une nouvelle menace centrale pour les Etats-membres. Certes, l'Alliance Atlantique demeure un facteur important de stabilité à l'absence duquel se formerait en Europe un "trou" stratégique, un vide à tout point de vue dangereux, surtout que l'avenir de la Russie reste imprévisible et le rôle et la place de l'Allemagne restent indéterminées.

L'O.T.A.N. avec ses expériences de coopération, ses structures développées et ses forces considérables pourrait contribuer largement à l'émergence du nouveau système de sécurité collective en Europe, d'une organisation régionale de sécurité multilatéral non plus destinée à contenir un ennemi extérieur, mais à faire respecter des normes dans les relations entre Etats et à veiller au règlement pacifiques des conflits entre ses membres.

A cet égard, l'Alliance Atlantique a su se donner au-delà de son rôle traditionnel de défense commune, des missions nouvelles qui correspondent aux défis de l'après-guerre froide : le dialogue et le partenariat avec l'Est dans le cadre du C.O.C.O.N.A. et la possibilité de contribuer à la sécurité collective en Europe en liaison avec l'O.N.U. et la C.S.C.E.

La modification la plus importante de l'O.T.A.N. réside dans l'ouverture vers les pays de l'Est, par le biais du C.O.C.O.N.A. avec la mission de renforcer

la stabilité en Europe Centrale et Orientale et dans toute la région européenne, en représentant un encadrement pour le dialogue, la consultation et la mise sur pied de projets conjoints. On peut considérer le C.O.C.O.N.A. comme une sorte d'école de formation pour les pays de l'Est.

Mais dans ce cas, le C.O.C.O.N.A. ne peut être qu'une organisation transitoire et nécessite une transformation considérable afin de lui rendre la finalité politique à long terme :

- faire évoluer le C.O.C.O.N.A. d'un club de "16 membres permanents et 22 membres invités" en organisation rassemblant tous les participants sur un pied d'égalité ;
- le transformer d'un simple appendice de l'O.T.A.N. qui double les activités des autres institutions existantes en Europe, en organisation de plus en plus autonomes (conservant les liens naturels avec l'O.T.A.N.) à vocation paneuropéenne ;
- renforcement du C.O.C.O.N.A. et son élargissement vers d'autres pays de la C.S.C.E. ;
- son rapprochement, même institutionnel avec la C.S.C.E. et leur coopération intime pour déboucher sur l'émergence d'un système de sécurité collectif paneuropéen et euroatlantique.

Enfin, l'Alliance Atlantique a assumé des nouvelles missions en offrant ses services et ceux du C.O.C.O.N.A. aux Nations Unies et à la C.S.C.E. pour des opérations de maintien, d'établissement et d'imposition de la paix au niveau paneuropéen. Pour l'instant, l'O.T.A.N. avec sa combinaison unique des ressources politiques et militaires, de l'expérience demeure indispensable à la préservation de l'ordre en Europe. Mais les réticences américaines et de pays ouest-européens s'engagent concrètement (l'exemple de l'ex-Yougoslavie) démontrent à l'évidence que l'alliance ne serait nécessairement mobilisante au profit des conflits multiples et divers en Europe.

D'autant plus, l'"otanisation" ou "l'occidentalisation" excessive d'une opération de maintien de la paix comporte le risque d'une dérive vers une opération de rétablissement de la paix, voir la guerre. La prétention de l'O.T.A.N. à un rôle de décision politique en matière de maintien de la paix avec une implication politique et militaire trop directe et trop visible comporte aussi un risque d'un discrédit de l'O.T.A.N. en tant que l'organisation de sécurité en Europe et d'effondrement du système de sécurité paneuropéen. C'est pourquoi il est important que toute opération de

maintient de la paix et de rétablissement de la paix soit placée sous l'autorité et le contrôle de l'O.N.U. et de la C.S.C.E. On peut préciser les conditions selon lesquelles l'O.N.U. et la C.S.C.E. pourraient emprunter les forces et les moyens de l'O.T.A.N. ainsi que l'articulation entre l'Alliance et les organisations de sécurité collective en ce qui concerne le contrôle politique. L'O.T.A.N. a vocation d'être une "société de service" en matière de maintien de la paix.

La programme de coopération du C.O.C.O.N.A. en matière de maintien de la paix pourrait engendrer la capacité et les moyens d'une action commune des Etats-membres. Le C.O.C.O.N.A., l'organisation paneuropéenne, en coopération intime avec l'O.T.A.N. et la C.S.C.E. pourrait constituer un cadre cohérent pour ces nouvelles missions de maintien de la paix et de rétablissement de la paix.

Le problème de l'élargissement de l'Alliance Atlantique à l'Est a été beaucoup agité ces derniers temps. Plusieurs pays de l'Europe Centrale et Orientale considèrent que la seule adhésion à l'O.T.A.N. - ou à défaut de sérieuses garanties de l'Alliance - peuvent combler le vide stratégiques dans cette partie de l'Europe et satisfaire leurs propres besoins de sécurité. Sans mettre en doute le bien-fondé du problème réel du vide géostratégique et institutionnel du Centre Europe et les souhaits légitimes et motivés des pays intéressés, on peut estimer que l'élargissement de l'O.T.A.N. vers l'Est comportent de sérieux problèmes :

- l'O.T.A.N. reste dans ses principes, une coalition militaro-politique destinée à la défense commune des Etats-membres. En l'absence d'un adversaire d'un adversaire commun l'O.T.A.N. est fort peu mobilisable à l'expansion de "garantie de sécurité" comme en prévoit l'article V du Traité de Washington ;
- une adhésion sélective, en acceptant certains candidats et en en refusant d'autres, semble aujourd'hui politiquement difficilement défendable ;
- créer de nouveaux rideaux au sein du C.O.C.O.N.A. et de nouvelles divisions en Europe signifierait enterrer le C.O.C.O.N.A. et saper les fondements d'une architecture politico-militaire paneuropéenne ;
- enfin, en l'état actuel des choses, qu'elle peut être la garantie de sécurité donnée à ces pays par l'Alliance ? Elle relève essentiellement du discours et de la réassurance psychologique. Une fois encore, la crise yougoslave parle d'elle-même.

Dans le contexte géostratégique actuel en Europe, l'élargissement

prématuré de l'Alliance pourrait multiplier des problèmes de sécurité au lieu de les limiter.

Dans cette Europe en pleine turbulence, l'Union Européenne constitue un pôle de stabilité et de prospérité sans équivalent que chaque Etat européen non membre souhaite rejoindre. L'Union pourrait se cristalliser en un acteur stratégique organisé, pouvant aider par son exemple et par ses décisions à la stabilité et la sécurité du continent européen.

Puissance et stabilité économique de l'Europe des Douze tout d'abord, pouvant aider les nouveaux Etats de l'Europe Centrale et Orientale dans leurs développement économique et démocratique. Ce rôle de ferment économique d'un système paneuropéen à construire, ne peut être à l'évidence joué, ni par l'Alliance Atlantique, ni par le C.O.C.A.N. L'Union Européenne pourrait contribuer largement à la revitalisation de la "corbeille" économique de la C.S.C.E. qui n'offre aujourd'hui qu'une plate-forme de débats très insuffisante pour la réflexion sur les économies en transition.

Stabilité politique, ensuite. L'exemple le plus réussit - c'est la guerre ou même la menace militaire qui sont devenues impossibles entre Etats-membres de l'Union, dont les sociétés sont économiques plutôt que militaires, de coopération plutôt que de confrontation. La vocation de l'Union Européenne consiste à faire étendre sa posibilité pacifique vers l'Europe entière. Par sa force d'attraction, qu'elle exerce sur tous les Etats européens, l'Union Européenne est en mesure de renforcer voire d'imposer une espèce de stabilité et de sécurité en Europe. Il reste à en trouver la plupart des mécanismes et des moyens les plus cohérents. L'initiative récente des Douze d'organiser une "conférence sur la stabilité en Europe" pourrait en constituer un pas important.

L'Union Européenne représente ainsi pour toute l'Europe un modèle d'ensemble démocratique qui a posé l'entente et la coopération entre les Etats comme une condition essentielle de leur propre survie et prospérité. D'où l'idée d'une Grande Europe structurée comme un ensemble d'un nombre de foyers de concertation, de coopération et d'intégration qui s'articulent et se rapprochent vers l'Union Européenne en tant que des pôles comparables. L'Europe de l'Est donne déjà les premiers exemples, encore timides et insuffisants, de ce raisonnement en termes de regroupement et de solidarité, de l'émergence de nouvelles formes de concertation régionale avec le

lancement du groupe de Visegraad, du Conseil de Coopération des Etats Baltes, de la zone de coopération économique de la Mer Noire, de la C.E.I.

Certes, aujourd'hui l'Union Européenne n'a guerre de moyens de peser sur les crises régionales et en tout cas pas de moyens militaires.

La coopération rénovée entre la Communauté et l'U.E.O., le processus d'autonomisation de cette dernière par rapport à l'Alliance Atlantique, l'émergence d'une identité européenne de sécurité et de défense ainsi que l'élaboration de la P.E.S.C. n'en sont pas à un degré tel que l'Europe des Douze dispose un volant des forces militaires et des mécanismes politiques efficaces pouvant assurer les opérations de maintien de la paix en Europe.

Dans ces conditions, l'Union Européenne ne saurait être qu'une des acteurs importants parmi d'autres s'efforçant de construire une Grande Europe de stabilité et de sécurité. Mais on peut affirmer que les principaux canaux de l'intégration paneuropéenne, de la coopération économique et politique, du rapprochement substantiel de l'Europe Occidentale vers l'Europe Centrale et Orientale passent par l'Union Européenne.

D'où l'intérêt commun de tous les Européens voire en Europe des Douze un pôle à la fois autonome et ouvert, économiquement, politiquement, militairement susceptible de jouer un rôle majeur de la restructuration de l'espace européen entier. Il est indispensable d'articuler l'édification de l'Union Européenne avec la construction de la Grande Europe.

III - CONSIDERATIONS

Aucun projet d'architecture européenne de sécurité n'est capable de prévoir l'extraordinaire complexité de devenir des pays de la Grande Europe. Pour les années à venir il serait indispensable de conserver et de perfectionner les institutions européennes existantes en matière de coopération et de sécurité :

- la C.S.C.E. revitalisée comme ossature et toit de l'édifice européen, le renforcement de son caractère fédérateur paneuropéen, création d'une espèce de Conseil de sécurité européen ;
- l'O.T.A.N., semi-extension vers l'Est : politique plutôt que militaire, clarification de nouvelles missions : partenariat avec les pays non-

membres de l'Alliance et la contribution à l'émergence du système de sécurité paneuropéen ;

- le C.O.C.O.N.A. - son renforcement et son autonomisation, la vocation paneuropéenne en matière de sécurité et de maintien de la paix, son rapprochement même institutionnel avec la C.S.C.E. ;
- l'Union Politique - double extension, d'abord économique et politique ensuite ; préparation des modalités de l'élargissement graduel à long terme ;
- l'U.E.O. - émergence de l'identité européenne de sécurité et de défense en coopération avec l'O.T.A.N. et le pays non-membres ;
- le Conseil de l'Europe - vocation paneuropéenne en matière de respect des droits de l'Homme et de la démocratie ;
- l'Europe Centrale et Orientale : l'émergence et le renforcement des foyers régionaux de concertation, de coopération et d'intégration économique et politique en vue de la recomposition progressive de cette partie d'Europe et de la création de vrais pôles comparables avec l'Union Politique. Leurs rapprochements croissants.

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Conference on

THE INTERACTION OF THE EU AND NATO: ADAPTING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION TO THE NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE

THE ROLE OF EUROPEAN/ATLANTIC SECURITY INSTITUTION: PERCEPTIONS FROM THE CSCE COUNTRIES

A view from **Latvia** by

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Palazzo Salviati
Rome, 21-22 January 1994

Introduction: Baltic premises

The collapse of the Soviet empire brought about the restoration of independence for the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania which had disappeared from the map of the world since World War 2.

Although the Baltic states sought independence before the demise of the Empire through their initial declaration of restored independence in March - May, 1990, no state in the Transatlantic - European security system (with the possible exception of Iceland *vis-a-vis* Lithuania), was ready to recognize the sovereign will of the Baltic peoples. Member-states of the Western security system that came into being as a product of the Cold War followed a policy of "the USSR first" in its dealings with forces opposed to the Empire even though they had not recognized the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union in 1940.

The independence of the Baltic states was only recognized after the coup attempt in 1991, after Russia first granted recognition on August 24. Finland and Denmark renewed recognition on the same day, France , Great Britain, Germany, Sweden on the 22th, the USA on September 2, four days before the disintegrating USSR did so.

The three Baltic states are, according to still prevalent theories of international relations "weak" states with no tangible power base elements, i.e., those physical and human resources which are commonly understood as the constituents of military and economic capability.[1] What they have are the so-called intangible power base elements, diplomatic skills, prestige and reputation as peace-loving

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1. K. Goldmann and G. Sjostedt, "Power, Capabilities, Independence", London, 1979

countries that have never used force against other states other than to defend themselves when attacked. Even in the struggle against the Empire in the closing days of its existence, Balts did not succumb to the temptation to use force against the provocative attacks of the Soviet Ministry of Interior black berets (OMON) : their struggle was based solely on non-violent methods.[2]

Especially important for the Baltic states in trying to influence the changing European strategic landscape are international norms as enshrined in the UN charter and the CSCE process. However, the historical experience of the Balts teaches them that international norms are a function of what the so-called "strong" states consider to be their vital national interests. In any case, because of lack of financial resources and the fact that the Baltics did not exist for 50 years, a new diplomatic elite is still only in the making.

Despite these disadvantages, the Baltic states do now exist and with their 170 000 square kilometers do take up space in Europe. In the debate about a new emerging security system in Europe to replace the old one they can point out that traditional thinking of what constitutes security led to the rise of Europe's division and ultimately to Eastern and Central European backwardness which is also a cause of insecurity in Europe today. Had the Western democracies drawn the right conclusions in 1940 when the Soviet Union occupied and then incorporated the Baltic states , we would not be gathered here in Rome and talking about the changed European strategic landscape after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. The division of Europe would never have taken place.

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2. D. Eglitis, Nonevident Action in the Liberation of Latvia, Monograph series nr. 5, The Albert Enstein Foundation, 1993.

Baltic security apprehensions today are that by following a policy of (once again) "we first" and "Russia first", the Transatlantic-European security community is following the traditional path toward a division of Europe.

The Strategic Situation

I see three main risks that are or will be influencing the European security environment: a resurgent Russian empire, this time under the banner of xenophobic nationalism that will first try to "reclaim" its "near abroad", and then try to gain paramount influence in Eastern Central Europe, including the three Baltic states. Complementary to this is the risk emanating from the various mafia, or organized crime syndicates in Russia that is already posing a threat not only to Russian civil society itself, the weak governments around the periphery of Russia, but also the Transatlantic community through the merging of Eastern and Western mafia groups.

The third risk is the debacle in the former Yugoslavia and this on two counts: it demonstrates to other would-be aggressors in Europe that aggression pays and shows to the Muslim world that the Christian world, by implementing a policy of arms embargo against a victim of aggression, is not impartial to the savage war in Bosnia-Hercegovina. This does not have to be the actual case: it may be simply wrong political decision-making on the part of the Transatlantic states, but if I were a Muslim, I would perceive it as such. How this will effect European security in the future is not clear, but history shows that past perceived wrongs have a way of reappearing sooner or later as Soviet aggression against Afghanistan demonstrates. Without a doubt, Russia today has a problem with the Muslim world community.

The political, economic and military factors that I expect will significantly effect European security are those leading or not leading to a European Union. The war

in Bosnia-Hercegovina shows that by not initially demonstrating a common approach to the break-up of Yugoslavia , the European states have themselves fallen into disarray *vis-a-vis* the boomerang effect the continuing war in Bosnia - Hercegovina is having on European and American politics. The lack of leadership and will on the part of European leaders in this connection may lead to timidity in coping with security challenges posed to the former Warsaw pact countries in Eastern Europe, including the Baltic states. A positive departure from this attitude was the sending of peace-keeping forces to Macedonia.

Undoubtedly, the economic recession in Europe also is an important factor - no mass demonstrations against what is happening in Sarajevo are being witnessed in European streets - instead rather ugly racist attacks on foreigners take place.

The key country for European security is, of course, the Unite States, and if the USA left Europe, I am afraid we would be back where we were in the early 1920's. Fortunately, this is not going to happen as reaffirmed by president Clinton's first trip to Europe early this year. The other key actor is Russia, but more in the negative than positive sense, unless it renounces its aim of partial restoration of the Empire.[3] In between we have the third key country - a united Germany, that, "unlike France or Great Britain, cannot afford the luxury of a decade - long debate about the future, Germany cannot live with a wild East on its frontiers." [4]

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3. A. Arbatov, "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives", *International Security*, (Fall, 1993), p. 42.
4. Jonathan Eyal, "Tell Them That the Cold War's Over", *The Spectator*, (November 1993), p.10.

With regard to weapons of mass destruction, it does not matter whether one or ten atomic bombs hit Latvia - with its small population and size it would be completely destroyed on both accounts. What Latvia can do in this regard is to tighten its Eastern border so that Latvia does not become a transit country for nuclear materials and mass weapons of destruction. But here Latvia, together with Estonia and Lithuania, will need more technical support from the West.

European Security System

When debating the need of an encompassing security system for Europe and the future role of the various collective security and defence organizations that arose during the course of the Cold War one must first sort out problems of a conceptual nature. I alluded to these already in my introduction, but Dieter Mahncke from the WEU Institute for Security Studies puts the problem in a nutshell: European security first and foremost means that the Western allies want to make sure their security is maintained. Beyond that they are interested in overall European stability, primarily as a favorable environment for their own security. Only in the third place is there the idea of extending the type of western security regime eastward to benefit the East Europeans, again being aware that the extension of the regime would enhance stability, which in turn enhances Western European security. [5]

The Partnership for Peace program offered by NATO after its January summit meeting in Brussels is apparently the mechanism for implementing the Western security concept as defined by Mahncke.

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5. Dieter Mahncke, "Parameters of European Security", *Chaillot Papers* Nr.10, (September 1993) , WEU Institute for Strategic Studies, p.7.

This Partnership for Peace will be endorsed by all three Baltic countries and even before the summit the Commander of the Latvian Armed Forces Col. Dainis Turlais had ordered Latvia's armed forces to be reorganized on NATO organizational principles.

In my view the NATO initiative places it in the forefront of other security organizations in taking responsibility for European security: though the UN and CSCE are vital security organizations for the Baltic states, they do not offer the prospect of security guarantees as eventual membership in NATO will do. Although the UN and the CSCE provide important support for the Baltic states, particularly Estonia and Latvia, against Russian allegations of human rights violations in these countries, they are, in the final analysis, collective security and not collective defence organizations. Collective security organizations have never worked except in cases when a weak state attacks another weak state (Iraq/ Kuwait) and the interests of strong states do not collide.

This is clearly seen from the attempts by the Baltics to gain support for the Baltic Regional Table at the CSCE Vienna Security Forum. The aim of such a Table would be to overcome conceptual barriers fostered by the Cold War and make the Baltic region a whole region without a dividing line running through it separating East from West. This would be a subregional arrangement within the new pan-European security system that would involve other European regional powers besides states around the Baltic Sea, i.e. Great Britain, Germany and - as a key actor in European security - the USA to balance Russia which dwarfs its Baltic region neighbors. Yet there are no takers for this idea because no western state is ready to be involved in any sanctions mechanism without which the Table would have little meaning.

The CSCE, nevertheless is important and would still have a future role in cases when all parties agree that force would be counterproductive and problems must be solved by political and diplomatic means as, indeed, is being done in the Baltic states presently by the CSCE with regard to the Russian troop withdrawal and minority questions. But in order to make the CSCE more effective, countries that do not belong to the Transatlantic space like the Central Asian republics of the FSU should be excluded. They belong to another geographic and political region with its own special set of security problems and concerns.

Only a collective defence organization like NATO which has the means to implement sanctions of a military nature can solve European security concerns embracing the whole European space. Russia should appreciate NATO's stabilizing role on it border: Russia's border with Europe would be the only stable border it has which should encourage Russia to cooperate with an enlarged NATO since this would correspond to Russia's security interests. Russia's southern borders are not stable for reasons indicated earlier and I agree with Dr. Sergei Karaganov that it is only a question of time before China will raise its territorial claims against Russia [6] and, because of population pressures, start transferring its peoples to the empty space north of its borders. 25 million Russians were displaced by Stalin and Brezhnev outside of Russia in order to russify non-Russian areas in the Empire and it is a riddle for me why democratic Russia, apart from local governments in the depopulated areas of Russia, are not facilitating their return - unless it is to continue the policies of the former Empire under a different cover.

The Baltic states understand that NATO's Partnership for Peace is an entry ticket to NATO: the question then to be answered is whether there is time for the *de facto*

6.Sergei A. Karaganov, Russia Towards 'Enlightened Post-Imperialism', in: W. Weidenfeld and J. Janning (eds.) "Europe in Global Change", Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, Gutersloh, 1993.

integration into NATO before a *de jure* admission is made? According to some Baltic analysts and politicians there are only two years, i.e. until 1996 when the next Russian presidential elections take place, before the Baltic states will face ultimatums similar to those in 1939 and 1940.

But the Balts may not have to wait that long. On January 18 at a meeting of Russian ambassadors to the CIS and Baltic states the Russian foreign minister A . Kozyrev equated the Baltics with the CIS states where Russia has vital national interests. A complete withdrawal of Russian troops from them would create a "security vacuum" which would be then filled by "hostile forces" to Russia.[7]

Kozyrev appears to have turned 180° degrees - shortly before president Clinton's visit to Moscow he said that there is no security vacuum in Europe and there are no hostile forces. [8] Does this mean that Russia will not withdraw its remaining troops from Estonia and Latvia? If so, the gauntlet has been cast to all the existing security organizations that have called for a speedy withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic states.

In concluding I would like to repeat what I said at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs' seminar in commemoration of Latvia's 75th independence anniversary: While fast approaching the 21st century, influential political forces in Moscow have learned little from the rise and fall of empires in the 20th century, and still cling to 19th century modes of thinking, national security concepts. This is the right recipe for more wars and instability, because any stability brought about against the will of the people will only be a parody of stability and certainly not stability of an enduring nature. Two great wars and several revolutions in this century should have taught us that.

I would like to add here that perhaps outmoded security concepts are a problem for the West too.

7.Jānis Kulmanis,M.Ķibilds, "Kozyrev:The Army Has to Stay in the FSU Territory",*Diena*, (January,19, 1993)
8. Andrej Kosyrew," Partnershaft fur ein geeintes, friedliches und demokratisches Europa", *Frankfurter Rundschau*, (January 8, 1994).

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Istituto Affari Internazionali | Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik

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Conference on

THE INTERACTION OF THE EU AND NATO: ADAPTING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION TO THE NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE

THE ROLE OF EUROPEAN/ATLANTIC SECURITY INSTITUTION: PERCEPTIONS FROM THE CSCE COUNTRIES

A view from **Austria** by

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Palazzo Salviati
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1. The Strategic Situation

It is stating the obvious to point out that contrary to initial optimistic expectations, the collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the ensuing end of the Cold War have not enhanced stability and security in Europe - the opposite is unfortunately true.

As regards military security, the bipolar system to which the Cold War had given rise had one, albeit dubious advantage. Because of the disastrous consequences which a military confrontation was also bound to entail for the eventually "victorious" aggressor, an armed clash between the two blocs or their individual members was highly improbable. The logic of deterrence also applied to a military conflict on the conventional level, since the side that was on the verge of defeat was likely to escalate the showdown across the nuclear threshold.

Today, resort to armed force can again be limited, both geographically and with respect to the means used. To make matters worse, conflict potential, both old and new, abounds especially in Eastern Europe and may erupt into intra- or inter-State armed violence. On the one hand, the cold War had merely "frozen", but not eliminated, traditional ethnic, religious, or territorial disputes, whose roots often date back to past centuries. On the other hand, modern socio-economic tensions which are caused by economic difficulties, as well as the crisis of the new democratic

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* This paper tries to address most of the points raised in the questionnaire. However, the answers to some questions are obvious so that there seems to be need to develop them further. Other issues are more complex, and they are therefore dealt with in more detail.

institutions, for which traditions and genuine popular commitment are lacking, add to the explosiveness of those "classic" causes of conflict.

The situation is further aggravated by the attitude of other, above all the Western countries. Professions of faith to the contrary - such as in the 1990 CSCE Charter of Paris for a New Europe - notwithstanding, they obviously consider security divisible. This was borne out by the Western response - or rather lack of (effective) response - to the use of armed force in former Yugoslavia.

For the West European countries, the principal military threat is not that of a major direct attack by ex-WTO members. Rather, countries close to the former Iron Curtain may be faced with a possible spillover of armed hostilities from their neighbors. This is a challenge with which they ought to be able to cope on their own, provided they take their national defense seriously enough.

In addition, more than ever before, security must today be defined in a broad sense. In point of fact, non-military risks and threats hve moved to center stage: the consequences of mass migration for security, ecological disasters, in particular nuclear hazards, political or religious terrorism and internationalized, professionalized and organized crime for non-political purposes.

Since most contemporary threats and dangers are interrelated, it is difficult to identify the factor(s) which has/have the most decisive impact on European security; the same applies to the appropriate responses to those challenges. In any event, there is one aspect whose security implications tend to be overlooked or at least underrated: the results of the economic transformation processes in the former Communist countries. If the transition to a market economy does not very soon lead to tangible improvements of the average living standards, widespread disappointment and social tension could well bring populist and nationalist forces to power. They must be expected not only to slow down or even cancel domestic reforms but also to steer a collision course in foreign policy. If any further evidence of this danger had been needed, the results of the elections in Russia in December 1993 certainly provided it.

Massive Western assistance to the reformist countries would therefore not only make economic sense, because it will contribute to creating additional attractive markets for the donors in a mid-term perspective; it ought also to be perceived as an important investment in European security. The main difficulty lies, of course, in achieving the necessary popular support for such large-scale aid: How can Western public opinion be convinced of the need for measures such as the granting of substantial credits and loans or the opening of Western markets to the competitive products of the East, especially in a period of structural recession and high unemployment?

As regards individual countries, it is not hard to identify the main sources of instability and insecurity in contemporary Europe. Because of the magnitude of the problems it could cause, the Russian Federation is mentioned first in this context. As was already mentioned, the results of the December 1993 parliamentary elections bode ill, even if the party supporting President Yeltsin, Russia's Choice, eventually obtained the highest number of seats in the Duma. It is unclear whether time works for the success of durable democratization and, above all, of the introduction of a market economy, or whether stagnation or even a further decline in living standards will play into the hands of the Communists and the "Liberal Democrats."

Since a genuine improvement of the living conditions in Russia is an expensive and time-consuming endeavor, President Yeltsin may be tempted to rally the majority of his compatriots behind him by meeting some demands of the nationalist opposition in the field of foreign policy.[1]

Such "concessions" could be all the easier because many reformers also call for the protection of Russian minorities in former Soviet republics and for a zone of influence and security for their country. The first type of demand is at times understandable. Like many of their Western counterparts, Russian politicians tend to speak with two voices, depending on the audience they address - especially on whether it is international or domestic. Russian imperialism has much

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1 Alexei Arbatov, Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives, International Security 18, No 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 5-43; S. Neil MacFarlane, Russia, the West and European Security, Survival 35, No 3 (Autumn 1993), pp. 3-25.

older roots than its Soviet version on behalf of spreading Communism. In fact, pan-Slavism and the mission of freeing Orthodox populations dates back to past centuries.

Moreover, despite its serious internal difficulties and the loss of its "Soviet empire", Russia remains a great military power, both on the conventional and nuclear levels. Futhermore, the military's hand has been strengthened in the wake of the bloody showdown between President Yeltsin and parliament in October 1993. The best way to satisfy the armed forces and to prevent the negative consequences of their demoralization and marginalization is to assign them operational tasks such as "peacekeeping missions" in the "new abroad" - missions which differ from the usual operations under the UN flag in that they also serve the hegemonial ambitions of the country providing peacekeeping troops. The way Russia exploited its overwhelming military superiority in the civil war in Georgia and in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, playing cat and mouse with the parties involved, illustrated this point. Finally, the new military doctrine approved in November 1993 by the Russian Security Council is anything but reassuring in this respect. Among the external threats to Russia, the new concept mentions the suppression of the rights and legitimate interests of Russian citizens living abroad; it also includes not only defensive but also offensive options for the Russian Federation's armed forces.

Politically, President Yeltsin and his government can transform their relative domestic weakness into strength on the foreign policy level. Moves which are unacceptable in principle to the West can be presented as inevitable concessions to rein in political forces which would embark on a conflictual foreign policy if they came to power.

The West ought not simply to look the other way or limit itself to verbal condemnations and essentially symbolic gestures as it did in the conflicts in former Yugoslavia if Russia chose an expansionist foreign policy. If the West does not respond appropriately, it will do so at its own risk and peril and not just at the cost of the direct victims. Granted, Mr. Zhirinovsky, who wants

Russia to share a common border with Germany, is not (yet) in power[2]; yet it is high time for the West to reconsider its Russian policy. One may wonder whether it is wise to stake all one's hopes on a single person, namely Mr. Yeltsin, without developing any alternatives should he fail or not listen to Western reason.[3]

In addition to other problems, the West's Ostpolitik is complicated by an obvious dilemma. On the one hand, Russian leadership is apt to contribute to desirable stability in a volatile region. On the other hand, such a leading role, even if short of resort to military force, may amount to unacceptable intervention contrary to the sovereignty and the principle of self-determination of the peoples in the States subjected to Russian influence. The line between welcome stabilization and illegal interference might be difficult to draw.

The second major "problem child" is Ukraine. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the emergence of a new European middle power in terms of size, population, natural resources and also military potential. At this writing, Ukraine still ranks third among the nuclear-weapon States in the world.[4] It is true, however, that these weapons are under Russian control and cannot be launched by Ukraine. What is more, Ukraine has recently agreed to remove nuclear weapons from its soil. From a general European viewpoint, this Ukrainian move is no doubt to be welcomed. However, if the agreement is actually implemented, Ukraine will throw away its major international political trump card. It (and the rest of Europe) can only hope that it does not thereby put its security at risk. Ukrainian anxieties are not unfounded, because non only "Red-Brown" nationalists and imperialists but also many Russian reformist democrats view Ukraine as a natural part of Russia; after all, Kiev is considered the cradle of the Russian nation and civilization. The situation is further exacerbated by the dismal state of the Ukrainian economy -

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[2] Time, December 27, 1993.

[3] Cf. William Pfaff, A U.S. Foreign Policy Named Boris Yeltsin, International Herald Tribune, January 4, 1993

[4] Cf. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1993-1994 (London 1993); John J. Mearsheimer, The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent, Foreign Affairs 72, No 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 50-66; Steven E. Miller, The Case Against a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent, ibidem, pp. 67-80.

by comparison, Russia appears as a success story - and the ethnic and religious heterogeneity of the country.

That the Balkans remain a powder key is equally obvious. Whatever "solution" to the Bosnian tragedy is eventually agreed on, or rather imposed on the Muslims, will not settle the underlying issues. The physical and psychological wounds inflicted on the parties may take generations to heal. Another outbreak of fighting cannot be excluded. Moreover, the acquisition of Bosnian and Croatian territories by force and "ethnic cleansings" there are unlikely to satisfy the Serb ambitions aiming at a "Greater Serbia." Further repression of the Albanians in Kosovo may therefore be the next step. If it leads to desperate armed resistance, Albania will probably not sit idly by. The resulting international conflict may well draw in other countries, including Greece and Turkey on opposite sides - a nightmare for the other members of NATO as well.[5]

The development or acquisition of weapons of mass destruction - of chemical and biological, as well as nuclear warheads and of long-range delivery systems - is becoming less and less a technological and financial problem but merely a matter of political decision. Saddam Hussein and Kim Il-Sung (or whoever is in charge in North Korea) have sent a disturbing message to this effect. In this connection, the southern "arc of crisis" requires particular attention in spite of the concerns caused by developments in the eastern part of Europe. Crises in the Mediterranean region may evidently have consequences for European security as well - from mass migration to a military spillover. It is in this context that the "clash of civilizations" which Samuel Huntington expects to dominate world politics after the end of ideological conflicts may indeed occur.[6]

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[5] The volatile situation in and around Macedonia could also embroil the Balkan countries in a major conflict.

[6] Samuel. P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs 72, No 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 22-49, and the discussion in the following two issues of Foreign Affairs.

2. Toward a New European System: Concepts and Realities

The features of a desirable European security system are easy to list. Before the eventual establishment of a single genuine system of collective security in Europe, the existing institutions should each contribute as best they can to the maintenance of stability and security by agreeing on an optimal division of labor.

The CSCE should serve as the pan-European forum for political debate, the adoption of additional normative principles and rules for the behavior of participating States, the peaceful settlement of international (and potentially dangerous domestic) disputes and crisis management. This pan-European institution ought also to authorize peacekeeping operations under its auspices, which would be implemented by NATO, the WEU, or the CIS (but not Russia on her own), and to impose at least non-military sanctions against participants who commit blatant major breaches of the "European code of conduct".

The EU should gradually extend membership to applicants who share its political values and who develop market economies that can stand competition within a full-fledged economic and monetary union. Belonging to the Union in itself considerably enhances the security of the country concerned, because an aggressor would have to reckon with collective economic and political countermeasures which all Union members must be expected to take against him. In addition, the Union ought, in due course, embark on a common security policy. One option to achieve this objective would be to transform the WEU into a functioning collective self-defense organization endowed with the necessary infrastructure and joint military forces. In the meantime, the WEU should develop its military muscles along the lines indicated in the 1992 Petersberg Declaration.

For the time being, however, NATO is the only effective security organization in Europe. The desirable evolution of the Atlantic Alliance would include an extension of its protection to former Communist countries and "out-of-area" activities. France would have to rejoin the organization as

a full-fledged ally. Germany should abandon its inhibitions about the use of its forces outside its territory. NATO ought to assure a sufficient U.S. military presence on the Old Continent and to enter into some kind of security partnership or cooperation with Russia. Instead of rivalry and jealousy, the Atlantic Alliance and the WEU should coordinate their activities; NATO ought to take action necessitating U.S. participation, whereas the WEU should deal with problems of a lesser magnitude, which could be solved within a purely European framework.

European security mechanisms would have to be embedded in the universal framework of the United Nations. One major reason is the need of authorization by the Security Council if and when enforcement measures beyond collective self-defense are to be taken. Under Art. 53 of the UN Charter, this requirement also applies to regional arrangements under Chapter VIII, into which the CSCE transformed itself in 1992.

Although all these signposts for the development of the interlocking European security institutions ought to be beyond dispute, they unfortunately belong to the realm of wishful thinking.

The crucial expectation that, after the end of the East-West conflict, all European countries (as well as their North American partners) would be able to agree on a common assessment of challenges, a common definition of their interests and common responses on the basis of a common value platform, has not been borne out by events. On the contrary, the dismal failure of the rest of Europe, especially the West, in the conflicts in former Yugoslavia demonstrated the absence of a common perception and the lack of political will to take any action which was likely to entail substantial costs and losses for those participating in them as well. The point to be made in this connection is to emphasize that the blame for not putting an end to the illegal use of force and large-scale atrocities lies with national governments and not with the international organizations which have been cutting such a poor figure. To restate a truism which, however, is often lost sight of: International institutions are as effective or as impotent as their member States want them to be.

Against this sobering background, a realistic recommendation for the CSCE would be to focus on the actual use and perhaps gradual improvement of its various mechanisms in the fields of crisis management, the protection of human rights and pacific dispute settlement, instead of trying to set up new ones.[7] The comprehensive membership of 53 participating States - more than the initial number of the UN members! - and the consensus rule, which still governs CSCE decision making in principle, make substantial progress toward a genuine security institution rather unlikely. What the CSCE could and should do is to take, together with NATO,the WEU and perhaps also the CIS, concrete steps to translate the provisions of the 1992 Helsinki Decisions on peacekeeping into political and military reality.

As regards the EU, its immediate priority is the admission of the four applicants from the ranks of EFTA; this fourth enlargement of the Community/Union is anything but a foregone conclusion, given the need for a positive outcome of a referendum on EU membership in all four countries. The (hopefully) Sixteen should then "get their act together" in time for the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. One major item on the agenda will be the development of the Union's "defense identity", including the future of the WEU.[8] What progress in this direction can be made at that meeting is today anybody's guess. The question mark concerns not only the future attitude of Austria, Finland, and Sweden, provided these three States eventually join the Union; for the time being, they intend to maintain their redefined (that is, narrowly conceived) neutrality or "not-alignment", coupled with a rather strong independent defense, as EU members.

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[7] Victor-Yves Ghebali, La CSCE à la recherche de son rôle dans la nouvelle Europe, in Mario Telò (ed.), Vers une nouvelle Europe? Towards a New Europe? (Brussels 1992), pp. 49-79; Hanspeter Neuhold, Konflikte und Konfliktregelung im "neuen" Europa (Salzburg 1993); Michael Staak (ed.), Aufbruch nach Gesamteuropa. Die KSZE nach der Wende im Osten (2nd ed., Münster and Hamburg 1993); Heinz Vetschera, Die sicherheitspolitische Rolle der KSZE: Krisenmechanismen, Konfliktverhütung und präventive Diplomatie, Österreichisches Jahrbuch für Internationale Politik 1992 (1993), pp. 92-134.

[8] Alfred Cahen, L'Union de l'Europe occidentale et la sécurité européenne, in: Telò (ed.), op.cit., pp. 253-262.

This position is compatible with the Treaty of Maastricht. Art. J 4 in fact entrusts decisions and actions of the Union with defense implications to the WEU; furthermore, EU members are not obligated to join the WEU. It also remains to be seen whether the twelve countries forming the present Union will subscribe to a common defense system. In the immediate future, the EU's main contribution to European security would seem to be indirect, through assistance to economic and political transformation in the former Communist bloc. The Union ought to coordinate its efforts to this end with other institutions, such as the EBRD, the IMF and the OECD, on the one hand, and the Council of Europe, on the other hand.

It is NATO, however, which is facing the most immediate and urgent challenge: Should it extend its security guarantees to Central and East European countries or not?[9]

A good case can indeed be made for answering this question in the affirmative. If the Atlantic Alliance, a child of the Cold War, does not sufficiently adapt to the new realities, it will become increasingly irrelevant - it it does not go out of area, it will go out of business. The window of opportunity opened by the end of the East-West conflict ought to be exploited by placing the switch of the ex-Communist countries to the Western camp on a solid basis in the critical field of security as well.

A Russian veto to former Soviet satellites joining the Atlantic Alliance would violate their newly acquired sovereignty and would be politically unacceptable. This does not mean that Russia's legitimate security concerns would not be taken into account. Russia should not be isolated but ought be included in a new security partnership governed by such principles as military

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[9] François Heisbourg, The Future of the Atlantic Alliance: Whither NATO, Whether NATO? The Washington Quarterly 15, No 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 127-139; Ronald Asmus/Richard L. Kugler/F. Stephen Larrabee, Building a New NATO; Foreign Affairs 72, No 4 (September/October 1993), pp. 28-40; Owen Harries, The Collapse of the "West", ibidem, pp. 41-53; see also Charles L. Glaser, Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe, International Security 18, No 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 5-50; Uwe Nerlich, Neue Sicherheitsfunktionen der NATO, Europa-Archiv 48, No 23 (1993), pp. 663-672; Michael Rühle, NATO als Instrument des Krisenmanagements, ibidem, pp. 673-680.

transparency and close cooperation in crisis management or peacekeeping. It would be hard to understand why the Russian Federation should worry about instead of appreciating a zone of democracy, prosperity and stability on its Western border.

With respect to Western reservations about NATO's "inheriting" unwelcome conflicts between its new allies, the solution to this problem seems evident: Applicants should not only prove their credentials as stable pluralist democracies and functioning market economies; their admission could also be made conditional on the acceptance of a compulsory system for the peaceful settlement of disputes, the renunciation of territorial claims and the respect for minority rights.

However, these and other arguments evidently do not carry enough weight to sway Western governments is open to doubt. Concerns about Russian susceptibilities appear to prevail over the calls for protection from the Central and other East European countries. Warnings that ignoring Russian security interests will strengthen the hand of the fascist and Communist opposition against President Yeltsin and the other reformers in their domestic power struggle apparently impress decision makers in the West. Thus Mr. Yeltsin got away with his change of mind after his visit to Poland in August 1993. On that occasion, in a joint declaration he accepted Poland's membership in NATO as not contrary to Russian interests, only to oppose an enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance to Eastern Europe soon afterwards.

If NATO disregarded these objections, as it is fully entitled to, it would not only irritate the Russian Federation but would face a credibility problem. This dilemma is exacerbated by the West's appalling record in former Yugoslavia. Granted, it was not bound by alliance pledges vis-à-vis Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Yet instead of at least living up to its repeated declarations that forcible border changes would not be recognized, the West launched the Vance-Owen and other similar plans which flew in the face of these pious statements.[10] Western security commitments would be further weakened by the high costs and casualties their implementation in East European conflicts is likely to entail. In a period of recession in which, moreover, the end of

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[10] Neuhold, op. cit., p. 11.

the East-West conflict is widely expected to produce a peace dividend, the necessary commitment of military and financial resources to bolster additional security pledges is extremely unlikely. Furthermore, "Mourir pour Budapest? (let alone Kiev?)" would be as unpopular as "Mourir pour Sarajevo"? Hence domestic controversies, as well as the familiar disputes about burden sharing within the Alliance, are bound to surround any serious debate on extending the umbrella of Art. 5 of the 1949 Washington Treaty or non-reciprocal guarantees to new beneficiaries.

If, with a view to their credibility and feasility, NATO offered additional safeguards gradually, for instance initially to the Visegrád countries, what message would send this decision to the Baltic States or Romania and Bulgaria, let alone Ukraine and Belarus, as well as Russia? Would the promise of later admission or assistance pledges provide sufficient reassurance to those countries or rather be understood as the tacit acceptance of their inclusion in a Russian sphere of influence?

Under these circumstances, the much criticized step-by-step approach underlying NACC and the new "Partnership for Peace" may indeed the least evil - but still more of an evil than a truly satisfactory solution. It is difficult to take issue with those East Europeans who feel that Russia has been given a de facto veto over the Atlantic Alliance's enlorgement. For some critics, "P4P" is a step in the right direction, but is too short.[11] In addition to joint military planning, training and exercises, as well as peacekeeping operations, and political consultations in crisis situations, they would have liked a timetable for their eventual admission to NATO. In any event, much will depend on the concrete follow-up to the cooperation program adopted at the NATO summit in Brussels in January 1994 in order to dispell misgivings about an apparent U.S.-Russian bilateralism at the expense of the other East European States and Western readiness to give in to Russian blackmail. Moreover, NATO's credibility suffered another blow as a result of continued disagreements over its Bosnian policies at the Brussels summit meeting. Further threats of air strikes did not impress the Bosnian Serbs. Yet in an optimistic perspective, the links to NATO

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[11] Such as Polish President Lech Walesa. International Herald Tribune, January 11, 1994

established by military and political cooperation in various areas over time may eventually offer a non- negligible degree of protection to the East European partners.

The new partnership may also be the best approach to assure an adequate U.S. military and political presence in Europe and to "let sleeping trans-Atlantic dogs lie."[12] In an unstable Europe where the EU is not (yet) able to maintain order, the active involvement of the United States is still indispensable, and not only as a counterweight to the Russian and Ukrainian nuclear arsenals. Yet it is also clear that the Europeans will increasingly have to pull their own weight in the area of security policy, since U.S. priorities have at long last shifted to a long-neglected domestic agenda, and the Pacific region is becoming more and more important and attractive for Americans, above all in economic terms. Therefore, both sides must use the time to work toward a new Atlantic partnership in which the United States abandons residual reservations about an integrated Europe growing up as an equal partner in all respects, while Europeans learn to keep order in their own house and accept their part of the responsibility for solving the global problems - from the degradation of the environment to the demographic explosion and its consequences - in a cooperative spirit.[13]

3. Austria in a New Security Environment

Like other European countries and NATO as a whole, Austria has also adapted its security policy and military doctrine to the new challenges in 1992. According to the formula "leaner but meaner", emphasis is placed on the flexibility, mobility and modernization of the armed forces. The concept of an essentially static area defense, which relied heavily on large militia force, was abandoned in favor of strengthening border defense. Mobilization strength is to be reduced from 200.000 to 120.000 troops. A central role was assigned to a well-armed rapid reaction force of 15.000 men.

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[12] Mark M. Nelson, Transatlantic Travails, Foreign Policy No 92 (Fall 1993), pp. 75-91.

[13] Cf. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century (New York 1993).

With regard to its attitude toward European security institutions, Austria has actively cooperated in the CSCE process - the only forum dealing with security matters where membership did not raise any problems for the country's permanent neutrality - from its inception. Together with the other members of the N+N group, Austria engaged in bridgebuilding functions, such as hosting CSCE meetings, the coordination of the final phases of negotiation, and the drafting of compromise texts. The efforts of the N+Ns contributed considerably to the successful conclusion of CSCE conferences on more than one occasion prior to the end of the East-West conflict.[14]

The next major step envisaged by the Austrian government is the country's admission to the EU without abandoning the status of permanent neutrality. The assumption that the fulfillment of neutrality obligations and the continuation of a policy of neutrality would be compatible with EC membership was expressly stated in Austria's application to the Communities on July 17, 1989. Given the widespread skepticism concerning the Austrian position, the low-key manner in which the problem of the three neutral countries' participation in the CFSP of the EU was eventually finessed in the negotiations on admission must have surprised many observers.

On November 9, 1993, Foreign Minister Alois Mock had reiterated to his counterparts from the EU members previous Austrian pledges to participate actively in the CFSP in accordance with the Maastricht Treaty. He stated that such participation was considered compatible with Austria's constitutional provisions (in this context, it should be borne in mind that Austria's permanent neutrality was laid down in a Federal Constitutional Act in 1955); Minister Mock added that appropriate adaptations of domestic law would have to be undertaken in light of a changed political environment in Europe in connection with Austria's accession to the EU.[15]

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14 Hanspeter Neuhold, CSCE: N+N Perspectives: The Process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe from the Viewpoint of the Neutral and Non-Aligned Participating States (Vienna and Laxenburg 1987).

15 Die Presse, November 10, 1993.

On December 21, the Union contented itself with the acceptance by the four applicant countries (the three neutrals and Norway) of a joint declaration in which they promised their full and active participation in the CFSP under Title V of the Maastricht Treaty as a whole.[16]

Once admitted to the EU - the big question mark being the necessary positive outcome of the referendum on membership, - Austria intends to apply for the status of observer with the WEU. For the time being, membership in this alliance or NATO - which would mean terminating neutrality - is not on Austria's agenda. However, cooperation in areas of particular interest to Austria is aimed at; thus, Austria takes part in the work of the ad-hoc group of NACC on peacekeeping.[17]

As regards the state of the Austrian debate on security issues, it must be pointed out that the "security policy community" in the country is still rather small. Most of the - not very original - views expressed in this paper are probably shared by most Austrian security experts - from a broad definition of security to the concerns over Eastern Europe, notably Russia and also Ukraine. They also agree that neutrality ist not an adequate security strategy any more (if it ever was). It is now admitted that a good deal of wishful thinking underlay the entrance and occupation price strategy" practiced by the European neutrals. These countries tried to dissuade potential aggressors from actually attacking them by raising the costs of invasion in terms of human casualties and the loss of war material, time and political prestige to a level which exceeded the limited value of direct control over the neutral's territory and other resources. In addition, it was expected that the most likely resort to armed force in Europe would not be a direct, "frontal" attack on a neutral State but a bloc-to-bloc confrontation. In this event, each side would need the bulk of its forces against the other bloc, so that it could direct only a small part of its military potential against a neutral. The latter's chances of successfully defending itself would thereby improve considerably. The neutrals thus assumed that they could avoid involvement in a

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16 Die Presse, December 22, 1993.

17 As regards the new Partnership for Peace, Chancellor Franz Vranitzky stated that Austria had no direct interest in participating in it. Die Presse, Janurary 11, 1994.

major military conflict between the two blocs in Europe in spite of the realities of geography and modern, in particular nuclear weapons.

With the end of the East-West conflict, the neutral States have lost their principal conflict of reference and their main functions. In particular, Austria had served both as a geostrategic buffer between the two alliance systems and, together with Switzerland, as a "neutral thorn in NATO's flesh" - a fact which goes a long way to explain Soviet acceptance of Austrian independence and neutrality in 1955. True enough, conflicts in which bridgebuilding by third parties would be useful abound today. Yet, on the one hand, the European neutrals seem to be losing their "oligopoly" with respect to these functions.[18] On the other hand, solidarity and not "fencesitting" is required if the new Europe is to become a reality. Moreover, especially the non-military threats outlined above necessitate collective responses - although cooperation in these area would be compatible with neutrality defined in a military sense. In any event, the time has come to phase out neutrality and jointly work toward an effective European security system. The problem in Austria is that many Austrians are still so much attached to neutrality that, for example, they are not ready to vote for EU membership if the price to be paid for it were the abolition of neutrality. Moreovever, hesitations about this step are understandable as long as alternative collective security structures are not yet in sight.

[18] For instance, the agency charged with monitoring compliance with the chemical weapons ban signed in 1993 will have its headquarters in The Hague (and not in Vienna or Geneva).

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Conference on

THE INTERACTION OF THE EU AND NATO: ADAPTING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION TO THE NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE

THE ROLE OF EUROPEAN/ATLANTIC SECURITY INSTITUTION: PERCEPTIONS FROM THE CSCE COUNTRIES

A view from **Bulgaria** by

PLAMEN PANTEV

Center for Higher Defence Studies
Palazzo Salviati
Rome, 20-21 January 1994

I The Strategic situation

1. The greatest risk in a changing situation is to lose the perspective of where security should go next.First,denuclearization and debipolarization must not be reversed.Second, clarity is needed of what of the post-WWII security legacy must be retained in the post-Cold War era.

A real security challenge is the future of nuclear arms and policy in Europe,the implementation of the STARTs.The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the other WMD - chemical and biological,are risks of highest priority.

The risks that may call an eventual military response are the nationalist,ethno-territorial and religious conflicts in Europe.They are a major cause of the migration and refugee problem.A resurgent and militant Islamic fundamentalism and Pan-Turkish nationalism are specific features of the present Balkan and ex-Soviet developments.The military disbalance, stemming from the CFE Treaty,based on the 'bloc' method of negotiations,is a serious risk for many countries,especially around ex-Yugoslavia.

Non-military risks,influencing European security are:

- the hard economic crisis in East/Central European countries and former Soviet Union;their slow economic restructuring,big foreign debt,poverty and economic migration.Logical consequ-

ence is the domestic social and political turmoil.

- the disruption of foreign economic links,leading to break of trade and endangering the energy supplies.
- disintegration of society due to poorly measured application of the principle of self-determination,neglecting the other imperative international legal principles.
- revival of fascism in Europe.
- risk of environmental disasters or gradual degradation, caused by nuclear or chemical sources;ecological blackmailing and terrorism;environmental migration,etc.

2. a. Political factors of European security and balance of power

The stability and enlargement of the European Union(EU), framing of its relations with the USA and CIS would determine Europe's consolidation; Security is indivisible,interdependent and interconnected.The contribution to it is different.Still having equal shares of it is the fairest and most economic concept of European security; the success of the reforms in Central and Eastern Europe; Building of an effective deterrence against the expansionist,aggressive and conservative elements of Islam and Islam-motivated nationalism.The values and norms of the developed non-Islamic world are the base of meeting 'modern,sensible and intelligent' Islam in Europe; effective management of the conflicts in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union.

b. Economic factors

Preventing a new division of Europe into rich and poor parts, integration of the Central/Eastern European countries in EU;

Regulating the economic competition of the EU with the USA and Japan; Building of stable economic relationship with PRChina; Help in promoting Russian and CIS economic revival.

c. Military factors

Building strategic partnership between the USA and Russia; Isolating militarily and deterring the proliferation of the conflicts in the Balkans without offensive operations; Settling the military aspects of NATO/WEU relationship.

Key actors in determining the European security order are the USA,Russia,the nuclear powers of Europe (the UK, France),economically dominant and politically influential Germany,Italy - a key player in Mediterranean and South-Eastern European affairs,Ukraine - a country of vast potential.Though the values and norms of security interrelationship are defined by the multitude of small states in Europe.

3. Local crises and conflicts in areas outside Europe will affect European security in two ways: directly and indirectly.The Euro-Atlantic area is 'doomed' to proliferate stability all-over the world in a long-term perspective.The developments in the whole world are of concern for Europe.There are different priorities and levels of reaction to them.The more Europe is to be interwined in the global structures of economy and international relations,the more direct the impact on Europe's security is going to be.

4. WMD and WM impact both inside and outside Europe are a priority concern of European security.There are three ways in which they can affect European security: if used in local conflicts; if used by terrorists; if go out of technical con-

trol,i.e. without 'destructive intentions'.

The de-bipolarization of the world created new risks for the NPT regime.Security vacuum,non-alignment with an effective security organisation,the tendency of re-nationalization of security - all they breed-up the temptation for nuclear proliferation.If sophisticated nuclear weapons cannot be developed,radioactive contamination remains an open option.In this respect missiles will play a major role.

II A European security system

The security system in Europe should care of the principles: a. optimal 'full responsibility' coverage of territory and space; b. economic way of building-up; c. a clearly structured and timed strategy of 'enlargement' to other regions out of Europe; d. 'value-oriented' strategy of enlargement; e. preserving continuity in stability no matter the institutional transformations.

1. In the context of these principles all existing security organisations play a necessary and unique role,formulated by the specific circumstances of their foundation and Charters, and which may be further developed.An adequate management of the process of interlocking is vital to prevent the existent security mechanism to be turned into an 'interblocking' one. The UN,CSCE,NATO/NACC,EU/WEU/Forum of Consultations with the Central European countries - all they have and will continue to play constructive role in the evolution of the new Euro-Atlantic-Asiatic security organisation.

The UN provides both the global background and the security achievements of the post-WWII world order.The CSCE symbolizes a unique process which marked the end of the Cold War

and carries a great political potential,comprising 54 states from North America,Europe and Asia.

NATO is the existing efficient political-military organisation,whose military deterrence capability may guarantee the progress of the evolution of the newly-forming security system.A specific indication of how and in what direction NATO's interests practically evolve is the inclusion of non-European CIS republics (and many years ago - Turkey),in the NATO/NACC system of relations.It is the Asiatic direction, with 38 states by now.

EU/WEU/Forum of Consultation... interrelationship bears the most dynamic driving factor of the social,economic,political and defense processes in Europe - the integration of the European countries.While CSCE and NATO are to expand and assume new legitimacy in the Euro-Atlanto-Asiatic context,the EU/WEU/Forum of Consultation system is to execute the functions of the broad security organisation in the European region.

The concept and system of the security organisations with interlocking functions is not just viable,but for the short and partly - for the medium term - the only realistic option. The condition for effective management is that each of the interlocking functionally organisations adapts permanently to the other by developing,by adding or giving-up something in its status and activity.Nobody is in a position to clean up the existing organisational system and to provide the resources of constructing an absolutely new one.

The UN connection of the interlocking CSCE-NATO/NACC-EU/WEU/FC should be provided by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter .

The new,'Asiatic' element of the Euro-Atlantic security system will certainly provide a new start and legitimacy for the 21 century of a prooved efficient organisation as NATO . The US-Russian strategic partnership will be added naturally to the new and broader destination of the Euro-Atlantic relationship.

2. The interlocking functions of a whole system of organisations will necessitate clarity of the functions of each of the elements,a perspective specialization and adjusting the timing of the process of interlocking.For the practical execution of the interlocking functions a 'lending' or 'granting' principle should be followed .One organisation grants certain functions,material resources,facilities and/or infrastructure to another for a smoother transition to the new missions of the organisations.

The efficiency of the CSCE will depend on how it will formulate its needs and practically specialize in the fields of :conflict prevention; peaceful settlement of disputes; crisis management,and,peacekeeping.This can hardly be realized without a strict division of labour with the other organisations,having similar functions.The process of strengthening of the four functions of the CSCE will depend on its stable legal status of a regional arrangement in the understanding of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter; on the direct link of communication with NACC and NATO authorities in connection with these functions.The 'consensus' (minus one or two) method of decision-making will become less of a barrier when the functions of the interlocking organisations are punctually formulated and their overall effect provides a real

sense of security for the individual states.

Having a unique encompassing political position,the CSCE should get rid of its image of an inefficient security organisation by linking its crisis prevention and crisis management centre with the United Nations Security Council and with a reshaping itself NATO.The linkage should not only be technical,but rather a legal arrangement of the potential use of force for the restoration of peace.With the evolution of the NATO-WEU relations the linkage should be respectively reoriented.NATO/WEU-UN Security Council connection should be simultaneous in real time terms and efficiency,logically linked to the one with the CSCE.The CSCE has a specific mission within the strategy of 'security enlargement' - to settle relationship with major Asian countries.The initial experience with Japan should be gradually broadened.

3. The stability of the strategic situation,the smoothness of the process of construction in an evolutionary way a new, broader security system should be guaranteed by an effective security organisation.This is a reformulated,having a new political sense and motivation mission of NATO.

It is an indispensable organisation for the security needs of a trans-Euro-Atlantic area,covering practically the Northern hemisphere.The 'know-how' gathered through the NACC functioning is of a particular importance.

NATO is supposed to be the major contributor to the WEU's logistical and infrastructural base - an efficient pillar of

the Alliance's policy in Europe.Lending of military means to the WEU by NATO is an important step in the process of giving real life to the interlocking functionally organisations of security.

Neither of the three NATO roles can be implemented without the support of the USA.The American military presence in Europe assumes a new meaning - not because of a 'residual' risk from the East,but as a natural burden-sharing in a broad hemispheric context,in which a limited military presence is vital.Furthermore,a US-Russian military linkage in the Northern Pacific region would add logically to the US-European military connection.

4. NATO's peace-keeping and peace-enforcement role in Europe is an element of the interlocking functions of the security organisations.It has a CSCE and a UN connection.It will change proportionally to the adoption of these roles by the WEU.

These roles will become natural in the broader region from Vancouver to Vancouver through Brussels and/or Vladivostok.As for other regions the UN connection is to be considered.

The fate of NATO notwithstanding,the USA and Canada are culturally,spiritually,historically,economically and militarily part of the European security and this logically places them in the evolving Northern hemispheric security system. This security system is virtually unattainable without their

participation.Any act of isolation of Europe in security terms to the East,to the West and to the South is counterproductive. The principle of 'security enlargement' is based on real security needs of creating security prerequisites in the neighbouring regions identical to those of the internal security environment of Europe.

5. Until the question of formalizing a new,encompassing three continents organisation of security becomes actual, NATO's extended security guarantees to the East will most significantly add to the others from the interlocking organisations.The PFP initiative ('Partnership for Peace') bears a pragmatic potential in that respect.

The PFP should also be considered as a step in the process of building a broad organisation of security,in which the participants from the East and the West of the Euro-Atlantic-Asiatic 'belt of security' will be equal partners.

Accepting new members in an evolving and changing its basics security organisation would be a forced process, counterproductive for the NATO members and for the organisation as a whole.This does not mean that the security vacuum and the security risks and threats in Eastern Europe need not dealing with.The East European people and states deserve entertaining effective security guarantees after the end of the Cold War.A full NATO membership of the former Warsaw Pact members is a solution.But in case it creates more problems than solves,the result should be sought in another way: through NATO's partnership.

6. In the developing structure of the interlocking security organisations the EC,or rather the EU,and the WEU have an especially dynamic role to play.Gradually the EU assumes the economic,political and defense authority of the European continent.The WEU is playing an important role in stabilizing the European security identity.

Being the European pillar of an evolving NATO,the WEU should be lended on a planned basis a significant part of the Alliance's European military might - arms,armed forces, logistics,infrastructure.The countries that have signed 'Europe Agreements' with the EC should be involved intensively and without differentiation for security matters in EU/WEU activities.Responsibility of the Europeans for the security of Europe in a Northern hemispheric context,where an enlarged NATO is to play an umbrella role - this is the mission of the EC(EU) and WEU in the developing European security system.

7. The best way that CSCE countries,which are not members of the Western security institutions,especially the East and Central European ones,can contribute to security tasks in Europe is: first,by consolidating their democratic societies,developing internal mechanisms of regulating in a peaceful way their various internal problems - social,political,economic,ethnic,religious,cultural,etc.; second,by keeping to the letter and spirit of the CSCE norms of regulation,and,third,by joining with material contributions the

politically dominating CSCE and UN/NATO/WEU as an organizer of the military performance in their acts of conflict prevention,crisis management and peacekeeping.In case the security guarantees of NATO and WEU are extended to the East,filling the security vacuum in an effective way,the financial contribution to the CSCE's conflict prevention and management mechanisms should be increased with the improvement of the economic situation in the countries passing to market economy and political democracy in Europe.

8. NATO and the EC(EU) should operate together in the security field through the channels of the WEU.The very 'vitalization' of the WEU,as an exponent of the European security and defense identity,through the transfusion of NATO military energy into it,shows how important this interaction is.

Furthermore,the NATO/EU relationship is part of the basic USA/EU connection - major players in the formation of the new and broader in scope security belt in the Northern hemisphere.

9. Bulgaria was one of the founders of the CSCE in Helsinki in 1975.It actively participates in the creation of a developed CSCE organisational structure to adapt to the post-Cold War environment and to deal with the numerous conflicts in the continent's Eastern part,for example,the promotion of the activity of the CSCE's Secretary General,the High Commissioner for national minorities,etc..Bulgaria supports CSCE's efforts to develop its relations with the United Nations,

NATO and WEU.It opposes the enlargement of the CSCE's bureaucracy and suggests the development of a more effective spending of the resources of the organisation.

Bulgaria accepted the invitation,outlined in the NATO's London (July,1990) Declaration of the North Atlantic Council. The Bulgarian parlamentarians received in November,1990,the status of an "Associated Delegation" with the North Atlantic Assembly.Bulgaria develops its relations with both NATO and its member countries.NATO's Consultative Group for Atlantic Policy held one of its meetings in Sofia,June 1993.All high-level Bulgarian political and military officials have visited NATO's Headquarters.Since December 1991 Bulgaria participates in NACC.Bulgaria tries to be more closely involved in the decision-making process of NATO,concerning security in the Balkan region.

Bulgaria has officially expressed its wish to be accepted in NATO as a full member.Realizing NATO's crucial role in the system of interlocking security institutions in Europe,Bulgaria will participate most probably on a 'national consensus' basis in the PFP initiative.

Bulgaria's participation in the NACC activity allows an opportunity to set and discuss important questions of the country's national security and foreign policy and to influence in a way the perceptions of the policy-makers of the partner countries in Europe.NACC's activity gives an equal opportunity to participate in a security forum where

there are no priviliged countries.

Bulgaria has concluded and ratified its 'Europe Agreement' with the EC.The process of ratification by the EC began in October 1993.Bulgaria views its present relations with the EC as an initial stage,evolving in a period of 10 years to full membership.There is a national consensus based policy of the country in that respect.

Bulgaria's relations with the WEU develop quite successfully.Being a partner in the Forum for Consultation of the WEU with the Central European states,Bulgaria has concluded an agreement with the WEU (similar agreements have been signed with Romania and Hungary) for police-controlling activity on the Danube in implementation of the United Nations' sanctions against Serbia.The political,military and scientific contacts with the WEU are gathering momentum.Bulgaria views its integration in the WEU as a logical step in the enlargement of the EU.

III Considerations and proposals

1. The threat perceptions in Bulgaria are centered around four major issues: 1) the economic degradation and impoverishment of the country and the people,the unemployment, criminality and drug problems; 2) the spread of the wars from ex-Yugoslavia; 3) the upheaval of Turkish nationalism in the Balkans,affecting the country with its 9 per cent Turkish population.The display is mainly through the

channels of the Moslem religion.The facts perceived as most dangerous are: the influence through Islam on the national and citizen's self-consciousness of the Turkish people - Bulgarian citizens,converting it into Turkish national self-consciousness; the influence through Islam on more than 250000 Bulgarians,confessing the Muslim religion,converting their self-awareness into a Turkish one; the number and quality of armaments as well as the offensive strategic posture of the 1st Turkish Army in Eastern Thrace; 4) the environmental degradation of certain areas,the transboundary pollution of the air,the threat of ecological disasters from chemical or nuclear sources,etc.

The economic-social factor and the Islamic factor,symbolized mainly by Turkey in the Balkans,are perceived as most dangerous for the region and for the whole of Europe.The far out-of-Europe conflicts are of less concern to the people. Nuclear weapons and other WMD,due to the long period of living under their threat are feared and their proliferation is considered extremely dangerous not only for Europe,but for the world.

The opinions about the security system,in which Bulgaria should be placed in vary from 'immediate' acceptance in NATO to establishing a new 'East European Security Pact',similar to the Warsaw Pact but not with anti-Western purposes, just for filling the security vacuum.CSCE is popular,but is considered an inefficient militarily organisation.At the same

time NATO is respected as a powerful alliance,which unnecessarily provided in a 'cascade' manner Turkey and Greece with sophisticated weaponry in 1992 - something that the post-Cold War Balkans did not need.

The WEU is connected with Bulgaria's involvement in the integration with the EU.

Any new encompassing security system in Europe,in which Russia and the CIS are not placed in satisfactorily for them, is considered dangerous for the security of Europe.

2.a. Nuclear non-proliferation would need additional,regional approaches,consideration and organisation,so that the universal NPT regime is strengthened.The same issue should be permanently reviewed at the CSCE and NACC fora.

b. The configuration of the security organisations,based on the concept of the interlocking institutions,should reflect the needs of the security situation and not to shape themselves to the convenience of the individual institution.Norms and organisations should satisfy the regulative needs of the security interrelationship - not the organisational bureaucratic interests or narrowly conceived prospects of the evolving security necessities.

c. The individual interlocking institutions should intensively change and adapt in order to survive and to keep their positive achievements.There must be a legal stabilization of the UNSC-CSCE linkage.The CSCE-NATO/NACC interrelationship, aimed at finalization of the functions of the CSCE,should

also get a normative form.For example,the Consultative Group of the CPC should assume a coordinating role in the NACC/ CSCE context.The CSCE/NACC cooperation in conflict prevention may be developed in joint organisation of military operations.

The CSCE should cope with the 'consensus based decision-making' issue by granting decision-making power to a body of states with permanent and rotating non-permanent members.

The 'transfusion' of military power from NATO to the WEU in the European region should proceed in a more decisive way, so that the European security and defense identity assumes real outlines.

The issues in the field of economics and security in the Northern hemisphere are urgent enough not to postpone for long the 'clarification' period of NATO's and its NACC partners' future.The Northern hemispheric scope of the problems in that area necessitate a more expedient convergence of NATO,NACC and the CSCE,backed by a Russian-American strategic partnership.

d. A very specific and actual suggestion,concerning the practical activity of the interlocking security organisations is to send additional UN troops in Albania (border with Kosovo) and Macedonia (borders with Albania and Serbia) to reinforce the deterrent capabilities of the Scandinavian and US military contingents already stationed there.

3. The European security environment geographically,politically,economically and strategically comprises the whole world.The Northern hemispheric region is of special im-

portance for stabilizing the new European security organisation. If the European,the Atlantic and the Asiatic-Pacific segments of the Northern hemisphere are to be stable and secure they can be only conditionally separated from each other.The big security problem of the Euro-Atlantic area in the next two decades is how to become compatible in security terms with China,Japan,India and the countries of the Muslim belt from North-Western Africa to India,China and Indonesia.

Part of the solution,but a very important one,is how to combine this effort with the potential new equal partners of Eastern Europe and the CIS,mainly Russia and Ukraine.The new deal between the EU and the USA should be coupled with a similar deal of the EU and of the USA with the CIS.The Central European countries may be the first to benefit from the establishment of a solid strategic partnership between the USA,the EU and the CIS,channeled through NATO and the CSCE.As future members of the EU and its defense organisation they will first pass the experience of the dual security relationship to the East and to the West.That would mean a re-orientation of the NATO mission - to cover regionally the whole Northern hemisphere,evolving eventually into a Northern Treaty Organisation (NTO).It should have arranged by the year 2000 its relations with the Eastern European countries and the CIS.

Through the extension of the CSCE process into Mediterranean,Middle East,Central and Far East Asiatic direc-

tions by 2010 there must be developed the pre-conditions of regulating compatible security relationship with the Muslim belt of countries,Japan,China and India.

Only an extensive program of enlargement,constructive and peaceful intentions and steps may lead to lasting manageability of the world security situation - the major prerequisite for Euro-Atlantic prosperity.

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A view from **Finland** by

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I THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN EUROPE

1. The Risks

The questions put to the participants of the round table begin with a request to assess which are the paramount risks influencing the European security environment. This paper tries to find answers to the questions from a perspective of a student of European affairs from a neutral country which used to define its position in Europe as a "status quo" country but which has recently announced that it has no reservations concerning the Title V of the Treaty of Maastricht. The list of the major risks in the view of the present author is the following:

1. Russia.

The risks Russia puts to Europe are manyfold and basically extremely unpredictable. Three specific risks seem accurate from the point of view of the European security system. **For the first**, there is a risk of the collapse of the central political and administrative authority. The process of "bandustanisation of Russia"[1] is well on its way. Its reasons are partly historical dating back to 1918, partly a result from the economic chaos which followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 8, 1991.

The collapse of the central political authority would probably result in a situation where political authority stays with regions, cities and even political strongholders like the Princes in the Renaissance. Partly this is also historically understandable: Russia in its

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[1] Bogdan Szajkowski, The Bantustanisation of Russia. **Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift**, 3, 1993, 258-271.

current form does not have any historical tradition or predecessor. The impact and independence of regional economies is already great (St Petersburg for instance) and the this will further strengthen the autonomy of the local authorities, often still under the control of the apparatchik.

The second risk concerning Russia partly is a consequence of the first risk: the position of the armed forces. Already during the political crises of the Fall 1993 there were serious doubts wether the central authority really was in control of the military units. At least it is fair to argue that the civilian control over the armed forces is not very firm. The army seems to be neutral but may easily change its position. The risk associated with the position of the armed forces is not the military take-over but the decline of the control of the central authority and the disintegration of the army to the local level. If the bantustanianisation advances, the disintegration of the armed forces follows. As a result a great number of smaller and professional armies emerges and the internal development of Russia militarises further.

Thirdly, there is always a dander of the return to the power of either the communist rule of the ultra-nationalist forces. Presently the latter option seem to be more realistic. It is felt as a major risk in the neighbouring countries, in particular in the Baltic states and Finland.

2. Further destabilisation in Eastern and Central Europe.

The difficult stabilisation of economic development associated with political instability creates a threat of the revolution of unsatisfied expectations which may have great impact on the whole region. A related trend is

the growing impact of extreme nationalism and political ideologies associated with it.

3. The internationalisation of internal security.

This risk is caused mainly by the dissolution of boarders and opening up of Europe. One may expect a rise of international crime, the increase of illegal trafficking and immigration. All these factors shall have destabilising effects and may lead to counter-measures that threaten democratic rights and thus produce unexpected social reactions.

4. The acceptance of the idea of genocides in Europe.

This is obviously the greatest risk of all and it concerns the nature of European reactions towards the decline of the civilisation towards barbarity on the continent of Europe. This is a matter of political leadership in European countries but it also measures the standards of the civil societies.

In addressing the question of how to avert anarchy in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Empire Jack Snyder presented three views of the demise of bipolar order in Europe.[2] As the first view he referred to then famous liberal "End of History" argument which implied that liberalism and market system had decisively rolled back socialism in Europe. His second alternative was a return to a hobbesian pessimism and consequently recurrence to nationalism and multipolar instability. As a third way Snyder outlined a conditionally optimistic scenario of neo-liberal institutionalism with international institutions as its core.

Looking back to Snyder's proposals, only less than four years later, the victory of liberalism and market mechanism looks much bleaker than what one could anticipate in the hey day of

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[2] Jack Snyder, Averting Anarchy in the New Europe. International Security. Vol 14 (4), 1990, 5-6.

structural changes. Liberalism has been pushed back in recent elections in many former Eastern Block countries, most notably in Russia. Instead of a triumph of liberalism old communists under fresh labels are making their way to back to power. On the other hand the creation of market economy in Central and Eastern European countries has proven to be a much more difficult task than what the "end of History" -analysts anticipated.

The scenery of the European security system is to be found somewhere between the hobbesian pessimist view and the neo-liberal institutionalist view. Certainly the establishment of the European Union, incorporating the system of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), supports the idea of the neo-liberalist philosophy. But at the same time a return to political and social instability associated with extreme forms of nationalism and the use of coercive power as an instrument of policy is also a fact of life.

1.1. Factors Shaping the Security Situation

The current strategic situation in Europe has been shaped by many interrelated factors. The collapse of the post-war hegemonic system has naturally been the dominant catalyst for changes and transformation. The main effect associated with this mega-change is the fall of the European security system as a whole. The difficulties in assessing the relevant factors contributing to the security situation derive from the particular fact that interpretations concerning the nature of the collapsed system deviate to a great extent.

An illustrative example of the situation is the concept of bipolarity. Bipolarity has often been regarded as a main characteristic of the Post-War security system of Europe. The system certainly rested on the hegemony of the two great powers. R. Harrison Wagner has found four interpretations of the term in the Post-War system:[3] a condition in which states are organized

[3] R. Harrison Wagner, What was Bipolarity? International Organization, vol 47(1), 89.

into two hostile coalitions; a condition where there are only two states capable of pursuing a strategy of global deterrence; a system of only two powers and a system in which power is distributed in such a way that two states are so powerful that they can defend themselves against any combination of other states.

The collapsed European security system certainly met these conditions. It was divided into two opposing blocks, which remained very firm and stable and where hostility or adversity was a distinctive feature. It had only a rather small number of nations which declared themselves as "neutrals" (Sweden, Finland, Austria, Switzerland and Ireland as a deviant case), non-aligned (Yugoslavia) or simply stayed outside Alliances for myriad reasons.

It is equally adequate to argue that the two superpowers dominated the word scene and were strategically in a position "to measure their strength against all (its) rivals combined"[4]. The peculiar nature of the post-war system rested on a dual hegemony. The two dominant powers also were the only powers which really had the capacity to maintain a global deterrence.

The fundamental question concerning the current strategic situation is, **has the Post-War balance of power system really lost its importance and how much this structure still dominates the strategic thinking and reasoning of both minor and bigger powers in Europe?**. Has Europe really moved towards a new type of an international system and if, then how should we define the new or emerging security structure?

One is tempted to conclude that we may live in a "post-Cold-War" system but certainly not in a "post-balance of power system". This has become evident in recent discussions concerning the extension of NATO security guarantees over former Soviet Block nations. This is certainly a key issue in the debate in the (former?) neutral

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[4] Martin Wight, **Power Politics**". Harmondsworth, 1979, 34.

countries who now try to adjust to the conditions of the CFSP of the European Union.

The future of the strategic situation in Europe being extremely unclear, the identification of influencing factors is only the first step in assessing the problem. A list of such factors should include:

1. **Further deepening of the disintegration of the Former Soviet Union or CIS both within the boarders of the former SU and inside current Russia.** For as long as the political instability in Russia and within the boarders of the CIS continues, the security situation of Europe at large remains unstable. Any strategic consideration must pay an indispensable attention to this factor. This component is even more relevant because of the nuclear threat associated with the lack of political stability of the owners of that arsenal

2. **The uncertainty concerning the potential of the European Union to meet the requirements of CFSP and to enter the phase of common defence policy.** The EU is for most of European countries outside it (excluding the CIS) the major pole of attraction. The dubious wording in security policy (...including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence") and problems of decision-making procedures of the CFSP put the present and future applicant countries in a difficult situation in assessing their future security considerations

3. **The (dis)ability of the Atlantic Alliance and in particular the United States as its major associate to redefine the role of the Alliance** causes considerable difficulties to any European nation, including the members of the Alliance, to judge their national security options. The establishment of the NACC and the proposed agreements for the Partnership for Peace have not made the situation any better.

4. **The decline of the European nation-state system and the erosion of the Westphalian system in its classical meaning** contributes to radical reforms of political authority in Europe. Simultaneous processes of re-nationalisation of political authority in Central and Eastern Europe and denationalization of it in the conditions of the European Union further complicate any attempts to reformulate Cold War positions and models of security.

II THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM

In addressing the question how a working security system is established and maintained in Europe, three alternatives emerge:

- **to bring security through hegemony.** This would imply the creation of a new hegemonic structure to replace the declined hegemonic structure. The main question in this alternative is how to create a new hegemonic structure and who is going to serve as a hegemonic power or powers?

- **to accept a return to the classical balance of power system** of the 19th century. In this alternative the European security would rest on the cooperation between traditional European great powers: England, France, Germany and Russia with a possible great power role given to Italy.

- **to strengthen the system of interlocking institutions** as a new form of security system.

2.1. A return to the classical balance of power

The emergence of a new balance of power -system would mark a re-emergence of the 19th century European security order. It would mean a transformation of a **bipolar system** into a **multipolar configuration** with a half a dozen Great Powers. A return to multipolarity does not necessarily suggest a resort to war as a normal tool in the management of European international relations. In fact the balance of power system has been a constituent procedure in the European international system.

Several authors have also asserted that in particular the years 1815-1914 marked an exceptionally peaceful period in European history. Paul Schroeder for instance argues that the most impressive aspect of the post-1815 system was not the absence of war but the array of positive results achieved through diplomacy and other non-war methods of international relations.[5] The system was able to accomplish collective actions in the name of a common will by sometimes even vigorous actions.

Even if the outcome of the modification of the collapsed post World War II order does not lead to a return of the Holy Alliance, a new multipolar power structure will nevertheless have to emerge. In fact this alternative has been seen as the most obvious alternative in the Post-Cold-War system. The first "great debate" in the aftermath of the collapse of the old order, the "Mearsheimer-de Evera -debate" was centred around the merits and dismerits of multipolarity.

This debate, the so called "Mearsheimer-de Evera debate" in the journal **International Security** brought up the distinction between "pessimists" and "optimists". A pessimist argument says that a return to multipolarity will bring more instability and disharmony while an optimists reasoning claims that a return to

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[5] Paul W Schroeder, The 19th Century International System: Changes in the Structure. **World Politics**, vol XXXIX, 1986, 3.

multilateralism does not necessarily imply that a parallel to 1914 or 1939 will be realized.

John Mearsheimer in his provocative "pessimistic" article claims that the new multipolar structure would mark a return of Germany, France, England and possibly Italy to status of great powers and the decline of the Soviet Union/Russia from a superpower status to an ordinary great power.[6] In a European system dominated by five great powers the power disparities will increase and stability will be undermined concludes Mearsheimer.

An "optimist" Stephen Van Evera presents a counter-argument that the merits of bipolarity and multipolarity are roughly equal and that the future of Europe is shaped more by the breakdown of the rules of the international order and by the breakdown of the domestic orders in Eastern Europe than by returning to multipolarity as such.[7] Van Evera stresses that he does not see a logical connection between multilateralism and war. He emphasises the relevance of domestic factors in explaining nations' willingness to go to war.

An unavoidable question in a multipolar European security order is the control and possible proliferation of nuclear weapons. This question is eminent since nuclear weapons played an essential role in the old order: the Soviet Union and the United States based their hegemonic position on the possession of nuclear weapons. That was the monopolistic public good[8] on which the Cold War order was based. This argument is often seconded by a claim that nuclear weapons have been in a core role in preventing an outbreak of a

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[6] John J Mearsheimer, Back to the Future. International Security, vol. 15(1), 1990, 7.

[7] Stephen van Evera, Primed for Peace. Europe after Cold War. International Security, vol 15 (3), 1990, 45-47.

[8] George Modelski, Long Cycles and the US Strategic Policy. Policy Studies Journal, vol 8, 1979, 11.

major war in Europe. "The Long Peace" has been made possible by the deterrence function of nuclear weapons.[9]

Four possible alternatives could be envisaged in the proliferation issue. The first alternative is that a nuclear free Europe is achieved in which case Europe would loose the decisive pillar of its prevailing stability, as Mearsheimer sees the dismerit of this option. Another alternative is that a nuclear proliferation takes place in Europe. In stead of two stable nuclear superpowers Europe would host an unpredictable number of perhaps less unpredictable nuclear powers. European security would in this case follow the logic "more might be better"[10] This is in particular an alarming alternative if the NPT regime, now entering the final phase of its treaty-based legality, is not re-affirmed.

The third alternative is that existing nuclear powers of Europe, including the United States, give up nuclear arms but compensate them by conventional arms. This option would dramatically increase spending on arms and ultimately lead to a much higher level of militarization of European societies. The fourth course of action means further cuts in nuclear weapons but still maintaining first strike capability as a security guarantee admitting at the same time more role in security policy for the European powers. This is the traditional nuclear umbrella theory which is intimately linked to the US commitments in Europe.

2.2. Interlocking institutions

Institutionalisation has become a fashionable term in international relations studies. It is seen as a third way

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[9] John Lewis Gaddis, **The Long Peace**. New York, 1987, 120-123.

[10] Kenneth Waltz, The Speared of Nuclear Weapons: More Might be Better. **Delphi Papers**, no 171, 1981, .

solution between idealism and realism but also as a key argument in the neo-realist discourse. In many ways attempts to institutionalise European security as a response to the collapse of the cold-war system is a real test for the institutionalisation thesis.

The option to bring security through institutions has become relevant alternative largely because the Post-War Western Europe has experienced an emergence and a considerable success of an institutionalised arrangement through the EC. The European Community integration offers an example whereby Nation States manage their relations in the framework of a single decision-making structure. Although the success of the EC relies mainly on achievements in producing welfare, its impact on security matters is unquestionable. In any case it has had its own merits in making a war between its members practically impossible.

The lessons learned from the EC carry on the idea of a **functional strategy of institutionalization**. It suggests that international institutions represent a qualitative leap in organising political authority in international relations. In David Mitrany's words, nation-states have become real obstacles for the harmonious development of international relations. State authority, therefore, should be replaced by a common authority, better adjusted to the actual needs: "to make international rules and controls co-extensive with international activities". [11] As a strategy based on the idea of producing welfare functionalism should offer a model of integration for Central and Eastern Europe as well.

Lessons learned from integration processes in Europe also suggest that the functional strategy is less likely to success if the core areas of state sovereignty are at immediately stake. The advice of the functionalist model is that security elements and welfare elements should be kept distinct and that only gradually the core elements of national sovereignty are conveyed to the sphere of a

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[11] David A Mitrany, **The Progress of International Government**. New Haven. 1933, 102.

new authority. In this view the new European security order ought to be based on enhancing cooperation first in sectors which are outside the immediate nucleus of state sovereignty and only later these should be approached.

The European reality in the early 1990's supports the functionalist thesis in many respects. No doubt welfare issues are very much in the core of attempts to establish stable conditions in Europe. Functional institutions could increase cohesion in this dimension and would thereby serve important security interests as well. But contrary to the functionalist logic the need to establish a working security system is an immediate task and it has to touch the core issues of national security.

Lessons from the EC also demonstrate the limits of the functionalist strategy. In order to achieve the targets of a political union in the 1980's an intergovernmental strategy had to applied. And finally in the Maastricht treaty the security matters were left out of the functionalistic Community competence and brought into intergovernmental domain.

Outside the realm of regional integration and functionalism **neo-liberal institutionalism** stresses the interest of states to cooperate in matters where they have common interests and when they can expect gains as the main motive to establish institutions.

The use of institutions is motivated by two assumptions. The first is the **expectation of reciprocity.** Participation in institutions creates costs which must be weighted against gains. Institutions also reduce uncertainty and alter transaction costs. They are economical if they cover a variety of sectors or tasks. The more functions institution has, the less costs are caused by entering into new areas of cooperation. An important reason for this is that costs and benefits can be balanced by linkage processes.

The second assumption claims that **institutions** are based on **learning.** Historical experiences shape institutionalization and states make their decisions of establishing and joining

institutions on the basis of prior commitments. In both of the approaches the key problems are authority and sovereignty. Nations entering into international cooperation and institutions are aware that the effect of institutionalization is not neutral. Institutions confer advantages on those to whom their rules grant access and share in political authority[12].

Europe is the most institutionalized international 'subsystem. Therefore institutionalisation is a highly relevant alternative also in future security arrangements. European states have experiences both from the institutionalized reciprocity and from learning. Institutionalized security settlements have helped to maintain peace in Europe for almost 50 years. The core questions in the future of European security institutions are: how the existing institutions can adapt to the new situation and how the relations between existing institutions shall develop.

The existing institutional structure reflects three major types of security arrangements:

* CSCE - Pan-European Security Model
* NATO - Atlantic Security Model
* WEU - West-European Security Model

They all have been established during the bipolar power structure of the cold war and bear the burden of that time. The CSCE and NATO have both deeper roots in the cold war system than the WEU whose dismerit again is the practical ineffectiveness until the mid 1980's.

The CFSP of the EU should now be added to the group of European security associations as well. The real impact of the CFSP being most unclear for probably many years, its future role depends very much on the relationship between it and other three institutions. This interplay is reflected in the Maastricht Treaty according to which the EU tries to incorporate all existing arrangements. Its values are based on the CSCE, it plans to assimilate the WEU into

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[12] Robert O Keohane, International Institutions and State Power. Boulder Col, 1989, 166-171.

its own defence arm but it accepts the commitments of its Member States to NATO and "shall respect the obligations of certain Member States under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence" policy established within that framework".

Sverre Lodgaard has proposed that the four security related institutions in Europe actually constitute two major arenas of security policy.[13] The EC/WEU/CSCE form a distinct group from that of NATO/NACC/CSCE. The two arenas reflect the "Europeanist" and Atlanticist" security models but emphasise the inter-institutional aspect. Lodgaard further argues that the real competition between the two arenas is "a struggle for the political soul of the Europeans".[14] He also argues that key to the soul of Europeans is the success in incorporating the interests of the East.

Although institutionalization is very much in the core of the designs for a new European system, opinions on how it should be promoted are scattered. The most important unsolved issues are of two types. For the first, the selection of the core body of institutionalization is an open question. One element in this discussion is whether the CSCE should be developed into a new comprehensive All-European institution. If this is the course of events, the next unsolved problem is what form the political cooperation system should have. The maximalists suggest a confederal structure while moderates would be satisfied with a method of summitry. There seems to prevail a wide understanding that the CSCE system ought to have different levels, each performing different tasks.

The second problem is, how to create working links between the already existing institutions. The division of labour is perhaps a lesser dilemma than the transformation of initially block-based

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[13] Sverre Lodgaard, Competing Schemes for Europe: The CSCE, NATO and the European Union. Security Dialogue, vol 23(3), 1992, 61.

[14] Lodgaard, op cit. 63.

institutions. There seems to prevail a widely shared understanding that the CSCE cannot be transformed into an institution submitting military security. In this respect NATO will stay as a military organization although with diminishing responsibilities.

2.2. The CSCE

The CSCE has through its history been specified by the coexistence between the **competitive order** and the **collaborative order.** [15] These dimensions not only describe an aspect of tension in conceptual terms but deeper underlying views reflecting the confrontation between the basic philosophical interpretations concerning the nature of international relations. That is, they reflect the contrast between competitive theories, which see international relations in a constant state of conflict and collaborative approaches, which stress the harmony of interests as the basis of international relations.

The idea of institutionalization made a breakthrough in the CSCE process in the form of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe in November 1990. Until that there had been very little support for ideas of institutionalisation. In Paris the Heads of State issued a document whereby a remarkable step towards a permanent institutional structure was taken.

The Paris Charter states:

> "Our common efforts to consolidate respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, to strengthen peace and to promote unity in Europe require a new quality of political dialogue and cooperation and thus development of the structures of the CSCE"

The body of proposals and designs concerning the future order in Europe grew constantly before the Paris Summit. It was a parallel phenomenon to the decline of the post-war European order. The evident collapse of the old regime provoked the academic

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[15] Esko Antola, Order and Change in the CSCE. **Österreichschische Zeitschrift fur Politikwissenschaft**, 1986, 271-282.

community, European political forces and the state officials to produce their own scenarios.

In the CSCE institutionalization means that there should be a proliferation of permanent methods of cooperation instead of ad hoc -type of forums in various areas. Institutionalization would also increase the stability of cooperation and disengage it from the problems of the political-military dimensions. This would probably favour collaboration in areas which are sufficiently far away from the hard core of national security interests. In other words, institutions would decrease transaction costs as the theory of liberal institutionalism assumes.

The future role of the CSCE depends on its ability to act as a central platform in the system of interlocking institutions. This was the aim taken up in the Helsinki Summit in 1992. However, the ambition has not been realized. The CSCE has fallen into a trap of enlargement and consensual decision-making, which has virtually deactivated the whole institution. Richard Schifter seems to have a good point when arguing:[16]

> Rather than suggesting that the CSCE has failed, therefore, we should say that situations have arisen in Europe with which CSCE was not designed to deal."

Schifter proposes a redesign of the institution into a real collective security organisation with powers for collective action in the same way as the United Nations Security Council has. This would mean the transformation of the CSCE into a Regional UN with a regional Security Council. Charles W Kegley goes even further by arguing that the CSCE should be developed into a concert-based security organisation, where sovereignty is pooled. As a precondition Kegley sees a two-tier system where great powers would have joint responsibilities without "reducing the lesser powers into second-class citizens"[17]

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[16]Richard Schifter, The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Ancient History or New Opportunities? The Washington Quarterly, vol. 16(4), 1993, 125.

[17] Charles W Kegley, Does US have a Role in the Future European Security System?. In **Redefining the CSCE. Challenges and Opportunities in the New Europe**. New York, 1992, 134.

On the other hand the CSCE now is institutionally capable of acting as a crises prevention system. Getting the existing set-up to work is a key to the future of the CSCE. It has shown certain success in applying preventive diplomacy in Macedonia for instance. A rational solution would be to streamline the actions of the CSCE towards a multilateral system of conflict prevention and preventive diplomacy and to accept that many functions associated with the CSCE are already taken care by other European institutions. For instance the Council of Europe now in the field of human rights is a capable institution both from its experiences and nowadays also from its membership.

Rapid changes in Europe may require further changes in the working methods of the CSCE. An important element is the eventual marginalisation of the role of the N+N Group. They, as a third party, are seen a key element of the functioning of the CSCE.[18] Neutrality now virtually disappearing from European politics in the sense it has influenced the work of the CSCE, the adaptation process of the CSCE is made even more difficult. One is tempted to ask, who or which group of nations in the future shall exercise similar functions and care?

2.3. NATO

NATO's well-known problem is to transform itself from a cold-war organisation into a post-cold-war institution. This transformation is often expressed as a process of replacing it main function to meet threats by the ability to control risks as the main source of vitality for the further existence of the whole institution.

The strength of the Atlantic partnership for over 40 years has rested on security guarantee of the United States, the economic leadership and dominance of the United States and the shared

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[18] Jeanie Leatherman, Conflict Transformation in the CSCE: Learning and Institutionalisation. Cooperation and Conflict, vol 28(4), 1993, 410-411.

experience and common purposes uniting the nations concerned[19]. All of these core factors are now in question. The lively discussion on the topic in the United States is an expression of the prominence of the theme.

It is hard to envisage NATO as a security organisation without a substantial presence and commitment of the United States. All possible scenarios concerning the future of NATO must therefore depart from this basic notion. For as far as the firmness of US commitments remains even to a minor extent unclear, the future role of NATO remains as well. A very substantial problem in the adjustment process is the nature of the relationship of the United States vis a vis its partners in Europe. At the other extreme is imperial presumption, turning allies into clients and at the other end the risk of becoming a hegemon in decay[20], an overstretched hegemon.

Standard arguments in favour of the continuing US commitment in Europe stress the leadership issue. In spite of serious doubts about the quality of US leadership it is said to have helped the Europeans to make decisions or indeed, relieved Europeans from making difficult decisions.[21] The leadership issue is clearly a problematic one in a period of post-modern and post-Cold War world. A trust on a single authority as well as on a single ideology of truth does not speak for a hegemonic leadership.[22]

Another similar argument has been (and still is) the need to deter nuclear weapons by nuclear weapons. Although the Soviet Union as an adversary has gone her nuclear arsenal prevails and stays under

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[19] Martin Lees, The Impact of Europe 1992 on the Atlantic Partnership. **The Washington Quarterly**, Autumn 1989, 172.

[20] David P Calleo, Rebalancing the US-European-Soviet Triangle. **Europe and America beyond 2000**. Ed by Gregory Treverton. New York, 1990, 40.

[21] Laurence Martin, Dismantling Deterrence? **Review of International Studies**, vol 17, 1991, 220.

[22] Christopher Coker, Post-Modernity and the End of the Cold War: has war been disinvented? **Review of International Studies**, vol 18, 1992, 189.

a much more dubious control than before. Therefore it seems prudent to keep the Americans in Europe for deterrence reason. This again will maintain the balance of power type of reasoning alive in security thinking.

The situation very much follows the logic of Glenn Snyder's arguments concerning the **security dilemma**. The dilemma certainly prevails and is even more complicated than ten years ago when Snyder published his article.[23] In looking for the factors which determine the magnitude of the dilemma he points to five determinants. The first is the relative **dependence** of the partners. This denotes that the success of the alliance depends on how much partners need each other's aid and how they evaluate each other's dependence. In this respect clearly the European need less US commitment than what they used to do in the days of the Soviet Union as mighty adversary.

Snyder's second determinant, the **strategic interest**, has also lost much of its initial appeal. In today's Europe the need is not to block an increase in the adversary's power than to redefine the concept of adversary. In NATO's terms the adversary has gone but the risk of instability is there. But methods to deter instability must be radically different from those of deterring a nuclear Great Power.

The third determinant in Snyder's list has become apparent. **Explicitness** of the Alliance posture in various positions taken by the Alliance and in particular by its leader has diminished. On the other hand the EU's statements concerning its relations with former adversaries have not made the situation easier. For an outsider the debate over the new role of NATO has given very confusing signals.

Also the fourth dimension of an alliance dilemma is easily recollected: the **interests** that are in conflict with the adversary have become divergent. The European interests in Eastern Europe

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[23] Glenn Snyder, The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics. World Politics, vol XXXVI (4), 1984, 471-475.

are very much different from those of the United States and are often in conflict. This is the case in particular in the field of economic interests. Finally the determinant of behaviour is present as well. This conflict has surfaced in particular in diverging behavioral patterns in the crises in Balkan.

There is another dilemma which NATO faces. It has to stay as a meaningful security institution to its members and at the same time it has to be able to facilitate the aspirations of those, mainly Eastern-European, non-member states which turn to it in hoping clearly defined security guarantees. This may prove to be an impossible task.

There is evidence of a second "great debate" on the nature and extension of American involvement in the transformation of Europe between National Interest type of views and atlanticist views. The former argument has been developed in a explicit way by Owen Harries who offers six reasons for not the extent American, and indeed West's commitments to the East.[24] He argues first of all that these proposals do not take into consideration Russian suspicions concerning the entry of her adversary from not so distant past into her sphere of influence. Another reason is derived from the lessons from Bosnia: Harries asks: "why should anyone in Eastern Europe take such a guarantee seriously"[25]

Harries further points to the fact that a reliable guarantee would imply the acceptance of expensive peacekeeping and peacemaking actions which are not easily sold to the public opinion. These actions should be taken in a period of nor only decreasing military budgets but also decreasing number of troops available. The fourth argument is that NATO is not capable of executing military operations needed. There will always be an intra-organisational debate on blames and merits.

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[24] Owen Harries, The Collapse of the "West". Foreign Affairs, september/october, 1993, 42-46.

[25] Harries, op. cit. 43.

Two additional doubts concerning the expansion of security commitments of NATO concern the accuracy of the assumption that Europe and America really should have common actions and interests in Eastern Europe. Instead Harries proposes a division of labour between the USA and Europe: the former should concentrate on nuclear issues with Russia and Ukraine while the latter should focus upon "second-order" issues in Central and Eastern Europe. Finally Harries reminds that any effective military operation will produce military casualties which will produce serious domestic repercussions.

It is easy come to the conclusion that arguments presented are linked to the growth of isolationism in the American public opinion.

An opposite list of arguments has been produced by Ronald Asmus, Richard L. Kruger and F. Stephen Larrabee.[26] The argue that the West needs a grand strategy which should be, first and foremost, political and economic. They go on by arguing that the obvious tool for that is NATO.[27] They regard both the EC and the CSCE as incapable institutions to do that. But as a precondition for the new role for NATO is a new transatlantic bargain which could be achieved by six steps.

The first step is to change NATO into an alliance committed to project democracy, stability and crises management. The next step would be the harmonisation of interests on both sides of the Atlantic. As the third step the authors regard the need to settle the German question: only "strong Germany can facilitate European integration and NATO's strategic transformation".[28]

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[26] Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kruger and F. Stephen Larrabee, Building a New Nato. **Foreign Affairs**, September/October, 1993, 28-40.

[27] Asmus, Krugel and Larrabee, op. cit. 31.

[28] ibid, 33-34.

The three first steps in authors' view are needed to reorganize the West in order to tackle the fourth step: to integrate the Visegrad countries into the EC and NATO. The authors argue that security guarantees given to the Visegrad area through WEU will destroy the Atlantic Alliance because the arrangement would not give any say to the United States.

The fifth step concerns Russia and Ukraine.[29]"helping to democratize Russia should be one of the West's top strategic priorities". The authors state a wishful hope that extending Alliance towards Russia should be regarded as a step towards Russia rather than against it. The sixth step finally consists of similar actions towards Ukraine keeping in mind, however, that Ukraine is basically more a proliferation threat than security threat.

In order to facilitate the new NATO the authors also call for reorganizing NATO's military. The first task would be to make an end to the eternal debate between "in area" and "out of area". They further propose institutional reforms which consists of the establishment of a Committee for Preventive Diplomacy and Crisis Management and a new Force Projection Command for operations between NATO's traditional boarders.[30]

The last proposal be necessity brings up the concept and the practise of peacekeeping. It currently undergoes a fundamental change. In the classical UN concept peacekeeping was regarded as a method in controlling inter-state conflict. Peace was kept by establishing a demarcation between the partners in conflict. The collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union has changed the situation.

Peacekeeping in Europe of 1990's is primarily a matter of internal conflicts. This means that peacekeepers have to operate in a primarily civilian environment and have to collaborate primarily with non-state actors. They also have to be ready to accept more

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[29] ibid. 36-38.

[30] ibid, 38-39.

casualties than before yet at the same time peacekeeping operations become more political than military operations. This means a radical departure from the traditional UN -enforced operations: that self defence is accepted only in extreme cases and that all operations must be based on consensual decisions.[31]

However difficult the peacekeeping is in today's Europe there seems to be a great interest in it. All existing security institutions are interested in it, at least in principle. There already exists an inter-institutional arrangement between the CSCE and NATO. The future of peacekeeping and in particular peace enforcement is very much dependent on the internal debate of NATO.

The arguments in favour of Nato are most forthrightly presented Charles L. Glaser.[32] Glaser's argument is based on an analysis of the merits and dismerits of five security models in three different types of possible wars which the West may face in Europe. The war scenario number 1 is a deliberate attack by Russia. Scenario 2 is a war in the East possibly expanding to the West and Scenario 3 envisages a war within Western Europe, possibly exacerbated from the East.[33]

As relevant security institutions again Glaser identifies the following five: a transformed NATO, integrated Western Europe, a continent-wide collective security, a concert of major powers and a defensive unilateral security model.[34] His analysis comes to the conclusion that preserving NATO would be the best solution. It is the best institution against a resurgent Russia, it can extent security guarantees to countries of Central Europe and continue to pacify Western Europe in a case they are divided by security

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[31] Roberto Toscano, Peacekeeping in the New International Situation. **The International Spectator**, vol XXVII (1), 1993, 49-51.

[32] Charles L. Glaser, Why NATO is Still Best? International Security, vol 18(1), 1993, 5-50.

[33] Glaser, op. cit. 5.

[34] Glaser, op. cit. 6.

concerns. However, NATO should avoid appearing provocative in the eyes of Russia.

Glaser acknowledges that Western European alliance (EU and WEU) could meet the two first challenges but not as effectively as NATO. But he argues that WEU could not prevent the deterioration of relations between Western European nations: Western Europe still needs a "defensive balancer"[35]

2.4. The European Union

The European Union now having been established by the successful ratification procedure of the Maastricht Treaty is, however, far from a solid institution in general not to talk about the security dimension. Helen Wallace has identified the future problems of the Union in four dimensions: economic sustainability, political sustainability, the shadows of the past and the shadows of the future[36].

In particular the shadows of the past and future are of interest in the connection of this paper. By the shadow of the past Wallace refers to the "normalisation" of Germany as a result of unification and to the dying out of the shadow of the Soviet Union. Both of these factors have profoundly altered the environment from which a remarkable amount of integrative potential was absorbed. The shadow of future again, in Wallace's mind, is linked to the indistinct agenda of aims and targets of the Union. The major question in Wallace's view is wether the priority should stay with the establishment of secure and

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[35] Glaser, op cit. 47.

[36] Helen Wallace, European Governance in Turbulent Times. **Journal of Common Market Studies**, vol. 31(3), 1993, 298.

prosperous Europe or wether the next phase of integration involving the unavoidable debate on the political nature of the Union should be taken up.[37]

Josef Joffe goes even further by arguing that indeed the success of EC integration was possible only under the cold war bipolarity and that therefore European Union has not to worry about spill-over but about spill-back, i.e. securing yesterday's accomplishments.[38]

But on the other hand changes in the concept of power seem to work in favour of the EU as a security policy actor. These changes are often described as a process from the definition of power in terms of military capability and getting others to change their behaviour, to use **command power** towards **co-optive power**. It is argued that power of today is the competence to be able to set the agenda of world politics; "getting others to want what you want".[39] In Nye's terms the power to establish other's preferences tends to associate with power resources such as culture, ideology or institutions. No doubt the power of the European Community vis-a-vis the EFTA countries has been of this sort and seems to be of the same type vis-avis the Visegrad countries of today.

However, the accounts made on basis of the achievements of the EPC (1975-1993) point to modest achievements. In assessing the role of the EPC in European Politics Christopher Hill identifies three interpretations:[40] European Community as a **Power Bloc**, as a **Civilian Power** or **European foreign policy as a flop**. Hill concludes that although the EPC has not been a great success it has not been a complete flop either. What he seems to suggest is

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[37] Wallace, op. cit. 301-302.

[38] Joseph Joffe, The New Europe: Yesterday's Ghosts. **Foreign Affairs**, vol 72 (1), 1993, 41.

[39] Joseph S, Nye, The Changing Nature of World Power. **Political Science Quarterly**, vol 105(2), 1990. 181.

[40] Christopher Hill, European Foreign Policy: Power Block, Civilian Model - or Flop?. In Reinhart Rummel (ed),**The Evolution of an International Actor**. Boulder. Col., 1990, 34-53.

that perhaps the EC had its best times in foreign policy as a civilian power[41]. No doubt this would be its most natural function in present Europe, too, in particular in its relations to the Visegrad countries.

One is tempted to ask wether, knowing the experiences of the EPC, the EU can realistically perform any other function than securing the "presence" of the European interest.[42] David Allen and Michael Smith conclude that in the political sphere the presence of Western Europe can be seen as a "shaper" or "filter" which mould the perceptions of policy makers, shape collective actions and filter out certain options. In military matters again the presence of Western Europe is limited to the development of an idea of European identity while in economic issues its impact has been most perceptible although not always a positive one.[43]

In a more recent account Christopher Hill identifies four functions to the EC in the international system up to the present and conceives six future functions:[44]

FUNCTIONS UP TO PRESENT:	FUNCTIONS IN FUTURE
* Stabilization of Western Europe	* Replacement of USSR in global balance of power
* Managing world trade	* Regional pacifier
* Principal voice of the developed world in relations with the South	* Global intervenor
* Providing a second western voice in international diplomacy.	* Mediator of conflicts
	* Bridge between rich and poor
	* Joint supervisor of the world economy

[41] Hill, op. cit. 53-55.

[42] David Allen and Michael Smith, Western Europe's Presence in the Contemporary International Arena. Review of International Studies, vol 16, 1990, 21.

[43] Allen-Smith, op cit, 37.

[44] Christopher Hill, The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role. Journal of Common Market Studies, vol 31(3), 1993, 310-315.

In Hill's terms the problem of the European Union is that is faces a serious capability-expectations gap in its international role. Quite obviously the EPC has had remarkable achievements but it has failed to reach a status of an international actor; "an ability to take actions and hold to them"[45].

No doubt one of the major reasons for that is the rather unclear institutional set-up of the EPC and indeed the CFSP. By referring to the criteria for conducting foreign policy by the European Council in Dublin 1990[46] Joerg Monar argues that one of the great difficulties in the CFSP is the vague term "common action". It has not been defined but shall be subject to all sort of conditions and reservations.[47] Clearly the decision-making procedure still resting heavily on unanimous decision-making style is an effective hindrance to a more effective conduct of foreign policy.

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[45] Hill, 1993, op.cit. 318.

[46] - The capacity to respond efficiency and effectively to external challenges;
- unity and coherence in international actions
- the strengthening of democratic legitimacy.
See Bull.EC 4-1990, p. 9.

[47] Joerg Monar, The Foreign Affairs System of the Maastricht Treaty: A Combined Assessment of the CFSP and EC External Relations Elements. In Joerg Monar-Werner Ungerer-Wolfgang Wessels (eds), **The Maastricht Treaty on European Union**. Brussels, 1993, 141.

3. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

It is much easier to find arguments to highlight the weaknesses of the existing security institutions and other arrangements than to propose new resolutions. The basic argument of the present author has been in this paper that **the transformation of security institutions has neither been rapid enough nor deep enough in order to bring about new security models.**

This is true with the two main types of European institutions: the **security institutions proper** (CSCE, NATO, WEU) all are cold-war institutions which have difficulties to get rid of their past; **integration organisations** again have in the past concentrated so much on welfare functions and producing welfare that they lack experiences of touching defence related issues, not to speak about taking responsibilities in these matters.

If we try to discover a solution on these premises we must ask wether it would be easier to change integration institutions into security related institutions or vice versa? Obviously there is also a possibility to invent third way solutions by establishing new organisations.

Finding answers to the these questions one is tempted to rise further inquests:

1. Could and should Europe be defended by Europeans or should the Atlantic Alliance be maintained?

2. Is European defence by Europeans anything else than rhetoric and can it be anything else in the near future?

3. Are there in reality changes to go beyond the balance of power thinking.

Approaching European security issues from the position of Finland the situation is not made any easier. The starting point is that in the collapsed European order Finland presented itself as

neutral country which regarded itself as an integral part of the European balance of power.

Finland's international position has been closely tied with the Great Power conflict. This associates it with systemic variant of neutrality. In the declined European security structure neutrality was seen foremost in military and political contexts. In the case of Finland the security dimension appeared as political sensitivity in relations to the Soviet Union. An consequential part of the national debate was the question wether Finnish-Soviet relations constituted a necessary precondition for the policy of neutrality or wether neutrality as a metadoctrine conducted also the relationship with the neighbouring Great Power.

The systemic countenance of neutrality was also seen in the work of institutions, most notably in the CSCE where the proficiency of neutrals surfaced in the group of N+N. The CSCE was also the framework where positive neutrality[48], i.e. strengthening of the status and acceptance of neutrality, was enhanced. For the Finland the CSCE has been a major platform to exercise neutrality.

The reformulation of the Finnish foreign policy metadoctrine thus took place in an intimate affinity to the erosion of the old European order. The gradual departure from the cold war position took place through unilateral action. This was highlighted by the unilateral renewal of interpretations concerning two basic state treaties which established the treaty-based foundation of the Post-War foreign policy. This is somewhat in conflict with the tendency to regard Finland as a status quo country.

In september 1990 Finland announced that it no longer regarded the restrictions put upon Finland by the Paris Peace Treaty as valid with the exception of the ban to own nuclear weapons. The reason for the redefinition was the unification of Germany and the Soviet-German treaty. At the same occasion the President of Finland also gave a statement where he interpreted the military aspects of

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[48] Efraim Karsh, **Neutrality and Small States**. London, 1988, 35.

the FCMA treaty as outdated. These new interpretations were primarily due to the German unification and the fact that both basic state treaties linked Finland directly to Germany.

By the summer 1991 the European Community Membership option gradually begun to emerge. In particular the membership application of Sweden in July 1991 pushed the course of action to the same direction. The Government of Finland did not change its basic premises until early 1992.

The collapse of the Post-War European security order made dubious the main elements of the Finnish security policy. The status quo -element of the foreign policy doctrine, which dominated it in the days of the cold war, is increasingly obscure in the early years of the 1990's. The reformulation of the doctrine is closely linked to the doctrine of integration policy. Changes in the European integration scene ultimately called for changes in the doctrine of neutrality as well.

Finland in her application to the European Community in February 1992 posed no reservations concerning the commitments to the European Union. On the contrary the Finnish Government explains its position with the following words:

> "While applying for the membership Finland accepts the accomplishments of the European Political Cooperation as well as the aim, as expressed in the treaties of Rome and Maastricht, of an ever deepening economic and political union between the Member States"

The statement further assures that Finland is ready to participate actively to the realisation of the CFSP. In the Government's view the central questions in the Finnish foreign and security policy shall be the attitude towards international crises, the defence dimension of the Union and the importance of Russia as a neighbouring country of Finland.

The Finnish solution to dilemma of neutrality in the post-Cold-War Europe is the concept of **independent defence**. The logic of the independent defence -argument derives from two different sources. **For the first**, a strong independent defence is a by-product of the traditional element of neutrality: a neutral position is secured

only for as far as Finland can defend her territory with her own means and own troops.

In the old European architecture this implied a highest possible threshold to the possible proposal for military cooperations from the Soviet Union. In the new European architecture independent defence would imply a high threshold against military cooperation *bid from the European Union.

Independent defence -argument points to the Finnish desire to remain outside alliances, to become non-aligned. From the ongoing discussion in Finland one may learn, however, that there are different and sometimes conflicting ideas of what independent defence actually means. The President of the Republic dr Mauno Koivisto has in certain interviews suggested that perhaps non-alignment could be a more suitable word to describe the Finnish position because the term "non-aligned" is an objective concept: either you are a non-aligned country or not. Neutrality again is a concept which depends on the recognition of others.[49]

But in the internal Finnish debate there is also a strong argument in favour of a return to classical war-time neutrality. The essence of this argument is that Finland may become a member of the European Union but remain outside defence cooperation and declare her neutrality in a possible war-like situation. This view implies that Finland has no difficulties in the CFSP in its current form for as long as defence issues are excluded. The argument comes close to the Danish situation whereby Denmark abstains from defence cooperation but takes part in political cooperation. The concept of neutrality reduced its basics would in this view enable Finland to maintain her neutrality.

The second reason for the emphasis on the independent defence is linked to public opinion where strong reservations concerning the membership prevail. Reservations are to a great extent based on security policy considerations. In particular the Finnish-Russian relations are seen in the public opinion as a major reason for

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[49] Referred in **Helsingin Sanomat**, October 28, 1992.

neutrality. The Government's emphasis on the independent defence posture largely serves domestic consumption.

Despite of a strong emphasis given to the willingness of Finland to meet the membership criteria of the European Union, the Commission in its *avis* on the Finnish application in November 1992 showed a considerable suspicion concerning the full acceptance of the principles and aims of the Union's foreign and security policy. In particular the Commission casted doubts wether Finland, even if strongly armed, can fully share some of the Union's objectives, in particular those linked to the Article J.4 of the Maastricht treaty.

The Commission is rather explicit in its conclusion:

> "Nevertheless such anticipated effects (concerning the restrictions of commitments caused by neutrality -E.A.), even if they are of political nature, can pose problems for the Union, to the extent that they might cause Finland to oppose itself systematically to certain actions which, in its view, could be prejudicial to its policy of neutrality, or what is left of it."

There appeared to be a major dilemma in the relationship of Finland to the aims and functions of the Union. The Finnish government presented its case by arguing that the emphasis on a strong independent defence would actually strengthen the security of the Union, to contribute to the defence of the Union. The Commission, however, did not fully abide to this assumption. The Commission does not worry the ability of Finland to defend her territory in a possible crisis as such. The Commission rather showed doubts wether Finland in reality is a reliable member of the Union because of her traditional neutral position.

These reservations seem to be swept aside by the statement made by the Union on December 21, 1993 which states inter alia:

> "- the acceding states will, on accession, take on in their entirety and without reservation all the objectives of the Treaty, the provisions of its Title V and the relevant declarations attached to it."

In the same connection the Finnish Government re-stated that it had no reservation concerning the CFSP. In his statement from

December 21, 1993 H.E. Heikki Haavisto, Foreign Minister of Finland declared:[50]

> "The negotiation result reached today is based on acceptance by Finland of the provisions of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty and its political objectives.
> In these negotiations and the discussions it has had with Member States, Finland has expounded upon its policy, noting that after the Cold War our point of departure consists on **military non-alignment and an independent, credible defence.**(emphasis mine). We prepared to **constructively and actively participate in the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy, also with regard to the so-called defence dimension.**(emphasis mine) We do not exclude any option in this regard."

This statement made marks a remarkable departure from the country's previous and traditional security policy. At the outset it seems that Finland has made its choice: **Finland prefers the European security arena (EU/WEU/CSCE).** This is understandable for obvious reasons. The uncertainty of the real intentions and practical arrangements of the Atlanticist security arena (NATO/NACC/CSCE) make Finland reserved. In particular the reactions caused by recent NATO proposals in Russia have kept Finland alarmed. Keeping in mind that Finland shares 1300 kilometres of common boarder with the European risk factor no 1 in my list is fact of life.

This does not mean, however, that the partnership for peace - proposal would be turned down without considerations. On the contrary, Finland has an observer status in the NACC and is ready to consider any new proposals. Finland is not, however, interested in defensive guarantees. On the other hand Finland sees the partnership settlement as an interesting effort from the point of view of peacekeeping. Finland often regards itself as "a Great Power in Peacekeeping".

The basic model is the independent and reliable defence in combination with the membership in the European Union. As an integral part of the reliable defence -argument is the "arms deal of the century": Finland has purchased 60 F/A 18 interceptors from the US Navy.

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[50] H.E. Mr Heikki Haavisto, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, December 21, 1993 (press release)

Since Finland was a "status quo country" in the bi-polar system of Europe it has difficulties to take a departure from that position. The option of neutrality still very much dominates the internal discussion on Finland's security policy. The question here is: could neutrality still serve as an element of the basic security policy. Could the Finnish security policy be build on the triangle Union membership - Reliable defence - Military neutrality?

Since both the definition and practice of neutrality have been of different nature, the reactions of neutrals in adapting to the new situation have been different as well. One common denominator is the possible future membership in the EU. All the neutral countries wish to maintain something of their neutral past also in the new situation. In the Finnish case the notion that instead of the collapse of the Cold War, the recollection and reflection of bi-polarity still exists in Europe is an important factor.

At the outset the possibilities of the neutrals to be able to enjoy a special treatment as members of the CFSP are diminished by the Treaty on European Union. Title V clearly emphasises common obligations. In particular Article J.1.4. sets limits to the freedom of actions of the Member States:

> "The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. The Council shall ensure that these principles are complied with".

However, the treaty leaves room for national interests as well. Art J.3.5-6 seem to indicated that in urgent national matters or rapid changes in situations, national policies different from joint action of the Union are accepted. A similar reference is made regarding the defence implications of the Union. Art J.4.4. states that "The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States...". One could at least assume that the reference to "specific character" might imply that the neutrals could maintain at least something from

their previous policy line also as the members of the Union unless they made "specific character" a habit.

One is tempted to argue also that neutrality is after all not disappearing from Europe. Even if Finland and other neutrals as well are not able to keep much of their previous positions they shall employ their historical experiences and roles. Given that fact that the membership of the Union could even rise to 16 as a result of the ongoing accession negotiations the neutrals will have the possibility to exercise their established roles and skills as intermediators, coalition builders and even bridge-builders between the rival coalitions inside the Union (North-South for example). The larger the membership, the greater is the need for the kind of roles the neutrals have had in "Old Europe".

Neutrals in the enlarged European Union shall have as their core the "3 to 5" -votes Members. Their position to influence coalition building is rather meaningful and their "cooperativeness" in an institutionalized decision-making system should be a special asset. How much that will shape the Community's position as a power in the World of Powers is an interesting but purely speculative question.