


THE REEMERGENCE OF AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM AND EUROPE
(XI International Lisbon Conference)

Instituto de estudos estratégicos e internacionais
Lisbon, 17-19/XI/1993

- a. Conference programme
- b. List of participants
 - 1. "Le renouveau nationaliste en Europe Communautaire et ses implications dans les relations inter-étatiques"/ Anne-Marie Le Gloannec
 - 2. "The emergence of non-Russian nationalism: the legacy of the Soviet empire"/ Mark N. Katz
 - 3. "Nationalism in Russia and European security"/ Ednan Agaev
 - 4. "Nato and future nationalism"/ Trevor Taylor
 - 5. "Facing radicaln nationalism: Csce responses"/ Peter Schmidt
 - 6. "Le nationalisme en Europe: le rôle du Conseil d'Europe"/ Gonçalo Santa Clara Gomes
 - 7. "The future of European security"/ Willem van Eekelen
 - 8. "La crise structurelle du nationalisme algérien"/ Lahouari Addi
 - 9. "Nationalism in the Arab world today"/ Roberto Aliboni
 - 10. "The rise of radical nationalism: prospects for Euro-American cooperation"/ Desmond Dinan





IEEI INSTITUTO DE ESTUDOS ESTRATÉGICOS E INTERNACIONAIS

XI International Lisbon Conference
THE REEMERGENCE OF AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM AND EUROPE

Belém Cultural Center
Lisbon, 17th - 19th November 1993

Conference Programme

Wednesday, 17th November

- 14h30 **Opening Session**
* José Manuel Durão Barroso, Portuguese Foreign Minister
* Jorge Sampaio, Mayor of Lisbon
* José Calvet de Magalhães, Chairman of the IEEI
- 15h30 **A general analysis of nationalism in Western Europe**
* Eduardo Lourenço, Portugal
- Discussion
- 16h45 **Coffee-break**
- 17h00 **The rebirth of nationalism within the European Union and its implications for inter-state relations**
* Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, CERI, France
* Guilherme d'Oliveira Martins, SEDES, Portugal
Comments: Manuel Braga da Cruz, Institute for Social Sciences, Portugal
- Discussion

Thursday, 18th

- 09h30 **The emergence of post-communist nationalism in Central Europe and the former Soviet republics**
* Aleksander Smolar, Batory Foundation, Poland
* Mark Katz, George Mason University, United States
Comments: Vojtech Mastny, The Bologna Center of Johns Hopkins University
- Discussion
- 11h00 **Coffee-break**

- 11h15 **The rebirth of nationalism in Russia**
 * Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, de l'Académie Française
 * Ednan Agaev, Directorate of Analysis and Forecasting, Ministry
 of Foreign Affairs, Russia
- Discussion
- 15h00 **The case of the former Yugoslavia**
 * Jacques Rupnik, CERI, France
 Comments: Thanos Veremis, ELIAMEP, Greece
- Discussion
- 16h30 Coffee-break
- 16h45 **Working Groups**
**Initiatives for stability and democracy in Europe designed to
 counter the risks of aggressive nationalism**
 I. European response (European Union and WEU)
 Moderator: Luís Filipe Lobo Fernandes, University of Minho,
 Portugal
 * Carlos Gaspar, Institute for Social Sciences, Portugal
 * Roberto Zadra, Institute for Security Studies, WEU
 Rapporteur: Maria João Seabra, IEEI, Portugal
 II. NATO response
 Moderator: José Gregório Faria, Portuguese Permanent
 Representative to NATO
 * Trevor Taylor, Royal Institute of International Affairs, United
 Kingdom
 * John Kriendler, former deputy assistant secretary general for
 Political Affairs at NATO
 Rapporteur: Moisés Venâncio, IEEI, Portugal
 III. CSCE and the Council of Europe. The role of pan-European
 initiatives.
 Moderator: Hans Stark, IFRI, France
 * Peter Schmidt, SWP, Ebenhausen, Germany
 * Gonçalo Santa Clara Gomes, Portuguese Ambassador to the Council
 of Europe
 Rapporteur: José Soromenho Marques, University of Lisbon, Portugal
- 20h30 Dinner offered by the Mayor of Lisbon. After-dinner speech by the
 Secretary-General of WEU, Willem Van Eekelen.

Friday, 19th November

- 09h30 **1.5. Radical nationalism in the Arab World: radical political
 Islam and secular Arab nationalism**
 * Lahouari Addi, University of Oran, Algeria
 * Roberto Aliboni, IAI, Italy
- Discussion

11h00 Coffee-break

11h15 Working groups

14h30 The future of Euro-American cooperation: facing the challenge
 of aggressive nationalism.
 * Stefano Silvestri, IAI, Italy
 * Desmond Dinan, Center for European Studies, George Mason
 University, United States

 Discussion

16h15 Coffee-break

17h00 Closing Session
 Speech by Edgar Morin, director of research emeritus at the CNRS,
 France, followed by discussion.
 Summing-up by Álvaro Vasconcelos, director of the IEEI.

 Closing address by H.E. the President of the Portuguese
 Republic, Dr. Mário Soares

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INTERNAZIONALI - ROMA

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IEEI INSTITUTO DE ESTUDOS ESTRATÉGICOS E INTERNACIONAIS

XI Conferência Internacional de Lisboa

**A EUROPA E A REEMERGÊNCIA DO NACIONALISMO RADICAL
THE REEMERGENCE OF AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM AND EUROPE**

Centro Cultural de Belém, 17 - 19 de Novembro de 1993

LISTA DE PARTICIPANTES / LIST OF PARTICIPANTS



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XI Conferência Internacional de Lisboa
A EUROPA E A REEMERGÊNCIA DO NACIONALISMO RADICAL
THE REEMERGENCE OF AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM AND EUROPE

Centro Cultural de Belém
Lisboa, 17, 18 e 19 de Novembro de 1993

Sessão de Abertura e de Encerramento
Opening and Closing Sessions

Sua Excelência o Senhor Presidente da República
Dr. Mário Soares

Sua Excelência o Senhor Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros
Dr. José Manuel Durão Barroso

Sua Excelência o Senhor Presidente da Câmara Municipal de Lisboa
Dr. Jorge Sampaio

Oradores / Speakers

Alemanha / Germany

Peter Schmidt
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen

Argélia / Algeria

Lahouari Addi
Universidade de Oran

EUA / USA

Desmond Dinan
Center for EC Studies, George Mason University

Mark Katz
George Mason University

John Kriendler
Former deputy assistant secretary general
for Political Affairs at NATO

Vojtech Mastny
The Bologna Center of the Johns Hopkins University

França / France

Hélène Carrère d'Encausse de l'Académie Française
Institut d'Études Politiques de Paris

Anne-Marie Le Gloannec
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales

Edgar Morin
Directeur de recherches émérite au CNRS

Jacques Rupnik
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales

Hans Stark
Institut Français de Relations Internationales

Grécia / Greece
Thanos Veremis
Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy

Holanda / Netherlands
Willem van Eekelen
Secretário Geral da UEO / WEU Secretary General

Itália / Italy
Roberto Aliboni
Istituto Affari Internazionali

Stefano Silvestri
Istituto Affari Internazionali

Roberto Zadra
Institute for Security Studies, WEU

Polónia / Poland
Aleksander Smolar
Batory Foundation

Portugal /Portugal
Manuel Braga da Cruz
Instituto de Ciências Sociais

José Gregório Faria
Representante Permanente de Portugal na NATO

Luís Filipe Lobo Fernandes
Universidade do Minho

Carlos Gaspar
Instituto de Ciências Sociais

Gonçalo Santa Clara Gomes
Embaixador de Portugal junto do Conselho da Europa

José Calvet de Magalhães
Presidente do Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais

José Soromenho Marques
Universidade de Lisboa

Guilherme d'Oliveira Martins
SEDES

Eduardo Lourenço
Ensaísta

Maria João Seabra
Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais

Álvaro de Vasconcelos
Director do Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais

Moisés Venâncio
Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais

Reino Unido / United Kingdom
Trevor Taylor
Royal Institute of International Affairs

Rússia / Russia
Ednan Agaev
Director, Analysis and Forecasting,
Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Participantes / Participants

Vera Vasconcelos Abreu
Fundação das Descobertas

David Adamson
Embaixada dos EUA

Sofia Isabel Coelho Afonso
Universidade do Minho

João Marques de Almeida
Universidade Lusíada

Vicente Pinto de Andrade
Universidade Moderna

Afonso Morais Sarmiento de Barros
ISCTE

Philippe Berg
Embaixador da Bélgica em Lisboa

Antero Coutinho Bernardo
Inst. de Altos Estudos da Força Aérea

Fernanda Bizarro
RTP 2

Renato Bocchetti
Western European Union

Maria Rosa Boceta
Embaixada de Espanha

Joaquim Soeiro de Brito
Comissão Nacional dos Descobrimentos

Maria José Pires de Brito
Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais

Jefferson Brown
Embaixada dos EUA

Marcello Caltabiano
Western European Union

Fernando Jorge Cardoso
Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais

Pedro Alexandre Gomes Cardoso
Instituto Português da Conjuntura Estratégica

Rui Fernando Sucena do Carmo
Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros

Maria Carrilho
ISCTE

Amadeu da Silva Carvalho
Instituto da Defesa Nacional

Anabela Carvalho
Universidade do Minho

Armando Antunes de Castro
ISEG

Ladislav Cervenka
Embaixada da República Checa

Milton Charlton
Embaixada dos EUA

Abel Cabral Couto
ISCSP

António Oliveira Cruz
Instituto Piaget

Giuseppe Cucchi
Célula de Planeamento - UEO

José Fernando Moreira da Cunha
Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros

Ivone Cunha
Embaixada dos EUA

José Cutileiro
Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros

Horácio M. do Vale César
Rádio Comercial

Patrícia Vitória Daehnhardt
Universidade Lusíada

Jim Davis
Embaixada dos EUA

Slaheddine Dhrif
Embaixador da Tunísia em Lisboa

Helmut Elfenkämper
Embaixada da Alemanha

Paul Faber
Embaixador de Luxemburgo em Lisboa

Fernanda Faria
Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais

Aurélio Faria
SIC

Gérard Fauveau
Embaixada de França

João Manuel Mariz Fernandes
Instituto de Altos Estudos Militares

Manuel de Campos Dias Figueiredo
União Europeia Ocidental

Wilton Fonseca
Agência Lusa

Fernando Coelho Fonseca
Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais

Luiz Henrique Pereira da Fonseca
Encarregado de Negócios a.i. do Brasil em Lisboa

António Siqueira Freire
Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais

Jaime Gama
Deputado

Myriam Avelar Ghira
Ministério da Defesa Nacional

Pedro Gomes
JSD

Rolando Lalande Gonçalves
Governo da Região Autónoma dos Açores

Gabriel Corte-Real Goucha
Juventude Europeia Federatista

Hans Martin Windisch Graetz
Embaixada da Áustria

Ruy Teixeira Guerra

Álvaro Sabino Guerreiro
União Europeia Ocidental

Alberto Laplaine Guimarães
Câmara Municipal de Lisboa

Gail Gulliksen
Embaixada dos EUA

András Gulyás
Embaixador da Hungria em Lisboa

Jorge Heitor
Público

Mendo Castro Henriques
Instituto da Defesa Nacional

Luísa Cândida Tavares Jeremias
Diário de Notícias

Nuno André Amaral Jerónimo
Universidade da Beira Interior

Francisco Manuel Junceiro
Estado-Maior da Armada

Jan Knutsson
Ministério do Negócios Estrangeiros, Estocolmo

Otto Lampe
Embaixada da Alemanha

Jean Lamy
Embaixada de França

N. Langman
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London

Luís Fernando de Lima
Ministério da Defesa Nacional

Luis Guimarães Lobato
Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian

Vitor Lourenço
Ministério da Defesa Nacional

Václav Malý
Embaixada da República Checa

Giorgio Marini
Embaixada de Itália

Paulo Pinto Mascarenhas
O Independente

David C. McGaffey
European University

Emanuel Macedo de Medeiros
Açoriano Oriental

Aziz Mekouar
Embaixador de Marrocos em Lisboa

Rui Miguel Peixoto G. Monteiro
Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros

Adriano Moreira
Deputado . ISCSP

José Maria Mendes Moreira
Ministério da Defesa Nacional

Kjeld Mortensen
Embaixador da Dinamarca em Lisboa

Gustavo Moura
Açoriano Oriental

Gavriel Nahum
Embaixada de Israel

Joaquim Trigo Negreiros
Público

Miguel Santos Neves
Universidade Moderna

Martinho da Cruz Nombo
Fundação Cidade de Lisboa

Isabel Nunes
Ministério da Defesa Nacional

Matias da Nóbrega-Guilherme
Universidade Nova de Lisboa

Benjamin Oron
Embaixada de Israel

Ludovico Ortona
Embaixador de Itália em Lisboa

Jim Overly
Embaixada dos EUA

Michel-Akis Papageorgiou
Embaixador da Grécia em Lisboa

José Maria Andrade Pereira
Advogado

Manuel Tomás Fernandes Pereira
Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros

José Manuel Macedo Pereira
Liga Europeia Coop. Económica

José António Rodrigues Pereira
Ministério da Defesa Nacional

Vladimir Ivanov Philipov
Embaixador da Bulgária em Lisboa

Rui Pina
Ministério da Defesa Nacional

António José T. Gomes de Pinho
ACDS

Mário Lemos Pires
Instituto da Defesa Nacional

António Fuzeta da Ponte
Estado Maior da Armada

Carlos Manuel Sousa C. Ramos
Estado Maior da Armada

Jair Rattner

Fernando José Reino
Embaixador

António Gonçalves Ribeiro
Ministério da Defesa Nacional

Luísa Ribeiro
Agência Lusa

Philippe Romain-Desfosses
Ministère de la Défense, Paris

Pedro Roseta
Grupo Parlamentar do PSD

Janusz Rymwid-Mickiewicz
Embaixada da Polónia

António Emílio Ferraz Sacchetti
Conselho Superior de Disciplina da Armada

Hermínio José Ferreira Santos
Expansão

Artur Batista dos Santos
Instituto da Defesa Nacional

Victor Marques dos Santos
Instituto de Defesa Nacional

Alexandre Petrovitch Smirnov
Embaixador da Federação Russa

Tony Smith
Jornalista

Teresa de Sousa
Público

Martin Stropnický
Embaixador da República Checa

Manuel Rodrigues Tabau
Secretaria de Estado de Assuntos Parlamentares

Francisco Torres
Universidade Católica Portuguesa

Joaquim José Pablo da S. Torres
Universidade Moderna

Fevzi Uslubas
Embaixada da Turquia

Ma. do Rosário de Moraes Vaz
Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais

Anibal Villalba
Inst. Cuestiones Internac. y Política Exterior, Madrid

John Stephen Wall
Embaixador do Reino Unido em Lisboa

Jorge Wemans
Público

Sharon Wilkenson
Encarregada de Negócios a.i. dos EUA em Lisboa

Peter Zsoldos
Embaixador da República Eslovaca

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XI Conférence Internationale de Lisbonne

L'EUROPE DEVANT LE NATIONALISME RADICAL

Centre Culturel de Belém, Lisbonne, 17 - 19 Novembre 1993

***Le Renouveau Nationaliste en Europe Communautaire
et ses
Implications dans les Relations Inter-étatiques***

par

Anne-Marie Le Gloannec

(Chargée de Recherche, Centre d'Études et de Recherches Internationales)

[Draft]

Le renouveau nationaliste en Europe communautaire et ses implications dans les relations inter-étatiques

L'intitulé de l'exposé qu'il m'est demandé de faire appelle une triple interrogation:

- premièrement le nationalisme a de nombreux visages, instrument d'une modernisation, éclairée, autoritaire ou totalitaire ou encore repli frileux sur la tradition, ouverture ou fermeture. De même les concepts corollaires d'intérêts nationaux ou d'identité nationale peuvent recouvrir toute une gamme idéologique et politique. La définition de ce qu'on appelle identité nationale et la défense d'intérêts dits nationaux peuvent s'inscrire dans un contexte d'ouverture - ouverture des sociétés les unes aux autres et coopération entre Etats et gouvernements - mais aussi s'accompagner d'un rejet de l'autre, citoyen ou Etat, marqué par l'essor de la xénophobie et le démantèlement ou l'absence de structures de coopération internationale. A l'évidence, l'Europe communautaire des années quatre-vingt-dix n'est pas l'Europe abaissée des années trente. N'assiste-t-on pas pour autant à des frémissements nationalistes ? Mais de quoi justement parle-t-on ? De la xénophobie, parfois violente et criminelle, des sociétés, cependant prêtes à s'émouvoir au vu et au su des atrocités commises en Bosnie-Herzégovine, voire à accueillir des réfugiés ? Des pannes diplomatiques - de l'impuissance de la Communauté en ex-

Yougoslavie aux hoquets du Système monétaire européen - alors que celles-ci n'ont suscité ni dévaluations compétitives ni véritable reconstitution de sphères d'influence dans les Balkans ?

- Ceci m'amène à une seconde question: si nationalisme il y a, peut-on parler de renouveau - et renouveau par rapport à quoi ? La division de l'Europe n'a pas empêché la défense d'intérêts nationaux - on en voudra pour preuve la politique gaulliste et le départ de la France de l'organisation militaire intégrée ou encore l'Ostpolitik ouest-allemande qui, selon une formule célèbre, donna à la République fédérale deux jambes pour marcher. Quant à la xénophobie, elle n'est pas, hélas, propre à notre fin de siècle. Y a-t-il donc renouveau - et de quoi - ou y a-t-il quelque chose de spécifique à ce qu'on appellera pour l'instant 'renouveau du nationalisme' et qui fait que cette Europe communautaire n'est fort heureusement pas l'Europe des années trente mais peut-être pas non plus l'Europe irénique dont rêvaient les pères de Maastricht.

- Troisième interrogation enfin, peut-on parler de 'renouveau nationaliste' en Europe occidentale sans évoquer ce qui fut naguère l''autre Europe' ? Cette autre Europe n'aspire-t-elle pas, pour l'essentiel, à faire partie de l''Europe' - de l'Europe occidentale, s'entend, Europe productive et marchande, Europe de droit - sous peine de s'appauvrir ou pire de se déchirer et d'expédier dans cette Europe communautaire immigrants économiques et réfugiés fuyant les nouvelles guerres moyen-âgeuses ? Mais ceux-ci justement ne suscitent-ils un repli frileux de la part de ceux censés les accueillir ? Y a-t-il donc interactions entre nationalismes à l'Est et nationalismes à

l'Ouest et sous quelles formes - contagion ou contre-exemple ?

I Opinions publiques et partis politiques:

Dans l'Europe du chômage dont on attribue la responsabilité aux "autres" - en France à la compétition de pays à salaires moins élevés et en République fédérale aux coûts de la réunification -, les frontières ont tendance à se fermer, frontières tangibles ou frontières symboliques. On se ferme aux autres de façon marginale et violente, dans les banlieues françaises et britanniques et dans les villes allemandes, explosions ponctuelles de violences meurtrières à l'encontre des Indiens, des Noirs et des Arabes, des Turcs et des Tziganes et l'on peut se demander s'il y a contagion spontanée ou coordination explicite, dans cette sinistre mode qui consiste à brûler des victimes expiatoires. On se ferme aussi aux autres de manière frileuse et feutrée en entravant la venue de nouveaux arrivants, immigrants dits économiques ou demandeurs d'asile - puisque, de l'Autriche aux Pays-Bas, de l'Allemagne à la France, les pays d'Europe occidentale rendent juridiquement plus difficile l'attribution du statut de réfugiés politiques - et en interdisant l'importation de certains produits est-européens, agricoles ou industriels, concurrençant la production ouest-européenne. On craint enfin le monstre Maastrichtien, dévoreur d'identités, comme l'ont montré les referendum danois et français ou les mouvements d'humeur allemands dénonçant la mort future du Deutsche Mark - qu'on redoute la législation bruxelloise ou, de façon plus confuse, la disparition des spécificités politique nationales: jamais on n'a tant pleuré les

Parlements nationaux, larmes de crocodile dans certains cas.

La violence xénophobe rencontre toutefois la désapprobation d'une majorité des populations, ainsi en Allemagne où après le triple meurtre de Mölln, en novembre 1992, des millions d'Allemands défilèrent de leur propre initiative - et non à l'appel de partis politiques - dans les rues de Munich, de Hambourg, de Francfort et de Essen. De même, à la fermeture des frontières aux immigrants et demandeurs d'asile, on peut opposer l'ouverture de pays comme l'Autriche, l'Allemagne - ou encore la Hongrie - qui accueillirent un grand nombre de réfugiés temporaires fuyant la guerre dans l'ex-Yougoslavie. Enfin si Maastricht éveille l'irritation plus que l'enthousiasme, les attentes des publics n'en sont pas moins profondément ambiguës: selon un récent sondage, les Français interrogés rejettent le traité en leur majorité mais n'en souhaitent pas moins une union économique et monétaire.

Une frange des partis politiques, conservateurs notamment, reprend le thème de la fermeture - fermeture des frontières aux immigrants et à ceux des demandeurs d'asile qu'on soupçonne de faux, fermeture aussi à la concurrence internationale, caressée en France plus qu'en Allemagne, fermeture enfin du processus d'intégration européenne, dont le leader de la CSU bavaroise a récemment souhaité qu'il se ralentisse, voire qu'il s'interrompe. Craignant la concurrence de partis plus radicaux, Front National, Republikaner... ces franges politiques surenchérissent et, par contagion, ébranlent les positions de l'establishment auquel ils appartiennent. Ainsi le chancelier Kohl dut-il, en décembre 1991, faire quelque concession à son aile droite, traversée de

frémissements nationalistes: alors que l'essentiel de la presse conservatrice et libérale l'accusait d'abandonner le Deutsche Mark aux Européens, le Chancelier reconnut inopinément les républiques sécessionnistes de l'ex-Yougoslavie, cédant, avec son ministre des affaires étrangères, aux pressions conjuguées de son aile conservatrice, de la CSU bavaroise, de l'Eglise catholique et de la presse, écrite ou télévisée. De même, le gouvernement d'Edouard Balladur doit-il manoeuvrer entre exigences de la gauche et de la droite, revendications paysannes mais aussi demandes des industriels en ce qui concerne le GATT.

II Coopération ou re-nationalisation ?

Dans le premier cas, le gouvernement fédéral adopta, par la suite, un profil bas, prisonnier tant de son incapacité à envoyer des troupes dans des zones hors-OTAN que des complexités de l'imbroglie yougoslave. Dans le second, le gouvernement français travaille à la recherche de solutions européennes, notamment franco-allemandes, malgré un discours qui fut parfois dur. Si la rhétorique est nationale, la coopération au sein de la CE reste l'impératif: la défense des intérêts nationaux exige des solutions internationales alors même que le discours reste souvent national. D'une part en effet, les partis politiques sont, dans la plupart des pays de la Communauté, en proie à une grave crise de légitimité dont les ressorts sont vraisemblablement plus structurels que temporaires, liés à la remise en cause d'un modèle de développement et de redistribution économique et social, voire de la démocratie représentative. D'autre part cependant, les responsables politiques semblent

comprendre qu'il n'existe d'autre voie que la coopération: à preuve, par exemple, le refus de François Mitterrand de former une alliance franco-britannique dirigée contre l'Allemagne mais plutôt de poursuivre la voie tracée par ses prédécesseurs (refus du 'balancing against' pour préférer le 'bandwagoning with').

Il n'en demeure pas moins que dans l'Europe d'après 1989, les cadres de coopération se relâchent de sorte que certaines politiques se re-nationalisent de facto tandis que d'autres demeurent pour l'essentiel nationales. Ainsi les politiques d'immigration sont-elles encore avant tout du ressort des gouvernements concernés, la politique commune que prévoit le traité de Maastricht en matière de justice et de police étant inter-gouvernementale. Cependant politiques monétaires et militaires se re-nationalisent, l'une à la suite des troubles monétaires de l'été 1993 qui conduisirent à l'élargissement des marges de fluctuations des monnaies du SME les unes par rapport aux autres, l'autre du fait à la fois de l'accession à la souveraineté pleine et entière de la République fédérale en 1991 et du retrait partiel des Etats-Unis, à la fois en termes militaires et en termes diplomatiques.

La modification du SME a permis de facto à la Bundesbank de recouvrer une marge de manoeuvre qu'elle avait en partie perdue, au plus tard avec les accords de Bâle-Nyborg: elle n'est plus obligée d'intervenir pour soutenir des monnaies plus faibles. Alors que cependant les taux directeurs allemands continuent de dicter la politique monétaire des voisins de l'Allemagne, le rôle de la Bundesbank en Europe devient plus domination qu'hégémonie - perdant en partie une légitimation qu'elle s'était acquise en

soutenant les monnaies plus faibles, c'est-à-dire en aidant les pays les plus fragiles à jouer le jeu européen. Sur le plan militaire, les nouvelles instabilités européennes et la nécessité d'adopter une flexibilité d'emploi des forces tout autant que la disparition des contraintes nées de la défaite et de la division de l'Allemagne expliquent la création d'un état-major inter-armées de planification et d'un commandement national de l'armée de terre en République fédérale alors que ce pays reste le pilier de l'Alliance, détenant des positions clef au sein du dispositif militaire.

Le terme de re-nationalisation recouvre en fait une réalité extrêmement complexe. En effet, malgré l'affaiblissement des contraintes objectives pesant sur les monnaies à la suite de l'élargissement des marges de fluctuation, les gouvernements européens n'ont pas recouru à des dévaluations compétitives et même plus, ils s'en tiennent pour certains aux règles du SME d'avant août 1993, ainsi les autorités monétaires françaises. Dans le domaine de la défense, re-nationalisation ne signifie pas absence de coopération puisque des unités multinationales ont été mises sur pied, germano-américaines, germano-néerlandaises, corps européen...

III Au coeur, l'Allemagne:

Ainsi les processus se combinent plus qu'ils ne s'opposent, d'un côté repli sur un mythe identitaire, invocation d'intérêts nationaux, sécuritaires ou économiques, fermeture à l'étranger et, de l'autre, sensibilité aux maux d'ailleurs et sursaut humanitaire, coopération internationale et ouverture.

Fragmentées, les populations à l'intérieur d'un même pays réagissent différemment, perdants contre gagnants, ruralité contre urbanité en France plus qu'en Allemagne et, dans ce dernier pays, Est contre Ouest, sans que l'invocation d'une unité mythique, celle de la nation française - ou des syndicats ou des intérêts économiques - et celle de la nation allemande - que prétendrait incarner un Steffen Heitmann, candidat à la présidence, cependant extrêmement contesté - ne puisse recouvrir les fractures. Au niveau international, la dissolution brutale ou progressive des cadres nés de la guerre froide fait place non à de nouvelles structures mais bien plutôt à des tendances, à des processus, re-nationalisation d'un côté, coopération multinationale et inter-gouvernementale de l'autre - sans que l'acquis communautaire ne soit véritablement remis en cause.

Au centre de ces processus, l'Allemagne, gagnante et perdante, puissante et fragile, demeure la clef de voûte de la Communauté comme de l'Alliance atlantique, centre géographique et politique du continent européen. Dans ces trois dimensions cependant, ouest-européenne, atlantique et européenne, son rôle s'est profondément modifié depuis la fin de la guerre froide. Si elle demeure une pièce maîtresse au sein de l'Alliance, qu'il s'agisse de la détention de postes-clefs et de l'appareil logistique par exemple, elle n'est plus cette pièce maîtresse du dispositif de défense qu'elle fut quarante ans durant. Si de l'Allemagne dépendent toutes les évolutions ultérieures de la Communauté - puisque sans elle point d'union économique et monétaire -, le regain d'indépendance de la Bundesbank - qui n'est plus obligée de soutenir des parités étroites auxquelles

pourtant se tiennent les autorités d'autres pays membres du SME - et la mise à mal du modèle allemand - qui avec la réunification et l'endettement fédéral a perdu de sa vertu - entament la légitimité de l'hégémonie allemande. Dans la dimension européenne enfin, la République fédérale n'est pas la figure de proue d'une réunification continentale telle que certains l'espéraient encore en 1990-1992. Privée encore de capacités d'intervention militaire, ses moyens financiers amenuisés, crainte enfin par Polonais et Tchèques, elle peut certes étendre son influence politique et culturelle - avocat notamment des pays de Visegrad auprès de la Communauté et de l'Alliance - et multiplier les investissements dans cette région d'Europe sans toutefois y jouer d'un leadership incontesté.

Plus que d'autres pays européens, l'Allemagne est à la fois puissante et fragile, moins puissante et moins fragile qu'elle ne le fut toutefois à certains moments de son histoire. Elle n'en est pas moins puissante, à la fois potentiellement et réellement parce que son tissu économique et social demeure solide, fruit de quarante ans de miracle, plus solide que ne le laissent parfois croire les comparaisons monétaires et budgétaires avancées par la presse française par exemple. Elle n'en est pas moins fragile, du fait de la réunification bien sûr mais aussi des évolutions à ses portes: tout déchirement économique, politique et social en Pologne, en Russie ou ailleurs en Europe centrale et orientale aurait des conséquences en terme d'immigration - même si celle-ci est en partie jugulée par les nouvelles dispositions de la Loi fondamentale -, en termes économiques - qu'on songe aux investissements - ou encore

financiers ou boursiers - même si la bourse de Francfort a réagi aux événements du 3 octobre 1993, en Russie, avec moins de nervosité qu'on ne s'y attendait.

Elle est fragile aussi parce que le processus décisionnel y est éclaté, partagé entre de nombreux acteurs, gouvernement et partis politiques, Tribunal constitutionnel et opinion publique. A cet égard pourtant, l'Allemagne ne fait que préfigurer en quelque sorte les évolutions des autres pays de la Communauté. La fragmentation des populations, magnifiée en République fédérale par la division territoriale entre l'Est et l'Ouest mais tout aussi importante dans une société hiérarchique comme la française, la faiblesse du pouvoir central face aux Länder, au Bundesrat ou au Tribunal constitutionnel mais grandissante dans un pays comme la France où les revendications sectorielles mettent en échec le gouvernement ou dans d'autres pays encore comme l'Italie ou la Belgique où se combinent les exigences redistributives et territoriales, le discrédit enfin des partis politiques dans la plupart des pays ouest-européens interviennent à un moment où les différents niveaux - national, régional et international- s'interpénètrent plus que jamais.

La division bipolaire de l'Europe permit non seulement l'organisation du continent en structures claires - Pacte de Varsovie et CAEM à l'Est, Alliance atlantique et Communauté à l'Ouest -, au prix de la liberté des sociétés est-européennes. C'est en partie parce que ces sociétés, la polonaise notamment, recouvrèrent la parole que ces structures s'effondrèrent. L'Europe d'après-1989 semble, plus que jamais, le théâtre de tendances multiples où le niveau national paraît mis à mal, rongé

tant par les fragmentations des sociétés que par la globalisation de processus économiques, écologiques et sociaux. Ces tendances multiples se combinent et s'annulent: il n'y a plus de villages mais le village mondial n'existe pas non plus. D'où le repli - de certains fragments de la populations et de certaines élites - sur le seul discours connu depuis la naissance des démocraties, le discours national. Reste, dans une ère nouvelle, celle du non-national, ni post-national ni, espérons-le, pré-national, à réinventer la démocratie.

Anne-Marie Le Gloannec

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***The Emergence of Non-Russian Nationalism:
The Legacy of the Soviet Empire***

by

Mark N. Katz

(Professor, George Mason University)

The Emergence of Non-Russian Nationalism:

The Legacy of the Soviet Empire

Mark N. Katz

The breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the disintegration of the last great European colonial empire. Just as when the European powers withdrew from their colonies, the new nations which have emerged from the Soviet empire are experiencing a host of problems: economic dislocation, weak political structures, ethnic tension, and even warfare.

Although not the sole source of these problems, a factor contributing toward all of them is the emergence of nationalism in the newly independent non-Russian republics. Nationalism, of course, is not necessarily a destructive force. Indeed, it is something that occurs in virtually all nations and can be a unifying force within a country. But just as in many Third World states when they became independent, what has emerged in the newly independent non-Russian republics of the former Soviet Union is often a vengeful form of nationalism. While the nationalisms of the non-Russian republics tend not to be expansionist (though there are some that are), they do tend to be ethnically exclusivist.

What gives rise to this ethnically exclusivist form of nationalism? Several factors can be identified. One is the very newness of independence for these republics: non-Russian

nationalism is being embraced vigorously by peoples whose nationalism was long suppressed both by the Russian-dominated Tsarist and communist regimes. Another is the relative insecurity of these new nations. Having experienced domination by Russians for so long, they fear losing their independence to the Russians again, just as many of those nations gained independence when the Tsarist empire collapsed but lost it when the communists in Moscow became strong enough to reconquer them. Of course, the newly independent non-Russian republics do not just fear the possibility of Russian domination. They often fear each other as well as their immediate neighbors outside the former USSR. And like many Third World states, many of these former Soviet republics fear Western economic domination.

Some scholars see particularly virulent forms of nationalism as inherently temporary phenomena. While possessed of a highly defensive nationalism at first, it is argued, new nations gradually acquire the experience and self-confidence which allows them to put aside nationalist policies which are recognized to be counter-productive.¹ The experience of many Third World nations which used to ban or severely restrict Western investment in their countries but which now actively seek it is an example of this.

Many observers see democratization in particular as a means by which extreme nationalism is ameliorated. The theory is that democracies do not go to war with each other (or with themselves) because they resolve their conflicts through peaceful methods.²

The fact that most of the non-Russian republics have either embarked on the path toward democratization, or have at least stated their intention to do so, appears to offer the hope that extreme forms of nationalism in them might abate.

Perhaps ethnically exclusive forms of nationalism will eventually recede in the non-Russian republics as a result of democratization, economic development, or other positive factors. It is highly doubtful, however, that this will occur any time soon in this particular region. For there exists in the former Soviet Union, as in many parts of the Third World, a problem that serves to heighten insecurity, and thus to enhance extreme nationalism. This problem is that the existing set of borders between the newly independent republics of the former USSR were not drawn by the imperial power (Moscow) to reflect actual ethnic and national differences, but for its own convenience. It is not clear whether or to what extent the newly opened Soviet archives will demonstrate that Moscow deliberately drew and redrew contentious borders among neighboring non-Russian nationalities so that they would each look to Russia for protection against the other. Whatever Moscow's past intentions, however, the borders it drew did indeed serve to exacerbate relations among ethnic groups. The borders for the union republics--which are now all independent states--often included two or more nationalities which have historically had poor relations. Nor were the borders drawn to include ethnic groups entirely within them; large segments of them were sometimes incorporated within the territory

of a neighboring republic.³ And just as with the retreat of West European colonial empires from the Third World, the demise of the Soviet empire meant that there was no longer a central authority to regulate relations among these nations.

While the Soviet Union may no longer exist, the legacy of empire which it bequeathed in the form of highly contentious borders has fueled nationalism in the newly independent non-Russian republics. Non-Russian nationalism, of course, is not a homogenous phenomenon; its character and intensity vary not only across ethnic groups, but also within them. Contentious borders, however, contribute to five different types of problems which fuel ethnically exclusivist forms of nationalism in the non-Russian republics: 1) nationalists in neighboring republics claiming the same territory; 2) regionally-dominant minorities seeking secession; 3) communist-turned-nationalist regimes seizing on territorial disputes to justify authoritarian rule; 4) the effect on non-Russian nationalism of rising Russian nationalism within the Russian community living in the non-Russian republics; and 5) the effect on non-Russian nationalism of rising nationalism emanating from Russia. Each of these problems will be examined in turn, followed by a discussion as to what these problems imply for the future international relations of the non-Russian republics of the former USSR.

Nationalists in Neighboring Republics Claiming the Same Territory

There are several outstanding examples of nationalists in

neighboring republics claiming the same territory. The dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan kindled a war between the two neighboring republics which began almost four years before they became independent. The conflict centered on the question of whether Nagorno-Karabakh, a predominantly Armenian region which Soviet authorities assigned to Azerbaijan despite its immediate proximity to Armenia, should belong to Azerbaijan or Armenia.⁴

It cannot be said with any degree of certainty that if Moscow had drawn the borders differently back in the 1920s--if Nagorno-Karabakh and the tiny sliver of territory between it and Armenia had been assigned to Armenia instead of Azerbaijan--that the current conflict could have been avoided. What can be said, though, is that the way the Soviets did draw the borders between them has served to inflame both Armenian and Azeri nationalism. Each side believes that its absolutely vital interests are at stake in the dispute. Neither government has been willing to compromise, despite the fact that the war has devastated the economies of both nations, aggravated Armenia's relations with its Muslim neighbors Turkey and Iran, and led to political turmoil within Azerbaijan. And the reason neither government has been willing to compromise is because this would mean political suicide for them: public opinion in both nations has adopted an extremist nationalist position regarding the territorial dispute. It is doubtful that greater democratization in either country would alter this, at least at present.

Another case in which a territorial dispute is causing

serious tension between two neighboring states is the Crimea. An independent Muslim khanate previously, Crimea was conquered by Russia in the eighteenth century. It was ruled as part of the Russian Republic after the Bolshevik revolution until 1954 when Khrushchev transferred it to Ukraine. When Ukraine became independent in 1991, Crimea belonged to it. Russian nationalists, though, claim that Crimea should belong to Russia. Shortly before it was abolished in 1993, the communist-dominated Russian Parliament formally laid claim to Crimea. Although President Boris Yeltsin repudiated this claim, the conviction that Crimea should belong to Russia has strong support among the Russian public. Similarly, Ukrainians of every political hue are determined to retain Crimea. They fear that giving it up would be the first step toward the dissolution of Ukraine altogether.⁵

In both these cases, nationalist passion makes compromise difficult, if not impossible. There are other territorial disputes between republics which have not so far inflamed nationalist passions, but have the potential to do so.⁶ What the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh shows in particular is that once such disputes do energize nationalist passions on opposing sides, they can be extremely difficult to resolve.

Regionally-dominant Minorities Seeking Secession

When the Soviet Union broke up, it was only the so-called "union republics" which became independent. There were a host of other ethnic groups which predominated (or once predominated)

within certain areas that under the Soviet Union were organized into "autonomous republics," "autonomous regions," or other arrangements. Many of these ethnic groups have asserted their desire for independence also. The distinction between a union republic and an autonomous republic may have seemed clear to the Soviet inventors of the concepts, but it was and is not clear to the inhabitants of the autonomous republics, some of which have larger populations than the now independent union republics.

Inside Russia, some autonomous republics--including oil-rich Tatarstan--have declared themselves independent. Yeltsin has refused to recognize their independence, although he has been unable to prevent the governments of the autonomous republics, etc., from increasing their authority at the expense of Moscow's within their own borders.⁷

But Russia is not the only former Soviet republic facing secessionist demands. Several of the newly independent non-Russian republics also possess one or more regions where smaller ethnic groups are demanding independence. Georgia is facing secessionist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Gagauz and the "Trans-Dniester Republic" have asserted demands for independence from Moldova. In Central Asia, there are secessionist movements in northern Kazakhstan, eastern Tajikistan, and western Uzbekistan, as well as others. In the Crimea, there is a movement which favors independence and opposes adhesion to either Ukraine or Russia.

In all these cases, the newly independent non-Russian

republic asserted its own right to secede from what was the Soviet Union, but has refused to recognize the right of any region to secede from it. Nor are these newly independent republics willing to allow referenda within regions where secessionist movements are active to determine whether or not they should become independent. In republics with undemocratic regimes, governments are unwilling to do this since allowing one or more regions to determine their own future democratically would raise demands throughout the republic for democracy.

Nor is this a problem that can readily be resolved through democratization at present. Under the Soviet Union, Moscow's power was not diminished through transferring territory from one republic to another. It is, however, virtually impossible for the governments of the newly independent republics to relinquish any territory voluntarily for fear of being ousted in a nationalist backlash at the next election, or possibly sooner by undemocratic means. This political fact of life hardens the attitude of governments toward not just actual, but even potential secessionist movements. And this hardened attitude, of course, does not necessarily encourage minority groups to integrate into the larger nation, but instead can inflame their desire to secede.

Communist-turned-nationalist Regimes Seizing on Territorial Disputes to Justify Authoritarian Rule

In most of the newly independent non-Russian republics, the government has remained under the control of the former

communists. Their primary goal, not surprisingly, is to remain in power. Communism, though, is no longer a particularly popular ideology, and all the communists who inherited power have changed their name and claim to be adherents of democracy. Many, of course, are not democratic, and even those that are do not wish to be voted out of office. Nationalism, though, is a popular ideology which the former communists can capitalize on, especially where the republic faces a territorial dispute with a neighbor or an attempt at secession.

For those communists which are more democratically-oriented, a nationalist position regarding a territorial dispute or attempted secession can serve to bolster support for them internally, at least within the majority ethnic group. For those which are less democratically-oriented, a territorial dispute or attempted secession can be a useful means of justifying continued authoritarian rule. In Kazakhstan, for example, where there are almost the same number of Russians as there are Kazakhs, many believe that democratization will lead to the emergence of Kazakh and Russian nationalist parties, whose fears of each other will escalate and possibly lead to civil war. Continued rule by the authoritarian but relatively benevolent regime headed by Nursultan Nazarbayev is seen as preferable to this.⁸

Nationalism emerging in response to a territorial dispute or a secessionist movement can not only be useful in helping former communists remain in power, but also in regaining power where they have lost it. Geidar Aliev, the former communist party boss

of Azerbaijan whom Gorbachev had dismissed, regained power in 1993 mainly due to the collapse of authority which the democratically elected leader of Azerbaijan suffered as a result of his government's inability to halt Armenian advances in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.⁹

When former communists (or others) exploit nationalist sentiment over territorial disputes or secessionist movements, they risk creating conditions that make attempting to reach a compromise settlement over such issues extremely difficult. In September 1993, for example, the outline for a settlement of some of the issues outstanding between Russia and Ukraine was announced. The proposed agreement involved Ukraine relinquishing its claims to the disputed Black Sea fleet in order to pay off its mounting debt to Moscow for Russian oil shipments, and to allow nuclear warheads in Ukraine to be shipped to Russia and dismantled there in exchange for supplies of uranium needed for Ukraine's nuclear reactors. Nationalist opposition to the proposed agreement in Ukraine grew so intense that the Ukrainian leader, Leonid Kravchuk, had to repudiate it almost immediately. One of the concerns of the nationalists was that by giving up the Black Sea fleet, Ukraine would have a weaker claim to the Crimean Peninsula where much of the fleet is based.¹⁰

Finally, just as defeat in a territorial dispute or failure to prevent secession can severely weaken a government consisting of non- or anti-communists, these can also weaken a government consisting of former or renamed communists. The failure of

Eduard Shevardnadze, the restored former communist boss of Georgia, to prevent secession by Abkhazia in September 1993 led instantly to an upsurge in the rebellion against his rule led by the elected but deposed anti-communist leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia.¹¹

The nationalism that authoritarian governments fan with regard to territorial disputes and attempts at secession can be useful in justifying authoritarian measures, but this nationalism can also trap an authoritarian regime into pursuing uncompromising policies toward these problems for fear of being overthrown if they back down at all. Unwillingness to compromise, though, can lead to warfare breaking out or escalating. And if the government loses, it may also be ousted.

The Effect on Non-Russian Nationalism of Rising Russian Nationalism within the Russian Community Living in the Non-Russian Republics

The presence and the actions of large Russian communities in several of the non-Russian republics has also served to inflame non-Russian nationalism. There are approximately 25 million Russians living in the non-Russian republics. During the Soviet era, these Russians enjoyed preeminent status in the non-Russian republics they resided in. They held most of the top positions in the local economic, political, military, and educational structures. Official business was conducted in Russian, not the local language.

The non-Russians, not surprisingly, often viewed the Russians in their republics as colonial occupiers. Upon independence, or even before it, the non-Russians sought to end Russian dominance in their republics. Most have deposed Russian as the language of official business and have replaced it with their own. The non-Russians have also sought to oust Russians from the leadership positions they hold.

The position of the Russians in the non-Russian republics resembles that of the European colonists resident in the Third World when countries there became independent. In many cases, the European population emigrated en masse back to Europe either because the new government drove them out, because they feared that nationalist policies or sentiment would make life uncomfortable for them, or because while the new government wanted Europeans to remain, they would no longer have nearly as much decision-making power in the new state as they did when it was a colony.

For those Europeans returning to Britain, France, Portugal or wherever, the transition was often very difficult. They had to find places for themselves in societies experiencing difficult economic circumstances. At least, however, there was a capitalist economy for them to integrate into. The Russians in the non-Russian republics face a much more difficult situation if they return to Russia. The Russian economy is in complete disarray. For returning Russians, the prospects of finding jobs or even housing back in Russia are extremely bleak.

Not surprisingly, most Russians do not want to return to Russia. On the other hand, they do not want to adjust to the reality of independence for the non-Russian republics. They do not want to give up their high status jobs. They do not want to learn the local languages. And in some cases, they have shown signs of being unwilling to accept minority status within a non-Russian republic. The predominantly Russian population on the east bank of the Dniester River, for example, has announced its secession from Moldova and formation of the "Dniester Republic." There are movements in eastern Ukraine and northern Kazakhstan, where Russians form a large proportion of the population, to secede from these two republics and join the adjacent Russian Federation. A similar movement has sprung up among the predominantly Russian population of northeastern Estonia in reaction to the Estonian law granting citizenship only to ethnic Estonians and to those "others" (primarily Russians) who pass a proficiency examination in the Estonian language--something the Russians in Estonia are mainly not capable of doing.¹²

The ethnically exclusivist elements in the nationalisms of the newly independent non-Russian republics on the one hand and the Russian communities living in those republics on the other are mutually reinforcing. The assertion of non-Russian nationalism is highly threatening to the Russians living in the "near abroad," especially since moving back to Russia would mean destitution for most of them. But the response of the Russian communities--asserting Russian nationalism, especially in the

form of secessionist movements--only serves to inflame non-Russian nationalism. The non-Russians see the prospect of Russian secessionism as not only weakening the newly independent states by detaching vital territory from them, but also as part of a larger Russian plan to reabsorb their republics altogether. Because each community sees concessions to the other as potentially leading to the loss of independence for the non-Russians or expulsion for the Russians, neither is willing to cooperate with the other. This, of course, only serves to harden non-Russian as well as Russian nationalist positions.

The Effect on non-Russian Nationalism of Rising Nationalism
Emanating from Russia

Non-Russian nationalism is also being inflamed by rising nationalism emanating from Russia itself. Whereas the Russians living in the non-Russian republics may possess only a limited capability to bring about secession, their ability to do this with the help of the Russian government or armed forces is greatly enhanced. For example, it is Russian Army support for the "Dniester Republic" that has allowed the Russians living in that region to avoid being ruled by the Moldovan government.¹³ Boris Yeltsin himself has threatened Estonia over the issue of Russians living in that republic.¹⁴

Russia, of course, has the capability of intervening not just to support Russians in the "near abroad," but others as well. Russian armed forces, for example, have intervened in

Tajikistan in order to restore an old-line communist regime which had been ousted by a coalition of democratic and Islamic forces.¹⁵ Yet despite Russia's purported concern about the spread of "Islamic fundamentalism" in Tajikistan, Russian forces assisted a Muslim minority in ousting Orthodox Christian Georgian forces from Abkhazia.

When the West European powers withdrew from their colonies in the Third World, they retained significant influence in some (notably the French in sub-Saharan Africa) and little or no influence in others. None of the former West European powers, however, attempted to rebuild their colonial empires after having given them up. Powerful forces in Russia, though, appear determined to do just this.¹⁶

The governments of the non-Russian republics have responded differently to Moscow's efforts to re-extend Russian influence. Estonia and Ukraine have unsuccessfully sought support from the West. The Georgian government finally joined the Commonwealth of Independent States after Russian forces expelled it from Abkhazia, but Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze at the same time denounced Russian "imperialism." The Lithuanian government adopted an accommodating attitude toward the Russians present in that republic--it could afford to do so since there are relatively few there compared to Latvia or Estonia. Armenia and Azerbaijan have both sought Russian support in their ongoing struggle with each other (there are few Russians in either). The Central Asian governments have sought to accommodate Russian

interests. But except for Kirgizstan, the governments here consist of old-line communists who fear their own people so much that they have turned to Russian forces to keep them in power.¹⁷

Whatever the response of their governments, however, non-Russian nationalists for the most part regard Russian actions with extreme alarm. Many are convinced that Russia intends to eliminate their independence and reabsorb them just as occurred with most of the non-Russian states which briefly asserted their independence at the end of World War I and with the Baltic states in 1940. Indeed, non-Russian nationalists see Russia behind all the disputes their nations face, whether it actually is or not. What they fear in particular is that Moscow is now taking advantage of the contentious borders which the Soviet regime drew in the past in order to divide and conquer them once more. This, of course, only serves to inflame non-Russian nationalists and make them less willing to compromise. There are, however, some non-Russian governments that have cooperated with Russia. These, however, tend to be regarded as suspect or even traitorous by non-Russian nationalists--a development which serves to undermine their legitimacy and hence their ability to remain in power.

Conclusion

Although the USSR no longer exists, its successor states have inherited a grim legacy of empire in terms of intractable border disputes, a variety of secessionist movements, and the

other problems discussed here which have given rise to ethnically exclusivist forms of nationalism in the non-Russian republics as well as Russia itself. Nor is this a problem that is likely to be ameliorated by democratization, at least in the near future. This is because ethnically exclusive nationalism results in people, whether from the majority or a minority group within a particular country, identifying primarily with their ethnic group and only secondarily, if at all, as citizens who have interests in common with other citizens, despite ethnic differences, of the republic they live in. Democracy under these circumstances may only serve to ratify the "tyranny of the majority." It is this prospect which makes minorities in various non-Russian republics unwilling to be part of countries where they do not belong to the majority, but prefer instead to secede and either join a neighboring state and benefit from the tyranny of the majority there, or become an independent one where they can exercise their own tyranny of the majority.

What this implies is that as a result of the legacy of the Soviet empire which has pushed non-Russian nationalism in an ethnically exclusivist direction, the non-Russian republics are likely to have confrontational relations with minority groups within their borders, with each other, and with Russia for a long time to come. This, of course, is a recipe for continued and perhaps even increased tension and conflict.

If the experience of the states of Asia and Africa after the withdrawal of the European colonial empires is a guide, then it

is likely that ethnic conflict in the non-Russian republics of the former USSR is likely to be bitter, protracted, and violent. Many of the conflicts which Third World states inherited as a result of the borders drawn by the West European powers have lasted for decades and appear to have little prospect for resolution.

The experience of other nations, though, does offer some hope. Real progress has been made recently toward resolving seemingly endless conflicts between blacks and whites ⁱⁿ ~~and~~ South Africa, between Jews and Palestinians in the Middle East, and between Eritrea and Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa. The good news from these conflicts is that progress is possible. The bad news is that it can take decades before any progress is made. What this implies is that the recent wave of nationalist conflict which has emerged in the new states of the former USSR is not likely to be short lived, but may well last for decades.

Mark N. Katz is an associate professor of government and politics at George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia, USA. He gratefully acknowledged the assistance of the Earhart Foundation for its generous support in writing this paper.

1. This argument was forcefully made in Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: The Free Press, 1992), ch. 25.
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
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IEEI INSTITUTO DE ESTUDOS ESTRATÉGICOS E INTERNACIONAIS

XI International Lisbon Conference

**THE REEMERGENCE OF AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM
AND EUROPE**

Cultural Center of Belém, Lisbon, 17 - 19th November 1993

***Nationalism in Russia and
European Security***

by

Ednan Agaev

(Director, Directorate of Analysis and Forecasting,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow)

Nationalism in Russia and European Security

(Theses for the statement at the International Conference
"Radical Nationalism and its consequences for
European Security", to be held in Lisbon)

1. Nationalism is a prominent feature of the contemporary social processes. However quite often different meanings are attributed to this term. In most cases nationalism is interpreted as hostility to another ethnic group or hatred on the national ground. But at the same time it is understood also as love for someone's own culture and people and a struggle for national revival.

A simple awareness of ethnic differences develops into a negative and even hostile attitude to another ethnos under the influence of demographic shifts and social and political upheavals. As a result, a phenomenon such as aggressive nationalism emerges.

After the Cold war aggressive nationalism has become one of the major challenges to security and stability in the world. The roots of the present surge of aggressive nationalism and inter-ethnic conflicts are in the collapse of the ideological system and antidemocratic governmental mechanism in the former Soviet Union. Thus it is no coincidence that separatism and inter-ethnic conflicts take especially violent forms on the territory of the former Socialist countries.

At the same time nationalism in its positive meaning of national revival has become one of the main factors of destruction of the totalitarian system in the USSR. It was a manifestation of a dialectical nature of nationalism as a phenomenon of the social life.

2. A sound nationalism supposes a protection of national interests, which is natural for any democratic State. For a normal civil society this is an objective need and reality, which is also respected by other States.

An aspiration of any country to protect and promote its national interests cannot and should not be interpreted by the others as a demonstration of hostility.

In this connection one should clearly understand that the departure from a global confrontation between the East and the West and moving forward on the path of partnership do not mean a renunciation of national interests. Interests of different countries may coincide or differ. That is why it is important to find an optimal balance of national interests, non-detrimental for any of the partners.

As for the Russian Federation, its main national interests are as follows:

- to revive Russia as a free democratic State with a view to form a civil society;
- to ensure security of the country in all its dimensions including sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity, as well as to strengthen stability along the perimeter

of the Russian borders, in the neighbouring regions and in the world at large;

- to protect rights, freedoms, dignity and well-being of the people of Russia;

- to create efficient market-oriented economy in the country;

- to establish equal and mutually advantageous relations between Russia and Member-States of the CIS and other States of the "near abroad";

- to pursue further the policy of maintaining partnership and allied relations with those countries of the "far abroad" which best succeeded in finding solutions to problems which confront Russia today;

- to ensure for Russia a proper role in the world balance of influence, which corresponds to the status of a great power.

As it can be seen from this list, promotion of national interests of the revived Russia by no means poses a threat to European and global security. On the contrary, it contributes to the creation of most favourable conditions for mutually advantageous cooperation and partnership on the continent.

3. At the same time there are some other forces in Russia which put forward a slogan of nationalism in attempt to seize political power or break the State to pieces. In doing so they take the current ethnic explosion caused by negative legacy of the national policy pursued in the former USSR and by hardships of the current process of transformation of the society. Imposing the ideology of internationalism and ignoring objective laws of ethnic

development by the leaders of the USSR caused grave imbalances in inter-ethnic relations. The inferiority complex formed as a result of that and a feeling that interests of many ethnic groups, including Russians, are infringed has created a fertile ground for activity of modern national patriots and separatists.

Confronting economic hardship and political destabilization, ideological crisis and social disruption, people lose their bearings in life and in perception of the world, except ethnic ones. It allows national chauvinists and separatists to drive the mass of people to a state of irresponsibility when they lose the feeling of national self-preservation. The communists forming an alliance with national patriots also try to keep this "scum" afloat. They have a common interest in restoring the rule of former elite - "nomenclature": a great-power imperial ideology has substituted the communist's position of internationalism.

In Russia these trends took place against the background of a painful formation of the new system of government. It explains why ethical tensions so readily grow into conflicts which pose a threat to integrity of the State.

4. One should not underestimate the danger of such aggressive nationalism in Russia. However its overestimation also could lead to wrong conclusions. In particular, it could engender in the European circles a desire to fence off Russia or to isolate it while the danger is grave. It would be a completely wrong solution which could be detrimental to the Europeans themselves.

In assessing the extent of a risk posed by radical nationalism in Russia the following should be taken into account:

First, nationalist sentiments are not shared by the majority of the people. Aggressive nationalism, especially Russian nationalism, is professed only by marginal elements. Russian nationalist organizations, like "Pamyat", have neither many followers, nor influence in the society. The population is more concerned with social and economic problems and changes in living standards. Problems of nationalism cause anxiety among the population in so far as they pose a threat of potential armed conflicts and violence and aggravates the economic situation.

Second, it would be wrong to put on equal footing extremist groupings and a natural process of the Russian national self-consciousness growing, promoted by real problems faced by the people. The idea that the Russian revival is rooted in xenophobia and antisemitism has also proved unfounded.

Ultimately, last years experience shows that "the Russian issue" arises only where and when the pressure on the Russian people is exerted. It happens mainly outside Russia, in the "near abroad" countries.

5. The Russian issue has acquired a new external dimension after disintegration of the USSR. 150 million people, the biggest nation in Europe, has become a divided one. 25 million people, or 17 percent of the Russian population of the former Soviet Union, now live in the newly independent foreign States. Some of them witness a trend to establish ethnocratic regimes and discriminate against the Russian speaking population provoking ethnic tensions.

Many Russians living outside Russia have felt that their future was threatened. The more they are discriminated, the more stormy and radical is their response.

It is precisely among the Russians who have become ethnic minorities in the "near abroad" that radical nationalist movements are being formed. These movements affect Russia itself. Tragic events that occurred in early October in Moscow are yet another proof of it. Commandos from Dniester region and members of Riga's OMON (anti-riot police) supported leaders of the former Supreme Soviet in recent military actions.

Thus, recent events have once more underscored a potential danger of infringement of Russian speaking population's legitimate rights in the newly independent States. Discrimination of ethnic Russians in these countries actually nourishes attempts to restore totalitarian order in Russia itself; that would by no means meet interests of the Europeans, as well as Russia's "near abroad" neighbours.

Russia stands for a normal national revival of the newly independent states emerged within the territory of the former USSR. However, other ethnic groups, including Russians, should not be discriminated in this process.

The problem has become particularly serious in our relations with Baltic States. It is widely acknowledged that Russia made every effort to support their drive for independence. We are interested in promoting a wide cooperation, especially in the economic field, with Baltic States. However, to be successful, we should cure the "abscess" in our relations by rejecting radical

nationalism and guaranteeing legitimate rights of ethnic minorities. Our principled stand provides for compliance with relevant international standards and norms. It would make it possible to channel our relations with Baltic States into the civilized All-European stream and to strengthen security and stability in Europe.

6. One of the potentially dangerous dimensions of radical nationalism in Russia is secessionism of Federation's subjects and regions. The economic difficulties are the prime source of their alienation from the Center beyond limits envisaged in the Federate treaty signed in 1992. Approximately half of the respondents in an opinion poll carried out in regions feel that their regions give more to other regions, than receive from them.

There is a persistent view that various ethnic groups are unequal as far as their living standards are concerned. The political and economic crisis is giving rise to illusions that separation from Russia will offer more opportunities to overcome difficulties. The facts, however, do not confirm that argument. "Sovereign" Chechnia is suffering now more hardships than any other region of Northern Caucasus. If Tatarstan had severed its ties with Russia its GNP would have dropped by 25 per cent while similar losses of Russia would only account to 3 per cent of its GNP. Severance of ties would force 250 (50 per cent) industrial enterprises of Tatarstan to stop production.

The Russian business community believes that separatism and regionalization are inconsistent with a real market. They would isolate economic units from each other and destroy a single

economic space and a common monetary zone based on Ruble. Such a position of the business community is quite reasonable for under market conditions rational nationalism requires that a middle class of owners be established and their economic interests be protected by the state.

Some subjects of the Russian Federation may attempt to form a confederation or to secede from Russia. This development, however, is not inevitable. We should take into account a powerful factor that the majority of Russians are in favour of preserving the unity and integrity of the country. Public opinion polls show that separatists and advocates of regionalization do not enjoy broad massive support. They are rather boisterous than strong.

Adoption of the new constitution will undoubtedly be of critical importance. It should lay a foundation for a new national State structure in Russia.

7. The danger of separatist trends and disintegration of Russia, however, should be taken seriously. This factor can undermine the basis of stability on the entire eurasian space.

Russia actually alone performs important peace-making functions on all the territory of the former USSR. Unfortunately, until now it has not got a penny from the budgets of the international organizations. And what will happen in case of a disintegration or further weakening of Russia? Would Europe which faces its own problems as urgent as the Yugoslavian crisis be able to shoulder an additional Russian burden? It is doubtful.

In case of the disintegration of the Russian Federation totalitarian nationalist regimes may emerge at least in a half of new state entities. Some of them will be oriented to such countries as Iraq, Libya and so on. New conflicts will arise provoked by border disputes, by a situation of divided nations and ethnic minorities. A new real threat of nuclear weapons division will appear. It would be fraught with the most dangerous consequences not only for the European, but for the global security as well.

A famous Russian philosopher Mr. I.A. Ilyin has written as early as in 1948 that "the division of the Russian "beson" into small twigs would be an adventure unprecedented in history." The human race would feel its disastrous consequences for many years, and that is why possibilities to disintegrate Russia "have their limits, rooted, in real interests of all mankind".

8. There are no widespread anti-west attitudes in Russia. A distinctive trait historically cultivated in the ethno-psychology of Russians is their openness, their genuine interest to the culture of other nations, their desire to learn from them everything good and to share with them everything they possess themselves. And in the meantime one should not forget that the remaining biological distrust of the West toward Russia would play into the hands of those in our country who try to stir up ethnocentric attitudes here.

We do not abandon genuine and legitimate national interests of Russia. Our main task now is to assure a political stability and economic revival of the country. A stronger Russia will

naturally become a stronger competitor for the developed European countries. But it will be a normal, civilized competitor and a partner at the same time acting under the recognized European norms. The alternative to that - the weakening of Russia - would create among the Russian people a complex of inferiority and as a consequence would give rise to aggressive nationalism. The trend to aggressive nationalism of one of the biggest nations of Europe would hardly enhance calm and security of the Europeans. It's enough to remember the example of the fascist Germany. Revived and independent Russia, as well as democratic, strong and now united Germany is much more useful for Europe. That is why Russia's sound nationalism understood as its national revival corresponds to the goal of strengthening security and stability in Europe.

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THE REEMERGENCE OF AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM AND EUROPE

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NATO and Future Nationalism

by

Trevor Taylor

(Associate Fellow, Royal Institute of
International Affairs)

A Paper for the Conference on
European/US relations and the
new challenges to European security in the post-cold war era

Instituto de Estudos Estrategicos Internacionais

Lisbon

17-19 November 1993

"NATO and Future Nationalism"

by

Professor Trevor Taylor
(Staffordshire University and
Associate Fellow
at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London)

Introduction

Historically, it is clear that NATO's main task was to defend against the military threat from Moscow, but it had two important but concerns with nationalism, which were to a degree contradictory.

On the one hand, it sought to protect the sovereignty of its members so that they could express their national characters and priorities. Unlike the EC, NATO was about maintaining rather than eroding the sovereignty of its members. This was reflected in the flexibility which it showed towards the particular wishes of its members - France was allowed to withdraw from the integrated military command while remaining in other parts of the Alliance which it liked better, such as the NADGE; Spain was allowed to sit on all NATO's committees as a full member, including the military committee, although it rejected participation in the integrated military command. Norway remained covered by the US nuclear guarantee even though it would not allow either foreign forces or nuclear weapons to be stationed on its territory in peacetime.

On the other hand, some judged that NATO controlled its members'

national fears and rivalries through the provision of US oversight of Western Europe and of the US nuclear guarantee. For some writers, in particular John Mearsheimer and to a lesser extent Jo Joffe, NATO's end would signal the start of international power struggles with a military dimension within western Europe itself¹. Perhaps most credible is the assertion that, faced with thousands of nuclear weapons under the control of Moscow and perhaps other governments in the former Soviet Union, Germany would feel inadequately protected if the US nuclear guarantee was withdrawn and would therefore seek to develop its own nuclear forces. In this line of reasoning, no re-casting of the nuclear forces of Britain and France, perhaps involving new systems, deployment arrangements and doctrine, could possibly provide Germany with the security it would want.

With the Cold War over, three questions have been raised about the immediate future of NATO and have become prominent on the Alliance agenda. Put briefly, they are:

Should NATO continue in being since the threat from Moscow has disappeared over the horizon, and Russia's military capability is much less than that of the former USSR?

Should NATO take on new members, especially as a range of countries from the former Warsaw Pact would like to join? and

Should NATO become much more concerned with organising military interventions for peace-keeping, peace-building or peace-enforcing operations beyond the territory of its own members?

With particular reference to nationalism, however, different points emerge, namely that the West would seem able to address it with a combination of three approaches. The broad options are:

¹. J.Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future ..."

to defend against it with organised armed forces and alliances; and/or

to manage it through military intervention activities such as peace-keeping forces and through diplomatic efforts to establish, inter alia, the rights of minority groups; and/or

to contain and absorb it through integration processes.

Clearly there are links between the current Alliance agenda and the range of ways of addressing the problems of nationalism, although the Alliance agenda is generated by many other considerations besides nationalism.

1. NATO existing membership and defence against external threats enhanced by nationalism

NATO can effectively defend its existing members from direct military threats arising from nationalism, most obviously in Russia. Russia remains a source of concern, and not just for its immediate neighbours. It has three particular features which should be highlighted.

First, it remains in possession of more than 30,000 nuclear weapons, many of which need to be kept in effectively-guarded storage facilities until they have been dismantled. Even after dismantlement there will be hundreds of tons of fissile material (enriched uranium and plutonium) to be looked after. Russia's stock of strategic nuclear weapons also cannot be ignored. It will take until well into the next century to implement the START 2 Treaty, even assuming it is ratified by Russia, and Russia will still have an arsenal of 3,000 nuclear warheads. Should NATO collapse, Western Europe would want an alternative to the US deterrent to offset the Russian nuclear arsenal. A system of extended nuclear deterrence by Britain and France unsupported by the US might not be credible, either to those it was meant to protect or those it was meant to deter. A national nuclear deterrent for Germany would receive much more serious

consideration than it has to date.

Second, Russia's new military leaders, although comparatively young, clearly want to put military power at the centre of Russia's foreign policy posture and to maximise their influence in many parts of the "empire" in the Baltic, Central Asia and even the Caucasus (hence the Russian army's contributions in Abkhazia, Trans-Dnestr, and Tajikistan and its reluctance to move out of Estonia and Latvia). The draft military doctrine issued last May revealed a concern with having a war-winning capability against "the probable enemy"². The Defence Minister, General Grachev, by no means the most nationalist of Russia's military leadership, has complained implicitly about the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty because it puts much of his military equipment east of the Urals whereas his military personnel are west of the Urals³. The doctrine as apparently confirmed in the autumn of 1993 provided some assurance for the West in that it placed more stress on Russia's "near abroad" rather than on the a perceived danger from the US, but not all of the doctrine has been made public.

An imperialist, intimidatory Russia is clearly possible if the senior Russian military obtain greater political control or if a "red-brown" combination of political forces should obtain power in Russia. Such developments look unlikely in the mid-1990s but are real possibilities in the longer-run.

This leads to the third point. There is not yet any certainty about Russia, or indeed about any of the successor states of the former Soviet Union. Territorially Russia could become considerably larger, especially if it tries to include in its borders many of the 25 million ethnic Russians who live outside

². A phrase used in the draft Russian military doctrine of May 1992.

³. See P.H.Vigor & M.J.Orr, Future Russian Security Policies - A Military-Scientific Conference, Sandhurst, Royal Military Academy Soviet Studies Research Centre, November 1982, p.12; and General Pavel S.Grachev, "Drafting a New Military Doctrine", Military Technology Vol.17, No.2, pp.10-17.

Russia. On the other hand, it could equally well break up: Chechenya, Tatarstan and many other regions are pressing for independence or much increased autonomy. In 1992 their readiness to implement orders from Moscow was diminishing and the October 1993 violence which resulted in the fall of the Congress of People's Deputies and of the former Soviet constitution probably increased only for a brief period President Yeltsin's capacity to direct the whole of Russia. Politically Russia does not yet have a stable form of government, as the power struggle between President Yeltsin and the Congress has underlined. Economically, it is not yet clear what kind of system will eventually emerge and the fall in national production has not yet been arrested. Externally, the shape of Russia's relations with its neighbours in the "near abroad" has yet to be settled, and in particular it is not certain that Moscow will be able to accept Ukraine, Estonia and others as sovereign equals.

All this suggests that NATO will continue to have a significant agenda related to Article 5 of its treaty from Russia-related issues, and that NATO could serve as a solid foundation of stability in uncertain times. With NATO in being, any Russian government contemplating aggression or intimidation against a neighbour would have to anticipate a coherent western response involving significant economic sanctions and an enhanced military effort. In response to even limited Russian expansionism, Moscow knows that NATO might expand its membership, and fundamentally NATO's existence guarantees that no future Russian government can contemplate the domination of all Europe.

A word is necessary on possible threats to NATO members from other than Russia, in particular from the Mediterranean region. Turkey is the NATO member which could most credibly face problems but in general the conventional forces potential of Middle East and North African countries is much less than the capability of the former Soviet Union. Nor are relations between the north and south shores of the Mediterranean particularly bad, although Libya does present particular problems. There is thus a chance and a need to consider the longer term and here two things are

striking. The first is that it is hard to see the basis for comfortable relations between two neighbouring groups of states if one has a stable population size and the other has populations growing by between two and three percent a year, if one has a secular approach to politics and the other allocates to a messianic religion a growing place in political life, and if one enjoys considerable material wealth and economic growth while the other lives in poverty and economic stagnation. These contrasting trends are not immutable but they are currently in place and their continuation will make relations across the Mediterranean more problematic. The second is that western Europe will most fear the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East and North Africa⁴. It will therefore maintain an interest in ballistic missile defences, a field where armaments development cooperation between western Europe and the US could be particularly valuable.

2. NATO, new members and defence against external threats

A much-debated possibility is whether NATO should in fact take on the defence of more states by admitting new members.

There is of course no shortage of European states which want to join NATO, but Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary have effectively pressed their claim that they should be taken in first. In support of their claims they argue that there is a security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe where states do not have a clear idea as to the basis of their future security. NATO membership would provide that basis. They also say that NATO has always presented itself as a West European/transatlantic association of liberal democratic states. As they have become democratic European states themselves, they assert their eligibility for NATO membership.

Yet, changing NATO's membership in the near future looks a

⁴. See Yves Boyer, The Washington Quarterly

foolish move, and for a cluster of four reasons.

- a) of decisive importance, extending NATO membership eastward would alarm nationalist forces in Russia which already see the US and NATO as "the probable enemy". Such nationalist forces believe the West wishes to weaken Russia to the maximum extent possible, and they are well represented in the Russian high command. Moving NATO nearer to Russia's borders would give credibility to and reinforce their political position. The precise nature of a Russian response to a NATO readiness to consider new members is difficult to assess but Moscow could well become much more reluctant to introduce the drastic cuts in defence expenditure needed for the Russian economy to develop. Should the Russia not advance economically, it will not be politically stable, and European security will suffer accordingly⁵. In addition Russia could well become eager to:

⁵. It should not be overlooked that some important elements in the former USSR did not accept that NATO should continue to exist at all. General Mikhail Moiseyev, Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, in the context of his observation that "US open pretensions to the role of world hegemon are being resumed", noted that

It appears that the new order in Europe, which is coming to replace the 'Cold War', should fundamentally differ from the existing one. The Paris conference laid the foundation for this order. It is obvious, however, that if NATO's military organisation is preserved, there can be no hope for equal security. The factor of asymmetry will always be present and will have, depending on circumstances, a varyingly destabilising effect. There will always be doubts, concerns regarding security, attempts by the other side to talk from a position of strength, to exert pressure. A new rivalry may arise.

Speech of 5 April 1991 released by the Novosti Press Office. London. At a NATO conference in Prague, the USSR pressed to some extent for NATO's abolition, see "Soviets Press To End NATO", Defense News 29 April 1991. Clearly the failure of the August coup will have removed from influence many senior people who held such views, but it is likely they were shared also by some more junior officers who remain in post.

re-establish control over ex-Warsaw Pact areas which might be feared would otherwise end up in NATO before long, such as the Baltic states and even the Ukraine,

abandon existing arms control agreements; and

leave current negotiations and cease cooperation in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, thus denying the West a chance to support the positive development of the civilian oversight of the military in Russia and of cooperative attitudes within the Russian defence establishment.

- b) NATO has not yet generated an outline idea of how it might give credibility to a security guarantee should it take on new members. Before new commitments are made, some broad sense should be generated about how they might be met, and as yet there are no agreed answers as to the role which nuclear weapons, multi-national units, forward-deployed forces, multi-national exercises (currently constrained by CSCE agreements) and modified command structures might play in the defence of new members.
- c) Many of the doctrinal, force structure and deployment issues raised above have major resource implications and in 1993 NATO countries lack the resources to extend their defence commitments. With the disappearance of the Soviet threat, at least to a position over the horizon, and with a widespread recession in place hitting governmental tax revenues, Western publics and governments want to spend less money on defence. As a consequence, defence ministries almost throughout NATO are looking to cutting forces, defence roles and commitments. Taking on responsibility for the defence of states in Central Europe would be an additional burden which declining defence budgets simply could not bear.
- d) If some former WTO Treaties were admitted to NATO on the

grounds that they were pluralistic democracies with market economies which wanted to be part of a wider security grouping, other states would at a later stage claim membership on the same grounds. The Baltic states, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Ukraine could be envisaged as credible demandeurs. Most significantly, in a few years time, should things go well, Russia itself could claim a right to membership. Indeed one motive in Moscow for going along with any formal association of the Central Europeans with NATO would be the expectation that it would help Moscow itself before long to claim the same position. In a Greek-Turkish context, NATO has long asserted that a member cannot call on the Alliance to help against another member, and so Russia joining NATO would fundamentally transform NATO: the Alliance would not longer be able to defend against Moscow.

Thus at this stage the balance of argument is that NATO should not for now be expanded to give a security guarantee for new members.

3. NATO and the absorption of members' nationalism

Even if NATO took in new members, however, there is no certainty that such a development would significantly cause a significant integration of new members into Western society, so eroding nationalism in the East. As noted, NATO has always been concerned to allow the sovereignty of its members to flourish. An assertion of some credibility is that NATO has helped to prevent a full-blown, if probably short war between Greece and Turkey. But it has not prevented the two states from having serious confrontations and protracted confrontations over Cyprus and the Aegean. Despite NATO (and EC and UN) commitments, even Greece, a small state, remains difficult to control. Its government is widely believed to be turning a blind eye to trading with Serbia, despite binding UN sanctions.

If NATO accepted the Central European states, it might acquire

members whose national feeling it could not always control, given that their political and economic systems are not firmly established. More nationalistic governments are conceivable and concern about their national minorities elsewhere might tempt such governments in Poland and Hungary to use their military forces on the territory of their neighbours. Poland might be drawn to help Poles who appeared as victims of Lithuanian nationalism. Hungary might be tempted to act against Rumania or Serbia in support of Hungarian minorities.

4. NATO, intervention and the management/control of external nationalism

A different possibility for NATO would be to abandon any idea that it was responsible only for the defence of the territory of its members and to assert that it had security responsibilities in the wider world, beyond "the NATO area". The appeal of this argument lies mainly in the assertion that such a re-direction of NATO would keep it relevant and prominent at a time when Western Europe is relatively secure against external attack but when there are a proliferation of security problems and conflicts elsewhere, in part nationalistic consequences of the end of the cold war. Thus NATO could seek to play a bigger part in controlling nationalism through the provision of peace-keeping, peace-building and peace-enforcing missions, intervening in outside conflicts in the name of NATO. In 1992 NATO ministers agreed that they could provide peace-keeping forces to meet a CSCE or a UN mandate.

Yet in the long and perhaps the short term a change to emphasis on NATO interventions could well weaken the alliance because of the quarrels among allies which it could generate. In the past NATO allies have often disagreed deeply on "out-of-area" questions. The British are too embarrassed about the Suez crisis to reflect too long on it, but the French have no such inhibitions. Few Europeans shared US convictions about the significance of Vietnam. The 1980s were a difficult decade as

little European enthusiasm was apparent for the US bombing of Libya and the invasions of Panama and Grenada.

Out-of-area military intervention issues often provoke intra-allied differences because they involve difficult judgements about what will constitute reasonable and effective action, rather than because they expose different national interests. Military intervention issues, because of the judgements they involve, often provoke divisions within states as well as among states. Thus it is not surprising that NATO has previously always stressed itself as a defensive alliance, even when pressure to do otherwise was increasing. In the early 1980s, after the hostage crisis in Iran, the US pressed its European allies to do more in the out-of-area dimension⁶. However, the NATO choice was clearly to leave such matters to the states which were interested and not to make out-of-area matters NATO business. Bearing in mind that concern with the Soviet military build-up was then pushing NATO states closer together, a reminder of the wording of NATO's 1982 Bonn Declaration is in order:

None of our weapons will ever be used except in response to attack. We respect the sovereignty, equality, independence and territorial integrity of all states....

Our purpose is to preserve the security of the North Atlantic area by means of conventional and nuclear forces adequate to deter aggression and intimidation....

Our purpose is to contribute to peaceful progress worldwide; we will work to remove the causes of instability such as under-development or tensions which encourage outside interference. We will continue to play our part in the struggle against hunger and poverty. Respect for non-

⁶. The US argued that Europeans should make more of their forces ready for out-of-area missions, and/or make their infrastructure facilities available for the US to use for out-of-area activities, and/or build up their USSR-oriented conventional forces so that more US forces could be released for out-of-area missions.

alignment is important for international stability. All of us have an interest in peace and stability in other regions of the world. We will consult together as appropriate on events in these regions which may have implications for our security, taking into account our commonly identified objectives. Those of us who are in a position to do so will endeavour to respond to requests for assistance from sovereign states whose security and independence is threatened⁷.

Six months later the Alliance came up with different language and even more qualified commitments:

The Allies recognise that certain events outside the Treaty area may affect their common interests as members of the Alliance. Allied consultation on such events will be based on the recognition of those common interests. Those Allies in a position to do so may respond to requests by sovereign nations whose security and independence are threatened....⁸

In the past NATO states have consulted on their broader foreign policies because of the appreciation that major divisions in that area would undermine the credibility of the alliance as a defensive arrangement⁹. But there has never been an effort to build the common foreign policy necessary to provide a foundation for military intervention. Member states have not felt that it would be possible to agree on such a common foreign policy, and they have wanted to maintain national freedom of action. In the future this may change as far as the European Community members of NATO area concerned, since at Maastricht in December 1991 they committed themselves to the creation of precisely the common

⁷. Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Bonn, 10 June 1982, text in NATO Review, August 1982, pp.25-6.

⁸. North Atlantic Council Final Communique after the NAC Ministerial session in Brussels, 9-10 December 1992, text in NATO Review, February 1983, pp.23-5.

⁹. See in NATO Review,

foreign and security policy which could guide intervention activities. In the months after the Treaty's signature, however, there was comparatively little progress in developing such a common policy, not least because of difficulties in agreeing on how to intervene effectively at acceptable cost in the former Yugoslavia.

The US is of course determined to maintain freedom of action in its foreign policy, and the advent of the Clinton Administration brought in a series of new judgements which Britain at least apparently found difficult. At the beginning of April 1993, the US was at best lukewarm about the Vance-Owen plan for Bosnia, which Britain endorsed; the US was seemingly more ready than Britain to ease sanctions on Iraq while Saddam Hussein was in power, and less ready to strengthen the Iranian economy by agreeing to a World Bank loan for electricity generation; on Libya US Secretary of State Warren Christopher called for an oil embargo while Britain and France (with the US) were concentrating on renewing the Security Council resolution against Libya over Lockerbie, so leading the UK to voice "mild curiosity"¹⁰.

All this suggests that generating public expectations that NATO will remain relevant and prominent by dealing with out-of-area matters could prove dangerous for NATO, since in practice such matters could well generate significant disagreement. In the past NATO has prospered because it has been able to focus on a single agreed cause, the defence of members' territory and it has cooperated on other issues only to the extent that the credibility of the alliance was not undermined. Radical change to this approach might generate more heat than light, more friction than cooperation.

Dealing with out-of-area issues within Europe (such as Yugoslavia) could be more straightforward than those in other continents, but in practice differences of judgement clearly appear on Europe as well. There is the additional complication

¹⁰. See "Rift with US alarms Britain", The Guardian 1 April 1993.

that extending NATO's role to the East, if not its membership, could provoke Russian intransigence and paranoia, thus diminishing the overall security of the continent. Certainly it will be more difficult to secure perhaps needed Russian participation in peace-keeping or peace-enforcing operations in Eastern Europe if such operations have a NATO label and command. However, the signs as 1993 came to a close were that the Western countries were loathe to send even individual officers to such troublespots as Georgia and Nagorny Karabakh, where there was respectively UN and CSCE involvement. If and when a settlement is eventually reached in between Armenia and Azerbaijan, there will presumably be a need for peace-keeping forces. The Western readiness or otherwise to provide troops will be a serious indicator of how ready NATO countries are to get involved in the control of national and ethnic issues in the former Soviet Union.

5. The positive evolution of NATO

So much for the cautionary and the negative but what should NATO be doing? What can it do which is particularly worthwhile? Five things are apparent.

a) Survive

First it must aim to survive since its collapse would have a significant unsettling effect on West European security and could well make countries, including Germany, much more ready to depend on purely national means for their defence. The European Union provides some, but not complete, assurance that this will not occur. NATO cannot prevent to some degree the re-nationalisation of defence policies in Europe, but it should serve to moderate its effect and, alongside other bodies including the WEU and the European Union, it can make a valuable contribution.

b) Article 5

As was made clear earlier, Article 5 of the NATO Treaty cannot yet be forgotten. There is still a significant Russian capability, especially in the nuclear area. NATO must work to ensure that effective forces to counter such capabilities remain in place. Moreover, as the Russian threat continues to decline, NATO could concentrate more on coordinating the defence cuts which members are making. At present, national budgets are being adjusted downwards with little regard to NATO guidance or the preferences of other allies. NATO needs a downwards equivalent to the "three per cent commitment" of 1977-8. That commitment gave the Alliance a clear opportunity to monitor increases in defence effort. It now needs criteria to restrict and coordinate reductions in defence efforts so that NATO ends up with coherent forces with a collective strength in excess of the simple sum of national efforts. NATO's new force structure is not yet operational with perhaps only half the main defence units in view which were once anticipated. The revised command structure might also need further review.

Related to Article 5, but concerned with improving relations with the enemy rather than defending against it, NATO needs to give further attention to arms control and confidence-building measures, both with regard to the implementation and verification of existing agreements and to the negotiation of new ones, most obviously through the CSCE framework. NATO has a clear security interest in cooperative security arrangements being developed which have a positive impact on relations among central and east European states, including relations between Russia and its neighbours. Arms control and confidence-building measures could play a helpful role in containing nationalism and certainly it is important to keep the CFE Treaty in being.

One of the unsung but wise choices of NATO in the establishment of the political liaison process from 1990 was to treat all former members of the Warsaw Pact on the same basis, thus minimising the ammunition available to those in the then Soviet Union who wanted to argue that NATO was devoted to the weakening of Moscow's power. Non-discrimination as a principle was

sustained also with the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council at the end of 1991. There remains extensive business for NATO, operating through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, in promoting the civilian direction and democratic oversight of defence policy. The countries of the former Warsaw Treaty Organisation have much to learn in this regard. All including Russia are in the process of establishing new national defence policies and they can benefit from a wide variety of training and exchange programmes in areas such as the role of parliaments (including defence committees) in defence policy, budgeting procedures and practices, procurement from the private and public sectors, officer and soldier education, civil-military relations in the defence ministry, the coordination of defence ministries with other relevant ministries including finance and foreign affairs, and so on.

In brief NATO can work to erode panania, parochialism and extreme, undemocratic nationalism in the defence establishments of former Warsaw Pact states by integrating them into the West. However the integration should take the form of thousands of contacts at the human level rather than the early offer of NATO membership to Central European states and others.

Such activities are neither cost-free nor short-term, since it will take a decade or longer to establish new cultures in east European armed forces and governments and it will be particularly important to build sustained contact with the nationalist, suspicious young generals of the Russian high command who have rarely travelled beyond Russia. NATO has now a whole series of new opportunities to work in support of the 1967 Harmel Plan and its stress on "progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved" and "the greater relaxation of tensions".

c) Political consultation

Making NATO particularly useful for states on both sides of the

Atlantic is its role as the most important forum for transatlantic political and security consultation, the place where the US talks most intimately, regularly and comfortably with its European partners. Neither Western Europeans or the US contemplate dealing with global issues in complete isolation from the other and NATO is simply the best place to talk. The scheduled meetings of EC and US representatives are no substitute for the constant opportunity for formal and informal contact which NATO provides. Even when the US and Europeans cannot agree, and it was argued above that disagreement will probably not be rare, they can at least understand each others' positions well as a result of NATO discussions. Comparatively minor amendments to national positions may help avoid damaging quarrels: even when one state may not support a policy line, with consultations in NATO it may be persuaded not to oppose it openly.

Significantly such consultation processes should yield better, more effective policy, since such policy will have been exposed to a wide variety of national perspectives and intelligences. At a time of complex international problems of great difficulty, bringing a range of states to address a problem should bring extra insight and perhaps caution.

In this sphere, if West European efforts to generate a common foreign and security policy make reasonable progress, the nature of discussion will change with most members of NATO Europe bringing a common position to meetings. Such positions should not be rigid and NATO's health will clearly require that where appropriate NATO members from both sides of the Atlantic be ready to show flexibility in their positions in the face of clearly-articulated and well-supported arguments.

Political consultation may on occasions lead to cooperation, even to military activities in which armed forces from both sides of the Atlantic take part, even though, as in the Gulf in 1990-91, they may not fight under a NATO flag.

d) Western forces preparation and training

NATO military cooperation, involving common procedures and standards, regular exercises, multi-national command structures and so on, ensure that the national armed forces from both sides of the Atlantic can fight effectively together. It is important that this capacity be maintained and widened to include a capacity to "peace-keep" together. As a result of follow-up decisions to NATO states' choices of 1992 that NATO can provide peace-keeping forces in response to a CSCE or a UN request, NATO is increasing its cooperation in this area¹¹ and this cooperation can and should bring in forces from Eastern Europe, including even Russia and Ukraine.

Even if the military threat to NATO territory were to disappear completely, and it has not as Norwegians regularly point out, there would be a case for sustained military cooperation among NATO countries to give them the option of being able to work together. However, because of the damage which overt intra-NATO quarrels might cause, the political environment should not include an expectation that NATO would normally act in crises beyond the NATO area. The Kuwait crisis demonstrated the utility of having western forces which could work well together while not involving the political problems of running it as a NATO operation (Belgium, it must not be overlooked, refused to supply Britain with needed 155 mm ammunition).

e) Armaments cooperation

A fifth task for NATO should be to strengthen transatlantic armaments cooperation at a time when defence budgets are falling yet the demand for advanced technology in equipment shows no sign of diminishing.

To date NATO's record in this area is very limited. The Europeans have regularly bought US systems either ready-made or for

¹¹. See the communiques issued after the North Atlantic Council and Defence Planning Committee meetings in December 1992.

manufacture under licence in Europe. Significant offset arrangements have often been involved. On the rarer occasions when the US has bought European equipment, it has normally insisted on its manufacture in the US. Genuine transatlantic collaborative development and production projects, which have been numerous among west Europeans, have been virtually unknown and, despite the late 1980s's efforts of Senator Nunn and others, have been largely limited to the US-dominated development of the AV.8B from the original British Harrier.

The US future financial capacity to develop and produce unilaterally all the military equipment it needs must be doubted, and it cannot expect that west Europeans will simply be ready to see their own defence industries cut back drastically while equipment from the US is imported (with West Europeans also paying a levy to pay off some of the US R&D costs). This has particular relevance perhaps to the ballistic missile defence issue noted much earlier in this paper. Weapons collaboration across the Atlantic could work to everyone's advantage and NATO is best placed to arrange it. For success it will need a readiness to change attitudes and practice in Washington and to a lesser extent in Europe, and again very rapid short-term results cannot be expected.

The significance of arms cooperation as a means of integrating the military capabilities of states should not be under-estimated since a reliance on collaborative projects makes national action without the at least tacit support of weapons partners near impossible.

6. Conclusion

In summary, NATO should continue to exist as a force for peaceful, cooperative relations in the North Atlantic area and the wider world. The environment is not right for it to be transformed into a new body, either by taking in new members or

by changing its function so that it could be expected to fulfil a world or regional policeman role. Instead NATO should concentrate on:

the continued prudent defence of its members territory, so that it can defend against external nationalism and maintain the existing integration of West European defence activities;

the continued transformation of relations with Moscow central/east Europe so as moderate the development of nationalism by integrating Eastern defence establishments with Western partners and values;

effective transatlantic political consultation on a wide range of regional and global matters including the containment of national conflicts, in accordance with the Bonn and Brussels statements of 1982;

military cooperation which ensures that the needs of Article 5 are met and that NATO states and former Warsaw Pact can work together on an ad hoc basis when and if they so choose on peace-keeping and other operations to contain nationalism;

on armaments cooperation to guarantee that NATO forces are properly equipped at an acceptable economic cost and to integrate them, making national action impossible without allied endorsement.

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***Facing Radical Nationalism:
CSCE Responses***

by

Peter Schmidt

(Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen)

Dr. Peter Schmidt, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, D-80267 Ebenhausen

OUTLINE OF A PAPER

Facing Radical Nationalism - CSCE responses

I. Introduction

Optimism with regard to the CSCE's competence to manage crisis in Central and Eastern Europe dominated the initial period after the collapse of Communism. By enmeshing all countries of the former Warsaw Pact in the CSCE and by institutionalizing the CSCE conference series - aiming at the establishment of some sort of a collective security institution - many believed that possibly evolving conflicts could be successfully handled within this framework. The Charter of Paris (1990) was very much dominated by this hopeful outlook.

In reality, it turned out that:

- the South Eastern, Central and Eastern CSCE area has become an arc of existing or potential crises, armed conflicts and even war,
- the CSCE is not the dominating European security institution but rather an institutional patchwork made up from pieces of overlapping institutions including not only the CSCE but also NATO, NACC, European Union, WEU, Consultative Council of WEU and even the U.N., which has become heavily involved in European security affairs, now exists.

Now that the original optimism has been daunted by many regional tensions, clashes and even wars, a second period of more realistic approaches to European security in which political actors try to pragmatically evolve the institutional set-up and to define a more moderate and down-to-earth role for CSCE is now be experienced.

Against this background, this paper (outline) aims at the discussion of the following questions:

- What are the CSCE's key functions in the new era?
- How far is the CSCE able to restrain (retain? resolve?) conflicts; especially ethnic tensions and extreme nationalism?
- What are the options (proposals) for the future development of the CSCE and how could these options contribute to the goal of preventing ethnic conflicts and extreme nationalism?

- How does the current CSCE fit into the broader framework of security related institutions?

II. CSCE's Institutional development, tasks and functions in the new era

Like other institutions, the CSCE was based on East-West antagonism. Until 1990 the CSCE represented "a process of succeeding multilateral diplomatic conferences aiming at the gradual creation of a solidified network of norms."¹ After the demise of the old order there was a strong need for change and adaptation in order to cope with the new types of conflicts in Europe.

The CSCE member states - especially in the Charter of Paris - worked out four goals for CSCE:²

- to promote democracy, peace and unity,
- to stimulate and develop common guidelines for future cooperation in a number of areas,
- to develop norms and rules with regard to the rights of minorities,
- to establish a system of preventive diplomacy with regard to crises between and within member states within new institutional structures.

Whereas the first two goals are of long-term character, the last two are of short and medium term value. These points are of special importance because they refer to the near future: it is impossible to attain the long-term goals without some success in the short and medium term ones. The following will therefore put emphasis on the two last points.

With regard to minority problems the following can be said:

- The main sources of conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe are ethnic-national tensions which often lead to secessionist attempts. The CSCE has not yet been successful in defining the criteria for legitimate secession: the capitals are (understandably) reluctant to accept a formal right of secession;³ the principle of sovereignty still overrules the right of self-determination. In the ex-Yugoslavian case this has led to a contradictory policy: on the one hand the CSCE (following the EC member states) accepted the secession of Slovenia and Croatia during 1991, on the other

1 Norbert Ropers / Peter Schlotter, *Die KSZE. Multilaterales Konfliktmanagement im weltpolitischen Umbruch. Zukunftsperspektiven und neue Umpulse für regionale Friedensstrategien*, HSK-Report 11-12/1992, p. 1.

2 See the chart on The Charter of Paris for a new Europe.

3 See Norbert Ropers / Peter Schlotter, *Die KSZE*, op. cit., pp. 42-46.

hand the CSCE has refused to consent to the right of self-determination for the Serbs living in Croatia, who are demanding either their own state or the right to join Serbia.⁴ The CSCE has not yet been able to develop a consistent policy of secession.

- Nevertheless, the CSCE addressed a question which is quite often linked with ethnic-national tensions: the right of minorities. Minority rights have originally been treated by the CSCE as individual rights based on the assumption that the rights of minorities can be protected by the general observance of human rights. The growing minority problems have, however, led to a new policy initiated during the Copenhagen Summit of June 1990 in which a number of concrete guidelines to protect the identity of minorities were agreed upon. In particular: ⁵
 - the freedom to express the ethnical, cultural, and linguistic identity,
 - the freedom to use the mother tongue,
 - the possibility to build up educational, cultural and religious institutions,
 - the right to build up organizations etc.

There was a clear understanding, however, that these rights have to be supported by adequate support structures in case of violation. The functioning of these procedures depend, however, mostly on the consent of all member states. These procedures are based on the idea of prevention rather than to fairly handle fairly advanced crises.

The CSCE succeeded in establishing a crisis prevention system by the creation of three so-called mechanisms:

- the political crisis mechanisms of the Committee of Senior Officials,⁶
- the military crisis mechanisms within the framework of confidence and security developing measures,⁷
- the human dimension mechanism.⁸

This system has the following features:

4 ibidem p. 26.

5 See the results of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE in Copenhagen, June 29, 1990.

6 See chart

7 See chart

8 See chart

- The procedures to cope with the respective problems are similar throughout all the mechanisms: there are several stages (request of explanation, answer) followed by bi- or multilateral meetings.
- The political mechanism (Committee of Senior Officials) gives, for the first time, a certain possibility to base a decision on majority voting. A party (or parties) cannot veto against a convocation of a meeting. The humanitarian mechanisms encompass even more elaborate majority rules.
- The three mechanisms suffer from not having clearly defined and separable tasks. Whereas the military mechanism addresses alarming military activities only and member states can put into operation the humanitarian mechanism if there is a violation of human rights, it is the political crisis mechanism which does not fit into a concept of division of labour because this mechanism has the task to address "serious and urgent situations" in general. This overlapping structure causes procedural problems.

Whereas the above mentioned functions (despite some violations of the consensus rule) are part of a concept of cooperative security, two additional tasks fit more into a collective security approach:

- The CSCE plays a certain role in the U.N.'s enforcement actions against former Yugoslavia.
- During the Helsinki follow-up meeting the member states also agreed on the possibility to undertake, under certain conditions, peace-keeping missions under the auspices of the CSCE.⁹

These two activities should be regarded as supportive and secondary functions only. They are not based on the CSCE's own sphere of competence but on mandates from the U.N.. Nevertheless, these tasks bring about two positive consequences:

- Due to its world-wide character, the U.N. operates beyond its capacities. The CSCE can play a positive supporting role in this regard.¹⁰
- The CSCE can engage countries in peace-keeping missions which are not part and parcel of organizations establishing an elaborated structure to fill

9 The criteria are: a reliable ceasefire, the existing of a memorandum of understanding among the parties concerned, guarantees of security for the CSCE personal. The U.N. Charter limits the role of regional arrangements to "peaceful means". This includes above all: negotiations, investigations, arbitration etc. (see Article 52, section 4).

10 This is the major message in the U.N. Secretary General's "Agenda for Peace".

out these tasks like NATO or NACC. Quite often, these countries have a great deal of experience with peace-keeping (like Austria, Switzerland, Finland, Sweden).

III. The CSCE's value

The CSCE's process of change is accompanied by false expectations and misleading criticism. A fair assessment of its ability to perform must accept the following points:

- The CSCE cannot do more than the member states want to let it do. The member states have to be blamed for deficiencies not the CSCE organization.
- The CSCE has become an institution based primarily on the idea of cooperative, not collective security.¹¹ This concept has its value but also its limits. Therefore the benefits of this organization have to be identified within the overall network of security related institutions. During the follow-up meeting in Helsinki (1992), the CSCE declared itself to a regional organization based on article 52 of the UN's Charter. In accordance with the UN's Charter such an organization does not have the task to enforce peace in the region concerned but rather only to establish a certain relation among the member states.¹² The CSCE cannot replace the U.N. (and do a better job than the U.N.) but it can add a positive element to the functioning of the U.N.
- Extreme nationalism implies the vigorous demand for the establishment of an identifiable and separate political and social entity with a number of shared elements (mostly ethnic factors). The groups adhering to extreme nationalism are ready to free their territory of "foreign" elements using almost any means, in the most extreme case by "ethnic cleansing". A fair evaluation of the CSCE's value has to take the fact into account that all security organizations face similar problems with regard to the handling of such conflicts. It is extremely difficult to influence the social and political disintegration of states from the outside. The problems related with this

11 See attached chart on the Comparison of System Characteristics of Co-operative and Collective Security.

12 See Heinz Vetschera, Die Rolle der KSZE als Einrichtung kooperativer Sicherheit im Rahmen des "interlocking institutions"-Konzepts, Ebenhausen (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik), unpublished manuskript, October 1993, p.

are therefore not specific CSCE problems. They concern every international organization.

Against this background, the positive elements of the CSCE are the following:

- Ethnic or secessionist conflicts can best be addressed at an early stage of the contest. The CSCE has developed a special competence in this field (three mechanisms, procedural elements allowing early involvement). The CSCE is involved in a number of crisis regions like the former Yugoslavia, Georgia, Moldavia, Estonia, Tadshikstan and Kosovo, where nationalistic or minority conflicts have broken out or are on the doorstep. Some positive experience is reported in this regard (especially in Kosovo).
- One of the major problems today is to transcend the traditional inter-state approach of international law and diplomacy with new elements giving the world community formalized access to domestic conflicts based on clear principles and criteria. The CSCE has developed a number of instruments in this regard (High Commissioner for National Minorities, minority rights, humanitarian mechanisms addressing directly the violation of human rights inside a country).

Nevertheless, the CSCE's positive functions are endangered by the following developments:

- The idea to base the CSCE on some sort of a collective view on the secession of states and the rights of minorities is threatened by the hegemonic principle (however "human" the hegemony may be):
 - Russia, e.g., is currently the only country engaged in peace-keeping on the soil of the CIS and it looks like the West is generally accepting this because no Western state is interested to get involved in these affairs. There is a general tendency that each country takes care of "its" minorities outside its own territory.¹³
 - In the Yugoslavian case, even the EC states demonstrated some sort of a EC nationalism in the summer of 1993: they claimed that this region belongs to the EC influence zone and the crisis therefore should primarily be addressed and solved by the EC states.

13 For a excellent analysis of this development see Paul Widmer, *Neuer Nationalismus, alte Denkmuster*, in: *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 20-21 May 1993, p. 41

The great question is whether the principle of influence zones will again dominate the all-European order or whether a political structure within which the community of European states addresses the problems - as far as possible - in common and based on common values and agreed upon procedures will develop.

IV. Options for change

A number of perspectives on the future development of the CSCE are discussed:

1. The Balladur plan for a "Pact on Stability in Europe"¹⁴

This plan tries to directly address the problems of minorities and secession in Europe¹⁵ by an international treaty containing principles defined in regard to borders and minorities. The pact also aims to coordinate the action of the many existing institutions "to provide the best possible guarantee for these principles."

The main problems of this proposal are as follows:

- It puts the U.S. at the fringes of the process despite the desire of Central European countries in particular to maintain a major role for the U.S. in this region.
- It formalizes negotiations on extremely complex issues and neglects the benefits of flexibility in the CSCE process.
- The pact would double a number of action areas of the CSCE (especially with regard to minority problems), where the CSCE has been rather successful.

2. The establishment of a CSCE Security Council

This proposal is founded either on the idea to establish a regional collective security which differs from the current cooperative security orientation of CSCE, or on the intention to develop a more effective consensus-building mechanism without establishing a fully-fledged collective security system.

These considerations bring with it the following problems:

- Due to the complex power structure within the CSCE the result of negotiations on this question will very likely lead to a rather weak and

¹⁴ See Europe Documents, no. 1846, 26 June 1993, pp. 1-5.

¹⁵ The proposal excludes Asian countries.

loose structure incorporating most of the consensus problems in the overall CSCE. The benefits in terms of decision-making efficiency will be rather small.

- During such a change the benefits of a cooperative security system (general acceptance, conflict prevention through permanent consultation among all parties concerned etc.) will disappear.
- Especially the longer-term function to develop a common "code of conduct" could be hurt by the inclusion of majority decisions within a CSCE Security Council.

V. *The links with other institutions*

Europe experiences a proliferation of institutions without a clear-cut division of labour. Overlaps with other organizations exist in the case of the CSCE in the following cases:

- In the area of peace-keeping not only the CSCE but also NATO, NACC, WEU and the U.N. claim the competence to undertake those actions.
- With regard to diplomatic missions (observers, fact-finding missions etc.), there are local powers (like Russia or the EC) and the U.N. itself exercising this task.
- Regional powers (EC states, Russia) negotiate in peace talks on European soil. The U.N. is also directly involved in peace negotiations. The CSCE plays a minor role only in this respect.
- The Council of Europe has some competences in the field of human rights, political and social exchange and cooperation.

With regard to the main bodies in the security field, however, a certain perspective for a division of labour can be identified (and should be further developed):

- Within the limits of the general regulations of the U.N. and the special rights of the Security Council, the CSCE has a special competence to fit into a system of cooperative security (especially with regard to preventive diplomacy).
- The CSCE has a special capacity to exert influence in the area of minority rights and a certain value with regard to the secession of a state.

- It should take part in peace-keeping actions (with full consent of the conflicting states), but larger actions will need to be based on the involvement of great powers or large alliances (like NATO).
- Enforcement actions can only take place under the auspices of the U.N.. The CSCE's contribution can only play a role at the fringes (control of sanctions, e.g.). Great states or existing military alliances (with different kind of involvements) will play a dominant role.

VI. Conclusions

There is no magic wand in sight which is able to find a solution for the ethnic and nationalistic conflicts in the CSCE area. Nevertheless, the CSCE can contribute on a short-, medium and long-term basis to dampen conflicts and to regulate crisis.

The international community should address a number of tasks in the near future:

- There is a need for rationalizing the overlapping structure of security institutions in Europe. The future division of labour should be based on a clear distinction between mandate fulfilling organizations and regional arrangements. CSCE should mostly be based on the idea of a regional arrangement whereas organizations originally devoted to collective self-defense should represent mandate fulfilling organizations.
- In order to get to this point it is necessary to define more precisely what a regional arrangement is.
- The CSCE should go on contributing to the development of minority rights and establishing criteria for the peaceful secession of states,
- Within the CSCE there is a need to establish a reasonable division of labour among the different conflict prevention mechanisms.
- The CSCE can have a share in peace-keeping efforts in order to base these efforts on as broad a basis as possible (to side major powers or alliances having the lead in this field).
- The CSCE should further develop the envisaged cooperation areas.

Charts:

1. Charter of Paris
2. Military Mechanism
3. Political Mechanism
4. Human Dimension Mechanism
5. Comparison of Cooperative and Collective Security
6. The Framework of Security Institutions in Europe

The Charter of Paris for a new Europe 1990

A New Age of Democracy, Peace and Unity

- Human Rights, Democracy, and Rule of Law
- Economic Liberty and Responsibility
- Friendly Relations among Participating States
- Security
- Unity
- the CSCE and the World


Guidelines for the Future

- Human Dimension
- Security
- Economic Co-operation
- Environment
- Culture
- Migrant Workers
- Mediterranean
- Non-governmental Organizations

New Structures and Institutions of the CSCE Process


Additional Document for the Realization of Some of the Norms Established in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe

**Military crisis mechanisms within the framework of
confidence and security developing measures**




Source: Heinz Vetschera, "The CSCE crisis mechanism and its application during the Yugoslavia crisis in: Austrian Military Journal, issue 5/1991, S. 407.

The crisis mechanisms of the Committee of Senior Officials



Source: Heinz Vetschera, "The CSCE crisis mechanism and its application during the Yugoslavia crisis in: Austrian Military Journal, Issue 5/1991, S. 405.

The Human Dimension Mechanism




System Characteristic \ System Type	Cooperative Security (e.g. CSCE)	Collective Security (e.g. UN)	Collective (Self-)Defense (e.g. NATO)
Disarmament and Arms Control as System Function	very pronounced	very pronounced	originally not provided for
Priority on Peace- ful Conflict Reso- lution	very pronounced	very pronounced	targeted on principle
Utilization of a Comprehensive Security Concept	yes	yes	less pronounced
Extensive Help and Co-operation as System Function	planned	planned	less pronounced
System Defines Itself as a Function- ing Body of Com- mon Values	planned	questionable	very pronounced
Sanctions against 'External' Peace Violators provided for	no	yes	yes, especially military
Sanctions against 'Internal' Peace Violators provided for	in rudimentary form	yes	no
Degree of Political Organization	in its in- ceptional phase	very high	very high
Degree of Military Organization	none	none	very high
Majority Decisions	none	basic principle	consensus sought

Comparison of System Characteristics of Co-operative and
Collective Security

Source: Österr. Milit. Zeitschrift, Heft 3/1991

THE FRAMEWORK OF SECURITY INSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE



CSCE : Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

NATO : North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

EC: European Community

WEU : Western European Union

FC: WEU Forum of Consultation

NACC: North Atlantic Cooperation Council

** : Pending ratification*

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XI Conférence Internationale de Lisbonne

L'EUROPE DEVANT LE NATIONALISME RADICAL

Centre Culturel de Belém, Lisbonne, 17 - 19 Novembre 1993

***Le Nationalisme en Europe:
Le Rôle du Conseil d'Europe***

par

Gonçalo Santa Clara Gomes

(Ambassadeur du Portugal au Conseil de l'Europe)

Le nationalisme en Europe - Le rôle
du Conseil de l'Europe

Notre réflexion est basée sur l'existence en Europe, depuis au moins la fin du XVIII^e siècle, d'un facteur national. Ce facteur part de l'idée de Nation, interprétée de multiples manières, et la met en rapport étroit à celle d'Etat, bien que sous des formes et avec des intensités très diverses. C'est la variété d'interprétations et de manières de vivre du concept de Nation, conjuguée avec la diversité de liens établis avec les Etats - existants ou à créer - qui rendent le problème du nationalisme complexe.

2. La pluralité d'interprétations qui lui sont données, rend difficile de circonscrire le concept de Nation. Il a été et est toujours lié aux notions de race, de langue ou de religion - sur lesquelles sont fondés bon nombre de nationalismes - mais déjà Renan, par exemple, a démontré qu'aucun de ces éléments lui est essentiel. Et Renan a proposé, à son tour, une définition basée sur deux éléments, un objectif, "la possession en commun d'un riche héritage de souvenirs", c'est-à-dire, la mémoire d'un passé commun, et l'autre, subjectif, volontariste, qui serait le "consentement actuel", le "plébiscite de tous les jours". Outre la part de vérité indiscutable de ces interprétations ou d'autres, il nous suffit, pour notre propos, de retenir que la Nation est une communauté d'hommes qui se considère naturelle, bien qu'elle soit, selon le mot de Benedict Anderson, une

"communauté imaginée" ayant recours, comme le disent Eric Hobsbawm et Terence Ranger, à l'"invention de la tradition".

Savoir comment et pourquoi les nations et le nationalisme sont nés n'est pas notre propos. Mais il convient de mettre l'accent sur l'importance qu'ont eu dans la vie européenne, depuis la Révolution Française, la nation et les concepts qui en découlent de principe des nationalités et de nationalisme. C'est vrai que ces idées-force nous aident à comprendre, par elles-mêmes, une grande partie de la vie des Etats européens pendant cette période, puisqu'elles ont été utilisées en tant qu'instrument et sont à l'origine de beaucoup d'évènements politiques intérieurs des Etats aussi bien que de la structuration du système international européen et même des conflits armés à partir de 1815.

Le rôle central que la nation joue dans la vie politique européenne est visible, en premier lieu, à travers sa fonction importante qu'elle a été appelée à exercer de légitimation des systèmes politiques étatiques, remplaçant la légitimité des anciens régimes basés sur le principe dynastique. Nous n'allons pas, non plus, nous étendre davantage sur ce sujet, mais il ne faut pas oublier que toute la légitimité des régimes libéraux et démocratiques a dû se fonder sur une conception de nation en tant que patrie de citoyens égaux en droits, participant en commun, à travers leurs représentants, à l'exercice du pouvoir politique. Seule cette vision d'une solidarité plus forte que les divisions politiques et religieuses a permis l'établissement de régimes représentatifs. Mais cette solidarité naturelle a dû

néanmoins être renforcée par des symboles et des pratiques d'une religion civile, ou laïque, fondée sur des valeurs universelles et rationalistes. De là, de cette utilisation de la nation en tant qu'instrument par l'état libéral contre l'ancien régime, provient notre conception du patriotisme.

La fonction donnée à ce qu'on appelle principe des nationalités dans l'organisation du système d'Etats européen correspond, aussi, à une utilisation progressiste du phénomène national. Là encore la Nation a été utilisée avec des objectifs qui se prétendaient universels et qui visaient une rationalisation du système d'Etats en unités politiquement, économiquement et culturellement viables. De là provient la restriction de l'application de ce principe aux communautés viables, c'est-à-dire, à partir d'un certain seuil de population, que nous trouvons, par exemple, chez Stuart Mill et chez Mazzini.

Si les unifications allemande et italienne sont le meilleur exemple de l'application du principe des nationalités, il a été également appliqué aux territoires issus, d'abord de l'Empire Ottoman et ensuite de l'Empire Autrichien. Là encore, la Nation a été utilisée en tant qu'instrument dans un sens progressiste; cependant, tandis que dans les cas italien et allemand il l'a été vis-à-vis de petits Etats au nom d'une aspiration nationale que les dépassait, dans les autres cas elle a été utilisée contre des empires plurinationaux dont la légitimité se périssait.

La réalité nationale a prouvé, cependant, être une force si puissante qu'elle n'a pas tardé à être déviée au profit d'autres

objectifs. Nous assistons alors, dans le plan intérieur, à la naissance, à partir de 1880, des nationalismes de droite que nous connaissons aujourd'hui et, simultanément, à la naissance du terme même de nationalisme. L'apparition de ce phénomène est liée aux moments de crise, politique ou économique, lorsque les valeurs de l'Etat laïque et rationaliste sont mis en cause suite à des défaites militaires ou à d'autres crises profondes. C'est le cas, par exemple, de la France, après 1870, ou de l'Allemagne, après 1918, lorsque renaît avec force mobilisatrice une conception exclusiviste de nation en tant que communauté naturelle traditionnelle - Gemeinschaft - opposée à la société de citoyens libres et égaux - Gesellschaft - celle-ci basée sur des présupposés démocratiques, rationalistes, universels. Ce nouveau nationalisme se renforce et se nourrit de passions que des facteurs tels que la religion, la culture ou la race peuvent susciter, pour assaillir et essayer de prendre le pouvoir politique. Là encore, la Nation est utilisée par rapport aux Etats, cette fois-ci pour les conquérir de l'intérieur, au nom d'une autre légitimité.

Ce nouveau concept de Nation et de nationalisme, une sorte d'image invertie de celles d'avant, viendra dominer la première moitié de notre siècle. A l'intérieur des Etats, il a prouvé qu'il était anti-démocratique, autoritaire, anti-rationaliste, intolérant, xénophobe. Et sous cet aspect, les nations issues de l'anéantissement des empires autrichien et turc se sont révélées aussi capables que les autres de persécuter les minorités nationales. Au nom de la logique du principe qui visait faire coïncider les frontières des Etats avec celles des nations, des

expulsions en masse et des phénomènes d'extermination de minorités ont eu lieu. Internationalement, il suffit de dire que le nationalisme, d'une forme ou d'une autre, a continué à influencer la structuration du système international européen et l'aspérité et la violence des relations à l'intérieur du système.

La question des minorités, produit typique de la période post-1918, issue de l'existence dans les nouveaux Etats de groupes minoritaires de forte cohésion, appartenant à des nationalités différentes, soit liés à d'autres Etats nationaux, destitués d'Etat, est en rapport avec cette phase des nationalismes. La réglementation, ou la tentative de réglementation, de cette réalité est aussitôt imposée par les vainqueurs de la Première Guerre Mondiale: surgit alors la première réglementation internationale des droits des minorités, imposant certaines obligations aux Etats et sous le contrôle de la Société des Nations. La période entre les deux guerres a révélée la fragilité et les dangers de ce système: en légitimant certaines minorités et pas d'autres, il stimulait dans celles qui n'étaient pas reconnues le désir d'exister par elles mêmes, tout en favorisant dans celles qui étaient reconnues les tendances à la sécession ou au rattachement à la Mère Patrie perdue. Ces patries amputées, à leur tour, voyaient dans ces minorités un instrument privilégié de leur expansionnisme. En reconnaissant le rôle négatif que ces statuts des minorités ont pu jouer à l'origine de la Deuxième Grande Guerre, les puissances victorieuses de 45 ont renoncé à une protection internationalement garantie des minorités - ce que, en conjugaison avec l'imposition des dictatures communistes, a fait

que ce problème a cessé de représenter une menace sérieuse durant la période de la Guerre Froide.

La guerre froide, qui a impliqué la formation de blocs antagoniques, a ainsi gelé les nationalismes en Europe. En Occident, la question nationale a pu être dépassée, grâce aux réformes politiques démocratiques et décentralisatrices et à la reconnaissance plus vaste des droits de l'homme, ainsi qu'un certain dépassement de la prééminence de l'Etat en tant qu'espace plus "rationnel" de l'organisation économique ou de la sécurité (ce qui a amené à des formes d'organisation collective telles que la CE et l'OTAN). En Europe Centrale et Orientale, l'existence de gouvernements totalitaires aussi bien que la souveraineté limitée dont ils disposaient à l'intérieur du bloc ont paralysé les nationalismes ou les ont orienté essentiellement contre l'empire de l'URSS. Les changements de 1989 ont libéré ces forces, d'un caractère destructif, comme dans les cas de l'ancienne Yougoslavie et des pays de l'ex-Union Soviétique. Le problème se pose désormais de caractériser ces nationalismes, d'évaluer leurs dangers et de leur trouver des réponses adéquates.

Il est bien clair que le nationalisme qui réapparaît maintenant en Europe Orientale n'a pas perdu sa capacité d'influencer les événements, que ce soit au niveau interne, dans les Etats, ou à niveau du système européen.

Les guerres civiles en Yougoslavie, en Géorgie ou à l'Azerbaïdjan sont la preuve de la force destructrice du phénomène nationaliste au niveau interne. Au niveau

international, la puissance du phénomène nationaliste a entraîné la modification de la structure du système européen - de 35 les Etats membres de la CSCE sont passés à 53 - et a créé des dangers potentiels pour la paix et la stabilité de ce système.

L'éclosion récente des questions des minorités, qui était d'ailleurs prévisible, vient poser de nouveau la question de la protection par le Droit International de leurs droits. Deux principes juridiques entrent ici en conflit, tous deux reconnus par le Droit International et cependant maintes fois contradictoires: d'un côté, le principe de l'autodétermination des peuples et leur droit de s'organiser en Etats; et de l'autre côté, le principe du respect des frontières. Il n'y a pas d'hiérarchie claire entre les deux principes, son application dépendant des circonstances et des volontés politiques. Cette indéfinition juridique crée une situation instable, puisque rien n'empêche à une minorité d'aspirer à son autodétermination - l'exigence d'un seuil de population, présente dans la doctrine du XIXe siècle, n'ayant pas de consécration légale - au lieu d'accepter un statut limité de minorité. D'ailleurs, comme je l'ai dit auparavant, ce type de statut n'était plus consacré depuis la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale.

En grande partie, la difficulté de faire face au problème de la protection des minorités, que ce soit au sein de la CSCE ou au sein du Conseil de l'Europe, ou bien dans le cadre du futur Pacte de stabilité défendu par l'Union Européenne, trouve son point de départ dans cette ambiguïté fondamentale du droit européen.

En Occident, cependant, le nationalisme, s'il n'a pas disparu, a perdu néanmoins de force. Ici, au moins, reste vraie l'affirmation d'Hobsbawm selon laquelle on assiste au "déclin du nationalisme en tant que vecteur de changement historique". Et il est intéressant d'en examiner les raisons, puisque cette tendance nous ouvre des perspectives pour une action efficace contre les formes négatives du nationalisme contemporain. Je pense que cette perte de force du nationalisme est due à l'action conjuguée de plusieurs facteurs. Premièrement, le pouvoir politique, dans la généralité des pays d'Europe occidentale, s'est vraiment démocratisé - outre une plus grande participation populaire, on a essayé dans beaucoup de pays des formules de régionalisation ou de décentralisation qui ont rendu le pouvoir plus proche des citoyens. Deuxièmement, et d'une manière plus générale, on a assisté aussi à une prise de conscience plus aigüe des droits des citoyens, désormais davantage protégés qu'auparavant, notamment dans le cadre de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l'Homme. Troisièmement, la circulation des personnes et des biens a augmenté en même temps que l'interdépendance économique, et ceci dans un cadre de prospérité économique presque continue. Quatrièmement, cette interdépendance a été accompagnée de l'émergence de l'idée européenne, concrétisée dans une Union puissante de 12 Etats. Et, enfin, en même temps que l'affirmation de cette nouvelle idée-force, et en grande partie comme sa cause directe, s'impose la perception que l'Etat n'est plus le cadre suffisant, que ce soit pour soutenir efficacement l'activité économique de ses ressortissants ou pour assurer la défense et la sécurité de son peuple, qui se voit maintenant confiée à une alliance permanente dans laquelle

participent les Etats Unis.

Cette évolution ne signifie pas qu'en Europe Occidentale le phénomène du nationalisme exacerbé n'existe plus. Il est malheureusement présent, du fait de l'actuelle crise, puisqu'il subsiste comme une réaction instinctive contre ce qui est senti par certains comme une menace - le nationalisme est aussi une valeur refuge, comme l'a été l'or, en des périodes de perturbation et d'incertitude. Ce nationalisme se manifeste par deux formes distinctes que nous ne devons pas confondre: d'un côté, nous avons le nationalisme qui veut défendre et préserver l'état-nation dans la fonction traditionnelle qui est la sienne depuis la Révolution française, en tant que centre de la vie politique nationale et internationale; et d'autre part, un nationalisme différent est né, raciste, xénophobe et intolérant qui prétend défendre l'espace et les valeurs de la nation contre tout ce qui lui est étranger, surtout venant du tiers-monde, et qui est senti comme une menace pour la sécurité et pour la qualité de la vie de nos sociétés. Ces deux phénomènes, d'ampleur et de gravité diverses, ne doivent pas être confondus, bien que dans certains cas ils puissent se toucher, car ils ont éthiquement (et même politiquement) peu de choses en commun. Il est à noter, cependant, que ces deux formes du nationalisme occidental contemporain sont entrées en concurrence ouverte avec d'autres forces qui lui sont directement opposées, tels l'individualisme croissant de nos sociétés et la conscience de la nécessité de structures supranationales (le problème de la légitimité du pouvoir dans ces structures supranationales se pose déjà, mais nous n'en parlerons pas ici).

Ce qu'il faut faire, devant les nouveaux nationalismes du Centre et de l'Est de l'Europe, peut et doit s'inspirer des solutions que nous avons trouvées pour la partie occidentale du continent. Il faut protéger les droits de l'Homme, soit considérés individuellement soit intégrés dans ses groupes naturels, et notamment son droit à une identité culturelle propre. Il faut rapprocher le pouvoir des citoyens et des groupes de population, de manière à leur donner à tous la sensation que ce pouvoir est légitime parce qu'il leur appartient. Il faut ouvrir les sociétés que jusqu'à présent sont restées fermées au contact avec les autres et les intégrer à l'interdépendance européenne accrue, à la fois dans les domaines économique, politique et culturel. Il faut rendre à ces sociétés l'espoir d'une future inclusion dans cette Europe en construction, de laquelle ils sont encore éloignés. Il faut garantir la sécurité de l'ensemble européen, fondée sur des principes acceptés par tous. Il faut espérer que ces contacts et cette ouverture produiront des effets au niveau des mentalités, ce qui, on le sait par expérience, ne sera pas immédiat. Il faut, enfin, travailler par tous ces moyens pour que les aspirations séparatistes disparaissent.

Quel est le rôle des organisations européennes dans cette tâche?

En ce qui concerne ce qui est commun à toutes les organisations, je commencerais par faire l'observation suivante. L'Europe Occidentale est une région ou un sous-système distinct dans le système international, résultant d'une évolution depuis la deuxième guerre mondiale. Ce sous-système est caractérisé par l'Etat de Droit, par des formes de gouvernement démo-libérales,

par l'économie de marché et par des systèmes de protection sociale développés. A l'intérieur de cette région, et grâce aux instruments que constituent les organisations européennes - un des traits distinctifs de ce système - une intense coopération s'est développée dans tous les domaines. Or, les pays de l'Europe Central et Oriental faisaient partie d'un sous-système différent qui s'est désintégré et ils se rapprochent à présent, avec d'énormes efforts, qui provoquent des tensions internes et des ruptures, du système occidental. Les organisations de notre système, dans le cadre de leurs compétences, doivent soutenir les efforts en cours dans ces pays et, en même temps, faciliter, dans la mesure du possible, leur adhésion. On retrouve ici deux questions fondamentales pour la psychologie des peuples et des personnes: celle d'appartenir ou d'être exclu et celle de la reconnaissance par autrui. En matière de nationalisme, ces deux idées - appartenir et être reconnu - sont fondamentales.

Plus spécifiquement, mise à part l'Union Européenne, qui nécessairement agit dans tous les domaines, de la sécurité à l'économie, chaque organisation doit fonctionner dans le cadre de ses propres compétences visant répondre aux besoins pour lesquels elles ont été créées. Dans les cas de double emploi, tout doit être fait pour coordonner les actions des organisations concurrentes, qui doivent être considérées toutes comme des instruments de l'ensemble des Etats européens.

Au Conseil de l'Europe échoit une action importante en ce qui concerne les nationalismes. Dans un certain sens, on pourra même dire qu'il a été créé pour les contenir et les repousser,

en réalisant, comme il est dit dans le Statut, "une plus grande union entre ses membres". Il vise ainsi supérer les limitations nationales par une coopération entre les nations permettant une plus grande union entre elles.

Premièrement, par son rôle central dans la défense des droits de l'homme, mission principale du Conseil - il dispose pour le faire d'un mécanisme de protection assez développé (la Commission et la Cour, d'ailleurs en voie de fusion) qui a été institué par la Convention Européenne des Droits de l'Homme. En garantissant les droits de l'homme et en faisant d'eux la clé de la construction européenne, le Conseil de l'Europe assure une base essentielle à l'unification du continent et à la réforme nécessaire des mentalités.

Deuxièmement, et en tant que corollaire, à travers les droits de l'homme, le Conseil de l'Europe protège indirectement les minorités. Le renforcement de cette protection a été décidé les Chefs d'Etat et de Gouvernement, réunis à Vienne, qui ont prescrit l'adoption d'un protocole additionnel à la Convention Européenne des Droits de l'Homme sur les droits individuels de nature culturelle, d'un intérêt particulier pour les minorités. Ils ont également décidé de préparer une Convention-Cadre sur les minorités, où figureront les engagements et les devoirs des Etats dans cette matière. Par ailleurs, une Convention sur les langues minoritaires a déjà été adoptée et signé par douze Etats.

Troisièmement, le Conseil de l'Europe donne assistance aux pays candidats à l'adhésion en vue de l'établissement d'un véritable Etat de Droit, garantissant les droits des citoyens aussi bien que des minorités. Il prête ainsi son assistance technique à la rédaction de Constitutions et de lois de base dans

plusieurs Etats. Une attention toute particulière est donnée à l'organisation des Etats surtout en ce qui concerne les collectivités régionales et locales, de façon à assurer le rapprochement nécessaire des institutions aux citoyens et, là où il est approprié, des formes de partage du pouvoir, qui respectent le principe de la subsidiarité.

Quatrièmement, le Conseil de l'Europe a un rôle particulièrement important à jouer dans la définition des principes et des priorités de la coopération dans les domaines de la culture et de l'éducation et dans la mise en oeuvre de programmes dans ces domaines. Étant donné l'importance que les questions culturelles et de l'éducation ont dans les revendications des minorités nationales, il s'agit là d'un cadre où une action extrêmement utile peut être menée. Outre la Charte Européenne des Langues Régionales et Locales sus-mentionnée, des programmes d'un grand intérêt sont déjà mis en oeuvre dans le domaine des relations intercommunautaires. Là encore, une référence toute particulière doit être faite au projet en étude sur la création d'une Fondation Culture et Démocratie. On doit également mentionner, pour les effets qu'il prétend avoir au niveau des mentalités et des habitudes, le plan d'action contre le racisme, la xénophobie et, d'une manière générale, contre l'intolérance qui a été adopté par les Chefs d'Etats et de Gouvernements lors du Sommet de Vienne et qui sera complété par une campagne, ayant le même objectif, à réaliser surtout parmi les jeunes.

Le Conseil de l'Europe joue aussi un rôle important dans la protection du patrimoine culturel, matière de spéciale importance pour les minorités.

Cinquièmement, il convient de signaler que, grâce au Fonds de Développement Social, institution financière de soutien à des programmes sociaux et, tout d'abord, à l'installation des réfugiés, le Conseil de l'Europe peut donner une contribution importante à l'atténuation de ces problèmes, dont nous connaissons la gravité.

Sixièmement, il faut observer que le Conseil de l'Europe, bien qu'il ait assumé traditionnellement un "low profile", s'occupant surtout de matières dont le contenu politique est faible et au sujet desquelles un accord entre les Etats membres est plus facile, n'est pour autant moins important en tant que forum politique doté d'un Comité des Ministres, d'une Assemblée Parlementaire et d'un Congrès des Pouvoirs Locaux et Régionaux de l'Europe en voies de devenir organe statutaire. Son importance s'accroît avec l'élargissement du Conseil qui avec 32 membres est devenu actuellement presque paneuropéen. Le dialogue politique dans le Conseil aura désormais un intérêt accru.

Enfin, et pour conclure, permettez-moi une dernière remarque. Le Conseil de l'Europe est affecté par les conditions dans lesquelles il a été créé et a évolué, comme un organe consensuel, un club restreint et homogène de démocraties, le théâtre d'une coopération non spectaculaire, suivant l'expression de R. Dahrendorf. Cela se vérifie depuis les années 50, période durant laquelle, face à l'initiative mobilisatrice qui était la Communauté Européenne, les Etats ont donné une faible priorité à leur discrète, bien qu'importante, coopération dans le cadre du Conseil de l'Europe.

Aujourd'hui, la situation est différente. Les consensus,

autrefois faciles, deviennent plus difficiles et une certaine conflictualité peut même surgir alors qu'auparavant elle était renvoyée vers d'autres fora, comme l'ONU, la CSCE ou les blocs politico-militaires.

Au fait, le Conseil de l'Europe devra désormais s'engager plus à fond pour la consolidation de l'espace européen dans le système mondial, au niveau des valeurs et de la coopération, mais aussi au niveau politique. Il lui revient ainsi une double mission, celle d'amener l'Europe Centrale et Orientale vers la coopération européenne et de développer en même temps entre les 32 Etats membres une coopération progressive qui prépare l'activité plus active qu'ils auront à l'avenir dans le cadre de l'Union Européenne.

A cette fin, et je termine, la coopération avec l'Union Européenne est fondamentale et devra être développée dans le sens d'une complémentarité accrue. De même avec la CSCE dont le rôle politique et la fonction européenne ne peuvent être remplacés par le Conseil de l'Europe.

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7

XI International Lisbon Conference

THE REEMERGENCE OF AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM AND EUROPE

Cultural Center of Belém, Lisbon, 17th - 19th November 1993

The Future of European Security

by

Dr Willem van Eekelen

(Secretary-General, Western European Union)

At the time of the signing of the Brussels Treaty in 1948, the emerging Cold War focused attention on the security aspects of transatlantic relations and the common defence of Western Europe. It is interesting to remember that the US could only mount the Marshall Plan after countries of Western Europe had declared themselves willing to cooperate closely along the whole range of international relations. WEU went further than NATO in its Article V providing for automatic military assistance in case of aggression against one of its members, but in practice the emphasis shifted to NATO. As European integration progressed, we saw several attempts to extend it to defence and security. Joint effort provided the diplomatic and economic framework for the successful reconstruction of Europe and for a containment of the Soviet threat on the basis of collective security arrangements, the Brussels and Washington Treaties.

The failure of the Genscher-Colombo plan of November 1981 showed that some European Community member States were not prepared to contemplate cooperation in the field of defence. Because of its membership (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom), WEU was seen as the only forum where common progress could be achieved on security questions. The Euromissiles issue relaunched the debate on burden-sharing and the nature of a European pillar within the Alliance. In 1984 we had the first joint meeting of Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministers of WEU

countries in Rome. Ministers adopted the Rome Declaration, which is the basis of WEU reactivation. It spelled out a dual objective, namely to define a European security identity and progressively to harmonize member States' defence policies. Following a French initiative and using a report drafted by the Council's working groups, WEU Ministers adopted the Hague Platform on 27 October 1987. It represented a notable achievement in defining a European defence identity. At the same Ministerial meeting, it was decided to start negotiations with Spain and Portugal on their accession to the modified Brussels treaty. Both countries formally became full members on 27 March 1990. In the meantime, the threat to freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf had provided a first opportunity for operational coordination under the aegis of WEU, with the mine-sweeping operations in 1987 and 1988.

In its present format, WEU is organized around two components, one intergovernmental and the other parliamentary. The intergovernmental structure comprises all bodies dealing with the intergovernmental consultative process and operational coordination as well as the Institute for Security Studies. The WEU Parliamentary Assembly has 108 members. Its Secretariat is based in Paris where the Assembly holds twice-yearly ordinary sessions.

The intergovernmental structure is organized around the Permanent Council, supported by the Secretariat. It has been based in London since 1954,

but was transferred to Brussels last January. The WEU Council meets at two levels. The Permanent Council meets every week, for the day-to-day management of the Organization as a whole, and to monitor its Working Groups. The Council meets at Ministerial level at least twice a year. The Ministerial Council is jointly chaired by the Foreign and Defence Ministers of the country holding the twelve-month Presidency. The WEU Presidency is responsible for keeping European NATO informed. The Council's main working groups are the Special Working Group (SWG) dealing with the political aspects of security issues and the Defence Representatives Group (DRG). The outer groups deal, for instance, with space cooperation, arms control verification, the open skies initiative and security in the Mediterranean.

The WEU Institute for Security Studies started working in Paris on 1 July 1990. Its primary goal is to stimulate the debate on future European security structures in view of the new and potential risks arising from geopolitical developments in Europe. The Institute contributes to the development of a common language for a European strategic culture. Its two inter-related tasks are to conduct studies and independent research for the Governments of WEU member States and to stimulate a wider debate on European security issues, in particular through the development of a dialogue with institutes from countries of Central Europe. The Institute operates mainly through a combination of study

groups, seminars and conferences. It can appoint "associate fellows" on a short-term basis.

Apart from its plenary session, the WEU Parliamentary Assembly holds ad hoc sessions and symposia. Its committees deal inter alia with defence, political affairs, technology and aerospace, parliamentary and public relations. Its main steering bodies are the Presidential and Standing Committees. The 1984 Rome Declaration called for a greater role for the Assembly, particularly in helping to inform public opinion in member States of policy statements on European security by the Council, which "expresses the political will of the individual governments". WEU is currently the only European body with a Parliamentary Assembly mandated by treaty to discuss defence matters.

The dramatic political upheavals which we have witnessed in and around Europe since 1989 have led to a dynamic adaptation of existing European security structures to the new environment. Once ratified, the Treaty on European Union will significantly accelerate the process of European integration. Western European Unions's role and place in the emerging European security order has been given a new definition. WEU is developing its operational role and structures as the core of European security.

The two Declarations adopted by Western European Union member States in Maastricht define WEU's role as being the defence component of the future European Union and as the instrument for strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. They set the course for WEU's development by outlining a three-stage process. The first stage makes Western European Union "*an integral part of the development*" of the European Union and the link between the European security and defence identity and the Atlantic Alliance. A second stage will be "*the eventual framing*" of a common European defence policy, which might in a third stage "*lead to a common defence*". Implementation of the measures listed in the Declaration on the strengthening of WEU's operational role and on the shaping of its relations with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance started immediately after the Maastricht Summit.

In June 1992, at their Petersberg meeting near Bonn, the WEU Ministers decided to concentrate on three categories of missions:

- humanitarian and rescue;
- peacekeeping;
- the tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

Our new Planning Cell, which became operational in April 1993, will refine these missions and draw up force packages on the basis of "forces answerable to WEU", i.e. forces countries are prepared to make available to WEU. This applies to existing multinational forces (Eurocorps, multinational air mobile division in Central Europe, UK-Netherlands amphibious force) and national forces. Subsequently the Planning Cell will plan their transport, logistic support, communications and command arrangements. Here we do not want to duplicate what exists already and we intend to designate existing headquarters for the various scenarios our forces may have to deal with. The key word here is double hatting: giving several tasks to these headquarters, both for NATO and WEU missions.

Finally we hope to be able to give a new impetus to armament cooperation. WEU is taking over the functions of the independent European Programme Group and of the Eurogroup and we hope that our political-military framework will lead to better results than in the past. Personally, I believe that our multinational force packages could be an important stimulus in the direction of standardisation and inter-operability.

* * *

The simultaneous eclipse of communism and the Soviet Union brought about a fundamental change in East-West relations, but is also impacting on West-West relations. Analyzing the new situation, I should like to make the following points:

1. To the West collective defence no longer is the overriding priority of national and transatlantic policy. Today the emphasis is on the possible use of military capabilities outside our own territories, no longer to defend our own integrity and independence, but rather in support of wider political objectives. The decision to send forces to Kuwait or Bosnia has become very much a political decision, which may be viewed differently in the various capitals of Western Europe and North America.
2. Clearly the security of one country continues to impact on the security of the whole of Europe. Nevertheless, the notion that security is indivisible no longer is self evident, but will require hard work, politically and diplomatically, to retain the validity it had during the Cold War. Under threat of massive surprise attack it was evident that only a common and immediate response would be needed. Today such a common response will require much more

analysis, consultation and planning. Times have become much more complicated.

3. In these new circumstances multinational organisations exclusively devoted to defence lose much of their relevance. In the first place because economic and political issues take priority over military questions. Today's problems cannot be solved by military solutions. At best our military capabilities can be used to underpin political settlement, both in reaching them and subsequently in implementing them. That is why NATO today is emphasizing the consultation function and its new role of outreach to its former adversaries. That is, I believe, also one of the reasons why WEU is receiving so much attention, because together with the European Union we are able to provide more convergence than any other organisation, i.e. convergence between foreign, economic and security policies. In other words, although WEU has the characteristics of a military alliance with an automatic military assistance clause, its real significance lies in becoming the operational arm of the European Union (you notice me using the word "operational" rather than "defence arm", because we are moving beyond "defence" in its traditional context). At the same time we want to become the European pillar of NATO, in a transformed alliance with a new,

more balanced relationship between the European and the North American members.

4. After the collapse of communism and the disappearance of the Soviet Union, both CSCE and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council have included all its successor states. The rationale was that we should extend our code of conduct to all of them, extending rights and obligations to all of them, not wanting to exclude or isolate any of them. One of the questions the forthcoming NATO summit will have to discuss is whether intensification and differentiation is possible simultaneously and, if so, how this could be done. In WEU we have adopted a different approach from the beginning. We limit our "Forum of Consultation" to the Visegrad countries, Bulgaria, Romania and the Baltic countries, i.e. countries which are close to us geographically and are moving closer to the European Community. Most of them already have association agreements with the EC along the new "European" model. We are modest in calling them our "consultation partners", but already we are moving towards some very concrete forms of cooperation. The most striking example is the WEU embargo action against Serbia on the Danube, supporting the three countries involved in the operation: Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. At the same time we

are conscious of the fact that our Forum has to be supplemented by bilateral relations with countries which are not or not yet associated with the EC. This applies in particular to the Ukraine, but also to Russia.

5. At Maastricht the WEU countries agreed that all member countries of the EC would be eligible for membership of WEU as well, subject of course to negotiation on a treaty of accession. As a result, Greece will become a full member, Denmark and Ireland observers. I assume the same will apply to future members of the EC, first to Austria, Finland and Sweden, later to the other countries of Central Europe. So they could become full members or observers. Of course, we hope that ultimately all the members of the EC will also become full members of WEU, because otherwise the potential for convergence would not be exploited and ambiguities would arise between the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union and the operational activities of the WEU. Transitional arrangements are always possible, but we should aim at full synchronisation of membership.
6. What does this mean for NATO? Of course, it is for the Alliance to decide on its own enlargement. I can only point at some

implications if this question. The major one to me is whether it is conceivable for WEU to extend security guarantees which are not matched by NATO. I must admit that under today's circumstances I would find that very difficult. But nobody knows how our relationship with Eastern Europe will evolve, how NATO will be transformed, and to what extent we manage to build a collective security system covering the whole of Europe. In general terms, I would prefer the "Royal road" of first extending the EC, then WEU and finally consider membership of NATO.

Some advocate earlier enlargement of NATO and I presume that the NATO summit of January 1994 will discuss this question.

Personally, I have a feeling that it will be easier to extend the obligation to consult under art. 4 of the Washington treaty to the NACC partners than to extend the guarantees of art. 5. But, again, that is up to NATO.

On a strictly personal basis I should like to raise two points:

What kind of guarantees would really be helpful in enhancing the perception of security? To whom should they be given and where do we draw the line? Such guarantees cannot be directed against

Russia, because we no longer regard her as a threat in general terms, nor more specifically in strategic terms as she no longer borders on our Central European partners. The problem then boils down to the question to what extent security guarantees are relevant to our present major preoccupation with minority problems and regional instability.

The other point is even more conceptual. Guarantees only work if there is a sufficient degree of consensus and common approach to foreign policy. Otherwise there would be the risk of a country obtaining guarantees following an independent policy and exerting leverage on the countries issuing the guarantees. Only if there is sufficient maturity all around, a consultation machinery with reciprocal rights and obligations and the acceptance of policy restraints will it be possible to find agreement on security guarantees.

This leads me back to my earlier emphasis on the European Union in providing a convergent approach, drawing security policy into a wider framework of foreign and economic policies. It seems to me that the countries of Central Europe are best served by such a broad convergent pattern of relations and that we should

concentrate on filling in all its different aspects, rather than concentrating somewhat selectively on separate issues.

WEU's Forum of Consultation provides the opportunity for our partners to explain their security concerns and for the WEU members to take account of them in their policies. The system will be successful when our consultation partners see their concerns reflected in our policies. At the same time, we shall have to examine ways and means of doing things together. I already mentioned the Danube embargo operation as an example. Similarly, Poland and Czechoslovakia participated in the monitor missions of the EC in Yugoslavia. It may be possible to extend this cooperation in the future execution of WEU missions, which, as you may know, will concentrate on humanitarian missions, peacekeeping, and peacemaking. Participation of our consultation partners in these activities and their planning would draw them closer to our day-to-day reflections and activities and could be instrumental in building the community of interests which is the indispensable basis of future European integration.

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La Crise Structurale du Nationalisme Algérien

par

Lahouari Addi

(Professeur, Université d'Oran)

LA CRISE STRUCTURELLE DU NATIONALISME ALGERIEN

A lire la presse spécialisée qui traite du monde arabe, nous serions portés à croire que l'éruption du fondamentalisme islamique est un épiphénomène récent, en tout cas postérieur aux indépendances. Mais si nous jetons un coup d'oeil rétrospectif sur la genèse historique du nationalisme arabe, nous nous rendrons compte que le fondamentalisme islamique a joué un rôle important dans l'émergence du nationalisme arabe comme courant politique qui a encadré la société dans la lutte pour l'indépendance. Pour illustrer cette hypothèse, je m'appuierai essentiellement sur l'expérience historique algérienne.

A y regarder de près, la << Nahda >> au XIXe siècle en Egypte a été un mouvement politique, voire politico-religieux, et non un mouvement intellectuel de critique sociale ou de réforme religieuse. Elle a été une réaction nationaliste à l'échelle du monde musulman, face à la domination coloniale. Mobilisant l'Islam comme facteur identitaire pour s'opposer à la domination européenne, la << Nahda >> peut être considérée comme l'acte de naissance du nationalisme, dans sa version moderne, dans les pays musulmans. Pour l'anthropologue anglais Ernest Gellner, la << Nahda >> perçue comme une réforme religieuse, est inséparable de la naissance du nationalisme arabe : << L'une de ces nombreuses auto-réformes successives [de l'islam] coïncide pratiquement avec la naissance du nationalisme arabe moderne et il est très difficile de les séparer. Il semble que l'émergence de la nation et la victoire du mouvement de la réforme fassent partie d'un seul et même processus¹. >>

A partir de la << Nahda >>, le nationalisme dans les pays musulmans évoluera et se scindera en deux grandes tendances.

1. Ernest Gellner, *Nation et nationalisme*, Payot, Paris, 1989, p. 118.

La première posera l'islam comme moyen et comme fin, donnant naissance à l'islam politique tel qu'il s'est exprimé chez les <<frères musulmans>> en Egypte ou chez les ulémas en Algérie dans les années vingt et trente. Faute d'une meilleure expression, appelons cette tendance << nationalisme culturel >>. La seconde tendance empruntera ses formes et son discours à l'Occident, exprimant ainsi un nationalisme local, se donnant comme objectif de créer un Etat moderne, respecté sur le plan international. Appelons cette tendance << nationalisme politique >>. D'une manière générale - et c'est plus vrai pour l'Algérie - c'est cette tendance qui a été efficace dans le mouvement de libération nationale, même si l'autre tendance a joué un rôle non négligeable sur le plan idéologico-politique.

Le nationalisme, dans les pays musulmans, sera marqué par cette tension structurelle entre un pôle se focalisant sur l'authenticité (*asala*) et un pôle s'investissant dans la modernisation. Ces deux pôles ne constituent pas deux nationalismes distincts; ils appartiennent au même nationalisme dont ils sont les deux faces. Il est d'ailleurs utile de souligner que dans les pays où l'un est vigoureux et radical, l'autre l'est aussi. L'exemple de l'Egypte et de l'Algérie est assez significatif de ce point de vue. Cependant, depuis les années soixante - précisément depuis 1967 - le pôle religieux, ou plutôt culturel, semble revigoré par la défaite militaire face à Israël et par l'échec en matière économique. Captant le mécontentement social, il se pose désormais comme une alternative à son rival. Ce chapitre premier tentera d'expliquer l'évolution du nationalisme algérien à travers la tension structurelle qui lui est inhérente.

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NATIONALISME POLITIQUE VERSUS NATIONALISME CULTUREL

Les conflits violents qui secouent aujourd'hui l'Algérie peuvent trouver en grande partie leur explication dans le choc de deux nationalismes : celui du FLN et celui du FIS. Le nationalisme du FLN a été porté et exprimé d'abord par le FLN durant la guerre de libération, ensuite par l'armée et les différentes institutions

d'Etat après l'Indépendance. Dès 1962, le FLN cesse d'être un parti politique pour devenir un appareil administratif subordonné à l'Etat et gérant la « rente symbolique » servant de soutien à la légitimité historique. Cela pour dire que le nationalisme du FLN déborde largement l'appareil administratif auquel le parti s'est réduit. Le nationalisme du FIS est le nationalisme formulé à travers le discours religieux. Il n'est pas propre au FIS et a une histoire qui se confond avec le mouvement national dans son ensemble. Il est aujourd'hui représenté, jusqu'à la caricature, par le FIS. Pour comprendre la nature de ces deux nationalismes et leur opposition, il faudra recourir à l'histoire du mouvement national, seule susceptible d'éclairer les évolutions ultérieures.

Sous la domination coloniale, le nationalisme algérien était composé de plusieurs courants d'inégale importance en termes d'impact populaire et d'enracinement dans la société : les radicaux-activistes du PPA-MTLD qui ont créé le FLN en 1954²; les ulémas, regroupés dans l'association religieuse AUMA (Association des ulémas musulmans d'Algérie), animée par Abdelhamid BenBadis, mort en 1940; les modérés s'apparentant à l'UDMA (Union pour la défense du manifeste algérien) de Ferhat Abbas; enfin, les communistes, plus présents dans les organisations syndicales que dans le sous-prolétariat urbain et rural. Ce qui animait ces quatre courants, c'était un même objectif, celui de l'indépendance; mais compte tenu de leurs stratégies politiques respectives, ils divergeaient sur

2. Le Parti du peuple algérien (PPA) a été fondé à Alger en 1937 par des militants nationalistes dirigés par Messali Hadj. Dissous en 1939, il entre dans la clandestinité. En 1945, la direction crée le MTLD (Mouvement pour le triomphe des libertés démocratiques), qui participera à la vie politique légale et aux élections, tout en maintenant le PPA clandestin. Le PPA-MTLD est donc un mouvement dont une partie est clandestine et une autre légale. A ce sujet, cf. Mohammed Harbi, *Aux origines du FLN*, Christian Bourgois, Paris, 1973.

l'opportunité tantôt du moment où le mot d'ordre devait être mis en avant, tantôt sur celle des moyens pour le réaliser³.

Au-delà des alliances ou des oppositions conjoncturelles entre ces quatre organisations, l'une d'entre elles se différenciait fondamentalement des trois autres. En effet, l'AUMA se plaçait uniquement sur le terrain culturel et religieux⁴, appréciant les intérêts des Algériens principalement en ces termes, tandis que les autres développaient un discours politique axé sur le droit de l'Algérie à être un Etat souverain. Le nationalisme algérien peut donc être classé en deux tendances : le « nationalisme culturel » des uns par opposition au « nationalisme politique » des autres, à défaut d'autre appellation. Le « nationalisme politique » est le mieux représenté par les militants du PPA-MTLD qui se reconnaissaient, avant 1954, dans la figure charismatique de Messali Hadj. Lorsqu'ils créeront le FLN et déclencheront l'insurrection, les autres courants n'auront le choix que de rejoindre les maquis ou de disparaître.

Mais il faut relativiser l'opposition entre les deux nationalismes. L'AUMA se déclarait association religieuse apolitique, même si, malgré elle, elle était une organisation politique. Ce refus de se considérer comme organisation politique ne s'explique pas par des raisons tactiques; il renvoie plutôt à une conception religieuse du politique où celui-ci n'est pas autonome et n'est pas reconnu en tant que tel. L'un des objectifs de l'AUMA était d'obtenir les mêmes droits civiques pour les Algériens que les citoyens français, dans le respect toutefois de la religion musulmane, c'est-à-dire dans le respect du droit musulman en matière de statut personnel, que le code civil ignorait. La principale préoccupation de l'AUMA était de préserver le caractère musulman de l'Algérie, menacé par le processus de naturalisation contenu dans le projet Blum-

3. Sur cette période, cf. Mahfoud Kaddache, *Histoire du mouvement national*, 2 vol., SNED, Alger, 1980.

4. Ali Mérad *Le mouvement réformiste en Algérie de 1925 à 1940*, Mouton, La Haye-Paris, 1967.

Violette⁵, qui prévoyait d'accorder la citoyenneté française à vingt mille « indigènes ». C'est ce souci constant de l'islam et des fondements culturels, primant celui de l'indépendance dans l'immédiat, qui caractérise l'AUMA et qui permet de la distinguer des autres organisations nationalistes comme expression d'un nationalisme religieux, ou plutôt culturel.

Le mot d'ordre de l'indépendance n'a jamais été prioritaire chez les ulémas dans les années trente et quarante, mais cela ne signifie pas qu'ils étaient contre l'indépendance, comme les en accusent leurs adversaires. Abdelhamid BenBadis, prenant la mesure du rapport de forces entre la métropole et sa colonie, se soucie alors surtout de préserver le fondement arabo-musulman du peuple algérien sous la domination française. Il ne trouve pas, néanmoins, contradictoire de revendiquer pour les Algériens la nationalité française pour jouir des mêmes droits civiques que les citoyens français en métropole et en Algérie. A cet effet, il invente la subtile distinction entre nationalité ethnique (*janssiya qawwmiya*) et nationalité politique (*janssiya syassiya*), qui lui permet de revendiquer cette dernière sans porter atteinte à la religion musulmane et à la culture arabe. Définissant la nationalité ethnique comme l'ensemble des traits socioculturels (religion, langue, moeurs...) considérés comme inaliénables, les ulémas revendiquent avec bonne conscience la nationalité politique définie par eux comme l'ensemble des droits et devoirs civiques propres à une époque. La nationalité ethnique serait donc permanente et la nationalité politique conjoncturelle. Cette conception du caractère éphémère de la nationalité politique - donc de la colonisation - leur dicte leur attitude vis-à-vis du mot d'ordre de l'indépendance qu'ils ne revendiquent pas formellement comme le font les radicaux partisans de Messali Hadj.

5. A la faveur du Front populaire en 1936, le projet Blum-Violette, du nom de ses initiateurs, prévoyait d'accorder la citoyenneté française à des "indigènes dignes d'appartenir à la civilisation française en raison de leur statut social ou de services rendus à la France." L'intransigeance des colons a fait échouer le projet qui a été abandonné après la chute du Front populaire.

Leur position sur l'indépendance est néanmoins claire et sans ambiguïté comme l'atteste ce passage extrait de leur journal : <<L'indépendance est un droit naturel pour tous les peuples du monde. Bien des peuples sont devenus indépendants qui nous étaient inférieurs en force, en science, en vertus morales, et en civilisation. Nous ne sommes pas de ceux qui prétendent prédire l'avenir, et assurent que l'Algérie restera à jamais ce qu'elle est actuellement. De même que son état a changé au cours de l'histoire, il est vraisemblable qu'elle continuera d'évoluer. Il n'est pas inimaginable, il est parfaitement possible qu'un jour vienne où l'Algérie atteindra un haut degré de civilisation matérielle et morale et que la politique coloniale en général, et particulièrement celle de la France, puisse traiter l'Algérie comme l'Angleterre traite l'Australie, le Canada et l'Union sud africaine et que l'Algérie deviendra un pays jouissant d'une large indépendance. Alors la France pourra s'appuyer sur l'Algérie, comme peut s'appuyer un peuple libre sur un autre peuple libre. Voilà l'indépendance que nous nous représentons. Il ne s'agit point de l'indépendance rêvée par nos criminels adversaires - l'indépendance dans le feu et le sang⁶...>> Cette position exprimée en 1936, année du congrès musulman revendiquant l'application du projet Blum-Violette évoluera avec le temps. Il est évident qu'en 1954 les ulémas ne pouvaient pas soutenir la position des années trente. Du reste, en 1956, ils rejoindront le FLN-ALN dans lequel ils se dissoudront et à qui ils donneront de nombreux responsables.

Cependant, si le « nationalisme culturel » est à proprement parler religieux, le « nationalisme politique » n'est pas pour autant laïque et ne se revendique pas comme tel. Le PPA-MTLD n'instrumentalise pas la religion à des fins de mobilisation. Il n'est pas démagogique avec la religion. Il a lui-même une perception religieuse de la politique, inscrivant l'indépendance et le développement économique et social qui s'ensuivrait dans le cadre de la renaissance de l'islam en tant que civilisation ayant

6. Shihab, juin 1936.

eu sa grandeur passée. Messali Hadj était un homme politique moderne dans la mesure où il maîtrisait le discours politique moderne et ses notions constitutives, mais il était aussi imprégné de religiosité. Il était perçu par les masses, que faisait mouvoir le PPA-MTLD à l'occasion de meetings, comme un homme religieux dont on s'arrachait les objets personnels, conservés comme amulettes. Messali Hadj était investi d'une « baraka » qui le rendait invincible face à l'ordre colonial. Il n'est d'ailleurs pas inutile d'évoquer ce que fut la crise dite « berbériste » du mouvement nationaliste pour mieux comprendre la nature idéologique de son aile populaire.

En 1949, des militants de la Fédération de France (Paris, Lyon) du PPA-MTLD, tous originaires de Kabylie, ont interpellé la direction du parti, lui demandant de se prononcer sur la démocratie et sur la relation entre l'islam et la politique. Cette interpellation remettait, à l'évidence, en cause les fondements idéologiques du parti, la nature du charisme et la popularité de Messali Hadj, qui se situaient dans le prolongement d'une « culture politique » où la frontière entre le politique et le religieux était floue. Tourner le dos à cette culture politique, séculariser le discours du parti, demander à Messali Hadj de renoncer à la symbolique religieuse, c'était courir le risque de se couper des masses populaires dont le parti exprimait les aspirations. Du reste, ces militants dissidents, souhaitant des pratiques politiques modernes, n'ont pas été suivis en Algérie, y compris en Kabylie. Isolés du parti, ils ont été exclus sous l'accusation de « berbérisme ». Le militant du PPA-MTLD, qu'il soit originaire de la Kabylie ou d'une autre région d'Algérie, ne conçoit pas la religion séparée de la politique⁷.

7. Sur la crise dite "berbériste", cf. : M. Harbi "Nationalisme algérien et identité berbère" in *Peuples méditerranéens*, avril-juin 1980; M. Harbi *L'Algérie et son destin. Croyants ou citoyens*, Arcantère, Paris, 1992; Omar Carlier, "La production sociale de l'image de soi. Note sur la crise berbériste de 1949", *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord*, vol. XXII, IREMAM-CNRS, Aix-en-Provence, 1984.

La crise dite << berbériste >> a été en fait une profonde crise politique, renvoyant au fondement idéologico-culturel du mouvement national dans son ensemble. Au départ, il n'y avait pas une revendication culturelle spécifique à une région. Mohammed Harbi, fin analyste du mouvement national, attire l'attention sur le fait que cette crise a libéré une dynamique qui lui a été propre et qui a échappé à ses acteurs : << A l'instar de toutes les crises politiques, écrit-il, la crise de 1949 a acquis une logique propre qui l'a éloignée de ses causes premières. La mobilisation ethnique était un point d'arrivée et non un point de départ.>> Une vue superficielle pourrait, en effet, suggérer que la crise de 1949 s'expliquerait essentiellement par une revendication ethnique propre à une région. Mais à y regarder de plus près, la crise a été celle du nationalisme algérien qui reposait sur l'identification communautaire. Le nationalisme communautaire libère un sous-nationalisme à chaque niveau régional ou local de la communauté nationale. Tant que le nationalisme ne repose pas sur la citoyenneté véhiculée par l'individu, il demeurera soumis à l'irrégentisme régional ou tribal.

C'est ce qu'a vu M. Harbi quand il écrit : << Ce que révèle cette crise << berbériste >>, c'est la difficulté pour le nationalisme algérien d'articuler ensemble la notion de nation et celle de citoyenneté. Le fait même que la logique objective qui s'imposera aux militants de Kabylie sera celle de l'ethnicité et qu'à leur insu ils seront perçus comme régionalistes par leurs adversaires dans le MTLD, montre que l'esprit communautaire prédominait dans l'espace politique, que ce soit celui d'une communauté nationale conçue comme un tout sans division ou celui d'une communauté ethnique dans laquelle le particularisme se pensait, lui aussi, comme un tout⁸.>> Le régionalisme qui marque le système politique n'est donc pas un régionalisme << indépendantiste >>, c'est plutôt un régionalisme hégémonique, c'est-à-dire que chaque région, chaque tribu,

8. M. Harbi, *L'Algérie et son destin...*, op. cit., p.81.

chaque village se considère comme le plus apte à exprimer le nationalisme communautaire. Les Kabyles se disent plus nationalistes, de même que les Chaouis, les Oranais etc., et la surenchère se retrouve au niveau régional mettant en compétition des collectivités très réduites à l'intérieur de la Kabylie, des Aurès, de l'Oranie⁹...

La crise dite << berbériste >> montre finalement que, du point de vue idéologique, la différence entre le PPA-MTLTD et les ulémas n'est pas aussi grande qu'elle apparaît de prime abord. La conception du politique qui culminait dans l'idéologie de la communauté nationale reprise par le PPA-MTLTD n'était pas fondamentalement différente de celle des ulémas. Messali Hadj aimait à répéter « *Hob el watan min el iman* » (l'amour de la patrie a pour source la foi religieuse). Le PPA-MTLTD ne se concevait pas comme un parti laïque. En tant que parti véhiculant et exprimant l'idéologie de la communauté nationale, il devait inéluctablement privilégier le facteur identitaire religieux comme ressource de mobilisation.

Ces deux nationalismes ne sont donc pas fondamentalement contradictoires, et ils se sont heurtés dans le passé uniquement au sujet de l'attitude vis-à-vis du pouvoir colonial et des moyens à mettre en oeuvre pour le combattre. Ils étaient, en fait, beaucoup plus proches que ne le laissaient croire les relations entre leurs organisations respectives. Car le PPA-MTLTD, bien que se posant comme parti ayant un objectif politique et non religieux, se nourrissait de l'idéologie culturelle que diffusait l'AUMA. Les radicaux reprochaient aux ulémas de ne pas prendre en compte la dynamique politique que libéraient la propagation et l'enseignement de leur doctrine. Il y a eu alors

⁹ Le régionalisme a été utilisé par des chefs au niveau de stratégies individuelles d'occupation de postes dans le mouvement national ou dans l'appareil d'Etat indépendant, mais il n'a jamais été une idéologie mobilisatrice au niveau national. Deux faits historiques étayaient cette affirmation. Les soutiens les plus fidèles de Messali Hadj, originaire de Tlemcen, se situaient à l'est du pays, et notamment en Kabylie; et les soutiens les plus fidèles au colonel Boumédiène, originaire de Guelma, se situaient à l'ouest.

comme une division des tâches : aux ulémas la << production >> de l'idéologie nationale, aux autres la traduction des effets politiques de cette idéologie résumée dans le slogan « l'islam est ma religion, l'arabe est ma langue, l'Algérie est ma patrie ». Messali Hadj et Abdelhamid BenBadis n'étaient pas des figures concurrentes du nationalisme algérien, mais l'envers et le revers d'une même médaille. L'un pensait à restaurer l'Etat algérien dans sa souveraineté internationale, fût-ce par la violence; l'autre pensait préserver les fondements religieux du peuple algérien quelle que soit la durée de la domination de l'ordre colonial. L'Etat auquel aspirait l'un s'emboîtait culturellement et idéologiquement à la Nation à laquelle aspirait l'autre¹⁰.

Une lecture rapide et superficielle de l'histoire du mouvement national pourrait suggérer que les ulémas ont joué un rôle secondaire dans le processus qui a conduit à l'indépendance. En réalité, leur rôle a été primordial dans l'émergence d'une conscience nationale aussi bien dans l'Algérie urbaine que rurale. << Au XIXe siècle, écrit E. Gellner, la religion musulmane algérienne qui a vénéré les lignages sacrés, était, dans la pratique, coextensive aux lieux et au culte des saints à la campagne. Au XXe siècle, elle a rejeté tout cela et s'est identifiée à un scripturalisme réformiste, refusant la légitimité d'une médiation sainte entre hommes et Dieu. Les lieux saints avaient défini les tribus et leurs limites; le scripturalisme pouvait définir une nation et il le fit¹¹ >>. Mais il faudra, néanmoins, se garder de tomber dans la dichotomie simpliste selon laquelle les ulémas représentent l'islam urbain et leurs contradicteurs l'islam rural. Les ulémas ont véhiculé une réforme et un esprit de réforme qui a touché aussi bien les confréries que les zaouïates¹². De ce point

10. Cf. Lahouari Addi, *L'impasse du populisme*, ENAL, Alger, 1991, p. 50.

11. E. Gellner, *Nation et ...*, op. cit., p. 110.

12 La confrérie est une association dont les membres, se reconnaissant dans l'autorité d'un maître spirituel, pratiquent un rite commun. Ils se réunissent dans des zaouïates pour des prières, des récitation du Coran, des méditations ascétiques, etc. Les confréries ont souvent rempli un rôle missionnaire. Au Maghreb, elles organisaient les tribus dans la résistance contre les Portugais et les Espagnols aux XVe et XVIe siècles. Elles sont fortes dans les régions musulmanes où le pouvoir central est faible. Cf. à

de vue, l'opposition ulémas-zaouïates a été exagérée et ne correspond pas à la réalité.

DE LA LEGITIMATION RELIGIEUSE AU FONDAMENTALISME D'ETAT

Après l'indépendance, les « sensibilités » UDMA et PC se sont plus ou moins « dissoutes » dans le FLN, dont elles cherchaient à infléchir, dans un sens ou dans un autre, le programme politique¹³. Les ulémas, quant à eux, en position de faiblesse en 1962, se sont tenus en marge, ne se reconnaissant pas dans le discours du FLN, jugé trop matérialiste, voire trop marxiste, et par conséquent, insuffisamment ouvert sur les problèmes culturels : langue, religion... Telle a été leur position jusqu'au coup d'Etat de 1965 du colonel Houari Boumédiène qui, recherchant des appuis, leur proposa des postes ministériels dans son gouvernement. Abandonnant alors l'espoir de diriger le FLN laissé aux « marxisants », les ulémas se sont contentés des ministères de l'Education nationale, de la Justice et enfin des Affaires religieuses qui leur revenait de droit, y compris dans le précédent gouvernement. Mais ce retour en force des ulémas ne relevait pas d'une tactique conjoncturelle de la part du colonel Houari Boumédiène; il procédait, en fait, du souci de légitimation religieuse et de la mise en place de la cohérence idéologique du régime dans son ensemble, une fois passées les premières années de l'indépendance.

Dans l'exercice du pouvoir, l'idéologie politique du FLN rejoignait de plus en plus celle des ulémas : le FLN faisait sienne l'interprétation mythique de l'histoire de l'Algérie lue par les ulémas, concevait l'arabisation comme une opération technique

sujet Louis Massignon "Tarika", *Encyclopédie de l'islam*, Leyde-Paris, 1929. et Robert Letourneau "Darkawa", *ibidem*, 1961.

¹³ Sur l'importance des différentes tendances du mouvement national dans le FLN, cf. W. B. Quandt *Revolution and Political Leadership. Algeria 1954-1968*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massasuchetts, 1969.

ignorant la promotion des parlers populaires et la modernisation de la langue arabe, refusait de séculariser la religion et de définir ses rapports avec l'Etat dans une perspective moderniste, etc. Comme celle des ulémas, l'idéologie du FLN était en rupture avec la modernité politique, dont les deux principes constitutifs sont l'autonomie de l'individu sujet de droit et la conscience critique vis-à-vis des pratiques sociales. Au regard des premiers textes idéologiques, notamment le *Programme de Tripoli* (adopté en juin 1962 par le CNRA, instance suprême du FLN à l'époque) et la *Charte d'Alger* (adopté par le Congrès du parti en avril 1964), il peut sembler qu'il y a eu ensuite une << dérive islamiste >> du FLN qui s'expliquerait uniquement par la nécessité conjoncturelle des alliances.

En fait, les présupposés idéologiques du discours du FLN sur la Nation, sur l'Etat, sur la société, sur l'Islam, sur la démocratie, sur le marché, etc., ont libéré, dans la pratique et à travers la durée, une dynamique islamiste inéluctable. Ces présupposés se retrouvaient y compris dans le *Programme de Tripoli* et dans la *Charte d'Alger*, considérés pourtant comme des textes de facture marxisante. Ils ont été, cependant, appréciés comme tels en raison de leur économisme. Ces textes sont construits implicitement sur le paradigme du marxisme vulgaire selon lequel il suffirait de transformer l'*infrastructure* pour changer dans le sens souhaité la *superstructure*. Il y aurait toute une analyse du discours et une étude sémiotique à entreprendre sur les textes du FLN¹⁴, sur leur capacité à synthétiser les différents courants idéologiques pour se faire accepter par tous¹⁵. Lorsqu'une crise éclate, les différentes tendances se disent prêtes à rompre les unes avec les autres à la veille d'assises

¹⁴ La seule analyse de discours politique en Algérie a été tentée par Hocine Benkheira, *Discours, pouvoir et syndicat. A propos du discours des 4e et 5e Congrès de l'UGTA (1973-1978)*, Thèse de Magister, Université d'Oran, 1981.

¹⁵ Voir Jean Leca, Jean-Claude Vatin, *L'Algérie politique. Institutions et régime*, Paris, Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, Paris, 1975.

nationales censées résoudre la crise. Un texte politico-idéologique est alors adopté et chaque tendance croit l'avoir emporté sur les autres, jusqu'à la prochaine crise, et ainsi de suite.

Néanmoins, de texte en texte, le discours dit progressiste perdait du terrain au profit du discours « culturaliste ». En fait, le FLN ne pouvait pas contenir cette dérive sans se déjuger, sans remettre en cause sa propre culture politique. C'était ainsi parce que le FLN s'était enfermé dans une perspective apologétique du passé qui tendait à idéaliser celui-ci. Les islamistes l'idéaliseront encore plus, et c'est pourquoi ils supplanteront plus tard le FLN dans la conscience des masses populaires. Le FLN et le FIS ne sont pas des mouvements qui recrutent dans des couches sociales différentes. Les mêmes couches sociales populaires qui ont fait hier la force du FLN dans le combat anticolonial font aujourd'hui la force des islamistes.

Mais le « nationalisme culturel » lui aussi évolua dans le temps. Entre 1962 et 1965, il était quasiment absent au niveau du gouvernement; après 1965, il a été récupéré par Houari Boumediène à des fins de « légitimation sacralisant une politique économique et sociale décidée et mise en oeuvre en dehors de son influence directe¹⁶ ». Mais au fur et à mesure que déclinait l'efficacité de la légitimité historique, et donc que s'accroissait le déficit de légitimité du régime à la fin des années soixante dix, ce « nationalisme culturel » se transforma en « fondamentalisme opérant non pas contre l'Etat mais dans l'Etat¹⁷ ». Ce fondamentalisme d'Etat s'était fixé comme objectif de « réislamiser » la société à partir de l'Etat. Par réislamisation de la société, il faut entendre la moralisation de l'espace social selon l'éthique islamique et l'application de la Shari'a. La crise économique et sociale est interprétée d'abord comme une crise morale, d'où la nécessité de moraliser la société. Au fur et à

¹⁶ L.W. Deheuvels, *Islam et pensée contemporaine en Algérie*, CNRS, Paris, 1991, p. 273.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 246.

mesure que le mécontentement populaire s'accroissait en raison des difficultés de plus en plus grandes de la vie quotidienne (logement, transport, chômage des jeunes, pénurie de produits divers, coupures fréquentes d'eau, etc.), un fondamentalisme de contestation apparut dans les mosquées où les prêches violents contre le pouvoir attirèrent des foules de plus en plus nombreuses. Le fondamentalisme de contestation s'était donné pour objectif d'abord d'« islamiser » l'Etat¹⁸, pour ensuite « islamiser » la société. A cette fin, il se lança directement à la conquête du pouvoir, soit en organisant des marches impressionnantes, soit en participant aux élections désormais libres depuis la réforme de la Constitution à la suite des émeutes d'octobre 1988.

Le fondamentalisme de contestation a supplanté le fondamentalisme d'Etat parce que l'échec du développement économique et social avait donné naissance à un grand mécontentement populaire. Tandis que les << industrialistes >> du FLN pensaient instrumentaliser les ulémas à des fins de légitimité, en attendant que le développement économique programmé rende, à terme, leur sensibilité totalement anachronique, ces derniers étaient en train de regagner, à partir principalement des ministères de l'Education nationale et des Affaires religieuses et de la Justice, l'hégémonie politique que la guerre d'indépendance leur avait enlevée. Lorsque le développement économique et social se révèlera un échec, lorsque s'effondrera le socialisme d'Etat, le « nationalisme culturel » se présentera comme l'alternative la plus populaire et la plus enracinée dans la société. S'il y a une continuité génétique entre les Ulémas d'hier et les islamistes d'aujourd'hui, il faudra alors convenir que le vieil antagonisme, que l'on croyait dépassé, entre Messali Hadj et Abdelhamid BenBadis, n'avait finalement jamais cessé, et trente années après l'indépendance, les disciples

¹⁸ Le fondamentalisme de contestation a existé dès les années 1960, mais il n'a jamais attiré les foules. Les quelques "imams dissidents" étaient l'objet de poursuites et tracasseries policières, ce qui était à l'époque dissuasif. Cf. à ce sujet Aissa Khelladi, *Les islamistes algériens face au Pouvoir*, ed. Alfa, Alger, 1992.

du second semblent près de prendre leur revanche sur les disciples du premier. Sauf que les islamistes d'aujourd'hui peuvent se réclamer à la fois de Abdelhamid BenBadis de qui ils héritent le projet politique religieux, et de Messali Hadj de qui ils héritent l'activisme à travers lequel ils pensent accéder au pouvoir.

Usé par plus de trente années de pouvoir, délégitimé par l'échec économique et social de l'Algérie, le « nationalisme politique » du début des années quatre-vingt-dix demeure porté par l'armée qui s'oppose aux islamistes pour au moins trois raisons. La première est que la hiérarchie militaire - dont les membres ont entre 50 et 65 ans - est originaire plus ou moins directement de l'ALN, créée par les anciens militants PPA-MTLD. La deuxième raison est que l'Armée ne veut pas d'une situation où le nouveau régime suscite des règlements de compte à grande échelle à l'encontre des responsables de l'Etat-FLN. Enfin, troisième raison, elle craint l'instabilité qui s'installerait au cas où les islamistes au pouvoir viendraient à traduire dans les actes leurs discours enflammés contre les femmes qui travaillent et contre ceux qu'ils considèrent comme les « ennemis de l'islam ». En effet, sous cette étiquette, n'importe quel individu est susceptible d'être jeté en prison. L'armée craint cette situation non pas parce qu'elle aurait subitement découvert les vertus des droits de l'homme, mais elle pressent qu'une telle répression pourrait raviver les solidarités lignagères et claniques, ce qui mettrait en danger la paix civile et l'unité nationale.

La nomination, en juillet 1992, à la tête du gouvernement de M. Bélaïd Abdessalam, opposant irréductible à Chadli Bendjedid, signifie que l'armée voulait marquer une rupture avec l'ex-président, soupçonné d'avoir voulu pactiser avec les islamistes au lendemain de leur victoire électorale. Cette nomination exprimait aussi la volonté de reproduire la période des années soixante et soixante dix, marquée par la figure charismatique de Houari Boumédiène, dont Bélaïd Abdessalam avait été un proche collaborateur. Le prestige du président défunt, considéré comme un farouche patriote, un musulman sincère et un progressiste

convaincu, est ainsi rappelé pour détacher du FIS une partie de son électorat. Le choix de Ali Kafi à la tête du HCE¹⁹, ancien officier supérieur des maquis, connu pour son « nationalisme arabe », s'inscrit dans cette même stratégie de contrer l'influence du FIS en puisant dans les ressources ultimes du « nationalisme politique ».

La rapidité avec laquelle le gouvernement de Bélaïd Abdessalam a perdu la confiance des technocrates et de l'élite sociale qu'il a accusée de "laïco-assimilationniste" pour l'avoir gêné dans sa tentative de se rapprocher des islamistes, montre que le populisme bureaucratique des années soixante et soixante dix est totalement anachronique dans l'Algérie des années quatre vingt dix. La société est aujourd'hui trop divisée sur le plan idéologico-politique pour que puisse exister une doctrine politique dans laquelle se reconnaîtraient à la fois l'ingénieur et le paysan, l'entrepreneur privé et l'ouvrier, le haut fonctionnaire et le chômeur. Le populisme bureaucratique est resté le même, mais l'Algérie a changé au cours des trois décennies d'indépendance. Précisément, le populisme bureaucratique - qui a été porté par le nationalisme arabe radical - a échoué parce qu'il est en rupture avec la modernité politique.

Le nationalisme arabe radical, tel qu'il a été représenté par les courants nassériste, baâthiste ou boumédiéniste, a rencontré des limites dans le processus de modernisation pour deux raisons : d'une part, il n'a pas trouvé dans la société les moyens idéologiques pour transformer les fondements culturels de celle-ci, comme le proclamait son discours; et, d'autre part, il a buté sur la question du pouvoir, qu'il a considéré comme une fin et non un moyen. Il a posé comme objectif final l'accession et le maintien au pouvoir, comme si le maintien au pouvoir d'une idéologie politique qui se proclame révolutionnaire était en soi

¹⁹Le Haut Comité d'Etat, organe collégial, a été créé en janvier 1992, à la suite de la démission du président Chadli Bendjedid après l'annulation des élections remportées par le FIS. Il a pour mission de remplir les tâches du président de la République, dans l'attente des élections présidentielles.

suffisant pour la modernisation de la société. A cet égard, l'expérience historique du FLN est très suggestive, en ce qu'elle montre les limites historiques de l'idéologie nationaliste arabe radicale, dont le FLN a été la variante au Maghreb.

LE POPULISME COMME MYSTIFICATION

L'idéologie de la tendance radicale se lit non pas à travers ses propres textes idéologiques - car ces textes disent ce qu'elle croit être, ou ce qu'elle voudrait être, ou encore ce qu'elle voudrait que les autres croient qu'elle est -, mais à travers ses pratiques politiques. L'histoire politique de l'Algérie, dont elle est l'acteur principal depuis les années cinquante, indique quelques-uns de ses traits qui nous permettront de mieux la connaître. La tendance radicale n'a pas de projet politique, ni de vision idéologique; elle a, cependant, un objectif pratique, concret : l'indépendance du pays. Une fois celle-ci acquise, l'objectif se déplace pour devenir le pouvoir. La tendance radicale pose le pouvoir comme finalité, car elle le considère comme la manifestation formelle de l'indépendance. Se posant comme les seuls capables de sauvegarder l'indépendance chèrement acquise, les dirigeants radicaux se considèrent comme les seuls légitimes à exercer le pouvoir. L'unicité du parti dans le système politique algérien et le *néo-patrimonialisme* dans lequel il s'exprime, ont pour explication cette prémisse²⁰.

20. Le néo-patrimonialisme est défini comme l'appropriation du centre politique par un groupe de manière autoritaire dans un contexte de modernisation. Bertrand Badie estime que le néo-patrimonialisme cache deux traits spécifiques des systèmes politiques du Tiers-Monde : "la forte accumulation de capital du pouvoir politique contrastant avec la faiblesse du pouvoir économique endogène; la manipulation de ce pouvoir par les élites qui en sont détentrices." B. Badie "Formes et transformations des communautés politiques" in M. Grawitz, J. Leca, *Traité de science politique*, Paris, PUF, 1985, p. 651. Cf. aussi S.M. Eisenstadt *Traditional Patrimonialism and Modern Neopatrimonialism*, Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1973. Pour une lecture du système politique algérien à travers cette notion, cf. Lahouari Addi "Forme néo-patrimoniale de l'Etat et secteur public en Algérie", *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord*, IREMAM-CNRS, Aix-en-Provence, 1988, et "Economie et néo-patrimonialisme en

Une fois l'indépendance acquise, la tendance radicale a cherché à retrouver un second souffle dans la promesse du développement économique et social, promesse contenue dans ses textes de référence que sont Le Programme de Tripoli (1962), La Charte d'Alger (1964) et La Charte nationale (1976). Ces textes, dans lesquels la tendance radicale croit avoir fixé son idéologie pour l'éternité, sont le type même du discours formellement révolutionnaire, mais sans aucune prise sur la réalité. Naïf, emphatique et lyrique par moment, constitué de slogans célébrant le moralisme et la bonté du peuple, ce discours proclame son intention de construire la Cité idéale expurgée de conflits politiques. Mais le point aveugle de ce discours, qui lui a été par la suite fatal, est la contradiction gouvernants-gouvernés, niée, refoulée. En niant le politique, en voulant à tout prix mettre tout le peuple au pouvoir - c'est-à-dire en cultivant et en se forgeant une image irréaliste du peuple -, les dirigeants ont fini par s'identifier au peuple. Dès lors, les citoyens devaient être privés de parole pour permettre au peuple d'exercer démocratiquement le pouvoir. Cette mystification, cependant, n'a été d'aucune utilité contre la corruption et, évidemment, n'a pas pu empêcher l'accumulation des fortunes privées à l'ombre des allégeances clientélistes²¹.

L'obsession pour le pouvoir et la conception étroite de la notion d'indépendance ont empêché l'Algérie d'imaginer un pouvoir économique recevant ses impulsions des lois de l'échange et du marché international. Cherchant à l'origine à industrialiser le pays, le régime a mis en place une économie administrée totalement déconnectée de la rationalité économique de

Algérie". *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord*, IREMAM-CNRS, Aix-en-Provence, 1989.

²¹ Le clientélisme politique se définit comme une relation mettant en rapport un patron fournissant des faveurs et un client apportant des soutiens. Dans les systèmes lignagers, le clientélisme ne repose pas sur une relation personnelle mais sur un clientélisme de groupe. A ce sujet, cf : J. Bill, C. Leiden, *Politics in the Middle East*, Boston, Little Brown, 1979; J. Waterbury, E. Gellner, *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*, London, Duckworth, 1977; J. Leca, Y. Schemel, "Clientélisme et néopatrimonialisme dans le monde arabe", *International Political Science Review*, décembre 1983.

l'accumulation. Grâce aux ressources fournies par l'exportation des hydrocarbures, des usines clés-en-main et produit-en-main ont été importées pour constituer la base industrielle de l'économie. Cependant, cette industrialisation, dont la motivation profonde était politique et non économique - dans le sens où elle recherchait surtout le gain politique immédiat -, a échoué parce qu'elle a été menée dans un esprit bureaucratique qui empêchait les unités industrielles d'être rentables. Le projet d'industrialisation devait réaliser le moyen économique par lequel le pouvoir central devait contrôler la société.

L'échec économique s'explique fondamentalement par la nature politique du projet de développement. Ladite planification tournait le dos aux prémisses de l'économie politique, dans la mesure où la production industrielle - comme toute autre production du reste - est sociale et implique l'autonomie du pouvoir économique, l'existence de syndicats revendicatifs, la négociation, le respect de l'autre en tant qu'individu sujet de droit, etc. Or toute cette architecture de l'économie politique est en contradiction avec le populisme de la tendance radicale²². Le résultat est que l'Algérie a stérilisé sa rente énergétique, d'une part, dans l'importation de produits alimentaires pour donner quelque réalité économique à la monnaie nationale, et d'autre part, dans le remboursement d'une dette extérieure qui a financé en partie la mise en place d'industries peu performantes.

L'ABSENCE DE DEBATS IDEOLOGIQUES

22. Tourner le dos aux équilibres macro-économiques, ignorer le mécanisme de la rente par opposition à celui du salaire du travail productif, maintenir en fonction des entreprises déficitaires, etc. ne constitue nullement une économie opposée à l'économie politique classique. La rationalité économique, celle sur laquelle se basent les mécanismes de l'accumulation, est incontournable dans les conditions historiques présentes. Une chose est de créer les conditions pour la dépasser; autre de chose est de la nier. Sur l'existence d'une économie politique parallèle, cf. Lahouari Addi "Rareté, rente et plus-value", Les Temps modernes, mars 1983.

Incapable de tenir ses promesses de donner naissance au progrès social, et surtout incapable d'enrayer le processus de dégradation des conditions de vie de la majorité de la population, le régime a secrété une opposition qui lui emprunte son radicalisme verbal puisé cette fois dans la religion. Il ne pouvait pas en être autrement, car au cours des trois décennies d'indépendance, les dirigeants n'ont pas tenté d'impulser une culture démocratique et de construire une << citoyenneté politique >> puisant ses déterminations et sa justification dans les droits de l'individu. Il est vrai que la citoyenneté politique - qui permet à l'individu-citoyen d'interpeller le pouvoir et de choisir ses représentants - est en relation avec les conditions historiques (culture, économie...) qui permettent - ou ne permettent pas - l'émergence d'une *société civile* indépendante du pouvoir quant à la production de ses moyens d'existence. Mais la vraie radicalité consiste à faire accoucher l'histoire même quand celle-ci est peu féconde, c'est-à-dire à préparer les conditions de constitution d'une société civile.

La tendance radicale n'a été révolutionnaire que dans la situation coloniale. Sitôt celle-ci dépassée, de son caractère révolutionnaire, il n'est resté que le discours. La gestion de l'Etat tendait à empêcher la constitution d'une société civile, principalement à travers l'étatisation de l'économie et de tous les espaces sociaux. Le projet était de faire dépendre chaque individu du pouvoir central du point de vue de ses revenus, de manière à le dissuader de toute velléité de rébellion ou d'opposition. Que ce soit intentionnellement ou non, l'individu s'est trouvé inséré dans un univers politique où il ne peut choisir en dehors de l'allégeance aux réseaux clientélistes et à l'obéissance au leader.

Mais comment un pays qui avait la prétention de construire le socialisme, et donc d'enjamber le développement capitaliste, peut-il aujourd'hui se retrouver avec une opposition populaire puisant son idéologie et ses principes dans la religion? Au delà des explications conjoncturelles et des erreurs de calcul politique des uns et des autres, l'émergence d'un courant religieux

populaire en Algérie se situe, come on l'a vu, dans le prolongement du nationalisme du FLN qui est lui-même d'essence religieuse. Facteur d'identité face à la colonisation occidentale, l'islam a été l'épine dorsale du mouvement national et ce, pour des raisons sociales, culturelles et idéologiques propres à la société arabo-islamique. C'est la gauche occidentale - et ultérieurement l'appui de Moscou - qui dans sa lutte contre le système capitaliste mondial, a prêté à celui-là des vertus révolutionnaires post-capitalistes. Percevant l'avantage qu'ils pouvaient tirer de cette alliance stratégique, les dirigeants nationalistes ont laissé subsister l'ambiguïté idéologique pour ratisser large dans la société, et attirer à eux les catégories sociales attachées à la modernité.

L'idéologie politique du FLN n'a pas été portée par un mouvement d'idées qui aurait repensé la modernité selon les critères de la culture islamique. Plus grave encore, après l'indépendance, le nouveau pouvoir n'a pas suscité un tel mouvement: il n'y a jamais eu, en effet, de grands journaux, ni de revues théoriques dans lesquels auraient été débattus les problèmes fondamentaux des sociétés arabo-islamiques. Par problèmes fondamentaux, il faut entendre la diglossie qui caractérise tous les pays arabes (c'est-à-dire la profonde différence qui existe entre la langue parlée et la langue écrite²³), la citoyenneté politique, l'égalité juridique entre l'homme et la femme, l'émergence d'une conscience critique, la place du sacré dans l'espace social, la dépolitisation de l'économie, la formation d'un système économique national compétitif ouvert à la concurrence internationale, etc.

Au-delà des apparences, le nationalisme radical du FLN - qui est une variante maghrébine du nationalisme arabe - n'a emprunté à la modernité que les formes extérieures, tout en reproduisant les catégories prémodernes du politique de la société traditionnelle. Le *néo-patrimonialisme* est une forme de substitution de la chefferie traditionnelle, et la rhétorique

socialiste un subterfuge pour contrôler la société. Le nationalisme arabe radical a toujours refusé le débat idéologique sur les questions essentielles au devenir de la société. Il a substitué à ces débats des slogans creux dont la généralité ne gênait personne. Mis au service de régime néo-patrimoniaux brutaux qui ne tenaient que grâce aux polices politiques, le nationalisme arabe ne pouvait qu'évoluer vers un nationalisme religieux, en réaction contre la dégradation des conditions de vie des populations et de la corruption de l'administration. Les régimes arabes de type nassérien ont pour successeurs naturels des régimes religieux parce que, exprimant une conception du politique qui sied à la légitimité religieuse, ils se ferment à toute perspective de dépassement évolutif. En interdisant la contestation, celle-ci se loge dans l'espace religieux où il est difficile de la réprimer. Dès lors, l'opposition, ne devant rien à la liberté politique, se donne comme objectif de renverser le régime pour instaurer le même ordre politique où le multipartisme et la liberté d'expression seront interdits.

UN AUTORITARISME STERILE

Dans une pertinente analyse du nationalisme arabe à travers le nassérisme, Charles Rizk, auteur libanais, distingue deux caractères constitutifs du régime de Nasser : << Le premier est le caractère policier. Il est la conséquence directe du vide idéologique auquel le régime se condamne lui-même après la suppression des partis et notamment le Baas, auquel ne se substitue aucune idéologie digne de ce nom... D'où le deuxième trait caractéristique du nassérisme, corrolaire de son caractère policier : le conservatisme islamisant. Parce qu'il n'est porteur d'aucune idéologie originale, le régime de la bourgeoisie d'Etat, pour légitimer son pouvoir, ne peut recourir qu'aux valeurs morales et sociales traditionnelles. Avec un mimétisme à la fois ridicule et poignant, la bourgeoisie nouvelle singe la bourgeoisie

ancienne dont elle copie les moeurs et les rites, n'ayant aucun modèle à leur opposer²⁴>>

Le nivellement par le bas qu'opèrent les régimes arabes de type nasserien, l'égalitarisme qu'ils promettent, les aspirations et libertés individuelles qu'ils refoulent, le sens critique qu'ils combattent, le culte du leader désigné à vie, la confiscation de l'espace public, l'économie redistributive qu'ils mettent en place, etc., sont autant d'éléments qui perpétuent le modèle social d'avant la colonisation et qui réactivent les structures sociales traditionnelles. La contestation islamique ne remet pas, du reste, en cause ce modèle; elle accuse plutôt les dirigeants d'être incapables de le réaliser. C'est pourquoi il serait à peine exagéré de dire que l'islam politique est le stade suprême du nationalisme arabe radical.

Il en a été ainsi parce que le nationalisme arabe radical n'a pas eu de projet pour la société postcoloniale, si ce n'est le maintien d'un cadre national formel et le renforcement administratif du pouvoir central. Evidemment, les régimes radicaux ne sont pas les seuls à être menacés par l'islam politique. Des pays comme le Maroc ou l'Arabie saoudite sont aussi concernés, mais là, les

²⁴ Le texte de C. Rizk continue ainsi : "Malgré le modernisme apparent de Nasser sur le plan personnel, l'inspiration islamique de sa version du nationalisme arabe est constante. Elle éclate en particulier dans ses diatribes contre le Baas : le 23 juillet 1963, dans un discours prononcé pour l'anniversaire de la révolution, Nasser lance contre le Baas des accusations ignominieuses où les allusions confessionnelles sont évidentes et où Aflaq est raillé pour son prénom chrétien, Michel.

Parce qu'elle condamne le nassérisme au conformisme intellectuel et donc à l'attachement aux valeurs islamiques traditionnelles, cette indigence idéologique rend compte de sa lutte farouche contre les Frères Musulmans, lutte sans merci entre deux parties se disputant la même base populaire, la même clientèle politique. Malgré leurs différences, Nasser et les Frères Musulmans partagent le même souci de représenter l'authenticité égyptienne et arabe en rébellion contre l'agression politique et culturelle occidentale. Or, cette authenticité s'exprime essentiellement dans l'appel aux valeurs islamiques qui, en l'absence d'une idéologie nouvelle de remplacement, restent dans l'Egypte et le monde arabe de cette époque les seuls fondements de l'identité. Expert s'il en est de la sensibilité populaire égyptienne, Nasser perçoit le danger représenté, pour son mouvement, par ses concurrents Frères Musulmans. Aussi se montre-t-il implacable à leur égard". (Charles Rizk, *Les Arabes ou l'histoire à contre-sens*, Albin Michel, 1992, pp. 134-35).

chances pour le mouvement islamiste sont moindres car la symbolique religieuse y est déjà fortement présente au niveau de l'Etat, et il n'y a donc pas de vide à occuper du point de vue de la légitimité religieuse.

De nombreux sociologues et politologues ont longtemps pensé que l'autoritarisme du nationalisme arabe radical correspondait à une volonté de changement de sociétés traditionnelles au départ opposées au changement. Cet autoritarisme aurait été l'expression d'une volonté politique de promouvoir par la force une société civile ouverte au progrès et dépassant le cadre l'autosubsistance. Les bilans montrent qu'il en a rien été. Cet autoritarisme, puisant sa justification uniquement dans le maintien narcissique d'un pouvoir qui se posait comme une fin en soi, n'a réglé aucun des problèmes fondamentaux de la société arabo-islamique. Cet autoritarisme, fonctionnant dans le vide, n'a opéré aucune rupture. Comme s'il n'avait pas prise sur le corps social, comme s'il avait conclu un contrat tacite avec la société²⁵: qu'elle ne le conteste pas et, qu'en échange, il ne la transforme pas, qu'il ne s'immisce pas dans les problèmes culturels et idéologiques essentiels, bref qu'il ne lui impose pas la modernité.

Or celle-ci n'est ni un don du ciel, ni un accident géologique comme le pétrole. Elle est une construction historique, une construction humaine, c'est-à-dire une construction artificielle qui brise les imaginaires sociaux communautaires²⁶, qui libère

²⁵ Par société, il faut entendre le groupe national défini par les frontières héritées de la colonisation et non pas le concept sociologique. Dans ce texte, j'entends par société l'idéologie communautaire qui maintient les groupes sociaux dans un cadre national à travers la solidarité mécanique. La société dans les pays arabes, c'est plus les représentations collectives, l'imaginaire communautaire que la collection d'individus concrets reliés par un type de relations sociales à un niveau macro ou micro-sociétal. Dans les pays arabes, la société est une idée culturelle et non une réalité sociologique qui a pris conscience de sa matérialité et de son autonomie vis-à-vis de l'ordre naturel et divin.

²⁶ J'emprunte la définition d'imaginaire social à Pierre Ansart qui écrit : "Aussi bien, toute société crée un ensemble coordonné de représentations, un imaginaire à travers lequel elle se reproduit et qui, en particulier, désigne le groupe à lui-même, distribue les identités et les rôles, exprime les besoins collectifs et les fins à réaliser. Les sociétés modernes, comme les sociétés sans écriture, produisent ces imaginaires sociaux, ces

l'individu de la mythologie des ancêtres, qui trace une frontière visible entre le sacré et le profane, qui libère la dynamique productive étouffée par les rentes de toutes sortes. La modernité est ce mouvement profond de destruction sociale débouchant sur la constitution d'une société créatrice de ses propres règles juridiques et consciente de son autonomie vis-à-vis de la nature et du sacré, quant à la production de ses moyens d'existence. Il faut convenir que ces transformations radicales s'opèrent rarement dans un régime politique démocratique. En Occident, ces transformations ont été menées par les régimes politiques de Napoléon, Bismarck, Franco... pour les plus connus - et précédées, auparavant par ce qu'on a appelé les << despotes éclairés >>. A la différence de l'expérience occidentale, le nationalisme arabe radical n'a pas produit de << despotes éclairés >>; il a produit des dictateurs dont l'autoritarisme n'a été qu'un coup d'épée dans l'eau.

systèmes de représentations à travers lesquels elles s'auto-désignent, fixent symboliquement leurs normes et leurs valeurs". Pierre Ansart, *Idéologies, conflits et pouvoir*, Paris, PUF, 1977, p. 21.

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Nationalism in the Arab World Today

by

Roberto Aliboni

(Director of Studies, Istituto Affari Internazionali)

NATIONALISM IN THE ARAB WORLD TODAY

paper presented by **Roberto Aliboni**
Director of Studies, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
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The Decline of pan-Arab Nationalism

Since the foundation of the Egyptian republic at the beginning of the 1950s, Arab or pan-Arab nationalism suffered a series of setbacks and gradually declined. At the same time, there was an increasing trend toward singularity among the various states which had emerged from the colonial or semi-colonial period. This transformation and decline of Arab nationalism may be attributed to three main factors: defeats in the struggle against Israel; internal dynamics of the Arab world; and the emergence of Islamism.

Defeats in the struggle against Israel. The repeated defeats of the Arabs in their struggle against Israel may be considered as the first main cause of the progressive erosion of Arab solidarity and nationalism.

While it is true that solidarity was manifested during the wars of 1948, 1967 and 1973, it was not very effective and the Arab states were frequently divided by divergent interests as well as other differences. Following the 1973 war, however, Arab solidarity began to be deteriorate significantly. It was after this war that Sadat instituted a policy of openness toward the West which was to lead to peace with Israel and a definite break with the Arab world: Egypt became an outcast of the Arab community. Finally, many Arabs perceived the lack of an effective demonstration of Arab solidarity in the face of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon as conclusive evidence of the decline of Arab nationalism: "Arab reactions to the devastating war

... once again demonstrated the obsolescence of pan-Arabism and of the belief in a common Arab destiny.¹

Clearly, Arab nationalism was weakened by its failure to end the Israeli occupation of Palestine and to re-establish Arab policy and values in that territory. But internal dynamics of the Arab world also contributed to this decline.

Internal dynamics of the Arab world. One important element of these dynamics was the competition for hegemony, that is the conviction of one regime or another that it held the legitimate and authentic leadership for the unification of the Arab world. The first wave of attempts at pan-Arab unification--initially the United Arab Republic and later the Federation of Arab Republics--was characterized and ultimately defeated by the hegemonic claims of Egypt, the refusal of the other states to yield to such hegemony, and Gheddafi's demands that Egypt do as he thought fit. It is conceivable that the nationalist Arab regimes of the 1950s and 1960s were genuinely eager to surrender their power to the pan-Arab collectivity voluntarily. But it was the attempts at hegemony and other disagreements that quickly convinced the regimes to think of their own survival and to strengthen the legitimacy of their states.

It is important to note that in order to reinforce and legitimate themselves within their own states, the various regimes made considerable use of pan-Arab rhetoric. The divisions and differences among the Arab states were often justified and explained in the light of pan-Arab nationalism, that is, in support or in opposition to such nationalism. But although the Arab states continued to present their policies as being founded on pan-Arabism rhetoric, they increasingly acted according to their own interests, regardless of their ideological propensity to support the principles of pan-Arabism. In some states, such as Syria, pan-Arabism remained a more important

ideological and political factor than it did in other Arab states, but even the former were caught up in the general trend toward singularity.

Arab states are also organized in forms of international solidarity, not unlike European or Western institutions, though the former are less well-structured and are not always as politically compact. Current potentially significant forms of collaboration and integration among the Arab states include the Arab Maghreb Union, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab Cooperation Council. But these forms of collaboration, far from aiming toward union, are marked by an unmistakable intergovernmental quality. While their member regimes present them to the public as steps toward the realization of pan-Arab objectives, such steps are in fact impeded by the specific interests of the various member regimes and states, as has been the case in the Arab Cooperation Council and the Arab Maghreb Union.

The emergence of Islamism. The most profound crisis in pan-Arab nationalism was the result of the emergence of Islamism. As early as 1967, Islamism attributed the "setback" in Egypt and in other Arab states to nationalism, which it considered a modernist and Western concept. But it was particularly following the revolution in Iran and the victory of the Khomeini that nationalism was attacked and discredited by Islamism. Nationalism, even pan-Arab nationalism, is a secular concept that comes from the West. According to the Islamists, nationalism failed to liberate the Arabs from Western domination and from Israel, and it frequently led to alliances with the West. In their view Arab nationalism has led to the establishment of states which imitate the Western model, while Islamism renews political unity among Arabs on the basis of cultural and political values which are in opposition to those of the West. According to Islamism, nationalism is not capable of affirming the identity of the Arab peoples and is often an enemy

to be defeated.

Nationalism since the Israeli-Palestinian Agreement

The agreement between Palestinians and Israelis in September 1993 within the framework of the Arab-Israeli negotiations begun in Madrid is of particular importance with respect to the evolution and future of pan-Arab nationalism.¹ This agreement, reached by the Palestinians independently of its other Arab partners has several significant implications. First, it involves the singularization of the Palestinian issue-- an issue which until then had been at the heart of the struggle of Arab nationalism. From the pan-Arab point of view, the "Palestinianization" of the foreign policy of the PLO is even more significant and disruptive than the "Egyptianization" of the Egyptian foreign policy that was the subject of debate during the Egypt-Israel peace process.

If the Palestinians have decided to work alone, a large segment of the foreign policy of the Arab States and of pan-Arab rhetoric is destined to fade. This development has immediate consequences for the "frontline" states, i.e. Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, but also for all the others. Of course, this does not preclude the possibility of Arab solidarity--if that is what the Arabs want; rather, it means that with the singularization of Palestinian policy (which had already begun a few years ago under the influence of *intifada*), the foundations and objectives of Arab solidarity will be those of the international, intergovernmental groupings referred to earlier, and not those of nationalist, pan-Arab solidarity.

A second implication of the singularization of Palestinian policy is analogous to the meaning of the fall of the Berlin Wall for Europe and the West. Pan-Arab nationalism has lost its most immediate and direct enemy. The Israeli threat to the Arab world has become less

defined. Of course, there are perceived threats from other fronts: Iran, the West, radical Islamists. Furthermore, the process of normalization of relations with Israel has just begun and could well fail. But since the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel and the turning point brought about by the Israeli-Palestinian agreement, it seems that progress in the normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab states is now irreversible. Consequently, it is conceivable that the core of the threat to the Arab world, at least as it was perceived since the birth of the "Zionist entity" in Palestine in 1948. Thus, it would seem that the more concrete prospects for peace that are emerging in the Middle East could have the same effect in that region as the end of the Cold War had in Europe and the West. The fading image of the enemy should result in weakening of Arab nationalism further, and particularly in making it a less effective means of legitimization of Arab regimes, thereby leading to their decline.

Nationalism and Islamism

It is possible that the Israeli threat will be shifted to the West: the new threat (or risk) could be construed as no longer coming from Israel but from the West as a whole. This view constitutes the rationale for an alliance between nationalism and Islamism. The creation of this type of link was attempted both by Saddam Hussein during the 1990-91 Gulf war, and by several markedly secular and nationalistic actors such as Government of Syria and the radical Palestinian Fronts since the 1980s. The alliance between nationalism and Islamism is therefore not new, but the political evolution under way may reinforce it.

There is a widely held theory that Islamism is nothing more than present-day nationalism. That is to say, it is--to use Lenin's well-known notion--the "supreme stage" of nationalism.

Several points must be made to clarify the meaning of this interpretation. It seems to make a valid assertion that Islamism tends to supercede and absorb nationalism; it is a formidable rival of nationalism. In fact, Islamism presents itself to the people as the movement capable of pursuing the objectives that nationalism failed to achieve. Thus, while Lenin presented imperialism as an outgrowth of capitalism, Islamism tends to subsume nationalism. This interpretation must not obfuscate the fact that Islamism and nationalism are two profoundly different political and ideological movements.

The Arab-Islamic appeal by Saddam Hussein sparked public opinion throughout the Arab world, playing on a widespread frustration. But it did not create a unified or lasting movement. In the 1980s--as we have seen--there were numerous cases in which there were links between Islamism and nationalism, but not even these led to a significant form of unity. Islamism and nationalism may be fellow travellers, but the underlying trend is toward divergence and even conflict.

The relationship between Islamism and nationalism is characterized by the risk of subordination of the latter to the former. Whether we refer to the forces in opposition to nationalist regimes, or to any alliance between Islamism and pan-Arab nationalist opposition, the historic failure of nationalism to achieve the objectives of affirming the position of Arabs in the world and in the region hands that task over to the Islamists, and awards them hegemony in the movement and among the masses. In this context, Islamism has not failed to exert its hegemonic claims and aggression against its the nationalists.

Nationalism cannot expect to be invigorated and reinforced by Islamism. It remains culturally different: it has Western roots, while Islamism sees the West as an often ineluctable

antagonist. Islamism is not only a declared enemy of the nationalist regimes in power, but it also threatens to splinter the pan-Arab nationalists which join it in opposition to the regimes.

In sum, nationalism appears to be in sharp decline. It has already lost ground to Islamism, which tends to subordinate and overpower it. Already weakened by its historical downward spiral, nationalism is further weakened by the political evolution which has prevailed since the Cold War, that is by the predictable disappearance of the enemy of Israel. Without the threat of Israel, the regimes risk losing the rhetoric of legitimization which has kept them in place thus far. Since the agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, the regimes, the nationalist intellectuals and the Arab League have made every effort to underline the need to prevent the peace agreement from giving rise to forms of integration with Israel in the region; they make impassioned calls for the reinforcement of Arab unity, security, economy, etc.²

But the main problem of nationalism does not lie in its relationship with Islamism or with Israel; it is to be found elsewhere. Is there anything that can turn nationalism into an effective and constructive political force and make it strong and autonomous with respect to Islamism?

Nationalism and democracy

The process of singularization of the Arab states at the expense of traditional Arab nationalism has developed without offering anything to the people: the regimes have been legitimated by promising Arab unity, but they achieved neither this unity nor prosperity, nor did they allow the participation in government that citizens have the right to expect. The critical issue in the current debate is political participation and democracy. This is the main concern of Arab intellectuals today. There are two principal schools of thought on this issue, and though they are based on

different premises and considerations, they reach the same conclusion.

Among the secular intellectuals, differing opinions find agreement on the fact that the Arab state is based on alienation of the governed from the governors, that is, on the absence of political participation and democracy. Some maintain that the creation of a democratic polity would bring to light the consensus of Arab public opinion with respect to the ideals of solidarity and pan Arab unity. Thus, greater democracy would force Arab governments to implement more genuine and effective pan-Arab policies.

Others maintain that "political participation and palpable improvement in the quality of life . . . was sacrificed on the high altar of Arab nationalism".³ Given that the regimes have neither achieved the objectives of nationalism nor delivered an improvement in the quality of life, they have lost legitimacy and should restore the political freedom that their citizens have sacrificed in vain.

These two schools of thought are based on two opposing views of Arab nationalism: the first emphasizes the continued validity of Arab nationalism; the second seems to accept the "singularity" of the Arab states and is primarily concerned with the relationship between the government and the people. Both call for the institution of democratic regimes, either in individual Arab states or in the wider circle of the Arab nation as a whole.

It may be said that the debate on nationalism is currently centred around two main aspects: its scope, i.e. whether a true pan-Arab nationalism should prevail or whether nationalisms of individual states should emerge; and its political substance, i.e. the democratic substance of nationalism, however it is manifested.

As'ad AbuKhalil, an Arab intellectual who has recently been studying the issue, supports

the assertion that there is a relationship between democracy and pan-Arabism, pointing out that today the objective of a return to Arab nationalism is freedom, as opposed to the glory and greatness prescribed by Arab nationalism in the past: "Unlike the nostalgic Arab nationalism harking back to the Baghdad of Haroun al-Rashid, Arab nationalism today does not aspire to achieve glory and greatness . . . Many Arabs simply look for greater ease of population movement within the Arab world without worrying about the watchful cruel eyes of the *mukhabarats*".⁴

Another Arab intellectual, El-Sayed Yassin, Director of the Al-Ahram Center for Strategic and Political Studies in Cairo, maintains that "the Iraqi invasion to Kuwait . . . was also an act interrupting the process of changing Arab World view which was going on steadily before the invasion. In this process, a trend was emerging to shift Arab politics from Authoritarianism to political pluralism and democracy, and from rigid planned economic policies to more liberal policies, and lastly from adopting an utopian view of Arab unity to a more functional approach, stressing mainly economic cooperation. This last development has been represented by the establishment of three Arab Councils: The Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab Cooperation Council . . . and the Maghrebi Union. The Iraqi invasion led actually to a break in the Arab Regional System."⁵

Thus, it seems clear that there is the convergence within a system of regional Arab solidarity that is characterized by objectives of democracy, cooperation and development-- objectives which represent new constituents with respect to the ideals of the historic Arab nationalism that emerged in the 1950s.

What is most important is this convergence on democracy. Whether it is achieved within

a more or less institutionalized pan-Arab solidarity, or whether it is achieved by states among which there are relations of international cooperation and integration, democracy is what can give nationalism a purpose again. In this context, particular mention should be made of the importance of the Palestinian elections and the process that they should usher in to strengthen the Palestinian state; similarly note must be taken of the importance of the elections in Jordan on 8 November 1993.

Concluding remarks

In which direction are the Arabs moving? Toward a national or supranational pan-Arab state? Toward individual, national, Arab states, linked perhaps by a strong international solidarity? Or toward unity dominated by a type of Islamic nationalism?

It is difficult to define Arab nationalism in the current situation, in which a common foundation gives rise to contradictory trends. Public opinion in the various Arab countries regards pan-Arab nationalism as an important and compelling objective; nationalist regimes, on the other hand, tend to emphasize the singularity of the individual states. The nationalist regimes claim to be pan-Arab in order to gain the consensus of public opinion, but their main objective is actually that of keeping themselves and the states they govern alive. In other words, the pan-Arabism of the regimes is merely rhetoric aimed at keeping them in power.

The result is that a national or supranational pan-Arab state does not exist; nor are there individual, national Arab states. The absence of democracy prevents the evolution of the modern-day Arab state toward a more specific identity. In fact, it prevents pan-Arab public opinion from forming governments which are truly committed to this goal. Furthermore, it prevents the regimes

from evolving in the direction of the democratic national state which has prevailed in the West.

Within this contradictory framework, two trends may be identified: on the one hand there is pressure from the bottom up--from the society at large and from the intellectual--calling for democratization, and aimed at the rise of a nationalism which is intertwined with democracy within individual national states, or within a national or supranational pan-Arab state; on the other hand, there is pressure to ensure stability and confidence in the notion of a pan-Arab nation--a notion that has been jeopardized by the agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, as well as by the dynamics of the peace process and regional integration set in motion in Madrid. This pressure comes from the regimes, but their slogan of nationalism serves only to mask their anxiety about their survival.

Thus, the debate on democracy is crucial to the future vitality of Arab nationalism. If Arab nationalism is not linked with democracy, that is, if it is not adapted to the needs and aspirations of the Arab people, it will be devoured by Islamism.

1. Farid el-Khasen, "The Middle East in Strategic Retreat", *Foreign Policy*, 64, Fall 1986, pp. 140-60. For a more general view, see Fouad Ajami in Tawfic E. Farrah (ed.), *Pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalism*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1987.

2. Arab reactions to the eventuality of an arrangement with Israel within the framework of a US-dominated "new world order" are very much concerned with Arab unity. By the beginning of September 1993, the Arab League had issued a report on the prospects of "Arab national security", pointing out "Western attempts to drive a wedge between the Arab parties and interference in their internal religious and ethnic affairs", according to reports of the *Al-Ahram Weekly* ("Arab League's Rallying Call", August 19-25, 1993. Ambassador Adnan Omran, Assistant Secretary-General for political affairs of the Arab League, made the following comment on the prospects for multilateral economic cooperation in the region: "Calls for a Middle East market now are the second stage of foreign attempts to undermine Arab nationalism" (Boycott of Israel Seen as Arabs' Last Bargaining Chip", *Egyptian Mail*, November 6, 1993). Along the same lines, Dr. Ramzi Zaki, Director of the Egyptian National Planning Institute, stated in a public meeting that "The revival of the call for a Middle East market and for a regional arrangement including Egypt and the Arab Gulf states is mainly aimed at rearranging the geo-

political map of the Arab World on a non-national basis. . ." (Pan-Arabism: Still the Only Way", Al-Ahram weekly, July 8-14, 1983).

3. "Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Crises, Elites and Democratization in the Arab World", *The Middle East Journal*, 2, 47, Spring 1993, pp. 292-305.

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**THE REEMERGENCE OF AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM
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***The Rise of Radical Nationalism:
Prospects for Euro-American Cooperation***

by

Desmond Dinan

(Director, Center for European Community Studies,
George Mason University)

The Rise of Radical Nationalism: Prospects for Euro-American Cooperation

Desmond Dinan

George Mason University, Virginia
and the College of Europe, Bruges

The rise of radical nationalism in the Balkans and the former Soviet bloc is one of the most disturbing developments since the end of the Cold War. By destabilizing or threatening to destabilize the region, the rise of radical nationalism hinders the implementation of what U.S. National Security Adviser Anthony Lake has called America's post-containment "strategy of enlargement." According to Lake, one component of such a strategy involves fostering and consolidating "new democracies and market economies ... especially in states of special significance and opportunity."

The U.S. and Europe have a common interest in furthering peace, prosperity, and stability in the East. Nor do they lack either policy instruments or institutional platforms to promote that objective. Policy instruments range from economic and technical assistance, to diplomatic recognition and non-recognition, to sanctions and the use of force. Institutional platforms include the UN, NATO, the NACC, the CSCE, and the G24.

Euro-American cooperation to combat radical nationalism is built largely on bilateral exchanges and discussions between the U.S. and individual European countries, and on a highly-developed economic and political relationship between the U.S. and the European Community (EC). Indeed, the EC is the United States's main interlocutor on questions of aid, trade, and policy toward the East. Accordingly, this paper will examine prospects for Euro-American cooperation on the question of radical nationalism largely from the perspective of U.S.-EC relations. First, the paper will explore institutional, structural, cyclical, and issue-specific factors that affect U.S.-EC cooperation and collaboration on policy toward the East. Second, it will assess specific policy options and instruments both in light of those fundamental factors, and in view of recent experience in Yugoslavia and elsewhere.

Fundamental Factors

Institutional: The U.S.-EC relationship is now highly institutionalized. Arguably, it is too institutionalized. With great fanfare, the November 1990 U.S.-EC Declaration added another echelon to an already intense network of meetings between U.S. and EC officials. At the highest level of the relationship, every six months the President of the U.S. meets the Presidents of the EC's Council and Commission. The plethora of U.S.-EC

meetings, and especially the schedule of Presidential meetings, tends to stress form over substance. A highly institutionalized relationship is not necessarily a close one. Conversely, skipping a Presidential meeting--as happened in the second half of 1993--does not necessarily mean that the relationship is in jeopardy.

Structural: The highly institutionalized nature of the relationship tends also to disguise its inherent asymmetry. Contrary to some observers' characterization of it, the six-monthly U.S.-EC summit is not a meeting between the U.S. President and his EC counterparts. The U.S. president has no EC counterparts. The Council President is the U.S. President's Belgian, Portuguese, German--or whichever country happens to be in the rotating presidency--counterpart. The Commission President has no analogue in national political systems.

The inherent disequilibrium and asymmetry of the U.S.-EC relationship has profound implications for cooperation in the sphere of foreign and security policy. The U.S. is a sovereign, federal state; the EC is a quasi-sovereign, proto-federal entity. The U.S. has a recognizable--although sometimes incoherent--foreign policy, and the means to implement it, if necessary by force; the EC has a fledgling procedure to coordinate its member states' foreign policies and to devise common positions, and has only limited means to take joint action. To put it simply and bluntly: the U.S. has an army, the EC does not.

The Community's member states developed a procedure for foreign policy coordination (EPC), and then a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), because they realized that their own powers of diplomatic and military persuasion were inadequate to meet the challenges of an increasingly complex international system. But the history of EPC, and the development of the CFSP, have been slow and painful. Nor is foreign policy coordination a common Community activity. Instead, it is an inter-governmental process still subject to national veto and to national arm-twisting. Two recent examples, both related to the problem of radical nationalism, illustrate the point. In December 1991 and January 1992 Germany successfully advocated Community recognition of Croatia despite other member states' opposition, and despite the escalation of tension in the former Yugoslavia to which it gave rise. Subsequently, Greece blocked Community recognition of the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia in the teeth of other member states' wish to recognize the new state, and despite the escalation of tension in the Balkans to which it also gave rise. Admittedly both incidents took place under EPC, but it is difficult to see how the outcome would have been different under the new CFSP.

The CFSP is an unsatisfactory procedure. It emerged as a lowest common denominator from the member states' 1991 inter-

governmental conference (IGC) on political union. Perhaps the next IGC, in 1996, will strengthen the CFSP, and also give the European Union a military capability. But there is unlikely ever to be an EC army in the sense that there is a U.S. army. The Maastricht Treaty ratification crisis clearly showed the limits of European integration, at least for the foreseeable future. Especially after the 1992 and 1993 ratification debate, it is difficult to imagine that Western Europeans would be willing to surrender full sovereignty in the highly sensitive area of national defense. It is doubly difficult to imagine that public opinion in Austria, Finland, and Sweden, which by 1996 may be Community members, would acquiesce in the complete abandonment of neutrality, a label to which at least Austria hopes to cling in the presently-constituted CFSP.

Apart from the question of neutrality, enlargement of the Community will make the development of an effective CFSP even more difficult to attain: it will be far harder to reach consensus in a Community of sixteen or twenty than in a Community of twelve. Moreover, enlargement will introduce new perspectives and concerns that could make the EC's foreign policy agenda too large and unwieldy: Finland has radically different foreign policy concerns than Portugal; Austria has radically different foreign policy concerns than Ireland.

At least Finland's and Austria's main concerns lie to the East, from whence the primary threat from radical nationalism comes. For that reason the next round of enlargement could help to strengthen the Community's Ostpolitik, but could also make that Ostpolitik harder to formulate and implement. Another round of enlargement to include the Visegrad Four would further strengthen the Community's orientation toward the East, while again compounding the problem of CFSP formulation and implementation.

Not only does the disequilibrium between the U.S. and the EC limit effective cooperation on military and security matters, but the Community's unique character is an inherent source of frustration in the transatlantic relationship. Even if the CFSP became a Community policy rather than an inter-governmental procedure, it would remain subject to undue national influence. The case of the Community's common commercial policy is revealing and highly germane to the current state of U.S.-EC relations. On behalf of the EC, in November 1992 the Commission negotiated an agreement (the Blair House accord) to resolve U.S.-EC disputes over agricultural subsidies. That agreement, in turn, was supposed to unblock the Uruguay Round negotiations. Instead, one member state--France--subsequently denounced the Blair House accord and insisted that the Commission seek "clarification, interpretations, and improvements" to it. Ultimately the Council of Ministers will vote on the Blair House accord, and on the Uruguay Round agreement (if it is ever concluded). Yet, if outvoted in the Council, France threatens to revive the national

veto and scuttle the entire undertaking. The United State's annoyance is understandable. Whatever the merits of France's case, the entire affair calls into question the Community's reliability and efficacy as an international partner. A CFSP run along similar lines would be equally frustrating.

To a great extent, therefore, the structural problem of U.S.-EC cooperation on foreign policy and security lies in the nature of European integration itself. A European Union now exists, but it is hardly the definitive end of European integration. As the process of European integration continues, political union will doubtless become more focused and coherent, but its ultimate objective will never be a single European government, with responsibility for a single European foreign policy, and in control of a single European army.

Cyclical: Apart from structural problems, the current state of U.S.-EC relations is not conducive to close cooperation. Since the high-point of the 1990 Declaration, U.S.-EC relations have taken a noticeable downturn. Only a month after the Declaration was signed, what was to have been the concluding session of the Uruguay Round negotiations collapsed in Brussels. The course of negotiations since that time, and especially the Blair House debacle, has further soured trade relations. Although projections of a new agreement's impact may be exaggerated, undoubtedly a successful end to the Uruguay Round would provide a badly-needed economic boost to the U.S. and EC. Yet, partly because of the recession, both sides seem unwilling to compromise and are adopting instead a beggar-thy-neighbor approach.

At the same time, the end of the Cold War put transatlantic relations under additional strain. Despite encouraging Brussels to lead the international aid effort for Eastern Europe and to take the initiative in trying to mediate the Yugoslav conflict, Washington clearly resented the Community's growing international profile and occasionally revelled in the Community's apparent inadequacy as an international political actor. A strong U.S. reaction against proposals in the 1991 inter-governmental conference to merge the EC and WEU, thereby possibly weakening NATO, demonstrated Washington's fears of losing its dominant position in the Alliance.

Despite Washington's assertiveness on WEU, the current American mood of disillusionment with foreign affairs makes it harder for the U.S. and EC to cooperate on pressing international issues. As President Clinton, Secretary of State Christopher, and senior American officials have been at pains to point out recently, there is no question of a return to 1920s' and 1930s' isolationism. The U.S. will remain engaged internationally, not least because of the obvious relationship--in terms of military and socio-economic security--between domestic and foreign affairs. Yet the American public, Congress, and Administration

are decidedly inward looking; possibly more so than at any time since the Second World War. President Clinton is having to devote a lot of his time to international affairs, but he won the 1992 election largely on a domestic platform. Thus, at a time of bewildering international instability and biting economic recession, America is least likely to undertake foreign commitments that seem open-ended and expensive. With rising domestic demand for dwindling economic resources, inevitably there is little sympathy or support in the U.S. for costly overseas operations.

Issue-Specific: The issues of radical nationalism and of assistance for the newly-emerging democracies themselves hinder close U.S.-EC cooperation.

First: the problem of radical nationalism is not well understood in the U.S. The U.S. is highly nationalistic in the obvious sense of flag-waving and anthem singing, but its nationalism is inclusive. Because their own ancestors willingly subsumed their native nationalism, while clinging to ethnic identity, most Americans genuinely don't understand the persistence and potency of contemporary radical nationalism. By contrast, most Western Europeans show few outward signs of fervent nationalism--a British government minister's recent effort to promote American-style nationalism in the UK engendered more scorn than support--and have long since ameliorated their own radical nationalism. Yet Western Europeans understand only too well the nature and the virulence of radical nationalism today.

Second: As well as being difficult to comprehend, the problem of radical nationalism is notoriously difficult to deal with. Ethnic conflicts seem intractable and unmanageable. They are precisely the kind of issue least likely to engender American public and Congressional attention. Experience in Vietnam and, more appropriately, in Somalia and Haiti cautions Americans against involvement in incorrigible tribal, ethnic, and nationalistic disputes, especially in far-off places.

Third: Americans perceive the problem as primarily and peculiarly European. Instability in Eastern Europe is hardly in America's interest, but it affects Western Europe much more immediately and directly. A massive exodus of refugees from North Africa and Eastern Europe would obviously have a far greater impact on Western Europe than on the U.S. Western Europeans have shown little sympathy for U.S. efforts to stem illegal immigration resulting from instability in Central America; Americans are unlikely to sympathize now with Western Europe's plight.

Policy Options and Instruments

There is a range of policy options and instruments available to the U.S. and EC, either separately or together, to try to

influence developments in the Balkans and the former Soviet bloc. Like the assessment of factors affecting U.S.-EC cooperation, recent experience shows that Washington and Brussels will not always agree on how best to cope with the problem of radical nationalism.

EC Enlargement: the EC's enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe is a possible solution to some of Eastern Europe's political problems. After all, the Community is, first and foremost, a security system. The Community's original purpose was to help reconcile old enemies in Western Europe by integrating their economies to such an extent that war between them would become both unthinkable and impossible. To cite the title of David Mitrany's seminal work on functional integration, the Community is "a working peace system."

As a peace system, the Community has been an unqualified success. It has also helped to consolidate democracy in its most recent entrants: Greece, Portugal, and Spain. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are well aware of the Community's potential in that regard. Appeals for EC membership by newly-independent states in Central and Eastern Europe frequently refer to the peaceful implications of European integration. As Czechoslovakia's foreign minister remarked in 1992, "we will be secure only if relations among all European countries are, let's say, like relations between Belgium and the Netherlands."

The U.S. is equally aware of European integration's contribution to peace and democracy. Indeed, whereas the U.S. has always been ambivalent about the external economic implications of European integration--oscillating between euphoria over access to larger markets and paranoia about protectionism--from the outset the U.S. supported European integration largely for political reason. As in the past, the U.S. will watch closely to ensure that a wider EC is not economically a more exclusive EC, but in principle Washington strongly supports further Community enlargement.

Yet there are limits both to the peacemaking potential of Community membership--integration is not a panacea for unrequited nationalism--and to the Community's geo-political and geo-economic scope. The Community has already conceded eventual membership to the Visegrad Four. Having possibly twenty member states will change the Community's character completely. Understandably, the institutional, political, and economic indigestion caused by swallowing the Visegrad Four will sour the Community's appetite for further enlargement to the East. The U.S. will likely sympathize with the Community's point of view.

Economic and Technical Assistance: Both the U.S. and the EC agree that economic development is essential to foster democracy and stability in the Balkans and the former Soviet bloc. They also

concur that economic recovery at home will strengthen the transatlantic relationship and provide an essential basis for economic development abroad. Yet their inability to conclude the Uruguay Round is hindering their own economic recovery, weakening their ability to assist newly-emerging democracies, and denying trade opportunities to those countries which need economic assistance most.

Eastern European countries look primarily to the EC for technical assistance, financial support, and export opportunities. Apart from its "Europe Agreements" with the Visegrad Four, the EC has negotiated or is in the course of negotiating a variety of economic agreements with other Eastern European countries and former Soviet republics. Accordingly, the EC has a degree of leverage over its Eastern interlocutors. Indeed, from the outset the Community offered to negotiate Association Agreements only with the Eastern European countries that fulfilled certain "fundamental conditions concerning democracy and a market economy." But the course of current negotiations between the EC and Russia, and the EC and Ukraine, demonstrate the difficulty of exerting such leverage and the gulf that separates East and West on the meaning of democracy and the nature of human rights. In both cases, negotiations stalled partly because of Russia's and Ukraine's refusal to accept the EC's so-called "suspension clause" regarding guarantees for human rights and democracy.

Despite lingering resentment over the EC's leading role in the economic assistance effort, the U.S. has encouraged the Community in that regard. Indeed, the U.S. complains that the EC is not doing enough, particularly with regard to market access for Eastern Europe's primary and industrial products (most recently in a conflict over Russian aluminium exports). Undoubtedly, trade negotiations between the EC and Eastern European countries have pitted the Community's protectionist proclivities against its political rhetoric. When it comes to granting liberal market access, a number of EC member states are succumbing to domestic protectionist pressure and blocking generous terms.

Although not exclusively confined to U.S. and EC participation, a number of cooperative ventures to assist Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have had mixed success. The EBRD was politically controversial from the beginning; the Energy Charter is foundering due to political indecision and lack of legal infrastructure in the Soviet Union and its successor states. By contrast, the G24 was a far more important initiative enjoying widespread support in the U.S. and the EC. Moreover, the U.S. strongly encouraged the EC to lead the multinational aid effort, and continues to work closely with the EC to channel assistance eastward.

Diplomatic Recognition of New States: The issue of diplomatic recognition of newly-independent and successor states is one on

which the U.S. and EC have attempted to cooperate closely. Both have developed criteria based on the CSCE's Helsinki Final Act (1975) and Charter of Paris (1991), including the principle of self-determination, respect for human rights and the rule of law, and a commitment in good faith to the peaceful resolution of disputes. Nevertheless sharp transatlantic differences have arisen over the question of diplomatic recognition, notably in the cases of Croatia and Slovenia.

Sanctions: Not least because of enforcement problems and its likely impact on neighboring states, the imposition of economic sanctions is an extremely difficult option on which to secure close U.S.-EC cooperation. The effectiveness of sanctions is also debatable, with the answer apparently depending on political rather than economic considerations. The imposition of sanctions during the Gulf and Yugoslav crises raised questions in the transatlantic relationship of military and economic burdensharing. American willingness to enforce blockades and embargoes in seemingly remote corners of Europe cannot be taken for granted.

Military Action: Military force is the most extreme and the most difficult option for the U.S. and the EC. As recent events in Somalia and Haiti have shown, the American people and Administration are unwilling to risk U.S. lives in conflicts, near or far, that do not directly and self-evidently affect America's national interest.

Ironically, the U.S. and eleven of the EC's twelve member states have an ideal vehicle--NATO--for conducting joint military operations. As Stephen A. Oxman, U.S. assistant secretary of state for European and Canadian affairs, recently remarked, the Yugoslav crisis has not demonstrated NATO's inappropriateness for the post-Cold War World. On the contrary, the "out of area" debate is over, and NATO did all that was asked of it. Further improvements in NATO's ability to respond to out of area crises will likely follow the January 1994 summit.

The main problem, therefore, is not institutional, but political. Yugoslavia has revealed a sharp divergence of opinion within the Alliance on the use of force to try to end or ameliorate ethnic conflict. President Clinton was moved largely by humanitarian concerns to advocate the use of force in Bosnia. Subsequent events in Somalia make it unlikely that humanitarian concerns will again move him to advocate the use of force in ethnic disputes or civil wars.

While most unwilling to use force itself, should the Community decide to do so the U.S. would most likely cooperate with it and possibly provide logistical support. But this brings us back to an earlier, structural point: the Community lacks both a procedure for effective security policy making and the ability to

take military action. Moreover, even if the Community develops such a procedure and such a military capacity at the 1996 IGC, it will always face a unique and debilitating problem: Germany's inability to play a role commensurate with its size and power. The problem is not constitutional; that has already been resolved. Rather, the problem is historical and political. Germany's brutal occupation of the Balkans and the former Soviet bloc during the Second World War, and pervasive post-Cold War pacifism, make it highly unlikely that German troops could ever operate in those parts of Europe where radical nationalism now poses the greatest threat. The probable non-involvement of German troops in operations to the East and South-East would make nonsense of an EC military option.

Conclusion

In conclusion, prospects look poor for effective U.S.-EC cooperation to defuse ethnic or nationalist tension in the East. Already, the Yugoslav conflict and the question of aid to Russia have periodically led to resentment and irritation in U.S.-EC relations. Structural factors inhibiting effective cooperation, such as the essential asymmetry of the relationship, are not going to change, although two forthcoming developments--the 1994 NATO Summit and the 1996 IGC--may sharpen the EC's security capability. Nor are the issue-specific factors that militate against greater American engagement likely to alter in the near future. These problems will not be resolved simply by establishing new frameworks; indeed, adequate institutional platforms already exist for close U.S.-EC cooperation. At least cyclical elements such as the poor state of U.S.-EC relations, and the disengagement of the American public, may take a turn for the better. By that time, however, the U.S. and the EC might have missed many opportunities to avert further conflict in the East.

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