


THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTHERN EUROPE
World Peace Foundation
Lisbon, 15-16/X/1993

- a. Conference schedule
- b. List of participants
 - 1. "Growth and change in Southern Europe"/ Ian O. Lesser
 - 2. "U.S. interests and policy options"/ John W. Holmes
 - 3. "Efforts at Mediterranean cooperation"/ Antonio Badini
 - 4. "The question of migration"/ Nadji Safir
 - 5. "Relations with the Maghreb"/ Andrés Ortega
 - 6. "Interests in the Middle East"/ Graham E. Fuller
 - 7. "Southern Europe and the United States: the Community approach"/ Roberto Aliboni
 - 8. "Southern Europe and the United States: the bilateral approach"/ Jaime Gama
 - 9. "Southern European countries in the European Community"/ Dimitri Conostas
 - 10. "Southern European countries and European defense"/ Fernando Rodrigo



CONFERÊNCIA

AUDITORIO DA FLAD

OS E.U.A. E A EUROPA DO SUL

15 E 16 DE OUTUBRO DE 1993

P R O G R A M A

SEXTA FEIRA, 15 DE OUTUBRO

- 9.30 h **Inscrição**
- 10.00 h **Abertura da conferência**
Intervenções do Presidente do Conselho
Executivo da FLAD, Rui Machete,
Embaixador Richard Bloomfield
e do Representante do Governo
Português
- 10.45 h **1.ª Sessão da conferência**
APRESENTAÇÃO DO PROBLEMA
(*presidida por Jaime Gama*)
- «Crescimento e Mudança na Europa
do Sul», *Ian Lesser*
 - «Interesses e Opções Políticas
dos E. U. A. no Mediterrâneo»,
John Holmes
- 11.45 h **Intervalo**
- 12.00 h **Continuação da 1.ª sessão
da conferência**
Debate com outros participantes
Perguntas e comentários da audiência
- 13.15 h **Intervalo para almoço**
- 14.45 h **2.ª Sessão da conferência**
A DIMENSÃO MEDITERRÂNICA, 1ª PARTE
(*presidida por John Holmes*)
- «Cooperação Mediterrânica»,
António Badini
 - «A Questão da Migração», *Nadji Safir*
- 15.45 h **Intervalo**
- 16.00 h **Continuação da 2.ª sessão
da conferência**
Debate com outros participantes
Perguntas e comentários da audiência
- 17.30 h **Encerramento da sessão**

SÁBADO, 16 DE OUTUBRO


- 9.00 h **3.ª Sessão da conferência**
A DIMENSÃO MEDITERRÂNICA, 2.ª PARTE
(*presidida por John Holmes*)
- «Relações com o Magrebe»,
Andrés Ortega
 - «O Médio Oriente», *Graham Fuller*
- Debate com outros participantes
Perguntas e comentários da audiência
- 11.00 h **Intervalo**
- 11.15 h **4.ª Sessão da conferência**
RELAÇÕES ENTRE A EUROPA DO SUL E OS
ESTADOS UNIDOS
(*presidida por Richard Bloomfield*)
- «A Europa do Sul e os Estados
Unidos: a Abordagem da
Comunidade», *Roberto Aliboni*
 - «A Europa do Sul e os Estados
Unidos: a Abordagem Bilateral»,
Jaime Gama
- Debate com outros participantes
Perguntas e comentários da audiência
- 13.15 h **Intervalo para almoço**
- 14.30 h **5.ª Sessão da conferência**
A EUROPA DO SUL NO CONTEXTO EUROPEU
(*presidida por John Holmes*)
- «Os Países da Europa do Sul na
Comunidade Europeia», *Dimitri Constatas*
 - «Os Países da Europa do Sul
e a Defesa Europeia», *Fernando Rodrigo*
- Debate com outros participantes
Perguntas e comentários da audiência
- 16.15 h **Resumo da conferência, John Holmes**
Debate
Intervenção de encerramento,
representante da NATO
- 17.00 h **Encerramento da conferência**

CONFERENCE

LADF AUDITORIUM

THE UNITED STATES
AND SOUTHERN
EUROPE

OCTOBER 15-16, 1993



World Peace Foundation

CONFERENCE SCHEDULE

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 15

- 09.30 h **Registration**
- 10.00 h **Opening of Conference**
President of the Executive Council of
LADF, *Rui Machete*
Ambassador Richard Bloomfield
Representative of Portuguese
Government
- 10.45 h **Conference Session One**
INTRODUCTION TO PROBLEM
(Chairman, *Jaime Gama*)
- «Growth and Change in Southern Europe», *Ian Lasser*
 - «U.S. Interests and Policy Options in the Mediterranean», *John Holmes*
- 11.45 h **Coffee break**
- 12.00 h **Resumption of Conference Session 1**
Discussion by other participants
Questions and comments from audience
- 13.15 h **Lunch break**
- 14.45 h **Conference Session Two**
THE MEDITERRANEAN DIMENSION, PART 1
(Chairman, *John Holmes*)
- «Mediterranean Cooperation», *Antonio Badini*
 - «The Question of Migration», *Nadji Safir*
- 15.45 h **Coffee break**
- 16.00 h **Resumption of Conference Session 2**
- Discussion by other participants
 - Questions and comments from audience
- 17.30 h **Conclusion of session**

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 16

- 09.00 h **Conference Session Three**
THE MEDITERRANEAN DIMENSION, PART 2
(Chairman, *John Holmes*)
- «Relations with the Maghreb», *Andrés Ortega*
 - «The Middle East», *Graham Fuller*
- Discussion by other participants
Questions and comments from audience
- 11.00 h **Coffee break**
- 11.45 h **Conference Session Four**
RELATIONS BETWEEN SOUTHERN EUROPE
AND THE UNITED STATES
(Chairman, *Richard Bloomfield*)
- «Southern Europe and the United States: The Community Approach», *Roberto Aliboni*
 - «Southern Europe and the United States: The Bilateral Approach», *Jaime Gama*
- Discussion by other participants
Questions and comments from audience
- 13.15 h **Lunch break**
- 14.30 h **Conference Session Five**
SOUTHERN EUROPE AS PART OF EUROPE
(Chairman, *John Holmes*)
- «Southern European Countries in European Community», *Dimitri Constatas*
 - «Southern European Countries and European Defense», *Fernando Rodrigo*
- Discussion by other participants
Questions and comments from audience
- 16.15 h **Summary of Conference**,
John Holmes
- Discussion
 - Closing remarks by NATO representative
- 17.00 h **Conclusion of Conference**

(b)

World Peace Foundation
United States and Southern Europe
Conference at Lisbon, Portugal

Meeting Participants at Oct. 5, 1993

Roberto Aliboni, Director of Studies, Italian Institute for
International Affairs

Jeffrey J. Anderson, Professor, Brown University, U.S.A.

Michael Austrian, Foreign Service Officer, U.S.A.

Antonio Badini, Ambassador, Italian "Sherpa"

Salah Bassiouny, Ambassador, Egypt

Richard J. Bloomfield, Ambassador, Visiting Fellow, Brown
University, U.S.A.

John Chipman, Director, International Institute for Strategic
Studies, U.K.

Dimitri C. Conostas, Professor, Rector of Panteion University,
Greece

Graham E. Fuller, Rand Corporation, U.S.A.

Jaime Gama, Deputy, Portuguese Parliament

John W. Holmes, World Peace Foundation, U.S.A.

Kemal Kirisci, Professor, Bogazici University, Turkey

Ian O. Lesser, Rand Corporation, U.S.A.

Remy Leveau, Director of Studies and Research, Fondation Nationale
des Sciences Politiques, France

Andrés Ortega, Studies Department, Prime Minister's Office, Spain

Robert J. Pranger, Managing Editor, *Mediterranean Quarterly*,
U.S.A.

Fernando Rodrigo, Deputy Director, Spanish Center for
International Relations

Nadji Safir, Professor, University of Algiers, Algeria

Dirk Vandewalle, Professor, Dartmouth College, U.S.A.

Pere Vilanova, Professor, University of Barcelona, Spain

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INTERNAZIONALI ROMA

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25 OTT. 1993

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The United States and Southern Europe

Growth and Change in Southern Europe

Ian O. Lesser

A World Peace Foundation Project
In Cooperation with the Luso-American Foundation

October 15-16, 1993
Lisbon, Portugal

DRAFT: NOT FOR QUOTATION OR CITATION WITHOUT PERMISSION

I. INTRODUCTION¹

With the sweeping changes in international affairs, old assumptions about the relationship of the United States to Europe and Europe's regions are changing rapidly. Under Cold War conditions, Southern Europe -- for the purposes of this analysis, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece and Turkey -- was relegated to the periphery by policymakers and observers on both sides of the Atlantic. What little treatment the region did receive was generally couched in terms of security within NATO's "Southern Region", itself an increasingly irrelevant framework in the post-Cold War world. Developments in Europe and further afield have fundamentally altered not only the character but the locus of political, economic and security concerns. In the new strategic environment, problems and interests have shifted decisively from the center of Europe to the periphery, both south and east. As a result, the countries of Southern Europe are emerging as more important actors in the evolution of European and transatlantic institutions, influencing the prospects for stability on the European periphery and as far afield as the Greater Middle East.

The debate over the character of the new international order has focused above all on issues of societal change and political and economic

¹The views expressed in this paper are the author's own and should not be interpreted as representing the views of RAND or its research sponsors.

development. In this context, the evolution of Southern Europe since the Second World War provides a useful reference point for the discussion of transitions -- domestic and external -- elsewhere, not least Eastern Europe and the territories of the former Soviet Union. The question of transitions also provides much of the rationale for including Turkey in the discussion of Southern Europe. As the European Community and NATO consider the wisdom and implications of extending their membership and reach eastward, Turkey's future role in relation to Europe remains ambiguous. Unquestionably a member of the European "system", Turkey is less clearly part of Europe in cultural and political terms. But its role in the Southern European environment, and its prominence in transatlantic strategic perceptions cannot be ignored.

The following discussion emphasizes trends important to the internal and geopolitical evolution of Southern Europe as a whole, with secondary attention to specific national circumstances. In short, what have been the key points of evolution across Southern Europe? How has the region's relationship to Europe and the Atlantic community changed? What are the current challenges, and why does the region merit new attention in a transatlantic context?

II. AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

For much of modern European history, southern Europe and the Mediterranean world as a whole were at the very center of cultural, political and economic affairs. Europe's southern borderlands were the leading theater in the 1000 year confrontation with Islam around the Mediterranean and its hinterlands. This extended confrontation, a dominant factor in the evolution of Southern Europe from the 8th through the 18th centuries, has not unreasonably been described as the "first Cold War".² Beyond political and military confrontation, the Mediterranean has, albeit with periods of greater and lesser intensity, been a center of cultural and economic exchange between civilizations influencing the development of Europe as a whole. This experience has contributed to the contemporary interest in the theme of Mediterranean unity, whether lost, actual or potential. It has also given rise to a substantial school of historiography exploring the role of Southern Europe as both a bridge and a barrier in geopolitical terms.³ Echoes of this history and the theme of Mediterranean unity can be found in the increasingly active foreign and security policies of the Southern

²See Ada Bozeman's discussion on this and the role of *marca* or borderland states in the European system in *Strategic Intelligence and Statecraft: Selected Essays* (Washington: Brassey's, 1992).

³These themes are pursued in Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the age of Philip II* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972, first published 1949); and Henri Pirenne, *Mohammed and Charlemagne* (London: Unwin, 1974, first published 1939).

European states, most notably Spain and Italy. It is most pronounced in proposals such as CSCM (Conference on Mediterranean Security and Cooperation), and is not absent from narrower regional initiatives in the Western Mediterranean. In both cases, Southern European countries (along with France, whose southern vocation is pronounced but accompanied by more global interests) and institutions are understood to have a special role in addressing problems on the European periphery.

The European discovery of America, the opening of the Atlantic system, and the European penetration into Asia and Africa, were largely the result of Portuguese and Spanish exploration. It is a striking geopolitical irony that these Southern European initiatives ultimately led to a marked decline in the political and economic importance of the Mediterranean basin. From the North American perspective, it is equally noteworthy that the American involvement in European security also had its start along an Atlantic-Mediterranean axis, with a naval presence in the Western Mediterranean.⁴ The parallel expansion of the "Turkey trade" and support for national movements in the Balkans gave additional political and economic weight to American interests in the Mediterranean and Southern Europe.⁵

The essential point is that Southern Europe has had a pivotal role in the geopolitical evolution of the European, Mediterranean and Atlantic systems. But the pattern since the 17th century has on the whole been one of decline when measured in global terms, with the evolution of the

⁴Southern Europeans as well as Americans, accustomed to viewing the American military presence in the Mediterranean as a Cold War phenomenon often overlook the fact that this presence is almost two hundred years old.

⁵See James A. Field, *America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882* (Princeton University Press, 1969).

region overwhelmingly tied to developments and decisions taken elsewhere. In this sense, the political marginalization of the region during the Cold War was hardly a departure from modern historical patterns.

III. GROWTH AND CHANGE SINCE 1945

The post-war evolution of Southern Europe has been characterized by three broad themes: democratization; Europeanization; and the adjustment of external policies. To a significant degree these have been interactive and open-ended processes. From a policy perspective, the net result has been a broad convergence in terms of prosperity and political development, both across the region and in relation to Western Europe as a whole.

Political and Economic Transformation

Although the pace and style of political change has varied, the countries of southern Europe share the experience of transition from authoritarian to democratic rule. This has not been an uninterrupted process as the era of the Colonels in Greece demonstrates, and in the case of Turkey, the movement toward democratization and transparency remains incomplete. But the process of democratization and occasional anxiety about its durability have been overwhelmingly important factors in shaping internal and external policies from Lisbon to Ankara. With the death of Franco and the rapid consolidation of democratic rule, Spain has moved from a position of diplomatic isolation to one of considerable activism on the international scene.⁶ For Portugal, Spain

⁶On the democratization and modernization of Spanish society and its consequences for external policy, see Carlos Alonso Zaldivar, Manuel

and Greece, membership in the European Community and NATO has had enormous symbolic as well as practical value as proof of membership in the Western democratic "club" and as a legitimate, external outlet for military establishments.⁷ In a somewhat different context, Italy's central role in both institutions was understood as serving the Cold War purpose of reinforcing the country's Western vocation in the face of substantial communist strength. In reality, Italian communists and socialists also had a substantial stake in Western institutions. Indeed, a position on the margins of Cold War Europe arguably fostered the growth of Eurocommunism across Southern Europe. Lacking full membership in Europe, NATO (and to a more limited extent, membership in the Council of Europe) has served a critical political function in Turkey, offering tangible proof of the country's Western credentials. In the view of many Turkish observers, participation in NATO has also had a positive influence on the character of civil military relations and made a conscious return to authoritarianism more remote.⁸

The potential relevance of the Portuguese, Spanish and Greek transitions to democracy and experience of European integration to the process of reform underway in the East has emerged as a common theme among Southern European observers. To the extent that the countries of eastern Europe

Castells et al., *Spain Beyond Myths* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1992); and Joyce Laqsky Shub and Raymond Carr, eds., *Spain: Studies in Political Security* (New York: Praeger, 1985).

⁷On the role of civil-military relations in democratic transitions, see Lawrence S. Graham, *The Portuguese Military and the State: Rethinking Transitions in Europe and Latin America* (Boulder: Westview, 1993)

⁸See Ronald Chilcote et al, *Transitions from Dictatorship to Democracy: Comparative Studies of Spain, Portugal and Greece* (New York: Crane Russak, 1990); and Howard Wiarda, *The Transition to Democracy in Spain and Portugal* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1989).

and the former Soviet Union are eager to return to the European cultural, political and economic fold, and to join established Western security institutions as a hedge against regional risks, the Southern European experience may well provide a variety of useful models.

Second, and with the partial exception of Turkey, the countries of Southern Europe have become progressively more European in character and outlook. As noted above, this evolution has been most pronounced in political terms and was given considerable impetus by Spanish, Greek and Portuguese membership in the EC. Relatively high rates of economic growth and continuing integration into the European economic mainstream have brought Portugal, Spain and Greece levels of prosperity approaching the European norm, despite some notable examples of regional underdevelopment within states (e.g., the *Mezzogiorno* and Andalusia). The economic development of Italy since the 1970s is the most striking example, with the Spanish economic success of the 1980's not far behind. Structural problems have persisted, not least the relative weight of the public sector and the extent of public debt when judged against EC standards, and the related problem of capturing revenue from the robust "black" and "grey" economies. But the general trend has clearly been rapid movement toward the European mainstream in standards of living. At the same time, Southern European societies have come to resemble their Western European partners in broader cultural terms to an extent that would have been unthinkable in the immediate post-war years (and this includes the spread of urban ills associated with advanced industrial societies elsewhere). Traditionally net exporters of labor to northern Europe and North America, with increasing prosperity Portugal, Spain,

Italy and Greece have become destinations as well as conduits for economic migrants and refugees from North Africa and Eastern Europe. Turkey has been a leading exporter of labor to northern Europe, with a community of some 1.5 million in Germany alone.

Frustrated in its ability to pursue the European option, Turkish society has nonetheless been strongly influenced by the process of European integration affecting its southern European partners. The desire to "join" Europe in the Institutional sense has shaped the views of the political class as well as large portions of the public. At the same time, Turkey has also experienced very high rates of economic growth, especially through the Ozal era, accompanied by the challenges of inflation and inadequate distribution of wealth. Although outside Europe in a formal sense -- and in the perception of most Europeans -- Turks in general have also become more European in terms of their economic and political expectations. The tension between these expectations and Europe's reluctance to envision EC membership for an Islamic country of 60 million people (with a per capita income which remains half the EC average) raises important questions for Turkey's future orientation.⁹

Foreign and Security Policy Adjustments

The progressive Europeanization of Southern Europe has encouraged a third and parallel transformation in the region's approach to external policy. As elsewhere, Portuguese, Spanish, Italian and Greek attitudes toward foreign and security policy throughout the Cold War were shaped

⁹See Graham E. Fuller, Ian O. Lesser et al, *Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China* (Boulder: Westview/RAND, 1993); and Morton Abramowitz, "Dateline Ankara", *Foreign Policy* ____.

by the imperatives of containment and the structure of defense cooperation with the U.S. In the case of Portugal, the process of colonial withdrawal was an additional and important factor. Under classical Cold War conditions NATO's southern allies were marginalized as a result of their limited military potential (Turkey was and continues to be an exception in this regard) and remoteness from the principal points of East-West confrontation in Central Europe. Italy was indeed a player in NATO Central Region as well as Southern Region affairs, but this made little difference to the perception of strategic marginalization in Rome.

The problem of strategic "coupling" a central dilemma for European strategists throughout the Cold War was particularly complex from the Southern European perspective. For the southern allies, the problem was not only to assure the credibility of extended deterrence across the Atlantic, but also to maintain the linkage between security in central and southern Europe. As the unifying perception of a Soviet threat to Europe has evaporated, these linkages have been exposed to new debate. Traditionally, the American presence on the Continent and in the Mediterranean has been the leading factor in coupling security in Europe's regions. Over the next decade, and in the wake of the east-west competition, it is not inconceivable that the U.S. military presence on the Continent will shrink to quite modest levels (or even disappear), while a substantial air and naval presence in the Mediterranean will almost certainly remain. Such a development would obviously place the Southern European countries in a new light on both sides of the Atlantic.

The Cold War position of Southern Europe was unique in other ways. Notwithstanding the existence of a Warsaw pact threat to northeastern Italy, Thrace and eastern Turkey, the strategic environment in the Southern Region was characterized by the absence of a focus of vulnerability comparable to that on NATO's central front. The remoteness of the Soviet threat and the existence of diverse strategic traditions and local security concerns encouraged distinct and often assertive national policies toward the Atlantic Alliance.¹⁰ Greece's turbulent relations within NATO, now normalized, provided a leading example of this phenomenon.¹¹ Even the nuclear guarantee to Europe, while embracing the Southern allies, was focused overwhelmingly on deterring the Soviet threat to centers of political and economic importance in central rather than Southern Europe. The defense of Frankfurt and Athens were never really equivalent in NATO strategy.

In the aftermath of the revolutions in Eastern Europe and the waning of the Cold War there was considerable concern across Southern Europe that requirements for development and investment in the east would result in a diversion of resources and political attention that might otherwise have flowed southward to the Mediterranean. In economic terms, these

¹⁰See, for example, John Chipman, ed., *NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges* (London: Routledge, 1988); Diego A. Ruiz Palmer and A. Grant Whitley, "The Balance of Forces in Southern Europe: Between Uncertainty and Opportunity", *International Spectator*, January-March 1988; and Lesser, *Mediterranean Security: New Perspectives and Implications for U.S. Policy* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1992).

¹¹See Thanos Veremis, "Greece and Southeastern Europe" in F. Stephen Larrabee, ed. *Political Change and Security in the Balkans: Old Problems and New Challenges* (forthcoming 1993); and Theodore C. Kariotis, *The Greek Socialist Experiment: Papandreou's Greece, 1981-1989* (New York: Pella, 1992).

fears have not yet been realized. In fact, Italian, Greek and Turkish enterprises have themselves been among the most active in exploring new opportunities in Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the territories of the former Soviet Union. Over the longer term, however, there can be little doubt that demands for EC development assistance and investment in the East will compete with perceived requirements in the less developed areas of Southern Europe as well as North Africa, where Southern Europeans believe they have a special stake.

Above all, the end of the Cold War highlighted the extent to which decisionmakers from Lisbon to Athens increasingly looked to Brussels in framing their external policies. With the important exception of Italy whose commitment to the European idea was longstanding, the Southern European countries had not been in the vanguard of the movement for a common European foreign and security policy, or "European pillar". But by the time of the Gulf War, the situation had evolved considerably, with the progressive Europeanization of Southern Europe making itself felt in this as in other areas. In the case of the Gulf, the existence of a European consensus on cooperation with the U.S. was an essential factor behind the very extensive Southern European contribution to the coalition operations. In the case of Spain and Greece, this included granting the U.S. access to facilities, in some instances for offensive operations against Iraq, which would have been difficult, even impossible to arrange on a strictly bilateral basis.¹² Beyond the question of security cooperation with the U.S., decisions about defense

¹²See Fernando Rodrigo, "The End of the Reluctant Partner: Spain and Western Security in the 1990s"; and Herminio Santos, "The Portuguese national security Policy", in Roberto Aliboni, ed., *Southern European Security in the 1990s* (London: Pinter, 1992).

budgets, the structure of forces and the character of operations in which Southern European countries are willing to participate can no longer be divorced from their European context. Turkey, as a full participant in neither the EC nor the WEU, and whose prospects for full membership in both organizations remain poor, has been increasingly isolated from this process of Europeanization affecting the region's foreign and security policy.

East-West disengagement and the apparent de-militarization of relations on the Continent worked to the advantage of Southern Europe by opening the way for diplomatic initiatives in which military power figured slightly if at all. The Southern European countries have emerged as leading advocates for a variety of regional initiatives, and have adopted a far higher profile in European and international affairs. This activism has not been limited to governments. The past decade has seen greatly increased interest in foreign affairs in the private sector and academic settings, with the establishment of new international policy institutes and the emergence of a network of Southern European analysts devoted to the study of Mediterranean and broader questions. In the Italian case, and possibly elsewhere, the broadening of the debate on foreign affairs can be traced to deliberations over the deployment of theater nuclear forces in Europe in the early 1980s and the growing public interest in previously arcane questions of strategy.¹³

¹³This phenomenon is similar to that described by Peter Haas as the rise of "epistemic communities" in relation to environmental policy in the Mediterranean. See Peter M. Haass, *Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental Cooperation* (New York: Columbia University press, 1990).

Prominent Southern European initiatives include the Portuguese, Spanish, French and Italian dialogue with the members of the Arab Maghreb Union plus Malta (the "Five plus Five"); the Italian led Central European Initiative focused on but not limited to regional development in the Danube Basin; Greek and Turkish initiatives in the Balkans; and Turkey's Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone. A more ambitious proposal for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM), reaching from Mauretania to Pakistan in its "global" variant, has at points taken up a great deal of diplomatic energy in Rome and Madrid. Active pursuit of the CSCM concept has been deferred pending the outcome of the Middle East Peace talks in Washington. With movement towards a comprehensive settlement in this area, CSCM could reemerge as a vehicle for Southern European activism.¹⁴

¹⁴See the "Joint Document on CSCM by France, Italy, Portugal and Spain," in *The Mediterranean and the Middle East After the Gulf War: The CSCM* (Rome: Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 1991).

IV. POST-COLD WAR CHALLENGES

The end of the Cold War has swept away much of the basis for European and North American perceptions of Southern Europe. It is also changing the way Southern Europeans see themselves and their international role. Above all, new concerns about instability on the European periphery and problems of north-south relations place the region in the geopolitical front rank.¹⁵ On the domestic scene, the political and economic optimism of the past decade is coming under increasing pressure.

Will the trend toward Europeanization continue?

Southern Europeans have been among the most active supporters of deeper European integration. With the post-Maastricht, post-Yugoslavia crisis of confidence in European institutions, the trend toward Europeanization faces some formidable countervailing pressures. These have been strengthened by the exposure of previously buoyant economies -- Spain is the leading example -- to recession and mounting unemployment. While the notion of a European defense identity continues to find support across the region, political and strategic concerns have encouraged a careful approach. Portugal continues to search for a Euro-Atlantic balance

¹⁵On post-Cold War strategic perceptions, See Aliboni, *Southern European Security in the 1990s*.

which, in practice, produces a marked Atlanticism¹⁶. Italy remains wary of European defense initiatives which give too much weight to Germany or encourage a Franco-German condominium. Greece, highly sensitive to the potential consequences of developments in the Balkans has pursued policies at variance with mainstream European opinion on the former-Yugoslavia and Yugoslav Macedonia. Even Turkey's European aspirations have been affected by the perceived abandonment of Bosnia's Muslims by the Community, with many Western-oriented Turks openly questioning the value of European institutions as a context for Turkish foreign and security policy. To a greater or lesser degree, each of the Southern European countries is experiencing a period of reassessment with regard to Europe and, in some cases, a re-nationalization of outlook and policy. On balance, the attachment to Europe and the desire for multilateral approaches to security and security-related problems remains strong. But the potential for a re-nationalization or regionalization of policy has grown, especially on such highly politicized issues as immigration.

Whither Turkey?

Turkey's geopolitical importance has grown, but the country remains outside the process of Europeanization in a full, institutional sense, and is unlikely to join Europe in the way that most Turks have wished. Moreover, it is unclear that Turkey itself will continue to pursue its European vocation with the same vigor as in the past. The death of

¹⁶See Jose Calvet de Magalhaes, Alvaro de Vasconcelos and Joaquim Ramos Silva, *Portugal: An Atlantic Paradox* (Lisbon: Institute for Strategic and International Studies, 1990).

President Ozal and the depth of Turkish disillusionment over the fate of Bosnia have combined with political turmoil in Ankara and instability in southeast Anatolia to lower the general level of enthusiasm and energy for pursuing deeper relations with Europe. Nonetheless, Ankara is preparing for the establishment of a full customs union with the EC in 1995, an important step toward the revitalization of the country's associate status within the Community. After a period of more moderate growth, the Turkish economy is once again growing at a rate of roughly ten percent per year, the highest in the OECD (attempts to reduce inflation and the size of the public sector have been much less impressive). Ultimately, however, the prospects for Turkish integration into Europe will have more to do with culture and politics than economics, a fact which is likely to become more apparent as the Turkish economy continues to grow by conventional measures of GNP and GDP per capita.

The emergence of Tansu Ciller as Prime Minister might have helped to give Turkey the Western "look" important to deepening ties with the West (and indeed this was the view of many politically centrist Turks). The reality has proved to be more complex, largely as a result of an increasingly hard-line, military approach to the Kurdish insurgency in southeast Anatolia. This, together with the failure to move rapidly on broader questions of human rights and political reform, has only served to deepen European reservations about Turkey.

Prior to the Gulf War it was fashionable to speculate on the prospects for radical Islam in Turkey. The failure of Islamists to move beyond a

stable but politically marginal base of support, together with new Turkish activism in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia, has encouraged a more recent focus on Turkish nationalism and its regional consequences. As the enthusiasm of the political class for political initiatives in the Black Sea and Central Asia has waned (the interest in economic opportunities remains strong), the question of Islam has once again come to the fore. As the Atatürkist tradition has come under strain, the secular, Western, non-interventionist character of Turkish foreign policy also faces an uncertain future. Turkey has been described as a society "torn" between its Western and Islamic roles.¹⁷ Without positing any fundamental change in the role of Islam in Turkish politics, it is possible to envision the progressive development of a more "Islamic" foreign and security policy in Ankara. To an extent, this may already be observed in the overt linkage between Turkish cooperation in the containment of Iraq and Western policy toward Bosnia.

The evolution of relations between Europe and Turkey will have important implications for stability in southeastern Europe, and could influence relations between Islam and the West in ways that would affect the security of Southern Europe as a whole. In this context it is not surprising that a growing number of observers in Greece have begun to note the importance of "anchoring" Turkey in post-cold war European institutions. The European desire for movement toward a common foreign and security policy, although somewhat deflated at the moment, makes this a more difficult proposition. While Turks are fond of describing their geopolitical role as a *bridge* between east and west, north and

¹⁷Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993, p.42.

south, Europeans are more inclined to view Turkey as a *barrier*, a strategic glacis separating Europe from the instability of the Middle East. Few Europeans would be enthusiastic about the additional and direct exposure that full Turkish membership in the EC and the WEU -- and borders with Iran, Iraq and Syria -- would imply.

A second political revolution?

The countries of Southern Europe share a varied tradition of political transition. Recent developments across the region suggest that the political evolution of these countries is hardly complete and has entered a new and stressful period. The political upheaval in Italy, with the expansion of regional movements such as the *Lega Lombarda*, the revival of domestic terrorism, and the virtual collapse of the established political class, is the leading example. Longstanding political arrangements are also under pressure elsewhere, as demonstrated in the narrow victory of Spain's ruling Socialist Party in the 1993 elections and continuing political turmoil in Greece and Turkey. In this, Southern Europe is perhaps experiencing a more turbulent variant of the pressure on established politicians and institutions evident on both sides of the Atlantic.

In some cases, political change is being driven by the desire for more complete, more transparent democracy. In other instances, developments are being fueled by economic stagnation and mounting pessimism about the efficacy of "business as usual". Regionalism and ethnicity are potent political forces in much of Southern Europe -- from its more moderate

expressions in the Azores or Catalonia, through more pressing movements in the Basque country, the South Tyrole and northern Italy, to the violent insurgency in the Kurdish region of Turkey. The current climate of political turmoil is to a considerable degree a product of the regional and ethnic cleavages to which Southern Europe is exposed. The role of the "Macedonian" question in Greek domestic politics provides a striking example of this phenomenon. Finally, it is interesting to speculate on the extent to which attacks on established institutions and patterns of governance also represent a revolt against more specifically Mediterranean traditions of clientalism and political "arrangement".¹⁸

It may be argued that chaotic politics have hardly prevented Southern European countries from playing an active, predictable role in international affairs in the past, witness Italy's steady foreign policy despite decades of perceived political instability. But the hypothesis may not hold. As many observers have noted, Italy's hectic party politics masked an essential stability within the political class and the foreign and security policy establishment. In Portugal and Spain, the stabilization of democratic politics has been a prerequisite for the conduct of a credible foreign and security policy. To some extent the point holds for Greece and Turkey, although here external activism has also served at times as a prop to authoritarianism. What would be the external policy implications of a period of prolonged political instability in Southern Europe? One consequence might be less energy for the pursuit of regional initiatives launched over the last few years, including frameworks for north-south, pan-Mediterranean and Black Sea

¹⁸See, for example, Robert Fox, *The Inner Sea: The Mediterranean and Its People* (New York: Knopf, 1993).

cooperation. The absence of self-confident and secure leaderships on both sides of the Aegean would almost certainly harm the prospects for deeper Greek-Turkish détente and, perhaps, increase the risk of destabilizing involvement in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Above all, domestic uncertainty could make it more difficult for Southern European leaderships to play an effective role in multilateral diplomacy at a time when the Mediterranean region is emerging as a center of political and security challenges.

From the periphery to the center?

After four decades of relative marginalization, Southern Europe finds itself on the front line along what many observers have begun to describe as a new "arc of crisis". After a long period of growing affluence and security, the countries of Southern Europe are facing a less certain and less secure future as a result of developments across the Mediterranean, in the Balkans, and on the southern periphery of Russia. At the same time, Southern Europe is poised to play a potentially critical role in the political and economic development of the southern Mediterranean, as well as new security arrangements within and outside NATO.

As noted earlier, Southern Europe, especially Italy, Greece and Turkey, is fully exposed to the effects of ethnic conflict in the Balkans and the Caucasus. These effects include potentially massive refugee flows, economic dislocations, and pressures for direct intervention.¹⁹ The

¹⁹The disruption of the land route through the former Yugoslavia to Central and Western Europe has imposed notable economic hardship on both Greece and Turkey.

conflict in the former Yugoslavia has transformed security perceptions in Athens and Ankara, with the prospects for stability in the Aegean now heavily dependent on the outlook for escalation in the Balkans.²⁰

Ankara has resisted domestic pressure to intervene in some fashion on behalf of Bosnia's Muslims. Yet the potential for a more active Turkish policy as security guarantor for the roughly nine million Muslims in the Balkans cannot be ruled out. At a minimum, the crisis has badly shaken Turkish confidence in the efficacy of NATO and the Western security guarantee at a time when both are subjects of intense debate in Turkey. Turkish unease about the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is, if anything, even more pronounced, bringing with it the spectre of a confrontation with Russia. From the Greek perspective, the conflict and the possibility of a wider conflagration involving Albania, Bulgaria and Turkey has given rise to a pronounced sense of insecurity. Politically, the crisis has done nothing to improve the climate of relations with the EC, already strained by financial issues. Although less direct, Italy's exposure in the Balkans is substantial. The memory of the large scale exodus of Albanian refugees in 1991 is still very much alive, and the potential spill-over of ethnic violence onto Italian territory in the form of terrorist incidents cannot be discounted.²¹ In the broadest sense, Italy would find it difficult to insulate itself from the effects of continuing violence and instability across the Adriatic.²²

²⁰See Nicholas X. Rizopoulos, "A Third Balkan War?", *World Policy Journal*, Summer 1993.

²¹Some 10,000 Albanians arrived at Italian ports in a period of days during August 1991; roughly 24,000 had arrived in earlier migrations. Greece has absorbed far larger numbers of Albanians (perhaps 100,000) and Romanians. Over 320,000 Bulgarian Turks sought refuge in Turkey in 1989; over half have returned to Bulgaria.

²²On the effects of the Yugoslav crisis and other developments on Italian and Greek security perceptions, see Ettore Greco and Laura

To the extent that cleavages between north and south or Islam and the West become a more prominent feature of the post-Cold war landscape, Southern Europe as a whole will face more difficult political and security dilemmas.²³ The character of security in the western and eastern basins of the Mediterranean remains distinctive, with a preponderance of "harder" military issues in the east. North-south problems in the western Mediterranean remain largely political and economic. Yet both areas will be affected by the expansion of the security canvas to include a range of non-traditional issues -- political and economic development, migration, economic and environmental security -- as well as more clearly military concerns such as the proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons in North Africa and the Levant.

Observers in the European countries of the Western and Central Mediterranean often refer to an emerging "threat from the south", a notion largely unrelated to the security of territory in the traditional sense.²⁴ Rather, it is the perceived threat to the fabric of societies unaccustomed to large scale immigration, and more broadly, fear of the spillover or milieu effects of Islamic radicalism and conflict in the Muslim south. The dramatic demographic imbalance between Southern Europe

Guazzone, "Continuity and Change in Italy's Security Policy"; and Yannis G. Valinakis, "Southern Europe Between Détente and New Threats: The View from Greece", in Aliboni, *Southern European Security in the 1990s*.

²³Edward Mortimer, "New Fault Lines: Is a North-South Confrontation Inevitable in Security Terms?", in *New Dimensions in International Security*, Adelphi Paper No. 266 (London: IISS, Winter 1991/92).

²⁴With some exceptions: the insecurity of the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on the Moroccan coast is one, the air and ballistic missile risk to Southern European is another.

and the Mediterranean lands to the south and east is a leading factor in both concerns.²⁵ The growing demographic weight of Europe's Islamic periphery suggests relations across the Mediterranean are likely to become more central to European foreign policy, and perhaps by extension, more important to transatlantic relations. As self-described borderland states, the countries of Southern Europe will be exposed to the risks as well as the benefits of increased attention.

These concerns are given more extreme expression in the notion of a post-Cold War "clash of civilizations".²⁶ From a Southern European perspective, the civilizational cleavages and dilemmas imposed by geography are hardly new (Turks are equally familiar with the civilizational tensions possible within societies). At the same time, Southern Europeans are aware of the opportunities for accommodation between civilizations and the special role of borderland states in this regard. North Africans already perceive the development of a new strategic confrontation between "haves" and "have nots" and fear the emergence of a new Berlin Wall along north-south rather than east-west lines. The foreign and security policy views of a new generation of political elites as well as Islamic opposition leaders in the south will inevitably be affected by these perceptions, to the detriment of Southern European security.

²⁵It is estimated that the populations of Turkey and Egypt in the year 2025 will reach 100 million each, and that of the five AMU states will total some 127 million. The population of these seven countries combined will roughly equal that of the EC.

²⁶See Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993

Pace Samuel Huntington, the leading military risks around the Mediterranean remain south-south rather than north-south. The strategic environment facing Southern Europe will nonetheless be strongly influenced by the character of regional rivalries and the quest for post-Cold War geopolitical weight across the Mediterranean. Above all, the growing balance of conventional military capability between north and south, and the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery at longer range, will impose new requirements for deterrence and reassurance in Southern Europe. The nature if not necessarily the outcome of Southern European deliberations regarding Western interventions outside Europe would certainly be affected by the vulnerability of northern Mediterranean population centers to ballistic missile attack. An expansion of the European security space southward and eastward (i.e., what used to be termed "out-of-area" involvement) would make the Southern European countries more obvious consumers of security within NATO, the Western European Union, or any other European security organizations that may emerge.²⁷

Finally, Southern Europe is poised to play a more central role in the economic life of Europe, not least in the areas of transport and energy flows. As the countries of Eastern Europe are reintegrated into the international economy, links to the Mediterranean sea lanes will almost certainly acquire greater significance for access to oil and non-fuel resources.²⁸ If the necessary conditions of stability can be fulfilled,

²⁷On the shift of security problems to the European periphery and the issue of NATO expansion, see Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Building A New NATO", *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1993.

²⁸*Europe's Maritime Interests: Conference Report and Proceedings* (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 1991).


this could revive the fortunes of Adriatic ports such as Trieste, as well as Thessaloniki. In the Western Mediterranean, new pipeline projects linking Algeria to Europe via Morocco and Spain, and the expansion of existing capacity across the Central Mediterranean via Italy, will create new and potentially beneficial interdependencies. In the East, the expansion of Caucasian and Central Asian energy exports will require new pipelines through Turkey, reinforcing that country's longstanding role as a conduit for oil from the Persian Gulf. More broadly, a reversal of the post-1945 shift of Europe's economic center of gravity westward could bring new opportunities for Italy, Greece and Turkey.

V. CONCLUSIONS: SOUTHERN EUROPE TOWARD THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Southern Europe has experienced extraordinary growth and change since 1945, with trends in political and economic development steadily moving the region as a whole into the European mainstream. Over the last decade, and particularly since the political revolutions in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Southern European capitals have emerged as centers of activism focused on, but not limited to, Mediterranean affairs. As the character of the political, economic and military challenges facing Europe in the post-Cold War world has changed, the region's position on the margins of European and international affairs is also changing rapidly. Above all, the shift of the leading strategic dilemmas facing Europe from the center to the periphery, both south and east, has placed the Southern European countries, including Turkey, in positions of increased opportunity and risk. By virtue of their history and location, and the apparent direction of post-Cold War international affairs, Southern Europeans now have a more important role to play as models for political and economic development and as interlocutors between north and south, Islam and the West. As a result, the evolution of Southern Europe has become more

important to the evolution of Europe as a whole and, by extension, more central to a relevant North American involvement in Europe.

In seeking to adjust their internal and external policies to diverse post-Cold War challenges -- from economic recession and refugee flows to proliferation and terrorism -- the countries of Southern Europe will also confront pressures for regionalization and renationalization capable of interrupting established patterns of evolution. As Southern Europe moves toward the twenty-first century, it is likely to become a less certain, less optimistic, and considerably more important place.



The United States and Southern Europe

U.S. Interests and Policy Options

John W. Holmes

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THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTHERN EUROPE
Chapter 10: U.S. Interests and Policy Options

John W. Holmes

Introduction

For forty years, U.S. policy toward Europe was dominated by two relationships. First, the U.S. responded to the power and threat of the U.S.S.R. by according U.S.-Soviet relations primacy in importance. The second, related, emphasis was on Western Europe, particularly as it was organized for defense. The main channels of U.S. relations with Western Europe were NATO plus the bilateral links with Western Europe's major military powers, Germany, the U.K., and France. The end of the Cold War has weakened the claims of these two relationships on American attention; in relative terms other foreign policy concerns have become more important. Among these are relations with the European states on the north side of the Mediterranean.

This discussion is rendered difficult by two circumstances.

The first is perennial. The U.S. lacks an integrated view of the problems of this area. A fault line splits the American bureaucracy; it runs through the Straits of Gibraltar and reaches land at the border of Turkey with Syria.¹ One can argue that the Mediterranean is not, taken together, a coherent subject of analysis or policy.² But to pretend that Europe on the one hand, and the Middle East and North Africa on the other hand, are in separate universes ignores the strong North-South interactions.

The second circumstance is, one hopes, more transient.

The 1992 American presidential election could be seen as a silent competition between two foreign policy approaches, even ideologies. Silent, because foreign policy played little part in the campaign. The Bush Administration appeared to stand for an effort to continue U.S. leadership in the world, while acknowledging the economic facts of life by a more selective approach to intervention. The selection of problems to deal with seemed to be founded on "realism."

The new Clinton Administration arrived carrying with it, some thought, a neo-Wilsonian approach which stressed universal human values; as Warren Christopher put it, human rights is the cornerstone of the Clinton Administration's foreign policy. And that point, rephrased, continues to be stated: in early May Deputy Secretary Wharton called human rights "the core of our foreign policy," and, speaking to the World Conference on Human Rights in June, Christopher called reinforcing democracy and human rights "a pillar of our foreign policy."³

There are still complaints that the new Administration's foreign policy is not clear. But it is clear that the change from the Bush Administration's policies is not as radical as might have been expected.

The Clinton Administration also perceived that intervention in Bosnia could be perilous, and bore little relation to U.S. national interests, whatever the humanitarian arguments. Christopher, in defense of U.S. inaction, said, "My job is to worry about American interests and I think we're pursuing

American interests adequately there."⁴ And what emerged from Defense Secretary Aspin's "bottom up" review is a military force structure in the middle of this decade that will not greatly differ from that proposed by the Bush Administration.

However, there continues to be a gap between the risk avoiding actions of the Clinton Administration (and some revelations of its inner thinking like Under Secretary Tarnoff's off-the-record speech of May 1993), and its universalistic rhetoric. (The latter is given its best presentation in National Security Advisor Tony Lake's Sept. 1993 speech, "From Containment to Enlargement."⁵)

And there is one discontinuity between the Clinton Administration's foreign policy and that of its predecessors: there is a vanished middle between pursuing narrow national interests and proclaiming universal principles: acting in the interest of the Alliance.⁶

Finally, and possibly more important than the theoretical or practical details of the Clinton Administration's foreign policy, it is generally accepted that foreign policy is not the priority of this Administration. President Clinton's own interest is clearly focussed on domestic issues; and this is likely to continue throughout the four years of his term — health reform, to take an important example, will take months if not years to enact, and years to phase in. Clinton recognizes that some foreign problems have to have his attention, at least sporadically: Russia is the main case in point. He cannot avoid some others, like NAFTA, a legacy that is also something of an

albatross. This domestic focus reflects the desires of a majority of Americans: limiting foreign involvement — even attention to foreign affairs — is seen as the price of doing what is much more urgent: focussing attention and resources on domestic needs.

It is this lack of attention and involvement at the top that permits the flowering of many and diverse foreign policy views at lower levels. This is different from the inflamed competition between State, Defense, and the NSC in previous administrations. Those were struggles for the attention of the President and the power of his involvement. What we see and hear today smacks more of a genteel academic debate.

This is not to say that the United States will easily yield its primacy in world affairs. It continues to proclaim, rhetorically, its leadership. In more than one recent instance, it has seized on a development initiated or largely financed by others, and insisted on presiding over it.⁷ But this is leadership on the cheap.

This paper does not attempt to state what is unknown to its author, the detailed, secret intentions of the Clinton Administration (insofar as they exist). Instead, it presents his views on what U.S. interests and options are, and what choices can or should be made among those options. However, the author has attempted to temper his judgments by his *perceptions* of the policy stance of the Administration.

U.S. Interests

American interests in the nations of Southern Europe are partly direct, but partly derive from the fact that these nations share a neighborhood — a rather rough neighborhood — with countries and movements that constitute a potential threat either to Southern Europe, the United States, or both. This neighborhood — the Mediterranean and the lands around it — is in fact one of the relatively few areas of the world where two conditions are met: the United States has important national interests, and the circumstances of the area are such that what the United States does — its commitment, very much including its military commitment — can make a big difference.

Our Interest in Southern Europe

Our *direct* interest derives from the fact that Southern Europe has developed, especially economically, and may continue to grow in importance.

While these countries⁸ were all, until quite recently, economically backward and politically undemocratic, they are now all democratically governed and have, for the most part, enjoyed exceptional rates of economic growth. Italy, the first in the class in terms of both political and economic development, is now one of the world's major economic powers (and, conceivably, when it emerges from its "second revolution," may be a more assertive and important political actor). Collectively, they are bulking larger and larger economically, and, as increasingly prosperous and mature democracies, count steadily for more in political terms.

The progressive replacement of NATO by the EC as the most

important European regional organization is contributing to the growth of the relative political weight of these states, compared to the traditional great powers of Northern Europe ("the warrior states").

That said, by the same token, the progressive transfer of economic powers to Community level reduces somewhat the importance for economic relations of all the individual governments of the EC. And the dominance of the Community, to date, by the Paris-Bonn axis, and the persistent failure of the Southern European nations either to play individual leadership roles of note, or to organize effective coalitions, reduces the significance of these countries for an outside power like the United States. But this, too, could change. Spain, for a new member, has been a fast learner of the EC game; and Italy, which hitherto has played a relatively strong foreign policy hand weakly, even within the EC, may in the future demand a role more equal to its material strength.

This is the dominant, and brighter, side to the picture of Southern Europe. Cohabiting with these happy developments and observations are some more worrisome facts and possibilities.

The relatively stable governments and leadership of several Southern European countries — with which the United States has found it easy to work — show signs of fragility.

The political system in Italy is in the midst of changes that bear comparison with those in Japan, and, in terms of the displacement of a ruling group that has retained unbroken power for 40 years, with Eastern Europe. The outcome is in large part

uncertain. At worst, it may be found that the old Italian political system, corrupt and undemocratic though it was, performed better than its replacement. In any case, both the old style of governance and the old political class are likely to be replaced. This may increase the energy level of Italian foreign policy, but it could conceivably make Italy a less accommodating partner for the United States.

At the other end of the Mediterranean, paths taken by recent governments may change. By the time our Lisbon meeting begins, the Mitsotakis government may have been replaced in Greece. Despite its failings, it made a serious effort to liberalize — and therefore modernize — the Greek economy. Like all Greek governments it was distracted by foreign affairs, but its priorities were, properly, elsewhere. If PASOK returns to power, it will bear with it the burden of its demagogic past, at a time when troubles in the Balkans provide great, and dangerous, temptation. The death of Ozal in Turkey also leaves a void, and it is too soon to know how, or whether, Prime Minister Ciller will fill it.

Despite these unknowns, the Southern European members of NATO are, overall — as they almost never were in the past — a collection of liberal democracies in which the market economy predominates. The U.S. has material (as well as cultural and sentimental) interests in these countries. No serious conflict with them is likely: they now form part of the community of liberal states among which war is inconceivable. Put another way, that of Francis Fukuyama, they are at the end of history.

Our interest in the Middle East

The story is quite different when we turn to the other basis for the interest the U.S. has in Southern Europe: its location in a part of the world where the threat of conflict is very real. Even Fukuyama allows for continuing conflict within the surviving historical world (the old Third World, more or less) and between it and the post-historical world (the liberal democracies). As Nadji Safir has already pointed out, Fukuyama's three axes "along which the two worlds will collide" — oil, migration, and "world order" issues (especially the transfer of sensitive, militarily significant technologies) describe the situation, actual or potential, in and around the Mediterranean.⁹

The United States has strong national interests in the area at the eastern end of the Mediterranean. With the end of the Cold War, the Middle East may in fact be the area of the world where U.S. interests are most actively engaged.

The stability of the Middle East will be important to the U.S. as long as it wishes to play the role of world power. Indeed an interruption in the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf, or a threat to the survival of Israel, would probably elicit a response even from an America that in other respects had abdicated that role. We could not escape the international economic impact of a massive cutoff of oil. And our domestic politics would prevent us from ignoring a vital threat to Israel.

Southern Europe also has important interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf. While historically there has been backbiting about the specifics of action, there is a real

commonality of views, and the degree of European-American cooperation has increased in recent years. This is fortunate from an American point of view. Aside from any direct European collaboration in the Middle East, events as recent as the Iraq war of 1991 have reinforced the U.S. view that the pursuit of its interests in the Middle East requires a secure corridor through the Mediterranean, which in turn requires Southern European cooperation.

It may be useful, in the light of recent developments, to discuss these interests a bit more.

At one time the U.S. role in the Middle East was justified by the threat of Communist (or Russian) expansionism. That, for the time being at any rate, no longer exists. But the underlying material ground for interest in the Middle East (aside from the specific of Israel's existence), access to oil, remains.

The United States has only rarely engaged in direct military action to protect this interest. More typically we have employed aid to and cooperation with friendly governments; sometimes we have even looked benevolently on oil price increases as the price for the stability of friendly producers. These methods may have their uses in the future. However, particularly since the Iranian Revolution, indirect means have been less effective in preserving the Persian Gulf balance of power. If, as Graham Fuller suggests, Iraq were to disintegrate,¹⁰ a tolerable regional balance might be very hard to achieve: there would be a threat of Iranian hegemony.¹¹ In these circumstances, more than ever, the U.S., for its own interests and those of its allies,

continues to need to play at least a balancing role in the Middle East.¹² This role requires secure access through the Mediterranean: the analogy is with the British lifeline to India in the days of the Empire.

There are two principal arguments for a more detached approach to the question of oil access. The first is that it doesn't matter very much; the oil, somehow or other, at some price or other, will flow.

But it is the price effect that counts. It is probably excessive to see the first oil price crisis of 1973-74 as the cause of the distinct change in the trend line of Western economic growth, though the temporal coincidence is striking. What is not in doubt is that the Yom Kippur crisis, and the second oil crisis at the end of the same decade, shocked the world economy and caused significant losses in income for consumer countries (as well as adding fuel to inflation).¹³ As for the threat posed by Iraq in 1990-1: one expert's estimate is that if Iraq had gained control over Middle Eastern oil prices, "the long-term price of oil would have been as much as 50-100 percent higher than it would be with oil resources under the control of regimes friendly to the existing world order."¹⁴

The other escape route from the involvement motivated by dependence on Persian Gulf oil is to reduce that dependence. Two principal means to that end exist.

One is the exploitation of oil resources outside that area. The most promising zone is the former Soviet Union. But realization of its potential will depend on foreign investment

and technology, and internal political stability. So far, it is far from a sure thing. And even if there is a substantial increase in exports from the former USSR, the Middle East still will be the main source of additional oil supply over the next decade.¹⁵

The other route is that of oil conservation. Judging from the tiny increase in transport fuel prices just enacted in the United States, despite the most favorable of circumstances (a major effort to reduce the government deficit; low oil prices), this is a road that will not be taken.¹⁶ (It may be that maintaining the threat of military intervention is a cheaper option — particularly if, as in the war against Iraq, we can "tax" other consumers for the surge cost of actual war. But the issue has not been debated in these terms.)

Therefore, taking a cold-eyed view, active U.S. involvement in the Middle East to preserve reasonable access to oil seems likely, and given the current lack of alternatives, has a certain bounded rationality.

The other major U.S. interest in the Eastern Mediterranean, the security of Israel (or, put more nicely, the avoidance of major war between the Arab states and Israel) may, on the other hand, be greatly affected by a recent development — the understanding reached just a few days ago between Israel and the PLO. If this development were to lead to a general and durable peace between Israelis and Palestinians, the threat to Israel from the Arab world would dwindle.

That in turn would change the nature of the U.S. interest in

Israel and its immediate neighbors. It is hard to imagine America's ceasing to have strong personal and economic ties with Israel, but the relationship would be different from the past. Furthermore, we would not have quite the same interest in maintaining the good will of some other states.

The most important case, from every point of view, is Egypt, which has received heavy American assistance since the Camp David accords. It would, if the Palestinian issue is resolved, cease to have the same priority for U.S. assistance; and U.S. political support for its government might become less unconditional. The degree and rapidity of these shifts should not be exaggerated. It may be decades before relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors are truly normalized; until then, Egypt, the only Arab country capable of threatening Israel militarily, is vital to U.S. policy relating to Israel. Egypt is also important for access to the Persian Gulf area. And if Egypt were to fall under radical Islamist domination, it would be more difficult to resist that movement elsewhere.

Nevertheless, it's worth stating that a *lasting* settlement of the Palestinian question would permit, and probably produce, a significant U.S. disengagement from the Eastern Mediterranean except insofar as involvement there is necessary to preserve our Persian Gulf interests.

Other Mediterranean interests

Fukuyama's other two "axes" of collision, migration and the spread of dangerous technologies, run mainly between Southern Europe and the countries on the Southern rim of the

Mediterranean.

Migration is largely a regionalized problem. While the United States is playing host to a number of immigrants, legal and illegal, from the Islamic world, the bulk of our immigrants come from Latin America; Europe is the target for migration from the arc running from Turkey to Morocco, and extending even beyond the Sahara.

Similarly, the threats posed, for example, by the proliferation of missile technology to unstable and potentially unfriendly nations on the Southern rim, are threats to Europe, mainly Southern Europe, as well as threats within the Southern rim, but they are probably not directly pertinent to the United States.

To say this is not to say the U.S. has no interest in what may happen. Developments that would harm Southern Europe would have some impact on the United States, even if they did not threaten our more clearly vital interest in access to the Eastern Mediterranean. It is true that our ability to influence the socio-economic conditions in Southern Rim countries that are the culture in which these threats may grow, is limited. But, as Antonio Badini argues,¹⁷ the United States is not only a global military power, it is also a global trading power. The idea of a vertical division of the world, with the U.S. concentrating only on its supposed economic bloc in the Americas, runs counter to the existing patterns of trade and investment.

Taking a still broader, more political point of view, the United States should take an interest in avoiding a clash of

civilizations between "the West" and the Islamic world. A failed relationship between Western Europe and the Maghreb might be the flash point for such a clash, but it would spread and affect U.S. interests in a much broader area, starting with but not limited to the Eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf.¹⁸

The need for U.S. involvement in limiting the transfer of sensitive technologies to unfriendly nations is evident. The United States is both one of the great sources of these technologies, and the power most able to coax or coerce other potential suppliers into controlling such flows. Furthermore, this objective forms part, as Fukuyama notes, of a complex of "world order" issues. The United States has a generalized interest in order in the issues referred to by Fukuyama — not only the spread of militarily usable technologies but also those that have an environmental impact — not just for humanitarian reasons, but because such order would reduce the calls on the United States to be the world's "policeman."

Greece and Turkey

All of the interests I have discussed are ones which have survived the end of the Cold War. But the Cold War has left some orphans, particularly Greece and Turkey.

The American military involvement in these countries predates NATO. It dates from the early post World War II days when both of them were on the front line of what, at least in the case of Greece, was more than just a cold war. These countries have been and continue to be, unlike other Southern European countries, recipients of significant American military

assistance. We are also witnessing a very significant build up in these countries' stocks of modern military hardware by purchase and even more by virtue of the provisions of the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty. (Other NATO countries are permitted to transfer modern equipment to Greece and Turkey; they destroy equivalent obsolete equipment, but the effect is a radical modernization and improvement in capability.)¹⁹

Over the years the military threat from the Soviet Union became less acute but, regrettably, Greece and Turkey renewed a hostility to each other that had been submerged in the early days of the Cold War. The United States was trapped: it could not tailor its military assistance to these countries to the outside threat, but had to limit the natural imbalance between them by applying the famous 10:7 ratio to assistance to Turkey and Greece.

The end of the Soviet threat has had an uneven effect on the U.S. interest in these two countries. For the moment, the Soviet, or Russian, threat is non-existent. But Turkey, at least, is seen in Washington as a potential ally or agent in the traditional Middle East, and, much more arguably, in the "new Middle East," Central Asia.

Turkey is unhappy that the United States has not clarified its view of Turkey's post-Cold War role. It feels that it was misled, perhaps let down, when it did not receive American financial support for its efforts in Central Asia. (It is also uneasy about what is seen as U.S. support for Russia in the latter's apparent efforts to reassert dominance in the areas that

were once part of the Soviet Union.)²⁰

Washington's response to this is "Tu quoque" — why doesn't Turkey try defining its own role? But, despite these differences, and discounting the more extreme Turkish advocates in the U.S., it is generally agreed that there is a case for bolstering Turkish capabilities, even if there is some fuzziness about the purpose thereof.

There is no such consensus in the case of Greece.

The case for assistance to Greece is to a degree akin to the much more significant commitment the United States continues to have to Israel. Greece feels threatened, at least potentially, by Turkey, and looks, for ethnic reasons, to the United States to play the role of sub-regional balancer. Its claims are advocated by a significant domestic lobby in the United States.

There may be another, if involuted, motive for continuing U.S. interest in Greece: the potential for a new Balkan War. Greece professes to see threats from north of its border; and some Greeks may see opportunities. The classic boiler plate of U.S. Government policy statements, that Greece might be a stabilizing force in the Balkans, hardly seems valid. U.S. assistance to Greece might be seen, in this context, as giving us some good will and leverage in Athens that we might not otherwise have, with the aim of restraining interventionist actions.

Finally, while there has been no talk about Greece, like Turkey, serving as U.S. agent or collaborator in the Middle East, Greece does share Turkey's importance to the United States as a base for potential military actions in that area. The number of

U.S. bases in Greece has shrunk, but the remaining ones (principally the air and naval facilities at Souda Bay) are valuable, and some further investments are being made in them. Past agitation against U.S. bases seems to be dormant in Greece. Continued military assistance is probably a necessary condition for such quiescence. However, Souda Bay is viewed as useful but not crucial.

In fact, there is some Washington thinking about phasing out military assistance to both Greece and Turkey (it would be impossible to end it for just Greece). This would at least get the United States out of the position of contributing to a threat of military conflict.

U.S. Policy Options

First, a few words on general attitudes and broader developments that impinge on the options available, and on the choice to be made between them.

The new American administration's desire to limit, not deepen, foreign involvement, with a view to focussing attention and resources on domestic needs, has been noted. The Mediterranean/Southern Europe area does not escape the effect of the diminished U.S. interest in the world. Action in the Persian Gulf and reactivation of the Middle East peace process may have been the end of a chapter, rather than something that will continue or be repeated. Just as the U.S. has tried to view Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia as fundamentally European problems,

it may reduce its involvement in this area. And if the American military drawdown goes beyond the 1995-96 target of 100,000 Europe-based military personnel (mostly army and air), the Sixth Fleet may be vulnerable even if it has a separate justification.

The great hopes for the Community that grew during the heady years from the Single European Act to Maastricht have grounded on sandbanks, if not reefs. The prospects for a common foreign, security, and defense policy, much less a common defense, are poor, at least for the remainder of this decade. NATO, though shorn of its original *raison d'être*, has gained from Community confusion and impotence.

Military means are, of course, not the only ones that can or should be used to advance foreign policy objectives. It can, for example, be argued that even in the extreme case of the establishment of hostile control over all the oil in the Persian Gulf, it would still be questionable whether military action would be the necessary or ideal means to resolve the problem. (As did a senior Japanese official on the eve of the U.S. war against Iraq: "It is of course better that oil is in friendly hands. But experience tells us that whoever controls oil will be disposed to sell it.²¹) And certainly military means are inappropriate to dealing with the problems that are latent in North Africa.

But there appears to be a continuum between willingness to act militarily, and willingness (or ability) to act at all. Southern European countries, while they are, in some cases, trying to create effective rapid deployment forces, are generally

incapable of military power projection. They also seem — and here the indictment runs to the European Community — incapable of using massively and effectively the "civil power" Community advocates often discuss, in advancing their interests and those of their Southern neighbors. In this instance, resources are not lacking; will is.

All of this has to be said. But a balanced presentation requires me to add something more regarding the potential for an active U.S. policy in this area.

Some of the U.S. interests in this area are perceived as truly national interests; this is true, most obviously, of our commitment to Israel, but also of our interest in the free flow of Persian Gulf oil. They therefore should not be subject to the "Yugoslav precedent" — that is, to the growing U.S. unwillingness to act on the basis of collective interests where the narrowly conceived U.S. national interest is not important.

Furthermore, our role, especially our military role, is seen as effective, within our resources, and hard to replace. Proportionally, the U.S. military drawdown in the Mediterranean area has been far smaller than in Central and Northern Europe. No other power or combination thereof is capable of substituting for us in the sort of action we led against Iraq. And our military capabilities are tailored for such a challenge. This contrasts with the U.S. military commitment to East Asia, for example.²²

Finally, the rather strong universalistic streak in American thinking, of which Lake and others in the Clinton Administration

are exemplars, should conduce to a grasp of the importance of bridging the gap between the West and Islam.

What should we try to do?

Put very broadly, the U.S. should aim, in the area around the Mediterranean, to avoid the shocks to the world economy (and to its own) that would result if the oil resources of the Persian Gulf fell into unfriendly hands. It should also seek to create a situation of cooperation and friendship among the countries of the Southern rim of the Mediterranean (including Israel) and between them and the developed world, especially Europe and America. Finally, while it now is a distant threat, we would not want a revived Russia (the only outside force of consequence in this area) to imperil either the independence of the countries of the region, or the economic benefits we derive from it.

These are objectives that should be shared by the United States and the countries of Southern Europe; they probably would gain general assent on both sides of the Atlantic. But when we get down to particulars, the agreement fades.

Take the special, but important, case of Turkey. Turkey is important for its strategic location and for the example it gives to the Islamic world. The United States, to its credit, recognizes this. Unfortunately, the United States cannot provide what Turkey needs most, if it is to remain attached to and increasingly incorporated in the world of the liberal democracies: a market for its goods and people. Geography dictates that the European Community is the natural economic partner for Turkey. And the EC, up to now, has not been willing

to accept Turkey fully (indefinitely postponing its application for membership), for a combination of cultural and economic motives.

Western Europe seems to be telling the United States, "Turkey is your problem." It does not say this with regard to the Maghreb. Yet its response to the challenge it recognizes in the Maghreb — repeatedly described as a "time bomb"²³ — reminds one a bit of its casual attitude toward Turkey. The response is strikingly incommensurate with the size of the problem. European government assistance has been feeble compared to the effort recently mounted on behalf of Eastern Europe.²⁴ Private investment there has also been weak.²⁵ Faced with a situation similar to but more serious than that which the United States has encountered in its relationship with Mexico, Europe has been dysfunctionally unimaginative. Aside from Community politics — a point I shall touch on shortly — the explanation seems to be partly cultural, a sense that the Islamic peoples of North Africa are the "wholly other." Unless and until Europe can escape from this frame of mind, it is likely to follow Sam Huntington's script. And the United States, which generally has stood aloof from this problem, will share in the bitter harvest.

How should we do it?

Historically, U.S. relations with the countries of Southern Europe have either been a subset of our relations with Europe in general, usually conducted within or through NATO, or, where there were specific local questions at stake (base rights, for example), handled bilaterally with the countries concerned. What

are the prospects for the future? Shall we deal bilaterally, via the EC, through new multilateral arrangements, or by modifying old ones like NATO?

Dividing the labor with the EC

The Bush Administration began, in the case of Yugoslavia, to attempt a policy of division of labor. The United States welcomed the signs that the European Community wanted to take primary responsibility for this problem; it did not seem to impinge directly on American interests, and letting the Europeans do it seemed appropriate as part of a general strategy of selective intervention.

In the event, the Community was incapable of dealing with the situation; its failure has had considerable impact on the self-confidence of that institution (at a time when much else was going wrong for it), as well as creating new grounds for trans-Atlantic recrimination.

In the Mediterranean the same policy is being pursued *de facto*; it may be that the results will be comparably poor.

In effect, the United States has been dominant in the Eastern Mediterranean; Europe has been left the lead in the Western Mediterranean. Neat though this is, and while it reduces friction, it is not a perfect solution. For one thing, it does not reflect interests and capabilities accurately.

In the Eastern Mediterranean it may be natural for the United States to take the lead. The United States is the only power capable of massive power projection; it has developed and maintained strong special relationships with certain key states,

especially Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.

But it needs the cooperation of others — mainly Western Europe. It was encouraging that the Community was willing to put so much into the Palestinian development effort; it was an act of hubris for the United States to seek to deprive the Community of the lead in monitoring that effort. If the countries of the Eastern Mediterranean — like the rest of the Southern rim — are to have a more prosperous and consequently one hopes, a more peaceful and democratic future, it must be through enhanced economic integration with Europe.

The United States may also need military cooperation. While the United States is capable of fighting another Iraq-type war by itself, it could not do so, in terms of American political reality. (Recall the narrow vote in favor of military action against Iraq in the U.S. Senate, even when we were assured of allies.)

Leaving the Western Mediterranean to the Europeans is also too simple an option. As noted, the Community has been delinquent in addressing adequate attention to the problem, and the U.S. will not escape the impact of negative consequences, should that time bomb blow up.

The notion of a division of labor is not intrinsically wrong, so long as the division is mutually agreed, and so long as the "non-leader" is willing to lend a hand. But the United States finds it somewhere between uncomfortable and impossible to be the junior partner in enterprises it joins. And Europe is stuck betwixt and between: no single European power is willing

(or capable) of shouldering major external responsibilities by itself; and the European powers collectively have so far not been able to get beyond rhetoric in their professed progress toward a common foreign and security policy.

The likeliest future for the Community may still be one in which political union is achieved, somewhat along Maastricht lines. However, if this does happen, it is not likely to be reached in this century, nor, perhaps, early in the next.

The Community's recent troubles should not blind us to its present importance, and its great potential. The U.S., for broad reasons of transatlantic and international economic policy, should now seek to reach a grand accord with the EC.²⁶ It should, furthermore, not resist, but in fact encourage, the development of a European defense capability.

But dealings with the EC are not, for the remainder of this decade, likely to be an entirely satisfactory way of coordinating Mediterranean policy, due both to the incomplete development of CFSP and to the inadequate attention the EC currently gives to Mediterranean problems. The latter problem is not due mainly to the inadequate development of the political aspect of the Community. The Community already has most of the means necessary to make an impact on the socio-economic situation on the Southern rim of the Mediterranean. The problem lies in the inadequate efforts of the Southern European countries to fix the Community's attention on the Mediterranean, and the even more inadequate results of these efforts.

Antonio Badini is entirely right that, while the Community

may not have the capability of playing a worldwide role, it can and should be a regional power, and the areas to the South and East of the Mediterranean are a proper focus for it.²⁷ When the Community realizes this, and acts on this agenda, a division of labor with it will be possible and desirable.

NATO

What of cooperation in and through NATO?

Over the last few years, as a senior Defense Department official noted to me, most of NATO's activity has been south of the Alps. As we meet in Lisbon, the air base at Aviano is jammed with aircraft from NATO countries. A permanent, integrated NATO naval force has been organized in the Mediterranean. Planning for southern contingencies has preoccupied NATO staffs.

NATO has been the beneficiary of the failures of other organizations. The blunting of the spears of the CSCE, the UN, and the EC on the Yugoslav catastrophe has left NATO almost alone in the ring as a possible agency of collective action. But its credibility, too, may find its match in Yugoslavia — or rather, in the reluctance of NATO's member countries (the United States included) to do more through it, than the members of the other, semi-failed organizations were willing to do through them.

Furthermore, NATO has had and continues to have a number of problems dealing with the "Southern Flank:"

- The area never has formed a coherent whole, in the way the old Central Front did. Each of its countries had quite distinct interests and felt little involved with those of the others; the main connection was not with other Southern

European countries, but with the United States. Much more than was the case north of the Alps, "NATO" tended to be the cover for a batch of bilateral relationships with the U.S. Since the end of the Cold War there has, on the one hand, been some increased cooperation, but on the other, the one agreed threat — the Soviet Union — has been lost.

- The Southern Flank, furthermore, has suffered and suffers from the fact, unique in NATO, that two of its countries, Greece and Turkey, are as much adversaries as allies. The "security community" that includes most of Western Europe does not include them.

- Beginning with the Gulf War, NATO has displayed some operational flexibility about operating "out-of-area," with its logistical and staff capabilities being put to use first in Iraq, now with regard to the former Yugoslavia. But there has not as yet been a clear decision to address out-of-area activity as a matter of open and accepted practice, with the arguable exception of Yugoslavia. And even when NATO figures like Secretary General Woerner talk about NATO's future being out-of-area, the reference seems to be to Yugoslavia and possibly other Eastern European areas, not to the Mediterranean.

- Somewhat similarly, the debate regarding the expansion of NATO which is going on within the U.S. Government, and which might flow into the NATO Summit of January 1994, has to do with its expansion to the East.²⁸ In other words, the one major political change in NATO that has been proposed, has

nothing to do with our area.

•I would not want to discount the potential military threat from the Southern Rim.²⁹ However, in the short-to-medium term, the "threat" from the South is not military; it is essentially that a wave of new migrants may land on Europe's shores as a result of socio-economic conditions and, perhaps, political explosions. The means to avoid this threat are non-military. These means, if they work, may also limit the long-term threat. But NATO, while showing remarkable flexibility and adaptability on its military side, has not given any evidence of becoming a significant agency for political-economic purposes.

All of the above should not be taken as an argument for getting rid of NATO. NATO has its distinct strengths, and for certain purposes has no substitute. But its capabilities, present and prospective, do not closely match the problems the U.S. and Southern Europe confront in the Mediterranean area.

New forms of cooperation

What of newer forms of collective action in the Mediterranean?

The Italo-Spanish proposal for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean did not get very far. The diversion of Gianni De Michelis's attention by Italy's internal political crisis is a sufficient explanation, but the CSCM proposal faced many other obstacles. It was generally agreed that until the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is resolved, trans-Mediterranean cooperation on a grand scale is inconceivable; on

this score, there is, obviously, progress, but not enough so far to change the prognosis. In addition, other countries were doubtful to negative about the proposal.

The American opposition, which persists, is for the wrong reasons. The United States is opposed to any country participating in more than one regional organization — unless that country is the United States.³⁰ This hub-and-spoke conception of the world (the United States as the center of all international politics) is part of the reluctance of the United States to abandon the trappings of universal leadership, even when it wants to relieve itself of the responsibilities of that role.³¹ (Underlying this formalist position lay a fear that U.S. freedom to act in the Mediterranean area would be constrained by some sort of unholy alliance within the CSCM.)

In any case, the second coming of the CSCM does not appear imminent. What seems more feasible is something less ambitious. Antonio Badini makes a number of interesting suggestions in his paper for this project. They deserve consideration, whether they be for a Mediterranean Bank or for more generalized cooperation between the countries around the Western Mediterranean basis (like a Five plus Five, excluding, perhaps, incorrigible cases like Libya). Where American participation is asked and would be useful, we should take part. But at least in the short term, these schemes for cooperation are at best a partial answer to the needs of American policy in the area.

The short term solution

The absence of ways of transferring or dividing

responsibility for U.S. interests in the Mediterranean suggests that, for the time being — perhaps for the remainder of this decade, U.S. policy will be put into effect by a combination of unilateral and bilateral means.

The United States by itself must, as a deterrent to those countries or movements that would threaten either access to Persian Gulf oil, or the security of Israel, retain a substantial military force in being in the Mediterranean, plus the capability of reinforcing that force in case of need.

This same force, incidentally, will serve, at least psychologically, as a defense of Southern Europe from a military threat, or the fear of a military threat, coming from the South. The point I am trying to make is akin to Michael Howard's 1982 discussion of NATO's reassurance, as opposed to its deterrent, function.³² Without the Sixth Fleet and some other American military forces, Southern European countries might justly feel themselves naked to their neighbors; Northern European countries seem less willing to extend military protection than the U.S.³³

The United States should also continue — in its own and in the collective world interest — its efforts to achieve a settlement in the Arab-Israeli dispute. The new climate created by the war against Iraq and by the U.S. Middle East initiative that began in Madrid, certainly is a large part of the explanation for the opening and successful conclusion of talks between Israel and the PLO. While those talks show that the United States does not have to be present for progress to be made, it is far too soon to let the United States exit from the

scene: we are nearer the beginning than the end of the peace process, and U.S. influence is one of the keys to its ultimate success.

But the U.S. cannot act in the Middle East without cooperation. Some of that cooperation must be sought elsewhere. Use of bases, and prepositioning, in some of the Persian Gulf countries themselves is important. So is continued access to military facilities in Germany. (One of the unspoken, or at most whispered, reasons for continued U.S. commitment to NATO is that it provides cover, in the inelegant phrase used in some U.S. military circles, for the garaging of U.S. forces to be used outside the NATO area.) But the cooperation of Southern European countries is vital.

The United States has slimmed down its inventory of bases in this area. Some of this was under pressure from host governments, notably in Spain and Greece; but some has been for reasons of economy. Furthermore, there may be some further winnowing out. The United States has a strong interest, for example, in only one base in Turkey: the one at Incirlik. That interest derives, transparently, from its potential for usefulness in actions in the Middle East, not for traditional NATO purposes focussed on the USSR. In Greece, the winnowing has already taken place; Souda Bay, too, is important principally in relationship to the Middle East.

While NATO cover continues to have some usefulness, base rights will, even more than in the past, be a matter essentially for bilateral negotiation with the several host countries. But

this negotiation will be conducted on a different basis from the past. Portugal, right now, is being added to the list of countries which receive nothing for their bases, even implicitly. Greece and Turkey could be put in a similar position in the future. Host countries will all grant rights, as many do already, on the basis of shared interests, rather than "rent." There is enough redundancy in the base inventory so that the reluctance of one or two countries to do this would not be threatening to U.S. interests — which reduces the bargaining power of the remaining aided hosts.

Nevertheless, it is both wrong and dangerous to tie base arrangements solely to military requirements. It is far better to embed them in a general pattern of relations — of cooperative relations. The current Portuguese base negotiations are setting an example for this.

Indeed, the loosening of the traditional NATO framework argues for a deepening of the bilateral relationship between the United States and the several Southern European countries.

No one who knows the past of those relationships would deny that there has existed between the United States and most of the Southern European countries (the probable exception is Spain) a special relationship. Even today, a Turkish, or even an Italian, Prime Minister goes to Washington with different desires and expectations than the leaders of Northern Europe. Unfortunately, the interest Southern Europeans bring to their relations with the United States has not been reciprocated. What former Ambassador Abramowitz says with regard to Turkey is true generally. The

United States has a major stake in these countries. "But preserving that stake will demand more concentrated and sympathetic attention than senior U.S. officials have usually been willing to devote to their long-time ally."³⁴

With some, at least, of the Southern European countries our relationship has lacked breadth and depth; as another former U.S. Ambassador, Monteagle Stearns, says with regard to Greece and Turkey, "despite the intimacy of our relations since 1947, our prior relationship was superficial, leaving little foundation of shared interest and understanding to cushion the shocks to which intimate relations can be more subject than casual ones."³⁵

This task, of enriching bilateral relations, is one the United States and the Southern European countries can and should share. Since working together on a variety of subjects sometimes leads on to further and higher level agreement (the Monnet approach to integration), it would be useful if the United States and the Southern Europeans could work together on another objective they should share: avoiding a cultural-political clash with the Islamic world.

The ingredients of this, in an ideal world, seem clear. We could work together to remedy the socio-economic backwardness of the Mediterranean's Southern Rim; we could seek to reduce cultural misunderstandings; we could work together politically to encourage democratic development in the Mediterranean's south; we could seek to work together even on migration issues (where Europe has as much to learn from the American example as it did when, forty-odd years ago, it sent productivity teams to the

U.S.).

There are two problems with this in the real world.

The first is that the United States, for reasons of geography and economics, is bound to be the minor partner in the effort — and the United States continues to be unwilling to be on a team unless it's captain. This must change.

The second is that the tools of policy in the areas in question — trade, aid, economic policy, migration, etc. — have largely been ceded by the Southern European countries to the Community. This is not necessarily a negative development. Conceivably, it could lead to more resources being available for these purposes. But, so far, Southern European countries have displayed neither the insight nor the bureaucratic political skills necessary to focus the Community's attention on what should, for it, be the priority area of foreign involvement. This too, must change, if all of our interests are to be served.³⁶

But even with these handicaps, something more can be done than has been done.

The bilateral stress of this discussion may displease some; Stearns, for example, argues for a growing NATO political role in the Mediterranean area, specifically in resolving the several Greco-Turkish disputes.³⁷ Regrettably, this does not seem to be a practical option. The United States, exploiting continuing dependencies, may be the only outside force able to prevent or limit a potential conflict between Greece and Turkey.

Our bilateral efforts cannot, of course, be limited to

Southern European nations, even if the geographic area in question is contiguous to them. Military efforts of a certain scale almost always require consultation with, and, it is to be hoped, cooperation by the major military powers of Northern Europe. Assistance to the Palestinians, as part of the effort to bring an end to the Arab-Israeli dispute, involves contributions from all of Europe, not just the more contiguous nations. But even in such efforts it would help to have the Southern Europeans in agreement.

The longer term

The longer term prospects for U.S. relations with Southern European countries are dependent on developments in at least three areas:

- The stability, in the longer term, of the area to the South and East of the Mediterranean, depends on whether its economies, and also its political systems, develop favorably. Even if Europe and the United States do what they can to aid the development process, the results are unpredictable. Paul Kennedy notes that "in the 1960s, South Korea had a per capita GNP exactly the same as Ghana's...whereas today it is ten to twelve times more prosperous."³⁸ One would guess that the cultural-political climate for economic growth in the countries of the Southern rim is somewhere between the East Asian and the African levels. If so, not many of the countries in the area are likely to become stable and prosperous democracies during the next generation — which means that trouble, internal and

international, is very probable; that Persian Gulf oil, to take a specific, will continue to be at risk.

•What will happen to the European Community, politically and economically? Will it develop institutionally to the point of being a capable and responsible regional power (one with which the U.S. could divide responsibilities, perhaps leaving it most of the responsibility for the Mediterranean)? Will its economy get back on track? If not, it is likely to be, for example, unreceptive to immigrants, regardless of the political consequences.³⁹

•Will the United States retreat even from its current guarded willingness to involve itself internationally? It, too, could be pushed in an inward-looking direction by continued economic difficulties. It could also be pushed in that direction by a perceived lack of cooperation by the outside world, and especially by the part of the outside world it counts on most, Western Europe. It is true that the interests of the United States in the Mediterranean are closer to bed rock than those which underlie American involvement in most parts of the world; but it is not incredible that the U.S. would retreat from them over the next generation. Regrettably, that retreat is likeliest if it does not receive cooperation from its erstwhile allies; in that case, what it may leave is a power vacuum.

The United States is not likely to pull out of the Mediterranean soon, but it will probably try to limit its involvement. A continued if diminished U.S. presence and

interest would be of value to Southern European countries, and they should try to preserve it. But, at the same time, they might well begin taking out insurance for a possible U.S. withdrawal. As of now — even after its post-Maastricht disasters — the European Community seems to be the only possible alternative to continued dependence on the United States, and Southern European countries have a strong interest in turning it into an effective political entity. With some luck, in this longer time frame, the United States and a European Political Union can work together on what will surely still be a lengthy Mediterranean agenda.

October 5, 1993

NOTES

1. Ellen Laipson, "Thinking about the Mediterranean," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Winter 1990): 50-65. The discussion of this point is on pp. 63-65.

2. One could go a step further, and note that while the Southern European countries share some problems, they sometimes seem to share little else.

3. Elaine Sciolino, "Despite Heat, Christopher Has 'the Time of My Life,'" *New York Times*, 1 June 1993, A3; "Democracy and Human Rights: Where America Stands," *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, vol. 4, no. 25 (June 21, 1993): 441.

4. Interview with Robert McNeill, "McNeill-Lehrer News Hour," PBS, 1 June 1993.

5. Address given at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, D.C., September 21, 1993. Perhaps what is needed is a Fukuyama-esque synthesis. "As a *prescriptive* doctrine, the realist perspective on international relations continues to be quite relevant....On the other hand, as a descriptive model for how the world works, realism leaves a great deal to be desired." Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Avon Books, 1993): 279.

6. A senior State Department official told me that when an attempt was made in September 1993 to draft a comprehensive foreign policy speech for Secretary Christopher, language referring to acting in the Alliance interest was carefully stripped out. (In the event, it proved impossible to draft such a speech; Christopher spoke instead about the Palestinian donors conference.) The discontinuity should not be exaggerated; the Bush Administration, in its approach to Yugoslavia, could be seen as heading in the same direction.

7. This was true of the Israeli-Palestinian agreement brokered by the Norwegians. Less usefully, the United States provoked an unnecessary dispute with the European Community, insisting on being in charge of monitoring the distribution of aid to the Palestinians, despite the fact that the European financial contribution was much larger. (One good effect of this was that the United States suddenly upped its contribution.) Mary Curtius, "US, EC viewed at odds over monitoring of aid to Mideast," *Boston Globe*, 1 October 1993, 12. A similar attitude underlies the continuing U.S. Government hostility to a CSCM.

See below.

8. France is obviously in part a Southern European country, and it is a very important player in the Mediterranean game. But my focus is on the countries traditionally considered part of the Southern Flank: Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey.

9. See Safir's paper for this project, "The Question of Migration." See also Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Avon Books, 1993), 276-8.

10. See his paper for this project, "Southern Europe and U.S. Interests in the Middle East."

11. Iran is, of course, basically the most powerful state bordering on the Gulf; even an undivided Iraq would not, in normal circumstances, balance it. However, one should not conclude that Iraq's division would necessarily create an easy situation for Iran. Indeed, the division of Iraq can be seen as a threat, not an opportunity, for Iran. Iran's current borders include several non-Persian, non-Farsi-speaking ethnic groups which might seek to follow the Iraqi example. Perhaps for this reason, Iran has not given the support to the Shiites in Southern Iraq that it could have.

12. Some of the states in the area also want us to play a balancing role. Terry L. Deibel, "Strategies Before Containment," *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Spring 1992): 86.

13. Yergin estimated that the G-7 industrialized nations alone lost \$1.2 trillion in economic growth as a result of the two oil shocks. Daniel Yergin, "Crisis and Adjustment: An

Overview," in Yergin and Martin Hillenbrand, eds., *Global Insecurity: A Strategy for Energy and Economic Renewal* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), 5. The indebtedness of LDCs, which wracked their economies and societies during the 1980s and early 1990s, was partly due to these "temporary" oil price shocks. Robert Lieber, "Oil and Power," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992): 172.

14. Edward N. Krapels, "The commanding heights: international oil in a changed world," *International Affairs*, v. 69, n. 1 (January 1993), 72.

15. See Joseph Stanislaw and Daniel Yergin, "The Oil Shocks to Come," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 4 (September/October 1993): 81-93.

16. See also Lieber, "Oil and Power," 174-6.

17. See his paper for this project, "Mediterranean Cooperation."

18. Huntington's widely read essay is useful for calling attention to a potential problem but not for its basic approach nor for its sense of inevitable conflict. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22-49. What is good in Lake's contrasting approach (see note 5) is the idea of incorporating more and more of the world into the democratic community. A concern for the projection of American values abroad is one of the three perennial categories of the American national interest (the others being physical security and economic prosperity). Deibel, "Strategies Before Containment," 82-3.

19. See William Drozdiak, "Greece, Turkey Amassing Arms: Some Fear They Will Be Used in Balkan Wars," *Washington Post*, 30 September 1993, A14.

20. Based on a discussion with a Turkish source regarding topics to be raised by Prime Minister Ciller during her mid-October 1993 visit to Washington. For a discussion of recent U.S.-Turkish relations (and missed connections), see Morton L. Abramowitz, "Turkey After Ozal," *Foreign Policy* 91 (Summer 1993): 178-80.

21. Krapels, "The commanding heights," 71. David responds that "economic logic might not work in the Persian Gulf" because "conflict within and among Persian Gulf states may prevent the production of oil regardless of the economic costs," and because of the impact of culture and religion. Steven R. David, "Why the Third World Still Matters," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992/93): 149-50.

22. See Paul Bracken, "The Military After Next," *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 16, no. 4 (Autumn 1993): 169.

23. For example, by the Spanish Foreign Ministry: "L'Europe et le Maghreb: Rapport," Madrid, 26 February 1992. I'm indebted to Safir for this citation.

24. See, for example, Yves Boyer, "Europe and Its Southern Neighbors," *Washington Quarterly*, vol. 16, no. 4 (Autumn 1993): 151.

25. See the figures cited in Safir's paper for this project.

26. Argued for in the study chaired by Robert B. Zoellick: Mark M. Nelson, *Atlantic Frontiers: A New Agenda for U.S.-EC*

Relations (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993).

27. See his paper for this project.

28. An argument for this which is being given great weight, is found in Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Building a New NATO," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, no. 4 (September/October 1993): 28-40. The permanent bureaucracies in the State Department and the Defense Department are opposed, partly because this would dilute NATO, partly for fear of the Russian reaction — the latter fear seemingly confirmed by a letter from Yeltsin to Clinton, Mitterrand, Kohl, and Major. Roger Cohen, "Yeltsin Opposes Expansion of NATO in Eastern Europe," *New York Times*, 2 October 1993, 4.

29. For a succinct discussion, see Boyer, "Europe and Its Southern Neighbors," 147-9.

30. The potential European members of the CSCM are, of course, already members of the CSCE.

31. The United States has abandoned its opposition to the creation of a regional security organization in East Asia (formerly it wanted no such organization, but only bilateral arrangements with the United States, to exist). But this organization does not transgress the principle of non-duplicative membership.

32. Michael Howard, "Reassurance and Deterrence", in his *The Causes of Wars* (London: Temple Smith, 1983): 246-64. The same article appeared in the Winter 1982/83 issue of *Foreign Affairs*.

33. The United States might also encourage Southern European countries to acquire anti-missile defenses.

34. Abramowitz, "Turkey After Ozal," 181.


35. Monteagle Stearns, *Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992), 5.

36. One of the most important steps the European Community could take to smudge the all-too sharp boundary between "the West" and "Islam" would be to admit Turkey to membership. Southern European countries, while not the main obstacles, have not exactly been advocates of this.

37. See Stearns' *Entangled Allies*, especially pages 145-50.

38. Paul Kennedy, "Preparing for the 21st Century: Winners and Losers," *New York Review of Books*, 11 February 1993, 32.

39. While the European resistance to Islamic immigrants is primarily based on cultural-ethnic motives, economic conditions contribute to it. See Myron Weiner, "Security, Stability, and International Migration," *International Security*, vol. 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992/93): 105.



The United States and Southern Europe

Efforts at Mediterranean Cooperation

Antonio Badini

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WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION

THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTHERN EUROPE

CHAPTER 5: EFFORTS AT MEDITERRANEAN COOPERATION

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CHAPTER 5 :

"EFFORTS AT MEDITERRANEAN COOPERATION"

The Recrudescence of a Corrosive Mistrust: the Pressing Need for Early Action.

I - The Mediterranean has been historically an area of conflict, a hotbed of crisis and tension and a theater of wars.

In spite of wide-spread expectations, the end of the East-West confrontation and the establishment of the European SingleMarket have not yet produced any significant improvement in the relations between the two shores of the Mediterranean. No redistribution of wealth has occurred; on the contrary the southern Rim countries have apparently been left alone to confront difficult economic and social problems and an almost intractable internal dissidence.

Fundamentalist movements have sprung up with force in many Arab countries claiming political power to radically change society. Most of the Islamic movements are rallying popular support against the forces of secularism or modernism. Repression cannot be the only remedy to face the religious upsurge, which clearly entails political ambitions.

Misperceptions might make even more difficult the task of promoting confidence building measures on either shore of the region. In many countries of the southern shore, Islamic movements consider western powers accountable for propping up local governments that they accuse of corruption, mismanagement and of conducting unfair and ill-advised policies.

On the other hand, the West's perception of the South has been characterized by images of inefficiently ridden countries and of fanaticism, nurtured hostility towards western values and interests, and as the hotbed of international terrorism. A disquieting factor is the emergence in many European countries of new forms of racism, which is fed by social crisis and expresses itself through hostility towards the immigrants, specially the ones coming from the south of the Mediterranean.

If the trend is not reversed, racial and religious tensions will worsen, jeopardizing the very cultural and religious pluralism and peaceful coexistence in the region. As long as dangerous threats hang over the Mediterranean basin, many countries on either shore remain vulnerable to an insecure and unstable political environment.

II - The most intractable challenge to face in the region - the mother of any future major crisis - is the alarming geographical mismatch between demographic pressures and technological and

natural resources. While in European countries population will remain virtually unchanged, in the Southern Rim ones the working age population, will in the next 10-15, years double. This could become an explosive factor for the entire area.

In the whole Southern Rim shore governments enjoy insufficient popular support. Although population in the area looks quiescent, militant forces are at work to capitalize dissent and to try to turn discontent into destabilizing protest. The Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt is winning greater support; the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), now banned in Algeria, continues to challenge the regime by killings and terrorist attacks. Besides, in response to Israel's efforts to crush opposition to its military occupation in the West Bank, Gaza and a portion of Lebanon, Hamas, a radical group allegedly supported by Iran, has taken away much of the support from the more moderate Fatah, the major component of the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

Although the magnitude of problems confronting the area makes any rapid remedy illusory - a quick fix capable to alleviate the malaise and the lack of perspective-signs of change are however emerging.

The most striking is the recently signed agreement between Israel and the PLO establishing immediate Palestinian self-rule in the Gaza strip and the West Bank city of Jericho.

An historical deal which may lead to a wider peace settlement in the region. Besides, with a more open government,

Algeria will hold a constitutional referendum this year which might turn out as a key element of a plan to get the country back to political pluralism and democracy. Recent elections in Morocco have allowed opposition parties to win a greater role in Parliament. The Jordanian and Tunisian governments have been working to improve national dialogue and reconciliation. Egypt is striving to devote more public resources to the neediest social strata in order to allay discontent.

But only a greater and more effective involvement of the Western world for enhancing the security of the region, which implies economic and social progress of its population, may give strength to these signals. Western capital and technology ought to become a fundamental component of a strategy for southern mediterranean countries aimed at establishing a pluralist political system, democratic rules and a market economy.

The Quest for a New Model of Mediterranean Partnership.

1- The Rationale for a Joint Action by Southern European Countries, the EEC and the United States.

The incapability of market forces to function as the engine of a harmonized growth in the Mediterranean brings up the question

as to what kind of cooperative regional framework is necessary to promote the economic and social development of the region, while reducing its striking gap in wealth and technological progress. Southern European countries - with the support of the EEC as a whole, and the United States-should reach a common awareness on the destabilising risks in the area and reflect together on how a cooperative regional structure may function as preventive diplomacy and peace- consolidation mechanism. First, they have to strengthen a shared understanding of the issues at hand, and of the potential for action. Secondly, after close and fair consultations with the Southern Rim countries, they should formulate and agree upon overall policy guidelines for directing the cooperation in the region along the desired path, and upgrading its level to the one perceived as adequate to their strategic aims.

Why should the United States join in the effort? Basically for two reasons.

- First, because as a global power, the U.S. are expected to intervene in case a serious military crisis or a threat to peace should arise in the area. This implies a continued and direct U.S. interest in the security of the region, at least for the foreseeable future. The problem is then to shift from a military concept of security to a broader one, based on fostering a fairer sharing of well-being and economic progress. No one disputes that one of the two main causes for the growing discontent in the southern Mediterranean Rim

(the other being the perceived ignoring by the West of the Arab nation's aspirations) is a disquieting impoverishment and a widening mismatch between population and resources. While the Israeli - PLO deal on Palestinian self-rule holds out a promise of accomodating long-awaited arab expectations, a new type of action is needed to tackle the continous economic and social degradation threatening the region security.

Second, the United States have global trading interests; they thus have a big stake in maintaining and increasing access to overseas markets. Hence their clear reason to enter a regional trading scheme to better protect access for American products and services. The US industry may therefore get a return from a greater participation in the economic development of the region, particularly taking into account the rich potentialities in natural resources existing in some countries of the area, which are still inadequately exploited.

The thesis claming for a model of international division of tasks between the US, Europe, and Japan by areas of influence does not look any longer convincing. It contradicts first of all the more solid path of globalisation, which is getting new steam. Furthermore, concerns about the US re-focusing their trade priorities toward their neighbours in North America are seemingly short-sighted. Trade with their regional neighbours accounts for only about 26% of total US trade, and trade with North and South America combined, only accounts for one- third of total US exports and imports.

The United States cannot ignore their important trade and investment ties elsewhere, specially with countries in the Pacific region and Europe, including its neighbouring economic areas. In this respect NAFTA cannot be regarded as a shift in US policy away from its central focus on multilateralism. President Clinton's plan for an informal APEC (Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation) Summit in Seattle in November 1993 provides an unequivocal evidence of the American outward looking approach.

Other factors warrant U.S univolvement in the area. Both the EEC Mediterranean policy, and the European countries' bilateral action in fact have proved short of generating the kind of economic dynamism which we have witnessed in other regions, such as for example the Asia -Pacific basin.

Europe has been so far unable to carry out a fruitful economic platform in the region and to adopt a workable and solid global strategy. One possible explanation for its insufficient action are the too ambitious plans with which the EEC has become preoccupied in recent years.

The fall of Berlin's wall has given rise in the EEC to a sense of global responsibility, with a flurry of initiatives and federalist designs which turned out to be premature. In this respect, the recent serious turmoil over currency may have been a healthy blow to the EEC dreams of power a somewhat rude but pheraps refreshing awakening for bringing Brussels Executive back down to Earth.

The EEC basically remains a regional power and has to tailor its ambitions to its concrete perimeter of interest as well as to its capability to deliver reliable Action. For its own security, the EEC should focus more on a doorstep policy-towards the East as well as the South-East and the South. In these areas the EEC countries must be more assertive and show readiness to assume risks and responsibilities as well as to exert leadership.

Ultimately the responsibility for the security in the Mediterranean should be borne by the whole Europe. If the EEC wants to keep its cohesiveness and act on the changing international area as a credible political and economic force, it should be as active and supportive to enhance European involvement in the whole Mediterranean basin as its Southern countries - Italy, Spain, France and Greece- have been in contributing to the EEC action in favor of the former USSR and of Central and Eastern Europe.

It is true that the EEC has defined a new policy for the area - the "Renewed Mediterranean Policy" - but its actual implementation has been - to a large extent - sacrificed to the altar of a strengthened Central and Eastern European stability. On the other hand, the EEC's tangle, triggered by recurrent currency markets instability and a growing recession-led unemployment, have very much played to the detriment of the cooperation with the Mediterranean countries.

It is however important to stress that a more consistent supportive action of the EEC toward the opposite shores' countries

does in no way diminish the need for Southern European nations to review their policy options. As of today, they have been unable to assume a leading role to reorient EEC priorities, and have failed to work out a cooperative approach among themselves. They have regarded themselves as rivals rather than partners, and an unbridled competition has destroyed rather than created margins of mutually beneficial joint or parallel trade initiatives, as it should have been the case. A further obstacle has been the hegemonic influence claimed by France, in the countries belonging to the so-called Small Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia), which proved to be detrimental to the establishment of a cooperative framework.

Finally it has to be said that Northern Rim countries have preferred to orient their efforts for a more profitable division of labor toward the EEC integration mechanism and the Free Trade Zone countries, - such as Norway, Sweden, Austria and Switzerland. All that has not favored the development of any real scheme of "horizontal" cooperation among countries of the Northern Mediterranean.

2- Regional Widespread Tendency Toward Economic Integration

Regionalism has been developing world-wide over the last decade with a distinctive surge after the end of the Cold war. In a sense, it constitutes a new dimension in North - South relations. The

Asia-Pacific region provides the most telling demonstration of the force which is behind the new phenomenon. The striking aspect of the trend toward regional interdependence in the Asia-Pacific zone is that it has been propelled by market forces which have been operating under the multilateral free-trade system.

The creation of the APEC (Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation)- which includes at the same time highly industrialized countries, some among the most dynamic economies, and less developed nations - proves that regionalism is alive and well. NAFTA is another case pointing to future directions of trading arrangements.

Is this trend conflicting with economic globalism and the GATT rules? There are opposing views on the matter, but no equation proves which of the two theses is the right one.

From a political perspective, regionalism may well play a stabilizing role. Many analysts consider with favour -for instance - the establishment of closer and productive ties between Russia and the other former USSR States, as well as an integration of China and Vietnam into that region's economy.

We have, of course, to remain mindful of the possible harmful consequences of the phenomenon, while constantly assessing the impact of regional integration on Third countries in order that the new trend does not weaken in any way the GATT system and does not infringe on multilateral trading rules. In

principle, we may assume that only in the absence of a process strengthening GATT, regionalism would generate protectionist pressures to maintain the discrimination inherent in preferential trading pacts. Thus, the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations is crucial to keep regionalism quite complementary and interwoven with globalism.

3- The Desiderable Shape of Regional Cooperation in the Mediterranean Basin.

I - Unlike East Asia economies, which have achieved a spectacular growth for the past two decades, the Southern Mediterranean Rim countries are mostly in the midst of a downward development trend. Furthermore, the characteristics of the countries of the region are seemingly not functional to regional integration. Economic relations among those countries remain poor and stagnant. Natural resources are not uniformly distributed and trade patterns are not moving toward greater interdependence.

In the absence of a well-aimed global strategy, trade barriers and the lack of economic complementarity and of transport infrastructures do not allow to expect better prospects for intra-regional trade in the foreseeable future

Moreover, the wide differences in industrialisation levels, socio-political systems and cultural traditions existing between the

two shores of the Mediterranean, have hampered so far the promotion of the volume of cross-border investments and production - sharing arrangements that the economic diversity could have encouraged. As a result, all the arrangements and policies hammered out until now for promoting the development of regional or sub-regional economic zones have failed to achieve their goals.

For all these reasons a "de facto" economic integration in the Mediterranean area might hardly occur. It is much more likely that regional or sub-regional economic integration could result from a well-conceived, thoroughly studied, institutional framework.

II - A voluntarist approach based on agreements among governments and a generous scheme of incentives (concessional aid, trade-barriers reductions, transfer of technology, economic reforms) should aim at the creation in the Southern Rim of an economic entity of at least a certain critical size to attract investments and management from abroad.

The Union of the Arab Maghreb (UMA) established in 1989 among Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia to gradually form a EEC-type Common market appeared as an important first stone of a bigger edifice, a catalyst for a long-awaited regional integration process. UMA had the ambition to set a concrete example by laying down the basis for an environment in which goods, capital, labour, and information move across

borders, and corporations are encouraged to extend their horizons and promote global operations. Maghreb countries were imaginative enough to timely perceive the benefits of regionalism, but unfortunately too narrow-minded in their actual behaviours, which have been rather incoherent in spite of the initial support pledged by EEC.

III - In the Mediterranean basin, moves toward regional integration can be viewed as efforts to fill the gap between an increasingly internationalized economic activity and still border-conscious political systems. In this respect any progress toward greater economic interdependence is likely to make countries in the area more willing to embark on a regional political dialogue tailored to bringing nearer rules of behaviour of countries belonging to different social systems and political alignments

More particularly, an institutionalized regional or sub-regional integration in the Mediterranean basin appears as an instrument for promoting economic development and a process of social and political harmonisation. A first, important step in this direction is to encourage Southern countries to establish free trade links among themselves. Trade among Mediterranean countries is no more than 5% of their total trade, while they do 40-70% of their trade with the EEC countries.

Regionalism in the Mediterranean could increase national welfare, by promoting greater intra-regional trade and economic

development. It could also act as a stepping stone to freer future trade, as it would provide member countries with a framework enabling them to pursue a wider liberalisation.

Regional integration in the area might be conceived to overcome both intra and extra-regional problems. It could, in particular, serve as a means:

- for alleviating political tensions and promoting closer political co-operation - as it would increase the involvement of each member in the other's trade (and economic) matters.
- for building a common consensus on issues of mutual concern in areas that go beyond trade in goods and services, such as regional security and industrial development.

Furthermore, regional integration can help use the collective bargaining power of the group: - to shift terms of trade in favour of the regions' members in multilateral trade negotiations;- in dealing with developed countries for market access;- in counter-balancing protectionism.

Prospects of integration may also encourage national governments to liberalise and harmonise their economic policies with neighbours, in order to enhance their competitiveness within an increasingly global market. In this respect trade arrangements between southern Mediterranean countries could pave the way for agreements on more solid and credible policy options and far-

sighted initiatives like the Renewed Mediterranean Policy of the EEC.

4- The Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) Idea.

The Italian proposal - of a CSCM- promptly backed by Spain - can be interpreted as an answer to the need to ensure regional peace through a set of rules based on international legality and U.N. principles. The Conference would mirror the open-ended, three basket experience of the Helsinki process, while adjusting it to the peculiarities of the Mediterranean region.

The project has many merits and responds to a number of quite understandable motivations. Basically, the CSCM called on Europe to take primary responsibility in an area vital to its security interests. Europe has a specific experience which it has derived from the long and successful record of the CSCE. It also has a unique heritage of historical ties which can be put at the service of such a project.

Although global in scope, the participation to and content of the CSCM might rest on an evolutionary approach. The CSCM would thus constitute a process to address the region's problems in a progressive and comprehensive way. Furthermore, it could be conceived as an overall framework, providing an umbrella for

specific mechanisms aimed at the solution of localised conflicts and crises.

More specifically, the CSCM's goals are:

- To safeguard the security of all the countries in the region, in a general framework of arms control and with the aim to ban all arms of mass destruction from the area - thus contributing to a greater degree of global stability.

- To promote a balanced economic and social development in the area, thereby gradually reducing disparities. This basket is essential if the CSCM is to achieve its fundamental goal of meeting the broad expectations of peoples in material terms, by fostering co-development as a necessary choice to tackle the economic, social and demographic imbalances of the region.

- To set up a framework in which diverse civilizations could coexist peacefully. This basket would aim at bringing the peoples of the region closer together, while respecting their cultural and religious identity. The goal is to promote - through dialogue - tolerance and understanding among societies that would allow interchanges among different nations without compromising on essential standards. This would cut down intellectual distance and the incomprehension gap currently separating Western culture from Islam.

- To establish in the area a more stable order, based on solidarity, and to foster cooperation as an alternative to

confrontation. This would lay the foundations for a system of good neighbourliness, co-responsibility and interdependence among all the countries in the region, and would ensure an active role for the Mediterranean and Middle-East region within any new international order to be fashioned. It is worth noting that ongoing efforts to remove some historical stumbling blocks in the Arab-Israeli crisis are now producing breakthroughs which will hopefully clear the way toward a final and comprehensive settlement of the conflict.

5 Towards an Intermediate Approach

The overall reaction to the CSCM idea was rather lukewarm. Some countries did not conceal their skepticism. Italy, after winning the co-sponsorship of the initiative by Spain, managed to get "a non-negative" attitude by France and an active backing by Egypt. The United States, which regrettably were not properly consulted before the idea was launched, feared that the Middle-East peace process could get out of its hands and lose track of its timetable for the stability of the whole region. Other governments, too - even among Arab countries - thought that the initiative would have drawn the primary attention away from the Arab-Israeli conflict with seemingly no concrete alternative option for settling the security issues of the area.

Retrospectively, one can see that the underlying concept of the initiative - that is, linking military security to a global strategy of cooperation and partnership - is no less valid today and will possibly prove to be even more necessary in the future, if a lasting and comprehensive peace settlement has to be found.

The broader concept of security -one encompassing sub-regional economic and technological cooperation - constitutes on the other hand an integral part of the present, ongoing approach for a definitive settlement of the Middle-East crisis. But the search for region stability cannot be limited to localised portions of it, no matter how important they are. The new relationship between the EEC and Maghreb countries - now frozen because of the U.N. sanctions against Lybia - on which the Twelve have been focussing for a while their attention are a case in point. The need that limited sub-regional initiatives should not be seen as exclusive and closed to wider developments is also revealed by the recurrent attempts of Egypt to revive its proposal to launch " The Mediterranean Forum".

The Israeli - PLO rapprochement, by breaking the log jam obstructing progress toward a global solution to the Mideast crisis, could again put all the peace forces of the region at work and the CSCM

exercise on a more solid footing. However, fears and uncertainties should not be underestimated. Nor should the repercussions on the rise of Islamic radicalism be overlooked. Even though the horizon looks less cloudy, hopes brought in by the historical deal are still fragile and the final settlement of the Middle Eastern conflict looks still a long way ahead.

The complexity of the CSCM could still easily be a drag on solutions to critical issues, while removal of all the dangerous sources of instability in the area requires a powerful leadership. On the other hand it is imperative and urgent to break up the vicious circle of political instability, arms race, waste of resources and social turmoils. Countries having a more direct interest in the region's security - starting with the US, the EEC and Southern Europe - have to send a convincing message of understanding and support as part of a joint strategy with the Southern Rim nations to make them less vulnerable to outbursts of frustration and despair

If we want them to urgently assume more responsibility for the region's global security, on the environment and human rights as well as arms proliferation control, we should behave so as to promote an increase in global wealth on either side of the Mediterranean.

6 - The Creation of the Alliance for Progress

I - The Mediterranean runs the risk to remain excluded from the phenomenon of regionalism, which appears for many developing countries as the best vehicle for being integrated into world economy, and through that gaining access to the world wealth circuits. So far, no region-wide attempt has been made possible to liberalise trade, to reduce tariff barriers and to narrow domestic legislations on issues critical for bringing about a common market. Only sub-groupings have been occasionally created as result of mainly politically motivated Unions such as the Arab Cooperation Council. But those entities have been short-lived and ineffective except for the Union of Arab Maghreb (UMA), which even though poor in results, constitutes until now the best example of lasting cooperation.

Although UMA represents the only serious attempt to establish in the Southern Rim a sub-regionally integrated area, the reduction of intra-regional tariffs and trade barriers as well as the implementation of guidelines on infrastructures, production-sharing and transportation policy have, however, made little real progress. Thus, the Union still remains a long way from the achievement of a full-fledged FTA (Free Trade Agreement) or a Custom Union,

not to mention the creation of a common market that seems today absolutely unrealistic.

II - As it was said before, market forces - differently from what occurred in other regions- have been unable to produce in the Mediterranean a real integration process. At the same time no formal integration can be envisaged in that area, unless a number of conditions are fulfilled; such as similarities in trade and economic regimes, in political institutions, in culture, and so forth. Therefore, the big and almost intractable problem in the Mediterranean is how to weld together a set of so disparate countries through a viable cooperative structure.

A number of reasons lead to believe that a loose form of institutional framework is, under the present circumstances, the best avenue to be pursued. Evidence has proved that, in the past, the political impulse has failed to propel market forces in the desired direction and that integration dividends were inadequate to mobilize the political will of the countries concerned. What is then needed is to devise a mechanism which envisages differential provisions while encouraging gradual harmonization efforts, and which is capable of fostering a stronger interaction between policies, incentives and market response.

In order to contain social and economic degradation in the Region and restore a certain degree of confidence and dynamism to the integration process, a New Alliance for Progre must be soon

launched in the Mediterranean. It might prepare future and more ambitious formal agreements like a revised and well-refined Conference on Cooperation and Security.

The mutuality of interests should lead the countries of the two shores, plus the ECC as a whole and the United States, to join now their efforts to turn the risk of an era of confrontation into a prospect of peaceful and shared prosperity.

The Alliance might opt for an evolutionary approach functional to economic integration. It should be based on a concept of partnership. Its main purposes could be:

- to promote multiple cultural interchanges (research institutes and university cooperation; new arrangements between Writer's Associations, performing arts, etc.) in order to improve mutual understanding and trust;
- to encourage dialogue between the two shores on how to enhance cooperation and self-reliance in the context of a shared responsibility;
- to accelerate investments and transfer of technology in the southern countries in order to diversify and broaden their productive base.
- to allow a greater market access to the northern countries for goods and services produced in the southern countries.

III - Only through a well-conceived and credible strategy the northern countries might convince southern countries' governments

to accept a set of agreed rules and principles consistent with a durable and sustainable development. The first objective in this respect is to prove that the bad state of the southern Mediterranean economies derives from delaying effective reforms. Market-orientation of the economies should become in those countries more deeply rooted.

Economic growth, in turn, has to be planned in a way to reduce disparities in the society and to foster human development (housing, healthcare, education). That would counterbalance northern countries' request to the southern shore governments to improve their performance on human rights.

Social stability depends to a large extent on successful efforts to ensure the respect for the dignity of the underprivileged. Joint efforts are therefore necessary. This implies that the "northern" members of the Alliance should be ready to offer a package of policies and to mobilize adequate financial and technological flows to carry them out. But international assistance can hardly be expected to produce any breakthrough where corrupt and obstructive regimes prevail; fanaticism and radical views impair any changes in the status and education of women, or in the mentality of large proportions of society, and faulty economic policies smother growth.

If it is true that democracy without social and economic progress might prove illusory, the reverse is also true: no lasting

economic development is possible outside a democratic system and an open society.

Other common rules - as it will be later on spelled out - should concern governments' endeavours in foreign relations such as the commitment not to make recourse to force for settling controversies, to abstain from interferences and destabilizing practices in other countries, to combat international terrorism, etc....

7 - Scope and Characteristics of the Alliance. Membership Requirements and Functioning Modalities.

I - While membership has to be open to all the countries of the two shores plus the United States, and in some specific and very limited cases, to nations of the immediate hinterland, real accession would be made conditional upon the issuing by the interested countries of a formal declaration underlying their commitment to the universal principles of freedom, rule of law human rights and respect for international law. Moreover, in order to become Members, States must:

- have adhered to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and have declared their readiness to combat the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles;

- state to be ready to play a constructive role in the international community and to abide by behaviors which are consistent with efforts aimed at consolidating peace and security.

In no way accession can be attained by a country against which the UN Security Council has imposed sanctions. Furthermore, membership can at any time be suspended or repealed for those countries which do not respect UN Security Council Resolutions in full.

The above mentioned clauses constitute only conditions for any country's exerting the accession right to the Alliance, but not to enjoy full membership. This will depend on the extent to which countries perform good governance and pursue reform process towards market economy.

For their part, "northern" nations have to agree upon a common program to support reforms, consisting of both concessional aid and loans for: training; technical, managerial and banking assistance; transfer of know-how and technology; and investment facilitations and trade preferences with the general purpose of promoting a growing role for private sector and reducing statism and centralised economy.

II - The Alliance scheme should be flexible enough to reflect the realities of the region and the wide variety of situations existing

there, without however losing sight of the overall architecture and of its final goal, that is the creation of a more integrated community.

As there is no single model which can be fitted to the different Southern Rim nations, it is advisable that the Alliance's cooperative structure be based on a "variable geometry" approach. Some precautions should however be kept in mind while selecting specific options. The main one is not to put in motion anything which might be perceived as divisive or which could deepen rather than narrow disparities among southern countries. In this respect the recourse to the "hub-and-spoke" kind of agreement - which the EEC Commission is seemingly resorting to in implementing the "New Mediterranean Policy" - needs to be avoided.

It is inevitable that the EEC as such (including some specific southern European countries), and because of its economic and technological weight, its geographic proximity and its traditional interests, will function as a magnet, but both Europe and the United States should refrain from applying too different a provision to each "spoke" country. In the longer-term this approach would very likely generate frustration and rivalry among the less favored nations which will feel themselves discriminated against.

Graduation of incentives - which look necessary at the start to take into account the different situations existing in the region - should be conceived so as to foster at any time harmonisation and

other forms of agreement also among those countries which cannot fulfil conditions for full membership.

The other extreme too -that is the " Convoy " approach - has to be equally avoided, because it would inevitably slacken the speed of the integration process to the slowest member or sub-grouping, or it would spill over other countries problems pertaining to one of them (like the Libian case which is blocking the cooperative arrangement called "five plus five").

In order to meet such flexibility two possible alternatives remain available. The first - the concentric circles theory - puts hard core countries at the center of the structure around which bands of more loosely link countries gravitate as in a satellite system.

The second would instead consist of a string of "inner core" countries scattered in the different areas of the Region. The basic difference between the two approaches is that while in the first case countries are divided - by agreed standards- according to their respective degree of similarity or reforming capability, in the second case sub-groupings are shaped by geographical proximity or cultural and historical ties (i.e. the U.M.A. or even the sub-regional cooperative arrangement devised as a tool for the success of the Middle East peace process).

What appears in the last scheme is not the single country but the group which becomes at the same time the object and the subject of the cooperative process. No doubt that, to be fruitful and

vital each group needs to have economic complementarity, to develop trade relations among its members, and a distinctive comparative advantage to trade with other groups or external partners. This may not be always the case and it is up to the Alliance Steering Committee to adopt the appropriate corrective measures.

III - The formation of aggregations should be anyway encouraged within the framework of the Alliance. To this end the second alternative looks less contentious and easier to apply. It may provide the most suitable structure to foster the involvement of the largest number of countries. Specially smaller economies need to be part of sub-regional groupings in order for their voices to be heard and their interests to get greater protection in global negotiations.

As for the groupings composition more analysis and study should be done. Here, just as preliminary indications, one might suggest for further thought three basic sub-regionally groupings : respectively to the West, the South-East and to the East of the region. The first grouping could be made up of Portugal, Spain, France and Italy - as northern countries- and the so-called "Small Maghreb" countries (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia), as Southern Rim. The second grouping might be open to the membership of former Yugoslavia countries, Greece, Lybia, Egypt and Mauritania, which is included by the EEC among the African Pacific and Caribbean countries (APC). Lastly, the sub-regional grouping

associated with the Middle-East negotiating talks. Malta could be offered the choice to adhere either to the "western" or to the "central" grouping. Cross-participation could be allowed if that will be in the interest of the sub-grouping concerned, and/or for the success of the collective effort. This is certainly the case for the United States, the EEC as a whole, Egypt, France, Spain, Portugal and Italy. Although in the aftermath of the Israeli -PLO peace deal, Mid-Eastern group is bound to attract the greatest flows of financial and technical resources, it would be a mistake to direct all efforts to that area the exclusion of other groupings. An even handed attitude aimed at promoting greater openness and pluralization in the whole region would ensure a more solid consensus and support to the peace prospects in the Middle East by circumscribing hotbeds of radicalism and religious fanaticism.

8 - The Alliance's Priorities, Organizational Aspects and Operational Branches

The Alliance's basic strategy should encompass policies aimed at upgrading the standard of living of Southern Rim countries by ensuring a better balance between population growth and available resources. This brings about the concept of sustainable development and the need for assessing the environmental impact of development initiatives and more generally of any economic reforms. Social, cultural and scientific aspects and effects have to constitute an integral part of coordinated policies. While specific actions may well differ from country to country, the following "core" program should be retained as the key element of the Alliance's Strategy:

- advancing market reforms and privatisation of the economy;
- upgrading regional agricultural production in order to meet, to a greater extent, the food demand of local population;

- phasing in environmental compliance guidelines with industrial and economic restructuring;-
- creating new job opportunities specially for young people.

The huge support necessary to boost sustainable development in the area suggests to consider the Alliance as a kind of catalyst, and the initial contributions of "northern" members as seed money enabling to mobilize human and financial resources from other sources, both multilateral and bilateral. In this respect the Alliance, through its Steering Committee, should promote the establishment of an Inter-Agency Unit as well as of a Mediterranean Banking Institution.

9 - The Inter-Agency Unit.

The Inter-Agency Unit would be targeted to increase and coordinate the Multilateral Organisations' programs for the region. It should be a high-level, policy-oriented and interdisciplinary Group, jointly responsible with the Alliance's Steering Committee for planning, coordinating, and monitoring: It should be composed of a representative from each of the Institutions operating in the region (IBRD, IMF, FAO, EIB, IFAD, UNEP, etc.)

So far the Bretton Woods Institutions (IBRD and IMF) - account for nearly two thirds of the multilateral funds devoted to the Southern Mediterranean countries.

Their policies and practices thus colour very heavily multilateral development lending to the countries under review. The other main sources of multilateral finance to the region are in this order: the European Investment Bank, the African Development Bank and Fund, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, the Islamic Development Bank, the OPEC Special Fund, and the Arab Fund of Economic and Social Development. Those institutions help shape projects; they play a useful but not critical role in overall external financing to the Region.

There is a rather clear-cut distinction of roles and functions between the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, on the one hand, and development finance from the other multilateral sources, on the other. The Bretton Woods Institutions give priority to financial stabilization and structural adjustment and place a strong policy emphasis on both overall strategies and individual lending operations, whilst the other multilateral agencies are essentially geared to the support of individual projects, mostly on the basis of their financial technical and micro-economic merit.

The different policy objectives and vocation of the various institutions encourage the search for simultaneous actions to be closely coordinated from the outset. The World Bank and the EIB have recently jointly financed "the Environment Program for the Mediterranean", which might provide a good example for future joint ventures. The areas of interest of the two institutions have differed

somewhat: the World Bank focussed more on water, land and rural management issues through a broad range of agricultural and forestry projects, while the European Investment Bank has lent funds primarily for water management and pollution control..

The International Fund for Agricultural Development Region, the African Development Bank and Fund, and the Arab Fund of Economic and Social Development have achieved some success; overall lending however, has been so small that it has not had any noticeable impact on the key development issues and prospects of the Region. Their support could therefore be enhanced if their lending activity is carried out in parallel or jointly with that of the Bretton Woods Institutions. Actually, financial stabilization and project financing are two complementary activities to be closely intertwined and fine tuned with one another, so as to have an efficient and effective positive impact on the recipient country.

A distinction of role and different vocations among multilateral financial organizations operating in the area, can be of great advantage if the resulting mix of multilateral policy and project financing is adequately addressing, in a coordinated fashion, the priority issues..

The task of the Alliance's Committee would be to review, together with the Inter-agency Unit, how specific policies have so far responded to the most pressing problems of the area and how a concerted effort might better meet the coming challenges. The new

emphasis will have to be placed on region integration through cross-sectoral and cross-country initiatives with the aim of ensuring a consistent application of policy directives and guidelines in the various sub-groupings and also of helping in transferring the experience gained from one of those sub-groups to others.

10 - The Mediterranean Banking Institution

As to the Mediterranean Banking Institution, its creation would parallel other regional banks, such as the African Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank etc. The proposal of setting up the new Institution has been given further support by the establishment of the EBRD, so as to avoid that the diversion of multilateral funds towards the East would actually be detrimental to the European security in the Mediterranean.

Debt and development in Mediterranean Africa and Asia are a problem of common concern for Europe and Africa. A Regional Development Bank able to operate on the pattern of the Inter-American Development Bank and of the Overseas Co-operation Fund of Japan seems indispensable for channelling towards those countries new financial resources for infrastructural investments, and for supporting productive investments by means of insurance guarantees and co-financing.

The case for a strengthened and extended financial cooperation takes into account that, for many years to come, it will be difficult to expand exports from the countries of the Southern Rim toward the Northern Rim, even on the assumption that the ongoing "Uruguay Round" of multilateral trade negotiations has a favourable outcome.

However important and sizeable the global contribution of the existing Multilateral Institutions might be the countries of the region will continue to be adversely affected by severe population pressure, rapid demographic growth and acute unemployment. The migration flows stemming from rapid demographic growth and the increasing unemployment are causing heavy pressures on the labour markets of the countries of the Northern Rim of the Mediterranean region, especially France, Italy, Portugal and Spain.

Furhermore, the pressure on natural resources is causing severe environment degradation with implications for the entire Mediterranean region, especially in the area of water management. Thus, the real challenge for development and for development finance is how to address the employment and the environment issues in the countries of the Southern Rim. To this end a regional Bank might top up financial requirements.

- A Collective Effort to Cap with Environment Degradation Problem. A Strategy Outline.

Global issues, population and environment could be the first priority for enlarging the scope of North- South and regional cooperation, also taking profit of an expanded GEF (Global Environmental Facility) program. The draft of the environmental guidelines and prescriptions has to be re-examined on the basis of updated scientific and technological knowledge so as to set a platform for action in the next 10 years.

Key-elements of such platform must be the initiatives needed to counteract the impact on environment of the population explosion.

The European Investment Bank and the World Bank launched in 1990 an initiative to curb and try to reverse trends of environmental degradation in the Mediterranean, which proved that problems of water contamination by industry, particularly dispersed small and medium-scale industry, are especially complex because of the difficulties of monitoring pollution, enforcing standards, and predicting the viability of outmoded industry if environmental controls were required.

Pressures on land and forest resources are also directly related to the scarcity and quality of water resources. It is estimated that 10% of Tunisia's agricultural land has been affected by erosion,

in Morocco the figure is as high as 40 percent. The concentration of industry around major urban centers gives rise to a large part of urban air pollution in the region. Water scarcity and the mounting pollution of available surface water will continue to be the main environmental concern in many of the region's countries.

Urbanization also poses serious environmental challenges for the future. The rapid growth of megacities like Cairo creates an enormous need for management of water, wastewater, and solid waste. Industrial pollution and vehicle emissions lead to serious air quality problems. Removal of biological pollutants is one of the top urban environmental priorities, followed by initiatives to improve air quality.(1)

(1) For a more detailed description of environment degradation in Southern Rim countries see annex 2 to the Chapter.

An important ongoing activity - put forward by the two Banks joint initiative - is the Mediterranean Environmental Technical Assistance Program (METAP) which supports regional environmental programs and training, as well as the preparation of investment projects to be considered for bank financing. In addition to a second phase of METAP (Mediterranean Environmental Technical Assistance Program), regional activities under preparation include the Red Sea and the Gulf Environmental Action Plan

To cope with such global issue the Alliance for Progress must assure, as early as possible, the signing of a new Charter among Mediterranean countries for applying to the Region, through a compliance and enforcement timetable, the major Conventions approved at the Rio Summit.

More particularly, the Alliance has to manage to get the earmarking of a special fund for the Mediterranean out of the future GEF, after its pilot phase, which should address such issues, functioning as a mechanism to secure effective and efficient implementation of cooperation as well as appropriate financial resources. Likewise, a special section for the Mediterranean should be set up within the UN Commission on Sustainable Development. This in addition to a strengthened second three-year cycle of METAP with enlarged geographic coverage of Mediterranean countries and a greater emphasis on the coastal urban environment.

A legal framework should include the implementation of the following:

- a) The ratification of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change within this year;
- b) The early signing and ratification of the Convention on Biological Diversity;
- c) The early promotion of a convention to combat desertification;
- d) The implementation of the Statement of Principles on Forests and the promotion of dialogue on binding arrangements.

Besides further consideration should be given to the following points :

- a) Measures including economic means to control CO₂ emission;
- b) Protection and enhancement of existing sinks of CO₂, such as forests;
- c) Technological breakthrough and formation of an international comprehensive strategy to achieve it.

Concluding remarks

The Mediterranean represents an integral part of a strategy aiming at ensuring a solid foundation to world stability. The Region remains a key-element for the European security, while its stability is functional to any lasting and peaceful arrangement in the Middle East and the Gulf area.

Countries in the Southern Rim are now facing enormous challenges on many fronts, starting from the economic one.

Security and stability are more and more interlinked with social and human development. The southern shore continues to lag behind the pace of progress and wealth achieved by the northern shore of the Mediterranean.. The governments of the southern countries have to intensify the reform process to usher in political pluralism and market-oriented economy. However there is no chance that this effort will succeed without a sizeable and continuous support from the international community.

In order to reverse tendencies toward a corrosive climate of mistrust and to lay down the basis for a new partnership, a strong and credible initiative should be launched as early as possible seizing the unique opportunity provided by the Israel - PLO peace deal. The Alliance for Progress, however complex it might seem, offers a credible and viable intermediate step to gradually integrate the southern shore countries into the European development and security mechanisms.

The sub-regional cooperation which the breakthrough in the Middle-East peace process is beginning to trigger fits perfectly with the broader Alliance's scheme. If correctly applied, this scheme will allow to achieve a stronger market position and realize considerable effects of synergy. Economic progress will lay down the basis for pluralization and more open societies fully respectful of individual and collective rights, which are the necessary precondition for creating in the region a " community of destiny."

Annex one

The salient features of the major countries of the Southern Rim of the Mediterranean Region are as follows: (1)

ALGERIA : In spite of severe domestic difficulties, the Government has been pursuing a liberalization policy of the country's external sector as shown by the decision to facilitate joint ventures and to allow private savings in international currencies. If Algeria continues to pursue structural reforms and if oil prices do not fall any further, Algeria ought to be able to increase real growth and employment in a not too distant future.

CYPRUS : The Government's policy is addressed to the need of increasing competitiveness within the Single European Market, and places an emphasis on diversifying the economic base, fostering exports and protecting environment, especially the country's coastal waters.

(1) All informations and figures have been drawn from World Bank and other International Institutions publications.

EGYPT: It has been the beneficiary of a major debt reduction operation which has cut by nearly 50% its annual debt service obligations to official institutions of creditor countries.

Public finances remain weak with an overall deficit of 20% of GDP and the unemployment rate is extremely high. The challenge to policy makers is to accelerate the pace of reform, firmly establish the credibility of the programme and to elicit a supply and employment response.

LIBYA: It has benefitted from the increase in oil prices as well as from a strengthened and improved relationship with Algeria and Tunisia.

MALTA: It is continuing to develop an off-shore business center capability and to free foreign trade. This is being facilitated by the upgrading of infrastructures.

MOROCCO: the country has suffered from the decline in tourism due to the Gulf War (nearly 25%). Moreover, the world demand for Morocco's phosphate weakened considerably. In 1991, the negative impact of these developments was partly mitigated by a record cereal harvest, a major inflow of external assistance and good exports of agro-industrial products and manufactures.

In 1992, a severe drought had a negative impact on overall growth and depressed fiscal revenues, thus raising the budget deficit above the targets originally established in the Financial Law, in agreement with the international financial institutions.

TUNISIA : This country, too, was adversely affected by the Gulf crisis. Foreign exchange earnings from tourism decreased by 33% and other exports dropped. In addition, it might suffer from a reduction in U.S. assistance, due to her apparent pro-Iraq stand during the Gulf War. On the contrary, significant is the pace of domestic reform. The tax system has been made more efficient and equitable. The liberalization of trade and financial system are actively being pursued.

TURKEY : The new Government inherited a public sector deficit equivalent to 13% of GDP and a 70% annual inflation rate - two heavy legacies accentuated by the aftermath of the Gulf War. The external current account, however, shifted into surplus at the end of 1991, as a result of a sharp slowdown in economic activity and the receipt of special external grants as well as the export sector's success in finding new markets for its goods and services to replace those that had been lost in the Middle East because of the Gulf crisis. The Government has put forward a policy of accelerated reform and

privatization of public enterprises and of curtailment of the budget deficit.

Natural resources as development factors: (1)

FORESTS still cover 5% of the Mediterranean region. Flooding, erosion, desertification and silted dams are all on the increase in the South and East because of their over-exploitation. In the North, the rise in the number of fires, whether accidental or criminal in origin, and destruction in the face of urbanization are the main causes of deforestation. However the moderate trend scenario and the alternative scenarios indicate a future where the situation will be less dramatic: in the south it will probably continue its downward trend until 2000, then it will become stable before showing signs of improvement, from 2025 onwards; in the north, waste land will continue to gain ground and it will only be after 2000 that rehabilitation policies for these areas will begin to have an effect.

(1) All informations and figures have been drawn from " A Blue Plan for the Mediterranean People" and other International Institutions publications.

SOIL DEGRADATION is in danger of speeding up, particularly in southern countries. This is due to erosion in a region where steep slopes and lashing rain together contribute towards 35% of soil undergoing losses of between 5 and 50 tons per hectare per annum. All the scenarios show erosion of the Mediterranean countries' soil and the present incapacity to stop this process is one of the most worrying threats to the basin, which requires extremely long-term action and considerable funding.

WATER RESOURCES IN 2025. Good quality water resources are both the key condition and the limiting factor in Mediterranean development. All the scenarios, even the most optimistic, show the need for economising on water, and this all the more so as demand is subject to high seasonal increases which reach their peak in summer, contrary to the surface run-off pattern which is at its peak in winter.

THE COVETED COAST. The scenarios also emphasize the convergence and the combined effect of the different pressures on the coastal area. The coastal concentration or "littoralization" poses all the more problems in that the Mediterranean coastal strip is narrow. The coastal population, which was 133 million in 1985, should reach between 195 and 217 million by 2025. This concentration on the coast must be considered as a major handicap for

the basin's future. This coastal area is fragile. About 1 million hectares of wetlands have been destroyed there over the last fifty years or so. If this process continues, it is a process which will deprive the countries of one of their important ecological and economic assets.

THE SEA IN COMMON Some 600,000 tons of oil are spilt into the sea each year, and 30% of that reaches the coast and spoils the beaches. The Mediterranean is particularly polluted by plastics.

The safeguard of the sea and Mediterranean shores depends not only upon local preventive and protective measures, but also upon overall development and environment policies at a national level. The latter depend in turn upon economic and commercial links between those countries and all the others.

The alternative scenarios with strong North - South cooperation lead to a faster development of the southern and eastern countries; the scenarios with predominant South-South cooperation lead to a better overall balance. A combination of the two would probably offer the most favourable conditions for the protection of the Mediterranean region.

Environmental protection along the coastal strip will depend upon the way that urbanization, which will develop inevitably and rapidly is handled. Main efforts should focus on the management of water supplies on saving energy, on the elimination of toxic waste,

on the maintenance of a type of housing and architecture adapted to ecological and cultural conditions, on the creation of green spaces and on the protection of peri-urban agricultural land and historic urban centres.

Despite their political, economic and cultural differences the Mediterranean countries have understood the urgent need for concerted action in order to curb the deterioration of their living environment. All the bordering countries have come to an agreement, under the auspices of the United Nations Environment Programme, to develop together ways and means for working towards a better future.

As a result of the first United Nations Conference on the Environment at Stockholm in 1972, the United Environment Programme (UNEP) was set up. It was instrumental in launching, in 1975, the Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP), a voluntarist and exemplary programme of regional cooperation between all the bordering countries to save their common asset.

In 1990, the flow of long-term public and publicly guaranteed external capital to the countries of the Southern Mediterranean basin reached nearly \$ 10 billion, while official development assistance was less than \$ 3 billion and private non guaranteed external capital flows barely touched \$ 200 million.

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THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTHERN EUROPE
The Question of Migration

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At a time when the question of migration is asserting itself as one of the essential structural dimensions of the world situation, Southern Europe, on more grounds than one, finds itself directly affected.

Furthermore, Southern Europe, being a frontier area bordering the Mediterranean, after which an "other world" begins, is in fact where all the essential questions of our times flow together.

Indeed, if one looks at it from an economic perspective, the Mediterranean clearly marks the boundary between the North and the South of our world, at a time when the disparities between the two groupings — in favor of the North as all analyses attest — are becoming more accentuated.

If one looks at it from a geopolitical perspective, Southern Europe "functions" as a component of the European pole in relationship to the two other poles, North America and Japan, with which it is in competition.

If one looks at it from a strategic perspective, with the end of the East-West confrontation, the definition of a grouping going from "Vancouver to Vladivostock" necessarily makes Southern Europe into a frontier in a new context where, one way or another, the enemy which has "disappeared" in the East is — confusedly, certainly — seen as possibly lying to the South.

If one looks at it from a cultural perspective, in a world where, no matter what area of civilization is in question, the dynamic of identification is strengthening, or rather exacerbating, once again Southern Europe seems to be a frontier since the Mediterranean represents the break between East and West, or between Islam and Christianity.

It is, therefore, clear that two groupings are facing each other across the Mediterranean which are separated by many characteristics, even if others bring them together. For, indeed, it's worth saying that the notion of the Mediterranean as a space common to the two shores, like a shared inheritance in terms not just of basic economic, ecological, social, and cultural facts, but also of norms and values, is an undeniable reality which offers the necessary basis for cordial relations in many fields.

All the more so because movements of population throughout history, and especially in the contemporary period, have indisputably contributed to the birth of powerful links, currently taking the form of communities originating on the South of the Mediterranean which live on the North side.

Now, the migratory flows which have been the source of the establishment of these communities, after having for a long time been "taken for granted" by the partners of the region, are more and more perceived by them — and particularly in the North — as disturbing phenomena.

In any case, it appears that the Mediterranean problem must in the future more and more be structured, other than by the four

perspectives which we have already referred to, by the demographic perspective which appears to be, as the editors of the Plan Bleu write, "the most serious factor."¹

1- THE DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REGION

They can, in essence, be presented in the following table:²

Country	Population (millions)				Annual Rate of Population Growth		Fertility Rate (1991)
	1960	1991	2000	2025	1960/1991	1991/2000	
Portugal	8.8	9.9	9.9	10.1	0.4	0.1	1.5
Spain	30.5	39.0	39.6	60.8	0.8	0.2	1.4
France	45.7	57.0	58.8	40.6	0.7	0.4	1.8
Italy	50.2	57.7	58.1	56.2	0.5	0.1	1.3
Greece	8.3	10.2	10.3	10.1	0.6	0.2	1.5
North Shore	143.5	173.8	176.7	177.8			
Morocco	11.6	25.7	31.7	47.5	2.6	2.3	4.5
Algeria	10.8	25.6	32.7	51.8	2.8	2.7	5.4
Tunisia	4.2	8.2	9.8	13.4	2.2	1.9	3.6
Libya	1.3	4.7	6.4	12.9	4.0	3.4	6.5
Egypt	25.9	53.6	64.8	93.5	2.3	2.1	4.2
Turkey	27.5	57.2	68.2	92.9	2.4	2.0	3.6
South Shore	81.3	175.0	213.6	312.0			
North Shore =100	56.6	100.6	120.8	175.4			

The data presented are sufficiently eloquent, standing alone, and give a clear idea of the growing imbalance which characterizes the region as regards population.

More than the current data, it is the prospects which best illustrate the extent of the imbalance. It's thus that "of the 170 million additional people living on the shores of the

Mediterranean in 2025, 68 percent will have been born in an Arab country, 22 percent in Turkey, and only 10 percent in Europe."³

At the same point in time, Morocco will have a larger population than Spain, while Algeria and Tunisia, taken together, will have a larger population than France.

The situation within the region is all the more noteworthy because, compared to other parts of the world, it displays some significant differences.

It is thus that if one takes that essential indicator, the fertility rate, while in 1991 in the United States and Mexico, involved in the migration issue, it is 2.0 and 3.3 respectively, one notes that in the Mediterranean region it is at the same time higher in the South (ranging from 3.0 to 6.5) and lower in the North (from 1.3 to 1.8).

A last characteristic of these populations deserves to be pointed out: it concerns, once more, a very clear imbalance in their structure.

In the North the proportion of persons over 60, already high, is destined to grow and reach 20 percent in 2020, with a median age of 43.9 years (in 1970 it was 32.0), while at the same time in the South it will be only 12 percent, with a heavy proportion of young people.

On the basis of the demographic data alone, it clearly appears that, to use the terms of a French demographer, "because of the empty spaces that it creates, the demographic depression in the North constitutes a factor of attraction."⁴

Now if one integrates into this analysis the economic

prospects of the region, this hypothesis takes on still more significance.

2- THE REGION'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS

The principal economic and social indicators for the region are presented summarily in the following table:⁵

Country	Human Development Index		GNP Per Capita (in dollars)		Share of Agriculture in GNP (%)	Secondary School Enrollment Ratio
	Rank	Value	1991	Growth Rate 89/90		
France	8	0.971	20600	1.8	3	97
Italy	22	0.924	18580	2.1	3	78
Spain	23	0.923	12460	2.9	5	100
Greece	25	0.902	6230	1.2	17	97
Portugal	41	0.853	5620	2.7	-	53
Turkey	73	0.717	1820	2.9	18	51
Libya	87	0.658	-	-	-	-
Tunisia	93	0.600	1510	1.2	18	44
Algeria	107	0.528	2020	-0.8	13	61
Morocco	119	0.433	1030	1.6	19	36
Egypt	124	0.389	620	2.0	18	81

Once more the difference between the two shores of the Mediterranean is clear and speaks for itself.

The prospects for the region, despite a context of a crisis which is hitting both shores, only reinforce the present trends since, quite obviously, whatever the difficulties which the north shore will confront, it is the South shore that will be burdened by the most serious constraints, notably by the growing burden of unemployment, as the following analysis underlines:

Unemployment is a serious economic, social, and political phenomenon throughout the region. More than 15 percent of the active population is unemployed in the countries of the Maghreb, in Egypt, and in Iran, while in Jordan and in Yemen the unemployment rates exceed 25 percent. The consequences of past demographic growth will continue to show up as extraordinary increases in the working age population during the next 20 years. If the region is to find social stability thanks to the productive employment of those currently unemployed and of the work force that will enter the labor market in the future, the rhythm and the nature of economic growth must evolve considerably compared to what they have been in the recent past.⁶

It appears that the region is destined to have a notable migration problem because, given the constraints upon the South shore, the positive effects of the results that can be expected from the processes of adjustment that are in train will make themselves felt only in the long term, and will certainly not absorb the labor supply destined to enter the market.

As is underlined by the *World Report on Human Development* of 1992, "migratory pressures will continue to be experienced unless the South develops. Economic opportunities — better access to world markets and to foreign direct investment — must travel to reach these peoples, if they cannot travel to reach them."⁷

More than for any other region of the world, this analysis is valid for the Mediterranean, especially because of the

intensity of the relations which have existed there for a long time, and which have created situations which are henceforth irreversible.

3- CONTEMPORARY MEDITERRANEAN MIGRATIONS: FORMER REALITIES⁸

For numerous years, particularly since the beginning of this century, South to North migration has taken place, especially in the framework of the former colonial relationship.

In fact, of all the countries of Southern Europe, only France was a country of immigration, coming especially from this region. The others were all countries of emigration, including emigration in the direction of France.

Starting with the 1960s, the region witnessed a new migration, deriving from the South shore of the Mediterranean, but in the direction of a country of Northern Europe: from Turkey to Germany.

At present, in differing degrees, the countries on the North of the Mediterranean play host to communities deriving from the South shore of the Mediterranean, although the only one for which they represent a statistically important reality is France, in which the community of Maghrebian origin is on the order of 1.5 million people, of whom 500,000 are workers.

In Spain and Italy communities with origins on the South of the Mediterranean (mainly the Maghreb and Egypt) are beginning to take on meaningful size, on the order of 200,000 in each country.

The Turkish community, on the order of 2 million in Europe as a whole, is concentrated mainly in Northern Europe, in

Germany, where 1,700,000 Turks live.

But the countries of Southern Europe are not affected solely by flows coming from the countries bordering on the Mediterranean; it is proper to mention as well the flows coming from sub-Saharan Africa (especially in France, on the order of 150,000, Italy, around 50,000, and Portugal, around 30,000).

Finally, it is proper to mention that aside from the number of foreign nationals originating on the South shore, for obvious historic reasons a significant number — unfortunately hard to quantify — of European citizens, French especially, has its origins on the South of the Mediterranean, with which it maintains connections, especially cultural connections, which are often complex (the phenomena of the second and third generations, "beurs"...).

That is to say that for one country at least, France, immigrant communities deriving from the South shore of the Mediterranean are not a new fact but, very much to the contrary, well established social realities.

That raises the following question: why, for several years now, but with a sharpness that grows as time passes, have the collection of phenomena connected to the migration problem become essential elements in the debates going on both within the societies concerned and also in the relations between the states involved.

4- CONTEMPORARY MEDITERRANEAN MIGRATION; SOME NEW QUESTIONS

Three major questions form the structure of the new migration problem in the region:

•The first is relative to the perception of the crisis, postulated as of an economic nature, and as such a durable phenomenon from which the region will not emerge for a long time.

It is noteworthy that this perception of the crisis is held by the most diverse groups, and as much in the North as in the South of the region.

That is because, in the North, starting with an overall withdrawal reflex, reinforced by the conviction that in the South the conditions for economic growth are not ready to be brought together and therefore that the migratory flows are destined to continue and even to grow, it is no longer a question, as a French official said, "of taking in all the misery in the world."

•The second regards the change in the nature of migration which, long lived with as a transitory phenomenon, is more and more perceived as a durable phenomenon which straightforwardly poses the question of the integration of the populations concerned.

That said, in the South as well the dominant perception of migration is of a departure which, if not definitive, is at least likely to be long lasting.

All that has been said, as much in the North as in the South, regarding voluntary departure or reinsertion is today clearly perceived to be applicable only to a very restricted number of individual cases.

That is why, in the North, there is a progressive change in attitude, because, once an "invited worker" (*Gastarbeiter*, to use the German term), the immigrant has become the person with whom

one is destined to live.

Furthermore, the picture gets more complicated because cohabitation is necessary not just with the worker himself, but also with his family, given that family reunification gives him the right to have them come.

•The third regards the redefinition of the relations prevailing in the region which, like all other regions, is affected by the new world situation, dominated by the end of the East-West confrontation.

Looked at this way, the question of migration is directly involved, especially by the new European situation which makes Central and Eastern Europe, one way or another, a "natural extension" of the structure that is being built in the West.

Long the principal reservoir of potential migration, the South of the Mediterranean is squarely confronted by the "competition" from Eastern Europe, which benefits, in addition, from a "cultural proximity premium."

These new considerations all contribute to redefining the problem of migration in the region in the sense, very clearly, of a new phase, to come, in relation to which the events which today we are experiencing, are analyzable in terms of a transition dominated by three major themes, those of identity, of security, and of cooperation.

5- THE QUESTION OF MIGRATION AND IDENTITY

The whole debate going on in the North about the question of migration is also, one way or another, a debate regarding the

relations which Europe ought to maintain with Islam.

For — and this is a fundamental characteristic of the debate — it is clearly perceived that the extra-European flows of immigrants, whether they come from the Southern shore of the Mediterranean or from sub-Saharan Africa, come from Muslim societies. They therefore pose the question of relations with the culture of the host countries.

The presence of Muslim communities on European soil, which has existed for the long time, makes European Islam a tangible reality: currently it ranks as the second religion in three important countries of the Community, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.

The number of Muslims in all of the countries of the European Community is currently estimated at around 7 million. An important proportion of these are citizens of the member states, and therefore, on the basis of the Maastricht Treaty, of the European Community.

Given the general context of exacerbated emphasis on identity, it is evident that Europe cannot help being affected, as is shown by the more and more open manifestations of xenophobia and racism.

The social strata affected by the economic recession constitute an especially favorable medium for the incubation and development of these feelings, for which immigrants in general, and Muslim immigrants in particular, constitute preferred targets.

In such a context, obviously, migratory flows deriving from

the South of the Mediterranean are very much at risk because they run into active resistance in the societies concerned. The resistance is all the stronger because it is manipulated by political forces which often have extremist agendas, and for which immigration is an "easy" topic with the potential for yielding immediate results.

The new European situation created by the Maastricht Treaty poses the question of European identity. This, at least judging by the texts, has never been envisaged as being of a religious nature, "Christian," for example. If the Maastricht Treaty makes reference to "common values" (notably in Title V, Article J 1, point 2, regarding the objectives of the common foreign and security policy), the concept appears to be sufficiently broad so that a spiritual message like Islam can quite fully accept it.

That said, the dominant perception of Islam in Europe is often of an essentialist and static nature. It does not sufficiently take into account the dynamics affecting Islam as a spiritual message and sum of individual and collective practices, and also, and especially, the Muslim communities. These communities are, in Europe, inserted in a new context of developed industrial societies, which cannot help but influence all their perceptions and attitudes.

In any case, if the question of identity is important in and of itself, it is also important from another perspective, that of security, which, often in an implicit but more and more in an explicit way, is brought up in connection with the question of migration.

6- THE QUESTION OF MIGRATION AND SECURITY

Over the course of the last few years, the question of migration has progressively become part of a new field of discussion, that related to security.

First of all there were the problems of internal security as seen by the host countries; then — and this was an essential turning point — the problems of security in a broader sense, implying a set of problems in terms of international relations.

This evolution, extremely important for its direct and indirect, immediate and distant consequences, derives fundamentally from a new understanding of the concept of security, which broadens its meaning in two directions:

- It can no longer be limited to the military field alone, and necessarily involves others such as the economy, ecology, and culture, to mention only the most important.

- It can no longer be limited to the state alone as principal and often sole operator, since civil society more and more considers itself as the party that has to pay the bill.

As a result of this new double connotation, migration is immediately put in question, first of all because it is seen as involved in the problem of identity.

In this regard, voices are raised on the North shore of the Mediterranean, denouncing immigration as an "invasion" especially because the actual or potential flows come from Muslim countries, and raise the issue of the nation's identity, both for its own sake, and as component of the general perception of security.

In that perception, immigration "functions" as a "fifth column," putting itself at the service of foreign interests — in this case, Islam.

In reality the links between the communities originating on the South shore and their countries of origin are far from being as strong and open to exploitation as such perceptions suggest. In fact, it increasingly appears that the migratory processes are escaping the control of the sending countries, particularly in a context of political crisis and of growing strength of the black economy.

In such conditions, it is difficult to imagine that, as a rule, the migrant is transformed into an agent. He would be operating for the account of a state with which he has less and less connection, and from whose policies, plainly, he has often fled.

Nevertheless, reductive perceptions of the immigrant exist, and it is thus that in an analysis that may be marginal but which has the merit of frankness, it is written that:

...the twenty-first century could once again find Islam at the gates of Vienna, as *immigrants or terrorists if not as armies*. Indeed, *massive Islamic immigration* into France may already have reversed Charles Martel's victory in 732 at the Battle of Tours.⁹

The hierarchy introduced by the author is highly significant because it postulates a neat gradation going from the immigrant to the terrorist and then to the soldier of an enemy army.

Such attitudes exist in certain milieus on the North shore,

even if often they are not made explicit with the same clarity. They, too, contribute to the emergence of tensions in the region.

Fundamentally, they stem from analyses of a more general character. These, in their turn, have their origin in new evaluations of the world strategic situation in the aftermath of the end of the East-West confrontation. These evaluations make the South into the new enemy — at least potentially.

The fact is that the new strategic space ranging from Vancouver to Vladivostock is, with the exception of its American portion, flanked to the South, for the most part, by the area of Islamic civilization. Many of that area's tendencies are perceived as disturbing, particularly since the change of regime in Iran and the recovery of dynamism by the Islamist movements.¹⁰

Aside from factors of a purely political and security nature, social and economic factors — especially the enormous, inverted, differences in the demographic and economic potentials — are involved in the perception of the area of Islamic civilization. For in fact the real problems on the South shore of the Mediterranean lie at this level of economic and social conditions, as the Communiqué of the Atlantic Council held in Rome in November 1991 recognized. In its analysis they are the sources of Islamic radicalism.

That is why the problems of security are always closely connected to those linked to cooperation in all the approaches being made at the regional level and, above all, of course, the proposal for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, as well the so called "5 plus 5" framework — both

stili in an embryonic stage.

Now, it appears that hereafter in these approaches to cooperation the migratory phenomenon will constitute an essential dimension, in a way a "passage obligé."

7- THE QUESTION OF MIGRATION AND COOPERATION

Aside from what is going on at the regional level, it is by now agreed at the world level that only policies that get to the root of the problem are capable of coping with the migratory logic that is expressed in the formula of the French demographer Alfred Sauvy: "If wealth doesn't go where men are, men will go where the wealth is."

This key idea is very widely shared within the region,¹¹ in the North as much as in the South, but without so far having had particularly tangible results in terms of cooperation. This has led to the Maghreb being described, in a Spanish official document, as a "time bomb."¹²

Indeed, the gaps in development and in living standards between the two sides of the Mediterranean — which in the opinion of all experts are still growing¹³ — are clearly perceived by now, in the North and the South, as no longer susceptible to "routine management," which would certainly lead the region to face, inevitably, serious tensions.

It is thus that, among other illustrations of this new awareness at the European level, the "Renewed Mediterranean Policy" has been developed. It has as its starting point a perception expressed at several points in terms which are

significant:

Considering that the pressure of migration will be all the more massive and uncontrollable if the European Community does not establish **new and more equitable** trade relations with Mediterranean third parties, and does not institute **cooperation that is quantitatively and qualitatively different from that of the past** in order to contribute to the development and growth of these countries.¹⁴

In addition, the theme of migration is, at the highest level, assuming a growing importance in the European institutional vision, as these extracts from a document which is particularly valuable in this regard illustrate, among them one of the points entitled, "to act on the migratory pressure: to take migration into account in the foreign policy of the Community," which includes, among others, the following recommendation:

That is why the Community should make explicit in its future cooperation agreements where it is clearly necessary, the dimension of migration, dealing with aspects such as:

...the examination in each of the countries involved of the questions relating to the maintenance in its zone of origin of the population that might potentially emigrate.¹⁵

It appears, therefore, that on the European side, at the level of positions of principle, an overall vision is in the process of being born, of emerging progressively, while at the same time recognizing the difficulties inherent in the process of

European construction and especially those deriving from the Maastricht Treaty.

On the South side, taken as a whole, it is clear that there is no common perception of the problems connected with migration, whether in general or in connection with the prospects for cooperation between the two sides. It is as if only national interests were involved, despite the efforts — often purely formal — to develop common positions.

From this point of view, the serious crisis which the Union of the Arab Maghreb (which remains a formal framework, without real content) is experiencing, has obvious repercussions for the question of migration,¹⁶ even though it should be a priority theme par excellence as regards both cooperation between the member states and that to be promoted with Europe.

That is why, at the multilateral level, no notable action deserves to be singled out. The rare actions undertaken are only in their beginning stages, without real prospects for cooperation taking shape.¹⁷

This is true even though all the countries on the South shore are experiencing serious economic difficulties in a context strictly defined by structural adjustment programs, with social consequences that are difficult to cope with, much less manageable, because they involve a growing number of persons who are left out, and who therefore are tempted by any adventure, including the most destabilizing.

Face to face with this situation, in the concrete economic reality the only forces operating are the rigors of the market,

whose logic prevails; the principal index is the flow of direct investments.

From this point of view, the performances of the countries on the South of the Mediterranean are, looked at on the global scale — an obligatory reference given the levels reached by the internationalization of the economy — exceedingly modest; for example, over the four years 1987-90, with investments amounting to \$4,375 million, attracted less capital than Portugal (\$4,795 million), Argentina (\$4,792 million), Malaysia (\$5,972 million), and Thailand (\$5,389 million).¹⁸

On the same point a European source sums up the situation well in the following terms:

I draw your attention to the miraculous performance of tiny Asian countries like Singapore and even Malaysia, which in the past ten years have been able to attract *more private investment than all the Mediterranean countries combined*.¹⁹

By now the figures speak for themselves. It is clear that, without an overall, long-term vision, necessarily involving on the part of all the partners a sharpened awareness of their real common interests, the risks of regional disaster are great.

If the processes that are dominant on the world level must also be relevant to the region, and should be well understood, they must not in any case be the only ones at work, or the risk is that the effect will be the opposite of what is sought.

An overall and coherent approach to the problems, especially the economic and social problems, of the region, is indispensable, all the more because the medium and long term

prospects, far from being totally under control, are certainly laden with new questions and therefore with new evaluations of the facts as we now know them.

8- THE QUESTION OF MIGRATION AND REGIONAL PROSPECTS

If migration is now an active issue in the Mediterranean, it is already established that it will continue to be one for a long time to come, thus becoming a structural dimension of the regional problem, whose prospects will necessarily be influenced by it, however it may develop.

In the North, four great key ideas are destined to mark the path of the prospects of the countries involved:

- The difficulties connected with the necessary adaptations to the worldwide changes that the economies will experience, with all their consequences for society.

If, in the short and medium terms, these difficulties seem inevitable, it is not at all to be excluded that in a later phase a recovery will take place, resulting especially from the effects expected from the process of integration that is in course.

It is, however, appropriate to note — and this is a new and important fact — that a resumption of growth does not necessarily imply a sharp reduction in the rate of unemployment,²⁰ and therefore, in this field which is directly connected with the problems of migration, because of the tendency of the labor market, tensions will persist which will continue to have a negative impact on the view taken in the North of migratory flows, whether actual or potential.

•The pursuit of the process of European construction, in the prospects opened up by the Maastricht Treaty.

In this regard it is appropriate to ask oneself what real content to accord to the concept of Southern Europe, inasmuch as quite clearly, important issues, and therefore the question of migration in particular, are more and more being raised to Community level.²¹

Besides, the specialization which would consist in making the Southern European countries the designated interlocutors with the South shore can be subject to debate in an approach centered on the primacy of a common European vision, in which the countries of Northern Europe "have their piece to speak."²²

Nevertheless, it is clear that the countries of Southern Europe will continue to enjoy considerable autonomy, permitting them to define their own positions with regard to the relations they intend to maintain with their neighbors on the South shore. But it is just as clear that this autonomy must necessarily be redefined within the European institutional framework which will progressively assert itself, despite its current "stammering."

•The growing emergence of Europe as a worldwide pole, in competition with the two other, American and Asiatic, poles, forming thus what is by now called "the Triad."

The political as well as economic prospects opened up by the Treaty on European Union are going to produce a general dynamic that will benefit Europe but whose effect might be spoiled in a context where internationalization imposes its norms and where the two other competing poles are very energetic.²³

The policies which these two poles follow with regard to their immediate neighbors,²⁴ that is, their immediate South, constitute for Europe an index of their will to deal in a dynamic manner with constraints that are just as complex as those which confront Europe.

As for the countries of Southern Europe, despite the strong solidarity that ties them to the other European countries in the framework of the European Union, they also, nonetheless, remain subject to the rigors of European and worldwide competition, in which they are not always the strongest performers.

- The persistence of European demographic decline with acute problems especially in matters of social welfare, given the growing aging of the population.

That said, the population prospects, which show clearly the aging as well as very weak growth of the population, do not automatically lead to the conclusion that it is necessary to draw on the population outside Europe.

However, it is generally agreed that for particular segments of the population, especially skilled labor, Europe will have need of external resources. In this field, like others, it will be in competition with the other worldwide poles, as is underlined by this analysis:

Due to the demographic process in Europe and due to the urgent need for human resources in the next century, the EC will have to *compete worldwide* for mobile professionals, highly qualified workers, and specialists. Racism and xenophobia are definitely self-defeating, because they

repulse the kind of (complementary) human resources *Europe* will desperately need!²⁵

In the South, the problem is structured around three key ideas:

- The persistence and probably the aggravation of the economic difficulties encountered, one way or another, by all the countries.

The most disturbing problem will be that of unemployment. In no significant case will the unemployment rate be held within levels compatible with making it possible to manage society without major dysfunctions. The structural adjustment programs that are being implemented, leading to the spread of the market economy, imply changes that will be difficult, particularly in the context of a reduction in available financial resources.

- Demographic growth continues at relatively elevated rates, despite the downward trend that can be discerned.

The fundamental process of demographic transition, generally begun on the South shore, in different degrees depending on the country, does not eliminate the extremely severe constraints that already exist. Thus, the annual rate of growth of the active population should be in the neighborhood of 4 percent, a rate which implies an extremely high rate of economic growth if employment is to be maintained, on the order of 10 percent per year, which is in actual fact impracticable.

In these circumstances, there is every reason to believe that the migratory potential of the South shore will continue to be very high and directed toward the nearest rich countries, that

is, those of Southern Europe.

- A context of political crisis with serious risks of instability that could trigger explosions in certain countries.

This is a direct consequence of the two series of phenomena already cited, of an economic and demographic nature, as well as other, political, factors tied, in a more specific manner, to the history of the different countries.

The profound crisis of legitimacy which the political élites are experiencing, especially as a result of the clear failures of the development policies they have followed, is leading in certain cases to a true crisis of the state, which is incapable of accepting the need for a new division of economic and political powers after a long period in which nothing changed.

In such conditions the answers offered by Islamism more and more appear, especially for many persons who have been excluded from power, like an acceptable wager, given the impossibility of moving in other directions.

If one combines all of the key ideas that form the structure of the regional problem, it is clear that it will be pervaded, quite obviously, by the migration issue.

For, aside from all the potential economic migrants, and they are numerous, the prevalent instability on the South shore can lead to migration in response to other motivations, but whose effect will be the same: to reinforce the pressure of migration on Europe.

In this regard, it's best not to exaggerate excessively the possible impact, in terms of massive migration, of the political

changes that could take place in certain countries of the South shore. In fact, it is happening as if the process were already begun, and was being done "drop by drop," especially in the milieus that consider that a political explosion, of the "Islamic Republic" type, for example, would damage their interests or lead to practices contrary to their principles.

In any case, it seems difficult to imagine massive migrations from the South shore to the North shore because they would pose extremely complex, if not insurmountable, problems in the context of European societies.

A less concentrated and more permanent increase of the pressure of migration on Europe seems more plausible and, in fact, poses a serious problem for the South shore, for the increase might be made up of the most dynamic elements in its societies, those who often have a combination of skills, spirit of enterprise, and capital. This loss of resources would be extremely prejudicial for the South shore. It would aggravate the crisis, generating new migratory pressures; a true "vicious circle" might develop.

Another important migration problem deserves to be pointed out, for it will, more and more, directly affect both shores of the region: migration from sub-Saharan Africa.

The extraordinary migratory potential of Africa is directed more and more at Europe, and necessarily "encounters" North Africa "along the way," whether as a transit area, an intermediate stop, or even, often "against the will," as a final destination.

What has been going on for some years will intensify in the future. In the very first place the countries of the Maghreb are going to find themselves faced with a problem of migratory flows from sub-Saharan Africa, involving not only economic migrants, but also those driven by ecological and political motives.

This complex situation challenges the two shores of the Mediterranean, for which it should be a cause of concern but also be turned into an opportunity for cooperation, in a triangular approach (North shore, South shore, and sub-Saharan Africa). It is proper right now to think of the outline of such cooperation. Without such a vision, the situation runs the risk of quickly getting out of control and of complicating still further the details of the problems of all kinds that affect North Africa, and whose consequences in terms of migration toward Europe are evident.

Since the question of migration is destined to remain, for a very long time, one of the fundamental elements of the Mediterranean problem, it is appropriate to understand its new stakes.

9- THE NEW STAKES OF THE QUESTION OF MIGRATION

The region around the Mediterranean is, for several reasons, important for, at least typical of, the world order toward which we are heading.

We would like to take as proof of this the fact that it "includes" all the principles of North-South relations as they are stated by Francis Fukuyama:

In many respects, the historical and post-historical worlds will maintain parallel but separate existences, with relatively little interaction between them. There will, however, be several axes along which these worlds will collide. The first is oil which was the background cause of the crisis caused by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait....The second axis of interaction is less visible than oil presently but *in the long run perhaps more troublesome: migration*....The final axis of interaction between the two worlds will be over certain "world order questions."²⁶

Indeed, whether it's a question of immigration (our subject), energy, or questions relative to the world order (such as sensitive weapons, the example used by Fukuyama in his book), the Mediterranean is "on the agenda."

That reflects the degree to which it is a sensitive area, and furthermore that, in a world where cultural factors are more and more pertinent, it is the meeting place for two great areas of civilization which have contributed a great deal to humanity.

How then can so sensitive an area, one that has almost a symbolic value, transform itself into a place for intercourse rather than confrontation?

Seen in the light of the problem of migration which we are discussing, the answer is connected to four major propositions:

- The first is that there must be a new, completely transformed vision of cooperation in the region.

It is clear that the approaches utilized heretofore are ineffective and have produced only mediocre results, at least

below the level of the expectations and objectives connected with the problems that exist.

First of all, an overall vision in terms of common interests, which takes into account the imperatives of the internationalization of the economy, must prevail. From this point of view, the South shore should be treated as an opportunity for Europe, as a condition for its functioning as a worldwide pole. The South shore and most especially the Maghreb no longer be seen as a brake on the functioning of the European pole but, on the contrary, as an integral part of its basic mechanisms.

It is paradoxical to hear Europe complaining about the competition from the Asiatic pole when, by its direct investments in the framework of the process of globalization, perversely, it itself nourishes that pole and contributes to the support of the crisis it is suffering from.²⁷

If the logic of the market must remain the prevailing logic, it should not, in any case, be the only one. It must, necessarily, be part of an overall vision based on the balances to be maintained in the region.

The institutionalized process of bilateral and multilateral cooperation, just as the economic exchanges between private operators, must be directed by arbitration and incentive mechanisms of a macro- and micro-economic character, taking account of the effects, in terms of reducing migratory pressures, expected from all investments.

•The second proposition is to make the migration issue

explicit in the relations prevailing at the regional level, making it an official, fully accepted dimension thereof.

The objective should be progressively to arrive at first control of, then management of, the migratory flows and of all the questions to which they are connected.

In this regard, just as in the North the migration issue is more and more becoming an element in foreign policy, it should in the South become a dimension giving structure to the regional action to be taken, both bilaterally and multilaterally.

In numerous instances throughout the world, ideas are emerging going in the direction of a controlled regulation of migratory flows that would not be just left to the laws of the market.²⁸

Besides, going in the direction of these theses, the French President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, answering a question about the opposed, liberal, theses, declared:

No, economics are secondary compared to politics.

Certainly the enterprise has a very great role to play but it cannot regulate political and social life. To let the market regulate the great human movements that migrations are would be *ineffective and catastrophic*.²⁹

This point of view is widely shared and it is thus that two authors whom we have already referred to, advance the proposition of a "General Agreement on Migration Policy" (GAMP), which in their opinion would have a double objective, which they present in the following manner, making explicit reference to the Mediterranean:

Ideally a GAMP should seek (i) to reduce income differences through increased economic growth in the potential emigration countries, (ii) to create new additional employment opportunities in the home countries of potential migrants.³⁰

The formulation of the problem of migration remains inadequate, however, if it does not go further by treating it in all its aspects, which alone will permit an assumption of responsibility that is equal to the requirements of the future.

•The third proposition will, then, be that of the formulation of a regional problem in the domain of human resources, ranging from population to education and training, and to employment. For in fact immigration comes into the picture only at the end of the "chain," for which it represents a "negative way out" since it results from the failure to control the three "links" of which it is composed.

That is why, at least at the regional level, the objective should be to arrive at a "General Agreement on Human Resources Policy" (GAHRP) as indispensable complement of the GAMP. The question of human resources is important for several reasons and, especially, because it conditions the capacity of the South shore to become a particularly effective partner in worldwide competition.

The central link at this level is the system of education and training. The crisis it is passing through in the countries on the South of the Mediterranean is the most evident index of the more general crisis they are undergoing and which leaves them

few positive prospects as regards economic growth.

The attraction for European investors of the Asian countries is in part explained by the quality of their labor force and therefore, necessarily, of their system of education and training.

At present the rigors of the structural adjustment programs on the South shore are striking hard at their education and training systems, which were already quite disturbed, and are reducing them to institutions which more and more have a formal mission which is distant from the most elementary requirements of international standards.

That is why only their reinsertion in the very center of the problem of regional cooperation can give them again the rhythm necessary for them to match the economic dynamics to be put in place.

•The fourth proposition is the integration of the migrants from the South bank in the societies of the North.

This is also an important dimension of regional cooperation since, one way or another, the countries of the South shore have a role to play in order to aid the best insertion possible of the communities henceforth installed on the North shore.

For indeed it's worth saying that the return to their countries of origin of the migrants who have come from the South shore can involve only individuals and groups of limited size, and, in consequence, can no longer appear to be a realistic proposition.

Behind the different and very complex questions which

integrating communities originating on the South shore into their host societies raise, there lies a great anxiety regarding Islam.

If European Islam is by now a reality, it is also evident that it is far from being fully integrated in the societies where it exists, and it continues to stimulate questions and, in certain cases, fears. Now these feelings often arise from the misunderstanding, if not ignorance. Just as often the Muslim communities in Europe, and also their communities of origin, the "sending countries," are in the same situation vis-a-vis European cultures.

Whence the importance of the cultural dimension in the process of regional cooperation envisaged from the point of view of the migration question. It is the condition "sine qua non" of any dialogue between the two sides.

In this regard, the notion of Confidence Building Measures in the Mediterranean, put forward in the common document of the Northern countries which proposed a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, and inspired by the notion of Confidence Building Measures born in the context of East-West relations, should, if it is to be retained as a working hypothesis, be reviewed and adapted both to the conditions prevailing in the region and to the new stage of history.

In this sense, it is clear that the notion of confidence presumes, as a necessary and difficult preliminary, real mutual knowledge, without which nothing can be done, and also concrete measures addressing the problems that exist in the region.

The "sequels" left by the Gulf War in the collective

consciousness of the South side, as well as the negative perception of the European "management" of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, which has gravely damaged the interests of the Muslim population of Bosnia, and of the throbbing Palestinian problem, the true original rupture, at least in the contemporary period: all these demonstrate that the relations between the two sides depend on an overall approach that takes into account the real challenges that exist. For, in the final analysis, beyond the problems connection to the question of migration, and they are numerous and complex, it is the stability of the entire region that is at stake.

An essential phenomenon of the end of this century, and certainly destined to affect the century to come, international migration has no intrinsic meaning but serves as an indicator, a magnifying glass that permits us to follow better the realities that are involved. In the Mediterranean, it teaches us that the existing imbalances are often too great and the perceptions of the problem too remote, to endure, unless the two sides are led to some reassessments which will certainly be costly and painful — leaving open, for the time being, perhaps, the hypothesis of a divorce.

That is why the strategic wager for all the partners involved consists in adopting, from now on, the changes that are necessary, and not having them imposed later in conditions that will be more and more difficult, or even impossible.

NOTES

1. Michel Greno and Michel Batisse, eds., *Le Plan Blue: Avenir du Bassin Méditerranéen* (Paris: Economica, 1988), 8.

2. Several sources have been used for the demographic data, notably: UNDP, *Human Development Report 1993* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993); FNUAP, *Etat de la population mondiale 1993* (New York, 1993); *Demographic Statistics 1992* (Luxembourg: Eurostat, 1992); UNFPA, *Meeting the Population Challenge* (New York); Leon Tarbeh, *Demographic Imbalance Between the Countries of the Mediterranean Basin* (report presented to the Council of Europe); *L'Europe dans le mouvement démographique* (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, Cellule de prospective, June 1990).

3. Rafic Boustani and Philippe Fargues, *Atlas du monde arabe: Géopolitique et société* (Paris: Bordas, 1990), 39.

4. Jean Claude Chesnais, "L'évolution démographique, facteur de déséquilibre international: La fracture méditerranéenne" (communication presented to the conference on "Sécurité collective en Méditerranée et au Moyen Orient" held in Brussels, 5-6 November 1991, by the Centre d'Etudes de Défense), 7.

5. Several sources have been used for the economic and social data, notably: UNDP, *Human Development Report 1993* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993); World Bank, *Rapport Annuel 1992* (Washington); *World Bank Atlas 1992* (Washington).

6. World Bank, *Annual Report 1992*, 163.

7. UNDP, *Rapport Mondial sur le Developpement Humain 1992*, 64.

8. For the data regarding immigration in Europe several sources have been used, notably: *Portrait social de l'Europe* (Luxembourg: Eurostat); *Tenth IOM Seminar on Migration*, 15-17 September 1992 (Geneva); European Community, *Le Courrier ACP*, no. 129 (Sept.-Oct. 1991); several internal documents of the Commission of the European Communities in Brussels.

9. William S. Lind, "Defending Western Culture," *Foreign Policy* 84 (Fall 1991): 45. On the same argument, see the article by Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs*, v. 72, n. 3.

10. It is worth recalling in this regard the notion of a "new arc of crisis" applied to the zone running from North Africa to Central Asia.

11. Indeed, by now it is among the most generally accepted ideas on the handling of the migration question, as is demonstrated by our earlier quotation from the *World Report on Human Development 1992* (see note 7).

12. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Spain), "L'Europe et le Maghreb: Rapport." Madrid, 26 February 1992.

13. The document of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs which we have just quoted points out, with regard to the Western Mediterranean, that:

Whether one likes it or not, this geographical contiguity produces a strong interdependence between the

North and South shores of the Western Mediterranean, which contrasts with the *growing* economic imbalances between the two. [Our emphasis]

14. European Parliament, "Resolution A 3 - 121/91 on a Revived Mediterranean Policy (Consideration 1)." Our emphasis.

15. Commission of the European Communities, "Communication de la Commission au Cancell et au Parlement Européen sur l'Immigration," SEC (91) 1855 final, Brussels, 11 October 1991, p. 18.

16. In the framework of the Union of the Arab Maghreb the ministers responsible for migration problems have met and have adopted a resolution, but this has not led to any coordination of national policies.

17. Thus in April 1993 a workshop was held in Turin organized by the ILO and bringing together, aside from three Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) and five "fund granting" European countries (Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain, and France), some multilateral organizations (EEC, World Bank, and UNDP).

18. *Bulletin du Club Financier Méditerranéen*, n. 6 (April 1993), 61.

19. From an internal document of the staff of the Commission of the European Communities; our emphasis.

20. Thus, the editors of the *Human Development Report 1993* write (p.3):

We are witnessing a new and disturbing phenomenon:

jobless growth. And policy-makers the world over are searching for development strategies that combine economic growth with more job opportunities.

In the same vein, the President of the French Senate declared, "To make believe that it's the recovery that will reduce unemployment is to contribute to keeping alive a hope which, when it's not fulfilled, will wind up producing a *social explosion*." Our emphasis. *Le Monde*, 22 July 1993.

21. The Treaty on European Union, the so-called Maastricht Treaty, places migration henceforth among the subjects "of common interest." (Article K 1, points 1, 2, and 3.)

22. In this regard, a Bundestag resolution dated 2 December 1992, "Bases for German policy with regard to the states of the Maghreb," is worth quoting (our emphasis):

...to activate the plans for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, while, however, guaranteeing that active collaboration within the CSCM is not limited solely to the Southern member states of the European Community while the Federal Republic of Germany looks after Eastern Europe. These two problem areas, the East and the South of Europe, require a common European policy which includes the bilateral measures of all the member states.

23. It is, moreover, appropriate in this regard to take note of the more and more military language used to describe worldwide economic competition as well as the hypotheses formulated here

and there regarding growing rivalries, taking the form of "economic warfare," at least within the Triad. Very representative of these theses are works such as, to give examples, *The Coming War with Japan*, by George Friedman and Meredith Lebard, or even *Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe, and America*, by Lester Thurow.

24. The United States thanks to the NAFTA accord (concluded with Canada and Mexico), and Japan thanks to a dynamic overall policy which has greatly contributed to the modification of the appearance of all of Asia.

25. K. F. Zimmermann and T. Straubhaar, "Immigration and the European Community," in *Human Resources in Europe at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (Luxembourg: Eurostat, 1992), 415.

26. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 277-8. Our emphasis.

27. Thus, according to a report of the French Senate, "...the trade deficit alone — 16 billion francs — of France with the two Chinas, mainland and Taiwan, is equal to the surplus achieved with all of its partners in the European Community put together?" *Le Monde*, 4 June 1993.

28. This certainly does not exclude diametrically opposed approaches, such as that of the American Nobel Laureate in Economics, Gary Becker, according to whom, in substance, the movement of people, being a good, should be free.

29. "Vaincre les douze peurs de l'an 2000: Les réponses de 24 penseurs et experts." *Le Nouvel Observateur*, Collection

Dossiers n. 14, p. 16.

30. *Human Resources in Europe*, 431.

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BIBLIOTECA

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Relations with the Maghreb

Andrés Ortega

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THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTHERN EUROPE
PART II, CHAPTER 2: RELATIONS WITH THE MAGHREB
ANDRÉS ORTEGA

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THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTHERN EUROPE

PART II, CHAPTER 2: RELATIONS WITH THE MAGHREB

ANDRÉS ORTEGA

The Mediterranean is a meeting point between North and South, between rich and poor, between Islam and the Christian West. Nowhere is this situation more acute than in the Western part of this sea where only 14 kilometers, but all sorts of issues, separate Southern Europe from the Maghreb (which originally included Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, but due to the dynamics of the region has been extended to Libya and Mauritania). The challenge, for Europe and for the Maghreb is to manage, and, if possible, to overcome this division.

The end of the Cold War presents new opportunities for political and social change in these Northern African countries, but also new concerns. Although the Maghreb countries cannot count anymore on playing the East-West competition for their own benefits, a return to old forms of competition and power politics among European states, and of a new kind of confrontation between South and South and between North and South are not excluded. The Maghreb is a test case. The regional evolution depends to a large extent on the determination and capability of the Maghreb countries to integrate into the world economy and to share, or at least coexist with, different values, an attitude that the North should also follow. The positive evolution of the Middle Eastern situation can also bring benefits to the Maghreb.

1. DOES IT MATTER?

Why is the Maghreb important to Southern Europe (or even to the United States)? There are a number of reasons that range from geopolitics, to ecology, economic, society or culture. But, basically, it matters because stability, prosperity and security of the Maghreb countries, and of the Mediterranean in general, represents stability, prosperity and security for Southern Europe. Two transitions are taking place at the same time, and they interact in positive and negative ways: the European transition and the Maghreb's transition. This last one has at least three dimensions: demography, society and politics.

1.1. European concerns.

From a mid- and long-term perspective, Europe needs to develop a policy of neighborhood aiming at creating stability and prosperity to its East and to its South, although these two simultaneous objectives can conflict. Europe cannot be a fortress of prosperity surrounded by poverty and backwardness. Firstly, because the Southern European countries would become an inhospitable frontier instead of a bridge. This in turn would make of the Mediterranean a vulnerable frontier of Europe. Secondly because poverty is a strategic enemy (Commissariat 1993) for everybody. The prospect of 300 million of poor people just across the sea, in countries in which problems of economic growth, political development and cultural roots are deeply interweaved, will bring about mass migrations, an issue of great concern for Europeans -not just Southern Europeans-. Some five million people of Maghreb origin (i.e., about 10% of the Maghreb population) actually live in Europe. This, obviously, can

have repercussions on the way Europe is and lives, a kind of problem which is sometimes localized in some places and aereas. The Maghreb is thus not "alien" to Europe, and in particular for the Southern Europeans. Immigration, sometimes massive in local terms, coupled with the economic and value crisis in the North, is already having major political effects, from xenophobic and racist reactions, to the upsurge of extreme right movements. This situation is pressing a number of countries to reform their traditional approach to their concept of nation by means of changes in immigration and nationality laws, as is happening in Germany or France. Mass immigration could jeopardise the stability of the European democracies.

1.2. Demography and economy: a difficult couple.

The demographic issue in the Maghreb is a time bomb. Its population has more than doubled in the last 30 years. If this trend is nor reversed, with a cumulative growth of around 3%, it will double again, from the current 59 million to 144 million in 2025 according to World Bank projections. There are some signs however that the population growth is easing (in Tunisia, for example while the 1966 rate of population growth was 3%, it dropped to 1,9% in the late 80s), but the real positive effects of this trend will not be felt in al least a generation.

We are thus faced with an essentially young population, with bleak outlooks, life expectancies of 62 to 66 years, deficient education and low indexes of Human Development (0,6 for Tunisia; 0,528 for Algeria; 0,433 for Morocco) (PNUD 1993). These countries are far ahead from most of the African countries, yet they do not look Southward. Their reference is

the the North where GNP per capita is at least ten times higher. For the population, migration and television have broadened what Brzezinski calls the gap between expectancies and capabilities, which produces an intense sense of frustration.

There has been growth in the area, but, it has been unequal and outflanked, or stopped by the demographic explosion. In the region, particularly in Algeria, agricultural production has not matched either the population growth, with the result of low levels of food self-sufficiency (40% in Algeria's case). Morocco's GNP grew over the period 1986-1988 at an annual rate of 5%, though per capita income fell around 1%. The world crisis is heavily burdening these economies. In 1993, for instance, Morocco's financial law was established on the basis of a 6,5% growth. It will probably not go beyond 3%. In Algeria, the policy of not rescheduling of the debt has led to stagnation and to a decrease of its imports of around 3%. Most of the foreign aid received by Algeria has been allocated to the payment of the debt. Algeria's economy grew at a annual rate of 5% between 1980 and 1985 but then this growth fell to less than 1% or even to negative numbers in 1990, stabilising in 1991. The reforms which were approved by the IMF seem to run out of steam. Tunisia, which started a privatisation process ahead of the other countries, seems to be an exception with an annual GNP growth rate of 6,6% over the last few years (8,6% in 1992), coinciding with exceptional agricultural harvests.

Unemployment has been on the rise (between 15 and 30% of the working population, and affecting mostly people under 30). During the late 80s and early 90s, Algeria created only

100.000 jobs, less than half of the planned. Tunisia, in spite of its growth, created only 45.000 instead of the projected 75.000. These high rates have led to mass emigration to France and other member countries of the EC. As for inflation, it runs high at an annual rate of 15 to 40%.

Economic liberalization -fiscal, monetary, commercial, markets, privatisation, foreign investments- has evolved at different paces and with different results. It has produced a real "revolution of the economic apparatus and instruments" (Navarro 1993), but has raised risks of political and social instability. If the "social dimension" of the adjustment process is neglected, the liberalization process itself could be put at risk. One of the results of this process of radical change has been a split between generations (to have a school degree is not enough anymore), between social strata, and between regions.

The reforms nonetheless have had some positive results. In Morocco public deficit has lowered and foreign investment grown by 58% in 1992. But the attempts of modernization, matched with a high degree of mismanagement have brought about a huge increase in these countries foreign debt whose service accounts for 30% of exports of goods and services in the case of Morocco (it was 60% only a few years ago); 25% in Tunisia; and 71% (up from 35% in 1980) in Algeria.

The Maghreb is also important for Europe, because it is the third trade partner of the EC (ahead of Japan). The volume of trade represents a total of \$ 65.000 million, with a surplus of \$ 5.000 to 7.000 million a year in favor of the EC, though the volume of trade has dropped in real terms. Even if these countries represent less than 1% of the EC

external trade, in some aspects, the importance and potential of the region is greater than what the figures reflect. Energy imports, for instance, are due to grow. In this sense, Algeria's exports of natural gas to Spain are due to increase from 2.500 cubic meters in 1985 to 7.000 in 1995. At the end of that year the Euromaghreb gas pipeline that will join Algeria and Spain (and the rest of Europe) through Morocco should enter into function. Italy and Tunisia agreed in 1991 to double the capacity of the 1983 gas pipeline to attain 40.000 cubic meter for the year 2000. There has also been an upsurge in the activities of some European companies which view those countries as a "European México".

For the Maghreb this trade is paramount, as the EC represents 70% of the total exports and 60% of imports for these countries (two thirds of which with the Southern European countries). This pattern of commercial exchange with the EC contrasts with the lack of intraregional trade (less than 6% of their total) among the Maghreb countries themselves.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC OVERVIEW

	ALGERIA	MOROCCO	TUNISIA	LIBYA	MAURITANIA
Surface Thousand\Km ²	2.382	450 [*]	164	1.760	1.031
Population (million, 1991)	25,6	25,7	8,2	4,4	2,1
Year in which population doubles	2.017	2.020	2.025	2.050	2.015
Population forecast 2025	52	48	14	14	5
Life expectancy at birth (1990)	65,1	62,0	66,7	62	47,0
Unemployment % of working population	25	18	20	---	---
Schooling Index	0,20	0,22	0,16	---	0,02
Illiteracy rate	46	64	41	25	69
Per capita income (US \$ 1990)	2.230	880	1.260	---	---
Real per capita GDP adjusted \$ PPP, 1990	3.011	2.348	3.579	---	1.057
% External Trade with de EC	71	61,3	73,6	79,7	51,4
TV sets/1.000 inhabitants	74	74	80	91	23
Human Development Index	0,515	0,433	0,600	0,659	0,140

Sources: PNUD (1992 and 1993), Banco Mundial, European Commission, World Bank, El Estado del Mundo 1993.

1.3. Political evolution.

The stabilisation of Northern Africa, coupled with the democratization of Southern Africa, could bring some hope for the rest of the continent, but the opposite is also true. Developments in the Maghreb were seen, overall, with optimism some years ago. The crisis in Algeria, the Gulf war, and the international economic crisis -North and South- have given way to a greater pessimism about the future of the region. The Maghreb is no longer a model for Arab modernization in the rest of the Arab world.

Periodic crisis seem to shake these countries, like the bread revolts of the bread in Tunisia, or the effects of the Gulf war which alienated the people from their Governments, like in Morocco, that took an anti-Sadam stance. But in the new context, one has to differentiate even more than before among the different countries and actors in the area. As for political evolution, each country has its own features.

In **Algeria**, the interruption of the electoral process in December 1991, to prevent the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) from coming to power, and the accompanying coup has led to a dynamic of terrorism and repression, and to a certain radicalization of the moderate wing within the fundamentalist movement. The assassination in June 1992 of Mohamed Boudiaf, President of the High State Committee reflected the resurgence of a terrorist threat which has killed 1.000 people. Nonetheless, the Islamic movement could be losing some popular support. The new Prime Minister, Redha Malek, seems to combine toughness and dialogue, stick and carrot, in trying to deal with a situation in which the economic

problems are aggravating. The Army, who plays a crucial role, seems to keep united.

In **Tunisia**, where a "medical coup" in November 1987 brought Ben Ali to the Presidency Ben Ali, ending the long Bourguiba era, the cycle of repression-violence which was triggered by radical islamism could be coming to an end. An evolution which, coupled with a positive economic performance, could facilitate a democratization process. Nonetheless, there are many clouds in the horizon.

Morocco, for the time being, could be seen as a pole of stability. In spite of their shortcomings, the constitutional reforms and the elections held in June 1993, with the victory of the Socialist Union of the Popular Forces (USPF) and of Istiqlal -both of the regular opposition-, indicate a direction of change. Nonetheless, Morocco has still to come to grips with its very important "social deficit".

As for **Libya**, the reform process which started in 1987 has not yet succeeded in solving one of the key problems for this country: Col. Gadhafi's succession. Its attitude regarding the Lockerbie Affair has not contributed to a positive evolution of the regime, as the Security Council imposed, and renewed in April 1993, its sanctions to Libya on arms sales and air traffic (not on trade through naval conducts) in april 1993.

Mauritania, lives a situation of "controlled democracy", and in spite of formally being a "Islamic Republic", does not seem to face an Islamic challenge, although it is confronted to very serious tribal conflicts and to a critical economic situation.

Several other problems contribute to the looming perspectives of the region, like the Western Sahara conflict which confronts Algeria and Morocco, the attitude of Libya, or the general rise of fundamentalism.

1.4. The Islamic challenge.

The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the Maghreb is usually seen as part of a larger movement which goes from Asia to the Atlantic. It can be seen as "measles", or as a threat, derived from what Prof. Huntington (1993) has called a "conflict of civilizations". We tend to approach this issue much more in terms of "challenge" or "risks" rather than threats. To treat it as threat could become a self-fulfilling prophecy, as was partly the case in the confrontation with Soviet Russia (Esposito 1993). The challenge needs not always result in a threat to regional stability or Western interests. They do not pretend to change our life.

The so called Islamic Fundamentalism is not a single movement. Diverse in its Shii (as in Iran) and its Suni configuration (as in the Maghreb), it is polycentric, although throughout the years it has grown in coordination. The rise of fundamentalism has been unequal within the Maghreb countries and has had different causes. These range from a reaction against the lack of expectations, the social gap, the economic and technological revolution which has changed or broken secular traditions, affecting youth in particular, or a sense of revolt against corruption. In the Maghreb, fundamentalists are usually urban people with a technical and scientific formation, which, in a generational split, look for a model which is not the one of their

fathers, the independence, nor the Western model, nor the failed soviet communist experience. They are left with Islam, looked at in a different way. In a sense, they could be seen (Michel Camau, in López 1992) as an emerging civil society, in a role not too different from the one of the dissidents in Soviet Russia. Fundamentalism questions the definition of the relationship between the ideals of Islam and the modern world, a relationship which has still to be renewed in most instances, including Morocco.

In political terms, paradoxically, in the Algerian and Tunisian case, it has been the process of political change which has opened the way for the arrival to power of Islamism. The interruption of the democratic process to prevent those movements from coming to power has made matters worse. Fundamentalism was very seriously repressed in Tunisia after its alleged participation in an aborted coup. It has also been repressed in Libya. In Morocco, there are similar, although more dispersed, movements, but the double nature of the Monarchy -the King being not only the political but also the religious head of the country-, together with the political reforms have eased the situation. In Algeria, President Chadli's idea of a "cohabitation" with the FIS could not be put into practice. Radical islamism however seems to be losing grip and being relegated to a more extremist terrorism.

Why do we fear an Islamic Maghreb, or even just an Islamic Algeria? Not because it would undermine Western economic, and in particular energy, interests, as the country would still, or even more so, need to strengthen economic ties with its Northern neighbors. Not because it halts modernization, as their goal seems to be to islamise

modernity instead of modernising Islam. They even promised more economic liberalization. Neither because it would be nondemocratic, as the West has dealt largely with nondemocratic regimes. Fundamentalism even bears some positive aspects, like a new morality, and strong attitude against corruption, or the search of cultural roots(Dezcallar 1991). In a "measles", rather than "threat" approach to the problem, King Hassan II of Morocco came to state to Acharq Al Awsat at the beginning of 1993: "I would have liked to see the [integrist] experience carried out. Algeria would have constituted a laboratory which would have revealed how the religious extremism can overcome its contradictions". He later changed his position, and one can doubt whether neighboring countries could resist such a contagion. Again, neither do we fear it because of the threat of a nuclear Algeria, which would be a threat in itself independently of any other consideration, and even more so if it responded to a radical arab nationalism. The main reasons are that an Islamist Algeria would trigger a mass, especially middle class, emigration, and would undermine the prospects for economic growth in the whole area, widening, even if it was only psychologically, the gap between North and South, between Europe and the Maghreb, contributing to the "frontierisation" of Southern Europe.

As for violent islamic fundamentalism, its rise is not only a problem for the Maghreb, but also for other major countries like Egypt and Turkey. The Gulf war clarified and changed some realities -like the financing of Islamic fundamentalist movements by Saudi Arabia cutting off the FIS when it supported Saddam Hussein-, although the Islamic fundamentalists may look at other financial sources.

The rise of Fundamentalism tends to lead gradually to equate in public Western perception, these political-religious movements with Islam in general, leading thus to a dangerous misperception. As an Iranian proverb says, Islam is a sea where you can find almost any fish.

Therefore, there are reasons to believe that Islamic Fundamentalism will probably rise. But we should avoid a North-South confrontation that replaces the old East West. Fundamentalism should no be "evilised".

1.5. Security challenges.

If we define security in broad terms as the preservation of a way of life, the Maghreb has also a major security importance for the Southern European countries. There are a number of risks, direct or indirect (through emigration), with economic, social, religious, ecological or military causes. For instance, the Mediterranean is a vital route for energy supplies, and the Maghreb will be even more important once the gas pipeline is operational in 1995.

In military terms, the Mediterranean, and in particular the Maghreb, has a strategic significance which might have changed in military terms, and which will probably change again, but which remains of the utmost importance for the Southern European countries. For instance, by the mid-70s, the countries of Northern Africa did not have submarines. By 1989 there were already 13. These countries have also recently acquired antiship missiles, which could technically enable them to limit by military means the freedom of movement in the Western Mediterranean.

The evolution of military expenditures has been markedly upward from 1982 to 1986, reaching levels of 5% of the GNP in some cases. Argelia, Libya and Morocco have land and airwarfare equipment superior in numerical terms to the armament of the countries of the Northern shore. Moreover this trend could be enhanced with the arms bargain that has followed the demise of the Soviet Union and the limitations imposed on Europe by the CFE treaty. Nonetheless, the Maghreb countries greatly rely on the outside world for their arms supplies, while their training and technical know-how is significantly inferior to the European one (and one of the main questions for the future is for the West to retain this technological superiority that proved decisive in the Gulf). Thus Libya might have 2.000 tanks, but only 20% or so operational. They do not have a capability to project conventional forces in European land.

Nonetheless, the search for "strategic weight" (Lesser 1993) by some of those countries, especially Algeria or Libya, might bring new risks -for the time being, and eventually threats in the future- of proliferation of conventional and unconventional weapons in terms of land, naval and air power. A particular problem is the proliferation of mass destruction weapons (chemical or nuclear) and vectors to deliver them, as by the year 2000, it is possible (Lesser 1993) that every Southern European capital will be within range of ballistic missiles fired from Algeria or Libya, or, in any case, from airplanes. ", according to Ian Lesser). In this context, the U.S. GPALS program may become more important for the Europeans.

As for nuclear armaments, King Hassan of Morocco, a country which is party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and which openly supported the antiiraqui coalition, said in the midst of the Iraqui invasion of Kuwait: "India and Pakistan have their own bomb. Yet nobody challenges them? The israeli have their bomb too, even worst, as they have not signed the NPT ... so everything is allowed to a few but forbidden to others. If some have the atomic bomb why leave the others unarmed? If Irak wants to build its own nuclear weapon, while it faces someone that has 200 nuclear warheads, it has the right to do it. Either it is allowed for everyone or it is forbidden for all. It is not possible to have double standards. Even more, this is an aggression against the arabs. Everyone can have its little bomb except the arabs ..." (Le Monde, 16 August 1990).

Algeria is not a party to the NPT (nor is Mauritania), and there has been great speculation concerning the reactor in Ain Oussera, 200 kilometer South of the capital. Algeria has become a threshold country as far as nuclear armament is concerned. As for chemical weapons, none of these countries is a full party to the Geneva Conventions on chemical and Biological arms, Libya excepted, which has been signalled as a potential infractor.

Last, but not least, there is the problem of internal and external terrorism.

1.6. The Middle Eastern connection.

The Middle East and the Maghreb, may be far apart, but they have a close connection, and what happens in an area has repercussions in the other. Events in the Middle East during

the Gulf war shook confidence and sometimes separated Government and society in the Maghreb. The Palestinian issue and the lack of progress in the Peace Process in the Middle East also had its repercussions in the Maghreb, whose attitudes has also influenced positively events in the Middle East. The moderate position of King Hassan of Morocco and its attitude towards Israel has helped the peace process. Today, with the new perspectives of an Israeli-Palestinian settlement -which has been compared to the fall of the Berlin Wall in Europe- and for the peace process in general, politically the Maghreb could benefit and dissipate some of its own tensions. It can be a unique opportunity of cooperation among Europe and all the Southern Mediterranean for economic, security and environmental cooperation, even if the priority of European aid to the Occupied Territories (500 million ECUs for five years) may undermine the amounts disposable for the Maghreb.

1.7. The Europeans and the Maghreb.

National interests shape different approaches to the Maghreb. There is no Western, nor European, nor even Southern European vision of the Mediterranean and the Maghreb. Furthermore, the Mediterranean is increasingly becoming a space where the Northern countries feel they can exercise an active margin of autonomy. There can be some competition -in cooperation- between France and Spain. Not so between Italy and Portugal. All -with possibly the exception of Portugal- share common concerns regarding immigration.

France has historical, economical, political and social interests, including important investments to defend, in the Maghreb, especially in Algeria and Morocco. We should also

recall that France has the largest immigrant population from Maghreb origin. In a way, France, with the burden of its colonial past, is a local superpower. Faced with the crisis in Algeria, it has had changing attitudes, in part also reflected in a relative loss of influence due to its attitude during the Gulf war. France had greatly contributed to create multilateral frameworks to deal with the Maghreb, although there are signs that the new Government is somewhat reluctant to pursue much further this multilateral approach and would prefer a more traditional national approach.

Spain, the only European country that shares a border with Morocco -in the Spanish North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla- and separated only by 14 kilometers through the Gibraltar straight, has a vested interest in not becoming an inhospitable frontier which could also push Spain towards a peripheral situation in Europe. The democratic Spain changed the previous foreign policy approach of playing Algeria against Morocco, instead of fostering cooperation in the region. Spanish companies are increasingly investing in Morocco and Algeria. Spain has also been the major supporter of the pipeline which should bring algerian gas through Morocco and across the Straight to Europe. In its approach to the Maghreb, Spain needs the European Community as a force and means multiplier. It also needs, in some respects, the support of the United States.

Italy, for geopolitical reasons, looks more towards the Middle East than towards the Maghreb, but the evolution of the maghreb has a major importance for Italy's interests, because of the immigration dimension, the ecological problems, the security concerns aggravated by the geographical proximity, and energy, commercial and investments links to defend, in

particular after the spectacular growth of Italy's foreign aid in the last decade. Geography and history would make it natural for Italy to have a special relation with Libya, similar to the one that France has with Algeria, but these developments are limited, due to the problems of Libya itself.

Portugal has recently discovered the Maghreb. Attaching great interest to Southern European initiatives, Portugal has become increasingly involved in the Maghreb, also from an investment and trade point of view.

Although maybe not with the required intensity, other European countries also start focusing towards the Maghreb, like, for instance Germany, which pursues economic interests, bearing also in mind in the last few years the rising immigration problem. There has been over the last few years an increased concern on the part of Germany whose Defence Minister said recently that "the Maghreb and the Middle East are of considerable importance for Europe's security" (The Wall Street Journal, 9 September 1993). Other North and Nordic European countries have also placed greater attention to this region.

As far as the **European Community** as such is concerned, the development of a Mediterranean policy in general and a policy towards the Maghreb in particular is important in itself and for the own development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy.

In 1972, the EC put in practice the so called Mediterranean Policy, which was essentially, in a first phase, of a commercial nature. It not only covered the Maghreb, but

all the Mediterranean (except Libya, for political reasons, and Mauritania which is part of the Lome Convention). As far as cooperation and aid is concerned, the amounts have been very scarce. In the period 1977-1991, only 3% of the total foreign economic and financial cooperation that these countries of the Southern Mediterranean received came from the EC (against 14% from the EC member States, 28% from the OPEP, and 31% -mostly for Egypt and Israel- from the US). Algeria, for instance, got in 1977-1991 504 million ECU (and even that was not used totally).

In 1990, the Twelve launched the New Mediterranean Policy with new contents and increased financial cooperation: 4.405 million ECU for the whole of the Mediterranean, of which 1.072 million for the Maghreb. A similar amount was granted for "horizontal cooperation", for financing programs like the EuroMaghreb gas pipeline or environmental protection actions, apart from the bilateral aid of European countries, which is sometimes difficult to quantify with precision. In spite of their increase, these figures may still look short. They should not be judged in isolation as the Mediterranean Policy is not only aid: since the launching of the Mediterranean Policy, the industrial exports of the Maghreb have increased by 500%.

**TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL COOPERATION
EC - MAGHREB**

	EC BUDGET	BEI LOANS (million ECU)	TOTAL
<hr/>			
MOROCCO			
1971-1991 (I-III Protocol)	356	297	653
1992-1996 (IV Protocol)	218	220	438
ALGERIA			
1971-1991 (I-III Protocol)	144	360	504
1992-1996 (IV Protocol)	70	280	350
TUNISIA			
1971-1991 (I-III Protocol)	208	250	458
1992-1996 (IV Protocol)	116	168	284
TOTAL MAGHREB			
1971-1991 (I-III Protocol)	708	907	1.615
1992-1996 (IV Protocol)	404	668	1.072
<hr/>			

Source: European Commission.

2. WHO DOES WHAT?

"A marginalised Maghreb would become, sooner or later, an unstable Maghreb" (Navarro 1993). Europe has to contribute to the stability of this region, offering these countries the perspective of an anchorage to Europe. However, their expectations cannot be matched to the ones held by the Eastern European countries. There is a fundamental difference: these societies want to integrate as soon as possible into the Western system. The societies of the Maghreb share this goal in terms of level of consumption are concerned, but are much more negative towards other aspects of the Western modernity (Commissariat 1993).

2.1. What to do?

A large dialogue should be established with these countries, on the understanding that we have to defuse the possibility of an emerging threat, and not to approach the problems in terms of threats. The worst way of acting would be a Southern revival of "containment" or even of "deterrence". The best way is to try to incorporate, to anchor these countries into Europe. Most of the problems do not have a military nature, and cannot be solved militarily. Europe must go to the root of the problems, but the Maghreb countries too.

Is it too late? No doubt, it is more difficult to act now than it would have been five years ago. But it is not too late. In political terms, it can never be too late to deal with a neighbor. We should not underestimate the challenges, but neither should we underestimate the opportunities.

Several issues have to be tackled with different countries, and probably, a "variable geometry" and "several speeds" approach is more viable and more prone to success, and even to lead eventually to a single geometry.

2.1.1. Political dialogue and Islamic Fundamentalism.

Southern Europeans do not fully agree on what to do in terms of political change and Islamic fundamentalism in the Maghreb. But the vicious circle between political liberalization and the arrival to power of Fundamentalism, which leads to repression and lack of political solution, must be broken. The choice between mosque and barracks has to be avoided. Is it possible?

France has changed its attitude towards Algeria, turning from open criticism of the coup to open cooperation with the Algerian regime. France thus joined Italy and Spain, which given the evolution in Algeria, opted for a constructive approach, leaving the doors open to the political dialogue and economic cooperation.

Fundamentalism is not monolithic. Within this movement there are moderate elements with which Europeans should establish better relations. Radicalism may be losing strength, according to some views (Spencer 1993). This would allow a more balanced approach to integrate Islamism and democracy. Internal and external dialogue must be the first step toward democracy. But this internal dialogue, and the external one as well, must go beyond the problem of fundamentalism, to tackle the development of civil societies in these countries, the promotion and respect for human

rights, and the celebration of democratic elections (Miller 1993).

The EC's New Mediterranean Policy gives renewed importance to the respect for human rights and to the promotion of democratic values in those countries. This evolution calls for greater pressures from the United States and the European Parliament. Once the Maastricht treaty is ratified, the European Parliament will have veto powers over treaties with third countries. The respect for human rights is a principle included in the latest bilateral treaties, like the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed by Spain and Morocco.

To carry on this dialogue, the West has also to contribute with its struggle against xenophobia and racism, in order to overcome the perception in the South that "the West hates Islam", as much as Islamism is seen in the North as anti-Western, which to some high degree it is, especially after the Gulf war.

Political dialogue is not enough. The problems have to be tackled at their roots: political, economic, social and cultural. The West should continue to push for reforms in all these areas, but given the attitudes and risks which have arisen it would be more sensible to suggest prudence and moderation in the pace of the reforms" (Navarro 1993)

2.1.2. Immigration cooperation.

To control immigration, police measures by themselves will not bring a solution, and could bring the emergence of a new Wall, this time in the Mediterranean. But no police or

sanitary cordon will be able to stop a flux of people who lack expectations in their own countries. The best way to bridle immigration is to develop real possibilities of expectations in those countries.

But apart from that, the example given by Morocco when, at the request of Spain, it decided in 1992-1993 to control illegal emigration is a good precedent. The action taken by the Moroccan authorities put a brake on the illegal passing of immigrants in dangerous boats.

The best way to control immigration, and to treat immigrants with the respect and decency they deserve is to set quotas, according to the needs of the market and society. Tunisian President Ben Ali, speaking to the European Parliament in June 1993, proposed setting up a EuroMaghreb Charter which would define the rights and duties of the immigrants from the Maghreb in the EC. Sometimes events point in other negative directions.

The immigration dialogue should be completed with a cultural dialogue. For the good relations between the Maghreb and Southern Europe, it is essential not to trample on the dignity of neither part. Understanding, coexistence, interaction and tolerance have to be developed. The role of television (through what some fundamentalists call "paradiabolics") and other instruments and channels of communication have to be enhanced. Europe can also exert a cultural influence on the Maghreb through the immigrated population and the policies towards immigration, and viceversa.

2.1.3. Economic partnership.

To have a possibility of overcoming their major problems, the Maghreb countries need to be part of the world economy and networks. For this purpose, the Maghreb needs Europe. It could be said that if Europe stagnates, the Maghreb's situation will worsen, making problems more acute for Europe. If Europe returns to a path of growth, with lower interest rates, the Maghreb could benefit, if it seizes the opportunity. Economic cooperation is the most important instrument.

Western economic aid has been conditioned, more to economic than to political reforms, even with the hope that aid could open the way to democracy. Thus, in spite of the political situation, economic reforms -backed by the IMF-helped Algeria to other credits by the World Bank, France, Italy, Spain, and the EC. Although, Europe might need the US and even Japan in this endeavour towards the South, it is unlikely to get it.

Aid is not the only answer. Trade and investments can be more important. In fact private European investments in the Maghreb countries have grown over the last few years (from 46,5 million \$ in 1983 to 165 million in 1990) and permitted the development of important sectors like textiles, agriculture, chemical and electronic industries. Investments should grow even more in the future, despite the economic crisis in Europe and the scant understanding of public opinion. Trade barriers, with the same kind of opposition, have also to come down. This will also enable technology fluxes. The European Council stressed in June 1992 the new importance of "horizontal cooperation", mentioned before.

2.1.4. Security dialogue.

As with the issue of fundamentalism, in terms of military security we run the risk of creating a threat where there is only a risk in approaching the risk as a threat. A main risk is for South-South conflicts involving the North. A security dialogue has to be reinforced with these countries to help deactivate those risks.

No doubt that Europe is more interested than the Maghreb countries in a security dialogue which for the Northern African states should probably be accompanied by economic concessions.

A new atmosphere in the Middle East -especially if it encourages agreements on confidence building measures, arms control and proliferation in the area- could help the security dialogue in the Western Mediterranean -indee, it would be a unique opportunity-, as would a peaceful solution to the Western Sahara conflict.

Europe, through the WEU is also opening this security dialogue with the Maghreb countries separately, and with Egypt, a proposal which is backed by the Parliamentary Assembly of this organization. Maybe a kind of opening should also be explored at the NATO level. If Azerbaijan can be part of the NACC, why not Morocco? Furthermore, the interest in those countries participating in the CSCE process was stated by Morocco.

This dialogue must also aim at the establishment of more transparency, and greater cooperation in the field of

armaments, and the establishment of Confidence Building Measures. The NPT revision conference to be held in 1995 should also be an occasion to make Algeria and Mauritania parties to the Treaty, especially after France's membership. Control and transparency mechanisms of the NPT should be reinforced granting greater powers to the IAEA -intrusive inspections capabilities- and considering UN sanctions against violators.

Bilaterally, the Southern European countries should proceed with their military cooperation and arms sales policy towards the Maghreb countries, while they go on with their own triangular dialogue (Italy, France, Spain) on Western Mediterranean security. The compromise of not using force in solving disputes should be generalised.

2.1.5. The Maghreb's own obstacles.

A number of positive initiatives towards this region could fail because of the Maghreb's countries own obstacles. The lack of economic unity and evenness among them is an important obstacle for regional development and cooperation. It is up to the Maghreb countries to open the way for European investment. All of these countries are doing serious efforts aiming at economic reform, as we have already mentioned. In all of them recent laws allow foreign investments to take up to 50 or 51% of the shareholds of companies. Nonetheless, in the short term, the effects of these reforms have been scarce.

As far as political reforms are concerned, a major problem, as we have seen in the case of Algeria, is that

changes have or could open the way for Islamists to reach power, provoking an authoritarian reaction which has made matters worse. Morocco is the country which has gone farther in its political reforms (and which has developed closer ties with the EC).

Past attempts in the construction of a Great Maghreb have failed, since 1964. There are political and economic tensions among these countries -like the Sahara conflict, "Achilles heel" of the construction of the Maghreb, according to Balta (1990)- which are preventing a full development of the UMA (Union of the Arab Maghreb), which also includes Libya and Mauritania. Nonetheless, the UMA has always been viewed not as the result of an understanding, but as a way of solving common problems and creating this understanding (Michele Brondino, in López 1992).

The Maghreb's own problems are paralyzing multilateral cooperation, be it the "5+5" process, the EC-UMA dialogue, and the Euroarab dialogue, thus undercutting these countries' perspectives.

2.2. The structures.

We should however recognize that even in the most optimistic scenario, the problem of competition with the East for EC attention and funds remains. The volume of EC financial aid towards the East and the novel features of some of its instruments (PHARE, BERD, TEMPUS, etc.) has fostered a sense of frustration in the Maghreb countries that feel marginalised, a feeling which has been reinforced by other events, such as the temporary non approval by the European Parliament of the EC-Morocco IV financial protocol. EC aid

(not including that of the Member states towards the Maghreb has been of 2,5 ECU per inhabitant and per year, against 7 ECU for the Eastern and Central European countries (and even 4,5 ECU for the countries of the Lome Convention) (Navarro 1993). Nonetheless, by 1996, with the Renovated Mediterranean Policy, EC funds for these countries will have increased by 370% (72% for Asia and Latinamerica, and 41% for the Lome Convention countries).

The concept of a "Euromaghreb partnership" or association, moving away from the traditional logic of cooperation towards an idea of "corresponsability" in development, was launched by the European Council held in Lisbon on June 1992. New instruments and new areas are being considered in this respect by the European Commission, as the creation of a EuroMaghreb Development Bank, following the BERD modes, but which has already been opposed by some member States. Common action in social and cultural affairs is also under consideration. The EC is introducing a major new element in its approach: the intensification of relations between private investors and operators in Europe and public and private operators in the Maghreb, towards promoting investments and joint ventures.

Due to the situation in Algeria a "single speed" approach is not possible. The EC is thus negotiating an association treaty with Morocco, and will soon start to negotiate another one with Tunisia, aiming at setting up a free trade area. The need to proceed at a reasonable and prudent pace, however, limit this endeavor is the first stage to important trade concessions, with special attention to sensitive products of both sides as well as to Morocco's new industries. Nonetheless this situation will be revised by the

year 2000. A full free trade area might not be for today or tomorrow, but it is becoming an important incentive for future developments. Although it is inevitable, this differentiation have setbacks, preventing regional integration, at least in the short or medium term.

The EC initiatives by their own are not enough. Bilateral relations between the Maghreb and the Southern European countries are, still, even more important. Yet, to have a greater effect, these bilateral relations would have to be better coordinated, from both sides. It is doubtful it will happen on either side.

The "5+5" dialogue points in the right direction. It brings together Italy, France, Spain, Portugal (and lately Malta) with Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Mauritania. After the first ministerial meeting held in Rome in 1990, the Algiers declaration in 1991 institutionalized the process, which has been paralysed by the coup in Algeria and the attitude of Libya in the Lockerbie affair.

A renewed effort at multilateralisation should also be made, be it through the revival of the "5+5" process, or the EC-UMA dialogue, the Euroarab dialogue, or even in the perspective of a future Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM).

3. THE US AND SOUTHERN EUROPE IN THE MAGHREB.

Is the Maghreb a "new" issue in transatlantic relations? It can become one, and thus become another area of common interest and cooperation.

3.1. US interests.

The US perception of the Maghreb has been throughout the last decades greatly influenced by its vision of the Middle East, and by the Cold War, although its interest in the Mediterranean goes much further back. The US is now facing changing perspectives and new approaches. It looks for less involvement in South-South conflicts. Conversely, in some ways, these countries may look at the US as a counterbalance to an independent European defence identity in the area (Lesser 1993) which they fear.

Although Morocco still remains a high priority, the US interest and attention seems to focus on Algeria. The US diplomacy has strongly pressed Morocco in order to settle the Sahara issue.

Concerning the evolution in the region, the US also gives an increased importance to human rights and carefully follows the rise of Islamic Fundamentalism, which, evolving towards terrorist activities, affects its interest. Fundamentalism -its effect on the Maghreb and the effect of the Maghreb on fundamentalism- is probably the main issue of concern for the US, with its sight on Egypt and Turkey in particular.

3.2. Prospects for European-US cooperation.

At least for certain member countries, like Spain and Italy, the US presence in the area is welcomed, and there is room for cooperation. This cooperation should start from joint analysis of the situations and of the political processes in the area.

There are three main issues as far as the area is concerned: order/disorder in the Maghreb, European integration/desintegration (or paralysis), and US-European cooperation/competition. We can establish three kind of scenarios, which complement each other:

In the first one, disorder in the Maghreb would probably enhance US-European cooperation (bilateral and multilateral) in the area and grant a greater role to NATO. Conversely, a process of order in the Maghreb would not feed US-European cooperation.

In the second one, the furthering of European integration, and in particular the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, could focus on the Maghreb as a test case for European action, possibly relegating relations with the US to a secondary, although important, order. A process of stagnation, or retrogression, in European integration would possibly put cooperation with the US as a priority for the individual Southern European states.

In the third one, the evolution of the relations between the US and Europe, could be decisive for the Maghreb. A competitive attitude would not bring stronger cooperation on Maghreb's issues.

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS.

Europe cannot ignore the problems of the Maghreb, as its own future, especially the Southern European future, is closely attached to it. The Maghreb is not alien to Southern Europe which can not live backwards to this region.

Europe and the Europeans should try to prevent the ideological and cultural gap from evolving into major issues that could spill over into other fields and lead to a Southern renewal of containment. Much depends on whether we choose a conflictual or cooperative approach. Cooperation and dialogue seems to be the way the Europeans should follow, and bring with them the US in this endeavor. The positive evolution of the Middle Eastern situation is also an opportunity for the Maghreb.

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SOUTHERN EUROPE AND US INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Graham E. Fuller

15 September 1993

THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE CHANGING WORLD ORDER

The end of the Cold War, the Maastricht treaty, and uncertainty over the future role of NATO all raise questions about the character of the new Europe and its relations with the world beyond. The Middle East increasingly has become a factor in the broader evolution of a new European identity, its interests, and the determination of US interests in the region as well. Even as Europe is undergoing a state of rapid geopolitical evolution, so too is the Middle East, perhaps even moreso. One of the major challenges of Western policy will be to elaborate a new set of relationships with the Muslim world.

The very concept of how the Middle East is defined is undergoing change. It is now expanding to embrace newer and more complex geopolitical relationships released by the end of the Cold War. Turkey has been one state whose geopolitics have been profoundly affected by the breakup of the Soviet Union. New Muslim politics in the Balkans, the Caucasus and in Central Asia are now increasingly linked in one way or another to European interests. The Muslim world is more interlinked than ever before--if only in conflict in some regions. We need to understand the new geopolitics of the post-Cold War Middle East if we are understand its impact on southern Europe and US interests.

Second, the final emergence of a likely comprehensive peace between Israel, the Palestinians and the Arab states represents a major geopolitical watershed in the world, nearly on a par with the fall of the Berlin wall. Political relationships that have been frozen in the Middle East for half a century are now in the process of thaw. The longer term impact on the region can only be dimly divined at this initial stage; the world will go on witnessing change in large and small ways all around the region as the longer term impact of the peace settlement takes effect. The relationship of Europe and the United States to the region will also be directly affected.

One of the major impacts of Arab-Israeli peace on the Middle East will be to accelerate forces of change that have long been accumulating but suppressed. Most regimes in the region lack legitimacy and are moving towards domestic crisis as they fail to meet growing economic and social demands; at the same time they are increasingly less able to revert to outright repression as a means of solving longer term problems. The Arab-Israeli confrontation has been a boon to authoritarian regimes who have used it as a pretext for the imposition of powerful police-state controls, calls for "eternal vigilance against the Zionist enemy," a race for arms, the elaboration of radical ideology, and the intimidation of neighbors in seeking to impose politically correct Pan-Arab ideals as defined by the radical states.

Now, nearly all states in the region will be torn by political change that pushes in the direction of greater demand for increased

and Islamists!

political participation on the part of populations. If this trend was true before an Arab-Israeli settlement, it will be even truer now when the excuse for authoritarianism and "solidarity" is waning. These political changes will in turn provoke major social change as old elites lose their grip on power and are forced to give way to new groups, including ethnic and religious minorities. The end of the Cold War had in fact already begun to weaken the position of these elites since the external support they historically derived from either the US or the USSR--in payment for their strategic allegiance--has now largely vanished. These changes must come to the region, for the absence of representative government and the Arab-Israeli conflict were the two chief causes of oppressive government, extremism, and instability in the region.

It is thus good news that the way has been cleared for long overdue political evolution to take place in the region. Over the longer run it will contribute to greater stability and rationality of government, diminished conflict, and diminished need for Western military intervention--that in every case leaves a baleful psychological legacy upon the region's peoples.

Economic change should also emerge from a new political framework. The region has been bound by ineffective state-run sectors that have made most economies of most states a shambles. It has also produced rising social discontent that is fodder for radical Islamist movements. But dictators like centralized economies that contribute to their overall control of the state and society and the repression of any independent sources of power

within the state. Now there should be less excuse for highly authoritarian and centralized economies. The creative forces of the region will hopefully now be unleashed to improve the domestic economic situation in most states, especially those with large urban populations. It is therefore important for the West to work for and encourage this process of political and economic liberalization.

But the process of political liberalization over the short term will not be smooth. On the contrary it will lead to short term **instability** as societies face major political and social change. The political dominance of minorities in many states will inevitably give way to new social groups and classes that assume a greater voice over the conduct of state policies. This change will in many cases be quite revolutionary in character, and perhaps resisted by many old elites. But the process is inevitable and cannot be put off. The good news is that these processes of change and instability no longer possess the global significance that they did during the East-West struggle. The West can now afford to permit and even encourage these long-range processes of change in the direction of political and economic liberalization.

WESTERN INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Oil and Strategy

What then, are the interests of Southern Europe and the US in looking at the Middle East? Historically, of course, the free flow of oil at "acceptable" prices has always ranked near the top of the

list. In fact, however, one may ask the degree to which the flow of oil has every been seriously threatened. It has been maintained over the past many decades through a variety of conflicts, including the Iran-Iraq war in which for eight long years well-heads, oil refineries, oil terminals and tankers were all targeted up and down the Persian Gulf--the ultimate horror scenario for Western oil planners and strategists. Yet that conflict did not fundamentally affect Western economies. Indeed, there was excess capacity in the market in that period. But the degree of redundancy of oil refineries, pipelines and terminals make it ever harder for decisive impact to be made upon the secure flow of oil to the West.

Western strategists often justify a broad range of political-military arrangements in the region on the basis of protection of the flow of oil. Reality would suggest that more critical analysis needs to be devoted to this issue. If the US or Europe as a whole has other strategic reasons for security treaties, bases, access rights, prepositioning of military equipment, etc., in the region, then they should be justified in specific terms other than "securing the free flow of oil." The US may still wish to maintain overseas access rights on a contingency basis in general from a global strategic outlook. Such aims then require justification in new strategic terms. Or the goal may be to ensure close working relations with existing Gulf oil regimes to ensure "friendly" policies on pricing issues. These are different goals than securing the flow of oil in traditional terms.

What constitutes oil security in the next decade will come under closer scrutiny as the geopolitics of the region move towards change. The role of oil in Middle Eastern politics will require much new thinking. Equitable and stable pricing structures will be a key demand of oil producers, and should be of equal interest to Western consumers over the longer run. Redundancy of pipeline systems is another important interest to all. The emergence of oil from Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union involve yet new pipe-line networks that relate to the present network as new lines emerge through Central Asia and the Caucasus to Iran and Turkey. The rapid expansion of the existing oil pipeline network eastwards in just one facet of a Middle East undergoing broad redefinition.

The Security of Israel

Historically the US has always considered the security of Israel to be a major American goal in the Middle East. Close strategic ties with Israel have in fact assured that. Israel is more secure today in the region than ever before. Israel was also seen as an important strategic ally in the Cold War context. With the end of the Cold War, however, the strategic value of Israel to the US in the Middle East diminished sharply. Given the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel under most circumstances would not be the ally of choice for the US when dealing with political crisis within the Arab world. But the emerging Arab-Israeli peace settlement puts yet a new spin on the traditional US relationship with Israel. Close ties with Israel no longer work directly at cross purposes

with US relations with the Arab states. The zero-sum game quality of Arab vs Israeli ties is on the way to alleviation. One can now imagine Israel gradually beginning to play a regional role in concert with other Arab states. This kind of involvement will have to come slowly and carefully in view of past sensitivities, but it will come. Some Arab states may then find it has reason for working ties with Israel on a variety of issues including most prominently trade, but also technical assistance and cooperation, agricultural cooperation, perhaps export of technology, and eventually maybe even security cooperation.

The Quest for Stability

Other American goals include the general goal for stability in a region which is of such economic importance and which has the greatest mass of arms of any region in the world. As noted above, however, even the concept of stability will require careful reconsideration as the pressing need for political and economic reform emerges more strongly in a post-Arab-Israeli conflict environment. Stability now will require measurement in terms of liberalization with its acknowledged short-term destabilizing effects.

Weapons Proliferation

Weapons proliferation in the region, especially unconventional, will remain a major concern for both the US and Europe. Southern Europe is especially exposed in that it will soon

be in range of Middle East missiles which could carry weapons of mass destruction in the next decade if not earlier. Arms control in the region is thus a high priority. The strategic environment for arms control should begin to change markedly if the Arab-Israeli settlement proves enduring.

Economic Development and Trade

European trade with the Middle East--oil and guns excepted--has been relatively limited. With an emerging Arab-Israeli settlement, however, trade pattern with Europe should increase sharply as Israel and Palestine become gateways for trade into the Arab world, unhindered by boycott and closed borders. The Maghreb in particular sees close economic ties with Western Europe as essential to its own development. In the past, economic ties with Europe have been vastly more important than trade among the Maghreb countries themselves.

Refugees and Immigration

Europe is strongly concerned with questions of economic development in the Middle East, especially in North Africa. Concerns for demographic movement from the Middle East to Europe is especially great in southern Europe which is already the port of entry for most Arabs. European sensitivities to immigration problems and the cultural absorption of large numbers of Muslims also looms high on Europe's agenda. The stability of the region will have direct affect on the immigration issue: desperate

economic situations and internal instability and civil conflict will have a major "push" affect on potential immigrants to Europe.

Islamic Fundamentalism

Lastly, the US and Europe share a concern for the spread of radical ideologies in the Middle East--that can also destabilize the region and spark war. Islamism, or "Muslim fundamentalism" ranks first as a radical ideology of concern because of its potential anti-Western orientation. How to live with political Islam is a particularly complex problem for the West. The most important characteristic of political Islam, however, is that it flourishes under circumstances of political, economic and social hardship, as do most radical ideologies. Thus without some alleviation of these sources of discontent, Islamists will make significant inroads in many countries.

Several other facets of political Islam require discussion. There is no monolithic movement within Islam. Islamist groups and movements vary considerably among themselves in their degree of radicalism, in their approach to democracy, political reform, liberalization, and relations with the West. Divisions among them tend to be most readily overcome and a united front produced when they suffer heavy repression from the state. At present in many countries such as Egypt, Algeria, and Syria, the Islamists constitute virtually the only form of opposition to the state. When the state is incompetent, corrupt, repressive and lacks political legitimacy then Islamists attract a major degree of

political support.

In the end, political Islam is destined to emerge into Middle Eastern politics to one extent or another in almost every state. When it is repressed its appeal grows. Where it often lacks any comprehensive program of its own other than opposition to the obvious shortcomings of the state, it can fall back on simplistic slogans such as "Islam is the answer" when it is declared illegal. Only when Islamic groups and parties are allowed entry into the political system, along with other repressed parties and groups, will it begin to fall into proper perspective on the overall political spectrum. In states where Islamist parties regularly contest elections, such as Turkey and Pakistan, they never fare better than 12-15% of the vote. Once they contend on the political scene and assume modest roles within the political system it becomes evident that they possess no magic answers and possess the same failings as many other political groups. Many initially radical Islamic groups have also politically evolved and matured when participating in the political process as they did in Egypt earlier, or today in Jordan, Yemen, Turkey, Algeria and Kuwait.

In short, the only way in which political Islam will be "tamed" and able to take a normal place on the political spectrum is through its **gradual and controlled** entry into the political system. In states where it bursts forth onto the political system legally after years of repression and authoritarian government it almost invariably becomes the primary beneficiary of the backlash, can sweep the election, and thus enter the political system under

the most adverse circumstances that play to its most radical and perhaps authoritarian forces.

The great art, then, for Western policy is to encourage gradual political reform that includes the Islamists. Under these circumstances radical Islam should not become the dominant political voice in the Middle East. But given the extreme deficiencies of the current regimes in Egypt, Algeria, and perhaps Tunisia and Syria, there is in fact a likelihood that political Islam might emerge supreme in one or another of these states in the next decade. There is little the West can do about it except to establish ties with all but the most radical groups. Western policies towards Islam and the Muslim world, after all, also play a major role in the perception of the West by these movements that are sensitive to past Western colonial domination, and the powerful inroads of often negative aspects of Western culture into more traditional Islamic societies. Lastly, strong Western support for undemocratic and repressive regimes in the region will leave a strong legacy of suspicion towards the West that it has no interest in the democratic process, only interests to be preserved via dictators if necessary. In sum, the phenomenon of political Islam is very complex and deserves a subtle and textured approach to it from the West if talk of "a clash of civilizations" or "Islam vs the West" does not become a self-fulfilling prophesy. Europe will be affected by this phenomenon more than the US as the new borders of Europe are perceived and their relations with the neighboring Muslim world defined.

NEW REGIONAL POLITICAL CONFIGURATIONS

Turkey

As Europe is changing with the end of the Cold War, so too the traditional view of what constitutes the Middle East has been changing, especially with the emergence of six new Muslim states on the territory of the old Soviet Union. The effects of these changing geopolitical configurations, among other things, extend the boundaries of the traditional Middle East far to the East into Western China, in a new Turco-Muslim cultural continuum. The geopolitics of Turkey, Iran, and the Gulf have been most directly touched. Let us examine the new shape of these new configurations.

At the top of the list is the extraordinary transformation of Turkey, a state that has evolved from a geopolitical location at the "tail end" of Europe and NATO to become the center of a new Turkic-oriented world that stretches from the Balkans across the Caucasus and on into Central Asia and Chinese Turkestan. Europe's close relationships with Turkey therefore now inevitably draw in Central Asian and Caucasian politics in important ways into the European sphere. The republics of the former Soviet Union have in fact gained membership in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)--an astonishing fact that brings Tajikistan more formally into the councils of NATO thinking than Morocco, a stone's throw across the straits of Gibraltar from Spain. CSCE is now deeply involved in attempting to adjudicate the Mountainous Karabagh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This conflict has the

potential of embroiling Turkey, Iran, and Russia in ways which would have great negative impact upon the whole region.

Similarly, on Europe's doorstep, conflict in the Balkans is taking on a Muslim-Christian edge in Bosnia that can drag in diverse regional states such as Turkey, Greece, Albania, and Bulgaria in a third replay of the Balkan wars at the turn of the century. Turkey is one of the key factors in these conflicts, whose restraint has been important to the containment of the conflict. Bosnia, nonetheless, has had major impact upon the entire Muslim world, seen as a paradigm of Western indifference, if not hostility, to one of the last Muslim communities in Europe. This is the first time that the concept of Islam in geographical Europe has emerged since the turn of the century, in new geopolitical extensions of the Muslim world. If Bosnia is not dealt with justly, it bodes to become a "second Palestine" in terms of its emotive impact on the Muslim world.

Turkey's influence finally extends to the creation of a Black Sea Consortium of all riparian states and including Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Greece. This organization promises to create new trade ties across the Black Sea that had been "frozen" by the Cold War. The consortium could be an important factor in regional politics and lead to cooperation on security issues as well.

Iran

The involvement of Iran, too, in the politics of the Mediterranean has grown considerably in the last decade. Tehran

is present in the Mediterranean with its strong and historically effective support to radical Shi'ite groups in Lebanon. As Lebanon tries to rebuild itself and its mixed Christian-Muslim culture in the next decade with the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iran's support for the long oppressed Shi'ite community--the largest single group in Lebanon--will play a potentially significant role. Tehran's decade-long power in Lebanon has now been augmented by significant ties to the radical fundamentalist Palestinian organization Hamas. Hamas has declared its opposition to the Palestinian accord with Israel. While Iranian support has been significant in strengthening it, Hamas is not simply the puppet organization of Iran.

Far less effective, but still symbolically important, are Iran's new ties to Sudan and fundamentalist groups operating along the Mediterranean: Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria. In reality, the Islamist challenge to those states would be no less if Iran were to disappear tomorrow, but Iran helps encourage the concept of a broad international Islamist movement. Worse, it provides an excuse to these beleaguered regimes to blame all their problems of external interference and to justify refusal to liberalize. Iran's policies thus have indirect impact on issues of direct concern to a southern Europe that is working for stability and development in North Africa.

Rethinking the Nature of the Persian Gulf

The Persian Gulf has, of course, always been an integral part

of the interests of the West. But the very geopolitical meaning of the Gulf has also been affected by recent political changes in the area.

First, Iraq's adventurism has laid bare the deep ethnic and sectarian frictions that have been so exacerbated by the ruthless and destructive policies of Saddam Hussain. The country is now at serious risk of partition; the Kurds have now attained quasi-autonomous status. Unless Iraq is able to rid itself of the most brutal regime in the history of the modern Middle East and adopt principles of democratic rule and federalism, the state is doomed to breakup. Such an eventuality has massive implications for the rest of the Middle East, for the Kurdish problem is really a paradigm for broader problems of ethnicity, sectarianism, separatism, human rights, democratic rule and federalism that will challenge virtually all states of the region in the next decade. The resolution of the Kurdish problem will thus determine whether the solution will be repression and denial of ethnic and sectarian differences--a course doomed to eventual collapse and civil war as in the former communist states--or democratic federalism.

Whatever course is chosen in Baghdad, either way the issue has immense implications for the future of the territorial integrity of Turkey and Iran, both of whom possess large Kurdish populations. Turkey is developing decent de facto working relations with the Kurdish entity in northern Iraq. But the process is delicate due to the problems of Kurdish dissatisfaction within Turkey itself. Europe has already been affected by the problem due to the presence

of nearly two million Turks in Germany, of whom one-third may be Kurds. The Kurdish problem has already negatively affected Turkish-German relations and the battleground between Turks and Kurds has now extended to German cities. Turkey's application for EC membership will also be profoundly affected by its handling of its own Kurdish problem. Europe is thus inescapably linked to this problem.

The extension of active Kurdish politics on the international level up from Iraq into Turkey and Iran has impact on Iran beyond its own Kurdish population. The Kurdish area of Iran is contiguous and intermeshed in Iranian Azerbaijan. The emergence of an independent Azerbaijan in the former Soviet Union now also challenges Iran's integrity since Iran possesses nearly twice as many Azerbaijanis as does Azerbaijan itself, raising questions about potential Azeri separatism in Iran over the longer run.

The Azerbaijan problem for Iran has broader implications since it threatens Tehran with the specter of "Turkish encirclement." Azerbaijan's strong Turkish orientation could place Turkey potentially on the side of Azerbaijani separatism if strongly nationalist-chauvinist elements were to come to power in Turkey. This rising tension may well eventually lead to serious Turkish-Iranian conflict in the future. Iran is also engaged in competition with Turkey in (largely Turkic) Central Asia. Iran will thus be highly preoccupied in the future with its northern borders, likely distracting some of its focus from the Gulf. More significantly, "Persian Gulf politics" has now clearly extended on

up into Kurdistan and the Caucasus, given the importance of these regions to the politics, stability, and even integrity of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. Europe will not be able to deal with these problems entirely in isolation for they are all geopolitically linked.

Central Asia's five new Muslim nations have attracted much international attention, and most of all, of course, in Turkey. Immediately after the independence of these states in 1991, Turkey sought to extend political, economic, and cultural ties to the area. It has done more than any other state to bring these states into the orbit of the outside world and is engaged in extensive projects in all the states. Washington expressed great interest in Turkey's role in the region, somewhat simplistically urging that Turkey be the model for the region in order to shut Iranian influence out. The situation is considerably more complicated than that from the point of view of Western interests.

First, Turkey's ambitions cannot be sustained by the limited resources it possesses as a state. It is not in a position to channel significant sums into Central Asia. Joint ventures and educational, technical, and cultural assistance are Turkey's main attractions to Central Asia, as well as serving as a state with special sympathies and cultural ties to the area that can be helpful to Central Asia. The West is interested in extending some aid to the region via Turkey, which could be helpful. But the Central Asian states themselves are not interested in committing themselves to any particular bloc or political-cultural orientation

that will in any way prejudice access to the good will or resources of any other state, including Iran. China, Japan, East Asia, India, the Arab world, the United States and Europe are all potential sources of aid and trade. Central Asia can properly be expected to play the field to its own advantage.

Second, Iran cannot be ignored, however unattractive or negative its policies are perceived to be in the West. A glance at the map reveals that Iran is the sole alternative to land access to the West apart from dependence on Russia. Roads, rail-lines and pipelines via Iran are the logical way to get to the Persian Gulf and Turkey and onwards to the West. No Central Asian state will wish to damage its ties with Iran unless Iran should pursue policies hostile to the interests of the Central Asia. So far that has not been the case; Iran has been cautious to pursue largely very pragmatic policies in the area, despite accusations--highly exaggerated and inflammatory--by Uzbekistan about Iranian meddling in the Tajikistan civil war. In any case, Iran will be more and more involved in the passage of oil and gas out of Central Asia and Azerbaijan into the Mediterranean outlets of Turkey's pipe-lines. Here again, then, Western interest and investment in the energy sectors of the Caucasus and Central Asia tie the area into the Turkey-Iran axis, where any such Western activity was inconceivable before 1991.

Russia and the Middle East

Finally, all of these issues in the Balkans, the Caucasus,

Central Asia and on China's borders have direct impact upon the emerging policies of Russia. Russia is still in a quandary about what its national interests may be in a post-Communist world and with its new borders. Major debates are underway between those partisans of an Atlanticist foreign policy and the "Eurasianists" on the other. The Atlanticists see Russia's future tied inextricable with the West in shared common political and economic values. This trend obviously represents the antithesis of the past and a rejection of all the values of the communist era.

The Eurasianists represent a diverse group that lacks any single coherent vision, but several key themes dominate. First, that Russia is not a European, but a Eurasian nation that makes it inappropriate for Russia to pursue foreign policies that are in lockstep with European and American interests and policies. While it is self-evident that Russia is an Asian continental power and would naturally have important interests and ties to the south and to China, Japan, and the Pacific to the East, this policy orientation says nothing about the political **values** that would guide and inform Russian foreign policy. Does Eurasianism suggests any distance from democratic values?

Second, Eurasianists stress the fact that Russia is still a great power and therefore its interests by definition cannot mirror Western policies: Russia must have its own "independent" foreign policy. This approach at times almost seems to reflect difference for difference's sake--a desire to place distance between itself and the West, even where concrete differences of interest are not

spelled out. This school also includes a number of thinkers who are strongly nationalist in outlook and stress deep ties with Slavic nations and the Orthodox Church--reminiscent of the nineteenth century Slavophile school. Yet also implicit in this "Eurasian" tendency is the belief that Russia is somehow mystically linked with the East--going back to Orthodox Byzantium--and with the Islamic world--going back to the country's deep (and hostile) ties with the Tatars for so long. This line of thinking would place special emphasis on Russia's policies towards the Middle East where Russia has long had involvement from the early nineteenth century. The main question however, is whether Russia would see its former radical clients--Libya, Iraq, Syria--as the natural focus of new Russian interest, or whether it could work with all Muslim states in shared conjunction with the West.

If Russia suffers from uncertainty about its new place in the world, its own borders have been even more drastically affected. Russia's old international borders have almost completely vanished as the former Soviet republics, now independent, have become the new borders. Indeed, Russia speaks of its relations with the former republics as the "near abroad" (*blizhnee zarubezhie*) as opposed to traditional foreign policy with the "far abroad." This distinction may be risky since it implies different treatment for the former Soviet republics within the shifting and uncertain parameters of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

These issues are not merely abstruse philosophical issues, for they have direct bearing not only on Russia's overall orientation

towards the West, but affect Russia's relations directly to its south and the former Muslim republics. One point would seem clear at the outset: Russia's relations with the "far abroad" will inevitably be affected by Russia's relations with the "near abroad," for the external world will be attentive to signs of resurgent Russian imperialism. And Russia's relations with the Middle East cannot escape influence from the relations Moscow maintains with its former Muslim Republics. Europe's interests with Russia are therefore directly linked to Russia's ties with the emerging world of the new Islamic politics.

How then will Russia view the upsurge of external states in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Black Sea? What of the Turkish challenge to Russian traditional influence in these areas? Turkish Prime Minister Demirel (now President) several years ago urged the Turkic republics to consider forming a Union of Turkic States that potentially would end up reducing overall Russian economic and political influence in Central Asia. While Russia need not think in former Cold War terms of a Turkish/NATO "threat" to Russia in Central Asia, it still seeks dominant influence in the region in all areas including security, (sometimes referred to in the West as the "Monroesky doctrine.") If Russia feels challenged by Turkish activism in the region, might it support Iran as a counterweight to Turkish influence there? How are we to take the July 1993 coup in Azerbaijan in which the elected nationalist president who worked closely with Turkey and western oil companies was replaced (possibly with a Russian assist) by a former senior

communist who declared the need to reorient Azerbaijan's policies more closely with Russia? Turkey views this as a direct setback to its own interests in Azerbaijan.

The chances are that as long as committed democrats are in power in Moscow, there should be no serious conflict between Russia and other outside powers in Central Asia. But the potential ethnic instability (including millions of Russians) in the region will also influence Russia's relations there and broadly affect Russia's relations with Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, India, and the Middle East. The greatest concern is that major instability in Central Asia could lead to Russian interventionism that would in turn create resistance in the region, creating some kind of "Islam vs Russia" scenario that would then feed intensified Russian chauvinism and imperialist expansionism. Such trends would have major impact on Russia's relations with the West as well.

Conclusion

Major new factors are thus emerging in the entire region from Europe to Western China, creating new geopolitical factors that have direct impact on European, southern European, and US interests.

- Europe's new process of self-definition, including the question of what its relationships with neighboring Muslim states will be;

- the new prospects for the Middle East that emerge from a budding Arab-Israeli peace settlement;


- the impact of new Muslim states in the former Soviet Union and their ties to the West, including with Turkey and Iran;
- the uncertainties of ethnic separatism that is on the way to affecting the Middle East, with Iraq as its first major victim;
- the role of an Iran that has still not fully emerged from the radical ideological focus of the revolution, despite many moderating trends;
- Turkey's new geopolitical centrality;
- the growing force of political Islam as it seeks to define new relationships with the West in a post-colonial period, some of the states perhaps even hostile;
- the demands for reform and political and economic liberalization in the Middle East which will have an initially destabilizing influence on the area;
- the uncertainty of Russia's search for a new foreign policy.

Europe--especially Southern Europe--and the US will thus find themselves involved increasingly in a geopolitically broadening Muslim world--in which even the distant borders of Western China's Muslim population start impinging upon the rest of the Muslim world across to the Mediterranean states and their interests.

In the end the ultimate challenge for the West will be two:

- how to define its future relationship with the neighboring Muslim world--a policy of inclusion or exclusion--with major implications for either choice;
- how to assist in the evolution of these societies towards

more stable, democratic orders on Europe's borders. Getting there will be tricky and rife with instability. The West will need to avoid the danger of embracing "false stability" in the region, that is, keeping the lid on via support to repressive regions that are simply delaying the inevitable processes of social change long pent up. If they are not allowed to evolve as they should, already difficult problems will become even more explosive. The post-Cold War challenge well exceeds that of the Cold War itself.



The United States and Southern Europe

Southern Europe and The United States:
The Community Approach

Roberto Aliboni

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THE COMMUNITY APPROACH**

paper presented by **Roberto Aliboni**
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In Euro-Atlantic geopolitics, Southern Europe comprises the rim of countries lying on the southern flank of the Atlantic Alliance, from Portugal to Greece and Turkey, all being involved with both NATO and the European Community.

Turkey, though not exactly a European country, is a pivotal NATO member associated with the Community, and was always included in the notion of Southern Europe during the Cold War. At the end of the 1980s, however, pessimism about the possibility of its joining the Community in those historic times, and changes brought about in Turkey's geopolitical position by the end of the Cold War, shifted Turkey from the European circle to a more Turkish-centered role**1. Though this may well change again in the near future, presently the consequence of this shift is that Turkey, at least for general purposes, is still a crucial Western country but its South European role is fading.

France, on the other hand must be considered a North European country with an important Mediterranean dimension rather than a South European one**2. Though France shares important interests, views and heritage with Southern Europe because of its southern location and culture, its international role and policies are dominated by factors and goals that are not shared by South

European countries (e.g. the Franco-German axis, its nuclear armaments, its peculiar position in the Atlantic Alliance and its attempt at playing a global role in international relations).

Thus, for the purposes of this paper, the broad notion of Southern Europe will include Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece.

During the Cold War--to which the notion of Southern Europe is very much linked--South European foreign and security policies were shaped by three factors: national interests, the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community. The Community, though for different reasons and in varying conditions, has played a unique role in shaping the new democratic institutions and contributing to economic development in all four South European countries. Assuming that changes presently arising from the end of the Cold War are bringing about different new options for Southern Europe, what will be the weight and merit of continued membership in the Community? The relevance of a Community approach to Southern Europe is the subject of this paper.

Three arguments will be presented: (a) a general interpretation of the international role of Southern Europe; (b) an examination of challenges arising in the regional areas close to South European countries; and (c) a discussion of the relevance for South European countries of a Community approach to deal with such challenges.

The South European Role: Centrality and marginality

Southern Europe's participation in the Euro-Atlantic

institutional network proved very beneficial to the countries belonging to the area. As a result of their Euro-Atlantic integration, South European countries have been able to develop economically and to mature as viable democracies. Still, their political and economic weaknesses continued to characterize their participation in the life of the Euro-Atlantic alliances.

Their marginality has been stressed by all analyses which have been devoted to Southern Europe**3. They suggest that despite remarkable growth and modernization, major structural weaknesses and imbalances have persisted in these countries, relegating them to a marginal role on the international stage. But this marginality is relative, and differs depending on whether it is considered from the perspective of NATO or the Community.

Within the framework of NATO, the role of South European countries during the Cold War can be considered both marginal and central. Their more or less peripheral location with respect to the main threat emanating from the Communist bloc, i.e. away from the central front, entailed a certain distance from the political centre of the Alliance as well. On the other hand, while militarily and politically marginal within the circle of the Alliance, South European countries were geographically central with respect to the regions south of the Mediterranean. In other words, Southern Europe was marginal with respect to the "global" dimension of the Alliance, but central from a "geopolitical" point of view.

It must be noted that this centrality had a double dimension:
(1) within the Alliance, with respect to Southern Europe's role as

NATO's southern flank; and (2) out of the Alliance with respect to relations with the regional countries not included in the Alliance's jurisdiction. This has always led to overlappings between "area" and out-of-area" and ambiguities in South European countries' relations with the US, depending on whether the latter wore its NATO or national hat.

Political marginality pertained more to the Atlantic circle than to the European one. In the Community, there is no doubt that South European countries have gained political weight and enjoyed a substantial parity despite their relative economic weakness. Their membership in the Community helped South European countries to perform a much more significant international role than would otherwise have had individually.

One consequence which is relevant here of course is that the solidarity extended by the Community has given Southern Europe the possibility of compensating for their marginality within the Atlantic Alliance.

In particular, European solidarity eased the management of contradictions arising from the bilateral and multilateral dimensions (i.e. centrality/marginality) of the security relationship between South European countries and the US at the southern fringe of the Alliance. In a broad sense, the existence of the European solidarity made it easier for Southern Europe (and, broadly speaking for all the European members of the Atlantic Alliance) to resist recurrent pressures from the US for NATO to get involved in "out-of-area" operations. In particular, controversies

stemming from Mediterranean and Middle Eastern crises, in which the US acted as a global power enforcing its national security goals from military bases located in Southern Europe, were also made more manageable by the existence of this Community solidarity.

It must be pointed out that during the successive US interventions in the Mediterranean and the Middle East which punctuated the 1980s, Community solidarity was manifested, but with all the limits of the so-called European Political Cooperation (EPC), an intergovernmental diplomatic cooperation empowered to do little more than make declarations. Unless the 1991 Maastricht Treaty is enforced, the Community is not endowed with substantive instruments of foreign and security policy. Thus, as important as Community solidarity might have been up to the end of the 1980s, it has proved limited. As a result, the EPC was able to attenuate, but not to eliminate the situation of marginality and centrality shared by the South European countries on the southern rim of the Alliance's territory.

As limited as its political backing might have been, in the Cold War international context the Community approach did manage to alleviate Southern Europe's predicament twice. First, within the European Community itself the Community approach gave Southern Europe a political weight and an economic support which would otherwise have been very difficult to achieve. Second, the upgraded political status and external solidarity extended by the Community as a whole helped Southern Europe to play a remarkable international role at large and to manage the ambiguities of the

individual South European countries' security relation with the US in the Mediterranean, at the border with territories and challenges out of the NATO area.

To complete the picture, it should be said that Southern Europe's strategy of using the Community to compensate for its marginality in NATO or centrality in the Mediterranean has also sometimes worked the other way round, that is by using relations with the US to compensate for marginality in the Community. This was particularly the case for Italy, where an "American party"--as opposed to a "European" one--has always had a remarkable influence and a strong role in shaping both domestic and foreign policies.

Though it would be fatuous to talk about a South European model, there are some regularities in their international predicament that are worth pointing out:

- there is a tendency to compensate for marginality either in NATO or in the Community by stressing relations with the Community and NATO respectively;
- there is a tendency--to some extent close to Third World political patterns--to combine global marginality with regional/geopolitical centrality;
- there is a tendency to compensate for weaknesses in bilateral relations with the US by drawing support from the Community multilateral context.

Is this combination of marginality and centrality coming to an end in the post-Cold War situation? The fluidity of such a situation does not allow for a clear-cut response. The apparent

loosening of the Euro-Atlantic framework may increase marginality and weaken South European countries both regionally and within the Euro-Atlantic circle. On the other hand, Southern Europe's proximity to the regions south of the Mediterranean and the Balkans may increase its centrality and attenuate its marginality, as these regions are becoming increasingly central from both an international and a Euro-Atlantic point of view, .

What is new with the end of the Cold War is the nature of Southern Europe's centrality. Whereas this centrality was essentially geopolitical and regional during the Cold War, it seems that it has more of a global flavour in the present situation. With respect to the new kinds of risks, tensions and threats pointed out by the new NATO strategic concept worked out in the December 1991 Atlantic Council in Rome, Southern Europe emerges as a central area. The same is true with respect to the "new arc of crisis" singled out by the Western security community, though in both cases Southern Europe is only a segment of the whole Western area that is exposed to the new dangers.

This is not to exclude the South European tendency to remain marginal within the changing Euro-Atlantic context. However, this tendency toward marginality combines with a stronger centrality. It is evident that this stronger centrality might be used by Southern Europe to compensate for its marginality.

Before examining the new interaction of opportunities and liabilities present international developments are offering Southern Europe, we have to consider the regional situation around

Western Europe, i.e. the determinant of its new international situation.

Regional developments around Western Europe

Even before the end of the Cold War there were significant new developments in the regions south of the Mediterranean. Some of these developments are merely the continuation of trends already at work in the past; others are new. With respect to old trends, the essential change is that the end of the Cold War dissipated military threats coming from the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean area and the risks of horizontal escalation. From a regional point of view, however, old regional sources of instability persist and the new ones are not kept in check by the Cold War "order". To this southern instability it must be added that, as a consequence of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, further sources of instability and concern have emerged in Southeastern Europe. Southern Europe is at the juncture of these two arcs of crises.

The factors contributing to instability and affecting security across the Mediterranean, especially in North Africa, the Middle East and the Gulf up to Central Asia, have been explored by a number of works in the recent years**4. These factors are summarized below.

Broadly speaking, socio-economic conditions in the regions south of the Mediterranean, particularly in key-countries like Algeria, Egypt, Iran, are not improving. Though slightly decreasing

in the mid-long term, demographic pressure remains very high, leading to unemployment, particularly among young people. Migration, increasingly limited by both European and Arab states, can ease the situation only to a limited extent. These socio-economic conditions favour political radicalism, in particular political Islam or Islamism.

Islamism, from mainstream parties like the Muslim Brothers (now represented in several legislative bodies and even governments) to clandestine and terrorist groups, is increasing almost everywhere--including Saudi Arabia--and is encouraged by the radical international postures assumed by Iran and Sudan. In the space of a few years, religious radicalism has also become a factor in the Maghreb countries, a development that is of particular concern for a number of South European countries.

Religious radicalism is the response of frustrated people to old and new crises in the region, like the Arab-Israeli dispute and Iraq's inconclusive crisis. It is also the response to the failure of Nationalism in delivering Arabs and Muslims an economic and political status commensurate with the important cultural and historical heritage of the Arab and Islamic peoples. Islamism wants to achieve the goals Nationalism proved unable to do and it considers the West as its enemy. Unlike Nationalism, however, Islamism is not striving to gain political and economic parity with the West, but to assert its diversity. The feeling of Islamists towards the West ranges from "separateness" to hostility. Therefore, prospects for international cooperation are bound to be

limited. Antagonism and conflict are bound to be the rule.

This new cultural antagonism in combination with the hostility taken up from old Nationalism makes Islamism a factor of international conflict that promises to be more difficult than previous ones. Today, in addition to conflicts fuelled by late-Nationalism (as in the case of Saddam Hussein's Iraq), Islamism is trying to destabilize secular regimes (e.g. Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria), often by using democratic institutions, and non-secular regimes (e.g. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait). It is constantly narrowing the freedom of non-Muslim communities in the Middle East by the gradual Islamization of society, as in Egypt.

This situation of turmoil in the region is bringing about terrorism and other forms of low-violence. It may bring about conflicts which may involve the West or oblige it to intervene. From the Western point of view, however, the most worrying trend arising from today's relatively impotent Islamist hostility is that it is leading to an increase in the quantity and quality of arms in the region. Islamism is not yet a military threat today, but it may become one tomorrow.

The end of the Cold War has brought about an arrangement between Israel and the Palestinians, and the beginning of a normalization between Israel and the Arab countries. The peace now emerging within the context of the Arab-Israeli crisis is a crucial development for the stability of the region. However, it would be highly premature to speak about the stabilization of the region because of the possible Arab-Israeli normalization. Apart from

political instability in the Gulf, the trend that is bringing about instability in the whole of the Arab-Muslim area, cutting across its various regions, is now Islamism and its combination with Nationalism. The predictable opposition to the Arab-Israeli normalization from Islamists and other rejectionist quarters may work as a factor of radicalization of the radical tendencies already at work in the region. This will keep the area in a state of instability (and require effective management from the West).

As for the crisis brought about by the collapse of the former Yugoslavia and by the Serbian combination of aggressive Nationalism and communism, it is only partly linked to instability in the regions south of the Mediterranean--the linkage being the presence of a Muslim component in the crisis (the Muslim people in Bosnia, Sandjak, Kosovo, etc.), making Muslim and Arab countries feel involved.

In principle, this linkage is not enough to merge the two theaters of crisis but it is not to be excluded either. In fact, the tendency toward a linkage between the crisis in Southeastern Europe and those in the regions south of the Mediterranean is reinforced by similarities in their ideological and socio-economic matrices. There is the same intolerance arising from an exasperated search for identity. This intolerance, like that in the Arab-Muslim area, gives rise to significant displacement of people, environmental damage and economic instabilities. Most important, because of present conflicts in the Balkans and the Western inability to manage them, Balkan Islam may well turn to Islamism.

This development would merge the Balkans and the areas south of the Mediterranean.

The former Yugoslavia and other areas previously included in the Soviet Union, like Transcaucasia or Tajikistan, may be aptly considered today as part of an enlarged notion of "out-of-area". Some have referred to the "mediterraneanization" of the areas that were peripheral to the former Soviet Union**5. The notion of a new arc of crisis extending from Morocco to the former Soviet Union is now widely accepted**6. Threats and tensions arising from different areas within the new arc of crisis are not necessarily likely to merge, but they pose the same kind of challenges and threats to the West and the international community. A new notion of "out-of area" is emerging, in which areas that were part of the Eastern bloc are now considered part of an expanded notion of "out-of-area", with important differences but also important similarities among its countries. The multi-dimensional threat described by the 1991 new strategic concept of the Atlantic Alliance refers to both regions East and South of Western Europe, i.e. to the entirety of its new "out-of-area".

To come back to Southern Europe, some remarks are in order. As we have already noted, its geographic exposition with respect to this new "out-of-area" and the global significance of the "out-of-area" in the present international situation make it more central than it had been in the Cold War. But is this centrality more regional or global in nature?

Despite the presence of important unifying factors among the

various components of the new "arc of crisis" (particularly in Southeastern Europe and along the rim of the Russian Federation), it is very clear that it is divided into an eastern and a southern segment, both preserving important distinctive characters and problems. For Southern Europe, one element of centrality in this situation is its location at the juncture of these two segments.

From the point of view of the West as a whole, the eastern segment is more important than the southern one. This may marginalize Southern Europe within the global circle, according to the traditional pattern. But it seems that the eastern segment is a more definite priority for Germany and the other continental European countries than it is for the US. This different strategic emphasis between Northern Europe and the US may have important consequences for Southern Europe.

Finally, it should also be noted that not all of the South European countries are equally positioned with respect to this new arc of crisis. Italy and Greece are more exposed than Portugal and Spain. The two latter countries are definitely more interested in the Maghreb than the former are. This situation entails different regional and global involvements and different alliances within the Euro-Atlantic circle of the two groups of South European countries we have just mentioned.

Southern Europe's Community approach

Clearly, Southern Europe is not equipped to cope with challenges presently emanating from across the Mediterranean and

the wider arc of crises lying east and south of the Euro-Atlantic ensemble, neither militarily, nor politically and economically. The individual South European countries may each perform a role in dealing bilaterally a given country, for example Italy with Albania. They may even work effectively as a regional group, as in the case of the so-called Group of "Five plus Five" in the Western Mediterranean--a cooperative scheme that is now at a standstill. But unless they go their way by adopting some futile form of nationalism, the backbone of their policy toward the new "out-of-area" will be provided by their Euro-Atlantic multilateral tradition.

Within this Euro-Atlantic tradition new options are now open. They may opt for a more Atlantic or a more European approach, putting their emphasis on NATO or on the Community; they may even opt for a combined approach.

Broadly speaking, a Community approach would allow Southern Europe to deal with challenges coming from the Mediterranean and the Balkans more easily. A strong Community means a capacity to extend enhanced economic, financial and social cooperation to the countries around the Mediterranean. By and large, this cooperation is deemed very important in helping these countries to stabilize and, therefore, in reinforcing Community's security. The development of the so-called Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) envisaged by the Treaty of Maastricht should offer the European Union a possibility both for multiplying its cooperation efforts and for using the latter to improve its security within the

framework of a common foreign policy approach. Furthermore, the Treaty of Maastricht also gives the Community the chance to add a policy of military insurance to the cooperative dimension of its security policy, thanks to the development of a common European defense within the framework of the Western European Union (WEU) designated by the Treaty to act as the military arm of the European Union.

In principle, the Community approach, particularly if the Community is upgraded into a European Union, would offer Southern Europe an optimal combination of marginality and centrality with respect to the global circle. The existence of a CFSP would attenuate differences between eastern and southern priorities among member states; Mediterranean, Balkan and Eastern policies would emerge as different dimensions (of course, with different weights) of a single CFSP of the European Union. A reinforcement of the Community solidarity would attenuate South European risks of marginality with respect to a weaker Community and the dominance in it of an eastward priority. On the other hand, risks associated with centrality in the Mediterranean would be compensated for by the possibility of sharing them with the Community's partners.

These remarks have to be weighted against two trends: first, the impact of the Community approach on the trans-Atlantic dimension, i.e. US-European relations and, second, the prospects of the deepening of the Community in a post-Maastricht European debate that risks weakening rather than strengthening the Community.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union "L'Europe cessait d'être

aux yeux de l'Allemagne une obligation pour devenir une option"***7. The Treaty of Maastricht has failed to offer Germany's unification a new, attractive European frame in three ways: it did not present Germany with precise commitments to budgetary policies; it failed to offer a more stringent democratic control in the European Union by strengthening its institutions, particularly the European Parliament (a point that is also related to monetary and economic policies); it did not propose to share the burden of the reconstruction of East Germany through financial transfers from the Community as an alternative to the high interest rates adopted by the German government. The consequence of this failure is a tendency toward German re-nationalization, which while not emerging as a clear trend to fragment the Community creates a Germano-centric Community with member countries running at different speeds.

Despite many efforts and initiatives, the Franco-German axis is in shambles. France cannot accept a Community led by Germany, but it does not seem prepared to understand that Germany is no longer obliged to recognize a French leadership in Europe, and that the only way out is to offer Germany a more federal Community.

In this situation Southern Europe's option for a Community approach means the ability to contribute to restoring Community cohesion and to giving new impetus to the move toward European Union. The main argument for Southern Europe to become especially active in restoring the effectiveness of the Community is that otherwise they will be destined to marginality within Europe as

well as in the trans-Atlantic circle (to the extent that a fading Community will allow for the survival of the Atlantic Alliance as we know it).

Whether South European countries are willing to restore a Community approach is not clear. All the countries are aware of the vital importance of the Community for their economy; however, there is a tendency to postpone the deepening of the economic integration planned by the Maastricht Treaty, while taking advantage of the existing communitarian economic solidarity in order to address the current slump. There is also a call for some form of economic renationalization in certain quarters which should not be ignored. As for foreign and security policies, there are mixed results: the Yugoslav crisis has revealed a lack of European political cohesion, but the WEU has taken some steps forward in the wake of the rearrangement planned by the Maastricht Treaty and it was able to arrange for the joint military operations in the Adriatic Sea and on the Danube river. Nevertheless the agreement on Yugoslavia reached on May 22, 1993 at the UN by the US, Russia, France, the UK and Spain, without consulting the other European partners, gave way to complaints by Germany and Italy in NATO and seemed to indicate a weakness in the emerging European security solidarity. In conclusion, it must be said that Southern Europe is not particularly active in contributing to preserve and deepen the Community, despite its special interest in it. Southern Europe reflects the widespread uncertainty presently prevailing among all the Community's members: nobody is deliberately going towards

renationalization, but no one has managed to understand how the vicious circle can be interrupted.

The stagnation that is prevailing in the Community is crucial to an understanding of the other factor affecting the South European posture, i.e. US-European relations. The compromise outlined by the Treaty of Maastricht about the CFSP and European defense was heavily biased in favour of the creation of a trans-Atlantic pillar rather than a pillar of the European Union. The Franco-German Eurocorp, which was regarded at the outset as the beginning of a European counterweight to the integrated Atlantic defense, is definitely not regarded by Germany as an anti-Atlantic initiative: Germany considers it an element of the more or less sincere German willingness to preserve the special Franco-German relationship. With the controversies stirred by the Yugoslav crisis within the Euro-Atlantic framework, the European and US-European debates about European defense and security policies now seem obsolete: dissensions within NATO are not generated by the more or less effective will of the Europeans to create a more or less independent CFSP, but by fragmentation within the Community and about strategic perspectives.

The most recent developments in this debate show that, more than ever, the core of dissensions is about the future of NATO. The new American administration seems increasingly willing to preserve NATO as the locus of the coalition that makes American leadership culturally and politically coherent, feasible and strong; it seems willing to redirect NATO to the broad "out-of-area"; it seems

unwilling to enlarge it to the East, but intent on increasing its ability to act as an instrument of political cooperation (as in the case of the NACC) both towards East and South. On the other hand, the European side, though definitely willing to preserve NATO and the American military presence in Europe, is strongly reluctant to accept the renewal of NATO's rationale and of the US leadership in it. This is demonstrated by the debate about NATO intervention to police Sarajevo and by the debate taking place under German and Northern European pressures on the enlargement of NATO to the East European states. This enlargement would divide NATO with respect to non-central European countries, Southern Europe and the southern segment of the "out-of-area". It would prevent NATO from assuming the wider global relevance that the emerging American vision is trying to assign to it. In both debates there is an opposition between the US and the varying European groupings.

During the debate that led to the Maastricht Treaty, many US quarters (including the present US Ambassador to Italy, Reginald Bartholomew) were strongly suspicious and hostile with respect to the eventuality of a political and security reinforcement of the Community. What can be seen today is that the Community's fragmentation and failure to develop its CFSP and a stronger common European security identity are emerging as an obstacle to a constructive debate within NATO. This shows how intertwined the trans-Atlantic and European cohesions are: there is a parallel between the weakening of the Community and that of NATO.

This parallel affects Southern Europe, which is both

should be
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especially interested in the restoration of an effective Community approach and in the continuation of a balancing American presence on the European political stage. In this sense there is a strong convergence of interests between the US and Southern Europe in restoring Community cohesion as a way to allow for a renewal of NATO. Perhaps this is particularly true for Italy, a country which is at the juncture of the areas involved in the current debate. This consideration emerged very clearly during of the Italian prime minister's visit to Washington in September 1993. In order to cope with its dilemma of centrality vs marginality, Southern Europe needs a good combination of European and trans-Atlantic cohesion. The continuation of current tendencies would be detrimental to Southern Europe.

If the Euro-Atlantic framework proves unable to survive present difficulties and goes into a decline, South European countries will probably develop stronger relations with the US. This development will ensure Southern Europe against challenges from the new "out-of-area" and give the US a good logistic platform to manage crises around the Mediterranean. However, European fragmentation might well lead to the re-emergence of major threats from the darkness of recent history, thus making "out-of-area" challenges assume only the secondary importance they had during the Cold War, and diminishing any interest in a stronger US-Southern Europe bilateral relationship.

NOTES

- (1) See Ian O. Lesser, *Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War*, Rand, R-4204-AF/A, Santa Monica (Ca), 1992; Graham E. Fuller, *Turkey Faces East. New Orientations Toward the Middle East and the Old Soviet Union*, Rand, R-4232-AF/A, Santa Monica (Ca), 1992; Paul B. Henze, *Turkey: Toward the Twenty-First Century*, Rand, N-3558-AF/A, Santa Monica (Ca), 1992. The idea of a new self-centered Turkey, energetically projected in various directions has been pruned especially from US quarters, in the wake of the role played by Turkey in the 1990-91 Gulf war (and with a polemic intention towards the non-role played by the European Community). Recently, the US press reported some skepticism about Turkey's ability to meet US expectations; see: Alan Cowell, "Turkey's Fading Role as U.S. Proxy to Emerging Central Asian Nations", *International Herald Tribune*, August 5, 1993.
- (2) Christophe Carle, "France, the Mediterranean and Southern European Security", in Roberto Aliboni (ed.), *Southern European Security in the 1990s*, Pinter Publishers, London & New York, 1992, pp. 40-51.
- (3) Roberto Aliboni (ed.), *Southern European Security in the 1990s*, op.cit.; Douglas T. Stuart (ed.), *Politics & Security in the Southern Region of the Atlantic Alliance*, MacMillan Press, 1988; John Chipman (ed.), *NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges*, London, New York, Routledge with Atlantic Institute for International Affairs, 1988.
- (4) Roberto Aliboni, *European security across the Mediterranean*, WEU Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper No. 2, Paris, 1991; Ian O. Lesser, *Mediterranean Security. New Perspectives and Implications for U.S. Policy*, Rand, R-4178-AF, Santa Monica (Ca), 1992; Bertelsmann Foundation, Research Group on European Affairs headed by W. Weidenfeld, *Challenges in the Mediterranean -The European Response* (paper presented to the Conference of Barcelona, Oct. 7-8, 1991). + Boyer
- (5) Reinhardt Rummel, *The Global Security Architecture and the Mediterranean*, paper presented at the International Conference on "The Mediterranean: Risks and Challenges", Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, 27-29 November 1992.
- (6) This notion was elaborated at the IISS's annual Conference in Zurich, Sept. 12-15, 1991; see G. Joffé's and C. Gasteyger's papers in *New Dimensions in International Security Part I*, Adelphi Papers, 265, Brassey's for the IISS, 1992 ; see also in the same proceedings Z. Brzezinski, *The Consequences of the End of the Cold War for International Security*. See, recently, R.D. Asmus, R.L. Kugler, F.S. Larrabee, "It's Time for a New U.S.-European Strategic Bargain", *International Herald Tribune*, August 28-29, 1993. The latters distinguish between a southern and an eastern section of the arc.
- (7) Jean-Louis Bourlanges, "Contro l'Europe platonique", *Le Monde*, August 23, 1993.

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The United States and Southern Europe

Southern Europe and The United States:
The Bilateral Approach

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The new international context, which derives especially from the changes that have taken place in East-West and North-South relations, is propitious for a new function for the bilateral dimension. The recent development of multilateralism and the increased role of international organizations do not weaken this trend; rather they coexist with it and seek to integrate it. National governments have, furthermore, the same capacity to adjust as they displayed with regard to their gradual involvement in the legalization of international relations on a more generalized scale.

The fact that international relations are becoming ever more intense within frameworks created by collective organizational schemes does not stand in the way of the emergence of leadership by national institutions. It must also be noted that there are two parallel developments: the phenomena of proliferation of international organizations and organisms, and the multiplication of positions taken unilaterally by national governments to establish special relationships for consultation, understanding and concerted action. These are of a bilateral scope and exclusively involve nations as participants.

The instability of the international situation also accentuates these parallel developments. On the one hand, the call for multilateralism is growing, and on the other hand national governments are forced to make essential choices and develop solutions.

The relationship between southern Europe and the United States is not an exception to the general rule. On the one hand, the area of influence of large international organizations is growing; on the other hand, the freedom of action of states leaves to them the option, in case of crisis, regarding coordinating foreign policies. Thus southern Europe is an area where different approaches to the organization of the international system come together. This derives from the degree to which bilateral or multilateral relations overlap and the preservation by states of their ultimate freedom to decide on their foreign relations autonomously.

Southern Europe is a zone of great diversity. The proximity of the Mediterranean, the Greek and Latin roots of its cultures, the levels of development and the political transformations during the decade of the 1970's (in the cases of Greece, Portugal and Spain) have led naturally toward uniformity. Soviet pressure on southern Europe, especially with respect to Turkey, Greece and Italy, and its diplomatic and naval presence in the Mediterranean, contributed to the homogeneity of the area, so that a southern flank was quite clearly defined in a bipolar context as a region of possible intervention. All of this notwithstanding, in this context the southern flank was an area strategically subordinated to the essential logic of a conflict which would arise on the central front, further north and thus having the Federal Republic of Germany and its security as the determinative factors. This bipolar context with its strong

degree of confrontation lessened southern Europe's heterogeneity. However, one should not fail to note such significant special factors as the dispute between Greece and Turkey, the departure of France from the military organization of the Atlantic Alliance and its doctrinal conflict with the United States, or the entry of Spain into NATO without incorporation into the integrated military structure.

The end of the Cold War, with the disintegration of Soviet power, has naturally accentuated the tendency of southern Europe toward diversity. This has now been made viable by the absence of a pressure that previously acted as a boon to solidarity and promoted a relative convergence of interests. The conflict in the Balkans, as well as the alignments which are being established in relation to it, are the clearest examples of this deterioration of the cohesive effect of the Soviet threat.

Southern Europe thus sees itself transformed into a stage for armed confrontation of large proportions with the risk of spilling outside the territory of the former Yugoslavia. At the same time, on the other side of the Mediterranean, one observes the slow erosion of the political systems and ideologies which undertook the decolonization of North Africa and, either sporadically or continuously, maintained an active relationship with the USSR, particularly with respect to the import of armaments and the concession of naval bases for the Soviet fleet. The future of the Arab countries of North Africa - their demographic, economic and social problems, their migratory

currents and the spread of fundamentalism - has planted itself at the heart of the worries of southern Europe, if not in the form of a direct military threat - which, in any event, it is not, for the moment - then at least as the risk of a difficult relationship.

To this scenario of uncertainty characterizing southern Europe at the end of the Cold War there is added the fact that, within its limits, the entire problematic situation of the Middle East presents itself, along with the tensions in the Gulf and the war in the Caucasus, without losing sight of issues which necessarily spell trouble for some of its component members, such as the future of formerly Soviet Central Asia, or where the interest is transitory, such as the operation in Somalia.

The concentrated Soviet military threat, which was situated more to the north, has been succeeded by a chain of instability which stretches horizontally across the Mediterranean zone, making it one of the most pronounced foci of risk on the international scene today. The problems resulting from the stationing of the military forces of the Warsaw Pact in proximity to Turkey, Greece or Italy, from the presence of Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean, and from the possibility of using bases for the projection of the USSR's and its allies' air forces throughout this region, no longer exists. But similar issues are now resulting from the explosion of a country - Yugoslavia - whose neutrality and nonalignment was a keystone for the European balance during the period of the Cold War - as well as from the

lack of a resolution of the situation of Moldova, the uncertainty characterizing the relations between Ukraine and Russia, the war in the Caucasus, the fact that the future of Turkish-speaking Central Asia remains to be defined, the persistence of tensions in the Middle East and the Gulf, and the economic and social crisis throughout North Africa, propitious for resentments and having the power to attract political/religious proselytism. The southern flank of Europe, which fulfilled functions complementary to the allied central front, now sees itself projected into the position of a border facing a whole area of uncertainty. This imbues it with characteristics clearly similar to those of the former central European front to the extent that the line of inquiry for this quadrant has become a subject of manageable stability. This does not involve finding a substitute or a successor for the Soviet threat; rather it involves recognizing the increased potential of risk in this zone, which by itself justifies the need to structure a diplomacy, a security policy and, as well, a defense.

The European countries, especially in the south, have perceived the rise of the new economic circumstances of the Mediterranean and, at the same time when they launched bilateral plans for strengthening diplomatic relations with their Arab neighbors outside the zone, they did not neglect to initiate plans to convert their military force structures, to respond to the lessening of tension in central Europe, and to strengthen their defenses (in preparation for a scenario of risk) for facing

tensions in the south. The investment in naval and air equipment is an adaptation to this new context of conflict and the preparation of rapid deployment air transport forces is an example of new priorities in defense organizations. The allocation of a large amount of resources to systems such as air defense or anti-missile defense and the introduction of capabilities for collecting and processing data attest to the option of taking seriously the events around the Mediterranean and the need for handling possible points of disturbance that may occur with substantial damage to European and allied security. The European countries surrounding the Mediterranean also have an Atlantic front (France and Spain) and project their interests toward the continental area in the north (Italy, Greece and Turkey). The fact that they have involvements of various types and are not limited to a southern scenario does not mean that they currently do not place the subject of the Mediterranean, meaning both sides of that sea, at the center of their evaluations of the situation, and give it very special attention. But they do not glean from this analysis a satisfactory basis for response. The military modernization programs of these countries are also cast within a more general context of restructuring defense arrangements that an organization such as NATO is adopting for its southern flank, which takes into account a context of new risks and threats in no way comparable to the model of what it had to respond to in recent decades.

The reduction of the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean and the end of this zone as a subject of strategic effort by the USSR also led to a restructuring of goals by the U.S. with respect to the region. Now the objectives are not as contentious as the objectives against Communism or Soviet expansion were in their day, rather they constitute an arbitration of intra-European and intra-Arab disputes - or of both - and the possibility of using means adequate either for timely interventions in the region or for projecting force to contain nearby crises, with special emphasis of the Gulf, the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. Joining their own capabilities with the capabilities of allies and using a network of facilities reshaped to the scale of the new realities, the U.S. sees the Mediterranean corridor as essential to its power to assume effective international responsibilities in its zone of involvement. The U.S. does not seek to have a presence in the Mediterranean because of the USSR, but because of the new perception it has of its own responsibilities on a worldwide scale.

The diversity of southern Europe makes it impossible to treat it as a uniform zone. Countries such as France, Spain and Portugal (which, not being an adjoining country, still has clear affinities to the area) will give priority to the problems of the western Mediterranean; Italy will always aspire to Mediterranean leadership in all directions, while Greece and Turkey will concentrate more on their bilateral context and on relations with

their neighbors on the land borders. To add to this diversity of interests there is also the difficulty of establishing an intensive relationship with the Arab countries, especially at a time when their political structures fear being structurally weakened by such an opening. If, from the standpoint of a great power surveying the international scene, it is possible to identify the outline of southern Europe or the Mediterranean as the USSR did and as U.S. diplomacy appears to continue to do, however the most profound reality is the existence of states strongly rooted in their autonomy or of a group of sub-regions, some indeed more inclined to find common interests. Here the end of the Cold War has also seen a reduction of the attracting force of the major common denominators.

The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the retreat of Soviet power in the international arena, in conjunction with the development of different sorts of threats to security and stability in the Mediterranean region, have favored doctrinal and organizational changes in the international institutions with interests in the region. Such changes, primarily dictated by the different approaches taken by the international system, basically have the intention of also including in their overall objectives an accentuated preoccupation with problems in southern Europe, the Mediterranean and northern African regions. Never before in the formulation of strategic concepts by international organizations with dimensions such as the CSCE, NATO or the European Community and the WEU, has their presence been felt so

strongly in such kinds of problems. If there is a lesson to be learned with the end of Soviet hegemony, it is that a vast set of potential issues came to light, which now burst uncontrollably on to the international arena without any type of governance or mediation. It is therefore natural that the vitality which exists in the Mediterranean region has come to express a stronger dynamic than the one that existed previously and that, by virtue of this intensity and the absence of a bipolar command, the international organizations, either by changing objectives or by broadening their scope, have gradually moved their focus of attention to the south, also adding, now more concretely, the southern European, Mediterranean and northern African issues.

The Cold War had focused the problems of security and joint defense in the need to confront a strong concentration of continental power capable of disputing, in a preliminary phase, the central European region. The centrality of the Soviet threat in the European ground gave rise to a response based on the doctrine of the indivisibility of the western allied nations' security. What in fact this always meant was an inevitable accentuation of the central front role and a relative reduction of the importance of the northern and southern flanks. Thus the southern flank of the Atlantic Alliance has always had a role, whether in strengthening the central front and giving logistic support, or in surveillance and control of the Mediterranean. The southern flank, however, was never understood to be a first line

of defense with the same strategic and tactical significance as the Federal Republic of Germany, for instance.

Indeed, what the changes in the international situation now present is almost a reversal of what until now was the model of security and defense architecture. The central front has ceased to be the focus of attention - by the way, clearly constructive means of cooperation have arisen there (such as in the cases of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia) - and has become the periphery. The southern periphery in particular has become the priority front, because of the new types of threats that make their effects felt concretely. It is therefore no surprise that international institutions and countries make the necessary doctrinal and structural changes for the proper assumption of this new reality.

The CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), having institutionalized the East-West dialogue during the Cold War period, made a strong contribution to the creation of a multilateral environment capable of addressing sensitive issues in complex areas of security, human rights and economic cooperation. The transition, after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the demise of the USSR, also permitted the strengthening of this multilateral environment with the addition of other relevant issues in the various areas of electoral processes, ethnic minorities, linguistic, religious and cultural identities. That is, the CSCE - which is becoming ever more visible as the regional forum for the United Nations in Europe - is clearly

assuming the objective of undertaking the challenge and eventual resolution of a vast group of problems that have always been at the heart of the cause of European conflicts within the context of multilateral cooperation. It is true that, in specific cases of enormous seriousness, such as the question of Yugoslavia, the CSCE shows itself not to have the means to act with determination to prevent a crisis and deter a conflict, failing, however, in its resolution. Nevertheless this does not mean that the standard through which the CSCE perceives a methodology of diplomatic involvement is not an instrument of great usefulness and that from it conclusions cannot be drawn for Mediterranean security in general.

In 1991, when the "Five-Plus-Five" dialogue began (between France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Malta, on one side, and Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania, on the other) a first step was made, certainly inspired by the model of the CSCE, to deepen the cooperation between countries on opposing sides of the western Mediterranean, that is, between southern Europe and the Maghreb. The assessment of the parameters of this dialogue ranges from diplomatic consulting and the exchange of points of view on the political level to financial problems, to the issue of population migration and to cooperation in the environmental sphere. For the first time it was possible, in an informal context, to establish a nexus of relations between countries which clearly assumed a multilateral and sub-regional posture in

its attempt to resolve the issues under debate in their respective areas.

Thus it is no surprise that from the discussion carried out within the scope of "Five-Plus-Five" process, the notion that it was necessary to advance from an informal and colloquial level to a more formal and institutionalized level began to gain consistency. The idea of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) thus began to acquire force, reproducing for this zone the structuring principles of the CSCE itself. Nevertheless, the existence of various cultural heritages (and a degree of differences which does not compare that which separates the members of the CSCE during the Cold War period for ideological reasons) does not mean it is inappropriate that an inter-governmental conference on security and cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) be called for and that its agenda include the principles, the main issues and subjects with the necessary adaptations that have governed the Helsinki process. A broad version of the CSCM (with all of the countries surrounding the Mediterranean and bordering all of the points of the CSCE) is certainly not practical at the moment. But a version embracing the countries of the western Mediterranean that began the "Five-Plus-Five" dialogue, one which would concentrate on some of the subjects of the CSCE (such as environmental and economic cooperation, the confidence building security and the cultural and legal dialogue) would already be attainable with a certain degree of realism.

Another international organization that did not remain indifferent to developments which arose in southern Europe was NATO. For many years it was common for NATO to involve itself in critical points of allied security - and these were always located in the central Europe zone. NATO responded rapidly to the need to resolve the questions arising in the security of its southern flank in the post-Cold War. While it is certain that NATO was quicker in trying to establish points of contact with its contenders of the past - the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council is a proof of this - it may not, however, be possible to judge with absolute certainty whether or not NATO attributed a high degree of importance to the southern flank in its new strategic concept as well as in its new structure of forces and commands. Nothing else could take place when it is precisely there that its increase in armaments and military expenses is taking place and it is there also that the number of military troops is very disproportionate in view of the needs of the respective countries. It is there that some of the serious problems related to the support of the international terrorism, the proliferation of missiles and the acquisition of offensive means in the area of chemical ammunition and even nuclear capabilities lie.

NATO's new strategic concept clearly fosters this type of concern and it is from there that the new structure of forces - especially at the level of forces of rapid deployment and forces of immediate deployment - take into account the imperative need

to not create gaps in security for the alliances between the central front and the southern flank, precisely when it is from this direction that some of the new types and modalities of risk to which the concept points out come today. Although NATO has not yet, in this field, gone beyond mere assessments of risk or simple consultations, the truth is that the organization is structuring itself militarily to be in the position to give satisfactory response to some unexpected events that may be observed in the region, namely being able to integrate operations for reestablishing or maintaining peace under the auspices of the United Nations and the CSCE and under the umbrella of the new allied philosophy for out of area intervention. The fact that Spain and France do not participate in the integrated military structure, that relations between Turkey and Greece have never been good and that the United States and Europe have not agreed entirely on a policy for the Mediterranean are factors that make a dynamic performance of NATO in the whole region somewhat difficult . Nonetheless, the creation of the STANAVFORMED, the progress in the areas of air defense and the establishment of new ground structures for rapid deployment endowed with great flexibility power, mobility and projection at distance, try to, as part of NATO, show a clear concern aimed at adjusting its capabilities to the new realities and to give the southern flank a different and more current focus than the one the organization had up to now. In fact, in a transition period such as now, NATO must not distance itself from developing relations with the

south, but rather make the same effort of tracking changes it has learned to observe in relation to countries in central and northern Europe. At this point an imbalance would hurt the indivisible security dogma which serves as the alliance's guiding line.

Following the shift of other large international organizations, the European Community has been giving increased attention to southern European problems. From an internal perspective, the Community, when addressing economic and social cohesion, assuming a regional policy, and transferring greater financial resources to confer to the southern zone the adequate infrastructure that will serve as a support for a unified market with full mobility of goods, services, capital and people, has learned to make effective a policy of economic integration that works for itself as a true guarantee in the area of security. From the international standpoint, and in regard to the Mediterranean, the community has acted in two complimentary ways. On one side, and in a defensive posture, it has come to adopt measures of increased integration regarding border control, immigration policies and the status of resident aliens, which obviously has consequences vis-a-vis the north African populations. On the other hand, it has developed, through its "Renewed Mediterranean Policy" dating back to 1990, a more active role in the region, which includes a vast set of mechanisms for financial support and cooperation. The renegotiation of accords with the countries of the Maghreb aims at solidifying a

"Maghrebian economic space", the aim also of the Arab Maghreb Union (Treaty of Marrakech of 1989). In reality, without reaching a reasonable platform for the realization of economic cooperation in this domain - to which the Community seems very much inclined - Europe will be unlikely to be able to compete in terms of Mediterranean policies with the intensified influence represented by the American military presence (especially air and naval forces) in the region. The European countries with a Mediterranean vocation are very interrelated with respect to their national policies relating to the region. They give emphasis to areas with objectives of influence that have a relationship with their colonial past, which, at the same time, assures important access in certain instances, but triggers resentments that have clear political and diplomatic implications.

It is for this reason that the adoption of foreign and security policies as a unified common policy, as provided for in the Maastricht Treaty, and the role attributed to WEU as the armed branch of future European Union, are factors that lead to the prediction of greater convergence of the European Community member countries in Mediterranean policy and in its development not only in the area of internal control of the migratory flows, but also in economic aspects including also components of foreign policy, security and defense. One of the critical points that this new discussion will test will certainly be the Mediterranean, in particular in view of the proximity and the

importance that the region has for the countries of the Community. The impossibility of making the Mediterranean uniform will certainly lead to a continuation of a special identification for the Maghreb despite the Libyan irritant and it will stimulate the existence of a partner on the other side of the Mediterranean with an integrated economy that has a minimum of consistency. The cooperation between organizations will be made easier but, at the same time, it will not make less important, in the whole region, either in the north or in the south, a specific dimension for foreign policy for each country, in particular if we take into account the weight and the acquired notions of autonomy, liberty and independence of the states, sovereignty and historical roots of national decisions and even the nationalistic prejudices which are not exclusive characteristics of the Arab states.

The fact that the main international organizations are gradually extending their umbrella of influence to southern Europe and that today it is more willing to submit to the obligations of certain regional understandings of a rather limited scope, does not mean that the states will not maintain their own identity; and it is on this basis, in the last analysis, that the substance of their foreign policies will be defined. On the southern side of the Mediterranean the tendencies for any movement towards integration are very precarious and the Arab Maghreb Union itself is, in practical terms, a goal for the longer term. Furthermore, the political

regimes in existence in the area and the ones that will eventually come to exist will for many years give particular weight to national and even nationalist factors, not only in their relationship with other countries, but especially in relationships among themselves. The relations between Tunisia and Libya, Libya and Egypt or Algeria, or Mauritania and Morocco and Morocco and Algeria are an excellent domain for the preponderance of national affirmation to the detriment of any multilateral solution. On the northern side, despite the participation of the countries in established international organizations, the uprooting of the age-old roots that are at the basis of and reinforce the main lines of countries' respective foreign policies, as has often been demonstrated when consensus has been sought, whether in the Atlantic Alliance or in the European Community, is not foreseen at any early date. The basic perceptions in foreign policy will remain linked to the actual circumstances of the states and it is unlikely that any movement toward convergence - which is certainly important for the affirmation of Europe internationally - will be converted into an automatic uniformity of positions. Who can imagine Portugal relinquishing its special relations with Africa or Brazil or its special care when dealing with questions related to Spain? Or Spain agreeing to end its presence in the Hispanic world and decreasing the importance it gives issues involving matters with France? In fact, no other country more than France will not abandon a foreign policy defined on the basis of a national

perspective. And will Italy not assume the protagonism of transmediterranean horizons without proceeding with the affirmation of its permanent orientation towards Europe? And Greece or Turkey, who could suppose them hesitating with respect to their regional positions and the search for allies, the creation of areas of influence and mechanisms of protection? One can find, with respect to this national priority and to the unilateral policies, the basic elements of action for the mediterranean countries in the field of international relations. Unilateralism on the northern side is obviously balanced by the need to integrate larger alliances or by collective security and, overall, sources for facilitating economic and social development until now associated with ideas of European integration and a common market.

During the Cold War, the United States committed itself to the Mediterranean, particularly in regards to its naval forces, taking into account the possibility of a Soviet advance on the region. At the same time, the Mediterranean became an area of transit for other scenarios of crises and conflicts that emphasized the necessary points of support. The end of the Cold War came to broaden this vital need not only for the Middle East or the Gulf region, but also for the Horn of Africa and the Balkans. The developments in the Caucasus and the former Soviet Central Asia, such as the Russian-Ukraine tensions, are still factors of concern. The North American tendency in particular continues to favor a global analysis of the world situation and

the definition of global strategic objectives in order to integrate simultaneously the attempt to stabilize and establish areas of influence and to affect the expansion of power previously necessary for the management of the bipolarity and, today, the affirmation of world leadership. This global concern, technically based on the notion of scenarios, often collides with the capacity to generate and maintain long-lasting relations, transforming them, in many instances, to occasional bilateral relations, determined by the need for intervention in moments of crises. With effective air-naval presence and empowered with significant bases, the United States is capable of establishing a corridor for multiple uses in the Mediterranean, not only on the northern side, but also including Morocco and Egypt, through which its access for demonstration or intervention in a variety of conflicts is guaranteed. Despite the new world context and the priorities resulting from budget constraints, the truth is that reductions in the number of bases abroad has not affected the essential U.S. military capabilities in the region, which have adjusted to the nature of the new missions, whether they are of the type similar to "Desert Storm" or "Restore Hope," or other missions aimed at maintaining peace justified by the need for international stability, as well as the different contingency plans for Bosnia.

The Mediterranean policy of the United States does not always equally balance support for both sides of the Sea, and is not always devoid of friction with its allies to the north,

whether they are Spain, France or Greece. Taking into account the specifics of the Turkish position vis-a-vis several different problems around its borders, the Americans are today emphasizing a Turkish platform. This is sometimes not well understood or easily accepted by the other allies, whether they are Arabs or Europeans. Excessive endorsement by the United States of Turkish activism does not lead to a balanced role for the U.S. with respect to the region, and, with time, taking into consideration the end of the Cold War, would appear to risk eroding U.S. diplomatic capability vis-a-vis the Mediterranean countries.

Despite taking part in several regional organizations and maintaining reasonable foreign policy ties amongst themselves, the southern European countries continue to have an active relationship with the United States, which stems not only from the U.S. presence in the region, but also, and above all, from the U.S. role in the international system. If we do not take into account the case of France, which for reasons of organization of its defense and its foreign policy has positioned itself on a different level, the "entente" with the United States takes on a vital role for the remaining countries.

The strategic environment of the Cold War led the military area to be given a special status in the relation between the United States and its allies in southern Europe. The need to provide for the deterrence of the Soviet Union's power beyond its borders gave special importance to countries like Turkey, Greece

and Italy, which were positioned in a more advanced line on the southern flank with regard to the air and ground threats, or countries such as Spain and Portugal that were clearly located in the rear area with regard to those threats, but in a position of great relevance if the presence of naval and naval air forces is taken into account. The complex infrastructure of support for U.S. Sixth Fleet has shaped the foreign policy structured by Washington over the years, aiming at assuring its freedom to act through mechanisms of facility, support, traffic and bases along the Mediterranean corridor. The development of the situation made this corridor not only a vital element for the support of the central forces or for the deterrence of the Soviet fleet, but an equally vital element for acting in unpredictable situations. The structure for these activities within the framework of NATO has been AFSOUTH, which now has a doctrine adopted in view of the new circumstances, but only by elaborate diplomatic efforts was it made possible to guarantee it full operationality. Furthermore, the diplomatic efforts were mostly bilateral actions that did not follow a single model for adjustment, although obviously, in all cases, the objective was the same. It was in this way that the alignment of U.S. foreign relations with southern European countries was established on military issues. The countries that guaranteed facilities which the U.S. forces were seeking to obtain received in return some support and assistance to maintain and modernize their own defense systems. The militarization of bilateral relations, in some cases,

followed mechanisms of professionalization of such a nature that due to laws restricting access to information in that area, the treaties in many instances only contained generic principles. The real details military links were covered by technical agreements, most of the time without the knowledge of public opinion and the respective countries' governmental and political representatives. This method, plus the U.S. practice of taking unilateral actions, in some cases contrary to the foreign policies of the host countries, provoked an accentuated loss of legitimacy of relationships between the United States and its Mediterranean allies of the type of the defense accords initiated in the 1950s.

International developments at the end of the Cold War, with the growing multilateralization of international relations and the new role of the United Nations, make a change of philosophy from the sole, military-centered model of relationship with the United States, necessary. What is being considered, therefore, is the need to review this type of policy instrument to demilitarize bilateral relations, taking into consideration current data on the international system and the will of the respective players. This has been understood by those who, not only in the Mediterranean region, defend the growth of the bilateral relations with the United States based on a new diplomatic basis.

In a period in which bipolarity has ceased and the United States is seeking to reconstruct the basis of its international

relationship through a reformulation of the role of the United Nations, while maintaining at the same time the essence of its traditional alliance, NATO, there is a desire that the countries of southern Europe stimulate bilateral relations with the United States and evoke standards different from those that were tested during the confrontational period of the Cold War.

The role of the United States as a world power is not limited today to military or economic aspects. The fields of science and technology, communications and culture, and its model of consumer behavior, are factors that tend to reinforce the role of the U.S. on a global scale in today's society. For a region such as southern Europe, which is in a development process, the relationship with the U.S. does not, therefore, limit itself to military aspects. If this is to be continued, and also to be brought up to date to reflect of the new international reality, it's vital for countries in such circumstances to improve joint actions with the U.S., in order to introduce a synergy in their growth process. Economic cooperation, in particular in the areas of finance, investment and trade, is fundamental. Great importance must also be given to education and science due to their multiplier effects on society. The creative diversity of the U.S. in significant areas such as basic and applied research, and computer sciences, production engineering, management, marketing and communication, in addition to the standards of excellence of some of its investments in this field, foster a special interest in cultivating access for students and experts

from southern European countries to universities, research institutions and U.S. companies, as is the prevailing tendency today, for example, in the Asian countries with more dynamic economies. The role of the English language in the world, the quality of cultural and artistic creation in the U.S. and its dissemination by virtue of the global reach of the media - a process in which the U.S. plays a key role - are other factors to add to the previous ones, so that it is perfectly clear that southern Europe should not remain bound to a sole model of a relationship with the U.S., which is apparently outdated, and which exists throughout several other countries from Asia to Central Europe, created or recreated after the demise of the Soviet Union.

Very alert to what happens with respect to the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and the demise of the Soviet Union, the U.S. certainly will not, from one day to the next, withdraw from southern Europe. It would be interesting if they seek a balance of their presence in the region with the same effort that they seem to make when it comes to the reconstruction of Central and Northern Europe, that, above all, it is not to be seen solely as a springboard for access to areas in crisis, the result of an occasional relationship dictated by military reasons and recycled according to the old model of the Cold War. The need to establish the groundwork of its diplomacy as more preventive than remedial or even surgical produces a demand for long-lasting bilateral relations, taking into account the specific needs of

each country, its location in the Mediterranean region and the fact that all of them are a part of NATO and, with the exception of Turkey, of the European Community, which means not only integration in the economic field, but also in the common security and foreign policy (CSFP), this in addition to the all of its potential in the field of defense within the scope of the construction of a future political union foreseen by the Maastricht Treaty. The worst temptation for U.S. diplomacy may will be to try to establish a special tie with Mediterranean Europe with the intention of fostering a division (decoupling) in the European integration process, instigating strategic differences in western Europe, which NATO has denied over the decades in the formulation of its military doctrines. On the other hand, the southern flank will always be incomplete if the U.S. is suspicious in regard to any initiative that tries to establish a forum between the two sides of the Mediterranean for the discussion of security issues in a broader sense. The region, due to its heterogeneous aspects and its problems, demands foresighted diplomacy and the formulation of a set of proposals and initiatives that do not amount to the mere maintenance of the status quo. This new stage basically fits the bilateral actions of foreign policy and not those of multilateral association, especially in the regions where the actions of international organizations are not fully effective.

On the chessboard of southern Europe and the Mediterranean world, Portugal is the example of a country that is characterized

by its position of balance and linkage. In the far west of Europe, it is at the same time geographically proximate to the U.S. Continental by its territorial position on the Iberian Peninsula, it opens to the Atlantic with its long coast and its island groups (Madeira and Azores). Orlando Ribeiro summed up the geo-strategic qualities of the country well, stating that Portugal was Atlantic by location and Mediterranean by vocation. Even if in reality none of its parts are positioned in direct contact with it, the truth is that the Mediterranean question, in particular the West Mediterranean region, has a profound influence on the formulation of Portuguese foreign policy, especially the aspect of security. On the other hand, because Portugal has structured itself as a nation with its interests turned towards emphasizing a Portuguese-speaking sphere in many continents, it always based the participation of the country in the international system on common characteristics, which in addition to the European components that are sought to consolidate diversified ties overseas, fundamentally increases its attention to the Atlantic. While it is certain that the Atlantic does not necessarily or exclusively mean the North Atlantic in this case, as Brazil and Africa are to the south, it is not less certain that the sustainability of the Portuguese national factor is in connection with the Northern Atlantic area, above all if we take into consideration the importance of the British alliance for the consolidation of Portuguese autonomy in international relations. The conservation of Portuguese naval

power, given support by that alliance, solidified its independence in face of the various plays for influence by European powers, liberating it from more risky involvements in European confrontations and preventing the unification of the Iberian peninsula by the Castilian forces. When the British empire ceased to be a world power and the United Kingdom reshaped itself in its European place due to the global size of the U.S. and its international importance, it was the U.S. that Portuguese diplomacy had to engage in structuring a vital relationship that was not always easy, but thanks to which it reached a certain level of stability in the world context.

It was hard for Portugal to adapt the perception that leading world power was no longer England and that, since World War I, the U.S. had clearly emerged as a country that was more dominating on an international scale. Its difficulty of perception resulted in the idea that until World War II Portuguese diplomacy tried to mediate through British diplomacy its relationship with the U.S. concerning vital questions. For the U.S., however, knowledge of the importance of Portugal's strategic position in the Atlantic had been present, for a long time, since the facilities given to whale fishing fleets and to sea transport from the East Coast to the Pacific, in a trip that needed the Azores islands to find favorable winds. Even the naval facilities of World War I and the air facilities possible in the end of World War II were not structurally different from the previous ones. The position the Azores have assumed, as a

consequence, was no more than the role of a proper platform, justifying the development of a specific diplomacy to organize relations between the U.S. and Portugal.

In general, the U.S. needed the Portuguese facilities to expand its deployment capability to Europe, which was threatened by Soviet pressure, in order to assure the freedom of the seas in a vital region of the Atlantic, and also to reach other areas in the Middle East, the Gulf region, Southwest Asia, the Mediterranean and Africa. The link with the Azores was vital to maintain European reinforcement and the support to U.S. and allied forces in West Germany. The use of facilities in the archipelago allowed the particularly efficient monitoring of Soviet threats to the U.S. coast as well. For Portugal, the establishment of an accord with the U.S. in such a delicate matter gave after World War II an authoritarian regime legitimacy in the international arena, guaranteeing a long-lasting passport of membership in NATO. In addition it could gain support for the acquisition of military supplies that could not possibly be entirely covered by the national budget. The value ascribed to the Portuguese position in the Azores by the U.S. was also important in opening new options for American diplomacy with which Washington was able to assess the Portuguese policy on Africa in the sixties as well as the caution exercised in monitoring a more disturbed period following the 1974 Portuguese revolution. Hence the establishment of constitutional normality in the country came to contribute fully to stabilize relations

between Portugal and the United States in the area of defense, which was within the due parameters of the international context for both countries' participation in a common alliance and the existence of a growing bipolarization of the international community. The end of the Cold War, as expected, modified a model of bilateral relations that was in decline for sometime. Various factors had in fact contributed to this evolution prior to the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, namely the economic and diplomatic impact of Portugal's entry to the European Common Market, marked by a decrease in trade between the two countries, and the adjustments introduced in the formulation of the Portuguese foreign policy through the mechanisms of European political consultation. On the other hand, the end of the Cold War led the United States to rearrange its military forces in Europe and in the Atlantic, which obviously had consequences for its bases in the Azores. This led to the contraction — proportionate to the absence of Soviet threat — of the lines of anti-submarine defense, which saw, at the same time, the reformulation of its fundamental nature, now more geared to support airborne refuelling, a more frequent operation in the international arena, which increases current opportunities in military defense resources for reestablishing or maintaining peace and for rapid access to sites in crisis. New forms of threats and the U.S. priority of cutting public expenditures, especially in the military field, also caused a decrease in the resources that the U.S. allocated to Portugal for the use of its

facilities, the main beneficiaries of which had been the Portuguese armed forces and the budget of the Autonomous Region of the Azores, where most of the facilities are located. The end of the financial assistance transferred these respective costs to the Portuguese budget, especially with regard to the more significant actions provided for in the new Military Program Act, which includes the 1993-1997 period. As a consequence of the redefined U.S. policy towards foreign forces and domestic budget policies, it is certain that the new option is justified in Washington by the fact that Portugal today is part of a competing trade block, the EEC, and that it thus does not lack assistance. Such a change will affect the judgement that the respective beneficiaries made about a special relationship with the United States, often placing an integral perspective of maximizing specific advantages before one of national interests stemming from general goals. A greater share of self-financing of military expenses on the part of Portugal will make its international posture truly more independent and its military and diplomatic system less prone to influences from donor countries. These evolving tendencies occur at the same time that the European integration process, the institutionalization of a common foreign and security policy, and European political cooperation deepen. If the Maastricht Treaty yields palpable developments in the area of common defense policy and common defense, it will not be easy for Portugal to remain absent from such a context when the time comes to define the parameters of

its military relationship with the United States. The fact that the United States today aspires to world leadership without bipolarity and the emphasis that it places on intensive interventionism by the United Nations are factors that the Portuguese diplomacy will not fail to ponder, especially when distant geographical areas with less (in a Portuguese view) structurally important strategic interests are involved in these moves, or when, in some cases, they eventually conflict with the normal perceptions and the consensus of Portuguese opinion concerning the involvement and non-involvement of Portugal in international crises. The projection of Portugal on to stages of conflict to which it is traditionally alien does not gain the support of public opinion, just as this will tend to be particularly sensitive to an external action on the part of the United States that does not meet a minimum consensus at least within the European Community and that is capable of maintaining continuous standards in terms of human rights, and at the same time with respect with to its stand regarding the question of East Timor as well as to the content and reach of its relations with Indonesia.

Today, relations between Portugal and the United States do not have on the part of Portugal the need to make legitimate a political regime, as was the case in the dictatorial period or in the beginning of the political changes of the mid-seventies that led to the installation of a pluralistic democracy. The fact that the national budget finances military modernization and that

regional finances in the Azores have been used to receive more significant financial resources from Brussels than from Washington eliminates the possibility of subjecting domestic choices to U.S. diplomatic arguments in Portugal, especially when the intention is to negotiate from an advantageous position. If we add to that a greater degree of alienation of the public opinion in view of the need of American regulation of international affairs - due to the end of its main reason to exist, Soviet expansionism - will we then have to conclude that this is really the end of a diplomatic relationship on which the Portuguese-American ties have rested since the last World War, and that it is not merely an apparent reformulation of its pattern that will revitalize it, but, instead, a total reformulation of the reasons for a partnership to exist between the two allies? A national set of principles will arise for the desired continuation of a coincidence of interests that operates visibly both ways and not just one way.

The delay in arriving at agreement on a new accord between Portugal and the United States in the area of defense is indivisibly linked to the end of the treaty model on which it was based and the need to substitute for the older standards to be more in line with the reality of modern times. In a framework characterized by increased multilateralization, there will be a need to define with clarity what, at this level, shall be the subject of an understanding, in particular with respect to the scope of the Atlantic Alliance's objective, which, above all, is

aimed at efforts in the military and defense field. That is, there will be a need to seek an area of issues that is within the scope of responsibility of the alliance organization. Then, and only then, can the core of issues be defined, which will remain the subject to be addressed accordingly between the two countries, without an overlapping of that which is being done within the alliance. Furthermore, for bilateral relations to be effective, it is important that they are supported by explicit interests and mutual advantages, not only for one of the parties.

If we review the evolution of the Portuguese-American accords since 1953 we will observe that while the U.S. diplomatic formulation is clearly based on the verbalization of their specific objectives - that is, Americans know exactly the reason they want the Lages base - the Portuguese diplomatic formulation is predominantly defensive, stemming from subordinate negotiations of interests (the acquisition of military supplies, regional development assistance), but does not have comprehensive national security and defense goals in priority. The fact that Portugal and the U.S. are both NATO members is only the generic focus of the accord, for the truth is that, in reality, the Lages base does not function as a NATO base. To assure the hybrid character of operation of this installation is in fact one of the main purposes for the U.S. negotiations in relation to which, with difficulty, it has been possible to clarify certain situations in view of the elements introduced in the more recent reformulations of the respective technical accords. When

Portuguese diplomacy concentrated on searching for the mere logic of financial compensation or military aid - as was the case in many instances - its negotiating capacity to demand a clear framework for the accords was, from the outset, limited by this erroneous formulation of purposes.

In the 1983 negotiations between Portugal and the U.S. it was sought, under controlled circumstances, to limit to the reasonable additional facilities required by the American forces, especially the non-acceptance that has to do with the stationing of offensive naval forces in the area of Portuguese jurisdiction, but at the same time, it attempted to deconcentrate the military relationship with the U.S. for the whole national territory (which was the case of the station GEODSS, a project that was not implemented by the Portuguese authorities). Under a prism that has allowed a prediction of the needs to demilitarize relations between Portugal and the U.S., the negotiations were directed at the same time towards enlarging the support for the regional development of the Azores, and sought to obtain a useful instrument (the Luso-American Development Foundation) for the dynamization of the scientific, technical, commercial and cultural relations between the two countries, fulfilling interests on the part of researchers, professors, artists, students, technicians and businessmen. The repositioning of the relations between Portugal and the U.S. within other parameters required additional efforts in areas vital for Portuguese development, and this was therefore noted in an instrument drawn

up with the necessary flexibility to implement such an important mission. Therefore, it was not only the legal aspect of writing a radically new accord, but, through a variety of accords, an attempt to consolidate developments in new areas that, at that point, had started to justify special attention. Naturally, the future evolution at this moment is still not possible to predict - it came to open the way for a new, wide reformulation of various diplomatic instruments signed between Portugal and the U.S., namely the signing of a friendship and cooperation treaty capable of summing up the set of partial accords, giving them an overall focus.

One of the major disrupting elements in the relationship between Portugal and the U.S. is the one that results from the superficiality with which the issue is treated. From the American standpoint there is a resurgence of some interest every time Portugal goes through serious convulsions (wars in Africa, changes in regime, decolonization). There is a resurgent interest every time the U.S. has the need to use Portuguese facilities to deploy its military forces in any direction or any time that the Portuguese vote is useful for U.S. diplomacy in any type of international conflict. However, later, when events return to normal, the intensity of the Portuguese affair in Washington is reduced to the administrative level in the different agencies, in Congress and even in the universities. On the Portuguese side, the alienation is not any less; what happens is that it is disguised by the superficial and many times

rhetoric commitment that confuses intentions with realities, the superfluous with the essential, and almost invariably is not capable of implementing its declaratory objectives. The occasions at which numerous personalities of different walks of life express their support for the development of relations with the U.S. are frequent, and they are present in a large number of events in which they come to show a public intention. However, the reality of the accomplishments is poor: bilateral trade has decreased, and the same has happened to U.S. investments in Portugal; the number of Portuguese students with scholarships in American universities is not proportionally comparable to those of other European countries; the transfer of knowledge and technology is insignificant, the exposure of Portuguese culture in the U.S. is almost non-existent and even the issue of military cooperation itself, excluding the transfer of some of the equipment, is very embryonic and has not produced the technically modernizing effects which would be expected in key areas of the military and Portuguese defense structure.

This difficulty on the part of Portugal in establishing a relationship with the leading world power was not modified with the shift of this role from the United Kingdom to the U.S. early this century and many times gives rise to conduct that combines alternately extremely positive statements with an attitude of distrust, lack of capacity to establish attainable objectives and even a dose of resentment. We are, therefore, a step away from streamlining positions in which, on one side, some faithfully

maintain a preferential alliance to the U.S. and the PALOP, nostalgics of Empire in opposition to the European integration, and others, favoring the latter, seek to avoid any sort of lasting relationships with the U.S. If we add to these attitudes a tendency for simplification, one can observe how easy it is for a certain type of public debate to lean towards a view of the options opted for by the Portuguese foreign policy without taking into account the nuances, the complexity or the less obvious, resulting in a serious risk for Portugal's foreign relations in this respect.

The change in the scenario of the international context introduces effective changes in the strategic position of a country such as Portugal. The decline of Soviet pressure, namely the naval presence in the Atlantic and their access to the Mediterranean sea, is now counterbalanced by a new type of risk which confronts the area, including the risks of closer proximity, and that involves the western Mediterranean, whether these risks spread along the Mediterranean, in the center and to the east with the involvement of the Balkans, the Middle East, the Gulf, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Horn of Africa. These are places in which disturbances will always affect the security of the North Atlantic Alliance's southern flank and the vital interests of U.S. foreign policy. It is no surprise, therefore, that Portugal and Spain try to give priority to their military programs for the defense of the region, with special attention to air defense, the strengthening of the naval

capability and the creation of programs aimed at giving their ground forces the highest level of air mobility. The defense of their own borders that are now also common borders with the members of European Community is another concern and requires significant changes in customs, fiscal and border policies. Although Spain is not part of the military organization of NATO, its national programs and the accord for coordination established with the allied command point in the direction of an intensification of the security ties in the region, a concern which is also demonstrated by the new Portuguese military program act and by the recent measures adopted for the control of alien entries and the restructuring of customs, fiscal inspection and immigration services.

By favoring the southern flank, the Atlantic Alliance shifted a part of the missions performed by the Portuguese armed forces, from a significant role in anti-submarine warfare and strengthening the defense of the north of Italy, to the concentration of Portuguese military efforts in the defense of the region and to the capability to reinforce the rapid deployment means AFSOUTH will have available to protect the southern flank and act, from Portugal to Turkey, to resolve crises and conflicts. With one change particularly, the notion of the transatlantic link will have a less important role in the strategic function of Portugal and missions of other kinds will stand out in a scenario in which the actions of the U.S. towards Europe will no longer benefit from any privileged national link,

resting on a division of tasks between the American and the European pillars, both members in the same alliance. However, the fact that the ties of friendship between Spain and Portugal are still not capable of generating defense accords, and that Morocco maintains a dispute with Spain on the Ceuta and Melilla controversy, as well as the fact that the United Kingdom is not giving up its presence in Gibraltar, all of this ends up granting the U.S. a role of mediator in the region, a very relevant role, so much so that Morocco has not seen its aspirations of a greater participation in the Common Market come true.

Without any historical problems with the U.S., Portugal will be, for a long time, an important element in the chain of foreign relations by the U.S. and it is not predictable that an option will be denied by the reinforcement of the European political union, taking into account that such a policy is not sufficiently uniform to abolish the freedom of countries to exercise foreign policy or an individualized defence. The fact that Portugal is not located in the Mediterranean - and therefore, is very protected from the repercussion that any of its acts may cause in that region - adds to its strategic position an appreciable qualification that places it, from the start, on extremely favorable ground to address the issue of special relations with the US on several levels. Issues such as the new role of AFSOUTH within NATO, the reevaluation of SACLANT in the present context or even the extension of certain CSCE mechanisms to the western Mediterranean are some points on which the Portuguese-American

dialogue may contribute towards reaching mutually advantageous solutions.

Today it is absolutely impossible to dissociate, in terms of foreign policy, the field of bilateral action from that of multilateral positions. In reality, there is no pure bilateral or pure multilateral position. The fact that multilateral diplomacy establishes new fields of action and involves in its current practice an increasingly larger number of countries does not preempt the typical methods of bilateral relationship. Likewise, the methodology of bilateral negotiation that characterizes international action on the part of countries before the proliferation of transnational institutions is not exercised today in an absolute manner or by means of an irreducible formula. If, on one hand, international organizations have a sphere of intervention that can be overlapping in many cases, on the other hand, the space of solidarity emerging through them is also influenced by the juxtaposition of bilateral relations that the countries among themselves continue to develop and do not abdicate.

Southern Europe is certainly an interesting universe of overlapping intervention by multilateral institutions. Here the action of the United Nations is felt and, in a very specific form, the CSCE, with all its changes from the Cold War up to now and also with the possibility of projecting some of its essential mechanisms to the southern margin of the Mediterranean by holding a conference for security and cooperation in the region. Here


the action of NATO is equally felt, a defensive organization that now reassesses the nature of its own mandate when accepting placement of its forces under the authority of the UN or the CSCE, for the execution of peace missions, and which seems to demonstrate greater interest in restructuring the forces on the southern flank, taking into account the sophistication of new risks and possible threats. There the effects of common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and the European Community are also felt, with future developments which the Maastricht Treaty institutionalized in the areas of defence policy and defence and with the revitalization of the Western European Union, now considered the armed force of the future European Union and also European pillar for the Atlantic Alliance. There the most relevant aspects of legal and cultural cooperation continue to rest, the Council for Europe, a prestigious organization that has contributed so much to the expansion of the model of a state based on law for emerging democracies on the European continent. The coincident intervention of all these international organizations in shaping similar standards of conduct in the southern European region, also in conjunction with northern Europe, has strongly contributed to reinforce convergence and minimize disparities. Its intervention, which encompassed in its own spheres security, defense, economics, laws, politics, diplomacy and culture, has exerted a synergy, a multiplier of several potentials to which it is responsible and has brought about a significant reinforcement of stability and progress in

this part of the world. Southern Europe would be completely different if the expanded authority of the international organizations did not include binding standards for the freedom of action of these respective countries in the world arena.

The recent multilateralization of international relations will not dim, however, the increase of typical developments of bilateral foreign policy. These will remain in the southern Europe scenes, as well shown in the numerous Portuguese-Spanish, Franco-Italian or Franco-Spanish minor disputes, the Greek/Turkish problems, the Hispanic-British negotiations relating to the Gibraltar question or the analogous Hispanic-Moroccan issue on Ceuta and Melilla. The action of the U.S. in the region has been given in CSCE and NATO important instruments for structuring but do not discount a bilateral active policy that, in fact, will take into account the interest of each protagonist, on the Mediterranean side extremely differentiated and at time in hard competition with their immediate neighbors. These indispensable bilateral relation will not fail to have as a background the fact that the U.S. will be a partner for European countries in organizations for security and defense (CSCE and NATO), but will not be part of the European Community. The problems of compatibility between NATO and WEU, so as not to disrupt the transatlantic link, will not be interpreted in a similar way by all of the countries of southern Europe, and it will be possible to detect nuances with certain significance between the followers of a more classic Atlantic concept and the

more intense followers of a European identity in foreign relations. The fact that the area of the Mediterranean today poses specific security problems that advise preservation of constructive relations with the U.S. points to the fact that the majority of the southern European countries will favor a prudent methodology in terms of European unity with regard to security and defense issues, so as to consolidate, although with the necessary adjustments, the essential transatlantic solidarity.

The interaction of forces between the differentiated modalities of foreign policy will have its effects throughout southern Europe. Bilateral mechanisms will intensify its presence, while the bilateral will remain and will begin to comprise issues other than those common to classic diplomacy. Multilateral formulas will integrate, however, part of the bilateral policy and the schemes that the bilateral relationship will have to develop taking into consideration the multilateral framework that is already consolidated. In some areas, such as human rights and security, multilateral relations will be important, but in areas such as defense or on the core of foreign policy the bilateral will prevail, even under the formula of "multiple bilateral." Nevertheless, it will always be in the context of a very strong interaction of diplomatic means that southern Europe and the Mediterranean region will continue to be part of the international system and, consequently, handle the multifaceted field of their relations with the U.S.



The United States and Southern Europe

Southern European Countries in the European Community

Dimitri Conostas

A World Peace Foundation Project
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SOUTHERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

IN THE

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

D i m i t r i C o n s t a s *

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1. THE IDENTITY OF THE SOUTHERN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY MEMBERS (SECM)

Whether a distinct identity of the SECM exists at all is more the result of images held by outsiders regarding the region and the common features and interests of its component parts - rather than the outcome of historical, cultural and geographical realities. In the period after bipolarity a number of such external perceptions exerted constructive influences on SECM regarding their common needs and concerns and joint efforts to fulfill them. The collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union set the ground for the full restoration of century-old channels of communication between the East and West of Europe where unlike the North-South divide there are no great geographical barriers, like the Alps, obstructing interaction. Apprehensions that diversion of EC attention to the East will deprive SECM of valuable resources underlined the expedience of coordination of a number of Community policies and their future formulation.¹ The acceleration of the process of European integration decided at Maastricht in February 1992 led to a timetable for attaining some quite ambitious economic targets prior to each of the main stages in the evolution of the European Union. This, in turn, implied that unless the less developed member-states, like the SECM and Ireland, prevented the diversion of Community funds supporting economic and social cohesion to other targets their place in the future Union could be insecure.

Furthermore, with perceptions of a military threat from the East fading away, indirect security challenges like religious fanaticism, nationalist claims, illegal immigration, terrorism and the like along with potential direct security threats from Third Mediterranean Countries (TMC) and the Middle East were fast upgraded on the agenda of European security considerations.² Such issues were quite familiar, throughout the Cold War years, to nations in the Southern region where, with the possible exception

1. A. de Vasconcelos Portugal: A Case for an Open Europe Outline of a Paper presented at the Conference: "The Community; the Member-States and Foreign-Policy: Coming Together or Drifting Apart?" sponsored by the European Policy Units of the European University Institute, Theatre-Badia Fiesolana, July 1-3, 1993.

2. I. Lesser Mediterranean Security: New Perspectives and Implications for US Policy (Rand:1992) p. 21.

of Italy, perceptions of an immediate threat to national security from the Warsaw Pact never dominated the domestic political debate.³ Developments in the East presented SECM with novel opportunities to bring their views on security closer to those of the Northern members.⁴ The dynamics of this convergence became evident prior and during the Maastricht Treaty deliberations and contributed to the delicate balance of views on CFSP reached at Maastricht. One should point out in that respect that unless this process continues to produce concrete results the long tradition in the Southern region of bilateral security arrangements with the US, the superpower dominating the Mediterranean, could seriously undermine the course of European integration.

* * *

The identity of the SECM can also be deduced from certain objective criteria, especially geographic location and stage of economic development, and most appropriately from a combination of the two. Given that only current EC members are reviewed in this paper the application of the geographic criterion would suggest five prospective members for classification in the SECM category: Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Greece. France, however, although it is undoubtedly a Southern and a Mediterranean nation it is equally an Atlantic and a Northern one as well as the state that since the foundation of the EC has strived to preserve as its cornerstone the Common Agricultural Policy, traditionally tuned more to the interests of the North than to those of the South.⁵ Table 1 shows a classification of the five prospective SECM based on their share of payments from the EAGGF-G and the ERF. The first Fund supports the export or the destruction of surplus EC agricultural produce as well as its private storage while the second finances projects that could contribute to economic growth in the less developed regions of the EC. While there are great variations concerning the share of each of the five from the EAGGF-G: France is first followed at a distance by the second: Italy and the fourth: Spain. Greece is only seventh and Portugal a distant: eleventh. On the contrary, there is much more evident homogeneity among a group of four mem-

3. A. de Vasconcelos, "The Shaping of a Subregional Identity" in R. Aliboni (ed) Southern European Security in the 1990s (London: Pinter, 1992): 1527 at 18.

4. Ibid p. 17.

5. See M.V. Agostini "Italy and Its Community Policy" The International Spectator XXV (No. 4, October-December 1990): 347-355 at 349.

bers concerning their common interest to secure EC financial support for their underdeveloped regions: Spain is first, Portugal is second, Italy is third and Greece is fourth while France is only seventh in that respect.

T A B L E 1

Payments to Portugal, Spain, France, Italy & Greece in 1991 through the European Agriculture Guidance & Guarantee Fund (Guarantees) (EAGGF-G) & the Eur. Regional Funds (ERF)

FUND	E C M E M B E R															
	PORTUGAL			SPAIN			FRANCE			ITALY			GREECE			(IN MIL- LION ECU)
	AMOUNT IN MILLION ECU	% OF EC TOTAL	RANK AMONG THE TWELVE	AMOUNT IN MILLION ECU	% OF EC TOTAL	RANK AMONG THE TWELVE	AMOUNT IN MILLION ECU	% OF EC TOTAL	RANK AMONG THE TWELVE	AMOUNT IN MILLION ECU	% OF EC TOTAL	RANK AMONG THE TWELVE	AMOUNT IN MILLION ECU	% OF EC TOTAL	RANK AMONG THE TWELVE	
EUROPEAN AGRICUL- TURE GUIDANCE & GUARANTEE FUND - GUARANTEES	316,4	1,00	11th	3.300,3	10,46	4th	6.332,7	20,08	1st	5.347,0	16,96	2nd	2.211,8	7,01	7th	31.527,8
EUROPEAN REGIONAL FUND	971,2	18,74	2nd	1.488,8	28,74	1st	323,2	6,23	7th	710,8	13,72	3rd	537,2	10,37	4th	5.179,9

* Source of Data: Annual Report of the Board of Auditors for the Financial Year 1991, Official Journal of the European Communities (330, December 15, 1992, p. 15 (Greek Edition)).

Using, therefore, the mixed criteria of geographic location and regional underdevelopment I would limit the inquiry of the policies of the SECM within the EC to these four countries and with considerable hesitation I would exclude France. Although not a SECM in a strict sense, France is the one among EC's "largest three" (with Germany and UK) that, in a great number of issues, follows policies supportive of Southern interests. This is particularly the case with regard to "widening" i.e. enlargement of the EC where France has taken a cautious position giving priority to strengthening internal cohesion first.⁶ It is also the case

6. See N. Nugent "The Deepening and Widening of the European Community: Recent Evolution, Maastricht and Beyond" Journal of Common Market Studies XXX (No. 3, September 1992): 311-328 at 311 and related analysis infra.

concerning the development of an EC Mediterranean Policy as well as Inter-Mediterranean trade where France is the most important partner for the Maghreb countries.⁷ On the other hand, one should also take into account the fact that although France was originally a strong supporter of extending southernwards the boundaries of the Community presented the strongest opposition to the accession of Spain at least until the socialist victory of Francois Mitterand in the French presidential elections of 1981.⁸

Finally, France where immigration from the Maghreb has been perceived as an internal and external challenge, has been instrumental in introducing the concept of a "threat from the South" into contemporary European security considerations and in encouraging "redefinition of security in which economic and social issues are being given greater importance"⁹ thus leading the way to the convergence between Northern and Southern perceptions on security.

Italy, on the other hand, whose stronger credentials on both grounds (location, regional underdevelopment) make her part of the SECM group has, in the period after Spanish membership to the EC, gradually relinquished to the latter leadership on "Southern issues", like cohesion, within the Community and tends to follow less distinct and more balanced positions. This is a development that stems both from the accentuation of its internal "north-south" economic and political divisions as well as from broader foreign-policy considerations of the post-bipolar era.¹⁰

* * *

This paper will attempt, using available data, to investigate SECM attitudes primarily in three areas of profound common interest: Mediterranean Policy; Enlargement and, finally, Evolution of the European Union. In a second part it will review

7. L. Guazzone "The Mediterranean Basin" The International Spectator XXV (No. 4, October-December 1990): 301-309 at 305.

8. A.G.Ibaner "Spain and European Political Union" in F. Laursen & S. Vanhoonacker (eds) The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union (Maastricht, The Netherlands: European Institute of Public Administration/Martinus Nijhoff Publishers:1992) :199-114 at 101.

9. See Lesser, *supra*, n. 2 p. 50.

10. See, R. Aliboni et al "Three Scenarios for the Future of Europe" The International Spectator XXVI (No.1, January-March 1991): 4-24 esp. 21-24.

briefly SECM positions related to Common Foreign and Security Policy (CESP) for the European Union and will make an effort to test the compatibility of prevailing trends in that area to long-term SECM economic and political interests.

2. SOUTHERN ATTITUDES AND POLICIES

2.1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MEDITERRANEAN POLICY

The 1980s witnessed a rapid deterioration of economic conditions in the TMC. Some of the causes of this deterioration are independent of EC-related developments e.g. overpopulation, inadequate political systems and public administration mechanisms, shrinking fresh water resources, growing external public debt (see Table 2), domestic consumption of agricultural products that reduced income from exports, etc. On the other hand, the two enlargements of the Community to the South: Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986) led, for the first time, to a surplus of Mediterranean products within the Community and isolated some TMC from their traditional markets.¹¹

At the same time the enlargements gave birth to a much more homogeneous and determined SECM group whose members - their historic links with the TMC and their concern for preserving stability in the region notwithstanding, - have had both the ability and the resolve to discourage excessive Community concessions potentially detrimental to their vital economic interests. Two of the new members also brought with them their disputes with TMC: the Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus and the Aegean and the Spanish-Moroccan territorial dispute (Ceuta and Melilla).

The Community, by far the most important trade partner of the TMC, had failed to provide through its Mediterranean Policy sufficient financial support to stimulate economic growth. In the 1979-1987 period the EC, collectively or through individual contributions of member states, provided aid amounting to 17% of total development aid given to TMC, compared with 31% given by the US and 28% by the Arab members of OPEC.¹² During the same period

11. Ch. Tsardanides The "New" Mediterranean Policy of the European Community and Greece (Athens: Hellenic Center for European Studies/Papazissis Publishers, 1992): 22 - in Greek; see also M. Plummer, "Efficiency Effects of the Accession of Spain and Portugal to the EC" Journal of Common Market Studies v.XXIX (No.3 March, 1992) 317-323 at 322-323.

12. Ibid p. 25.

underdeveloped countries in Latin America and Asia received 21,5% of total EC development aid, ACP countries close to 67% and TMC only 11,5% .¹³

T A B L E 2

Total External Debt Ratios of Selected TMCs

TMC	Total External Debt as a % of:				Total debt service as a % of exports of goods & servic.		Interest payments as a % of exports of goods & services	
	Exports of goods & services		GNP					
	1980	1989	1980	1989	1980	1989	1980	1989
Algeria	130,0	248,8	47,1	56,8	27,1	68,9	10,4	19,1
Morocco	223,8	328,4	53,1	98,4	32,7	32,2	17,0	18,4
Jordan	79,2	246,0	--	181,2	8,4	19,6	4,3	11,7
Tunisia	96,0	136,7	41,6	71,9	14,8	22,6	6,9	8,5
Egypt	208,4	333,6	95,0	159,0	20,8	20,5	9,0	10,3
Syria	82,3	--	21,0	47,1	11,4	--	4,7	--
Turkey	332,9	190,0	34,3	53,8	28,0	32,1	14,9	14,1

Source of Data: The World Bank World Development Report 1991: The Challenge of Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) : 250-251.

Immigration to the "affluent" Mediterranean North and the rest of the EC became an irresistible remedy to economic stagnation and demographic explosion in TMCs expected to assume alarming proportions in the years to come. Contrary to some very rigid stereotypes of the Cold War era, the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean is no less threatening than that in its Western

13. Ibid

part. Table 3 shows that there are considerable similarities concerning economic conditions, population growth, as well as nutrition, health and education between the two parts of the Mediterranean. While the population of SECM (including France) will increase from 1989 to 2025 by an average of only 5%, in the same period the population of the nine TMC, shown in Table 3, will increase at an average close to 90%. Turkey, an Eastern TMC, will see its population grow from 55 to 92 million, an increase that marks the largest share, of any single country, in the total population growth of the Mediterranean.

TABLE 3

**Population growth & projections and related health,
nutrition, education and some basic indicators
for selected TMCs**

TMC	Population (in millions)			Life Expectancy (years) 1989	Primary Pupil teacher ratio (1988)	Average Annual Rate of Inflation %		GNP per Capita Dollars Average annual growth rate (1965-89)		Infant Mortality Rate (per 1000 live births) 1989	Adult Illiteracy	
	1989	2000	2025			1965-80	1980-89	1989			Female 1985	Total 1985
TURKEY	55	68	92	66	31	20,8	41,4	1370	2,6	61	38	26
ISRAEL	5	6	7	76	19	25,2	117,1	9790	2,7	10	7	5
SYRIA	12	18	36	66	26	7,9	15,0	980	3,1	44	57	40
EGYPT	51	62	86	60	30	6,4	11,0	640	4,2	68	70	56
LIBYA	4	6	14	62	31	15,4	0,2	5310	-3,0	77	50	33
TUNISIA	8	10	14	66	30	6,7	7,5	1260	3,3	46	59	46
ALGERIA	24	33	52	65	28	10,5	5,2	2230	2,5	69	63	50
MOROCCO	25	32	48	61	26	5,9	7,4	880	2,3	69	78	67
JORDAN	4	5	9	67	18	--	--	1640	--	53	37	25

Source of Data: The World Bank World Development Report 1991: The Challenge of Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991): 204-205, 254-261.+

As regards immigration, in 1990 "foreign residents in EC countries" totalled 13 million persons or 4 per cent of the population of which the 8 million came from outside the EC.¹⁴

14. United Nations Population Fund The State of World Population - 1993 (N. York: UNFPA, July 6th 1993): 16.

About half of these immigrants originate from TMCs namely North Africa, areas of former Yugoslavia and Turkey. It is well known that the country that absorbs most of this immigration flow is not a member of the SECM group but former West Germany where the foreign resident population has risen from 4,5 million in 1980 to 5,2 million in 1990 or 8,4% of the total population. Turks in (West) Germany amount 1,7 million or 32,6% of the foreign population in Germany and 21,2% of that in the whole EC.¹⁵

Economic stagnation, overpopulation and concerns for imminent massive population movements from South to North along with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, political instability and a rapid deterioration of the environment in TMCs, provided powerful incentives for a reconsideration of EC's Mediterranean Policy that, by and large, consisted of a "set of association and cooperation agreements drawn up in the second half of the 1970s".¹⁶ The initiative for a new policy came not only from the SECM but also from the prosperous North, more attractive to immigrants, and especially Germany whose society and economy already reflects the pressures placed on them by the new entrants.¹⁷

The "new" Mediterranean Policy would promote three main objectives:¹⁸ (a) preferential treatment of industrial and agricultural products of TMCs so as to secure access to EC markets; (b) a significant increase - close to 40% - of financial aid to TMCs that should aim at increasing agricultural and industrial productivity and improving technical and professional training; (c) encouragement of regional economic cooperation among TMCs, development of human resources, incentives to support private business and investment, protection of the environment through a "horizontal" program of financial assistance benefiting the total of the TMCs. The European Investment Bank would play an important role in the action plan through loans that would reach \$ 1.800 million ECU in the 1992-1996 period.

During the negotiations for the "new" Mediterranean Policy (1990), SECM kept distances from EC Commission proposals making too generous trade concessions to TMCs on products that would compete with their own. The Italian Presidency, however, followed

15. Ibid

16. Guazzone supra n 6 at 305.

17. A. Menon at al, "A Common European Defense?" Survival v. 34 (No. 3 Autumn, 1992): 98-118 at 103-104.

18. See in detail Tsardanides, supra n. 11.

a more balanced policy in line with broader Italian objectives especially with regard to the Western Mediterranean (like the 5+5 initiative)¹⁹ as well as the Mediterranean as a whole. To ensure, therefore, that the Policy would be adopted within its term, Italy did not allign with the rest of the SECM group and pressed hard for a compromise formula. On the other hand, Northern EC members like United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Germany were quite keen to endorse trade liberalization but unwilling to consent to large increases in financial aid to TMCs for which there were no objections by the SECM.²⁰ An additional complicating factor was Greece's position, in line with its traditional policy to link Turkey's access to Community funds and policies with positive steps towards the solution of the Cyprus problem, that both provisions on financial protocols and those on the "horizontal policy" be drafted in a way that would not benefit Turkey. With neither side ready to take the cost of postponing or cancelling an important package-deal with the "South" the new Mediterranean Policy, with minor changes, was finally approved in December 1990.

The difficulty of disassociating political from economic aspects of cooperation with the TMCs became apparent within the next few months when the European Parliament rejected the Financial Protocols with Syria and Morocco for failure of these countries to guarantee satisfactory protection of human rights. Notably Morocco was one of the countries that had participated from the beginning in an initiative taken by the countries of the Western Mediterranean, at a meeting in Rome in March 1990, that included France and three countries of the SECM group: Italy, Spain, Portugal as well as the members of the Union of the Arab Maghreb: Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya to institutionalize a political dialogue on economic, environmental, cultural and social questions that could evolve into some kind of a Conference on Security and Cooperation for the Western Mediterranean. The Gulf War early the following year and the enduring crisis in former Yugoslavia showed that the division of the Mediterranean in Western and Eastern might, in the short run, safeguard cooperation experiments in the former but in the long run it would prove shortsighted and counterproductive. It took only a few days for radical messages to reach from Baghdad to Algeria and Morocco and even the streets of Paris and only a few weeks for refugees from Yugoslavia to spread into Western Europe.

With hopeful prospects for peace in Bosnia and the Arab - Israeli dialogue closer to a settlement than ever before it appears to be an historic opportunity for a global Mediterranean

19. Ibid p. 50.

20. Ibid p. 62-63.

policy that would address the "threat from the South" with economic as well as political means. The convergence of interests between Northerners and the SECM in meeting effectively this challenge might even smooth the way for the application of the CFSP provisions of the Treaty of Maastricht.²¹

2.2. DEEPENING v. WIDENING OF THE COMMUNITY

The acceleration of the process of European integration, institutionalized at Maastricht, and the claim of the poorer members for more resources to strengthen socio-economic cohesion conflicted with the aspirations of Central, Eastern European and Mediterranean countries who turned to the EC for economic and political support and eventually full membership and saw their hopes withering away. Discrepancies between applicants from those regions and those from the rich EFTA nations were embarrassingly visible: \$ 33.000 and \$ 23.000 per capita GNP in Switzerland and Scandinavia respectively, \$ 1.600 in Poland and Turkey thus posing to EC decision-makers some very real moral, political and economic dilemmas.²² The experience with German reunification - a unique kind of "widening" that was accomplished within a few weeks without the usual protracted accession procedures - with its negative effect on European Monetary Union and other aspects of cohesion complicated the debate on enlargement inevitably linking it with the broader budgetary questions of the EC.²³

The views of EC members concerning enlargement place them into two groups. The first comprises states who for a variety of reasons are in principle in favour of enlargement although, by and large, tend to have in mind specific states or group of states. Perhaps, the state most committed to enlargement in general is United Kingdom: "The British government's interest in increasing this intergovernmental cooperation within the Union framework is widely believed to be a primary reason for its attachment to enlargement".²⁴ Germany also supports enlargement

21. See at this point R. Aliboni "Southern European Security: Perceptions & Problems" in R. Aliboni (ed) Southern European Security in the 1990s (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992): 12-13.

22. W. Goldstein, "Europe After Maastricht" Foreign Affairs (Winter 1992-93): 117-132 at 129.

23. A. Michalski & H. Wallace The European Community: The Challenge of Enlargement (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House: November 1992): 7.

24. Ibid at 57.

particularly, however, in the direction of neighboring Austria and Switzerland as well as the Baltic Republics.²⁵ Denmark is particularly keen to see an end to the "artificial division of Nordic countries" by admitting the rest of them to the EC, a prospect also attractive to the Netherlands but not at the risk of threatening existing Community structures or the future evolution of the Union.

The other two Benelux countries take an even more cautious line and with the much more outspoken SECM (including France) and Ireland form a strong opposition group whose negative stance, however, becomes more flexible in the case of EFTA members while the SECM would also endorse parallel negotiations for the admission of one, at least, Mediterranean country: Malta.²⁶ Greece, most certainly, will argue that Cyprus, more prosperous than Malta (GND per capita 5830 US \$ (1989) compared with 7040 US \$ for Cyprus) should not be penalized for a division imposed on it by force following the 1974 Turkish invasion. Nevertheless, SECM and Ireland would oppose any new membership that will place considerable burdens on EC finances: "the poorer nations in the Community relapsing into economic stagnation demand more money for regional aid and structural assistance from the richer north and from the new applicants in EFTA. That is their price to negotiate an enlargement of the EC (with) a GNP per capita less than half that of the northern members of the Community they are in no hurry to admit the poorer countries of Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean or to sacrifice their slice of the perennially contested EC budget".²⁷

In the Lisbon Summit (June 1992) the Commission submitted to the Council a Report on Enlargement which the latter accepted in principle.²⁸ The Report made it explicit that "widening must not be at the expense of deepening" and that negotiation should await not only the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht but also the completion of the negotiation on the second package of financial and structural measures. In its evaluation of applicant countries the Report is in the mainstream of member-state opinion in concluding that EFTA members will pose the fewer problems and that an unspecified period of preparation would be necessary for the rest. As for the procedure for enlargement, the Commission hints that some kind of evaluation of applications in groups

25. Ibid at 56.

26. Nugent, *supra* n. 6, at 323.

27. Goldstein, *supra* n. 22 at 127.

28. See text in Michalski & Wallace, Appendix Three, *supra* n. 23, pp. 157-167.

would be convenient and appropriate. This echoes Gianni de Michelis's notion of "groupings of states" visualized as three concentric circles whose center will consist of EC and EFTA, next of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and finally the remaining CSCE members.²⁹

A similar concept, which in fact postpones to an unspecified date the accession of all but the wealthiest of applicants has also been voiced by Jacques Delors and received a warm response by the SECM.³⁰

In short, the seven EFTA members who already accepted more than 60% of the *acquis communautaire* through the European Economic Area (EEA) Treaty (May 1992) and whose accession will increase EC population by only ten percent appear as the most likely new EC members. To strengthen even further their candidacy and help appease SECM concerns that their membership will pave the way to a two-speed Community, EFTAs agreed during the EEA negotiations to contribute to the financial solidarity of the Community by setting up "an EEA cohesion fund for the benefit of southern EC members and Ireland".³¹

As for the other groups Central and Eastern Europeans will have to content themselves for several more years with EC assistance through the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development as well as trade and cooperation agreements which in some cases could take the form of the more ambitious and deep-seated association agreements known as "Europe Agreements".³² As regards current Mediterranean applicants, all three have association agreements with the Community that envisage development into customs union and possible accession. There is a broad consensus today that from this category and for that matter, from any category of prospective applicants, Turkey is the country less likely to become eventually a member of the Community: "EC governments would, by and large, prefer the Turkish application to go away".³³

29. G. de Michelis "Reaching out to the East" Foreign Policy 79 (Summer 1990): 44-55 at 45.

30. Vasconcelos, *supra* n. 3 at 26-27.

31. Michaliski & Wallace, *supra* n. 23 at 43.

32. *Ibid* at 113-114 and Nugent *supra* n. 6 at 319.

33. Michalski & Wallace, *Ibid* at 56.

Besides the traditional references to the Cyprus Problem and the Greek objections, in recent years additional reasons are more openly and frequently cited to sustain the view that the prospects for Turkish membership are worse today than before the Gulf War³⁴ including the following: "it has by far the largest population of all potential applicants" and the fastest rate of population growth (see Table 3); "it is very poor" and "not wholly European" (sic);³⁵ "it has failed to establish a full democratic regime;³⁶ "it will be increasingly difficult for EC members to accept the additional exposure in the Middle East that Turkish membership would imply";³⁷ "the status of the Kurds within its borders represents a newly-stated barrier".³⁸

The end of bipolarity and Turkey's vital role in the Alliance as a front-line state with the longest borders with the USSR might explain the unusual frankness and vigour with which arguments against Turkish membership are put forward and defended. Perhaps, the most accurate picture of the actual dilemmas that Turkey, a regional military superpower, encounters in the post-bipolar era is the one depicted in the analysis of a distinguished Turkish scholar, Duygu Sezer:

Differences of political nature, namely, Turkey's exclusion from the EC and the Greek-Turkish Conflict also help to draw a wedge between Turkey and the rest of the countries in the region. Turkey's particular social and economic problems, more specifically its relative underdevelopment, the revival of Islam and its adverse record in human rights are features that are more commonly found in the south than in the north. In other words in many ways Turkey is south where as the rest of Southern Europe is north; this means that it presents them with the types of challenges that they fear might come, for example from North Africa (emphasis mine).³⁹

34. I. Lesser "Turkey and the West After the Gulf War" The International Spectator XXVII (No. 1, January-March 1992: 33-46 at 35.

35. Nugent, supra n. 6 at 323.

36. Vasconelos, supra n. 3 at 17.

37. Lesser, supra n. 2 at 88.

38. Michalski & Wallace, supra n. 33 at 10.

39. D. Sezer, "Prospects for Southern European Security: a Turkish perspective" in R. Aliboni (ed.) Southern European Security in the 1990s (N. York, Pinter, 1992): 117-135 at 132.

Turkey's post-bipolar dilemmas are also dilemmas of the Community. Regardless of the eventual fate of the Turkish membership bid there can be no comprehensive and effective EC Mediterranean policy addressing the political, economic and security dimensions of the "threat from the south" that would exclude Turkey. Greece can and should not stand in the way of such a policy provided that its legitimate security concerns are taken into account in the new EC system of CFSP. This is particularly pertinent in view of Part III of the Petesburg Declaration adopted by the WEU Council of Ministers in June 1992. The Declaration deprives members of WEU (and, of course, Greece, after its accession to that organization) the right to invoke WEU Treaty's security guarantees in disputes with a member of NATO e.g. (Turkey). As Edward Mortimer points out: "this is not very satisfying for Greece, which regards possible Turkish aggression as the most serious threat to its security, and looks to both NATO and the WEU for insurance against it; and, indeed, the Greeks can argue that the Petesburg formula is tantamount to declaring that NATO allies are free to attack each other"(emphasis mine).⁴⁰

2.3. THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on the Political Union and the deliberations and consultations that preceded it provided important incentives to member states to formulate positions on the different aspects of the European Union.

Table 4 presents those positions in a simplified fashion. Still it exposes with clarity that despite similar backgrounds and needs SECMs managed to form a homogeneous front on only two out of the six major items debated and decided in the IGC. One of these two: The "principle of subsidiarity" was an important but by no means feverishly contested issue. The principle, inserted in Art 3b of The Treaty on European Union states that: "in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore be better achieved by the Community". The proposal represented a shrewd move by the Commission's President Jacques Delors⁴¹ to counter growing hostility against initiatives taken by Brussels bureaucrats and the

40. E. Mortimer European Security After the Cold War (Adelphi Paper: 271, Summer, 1992): 61; for the opposite view see Menon et al, supra n. 17 at 113 and 116.

41. Goldstein, supra n. 22 at 128.

only remarkable thing about it is that it won easy approval by the most anti-federalist of members despite its wide recognition as one of the central principles of federalism.⁴²

T A B L E 4

SECM positions on certain
aspects of the European Union*

Issue	Spain	Portugal	Italy	Greece
Co-decision for the Euro- pean parlia- ment	In favour	Opposed	In favour	In favour
Federalism	In favour	Opposed	In favour	In favour
The princi- ple of sub- sidiarity	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour
Majority vote in CFSP	Ambivalent**	Opposed	Ambivalent	Ambivalent
Inclusion of defense in CFSP	In favour	Opposed	Ambivalent	In favour
More cohe- sion money	In favour	In favour	In favour	In favour

Note : All ratings are based on post-1989 documented posi-
tions of members.

* Valuable information for this Table was drawn from F. Laursen & S. Vanhoonacker (eds) The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union (Maastricht, The Netherlands: European Institute of Public Administration/Martinus Nishoff Publishers, 1992).

** "Ambivalent", means that either there is no sufficient evidence to establish a state's position on the issue or that available evidence does not place it unequivocally either on the "in favour" or "opposed" categories.

42. F. Laursen, "The Maastricht Treaty: A Critical Evaluation" in Laursen & Vanhoonacker The Intergovernmental Conference supra n. 8, pp. 249-265 at 259.

The area of social and economic cohesion, constitutes by far, the most characteristic common policy of the SECM and one that has been pursued with considerable success. Although funds and policies to support the less wealthy countries and regions of the EC preexisted the Spanish and Portuguese accession it was the prospect of this accession and then eventual membership that gave new momentum and vigour to such Community actions. Actually, the forthcoming entry of these two countries into the EC led, in July 1985 to the adoption by the Council of Ministers of the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMP) with an aim to improve the socio-economic structures of certain regions in France, Greece and Italy and overcome the adverse impact of the second enlargement on their economy. Table 5 shows the considerable financial benefits that each of those countries has gained as a result of the IMP.

T A B L E 5

Distribution of payments in the context of IMP

(million ECU)

Actual Payments				
Member-state	by 31/12/1989	in 1990 & 1991	in 1992	Total
Greece	1.987,6	5,2	7,2	2.000,0
France	782,6	16,8	44,1	843,5
Italy	1.009,6	246,9	--	1.256,5
Total	3.779,8	268,9	51,3	4.100,0

Source: Annual Report of the Board of Auditors for the Financial Year 1991 Official Journal of the European Communities (330, December 15, 1992) p.171 (Greek Edition).

As regards Greece in particular, the successful pursuit of the IMP marks an important turn in the policy of the Socialist Government from making unilateral claims to offset the potentially negative effects of accession on the Greek economy, to acting collectively in support of broader EC policies ("southern interests") eventually beneficial to Greece.⁴³

The Single European Act, approved almost a year after the second enlargement (July 1987), enacted Regional Policy as Primary Community Law and emphasized its role in promoting economic and social cohesion and, at the same time, required the restructuring and coordination of all EC funds which affected regional development (FEOGA - Guidance, Social Fund, European Regional Development Fund).⁴⁴ A few months later (February, 1988) the European Council agreed with the Commission's proposal to approve the "first" Delors Plan to finance the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy and the structural funds. The new Regional Policy started in January 1989 with its main beneficiaries (as shown in Table 6) the SECM and the United Kingdom. The advantages of this development were considerable but insufficient to remove the obstacles that SECM and the other less wealthy members encountered as regards their full participation in the European Union.

TABLE 6

Payments to member states under the regional fund (1987-1991)
(in million ECU)

FISCAL YEAR	BELGIUM	DENMARK	GERMANY	GREECE	SPAIN	FRANCE	IRELAND	ITALY	LUXEMBURG	NETHERLANDS	PORTUGAL	UNITED KINGDOM	NEW AVAILABLE GRANTS	EUR 12
1987	23,0	16,6	73,4	293,9	345,3	311,2	134,7	563,5	3,8	19,6	222,7	526,7	0,6	2.535,0
1988	29,6	10,1	96,9	312,6	543,5	436,3	136,9	597,4	7,4	13,3	330,7	577,8	0,3	3.092,8
1989	40,6	14,8	163,8	418,4	980,0	284,2	191,3	787,3	1,2	28,9	396,9	612,4	0,3	3.920,0
1990	43,6	18,9	88,6	543,2	1.406,9	331,3	250,2	910,2	0,4	32,7	451,9	464,6	11,6	4.554,1
1991	46,4	11,3	94,8	537,2	1.488,8	323,2	411,9	710,8	18,3	34,6	971,2	530,1	1,3	5.179,9
TOTAL	183,2 1,0%	71,7 0,4%	517,5 2,7%	2105,4 10,9%	4.764,6 24,7%	1.686,2 8,7%	1.125,0 5,8%	3569,2 18,5%	31,0 0,2%	129,1 0,7%	2.373,4 12,3%	2.711,5 14,1%	14,0 0,1%	19.281,8 100%

Source: Annual Report of the Board of Auditors for the Financial Year 1991 Official Journal of the European Communities (330, December 15, 1992 p. 132 (Greek edition).

43. D. Conostas, "Greek-Foreign Policy Objectives: 1974-1986" in Sp. Vryonis (ed.) Greece on the Road to Democracy: From the Junta to PASOK 1974-1986 (N. York: A. Caratzas, 1991): 37-69 at 50.

44. N. Mousis European Community: Institutions and Policies (Athens: Papazissis Publishers, 1991): 175.

The Spanish threat to veto the entire Maastricht Treaty unless important steps were taken to address economic and social cohesion is symbolic of the importance attached to this issue by SECM and Ireland who became known as "the cohesion countries".⁴⁵ It is also symbolic of the leadership role that Spain undertook with considerable success in the IGC negotiation regarding "Southern issues".⁴⁶ A few weeks before the Maastricht Summit (November 10, 1991) a special meeting took place between Commission officials and representatives of Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland where Spanish delegates exerted strong pressures for the endorsement by Jacques Delors of a "maximalist" Spanish proposal asking, inter alia, for the setting of a fifth economic resource proportional to the economic capacity of each Member State, a special fund to help implement social cohesion, a revision of the system of EC's "own resources", as well as that "structural funds be doubled and be implemented with flexibility".⁴⁷

The Spanish proposal met with strong resistance from Northern members and was not accepted as such. Nevertheless, the results of the solidarity among SECM during the IGC were by no means negligible: (a) a decision to set up, before 31 December 1993 a new Cohesion Fund to provide "a financial contribution to projects in the fields of environment and trans-European networks in the area of transport infrastructure; (b) the objective of social and economic cohesion became the subject of a Special Protocol as well as of specific provisions in the Treaty (Arts 130a-130e); (c) In the Protocol a commitment is made both to review the operation effectiveness and size of the structural funds as well as to satisfy the Spanish demand for correcting "regressive elements existing in the present own resources system"; finally (d) a Delors II Plan was announced that will lead to further financial transfers to the poorer regions of the Community.

As already mentioned the field of economic and social cohesion represents the only area where a solid SECM bloc has operated within the EC. Regarding "co-decision" by the European

45. Laursen, supra n. 42 at 257.

46. E. Barbe "Spain and European Political Cooperation" Summary of a paper presented at the Conference The Community, the Member States and Foreign Policy: Coming Together or Drifting Apart? - Paper Outlines European University Institute, July 1-3, 1993. Ireland also benefited from Spanish tactics: see C. Wijnbergen, "Ireland and European Political Union" in Laursen & Vanhoonacker The Intergovernmental Conference supra n. 8, pp. 127-138 at 136.

47. Ibanez, supra n. 8 at 108-109.

Parliament - a new provision (Art. 189b of the Maastricht Treaty) under which in certain cases of disagreement between the Council and the European Parliament the latter will have a veto - the Portuguese had a number of reservations commensurate with their preference for the maintenance of the present institutional balance in the Community.⁴⁸ Also satisfaction with the inter-governmental aspects of the Community system and special relations with the United Kingdom led Portugal to take a low-key but negative attitude regarding explicit reference, in the Maastricht Treaty, to a federal goal for Europe.

Ratings are much more discouraging - concerning SECM cohesion and solidarity - in foreign policy, security and defence related issues. Portugal was against majority voting in the CFSP field but it would consider it for the future provided that the "one country, one vote" rule would apply.⁴⁹ Also Greece's position on this issue rated "ambivalent" in Table 4 might have hardened even further against relinquishing the national veto in view of the incoherence of EC policy on former Yugoslavia and her own vital interests in the region.⁵⁰ Spain was also in favour of preserving unanimity in decision-making on CFSP but agreed that abstentions should not hinder a decision.⁵¹

The extension of CFSP to include defense found SECM even more divided. Spain, was the country among the four SECM that has taken the most unequivocal stance in support of a defense dimension for the Community⁵² with Greece - after the conservative victory in the polls in 1990 - following at a very close distance.⁵³

48. F.X.G.M de Meirelles "Portugal and the European Political Union" in Laursen & Vanhoonacker The Intergovernmental Conference supra n. 8 pp. 177-187 at 183-184. On the position of the other SECM see Laursen et al "Overview of the Negotiations" in Laursen & Vanhoonacker The Intergovernmental Conference supra n. 8 pp. 3-24 at 16.

49. Meirelles Ibid, at 185.

50. D. Tsakaloyannis Small States and Collective Security: The Case of Greece in Conference on EC Foreign Policy supra n. 46 pp. 1-5 at 5.

51. Ibanez supra n. 8 at 105.

52. Ibid at 105.

53. A. Hartog "Greece and European Political Union" in Laursen & Vanhoonacker The Intergovernmental Conference supra n. 8 pp. 79-97 at 94.

Portugal, on the other hand, has adopted a view which is very close to the United Kingdom's position that "it is too soon to integrate the WEU into the EC and that NATO should remain as the main defence organization in Europe".⁵⁴ Finally, Italy, as exemplified by the Anglo-Italian Declaration on European Security and Defense⁵⁵ (5 October 1991) and her general attitude during the IGC, does have great difficulty to choose between the option of "an independent European security pillar and the Atlantist option".⁵⁶

3. THE DIVERGENCE OF SECURITY PERCEPTIONS

The disparity of SECM's views on the evolution of a security and defence dimension for the European Union, amply demonstrated during the IGC, is a natural reflection of their diverse historical experiences and contemporary needs and priorities. Since this subject will be dealt with in length by experts in the field in other Chapters of this volume it suffices to briefly summarize here some of the factors that accentuate this divergence of perceptions and attitudes as well as their implications.

The SECM represent an heterogeneous group of states from the point of view of size, location, security needs and military capabilities. Their membership in collective defence mechanisms (NATO and - with the exception of Greece - WEU) founded in order to deter distant "threats from the East" had meager results in stimulating perceptions of a common security and defence identity. As long as the "central font" mentality dominated allied strategic doctrine and military planning, SECM apprehensions over indirect, or even direct, security threats emanating from their adjacent regions - the Mediterranean and the Middle East - would have to be downplayed as marginal or even parochial preoccupations. The absence of institutionalized structures of collective

54. Meirelles, supra n. 48 at 185-186; see also A de Vasconcelos "Portugal and European Political Cooperation" The International Spectator XXVI (No. 2, April-June 1991) 127-140.

55. France saw the joint Declaration as calling into question the French aim of an autonomous European Security identity, submitted together with Germany, and reacted very strongly, see E. Martial, "France and European Political Union" Laursen & Vanhoonacker The Intergovernmental Conference supra n. 8 pp. 115-126 at 123.

56. E. Martial, "Italy and European Political Union" in The Intergovernmental Conference Ibid pp. 139-153 at 150. For an analysis of the Italian attitude see Lesser supra n. 2 at 68-69; and Agostini supra n. 5 pp. 347-355.

defence capable of addressing such issues further enhanced the already dominant American position exemplified in the bilateral defence and cooperation agreements linking the SECM with the Western superpower.

Those bilateral arrangements; besides their concrete economic and military benefits, were conceived by the smaller SECM as supplementary safety valves elevating their national posture vis-a-vis powerful neighbors like Spain and Turkey that also retained their own bilateral institutional ties with the United States in the security and defence fields. Certainly, Portuguese apprehensions of potential Spanish economic and political domination over the whole Iberian peninsula although existent⁵⁷ are not comparable to Greece's fears, rooted in the 1974 precedent in Cyprus, that her adversary, Turkey, could once more resort to military force as a means of settling bilateral disputes. The weight of the "Turkish threat" for Greece as well as the inadequacy of NATO guarantees to provide an effective deterrence led that country to forewarn her partners in IGC negotiations that it would veto all Maastricht agreements unless it was allowed to join the WEU.⁵⁸ The demand was officially justified by references to the rapidly deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia but there was little doubt in anybody's mind that Turkey was the true motive behind Greek intransigence.⁵⁹ Spain's dispute with Morocco, also a country with special ties to the United States, over the Ceuta and Melilla enclaves i.e. North African territories falling outside both NATO and WEU areas of responsibility, provides additional evidence regarding the insuf-

57. See: S. Vanhoonacker, "A Critical Issue: From European Political Cooperation to a Common Foreign and Security Policy" in Laursen & Vanhoonacker The Intergovernmental Conference supra n. 8, pp. 25-33 at 28; also, Meirelles, supra n. 48 at 179; and Lesser, supra n. 2 at 31: "Portugal's traditional wariness of Spain continues to make itself felt in the political, economic and military realms, despite recent initiatives aimed at improving bilateral ties. It also exerts identifiable, if waning, influence on strategic thought. In particular, the continental dimension of Portuguese defence planning has long incorporated what some observers have termed the "theory of the Spanish danger", reflected in the Portuguese military structure adopted in the 1980s".

58. See Hartog, supra n. 53 at 94 and Laursen et al supra n. 48 at 20.

59. See supra n. 40 and related text.

iciency of existing multilateral security arrangements as well as the importance of America's role as an external balancing actor in SECM conflicts with TMC.⁶⁰

The short period of time separating the collapse of the bipolar world order and the IGC was not enough to allow SECM to absorb the new realities and re-examine their policies and commitments. SECM would be delighted to draw the attention of the rest of the EC to their traditional concerns over economic, demographic, political, religious, even military developments in the Mediterranean but would find it especially hard to agree first among themselves on the specific geographic-country origins of related "threats" even more so on an agenda of priorities. It was, nevertheless, natural for Spain to take the lead in supporting an independent defence option for the European Union. Spain, unlike Italy, was not preoccupied with dilemmas of the "Atlantist" v. "European" variety and although large, self-confident and ambitious it was apprehensive of its vulnerability to indirect, even direct, security challenges from the South and eager to draw Northern EC members behind a collective security defence scheme that would reduce unilateral dependence on the United States. Still, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, challenges from the South have got to assume proportions that would motivate a joint SECM and possibly EC-wide reaction.

At the same time rapid developments in the Balkans further underlined the peculiarity of the position and security needs of Greece, the Eastern Mediterranean of the SECM group, who saw its immediate environment dramatically reshaped as a result of regime changes in Albania and Bulgaria and the war in former Yugoslavia. Greek failure to draw the rest of the EC behind a policy that would resist the rapid disintegration of Yugoslavia or to endorse its position regarding the use of the name "Macedonia" by the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) made Greek policymakers increasingly skeptical over the prospect of transferring sovereign foreign-policy prerogatives to a European Union unable or unwilling to understand Balkan realities.⁶¹

In short, a SECM foreign policy and defence identity that would subsequently merge with broader EC security considerations in the context of the European Union is not founded on shared perceptions over the inadequacy of current multilateral arrangements to cope with immediate security threats common to the group. Even in cases like those of Greece, and to a much lesser extent Spain, where a SECM does have specific and urgent reasons to explore alternative security arrangements, it will face, as a

60. Lesser, *supra* n. 2 at 41-42.

61. See also *supra*, n. 50 and related text.

rule, negative or reserved reactions from EC partners unwilling to entangle themselves in geographically distant disputes that could escalate into armed conflicts.⁶²

4. CONCLUDING REMARKS


The preceding analysis sustains the view that indeed SECM operate as a pressure group in certain areas within the E.C. Their combined efforts have already influenced policies related to the economic and social cohesion and TMCs and could prove in the future a decisive factor on decisions concerning enlargement. Still the two factors that have brought closer the members of the group in the post-bipolar era: the accelerated pace of integration set at Maastricht and the prospect of diverting resources and offering E.C. partnerships to the new democracies in Eastern Europe were not forceful enough to change traditional SECM attitudes and policies so as to form a united front on the vital issues of the evolution of the Union.

In that respect SECM appeared trapped in a vicious circle. For the E.C. to continue benefiting SECM economies it would have to survive in international competition. But in order to achieve that it needed to strengthen its internal political and economic cohesion and acquire competences that would allow it to deal collectively and effectively with major foreign policy and security issues. The SECM would, certainly like to see an EC properly endowed to redistribute wealth and bridge economic differences between its north and south and appreciate the additional security that their membership in a strong European Union implies in connection with challenges from TMCs. Still they maintain the hope that they might have some or all of those benefits without making substantial sacrifices in their sovereign prerogatives or changing their traditional policy patterns in multilateral or bilateral commitments regarding security and defence. Even a SECM like Greece, eager to utilize the advantages of taking part in a Union endowed with a CFSP, would hesitate e.g. to loosen in bilateral ties with to the United States before such CFSP had taken shape and proven in effectiveness; an unlikely development should the majority of EC partners, including the major ones, shared this attitude. One should add at this point that the forthcoming enlargement of the EC in the direction of the traditionally neutral EFTA members like Austria and Switzerland could add to the

62. See supra n. 40 for the Greek experience and E. Regelsberger "Spain and the European Political Cooperation - No Enfant Terrible" The International Spectator v. XXIV (No. 2, April-June 1989): 118-123 at 123.

problems that the CFSP has encountered due to lack of substantial SECM support, and, of course, the negative position of the United Kingdom and the other Atlantists.

Failure of the European Union to make progress both in its economic and political dimensions, including an efficient CFSP would pose insurmountable obstacles in promoting development and stability both in East-Central Europe and the South of the Mediterranean. Thus in Edward Mortimer's words could revert Europe "to its prewar status of mutually hostile nation-states";⁶³ a prospect that should worry all EC members regardless of wealth or particular national objectives pursued though the course of European integration. SECM, have much at stake in a strong and effective European Union. Recent spectacular developments leading to a settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict pave the way for a more energetic and comprehensive EC policy for the whole Mediterranean. They also present SECM with an unprecedented opportunity to take the lead in that direction, to revive their own special identity and, in cooperation with likeminded powers e.g. France, breathe new life and open new horizons for the CFSP arrangements of the Maastricht Treaty.



63. Supra n. 40 at 68.

The United States and Southern Europe

Southern European Countries and European Defense

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1. THERE IS STILL SOUTHERN EUROPE?

My purpose is to explore if there is something enough articulated and differentiated within NATO or within the EC as to justify the fact of speaking about a Southern European dimension in European security policy. Or if we are dealing with a topic that many of us have contributed to create and expand during the last years. (Chipman, 1988; Aliboni, 1992; Lesser, 1992)

This quote from the Introduction that Philippe Schmitter wrote some years ago as an opening for the volume dedicated to Southern European Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Schmitter, 1986) could be useful today as the beginning of our reflection.

"The countries of the northern rim of the Mediterranean have long been the 'stepchildren' of the study of Western European politics and society. With the notable exception of Italy (and then only since its democratization after World War II), they have been routinely place outside the mainstream of inquiry and generalization about political developments in that part of the world. Scholars shied away from studying them. Textbooks simply ignored their existence. Classification systems assigned them the status of 'exceptions,' or simply place them in the ignominious category of 'other.' In the crosstabs, factor analyses, and scatterplots that sought the socioeconomic correlates of political democracy, the Southern European countries kept popping up in the offcell, adhering to the wrong cluster, or outlying with a whopping negative residual.

The conviction grew that they somehow did not belong in Western Europe. Spain and Portugal were placed on the other side of the Pyrenees, 'in Africa.' Greece, when it fell to the despotism of the colonels, became Balkan. Turkey, despite all its efforts at Western secularization and modernization, was exiled to the Middle East". (Schmitter, 1986)

What those countries had in common was their shared marginality in relation with the mainstream of Western politics, as a result of their slow path of economic development, the singularities of their political systems and their dubious stance at the end of the World War II.

But these negative characteristics that could have identified them as a group at the early eighties, are still alive and remain important today? When all those countries after have established democratic political systems, have joined the EC and have gone through a period of impressive economic growth, Or, in the way of 'normalization' of their internal and external policies these countries have choosen different paths, in accordance with their different interests and values?

2. FROM THE SOUTHERN REGION OF NATO TO SOUTHERN EUROPE

2.1. When NATO is not enough.

If there was a Southern Region during the sixties and seventies, it existed only in strategic terms and it included with Italy all these backward countries in the North shore of the Mediterranean (Portugal, Spain, Greece and Turkey) that were integrated in the West because of their links with the 'strategic federator', the US. (Vasconcelos, 1992, pag. 19)

But strategically speaking there was not an autonomous Southern Region, it existed only because of its importance for the defense of the Central Front, that was the 'raison d'être' of NATO. In fact, the Southern Region consisted of four separate military theatres: Italy, Greece and western Turkey, eastern Turkey and the Mediterranean Sea. (Chipman, 1988, pag. 38)

If these countries belonging to the Southern Region had something in common was the perception that their security concerns were not fully met by NATO and even in some cases were conflicting with the interests of the more important country in NATO, the USA . But this perception was normally the consequence of a long process with different origins in each country.

In Greece, the origin of the conflict with NATO was the support given by the US to the military dictatorship at the end of the sixties and the lack of support given by US and other NATO members to Greece in his conflict with Turkey over Cyprus in 1974. The Greeks discovered that more than twenty years of alignment with the Western powers and dependence of US has not given them the capacity of defending their territory against external threats. (Laipson, 1991; Platias, 1991)

That lead to the withdrawal of Greece from the integrated military structure of NATO and the termination of the 1973 home-porting agreement with the United States. At the same time, Greece begun to develop an autonomous security policy and made the defense from the Eastern threat, Turkey, the focal point of his military organization. This crisis maintained Greece alienated from NATO and the US during the second half of the seventies, when the victory of PASOK in the 1980 general elections prevented the normalization of these issues as well during the eighties. (Veremis, 1988)

In Portugal, the relationship with NATO had been also mainly a Luso-American affair. As Thomas C. Bruneau has pointed out:

"Despite joining NATO as a charter member in 1949, the main contribution of Portugal in the Alliance was the provision of facilities on the mainland and access to bases and others facilities in the Azores by the United States in accordance with the terms of a bilateral agreement first signed in 1951." (Bruneau, 1992)

This very limited involvement in NATO virtually disappeared with the outbreak of the colonial conflict in 1961 and Portugal remained only a nominal NATO member until the end of these colonial wars that was a consequence of the 1974 Revolution.

The conflicts that existed between Salazar and the US Administrations because of the colonial wars and the role that the US played during the 1974 Revolution and afterwards, produced a period of exceptional good relations between the two countries but failed to bring about a change in the bilateral relation.

During the eighties the 'special' relationship with the United States deteriorated because of democratic Portugal looked for a broader relationship with the US, meanwhile the US was very comfortable with the 'status quo'. That lead Portuguese governments to adopt a more pluralistic approach in his foreign and defense policies relying more in multilateral frameworks as NATO, EC and WEU and emphasizing the importance of independent policies in some areas of the world of special relevance for Portugal like Brazil, Angola and Mozambique or the Middle East. Nevertheless, the Atlanticism has remained one of Portugal defining trends. (Vasconcelos, 1990)

Spain was linked to the Western security only through the Defense Agreements signed in 1953 with the US and his main contribution, as in the case of Portugal, was to provide facilities for the US armed forces. This connection between the Franco's regime and the US was a liability for the United States when Franco died in 1975. Nevertheless, all the political forces, even the Communist party, understood that in order to proceed to a peaceful change of regime, Spain had to maintain the 'status quo' in this respect. Therefore, the first government of Juan Carlos I signed a Treaty of Friendship and Defense with the United States in September 1976 that was overall an extension of the previous one.

But in 1981, when this Treaty had to be renegotiated, the Spanish Government of Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD) thought that the time has come to alter the bilateral relation and to established a more equilibrated one. This reequilibration, was only possible, in the Government view, if the relationship with the United States was situated in a multilateral framework and Spain applied for NATO membership in 1981 and became a NATO member in May 1982, at the same time that a new a more equilibrated Defense Agreement was signed with the USA.

This process of normalization of Spanish security policy was interrupted due to the reaction of socialists and communists, which perceived this step as a serious alteration of the 'status quo' and as a threat to the security of Spain that had no interests in the East-West conflict. These positions, after a momentous campaign, obtained the favor of public opinion and were an important element in the overwhelming victory of the PSOE some months later, in October 1982.

When the PSOE arrived to Government, Felipe González began to understand the importance of keeping Spain within the same security framework than the other Western countries and designed a strategy to assure Spanish membership in NATO in exchange for non-military integration in the Alliance and the withdrawal of important US military forces from Spain.(Viñas, 1986)

This strategy allowed González to win a referendum in 1986 on NATO membership and lead to a period of crisis in the relationship with the US. Finally, in January 1988 the US Government accepted to withdraw the 401st Tactical Combat Wing from Torrejon near Madrid and at the end of 1988 signed a new Defense Agreement with the United States.(Rodrigo, 1992)

8

The case of Italy differs from those of Greece and Spain and closer to that of Portugal, because in Italy too the relationship with the United States and membership of NATO are key elements of his foreign and security policy, that commands a wide support between political elites and the public at large. NATO membership was for Italy during the forties and fifties an important element of Italy's international legitimacy and support to the US military requirements within and outside the Alliance was something taken for granted.

"In the 1950's, the Mediterranean was considered an 'American lake'. The 'threat from the south' had not yet entered NATO terminology... No military requirements other than those deriving from the Alliance's operational planning were envisaged...and no scenarios of bilateral crisis outside the Atlantic context were imaginable. (...)

It is even arguable that up until about 1979, Italy did not really have its own military policy but merely copied that of NATO." (Cremasco, 1988)

External developments like the Camp David agreements or the Israeli's invasion of Lebanon, lead Italy to develop in the eighties a more active and independent policy in the Middle East and to elaborate an autonomous approach toward these areas of the Mediterranean that potentially presented risks for Italian security and were not covered by NATO planning. (Greco and Guazzone, 1992)

This autonomous course produced some important crisis between the Italy and the US, as was evidenced with occasion of the US management of the hijacking of the Achille Lauro in 1985 and the air raid on Libya on April 1986. Incidents that lead to serious conflict with the US Government because of his use of the NATO bases in Italian territory for 'out of area' purposes without prior authorization of the Italian Government.

2.2. The Europeanization of the South.

Nevertheless, this common feeling of dissatisfaction with the security arrangements established during the Cold War, was not enough to produce between them a sense of shared identity. Only the integration of these countries in the European Community during the eighties meant a step in that direction. Although EC membership more than the opportunity for building up a Southern European caucus, meant the possibility of formulating a more autonomous and pluralistic foreign and defense policy. Particularly, through their participation in the European Political Cooperation (EPC) that was strengthened in 1987 thanks to the Single European Act.

Entry in the EC became the main objective of the foreign policy of these countries after their successful returning to a democratic system of Government during the seventies.¹ The entry in the EC provided them with a unique framework for developing a more autonomous approach to foreign policy without creating many problems with the US, because of the absence of security and defense competencies of the EC. They became less dependent of the US in economic and political terms and obtained new sources of information as well as new foreign policies capabilities thanks to their participation in the EPC, without affecting their security compromises with NATO and the US.

Nevertheless, Turkey, although it has suffered during the seventies similar problems to those described in the section 2.1. The breakdown of its democratic regime in 1980 as well as its conflict with Greece interrupted its rapprochement with the EC, always problematic for cultural and economic reasons. (Sunar and Sayari, 1986; Karaosmanoglu, 1988; Stephanou and

¹.- Greece applied for membership in 1975 and became an EC member in 1981. Portugal and Spain applied in 1977 and became members in 1986.

Tsardanides, 1991) Therefore, Turkey could not develop a new international identity during the eighties and remained in the Southern Region, meanwhile the other countries transformed themselves in Southern Europe. As Prof. Bazoglu Sezer from Bilkent University has put it:

"In other words, in many ways Turkey is south, whereas the rest of Southern Europe is north;" (Bazoglu Sezer, 1988, pag. 133)

2.3. Back to the periphery?

The almost simultaneous arrival to the EC of these three countries altered the equilibrium of the Community towards the Mediterranean, but was not enough to create a Southern European caucus within the EC, at least vis-à-vis foreign and defense policies. The creation of this group was a reaction to the events in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989 and particularly the fall of the Berlin wall in November of that year.

The negotiations that lead to the signing in Moscow in September of 1990 to the Treaty that gave the green light to the unification of Germany produced an earthquake that shaken all the countries in the EC. The effect of this earthquake in the Southern European countries of the EC, particularly in those situated in the Western corner, was specially intense, arousing fears that an EC turned to its Eastern borders, could forget about its Southern dimension.

Therefore, all the Southern European countries supported the idea of deepening the Community before any enlargement could take place, although the idea of convening an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on Political Union divided the Southern caucus, with Portugal playing in the reluctant camp with Great Britain and Ireland. (Laursen, Vanhoonacker et al., 1992)

These policies pointed to avoid the isolation of the Southern European Countries from the incoming changes occurring inside and outside the EC. But they didn't address the question of the future of EC relations with the non-EC Mediterranean countries that was one of the main concerns of Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece.

This concern lead to a new activism of these countries vis-à-vis the countries of the southern shore of the Mediterranean, that contributed decisively to create a shared identity and produced the perception in the other EC countries that a Southern European caucus existed at least with reference to Mediterranean affairs. (Barbé, 1991)

3. SOUTHERN EUROPE AND THE DEBATE ABOUT EUROPEAN SECURITY.

Nevertheless, the debate about a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that was a consequence of the IGC on Political Union jeopardize very soon the illusion about the existence of Southern Europe as a group that pursued similar policies within the EC.

The Southern countries were members of an EC which only painfully coordinates the foreign policies of their members, but lacked competencies to formulate and implement a common foreign policy and to deal with the military aspects of security. The only European institution with competence for dealing with defense matters, the Western European Union (WEU), hadn't any formal connection with the EC and didn't posses any operational capacity of its own. Therefore the interests of Portugal, Spain and Greece for membership in WEU was more for attaining another symbol of

their new European identity, than because they were looking for an alternative to the existing defense arrangements.²

But all these changed with the prospect of establishing an European Union with a more vigorous international dimension. The debate soon turned around the idea of transforming the intergovernmental mechanisms of the EPC in a element of the EC process and the abolition of restrictions on the examination of security problems.

One of the first contributions to this debate came from Greece and meant an important change in the way Greece approached the Community. That was a consequence of the existence of a new Government in Greece after the April 1990 general elections that lead Constantino Mitsotakis to replace Papandreou, that had remained 10 years in office, as Prime Minister. Only one month after taking office, the Mitsotakis Government release an important memorandum on 'Progress Towards Political Union', where he stressed that:

"Application of the principle of subsidiarity leads to the conclusion that external policy is one of the areas where joint action is more effective than action by each individual Member State." (Greek, 1992)

This view, although didn't implied the incorporation of EPC into the EC framework, was very far away of the traditional mistrust of the Papandreou's Governments towards EPC because it implied a threat to Greek sovereignty in foreign affairs.(Hartog, 1992)

².- Portugal and Spain became full members of WEU in March 1990, although since November 1988 they took part in WEU activities.

3.1. The Gulf War.

The invasion of Kuwait the 2nd of August 1991 had a direct impact in the debate about a Common Foreign and Security Policy. In the first months of the conflict, the performance of EC and WEU was certainly impressive. The Foreign Affairs ministers of the Twelve after several meetings of EPC decided to convene the 21st of August a ministerial meeting of WEU, where the EC countries that were not members of the WEU (Ireland, Denmark and Greece) plus Turkey were invited.

This WEU ministerial meeting, because of the lack of competencies of EPC in military matters, decided to coordinate the naval forces sent by member countries in order to apply the embargo ordered by the Security Council. Therefore the 27th of August, for the first time in the recent history of the organization, the Chiefs of Staff of the WEU countries met to draft a document on co-ordination and on 31st August a co-ordination group was formed with a permanent co-ordination unit in Paris and coordination activities on the spot. Thanks to this umbrella provided for the Western European Union, Portugal, Spain and Greece participated in the Gulf coalition.

As a consequence of this practical example of CFSP, many declarations were held in favor of the development of an independent European security and defense structure within the future European Union. Nevertheless, the situation changed when the crisis with Irak became an open military conflict and the capability of The Twelve for developing an independent diplomatic course became evident. The important role played by the US and the divisions between Britain and France cooled the enthusiasm of many countries about an independent defense policy for the future European Union. (Guazzone, 1991)

3.2. The role of WEU

In the aftermath of the Gulf War the debate centered around the role that WEU should play in the security dimension of the Union. Italy which held the presidency of the EC expressed, as early as the 18th of September, its will:

"...to transfer to the Union all the competencies presently being exercised by WEU..." (Italian, 1992)

And Britain headed the countries that were against WEU been swallowed by the future European Union and stressed the importance of WEU as a bridge between the Union and NATO.

The Community was once more divided between Europeanists and Atlanticists, and Southern European countries were as well divided along this axis. From the more Europeanists views of Spain and Greece to the more supportives of the Atlantic perspective as those of Portugal:

"Although the Portuguese government appreciates that the need for an agreed European security policy was apparent during the Gulf crisis and regards it as a necessity, the main lesson it tends to take from these events is that its view of the fundamental role of the United States in European and out-of-area security was fully vindicated, and that one must stress the eminently national character of defence issues." (Vasconcelos, 1991)

And Italy, finally became a middle man between both options with the Anglo-Italian Declaration on European Security of October 1991.

Meanwhile, a NATO summit that was held in London in July 1990 has decided to initiate a gradual transformation of the Alliance and a new strategic concept was approved in Rome 7-8 November 1991, recognizing the importance of the European contribution to the atlantic security. Therefore, in

spite of so many changes, at the end the equilibrium between EC, WEU and NATO has not been altered.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The reactions towards the Gulf War as well as the debate about CFSP has shown us that it is not so easy to argue about something like a common perception between Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece about European Security and in fact that there are many elements of conflict between the Southern European countries related to this question.

Although, Southern European countries have been very active promoting fora for emphasizing their common concerns with respect to the Mediterranean aspects of the European security during the last years. Nowadays this dimension is halted because of unfavorable events in the Maghreb, the Balkans and the Middle East and it would be very unlikely that the four Southern European States will succeed in the near future in building up a framework capable of addressing so many different concerns.

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