COOPERATION AND SECURITY IN EUROPE, THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE BALKANS

Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy

Halki/29/VIII-11/IX/1993

a. Seminar programme
b. List of participants
c. 14th biannual conference of directors of European institutes of international relations : programme
d. List of participants
1. *"Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union"/ Ednan Agaev
2. "Is South-Eastern Europe making it?"/ Franz-Lothar Altmann
3. "Nordic security policy after the Cold War"/ Sigurd Marstein
4. "Human rights and minority protection in Eastern Europe"/ Claire Samkova
5. "Minority rights and security in the Balkans"/ Mario Apostolov
6. "Csce and human rights: a new ideology? (summary)"/ Ayhan Kaya
7. "Slovenia and the disintegration of Yugoslavia"/ Anton Grizold
8. "International community and Yugoslavia: lessons from a failure"/ Predrag Simic
9. "Croatian foreign policy and Europe"/ Radovan Vukadinovic
10. "The role of Weu in the Yugoslav crisis"/ Roberto Zadra
11. "Italy's policy towards the Yugoslav crisis"/ Ettore Greco
12. "Dissonances franco-allemandes sur fond de guerre yugoslave"/ Hans Stark
13. "Hungarian roles connection with the Yugoslav crisis"/ Janos Szabó
14. "New Europe"/ Valery Marmazov
15. "The CIS and its viability"/ Arsen Gasparian
16. "Belarus in search of security"/ Anatoli A. Rozanov
17. "Georgia and the new Europe"/ George Sulkhanishavili
18. "Integration in the North Caucasus"/ Alan Kassayev
19. "The current situation in Central Asian countries and issues of regional security"/ Khasanov Rakhim
20. "The political meaning of trade in East European association with EC"/ Krassimir Nikolov
21. "Bulgaria and the European Community: the security aspect"/ Plamen Pantev
22. "La Roumanie et les Communautés européennes"/ Ruxandra Oane Stanescu
23. "Romania and the European Community"/ Vlad Andrei Moga
24. "Slovenia and the EC: some aspects of a complex relationship"/ Milan Brglez
25. "Security perspectives of Central Europe: a view from Slovakia"/ Svetoslav Bombik
26. "Armenian position vis-a-vis Black Sea Initiative"/ Gevork Ter-Gabrielian
27. "Romania and the Black Sea Initiative"/ Luminita Irina Nedel
28. "Turkey and the Black Sea Initiative"/ Evaki Athanasopoulou
29. "International seminar on issues at the 1995 NPT conference : a preliminary review of the issues"/ David Fischer
30. "Europe after Maastricht"/ Nicholas Hopkinson

(segue)

(segue)

*Peper presentati a: 14th biannual conference of directors of European institutes of international relations : Rhodes, 3-5 September 1993 / Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy, Hellenic Centre for European Studies

HALKI INTERNATIONAL SEMINARS

"COOPERATION AND SECURITY IN EUROPE, THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE BALKANS"

Seminar Programme

29 AUGUST - 11 SEPTEMBER 1993
Halki / Rhodes, Greece

Saturday 28 August

12:00	Assembly at Ag. Spyridon Church - Piraeus Port (Athens)
13:00	Departure by F/B "Ialyssos"

Sunday 29 August

09:00	Arrival at Rhodes/Tour to Rhodes City
10:30	Assembly at Rhodes Harbour (Meeting Point: F/B "Ialyssos")/Departure for Halki
14:00	Arrival at Halki
20:00	Seminar Opening Greetings: Prof. Theodore Couloumbis, President of the Board of Directors, ELIAMEP, Athens
21:00	St. John's Folk Festival

Monday 30 August

Morning Session: Introductory address: **The New European Security Setting**
(9:30 - 11:00)   Prof. Bo Huldt, Director, International Institute for Strategic
Studies (IISS), London

(11:30 - 13:30)   **The End of the Cold War: Are the Old Security
Institutions Relevant?**

Chair: Prof. Bo Huldt, London

From NATO to NACC and Beyond
Dr. Maurizio Cremasco, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome

—✗— *The WEU and Eastern Europe*
Roberto Zadra, Institute for Security Studies, WEU, Paris

✗ *The CIS*
Dr. Ednan Agaev, Director, Administration of Analysis and
Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow

Afternoon Session: **The Challenges of Eastern Europe**
(18:00 - 19:30)

Chair: Prof. Yannis Valinakis, Deputy Director, Hellenic
Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP),
Athens

✗ The Economic Challenges
Dr.Franz-Lothar Altmann, Deputy Director, Suedost - Institut,
Munich

The Political and Security Challenges
Prof. Cengiz Okman, Deputy Director, European Community
Institute, Marmara University, Istanbul

Comments: - Roumen Danov, Advisor to the President of the
Republic, Sofia

(19:45 - 21:15)   **Working Group Sessions**

Working Group I: **The New Security Agenda**

Chairman: Dr. Maurizio Cremasco, IAI, Rome

Security Options for former communist countries
Monica Wohlfeld, Dpt. of War Studies, King's College, London

Defense Equipment and Expenditures in the former
communist countries
Nicholas Protonotarios,International Institute of Strategic Studies
(IISS), London

✗ Security Options for the former Neutral Countries
Sigurd Marstein, Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO), Oslo

Working Group II: **Democracy and Human Rights**

Chairman: Vladimir Philipov, Ambassador of Bulgaria to Portugal

Democracy and Human Rights in East and Southeast Europe
✗ - Claire Samkova, Deputy Director, Institute of International
   Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prague
✗ - Mario Apostolov, Institute of International Studies (IUHEI),
   Geneva
   - Ritvan Peshkepia, Member of Parliament (Democratic
   Alliance), Tirana
✗ - Ayhan Kaya, Institute of Social Science, Marmara University,
   Istanbul
   - Dragan Knezevic, Advisor for International Humanitarian
   Law, Belgrade

Islam, Democracy and Human Rights
Dr. Victor Nadein Raevsky, Institute of World Economy and
International Relations (IMEMO),
Moscow

Tuesday 31 August

Morning Session : **The Crisis in Former Yugoslavia (I)**
(9:00 - 10:30)

Chair: Prof. Theodore Couloumbis, Athens
Opening Remarks

X *Slovenia and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia*
Dr. Anton Grizold, Head of Defense Studies Division, University
of Ljubljana

X *Serbia and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia*
Dr. Predrag Simic, Director, Institute of International Politics
and Economics, Belgrade

X *Croatia and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia*
Prof. Radovan Vukadinovic, Zagreb

(11:00 - 13:30) **The Crisis in Former Yugoslavia (II)**

Chair: Dr. Franz-Lothar Altmann, Munich

The Military Situation in Former Yugoslavia
Dr. Anton Grizold, Ljubljana

Dilemmas of Peacekeeping and Peacemaking
- Prof. Bo Huldt, London

The Role of the EC and WEU
- Dimitris Kourkoulas, Directorate General of External Relations,
EC Commission, Brussels
X - Roberto Zadra, WEU, Paris

Comments: Dr. Sergei Karaganov, Moscow

Discussion

Afternoon Session: **Yugoslavia: The Role of External Powers**
(18:00 - 21:30)

Chair: Roumen Danov, Sofia
Opening Remarks

Russia and the Yugoslav Crisis
Dr. Victor Nadein Raevsky, Moscow

Germany: Dr. Franz - Lothar-Altmann, Munich

X Italy: Ettore Greco, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome

X France: Hans Stark, Institut Francais de Relationes
Internationales (IFRI), Paris

X Hungary: Janos Szabo, Institute for Strategic & Defense
Studies, Budapest

Albania: Agim Nesho, Tirana

Bulgaria: Vesselin Todorov, Associate Dean, Southeastern
College, Athens

Comments: Dr. Spyros Economides, Lecturer, London School of
Economics (LSE), London

Discussion

Wednesday 1 September

Morning Session: **Simulation Exercise - Part I: Preparing Negotiating**
(9:00 - 10:30)   **Positions**

Coordinator: Anat Kurz, The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies
(JCSS), Tel Aviv

Instructions: Substance and Logistics

Negotiating Group Discussions

Reconvening of Negotiating Groups: Discussion of
Methodological Problems

Afternoon Session: Group B: **Simulation - Part II**
(17:45 - 20:30)

Preparation of Negotiating Positions - Continued

Negotiations: First Session

Discussion of Methodological Problems

(21:00)   Keynote Dinner Address: Dr. Pier Giovanni d' Ayala, General
Secretary, International Scientific Council for Island
Development (INSULA), UNESCO, Paris

Thursday 2 September

Morning Session: Group A: **The CIS and Its Viability**
(09:00 - 13:30)

Russia and its Internal Situation
- Dr. Victor Nadein Raevsky, Moscow
- Andrey Soroko-Tsupa, IMEMO, Moscow

X *The View from the Republics*
X - Valery Marmazov, Consultant, Ukrainian Parliament, Kiev
X - George Sulkhanishavili, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tbilisi
X - Arsen Gasparian, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yerevan
   - Rakhim Khasanov, Counselor, Permanent Representation of
    the Republic of Tajikistan to Russia, Moscow

The Caucasus and Central Asia
X - Alan Kasayev, Executive Director, The Caucasian Centre,
   Moscow
   - Mansour Salsabili, College of International Relations, Teheran

Afternoon Session: **Simulation - Part III**
(17:45 - 20:30)

Consultations of Negotiating Groups

Negotiations: Second Session

Simulation Summary: General Discussion

Friday 3 September

Morning Session: **The EC and Eastern Europe**
(09:00 - 13:30)

Chair: TBA

X *EC and Bulgaria*
  Krassimir Nikolov, Center for European Studies, Sofia

X *The EC and Romania*
  Ruxandra Stanescu, Academy of Diplomatic Studies, Bucharest

The EC and Croatia
Dr. Ksenija Jurisic, University of Zagreb

X *The EC and Slovenia*
  Milan Brgliez, University of Ljubljana

The Expectations of Eastern Europe
Ambassador Vladimir Philipov, Lisbon

Information on the EC in Eastern Europe
- Martine Diss, EURO-INFO Centre, Brussels
- Polydoros Demetriades,

Afternoon Sessions: **The New Europe: Regional Cooperation Models (I)**
(17:35 - 19:30)

Lessons from Balkan and Baltic Cooperation
- Bo Lykke Nielsen, College of Europe, Bruges
- Dr. Spyros Economides, Lecturer, LSE, London
- Gantcho Ganev, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sofia
- Kestas Sadauskas,Institute of International Relations, Vilnius University,
- Emannuela Doussis, International Scientific Council for Island Development (INSULA), UNESCO, Paris

Monday 6 September

Morning Session: **The New Europe**
(9:00 - 13:00)   **Regional Cooperation Models (II)**
                        Problems and Prospects

The Black Sea Region
X - Gevork Ter-Gabrielian, Advisor to the President of the Republic of ArmeniaYerevan
- Zdravka Michailova, Journalist, Sofia
- George Sulkhanishavili, Tbilisi
X - Luminita Nedel, Journalist, Rompres Agency, Romania
X - Dr. Ekavi Athanasopoulou, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London

Afternoon Session : **Arms Control and Non-Proliferation**
(17:30 - 20:30)

Chair : Dr. Shai Feldman, Senior Research Associate, The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv

X *Nuclear Proliferation: from the 1960s to the present*
Dr. David Fisher, Consultant, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Vienna

Prospects for Non-Proliferation (presentation of main countries of proliferation concern)
Geoffrey Kemp, Carnegie Endowment, Washington D.C.

Comments:
- Mahmoud Karem, Director, Dpt. of Disarmament Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo
- Dr. Dimitris Perricos, Director, Department of Safeguards, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna

Tuesday 7 September

Morning Session:
(9:00 - 11:00)

Europe After Maastricht

Chair: Prof. Thanos Veremis, Director, Hellenic Foundation for
Defense and Foreign Policy
(ELIAMEP), Athens

The State of European Integration
Prof. Michael Stuermer, Director, Stiftung Wissenschaft und
Politik (SWP), Ebenhausen

Implementing a Common Foreign and Security Policy
Dr. Roberto Aliboni, Director of Studies, Istituto Affari
Internazionali (IAI), Rome

A View from the EC
Fraser Cameron, Foreign Policy Advisor, Secretariat General,
EC Commission, Brussels

(11:30 - 14:30)   **Working Group Sessions**

Working Group A: **International Non-Proliferation**

Chair: Dr. Dimitris Perricos, Vienna

The International Non-Proliferation Regime: A European View
Dr. David Fisher, Vienna

The International Non-Proliferation Regime: An Arab View
Dr. Mahmoud Karem, Cairo

Afternoon Session: **Working Group Sessions**
(18:00 - 21:00)

Working Group A: **Proliferation in the Mediterranean and
the Middle East: Consequences for Peace and Stability
in the Region**

Chair: Dr. Dimitirs Perricos, Vienna

An Israeli View: Dr. Shai Feldman, Tel Aviv

An Arab View: Dr. Mahmoud Karem, Cairo

A European View: Dr. Thanos Dokos, ELIAMEP, Athens

Working Group B: **Europe After Maastricht (cont.)**

Implementing a CFSP
Moderator: Dr. Roberto Aliboni, IAI, Rome

    ✗ - Nicholas Hopkinson, Wilton Park, London
     - Hans Stark, Paris
    ✗ - Patrizia Maria Prode, IAI, Rome

Wednesday 8 September

Morning Session: **Europe and the Expanded Mediterranean:**
(9:00 - 11:00)   **The Middle East and North Africa**

     Chair: Dr. Philip Robins, Chatham House, London
     Opening Remarks

     - Fraser Cameron, Brussels
     - Dr. Moustapha Elwi Seif, Center for Political Reserach and
      Studies, University of Cairo
   ✗ - Dr. Kamal Yazigi, Beirut University
    X - Claire Spencer, Wilton Park, London
     - Fernanda Faria, Instituto de Estudios Estrategicos e
      Internacionais (IEEI), Lisbon

(11:30 - 13:30)   **Working Group Meetings**

     Working Group A: **Non-Proliferation Efforts in the**
                                 Mediterranean the Middle East

     Chair: Dr. Shai Feldman, Tel Aviv

     *Non-Proliferation Efforts in the Mediterranean and the Middle
     East :* Geoffrey Kemp, Washington D.C.

     The Case of Iraq: Dr. David Fisher, Vienna

     The Arab-Israeli Peace Talks: Dr. Mahoud Karem, Cairo

Afternoon Session: **The EC and the Mediterranean**
(18:00 - 20:30)

     Chair: Dr. Alvaro Vasconcelos, Director, Istituto de Estudos
                                  Estrategicos e Internacionais
                                  (IEEI), Lisbon

     The EC Mediterranean Policy
     - Dr. Charalambos Tsardanidis,ELIAMEP, Athens
     - Fernanda Faria, Lisbon

    ✗ *The EC's Mediterranean Expansion*
     Cyprus: Yorghos Leventis, University of Bradford

✗ Malta: Stephen Calleya, University of Warwick

✗ *Turkey vis-a-vis the EC*
- Goktug Guclu, Marmara University, Istanbul

Working Group C: Challenges to Internal Stability in the Middle East

Chair: Prof Cengiz Okman, Marmara University, Istanbul
Opening Remarks

- Dr. Kamal Yazigi, Beirut
✗ - Dr. Gerd Nonneman, University of Lancaster
✗ - Zoubir Yazid, University of Delaware, New York
✗ - Murdock Alan Thompson, Journalist, Toronto
- Katerina Dalakoura, London School of Economics (LSE), London

Thursday 9 September

Morning Session: **The Middle East Peace Process**
(09:00 - 13:00)

✗ *The Future of Palestine*
Dr. Yezid Sayigh, St. Anthony's College, Oxford University

Israel: Its Approach to Peace with the Palestinians
Anat Kurz, Tel Aviv

✗ *Syrian - Israeli Peace: A View from Israel*
Eyal Zisser, The Moshe Dayan Center and University of Tel Aviv

Egypt and the Middle East Peace Process
Dr. Moustapha Elwi Seif, Cairo

✗ *The Water Problem and the Security in the Mediterranean*
Abdullatif Darweesh, Panteion University, Athens

Arms Control and Regional Security in the Middle East
Jamil Rabah, Palestinian Delegation to the Working Group on Arms Control, Jerusalem

Discussion

Afternoon Session: Working Group A: **The 1995 Extension Conference and the**
(18:00 - 21:00)   **Future of the NPT**

Chair: Dr. Shohab Shahabi, General Director, IPSI, Teheran

A European View: Dr. David Fisher, Vienna

An American View: Geoffrey Kemp, Washington D.C.

An Arab View: Namir Ahmaden, Deputy Head of Disarmament
Department, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Cairo

An Israeli View: Dr. Shai Feldman, Tel Aviv

Friday 10 September

Morning Session:
(09:15 - 11:00)

Nuclear Proliferation in the New World Order

Chairman: Geoffrey Kemp, Washington D.C.

- Dr. David Fisher, Vienna
- Dr. Shai Feldman, Tel Aviv
- Mahmoud Karem, Cairo

(11:30 - 13:30)

Conclusions

Chair: Prof. Thanos Veremis, Athens

- Prof. Michael Stuermer, Ebenhausen
- Fraser Cameron, Brussels
- Geoffrey Kemp, Washington D.C.
- Dr. Yazig Sayigh, Oxford University

Discussion

Afternoon Session: **Closing Ceremony - Award of Certificates**

Saturday 11 September

11:00   Departure from Halki to Camiros Scala - Rhodes

14:00 (approx.)   Arrival in Rhodes - Departure for Piraeus by boat
(For those not flying on charter flights from Rhodes)

Sunday 12 September

10:00 (approx.)   Arrival in Piraeus - Athens

Balkan Troobs

NATO

HALKI INTERNATIONAL SEMINARS

"COOPERATION AND SECURITY IN EUROPE, THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE BALKANS"

List of Participants

29 August-12 September 1993
Halki, Dodecanese Islands

ALBANIA

1. Dr. Anastas ANGJELI, Member of Parliament (Socialist Party) & Professor, University of Tirana
2. Agim NESHO, Director, Albanian Foundation for European Affairs, Tirana
3. Ridvan PESHKEPIA, Member of Parliament (Democratic Alliance), Tirana

ALGERIA

4. Zoubir YAZID, University of Delaware, New York

ARMENIA

5. Arsen GASPARIAN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yerevan
6. Gevork TER-GABRIELIAN, Advisor to the President of the Republic, Yerevan

AZERBAIJAN

7. Gyunduz GAFAROV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Baku
8. Agshim MEKHDIYEV, Head, Dpt. of West European Countries, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Baku

BELGIUM

9. Dr. Gerd NONNEMAN, Research Fellow, Exeter University

BENIN

10. Adelabi Claudia ADEOUSSI, University of Paris II

BULGARIA

11. Mario APOSTOLOV, Graduate Institute of International Studies (UHEI), Geneva
12. Roumen DANOV, Advisor to the President of the Republic, Sofia
13. Gantcho GANEV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sofia
14. Valentina GOSTEVA, Journalist, "168 Hours", Sofia
15. Ivan KRASTEV, Political Advisor, Friedriech Nauman Stiftung & Lecturer, New Bulgarian University, Sofia
16. Zdravka MICHAILOVA, Journalist
17. Krassimir NIKOLOV, Centre for European Studies, Sofia
18. Liana PANDELIEVA, Reporter, Bulgarian National TV, Sofia
19. Vladimir PHILIPOV, Ambassador of Bulgaria to Portugal, Lisbon
20. Sergei ROUSSEV, Director, Centre for Balkan History (CIBAL), Sofia
21. Albena SHKODROVA, Reporter, "Standart News", Sofia
22. Vesselin TODOROV, College of Southeastern Europe, Athens

CANADA

23. Jean Francois GOULET, Coordinator of Research, College of Europe, Bruges
24. Murdock Allan THOMPSON, Journalist, "The Toronto Star", Toronto
25. Angela NEMBAVLAKIS, Dpt. Energy Mines & Resources, Ottawa

CHINA

26. Yu JIANG, China Institute of International Studies, Beijing

CROATIA

27. Ksenija JURISIC, University of Zagreb
28. Dr. Radovan VUKADINOVIC, Director, Dpt. of Political Science, University of Zagreb

CZECH REPUBLIC

29. Claire SAMKOVA, Deputy Director, Institute of International Relations, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Prague

CYPRUS

30. Michalis FIRILAS, Tel Aviv University,
31. Yiorgos LEVENTIS, University of Bradford

DENMARK

32. Bo NIELSEN, College of Europe, Bruges

EGYPT

33. Namir AHMADEIN, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo
34. Mahmoud KAREM, Director, Dpt. of Disarmament Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Cairo
35. Dr. Moustapha Elwi SEIF, Centre for Political Research & Studies, Faculty of
Economics & Political Science, Cairo University

FRANCE

36. Diss MARTINE, EURO INFO Centre, Brussels

GEORGIA

37. Gia MIKABERIDGE, Head of the EC Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tbilisi

GERMANY

38. Dr. Franz-Lothar ALTMANN, Deputy Director, Suedost Institut, Munich
39. Hans STARK, Institut Francais des Relationes Internationales, Paris
40. Monica WOHLFELD, King's College, London
41. Prof., Dr. Michael STUERMER, Director, Stiftung Wissenscaft und Politik, Ebenhausen

GREECE

42. Dr. Ekavi ATHANASOPOULOU, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), London
43. Katerina DALACOURA, London School of Economics (LSE), London
44. Polydoros DEMETRIADES, Directorate General of Information, Communication, Culture & Audiovisual, EC Commission, Brussels
45. Emmanuella DOUSSIS, "Insula Program", UNESCO, Paris
46. Dr. Spyros ECONOMIDES, Lecturer, London School of Economics (LSE), London
47. Andreas KINTIS, University of Hull
48. Dimitris KOURKOULAS, Directorate General of External Relations, EC Commission, Brussels
49. Dimitrios LIVANIOS, St. Antony's College, Oxford
50. Dr. Dimitris PERRICOS, Dpt. of Safeguards, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna

HUNGARY

51. Janos SZABO, Institute for Strategic Studies, Budapest

INDIA

52. Ms. Navnita CHADHA, University of Kent

IRAN

53. Saeed NAGHIZADEH, Iranian Institute of Political Studies (IIPS), Tehran
54. Mansour SALSABILI, Member of the Scientific Board, College of International Relations & Journalist, "Hamshahri", Teheran
55. Dr. Shohrab SHAHABI, General Director, IIPS, Tehran

ISRAEL

56. Dr. Shai FELDMAN, Senior Research Fellow, The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS), Tel Aviv
57. Anat KURZ, Researcher, JCSS, Tel Aviv
58. Gal LEVY, JCSS, Tel Aviv
59. Eyal ZISSER, The Moshe Dayan Center & Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv

ITALY

60. Prof. Roberto ALIBONI, Director of Studies, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome

61. Ettore GRECO, IAI, Rome
62. Dr. Maurizio CREMASCO, Senior Fellow, IAI, Rome
63. Alesandro POLITI, Defense Researcher, IAI, & Correspondent "Defense News", Rome
64. Patrizia Maria PRODE, Researcher & Assistant Editor, "Maastricht Watch", IAI, Rome
65. Roberto ZADRA, Research Fellow, Institute for Security Studies, WEU, Paris

JORDAN

66. Abdullatif DARWEESH, European University, Athens
67. Caroline FARAQ, Journalist ,"Al Rai", Amman
68. Dr. Farooq HASNAT, Center for Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, Amman

KAZAKHSTAN

69. Valery TOLMACHOV, Office of the President of Kazakhstan, Alma Ata

LEBANON

70. Sawsan KHANAFER, Beirut University College
71. Dr. Kamal YAZIGI, Beirut University

LITHUANIA

72.. Kestas SADAUSKAS, Institute of International Relations, Vilnious University

MALTA

73. Stephen CALLEYA, University of Warwick

NORWAY

74. Sigurd MARSTEIN, Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO)

PALESTINIANS

75. Dr. Yezid SAYIGH, St Antony's College, Oxford University
76. Jamil RABAH, Member of the Palestinian Delegation, Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security
77. Huda HAWA, Political and Military Affairs Researcher, Exeter University

PORTUGAL

78. Fernada FARIA, Researcher, Institute for Strategic & International Studies (IEEI), Lisbon
79. Dr. Alvaro M.R.G. de VASCONCELOS, Director, IEEI, Lisbon

ROMANIA

80. Carmina-Dana HASEGANU, Foreign News Editor, "Romania Libera", Bucharest
81. Vlad MOGA, Director, Association for International Law & International Relations (ADIRI), Bucharest
82. Luminita NEDEL, Journalist, National News Agency, Bucharest
83. Ruxandra STANESCU, Academy of Diplomatic Studies, Bucharest

RUSSIA

84. Dr. Ednan AGAEV, Director, Administration of Analysis and Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow
85. Dr. Sergei KARAGANOV, Deputy Director, Institute of Europe, Academy of Sciences, Moscow
86. Alan KASAYEV, Executive Director, The Caucasian Centre, Moscow
87. Dr. Victor Nadein RAEVSKY, Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow
88. Andrey SOROKO-TSUPA, Researcher, IMEMO, Moscow

NEW YUGOSLAV FEDERATION

89. Dragan KNEZEVIC, Advisor for International Humanitarian Law, Yugoslav Red Cross, Belgrade
90. Zoran KRSTIC, University of Belgrade, Belgrade
91. Dr. Predrag SIMIC, Director, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade

SLOVENIA

92. Milan BRGLIEZ, Researcher, University of Ljubljana
93. Dr. Anton GRIZOLD, Head of Defense Studies Division, University of Ljubljana

SPAIN

94. Mercedes GRACIA-ALDAZ, Freelance Correspondent, Athens

SWEDEN

95. Magnus EKENGREN, University of Stockholm, Stockholm
96. Prof. Bo HULDT, Director, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), London

SOUTH AFRICA

97. Natalie SLABBERT, Institute for Strategic Studies, Pretoria

TAJIKISTAN

98. Rakkim KHASANOV, Councelor, Permanent Representation of the Republic of Tajikistan to Russia, Moscow

TURKEY

99. Simten COSAR, Bilkent University, Ankara
100. Goktug GUCLU, Dpt. of International Relations, Marmara University, Istanbul
101. Ayhan KAYA, Institute of Social Sciences, Dpt. of International Relations Marmara University, Istanbul
102. Prof. Cengiz OKMAN, Deputy Director, European Community Institute, Marmara University, Istanbul

UNITED KINGDOM

103. Fraser CAMERON, Foreign Policy Advisor, Secretariat General, EC Commission, Brussels
104. David FISCHER, Assistant Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, London
105. Nicholas HOPKINSON, Wilton Park Conference Centre, London
106. Dr. Philip ROBINS, Head of the Middle East Programme , Royal Institute of International Affairs,Chatham House, London
107. Claire SPENCER, Wilton Park Conference Centre, London
108. Anthinoula TORI, London School of Economics (LSE), London

UKRAINE

109. Valery MARMAZOV, Consultant, Ukrainian Parliament & Deputy Dean, Law Faculty, Kiev University

UNITED STATES

110. Geoffrey KAMP, Carnegie Endownement, Washington D.C.

ELIAMEP

111. Prof. Theodore COULOUMBIS, President of the Board of Directors
112. Dr. Thanos DOKOS, Researcher
113. Prof. Thanos VEREMIS, Director
114. Dr. Charalambos TSARDANIDIS, Head of Middle East Division

ALBANIA

1. Dr. Anastas ANGJELI, Member of Parliament (Socialist Party) &
Professor, University of Tirana)

2. Agin NESHO, Director, Albanian Foundation for European Afairs,
Tirana

3. Ridvan PESHKERIA, Member of Parliament (Democratic Alliance),
Tirana

ALGERIA

4. Zoubir YAZID, University of Delaware, Newwark, Delaware
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14th BIANNUAL CONFERENCE OF DIRECTORS OF EUROPEAN INSTITUTES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

EUROPEAN SECURITY IN A WORLD OF CHANGE: THINK TANKS, NETWORKING, AND POLICY PLANNING

3-5 September 1993
Rhodes, Greece

Dear Conference Participants:

As we are approaching the end of the twentieth century, we can sadly conclude that the high incidence of war and violence (exaggerated by technological breakthroughs in the accuracy and destructiveness of weaponry) continues to threaten international peace and security. If we were to evaluate the current state of affairs, we would surely propose that ours is a time of great opportunities for a just and peaceful future, which can however, be dashed on the rocks by forces of instability.

The cold war is over and the system of multi-party democracy operating with a free-market economy has a good chance of being adopted globally. Unfortunately, in place of political stability, we are faced with a system of considerable fluidity and uncertainty caused by a series of ethnic separatist challenges. These challenges have introduced a new and unpalatable term in our political vocabulary - "ethnic cleansing."

ELIAMEP deserves recognition for its initiative to organize this invaluable conference with the participation of over 100 directors of institutes of international relations as well as representatives of foreign ministries from several regions of the world. The main objective of this conference is to project new patterns of organization and management of European political and security policies, in order to contribute to the crystallization of a much hoped for peaceful new world order.

Greece is today within breathing distance from the Bosnian tragedy, and we firmly believe that any further escalation of the conflict could involve a number of Balkan states in a horrible war that will have no victors, but only vanquished. Such a Europe of today is plagued by a number of contradicting and countervailing forces.While its Western half is integrating and transcending territorial claims, its Eastern half is fragmenting and returning to atavistic patterns of supra-nationalism and territorial revisionism.

Our collective task at hand is to contain nationalist confrontations by guaranteeing existing international frontiers, rejecting the use of force, safeguarding democracy and human rights, and institutionalizing structures of political dialogue. These are, I believe, some of the themes which will hopefully focus your exchanges for the next three days, and we will surely be looking forward to useful and policy-relevant results.

Let me close by wishing all of you well in your important endeavors and that the clear blue and white lines in the Dodecanesian horizon will inspire you to offer the very best in each of you.

Constantin Mitsotakis
Prime Minister of Greece

FRIDAY 3 SEPTEMBER

18:00-20 REGISTRATION at the Rodos Palace Hotel

20 COCKTAILS

21 GALA WELCOME DINNER - Keynote speaker:
Michalis Papaconstantinou,
Foreign Minister of Greece

SATURDAY 4 SEPTEMBER

9:0 INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
PLENARY SESSION

Welcome Address: Theodore A. Couloumbis
                      President of ELIAMEP

9:15-1 PANEL DISCUSSION
"European Security
in a World of Change"

Chairman: Thanos Veremis
               Director, ELIAMEP

Panel: Bo Huldt
            Director,
            International Institute for
            Strategic Studies
            (IISS,London)

            Sergei Karaganov
            Deputy Director,
            Institute of Europe
            (Moscow)

            Dominique Moisi
            Deputy Director,
            Institut Français
            des Relations Internationales
            (IFRI, Paris)

Commentators: Mark Dickinson
                   Policy Planning Staff,
                   Foreign and Commonwealth
                   Office (London)

                   German Policy Planner
                   Ministry of Foreign Affairs
                   (Bonn)

11:00-1 COFFEE BREAK

11:30- DISCUSSION of morning topic

Discussion Leader: Michael Stürmer
Director, Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik
(SWP, Ebenhausen)

13:00- LUNCHEON - Keynote Speaker:
Sir Nigel Bagnall: "The Strategic Importance
of the Mediterranean Throughout History"

15:00- WORKING GROUPS

17:00- COFFEE BREAK

Group 1:   THE BALKANS

Chairman: Elena Zamfirescu
Director, Policy Planning Division
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Bucharest)

Panel: Franz-Lothar Altmann
Director, Südost-Institut
(Munich)

Jonathan Eyal
Director, Royal United Services
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(RUSI, London)

Egerem Mete
Political Director, 1st F.O. Directorate
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Tirana)

Predrag Simic
Director, Institute of International
Politics & Economics
(Belgrade)

Radovan Vukadinovic
Director, Institute
for Political Science
(Zagreb)

Commentators: Roumen Danov   Evangelos Kofos
Advisor to the   Special Advisor
President of   for Balkan Affairs,
Bulgaria   ELIAMEP
(Sofia)   (Athens)

Group 2:   THE E.C. AFTER MAASTRICHT

Chairman: Loukas Tsoukalis
Director, Hellenic
Centre for European Studies
(EKEM, Athens)

Panel: Roberto Aliboni
Director of Studies,
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(IAI, Rome)

Panayotis Ioakimidis
University of Athens
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Michael Stürmer
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Commentators: Fraser Cameron
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Group 3:   ARMS CONTROL & NON-PROLIFERATION

Chairman: Tom Graham
Senior Program Officer,
Rockefeller Foundation
(New York)

Panel: David Fisher
Consultant, International
Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA, UK)

Geoffrey Kemp
Director, Middle East Arms Control
Project, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace
(Washington, D.C.)

Dimitris Perricos
Director, Department
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(IAEA, Vienna)

Sergei I. Pirozhkov
Director, National Institute
for Strategic Studies
(Kiev)

Shohab Shahabi
Director General,
Iranian Institute for
International Studies
(Tehran)

Commentators:	Shai Feldman	Mahmoud Karem
	Senior Research	Head of ↑ .
	Fellow,	Disarmament
	The Jaffee Center	Affairs,
	for Strategic Studies	Ministry of
	(Tel Aviv)	Foreign Affairs
		(Cairo)

Group 4: **EASTERN EUROPE AND THE CIS REPUBLICS**

Chairman: John Roper
Director, Institute
for Security Studies,
Western European Union
(WEU, Paris)

Panel: Ednan Agaev
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of Analysis and Planning,
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Stephen Heintz
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Nicolae Chirtoaca
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(Chisinau)

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Deputy Director,
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Marmara University
(Istanbul)

Henryk Szlajfer
Acting Director,
Polish Institute
for International Affairs
(Warsaw)

Commentators: Hanspeter Neuhold
Director, Austrian Institute
for International Affairs
(Laxenburg)

Ambassador Samuel Lewis
Director, Policy Planning Staff,
U.S. Department of State
(Washington, D.C.)

21:00

GALA DINNER In the 14th century Palace of the Knights
(old town)

Keynote Speakers: H.E. Vitaly Churkin, Deputy Foreign Minister
of the Russian Federation and Gebhardt von Moltke, Assistant
Secretary General for Political Affairs, NATO

SUNDAY 5 SEPTEMBER

9:30-10

PANEL DISCUSSION

"Conditions for the Creation of a Framework of Cooperation Between Think Tanks in an Interdependent World"

(Integration of the new institutes, information management, networking, documentation and technology exchange)

Chairman: Thanos Veremis
Director, ELIAMEP

Networking of Think Tanks and Policy Planners: The Need for a New Vision

Christoph Bail
Advisor to the Cellule
de Prospective, EC Commission
(Brussels)

Presentation of Cooperation Framework:

Yannis Valinakis
Deputy Director, ELIAMEP

10:30-11:00

COFFEE BREAK

11:00-12

Electronic Networking Possibilities

Jeffrey Gardner
Director of Information Resources,
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Research Institute
(Munich)

Dietrich Seydel
Chairman of the European Working
Group on Information and
Documentation in International
Relations and Area Studies, SWP
(Ebenhausen)

Commentators: TBA

12:45-13

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Thanos Veremis, ELIAMEP

13:00-14

LIGHT LUNCH

14:00-TBA

EXCURSION TOUR TO LINDOS: swim and tour of the fortress and temple

21:00

FAREWELL DINNER
Keynote Speaker: H.E. Lyuben Berov, Prime Minister
of Bulgaria

A SPECIAL THANKS TO:

- ❏ Book Exhibit Organizer, Sue Wilson
- ❏ Cair S.A. Rhodes
- ❏ Epilogi Economic Magazine - Annual Economic Editions
- ❏ Foreign Ministry of Greece
- ❏ General Secretariat for Youth
- ❏ HANIEL Stiftung
- ❏ Hellenic Tourism Organisation
- ❏ Mayor of Rhodes, Mr. Kokkinos
- ❏ NATO
- ❏ Nordic Council of Ministers
- ❏ Open Society Fund
- ❏ Prefect of the Dodecanese Islands, Mr. Haralambopoulos
- ❏ The Rockefeller Foundation

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HELLENIC FOUNDATION FOR
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14th Biannual Conference of
Directors of European Institutes
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3-5 September 1993 - Rhodes, Greece

E K E M

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HELLENIC CENTRE FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES

Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union

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EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

The collapse of East European block predetermined qualitative change of the general European situation which is at present characterized by the two basic trends.

On the one hand the removal of ideological and military-political base of schism and confrontation opened wide possibilities for drawing closer interests of all European states and subregions and for extending cooperation between them up to the point of partnership. Today we can already speak about and participate in developing of the common European entity.

On the other hand breach of previous scheme of relationship between allies and partners resulted in the emergence of security lacunas and weakening of the regulatory mechanisms able to maintain regional peace and stability. Now there is a lack of a clear-shaped new system of military and political ties that could substitute the former bipolar structure of strategic equilibrium.

The stated factors put complex tasks and bring about new challanges to the countries of Eastern Europe. The way they will cope with the new reality will largely influence the future development of the entire continent. Geopolitically the notion "Eastern Europe" can probably be divided into four main regions: the Central Eastern Europe, the South Eastern Europe (or the Balkans), the Baltics and the former USSR.

I would like in my brief statement to dwell on the Russia's view about the main developments in each of these regions.

The countries of <u>Central Eastern Europe</u> do not have such intense and profound distinctions from the Westren part of the continent as many other East European states. Their adaptation to internationally acknowledged standards is not accompanied by the need to surmount many of the difficulties inherent in Russia for example. These countries have already established advanced enough ties with West European institutions and this process will undoubtely go further on.

We fully understand aspirations of these countries to become an integral and fully fledged part of the leading European organizations. Furthermore such aspirations go in line with our own policy of developing close cooperation with powerful European integration bodies, EC, above all. But in this respect we take the firm position that Europe's integration without Russia will seriously damage the vital interests of our country: founding ourselves in isolation in Europe is the least of our wishes. That is why we proceed from the following rule: the speed of developing of Russia's cooperation with the exising European structures must exceed the pace of joining the EC East European countries.

The same goes to security organization. The emergence of a kind of "security vacuum" in the former zone of the Warsaw Pact responsibility became a stimulating factor of some East European countries to seek for new security guarantees by formalizing ties with NATO and WEU or by creating their own alliances. Again, Russia can only welcome the intensification of East European cooperation

with NATO if it will be carried out through existing mechanisms like NACC and correspond with the ongoing transformation of the Alliance itself from the old-fashioned military block into an efficient coordinating body, able to fulfil peace-keeping tasks under the CSCE or UN mandate. It is in this direction that we develop our own relationship with NATO.

Any attempts to join the existing or form new military-political structures to the prejudice of Russia's interests that could result in its estrangement from the rest of Europe will raise our serious questions.

Speaking of Russia's relations wih the countries of Central Eastern Europe let me say that this region remains of great importance to Russia as a traditional zone of its interests where it is vital to develop equal and mutually beneficial cooperation.

We know that history - especially the recent one - has left to us a grave and difficult legacy which will be hard and long to overcome. But if we proceed from our common objective interest in the revival of economic ties - this time of course on a totally new base - we will be able to meet many of the current challenges. Russia is vitally interested in a stable, independent and prosperous Eastern Europe. In such case this gerion will not only be our important partner but also will become an efficient channel of Russia's integration into European processes.

Many of the features that define the present situation in Central Eastern Europe are also typical for the countries of <u>South Eastern Europe</u>, namely Romania and Bulgaria. But a look at the Balkans of today will inevitably be focused on the former Yugoslavia.

The tragedy that broke out on this territory is without doubt the most serious challenge to the European security after World War II. Thus far the conflict has reached the point when its further aggravation can lead to a collapse of the global stability. So alongside the urgent peacemaking efforts we must draw lessons from this situation and try to find effective means of averting its repetition elsewhere in the future. And it is self-evident that for Eastern Europe this has a special importance. So, what are these lessons?

First and foremost, it should be realized and recognized that the principle of self-determination does in no way have an absolut or self-countained meaning. Only a well-balanced, pragmatic and equitable approach can be appropriate in this complex and delicate area. Every such situation should be carefully examined from different positions. And the guarantee of minority rights is the name of the game.

The abandoning of this rule in Yugoslavia resulted in the present tragedy. The situation was aggravated by extremely tangled ethno-territorial composition of the country. On top of that the international community chose a rather simplistic approach of virtually automatic recognition of the new Yugoslav entities before various minority disputes were settled.

Hence another lesson: the formation and further recognition of a new state must be strictly conditioned by providing comprehensive guarantees for the rights of minorities.

The international community should also agree upon basic principles of dealing with crisises similar to the Yugoslav conflict. Such principles could include observance of human rights, respect for

sovereignty and territorial integrity, commitment to peaceful settlement of disputes and other elements. The most important is to find a proper balance between all the principles worked out by the Helsinki process. For the Yugoslav experience showed that attempts to give preference to one principle at the expense of the other are fraught with the risk of setting of the chain reaction of violence. Thus we come to the conclusion that the Helsinki principles are inseparable from each other and should be applied as a single whole.

Another convincing Yugoslav lesson is that it is much easier to prevent or settle any conflict situation at an early stage. Immediately after the appearance of signs of crisis the settlement action should be taken by direct participants. Of necessity the international community can provide its assistance.

In case of a real risk of uncontrolable conflict escalation the need arises to take an active and coordinated internaional action. And the unconditional priority should be given to political, diplomatic and other nonmilitary instruments. Finally, the use of force remains measure of last resort that should be avoided until the very last possibility. It is extremely important to have clear and distinct criterions and principles for such operations. They also must fully correspond to international legal norms, the UN Charter and must be sanctioned and monitored by the international community.

It is in Russia's long-term interests to establish and develop neighbourly, equal and mutually beneficial relations with the Baltic countries. Relations, based on mutual understanding and respect for the interests of each other. There are both a solid base and objective possibilities to achieve this goal.

I have to say, however, that at present there are serious obstacles on that way. Yet we firmly believe that these difficulties are of temporary nature and will be overcome by joint efforts.

So far, the most serious and sensitive problem has been the rights of ethnic Russians in Latvia ans Estonia. We can not be passive and indifferent to the violation of these rights aimed at forcing out the Russian-speaking population. We are determined to do everytning in our power in order to rule out double standards and to protect the rights of our compatriots. Russia will act consistently through international mechanisms and public opinion to guarantee equal rights for all nationalities in Latvia and Estonia. Still, I repeat, we hope that this and other political, military, economic or social problems in our relationships with the Baltic countries will be resolved and mainly by our own joint efforts.

Developments in the ex-USSR countries, and first and foremost those of them who form the Commonwealth of Independant States directly influence the situation in Russia. Making the CIS zone of stability and intense cooperation is the top priority of the Russian foreign policy. We realize it very well that without developing economic and transport ties within the CIS, establishing solid cooperation in the field of defence and border-guarding without settling conflicts and territorial disputes and securing stability all along the post-Soviet space the Russian Federation will not be able to develop in the right direction.

We perceive the CIS as a stricfly voluntary organisation based on the principles of mutuality and equality of rights. Russia pursues the policy of a flexible and multilevel approach to the forms of

organization and functioning of the Commonwealth. This approach in case some of the CIS members are not ready to cooperate in certain fields provides for developing intense cooperation only with the interested countries.

One of the urgent tasks facing the CIS is to enhance the common military-strategic space resting upon the system of collective security. Today we concentrate our efforts on protecting external borders of the Comonwealth. Without that the internal stability of the CIS states will be at serious risk. We also proceed from the vital importance of centralized control over the nuclear weapons on the territory of the Commonwealth.

Realizing its responsibility for the stable and safe development of the entire CIS Russia does in no way intend to turn it into a kind of a reservation of its own. We are ready to cooperate in this respect with any interested country or international organization. Especially in the domain of crisis management. Working out ways and means to settle the existing and prevent potential conflicts we count on the support of the UN, CSCE, EC and others.

I would also like to stress that the CIS is not a new military union as it sometimes is erroneously perceived. It is a regional organization aimed at regulating the most important spheres of cooperation between the member-states and laying the foundations for future development of integration.

To date we have created favourable conditions for regulating economic processes within the CIS including important joint coordination and control mechanisms. An active work is being done

in the humanitarian sphere to bring the level of human and minority rights protection in the CIS closer to the European standards.

Of course, there still are many serious problems to overcome. But we believe that after the first stage of formation the CIS will become an effectual factor of national development of each member-state.

Is South-Eastern Europe making it?

Franz-Lothar Altmann

Although all countries of Eastern Europe[1] have announced their clear intention to set up a market economy, there were great differences in the preconditions for their starts – in the various policy-mixes they adopted, in the progress they have made in achieving the first macroeconomic targets (e.g., economic stabilisation, reduction of budget deficits, slowdown of inflation and so on), and in setting up the new legal and institutional structures which the new market economies need for their functioning.

In 1992 a further widening of the gap between Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union could be observed,[2] but the differences between the individual smaller East European countries also increased as far as their economic performance and their (domestic) political environment were concerned. In particular, a clear difference became apparent between the Central European countries – Poland, Czechoslovakia (now the Czech and the Slovak Republics) and Hungary – on the one side, and the South-East European countries – Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and the countries of former Yugoslavia – on the other. This means in effect that, as the transition proceeds those differences become more pronounced and decisive. This article does not present an analysis of all the relevant aspects of the transition in the former Communist countries, nor does it try to work out any firm conclusions from the various developments; it will merely put forward a few tentative observations.

Different starting points

When in the second half of the 1980s serious reform discussions started in Eastern Europe, individual socialist countries found themselves at very different stages of preparation and development.

First of all, the theoretical foundations for reform discussions had developed quite differently. Hungary and Poland had a long tradition of studying Western economic theory and of discussing alternative concepts for (and within) the existing socialist models – for example, the ideas of competitive socialism by O. Lange, or the original contributions by M. Kalecki and J. Kornai. There were relatively lively exchanges with Western countries, and access to Western economic literature was less restricted in these two reform-open Central European countries than in South-Eastern Europe.

Therefore, the number of possible candidates for filling important positions in the economy or in politics in Hungary or Poland is today much greater than in Albania, Bulgaria or Romania – and of course also in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The fundamental principles of socialism, i.e., the superiority of socialist over private ownership of the means of production, could more easily be questioned in Hungary and Poland (although in Poland the greater part of agriculture has remained in private hands, even in socialist times), and the effectiveness of market mechanisms could implicitly be acknowledged. Demands for decentralisation and for the liberalisation of prices were not such absolute novelties there as they were in Albania or Romania.

The situation in the former East Germany and in Czechoslovakia was more complicated. Ideological positions impeded the

liberalisation of economic thinking, although in those two most developed countries of the former socialist bloc, in particular, a revitalisation of old market traditions should have been easiest. However, in Czechoslovakia through the years – despite strong ideological barriers – many economists could be found who acquired, often at considerable personal cost, a high level of education and knowledge which they were unable to apply in practice because the restrictive political conditions would not allow it.

Lack of earlier discussions as well as the relatively small number of people capable of taking charge of the political and economic responsibilities placed the countries of South-Eastern Europe at a disadvantage once the moment of complete change had come. It turned out to be extremely complicated to develop schemes of systemic transition that would match the specific conditions in the respective countries. This then led to what was in effect the copying of the general transformation programmes prepared – also in a great hurry – by economists in the Central European countries (e.g., the privatisation plan of Szomburg and Klaus), or which were more or less dictated by Western advisers and institutions (stabilisation policies) as a precondition for receiving further financial assistance. We can speak of a Polish, Hungarian or Czech way of transition, but there is no such notion for the countries of the South-Eastern tier, at least not in the sense of a particular 'programme' that could be considered custom-built.

There is another disadvantage for South-Eastern Europe which should be mentioned in this context, although this is even more difficult to quantify and thus also to verify. That is the lack of direct ties between the homeland and the diaspora which, in the case of Poland and Hungary and to a certain extent also of Czechoslovakia, nowadays plays an important role. In particular, Poland and Hungary have, throughout their socialist years, cultivated close relations with their emigrés, and this has produced strong lobbies exerting considerable influence on the attitude of the West towards these two countries. Such lobby assistance is not apparent in the case of Albania, Bulgaria or Romania.

The policy-mix

The policy-mix adopted by the countries in transition consists mainly of two groups of policy measures: stabilisation policies and transition policies proper.

Stabilisation policies were directed towards controlling inflation, which was to a great extent the unavoidable result of price liberalisation, and towards reducing state budget deficits. Both measures were combined with general attempts to establish order in the new monetary system. The results so far have been mixed and differ widely in the region, reflecting to a certain extent also the size of the initial macroeconomic imbalances as well as the nature of individual stabilisation programmes.[3]

Already in 1991 all countries of South-Eastern Europe except Romania registered budget deficits exceeding the target levels which had been set by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and whose attainment was linked to the disbursal of IMF loans. In

Albania, the fiscal situation had deteriorated markedly as early as 1990, when the deficit exceeded 16 per cent of gdp. In 1991 it reached a record high of 34 per cent. For 1992 estimates range from 1.6 per cent for Slovenia (which managed to reduce its relatively small 1991 deficit of 2.6 per cent) to more than 10 per cent for Bulgaria. Albania's estimates for 1992 are not yet available.

In all these countries budget revenues have been consistently overestimated, because fiscal reforms need much more time than anticipated and because the recession has turned out to be much more severe than expected. Not only did enterprise profits fall substantially, but tax evasion became widespread in the new private sector, which in Hungary, and even more in Poland, is rapidly gaining in importance. Budget deficits in the former Yugoslav republics other than Slovenia are large and growing, mainly due to the impact of the war and, in the case of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, the UN sanctions on rump Yugoslavia.

As a more or less expected outcome of price liberalisation, inflation was high throughout Eastern Europe, although again with considerable variations. Whereas in Czechoslovakia and Hungary a slowdown in the rate of inflation can already be observed, developments in South-Eastern Europe are not uniform: Bulgaria's inflation for 1992 is estimated at 80 per cent,[4] which is an improvement over the preceding year (338 per cent), but in Romania consumer prices rose by 210 per cent, compared to 165 per cent in 1991.[5] Of course, high rates of inflation had to be expected also in Croatia and rump Yugoslavia, where annualised rates rose to 1,300 and 22,500 per cent respectively in the third quarter of 1992. In Albania, where some prices were liberalised in November 1991 (those for basic consumer goods have remained under state control), consumer prices had risen by more than 70 per cent by June 1992.[6]

Fiscal and monetary policies were relatively restrictive in all the countries concerned, but the fiscal policies in particular very soon came up against the problems inherited from the old regimes: cuts in subsidies for non-competitive industries (and most of Eastern Europe's industries are not competitive on the world market) plus tight monetary policies, bringing with them large-scale closures of state enterprises where the majority of workers are still employed. With unemployment in Romania at 9.1 per cent (end of 1992) and 16 per cent in Bulgaria (end of October 1992) – to say nothing of Albania, where only very vague estimates vary from 30 to 50 per cent, and war-affected Croatia and rump Yugoslavia (from 16 to 19 per cent) – it is difficult to expect further substantial cuts in state expenditure. The new ruling parties in these countries are afraid of losing the support of their electorates.

Monetary policy was rather tight in all countries, at least in the beginning, but market rates of credit have become too high now for enterprises seeking finance, and banks are reluctant to lend money when profit prospects are dim and securities very often cannot be provided because ownership conditions are still uncertain. In the meantime, inter-enterprise credit has undermined the role of the 'normal' finance system which is controlled by the state's monetary policy. As soon as bankruptcy laws are adopted, the number of enterprises being forced to close will increase rapidly, as the Hungarian example has shown. Therefore some softening of monetary policy could be observed in Bulgaria and also in Albania.

Liberalisation policy was also applied in foreign trade in all these countries. In general, governments resort less and less frequently to formal control of trade flows, which is partly explained by the rapid increase in the number of firms engaged in foreign transactions. Quotas or licensing in exports only exist for fuels and raw materials in Albania and Bulgaria, and for some foodstuffs in Romania. For imports some global quotas are still applied for consumer goods in Albania, whereas only Romania continues to make general use of quotas or licensing for its imports.[7]

Some sort of control of access to foreign exchange still exists in all South-East European countries. At present Slovenia seems to be the most liberal country in this respect, offering not only internal convertibility but being fairly close to full convertibility. Bulgaria uses a limited internal convertibility regime, whereas Romania, which had declared internal convertibility in November 1991, de facto suspended it in May 1992 as a result of the great imbalance between supply and demand of foreign exchange (at present 1:10). Albania and 'Rest-Yugoslavia' (Serbia and Montenegro) have no internal convertibility either but use instead currency auctions to allocate foreign currency to the enterprise sector.

Privatisation – the centre of institutional transformation

Of course, price decontrols, liberalisation of foreign trade activities and new tax laws belong to institutional changes as much as do deregulation of private-sector activities, anti-monopoly legislation and various other changes in the legal field such as, for example, new labour codes or bankruptcy laws. Most attention, however, seems to be devoted to the privatisation of state-owned enterprises.

Compared with the countries of Central Europe, the process of privatisation started later in South-Eastern Europe and is proceeding rather slowly. This holds true mainly for the transformation of the former state- or cooperative-owned enterprises. Setting up private firms became possible in these countries very soon after the political change.

Bulgaria, which at the beginning was rather successful with its monetary stabilisation programme – and therefore also received rather good evaluations from the international organisations – was for some time hampered by the still strong position of the former Communist (now Socialist) Party. Only in the spring of 1992 did restitution laws come into force. They regulate the return of enterprises and property that had been expropriated by the Communists. According to a senior figure in the Dimitrov government (which resigned in November 1992), almost 80 per cent of the properties (houses, shops, warehouses) in the Sofia region earmarked for restitution had been returned by end of September 1992.

Reprivatisation of agricultural land had already been initiated with a new law in spring 1991, but gained momentum only after an amendment of the respective law one year later, when restrictions concerning the number of hectares to be available for restitution had been lifted.[8] By the end of 1992 some 27 per cent of agricultural land had been returned to private owners, according to the Central Statistical Office in Sofia.

More important, however, was the passing of the law on the transformation and privatisation of state-owned and municipality-owned enterprises in April 1992, but not very much has happened so far. By November 1992, only two enterprises had in fact been privatised. In mid-1992 the share of private activities in manufacturing was only 1.3 per cent, whereas the share of private entrepreneurs in retail trade turnover had reached already 41.7 per cent at the same time.

Romania also has lost much time which it could have spent on transforming the economy because of its complex political structure. In contrast to the other former socialist countries, privatisation started with the return of agricultural land on the basis of a law which was adopted by Parliament as early as February 1991. It is said that, by the end of 1992, 82 per cent of agricultural land had been transferred to private ownership, but this 'success figure' must be taken very cautiously.

The law of the privatisation of enterprises was adopted by Parliament at the end of July 1991. It establishes five funds for private property which should administer 30 per cent of the capital stock of some 6,200 state enterprises, representing approximately 55 per cent of the stock value of state enterprises. The remaining 45 per cent (some 330 large firms) belong to the so-called strategic sector and will be kept under state control as self-administrated state enterprises (*régimes autonomes*). So far only some 1.650 smaller industrial units have been privatised, and a new start is planned with a voucher system which is supposed to come into operation later this year. If one believes Romanian official estimates, then about 400,000 registered private firms, employing half a million people, are already responsible for about 40 per cent of retail trade turnover and some 20 per cent of industrial production by employing half a million people. The Statistical Office claims a share of 25 per cent of private activities in Romanian gdp.[9]

Slovenia needed two years of political discussions before Parliament passed a privatisation law just one day before the elections in December 1992. It is a combination of sale and cost-free distribution of socialist property. Problems arose in particular because in Slovenia, according to former all-Yugoslav law, the majority of enterprises was not state- but socially owned, i.e. the employees were the quasi-owners of the enterprises through various self-management organs. By mid-1993 the evaluation and formulation of privatisation programmes of some 2,600 enterprises will have to be elaborated. Privatisation models include internal distribution of shares as well as international tenders, but combinations of different models may be applied as well. Former owners may present their claims, but only within a two-months period. Again a voucher-method version will be the predominant way of privatising public properties.

As in Slovenia, most of the enterprises in *Croatia* were in the sphere of social ownership, which meant that managements were not responsible to the respective ministries but were subject to the control of the Communist Party. Croatia, too, adopted a privatisation law in mid-1992, establishing a Privatisation Agency and a State Development Fund. Until the end of 1992, applications for autonomous privatisations could be submitted by the enterprises themselves, but the war in the second half of 1991, which extended into 1992, hampered privatisation attempts substantially: 3,600 enterprises were foreseen for privatisation, 2,500 submitted their privatisation proposals, but only 88 procedures were concluded. Most of those were smaller units, and 65 were purchased outright by the employees of the firms concerned. Since in Croatia private citizens have very little disposable capital and foreign capital is understandably reluctant to come in, one can expect that the Croatian state, through its Development Fund, will remain the biggest capital owner for the foreseeable future.

As yet no serious privatisation programmes have come to light for Albanian or for the other former Yugoslav republics. Those countries need first of all macroeconomic stabilisation in order to provide the population with the absolute minimum for their survival. Systemic transformation will come later.

Conclusions

In South-Eastern Europe, only Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia can at present be said to be more or less transforming their economic systems. Slovenia, although the last country to enter the transformation path, seems to be taking the lead due probably to relatively few structural problems inherited from the former regime. But the higher level of education and skills in Slovenia, as well as the fact that it borders on Austria and Italy, must also be seen as a likely contributory factor to its development. In general, difficult domestic and also foreign political situations have led to the belated start of the various transformation programmes. This has brought about additional economic problems which have already generated growing reluctance (and sometimes even opposition) among the population to accept radical transformation schemes. One can only hope that the more progressive countries in Central and Eastern Europe – Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary (independent Slovakia is becoming increasingly problematical as far as political and economic transition is concerned) – will soon be able to exhibit the first undisputed positive results to provide some moral backing for transformation politicians in South-Eastern Europe.

NOTES

1. The term 'Eastern Europe' includes all the smaller countries of the former European region of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (MEA) or Comecon, for short.
2. Economic Commission for Europe (ECE). *Economic Bulletin for Europe.* Vol. 44 (1992). p. 26.
3. ECE. *op.cit.*, p. 32.
4. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.* 16 January 1993.
5. *Idem.* 15 February 1993.
6. ECE. *op. cit.*, p. 33.
7. ECE. *op.cit.*, pp. 55 and 57.
8. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung.* 26 November 1992; and *Nachrichten für den Aussenhandel.* 6 June 1992.
9. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.* 15 February 1993.

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NORDIC SECURITY POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR
Paper prepared for the Halki International seminar, ELIAMEP 1993

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Introduction to the Nordic countries
The Scandinavian Peninsula is situated north of continental Western Europe and consists of the kingdoms of Sweden and Norway. This geographical unit forms the core of the region which is referred to as the Nordic area. This area has traditionally, in addition to Sweden and Norway, been understood to include the kingdom of Denmark, and the republics of Finland and Iceland. Until now, the Baltic republics have been excluded from the term due to their occupation by the former Soviet Union. In this paper, The Faeroe Islands and Greenland will not be considered as independent members of the Nordic area, as they are sparsely populated, geographically peripheral, and finally, constitutionally subordinated to Denmark.

The states of the Nordic area share geographical, historical, and linguistic features. After World War II they have all shared the security problems related to being small states in the proximity of a frightening great power, the Soviet Union.
The Nordic states have managed these security problems in different ways, suggested by their differing geographical position relative to the Soviet Union.
Finland accepted an affiliation to the Soviet Union in some fields. This enabled the Finns to pursue a relatively credible security policy, emphasising neutrality in times of international peace as well in times of war.
On the other hand Denmark and Norway chose a commiting membership in NATO, rejecting a late 1940s Swedish proposal for a more non-aligned Nordic defence community.
This left Sweden in a delicate position, squeezed between its close neighbours, which had chose/ been forced to become clients of two external, strongly antagonistic super powers. Sweden`s choice of foreign and security policy orientation would be decisive for which way the political tide in the Nordic area would turn, probably producing serious trouble for the neighbour that had taken the losing affiliation. To avoid this,

Sweden decided to stay neutral, depending on its strong military posture in its own right to lend credibility to this policy.

The result later found expression in the term Nordic Balance: the strong neutral Sweden in the middle, with the Soviet-dominated Finland to its east and Norway the NATO-member, to its west. Until the end of the Cold War, this situation produced a remarkably stable balance-of-power situation in Northern Europe, signaling to the two super powers that they would both be best served by not placing undue strain on any of the countries of the region.

With the end of the Cold war, the super power confrontation is no longer a guideline for choosing political course. The outbreak of peace has allowed the Nordic countries to seek closer ties to Continental Europe, the more natural connection for most of the Nordic countries. This paper will study how the different Nordic countries perceive their security needs after the Cold War, and how they intend to meet these needs in the dramatically changed European political environment.

Sweden

Sweden is the largest of the Nordic countries, in population as well as in territory. Furthermore, it is situated in the centre of the region, bordering Norway to the west, and having excellent access to Finland and Denmark by way of the Bothnic sea to its east.

During the Cold War, Sweden pursued a non-alignment foreign policy, applying its mainly idealistic international efforts on the global level through the United Nations. This non-alignment was dictated by Sweden's desire not to add further tension to the situation in Scandinavia. already delicate due to the Soviet Union's firm grip around Finland, and Denmark and Norway's 1949 decision to join NATO.

The credibility of Sweden's ability to stay neutral during conflicts was supported by its strong military posture. In the 1950s, the Swedish Air Force was comparable to the Royal Air Force in numbers and quality of equipment.

After the Cold War, Sweden has changed from security through neutrality to more active contributions to regional efforts like peacebuilding integration and collective security. Sweden has been pursuing these targets within two dimensions.

The first dimension is the West-European one. The Swedish government has unconditionally applied for membership in the forthcoming European Union, the EU. Sweden hopes that the EU will not develop supranational ambitions beyond the level agreed in the Maastricht Treaty. Sweden wants member states to retain their ultimate sovereignty.

Reflecting this, Sweden wishes to retain at least traces of its neutralist heritage within the EU by advocating that Swedish and Finnish armed forces must remain under national control. This way, these credible but non-offensive war-fighting machines will help to maintain stability in Northern Europe. This is especially important due to the region's proximity to less-than-stable Russia and the newly independent Baltic republics. Sweden is less concerned with possible membership in the Western European Union, which it considers to be too one-sided militarized and too supranational in outlook to be in the interest of broader Swedish security goals. Neither has the WEU proved itself to be a likely successor to NATO.

The second Swedish security dimension is the all-European one, represented by the CSCE. Situated next to Russia, Sweden will always have to give high priority to the interests of its mighty neighbour. This is also a regional responsibility, the Baltic states being even more sensible to Russian decisions than is Sweden. A less ambitious security system, not taking Russian interest into consideration, would not be worth its name, according to Swedish experts, whatever this name might be.

The preferable way to accommodate Russian security interests would be within a framework of common security. Such a framework must by necessity include the United States, as only a massive and formalized US presence can counterbalance the sheer political gravity exercised by Russia on the European Continent.
Thus, a smoothly-functioning CSCE is supposed to create the stable security environment needed to allow the EU to explore its possibilities in the fields of economic and political integration. Such integration is necessary to strengthen the interlocking web between Europe's many nations. Such a web would further reduce the sources of conflict and increase the mutual benefits to be reaped by close and peaceful coexistence.

Besides these European dimensions, Sweden takes a keen interest in improving its relations to the Baltic states. Development of stable relations in the Baltic Sea area is vital to Sweden as the Baltic is its gateway both to Continental Europe and to the Atlantic Ocean. Sweden has traditionally been the local great power in this region, but it does not purport to re-obtain any such position, as it would be hard to see what advantages this would hold for Sweden or for the rest of region.

On the global level, Sweden wishes to continue its policy of substantial and multifaceted support to the UN system. Although Swedish security and development-aid policy will take on a more regionally oriented profile in the years to come, Sweden

will still pursue these goals on the global level, as development on the regional and global level is mutually interdependent. The UN and its sub-organisations will still be recognized as the institutions best suited for promoting these goals globalwide.

Finland

Finland is situated east of the Baltic Sea. To the north, it is connected to its traditional hegemon and western cultural partner, Sweden. To the east, Finland has a long common border with Russia. These two countries have throughout the centuries taken turns in dictating large parts of Finnish politics, especially in the field of foreign relations.

Finnish security policy after World War II was based upon its "Friendship and Cooperation Treaty" with the Soviet Union. The treaty, the final outcome of the wars between these two countries during World War II, specified a neutral status for Finland, but gave allowances for maintenance of traditional, non-military bonds to Sweden and Western Europe. This enforced neutrality served Finland reasonably well during the Cold War, permitting Finland to find itself a position as a semi-Western country, although having to accept the place in the European security architecture the Soviet Union designated for it.

The end of the Cold War has meant that Finland finally can normalize its relations to Russia, treating it more like an ordinary great-power neighbour. This has allowed Finland to start looking for its natural role in the region, subsequently, seeking closer cooperation with Sweden, its natural economic and foreign policy partner.

Due to its more isolated geographical position and historical subordination to its mighty neighbours, Finland has fairly modest aims for its new foreign and security policy.

On the European level, Finland has applied for full membership in the announced European Union. The Finns have their own reasons for wishing closer ties to Europe. These reasons are primarily of an economic character, following the breakdown of Russia as a major trading partner. The security reasons, however, are mainly product of Sweden`s reorientations in the aftermath of the Cold War. As Finnish political interests often mirror those of Sweden, the Swedish EU application was bound to bear consequences also for Finland. Swedish signals of a stronger European commitment mean that lower priority will be given to Nordic cooperative efforts in the future. Downgrading of Nordic cooperation will affect Finland disproportionally more than the other Nordic countries, as these countries already have established their positions within various regional, European, and Atlantic communities. Finland will be left in isolation without admission to firm regional or European institution. With stronger

Nordic institutions becoming an increasingly unlikely possibility, Finland has to follow Sweden to Europe. This will be of great value also to Sweden, as the two countries have congruent interests in a broad range of topics. Sweden will be able to pursuit these interests with greater chance of success if it gets back-up from Finland.

On the more local level, Finland participates in two different regional spheres; the Baltic Sea area and the Arctic area. The Baltic area is the more important of the two. Finland actively supports further development of cooperation among the states bordering on the Baltic. This is easy to comprehend; in relation to the Atlantic-oriented Europe, Finland has been peripheral. With the Baltic Sea as a fulcrum for cooperation on a more regional level, Finland will take on a far more central position. The other sphere is the Nordic/Arctic one. After the release from Russia, Finland would ideally have wanted stronger commitment to foreign and security policy coordination on the Nordic level. This would have facilitated the approach to the EC. This is no longer relevant, but Finland still wishes to maintain the largest possible degree of Nordic cooperation. This is because the Nordic countries still will have to coordinate their politics in many fields, including Arctic questions, where Finland has common interests with Russia and Norway in both using and protecting the vulnerable Arctic nature.

In a long-term perspective, Finland could apply for NATO membership, that is, if the organisation is eventually transformed into a credible all-European collective security system. This cautious approach to NATO reflects Finland`s need to take Russian interests into account at all times. This is even more important to Finland than to Sweden.

Denmark
Denmark is located immediately north of Germany, close to the Baltic approaches. This position has traditionally meant that the Danes have been less preoccupied with Russia than their fellow Scandinavians. Danish security needs are more similar to those classic continental European ones; basically, how to contain German expansion.

Traditionally, Denmark`s foreign policy had four geographical cornerstones: the Nordic countries, Europe, the Atlantic Ocean and the world through the United Nations. Of these, the European and Atlantic dimensions took priority.
Denmark differs from Sweden and Finland in having sought close international cooperation in the fields of economic and security policy. Denmark is the only EC member among the Nordic countries. So far, however, the European dimension has been limited to economic issues, while foreign and security policy has been strictly

allocated to the Atlantic community. Through NATO, Denmark has closely coordinated these matters with Great Britain and the United States. Denmark is a founding member of NATO, as it was obvious that the small northern European countries could not possibly deal with the post-war Soviet threat on their own. Now, with the end of the Cold War, these distinctions have grown increasingly blurred. The European Community is expected to assume an increasingly important role as a forum for coordinating the foreign policy of its members. The Danish government, present at the Maastrich creation, endorsed the development of the Community into an European Union, but it had its reservations towards the agreement on the issue of common foreign and security policy. The Danes want to keep armed forces under national control, a position dictated mainly by the desire to keep security and military matters firmly within the Atlantic dimension. For the same reason, Denmark is not enthusiastic about the WEU, which it perceives as a threat to NATO and to the continuation of US commitments to European security and stability. In this, the Danish position bears a considerable resemblance to that of the governments of Sweden and Finland.

Denmark wants as many Nordic countries as possible to apply for EC/EU membership, to help to counter-balance the increasingly southern Europe-dominated Community. Denmark would gain greater proportional weight if it could coordinate its policies with those of the other Nordic countries inside the Community. These perceptions are shared by Sweden and Finland, which have subsequently applied for membership. These three countries share several important interests, for instance the wish for increased security through retaining overeignty in national security matters. These goals are considered more easily achieved within the community than outside.

Increased Nordic representation in the Community leads to diminished Danish interest in specifically Nordic institutions. As Scandinavia glides closer to the Continent, Nordic cooperation in itself seems less relevant than before. Close Nordic political coordination within the Community, however, is seen as an increasingly attractive option by the Danes. Denmark does not wish a Scandinavia where some countries are Community member and other are not.

Denmark does not share the common Nordic conception of the "Arctic area". To Denmark, the Arctic means Greenland and possibly the Faeroe Islands, a percpective unique to Denmark among the Nordic countries, with the exception of Iceland. Due to Greenland's location, Denmark tends to align more with Iceland and the United States than with Norway and Finland in its High North politics, and it is largely seen isolated from the political developments in Europe.

The Baltic Sea region is important to Denmark. In terms of security, this is perceived as the most unstable area in Northern Europe. As Denmark borders this area as well as the Atlantic area, Denmark fully supports the efforts to develop economic, political and cultural ties between the countries in the region. This is held to be a natural responsibility of Denmark, due to its long historical affiliation to the area and to its countries. Closer ties will contribute to a more stable political situation in the Baltic Sea region. Important as this goal is, it will be subordinated to the efforts on the European level. Baltic stability will primarily be a function of all-European stability. This all-European stability can subsequently be achieved only at the all-European level.

As a curiosity, we may recall that the Danish people finally expressed their very Nordic scepticism to Maastrichtian Europe by rejecting their government's decision to join the EU, in the referendum of June 4, 1992. This "no" came near to derailing the whole European integration process. Indeed, many will say it has never really recovered from this nasty blow, even though the Danes were later lured into the EU by saying "yes" to a special, less committing form of membership.

Norway
Situated west of Sweden, Norway faces the North Atlantic ocean along its entire coastline. This long coast is Norway's most striking feature, shaping Norwegian perceptions of the world and where in the world Norwegians belong. In the high north, Norway borders on Russia.
Norwegian security has been guaranteed by NATO since the foundation in 1949. Indeed, NATO membership has ever since been a cornerstone in Norwegian foreign policy. Norway's ties to continental Europe have been weak compared to those of Sweden and Denmark. This is understandable, for two reasons.
Norway has not been an industrialized trading nation in the Swedish tradition. Norway's main industry was its shipping, facilitated by its long coastline; and shipping is a global and transcontinental industry more than a regional and continental one. Moreover, its position far north has made continental Europe less of an obvious companion to Norway than to the other Nordic countries. The Norwegian people voted no to EC membership in a 1972 referendum.

Norway has trouble in coming to grips with its international position after the Cold War. The NATO affiliation was a comfortable one, as it formalized the ties to Great Britain and the United States, countries to which Norway has traditionally been oriented. The Norwegians could feel their importance within the alliance, as Norway was an important northern flank to Central Europe. With the Cold War gone, Norway

is becoming less and less interesting for its NATO partners, suggesting that Norway will inevitably become more isolated on the northern rim of Europe. This is not wholly unfortunate, as it in a way reflects the peacefulness and stability of Norway's surroundings. NATO is therefore still seen as an adequate security arrangement, although Norway has applied and been accepted as associate member of the WEU. This is mainly an attempt to coordinate security politics with its NATO partners, most of whom place increasing emphasis on the WEU.

These WEU overtures does not reflect any Norwegian desire for European institutions to take over NATO responsibilities. When it comes to security, Norway definitively prefers to leave that to the Atlantic sphere. Continental Europe has traditionally rather been a source for un-security. Norwegians fear German expansionism and Southern Europe catholicism. They said no to EC membership in 1972 and they seem likely to do so again. Subsequently, Norway does not want the EC/EU to take on an increasingly important role in security policy decisions, as these decisions will have consequences for Norway, without Norway being able to influence them.

The Baltic Sea dimension is less important to Norway than to the other countries in the region. Norway's true regional partners are Sweden and Denmark, with which Norway has a long history of close cooperation in various low-politics matters. This cooperation is now entering a difficult phase as Sweden and Denmark grows more and more Europe-oriented.
In the High North, Norway is seeking regional cooperation with Finland and Russia. On the subject of management and preservation efforts of the Arctic nature, Norway's main worry is the risk of nuclear pollution from Russian industry and military installations on the Kola Peninsula. Another High North topic common to Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia are the conditions of the Sami people, a minority group living in an area that straddles national borders
On the global level, Norway like most other small countries, has chosen to direct its idealistic efforts through the UN system.

Iceland
Iceland is situated in the North Atlantic Ocean, midway between the Scandinavian Peninsula and North America. The population descends from Danish and Norwegian emigrants which settled in Iceland during the medieval age. Due to its geographical location, Iceland's security concerns are rather simple: the Soviet Union was the sole threat to Iceland, as control over the North Atlantic would be vital in case of a super power conflict during the Cold War. Also, Iceland's geographic position explains its

importance to NATO. Iceland is an unsinkable aircraft carrier from which one can exercise control over transatlantic shipping communications.

Today, security issues are losing priority to economic issues in European politics. Iceland can no longer cash in on its strategic location. As Continental Europe grows more important, Iceland is becoming increasingly more peripheral and uninteresting to its NATO partners.

Because Iceland's economy is so unilaterally dependent upon the fishing industry, EC membership does not hold any obvious attraction. Iceland prefers continuation or extention of the Nordic countries` existing EFTA agreement with the Community. However, with the other Nordic countries applying for full EC/EU membership, any future Nordic EFTA efforts towards the Community seem increasingly less likely. Moreover, Nordic cooperation has come to emphasise the Baltic as its fulcrum. This further increases the feeling that Icleand is getting marginalized in the new political architecture of Europe. In this situation, it is increasingly tempting for Iceland to look to its western neighbour, the United States, for political cooperation. Iceland already has its own defense agreement with the USA, separate from NATO activities.

Conclusion

After World War II, the Nordic countries were not allowed to seek the close political cooperation which would seem natural, given their long tradition of cooperation. Still, they developed the clever formula of Nordic Balance, which allowed them a rather comfortable position to the north of the Cold War-ridden continent, with a great degree of flexibility on everyday issues. On these lower-level issues, they developed smoothly-functioning cooperations within several fields, suggesting that this cooperation could incorporate higher-politics issues that day the international political ralations allowed them to do so.

This was not to be. Instead, most of the Nordic countries have been increasingly attracted to the established Western European cooperation, where they will be small fish compared to the traditional great powers such as Great Britain, Germany and France. Still, economics-of-scale considerations and a newfound realism concerning Scandinavia's place in the world dictates that the Nordic countries will have to surrender much of their traditional splendid semi-isolation in the North of Europe.

This does not necessarily mean the end of Nordic cooperation. With their close cultural ties, the Nordic countries will still be best served by maintaining close coordination over a wide field of everyday issues. But it does mean that there will probably never be any high-level coordination of foreign and security policy among the Nordic nations in the aftermath of the super power-dominated Cold War.

Suggestions for further reading:
- Mauno Koivisto: "Foreign Policy Standpoints 1982-92, Finland and Europe, Oxford 1992.
- Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1992, ISBN 82-7177-328-3.
"The Nordic countries Foreign and Security Policy in a New Europe".
- Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993, "Principles and Perspective in Danish Foreign Policy".
- Royal Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993, "Sweden`s Foreign and Security Policy in a changing Europe".
- Royal Swedish Ministry of Defence 1992, "The Security and Defence Policy".

Human Rights and Minority Protection in Eastern Europe

It is very difficult for me to write on the theme of human rights and protection of minorities in Eastern Europe – for several reasons.
The first reason is that I do not know to whom my text is addressed. According to my previous experience, the life experiences of those who grew up under a totalitarian regime of Central or Eastern Europe and those who grew up and have been living in the democratic world are so different that it is not possible to ignore it. Because I am writing this article for my colleauges participating on a seminar in Greece, I assume that the majority of its participants did not go through the same experience as we who were born under the governement of the Great, Allmighty and Infallible Communist Party.
I would like to say that this experience was not only a negative one – despite the fact that my generation and the generation of my parents have been deprived of something we can hardly ever recover, i.e. the classical education and the economic status of the people of our age, and only with difficulties we get the feeling which is so natural in the "West", the feeling that freedom is to be taken for granted. It is also the feeling that a number of other things can be taken for granted, such as life and democracy, and the feeling that justice and and law will win in the end. In exchange for this we got a feeling that these aforementioned things are not at all self-evident. We know that for each it is necessary to fight for every bit of these "self-evident" things, and that every small step to appeasement can result in a long and painful fall. We have an ironic feeling that it is necessary to fight for democracy by all, even undemocratic means, because democracy itself and its means can selfdestruct.
Let me now return to the key words from the title of my paper, which was given to me by the kind organizators of this meeting. Let us first concentrate on the elucidation of the following terms:

1. Eastern Europe:

Eastern Europe is today not a georgaphic term but a political one. East Berlin was on the same meridian as Western Berlin and Prague, the former capital of Czechoslovakia, was much more to the west then for example Vienna – not to mention Athens, of course. When we speak about Eastern Europe, we mean these countries, in which the Communists came to power after World War II, or the Soviet Union itself, but in every case under leadership and preparing of Communist Party of Soviet Union. Maybe you think that to mention the term "Eastern Europe" now when in all countries of the previous Communist block have started to build a democratic system of government does not have any sense. I would like to make you understand that "Eastern Europe" and "Western Europe" are not thousands and thousands kilometer apart – they are neighbors, that they intertwine and that "Eastern Europe" can influence the "West" and vice versa.

This intertwining of "Europes" results in the intertwining of problems, which both of them must face. The concept, to which many Western politicians are near (especially some politicians of the "Twelve") - i.e., the concept that the problems of "Eastern Europe" can never reach them, is absolutely false. In the time of the Cold War there were road maps of Europe on which Europe (ended) finished on the borders of the non-Communist world. Beyond these borders, there was only white color and a few important rivers. These maps of the Communist world were well defended and even those who did not draw or accept such maps had to bear it in mind - at least in the form of high taxes for armament expenses. The so-called "ostrich policy" of putting one's head in the sand not to see, which some politicians practice, is absolutely futile. If the so-called "Western Europe" of today refuses to face the problems of the former Communist countries together with them [for instance in the case of former Yugoslavia], these problems will sweep over also to these states, which have had nothing to do with any of the Communist regimes.

2.Rights

When the totalitarian power in former Czechoslovakia started crumbling in November 1989 I was nearly 27. Until the age of 27, my relationship to rights was that of a blind person to colors. He may be aware of their existence, but he can not touch them, he does not understand them and they are something very very distant for him.
To understand the totalitarian state meant to understand the fact that there were NO rights and that this lack of rights is a direct sign of all totalitarian systems. Or, more precisely, all rights do not apply to everyone, and the same is true about duties.
Orwell's definition of power says that power is the ability to cause pain or humiliation to others without any punishment and that the aim of power is power itself. My definition of a totalitarian system is that it is a system, in which members of the ruling strata can break a law without any punishment, although the majority of population is required - quite strictly - to observe these laws.
The totalitarian Communist state is a system of two paralell structures. One, which I call the telephone structure, and the second, which which I call the paragraphs structure. With the help of the phone and on the basis of the "Party's order" was possible to enter at any given time into the sphere of the paragraphs. The power of the paragraphs is not the absolute one - under certain conditions, the common denominator of which is the loyalty to the ruling Communist Party, the person can be put above the law, regardless of his or her crime. Not only this fact itself, but the awareness of this possibility and awareness of the possibility of a shift from the paragraph structure to the telephone one, which could happen at any given time, was extremely damaging for the nation's mentality and led to a nearly total disappearence of its consciousness of law.
    I remember that the seats of the Governement and of the Communist Party were on different banks of (river) the Vltava River in Prague. According to this the "left-bank-calls"[understand: the Governement ones] and the "right-bank-calls" [understand: the

Party's orders] were distinguished. The "left-bank-calls" could be neglected from time to time. The "right-bank-calls" could not be neglected and were usually much more arrogant than the first. The contents of these phonecalls varied: from orders such as who has to be accepted to secondary school or to the University (even if he or she hopelessly fail the exams) to orders who should and who shouldn't receive medications from abroad, on which often the life or health of a certain person depended, or to who would be kicked out from his job and who would advance to a higher position, who would be forgiven bad parking on the sidewalk or murder, or whom to accuse of murder to press him into collaboration with the secret police. The system tried to persuade you that there is NOTHING you can influence, regardless of your will, effort or intelligence, and that ALL depends on the phone staying on the desk of somebody, who is your boss. And there is always someone who is your boss, ~~boss)~~, because you have a duty to work. And if you do not work, your boss is the boss of your jail.

In this atmosphere and with the idea, that the law is a thing which sometimes works and sometimes does not, two generations grew up.

[In the Soviet Union, four.] Let me demonstrate the difference between these people and those who grew up in a state governed by law by the following story: Recently I met one very close collaborator of Nelson Mandela, who lived for many years in Great Britain. He can not understand why the millions and milions of people in Soviet Union, who were sent to Stalinist concentration camps in Siberia in the Thirties, did not appeal to the court. I told him that they did. "So how they could be condemned, when they were innocent?" "Because the courts had orders to condemn them." With this statement our conversation ended hopelessly. He could not understand, how is possible to give an order to the court, while I could not understand how it is possible not to understand such a simple thing as to give an order to somebody, even the court.

3. Human Rights

Human rights were, in fact, first expressed in legal form only in the second half of this century, although the concept itself had existed - mainly in the Christian civilization - for a long time before this period. The codification of human rights was expected to assure equal rights to all people, nations, ethnic and religious groups; in my opinion, however, it achieved something else. Instead of assuring all these groups equal rights and equal treatment it led again to differentiated treatment: ironically, negative discrimination was replaced by so-called positive discrimination. In my opinion, this is a very negative trend. Though I am not an expert on the U.S. Constitution, I feel I must ask: was it really necessary to have a Bill of Rights? Wouldn't it have been enough simply to start interpreting the words of the Declaration of Independence - "We, the people" - as referring to ALL people of the United States, and to enforce strictly such an interpretation? I believe that the basic approach to human rights is to respect CIVIL rights - if these are maintained, then a codification of "human rights" becomes redundant. If a child, as every citizen, has a right to receive education, then this right should be enforced in a way which is acceptable to him or

her, i.e. also with respect to the child's language if he or she belongs to a national minority. Likewise we can try to define - through the concept of civil rights - the right not to be discriminated against in other fields, including job, sex and sexual orientation. I believe it is necessary to return to the period before the U.N. Charter and to try to find a different pathway which could lead to the results we hope for.

4.Minorities

The term "minority" should be discussed in connection with the aforementioned one ("rights") and the followin ("protection"). In fact, just as Eastern Europe can be pretty far to the West, even a "minority" can well be more numerous than the "majority". We should not understand this term as a purely quantitative one - on the contrary, it should reflect minority PARTICIPATION in the decision-making process, a minority STATUS in society. Only from this aspect we can actually consider women a minority, as various feminist movements claim. From such a viewpoint, therefore, the struggle for minority rights should not be disguised by concepts of "human rights", "humanity" or even "charity", and it should be recognized as a struggle for power - mainly economic power - which it actually is. It might seem that it would be hardly in the interest of any majority to grant access to a part of this power to the minority; however, the opposite is true. It is well known that even 1-2 per cent of the population can very seriously destabilise society if they really have no access to any participation on power. By granting a part of the power to the minority, the majority buys the stability of its own society and, simultaneously, it binds the minority to itself by the strongest imaginable bond. This results from the fact that participation on power means participation on responsibility; once the minority assumes responsibility, it is always responsibility for the society as such, not only for the minority itself. Thereby the differences between the interests of the minority and the majority diminish very substantially and the society becomes more homogeneous, notwithstanding its continuing cultural, linguistic, national or other diversity. Our Communist leaders and their ideology refused to grant the majority of the population (the non-Communists), who were socially reduced to a pronouncedly minoritarian status, not only the participation on state power but even the participation on the power through which the individual commands his own destiny. Unfortunately, we have inherited the results of this attitude. After the regime changed, the non-Communists as a former "minority" are encouraged to participate on state power as well as on the power over their own individual lives. This, of course, means also full responsibility for oneself as an individual. As it concerns many practical activities of their everyday lives, the transformation of a non-participating "minority" into a participating majority is one of the most difficult transformations in the minds of the people. One who is suddenly thrust from "minority" to majority status has to learn self-responsibility, to achieve an enterprising spirit and an active approach to life as well as the capacity to form an independent opinion on various matters. The speed of this transformation is crucial for many things,

including the economic success of the country, the stability of society and its development in general.

5. Protection

The protection of rights is one thing which is in short supply in all the post-Communist countries - without exception. It is often being said that these countries have inadequate laws and that their legal system has to be entirely transformed. Despite the fact that there were laws which required changes - for instance the constitutional paragraph about the leading role of the Communist Party - I believe, after two years of work in the Parliament's Committee for Constitution and Law brought to my attention thousands of proposals for amendments of various laws, that it was in fact necessary to change only a few basic ones. The problems of law and legality in post-Communist countries do not result from the nonexistence of laws but from the lack of enforcement. When the first hearing in court comes six months, a year or even two years after you have filed suit, you can hardly speak about a state governed by law. The same applies to the fact that the state prosecutor fails to prosecute evident crimes, that a large proportion of crimes are never solved and that to register a private enterprise you have to wait three quarters of a year - unless a handy bribe gets you the registration in a week, of course. Unfortunately, all of the aforementioned things happen not only in the Czech Republic, but also in Slovakia, and - as I have been told by the Chairman of the Russian Union of Private Enterpreneurs - they are among the plagues of contemporary Russia. Therefore the issue of "protection of righ_ts" is actually a much broader, and perhaps even more important one: the protection of the law. If this does not exist, then can be no protection of rights, and without both there can hardly be justice. Unfortunately, we will probably have to wait for both in the post-Communist countries for quite a long while.

The second reason, why it is difficult for me to write about this particular theme, is that it demands that I speak about Eastern Europe as a whole. It is, however, a serious error to treat Eastern Europe (or the post-Communist part of Europe, as I have said in the beginning) as if it were a homogeneous entity; in fact, it is one of the favorite absurd errors of so-called Western politicians. Forty years, or even seventy-five, represent a time span far too short for various states and nations to change fundamentally and become very close to each other. The only thing which they shared was the totalitarian form of government in this period ; once they got rid of it, the history of each nation took its own course, often in accordance with its original historic tradition. Russia and Hungary have less in common than Greece and Norway, and even the Czech Republic differs quite substantially from Slovakia, while of course, the attitudes of these two countries are extremely different from those of, say, Kazakhstan. The differences concern, of course, also the issue of the protection of human rights and minorities. I believe that two important factors contribute to the actual treatment of minorities (in this case I am focusing on national minorities): First, the degree of self-identification achieved by the nation which constitutes the majority in that particular state. It is the curse of the 20th century that the state is

often identified with the nation, and that the term "state" itself is automatically understood as a "national state", not as one defined by its territory. Around the 11th century, European law had overcome the concept of the "personality of law" as a major and decisive criterion of the individual's status, and the territorial concept of law was introduced - i.e., the idea that the individual's status depends on the law which is valid on the given territory. The French Revolution revoked the devil of "personality" back from the darkness of the Middle Ages in the form of the "personality" of the nation. The results were soon to be seen. In 1848 Europe was struck by the first wave of revolts which we may describe as national ones, and the second half of the 19th century is full of various political and military struggles in the name of nations. The 20th century added tens of millions of casualties in two world wars, which were waged in the names of nations. It will be the task of the 21st century to send the devil of nationalism (and therefore also of national minorities and their special status) back where he belongs, i.e., to the dark times of the early Middle Ages. The treatment of minorities depends on the degree to which the majority nation feels threatened (or not threatened) in its own identity. Relatively young nations, which have to build their own postion and have a difficult time searching for their history and self-identification, often find it hard even to acknowledge the presence of minorities, not to spaek about the existence of their rights. They find the acceptance of such a minority and a guarantee of its rights as a threat to their own na

tional identity and rights. We can see many examples of such relationships throughout the former Communist empire, for instance the way the Slovaks and their state relate to Hungarians, the Azerbaijanis to Armenians, the Czechs to Romanies, the Estonians to Russians etc. The second factor which determines the behavior of national states towards their own minorities is the "superpower self-image" of the majority populations. In this respect, we can divide nations in three groups: 1) those whose states actually became superpowers (Russia) 2) those who have a "superpower image" of themselves and consider themselves a "great nation" (the Hungarians, Armenians, Poles, Bulgarians and Serbs) 3) those who never aspired to a superpower role and such a notion makes no sense for them (Czechs, Slovaks, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Rumanians, Slovenians) It is interesting that this inner feeling and self-identification does not correlate with the nation's population or the size of its territory. However, the image of oneself together with the degree of self-identification are still THE basic factors which determine the treatment of national minorities (and perhaps of other minorities as well).

From what I already said it should be obvious that to write on this issue and try to make statements about the whole of East Europe would be almost impossible - and also irresponsible. In every East Bloc country the protection of national minorities took its own course and achieved different legislative forms. Generalizations could hardly be of any value; therefore I sould like to add only one short observation on the situation in our country. Although national minorities, at least, were protected by the constitutional law No 144/1968, which granted them a right

for an independent development of their culture, language etc., we can hardly speak about a protection of human rights in this respect. As I have already said, human rights can be protected only in a society which respects civil rights, and such a respect was hopelessly lacking in the Communist society. Moreover, the law granted rights only to some national minorities - according to its own decision. In our case, these minorities were the Germans, Hungarians, Poles and Ukrainians. However, the Romanies were simply ignored, as were the Ruthenians, who were forcibly assimilated to be Ukrainians. Also other, non-traditional minorities were ignored, for instance the Greeks, of whom tens of thousands arrived after World War II. Only in January 1991 the concept of human rights was extended beyond the rights of minorities when the Federal Assembly accepted the Declaration of basic human rights and freedoms. However, this is a typical example of a "positivistic" legal norm which declares a lot of things but has no connection to the laws of lesser legal force which would include not only dispositions but (above all) the necessary sanctions. To reach a conclusion about the current conditions of minority and human rights protection in the Czech Republic, I must state, unfortunately, that the legal guarantees do not function and are not being used. Moreover, the awareness of our citizens about the necessity to respect human rights can be described as nonexistent. Our current post-Communist society, including the Government itself, is oriented almost exclusively towards economic goals. Human rights are conceived of as being something foreign, created by half-crazy "Westerners" (and above all by Americans) who need an excuse not to accept the Czech Republic into the European Community, or else not to give it some material help. It will be a task of the following decades to change this entirely misplaced conviction of both our public and our Government.

MINORITY RIGHTS AND SECURITY IN THE BALKANS

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Introduction

There are two aspects of the minority problem in international politics today: the question of providing protection for minorities and the security concerns of the states or the different segments within the states. These two aspects are closely linked. Each of them, however, is an expression of a different attitude towards the problem of minorities. On the one hand, the notion of providing protection for minority rights is an emanation of the idealistic approach to international relations, assuming the priority of morality and law in international politics. On the other hand, the idea of the priority of the security concerns in the policies of the states reflects the realists' vision of the world: a world in which there is no common government to impose norms of morality but international politics is governed by the balance of power among the different states, which have one goal: assuming more power and improving their security in any single sphere of political life.

I. Minority Rights

The idea about minority rights protection has passed through several stages.

It dates back to medieval Europe where religious minorities were a major concern and a number of international treaties granted protection to such minorities. The reasons why religious minorities in particular were given such attention was the primordial role of religion in the medieval society and psychology and the contradiction between the appeal to tolerance of all major religions and the appalling practices of religious persecution. The Balkan society at that stage (15th-19th centuries A.D.) was based on the Ottoman "millet" system where the minority religions had an inferior but autonomous status. International protection of the inferior religious minorities was imposed on the declining Turkish Muslim power in the 18th and 19th century. Through the treaty of Kücuk Kajnardja from 1774 Russia received the right to protect the Orthodox population in the Ottoman Empire. Similar concessions for the protection of all Christians in the Empire received France

after its interference to protect the Lebanese Maronite Christians after the massacres in the 1860s. In addition, the Great Powers raised as a precondition for the recognition of the independence of Greece in 1829-30 and of Rumania and Bulgaria in 1878 the guarantees for the protection of the rights of the Muslim minorities in the respective countries.

The second stage, influenced by the French Revolution (1789) and the American independence (1776), was marked by the advent of nationalism. International protection for national minorities was first introduced by the Vienna Congress of 1815 with regard to the Poles, divided between Russia, Austria and Prussia. The plight of the Balkan peoples was at the centre of European politics in the 19th century. In fact the first infringement on the principle of the "legitimacy" of the European rulers (including the Sultan) over all their territories was the international support for the struggle of the Greek people for national independence in 1829-30. Similar support for the national minorities in the Balkans was discussed at the international conferences at the time of the Balkan crises in 1876-78 and 1903. A series of wars was waged by the young Balkan states for the liberation of their co-nationals still living in Turkey, such as the Serbian-Turkish war of 1876 and the Greek-Turkish war of 1893. The most successful, however, was the First Balkan war of 1912-13. In the following events, however, security concerns took over the minority protection. In the partition of Macedonia Serbia's drive to an outlet to the sea was quite important. In Greece during the Balkan wars the opposition criticized the idea of Venizelos, taking account of the security "geographical factor", to create more "rounded" and secure boundaries to the north, where an alien population would always create tensions, including inter-state tensions in the Balkans,[1] while abandoning the compact masses of Greek population in Asia Minor which could only be protected with the aid of the

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[1] see INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION TO INQUIRE INTO THE CAUSES AND CONDUCT OF THE BALKAN WARS. CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE. Report of the Commission, Washington 1914, p.196.

neighbouring Christian Orthodox states. Denying national identity and forceful change of this identity were typical policies in during and after the Balkan Wars in the recently acquired territories: the Novi Pazar Sandjak; Old Serbia (Kosovo); Macedonia; Thrace and Dobrudja.[2] The Treaty of Bucharest of 1913 left large minority populations in different Balkan states. The vague provisions for minority education and religious rights were absolutely ignored.[3] Thus the minorities in the Balkans, under the pressure of the overwhelming nationalism in the Balkan states, lead to the elimination even of the inferior but autonomous status in the Ottoman Empire.

The outcome of World War I forged a new approach to minority rights as rights of collectivities. This process felt the influence of a person: the US President W.Wilson (himself a professor of political science with quite idealistic, in the good sense of the word, views on the possibilities for better inter-ethnic relations in Europe) and a movement: the socialist and communist propaganda for cultural autonomy of any single minority. The territorial arrangements of the Paris conference in 1920 were advertised as solving the national question in Eastern Europe by giving a state to each nation. Nevertheless, they were to a large extent meant to satisfy the security concerns of the winning coalition and especially of France by enforcing the potentially anti-German states in Eastern Europe. Such states as Romanian, Greece and what later became Yugoslavia received territories with heterogeneous population. For the protection of these new minorities the Versailles minority treaty system and the mechanism for reviewing pleas and petitions of minorities at the League of Nations were demised. Such minority treaties were signed by Rumania, Yugoslavia and Greece. This system of minority protection was completed at the Lausanne Treaty (art.38-44) and the Convention of Lausanne from 30

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[2] ibid., pp.55, 148, 197.

[3] see HELMREICH, E. The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars, Cambridge, 1938, p.395 and Le Traité de Paix de Bucharest, Bucharest, 1913, p.53.

January 1923 signed after the end of the Greco-Turkish war and which envisaged population exchange and the protection of the remaining Muslim minority in Western Thrace and Greek minority in Istanbul and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos. Pleas and petitions from the Hungarian minority in Romanian, the Greek minority in Albania and the Bulgarian minorities in Greece and Yugoslavia were gathered in the archives of the League of Nations without any effect. This lead to the conclusion that other practices with respect to minorities should be adopted and the example of the Greek-Turkish population exchange was followed by new agreements of the same type, such as the Greek-Bulgarian agreement on population exchange Mollof-Kafandaris from 1926 when Bulgarians living in Greek Macedonia and Western Thrace left for Bulgaria. Such an arrangement was envisaged by the Krayova Treaty from 1940 for the exchange of the Bulgarians living in Northern Dobrudja (in Romanian) and the Rumanians living in Southern Dobrudja (in Bulgaria). The international documents of the inter-war era in Europe, such as the advisory opinions of the Permanent Court of International Justice from 31 July 1930 (on the emigration of Greco-Bulgarian communities) and from 6 April 1935 (on the minority schools in Albania), also bore the major feature of this period: they regarded minority rights as collective rights.

The League of Nations system for minority protection did not work for two reasons: the unwillingness of the states parties of the minority treaty system to fulfil their obligations (Romanian even officially left this system in the 1930s) and the practice of the Nazi regime to use its minorities abroad for conquering whole countries. This lead to a change of the attitude to minority rights after World War II on a new, fourth, stage. After 1945 the notion of minority rights crystallized as one of the "rights of persons belonging to minorities". The major international instruments of the post-war period, adopted by the UN, the CSCE, the Council of Europe, etc. were built on the perception of minority rights as individual rights. During the Cold War period there was a tacit consensus between the East and the West that minority issues should

not be given much attention and minority rights should be treated as individual rights. There was only one state from the Balkans that tended to regard minority rights as collective rights for its own purposes and defended this position at all fora for reasons that we shall see below. This state was Yugoslavia and the cited position frightened even Serbia's traditional allies: Romanian and Greece. Governments from both blocs feared threats to the stability of their states coming from the minority problems. The reactions of Greece and Bulgaria (one was member of NATO, while the other of the Warsaw Pact at that time) to the first [Yugoslav] draft of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to Minorities from 1978 were quite indicative. Greece openly opposed the declaration (claiming that it will cause even more problems for the states, the minorities and their members) because in fact it saw in the Yugoslav position a danger for itself and its own position on Macedonia. Bulgaria, while approving the idea of a declaration on minorities, stuck to the idea of the socialist countries at that time that this declaration should not go beyond the provisions of the Charter of the UN, article 27, and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination[4].

The Yugoslav diplomacy was very active in the field of minority rights. In the UN Commission for Human Rights it proposed the draft-declaration on the rights of minorities and was the most active participant in the 15 year drafting process. Yugoslav diplomats as Mr.Ivan Tosevski, Mr.A.Bozovic and Mrs.Zagorka Ilic have presided over the working group on the draft-declaration. There were two reasons for the Yugoslav activity on the issue of minorities, very well indicated by B.Vukas in his article "Le projet de déclaration sur les droits des personnes appartenants à des minorités nationales, ethniques, religieuses et linguistiques"[5].

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[4]see VUKAS, Budislav: "La proposition yugoslave d'une Déclaration sur les droits des minorités nationales, ethniques, religieuses et linguistiques", in Annuaire français de droit international, vol.XXV, 1979, p.285.

[5]see ibid.

The first reason was that the national minorities constituted a large part of the population of Yugoslavia and B.Vukas stated that "*leur égalité au sein de la société yugoslave est garantie par l'organisation sociopolitique et le système juridique de la République socialiste fédérative de Yougoslavie*"[6]. After World War II Yugoslavia, after a period of national discrimination, tried to achieve a *modus vivendi* among the different nations, following the Soviet pattern of creating different levels of autonomous units for the different ethnic groups. This system worked in the centralized Yugoslav federation but this was not a clear consociational democracy with a grand coalition of all segments because it was enhancing most and not all ethnic elements only on the level of one segment in the ideological cleavage: the local elites, related to the communist nomenclatura. In fact Tito, himself a Croat, wanted to diminish the dominance of the Serbian element in Yugoslavia and this is why he advocated the creation of the federal system where some new nations were created - the Muslims of Bosnia, the Macedonians and the Montenegrins. By constitution in Yugoslavia there were 6 nations (all of them Slavonic) entitled to a separate republic in the federation. All the other ethnic groups were regarded as "nationalities" or minorities. Following this logic Bosnia was often conceived as a state of the "Muslim nation" (less than 50% of the population of the republic) after the demise of this nation in 1967. This logic only increased the will of the "nationalities" to acquire the status of a "nation" and a separate state.

The second reason why Yugoslavia was so active, according to Vukas, is that numerous minorities belonging ("*appartenant*") to the Yugoslav peoples live beyond the boundaries of Yugoslavia. He cited two such minorities - the Slovenes in Italy and the Macedonians in several neighbouring states. Yugoslavia hosted two UN seminars on minorities and it was not by chance that they were held in

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[6] ibid, p.284.

Ljubljana (8-21 June 1965) and in Ohrid, Macedonia (July 1974). In football it is said that attack is the best defence. Yugoslavs, who are good in football, adopted the same policy in diplomacy, concerning minority issues. The Yugoslav government sought a security solution for the internal ethnic tensions in redirecting the national aspirations of the local populations towards neighbouring countries. In fact, while very active on the issue of minority protection, Yugoslavia always stressed on the necessity to abide by the principle of territorial integrity of the states, thus caring for its own security problems.

Both of these two reasons required the interpretation of minority rights as collective rights. Minorities in the neighbouring countries had to be regarded as collectivities and the different ethnic groups in the Yugoslavia, entitled to different forms of autonomy had to be regarded as collectivities as well. Nevertheless, despite the active position of Yugoslavia in the process of drafting the CSCE Final Act of Helsinki and the UN Declaration on minority rights, its diplomacy remained in isolation on the issue of minority rights as collective rights and everywhere they were conceived as individual rights.

After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Yugoslavia it is still difficult to say whether the concept of minority rights as individual rights has become universally valid. In fact activists of other minorities in the Balkans, such as some Turkish minority leaders in Bulgaria, claim that minority rights are essentially collective rights. This position is still frightening government officials in the Balkans with the ghost of possible secessionist demands. The concept of minority rights is in a process of reassessment now and universally valid principles for their guarantees are not yet demised though increasingly necessary.

II. Security Concerns

The minority related security concerns in the Balkans stem from the complicated historical heritage of the peninsula: the

peculiar political culture of the Balkans, combining Occidental with Oriental features; as well as the delayed development of the European type of political structures in the region. These two elements implied the development of nationalistic excesses in the Balkans both in the past and now.

The first problem related to security is the problem of giving a definition of minority. There is no unanimity among scholars on the definition. The attempts to elaborate one have demonstrated difficulties emanating from the strong political meaning with which the term "minority" is charged. If one state may accept a given definition others will reject it as dangerous for their security. The politicization of the definition of minorities is especially strong in the Balkans. In addition, the UN has declared "the right of peoples to self-determination" without having defined the term "people" which is confused with minority. The UN experts claim that they analyze different parts of the concept "minority", taken from the historical reality, in order to put them together and reach a definitive concept. The problem is that they never come out with a final definition because they fear political implications.

The general concept of minority is of a national or ethnic, religious or linguistic non-dominant group in the state whose citizens its members are; which is distinct from the rest of the population and wishes to preserve its distinct characteristics in a sense of solidarity; a group which is expected to continue to live in the existing state; which may or may not be in conflict with the ruling community, though conflictuality is often considered as part of the concept of minority. These elements persist in the definitions proposed by Andrysek, Capotorti, Deschênes[7], and the unofficial draft convention of the European Commission for Democracy through Law.

The roots of the dispute are not merely academic but also political. The UN, caring about the security of the states, adopted a statist approach to the problem of minorities. The multiplication

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[7] for these definitions see UN document E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/37, p.10-12, para.47-53.

of different categories of minorities could only complicate the
issue of the stability of the states. Some UN experts exclude
groups in complicated political situations, such as those of
Lebanon, from the definition, just because there is no well
pronounced dominating majority. In fact these UN experts just want
to make their task of providing protection for minorities easier.
The issue of <u>territorial integrity</u>, as a central concern in state
security, is emphasized by some governments and experts as an
important element of the definition of minorities.

There are <u>subjective and objective criteria for defining a
minority</u> and only a reasonable mix of the two may satisfactorily
characterize a minority without going to extremes. Many authors,
however, prefer the subjective approach[8]: defining a minority
through the common desire of its members to be distinguished from
the rest of the population. The risk is that the political
ambitions of internal or external actors (such as a foreign state
or the government of a multi-national state) may overestimate the
will of the members of a group to be distinct or they may merely
create artificial entities stimulating division and mistrust among
people. A Yugoslav representative stated at the UN that "the
'subjective factor' is dependent on the political atmosphere and
the cultural and social circumstances... in which the members of
minorities live and work" and their "indifference" is a consequence
of these circumstances[9]. In this statement crystallize both the
possibility for political influence on the self-identification and
the Yugoslav notion of carving distinctions among groups of people.
The objective approach implies common past experience or political,

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[8]see for example PACKER, John. "On the Definition of Minorities" in <u>The Protection of Ethnic and Linguistic
Minorities in Europe</u>, ed.by John Packer and Kristian Myntti, Institute for Human Rights - Abo Akademi University,
200p.

[9]CAPOTORTI, Francesco. <u>Study on the Rights of Persons belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic
Minorities</u>, Human Rights Study Series No.5, United Nations, New York, 1991, p.9.

educational or confessional demands. Some authors[10] give priority to the classification of minorities, based on objective criteria: geographical concentration, homogeneity or origin (emigration, transfer of territory or a conquest). Overestimation of the historical facts without considering the state of mind of the minority members today, may mislead the assessments of the minority's desires and problems. Conflictuality also often constitutes an element of the definition, despite some situations of good coexistence.

Some minorities are called by different names, such as the name Rum for the Greeks in Turkey: a name which denotes in Turkish any Orthodox Christian in the Ottoman Empire and comes from the name "Roman Empire", denoting the Byzantine or the Eastern Roman Empire.[11]

Ethnic or national minorities are sometimes qualified by the corresponding governments as "religious communities" for purposes of state security. This was the case with the Bulgarian Turks during the last years of the communist regime. Similar attitude exists in Greece towards the Turks and Bulgarian speaking Pomaks, officially called merely "Muslims". Thus they are dissociated from their compatriots abroad and all the Orthodox Christian population of the country is represented as Greek, including the Slavonic and Albanian speakers to the north.

The processes of democratization in Eastern Europe unleashed new problems of minorities in the Balkans. The Balkan societies are highly heterogeneous in an ethnic, religious or linguistic sense. The particular circumstances, however, differ a lot from country to country. If Bosnia-Herzegovina is clearly a plural society of the three constitutive communities with approximately equal strength

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[10] see for example the reports of the UN Special Rapporteur on minorities prof. Eide to the Commission on Human Rights: UN documents E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/43 from 24 June 1991, and add. 1,2 and E/CN.4/Sub.2/1992/37 from 1 July 1992 and add. 1,2.

[11] See HELSINKI WATCH. Denying Human Rights and Ethnic Identity. The Greeks of Turkey. Human Rights Watch,, New York, 1992, p.24-25.

(43.7% Muslims, 31.3% Serbs, 17.3% Croats) who live interspersed, Serbia and Croatia are on the other extreme where a strongly dichotomous situation exists opposing a strong majority consolidated in the state power and a significant minority (the Albanians of Kosovo and the Croatian Serbs respectively) living in a compact mass. Albania and to a lower extent Bulgaria, Romania and Greece are close to the second situation but the minorities there are scattered and mixed with the majority population in different regions. The dichotomy here is not so strongly expressed also because there are several minorities in these countries and the major cleavages Bulgarians-Turks, Albanians-Greeks, Rumanians-Hungarians are not the only ones. In Bulgaria, in addition to the Turkish and Hungarian minorities, there exist a Gypsy minorities which are at least as large as the first ones: there are 8% Turks and at least 8% Gypsies in Bulgaria. Nevertheless, the Gypsies are not so consolidated and do not have compatriots constituting an influential neighbouring state. This means that the Gypsy minorities do not represent the same danger for the national security of the respective states and are not given the same attention. Nevertheless, the increasing number of the Gypsies and their peculiar way of life are starting to occupy the minds of the policy makers in the Balkans.

The Macedonian society is somewhere between the two basic types of the societies above. With a majority of 65% and minorities of 21.7% Albanians, 3.8% Turks, 2.6% Gypsies, 2.1% Serbs and 0.4% Vlachs (according to the official census of 1991) Macedonia is more plural than Bulgaria, Greece and Rumania. This is the reason why the Macedonian government now has no choice but guaranteeing a variety of rights to its minorities.

There exist different policies for finding solutions for the political problems of divided plural societies. Lijphart cites three types of such solutions, all of them attempted in the Balkan

states.[12] These are:

1) reducing the plural character of the society through assimilation of certain segments;

2) consociational methods through achieving a grand coalition of the leaders of the major segments in the society, effective mutual veto, proportionality of representation, appointments and fund allocation. Consociational methods are most suitable for plural societies with many segments;

3) reducing pluralism by dividing the state into several separate and more homogeneous states.

The first solution was attempted in Rumania and Bulgaria during the communist regimes, in Yugoslavia between the two wars and at certain stages in Turkey and in Greece after 1913. The second approach, although inconsistently, was used in Yugoslavia after World War II. Consociationalism in Yugoslavia was demised as a separation of the different segments of the society, in order to reduce the possibility for conflict. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the Yugoslav consociationalism was not constructed on an entirely democratic basis. In fact this was consociationalism of the elites which were by no means insignificant because about 10% of the Yugoslav citizens were members of the Yugoslav Communist Party and a large part of the intelligentsia embraced the Yugoslav idea. On the other hand the dissident trends, including nationalists and religious activists was left aside and even oppressed, something that was clearly illustrated by the events of the last several years. The third solution was adopted twice in the history of the Balkans: during the liberation of the Balkan states from the Turkish domination and during the breakdown of the Yugoslav federation.

Consociational democracy is by definition a solution for the political problems of divided plural societies with several and not only two segments. Such a society today is the Bosnian one but the

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[12] see LIJPHART, Arend. Democracy in Plural Societies. A Comparative Exploration, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1980, pp.44-45.

possibilities for achieving a grand coalition of the leaders of the three segments are bleak. Consociational methods, proportional representation and grand coalition on different levels were at several occasions tested as peaceful solutions for divided societies in Western Europe. This shows that such solutions can be sought for the Balkans as well and especially for finding forms of proportional representation of the minorities thus reducing the possibility for their resentment.

The fate of the strictly dichotomous states Serbia (the FRY) and Croatia is not yet decided. Consociational methods (autonomy) are rejected by both the minorities (Albanians and Serbs respectively) who demand secession and by the majorities (Serbs and Croats respectively) who want to maintain their unitary states, fearing that autonomy will lead to secession. Croatia has significant security concerns in this sense. The secession of the Serbian populated region of Knin in Croatia may lead to the division of its territory into two thus nourishing an eventual reemergence of Italian claims on the region where a large number of the population enjoying the Croatian law for granting double citizenship accepted a second Italian one.

Conclusion

This short essay does not have the ambition to give a full record or list of the situation of all minorities in the Balkans nor to propose remedies for the complicated minority problems in the area. The only ambition of this paper is to show that the issue of minority protection in the Balkans is to a large extent subordinate to the security concerns of the state. The guarantees for the rights of minorities, by virtue of the historical experience of the region, are not considered to be benevolent for increasing the unity and the stability of the states. Oppression against minorities is not regarded as alienating this part of the population from the rest of it but rather as a sole solution of the problem of providing the security of the state. In order to find democratic solutions for the minority problems this unilateral link

between minority rights and security should be reassessed and guarantees should be demised for the basic minority rights: the rights to proportional representation; the right to the development of the cultural and religious specifics of the minorities as segments of a consociational democracy.

More attention should be given to the possibility of providing a system of collective security in the Balkans, which would reduce the danger of large scale ethnic conflicts. The security concerns related to the minority problems in the Balkans represent a situation of a typical "prisoner's dilemma" with multiple players. Should everyone cooperate in providing security and guarantees for both the minorities and the majorities, there would not be any reason for policies of oppression and costly security measures against the minorities. A system of collective security cannot be effective unless it contains a set of principles guaranteeing the rights of minorities and we should hope that the world politics is moving in the direction of adopting such generally recognized principles on the rights of minorities.

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CSCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A NEW IDEOLOGY ?

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To sum up, the basic characteristics of the modern individual are being self referential, manipulated by "the mediatic power", having lost ethical concerns, being indifferent towards what is unjust and evil, and having been perceived by "the individual freedom discourse".

The passifism of the international community arises from the uncertainities appearing in the last decade. Although, the world peoples were saved from tyhe bipolar headquartes of wodka - Cola, they were dragged into chaos in many terms; regional wars, ethnic discrimination, terror, religious fundamentalism, economic depression and etc.

The term, "the new world order" is, actually, the definition of an indefinite position. Time after time, it is obviously seen that the new world order does not differ from the former world order in may terms; power politics is still alive, ethnic discrimination is gaining extra momentum, state system still prevents the international organizations to find urgent solutions to the ongoing problems...

CSCE, rather than the United Nations, seems the international organization of the post-cold war era, as the

League of Nations was of the inter bellum period, and the United Nations was of the post-war period.

CSCE describes itself as "the Community of Values". The term, "community of values" especially concentrates on human dimention and human rights. Thus, it seems that, yet the most important function of the CSCE should be to open a way for the individual states to discuss about the human rights, and about re-constituting ethical values.

CSCE tries to universalize the following concepts; respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy, rule of law, economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility. Thus, CSCE has a vital role in the world in which almost all the universal ethical norms are lost.

The term "human rihts" nowadays has a widespread use. Hence, the political discourse of "human rigts" could be interpreted as a new ideology to manipulate the masses and international community. In order to be able to make a distinction between "human rights" and former macro ideologies, the promises of "human rights" discourse should be actualized. The only way to do this is to legalize CSCE in domestic laws, and to give a supra-national structure to the CSCE.

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SLOVENIA AND THE DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA

The goal of this paper is to discuss the basic factors which contributed to the Yugoslavia's instability and her final breakdown as well as the position of Slovenia in this disintegration process.

1. The nature of the Yugoslav crisis

The second Yugoslavia (faunded in 1943-1945) had existed within her post-1945 borders and with all founding republics for about 46 years. The Yugoslav federal state was based on the common but also dividing experience of the National Liberation War (1941-1945) as well as an authoritarian system of government which was in some important respects copied the Soviet model of national integration. Like their Soviet "brothers" the Yugoslav communists believed that the communist revolution resolved the national question in Yugoslavia once and far all. This is why they initially did not build into the Yugoslav federal system effective instruments for national conflict prevention and resolution[1].

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[1] A.Bebler, The Armed Conflicts on the Balkans in 1990-93: Social, Economic and Political underpinnings and the International Extraregional framework. The paper was presented on the "International Conference on Armed Conflicts in the Balkans and European Security" in Ljubljana/Slovenia, from 20th-22nd April, 1993.

The Yugoslav socio-political model established after the Second World War based on Marxist theory and ideology of the ruling Communist Party has been in 1948 altered from a strict stalinist one to a model of socialist self-management which was supposed to make the implementation of socialist and democratic ideas possible.

But this model did not live up to its expectations. Self-management socialism has remained an unachieved ideal while in practice the old, ossified political system with strong state centralism and political monopartism prevailed. In other words, the highest party-state organs have maintained the above mentioned model for 45 years tolerating only "innocent" corrections and adaptations. Moreover, the authoritarian system (with the professional communist party apparatus, secret police and the professional military as the main vehicles of power) prevented timely and thorough connections of the flows in the second Yugoslavia's initial design and her destabilizing economic, social and other policies. The result was the delegitimation of constitutional order and the accumulation of problems. This created a heavy overload in a critical moment when the federal state lacked strong and widely respected leadership in the early 1980's[2].

The great changes in Europe in the last few years and social changes in Yugoslavia caused the neccesity for initiating political pluralism, parliamentary democracy, human rights, market economy etc. within Yugoslav society. The implementation of these principles and values was hindered by the federal socialist politocracy which did not want to give up its ruling monopolistic position in the society. The Yugoslav federal politocracy in linkage with the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) has threatened with an intervention whenever there was any activities to change the existing state (status uo). Three things are worth noting: first, the destruction of the myth about a harmonious community of nations and minorities and their melting into "Yugoslav non-conflict community" created after the Second World War;

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[2] A.Bebler, ibidem.

- secondly, unilateral decision on the integration of both constitutionally founded Autonomous Provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina) passed by the Serbian parliament. This abolition of Kosovo's political autonomy (in 1987-1989) under the threat of the federal army's tanks, constituted the first gross violation of the Yugoslav constitutional order since Tito's death.

And thirdly, the first democratic elections after the War II. in Slovenia (1990), which were followed by the rest of Yugoslav Republics (Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro). At this point the Yugoslav Republics had their historic chance to define their political identity, interests, values and to decide how they were prepared to live either in the frame of Yugoslav confederation, federation or independently as a separate sovereign state.

These events caused the outbrake of a violent information-propaganda war among the newly elected politocracies in individual republics as well as they were preceeded by growing political tensions between the following two political, ideological and national groupings: the first one was the centralist coalition which encompassed the YPA high command, the federal government, the Serbian government and its allies as well as the majorities among the Serbian communities in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The second was the anti-centralist coalition represented by the most political parties and the newly elected governments in Slovenia and Croatia as well as same parties in Bosnia, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Vojvodina. The latter group had been ideologically and nationally too heterogeneous to become an effective anti-coalition. On the contrary, the centralist coalition has largely relied an the federal army (YPA), the federal interior security apparatus, other federal powers, its control of the national bank - its printing presses and hard currency reserves, on considerable external political and economic support etc.[3]

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[3] A.Bebler, ibidem.

In order to solve the Yugoslav crisis, intensive negotiations on the level of the presidents of all republics started. Although they went on for several months, they gave no positive results.

One of the main reasons for these "zero sum negotiations" is that the Serbian political regime, led by president Slobodan Milosevic, saw the solution of Yugoslav crisis in a policy based on nationalism and cheap populism. Besides, Milosevic's regime as the only remnant of the ex-mono-party political system of the SFRY builds a yoke of interests with the top of the Yugoslav People's Army.

Any other political solution forwarded by other Yugoslav republics not in conformity with the Serbian logic was apriory rejected by Milosevic and his political supporters in other parts of Yugoslavia (e.g. in Montenegro, Serbs in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina). The non-communist political garnitures in Slovenia and Croatia which strived for non-aggressive and peaceful solution of the Yugoslav crisis have been regarded from the very beginning with disfavour by the top of YPA. It should be noticed that Serbia has within the context of Yugoslav crisis some very important advantages: first, a direct linkage with and support from a great part of professionals in YPA, and second, three representatives (i.e. three votes) in the federal presidency in spite of the abolition of the constitutionally assured autonomous status of its two provinces.

It is obvious that hitherto talks among the presidents of all Yugoslav republics has given no concrete results. They rotate in a perpetual vicious circle: because of the existing antagonisms among the political garnitures none of the crisis solving options can be realised. The possibility of secession of one or more republics is in this marathonic and useless circle of talks immediately labelled as "treason" and "disruption of the federal state". Every such step had been threatened by an intervention of the YPA. On the other hand the status quo within the system of the disintegrating federal state meant, for any particular republic, a subordination ot the

central federal authority in Belgrade, the weakening of its economic position and a constant aggravation of the general crisis of the whole system on both federal and republican levels.

Apart from this, Serbian caused an institutional crisis by blocking the constituting of the presidency of SFRY and the nomination of the Croat representative · for its president. In this situation the YPA has found itself with no formal civilian supreme commander. The top military officers, functioning in the so called "supreme command" within the Federal Ministry of Defence, operate as an autonomous political factor within Yugoslav social and political context. Although subjectively committed to "saving Yugoslavia", the Yugoslav professional military objectively added to the desintegration of that multinational state.

2. Slovenia within the process of disintegrating Yugoslavia

In the above mentioned circumstances Slovenia accepted what it seemed the only possible strategy for its national survival i.e. to rely on its own forces and to acquire international support for the implementation of the right to self-determination. Therefore, in December 23, 1990 Slovenia carried out the plebiscite in which 88.5% of the participating voters were in favour of an independent state of Slovenia. The will of the Slovene population was proclaimed by Slovenian Parliament on June 25, 1991 in the Declaration of Independence of Slovenia. By this Declaration Slovenia is obliged to take over all the functions of the state authority on its territory. This proces should be gradual and an agreement should be found with federal government and with the rest of the Yugoslav republics. Althought the hope for reaching a confederal solution faded away the Slovenian leadership still hoped for and preferred a civilized divorce. The Slovene government proposed a transition period until December 31, 1993 during which the federal army would remain in sovereign Slovenia and would be paid for by the republic. The day following the proclamation, the federal army (YPA), with a formal assent of the federal government, intervened in Slovenia. By this

brutal and violent act the YPA transformed itself from "an unique integrative force in Yugoslavia" into an actual disintegrative force.

The YPA generals had led for a few days a true war against Slovenia in which young soldiers were forced to fight and die without knowing why. The formal cover of the military intervention in Slovenia by federal government enabled the top of YPA to appeal formally to its legalistic operation (i.e. in accordance with the federal 1974 Constitution)[4].

The political-strategic goals of the military intervention of the YPA were the following:

first, to reach and take over the Slovenian borders by military force;

second, to cut off Slovenia and Croatia from the international community;

third, to "solve" the Yugoslav crisis in conformity with the views and interests of the Serbian political regime and the top of YPA (i.e. to form a highly centralised federal state with Serbia on its top).

Contrary to the expectations and miscalculations of the top of YPA and the federal as well as the Serbian centralists, Slovenian population resisted the YPA units first without arms (they blocked the main roads with barricades of trucks, buses, cars etc.).

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[4] Concerning the Constitution two points are worth noting: first, the 1974 Constitution of the SFRY was in that time in great discrepancy with all social, political, economic, cultural etc. changes which have occured in Yugoslavia within the last 17 years. Therefore, the invocation of this Constitution was obviously an anachronism. Second, the 1974 Constitution was the expression of the Yugoslav political system in which the YPA has completely integrated and identified itself with the ideology and politics of the ruling political force – The Yugoslav League of Communist. This political system allowed YPA to act as an autonomous political subject.

After the brutal and wild acts of YPA (destroying everything that stood in their way - rods, cars, trucks, even houses etc.) Slovenia used its Territorial Defence (TD)[5].

On the second day of the military intervention the top Slovenian political leadership decided to employ its TD for the so called selective defence strategy, i.e. the units of TD had the order to put military technics of the YPA' units out of action though not to destroy it. Several factors contributed to the successful defence of Slovenia: efficient TD and police operations, miscalculations of the top of YPA of Slovenian reaction (especially the preparedness of the Slovenian population to defend their homeland), demoralisation of the recruits and many officers in the YPA which were not ready to shoot at their own people.

The raving of real war almost in the heart of Central Europe encouraged the European Community to interfere and to try to achieve a cease fire as well as to reach an agreement by which the Yugoslav crisis would be solved in a peaceful way.

After several hours long Conference among the representatives of European Community (EC), representatives of Yugoslav Federal Government and Federal Presidency, as well as representatives of Slovenia, Serbian and Croatia, the declaration was adopted on July 7, 1991.

This Declaration, called the Brioni Declaration (after the Brioni islands, where the

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[5] The Territorial Defense was a military formation armed with light infantry arms and its structure based almost entirely on the military reserve. The Yugoslav Constitution (1974) defined the Territorial Defense as the one of the two elements of the Yugoslav armed forces (the other one being the Yugoslav peoples' Army). Each Yugoslav republic organized its won TD as a local - territorial element and a part of the common Yugoslav Armed Forces. The TD had according to the Yugoslav official military-defense doctrine the most important role in the following: to combat with the diversants, terroristic groups and other forces on the front, on the "temporarily occupied territory" as well as the back lines.

meeting was held) was confirmed by he Slovene Parliament on July 10, 1991 as well as by the Yugoslav federal presidency on July 12, 1991. By this Declaration Slovenia was bound to freeze the processes to achieve a complete independence for three months. The three months dead-line of the Brioni Declaration expired on October 7, 1991.

After that, Slovenia continued with the consolidation of its autonomous political identity. Internally, through its legal, political and security defence system, and externally through the talks on the legal international recognition of Slovenia by other sovereign states.

After some months of endeavours and expectations, the formal international recognition process started on January 15, 1992. The process was initiated by Germany, and soon after Slovenia was recognised y the states of the EC, since then, other states have gradually followed suit.

3. Concluding remarks

The economic, political, legal, ethnical and moral crisis, facing the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) which burst out at the beggining of the 1980's, started collapsing in 1989, acquire din 1991 a further military dimension. On April 27, 1992 the official dissolution of the "Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" emerged. There are many important internal causes for the Yugoslavia's breakdown such as: national-etnic, political-ideological, economic, social etc. The single most important cause of the Yugoslavia's breakdown had been in her authoritarian system of government for over decades.

Throughout the 1980' the serious and growing economic difficulties have undermined the staying power of the political regime and contributed to general political instability in second Yugoslavia. In this period (1980-1991/2) the nationally, politically and

culturally divided Yugoslav elited were incapable, and same unwilling, to effect a speedy and orderly transition from and authoritarian order to a competitive democratic system.

In Yugoslavia the blockade occurred in the federal center and took the form of an alliance between the Serbian communist partocrats, the professional military and the representatives of the military-industrial complex. The blockage pushed the pressures for Yugoslavia's deep democratization to the sub-federal levels. As a result of this deflection the first free competitive elections were held in March-April 1990 in the two north-western republics only. After electoral victories, eventually won in most republics by national, nationalist and regionally-defined parties, Yugoslavia's national fissures, burst open and became democratically legitimized. These fissures were imperfectly correlated with the ideological, economic and political cleavages. Due to the lack of consensus among the elites (notably on he main causes of the crisis and on proper cures) a democratic reconstitution of the federal state in its 1945 borders - passing a new federal electoral law, carrying out the first truly competitive and democratic federal election, drawing a new federal constitution and electing a new, this time democratic federal government - became impossible[6].

Although the former Yugoslavia's breakdown was not inevitable (if quickly reorganized into an association of sovereign republics), the violent turn in its dissolution had been however less avoidable due to Serbian political regime which preferred no Yugoslavia at all rather than the Serbia's dominant role in the federal state. In addition, they set out to achieve this good if necessing even with military power.

In 1989 Slovenian authorities strived for reorganizing the Yugoslav state into an association of sovereign republics (konfederate option). This option might have still

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[6] A.Bebler, ibidem, p.12.

had a chance after the elections in Slovenia (1990), but after June 25, 1991 the main objective in Slovenia shifted to defending security, integrity and sovereignty of the newly proclaimed independent state from the military attacks by the YPA. On May 22, 1992 Slovenia (as well as Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) was admitted into the membership of the United Nations[7]. Since then Slovenia's authorities one hand have been still reestablishing all elements of completely modern state. The completed disentanglement of the whole Yugoslav disintegration is seen from their view as predominantly international issue.

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[7] <u>Here are some basic data about Slovenia</u>

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Surface:                        20 256 km
Number of Inhabitants (1922):   2 020 000
Number of Households (1991):    641 900
Population Density:             99 Inhabitants /q km
Type of Government:             Parliamentary Republic
Capital:                        Ljubljana
National Composition:           Slovenes 91%, Hungarians 0,5%,
                                Italians 0,1%
Official Language:              Slovene, on nationally mixed.
                                territories also Hungarian and
                                Italian Language.
Currency:                       Slovene Tolar (1 SIT/100
                                hundredths)
Year population growth 1991/1,1%
Life Expectancy (1988/89):      Male: 68,8 years, Female: 76,7
                                years
Urbanisation (1991):            50,7%
Major Cities (1992):            Ljubljana (276 000),
                                Maribor (105 400),
                                Celje (42 000),
                                Kranj (37 100),
                                Velenje (27 300),
                                Koper (24 600),
                                Novo mesto (22 600)
GNP in 1990:                    12.4 mlrd USD
GNP per capita in 1990:         6200 USD
Export in 1991:                 3,86 mlrd USD
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INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND YUGOSLAVIA:
LESSONS FROM A FAILURE

Ever since the outbreak of civil war in Yugoslavia in June 1991 efforts of the international community to mediate between the warring parties and find suitable political solution were limited by differing, even contradictory definitions of this conflict. War destruction and suffering of civilian population unrecorded in Europe since World War II have shocked the international public and contributed to rapid internationalization of this crisis, with a large number of international factors involved in its solving. However, internationalization of the crisis produced contradictory effects and during the past course of the crises failed in finding lasting solutions to the problems raised by disintegration of the Yugoslav federation. The situation is further complicated by divergent interests of the European states and the U.S., media campaign that mobilized the public in forcing their governments *to do something* about the Yugoslav tragedy, ineffectiveness of international organizations and mechanisms for conflict solving and, above all, lack of clear-cut concept for arrangement of relations in the Balkans after disappearance of Yugoslavia from the political map of Europe.

These factors led to completely opposite definitions of the crisis, that decisively influenced the conduct of the Yugoslav and foreign factors and prevented definition of a consistent policy of the international community for its solution. Abundance of views on causes, consequences and ways to solution of civil war in Yugoslavia could be briefly summarized in the three characteristic approaches.

* According to the *first* approach, widely promoted by world media, but also present in official assessments of some international factors, the greatest if not the sole responsibility for the war rests with Serbia that, according to this approach, committed "aggression" first on Slovenia, than on Croatia and, finally, on Bosnia-Herzegovina, threatening to spread it to provinces within its territory and to other areas of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Balkans. Motives for this, according to these views, can be found either in the policy of the Serbian leadership or in "aggressive attitude of the Serbian people" in their attempt to preserve the former social order and impose hegemony on the entire Yugoslav territory. With policy based on such definition of the situation the international community tried (mainly unsuccessfully) to stop armed clashes and establish peace on the Yugoslav territory first through international recognition of secessionist republics (Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and, after long hesitation, Macedonia), by denying recognition and introducing international sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (consisting of Serbia and Montenegro), and subsequently through various forms of pressure stipulated by Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, including threat of direct military intervention.

* The *second* approach, prevailing in FR Yugoslavia, but also among many foreign analysts, such views considers to be deliberate misinterpretation, aimed to conceal the true motives of secessionist Yugoslav republics and their foreign allies in their attempt to revise the results of World War I and II on the Yugoslav territory, the Balkans and Europe. According to this interpretation, civil war in Yugoslavia occurred as the result of illegitimate secession of Western republics, that seriously violated the interests of nations willing to remain in the Yugoslav community. This particularly refers to interests of the parts of Serbian people that after secession of Croatia and Slovenia became discriminated minorities in the newly established states, but also of Muslims in Bosnia-

Herzegovina and other peoples of former Yugoslavia that fell victims of the conflict they did not start in the first place. When the international factors abandoned the principle of inviolability of European borders by force (the *first basket* of the Helsinki Act) in case of external borders of SFRY and insisted on preservation of internal borders between the Yugoslav republics that have never been established in a legally proper way, this was interpreted[1] as serious breach of the norms of international law and violation of legitimate interests of the Serbian people. According to this opinion, peaceful solution to the Yugoslav crisis can be achieved only through consistent implementation of the principle on right of peoples to self-determination, that would equally endorse the interests of all Yugoslav nations - both those wishing to leave Yugoslavia and those willing to remain in it.

* The *third* approach to the Yugoslav crisis is based on the thesis that civil war in Yugoslavia is an extremely complex ethnic and religious conflict with far-reaching international implications, that caught the main actors of international relations completely unaware. This in turn allowed the warring Yugoslav republics to manipulate the views of the international community through further escalation of the conflict and propaganda war. In a specific political "vacuum" that emerged after sudden disappearance of the bipolar order in Europe, due to lack of clear concepts and effective international institutions and mechanisms for conflict solving, the main international factors resorted to improvisation and long ago outdated geopolitical concepts, that only added fuel to the fire of the Yugoslav crisis. From this standpoint, the Yugoslav community has been shaped not only by the interests of its peoples but also by interests of creators of the international order in Europe after World War I and II. That is why it became one of the first victim of the collapse of bipolar order on the continent. Therefore, its breakup after seven decades of existence reopened the *Pandora's box* of ethnic and religious conflicts in the Balkans, with direct implications for peace and security in the entire Europe.[2] It follows that peace cannot be imposed by force and that just and lasting solution to the Yugoslav crisis is possible only within a stable and democratic international order in Europe, that will adequately accommodate the interests of all Yugoslav peoples.

Common for all three approaches is that the Yugoslav conflict is considered as precedent in the creation of the new system of international relations after the end of the cold war, the outcome of which will also reflect on the policy of the international community toward the present and future similar crises in Central and Eastern Europe and beyond. Although only the future course of events on the territory of former Yugoslavia will either confirm or deny the views contained in the mentioned approaches to the Yugoslav crisis, one may conclude that it is a very complex political, ethnic and religious conflict with profound causes and consequences that go way beyond the Yugoslav area. That is why any attempt to define the causes and character of this conflict and possibilities for its solution must methodologically start from the following two elements - collapse of the Yugoslav model of socialism that occurred within the process of dissolution of East-European socialist regimes and complex geopolitical position of the south-eastern part of Europe, that made *history return with revenge* to the Balkans.

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[1] See: Miodrag Zečević & Bogdan Lekić: *Frontiers and Internal Territorial Division in Yugoslavia*, The Ministry of Information of the Republic of Serbia, Beograd, 1991.

[2] *...the Yugoslav tragedy appears to have so much in common with the classical Greek tragedy with its element of ananke: at each time point, a number of actors are doing what they have been trapped - whether by their own previous actions or those of other actors - into having to do, and as result they sink deeper and deeper into catastrophe.* Hakan Wiberg: *Peace Order in Europe - Lessons from Yugoslavia*, paper presented at the conference *Challenges for Peace and Security* at the International Institute for Peace, Vienna, 21-22 November 1992 (photocopied).

From communism to populism

Civil war in Yugoslavia confirmed the thesis that socialist order was its main cohesive factor after World War II. Owing to the position of a *strategic buffer*, skillfully maneuvering between the East and the West, during 1950's and 1960's Yugoslavia both internally and internationally broke away from the East-European group of countries. Successful economic development, relatively liberal internal order and independent foreign policy contributed to consolidation of the communist party's power and suppression of structural, above all ethnic problems faced by Yugoslavia ever since its creation in 1918. The limits to liberalization were reached in mid-sixties, when economic and social reforms started to threaten the monopoly of LCY (League of Communists of Yugoslavia), confronting the regime with civil and nationalist opposition. Attempts to restore the communist order during the 1970's killed the roots of civil society, concentrating the opposition to regime around nationalist ideas, in which the republican communist parties discovered the main sources of their power. In this way, Yugoslavia turned into a loose communist confederation of national states that started to develop rather independently, thus widening the mutual economic, social and political differences and competing with each other in the struggle for local interests.[3]

Disintegration of the unique Yugoslav economic system and progressive paralysis of LCY during 1970's were the sources of profound economic crisis which was full blown during 1980's. The most serious aspect of the crisis was first declining and eventually negative economic growth, that the regime tried to stop first through labor migration, and then by uncontrolled borrowing abroad (over USD 20 billion by early 1980's). Although increase in foreign debt in principle need not be a negative phenomenon, wasteful use of petrodollar credits to preserve the consumption level from the 1960's and strengthening of power of republican party nomenclatures has definitely destroyed Yugoslavia's economic system. Failure of the federal government to check rising inflation, unemployment and disintegration of the Yugoslav economic system contributed to drastic division between republics[4] and different regional orientation of their economies.[5] This has further increased political differences, since developed republics (Slovenia, Croatia and, later, Serbia) complained of the amount and unprofitable use of resources for underdeveloped, while undeveloped parts of the country (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and, in particular, Kosovo) complained of insufficient assistance they were receiving.

The consequence was deepening political conflict that revived old national rivalries - companions of the Yugoslav history since its birth. Collapse of the communist ideology and weakness of the civil society at the same time left the *vacuum* in the political sphere that was filled with national romanticism. The latter gradually shaped into dominant political programs and finally prevailed by the late 1980's - early 1990's, particularly at the first multiparty elections in 1990. This has finally shaped the constitutional crisis of the *second*

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[3] See: Predrag Simić: *Civil War in Yugoslavia and Emerging New States and Republics on the Territory of the Former SFRY*, paper presented at the Third session of the Bertelsman Foundation Working Group *Central and Eastern Europe*, Moscow, 17-20 June 1992.

[4] The income *per capita* ratio between the richest part (Slovenia) and the poorest part (Kosovo) grew from three times in the late 1940's to about five times in 1965 and more than eight times by the late 1980's.

[5] Western republics turned toward West European and Central European markets (above all Germany and Italy), while eastern rather opted for COMECON (particularly USSR) and Middle East. What was lacking in interrepublican conflicts over resources for underdeveloped areas was the fact that competitiveness of products coming from western republics was largely credited to cheap raw materials, energy and labor originating from less developed parts of the country. Price difference between products sold by western republics on the foreign and local markets by the end of eighties reached 1:3 ratio. On the other hand, closing of republican borders after 1974. has limited direct investments of developed republics on the east of the country. In a word, Yugoslavia was a typical example of differences between the North and the South.

Yugoslavia, leading to endless political conflicts between republics and complete paralysis of federal government organs. Soaring inflation, declining living standards, increasingly obvious inability of LCY to solve the country's problems, and events in Eastern Europe have undermined the prestige of the *self-management socialism* among population that increasingly turned to nationalist ideologies. The first such movement broke out among ethnic Albanians in the southern Serbian province of Kosovo in 1981,[6] which echoed as revival of long dormant Serbian nationalism, that was first shaped in intellectual circles, and obtained its political expression in the policy of the new Serbian president Slobodan Milošević.[7] Reactions to disturbed ethnic balance came soon afterwards from Slovenia and Croatia, and subsequently from Bosnian Muslims and other national communities as creation of nationalist parties.

This has opened the *Pandora's box* of ethnic conflicts in this multinational country, that collapsing communist regime could no longer keep under control. Although certain national movements gave themselves various ideological titles, underlying differences were mainly motivated by anticipated alliances rather than by essentially different ideological orientations. Contrary to frequent interpretations that civil war in Yugoslavia broke out as the conflict between pro-Western and democratically oriented western republics with communist diehards led by Serbian president Milošević, political processes in Yugoslavia during 1980's do not corroborate such thesis. Most post-communist leaders of the republics in former Yugoslavia used to be high-ranking officials in the communist hierarchy.[8] This could explain the widespread phenomenon that most of post-communist political movements in former Yugoslavia could be classified as populist movements with nationalist orientation, which also determined the logic of the civil war. The only exception was Slovenia, where relatively strong civil society was established during 1980's and with more or less success resisted the actions of national and clerical right.

Rebalkanization of Yugoslavia

The reasons of national conflicts in the Yugoslav community could be reduced to two categories: a) *rivalries of national groups* for their influence in the federation, i.e. resistance to the influence of the federation and b) *historic traumas* in mutual relations, systematically suppressed, but not resolved during the communist rule.

* *The first* category encompasses a number of inter-ethnic conflicts, among which no doubt on the first place comes the rivalry between the two largest peoples - *Serbs* and *Croats*. Although through the idea of the Yugoslav community both peoples managed to gather within the borders of a single state most of their members, ethnic mixture, different cultural heritage, religious affiliation and mutual fear of domination confronted them from the very beginning of the Yugoslav state, subsequently causing the bloody inter-ethnic conflict in the so-called *Independent State of Croatia*[9] during World War II.

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[6] These demonstrations repeated the claims of the first ethnic unrests in Kosovo in 1968 that Kosovo should become the seventh Yugoslav republic.

[7] On this point see: Nebojša Popov: *Srpski populizam (Serbian Populism)*, supplement to weekly *Vreme*, No. 153, 24 May 1993.

[8] Croatian president Franjo Tudman was a prominent YPA general, Slovenian president Milan Kučan occupied in early 1980's one of the leading posts in the LCY Central Committee, while Macedonian president Kiro Gligorov was one of the leading figures in the federation in mid-sixties. Serbian president Slobodan Milošević and Montenegrin president Momir Bulatović made their way to leading positions in the communist hierarchy during 1980's, while only Alija Izetbegović, leader of Bosnian Muslims, was never the member of the communist nomenclature.

[9] This quisling state, created by the Axis powers after occupation of Yugoslavia, encompassed most of the territory of the present-day Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

* Unlike them, *Slovenes* and *Macedonians* have only partially solved their national issues through Yugoslavia, since large portions of their peoples remained living in neighboring countries. Although both these peoples only through Yugoslavia managed to constitute their national states, this problem remained on the agenda until the present day. Also, these peoples as well as other smaller Yugoslav peoples feared of domination of Serbs and Croats in the federation.

* *Bosnian Muslims* are a specific category, since their ethnic roots are largely either Serbian or Croatian, while the status of a separate ethnic group in Yugoslavia was given to them only during 1960's. Awareness of their ethnic distinction appeared among Bosnian Muslims through resistance of Bosnian feudalists to Ottoman Empire during the 19th century, but also as the consequence of fear of Serbian-Croatian rivalry, since promoters of the idea of Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia claimed the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.[10]

* *Montenegrins* are ethnic group that in spite of the longest uninterrupted state continuity among the Yugoslav peoples and dynastic rivalry with the Karađorđević dynasty in Serbia, cherished the feelings of belonging to the Serbian people. This is particularly reinforced by the fact that a large number of Montenegrins are now living outside Montenegro (mainly in Serbia) and occupy prominent place in the political life of Serbs in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

* *National minorities* - the term that within the communist federal order referred to members of peoples whose mother country is outside Yugoslavia - took different positions toward ethnic conflicts. The largest among them, who have their mother country in neighboring states (particularly *Albanians*) demonstrate strong irredentist aspirations and will not settle for autonomous status. On the other hand, members of smaller national communities, afraid that they might become victims of conflicts between Yugoslav peoples, demand minority protection and safeguarding of their cultural identity.

Inter-ethnic relations in Yugoslavia have been seriously disturbed by political conflicts during the *First* and *Second Yugoslavia*, and particularly during World War II, that left profound *historic traumas* which broke out with disintegration of the federation. The following among them are exceptionally important:

* *Trauma of relations between Serbs and Croats.* After unification in 1918 the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (since 1929 the Kingdom of Yugoslavia) was first organized as a unitary monarchy under the crown of the Serbian dynasty. Most Croats therefore experienced the new state as a (worse) repetition of the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy, demanding substantial constitutional reforms[11] that have been carried out in 1939 with the creation of the Croatian Banovina[12.] However, World War II prevented them from

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[10] On this point see: Midhat Muradbegović: *Muslimani u Bosni i Hercegovini pod turskom okupacijom od 1463. do 1852. godine (Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina under the Turkish occupation 1463-1852),* paper presented at the international conference Balkans After the Cold War, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, 11-12 May 1993 (photocopied).

[11] It is interesting, however, that Croatian politicians in 1928 declined the offer by King Aleksandar Karadordević to leave Yugoslavia. They instead opted for constitutional rearrangement of relations between Serbs and Croats in the common state. The thesis of then-time Croat political leader Vlatko Maček was that *Yugoslavia is a coat buttoned in the wrong way,* and therefore needs to be *rebuttoned* instead of torn up.

[12] The present-day line of conflict between Serbs and Croats mainly follows the division line of 1939 that corresponds to historic borders between Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Empire. The territory of the *Republic Serb Krajina,* i.e. areas under UNPROFOR protection largely encompasses the territories of the former Military Frontier (Militärgrenze) of the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy, where Habsburgs since the 17th century populated by Serbian refugees with a task of

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showing their full effects on Serbian-Croatian relations. Between 1941 and 1945 the biggest mass-scale ethnic cleansing took place on the territory of the nazi *Independent State of Croatia*, under the slogan of the *ustasha* regime that *one third of Serbs should be killed, one third moved, and one third converted to Catholic religion*.[13] This historic trauma, still very vivid in memories of Serbs in Krajinas and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, made Serbs start to fear for their security in independent Croatia, which was the main reason for their revolt in 1991, when they demanded to *remain in Yugoslavia* after secession of Croatia.

* *Trauma of relations between Serbs and Muslims* (primarily in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Sandžak, i.e. Raška in Serbian). For nationalist-minded Serbs Muslims are defectors from Serbian people who for their own interests changed religion and served first to Turks and later to Austrian-Hungarians as an instrument for repression over Serbs. From the Muslim point of view, during the 19th and 20th centuries Serbs engaged in systematic ethnic cleansing of Muslims, expelling them to Turkey where some 2,000,000 Muslims originating from Bosnia-Herzegovina now live. During World War II many Muslims in the *Independent State of Croatia* took the *ustasha* side (who were counted as Aryans by Croats), committing numerous crimes against Serbian population. On the other hand, Serbian nationalists - *chetniks* - also committed numerous crimes against Muslims during World War II.

* *Trauma of relations between Serbs and Albanians.* The Province of Kosovo (where ethnic Albanians now constitute some 90% of the population) is considered by Serbs their historic cradle, particularly because Turks defeated the medieval Serbian state in 1379 in the battle on the Kosovo field.[14] The present discrepancy between the Albanian and Serbian population in Kosovo (in 1941 the ratio was 50% : 50%) is explained by ethnic cleansing of Serbs by Albanians, extremely high birth rate of Albanian population (the highest in Europe) and illegal immigrations of Albanians from Albania after World War II under patronage of communists. From the Albanian point of view, Serbs have occupied and colonized Kosovo and over the past 70 years tried to ethnically clean it, forcing Albanians to emigrate to Albania and Turkey.

Therefore, civil war in Yugoslavia has again raised all ethnic and border issues between the Yugoslav and neighboring peoples, that used to be the source of the *balkanization* phenomenon in late 19th and early 20th century. Solution to this problem was among the reasons for creation of Yugoslavia. Individually, the following unsettled problems could be mentioned: 1) conflict between Serbs and Croats caused by separation of the *Republic of Serb Krajina* from the Republic of Croatia when this republic declared independence from Yugoslavia; 2) conflict between Muslims, Croats and Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina caused by its separation from Yugoslavia, after which Serbs proclaimed the *Serbian Republic* and Croats the *Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosna*; 3) conflict between Serbs and ethnic Albanians over the status of Kosovo, particularly after Republic of Kosovo was proclaimed 4) conflict between Slovenia and Croatia about their common border; 5) conflict between Montenegro (FR Yugoslavia) and Croatia concerning the Prevlaka peninsula; 6) conflict between Macedonia and Serbia over the territory of the Prohor of Pčinja monastery; 7) conflict between Macedonians and Albanians concerning the status of

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safeguarding the borders of the Monarchy from Turkish invasion. In return, Serbs in these territories enjoyed autonomy, which is where the roots of conflict with Croats lie, since the latter consider Krajina the historic part of Croatia.

[13] The extent of genocide is contradictory even today. According to Serbian sources, relying on estimates of the American intelligence during World War II, about 1,000,000 Serbs have been killed in these areas (of which 700,000 in the Jasenovac concentration camp), while according to president Tudman only 40,000 have been killed.

[14] During the Ottoman occupation Serbian folk poetry developed so-called *myth of Kosovo*, on which the Serbian national identity was based after liberation in early 19th century. Today, there are some 280 Serbian religious and other cultural monuments in Kosovo, of which 220 date back to the middle ages.

western Macedonia; 8) conflict between Serbs and Hungarians over the status of Hungarian minority in Voyvodina, that may escalate into territorial dispute between the two countries[15]; 9) conflict between Serbia and Bulgaria over the status of Bulgarian minority in eastern Serbia[16;] 10) conflict between Macedonia and Greece over the name of this former Yugoslav republic, territorial definition and status of Macedonian minority in Greece; 11) conflict between Serbs, Montenegrins and Muslims concerning the status of Sandžak (Raška); etc.

Generally, ethnic and border conflicts between Yugoslav peoples represent historical heritage of numerous wars that over the past ten centuries, and particularly since the beginning of the so-called *Great Eastern Crisis* in the 19th century (caused by the breakup of the Ottoman Empire) took place in these territories both between the Balkan and non-Balkan states. The consequence were numerous migrations, confessional conflicts, islamization of some of the Slavic population and frequent uprisings against occupational forces. All this made the entire Yugoslav and Balkan territory extremely heterogeneous in ethnic and religious sense, and shaped some of its part under the influence of neighboring major religious, political and cultural communities - Catholicism and Central Europe in the west, Orthodox church and Russia on the north-east and Islam and Turkey on the east. How topical these divisions still are was seen after the collapse of Yugoslavia and outbreak of civil war among its peoples.

The logic of civil war

Blockade of the federal state caused by rivalry of republican elites that adamantly insisted on their own views concerning constitutional reforms[17] was conducive for outbreak of first open ethnic conflicts. The new Croatian parliament immediately introduced various forms of discrimination against the quarter of the population that were non-Croats. In particular, the Serb half of this quarter was hit by demands for loyalty oaths, Serbian policemen in the Serbian majority areas were fired and government attempted to send ethnic Croatian policemen in to replace them. The Serbian areas in Krajina, apparently encouraged by the Serbian government, then took over their own administration, especially police functions, declaring if Croatia would leave Yugoslavia, they would leave Croatia. In Serb-populated areas of Croatia unsettled historic traumas from World War II were the reason why they rejected the idea of living in an independent Croatian state, since Serbs from Krajina experienced it as reincarnation of the fascist "Independent State of Croatia". This was further aggravated by historic revisionism of the new Croatian authorities, who missed the opportunity to calm down Serbian fears through adequate confidence building measures.

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[15] *The Prime Minister of Hungary, Joszef Antall, has already stated that the status of Hungarians in Vajdasag, the Hungarian name for Voyvodina, would have to be reconsidered if Serbia were ever to become an independent state, for authority over Hungarians in Vajdasag was granted to the state of Yugoslavia and to an independent Serbia. Thus, if Yugoslavia were to fall apart "into pieces" then the raison d'être of the Treaty of Trianon would also collapse.* Robert Aspeslagh, *Trianon Dissolved: the Status of Voyvodina Reconsidered?*, in: Martin van den Heuvel & Jan G. Siccama, *The Disintegration of Yugoslavia*, Rodopi, Amsterdam-Atlanta, 1992, p. 125.

[16] *We cannot postpone the problems with formulation of the future policy toward Serbia, where the Bulgarian minority is subject to unheard of harassment, as well as establishment of closer connections with Slovenia and Croatia, Bulgarian potential partners and friends. Legal succession of the former Yugoslavia is also an important issue. All Bulgarian obligations, and territorial concessions for that matter, refer to Yugoslavia, and not Serbia.* Emil Minchev: *Yugoslav War and Bulgarian Foreign Policy, Deutsche Welle*, quoted after: *Jugoslavija i susedi*, No. 26/27, April 16, 1992, p. 3.

[17] Serbia and Montenegro insisted on creation of the *modern federation*, Slovenia and Croatia on *loose confederation*, while Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia tried to offer a compromise federal-confederal solution.

Attempt by YPA, that was increasingly plunging into political void[18] in Spring 1990 to place armament of the Croatian and Slovenian territorial defense under its control, was carried out in the former but not in the latter republic, where Slovenian president Kučan prevented this action. That was probably one of the reasons why this republic was ready in the military sense for disintegration of Yugoslavia and moreover, by its political decisions dictated the pace of political events in the second half of 1990 and first half of 1991. Although probably unprepared, Croatia had to follow the decision of the Slovenian parliament of 25 June 1991 and declare secession (dissociation in the Slovenian terminology). Had it not done so, it would have been in a much less favorable position against the Serbian-Montenegrin bloc.

That is why some foreign analysts[19] think that at that point only *Slovenia* had clear strategy, which according to this interpretation boiled down to the following. *First*, this republic was well prepared in the military sense, since it was well stocked with armaments and had well trained territorial defense, whose tactic relied on the Yugoslav doctrine of *total national defense*. *Second*, declaration of Slovenian independence directly resulted in Croatian secession and consequently in Serbian-Croatian conflict, which moved the focus of war further from the borders of Slovenia. *Third*, political determination and military preparedness of Slovenia to resist the YPA intervention and perspective of major Serbian-Croatian conflict made the interests of Ljubljana and Belgrade complementary in terms of Slovenia's secession.[20] *Fourth*, Slovenia in this sense could count not only on Serbia but on impatience of the EC, which for its own reasons rushed to achieve visible results in checking this conflict, and on influential circles in Austria, Germany, Italy[21] and other countries with whom it closely cooperated for more than ten years in the *Alpe Adria* Working Group. *Finally*, the success of all these moves allowed Slovenia to take a principled stand toward the conflict in Croatia and the rest of Yugoslavia, by which it consolidated its international position, avoiding thereby to undertake any obligation toward Croatia or any other part of the former Yugoslavia.

Croatia, on the other hand, was in a far less favorable position and without adequate strategy or leadership that could replay the Slovenian model of secession. Unlike Slovenia, Croatia is not ethnically homogeneous. Moreover, areas populated by Serbs are situated in strategically critical parts of Croatia.[22] Unlike Slovenia, which managed to secede mainly relying on its own forces and good assessment of the overall situation in Yugoslavia, it seems that the Croatian leadership underestimated YPA strength after its withdrawal from Slovenia and overestimated the willingness of the international community to intervene in its favor. Aside the referendum on secession from Yugoslavia, it seems that the political consensus on this issue among the Croatian population was not reached until YPA severely destructed Vukovar and besieged Dubrovnik, when Croatian military forces were reorganized and equipped to the extent that made them capable of resisting YPA.[23]

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[18] On this point see: Veljko Kadijević: *Moje viđenje raspada (Collapse from my point of view)*, NIP Politika, Belgrade, 1993.

[19] See: Hakan Wiberg, op, cit., pp. 11-12.

[20] This was confirmed by the decision of the federal rump-presidency to withdraw YPA troops from Slovenia even though it was not obliged to do so by the *Brioni agreement*.

[21] According to the former Italian foreign minister Gianni de Michelis, initial support to Slovenia's emancipation came from Italian Christian democrats in Veneto and Furlania, Bavarian CSU and Austrian People's Party. See: Giancarlo Perna: *Interview with Gianni de Michelis*, L'Europeo, 8 June 1993, quoted after: *Tanjug press*, No. 114, 14 June 1993, p. 6.

[22] Knin is the main railway junction between Zagreb and Split (continental Croatia and Dalmatia), eastern Slavonia and Baranja are major agricultural regions, also with ample reserves of oil and gas and bordering on Serbia.

[23] On this point see: Philip Schwarm: *From Ashes to an Army: Croatia on the Offensive*, Balkan War Report, London, No. 12, January 1993, pp. 14-15. In spite of the UN embargo on arms deliveries to republics of the former Yugoslavia, Croatia at that time imported considerable stocks of modern armament. See: Yossef Bodansky & Vaughn S. Forrest: *Nuclear*

Croatia's main advantage was in propaganda activities, where it soon beat Serbia, earning support by influential EC member countries. Under the thesis that *civil war in Yugoslavia can be stopped only by prompt recognition of separated republics* and *denyal of Yugoslavia's legitimacy*, which at that time prevailed in the EC, this organization by mid-December invited *all Yugoslav republics which so wish* to submit application for recognition.[24] At this point, however, some 30% of the territory of this former Yugoslav republic was under control of YPA and local Serbian forces, that according to Cyrus Vance's plan were placed under UN control.

If there are any doubts as to whether recognition of independence of Slovenia and Croatia stopped the civil war in these republics, it is almost certain that it was the main trigger for conflict in ethnically mixed *Bosnia-Herzegovina*. This republic, with no majority ethnic group, was inseparably tied to survival of the Yugoslav federation, because only within its framework it was possible to preserve the delicate ethnic balance between Muslims, Serbs and Croats. When the conflict broke out in Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina faced two alternatives: to remain in a sort of community with the remainder of Yugoslavia and thus avoid revolt of Serbs in this republic, who wanted *to remain in Yugoslavia* or to opt for independence relying on Muslim-Croatian coalition. Although the Muslim Bosnian organization during 1991 proposed the first solution, it seems that the scales tipped toward desire of the Muslim leadership, to pursue independence[25] in alliance with Bosnian Croats, who denied any connection with Yugoslavia. The logic of civil war became apparent at this point, that with secession of Slovenia and Croatia disturbed the ethnic balance, increasing the influence of Serbia in the remaining parts of the country. In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia this revived fears that rump Yugoslavia would in fact be Greater Serbia. Although at the beginning of 1992 all three ethnic groups signed in Lisbon the plan on *cantonization* of Bosnia-Herzegovina, proposed by the Portuguese ambassador in Belgrade Cutillero, Muslim leader Alija Izetbegović under the pressure of his colleagues withdrew his signature immediately after returning to Sarajevo, thereby throwing doors wide open to armed clashes.

Contrary to intentions of the U.S. and the EC to prevent spreading of war to Bosnia-Herzegovina through preemptive diplomacy, i.e. early recognition of its independence, this move in practice triggered the civil war, whose cruelty soon exceeded all expectations.[26] YPA, with above-average share of Bosnian Serbs in its officer ranks, which traditionally relied on natural and military-industrial strongholds in this mountain republic, largely took the Serbian side, turning into the army of the self-proclaimed *Serbian Republic*. Although formally in alliance with Muslims, Croats did just about the same, creating the *Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosna* with direct military support of Croatia. Bosnian Muslims, unprepared for war, were thus faced with the least favorable military position, expecting in vain the military assistance from the international community.[27] Loud reactions of

Trafficking in Europe, Task Force on Terrorism & Unconventional Warfare, House Republican Research Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.., November 30, 1992.

[24] On this point see: John Newhouse: *The Diplomatic Round, The New Yorker*, August 1992, pp. 60-71; John Zametica: *The Yugoslav Conflict*, ADELPHI Papers, IISS, London, No. 270 and Jonathan Eyal: *Europe and Yugoslavia: Lessons from a Failure*, Whitehall Paper Series, RUSI, London, 1993.

[25] According to some sources, Serbian president Milošević visited Turkey by the end of 1991 in an attempt to make Ankara mediate and persuade Bosnian Muslims to remain in Yugoslavia, for which he obtained Turkish consent, as the sources maintain.

[26] In overheated political atmosphere prevailing in Bosnia-Herzegovina since the beginning of civil war in Yugoslavia, Serbs in this republic interpreted the EC decision of 6 April 1992 (anniversary of Hitler's attack on Yugoslavia) to recognize this republic as re-run of World War II events.

[27] According to UNPROFOR officers stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Muslims are accountable for some of the most tragic episodes in this former Yugoslav republic (e.g. shelling of civilians waiting in line for bread). They tried in this way

international media to mass atrocities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, ethnic cleansing, destruction of cities and ceaseless flood of refugees, created an illusion that the foreign military intervention will be undertaken soon. However, that did not happen. On the other hand, Bosnian Serbs, who were ready to political compromise before the clashes broke out, were superior in the military field. This has considerably increased their political ambitions to the point where their objective became either unification with Serbia and Montenegro (FR Yugoslavia) or creation of the *second, Western Serbia* that would be carried out through unification with the *Republic of Serb Krajina*.

Regardless which of these options finally prevails, the reason Serbs quoted ever since the beginning of conflict with Alija Izetbegović's government was their fear that unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina, due to number and rapid natural population growth of Muslims and support by Islamic countries[28,] will soon turn into *the first Muslim fundamentalist country in Europe*[29.] The UN Security Council sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, based on assessment that what was happening in Bosnia-Herzegovina is *aggression from Serbia* and that *Bosnian Serbs are acting as agents of Belgrade, with the objective of creating Greater Serbia* [30] neglected this reality, that became obvious only after the adoption of the Vance-Owen plan by Serbia and Montenegro and its rejection at the referendum of Bosnian Serbs. Finally, Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who already at the beginning of the war, through creation of the *Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosna* with military assistance from Croatia, achieved most of their military goals both in relation to Muslims and in relation to Serbs, could reduce their military activities until May 1993 and thus escape the attention of the international community.

Macedonia, the *fourth* Yugoslav republic that proclaimed its independence, did so following similar motives as Bosnia-Herzegovina, fearing Serbian domination in the rump-Yugoslavia. Although in international circles prevailed the opinion that *Serbia might commit aggression on Macedonia*, only this republic so far managed to avoid civil war in its territory, skillfully maintaining internal (ethnic) and international balance, in spite of stern opposition by Greece to its international recognition. According to agreement with Macedonian president Gligorov, YPA withdraw early from the territory of this republic, thus avoiding potential conflict, while Macedonia refrained from hostile acts against the army, that in other secessionist republics directly triggered the conflict. Although the international position of Macedonia is extremely delicate because of this republic's weakness and ambiguous attitude of neighbors towards it[31] civil war on its territory has been avoided during the past course of the Yugoslav drama, although the position of Macedonia remains

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to attract the attention of the international community and encourage foreign military intervention, that could only change the balance of forces in the military sense. See: Patrice Piquard: *Ex-Yuogoslavie: vérités et mensonges au-dessus d'un champ de mines*, L'Evenement de Jeudi, 4 au 10 mars 1993, pp. 115-125.

[28] Fear of Serbs from fundamentalist streams among Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina is recently confirmed by Western analyses of the influence of radical Islamic countries. On this point see: Yossef Bodansky & Voughn S. Forest: *Iran's European Springboard?*, Task Force on Terrorism & Unconventional Warfare, House Republican research Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington D.C., September 1, 1992.

[29] This fear of Bosnian Serbs could soon turn into self-fulfilling prophecy, as it is likely that war destruction and heavy casualties on the Muslim side might be the reason for radicalization of Bosnian Muslims, among which only negligible minority could be deemed fundamentalists. The growing number of Islamic volunteers from Iran, Afghanistan and Lebanon (HizbAllah) in Alija Izetbegović's army and increasing political and military support by Islamic countries undoubtedly point in this direction.

[30] Fred Warner Neal: *American Views and Policies on the Yugoslav Conflict, Review of International Affairs*, No. 1016-17, Belgrade, May-June 1993, p. 5.

[31] Serbia recognizes Macedonian nation, but not the state, Bulgaria recognizes the state but not the nation, Greece recognizes neither the state nor the nation, while Albania fosters aspirations toward the western part of Macedonia, largely inhabited by rapidly growing ethnic Albanian population.

uncertain due to numerous problems that could escalate if armed clashes break out in Kosovo. According to almost unanimous assessment, in such a scenario the war could very quickly spill over to Macedonia, thus provoking the interference by Serbia, Albania, Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey, and hence the new Balkan war. Following the disputable thesis on impending *Serbian aggression on Macedonia*[32] first the UN sent a limited contingent of "blue helmets" to Macedonia, while in early June 1993 the U.S. decided to deploy their forces along the northern borders of this republic.[33] Although this might be interpreted as acts of preemptive diplomacy with an intention of preventing the mentioned scenario, in reality this might in fact trigger the conflict, since the presence of American troops in the neighborhood might encourage the uprising of Albanians in Kosovo.

Finally, *Serbia* and *Montenegro (FR Yugoslavia)* are the only two republics that opted to *remain* in Yugoslavia, aspiring not only to its continuity in the sense of international law, but to their own dating before 1918. Through the UN, CSCE, NATO and a number of other international organizations, the international community condemned these two republics (Serbia in particular) as main culprits for war in Yugoslavia, accusing them of aggression in an attempt to create *Greater Serbia* at the expense of neighboring republics. The evidence frequently quoted as support to this thesis are opinions of a group of Serbian academicians, who in the middle of 1980's from anti-communist positions developed a platform of the modern Serbian nationalism.[34] In the practical political sense, however, nationalist ideas of Serbian writers and historians were mainly intended to provide legitimacy to the policy of the new Serbian leadership in inter-republican disputes in late 1980's/early 1990's.[35] This again raised the *Serbian national issue* that essentially boils down to two problems: a) problem of Serbs in Serbia, where they account for some 65% of the population (about 2/3 of all Serbs on the territory of the former Yugoslavia), while the remaining population is made up of Albanians from Kosovo, Hungarians, Muslims and some 20 other ethnic groups (mainly in Voyvodina); b) problem of Serbs in diaspora, mainly in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (about 1/3 of all members of the Serbian nation).[36] This might explain the fact that Serbian leadership rather soon agreed to secession of Slovenia and Macedonia, but not so in the case of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Serbian communities, after secession of these republics, stated that they wish *to remain in Yugoslavia*. Therefore, the problem of Serbian population in these two republics was in the focus of civil war in Yugoslavia, caused, above all, by historic traumas of World War II and genocide committed against them in the so-called *Independent State of Croatia*.

Protagonists of civil war

The breakup of Yugoslavia and ensuing civil war contributed to the creation of a number of power centers on the Yugoslav territory, which made the geopolitical

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[32] On this point see: Sean Gervasi: *Eyeless in Bosnia, Review of International Affairs*, No. 1016-17, Belgrade, May-June 1993, pp. 10-12.

[33] See: *U.S. Troops Committed to Macedonia, Wireless File - Daily Bulletin of the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade*, No. 109, June 11, 1993, p. 1.

[34] The platform of the contemporary Serbian nationalism is often seen in the so-called *Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences* from 1986. The former president of FR Yugoslavia, author Dobrica Ćosić is considered to be the person who gave the idea for this document (although he denied such claims in his recent interviews), who in a series of his novels under the common title *Vreme zla (The time of evil)* severely criticized Serbian communism, elaborating the thesis that Serbia and Serbian people are endangered in Yugoslavia.

[35] When Dobrica Ćosić was removed from his office of the president of FR Yugoslavia in early June 1993, this marked the parting of authorities with this group of Serbian intellectuals.

[36] They predominantly live in the *Second Serbia*, i.e. territory of the former Military Frontier (krajina), which is divided by the border between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Larger Serbian communities can be also found in north-eastern Bosnia, eastern Herzegovina, etc.

configuration of this conflict extremely complex. The most important among them are mentioned below.

Slovenia is the first republic of the former Yugoslavia that became independent and received broad international recognition (including that of Yugoslavia). Slovenian government is in full control over its territory (with the exception of minor territorial disputes with Croatia) and hence can be considered to posses actor capability. Due to removal of focus of the civil war from its territory and close cooperation with central European group of countries, some doubts may be raised about it as a Balkan state.

Croatia during the course of the war lost control over the part of its territory inhabited by Serbs, but with a legitimately constituted government, that exercises sovereign control over the greatest part of the territory of former SR Croatia and extensive international recognition, it no doubt possesses actor capability. The problems of this state result mainly from its strategically hard-to-defend shape, resistance of Serbian population in krajinas toward authorities in Zagreb, war destruction, relation to the Croatian population on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and (to a lesser degree) Serbia, great number of refugees from war afflicted areas, internal political conflicts and relation between regions in its scope.

FR Yugoslavia was constituted in April 1992 on the territory of Serbia and Montenegro. Although with undisputable sovereignty on its territory, legitimately constituted government, but not the international recognition, it does have actor capability (with certain independence of its two constitutive units in the foreign policy area). Problems of FR Yugoslavia mainly result from its disputable international position (without international recognition and with the UN sanctions), relation toward the Serbian population in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, territorial dispute with Croatia (the Prevlaka peninsula), relations with the leading minority groups on its territory (that in certain conditions may become conflicts with neighboring countries), large number of refugees from war afflicted areas (about 800,000), internal political conflicts, economic consequences of war and sanctions and inherited economic problems.

Bosnia-Herzegovina is probably the most complex problem among the former Yugoslav republics and maybe thee biggest victim of the civil war in Yugoslavia. Although internationally recognized in April 1992, the government in Sarajevo is recognized neither by Serbian nor (largely) by the Croatian population,[37] without control over the greater part of its territory and it is very unlikely that without major foreign military intervention it could establish sovereign government on the territory it aspires to. Irreconcilable conflict and political radicalization of the three national communities which together make up Bosnia-Herzegovina, heavy destruction through war, ethnic cleansing of the population for which both victims and culprits can be found among members of all three peoples, and numerous local militias, which are accountable for the worst crimes against civilian population - all this makes the survival of this former Yugoslav republic as a sovereign state quite uncertain in the short run, unless some sort of UN trusteeship is established. It is more likely that Bosnia-Herzegovina will be divided in the future between three national states or that loose confederation will be established based on ethnic divisions as provided by the Cuttilero or Vance-Owen plan. The results of talks in Geneva in June 1993 also point in this direction. However, one can hardly expect that any of these options might lead to long-term solution to the ethnic and religious war in Bosnia-Herzegovina without a broader Yugoslav framework.

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[37] Fierce clashes between Croats and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina around Travnik, Vitez, Mostar and other disputable territories during May and June 1993 confirm that initial Muslim-Croatian alliance was mainly tactical.

Macedonia is the only republic of the former Yugoslavia which managed to achieve its independence in a peaceful way, establish control over its entire territory and constitute a legitimate government, which undoubtedly gives it actor capability. The main problem of this republic is its exceptionally sensitive geopolitical position in the heart of the Balkans, burdened by unsettled problems with all neighbors, ethnic and economic problems (Macedonia was the least developed republic of SFRY). Efforts of the international community to avoid broader Balkan conflict that might break out if the civil war on the Yugoslav territories spills over to Macedonia might in fact be the factor that will strengthen its position on the Balkans.

Republic of Serb Krajina was established through secession of the parts of Croatian territory inhabited by Serb population, that under the Cyrus Vance's plan was placed under the UN control. As it is not internationally recognized, while being geographically located on a partly connected area, and therefore highly dependent on economic and other assistance from outside this area, its actor capability may be seriously questioned. Its survival largely depends on the outcome of the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and reliance on the *Serbian Republic*, through which it maintains its territorial continuity. However, it has its own military forces capable of resisting the attempt by Croatia early in 1993 to establish control over its territory, which makes it all but neglectable actor in all future negotiations.

The Serbian Republic was created after decision of the Serbian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina to separate from this republic and establish their own state. Although not internationally recognized and in conflict with the government in Sarajevo and *The Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosna*, it has respectable armed forces and enjoys support by most of the Serbian population, that provide for its actor capability. Unlike the *Republic of Serb Krajina*, the *Serbian Republic* has ample military and economic resources (although dependent on the corridor in northern Bosnia), large population and determined political leadership that managed to date to resist all pressures not only of the international community but also of FR Yugoslavia to accept solutions contained in the Vance-Owen plan.

The Croatian Community Herzeg-Bosna has been established on the territories inhabited by Croatian population in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with military support of armed forces from the Republic of Croatia, on which it mainly borders. Although at the beginning of civil war in this former Yugoslav republic the Bosnian Croats were in alliance with Muslims, they later came into conflict about territories, accompanied with mutual ethnic cleansing, suffering of civilian population and mass-scale destruction.

In addition to the mentioned protagonists of the conflict in Yugoslavia, one should mention other actors that aspire to an independent role, such as Albanian irredentist movement in Kosovo, Muslim separatist movement in Sandžak (Raška), etc. Internationalization of the civil war in Yugoslavia also contributed to involvement in the Yugoslav conflict not only of the Yugoslav, but a large number of regional, European and global political actors, who are in different relations to individual Yugoslav protagonists.

Common to all Yugoslav actors of the conflict (with the exception of Slovenia) is that breakup of Yugoslavia faced them with serious threats to their security, problems referring to economic, social and political transformation into stable democratic and market-based societies, profound economic crisis, moral and border problems (mutually and with neighboring countries), uncertain integration into the European area, and a whole range of other problems. Fragmentation of the Yugoslav economic area brought about the creation of a number of small state, social and economic units, whose ability to deal independently with problems they are facing is substantially reduced due to limited resources at their disposal and to interruption of the long-term mutual economic ties, consequences of civil war, etc. Numerous hard-to-solve problems raised by disintegration of Yugoslavia seriously

dispute the thesis that Yugoslavia represented an artificial and forceful community of nations that could achieve their objectives only by braking away from it.

Possible solutions?

Disintegration of Yugoslavia, state community of the South Slavic nations that for 70 years was the factor of stability in the geopolitically sensitive Balkan area raised in essence two groups of problems.

On the *internal plan* disappearance of Yugoslavia from the political map of Europe *raised national issues of all Yugoslav peoples* for whom Yugoslavia was a compromise solution. Due to complex ethnic geography of the South Slavic area, historic, cultural, confessional, economic and other factors, one can hardly assume that in the foreseeable future most of these national issues could be solved satisfactorily outside the Yugoslav framework. This opens the perspective for long-term ethnic, border and other disputes, both between the newly created states, and with neighboring countries. This might further deteriorate due to inevitable worsening of economic situation of these countries, that will in no way be suitable for creation of democratic and stable political systems and successful market economies. A more likely option is that the mentioned factors will continue to act toward strengthening of authoritarian and populist political ideas, movements and regimes, in which the Balkan history abounds, and that will inevitably look for their legitimacy in militant nationalism, religious fundamentalism and other radical ideologies.

On the *international plan*, disintegration of Yugoslavia again faced the south-eastern Europe with the phenomenon of *balkanization*, i.e. continuous ethnic and territorial conflicts between small Balkan nations, which is frequently only the reflection of much broader political conflicts.[38] As a region that in recent history lacked self-stabilising ability, the Balkans today represents one of the potentially most dangerous focuses of crisis in Europe.[39] According to some foreign analysts, further development of relations in the Balkans will be largely under influence of three broader geopolitical groups in its surrounding: a) Central European group of countries (including the so-called Visegrad triangle); b) Islamic countries and, c) group of Slavic and Orthodox countries (above all Russia).

That is why the leading factors of international relations in Europe (EC, U.S., Russia, CSCE, etc.) could not remain aside the civil war in Yugoslavia. That contributed to its very rapid internationalization, and thus added new elements to the inner logic of this conflict, because very soon Yugoslav protagonists started to adjust their conduct to anticipated reactions of the foreign actors.[40] Internationalization made this conflict much more complex and harder to solve due to contradictory interests of leading international actors and also

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[38] Characteristic example of this view on the civil war in Yugoslavia, above all in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was presented by the Harvard University professor Samuel P. Huntington, who thinks that this conflict indicates the *clash between civilizations* that will replace the ideological conflict between the East and the West. See: Samuel P. Huntington: *The Cold War and its Immediate Aftermath*, paper presented at the conference *The International System After the Collapse of the East-West Order*, Luxembourg, February 1-4, 1993 (photocopied); Samuel P. Huntington: *Clash Between Civilizations, The New York Times*, June 8, 1993.

[39] This assumption is confirmed by numerous analyses of influence that disintegration of Yugoslavia might have on the European security. On this point, see: Roberto Spano (a cura di): *Jugoslavia e Balcani: Una Bomba in Europa*, Franco Angeli, Roma 1992.

[40] For example, when Lord David Owen, chief negotiator to the Balkans for the European Community, gives a press conference or an interview in New York at the United Nations, the Muslims and Serbs respond to it within a matter of hours, and the news media have to deal with that. *The Media and Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World, The Freedom Forum Media Studies Center at the Columbia University in the City of New York*, New York 1993, p. 34.

because they tried to solve an essentially geopolitical conflict through principles of *humanitarian interventionism*, that tried to reduce complex inter-ethnic relations in the Balkans to a simple pattern of conflict between the aggressor and victim.[41] In a nutshell, attempts of international mediation were a mixture between the *humanitarian* and *geopolitical* approach, which reduced their effectiveness and allowed the Yugoslav actors of the crisis to manipulate the views of the international community.

From the geopolitical perspective, one may conclude that possibilities for the solution to the Yugoslav conflict are somewhere between the two extremes: a) implementation of the principle on *radical right of peoples to self-determination* and, b) *restoration of a kind of community on the Yugoslav and Balkan territory*.

Radical implementation of the principle on right of peoples to self-determination during the past course of civil war in Yugoslavia led to fragmentation and creation of a range of miniature states, whose number might eventually further increase as the conflict progresses. Since the military power of these states would play a decisive role in this process, the final outcome of the conflict might lead to creation of three broader state communities on the Yugoslav territory: *Greater Serbia*, probably without Kosovo, but with the extension to parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia; *Greater Croatia*, without parts of the territory inhabited by Serbian population, but with the extension to parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and *Greater Albania*, that would extend to include Kosovo and parts of Montenegro, Macedonia and Greece. Further continuation of war, mass population transfers (ethnic cleansing) and exchange of territories would be the price to pay for this solution, with small chances to preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia and with inevitable revanchism of afflicted peoples and revisionism of most of the Balkan states. That could also mean that the Balkans, after disappearance of Yugoslavia and creation of national states, would be shaped under the influence of three political and confessional *axes*: Central European - Catholic, East European - Orthodox, and Islamic, so that the entire region would become something of a *frontier* between the tree broader geopolitical configurations.[42]

Restoration of Yugoslav and (possible) creation of the Balkan community of nations could contain ethnic and territorial conflicts on the Balkans, but such a solution, in the short-run, is highly unlikely due to effect of historic factors, consequences of atrocities committed during the civil war in Yugoslavia and its broader geopolitical aspects.[43] That is why such a solution would be possible only with the participation of *non-Balkan factors* that would by force check the expansion of conflict and with mass political and economic support to such solution motivate old and new Balkan states to mutual cooperation as the condition of their integration into Europe.[44] The peripheral position of the Balkans and unwillingness of the main actors of international relations to commit themselves to this solution make it very unlikely in the short-run, although it is equally unlikely that stabilization of the Balkans in the long run could be achieved without creation of a regional multilateral security system

[41] As Henry Kissinger pointed out: *In typical Wilsonian fashion, the media see that war not as the expression of real geopolitical differences between two or three groups, but as war caused by bad and evil men. The Media and Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World*, op. cit., p. 27. On this point, see also: Stephen John Stedman: *The New Interventionists, Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 1/1993.

[42] On this point, see: Christopher Cviic: *Remaking the Balkans*, RIIA & Pinter Publishers, London 1991, and: F. Stephen Larrabee: *Emerging Security Orientations in the Former Yugoslavia*, paper presented at the conference *Stability and Instability in Central Europe and New Independent States*, Krakow, August 1992 (photocopied).

[43] The conflict potential of the Balkans is visible not only in the number of unsettled ethnic and territorial issues, but in the above-average degree of armament of the Balkans states. See: Zlatko Isaković: *The Balkan Armed Forces at the End of the Cold War*, paper presented at the conference *Balkan after the end of the Cold War*, IIPE, Belgrade, 11-12 May 1993.

[44] On this point, see: Predrag Simić, Srdan Kerim & Mirko Stojčević (eds.): *Towards a New Community*, Peace and Crisis Management Foundation & Institute of International Politics and Economics, Zug-Belgrade 1992.

and a kind of economic integration of this area. Is the *Balkan CSCE* or the *Balkan Free Trade Zone*[45] only a fiction is the question that yet remains unanswered. However, there is no doubt that progress in inter-regional cooperation of the south of Europe could be possible only after ending of the civil war in the Yugoslav territory and with willingness of the Balkan and non-Balkan factors to commit themselves to such a solution in the way it was done in Western Europe in late 1940's. That would certainly imply the checking of the process of *disindustrialization* of the region as the consequence of war, lifting of international trade embargo[46], and economic assistance under terms similar to the Marshall plan.

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[45] Implementation of the CSCE mechanism (mutual guarantee of inviolability of borders, confidence building measures, multilateral disarmament, etc.) to the solution of the civil war in Yugoslavia and open issues in the relations between the Balkan states, as well as possibility of creating the *Balkan free trade zone* are subjects of considerable controversy and dilemmas, with no answer yet in sight. See: *Balkans After the Cold War, Review of International Affairs*, No. 1016-17, Belgrade, May-June 1993.

[46] Economic sanctions of the UN Security Council, in addition to Serbia and Montenegro, also affect the neighboring countries, by severing their natural economic connections and reducing the volume of inter-regional trade and trade with neighboring regions. Creation of regional economic groups in the neighborhood, e.g. the *Visegrad Group* or the *Black Sea Zone* indicate that such solutions, under certain conditions, could be applied in the Balkan area.

Radovan Vukadinović

CROATIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND EUROPE

For all new European states (from the former
Soviet Union as well as from those of former Yugoslavia) 1/
the European alternative is most significant. There is
no country that does not count on Europe in its vision
of future prosperity. Europe is regarded as a ticket to
optimal solution for economic, social and military issues.
It also represents an effective Western model of
development which former socialist countries want to

apply as soon as possible. It might be claimed that this image of a developed Europe, its prosperity, its effective institutions and democratic freedoms were constant motivation for seeking changes which have brought about the inner collapse of the socialist model of relations.)

At present, with the borders of the newly created countries mostly defined, there is the question to what extent it will be possible to integrate all those new post-communist countries into Europe and its developed political, economic and military institutions.

During the cold war, Europe was ideologically, politically, economically and militarily divided into the West and the East. Nowadays, ideology as the grounds for this division has disappeared, there are no military and political polarisations, but there are still differences between the East and the West. They are manifested primarily in economic development and the civilisational levels.

There have been some gloomy predictions about the developmental prospects of the East, stressing the impossibility of a faster economic development and catching up with Europe. It has even been claimed that the civilisational gap might widen 2 and the problems facing post-communist countries become even more pronounced. Lower production, unemployment, inflation, a drop in living standards and a loss of faith in a better future might provoke malcontent and rage of the people who obviously are not willing to postpone the realization of the vision of a better life after many years of self-sacrifice and waiting.

The demands for setting up a sort of a new Marshall plan have not given fruit. Considering the depth of the crisis in the former Soviet Union, it is clear that the bulk of the support of

believed West ... to be ... ... that in ... the existence of nuclear weapons on the territory of four former Soviet republics, the possibility of the outbreak of ethnic hostilities, the operation of fifty nuclear plants scattered all over the vast territory (i.e. possible targets in a military confrontation) is a nightmare for all Western statesmen. It is symptomatic that even in time of a recession, the launching of aid for former Soviet republics did not provoke criticism, either in the USA or in European countries.

The priority of the former super power and the possible dangers emerging on its territory are a reason enough to make the former Soviet republics the foremost recipients of Western aid. Regardless of the sufficiency of the resources and the time necessary before any results are felt, it is more than certain that this order of foreign policy priorities is not to change.[3]

The second on the list are the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, and only then former Yugoslav republics. Dramatic events on the former Yugoslav territory, the war and all its consequences represent additional elements which might lead to a dangerous widening of economic and civilisational differences not only between the countries of the East and those of the West, but also between those in Central Europe.[4]

Although they are facing enormous economic and social hardships, countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary are nevertheless in a better position as they have had no war, destruction, human or material losses. Their efforts to gain entry into Europe (which occasionally reach euphoric heights) should be seen in a different light as their situation may be called normal and only requires intensive work and time to bridge the gap separating these countries from the West.

However, those countries have had to accept it ... will not be any Marshall plan which would automatically help the East. The order of the priorities has been established with the Soviet republics on the top. In the new post-cold war conditions there is no use in invoking solidarity, ethics and justice. The collapse of the socialist model has brought about new relations in which there are no enemies and which are founded on national interest and profit. Such interests and profits are most optimal if mutual...

Some people claim that the world of today is in need of creating a new world order with strong mechanisms of common action which would bridge the existing gap in Europe. However, European realities should be taken into account. They indicate that the developed part of the continent with its solidified prosperity is not yet willing to adopt decisions and programmes which would mark the beginning of the process of building the new Europe. Such Europe should be less split in its economic principles and create conditions for other forms of social, political and cultural infrastructure.[5]

The challenges from the East and the so called new democracies, the former Soviet and Yugoslav republics appeared for the European policy planners sudenly and unexpectedly.

In the former days of European cold war division, everything looked simpler and easier. There were two Europes. In the rich and developed Western Europe, developmental trends could have been planned unimpeded by unforeseen and unanticipated factors. The transformations in the East and its wish to join Europe as soon as possible have somewhat slowed down the process of west-European integration. Some sceptic observers of the European Community integration have pointed out that "1992 will happen,

... ... a ... ...
development made up in Brussels seek possibilities of a gradual
rapprochement of the East and the West. These visions are
partial, almost marginal, and they recommend patience.

The concept of the so called three Europes has appeared in
this context. Such Europe should be a sort of a global plan for
future European action. The First Europe would include the
European Community member countries plus those western countries
which are soon to join them (Austria, Norway, Sweden, Finland and
Switserland). The Second Europe would include the Baltic Soviet
republics, Central European countries up to Slovenia and Croatia,
while the Third Europe would include the countries to the east of
the so called Second Europe. Claiming that this division is based
on economic, religious, cultural and civilisational traditions,
the advocates of this approach through this concept give clues as
to the time envisaged for building an integrated Europe.

The construction of Western Europe should be completed in a
few years; the Second Europe would get a chance to join Europe
(i.e. European Community) at the beginning of the 21st century
(The Centre for economic development studies in Brussells
anticipates that Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary may become
European Community members in twenty years. (Polityka Warszawa,
Oct 17, 1992), while the Third Europe would have to wait twenty
to thirty years more. Although this concept may seem voluntary as
it has not been officially proclaimed, it is obvious it
represents the foundations for the new European relations. It
also ranks post-communist countries.

Croatian foreign policy within European cooperation and

security

The effectiveness and success of Croatian foreign policy, like every foreign policy, originates to a great extent from a country's economic might and position. Looking back on the pre-war period, no economic analysis would be necessary to prove that Croatia had by far the most favourable position in comparison with all other new European nations. Relatively developed, situated along the major north-south, west-east communication line, Croatia should have been a major crossroads of air, sea and road communication. Abounding in magnificent natural scenery and having relatively developed tourism, Croatia could have significantly expanded this branch of industry (modelled after Portugal and Turkey), while agriculture could have satisfied the country's needs and produce some surpluses for export. By a careful selection of profitable industries and enterprises, Croatia might have quickly achieved the standard of the lower ranks of the European Community member countries.

But war and destruction, probably deliberately inflicted by the aggressor in order to weaken Croatia and bring it into economic dire straits, has changed this. Because of such decreased economic power, Croatian foreign policy must pay more attention to the need of quickly joining Europe.

Croatia should make good use of the great moral capital it has gained in this war. The majority of international political and public opinion is on Croatia's side which has been attacked and has paid a high price for its freedom. Croatia must constantly explain what is happening in this region and must point out that Croatia belongs into Europe and that it follows European political, economic and democratic precepts. Croatia has always been in Europe, territorially and culturally. The question is only of how and when to join all European developments and

an aggression. Not only is Croatia but all of Croatia is a part of Europe. Croatian foreign policy ought to put more emphasis on that European identity and the necessity of solving the turmoils in former Yugoslavia by means of European instruments and institutions. In that respect, the European Community engagement (politically at first, and then by sending observers) was the right move which unmistakably pushed Croatia into Europe, demonstrating that the most powerful European institution must be interested in what is going on in this part of the continent.

Viewing Europe as its homeland and the continent with the biggest number of major foreign policy partners, Croatian foreign policy must build a coherent strategy of European politics, action. It should include:

- the setting, the meaning and the ties between Croatia and Europe as an integral entity;

- the fact that the European integration processes are Europe's present and future; Croatia should, therefore, use every opportunity to approach the institutions and mechanisms of European integration;

- the need to use miscellaneous European institutions as the arena for promoting Croatian interests and seeking allies in crises;

- through cooperation with European partners and institutions, Croatia should secure an active role in the UN and become a recognized participant in international relations.

In such long-term European action strategy, Croatian foreign policy should realize its political, economic and security goals. Thus, the Republic of Croatia will enhance its position as a democratic European nation.

... intereuropean cooperation. Neither Croatia nor any of the five post-communist countries will be given a chance to join the European integration in the near future. Bearing this in mind, all possible forms of cooperation which might promote economic integration with Europe should be practised.

Within the possible forms of cooperation in former Yugoslavia, in developing relations with the neighbours, in using some of the existing forms of European regional linkage, Croatia should take an active part and come out with own initiatives. The former instrument of regional action, the Alpen-Adria, which used to be a specific form of cooperation at the time of European division, should be given a new lease of life. As this organization includes regions, Croatian foreign policy should speedily secure places in it for two or three Croatian regions, maintaining cooperation and demonstrating its continuous interest. Full membership should also be won in the Hexagonal in which some changes might, perhaps, be made to include all these states. The conditions and results of the cooperation within the Trilateral (Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary) should also be reconsidered to see if there are possibilities for expanding it into a sort of a central European organization.

All these forms of regional activities cannot replace the broader European vision, particularly the wish to join Europe. However, until this ultimate goal is achieved, all the exisiting European instruments and means should be exploited, among which is the possible future cooperation on the territory of former Yugoslavia, regional European cooperation, and, by all means, an active stance towards the EFTA. Regardless of the

organization of highly developed European nations.

All these forms of economic integration are not sole of interest to Croatia which today covets economic cooperation and integration. This so called lower level of economic integration is fostered by the European Community which in this sees the opportunity for certain countries and regions to join their forces in common actions and solve common problems. The European Community has so far clearly showed its willingness to support such forms of economic integration as a part of its strategy towards post-communist countries.

Croatia must show its capacity for adapting itself to European economic conditions. It must show the degree of evolution necessary for becoming a full member of the European Community. This it can do by adopting free market mechanisms, fostering democracy, respecting human rights, accepting all European standards and expanding its economic cooperation. Having in mind the steps - regional cooperation, associate membership and, finally, full membership - Croatian foreign policy must use every opportunity for an active participation in all bodies that promote cooperation. It must acknowledge the need for a broad international action strengthening all forms of economic, scientific, cultural, social, ecological and universal pan-European integration. It is the best way and the best reccommendation for the day when Croatia will be in the position to become one of the yellow stars on the blue European flag.

Politics. The European Council represents the focus of action and the venue for entering the European Community. Some of the new democracies have already become full members. Croatia is for the time being an associate member soon to become a full

... the top-level European presentation of Croatian attitudes and views of European relations. In case of need, Croatia can once again ask Europe for help in solving internal problems.

The high standards set up by the European Council for the membership are the best proof of the degree of democratic development a new member has achieved. Thus, the membership has a multiple political meaning. It will provide Croatia with an opportunity for careful monitoring and active participation in building the new Europe. The Council is also a place for political support of all those processes conducive to integrating and unifying Europe,7 in which Croatia can and must find its place.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which tried to find the solution to Yugoslav crisis from the very beginning, has been the best indicator of the evolution of European political thinking. From giving support to the existence of an integral state, to pointing out the need for a peaceful solution of the conflict to the condemnation of the aggression and offering full membership to Croatia, the CSCE, despite all these meanderings, has confirmed its status as a major political mechanism. The CSCE principles, particularly those concerning human rights and changing borders by force, have remained a significant milestone for solving political issues. Together with the European Council standards, this represents a solid political foundation for building the new Europe.

Due to its links with non-European countries (the USA and Canada) and its inclusion of the Asian Soviet republics, the CSCE is a significant political factor. It is clear that this institution will only gain in importance.

... as the ever increasing need to create a body whose task would be solving conflicts between post-communist countries, will turn the CSCE into an indispensable political instrument of multilateral cooperation. As Croatia is to have to a certain extent the same political problems with its neighbours, both of these institutions will be important as a means of continual political monitoring.

Security. The demands for protecting national security will be dominant. This is not characteristic of Croatia only but of numerous post-communist countries that bring with them into Europe their problems and conflicts. That is why the new European relations must be arranged in a way which would protect the main protagonists' security, as well as guarantee that their behaviour will not endanger the foundations of European peace and security.

Surely, post-communist countries are not soon to join the European Community and integrate into Europe. Surely, a European mechanism of collective security is not to be established soon. Having in mind all the discussions about security issues going on within NATO and the efforts to create a single European structure of political, economic and military relations in the new, integrated Europe, it is obvious that these are lengthy processes which, at this stage, will leave the new European countries, including Croatia, mostly on the margins.

Because of the war in Croatia and the still unstable situation, it is understandable that Croatia will be particularly interested in developing the kind of relations that might fortify its national security. Due to the geografical position and all the dangers that come with it, the war and its aftermath, Croatia is vitally interested in creating a security system enabling it

... international ... guarantees.

Croatia should go on with developing its own military forces which have proved to be well-organized, highly motivated and capable of standing up to a much stronger enemy. At the same time, Croatian foreign policy will have to seek not only political, but military allies. After all that Croatia has been through it is obvious that the relations with Serbia will not improve to the extent that dangers and threats will vanish. Dangers and threats may be manifested in the form of anti-Croatian forces, terrorist groups or forays of a limited military character. As the bordering regions are extensive and with the majority Serbian population, this problem remains an open security threat for many years to come.

Considering possible changes in international constellation or certain relations on the Balkans, it is likely that new relations might be formed which could affect the position of Croatia and its security. As some of the major economic orientations of Croatia, communications and tourism, might be directly threatened by these activities, it is clear that security is Croatian priority requiring macro and micro level solutions.

Subregionalism. The forms of international cooperation in which Croatia has taken part (the Alpen-Adria) or those in which it is to take part (the Hexagonal) will not suffice to solve political and security issues. Even in case of the creation of an alliance of foremer Yugoslav republics (Slovenia, Croatia, part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia), such an alliance could not meet the security requirements. Although it might represent the shield against Serbian aggressive politics, its scope would

[...] have broader motivational force beyond the [...] modular territory.

As all new European states are searching for the framework of their security, Croatian foreign policy must be active in such common effort of establishing its security and the new European system.

The efforts on part of some post-communist countries within the Trilateral (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary) to create a system of consultations about military questions is only an indicator of the potential joint action of these three Central European countries. On the other hand, the military cooperation has been left on the margins, as the Trilateral predominantly focuses on the political harmonization of attitudes which has been manifested in the joint political actions concerning former Yugoslavia.

This association of independent countries has been paralyzed by varying efforts; on the one hand, centralists who would like to see the military as the hub of the security system, and on the other, advocates of referring security into the domain of national states.

Besides all the initiatives accompanying subregional security linkage, Croatia should pay particular attention to the central military instrument in Europe: NATO.

NATO. All new European states see it as the hard core of European security, tested by time, successfully integrating sixteen Western countries plus the USA and Canada. Despite all the changes undergone by international relations in the last few years, the East is still firmly convinced of the necessity of the existence of that instrument of military and political action. It

would be wise for the countries that have helped the new socialist away to approach this organization.

When the tendencies of new democracies became obvious, NATO at first kept its distance, being first and foremost weary of Soviet reactions. It was openly claimed in the NATO circles that nothing must be done which might interfere with the Soviet interests in Eastern Europe and that no heed should be given to the desires of East European countries. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation of the Union of Independent States and the final debacle of the global Soviet politics, NATO changed its attitude, though it still kept its distance.

The fifteen new republics on the territory of former Soviet Union and the prospects of the creation of ten more within Russia, the unresolved issues in East European countries and the catharsis on the territory of former Yugoslavia are sufficient to dampen any NATO's appetites directed at strengthening cooperation with the new democracies.

Rapprochement between the East and NATO is seen as a desire of these states to join Europe and put all their crises and conflicts on the NATO agenda, even to ensure its direct involvement. NATO does not want it and there are no chances that this attitude might soon change.

What may be expected and has already been put into practice is the cooperation of certain NATO departments with the new democracies, the establishment of the Consultative Council within which the consultations have commenced. Although these are primarily political forms of action, it is obvious that NATO has made first tentative steps in the direction of the East.

During recent years more and more of them are becoming anxious to get guaranteed from NATO ... but nothing comes out of it. Notions of the so called associate membership have not been favourably received in Brussels. A display of a bigger interest in developing relations with the East and in the operation of the Consultative Council as the linking body between NATO and the East, are for the time being the main forms of cooperation which might sometime in the future lead to the full membership of some East European countries.

Having its national security in mind, Croatia must keep a watchful eye on all respectful developments and try not to lag behind other new democracies. There is hardly a new European state in a bigger need of a protection mechanism anyway. Croatia should work on all those areas where it is possible to make at least initial contacts which would later lead to contacts on higher levels.

At some future higher stage of European relations, based on NATO as the guarantee of comprehensive European security, Croatia must be among the first members. Free of all ideological restraints, never looking back or holding on to some schemes about the character of political and military ties, Croatia must see in NATO the most powerful mechanism of its protection and European security.

The West European Union. As an organization that has a rather undefined role, particularly within the new European development, it has felt a chance to win a new status in the transformations taking place in the East as a go-between between NATO and the European Community. It has expressed its readiness for an active approach to certain crises within the former socialist bloc, for example, interceding in the possible conflict

between Croatia and Hungary. Austria and Italy Croatia[?] has also worked on a plan for being handed as emergency interventions.

However, neither the further expansion of conflicts on the territory of former Yugoslavia, nor the intensity of the destruction have provoked direct activity of the WEU. In any case we may expect the WEU to retain an important place in the search for a comprehensive new system of European security. It has not been established yet. It will include NATO, WEU, CSCE and the new forms of European integration within the ranks of the European Community.

Therefore, Croatian foreign policy must take into consideration the range of activities of the WEU. In case it shows willingness for opening towards the East and for accepting the new European countries, Croatia must immediately show its interest.

The European security system within European integration should be established parallelly with increasing economic, political and military linkage of the European Community members. The Maastricht agreement has opened doors to the major process which should be completed before the end of the century and in which not only the European Community members, and all new European countries from the Baltic to the Adriatic, but also former Soviet republics are interested.

The chance for a fast development, better life and more human freedoms, all the new European states see in the European integration, i.e. the European Community. Concerning the grave internal situation and all the benefits ensuing from the membership, the new European states are willing to accept all the criteria set up by the European Community, among which is the

... the form of future political and military linkage.

If such developments do occur in Europe and the European Community opens open wide to the new countries it would facilitate the functioning of the European security system. The integrated European countries and the new integrative components, which should be incorporated before 1999, would suffice to create a system that would guarantee security to all the members of the new and considerably larger European Community.

This process, however, will undoubtedly take time and be hampered by military, political and economic obstacles. Both NATO, which is in no hurry to step up its activities towards the East and refuses any possibility of accepting the new European states in its ranks, and the European Community toe the same line. Aware of this, certain post-communist countries have come up with various conceptions which should bring their countries closer to the central European institutions.

In seeking guarantees Hungary uses as an argument the proximity of the perilous situation in former Yugoslavia. Bulgaria mentions the Serbian danger and the need to stop Islam. Albania also mentions the Serbian danger, and the Baltic states the possible conflict with the deployed Russian troops, while Ukraine wants to be protected from its neighbours.

Having all these requests in mind on the one hand, and on the other the very cold attitude of NATO and the European Community, Polish president proposed the establishment of NATO-A and NATO-B as well as of the European Community-A and European Community-B. Using the traditional Polish internal political paradigm which divides Poland into two parts, the more developed

and the less developed. Nations broke down two directions within the two military organizations. The first, NATO-A and the European Community-A, would include all the present members of these organizations, while the other, the so called second division, would include European post-communist countries. The concept launched on the eve of Walesa's departure to Germany [?] was not, however, enthusiastically received in those organizations, making it clear that they are not to change their attitudes on cooperation. Particularly obvious is their insistence on long membership entry wait.

All this applies to Croatia which is going to share the same fate. Although the European Community is politically present on the territory of former Yugoslavia through its efforts to solve Yugoslav crisis, through sending its observers and through arranging the Conference in Brussells, this does not mean that Croatia could be soon allowed into the European Community. This calls for an intensive development of all types of relations with the European Community, a careful implementation of the criteria required for the entry and the establishment of the conditions necessary for Croatia to be among the first group admitted into the European Community. Economic and political reasons as well as the present European Community engagement are conducive to this.

If the European Community is to be expanded on this basis and the security system established, it would be a significant move towards the creation of a European security system based on integration. Croatia would not have any problems to incorporate its security and to participate with other new countries in the integral model of European security.

This remains the long-term goal; it is essential to move into that direction and stress the willingness and the openness

its political, economic and security aspects.

Unlike the mentioned forms of security action which has or should have its distinct and concrete political and military structure, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe/CSCE has not defined its activities. This sole form of pan-European security and cooperation which has territorially expanded to include a part of Asia (former Soviet Asian republics) and considerably increased its membership (from thirty-five to fifty-two) is the most comprehensive instrument for solving the issues of security and cooperation in Europe and part of Asia.

In the post-coldwar period and at the time of searching for the new world order, the CSCE satisfies all the requirements necessary for becoming the centre of activities built around European security. Several facts corroborate this.

a) CSCE is by far the most numerous European (partly North American and Asian) international organization with a political mechanism which should promote security and cooperation.

b) all these mechanisms were established at the time when the world was still rife with cold war and its divisions. True, the agreements made before and after Helsinki are evidence that various states are willing to adopt certain basic principles of international life and incorporate them in their activities.

c) the results achieved up to now in security and cooperation, outlined in the Final Helsinki Act and the Paris Charter, confirm that CSCE on the whole is an international body, capable of further development, of which the increase in number of member countries and their constant interest in cooperation is an unimistakable evidence.

9. At the time when European integration, as the process which would encompass all European states, is still far from complete and when the existing military organizations of the West do not intend to broaden the scope of action, it is obvious that CSCE can be the link among the various organizations (NATO, WEU and EC), whose political and military aspects will channel their activities. For all CSCE member states, the principles and provisions of the Helsinki Act and the Paris Charter must represent the minimum of action determining their behaviour in Europe and the world. It is a code of behaviour that has a particular value as the foundation for the parallel existence of states and their guarantee of rights and responsibilites within the new European and international system. Though that system has not been perfected and is still far from being able to offer direct assistance in the form of collective security, it nevertheless represents the beginning of the European security system. Or, as some authors claim, CSCE is a system of European security "in statu nascendi".10

For the new European countries, particularly Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina that have been and are still being ravaged by war, joining such a system is important in itself. It proves that the new states have been recognized but at the same time it is a relatively mild guarantee that their international activities, including security and cooperation, will be promoted.

At present it seems that CSCE might enter a higher stage of development. It should insist on accepting bilateral agreements which would govern the relations between the countries. Based on the CSCE provisions, these bilateral agreements should strengthen ties between neighbours, attaching special value to the CSCE provisions. In this way CSCE would inspire its member countries

of their interaction and, at the same time and in accordance with the state of their relations, to strive toward admitting European-style relations. Because of the present state of the relations between Croatia and its neighbours and the possible turmoils in the future, it is evident that this bilateral mechanism of duties and responsibilities would occupy an important place in developing international cooperation, particularly among neighbouring countries.

The CSCE should also now take a more active stand in implementing the already established CSCE mechanisms. It was Yugoslav crisis and the beating about the bush that revealed the depth of the misunderstanding of the situation, since the CSCE mechanisms were very slowly set into motion. Only after the Serbian aggression in Bosnia and Hertegovina had peaked, did CSCE reach the consensus and exclude the Belgrade government from further discussions about the crisis.

The Viennese Centre for Crisis Prevention should simultaneously enlarge its range of activities in order to move from the question of disarmament to the considerations of broader aspects of security (migrations, national minorities, unchageability of corders, ecological disasters). All these factors may directly affect the outbreak of new predicaments that migh threaten European security.

As a full member of CSCE Croatia must actively participate in the effort at implementing all provisions as its vital interests rest with the application of the contents of the major CSCE documents.

Finally, the creation of a special body within CSCE that would deal with Eastern and Central Europe should be proposed. It

is clear that there will be constant tensions and frictions on the territories of former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. Unless these territories are not covered by CSCE action, European security will be constantly jeopardized with new forms of destabilization. This calls for the establishment of a regional mechanism or mechanisms that would take care that certain tensions in these most sensitive regions do not turn into open conflicts. All CSCE provisions about security would thus find its application and prevent the outbreak of crises.

All this is of a singular importance for Croatia, which must perceive security in a broader sense, i.e. not only as absence of fear of being attacked, but as a category which is not achieved only by military means. Security means the existence of armed forces sufficient for defence but it also means an organized effort to raise cultural and educational levels, strengthen two-way relations (particularly with the neighbours) and national economy, develop democracy, freedoms, and human rights, including minorities' rights. This creates the security framework of ever increasing significance for the new European relations.

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Developing its cooperation in Europe and setting up the foundations for European integration with other new European countries, Croatia's foreign policy should pay attention to the United Nations, whose member it has become. That major international political forum, whose membership is the ultimate sign of recognition of a new state by the international community, is the broadest form of action for promoting the right of a sovereign state. All the roads to international cooperation lead to the UN and its specialized organizations (eventually to

those financial and economic ties with Western Europe as a way of joining the mainstream of international relations.

Croatia, a new state, in its development of democracy and its international activities, must prove itself a worthy member of the UN, the big family of united nations.

Croatian foreign policy must find its inspiration and the memento in the specific wartime conditions in which Croatian state was born. It would be a reminder of what to do never to find itself exposed to such destruction again. Peace, security, and prosperity must be the main goals of Croatian foreign policy. Croatia, as a relatively small European country, must find its place within the group of sovereign and democratic states pursuing meaningful and coordinated policies.

NOTES:

1. Paul Shoup: Titoism and the national question in Yugoslavia: a reassessment in The Disintegration of Yugoslavia; Martin van de Houvel and Jan G. Siccama (ed.); Amsterdam-Atlanta, 1992, pp. 71-72.

2. Teresa Los Nowak: Poland and the Process of European Integration, in Transnational Future of Europe; Ziemowit Jacek Petras and Mark Pietras (ed.); Lublin 1992, p. 524.

3. See: Buzan, Kelstrup, Lomaitre, Tromer and Weaver: The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post Cold War Era; Copenhagen 1990.

4. K. Krzysztofek: Wizje swiata: uniwersalim contra pluralism; Sprawy Miedzynarodowe, 1990, no. 7-8, p. 111.

5. Gary Marks: Structural Policy in the European Community, in EUROPOLITICS: Institutions and Policymaking in the "New" European Community; Albert M. Sbragia (ed.); Washington 1992, pp. 218-219.

6. Radovan A. Leinovid: Uvod u Mtadar Evrope: Izdanja: Zagreb 1990, p. 301.

7. Simon Serfaty: Understanding Europe: The Politics of Unity: London 1992, p. 170.

8. Radovan Vukadinovid: The Break-up of Yugoslavia: Threats and Challenges: Clingendael Institute, The Hague 1992, p. 26.

9. Polityka: Warszawa April 11, 1992.

10. Adam Daniel Rotfeld: Europejski system bezpieczenstwa in statu nascendi: Warszawa 1991.

Roberto Zadra

(D R A F T   —   N O T   F O R   C I R C U L A T I O N)

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Introduction

Criticism of Western action/inaction in the Yugoslav crisis does not only come from the Arab world, but it also exists in Western public opinion. Not only articles in newspapers, magazines and specialist journals frequently ask for a more active role of the West in terms of conflict prevention and/or crisis management in former Yugoslavia (e.g. Bosnia-Hercegowina, Kosovo, Macedonia), but also government officials and high-ranking negotiators have from time to time openly criticised inadequacies of Western policies (e.g. Lord Carrington, Cyrus Vance), and some of them either resigned or were forced to resigne from their positions. It is only a few days ago that another (the fourth) US-official dealing with the Yugoslav crisis announced his resignation: Mr. Stephen Walker from the State Department wrote in a letter to the Secretary of State that "genocide is taking place again in Europe, yet we, the European Community and the rest of the international community stand by and watch" (IHT 25/8/1993). These are undoubtedly sharp words, but is this criticism correct?

The following pages do not pretend to give a comprehensive answer to this question, but they rather contribute to a partial answer by concentrating on one of the various institutions involved in the Yugoslav crisis: the Western European Union (WEU). It will first briefly present and analyse the efforts which WEU has made in the last two years over the issue and then draw some conclusions which will among others address the criticism reported above with regard to an inadequacy and/or

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The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the organisation for which he works.

insufficiency of Western (in our case: WEU) policy in the crisis.

WEU's involvment in the Yugoslav crisis

The first time that the WEU Council of Ministers issued a public statement over the deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia was in June 1991: Foreign Ministers meeting in Vianden (Luxembourg) expressed their "deep concern at the current turn of events in Yugoslavia" and appealed "to all the political authorities in Yugoslavia to avoid all confrontation, to refrain from the use of force and to resume the dialogue with a view to securing the unity of the State" (Vianden, 27/6/1991). Since that time, only two years have passed, but during those two years the situation changed dramatically (no more unitary state, but recognition of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegowina and Macedonia as successor states), and WEU has developed a significant amount of activities which attempted to contribute to effective crisis management.

Between June 1991 and June 1993, five regular meetings of the **WEU Council of Ministers**, all including declarations on the Yugoslav crisis, and six extraordinary meetings of the WEU Ministerial Council, five of them dealing exclusively with the situation in Yugoslavia, were held (see table 1). Apart from those meetings at ministerial level, during the last two years

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table 1:   meetings of the WEU Council of Ministers dealing with
           the Yugoslav crisis, June 1991-June 1993
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27 June	1991	Vianden	
19 September	1991	The Hague	(extraordinary)
30 September	1991	Bruxelles	(extraordinary)
29 October	1991	Bonn	(extraordinary)
18 November	1991	Bonn	
19 June	1992	Petersberg	
10 July	1992	Helsinki	(extraordinary)
28 August	1992	London	(extraordinary)
20 November	1992	Rome	
5 April	1993	Luxembourg	(extraordinary)
19 May	1993	Rome	

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source: Western European Union, Secretariat, Bruxelles, 1993

most sub-organs of WEU have had dozens of meetings in which the Yugoslav crisis was discussed and proposals for action were elaborated. The **Permanent Council** of WEU, meeting first in London and since January 1993 in Bruxelles at ambassadorial level, constantly followed the evolving situation: almost every meeting had the Yugoslav situation on its working agenda, and several meetings were almost exclusively dedicated to the crisis. The WEU organ which has followed the evolution of the conflict with perhaps most political and military attention was the **Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia**. The ad hoc group is made out of high-ranking specialists from the ministries of foreign affairs and from the ministries of defence, and it first met in September 1991; since then, it held a meeting almost every month in average, and the frequency seems augmenting rather than diminishing (4 meetings in 1991, 11 meetings in 1992 and already 9 meetings in the first half of 1993). Apart from the permanent Council and the Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia, other organs of WEU involved in extensive discussions of the crisis were, among others, the **Planning Cell**, the **Contingency Planning Group** and the **Mediterranean Subgroup**, as well as **groups of military and of naval experts** (the latter group for example dealt with the embargo in the Adriatic). It seems quite evident that, without the intense and regular work of all these and other sub-organs, WEU would not have been able to analyse the Yugoslav crisis and to develop proposals for proper joint political and military action.

In order to better understand the dynamics of the involvment of WEU in the Yugoslav crisis, it is useful to take a closer look at the decisions made in some of the various regular and extraordinary meetings of the Council of Ministers which were held during the last two years (regular meetings are usually held twice a year, in-between and at the end of the Presidency which a member country holds for one year). The four Ministerial Councils held between June 1991 and November 1991 (see table 1) did not yet lead to any significant direct involvment of WEU into the management of the crisis in Yugoslavia, but they were rather preparatory meetings in the sense that the various existing

national perceptions of the crisis, of its relevance for European security and of its potential political and military consequences for WEU had first to be discussed together in order to perhaps lead to any potential subsequent joint action (the ministerial decision taken in The Hague to create the Ad Hoc Group on Yugoslavia which among others discussed potential military action must also be seen as a measure in this context).

In 1992 however WEU's involvment in the Yugoslav crisis increased significantly, particularly after the extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers held in Helsinki on 10 July, when ministers decided the "surveillance of the embargo set by UNSC Resolutions 713 and 757" under Italian coordination (Italy also had the WEU Presidency at the time) in the Adriatic. During the following months these embargo operations in the Adriatic were further strengthened, especially after a new UNSC resolution and with the Ministerial Council of 20 November (Rome), when embargo enforcement measures involving "warships and aircraft of WEU member states" and including "stop and search actions and other mesures as necessary" were decided. These embargo operations were increasingly co-ordinated with NATO (who has also been building up a similar operation in the Adriatic, north of WEU's area of action), and on 8 June 1993 (one year later, sic!), both NATO and WEU Councils jointly approved a combined concept of operations including a single command and control arrangement "under the authority of the Councils of both organizations" (this new joint operation was now called 'Operation Sharp Guard'). One month later, on 28 August, Foreign and Defence Ministers met again at the margins of the London Conference on former Yugoslavia, and in a communique they stated their willingness to increase efforts of WEU and of its member states for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the population in Bosnia-Hercegowina, for a supervision of heavy weapons in Bosnia-Hercegowina and for strengthening the effectiveness of the embargo in the Adriatic (assistance to Danube riparian states was also mentioned as a possibility for the first time and then repeated in Rome in November).

1993 brought a further increase of WEU's efforts in contributing to manage the crisis in Yugoslavia, both in political and in military terms. Further measures for an embargo enforcement were analysed and the creation of security zones was considered (in March WEU Council presents to UN Secretariat his plans for a security zone around Sarajevo). At the extraordinary WEU Council on 5 April in Luxembourg, ministers "offered their concrete support to the riparian states by means of the organisation of a police and customs operation on the Danube", a measure which had been raised already in August 1992 (London) and which since then had been thoroughly prepared in various WEU sub-organs (e.g. Ad Hoc Group, Contingency Planning Group). This offer was elaborated further in the following weeks (in May UNSC Resolutions 820 on embargo enforcement and 824 on security zones were adopted), and on 9 June of this year, WEU announced that its offer "is now being put into effect as Memoranda of Understanding between WEU and the individual riparian States have been signed". According to the Press release, the embargo measures will include about three hundred civilian officials (Customs and Police Officers) from member States with up to eleven patrol boats and this mission "may include the halting and/or diversion of shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations". This operation has now been in place since three months.

Conclusions

Coming back to the question posed above (whether the West has not done enough in trying to solve the Yugoslav crisis), at least as WEU is concerned. Of course, any evaluation depends from which point of view one starts: if one believes that Western nations and international institutions should impose peace in the area (as the US official quoted above seems to believe), then Western efforts in general and WEU's efforts in particular must be judged as insufficient since much more could have been done. On the other hand, if one believes that the outside world can or should not try to exclusively manage the Yugoslav conflict (see

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for this the WEU Assembly Report 1342, in which the Rapporteur
Goerens (French) concludes that "all the western governments are
equally anxious to limit their military commitment on the
territory of former Yugoslavia and not to become involved in a
conflict that they do not feel they have the means to control.
(..) They cannot do much more without running the risk of
becoming embroiled in a cruel conflict to which they cannot
impose a solution"), then WEU's efforts made so far will be
judged in more positive terms. What is certainly true is that
WEU's work has been continuously increasing during the last two
years, one must conclude that both in quantitative terms (e.g.
creation of groups dealing with Yugoslavia + frequency of
meetings/Councils) and in qualitative terms (from embargo
monitoring to embargo enforcement in the Adriatic + Danube
embargo + towards guarantee of security zones) the organisation
has so far increasingly contributed to the management of the
crisis. Whether this trend will continue also in future remains
of course to be seen, but let us for the time being constate
that, so far, this has been the case. (say something on
Zadra/Silvestri-idea).

Finally, a few words on the relations between WEU and NATO
and between WEU and the United Nations. Those who followed the
activities of WEU and NATO during the first year of the embargo
in the Adriatic might have received the impression that both
organizations were competing with each other in terms of
competences and in promoting their respective roles as relevant
post Cold War security organisations in Europe. In fact, the way
and the timing in which both organisations set up their
respective operations in the Adriatic were perhaps creating this
impression. However, one has to take into account that
inexperience and pressure to demonstrate their respective
relevance in crisis management in post-Cold War Europe (this
pressure exists for both WEU and NATO, but it is perhaps stronger
in NATO: perception that "succeed in Yugoslavia or die" does
exist in NATO but I don't think it is perceived in these terms
in WEU) contributed to their initial relatively poor coordination

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of action. However, this situation changed considerably with passing of time and led to the joint 'Operation Sharp Guard' in June 1993.

With the United Nations on the contrary the 'spirit of competition' was less evident, even if the UN is now increasingly involved as an active player with regard to European security issues (particularly with the advent of the Yugoslav crisis but perhaps also in future potential crises in the East and South). However, so far WEU has always been keen in first having a new resolution pushed through in the UN Security Council before it accepted to become more actively engaged (this is true for all three main discussions held: embargo monitoring + enforcement in the Adriatic, embargo on the Danube, creation of security zones). Furthermore, during the last two years contacts on various levels have significantly increased between WEU and the UN (e.g. through the WEU Presidency and through exchanges of letters between the Secretary Generals of WEU and the UN), and in almost all WEU Ministerial Council declarations and communiques a reference is included that WEU actions are in accordance with respective UNSC resolutions and therefore in the spirit of article 53 of the UN Charta. Finally, it needs to be mentioned that there is an ongoing discussion, with different schools of thought, on the question whether WEU is a regional arrangement (according to Chapter VIII of the UN Charta) or whether WEU is able to decide over military actions without a prior UN consensus (according to Chapter VII of UN Charta: particularly article 51 of UN Charta and article VIII.3 of the Modified Brussels Treaty), but it seems that the two interpretations must be seen as complementary rather than as mutually exclusive (see forthcoming Vierrucci Chaillot Paper).

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ITALY'S POLICY
TOWARDS
THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS

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1. Introduction

Italy has, for the last year, been wracked by serious political and institutional crisis, to which no certain outcome can as yet be predicted. As a result, the attention of both the Italian public and the political world has been concentrated on the problems of domestic policy, neglecting those connected to the country's many and growing international commitments.

There seems to be a tendency in many Western countries, starting with the United States, to give priority to domestic problems, but nowhere has that trend been more evident than in Italy. Especially during the most acute phase of the political maelstrom which uprooted the old ruling class, the interest shown, above all by the mass media, for international developments--even those of extreme relevance to Italy--declined sharply. And this accentuated that "agnosticism" which is one of the characteristic features of Italy's attitude toward foreign policy. In addition, there is the awareness that the crisis of the political system produced by deep-seated degeneration which would require a long and difficult reform process has weakened Italy internationally.

Yet, just as political debate was essentially concentrated on the reforms required to overcome the domestic crisis, the Italian government decided to take on a number of international commitments, contributing to the attempts undertaken by international institutions to manage certain crises (in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Mozambique). Paradoxically, therefore, this exceptional growth in Italy's international exposure coincided with an inward-looking period marked by relative disinterest in foreign policy. As a result, some of the more weighty international decisions recently taken by Italy were not accompanied by sufficient debate to make the main implications evident to public opinion.

Only recently, thanks to a slight slackening of internal political tensions, has this glaring contradiction come to light. Criticism has increased of the lack of strategy characterizing the government's policy in the Yugoslav crisis, above all, of its inability to identify and bring to bear specific national interests in the Balkan area. This critique is put forward by politicians and commentators from a broad political and ideological spectrum, but it is backed particularly vehemently by a neo-nationalist tendency which claims that, with the end of bipolarity, the world has entered a new phase again characterized by balance of power. Italy, so the argument continues, must acknowledge this change in the international situation and make efforts, as other Western countries have long been doing, to promote its national interests, if necessary, without the support of its allies and partners. In any case, even exponents of political positions totally foreign to such nationalistic aspirations lament the lack of awareness of Italy's strong exposure in the war in the Balkans and draw attention to the need for actions

specifically directed at safeguarding national interests. In short, although a vast majority of public opinion and the political world is still in favour of Community and Western solidarity, the need is felt for a rethinking of Italian policy towards the Balkan area based on a clearer definition of national interests at stake.

The geopolitical developments in Europe have to some extent put into question the general guidelines underlying Italian foreign policy since the end of the Cold War: while confirming the commitment to promote European and Community solidarity and to strengthen the institutions pursuing it, it is widely believed that Italy should play an autonomous role in the development of cooperation with Eastern European countries. At the same time, the regional cooperation initiatives that Italy has tried to promote to that end have come up against increasing difficulties owing to the portentous geopolitical changes that have taken place in Central and Eastern Europe. Specifically, the plan for cooperation with Central-Eastern European countries promoted by Italy, initially known as the Quadrangolare and today as the Central European Initiative, has gone into crisis since 1991. The strongest blow to the plan came from the disintegration of Yugoslavia. For some time, the Italian government hoped to be able to use is as an additional instrument in managing and containing the crisis. Then again, the Yugoslav crisis has clearly revealed the limits of the regional approach advocated by Italy as a complement to Community and Western policy. Indeed, other regional initiatives, which seemed to have a more solid foundation, also suffered the same fate (Visegrad Group).

Italy has no choice but to review the policy towards Central and Eastern Europe and, in particular, Yugoslavia that it has pursued to date. The cornerstone of that policy will remain its anchorage in the institutional framework of Europe and the West, but it is likely that Italy will take a more assertive attitude towards its specific national interests. The promotion of these interests could well include a relaunching--on new bases--of a regional plan for cooperation.

2. From support for Yugoslav unity to recognition of the secessionist republics

Like most European countries, Italy shifted during 1991 from a policy aimed at preserving Yugoslavia's political and territorial unity to a more realistic stance accepting the inevitability of disintegration of the Yugoslav state. After having been among the most convinced supporters in Community debate of the various projects for construction of a new federal arrangement, during the crucial phase on recognition of the secessionist republics in December 1991, Italy aligned itself with Germany, supporting recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.

There were a number of reasons for Italy's initial rejection of the prospect of the accelerated disintegration of the Yugoslav state.

First, there was the fear that this was only the first sign of a dangerous trend towards new equilibria in Europe, which could lead to the progressive weakening of Italy's position and its role in Europe and the West. The main fear was the re- emergence of a balance of power policy in the

Balkan area and, consequently, the weakening of European solidarity.

Second, there was the reluctance to give up the close relations built up over the years with the leaders in Belgrade. Thus, Italy continued to express its confidence in the federal authorities (first Prime Minister Markovic and later President Mesic), and to cast itself in a mediating role.

Third, Italy was concerned that acceptance of the claims of independence would have uncontrollable repercussions that could directly affect Italian security. A particularly strong source of apprehension was the danger of an influx of refugees (the arrival of the Albanian refugees had already had a strong psychological impact on the country).

Fourth, like other European countries with minorities that manifest separatist tendencies more or less openly, there was the concern that the Slovenian and Croatian examples would constitute an ominous precedent. As a matter of fact, in 1991 the Italian government was engaged in passing measures aimed at safeguarding the rights of the German-speaking minorities in Upper Adige- South Tyrol.

The champion of this policy of containment of secessionist tendencies and support for projects for reconstruction of a federal Yugoslav state, albeit on a new basis, was Italian Foreign Minister De Michelis. For a long time, De Michelis tended to minimize the magnitude of the Yugoslav crisis and encourage expectations--which were regularly revealed to be unfounded-- about the effectiveness of the agreements repeatedly reached in the various negotiating fora. De Michelis's optimism was sharply criticized by both the press and parliament, but the cautious line pursued (then as now) by the government was supported

by broad consensus in the public opinion and among political forces. On the whole, the debate on Italian policy regarding Yugoslavia confirmed the tendency towards bipartisanship in foreign policy that started to emerge in the mid-seventies. In the major parliamentary debate on the Yugoslav crisis which took place on 25 September 1991, the line sketched out by then Prime Minister Andreotti received the consensus not only of the parties forming the government coalition (Christian Democrat, Socialist, Social Democrat and Liberal), but also the main opposition party, the PDS (Partito Democratico della Sinistra). This broad convergence among political forces was not affected by subsequent developments and the unsuccessful intervention of international organizations. Indeed, the recent parliamentary debate (9 June 1993) on the situation in Bosnia concluded with the passage of a motion by a 90 percent majority.

The government's reluctance to recognize the secessionist republics was shared by a broad range of political forces, including, once again, the PDS. Only the small (but very active) Radical Party and the right-wing opposition party, MSI (Movimento Sociale Italiano) called for unilateral recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. And the Republican Party, in disagreement with De Michelis's position, urged the government to persuade its European partners of the expediency of recognition. Nevertheless, in the second half of 1991, the number of exponents of parties in the government coalition--above all Christian Democrats--in favour of recognition gradually grew. The most pressing entreaties for a change in stance came from the members of parliament from the northeastern regions and from the Catholic world (in an interview, De Michelis polemicallly

quipped about the existence of a "Croatian lobby" at the Holy See). The government, on the other hand, while admitting that recognition would be inevitable if an illegitimate military or authoritarian regime were to come to power in Belgrade, continued until the end of November to maintain that recognition would only exacerbate the situation.

Thus, the government decision of 19 December 1991 to recognize Slovenia and Croatia on 15 January 1992, could appear surprising (the EC had decided to leave the final decision regarding the admissability of the requests for recognition advanced by the Yugoslav republics up to the Badinter commission). Italy's position turned out to be one of total, although tardy, alignment with the German stance. This decision should probably be attributed more to considerations of an international character than to growing domestic pressure. First, the inevitability of recognition had become ever more evident as the conflict escalated, leaving little hope for reconstruction of any kind of federal structure and increasingly revealing the major responsibilties of the Serbs (denounced by the EC after the bombing of Dubrovnik). Second, Germany's choice after the Maastricht summit to recognize Slovenia and Croatia created a completely new situation within the EC that seriously jeopardized Community solidarity. By taking sides with Germany, Italy hoped to put pressure on the other Community partners to abandon their reserve and reach a common position (which, in fact, occurred on 15 January), thus avoiding a crisis within the EC which could have had unpredictable consequences.

Since the beginning of 1993, the Italian government has worked actively in favour of recognition of Macedonia by its Community partners. The government argues that Macedonia must be brought out of its international isolation if the deterioration of the country's social and economic conditions--which could have serious repercussions on the stability of the Balkan area--is to be halted. Also as a result of its sizable commitment in Albania, Italy feels particularly exposed to the possible effects of the spread of the conflict to the south (involving Macedonia, Kossovo and Albania).

On the whole, Italy has continued to pursue a cautious policy giving priority to Community solidarity and a strategy based essentially on the use of diplomatic and political instruments. Thus, the government has made constant efforts to keep channels open with the authorities in Belgrade, underlining any positive signals from the Serbian leaders. This attitude has, however, often been criticized by the mass media and both government and opposition forces. In particular, Foreign Minister Colombo was severly censured for his decision to meet with Serbian leaders in Belgrade on 21 January 1993. The new government sworn in April 1992 also confirmed its preference for a diplomatic rather than a military approach to the crisis: the Italian government supported the Vance-Owen plan until the very end. Moreover, in their meeting with American Secretary of State Christopher (7 May), Italian leaders rejected the American proposal to revoke the embargo against the sale of weapons to Muslims and to bomb Serbian artillery positions in Bosnia also on the grounds that developments in Belgrade were positive. On 13 May, the current Foreign Minister Andreatta claimed before Parliament that credence should be given to Milosevic, underlining the divergence that had appeared

between the leadership in Belgrade and the Serbs in Bosnia. But also in this case, government optimism turned out to be largely unfounded.

3. Italy's role in the international efforts to manage the crisis

As already mentioned, the Italian government was always very reluctant to consider military intervention in the absence of a global political agreement among the parties at war. Even when, in September 1991, the possibility of European intervention in Croatia for the purpose of "interposition" was concretely discussed in the WEU and the EC, some leading exponents of the government majority voiced their objections to that option (before the Twelve decided to formally reject it). On several occasions, the former secretary of the Socialist Party, Craxi, expressed his conviction that the presence of European soldiers on the war front would only complicate the situation, with the risk of entangling the EC for an indeterminate period of time in a mission lacking clear political objectives. The military were also against military intervention, especially if it was to be an enforcement action. In May 1993, Army Chief of Staff Canino made alarmistic statements to the press about the loss of life involved in the deployment of ground troops in Bosnia. This attitude was basically shared by the Defence Minister, while the Foreign Minister declared himself more willing to take on participation in an enforcement action. Italy, therefore, witnessed the same divergence in views between those in charge of foreign policy and those in charge of defence which marked political debate on the possible forms of intervention in other major Western countries.

Despite these misgivings, the Italian government repeatedly manifested its willingness to participate in humanitarian or peacekeeping missions. In the autumn of 1991, Italy was ready to participate in the FORPRONU in Croatia with a force of 3000 men. One year later, the Minister of Defence again spoke of participation of an Italian contingent (1200-1300 men) in the UN humanitarian mission in Bosnia. In both cases, a veto from the Serbs (and the Croats) kept these plans from being realized. The UN, at the same time, continued to rule out the participation in military missions of countries bordering on the crisis area. More recently, Foreign Minister Andreatta declared that Italy is ready, should the UN request it, to participate in operations in Bosnia aimed at implementing a peace plan agreed on by the parties.

Worthy of mention is the coordinating role played by Italy in its capacity as WEU president-in-office, in operations of control and enforcement of the embargo in the Adriatic against the Serbo-Montenegrin federation. Indeed, the government claims to have been the mediator during Western consultations between the French, in favour of a strictly European force, and the Americans, keen on reasserting NATO's supremacy , thereby favouring a compromise solution.

In the field of humanitarian intervention, Italy used its own aircraft to participate in the international airlift to Sarajevo from 3 July to 3 September 1992, the date on which an Italian G-222 was shot down. Subsequently, Italy participated in ground rescue operations. In the course of 1993, Italy has made its most important contribution in the

field of logistics, by offering use of its airbases to the allies for various missions: the airport in Falconara for the airlift to Sarajevo; the one in Brindisi for the US and German airdrops of humanitarian aid; the nine in various parts of the country for missions enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia. The use of those bases was also scheduled for any NATO bombing of the Serbs in Bosnia, a threat brandished by the West against the Serbian leadership last July (and which obtained the withdrawal of Servian forces from the hills overlooking Sarajevo).

Italy's progressive transformation into a "propulsive platform" --as the current Defence Minister, Fabbri, has put it emphatically-- for intervention in the former Yugoslavia naturally poses a number of problems.

First of all, the Italian government insists that each operation departing from Italian soil must have clear UN coverage and that it must be informed in detail, on a case-by-case basis, of the plans of every mission to be carried out. It is particularly concerned, however, that its logistic role is not receiving adequate political recognition. In particular, the government officially expressed its disapproval at being excluded from the consultations that led to the Washington Plan for the implementation of protected areas (24 May), vaguely threatening to reconsider its commitments should the same thing reoccur in the future.

As a result of its growing commitment in support of the efforts at crisis management undertaken by international organizations, Italy has to reckon with increasing security risks. The threats by Serbian extremist leader, Vojeslav Seselj, to launch a missile attack against Italy in the event of

NATO intervention against the Serbs was avidly picked up by the mass media. Various exponents of the Serbian government denied the threats and the Italian government ruled out the existence of a concrete missile threat from the Serbs. Nevertheless, the fear that the Serbs could retaliate against Italy for military intervention remains. In particular, the government has warned against terrorist attacks by Serbs should more intensive measures be taken against them. It should be noted that the Minister of Internal Affairs has not ruled out the hypothesis of an international origin to the terrorist attacks recently perpetrated in a number of Italian cities. In order to combat the infiltration of terrorist groups from the former Yugoslavia, the government has decided to intensify border controls with Slovenia, a measure which has already brought protests from authorities in Ljubljana. Some analysts feel that Italy should equip itself with the instruments needed to deal with the possible threat of Serbian expansionism. At the moment, however, a direct Serbian threat to Italy seems improbable.

4. The problem of Italy's eastern borders and the Treaty of Osimo

The government's line towards Yugoslavia has received broad consensus. In contrast, divergences among the political forces and within public opinion on the policy to be pursued in managing the new problems created along Italy's eastern borders by the dissolution of Yugoslavia are far more marked. Debate centers on the Treaty of Osimo, signed in 1975 by the Italian and Yugoslav governments and definitively sanctioning the border changes that emerged from the Second World War. The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the dividing up between Slovenia and

Croatia of the territory assigned to Yugoslavia by the Treaty of Osimo has given rise to the problem of whether or not the treaty is still valid in this new, radically different situation or whether it should be renegotiated or denounced.

From the beginning, the Italian government has kept a low profile on the issue, avoiding all actions that could cause tensions with authorities in Ljubljana or Zagabria. Upon Slovenia's announcement (31 July 1992) of its intention to replace the former Yugoslavia in all treaties with Italy concerning it, including the Treaty of Osimo, Rome merely issued an official communiquq (8 September 1992) acknowledging with satisfaction the Slovenian initiative which indicates a desire to continue to consider the treaty valid. This government reaction triggered polemics in the political world. Charges even came from within the government majority. Some parties asked for denunciation of the treaty. Only the extreme right (MSI) openly claimed the return of Istria and Dalmatia, but other groups, above all the Liberals and Republicans, claimed denunciation of the treaty as a condition for renegotiation with the new republics of the questions regulated by it. On the whole, these forces were in the minority in parliament. The major parties (Christian Democrat, Socialist and PDS) substantially supported the cautious line adopted by the government.

A rather large movement in favour of denunciation has sprung up in Trieste, led by the organizations of the Italian exiles that were forced to leave Istria and Dalmatia after the war (approximately 300,000 persons), and several local political forces and leaders. Mobilization centers around the issue of compensation for and return of goods abandoned by the exiles in Istria and Dalmatia. Another fundamental

demand is guarantees from the Croatian and Slovenian authorities for the protection of the rights of the Italian minorities (35,000 persons) that remained in Yugoslavia. Many of those advocating unilateral denunciation of the treaty do not rule out revision of the borders, but the only force that considers this a central issue is the extreme right.

While rejecting unilateral denunciation of the treaty, the Italian government has acknowledged the need to adapt the treaty to the new situation. According to the government, that should involve only the parts of the treaty referring to economic problems and the protection of Italian minorities, not the borders. In fact, the government claims that, pursuant to the Helsinki Final Act, borders can only be renegotiated in agreement with the states concerned. Basically, Rome has tried to keep the problem of redefinition of the borders separate from the other aspects of the treaty, considering only the latter in need of "adaptation". This was the premise for the opening of negotiations with Slovenia for revision of the treaty; negotiations formally started on 23 February in Ljubljana (a joint Italian-Slovene commission charged with giving relations between the two countries a "historical and cultural foundation", has been set up to study their common past).

There are two fundamental arguments in favour of unilateral denunciation of the Treaty of Osimo. The first is of a legal nature, and claims that the treaty should be considered terminated as the principle of the unity of the Italian ethnic group established in Article 8 has been violated by the division of Istria between Slovenia and Croatia. The second is more political and revolves around the thesis that the Treaty of Osimo had a precise strategic objective: to

ensure good relations with a country which could play an important role in containing the Soviet power in a crucial area like the Balkans. Since this objective--in the name of which Italy, under pressure from its allies, agreed to sacrifice its national interests--no longer exists, there is nothing to keep Italy from reopening the dispute over the issue regulated by the Treaty. The advocates of a simple updating of the treaty respond that, although strategic concerns linked to the bipolar arrangement have disappeared, Italy continues to be vitally interested in maintaining a stable situation on its eastern borders. Entering into a territorial dispute would mean helping to foment the trend towards territorial revisionism that is one of the major threats to stability on the continent today. Furthermore, it would jeopardize the fundamental objective of obtaining guarantees to protect the rights of the Italian minorities in Croatia and Slovenia and would deprive Italy of the support of its European partners.

Finding a solution to the two points on which the Italian government has chosen to centre negotiations for the updating of the Treaty of Osimo--the question of compensation for and return of goods and the safeguarding of Italian minorities--is no small order, either. Yugoslavia has paid only a minimal part of the sum promised in the 1983 agreement on compensation for the goods left by Italian refugees. Refugee organizations are now demanding the right to repossess those goods. But that would involve immense problems in both legal and practical terms. In particular, neither Slovene nor Croatian legislation provide for the ownership by foreigners unless joint ventures are set up. The Italian government threatened to impede the signing of the economic protocol between the EC and Slovenia and

its entry into the Council of Europe unless these problems were solved, but then did not follow through. Foreign Minister Andreatta recently declared that Italy will make the entry of Slovenia into the EC contingent upon revision of its legislation on ownership.

No less complex is the problem of safeguarding Italian minorities. Italy and Croatia signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the issue on 15 January 1991, but Slovenia refused to join in as the MoU lacks a clause on reciprocity for the Slovene minority in Italy. The problem of reciprocity was subsequently also raised in Zagabria.

In the last municipal elections in Croatia (February 1993), the Istrian Democratic Diet, a political formation with a large Italian component, recorded landslide victories in the Istrian constituencies. The Diet's aim is to transform Istria into an autonomous transborder region with legislative powers, but both the Croatian and Slovene governments are categorically opposed to the idea. The day after the Croatian elections, Croatian President Tudjman severely admonished the Diet, accusing Italy of "imperialism". Last May, the Croatian government denounced the unconstitutionality of all acts aimed at maintaining or introducing bilingualism into the Istrian population. Yet the consensus obtained by the Istrian Democratic Diet does not seem to be linked to separatist tendencies; it seems to rooted in the profound dissent of the Istrian population for Zagabria's nationalist policy.

5. Concluding remarks

1.   Italy's exposure to the effects of the Yugoslav crisis has been growing as a result of the gradual escalation of the conflict--the refugee problem has become increasingly serious-and of the new measures adopted by international organizations. Although Italian troops are not deployed on Yugoslav territory, Italy is providing a significant contribution to the implementation of those measures and therefore finds itself in a front line position. Other sources of concern are the risks of the conflict between the Serbs and the Croats flaring up again over control of Slavonia and Krajina and of the southward spread of the conflict. Finally, Italy is engaged in delicate negotiations on the revision of certain aspects of the Treaty of Osimo, on which hinge future relations with both Croatia and Slovenia.

2.   In this context, the government is being urged to work more actively in promoting national interests in the Balkans. Openly nationalistic tendencies, however, seem to be a minority. In any case, Italy lacks the capability and instruments with which to expand its influence in the Balkans outside of the Western and European framework. There is, therefore, no realistic alternative to close cooperation with Western allies. Without their support, Italy would have difficulty in obtaining positive results in the matters that most directly involve its national interests (such as the question of the safeguarding of the rights of the Italian minority in Istria).

3.   A policy of consistent search for European and Western solidarity cannot be reconciled with choices that could contribute to and increase the already high level of instability

in the Balkan area. Italian political spheres are well aware of this. The most difficult test for the Italian government will be management of the problems connected with revision of the Treaty of Osimo. It has already produced some tension with Slovenia and Croatia, but there are also many areas of possible common interest, especially in the economic field. Both republics have shown keen interest in being fully integrated into the European trade and communications system and in diversifying their economic and trade relations to avoid excessive dependency on Austria and Germany. Italy thus has remarkable opportunities to develop economic cooperation between the two republics, even if it will have to do with the limited resources at its disposal. Of particular interest in this regard are certain cooperation projects, such as setting up forms of long-term collaboration and integration between the ports of Trieste and Koper and the construction of new highway and railway links along the east-west axis.

4. Italian attempts to develop forms of regional cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries have met with increasing difficulties deriving from the re-emergence of nationalist rivalries. Nevertheless, the idea of integrating Community policy with a regional cooperation effort is still valid. With respect to the former Yugoslavia, such an initiative could be taken into consideration if a stable solution were found to the present conflict. Italy is particularly interested in strengthening its ties with the northern republics (Slovenia and Croatia). But it could also play an important role, both politically and economically, towards the southern republics in light of the commitment it has taken on in Albania, which gives it special responsibilities within the Community framework.

DISSONNANCES FRANCO-ALLEMANDES SUR FOND DE GUERRE "YOUGOSLAVE"

par Hans STARK

En éclatant presque à la veille de la proclamation solennelle de "l'Union politique" des Douze et donc de façon fort inopportune, la guerre des Yougoslaves a divisé les Occidentaux. De surcroît, leurs différends ne portaient pas seulement sur les modalités de la reconnaissance des républiques indépendantistes, mais plutôt sur le rôle joué par l'Allemagne dans cette affaire. La RFA fut accusée par tous ses partenaires de vouloir s'arroger le leadership non seulement dans une région avec laquelle elle aurait toujours entretenu des rapports aussi étroits que conflictuels - l'Europe centrale et les Balkans - mais aussi, désormais, au sein - et surtout aux dépens - des Douze. Consternés l'un comme l'autre après la reconnaissance unilatérale par le gouvernement de Bonn de la Slovénie et de la Croatie, le 23 décembre 1991, la France et les Etats-Unis, les deux principaux partenaires de l'Allemagne, ont lancé de très vives attaques : brandissant à Paris le spectre du "retour de la question allemande" et stigmatisant à Washington le "growing assertiveness" de Bonn, Français et Américains, longtemps attachés à l'intégrité territoriale de la Yougoslavie (ménageant ainsi indirectement le pouvoir serbe) furent (une fois n'est pas coutume) solidaires et unanimes dans leur critique vis-à-vis de l'Allemagne. Pris en tenaille entre les nécessités de Maastricht et le retour des clivages d'avant 1914, Allemands et Français se sont trouvés tiraillés entre leur velléité de rupture et l'attrait -nécessité oblige- des retrouvailles. Or, au delà de l'analyse immédiate des perceptions respectives, des tâtonnements diplomatiques et péripéties politiciennes de part et d'autre du Rhin, la question est de savoir si la guerre des Yougoslaves a réellement modifié les marges de manoeuvre de la "nouvelle Allemagne" dans cette Europe issue de Yalta, voire de Versailles.

PREJUGES SUR TOUS LES TONS

Le 23 mai 1991, à peine un mois avant les déclarations d'indépendance de la Slovénie et de la Croatie qui marquent la fin de la fédération et le début de la guerre yougoslaves, Ante Markovic, un Premier Ministre d'un autre âge déjà, est reçu à Paris avec autant d'honneur que d'espoir. Selon le gouvernement français de l'époque, "cette visite s'inscrit dans la tradition de relations amicales entre nos deux pays. Née de l'époque napoléonienne et de la création des provinces illyriennes, cette tradition s'est enrichie de la fraternité d'armes des première et deuxième guerres mondiales... La France est en effet convaincue, vous le savez, que c'est aux Yougoslaves et à eux seuls, qu'il revient par un dialogue politique, tenu à l'abri des provocations intérieures et des ingérences extérieures, de déterminer la forme future de leur Etat. Cet Etat unitaire (sic !) riche de ses diversités est le partenaire qu'attend l'Europe"[1].

Ce passage résume à lui seul l'idée que se faisait la France de la Yougoslavie[2]. Alors que moins de 5 % des habitants de Yougoslavie se sont déclarés "Yougoslaves" lors des différents recensements, pour la France, dont la tradition centralisatrice et jacobine est si opposée à la notion d'Etat multinational, il ne semblait y avoir en Yougoslavie que des Yougoslaves, de même que l'URSS n'était peuplée que de Soviétiques. De là à faire l'amalgame entre Yougoslaves et Serbes (comme entre Soviétiques et Russes) il n'y avait qu'un pas à franchir, qui le fut d'autant plus facilement que Belgrade était la capitale à la fois de la Serbie et de la Yougoslavie. Ce même amalgame est à l'origine de la transposition d'images de l'héroïque Serbie de Pierre Ier (roi de Serbie de 1903 à 1921), et de la Yougoslavie d'Alexandre Ier (roi de Yougoslavie de 1921 à 1934), voire celle de Tito. Aussi, malgré les agissements du Président de Serbie, Slobodan Milosevic, arrivé au pouvoir en septembre 1987, la responsabilité de l'éclatement de la fédération yougoslave n'incomberait qu'aux seules républiques de Slovenie et de Croatie, qualifiées le plus souvent de "sécessionistes" par la presse française. D'ailleurs, la Croatie, ne mérite-t-elle pas son destin pour avoir été oustachie il y a cinquante ans ? Bref, du moins jusqu'en septembre 1991, l'exécutif français, dans

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[1] <u>Bulletin d'information du Ministère des Affaires étrangères</u>, 24 mai 1991.

[2] Voir notamment : Paul GARDE, <u>Vie et Mort de la Yougoslavie</u>, Fayard 1992.

son refus de distinguer l'agresseur de l'agressé dans un conflit qualifié de "guerre de tribus", a défendu l'intégrité d'une fédération morte depuis des mois déjà.

Avec le même entêtement impulsif, l'Allemagne défend une position diamétralement opposée à celle de la France. Apparemment convaincue d'être seule en mesure de comprendre les nouvelles réalités est-européennes, la République fédérale s'est constamment référée à sa propre histoire pour analyser la situation en Yougoslavie. Ainsi, le droit au libre choix politique et à l'auto-détermination des peuples, dont ont bénéficié les Allemands de l'Est pour sortir du communisme et s'associer à la RFA, devait aussi être valable pour d'autres, à commencer par les Slovènes et les Croates qui, par le biais de l'indépendance, ont cherché à fuir le communisme serbo-yougoslave. Ce raisonnement s'appuie sur un déterminisme historique propre aux traditions germaniques : unis par la langue, la culture et l'histoire, les deux peuples allemands devaient se (ré)unifier un jour ou l'autre ("es wächst zusammen, was zusammen gehört"). Pour les peuples de Yougoslavie, il en est tout autrement ; tout les sépare : quatre langues au moins, trois religions, deux alphabets et, surtout, deux cultures politiques différentes, (chrétienne-)démocratique au nord, jadis austro-hongrois, communiste chez les orthodoxes du sud, autrefois ottoman. Principal gage de stabilité dans les Balkans pour beaucoup d'Occidentaux, la fédération yougoslave n'était, d'après ce raisonnement, qu'une création artificielle condamnée à disparaître, un accident de l'histoire. Avant même les déclarations d'indépendance de la Slovénie et de la Croatie du 25 juin 1991, une grande partie de la presse et donc de l'opinion publique d'outre-Rhin s'est servie d'arguments de base propres au processus de l'unification allemande pour analyser les raisons de l'éclatement de la Yougoslavie. Cependant, l'attitude pro-croate et anti-serbe de la RFA se nourrit beaucoup moins d'antécédents historiques que l'on ne l'a cru en France, la plupart des Allemands ignorant souvent l'existence même de l'alliance nazie-oustachie de la seconde guerre mondiale. A l'inverse, auprès de "l'élite politique" de RFA, la Serbie jouit depuis près d'un siècle d'une réputation de fauteur de trouble dans les Balkans, dont le penchant despotique et expansionniste serait une source de menace permanente pour ses voisins d'Europe centrale. D'autres raisons, plus conjoncturelles, expliquent davantage les préjugés favorables aux Croates. La proximité des foyers de guerre et surtout les images rapportées par les chaînes de télévision, montrant de façon beaucoup plus intensive qu'en France les bombardements systématiques des villes croates par les forces serbo-fédérales, n'ont pu que révolter une population dont le principal souvenir de guerre est (à tort ou à raison) celui de la destruction des villes allemandes. Mentionnons aussi

la formidable pression exercée par un "lobby pro-independantiste" fort de près de 7OO OOO travailleurs immigrés venus de Yougoslavie, parfaitement intégrés en RFA et presque exclusivement originaires de la Croatie et de la Slovénie, deux républiques de surcroît très ouvertes au tourisme d'outre-Rhin. Enfin et peut-être surtout, la CDU/CSU, formation chrétienne-démocrate, aussi conservatrice que catholique, semble avoir été séduite par le pouvoir politique né en Slovénie et en Croatie, conservateur et catholique lui aussi et donc fondé sur les mêmes valeurs. Ainsi, le tout-Bonn fut acquis de manière définitive et inébranlable à la cause indépendantiste. Mais, si la RFA avait raison de prendre fait et cause pour un peuple agressé, son soutien aurait gagné à être moins inconditionnel, plus compréhensif à l'égard des intérêts légitimes de la minorité serbe en Croatie, discriminée par l'équipe réunie autour du révisionniste Tudjman, et surtout, plus lucide quant à la nature du pouvoir politique installé à Zagreb.

DU DODECAPHONISME COMMUNAUTAIRE

La guerre des Yougoslaves constituait un double défi pour les Occidentaux. En quête d'une identité propre en matière de défense, la Communauté, demeurée très discrète tout au long de la guerre du Golfe, aurait pu y trouver l'occasion rêvée pour élargir sa marge de manoeuvre par rapport aux Etats-Unis si les Douze avaient pu gommer leurs divergences internes. Celles-ci trouvaient leur origine en grande partie dans l'opposition entre Paris et Bonn, très prononcée pendant les premiers mois du conflit yougoslave (juin-septembre 1991). Outre leurs approches différentes, la gestion occidentale du dossier est-européen constituait le véritable enjeu. Or, depuis les premiers débuts de l'Ostpolitik (celle menée par Willy Brandt) et les doutes exprimés en France sur l'éventuelle "dérive vers l'Est de l'Allemagne" à l'heure de la crise des Euromissiles (1983), mais surtout depuis le démantèlement du rideau de fer, la "question est-européenne" pèse de plus en plus lourd sur l'entente franco-allemande. Au grand dam des Occidentaux, la guerre des Yougoslaves a permis à l'Allemagne unie, pour la première fois depuis la seconde guerre mondiale, de définir à elle seule ses "intérêts nationaux" en Europe et, de plus, d'en imposer les grandes lignes à ses voisins.

Cet état de fait plaçait la France devant un cruel dilemme. La tentative du repli sur l'Ouest en compensation des incertitudes est-européennes menait droit dans une impasse : elle se traduisait par un réel immobilisme vis-à-vis de l'autre Europe et risquait de laisser le champ libre à l'Allemagne. Celle-ci, au lieu d'être amarrée

à l'Ouest, ne pouvait alors qu'interpréter le désintéressement occidental comme une raison supplémentaire de faire cavalier seul en Europe de l'Est. L'insistance avec laquelle Paris prônait l'accélération du processus d'intégration des Douze se heurtait ainsi à une triple opposition : celle, tout d'abord, de la société française dont la conscience nationale répugne à une intégration trop brutale de la communauté ; celle des "Est-Européens" ensuite qui revendiquent la solidarité de la Communauté, obligée d'entériner par des actes concrets la nouvelle donne du post-communisme ; celle, enfin, de l'Allemagne, très préoccupée de l'instabilité à l'Est. D'où l'indispensable revirement de la France en ce qui concerne le conflit serbo-croate.

Tout comme les positions de la France et de l'Allemagne dans la guerre des Yougoslaves, celle de la Communauté a traversé trois phases d'arbitrage distinctes, une donnée qui rappelle l'évidente interdépendance entre l'état des relations franco-allemandes et la santé communautaire. Reproductions fidèles des cacophonies enregistrées de part et d'autre du Rhin, les premières réactions des Douze (juin-septembre 1991) au lendemain des déclarations d'indépendance slovène et croate témoignaient parfaitement de l'incompréhension communautaire des réalités yougoslaves. L'insistance sur le maintien d'une fédération yougoslave, devenue le symbole de l'hégémonie serbe, le moratoire de trois mois sur les déclarations d'indépendance imposé aux "sécessionistes" de Lubljana et de Zagreb et l'impuissance des observateurs occidentaux face à l'agression de l'armée serbo-fédérale traduisaient une ignorance réelle des données de base du conflit : la haine viscérale entre Serbes et Croates, la volonté ferme des Slovènes et des Croates, d'abord, des Macédoniens et des Musulmans, ensuite, de résister à l'agression serbe, de se joindre à l'Europe du Centre, voire à la CEE, enfin la déroute d'une armée "populaire", principal pilier du communisme en Yougoslavie. Pendant ces premiers mois, Bonn et Paris se sont montrés on ne peut plus en désaccord. Dès les premiers coups de feu, l'Allemagne invoquait le respect du droit à l'autodétermination des peuples - faisant peu de cas de l'autre principe de base de l'acte final d'Helsinki, le maintien des frontières européennes issues de la seconde guerre mondiale. D'où les critiques acerbes formulées par la France, encore longtemps attachée à la survie de la Yougoslavie. La RFA fut notamment accusée de vouloir créer sur les ruines de la fédération yougoslave un chapelet de petits Etats qui se tourneraient vers leurs anciens protecteurs. Economiquement

peu viables, la multiplication des "tribus", un terme cher à François Mitterrand[3], en Europe centrale y accroîterait encore le poids de l'Allemagne. Cette politique ne daterait d'ailleurs pas d'aujourd'hui, puisque la Bavière de Franz-Josef Strauss aurait amorcé la désintégration de la fédération yougoslave en associant la Slovénie au groupe Alpes-Adria. Bref, avec le retour du spectre "mitteleuropéen" et les références répétées aux deux guerres mondiales, le climat communautaire devenait de plus en plus hystérique. Brandissant jusqu'en septembre 1991 la menace de recourir à une reconnaissance unilatérale de la Slovénie èt de la Croatie, l'Allemagne s'était enfoncée dans un isolement grandissant parmi les Douze. De surcroît, le désaccord entre Européens, et en particulier entre Bonn et Paris, à propos de la Yougoslavie, risquait, à la veille de Maastricht, d'avoir un puissant effet désintégrateur sur la CEE. La tension entre les deux pays avait en effet atteint son paroxisme au mois d'août, lorsque le ministre allemand des Affaires étrangères, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, a annoncé à son "ami", Roland Dumas, son intention de proposer au Conseil des ministres allemand la reconnaissance effective des deux républiques sécessionistes. "En agissant ainsi, vous renverriez les relations franco-allemandes vingt ans en arrière", aurait alors menacé le chef de la diplomatie française[4].

L'INTERLUDE FRANCO-ALLEMAND

A l'automne 1991, donc avant Maastricht, l'Allemagne, consciente des conséquences qu'une telle action aurait pu entraîner, n'a pas encore osé faire cavalier seul. Lors de la visite du chef de l'Etat dans les cinq Länder de l'ex-RDA, en septembre 1991, Helmut Kohl et François Mitterrand ont travaillé à rapprocher leurs positions. Côté allemand, on a admis ne pas avoir suffisamment pris en compte les conséquences d'une reconnaissance unilatérale, tant sur le plan diplomatique que sur le plan militaire (où la RFA ne dispose d'aucune marge de manoeuvre). Cette concession fut assortie de la promesse d'accorder la priorité à la cohésion des Douze[5]. La France, de son côté, avait également tempéré certains

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[3] Voir le discours de François Mitterrand du 29 février 1992 lors du Colloque au Palais de Chaillot consacré au thème "Les tribus et l'Europe".

[4] Pierre HASKI, "Les Douze arrivent à saturation", *Libération*, 8 octobre 1991.

[5] "In der Unionsfraktion zeichnet sich eine Änderungshaltung zu Jugoslawien ab", *Frankfurter Allegemeine Zeitung*, 20 septembre 1991.

des postulats de sa politique à l'Est, qualifiée d'ailleurs par une partie de la presse nationale de "politique à la Metternich"[6]. Au vu de l'échec des assises de Prague, du scandale du véto français contre l'importation dans la CEE de viande bovine en provenance d'Europe centrale et enfin de l'erreur d'appréciation du Putsch de Moscou, l'idée commençait à se répandre en Allemagne que Paris regrettait la fin du système de Yalta. De même, une réorientation de l'Ostpolitik française s'avérait d'autant plus indispensable que la mésentente franco-allemande compromettait tout espoir de voir entériné à Maastricht le projet d'une Union politique et de défense commune, un projet cher à François Mitterrand et à Helmut Kohl. Réunis à Bonn, ces deux derniers ont eu le souci évident de masquer leurs divergences de fond sur la Yougoslavie par la publication des résultats d'un triple compromis réclamant une cohésion politique étroite des douze Etats membres (c'est-à-dire pas de Sonderweg allemand), le respect du droit à l'autodétermination (et donc l'acceptation des indépendances slovène et croate) et la garantie des droits des minorités concernées (notamment ceux de la minorité serbe en Croatie)[7].

Enfin, la position française fut définie. Après avoir indiqué une première fois, le 23 juillet, à Bad Wiessee (RFA) "qu'il était impossible de maintenir une fédération par la force", le Président de la République reconnaissait désormais explicitement le droit à l'autodétermination des peuples[8]. Ce pas, comparable à un abandon de la Yougoslavie, fut assorti d'une multiplication des initiatives françaises en vue d'une restauration de la paix entre les républiques yougoslaves. Le 27 août 1991, c'est une proposition française, reprise par la délégation allemande, qui instituait la Conférence de la paix dont la présidence fut confiée à Lord Carrington. De même, le 3 septembre 1991,lors d'une réunion des ministres des affaires étrangères de la Communauté, Paris a lancé l'idée d'instaurer une Commission d'arbitrage, confiée à M. Robert Badinter, président du Conseil constitutionnel. Censée fonctionner parallèlement à la Conférence de la paix de La Haye, la Commission d'arbitrage fut chargée d'examiner les différends soumis par les parties en conflit et de rendre ses décisions avant Noël 1991, notamment

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[6] Voir Paul FABRA, "Mitterrand-Metternich", *Le Monde*, 5 juillet 1991.

[7] Bulletin d'information du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, 20 septembre 1991.

[8] Yougoslavie / Réponse du ministre d'Etat à une question d'actualité, Assemblée Nationale, 9 octobre 1991.

en ce qui concerne le statut des minorités et des problèmes de frontières à la fois internes et externes de l'ex-Yougoslavie. Enfin, le 19 septembre 1991, une déclaration commune franco-allemande préconisait l'envoi, sous les auspices de l'UEO, d'une force d'interposition stationnée à l'intérieur d'une "zone tampon" entre les belligérants et composée de 20 000 soldats et 10 000 hommes en soutien logistique chargés de contrôler l'application du cessez-le-feu et d'empêcher l'extension du conflit.

Derrière ces initiatives multiples, par le biais desquelles la France se retrouvait à l'avant-scène des problèmes yougoslaves, se cachait un double exercise franco-allemand visant à trouver une solution commune dans les Balkans tout en effectuant une opération de sauvetage -in extremis- de la Communauté européenne. Or, la date-butoir du rendez-vous de Maastricht à peine passée, la France n'a pu contenir plus longtemps ses divergences de fond avec l'Allemagne à propos de la Yougoslavie. Celles-ci éclatent au grand jour au lendemain de la réunion des ministres des Affaires étrangères des Douze, tenue le 16 décembre 1991 à Bruxelles , et notamment à la veille de Noël, jour de la reconnaissance de la Slovénie et de la Croatie par la seule RFA. Que l'Allemagne, qui ne s'estimait plus obligée de respecter une réserve, somme toute imposée contre son opinion publique, ait finalement fait cavalier seul semble lié à toute une série de désaccords entre l'Allemagne d'un côté, la France, la Communauté, mais aussi les Etats-Unis de l'autre.

LE FINALE DE L'APRES-MAASTRICHT

Le jugement porté par les autorités de Bonn et l'opinion publique allemande sur l'action de la conférence de paix présidée par Lord Carrington fut sans merci : qu'elle ait fait signer par les belligérents quelque quatorze accords de cessez-le-feu n'a cependant pas empêché la Croatie de perdre entre temps un tiers de son territoire majoritairement non-serbe (notamment la Slavonie et la Baranja croates où la population serbe fut décidément minoritaire - moins de 25% [9]), sans parler des destructions massives et des actes de barbarie, perpetrés par l'armée serbo-

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[9] Une analyse précise de la répartition des différentes nationalités yougoslaves vivant en Croatie est fournie par Paul Shoup, "The Future of Croatia's Border Regions", *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe*, 29 novembre 1991.

fédérale. Selon Bonn, Lord Carrington aurait fait la part trop belle à la Serbie, d'où la nécessité d'une reconnaissance unilatérale. De même, l'offre d'une intervention militaire sous la bannière de l'UEO, lancée par Paris et Bonn, a été déclinée par une majorité des pays membres, dont les Britanniques en particulier, peu enclins à doter la CEE d'une défense commune susceptible diminuer le rôle de l'OTAN. La nécessité de saisir l'ONU et de préparer l'envoi des casques bleus en Yougoslavie constituait non seulement un revers diplomatique cuisant pour Paris et Bonn, mais a fini par convaincre les plus hésitants parmi les responsables d'outre-Rhin de l'inefficacité communautaire dans cette affaire. La confiance allemande en la mission de Lord Carrington en a d'autant plus pâti.

Que Maastricht n'aît pas vu l'émergence, au grand dam de la RFA, d'une Union politique où le vote majoritaire deviendrait la règle, n'est peut-être pas étranger à la brutalité avec laquelle le gouvernement de Bonn a imposé le principe, voire de facto la procédure et la date, de la reconnaissance des républiques indépendantistes. Dans la nuit du 16 au 17 décembre 1991, à Bruxelles, les ministres des Affaires étrangères des Douze ont frôlé la rupture à propos du dossier yougoslave avant de trouver, en dernier recours, une formule de compromis. Celle-ci prévoyait une procédure en deux étapes, la première le 23 décembre 1991, la deuxième le 15 janvier 1992, de reconnaissance conditionnelle des républiques yougoslaves désirant accéder à l'indépendance - la Croatie, la Slovénie, mais aussi, éventuellement, la Macédoine et la Bosnie-Herzégovine. Dans une dernière tentative pour sauver les apparences (de l'hypothétique "esprit de Maastricht"), M. Roland Dumas a présenté comme un premier exercice d'application de la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune décidée à Maastricht ce qui fut en fait un réel échec pour la Communauté. Certes, les Douze ont approuvé à l'unanimité une sorte de doctrine pour la reconnaissance des Etats est-européens, une doctrine initialement formulée par la France au sommet de Maastricht, mais présentée à Bruxelles comme une proposition franco-allemande[10].

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[10] "Concrétisant une proposition faite à Maastricht par François Mitterrand, cette doctrine indique notamment que les Etats candidats à la reconnaissance de la CEE devront : 1) respecter les dispositions des Nations unies et de l'acte final d'Helsinki ayant trait à l'Etat de droit, à la démocratie et aux droits de l'homme ; 2) garantir les droits des groupes ethniques et nationaux, ainsi que des minorités ; 3) respecter l'inviolabilité de toutes les frontières, lesquelles ne pourront être modifiées que par des moyens pacifiques et par commun accord ; 4) reprendre à

Or, à peine mis au point ce compromis donnait déjà lieu à des interprétations différentes. Le débat, où émergeait une Allemagne de plus en plus isolée, certes, mais sûre de défendre la bonne cause, se cristallisait sur les dates et la question de l'automaticité de la reconnaissance. A l'heure où les combats firent rage en Croatie, l'Allemagne, soutenue par la Belgique et le Danemark plaidait pour que la reconnaissance par les Douze prenne date au plus tard le 23 décembre, tandis que la France, le Royaume-Uni, l'Espagne, l'Irlande et le Luxembourg réclamaient un délai plus long, jusqu'à la fin du mois de janvier, le temps de laisser à la Commission d'arbitrage le temps d'émettre son jugement et à l'ONU de poursuivre ses négociations de paix[11]. Cette querelle intercommunautaire masquait en effet encore une autre divergence franco-allemande. Paris posait au moins trois conditions à la reconnaissance : celle de la situation sur le terrain, c'est à dire que les armes se soient tues (ce qui ne pouvait qu'encourager l'armée serbo-fédérale à poursuivre son agression), celle de la garantie des droits des minorités (Paris faisait valoir que les Serbes n'envisagent pas de vivre sous domination croate[12]), enfin celle des frontières intérieures (François Mitterrand reste hostile à la thèse allemande de ne pas les modifier[13]). Pour Bonn la reconnaissance immédiate avait la priorité absolue afin de stopper l'avancée serbe en Croatie (les combats ont repris malgré la reconnaissance) et de faire garantir par la communauté internationale les frontières actuelles de la Croatie (une garantie largement hypothétique, notamment pour ce qui concerne la Krajina). Quant à la question des minorités, la RFA refuse de traiter du seul sort de la minorité serbe en Croatie et met aussi l'accent sur la question des communautés albanaise et musulmane de Serbie. Ces divergences de fond, réapparues après Maastricht, pesaient évidemment sur la question de l'automaticité de la reconnaissance en fonction du jugement émis par la Commission d'arbitrage. Proposée par la France, la doctrine de reconnaissance avait aux yeux de François

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leur compte les engagements précédemment souscrits qui concernent le désarmement et la non-prolifération nucléaire ainsi que la sécurité et la stabilité régionale", citation du journal *Le Monde*, "L'indépendance des républiques yougoslaves", 18 décembre 1991.

[11] *Europolitique* n° 1730, 18 décembre 1991.

[12] Bulletin d'information du Ministère des Affaires étrangères, 7 novembre 1991.

[13] *Le Monde*, 1er décembre 1991.

Mitterrand l'avantage de fournir un cadre de référence objectif pour tenter d'éviter que les Douze, politiquement divisés sur la reconnaissance des républiques yougoslaves, ne réagissent en ordre dispersé[14]. Or, tout genscherien qu'il fut, le ministre allemand, bien qu'il ait approuvé la doctrine de reconnaissance, n'a pas pu donner l'assurance, le 16 décembre, que son gouvernement renoncerait également à sa liberté d'action. Etant donné les divergences de fond entre Paris et Bonn sur le dossier serbo-croate, le gouvernement Kohl refusait de se lier les mains en cas d'avis négatif des juristes, préférant mettre ses partenaires, le 23 décembre 1991, devant le fait accompli.

POSTLUDE OCCIDENTAL

Face à la tragédie de l'ex-Yougoslavie et, tout particulièrement, du peuple musulman de Bosnie, la "brouille" franco-allemande de l'automne 1991 a perdu beaucoup de son acuité. Plusieurs événements ont permis à Bonn et à Paris d'harmoniser leurs perceptions et d'accorder leurs positions.

Tout d'abord, la "nouvelle Allemagne" a payé cher son entêtement pro-croate, qui s'est avéré une véritable victoire à la Pyrrhus. Rarement aussi isolée depuis 1949 et, somme toute, pour un enjeu mineur, la RFA s'est imposée contre la volonté explicite de la CEE, des Etats-Unis et des Nations-Unies, suscitant, à la stupéfaction de Bonn, des réactions "mordantes" de la part de ses partenaires. Si l'on se fie à la presse occidentale, l'affaire yougoslave s'intègrerait parfaitement dans un ensemble d'actions qualifié par beaucoup d'Allemands comme "l'expression de leurs intérêts nationaux" mais que leurs partenaires et voisins perçoivent comme les signes tangibles et nombreux d'un retour à l'hégémonisme allemand : actions unilatérales en Europe de l'Est, hausse des taux d'intérêts de la Bundesbank, campagne feutrée pour obtenir un siège au Conseil de sécurité, sans parler de la querelle interallemande sur l'abandon du Deutschemark et la construction européenne[15]. La Slovénie et la Croatie une fois reconnues, l'Allemagne a jugé nécessaire pour son "image à l'étranger" et vis-à-vis en

[14] Claire TREAN, "La France s'apprête à ne reconnaitre que la Slovénie", *Le Monde*, 16 janvier 1992.

[15] Michel COLOMBES, *Le Point*, 22 février 1992.

particulier de ses principaux partenaires de faire preuve d'une plus grande retenue dans l'affaire balkanique et d'une position plus nuancée à l'égard des responsables croates. Cela fut finalement d'autant plus facile à mettre en oeuvre que la guerre des Serbes contre la Croatie s'est grandement atténuée dès les premiers mois de l'année 1992 pour céder le pas à la guerre en Bosnie-Herzégovine. Or, si dans cette république les populations civiles musulmane et croate sont en effet les principales victimes de la "purification ethnique" chère à Belgrade, ce concept semble également avoir séduit une partie des Croates de la Herzégovine occidentale, et cela avec l'aval du président Tudjman. Bonn ne peut donc plus distinguer, de façon quelque peu sommaire, "les bons des méchants", et soutenir aveuglément la Croatie. Enfin et peut être surtout, l'action des Occidentaux dans le cadre de la tragédie de l'ex-Yougoslavie ne peut se limiter davantage à une simple reconnaissance diplomatique. Il s'agit de savoir si les Occidentaux sont acculés ou non à l'intervention par la force pour empêcher l'extermination des Musulmans yougoslaves et arrêter l'expansion territoriale serbe. Sur cette question, dont l'OTAN et surtout l'ONU sont davantage en charge que la CEE, l'Allemagne n'a aucune influence faute de pouvoir participer à des actions militaires "hors zone" et n'ayant pas voix au chapitre dans les délibérations du conseil de sécurité de l'ONU.

L'ensemble de ces raisons pousse le gouvernement de Bonn à une plus grande retenue à la fois politique et verbale et lui fait adopter une position qui le rapproche à nouveau de Paris. Cependant le changement de perception n'est pas le fait de la seule RFA. En France aussi, les sympathies pour l'ex-allié historique appartiennent désormais au passé tant les crimes commis par la Serbie ont suscité le dégoût de toute la classe politique française. La compréhension affichée à l'égard de Belgrade au début de la crise par la France fut d'ailleurs assez mal perçue par le monde musulman qui s'indignait à juste titre des sympathies pro-serbes à l'Ouest et surtout de l'indifférence occidentale quant au martyre des Musulmans bosniaques. Côté français, comme en Allemagne, une plus grande retenue vis-à-vis des alliés de jadis s'est avérée de mise, et cela d'autant plus qu'à Paris, et encore moins à Bonn, personne n'est prêt à envoyer ses soldats mourir pour Sarajévo. Aussi, on ne peut exclure que l'entente retrouvée entre Occidentaux sur le dossier de l'ex-Yougoslavie traduit, en ce qui les concerne et non sans une certaine ambiguïté, voire du cynisme, "que l'affaire est déjà réglée,

que les Serbes ont réussi leur coup et qu'il faut en prendre acte, une situation semblable à celle de Chypre"...[16].

Or, il est probable que l'entente entre Bonn et Paris sur le dossier balkanique ne soit que transitoire. En effet, loin de constituer un exercice de "Realpolitik", la prudence, sinon la résignation des Occidentaux risque fort de faire ressurgir les désaccords franco-allemands de l'automne 1991. Car, comment, une fois la guerre finie, traiter avec une Grande Serbie, dont l'importance "géostratégique" en fait un acteur incontournable dans les Balkans mais dont la naissance et l'affirmation en tant que puissance régionale doivent tout à la violation des principes les plus élémentaires de la civilisation européenne ? Comment, une fois la guerre finie, traiter avec une Croatie amputée certes de la moitié sud de son territoire, mais qui a fait main basse sur une partie de la Herzégovine préalablement "nettoyée" ? Comment traiter avec des dirigeants responsables de crimes de guerre ? Comment, enfin, éviter que les stratégies serbe comme croate ne deviennent des modèles pour d'autres Etats est-européens soit insatisfaits du tracé de leurs frontières, soit "inquiets" du sort réservé à leurs compatriotes vivant chez le voisin, soit "provoqués" par le comportement de minorités nationales vivant sur leur sol et qui ont le tort d'aspirer à de plus larges autonomies que celles qui leur sont accordées ?

Eludés par la "gestion de la crise yougoslave", tous ces problèmes risquent de ressurgir dans les mois à venir et de confronter l'Ouest à des imbroglios inextricables. Redevenus "fréquentables" Serbes et Croates chercheront sans doute à se regrouper à nouveau autour de leurs alliés d'autrefois ce qui diviserait une fois encore les Occidentaux, tentés, comme toujours dans l'histoire, de contrebalancer quelque peu une Allemagne, dont l'analyse concernant les problèmes de sécurité de son voisinage est-européen ne font pas toujours l'unanimité à l'Ouest.

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[16] Voir interview avec François Heisbourg, *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 20-26 août 1992, p. 40

JANOS SZABÓ

Hungarian roles connection

with the Yugoslav Crisis

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The last years wereloaded with contradictions with regard to Hungary´s security as well. In many respects we progressed in those relationships maintained with international organizations capable of guaranteeing our security, our relationships with several of our neighbours improved, we made several modest steps forward in the establishment of the European security system, but at the same time all of these steps have not brought the desired breakthrough. The reform of the Hungarian armed forces did not advance substantially nor did its reduction-which has lasted for years- and those conflicts in our environs continued (new ones even sprang up) which arose in connection with breakup of the multi-ethnic states and which signify the greatest danger to the country´s security.

The msot spectacular and in all certainty perhaps the most dangerous crisis of the past year, the Yugoslav crisis, did not move considerably closer to resolution during 1992-93, It became clear that the Carrington conference conducted under the aegis of the European Community was a failure, the admission of which was the convening of the London Intgernational Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) in August of 1992.

In this place, the following We try to analize only the most important three dimensions of the Hungarian role system connection with the Yugoslav Crisis:

1., The Hungarian standpoint about the losses of the Yugoslav embargo
2., The Southern Slav´s refugee matters and migration problems for the Republic of Hungary
3., The Hungarian Minorities within the Yugoslav Crisis and the Hungarian Standpoint

I. The Hungarian standpoint about the losses of the Yugoslav
   embargo

Hungary is pleased to note how quickly the Working Group
of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia began to consider
the applications submitted to it. Hungarian Government feel that
it is vital for countries facing special economic problems as a
result of the implementation of the sanctions to be able to
exercise their right under the Charter and to hold consultations
with the Security Council on the matter. Hungarian Government
hope that the Working Group will be able to accomplish its
mandate as soon as possible, to find a solution to these
difficulties and to end its work on a postitive note.

The sanctions regime against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is in a way an even more
serious obligation for Hungary because it participated as a
member of the Security Council in the adoption of Council
resolutions 757 (1992), 787 (1992) and 820 (1993). Although the
Hungarian authorities were aware even before the adoption of
these resolutions that the economies of neighbouring countries,
Hungary decided to vote in favour of the sanctions regime taking
into account the wider political context of the conflict in the
former Yugoslavia.

We have already mentioned Hungary's economic
difficulties stemming from this sanctions regime. The
restrictions on navigation on the Danube are particularly
serious. The firms affected find themselves in such dire straits
that it is virtually impossible for them to carry out any
commercial activities. Since the adoption of Security Council
resolution 757 (1992) Hungary has incurred losses of US$ 800
million.

This figure breaks down as follows:

- Thus far, losses of trade earnings as a result of
  the sanctions regime amount to $355 million; the
  figure for 1992 was of the order of $150 million,
  while that for the current year is $205 million;

- Bad debts of firms total $80 million, of which $15
  million are debts of Serbian enterprises arising
  from commercial transactions prior to the
  imposition of sanctions, $23 million debts with
  respect to losses of transport-transit revenues for
  natural gas transported from the territory of
  the former Soviet Union through Hungary, and
  $40 million debts with respect to transport-transit
  revenue of the Yugoslav railways which were incurred
  prior to the imposition of the sanctions;

- Losses of transport and transit revenues including
  revenue for natural gas are of the order of $110
  million;

- The losses incurred as a result of additional
  transport revenue amount to $180 million;

- There were other losses of the order of $70 million
  in addition to those I have just mentioned,
  particularly ecological damage of $20 million
  caused by the substantial increase in the trans-
  portation of goods by road through the southern
  and south-eastern borders of Hungary and interest
  charges on bad debts. The Hungarian railways com-
  pany alone has had to absorb losses of $35 million,
  in addition to meeting additional port storage costs,

wagon demurrage charges incurred owing to the slow
procedures for granting authorization for consign-
ments in transit, interest charges caused by delays
in delivery and late collection, additional bank
charges and expenditures arising from the introduc-
tion of a stricter system of customs and border
inspection.

I would like to stress that our calculation of the
amount of aconomic losses that Hungary has incurred and
continues to incur, has taken into account only quantifiable and
concrete statistical data and that, consequently, indirect
significant losses affecting real estate values and capital
investments, for example, have not been included in our
calculations. The foregoing notwithstanding, I wish to reaffirm
once again that the severe impact of the sanctions regime on
Hungary does not in any way shake its firm commitment to
fulfilling its obligations with regard to the implementation of
the relevant Security Council resolutions.

We hope that this Working Group will soon be able to
finalize and adopt specific recommendations for each one of the
countries that have indicated their desire to consult the
Security Council as was done in the case of the sanctions
against Iraq. We feel that in dealing with the question of
providing assistance to resolve the economic difficulties of a
number of countries as a result of their implementation of the
sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro), it is crucial for the competent international
financial institutions to commit themselves to playing a key
role. We are sure that, alongside such multilateral efforts,
bilateral assistance will also be important.

II. The Southern Slav's refugee matters and migration problems
    for the Republic of Hungary

Separate consideration has to be given to the set of problems concerning the southern Slavs who fled former Yugoslavia and moved to Hungary because of millitary events. From the summer of 1991 to the end of 1992, the Hungarian authorities registered a total of 63,506 Southern Slav refugees (see Annex for data broken down by country of origin and nationality).

Before the Southern Slav tragedy occurred, the Hungarian Government had repeatedly pointed to the possibility of a military crisis, but, unfortunately, no appropriate preventive measures were taken. Consequently, the region has become the scene of the bloodiest conflagration since the Second World War and has triggered the largest flood ever of refugees in Europe. The London Conference on Yugoslavia, which was convened too late, and the presence of UN peace-keeping forces have so far been unable to cope with the situation, and thus the exodus has continued up to the present day.

It is an admitted fact that the UNHCR and other organizations have spared no effort to extend humanitarian assistance to the civilian population afflicted by the war and to send international relief supplies to those in need.

Most of the refugees fleeing the country because of the war come from Bosnia and Hezegovina, and the vast majority of them are Muslims.

From the outset, Hungary had admitted refugees and provided them with appropotiate accommodation. It has kept its borders open in order to ensure free movement for people coming to Hungary or passing through it to other destinations. It has

done so despite the fact that other countries bordering on Hungary have imposed restrictions on admission. The majority of refugees came form Croatia. In early 1992, Hungary signed a trilateral arrangement with the Croatian Government und the UNHCR, mainly for the purpose of repatriating refugees from Croatia. The related programme is being drawn up by a working group, and will be implemented as soon as possible. The persistence of the crisis and the delay in the repatriation of refugees unfortunately continue to increase the burdens placed on Hungary, for it should also be borne in mind that the devastiation of settlements and the forcible removal of inhabitants due to so-called "ethnic cleansing" will compel a large part of the Southern Slav refugees to remain in Hungary for a prolonged period of tθme.

Hungarian diplomacy sought the cooperation of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). At UNHCR headquarters in Geneva Hungarian experts studied the organization's activity, mainly to devise an institutional setting and a procedure for dealing with refugee questions in Hungary. The 1951 Geneva Convention, signed by Hungary on October 4, 1988, came into force for Hungary on June 12, 1989.

By virtue of its enabling provisions, the Convention was signed with so-called geographical reservations. In brief this meant that the provisions of the Convention were applicable only to refugees from Europe. (Similar reservations had formerly been made by Turkey, Malta, Madagascar and Monaco.) The reasons for restricted applicability lay in domestic policy: on the one hand, the worsening living conditions and the emergence of unemployment in Hungary were beginning to give rise to tensions between the refugees and local inhabitants, which at the time were increased by the half-hearted measures of the police against large numbers of foreign black-marketeers and currency

smugglers, and, on the other, by the fact that Hungary did not have enough material resources to provide an appropriate standard of treatment for refugees from other than European countries, let alone eventual risk factors of security (the smuggling of refugees into the country, drug trafficking, etc.).

Bilateral relations concerning refugee matters are coordinated, outside the multilateral channels mentioned, by the Section for migration and Refugees, which, as part of the Foreign Ministry's Consular Department, monitors - through Hungarian foreign missions - the situation with regard to refugees in the receiving countries and obtains relevant information for the competent Hungarian authorities.

Another important standing assignment of this Section is to secure foreign assistance and support, political as well as financial, for the management of refugee problems in Hungary. While, bearing in mind the number of Southern Slav refugees residing in Hungary, the UNHCR provides most of the funds required for the annual Hungarian programmes (in 1992, for instance, Hungary received USD 9.1 million from the donor countries), the need occasionally arises for additional foreign funding, since the Government's Refugee Fund amounting to HUF 1 billion a year is insufficient to cover expenses. Such diplomatic efforts have met with a favourable response. mention may be made of the Sasakawa Foundation in Japan, which last year transferred an amount of USD 1 million in assistance to the Hungarian authorities dealing with the Southern Slav refugees in Hungary.

REFUGEES IN HUNGARY

(1986-1992)

YEAR	NUMBER OF REGISTERED REFUGEES	COUNTRY OF ORIGIN	PERCENTAGE RATIO
1988	13,173	ROMANIA	99
1989	17,448	ROMANIA	98
1990	18,283	ROMANIA	95
1991	53,359	YUGOSLAVIA	87
		ROMANIA	10
1992	16,202	YUGOSLAVIA	93
		ROMANIA	5
TOTAL:	118,465		

Refugee status under the Geneva Convention was granted from October 15, 1989 to 5,305 persons.

From June 1, 1991 to December 31, 1992, a total of 63,506 applicants from the territory of former Yugoslavia were registered for temporary status.

Of them, 796 applied for and 534 acquired refugee status.

I. ARRIVAL OF REFUGEES IN HUNGARY BY YEAR AND NATIONALITY

YEAR	TOTAL ARRIVALS	OF WHICH:			
		ROMANIANS	SOVIETS	YUGOSLAVS	OTHERS
1988	13,173	13,173	-	-	-
1989	17,448	17,365	50	-	33
1990	18,283	17,416	488	-	379
1991	53,359	3,728	738	48,485	408
1992	16,202	844	241	15,021	98
TOTAL:	118,465	52,526	1,517	63,506	918
	(100%)	(44,3%)	(1,3%)	(53,6%)	(0,8%)

II. MODE OF REFUGEE ARRIVALS IN HUNGARY

YEAR	LEGAL (%)	ILLEGAL (%)
1988	52,5	47,7
1989	20,6	79,4
1990	81,3	18,6
1991	88,4	11,6
1992	88,3	11,7

III. TOTAL OF PERSONS TAKING REFUGE IN HUNGARY

YEAR	TOTAL	OF WHICH ETHNIC HUNGARIANS	
		PERSONS	%
1992	16,202	5,829	35

SOUTHERN SLAV REFUGEES IN HUNGARY, 1991-92
NUMBER OF REFUGEES BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND NATIONALITY

TOTAL ARRIVALS: 63,506

FROM CROATIA:	61,5%
FROM SERBIA:	5,0%
FROM BOSNIA:	14,0%

OF WHICH

. ETHNIC HUNGARIANS	2,7%
. CROATS	12,3%
. SERBS	1,9%
. MUSLIMS	78,0%
. OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS	5,0%
FROM SLOVENIA	2,0%
FROM VOIVODINA	13,3%
FROM KOSOVO	0,7%
FROM MACEDONIA	0,3%
FROM CRNA GORA	0,8%

TOTAL OF ETHNIC HUNGARIANS	27,7%
ETHNIC CROATS	52,0%
ETNIC SERBS	3,0%
ETHNIC SLOVENES	0,2%
MUSLIMS	15,0%
OTHERS, UNSPECIFIED	2,7%

NUMBER OF PERSONS BY CONTRY/REGION

Country/ Region	Total		Committing illegal crossing of the border on			Attempting		Smuggling people/assisting violators of the frontier		Handed to authorities of neighbouring countries		Received from neighbouring countries	
			exit		entry		exit							
	1991	1992	1991	1992	1991	1992	1991	1992	1991	1992	1991	1992	1991	1992
Austria	15,422	11,641	3,860	3,775	226	196	11,139	7,074	197	596	48	31	3794	3,750
Former Yugoslavia	1,871	2,929	141	82	1,044	1,172	530	399	156	1,276	119	206	128	74
Romania	8,614	6,051	66	20	8,201	5,044	95	52	252	935	6,053	3,712	21	17
Ukraine	49	120	0	13	32	44	7	7	10	56	12	19	0	8
Slovakia	3,688	2,936	1,181	653	259	257	2,128	1,524	120	502	146	126	1,097	641
Total:	29,831	23,925	5,251	4,544	9,937	6,751	13,899	9,061	739	3,569	6,378	4,094	5,043	4,491

III. The Hungarian Minorities within the Yugoslav Crisis and the Hungarian Standpoint

Among all the national and ethnic minorities living in Europe, the number of Hungarians ranked the highest before the dissolution of the Soviet Union left many millions of Russians as a minority in the successor states. Nearly 3.5 million Hungarian people live in the states surrounding Hungary, in minority status. This figure does not include the Hungarian diaspora in Western Europe, North America and elsewhere. The number of the Hungarian minority in Romania, according to the latest census conducted under the Ceausescu regime, totals up to 1,651,000. Nevertheless, competent and responsible sources (demographic experts, church data etc.) put the figure to at least two million. Presently, in Slovakia 567,000 (650,000), in Serbia 400,000, in Croatia 30,000, in Slovenia 10,000, in the Ukraine 158,000, (200,000), while in Austria roughly 5,000 Hungarians live.

These populations found themselves in minority status as a consequence of the territorial changes following the First World War, when two-third of the territory of the historic Kingdom of Hungary was ceded to Rumania, Austria the newly created Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia respectively. The majority of these Hungarians live in compact blocks along the borders of what was left of Hungary. During the last seventy years the states surrounding Hungary, except for the post - 1955 Austria, have pursued-irrespective of their political systems-a clear-cut, from time-to-time extremist, anti-minority policy. Methods of this policy have included economic and political pressures on the minorities, the reduction and restriction of Hungarian educational and cultural institutions and an arbitrary modification of the ethnic composition of areas inhabited by them. As a direct consequence of the se circumstances, in the

last seventy five years about one million Hungarians have been
compelled to leave their homes, and a far larger number of
Rumanian, Slovak and Serb settlers moved there to take their
place.

Hungarians, living as a minority, are strongly devoted to
their language, customs and national identity. This is well
illustrated by the fact that during seventy years their numbers
have not decreased significantly, only their proportoins have
been reduced as a result of resettlement. Hungarian minorities
living in territories ceded by Hungary to the neighbouring
states, still make up over 20 percent of the population, while in
some regions they form an absolute majority.

In the last three years, as a consequence of political
changes in Central and Eastern Europe, more advantageous
possibilities have emerged for political activity and
representation, as well as for economic activities by national
minorities. Hungarian minorities being traditionally open to
Western ways and values eagerly tried to exploit these new
possibilities. At the same time formerly muted nationalistic
tendencies have also risen to the surface from the side of the
majority.
Concerning the Hungarian Minorities in the former Yugoslavia:

In Slovenia the status of the 10,000-strong Hungarian
community is satisfactory. In Croatia the democratic transition
has had a beneficial impact on the community of approximately
30,000 Hungarians, who had lived under relatively good conditions
earlier as well. The civil war has overthrown everything, and a
substantial part of the Hungarians have been forced to escape to
Hungary, abandoning all their possessions. On December 15, 1991
Croatia joined the Hungarian-Ukranian Declaration on respecting
minority rights.

In the Voivodina, the formerly autonomous province of Serbia, conditions for the 400,000-member Hungarian community were gradually normalized after a massacre which claimed approximately 40,000 lives at the end of the Second World War. In the last two years, however, the revival of Serbian nationalism has put an end to their relatively favourable position. Provincial and local autonomy was abolished, the institutions of Hungarians have been curtailed. Since the outbreak of the war Hungarians have become targets of increasingly vicious verbal and, occasionally, physical attacks. Their proportion among the casualties in the army is relatively very high. At present the Hungarian community in Serbian Voivodina is seriously afraid of pogroms and a massacre or expulsion. A civil disobedience movement against the call-up of reservists, who do not want to be used as cannon-fodders in the war against Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina is growing, but harsh measures are being taken against them. International publicity as well as political pressure is urgently sought.

As the 1990 Program of the Hungarian Government declares:

"One of the most important cornerstones of democracies is tolerance towards those who belong to different religions or to different nationalities, who speak different languages-in short, minorities of all kinds. The main objective of our minority policy is to guarantee human rights to the minorities. Since one-third of all Hungarians live beyond the national borders, it is the Hungarian state's special responsibility to support the survival of the Hungarian nation as a cultural and ethnic community. This is the reason why we have been struggling for the rights of the Hungarian communities beyond the borders, including the right for self-determination (which could cover the establishment of cultural autonomy). In our activities we have always complied with the existing international agreements and acted in accordance with the manifest promises made by the

governments of the neighbouring countries. We support the efforts of these Hungarian communities to preserve their national identity. We think that every such initiative of the civil society is important. It is time that the ethnic minorities really constituted the most important bridge between nations, but this can only be implemented by communities which have regained their rights and dignity. This honest effort of ours enjoys the support of international organizations, especially the Council of Europe and the European Communities, and that of the governments and public opinion of individual countries.

On account of our commitment to human rights and democracy, we wish to help to establish the institutional framework needed for the exercise of individual and collective rights of minorities: there must be opportunities for their self-organization and their autonomous minority structures. It is important that the minorities should not be prevented from maintaining their contacts with relatives and friends, they should be able to preserve their cultural traditions and historical heritage, and to learn their mother tongue at each level of education. For this purpose we must form proper guarantees and institutional framework at bilateral, regional and all-European levels, including a system of protection and control. The most suitable form of this would be a universal or European code on minority policy.

Until this international regulation is born, the Hungarian Republic supports the lawful claims of the neighbouring Hungarian communities to report their possible grievances to international forums. We will continue our activities aimed at extending the scope of international law and realizing self-determination, and at the same time we vill stand up against the infringement of cultural rights, forceful assimilation, and discrimination.

The Government devotes special attention to the cause of national ethnic, language and religious minorities. This matter must be treated in a European fashion and with exemplary openness, but we should not always look for reciprocity in the assessment of the situation of ethnic minorities in Hungary and Hungarian minority beyond the borders.(...)

Our detailed "ation policy" forms an integral part of the Government program. Under the Prime Ministers's Office, the Secretariat of Hungarians Beyond the Borders was set up to carry out the tasks efficiently. This body has been working in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, other ministries and agencies, and certain committees of the Parliament. Always in accordance with the legislation of the countries concerned, we are planning the ways and means of the political, moral, and financial assistance for these organizations. We have begun a broad and fruitful cooperation with state and political institutions, organizations, and politicians of the neighbouring countries, while recognizing the modifications in state frameworks. This is the reason the negotiations with Croatian, Slovenian, Serbian, Slovak and Ukrainian leaders are so significant. (...)"

AUSTRIA

HUNGARY

ITALY

Slovenia

Ljubljana

Zagreb

Croatia

Vojvodina

ROMANIA

Novi Sad

Bosnia-Herzegovina

BELGRADE

Sarajevo

Serbia

	Albanians
	Bulgarians
	Croats
	Hungarians
	Macedonians
	Montenegrins
	Muslims
	Serbs
	Slovenes
	No nation majority
•●●	Republic boundary
......	Autonomous region boundary

Montenegro

Pristina

Titograd

Kosovo

BULGARIA

Adriatic Sea

ALBANIA

Skopje

Macedonia

0   100 Km

0   75 Miles

GREECE

5

Source 2.

The proportion of ethnic Hungarian population
in the neighbouring states of Hungary, 1980

0   50   100 KM

SLOVAKIA

AUSTRIA

KOŠICE

UŽGOROD

UKRAINE

BRATISLAVA

SLOVENIA

BUDAPEST

HUNGARY

CLUJ

CROATIA

SUBOTICA

TIMIŞOARA

BRAŞOV

RUMANIA

BEOGRAD

SERBIA

Hungarians over 50%
Hungarians 25-49%
Hungarians 5-24%

Decline in the ethnic Hungarian population
in the neighbouring states of Hungary
from 1920 to 1980

0   50   100 KM

SLOVAKIA

UKRAINE

AUSTRIA

SLOVENIA

CROATIA

SERBIA

RUMANIA

KOŠICE

UŽGOROD

BRATISLAVA

BUDAPEST

CLUJ

SUBOTICA

TIMIȘOARA

BRAȘOV

BEOGRAD

Hungarian absolute majority in 1980
Hungarian absolute majority in 1920

ETHNIC MAP OF VOIVODINA (1981)

by Károly Kocsis
Institute of Geography, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, 1991

Scale:

Legend:

○ Serbians
● Hungarians
◍ Croatians
◫ Slovakians, Czechs
◕ Rumanians
◉ Ruthenians
◌ Others

---·--- Republic frontier
--- --- Commune boundary
——— railway
——— main road

Persons
100
500
1000
5000
10000
50000

HUNGARY

RUMANIA

CROATIA

BOSNIA

SERBIA

Belgrade

Novi Sad/Újvidék

Source: Census 1981

New Europe.

V. Marmazov

1.

Specialists in Central and Eastern Europe have been faced with extremely rapid change. The sudden freedom of the East Central European countries in 1989 to choose their own destinies itself was unexpected. The reunification of Germany followed quickly. The August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow led with astonishing speed to the breakup of the Soviet Union. The disintegration of Yugoslavia began almost at once, and led to a terrible and expanding war, a war that may expand further. Violence erupted at several points in the former Soviet territory. Then Czechoslovakia decided to split.

Governments and specialists in the region were not prepared for one historic change after another. Most of these events could not have been anticipated, let alone prepared for, by anybody. Governments and specialists have found themselves forced to perceive, to understand, and somehow to respond to a cascade of changes. Analysts find themselves trying to understand today's world while not yet fully able to absorb yesterday's world.

The sheer speed at which events have been moving in eastern Europe is one of the basic factors affecting specialists' thinking about security in the region, and hence affecting the making of policy. Governments as well as independent specialists often find that the situation simply is changing too fast to permit its complete assessment.

2.

The impact of the speed of change is compounded by complexity and uncertainty. The Yugoslav situation is complicated all by itself, especially if one considers ways it might develop. So is the situation in the Caucuses region of the former Soviet Union. This, in turn, is only a small part of the security situation of the CIS as a whole. Another part, the relationship between Russia and Ukraine, could have a profound impact on the entire region. And so forth. The bipolar simplicity of the old Cold War has given way to a mosaic of vast complexity.

The current situation also presents enormous uncertainty, for a reason that goes beyond its complexity. There are now a great many independent sources of decision. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, once single actors on the stage, have disintegrated into many parts. Each of these now makes its own decisions. In some places the capacity to make independent decisions has descended further, even down to relatively small units, thus multiplying the number of actors. The many independent sources of decisions, each acting upon others, create an overall situation of tremendous unpredictability.

The combination of unpredictability and complexity, added to the speed of events, creates an extremely difficult environment for governments and specialists. It is only normal that mistakes may be made, simply as a result of misperception and misunderstanding, and of natural human limitations.

3.

Many of the security questions of Eastern and Central Europe have roots in one or both of two basic problems. One is the breakup of old structures and the appearance of new states. The other is the treatment of national minorities. These two, which are deeply intertwined, are not the only broad problems underlying the security issues of the region, but they are worth discussing here because they recur frequently and they are not well understood.

The breakup of multi-ethnic states is a source of great concern to policy specialists. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have already broken up. Czechoslovakia is breaking up now. Specialists fear the same may happen in Russia, and perhaps in other post-Soviet states. Several serious concerns arise.

The breakup of states can readily lead to new armed conflicts. The potential for disaster is demonstrated by the current agony in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the other hand, the peaceful division of Czechoslovakia may offer a positive example of a "civilized divorce."

The breakup of states can either increase or decrease the "visibility" of the smaller states that follow. One of the Slovak motives for independence was that Slovaks felt invisible to the world while inside the old Czechoslovakia. A similar desire for visibility can be found among national groups all over the region. But another possible result of separation is isolation, which includes lessened visibility. Russia is an important example. Russia is now separated from Western Europe by not one but two layers of states: the countries of East Central Europe and the westernmost layer of post-Soviet states (the Baltics, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine). Many specialists in the region are concerned that Russian isolation could be dangerous, and they urge steps to engage Russia in a cooperative international order that promotes security and economic growth for both Russia and its neighbors.

The actual and possible breakup of states poses extremely difficult problems of reconciling principles of sovereignty, individual human rights, and rights of national minorities. The end of the Soviet reign in East Central Europe, followed by the breakup of the Soviet Union, has led to an explosion of demands by nationalities for autonomy and self-determination. The sudden end of rule from above opened an enormous opportunity to assert national identities, and the resulting explosion has been all the greater because national identities had been repressed for so long. Almost no borders in the region correspond exactly with the places where peoples live, nor can they, because different nationalities overlap greatly. Almost every state finds that some of its people are minorities across the border in neighboring states, while other nationalities are present

inside, as minorities. Thus almost every state has mixed or inconsistent ideas about the rights of minorities -- wanting to promote them for its own people abroad, but perhaps not, for other peoples within.

Specialists in the region are concerned that the resulting problems are at once so complicated and so often the fuel for intense conflict. Complexity plus passion is a combination that makes some analysts pessimistic.

Other specialists believe that in many specific cases, minority rights problems can be handled by taking them to nonpartisan international bodies. Disputes that cannot be resolved between local parties, because of local tensions and emotions, may prove manageable if they can be referred to international bodies and mechanisms. Various possibilities already exist, including special commissions, third-party mediation, "fact-finding" by UN, E.C., or CSCE bodies, and others. Many specialists are interested in the expansion and further development of international mechanisms. One new development could be the creation of a "charter of minority rights" that might gain the backing of European and world opinion, and that could be applied to specific cases of alleged violations.

The intertwined questions of national minority rights and the breakup of old states are generally seen as problems that will continue to plague the region for a long time to come.

<div align="center">4.</div>

Two broad trends can be found in the thinking of policy specialists in Central and Eastern Europe about security. Individuals may not adopt one or the other exclusively. It is common to find specialists who employ some mixture of both. Even so, the two trends, or two approaches to security, can clearly be identified in specialists' thinking. One approach emphasizes "unilateral" actions by one's own country, minimizing reliance on multilateral agreements and collective structures. The other approach seeks security for one's own country by seeking security for all the countries in the region.

Interestingly, this is the same distinction that arose in some focus groups of the public, as mentioned above (~~presently~~). Some citizens in the groups wanted to build up their own country's military and "find allies," while others preferred to integrate their country into larger security mechanisms such as CSCE or NATO. The fact that the same distinction between two ways of thinking about security recurs among the public and among specialists should draw attention to the importance of these ways of thinking. Section Three concludes by examining them more carefully.

Even though many specialists combine both views in their own analyses, it is necessary to separate the two to understand them clearly. In the abstract, furthermore, the two are based on different assumptions, lead in different directions, and create different policy agendas. This will continue to be true, even though it is also true that a government can pursue elements of both approaches simultaneously, in a complicated and ambiguous situation like the situation in this region.

The "unilateral" approach to security is a traditional way of pursuing security. It interprets "national security" emphasizing security for one's own country, even though measures taken to that end may diminish the security of neighbors. This is *realpolitik* in its coolest form. On the assumption that European states pose actual or potential threats to each other's security, a given state (Country X) must look out for itself. In this perspective, the best way for Country X to meet possible threats is to take whatever steps it can (for instance, increasing military expenditures, seeking allies) to bolster its relative strength. An unavoidable implication of this approach is that neighboring states may perceive a greater threat from Country X, and they will probably compensate by building up their own strength. Their actions may, in turn, cause Country X to take more unilateral steps in response. The unilateral approach does not entirely exclude the possibility of international cooperation (in the UN, the CSCE, etc.) but it gives cooperation a low priority. Cooperation is subordinate to unilateral measures and to national sovereignty. There are important dangers in this approach. It can easily lead to local and regional arms races, competitive alliance-building, and other behavior that increases tensions.

The "mutual" or cooperative approach to security emphasizes those dangers. It points out that rising tensions may actually reduce rather than improve a country's security. A way of thinking that ends up reducing security cannot be desirable. As an alternative, countries can cooperate to manage and reduce, and perhaps in time almost to eliminate, any threats they perceive from one another. Rather than seeking unilateral military advantages over others, countries can find mutual arrangements that make all parties more secure. Cooperation is not limited to seeking large security structures like the UN or CSCE. This approach to security also includes less dramatic, but often very useful, steps such as verified arms reductions and the expansion (and consistent implementation) of confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs).

Reduced to its abstract essence, the unilateral approach sees the security relationship between one country and its neighbors largely as a "zero sum game," in which gains in one country's security often come at the expense of the security of others. The mutual approach seeks to avoid that by creating a "positive sum game" in which the security of all participants is increased.

5

An example from East Central Europe may illustrate the difference. Policy analysts inclined to the unilateral approach, and concerned about possible future threats from Russia or Ukraine, often favor increased ties to NATO, and preferably full membership, as a response. Their analysis overlooks or de-emphasizes the risks that might follow. Enlargement of NATO to include, say, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, but not Russia or Ukraine, might be seen by the latter two countries as an unfriendly action. A renewal of "east-west" tension could result.

Policy analysts inclined to the mutual approach, and seeing the same possible future threat from Russia or Ukraine, may also favor increased ties to NATO. However, these analysts recommend "positive sum" solutions to any tensions that might result between NATO and a future Russia or Ukraine. In their most radical version, these solutions would include Russia and Ukraine (and others) joining NATO too. Other "positive sum" solutions, less radical in character, would include steps such as major new arms reductions, stronger CSBMs, and demilitarized borders (or at worst, small and defensively-oriented forces near the borders).

There is a tendency for the fundamental difference between these two approaches to security to be overlooked in the heat of specialists' arguments over what security structure would be best for Europe. The difference between the two approaches to security is more basic than the argument over *which* security structure to develop. There is a danger that, if the argument over structures continues without resolution, some countries in Central and Eastern Europe (and eastwards) may drift into unilateral thinking about their security.

At least three security structures for Europe are being debated by specialists:

   -- a system based on widening NATO to include most or all of the former Soviet
         republics, as well as the East Central European countries;
   -- a system based on widening and strengthening the
         European Community, with the WEU as its military arm.
   -- a system based on strengthening the CSCE.

Many variations and combinations of these ideas are possible, and many analysts put forward arguments in favor of the various possibilities. The arguments are familiar in the specialist community and need not be repeated here.

Other analysts take a more step-by-step view, seeking practical ways to improve conflict resolution, and to strengthen the peacekeeping capabilities of international organizations. Without excluding a long-term evolution toward a large structure, these specialists believe much more can be done in the immediate future with *ad hoc* approaches. They point, as an example, to recent negotiations among Moldova, Russia, and leaders in the trans-Dniester region to resolve the crisis there. They offer the Central European Initiative and the Visegrad arrangements as

other good examples of practical problem-solving. (The Initiative was formerly called the Hexagonale.) Many of these analysts believe that strengthened UN peace-keeping and "peacemaking" capabilities, which could be supported militarily by NATO or the WEU, could help greatly to provide security in local or "sub-regional" situations.

This approach of immediate problem-solving has the advantage of avoiding the long-running debate over grand systems, which seems at times to have a somewhat theological character. Also, this *ad hoc* approach can usually take advantage of the "mutual" idea of security, since local solutions will need the agreement of everyone directly involved and will work only if each sees a gain (the "positive sum"). However, immediate *ad hoc* approaches do not always succeed, as the repeated failure of such approaches to the Yugoslav war shows.

As time passes, it is possible that *ad hoc* measures, applied case by case, will fail more often than they succeed. It is also possible that the existing security structures like NATO and CSCE may continue to be seen as hardly relevant to the kind of fighting that is actually taking place. Together, these things could create a belief among policy specialists, in and out of governments, that cooperative attempts to find security usually will be unsuccessful. A perception could grow that the mutual approach to security is ineffective.

Thus there is a danger that countries in East Central Europe and eastward may turn more and more to unilateral measures to improve their security. Unilateral steps by one country, such as strengthening its military or seeking a local ally, could easily threaten neighbors, who may take their own unilateral steps in reply. As the years pass, the region could sink to becoming a new arena of maneuver and counter-maneuver, with less security for everyone.

This possibility is not inevitable. For governments and specialists to observe it at this stage can help them to avoid it. A basis does exist already, both in public attitudes and in the thinking of the region's specialists, to develop further and to put into practice the alternative, mutual approach to security. One of the important challenges of the 1990s is for governments to recognize the risk in the unilateral approach and to create, instead, a long-term trend toward increasing cooperation for security throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

HALKI INTERNATIONAL SEMINARS '93

COOPERATION AND SECURITY IN EUROPE, THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE BALKANS

THE CIS AND ITS VIABILITY

Arsen Gasparian
Republic of Armenia

HALKI / RHODES

29 August - 12 September 1993

I. The Collapse of the Soviet Union

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was formally established on 30 December 1922 when the First Congress of Soviets of the USSR endorsed the Declaration and Treaty on the formation of the USSR. The Congress was attended by delegates from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and the Transcaucasian Federation (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia). Seventy years later, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus met at Minsk (the capital of Belarus) on 8 December 1991 and proclaimed the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Here should be noted that before the Minsk meeting, on 17 September 1991 the three Baltic Republics of the USSR, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were admitted as members of the United Nations and had achieved recognition as independent states.

On 21 December 1992 the Central Asian republics, Armenia, Azerbaijan[1] and Moldova signed the Alma Ata Protocol according to which they joined the Commonwealth of Independent States formed on 8 December by Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. On 25 December, Mikhail Gorbachev, the President of the Soviet Union resigned, thus removing the final obstacle to the dissolution of the Soviet empire.

The dramatic events of December 1991 were the outcome of a series of socio-political processes triggered by Gorbachev after his accession to power in 1985. The main features of the socio-political changes introduced by Gorbachev under the Perestroika program evolved around three basic notions, the main elements of which can be characterized as follows:

1. Abandonment of Marxist-Leninist ideology and suspension of the Communist Party as the sole political power in the country.

2. Establishment of the right of the populace to form political parties and organizations.

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[1] The Parliament of Azerbaijan hasn't ratified the Agreement signed by President Mutalibov.

3. Introduction of the free elections based on the principles of multi-party system.

Gorbachev's political reforms were intended to shift the power and authority from the party to the state organs.

On the other hand, the rising costs of maintaining traditional nationality policy contributed to the crisis in the Soviet society. As it was noted, "Mikhail Gorbachev originally placed the nationalities issue at the very bottom of his agenda and did not even raise the need for a revaluation in nationalities policy until he was almost two years in office".[2] During his period in power Gorbachev was oscillating between his original aim of reforming the Soviet economy and that of preserving the Soviet Union as a political entity. Taking into account the legacy of Soviet nationality policy, however, it is surprising that Gorbachev's persistent attempts the reconcile the transition to democracy and a market based economy with the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union was to prove futile. In all multiethnic Soviet-type societies, universal ethnic mobiliziation and strong separatist movements in the most developed republics have been an inevitable reaction to the profound systematic crisis. Under these conditions the progressive weakening of the state control made Soviet disintegration inevitable.[3]

It's impossible to reject Gorbachev's personal role in introducing and managing the reforms, but Gorbachev failed to maintain a balance between the extent of the reforms and the needs of the Soviet society, and a balance between reforms and the political management of these reforms. Anyway, Gorbachev reforms accelerated the process of collapse of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Empire has collapsed and its peoples have gained their independence and the right to assert their inalienable right to self-determination, a necessary condition for their democratic development.

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[2]Lubomyr Hajda and Mark Beissinger, *Nationalism and Reform*, in L. Hajda and M. Beissinger, eds., The Nationalities Factor in Soviet Politics and Society (Boulder, CO; Westview Press, 1990), p. 306.
[3]Victor Zaslavsky. *Success and Collapse:Traditional Soviet Nationality Policy* in Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States, Cambridge University Press 1993, p. 41.

II. The Creation of the CIS

The CIS was established by a proclamation in the Minsk Declaration of 8 December 1991, by Presidents Yeltsin of the Russian Federation, Kravchuk of the Ukraine and the Chairman Shushkevich of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus. On 21 December the USSR was formally dissolved when eleven constituent republics signed the Alma Ata Protocol. The treaty according to which the CIS was formed on 8 December stipulated that the CIS is based on the principles of inviolability of present inter republic borders, protection of minorities, and equality of rights among citizens of each republic. It also created a unified military command and defined the jurisdiction of the CIS institutions, including.

- coordination of foreign policy,
- cooperation in the formation and development of a common economic space and Europe-wide and Eurasian markets and in the field of customs policy,
- cooperation in developing the transport and communicating systems,
- cooperation in the protection of the environment and participation in establishing a comprehensive international system of environmental security,
- issues of migration policy,
- combating organised crime.[4]

The principle issue of the CIS, as far as international law is concerned, is the status of the CIS.

Status of the CIS. The CIS is not a state; it is a commonwealth. The reason for establishing the commonwealth was that, while some of the Soviet republics had achieved or at least declared their independence, all of them were nevertheless closely linked after more than seventy years of economic and political integration and centralised control from Moscow. It was vital to have a coordinating body that would serve as a medium through which to regulate these areas of common interest, or at least to ensure that their

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[4]Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States, 8 December, 1991, Article 7

disintegration was as orderly and safe as possible. This was acknowledged in the Minsk Declaration, the last clause of which provides that the parties "are making provision for joint control over nuclear weapons and for their non-proliferation".

The Minsk Agreement establishing the CIS is a relatively short document of fourteen articles plus a preamble. The parties clearly regard themselves as separate, independent states. In the first paragraph of the Preamble, they describe themselves as "High Contracting Parties"-not in itself perhaps conclusive, but still the normal term used by states to describe themselves in treaties. They then declare that the USSR no longer exists "as a subject of international law and in geopolitical reality". The right to bring the USSR to an end seems to have been based on the parties status as "founder states of the USSR".

Coordination by heads of state and government. The Alma Ata Declaration provides *inter alia,* that cooperation between the parties in the CIS shall be conducted through coordinating bodies operating under a procedure to be determined by agreements between the parties.

The Declaration is accompanied by the agreement on Coordinating Bodies of the CIS. Paragraph I says that a supreme organ of the Commonwealth, the Council of Heads of State, shall be established, along with a Council of Heads of Government.

The Republic of Belarus, the USSR and Ukraine were founder members of the United Nations. The States of Commonwealth passed a decision supporting Russia's continuance of the membership of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the United Nations, including permanent membership of the Security Council, and other international organizations. Other republics of the CIS one after another became the members of the UN.

Control of strategic armed forces and nuclear weapons. The fate of the USSR's nuclear arsenal has been of major concern to Western states, particularly because of the fear that some of it might fall into the "wrong"

hands. A related problem has been the dispute between Russia and Ukraine over control of the Black Sea fleet, which has been claimed by both states.

The CIS agreement attempted to regulate the Soviet armed forces and nuclear arsenal, bringing some of it under centralised control. The theoretical cooperation which exists in the agreements reflects the recognition by the member states of the need to ensure strict control. Nevertheless, some states have established their own armies.

For purpose of ensuring international strategic stability and security, unified command of strategic military forces and joint control over nuclear weapons will be maintained.

On the same day as this was agreed a commander of the Armed Forces was appointed, and there was signed an Agreement on Joint Measures with Respect to Nuclear Weapons. The parties to this are Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine, all of which have nuclear weapons on their territory. Article I provides that the nuclear weapons which are assigned to the Joint Strategic Armed Forces are intended to safeguard the collective security of the whole CIS. Thus, while the members of the CIS are independent states, their strategic security is supposed to be controlled by a centralised body. However, control over the use of these weapons is not held by all member states. Article 4 specifies that any decision to use them shall be taken by the President of the Russian Federation "with the consent of the Heads of the participating States of the Agreement on the basis of procedures drawn up jointly by the participating States".

III. The Future of the CIS

At CIS summit held in Minsk on 22 January 1993 Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikstan and Uzbekistan signed the new CIS Charter. Ukraine, Moldova and Turkmenistan haven't signed it yet on the ground that the Charter paves the way for the creation of a new state. The summit also witnessed deep cleavages concerning the issues of the division of nuclear arsenal of the Soviet Union, the functions of the unified military and strategic command, the defence of common borders, the establishment of the Parliamentary Assembly and a joint bank. The member states of the CIS up to the present time signed around 250 documents (including, agreements, resolutions, etc.) in a political, economic, military, scientific and cultural fields. Thus, the new republics (all the former Soviet republics, except Baltic republics, Georgia and Azerbaijan) established CIS, which is not a state, nor a supra-state entity. The CIS has a Council of Heads of State. It has a unified command of strategic military forces. The operations of the Council of State and unified strategic forces are controlled by member states themselves. The CIS is not a member of any international organization, nor has applied for any such membership.

At a minimum, the CIS should be viewed as a way of identifying the commonality of interests of millions of people who inhabit the space of the former USSR. The CIS holds the potential for future structures of profound cooperation among areas and territories that were once united in a single Soviet state. Russia, the largest, most populous, and militarily the most powerful state to emerge from the ruins of the USSR, must maintain the closest possible friendly relations with all of the member states of the CIS, otherwise the CIS is doomed.

The priority objective of Russian policy will be to keep the Commonwealth as unified as possible, a tendency already seen in Yeltsin's efforts to have it retain a central army, single currency, coordinated foreign policy (the CIS has already established a Council of Foreign Ministers), and common economic space. Academic Sergei Karaganov has suggested that Russia must "provincialize itself", pursuing a less international agenda than in the past: "Russia's external success will be 80 percent dependent not on

relations with America and Europe - for all their importance - but on its ability to influence the policy of Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the other former republics of the USSR".[5]

In practice the existence and effectiveness of the CIS have been threatened almost since its inception, first by the failure of its members to accept the spirit of the unified strategic armed forces, especially the division of the Black Sea fleet between Russia and Ukraine; second, because of conflicts within and between some members; and finally due to threats by some members to leave the Commonwealth. There are other explosive problems such as the treatment of Russian minorities in other republics and the division of the Soviet assets and liabilities.

The future of the CIS depends on how the member states are able to formate and develop a common economic space, create real political pluralism and market economies. The member states of the CIS must also establish the economic councils to coordinate the economic activities between the member states.

Thus, in the future the CIS can be transformated into a regional political and economic organization, such as, the Organization of American States.

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[5]Bruce D. Peter. *A Country Instead of a Cause: Russian Foreign Policy in the Post Soviet Era,* The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1992, p. 41

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BELARUS IN SEARCH OF SECURITY

One of the most urgent tasks facing the Republic of Belarus in defining

its foreign and military policy priorities is the formulation of a prudent

far-sighted line in the security field.

Unfortunately, so far neither the ministry of foreign affairs nor the

defense ministry of Belarus have issued any detailed official report on this

subject. There is little information about the steps to be taken by the

republic in the security sphere. It is necessary to take into account the

absence of a tradition to discuss such issues openly and freely in Belarus.

Formerly, the republic had no real possibility to proclaim its own position

on these matters because all the major decisions related to the formulation

and implementation of foreign policy and security strategy of the former

Soviet Union were taken in Moscow.

Now Belarus stresses the independent character of its stance in

foreign affairs and security issues. Basic principles of the Belarusian

security policy were outlined in the Declaration on State Sovereignty

adopted by parliament in July 1990. They include the desire to be nuclear-

weapon free and neutral in the foreseable future.

It is worth mentioning that Belarus does not demonstrate any

hesitation in its desire to get rid of nuclear weapons. On July 20, 1992

Belarus and Russia signed a comprehensive treaty on the coordination of

their actions in the military affairs. According to this document,

strategic nuclear forces now deployed in Belarus were taken under Russian

jurisdiction and are to be withdrawn to Russia by the end of 1990's. There

is a real possibility that this term might be considerably reduced if a

special agreement would be reached with Russia on a tight schedule for

the withdrawal of strategic nuclear forces from Belarus.

On February 4, 1993 the Belarusian parliament ratified the START Treaty,

the START Protocol signed in Lisbon in May 1992 and decided to join the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state.

Some problems are likely to arise if Belarus tries to adopt a neutral

status as soon as possible disregarding fundamental changes in European

politics after the end of the Cold War, dissolution of the Warsaw Pact,

break-up of the Soviet Union, and cessation of East-West confrontation. A

discussion is now going on in Belarus focusing on the question of whether it

is reasonable to become neutral immediately and how to behave towards the

creation of different systems of collective security.

It is noteworthy that some Western experts are skeptical about the

prospects of the neutrality of such countries as Ukraine and Belarus.

In May 1993 the Working Group on the New European Security Order prepared

a report for the Political Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly. The

authors state that if a country chooses to be neutral now it assumes that

there are going to be political, military, ideological, or other divisions

in Europe. If those divisions are going to disappear with the end of the

Cold War it is rather strange to proclaim neutrality - vis-à-vis what and

whom?

Of course, a country can choose non-alignment with any multilateral,

collective, or bilateral security arrangements. But, practically speaking,

this can apply to either small periferal countries or countries with an

established tradition of neutral status, such as Switzeland. In view of

these remarks, it seems difficult to imagine neutrality for Ukraine and

Belarus which proclaimed their desire to be neutral. In the longer run, as

to the opinion of the western analysts, all nations in Europe will feel

more secure if the two republics will be part of a collective security system.

When the Treaty on Collective Security was signed in Tashkent on May 15, 1992 by the representatives of several newly independent states – former republics of the Soviet Union, Belarus at first decided not to participate in this treaty on the grounds that future neutral status does not allow to take part in military blocs. But after hot discussion the Supreme Soviet of Belarus on April 8, 1993 decided to join the treaty with some reservations.

The supporters of this step argue that the Tashkent treaty itself does not mean the formation of a military alliance. It was designed to create a system of regional collective security which fully corresponds to the principles of the United Nations Charter. They also stress that strong military ties with Russia are unavoidable in the transitional period.

Many of the suppporters of the treaty doubt whether Belarus could be really neutral while occupying such an important geostrategic position in Eastern Europe. Most of its neigbours are eager to enter NATO or at least to receive NATO's military guarantees in any form. It may happen that in the future NATO would become the central pillar of the all-European security system in its military dimension. In the light of this perspective non-participation of Belarus in the structures of security and stability created by NATO would hardly be a prudent option.

The chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Belarus Stanislav Shushkevich is in favour of unconditional Belarusian drift towards neutrality and sgainst the participation in the Tashkent treaty. He proposed to resolve this problem throug a referendum. This complex situation is sharply dramatized by the evident polarization of political forces which are, so to speak, more pro-Russian, on the one hand, and more pro-Western, on the other.

So, Belarus faces serious dilemmas in its efforts to find out an adequate course in the security dimension, in the European politics, in

relations with Russia. It is clear that in the process of formulation the
security policy and military strategy of Belarus corresponding concepts
developed by NATO countries should not be ignored.

A very useful channel of mutual information on security and defense
matters is the participation in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. This
body might be viewed as a forum for the discussion and formulation of
coordinated actions in the security dimension which are commensurate with the
new tasks of extended collective security in the Euro-Atlantic frameworks.

GEORGE
SULKHANISHVILI

Georgia and the New Europe

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union the international relations system, which was based on post World War realities and which was expressed in the East-West "Cold War", is facing new challenges. The most serious question confronting Western democracies is relations with the new independent republics. On what basis should these relations be built?

For these republics a more serious dilemma than economic reform is the security issue which also involves Western interests. What kind of foreign policy should these republics have first of all towards Russia, then towards the West? These are problems to be discussed in this article. The recognition of the independence of ex- Soviet republics by Western Countries was connected with lots of problems, and most of them still remain unsolved . I think here are several key questions to be discussed:

First, how difficult it will be for Russia to accept the independence of other ex-Soviet republics. This is not only the question of the security of these republics, but also whether they will be able (all fifteen together) to build democratic societies and establish a civilised modus vivendi. Unfortunately recent events which have taken place in Caucasus, Baltic states, in Central Asia are showing to us, that it is very difficult to establish a civilised modus vivendi and Russia can hardly accept the independence of these republics as legitimate.

Second, the desire of all these republics to participate in world process independently and their unacceptance of the idea that their participation should be mediated by Russia. For example, Central Asian republics with their enormous resources of oil, gas, raw materials can not agree to the idea to be mediated in international economic activities, but the recent events in Tajikistan make other republics be more careful on their way to full economic and political independence.

Third, the existing economic dependence of the republics on each other is playing a negative role in establishing normal economic relations, because the old economic integration of the ex-Soviet Union was non-beneficial to all republics and was created just for one purpose - to prevent the totalitarian state from falling apart.

Fourth, the national problem. During the Soviet era ethnic identities of groups were converted in nationalities, with artificially defined territorial borders. The "ethnic-state" borders were designed for keeping ethnic tension within each region keeping the Soviet Union together and preventing the creation of nation-states (in the European sense of this word), which had to be the natural, traditional, historical way of civil development and in which citizenship has relatively greater importance than nationality.

Social, economic, human rights problems in former Soviet Union very often were identified just to persons belonging to one or other ethnic group. This is quite evident today - violence in the Caucasus, disputes over citizenship in the Baltic states, Central Asian problems and situation in Russia itself. - This approach, which is called "Matrioshka Principle", when there is the idea that human rights, national, social and other problems can be solved just by giving to a smaller entity surrounded by a bigger one the symbols and characters of that bigger one might be appropriate in Russia itself and not the Caucasus, where historical way was different from what it was in Russia and where are no conquered territories, or in Europe or in Central Asia. The parade of sovereignty in Russia and export of this idea by Russian foreign policymakares abroad, first of all in ex-Soviet republics in the most suitable way for them and could bring us to the violation of the international law, signs of which we already have today.

Fifth, that what is more or less common to all republics is the establishment of a political system which is not based on civil society. What I mean under this is that there is no real political force - political party or at least civil movement (which is probably too late today) - to express the real political and economic will of a citizen, and to give a citizen the possibility to participate in building the state. For example, the political crisis in Russia, the situation in other republics, that no political force can take the responsibility for governing the country, creating an affective cabinet of ministers. That is why all power is personified in one person and all international relations is based on this: the same happens in almost every ex-Soviet republics.

These are some of those problems confronting the ex-Soviet republics and which complicate and make difficult their full integration in the world processes.

Western countries, not having real mechanisms of influence over the republics, prefer to deal with one person in whom the whole power is personified, thus the international relations can't be effective. In this case they are fragile, and carry in themselves a threat to the future stability and security in Europe.

The question posed at the beginning of this report needs an answer, if not a complete, full answer then a partial one at least. The clue to this problem is of course in the republics; what the west can do is to help the ex-Soviet republics to realise their potential for internal development and encourage them to find and develop common interests.

Some concrete proposals for these:

First, helping these republics to normalise relations with Russia, first of all helping them to structure the state and to start radical economic reforms. Leaving these countries alone with Russia, or with each other will not give satisfying results, because all of them were living not in a real dimension. As the ancient Greeks used to say about the Persians, that they had no language and they did not mean a system of sound symbols, but real modus vivendi . That same approach may be used to the relations between Russia and the former Soviet republics. There had no language which they could speak and still have not got it. But all of them are obliged to speak real language when dealing with western democracies, because in the West there is only real language, as ancient Greeks used to say.

For this is necessary the de facto division responsibilities among the UN, CSCE, NATO and other international organisations, the immediate reorganisation for increasing their effectiveness, including a more efficient management of the UN, CSCE operations and not calling for new conferences on co-operation in Europe. We should welcome the US administration's decision of the US mediation of disputes among former republics of the Soviet Union. Other Western countries should encourage this initiative and should join it. This step would help to find and attack the roots of the conflict and will help to stimulate long-term institutional development. This kind of initiative for sure is in the interests of all republics and by all means is in Russia's interests. Despite the official foreign policy of Russia to keep a military presence in the former Soviet republics and with this mechanism to influence their political and

economic life, having regimes in the republics which suit Russia's national interests - (this phrase is very popular nowadays in Russia, but I am not quite sure whether they really understand what their real and not phantom national interests are) - the public opinion is completely different: they want economic changes, stability and peace.

Second , the idea of creation of democratic belt round Russia could play a positive role in achieving stability in Euro-Asia. This idea could be based on common economic interests. The interests of Central Asia - (and not only Central Asian, but also central Russian regions) - to export oil, gas, raw materials via Euro-Asian corridor to Europe and first of all to East Europe. Cross-border trade between republics and Russia's regions will grow. And in this direction the co-operation of the regional organisations like BSEC, Baltic Sea Conference, Vishegrad Group, Caspian Sea Co-operation, Central Asian Economic Co-operation and such developed organisations as EC and Nordic Council will help us to accomplish the basic democratic goals set out in the Paris Declaration of the CSCE.

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          INTEGRATION IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS

    1. Assembly of Caucasian Nations - Confederation of
Caucasian Nations

    The current political situation in the southern parts
of Russia is, to a great extent, determined by the
evolution of the notion of a "North-Caucasian home"
("obshchii dom"). The conflict between Georgia and
Abkhazia, which started in July 1989. enhanced the
Caucasian movement for integration, and became an
additional motive for the creation of the Assembly of
Caucasian Gorsky ("mountainous") Nations (CCN). On August
26, 1989, the first session of the Assembly of Caucasian
Nations, represented by members of six national movements
of the Caucasus: Shapsug. Adyg, Cherkes, Kabardin,
Ingush, and Chechen, voted to support the Abkhazian
issue. The main idea under the creation of the Assembly
was to help the smaller Caucasian nations to solve their
problems: national ones, such as controversies over
national boundaries; historical ones, such as the renewal
of the Gorsky republic 1: political ones, such as the
problems of nations that have been subject to political
repressions; to a certain extent, economical problems 2.
The Assembly was intended to improve the standing, of
national movements on local and federal levels.
    Another reason for the birth of the ACN was the
complicated hierarchy of nations that existed in the
USSR, where all nations were divided into "federal" and
"autonomous" ones, with three degrees of autonomy.

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1 The Gorsky republic existed from May 11, 1918 until May
1919. It was recognized by monchevik Georgia. Azerbaijan,
Turkey and Germany, and was represented in the League of
Nations. Internal controversies (between the temporal
democratic faction and the theocratic one. between
socialists and conservatives etc.) made the republic too
weak to resist invasion by the Army of Denikin. In May
1919 the government of the Gorsky republic resigned. The
green flag with seven stars (for Abkhazia. Adygeia,
Kabarda, Cherkessia, Ingushetia, Ossetia, and Dagestan)
that was raised at every session of the ACN, is the flag
of the Gorsky republic.
2 For instance, after the disaster near Tuapse, the
reconstruction of destroyed bridges and roads in the
regions populated by Shapsugs was financed by Adyg

national movements.

By mid-1991, the ACN included 16 national movements of the Caucasus. Its activities were chiefly diplomatic.

At the first stage of its existence, the leaders of all member movements in the ACN were active supporters of Russian democrats that advocated Sakharov's idea of equal rights for all Soviet peoples. However, given the unstable policy of Russian authorities concerning the federal structure of Russia, as well as the galloping disintegration of the USSR, the ACN soon changed its orientation. On November 1, 1991, the third session of ACN proclaimed the creation of the Confederation of Caucasian Gorsky Nations. Another important reason for the birth of the CCN was the Chechen revolution, and especially the behaviour of Russia, which proved unable to control the developments in Chechnya after the displacement of Doka Zavgayev, speaker of the Supreme Soviet of Checheno-Ingushetia. 3

The second stage of Caucasian integration includes the evolution of the CCN into a pseudo-state, with its own offices. The CCN elected a "parliament", in which each Caucasian nation, irrespective of size, was represented by three deputies. The parliament is headed by Yusup Soslambekov, chairman of the committee for foreign affairs of the Chechen parliament. Musa Shanibov, sociologist from Nalchik, was elected president of the Confederation.

The majority of North Caucasian leaders, though, are still oriented on Russia. The statements of the Russian authorities in connection with the situation in South Ossetia in June 1992 caused a split inside the CCN. A moderate, pro-Russian trend clearly separated itself from a radical, pro-Chechen one. The latter was only supported by the Karachayev nation. The affinity between the Presidents of Chechnya and Georgia, Dudayev and Gamsakhurdia, was decisive to the schism: for the majority of Caucasian nations, the name of Gamsakhurdia was linked to the deportation of their compatriots from Georgia and severe discrimination of national minorities. In June 1992, the majority of national leaders in the CCN took to the pro-Russian trend. The Chechen division, which had actual control over the "peacemaker" forces of the Confederation, refused to send volunteers to South Ossetia. Jokhar Dudayev came out with severe criticism of the Abkhazian speaker, Vladislav Ardzinba, for the latter's attempts to establish relations with the Russian authorities.

The antagonism between Dudayev and the CCN, on one hand, and the accord of the Chechen leaders with Gamsakhurdia, on the other, promoted further

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3 The antagonism between Moscow and the National Congress of the Chechen People (NCCP) became evident by that time. After the overthrow of Zavgayev, the speaker of the Russian parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov, a Chechen by nationality, came to Chechnya to create a temporary committee that would function until a democratic election

takes place. The project was opposed by the NCCP and failed.

confrontation among former champions of Jokhar Dudayev. The latter risked total isolation. This tendency, however, changed later, when the Russian President spoke his support of Georgian unitarianism in the course of talks with Shevardnadze on the South Ossetian issue. The Russian policy of non-interference into the Abkhazian crisis, and later the arrest of CCN President Musa Shanibov, eventually reversed the tendency. 4 National movements gradually became more radical. Meetings in Kabarda gathered thousands demanding the release of Shanibov and the withdrawal of troops. Soon they were demanding the displacement of Kabardino-Balkarian president Kokov, and eventually the independence of Kabarda from Russia. The confrontation untited the CCN, joined by representatives of Nogai and Kumik nations, and by Cossacks. The name of the Confederation was changed: it lost the word "gorsky" - "mountainous", and became simply a Confederation of Caucasian Nations. One reason was that neither Nogai nor Kumik nations are mountain ones. As to Cossacks, the decision by the parliament of the CCN to change its name was an evident attempt to show its non-confrontation with Cossacks. and probably even to cause a split inside the Cossack movement. In Abkhazia, the policy of the Confederation was supported by some of the South Russian Cossacks.

As a result, Caucasian leaders became consolidated inside the "Chechen" trend, and the denunciation of the Federation agreement became a popular idea.

It is, nevertheless, still premature to regard as final the tendency for isolation of North Caucasian national movements from Russia, or the tendency to implement the concept of a Union of Caucasian states (the Gorsky republic). 5 Beside the opposition of the two orientations, the structure of the CCN is extremely heterogeneous. Nations differ in religion (Christian and Muslim); some closely related nations, such as Adygs and

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4 The criminal charge to the CCN and the arrest of its President were said to be a measure to "prevent potential conflicts in the region". To the same end, special troups of Russian home forces were brought to the North Caucasus. The formal pretext for the criminal charge was an edict of the CCN, widely quoted by the press, in which all Georgians were called "hostages". Later Shanibov announced that mass media gave an inaccurate quotation.
5 Such a suggestion was made by Dudayev during the congress called "The Caucasian home", organized on September 4-5. 1992 as an antitheses to Russian politics and therefore having no representation of official North Caucasian leaders. This does not lessen the importance of the suggestion, given the approaching elections in the Caucasus and the habit of the official elite to pick up ideas of popular leaders. Moreover, both the creation of a North Caucasian association of republics regions, and

districts, and the concept of regional safety networks born during the Abkhazian crisis, are, in fact, an implementation of the same idea.

Vainakhs, work for leadership; other, for unification. 6 Moreover, not a single boundary in the North Caucasus has a definite historical justification. And, of course, Caucasian leaders have personal political ambitions. As a matter of fact, the CCN is used by every one of its members to his own purpose: by Ossetia, for support in the conflict with both Georgia and Ingushetia; by Chechnya, as a means of pressure on Russia and for the creation of a Gorsky republic with access to both the Black sea (through Abkhazia) and the Kaspiysky sea (through Dagestan). While the Confederation itself is so non-uniform, its basic principles are extremely flexible, and only an external influence can secure its stability and internal consolidation.

The contemporary post-totalitarian Russia has not yet defined its national policy. "Every high official has his own national policy", said the Chairman of the Russian State Committee for Nations Valery Tishkov as he left his position. Unlike Gorbachev's administration, the new one has no experience in dealing with national movements, and it had chosen the manner of stabilizing the Confederation that is prone with irresolvable problems both in the North Caucasus (problems of boundaries and national conflicts in the first place) and in Russia itself (a precedent showing that one may use force in order to prevent the disintegration of Russia). Now Russia is doomed to keep a sizable armed force in the Caucasus to maintain its own standing and the standing of the present local authorities. To live up to the principle "divide et impera", Russia will have to follow an intricate policy, choosing "partners" and "victims" according to its strategic interests.

The Confederation was probably the only force able to prepare the grounds for an acceptable procedure of unification of closely related nations into republics (Kabardino-Cherkessia, Karachaievo-Balkaria). Having missed the opportunity to make the Confederation its ally, Russia has to deal with national antagonism in overpopulated North Caucasus with its disputable boundaries and republics that have been created without respect to ethnic factors.

Another source of instability in Russia are the migration waves from the Transcaucasian conflict areas, and secondary migration waves — "non-native" fugitives from the North Caucasus. The problem is especially serious since both national antagonism and overpopulation are increasing rapidly. The conflict in South Ossetia resulted in the migration of over 100,000 persons to Russia, destabilizing the most Russian-oriented of the

6 For instance, the World Cherkes Association, including the Cherkes, Kabardin, Adyg, Shapsug, and closely related Abkhaz and Abazin nations, advocates the creation of a

confederacy of the above states. In summer 1992, this
project was discussed on government level, and
contemporary Cherkes states have signed two-sided
agreements.

North Caucasian republics, North Ossetia, and, in a way,
promoting the war between Ossetians and Ingushs.

2. The "Islamic Factor" in the Caucasus

Similarly to Orthodox Christianity in Russia, the
Muslim religion is an important constituent of the
national culture of Caucasian Muslim nations. The ethnic
nature of Muslim religion became evident with the
disintegration of regional religious offices in Russian
autonomies into independent national Muslim centres. New
national Islamic parties and movements began to appear;
in Dagestan, for example, there are three independent
parties of this type. Of course, considering the great
number of nations and languages in the Caucasus, attempts
to create a pan-Caucasian ideology must inevitably pass
an "Islamic" stage. Muslim attributes, used by national
leaders (with the exception of Ossetians and Abkhazians)
at the sessions of the CCN, are now regarded as the
symbols of Caucasian unity.
The idea of unification on an Islamic basis was soon
rejected: the Chechen parliament has thus annulled in
November 1992 the law on punishment for criminal offences
according to the shariat. and emphasised the fact that
Chechnya is a temporal state.
Current attempts to treat confrontations in the
Caucasus as confessional ones, where civil life or
military conflicts (between Ossetia and Georgia, Abkhazia
and Georgia, or Ossetia and Ingushetia) are concerned,
are undoubtedly worthless. The Muslim constituent is
indeed used by some political leaders, in Chechnya in the
first place. and by the authorities of traditionally
Christian countries: Armenia, Georgia, and to some extent
North Ossetia. Still, "Christian" president Gamsakhurdia
supported the Muslim Ingush nation in its conflict with
Orthodox Ossetia.
To Georgia, "Muslim fundamentalism" became a useful
way of camouflage for explaining the military invasion of
Abkhazia to the Western society. The conflict between
Georgia and Abkhazia is presented as a conflict of two
civilizations not only by Georgian leaders. but by
Russian mass-media as well. It is sufficient to refer to
numerous statements by North Caucasian volunteers that
were published in Russian papers. One of their slogans
was "Our aid to Abkhazians is the will of Allah". The
priest of the Kuban Cossack corps, Valentin Golikovsky,
evaluated the situation as follows: "You see. Georgians
are Orthodox just like we are, and the majority of
Abkhazians are Muslims (only a small part of the
Abkhazian nation has become Muslim in the 17th century,
but still there is not a single mosque in Abkhazia —

ed.)... Our region has become a outpost of the Christian civilization. And I think that, unfortunately, a clash of the two worlds is inevitable..." He added: "We stay more or less neutral..." The supposed Islamic religion of Abkhazians did not make much impact on the attitude of

the Kuban Cossack Rada, whose Council of Atamans sent the Russian President a telegram insisting on urgent support of the "sovereign republic of Abkhazia", and saying that the Kuban Cossacks "are prepared to defend the Abkhazian and Slavic population of Abkhazia". Cossacks and representatives of other Slavic nations are volunteers on the Abkhazian side, and fight against Orthodox Georgians. To Slavic and North Caucasian nations, the choice was determined by Abkhazia's orientation on the USSR, and later on Russia. 7 Recent sociological surveys, carried out in September 1992, show that the majority of the population of poly-confessional Russia, including wholly Orthodox regions, support the Abkhazian issue.

6

The conflict between Ossetians and Ingushs in the Prigorodny region of North Ossetia is also frequently understood as a case of confessional antagonism. This understanding is sustained by the claim of local Tersky Cossacks to the status of "native population" of the Prigorodny region. But, while taking the side of Ossetians in this conflict, the Tersky Cossacks themselves claim the Mosdok region of Ossetia, with a Russian majority of 59% against 9% of Ossetians, and demand that the region be adjoined to the Stavropol region of Russia.

The approach to the conflict as a confessional one is typical to the political leaders of North Ossetia and Russia: the former exploit it to get preferential treatment from the federal authorities and to stabilize their own standing; 8 the latter use it in the stead of a realistic system of national priorities.

We have to admit that the Russian authorities are substaintially contributing to the enhancement of the significance of the "Islamic factor" in the former USSR. The situation is unfolding in a different fashion in Russia and in the rest of the CIS.

In Russia, this tendency is dictated by the evolution of official ideology in the direction of Orthodox

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5 After abortive attempts to get the Russian authorities to support the idea of Georgian federalism, Abkhazian leaders altered their political course. The currently popular concept in Abkhazia is that of North Caucasian unity.

8 By the estimates of most surveyors, the collisions of Ingushs and Ossetians between November 1 and 10, 1992, were the result of a provocation. Several parties benefit by this conflict. The communist elite of Checheno-Ingushetia tries to make a retribution at the cost of Russia. The authorities of Georgia hope that with the beginning of war and blockade in Chechnya, Chechen volunteers will leave Abkhazia. The rulers of North Ossetia expect that it will help them to win the struggle

for power between Ossetia's present leader, Galazov, and former member of the Central Committee of the communist party, Dzassokhov. The Russian Ministry of defence uses the opportunity to put a convoy along the Military Georgian route (Гχξφφχ-μρппρφ.Ξ-ιΩ vχρχμι) and bring military equipment back from the Transcaucasus.

Christianity. Official exploitation of the Orthodox religion makes the authorities of Russia regard Islam as a threat to the country's stability in the Povolzhie and in the Caucasus. This fact was used by South Ossetian rulers to influence the attitude of Russian leaders to Shevardnadze's military policy in South Ossetia.

Russia's role in the increasing importance of the Islamic factor outside the Russian federation follows from the general course of political events in the former USSR. After the disintegration of the USSR, the authorities of Muslim republics remained communist. Since the Moscow events of August 1991, democratic Russia announced its "special place" in the CIS, and threatened young states with a review of borders if they go too far on the way to sovereignty. The imperialistic attitude of Russia was explained by a new slogan: "Democratic Russia must help the new states to get rid of the freight of national communism." Despite the fact that the slogan was soon rejected, the attitude of Russia to post-communist elites and national-democratic oppositions, often linked to Islamic parties and movements, remained, adding to instability on the Southern borders of the CIS.

3. External Forces in the North Caucasus

While Russian authorities are losing their influence on the Caucasus, it is natural to expext a change in the regional balance of power. Muslim countries are already showing their interest in this complex region. Guests from Turkey, Oman etc. paticipated in sessions of the CCN parliament. Turkey has the best prospects for influence on the North Caucasus. Turkish authorities are still waiting for the development of events: business contacts or the participation of volunteers in the Abkhazian conflict cannot be taken too seriously. The unhurried attitude of Turkey is easy to explain. At present, Turkey has no need to take active steps to enhance its influence in the region. The inconsistent policy of Russia together with its internal problems are making its rating in the Caucasus lower with every day. The leaders of many national movements in the Caucasus are already oriented on Turkey. The construction of mosques and educational projects provide futher basis for political influence. One can picture a day when the popularity of Russia in the North Caucasus will depend on the extend of Russian-Turkish collaboration.

Given the general instability of the region, it is too early to say whether the Turkish influence on the North Caucasus will pass through Georgia or Azerbaaijan. The relations of the latter two with Caucasian nations are

complicated by the problem of Lesgistan and by the discrimination of Abkhazians and Meskhetin Turks.

Conclusion

The role of the CCN in the political life of the region is primarily determined by general development

which is usually exaggerated, nor by the personal connections of its leaders. 9 Both Russia's inability to influence the course of events in the North Caucasus, and the instability in the Trascaucasus, will continue to propel North Caucasian republics to futher integration. At present, the CCN is the only organization that proved capable of protecting Caucasian interests from "aggressive aspirations of Russia and Georgia". The Assembly of Nations of the North Caucasus and the Commonwealth of Nations of the North Caucasus, both of which were recently created at the initiative of Russian authorities, are chiefly concerned with the propaganda of humanitarian ideals and with "people's diplomacy". Similar activities have little chance of earning these organizations much popularity.

One more opportunity for the CCN lies in the personalities of its leaders and in the forces that are backing them up. The President of the CCN, Mussa Shanibov, was chosen for this position for his capacity of professional demagogue. He performs mainly as an orator and has little impact on actual decisions. His political credo is separation from Russia and evolution of the CCN from a union of nations into a union of states, i.e. into a true confederation. This is hardly practical, considering the present discord among CCN members. The current tendency includes the formation of a balanced two-centered structure in the Caucasus, with one centre in Chechnya and one in Cherkessia, while the political activity of Dagestan in the CCN remains low. Shanibov's ideas are only supported by Abkhazians, and only on the condition of staying on good terms with Russia.

The true leader of the CCN and of its armed forces is Yussup Soslanbekov, chairman of the Committee for foreign affairs of the Chechen parliament. His point of view consists in letting the CCN remain a union of nations while enhancing its influence on republican authorities. To this end, permanent committees of the CCN are to function on the level of vice-minister of every republic; neutral arbitration of differences between republics is to become the usual practice; the CCN is to use its own armed force to resolve conflicts inside the CCN. The main aim of Soslanbekov and the Chechen forces behind him is to acheive economic integration in which Chechnya will dominate, being a monopolist in the production and refining of fuel. Soslanbekov is regarded as an important figure by all political forces of the Caucasus and of Russia, and is considered to be the most probable future leader of Chechnya.

9 In reality, the only member nations of the CCN whose leaders have connections in Moscow or outside the former USSR are Chechnya and Abkhazia.

Dr. Khasanov Rakhim

THE CURRENT SITUATION IN CENTRAL ASIAN COUNTRIES AND ISSUES OF REGIONAL SECURITY

As a result of the disintegration of the Soviet
Union the newly founded states in Central Asia and
Kazakhstan have not only joined the world community but
have come to closer grips with the problems which used
to be at the background of political life in the former
Soviet republics.

The current situation in the region is shaped by the
conflict of two cotroversial tendencies which can
influence both the future of the new-born states and
their drive to secure their positions as members of the
global system of international relations. One of them is
the tendency of preserving stability, putting an end to
the existing and preventing the outbreak of new
conflicts in order to avoid destabilisation of the
situation in the region, which is part of the former
Soviet Eurasian expanse, and thereby eliminate any
threat to peace. The other one is a destabilising
tendency brought to life by the realities of the
totalitarian past and controversial processes of the
region's evolution in the post-communist period.

The underlying problems of the latter tendency are,
first and foremost, those of the socio-economic
development of the Central Asian states. The

predominantly single-crop economies of the former Soviet
republics of Central Asia based on growing cotton
accounted for the lack of jobs in the region with
traditionally redundant labour. Demographic issues
occupied a place no less important, with high birth
rates being characteristic of the Central Asian region.
Incidentally, Tajikistan had the highest population
growth rates among the republics of the former Soviet
Union.

Problems engendered by the regional controversies
tearing apart the new Central Asian states still remain
a headache. Specifically, these issues are related to
the economic potential, industrial pattern, economic
specialisation, ethnic structure, way of life, people's
living standard and their social and cultural
preferences. These factors used to influence political
life in different regions of each of the Central Asian
states. Thus, in Tajikistan the Northern and Southern
regions are following different patterns of public
life: while the North gravitates toward the development
of traditionally close relations with Uzbekistan, Russia
and other CIS countries, the South is keen on
integrating, economically and culturally, with Middle
East countries. Ethnic and cultural community is
conducive, in particular, to the promotion of its
rapprochement with Afghanistan.

The destabilising tendency in the region is being further fuelled by the conventional character of the existing frontiers between the Central Asian countries. Under the 1924 national and territorial delimitation Bukhara and Samarkand--the two ancient centres of Tajik national culture--were transferred to Uzbekistan.

The Islamic integrationist movement gaining strength in Tajikistan coupled with above-mentioned problems identical, for the most part, for all the countries of the region have triggered off an outbreak of civil war. As to the involvement of Afghanistan in the conflict it is threatening the stability not only of the CIS countries, but Middle East countries as well.

The activities of the forces opposed to the governments of the Central Asian states help the destabilising tendency to take root in the region. The main opposition force is represented by fundamentalist Islamic movements which came up at the end of 1980s and the beginning of 1990s with nationalist and religious mottos and used Islam in pursuit of their political goals. Initially, these movements advocated the promotion of culture, spirituality and national traditions channelling their efforts primarily into activities in the fields of enlightenment and culture to be followed later, however, by vigorous offensive political actions. It is noteworthy, that while in the Moslem Middle East countries the Islamic integrationist

movement turned to be a response to a hasty policy of modernisation and a desire to find a real alternative to the West, in the new Central Asian states it was associated with the search for an alternative to the Soviet model of socialism with its inherent distortions in the social and economic development, superficial modernisation and resentment of nation formation.

The integrationist Islamic movement in Central Asia reached its summit in 1990-1992. In June 1990, the nation-wide Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) was established. Next year its branches were set up in Dushanbe and Tashkent. The establishment of the IRP gave impetus to the propagation in the Moslem regions of the former Soviet Union of Islamic political parties and movements and stirred up their political activities.

Initially, the Islamic political movement avoided extreme mottos and kept apart from the idea of the creation of an Islamic state in the Central Asian region. But already in 1991 the IRP reversed its policy to begin its struggle for power using radical methods and that, naturally, shifted emphases in its political doctrine. On making best use of the aggravation of the social and political situation in Tajikistan in May 1992, the IRP instigated the political crisis in the country to resolve which it had to be given portfolios in the government. A number of sociological studies

conducted at the time showed that a mere 6 per cent of the country's population supported the Islamists.

Once founded, the Islamic movements in the Central Asian region did not waste time to establish close relations with their counterparts in Middle East countries. The IRP of Tajikistan maintains contacts with the Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria, HAMAS and El Nahda—the Islamic Resistance Movement, in particular. In an interview to the *Keihan Havai* newspaper, Hikmatzade, the leader of IRP of Tajikistan pointed out that his party was active since 1979, the time of victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran. In the 1980s the IRP established contacts with the Islamic Party of Afghanistan and the Islamic Society of Afghanistan which were developing across the Afghan-Tajik border.

On getting portfolios in the Tajik government in May 1992, the IRP openly declared its determination to build an Islamic state. The censorship and certain limitations were imposed on information, the Moscow TV and radio channels were disrupted and ideological purges have begun. Tajikistan was virtually flooded with information spread by the mass media of Iran and Afghanistan and its bilateral relations with each country have notably expanded.

Such situation antagonised the population in the majority of Tajikistan's regions and as a result of their resistance the government dominated by the IRP

representatives was overthrown. However, this was by no means a sign of a decline of the religious movement in the country. Now its base has shifted to the neighbouring Middle East countries. Afghanistan leads the way here with its four million Tajiks and two million Uzbek, Turkmen, Kirghiz and Kazakh nationals. Taking into account about 70,000 refugees from Tajikistan who have fled to Afghanistan, it is easy to appreciate vast opportunities of the Tajik opposition to use the territory of Afghanistan to interfere, military intervention included, in Tajikistan's internal affairs.

The more so, as some Tajik intellectuals welcome the idea of uniting with Tajiks in Afghanistan. There are quite a few field commanders among Afghan *mujahedin* who share their view.

The implementation of this idea is fraught with high violence potential for the Central Asian states. It will be defined, first of all, by the conventionality of the frontiers between the region's states founded only as far back as 1924 with complete disregard of the principles of settling of different ethnic groups and of the importance of many cultural factors.

The unstable political situation in Afghanistan keeps the conflict smouldering along the borders of Tajikistan, as well as other Central Asian states. At present there are 10 training camps in Afghanistan for

Tajik and Afghan Islamic groups of recruited gunmen and
attemts to breach the Tajik-Afghan border have become
more numerous. The CIS countries are deeply concerned
with these latest developments and are taking adequate
measures.

THE POLITICAL MEANING OF TRADE
IN EAST EUROPEAN ASSOCIATION WITH THE EC

Krassimir Nikolov

Paper prepared for the Halki International Seminars '93

The political vocation of EC's Association Agreemants with CEECs has been proclaimed already in the guidelines of the Commission in its Communication of August 1990. The "red thread" of this vocation, running through all stages of community relations with East European partners, was the fulfilment by the latter of substantial democratic requirements . In addition, the agreements were attributed a broader political meaning. They were destined to "create a climate of confidence and stability favouring political and economic reform and allowing the development of close political relations which reflect shared values", to enable Central and Eastern European countries to "participate in the wider process of European integration" and to "return to the mainstream of European political and economic life"[1].

In the preambules of all Association Agreements these objectives are confirmed and developed. The Community is acknowledged to be "one of the cornerstones" of the new "system of stability"[2] that is being established in Europe. Account is taken of the EC's "willingness to provide decisive support for the implementation of reform", as well as to help the three countries to "cope with the economic and social consequences of structural readjustment"[3].

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[1] COMMISSION of the European Communities. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Parliament: Association agreements with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe - a general outline, COM (90) 398 final, 27 August 1990, p.2; hereinafter referred to as: Communication, August 1990.

[2] *Hospodarske Noviny*, Praha, 17 December 1991, pp.13-18.

[3] Ibidem.

While the association idea can be justly qualified as "overtly political in nature"[4] in view of its goal to give a positive response to the hopes and aspirations of Eastern European peoples and to assure them of EC cooperation and commitment to their development in the future, the means of realizing this idea are to a great extent economic - in one way or another most instruments provided for in the Association Agreements are economy-related. The link between political objectives and economic means is therefore the key to understanding the negotiations on association as well as the acievements and failures of the agreements.

This is where a clear distinction can be made, as far as the role of political factors is concerned, between the period of preparation of the Europe Agreements and the very negotiation process: During the "normalization" stage of EC-CEEC relations and at the time when the general political framework of association was being set up the influence of politics was direct and explicit; it was articulated in declarations, resolutions, communications and, in the end, in the preambules of the agreements. On the contrary, when the political commitments cited above had to be translated into concrete provisions about trade, commercial, economic, financial cooperation, etc., political considerations, pressures and interests were realized via economic instruments. The main efforts of the delegations at the table of negotiations and the bulk of time spent were dedicated to economic issues. The overall impression was that the experts from both the EC and CEEC side were the only actors during the negotiation process, and that, once economists and lawyers had "got down to business", the political underpinning of association had stepped back in the wings. Indeed, overt political rhethoric did cool down to a certain extent while quotas, duties and procedures were under discussion. Yet, it was precisely these issues, and also concessions, tariff ceilings, specific clauses, that shaped the economic leverage of politics.

This helps to clearly formulate the subject of the paper: to show the political motivation behind the texts of the Europe Agreements relating to trade, the link between their political and economic meaning and their implications for social and political life in the CEECs and in Bulgaria in particular. For these countries such an approach seems both appropriate and necessary in view of the high politicization of

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[4] PELKMANS, J. and MURPHY, A., Catapulted into leadership: the Community's trade and aid policies vis-E-vis Eastern Europe, *Journal of European Integration*, Canada, vol.14, 1991, Nos 2-3, p.142

economic problems and the repercussions of this phenomenon on the political climate in each of them, on the health of economy and on the association issue itself. As for the EC side, interlinking of economic and political aspects of association is needed in order to make long-term community interests in the region explicit, to observe the difficult balance between the Commission's positions and various member states' stands on the specific sectoral conflicting points and to assess the extent to which all these factors, already materialized in the texts of the Europe Agreements, could influence their implementation.

The title of free movement of goods is attributed particular signifiance in the Europe Agreements. Judging by the development of the negotiating process, the provisions on trade were at the centre of debate around all five negotiation tables and raised most of the controversies between the parties. Analysing the results of the lengthy and difficult rounds of talks, the very existance of separate Interim Agreements which basically reproduce the commercial parts of the Association Agreements is indicative of the centrality of trade in future EC-CEEC relations5.

In the titles on free movement of goods it is clearly stated that the objective of the agreements in this field is the gradual establishment of "a free trade area in a transitional period lasting a maximum of ten years starting from the entry into force of the agreement, in accordance with the provisions of the present agreement and in conformity with those of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade"6. The significance of this objective is difficult to overestimate. Free trade between the EC and the respective country would provide, if achieved, incomes for consumers, funds for investment and incentives to work; it will ensure contact with more advanced consumers, firms and technologies, all of which enhance the rate and direction of technical change; it will also have other positive side effects.

For the realization of this goal the agreements foresee different methods of dismantling tariffs and quantitative restrictions for the various groups of products. Trade in industrial goods will enjoy an immediate abolition, by the Community and

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[5] As the entering into force of the Europe Agreements requires their ratification by the national parliaments of the twelve EC member-states, trade and trade-related matters are separated in the Interim Agreements, so that the latter, having been approved by the Community, can be implemented more rapidly.

[6] See Article 8 of the Europe Agreement between the EC and Bulgaria, COM (93) 45 final, Brussels, 18 February 1993, p.6

(with some exceptions specified in annexes) by the five CEECs, of quantitative restrictions and other measures having equivalent effect. Customs duties on imports of industrial products will be abolished (within five years by the EC, and during a longer period - by its Eastern partners) by applying different techniques: immediate dismantling, immediate reduction down to a fixed percentage followed by further gradual annual reductions, tariff ceilings with free import within them and gradually phased-out duties beyond them, etc. This complex system of trade liberalization measures provides for a different rhythm of opening the markets of each party to the imports of the other. In the majority of cases the CEECs are given the possibility to protect their domestic economies undergoing restructuring during a longer period than the Community - this is known as the application of an "asymmetrical approach" to trade.

Trade in three sectors defined as "sensitive" - textiles, steel and agriculture - has been the "apple of discord" during the negotiations of almost all CEEC delegations with the representatives of the Commission. Without going into a detailed comparison between the five documents7, an analysis of the trade regime finally agreed upon in the protocols and annexes accompanying the basic texts of the agreements would show that trade liberalization in the "sensitive" sectors (a) has a narrower scope than in the case of other products, (b) is realized at a lower speed, and (c) is left more vague in the texts of the protocols and annexes and thus much more dependent on economic conjuncture8.

To complete this only very brief outline of the trade and trade-related clauses of the Association Agreeements, the provisions common to all sectors should be mentioned: anti-dumping and safeguard measures, rules of origin, etc. As the implementation of some of the Interim Agreements has proved, they have a major significance for the exchange of trade flows between the EC and CEECs; specific cases of their application will be discussed later

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7 For a comprehensive analysis of the commercial aspects of the Association Agreements see e.g. BENYON, F.S., Les "accords europeens" avec la Hongrie, la Pologne et la Tchecoslovaquie, *Revue du Marche Unique Europeen*, No 2 / 1992, pp.25-49; or MARESCEAU, Marc, Les accords europeens: analyse generale, *Revue du Marche commun et de l'Union europeenne*, Paris, No 369, juin 1993, pp.507-515

8 In the case of some groups of products, e.g. textiles, an explicite reference is made to the development of trade between the parties.

Having this short overview of the commercial scope of the Europe Agreements in the background, two basic questions should be asked as far as interdependence between economic and political factors is concerned: What is the role of political considerations in arriving at the particular set of measures on trade fixed in the documents; what political factors are influencing and will influence further on the implementation of these agreements? And vice versa, to what extent and in what specific way will trade relations stimulate or hamper EC-CEEC cooperation in other spheres; how trade will condition the attainment of other, "more advanced objectives"9 of the Europe Agreements? With these questions in view, an attempt will be made hereinafter to reveal the political meaning of trade provisions.

The most general problem directly linked with the commercial aspects of EC-CEEC relations is that of asymmetry, or rather the juxtaposition of asymmetry and reciprocity in the letter and in the spirit of the agreements. It should be considered both in principle and in practice.

Asymmetry, understood as a set of clauses in EC agreements with third countries which offers to these countries more favorable conditions than it does to the EC itself, is in the traditions of community external relations. In most general terms, Europe Agreements, too, fall in the line10. There exists a difference, however, between these agreements and the ones with ACP and Mediterranean countries which definately favour a one-way preferential treatment, and it consists of both the different legal basis (Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome for the former and Article 131 for the latter) and the different treatment of the question of creating a free trade area.

The distinction mentioned hereabove comes to the fore when the concept of asymmetry is related to that of reciprocity. If one looks at the texts of the five Europe Agreements, in all of them an emphasis is put on establishing "close and long lasting relations based on mutual interests and reciprocity". In terms of

9 HOROVITZ, Dan, The Impending "Second Generation" Agreements Between the European Community and Eastern Europe - Some Practical Considerations, *Journal of World Trade. Law, Economics, Public Policy*, vol. 25, No 2, April 1992, p.55

10 For this type of continuity of the EC's approach to third countries, see BENYON, F.S., op. cit., p.39

commercial provisions this commitment is translated in the formulation of free trade as a goal. On the other hand, the time schedules for the liberalization of trade in various groups of products are more favorable, as pointed out above, for the EC's East European partners. Therefore, no definitive conclusion can be made about the primacy (if community law terminology can be used) of either asymmetry or reciprocity of EC-CEEC trade relations11. To go even further, lack of clarity in the formulation and the articulation of concepts in this concrete case reflects hesitations about the political priorities of the Community and its member-states.

If this is asymmetry in principle, what is it in practice? It should be noted that the experience of the five CEEC delegations during the negotiation process varies. Some EC partners played more "stubborn" and protectionist and succeeded in obtaining a more favorable time schedules of trade liberalization and better quota arrangements, while others "gave in" more easily to EC pressures. The pieces of the "cake" of community concessions grabbed by each CEEC will not be weighed here. To be able to evaluate the real significance of the asymmetrical approach, one should look at the composition of the cake. In practical terms, the importance of the whole set of tariff and quota arrangements fixed in the Association Agreements should be assessed only through the volume of trade that is expected to be realized in the case of every particular product or group of products.

That is where the economic, but also the political and moral importance of the asymmetric approach is washed down by the rigid treatment of the so called "sensitive sectors". In all Europe Agreements textile, steel and agricultural products are in the lists of goods for which tariffs and quotas are to be lowered/abolished at the slowest pace. On the contrary, the economic structure of CEECs that had been in place during almost five decades and the priorities of their economic policies has made these sectors among the most competitive on world markets. These are,

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[11] For an elaboration of this alternative, see GEORGIEV, Dencho, Bulgaria's Association with the European Community: Conceptual Aspects, paper presented at the expert conference "The Europe Agreements and Bulgaria's Prospects of European Integration" organized by the Institute for International Relations - Sofia, 15 June 1993. More theoretic analysis of the asymmetry-reciprocity correlation should, of course, take into consideration not only trade, but also the other titles of the Europe Agreements, which present arguments in favour of both principles (e.g. economic and financial cooperation for asymmetry and harmonization of legislation, and more specifically of competition rules, for reciprocity).

therefore, the groups of goods which will occupy (or could possibly occupy) a leading place in future trade of Central and Eastern Europe with the Community12, and which will (or could) thus stimulate the revival of East European economies. The fact that these "sensitive sectors" became the stumbling blocks in all negotiations and, hence, the burden of the Association Agreements, questions the relevance, the validity and the practical meaning of asymmetry. Projected in a more general, political framework, this position demonstrates the incoherence between EC political commitments and their practical realization.

The problem of trade liberalization can be regarded from another angle - not in terms of who gives more and who receives more, but also how much is actually given. A comparison not of the concessions of the two parties to the Europe Agreements, but only of community concessions during the different periods of EC-CEEC relations [i.e. (a) at the time of the agreements of the previous generation, (b) during the first years of functioning of the Interim Agreements and (c) by the end of the ten year period when free trade is supposed to govern] has led many scholars to the conclusion that "trade will not suddenly surge in a very dramatic fashion"13 as a result of the entering into force of the Association Agreements, i.e. trade liberalization measures do not represent a qualitative leap forward towards the realization of the final goal of the agreements and the rapprochement of the economies of CEECs and the Community14. These conclusions are based mainly on the assessment that, on the one hand, trade concession in the sectors which are not considered "sensitive" have already been granted to Central and Eastern European partners in the framework of the "first generation agreements"; on the other hand,

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12 For statistics concerning EC share in Bulgarian exports of "sensitive" products, see *Euro-East. Report on E.C./E.E.A. Relations with Central and Eastern Europe*, Europe Information Service, 20 September 1992, monthly No 3, p.13; hereinafter referred to as *Euro-East*.

13 EC trade with central Europe and the new association agreements, *Report from Brussels, Bank Brussels Lambert*, No 210, April 1992, p.5; hereinafter referred to as *Report from Brussels - BBL*

14 Such rather sceptical views are expressed, for example, by: LANDAU, Alice, L'AELE, la CEE et les pays d'Europe centrale: vers une cohabitation?, *Le courrier des pays de l'Est*, No 366, janvier-fevrier 1992, p.38; LAVIGNE, Marie, La CEE est-elle l'avenir de l'Est, *Le Monde diplomatique*, avril 1993, p.13; MESSERLIN, Patrick A., Restrictions on OECD imports from eastern Europe: an overview - a paper given in March 1992 to an EBRD sponsored conference held in London on "Eastern European Trade Policy Issues", and summarized in the *Financial Times*, April 13, 1992; SZYMKIEWICZ, Krystina, Le difficile "retour a l'Europe" des pays de l'Est, *Revue du Marche commun et de l'Union europeenne*, Paris, No 369, juin 1993, p.529

liberalization in the (most crucial for CEECs) "sensitive sectors" is postponed until the second five year period of association. As a result, the potential for an increase in the volume of trade between the two parts of Europe during the following years is likely to be exhausted rather soon15.

In one perspective, community attempts to delay the real increase of trade flows from Eastern Europe (i.e. an increase generated mainly in the "sensitive sectors") can be understood: the EC, by providing for a more restrictive trade regime for textile, steel and agricultural products would like to assure a gradual and, which is even more important - *predictable*, rise of these imports and in this way to allow for time and tranquility for carrying out reform in these sectors within the Community. However, two possible dangers should be pointed at: Will short-term predictability of trade flows not generate long-term political and social *non-*predictability in CEECs? Will a de facto restrictive trade policy towards Eastern Europe not empty the Europe Agreements from their economic meaning, will it not undermine the foundations of their most solid economic and commercial "pillar" and thus leave the whole burden of EC-CEEC relations (including rhethoric about political commitments, moral obligations, etc.) to be carried by the political "pillar", namely the political dialogue? Be that the case, will this "pillar" stand, given the fact that the EC's "group-to-group dialogue" has been successful exactly where economic relations are on the rise?

For almost all countries from Central and Eastern Europe (maybe except for Czechoslovakia, and now - the Czech republic) clauses concerning agriculture have been hardest to negotiate within the Europe Agreements and will be most difficult to apply. It has already been mentioned how important is agriculture, due to its competitiveness, for the restructuring CEEC economies. This sector's centrality in the overall reform process inevitably attributes political significance to the question of market access for East European agricultural produce.

The analysis of EC positions on the issue seems, however, more interesting in view of the greater complexity, on the one hand, and the more explicit articulation, on the other, of sectoral, national and community interests, political pressures and

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15 INOTAI, Andras, Une vision strategique des accords d'association entre la CE et les pays d'Europe centrale, *Revue du Marche commun et de l'Union europeenne*, Paris, No 369, juin 1993, p.521

influences. The Common Agricultural Policy - the Community's former flagship and recent damnation - has been possible to preserve and carry on through the years mainly because of the politically powerful farmers' organizations in several member states, the best known case being France. Their inadequately strong influence in national capitals and in Brussels has produced, through CAP mechanisms, quite prohibitive levels of import tariffs applied on CEEC products16 and restrictive positions during the negotiations on association. More indicative of the political importance of sectoral interests in the EC (and, hence, very instructive for CEECs and Bulgaria in particular in their future actions to implement the Interim Agreements) is the fact that restrictive decisions on agriculture are supported by an impressive number of member states, and not only by the most outspoken CAP defenders17.

In this context, the positions of two member states, the United Kingdom and Germany, are interesting to observe - not as much in substance, as in terms of coherence: While the UK is famous (some would say "notorious") for its CAP-allergy long before its entry in the EC18, the position of Germany is under the influence of two divergent groups of arguments: On the one hand, there is the political influence of the Free Democratic Party and the inertia of continued support for France and CAP. This tendency is seen, however, to fade away, especially in the framework of the negotiations in the Uruguay Round of GATT. Bonn seems to support firmly free trade principles. Such a firm stand might be eroded, through agriculture again, as the depressed agricultural areas in the Eastern provinces might try to "assert their interests over those of East European agriculture"19. Yet, this protectionist stand will meet, when German positions are decided on a higher political level, conflicting views of other industries which regard Central and Eastern

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[16] The implicite tariff rate in late 1980s was some 100 per cent; see: *Report from Brussels - BBL*, p.6

[17] The proposal of the EC Commission for agricultural concessions to Bulgaria and Romania under the Europe Agreements, submitted to the Council in October 1992, was found too liberal by nine (!) out of twelve member states. For details see: *Euro-East*, 1992, No 4, p.6;

[18] While leaving the famous phrase of Mrs Thatcher "I want my money back!" in the past, nowadays there are opinions in British academic circles going as far as to hint that "the destruction of the Common Agricultural Policy" should be "officially adopted by the government" as a foreign policy goal. See MORGAN, James, Wide Horizons, Slender Means: the Scope for British Influence, *International Affairs*, RIIA, vol. 68, No 4, 1992, p.612

[19] HAMILTON, Daniel, A More European Germany, a More German Europe, *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 45, No 1, Summer 1991, pp.137-138

Europe as a *chasse gardee* for German foreign trade. Moreover, as agricultural exports have considerable money-earning potential for CEECs, closing agricultural markets to Eastern farmers would mean increasing demands on EC national and, above all, German budgets, which will be much harder to justify to electorates tomorrow than it is today.

Faced with such a cumulation of interests, political pressures and influences, CEEC see little hope for the development of their agricultural exports to the EC, although the end of GATT negotiations may leave some chances for improvement. Despair and lack of alternatives in such a situation could push East European governments to make wrong policy choices: what the EC has been trying to reform during the last several years - the price guarantee system of CAP - is likely to be introduced in Poland20.

EC-CEEC trade relations in general, and restrictive ones in particular, can have possible side effects which could bring negative political reprecussions for both parties. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe, having established (after 1989) a new customs tariff, begin reducing or abolishing it, under the Association Agreements, in favour of the EC, i.e. at the expence of other foreign competitors; this is an argument for accusing the Community of encouraging CEECs to build trade walls and third parties21. However, that is to a great extent debatable in view of the parallelly going CEEC-EFTA negotiations for creating a free trade area. Only non-European partners could be damaged if such an approach is adopted and it is unlikely that problems appear on the higher, political, level for this particular reason.

Grave could be the effect of restrictive EC-CEEC trade, though, on relations *between* former Comecon members. Difference and discrimination in commercial arrangements under the Europe Agreements has introduced "elements of political rivalry amongst them which will probably also affect their trade relations with one another"22. The Romanian and the Bulgarian delegations, for example, tried hard during the negotiation process to obtain from the Community the same concessions

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[20] For a recent decision of the Agricultural Committee of the Polish Senate on the development of agriculture in Poland, see *Euro-East*, 1992, No 3, p.16
[21] MARESCEAU, Marc, op. sit., p.510
[22] MAYER, Otto G., EC: Challenge from the East, *Intereconomics*, vol. 27, No 3, May/June 1992, p.101

in the "sensitive" sectors as the Visegrad countries had done. The Bulgarian delegation decided even to run the risk of insisting on some additional rounds of talks and of delaying significantly the finalization of the texts of the agreement in order to receive better treatment for Bulgarian goods on EC markets. Politically this boomeranged both in the "jealousy" of the three Central European countries which regarded their own achievements as a priviledge, and in a close to envious and irritated attitude from Romania which felt very sensitive on Bulgarian attempts to escape from being treated as a group23. A deeper look into the motivation of the Bulgarian delegation could raise doubts about the reasons why Bulgaria aimed at the same concessions as the ones granted to Central European states - was this position based on concrete economic needs, calculations of the commercial potential of the country and evaluations about future trade flows (in the chaotic situation of 1991-92 when detailed and reliable statistics were difficult to obtain), or this stand was cemented by the political motivation "not to be left behind Central Europe"?

To avoid more insistant demands about trade concessions and to mitigate the political rivalry mentioned above, the Community proposed to CEECs as a compromise the formula of "triangular operations", which envisaged EC financing for agricultural and food exports from Central Europe to the USSR. The reasoning behind this proposal was mixed - both political (to overcome feelings of political isolation of Central and Eastern Europe, especially after the Moscow coup in 1991 and the events in Yugoslavia) and economic ("to avoid, namely for the sensitive products, that Eastern European production is diverted towards us"24).

Obviously triangular trade, despite the double loss incumbent on the Community (refrain from selling EC products to the republics of the Soviet Union, as well as an effort to provide the necessary financial assistance), has been chosen as a way out of the impasse for domestic political reasons (preventing further growing discontent in the sensitive industries). Nevertheless, the double loss, on the EC side, and the low expectations, in CEECs, of facing effective demand in the CIS *after* EC

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23 Senior officials from the Bulgarian Ministry of Trade regarded their own firm stand during the negotiations as a major contribution to building a new image about Bulgaria in EC circles (and especially in the Commission), in which Bulgaria is no longer grouped together with Romania. This is being assessed as a significant political achievement of the delegation.

24 GUIGOU, Elisabeth, Les reponses francaises aux besoins des pays d'Europe centrale, *Revue politique et parlementaire*, 93e annee, No 956, novembre/decembre 1991, p.11

financing has ceased, might prevail over the original idea of triangular operations to maintain at least some of the traditional links (and trade flows) between countries of Eastern Europe. Moreover, as witnessed by CEEC officials, the recipient states, especially Russia, are themselves reluctant to see higher quality EC products replaced by goods of their former "comrades". That is why for both government officials and analysts "it is difficult to imagine that [triangular trade] will remain a permanent feature"25.

A far more effectively felt long term impact, either positive or negative, on intra-CEEC relations can have some of the trade related provisions of the Interim Agreements, namely the rules of origin.

As the final goal of association is the establishment of a free trade area, rules of origin have a primary importance in the whole system of commercial provisions as they practically determine the material scope of application of the other free trade arrangements. We shall not deal here with the implications of the implementation of these rule on trade *per se*26, but shall only emphasize two problems that could have political bearing.

One is the issue of cumulation of the rules of origin. It is vital for the development of trade in Central and Eastern Europe to encourage a more extensive application of cumulation, so that not only products with EC or CEEC parts, but also ones with components coming from EFTA countries qualify for free trade treatment ("diagonal cumulation"). By intensifying relations between economic agents from all three zones in Europe, such an arrangement would not only animate economic life in CEECs through increasing export possibilities for their products, but will also contribute to strengthening links between countries on a pan-European basis - CEEC-CEEC, EC-CEEC, EC-EFTA-CEEC. During the negotiation of Association Agreements the EC showed itself reticent to applying cumulation on such an extensive basis, but later, especially as the countries from Central and Eastern Europe concluded free trade agreements with EFTA, progress in this direction seems possible27.

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25 GUTH, Eckart, Agriculture in Europe: New Challenges Ahead, *Intereconomics*, vol. 27, No 5, September/October 1992, p.220
26 For a comprehensive analysis, see HOROVITZ, Dan, op. cit., pp.58-60
27 *Euro-East*, 1992, No 4, p.19

The practical implementation of rules of origin will have domestic implications in the associated countries, as well, and these, under specific circumstamces, could acquire a political dimension. The problem lies in the complexity of the rules of origin. Simplified provisions will make the work of CEEC administrations easier and more efficient and will thus decrease or at least discourage temptations of corruption. In view of the still existing possibility of politicizing all economic problems (this is an example *par excellance*), it may prove better, through establishing a simple, clear and coherent system of issuing certificates of origin, to refrain from letting administrations have more than executive functions. Unfortunately, EC-EFTA experience in this field manifest the Community's "discontent"28 with applying simplified rules.

While rules of origin have a long-term, but in a sense passive impact on commercial flows, quite opposite are the implications of the other type of trade-related provisions in the Europe Agreements - safeguard measures. They are capable of paralysing imports for a certain period, which could have a shock effect for the situation of the whole industry concerned. In the case of EC-CEEC association, there is understanding in EC member states for the negative consequences of applying safeguard clauses29. However, it was not translated by community bodies in concrete negotiating positions and policy decisions.

Safeguard measures will enter academic analysis of the Europe Agreements not as much for being a tough negotiatinng issue (which they were), as for the very early example of their implementation - the case of Czechoslovak steel imports in the EC. Only five months after the entry into force (1 March 1992) of the Interim Agreements with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the Community decided to resort to this clause in order to interrupt the significant rise (three to four times for the same period) in the imports of some steel products from Czechoslovakia. Politically, this decision raised great disappointment in the country, as it was largely regarded as indicative of the future development of the "infant" Association

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28 HOROVITZ, Dan, op. cit., p.59
29 See f.ex. the opinion of the French Commissariat general du plan: "La question cruciale pour les prochaines annees est tout particulierement celle de l'application minimale des clauses de sauvegarde et autres provisions anti-dumping."; in: Commissariat general du plan, La transition en Europe, Economie privee et action publique, Rapport de l'atelier "Continent europeen", Groupe Monde-Europe du XIe Plan (1993-1997), mars 1993

Agreements. For the other two Central European countries, as well as for Bulgaria and Romania, it was also very important - for the first two it was overtly pointed at as a lesson that should be learned30, while for the latter two it led to the introduction of a specific safeguard clause for steel31.

The experience gained during the Czechoslovak steel safeguard has led experts and government officials in CEECs to the conclusion that the decision of the Community not to impose quantitative bareers in the steel sector was premature32. Bulgarian trade negotiators have also underlined that fear for an eventual application of safeguard might lead to a situation where CEEC exporters would prefer not very large but stable quotas to a "Damocles-sword" safeguard arrangement which has been chosen only to match high political commitments.

In a more theoretical perspective, being an example of administered protection procedures33, safeguard actions are usually regarded as alternative to direct lobbying and as a legal and objective instrument to "mitigate political influence in trade policy"34. Indeed, in the Czechoslovak steel safeguard case the Commission did make efforts to find a compromise solution for more than a month. For EC producers (steel companies in this case) the two options - administered protection / lobbying - are not necessarily or not always alternative because of the complicated multi-level decision making process in the Community, to which in the context of the Association Agreements a new dimension is added - the East European administrations and political elite. Thus, the example analysed here speaks for a certain complementarity of efforts: On the one hand, in the community framework the powerful Eurofer lobbied on both the EC and member states level in favour of applying the safeguard clause. On the other hand, at the very time of

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30 See *Agence Europe*, 22.08.1992, p.4

31 In Bulgaria the insistance of the EC delegation at the negotiations to insert specific safeguard for steel in the text of the agreement was regarded mostly as a political demarche, since the Community had managed the critical situation with Czechoslovak steel imports with a resort only to the general safeguard measure.The same treatment did not raise any major objections by the Romanian delegation - see *Euro-East*, 1992, No 5, p.19

32 Interview with Jiri Varva, counsellor for commercial affairs at the Mission of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic to the European Communities, 27 November 1992, Brussels

33 MOORE, Michael O., SURANOVIC, Steven M., Lobbying vs. Administered Protection. Endogenous Industry Choice and National Welfare, *Journal of International Economics*, vol. 32, No 3/4, May 1992, pp.289-303, North Holland

34 Ibid., p.289

ardent disputes in the summer of 1992,35 some of the largest EC steel companies provided technical assistance for a PHARE project for restructuring the Czechoslovak steel sector, which should lead to reductions of production much sharper than those in some of the EC member states (e.g. Italy), and thus implemented a very subtle and indirect way - via the Czechoslovak decision making system - of administered protection.

Just to place the EC member governments in this framework and explain their insistance on finally resorting to the safeguard clause, it should be noted that in a situation of economic recession and political instability, and also one of difficulties in carrying out EC regional and structural policies, the scope for "opportunistic behaviour"36 of national authorities is increased and they are thus more susceptible to sectoral pressures. This adds up to the member states' traditionally reserved additude towards opening "sensitive" markets.

The Association Agreements contain provisions which are more directly oriented to political life in the parties and which allow for authorized restrictions to trade "justified on the grounds of public morality, public policy or public security: the protection of health and life [...], of the exhaustible natural resources, of national treasures of artistic, historic or archaeological value [and] of intellectual, industrial and commercial property". This is a clause reflecting the texts of Article 36 of the EEC Treaty and of Article XX of the GATT. Nevertheless, the same provision further requires that "such prohibitions or restrictions shall not [...] constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between the Parties."37 In addition, the general and final provisions contain a clause to take any measures (i.e. including restrictions to trade) in connection with essential security interests, for defence purposes, for maintaining peace and international security, etc. These provisions are also founded on GATT principles, but are more precise than previous Association Agreements and seem to reflect more adequately the current international political situation.

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[35] *Agence Europe*, 08.08.1992, p.8
[36] DICKE, Hugo, Europe '92: An Obsolete Integration Concept?, *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 42, No 2, 1991, p.170
[37] See Article 36 of the Europe Agreement between the EC and Bulgaria, COM (93) 45 final, Brussels, 18 February 1993, p.16

Both groups of authorized trade restrictions whose political meaning and implications are more clearly seen are directly linked with the overall level of integration; resort to them will depend on the general context of EC-CEEC relations. On the basis of community case law38, which postulates a strict interpretation of restrictions within the Common Market (the political goals of the Treaty of Rome should be recalled here), it might then be correct to conclude, by analogy, that in an arrangement with a "political vocation", what the Europe Agreements definately are, a limited application of such authorized restrictions could be expected.

Analysis of the trade and trade-related provisions of the Association/Interim Agreements has to a great extent concentrated on the contradiction between taking political commitments and advocating free market principles, on the one hand, and practicing protectionism, on the other. The incapability of the EC to translate political will into concrete economic instruments becomes evident in policy areas where internally "EC process has proved dysfunctional"[39]. Trade provisions in the Europe Agreements are external implications of the internal community problems caused by the EC's policy choices. Even political will (assuming that this term always has a positive meaning) stumbles in a web of economic and political considerations, national, sectoral and private interests. The associated countries from Central Europe realized during their negotiations that "the resistence to critical reappraisal"[40] by the Community of its own policies was possible even under the pressure of "the political momentum of 1991"[41]. The absence of such a "momentum" when the second group of agreements (with Bulgaria and Romania) were on the table tightened negotiations even more, especially in the field of commercial matters. Now, after the conclusion of the agreements, it becomes obvious how safeguard actions, rules of origin, anti-dumping, etc. can threaten reform programmes in the East and how they can affect their short-term recovery.

East European claims for better treatment and protests against protectionism should not, however, leave the impression that restrictive trading practices are

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[38] E.g. Case 46/76, *Bauhuis v. Netherlands*, 1977 ECR 1, at para. 12; cited in HOROVITZ, Dan, op. cit., p.62

[39] WALLACE, H., The Europe that came in from the cold, *International Affairs*, RIIA, vol.67, No 4, October 1991, p.655

[40] Ibidem.

[41] PELKMANS, J. and MURPHY, A., op.cit., p.151

"licenced" only to community actors. When CEEC decision makers feel their own markets threatened, they may well turn protectionist (even beyond the larger margin for manoeuvre that is envisaged under the Association Agreements), and will thus show that they have learned the protectionist lesson which the Community teaches them now. What will be more difficult for the Central and Eastern European administrations to achieve is to master the new instruments which would *promote* free trade, and which are available in the agreements, especially "in an environment subject to political uncertainty and lack of consensus"42.

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42 LANDAU, Alice, op. cit., p. 31

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Bulgaria and the European Community:
The Security Aspect

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Bulgaria and the European Community:
The Security Aspect

The "European" foreign-political orientation of Bulgaria is a sphere of an indisputable national consensus in a country overburdened with problems, contradictions and conflicts on its path to market economy and democracy. This foreign-political philosophy may also be found in the letter and the spirit of the new, 1991 democratic Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, in the political platform of the major Bulgarian political parties and organizations, in the official parliamentary, governmental and presidential documents in the last three-four years.

Bulgaria's involvement with the European Community - economic, political, and legal, logically sets forth the question of the new dimensions that Bulgarian security policy is to assume in the light of the Europe Agreement, establishing an association between the European Communities and their member-states, of the one part, and Bulgaria, of the other part. A problem of more general character that both parties to this Agreement face is about the concept, objectives and institutions of the European security policy in the aftermath of the Cold War.

I. European security: in search of a common denominator

The present period in Europe's security build-up is characterized by two basic tendencies: the multilateralization of security, and, second the preservation of the national approach to security in each country's efforts of adaptation to the changing external and internal economic, political and social environment.

The dangers, connected with the realization of the first one are of conceptual character, mainly how to overcome the slow pace of rationalizing the European security architecture.

Those, accompanying the second one, are the continuing striving for geopolitical domination, the indications of attempts to return to the competition for national power among European states, the renationalization of security and defense policies, etc.

These are quite important reasons for all European countries -West, East, Balkan, Central, etc., to continue the efforts for preservation of the dominating lines of multilateralizing security and defense policies. The real issue of that understandable

desire is the formulation of a genuine common denominator for security in Europe, meeting the requirements, needs and interests of all participants in the complex interrelationship of European nations in the field of security. Bulgaria, fixing the details of its ties with the European Community, as well as the EC itself need to level and synchronize their notions of a futur common foreign, security and defense policies.

A set of priority questions should deal with the future geopolitical roles of powerful countries like Russia, Ukraine and Germany, as well as with the new meaning and contents of the modifying transatlantic interrelationship. No doubt, the European security system needs a new, broader and more stable framework, covering the whole Northern hemisphere, including the Atlantic area, Europe and the Mediterranean, the territory of the former Soviet Union, Japan, China, the Northern Pacific and North America. This is what global security interrelationship and interdependence needs for situating in a stable manner one of its components - Europe.

It is only through the Euro-Atlantic-Asiatic context that the specific European sources of insecurity might be approached, treated and coped with. The strict control of nuclear weapons in Russia and Ukraine, the pacification of the troubled societies of the former Soviet republics, migration and refugees, ethnic and national conflicts, Islamic fundamentalism and nationalistic ideologies, drugs-traffic and terrorism are real risks, facing both the EC and Bulgaria.

It can be hardly doubted any longer that European security is defined not only in military, but also in political, economic and humanitarian terms. Common values in these aspects -political democracy and pluralism, market economy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, can be the basis for constructing a new, comprising both East and West, European security organization.

The difficult and unique transition of Eastern Europe to a democracy and market economy needs patience, effort and support. Meantime, Europeans must not allow cross-border issues to develop into crossborder interventions. Ethnic or religious differences and tensions should be solved by Europeans in the most civilized, "European" manner, and not allowing a neighbouring state to be involved in another state's conflict.

A purpose that can unite all Europeans is overcoming security threats, stemming from out-of-Europe sources - Islamic fundamentalism, aggressive nationalism,

proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology to adjacent to Europe regions, etc. Building cooperative security interrelationship with the former Soviet Union republics, stabilization and conflict resolution inCentral Europe, including the Balkans, blocking the re-nationalization of security and defense in Europe, finding a new and adequate for the interests of Europe and North America formula for security cooperation, are decent objectives for the EC countries' and Bulgaria's security policies.

Two more aspects of an all-European security concept might be discussed too. The first one is the need to treat the developments in Eastern Europe and the Balkans as a sphere of the national interest of West European Countries. The present situation in the Balkans is an approprate chance on an ad hoc basis to formulate a more sophisticated "common European interest" -an element of a future system of "common European interests" in the field of security, developed and upgraded on clear and stable political principles.

The second one is connected with the interdependent character of security in international relations. Probably, there has come the time to accept and assimilate the understanding that it is fair and just to have equal shares of security though having different contribution for its formation and preservation. There can hardly be a more economic and effective approach and concept of European security, which when coupled with the economic integration and the preventive approach and notion of its building-up, could really meet the highest requirements for perspective treating of that problem.

II. The Europe Agreement with Bulgaria: Concequences for security

Six Central European countries, including Bulgaria, signed Europe Agreements with the EC. Bulgaria ratified it only five weeks after it was signed. Thus Bulgaria opened on a formal basis its political dialogue with the Community -an important instrument for cooperation in different fields, including the social, financial, scientific, environmental, transport, nuclear safety, energy, banking etc.

The very fact of signing the Agreement reflects a new and higher level of political relations between the most successful integrating community of nations and Bulgaria, a formal recognition of the initial success of the reform towards democracy, pluralism, rule of law and respect of human rights in the Central Balkan Country. the implementation of these principles is the link between the present status of

"association sui generis" and the upcoming full membership, of which the European Council has declared in Copenhagen, 21-22 June, 1993 (1).

The political dialogue between the EC and Bulgaria was institutionalized at all levels and the political impact, including in the foreign-political and security sphere, was immediate after the signing of the Agreement. the parties demonstrated that by developing their political relations they intend to enhance security and stability in the whole of Europe and in the specific region, where Bulgaria is situated.

The economic concequences of the Europe Agreement for Bulgaria's security might be traced in two directions: first, a stabilized Bulgarian economy should lead to a strengthened hardware of securityand defense; second, a stable and prosperous Bulgarian economy should lessen the social and political tensions in the country, thus creating a more secure internal and external environment for the country.

The political concequences of the Europe Agreement, adding to national security are:

first, the very problem of security of Bulgaria, of the region and of Europe might be a topic of the institutionalized discussions, thus having the chance to enter the EC's and Bulgaria's security decisionmaking process;

second, a continuing for years series of consultations, discussions and dialogueserves the upgrading of the concept of multilaterilization of security in Europe, the development of the "common european interests". Probably, an intermediate organization of the Central and Eastern European countries and republics of the former Soviet Union, on one part, and the EC countries, on the other part, will turn to be the appropriate transmitter to full EC membership of the present and future signatories of Europe Agreements. No doubt, if willing so, the resources of the U.S.A. and Japan, aimed at facilitating the transition of these societies to democracy and market economy, might be included in such an organized European effort of helping its Eastern part. Parallel or identical security policy will be a natural result for the EC and for Bulgaria - the last but one stage of formulating a common foreign and security policy, based on common interests and need for solidarity.

The next result of the Europe Agreements of the EC and Central and East European Countries, including Bulgaria, which might be expected, is increased stability and security for Europe, the Balkans and Bulgaria. What the EC countries and authorities can do to accelerate these positive for Europe processes is to set a

date for the attainment of EC membership by the signatories from East and Central Europe and to allow them access to EC markets, to ratify sooner the Europe Agreements.

III. Bulgaria's "Europran" strategy in the Balkans: the security dimension

The "Europeanization" of Bulgaria's Balkan foreign-policy and security strategy already has for more than three years a stabilizing effect for the whole of South-Eastern Europe. The discussion whether this is the result of a rational and purposeful political behaviour, dialogue and choice of the internal political and societal forces, or the final product of an unconscientious clash of domestic groups with different interests and political aims, or a mixture of both methods, is of another magnitude and level of analysis, which is not treated in this paper. Usually, such a discussion is precluded with the proposition that Bulgarians have found or are successfully searching their difficult way of national reconciliation and national consensus on foreign-political and security issues.

What can be gathered and suggested here is more of an analytical character, still to be discussed by foreign policy and security decision-makers inside Bulgaria and out of it.

A long-term, potentially successfull Bulgarian "Balkan security strategy" could be the development of such an interrelationship of the Balkan states, which might be conditionally termed "a coordinated management and solution of problem, including conflict, situations in the field of security in the Balkans". The final purpose of this model of developing relations should be the construction of a regional "security community" -an equal and compatible element to the global European security organization.

The "security community" of the Balkan nations is such a configuration of states among which the use of force for solving their disputes must become both unthincable and unapplicable. A lot of regional, local national and external for the area tasks are to be solved -both in the short and in the long term. Three basic conditions are to be fulfilled:

first, reaching compatibility of the values of the decision-makers in the different states;

second, achieving mutual predictability of the behaviour of the decision-makers

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in the same states, and,

third, raising to the level of mutual responsiveness of the governments of the Balkan states, obstaining from using force, but reacting in a communicative and cooperative manner to similar acts of the neighbouring countries from the region.

It is only on the background of such a long-term constructive strategic purpose, serving the role of a complex and high standard that negative sides or insufficient efforts of the participants are to be outlined. Examples for that might be observed easily now: the unexploited resource of cooperation among the former Yugoslav partners -Serbs, Bosnians, Croats, etc., for solving their conflicts; PanTurkish ideology and nationalist policy, the human-rights violations in Turkey and the unacceptable disposition of Turkish forces on European territory and military balance in the present positive political atmosphere of interrelationship, disadvantaging Bulgaria and favouring Turkey according to the Cold War criteria; the real causes for the standstill in solving the Cyprus problem; the texts in the Constitution of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, permitting interference in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries- a clear violation of imperative international legal principles, the remnants of chauvinism in some Balkan countries, where the dreams of "greatness" and "domination" are still alive, etc.

The realization of a common regional interest - turning the Balkans into a compatible European security sub-system is an essential responsibility of the security and international-relations experts in the region and out of it. They should be the first, together with the Balkan intellectuals, in creating a stimulating environment for the Balkan politicians, statesmen, diplomats, security and defense officials, motivating them for activity in modifying the Balkans into a "security community" - an alternative of another "theoretic" model for the future of the peninsula - the Ottoman one, a counter-thesis of the "Balkanization" political plague.

The great powers of Europe, North America and Russia, the security organizations NATO, WEU and the CSCE are in a position to influence the realization of this model and political possibility. First, the Balkans should be purposefully disarmed in a balanced and fair way, including the former Yugoslav republics.

Second, a mostly peaceful, diplomatic solution of the Yugo-crisis would create the best conditions for the future "security community" in the region.

Third, the Turkish regional superpower must be limited in reviving the imperial tradition and style of political behaviour, which means:

a) a re-consideration of the experiment of stimulating Turkey to play the role of the forefront and agent of democracy in Central Asia; b) continuing the support of the secular tendencies and political positions inside Turkey; c) understanding the legitimate concerns of the smaller Christian Balkan peoples, based on their perceptions of the both the material military capabilities and the intentional side of Turkey's position.

Fourth, acceleration of the institutional reconstruction of security in Europe with the aim of allowing an equal partnership in the field of security for all Balkan states and their peoples.

A short-term Balkan security strategy of Bulgaria is to help the limitation of the present and most dangerous conflict in the area -the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina, by following the line of isolating it from neighbouring coutries, from the other potential conflicts in Kossovo, Voivodina and Macedonia, and supporting a conflict-therapy, leading either to beneficial political solution for the warring factions, or to exhaustion of the fighting participants. Pitily, the former Yugoslav republics missed their historic chance to negotiate a new interrelationship among themselves after the collapse of the federation. The big powers and security organizations, on their part, missed the strategic chance to deter the spilling-over the wars through a decisive political intervention at the initial phases of the Yugoslav disintegration.

Facing this harsh and complicated reality in a neighbouring country, Bulgaria has no right to repeat old mistakes in its foreign policy by being militant, or to insist on military intervention of others. This is what Bulgaria recommends to all other Balkan countries, knowing the poor historical record in coping with similar issues.

The Balkan security strategy formula of Bulgaria needs to reflect two more factors or real importance:

first, the multilateralization of security organization, the interdependent character of security in Europe and the world, the country's obligations under the UN Charter, and,

second, the disastrous economic consequences for the country of implementing its obligations in imposing sanctions against Serbia in a situation of a non-existing mechanism for compensations. The strategy has to consider unaminous public

opinion that the policy of the big and rich states is implemented with the money of the poor ones, that, furthermore, are in economic crisis and in a period of transformation of the basis of the economic organization of society on market economy principles. This domestic mood is further aggravated by the reality of the losses Bulgaria suffered, without being compensated, by the sanctions against Iraq and Libya and of a large foreign debt. Obviously the problem is not only of strategy, but also of political choice -who can afford formulate practically a strategy with an almost sure result- financial and economic failure. The European partners of Bulgaria should consider the grave economic and financial consequences of the embargo against Serbia for Bulgaria - 260 million USD per month in the last one year and a half, at least in case they continue to need a stable and reliable partner in the center of the troubled peninsula.

A legitimate question is: whom can Bulgaria rely on in the realization of its potential long-term and short-term security strategies in the Balkan region? No less legitimate and, probably, more realistic is the question: which country or organization is interested in the implementation of these strategies or some of their elements by Bulgaria? A third, rather sober question is: are there European security institutions that need the effects of realization of Bulgaria's long-term security strategy as a part of a more "grand plan" of at least European proportions?

It seems most practical to try to answer the third question. Shy Bulgarian hints of an eventual NATO membership should be perceived rather as a desparate cry for help in an unclear security situation, and not as a realistic policy-making in connection with the only efficient militarily security organisation.

Bulgaria is a UN member and CSCE founder. A further evolution of the CSCE as a regional security organization in the meaning of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter might bring additional arguments for strengthening the political security of the country.

Most perspective seems the trend of extending the European Community's and the Western European Union's zone of stability to the countries from Central Europe, including Bulgaria. As mentioned earlier, an enlarged European Union's security areas be balanced in the EuroAtlantic-Asiatic belt of security, where US and Russian strategic cooperation is a major ingredient.

A French proposal, presented at the Copenhagen Summit of the EC, in June, 1993, for concluding a Pact for the Stability in Europe contains a very promising

provision, which may turn to be vital for European stability, if practically realised: the eventual admission to the status of "associate membership" for the signatories of this European Pact (2). Bulgaria's status of a partner in the Europe Agreement of the EC is an additional argument for obtaining "associate membership" position - a transitional state before becoming an EC and European Union member.

For the realization of the short-term strategy is needed an ad hoc coalition of big powers, supported by the UN and the European security institutions, the countries in the region and the directly interested political forces inside the warring area- just in case the very military conflict is considered the major enemy. Any short-term support should consider the long-term need - to cut the vicious circle of wars and hatred in one of Europe's regions, to change the image of the Balkans as the "power keg" of Europe, to be a practical impetus for the future Balkan security community of nations and states.

NOTES

1."iii) The European Council today agreed that the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union ...", in Europe Documents-Bulletin Quotidien Europe, No 1844/45, 24 June 93, p.5.

2. See: Aide Memoire-Object: Project de Pacte sur la stabilite en Europe, p.4.

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Diplomatiques - ROUMANIE

LA ROUMANIE ET LES COMMUNAUTES EUROPEENNES

La Roumanie se situe, a la moitié de l'année 1993,
sur une trajectoire ascendante en ce qui concerne la per-
ception, en Europe et dans le monde, de son option irrever-
sible en faveur de la democratie et de l'Etat de droit, au
niveau des standards europeens et internationaux, en faveur
de la reforme et de l'engagement ferme de la transition vers
l'économie de marché.

En meme temps, les positions adoptées par la Roumanie
sur le plan international sont, sans aucun doute, conformes
aux orientations générales de la communauté internationale
particulierement des Etats démocratiques, tandis que son
role de facteur de stabilité sous le plan regional et
sous-regional est reconnu et apprecié.

Dans le contexte des profondes transformations écono-
miques, politiques et sociales qu'elle connait, rapportées
à ses intérêts nationaux et aux nouvelles réalités de la
vie internationale, dans le processus de developpement et
de diversification de ses relations exterieures, la Roumanie
attache une importance particulière et prioritaire au
rétablissement sur de nouvelles bases de ses rapports avec
les Communautés Europeennes -et des structures euro-atlanti-
ques en général - en vue d'assurer les premisses d'une
évolution nouvelle, durable, des échanges commerciaux et de
la cooperation dans tous les domaines d'intérêt mutuel, de
l'integration de notre pays dans les organismes europeens.

Historiquement, un premier pas dans cette direction
a été fait par l'adoption , le 7 Janvier 1990, de la
Declaration sur l'importance que la Roumanie accorde au
developpement des relations économiques, ainsi qu'à l'etablis
sement de relations diplomatiques et à l'accreditation d'un
ambassadeur aupres des Communautés Européennes.

Après une periode de clarification, marquée par
l'évolution positive de la situation en Roumanie, les
progrès réalisés sur la voie de la démocratisation de notre

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société, du pluralisme politique et de la transition vers
l'économie de marché ont determiné une reconsideration gra-
duelle de l'attitude des Communautés Européennes face à notre
pays. Le 22 Octobre 1990 était signé à Luxembourg l'Accord
de Commerce, de Cooperation Commerciale et Economique entre
la Roumanie et la C.E.

On peut apprecier que les rapports de la Roumanie avec
la C.E. ont connu par la suite une évolution naturelle,
ascendante, conforme aux interets reciproques des deux Parties
et aux exigences du nouveau cours des relations internationales

Lors de la participation du Premier Ministre Roumain à
la cérémonie de la signature de l'Accord de Commerce et de
Cooperation, le 22 Octobre 1990 à Luxembourg, ainsi qu'à
l'occasion de la visite du ministre des affaires etrangeres
en Belgique et à Luxembourg, en Fevrier 1991, dans les convers-
tions avec les officialités des C.E. a été réitéré le désir de
la Roumanie de s'associer aux Communautes comme un premier pas
à l'adhesion, en perspective, de notre pays aux C.E. Cette
volonté a été maintes fois réitérée, par la suite, dans les
conversations avec la Commission Executive des C.E. et les
Gouvernements des Etats membres.

Suite au Memorandum transmis en Janvier 1992 à Bruxelles,
la Commission a adopté le 12 Fevrier 1992 les Recomandations
adressees au Conseil des Ministres de la C.E.E. demandant
l'autorisation de commencer les negociations avec la Roumanie.
Le 11 Mai 1992, le Conseil des Ministres a approuvé le mandat
sur la negociation de l'accord d'association avec la Roumanie
et les 19 et 20 Mai se deroulaient a Bruxelles le premier round
des pourparlers. Dans la periode du mois de juin a novembre
1992 ont eu lieu 5 nouveaux rounds de negociations et de
nombreuses rencontres au niveau d'experts. Ceci a permis la
finalisation du texte de l'accord, qui a été paraphé le 17
Novembre 1992. Un accord interimaire a été en outre convenu.

Le Parlement Roumain a approuvé la ratification de
l'Accord d'association de la Roumanie au C.E., tandis que la
procedure engagée aupres des parlements des 12 Etats membres
devraient prendre fin jusqu'au mois de decembre 1993. Jusqu'à
la ratification de l'Accord d'association, c'est l'accord
interimaire qui s'applique couvrant tous les domaines commer-
ciaux de la competence de la Commission des C.E.

.../...

Sur le plan interieur roumain, le processus de negocia-
tion de l'Acoord d'association a été coordoné par un Comité
interministeriel, spécialement constitué par une décision
du Gouvernement, conduit par le ministre du commerce, mesure
qui a permis d'aborder les differents aspects d'une maniere
comprehensive et armonieuse.

Les 11 et 12 Mars 1992, à l'invitation du Gouvernement
Roumain, le Vice-President de la Commission des C.E.E., Frans
Andriessen, a effectué une visite en Roumanie, action qui a
marqué une intensification des contacts et du dialogue roumano-
communautaire. A cette occasion, un accord cadre, qui établi les
éléments proceduraux des arrangements de financement pour
l'execution des projets d'assistance contenus dans le programme
indicatif PHARE a été signé. Pour l'année 1992, dans le cadre
du même programme, notre pays a beneficie d'une enveloppe
de 130 mil. ECU.

En outre, une délégation dirigée par Monsieur Herman de
Lange s'est rendu en Roumanie, en octobre 1991, en vue d'évaluer
les besoins d'assistance dans le domaine de l'alimentation
durant l'hiver 1991/1992.Le Premier Ministre Roumain a remis,
à cette occasion, une lettre exposant les besoins et les consi-
derations roumaines. A la réunion ministerielle du Groupe des
24, de novembre 1991, une décision favorable a été adopté à ce
sujet.

Une nouvelle demande d'aide alimentaire d'urgence pour
l'annee 1993, consistant en 5oo.ooo tonnes de ble et 2oo.ooo
tonnes de seigle a été adressé par le Premier Ministre Nicolae
Vacaroiu au debut de cette année. A l'occasion de la signature
de l'Accord d'association, lors de la rencontre du Premier
Ministre avec le President de la Commission, Monsieur Jacques
Delors, la possibilité de livrer un premier lot est ressorti.

D'autre part, en mars 1991, le ministre roumain des
finances a adressé au Vice-President de la Commission des C.E.E.,
Henning Cristophersen, la demande du Gouvernement Roumain que
le Groupe des 24 accorde un emprunt d'un milliard de dollars.
Apres plusieures analises, le Conseil des Ministres de l'économie
et des finances a décidé la participation des C.E. avec une
quote-part de 50 pour cent à cet emprunt. Le Memorandum financier
a été signé le 28 Novembre 1991 à Bruxelles. la
transferri on cour tranches de 250 mil. dol

Pour l'année 1992, le Groupe des 24 a accordé à la
Roumanie un nouvel emprunt de 160 mil. ECU. Le Conseil des
Ministres des C.E. a adopté la décision de participer avec
80 mil. ECU à ce programme le Memorandum étant signe le 7
Décembre 1992, a Bruxelles.

Sur le plan des relations bilaterales, un rôle signi-
ficatif revient à l'installation d'une Délégation Permanente
des Communautés Européennes à Bucarest et l'accréditation
d'un ambassadeur de la Roumanie aupres des celles-ci.

L'approfondissement et la diversification des rapports
de la Roumanie avec les Communautes Europeennes et l'integra-
tion complète de notre pays dans les organismes ouest-européens
constituera dans la periode à venir un objectif majeur de
l'Etat Roumain et, en meme temps, l'expression de l'intérêt
unanime de toutes les forces politiques et sociales de notre
société. Vu sous cet angle, celui-ci se constitue en un facteur
significatif d'unité et de stabilité de la sosiété roumaine
et, en meme temps, devient une garantie ferme en ce qui concerne
les orientations fondamentales et le contenu de la politique
exterieure et des positions de la Roumanie sur le plan inter-
national. L'intérêt en faveur d'une meilleure comprehension
et d'une aide plus active à la Roumanie, justifiée par les
considerations exposées plus haut, tend en meme temps d'impri-
mer un nouveau souffle et un contenu plus riche au dialogue
et a la cooperation des C.E.E. avec la Roumanie.

Je crois utile de souligner, dans ces circonstances aussi,
que l'integration croissante de la Roumanie dans les C.E., dans
la nouvelle architecture europeenne en général, developpement
éxigé par des facteurs economiques, politiques, geostrategiques
et spirituels essentiels, répond aux intérêts de toutes les
Parties et ceux de l'Europe en son ensemble.

Selon l'opinion de l'auteur de cette communication,
les objectifs immediats de l'évolution des rapports roumano-
communautaires pourraient etre définis ainsi:

– L'accomplissement par les Parties des procedures de
ratification et d'antrée en vigueur de l'Accord d'association
et la mise en application de l'Accord interimaire dans les
meilleures conditions;

- La realisation du dialogue politique, y compris au
sommet, dans le cadre du Conseil d'Association et du Comité
Parlementaire d'association;

- L'intensification des actions de collaboration
sur la ligne parlementaire par la transformation de l'actuelle
forme de relation entre le Parlement Roumain et le Parlement
Européen en Commission Parlementaire d'Association, structure
de cooperation plus conforme à l'Accord d'association signé;

L'Initiation et la réalisation de projets de cooperation
économique, financière, technique, scientifique, culturelle
etc comme prevoit l'Accord d'association.

A long terme, les objectifs devront viser:

- La réalisation graduelle d'une zone de commerce libre
et la création des conditions pour la libre circulation des
services, des capitaux et des personnes;

- L'adhesion de la Roumanie aux Communautés Européennes,
comme membre avec des pleins droits et obligations, au fur et
à mesure que seront créées les conditions necessàires.

Halki, Aout-Septembre 1993

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ROMANIA AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Romania and the E.C.

A. Natural links with the European Countries.

1) A major priority from the very first days of democracy

Ever since December 1989 Romania declared its total disponibility to reintegrate Europe in all aspects: political, economic, cultural, and others.

For long time, from the ancient history, connected to European life, disconnected some times by exterior forces, Romania tries, whenever it finds itself master of its own will, to link its destiny to the one it has always regarded as being its own-the European destiny.

Responding to the course of history, to its real interest and to an immense popular demand, Romania has initiated, as early as December 1989, contacts in view of reestablishing and eventually developing links with the European Community.

2) Why the E.C. ?

First of all, because the E.C. represents a symbol and a model of Western democracy and prosperity.

Secondly, because, after 50 years of isolation and interdiction of all constructive initiatives, Romania affirms again its heritage of greco-latin culture, of christian and humanist philosophy and looks forward to the integration into an unique European space.

The integration into the E.C. is regarded as a firm, solid, totally satisfactory step towards fulfilling this aim.

3) The first steps

The tormented transition period, the first six months when Romania was led by a provisional Government, the events of June 1990, ... imposed to the

approaching process of the two sides, a much lesser speed than the one wanted by Romania.

Inspite of all difficulties, both sides made efforts and a first step could be witnessed in May 1991. The Agreements,so called,"of first generation" were signed: The Economic and Comercial Agreement and the PHARE programme was extended to include Romania as well as other ex-Eastern European countries.

In December 1991 the Common Declaration of Cooperation with the Free Exchange European Association is concluded and signed.

B. The "European Agreement"

1) Negotiations and signing

Six negociation rounds for the "association" with the E.C. took place between May and November 1992. Agreed in November 1992 the Agreement was signed on the 1st of February 1993.

This Agreement, like those agreed by the E.C. with other ex-East-European countries, is an "European Agreement".

Through these "European Agreements" the creation of an equilibrated and homogeneous European area is intended. An area in which the E.C., by its dialogue and cooperation with these countries developes itself into an attraction pole.

2) The general principles

The basic text of the "Association Agreement" negotiated by Romania and the E.C. is similar to the ones previously agreed by the E.C. with Poland, Hungary and ex-Czechoslovakia.

The general principles of the Agreement are:

- the developing of the political dialog
- the progressive realisation of a free-trade-zone for goods, services, capital and persons.
- the creation of a frame-work for economic, financial and cultural cooperation

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- the preparation for the gradual integration of Romania into the political and economic European structures

- the support for the Romanian economic development and for the acceleration of the transition towards a free-market economy.

3) A look to the political and economic aspects

a) Political

As for the developing of the political dialogue, this is institutionalised and reenforced. Regular meetings at ministerial level or at the highest level are to be held. The political dialogue is seen as a decisive factor in the progressive approach between Romania and the E.C. in order to reenforce the solidarity and to ensure the political and economic stability in Europe.

b) Economic

- general aspects

Regarding the developing of the bilateral economic cooperation, the European Agreement creates a free-trade-zone between Romania and the E.C., which is to be implemented by progressive elimination of the tariffar and non tariffar obstacles in the common comercial relations.

The transition period is fixed for a maximum of 10 years, hoping that it might be reduced.

The concessions are asymmetrical. The E.C. will assume its engagements during the first part of the transition period, while Romania will assume its engagements mostly during the second part.

- industry

For the industrial products imported from Romania (others than metallurgical or textile), the E.C. eliminates, from the very first day of the application of the Agreement, all restrictions regarding the quantities and the customs-tariffs for almost 90% of them. For the other 10% the customs-tariffs will be gradually eliminated in the following 5 years. For the metallurgical and

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textile products the period is fixed for 6 years.

In response Romania will eliminate its customs-tariffs for about 70-75% of the imports from the E.C. in about 5 to 9 years, for some of them starting only after 3 years from the ratification of the Agreement. Romania is allowed to offer subventions for some industrial sectors, such as metallurgy and new industries, for about 5 to 10 years, according to the international standards and regulations.

- agriculture

For the agricultural basic products the free-trade-zone is limited because of the high sensibility of the E.C., in the domain, and the incertitude over the GATT negotiations.

Nevertheless Romania will enjoy a better access to the E.C. market by consolidating its advantages resulting from the application of the general preferential-tariffs and by substantial reductions (20, 40 even 60%) of customs-tariffs for other products.

The concessions made by Romania in the sector are less spectacular. A gradual reduction of 25% of the customs-tariffs for importations will be implemented for the next 5 years.

As for the transformed agricultural products the E.C. abolishes the customs-tariffs and offers gradual reduction, up to 60%, of the taxes for the elimination of the differences between the internal Communitary prices and the international ones.

For the same type of products Romania will gradually reduce its taxations only after 3 years.

4) The Institutional Mechanism

In order to ensure a proper and efficient application of the Agreement, a solid institutional mechanism has been established.

- an Association Council
- an Association Commitee

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-a Parliamentarian Association Committee

5) The Interim Agreement
        Considering that the full application of the European
Agreement will start only after its ratification by the European
Parliaments, by the Romanian Parliament and by the National Par-
liaments of the twelve member countries of the E.C. (the proce-
dures might take as long as 12 to 18 months), Romania and the
E.C. have concluded an Interim Agreement which allows the imme-
diate application of the economic and commercial aspects of the
association. The only ratification by the European Parliament
(12 February) and by the Romanian Parliament (22 March) were
necessary.

6) Ratification
        As to the ratification of the "European Agreement", I
would like to inform you that the Romanian Parliament has rati-
fied it on the 25th of March, 1993.
        It is with great pleasure that I would like to remind
our audience that the Greek Parliament has already ratified the
Agreement during the month of May 1993. We would like to express
our sincere hope, that in the spirit of the good relations
BETWEEN Romania and the other members of the E.C., more ratifica-
tions will soon follow, a fact which represents a special phase
in the process of approaching and connecting Romania to the Euro-
pean political and economic structures.
        In this respect, we have received recent visits of the
Raporteurs,- Mr. Richard Balfe of the Political Commision and Mr.
Ortiz Climent of the Economical Commission- and of the Vice-
Presidents of the European Commission- Mr. Hans Van Den Brook for
foreign relations and Mr. Leon Brittain for economical relations.
        These high officials of the E.C. made reports on Roma-
nian realities and on the compatibility of these realities with
the quality of an Associate Country to the E.C.
        A delegation of the European Parliament also paid a
visit to Romania and another report containing the recommendation
for the ratification of the European Agreement is soon to be pre-
sented.
        The delegation met different Romanian officials and
expressed its good impression regarding the unanimous opinion of
all political parties towards Romania's integration into the
European structures, especially the E.C.   The delegation also
mentioned its satisfaction regarding the progress Romania made in
the domains of democracy, human rights, and free market economy.
Mr. Alexander Langer, the chief of the European Parliament's
delegation told reporters "I have all reasons to believe that the
Report and the opinion presented by the delegation, in October,
will be a favorable one, and therefore the European Parliament
will ratify the European Agreements between Romania and the Euro-
pean Community".

C. Conclusions

The association itself represents the necessary and obligatory step towards the final objective--inscribed in, and recognized by the agreement--the full membership of Romania to the European Community.

Romania looks forward with hope and confidence to its full participation in the great European family.

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Slovenia and the EC: Some Aspects of a Complex Relationship

I. Introduction

1. The totality of interconnected issues, which should be considered according to the broad definition of international relations, claims for (i) an interdisciplinary access to the research, whereas (ii) some necessary limitations must be set up to keep the exploration manageable. For that very reason the object of our interest, i.e. the relationship between Slovenia and the EC, will be discussed fragmentary, even then with many doubts if particularly.

2. Analysing some political, economic, legal, and diplomatic issues of the relationship, even at the extreme end of objectivity, it must be taken for granted our subjective perception and selection patterns determined by the entirety of our background. Consequently all misunderstandings should originate from such interpretations.

3. After defining approximately our position we may put our fundamental supposition. Concerning to it the future development of Slovenia will depend crucially on her ability to establish a long-term access to the West European markets.

In the short- and medium-term, it is anticipated that the former socialist countries will no longer face the high government-induced entry barriers on the EC markets and that these limitations will be gradually reduced. Anyhow, these countries (including Slovenia to a limited extent) are likely to face increased natural barriers, in particular those originated from the determinants of national competitive advantages (Brinar, 1993:1). The former socialist countries will so remain subordinated to their Western counterparts with regard to the abuse of physical resources, the lack of financial capital, infrastructure deficiencies, the lack of strong market segments and sophisticated buyers, weak supporting industries and inter-industry linkages, and deficiencies in the fields of management and labour relations (Porter, 1990).

II. The right of self-determination, the recognition of state and related issues

1. Since the fall of the Berlin wall the right of self-determination has become "in" with the disintegration of multinational states. Both, predictors (Petrič, 1984) and current analysers (Aćimović, 1993) have had to recognise the factual predomination of political considerations over legal justifications connected with its implementation. In the case of Slovenia, there should be said that we have simply caught the right moment.

2. This fact has been gradually recognised by the international community being influenced above all by the EC and its member states. Anyhow, in the recognition[1] of former Yugoslav republic as states, there were present both, a constitutive and a declarative approach (Bučar, 1992b:8), with no reference to the difference between *de iure* and *de facto* recognition[2].

Principles determined by the EC as a part of common foreign policy (Petković, 1992) were based on the "Guidelines on the Recognition of the New States in the Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union" and the "Declaration on Yugoslavia"[3]. Although the emergence of new European law on recognition should be disputed, the "Badenter Commission" declared according to the Declaration and the Guidelines that Slovenia and Macedonia have fulfilled the conditions of the EC, while Croatia not completely[4]. But, as we know, the life has followed its own stream.

3. As far as the problem of succession is concerned the position of Slovenia should be described as follows from two advisory opinions of the Arbitration Committee: "...the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is in the process of dissolution"[5] and *"que le processus de dissolution de la R.S.F.Y. ... est arrivé á son terme et qu'il faut constater*

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[1] A recognition of state is (by a definition) a political act of sovereign state which has also legal consequences.

[2] Defined by Ian Brownlie (1990:94) as insubstantial in matter of efectiveness.

[3] Adopted at the meeting of foreign ministers in Brussels on 17 December 1991 (Review of International Affairs 42(1991)998-1000, pp. 27-28).

[4] *Avis No. 5, 6, 7* (Review of International Affairs 43(1992)1001, pp. 16-21).

[5] 29 November 1991, *Avis No. 1*, par. 3 (Ibid., p. 14).

que la R.S.F.Y. n'existe plus"[6] respectively. Certainly there should be noticed different interpretations (Obradović, 1992) on account of the fact that "Badenter Commission" has not fixed dates both, of the start and of the end in the process of dissolution. In spite of all that Slovenia has been recognized as a successor of all treaties adopted in the framework of the UN.

III. Efforts of Slovenia for an internal modernisation as well as for an inclusion in international co-operative processes

1. Slovenia has secured its own inclusion in the international community through the membership in the UN and its specialised agencies, the CSCE, and the CE. But, there is still much work that will have to be done. Just to mention that a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements have to be renegotiated, relations with neighbour countries (Croatia, Italy) should be improved etc.

2. Much more is still needed to be done in proof of the economic viability of being an independent state. Thus Slovenia faces the challenge of transition, which can be divided into: (i) a transition from a regional economy inside the larger country towards an independent national economy with all state's functions, (ii) a transition from a socialist economy with a state and social ownership towards a market economy with the predominantly private ownership, and (iii) a transition from an inflation-driven to a stable economy (Senjur, 1992).

3. Processes of transition are supported by the formation of an adequate institutional framework. The legal basis of the market economy and the democratic parliamentary political system (including privatisation, denationalisation and constitutional protection of human rights) has been adopted (Gray, Stiblar, 1992). Its implementation and evolution will determine the scope, the speed, and the depth of changes.

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[6] *Avis No. 8*, par. 4 (Review of International Affairs 43(1992)1005-6, p. 28).

IV. The use of diplomatic instruments: from the peaceful settlement of disputes to the establishment of permanent diplomatic missions

1. As far as Slovenia has been part of the "Yugoslav crisis"[7], it seems that some efforts of the EC for its peaceful settlement have been successful. In particular this statement may be available for the first phase of the EC involvement. Thus the mediation[8] and the diplomatic negotiations resulted in the conclusion of the Brioni declaration. With its expiration (the last attempt of the EC to keep Yugoslavia together) Slovenia became legally independent on 8 October 1991.

2. Being selective we may locate the next phase by the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia (August - September 1992). Its importance for Slovenia was most of all in the beginning of expert negotiations about the succession of former Yugoslavia.

3. Diplomatic negotiation between Slovenia and the EC, as a third phase, has resulted firstly in the prolongation of the status determined by the preferential agreement between the EC and Yugoslavia, and secondly in the concluding of the new one between Slovenia and the EC supplemented by the Joint Declaration on Political Dialogue[9].

4. The establishment of permanent diplomatic missions between the EC and Slovenia has occurred in 1993. Its meaning for Slovenia correlates with the evolved position of the international (and in particular supranational) organisations in the modern law of diplomacy (Dembinski, 1988:1-3; Murty, 1989). The agreement on the establishment, privileges and immunities of the EC's mission in Slovenia was ratified in June to specify its legal status[10].

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[7] For different opinions about its origin, course, consequences, and solutions suggested, see e.g. Kožar, 1993; Duffy, 1992; Nel, 1993; Simić, 1992b; Roper, 1992.

[8] The influence and the effectiveness of the EC as a third party were great in respect of its reputation, as well as its uniformity expressed clearly, thus they somehow opposed to "plurality-of-states" argument (Lall, 1966:100).

[9] Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 47, 12 August 1993, pp. 802-803.

[10] It is similar to that concluded between Yugoslavia and the EC (Official Gazette of the SFRY - International Agreements, No. 8, 1982).

5. In our opinion there exists the will of both partners to deepen their relations. Therefore the negotiations will continue, but the time-table will depend on the implementation of agreed rules.

V. Slovene foreign policy

1. Slovene foreign policy is primarily determined with the fact, that Slovenia is a small country (Benko, 1992b). Therefore it will not lead the world politics (Türk, 1992). Instead of that Slovene foreign policy shall carefully distinguish between the right scope of regionalism and universalism[11]. In the federal state Slovenia was able to play an active role only in the regional subnational organisations. Since becoming independent it has taken advantage of ties developed in previous years (Bavaria, Fruli-Venezia Giulia, Catalonia etc.).

2. The discussion about priorities of Slovene foreign policy (Benko, 1992a) have clearly stated a long-term goal to enter the EC. Agreement about this goal has been formed by the so-called "epistemic community"[12]. Its ability to shape the public opinion should be relativized by the example of Asian tigers showing that you shall be there where is a chance/possibility (Bučar, Svetličič, 1992).

3. Bilateral relations with larger countries in the neighbourhood will certainly co-shape the Slovene possibilities in international community. Therefore Slovenia will have to balance the influence of Germany and Italy, if it does not want to be just an inferior partner in an "unequal dyad" (Riekhoff, Neuhold, 1993:3-45).

4. Security issues will substantially influence the creation of foreign policy. The spectrum of possible alternatives can be so surely thinned. It must be clear that one of the essential functions of the small state's foreign policy is to maintain its security. Consequently we may speculate that Slovenia will join to any international co-operative structure even broadly connected with the international security, if it leaves its door open.

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[11] If Europe is to be a Europe of nations, states and regions, the all components are already incuded in the entity of Slovenia (Bučar, 1992a).

[12] For the "epistemic community" approach to the research of complex international issues, see Haas, 1992: 10-23.

VI. Economic aspects of the relationship with the EC

1. As a part of Europe and according to its traditional links (transport, communications, cultural), and intensive economic co-operation with European countries, Slovene priority is to establish institutional links with economic integration processes in Europe. This task seems even more important if we are trying to take into account future developments ot the economic integration in Europe and world-wide.

2. Due to the problems in ex-Yugoslavia and in ex-Comecon countries Slovene economy was to very high degree redirecting their exports to the markets of the European Communities.

Table: Slovene foreign trade with the EC 1989-1992 as a share of total foreign trade in % (Brinar, 1993:8)

	1989	1990	1991	1992
Exports	51.7	57.8	64.6	69.1
Imports	57.1	58.3	60.1	59.4

3. Among the factors that helped to increase substantially the portion of Slovene trade directed to the EC we should mention the former preferential agreement between Yugoslavia and the EC. Thus the opportunity to use this preferential access to the EC market according to the provisions of the Co-operation Agreement[13], signed in 1980, has been given largely. This preferential access of Slovenia to EC markets was granted until the end of 1992, although the original agreement expired in May 1992.

4. It was quite obvious that Slovenia should keep the access to the EC market on the preferential basis to improve its economic performance. As a step in the negotiation process between Slovenia and the EC an

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[13] Relations between Yugoslavia and the EC dated back to the non-preferential agreement signed in 1970 and expired in 1973. It was succeeded by a second five-year agreement, which was tacitly extended till 1980. The Cooperation Agreement has been concluded for an unlimited period and was the only one of its kind. Cooperation went considerably further than other Mediterranean agreements by taking in a number of new sectors (Brinar, 1989).

agreement was signed in April 1993[14]. It is similar to that concluded between the EC and Yugoslavia providing the preferential access of Slovene goods to EC markets. This Agreement, which is supplemented with the Financial Protocol and the Transport Agreement[15], includes an evolutionary clause[16]; i.e. some higher level of co-operation between the EC and Slovenia is foreseen. However, it is questionable whether such agreement (above all without setting a deadline by which the transformation period should be finished) would be appropriate to enhance the profound restructuring of the Slovene economy towards greater efficiency and competitiveness, or whether it would, in the long-term, contribute only very slowly to structural changes, thus further deepening the gap between Slovenia and developed countries.

5. Certainly, the way for the beginning of further negotiations on the so called "European Agreement" (associate membership)[17] is at least legally opened by the evolutionary clause. The reciprocity between the EC and its associate members, which is involved in this kind of agreements (although of asymmetrical character) from the beginning of their operation, would surely require far stronger commitments on the part of Slovenia than the signed and from Slovenia ratified agreement. In the agreed time Slovenia would gradually and selectively open its market for duty free entry and eliminate quantitative measures for goods originating in EC countries. Such measures would involve a much quicker adaptation of the Slovene economy to international standards. However, at the same time they would incur more costs, in particular social costs related to higher unemployment (Brinar, 1993:10).

6. At the moment being it looks that the association status of the "Vishegrad troika" countries has no practical value in comparison to the status of Slovenia, first of all owing to the unfinished processes of European Agreements' ratification among EC members (Inotai, 1993:3). Thus the blockade of meat exports from Eastern Europe recently established by EC has hit not only Slovenia but also Hungary.

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[14] It was ratified by the Slovene parliament in August 1993 (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 47, 12 August 1993, pp. 473 ff.).

[15] The latter raises certain problems for Slovenia since the EC requires the free transit of its trucks through Slovenia (Brinar, 1993:9).

[16] See: Art. 39 and Art. 50 of the Agreement between the EEC and Slovenia (loc. cit.).

[17] European Agreements are based on a common framework including *inter alia* issues as political dialogue, free trade and fredom of movement, economic cooperation, cultural cooperation, financial cooperation, institutions of association etc. The preamble of agrements refers to the EC membership as the ultimate, though not the automatic goal of agreements (Brinar, 1993:9).

Anyhow, the primary value of the EC - Slovenia Agreement for the Slovene trade should be noticed in more open and free exports and import flows. From the present viewpoint, when both contracting parties are just preparing themselves for its implementation, it seems that the only disadvantage of the Agreement is that the labour migration is left out of regulation[18].

7. The selection of the appropriate alternative will be of strategic importance for the future development of Slovenia, deserving so the attention and well-argumented analysis, especially if Slovenia is interested in full membership in the EC, as was expressed on several occasions[19]. Anyhow, each wise deliberation of possible options should be widened by an opportunity for integration in the EC through the membership within EFTA. Slovenia could so enter the EEA and became a member of the "extended" EC in the long-term[20]. A Declaration signed with EFTA countries should be understood also as a basis for further negotiations about such an alternative[21].

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[18] This exception should be interpreted as an aim of both sides to implement the treaty as quickly as possible. The incorporation of labour migration (as Yougoslav agreement did) in treaty provisions would have to be ratified by all EC member states. Taking into account experiences of other Eastern European states this decision looks like a good maneuvre of Slovene diplomacy ultimatelly oriented towards the same ends as prescribed in European Agreements.

[19] Full membership is an ultimate strategic goal of Slovene foreign policy. As early as in 1990 it was clearly and resolutely stated and adopted as Slovene Foreign Policy Strategy (ESA 229, Informer from the Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 11, March 26, pp. 11-15).

[20] But, Slovenia should be aware of the latest developments. Thus the EFTA is blocking further negotiations with Slovenia after the rejection of the EEA by the Swiss voters.

[21] There we should agree with the hypothesis that the model of the future negotiations with the EC/EFTA will depend on the Slovene performance as well as on the constitutional proposal of the EC concerning its enlargement (Brinar, 1993:9-10). It may be obvious to add that the latter will be crucial.

VII. The EC and the challenge of enlargement

1. The EC system and its environment are in the midst of a period of dramatic change (Simić, 1992a). The scope of the EC system are expanding to new areas, as well as a number of countries have responded to the newly founded dynamism of the EC by applying for a membership during the last five years. Although the enlargement has been constantly on the agenda (for various reasons) in the evolution of the EC, the current debate is different in at least two respects. First, the EC is dealing with a much larger number of applicants, majority of which are small or minor states. Second, some of these countries have an economic structure that differs from that of present member states. These new elements raise the question of how to safeguard the efficiency of the EC's structures, as well as how to preserve or rebuild advanced democratic structures in a continental polity.

2. Legally the conditions for admission to the EC have been considered as quite simple. Thus Art. 237 in the Rome Treaty states that "any European state can apply to become a member of the EC". The same clause may be found also in the Treaty on European Union (Sect. VII).

3. Following the decisions reached in Maastricht[22], new members will have to accept: (i) *acquis communautaire*, i.e. all rules laid down in primary and secondary EC legislation as well as the case law developed

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[22] Ms. Brinar (1993:11) quotes Helen Wallace and Anna Michalsky (The European Community: The Challenge of Enlargement. London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992). According to them the Maastricht summit took four decisions, which are of relevance to the enlargement issue. Firstly, the decisions on EMU and Political Union raise considerably a treshold which new member states will have to cross. Secondly, conclusions toughten the criteria for admiting new member saying that "... any European state the system of government of which is based on democratic principles can apply to become a member of the union". Thirdly, the summit asked the Commission to produce a report on the implications of enlargement. Fourthly, member states agreed to start enlargement negotiations at once the new basis for the financing of the union had been endorsed.

The European Commission Report on the criteria and conditions for accession of new members to the Community (Europe Documents, Agence Europe, 3 July 1992) was presented to the Lisbon summit in June 1992 outlining a number of critera and conditions for admission of new members including *inter alia* an adequate implementation system (Par. 9).

by the European Court of Justice; (ii) much less definable *acquis politique*, i.e. EC achievements in the foreign policy area; and (iii) *finalité politique*, i.e. long-term goals of the Union. Obviously, the practical implications of accepting *acquis* mentioned above would become greater after Maastricht, in particular regarding a possibility of Union's own defence policy and a number of criteria for participation in the EMU[23] constituting much more disputable economic eligibility[24].

4. Certainly there are many lessons from the past interesting for Slovenia as possible future applicant for a membership. Thus Spain and Portugal have managed rather quickly to adapt to EC standards of economic proficiency using the EC discipline as an effective weapon against domestic opponents of rapid modernisation. The same case may be used to show how EC membership can serve in the consolidation of democracies, where democratic traditions in societies are weak, and for that very reason supporting the hypothesis that the economic conditionality must be weighed against political advantages of early enlargement (Brinar, 1993:12).

5. The EC has always tried to ensure that geographical enlargement did not lead to a dilution of the Community. As the EC is now in the midst of deepening integration in key economic sectors, its response to pressures for enlargement is therefore in seeking to defer enlargement while looking for alternative forms of affiliation. Thus the idea of a EEA is an integration model, Which essentially involves partial economic membership without real influence on decision-making. In recent years there have been proposed other alternative models alongside the "pure" membership. A model of "affiliate membership"[25] and a model of partial membership, i.e. a shift towards a "European system of varying integrated circles or areas" proposed by German scholars (Brinar, 1993:13), have been maintained perhaps most notably.

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[23] The Treaty of European Union contains a size of the national budget deficit, a size of the national debt, an inflation level and an interest rate level.

[24] The economic eligibility should not be viewed too narrowly. Because every political uncertaintly is costly for any economy, thus e.g. the membership or a rock-solid commitment to accept country as a member (perhaps backed up with a fixed time table) will enhance predictability for foreign investors and other economic consequences.

[25] This model, as a supplement to the EEA, suggests that affiliate membership should be granted as full membership rights in the integration areas where they take part in. See Frans Andriessen's speech "Towards a Community of Twenty-Four" to the 69th Plenary Assembly of Euro-Chambers, Brussels, April 19, 1992.

6. On the disposal of the EC, there are at least three modes to be able to balance the geographical enlargement and the continuing deepening of integration: (i) system transformation, (ii) subsystem formation, and (iii) partial membership (Pederson, 1992). A number of concrete suggestions for institutional and procedural reform have been deliberated by the Commission. Thus the Preliminary Task Force Report contains three principles (strict adherence to the principle of subsidiarity, a reduction of democratic deficit, a streamlining of common decision-making), which ought to guide the EC's enlargement policy.

It is essential that hopes of Eastern Europeans admiring and following the EC as a symbol of democracy should not be frustrated. In consequence of this as well as for other reasons the EC would have to live up of its rhetoric and make the new union more truly democratic (Brinar, 1993:14).

7. At the moment being Europe may be found somewhere between a two-tier Europe and an Europe of variable co-operation areas. The EEA and the CSCE are most prominent "association structures", which could be interpreted also in confirmation of the model of "concentric circles". However, a geometrical clarity of the model considered does not correspond to current patterns of co-operation. So, it seems that the ever increasing complexity of the European co-operation would be better reflected by modelling and making use of concepts like "Europe of Olympic Circles" (Brinar, 1993:16).

VIII. Consequences for Slovenia or the viability of a small state

1. Any further negotiations with the EC will be determined by the ability of Slovenia to enter the GATT before the end of the Uruguay Round. But the membership in GATT, as a framework of the international trade and consequently of all integration processes world-wide (Dinh, Daillier, Pellet, 1992:991-995), would offer other possibilities that the small Slovene economy may decide for, if it was able to sale products and services according to international standards.

2. Before applying for a membership in the EC, Slovenia may find out how it can contribute to the EC and *vice versa*. It seems that relatively small costs of EC member states, which they would possibly have helping Slovenia to integrate, are not attracting enough.

3. The most important question for Slovenia in further negotiations with the EC on the European Agreement is whether it will be able to properly assert its advantages; relatively minor economic problems compared to all the other Central and Eastern European countries respectively. Furthermore, Slovenia will not have to negotiate on the structure of agreements, but on their content; i.e. on the dynamics of eliminating trade restrictions on various kinds of manufacturing goods, the degree of Slovene openness to trading in agricultural products, the dynamics of introducing EC standards and rules into the Slovenian economic system.

4. Most attention should be paid on the problem of future Slovene legal regulation, in particular in the field of standardisation. Many dengerouses so lay in transferring of foreign models in Slovene legal context without due co-ordination with its other elements. Somehow lessons from the EC integration should be used. Therefore, the proper legislative technique should be oriented towards the approximation and not strictly introduce the harmonisation.

IX. In the place of conclusion (a methodological remark)

The whole relationship between Slovenia and the EC could be analysed as a sequence of (i) political, (ii) economic, and (iii) legal (etc.) necessities and/or possibilities. Suggested order should not be arbitrary due to the meaning of each element in the interplay. Economic performance has been determined by political constellations operationalised by diplomatic instruments, as well as the legal regulation has followed political and economic attitudes of both sides. In consequence of processes in the opposite direction such a sequence could not be described in simple causal terminology. In the complex intercourse of (i) political *vs.* economic, (ii) political *vs.* legal (etc.), and economic *vs.* legal (etc.) elements, there ought to be noticed unexchangeabilities without remains of elements involved. Therefore a holistic viewpoint on such relationship should be desirable, while the triangular model explained briefly above could be heuristically useful for the further consideration, as well as exploration.

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SECURITY PERSPECTIVES OF CENTRAL EUROPE: A VIEW FROM SLOVAKIA

Five years following the end of World War I the founder of the Pan-European movement, Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, commenting the European discord, uttered prophetical words, that the discord will take such a long time, "until a Russian Napoleon comes forming his Federation of the Rhine from small East European countries to strike with its help a death blow to Europe". The history proved him to be completely right. "The Federation of the Rhine" entered the history under the name of the Warsaw Treaty and the member states of this pact were bound by the Brezhnev doctrine about the limited sovereignty. And so some 60 years after Coudenhove-Kalergi uttered his prophecy the Czech dissident Jiří Dienstbier had to state in his "Dreams about Europe" that "to a considerable amount, in the age of the superpower bipolarity... the European nations ceased to be the subject of European politics... Europe has not only been excluded from the center of the world events, even more, she was divided and seperated in the points where for one hundred years there were no boundaries. The Communist ideology deleted the awareness of being Europeans from the consciousness of the Central European citizens and replaced it by the consciousness of their being a part of the "socialist countries camp". In the minds of the West Europeans Europe boiled down .to West Europe only. From the consciousness of the ruling elites and strata the belonging together of both parts of Europe evaporated.

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In Europe there exists a special region that is generally believed to be situated directly in the center of the continent. In the second decade of this century, in the intellectual constructions of political theroreticians and military strategists this region began to be called as "Central Europe". It represents a part of Europe that - compared with the western and the eastern Europe didń't form such an overt political and geographical unity and had to deserve its name by complicated attempts at cooperation, fusion and various sorts of integrations. Its frontiers have never been defined exactly and both the West European and the East European diplomacy experienced serious problems as to its localization. It was the conspicuous ethnic fragmentation of the population where Central Europe differed heavily both from western, and eastern Europe, this fragmentation having won a great significance especialy with the emergence of nationalism in the course of the 19th century.

Generally, there is recognizable a trend to class as Central European the countries having formed a part of the former Hapsburg monarchy. In European politics, however, we can distinguish eforts to put Central Europe within a substantially broader framework, what has ben accepted by a big part of the European political public. Very often even the Black Sea states have been regarded as Central European ones, other times the

whole range of small nations spreading between Russia, or Ukraine as the case may be, and Germany. Germany presents a specific problem anyway, because she has been always considered to be the very incorporation of a Central European power. One part of her borders upon a classical West European civilization in the West, i. e. upon France, in the East the boundaries of Germany meet with the world of Western Slavs, with the Czech and Polish states. The German self-definition as "Mitteleuropa" has been reflected in the autonomization of this term and in its marking off Central Europe. "Mitteleuropa" has been seen as an area of a preferential German interest and influence, as a sort of a German empire that, after the implementation of the German hegemony, would be spreading from the North Sea or from the Baltic via Central Europe as far as the Bosphorus.

Hence comes the difficulty to give the term Central Europe concrete outlines and contours, and to define it exactly against such parts of Europe as Balkans or Scandinavia that were also comprised in the idea of Central Europe in the past. The complications grow even more owing to the artificial character of the conventional partition of the European continent in a certain number of regions. If only two parts of Europe find an acceptation , i. e. East Europe and West Europe, it is very difficult to define the territory not belonging to either part in toto. In the center of Europe there is involved an inherent dualism, because after excluding her western, homogenously German part, we can identify the Central Europe only with the region to the East of the reunified Germany. It was the reason that the term East Central Europe came into use some decades ago. There ensues automatically, however, a geographical and a geopolitical division of Europe not into two or three, but into four basic regions: western, central western, central eastern and eastern. Even in this case it is impossible to set some exact frontiers, because a considerable part of Eastern Europe, Ukraine, has been used to be identified with East Central Europe strength of the historical process in some of her parts and on the basis of ignoring the geographical aspect.

If the geographic lines being drawn between East and West Europe have never been set firmly, both politically, and geographically this problem was settled due to the result of the World War II, although only temporarilly, as can be seen today. After World War II Europe was divided in two political, ideological and military camps, whereby Central, i. e. East Central Europe, became a part of "East Europe". Quite contrary to their cultural tradition, in the sphere of the Soviet superpower influence there found themselves not only all Slavonic and almost all Balkan peoples but in East Europe there ended one whole third of the post-war Germany representing roughly one fourth of the German nation then.

Today, following the collaps of "East Europe" and of her hegemonic leader, the Soviet Union, the problem of Central Europe presents itself one again as the problem of that part of Europe that was built on the Latin civilization, that has formed, culturally, the history of western civilization and that has been connected with the West by many historical and political ties. West Europe is thus facing an unattached political zone that, unlike the Balkan, forms her historio-political and culturally indisputable integral part. It involves a group of nations that some decades ago, as the result of the outcome of the German-

Russian historical clash and against their will had got incorporated in the "East". Because of the unnatural integration into the eastern bloc they got rid of any affiliation with the East very quickly, nevertheless their relationship to the West had been impaired seriously in the consequence of more than 40 years' interruption of mutual links. They are just the nations being situated in the politically not precisely defined European inter-region, the nations, for which before the post-war polarization East-West the general accepted term Central Europe became quite common. They are nations whose problem of the top importance it is to find a secure place on the map of Europe, i. e. in her western part It is somewhat natural that they are seeking this place with joint efforts as one indivisible whole put through natural historical links and tied together by a common post-war lot. It was the reason that they pronounced their interests jointly in the Visegrad group and they are striving to reach an integration in the West European security system.

After World War I the nations of Central Europe got free from the constriction of Austria-Hungary and new states came into existence. After being established, "Czechoslovakia", too, became a part of that "System of Versailles" and within its framework she was included in the anti-German "cordon sanitaire". A number of the Entente powers gave their support to uncritical demands of some succession states of Austria-Hungary. In this way a group of states found itself in the situation of being endangered by the German or Hungarian revanchism, as the case might have been. "Czechoslovakia" was, naturally, among them. The Czech political representation didn't give the political rights to the Slovaks as had been agreed upon in the so called Pittsburg Treaty before Czechoslovakia came into being. All these facts brought their contribution to the destruction of "Czechoslovakia" just before the outbreak of the second world war. Threating to divide Slovakia between Poland and Hungary Hitler changed Slovakia in a puppet state of his own: "cordon sanitaire" finished its existence and "Mitteleuropa" appeared, again. The unacceptability of the Hitlerite puppet state for the Slovak public became, however, clear in the Slovak national uprising, during which the Slovaks joined the anti-Hitler coalition and stood for the restoration of Czechoslovakia on the principle of an equal footing.

By virtue of the result of the World War II the "Versailles" based Central Europe came into the zone of the Soviet influence, namely into that already mentioned "Federation of the Rhine". Since 1989, the Central European nations have been striving to get free from the Soviet influence and many of them have been oriented to a further desintegration of their state formations, which, gradually, leads to the destruction of the "Model of Versailles" that has not been able to take into consideration the authentic interests of Central European nations. These processes are very explosive by their nature and the situation is further aggravated by the fact that the Soviet tutelage succeeded in freezing completely any solution of problems in terms of these countries, what had been caused by the pattern of the post-war arrangement. A logical phenomenon ensuing from the freezing has ben the disarranged emergence of the problems in the pre-frozen shape of the time before World War II. Again, Central Europe landed up in a somewhat distinct historical time, other than the one valid in West Europe. Let's admit that in West Europe in the

course of the past 40 years the democratic integration mechanisms for harmonizing the difference were being created, whereas in Central Europe the differences were not harmonized but mechanically added under pressure of the totalitarian center. Therefore, today's turmoil of peoples and states is, taken historically, a logical conclusion of the previous development. Really, Europe is not living in the same historical time. Since the modern era the movement of culture and civilization in Europe is spreading like water circles from its epicenter – the Atlantic coast. In addition to this, in Central Europe the movement is as a rule being influenced by the character of powers dominating this area. In Europe today, we can observe a parallel process both of integration, and desintegration. As it seems, the West radiates integration impulses and philosophy that a part of Eastern and Central Europe is not willing to accept. The today's process of becoming independent of Central European nations and of Slovakia especially, happens, however, in the good faith in the European integration. The Slovak nation didn't become independent in order to isolate but with the aim to integrate the Slovak Republic into the international cooperation as a sovereign entity. The desintegration, therefore, was realized to the end of an authentic cooperation and integration. The measure of desintegration is expressed in the will of nations to reach self-determination. By the way, this right is also guaranteed by the Charter of the UNO. The initiators of the above mentioned making Slovakia independent contemplated Slovakia's independence with regard to the geopolitical balance and with the consideration that Europe has to find an equilibrium between freedom and organization.

Thus, in 1989 the countries of Central Europe got free from the Russian Soviet empire. Shortly afterwards, Czechs, Hungarians, Poles and Slovaks initiated the process of Visegrad within whose framework they coordinated their seceding from the "Federation of the Rhine" and from the instruments of the Soviet hegemony – the Warsaw Treaty and the Comecon. At the same time they activated their political, economic and security relations with the West, what led them to sign the association treaties with the EC in the last end. As already said, their western orientation is ensuing quite naturally from the character of culture and history of the Central European nations having been violated by the "russification" within the "Soviet bloc". Along with this statement it should be added that all these nations are further interested in a mutually expedient cooperation with the East. From the political, cultural and security point of view they wish,however, to become a part of the West and of its integration groupings. Slovakia, too, belongs to the West culturally, namely owing to her Roman Christianity and thanks to the Protestant tradition of the creators of her national identity. But due to her geopolitical position she is shifted gravity-fed to the East, without doubt also thanks to the power ambitions of her eastern neighbours. Although she has all compatible cultural and civilisation qualifications for an affiliation with the West, the precondition of such an affiliation consists in a very intensive and purposeful cultural and civilisation activity. In the long run, this activity corresponds fully to the tendency of the Slovak history, which is expressed in the aiming of Slovakia at the western cultural civilisation type. The tendency mentioned has been harking back

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to the Great Moravia period and to the Byzantine Empire, when the Great Moravian politician Svätopluk grasped clairvoyantly, that in order to penetrate into the structures of the western politics it is necessary to join the Central European region to the Roman, not to the Byzantine Christian radius. That's why he rejected the priests of the Byzantine rite and managed to attach this area to Rome and to the Latin culture for keeps, afterwards being followed in his activities by the first Hungarian king Stephen. Since that time Slovakia has been situated in the lines of force of the western culture and her both spiritual, and civilization development has been compatible and identical with the development of the West. Slovakia, too, has her tradition of Gothic, Renaissance, Baroque, Classicism, Romantism and Modernism in both history, and the cultural strata of those epochs.

The emergence of a sovereign Slovak Republic put the Slovak population before new problems and such types of activities, with which it has only minimal or even no experience at all. One of these activites is the inescapibility of the self-projection in the field of politics and security and in the military sphere. Slovakia has always been forming a part of larger state units and has not been enjoying any sovereignty within their framework. As a part of the former Hungary and of the former Czecho-Slovakia she has never elaborated a thought concerning foreign policy, military, security and strategy of her own. In this respect she has no tradition to take up. From this very reason she does not represent a settled and common European entity. Let's make the attempt to formulate some basic approaches of Slovakia to the problems of security forming the integral part of her activities in foreign policy and in the sphere of security. After the division of the Czecho-Slovak federation and after obtaining the state independence, Slovakia has her own security forces at disposal. This brings the necessity to strike an attitude to these problems and to enter an international dialogue.

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That part of Europe whose historical name Central Europe became common property, had been looking for a common identity with regard to its specific geographical position. At least beginning with the Middle Ages a whole series of projects was constructed here and some of them, as e. g. the Hapsburg monarchy, were even implemented. Today, once again, Central Europe is in the situation when she is forced to pursue common interests owing to her geographical and geopolitical peculiarities.

Slovakia has all preconditions for good relations with all neighbouring countries and does not present a security threat for any of them. The Slovak Republic has only 5 million inhabitants. As to her neighbours, Ukraine has 50 million, Poland almost 40 million, Czechland and Hungary roughly 10 and Austria about 7 million. The Slovaks have never been hegemonic leaders of a state that would lie in the territory of their neighbours and they don't make any territorial claims to the neighbouring countries. Neither has Slovakia a type of identity that would relate to foreign territories historically. In virtue of Slovakia's historical development her mentality is deeply defensive. Such a character of identity brings Slovakia to the goal, that after

having reached the independance she seeks a broader international framework she could become part of, to have her security guaranteed. On account of belonging to the Visegrad group, together with the other members she is envisioning to enter the Euro-Atlantic security system.

After her becoming independent, Slovakia has had no serious feuds with her neighbours. Since the beginning of the process of division she has signed a number of treaties with the Czech Republic having guaranteed a free of conflict and peaceful break-up of the republics that had formed a common state. Although the Czech part of what once was Czecho-Slovakia, and Slovakia were passing through a common economic development lasting four decades, some differences in the level of both economic units were conserved, whereof some unsolved problems appear in the present time. In this way, there exist only problems bearing an economic character. Such problems are rather common every time an economically joint unit breaks. At present, Czechs and Slovaks go to considerable pains to settle the problems and in each of the new republics there is a strong will to come to an agreement. Slovakia and Czechland are mutually put through not only in the economic respect. Each of these two countries is bound with the other one by a long period of the common political history and they have been also brought together by numerous personal and family links. That's what makes the interest of both new states obvious not to bring the hitherto unsolved problems to a head. Rather the opposite is true: What the Slovaks and the Czechs share is the endeavour to enter into the European security structures, in particular into the NATO, synchronously. To find out a solution of the problems concerning the division of property of these two Central European states might take a lenghty course, but the countries managed to isolate this controversy from the questions that should warrant a fair coexistence of the Slovaks and the Czechs as neighbours and partners. In 1993, the signing of additional treaties has been put on the schedule conserning, among other things, the setting up of custom-houses along the common state boundaries, a coordinated policy in accomplishing the property division of the former Czecho-Slovakia, a treaty about the division of the transit gas pipeline, paying off the debts of the former Czecho-Slovakia for covering the peace operations of the UNO, and many other items. Open problems are solved in a rather operative manner and correspond to the peaceful character of division that has been unprecedented compared with the split of some of the other post-communist states. It is in the interest of the Slovak Republic to keep the economic and political relations with the Czech Republic on such a good level as possible and, in turn, the Czech Republic must be interested in seeing her eastern neighbour as an economically strong and politically stable state. A joint integration into the West European or if necessary only into parcial Central European initiatives is of a top importance for both of these states. The discussion about a stricter control of the common frontiers brings another important component in the Slovak-Czech negotiations. The whole problem arouse on the basis of apprehensions of Czechland's western neighbour, Germany. It is that Germany fears an uncheckable influx of immigrants from the eastern and the south-eastern directions and Slovakia is supposed to appear as the transit country for the immigrants. The whole process can have negative consequences for Slovakia,

considering that the more the frontiers between the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic are closed, the more Slovakia moves away from her goal that is consisting in the incorporation into the western integration trends.

The relationship to Hungary has been marked by certain differences of opinion concerning the waterworks on the Danube and the position of the Hungarian minority in Hungary. For all that, in each of these cases there exist bilateral efforts to bring the problems to a positive solution. As to Gabčíkovo, both sides took recourse to the International Court of Justice in the Hague to help to solve the problem. The Slovak politics has set out to minimalize the tensions brought about in connexion with the waterworks of Gabčíkovo and to allay doubts concerning the feared ecological disaster in the region. Slovakia will go into negotiations with the intention to discuss the temporary régime of using the Danube waters and in cooperation with the European Community Commission it stands for establishing of a joint monitor commission running parallel to it, that would observe the state of ecology in the area.

The problems of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and of the Slovak minority in Hungary does not involve any conflict revealing national grudge, as can be noticed in some regions of the Community of Independant States or in the Balkan. The Slovak-Hungarian nationalities' relations haven't even reached the controversy level within some European NATO members. As everywhere in Central Europe, in the nature of the problem between the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and the Slovak minority in Hungary there are hidden deep historical roots. In the Hungarian part of the extinct Hapsburg monarchy the Hungarian ethnicum was hegemonic and was involved in serious feuds with all the nations and nationalities that were living in the Hungarian sphere of influence of that period, not excluding the German element. This day we can witness the after-effects of the living together that was in progres in the Hungarian state, we witness the residua of a sort of a Great Hungarian identity, as well as the echoes of introducing a new international order after World War I, especially the consequences of the Trianon Treaty some extremely political forces in Hungary can't cope with. Apart from this, the Slovak-Hungarian relationship show also other, maybee more important aspects than the complex of the Gabčíkovo and the Hungarian minority problems, although it would be futile to belittle them. Both states are striving to come to a political, economic and security integration with the West. The membership in NATO is of a top significance for the security of both countries and for the NATO the security in Central Europe is not negligible. Regarding the conviction of the Slovak policy that the NATO is certainly not interested in a tension between its two potential member states in the fashion of the sometime Greek-Turkish conflict, Slovakia is eager to harmonize the relations of both countries to a maximal extent. The Hungarian side seems to be still under the pressure of the "Trianon trauma" that has implanted itself in the national identity of the Hungarians very deeply. It seems not to realize that the critical anti-Slovak campaigns not relying on a sober judging of problems will have a counter-productive effect for the strategic interests of Slovakia and Hungary. Unfortunately, the mutual Slovak-Hungarian relationship is often perceived as a potential source of conflict in Central Europe, although this interpretation does not

accord with the real state of affairs. One reason more for the Slovak side to be active in launching the European process that would imbue the position of minorities with an open-minded spirit and a detached attitude. Slovakia is aware of the advantages accruing to both states from the North Atlantic Alliance - the membership is a guarantee that the relationship of Hungary and Slovakia will be under the control of the NATO and that the qualitatively new relations that are to come to existence between these countries are going to eliminate many points of friction.

If the relationship of Slovakia with the Czech Republic and with Hungary don't bear the nature of a conflict but only of problems that haven't been solved satisfactorily, the ralationship with other three neighbours of Slovakia can be described as explicitly unperturbed. With Poland an intensification of cooperation is being prepared. The relations with Austria develop positively in every respect. In particularly, the economic cooperation of both countries is very important, definitively the fact of Austria being the largest capital investor in Slovakia at present. Austria is doing her best to meet all the Slovak initiatives tending towards an even more extensive cooperation. Ukraine is an important economic partner of the Slovak Republic. Naturally, the specifity of the relationship with Ukraine consists in Ukraine being a nuclear power and in the mediating role Ukraine can play between Slovakia and Russia. Slovakia is highly interested in a codification of mutual relations on the grounds that in the past decades the relations between Ukraine and Slovakia formed a part of agreements that had signed Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. For economic reasons a big attention has been paid to frontier crossings that are subject to a rigid control on account of persons showing interest in the illegal immigration.

In the proceedings in the Central European region it is Germany that has traditionally exerted a big influence here. Central Europe is facing the problem, if it wants to stay Central Europe or if it will aloow her transformation into "Mitteleuropa", i. e. into the area of the overwhelming German influence. Since the early Middle Ages in the Central European region Germany has always played the hegemonic role in culture and civilization progress, beginning already with the spreading of Christianity, followed by introducing and cultivating the economic culture. The inverse side of this contribution involved the political and even military expansion to the east and the assimilation of the non-German peoples by the German element. The negative reminiscences are visible in the historical consciousness of Czechs and Poles up to date. The fact of the highly evaluated cultural contribution of the Germans has been, however, belittled in no way. The German culture has been regarded as means for uplifting the domestic culture and the German language, paradoxically, as an instrument for the cultural understanding of the Slavonic peoples. Up to this day the knowledge of German is a common matter with the older generation of Czechs and Poles, what creates good preconditions for the integration of the local peoples with the German capital. On the other side, the hegemonization of the German capital is hampered by apprehensions of the historical consciousness fearing the traditional combination of the German economic and cultural contribution with the German political expansionism.

All projects of a modern, integrated Central Europe stressed

the German civilization mission and appreciated it as a necessary qualification for modernizing the region. Otherwise, in a deplorable manner there failed projects envisioning the integration of the Central European, in this case of the West Slavonic nations, into the East Slavonic civilization.

After the reunification the German foreign policy has several options to choose from. The most probable of these options seems to be just the Central European orientation the West German political procedure anticipated already in the end of the sixties under the name "Ostpolitik", the traditional German identification with the Central European area then having come on the surface. Admitting, owing to the strong economic and geographical position of Germany the Central European option is quite a logical one. It represents the orientation towards considerably weaker and receptive neighbours. In every case, the German foreign policy will have to come to terms with the rather unexpected fact, that the position of Germany in Central Europe will never bear such traits of monopoly as in the "German age" preceding World War I. As a politically dominating factor Germany will be stigmatized for many generations to come with the Central European nations, thanks to the historical experience of two world wars. The political representation of Central Europe, namely of Poland and Czechland will be at pains, from the very self-preservation instinct of the population, to balance the threat of a predominantly German influence by an explicit orientation to the Euro-Atlantic region. There can be no doubt that the historically conditioned cultural hegemony of Germany and of her cultural mission is nothing more than a past. Communications, shifting of the modernizing economic centers in the dynamic, non-European parts of the world and the generally spread knowledge of the Anglo-Saxon culture and language among the intellectual and pragmatic elites of the Central European states, this all made for the interruption of the German cultural monopoly. The integration chance posed before Central Europe and Germany bears an overtly economic and security character. Admittedly, the Central European states, not excluding Slovakia, cater to that idea of Genscher about "European Germany" as an opposite to "German Europe".

Due to her geographical position, Central Europe has a very ambiguous relationship to Russia and to the Community of Independant States in general.

Slovakia perceives and appreciates the reform activities of president Jeltzin in a very positive way and gives her support to democratization efforts of the present Russian executive.

The historical experience during the last 40 years makes Slovakia to pick her way cautiously and her diligence becomes augmented by observing the political and ideological development in Russia. The crystallization of affairs in what once was the Soviet Union is rather inscrutable and Central Europe does not ceased to feel endangered by the possible victory of neobolshevik or imperial nationalist forces in Russia.

Slovakia experienced four decades, during which it was - as a part of the former Czecho-Slovakia - a satellite of the former Soviet Union and was absolutely subordinate to Soviet will, Soviet interests and Soviet orientation. This orientation included also a membership in the military integration of the eastern bloc - in the Warsaw Treaty. Without doubt it was a pact with a view to a confrontation, aiming at the scheme to secure

the never hidden Sovietization of Europe. Besides of this the pact fulfilled the so called inner function. That means, it was directed against the population of those member states that would try to extricate themselves from the Soviet sphere of influence. Slovakia was made to feel the severity of this inner function in August 1968, when the Soviet Army and, in a symbolic way, the armies of five other pact members, liquidated the Czecho-Slovak attempt at a reform of the Communist system - that failed experiment of Dubček to device a "socialism bearing a human face."

Slovakia could not understand the military intervention in 1968 otherwise than a successful step of the USSR, i. e. of Russia, to continue safeguarding the onslaught area in Central Europe.

Drawing a lesson from the experience Slovakia has kept a watch on the relapses of the imperial and nationalist thought in Russia of our days.- From the development in Russia one can draw the conclusion that the imperial mythology is gaining ground proportionately to the growing economic difficulties, and Slovakia understands the striving to monolitization of the ex-Soviet empire as a potential threat. One has to take into consideration the fact that of all members of the Visegrad group Slovakia is the weakest one and her frontiers with the only non-postcommunist neighbour - Austria - are very short.

The other members of the Visegrad group have a distinctly more favourable position in this respect, but even this does not shield them against the revival of the Soviet, better said Russian imperialism. Particularly perturbing is the fact that the anti-western spectrum of the Russian society is absorbing indiscriminately oldbolshevik, neobolshevik and conservative currents of all grades. Slovakia regards herself as a Central European, i. e. in fact a pro-western country and the coordinating and integrating advance of the Russian imperial and national front is alarming in her eyes. An imperial thought rooted in a deep tradition can't be changed in a single act by only cultivating the leading instruments of the state. Here a long, lasting and patient process is needed. The state of the Russian society suggests that the psychological threshold between two types of Russian historical thought is very low and very unstable.

These all are reasons forcing Slovakia to seek the guarantee of international security in her traditional civilization environment - in the West. The rising nationalist tendencies in Russia pass freely into more complex anti-Western trends in connexion with the traditional expansion of Russia in Asian regions. It corresponds fully to the ideas of an influential intellectual and ideological group in Today's Russia and to their conviction, the Russian federation has to avoid any identification with Europe, because in all points it represents a civilization of an "Eurasian" type. Exhortations to incorporate the previous, in particular the Slavonic and Baltic republics into a reunificated empire under a Russian supremacy is a serious warning. All indications aim at the conclusion, that the seemingly fundamental turn in the system orientation of Russia in the very beginning of the 90s might not be of long duration. In this context there comes to the foreground also the feedback of this threat for the security of the West, because the West has

become the priority object of the Russian imperial nationalists.

With regard to the classic historical conflict between East and West, i. e. between two value orientations in the history of culture and civilization it stands abundantly to reason that in a certain historical period Russia fulfilled nothing more than the role of the most exposed and the most powerful element of the eastern civilization sphere. As it turns out, the conflict East-West might pass into the future millenium in substantially transformed colours. It will be the Islamic countries and the Islamic fundamentalism at all that seem to become the bearer of the primary opponent of the West. Even an alliance of an half-atheistic, nationalist and anti-western Russia with the Islamic East is quite conceivable. For the Euro-Atlantic region there could appear a very complicated security situation and it could be of a big advantage for the NATO to see Europe stabilized as a whole and to let build Central Europe as a reliable part of the European continent.

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Like Poland and Hungary, Slovakia is situated at the frontiers between the Latin and the Byzantine cultural and civilization type. In the interest both of West Europe, and of Central Europe it is to rely on these frontiers as homogenous ones, without any satellite affiliations. One has to depart from the thesis that the neighbour of Slovakia, Ukraine, will be the first country to be hit by any change in Russia. The influence Russia is exerting on the development in Ukraine is being determined not only by the existence of a considerable Russian minority in this economically and strategically important republic. The integration of the Central European, especially of the Visegrad group countries into the NATO would mean to build a stable center in the whole region with clearly positive consequences for West Europe. The admission of the Visegrad group as a whole would be for the Community of Independant States fairly acceptable, because the historical claims of the former USSR towards these countries furnish proof of substantially other dimensions as towards the former republics of the extinct USSR. One reason more not to accept the Visegrad Four countries into the NATO individually and to envision a joint admission. The advantage of a collective admission of all member countries of the Visegrad group will show up also in keeping the continuity of their once existing military and security integration.

For the admission of the Visegrad Four into the NATO there speak also military reasons. The armies of all member states cooperated very closely in the past and it it advisable to preserve this positive tradition. The former Czecho-Slovak army was reckoned among the best armed and from the angle of the human factor among the first-quality armies within the eastern bloc. Today it is still possible to preserve and even to improve this quality. In case Slovakia and Czechland become members of the NATO in a foreseeable future, it will be possible to conserve the original military and integration basis of the former Czecho-Slovakia, what could be of a good use for the common activities of both armies in the NATO. A comparatively early passage of Slovakia and of the other Visegrad group countries from one military and security system into another would bring less complications than in case of a country by country admission, or

of an admission of all the states together following a long time interval.

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Slovakia is a Central European state situated between the traditional spheres of the German and of the Russian influence. Therefore, it is natural, that she will try to avoid the hegemonization in the region by one of these states by seeing an orientation in the Atlantic region. It is a tendency that bears relation to our global perception of the North Atlantic Alliance. We don't regard the NATO only as an organization of countries using the same weapons, but also as an alliance of states defending – even by various means – the same cultural and political values. It is the question of defending the classical values of the western civilization – democracy, political pluralism, free market, human rights – in its transatlantic dimension. It is in this way we understand the Atlantic philosophy of the NATO. At the same time, we are aware of the fact that considering our interest to become member of West European integration groupings both politically, and economically, it is not possible to solve, paradoxically, our security problems out of the western integration system the NATO plays a key role in.
We are convinced that the political, economic and security aspects form one coherent whole and we suppose, the West is of the same opinion.

GEVORK TER-GABRIELIAN, PH.D.

YEREVAN, ARMENIA

ARMENIAN POSITION VIS-A-VIS BLACK SEA INITIATIVE

I'd like to take notice on the fact that this paper does not reflect the official point of view of Armenian government. Here are some arguments and apprehensions of my own. They may be exaggerated. But I hope that expressingthem I would help to decrease the danger of deterioration of the situation in the region.

1. INTRODUCTORY NOTES.

1. Discribing the changes taking place in the world after the disintegration of the USSR, they often use a term "appearance of new states". Whereas we the inhabitants of these new states understand that the states do not appear all of a sudden. The republics of the former USSR are not yet Sovereign States to the full. Most of all it conserns Armenia wich has been in absolute economic blocade and neighbours with countries at war for a long time. The most important for Armenia is the conflict between the Republic of Mountainous Karabagh and the central authorities of Azerbaidjan.

So when we speak about processes taking place in our region it would be more true to speak about the continuing process of the disintegration of the USSR a process which would last for a long time yet.

Another widely used term-cliche is "an ethnic conflict". It implies that the reason of conflict lies in ethnic differences of conflicting parts. While the disintegration processes in the former USSR make us sure thet the ethnic veil usually conceals the very economic aspects of the conflict. I think so though it sounds as something marxist and marxism is not in fashion today in the former USSR. These are economic reasons that make different ethnic parts of Russia demand sovereignty. And look at what is going on today: following the suit of the ethnic regions of Russia the Urals, Siberia and others which were traditionally inhabited by ethnic Russians are also longing for sovereinghty... That makes

me think that solving the economic problems of the former Soviet Republics and regions would loosen the tension.

2. There are different disintegration and integration forces which act on the territory of the former USSR. They lead sovereign Republics to further disintegration. Sooner or later these forces will lead them either to full chaos or to the appearance of a new system of national and state relations where an ethnic territory and an independent economic region (or free economic zone) will have equal rights. Chaos can become irreversable if the authorities of so-called sovereign Republics will not realise that it's impossible to suppress their regions' aspiration for political and economic freedom by force and that the basis of the yearning for political freedom is the policy of infringement of economic freedom.

If representatives both of republic authorities amd regions try to solve together the problems on the basis of european principles of consensus and if regional international organisations and their individual members keep absolute and benevolent neutrality and equal respects for all the conflicting parties the new system of national relations will form.

2.A FEW ASPECTS OF ARMENIA'S FOREIGN POLICY.

3. For Armenia the participation in international organizations is an opportunity to run through the information blocade as well as to make a progress in international relations and to fascilitate its entering into the world division labour system with its' own unique place in it. Among such organizations the most important for Armenia, to me, is the CIS because Armenia's relations with former Soviet Republics have been most extensive and intensive for more than 70 years. Participation in different international organizations such as government and non-official, political, economic and cultural ones gives an opportunity to promote the research of new original ways to solve the Karabagh conflict and peaceful settling of Transcaucasia and the territory of the former USSR. In this respect I believe that Belovejskaya Puscha was not the last point in the history of the USSR but the voluntarist beginning of the search for new, long and difficult, ways of settling all the peoples of the former USSR .

4. The promises of help and collaboration given by other countries of the world community are beeing redeemed slowly (there are both objective and subjective reasons for it). This also refers to Armenia's participation in regional international organisations and in the first place in the Black Sea Economic Collaboration.

5. Having got the unexpected independence Armenia tried to lead a new not traditional policy i. e. to state normal relations with neighbouring Turkey and to take part in all international initiatives which could help it to get out of the difficult economic situation and also to help bring the Karabagh conflict nearer to its peaceful solution.

3.ARMENIA AND TURKEY.

6. Unfortunatly all the Armenia's attempts to state new relations with Turkey have found no response from the Turkish side yet. It is so because Turkey considers itself a real ally of Azerbaidjan whereas Armenia is treated as almost an enemical country puttling a claim on Azerbaidjan and in perspective on Turkish territories.

The attempts of Turkish authorities both former and new to present Armenia as an agressor country are gwtting more and more clear. Turkey is leading an extensive propagandist war against Armenia using its possibilities of a state which has wide contacts with many countries of West and East, North and South, both Europe and Muslim Asia. I'll tell you only about one of the many cases. New and old ECO countries-members were participating in the Summit in Istanbul in July 1993. As you know ECO is another international organization integrating noly Muslim countries where Turkey tries to play a leading part. There Turkey proposed a declaration blaming Armenia for an agression against Azerbaidjan. The text was rejected by the CIS' countries-members Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan. Then it was broadcasted however by BBC under the pretence of the document adopted at the Summit.

What makes Turkey take a demarche like that? Isn't it a forgery on a world scale?

And is this really Turkey's new policy in the region, I wonder.

Let's examine Turkey's activities within the limits of the CSCE Minsk' group on the adjustment of the Karabagh conflict.

Having become a Minsk' group member Turkey has done its best to turn down any initiative of any country if it didn't propose Turkey as the first fiddle to settle the conflict. Meanwhile any Turkey's proposal shows at once that it's not a neutrale negotiator but a very interested party. Turkey tries to manipulate with the authorities and public opinion of Azerbaidjan. But Armenia has no opportunity to do the same in Karabagh. Under pressure of Karabagh authorities a law was passed in Armenia empowering Armenia to speak for Karabagh only after having come to an agreement with Karabagh' authorities about it. And every time Armenian diplomats break the law they have to responsible for it and they are usually attacked by Karabagh public opinion. Meanwhile Turkey time and again practically let itself speak for Azerbaidjan and block decisions on behalf of it at the Minsk group negotiations thus dictating its position to Azerbaidjan representatives. So after Turkey's consultation Azerbaidjan blocked a joint Russian-American initiative in January 1993. The initiative became a Russian-American-Turkish and failed. In April 1993 Turkey blocked Russian President's initiative. The initiative failed like the former once.

Today Turkey is trying in to depreciate the importance of the first direct negotiations between Karabagh and Azerbaidjan. Nevertheless the very fact of the negotiations and the provisional cease-fire achieved after that shows distinctly: only direct negotiations between the real parties of the conflict may bring good results.

I've given here only a few examples from the latest ones. If we put together all the information about propagandistic, political and economic steps of Turkey against Armenia since 1991 it would make a weightly volume.

I'll remind you of only one fact. Since November 1992 Turkey hasn't let any goods to Armenia pass through its territory (including humanitarian help). So it makes the blocade of Armenia practically absolute.

7. So on the one hand declarations about wish to normalise relations, about cooperation within the limits of Black Sea Initiative.

On the other hand blocade, propaganda war, manipulating the international public opinion.

On the one hand participating in the CSCE Minsk group to help the settling of the Karabagh problem.

On the other hand blocking all the CSCE Minsk group positive concrete results.

On the one hand blocking other countries' initiative.

On the other hand lack of its own initiatives or proposals of wittingly unacceptable variants. Unacceptable not only for Karabagh or Armenia for such members of the Minsk group as USA or Germany either.

On the one hand declarations about its neutrality.

On the other hand significant economic, financial and other help to one of the struggling parties to Azerbaidjan (including the help by personnel and arms). Military help to Azerbaidjan is organized through the border between Turkey and Nakhitchevan. It has a form of a private initiative and smuggling. But we know exactly that Turkey is not a country which would allow its cityzens actions like that without agreement with higher authorities.

8. What does this picture mean? Doesn't it look like as if Turkey were working at the world public opinion and preparing legal foundations in order to commit an agression against Armenia at a certain moment?

I can't say exactly if it would be an occupation of a part of Armenian territory just as Turkey did it with Cyprus in 1974 or it would be "only" a concentrated bomb blow at Armenia or at Karabagh.

But while there is such a possibility Armenia can't remain silent.

Turkey of course might be responsible for it POST FACTUM, already AFTER that when the military action would be over. But that abstract threat might not stop Turkey. Especcially when the world community once and agan shows its inability just to settle large and small war conflicts and its inability to punish culprits. It happened so in 1974 in Cyprus and later on it became clear that Turkey was "right" because the occupation of the part of the Cyprus's territory had no consequence for it as you see.

9. To carry out such an action Turkey may create a scrnario for example a one-day fals military coup d'etat. A general - a "grey wolf" could have come to power, carry on a bomb blow at Armenia then he could be removed and then after a "trial celebration" put into "prison - country-cottage" for life imprisonment. It has already happened so more than once, for example, after the genocide of Armenians in Turkey in 1915.

As for Armenia and Karabagh they could have been thrown far back in their development by one such action and taking into account today's situation they might not get over it.

And what would "world public opinion"'s sympathy and help of the democratic West mean for them in a case like that?

10. I dare say that the world community and SC of the UNO don't yield much to Turkey's blackmail inspite of the fact that many countries of both West and East continue to regard Turkey as a democratic country which is to spread its influence on the regions of the former USSR left by Russia.

So unfortunately we can see that a rather large neighbouring country is blocking the achievement of piece and by that creates the prerequisites for continuing military actions in the region which make the front line stretch. Such a logic of the Karabagh war development conceals a clear aim of Turkey: to become the only state exersising influence on the Transcaucasia in order to make it a bridge for the further penetration into the Middle Asia and other turkic regions of the former USSR, in order to propagate not Democracy but Turkic nationalism. But if this doesn't work out there will be nothing for it but an opportunity to urge the conflicting parts on increasing war. Turkey is acting on principle "if not to me then not to the others" despite the fact that not only the ethnically "hostile" Armenians (from the Turkish ideologists point of view) but also the fraternal Azerbaidjanians die because of it.

11. We should like to understand the way Turkey sees the best settling of the Mountainous Karabagh conflict. Does it mean the Karabagh self-defence forces' capitulation? And raising the blocade of Armenia by Turkey for it? And then further deportation of all the remaining Armenians from the Karabagh? And then to put into effect the idea of "Gekcha-Zangezour Republic" on the territory of Armenia? That could cause only a new turn of military actins but now directly between Armenia and Azerbaidjan. Do they want war and blocade once again?

No Turkish initiative guarantees Armenians' security in Karabagh. Neither it garantees raising of the blocade of Armenian territory on behalf of Turkey (to say nothing of raising the blocade of Armenia on behalf of Azerbaidjan). On the contrary the domestic ideological machine in Turkey is working today to supply arguments for the false claims that the territory of modern Armenia belonged to Azerbaidjan in the depth of history.

4.THE BLACK SEA INITIATIVE AND ARMENIA.

12. At the side of the Armenia and Turkey relations crisis picture it becomes quite understandable why the Black Sea Economic Cooperation had no concrete results (for Armenia in any case). International organizations as well as any peaceful business in general can work only if normal, peaceful conditions of coexistence of States are secured. To overlook the fact that there are contradictions between a member a number of States, down to the war conflicts, is a hypocrisy.

Armenia doesn't consider itself an enemy of Turkey or Azerbaidjan. But can the work of these three countries within the limits of the BSEC be effective while Turkey and Azerbaidjan constantly blame Armenia for agression? Or maybe these accusations have no serious meaning, they are for "foreign market" and collaboration is kept for "home" one?

13. Armenia has nothing against collaboration with Turkey and especially with other countries-members of BSEC. But taking into consideration the above-mentioned can we assumed that put forward the BSEC (which is very timely and important) Turkey is pursuing again its own objects in politics. As well as having become a member of the CSCE Minsk group on the settlement of the Mountainous Karabagh - Azerbaidjan conflict Turkey in reality wishes not to settle the conflict but to achieve political dividents in the Transcaucasia region.

The same can be assumed in case of ECO...

Turkey has put forward the BSEC not only to develop the Black Sea basin and neighbouring regions, not only to develop private business in the Black Sea region, not only to help the Republics of the former USSR to get out of the economic crisis.

Otherwise, why was it necessary for Turkey to invite Albania and Azerbaidjan to join the BSEC (Armenia also was invited in order to make it look not so defiant). For what purposes was it necessary to concentrate the BSEC secretariate at the Turkish territory? Why does Turkey seek to locate all the services of the BSEC including the Bank on its territory? What for was it necessary to create the BSEC Parliament Assembly? Would it be one more liver for Turkey in order to adopt resolutions (or to make a show of their adoption by other countries), having nothing to do either with Black Sea or with economics and ecology?

14. Armenia has agreed to participate in the work of the BSEC in a full volume. Armenia is even (ulike Greece or Bulgaria) taking part in the Parliament Assembly of the BSEC.

But it doesn't mean that Turkey's hidden aims are not clear to Armenia. We just hope that the good idea will triumph over hidden low purposes, that this time good intensions will not lead us to the hell.

Our main task today is, when we speak about the BSEC, to turn political game into real mutually beneficial policy. I'd like to believe that this is also the task of such States as Bulgarians, Greeks, Moldavians, Romanians, Russians, Ukrainians and the others who evaluate the situation the same way.

It is just we who are responsible for carrying out the idea of the BSEC.

We are to aim at the fast development of bilateral and multilateral mutual relations. This will help to avoid such fears and will not let the contradictions between Turkey and the majority of other countries: members of the BSEC interfere with carrying out our plans and programs. These relations will give us a chance to quickly solve the arising problems in particular those which will arise within the limits of the BSEC.

5.SOME PERSPECTIVES OF THE BSEC.

15. In the light of all the aforesaid I would propose my own opinion on BSEC purposes and tasks:

economics:

- to create a ramified system of business contacts based not only on the high-level contacts but on those of individual economic entities and regional entities primarily. Thus in future such such regions of the former USSR as the Crimeria, Krasnodarsky region of Russia, Adjaria, Abkhazia, Karabagh and others could become the individual participants of economic structures of the BSEC. It could be possible to attach to them the status of Free Economic Zones.

communications:

- to develop communications and power supply system   taking into account the interests of all the BSEC countries - participants.

conflict prevention:

- to fascilitate the peaceful settlement of large and small conflicts going on at Balkans and in Transcaucasia and also inside Turkey calling conflicting regions representatives to participate in BSEC economic projects.

- to prevent potential conflicts and in the first place the large-scale wars at Balkans and in Transcaucasia-Near East by carrying out "preventing business actions" through calling for collaboration with the entities of potential conflicts on the BSEC concrete programs.

security:

- to create a mutual relations ratified code excluding the possibility of hostile economic actions of one of the countries-participants of the BSEC against another if they are not in condition of a declared war.

- to determine sanctions for breaking the mutual relations code right up to the esclusion from the membership in the BSEC.

- to call the BSEC participants to reject the accomodation of foreign military bases on their territories as the first real step to reduce international tension in the region.

Acting so the BSEC will promote settling of ethno-political conflicts assisting the regions in their economic development. As a result the BSEC could promote formation and evolution of new forms of national relations on the territory of the Caucasus and Transcaucasia. Those relations would be based on principles of horizontal economic collaboration between regions and ethnic territories excluding agressive political pressure of central authorities of the BSEC Transcaucasia countries-members.

To achieve that it is necessary that politics would not use measures to restrain the economic freedom and initiative. Ethnical, racial, religious and any other cultural and spiritual differences can be such instruments. Because it's not too difficult to transform the power and riches of peoples' cultures into a club to supress them.

(27)

" Romania and the Black Sea Initiatives"

Luminita [1]rina Nedel,

journalist at Romanian National News Agenc

Romania and the Black Sea Initiatives

Ladies and gentlemen,

Due to its geostrategig position on the Black Sea shore
and on the Danube, Romania has a particular interest in the
establishment and development of a process of cooperation in this zon

On the other hand, Romania takes considerable interes in
the economic cooperation in the Euro-Atlantic area. Now, this area is
at a critical stage in a period of radical chances. In this space,
hauted by different conflicts and disfunctions, there are deep
divisions between zones of stability and instability, of prosperity
and economic underdevelopment, wich can affect the security of all.
Romania is convinced that the success of the transition to marcket
economy is important to and in the interest of all European countries
and, also, that increased economic cooperation stand as a major pilla
of the stability in our area.

Romania supports and participates to the activities
aimed at building up a new schemes, formes and structures of regional
cooperation as part and parcel of the general European integration.
A good example in this direction is the European Community, wich has
showing that cooperation for regional prosperity can bring together
even countties who have fought against each other for centuries.

The initiative for creating the Black Sea Economic zone,
launched three years ago by Turkey, is considered like first step
of this cooperation.The sub-regional cooperation could and must
reprezent, in my country opinion, a major factor of development in
the Black Sea countries and in the Euro-Atlantic area as a whole,
with a view of supporting reforms in the transition countries and to
diminishing substantially the economic gaps prevailing now in Europe

Also, at a time of transition and uncertainty, when especially our neighbouring area are confronted with tensions and conflicts, Black Sea economic cooperation appeares as a major pillar of the stability in the framework of a world advancing toward economic integration, Black Sea Economic Cooperation constitutes a regional initiative of cooperation undertaken by a group of countries of a total population mounting to about 400 milion people and a land area bigger than that of the Europen Community, considerable natural resources, yet with most of them just having embarked themselves upon the road of the market economy.

Romania considered, in the same time, that the only way in wich Black Sea Economic Cooperation could function as an useful brick for a nasceht European arhitecture, is to preserve its open, flexible and nonexclusive character.

Now, when the Danube-Rhine-Maine Chanal is open, the Black Sea is, practically, an open sea, with a wide range of possibilities for marine transport. Romania believe that it will be useful to create on the future an "interlocking system" between different sub-regional projects, such as the Central-European Initiative, Mediteranian cooperation, the Project for complex cooperation among Danube countries, Balkan Cooperation, as well as other forms and structures.

As far as Romania is concerned, she, like other participatin states of the Black Sea Econnmic Cooperation, is confronted with difficulties relevant to the implementation of economic reform and the transition to a market economy. Beeing convinced that the BSEC offers a favorable framework to enhace the economic cooperation between our countries Romania intends to intensify its participation in the concret projects. One of this project was launched by the

romanian minister of foreing affaires in june, at [I]stambul.It concene
the creation, at [B]uchares, of a Centre for small and medium- sized
entreprises for [B]alkan and Blak Sea area.

Also, as a contribution to the BSEC activities, on 15-16
septembre, at Sinaia, Romania will host the meeting of the Working
Group on Banking and [F]inance. At the same time, at the end of this
month, at [C]onstantza, it will take place the ministerial Conference
on [T]ransports for South-Est [E]uropean area, as a prelude to the genera
European Conference on [T]ransports, to be held in Athens, in 1994.

[O]ne of the most interesting and promising feature of the
BSEC is the fact that the Istambul Summit D'eclaration - June 1993-
does not confine itself to the governmental interaction, but also
aims at involving in an active manner the private sectors and non-gu-
vernmental factors. [I]'n this context, I would like to mention the
activities taking place uhder the auspicies of the Romanian Fundation
" Danube - Blak Sea".

It was at the meeting in Istambul, last year, when the
[P]resident of Romania announced the founding of the Bla[c]k Sea Universi
ty, a romanian initiative that is shaping the BSEC area as a new
centre for adult education. The summer school programme, wich has
been start in may this year, hase been conceived along three broad
lines: the ecological study of the Blak S'ea, the economy and current
issuesof the counties in the Blak [S]ea area and the Blak Sea civilis [tior]

We hope that such an initiative provides an opportunity of
capitalization and dissemination of useful information whose
beneficiaries would be many people from the Blake Sea area, who
ardendly need information in order to strengthen relations among
themselves and among their counties.

Turkey and the Black Sea Initiative

On June 25, 1992, eleven heads of states gathered in Istanbul and signed the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Declaration.[1] The brain-child of the late Turkish President Turgut Özal, it is another indication of Turkey's shift towards regionalism as a response to the post Cold War developments. This shift, however, does not constitute a break with Ankara's traditional Western oriented foreign policy. On the contrary it should be seen as a new card in Ankara's hands aiming at reinforcing Turkey's relations with both the United States and Western Europe.

For almost half a century Turkey's membership of NATO and its association with the European Community have provided the basic framework for the country's foreign relations. Since 1945 Turkey has sought integration with the West on grounds of security and because of economic and ideological considerations. The dismantling of the Iron Curtain may have erased the first of these considerations, but the other two remain still very much alive.

The end of the Cold War appeared, at first, to undermine Turkey's position in the Western world since its role as a warrior on the borders of the Soviet Union was over. Ankara's feeling of uncertainty was further increased when the European Community - with which the Turks have a long-standing association agreement- rejected Turkey's application for membership in 1989.[2] Not only was the Community reluctant to accept Turkey as one of its members but also political and economic developments in Eastern Europe and the Community itself meant that Turkey ran the risk of being pushed to the bottom of the European agenda. It is in this context - and given

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[1] The signatories are, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine.

[2] This was pointed out by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Hikmet Çetin, quoted in Selim Ilkin, «Les Tentatives de Cooperation Economique en Mer Noire», *Cemoti, Cahiers d' Etudes sur la Mediterranée Orientale et le Monde Turco-Iranien*, no.15, 1993, p.53.

the winds of change around its borders with the former Soviet Bloc - that Turkey, in the last two years has been active establishing formal ties in all fields with Russia, the Turkic Republics of Central Asia and the Black Sea states. Thus, Ankara is seeking to secure its relationship with the West through a new role, that is of a regional stabilising power in the centre of an area of actual and potential conflicts - a role which Western Europe and the United States have welcomed as they see Turkey as a counter-weight in particular, to Iran's influence. The new Turkish President Süleyman Demirel has stated on more than one occasion that the underlying factor in Turkey's new diplomatic activities is not to develop an eastern alternative. As he put it when still Prime Minister, "we may be a bridge to Asia but we do not pretend to be the voice of Asia. On the contrary, for our closest neighbours we represent the voice of Europe."[3]

Nevertheless, there is also an element of opportunism in Ankara's new approach to the region. The Turks, as others, are well aware of the economic potential of these countries. The decline of Turkish exports to the Middle East since the second half of the 1980s has increased Turkey's need for new markets.[4] Both government[5] and opposition are attracted by the idea of Turkey becoming the economic - and in the case of the Turkic states the political - centre of the area. In Özal's words, " 'we are at a point where we should not lose sight of other possible alternatives [to the European Community]. Turkey cannot have all its eggs in one basket. I don't say that to challenge the EC or Europe. This is not at all the case. But we should consider every alternative.' Turkey must react quickly and show an

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[3] *The Guardian*, 23 November 1992.

[4] In the first half of the 1980s Turkish exports to the Middle East were on the rise. The oil-producing countries of the Middle East accounted for 16% of Turkish exports in 1979 but for 44% in 1983. Since the mid-1980s, however, there has been a reverse trend and exports to the area have fallen to 20%, Deniz Akagül and Semith Vaner, "Peut-il Se Constituer Un Sous-Ensemble Regional Autour de IA Mer Noire?", *Cemoti*, no.15, 1993, p.25.

[5] Although Demirel has been more cautious in his statements than Özal.

interest in regional developments. ‹Not after the events have taken place, but at an opportune moment›."[6]

Turkey's initiative in launching the idea of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation - "a new ‹Great Silk Road› under modern conditions", in Özal's terms[7] has to be seen in the light of the above mentioned considerations.[8] The ambitious scheme was put forward in 1990 before the dismantling of the Soviet Union.[9] In December 1990 representatives of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey met in Ankara and agreed to examine proposals about the free movement of capital, goods, services and labour across their borders. After the breakdown of the Soviet Union, the Black Sea successor states (Russia, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova) together with Armenia and Azerbaijan took its place in the discussions, and in 1992 Greece[10] and Albania were also invited to participate.[11] The final Bosphorus Declaration of June 1992 was a short, subdued document. It merely expressed the goodwill of the participants to promote bilateral and multilateral economic co-operation[12] without putting forward a concrete plan to this end. In fact, it was less ambitious than the agreement envisaged in 1990.[13] Thus, in the place of free

[6] Ilkin, "Les Tentatives de Cooperation."

[7] Özal's interview in *Izvestiya*, quoted in *FBIS*, *"Soviet Union"*, June 26, 1992, p.5.

[8] Demirel stressed on the day of its signature, that it is "a sign of Turkey's prestige and also a sign that Turkey must be treated with respect and attention", *FBIS*, *"Western Europe"*, June 26, 1992, p.12.

[9] Ambasador Sükrü Elekdag who was the main character involved gives an account of the developments, Sükrü Elekdag, "KEIB'in Türkiye Açisindan Önemi", *Türkiye ‹nin Dis Ekonomik Iliskilerinde Yeni Ufuklar, Uluslarasiseminer, 24-25 Subat 1992*, (1992, Istanbul Sanayi Odasi).

[10] Greece had intended to be only an observer but finally it agreed to become a member. Rumania and Bulgaria had insisted for Greece's participation since Athens would provide the link with the EC, Deniz Akagül and Semith Vaner, "Peut-il Se Constituer Un Sous-Ensemble Regional Autour de lA Mer Noire?", *Cemoti*, no.15, 1993, p.18.

[11] It should be noted that the Black Sea agreement does not have any geographical limitations. Currently Tunisia and Poland - along with the EBRD - have been accepted as observers.

[12] The Declaration makes also specific reference to co-operation in the fields of transport, energy, science and technology.

[13] W. Hale, "Turkey, the Black Sea and Transcaucasia", Paper Presented to Conference on Transcaucasia Boundaries: Geo-Politics and International Boundaries, Research Centre, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, June 1992.

movement of labour the declaration spoke only of free movement of businessmen, and instead of the establishment of free trade the signatories agreed to contribute «to the expansion of their mutual trade [...] by continuing their efforts to further reduce or progressively eliminate obstacles of all kinds, in a manner not contravening their obligations towards third parties». If the original concept had already been watered down by the time of this final announcement, it is not a surprise that one year after the Bosphorus Declaration, little headway has been made to co-ordinate policies for its achievement. Although in December 1992, it was decided to establish a permanent secretariat along with a Black Sea trade and development bank and a regional statistics centre - all essential for the development of the project - everything still remains on paper.[14] Moreover, Greece and Bulgaria abstained from a meeting in February 1993 when it was agreed to set up a Consultative Parliamentary Assembly.[15]

There is no doubt that progress regarding the institutional aspect of the agreement is bound to be slow since the member states are lacking the necessary experience. However, the real difficulties of putting the idea into practice are to be found elsewhere. Not only are the majority of the member states in the midst of economic chaos, but also Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Armenia are - and it appears that they will be for the near future - in a state of war. The newly independent states lack modern infrastructure in terms of telecommunications or financial services to facilitate contacts. Moreover, conditions of security along their roads are uncertain.[16] The fact that only Greece and Turkey have convertible currencies (or virtually

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[14] In fact, during the second meeting of Foreign Ministers in Istanbul, on July 17, 1993, Russia made it clear that it does not have the capacity, for the time being, to proceed with the idea of the Bank

[15] According to the Armenian Parliamentary Deputy the majority of the other participant states approache the Assembly according to the principle, «participating in this Assembly does not benefit my country, but it does not harm it, either», *Hayk*, june 26, 1993

[16] Turkish lorry drivers are constantly assaulted for money before they are allowed to continue their journeys. The situation is particularly unsafe in Georgia but also in Southern Russia, Ukraine and Azerbaijan.

convertible in the case of Turkey) complicates commercial agreements and capital movements. At present, barter trade is the prevailing mode of exchange between Turkey and the Black Sea states.[17]

Efforts by the Eastern European states to deregulate the economy and liberalise their trade and exchange systems depend on two interrelated elements, their ability to persist with their reforms and the availability of foreign investment. The Turkish Export Credit Bank (Exim Bank) has opened a credit line to the former Republics of the Soviet Union but it is obvious that Turkey, a heavy borrower itself,[18] can do little towards this direction. As Demirel pointed out in his opening address at the Istanbul Summit, «there is a need for financial power. Currently the region's financial resources seem to be more modest than their aims. There is a need for foreign resources.»[19] Until now, however, the West and the Japanese have been cautious in extending credits and loans to the area and there are no signs that their attitude is about to change. Thus, Ankara is «unlikely to quickly find others ready to pay for its cherished would-be role as a bridge» between Western financial centres and these states.[20] Not to mention the fact that all the countries involved in the agreement are competitors in the international financial markets.

There is also the question of commitments with third parties. Greece is a member of the European Community and Turkey is supposed to establish full customs union with the Community in 1996. Consequently, both countries will be able to lower trade walls only to the level that Brussels permits. Moreover, some

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[17] Turkey usualy provides the technology and machinery while the other country the raw materials and labour, *International Herald Tribune,* July 13, 1992. Ankara, at some point proposed the creation of a payments union but apparently this could result in a serious leakage of hard currency from Greece and Turkey.

[18] External short-term borrowing rose by 797.6% in the first 10 months of 1992, compared with 1991, *Middle East Economic Digest,* January 29, 1993.

[19] *FBIS,* «Western Europe», June 26, 1992, p.3.

[20] *Middle East International,* July 10, 1992.

Black Sea countries are already seeking separate agreements with the Community.[21] In other words, the Black Sea Declaration is a trade agreement which in the best case could become a poor cousin of EFTA.

Ankara is aware of the structural difficulties. Nevertheless, the idea is, according to Turkish Foreign Ministry to create a basic framework for discussion, "a medium for businessmen and basically let them carry on without too many bureaucratic barriers."[22] Turkey with a potential for exports in consumer and agricultural goods, along with telecommunications, construction and tourism services, expects to be in an advantageous position in this market of 320 million consumers.[23]. The ultimate aim, endorsed by all participants, is to alleviate political differences and achieve regional stability through economic co-operation.[24] For the time being, however, everybody tries to secure his own economic interests. This has been demonstrated in the negotiations for a pipeline to transport oil from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Ankara, opposed on environmental grounds the proposals for a Black Sea terminal either in Russia or in Georgia. Instead it insisted on a Mediterranean terminal on Turkish territory, particularly enraging the Georgians, who are desperate to overcome their economic bankruptcy.[25] At the same time, Turkey plans to introduce a toll in the Bosphorus which, if implemented, it will put a further strain on the trade of the Black Sea states, since this is mainly carried through the Straits.[26]

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[21] The declaration aknowledges the problem and states that the agreement will be implemented in a manner not contravening the obligations of the participants towards third parties.

[22] *Middle East Business and Banking*, January 1991, p.6.

[23] Özay Mehmet, "Beyond Glastnost and the Gulf War: Turkish Foreign Policy and Economic RelAtions at a Crossroad", *International Girne Conferences: Turkey's Relations with the Soviet Union and East Europe*, 1991, p.34.

[24] *Middle East Business and Banking*, January 1991, p.6.

[25] *PIW*, "Turkey's Ambitious Oil Diplomacy", March 29, 1993, p.9. At present, after the ousting of Elchibey in Azerbaijan, the protocol endorsing the Turkish proposal has been shelved.

[26] *Finacial Times*, August 18, 1992.

One really wonders how conducive to economic co-operation the atmosphere can be when most of the member states are at each other's throats. In fact, the *modus vivendi* of the area is rivalry and not co-operation.[27]. Ankara's initiative was based on the idea that Moscow had retreated politically behind its borders so Turkey - being the strongest country in the area and backed by the West - could step in as an economic co-ordinator. However, it was wishful thinking to write Russia off. In the last year, Moscow has shown that it is far away of abandoning its interests in territories long ruled by the Tsarist and Soviet empires.[28] Nevertheless, due to the fact that it does not have the means to oppose or to substitute Turkey's activity in the area it prefers co-operation to confrontation with Ankara. This, does not mean that Russia is willing to see the Turks, exerting increasing influence in the most sensitive area - due to oil and security considerations - of its «near abroad». In fact, the Russians have made it more than clear that they do not welcome Turkey's interference in the area.[29] Recent events in Azerbaijan have undermined the only serious link Ankara had in the area and made it clear that Russia is still the boss.[30] At the same time, most of the other member states have also reasons to antagonise Turkey's bid for regional power - although some are desperate for solutions to overcome their economic crises -. Greece has a long-standing dispute with Ankara over the Aegean and the question of Cyprus while Turkish policy in the Balkans has

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[27] For the antagonism at present in the region see, Andramik Migrayan, «The Soviet Union has Gone off in all Directions», *The Curent Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol.XLIV, no.43, 1992, pp.11-14.

[28] A. Rahr, "Atlanticists versus Eurasians", *RFE/RL Research Report*, May 29, 1992; Anne de Tinguy, "La Russie A-T-Elle Une Politique A L' egard De Son Sud?", *Cemoti*, no.15, 1993.

[29] It suffice to remember the statement of the Head of the Russian Army, back in 1992, that any intervention by Turkey in Azerbaijan would lead to a third world war. At the same time, Moscow seeks to include Iran in the regional game (agreement of co-operation and selling of sub-marines to Tehran).

[30] The Turks are not allowed any more to enter Azerbaijan without a visa. According to Hugh Pope, the Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev, during his visit in Ankara after Aliyev assumed power, gave even «table-thumping warnings» that Turkey should keep out of «our» Azerbaijan, *The Independent*, July 1, 1993.

become a new source of friction between the two countries.[31] Lately, a rapprochement has been taking place between Bulgaria and Turkey,[32] however, the existence of a sizeable Turkish minority in Bulgaria will continue to be a source of tension between the two countries.[33] The same can be argued about Moldova with its minority of the Gagauz Turks, to whom Ankara has promised moral and material support.[34] Ukraine sees Turkey as a counterweight in its present relations with Russia; yet, in the long run, Kiev would be apprehensive of Ankara's possible political influence in Crimea. Armenia would feel threatened by any consolidation of Turkish power and Georgia would not be pleased, either, to be squeezed between Russia and a strong Turkey.[35] Thus, it is not a surprise that the Agreement was met with apprehension in Western circles. A Western diplomat called it «an old-Arab style confabulation where the host country makes such a fuss that the others are afraid not to come in case they would lose out.»[36]

Turkey's Black Sea Initiative does not appear to have more chances of success than the Economic Co-operation Organisation (ECO).[37] The emergence around Turkey's borders of economically desperate and politically weak states, is just one factor out of many which could render Turkey in a position to play a key role

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[31] Moreover, Athens wishes to play itself a leading economic and political role in the Balkans, *Kathimerine*, January 23, 1991; P. Panagiotopoulos, «I Nea Democratia se Rolo «Valkanarhi», *Kathimerine*, June 16, 1991.

[32] Stephane Yerasimos, "L'Autre Alexandrie", *Politique Etrangère*, no.2, 1992, sees Sofia's new approach as the result of the rise of the Macedonian question.

[33] Rada Nikolaev, «Bulgaria's 1992 Census: Results, Problems and Implications», *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol.2, no.6, February 5, 1993; Ivan Ilchev and Duncan M. Perry, «Bulgarian Ethnic Groups: Politics and Perceptions», *RFE/RL Research Report*, vol.2, no.12, March 19, 1993.

[34] *Russia and the Successor States Briefing Service*, vol.1, no.2, April 1993, p.17.

[35] Although such considerations are unlikely to preoccupy Georgia in the near future, before domestic stability has been achieved.

[36] *The Independent*, June 26, 1992.

[37] Established under the name of Regional Co-operation and Development Organisation in 1965 between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, it changed its name in 1985. In 1992, Azerbaijan, Ouzbekistan, Turkmenistan were admitted as new members (Kazakstan, kyrgizistan and Tajikistan were given the status of observer) after Turkey's attempt to revitalise it.

in regional affairs.[38] There is not only the question of financial resources and Russia's rivalry. The Turks have come to realise that there are as many risks and responsibilities as opportunities deriving from the new *raison d' état* around their borders. This has been amply demonstrated in Turkey's attitude regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Despite Özal's rhetoric Ankara has been careful not to get involved in a conflict which might endanger its relations not only with Russia but also with the West[39]. There is also the question of Turkey's domestic situation. Ankara faced with serious economic[40] and internal security problems (Kurdish uprising) and with the Islamic movement on the rise is hardly in a position to concentrate its efforts towards an active policy in the area. A year ago, the Turkish Press gave prominent place to Turkey's relations with the former Soviet Republics. Today, attention is rightly focused on domestic developments. Of course, no one is denying that Turkey will have a role to play in the Black Sea area. Turkish banking, telecommunication and construction sectors are trying to establish their presence there. Nevertheless, Turkey today realises that this role will be much more modest and thorny than the one envisaged one year ago.

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[38] The situation is not very different regarding Central Asia despite the fact that Turkey has got cultural links with the Turkic Republics, see John Murray Brown, "Euphoria has Evaporated", *Financial Times*, May 7, 1993; Sophie Shihab, "Ambitions et limites d' une influence en Asie Centrale", *Le Monde*, 9 Janvier 1993; Alan Cowe, "Turkey's Fading Role as U.S. Proxy to Emerging Central Asian Nations", *International Herald Tribune*, August 5, 1993 It should be remembered that those states chose to be represented abroad by Russia and not by Turkey. (Until recently Turkey represented abroad only Azerbaijan).

[39] Edward Mortimer, "At the Centre of an Unstable Region", *Financial Times*, May 7, 1993.

[40] Turkey's external debt was $56 billion and its inflation ran at 70%, in September 1992.

INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON ISSUES AT THE 1995 NPT CONFERENCE (9–12 JULY 1993, CHILWORTH MANOR)

A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE ISSUES

(David Fischer - Director and later Assistant Director General for External Relations, IAEA 1957-80)

INTRODUCTION

I must apologize to many amongst you who have already listened to several reviews of the issues likely to arise in 1995.

To make the subject more manageable I shall divide the issues into three compartments,

        o   Housekeeping
        o   Procedure
        o   Substantive

although, as every conference diplomat knows, procedure and substance are often inextricably intertwined:

The 1995 conference has two main tasks. Firstly, to decide how long (and not whether) the NPT should be extended, and secondly to review the way in which the NPT has been implemented. In carrying out the first task, Article X of the Treaty gives the conference four choices: to extend the NPT indefinitely, i.e. to make it permanent; to extend it for a single fixed period; to extend it for a limited number of fixed periods; or to extend it for an indefinite number of fixed periods. At the end of my talk I shall examine each of these choices in greater detail

The decision on extension must be taken by a majority of the parties, not merely by a majority of the states taking part in the conference. If the decision takes the form of a statement of consensus rather than a vote, the conference must ensure that the consensus does indeed represent the formal and explicit decision of a majority of the parties.

As for the second task, the parties have not yet decided what period the review should cover, for instance should it look at the five years since the last review conference in 1990 or should it review the entire life of the treaty since 1970 when it entered into force.

George Bunn, Charles van Doren and I myself have addressed many of the procedural issues in PPNN Study Two (*Options & Opportunities : the NPT Extension Conference of 1995*) and George Bunn has again analyzed them in his paper for this meeting. The paper by John Simpson covers both procedural and substantive matters and should be read together with the others.

HOUSEKEEPING ISSUES

Now let us look at the main housekeeping issues. They are:

     o   Where should the conference be held?
     o   How long should it last?
     o   Who shall preside over it and its committees ,
     o   Who will pay for it and how much?

There are other house-keeping issues involving the Preparatory Commission (Prepcom), for instance how many meetings of the Prepcom should be held, how long they should last and where they should be held, what papers should the UN and the IAEA prepare for the 1995 conference. Ben Sander' paper offers a detailed analysis of these questions.

Location of the conference

The answer to the first question - the location of the conference - could influence its outcome. At the fourth Review Conference in Geneva in 1990 only 84 of the 140 states that were then parties were present. The number needed to constitute a majority of the parties and to take a decision was 71 out of 140. If the decision on extension had been taken at that conference a small group of 14 parties could have blocked any decision simply by withholding their votes. It has been wisely decided that the 1995 conference will be held at the UN Headquarters in New York where the risk of a poor turn-out is much smaller than in Geneva.

Duration

It has also been decided that the conference will take place from 17 April to 12 May 1995. What happens if the conference cannot reach any decision on extension during those four weeks? Does the Treaty automatically expire?. This interpretation would make the fate of the NPT hang on a purely administrative question, namely how much time the Conference Services of the UN are able to allot for a meeting during the spring of 1995. To make the future of one of the most important treaties of our time depend on administrative convenience is obviously absurd. The best opinion seems to be that the NPT continues to be in force

provisionally until the parties have reached a decision on its extension. If, by 12 May 1995, the parties have not been able to reach such a decision, they will have to prolong the conference, or suspend its sessions to allow them to consult informally on ways out of the dilemma. One possible solution would be to authorize the president of the conference to write to absent parties and find out whether they would accept a decision that the majority of the *participants* were in favour of, but that had not gained the support of a majority of the *parties*.

But fortunately this impasse is unlikely to confront the conference on 12 May 1995. Unofficial soundings indicate that between 90 and 110 parties - perhaps even 120 - already support a particular decision on extension. I shall return to this point later.

Who will preside?

There has been some discussion whether the president of the extension conference should be of the same rank as the most senior delegates (who are likely to be ministers of foreign affairs), or whether a mere ambassador would suffice. It seems to me that this is a pseudo problem. The presidents of the last three review conferences were all of ambassadorial rank, but this did not discourage foreign ministers from taking part in the conferences. Another consideration in favour of appointing an ambassador is that a foreign minister is unlikely to be able to spare four full weeks for the presidency. Since the appointment of the president is *ad personam* he or she could not delegate his or her responsibilities to another member of his/her delegation, and in any case it would be unfortunate if there were to be a change of horses in mid-stream.

I have been told of three candidates so far, from Hungary, Poland and Sri Lanka. The presidents of the review conferences came in the past from Europe (Sweden) Iraq (Middle East) Africa (Egypt) and Latin America (Peru). I believe there is a strong case for choosing a president from the developing countries and from a region that has not been represented. South and East Asia are the main regions that have not yet provided the presidency . Fortunately there happens to be a very strong candidate from that part of the world.

Who will pay and how much?

The last house-keeping question I shall touch on is who will pay and how much. Obviously all participants should make some contribution. The three depositary governments (the USA, USSR and the UK) met half the costs of each of the review conferences. But one of the depositaries may not be able to meet its share this time and the remaining two depositaries are not prepared to make up the difference. I do not underestimate the importance of money but it does

seem to me that this is a minor problem compared with the major issues at stake. Moreover some twenty states have joined the NPT since the last review conference and they include two nuclear-weapon states, China and France who like the other three enjoy a privileged position in the NPT.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Now for some of the procedural questions. As noted the two principal issues before the conference are the length of the treaty's extension and the review of its implementation. If these issues are not skilfully handled, the review process could complicate the extension decision.

I assume that the product of the review will be one or more "final documents" setting forth the conference's recommendations on substantive matters. These might include a comprehensive test ban treaty, further measures of nuclear disarmament such as post-START reductions, security assurances and commitments to no first use of nuclear weapons, how to stop the production of fissile material for nuclear explosives, and what to do with the fissile material recovered from dismantled nuclear weapons. These are all vitally important issues, and the recommendations that the conference will be invited to make about some of them are likely to be controversial

Should the decisions on such recommendations be taken by consensus or by majority vote? Should there be a single final document or a series of documents which could be voted on separately?

If the consensus rule is adopted, the experience of the review conferences suggests that the spring of 1995 will be unusually warm in New York. Only at the first and third review conferences could the delegates reach a consensus on the final document - and then only in an atmosphere of increasing tension, and during the last hours of the conference: in fact in one case as the sun was rising over Geneva. In the other two cases consensus proved elusive and the delegates went away unreconciled and their tempers frayed. Such an atmosphere would not be conducive to cool and wise judgement on the crucial issue of the length and form of the extension.

This argues strongly for keeping the two paths separate. One possibility would be to have two main committees reporting independently to the plenary, one dealing with extension and the other with the review. The plenary would also treat the two issues separately; if possible by two consensus decisions; if not, by two votes. A second possibility would be to have the extension decision taken in plenary without reference to a committee, and a third would be to have the decision on extension taken during the first week of the conference when several foreign ministers are likely to be present. Many of them would have the authority to negotiate, without reference to capitals,

whatever compromises might be necessary - in other words to strike a political bargain on the spot.

There are several other important procedural issues. George Bunn examines them in his paper and I shall leave it to him to explore them. I should merely like to say that a I agree with his conclusions, particularly that a single fixed term extension of the NPT or a limited number of fixed term extensions would amount to a deferred death sentence for the Treaty. I also agree that the Treaty does not provide for a conditional extension of its duration, for instance a decision that the NPT should be extended for a further fixed term, and after that it should only be prolonged if, in the meantime, a CTBT had been concluded or some other condition had been met. The four choices before the conference are clearly set forth in Article X and any formal setting of conditions would be an amendment of the Treaty. But conditionality could be introduced indirectly as we shall presently see.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

Now for the main substantive issues which I shall try to relate to each of the first six articles of the Treaty.

Article I

Article I of the Treaty forbids the five recognized nuclear-weapon states to transfer nuclear weapons "to any recipient whatsoever", and it also forbids the nuclear-weapon states to help any non-nuclear-weapon state to get the bomb. At previous review conferences there have been claims that the Western nuclear-weapon states had breached this article by helping Israel and South Africa to advance their nuclear weapon programmes. Since South Africa has since acceded to the NPT and dismantled the six nuclear warheads she had made, it seems that this issue will be less controversial than in the past, particularly if a truly democratic government is elected in South Africa next April. But South Africa's own admission of a nuclear weapon programme has raised many issues, including the question of what help she may have received from abroad in building her bombs. Such evidence as there is points to help from certain non-nuclear-weapon states rather than to a breach of Article I

How much heat the Israeli issue will generate may depend on what progress has been made towards a Middle East settlement, and in capping the plutonium production of Israel's Dimona reactor.

Another issue that might provoke a discussion under Article I is that of "managing" nuclear proliferation. For several years some commentators in the US and elsewhere have suggested that the world should recognise that states such as Israel, India and Pakistan are de facto nuclear-weapon states. However, at least the latter two, lack the command,

communications and controls and other facilities that the US and the Soviet Union created to prevent accidental firing or panic launching of their nuclear warheads. Accordingly it has been suggested that the experienced nuclear-weapon states should help India, Pakistan etc. to prevent such disasters. On the face of it this may seem reasonable enough but any such help would surely be a violation of Article I of the Treaty and it would, in a sense reward proliferation by making it safer. In my view the world's efforts should be bent in the opposite direction, namely to persuade all nuclear-weapon states, *de facto* or *de jure*, to roll back their nuclear weapon arsenals.

Article II

Both the Iraqi and North Korean programmes raise questions under Article II rather than Article I of the NPT since they are *prima facie* breaches of Iraq's and North Korea's undertakings as non-nuclear weapon states not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Iraq received substantial help from companies in Germany and elsewhere in continental Western Europe as well as from companies in the UK and USA. but it seems that most of this aid was in breach of the laws of the exporting countries, and that the governments of those countries were unaware of the illegal exports or of the dimensions of the Iraqi weapon programme. In other words, it does not appear that any party to the Treaty has deliberately helped either Iraq or North Korea towards nuclear weapons, and thereby knowingly breached Article I, or helped either country to breach Article II.

One hopes that the North Korean issue will have been satisfactorily resolved by 1995, but in any case the DPRK seems to have developed her programme with very little outside help. I would like to draw attention to the excellent analysis of the North Korean case in Ambassador Okawa's paper.

I have referred to Iraq and North Korea as being in violation of Article II. It is always possible that the conference will hear allegations that other non-nuclear-weapon states are breaching their Article II obligations.

Article III

Safeguards

Article III deals with two sensitive subjects: safeguards and nuclear supplies and Djalli Ahimsa addresses them in his paper. We shall also hear from Professor Scheinman about verification of the non-proliferation undertakings that the non-nuclear-weapon states have given in the NPT and about actions in the event of non-compliance.

Most governments have endorsed and are undertaking all three measures that Dr. Blix recommended as indispensable steps for strengthening safeguards and for enabling the IAEA to detect another Iraqi type programme. The IAEA's Board of Governors has reaffirmed the IAEA's right to carry out a special inspection whenever and wherever it has reason to suspect an illegal nuclear activity. The EC and most other major players have voluntarily taken measures to ensure that the IAEA receives comprehensive information about nuclear programmes and trade. Some leading powers are also sharing intelligence findings with the IAEA. The Iraqi experience showed that such sharing is essential to help the IAEA to send its inspectors in the right direction but intelligence is a sensitive issue and may provoke some discussion in 1995.

In relation to Dr. Blix's third point, the Security Council affirmed on 31 January 1992 that its members would regard any proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as a threat to international peace and security, and would take appropriate action on any violation notified to them by the IAEA. This pointed to the Council's reliance on IAEA as the agency responsible for monitoring the NPT. The Council underlined this point by noting that IAEA safeguards play an *integral role* in the implementation of the NPT

One would have thought that the Security Council's communique would have closed the door on suggestions made by some American critics of the IAEA that the safeguards functions of the IAEA or at least that the kind of inspections tht the IAEA carried out in Iraq should be transferred to a body to be set up under the aegis of the Security Council. The reasons the critics usually give for such a transfer are that, because of the IAEA's promotional functions, IAEA inspectors are too timid in their approach to their job or too cosy with nuclear operators. Unfortunately it is easy to get such ill-informed and sensational allegations into print and very difficult to persuade the media to print rebuttals or corrections.

The critics' proposals ignore the fact that the Security Council is not a technically specialized body but a committee of senior diplomats, designed to deal with threats to international security whenever they may arise and in whatever form they may take, that the Council it is unlikely to have the time, technical resources or inclination to manage a relatively large specialized operation in which some 500 international officials verify some 20,000 reports each year on nuclear stocks and movements of nuclear material, carry out some 10,000 person-days of inspection and supervise extensive R and D.

Moreover special inspections cannot be separated from routine verification. The routine activities themselves that may point to the need for a special inspection and the IAEA uses the same officials for both types of inspection. As for governmental control of the operation, it should be remembered that no member of the IAEA Board of Governors has

a veto, and that the Board acted swiftly and effectively in the Iraqi and North Korean cases. In fact in the North Korean case, the IAEA Board, unhampered by the fear of a veto, acted more swiftly and decisively than the Security Council. It should also be borne in mind that the international community has just assigned to another independent organization all aspects of the verification of the prohibition of chemical weapons.

In short, it is hard to see the advantages of and need for a second inspection bureaucracy at UN headquarters. It would inevitably duplicate some of the IAEA's activities, but apart from that it would have very little to do except wait for a crisis to turn up.

Of course the Security Council has a vital role to play as the final international arbiter in questions of peace and security and as the only UN body that has true powers of enforcement.

Article IV

Article IV of the Treaty reaffirms the right of all parties to make full use of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy and places an obligation on the richer parties to help the developing countries to do so. The controls applied to nuclear exports have a bearing on both issues.

Nuclear Exports

The Iraqi experience revitalized the nuclear suppliers' group which had been dormant since 1977. The group now meets annually and its membership has grown to 28. The suppliers now insist on full-scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply, and will require export licenses for some 65 dual-use items. The Iraqi government imported many such items for ostensibly civilian purposes but then used them in its nuclear weapon programme..

Many developing countries look upon the work of the suppliers' group with suspicion and some non-parties to the NPT sedulously cultivate this suspicion. But in requiring full-scope safeguards the 28 supplier countries are putting an end to an export regime that worked in favour of countries that did *not* join the NPT, and under which they could build up an clandestine nuclear weapon programme in parallel with that part of their programme which is under safeguards. That is precisely what South Africa did until 1991 and what Israel, India and Pakistan are still doing.

Nonetheless it is crucial for greater effectiveness and a better understanding of the work of the Group that newly emerging suppliers in the developing countries and the CIS should join it. Argentina is now the first in this category to do so.

Assistance to developing countries

With one notable exception the IAEA has become the main conduit for technical aid to developing countries. The exception is the sale of nuclear power plants. However only three or four developing countries party to the Treaty have or plan to have nuclear power programmes, namely Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and South Africa and there is some question whether the last two still fall within the category of developing countries.

For the vast majority of developing countries the direct economic and social benefits of nuclear energy lie elsewhere, namely in the application of nuclear science techniques and nuclear radiation in agriculture, food preservation, medicine, biology and industry. For these they turn to the IAEA's technical cooperation programme

It is therefore unfortunate that this programme is now stagnant. Although the target for voluntary contributions increases by $3.5 million each year, pledges fall increasingly short of targets and payments short of pledges.

The chief cause of this is the demise of the USSR and the acute economic problems facing its successor states. Surely it is time to get the technical cooperation programme expanding again. It seems that special responsibility devolves on the P-5, all of whom are now parties to the Treaty, and on other leading industrialized states. The amounts they would be called upon to pay are almost risible compared with the cost of a single advanced military aircraft. The same is, of course, true of the IAEA's safeguards programme.

Djali Ahimsa's paper provides an in-depth analysis of these issues seen from the point of view of a leading developing country that is planning to embark on an impressive nuclear power programme

Article V

Article V deals with the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions. This is a discredited technology that has served in the past as a cloak for proliferation, and the 1995 conference should put it to rest.

Article VI

As we all know Article VI is one of the most crucial articles of the Treaty and the article that is likely to be the main focus of interest in 1995. Ambassador Adeniji, Jozef Goldblat and Tariq Rauf have given us three perceptive and comprehesive analyses of the issues raised by Article VI, and I shall only pick out some of the highlights.

In my view the most convincing mean for the
NW countries would be not so much a continuation of the
current moratorium or the formal beginning of negotiations on the CTBT
in a multilateral CTBT context. My point ~~[illegible]~~ is then the NW undertake

In 1995 the principal issue is again likely to be urgent need for the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, a CTBT. This is a goal that all except two of the parties to the NPT have striven for but failed to achieve at the four NPT review conferences, in fact since 1963 when the partial test ban treaty came into force. But the prospects for a CTBT now seem to be better than at any time since 1963. Under a law passed last year, the US Administration may permit no more than 15 tests during the next three years. These tests must be exclusively for the purpose of enhancing the safety or testing the reliability of existing weapons. In 1996 the US must stop all testing provided that the other nuclear-weapon states do likewise. Congress also directed the US government to prepare a plan for negotiations on a CTBT at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

proposal for a ~~[illegible]~~ treaty a year before the end of the 1995 review conf.

It is no secret that there has been pressure on the US Administration to resume testing as soon as the present moratorium expires and to conclude a CTBT that would permit testing below a one kiloton yield- 1000 tons of high explosives. The latest reports are that President Clinton will follow a "no first test" policy, in other words extend the moratorium indefinitely, unless another country tests, and will negotiate a treaty banning all tests including those below one kiloton. If this is correct it is very good news for the 1995 conference. It seems plain that Russia will follow the same policy, and so will Britain and France, albeit somewhat reluctantly. The unknown factor is what China will decide. I would like to draw attention to an article by George Bunn and Roland Timerbaev in the May issue of *Arms Control Today* that makes a convincing argument for a seamless zero-option CTBT.

Nearly all of us hope that these developments portend a permanent end to nuclear testing. However a move to make the extension of the NPT explicitly and absolutely contingent upon the conclusion of CTBT would be doubly self-defeating. Firstly, if the NPT were allowed to expire the world would be a much more dangerous place than the it is today. Secondly, the prospects for ever reaching agreement on a CTBT would go down with the NPT. One cannot imagine that the nuclear-weapon states, whether they are *de jure* or *de facto*, would permanently renounce their right to test in a much more perilous world in which every nation outside the nuclear-weapon-free zones and possibly the former Axis powers, now had an unfettered legal right to make nuclear weapons (and some forty or more had the technical ability to do so). In short if we make the prolongation of the NPT contingent upon the conclusion of a CTBT we run a grave risk of losing both.

- I am also convinced that the fate of the CTBT will be the most important and tricky question in view of the preservation of the NPT regime and that at the same time this linkage cannot become too explicit, because then there would be the risk of losing both.

CIS : Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus

A second major issue for the 1995 conference may be raised by the present government of Ukraine. This matter is addressed by Roland Timerbaev in his paper. If before 1995 the Ukrainian government has carried out the commitments it made last year in Lisbon, and has therefore joined the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state, Ukraine's welcome in 1995 will be assured, and she will doubtless be amongst those nations pressing for further radical measures of nuclear disarmament going well beyond the two START treaties. If Ukraine has not acceded to the NPT, all the measures of strategic nuclear disarmament promised in START I and START II may be in jeopardy. My understanding is that the Russian parliament has decreed that Russia will not begin implementing START I until the instruments of ratification of the Lisbon Protocols have been exchanged by Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus as well as by the US, and Russia, and until the three non-Russian republics have acceded to the NPT. And without START I there can be no START II. The recent report that the parliament in Kiev has proclaimed Ukrainian ownership of the missiles, is not encouraging.

Failure to implement the two START treaties would be a significant setback, making it difficult for the nuclear-weapon states to maintain convincingly that they are carrying out their obligations under Article VI of the NPT.

Positive and Negative Security Assurances

As you know "positive" security assurances are undertakings given by other states, and in particular by the nuclear-weapon states, to come to the aid of a non-nuclear-weapon state that is under nuclear threat or attack. Such "positive" assurances are contained in Security Council Resolution 255 of 19 June 1968. But action under that resolution to help a threatened state could be vetoed by any of the five permanent members of the Security Council (the P-5) even if the user of the veto were itself the author of the threat. "Negative" security assurances are undertakings by the nuclear-weapon states to refrain from nuclear attack or nuclear threat against a non-nuclear-weapon state. In the past Nigeria has taken a special interest in promoting negative assurances while Egypt has taken the lead in pressing for more substantial positive assurances. Ambassador Adeniji and Ambassador Shaker may want to tell us more about these initiatives.

During the Cold War the Western nuclear-weapon states gave rather convoluted and limited negative security assurances. Presumably these limitations reflected the unwillingness of the Western nuclear-weapon states to forego the first use of nuclear weapons if they were attacked by overwhelming Warsaw Pact conventional forces. This issue no longer arises and its disappearance should open the way to undertakings by all the P-5 not to brandish the nuclear

threat against any state that renounces nuclear weapons in word and deed. A recent article by George Bunn in a publication of the Lawyers' Alliance for World Security addresses the need for stronger security assurances of both kinds. The Bunn article also contains the drafts of a Security Council resolution and of a declaration by the P-5 going considerably beyond the Western powers' previous negative assurances.

Plutonium and highly enriched uranium: a "cut-off", a surplus of plutonium and an international management system

Three mutually related issues concerning plutonium and highly enriched uranium - the two chief fission bomb materials - - have come to the fore since the last NPT review conference. Since both leading powers, the US and Russia, are dismantling their tactical nuclear weapons and have undertaken to reduce their strategic arsenals by two-thirds, it is difficult to see why either could need to produce new fissile material for its nuclear weapon programme. In fact, as highly enriched uranium and military plutonium are recovered from dismantled warheads, decisions have to be taken about the storage of these materials, their future use or disposal, and ways of ensuring that they do not find their way back into nuclear warheads. There is also a growing surplus of civilian plutonium - plutonium produced chiefly in France and Britain by the reprocessing of spent fuel from nuclear power reactors, especially by power plants in Germany and Japan.

Thus the prospects for agreement stopping the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons - a "cut-off" - seem better today than at any time in the past. The question also arises whether recovered military plutonium as well as the growing stocks of civilian plutonium should be placed under international safeguards and control. This has revived interest in a project that the IAEA studied in the early 1980s for creating an international plutonium management system.

THE EXTENSION OF THE TREATY

Now let us look at the fundamental aim of the conference, to decide how long the Treaty will be extended. As noted, Article X gives the conference four choices: to extend the Treaty indefinitely, to extend it for a single fixed period, to extend it for a defined number of fixed periods, or to extend it for an indefinite number of fixed periods.

Let me repeat, to extend the Treaty for a single fixed period or for a specified number of fixed periods would mean that the Treaty will expire at the end of that fixed period or at the end of those fixed periods; otherwise the distinctions drawn by Article X have no meaning. Extension

for a a single fixed period even of one hundred years means that the treaty will expire at the end of that term.

Another conclusion we can draw from the language of Article X is that to extend the NPT for, say, five fixed terms of ten years each would be exactly the same as extending it for fifty years, *unless* the 1995 conference made some provision for terminating the Treaty at the end of any of those fixed periods. So too, an indefinite extension of the Treaty, and an extension for an indefinite number of fixed periods, would amount the exactly same thing - unless we build in a mechanism for terminating the Treaty at the end of any one of those fixed periods.

Of the four choices the first - indefinite extension - is at present the favourite. It has been backed by the UN Secretary General, the G-7, the EC, NATO, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; in short, by nearly all the industrialized world as well as by many developing states. Unofficial polls indicate that between 90 and 110 parties, perhaps as many as 120, favour it. There is logic in this: the danger of a further spreading of nuclear weapons will be with us as long as man knows how to make the bomb; should not our main defence against this danger also be maintained indefinitely?.

But the NPT is not only intended to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to additional nations. Its fundamental aim is to lessen and eventually eliminate the danger of nuclear war. For this purpose the final object, as is indicated in the last phrase of Article VI, must be the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

Some states are therefore reluctant to accept an unqualifiedly permanent treaty unless it permits the parties to operate an effective check on the conduct of the nuclear-weapon states, a check that could be more effective than a five-yearly review of the treaty's implementation. In other words, some non-nuclear-weapon states may be reluctant to agree to a permanent renunciation of nuclear weapons if the nuclear-weapon states have a free hand to maintain and, if they so wish, expand and "improve" their own nuclear arsenals (there would also be no need for an NPT if the goal of Article VUI, namely general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, were ever reached).

A vote by a simple majority of the parties would fulfil the legal requirement for a valid decision on extension. But it is most desirable that this decision should be taken by consensus and that a formal vote should be avoided (unless the vote were unanimous). A decision that disclosed a deep split amongst the parties would be a bad augury for the future of the Treaty.

An explicitly conditional extension is not legally feasible. It may thus be necessary to seek a means to ensure that the Treaty would automatically remain in force if its main provisions - including Article VI and the Preamble - were being observed, but that would allow a majority of the

parties to terminate the Treaty if its main provisions were
not being observed, or if agreement were secured on more
far-reaching nuclear disarmament. This would imply a degree
of conditionality or linkage; if parties fail to fulfil the
principal obligations they have accepted they might
threaten the viability of the Treaty. The message could be
made even clearer in the recommendations that the 1995
conference might include in its final document(s).

To meet these concerns George Bunn, Charles van Doren
and I have suggested that if the 1995 conference cannot
reach a consensus on an NPT of unlimited duration, the
conference might decide to extend the treaty for an
unlimited number of fixed periods, and that the conference
should also prescribe in this decision a means that would
permit a majority of the parties to terminate the treaty at
the end of any of those fixed periods. In his paper George
Bunn refers to a number of ways in which this could be done,
for instance at a subsequent review conference or at a
special conference convened by the depositaries if one third
of more of the parties so request (this is part of the
procedure foreseen in Article VIII of the treaty if an
amendment is proposed). The matter is also examined by John
Simpson. In regard to the various mechanisms suggested in
George Bunn's paper I have some doubts whether a review
conference would be the appropriate forum for a decision
whether or not toe terminate the Treaty and I am inclined to
think that such an important issue would warrant a special
conference.

Is termination the only way in which the parties could
adapt the Treaty to radically changed circumstances?. Would
it not be simpler to amend the Treaty? A careful study of
Article VIII of the Treaty shows, however, that in practice
it would be extremely difficult to amend the treaty. I have
explained the reasons in Chapter 11 of a recent book,
Towards 1995. But there are numerous opportunities for the
parties to improve or adapt the way in which the treaty is
implemented. Some of these are also sketched out in George
Bunn's paper.

Let me conclude by indicating what steps are most
needed to ensure the success of the 1995 conference. I would
put two at the head of the list: a firm commitment by the
P-5 to put an end to all nuclear testing at an early date -
say 1996, - and a speedy resolution of the problem of
nuclear missiles in Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and the
consequent rapid implementation of the two START treaties.

But I am sure that most of us would like to go further.
In January this year the international community decided on
a total ban on chemical weapons. The leading powers had
presumably understood that, with the end of the Cold War,
chemical weapons had become irrelevant to relations between
them - but chemical weapons could still serve as a powerful
force multiplier in the hands of a ruthless dictator
(incidentally, let us not forget that during the lifetime of
many of us the most ruthless dictators sprang up on the soil

of this continent). Hence the leading powers had reached the conclusion that their own security would be better served by a total prohibition of chemical weapons. Hopefully they will come to the same conclusion about nuclear weapons - that their own security as well as that of all other nations would be better served by a total ban on nuclear weapons. This will not happen in my lifetime but at the very least, in the decision on the extension of the Treaty, the Permanent Five, all of whom are now parties to the NPT, as well as all other parties, should formally reaffirm the commitments they have made in Article VI to create a world that will eventually be free of all weapons of mass destruction. Such a reaffirmation of the Article VI commitment to nuclear disarmament might help to allay the fears of some parties that by accepting any form of indefinite extension of the Treaty they would perpetuate the division of the world into two groups, the privileged five nuclear-weapon states and the rest of humanity. This might also be one appropriate way of marking the fiftieth birthday of the United Nations on the 24th of October 1995.

Let us remember that 1995 is also the fiftieth anniversary of another event that changed the world, the first use of the atomic bomb, and hopefully the last.

PAPER FOR THE HALKI INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR, SEPTEMBER 1993

EUROPE AFTER MAASTRICHT

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OFF THE RECORD   O

CONTENTS

1   INTRODUCTION

The European Community (EC) has had to adjust to several
major international developments since the late 1980s:
intensified competition from Japan, the US and the Newly
Industrialised Economies (NIEs); the growing importance of
regional trading blocs; the success of the Single Market;
the collapse of the Communist system in Europe; the need to
integrate a unified Germany within the EC, and growing
transnational problems such as immigration.   The debate
over the structuring of the proposed European Union centres
on how far and how fast existing member states should
integrate policies at the European level (deepening), and
how many states should be admitted to membership
(widening).

The goal of an "ever closer union", as initially envisaged
by the Treaty of Rome, has been attempted before.   In 1972,
EC leaders agreed that economic and political union would
be completed by 1980.   Instead, the first oil shock in 1973
and the subsequent recession resulted in "Eurosclerosis".
The resolution of EC budgetary problems in 1984 and the
signing of the Single European Act in 1986 re-injected
dynamism into the moribund integration process, and
integration has since developed its own momentum.   In
particular, the Single Market programme, eliminating
internal trade barriers and enhancing competition, has in
turn accelerated the pressure for a single currency and
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

It should not be forgotten that the principal initial
motive for the Community was political: to make another war
between France and Germany unthinkable.   But as Jean Monnet
said, Europe would be built via money or not at all;   thus
EMU is important not only for its own advantages but as an
instrument for promoting European Political Union (EPU).

A key building brick of EMU has been the Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS),
which acted as a "locked" exchange rate regime supported by
interest rate differentials.   The ERM enjoyed stable
exchange rates on the basis of converging and lower
inflation rates between the mid-1980s and mid 1993, however
one can expect a return to narrower bands as stage two of
the EMU approaches.

The framework of EPU is less developed.   As an economic
super-power, the EC needs a more coherent foreign policy to
match growing responsibilities in a multi-polar world.   The
collapse of the Communist system in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union, German unification, common foreign and
defence policy problems in the Gulf and Yugoslavia, and the
need to remedy the "democratic deficit", all require

enhanced policy coherence at the European level and reform of European institutions.

The collapse of Communism in the East and the declining relevance of neutrality have removed major barriers to EC membership. The EC's economic success and critical mass has attracted applications for membership from countries in the East and from European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries.

Although the EC and 6 of 7 EFTA will form the European Economic Area (EEA), which incorporates 60% of the acquis communautaire, differences remain between EEA and EC membership. There is no customs union between EC and EFTA members, and border controls remain. EFTA countries did not join the EC's CAP and they maintain their own farm policies. There is no CFSP. EFTA countries are not members of the EMS although some already shadow the DM. EFTA countries will not participate in the EC decision-making process which creates a major problem. Although EFTA states will be able to participate in the work of EC committees, either as permanent or partial members, EFTA countries will not be able to vote on EC legislation. EFTA countries fear that even if they gain a hearing, they could be presented with *faits accomplis* by the Council of Ministers and the EP. The EEA Council of Ministers will decide by consensus whether to extend new EC legislation throughout the EEA.

The December 1991 Maastricht Treaty (the Treaty) is a small but significant step in the evolution of the Union. This paper first examines the content of EMU and EPU as agreed at the Maastricht Summit and then the implications of EC enlargement for EC policies.

2   ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION - STAGE ONE

The experience of devaluation and re-alignments in the 1970s and 1980s led to the implementation of the "hard currency paradigm" throughout most of the EC in the 1980s, and the D-Mark became the anchor currency to other European Monetary System (EMS) currencies. Commitment to the EMS prov ed to be a powerful weapon in fighting inflation and the initial success of the EMS paved the way for agreement on Economic and Monetary Union, the irrevocable fixing of EMS exchange rates followed by the replacement of national currencies with the ECU. Following the recent de facto collapse of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) many regard the Treaty's timetable for EMU as unrealistic. However, efforts to meet the EMU timetable are underway as we speak. Of the three stages of EMU agreed at Maastricht, Stage 1 differs from the final two stages in that it does not require a revision of the Treaty of Rome. Launched on 1 July 1990, Stage 1 aims to strengthen economic convergence

by having all EC currencies in the ERM narrow fluctuation band of plus/minus per cent and by complete liberalisation of capital flows by the beginning of Stage 2 in January 1994. Stage 1 strengthens the role of the Committee of Central Bank Governors in monetary co-ordination. The Committee, the nucleus of the future ECB, has been intensifying the co-ordination of monetary policy among the member countries through "learning by doing". Its mandate includes consultations in advance of national decisions, in order to harmonise monetary policy targets and instruments. Bi-annual surveillance of economic and fiscal policy by the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) has been practised since mid-1990 in order to promote non-inflationary growth.

STAGE TWO

Stage 2 is intended as a rapid transition period from co-ordination of national monetary policies to a single monetary policy. Conditions for entry into Stage 2 include; implementation of the Single Market programme, abolition of all restrictions on capital movements, and ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by national parliaments.

The Maastricht Treaty states that at the beginning of Stage 2, an independent European Monetary Institute (EMI) will commence operations with a President, a Vice President and its own secretariat. The EMI will succeed the Committee of Central Bank Governors, and itself will go into liquidation upon the establishment of the ECB in Stage 3. The EMI will have no direct operational responsibilities but it will; co-ordinate monetary policies, oversee the functioning of the EMS, start developing the monetary instruments of the future ECB, take over the functions of the European Monetary Co-Operation Fund in managing official ECU reserve holdings and transactions between central banks, and promote the use of the ECU.

Acting by qualified majority, the EMI may formulate recommendations on the overall orientation of monetary policy and exchange rate policy as well as the respective measures introduced in each member state. However, the opinions and recommendations of the EMI will have no binding force since the responsibility for monetary policy during Stage 2 remains with the national authorities. The EMI must have sufficient resources and authority to fulfil its role as the central planning body.

STAGE THREE

The Treaty states that the following sustainable convergence criteria for entering Stage 3 must not change over time and must apply uniformly:

1. States must achieve a high degree of price stability: the rate of inflation should not diverge by more than 1.5 per cent from the average rate of the three best performers.

2. The accumulated national debt should not exceed 60 percent of GDP at market prices, and the planned or actual annual budget deficit should not exceed 3 per cent of GDP at market prices.

3. States should have been members of the ERM within the narrow 2.25 per cent band for two years and no devaluation should have been initiated within that period.

4. In the year before entry, a member state must have an average nominal interest rate on long-term Government bonds or comparable securities that does not exceed that of the three best performing member states by more than two per cent.

Based on current inflation rates, very few countries meet the criteria.

The criteria for entering Stage 3 will not be implemented mechanically. There will be room for judgement because the absolute level of a country's economic indicators at any given time is less important than the direction and speed with which the indicators are moving. Thus, for example, if the budgetary ratios for entry into Stage 3 are exceeded, members states may qualify for EMU if their ratios are declining substantially and continuously, or if the excesses over reference values are exceptional and temporary.

However, fiscal rules are necessary in order to avoid: an overburdening of the stability-oriented single monetary policy by unsound fiscal policy in one large country or several member states; expectations of being bailed out by partner countries (moral hazard), and the inability of financial markets to ensure sufficient discipline. The role of the ECB and national central banks as fiscal agents of national governments and EC authorities is therefore to be limited.

The Treaty states that if a member state does not fulfil the criteria, the Council, acting by qualified majority, and on a recommendation from the Commission, may decide whether an excessive deficit exists. In cases where a member state persists in failing to comply with the Council's recommendations, the Council may decide to:

1. Require the member state to provide additional information prior to issuing government debt securities.

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2. Invite the EIB to reconsider its lending policy towards the member state.

3. Require the member state to make a non-interest bearing deposit of an appropriate size with the ECB until the excessive deficit has been corrected.

4. Impose fines of an appropriate size.

The Treaty states that transition to Stage 3 requires reports by the Commission and the EMI to be submitted to the Council of Ministers after consultation of the EP. On the basis of these reports, the Council of Ministers will decide whether to move to Stage 3 and which member states are able to participate. The Council, acting by unanimity, will adopt the conversion rates at which their currencies will be irrevocably fixed and at which the new single currency will substitute for those currencies. The ECB will be established to take sole responsibility for the supply of the single currency.

The Treaty states that a majority of the 12 member states must meet the convergence criteria in 1996 if currency union is to proceed. The protocol on the "irreversibility of movement towards EMU" provides that no member should act so as to prevent the others progressing toward EMU by opting out. No such "critical mass" is required at a later stage; in mid-1998 EC leaders will simply decide which states are ready for EMU. Stage 3 will begin in any case on 1 January 1999. There will thus be less pressure on the 1998 summit to relax the entry criteria, as no minimum number of eligible states has been set.

THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

The Treaty stipulates that price stability is to be the main task of the two-tier European System of Central Banks (ESCB), comprising independent national central banks and an independent ECB. Closely modelled on the German Bundesbank, the ECB will have a federal structure with a Governing Council comprising six members of an Executive Board and the Governors of the national central banks. The Governing Council will: formulate and implement European monetary policy, conduct exchange rate operations and manage member states' official reserves, ensure the proper functioning of the payment systems and prudential supervision of financial institutions, and ensure the stability of the financial system as lender of last resort. Decision-making will be based on the majority vote of the ECB's Board.

National legislation will have to be adapted so that national central banks become independent as in Germany and the Netherlands. Italy and Portugal have recently taken steps to grant their central banks greater autonomy. After the introduction of the single currency, the structure and functions of national central banks will change dramatically. In macro-economic policy, national central banks will be little more than branches of the ECB carrying out monetary operations in accordance with the guidelines and instructions of the ECB Governing Council. National central banks, however, retain important roles in banking and stock exchange supervision, and inter-bank transactions.

There are four major pillars of the ESCB's independence:

1. Institutional independence: the ECB and the national central banks will not take instructions from EC institutions or any government or government department.

2. Operational independence: the system will have full access to the necessary instruments of monetary policy, including intervention in foreign exchange markets.

3. Personal Independence: the members of the decision-making bodies will be appointed for long terms of office: eight years for board members and at least five years for presidents of national central banks.

4. The ECB's democratic accountability will be ensured *inter alia* by the submission of an annual report to the EP, the European Council, and the ECOFIN Council. The ECB's board members will attend meetings of these institutions, just as the Fed Chairman appears before the US Congress.

Open market policy and credit operations will be the cornerstones of the single monetary policy. The ECB or the national central banks will operate in various financial markets: buying and selling either outright, spot and forward or under repurchase agreement, claims and marketable government instruments like T-bills, notes and bonds. However, little marketable paper is issued by European central banks and European monetary policy will have to rely on the use of more liquid German funds and British Gilts. To facilitate direct inter-bank lending, a unified EMU-wide inter-bank market with unified rules is required.

Acting by unanimity on a recommendation from the ECB or from the Commission, the Council may conclude formal agreements on an exchange rate system for the ECU vis-a-vis other currencies. A common currency will make it easier for states to cope with the negative effects of dollar and

Yen fluctuations at the ECU will have greater weight in the global monetary system.

THE USE OF THE ECU

The bulk of savings from EMU will only be achieved once all national currencies are replaced by ECU. The "basket" ECU, designated as the European common currency, was introduced in 1979. Despite efforts to stimulate its use as a transaction medium, it is still used widely only in financial markets to take advantage of interest rate opportunities or currency hedging. Although a well-developed and rapidly growing private ECU market exists without any direct supervision, the ECU accounted for less than one per cent of all EC retail transactions in 1990. Outside the financial markets, the most notable use of the ECU has been for pricing and settlement of transactions between national subsidiaries of multinational groups.

Increasing the use of the ECU is a "chicken and egg" matter since individuals and organisations will only start to use it in their everyday business when there is a virtual certainty that it will become the single currency and secure payment systems exist to transmit ECU at a reasonable cost. Confidence in the use of the ECU is based on the conviction that there will be a smooth transition from the present basket ECU to a single currency ECU. As Stage 3 approaches, the use of the ECU should increase substantially, and authorities will have to dismantle restrictions on the use of the ECU.

The UK's "hard ECU" proposal has been revived following the collapse of the ERM. Two alternatives are being considered for the transformation of the current basket ECU into the single currency ECU:

1.   "Hardening" or "non-devaluation" means that the ECU basket would always be kept equal in value to the hardest EMS currency. Long-term ECU interest rates would then be strongly correlated to DM rates. Short-term rates, dictated to a large extent by central banks, would continue to be geared to the weighted average. The markets fear disruptions in the event of realignments, for example, changes in the currency amounts in the basket, since suitable hedging instruments and arbitrage opportunities are lacking.

2.   "Freezing" refers to fixing the currency amounts in the ECU basket. Periodic revisions of the basket would no longer be possible, and the inclusion of additional currencies in the ECU would be precluded. The currencies of new members would simply be pegged to the ECU. This second option is preferred in financial markets, since it avoids the risks of the "hardening" option. Freezing would be easier the more inflation and interest rates converge. For political

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reasons, freezing appears more likely to be chosen although Germany and the UK still favour hardening.

The introduction of a single currency will be more complex for each member state than previous currency changes in Europe, such as the reform of the French Franc eliminating two superfluous digits and decimalisation in the UK. The introduction of the ECU will require each national currency to be converted from its old primary unit by applying a decimal fraction, probably to four places. The transition at the retail level will be much more difficult since no national coin or note will correspond exactly with the new issues. "Old" national notes and coins will need to be withdrawn and replaced by standardised ECU-denominated notes.

It is vital that planning should commence at an early stage because an overnight change is quite impractical. Even the much simpler UK decimalisation took about five years from inception to the final deadline. The most likely scenario is a period of parallel running of both "old" national currencies and the new ECU. Introducing the ECU will also necessitate modification and, in many cases, replacement of all coin and note-operated vending machines as well as automatic banking machines. To reduce costs, details of the currency and the mechanics and timing of change-over must be settled early in Stage 2 so that machines can be adapted, designed and installed on a large scale by the time the ECU becomes the single currency.

The realisation of the full gains from EMU will require a reliable infrastructure to enable payments to be made securely across borders at no greater cost than is currently incurred domestically. The EMI will assume an active role in promoting the clearing arrangements of rapidly growing private ECU markets, currently operated by the ECU Banking Association and the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). However, this clearing system does not meet the generally accepted minimum criteria for a payment system, because there is no guarantee of settlement by members. The recent initiatives by central banks in England and France to provide guarantees for an ECU clearing system may contribute to setting up an urgently needed EC-wide system.

Businesses will have to modify accounting systems and records as they will be required to keep accounting records in ECU and note in national currencies. The preferred method of translation would be a changeover on a set day with national accounting rules setting the rate at which past data are translated into ECU established well in advance.

EMU will not present any major hurdle to EC entry for most EFTA candidates. Based on current performance, Austria and Switzerland would have no difficulty in meeting the EMU

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entry criteria, and Swedish fiscal problems may be overcome within the next few years. Above all Finland will need a strict adjustment programme, particularly in fiscal policy, which may reduce the potential for economic growth and impede the return to full employment.

Proponents of an early start to EMU should press for the early accession of the new members because this would improve the chances of having the required majority to move to stage 3.

Although formally the new members would have to be inside the EC and inside the EMS in early 1995 at the latest, the unilateral fixing of exchange rates vis à vis either the D-Mark or the ECU in a comparatively narrow band could be recognised as sufficient.

Because the EFTA states meet some of the convergence criteria for EMU better than some existing EC members, the main problem of admitting new members to the EC is whether it would lead to pressure for the watering down of the criteria. Existing member states, such as Italy, might not pass the EMU entry test, and would resist being treated as second class members. EMU cannot be sold as a privileged club for the rich countries of northern Europe. Although the ERM and the prospect of EMU has provided valuable pressure for Mediterranean countries to cut their budget deficits and restructure their economies, if they are denied EMU membership, they could lobby to relax EMU entry criteria or even threaten to block enlargement. However, the German Government and the Bundesbank have promised the public that the ECU will be at least as stable as the D-Mark. To safeguard this promise, the Bundestag built in a potential veto before Germany enters Stage Three as a condition for the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, should other member states not fulfil the convergence requirements and timetable.

3   POLITICAL UNION

The EC is an economic giant but a political dwarf. The Treaty partially remedies the imbalance although the framework for EMU remains considerably more developed than that for EPU. However, progress on EMU will generate the need for more progress on EPU. For example, the gains of big business from the Single Market and EMU will need to be balanced by the proper implementation of the Social Charter.

SUBSIDIARITY

Many opponents of EPU confuse federalism, a de-centralised system of government, with excessive centralisation. The question is: which issues should be decided at the central European level, and which issues should be left for individual states and even lower tiers of government to decide?

Part of the solution is to adopt a general principle such as the Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution which states: "The powers not delegated to the United States (federal government) by the constitution nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or the people". A federal union can only succeed in its purpose of simultaneously achieving the benefits of central decision where necessary with those of de-centralised decision where possible with the application of a test of "subsidiarity" of where are to be allocated for the greatest benefit. Subsidiarity implies that each decision should be taken at the lowest feasible level of government.

Thus trans-national problems should be regulated at a European, if not higher level, while individual European countries or regions should be left to regulate purely "local" matters such as limiting working hours.

A formulation of subsidarity can be found in the Maastricht Treaty:

Article 3b envisages subsidiarity as the EC taking action "only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaty".

This definition follows that in the EP's Draft Union Treaty of 1984: "The Union shall act only to fulfil the tasks conferred on it by the Treaties and to achieve the objectives defined therein. Where powers have not been exclusively or completely assigned to the Union, it shall, in carrying out its tasks, take action wherever the achievement of these objectives requires it because, by virtue of their magnitude or effects, they transcend the frontiers of the member states or because they can be undertaken more effectively by the Union than by the member states acting separately". Thus, the EC would have detailed powers in *certain* areas as it has now, for example, in trade policy.

REFORM OF DECISION-MAKING

There were two possible options to fill the post-war West European power vacuum: to move immediately to establishing a European federal government or move towards the federal goal step by step. The first option was advocated by Altiero Spinelli with some support from the Italian government. The second option, advocated by Jean Monnet and eventually adopted by national governments, envisaged a federal Europe as the end of a gradual process of inter-governmental negotiations.

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Monnet's strategy was selected because it actively involved national forces without requiring radical constitutional reform and a sudden creation of all-powerful supranational institutions. The defect in Monnet's strategy was that the powers necessary for a federal government could not be transferred gradually from nation-states to Community institutions. Hence the "democratic deficit" emerged as European institutions were developed which were not subject to adequate democratic supervision by either national parliaments or the EP.

The EC Commission makes proposals both on its own iniative and on request from the Council of Heads of Government or Ministers. The Council represents national executives and is itself an inter-governmental executive. Thus, the process of legislation in the EC is similar to a diplomatic negotiation whose proceedings are not published. Before the Single European Act, almost all Council decisions had to be taken by unanimity.

In most matters, the Council cannot act except on a proposal by the Commission. The Commission: exercises broad administrative and treaty-implementing powers; ensures that member states fulfil treaty obligations and implement Council directives; draws up and proposes the EC budget, and negotiates international trade agreements. The Commissioners are nominated by members states, and therefore the Commission is not directly responsible to any elected body.

Before Maastricht, the UK government was against extending the powers of the EP, out of concern for the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament, which traditionally has had unlimited authority to make any law or amend any law already made. The UK Parliament agreed to transfer powers to EC institutions by acceding to the Treaty of Rome and the 1986 Single European Act, but a vocal minority of Westminster MPs are reluctant to carry out such "pooling" of sovereignty to the greater extent required for EPU. The UK also objected to the growing power of the Commission; but critics of the UK position note that EC institutions should not be blamed for member states' unwillingness to reform EC institutional defects.

Chancellor Kohl's support for the EP's right to "co-legislation" backed by seven countries, would have extended the EP's power of amendment, now used for single market legislation, into all areas of policy decided by qualified majority vote in the Council of Ministers. A Dutch proposal for a "Negative Assent Procedure", which gives the EP an equal say with the Council, was agreed at Maastricht. Whereas previously the EP needed the Commission's backing to get its amendments through the Council, under the Treaty it will have the right to negotiate changes directly with the Council, and to reject bills that do not include them. If the EP's amendments are not accepted by the Council it

will be able to veto legislation. This procedure, in Article 189b, applies to laws on the internal market, consumer protection, the free circulation of labour, the right of individuals and companies to establish themselves in other member states, the treatment of foreigners, vocational training, public health and trans-European infrastructure, as well as to framework programmes on the environment and research and co-operation in education and culture.

Under the Treaty, the EP also gains new powers to agree: structural funds for poorer regions, rights of European citizenship, harmonisation of EC election systems and the right to be consulted on basic foreign policy choices. It will be allowed to set up committees of enquiry to investigate maladministration or contravention of EC law, and it will have more powers to scrutinise finances. The Commission president will be appointed by governments after consulting the EP. On appointment, the entire Commission, whose membership will be reduced from 17 to 12, will be subject to a vote of confidence by the EP. The EP is expected to ask for more powers as a *quid pro quo* for agreeing to admit the representatives of new member states.

The EC can function reasonably well with its present political structures for at most 15 members. However, enlargement makes simplification and improvement of EC decision-making essential. It poses a number of issues for the functioning of EC institutions:

Council: Unanimity for 12 in the Council is difficult and an enlarged Ec would only exacerbate the problem. At present, a qualified majority can be resisted by two large member states and one medium-sized one constituting a "blocking minority". With the addition of five small-to-medium-sized EFTA states, the relative strength of smaller member states increases. The larger member states will undoubtedly seek to preserve their relative position in decision-making.

New accessions are usually accompanied by an increase in the number of votes needed for a qualified majority. However, the Commission's Enlargement Task Force proposed an extension of majority voting in the Council with the threshold remaining at 54 votes. For the coming wave of enlargement, new member states will expect to be allocated votes on the same basis as existing member states. In the second wave of enlargement, a further reform of Council decision-making will be required.

Parliament: Larger member states, notably Germany which demanded and gained 18 extra seats to take account of reuninification, will seek to strengthen the proportional element in Parliament's composition. It is uncertain whether smaller member states will be able to retain six seats each. New member states will expect to be allocated

seats on the same basis as for present member states based on the size of each member state, but weighted to give relatively more seats to smaller countries. If four EFTA states join the EC, the Parliament will have to increase from 518 to 677 seats. The maximum number of members that can be housed in the new Parliament building in Brussels is 800 so ultimately the number of seats allocated to countries will have to be redistributed.

For other institutions, the main issue is whether all member states should be allowed to maintain their current representation:

Commission: Should each member state have at least one Commissioner or should there be some rotation amongst the smaller member states? Debate on this issue prior to the Danish referendum was generally considered to have contributed to the negative result. There are probably enough proper jobs for 17 Commissioners but, even with extended responsibilities under the Maastricht Treaty, there is unlikely to be enough work for more Commissioners.

The European Court of Justice has one judge per member state, and this level is likely to continue.

Presidency: In an EC of 20, each member state would only hold the six-monthly EC Presidency once every ten years. This is clearly unacceptable for the larger member states such as France, Germany and the UK, while coping with the responsibilities of the Presidency would cause problems for possible new micro-state members such as Malta. The Commission's Enlargement Task Force has proposed a group Presidency of three member states, rotating the President and two Vice-Presidents alphabetically every four months, to replace the current system which rotates the Presidency alphabetically irrespective of the size of states.

Languages: English and French are the day-to-day working languages. The use of English will be reinforced by the accession of EFTA states. The addition of new languages would require a substantial increase in the costs and complexities of maintaining present EC working practices, the number of working languages may have to be restricted.

The Maastricht Treaty extended a limited form of co-decision to the European Parliament: by strengthening the Parliament's supervisory and scrutiny functions, and increasing the accountability of the Commission to Parliament. In spite of these gains, the European Council and Commission remain largely immune to checks by any EC collective body. The legislative process remains extraordinarily complex with seven different procedures stipulated in the Treaty alone. Key policy areas continue to be decided by qualified majority by the Council meeting in secret, with the European Parliament merely being consulted, and thus escaping the ultimate democratic

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control at both the national and European levels. Parliament does not have the final word over the nomination of the Commission President nor can it hire or fire individual Commissioners. For the more inter-governmental aspects, Parliamentary scrutiny is at best a formality.

The European Parliament and other EC institutions view enlargement as a major opportunity to redress the democratic deficit. Nevertheless, the Lisbon Council concluded that the new member states could be accommodated within the EC's existing institutional framework, leaving a fundamental restructuring of EC institutions until the inter-governmental conference (IGC) in 1996. At the 1996 IGC, the European Parliament may try to link institutional issues with the revision of the Treaty itself. That revision would cover institutional reform, common security and defence questions, and further development of EC competences in key policy areas. The institutional changes will have to take account both of the technical adjustments necessary to involve the new member states in the EC decision-making procedure, and the political imperative of enhancing democracy in the EC.

In pre-negotiations, the EFTA states have argued against any weakening of democratic control of EC constitutions, and they would like their eventual accession to coincide with a strengthening of the role of the European Parliament. EFTA applicants appear to agree largely with the Parliament's objectives of:

1.   shaping EC decision-making into one institutional framework;

2.   extending majority voting in the Council to all areas of policy except major constitutional acts, accession of new member states and association agreements;

3.   applying co-decision to all items of legislation where unanimity is not in force;

4.   reviewing the form of co-decision with an obligation on the Council and on the Parliament to reach agreement (where they disagree, an item of legislation would not be enacted);

5.   strengthening the accountability of the Commission by having the Parliament elect the President of the Commission, and having the Commission's term-of-office coincide with that of the Parliament.

Not all Parliament's demands will be met in the IGC but the extension of co-decision and majority voting to a wider range of policy areas is likely.

The Martin Report, adopted by the European Parliament in 1992, called for institutional reform before the 1996 IGC

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and the withdrawal of Parliamentary assent to future enlargement unless the democratic deficit was eliminated.

FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

In most federations, external trade, monetary policy, and foreign and defence policy are controlled by the centre. Of these, a coherent Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has proved the most elusive in the EC. A CFSP was not envisaged by the Treaty of Rome and a weak European defence structure has developed separately under the Western European Union (WEU); the most vital common European security institution has been NATO.

After 1970 EC states had an "informal co-ordinated" rather than a "common" foreign policy through the European Political Co-operation (EPC). Although the intensive exchange of information under EPC procedures provided a basis for a common foreign policy, the formulation and implementation of such a policy remained weak. No diplomatic service or secretariat exists to carry it out, and democratic mechanisms, including adequate monitoring by the EP, have been absent. Article 30.1 of the 1986 Single European Act committed member states to "endeavour jointly to formulate and implement a European foreign policy", and the EPC gained a legal standing and a small six-person secretariat. Although the EPC has had some success in co-ordinating EC member states' strategies in the CSCE and facilitating trade sanctions against South Africa and Argentina, the EPC's decision-making process is hampered by the requirements of unanimity. Overall the will to share sovereignty over foreign policy was absent, and inaction rather than common action was the rule.

A major issue has been how far and in what way common foreign policy should be extended to common security policy or even to common defence. Underlying the answer remains the long-standing issue of how far EC member states should co-ordinate their policies with the US, especially through NATO, or how far they should develop European institutions which could reduce the US role in Europe and US influence on the foreign policy of European states.

European federalists note that the pace of change in Europe has left many established security institutions ill-suited to the new international order. For example, traditionally NATO has no commitment or mandate to intervene out-of-area. In five to ten years, Europe may need to have its own defence arrangements. If the EC does not have a CFSP, then Europe could return to the damaging balance-of-power politics of the inter-war period. Europe will certainly have to devote more resources to protecting its own borders against the new threats of mass immigration, terroism and the illegal import of drugs.

An effective CFSP was made all the more urgent in the late 1980s by: the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the inability to achieve a common response to the invasion of Kuwait, the subsequent Gulf War and the civil war in the former Yugoslavia. There are two predominant views on CFSP. One view, mainly advocated by France and Germany, is that a CFSP is only possible within a political union with some decisions taken by majority vote. Defence co-operation should be intensified under the WEU, as the new defence arm of the union, operating parallel to NATO. The WEU should eventually merge with EC institutions, probably when the WEU Treaty expires in 1998.

By contrast, Atlanticists believe that the US commitment to European defence could be weakened if the US is excluded from future European defence arrangements. For example, the development of a European defence pillar risks undermining NATO. It is also unclear whether European Governments will be prepared to pay for a security entity which is genuinely equipped to undertake major military operations. Therefore, NATO should continue to be regarded as the European "hard security" security organisation.

The UK, the Netherlands and Italy regard the European defence pillar as sub-ordinate to NATO. Motivated mainly by the desire to retain the primacy of NATO and the transatlantic link, the UK opposes both majority voting in a CFSP and the eventual incorporation of the WEU into EC institutions. The Netherlands equally does not wish to dilute the Atlantic dimension of European defence although it believes that the Atlantic link is compatible with a European pillar. Many questions remain open. Could an EC army alone protect EC members against a renewed Russian threat following a right-wing backlash in the former Soviet Union? Should and could the EC have its own nuclear deterrent? Would other EC states accept a French or an Anglo-French nuclear umbrella, and would this be sufficient to defend the union? Uncertainty about the answers to these questions suggests that there is still a role for NATO and a need for US forces to remain in Europe.

Although an effective EC CFSP might not have prevented the Yugoslav civil war, Euro-enthusiasts believe that it could have alleviated the conflict. Turkey and Greece, both NATO members, have expressed sympathy for opposite sides in the conflict, a situation that might have been less likely if both were members of the EC and WEU. Similarly, Germany backed Croatia while France tended to support the Serbs. A common CFSP would have prevented such conflicting alignments and might have committed peace-keeping troops at a much earlier stage when they could have been more effective.

If the Maastricht Treaty had been in operation in time to be applied to the development of a CFSP in face of the events in the former Yugoslavia, there could have been substantial advantages in the speed and effectiveness with which decisions were taken.

The case of former Yugoslavia has also heightened the long-standing debate between reliance on the US and development of EC competences in foreign and security policy. Following the collapse and disintegration of the Soviet Union there was a general assumption that the EC would accept primary responsibility for policy in East-Central, South-Eastern and Eastern Europe; the US was certainly content to leave the EC in the prime role in response to the events in Yugoslavia. The relative ineffectiveness of the EC obliged the US to become involved itself, rather than leaving this problem, lying on their very doorstep, to be handled by the Europeans. Those, especially in the UK, the Netherlands and Germany, who have long supported the encouragement of a continuing US role in Europe are probably content with this outcome.

Another issue in the inter-governmental conference leading to the Maastricht Treaty was whether the common foreign policy should be given supranational authority by being conducted at least in part on the basis of majority voting, or whether it should remain a process of intergovernmental consultation with the right of veto for each member.

The answers to this question as they resulted in the Maastricht Treaty were much nearer to the inter-governmental than to the supranational position. Implicit in the arguments between the supranational and the inter-governmental approach were the tensions between the large member states, who prefer the inter-governmental because it enables them to make informal agreements among themselves and to override the objections of the small states; and the small member states who mostly prefer the supranational method because it provides them with an opportunity to form coalitions and influence decisions taken in formal meetings by majority voting.

Some new procedures were included in the Treaty including merging the EPC Secretariat with the Council Secretariat and stating that the Commission is "fully associated" with the policy. Thus, a small foreign policy unit within the Commission gives a slight supranational component in what remains primarily an inter-governmental procedure. The small member states wanted a role for the Commission, and an extension of qualified majority voting (QMV),

This debate was mostly won by the large states, who insisted on unanimity for all the major decisions and would allow QMV only on matters of detailed implementation of policy.

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The Maastricht Treaty was a major step in the development of a European defence identity. The Treaty states that the WEU, separate from but with close links to both NATO and the EC political union, will elaborate and implement decisions of the Union which have defence implications. The Treaty makes clear that the WEU's activities must be compatible with NATO policies and must not undermine its central position in European defence.

The Treaty's provisions on a CFSP are vague but it does refer to a common policy, a distinct advance on earlier political co-operation. The CFSP remains inter-governmental with policy decided case-by-case on the basis of unanimity for decisions of policy, and majority voting only on implementation. Majority voting in a CFSP may be essential if the EC is to achieve a coherent foreign policy and avoid being blamed for failing to act decisively and soon enough, as in the case of former Yugoslavia. However, some member states are most reluctant to abandon their national veto.

The Treaty created only an empty shell with the "Union", which has no international legal character like the EC, taking responsibility for a CFSP. The Treaty states "the Union and its member states shall define and implement a CFSP .... including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence". The CFSP would involve "systematic co-operation" between member governments "gradually implementing" joint action between them. The "CFSP" will not formally be subject to European institutions or brought within the Treaty of Rome. Member states shall consult each other within the Council on any matter of general interest to ensure that their national policies conform to common positions. There shall be co-ordinated action in international organisations. The Council when adopting joint action shall define which decisions are to be taken by qualified majority".

The Treaty makes clear that while Europe's obligations towards NATO will not be undermined, the political and military role of EC states, although subordinate, will be enhanced. The Treaty states that the WEU "will be developed as the defence component of the Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance". Decisions taken by the WEU "shall not affect the obligations of member states under NATO and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework". However, the Union will be able to request the WEU "to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications". The WEU and Union Council secretariats will co-operate closely and synchronise activities, and the Commission will be closely informed. The Treaty takes into account the UK's wish for the WEU to be autonomous but it is unclear whether the Council would issue only guidelines to the WEU or develop a more binding policy.

The Treaty also states that membership of the WEU is to be expanded to include Greece and will eventually match the Union's membership. To balance Greek admission into the WEU, Turkey ᴡᴀѕ offered participation but not formal membership. Defence arrangements between the WEU and Turkey are to be negotiated.

Nevertheless, most member states accept the principle of majority voting on a CFSP and of an eventual defence role for the EC, thereby constraining the actions of the member states by the rule of law. Majority voting in the Council should be employed in the first instance in those regions where member states' policies are already compatible and where there is a close connection with existing external economic policies. Thus the EC's overall security policy should be concerned with external threats including instability in Central Europe, a right-wing backlash in the former Soviet Union, the Middle East and the Mediterranean, and perhaps even an attack on another EC member state.

The inclusion of security and even defence policy, together with a cryptic reference to a possible "common defence" appeared a major addition to the role of the Community as compared with EPC. However, given the continuance of national veto, it is hard to know what the practical implications of this part of the Treaty might be. Certainly, it opens the door for a substantial development of Community competence, and could become highly significant in the future if the members states so choose. Much will depend on how this part of the Treaty is interpreted and specifically on continuing discussions about the role of the difference European institutions in security and defence.

The conclusion on the CFSP is that the Community remains in a quandary. It faces external pressure to act as a single power; it recognises this and attempts to move in the direction of an effective CFSP; but since the large states in particular, and on some issues also the smaller, are unwilling to abandon their sovereignty when important issues are at stake, they are not prepared to structure the CFSP so that it can be effective. The Maastricht Treaty summarised this quandary, and used language suggesting that there was potential for some movement towards an effective CFSP, but without putting in place any convincing structures for achieving it. The British Foreign Secretary stated that his Government could not accept a CFSP which could be a majority vote determine policies putting at risk the lives of British Troops. Until the governments of member states are willing to accept such voting, it will not be possible to operate a common defence and probably not a coherent and effective CFSP.

THE IMPACT OF ENLARGEMENT ON THE CFSP

The future development of security policy in the Community will also be affected by Enlargement, and many questions remain to be answered also in this respect. Will new EC member states join the WEU? Will they be full members, of will they join only as associates or observers? Will some of the new EC member states even join NATO? How will the problem of traditional neutrality be handled?

Many argue that the justification for European neutrality disappeared with the Cold War. The CFSP cannot work on the basis of a variable geometry, with some states opting in and others opting out. France in particular has argued strongly that EC candidates must renounce neutrality before joining the EC, and that they must adhere to the full requirements of the WEU. The official EC view is that the CFSP is not an insurmountable obstacle for neutral candidates, but the EC will require assurances that they will demonstrate willingness to implement CFSP decisions.

The neutral EFTA applicants, particularly the Swiss, argue that they should not be obliged to abandon neutrality before entry, lest the accession negotiations and ratifications fail. Some neutrals believe that joining the EC's CFSP is tantamount to joining NATO, and they do not want to join an alliance left over from the Cold War when they join the EC. However, recent discussions of neutrality in the EFTA countries have tended towards the position that given the enormous changes in the global security scene since 1989, neutrality can no longer mean what it did during the Cold War and therefore will probably be abandoned quickly so long as there is no direct challenge to define its abandonment.

Irish neutrality, traditionally adopted vis-à-vis the UK, may provide a model for other neutral states. For many years Ireland was not part of the EPC, but eventually took the view that it could best influence the rules of the club, and its decisions, by being a member.

On the common assumption that the EFTA applicants will join the Community at an early date, possibly as soon as January 1995, the question arises whether the structure of the Community will change in such a way as to alter the approach to the CFSP .
The existing Community of 12 has five large and seven small states. A Community of 18 with the addition of six EFTA countries would contain five large and 13 small states. The common understanding in the large states is that they will continue to take the lead and to block any move to QMV even if they have difficulty in co-ordinating policy among themselves. The small states in fact face a dilemma. If they wish to see an effective EC policy they must want the

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large member states to work together; but if they do work together the small states will have little influence. If the small states are to have influence, they must press for QMV, but in political practice the large states are unlikely to allow themselves to be overruled when their national interests are seen to be at stake.

If there were an

EC plus three or four former EFTA states, with a CFSP, strongly influenced by small and traditionally neutral states; tending to off-set French and UK traditions of *decided* active involvement overseas. A CFSP conducted by majority *by* vote of the 15 would probably rally to the defence of *QMV,* fellow member states, but would be unlikely to mobilise a *it would be* collective CFSP response to an attack on an overseas dependency, such as the Falklands, or a former colony, like Chad. Enlargement will also increase pressure for the sharing of facilities and integration of forces, and hence a reduction of defence costs.

The Visegrad countries are eager to accept the *acquis communautaire* and the Maastricht Treaty *in toto*, although they acknowledge that it will be difficult for them to implement the economic *acquis*. Thus, the potential applicants from East-Central Europe have no particular difficulty about the CFSP, since they are at least as ready to submerge their sovereignty in foreign policy, security and defence with the Community as are many existing member states.

Eastern states are keen to join the Western Security framework, including NATO, in order to fill the vacuum left by the defunct Warsaw Pact alliance. Their gradual incorporation into CFSP would aid conflict prevention and resolution in the region. They believe that their relations with the WEU should correspond with the level of economic integration envisaged in the "Europe" Agreements.

The 1996 general constitutional review of the Treaty will examine whether the new inter-governmental co-operation on the CFSP and on immigration and criminal justice can be brought under more common rules.

SOCIAL POLICY

There is a deep-seated divide in the EC between some North Europeans, who believe that allowing low-cost labour competition elsewhere in the EC is "social dumping", and market economists who know that discrepancies in pay and conditions are necessary to offset difference in productivity.

Those opposed to an EC-wide social policy argue that it is too early to conduct one because social benefits and wage rates are by no means uniform within the EC. Low wage countries such as the UK, who no legislation on minimum

pay, maximum hours or minimum holidays, fear losing competitiveness if their labour costs are harmonised. One estimate indicates that the working time directive alone would cost UK employers £5 billion a year. Furthermore, all member states must be careful not to over-price their labour in the face of competition from the NIEs, who have even lower wage and social costs.

Advocates of the Social Charter argue that the introduction of aspects of Germany's system of industrial relations throughout the EC would reduce the incidence of strikes and enhance productivity. Harmonisation is intended to prevent member states competing unfairly by reducing social costs. Opponents of the Social Charter put too much emphasis on labour costs and not enough on the qualitative benefits of investment, management and training. Indeed, evidence from the most successful industrial and emerging developing economies suggests that investment in plant and machinery, and in education and training, is the key to enhanced productivity.

Given the disagreement on this issue between the UK and the rest, the 11 Continental member states at Maastricht formed a Social Community outside the Treaty, through a protocol similar to the British opt-out on EMU. Although the 11 will have full access to EC institutions, including the European Court, they will not be making EC law. They will make agreements by majority voting which will then be transformed into national laws, undertaking to "support and complement" government activities in: improvement of the working environment to protect workers' health and safety; working conditions; information for and consultation with workers; equality between me n and women with regard to labour market opportunities and treatment at work, and training the unemployed. Unanimity will still be required for: social security and social protection; protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated, and representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and employers.

Although the UK government will be exempt from any legal challenge from its citizens who believe they are denied benefits available to other EC nationals, the UK government could be challenged by other member states on the grounds of infringing Single Market competition rules through "social dumping".

Most EFTA countries favour an interventionist social policy in line with the Maastricht Treaty's Social Chapter. However, industries in Turkey and Central and East European candidates are unlikely to be able to afford the costs of minimum workers' rights. They fear that the Treaty's Social Chapter may erode the competitiveness of their low-cost labour base.

JUDICIAL AND HOME AFFAIRS

Judicial and home affairs do not come under formal Union structures. However, the Treaty states that members shall regard the following areas as matters of common interest: asylum policy, immigration policy, policy concerning the movement and resident of third country nationals, combatting drug addiction and international fraud; judicial co-operation in civil and criminal matters, and police co-operation to prevent terroism and drug trafficking.

Confronted by internal political divisions and a deluge of economic migrants from the East, Germany has become a major proponent of EC responsibility for immigration policy. All EC governments, save the UK, and the EP hope that immigration will become the subject of a pan-European policy after the 1996 constitutional review. However, the UK effectively restricted common action on immigration policy to continued inter-governmental consultation; but the Maastricht Summit did agree that a common visa policy may be decided by the Council acting by unanimity until January 1996 and by qualified majority thereafter. In the event of an emergency in a third country, the Council may introduce visa requirements for up to six months.

Accession to the EC grants freedom of movement for all EC nationals. Free movement, including the right to work, of EFTA and EC nationals was also agreed as part of the EEA, but the EEA will not result in the mass immigration of workers into the EC because the EFTA states have small and affluent populations. On the other hand, some member states fear that the accession of Central and East European states and Turkey would lead to an influx of economic migrants.

The Treaty also introduced the concept of European citizenship, to exist alongside national citizenship. This could take the form of a declaration of rights with moral force only, and of enforceable treaty rights in two areas: mobility rights within the EC for non-economic and economic purposes and the right of EC nationals living in other EC states to vote in municipal and EP elections.

THE EC BUDGET

An enlarged EC budget, the Delors II package, with significantly enhanced cohesion funds for poorer member states, was a pre-condition for Irish, Portuguese, Greek and, in particular, Spanish agreement to the Maastricht Treaty as well as to the opening of enlargement negotiations. The Edinburgh Summit agreed an enlarged ECU 15.2 billion fund for these four states over seven years. The new EFTA members would be net budget contributors while new members from the East, Turkey and other Mediterranean states would demand substantial increases in structural and cohesion funds. The accession of EFTA countries is likely

to increase the cohesion funds available for existing Southern EC states and future Eastern members, as well as to encourage greater accountability in EC finances, budget discipline and more careful costing of aid proposals.

OTHER AREAS

The Treaty also agreed that the Council, acting by qualified majority, could give the EC institutions new powers to issue directives and make programmes on:

1. The development of trans-European transport networks.

2. Implementation of a common energy policy similar to that currently existing in agriculture and fisheries.

3. Strengthening economic and social cohesion (the Cohesion Fund, to be established by the end of 1993, will support EC environmental standards and improve transport links in member states with a per capita GNP less than 90 per cent of the EC average).

4. The environment.

5. Promotion of research and development.

4   CONCLUSIONS

1.   Widening will not frustrate deepening of the integration process, as the Euro-sceptics hope. An EC with a larger membership would require new structures and an extension of majority voting in the Council, hence a greater degree of supranationality. Thus deepening is a prerequisite for widening. It is the deepening of the EC, and the associated stability and prosperity, that has made the EC attractive to potential new members.

2.   While some believe that EC membership must be extended to Central Europe to contain instability, others believe that the resulting network of association and transition agreements would cause the emergence of a Europe *a la carte*, allowing new member states the freedom to choose the content and speed at which they wish to adhere to EC norms.

3.   New members must adapt to the EC and not the other way around.

IMPLEMENTING MAASTRICHT: THE CFSP

The EC's success in building supranational institutions depended on the special conditions that characterized postwar Europe. The strong economic advance that took place in the eighties produced a sustained push for European integration and is no surprise that the rising of popular skepticism on the Treaty on European Union is mainly due to the present economic recession.

During the last two decades, the European Community had increasingly involved itself in foreign policy issues beyond those commercial and economic aspects, explicitly mentioned by the Rome Treaty. Presently absorbed with the rearrangement of its own internal affairs, the EC has shown signs of being less willing to provide the necessary attention and political will to deal with security threats when they arise. In other words it seems that the core of regional integration is at stake, especially with reference to the realisation of a common foreign and security policy (CFSP).

Though the present crises, the need for further

economic and monetary integration still subsists as
the international competitiveness demands it. This
does not necessarily imply to collaborate closely
in foreign and security policy as some would argue.
In fact, the most important aspect to verify is the
rationale for a more centralization of foreign and
security policy given the dramatic change in the
structure of international relations and especially
in Europe. If the Yugoslav crises seems to have
reinforced the idea of a unified action center, at
the same time there is a parallel need which favors
national and sub-national initiatives.

For too long the EC has been known as an economic
giant and a political dwarf. With the Cold War
over, the international scenario has radically
changed and the Community has to prove how much of
an international actor it represents.

In the 1970s, the European Political Cooperation, a
coordinating mechanism among member states, had
become an integral part of European foreign policy
making. It is not a decision making body but a
loose system of cooperation among the member

states. The result has been, as R.Rummel has called it, a "composed foreign policy" based on EC external policies, joint policies agreed through EPC and national policies. The interaction of these elements is the answer of the Community to sovranational aspirations on one hand and operational efficiency on the other. A rather complex structure that if natural to us, could be seen rather caotic from third countries. Two are the main weaknesses of EPC: it is "reactive" and is dependent on consensus.

The previous Single European Act, that came into force in July 1987 related primarily to the realisation of the common market and to Political Cooperation. The expression chosen in art.30 SEA, where the EPC finds its legal base, is the one of "commitment to endeavor" which does not imply any legal obligation. Its effectiveness is therefore dependent on the level of support the EC member states themselves lend to EPC as a forum for getting together common foreign policy positions. The implementation of EPC provisions remains at the political discretion of the Twelve. In this respect

there is no change in the Maastricht Treaty. The
Court of Justice cannot intervene in this field.
Without taking into account the difficulty of
interpreting a political declaration, an eventual
juridicial control would be rather ineffective :
how would the Court of Justice oblige a member
state to obey to the declaration? Would it apply
sanctions? The real reason is that none of the
Twelve want to create a government of judges in the
CFSP framework. Neverthless it should be reminded
that the several reports on EC foreign policy
making (i.e. intergovernmental declarations), have
developed a sort of morally binding foundation. In
such a way the "EPC has created an acquis
politique, just as the EC has established its own
acquis communautaire". Its evolution became the
backdrop to the debate over a CFSP leading up to
Maastricht.

There is no doubt that the development of a CFSP
came from a dual dynamic given by the international
environment on the one hand, (in particular by the
events taking place in Central and Eastern Europe)
and by the process of European integration on the

other. Internal and external affairs pushed the
Community to redefine itself with reference to the
new scenario. Though, it has been said that the
internal dynamic lies more with the institutional
debate, the external dynamic comes mainly from the
need to respond to the increasing expectations of
the EC being able to speak with one voice.

Therefore, on the occasion of the European Council
held in Maastricht in 1991, it would have been
impossible for the EC member states to ignore
foreign and security policy. The Maastricht Treaty
was a compromise that left key issues for the
future. It is based on a twofold logic : the
intergovernmental and the integrationist one. The
main reference for CFSP is Title V of the
Maastricht Treaty. But in order to understand the
whole of it, it is important to give a look to the
declarations which have been added to it. The
present EPC provisions (art.30 SEA), will be
replaced by the new Title V. This does not mean
that CFSP will replace national foreign policies.
As Delors emphasized, a common foreign policy does
not necessarily mean a single policy. It is up to

the EC to set out the broad objectives of policy
and to the member states to interpret them in the
light of their domestic traditions and interests.

The Twelve agreed to strengthen the Union's role in
foreign and security policy by establishing
procedures for "common positions" and "joint
actions" outside the EC structure of the Rome
Treaty, but binding on all members. The Treaty does
not define in detail the priority areas for the
CFSP and allows qualified majority on joint actions
only after a prior unanimous vote authorizing its
use. The latter represents a big step in the
decision making process.

As far as the implementation of CFSP is concerned,
the Treaty on European Union already foresees a
common surveillance system on the respect of the so
called "joint action": the obligation of
information according to which " whenever there is
any plan to adopt a national position or take
national action pursuant to a joint action,
information shall be provided in time to allow, if
necessary, for prior consultation within the

Council." Each member state can in such a way control the others.

Two are the limits of such a system. First, the control effectiveness is strictly dependent on the transparency of the member states. Second, nothing can assure that the "prior consultations" within the Council would lead to a success.

The joint action cannot be modified without a unanimous decision taken by the Council (art.J.3.3). This provision is partially true unless a member state calls for "an imperative need arising from changes to take necessary measures as a matter of urgency" (art.J.3.6.). This clause allow us to affirm that any joint action has to be seen in a temporarily way. The limit of such a provision is given by the fact that the member states are the only judges of their "imperative urgency", something which could easily lead to a large interpretation of the provision. The Council will exert an ex post control.

There is another clause which allows any member state to avoid the respect of the joint action. According to art.J3.7 "should there be any major

difficulties in implementing a joint action, a
member state shall refer to the Council which shall
discuss them and seek appropriate solutions".
While the former clause cannot be invoked unless "a
need arise from change in the situation" (change
which was not taken into account at the moment of
the adoption of the joint action), the call for the
latter does not imply eventual changes in the
situation. Moreover, in this case the Council
control is ex ante.

In case the member states manage to get to a
"common position", their national foreign policies
must conform to the acquis politique. Art.J.1 gives
a definition of CFSP goals: the safeguard of the
common values, the strengthening of the security of
the Union and its Member States, the promotion of
international cooperation, the development of
democracy and the respect of the rule of law and
human rights. As known the art.J.1. is more binding
that the art.30 of the SEA. "The Member States
shall support the Union's external and security
policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual

solidarity."

The main elements of CFSP can be identified as the following: One decision making center, the Council, A unified Secretariat
A non-exclusive right for the EC-Commission initiative, The rule of consensus in defining general guidelines The possibility of recourse to qualified majority voting for the implementation of agreed on policies.

Art.J8 seems to signal a move towards one decision making centre. The European Council will define the principles and guidelines of CFSP as it has done so far in the framework of EPC. As far as the role of the Council of foreign ministers is concerned, we could assess that art.J8.2 represents an element of communitarization of the intergovernmental structure.

The role of Coreper and the one of the Political Committee has also been revised. As far as the latter is concerned, its role is the one of monitoring the international situation to

contribute to the definitions of CFSP issues by request of the Council. If the Coreper will then put proposals developed by the Political Committee on the Council agenda is still to be seen. This could lead to eventual conflict between the two bodies. In Maastricht a solution could not be achieved and is therefore up to them to find a modus vivendi.

Art. J7 refers to the EP and its right to be informed by the Presidency in the field of CFSP. It is not provided that the Council shall consult the EP before taking any foreign policy decisions, and Parliament's opinion will not have any legal consequence. Three are the powers that the EP enjoys in the CFSP area:
- the codecision power regarding the conclusion of certain agreements with third countries (art.238 EC:association agreement, art.228 EC Consultation); the admission of new Member States(art.237EC) and the amending of non-compulsory expenditure in the budget procedure which often have an important foreign policy implication.

The new Treaty provisions are the result of an evident compromise and are often open to different interpretation. The respect of the "principle of consistency and unicity" has not gone further than including all EC policies under one common umbrella without communitarize them, as it would be required. The criteria of communitarization stays an open problem especially with reference to those matters where institutional procedures often lead to confusion between intergovernmental and communitarian framework. It is almost absurd that in order to condamn the behaviour of a third country, EPC provisions demand the consensus of the member states, whereas the Rome Treaty asks for a qualified majority for the application of economic sanctions, according to Art.113. This legal base has always been considered inadequate and the Twelve decided that the Maastricht Treaty would provide a new one, Art.228a. As it represents a link between the EC pillar and the one of CFSP it could easily become a matter of conflict. According to this provision the adoption of economic sanctions inplies two phases. The first comes from CFSP: the Council adopts a common

position or a joint action in order to interrupt or reduce the economic relations with third countries. The second stage comes from the EC: the Council by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, takes the necessary urgent measures. What is very surprising is that a decision taken in the CFSP field implies Community actions. Concerning the second stage the main question is to understand if the Commission is forced to present a proposal to the Council. Legally it is not required. Politically the Commission has to take into account the decision taken in the CFSP framework. Can the Commission propose sanctions without a previous decision taken by the Council in the CFSP framework? It is obvious that the Commission will never present a proposal without being aware of a potential of a qualified majority needed for the approval by the Council.

There is a need for clear rules in order to implement a common foreign policy. Collective and individual action will have to coexist, though in a mix which will be different from the present one, in the sense that the focus will be more often

shifted to collective action. This implies structural adjustment aimed at strengthening consistency, cohesion, continuity and effectiveness of a common foreign policy and to extend its competence to the field of security. The European Council should strengthen its leading role and the Council of ministers should become the operational structure for elaborating and implementing foreign policy.

The picture remains largely intergovernmental and there is no guarantee that the Union will be in a better position to ensure a more efficient foreign policy. Anyway it is important to stress that the division between the provisions concerning foreign and security policy and those relating to the Union's other policies is less sharp than it was in the SEA. The general provisions state that the Union is to have a single institutional framework consisting of the EC's institutions, which is to ensure the consistency and continuity of actions taken. The Commission and the European Parliament have also seen increased their power of intervention.

In terms of external representation of the Union, "the Presidency shall represent the Union on CFSP matters" and "shall be assisted if need by the previous and next member states to hold the Presidency. The Commission is fully associated to this task". The SEA already recognises the role of the Presidency but what is striking is that the Presidency will represent an entity which does not have any legal personality. In other words, the representation is more political than legal. Moreover, the role of the Troika finds its codification in the Treaty. The Council and the Commission remain responsible for the whole consistency of the Union's external policies. Given the different framework of decision making, Union and CFSP, it could happen that the measures taken differ. The need for consistency was already expressed in the SEA art.30.5 and the Treaty confirm this need in art.C. This provision goes beyond the simple consistency between external economic ralations and foreign policy, as it takes into account new areas such as security and development. This principle, in order to be

correctly applied must be assured by the institutions. The SEA gives this responsibility to the Commission and to the Presidency. The Commission becomes more and more a privileged interlocutor giving the importance of the economic aspect of external relations.

The Maastricht Treaty confirms the role of the Commission but replaces the Presidency with the Council. Moreover it should be stressed that if art.C of the Treaty gives this power to both institutions, art.J.8. establishes that only the Council ensures the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union.! There seems to be a certain incoherence between these provisions. What it really counts is the identification of the real "power center". What is consistency if not power?

The main weakness of the EC has not yet been overcome. It lacks a set of principles and a central political focus. Even too much attention has been attributed to the instruments and the decision making process. The Community is already

strong on instruments even without the military arm, but it is too weak on action. The dominant foreign policy reflex in the Community is still national, not communitarian, as the conflict in Yugoslavia has cleared demonstrated. The Maastricht Treaty went in some ways to introduce important reforms, but it did not ensure those mechanisms which are necessary to reinforce the EC international position by military means if necessary. In order to close this gap, the integration of the EPC and Council secretariats may be seen as a small step towards the communitarization process. This is more a mental than an institutional question. Without the change of mindsets, the EC will be limited to an aggregation of national views.

The EC should think more in terms of prevention than conflict management. The effectiveness of a CFSP will only depend on the question of how far the EC elaborates its executive branch for foreign and security policy. It is necessary to identify the ultimate source of political authority to which any military forces are accountable and from whom

policy emanates.

For more than forty years security was seen in military terms. Today it is necessary to adopt a different approach examining also political, economic and other aspects of security. CSI, Central and Eastern Europe, Mediterranean, Middle East they all represent areas where security problems may arise. All major policies have been included in the EC framework and the "common defense" is for the first time part of the Treaty on European Union.

The wording of the Treaty provides that "the CFSP shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy which might in time lead to a common defence". Usually, security related issues were excluded from EPC deliberations in order not to interfere with the competences of NATO. With the SEA the discussion on such an issue covered only the political and economic aspects of security so that to avoid the artificial separation between military and security aspects. According to the

Treaty on European Union, all aspects of foreign
and security policy will be considered for common
activity.

The idea of a European defense identity suggests
that there are still some obstacles in realizing
it. Peacekeeping, humanitarian aid seem by now the
most likely expression of European military
capability, but this would represent a limited
expression of a European defense identity. There is
a strong reluctance to commit forces to fight
situations even in nearby areas of instability. The
less involvement of the US forces could strengthen
the European efforts in order to avoid a possible
renationalization of European defense.

In order to ensure an all European security system
it is important to see the functioning of the
present interaction of institutions: WEU, the Union
and NATO.
The WEU nations have resolved the problem of the
relationship between WEU members and NATO countries
not part of the WEU. The Council agreed to allow
associate members to participate fully in WEU

meetings except where a majority of the Member
States vote to restrict the sessions. The WEU
stated also that no WEU member could invoke the
mutual assistance article of the Brussels Treaty
against a NATO member.

The link between WEU, the Union and NATO is based
on a double though asymmetric relationship: the WEU
is encharged with political questions and NATO is
encharged with operational aspects."The Union
requests the WEU, which is an integral part of the
development of the Union, to elaborate and
implement decisions and actions of the Union which
have defence implications". This view is
neverthless balanced by the formulation of the link
to NATO:"The policy of the Union in accordance with
this article shall be compatible with the common
security and defence policy established within NATO
framework".

As known, in next 1996 IGC a reform of the Treaty
will take place in all those areas where this is
foreseen (art.N). The nature and level of
instability in Europe's periphery requires the need

for a greater and more coordinated effort. A
larger Community could make achieving consensus
more difficult. The present member states have
stressed that the new comers will have to accept
the entire acquis communautaire including CFSP. But
if this will extend to the defense chapter is a
separate question, since the EC has already allowed
Denmark to opt out from it, as a price for its
ratifying the Treaty.
As the Economist says the Community is in danger of
suffering from "institutional overstretch" i.e. the
prospect of extending its institutions to more
countries.

Concerning the CFSP there are two articles to be
considered for next 1996 IGC:

- art.j4, par.6 which says "with a view to
furthering the objective of this Treaty, and having
in view the date of 1998 in the context of art.XII
of the Brussels Treaty, the provisions of this
article may be revised as provided for in art.N on
the basis of a report to be presented in 1996 by
the Council to the European Council, which shall

include an evaluation of the progress made and the experience gained until then."

- art.j10 which says: "on the occasion of any review of the security provisions under art.j4, the Conference which is convened to that effect shall also examine whether any other amendments need to be made to provisions relating to the CFSP". Thanks to this last sentence it is the whole of the CFSP which can be reviewed. WEU has already announced that it will reexamine its own provisions in 1996, including its relations with NATO. It is obvious that the success or failure will depend on the political will of the Member States.

The present development of nationalism puts into danger the concept of foreign policy. All countries are highly concerned with their own internal problems. And this nationalism can easily incite to an inward-looking leading to tensions between national groups. The consequence of this, is that foreign policy becomes a variable of internal priorities. What is necessary to avoid is that this process change into a rinationalisation of defense

policies of the EC member states. This is one of the reason why security policy has to become a common policy in the real terms and not a subproduct of EPC. Also because security thinking is far less militarised as it was before. A security policy includes much more than a defense policy. It is related to economic, commercial, R & D, policy etc.

Crisis-prevention and crisis management represent the two main objectives to achieve. In order to attain both, it is important that Europe be politically one and strong which means that a European Union be soon created, with its own foreign policy, and in which decisions can be taken timely and fast as well as fast implemented. It is also evident that as foreign policy instruments, economic, commercial and financial means do have to be coherent to a global foreign policy. The Maastricht Treaty's provisions for a CFSP is an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary step. It is all to be seen if CFSP will be a qualitative improvement over EPC.

The bitter example of the failure of EC diplomacy

in Yugoslavia was "due to the lack of understanding
both the intensity of the passions dividing the
Yugoslav nationalities and their readiness to use
violence to achieve their purposes". The
Community's main deficiency was in the political
will needed to define the still lacking "European
national interest". At the Copenhagen summit in
June, the Member States backed a plan presented by
the French Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur, for a
pan-European "stability pact". The idea is to get
countries to agree on frontiers and minority rights
so as to accept procedures for settling disputes.
In other words, the first challenge for CFSP.

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Halki International Seminar, 28 Aug/11 Sept.1993.

ABSTRACT

CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN THE MAGHREB: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

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1. The rise of Islamist protest movements in Tunisia and Algeria since the mid-1980s has been the strongest indicator of popular disaffection with the governments and development paths adopted since the independence of these states thirty to forty years ago. In Morocco, the religious role of King Hassan II has mitigated against the growth of a widespread Islamist opposition movement, but fears of external Islamist influences have nevertheless provoked change in the political process.

2. The successes of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (or FIS) in the local elections of 1990 were countered by the cancellation of national elections in early 1992. Since then, both the FIS and its Tunisian counterpart, Ennahda have been officially repressed, the movements dispersed, and their leaders imprisoned if not already in voluntary exile. With the loss of umbrella organizations, the future of a coherent Islamist opposition in these states has been cast in doubt. In the short term, the initiative in Algeria has been taken by armed, clandestine groups, responsible for attacks on and the assassinations of both security forces and civilians.

3. One of the strengths of the umbrella movements at their height was their ability to present a moral alternative to frequently corrupt official establishments. Their removal from the official political arena has weakened the control of reformist Islamist leaders over the radical elements of the movement. As violence has substituted for the dialogue of earlier years, so the moral legitimacy of both governments and the Islamist alternative has been undermined.

4. Longer-lasting alternatives need to address the aspirations, as well as disaffections of a largely youthful population, increasingly beset by unemployment. In Morocco, gradualist change has been centred on economic growth and reform, combined with strengthening the social and economic support bases of the centralised monarchy. Morocco also, however, enjoys the greatest distance between rich and poor, and runs the greatest risk of marginalising those who have gained little from a decade of austerity measures. Democratic institutions also remain weak, and subject only to piecemeal reform.

5. In 1988, Algeria took the path of rapid democratization against the background of a failing domestic economy and severe short-term debt-servicing requirements. Tunisia underwent a more limited liberalization process, from which few political alternatives have emerged, but which has spurred a more diversified economy. In the longer term, what remains to be seen

is whether these experiences have facilitated or hindered the emergence of strengthened and diversified civil societies, in contrast to the Moroccan experience.

6. Despite predictions to the contrary, there are few indicators of the collapse of any of the Maghreb states along ethnic or religious lines. A prolonged period of stalemate in the political sphere may provoke unforeseen developments, however, particularly after the intense activity of the years since 1988 in Algeria. New forms of Islamism present only one possible alternative, already widely discredited in their current manifestations. The political vacuum in Algeria, and to a lesser extent in Tunisia, is only tenable while energies are directed to the generation and distribution of economic and social opportunities.

7. The void is as much moral as political, thus favouring the emergence of groups or leaders espousing the values of social equity and justice. Failing this will be the protracted degeneration of civic life. The real danger to national and regional stability lies where there has been a long-standing impoverishment of the integrity of the traditional political classes. The younger generations of the Maghreb have been instrumental in stimulating change through protest. They have yet to participate fully in the construction of positive and integrated alternatives. Stability over the next few years is thus crucial to the transition from one political class to another.

8. Increasing numbers of the younger generation, however, have chosen the path of exile over biding their time in an atmosphere of diminishing opportunities. Rising migratory pressures have stimulated European states to adopt both defensive measures and a more active interest in assisting the reform programmes of Maghreb states. In the short term, this has provoked competition between Maghreb states for external resources, as well as lip-service to a unitary approach to facilitate their transfer.

9. The challenge posed to Europe by illegal immigration is, however, less Islamist in nature than economic. More crucial to the future stability of the Western Mediterranean are the effects on the popular perceptions of the Maghreb of European and international policies towards the Middle East and Bosnia, combined with the perpetuation of cultural myths, misconceptions about the diversity of Islamic expression, and the growth of European racism.

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ELIAMEP

HALKI INTERNATIONAL SEMINARS

SEPTEMBER 1993

PROSPECTS FOR E.C. EXPANSION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN : THE CASE OF CYPRUS

BY

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PROSPECTS FOR E.C. EXPANSION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN : THE CASE OF CYPRUS

History of Cyprus - E.C. relations.

The Republic of Cyprus negotiated and signed an Association Agreement with the European Community in 1972. This agreement provided for two stages. The initial stage was to be completed in 1977. The anomalous economic and social life in Cyprus that followed the tragic events of summer 1974 and the resulting occupation of the northern part of the Republic prevented the smooth evolution of the Association Agreement. The political situation which emerged in Cyprus was employed by some EC member-states either as a reason or as a pretext to voice reservations and prevent the evolution of the Agreement to its second stage within the specified period. Instead, the initial stage was given through various protocols another decade lease of life. Finally in 1987 a major protocol was signed that set out the conditions for the second and final stage of the agreement leading up the two contracting parties to a full Customs Union, to be achieved in stages over a ten-year period. [1]

Application for full membership.

On 3 July 1990, the government of the Republic of Cyprus submitted to the Council of the European Communities an application for membership of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) , the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC). [2]

Two years later the Cypriot application received a mention along with those of Malta and Turkey. At its Lisbon meeting on 26 and 27 June 1992 the European Council stated in its conclusions on enlargement:

... if the challenges of a European Union composed of a larger number of Member States are to be met successfully, parallel progress is needed as regards the internal development of the Union and in preparation for membership of other countries.

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[1] 'The Development of EC - Cyprus Relations' , Public and Information Office (PIO), Nicosia, Republic of Cyprus, 1991; pp 5-9.
[2] Commission Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership, Brussels 30 June 1993; p.1

In this context the European Council discussed the applications which have been submitted by Turkey, Cyprus and Malta. The European Council agrees that each of these applications must be considered on its merits.

Relations with Cyprus and Malta will be developed and strengthened by building on the Association Agreements and their application for membership and by developing the political dialogue. [3]

However negotiations on the accesion of four EFTA countries namely Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway took precedence and got under way as instructed by the next European Council meeting at Edinburgh on 11 and 12 December 1992. Yet again the Council recordered an indirect if not latent positive note that relates not only to the application of Cyprus but also of Malta and possibly of Turkey by including in the decisions of its Copenhagen meeting on 21-22 June 1992 a reaffirmation that enlargement with the EFTA countries shall be without prejudice to the situation of other applicant countries. Moreover it welcomed the Commission's intention to present in the near future its opinion on Malta and Cyprus and pledged that it will be examined rapidly but noted that the Council will view them "taking into consideration the particular situation of each of the two countries."[4] Such a wording could be interpreted as a first indirect warning to the Greek Cypriots that the de facto territorial, economic and ethnic division of Cyprus would weigh heavily in the final opinion on their application yet to be conveyed by the Council, bearing in mind that the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash has expressed his outright opposition to the initiative of the government of the Republic to apply for membership without prior consultation with the Turkish community. Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriot leader theatened to withdraw from the UN sponsored negotiations on reuniting the divided Island if the accession negotiations with the EC went ahead.[5] It would be naive to believe that the European Council will condone the Turkish Cypriot negative disposition towards Cyprus's application to join the Union, up until this time at least, let alone their position and interests with regard to the Turkish application.

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[3] ibid. p.2
[4] ibid.
[5] The issue arising from Turkish Cypriot objection to the application is discussed in more detail below.

In fact in the introduction to its report on the application of Cyprus communicated on 30th of June this year, the first issue the Commission mentions is the "Cyprus Question". Not surprisingly the Commission brings to the attention of the Council the lasting and one may dare say "unsolvable" character of the Cyprus problem:

Since the island was declared independent in 1960, the "Cyprus question" has constantly been before the United Nations and has never left the agenda of the Security Council.[6]

So reads the first paragraph of the Opinion. It is not unfair to refer to the bitter experiences of the international bodies with regard to the Cyprus affair in the last three decades.

In dealing with the history of the conflict the Commission adopts a diplomatic and reserved choice of words to refer to the events that created the present de facto partition in Cyprus. This terminology is consistent with the long established policy of Western governments to place on an equal footing what they perceive as the two conflicting parties, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, and by extension Greece and Turkey with regard to both the issue of allocating the historical blame for the events of 1974 as well as to the equally hard job of alloting responsibility for the present impasse. The concern of the Commission not to upset Turkey is noticeable as is illustrated by the characterization of Turkey as an applicant "of major strategic, political and economic importance to the Community." [7]

In this context the two-phased Attila operation of July-August 1974 that imposed a de facto partition in Cyprus, is according to the Commission not an invasion nor even an act of aggression against the Island Republic but "a military intervention by Turkey" that resulted from the "coup inspired by the supporters of intergration with Greece". On the one hand the Commission recognises that the outcome of the Turkish army's occupation of the northern part of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus has been today's de facto

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[6] ibid. p.3
[7] ibid. p.5

partition; yet on the other hand the large-scale population movements of Greeks from the Turkish occupied territories in the north to the government-controlled areas in the south of the Republic are mentioned without reference to their forcible character. Evaluating the deadlock of recent years the Commision considers that "a mutually acceptable institutional solution had been blocked by the intransigence of both sides".[8] Clearly there is a discrepancy from the last assessment of the situation made by the Security Council in resolution 789 that lays responsibility on the shoulders of the Turkish Cypriot leader who refused to negotiate on the basis of the set of ideas providing for a bicommunal, bizonal federation endorsed by the Security Council itself in its immediately preceding resolution on Cyprus (774/92).

In the introduction of the avis the Commission notes the objections raised by the Turkish Cypriot authorities in the occupied part of the island as to the legitimacy and competence of the government of the Republic to present an application for accesion on behalf of the whole of the Cypriot population. While conceding that Community membership would benefit the Turkish population of Cyprus, as much as, if not more than the Greek population, the regime in the Turkish occupied north objects to the right of the government of the Republic to speak for the whole of Cyprus and consequently demands that the Community should refrain from taking any action on the application. The authorities of the self-styled TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) - recognised only by Turkey - seek to support their argument in two ways. First by citing the 1960 Constitution of the Republic which vest the Turkish Vice-President with a veto over any foreign policy decision; and second by invoking the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee which prohibits the Republic from joining any international organisation or alliance that does not include both Greece and Turkey in their membership. The Community in fact regarded the application as admissible on the logic of its established position that the only legitimate government in Cyprus is that of the Republic and initiated the procedures under the

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[8] ibid. p. 3

Treaties for its examination.[9] Also the Commission noted the parliamentary consensus in

favour of Cyprus's application.[10] Irrespective of the decision of the Community to

proceed with the examination of the Cypriot application on the basis of its standing policy

to recognise only one legitimate government on the island, there is a point to be made

here. The Turkish Cypriot argument is questionable. After all the Turkish Cypriot

leadership has attempted to detach itself from the 1960 agreements as a whole by

unilaterally declaring the occupied territory an independent state in 1983; an act of

secession condemned unanimously by the international community. For it can only be

incongruous to invoke the 1960 agreements that have already been violently broken by

one's own actions.

As could be easily anticipated the Commission makes extensive reference to the key

issue arising from today's de facto partition and which in fact has been the sticking point

in the search for a satisfactory settlement of the Cyprus question: namely the dispute over

the implementation of fundamental freedoms and human rights over the whole of the

territory of Cyprus and respect for democracy. What we read in the introduction of the

avis is rather phlegmatic: It states:

As a result of the de facto division of the island into two strictly separated parts ... the
fundamental freedoms laid down by the Treaty, and in particular freedom of movement of
goods, people, services and capital, right of establishment and the universally recognised
political, economic, social and cultural rights could not today be exercised over the
entirety of the island's territory...[11]

In the chapter titled ''Outline of the de facto situation in Cyprus'' the Commission appears

more resolute in its expressions and draws the attention of the European Council to two

points. First:

... the island's forced partition alone represents a serious infringement of the fundamental
freedoms of citizens of Cyprus

and second

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[9] ibid.p4
[10] ibid. p9
[11] ibid. p.5

... the rights of victims of the events of 1974 have not yet been restored owing to the lack of a political settlement ...[12]

With regard to the human rights situation in the free areas of the Republic the Commission commends the fact that fundamental provisions of the constitution are effectively respected. These concern the rights of the three national minorities, the independence of the judiciary from the executive, freedom of speech and the right to free assembly, equality of all before the law and the prohibition of all forms of discrimination. As far as the occupied north is concerned apart from the serious infringements of the rights of all Cypriot citizens mentioned above the Commission reports that

... opposition parties have mentioned certain constraints and restrictions in their activities, in particular as regards access to the media. [13]

Another positive aspect of the avis is the reference to the feelings of both Cypriot communities about the influx of a considerable number of settlers from the Turkish mainland (between 45000 to 50000 according to UN estimates) and the demographic changes this has caused. It is mentioned that sectors of Turkish Cypriot public opinion also considers the Turkish settlers' presence as an infringement of the political and economic rights of the indigenous people. It is explicitly written in the avis that Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader ''holds a large majority in parliament (of the self-styled TRNC) owing to the Turkish settler vote.'' It is also recognised that both Denktash's economic policy and his approach on the Cyprus problem is encountering increasing opposition ''by some sections of public opinion.''[14] Nevertheless the Commission does no more than present its factual findings without taking the crucial step of envisaging an equitable solution to the dispute over the implementation of the three fundamental freedoms with the accession of the country into the Union as has been the expectation in the Greek Cypriot side. Nor does it suggest any positive measures which might see matters progress on this matter. The avis merely states that the freedoms and rights ''would have to be

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[12] ibid. p.9
[13] ibid. p.10
[14] ibid. p.9

guaranteed as part of a comprehensive settlement restoring constitutional arrangements covering the whole of the Republic of Cyprus."[15]

The Commission's report pays particular attention to the prospects of a negotiated settlement to the Cyprus question under the auspices of the United Nations which it purposefully links to the prospect of agreement for integration with the Community. The need for close cooperation between the two communities to achieve the integration of Cyprus with the European Community is highlighted in the "set of ideas on a comprehensive framework agreement on Cyprus" endorsed unanimously by the Security Council in resolution 774/92. The Commission stresses that the "set of ideas" as it stands was not accepted by either of the two sides. For the Turkish Cypriot side presses for a "more confederal" solution to the constitutional question than the one suggested in the "set of ideas". Meanwhile President Clerides

... while accepting the "set of ideas", has expressed the will, since his election, to introduce amendments, notably so as to reinforce references to human rights, make improvements on the operational side of the executive branch and make it more compatible with future membership of the Community. [16]

The latest preoccupation of the UN efforts with the CBMs - Confidence Building Measures - does not escape the attention of the Commission and in fact it considers agreement on these measures an indication of the willingness of the two communities to advance to an overall settlement.

With regard to the heart of the matter - the crucial constitutional issues - the Commission endorses the process initiated by the UN Secretary-General expressing the conviction that it is most important that it leads to an equitable solution paying equal respect to the interests of each community. At the same time the Commission takes a clear line: The possibility of Community membership is enhanced if the negotiated settlement ensures that

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[15] ibid. p.5
[16] ibid. p.11

... the decision-making process of the executive and the legislative is compatible with the Community's discussion and decision-making apparatus and will enable the Cypriot authorities to adopt the _acquis communautaire_ and implement it effectively throughout the island. [17]

If an implicit preference for decision-making by consensus in a future federal Cyprus is discernible here even at the executive level, it suffices to say that it is more than doubtful that such a system would ever work in a future federal executive in Cyprus given the bitter experiences of the past.

The Commission also points to the difficulty the current situation would present if Cyprus being a full member were to accept and implement commitments made under the European Union Treaty regarding matters of Common Foreign and Security Policy, especially where Turkey was concerned. With reference to this point the Commission emphasizes once again that "the need to promote a political settlement is all the more paramount". It is clear that what is contained here is the Community's determination not to let the Cyprus question harm its relations with Turkey. Another foreign and security policy problem as indicated in the avis is the active participation of Cyprus in the Non Aligned Movement. The Commission demands that Cyprus withdraws from the Movement. [18]

In relation to the state of the economy in Cyprus it behoves us to emphasize the contrasting courses of development followed in the two separated parts of the island. The population of the government-controlled areas of the Republic enjoys a high standard of living and a remarkable economic growth based at large on service industries, especially tourism; the occupied area presents a contrasting picture with the poor record of its economy which has been based mainly on agriculture and has suffered a recent blow with the demise of Asil Nadir. The GDP per capita there is three or four times less than the average for 1991 in the area controlled by the Cyprus government - 9000 ECU - a figure higher than in several Community Member States. [19]

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[17] ibid. p.12

[18] ibid. p.12

[19] ibid. p8

As testified in the avis the economy in the government-controlled areas is in a healthy state but this does not mean that there are no points of concern. One of these is the need to diversify services so as to diminish the overdependence of the economy upon the erratic tourist market. Also the industrial sector needs attention. There is a rather urgent need to consolidate industrial development before Cyprus's accession can be contemplated. The avis reveals that an analysis of industrial structures shows a considerable degree of vulnerability to the required level of exposure to international competition. It is argued that most sectors of industry still hide behind high tariffs in spite of the advance made towards the implementation of the Common Customs Tariff.[20]

This paper has intentionally dealt overwhelmingly with the political dimension of the Cypriot application to accede to the European Union family because it overshadows the economic one. This is also confirmed by the last paragraph of the conclusions in the Commission's report which states that the Commission should be prepared to face the eventuality of the failure of the intercommunal talks to produce a political settlement in the forseeable future. In such a case the Commission pledges to reassess the situation taking into account the positions adopted by each party at the negotiating table and reconsider its position towards the Cypriot application in January 1995.[21] This promise of reassessment raises Cypriot expectations that their country already a victim of aggression will not be penalised further by being excluded from the European family due to the intransigence of one side .

As I hope has been demonstrated in this paper the political dimension will carry the decisive weight in the deliberations of the European Council when it decides to pass its verdict.

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[20] ibid. p.17
[21] ibid. p.24

PROSPECTS FOR EC EXPANSION

IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION

HALKI INTERNATIONAL SEMINARS 1993

"COOPERATION AND SECURITY IN EUROPE,

THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE BALKANS"

28 AUGUST - 11 SEPTEMBER 1993

HALKI, GREECE

Map of Mediterranean Basin

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PROSPECTS FOR EC EXPANSION IN THE

MEDITERRANEAN REGION

The collapse of the Cold War has witnessed the demise of the bipolar structure of international affairs and has ushered in a period whose parameters are still in a state of flux. New strategies, objectives and alliances are being devised to take into account this new reality. Given its heterogeneous composition, the Mediterranean is one region that is being directly affected by this development.

Before one can discuss the prospects of EC expansion in any region, it is necessary to analyse the health of the EC animal itself. The EC is already an economic hegemon in global affairs. It is even more so in the Mediterranean area given that all of the countries in the Mediterranean basin are highly dependent on the Community. The harmonization of economic and financial regulations achieved through the Single Market programme and provided for in the Chapter dedicated to Economic Union in the Maastricht Treaty augur for a more cohesive economic hegemon that will dominate economically its southern and eastern peripheries.

Although the position of the EC might appear to be one of stability, its certainty and security are moderated by its proximity to the disintegrated Soviet empire (Central and Eastern Europe) and the volatile relations of the Mediterranean region (particularly in the Middle East and the Balkans). [*1]

Whether the EC will be able to play as forceful a role in the political and military spheres of Mediterranean security depends primarily on how successful it is in implementing its goal of establishing a Common Foreign and Security Policy as envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty. If the EC member states are capable of pooling their diplomatic and military assets into a single decision-making process, then the Community will be in a position to influence enormously both its southern and eastern flanks. If on the other hand national interests continue to supersede the notion of a collective security arrangement, bilateral relations (example France and Algeria, Italy and Libya, Spain and Morocco) will continue to dominate the region even if a more cohesive and coordinated EC Foreign policy could achieve better results.

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY INITIATIVES IN THE SOUTH

The New Mediterranean Global Policy

In 1972 the European Community launched its first scheme, the so-called global policy of the Mediterranean to establish a series of parallel trade and cooperation agreements with almost all of the non-member Mediterranean states. Association agreements had been signed with Greece in 1962, Turkey in 1964, and Malta in 1971. By 1973 agreements were also signed with Cyprus, Yugoslavia, Portugal and Spain. The Commission also commenced a series of agreements with the Arab Mediterranean countries and Israel.

Association agreements were intended to be the first step in a process leading to a customs union and eventually full membership. All of the accords established free access to EC markets for most industrial products, albeit on different time scales. Access to agricultural commodities was facilitated, although some tariffs remained. The EC imposed quotas on refined petroleum, cotton, and phosphate fertilizers for a transitional period. The principle of reciprocity (the granting of preferences in return)

was not applied immediately in all cooperation agreements, although in the event of economic decline in a particular sector the contracting state was entitled to take protective action.

Most of the agreements were accompanied by financial protocols indicating the amount of assistance the Mediterranean country would receive in each category. Financial aid took the form of direct grants, as well as loans from the European Investment Bank (EIB).

A review carried out by the European Commission in 1982 revealed that the EC Mediterranean Policy was far from achieving its main goal of establishing a free trade zone with its southern neighbours. [*2] Agricultural produce which the Mediterranean countries sought most to export, such as citrus fruits, olive oil and wine, were already in surplus in the Community. In addition, instead of providing a market for industrial goods from the South, the Community had been obliged to protect its own manufacturers against competition, especially in the textiles, footwear and processed food-stuffs sector.

The 1982 review led the European Commission to draw up an integrated plan for the development of its own Mediterranean regions and to adopt a new policy towards the non-member countries of the basin. One of the policy's primary objectives was to help Mediterranean states overcome their dependence on imported food by helping them diversify their agricultural production. Recent statistics reveal that this initiative has had a somewhat positive impact on certain countries but not on the region as a whole. For example, 1991-92 figures portray Tunisia as enjoying a positive food balance for the first time in two decades. [*3]

The review also reiterated the principle of free access to the Community market for industrial goods originating in the Mediterranean and an increase in financial assistance to encourage the complementary development of the different economies of the partner countries. In 1985 provisions were also introduced to ensure that non-member Mediterranean states would not be adversely affected by the accession of Portugal and Spain to the Community in 1986.

In December 1990 the European Community decided to introduce the new Mediterranean policy in an effort to support the gradual movement towards economic liberalization and democratization. The new policy comprises six main components: assistance in the process of economic adjustment; encouragement of foreign direct investment (FDI); an increase in bilateral and Community financial assistance; strengthening arrangements governing access to the Community market; inclusion of the region in the Community's single market programme; increasing economic and political dialogue at a regional level whenever possible.

The new Mediterranean policy provides an overall aid package of ECU 4,405 million, subdivided as follows: ECU 2,075 million in loans and grants for the Maghreb and Mashreq countries and Israel, over the five year period from November 1991. This amount includes support for structural adjustment programmes, undertaken in conjunction with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank; ECU 2,030 million for more broadly based financial cooperation, with a particular emphasis on promoting investment, developing small and medium sized businesses, and protecting the environment; ECU 300 million was provided as a back-up for economic reform. This fund was particularly established to help compensate for the adverse social effects of adjustment programmes (for instance, the effects on those below the poverty line of a reduction in subsidies for essential commodities). In July 1991 an additional ECU 60 million was granted to the Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied territories who had been adversely affected by the Gulf War in the preceding months. [*4]

Nevertheless, recent data discloses the European Community's failure to embrace the necessary long-term policies required to create an all encompassing forum for tackling the increasing social and economic disparities between itself and its southern neighbours. [5] For instance, a comparative study of the levels of development on the two sides of the Mediterranean reveals a ratio of one to ten, which is still widening. This fact was recently reiterated by the European Parliament who deplored the fact that, in economic terms, the gulf between the two shores of the Mediterranean is on the whole growing and that twenty-three years of cooperation have not succeeded in reducing it. [6]

While economic growth is being experienced by most of the non-member Mediterranean states, including the countries in the Maghreb, growth is insufficient to provide an improvement in living standards throughout the region due to the constantly increasing population figures. It appears that the only way to prevent the resurgence of instability in the Mediterranean is by holding out the prospect of anchoring the region to Europe in the long-term. At least three approaches currently underway aim at achieving exactly this objective: firstly, through what could be described as preliminary accession negotiations with the three Mediterranean applicants, Cyprus, Malta and Turkey; secondly via the Community's new Euro-Maghreb partnership policy; and thirdly, through the still evolving policies towards adjacent regions in turmoil, namely the Balkans and the Middle East.

1. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE MEDITERRANEAN APPLICANTS:

CYPRUS, MALTA and TURKEY.

In his address to the European Parliament earlier this year, President of the European Commission Jacques Delors restated the EC's interest in the Mediterranean when outlining the Commission's programme for 1993-94:

> I have mentioned our neighbours to the north and the east. But let us not forget our neighbours to the south, who sometimes feel neglected. The Community's Mediterranean policy must remain a priority. Our financial contribution already represents 31% of total world aid to the region, and it is set to rise following endorsement by the Council of Ministers of the Commission's comprehensive plan. New and more ambitious agreements will be negotiated with the Maghreb countries. These should be complemented by horizontal action to demonstrate the global nature of certain problems and to highlight the common interests which unite the countries bordering the Mediterranean. I am thinking in particular of the environment, management of marine resources, and cultural exchanges. [7]

The EC's speedy handling of the EFTAns membership applications and its swift implementation of European Agreements and the PHARE programme with Eastern and Central European states has fuelled the chorus of discontent among EC aspirants in the South. The Commissions claim that the Community's concern is to strike a fair balance between the north, the east and the south, and at the same time highlight the EC's presence in the Mediterranean area has mostly fallen upon deaf ears. It was only in July 1993, after the Commission issued its long awaited Opinion Reports concerning the membership applications from Malta and Cyprus that this criticism of neglect has to some effect been overcome.

CYPRUS

Cyprus signed an EC association agreement in December 1972 with the objective of creating a customs union between the two after a decade of transition. The customs union was to consist of two phases, the first to run for five years. Unlike the EC association agreements with Turkey and Greece, but parallel to that with Malta, the EC-Cyprus association agreement made no reference to the prospect of Cyprus actually becoming a full member of the Community. The Turkish invasion of the island in the summer of 1974 and the de facto division of the territory thereafter dashed any hopes of furthering developing EC-Cypriot relations.

It was only in 1987 that the EC was prepared to move to the second stage of association. In July 1990 the (Greek) Cypriot leadership decided to apply for full EC membership in an effort to accelerate closer relations with the Community. In line with the 1960 Constitution of Cyprus which states that no decision in international affairs can be taken without both Greek and Turkish Cypriot assent, the Turkish Cypriots are opposing the application on the grounds that they were not consulted about the application to join the EC, which according to them makes it illegal.

Confronted with this unique application, the EC has done its utmost not to become directly involved in the Cypriot stalemate, opting instead to support whatever measures the UN was adopting to resolve the Cypriot issue. Nevertheless, the EC has continued to adopt a consistent line in its bilateral negotiations with Cyprus in the framework of the association agreement. Two principles have been constant throughout: firstly, that there is only one legitimate government of the Republic of Cyprus and that is the Greek Cypriot government; secondly, notwithstanding the first principle, that the benefits of EC association should accrue to both communities on the island. [*8]

In its Opinion Report on Cyprus' application to join the EC at the end of June 1993, the Commission delivered a positive message to the divided Island as an incentive to try break the Cypriot deadlock. First it emphasised that accession negotiations could commence as soon as there was sufficient certainty about the prospects for unification of the island. The Commission then added the proviso that if no prospects for agreement were in view by 1 January 1995, it would review the situation and assign responsibility for the failure. The Council would then decide whether or not to initiate negotiations with only part of the island, although solutions of a different nature could also be considered. [*9]

The inclusion of this statement clearly prevents the Turkish community the right of veto on accession. The EC's ultimate aspiration is that the threat of being branded the guilty party in peace talks will be enough to persuade both sides in the affair to reach some mutually beneficial agreement, rather than risk the alternative of being isolated completely by the Community.

MALTA

Malta signed an association agreement with the EC in December 1970 which came into effect the following April. The significance of this agreement is evidenced by the fact that since its inception, Malta's trade relations with the Community have steadily improved. The progressive elimination of trade barriers and import duties by the Community has resulted in a doubling of Maltese exports to the EC in the last five years alone. Recent statistics reveal that Malta's imports from the EC constitute around seventy-five per cent of total imports with the percentage of exports being slightly higher. [*10]

Immediately after taking office in 1987, the Nationalist Party announced that EC membership was its foremost goal. Accordingly, Malta submitted its EC application in July 1990, and has since launched a series of legislative and economic measures as part of a wider process of developing *communitaire attitudes* and adopting the Community's *acquis communitaire*.

In its Opinion Report on Malta's application to join the EC in June 1993, the Commission highlighted economic anomalies between the EC and Malta as a major stumbling block that would have to be resolved before accession negotiations could commence. As a result the Commission has proposed negotiating an "adjustment protocol" as a first step towards accession negotiations, supported by technical assistance from the Community. Essentially, the EC has confirmed Malta's eligibility to become a full member of the Community and has even offered its political and economic support. It now remains for the Maltese to develop and implement the prerequisite economic reforms cited in the *Avis* so that it can join the *fast-track* accession line along with Austria, Finland, Sweden and Norway.

Other problems that will have to be resolved before accession negotiations with both Cyprus and Malta can be finalised include:

* the institutional implications of having a Community with up to twenty members and what rules will govern so-called *micro-states*.

* the issue of neutrality and non-alignment, so that both Mediterranean Islands can adopt the EC's eventual common foreign and security policy as depicted in the Maastricht Treaty.

The Commission has already stated that deliberations on the subject of institutional implications of enlargement will commence immediately after ratification of Maastricht is complete and that Member States will debate the issue at the intergovernmental conference scheduled for 1996. As for the issue of neutrality, both Cyprus and Malta have already declared their willingness to apply the EC's common foreign and defence policy. Constitutional amendments will however also have to take place prior to the final phase of membership negotiations.

TURKEY

Turkey signed an association agreement with the EC on 12 September 1963. The agreement consisted of three stages: a preparatory stage of up to nine years, followed by a transitional stage of twelve to twenty two years and, finally, a final stage which could involve full membership, although no timetable was specified for this. In hindsight, the association agreement cannot be described as a success. An additional protocol was signed in November 1970 and four financial protocols have been agreed, although the most recent one remains blocked by the Greeks. More significantly, the formulation of this protocol underlined the incoherence in both Turkey and the EC's reasons for signing an association agreement in the first place.

Turkey's objective in establishing an EC association was that this would enhance its European identity and serve as a stepping stone towards full integration. The EC on the other hand have not been consistent in their dealings with Turkey, formulating policy on an ad hoc basis according primarily to Western security requirements. Consequently, it is not surprising that the association agreement collapsed economically in the mid-1970s and politically after the 1980 military coup.

In an attempt to reactivate relations with the Community, Turkey formally applied for full EC membership in April 1987. Immediately two basic problems were identified as major obstacles inhibiting any rapprochement between the two sides from taking place:

the Cyprus issue in the Council of Ministers, and the human rights issue in the European Parliament.

The Commissions deliberations over Turkey's application to join the EC centred upon four main areas: economic, political, strategic and cultural. In spite of recent economic growth, Turkey was identified as essentially a relatively poor underdeveloped country, whose economy was still dominant upon agricultural production. As a result the financial cost of assisting Turkish accession was regarded as substantial and would impinge upon the budgets of all the Community's main sources of revenue: the Common Agricultural Policy reserve, the European Investment Bank, and the Cohesion Fund that is envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty.

The principle political issues hampering closer EC-Turkish relations remain Turkey's position vis-a-vis Cyprus, and its ambiguous attitude towards Greece. Other concerns include the nature and development of Turkish democracy and its respect of human rights, particularly in their handling of the Kurds. Opponents of Turkish EC membership also cite the cultural differences between the two sides. With religion as their basis, they reiterate the historical enmity between Europe and the Ottoman Empire and the more recent fear of a resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism. Although such fears seem excessive, repetition of such arguments does nothing to narrow the differences of policy-makers in both Ankara and Brussels.

The one area which certainly supports the case for Turkish inclusion into the EC concerns strategic issues. Given its geographical location and its membership of NATO, Turkey is often described as a buffer between a stable Western Europe and a volatile Eastern Europe and Middle East. Turkey's role in the Gulf War re-established its position as an essential component in the western alliance at precisely the time when the end of the Cold War augured for Turkey to become a less significant player in international affairs.

The Commission issued its Opinion Report on Turkey's application on 20 December 1989, and summarized the negative arguments presented above. [*11] It stressed the weakness of the Turkish economy, its human rights record and its disagreements with Greece. As an alternative to full membership it proposed a revised and more comprehensive association agreement. In June 1990, the Commission announced full details of what it had in mind: the completion of the EC-Turkey customs union in 1995, the promotion of industrial and technological cooperation, the resumption and extension of the financial protocol and the reactivation of political and cultural exchanges. Turkey has subsequently recognized that EC membership would have to become a long-term objective but is seeking to establish a customs union by 1995 in an effort to revamp its EC goal.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE MAGHREB: THE EURO-MAGHREB

PARTNERSHIP CONCEPT.

The realities of geographical propinquity, economic interdependence, population movements and a host of other links, are all indicators of the urgent necessity of making the Mediterranean a drawbridge rather than an EC moat. The communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament entitled: *The Future Of Relations Between The Community And The Maghreb*, announces the new concept of establishing a Euro-Maghreb partnership in place of the development cooperation policy, which if effectively followed through will serve as a first step towards creating such a model. [*12]

The Commission's objective in launching this new concept is to deliver a reassuring political and economic message to the countries involved. As if to emphasise that it

realized that its past initiatives were quickly being superseded by international developments, the EC stipulated that its ultimate goal is to establish a Euro-Maghreb economic area. [*13]

A number of key elements essential to the economic restructuring of the Maghreb were identified and integrated into the Community's new strategy towards the region. These include schemes to foster economic reforms, increase investment and job creation projects, develop trade liberalization, contain population growth, and enhance political liberalization.

Direct foreign investment statistics for the last decade indicate the urgent need to overhaul the system to create a much more conducive environment for economic activity. [*14] Although Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia are all at different stages in their structural adjustment programmes, the Community has identified a series of support schemes to assist these countries through this process. These include technical assistance in sectors such as fiscal and financial reforms, and restructuring businesses; support for sensitive social sectors such as health care, education, housing programmes, where the most strict budgetary measures would be too momentous to handle without safety nets; direct support for schemes linking vocational training and job creation such as privatisation and the creation of small business ventures.

An essential feature of the partnership concept envisaged by the Community is the complimentary development of both vertical and horizontal integration, which to date has been lacking substantially. Although the first attempt at setting up a single Maghreb institution dates back to 1958, most of the region's diplomatic efforts and resources have been consumed in coping with the implications of independence and regional disputes.

Significant progress was finally made towards the latter part of the eighties culminating in the setting up of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) between Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco and Mauritania, in Marrakech on 17 February 1989. Unfortunately, the economies of the Maghreb are entirely outward looking. In fact, there is no Maghreb economy as such, with only five per cent of trade being regional. Many reasons are prohibiting the development of a horizontal integration process. A strong element of protectionism in the form of tariffs and numerous non-tariff barriers are still in place. The fundamental necessity to generate hard currency revenue has led the Maghrebi countries to emphasise the expansion of export industries. Despite, historical, religious and linguistic affinities, there is no tradition of regional trade.

Plans to provide the infrastructure necessary for transporting commodities `horizontally` rather than `vertical` are still in their infancy. [*15] A unified transport and communications system is however envisaged, which includes a `trans-Maghreb highway and railway`, and a joint airline, Air Maghreb, for domestic freight and passenger flights in the countries of the Arab Maghreb. [*16]

The Community has adopted a series of initiatives in its new partnership concept to encourage this process of horizontal integration. These include concluding agreements leading to the creation of a customs union between Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia; providing technical assistance specifically focused on the integration process; financing projects with a regional impact; and establishing Community-Maghreb dialogue at all levels and in every field, with a view to promoting inter-Maghreb cooperation.

One area which the Community has so far failed to develop with its Maghreb counterparts is a comprehensive policy which addresses population growth and its potential impact on migratory trends.

While estimates vary, most forecasts predict that the total population of the Maghreb will double by the year 2025. [*17] Even if the Maghreb is included in the European

Economic Area (EEA), the need for a pan-European immigration policy will still be required to deal with the potential wave of emigration that could be triggered by declining living standards and rising unemployment.

Since the introduction of the Single European Act, the European Community immigration policy has become even more restrictive. The often cited phrase, `fortress Europe`, is characteristic of the EC's recent political tendencies in the immigration sector.

As an alternative, Europe should seek to identify its probable economic need, and capacity to absorb immigrant labour, which some analysts calculate will be as high as thirty per cent to overcome the shortfall in European labour supply. On the basis of that estimate, some observers advocate the introduction of a North American style points system of qualification for immigrants, weighted by regional origin. [18] Mediterranean cooperation in general and AMU cooperation in particular should be enhanced in this sector by guaranteeing legal immigrants access to social benefits schemes after their arrival. A pan-European approach will also minimize the adverse social consequences and share out the financial cost equally among the recipient countries.

Dealing with the symptoms without focusing upon the cause of the demographic problem will however never result in a satisfactory outcome. An increase in the standard of living will prove impossible to achieve if population growth continues unabated. As a result the Community also envisages supporting birth control policies throughout the Maghreb, in an effort to at least contain the demographic explosion that will otherwise affect the region.

The EC also seeks to enhance the trend towards political liberalization in the Maghreb by linking economic assistance to democratic reforms. Apart from the ethical imperatives of forging a society based on liberty and the respect of human rights, it is gradually becoming apparent that in the post-Cold War era a virtually symbiotic relationship between liberalization and development is occurring. As referred to in the discussion concerning foreign direct investment, the Maghreb can only hope to experience economic growth if it can present itself as an economically and politically stable region.

The long-term objective of the Community is therefore not only to anchor the southern shores of the Mediterranean to Europe in a technical or economic sense, but also in a political and social sense. Prospects for achieving this goal vary from one country to another. For instance, relations with Morocco and Tunisia are at an advanced stage, while those with Algeria and Mauritania are yet to take off. A major stumbling block remains the stalemate with Libya over the Lockerbie affair.

Furthermore, besides the various assistance programmes mentioned earlier in the Mediterranean Policy review, the EC is also introducing a series of what it terms as "new" instruments to bolster its partnership with the Maghreb. Technical assistance is one of the main support schemes that fall into this category. In order to remove certain bottle-necks in Maghrebi economic systems, the EC intends to promote economic restructuring plans that are currently being introduced in Central and Eastern Europe. These include: creation of stock markets, establishing effective and fair taxation systems, restructuring the public sector, privatisation, and the training of business instructors.

The EC in close cooperation with multilateral institutions also envisages creating a balance of payments support reserve for the mobilization of guarantees. Although Mediterranean debt has not reached the horrific heights of Latin American figures, the EC realizes that rapid economic development will not take place as long as excessive debt servicing continues to absorb a disproportionate amount of foreign currency

earnings. To date the Community has however offered no new initiatives to help tackle the debt problem many countries in the Mediterranean are experiencing. This must therefore be identified as a definite weakness in the Community's efforts to help the region move closer in economic terms to Europe, and will have to be addressed soon if the EC's ambitious targets of growth are to be achieved. [19]

The third "new" instrument that the EC hopes to accelerate in future cooperation agreements with countries throughout the Mediterranean is investment financing. As energy is one of the few privileged sectors for horizontal cooperation especially in the Maghreb region, a large proportion of the ECU 1.8 billion available from the EIB will be directed towards this field. [20] In addition to the pipeline linking Algeria and Italy via Tunisia which has seen its throughput capacity double since it came into service in 1983, preparatory work on a second gas pipeline from Algeria across Morocco and the Straits of Gibraltar to Spain are already underway. [21]

EUROPEAN COMMUNITY RELATIONS IN THE BALKANS AND THE MIDDLE EAST:

The longer the conflict in the former Yugoslavia continues, the longer it will take for the Balkan Republics to have any chance of closing the economic gap that exists between them and their western counterparts. Cooperation agreements with both Slovenia and Albania in November 1992 could serve as blueprints for the other Balkan Republics once hostilities in the area terminate. These could eventually be negotiated into association agreements similar to the "Europe Agreements" signed with the Visegrad countries. [22]

In the meantime, there is little chance of the Community directly influencing the course of the Balkan war. The Twelve's indecision and reactive approach during the initial stages of the conflict have more or less relegated the Community to the sidelines, once again leaving the Americans to fill the vacuum. The EC's authority and importance in the region may still be revived if its member states are seen to stand four square behind any UN brokered solution. They must also actively participate in the implementation of any eventual peace plan that is agreed upon by the warring factions.

On the other hand it is worth remembering that the EC does not yet have an institutionalised provision for undertaking common military action. Both the Gulf and the Balkan conflicts have drawn attention to the complexities that have to be dealt with before the EC can achieve its Maastricht goal of a comprehensive and united foreign and defence policy. Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty will introduce a new impetus to commence work on improving the EC's foreign policy machinery.

In the interim the best prospects for an increase of EC involvement in both the Balkans and the Middle East remains in the diplomatic arena. The resumption of the Community's political and economic relations in the Middle East after the Gulf war, and the acceptance of the EC's participation in the Middle East Peace Conference by all parties, including Israel, is recognition of the EC's potential. The lack of any alternatives to the proposals put forward by EC envoys in the Balkans is also evidence of the positive, though limited, contribution, the EC can make in these out-of-area crises.

CONCLUSION:

As stated earlier, the EC has charted three distinct routes under its all encompassing Mediterranean Policy for expanding its influence throughout the basin:

* through pre-accession negotiation with Cyprus, Malta, and eventually Turkey.

* through the Euro-Maghreb partnership with Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Mauritania, and perhaps eventually Libya.

* through development cooperation and diplomatic involvement in the Balkans and the Middle East.

The prospects of any EC expansion in the Mediterranean will be highly dependent upon the ability of the Community to introduce and implement a series of policies that are conducive to narrowing the growing disparities amongst its southern flank neighbours.

Firstly, the Community must realise economic policies aimed at overhauling the stagnant economies of Mediterranean countries. Such an exercise not only involves the channelling of financial assistance as provided for by the EC Financial protocols, but also the fostering of horizontal integration, at least among regional states such as those of the Maghreb. Establishing a structure such as a Euro-Mediterranean Development Bank (EMDB), would help in coordinating EC and international initiatives in this sector. Strict vetting of the new bank's regulations would avoid fraud and the duplication of effort within existing national or international financial institutions. [23]

Secondly, the Community must make a conscious effort not to develop a north-east bias in its external relations. The rapid rate at which EFTA applications are being processed has already aroused suspicion and criticism among Mediterranean EC applicants. Any co-development policies offered to Central and Eastern Europe must therefore also be extended to the South if the Community does not want to be accused of marginalising the Mediterranean. [24]

However, the likelihood of the EC developing such an integrated policy towards all of its neighbours remains remote. Certain factors are likely to help keep the countries of Central Europe high on the EC assistance list. For instance: the existence of common land borders makes the mass migration threat from the East more extreme than that from the `South`, where the Mediterranean Sea acts as a formidable barrier; the significant military arsenals still stockpiled in the East are considered more of a potential threat than the weaker military capabilities of countries along the southern shores of the Mediterranean; the opportunity to reap quicker and higher economic returns in the more advanced Central European countries than from the more under-developed economies of the Middle East and North Africa. All of these issues will work against the Mediterranean non-member nation's aspiration of climbing higher up the Community's priority list. [25]

Finally, EC influence in the Mediterranean is of course contingent upon EC integration itself. The Maastricht ratification process saw the re-emergence of Euro-pessimism and sclerosis, characteristic of the late seventies and early eighties. Now that this period of soul-searching seems to be over, the debate concerning EC cohesiveness must again be approached. Progress towards European Union is a prerequisite to EC expansion in the Mediterranean. In addition, the northern and southern EC member states must concentrate on finding ways to harmonize their interests if an internal EC `North-South` divide is to be avoided. In short, unless the Community can deepen its own integration process, it will quickly lose the gravitational pull it has over its neighbours.

International events since 1989 - the implosion of the Soviet Union, the Gulf War and the Balkan civil war - have established a volatile and uncertain periphery around the European Community. Lacking the luxury of having both stick and carrot measures to select from, the Community has had to rely upon diplomatic initiatives to contain potential challenges (proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, state sponsored terrorism, illegal immigration) to Western European security. The outcome, inevitably, has been a track record more similar to Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasement during the inter-war years than the West's collective plan of action during the recent Gulf war.

Ratification of the Maastricht Treaty will allow the Twelve to commence deliberations on the creation of a common foreign and security policy. The implementation of such a foreign policy decision-making process will be much more conducive to the development of a proactive leadership forum that has so far been absent in European Community external affairs. In sum, strengthening the EC's core will enhance EC prospects of participating in international peace-keeping and peace-making efforts, especially in the Mediterranean region.

ANNEX

FIGURE 1

INVESTISSEMENT ETRANGER DIRECT (net)

Moyenne annuelle millions USD	1983/1984	1985/1987	1988/1990	1990
ALGERIE	0,5	3,0	8,3	0,0
MAROC	46.5	27.0	139.0	165.0
TUNISIE	148.5	87.7	65.7	58.0
TOTAL	195.5	117.7	213.0	223.0
A titre de comparaison :				
EGYPTE	609.5	1.114.3	1.250.7	947.0
TURQUIE	79.5	113.0	571.3	697.0
Source : World Bank				

ANNEX

FIGURE 2 .

EC FINANCIAL PROTOCOLS WITH SOUTHERN AND EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES

TABLE 1

EC Financial protocols in force or under negotiation with Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries at 1 May 1991[1] (million ecu)

		Budgetary resources		Loans from EIB resources	Total
		Grant aid	Risk capital operations		
Algeria	III	52	4	183	239
	IV	52	18	280	350
Egypt	III	189	11	249	449
	IV	242	16	310	568
Jordan	III	35	2	63	100
	IV	44	2	80	126
Israel	III	0	0	63	63
	IV	0	0	82	82
Lebanon	III	19	1	53	73
	IV	22	2	45	69
Morocco	III	162	11	151	324
	IV	193	25	220	438
Syria	III	34	2	110	146
	IV	41	2	115	158
Tunisia	III	87	6	131	224
	IV	101	15	168	284
Total	III	578	37	1003	1618
	IV	695	80	1300	2075

1. For the period covered by the IV Financial Protocol (November 1991-October 1996) budgetary resources will include on additional 300 million ecus in grant aid to support economic reforms. Account should also be taken of the following resources allocated for "horizontal" financial cooperation in 1992-96: 2030 million ecus, 230 million of which are from budgetary resources (205 million in grant aid and 25 million in risk capital operations) and 1800 million ecus in loans from EIB resources. As for Turkey, the IV Financial Protocol initialled in 1981, but not yet signed, provides for 600 million ecus, allocated as follows: 50 million ecus in grant aid from budgetary resources; 225 million ecus in loans from EIB resouces; and 325 million ecus in loans on special conditions.

Source: European Investment Bank, *1990 Annual Report* (Luxembourg: EIB, 1991).

FIGURE 3

Immigration and migrants in the Europe of the 1990s

Table 1

Refugee and asylum applications in Europe (thousands)

	1985	1987	1989	1990	1991
Belgium	5.3	6.0	8.4	13.0	15.2
Denmark	8.7	2.8	4.6	5.3	4.6
France	25.8	27.6	61.0	56.0	46.5
Germany	73.8	57.4	121.0	193.0	256.0
[Aussiedler]	-	-	377.0	397.0	200.0
Greece	1.4	7.0	-	5.4	152.0*
Italy	5.4	11.0	2.2	4.7	31.7
Netherlands	5.7	13.5	14.0	21.0	21.6
Portugal	0.1	0.5	-	.	.
Spain	2.4	2.5	3.9	12.0*	13.0*
UK	5.9	5.0	15.5	30.0	57.7
Austria				22.8	27.3
Switzerland				36.0	41.6

* indicates unreliable figure

Sources: *Financial Times*, 4.3.92, p3; see also footnote 2

Table 2

Projected population growth and age structure 1989-2025

Population (millions)

	1989	2000	2025
Algeria	24	33	52
Morocco	25	32	48
Tunisia	8	10	14
Turkey	55	68	92

Age structure (%)

	[0-14]		[15-64]	
	1989	2025	1989	2025
Algeria	44	26	52	69
Morocco	41	26	55	68
Tunisia	38	24	56	68
Turkey	35	23	61	68

Source: World Development Report 1991, Table 26

Table 3

Estimate of illegally present non-nationals (thousands)

	Illegal immigrants	Illegal refugees
France	200	
Germany	350	300
Italy	600	
Spain	300	
Switzerland	100	
Other	400	350
Total	1,950	650

Source, see footnote 3

FIGURE 4

Total External Debt of Mediterranean Countries

Country	Total External Debt (Millions of US dollars)			Debt as a Percentage of GNP		
	1989	1990	1991	1989	1990	1991
Malta	410	598	612	20.2	24.0	23.1
Cyprus	2,105	3,023	3,213	46.5	59.6	60.2
Turkey	41,387	49,170	50,250	53.5	46.2	48.1
Yugoslavia[1]	- -	551	- -	- -	- -	- -
Albania	- -	- -	- -	- -	27.6	- -
Morocco	21,710	23,620	21,219	100.0	94.6	80.0
Algeria	28,574	29,794	28,636	53.3	51.6	70.4
Tunisia	6,940	7,713	8,296	71.6	64.0	66.2
Libya[2]	5,231	- -	- -	19.7	- -	- -
Egypt	51,498	40,104	40,571	165.4	126.7	130.2
Lebanon	1,187	1,965	1,858	- -	- -	- -
Syria	16,881	16,446	16,815	169.2	118.1	- -
Israel	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -
Jordan	7,395	8,328	8,641	181.5	237.6	225.3

Sources: Exept where superscripted, World Debt Tables, 1992-93, IMF.
1. ABECOR
2. OECD, Debt as a % of GDP.

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13) ibid., p. 5. See also Time International, 14 June 1993, pp. 36-37.

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Gökdüğ GÜÇLÜ

TURKISH - EC RELATIONS

What is and what will be Turkey's place in the new
architecture of Europe, the plans for which are being drafted
each day as a result of the upheavals taking place in the old
communist bloc. Will Turkey with its central geographic
location between west and east, between Mediterranean and
Russia be relegated to a strictly regional role?

By formally declaring on April 14, 1987 its wish to join
to European Community as a full member, Turkish leaders with
the support of all the social, political dimensions of
society have replied to these questions. "Turkey confirms its
traditional goal wich is to align itself with a Europe that
is politically plural, economically liberal, rich in its
cultural diversity and strategically necessary to the defence
and security of the west" said Mr.Özdem Sanberk, permenant
delegate to the European Communities at that time. (The
Outlook for EC-Turkish Relations, 1991, pp.17)

The Commission and the 12 replied nearly three years
later. They said that there was no issue as Turkey's
eligibility to become a member of the EC, but that her
candidature was premature in that the Turkish Economy was
still insufficiently developed to compete within the
constraint of the EC's emerging single market, ther was also

the consideration of the deepening process in which the Community was engaged with the two projects of economic and monetary union and political union.

Further review of Turkey's accession dossier has, thus, been pushed until after 1993. As compensation, however, Brussels agreed to renegotiate the bilateral association agreement and economic cooperation in terms more favorable to Turkey.

The choice made by Turkey to link her future to that of Europe is not a recent one, nor was in 1963 when the association agreement was signed with the Europe of six. The full effect of this decision did not become apparent until after the second World War, when Turkey began seriously to reestablish links with Western Europe. She was among the first countries to join the Council of Europe, and one of the members of NATO. The presentation of Turkey's official bid to become a full member of the European Community in April 1987 was, thus, only a new stage in this process.

The collapse of communism in the countries of central and Eastern Europe as well as in the USSR itself, the end of the separation between East and West, and the struggles to influence the Middle East and the Mediterranean, all reinforce rather that weaken Turkey's position as a geo-strategic crossroads for the countries of Europe. As a key

component of its European foreign policy, Turkey affirms her primary role in European security and defense affairs. From the begining of the Cold War, Turkey played a vital part in the West defense structure, thanks to geographic position giving her common borders with the Balkans, with Syria, Iraq, and the former Soviet Union. The Gulf Crisis and more recent confrontations in northern Iraq have underlined the continuing strategic importance of Turkey.

After thirty years of associate relations with the twelve, Turkey has widened its European relations in a new accord with the seven countries of EFTA. The accord is an ambitious undertaking envisaging a progressive demantling of tariffs and elimination of all restrictions to commercial relations.

The countries of the community are not only Turkey's main source of investment, they have also been for a long time and remain Turkey's principal trading partner. In 1970, for example, the Community absorbed 53 % of Turkish exports an accounted for 42 % of Turkey's import. These figures which have evolved during the last twenty years have not changed the importance of the EC in the context of trade with Turkey.

The Community, on the other hand, has failed on two essential issues. One is free circulation of the workers, and the other is financial cooperation. However, despite this

failing by the Community to fulfill those obligations, Turkey is persisting in carrying out her obligations under the customs union. The signs, so far, 60 % of the tariff reductions on the 12 year list, and 50 % on the 22 year list. The allignment of the Common Customs Tariff (CCT) to the order of 40 % and 20 %, the consolidation at 60 % of all the liberalization measures applied to import from the EC. These are strong indications of Turkey's determination to continue along this path.

There are several additional points that need to be mentioned with regard to Turkish - EC relations. The integration of Turkey will reduce the problems of economies of scale, an initial stimulus for the European Common Market. The enlargement of the Community market with the addition of the Turkish economy may provide a comparative advantage to Turkish and European companies, especially in areas where Turkey has competitive advantage. This will also increase the competition within the EC market, leading to more efficiency in EC economies. Finally, one should add that increased technology and know-how flows will also strengthen the position of the Turkish economy.

OBSTACLES TO STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST:
An Overview of Context and Linkages

Paper presented to the Halki International Seminars '93:
Cooperation and Security in Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean
Halki/Rhodes, Greece, 29 August-11 September 1993

Gerd Nonneman
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1. Introduction

The brief for this paper was to consider the chief obstacles to internal, or domestic, stability in the Middle East. Any such overview risks a number of things: first, to be all too brief, given the complexity of the situation - and particularly given the plethora of specific current events one might want covered. Second, it risks missing essential parts of the dynamics which explain instances of domestic stability, by remaining focused on the domestic scene only. And thirdly, it risks falling into a groove which is essentially journalistic - and thence being accused of lacking academic or theoretical rigour. No single paper, therefore, could comprehensively and satisfactorily address the subject. The main limitation which has been self-imposed below in order to cope at least with the first risk, is that this will not be a review of current events. The second risk will, it is hoped, be avoided by the overview of obstacles to stability provided in the second half of this paper (section 4). While this concentrates on matters of an international nature as well as on domestic ones, this is deemed necessary because of the intertwining dynamics of domestic and international affairs in the Middle East. It is as pointless to try to understand much of Middle Eastern foreign policy without reference to domestic issues, as it is to attempt an analysis of domestic dynamics without reference to the regional and international context and issues. It is, on the whole, both impossible and futile to disentangle the question of instability in one realm from that in the other. As regards the third risk, it is true that much writing about the Middle East in recent times has tended to be 'empirical', rather at the expense of more theoretical analysis. Section 4 below might be perceived in that light as well, in part because of its summary nature. While it is, nevertheless, in part rooted in an attempt at conceptualisation, the prominence of 'empirical facts' needs no apology: much theory-building has at times tended to obscure reality, as much as to enlighten it. This, of course, is not an excuse for giving it up altogether. In the first half of this paper (sections 2 and 3), a brief overview of some theoretical issues will attempt to place the subsequent list of obstacles in a more 'rigorous' context.

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2. Some remarks on theories of stability

2.1. Theoretical eclecticism and regional specification

The assumption adopted here, is that general, global models are not particularly useful at best, and that theoretical eclecticism needs to be combined with regional or even system specification. The main existing theories of political instability in states can be grouped in four categories: (1) sociological theories (the functionalist and the structuralist schools); (2) socio-psychological theories, which encompass both cognitive psychological, and frustration-aggression theories; (3) political theories; and (4) factor-analytic studies and other empirical, statistically-based analyses. Each of these have something interesting to say, and alert us to certain aspects of the dynamics being studied. Yet none of them, taken by themselves, offer a satisfactory framework for cross-national explanations of the phenomenon. One of the best efforts at operationalising these theories in statistical terms and measurable variables, by David Sanders, leads to the following conclusion:

> what emerges quite clearly from the empirical analysis... is that *considered in isolation* none of these theories (and they include both Marxist and non-Marxist theories) provides even a marginally adequate explanation of the cross-national incidence of political instability.[1]

He argues that one should follow

> the principles of the 'retroductive' account of scientific explanation and attempt to retain those *parts* of theories which are of consistent explanatory value, and organise them into probabilistic predictive models. In short, it is argued that we can only *start* to explain why political instability occurs by drawing on a variety of different (and largely unrelated) theoretical propositions.

This necessarily means more limited objectives than theory builders have usually had. Sanders elsewhere defends this approach with a robust but justified statement:

> Either we continue to undertake analysis at a high level of abstraction and remain fundamentally uncertain as to whether the empirical analysis we undertake 'really' tests the theoretical propositions which have been advanced, or we cease to claim that fairly rudimentary empirical results constitute support for sophisticated theoretical propositions.[2]

What is proposed hereafter, then, is not to reject any theory-building altogether. Rather, aware of the many regional variations, as well as of the limited usefulness of grand global theories, and the necessity to draw upon insights dispersed throughout

the many theories and models already put forward, it is possible to lift out of the various models those indicators which appear to have been generally corroborated by empirical evidence, and use them as a guide to the kinds of factors that might influence political (in)stability in particular case studies.

This will result in a list of indicators, all of which have a fairly high probability of being effectively related to political stability. These indicators are thus useful in themselves, but the list does not constitute a dismissal of theory: indeed, the indicators in it will to a considerable extent have been suggested by previous theory-building, and they can, at the same time, be supported by elements of such theories - elements which can be retained. It should be noted, also, that the validity of the indicators does not depend upon the whole of the theories or models from which they have been lifted being correct. It *is* possible, however, to use the indicators in a *framework,* a guide for one's thoughts. The construction of such a framework is beyond the scope of the present paper, however.

One is left, then, with two sets of potential explanatory factors for political (in)stability in any particular country: on the one hand there are those which appear to be usually valid (judged by cross-national empirical analysis); on the other there are culture- and system-specific factors. The latter depend mainly on the particular political culture prevailing in the country or area in question. There is a partial overlap: thus, among those variables which are usually found to be valid predictors of stability, there is that of higher legitimacy - itself very much determined by the political culture. On the other hand, system-specific elements help determine the degree to which, and the way in which, the 'generally valid predictors' actually influence stability. Among the system-specific factors there are abstract ones - such as the attitude to power and to violence - and the concrete one of the population's perception of a regime's legitimacy. In addition, there are system-specific factors which are 'hard facts', such as the available resources, geography, etc.

All of the above implies that, in addition to identifying those usually valid predictors, it is also necessary to keep in mind the types of societies which are being examined. This means focusing on aspects of the political culture which may be peculiar to a particular country. It also throws up the wider question of which evolutionary model best describes (and predicts) societies' development - and indeed, whether different models are applicable to different societies.

2.2. Which evolutionary model?

The obvious persistence of traditional forms and values persisting in the Middle East (and indeed elsewhere), means that one cannot simply employ a straightforward 'modernisation' paradigm, and accept that these societies and systems move from

3

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to legitimacy in fast modernizing, culturally heterogeneous societies'.[8] The model's underlying assumption of an inexorable progression from traditionality towards rationality-legality (whether stable or not), however, must be doubtful.

The *mosaic* model

> emphasizes the persistence of primordial and parochial loyalties even during rapid modernization, and in some conditions even predicts their strengthening. The implications of this model for building legitimacy is that reconciliation, bargaining, and conflict management procedures are the only viable course short of brutal, forced assimilation for achieving community.[9]

In Geertz's formulation, such primordial attachments stem 'from the 'givens' - or, more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed 'givens' - of social existence'.[10] What he calls 'primordial discontent', then, tends to crystallise around the following foci: (1) assumed blood ties; (2) race; (3) language; (4) region; (5) religion; and (6) custom.[11]

It is argued here that an approach based on the mosaic model has much to recommend it in the context of the Middle East - especially in countries such as Oman and Yemen. Indeed, South Yemen's experiment with transformationism not only proved in some ways a failure, it also did not stop 'primordial' attachments from surviving and powerfully re-emerging for instance during the 1986 civil war. In fact, ethno-religious and cultural fragmentation in countries has been shown to remain an extremely potent force for instability. This writer would second Harik's appraisal that

> the new states of the Middle East are in need of accommodating particularist tendencies and by constructive policy channeling them in the service of the civic order with patience and endurance.[12]

This is not to argue for the imposition or reinforcement of rigid confessional, tribal and other barriers - as that would clearly be counter-productive in terms of political development and long-term stability: witness Lebanon. But it is to urge an awareness and recognition of real identities and loyalties, the better to be able to achieve reconciliation, peaceful development, and ultimate state consolidation where appropriate.

2.3. Ingredients of stability: the global picture

Moving now to the list of usually valid stability-enhancing factors (in some way related to regime action), a review of the literature allows the 'distillation' of 26 such factors, which have received considerable empirical corroboration in addition to, in many cases, being explained by elements of theory.[13]

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(1) Regime legitimacy (Gurr; Hudson; implied in the majority of other approaches).

(2) Preservation of traditional social structures (Kornhauser; Arendt).

(3) Avoiding a rate and type of modernisation which disrupts traditional bases of solidarity, makes some groups lose out, and creates new groups opposed to prevalent authority structures, without increasing, to a higher extent, the regime's (or system's) capability to handle this (Huntington; Feierabends; Wriggins).

(4) Avoiding (relative) deprivation (Gurr).

(5) Offering channels for political and economic mobility (Huntington; Gurr; Adelman & Hihn).

(6) Giving 'the chief enterprising groups' the 'opportunities for getting on in this world' (Brinton).

(7) Offering channels for the venting of grievances (explicit or implicit in most approaches, but especially the frustration-aggression school and in the functionalist framework).

(8) Raising the general level of affluence (Aristotle; Lipset; Sigelman & Simpson; Parvin; Weede; Hibbs).

(9) Reducing income inequality (the focus on land inequality is more important the more rural a society is). Some have argued that the evidence is inconclusive (Hardy; Weede). Sigelman & Simpson's remark that income inequality, some inconclusive evidence notwithstanding, may in fact be significantly related to political violence within individual countries over time, rather than in a cross-national test (given, also, varying dynamics and mediating influences in different countries), would seem to offer the most fitting interpretation.

(10) Avoiding the impact on the population of a sudden widening of the gap between expectations and fulfilment (whether this is in a context of rising expectations against a drop in satisfaction, a sudden rise in expectations against level performance, or level expectations against a drop in fulfilment) (Davies; Gurr; Tilly).

(11) Avoiding differential allocation of resources between (relatively) deprived groups (Gurr).

(12) Avoiding group discrimination (Hibbs).

(13) Minimising change in group value positions, i.e. maintaining the status quo in the distribution of social, economic and political goods (Gurr).

(14) Even distribution of benefits if progress occurs (Gurr).

(15) If necessity dictates that some groups lose out, 'discontent can be reduced by increasing the number and scope of value opportunities for the less advantaged groups' (Gurr)[14]
   - see point 5.

(16) Focusing on keeping the intensity and scope of elite (relative) deprivation low: Gurr[15] has plausibly indicated that of four possible outcomes (minimal violence; turmoil; conspiracy; internal war), the only ones implying a high likelihood of extra-legal/violent regime change are the latter two, and they are more likely at high levels of elite (relative) deprivation.

(17) Institutionalisation (Hibbs; Huntington - the latter measures it by four aspects: adaptability; complexity; autonomy; and coherence).

(18) Adaptability of the regime, indicated by its previous effectiveness in dealing with relative deprivation (Gurr).

(19) Capacity for political development on the part of the regime (Huntington).

(20) Elite consensus (Field; Castles; also Huntington, in his 'coherence' criterion for the level of political institutionalisation - see point 17).

(21) Ability of 'governments and polity members to incorporate new strata into the polity and provide adequate compensation for loser groups' (Tilly)[16].

(22) The scope of the population under surveillance (Gurr).

(23) Consistency of regime sanctions (Gurr).

(24) Maintaining the loyalty of regime forces (Gurr).

(25) In case of relatively mild politicised discontent: minimising the resources devoted to internal security, and applying sanctions with consistency and leniency; in

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case of severe politicised discontent: maximising surveillance, while maintaining 'a policy of relative leniency' (Gurr).[17]

(26) Lower level of dependency (Chilcote & Edelstein; Cockroft *et al;* Kling; O'Kane; Sanders). This is a novel element in the approach to the study of political (in)stability, bringing in the international environment and its political effects - domestically generated or otherwise. The level of dependency may be measured by Duvall's criteria, among others. These are (1) the degree of reliance on imports, (2) the ratio of exports to GDP, (3) commodity concentration of exports, and (4) the number of major trading partners. The nature and extent of this claimed link are somewhat problematic (it will be obvious that many mediating factors play a role), but it appears too significant to omit.

Somewhat simplifying the above, and putting it in a manageable framework, it is argued here that regimes' survival rests on three pillars, *viz.* control, acquiescence, and support. In order to understand the support factor in particular, it is necessary to devote special attention to the concept of legitimacy, which is the key ingredient for such support.

3. Legitimacy

3.1. Legitimacy: a general discussion

Regimes have access to a whole range of strategies for survival. Legitimacy, in turn, is a crucial ingredient in - but not synonymous with - stability and survival. Indeed, both domestically and internationally, much of the instability (and potential for instability) observed has been shown to have its root cause in people's (and peoples') perception that the existing order is not a 'legitimate' one - that is: one which would find acceptance as right and proper among the great majority of those concerned.

One may differ with Hudson when he states that 'political legitimacy cannot be bought.'[18] Indeed, the remaining 'cynicism' which he observes where such acceptance has been 'bought' with welfare etc., is little different from that found in industrial societies, and thus does not necessarily mean that there is no legitimacy. Nevertheless, it will be recognised that other building blocks may be more important. It will, in any case, be necessary to have three different - if related - arguments: (1) one for legitimacy proper; (2) one for popular acquiescence (it is particularly, but not solely, here that the provision of welfare and specific benefits will be very important); and (3) control (surveillance and the sanction of violence). Together, these are the three routes to, or sources of, survival and stability.

Whereas the sources of control (backed by the sanction of violence) and acquiescence (self-interest and, in some cases, custom) are comparatively clear, those of legitimacy warrant some further attention. As Wriggins put it: 'with legitimacy, much is simple; without it, everything is difficult.'[19] As defined above, the concept does not include mere passive acceptance - although, when passive acceptance of authority would be the norm, this would make the regime in power legitimate. What makes a regime or a state legitimate will differ from place to place, and from time to time. In modern Western discourse the concept has come to mean something quite different, for instance, from pre-modern times. Then, political authority was usually assumed to be anchored in some kind of 'cosmic order,' which brought with it virtually automatic legitimacy - the situation labelled 'traditional' by Weber and other theorists of legitimacy and political development. It is only with the writings of people like Rousseau that the concept came to be formulated explicitly as based on human will (secular, rational). As Connolly puts it, 'if the established order does not reflect a cosmic order then any of its prohibitions, demands or rules that go against the will constitute infringements of freedom' and are therefore illegitimate.[20] However, neither is it a wholly 'modernised' society which is being examined in this case, nor is it accepted here that 'the traditional' necessarily has to disappear at all. The elements of legitimacy in the region of interest to the present study, therefore, are inevitably complex.

The basic importance of legitimacy, as expressed in Wriggins' eloquently simple phrase, has been recognised explicitly by almost every scholar of stability and political development since Weber (not forgetting the earlier exponents, of course - after all Aristotle already tackled the subject). In essence this understanding comes down to the fact that, while a ruling individual, group or institution may stay in power through coercion or on the basis of   custom, 'the most stable support will derive from the conviction on the part of the member [of the system] that it is right and proper for him to accept' the authorities' rule.[21] The importance of this factor for political stability was demonstrated also by the empirical studies referred to above.

What, then, are the bases upon which a system or regime can be recognised as legitimate - recognising that these may vary depending on the degree of 'modernisation' a society or system has undergone? Weber identified four such resources: (1) tradition; (2) positive emotional attitudes; (3) rational belief in absolute values; and (4) recognition of legality. Easton, perhaps more pertinent for those interested in the policy-oriented question of how to improve a regime's or leader's chances of acquiring, strengthening or maintaining legitimacy, proposes to classify these instruments or legitimacy resources under three headings: (1) personal, (2) ideological, and (3) structural.[22] To large extent, these could be interpreted as running parallel with Weber's (2)(3)(4) (not tradition).

Rawaf interestingly re-ordered the 'five crises in political development' as they were put forward by the Social Sciences Research Council.[23] The latter identified (1) the Identity Crisis, relating to the question of bringing nation and state into alignment; (2) the Legitimacy Crisis; (3) the Participation Crisis; (4) the Penetration Crisis, which relates to the problem of 'creating a political infrastructure of formal institutions linking the rulers and the ruled for the purpose of implementing government policy and securing compliance,' as Bill & Hardgrave put it;[24] and (5) the Distribution Crisis, relating to the allocation of resources. Rawaf[25] assumes an unsystematic interdependence among the four crises of Identity, Participation, Penetration, and Distribution, but a systematic one among the five in that the above four influence Legitimacy. His ultimate focus, therefore, is on Legitimacy. He argues that, even if certain revolutions (e.g. Russia, China) may have been the result of situations where the system was going through participation and distribution crises, the actual direct cause was still the resulting legitimacy crisis. (This is true as far as it goes, but again this scheme must not be considered as the complete answer: a regime which lacks legitimacy may, after all, still remain in power by other means).

3.2. Hudson on legitimacy in the Middle East

The crises identified by Rawaf can be argued to apply in particular to the Middle East. Indeed, Rawaf's own focus was precisely that region. It is worth, however, returning to the classic work by Hudson: the subtitle of his *Arab Politics* was 'The search for Legitimacy,' because 'the central problem of government in the Arab world today is political legitimacy.'[26] To whichever combination of transformationist, social mobilisation and mosaic approaches one subscribes, it is undeniable that the impact of modernisation on traditional Arab societies has caused severe tensions and even dislocations, destroying some existing legitimacy resources and inhibiting others; it can hardly be doubted that the Arab world's hovering between tradition and a bewildering array of forms of modernity is a major cause of the lack of legitimacy (and stability) experienced in the region until today. Yet Hudson[27] does not make sufficiently explicit the importance (perhaps it could be considered part of those societal transformations) of the impact of external forces, such as imperial powers' policies - especially their role in creating states that were in many respects artificial. It is the latter which is at least in part to blame for some of the present conflicts of identity: cultural, ethnic, and religious. These conflicts, though, do form a major focus of Hudson's inquiry, especially as they relate to the question of integration.[28] At the widest level, there is the Islamic umma; somewhat narrower is the Arab nation; moving downward, next comes the state (or what is officially proclaimed to be the nation); and then sub- or cross-state identities of an

ethnic or cultural nature (e.g. the Kurds, the southern Sudanese) and identification with the tribe, the clan and the family. The problem for a regime, then, and for the state it represents, is the challenge to identification with (and consequently integration of) the territory, institutions and myths of that state, from the potentially growing strength of supra-, sub- and cross-state identifications, as a result of rapid social mobilisation. In the terms of Deutsch and Hudson, state integration will proceed well only if the rate of assimilation is greater than the rate of mobilisation - otherwise sub-state groups will be further consolidated. This will require the state's 'capabilities' to grow faster than the 'loads' (as mentioned before). Much of this will be easier (and indeed will reduce the 'loads') if the state territory's population is homogeneous. Fifteen years after Hudson wrote his *Arab Politics*, one would have to qualify his assessment that the Arab and Islamic identities had become less important for legitimacy than they had been, by pointing to the resurgence in Islam as a political focus for identification in the 1980s and early 1990s.

The difficulties to be overcome for Arab regimes in establishing the level of legitimacy for themselves and their state, which will allow state consolidation and integration, and the construction of a stable future, are enormous. The resources which they can draw upon are four. Three are those listed by Easton: the personal, ideological and structural ones. In addition, it is argued here that the strong persistence of 'the old' as implied by the mosaic model justifies adding traditional sources as a fourth group (thus again more closely reflecting Weber's original descriptive list).

Perhaps the best discussion of the traditional bases of authority in the Arab world can still be found, again, in Hudson's work.[29] He identifies four dimensions. The first is that of patriarchal authority, from families through clans and tribes to the national level; this is linked with the importance of kinship (real or imagined) in the region's social and political dynamics. The second is the consultative tradition, as enshrined in mainly nomadic tribal customary values. The third is the Islamic dimension, with (1) the concept of 'right rule'; (2) both authoritarian and egalitarian tendencies; and (3) the historical practice of dynasties. And the fourth is the 'feudal' factor, inasmuch as 'the concentration of wealth, social control and power in the hands of a small landed elite contributed over time to a legitimation of that elite's authority.'[30] It should be noted that particularly in the latter factor, 'welfare' and economic considerations of self-interest are an important element, as illustrated by the practice of patronage, largesse, wasita, etc.

Among the modern bases of authority, or resources for legitimacy, Hudson concentrated on the values of democracy, socialism, and 'modern development.' Writing in the early 1990s, it would appear best to rethink this somewhat, firstly by referring, more carefully, to 'political participation' (the desired form may vary widely); secondly by deleting socialism and replacing it with the more general value

of, and aspiration for, social justice; and thirdly by adding the partly overlapping value of the pursuit of Islamic values and principles in social and political organisation. All of this can be classified under Easton's 'ideological' legitimacy resources. In addition, it will be remembered, there are the 'personal' and the 'structural' ones.

Hudson rightly points out the tension between some of the traditional authority patterns and modern values, but perhaps over-generalises in his assessment of the decline of the former. It is illustrative to quote him on the distinction between the monarchies' and the republics' attitudes to 'the traditional' - and perhaps come to a different conclusion. On the one hand,

> Instead of building a new nationalism unfettered by tradition, the monarchs have simply superimposed nationalism onto existing political culture patterns without trying to eliminate them.

On the other, the republican rulers 'have tried to break down... existing identity and authority patterns... and integrate people into new ones.'[31]

With hindsight, the obvious question to ask is whether the latter may not be the cause of their lack of success. By the same token, the monarchs' strategy - if the mosaic model is correct - may have been precisely the reason (or a major reason) for their success.

4. The ingredients of instability in the Middle East

Against the above background, in the remainder of this paper a summary overview is offered of the context and ingredients of Middle East instability, in its intertwining domestic and international aspects. Indeed, any Middle Eastern government's (or their outside allies') attempts at ensuring stability or even mere survival *within* the state necessarily takes place in this larger context.

In the course of an international study project on Middle East stability and integration convened in London by the European Commission and the Federal Trust for Education and Research over a number of seminars in the course of 1991 and 1992, a consensus list of key obstacles to stability in the region was arrived at, based on a submission of the present writer.[32] For practical purposes the obstacles can be listed under 14 headings:

(1) Lack of political participation.

(2) Lack of legitimacy for (a) the regimes and (b) the state itself.

(3) The gap between rich and poor states.

(4) The issue of water.

(5) Outstanding border disputes.

(6) Ethno-religious fragmentation and tension.

(7) Lack of development.

(8) The population explosion

(9) The issue of past and present foreign domination.

(10) Outside involvement.

(11) The Arab-Israeli dispute.

(12) The arms race.

(13) Lack of a reliable mechanism for settling disputes.

(14) Lack of integration.

It will be noted that the ogre of 'Islamic Fundamentalism' does not feature in this list. Indeed, it is argued here that (quite apart from the question of what would be a better term for the phenomenon) this is not so much a cause of present difficulties in the Middle East as a symptom of some of the obstacles listed. This also means that any strategy which focuses on the mere suppression of such 'fundamentalism' as a means to contain instability, is by definition fighting a losing battle; as it will feed into precisely those underlying problems which helped give rise to the phenomenon in the first place. In what follows, each of the fourteen points will be elaborated upon, and the linkages between them pointed out. It will be clear that several of the factors listed are valid also outside the region, for most of the developing world. This is particularly the case for factors (1),(2),(5)-(8),(10),(12),(13); the lack of integration (14), while a salient point also outside the Middle East, nevertheless has perhaps a special relevance in the region, in view of the persistence of the ideal of the 'Arab Nation,' with its historical, ideological and romantic appeal. Below, specific comments will be restricted to the case of the Middle East, although the general points made (especially for the factors highlighted above) have wider validity.

4.1. The lack of political participation

The lack of political participation is an obstacle to long-term stability in a number of ways. Firstly, it will tend to create pressures for change both from specific groups or individuals, and from wider popular movements. Secondly, it means regimes have to look for other ways of mobilising people in their own support: this may take the form of regionally destabilising rhetoric and demagoguery. Thirdly, it implies a jealous

guarding of personal privileges on the part of the power elite - even at the expense of international tension (as exemplified for instance in Iraqi-Syrian relations since the late 1970s). The most striking illustration of the dangerous potential of the absence of political participation can be found in the 1990-91 Kuwait crisis:[33] it was, after all, the extreme concentration of power in the hands of one man, increasingly isolated mentally and under tremendous strain in trying to assure his own survival, which was in large measure responsible for the crisis.

4.2. The lack of legitimacy

The lack of legitimacy for the regimes and for the State itself, is linked to the first point, as well as to the history of the region: there has rarely if ever been room for independent political thought or autonomous political action to develop, whether under Ottoman or Western domination.[34] As a consequence, the often artificial creation of 'nation-states' in the region since the Second World War has not led to a general acceptance of the new structures in political culture - nor of the regimes that embody them. This has obvious unsettling implications. First, it lends added potency to alternative foci of identity - whether intra-, inter-, or contra-state.[35] Secondly, it leaves or creates room for dispute over the *raison d'être* of existing borders. And this in turn reinforces the tendency of the insecure state towards paranoid and/or aggressive action to consolidate territorial control, both internally against potential domestic challengers or secessionists, and against outside claims or ambitions.

4.3. The gap between rich and poor states

The gap between rich and poor states creates inevitable feelings of envy, bitterness, and 'usurped rights' on the part of the poor, and of defensiveness in the other camp.[36] This would be potentially disturbing in itself, but is made more acutely so in the context of doubts over the legitimacy of boundaries: not merely where they should be, but in some cases whether they should exist at all. Again, the Kuwait crisis and many Arab states' reaction to it, provide a good illustration.[37] There is clearly a role here for the international community to help strengthen all of the regional economies, allowing demand and corresponding supply patterns to reach their potential within the region (see also factor 4.7).

4.4. The precarious balance of water resources

The precarious balance of water resources in the Middle East is likely to prove a highly sensitive and potentially explosive issue during the remainder of the decade. Indeed, without a major breakthrough there will simply not be enough water for the region's people before the first decade of the 21st century is over. No countries apart from Turkey and Iran are self-reliant in water resources: Iraq depends on Turkish and Syrian control of the upper reaches of Tigris and Euphrates; Jordan is subject to Israeli control and/or manipulation of the Jordan and Yarmouk waters; The West Bank's aquifers are controlled by Israel; and the latter would suffer from a mooted Syrian-Jordanian project to store the seasonal excess flow of the Yarmouk. Already, Turkish work on the huge irrigation scheme ('GAP') encompassing the Ataturk dam has caused friction with Iraq and Syria, particularly when the flow of the Euphrates was virtually halted during January 1990. Bitterness and anti-Israeli feeling has been exacerbated in the Israeli-occupied territories by what is seen as discriminatory Israeli controls; and Israel itself has warned that it will not countenance any water schemes that would affect its own supply (particularly the Syrian-Jordanian project).[38] Apart from the objective fact of aridity, the political salience of the water issue, in the absence of integration measures, is heightened because of factors 4.2 and 4.5. In this context, the study group stressed that attention needs to be devoted to the underlying economic-technical issue of what a sustainable management of the region's water resources would consist of: accepting some of the limitations imposed on economic policy choices by the very shortage of water may be a necessary .condition, but this in turn is only truly feasible in combination with the development of otherwise sustainable national economies (see factor 4.7).[39]

4.5. Outstanding territorial disputes

Throughout the region, outstanding territorial disputes complicate relations. Some have been settled satisfactorily on a basis of give-and-take (taking account of both parties' interests in perhaps other than purely territorial matters). The establishment of neutral or shared zones, for instance between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, or Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, has proved particularly useful and deserves consideration also today.[40] While few disputes retain the explosive potential of the Kuwaiti islands issue or the Shatt al-Arab question between Iraq and Iran, several others, even when apparently dormant, must not be left to fester. Even between the GCC allies Bahrain and Qatar, the 1986 Fasht al-Dibal clash showed that such disputes can flare up in armed confrontation. The Khafus border incident between Qatar and Saudi Arabia in 1992, which almost led to a Qatari boycott of the December 1992 GCC Summit, was

perhaps an even more ominous illustration. The question of legitimacy of boundaries apart, it is safe to say that, in general, the issues underlying the persistence of the potentially dangerous disputes are control over resources, and waterways. Efforts at settlement must take these interests into account.

4.6. Ethno-religious fragmentation

Ethno-religious fragmentation and resulting tension has made the region particularly volatile. This has proved, and remains, especially so because of the above factors 4.1 and 4.2; because of the issue of domination (factor 4.9 below) and the emotional content of 'Islam' as a rallying cry for reassertion against it; and because of direct outside involvement (factor 4.10 below) - witness the examples of the Kurds, Lebanon, etc. More specifically, of course, the mosaic has proved problematic because of the way boundaries have been drawn, often without much reference to ethnic or religious cohesion. In this context, the fragmentation and tension have been an obstacle for stability mainly in three ways: they have resulted in domestic upheavals (Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan); they have led to, or 'legitimised,' border disputes (Khuzistan/Arabistan); and they have been used opportunistically by rival regimes as well as by outside powers.

4.7. Underdevelopment

Moving to the economy, the general underdevelopment of the area (with the partial exception of the GCC states) does not help in the creation of a stable domestic and regional climate. For one thing, it creates resentment in the less developed areas against the West, as well as against the wealthy Gulf states. For another, the concomitant unemployment, deprivation, and deficient education, offer fertile ground for superficial but ostensibly pride-restoring rhetoric and solutions. These, whether couched in radical religious terms or as attacks against the existing system or the 'outsiders,' can be explosive. It could be argued that a concerted effort to assist in the process of socio-economic development is one of the most important contributions the international community could make towards the creation of a more stable environment. In the wake of the Gulf war, specifically, the region is seriously weakened by the economic plight of Iraq which cannot play its important potential role in generating demand; in addition, an economically weak Iraq unnecessarily destabilises the Tigris-Euphrates basin by appearing to have internal food (and therefore water) demands which could easily be satisfied on the world market if Iraq had the economic ability to purchase the 75 per cent of its food needs as it used to

before August 1990.[41] As regards the wealthy oil producers, here too the lack of a sustainable development base which is not hostage to the unpredictable vagaries of the oil market has potentially destabilising effects both domestically and regionally (the Iraqi invasion can in part be explained in this context).

4.8. The population explosion

While the EC study group considered the region's population explosion as one element in the economic equation, it arguably deserves consideration as a factor in its own right. The Middle East's population is growing at a rate of just under 3 per cent per year - enough to let it double in about 24 years. This is faster than any other major region except sub-Saharan Africa.[42] This phenomenon makes the developmental race to catch up with the region's and its population's needs all the more problematic and thus, via point 4.7, feeds into a greater potential for instability. Examples of the problem may be seen in the cases of Algeria and Egypt. Specifically, as Richards and Waterbury point out, such fast population growth

> exacerbates certain development problems, particularly those of educating the young and providing sufficient employment opportunities... [funds are] diverted from "capital deepening" and from *any* form of job creation [and, one may add, wealth création] to social-overhead investment (e.g. housing, sewage and water systems.[43]

Combined with a continuing rural exodus, this growth is, moreover, disproportionately concentrated in the cities - increasingly congested and filled with young populations often frustrated in their aspirations. It hardly needs repeating that cities is where political upheavals tend to start. The recent evidence that the rate of growth may be slowing in North Africa[44] is not replicated elsewhere in the region.

4.9. Foreign domination

The issue of foreign domination - colonial or otherwise in the past, economic, military, or technological today - is problematic in two different ways. The first could perhaps be called the 'factual economic' one: such domination has undeniably brought about a one-dimensional dependence on the part of many regional countries on the developed powers of the industrialised world, for exports, imports and otherwise. This has made them highly vulnerable to unpredictable fluctuations in, for instance, the weather or the phosphate market.[45] The 'factual economic' content of the domination issue, therefore, feeds directly into factor 4.7 above. Secondly, there

is the issue's 'political' content. The sense of having been, and in different ways still being, dominated, not surprisingly causes resentment against those dominant powers, *in casu* the West. Concomitantly there is a continued but equally unsurprising risk of agitation against regimes portrayed as 'collaborators,' especially as rival regimes can try to exploit this theme. Reassertion of one's culture's and society's own dignity, particularly in the absence of an open political system, has tended to take the form of 'Islamic' slogans (see factors 4.6 and 4.7), further raising the temperature and, for one thing, feeding back into the problem of religious fragmentation.

4.10. Outside involvement

Outside involvement in the region's affairs after the Second World War and most states' independence remained at a high level, either directly or through the use of proxies. Salamé argues that

> the intrusion of a superpower into any regional subsystem inevitably leads to new political cleavages among the member states or to the deepening of existing ones, [and] to the polarisation of local actors along international (i.e. extra-regional) lines.[46]

Such involvement had to do both with the area's resources and with its geostrategic importance, particularly during the cold war. The Arab-Israeli dispute and the arms race (factors 4.11 and 4.12 below) are of course related to this. While such involvement has fanned rivalries within and across borders directly, it also provides fuel for political agitation against it and against anyone who is seen to be associated with it. The end of the cold war and the different nature of intervention in the Kuwait crisis could offer some hope of lessening this factor's destabilising power, but avoiding the pitfalls represented by local perceptions would seem to remain a difficult task for outside actors - especially over the issue of Palestine.

4.11. The Arab-Israeli dispute

The Arab-Israeli dispute, the EC study group agreed, remains in many ways the central issue in the complex and inter-connected obstacles to peace and stability in the Middle East. It has obstructed the building of a more stable and secure environment particularly in four ways. The first and most obvious is the direct impact on relations (including war) between Israel and the Arab states, apart from the pressure cooker-situation in the occupied territories themselves. The competition for water will be one of the most critical elements of these relations (see factor 4.4

above). A related problem consists of Israel's periodic forays into Lebanon in its efforts to suppress non-state actors - be they Palestinian or Hizbollah. The existence and activities of these groups are the direct result of the existing Arab-Israeli dispute; armed Israeli intervention of the kind displayed in July 1993 is as likely to spur them on as it is to suppress them.

Secondly, the *issue* of Palestine is very politically explosive both in inter-Arab and in domestic Arab politics. As a result, it has helped lead to the toppling of a long series of regimes thought not sufficiently committed to restoring Palestinian rights; there is nothing to indicate that this would not be a phenomenon of the future as well.[47] The issue has also been used opportunistically both by regimes and other pretenders for power, because of its emotional appeal. Again, the aftermath of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and Saddam Hussein's partly successful attempt to rally a Middle Eastern audience around him by linking Palestine with Kuwait, provide a good illustration.[48] The third way in which the dispute obstructs any wider search for stability, is that it makes schemes for regional or even sub-regional arms control and disarmament highly problematic. As long as Arab states are faced with an Israel that is supremely armed and is perceived as antagonistic, there is little or no chance of their accepting any serious reduction in their own defensive capabilities.[49] And finally, the dispute inhibits the kinds of practical cooperation that could further the region's economic development, and continues geographically to split the Arab world in two.[50]

4.12. The Middle East arms race

The continuing arms race in the Gulf and the region as a whole inevitably produces a highly unstable and volatile cocktail. Demonstrated by the history of this and other regions of the world, this point has been made convincingly by Ehteshami and others.[51] Moreover, it also heightens the likely *level* of outside intervention, when such intervention occurs. The scale of destruction (and subsequent dislocation and resentment) is therefore likely to be greater (as well as the cost for those intervening).[52] In addition, the arms trade has continued to produce a huge distortion in these developing economies, exacerbating factor 4.7 above.

4.13. The lack of a settlement mechanism

A number of the difficulties flowing from the factors mentioned above could in theory be lessened if a reliable, effective mechanism were available among the states of the region for discussing, and taking action on, disputes of various kinds.

The institutions of the League of Arab States do not, in their present guise, provide that mechanism. The reason lies in the domestic political dynamics of the various states, and in the nature of the organisation itself: a forum for cooperation only - and this only when it suited the individual states (an argument most forcefully made by Salamé and by Bani Hani[53]). The absence of such a mechanism is, in fact, a reflection of the overall lack of integration (understood inclusively) in the region.

4.14. The lack of regional integration

Contrary to aspirations among large sections of at least the Arab world's population, and in contrast with a diet of official pan-Arab rhetoric, the lack of integration is indeed striking. The growth of Arab Nationalism - the initially romantic, German-influenced idea of one nation for the Arab people - began under the last Ottoman Sultans, focussing only on the Mashriq, and acquired political impetus with the World War I alliance between the Arab Legion and the Allied Forces, to be further strengthened in the bitter wake of broken promises after the war. Having emerged from Ottoman and Colonial rule, disintegrated and without any appropriate models readily available (domestic politics had either been 'unnecessary' or suppressed), the resulting territorial units all had to start searching for a fitting political system. As they were separate, and subject to different influences, they went about it in different ways. The concept of pan-Arabism itself was therefore approached in different ways and became an instrument whereby regimes sought to legitimise themselves, claiming to represent the only true form of Arab Nationalist ideology.[54] It became, in fact, a reason for *not* joining others. The idea of political integration retained its salience, not only as a legitimising factor, but also in reaction to perceived threats from the outside world.

'The prospect of Arab unity tantalizes all Arabs to some degree.'[55] Indeed, the state resulting from such a merger

> would extend almost... 8000 km... from west to east... Its total area...(13.7 million square kilometers), would be second only to the Soviet Union and considerably larger than Europe, Canada, China or the United States... By 2000, it would have more people than either of the two major superpowers. This state would contain almost two thirds of the world's proven oil reserves. It would also have enough capital to finance its own economic and social development. Conceivably, it could feed itself... Access to a huge market could stimulate rapid industrial growth... Present regional inequalities could ultimately be lessened and the mismatch between labor-surplus and labor-short areas corrected. The aggregate military strength and political influence of this strategically located state would be formidable... It is easy to comprehend why this dream has long intoxicated Arab nationalists.[56]

The potential benefits of integrative steps combine with some of the more obvious similarities of the region (culture, part of the history, the Arabic language, Islam) and considerable enthusiasm among large sections of the intelligentsia and the population at large, to lend the theme of integration particular relevance in the Middle East and the Arab world especially. Following the Second World War, the establishment of the League of Arab States in 1945 appeared to some to be a first step towards tying the Arab world closer together again, some quarter of a century after the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire. Under the League's auspices, a joint defence treaty was concluded, along with other political principles and intentions of cooperation, and an Agreement for Arab Economic Unity (AAEU). In the framework of the latter, the Council for Arab Economic Unity was set up, which in turn brought into being the Arab Common Market (ACM)(1964) - in name at least. That little of this had a major impact on integration along the lines of the Pan-Arab idea, hardly needs restating. Even among those Arab states (seven) that eventually adhered to the ACM, trade remained well below 5 per cent of total trade (that is lower still than for the Arab world as a whole),[57] and even the four original members (Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Iraq) still did not have a common external tariff by the end of 1992. The Kuwait crisis of 1990/91 illustrated well the limits of the League's political content. In addition, there were 20 smaller-scale integration agreements between two or more countries, beginning with the short-lived Syrian-Lebanese customs union of 1948. The most famous failures include the United Arab Republic (1958-61) and the Arab Cooperation Council, as well as Libya's many unification projects. Only three appear to have achieved any significant degree of success so far - the United Arab Emirates, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the unification of Yemen in May 1990. The Arab Maghreb Union's progress by late 1992 appeared to have come to a halt.

While this is not the place to examine the obstacles to integration in the Middle East at length,[58] it may be worth pointing at some key factors. Apart from historical and geographical differentiation and the resulting ideological and organisational differences - as referred to already - the most important factors are arguably political. The Arab system, and the League of Arab States, are, Salamé has pointed out, based less on Pan-Arabism as on the quite opposite ideology of inter-statism:

> The problem... is in the discrepancy between the dream of unity and the reality of Arab politics. Arab regimes have been established within the framework of independent states. Most of these regimes would be threatened by a higher level of integration in the Arab world. And they... systematically oppose this integration even when the state religion is Arab nationalism.[59]

This is particularly relevant in the absence of broad political participation, with regimes being, on the whole, very narrowly based and having immediate interests which generally could be damaged rather than served by integration.

In terms of the obstacles to long-term stability and peace listed above, increased integration (understood as including any of the stages from close cooperation via coordination to integration proper - whether region-wide or on a smaller scale) would, the EC study group agreed, offer relief from the worst effects of all factors except the lack of political participation, the Arab-Israeli dispute and the arms race. Yet one may also legitimately argue that it would be useful with respect to those two latter factors, as coherence in the Arab position would make it easier to achieve agreements (and stick to them), with the element of bidding up against each other having perhaps been removed.

5. Conclusion

Some of the above obstacles to stability, such as the ethno-religious mosaic of the region, are a given, and will not yield to any acceptable policy; yet their destabilising effects may ultimately be removed by tackling the other, contextual factors that *can* be remedied. What stands out is the intertwining of the regional/international with the domestic aspects of stability, and the linkages between the various factors generally. The lesson both for regimes within the region and for interested outside actors must be that an approach which tries to ensure domestic stability by 'security measures' alone, must be doomed to failure in the long run. Unless those ingredients of instability which are susceptible to remedial action are addressed, suppression of some of the symptoms - such as radical politicised Islam - is likely to be futile or even counter-productive in the long run. It would, for one thing, do nothing to improve a regime's legitimacy, indeed the contrary is likely; and it is regime legitimacy which remains an indispensible key to stability in the region. The prescription of a 'programme for action' is outside the scope of this paper,[60] but it seems reasonable to suggest that it would have to based on an approach including at least the following themes: (1) fostering the growth of viable economies; (2) greater economic integration; (3) active engagement on the Palestine issue; (4) the use of economic and other leverage to obtain peaceful settlement of other disputes and non-confrontational politics (the Kuwaiti attitude to Jordan and Yemen is a case in point); (5) arms control and disarmament; and (6) fostering political accountability and human rights.

NOTES

1 This and the two following quotes are from D. Sanders, Sanders, *Patterns of Political Instability* (London: Macmillan, 1981), pp. xvi-xvii.

2 Sanders, *Op. cit.*, p. 37.

3 M. Hudson, *Arab Politics: the search for legitimacy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 7-16.

4 *Ibid.*, p. 7.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 8. See also for instance M. Halpern, *The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

6 Hudson, *Op. cit.*, p. 7.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 12. Hudson is essentially interpreting the work of Deutsch.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 12. See also M. Hudson, 'La théorie de la mobilisation sociale et la politique arabe', in: B. Khader, *Monde Arabe et Développement Economique* (Paris: Le Sycomore, 1981), pp. 21-46.

9 Hudson, *Arab Politics (Op. cit.)*, p. 12.

10 C. Geertz, 'The integrative revolution', in Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 105-157: p. 109.

11 *Ibid.*, pp. 111-3.

12 I. Harik, 'The Ethnic Revolution and Political Integration in the Middle East', in: *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 3, 1979, No. 3, pp. 303-323: p. 312.

13 The sources listed are the following (alphabetically):

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14 Gurr, *Why Men Rebel,* p. 251,

15 *Ibid.*, figure 22.

16 See Taylor, *Op. cit*, p. 135.

17 Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, p. 353.

18 Hudson, *Arab Politics*, p. 162.

19 Wriggins, *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

20 W. Connolly, 'Legitimacy', in: Miller *et al.*, *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 279.

21 D. Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965), p. 278.

22 Easton, *Op. cit.*, pp. 303-4.

23 See Binder, Coleman *et al*, *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.)

24 J. Bill & R. Hardgrave, *Comparative Politics: The Quest for Theory* (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1973), p. 70.

25 O. Al-Rawaf, *The Concept of the Five Crises in Political Development: Relevance to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia* (Unpublished PhD thesis, Duke University, 1980), pp. 74-6.

26 Hudson, *Arab Politics* p. 2.

27 *Ibid.*, p. 7.

28 See especially Hudson, 'La théorie...' *Op. cit,*.

29 Hudson, *Arab Politics*, pp. 83-104.

30 *Ibid.*, p. 99.

31 *Ibid.*, pp. 26-7.

32 Middle East specialist members of the study group involved in the project included: Prof. Anthony Allan (SOAS, London), Ghaith Armanazi (Leagueof Arab States, London), Dr Maha Azzam (RUSI, London), Prof. Peter Beaumont (University College of Wales, Lampeter), Natasha Beschorner (IISS, London), Dr Anoushiravan Ehteshami (University of Durham, UK), Dr Rosemary Hollis (RUSI, London), Dr Haifaa Jawad (West Hill College, Birmingham, UK), George Joffé (SOAS, London), Dr Efraim Karsh (King's College, London), Sir John Moberly (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London), Dr Emma Murphy (University of Durham), Prof. Tim Niblock (University of Durham), Dr David Pool (University of Manchester), Dr Philip Robins (RIIA, London), Richard Schofield (SOAS, London), Prof. Paul Stevens (University of Dundee), and Dr Rodney Wilson (University of Durham), in addition to the present writer who coordinated the project. The group's report, to which this 'list of obstacles' was an introduction, was submitted to the EC Commission's Directorate-General for External Relations in February 1992. The second, revised and updated edition of this study, published in October 1993, is appearing under the title *The Middle East and Europe: The Search for Stability and Integration* (London: Federal Trust for Education and Research, 1993).

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Biographical note

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
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"Challenges to Internal Stability in the Middle East"

Zoubir Yazid

"CHALLENGES TO INTERNAL STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST"

The Middle East has known in recent decades numerous turmoils and crises that have challenged in more than one way its internal stability. This trend does not show any sign of changing in the near future, instead there seems to be a new set of challenges.

It would be impossible in this short paper to present a precise and comprehensive analysis of these challenges, but it is possible to raise a certain number of points that will enable us to have an idea of these challenges.

The three main points that I would like to discuss in this paper are as follows:

1) The notion of "Internal Stability" in the context of the Middle East.

2) A summary of the main challenges that the region faces with a focus on three key issues.

3) A discussion on the importance of the different challenges and the priorities that should be considered.

1) The notion of "Internal Stability" in the context of the Middle East:

When one is concerned by the challenges to internal stability of a country, one is also dealing with the notion of "national security" and therefore one should look at this notion in the context of the Middle East.

The simplistic definition of challenges to national security as a study of inter state war is not enough at present time. One

could of course argue that this approach is acceptable considering the history of the region. Inter state wars as the Arab-Israeli wars, the Moroccan-Algerian dispute of 1963, The Iran-Iraq war and the latest Gulf War are more than convincing arguments to this approach. Acceptable they are, but complete they are not. This approach can be used as a basis to the concept of national security but it needs to be widened and reformulated.

One of the main reasons that pushes us to review the concept is the very structure of the Middle Eastern countries. The relation between state and society in the region has followed a specific pattern and has led to what can be called "protracted social conflict". Korany, Brynen and Noble define it as being "essentially multi-dimensional for religion, language and identity, in addition to socio-economic aspects may all play a role in it". (1)

These conflicts encompass a large variety of features and this is why there is a need to go beyond the inter-state war vision to focus also on issues such as ethnic conflicts, state legitimacy, economic factors, water resources, food shortages, protection of basic values and so on. As a summary one can say that the challenges to the internal stability in the Middle East are the result of the internal fragility of the state and its external vulnerability. The internal instability is due to the historical process of their state formation (which leads to the notion of a state at war with its own society) and the external vulnerability is due to economic, financial, technological and agricultural threats. These non-traditional challenges are very closely related to the notion of "protracted social conflict" and these multi-

dimensional challenges are interrelated with inter state conflicts. As Kamel Abu Jaber puts it:

> "Life in all its aspects is still in an upheaval that transcends military insecurity and spills over into the social, political, intellectual, ideological and economic fields. Regime, even national, insecurity is not always viewed as a function of external forces, military or otherwise. Internally, regime and national insecurity often emanate, not from the military branch, but from the demands for change, for participation and political liberalization in mostly authoritarian regimes as well as from the demands for development leading to a general uplifting of the standard of living". (2)

These features are what gives a certain specificity to the challenges to internal stability in the Middle East. We are in fact broadening the realist paradigm that concerns itself with security issues that are external in origin and military in character. We are going to use the notion of "protracted social conflict" as a basis to our analysis of the challenges.

2) The main challenges that the region faces:

Having expanded the horizon of the challenges to stability in the region we can start by saying that there are numerous challenges. "Fundamentalism" (for reason of convenience I will use this term even though there is much to be said about its correctness), demographic pressure, scarcity of water and arable land (resulting in potential food scarcity in most of these lands), debt burden, cultural conflicts (educated elites vs. the uneducated or conservatives, including peasantry), corruption and tribal or ethnic conflicts (Kurds in Iraq, Kabyles in North Africa) are some of these numerous challenges.

In this short paper it would be impossible to deal with all

these issues, so I am going to concentrate on three main issues that seem to be the most delicate.

a) The issue of "Fundamentalism":

At present time this issue is one of the main focus of the international community and is considered as the main threat to a number of countries in the region as well as to Western interests. The Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, the Isalmic Salvation Front of Algeria and Al-Nahda of Tunisia are some examples of groups that are playing an active role in the attempt to destabilize the existing states. Much is to be said about this issue and numerous opinions could and are put forward, but in this short paper I would like to just mention two points of interest that are valuable in understanding the challenge that the issue of "Fundamentalism" represents. One deals with the nature of the challenge and the second one with its "strength".

- This issue should not be oversimplified by explaining it only in terms of economic factors. It is true that these factors do explain to a great extent the "awakening" of these movements, but one should not forget other components that also explain this "rise". The first one is what can be called the "Identity Factor". After a long period of colonialism most countries in the Middle East tried to define themselves in the international arena. Attempts were made through the use of different ideologies: Arab Nationalism (e.g. Egypt), Socialism (e.g. Algeria), Non-Alignment (e.g. Algeria), "Western Liberalism" (e.g. Iran) failed to cope with the post-colonial period and to give the masses a sense of identity. "Fundamentalism" can partly be explained by this search for oneself

cultural, religious and social identity especially after the failure of the "imported" models. This leads us to a second component which is that this newest "Islamic revival" is a mean of channeling a growing frustration among the people of the region. On one hand a frustration against post-colonial governments that have not been able to resolve the problems that the masses face and that are mined by corruption (therefore can not consolidate a sense of legitimacy); and on the other hand a frustration vis a vis a Western world that has shut them out of the international system. So one can see how this mixture of economic crisis, identity crisis and anti-government feeling can lead these movements to challenge the internal stability.

- After analyzing the nature of this challenge I would like to discuss its strength. In focussing on recent events in countries such as Egypt and Algeria one can not deny the threat that "Islamism" is representing. The stability of the state has been challenged to a great extent as it can be seen for example in Algeria where a state of emergency has been in effect for more than a year. Terrorist attacks have become common in these countries and one could question the capacity of these Islamic movements to really challenge the security of the state as a whole. It is evident that these movements have a destabilizing effect but they do not seem at the present time capable of overthrowing the actual regimes. It seems more likely that a pattern of gridlock has set into the political, social and economic life of these states. There seems to be no clear solution to what should be done and the different attempts of discussions to find a compromise do not seem

to have been fruitful. As Claire Spencer put it in the conclusion of her study on the Maghreb in the 1990's: "Only by opening the process of dialogue between current governments and broader sections of society will the elaboration of the details of such a compromise become possible. For some this means nothing short of a new social contract". (3) The question that one has to ask himself in this context is how this dialogue should be delt with?

b) <u>The issue of the debt burden:</u>

Even though the issue of the debt burden might be considered as an external vulnerability for the countries of the Middle East, it has a big impact on their internal stability. The inability of many states to deal with the issue lead to a number of social and economic crises because of the diminishing funding that could be allocated to vital problems (Employment, subsidies for food, education and housing). The enormous burden of repaying and servicing is a threat to any developmental projects of these countries. As Michael Chatelus put it in his analysis of Arab economies:

> "Debt income indeed becomes a general factor
> of insecurity to the extent that it imposes
> short-term policies, sacrificing indirect or
> slowly maturing investments to the highly
> symbolic decisions -often necessary, though
> never sufficient, conditions for an economic
> upswing. The result, in fact is a potent fuelling
> of social destabilization, with potentially
> broader regional effetcs". (4)

There are a number of examples of the impact of the debt burden. The food subsidy riots of 1977 and the mutiny of the Public Safety Force of 1986 in Egypt, the brief "sugar mutiny" in an army barrack of 1974 in Jordan, the food riots of 1984 in Tunisia are

still in the minds of the decision makers in the region. The issue of indebtedness raises the problem of the involvement of agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF into the economies of the countries they have lend to. Discussions and negotiations related to the rescheduling of the debts lead to the installment of austerity measures (e.g. Removal of subsidies on basic foods) that often result in an increase of social unrest and in the long term desatbilizes the internal stability of the state and the capacity of regimes to stay in power. (5) The issue here is not whether these measures do or do not stimulate development, but the fact is that the burden of the debt has a profound impact on the stability of the countries of the Middle East.

A good example of this pattern (even if different from the other Middle Eastern countries because of the fact that the government has refused to reschedule its debt) is the case of Algeria. At present time its debt is estimated at US$24 billion. Algeria has a very good reimbursement record but after the decline of the prices of oil in the mid-eighties it was obliged to borrow more money. This lead to the increase of the servicing burden which reached about US$6 billion in 1988. (6) Having refused any rescheduling of the debt the Algerian government still imposed its own austerity measures which did play a role in the riots of October 1988 which clearly challenged the internal stability of the state.

c) The issue of scarcity of water:

"As early as the mid-1980's, the US intelligence community estimated that among 10 places in the world where war could break

out over dwindling shared water resources, the majority were in the Middle East. Egypt, Jordan, Israel and Syria are sliding into the perilous zone where all available fresh surface and ground-water supplies will soon be fully utilized". (7) This description of the water situation in the Middle East seems to be very alarmist and some consider that the countries of the region are living on a time bomb that could explode at any time. (8) In her study Water and Instability in the Middle East, Natasha Beshorner considers that the great anxiety over this issue as a next cause of conflict is seriously misleading. Whether one agrees with the first or the second view of the issue, it is impossible to deny that there is a serious problem of water scarcity in the region. Of course not all countries suffer from this problem to the same extent. For example while Turkey and Iran enjoy a certain water surplus: Jordan, Israel and Egypt suffer from a considerable shortage.

The issue of water scarcity is interrelated with the population growth that many countries of the region have known. When one considers that there is a yearly population growth of 3% in the mostly desert region that includes Syria and Iraq, one can understand that struggle over water can be the cause of future crises in the region. (9)

Another factor that is interrelated with this problem is the issue of food security. Many Middle Eastern countries have followed policies of self-sufficiency to try to avoid any type of dependency, but these policies are a drain on the water supplies. In fact many countries have drained their water supplies without achieving complete self-reliance.

The shortage of water which is often coupled with the shortage of food can evidently be a cause of social unrest and may lead to inter state conflicts (the 1967 bombing of the installations near the Yarmouk basin by the Israeli air force) that will challenge the internal stability of the countries of the region.

3) The importance of the different challenges and the priorities that should be considered:

We did not have the time in such a short analysis to approach all the different challenges that the Middle East faces in terms of internal stability. "Fundamentalism", demographic pressure, scarcity of water and arable land, debt burden, cultural conflicts and other problems are all considered as serious challenges that are often interrelated with one another in different ways depending on what part of the Middle East we are dealing with. Each one of these challenges has its importance in terms of internal stability and it is impossible to classify them by importance even though some get more attention than others.

In the international arena it seems that the main focus is on the spread of "Islamic Fundamentalism" as a threat to the existence of a number of Middle Eastern states and to the stability of the international system as a whole. The events in Algeria and Egypt seem to justify this fear for many observers, therefore there seems to be a collective effort to deal with this issue as a first priority. It is true that for the countries of the region and also for the Western world there is a necessity to contain this movement, but we should keep in mind that this will not resolve the problem, it will only put forward punctual solutions that do not

take into account the long term perspective. If one is to really deal with this issue, priority should be given to the rethinking of the international system such as to allow, in this specific case, the countries of the Middle East to have a chance to actually be participants in the international arena. Of course much is to be done at the internal level, but a global restructuration needs to be also considered if one is to deal with the many challenges that the Middle East faces.

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(3) Spencer Claire, <u>The Maghreb in the 1990's</u>, Adelphi Paper Number 274, IISS, London, February 1993, p.27.

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(6) <u>The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World</u>, p.163.

(7) Starr Joyce, <u>Nature's Own Agenda: A War for Water in the Mideast</u>, Guardian Weekly, 24 March 1991, p.19.

(8) Naff T. and Matson R., <u>Water in the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation?</u>, Westview Press, Boulder, 1985, pp.1-21.

(9) <u>The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World</u>, p.17.

FUNDAMENTAL MISPERCEPTIONS: The media and the Islamic revival

By Allan Thompson - journalist, Toronto, Canada.

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The Islamic political revival in much of the developing world
is arguably one of the most important elements of our post-Cold
War era - and one most often misunderstood by the Western news
media.

That misunderstanding, which finds expression through the
use of stereotypes, violent images and threatening headlines,
is making its way into the belief systems of many in the
Western world, a development in itself potentially more
dangerous than the Islamic resurgence.

By now it has become almost a commonplace to suggest that
the basis of a new Cold War is being laid, that Islam has
replaced communism as the West's bogey. The news is
frightening: Islamic militants attack tourists and secular
intellectuals in Egypt, the outlawed Islamic Salvation Front
has turned to violence in Algeria, Sudan, with its Islamic
regime, is added to the U.S. State Department list of countries
sponsoring terrorism, a ring of hapless bombers in Manhattan
are connected to a blind Islamic cleric. Islam is news, and
more often than not, the news reports are subtly or blatantly
negative in tone and substance, and speak of ''Islamic
fundamentalism,'' as if it were a monolithic movement.

The danger is that the threatening image of Islam is seeping
into policymaking mechanisms around the world. In a discussion
about the Islamic political revival (often inappropriately
labeled Islamic fundamentalism), it is not 'shooting the
messenger' to suggest that the news media play a role.

Western decision-makers and ordinary citizens alike are
fearful of what they are told is a resurgent Islam, and that
fear will guide their actions. Those who call for a greater
understanding of the Islamic political revival should not be
labeled as apologists for Islamic militants. We needn't agree,
or sympathize with the protagonists in the Islamic revival in
order to understand them.

It may seem an obvious statement to suggest that what people
believe to be real is real in its consequences. It is what we
think the world is like, not what it is really like that
determines our behaviour. Well-informed, balanced understanding
of what the Islamic resurgence is all about is essential.
Unfortunately, that is not what much of Western news media
coverage of Islam is providing, and therein lies a danger.

In forming our images and beliefs about the world of
international affairs, a world that is for most, outside of
direct experience, our reliance on the media is exacerbated.

That is why it is of crucial importance to critically
examine the tone of media coverage of the Islamic revival.

Palestinian scholar Edward Said, whose books Orientalism and
Covering Islam are landmark studies, wrote of the Orient as the

west's ``cultural contestant, and one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other.''(1)

The recurring image to which Said refers plays itself out again and again in media reports.

``Because it does not conform to modern secular presuppositions, to the West's most cherished beliefs and values, Islamic activism is regarded as a dangerous, irrational and countercultural movement.''(2)

Western fear of an Islamic resurgence, and consequent support for the status quo, makes it easier for oppressive regimes to persecute their opponents, most often members of Islamic political movements. It makes it easier for non-Muslim states in the region to take heavy-handed military action against ``Islamic terrorists,'' even if thousands of civilians are caught in the crossfire.

The same fear often leads development agencies to overlook the very people who are often most involved in grassroots social welfare and development work in the Middle East and North Africa. The same fears lead foreign policymakers to formulate their ideas on the basis of what is often a perceived threat. Some would also argue that fear of a resurgent Islam was one of the unstated reasons for European reluctance to lift the arms embargo that left Bosnian Muslims outgunned in the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia.

But worst of all, the more pronounced our fear of Islam, the more likely are our fears to come true.

``The crusade against political Islam is in danger of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy,'' Leon Hadar, author of Quagmire: America in the Middle East, noted in a recent article in the journal Foreign Affairs.(3)

In the broadest terms, there are two schools of thought on the Islamic political revival and its implications.

One school suggests the revival is an important political movement that warrants our closest attention, but does not pose a direct threat. Indeed, continued support for regimes that suppress Islamists only increases the chances a backlash of violence will emerge. Witness Algeria.

Many Islamist politicians may not qualify as ``Jeffersonian democrats,'' as Hadar quips in his essay, but there is an argument that power could lead to pragmatism.

``Once in power, Islamic groups like the FIS (in Algeria) who have thrived on the martyrdom of political oppression, will have to deal with the mundane social and economic problems of their country. If they want to expand their political bases and remain in power, they will have to form political coalitions, modify their rigid theocratic agenda and take into consideration the interests and views of competing groups...''(4)

The alternative is continued support for the status quo, which has serious implications.

``Generally the West is not applying the most important lesson of the Cold War: co-option is far more effective than confrontation in undermining a rival, in this case one perceived rather than real. As in Algeria, the West would also be far better served by encouraging real democratic openings that include Islamists rather than tolerating authoritarian systems that exclude them.''(5)

``Finally, it would have been preferable to have the Islamists accountable in public office rather than operating as clandestine cells outside the system. The coup (in Algeria) has

encouraged violence, ironically, much as French repression
against Algerian demands for independence ignited one of the
longest and bloodiest wars in the Third World.''(6)
    The other school of thought, typified by such commentators
as historian Bernard Lewis, and journalist Judith Miller of the
New York Times, suggests that the Islamic revival is a
dangerous, threatening force that must be opposed.
    ''Western governments should be concerned about these
movements and more important, should oppose them. For despite
their rhetorical commitment to democracy and pluralism,
virtually all militant Islamists oppose both. They are, and are
likely to remain, anti-Western, anti-American and
anti-Israeli.''(7)
    Lewis argues in an article in The Atlantic Monthly that the
nature of Islam makes it an unnatural bedfellow with liberal
democracy. Lewis says that throughout history Islam has been
characterized by the absence of legal recognition of corporate
persons, a principle at the heart of the representative
institutions embodied in Roman law.
    ''For Islamic fundamentalists, democracy is obviously an
irrelevance, and unlike the communist totalitarians, they
rarely use or even misuse the word,'' Lewis writes. ''They are,
however, willing to demand and exploit the opportunities that a
self-proclaimed democratic system by its own logic is bound to
offer them. At the same time, they make no secret of their
contempt for democratic political procedures and their
intention to govern by Islamic rules if they gain power.''(8)
    According to Miller: ''Washington can also say that the
governments of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia are, for all
their many, well-publicized failings, still more tolerant and
less repressive than those that Islamists would most probably
establish in their stead.''(9)

WHAT THE MEDIA DO

News media, particularly those in the West, overwhelmingly fall
in line behind those who feel threatened by political Islam:
    Islamic terrorist.
    Sword of Islam.
    Muslim Fundamentalist.
    The Islamic bomb.
    Such expressions - all negative in tone - will be familiar
to those who consume Western news media. That's because they
are used almost every day in media accounts about the Islamic
political revival.
    ''Islamic fundamentalism on the rise threatens moderate Arab
states,'' shouted a headline on a Chicago Tribune story by Tom
Hundley datelined Algiers July 15, 1993.
    ''Terrorism, intolerance and revolution for export,'' are
the ''three scourges,'' of the Islamic revival, Time magazine
intoned in a cover story in its June 15, 1992 edition.
    And all too often just the labels used tell the whole story.
    When was the last time you heard a reference to a Christian
terrorist, Hindu terrorist, Shinto terrorist or Jewish
terrorist? Surely some people who belong to those faiths have
chosen to use violence to advance political causes, but the
media don't brand their religions as being inherently violent.
    But one needn't look far to find a reference to a Muslim, or
Arab terrorist.
    Indeed, when the first arrests in the bombing of the World

Trade Centre in New York were made, initial media reports referred to the accused only as a Muslim. It was as if the suspect's being Muslim was the only reason he'd been connected to a bombing.

Political developments like the emergence of the Hamas movement in the occupied territories or the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria are somehow seen as being solely religious things, when they have as much to do with economics, history, social conditions and in the case of Hamas, military occupation, as they do spirituality.

A special report in the Chicago Tribune published July 15 led with this scene-setting paragraph.

''The invaders at the gates, armed with Korans and Kalashnikovs, are young men and women of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), an outlawed fundamentalist group that has plunged Algeria into violence and already has taken more than 1,000 lives.''

''Journalists, who have become the transmission belt for such reports, so reminiscent of Cold War propaganda campaigns, add drama to the mix,'' Hadar writes. ''They impose the term 'Islamic fundamentalism' to describe diverse and unrelated movements that range from CIA-trained Islamic guerrillas in Afghanistan to the anti-American clerics in Iran, from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, operating in a parliamentary system, to murderous terrorist organizations like the Lebanese Hizbollah, from pro-American Saudi Arabia to anti-American Libya. Think-tank studies, op-ed pieces and congressional hearings add color to this image of unified and monolithic Islam.''(10)

Is it any wonder that some old cold warriors meeting at a key security policy conference of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Munich last year wondered aloud if their new enemy was a resurgent Islam.

Reuters news agency reported at the time of how warnings of a growing threat from Muslim countries along the southern flank of the Atlantic alliance echoed through speeches at the high-level defence conference.(11)

Gerhard Stoltenberg, then Germany's defence minister, set the tone in his opening remarks: ''A multitude of problems are combining into potential crises and conflicts in regions crucial to Europe,'' Reuters quoted him as saying. ''Especially in the Islamic arc of tension stretching from Pakistan to Algeria, there is a zone of potential upheavals that reach into the direct vicinity of Europe.

''There are risks that could seriously affect us,'' he said.

For his part, Britain's chief of defence staff, Field Marshal Sir Richard Vincent, stressed that even moderate Muslims could present problems, noting that Riyadh's rockets could be a threat if they were moved west along the North African coast.

''Saudi Arabia has Chinese-made weapons that, if moved along a littoral, could hit London or here tomorrow,'' Vincent said. It seems no one bothered to ask Vincent what possible motivation the Saudis could have for attacking London.

Later, NATO secretary-general Manfred Woerner warned during a visit to Moscow that ''Islamic fundamentalists are increasingly strong in Central Asia,'' a development that ''does not meet the interests of NATO.''

Those who are fearful of the Islamic revival have undoubtedly learned almost everything they know about it from

'the news media.

Most frequently, they have been told of a new wave of Islamic fervor that is often violent and inherently anti-democratic, a movement of religious ``fanatics'' and ``extremists'' that poses a real threat to the West and Western interests.

Many view the desire for a return to more traditional values as somehow alien, even though Christian or Hindu or Jewish ``fundamentalist'' movements, among others, have gained considerable influence in the policy making bodies of mainstream political parties.

Radical religious Zionists have pushed for expansion of settlements in the Israeli-occupied West Bank; the VHP, or Vishwa Hindu Parishad, cultural arm of the Hindu nationalist party in India, was tied to the destruction of a Muslim mosque and riots last December.

The Republican party of former United States President George Bush was committed in the 1992 election campaign to a conservative manifesto crafted in part by religious ``fundamentalists.''

Notably, the favourite media label of fundamentalist, originally coined to describe a current in American Protestantism and applied to Islam in the flurry of news coverage of the 1979 Iranian revolution, is one that few, if any, Islamic activists would apply to themselves.

After a decade's use, its connotations are entirely negative and its all-encompassing simplicity confusing.

``Western analysts have often assumed the monolithic nature of Islam and of `Islamic fundamentalism,' thereby obscuring the diversity of ideological interpretations and the even greater diversity of actual practise in Muslim societies,'' Arab world scholars John L. Esposito and James P. Piscatori argue.(12)

So even the words we use to describe the many-faceted Islamic revival are loaded with connotations we no longer notice.

But the images conjured up in our heads by the words ``Islamic fundamentalist'' are unmistakable.

An otherwise reasonably-balanced New York Times magazine article published this year on the topic had as its main illustration a picture more than a page wide showing a band of turban-wearing horsemen, advancing in a cloud of dust, swords waving wildly above their heads.(13)

News media accounts are replete with references to fanatics, extremists, religious zealots, violent activists -- as if that's all there is to the ground swell of Islamic political thinking in the Muslim world.

A recent article in the British magazine The Economist showed a picture of a science student, a Muslim woman who was wearing the hijab covering most of her face. The woman was using a microscope. The caption above the picture read: Seventh Century meets Twentieth.

It's as if the media can't think of Islam as being modern.

But the media should be careful not to equate modernity with westernization, and development with the acquisition of western values.

We don't have to agree with Islamists, or share their aspirations, to understand them.

``The West has to learn that its model of the secular nation-state is not as universal as it presumes, and other forms of political organization may be as valid,'' Ghassan

Salame argues in a recent article in Foreign Policy.(14)

Salame contends that ''western states ought to acknowledge that democracy is not necessarily built upon a one-person, one-vote system. In complex developing societies, established ethnic or sectarian group rights are as important as human or individual rights. Individualism is not a universal, nor a morally superior, philosophy.''

It is in the best interest of Western countries for their leaders to find out who the Islamists are and what they want. ''That cannot be achieved if the West views the Islamist challenge solely from the perspective of a security threat, nor if it is preoccupied with content analysis of the Islamists' frequently contradictory statements,'' Salame says in the same essay.

The media play an important role in contributing to this debate and policy-making process, through influence on decision-makers and the public opinion with which they must cope. For that reason, the media must try harder to unravel the complexities of one of the most important developments of our time, rather than resorting to sword-wielding stereotypes.

It must also get over the idea that this is a trend-driven movement that surfaced in the past decade or two. The Islamic revival - intensified in recent years - is far from new.

In the latter part of the last century Islam was a banner and rallying cry in anti-imperialist battles in Sudan and North Africa. The Muslim Brotherhood was founded by Hasan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928 and has had an active role in the Arab world in one way or another ever since.

Islamic forces participated in the Algerian struggle for independence from France that ended in 1962 and were caught up in countless other political balancing acts between autocratic post-independence leaders like Tunisia's Habib Bourguiba and leftist political forces.

And looking back even further, scholars like Akbar Ahmed suggest the tensions we are witnessing now are rooted in the two other great historical encounters between Islam and the West.

The first began with the 7th century rise of Islam, the conquest of Spain and arrival of Islamic armies in France and Sicily. That encounter reached a dramatic climax during the Crusades of the Middle Ages and ended in the seventeenth century when the Ottomans were halted at Vienna.

The second encounter occurred during the period of European colonialism, when the entire Muslim world was placed under European rule.

The third and present encounter, punctuated by such violent confrontations as the Arab-Israeli wars and the Gulf War, is described by Akbar Ahmed as ''perhaps the most complex and bitter of all. The weapons are culture and media propaganda.''(15)

That ''media propaganda'' is fixated upon the extremist fringe of Islamic politics at the expense of all other aspects, and stuck on the idea that Islamic political movements are all inherently anti-democratic, a notion that often confuses anti-Western sentiment for an all-out rejection of democratic ideals.

While there are valid concerns about what type of ''democracy'' the Islamic Salvation Front would have fostered in Algeria had it been allowed to attain power, little consideration was given the possibility that the Islamists

would have been willing to compromise in the interests of re-election and international acceptance.

''Some leaders of Islamic movements have spoken out against Western-style democracy and a parliamentary system of government,'' Esposito and Piscatori argue. ''Their negative reaction has often been part of the general rejection of European colonial influence, a defense of Islam against further dependence on the West rather an a wholesale rejection of democracy.''(16)

Surely in the case of Algeria, there was some chance of compromise. The Islamic party leadership was split over whether to rush headlong into re-introducing Islamic law or to offer Algerians a more moderate program. It's a good bet that pragmatic politics would have prevailed. There were already hints that President Chadli Benjedid - who under the Algerian constitution would still have held the reigns of power - was, in the end, willing to compromise and work with an Islamist parliament.

That most certainly brought about his downfall. The military forced his resignation and canceled the decisive second round of elections to create the power vacuum it was so eager to fill.

The Algerian elections were a landmark because they were the furthest any Islamic party had gone in a free vote and should have shown that contrary to the prevailing media wisdom, Islamic politics is not necessarily antithetical to democratic institutions.

When the Iranian-backed Hizbollah or Party of God took part in Lebanon's 1992 elections -- the first in two decades -- media reports noted fearfully that the Hizbollah had made astounding gains at the polls. That gain amounted to about one-tenth of the seats in parliament. What should have been seen as equally astounding was the fact that Hizbollah had opted to contest the elections at all, rather than continue its struggle to establish an Islamic republic in staunchly secular Lebanon from without.

WHY DO THE MEDIA FALTER?

A recent poll conducted by the American Muslim Council found that 43 per cent of Americans agreed that Muslims are religious fanatics, while only 24 per cent disagreed.

Why do such stereotypes persist?

Some of those seeking an explanation clutch at conspiracy theories, which should be put aside.

Yes, there are concerted campaigns of disinformation, often carried out for geopolitical reasons. The US disinformation campaign against Libya in the late 1980s, for example, was well documented.

And more recently, the media stunt before a US Senate committee, orchestrated by public relations firm Hill and Knowlton, serves as a case in point. In that instance, the daughter of Kuwait's ambassador to the US was coached to act as a Kuwaiti medical worker, who tearfully told the committee of how she'd witnessed Iraqi soldiers tearing babies out of incubators and leaving them to die on cold hospital floors. We later learned that never happened.

But there is no western media conspiracy to make the Muslim or Arab world look bad. Even if sinister western governments out to smear their eastern rivals were intent on using the news

media to do so, it is hard to imagine how they could possibly get all the hundreds of thousands of journalists on side.

And all too often otherwise reasonable people speak of a sinister Zionist conspiracy controlling the world's media.

Such misguided commentators should not make the mistake of confusing a well organized, well-funded and highly motivated propaganda campaign for a conspiracy.

If anything, there is a conspiracy of ignorance. In a news world where conventional wisdoms and stereotypes often reign, what we already know - or think we know - influences how we process the information that comes to us.

Granted, many news gatherers have probably been influenced over the years by a highly successful war of words waged by the State of Israel and its supporters. But that battle has had other combatants.

If you start from the premise that there is no objective reality, presumably those who are best at getting their message across will be the ones who are heard, and who will be more likely to have their version of reality accepted.

But the Zionist movement did not create the Islamist stereotype so prevalent in the western news media. The reasons for its existence are more subtle than that.

Partly, the dismal media portrayal of Islam is a result of plain laziness - physical, mental and intellectual laziness. Journalists may find it easier to go with the conventional wisdom that editors are willing to accept, rather than to go out of their way - physically and mentally - to advance different ideas. The images and stereotypes we see all too often become a kind of media shorthand that it is difficult to alter.

But after all this, all the blame should not be heaped at the feet of the Western news media. Bear in mind that the source of much of the current information about the Islamic political revival is the governments of Muslim countries. Tunisia's president is eager to portray his Islamic political rivals as terrorists so that he can justify brutal police operations aimed at destroying them - and keeping himself in power.

The same could be said of the generals now ruling Algeria, in place of the Islamic party that had opted to play by the democratic rules, and then made the mistake of winning the election.

Popular culture also plays a role. You need look no further than Walt Disney's current animated film Aladdin to find examples of the pervasive stereotypes rampant in popular culture.

Look too at the chorus of faceless, inhuman ``Muslim terrorists'' who show up again and again in popular movies. The word stereotype comes from the early days of the printing press, when one plate cast in metal could produce countless copies. With such images so prevalent in popular culture, is it any wonder that journalists and editors don't always detect the biases and stereotypes that appear in the news?

We must look too at the material about Muslims and the Muslim world found in textbooks used to shape generations of young minds. Four studies conducted in the Canadian province of Ontario in the 1970s and 1980s (The Middle East in Social Science Textbooks, from Prof. Lorne Kenny in 1975, Stereotypes of Middle East Peoples: An Analysis of Church School Curricula, from Prof. Baha Abu Laban in 1975, Mordechai Briemberg's Sand

in the Snow from 1986 and Teaching About Arabs in Ontario, a report published by the Near East Cultural and Educational Foundation in 1988) concluded there was a crying need for a vast increase in the number and quality of source materials and readings on the Middle East. Years later, a number of textbooks those reports criticized as either woefully inadequate, or downright misleading, are still on the Ontario ministry's circular of approved texts.

So existing media stereotypes, popular culture, and bias in literature and educational texts are some of the factors that might help explain the dismal media portrayal of Islam.

But what explains the factors themselves?

It may be hundreds of years in the past, but perhaps we underestimate the lasting impact of the colossal struggle that Westerners call the Crusades, that centuries-long conflict between Christianity and Islam, Occident and Orient, the images of which linger still.

It seems there has always been an Islamic and latterly, an Arab bad guy. Salah Ad-Din threw the crusaders out of Palestine, the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman banged on the gates of Vienna, Barbary pirates chased English, French and American ships out of the Mediterranean, oil sheikhs brandished the so-called oil weapon, Palestinians wearing kaffiyeh's brandished kalashnikovs and threatened civil aviation, and later threw stones. Now we have Islamic fundamentalists.

WHAT DOES IT MATTER?

Why does all of this matter?

It matters because those who fear Islamists have little alternative but to back the status quo, and in so doing, shore up often oppressive and autocratic regimes.

Egypt, for example, has resorted to a brutal campaign of torture, mass arrests and killings in its crackdown on Islamic militants, Amnesty International said in a report released May 25, 1993. The militants are not innocents, but is steadfastly backing the Mubarak government the way to defuse the crisis?

Western governments should not be surprised if, when some Islamist groups finally do come to power in places like Egypt, they have a hostile attitude toward countries which effectively applauded their repression and encouraged the stifling of democracy in their countries.

Development efforts in a region sorely in need of assistance could also be impeded by misunderstanding. A participant in a June, 1993 Ottawa conference of the Middle East Working Group, a collection of Canadian and Middle Eastern development agencies serving the Middle East, made a poignant comment during a question period.

Why, asked Baha' Eddin Shanableh, of the Jordan-based Near East Foundation, did the conference organizers not invite a single representative of one of the many Islamic-based organizations providing social services in the Middle East?.

There was no answer.

After earthquakes in Tipasa in 1989 and in Egypt in 1992 and floods in southern Tunisia in 1990, Islamist groups showed great efficiency in co-ordinating relief efforts when governments failed. Throughout the week-long Israeli shelling of southern Lebanon in July, 1993, it was Hizbollah, not the Lebanese government, that attended to the thousands of refugees who had fled north to Beirut.

And it is now almost a conventional wisdom to state that Islamic groups have won much of their support because of successful provision of social services. Such was the case in Algeria.

Other foreign policy decisions are being made on the basis of fear and misperception.

Michael Collins Dunn argues, for example, that U.S. policymakers have already mistakenly equated Islamic movements in the newly-independent republics of Central Asia with the Iranian model. Dunn criticizes the U.S. for embracing ``neocommunists,'' in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan as a best alternative to the imagined fundamentalist threat from Iran.

``The dynamic of Islamic revival in Central Asia is, as it has been for centuries, primarily Sufi...This approach to Islam is totally alien to the urban `fundamentalism' encountered in Algeria and elsewhere. Yet it is being equated, in U.S. policymaking, with the Iranian model...''(18)

He is supported by others, like journalist Robin Wright.

``The longer the Central Asian regimes delay real pluralism - allowing all parties to work within the system rather than outside it - the greater the danger of a more embittered, strident Islam emerging to challenge the ancien regimes.''(18)

Wright recounts how former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker toured the newly-independent Central Asian states to urge them to emulate secular Turkey rather than neighboring Iran...``Although the United States stressed human rights and pluralism in its talks with Central Asian leaders, the real message appears to be as much anti-Islam as pro-democracy.''(19)

Frustration caused by the suppression of Islamic political movements -- with Western acquiescence if not outright support -- will make Western interests a target for marginalized and radicalized Islamic militants.

Self-fulfilling prophecies are just that.

In a way, ours is a second-hand world where, to varying degrees, ordinary citizens and powerful decision makers alike structure their belief systems on the basis of information that comes to them from others.

The impact of the media is not only in providing raw information and detail. Perhaps more important, the media have a cumulative effect in sculpting our belief systems, creating the mental framework we will use to process new information that comes to us.

In examining how the media influence our decisions on which route to take, many overlook the media's role in creating the map on which such routes are plotted.

The impact of media coverage of the Islamic political revival could pose more of a threat than the Islamic resurgence itself.

NOTES
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(1) Edward Said, Orientalism, Vintage Books, 1979, p. 1. Also see his Covering Islam: How the Media and Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981.

(2) John Esposito, The Islamic Threat, Oxford University Press, 1992, p 10.

(3) Leon Hadar, ``What Green Peril.'' Foreign Affairs, Spring 1993 pp 27-42, this reference p 38.

(4) Hadar, p 38.

(5) Robin Wright, ``Islam, Democracy and the West.'' Foreign Affairs, Fall 1992 pp 131-145, this reference p 143.

(6) Wright, p 138.

(7) Judith Miller, ``The Challenge of Radical Islam.'' Foreign Affairs, Spring 1993, pp 43-56, this reference p 45.

(8) Bernard Lewis, ``Islam and Liberal Democracy.'' The Atlantic Monthly, Feb. 1993 pp 89-98, this reference p 91.

(9) Miller, p 55.

(10) Hadar, p 30.

(11) From a Reuters news agency report, moved on the wire service February 20, 1992.

(12) John L. Esposito and James P. Piscatori, ``Democratization and Islam.'' The Middle East Journal, Summer 1992, pp 427-440, this reference at p 440.

(13) Judith Miller, ``The Islamic Wave.'' The New York Times Magazine, May 31, 1992, starting on p. 23.

(14) Ghassan Salame, ``Islam and the West.'' Foreign Policy, Spring 1993 pp 22-38, this reference p 32.

(15) Akbar Ahmed, ``Islam: The Roots of Misperception.'' History Today 41: pp 29-31, April, 1991. This reference from p 29.

(16) Esposito and Piscatori, op cit, p 434.

(17) Michael Collins Dunn, ``Revivalist Islam and Democracy: Thinking About the Algerian Quandary.'' Middle East Policy, Vol. 1 No. 2, pp 16-22, this reference from p 21.

(18) Wright, p 142.

(19) Wright, p 143.

Islam today

Legend:
- Predominantly Muslim
- Predominantly Muslim with militant Islamic governments

SOURCE: The New York Times

Labels on the map:
EUROPE, KAZAKHSTAN, UZBEKIZTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, AZERBAIJAN, TURKMENISTAN, TAJIKI-STAN, TURKEY, SYRIA, AFGHANISTAN, TUNISIA, LEBANON, IRAQ, IRAN, MOROCCO, GAZA, JORDAN, BAHRAIN, PAKISTAN, WESTERN SAHARA, ALGERIA, LIBYA, EGYPT, KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA, OMAN, MAURITANIA, MALI, NIGER, CHAD, YEMEN, SENEGAL, SUDAN, DJIBOUTI, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, GAMBIA, GUINEA, AFRICA, SOMALIA

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
REGIONAL AND REGIME STABILITY

IN THE MIDDLE EAST: A LINKAGE APPROACH

by

Hoda Hawa

September 1993

REGIONAL AND REGIME STABILITY

IN THE MIDDLE EAST: A LINKAGE APPROACH

The Middle East and other regions are today being redefined
in terms of their political boundaries. The collapse of the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as a cohesive bloc is demanding
this revision. In the case of the Middle East, whose delineation
has always been debatable, an enlargement of its already loose
parameter to include the emerging Central Asian subregion could
be appropriately considered. However, this analysis, undertaken
with a historical perspective, will focus on the conventionally
dealt with Middle East, which comprises the Arab countries as
well as Iran, Turkey and Israel, having at its core the eastern
Arab countries. This is still a very valid definition,
considering the existing interaction and political
interdependence between the countries referred to above.

The issue of stability will be considered in both its
domestic and regional aspects as interrelated and correlative.
However, only limited features of stability will be accounted
for. The selectivity is the choice of the author and aims to
highlight certain particular concerns.

I - Domestic Scope

A major characteristic of the regional set up in the Middle
East during the past two decades was the political stability of
the ruling regimes. With the exception of Iran, and its 1979

1

revolution, nearly all the other countries (mainly the Arab ones)
maintained a continuity in their political superstructure. This
continuity is exemplified by the fact that leaders who were on
the political scene in the late 1960s are still ruling in
countries like Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Morocco, Libya. Others
maintained their regime stability with minor changes with
successions of monarchical or military/party rule. Thus it is
possible to identify common characteristics and generalize
certain features accounting to the nature of this stability. The
fact that this is in contrast with the turbulent and
ideologically motivated era that preceded it in the 1950s and
1960s makes a selective comparison between the two eras useful in
providing some insights.

I - 1. The major source of internal consolidation of power
in most of the Arab countries after 1970 was coercion. In
general, two types of domestic power existed: the monarchical and
the military, with differences among them in allowing limited
participation. Limited participation differed in nature and
scope, such as the controlled party system in Egypt and Morocco,
the 'Popular Committees' in Libya and the 'National Front' in
Syria. More extended participation began few years ago in Jordan
under the pressure of domestic crisis. However, such limited
participation helped in consolidating power rather than
challenging existing rulers, and in all these countries the
political power is highly centralized. The main feature of this

centralization of power is the uncompromising role of the leader
(president or monarch), who is the first and last authority in
all matters, and may even be unreplaceable. Most of the Arab
countries are governed by the same leadership figure since 1970.
Apparently this reveals a deeper phenomenon embedded in the type
of political power that relies in most Arab countries on family
(royal), ethnic or sectarian minorities.

   I - 2. The oil factor played its part in consolidating
domestic power as it is. As an external source of income it
provided the ruling elite with an economic power independent from
society and more dependent on the international customers. It
aggrandized the role of the state as an all-through provider.
Even the margin given to private enterprise is dependent to some
extent on the state, who chooses its beneficiaries and extends
the membership of the ruling elite. The term 'rentier state' has
been given to describe this phenomenon of state control through
dependency on external source of income. The oil-rich Gulf
economies are the extreme manifestation of this phenomenon, where
the externality of economic resources is manifested not only in
capital resources but also in labour (the employment of a very
large foreign productive labour force). In different degrees,
however, most of the Arab states embody aspects of rentierism, be
it the poorer oil economies or those who benefit from financial
aid.

I - 3. Dissecting the major domestic challenges to regimes'
stability is not within the domain of this paper. However, two
features, are worth mentioning. One is the underlying political
fragmentation of power centralization. This is more obvious
among the eastern Arab countries, where the religious diversity
had taken a political form unprecedented since the formation of
the political states after the First World War. Apart from
Egypt, where confessionalism is not a major problem due to its
historical character as a continuous entity, problems of
fragmentation were manifested in the civil strife in Lebanon, the
domestic crisis in Syria between 1979-81 which featured a
confessional division of some sort, and lately the post Gulf war
Iraq where both ethnic (Kurdish) and sectarian problems were
brought to the open. The fragility of these societies stems at
least from their new state formations (where colonialist interest
superseded other political and cultural aspects) and the absence
of a cohesive national ideology. The other glaring challenge to
the existing domestic order, and consequently regionally, is the
'salafi' Islamic movement. The word 'salafi' offers a better
description than the more often-used word 'fundamentalist' of a
movement whose main objective is to go back to what is considered
the glorious days of Islam. With its popular base, attracting
mainly the Middle Class, and its regional cross border dimension,
the Islamic movement is assuming a popular strength similar to
what the Arab nationalist movement had in the decades of the

1950s and 1960s. It poses a similar, yet more confusing, challenge to the existing order, because of its uncompromising character (particularly the new organizations that emerged in the 1970s) and its cross border influence that puts into question the existing state order.

II - Regional Scope:

II - 1. In the regional realm, the post 1970 domestic stability created a new regional order where realpolitik and pragmatism in relations among states replaced the power of ideology which was strong during the earlier decades of the 1950s and 1960s. Domestic coercion and the accompanying importance given to internal security, played an important role in imposing such a regional order by preventing the power of ideology from affecting the internal political fabric of the Arab countries as was the case during the heyday of Arab nationalism and Egyptian supremacy earlier. Emphasis was transferred from the political to the military and economic in regional politics. While the contest in regional politics was the championing of nationalist and even socially radical issues during the 1950s and 1960s, the emphasis after 1970 shifted from the augmentation of political capabilities to increasing the military one and making use of the economic one (particularly in respect to oil-rich states). The idol of a strong state and the quest towards increasing its prestige became the major active drive. This meant as well the strengthening of the state ideology rather than the trans-state

Arab national one, and the articulation of state-oriented
national interest and national security.

II - 2. The previous division among Arab states between
radical and conservative was replaced after 1970 with an
accommodating relationship among the respective states. Although
some sort of division persisted on this course, the weakness of
Egypt and the consequent change in its internal and regional
policies deprived the so-called radical states from the political
pivot on which to converge. What emerged as a consequence was
fragmented politics, or 'localized' regional politics, where
policies became more clearly articulated on subregional levels.
However, relations were competitive rather than cooperative. In
the Fertile Crescent animosity became a norm in the relations
between the two neighboring Ba'thi regimes in Syria and Iraq
since late 1960s, with Jordan jockeying within the existing
balance. The triangular relation between Egypt, Libya and Sudan
in the Nile delta subregion began to show signs of strain between
Libya and Egypt after 1973. Within the Arabian peninsula the
Saudi-Yemeni triangular relation replaced the old Saudi-Egyptian
competition. The Maghreb had its own balance of power with the
two major actors Morocco and Algeria. Another regionally and
internationally important balance of power emerged in the Gulf
after the British withdrawal by 1970. Regional politics became
the integration of these subregional competitions, with two major
regional/ international issue areas that of the Arab-Israeli

conflict and Gulf Security. Differences in the direction of
policies of states, such as the differences in their orientation
towards the international powers, or in the nature of the
domestic political systems and other ideological differences, as
well as the gap between the rich and poor states, were important
ones, but they remained relatively in the background.

II - 3. Until the mid 1970s the shading of ideological
differences and the harmonious policies of major countries (i.e.
Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia) towards the Arab-Israeli conflict
provided a minimum basis for cooperation among the Arab
countries. It was the time when the Arab League as a regional
organization was at its best, providing at least important
resolutions in the advancement of the Arab position towards the
Arab-Israeli conflict.

After the mid 1970s, not only the
Arab-Israeli conflict was no longer providing a collective policy
but it became a major issue of contention among Arab states,
particularly after Egypt moved along the path of separate peace
agreements with the Israeli state, irrespective of the wishes and
desires of other major Arab actors, specifically Syria.

Although Arab divisions in relation to the Arab-Israeli
conflict were more apparent after the mid 1970s, given the
centrality of the issue, the geographical, or localized,
competitions were more pronounced and violent. In the Fertile

Crescent, Syria's intervention in the Lebanese civil war brought its relations with Iraq to an unprecedented crisis which involved the massing of Iraqi troops on the Syrian borders, and from then on mutual attempts at subversion continued to plague their relations. The worsening relations between Egypt and Libya culminated in July 1977 to a war when Egypt advanced its army on the Libyan borders and the Egyptian threat continued to be for quite some time a major security occupation for Libya. Relations between Morocco and Algeria in the Maghreb became conflictual over the erupting Western Sahara problem in 1975, which threatened to involve the two countries in war at some occasions. Only the Gulf subregion seemed tranquil, at least for a while, as Iraq in March 1975 submitted to the Iranian diktat and accepted a new agreement on boundaries between the two countries, although differences on border between Iraq and Kuwait continued to be a highlight till 1977 when Iraq withdrew its forces from the borders.

II — 4. If problems to regional stability can be reduced to the sources of conflict between states, it is apparent within the increasingly geographical competition for influence and prestige, that apart from the Arab-Israeli conflict, border problems acquire a particular significance. In nearly most of the issues of conflict raised since the mid 1970s some sort of border problem was involved: between Iran and Iraq, Iraq and Kuwait, Libya and Chad, Morocco and Algeria (besides the conflict

on the fate of the Western Sahara, Morocco till now has not
ratified the 1970 border agreement with Algeria), and somehow the
Arab-Israeli conflict was reduced by the Arab states to an
exchange of territory for peace. Unsettled border problems still
persist significantly in the Gulf and to lesser extent in North
Africa. However, border issues are important for reasons other
than regional influence. They are mixed with what appears to be
anti-colonialist grievances, either in the form of non-
acknowledgement of borders considered to be a result of a
colonialist division of the Arab world in general, or in
particular cases of states such as Iraq and Morocco where the
borders are considered to be unsatisfactorily drawn by the former
colonialist powers. Other border problems are related to earlier
sovereignty disputes, as is particularly the case in the Arabian
Peninsula.

    II - 5. The means of conflict available, that is quantities
and qualities of armament, has as well an important effect on
regional stability. It is not a surprise that a region like the
Middle East, a witness to several large and costly wars and to
repeated violence, would rank first in arms imports worldwide.
But it is also valid to deduct that the arms race itself creates
vulnerabilities to wars and violence. The problem in the Middle
East is that the arms race was aggravated by the concerns of
the international powers. Particularly, the arms race was
significant in subregions with important international

involvement, such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and security of the Gulf, and was less significant in the Maghreb. This brings us to another source of conflict raised by international powers' competition.

III - International Scope

III - 1. During the 1970s, the division of the Middle East into client states to the competing superpowers was more obvious than in any other region. However, the form of this clientelism was very particular. It involved, in the pursuit of international powers' interest, delegating power to regional actors. This was obviously the case with the United States, who had theorized this kind of delegation within the so-called 'Nixon doctrine', in late 1960s, in order to fill the gap after the withdrawal of Britain from the oil rich Gulf subregion. Iran and Israel, each one in its local balance of power, the Gulf and the Arab-Israeli subregions, were assigned to these roles. The idea was to have these states acquire a superior military capability within the existing balance of power and consequently enforce a stability of some sort. The consequence was an increase in arms imports to the region from the United States to Iran and Israel equalled nearly by the Soviet exports of arms to the competing regional actors such as Iraq, Syria and for some of the time Egypt. By 1974 Iran had become the largest recipient of Foreign Military Sales from the United States, whose sales to the Middle East had replaced in importance those destined to Europe. Likewise the

Soviet arms exports to the Middle East exceeded any other international region outside the Warsaw Pact.

The lucrative arms sales to the Middle East became even more significant with the increase of oil revenues after 1973. The Shah of Iran was able to begin building a small military empire out of the US weapons stock. Saudi Arabia became an important arms sales' client. Between 1973-77 Iran's share of US military sales to the region was 42% while that of Saudi Arabia 24%. The oil revenues also helped states like Iraq and Libya to take the challenge in arms imports, and even those countries who did not have a substantial oil revenue benefited from financial aid coming from oil sources (i.e. Syria and Morocco) or from the generosity of the American donor (i.e. Israel) for the purchase of arms.

III - 2. While this type of superpowers contest was a safe framework for their competition which did not involve direct intervention, it increased competition and conflict among regional states. In the regional context it was destabilizing. Even from the perspective of US interest, the superiority of clients within the regional balance of power was not altogether satisfactory. The Arab countries, increasing their capabilities through Soviet military supplies, were able to challenge Israel's superiority in the 1973 war. Iran's ability to impose its diktat on its neighbours, particularly Iraq with the signing of 1975

border agreement, would not have been that easily possible were it not for the Kurdish problem within Iraq itself. However, the whole set-up increased the potential recourse to the use of threats parallel to the increased arms race, as stronger actors became more involved in the pursuit of regional dominance, and weaker ones, being more frustrated, were eager to change the existing balance of force to their advantage. In the meanwhile, regional conflicts seemed to be manageable as long as the superpowers maintained a constraining effect on their clients and their adversaries (e.g. the Soviet and American role in implementing a cease-fire in the Arab-Israeli 1973 war, and similarly the restraint on Iran by the existence of Soviet Union on its eastern borders).

IV - The Shaken Order

IV - 1. By 1979 the coercive stability of both domestic and regional politics was shaken, and consequently the region was a witness to more armaments, violence/wars, domestic unrest and regime brutality. Two coinciding events, the Camp David peace accords between Egypt and Israel and the Iranian revolution, were the major changes in the regional order. The first shifted the balance of power in the Arab-Israeli conflict, with the withdrawal of Egypt, to a point where the Israeli state was much less constrained to exercise its superiority against the remaining belligerents. Between 1978 and the mid-1980s, the Israeli state launched a series of aggressive acts, from the

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limited war in March 1978 against South Lebanon, to the extensive
air bombardment of PLO positions in South Lebanon and Beirut
between 1979 and 1981 coming together with supporting
Lebanese factions opposed to Syrian presence in Lebanon which
brought about the missile crisis with Syria in 1981, and finally
waging a full-scale-war with the invasion of Lebanon in 1982.
Rather than decreasing the arms race, the Egyptian-Israeli peace
treaty gave to the arms race a new stimulus. Israel got more
sophisticated weapons from the United States (F-15 and F-16
aircraft) as a bonus for Camp David peace, Egypt had its share as
well, while Syria, being put in a more threatened position,
increased its arms purchase from the Soviet arsenal.

   IV - 2.   The Iranian revolution had combined regional and
domestic consequences. As a successful revolution it was a
challenge to the coercive domestic order regionally, and gave an
impetus for increased opposition elsewhere. Syria was a scene for
a violent crisis during 1979-81 with a significant role being
played by the Muslim Brotherhood. More organized opposition
began in Iraq and other Gulf states, particularly within the
Shiite community. In Egypt, Sadat had to pay with his life in
1981 for the increased strength of the Islamic movement which
took shape in the 1970s. Other countries in the Machreq as well
as the Maghreb were similarly affected. However, the Shia version
of Islam adopted by the post-revolutionary Iran posed a
limitation on the capacity of Iran to transcend its Islamic

ideology in a majority-Sunni Arab world. Its influence had rather
deepened the divisions within countries more than uniting the
potential forces of opposition.

IV - 3.   The regional balance of power in the Gulf within
which the American interest and the stability of weak actors were
guarded was radically shaken by the Iranian event. Recourse to
the use of force became a reality with the war between Iraq and
Iran which began in 1980. Many of the reasons cited by different
writers on the causes of the war are related to the nature of
coercive stability that existed in the preceding decade: Iraq's
frustration from the imposition of Iranian diktat on the border
question, the repressive domestic situation within Iraq which
rested on the centralization of power and the associated deep-
seated security worries (in some sense Iraq was fighting on
behalf of the other Arab Gulf states whose domestic security
worries are not less profound), and last but not least the means
of recourse to force to solve problems was carried out in a
decade of increasing armaments and maximization of power. Until
it began to pose a threat on oil routes and on other neighbours
in 1986/87, the Iran-Iraq war was allowed to drag on for eight
years, during which the US was getting prepared for direct
military intervention if the need arose in implementation of the
'Carter doctrine', announced in the context of Gulf security
problems. This prolongation of the war, which suited the
interest of those who wanted to pacify both Iranian and Iraqi

capabilities, made its effect felt on regional stability in other ways. It increased the pursuit for armaments, hightened the divisions among Arab states, was a background for subversive and terrorist acts elsewhere, increased the recourse to domestic coercion and delayed solutions of other conflicts.

IV - 4. The shaken regional order made the security worries of respective states the dominant feature during the 1980s. In the Gulf, the level of arms expenditure was tremendous. Saudi Arabia became the largest military purchaser in the region (US military sales to Saudi Arabia were staggering, amounting to 51% of total US deliveries to the region between 1978-82, though mostly in the form of infrastructural build up), not to speak about the other Gulf oil states and the two countries involved in war, Iraq and Iran. The support given to Iraq to overcome the Iranian threat made it one of the most significant arms importers in the region. No less significant was the level of armament within the Arab-Israeli context. More important was the level of sophistication in arms procurement and the quality of the new arms. The loosening of the superpowers grip, particularly of the Soviet Union since the early 1980s, added to the existing security worries. For many of the previous client states, the relation with the superpower signified as well the existence of a guarantor of last resort. In the Iran-Iraq war, when Iraq became directly threatened after 1982, such a guarantor did not exist. This was the case during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982

with the weak performance of the Soviet Union. Some kind of guarantee was sought by weaker states through enhancing their long-range missile capabilities as an alternative. By the end of the 1980s, arms expenditure in the Middle East was still the highest among Third World countries. The eight highest ranking countries in military expenditure, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Israel, Iran, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Turkey, ranked as well among the largest arms purchasers among the Third World countries between 1973 and 1983, amounting to more than half of Third World imports. In the early 1990s, international worries centered on chemical weapons proliferation and other associated weapons of mass destruction. It is not in the domain of this paper to expand on this problem of armaments, but it will suffice to say that the attention that has been so far given to the potentiality of proliferation of such destructive weapons is avoiding the question the monopoly that the state of Israel had on such weapons and its superior capacity today, being the only nuclear state in the area and aspiring to the more sophisticated uses of missile technology (including ballistic and anti-missile capabilities).

V - Conclusion

The coercive stability on the regional and domestic levels that had been enforced in the 1970s and 1980s was a more receptive environment to wars, created repressed frustrations, and emptied societies and regions from the capacity to interact

and communicate on other levels than the level of power. The most disquieting frustrations had came to the surface in the past few years, creating another tragic war in the chain of regional crises, the 1991 Gulf war. On the other hand, domestic frustrations are feeding the growth of the Islamic 'Salafi' movements, the   expression by an opposition force of the absence of channels of societal communication and healthy interaction.

What is more worrying is that coercion both regionally and domestically is still the force of the day. The changing world order seemed to have offered a global opportunity for settling old scores and pursuing the logic of control. Although the relaxation of global conflict offers as well other opportunities for enhancing cooperation and communication, this is ignored. From a Middle Eastern perspective, and particularly an Arab one, the messages received from the UN, which is playing a more important international role, and from other global actors are those of sanctions and military pressures. The negotiations for an Arab-Israeli peace have dragged on with out much progress, the question of pacifying the Palestinian people been given a greater importance than their right to national self-determination.

The arena of domestic politics is breeding more violence. Stability is still sought through coercion, even maximizing coercion, now that the internal crisis is becoming multi-faceted.

The decline of oil revenues since the early 1980s has deprived
the existing rulers, be it in oil producing countries or aid-
receiving ones, from the main instrument of appeasement they had.
The economic crisis is giving more room to the Islamic political
opposition to gain stronger ground. The nature of the existing
regimes based on minority rule, nested in corruption and
nepotism, makes it difficult to channel genuine societal
communication and offer a real participatory system. On the other
hand, the existing Islamic political movements think of politics
as an exclusive domain of their own, cutting in advance the
possibility to interact and improve on the existing order. The
recourse to increased coercion and counter-violence is the
outcome.

The aim of this paper was to emphasize the usually
ignored interlinkage between domestic and regional stability, and
to offer some critical insights on the nature of such stability,
if it ever existed, in the Middle East. It avoided dealing with
the supposedly 'New World Order', considering it to be still in
the making, while attempting to deduce some aspects for a better
order. Without basic communication, interaction, cooperation and
conscious participation, things that have been denied to the Arab
region for such a long time by domestic and regional coercion, no
basis for stability could be established. What I call, for lack
of a better word, regional 'democratization', is inseparable from
offering just solutions for national questions, the Palestinian

question as well as the Kurdish one, and refraining from the
acceptance of Might as a force for a stable solution to disputes.
The extreme lack of democratic properties either leads to naked
suppression or disintegration. The domestic scene mirrors the
regional one and vice-versa, and the progress in one or the other
could lead to a break-through.

An Interim Palestinian-Israeli Peace Agreement:
Substance and Politics

Yezid Sayigh

(Notes and visual aids)

AREAS OF HEAVY JEWISH SETTLEMENT IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN
TERRITORY THAT ARE INTENDED FOR POSSIBLE ANNEXATION TO ISRAEL

DIAGRAM 4

Powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian interim self-government authority (PISGA) in the proposed Israeli model

ISRAEL

```
                        ┌──────────────┐
                        │   Israeli    │
                        │  Government  │
                        └──────────────┘
            ┌──────────────┐         ┌──────────────┐
            │   Defence    │         │  Civilian    │
            │   Ministry   │         │  Ministries  │
            └──────────────┘         └──────────────┘
                ┌─────┐
                │ IDF │
                └─────┘
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

                        ┌──────────────┐
                        │   Military   │
                        │  Government  │
                        └──────────────┘
    ┌──────────────┐                    ┌──────────────┐
    │  Residual    │                    │ Joint Liaison│
    │  Powers      │                    │  Committee   │
    └──────────────┘                    └──────────────┘

                        ┌──────────────┐
                        │ Palestinian  │
                        │Council (ISGA)│
                        └──────────────┘

  ┌──────────────┐   ┌──────────────┐   ┌──────────────┐
  │   Joint      │   │  Functional  │   │  Liaison     │
  │ Management   │   │  Spheres     │   │  Committees  │
  │  (Land,      │   └──────────────┘   └──────────────┘
  │   Water,     │
  │  Infrastruc  │   ┌──────────────┐   ┌──────────────┐
  └──────────────┘   │  (Health,    │   │   Health     │
                     └──────────────┘   └──────────────┘

                     ┌──────────────┐   ┌──────────────┐
                     │ Trade, etc)  │   │   Trade      │
                     └──────────────┘   └──────────────┘
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Israeli veto on primary legislation

THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY

DIAGRAM 3
Jewish settlements in the proposed Israeli model

ISRAEL

```
                    ┌──────────────┐
                    │   Israeli    │
                    │  Government  │
                    └──────────────┘
                     ↙           ↘
        ┌──────────────┐      ┌──────────────┐
        │   Civilian   │      │   Defence    │
        │  Ministries  │      │   Ministry   │
        └──────────────┘      └──────────────┘
```

IDF

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

```
                                    ┌──────────────┐
                                    │   Military   │
                                    │  Government  │
                                    └──────────────┘
```

Security

Functional
Spheres

Courts/Police

Municipal
Services

Land, Water,
Infrastructure

Jewish
Settlements

Civilian
Administration

THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY

DIAGRAM 2

Existing Structure of Israeli authority in the Occupied Palestinian Territory

ISRAEL

Israeli Government

Civilian Ministries

Defence Ministry

IDF

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

[2.000-3.000 military orders]

Military Government

Military Security

Jewish Settlements

Civilian Administration

THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY

Palestinian Municipalities

DIAGRAM 1

"Cake" model of powers and responsibilities

External security, sovereignty, foreign relations
Internal security
Personal jurisdiction
"Functional Spheres": Economic sectors, trade, finance, taxation
Health, education, environment, etc
Courts/Police
Municipal services (sanitation, lighting, maintenance, etc)
Infrastructure (electricity, telecommunications, roads, etc)
Management and use of land, water, natural resources

Israel (handwritten left margin, top bracket)

their power (handwritten left margin, bottom bracket)

Key notions and terminology:

-- Geographical jurisdiction
-- Personal jurisdiction
-- Primary legislation
-- Secondary legislation
-- Functional spheres
-- Military government
-- Civilian administration
-- Annexation
-- Extra-territorial extension of the legal system
-- Extra-territorial extension of civilian authority

Note on Diagram 1: What ties all the elements together?
    1) Territorial dimension (includes land, water, and nat-
    ural resources, as well as Jewish settlements and east
    Jerusalem)
    2) Human dimension -- personal jurisdiction, plus polit-
    ical authority and legal system
    3) Economic and financial sectors and functions
    4) Security

Syrian-Israeli Negotiations: The Israeli Point-of-View

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In an interview to Al-Wasat a few weeks ago, president Asad said that he felt that the Israelis were beginning to be serious in the peace talks. At the same time, Israeli spokesmen, including senior ministers, have said that they were optimistic regarding the chances of attaining an agreement with the Syrians in the near future and that they believed that Israel would be willing to pay the painful price that such an agreement requires.

These statements followed a number of positive signals emanating both from Damascus and Jerusalem over the past few months, which indicate that Syria and Israel are close to the longed-for breakthrough that would lead to the signing of a peace treaty between them.

The negotiations which are yet to take place between Syria and Israel shall indeed be long and difficult. It would seem that the Syrian-Israeli component of the conflict in the Middle East is full of pain, charged with suspicion and mutual distrust and highly emotional. Nevertheless, many believe that Syria and Israel have stepped on to path that they would not abandon, and

1

readiness.

Israel conceived of Syria's hostility towards it as deep-rooted and authentic, and as consisting of three components:
1. an ideological component, involving the denial of the right of a Jewish state to exist in the Middle East, for ideological, historical and other reasons.

2. a psychological component, involving an authentic dread of Israel, which the Syrians view as a military power of the first order, equipped with a strong air force and nuclear weapons, aspiring towards expansion and occupation, seeking to deprive the Arab nation of its chances to develop -- a power whose very existence threatened Syria and the Arab world at large.

One may note here in passing the amazing degree to which the Israelis and the Syrians fear one another and the extent to which they tend to attribute negative images and characteristics and even devious thoughts to one another. The Syrains truly believe that Israel poses a real threat to Syria and the Israelis are sure that Syria is a threat to Israel.

3. The third component in Syria's attitude to Israel, as viewed in Israel, is the constraints influencing Asad's regime, which relies mainly on the support of the Alawite community, and is thus obliged to recurrently prove itself in the eyes of public opinion in Syria and in the Arab world at large.

3

These components led Syria to adopt a radical and tough stand towrads Israel, and did not allow it to follow in the footsteps of Sadat and adopt a moderate and pragmatic policy. The Syrians, that is, could not join a political process for resolving the Middle East conflict, as they were not ready to come to terms with the possibility that at the end of this process they would be obliged to recognize the existence of the state of Israel.

What, then, brought about the change in the position of Syria, that is now willing to undertake something that it had totally rejecetd only a few years ago?

In my assessment, Syria's move towards Israel was not an isolated one, but constituted part of a laregr strategy, designed mainly to bring about an imrpovement in Syria's relations with the United States. This strategy evolved mainly as the result of the fact that since the late 1980's and especially following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Syrian regime was caught in the throes of an exsitential crisis which threatened its stability and its very exsitence.

In order to extricate itself from this crisis, the regime adopted a more pragmatic foreign policy, designed to open a dialogue and attain an understanding with the United States and

thus ensure a place for Syria in the new world Order.

As part of this strategy, the Syrian regime resumed ties with Egypt, although it had once vowed never to do so so long as Egypt maintained its peace agreement with ISrael. This strategy also underlay Syria's joining the anti-Iraq coalition led by the United States. It was becasue of this strategy that Asad found himself compelled (in fact, much like Shamir) to accept the American invitaion and, for the first time in the history of Syria existence, join a political process whose objective is a peace treaty with Israel.

I believe, however, that Asad's agreeing to join the peace process may also have been underlain by the follwoing motivations:

First, retreiving the Golan Heights is a vital interset of Asad, who was in power when they were lost to Syria and was therefore considered responsible for this loss. The retrieval of the Golan apparently now seems possible, after for years Israel- - backed by the United States -- refused to even consider the possibiluty of returning them to Syria.

Second, the United States is no longer considered an enenmy. The Bush adminsitration, in whose days the political process was launched, was even considered to be friendly towards Syria.

Third, at present there is a general consensus in the Arab world, and I believe in Syria as well, regarding the need to

negotiate with Israel and perhaps even sign a peace treaty with it.

The result, then, was Syria's readiness to join the peace process, albeit unenthusiastically, and out of fear of the price (recognizing the exsitence of the state of Israel and signing a peace treaty with it) that it might have to pay for this.

Syria posed two preconditions for any progress in the peace talks:
1. that Israel should fully withdraw from all of the Golan Heights.
2. that the Syrian-Israeli treaty be part of a comprehensive agreement that includes the resolution of the Palestinian problem.

As the Israeli government at that time refused to consider any Israeli withdrawal in the Golan, demanding that the Syrians first declare their readiness to recognize the state of Israel and sign a peace treaty with it, the Syrians could point accusingly at Israel.

Many people in Israel, however, felt that the problem was also on the Syrian side, for although the Syrians spoke -- and still speak -- extensively of peace, it is a peace of a strange nature, in which no partner is mentioned. Syria refused to

recognize the exsietnce of the State of Israel and to consider the possibility of establishing peaceful relations with it. The Syrians even hoped that they would gain from the peace process without having to pay any price. They hoped, that is, to take adavntage of the rift in the relationship between the United States and Israel, demand an improvement in their own relations with the United States, and all this -- without paying the price of signing a peace treaty with Israel.

This state of affairs came to an end following the June 1992 elections in Israel and the rise to power of the Rabin government. The political change in Israel had two major consequences:

1. relations between Israel and the United States improved, so that Asad can no longer count on a possible breach between them and on Israel's being presented as the enemy of peace.

2. the new Israeli government is now ready to discuss a withdrawal in the Golan Heights. Moreover, there have been quite a few hints, some of them coming from prime minister Rabin himself, that Israel would eventually be willing to withdraw from all of the Golan.

The rise to power of the Labour party in Israel, then, expresses a shift which took place in Israel.

Both the regional and the international set-up have changed.

It seemed that the world, at least in part, was marching towards a new order. Moreover, the Arab world too has changed and-- although most Israelis found this hard to believe until recently -- seems more ready than it had been for the possibility of peace. Third, regional conditions have changed. The Gulf War showed the people in Israel that wars in the region would involve missiles and non-conventional warfare, so that peace is now conceived of as one of the best guarantees for security.

The Israeli public, tired of wars, and having identified a change in the Arab position, is not prepared to let go of the opportunity for peace. It is this eagerness for peace that underlies the willingness to change which was reflected in the June 1992 elections.

This change which took place in Israel catalyzed the peace process and brought both Syria and Israel closer to the moment of truth in which they must decide whether they are indeed interested in signing a peace treaty, and even more so -- whether they are willing to pay the requisite price, which for Israel is giving the Golan back to Syrian hands, and for Syria-- recognizing the exsitence of the State of Israel and sging a peace treaty with it.

First, let us examine the Israeli position, that is -- how Israel coneceives of peace and what it wishes to achieve in the

peace process:

First of all, Israel is interested in full peace, based on a written treaty and including normalization, the exchange of ambassadors and especially -- relations in commerce, tourism, culture and other spheres. This demand has two causes:

First, Israel believes that giving root treatment to the conflict requires coping with the question of why Syria has so far refused to recognize the very existence of the State of Israel. It is important to realize that what is involved in the conflict is not a dispute over a a peace of land but a prolonged Syrian refusal to recognize the right of Israel to exist in the Middle East. Israel believes that there can be no real peace unless this issue is coped with.

Second, in order to develop relations between countries, and especially between nations, it is necessary to overcome anxieties and hostilities, and in order to do that -- it is essential to maintain normal ties and to cultuvate relations of culture, commerce and tourism. Otherwise, the peace treaty is no more than a piece of paper, whose implementation depends on changing political constellations and security arrangements. In other words, it would be a treaty without a soul or significant content.

The seocnd component that Israel is seeking is security arrangements. Of course, this is an issue that troubles both Syria and Israel. In fact, it is an issue for psychologists rather than historians and politicians. In Israel, but also in Syria, there is real, sincere and authentic anxiety of the Other. Israel is convinced that Syria intends to destroy and liquidate it, and Syria apparently believes the same.

Peace between Israel and Syria, then, would have to be based on security arrangements that would be sufficiently strong to both preserve it and provide psychological reassurance. This is especially important in view of the personality of the protagonists. I see no chance of Asad's turning into a contemporary Sadat, coming to Jerusalem and setting Israel's anxieties to rest in a daring and dramatic move.

In my assessment, it is entirely possible that in return for a peace treaty that would include these two components, Israel may be prepared to withdraw to the 1967 borders, that is -- give the Golan heights back to Syria, although the Golan is a crucial strategic asset, which provides control over the north of Israel and which had served as a base for Syrian aggression against Israel till 1967. I would like to point out in this connection that before 1967 Israel did not hold the Golan Heights, and yet there was no peace between Israel and Syria, not because of a piece of land but because Syria refused to recognize the

existence of the state of Israel.

As for the Syrian position - the Syrians, as I mentioned before, demand that they be given back the Golan Heights and that any Syrian-Israeli agreement be part of a comprehensive agreement in the Middle East. They also demand a series of security arrangements. Thus far, there is even some similarity between Syria's attitude to peace and that of Israel. However, now that I must turn to Syria's conception of peace, I am at a loss:

The Syrians recurrently use the term epace, but it would seem that from their point-of-view, peace does not involve a partner, but is signed between Syria and itself. I have been closely following the statements made in the Syrian media and by Sypian spokesmen, and I have not heard a single clue to the fact that the peace that Syria wishes to achieve is with Israel.

Moreover, Syria still refuses to recognize the existence of the state of Israel, to acknowledge its right to exist in the Middle East and to commit itself to maintain normal relations with it. Syria demands full Israeli withdrawal and the self-definition of the Palestinians, but refuses to say what it would be willing to give in return.

I have already said that Syria's readiness to join the political process was a result of a regional and international

set-up, which may change over time. It does not stem from a fundamental change in the way in which Syria perceives Israel. On the contrary, any reader of the Syrian media may see that Israel is still represented there as an aggressive, racist and hostile entity, as a non-legitimate and illegal being. It would seem, then, that the Syrians have not yet come to terms with the existence of Israel.

This leads many Israelis to fear and suspect that Syria is not really interested in peace and that it wishes only to placate the United States without paying the price that the United States requires -- a historical turning of tables in the Middle East. Incidentally, the United Sattes makes demands upon Israel too, including an almost complete withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the dismantling of settlements. .

For my part, I believe that Syria is indeed interestsed in peace. An analysis of Asad's moves over the past two years suggests that he has already gone past the moment of truth and come to terms with the possibility of signing a peace treaty with Israel. The problem is that he has not yet given any clear and unequivocal indication of this. Thus, Israeli apprehensions regarding Syria's desire to achieve real peace remain standing.

Assuming, then, that Asad is still to prove that he is truly interested in peace, and that Israel has come to terms with the

price that it would be required to pay for this peace, what are the problems still facing the negotiations? For, if Israel is willing to pay the territorial price, and Asad has come to the moment of truth -- what is holding up the negotiations?

First, Rabin's government is facing domestic problems. It is a coalition government in a democratic country, which requires public support, especially when tough decisions are at stake. Rabin apparently senses that unless he can show the Israeli public a tangible achievement such as Syria's unequivocal declaration that it is willing to establish peace with Israel, or a dramatic step such as the Egyptian president's visit to Jerusalem in 1977, he would not be able to decalre full Israeli withdawal from the Golan Heights.

Asad too, faces domestic constraints, although in his case, they stem manly from his own past. For more than two decades, Asad had spearheaded a hostile policy towards ISrael, and now he is required to completely forgo it. For tactical considerations (that is, because he wishes to get the Golan Heights back), Asad wishes to refrain from decalring his readiness to maintain normal relatiosn with Israel, for he believes that this is the last card he is keeping up his sleeve.

This state of affairs has led us to the present deadlock in the talks between Syria and Israel.

Despite the apparent maturity of both partoies, both hold back from being the first to take a risk, demanding that it be the Other party that take the first step. It was against this background that Israel asked for a summit to be held between the leaders of Israel and Syria, assuming that such a summit could lead to a breakthrough and to a courageous agreement between the two leaders, both of whom have proven much courage in the past.

The Syrians, however, refuse to hold such a summit as in their assessment, before they are ensured of the full retrieval of the Golan Heights they would not be able to justify such a summit to their public.

All that remains, then, is to await active American involvement, or Egyptian mediation, to lead the leaders of the two countries to overcome the barriers of insecurity and other psychological residue. My feeling is that the peoples of both countries are reday, and now it is the leaders who must take action.

One last remark, about the Palestinian issue, upon which the Syrians make the agreement with them contingent. I know this is a weighty and complex issue, perhaps the most complex in the entire conflict. I believe, however, that should a solution be found to the Syrian-Israeli conflict, this would lead first of all to the

resolution of the Israeli-Lebanese conflict. Consequently, the Palestinains may be pressured to reach an agreement with Israel by the Syrians, the United States and perhaps even from within Israel. Clearly, the Palestinian issue too must be resolved in a manner that includes both Israeli and Palestinian concessions. Thus, although it is possible that the entire peace process, including the negotiations between Syria and Israel, may eventually collapse due to an inability to reach an agreement on the Palestinian issue, I feel that on the contary, a Syrian-Israeli agreement will be the key to a comprehensive breakthrough in the region.

I have pointed out a series of difficulties, but I believe that despite thses difficultiues, there is cause for optimism. Peace is still far away and the road to peace is still strewn with obstacles. This road is sure to have its ups and downs, and both sides still have a long way to go on it, but unless something unexpected happends, they will travel it to its end, which is the longed-for peace.

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TITLE OF PAPER :

" THE POLITICS OF WATER AND PEACE "

BY

ABDULLATIF DARWEESH

Water sources, such as springs, rivers etc. have always been desired sites of human settlement. As such, water has often been a reason for conflict over the control of these sources. Human survival depends on water both directly and via agriculture. Plenty of water allows a strong agricultural sector to develop, which underpins a strong economy.

Around the Mediterrenean, there are many countries which face water conflict, such as Greece - Bulgaria, Turkey - Irak, Turkey - Syria, Irak - Syria, Egypt - Ethiopia, Israel - Jordan and Syria.

Sometimes, conflicts over water recources can provoke a war conflict between countries, because as a strategical asset, water can be even more valuable than oil.

There are two main issues in the dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians, the settlements and the water. In my opinion, Israel may make concessions in the settlements issue, but not in the water issue.

Palestine depends on 3 sources of water, rain, surface water and underground water. In the West Bank, the main sources are rains and the Jordan river. The average rainfall is 2.130 million m3 and from this about 60 - 70 % is lost by evaporation. The surface water is the river Jordan. The total surface of the river Jordan is 17.000 km2 and it crosses Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Palestine. Its surface in the West Bank is 660 km2 and the total water supply annually is 1.800 millions m3.

Israel uses 600 millions m3, Jordan 320 mil. m3, and in the Dead Sea arrive 650 mil. m3. The rest is eveporated.

Regarding the Gaza Strip, the underground water is the main source. Of the total rainfall in the Gaza strip, 114 mil. m3 is evaporated, and 40 mill. m3 is absorbed in the underground.

The water problem underlies the whole crisis in the Mediterrenean, and is a crucial issue within the political dialogue between the countries of the area.

The water crisis in the Mediterrenean, is attributed to 3 sets of factors : environmental, economic and political.

During the early years of the British mandate in Palestine, the British government sent General Charles Warn to look for water sources. The British government was interested in determining whether large-scale agricultural development could take place there, which would make the proposal of Jewish settlement there feasible. General Warn concluded that by diverting water south, settlement would be possible in the Negeb area.

At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the Zionist Organisation reuested a state with borders on the rivers Liteni and Jordan. After the creation of Israel in 1948,

the direction of the flow of the river Jordan was changed by the Israelis. Ever since 1948, the need for water has pushed Israel into further conflict. The U.S. President Eisenhower sent Eric Johnston to the area to create a plan for water in Palestine, which involved permanent settlement of Palestinian refugees in other Arab countries, allowing further Jewish migration.

Both sides turned down the plan. The importance of water was outlined by Ben Gurion, who said, in 1955, to the Knesset, " The Jews are having the battle of water with the Arabs and the existence of Israel depends upon these results" . Also in 1955, Ben Gurion said that use of water from the river Jordan would enable 250 settlements on the borders with the Arab countries. After the war in 1967, Israel got control of the supplies of the West Bank, which constitutes 40% of the Israel's water supplies, apart from water supplied by the river Yarmuk. The use of water by Palestinians and Jews is highly disproportionate, whilst 85.000 settlers consume 100 millions m3 of water per year, 1 million Palestinians consume 137 million m^3. Each Palestinian in Israel consumes 33.6 m^3 of water per annum, compared to 350 m^3 in the Mediterrenean in general and 537 m3 by Jews in Israel. 81.4% of the West Bank water is used by Jews leaving less than 20% to the Palestinians for all uses. In the Gaza strip problems are even more severe. Renewal

water is 100 million m³ p.a. whilst consurtion is 150 million m³ per annual. Palestinians in the Gaza strip use

50 million m³ p.a. WHO stated that there was a risk of loss of all water supplies there. 40% of Arab camps and 11% of their houses have no water supply. Palestinian agruculture in the west Bank and Gaza has suffered catastrophically due to Israeli refusal to give permission to dig wells. Israel attended, even after camp David, to gain access to water from the River Nile and after the war in Lebanon in 1982, Israel gained access to the river Litani one Palestinian reaction was to take Israel to the International court of Justice at the Hague because 70 Palestinian villages had noaccess to water.

It is expected that the shortage of water by the year 2000 will reach 30%, i.e. 80 mil. m³ and will become even more severe with the immigration of the Jews of Russian origin. In case Isreal withdraws from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights and the security zone in Lebanon, the water deficit will reach 1.300 million m³, i.e. 52 % of the needs the state. Now, Israel, takes 65% of its water illegally from the occupied territories and 25% from Lebanon. According to the report for the United Nations, the 67% of the water consumed in Israel has its origin outside the borders of 1948. 35% comes from the West Bank and the rest from the Golan Heights and Lebanon.

This brief review emphasizes the significance of water in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The current phase of Israeli settlement and the recent dialogues about peace are undermined by concerns over water. What I would like to analyze is, on the basis of population growth projections and current water supplies available to Israel - can there be peace ? Israel currently obtainsF water from the Gaza Strip, West Bank, Golan Heights and Southern Lebano. Can Israel give up these areas and their precious water supplies for peace ? The Palestinian reaction to lack of water also needs to be analysed. The Palestinian agricultural economy has been devastated by lack of water - what other avenues do the Palestinians have, apart from conflict ? Also I would like to look at how sustainable is the use of water by the whole population in the area. This all reuires an analysis of the affect of water availability in the agricultural sector and the importance of agriculturein thbe economy as a whole. The effects of water concern both sides and they need to be looked at, in the political context.

Since the solution is going to be based on the 242 and 338 U.N. resolutions, which ask for the withdrawal of Israel from all the occupied territories in 1967 and for securing the rights for the Palestinians. Then, Israel must respect also the rights of the Palestinains on their own resources.

Israel must respect the resolutions of the Geneva Conference, 1949, regarding the issue of occupied lands. This is the situation from the one hand. From the other hand, Israel must stop the immigration, as this creates much more problems, as the existing resources are not sufficient for so many people. All the countries of the region must work together for the use and distribution of water in the just and right way, by using modern technology in agriculture and water saving.

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DEFENCE EQUIPMENT AND EXPENDITURES IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA

1. The Rotating Axis.

Complexities emerging in the post Soviet world are primarily political, economic and sovereignty related. The break-up of existing strategic blocks, however, either territorially or in resource availability, have created technical problems and inadequacies in regional military capabilities which are becoming increasingly significant in determining future potential conflicts.

To understand the geographical significance of the new order it would be useful to draw the old and new axes along which the balance of power is applied. Until 1990, the axis could have easily been defined as running from East to West, from the Caucausus to the Adriatic, with a possible aberration in the case of Yugoslavia. Since then, the axis has been far more difficult to define clearly and has reverted to multi-azimuth lines of division reminiscent of ages past. This situation could be only temporary, as some players find their capacity for growth unhindered by the new climate, especially vis-a-vis their neighbours, while others, find themselves under pressure not only to maintain their existing position but to redefine their whole concept of valuation as well.

Countries in the former category include the two NATO countries, Greece and Turkey, while in the latter are Bulgaria, Albania and possibly Slovenia. Romania seems to have drifted happily away from the Balkans, while the rest of the Yugoslav republics present a view a future worst-case scenario for their neighbours. It should not be inconceivable to expect new alliances and possibly a new axis to form, neither as bold nor as linear, but as significant, in balance of power terms, as the old one.

To determine the possible orientation of this axis, it is necessary to look into the emerging strengths and weaknesses in overall capabilities of the players, always with regard to their strategic posture.

2. Economic Disparities.

The most obvious of changes in the former communist countries, was the economic downgrading not only of state controlled resources but of private incomes as well. The causes of this downgrading are not difficult to gauge. From a national account point of view, the deterioration of trade with existing trade partners, and the USSR in particular, was significant (often accounting for over 60% of total trade); apart from this, the existing credit arrangements became practically invalid as the value of the Rouble dropped to unrealistically low levels from 1992 onwards. As the credit and trade agreements broke down, supply of raw materials, parts and components for end-product indus-

tries became scarce and eventually dissapeared, leaving produc-
tion facilities, across the board, stranded without materials,
equipment or hard currency. On the other hand, the service indus-
try, always underrated in command economies, was either non
existent or inadequate to pick up the slack.

The rate and timing of economic degradation for each of the
former communist Balkan countries is closely related to political
developments, economic ties with the USSR and the West and exist-
ing levels of infrastructural development.

The above evaluation acquires greater significance when
applied to military capability for a number of reasons:

- military equipment was almost entirely standardised in the
Eastern Bloc, on the basis of Soviet designed hardware. Even
nationally produced equipment relied on Soviet R&D for its
upgrading. Ironically, this was considered a huge advantage when
compared with NATO's complete lack of commonality.

- military trade was, as in the West, subject to far greater
restraints than civilian trade. If basic civilian necessities can
be met today through western aid programmes and barter agree-
ments, military needs, either in components or in integrated sys-
tems do not enjoy the same freedom.

- allocations to the military were substantial even by the
most modest of estimates. Maintaining the same level of invest-
ment in the nineties is increasingly difficult to justify or even
realise, despite increasing threat perceptions.

- military potential is directly related to morale, national
pride and strong political leadership. In the new era, all three
have been significantly altered or undermined by the deteriora-
tion of national power and the collapse of their system of val-
ues.

Given the above, it is necessary to note some of the statis-
tical estimates related to economic and military expenditure
indicators. (All figures estimates in constant 1985 million USD).

Albania	1985	1991	1992
GDP	$4,610	$2,784	$1,522
DEFEX	$189	$103	$35
PERCENT	4.1%	3.7%	2.3%

Bulgaria	$31,190	$25,571	$22,982
	$4,397	$1,790	$1,310
	14.1%	7.0%	5.7%

Yugoslavia	$44,562:	$19,389	$13,525 (Serbia-Montenegro
	$1,692 :	$3,490	$3,760 for 1991-1992)
	3.8% :	18.0%	27.8%

By comparison, it is interesting to note the latest equivalent figures released by NATO for its member-countries:

Greece	1985	1991	1992
GDP	$37,246	$38,164	$38,909
DEFEX	$2,421	$2,099	$2,140
PERCENT	6.5%	5.5%	5.5%
Turkey	$65,524	$87,282	$92,169
	$2,280	$3,509	$3,591
	3.5%	4.0%	3.9%

Furthermore, the economies of Greece, and Turkey in particular, have witnessed healthy growth rates (1980s' for Greece, late 80s' and forecast for 90s' in Turkey's case), while Greece has benefited tremendously from its status as an EC member.

3. Equipment Disparities.

The hardware situation varies substantially from Balkan country to country. In order of potential their abilities can be summarized as follows:

Albania: Following the country's change of sponsors from the USSR to China and on to isolation, the armed forces remained in a state of flux. Equipment in all services is mostly of 50s'vintage with small quantities of 60s' vintage aircraft. Most of Albania's military resources were spent on developing a refurbishment capability to maintain what equipment there was and, in a regressive move, on building thousands of pill-boxes for static defence along traditional invasion routes.
The ability of the country to develop its own weapons or even build under license, remains entirely conditional to external support and alliances. It would, therefore, not be surprising if Albania opts for an alliance with the highest bidder and allows foreign bases on its territory in return for modernization and security guarantees.

Bulgaria: Unlike Albania, the Bulgarians had always remained the staunchest of Soviet allies and have benefited from an uninterrupted flow of equipment. The country has a small defence industry with limited research and development potential but enjoys a relatively well developed infrastructure.
Like most Soviet satellites its equipment was perfectly standardised and plentiful, but against third or fourth generation technology it would face the same problems as Iraq during the Gulf War. In an environment of declining defence purchasing power, as in the case of Bulgaria, the quantity of equipment can become a liability instead of an advantage, as its mechanical and chemical qualities deteriorate. Either a large part of this hardware will have to be put in storage, with mobilisation penalties incurred, or the equipment will become largely static with doc-

trine reverting to a pill-box mentality; not unlike the Maginot
mentality of the 30s'. Furthermore, Bulgaria's 1993 MPI (Military
Power Index) rates 4.0897 (3.1145 for capital intensity and only
0.9752 for manpower & reserves). This very capital-intensive
armed force, typical of Soviet satellites, is particularly sensi-
tive to equipment deterioration, especially given the relatively
open terrain which the Bulgarian military may be called upon to
defend. Its only advantage is that, unlike Greece and Turkey,
Bulgaria does not need to develop a navy on an equal footing and
may therefore invest more heavily in air and land assets.
　　　As in Albania's case, Bulgaria will be largely dependent on
alliances and external assistance, but unlike Albania, Bulgaria's
size and geographical position may allow her to choose more care-
fully amongst her natural or least threatening of allies.

　　　Serbia: Although embattled and weakened by sanctions, Serbia
has benefited from a concentration of force which followed the
Yugoslav breakdown. The Yugoslav stance on non-alignment, requir-
ing a high level of logistical independence, resulted in a most
respectable defence industrial capability with reasonable R&D
potential. It is believed that most of this capability has
remained either within Serb lands or within Serb zones of con-
trol (It would be interesting to note which of the offensives in
Bosnia were not in fact due to nationalistic sentiment, but to a
resource control rationale).
　　　Information on Serbia's assets is insufficient to provide a
MPI figure, but earlier studies placed Yugoslavia at approxi-
mately the same level as Greece and higher, if naval forces were
not taken into account.
　　　Given the above, it is apparent that Serbia cannot hope to
maintain its very high level of expenditure for very long.
Already, the deterioration of economic indicators make the situa-
tion untenable (see p.2). Serbia's substantial strength and expe-
rience will remain largely defensive, a role for which its train-
ing, deployment and composition are better suited.
　　　As for the deterrent value of its armed forces against west-
ern intervention, this is largely due to strategic consider-
ations, especially the perceived difficulty of limiting any con-
flict geographically and temporally, as well as to sheer determi-
nation of its people and leadership.

　　　Greece: One of NATO's smaller nations in economic power,
Greece is nevertheless driven by considerations which have abso-
lutely nothing to do with Soviet fortunes. Greece has always per-
ceived its primary threat from the East and has deployed its sub-
stantial strength accordingly. However, as far as the former com-
munist countries are concerned, the local balance of power has
shifted from the moment the CFE agreement and the "Cascadeeee" pro-
gramme in particular was implemented.
　　　Under the "Cascade" programme, large numbers of second-line
equipment from NATO's central front was to be transferred by the
end of 1993 to Greece and Turkey. This, along with unavoidable
cutbacks in expenditure in the West and a sound, if deteriorat-
ing, credit rating, have allowed both countries to sinificantly

upgrade most of their equipment and acquire capabilities in air
power, air mobility, anti armour, anti air, naval power etc.
which is completely beyond their economies' capacity to achieve
on their own.

Despite substantial cutbacks in standing armed force levels ,
from over 200,000 to under 180,000, the Greek MPI measured 6.9257
in 1993 up 24.38% from 1987. With 5.6531 capital intensity and
1.276 in manpower, Greek armed forces are also very capital
intensive, a fact which places tremendous strain on the Oper-
ations and Maintenance budget.

Touting its defence budget as the largest in NATO (as a per-
centage of GDP) Greece is finding itself in a spiralling arms
race with Turkey which it cannot hope to either match or beat.
Even more important, however, is the fact that the late eighties
and nineties have seen a slowdown in economic performance which
makes this race practically unsustainable in the long term. The
effect of the CFE cascades has had a stabilising effect in Greek-
Turkish balance of power, for the time being, but Turkish long
term investment in defence industry and multipliers will bring
this under question after 1996.

Turkey: The country's size and rate of demographic growth has
of late been matched by its long term economic programme and per-
formance. Its MPI is also significant at 11.8022 (7.5548+4.2474)

Perhaps not surprisingly, the Turks perceived their military
capabilities as declining in the early 80s' and certainly not up
to their country's security requirements. The modernisation pro-
gramme of the armed forces, begun in the mid 80s' is stunning
both for its size $ 12bn-16bn until 1996, and its scope, simulta-
neous upgrade of all three branches with heavy reliance on force
multipliers. Even more significant is the fact that most procure-
ment contracts involve some form of production cooperation. At a
time when most defence industries around the world are struggling
to survive, Turkey's huge investment in the sector is very bold
indeed; from a defence economist's point of view. From a strateg-
ist's point of view, the independence of supply sources, one of
the major advantages of defence industriiiiiiies, makes more sense.(The
question remains, however, for the future, when all of the moder-
nisation programmes have been completed).

Turkey has not embarked on this project unsupported; often
forgotten, the Arab contributions to the Turkish National Defence
Fund are no less than $750-760mil. per annum, for 5 years. As in
the case of Greece, Turkey has also benefited from very substan-
tial CFE Cascades and US equipment transfers (including most of
Turkey's attack helicopters, close support aircraft and naval
assets). On the other hand, US FMA has been turned, as in
Greece's case, into credit, from partial grant, to the Turks'
displeasure and the civilian infrastructure programme, one of the
world's largest, is expected to reach outlays of $12bn for 1993
alone, something which has prompted the IMF to suggest caution.
At the same time, Turkey's budget deficit has reached $7.02bn up
from an estimated $6.57bn in 1992 and inflation is still running
at over 70%.   .

5. Conclusions.

There is no doubt that the old balance of power in the Balkans is no longer. Economic, political and technical realities are responsible for this. Turkey's bid for supremacy in its area will probably be responsible for the axis rotating from East-West in orientation to North-South and the more traditional Asian-European lines. Turkey's high risk strategy in the region can only be proven in light of the country's needs and wise management of its substantial assets. However, as with all countries in the Balkans, Turkey and Greece remain under the control of their NATO allies both financially and in technical terms. It is up to the major powers in the West to keep this control by maintaining the existing balance of power and extending it into the future, while at the same time guaranteeing the former communist countries' security requirements.

European   Security

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With   the   dissolution   of   the   Warsaw   Pact   and   the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, the confrontation between the
Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has
come to an end. What Mrs. Thatcher Described as "the fire wall in
Central Europe" has fallen down, and the danger of a major war in
Europe has been removed. But there is neither genuine peace nor
"sufficient   security",   nor   "peace dividends"   in   Europe,   that
could be spoken of.

European   security   has been more fragile than at   any   time
even since the end of the Cold War.

Firstly,   the   great changes in the former Soviet Union   and
Eastern Europe left the West Europeans very much confused. The
new   situation   did   not   fit   into   their   traditional   security
concept. So all   the Western countries had   to   reexamine and
readjust their policies in the face of the new situations.   There
were   lots   of   different ideas on the future   European   Security
arrangement,   with   respect to the Euro-America   Alliance and   to
the   Western European Union.   The whole Europe is now still in   a
kind of uncertainty and instability.

Secondly,   ehtnic   problems,   religious   conflicts   and

territorial disputes which had long been hurried during the Cold War, have now come to the surface. A series of armed conflicts bursting out in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have broken up the more than 40-year long peace in Europe. The war in Bosinia has left hundreds of thousands of people dead and wounded, and has caused an enormous damage to the local people's property, that amounts to billions of American dollars and a forced a great number of exodus on to the West. There is no peaceful settlement in view yet. The political situation in some Republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States is precarious. Ethnic conflicts and border disputes in these states generate a potential threat to European security. The emergence of a large number of new nation states has not resolved the old ethnic issues, and on the contrary, it has created new ethnic conflicts and territorial disputes. The fact that all the new emerging nation states are entitled to have their own armed forces will inevitably complicate the negotiations on the conventional arms reduction in Europe. People are particularly worrying about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their technologies.

Thirdly, the non-military factors than other things are more on the West Europeans mind as regards European security. The economic crisis and turbulent political situation are the problems the Western governments are facing. The widening disparity between the rich Western Europe and the poor Eastern Europe has been driving a large number of eastern emigrants and refugees into Western Europe, that has affected the stability of Western European society.

In a word, since the end of the Cold War, Europe has had a series of thorny problems to deal with.

In the past few years, many "big powers" have put forward their ideas on the security arrangement in Europe, such as Golbachev's "Common European Mansion"; French President Mitterrand's "European Confederation"; the former US Secretary of State James Baker's "New Atlantic Charter"; and the former German Foreign Minister Gensher's European security institution similar to the UN Security Council. But none of them, however, has come true.

Western Europe has and the regional institutions which were very active and in the past effective. But these institutions have not been proved very successful in the recent three years. Then it calls for a reassessment of the roles of these institutions for European security in the new situation.

Firstly, as to the role of NATO had three missions: i) to keep the Soviets out; ii) to keep the Americans in, and iii) to keep the Germans down. The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, has landed the formulation invalid. With a heavy debt and relative decline of its power, the United States has to reduce its military presence in Europe, but it is still unwilling to totally pull out of Western Europe. Otherwise, Americans would have no say in European affairs. For Western European countries especially Germany and France, although they want to weaken the role and influence of the United States in Europe, they are not against the United States maintaining a moderate military force which assumes the role of a "stabilizer"

in Europe. At present, such role is indispensable. The Euro-
American alliance remains the key guarrantee of security in
Europe. As for the Germans, it is impossible to keep them down,
under the new circumstance nor it is likely for them to follow
the same old disastrous road of Hitler, but never the less it is
understandable for many European countries to worry about the
rise of Germany for historical reasons. Most of European
countries regard the U.S. as a decisive factor of maintaining the
internal equilibrium among the Western European powers.
Therefore, from this perspective, the US military forces in
Europe can be seen as a balancing power, that might will keep
Germans in their proper place, the Germany's neighbours less
worried and that will also be acceptable to Germans as well. This
may be the reason why German leaders, including Chancellor kohl,
have repeatedly expressed their appreciation of the continued US
military presence in Europe.

Secondly, on the role of the WEU, owing to the relative
decline of the US power and ascendancy of West European power,
the United States might one day find the WEU's troops not at the
command of NATO. Western Europe wants to play a greater military
role in Europe and on its periphery. Germany and France have
taken the lead by forming a "European Corps" of 35,000 men and
they expect other WEU member to join. In the future, the WEU is
expected to replace NATO. But in the short term, the WEU have to
continue to regard itself as NATO's "European Pillar" before it
becomes very strong.

Thirdly, on the role of the European Community. At present,
the EC is the largest and the most integrated economic bloc in

the world. It has great attraction to its neighbouring countries. The Maastricht Treaty describes a magnificent prospect of the EC for the world. If it comes true, Europe will be a powerful member in a multipolar world, and it might be able to look after the European security for itself. But at present, European integration is at a low tide. As affected by the economic recession and the financial and monetary crises, the European community seen the pace of the political union and economic and monetary union slow down. It is still an open question whether the EC will be able to speak in one voice and play a greater political and even military role in the international arena in the remaining years of this century.

Fourthly, on the role of Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The institution is merely a political forum people know that which neither have decision-making power nor the ability of action. Being aware of this constraint on the part of the CSCE, the former German Foreign Minister Gensher proposed that a European security mechanism like the UN Security Council should be established and a CSCE "Blue Berets" Peace-keeping force be formed. This proposal, however, was rejected by Britain and France.

The problem now is that the first three organizations such as NATO, WEU and EC have the ability to act, but the turmoil-ridden Eastern European countries and the CIS are not their members, while the CSCE has those countries as its members, has no ability to act. In my view, if a European security mechanism excludes Russia, there will be no real security in Europe.

Remarks

On Civil Society in Central & Eastern Europe

and the Changing Roles of International Think-Tanks

September 4, 1993

14th Biannual Conference of Directors of

European Institutes of International Relations

Rhodes, Greece

Stephen B. Heintz

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and Director, IEWS European Studies Center, Prague

It is a pleasure to be with you at this very timely conference on the role of international think-tanks and policy planning in a fundamentally changed and changing Europe. While the focus of the conference, as suggested in its title, is European security, I shall address my remarks to a number of current and emerging issues in Central and Eastern Europe that would not traditionally be considered within the field of international security studies. I do so because it is increasingly clear that traditional or narrow approaches to the issues of European security will, in fact, fail to achieve their goal, that is, they will fail to enhance security. Many of us who have been working in security or strategic studies think-tanks have realized that the threats to security in the post-Cold War world emanate from a far more varied set of sources than the friction plates of the East-West divide. We are all

struggling to define security more broadly to fit this context.

On one hand, for example, is Dr. Gwyn Prins of Cambridge University who has established an academic program in "Global Security" which seeks to integrate the examination of national and international security issues with an understanding of the economic, social, environmental and technological threats to "the positive survival of the human race," that is, "survival in a sustainable condition of cultural richness, permitting individual fulfillment." [University of Cambridge Global Security Programme Information - Pack]

On the other hand, Ole Waever and his colleagues in the European Security Project Group at the Center for Peace and Conflict Research in Copenhagen have put forth a quite different concept which they call "Societal Security" in which various threats to social identity are examined as they intersect with threats to state sovereignty. As Waever et al see it, societal security is "about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association and religious and national identity and custom." [Waever, et al, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, p. 23, London: Pinter Publishers, 1993]

The debate over terms and definitions is likely continue for some time and I suspect we shall not resolve it here on Rhodes. But there is an emerging consensus that the security studies of the next decades will require the analysis and understanding of a very broad set of threats and perceived threats, internal within states as well as from external sources.

Within this context, I shall address my remarks this afternoon to the evolution of civil societies in post-communist Europe. I am persuaded that the course of evolution of civil societies in Central and Eastern Europe will decisively shape the European security

environment as the twentieth century draws to a close. If civil society is not both widened and deepened in post-communist Europe, we will find ourselves for some years to come in an unpredictable and volatile security environment no less threatening and perhaps far more complex than that of the Cold War.

This hypothesis, of course, also poses a definitional dilemma at the very outset: just what do we mean by the term "civil societies?" It is a commonly used phrase and yet it seems there is no common understanding of what it may mean. We all have some notions of those elements that contribute to civil society but our formulations remain vague. It seems to me that civil societies are those in which government extends directly from the governed. But civil societies do not rely solely on political systems, laws or government institutions to mediate the relationship between the individual and the state. In civil societies citizens have maximum opportunity to form hundreds of voluntary associations which help organize much of civic life with little need for a governmental role. Civil societies are characterized by tolerant relations between individuals and among groups. They offer maximum opportunity for collective action while protecting divergence from the collective approach. In civil societies economic opportunity is not predetermined by central planning nor left to unrestrained economic Darwinism. Culture is venerated and diversity is valued.

There isn't time this afternoon to attempt a more comprehensive definition but I will make one additional comment to set the context for the rest of my remarks: it is clear to me that given the limitations of human nature, **all** nations must continuously struggle toward the ideal of civil society. We might assume that the United States with a two hundred year tradition of pluralist democracy and a highly developed fabric of civic associations has approximated civil society. But were the 1992 riots in Los Angeles evidence of civil society?

Clearly not. Evidence of the perpetual striving towards civil societies abounds in Western Europe as well. So the challenges posed by this ideal are as relevant in the West as they are in Central and Eastern Europe.

In the balance of my remarks this afternoon, I will attempt to identify some of the current trends in the evolution toward civil societies and the security risks these trends imply. In addition, I will attempt to look ahead to anticipate some future challenges for the region and from all of this, suggest some ways in which international think-tanks will have to adapt if they are to play an optimally useful role in shaping the security environment in a world of accelerating change.

As an American living in Prague and working throughout Central & Eastern Europe for almost three years, I have observed with enormous admiration the remarkable progress that has been made in political and economic reform and international relations.

But it is not my purpose today to present a review of these accomplishments. Instead, I think it will be more fruitful for the purposes of this conference if we identify some areas where progress in building civil societies has not been so evident.

Let me also clearly acknowledge that when one attempts to assess the status of civil society in the twelve states of Central and Eastern Europe one must first work to understand the significant differences among these states. Obviously, each has its own history, culture, and linguistic and religious traditions. Only by understanding these differences can we also recognize the profound similarities that also exist, especially in the struggle to overcome the legacies of communism.

Time does not permit a detailed exploration of important and subtle differences among the states of Central and Eastern Europe, so while acknowledging that generalities are

generally dangerous, I will offer some thoughts about the evolution of civil society in the region as a whole, focusing on those trends which suggest a variety of threats to security in the "extra-strategic" use of the term. I will present thirteen points in list form with the hope that we can discuss them in greater detail over the next few days.

1. It seems to me that there is **a phenomenon of post-totalitarian confusion about the role of power in society** - how power should be established, legitimized; how power is to be distributed in the relationship between the individual and the state; and how it should be used.

Recognizing the distorted use of power in totalitarian society has proved easier than creating balanced and effective structures of power in liberal societies in post-communist Europe. In 1978, Václav Havel wrote a famous essay entitled "The Power of the Powerless." Earlier this year, Havel's former dissident colleague, Jan Urban, has written an essay entitled "The Powerlessness of the Powerful" in which he criticizes dissident-turned-politicians who have proven incapable of effectively using the power they wrested from the previous regimes to implement the very ideals they espouse.

2. The **politics of fear** which characterized the totalitarian state **has largely been eliminated** in the region. But it is **not yet fully replaced by a politics of trust.** I have served as an observer in elections in several countries of the region and in dozens of interviews with voters, party workers, election officials and others it is clear that trust is not yet restored. Public opinion polls confirm widespread distrust of leaders and institutions.

3. I am concerned about **an excessive consumerism** which seems to be sweeping parts of the region. This is naturally borne out of the pent-up demand of 40 years of isolation from the market place and from the flood of Western products, Western advertising, and Western

pop culture. But unbridled consumerism has serious implications for individual and societal values, for economics and for the environment. It has proven much easier to put Nike sneakers on shop shelves than to help restore a sense of meaning to people's lives.

4. Similarly, there appears to be **a growing phenomenon of self-absorption** in Central & Eastern Europe. This too is perhaps only natural. But at the level of states this trend can lead toward isolationism inhibiting cooperation or even fueling tensions. At the level of the individual it can lead to a new atomization, a loss of social cohesion, to disaffection and apathy.

5. In several of these societies there seems to be **a persistent pattern of conflict rather than a culture of compromise.** Horizontal links within society, destroyed by 40 years of repression, are proving difficult to repair. There is a lack of meaningful discourse and a clinging to stereotypes and outmoded ideas. The ability to reach consensus is impaired by a prevailing legacy of zero-sum assumptions about the nature of disputes.

6. Under communism the people of Central and Eastern Europe lived in *cultures of imposition* in which the forms and extent of individual involvement in civic life were imposed by the requirements of the regime. These are **not** yet *cultures of contribution* in which citizens of their own free will consistently find channels for participation in the life of their societies.

7. I am concerned about the **growing disparities in incomes and wealth** and the deep social tensions that may result in societies with long pre-communist egalitarian traditions.

8. There is a looming **crisis in housing.** Hundreds of thousands of families are waiting for apartments. Millions are living in heavily subsidized housing. No one has yet figured out how to privatize state-owned housing without causing tremendous social and economic

dislocation. The shortage of housing also reduces labor force mobility at a time of rising unemployment. This leads to my next point:

9. **Unemployment is an increasingly significant problem.** While the rate of unemployment is currently only about 2.5% in the Czech Republic, in other parts of the region like Nograd County, Hungary or Lodz, Poland, unemployment is in excess of 20%. In some cities it is over 30%. Persistently high unemployment may contribute to political and social unrest and almost certainly will lead to greater social stress: alcoholism, family violence, etc. In August, Václav Števko, deputy chairman of the Slovak Confederation of Trade Unions warned that unless the government keeps agreements on wages and social benefits, trade unions will not be able to guarantee social peace. [*ČTK News Summary*, 8/12/93, p. 15] Economically and politically crippling strikes have occurred in Romania, Ukraine, and to a lesser extent, Poland and Hungary.

10. There is also a **deepening criminalization of society.** Crime has increased rapidly, especially economic crime. On the one hand this relates to the dark underside of freedom as controls on individual behavior are lifted and the police state is dismantled. On the other hand, rising crime also reflects the dark underside of capitalism: greed. As one value system has been torn down, new values have yet to take root and moral self-restraints are weak.

11. For civil society to flourish, each of the countries of the region must develop the political, legal, social and financial conditions that support the **creation and development of a vibrant third sector of voluntary associations** of civic life. This has been called a "process of self-organization of society." These non-government organizations (NGOs) help mediate the relationship between the individual and the state and help to provide appropriate limits to the role of the state. They are central institutions of civil society.

12. Clearly a major problem in the region is the increasingly manifest **racial and ethnic intolerance**. The most obvious and brutal example is the "ethnic cleansing" of Bosnia. But racial violence occurs with increasing frequency throughout the region. Borders are being tightened in Central and Western Europe as well to stem the flow of ethnic refugees. Two recent headlines in the *International Herald Tribune* captured the issue this way: "Doors Are Closing on East European Refugees" [IHT 7/1/93] and "New Global Challenge: Millions of Refugees Seeking a Better Life." [IHT 7/12/93]

13. Often, racial and ethnic hatred is fueled by **an atavistic nationalism**, which in some parts of the region has been raised to the level of ideology, replacing Marxism as the organizing theory of political power. Some analysts have tried to distinguish between "positive" and "negative" nationalism. But perhaps former Czech Ambassador to the U.S. Rita Klimová is right when she says that the term "positive nationalism" is an oxymoron.

As this list suggests, there are a number of profound challenges to the evolution of civil society. As one leader of a government of the region recently said to me "Freedom has overwhelmed us with its own problems."

Many of these points can be understood as directly related to the simultaneous and unprecedented processes of creating pluralist democracies and market economies in Central and Eastern Europe. While political and economic reform are often mutually reinforcing, their simultaneous pursuit can also lead to fault lines of intersection, especially as political empowerment outpaces economic gains. In both cases, successful reform requires fundamental societal change. Democracy is far more than free elections and the rule of law. Similarly, the market is more than private ownership and liberalized economies. Both are about deep changes in culture and values. And it is far easier to change systems, structures and even

institutions than it is to adopt to new patterns of thought and behavior.

I said at the beginning of these remarks that I was not going to give a balanced view of the progress to date in the effort to create civil societies in Central and Eastern Europe. Let me also reiterate that many of the conditions I have observed here can be found in Western societies as well. In fact, it strikes me that the key challenge as we near the end of the 20th century and embark on the 21st is to learn from each other, East & West, starting from vastly different points of history and experience, as all of us seek to understand and create truly civil societies.

So this leads me to some thoughts about the changing role of institutes of international relations and other think tanks in the new Europe.

The first point is central to the hypothesis I suggested at the outset of these remarks: there is **an increasing blurring of the boundaries between issues of domestic policy concern and those of international relations.** All of the issues I have enumerated have their roots in the internal political, economic and social condition of the various states of Central & Eastern Europe. But there is no question that many of them also spill across borders and affect relations between states. Obvious examples include ethnic problems, emigration, nationalism, crime, and trade. Less obvious, but no less important, problems associated with the lack of trust within societies, or the phenomenon of self-absorption, or the ambivalence about the nature of power also have significant international implications. Similarly, many of these problems cut across traditional fields of analysis such as economics, political science or sociology.

Thus, think-tanks and institutes will have to be more synergistic in the substantive work that we do. We will fail if we do not strive to understand the interplay of complex

domestic political and economic developments. We must all be multi-disciplinary in our approach to the policy challenges of the new Europe. Political scientists, economists, historians, ethnographers, etc. must work together in teams to analyze issues and suggest alternative responses.

Similarly, it is obvious that as the number of states in Europe has grown, **think tanks need to be both careful and strategic in how they are organized to work in a complex, multi-national environment.** This will affect governance issues like the composition of Boards of Directors, and staffing patterns, as well as the substantive agenda. Careful attention by think-tanks to the multi-national character of the issues can help combat the drift toward self-absorption and isolationism I noted earlier.

With the pace of change seemingly exponential, **it is essential that think-tanks be organized to be predictive, flexible and thus responsive to change.** In fact, we must all strive to improve our capacity to peer over the horizon, to anticipate issues and to address them early on. We must endeavor towards something which might be called "preventive analysis," recognizing and understanding issues as they emerge and offering policy-makers ideas that can help problems from becoming crises.

Both the nature of the issues ahead and the pace of change require that **think-tanks must be competent in applied problem solving as well as objective analysis.** This is a tricky and perhaps even controversial point. All of our organizations must strenuously protect our independence, objectivity and intellectual freedom. But I am persuaded that we cannot work entirely in the comfort of the ivory tower, conducting research and disseminating our ideas. If our ideas have merit and if they are embraced by our key constituents then we must be available to assist in the process of their implementation.

On Civil Society in Central & Eastern Europe and the Changing Roles of International Think-Tanks
Stephen B. Heintz, Institute for EastWest Studies

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My own institute, for example, is very interested in trans-frontier cooperation as a possible antidote to border disputes, economic competition and the problems of "ethnic overhang." Having studied models of trans-frontier cooperation, especially the formal Euro-regions of Western Europe, we suggested an adaptation of the model for the trans-Carpathian region that includes parts of Ukraine, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. For the past 18 months we have been working with local and regional leaders in Carpathia toward the establishment of a Euro-region to promote confidence-building through a variety of projects in economic development, education, the environment, etc. Our role is that of catalyst and facilitator of the process and as a broker of intellectual and perhaps financial resources to support the specific substantive projects selected by the local participants.

A related point: **it is also important that our work be "demand-driven"** -- that is that we are focused on those issues around which there is agreement from key constituents that our contribution will be of value. I want to be very clear that I do not mean that we should ever shy away from any issue because we might offend the political interests of any leader, party, government, academic institution, etc. We must be willing to take on tough issues when we have examined them carefully and have something meaningful to offer. But what I am saying is this: it is inappropriate, especially for those of us who work for non-indigenous organizations, to impose our agenda, or perhaps worse, to impose our own ideas about what should be done about a given issue without due appreciation for the specific local context and without some sense that our effort will be of use to those who are charged with actual policy-making responsibility.

We need to pay careful attention to the *processes* we employ in addition to the *issues* we address. How we conduct our work can have as much impact, negative or positive,

as what work we undertake. While we must always be sensitive to local cultures, conditions, and practice we must occasionally break-through the constraints of old patterns of thought and anachronistic methodologies in order to get to new ideas or approaches. Permit another example from my own work: as part of a multi-national conference on Market Economies and Social Safety Nets held at our European Studies Center at Štiřín in April 1992, we organized a public hearing during which the conference participants (policy-makers and scholars) listened as a hearing panel to "testimony" presented by citizens and professionals about their direct experiences with the shortcomings of the social safety net. Public hearings are rather commonplace in the West, especially in my own country -- so much so that we often take them for granted. But the effect of the hearing during our conference, which seems to have been a first, was galvanizing.

How we employ advanced technologies can also shape both our work and then environment in which we work. Information networks, data banks and instantaneous communications can allow us to involve much larger numbers of people in our work and its results.

Think-tanks will need to build new relationships and find new partners if we are effectively to address the complex issues of our dramatically changed and changing environment. A key example is in the sphere of economics. It seems clear that the critical role in economic development will be played not by governments but by the private sector itself, indigenous firms and multi-national corporations alike. It will behoove us all if we devise productive partnerships with the private sector as we continue to work on economic reform. Of course, these partnerships must not compromise our independence and objectivity but should be designed to enhance our understanding of the issues and our impact.

Similar partnerships should be developed with the new indigenous think-tanks and other NGOs of Central and Eastern Europe. Again our independence must always be maintained but our work can surely be enhanced by working with related organizations in the countries of our interest. We may also be able to contribute to the professional and organizational development of these new and often struggling NGOs. Perhaps we can play a role as incubator, helping to start new indigenous organizations which in the span of a few years function independently on a self-sustaining basis.

Finally, I must say something about the complex issue of *values*. **Many of the issues or problems I identified earlier in these remarks are related to individual values and value systems**. The transition of the societies of Central and Eastern Europe is, in fact, a transition from one set of values -- largely imposed by the regime -- to another set of values determined within society itself. This is a process that will take considerably longer than perhaps first imagined. And yet consensus around a set of positive values will, in fact, determine the direction and success of all other reforms.

How can think-tanks appropriately contribute to this process? First, it seems, it is important that we publicly acknowledge that the evolution of new values is fundamental to the ongoing process of political, economic and social reform. Values will also play a determining role in the nature of international relations. I would submit that values will shape the security environment as profoundly as military doctrine.

Second, we must walk a very fine line of objectivity and distance without being values-neutral. Again, I suppose this is rather controversial. But I think we must stand for something, not a just set of policy prescriptions but also a set of principles. The false and bankrupt principles of Marxist-Leninism ultimately caused its collapse. Worn-out values are

daily being challenged in my country and in all western societies. This a fundamentally healthy, if painful process. Think-tanks must be aware of the primacy of values to the ongoing evolution of European security. We must raise questions, challenge assumptions, convene the debate and contribute to consensus-building. We must also be prepared for the transformation of our own values as we participate in the shaping of values for post-communist Europe.

In conclusion, I'd like to suggest that while the evolution of civil societies in Central & Eastern Europe will significantly affect the security environment for the whole of Europe, think-tanks and institutes of international relations are ideally suited to adapt to the changing environment and to make a formative contribution. We are, after all, organizations of civil society ourselves. We are voluntary, consensual associations of citizens working together to explore new ideas and to positively exploit the development of the human mind. As this century draws to its close, we are faced with a daunting question: the Cold War may be over but what will we make of this rather fervid peace? As think-tanks we share responsibility to help answer this question.

RAPID REACTION FORMATIONS

Immediate Reaction Forces (IRF)

- Allied Forces Europe Mobile Force - Land (Bde.+)
- Allied Forces Europe Mobile Force - Air (19 Squadrons)*
- Standing Naval Forces (Atlantic, Mediterranean)

Allied Forces Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC)

	XXX			
	ARRC			
XX	X	X	X	X
UK	UK	UK	UK	IT
XX	X	X	X	
UK	UK	UK	UK	
XX ••	X	X	X	X
MND(C)	BE	GE	NL	UK
XX •••	X	X	X	
MND(S)	GR	IT	TU	
XX	X	X	X	
IT	IT	IT	PO	
XX	X	X	X ••••	
GE	GE	GE	GE	
XX				
US				
X				
SP				
X				
SP				

Figure 8

REFORMING NATO'S COMMAND AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL STRUCTURES: PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS

YOUNG AND WILLIAM T. JOHNSEN, STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE --
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

*Size to Squadron and quality of Aircraft varies
  considerably
**Multinational Division (Central Region)
***Multinational Division (South)
****Dual Role in Central Region with GE Corps

Rapid Reaction Forces (Air)

•35 Squadrons (including IRF)

Figure 8 (cont)

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BY: THOMAS-DURELL YOUNG AND
WILLIAM T. JOHNSEN
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
[U.S. ARMY
WAR COLLEGE

LANDCENT SPAN OF OPERATIONAL CONTROL

Multinational Corps

XXX•
LANDJUT

XXX
NL

XXX
BE

XXX
GE

XXX
GE

XXX
US

XXX
GE

EAST ••

National   Contributions

XX GE   XX DA

XX NL   XX GE   X NL

X BE   X US   X GE

XX GE   XX NL   XX GB

XX GE   XX GE   XX US

XX US   XX US   XX GE **+** X CA **?**

XX GE   XX GE

DUAL HATTED   DUAL ROLE TO ACE RAPID REACTION CORPS

XXX • CORPS
XX • DIVISION
X - BRIGADE

* TO BECOME PART OF AFCENT
** CANNOT FALL UNDER NATO COMMAND UNTIL 1995

Figure 3

AFSOUTH

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┌─────────────────────┐
│       SACEUR        │
└─────────────────────┘
           │
┌─────────────────────────────────┐
│ Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces │
│ Southern Europe  (CINCSOUTH)    │
└─────────────────────────────────┘
```

| Commander Allied Land Forces Southern Europe | Commander Allied Air Forces Southern Europe | Commander Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe | Commander Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe | Commander Naval Striking & Support Forces Southern Europe |

Commander 5th Allied Tactical Air Force

Commander 6th Allied Tactical Air Force

Commander Gibraltar Mediterranean

Commander Central Mediterranean

Commander Northeast Mediterranean

Commander Submarines Mediterranean

Commander Eastern Mediterranean

Commander Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean

Figure 7

Jordan's Occupied Lands

Jordan and the international community have repeatedly called on Israel to withdraw from the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights and South Lebanon in accordance with UN resolutions. Yet Israel, in defiance of international law, refuses to withdraw from these territories and is changing the physical and demographic composition of these occupied territories through illegal settlements.

Despite Jordan's policy of non-belligerence, Israel intermittently seized Jordanian territory by force between 1948 and 1969. The United Nations repeatedly condemned premeditated Israeli attacks against Jordan, but Israel persisted in endangering any form of peace on the joint border and continued its unprovoked attacks against Jordan.

Between 1967 and the Rogers Peace Plan of 1970, (which renewned the cease-fire agreement between the two countries), Israel violated the cease-fire agreement of 1967 almost daily. In these attacks, Israel indiscriminately targeted military installations, urban centers and Palestinian refugee camps. In 1968 and 1969 it attacked the city of Salt west of Amman and the city of Irbid in the north. These attacks resulted in heavy loss of life and considerable damage to property. In March 1968, Israel crossed the Jordan river into the East Bank in blatant violation of the cease-fire and demolished the town of Karameh in the Jordan Valley.

Today Israel still occupies Jordanian lands: approximately 1390 dunums (1 dunum ~ 0.25 acres) in the north, as well as a strip of about 320 sq. kilometers in the Wadi Araba area in the south. Israeli occupation of the area in the north prevents Jordan from using a major share of its water resources. According to the Johnston Plan of 1955, Jordan was supposed to obtain 100 mcm/year of water from the upper Jordan river. At present Jordan receives no water from the river. Israel is also channeling the salt water springs surrounding Lake Tiberias into the upper reaches of the lower Jordan river. This practice is detiriorating the water quality, making it unsuitable even for irrigation.

Jordan's Occupied Territories

Israel illegally seized vital land in the north of Jordan, which falls at the confluence of the Jordan and Yarmouk rivers, west of Bakoura. The Yarmouk/Jordan river confluence was the area that defined the border divide between TransJordan and Palestine during the British Mandate (1922-1948).

The Yarmouk River was considered the divide between Jordan on one side and Syria and Palestine on the other. Israeli occupation of this area effectively prevented Jordan from getting its share of water at the confluence.

By occupying the Wadi Araba since 1969 and

errecting barbed wire fences from Wadi Araba to the Gulf of Aqaba, Israel has tapped the acquifers of Jordan in that area.

The United Nations Security Council repeatedly condemned Israeli attacks on Jordan's sovereign territory:

Resolution No. 228 (1966) of 25 November 1966: Censures Israel for its attack on Jordan on November 13, 1966 in violation of the UN Charter and of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan. The Security Council deplores the loss of life and heavy damage to property resulting from Israel's action.

Resolution No. 248 (1968) of 24 March 1968: Condemns the large-scale and premeditated military attack against Jordan (Karameh) as a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and the cease-fire resolution.

Resolution No. 256 (1968) of 16 August 1968: Condemns further Israeli military attacks against Jordan (Salt). Considers the premeditated and repeated military attacks a danger to the maintenance of peace.

Resolution No. 265 (1969) of 1 April 1969: Condemns Israeli premeditated air attacks on Jordanian villages and other populated areas (Salt) in violation of Resolutions 248 (1968) and 256 (1968.

The maps in this section are included for illustrative purposes only: They do not represent official Jordanian government documents.

Armistice Line _____

Paved Road _____

Occupied Lands ☐

خزان اليرموك
Yarmuk Reservoir

To al 'Adasiya

ال العدسية

To Abu Seida act-Sharqiya

To Abu Seida act-Sharqiya

al Baqura

ال باقورة

Jisr el Majami'

الاحتلال الاسرائيلي لمناطق في شرق الأردن (منطقة الباقورة)
Israeli Occupation of Transjordan Lands (AL – Baqura Area)

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
THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN

THE JORDAN DELEGATION

MIDDLE EAST PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

MULTILATERAL TALKS

THE JORDANIAN PERSPECTIVE

The Multilateral negotiations of the Middle East Peace Process have been organized into five working groups, namely, Refugees, Economic Development, Water, Environment and Arms Control and Regional Security. Additionally, a steering group has been organized.

Initially, these working groups were categorized into: Human Cooperation, Resource Cooperation and Security. This categorization is reminiscent of the four Helsinki Baskets of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The Final Act of Helsinki, signed in 1975, consisted of four baskets: Security; Economics; Science and Technology and the Environment; and Humanitarian and other fields. The fourth basket is related to the institutional structure of the follow-up to the Conference.

All the related issues in the Middle East Peace Process can be considered in terms of a globalized idiom that reflects the region's priorities. The Middle East is essentially no different from other regions of the world. The Multilaterals provide a framework for adapting and applying the extensive body of principles evolved by the world community to provide ground rules for meaningful cooperation. Experience elsewhere, whether in terms of the Helsinki Process, the EC, the OECD, GATT or the international law Commission should be tapped. The presence in the Middle East Multilaterals of key members from those international groupings facilitates this task. Brick and mortar regional projects should be preceded by projects understood as principles and policies. The latter provide the required foundation for successful regional cooperation.

A Water Charter, a Social Charter and an Environment Charter are some of the principles and instruments that can be considered. An effective Environment policy, for example, needs to be broadly defined as relating to the environment for peace within the context of human settlement in the wider region. The mass migration of people, regional stabilization and structural funds, as well as confidence and security building measures (CSBM's), are issues integrally linked to an effective process for security and cooperation in the Middle

East. Even a complex issue such as the Right of Return can be considered within the two contexts of legal principles on the one hand, and practical implementation on the other.

The most important part of the security basket in the Helsinki process was the so-called Declaration of Principles. Among its ten fundamental principles were:

- Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief.

- Equal rights and self-determination of peoples.

Such principles are of particular relevance for promoting the peace process in the Middle East. They complement, for example, the general topics proposed for the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group (which include in the words of the co-sponsors "The political setting for confidence-building and arms control" and "the evolution of the process to develop confidence and security building measures").

The Middle East Multilaterals are, in reality, the other side of the political coin of the Bilaterals. Jordan's proposals highlight the synergy that exists not only within the baskets of the Multilaterals but also between the Bilaterals and the Multilaterals. These proposals reflect Jordan's awareness of the immense significance of progress in the Bilaterals to the Multilaterals. This may help evolve an interrelated package for Land, Peace and Security that lays down a solid foundation for a lasting and comprehensive settlement.

THE MULTILATERAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
A PROCESS FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

	BASKET	INSTRUMENTS/PRINCIPLES FOR PROMOTING SECURITY AND COOPERATION		
		MILITARY	POLITICAL	ECONOMIC
HUMAN	REFUGEES		RIGHT OF RETURN SOCIAL CHARTER DUAL NATIONALITY	MASS MIGRATION OF PEOPLE CATEGORIZATION ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY
RESOURCES	WATER		WATER CHARTER	REGIONAL WATER PLAN
RESOURCES	ENERGY		ENERGY CHARTER	REGIONAL ENERGY CORRIDORS
RESOURCES	ECONOMIC DEVELOP-MENT		- REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FUND - DEBT FORGIVENESS	REGIONAL STABILIZATION & STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT (REMOVAL OF IRON CURTAINS OF PROTECTIONISM AND SUBSIDIES)
RESOURCES	ENVIRONMENT		ENVIRONMENT CHARTER	REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PLANS (E.G. GULF OF AQABA, RIFT VALLEY, GAZA, WEST BANK, LEBANON): POVERTY AND URBANIZATION
SECURITY	ARMS: CONVENTIONAL & NON-CONVENTIONAL	CONTROL OF WEAPONS CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY BUILDING MEASURES	REDUCTION OF TENSIONS REGIONAL CONFIDENCE BUILDING	DEFENCE EXPENDITURE REDUCTION

The Peace Process One Year Later

Jordan was one of the first countries to join the Middle East peace process that began on 31 October 1991 with the Madrid Peace Conference. This initiative promised to herald a new era of peaceful coexistence based on international legality and human rights. Today, one year since the beginning of the peace process, negotiations between the Arabs and the Israelis have achieved some important results although progress in general has been very slow.

Jordan's Goals:

Jordan entered the "battle for peace" with the hope that the end result will be a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement for all the people of the region. The terms of reference for the peace negotiations are United Nations Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. UN Resolution 242--which Jordan helped formulate--calls on Israel to withdraw from all territories it occupied during the 1967 war. By calling for the full implementation of the resolution, Arab countries are offering Israel a chance to exchange land for peace.

During the past year, the Arab delegations to the peace talks met with their Israeli counterparts to identify the core issues that need to be discussed and resolved. Progress in the different tracks of the negotiations has differed from one Arab party to the other, but a final resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict will only come with a comprehensive settlement of all the issues.

The return to Palestinians of their rights on their national soil is central to the resolution of the Arab-Israeli problem. In addition, a comprehensive solution must address all the grievances of the other parties concerned.

Political Outlook:

The negotiations are expected to be long and arduous, but Jordan will continue to actively participate because it firmly believes in peace and the necessity of ending the suffering of all the people in the Middle East region. Indeed, the success of the negotiations will benefit not only the people of this region but the whole world. If the issue of Jerusalem is resolved, for example, Jordan envisions it becoming a symbol of peace among the followers of the three great monotheistic religions.

Who Is Making The Concessions?

Arab governments had high hopes that the newly-elected Israeli Labor government would have a more serious approach to the peace talks, but the last several months have proven that Prime Minister Rabin is actually more interested in making superficial changes rather than dealing with the core issues.

The Prospects for Peace:

The urgency of the situation and the nature of the issues require that we work together (Arabs, Israelis, Americans, Russians, Europeans and Japanese) for a comprehensive settlement. Israel must free itself from the "fortress mentality" of which it has been a prisoner for the past four decades, in order to operate in an interdependent world in which cooperation is the key word. By stalling further on the one-year-old peace negotiations, Israel is only serving the interests of extremist elements both inside and outside Israel, to the detriment of the whole region.

In order for the peace talks to succeed, Israel must share with Jordan and the rest of the Arabs the sense of urgency that people of the region feel. In the words of His Majesty King Hussein, this is one of the "very final chances we have to avert disaster and move ahead in line with the rest of the world, hopefully, towards a better future."

Jordan's Position On:

* *Refugees: The application of international law and relevant UN resolutions to Palestinian refugees and displaced persons*
* *Borders: Israeli withdrawal from occupied Jordanian territories*
* *Water: Securing its rightful share of water in the Jordan River Basin and searching for ways to alleviate water shortages*
* *Arms control and regional security: Calling for a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction and for the states within the region to sign and ratify all conventions and treaties pertaining to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons*
* *Development: Exploring the potential for future cooperation in regional socio-economic development (in the fields of environment, energy, infrastructure, etc.)*

It's Time for a New U.S.-European Strategic Bargain

By Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler and F. Stephen Larrabee

SANTA MONICA, California — Whether Europe unravels for a third time this century depends on whether the West summons the political will and strategic vision to address the causes of potential instability and conflict before it is too late.

A new U.S.-European strategic bargain is needed, one that extends NATO's collective defense and security arrangements to those areas where the seeds for future conflict in Europe lie: the Atlantic alliance's eastern and southern borders.

The end of the Cold War wiped away the strategic distinction be-

NATO would be transformed from an alliance based on collective defense to one dedicated to projecting stability, democracy and crisis management.

tween Europe's center and periphery.

Whereas the potential locus of conflict in Europe in the Cold War was along the old inner-German border, Europe's new strategic challenges exist almost exclusively along two arcs of crisis: the eastern arc, the zone of instability running between Germany and Russia from northern Europe down through Turkey, the Caucasus and middle Asia; and the southern arc, running through northern Africa and the Mediterranean into the Middle East and Southwest Asia.

While these circumstances are seemingly located safely on Europe's periphery, for a number of reasons conflicts along either arc are central to European security.

First, conflicts in the arcs are increasingly generated by antidemocratic and anti-Western ideologies that threaten the liberal-democratic foundations of Western Europe and the nascent democracies of the former Soviet bloc.

Second, conflict and insecurity in the twin arcs are unlikely to be neatly isolated or contained. Spillover, in the form of political and economic instability and refugees, is a real danger.

Third, while local conflicts may escalate into regional wars, instability in such geopolitically sensitive areas also threatens to draw in one or several major powers who see their own interests threatened.

Finally, and perhaps most important, instability along the arcs threatens to reactivate old fault lines and dormant historical rivalries — geopolitical competition between Germany and Russia along the eastern arc, or a conflict between the West and Islam in the south.

Western policymakers have been slow to recognize these new dangers and the security needs of these states. Many still cling to Cold War distinctions between Western Europe,

which is implicitly defined as a vital interest, and Eastern Europe, which is seen as a secondary concern.

East-Central Europe's lack of a stable security arrangement has already helped to undercut progress toward democracy and economic reform. Now the spread of instability or violent conflict threatens to destroy even that progress achieved thus far.

East-Central Europe's democrats know that democracy will succeed only if their states belong to a secure European and Western political, economic and military community.

The West, too, previously understood this link — as demonstrated with the case of West Germany. That nation might never have become a stable Western democracy had it not been accepted into NATO's fold.

Similarly, NATO membership helped stabilize democracy and stem authoritarian backsliding in Portugal, Spain, Greece and Turkey.

The obvious tool for this new Western strategy is NATO. The Gulf War and the Yugoslav crisis have shown the European Community incapable of taking on such a task. The remark of Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens of Belgium during the Gulf crisis — that the EC was an economic giant, political dwarf and military worm — sadly remains true.

The kind of NATO that could respond to Europe's new strategic challenges would bear little resemblance to the NATO of the Cold War. It would be based on a new bargain between the United States and Europe, a different set of political and military understandings, as well as a new relationship with the East.

This bargain would simultaneously expand the alliance's strategic hori-

zon geographically and find new ways to share responsibilities and burdens. NATO's rationale and mission would be defined anew.

Politically, six steps are necessary to forge a new trans-Atlantic bargain. The first is to transform NATO from an alliance based on collective defense against a specific threat into an alliance committed to projecting democracy, stability and crisis management in a broader strategic sense.

The second step must be a new understanding between the United States and its European allies that harmonizes their interests.

Europeanization of the alliance is as much in the interests of the United States as it is of Europeans. Washington must be willing to accept a stronger European identity, including in security affairs, and end its ambivalence toward European integration.

Europe — which in this case means France — must abandon its exaggerated fear of American hegemony. The real issue regarding the future U.S. role in Europe is not whether Washington will be hegemonic, but whether the trans-Atlantic relationship can be turned into a partnership that fully engages the United States.

Without French backing to transform NATO, the alliance will crumble. France would then find itself forced to go it alone in a Europe characterized by increasing instability along both its eastern and southern flanks, with an independent Germany and an aloof America.

French-American rapprochement can set the stage for the third step — Germany's strategic emancipation. Germany must finally resolve the confused debate over its role in Europe and beyond. To be sure, residual

fears concerning German power exist. But only a strong Germany can facilitate European integration and NATO's strategic transformation.

While Germany remains preoccupied with the staggering challenge of the political and economic reconstruction of its eastern half, the need to stabilize its eastern flank is Bonn's top security concern.

Reorganizing the West will set the stage for the fourth step in this process — a coherent and coordinated Western strategy for the integration of Visegrad countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and possibly Slovakia) into both the European Community and NATO. Opening the EC to the East is the best guarantee against a rival of anti-Western nationalism and of stabilizing the process of political and economic reform.

NATO should create the preconditions for the eventual integration of these countries into the alliance by

The best way to stabilize the reform process in the East is to integrate Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia into the EC and NATO.

expanding defense cooperation. Such cooperation need not initially imply a full-fledged defense commitment.

Conceivably, "association agreements" could spell out the criteria for membership, but not provide explicit security guarantees. This arrange-

ment would give the countries of Central and Eastern Europe the clear perspective they are looking for. And it would provide them time to adapt their military and defense establishments to meet NATO standards.

The fifth step in the new trans-Atlantic bargain concerns Russia. The West has been reluctant to move toward the East more quickly for fear of offending Russia's strategic sensibilities. But it is hard to understand how supporting democracy and stability in Eastern Europe can undercut democracy in Russia.

As it transforms and expands relations with Central and Eastern Europe, the West should also expand its security dialogue with Russia.

Whether NATO's eastward extension becomes a new offer for partnership or a move toward an anti-Russian alliance rests mainly on the outcome of Russia's own transformation. This process is likely to take years. To hold the future of NATO hostage to the outcome of Russian politics is a recipe for the demise of the alliance.

The sixth step in the new trans-Atlantic bargain requires the West to develop a constructive Ukrainian policy. An independent Ukraine is one of the most important features of Europe's new strategic landscape; it acts as an important strategic buffer between Europe and Russia.

In light of the uncertainties surrounding Russian democracy, it represents the best guarantee against Russian imperial restoration from the point of view of Eastern Europe, especially Poland.

The reincorporation of Ukraine into a Russian-led confederation would transform the geostrategic equation in Europe as a whole.

As a final, seventh step, extended collective defense and security means that the alliance must be reorganized militarily. NATO's basic problem is the mismatch between its old mission and Europe's new strategic challenges. It is no longer possible for NATO to concentrate on the strategic luxury of territorial defense. The dividing line between "in area" and "out of area" crises, so clearly drawn during the Cold War, has become ambiguous and artificial.

Redefining alliance commitments in both areas, and finding the proper balance between the two, is the fundamental issue facing the alliance. But any new balance must greatly improve NATO's capability to conduct military operations beyond its borders, and eventually allow it to expand its full security guarantees.

American leadership must secure the gains of the Cold War and build a new U.S.-European partnership that can project democracy and stability. What is required is political will and strategic vision.

By showing both, President Bill Clinton can lay the foundation for a new partnership between the United States and Europe.

The writers are senior analysts at Rand Corp. This article was excerpted by The New York Times from an essay in the September-October issue of Foreign Affairs.

TEAM EUROPE — POLAND

The changes which have taken place in Europe in the last few years can hardly be better illustrated than by introducing Team Europe Poland. The pace and character of these changes have been such that it is difficult to be surprised by them any longer. Nevertheless, the fact that from now on a Team Europe will be operational in Poland is not to be underestimated.

It is no coincidence that Poland is the first country in Central and Eastern Europe where Team Europe has been established. Poland is, after all, the country where the movement started which brought democracy and freedom to this part of the Continent. Poland is also a country with a rich tradition in culture and commerce. Opinion polls show that the Polish population is eager to learn more about the European Community, in all its aspects.

Poland is, moreover, a country with an enormous potential, both in human resources and economically. Team Europe Poland will be of invaluable help in developing these resources better. The members of Team Europe Poland will inform a range of audiences about the possibilities which there are in developing relations with institutions and markets in the European Community. They will play an important role in giving accurate information on the Community, thereby removing sentiments of lack of confidence and incomprehension which sometimes persist. Such sentiments can only persist because of lack of adequate information on the European Community, as it should be beyond doubt that developing such relations will be in the interest of both Poland and the Community.

Poland and the Community have become quite a lot closer already in the last few years, in fact, with incredible speed, if we look at it in retrospect. And we are only at the beginning. The ratification of the European Agreement which associates Poland with the Community has been approved by the Polish Parliament and by the European Parliament. It will come into force as soon as the parliaments of all the Member States of the EC will have ratified it. Parts of it have already come into force on 1 March 1992.

In the Delegation in Warsaw we are very happy with Team Europe Poland. There is no doubt about the enthousiasm, commitment and quality of the Team. We are looking forward to cooperating with the members of Team Europe Poland. We are convinced that they will contribute considerably to the development of Polish-EC relations.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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European Studies and consultant in motor car
company.

Miroslaw LOBODA

Lublin Business School

ul. Narutowicza 8
PL - 20-004 LUBLIN
POLOGNE

Tel.: 4881 / 258-43
Fax: 4881 / 294-96

Occupation:
Principal of the Lublin Business School and
professor of the Catholic University of Lublin.

Languages: fr, en, pl

Specialisations: CEER, SME, ET

Profile:
Subjects: Management, especially strategic
management and human resources
management. He also works as company
consultant.

Hanna MACHINSKA

Centre for Europe

Ksaerow 13
PL - 02656 WARSZAWA
POLOGNE

Tel.: 4822/269606, 452084
Fax: 4822 / 452084

Occupation:
Lawyer

Languages: de, en, pl

Specialisations: ENV, EPU

Profile:
A lecturer at the Faculty of Law. Deals with ecological law, comparative approach. Interested in basic tendencies of environmental law and practical and formal implementation by the member states.

Malgorzata MARSZYCKA

Academy of Economics (IMSSE)

ul. Rakowicka 27
PL - 31-510 Krakow
POLOGNE

Tel.: 48 12/ 210099 ext.310
Fax: 4812/ 210536

Occupation:
Economist

Languages: de, en, pl

Specialisations: REG, ER, EMU

Profile:
Since 1991 he has worked in the Institute of International Social and Economic Relations (Krakow Academy of Economics), at the post of assistant.

Bozena NOGA

Academy of Economics (IMSSE)

ul. Rakowicka 27
PL - 31-510 Krakow
POLOGNE

Tel.: 48 12/ 210099 ext.310
Fax: 48 12/ 210536

Occupation:
Economist

Languages: de, en, pl

Specialisations: CEER, ER. EMU

Profile:
Since 1991 he has worked in the Institute of International Social and Economic Relations (Krakow Academy of Economics), at the post of assistant.

Alojzy NOWAK

University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management

Szturmowa 3
PL - 02-678 WARSZAWA
POLOGNE

Tel.: 4822 /472522, 471981
Fax: 4822 / 471432

Occupation:
Assistant professor

Languages: de, en, pl, rus

Specialisations: EMU, FICL

Profile:
Former and current teaching activity with students centers on theory of Economy, Finance and Banking, Small Business. Research deals mainly with the evaluation of the monetary market in Poland.

Wlodzimierz NYKIEL

ul. Wioslarska 20/22 m35
PL - 94-036 Lodz
POLOGNE

Tel.: 4842 / 869690
Fax:

Occupation:
University Teacher, Legal Adviser

Languages: en, fr, pl

Specialisations: CUIT, EMU, FICL

Profile:
University of Lodz, Faculty of Law and
Administration. Lectures on financial law, tax
law, budgetary law, banking school, lectures on
financial law, local government school,
lectures on local finance. Publications: 2 books
and over 20 articles.

Leon OLSZEWSKI

University of Wroclaw

ul. Uniwersytecka 22/26
PL - 50-145 WROCLAW
POLOGNE

Tel.: 4871 / 402315
Fax: 4871 / 36848

Occupation:
Professor of economics

Languages: fr, en, pl

Specialisations: SME, IMIA, DEV

Profile:
Professor of Economics, Director of the
Institute of Economic Sciences, Head of
Department International Economic Relations.
Research: adjustment and macroeconomic
policy, theories of international economic
specialisation.

Paulina PATER

University of Wroclaw

ul. Czeska 3
PL - 51-112 WROCLAW
POLOGNE

Tel.: 4871 / 259717
Fax:

Occupation:
Lawyer

Languages: en, pl

Specialisations: ER, IMIA, STP

Profile:
Lawyer, specialised in international law.

Eugeniusz PIONTEK

UNI EXPERT Ltd.

ul. Krolewska 27
PL - 00 060 WARSZAWA
POLOGNE

Tel.: 4822 / 277822
Fax: 4822 / 277822

Occupation:
President of Uni Expert Ltd.

Languages: en, fr, pl

Specialisations: CSA, CUIT, FICL

Profile:
Director, Institute of International Law at the
University of Warsaw, Professor of
International and Company Law. Vice
Chairman of the Centre of European Studies at
the University of Warsaw. Reader in
International and Company Law. Practising
lawyer.

Leszek PODSTAWSKI

BUSINESS FOUNDATION

ul. Krucza 38/42
PL - 00-512 WARSZAWA
POLOGNE

Tel.: 482 / 628 28 82
Fax: 4822 / 120077

Occupation:
Manager

Languages: en, pl

Specialisations: EPU, EMU, ER

Profile:
Working in Business Foundation being the
Director of the International Distribution &
Events Department.

Ewa RZESZUTEK

Foreign Trade Research Institute

ul. Swietokrzyska 12
PL - 00-916 WARSZAWA
POLOGNE

Tel.: 48 2/ 6944214
Fax: 48 22/265562

Occupation:
Research Fellow

Languages: de, pl

Specialisations: EMU, IMIA, CUIT

Profile:
Working in the European Reference Centre.
Concentrates on Single Market issues, in
particular on services sector. Co-publisher of
information bulletin "European Communities".

Elzbieta SAWICKA

ul. Kepna 9 m 3
PL - 03-730 WARSZAWA
POLOGNE

Tel.: 4822 / 210321 ext.953
Fax:

Occupation:
Economist

Languages: en, pl

Specialisations: EPU, FICL, EMU

Profile:
Employee of Foreign Exchange Policy Dept. in
the Ministry of Finance. Responsible for
economic and financial problems of
cooperation between Poland and the E.C. and
EFTA-countries. Has participated at works on
the agreement on association between Poland
and EC.

Tadeusz SKOCZNY

University of Warsaw, Faculty of
Management

ul. Pustelnicka 9 A/1
PL - 04-170 WARSZAWA
POLOGNE

Tel.: 482 / 6104514
Fax: 4822 / 26 50 76

Occupation:
University Professor

Languages: de, en, pl

Specialisations: CSA, EPU, IMIA

Profile:
Professor at faculty of management. Gave
lectures on: introduction in law, constitutional
and administration law, public administration,
European and competition law. Since 1990 also
advisor to the president of the Anti-Monopoly
Office in Poland.

BE

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Lucjan SLEDZ

University of Gdansk

ul. Armii Krajowej 119/121
PL - 81824 SOPOT
POLOGNE

Tel.: 48 58/ 51 16 13
Fax: 48 58/ 52 22 12

Occupation:
Academic Researcher

Languages: en, pl

Specialisations: SME, ER, CEER

Profile:
Since the foundation of the Research Centre on
the EEC he has been working there and been
involved in the research and teaching projects
on the EC. Now, he is engaged in the reform
and organization of a new specialisation:
European Study.

Mieczyslaw STARKOWSKI

Journal "Spotkania"

ul. Zelazna 67
PL - 00-871 WARSZAWA
POLOGNE

Tel.: 4822 / 20 44 24
Fax: 4822 / 24 14 23

Occupation:
journalist

Languages: en, pl

Specialisations: CEER, CP, AGR

Profile:
He has been working as a business writer. He
writes about privatisation, EC + foreign -
Polish business relations, Polish Industry. He is
particularly interested in the impact of Poland's
association with EC on our economy.

Marian STASIAK

Council of ministers-European
Integration Office

Al. Ujazdowskie 9
PL - 00-583 WARSZAWA
POLOGNE

Tel.: 482/694-71-36
Fax: 4822/29-48-88

Occupation:
Economist

Languages: en, fr, pl

Specialisations: SME, CEER, EMU

Profile:

M. Andrzej STEPNIAK

University of Gdansk

ul. Armii Krajowej 119/121
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POLOGNE

Tel.: 48 58/ 51 16 13
Fax: 48 58/ 52 22 12

Occupation:
Academic Researcher

Languages: en, de, pl

Specialisations: CEER, ER, IMIA

Profile:
Since the foundation of the Research Centre on
the EC he has been working there and been
involved in the research and teaching projects
on the EC. Now he is engaged in the reform
and organization of a new specialisation:
European Study.

Ewa SYNOWIEC

Foreign Trade Research Institute

ul. Swietokrzyska 12
PL - 00-916 Warszawa
POLOGNE

Tel.: 48 2/ 6945212
Fax: 4822 / 245562

Occupation:
Research Fellow

Languages: en, de, pl

Specialisations: IMIA, CUIT, ER

Profile:
Has published about 20 articles on EC matters
(Polish-EC trade relations, Single Market and
its implications for Polish foreign trade). Has
also worked part-time in European Reference
Centre. Head of the monthly informatin
bulletin "European Communities".

Miroslaw SZYDELSKI

Szczecin Voivode Office

Waly Chrobrego 4
PL - 70-502 SZCZECIN
POLOGNE

Tel.: 48 91/ 46241
Fax: 48 91/ 53325

Occupation:
Engineer, M.Sc.

Languages: en, pl

Specialisations: REG, SME, CEER

Profile:
Deputy Director of the Department of
Economic Policy and head of the Centre for
International Cooperation in the Szcecin
Voivode Office. He is also a secretary of the
Polish-German Committee for Frontier
Cooperation.

Wojciech TRZNADEL

University of Wroclaw

ul. Czarnieckiego 80 m 4
PL - 53-627 WROCLAW
POLOGNE

Tel.: 4871 / 555223
Fax: 4871 / 36848

Occupation:
Assistant profesor

Languages: fr, it, pl

Specialisations: REG, SDIM, EMU

Profile:
Assistant Professor in the Institute of
Economic Sciences at the University of
Wroclaw. Interested in the development of the
European Regional Policy and its interactions
with national regional policies, with reference
especially to the Mediterranen countries of the
EEC.

Tomasz WASILEWSKI

Polish Central Board of Customs

Pl. Powstancow Warszawy 1
PL - 00-030 WARSZAWA
POLOGNE

Tel.: 4822 /262031 ext. 297
Fax: 4822 / 273427

Occupation:
Customs valuation

Languages: en, pl

Specialisations: CUIT

Profile:
Has been working as a civil servant of the
Polish Central Board of Customs for 3 years.
His position involves supervising the activity
of the Polish customs officials, especially the
tariffing of imports and the international
agreements.

BE
DE
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Marek WIERZBA

Academy of Economics in Wroclaw

ul. Sienkiewicza 90/2
PL - 50-348 WROCLAW
POLOGNE

Tel.: 4871 / 34583, 681155
Fax:

Occupation:
Master of business administration

Languages: en, pl

Specialisations: STP, SME, IMIA

Profile:
Master of Business Administration. Since 1985 assistant in the Department of Business Administration at the Academy of Economics.

Barbara ZABCZYK

Patent Office of the Republic of Poland

Aleje Niepodleg lTosci 188
PL - 00-950 Warszawa
POLOGNE

Tel.: 4822/258001 ext. 236
Fax: 4822 / 250581

Occupation:
Civil Servant

Languages: en, de, pl

Specialisations: STP, ENV, IMIA

Profile:
Counsellor to the President of the Patent Office in the computerization and patent inform. Before: specialist in the international patent cooperation; technical university assistant (chem).

Marek ZELAZKO

Polish Chamber of Commerce

ul. Trebacka 4
PL - 00-074 WARSZAWA
POLOGNE

Tel.: 4822 / 264765
Fax: 4822 / 274673

Occupation:

Languages: en, pl

Specialisations: CEER, IMIA, REG

Profile:
As the Secretary of the Polish Chamber of Foreign Trade he deals with international aspects of the Polish Chamber of Commerce, especially with legal aspects of international economic cooperation, bilateral chambers, harmonisation of laws in international conventions.

Marcin ZIMOCH

POLSKIE RADIO I TELEWIZJA

Plac Powstancow 7
PL - 00-039 WARSZAWA
POLOGNE

Tel.: 4822 /261194, 476226
Fax: 4822 / 26 19 08

Occupation:
Journalist

Languages: en

Specialisations: ICC, CEER, SDIM

Profile:
Journalist working for the Polish Television, TV presenter of the main news programme on Channel 2 (national network), head of the Channel 2 news department, responsible for four programmes daily.