


**EUROPEAN SECURITY AFTER MAASTRICHT:
WHAT ROLE FOR OUR COUNTRIES?**

Austrian Institute for International Affairs
Western European Union. Institute for Security Studies
Baden, 10-12/VI/1993
(solo sintesi)

- a. Programme
- b. List of participants
- 1. "European security after Maastricht: responses from WEU countries: longer term perspectives"/ Gianni Bonvicini
- 2. "New challenges and requirements for security in Europe: Russia/CIS"/ Roy Allison
- 3. "Mediterranean"/ Nuno Aguirre de Carcer
- 4. "New challenges and requirements for security in Europe: Central/Eastern/South-Eastern Europe"/ Gerhard Mangott
- 5. "La sécurité européenne après Maastricht: réponses des pays de l'UEO: perspectives à court terme"/ Patrice van Ackere
- 6. "The role of the WEU in European security: the Finnish view"/ Jaakko Laajava
- 7. "Swedish security in a changing Europe"/ Krister Wahlbäck
- 8. "European security after Maastricht: what role for our countries: responses from EC applicant countries (Austria)"/ Ernst Sucharipa



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**"EUROPEAN SECURITY AFTER MAASTRICHT:
WHAT ROLE FOR OUR COUNTRIES?"**

Hotel Schloss Weikersdorf,
Schlossgasse 9-11, A-2500 Baden

10-12 June 1993

Programme

Thursday, June 10:

19:30 Reception/dinner hosted by the Austrian Ministry of Defence

Friday, June 11:

9:00 Opening statement by the Austrian Minister of Defence,
H.E. Dr. Werner Fasslabend

**Session I: New challenges and requirements
for security in Europe
(Chair: John Roper)**

9:15 1. Russia/CIS

Introduction: Roy Allison
Discussant: Raimo Väyrynen

10:15 2. Central/Eastern/South-Eastern Europe

Introduction: Gerhard Mangott
Discussant: Reinhard Buchholz

11:15 Coffee break and Press briefing

11:45 3. **Mediterranean**

Introduction: Nuño Aguirre de Carcer
Discussant: Rutger Lindahl

13:00 Lunch

14:30 **Session II. Responses from WEU countries**
(Chair: Hanspeter Neuhold)

1. **Short-term perspectives (present - 1996)**

Introduction: Patrice van Ackere
Discussant: Martin Konertz

15:45 Coffee break

16:15 2. **Longer-term perspectives (1996 and beyond)**

Introduction: Gianni Bonvicini
Discussant: H.W. van Santen

18:00 End of session

19:30 Dinner at the "Heuriger"
(Altes Zechhaus, Kirchenplatz 1, Gumpoldskirchen),
hosted by the Austrian Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Saturday, June 12:

9:00 **Session III: Responses from countries applying for
EC membership**
(Chair: John Roper)

Introductions: Jaakko Laajava
Krister Wahlbäck
Ernst Sucharipa

10:30 Coffee break

11:00 **Session IV: Concluding Session**
(Chair: Hanspeter Neuhold)

12:00 Summing up: John Roper

12:30 Lunch

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1993-06-08
WEUPROG/mh/fs

**"EUROPEAN SECURITY AFTER MAASTRICHT:
WHAT ROLE FOR OUR COUNTRIES?"**

AIIA/WEU Institute Joint Seminar
Baden, Austria, 10-12 June 1993

List of Participants

Patrice van ACKERE	Chef du secteur Europe, Delegation aux Affaires Stratégiques, Ministère de la Défense, Paris
Nuño AGUIRRE DE CARCER	Vice-President, Instituto de Cuestiones Internacionales y Política Exterior (INCIPE), Madrid
Roy ALLISON	Senior Lecturer, Centre for Russian and East European Studies (CREES), University of Birmingham
Ali Hikmet ALP	Permanent Representative of Turkey to the CSCE, Vienna
Esko ANTOLA	Director, Institute for European Studies, Turku
Pablo BARRIOS ALMAZOR	Head of Policy Planning, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Madrid
Gianni BONVICINI	Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome
Elisabet BORSEEN BONNIER	Deputy Head, Swedish CSCE Delegation, Vienna
Reinhard BUCHHOLZ	Deputy Head, Department for Political and Military Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Bonn
Marcello CALTABIANO	Director of the Planning Cell, WEU, Brussels
Giancarlo CHEVALLARD	Head of Foreign Policy Planning, Commission of the EC, Brussels
Armand CLESSE	Director, Institut d'Études Européennes et Internationales, Luxembourg
Alessandro CORTESE	European Political Cooperation, Secretariat, EC, Brussels
Panayotis DIAKOUMAKOS	Military Representative of Greece to WEU and NATO, Brussels

Klaus-Carsten PEDERSEN	Director, Danish Foreign Policy Society, Copenhagen
Ursula PFANN	International Security Policy, Ministry of Defence, Vienna
Wolfgang PLASCHE	Head of the Department of International Activities, Ministry of Defence, Vienna
Elfriede REGELSBERGER	Deputy Director, Institut für Europäische Politik, Bonn
Erich REITER	Head of the Section for Legal Affairs, Administration and Financial Management, Ministry of Defence, Vienna
Luc REYCHLER	Directeur, Centre d'Études de la Paix, KUL, Louvain
John ROPER	Director, WEU Institute for Security Studies, Paris
H. W. van SANTEN	Atlantic Cooperation and Security Affairs Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, The Hague
Wolfgang SCHALLENBERG	Secretary-General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Vienna
Ralph SCHEIDE	Head of the Secretariat-General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Vienna
Walter SIEGL	Head of the Department for Western Europe and for General Security Policy, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Vienna
Kurt SPILLMANN	Director, Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule, Zurich
Stephane G. STATHATOS	Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy, Athens
Ernst SUCHARIPA	Political Director, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Vienna
Richard TIBBELS	Head of Security Policy Section, Political Affairs Division, Secretariat-General, WEU, Brussels
Richard TOWNSEND	Director for Security Policy, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Dublin
Raimo VÄYRYNEN	Professor, University of Helsinki
Joris J. C. VOORHOEVE	Director, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, The Hague
Martin VUKOVICH	Head of the CSCE Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Vienna

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European Security After Maastricht
Responses from WEU Countries
Longer term perspectives (1996 and Beyond).

Gianni Bonvicini, Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome

A. Two critical dates will determine the future shape of the security and defence policy of the Community: 1996, when the Conference of Revision of the Treaty of Maastricht is scheduled, and 1998, when the WEU Treaty expires. The latter will be significant only if the WEU does not become an "integral part of the European Union" in 1996, that is, if the WEU continues to be parallel to the EU--a scenario which would not fully respect the original spirit of Maastricht.

B. The post-1996 security and defence posture of the Community should in principle take account of certain basic factors which have recently clearly emerged:

- the growing diversity of risks and challenges for which nations and institutions must be prepared;
- the need to tackle new crises with a comprehensive approach which uses a full combination of diplomatic, economic and military means;
- the question of the legitimacy of the use of force outside EC territory, not just for peacekeeping purposes;
- the increasing need for economising in view of diminishing resources (which implies a division of labour and transfers of sovereignty);
- the imperative for multinational structures as a hedge against renationalisation;

It is evident from the above that a defence policy at Community level is essential.

C. How should the Revision of Maastricht be oriented in order to gain an effective defence policy for the European Union?

1. A precondition for improved prospects for a common defence is a strong political will to redirect the process of European integration toward defence by putting less emphasis on economic integration (which has been considered a priority since the establishment of the Community);

2. The trend towards a progressive communitarisation of the institutional procedures in the defence field must be strengthened with joint actions by majority voting, a greater role for the European Parliament, common budgetary procedures, etc.

3. Operational capabilities must be improved through the creation of a European Command of WEU, the full integration of the Eurocorp and its multilateralisation, the setting up of a European Armament Agency.

4. The Union should play an international role in the security field through the WEU, by promoting a policy of regional alliances with countries or groups of countries (e.g. the "group to group" policy of the EC and EPC). Alliances could be formed with the Maghreb, the Visegrad Group, the Gulf Council, Egypt, etc.

5. The relationship between Europe and United States should be transformed into a new kind of special partnership both outside and within NATO (a "hard core" of WEU members and the US within NATO, the appointment of a European Permanent Representative to the White House for security policy). This means rethinking NATO's aims. In particular, the following should be ensured: a) a high degree of cooperation between Europe and US; b) status as the privileged Atlantic interlocutor of Russia and CIS; c) logistic infrastructures for out-of-area operations.

D. These transformations call for a strong reinforcement of the political character of the future European Union and could have a negative impact on the process of Community enlargement and even on its present composition. Many countries would not accept the practical consequences of such a Union.

Possible scenarios for the future:

1. The WEU develops in the direction described above, outside the European Union (which, in this case, would include only economic and foreign policy aspects);

2. The European Union moves ahead on the "concentric circles" model, with an hard core of a few member states accepting full integration in the three basic fields (economy, foreign policy and defence).

3. An "Ellipsis Europe" with a variety of different groups of countries for each field of integration and a small nucleus for those which converge in all camps.

Evaluation of the pros and cons of the above models.

Rome, 8/6/93

Summarised Introductory Statement for Panel
"New challenges and requirements for security in Europe,"
Session "Russia/CIS"

AIIA/WEU Institute Joint Seminar, 10-12 June 1993

Roy Allison

Introduction

The direct threat from the former USSR has been removed, but in its place multifarious and uncertain risks to the security and stability of Europe have arisen. Apart from direct military issues, dangers will rise from the continuing collapse of societies and economies.

In the near term the values of democracy and liberty unfortunately can not serve as unifying symbols for the population at large in the CIS states, which rejects the old regime but is otherwise largely apolitical. Nationalism is the new basis for integration. But ethnic realities contrast greatly to the national territories of the previous Soviet republics and promise continuing internecine friction or conflict. Will nationalist governments be responsive rationally to Western policies and international commitments?

The growing influence of Russian military leaders and a Russian military-political lobby in foreign and security policy decision-making in Moscow, especially over policy towards the so-called 'near abroad', creates further uncertainty. The Russian military command increasingly views military means as an essential and natural political instrument in areas of the CIS beyond Russian borders. How should Western states react to Yeltsin's acceptance of parliamentary and military views that the former USSR be viewed as a zone of special Russian security interests where Russian-led peace-keeping forces should operate?

Security Challenges for Europe outside the Former USSR

1. The debate in Russia between pro-Western 'Atlanticists' and more Asia oriented 'Eurasians' shows that the consistency of Yeltsin's and Kozyrev's foreign and security policy line depends on domestic political developments. Parliamentary Chairman Khasbulatov's recent link between the ratification of START II and the removal of Foreign Minister Kozyrev shows that security policy consistency can not be assured.

2. As an example of this, the terms of the CFE Treaty are not wholly secure. Defence Minister Grachev has called for changes in the sublimits applicable to Russia to allow for greater flexibility in the distribution of total allocations. This could reflect plans to develop the North Caucasus, a Flank region in the CFE Treaty, as a new military base area.

3. There is a challenge of westward mass migration, a great increase in organised crime and drug trafficking across borders,

an increase in international terrorism and the promotion of the proliferation of sensitive weapons by some state leaderships.

The latter relates to efforts by the former Soviet military-industrial complex to regain some of its former influence but to escape former tight state controls. Conversion efforts may be resisted to stave off unemployment for millions of people in regions of concentrated military industry.

4. Central European countries bordering Soviet successor states are threatened by the spillover effects of conflict and turmoil. Poland and Czechoslovakia, for example, have to consider various worrying scenarios which underlie their interest in NATO or perhaps WEU security guarantees. The Baltic States have a similar interest since collective security is an essential element of their defence thinking.

5. Ukraine poses a major nuclear non-proliferation problem. Ukrainian deputies are not content with the security assurances to non-nuclear states given by the nuclear powers in association with the NPT and the idea of Russian guarantees raised by Yeltsin earlier this year has made little progress. Kiev seeks firmer guarantees against attack to ratify START. It now regards itself as the owner of the components and materials which comprise the nuclear weapons on its soil and appears to be working towards acquiring positive operational control over these ICBMs.

6. A regional fragmentation of the Russian Federation, or a breakdown of central military control of regional Russian military formations poses the small but possible danger of the theft or sale of nuclear munitions. Even if this risk is minimised the challenge posed by unsafe nuclear power stations, which post-Soviet states can not afford to shut down, will remain.

7. If by the mid-1990s the Russian Federation fragments, or is at least further reduced under the pressures of local nationalism and efforts towards regional economic autonomy, how will this affect Russian international security policy obligations and stability on the Russian peripheries?

8. Related to this, how should West Europe react to the demands of groups in the CIS which call themselves nations and demand statehood? What if, as in the former Yugoslavia, they seek to incorporate much of their group in one state? The CSCE principle that minorities in states can be protected through group rights is now challenged. In the case of the former USSR and Yugoslavia West Europe reluctantly accepted that existing states could break up, but only if they used as international borders the internal borders which had previously applied. But this principle is not accepted by certain CIS states.

Conclusion

1. These risks and the means to mitigate or resolve them should be carefully considered when assessing the possibilities for any further integration of Russia or other CIS states into European structures. Some institutions could be adapted to tackle

certain problems of the former USSR. But Russia itself or the CIS (if certain common structures finally develop on its basis) will continue to have considerable responsibilities for the management of security issues in the former Soviet 'space'.

2. But the West should recognise the distinct security interests of the new successor states to avoid nationalist disenchantment and truculence in countries like Ukraine. In West European policy Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic States could form a channel to Russia but should not become a political barrier to this state - the latter option threatens a serious Russian nationalist backlash.

3. Western security guarantees (nuclear or non-nuclear), except those based on UN documents, can not realistically be offered in the medium term and they would be invidious. But a linkage between responsible behaviour by CIS states on START/nuclear issues, arms exports, and treatment of minorities, and economic interaction/assistance with Western states should be retained.

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3. Mediterranean.

A) Three approaches to an analysis of Mediterranean strategy:

① The Mediterranean and NATO's Southern region are an extension of the European security environment.: developments around the Mediterranean are studied in the light of their actual or potential effect on the security of Europe.-It focusses its attention on, inter alia, the effects of arms control in the south of Europe, while there is a progressive reorientation of European security concerns toward the south of our continent after the end of the Cold War.

The Southern Region countries become then less peripheral in strategic terms within the Atlantic Alliance and within any other European security structure. The improvement of conventional defense -even before the changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union- underlined the importance of the Southern Region as a conventional theatre"par excellence". There is thus a shift in emphasis to the European periphery.

② The Mediterranean derives much of its strategic importance from its proximity to areas of crisis and potential conflict outside Europe. The economic and logistical dimensions of security enhance the importance of the sea lines of communication for oil, the access to the Suez Canal, the role of supporting forces and facilities for operations beyond the Mediterranean shores.

According to this approach, the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf form a single geostrategic entity. Turkey and Egypt provide continental and maritime bridges between US-East Coast and Europe, and the Middle East/Southwest Asia. That long logistical axis paved the way to 90 % of the material supporting the coalition operations in the Gulf during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The Indian Ocean route would have greatly reduced the capacity for rapid power projection. The Eastern Mediterranean is closer to Bagdad than even the Southern Persian Gulf(about 450 versus 1.000 miles). After the war there has been an enduring requirement for a substantial presence in and around the Gulf.

Although from its global conception the United States view the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the wider Middle East as part of a single strategic complex, others, in Italy and even Spain, emphasize the interdependence of security concerns from Gibraltar to Iran, perhaps keeping in mind political reasons the desirability of convening a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean(CSCM), overstretching the geographical and geostrategic dimensions of that Sea.

- 2 -

③ A third approach looks at the Mediterranean and its subregions as areas of strategic consequence in their own right, in addition to their links with broader issues of European and Middle Eastern security. The United States, lacking a "Mediterranean consciousness", considers this approach as alien to U.S. foreign and security policy, even more so if we take into account that, now, the disappearance of the Soviet threat encourages the isolation rather than the linkage of regional problems, in this and other geostrategic areas. This view is also supported, at least "de facto", by Nordic and Central European nations, for reasons of expediency, trying to keep Southern regional problems at arm's length. I can personally recall how difficult it was to have the corresponding chapters on Security in the Mediterranean included in the "blue book" of Helsinki, June 1973 and in the CSCE Final Act of 1975.

B Security concerns for Europe in the Mediterranean area.

a) Arms proliferation.

In the wake of conventional arms reductions (CFE) and unilateral withdrawals in Europe, which leave unaffected significant armaments in the Magreb and the Near East, the Mediterranean is a center of residual military power, coexisting with the naval and naval air forces (from the U.S., Europe, the Russian Federation and Ukraine) that remain outside the CFE framework. On the other hand, some initiatives of transfer of equipment under CFE have altered regional military balances, for instance between Southern Europe and North Africa, between Greece and Turkey, and among Turkey and its Middle Eastern neighbours.

If we compare data in the "Military Balance 1980-81" and the "military Balance 1990-91" we see an increase of the total number of active armed forces of 95% for the Mashrek, and 45% (60% with Libya) for the Magreb. In absolute numbers for 1990 the European Community stands at 2,37 million soldiers (3,02 with Turkey), the Mashrek 2,69, and the Magreb 0,35 million (0,45 with Libya).

Another factor of fear is the proliferation of unconventional weapons or "weapons of mass destruction", chemical, biological and nuclear, and the technologies for their manufacture. We must refer also to ballistic missiles of increasing range. We reach thus a change in the strategic environment of the Mediterranean, affecting directly the Southern Region countries.

b) Threats of retaliation.

Mostly from Libya (against Italy or Spain) or Irak (from Mauritania). The sanctuarization of Southern Europe can no longer be assumed.

- 3 -

c) International terrorism.

It is needless to emphasize the importance of a thorough, frank, candid, cooperation between the intelligence communities of European -and some non-European - nations in this field, where we find the pursuit of war...by other means, favored by technological advances and religious or ideological, or simply mad, fanaticism.

d) a situation of "neither war nor peace" in the Middle East, with open-ended interminable negotiations, which influence in the mean time, the stability of political forces: in Israel, OLP, Lebanon, Jordan, etc. In any case, the situation is better than before the start in Madrid of arab-israeli talks.

e) other potential risks, not actual threats:

- e.1) Migration to European countries;
- e.2) Over-population: Egypt, Algeria, Morocco.
- e.3) lack of economic development;
- e.4) lack of political stability: Algeria.
- e.5) excessive military budgets and procurements; etc, etc.

c) Successive "fora" for discussion between:

- 1) CSCE member countries: the Mediterranean chapters. The CSCM idea?
- 2) European Community members: the EURO-DIALOGUE. - The Lisbon Council ^{26/27/1992} (1992).
- 3) Regional Mediterranean consultations: the "5 + 5" talks.
- 4) Bilateral or multilateral talks among NATO members.
- 5) W.E.U. - The "Petersberg" declaration (19-6-92).
- 6) W.E.W. - The Mediterranean Group meeting (29-4-93) and the Rome Ministerial Council's mandate on Dialogue with the Magreb countries (19-5-93).

Ambassador Nuño AGUIRRE DE CARCER

"European Security after Maastricht:
What role for our countries?"

AIIA-WEU Joint Seminar
11-12 June 1993

Session

"New challenges and requirements for security in Europe"

Introductory statement to:
"Central/Eastern/South-Eastern Europe"

Summary

Gerhard Mangott

The whole region - with the exception of former Yugoslavia - has gained in security due to the collapse of the communist regimes and the dissolution of the former USSR. The region has escaped hegemonic control by the former Soviet Union. A violent reversal and the reconstitution of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe by force - at least in a mid-term perspective - are rather unlikely.

The main threats to regional security emanate from within the region itself. An entanglement of historical animosities and resentments, unsettled border and other territorial disputes and ethnic heterogeneity could lead to intra-regional crises and (armed) conflicts. Whether these unsettled disputes will wane or escalate depends to a large extent on the ultimate success of political and economic reform:

1. The most serious cause for regional instability are the difficulties encountered on the road to democratization. Distrust in the institutional framework and widespread disenchantment with the democratic élites and with the

slow pace of economic recovery could result in hostile policies against minorities or/and neighbouring countries.

2. Given the above-mentioned premises, ethnic heterogeneity and unsettled territorial disputes are imminent threats to regional security and stability. The treatment of the various ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities is a key issue throughout the whole region, either as an internal issue - meaning that a considerable number of a country's citizens does not belong to the "titular" ethnic community - or an external issue - meaning that a high number of the members of an ethnic community that forms a nation-state live outside the boundaries of that nation-state. Border disputes with the aim of incorporating related ethnic communities abroad (Serbia, Croatia, Hungary) or discrimination against ethnic minorities within the boundaries of a state (Slovak Republic, Romania) are the main sources of inter- or intra-state conflict in the region.
3. Moreover, there exist various transboundary risks - most of them non-military - that may ultimately have a destabilizing impact on regional security:
 - a military buildup in the region with nuclear proliferation as the most threatening scenario
 - transboundary ecological risks, caused most likely by accidents in old-fashioned nuclear power plants with low security standards
 - organized crime and large-scale smuggling, especially drug trafficking
 - huge flows of migrants and refugees into the East Central European countries, turning them into "net-migration receivers"
4. Threats to Western security emanating from (armed) conflicts in the Eastern European region do exist. Efforts

merely to contain armed conflicts within reasonable boundaries and to prevent negative chain reactions will probably be insufficient for several reasons (though the ongoing war in Bosnia-Herzegovina seems to prove the opposite):

- the threat of military involvement remains, as further escalation might involve Western allies (e.g. a spill-over of a war in Kosovo)
- continuous clashes and turmoil in the region will increase movements of migrants and refugees and pose a serious threat to internal stability and security in recession-plagued Western societies
- media reports on atrocities cause moral indignation within Western public opinion and exert considerable pressure on national governments to become involved in the conflicts
- even without any direct involvement, ongoing conflicts in the region strain the cohesion of Western institutions

So far the countries of the region have not established sufficient if any subregional security arrangements to prevent or to settle local conflicts. Security and military affairs are still only dealt with on a bilateral level or primarily remain a national affair. Large-scale Western engagement in and commitment to the region seem indispensable as a far-sighted investment in the West's own security: access to Western markets, financial help and direct investment, as well as support for democratization, rather than security guarantees are promising Western responses to the security risks and the needs of the region, as these measures tackle the root causes of regional instability. Although it will be difficult to "sell" this policy to the tax payer, no reasonable alternative is within sight.

**SEMINAIRE UEO A BADEN
(10 - 12 JUIN 1993)**

**LA SECURITE EUROPEENNE APRES MAASTRICHT :
REponses DES PAYS DE L'UEO
PERSPECTIVES A COURT TERME (1996)**

CANNEVAS D'INTERVENTION DE P. VAN ACKERE

**chef du secteur Europe à la Délégation aux Affaires stratégiques
du Ministère de la Défense**

Introduction : - l'influence des perspectives de sécurité sur la négociation du Traité de Maastricht et sur son application.
- les incertitudes qui caractérisent la sécurité européenne d'ici 1996.

1 - LA POLITIQUE DE DEFENSE DES PAYS DE L'UEO A ETE ADAPTEE AU NOUVEAU CONTEXTE DE SECURITE

1 - Adaptation des concepts de défense dans les pays de l'UEO.

- maintien du concept de dissuasion et efforts nécessaires pour assurer sa pérennité et sa modernisation, face aux inconnues de l'avenir ;
- constat général : convergence des politiques des pays de l'UEO même si généralement le processus de décision n'a guère fait l'objet de concertation (les analyses ont conduit aux mêmes conclusions ;
- nouveau concept OTAN, à la définition duquel la France a participé (évolution notable de la part de celle-ci) ;
- accent mis en même temps sur l'autonomie en matière de renseignement (un des enseignements de la guerre du Golfe) ;
- globalisation de l'approche de défense incluant défense militaire, économique et sécurité intérieure.

2 - Restructuration des forces des pays de l'UEO

- tendance générale à la réduction des effectifs ;
- tendance à la professionnalisation ;
- développement de la multinationalisation ;
- accroissement du caractère interarmées des forces, de leur mobilité, de leur flexibilité, priorité dans tous les pays de l'UEO aux moyens légers, aux C3I, aux transports.
- recherche de rationalisation des structures et tendance générale à la réduction (ou à la stabilisation) des budgets de défense, (tendance qui s'est déjà infléchie aux Royaume-Uni).

II - UNE POLITIQUE EUROPEENNE VISANT A DEVELOPPER L'IDENTITE EUROPEENNE DE DEFENSE

1 - Mise en place de la PESC d'ici 1996

- rodage du nouveau processus décisionnel (qui n'est plus exclusivement fondé sur l'unanimité avec ce que cela implique au plan politique) ;
- rationalisation des groupes de travail ;
- définition des relations Union politique/UEO et définition concrète du partage des tâches ;
- approfondissement du concept d'UEO pilier européen de l'OTAN: l'UEO existe au sein de l'OTAN et non à coté d'elle
- définition du lien entre Union/UEO et OTAN ;
- approfondissement du concept d'intérêts de sécurité spécifiquement européens ;
- lancement de la réflexion sur Maastricht II.

Remarque : les leçons du rôle de l'Europe dans la crise yougoslave devront être tirées d'ici là.

2 - Développement d'un outil militaire à la disposition de l'UEO d'ici 1996

- capacité d'action de l'UEO :
 - . forces relevant de l'UEO (corps européen opérationnel d'ici 1995, autres forces en cours de développement) ;

- . organisation pour le temps de crise et désignation des états-majors ;
- . capacité d'observation (perspectives du centre satellitaire d'ici 1996) ;
- . mobilité stratégique (grandes conclusions de l'étude franco-allemande en cours).

- ouverture de l'UEO :

rapprochement avec les pays A E I E : problèmes et solutions envisageables
(les implications de leur adhésion à la Communauté ;

- . dialogue avec les pays d'Europe centrale : voies et moyens ;
- . coopération avec Alliés nord américains : relation UEO-OTAN et relations bilatérales entre l'UEO et ces pays ;
- . objectifs des échanges avec les pays du Maghreb.

- une politique française volontariste :

- . le Premier ministre, le 8 avril 1993, a rappelé notre volonté d'être la force vive d'une véritable entité européenne de défense ;
- . la continuité de la politique française vis-à-vis de l'UEO (au confluent de sa politique européenne et de sa politique de défense) ;
- . dimension européenne du livre blanc et de la loi de programmation ;
- . restructuration militaire permettant à la France d'être encore mieux à même de remplir ses missions au sein de l'UEO.

Jaakko Laajava
Director General for
Political Affairs
MFA, Helsinki

**THE ROLE OF THE WEU IN EUROPEAN SECURITY;
THE FINNISH VIEW**

- Finnish foreign and security policy in the new Europe. New opportunities and challenges. Neutrality vs. participation.
- The Finnish defence solution: independent defence and military non-alignment. Present policy and the dynamics of change.
- WEU as a contributor in the new order of security in Europe based on cooperating and mutually reinforcing European and transatlantic institutions.
- WEU as the security policy arm of the European Union in matters having defence implications. WEU as the European pillar of NATO.
- The case of ex-Yugoslavia; crisis of cooperative security (CSCE) and collective security (UN).
- The future challenges of conflict prevention and crisis management, peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Finland's responsibilities and expectations.
- Regional security: Norden, Baltic Sea and Barents Sea regions.
- The "interim" period as a candidate for EU membership. Contacts and relations with WEU.

28 April 1993

Krister Wahlbäck

SWEDISH SECURITY IN A CHANGING EUROPE

Over the last few years, there have been a number of radical changes in the security situation in Sweden's geographical vicinity, and in Europe as a whole. Naturally, these changes also mean that there are new prerequisites for Swedish security and foreign policy.

The Soviet Union has been dissolved. Russia, its chief successor, is moving towards democratic government and a market economy, and it is looking for cooperation with Sweden, with our Nordic neighbours, with the rest of Europe and with the United States.

The Warsaw Pact has also been dissolved. The former Soviet Union's network of air and naval bases on the other side of the Baltic Sea - from Rostock to Tallinn - has been phased out or is being dismantled. The process of transferring Soviet military forces back to Russia from the former GDR and Poland will soon be complete.

Germany has been reunited. Poland and the other states which were forced into the communist bloc in 1945-48 have liberated themselves from the Soviet system.

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have regained the independence which they enjoyed before the Second World War and the Soviet occupation of 1940. And Finland and Russia have agreed that the "Pact of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance" of 1948 between Finland and the Soviet Union has ceased to apply.

In other words, the Europe which we lived in from 1949 to 1989 - a Europe divided up into two military blocs and two opposing ideological camps - is a thing of the past. Sweden no longer lies along the frontier between two military alliances.

This means that completely new opportunities have opened up in our security and foreign policy.

We applied for membership of the EC in the summer of 1991. Membership of the Community had been in Sweden's interest for quite some time. But previously our aim of being able to keep out of a war between the two military alliances had been so vital that we refrained from virtually all forms of security and foreign policy cooperation in Europe. Otherwise, we would have risked getting involved in ties which would have made the possibility of maintaining neutrality in the event of war quite illusory. And, as a result, we would also have risked disturbing the sensitive balance in the North of Europe in time of peace, something which was vital for Sweden and for her Nordic neighbours, particularly Finland.

Now we are free to participate fully in EC foreign policy cooperation, including the Common Foreign and Security Policy which will be formulated when the EC embarks on European Union.

In fact, active and full participation in European security policy cooperation is a prerequisite for Swedish contributions to a new order of peace and security on our continent. This is already true today in the CSCE, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and it will also apply in the European Union when we become members.

In the past, we used to describe our overall security and foreign policy in time of peace as "a policy of neutrality". This was at a time when there was a risk of war between the military blocs. We were therefore obliged to make continuous efforts to uphold the credibility of our determination and ability to maintain our neutrality if hostilities broke out.

But now we are living in a different Europe. How can we talk about "neutrality" in the old way when there are no longer any opposing military alliances to be neutral about?

"A policy of neutrality" has become an irrelevant and misleading label. If we continued to use it, we would give a false picture of our assessments of European security prospects. People in other countries would believe that we were still preparing to deal with traditional East-West warfare scenarios.

Above all, it would give a false impression of our approach to security policy cooperation in Europe. Other countries would believe that we still wanted to stay in our protective shell.

Today, we neither wish nor desire to accept the constraints involved in a policy of neutrality. We like to refer to Sweden's "European identity" because it clearly denotes our willingness to participate in efforts to achieve a European order for security and cooperation.

One topical example is the crisis in Bosnia. Sweden is obviously not neutral in this conflict. On the contrary, Sweden will probably be sending a military force which will participate in an operation decided by the UN Security Council and essentially under NATO command to ensure that the peace settlement which we are hoping for can actually be implemented in this tortured part of Europe.

On the other hand, we are still maintaining our non-participation in military alliances so that we can remain neutral in a conflict in our geographical vicinity. We are thus retaining the neutrality option.

But this does not mean that neutrality is the obvious response to any type of conflict in our vicinity.

For example, Sweden could never think of remaining indifferent in a situation in which the survival of the three Baltic states was threatened.

As we know, Sweden did not declare its neutrality when the Soviet Union attacked Finland in November 1939. We did not participate in the war, but we gave Finland considerable support.

Similarly, even in the new conditions which now prevail in Europe, situations may occur in our vicinity as well which will mean that we will obviously want to be active to a greater extent than is possible for a neutral state.

We know that one of the objectives for the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy is to formulate a common defence policy which may in time lead to a common defence. This objective will be subject to further discussion at the European Union inter-governmental conference which will start in 1996. Sweden does not intend to hamper progress towards the achievement of this goal.

The question of what Sweden's attitude should be to membership of the WEU (Western European Union), which is the military arm of the European Union, or of NATO, has sometimes been raised in the course of the political debate in Sweden. The only feasible reply today is that this is not a relevant question for the time being.

Membership of the WEU will not be possible, in formal terms, until Sweden has joined the EU, that is to say in 1995. It would hardly be reasonable, at the present time, to decide on a question which must be determined by so many unknown prerequisites in a future perspective which is so uncertain. We do not know whether the current members of the WEU and of NATO are going to want Sweden to be a member. And we do not know how the WEU and NATO will develop over the next few years, what military resources their member states will have at their command, or to what extent the US involvement in Europe which is so vital for us will be maintained, or how the general situation in Europe will have changed, etc.

Nor will an observer status in the WEU be formally possible until Sweden has joined the European Union.

When the question of membership of the WEU and/or NATO is raised in the public debate in Sweden, the underlying idea is often that Russia may abandon its present course and embark on a neo-imperialist policy which will threaten Sweden and its neighbours in the North of Europe. There is no doubt that a scenario of this kind would create serious problems for us, for our neighbours and for all the countries in our vicinity. The North of Europe is now the only region in a traditional "Western Europe" which has direct frontiers with a modern Russia.

But this is an unlikely scenario, and today's EC countries do not appear to envisage perspectives of this kind to any great extent when they discuss how the 1996 inter-governmental conference is to be able to agree on the forms and tasks for a common defence policy and common defence forces.

The scenarios in the forefront of these discussions are instead, quite naturally, of a type which we can already see in former Yugoslavia, that is to say new ethnic, religious or linguistic conflicts in other parts of Europe. This type of threat requires a more effective security order if such conflicts are to be contained and solved. The present members of the EC know that responsibility primarily rests with them, if Europe is to avoid a situation in which major areas in the former communist-controlled countries are to be subject to the rule of the strongest.

This is no easy task, but it is obvious that Sweden has the same responsibilities and the same interests as countries with comparable resources which are already members of the EC. Sweden must participate actively and contribute to the best of its ability. In view of our extensive experience of UN peace-keeping operations, this is an obligation.

As far as Russia is concerned, the EC countries and Sweden share the same interests. We must assist Russia and other former communist-controlled states in their difficult process of transition to democracy and a market economy and ensure that they can participate in all forms of cooperation in Europe.

In Sweden, we rather tend to feel that our status in the North of Europe as neighbours of Russia is an asset. Many years ago, St. Petersburg and north-western Russia provided the motive force for Russia's rapid industrial development. That was in the half-century before 1914, when economic progress at the end of the Tsarist epoch opened up excellent opportunities for Swedish industry. Today, north-western Russia once again has the prerequisites to play a similar dynamic role, at a time when Russia is again devoting its energies to modernizing its industry in cooperation with other countries. Businessmen and entrepreneurs in the Nordic countries are in a good position to take advantage of this opportunity.

It is to be hoped that the risk of nationalist-imperialist forces coming to power in Russia will gradually decline. Eventually, we will be able to say with a reasonable degree of certainty that the commitments to democracy at home and peace abroad signed by heads of government of the CSCE member states in the celebrated Charter of Paris in November 1990 really will be fulfilled in the long term by all the states which are relevant to Sweden's immediate security.

Until then, Sweden, with its strategic location in the heart of the North of Europe, must retain a credible capability to defend its extensive land, sea and air territory. Gradually, however, an increasing proportion of our defence resources will be devoted to preparations for Sweden's participation in peace-keeping and peace-building tasks, in pace with the fading away of potential threats to Sweden's own integrity and independence.

The greatest risks faced by Russia's neighbours are probably of a different nature: what would happen if it proved impossible to prevent a breakdown of society on a much wider scale than today? The risks include nuclear power disasters, hordes of refugees and threats or blackmail exerted by military freebooters. We cannot even exclude the possibility of the dissolution of Russia as a unified state, thus presenting us with a new and unpredictable neighbour as a result.

If Sweden had to live next to a great power in a state of chaos, this would probably create strains which we would find it very difficult to deal with on our own. This gives us all the more reason for wanting to participate in an EC security policy which covers the whole range of potential threats and risks.

* * *

For many decades, "neutrality" was the first thing foreign observers thought of when Swedish foreign policy was mentioned. As far as they were concerned, and for many Swedes too, it felt comfortable and secure to have as their point of departure a doctrine which had been moulded over the decades. It provided a measure of predictability in a Europe divided into military blocs and with rigid frontiers between the alliance structures.

But the situation in Europe has now changed fundamentally. In all essential respects, these changes have been deeply longed for, finally allowing people to hope for freedom - freedom from the threat of communism and from the burdens of the arms race.

But, in the course of the transition to the new Europe, there will be a period of uncertainty about the future prerequisites for security policies - both for Sweden and for other states. This means that we must be open to the future and avoid taking unnecessarily definite stands, whether this is the result of nostalgic retention of traditional dogma or of hasty decisions before the future has become clearer.

One thing is clear, however. The decisive factor for Swedish policy in this new situation is our active involvement in contributing to a new order for security and cooperation in Europe. In this endeavour, we want to ensure that the Europe of the future will be generous towards the rest of the world, with an open attitude towards the needs of poor countries.

We also know that the meaning of the "security" concept has been extended. There is no longer the same emphasis on comparative military strength. Today, the emphasis is increasingly on protection against environmental threats, illegal immigration and the smuggling of weapons and narcotics. Achieving security in the modern world is also more and more a question of being able to safeguard the interests of your own country in cooperation with other states. This means keeping in the forefront in technology and industry, as well as in education and culture.

This implies that Swedish society as a whole will face demands for change as a result of the dramatic events of recent years - not just those responsible for Sweden's foreign policy.

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AIIA/WEU Institute Joint Seminar

(Baden, 10 - 12 June 1993)

"European security after Maastricht:

what role for our countries?"

Responses from EC applicant countries (Austria)

Ambassador Ernst Sucharipa

Political Director

12 June 1993

Distinguished participants,

In the 10 - 15 minutes allotted to me I cannot possibly cover all angles of this complex issue in a systematic way. But this is just as well: I might get into trouble if I did. I should therefore like to limit myself to a few in my mind - particularly salient points. Although I am supposed to respond, I shall ask a few questions as well. I apologize already now for possibly repeating some of what has already been said yesterday.

1. New challenges facing Europe: Security through integration

To say that the euphoria created by the fall of communism and the end of the Cold War has given way to a more realistic assessment of the situation in Europe, means stating the obvious. Developments in the former Sowjetunion and the most horrible events in many parts in former Yugoslavia in particular had a sobering impact on public opinion and - I hope - also on the perceptions of the political leadership and the political class in general. Indeed these developments serve as a stark and daily reminder that a "relapse of history" is possible and that (Western) Europe cannot afford or enjoy a smug, cozy feeling of peace, security and stability in a highly unstable neighborhood.

Today emerges a multitude of new challenges caused by a diversity of factors which make a broadened definition of security mandatory: Threats do no longer emanate primarily from the military field, although there are still potential dangers, in particular with regard to the proliferation of states possessing nuclear weapons. The most acute threats to security in our days arise mainly from nationalism, poverty, migration, terrorism, organized crime and serious environmental dangers.

These challenges dwarf the ability and capacity of any single European state to deal with them successfully. Europe is thus - again - at a crossroads. It is faced with what Daniel Vernet, in a remarkable piece published last year in "Le Monde", has called a strategic choice: a choice between a further integration or aggravated nationalism. Needless to say, my vote goes to the former. Only integration and the pooling of resources can provide appropriate answers to these challenges.

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We must not overlook tendencies showing that Western Europe is not fully immune to the virus of nationalism. European integration - the Maastricht process - has been called "a race against history". This word from the former Dutch Foreign Minister and current EC-Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Hans van den Broek describes best the acuteness of today's political development in Europe. I would see in this race - provided it proves to be successful - also the best antidote against the afore-mentioned virus of nationalism.

In this sense European integration, seen as a truly comprehensive policy of peace, will have to:

- Firstly, encompass the progressive development of a coherent and effective foreign and security policy, including sound mechanisms and structures, in order to be able to respond better to the new challenges that have emerged in the fields I have mentioned above and
- secondly, European integration will eventually also mean the extension of the concept of security to Central and Eastern Europe; this is certainly the most delicate but equally most important task;
- thirdly, address the whole broad spectrum of challenges to our security as described above.

2. The role of the WEU and its relationship to NATO

In the military field, the WEU has been designated as the "security arm" of the EU. As the most recent events with regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina have shown there is indeed a demand for a specific European security effort: One needs only to refer to the latest statements coming from Washington which refer to Bosnia as a primarily European problem, by the way a sentiment with which I do not concur.

We therefor welcome the gradual development of WEU's operational capabilities including the establishment of a planning cell and its activities in relation to the monitoring of sanctions on the Danube and the Adriatic Sea. It is important that WEU not only exist on paper.

I am, of course, aware of the delicate relationship between NATO and WEU and the different shades of opinion among Member States on this relationship. This is why I have noted with great interest recent reports according to which the new French Minister for Defense Léotard evoked the Spanish relationship with NATO as an example which France should follow. Minister Léotard apparently also spoke of new missions for NATO in the course of new security threats in which France should have a say and he also favoured an augmented presence of French officers at NATO-HQ. A future change of the attitude of France toward NATO would obviously have consequences for WEU and for the whole western European security discussion. I would be interested in an assessment of such a development by our WEU-colleagues assembled here today.

3. Austria's future relationship to WEU and NATO

Austria has - as I have indicated - welcomed recent steps to strengthen the WEU. Our domestic common denominator - the present consensus between the coalition partners - can be found in a recent answer to a Parliamentary Question a clear reference was made to the role accorded to WEU in the Maastricht-Treaty. Therefore in preparation of relevant decisions, it would be opportune already now for Austria to initiate institutionalized contacts with the WEU.

In the meantime - that is at their meeting held in Rome on 20 May - the WEU Council of Ministers has offered to establish appropriate contacts in the interim period prior to accession to the European Union. We intend to take up this invitation for an institutionalized dialogue as a follow-up to the various useful and instructive informal contacts which have already taken place at various levels between Austrian politicians and officials and WEU representatives. In addition to general questions relating to European security and the development of the role of the WEU, topics to be discussed in such a framework should include issues with regard to peace-keeping, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief (here we would be particularly interested for example in learning more about WEU's plans relating to nuclear reactor-accidents), former Yugoslavia and the CIS.

Although the debate in Austria on our eventual relationship with WEU is still going on, my educated guess would be that, certainly as a first step, we may well seek an appropriate arrangement, possibly as an observer, after our accession to the European Union.

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Regarding NATO, we shall of course follow closely the
aforementioned developments among the members of the EC.
In the meantime we are interested in participating in the
NACC ad hoc Working Group on peace-keeping.

It is needless to say that our active participation in the
UN and the CSCE will continue.

4. "Une Europe à deux vitesses"? - Implications for Austria

Regardless of the positive outcome of the second Danish referendum some political pundits think that with regard to the future development of a European security policy there may well be a split between a core group of some members of the European Union and an outer ring consisting of others. Such concerns are perhaps heightened by the prospect of membership of Austria and other applicants.

Others (cf. The Economist, 22 May 1993) see in the explicit acceptance of the fact that not all members need to take part in every area of European integration (i.e. the exceptions granted to Denmark and Great Britain) a sign of flexibility which "adds strength, not shame, to the EC".

Not only for the sake of discussion but for tangible other reasons - primarily geography - it is also quite possible to argue differently: I, for one, could very well imagine circumstances under which Austria could become a "demandeur" in the area of security - as it surely will be in the areas of social, monetary policy and environmental policy -. Austria could therefore belong to the core group of countries who - albeit for different reasons - favour more integration and not less. I would be interested to hear the views of our WEU-colleagues also on such a scenario.

5. The extension of the concept of security to Central and Eastern Europe

These states have already now become security - "demandeurs". The EC Commission, in its reports to the Edinburgh and Copenhagen - summits has recognized this fact and has stated that a clear perspective of their future participation in the process of European Union should provide an element of stability and an antidote against excessive nationalism. The Commission has recommended to create a "European Political Area" as a framework for continuous dialogue, based on the belief that "a greater sense of belonging to the process of European integration will reduce feelings of insecurity and consequent tensions in the region, with gains for overall security and cooperation in Europe". It is therefore not just a one way-street taken for purely altruistic motives.

WEU itself has also taken further steps at its ministerial meeting in Rome on 20 May and has stated that the "political dialogue within the Forum of Consultation should provide a framework in which security and defence issues of common concern could be discussed" without duplicating the NACC and "with the aim of extending the area of stability and security in Europe".

I believe that all these are steps in the right direction, even if Central and Eastern European countries want more - more than WEU-members (or NATO-members for that matter) are able or prepared to give at least for now. It is therefore not surprising that other ideas and initiatives to deal with a perceived security vacuum have come up and will continue to do so. I, however, continue to see the development of a comprehensive system of European collective security with the European Union as its core as the best solution, but as a solution to be approached, to be sure, gradually and incrementally, in a security framework comprising also other organizations or regimes with their specific mandates.

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In order to proceed on this path step by step, we need as much common understanding of the challenges facing us in the security field as possible. This is why Austria has proposed to a number of Central and Eastern European states to hold a conference of Foreign and Defence Ministers in Vienna on 7 - 8 September. This is also why this very Conference to be concluded here today was and is very useful.