


THE SOUTHERN DIMENSION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY:
THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY IDENTITY
Centro militare di studi strategici
Western European Union. Institute for Security Studies
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Rome, 5-6/III/1993

- a. "Programme, List of the participants"
1. "Mediterranean security: political, economic and cultural factors"/ Roberto Aliboni (IAI9302E)
 1. "La sicurezza nel Mediterraneo: fattori politici, economici e culturali"/ Roberto Aliboni (IAI9302)
 2. "Mediterranean security: political, economic and cultural factors : comments"/ Salah Bassiouny
 3. "Security in the Mediterranean: military aspects"/ Roberto Zadra
 4. "Politico-military developments in the Maghreb"/ Giuseppe Cucchi
 5. "L'évolution politico-militaire au Moyen-Orient"/ May Chartouni-Dubarry



*Centro Militare
di Studi Strategici,
Rome*

*Western European Union
Institute for Security
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*Istituto Affari
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Rome*

CeMiSS

WEU-ISS

IAI



March 1993

**THE SOUTHERN DIMENSION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY:
THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY IDENTITY**
to be held at the CeMiSS, Palazzo Salviati
Piazza della Rovere 83, Rome, 5-6 March 1993

PROGRAMME

Thursday, 4th March 1993

2100 Welcome dinner offered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Valdo SPINI, Under-Secretary of State

Friday, 5th March 1993

0900 Welcome (Franco Angioni-CeMiSS/John Roper-WEU-ISS)

Chair: Cesare MERLINI (IAI)

0930 - 1100 **SESSION I - Security in the Mediterranean: political economic and
cultural aspects**

Introduction: Roberto ALIBONI (IAI)
Discussant: Salah BASSIOUNY (Egypt)

1100 - 1130 Coffee break

1130 - 1300 **SESSION II - Security in the Mediterranean: military aspects**

Introduction: Roberto ZADRA (ISS)
Discussant: Susie SYMES (RIIA)

1300 Buffet lunch



- 2 -

Chair: Giancarlo ARAGONA (Italian Ministry of Defence)

1430 - 1600

SESSION III - Politico-military developments in the Maghreb

Introduction: Giuseppe CUCCHI (CeMiSS)
 Discussant: Miguel UTRAY (State Department)

1600 - 1630

Coffee break

1630 - 1800

SESSION IV - Politico-military developments in the Middle East

Introduction: May CHARTOUNI-DUBARRY (IFRI)
 Discussant: Gabriel SHEFFER (Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

2100

Dinner offered by the RITAD

Saturday, 6th March 1993

Chair: General CUCCHI (CeMiSS)

0930 - 1030

SESSION V - Turkey between Europe and the Middle East

Introduction: Duygu Bazoglu SEZER (Bilkent University)
 Discussant: to be defined

1030 - 1100

Coffee break

1100 - 1230

SESSION VI - The development of a European security identity and the Mediterranean region

Introduction: John ROPER (ISS)
 Discussant: Ahmet ÜZÜMCÜ (NATO)

1230

Closing comments by H.E. Mr. Emilio COLOMBO, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs

1300

Buffet lunch

End of seminar

THE SOUTHERN DIMENSION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY
THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY IDENTITY

Rome, 5-6 March 1993

LIST OF THE PARTECIPANTS

- ABDALLAH Mrs. Souad - Embassy of Syria, Rome
- ABELA Amb. Maurice - Embassy of Malta, Rome
- AYHAN Mr. Akif - Counsellor, Embassy of Turkey, Brussels
- ALIBONI Dr. Roberto - Director of Studies, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome
- ANGIONI Gen. Franco - President, Centro Alti Studi Difesa, CASD, (Center for High Defence Studies), Rome
- BASSIM Mrs. Wafaa - Counsellor, Embassy of Egypt, Rome
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- BEN MANSOUR Mr. Abderrahmen - Embassy of Tunisia, Rome
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- CHARTOUNI-DUBARRY Mrs. May - Research Fellow, IFRI, Paris
- CHEVALLARD Mr. Giancarlo - Chief, Planning Unity, EC, Brussels
- CORTI Mr. Andreas - Junior Fellow, Centro Militare di Studi Strategici, CEMISS (Military Center for Strategic Studies), Rome
- CREMASCO Dr. Maurizio - Head of Security Studies, IAI, Rome
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 - SEBTI Amb. Zine El Abidine - Embassy of Morocco, Rome
 - SEZER Dr. Duygu - Bilkent University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative sciences, Ankara
 - SYMES Dr. Susie - Royal Institute of International Affairs, London
 - ÜZÜMCÜ Mr. Ahmet - Administrator, Central and Eastern European Liaison Section, NATO Political Directorate, Brussels
 - VALINAKIS Dr. Yannis - The Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy (ELJAMEP), Athens
 - VAN DEN BURG Ms. Fenna - Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Gravenhage (Netherlands)
 - WENZEL Dr. Volkmar - Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bonn
 - ZADRA Dr. Roberto - Research Fellow, ISS, WEU, Paris

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MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL FACTORS

by Roberto Aliboni

Paper prepared for the international seminar on «The Southern Dimension of European Security: the Mediterranean Area and the European Security Identity», organized by The Western European Union Institute for Security Studies in collaboration with Istituto Affari Internazionali, Centre for Military and Strategic Studies (CeMiSS)
Rome, 5-6 March 1993

ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI

MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY:
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL FACTORS

by Roberto Aliboni

With the end of the Cold War, the importance of military factors affecting security has taken a back seat to non-military considerations pertaining to Western European security in the areas beyond the Mediterranean (i.e. North Africa and the Middle East). This has been reflected in the growing body of literature analyzing non-military factors affecting security and the increased attention given to these issues by Western and European security institutions.

This presentation aims to identify the cultural, political and economic factors affecting security in the Mediterranean area, and will consider their implications on policy.

Cultural Factors influence European security in that they may prompt fundamental ideological antagonisms which in turn give rise to an environment that is hostile and potentially aggressive toward the West (and vice versa).

(1) Since the Second World War, Western Europe has developed a "rationalist" culture which has led to the strengthening and enlargement of its democratic political institutions, a strong emphasis on the respect for human and civil rights, and the primacy of international solidarity with respect to nationalist concerns. In the area surrounding Western Europe, however, the end of the Cold War has been accompanied by the re-emergence or reinforcement of "romantic" trends dominated by ethnic, religious, or national values which generally lead to an adversarial identity.

These developments may have a negative impact on the cohesion and integration of Western Europe.

(2) Western Europe--and the West as a whole--is considered the primary antagonist of the identity sought in the Mediterranean area. The nationalistic position is that of traditional Third Worldism, that is, the West prevents or impedes the spread of modernity (by preventing or limiting the spread of economic, technological and scientific development). According to Islamists, on the other hand, modernity may only be reached within the framework of indigenous values and not through assimilation of Western culture: modernization through imitation of the West is a trap which can only lead to subordination.

Islamists are more radical in their rejection of the West than are nationalists. The latter perceive themselves to be on the fringe of what are essentially shared cultural values; their goal is to assume a more central position a culture that is perceived as universal. Islamists, however, do not believe that Western culture is universal and perceive their development as being necessarily in opposition to the West.

The rise of radical Islamism (though there are also major moderate or less radical movements) has intensified longstanding anti-Western sentiments in the regions south of

the Mediterranean. The security implications of this trend include fundamental tension which hinders dialogue between Western countries and those of the Southern Mediterranean area.

(3) There has been an increase in immigration from the Mediterranean area (and from Eastern Europe) to Western Europe. Immigrants often form ethnic communities which resist integration into the European host culture. As this is occurring in a period of significant demographic fragility in Europe (where the growth rate is virtually zero in a rapidly aging population), immigration is strongly perceived as a threat, and has led to intolerance and racism. This has resulted in restrictive legislation on immigrants and refugees, which is in sharp contrast to the "rationalist", democratic nature of European society and exacerbates the fundamental tension referred to earlier.

(4) These elements of tension are amplified by the mass media, particularly because of the one-way flow of messages (images transmitted are almost exclusively Western--and these are compounded by those of Western tourists). On one hand, mass media send "European" images across the Mediterranean, giving rise to distortions, conflicts, imitations, and anomie (e.g. French, Italian and Spanish coverage of the Gulf War which was received in the Maghreb); on the other, mass media bring Europeans "European" views of the Southern Mediterranean, particularly of the Islamist movements, which are generally stereotypical and negative, fuelling hostility and mistrust toward the region.

Thus the tension felt by the South with respect to the North is mutual. From a European point of view, the pressures of current cultural trends are putting democratic institutions to the test, and creating a perceived threat to the European way of life.

Political factors also contribute to hostility toward the West.

(1) Western Europe, as an integral part of the West, is allied with the so-called moderate Arab regimes (i.e. those which are cooperative at the international level). Thus it often finds itself involved in inter-Arab rivalries. This is less of an issue than it had been during the Cold war when such rivalries contributed to the East-West confrontation. What is more relevant today is that opposition groups (Islamist and others) within Arab countries see the West as supporting what are usually authoritarian and repressive regimes.

The situation is marked by contradictions. Should they gain power, the most extreme Islamists would form regimes which would be at least as repressive as the current ones, if not more so. In any case, it is certainly true that the West neglected the issue of democracy in Arab-Muslim countries, partly because of the pressures of the Cold War. In light of the preceding considerations of cultural factors contributing to tensions across the Mediterranean, it is clear that the West's failure to support unifying democratic elements in Arab-Muslim countries was a mistake.

"Democracy" is currently an important ingredient of European policies toward the countries south of the Mediterranean. This must be carefully addressed because it risks clashing with the current sensitivity about identity. In any case, the democratic ingredient of European policies is crucial, at least with respect to those regimes or groups which are, or which claim to be, close to the West.

(2) The West and Western Europe are involved in the two major crises under way to the south of the Mediterranean: the Arab-Israeli crisis and the Iraqi crisis. Their involvement is a source of a hostility toward the West which will persist as long as the crises remain unresolved and even afterward, as the resolution will favour some groups at the expense of others. Thus the management of these crises must be carried out so as to support those groups which are willing to cooperate with the West and which are open to democracy.

(3) The lack of international cooperation between the European and Arab worlds constitutes a negative political factor in trans-Mediterranean relations. The Cold War made such cooperation difficult; the end of the Cold War should encourage Western Europe, and particularly the European Community, to develop a policy of cooperation with the Arab world, and to avoid being confined to a marginal role of indirect support or of involvement at the sub-regional level (Maghreb). Such a European initiative would not be a "duplication" within the Atlantic framework.

A significant impediment to the establishment of inter-regional cooperation between the European Union and the Arab world is the asymmetric level of institutionalization and cohesion of the two sides; the absence of a solid and articulated inter-Arab cooperation weakens the prospects for a successful policy of inter-regional cooperation.

Economic Factors affect European security in two main ways:

(1) The marked income disparity among most countries in the area and economic/social underdevelopment fuel opposition (particularly Islamist) to Arab regimes, thus increasing instability. International and bilateral cooperation has recently made more effort to address these problems, launching major adjustment and restructuring programmes. The European Community has established a new programme (the renewed Mediterranean policy). This programme, despite an increase in funding, remains a modest effort, considering EC interests in this region. It is weakened by the fact that member states hesitate to assign increased importance and resources to a common cooperation policy as opposed to national ones. The EC should play a greater and more autonomous role in supporting programmes and projects aimed at increasing employment in the short-medium term--an objective which is less important to the restructuring and adjustment programmes supported by the IMF and the World Bank.

(2) International economic cooperation, however, is limited by the severe disintegration and fragmentation of the regional economies and by the lack of cooperation between States with extremely unequal demographic and income distributions. The Arab-Israeli conflict constitutes a fundamental disruption of relations between the countries of the region.

This state of disintegration is a destabilizing factor and threat to West European interests. It results in market fluctuations and trade restrictions, weak infrastructures, threats to oil and other energy supplies, and the lack of mobility of goods and people (which contributes to migrations to Western Europe).

Progress in the current Arab-Israeli negotiations (end of the boycott, border openings, etc.) would have a very positive effect on international cooperation because it

would restore market continuity. In any case, intra-regional cooperation and integration must also be increased. Attempts so far, including the Arab Maghreb Union, have been disappointing. Furthermore, the EC has never made serious efforts to make its cooperation policies contingent on progress in regional cooperation. As in the political arena, increased regional integration is necessary in the economic field if international cooperation is to be successful.

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LA SICUREZZA NEL MEDITERRANEO: FATTORI POLITICI, ECONOMICI E CULTURALI

di Roberto Aliboni

Paper presentato al Seminario internazionale su «La dimensione meridionale della sicurezza europea: l'area mediterranea e l'identità di sicurezza dell'Europa», organizzato dall'Istituto per gli Studi di Sicurezza dell'Ueo con la collaborazione dello IAI e del CeMISS
Roma, 5-6 marzo 1993

ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI

LA SICUREZZA NEL MEDITERRANEO: FATTORI POLITICI, ECONOMICI E CULTURALI

di Roberto Aliboni

I fattori *non* militari che influenzano la sicurezza dell'Europa occidentale nelle aree oltre il Mediterraneo - prevalentemente il Nord Africa e il Medio Oriente - hanno assunto agli occhi degli europei e dell'Occidente un rilievo maggiore da quando la fine della guerra fredda ha messo sullo sfondo la schiacciante importanza dei fattori militari. Essi sono stati oggetto di crescente attenzione da parte della letteratura analitica e delle istituzioni europee e occidentali di sicurezza.

Questa presentazione cerca di identificare questi fattori culturali, politici ed economici, indicando alcune implicazioni di politica nei confronti delle aree in questione.

I *fattori culturali* influenzano la sicurezza europea perché suscitano contrapposizioni di fondo, sostenute da motivazioni ideologiche, che generano poi un ambiente ostile e potenzialmente aggressivo nei confronti dell'Occidente (e viceversa).

1) L'Europa occidentale dopo la seconda guerra mondiale ha sviluppato una sofisticata esperienza «razionalista», che ha portato al rafforzamento e all'espansione delle istituzioni politiche democratiche, ad una forte salvaguardia dei diritti umani e civili e al rafforzamento delle solidarietà internazionali rispetto a quelle nazionali. Con la fine della guerra fredda, attorno all'Europa occidentale sono riemerse o si sono rafforzate tendenze di tipo «romantico», che sottolineano i valori della stirpe e dell'etnia, valori tradizionali e religiosi, valori nazionali. Queste tendenze in generale puntano alla ricerca di un'identità antagonista.

Questi sviluppi potrebbero avere un impatto negativo sulla coesione e l'integrazione dell'Europa occidentale.

2) L'Europa occidentale - assieme all'intero Occidente - è considerata come il principale antagonista dell'identità che i popoli al di là del Mediterraneo intendono affermare. La posizione dei nazionalisti è quella terzomondista tradizionale: l'Occidente nega o ostacola la diffusione della modernità (escludendo o limitando la diffusione dello sviluppo economico, della tecnologia e della scienza). Secondo gli islamisti, invece, la modernità può essere attinta solo nel quadro dei valori indigeni e non mediante l'assimilazione della cultura occidentale. Cercare la modernizzazione imitando l'Occidente è un inganno che porta solo alla subordinazione.

Il rigetto dell'Occidente da parte degli islamisti è più radicale e profondo di quello nazionalista. I nazionalisti si percepiscono come marginali rispetto a una cultura che al fondo condividono; il loro problema è come diventare più centrali nel quadro di una cultura che considerano generale. Gli islamisti non considerano la cultura occidentale come generale e percepiscono il loro sviluppo come necessariamente antagonista a quello

occidentale.

Lo sviluppo dell'islamismo radicale (benché ci siano importanti correnti meno radicali o moderate) ha accresciuto e intensificato i sentimenti antioccidentali che non da oggi esistono nelle regioni a sud del Mediterraneo. L'implicazione di questa tendenza sul piano della sicurezza è una tensione di fondo che limita l'accesso e la comunicazione dell'Europa occidentale e degli altri paesi dell'Occidente rispetto alle aree in questione e rende più difficile il dialogo.

3) La presenza di individui e comunità transmediterranee nel territorio dell'Europa occidentale si moltiplica (assieme a quella proveniente dall'Europa orientale). Spesso, tali comunità intendono affermare la loro identità nel quadro delle società europee che le ospitano e non intendono lasciarsi semplicemente integrare. Ciò avviene in un contesto di rilevante debolezza demografica europea (incremento quasi nullo della popolazione e suo rapido invecchiamento). In questo contesto l'immigrazione è vivamente percepita dalle popolazioni europee come un rischio e dà luogo a manifestazioni di intolleranza e razzismo.

Ciò comporta legislazioni restrittive su immigranti e rifugiati e inserisce forti contraddizioni nel carattere «razionalista» e democratico delle società europee. Questa situazione contribuisce ad alimentare la tensione di fondo di cui abbiamo parlato.

4) Questi fattori di tensione sono amplificati dai *mass media* e dalla loro unidirezionalità (la produzione di immagini è praticamente solo occidentale - come del resto il turismo di massa). Da una parte i *mass media* portano le immagini «europee» oltre il Mediterraneo provocando distorsioni, conflitti, imitazione, anomia; si può ricordare il caso delle immagini della guerra del Golfo trasmesse dalle TV europee (francese, italiana e spagnola) e ricevute nel Maghreb. Dall'altra, portano nelle case europee immagini «europee» sui paesi a sud del Mediterraneo, soprattutto sul movimento islamista. Queste immagini sono generalmente convenzionali e negative e alimentano ostilità e diffidenza verso questi paesi.

Esiste dunque una tensione dal Sud verso il Nord, ma anche una tensione reciproca. Dal punto di vista europeo le tendenze culturali in atto mettono alla prova le istituzioni democratiche, sottoponendole a contraddizioni e pressioni. Esse inoltre creano la percezione di una minaccia al «way of life» europeo.

L'ostilità verso l'Occidente, oltre che da fattori culturali, viene anche da più specifici *fattori politici*.

1) L'Europa occidentale, come parte integrante dell'Occidente, è alleata di regimi arabi così detti «moderati» (cioè internazionalmente cooperativi). Per questo motivo essa finisce per essere (spesso solo pretestuosamente) coinvolta nelle rivalità fra alcuni paesi arabi. Questo problema è, tuttavia, meno attuale che all'epoca della guerra fredda, quando tali rivalità si collegavano al confronto Est-Ovest. Più rilevante oggi è il fatto che le opposizioni interne (islamiste e non) considerano l'Occidente un sostegno di regimi solitamente autoritari e repressivi.

Si tratta in verità di una situazione piena di contraddizioni. Infatti, gli islamisti più estremisti, arrivando al potere, costituirebbero regimi altrettanto o ancora più

repressivi di quelli che li opprimono. In ogni caso, è vero che la politica occidentale, anche a causa della pressione della guerra fredda, ha spesso trascurato il problema della democrazia nei paesi arabo-musulmani. Alla luce di quanto è stato detto circa i fattori culturali delle attuali tensioni attraverso il Mediterraneo, è evidente che aver mancato di sostenere nei paesi arabo-musulmani il rafforzamento di elementi di omogeneità democratica è stato un errore. Attualmente, la «democrazia» è un ingrediente importante delle politiche europee verso i paesi a sud del Mediterraneo. Questa politica richiede molta attenzione perché rischia di scontrarsi con le attuali suscettibilità relative all'identità. Tuttavia, non c'è dubbio che essa è cruciale, almeno nei confronti dei regimi e dei gruppi che sono o pretendono di essere vicini all'Occidente.

2) Occidente e Europa occidentale sono coinvolti nelle due maggiori crisi esistenti al di là del Mediterraneo: la crisi arabo-israeliana e la crisi irachena. Il coinvolgimento in queste crisi è fonte di ostilità nei confronti dell'Occidente non solo fin quando rimangono irrisolte ma anche quando in qualche modo saranno risolte. La soluzione di queste crisi, infatti, comporterà delle scelte e rafforzerà alcuni gruppi e alcuni paesi a danno di altri. La gestione di queste crisi dovrebbe essere condotta in modo da rafforzare i gruppi disposti a una cooperazione internazionale con l'Occidente e ad un'apertura democratica.

3) La mancanza di una cooperazione internazionale fra l'insieme del mondo europeo e l'insieme del mondo arabo è un fattore politico negativo nei rapporti attraverso il Mediterraneo. La guerra fredda rendeva difficile questa cooperazione. La fine della guerra fredda dovrebbe spingere l'Europa occidentale, specialmente la Comunità Europea, ad avere una sua politica di cooperazione con il complesso del mondo arabo, senza lasciarsi confinare a ruoli solo di lontano sostegno o subregionali (Maghreb). Questa iniziativa europea non sarebbe una «duplicazione» in ambito atlantico.

Un elemento di forte difficoltà per avviare una cooperazione inter-regionale fra l'Unione Europea e il mondo arabo sta nel diverso livello di istituzionalizzazione e coesione delle due parti. L'assenza di una più solida e articolata cooperazione interaraba indebolisce, infatti, l'avvio e il successo di una cooperazione politica inter-regionale.

Per quanto riguarda i *fattori economici*, essi influenzano la sicurezza europea in due modi:

1) Le forti diseguaglianze di reddito all'interno della maggior parte dei paesi dell'area e il sottosviluppo economico e sociale alimentano l'opposizione ai Governi, specialmente da parte degli islamisti, e aumentano l'instabilità. Negli ultimi anni, la cooperazione internazionale e bilaterale si è impegnata di più che nel passato verso questa regione, dando inizio a una serie di importanti programmi di aggiustamento e ristrutturazione. La Comunità Europea ha emesso un nuovo programma (la politica mediterranea rinnovata). Questo programma, malgrado un aumento dei fondi, resta modesto rispetto agli interessi della Comunità verso questa regione. Esso soffre del fatto che gli Stati membri esitano a dare maggiore importanza e più ampie risorse alla politica comune di cooperazione e intendono mantenere la politica di cooperazione nell'ambito nazionale. La Comunità dovrebbe avere un ruolo maggiore e autonomo nel sostenere

programmi e progetti destinati ad aumentare l'occupazione nel breve-medio termine, un obiettivo che ha invece meno importanza nell'ambito dei programmi di ristrutturazione e aggiustamento sostenuti dal FMI e dalla Banca Mondiale.

2) Le possibilità della cooperazione economica internazionale sono tuttavia limitate dal grave stato di disintegrazione e frammentazione delle economie della regione e dall'assenza di cooperazione fra Stati con enormi disparità di popolazione e ricchezza. Il conflitto arabo-israeliano comporta una vera e propria discontinuità nei rapporti fra i paesi della regione.

Questo stato di disintegrazione è un fattore di insicurezza e di rischio per gli interessi dell'Europa occidentale. Esso comporta aleatorietà e ristrettezza dei mercati, modestia delle infrastrutture, rischi negli approvvigionamenti di petrolio e altri idrocarburi, mancanza di mobilità dei fattori della produzione, in particolare delle persone (un elemento che contribuisce ad indirizzare gli emigranti verso l'Europa occidentale).

Il progresso dei negoziati arabo-israeliani in corso (la fine del boicottaggio, l'apertura delle frontiere, etc.) avrebbe un effetto molto positivo sulla cooperazione internazionale, perché eliminerebbe la discontinuità del mercato. Tuttavia, ugualmente deve essere accresciuta la cooperazione e l'integrazione fra i paesi della regione. Le diverse esperienze fin qui avutesi, compresa l'Unione del Maghreb Arabo, sono state deludenti. Nondimeno, la Comunità non ha mai seriamente legato la sua cooperazione a dei progressi nella cooperazione regionale. Come si è già notato parlando dei fattori politici, anche nel campo economico è invece necessario che si accresca l'integrazione regionale, se si vuole accrescere il successo della cooperazione internazionale.

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MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL FACTORS

Comments

by

Ambassador Salah **BASSIOUNY**

Mr. Chairman,

Allow me first to commend the initiative by the three co-sponsors to convene this seminar. To understand and be involved in questions related to perceptions of security in Europe and the Mediterranean, is of tremendous importance. It can help us achieve one day, the ultimate objective of security through co-operation and we can overcome what still prevails as doubts and apprehensions of the different parties in the geo-political area under discussion in this seminar.

For those of us in the south of the Mediterranean, we can claim an understanding of the implications of changes which took place in Europe since the end of the cold war and the different ideas, tendencies and even actions in order to formulate and re-arrange European security matters. Whatever

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reached and approved by Europe as the formula for the future, could be a factor of stability for the European order.

If such European policies consider that the situation in the south is endangered by political, economic, cultural and religious upheavals, they may consider "out of area" intervention to combat such threats. The military intervention by the forces of the alliance against Iraq has set a precedent to strengthen such policies and the present development of the U.N. peace-keeping and peace making is another demonstration of "in area" and "out of area" military activities by European forces.

The paper presented by Dr. Aliboni is to be commended for its objective analysis in trying to identify the cultural, political and economic factors affecting security in the Mediterranean area. Such objectivity is not new for Dr. Aliboni, who as a scholar and specialist in Middle East affairs, has proven through his writings and lectures, his deep knowledge and understanding.

Dealing with our topic, I would like to point out the following:-

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First: In his presentation, Dr. Aliboni states that Western Europe and the West as a whole is considered the primary antagonist of the identity sought in the Mediterranean area. While I agree that there exists antagonism, I differ on this generalization. If such antagonism exists, it does not negate the existence and defense of Western culture and political values by the majority of the nationalist forces. In fact, the struggle which is taking place against the Islamic fundamentalists and their claim of the political Islam, is a clear indication that such general anti-Westernism does not exist. However, when we are dealing with the present Islamic groups, it should be noted that if some of these groups goes to the extreme by believing that Islamic revival cannot be achieved except through a complete rejection of Western civilization and a return to the fundamentals of the Islamic society 14 centuries ago, the main stream of the Islamic movement rejects this extremism and accepts many enlightened interpretations which do not contradict the necessities of economic development or the basic human rights. But, I must add that this main stream is still far from presenting a comprehensive political, economic and social programme as the basis for their political movement. It might be note-worthy in this respect to refer to three developments which had tremendous effect on the present situation. The **first** is the

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Islamic revolution in Iran, and lest we forget, the west had a heavy hand in supporting this revolution and its success, the **second** is the war in Afghanistan and the western support to the Mujahideen and the dispatch of volunteers from the muslim world to assist in the Jihad- many of them are the nucleus of terrorist groups operating in our countries and the **third** is the anti-western wave after the war with Iraq.

The present situation is perceived by most governments in the region as a threat to their peace, stability and development, but this does not mean or should imply -as Dr. Aliboni says- that there cannot be a dialogue between Western countries and countries of the Southern Mediterranean. In fact, it does imply that Europe must stand firm to carry intensive co-operation and firm support for democracy and human rights. Here, I concur with Dr. Aliboni in his criticism of the West neglecting the issue of democracy in the Arab Muslim World for the reasons he outlined. However, I do not see a change of this policy in the foreseeable future so long as the regimes in the south are capable of safeguarding the interests of the West and continue to be dependant on foreign powers to secure their internal and external security.

Seond: In dealing with the two major crisis under way,

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namely the Arab-Israeli conflict and Iraq, Dr. Aliboni laid emphasis on how the West, in its management of crises, should give support to groups willing to co-operate with the West and are open to democracy. I see a paradoxical situation in this emphasis, because those who are ready to co-operate are not in fact open to democracy. If we review the two crises at present we can see that Arab negotiators are still faced with a declared Israeli policy of peace, but short of what is needed to achieve peace. The last crisis of deportees is yet another demonstration of this Israeli policy. Europe's stand on peace in the Middle East is clear in its support to the peace-process and in its effort to push ahead the multinational negotiations. However, there is need for a more active and a more defined European role in this respect. A role which should free itself from a one sided perception about the security of Israel and the legitimacy to acquire mass destruction weapons in order to secure a balance of power in its favour.

This is a situation where there could be a dominant European role in offering the guarantees to both Arabs and Israel to enhance their future security through military and non military means. For example, support for a Middle East free from all mass destruction weapons, control of arms trade and assisting in confidence building measures, are some of the measure

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which could be undertaken by Europe.

Third: Since the end of Gulf War, security in the Gulf has been a controversial issue, In the aftermath of the war, the six gulf states, together with Egypt and Syria, signed in March 1992 the Damascus declaration as the basis for a new political, economic and defense arrangements. It was not implemented until today and has shown to what extent is the fragility of such commitments if the Irani threats continue, the fear from the Iraqi regime persists and outside powers do not give their blessing and support for the primacy of the region's role in its security.

The question is :- How can anyone perceive security in the Gulf as totally dependent on foreign powers ? And how far can such a policy sustain itself? Egypt and Syria, see an Irani role in the security of the Gulf, but not hegemony. AT the same time, Iraq should not be weakened to break its territorial unity. In short, the security in the Gulf and the sea-lanes are vital for the region and for Europe. What could be then the best formula to satisfy claims of both parties?

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Mr. Chairman,

Security and co-operation in the Mediterranean is a two way process and must be beneficial to both the North and the South. The question which some Europeans ask : what benefits to the North through a relationship with a South borne with inter-state conflicts, serious political, socio-economic, cultural and religious problems. A South with a serious galloping demography...If such a serious imbalance exists, patterns of co-operation cannot succeed.

A simple answer can be to forget all about it.

Another answer, which I share with Dr. Aliboni, would be that there is today more need for more understanding and co-operation to achieve security.

Thank you.

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**The Southern dimension of European security: the
Mediterranean area and the European security identity**

Rome, 5 & 6 March 1993

Session II

Security in the Mediterranean: military aspects

-- Roberto Zadra* --

1. Threats and threat perceptions

There is a tendency among some political and academic representatives of the security community in both Europe and the United States to refer to the term 'threat' when describing and analysing the relations between the southern and northern shores of the Mediterranean basin. Is this assumption correct? Clearly, it is not. At present, there is no direct military threat stemming from Southern Mediterranean countries and aimed against Western Europe. In this context, it is useful to recall the terminology and the criteria developed during the years of the East-West confrontation, when a 'threat' was generally defined in terms of both capabilities and intentions: both were needed at the same time in order to create such threat, or better, the perception of such a threat. This however does not apply to the present north-south relations in the Mediterranean, and Western European governments are well aware of this. In other words, Southern Mediterranean countries lack either the significant military

* This paper reflects the author's personal opinions.

hardware to pose a serious military threat to Western European countries or they do not have the political intention to do so - in any case a dangerous combination of the two does not exist, not at present at least. This is not to say that everything is fine and that there are no risks for the future in the Mediterranean region: the proliferation of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons for example, if it is combined with nationalism or Islamic fundamentalism, could well lead to a dangerous mixture of both capabilities and intentions. However, even in such a scenario Western Europe would not automatically be exposed to a direct military threat, since most of these security problems would be more south-south rather than north-south related. This is valid for all three examples mentioned so far (growing arsenals, nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism). The conclusion to be drawn from this is that one should avoid using the term 'threat' when describing the current security situation in the Mediterranean region; it would be far better to refer to 'risks' and 'challenges'. This distinction was first developed by NATO (and later on taken over by almost all decision makers and security analysts) in order to describe and analyse East-West relations in the post-Cold War era in a more 'diplomatic' way. The same should apply to the description of current North-South relations in the Mediterranean.

On the other hand, the question needs also to be raised as to whether Southern Mediterranean countries perceive a growing threat to *their* security from the North, i.e. from Europe and the United States. The European integration process - with its prospects of a Common Foreign and Security Policy which might in future lead to a common defence policy and a common defence, as outlined in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union - could be perceived in such a way by southern Mediterranean neighbours. Similarly, current discussions within Western European Union to identify military forces answerable to WEU (e.g. the Franco-German Eurocorps or the Italo-Franco-Spanish proposal to earmark naval units for common action in the Mediterranean) could also be perceived in terms of such a 'threat'. Finally, it is also a fact that the existence of NATO and the presence of the US 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean basin has, in the past, been perceived by some southern Mediterranean leaders in terms of a 'threat', for example in 1986 by Libya (which, reacting to a US attack against Tripoli and Bengasi, fired Scud missiles against the Italian island of Lampedusa) or to a certain extent by Iraq in 1991-92 during Operation Desert Storm. It is of course possible to explain that it is not at all the intention of either the European Community/Union or of WEU or of NATO to threaten the security of southern Mediterranean countries, and many arguments can be put forward for this (e.g. the dynamics

of European integration, no southern out-of-area role for NATO etc.). However, even if all such counter-arguments are true, this does not free us from the potential problem that our southern neighbours could perceive our efforts within these three institutions the wrong way, i.e. in terms of a 'threat' against their own security. Admittedly, at present this problem is not an acute one, but can we totally exclude that it might become one in the future? Herein lies one of the main reasons why several European countries are promoting various efforts to improve dialogue and cooperation with southern Mediterranean countries and institutions in order to improve reciprocal confidence, also in the military field (e.g. the Italo-Spanish proposal for a CSCM, the Five-plus-Five negotiations, contacts by WEU with some Maghreb countries, etc.).

2. Proliferation and arms control

Even if current north-south relations in the Mediterranean should not be seen in terms of a direct military threat from one side to the other (and vice-versa), this does not mean that military factors do not play any role whatsoever in the present circumstances. The proliferation of armaments in the southern Mediterranean area is a particular security concern for Western Europe, even if this problem should be seen more in terms of south-south relations (local/regional destabilisation) rather than in terms of north-south ones.

Apart from on-going increases of weapons and manpower in most southern Mediterranean countries, what is of greater concern in terms of a *potential* military threat against Europe is the growing number of combat aircraft and ballistic missiles. Most of the surface-to-surface missiles are of a relatively short-range (between 40 and 150 km), but the various systems still under development (for instance, in Libya, Iraq, Israel and Egypt) clearly demonstrate that the trend is towards longer ranges (up to 4000 km) and smaller CEPs (Circular Error Probable). Combined with the efforts by some southern Mediterranean countries to acquire non-conventional warheads (nuclear, biological, chemical), these missiles could pose a even more serious challenge not only for regional stability, but they could also, if combined to deteriorating political relations between southern Mediterranean countries and Western Europe, further increase the unease which crops up now and then that Western European security would be threatened. This would principally affect southern European territories, but it goes without saying that a ballistic missile range of 2000 km or more would even affect central and northern European territories.

What can the West in general and Western Europe in particular do in order to avoid an uncontrolled proliferation of weapons systems of all kinds in southern Mediterranean countries? Arms control policies through negotiation are probably the most important ways to respond to these challenges, and these policies should include: a strengthening of the NPT regime in 1995, pressure on countries who have not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in January 1993 to do so, the reinforcement of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention through means of verification, the improvement of the control of transfer of ballistic missiles and of missile-production related technology (e.g. via the MTCR and COCOM). These are all areas in which a European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy could play an important role in the future, after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty: the idea of providing economic aid in exchange for arms control compliance (as is the case with the United States vis-à-vis the Ukraine on the NPT) could be considered in this context as one possibility for improving the chances of success. Finally, new arms control regimes with regard to both north-south and south-south relations in the Mediterranean could be developed in the future, for example on conventional weapons in the Mediterranean, on confidence-building measures or on naval forces, three fields which have not been covered by existing arrangements.

However, arms control policies through negotiation might be the most important, but they are clearly not the only means which could be at the disposal of European Union member countries in the future in order to keep the proliferation of armaments in the southern Mediterranean under control: real-time observation via satellites, rapid intervention forces and the discussion of the US proposal for a Global Protection System (GPS) can be mentioned here as three fields receiving increasing attention among Western European governments and institutions (including WEU) dealing with security issues in the Mediterranean. However, it goes without saying that all these and other potential counter-measures against proliferation, necessary as they might perhaps become in future, need to be integrated into a strategy which should promote a *cooperational* system with regard to north-south relations in the Mediterranean and therefore avoid as much as possible the creation of *confrontational* situations where, for example, the old deterrence-defence dilemmas developed during the Cold War made a turn of 90 degrees to apply to relations between Western Europe and southern Mediterranean countries.

To conclude, Western Europe vis-à-vis the Mediterranean is in a relatively favourable but also delicate situation: it is in a *favourable* one because its security is not at present threatened in military terms by southern Mediterranean countries or alliances (this however does not mean that there are no security risks whatsoever, e.g. migration or terrorism), and it is in a *delicate* one, full of risks but also of opportunities, because today's actions or inactions will contribute to determine the shaping of its future 'strategic' relationship with the whole Mediterranean area, whether it becomes a bridge or whether it becomes a barrier.

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
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Brigadier Giuseppe CUCCHI

POLITICO-MILITARY
DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE MAGHREB



MAGHREB - CONGRESS OF THE 5th AND 6th MARCH, 1993

The study of North-Western Africa can be approached in at least three different ways. So, we can talk about a "Maghreb problem", about the Maghreb situation, and/or about a possible Maghreb development, according to whether we consider information coming from such a area in a pessimistic, neutral or optimistic way. However, despite this fact there is only one way to understand what is really going on along the Southern side of the Mediterranean Sea.

In my opinion, only a multilateral data analysis allows us to point out the common issues among the countries recently federated in the Arab Maghrebian Union (AMU) (1). In fact, we can consider separately each single national reality, then, comparing the results of such a study, obtain a precise picture of both the Union's domestic situation and the obstacles it find to overcome and that have caused a slowing-down - or even a standstill - in the organization consolidating process.

Relation between AMU and EC results very interesting too, in particular those linking the Union to the EC's Southern countries, whit whom it gave rise to the wellknown "five plus five Group" (2).

Finally, the way Maghreb places and sees itself, on one hand in the framework of the Arab League, on the other in the Mediterranean basin scenario, is fundamental. Although in this part of the world it does not exist any regional agreement reuniting all the coastal Countries around the same table, North Africa is - from at least a geostrategic point of view - a single entity and, as such, it requires being considered.

This short study will thus concern four successive areas, focusing respectively on:

- the five Maghreb Countries;
- the Arab Maghrebian Union;
- the North-South relations developed in the framework of the "five plus five Group";
- the Maghreb as a part of the Arab League and the Mediterranean basin.

Then there will be the conclusions, which will mostly concern the evolution of the main trend lines focused on.

Clearly, although the study refers to Arab Countries, it will be carried out according to a Western point of view, that is to say in accordance with the logical categories of a culture totally different from the Islamic one. This might lead to conclusions that will be judged wrong or unorthodox by those who are taking part in this meeting and have grown up on the Southern side of our Sea. However, I think it will be useful for them to know how the Arab Countries and their problems are "perceived" in the West, also because these "perceptions" are sometimes so strong that they become more important than reality itself.

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Maghrebian Countries have many things in common but they differ one from the other in just as many. Obviously, their religion is the first and most important cohesion element, making all the believers share the Islamic Ummah. But this is a difficult period for religious beliefs. There is a reawakening of conscience but - at the same time - a search for the best way in which Church and State, faith and morality, progress and tradition can coexist (3).

As it happens in a situation like this, research can take different paths according to the different local conditions. In one country it could mean revolution, in an other it could give rise to terrorist movements while, in a third, it could perfectly merge with society. All these nuances can be found in Maghreb, sometimes one within a State and the other beyond its border, but sometimes they must even coexist within the same Country.

Then, there are the geostrategical interests. In this case too, Maghreb can be divided into areas. On one side - halfway between Maghreb and Masreq - there is Libya, which is a member of the AMU with every right but, at the same time, interested in both Mediterranean sectors. It is linked to Tunisia, but is also open to the influence of its big Egyptian neighbour. Then, there is "Classic Maghreb", the three Countries for which the big internal Sea's Western basin is the precise reference point as well as the centre of all interests. In the end, on the Southern side, there is Mauritania, which declares itself to be Maghrebian out of choice, even though it is not so for its geographical position. Mauritania is largely influenced by the Atlantic and by the classic dispute of almost all the Sahel's Countries between an Arab culture in the desert North and a black one in the wellwatered South.

Economy, development, industry and trade are all different from one Country to another, with considerable discrepancies even short distances apart (4). There are Countries whose rhythm is quite satisfying and in which there are well diversified service industries and solid middle classes, while there are others which are trying for a change in quality, regretting that they have chosen a time at which the request for aid exceeds the offer. There are still those who are anchored to the traditional pace and ways of living.

Demography is a problem all the five Countries have in common. The rates of population increase are considerably different (5). However, the most developed Countries - where the number of children per family is lower - are just those mostly feeling the need of improving their standard of living as soon as they have become aware of the situation. As a consequence, under the wave of growth the spur to emigration is the same everywhere.

But when one considers each individual situation, the same common problems turn into differences. As a matter of fact, the thing Maghrebian Countries seem to mostly share is the will to follow all together the same political path.

In order to ascertain whether their current domestic situation allows them to do so, it is necessary to take into consideration the latest main political events that have taken place in each country.

a. LIBYA

At present, Libya's domestic policy is feeling the effects of the so-called "LOCKERBIE affair" (6). This difficult and controversial subject of international law has forced the United Nations to adopt a series of restrictive measures towards the Country (7) and Aja's High Court to deliver a judgement contrary to Libyan theories (8).

Both the continuation of Colonel GHEDDAFI's leadership, which has already lasted for more than twenty years, and - indirectly - the precise place of the Country in regional and international line-ups, have come into play. In fact, the outcome of the dispute on political and tribal bases between Colonel Gheddafi and his perpetual second-in-command, Major

JALLUD, is whether or not Libya is included among those States willing to submit to the laws of coexistence accepted by the international community.

The Colonel, who had already showed himself unexpectedly moderate during the conflict against Iraq, seems to be willing to accept a compromise, maybe not personally but making it look as if imposed by people's will (9). Such a compromise is expected both to satisfy - at least in part - the U.S., the U.K. and France, and be in line with the pressure constantly exerted by Egypt through the United Nation's and Arab League's Secretary-Generals.

The sure thing is that such a conclusion would make a large part of international preclusions toward Tripoli fall, thus allowing Libya to be included within the AMU in a better way.

b. TUNISIA

All thing considered, the Tunisian scenario is maybe the steadiest and most advanced in the framework of North Africa. Although economic figures have registered a partial slowing down, they are still encouraging on the whole. The Country's technical and industrial potential is harmonious. Middle classes have become established, the government is stable, and the growth of the population is almost under control.

In this case, the weak point is the increased power gained by the most violent leaders of religious extremism. In fact, after a few years, they realized they had better withdraw from the Nation's political scene and carry on the struggle through terrorist movements (10).

The course of events triggered by the law on parties of April 1988 - according to which "no parties can be founded on the bases of religion, races and languages" - might in part have forced fundamentalist forces to take this decisions. Anyway, it is interesting to point out that the principle according to which no political force is allowed to have monopoly of such high common values, turns out to be right and beyond criticism from every point of view.

c. ALGERIA

In the West at least, the joint coming to power of BOUDIAF and GHOZALI had raised justified hopes as regards the possibility for Algeria to come out of its heavy political and institutional impasse quite shortly.

Attempts to moralize public life on one hand, and regain trust from international financial markets on the other, seem to have all failed. Boudiaf, who had begun to follow institutional responsibilities, was murdered in mysterious circumstances (11).

Ghozali, who urged privatization and had great prestige as a good economist, was forced to quit his job.

The best one can say about current situation is that Algeria has come to a complete standstill. Internally, the insurrection-repression spiral is hardly curbed and, anyway, dashes each hope of orderly development in the Country.

Abroad, the industrial world has to face an ethical dilemma it cannot ignore, a dilemma that prevents it from continuing to support Algerian development without violating its own principles.

d. MOROCCO

Marocco is still busy with the debate in progress for the modernization of its Institutions, still quite exclusively focused on the figure of the Sovereign.

Nevertheless, considerable progress showing a precise trend has been accomplished lately with the issuing of the new Constitution (12).

Although it is still very far from what the Opposition parties require, it abolishes some Royal Prerogatives. In this way, the choice of Ministers is left to Prime Minister while the regulation providing for the automatic dissolution of Parliament - in case a state of emergency is declared - has been revoked. The laws voted by the Houses will still be subject to approval of the King. But such approval is considered as indirectly given after a mere one-month wait. The setting up of a Constitutional Court has eventually been decided. The members the Sovereign appoints (four) will balance those chosen by Parliament (four as well).

Such progress - from a Western point of view - can appear quite little, especially if one considers that it is referred to a Country whose situation was recently judged particularly backward, thus causing much debate in the West (13). However, one can only judge this progress by considering it in the light of local reality in which the figure of Sovereign combines institutional aspects and religious connotations.

In this sense, such progress seems to have marked a firm step towards democracy, not one of Western kind, maybe, but rather a democracy of an "Arab type". Besides, it is not calimed that two forms of government should necessarily match one another in every single

aspect. This is a concept that, maybe, everybody should investigate thoroughly.

e. MAURITANIA

In the 1991-1992 period, Mauritania changed its image considerably more than it did in the previous thirty years of independence. This was due to the multiparty system, presidential and legislative elections, the dissolution of the Military Committee in power and the resumption of the relations with Senegal.

Despite the accusations the Opposition raised, the victory of Colonel MAAOUYA OULD SID'AHMED TAYA got with about 66% of the vote at the presidential elections, seemed indisputable. After the Opposition parties withdrew from the legislative elections, it was possible for the President to rely on almost all the seats available at the two Houses (14).

Therefore there is a democratic stability, although the Country's problems do not seem close to an automatic solution. In fact, illiteracy still exists especially in the country while some towns, in particular the coastal ones, are still overcrowded.

Also the matters linked to the different ethnic groups have not been solved yet. In fact, about 80% of black people in the South have voted against the elections of Ould Taya as a President.

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The Arab Maghrebian Union (AMU) originates from an essentially Algerian diplomatic project that Tunisia turned into a treaty, and which was consecrated in Morocco with the King's blessing (15). But so far, the AMU has made little progress on the difficult process which should enable it to achieve at least part of its ambitious goals. After an initial period marked by enthusiasm, the five member States didn't succeed in making their "brotherhood" ties stronger. What is certain is that the concept of a common destiny and origins amongst the three countries of the classic Maghreb will remain. Libya and Mauritania, on the other hand, are still considered as being on the side-line. "They are neighbours we had better have on our side even if we are perfectly aware that, at least in part, they belong to other worlds".

Neither progress nor prosperity - which were both among the purposes declared - have been achieved. Maybe as regards the former, some steps forward have been made, but as a result of individual initiatives and decisions rather than for programmes agreed upon. Instead, the latter remains a mere illusion, always at hand but never reached. However, it is a condition that - right now - is not an exclusive privilege of the big Maghreb at all.

The situation has improved a little as regards the launching of a common policy. The Union's rise put a stop to the conflict for the control over Sahara, a conflict that had been dragging on for decades in fits and starts. Anyway, a real and definitive solution of the problem has not yet been found nor has it matured in people's conscience. The premises set up with the intervention of the United Nations (16) let us hope that achieving a favourable result is only a matter of time and ability to negotiate.

Abroad, the Union has taken advantage of the particularly favourable situation due to the bipolar system crash and to the subsequent plans for the new world order proposed by President BUSH.. According to which, the EC now considers the AMU an exclusive and privileged single entity with whom it is essential to discuss all the controversial items concerning the Mediterranean's Western basin. As a result, a very tight sectorial relationship - which seemed on top of all to be further extended and examined - has been created through the so-called "five plus five Group".

However, it seems that this relationship is currently going through a period of indecision due to a series of reasons that will be investigated thoroughly later on.

In the end, the AMU does not yet envisage the free movements of people, services and goods among member States. However, it is useless to expect a rapid change in this sector. In fact, the EC began its work in 1956 and only on the 1st of January 1993 most of its targets envisaging economic integration can be considered as reached. But only most of them... not them all! It is no wonder that for the Union, too (17) the way towards integration will be long and difficult.

So far, some progress has been made, and the new boost it seems the Tunisians want to give to the integration process lets us hope for the best in the years to come.

* * * * *

The key to face the uncertainties about the future of Maghreb is to be found in the context of the relations between the region and

industrial Europe, in particular that part of Europe recognizing and defining itself as Mediterranean.

When the French point of view - focused on the Western Mediterranean - prevailed over that of Italy and Spain - both preferring to consider the basin as a whole - the AMU found itself with a reduced group of interlocutors.

Furthermore, all the continental European members forming the "five plus five Group" had other political interests - sometimes by far prevailing - in addition to those for the South Mediterranean. In fact, Portugal and Spain are Countries where a well-defined Atlantic bent - which has become consolidated over the centuries (18) - continues to exist. Besides, Madrid - being personally interested in the rivalries for the European Political Union leadership - cherishes continental aspirations, too. The spectrum of French interests is even wider: virtually they are as many as the dreams of a new-born Europe.

In the end, Italy cannot ignore the situation of its dangerous neighbours - the Balcans - nor can it neglect the revolutionary change in its own domestic policy (19).

Such a loss of attention and interest has not discouraged the EEC-AMU relationship which is fundamental to both the Organizations. Nevertheless, it has prevented multiple and strong relations from being created which, under different circumstances, could have been set up.

Also a different focus of interests by the Mediterranean's opposite sides has helped to create these circumstances. In the North, uncertainty for the future has prevailed in the last few years together with the consequent search for as high a degree of security as possible. On the other hand, in the South, economic problems, together with the two

linked effects of rapid population increase and emigration, have become fundamental.

Thus, the dialogue in the "five plus five Group" so laboriously carried on, has sometimes turned out to be a dialogue between deaf people.

The North tried to bring up questions directly or indirectly linked to security while the South always insisted on economy. Since they could not understand each other and reach an agreement, they ended up by discussing the traditionally neutral subjects such as history, culture and town-planning...

It is a good result, on the whole, if one considers all its aspects but by no means proportionate to the efforts and hopes.

At this point, some clarification is required so as to avoid dangerous misunderstanding threatening mutual comprehension. It is in fact better to make clear that the North Mediterranean does not consider its Southern part as a threat nor does it see the South as a potential rival that one day could take the place left free by the Soviet Union. In short, Europe is not desperately searching for a new enemy to justify continuing its defence efforts!

After saying that, it is also necessary to point out that Europe is not willing to ignore any elements making the situation more disturbing, elements that are concerning it now, or that could do so in the very near future. So the situation of Libya - which protects terrorism and is likely to make chemical weapons in Rabta and Sheba - is followed with concern. Algeria's partially destabilized situation and the use - which is not clear yet - of Ain Oussera's reactor arouses the same worry as well. Mauritania too, awakens fear for upholding at the times of the Gulf Conflict Saddam HUSSEIN's theories whilst there were rumours that

long-range rocket carrier were being moved from Bagdad to Nouatchott (20).

In short, there are three things Europe fears the most as they can be a risk for its own future: unscrupulous leaders, the existence of weapons of mass destruction (and their rocket launch vehicles), and the strengthening of extremist ideologies, that is to say exaggerated nationalism and religious fundamentalism.

If these three are maintained ~~supported~~^{separated}, they only trigger off worry and alarm. When two of them simultaneously exist within the same country, the worry becomes more serious and turns into anxiety. The three all together would eventually be considered as a threat that, even if it is obviously potential, should not be overlooked.

Perhaps this is a wrong way of seeing things. At the same time anyway is interesting the fact that it may encourage new co-operation prospects within the "five plus five" who could sit around a table and settle, for example, an eventual regional disarmament offset by economic compensations and mutual security. Besides, they clearly could not ignore the problem of emigration (21).

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In any case such a prospect should be considered in the overall framework of the Mediterranean basin where countries and problems of the Western area are intimately linked to those of the Eastern sector.

To take into consideration each Country, ignoring the influence and role of the Superpowers - or at least of the surviving one (22) - would in fact be completely illusory. In the same way, it would be dangerous and

limiting to alter the real balance of the Arab world by excluding Egypt - which, in this context, is now enjoying an undeniable political leadership (23) - from any change. Among other things, Egypt is the same country which already resented being excluded from the circle of those having to face together the problems of the Western basin. The Country resented this to such an extent that - even though unsuccessfully - it was necessary to put it in another unofficial group which, however, never got to count more than three Countries (Italy, Greece and, of course, Egypt).

However, taking into consideration countries and problems outside the region would end up by complicating the situation beyond measure. Controversial items never settled such as those caused by the Balkans, the Graeco-Turkish dispute over a part of the Aegean Sea and the triangular age-old dispute between the Arabs, Israel and Palestinians would become prominent. Besides - according to a farer-sighted point of view - taking into consideration the strategically linked area and the entire Arab world would highlight also the lasting revolt of Iraq against the new world order and - in the second place - the dissolution of each form of civil coexistence in the Horn of Africa (24).

These are all part of a very wide range of difficulties on most of which, Western views were considerably different from Islamic ones till not long ago. In some cases such as, for example, that of the Conference for the Middle East and that of Iraq's, the process seems to have been reversed, thus leading the various parts back to much closer attitudes one towards the other. But - as Western papers often highlight - the dichotomy between the reason and the heart of the Arabs still exists. The reason is personified by Governments that take "convenient" positions and let themselves be carried along on a wave that looks too

difficult or dangerous to be opposed. The heart is represented by the masses being ready to be fired and give in to the illusions of a dream rather than to current imperatives.

In other cases, however, the gap between points of view is becoming wider. It is what is happening in Bosnia because of the protraction of absurd genocides which will inevitably have indirect consequences on the the three worlds - Catholic, Orthodox and Islamic - that will be involved in the end.

But, regardless of how things stay, at least one attempt should be made. Maybe it will fail but at least we will have a clear conscience. This way of considering things could question again the Hispano-Italian proposal - which might have been shelved too hastily - envisaging the creation of a Conference for Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM).

* * * * *

In conclusion, for Maghreb and the Western Mediterranean too, this is a period of uncertainty and waiting. Old methods have turned out to be useful, but not decisive: the "five plus five Group" and the AMU have done a lot to improve mutual understanding in the area but they have not succeeded in making progress beyond a certain level.

Maybe, time has come to try to develop new methods and to search for paths previously unexplored. Particularly, it seems to be hard and unuseful to keep on cutting off in an artful way, Western Mediterranean framework from the rest of the basin and from other strategically linked areas. Doing so, it is just possible to create an

arbitrary fragmentation which does not allow to join North and South around the same table to discuss about the prominent, common topics. Dangerous strains become so deeper and deeper, while spreading and embittering crises can evolve - as the Bosnian one - in such a negative way to push Islamic and European world to deploy, even facing one each other.

On the other hand, common interests arise among all the Mediterranean Countries, which would be glad to proceed all together in the direction of a collective security system and towards an equally distributed economic development, which can allow to all in the region living people the same opportunities and chances.

To score these targets, however, it is necessary to speak, to open a dialogue.

The “five plus five Group” experience should be therefore retaken and extended on a wider base. Maybe, in such a way would it be possible to build something valid, provided that we do not fear excessively neither the great number of possible actors nor the problem variety we have to face together.

NOTES

- 1) Marrakesh, February 17th, 1989.
- 2) Comprising the five Countries of the AMU on one hand, and Spain, Portugal, France and Italy on the other. Malta joined afterwards.
- 3) In this historical period such a phenomenon is typical not only of Islam but also of all the most important religions. As a result, also Buddhists, Hebrews, Catholics and Orthodoxes have their "isms" (fundamentalism and integralism).
- 4) Per capita income in 1991: Tunisia \$ 1545; Algeria \$ 1839; Morocco \$ 1045; Mauritania \$ 542. Libyan data is not available but in 1989 it was equal to \$ 5310 per capita.
- 5) Annual rates of population growth referred to 1991: Libya 3,6%; Tunisia 2,1%; Algeria 2,8%; Morocco 2,4%; Mauritania 2,9%.
- 6) Further to the results coming from two parallel enquiries carried out by Americans and English on one side, and by French on the other, Libya was accused of inspiring attacks on two regular planes, a Pan Am Boeing 747 which crashed while flying over Lockerbie in Scotland in December, 1988 and a UTA DC-10 which blew up in the Ténéré desert in 1989.
- 7) Two resolutions adopted by the United Nations' Security Council have laid Libya under embargo (resolution No 731 unanimously adopted on January 21, 1992 and resolution No 748 passed by ten votes in favour and five abstentions - among them there was China - on March 31, 1992).

- 8) On April 14, 1992 the Court delivered a judgement rejecting Libya's appeal against the United States and Great Britain.
- 9) This is the key to explain the appeal to the General Congress of the representatives of the People Committees, which has in principle accepted the extradition of two Libyan citizens regarded as responsible on condition that they are tried before a neutral tribunal chosen by the UN and the Arab League with the approval of Libya.
- 10) The Islamic Tendency Movement (I.T.M.) - which had also taken part in the 1989 elections with independent candidates, getting about 13% of the vote at a national level - did not obtain recognition as a political party. After the anti-Islamic repression at the beginning of 1990 the I.T.M., which had taken the name of "Al-Nahda" in the meanwhile, has gradually slid into terroristic action.
- 11) The assassin is known but the principal will never be found.
- 12) September 4th, 1992.
- 13) The publication of Gilles Perrault's book in France - "Notre ami le roi" - where Hassan II is depicted in such a way that it aroused Moroccan royal family's indignation, is to be considered in this context.
- 14) In fact, the Democratic Forces Union (D.F.U.), which had backed up the other candidate at the presidential elections - Ahmed Ould Daddah - decided to hinder the legislative elections in sign of protest against assumed rigging of elections.
- 15) The admission of Libya and Mauritania, which have joined the three States of "classic Maghreb", shows a clear will to increase market's potentialities as much as possible.
- 16) The referendum for self-determination, which should have taken place under the control of the United Nations in January 1992, has temporarily been postponed to a date still to be fixed. The controversial

items in progress between Morocco and Polisario especially concern the number of those having the right to be included in electoral lists.

17) The EC's experience might help it simplify procedures and gain time. Yet progress will always be measured in terms of five-year periods not in terms of years.

18) Portugal, in particular, discovered the Mediterranean once it entered the EEC, as soon as it realized that its economic - especially agricultural - interests corresponded to those of Italy, Greece and Turkey.

19) Such a situation has caused the centre of political contrast - once focused on the opposition between democracy and communism - to shift, making the debate about any decentralization of state-administration become prominent instead.

20) Some news - never confirmed but highlighted by the Western press - gave it out as certain that, during the Gulf war, Iraqi Scud missiles were being transported from Iraq to Mauritania and Sudan.

21) The increasing number of the Maghrebians living in Europe has now started to arouse resentment and phenomena of growing intolerance and rejection. All the matters concerning immigration/emigration between North and South are thus ready to be settled in a harmonious way to ease the worries of Europe that is concerned about nurturing a culture that is foreign to its own life patterns. The alternative to be absolutely avoided is that of radically closing frontiers. In fact, such an alternative is bound to cause economic problems in the Maghrebian States thus stirring up their resentment.

22) Once Russia, - which has got a big fleet as well in the Black Sea - has reached a new stability, it could take on a key role in the Mediterranean waters once again.

23) Sanctioned, among other things, by the election of two Egyptians to hold the top jobs of Secretary-General of the Arab League and the United Nations.

24) Where, moreover, Somalia - even though it declares itself to be Arab - is upset by intertribal phenomena whose characteristics are typically African.

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