ARMS CONTROL AND NORDIC SECURITY
Utrikespolitiska Institutet
(The Swedish Institute of International Affairs)
Stockholm, 15-16/II/1993

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2. "War in the North within the limitsof the CFE Treaty"/ Marco Smedberg, Robert Dalsjo, Hans Zettermark
3. "Navies, arms control and the Nordic region"/ Robert Dalsjo, Johan Tunberger, Hans Zettermark
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n° Inv. 13050
17 MAGGIO 1993
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CONFERENCE PROGRAMME

FOR THE CONFERENCE ON

ARMS CONTROL AND NORDIC SECURITY

AT THE SWEDISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, WITH SUPPORT FROM FORD FOUNDATION

FEBRUARY 15-16 1993

The Swedish Institute of International Affairs wish you a pleasant stay in Stockholm

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Seminar on Arms Control and Nordic Security

February 15-16 1993

At the Swedish Institute of International Affaires (SIIA), Lilla Nygatan 23, Stockholm

Arranged by the SIIA with support from Ford Foundation.

Programme

Working language: English

Monday February 15

10.00-10.30 Coffee

10.30 **Opening remarks**
Chairman of the seminar *Dr Bo Huldt,* IISS

10.35-10.50 **What is Nordic Security?**
Professor emeritus Nils Andrén and Dr. Bo Huldt

10.50 **Discussant Mr *Ib Faurby,*** Politiken, Copenhagen

11.20-11.50 **Discussion**
Short Break

12.00-12.20 **Old Nukes in the New North**
Dr Thomas Ries, Institute universitaire des Hautes études Internationales, Genéve

12.20-12.30	**Discussant** Mr *Iver Johanssen,* Norwegian Defense Research Establishment
12.30-13.00	**Discussion**
13.00-15.00	**Luncheon** at the Naval Officers Club, Skeppsholmen, hosted by the Royal Naval Forces
15.00-15.20	**CFE and war in the Nordic area** *R. Major Marco Smedberg,* RSwA
15.20-15-30	**Discussant** *General Tønne Huitfeldt,* Norway
15.30-16.00	**Discussion** Coffee
16.20-16.40	**Naval arms control and the Nordic area** *Mr Robert Dalsjö and Mr Hans Zettermark* Swedish Defense Research Establishment
16.40-16.50	**Discussant** *Dr Hervé Coutau-Bégarie,* Foundation pour les études de défense nationale, Paris
16.50-17.30	**Discussion**
19.00	Departure for Dinner
19.30	**Dinner** hosted by *Under-secretary of State Ministry of Defence* (special invitation required).

Tuesday February 16

09.00-09.20	**CSCE and Nordic Security** *Captain Lars Wedin,* RSwN
09.20-09.30	**Discussant** *Mr Clive Archer* Center for Defence Studies, University of Aberdeen, Scottland
09.30-10.15	**Discussion** Coffee
10.30-10.50	**Satellites and Arms Control** *Mr Johnny Skorve,* Norvegian Institute of International Affairs
10.50-11.00	**Discussant Mr** ***Vipin Gupta,*** Verification Technology Information Center (Vertic), London
11.00-11.50	**Discussion** Short break
11.50-12.15	**Nordic Security and Arms Control** *Mr Johan Tunberger,* Swedish Defense Research Establishment
12.30-14.00	**Luncheon** hosted by the Political Departement, Ministry of Foreign Affaires

14.15-14.45	**Discussants** Vice Admiral ***Naotoshi Sakonjo,*** Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo, Japan and Dr ***Steven E Miller,*** Director of Studies, Center for Science and International Affaires, John F Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, USA
14.45	**Discussion** short break
16.00	**Concluding Reflections** *Dr Bo Huldt,* IISS London.

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SIIA, STOCKHOLM FEBRUARY 15-16 1993

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Rear Admiral **Frank Rosenius**	Ministry of Defence
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CONFERENCE DOCUMENTATION

ON THE SEMINAR

ARMS CONTROL AND NORDIC SECURITY

FEBRUARY 15 1993

The Swedish Institute of International Affairs
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contents

Papers to be discussed on February 15

1. Old Nukes In The New North
ByThomas Ries

2. CFE Treaty and War in the Nordic Area
By Marco Smedberg

3. Naval Arms Control and The Nordic Area
By Johan Tunberger, Robert Dalsjö and Hans Zettermark

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OLD NUKES IN THE NEW NORTH

Tomas Ries, 10/02-93.

Introduction.

During the Cold War the orientation of a part of the US and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal to the nordic area had a number of regional political and military consequences. These traditional issues are examined in the first part of this paper.

Today the collapse of the Soviet Union and the present stance of the Yeltsin regime - involving a high degree of cooperation with the west - have removed these pressures for the moment. At the same time however the chaotic conditions inside Russia resulting from the Soviet collapse have released a new set of problems associated with the presence of strategic nuclear forces in the nordic area. These new issues are essentially 'apolitical', in the sense that they are the indirect consequence of the general collapse of the post-Soviet system, and not the result of deliberate policies against the west or the nordic states. These issues are examined in the first part of the second section.

One must also keep in mind however that the present cooperative stance of the Russian leadership is almost certain to change. The deepening Russian ecoomic and social crisis and the highly unstable political situation in Russia will make it exceedingly difficult for Yeltsin to maintain his initial course - as we already witnessed in December - and indeed to remain in power. All of the potential Russian successor regimes invariably have a 'harder' and more authoritarian stance. While their attitudes to the west vary, they would all, to varying degrees, lead to increased tensions between Russia and the outside world. In this case we could witness a revival of the traditional political and military significance of the strategic nuclear weapons in the nordic area. This would of course be modified by the new conditions prevailing in Russia, and would depend upon the nature of the future Russian regime(s). These issues are examined in the second part of the second section.

The START II Treaty, signed on 3 January 1993, calls for the drastic cut in the US and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals. However the implementation of the treaty will depend partly upon the political stance of future Russian regimes, and partly on their physical capability to comply with the Treaty. Since it is impossible to foresee the precise nature of the coming Russian regimes this paper provides three broad scenarios for the composition of future Russian strategic nuclear forces might look at the beginning of the next century, assessing their implication for nordic security.

1. Strategic Nuclear Weapons and the Nordic Area during the Cold War.

During the Cold War a significant proportion of the US and Soviet strategic nuclear forces had a nordic orientation. This obviously does not mean that they were directed at the nordic states primarily, or that the nordic area had anything to do with their existence or purpose, but that these weapons systems in one way or another involved the territory of, or adjacent to, the nordic states. They did this in three ways: through their basing in the vicinity of the nordic states; through their peacetime transit and patrol pattern adjacent to the nordic states; or because of their anticipated wartime operational profile, with transit routes or launch areas close to or through the nordic states territories.[1] The nordic orientation of a portion of the strategic nuclear forces thus essentially arose from the interaction of geography and technology, and was fuelled by the intense hostility of the USSR and the US during the Cold War.

The nordic orientation of a portion of the US and Soviet strategic arsenals had both positive and negative consequences for the nordic security political environment during the Cold War. The value attributed to them is very much a question of interpretation, and depends particularly upon the observers perception of the Soviet Union and of whether deterrence or reassurance was the best way to manage the nordic-Soviet relationship. The regional consequences of the nordic orientation of Soviet and US strategic nuclear forces during the cold war are outlined below.

1.1. Coupling: Drawing US attention to the north.

A major advantage attributed to the nordic orientation of a portion of the US and Soviet arsenals was political, and consisted of the fact that these forces helped draw US attention to this part of the world. This was vital for the nordic states, since it helped to stimulate the interest of the major western power in the nordic area, thereby helping to check the overwhelming regional presence of the Soviet Union.[2] While it is possible that the US policy of containment would have been extended to most of the nordic democracies in any event,[3] there is little doubt that this 'geopolitical utility' of the nordic area for vital US nuclear interests helped cement the commitment. In this sense, by helping to prevent the isolation of the north next to the Soviet Union, the nordic orientation of Soviet and US strategic nuclear forces played a positive political role for the region.

1.2. Inducing Soviet caution.

A second political advantage was the possibility that the presence of vital Soviet strategic facilities close to the nordic states led to greater Soviet caution in her regional political stance, to avoid raising tensions in an area which was highly sensitive for the USSR.[4] According to this view the Soviet Union would thereby have had an interest in maintaining political stability and low tensions in the area, which benefitted the nordic states. There is no doubt some merit to this argument, since in fact it is hard to find any major incidents of Soviet overt political pressure against the nordic states after the fenno-Soviet Note Crisis in 1961. However this may also have been a consequence of the general stabilisation of the east-west relationship in Europe

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[1] For a detailed examination of the evolution of Soviet and US strategic nuclear forces between 1955-1985 and their impact on the nordic area see: RIES, Tomas: Soviet Strategic Nuclear Interests and Soviet Policy Towards the Nordic Region, 1955-1985. Geneva, Doctoral Dissertation prepared for the Graduate Institute of International Affairs, 1992: pp. 165 + Appendics, Maps and Footnotes.

[2] cf. TAMNES, Rolf: The United States and the Cold War in the High North, Oslo, Ad Notam Forlag AS, 1st. ed., 1991: pp. 384.

[3] cf BIRD, Major Victor: America's Post-Cold War Commitment to Norway. Oslo, IFS Forsvarsstudier, No. 8, 1992: pp. 111.

[4] This was a point often raised by Johan Jørgen Holst.

after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Finally it is also very important to note that this argument only applies to overt Soviet political pressure, and not - as we shall see below - to Soviet regional military programmes.

1.3. Generating Soviet political pressure.

On the other hand the nordic orientation of the strategic nuclear forces also had negative consequences for the north. These were of both a political and a military nature. The political drawbacks were that the Soviet perception of a US strategic nuclear threat via the nordic area could generate Soviet political pressure on the nordic states. Such pressure would have been designed partly to discourage deployment of US strategic nuclear forces or their support elements to the area, and partly to push Soviet strategic offensive and defensive assets forward into the nordic area.

'Defensive' Soviet initiatives.

It is possible to find a number of examples of Soviet direct and indirect pressure against US deployments to the area. Overt political pressure against actual or perceived US nuclear forces involving the nordic area took place in the late 1940's and throughout the 1950's, notably involving the Soviet diplomatic efforts regarding the nordic NATO members' nuclear basing policies, but virtually ceased with the Note Crisis in 1961. Indirect pressure, involving Active Measures, began on a large scale in the 1970's, then directed primarily against US SSBN operations in nordic waters, and lasted until the mid-1980's when the focus had shifted against US ALCM and SLCM forces.

'Offensive' Soviet initiatives.

It is more difficult to find examples of Soviet pressure to push their own strategic forces forward, at least from open sources. The fenno-soviet 'Note Crisis' of 1961 is an oft-used example of such a case, but recently released post-Soviet sources indicate that it may have had more to do with President Kekkonen's domestic manipulations than with a real Soviet concern over a nuclear threat. Nonetheless there are indications that other such initiatives may have taken place, though on a more discrete level. One such incident is the Ustinov proposal in 1978, for joint manoeuvres with Finland, which could have been linked to Soviet General Staff concerns over the perceived growing threat from US ALCM's. However for the time being open sources provide no concrete evidence of such pressure. On the other hand one should note that the danger of such pressure was a real and continuous fear among Finland's leadership during most of the period 1961-1991.

Another such case could be the very large scale but covert Soviet military programme directed against Sweden as of the late 1970's. These are vulgarly known as the 'Submarine Violations' but in fact involve far larger and more varied covert forces and had a greater objective than the notion of submarine violations implies.[5] According to the Swedish General Staff studies, the objective of the campaign was to make the operational preparations for a decapitating attack against Sweden. However here one should note that this was an exclusively military operation (which of course is little consolation) and was probably more related to the Eurostrategic considerations of the General Staff than to their strategic nuclear planning.[6]

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[5] For the most thorough unclassified study of the nature of the incidents see: AGRELL, Wilhelm: Bakom Ubåtskrisen: Militär verksamhet, krigsplanläggning och diplomati i östersjöområdet. Stockholm, Liber Förlag, 1st. ed., 1986: pp. 231.
To provide a more complete picture of the range of GRU covert operations in Sweden in this period parts of the following book are also useful: NORDBLOM, Charlie: Krig i Fredstid: Sovjets offensiv mot Norden, Stockholm, Timbro/Lettura, 1st. ed., 1988: pp. 468.

[6] cf RIES: Soviet Strategic..., 1992: pp. 115-120.

1.4. Decoupling: Generating the buildup of Soviet conventional forces in the north.

The military drawbacks involved both Soviet and US forces and anticipated policies. The Soviet military pressure was indirect, and resulted from the Soviet buildup of massive conventional forces in the nordic area, designed to partly to protect the Soviet Union against the perceived US strategic nuclear threat via the nordic area, and partly to protect the basing and operating areas of the Soviet strategic nuclear forces deployed to the north. The forces involved in these efforts were primarily the Strategic Air Defence Forces (VPVO) and the Northern Fleet (SF), with a smattering of Front forces to provide peripheral support in the land areas.[7]

While the VPVO and SF were primarily directed against the perceived US strategic nuclear threat and threat to the Soviet strategic nuclear forces, and the SF partly against the NATO Atlantic SLOC, their presence also helped shift the nordic military equilibrium increasingly in favour of the USSR, particularly as of the mid-1970's. While it is highly unlikely that the Soviet Union would have actually launched a separate military campaign against one or more of the nordic states, the growing imbalance did have political consequences in peacetime, by increasing the nordic insecurity vis a vis their large neighbour and hence Soviet political leverage. In a military sense this led to the increasing isolation of the nordic states as the Soviet military perimeter was pushed further south into the North Atlantic during the 1970's and early 1980's. As a result the no doubt unintended and certainly tangential consequence of the buildup of the Soviet secondary support forces was the gradual undermining of the postwar nordic security system and the increasing vulnerability of the nordic states.[8]

1.5. Inadvertent involvement: Horizontal escalation.

The perceived drawback with US military involvement in the nordic area was also linked to the US conventional presence and not to the strategic nuclear forces. The concern in this case arose after the US naval buildup once again permitted immediate large scale western operations north of the GIFUK Gap in wartime, and after the so-called Maritime Strategy of the US Navy (USN) was publicly pronounced in 1986. The concern in this case was encased in the concept of 'horizontal escalation'. This was the notion that the USN might be used to retaliate against the Soviet Union in the far north in response to a US-Soviet conflict of interests in another part of the world. Thereby, it was argued, the nordic area risked becoming drawn into a conflict in which it had little or no interest and where it might have been best to lie low. Whether or not this was a real danger is difficult to assess, but there is a logic to the argument which cannot be disregarded.

1.6. Inadvertent involvement: Targets of Soviet Nuclear Attack.

A final argument raised against the US military presence in the nordic area was that it would make the associated territories in the nordic states the subject of a nuclear strike by the Soviet Union in the event of a war, and that it was therefore better to refrain from any involvement in the east-west confrontation. This argument was current on the grass roots level of public opinion in the nordic states, but was supported by a number of academics, who often demonstrated a remarkable diligence and skill in uncovering US and nordic military installations. Though the underlying rationale was primitive, the movement did have serious political

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[7] For a detailed analysis of this development see: RIES, Tomas: 'The Soviet Military Operational Command Structure and its Application to Fenno-Scandia.' In: RIES, Tomas and Johnny SKORVE: Investingating Kola: A Study of Military Bases Using Satellite Photography. London, Brassey's Defence Publishers Ltd., 1st. ed., 1987: pp. 1-40.

[8] The problem this posed for the nordic security system is examined in: RIES, Tomas: The Nordic Dilemma in the 80's: Maintaining Regional Stability under new Strategic Conditions. Geneva, PSIS Occasional Papers, No. 1, July 1982: pp. 60.

repercussions, since it helped generate the 'second round' proposal for a Nordic Nuclear Free Zone in October 1980, which actually forced the nordic states to consider the proposal officially.

However the argument was based on the naive notion that the nordic states could somehow isolate themselves from a general east-west war if it were to erupt - an attempt at a sort of nuclear neutrality. This would have been extremely unlikely, to put it mildly, and therefore it will not be considered here.

1.7. The Nordic Dilemma: Decoupling versus Reassurance.

Of course one's attitude towards the above arguments in favour of and against the presence of US strategic interests in the north remains largely a question of perception. The glass of US military involvement in the north was either half full or half empty depending upon the standpoint of the observer. If one was more concerned over isolation next to the Soviet Union, then the US presence was the most important factor, while if one was more concerned with reassuring the Soviet neighbour then the US presence was a threat. This issue also demonstrates the basic schizophrenia inherent in the postwar nordic security policies, all of which tried to varying degrees to both reassure and deterr their Soviet neighbour. Since US presence bolstered the deterrence effort but weakened the reassurance effort it was difficult to reconcile the two, except at very low levels of investment. Which is why the increase in Soviet regional conventional forces in the 1980's presented such a fundamental dilemma to the nordic security arrangements of the Cold War.

2. Do Strategic Nuclear Forces Matter to the Nordic Area Anymore?

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the transformation of the international security system has of course had a profound impact on all of the above considerations. In the first place the monolithic Soviet power is no longer present and has been replaced by a Russia in a deepening state of internal collapse. Secondly the Soviet regime has been replaced - for the time being - by a relatively 'liberal' leadership, which seeks to collaborate with the west. This has both affected the nature of the US-Russian nuclear relationship and the attitude of Russia towards the nordic states. Thirdly the size and nature of the Russian and US strategic nuclear forces are undergoing rapid change. This is partly due to the flurry of arms control agreements which have taken place since Gorbachev came to power in 1985, but is also the result of the increasing disintegration of the post-Soviet economic and political system.

The question therefore arises whether the nordic orientation of a part of the US and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals matters anymore. At present the climate of relative cooperation between the Yeltsin regime and the west have removed the element of hostility and tension which made the presence of strategic nuclear forces so delicate and dangerous in the past. Secondly the Yeltsin regime - in its present guise - does not excert the same sort of pressure against the security of the nordic states as the Soviet Union did. Thirdly the scale and immediacy of the new problems resulting from the increasingly chaotic post-Soviet collapse overshadow traditional calculations concerning the size and nature of US and Russian strategic nuclear interests in the north.

Nonetheless the nature and size of US and Russian nuclear forces with a nordic orientation continues to matter for nordic security, though for the time being on a lower level of importance than in the past, and for partly different reasons. This is so for two reasons. On the one hand they present an immediate problem. This is new in nature and is linked to the breakup of the post-Soviet society. Under the increasingly chaotic circumstances prevailing in Russia any nuclear assets - be they civilian or military - risk becoming involved in the breakup. Either by default, since the organisation and assets needed for their safe maintenance or dismantling is lacking, or else more actively, by trickling out of the authorities hands or by becoming involved

in the potential power struggles which may arise in the area. These problems are 'apolitical' in the sense that they do not result from a deliberate political intention directed against the nordic states or the west, but are primarily the side effect of a break up of control in Russia. They nonetheless represent a real and serious security threat to the nordic states. In this respect the presence of Russian strategic nuclear forces in the vicinity of the nordic states constitute a serious danger, as part of the new range of problems which have emerged in the wake of the collapse of the USSR, or of which we are more aware under the present circumstances.

Secondly the reduced political relevance of the US and Russian strategic nuclear relationship is closely tied to the policies of the present regime in Moscow. As Foreign Minister Kozyrev reminded us with chilling effect only a few weeks ago, this cooperative stance can change, either overnight or gradually. The deepening economic crisis in Russia, and the political pressures it generates, indicates that the duration of the present 'liberal' Russian stance is limited. Just what sort of harder policies or regime will follow it cannot be foreseen at present, but that it will take place appears virtually certain.

In this case we may expect a partial return to a more hostile Russian attitude towards the outside world, which in turn could again make the presence of strategic nuclear forces more dangerous in a political sense. This is not to say that there would be a return to the situation of the Cold War. The successive Russian regimes will be harder than at present, but they will almost certainly not represent a return to the post SALT I Soviet leadership. However this is not necessarily a consolation. The Soviet leadership between the Cuban Missile Crisis and Gorbachev was both very cautious and very conservative, particularly where nuclear policy was concerned. This will not be the case for the future Russian regimes, which will be unstable and beset by unsolvable domestic pressures. At worst they will also be highly belligerent and hostile. In this case the remaining Russian and US nuclear forces with a nordic orientation could once again generate varying degrees of political and military pressure in the nordic area.

2.1. Immediate 'apolitical' problems related to Russian nuclear forces in the north.

The radically new conditions prevailing in Russia raise a number of novel problems related to the strategic nuclear forces, at the same time as the more liberal information policies since 1985 have alerted us to a number of problems which existed before - though perhaps on a smaller scale - but of which we are now far more aware. These can be roughly divided between 'anarchic' and ecological issues.

Anarchic problems.

The problems associated with Russian nuclear assets under the increasingly chaotic conditions raise three types of dangers for the nordic states. In the first place there is the known problem of ecological damage as a result of the collapse of the control and maintenance system. This is already underway in fact, but will become worse as post-Soviet society continues to deteriorate. This is dealt with in the next subsection.

Secondly there is the danger of nuclear materials being discarded, misplaced or falling into criminal or terrorist hands. This is nt the same as the proliferation of nuclear assets to other states, but involves the filtering out of smaller and more random quantities of nuclear-related material to the private market. Police reports in the west and in Russia indicate that this process is already underway. Citizens from the former Soviet block have been intercepted trying to transport or sell various types of radioactive materials, often doing great damage to themselves in the process. Since the nordic states lie cose to the potential sources of much such material, as well as of the associated ex-Soviet civil and nuclear technology, there is a danger that such materials could transit or end up in nordic territory.

Thirdly, there is the danger that the increasing chaos would lead to attempts by small groups, either criminal or political, to threaten nuclear facilities or acquire radioactive material, permitting

them to resort to nuclear terrorism, threatening to cause serious environmental damage if their requests are not met.

Fourthly, the nuclear issue would become acute if the collapse of Russia begins to involve large scale confrontations. In this case it is possible that nuclear assets - both civilian and military - could be used as part of the conflict. This does not need to involve their use in the actual way they were intended to be used. That possibility exists, but primarily concerns tactical nuclear weapons, which is not the subject of this paper. For strategic nuclear assets - and for civilian reactors - the greatest danger in such a situation would be that they would become damaged in the conflict, leading to radioactive leaks. On a slightly higher level there is the danger that one or more parties to such a conflict would seek to use the threat or actual damage to nuclear facilities as part of their struggle.

Examples of such cases already exist. In the former Yugoslavia the Croats deliberately destroyed a hydroelectric dam when they could no longer keep it under their control, seriously damaging the villages in the valley. This did not involve nuclear assets, but is a concrete example of the conditions under which such an event can occur. A case which directly involved nuclear facilities ocurred in November 1991 during the violent struggle for independence between the Chechen Republic and Russia. When President Yeltsin declared a state of war on 8 November General Dudayev responded by calling for full mobilisation, and warning that 'state terrorism' would not remain unanswered, and threatened terrorist attacks against Russian targets, including nuclear power stations.

Ecological problems.

At the same time the liberalization of Russian society has raised our awareness of a number of old problems, which already existed under the Soviet regime but which have been uncovered, or have become more acute, under the present conditions. These problems are primarily related to the terrible environmental damage and hazards which all Soviet and post-Soviet nuclear facilities and activities - be they civilian or military - posed and pose.

The threat in this case consists of the ongoing radioactive leaks from ex-Soviet nuclear facilities, and the danger of a serious accident involving any of these assets. The problem arises from the very poor workmanship, the inadequate technology and the inadequate safety measures which characterise most Soviet projects, including the nuclear. Thus the Soviet civilian and military nuclear assets already constituted a serious danger even when the old Soviet system was functioning. Today this problem is aggravated by the breakdown of the old system and the collapse of the economy. This has led to a deterioration of morale and a lack of physical resources to maintain the nuclear weapons, the reactors of the SSBN's and the facilities protecting these assets.

In this respect the location of strategic nuclear weapons close to the nordic area, particularly along the Kola coastline but also elsewhere, poses a constant threat to the nordic states. One should note that this applies not only to actual nuclear warheads, but also to the nuclear reactors of the SSBN's of the Northern Fleet. (Indeed it also applies - perhaps to an even greater degree - to the nuclear reactors aboard the civilian ice-breakers based in Murmansk and in the three main civilian nuclear power stations adjacent to the nordic states on the Kola, by St. Petersburg and at Ignalina in Lithuania. However they are not the subject of this paper.) In addition one should be aware that there is a large quantity of discarded radioactive material, ranging from raw radioactive waste used in military experiments to disused nuclear reactors. These have often been disposed of in a completely irresponsible way, ranging form the dumping of reactors in the Barents Sea to the storing of nuclear waste in rusting hulks in the Ladoga.

The positive aspects of the present situation is that under the present regime it is actually possible for the west to do something about these hazards. In its present cooperative mode it is possible to obtain the necessary information about the state of the civilian facilities and to

cooperate with the local authorities to improve or dismantle the installations or storage facilities. The problem however is partly that Russia cannot forgo the electrical energy generated by her active civilian reactors, despite the dreadful danger they pose, and that there does not appear to be sufficient political will in the west to allocate the funds needed to build safer western reactors and maintain them at western standards. However at present the political opening for such moves exists.

Military nuclear assets might pose more problems in this respect. The willingness of the military to divulge the necessary information, let outsiders into nuclear facilities or enter into joint recuperation projects remains limited. In this respect there has been some progress, often as a result of initiatives by regional authorities acting in conjunction with the military. Russian activists and local authorities have in some cases uncovered military-related environmental hazards, such as the journalist from St. Petersburg who revealed that radioactive material from military experiments in the 1950's was stored in half-sunken rusting ships in northern Ladoga. Western analysts have also been permitted to visit and in some cases study some Russian nuclear assets related to the military. Such projects are for instance presently underway between Russia and Norway, to study the dumping of nuclear reactors in the Barents Sea around Novaya Zemlya. However the constant hazard posed by ex-Soviet nuclear assets remains probably the most urgent and most serious threat to nordic security at present.

2.2. Longer term political problems related to Russian and US nuclear forces in the north.

In the longer term the shift of the Russian leadership to a less cooperative stance vis a vis the west could resuscitate some of the traditional pressures associated with the presence of US and Soviet nuclear interests in the north. That is to say the political linkage to the US, the Russian political pressure against the nordic states, the Russian conventional military force posture in the north and the possibility of horizontal escalation of US-Russian crises to the north. Under the post-Soviet conditions these would arise - if they arose - in a modified form, since the Russian political leadership, the nature of Russia, the Russian nuclear strategy and the composition of her nuclear forces would be different.

Military linkage to the US.

At present there is clearly a reduced direct US military interest in the nordic area. The one area where there may be a continued active involvement is in underwater operations in the adjacent seas, but even here operations are probably on a lower level. As noted earlier this may not weaken the US ideological commitment to the nordic states as western states, but it could weaken the military manifestations of this commitment.

In the event of a Russian hostile regime one of the primary positive side effects of the nordic orientation of strategic nuclear weapons during the Cold War - the tendency of US strategic nuclear interests to link the nordic area to the US - might be strengthened. Whether the aggregate effect would be positive is unlikely however. While the direct nordic military links to the US may be weaker today it is also true that they are also less necessary as long as the Russian leadership pursues her present cooperative and more tolerant policies towards the west. Thus a revived major US military interest in the north would probably be offset by the tensions and dangers to the nordic states presented by the type of Russian regime such a scenario presupposes.

Secondly, a revived US military linkage to the nordic states also depends upon the technologies involved, and to what extent they require an active US cooperation with the nordic states. This was the case as long as the US depended upon certain land-based facilities of her nordic NATO allies. However it is likely that the increasing autonomy of US C^3I assets, ASW forces, strategic nuclear power projection capability and strategic defence systems will reduce the former utility of nordic land-based facilities and hence the need for direct military cooperation with the nordic states. This is probably the case where US offensive strategic nuclear forces and strategic

defence forces are concerned, though it by no means applies to US conventional power projection capablities. Here the presence of a compatible logistical infrastructure is vital, but this does not concern the subject of this paper.

Russian political pressure.

Under the present cooperative Russian regime there is little tension vis a vis the west, probably a low perception of a nuclear threat, and hence little pressure against the nordic states derived either from basic political or strategic nuclear interests. However the nature of the Russian regime can shift suddenly and drastically. Under a less cooperative Russian regime tensions with the west would be revived to varying degrees. This would depend partly on the nature of the Russian successor regimes, but partly also on reactions within Russia and the extent to which they led to bloodshed, and finally on western reactions. Thus even a moderate Russian authoritarian regime, which desired a modicum of cooperation with the west but resorted to stronger measures to control the domestic situation, could, under pressure of western public opinion, generate tension with the west if situations similar to Tienanmen were to arise.

In any even the return of more hard line Russian leaders will increase tensions with the west, and might revive the political pressures that arose from the Soviet Union. These would no doubt be on a smaller scale, since Russia no longer has the same resources as the USSR had, while their nature would depend upon the policies of the Russian regime(s). However one should note that they could be far more intense than they were under the Soviet leadership. On the one hand because the domestic pressures on any future Russian leadership will continue to grow, forcing them to adopt at the least a more radical domestic policy. This could in turn generate the beginnings of a vicious circle of repression, with repercussions also for foreign relations. On the other hand because the possible candidates for Russian successor regimes include elements which could, in the worst case, be both more extreme and less responsible than the Soviet leadership was. This is particularly the case for the Russian national chauvinist movements, but also includes elements of the more reasonable military-industrial complex. The latter is the most likely successor to the Yeltsin regime, but in the longer term the regression to more primitive national-chauvinist regimes cannot be excluded.

Under such conditions Russian strategic nuclear interests could be revived, but it is uncertain whether the US-Russian nuclear relationship would acquire the same importance and independence as during the Cold War. On the one hand it could be argued that the Russian interest would be weaker since other factors - notably Russian domestic instability - would be far more important. From this perspective Russian strategic nuclear interests in the north could be involved in tensions or crises with the nordic states or the west, but would almost be derived from ulterior motives and would represent more of a pretext than a cause.

On the other hand however the importance of the strategic nuclear forces will increase dramatically for any future Russian regime which engages in a tenser or more hostile relationship with the outside world. Due to the collapse of virtually every other domestic and foreign policy asset of the former Soviet Union these strategic nuclear forces will be the only remaining source of international power and influence available to such a regime.[9] Even if such a regime had limited ambitions outside the confines of the former USSR, the strategic nuclear capability would be of vital importance as the only certain means of preventing possible western involvement in perceived Russian internal developments. This would be particularly important

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9 This increase in the relative importance of the Russian strategic nuclear forces is indicated in the new Russian Defence Doctrine, presented by the General Staff in May and approved by the Russian Parliament in December 1992. Even Yeltsin, who may be counted as one of the most cooperative Russian leaders envisageable, noted in November 1992 that, "It is no secret that Russia's status as a great power depends on its armed forces having nuclear weapons. Strategic nuclear weapons are the basis of our military might." Quoted in: LEOPOLD, George and Neil MUNRO: "Russia Renews Nuclear Reliance." Defense News, Vol. 7, No. 51, 21-27 December 1992; pp. 1, 20.

since such a regime would almost certainly increase tensions vis a vis the west at the same time as it employed violent means to assert its domestic authority in an impoverished and unstable Russia. Such tensions with the west could become acute if Russia sought to re-establish control over some of the smaller nations of the former USSR which are independent today. This would include the Baltic states, which actually are part of the nordic region.

Under these conditions the strategic nuclear forces would be of vital importance as the only effective means such a regime had of preventing western involvement in its perceived internal affairs. This could be exacerbated by the fact that the overall size of the Russian strategic nuclear force will almost certainly have to be reduced for economic reasons- regardless of treaties or the will of the Russian regime. This will in turn make the remaining force more vulnerable and would make any Russian leadership - but particularly one engaged in a tense or confrontative relationship with the west - more sensitive about the remaining nuclear assets. Under these conditions any such forces deployed to the nordic area could exert an even stronger influence on Russian regional policies than under the Cold War. The same applies to those US strategic nuclear forces which a Russian regime perceived might involve the nordic area.

Russian conventional military pressure.

Revived tensions between Russia and the west could also have several military consequences in the north. Where strategic nuclear forces are concerned it could lead to a renewed perception of the need to defend them, and hence to renewed efforts to develop their conventional military support elements. That is to say, primarily, the Northern Fleet. The same applies to the Russian concern over a nuclear attack, which could revive the attempts to develop the VPVO in the north.

Both of the above efforts would be weakened by the disorganised and impoverished state of Russia. Even if a future regime desired to strengthen the VPVO and the Northern Fleet it is difficult to see how the resources for such an effort could be marshalled, despite the increased domestic power which an authoritarian regime would have. This is reinforced by the fact that both the Northern Fleet and VPVO depend upon very costly and sophisticated development programmes, which no Russian regime can afford in the foreseeable future. Thus it is almost impossible to envisage the type of large scale and systematic buildup of these services which took place under the Soviet Union. Hence the destabilizing effect of such an effort will probably not materialize for some time. Even maintaining present force levels - and particularly the quality of these force during the last years of the Soviet Union - is almost certainly impossible. This is not to say that a radical regime might not attempt to keep their numerical size, but the actual capability of such a force will be strongly reduced. (This is deal with in more detail in the next section.)

These provisos however mainly apply to the VPVO and the Northern Fleet, where a further buildup, let alone maintaining the present forces, would be particularly costly. That is not the case for the Front (ground) forces in the nordic area. Here both the quality of the material, and their number, have been strengthened since the Soviet withdrawal from central Europe began. This does not mean that their short-term combat effectiveness has also improved however. At present the men and material redeployed to the north do not have a high readiness for major offensive operations. Morale is low and the resources for maintenance are lacking. However this could be altered at an acceptable economic cost by a regime determined to do so. Thus these forces could be further developed in the north, but they are not part of the subject of this paper.

Horizontal escalation.

Finally there is the possibility that a non-cooperative Russian regime and the tensions it generated with the west might renew the danger of a horizontal escalation of US-Russian conflicts to the nordic area. Such conflicts could be more likely with a less predictable Russian regime besieged by problems at home, and possibly pursuing highly unpopular policies in the

area of the former USSR, than they were under the relatively predictable years under Brezhnev. At the same time the option to apply a military slap on the wrist to Russia might appear more feasible to the US under the new circumstances. However such an horizontal escalation, were it to take place, would almost certainly not be directed at any Russian strategic nuclear assets located in the north, since this would almost certainly be highly provocative. Instead it would be directed against civilian objectives - for instance in the form of a naval embargo - or possibly against conventional military objectives, though even this appears unlikely. In this respect the threat of horizontal escalation is independent of the Russian strategic nuclear force posture in the north. However the possibility of a naval embargo, in response to violent Russian domestic repression or agression against neighbouring states of the former USSR, is possible.

Wartime operations.

Finally one should note that in the post-Soviet world the possibility of using war as a political instrument in Europe has re-emerged - even between the US and Russia. While such a conflict between the US and the USSR in the past would have been cataclysmic, and this eventuality was therefore not included in the analysis in section 1., it is possible that a US or Russian leadership might perceive that it could be managed in the post-Soviet environment.

In this case the presence of Russian strategic nuclear assets in the north could draw considerable US military attention to the area, though it would pass largely unnoticed. This would include two primary operations potentially involving the nordic area. In the first place operations against the remaining Russian SSBN force operating out of the Kola, involving primarily strategic C^3I and ASW assets. Since peacetime preparations for such an operation largely involve outer space and underwater operations they pass largely unnoticed. In the second place they could involve strategic nuclear bombers transitting nordic airspace enroute to Russian strategic nuclear targets west of the Urals. During the Cold War this flight route was the most direct approach to the Soviet heartland, and where the depth of the Soviet air defence system was the thinnest. The gradual dismantling of the ex-Soviet strategic air defence facilities in the Baltic states is thinning the Russian defences in this sector even further, but this is partly offset by the breakup of the southern USSR, which is also thinning the depth of the strategic air defence system in this area.

The US emphasis upon strategic ASW was cut after the fall of the Soviet Union, with procurement budget reductions of USD 640 million from the 1991 total of USD 1.6 billion, and research and development reductions of USD 540 million from the 1991 total of USD 2.14 billion. However there are signs that the strategic ASW effort may be revived. Thus the director of naval intelligence, Rear Admiral Edward Sheafer noted in an interview on 8 December that the effects of START II, which could place up to 55% of the Russian strategic arsenal on SSBN's, "...means that strategic antisubmarine warfare becomes something that is perhaps more important in the future than people thought it was going to be."[10]

At the same time the US emphasis upon the manned strategic bomber, while it has also been cut back as part of the general trend, remains strong. This is partly indicated by the special bomber warhead counting rules of START I, which would have permitted the US to develop its strategic bomber force into the most warhead-heavy segment of the strategic triad.[11] It is also interesting to note that the US attempted, up to the last moment, to keep these special counting rules in the START II Treaty, though she was forced to drop them in the final stages of the negotiations.

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[10] HOLZER, Robert: "Weapons Accords Expand Mission for ASW." Defense News, Vol. 7, No. 51, 21-27 December 1992: pp. 3, 20.

[11] For the number crunching of the warhead counting rules START I cf: RIES, Tomas: "Consequences of START for the Nordic Region." IFS Info, No. 7, Oslo, Institute for Defence Studies, August 1991: pp. 30.

3. Strategic Nuclear Forces and the Nordic Area after START II.

While the earlier part of this paper outlined the political and conventional military consequences of Soviet and Russian strategic nuclear interests in the nordic area, this section outlines various scenarios for a future Russian strategic nuclear force posture in the nordic area.

3.1. The START II Treaty.

The START II Treaty calls for drastic cuts in the overall number of warheads in the US and Russian strategic nuclear forces:[12]

		US	Russia
September 1992	ICBM	2,370	6,627**
	SLBM	3,584	2,776**
	LRB	3,908*	1,506**
	Totals:	9,862	10,909**
START II: Phase I	Totals:	4,250	3,800
START II: 2003	ICBM	500	504
	SLBM	1,728	1,744
	LRB	1,272	752
	Totals:	3,500	3,000

* Using real bomber warhead counts.
** September 1991.

It is important to keep in mind that the START II numbers are based on estimates of likely US and Russian choices in the distribution of warheads. Secondly that the warheads attributed to bombers reflect the actual maximum loads of the bombers and not the artificial loads attributed under START I.

In percentage terms the three legs of the US and Russian strategic triad are distributed as follows:

		US	Russia
September 1992	ICBM	24.0	60.8
	SLBM	36.4	25.4
	LRB	39.6	13.8
	Totals:	100.0	100.0
START II: 2003	ICBM	14.3	16.8
	SLBM	49.4	58.1
	LRB	36.3	25.1
	Totals:	100.0	100.0

US forces and the nordic area after START II.

For the US forces the above figures, if implemented, would indicate that the bulk of the strategic force would be deployed aboard SSBN's, and that they would be armed entirely with the Trident SLBM, since the reductions in the absolute numbers would mean the removal of all remaining Poseidon SLBM's. Since the range of the Trident SLBM permit them to be launched

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[12] 'Past and Projected Strategic Nuclear Forces.' The Arms Control Association Fact Sheet, Washington D.C., ACA, 3 September 1992: p. 2.
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction And Limitation Of Strategic Offensive Arms. 3 January 1993.

from most of the world's oceans it is unlikely that they would deploy north. Hence the major part of the US arsenal would not affect the nordic area.

However the second largest force would be deployed aboard the long range bombers. During the late 1980's the interaction of technology (ageing B-52's, the introduction of the ALCM and the integration of ALCM strikes and B-1 penetration routes) with the geopolitical situation (with Soviet strategic air defences thinnest over the nordic area) had made the nordic airspace of major importance for the US strategic nuclear bomber force.[13] This was reinforced by the fact that the US bomber force had, when one counted actual warhead loads, the largest number of warheads in the US arsenal.

Following START II the bomber force will be the second largest in the US arsenal, and almost as large as the SSBN force. On the other hand the geopolitical situation has changed and there are now a number of other avenues of approach to the Russian heartland where Russian air defences are thin. Assuming that Russia does not regain control over the former Soviet republics this factor would tend to reduce the exclusive strategic importance which nordic airspace had during the 1980's. Finally one should also note that the introduction of the B-2 and other stealth aircraft also reduce the importance of nordic airspace, since these bombers can, presumably, penetrate Russian air defences independently.

Finally the ICBM force would be strongly cut. This hs traditionally not affected the nordic area except where Soviet early warning radars were concerned, and has in fact tended to reduce the importance of the other legs of the triad. The SLBM and LRB components will now become relatively more important.

Overall the importance of the nordic area for the US strategic nuclear forces will probably decline somewhat, though it will remain an important potential standoff launch and transit route for the ALCM and penetration bombers. This in turn means that Russian General Staff planners will probably have to consider this a likely potential transit route for bombers, roughly on the same level of importance as today. On the other hand the remaining US SLBM's which could have had the north Atlantic as a potential launch zone will have been withdrawn. On the other hand, should the Russian leadership seek to pursue a global strategic ASW policy then the Kola basing facilities would, along with the Far East, remain vital. However given the type of resources such a policy would require, and its low chances of success, this seems unlikely.

Russian forces and the nordic area after START II.

The configuration of the Russian strategic nuclear forces will change drastically if START II is implemented. On the one hand the overall size of the force will have been cut by roughly two thirds. This will make each of the remaining forces more valuable, at the same time as it will make them more vulnerable. In fact, in many respects we will be moving back to a world where the feasibility of a US war- winning strategy increases. This is partly due to the overall reduction in the number of potential Russian counterforce targets, partly due to the possibility that a GPALS strategic defence might actually be implemented, and partly because those Russian nuclear forces which remain will become increasingly vulnerable to US technological advances. This particularly the case for the smaller overall number of Russian SSBN's - facing USN ASW technology - and the reduced number of bombers and ALCM facing CONUS air defences.

Of greatest consequence for the nordic area is that the relative size of the Russian SLBM force will have increased to the point where is becomes the largest leg of the triad. Thus the SSBN forces will probably become one of the focal elements in Russian nuclear planning. This will

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[13] RIES, Tomas: "Kryssermissiler: Strategiske konsekvenser for nordregionen." Forsvarsstudier, No. 8, Oslo, Institute for Defence Studies, 1990: pp. 148. (The strategic consequences of unmanned airborne vehicles for the nordic region.)

boost the importance of all areas where the SSBN's operate, which at present consists of the Kola Peninsula (roughly 67%) and the Kamchatka Peninsula (33%). At the same time however the absolute size of the SSBN force will have shrunk. This could leave the Kola Peninsula as the only Russian SSBN basing area, which would make it of even greater strategic importance.

Such a development results from the nature of the Russian SSBN force today. A cut from 2,776 warheads to a maximum of 1,700 - 1,750 under START II forces the scrapping of all of the older generation SS-N-6, SS-N-8 and SS-N-17 SLBM's, as well as a portion of the SS-N-18 SLBM. (In this context one should also note that the age of these systems and their SSBN's would in any event call for their retirement by the turn of the century.) As a result the bulk of the remaining force would consist of an estimated:

SLBM	Warheads	SSBN	IOC
SS-N-18	576*	12 Delta III	1978
SS-N-20	720**	6 Typhoon	1981
SS-N-23	448	7 Delta IV	1985

* With S-N-18 downloaded to 3 warheads. Estimate.
** With SS-N-20 downloaded from 10 to 8 warheads. Estimate.

Today all of the Typhoon and Delta IV SSBN's are based on the Kola, and 5 of the 14 Delta III. These are the most modern SSBN's in the Russian arsenal, and are specially designed for operations in the Arctic Ocean, in the marginal ice zone or under the ice. Since the Kola bases at present offer the only safe transit passage to these patrol zones it makes it unlikely that they will be moved. The only option would be if the Russians constructed a new SSBN base further east along their Arctic coastline, but there are no indications today from open sources that such a base has been constructed.

Thus in an immediate post-START II environment the Russian SSBN force could be divided as follows:

NORTHERN FLEET

SLBM	Warheads	SSBN	IOC
SS-N-18	144	3 Delta III	1978
SS-N-20	720	6 Typhoon	1981
SS-N-23	448	7 Delta IV	1985

PACIFIC FLEET

SLBM	Warheads	SSBN	IOC
SS-N-18	432	9 Delta III	1978

This would leave 1,312 SLBM warheads with the Northern Fleet and 432 in the Pacific Fleet. On this basis 75 % of the Russian SLBM force would be located on the Kola. This in turn would represent 44 % of the all Russian strategic nuclear warheads. One should note that the age of the SS-N-18/Delta III system would also call for its retirement by the end of the first decade of the next century. If this took place then all of the Russian SSBN force would remain on the Kola.

Such a development would of course increase the strategic value of the Kola bases and the adjacent waters considerably, both for Russian and US planners. This would particularly be the case in a world where Russian - western tensions re-emerged, and if the US reverted to a war-winning nuclear strategy.

Finally one should note that the Russian strategic bomber force would be cut roughly in half, but would that it's relative strength in the triad would be roughly doubled. This would make it a

more important element in the overall force, but also more vulnerable to US air defences. The Arctic transit routes would remain the primary means of reaching CONUS targets (the only after the liberation of Cuba). Hence airspace northeast of the nordic states, and the forward operating bases for strategic bombers on the Kola, Zemlya Frantsa Iosifa and Novaja Zemlya would remain important for both Russia and the US.

3.2. The political context.

The implementation of START II remains uncertain however. The future of the Russian strategic nuclear forces will depend on two factors. In the first place on the political leadership in Russia in the coming years. Here one should note that it would have to take exceptional circumstances for a future regime deliberately to refuse to comply with the Treaty. However this possibility cannot be ruled out, given the instability in Russia, the drastic cuts involved in START II, and the likelihood that future regimes will be 'harder' and more dependent upon the military.

Secondly, the implementation of START II will also depend upon the actual economic and technical resources available to Russia. Whether Russia could dismantle the warheads called for under START I is already open to doubt, and START II will place far greater demands. Here on the other hand the present Russian policy vis a vis the west permits us to try to provide assistance in building dismantling facilities. Finally one should also note that START II also depends upon compliance by all four former Soviet republics with strategic nuclear weapons. This too appears uncertain at the moment.

These issues are not examined here. Instead the section outlines three possible alternative scenarios for the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal. These are intended to cover the broad options available to future Russian regimes - ranging from the most cooperative to the most hostile. In each case their possible consequences for the nordic area are also provided.

Minimum Deterrence.

In this case it is postulated that the Russian leadership would opt for a minimum deterrent force, along the lines of Britain or France today. That is to say shrinking the number of warheads below that postulated in START II and foregoing one or more legs of the triad. In this case the political leadership would have as a main priority cutting the costs and possibly the environmental hazards of the nuclear force. Such a stance is associated with the most 'liberal' western oriented regime imaginable, and essentially presupposes a continuation of present Russian policies under Yeltsin in his present guise. One might note that such a political future seems highly unlikely in view of the continuous decline of the economy and the associated political pressures.

Under this scenario the key determinant of the composition of the force would be economic factors, with the leadership trying to reduce the costs of the strategic nuclear force to as low a level as possible. In addition other 'liberal' considerations might also be permitted to play a role, such as the ecological dangers involved in maintaining the different weapons. Finally the flexibility of the weapons system might also be a factor, with a priority on keeping those capable of performing conventional missions as well as strategic nuclear, thereby making them more cost-effective.

In this case the SSBN leg of the triad would be one of the least attractive. The development and maintenance costs of the submarine launch platform are far greater than for ground-based silos and probably greater than for bombers, even in the Stealth era. This is accentuated by the difficulties and cost involved in trying to keep up - ideally ahead - of the US ASW programmes. Secondly the ecological dangers involved in deploying nuclear weapons aboard Russian submarines are great, involving both the nuclear reactors of the submarines themselves, which pose a constant hazard even when in port, and the warheads, which add to the problem should the submarine have an accident while at sea - something which we witnessed all too often in

the late 1980's. Since they lack the nuclear reactors bombers and ICBM silos are safer in this rrespect, though the same potential for accident involving any load of warheads applies when the bomber is airborne. Thirdly, the SSBN as presently configured can be used for little else than to deter or wage nuclear war. This of course applies to an even greater extent to the ICBM, but not to the bomber, which is the most flexible of the three elements of the triad. Something we have also witnessed repeatedly regarding the US strategic bomber force.

	COST	ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARD	FLEXIBILITY
SSBN	High	High	Low
LRB	Medium	Medium	High
ICBM	Low	Low	Very low

On the basis of the above the SSBN comes out as the definite loser, while the bomber and ICBM each have certain advantages: the ICBM it's relatively low cost and high security, and the bomber its operational flexibility. If such reasoning prevails one could envisage the scrapping of the Delta I-III force by the end of the century, followed by the Typhoon and finally Delta IV classes as of the end of the first decade of the next century. And, if an overriding emphasis is placed on economy, development of follow-on SSBN classes would be cancelled and the SSBN leg would be removed from the triad.

However one can only repeat that the above scenario, with a transition to a minimum deterrence force, is dependent on the continuation in power of a 'liberal' and western oriented regime. At present this appears highly unlikely. In addition, even should sucha regime remain in power, one should note that:

- the Russian General Staff does not approve of a minimum deterrence posture.
- A minimum deterrence posture would weaken the Russian overall stance considerably, by reducing the only remaining claim to power and influence that they have.
- A minimum deterrence posture would make the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal excessively vulnerable. This is due to the technological inferiority of the Russian nuclear forces, which in part has to be offset by having larger numbers. Thus reducing the size of the force leaves the remaining units particularly vulnerable. This applies particularly to the relatively noisy SSBN's and the strategic nuclear bombers.

Thus a minimum deterrent force would appear to be an unlikely future option. Nonetheless a continued economic decline could enforce such a situation.

START II.

A START II force as outlined earlier would essentially consist of a continued balanced nuclear triad but at a far reduced level. Politically it would be associated either with a continuation of the present regime, but could also be adopted by a 'harder' successor regime. A typical such case might be a return to a pseudo-Soviet leadership dominated by the military-industrial complex. Under this scenario the regime is willing to spend more money on the strategic nuclear arsenal and take less consideration of the environmental hazards of retaining a number of forces which it would difficult to maintain properly.

Maximum Force.

There is also a slight possibility that a future Russian leadership would seek to retain a maximum force, in the sense that it would try to keep the largest possible number of nuclear weapons as possible. This presupposes disregarding the START II Agreement, investing heavily in the military and living with a very large number of obsolescent and improperly maintained nuclear weapons and launch platforms.

From a purely military perspective this option has a certain logic. Even if resources were only

available to maintain a small portion of the force, the large number could be used partly to offset the technological superiority of the US, and partly to make it more difficult for an enemy to attack the elite units of the force. This is particularly the case for the SSBN's, but would also apply to the bombers and ICBM's.

However such a policy would carry a heavy political, economic and ecological price, and as such presupposes a very 'hard' Russian regime, probably ruthless at home and highly hostile to the outside world. This scenario would present the most gloomy and dangerous option for the nordic states, both from the political implications, but also from the direct consequences of having a large number of obsolescent Russian nuclear assets close to their territories. One should also note that at present it seems unlikely.

Marco Smedberg
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War in the North Within the Limits of the CFE Treaty

Dramatic changes have taken place in Europe in the last few years: An Empire has fallen, and new states have been born, or reborn; a political and military conflict which made its imprint on the continent for more than a generation has vanished; far-reaching agreements restricting military forces have been made.

One of these important changes is the CFE Treaty, now in the process of being implemented. The treaty limits the number of tanks, artillery pieces, armoured combat vehicles, combat aircraft and attack helicopters, that can be held in Europe by the members of Nato and the former Warsaw Treaty Organisation. The treaty also places restrictions on the deployment of the first three of these categories of equipment. Of special significance is that the treaty makes drastic reductions in the conventional arsenal of the Soviet Union, and its successor states, necessary. Tens of thousands of major pieces of equipment have been moved to Siberia and tens of thousands more will have to be destroyed.

But conflict and the prospect of war have not disappeared from Europe. Instead, old conflicts — long suppressed by the Cold War — have resurfaced and new ones have appeared. The process towards a new security pattern is fraught with uncertainties. A major uncertainty concerns the future political course of Russia, where the prospect of a return to domestic authoritarianism and external assertiveness — perhaps even to a revanchist policy — cannot be ruled out.

Such prospects are taken less lightly in the Nordic region than in, e.g., Germany, which now has the benefit of two tiers of buffer states. There has also been apprehension among the Nordics that reductions and withdrawals from Central Europe would lead to a military build-up in the vicinity of their region, the so-called sausage effect.

The purpose of this essay is to:

* delineate the limits set by the CFE Treaty for Russian ground forces equipment in the vicinity of Scandinavia;

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* briefly sketch trends in military technology and doctrine, and discuss the consequences of such trends and of CFE limits for Russian force structure;
* discuss the implications of CFE limits and of future force structures for Russian capabilities to conduct offensive operations in the Nordic area, against the background of three "cases".

The time-perspective of this essay is approximately 5 to 15 years from now. This would grant Russia the time to put the immediate problems of the dissolution of the USSR behind her, to adapt to CFE Treaty obligations, and would allow a new regime time to get the armed forces into some kind of shape. There would also be time to get the present generation of new "high-tech" weapons operational, but not to field weapons which are now only on the drawing board.

The region concerned includes Norway, Sweden and Finland; the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; as well as the north-western parts of Russia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, this region contains somewhat of a power vacuum. This essay does not take into account any of the hypothetical security structures which may fill that vacuum in the future.

The essay emphasises matters connected with ground forces, as these are the forces primarily affected by CFE. However, any discussion about capabilities to wage war in the Nordic region must also take air and naval forces into account. An assumption underlying the analysis is that the CFE Treaty will remain in force, and not significantly amended in a way which would affect the Nordic region.

1. THE IMPACT OF CFE

The Treaty

Under the treaty, each "group of states parties" is allowed an equal number of so called Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE): 20,000 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces, 30,000 armoured combat vehicles (ACVs), 6,800 combat aircraft and 2,000 attack helicopters. Furthermore, no single state is allowed to have more than approximately 1/3 of the grand total, e.g., 13,300 tanks.

A certain number, e.g., 3,500 tanks, of each alliances' allotment has to be stored in special "Designated Permanent Storage Sites" (DPSS) and cannot be used in active units. Equipment surplus to the overall figures must be destroyed. The ceilings should be attained by November 13, 1995.

The treaty also contains special rules concerning zones of deployment and lays down a maximum number of ground TLE in each such zone (see figure 1). The three innermost zones are like "Russian dolls", contained within each other, and the figures for each consecutive zone outwards includes those for the zones

within. The fourth and outermost zone is the flank zone, which has a specific ceiling of its own, which may not be exceeded. These zone rules apply only to ground TLE — tanks, ACVs and artillery. Combat aircraft or helicopters can be deployed anywhere within the zone of application.

The treaty also provides for an extensive and intrusive regime of verification, using on-site inspection to ensure that the agreed restrictions are being met. An important side-effect of this regime is a general transparency in military matters.

After the signing of the treaty, agreements were reached within the two groups of states parties on national ceilings for all categories of TLE. The dissolution of the Soviet Union made a further settlement between its successor states — within the area of application for CFE — on new national ceilings necessary. A binding agreement, shown in the table below, was finally reached in Tashkent in the summer of 1992.

State	Tanks	ACVs	Artillery	Combat aircraft	Attack helicopters
Russia	6400	11480	6415	3450	890
Ukraine	4080	5050	4040	1090	330
Belarus	1800	2600	1615	260	80
Moldova	210	210	250	50	50
Georgia	220	220	285	100	50
Armenia	220	220	285	100	50
Azerbaijan	220	220	285	100	50
Kazakhstan	0	0	0	0	0
Total	13150	20000	13175	5150	1500

Kazakhstan has agreed not to deploy any TLE in the small part of its territory which lies within the area of application for CFE. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are not successor states to the USSR, thus they are by special agreement excluded from the area of application and are not subjected to national ceilings. Ex-Soviet troops, now Russian, stationed there are subject to the treaty's provisions, however.

The Soviet DPSS quota, applicable to ground equipment only, was also divided, between Russia, the Ukraine and Belarus. As the TLE stored in DPSS is included in the total, the quantity of TLE available for active units is reduced accordingly, as shown in the table below, indicating the figures for Russia.

	Tanks	ACVs	Artillery
Total ceiling	6400	11480	6415
of which in DPSS	1425	955	1310
Remaining active	4975	10525	5105

It should be noted that DPSS can as a rule only exist in the three inner zones, with special allowances in the flank zone for Leningrad Military District (MD) and the former Odessa MD.[1]

The Effects of CFE on Northern Europe

There has been fairly widespread apprehension within the Nordic security-policy community that reductions in Central Europe would lead to corresponding increases on the flanks. However, the treaty contains provisions preventing such effects, at least concerning the numbers of ground TLE. The most important of these provisions are specific ceilings for ground TLE in active units in the flank zone: 4,700 tanks, 5,900 ACVs and 6,000 artillery pieces.

Leningrad Military District

Leningrad MD, together with North Caucasus MD is part of the flank zone. When the allotments for non-Russian states have been deducted from the total flank ceiling, only 700 tanks, 580 ACVs and 1,280 artillery pieces remain for Russia to distribute to active units in these two MDs. To this should be added the quantity of TLE which may be kept in DPSS in Leningrad MD: 600 tanks, 800 ACVs and 400 artillery pieces. Importantly, such DPSS must be located south of the parallel N 60° 15', which runs through the northern outskirts of St. Petersburg.

These figures indicate a significant reduction as compared to the pre-CFE situation.[2] They also show that major re-deployments of ground units and materiel withdrawn from central Europe or the Baltic states to Leningrad MD would be in contravention to the treaty. Also, the CFE treaty ensures that Russian TLE-holding units in the Nordic vicinity will be subject to an intrusive regime of inspections at short notice, providing military transparency.

[1] Leningrad Military District still retains its old name, despite the city having changed its name to St. Petersburg.

[2] The 1992-93 edition of IISS' *Military Balance* includes, in addition to the traditional data per MD or group of forces, a useful map appendix on CFE limits and present holdings for the former USSR. The Norwegian Atlantic Committee publishes a North European version of the Military balance, entitled Militaerbalansen, which provides more detailed data on forces in the North.

It can therefore be concluded that the strict implementation of the CFE treaty and the maintenance of its integrity is in the interest of the Nordic states and beneficial to stability in the region as a whole.

How much TLE that will eventually be deployed to Leningrad MD depends on the relative priority given by Moscow to the northern and the southern "flanks" respectively. North Caucasus MD is now a frontier region not only bordering on volatile areas where wars are raging, but also actually including areas of open conflict, e.g., North Ossetia and Chechen-Ingushetia.

Thus, there seems to be good reason for Russia not to allocate to North Caucasus MD a proportionally smaller share of the Russian/Soviet flank total than hitherto, namely 25%. This would give Leningrad MD 75% and yield the following figures:

	Tanks	ACVs	Artillery
Active	375	235	860
DPSS	600	800	400
Total	975	1035	1260

It should be noted that this total includes TLE in service with airborne or naval units (naval infantry or coastal defence), i.e., units not under the command of the MD, only located there.

The treaty also allows for temporary deployment of TLE to the flank zone, but inside Russia such deployment is limited to a maximum of 153 tanks, 241 ACVs and 140 artillery pieces in active units. Also, any such deployment has to be notified. It seems likely that this option would primarily be preserved for peacekeeping or other contingencies in the region.

It should be noted that TLE held by any Russian forces in, e.g., Georgia or Moldova — on a non-temporary basis — would have to be deducted from the Russian flank total, further reducing the number available for deployment to the northern region.

The North-Western Group of Forces

The Baltic states are, after having regained independence, not covered by the treaty, but it should be noted that the ex-Soviet forces there and their equipment are. There is no longer a Baltic MD and its forces — whether in the Baltic countries or in Kaliningrad Oblast— are now organised into what is termed the North-Western Group of Forces (NWGF).

According to the zonal provisions of CFE, the former Soviet Baltic MD belongs to zone IV:3. In zone IV:3 the treaty allows for a maximum number of 10,300 tanks at active units, including the number of tanks in the innermost zone (IV:4). The

4,000 tanks allotted to Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary must be deducted. This would leave 6,300 tanks for the Soviet successor states to deploy in zone IV:3. As the Tashkent Agreement allots Ukraine 4,080 tanks and Belarus 1,800, it would appear that Russia could only hold 420 tanks within its part of zone IV:3, i.e., the ex-Baltic MD. As the IISS claims that Russia presently has some 1,600 tanks deployed in the former Baltic MD, of which almost 800 in Kaliningrad Oblast, it would seem that CFE would mandate a reduction.

However, TLE in DPSS is not subject to the zone restrictions, only to national ceilings. The former members of the Warsaw Pact has a collective DPSS quota of 3,500 tanks. Of this quota Russia's portion is 1,425 and the combined portions of the other states add up to 2,075. As the latter number does not count towards the zone restrictions, the number of tanks permitted for Russia in zone IV:3 rises by 2,075, from 420 to 2,495. Similar calculations for the other categories of ground TLE would yield 7,455 ACVs and 1,535 artillery pieces for Russia in zone IV:3. For tanks and ACVs — especially the latter — these figures are considerably higher than those for the present holdings of the North-Western Group of Forces. Furthermore, Ukrainian TLE in active units deployed to Odessa MD, which is part of the flank zone, would be deducted from the zone IV:3 total, and thus leave additional room for Russian deployments there.

However, if zone IV:3 was filled to the brim with ground TLE, only 1,500 tanks, 2,140 ACVs and 1,900 artillery pieces would remain to deploy in active units in the next zone outwards, IV:2. Thus, any quantity of active TLE — exceeding the figures above — deployed to Moscow and Volga-Urals MDs would reduce the number available for the NWGF correspondingly.

Moscow MD does not only contain the capital but now also borders on now independent Ukraine. Furthermore, Moscow and Volga-Urals MDs are natural staging areas for a central reserve. A deployment pattern giving the NWGF more TLE than those two MDs would surely seem unsatisfactory for Russia. Giving Moscow and Volga-Urals MDs two thirds of the TLE available for active units in zone IV:2, might be more reasonable and would be similar to the present distribution between the two MDs and the NWGF. This would still allow for a deployment of about 1,400 tanks, 3,300 ACVs and 1,300 artillery pieces to the NWGF; commensurate with 1992 holdings, except for ACVs where it represents an increase.

Finally, to the above figures should be added Russian TLE to be stored in DPSS. When the DPSS allotment for Leningrad MD has been deducted, some 825 tanks, 155 ACVs and 910 artillery pieces remain to be stored. While the CFE Treaty allows for DPSS within the ex-Baltic MD, it would for reasons outlined above seem better to place these storage sites within Moscow or Volga-Urals MDs.

The number of tanks and other TLE actually remaining in Kaliningrad Oblast after Russian withdrawal from the Baltic states, is highly uncertain — as is the

future strategic role of the enclave. However, considering the small size of Kaliningrad Oblast and it being cut off from the Motherland, it seems highly improbable that the old totals for Baltic MD will be exceeded. On the other hand, there are as yet no firm grounds for assuming that the 1992 strength in the oblast — some 750 tanks, 900 ACVs and 600 artillery — will be significantly undercut.

Finally, it can be concluded that the zonal restrictions of the CFE do not by themselves mandate Russian force reductions in the Baltic states or in Kaliningrad Oblast. Nonetheless, the fact that deployments to the former Baltic MD reduces the quantity of TLE which may be deployed to Moscow or Volga-Urals MDs, may indirectly help to reduce Russian presence on the shores of the Baltic Sea.

Possibilities of Circumvention

In the Nordic debate on the effects of the CFE Treaty it has sometimes been claimed that Russia could circumvent the treaty by substituting PT-76s for tanks; rebuilt MT-LBs for ACVs; and light artillery for heavy. This is only partly correct.

The PT-76 does not count as a tank under the treaty, but does count as a Heavy Armament Combat Vehicle (HACV), a sub-category of ACV. The assumed number of ACVs allowed in Leningrad MD is even more restrictive — especially for active units — than the number of tanks. There would thus seem to be scant advantage for Moscow in replacing tanks with PT-76s.

The MT-LB counts as an ACV but can indeed be "taken out of the treaty" by conversion into ammunition carrier (MT-LB-AT), with ammunition racks welded into place, reducing the maximum number of passengers to five. It is argued that these racks could be removed if necessary, allowing the vehicles to be used as ACVs once more. While this seems possible, the practical problems of a rapid and covert re-conversion of perhaps hundreds of such vehicles should not be underestimated.

Limits on artillery could indeed be circumvented by replacing existing equipment with smaller pieces having a calibre of less than 100 mm, which lie outside the scope of the treaty. This may be of some utility when it comes to mortars, e.g., using 82 mm mortars instead of 120 mm, but would seem to be rather ineffectual in the case of howitzers. One can also question the need for such re-equipping, as the assumed ceiling for artillery in Leningrad MD (1260) is more generous than the ceilings for tanks and ACVs.

Indeed, as the treaty applies the Steinean principle that "a piece of artillery is a piece of artillery is a piece of artillery" the best way of reducing the ceiling's impact on Russian firepower would seem to be the opposite: replacing existing artillery with heavier and more modern.

Effects on Quality and Modernity

The withdrawal of modern equipment from Central Europe, means that there is an abundance of modern equipment to be distributed throughout Russia The provisions of the CFE Treaty requires Russia to destroy tens of thousands of pieces of ex-Soviet military equipment, surplus to the ceilings. Naturally, Moscow has decided to destroy older TLE first, and to keep the newer and more capable. This has made it possible to equip all remaining units with modern or fairly modern heavy armaments.

Until recently, the modernity of military equipment in Leningrad MD was relatively low. Now, up-to-date T-80s have replaced obsolescent T-55s and T-62s. Commensurate developments seems to be under way concerning ACVs and artillery. The combined effect of withdrawals and the CFE Treaty is that the units of the Russian Army in the North are much better equipped than were their Soviet predecessors. The number of units is reduced, however, due to the TLE ceilings of the treaty.

2. Developments in Military Technology, Doctrine and Organisation

The impact of CFE limits on military capabilities will be tempered by the influence of changes in military technology, doctrine and organisation. Such changes can be spurred by CFE restrictions, or be independent of these. There seems to be three methods of adapting to the restrictions: to cheat; to make do within the limits by reorganisation and a change of tactics, perhaps adding equipment and procedures (such as command, control, communications and intelligence, C^3I) which act as force multipliers; or to develop new types or categories of equipment which can substitute for TLE in some roles. Technology is an important component of the latter two methods.

The Gulf War showed that the character and course of war can be greatly affected by the application of modern technology. Technically inferior equipment not only puts a military force at a tactical disadvantage, but such inferiority can also cause a serious erosion of morale.

General Trends

The battlefield of the future will probably have much less of a "front" than before. Combat can cover great space and great depth — as foreseen in the Air-Land Battle Doctrine — and take place at a higher tempo. This is not only because of increasing mobility at the tactical, operational and strategic levels, but also because of vastly enhanced facilities for C^3I, as well as lower force-to-space ratios. Airborne and heliborne units, and deep-penetrating "manoeuvre groups", may add to the "confusion" of the battlefield, underscoring the importance of rapidly discriminating between "target or non-target" over a wide area.

Furthermore, darkness and low visibility will not affect the battle as hitherto. Combat can take place around the clock, tactics and organisation permitting.

Concurrently, modern sensors are making target detection easier, even at long distances or at low visibility. The time from target detection to engagement is being shortened by the introduction of the Global Positioning System (GPS) and more effective command and control systems. The impact of an engagement is also being increased by weapons with greater range, rate of fire, and accuracy, e.g., Multiple-Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) and Precision-Guided Munitions (PGM) as demonstrated in the Gulf War.

The evolution of doctrine is probably heading towards manoeuvre warfare and a high degree of flexibility in tactics. Commanders will increasingly be trained for independent action in the fast pace likely on the modern battlefield. There will often not be time enough for commanders at a higher level of command to direct actions as before, making decisions at a lower level necessary. This may seem at odds with modern C^3I, which could be seen as facilitating direction from above, but senior staffs and commanders may be saturated by the amount of information available. Furthermore, the pace could be set by the technically superior side, making it necessary for others to compensate by allowing their subordinates greater freedom of action.

The technological and doctrinal evolution outlined above is part of the continual competition between firepower, mobility and protection, and between defence and offence. Currently, developments seem to favour mobility and firepower over protection, as well as detection over concealment. This could encourage the concentration of fire as an alternative to the concentration of forces, for defensive or offensive purposes. Any concentration of forces will increasingly run the risk of being detected and attacked, while a more dispersed deployment will allow fire — and in some cases also forces — to be rapidly brought to bear at a chosen point.

According to one view, increases in firepower and in the ability to detect targets could give rise to tactical/operational stalemates of a 1915 type, where combatants do not dare move for fear of destruction. In the First World War, the way out of the trenches was finally shown by the British tank and by German infiltration tactics — the two forerunners of *Blitzkrieg*. In a modern context, the antidote for stalemate is yet to be seen, but the introduction of new equipment, e.g., automatic or remotely operated vehicles, would probably not suffice. There would also be a need for significant changes in doctrine and organisation, changes of a type which seldom occur without the previous doctrine having failed in an obvious and often costly manner.

An alternative view focuses on the tempo of operations, seeing increased mobility and enhanced C^3I as decisive on the future battlefield; commanders will

aim to carry out operations at such a speed that the enemy will not be able to react in time, putting him at a very great disadvantage.

Experiences from the Gulf War might in this context focus interest on the first phase of a war. The manner in which surprise and the use of PGM paralysed the defender at the opening of the air campaign, allowing for his subsequent destruction, will probably greatly influence operational and tactical doctrine in the future — in spite of the fact that these lessons hardly are universally applicable.

Such developments could — unless offset by advances in, e.g., intelligence, early warning or survivability — greatly favour offensive action. The advantages of striking first, and the costs of receiving the first blow, might in a tense situation create strong incentives for pre-emption — a "high-tech 1914".

Which one of these two analogies — 1915 or 1914 — is the most correct remains to be seen. It cannot be ruled out that they will both prove spurious

The Impact of Reductions and Limits.

Concerning military organisation, trends — driven by the changing strategic situation and by concerns for costs, as well as by reductions stemming from CFE — strongly indicate a high-low mix within a smaller total force. The high end would consist of standing or professional units, very flexible and capable, equipped with modern systems, and often with a high degree of mobility. Such units would be suitable for rapid reaction and covering force purposes in different areas of operations, important within a smaller overall force structure. They might, however, also be useful for interventions and coups de main. Concentration of a large number of such units, or of support for them, would often not be necessary in advance, as they can be provided with firepower unthinkable in the past. The lower end of the force would consist of larger and more traditional units, with fewer "high tech" systems and often dependent on mobilisation.

At a tactical level, there seems to be a general movement in the direction of all-round units with a capability to carry out independent actions, as a way of handling a combination of restrictions on equipment and an uncertain strategic situation. It should be noted that armoured vehicles equipped as command posts, observation posts, fire direction centres, communications nodes, as well as light scout vehicles, specialised anti-tank or anti-aircraft vehicles and ammunition supply vehicles, etc., are not restricted by CFE. By adding a liberal measure of such vehicles to units previously dominated by tanks and ACVs it might be possible to better utilise the combat potential of the TLE available. Certain units could also be partly equipped with materiel not limited by CFE, with the option of adding TLE in case of conflict.

As mentioned previously, one possible way of tempering the effects of CFE limits would be to develop special equipment substituting for TLE or optimised to fit into the treaty's definitions; a parallel to the Washington cruisers and pocket battleships of the 1920s and 1930s. Presently, there seems to be little reason for such probably rather costly endeavours — reductions are driven by the absence of threats and by domestic concerns for cost as well as by CFE.[3] Russia and the United States also has the option of retaining equipment outside the area of application for CFE.

It might in this context be of interest to speculate a little on the future of the tank, not least because of its importance for the past 50-75 years and its role in the CFE treaty. Is the tank dead? Could a suitable replacement for the tank be found? If not, will the tank be the backbone of the smaller "standing" forces with their emphasis on mobility, or will the tank primarily be connected with a heavier and slower "main force", often dependent on mobilisation?

There are no easy answer to such questions. Claims of the "Death of the Tank" have often been made, and proved premature, e.g., after the Yom Kippur War. In this paper it is assumed that the tank will continue to play a vital part on the battlefield until a platform providing a better mix of protection, mobility, and lethality appears, or until a reasonably affordable and non-complex weapon poses a very real threat to it. For the foreseeable future, the tank will probably not only remain a vital component of main forces but also be found in rapid reaction forces — unless transportability by air is a requirement or suitable "light tanks" can be developed as a replacement.

Consequences for Russian Force Structure

The fact that Russia will not have the enormous advantage in numbers over its (potential) adversaries that the Soviet Union had, in combination with the lessons of the Gulf War and with the evolution of technology, gives reason to believe that Russian military doctrine and organisation will evolve in the same general direction as in the West.

Such a development would also be in consonance with much of the professional debate, as well as some other developments, within the Soviet military during the 1980. In this process, in which Marshal Ogarkov was often ascribed an important role by western observers, the need for major changes in doctrine, organisation and equipment in order to utilise the "third revolution of military affairs" and to keep up with the western concepts of Follow-On-Forces Attack (FOFA) and Air-Land Battle figured prominently. Among the possible solutions

[3] The US development of a tank destroyer/light tank of 15 tons, but with separately transported armour which can bring the vehicle up to "tank standard", has its rationale in the need for strategic mobility and transportability by helicopter, not in CFE circumvention. Such a vehicle would be restricted by CFE in the same way that the PT-76 is.

were brigades, operational manoeuvre-groups, PGMs and "integrated reconnaissance-strike complexes".

There is thus reason to assume that Russian developments in doctrine and organisation for its ground forces will include the following features:

* a force structure with a high-low mix containing a smaller number of standing, perhaps largely professional, forces with modern equipment and considerable mobility; a larger number of more traditional units; and a capability for mobilisation and reinforcement.

* flexible, balanced brigades/regiments with commanders capable of acting independently.
* emphasis on airmobile units and operations, including the capability to use attack helicopters over territory held by the enemy, e.g., as support for penetrating or inserted forces.
* less dependence on mass and an increased emphasis on speed, timing and precision.
* precision-guided and smart weapons.
* upgraded logistics.
* better means and skills for combat at night or in bad weather.
* integrated systems capable of surveillance, target detection and co-ordinated target attack, even against an enemy possessing high-tech weapons. ("Integrated reconnaissance-strike complexes".)
* increasing emphasis on communications and on mobile command facilities.
* better capabilities for electronic warfare, including counter-countermeasures.
* an emphasis on space-based systems.

The extent to which such changes, some of them costly, can actually be carried out in practice is of course dependent on the priorities set by Russia's political leaders and on the economic and industrial abilities of Russia. However, several of the outlined changes, e.g., a transition to a brigade organisation, are not particularly expensive and could be carried out even in the absence of a pro-defence political climate. Furthermore, it can not be ruled out that the prospect of exports, or concerns for industrial survival or for unemployment, can lead to a continuation of military research, development and production above the level justified by the strategic and military situation.

The matter of a transition to brigades might warrant a some further motivation. Ever since the Second World War the division has been the basic tactical building block of the Soviet/Russian force structure and the lowest level at which co-ordination in battle — beyond simple drills — was meant to take place. Indeed, Soviet doctrine emphasised the operational level, the army or the front, where the important decisions were to be made. This view was partly a result of the lack of trained commanders, as compared to the Germans, that the Soviets

suffered from during the war.[4] The German army was also organised in divisions consisting of regiments, as were most powers at that time, but the *Wehrmacht* also utilised a flexible system of *kampfgruppen.*, brigade-sized ad-hoc units with a balanced mix of forces and capable of acting independently. The Red Army could not take this route and had to concentrate its few competent officers on leading relatively larger units or formations — divisions or armies. Decision-making was centralised, as was the control over key assets — such as tank units, artillery or logistics — in order to ensure that they were applied at the point of decision in a concentrated manner. This proved to be a workable system and the basic pattern has survived until the present in a Soviet army which greatly valued its traditions and experiences from the "Great Patriotic War".

What could the reasons be for the Russians to change their organisation an adopt a brigade system ?

Generally, a brigade structure, as compared to a divisional structure built on regiments[5], offers several advantages: flexibility, including the ability to adapt to unforeseen events during combat; autonomous action with smaller units, thus reducing the dependence on mass; and co-ordination of functions at a lower level, facilitating rapid decisions and reducing vulnerability to, e.g., electronic warfare. These are all characteristics which may be important on a non-linear battlefield with reduced force-to-space ratios. Brigades, more homogenous than divisions, also make it harder for the adversary to detect the intended point of concentration, whereas the presence of a divisional tank regiment, or a tank division, indicates the area intended for breakthrough.[6] Among the disadvantages of a brigade structure are, besides the larger requirement for commanders and staffs, that it becomes harder to for the higher echelons of command to bring assets to bear at a chosen point of concentration.

More specifically, the following reasons may particularly relevant in the context of post-CFE force structure in North West Russia, where TLE limits for Leningrad MD are restrictive, especially for active units:
* A brigade structure makes better use of the limited number of TLE by integrating e. g., tank and mechanised infantry sub-units with assets not limited by CFE, e.g., engineers, reconnaissance and support, at a lower level.
* A brigade structure allows, *ceteris paribus*, a greater number of units capable of acting autonomously, making it possible to cover a greater area and making more tactical and operational options available to superior commanders.

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[4] In itself a result of Stalin's purges of Red Army officers before the war and of the expansion of the Army during the war.

[5] Unless otherwise indicated, "division" or "divisional structure" is used in this paper to connote the traditional Soviet type, consisting of specialised regiments and where integration takes place at the divisional level. This is unlike the West, where a division often contains three brigades capable of acting more independently.

[6] Of course, brigades can also be heterogeneous and of differing types.

* Brigades can be given considerable firepower, but would be smaller and more mobile than divisions. The movements of a division would be constrained by the sparse road system of the north, and could also be more easily be detected and attacked.
* The brigade staff is more capable as compared to a regimental staff within a division. This allows for greater flexibility in, e.g., receiving reinforcements, detaching "combat groups" or fighting around the clock, as compared to the regiment.

Larger and more capable staffs would naturally require a greater proportion of well-trained officers at the tactical level. These, however, are no longer in such short supply. It might even be advantageous that a brigade structure would create job opportunities for some of the many Russian officers made redundant by reductions and withdrawals. If these officers, used to division tactics, can be re-trained for a new and more flexible way of combat is another question.

It remains to see what organisational form the level immediately above brigade would take. One model, reportedly tested by the Soviet Army during the late 1980s, is to create a corps out of four or five brigades, plus support elements. Another model could follow the Western track of having divisions made up of three brigades plus support elements. Conceivably, these two models could co-exist, with a brigade-division structure in areas with higher force densities and where the brigades can be expected to fight together, and a brigade-corps structure in areas where the brigade would act more separately.

3 The Structure of Ground Forces in North West Russia

It is possible, against the background above, to hypothesise about a future force structure for ground forces in North West Russia. It should be kept in mind though, that the following reasoning, which focuses on Leningrad MD, it is a matter of conjecture, not prognosis.

When discussing future force structures in Leningrad MD the quantity of TLE allowed, and the distribution between different categories, must be kept in mind. Other important factors in determining force structure are terrain and operational requirements — which differ widely within Leningrad MD — as well as political considerations and infrastructure.

While the terrain around and to the south of St. Petersburg is suitable for tanks and conventional mechanised forces, the terrain of the northern wilderness is operationally very different. Kola and much of the heavily forested Finnish-Russian border area, rich in lakes and streams but with a sparse network of roads, is no "tank country". Neither is there any need for a great number of tanks, as the neighbouring countries have few or no tanks in the vicinity. The role of tanks in the Far North is mainly to provide a cutting edge against softer forces,

and in taking and holding key terrain. The main task of combat would fall on infantry, especially mechanised troops with armoured personnel carriers, and on artillery.[7] As a complement, transport and combat helicopters would be very valuable for movements as well as for fire support in an environment where vehicles often are limited by having to stick to the few roads available. Artillery units may also prove useful in this terrain, especially if augmented by heliborne forces and modern sensors and communications.

The estimates above indicate that CFE will allow for 975 tanks in Leningrad MD, of which 375 could be in active units, 1,035 ACVs, of which 235 in active units, and 1,260 artillery pieces, of which 860 in active units. Notable is the remarkably small proportion of ACVs, with fewer ACVs than tanks.[8] There is no obvious way of matching these ingredients into a coherent whole; any attempt involves difficult trade-offs and radical changes as compared to the present force structure.

It thus seems as if CFE will not allow for a Leningrad MD active force structure emphasising mechanised infantry and low on tanks, the type we have seen in later year and which would be suitable for much of the local terrain. On the contrary, there is a high proportion of tanks as compared to ACVs. The relative abundance of artillery could be used in several ways: to give combat units a large allotment of artillery; to concentrate it at corps/army level in order to provide support at the point of main effort — thus implying an offensive capability; as the backbone of artillery-heavy infantry units[9], e.g., artillery/machine-gun divisions, mainly suitable for defensive tasks; or to create "reconnaissance-strike complexes", should Russia choose to develop such hi-tech capabilities in the future.

Nonetheless, it seems reasonable that Russia will strive to maintain mechanised infantry units of a more conventional type in the southern part of Leningrad MD, and units of a type adapted to the area's special conditions in the north, perhaps complemented by artillery/machine-gun units. Furthermore, Leningrad MD is likely to continue to contain a number of priority units with high mobility and readiness, such as airborne, airmobile, naval infantry and *spetsnaz*. These might form part of a Russian "mobile force" under central command, but could also be used for operations in the region.

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[7] The special conditions of the far North has hitherto made Russia maintain units specifically tailored for combat in this region, so called "Northern" units with few tanks but with plenty of APCs — often MT-LB which can move over snow — and artillery.

[8] This can be compared to the present situation with some 1,200 tanks and 1,800 ACVs, and with the airborne division at Pskov has more than 400 ACVs, 170% of the active ACV quota for the entire Leningrad MD.

[9] It appears hard to fully mechanise a reasonable number of such units, considering the low number of ACVs available and the fact that ACVs would also be needed for mechanised units of a more conventional type.

Upon mobilisation, or when TLE stored in DPSS is otherwise put into active service, the additional materiel could be used to fill out gaps in existing units, to expand units (e.g., from brigade to division), or to equip entirely new units.

Finally, withdrawals from Central Europe and from parts of the former Soviet Union will probably lead to a higher concentration of combat aircraft and helicopters within Russia, including Leningrad MD, as well as an accelerated modernisation of such units. A notable increase in the number of modern attack helicopters in the north has already taken place, a significant development for a Scandinavian point of view. Su-25 ground support aircraft have also been re-deployed to the Kola. The limits for further such deployments will probably be set mainly by infrastructure and by military utility, as the CFE Treaty sets no zonal restrictions for aircraft and helicopters, only for ground TLE.

A Hypothetical Force Structure Compatible with CFE

For the purposes of analysis, dividing the assumed number of TLE into battalion-size "packages" might be useful. 375 tanks would yield nine battalions of 40 each, 235 ACVs would yield seven battalions of 31 each, and 860 artillery 35-47 battalions of 18-24 pieces each.

Using the nine tank packages as nuclei, nine ground combat brigades can formed. Three or four of these would be of the traditional motor rifle type and deployed in the vicinity of St. Petersburg and the southern part of the MD, one would be naval infantry, based on the Kola, and the remaining four or five would be northern type, or territorial, brigades based north of St. Petersburg, including on the Kola. In addition to these there would be one airborne brigade and one — or more — airmobile, none of which would contain tanks. An illustration of this force structure is provided in figure 2.

As noted above, the small number of ACVs is a bottleneck. The airborne brigade, a priority unit which can be expected to be used also in peacetime contingencies, would probably get at least one, perhaps two battalions, of these. Of the remaining five battalion sets, three would be used to equip the three motor rifle brigades in the south, and two for brigades in the Far North. Four brigades would thus be entirely without ACVs in peacetime. There is sufficient artillery to give each of the nine ground-combat brigades, as well as the airborne brigade, up to 60 pieces each and still create up four or five independent artillery brigades.

A typical active brigade would thus have a combat core of one tank battalion, one mechanised infantry battalion in ACVs, and perhaps a second infantry battalion in MT-LB-ATs or trucks.[10] There would also be two or three artillery battalions, as well as reconnaissance, engineering, staff and support units. The Northern type brigades might have more artillery, and use MT-LBs instead of BMPs for the

[10] Alternatively, a second mechanised infantry battalion might be formed on mobilisation.

mechanised infantry. Also some of the logistics could be carried on MT-LB-ATs or other tracked vehicles, in order to reduce dependence on the few roads available.

In the suggested structure, four of the active brigades would have to make do without ACVs, as might one battalion in each the other five brigades. Such a solution has drawbacks, but there is no alternative unless the number of units is reduced drastically. Usually the problem with sub-units having "odd" equipment is not with the leadership and staff, but with the reduced or uneven capabilities of the sub-units. The odd equipment may not only be less capable, but also necessitate time-consuming retraining of the troops. As a consequence, morale might suffer.

An important question is how the equipment stored in DPSS south of Lake Ladoga would be used upon mobilisation, or when otherwise taken into active service. The number of TLE is sufficient for 15 tank battalions, 25 ACV battalions and 16-18 artillery battalions. Designating the bulk of the stored equipment for units in the southern part of the MD seems reasonable, especially if speedy activation is a major concern, as movement of the TLE from St. Petersburg to Kola by rail would take a considerable time — 24 hours per brigade.

Rounding out each of the nine brigades to two battalions of ACVs would consume 13 battalions. The remaining 12 ACV battalions could be used to set up six new brigades, which would also need six of the tank battalions and twelve of the artillery battalions, plus engineers, etc. These brigades could be independent. It is also conceivable that the six new brigades could be built around the core of three active mechanised brigades, leading to the creation of three mechanised divisions, probably located around St. Petersburg or in the South.[11]

Six battalions worth of tanks would remain. These could be used as reserves, organised into two tank brigades, or they could be used to reinforce the other six active brigades.[12]

On the matter of personnel, adding mobilising battalions directly into the standing brigades is probably the fastest way of getting the majority of units ready for combat. Splitting active brigades in two or building new ones around their core makes sizeable staffs and support functions necessary in the standing brigades. One way of speeding up activation of the equipment in storage could be to bring in serving personnel, in complete "unit sets", from other military

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[11] Such a division could include three brigades, a tank battalion and an artillery regiment. Each of the brigades would include one tank battalion, two motor rifle battalions and an artillery regiment. The division would then contain 160 tanks, 186 ACVs and 192 pieces of artillery.

[12] Whether the result would be six strong brigades, or — with elements mounted on trucks or MT-LB-ATs — six two-brigade divisions is open to debate.

districts, rather than relying on call-up of civilian reservists who may have to be re-trained before they are fully combat ready.

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Concerning the forces in Kaliningrad Oblast, it has already been noted that CFE does not in itself necessitate reductions or restructuring there. The present force structure, including two or three mechanised divisions, two tank divisions, an artillery division, and a naval infantry brigade, could thus be maintained in the future. Whether such relatively large forces will actually be deployed or not depends on political factors, the strategic role of the enclave, and the need for TLE in Moscow and Volga-Urals Military Districts. The ground forces that do remain in Kaliningrad Oblast may, however, also be reorganised in a manner similar to those outlined for mechanised brigades or divisions in the southern part of Leningrad MD. An important aspect will be if the oblast will contain units with high readiness and mobility, suitable for the projection of power outside the oblast, or not.

Finally, it should be noted that air and naval developments are important factors affecting overall Russian military capabilities in the Northern region, although not analysed in this paper.

Withdrawals from Central Europe are leading to an increasing number of Russian air units in the vicinity of Scandinavia as well as a modernisation of their equipment. However, the combat capabilities of many Russian Air Force units is presently very low — due, e.g., to a very small number of flight hours per pilot, much less than needed to maintain the necessary skills. These deficiencies in skills could of course be rectified over a period of a few years. Another way of accomplishing air-to-ground support could be an increased Russian use of helicopters in that role.

A notable fact is also that the dissolution of the Soviet Union meant that Moscow lost control of a large part of her air- and amphibious-transport capacity. About half of the heavy-transport aircraft fleet remains under Russian control, the rest having been taken over by Ukraine and others; and only one fifth of the Soviet Union's Baltic fleet of medium-sized Roll-on/Roll-off ships now flies the Russian flag.

4. Capabilities for Offensive Operations — A Discussion around Three "Cases"

Since 1945 the Soviet threat has been the predominant factor in the Nordic security situation. The crumbling of the Soviet empire has led to radical changes including the emergence of a military power vacuum in the Baltic area. Russia is nonetheless still the largest country, holding the largest armed forces, within the region.

Moscow's loss of her position of power and military advantage in Central Europe may serve to redirect her political and military attention to the Baltic region. The Russian striving to secure ports and other forms of access to the Baltic Sea, and for a strong position of power in the region, has deep historical roots. Such old security interests will probably be a feature of Russian policy also in the future.

The strategic importance of the Kola peninsula may actually increase as a result of recent developments; as Russia's conventional forces decrease in numbers, her nuclear weapons — and thus also the Murmansk bases — become relatively more important. This trend is reinforced by recent agreements on strategic nuclear forces, which favour shipborne forces. Furthermore, US withdrawal of forces from Europe increases Europe's dependence on transatlantic reinforcements, should tension returns, once again making sea-lines of communication and the Russian Northern Fleet centres of interest

An important unknown in the strategic equation of the Nordic region is Russia's future relations to other Soviet successor states, which could have significant consequences for Russian military power. The future position of Belarus is of special interest in this context: Will she be hostile, friendly or even *de facto* part of Russia.

It cannot prudently be ruled out that Russia, under a different political leadership, will try to regain or compensate for her recent losses in the Baltic region, or otherwise see a need for offensive operations in the North, perhaps in order to protect her strategic assets. Of course, whether such action would actually be taken would depend on Moscow's reading of the political situation in the West, and of western reactions to Russian aggression. A total American withdrawal from Europe, a "de-coupling" of the security situation in the North from that in Central and Western Europe, or a fragmentation of Europe, would increase the risk that the Baltic and Nordic areas could become part of Russia's backyard

The drastic reduction of Moscow's potential for a large-scale military offensive in Central Europe is very beneficial for the security of the Nordic states as well. However, key assets which until recently where tied up in the centre — such as strike aircraft and certain high-quality forces — would now be available for use in other areas. Furthermore, the lack of offensive options in the centre could, in a crisis, make the former northern flank one of the few areas where strategically significant results could be attained with available forces, turning the North from a flank into a main theatre of operation.

In this context, mobile high-tech units with a high level of readiness constitute a considerable threat against defence forces with older equipment and dependent on mobilisation, such as the Scandinavian ones. In a more fluid security environment, with troop movements and local conflicts being part of normalcy,

preparations for an attack might not stand out as such to intelligence analysts and political decision makers. Preparations of standing forces for combat could perhaps also be concealed in a pattern of peacetime exercises. On the other hand, the fact that larger exercises have to be notified one year in advance according to the Vienna Document, coupled with the right to inspect units and exercises, should help to reduce the risk of surprise. It remains to be seen whether the collection and timely and correct analysis of intelligence will, on the whole, be complicated or simplified by these developments.

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In the following, Russia's future capabilities for offensive operations in the Nordic region will be discussed against the background of three hypothetical cases. In this, an attempt is made to cover as many as possible of the problems and developments outlined previously. The cases have been chosen with an eye to a geographic spread, a spread in the types of conflicts and the numbers of actors, and to a wish to present as many questions and problems as possible.

The following assumptions are applied to all the three following "cases", set around the turn of the century:

* numerical reductions according to the CFE Treaty have been effected;
* Russian withdrawal from the Baltic states has been completed;
* Kaliningrad Oblast is still an important Russian base area;
* Russia's armed forces are smaller but more effective as a result of concerted re-structuring and a continued modernisation;
* ground forces in Leningrad MD and in Kaliningrad Oblast have the structure outlined in section three;
* the Nordic countries have defence structures similar to those of the early 1990s, although reduced in size;
* Nato is still in existence, but with a reduced prominence and military capability;
* the Baltic states have national forces, albeit small, capable of frontier surveillance and sovereignty assertion.

Case 1: Land Grab — Gotland and the Baltic States

The operation envisaged is a rapid Russian seizure of the three Baltic States and of the Swedish island of Gotland. The motives for such an operation could be military-strategic, such as improving the base situation for naval and air defence forces and creating a defensive zone which excludes the western powers, or political-strategic, showing strength externally and internally, restoring part of the old order etc.

The Operation (figure 3)

If Gotland is to be included, the achievement of surprise would be of paramount importance, as would be speed in execution and the creation of a *fait accompli*. Hence, the attack on Gotland would have to commence before, or at least simultaneously with, the attack on the Baltic states. Deception would also be important, one way could be to conceal preparations for an attack within the normal pattern of peacetime exercises, another to create a pretext for increased presence and activity in the area, e.g., a grounded Russian vessel requesting assistance or ethnic problems.

An attack could initially be shrouded by massive electronic warfare, and special forces could be used to prevent the defenders from taking effective measures or mobilising their forces.

Concerning the Baltic states, mechanised brigades from Leningrad MD and large forces from Kaliningrad Oblast could be sent across the borders, in combination with airborne or airmobile elements landing in the vicinity of the capitals or major airfields.

Concerning Gotland, the shortage of substantial Swedish standing forces reduces the number of attacking units required. *Spetsnaz*, air-launched PGMs and cruise missiles could be used to sow confusion, take out garrisons and key installations and — on the Swedish mainland — to prevent the Swedish Air Force from interfering effectively. A battalion-size parachute assault on Visby airport would allow reinforcements and various forms of equipment — including surface-to-air and surface-to-sea missiles — to be flown in as soon as the airport is taken. Forces brought in by air could be complemented initially by "Trojan horses", civilian ships or even alleged refugee vessels clandestinely carrying troops and equipment.

Naval infantry could be used to consolidate the situation and also provide heavy forces, if needed. Approximately one or two battalions with heavy equipment could fairly swiftly be brought in from Kaliningrad by hovercraft or by "Wing-in-ground" vessels, should the latter be operational.

Possibilities/Problems

There are good reasons to believe that the Swedish forces on Gotland could not defend the island without mobilisation and/or reinforcements from the mainland. Even if readiness is somewhat raised and local forces start to mobilise, the defending units will small, disorganised and be short on key equipment. Furthermore, once the island had fallen, Sweden's capability to re-take Gotland by force would be very limited, indeed. Russian anti-ship missiles deployed on Gotland would, for example, severely hamper Swedish naval operations in the area. On the other hand, the operation would be very vulnerable to effective

countermeasures, e.g., by the Swedish Air Force, especially during the early stages, and the readiness of the RSwAF is fairly high.

Hence, attaining a *fait accompli* by surprise is essential to the attack on Gotland. The operation has to be carried out with the forces available, without revealing movement of reserves. This type of operation should favour, indeed require standing units with high mobility and with high-tech equipment.

'The relative lack of numbers and scarcity of heavy weapons in the attacking force against Gotland can partly be made up for by tempo of execution and by technical superiority; a clear advantage in, e.g., night combat capability or in C^3I could help the attackers to outpace and to overwhelm the defenders. Aviation assets would also be of great importance, not only for direct air support and for transportation, but also for attaining local air superiority and blocking attempts by the Swedish Air Force to interfere. The operation would be greatly facilitated if the attackers could use helicopters, especially combat helicopters with all-weather capability. Use of helicopters based in Kaliningrad Oblast would, however, presuppose increases in range or in-flight refuelling capability.

Russian forces and bases in Kaliningrad Oblast would be essential in the outlined attack on Gotland, as the ranges from bases in the Gulf of Finland are too great. The forces in the oblast would also make it possible to use overwhelming force, and to conduct a pincer movement, against the Baltic states without significant re-deployment in advance, and to erect an air- and naval cordon in the Eastern Baltic.

Without offensive capability in the Kaliningrad enclave things might look very different; CFE places such tight limits on the number of TLE and forces in southern Leningrad MD that future Estonian and Latvian national defences might blunt or significantly delay a Russian attack made with only locally available active units.

Speed and surprise would be important for an invasion of the Baltic states, as for the attack on Gotland. Early access to air bases in the Baltic states would greatly improve the Russian position in the eastern Baltic; in the Gulf War the French succeeded in making air-bases operational within 48 hours. Effective or drawn out Baltic resistance would, however, increase the risks of a strong reaction in the West; the effects on public opinion of combat footage on CNN could be hard to predict.

The reactions of "third parties" could thus be a critical factor in this type of operation. If the West's feeble attempts in Yugoslavia were to set the tone for the future, an aggressive regime in Moscow might not take the risk of active intervention very seriously. However, political conditions can change rapidly and a deployment of Western — especially US — aircraft to air bases in Sweden could upset the strategic calculus of the operation outlined here. One way of

dealing with foreign reactions could be to state very clearly that the operational objectives are limited and that achieved positions will be defended "by all necessary means".

Is the Operation Feasible?

There is no clear-cut answer to this question. The numerical limits of CFE are not in themselves prohibitive, if the attack is carried out rapidly and achieves surprise, so that the number and size of attacking units can be kept low. Concerning Gotland, geographic and basing constraints — restricting initial deployment of air and transport assets prior to the attack — are probably more prohibitive than the CFE limits for the number of TLE.

As noted, the Kaliningrad enclave is of great importance as a base for an attack on Gotland, as are substantial forces there if an invasion of the Baltic states is to be executed rapidly with overwhelming force. However, the position of the enclave and the density of forces there could make it vulnerable, e.g., to a western air campaign, in a conflict. In this context, the importance of Belarus for the local correlation of forces should also be recognised; an alliance between Minsk and Moscow would have significant effects on security in the south-eastern part of the Baltic littoral.

Case 2: Coup de Main — Stockholm

This operation against Stockholm is intended to quickly paralyse and break Swedish resistance, making a subsequent occupation of all of Sweden possible. The attack would be launched using very limited forces and come as a "bolt out of the blue".

If Russia succeed in taking Sweden the strategic situation would change dramatically in Russian favour, not only in the Baltic region, but in northern Europe as a whole. With access to Swedish air bases, Russian strike aircraft could reach the United Kingdom as well as large parts of continental Europe, and could threaten sea lines of communication in the North Sea, the English Channel and the North East Atlantic.

The Operation (figure 4)

As in the case of Gotland, surprise and speed are at a premium if Swedish countermeasures are to be avoided and if the attacker's force and transport requirements are to be kept reasonable, within CFE limits. It would probably be a high-risk operation; even few or small Swedish forces could — if potent — threaten the success of the operation.

The attack would concentrate on Stockholm, based on the idea that if the national leadership is neutralised and if the capital falls, resistance will crumble, and on such rapidly available Swedish units which could threaten the operation. It would, however, also be important to seal off other major population centres and to otherwise prevent mobilisation from taking place and resistance from continuing.

In an operation such as this, restrictions on the number and type of units in the initial attack are set more by the requirement for surprise and by geographic factors, and the availability of transport, than by CFE limits. The lack of numbers and of "heaviness" can partly be made up for by the use of unconventional means — such as *spetsnaz*, sleeping agents and Trojan horses, and by the use of cruise missiles, PGMs and air support.

Sabotage units, mines, PGMs and cruise missiles could be used neutralise the Swedish Air Force and other key high-readiness units, to cripple power supply, telecommunications and road traffic, to eliminate political and military leaders, and to generally sow confusion. The capital would be sealed off from the rest of the country. Other important areas could be isolated in a similar manner and, if necessary, pacified by selective terror strikes.

Special forces could, reinforced by paratroops, seize the major airports in the capital region. Once an airport was secured, additional troops and equipment could be brought in. Heavy follow-on forces and troops for occupation could be brought by ship across the Baltic as soon as the operation had begun.

Possibilities/Problems

This type of high-risk operation only allows for very small margins. There is no time for failures or any "second tries". One advantage to the attacker is that the defender will have substantial difficulties in realising what is happening and in identifying the main thrust during the very confusing opening of the attack.

The success of the operation is dependent on surprise. Hence, no advance warning can be afforded and success in concealing preparations is crucial. This means that almost nothing can be done in or versus the Baltic States in advance. Thus, the starting position, including that for air and sea transportation, will be disadvantageous, If Russia also chooses to attack the Baltic States to improve her strategic position, the preparations and the attack have to start late in order not to endanger the attack on Stockholm.

Besides surprise, firepower and tempo of operations would be key elements in this type of operation, reminiscent of the "high-tech 1914" mentioned previously. Like the Gotland operation, this operation benefits from the fact that no large forces are needed, as there are no or few active units in the Swedish army. Active Russian units should — if they have top-quality training and equipment —

suffice to provide the small forces needed for the initial part of the operation. The only active elements of the Swedish armed forces are parts of the Air Force and the Navy. These, however have to be neutralised at the outset of the attack. This task, as well as the initial strike against telecommunications, bridges, etc., would be greatly facilitated by a combination of sabotage units and PGMs and cruise missiles. The precision of modern munitions would allow the initial strike to be rapid, yet effective. Surface-to-surface missiles could also be used against air bases and key installations in southern and northern Sweden.

Air strikes and air defence would also be needed for some time to keep Swedish air force and navy units from recuperating and interfering, as well as to suppress any army units that manage to mobilise. Russia would also be prudent to detach forces for flank guard duty against reactions from other powers.

The possible reactions of other powers have to be taken seriously. Western powers might certainly be reluctant to go to war over Sweden, and the aim would be to present them with a fait accompli. Nonetheless, the reactions to such a strategic surprise are hard to foresee; one way of reducing the risk of war with the United States and its allies could be to make it very clear that Sweden, and only Sweden, is the target of the operation. Finland's position would be very exposed, but as long as Russia did not threaten Finland directly she might not feel obliged to involve herself.

Is the Operation Feasible?

In a high-risk operation such as this, the limits set on the number of TLE by the CFE Treaty are not particularly restrictive. More important would be skilful but covert preparations, the availability of key units, whether certain capabilities existed or not, geographic constraints and transport capacity. Importantly, immediate preparations, such as the concentration of transport and strike aircraft, would have to be concealed.

In this context, Swedish abilities in intelligence and decision-making would play a crucial role. Would Sweden see the danger in time? Would she take the proper precautions in time? On the one hand, reductions in the number of Russian conventional units, as well as inspection rights under CFE and other elements of military transparency, should facilitate correct intelligence assessments and strategic warning. On the other hand, CFE-type transparency does not include units without TLE, such as special forces, and the more disorderly situation in Europe — with internal strife part of normalcy — could make it harder to discern preparations for an attack.

To predict with any degree of certainty the outcome of this problem is not feasible, and neither is a "hard" assessment of the numbers of troops and units needed for this kind of operation. The German invasion of Norway in 1940 achieved surprise and was successful, this in spite of several warnings and

intelligence reports revealing preparations and in spite of troop strengths that seemed prohibitively low.

It should be noted that the CFE Treaty does not place restrictions on airborne units, only on their armoured vehicles. Although transport aircraft are not limited by the CFE, airlift capacity would still constitute a bottleneck. However, even though Russia's air-transport capacity has been significantly reduced she could still launch a sizeable airborne attack. This is especially so if the amount of heavy equipment in the airborne units is kept low, at least in the initial attacks. Thus, CFE limits on the number of armoured vehicles and reductions in air transport capacity may interact to create lighter airborne forces than previously.

Finally, a vital factor in such an operation would be the correlation of forces in the air, as regards both numbers and geography. The map clearly indicates that Russia's starting position for an attack upon Stockholm has been seriously weakened by the withdrawal from the Baltic States

Case 3: The Far North and Finland

Russia launches an attack on Finland and Northern Norway, aiming to occupy all of Finland and the northern parts of Norway, the counties of Finnmark and Troms. The motive for an offensive in the Arctic could be a perceived need to establish a protective zone for the strategically important Kola base complex, the patrol areas of SSBNs, and the Northern Fleet.[13] The inclusion of the rest of Finland in the plan would be a result of the need to use Finnish territory in the north, and the geographic proximity of to central and southern Finland to the Murmansk railroad and St. Petersburg.

It would not be absolutely necessary to include Sweden in such an attack. However, a glance at the map shows that the northernmost tip of Sweden — the "parrot beak" — offers a convenient way to bypass the strong Norwegian defensive position at Lyngen. The parrot beak is remote and completely desolate and the leadership in Moscow might ask itself whether Sweden would actually go to war if Russia made it perfectly clear that its intention was only to pass through, and that Sweden would be left out of the conflict as long as she did not interfere.

In the decision of whether to attack a Nato member, as in the more important decision of whether to attack at all, political factors and assessments of the prospective opponent's resolve would be of paramount importance. When contemplating an attack on Norway, the risk of American involvement must

[13]A similar pretext was used against Finland in 1939, concerning the alleged Finnish threat to Leningrad.

weigh heavily. It would also be essential to have the ability to hamper or delay Nato reinforcements to Norway, especially tactical aircraft.

The Operation (figure 5)

Surprise would be important, but not as decisive as in the first two cases. There would be a greater need for mechanised ground combat units, as Norway — and to a certain degree Finland — has some standing army units with fairly high readiness. Mobility and speed of execution would be crucial factors if the objectives are to be reached before the opponent has been able to take effective countermeasures.

In the North, the active mechanised brigades on the Kola would be sent westwards along the coast and through Finnish Lapland, while airborne and airmobile units seize key terrain ahead of the ground troops and — together with special forces — block the defenders from taking action. Naval infantry landed along the coastal highway — the only major road in the area — threaten the flanks and rear of Norwegian forces. The attack on Norway is supported by air strikes and combat helicopters. Suppression of Norwegian air bases, particularly important for US reinforcements, would require heavy strike aircraft, perhaps supplemented by special forces and surface-to-surface missiles.

In Finland the southern parts and the capital would be the primary targets, while the central and northern parts would be secondary. Sabotage, special forces and air strikes would suppress active Finnish units and slow down mobilisation. The attack against the capital would be carried out by active mechanised brigades from the Karelian Isthmus, preceded by airborne and airmobile units which seize key terrain and clears the road ahead of the main force. Alternatively a coup similar to the one outlined in the Stockholm case could be attempted against Helsinki, but in this case perhaps emphasising airmobile units, as Helsinki lies within helicopter range of St. Petersburg. The task of the mechanised units would then be to link up with forces already in the capital. In the North, the immediate objective would be to apply pressure and to keep Finnish forces from interfering with the march westwards.

As soon as possible, units built on equipment in permanent storage would be activated and sent as reinforcements. Reinforcements could also come in the form of active units from the mobile force, e.g., airborne or airmobile, normally deployed in other Military Districts.

Possibilities/Problems

As already mentioned, this case requires more ground combat units at the outset than the two previous. The limits mandated by CFE thus become more of a restriction on operations, particularly the limit on ACVs, and more so in the Far North than in the south. Under the assumed force structure, two or three

brigades with 30-90 ACVs altogether would be available for the first echelon in the south. While this is a rather small number, these brigades could be probably be rather rapidly be brought up to strength by use of ACVs stored in DPSS on the Karelian Isthmus. A second and a third echelon of units would also be available fairly fast, through re-deployments of units in the south and through activation of units whose equipment is in storage.[14]

In the Far North the situation is different; while the amount of immediately available forces —two army brigades with some 60 ACVs (plus any rebuilt MT-LB-ATs), and the naval infantry brigade — would be similar to those in the south, the prospects for speedy reinforcements would be much worse. Additional equipment or reinforcing units would have to be brought more than 1,000 kilometres by rail from storage sites in the south, at a maximum rate of a brigade per 24 hours. To start such a movement, or even the activation of TLE in storage, before the beginning of an attack would risk giving the game away, forfeiting the advantage of surprise and giving Finland, Norway and Nato the chance to take precautions.[15] If, on the other hand, activation and movement started only after the initiation of hostilities, the Murmansk railroad would be vulnerable and a tempting target for interdiction, e.g., by aircraft or cruise missiles.

Two brigades with 60 ACVs, and 80 tanks, would not seem to give the attacker a comfortable margin of strength, especially as attrition has to be factored in. Terrain and infrastructure in the far North are not — if properly defended —conducive to a rapid armoured push. There is only one major road, narrow and undulating, and the off-road mobility of vehicles is severely constrained by numerous bogs. During the winter the frozen tundra is passable to vehicles, but the Arctic winter causes other formidable problems to military operations. It would take days to reach the Norwegian defensive positions in Troms — even under the most favourable of circumstances — which by that time could be manned with substantial units and hard to penetrate.

Thus it seems that a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for success in this case would be that the defenders can be suppressed and kept from disrupting movement along the road. Here, airmobile units and attack helicopters with all-weather capability could be very useful, as would be intelligence systems capable of locating enemy units. Crippling the defenders at the outset of hostilities, with, e.g., raids by special forces on the few key installations in the north, could also be advantageous. Air support could also prove very effective in the open terrain of the north and most targets being soft.

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[14] How long time such activation would take depends on assumptions about "soft" factors; such as the future Russian system for force generation, the training level of personnel, etc.

[15] A similar problem has for a long time applied to fighter-bombers, which have not been permanently deployed on the Kola. One way for Russia to deal with this could be to establish a regular peacetime pattern of large-scale exercises in the Arctic region.

Is the Operation Feasible?

While the operation as outlined might be feasible in the south, against Finland, it seems unlikely that its objective, control of Troms, could be attained in the north. The forces available on the Kola, within CFE limits, appear too small for a Russian ground offensive to reach strategically significant areas, while such parts of Finnmark that could reasonably be taken seems of little strategic significance.

The requirement that reinforcements have to be moved to the Far North from St. Petersburg imparts a significant limitation and delay on Russian offensive capabilities in the north. By the time reinforcements had been transported up to the Kola and started the difficult move across Lapland and Finnmark, US reinforcements, notably all-weather strike aircraft, could already be at Norwegian bases.

In the light of this, Russia might seek a method of securing its objectives before Western, and Norwegian, reinforcements could be brought to bear in Northern Norway. Such a method could conceivably be to seize the objectives in Troms directly by parachute assault, expecting the airborne units to hold them until mechanised units from Kola, supported by airmobile forces, could link up by the land route. Such an operation would be reminiscent of operation Market-Garden, and involve all the types of dangers and pitfalls which that ill-fated gamble did.

5. Conclusions

The CFE Treaty mandates significant reductions in the number of heavy ground equipment and ground combat units, especially active, in the vicinity of the Nordic countries. Active ground forces in Leningrad MD would have to be limited to approximately nine to eleven fairly weak brigades, plus a strong artillery component; or to one fully mechanised division, some naval infantry and airborne units, plus some spare tanks and artillery. This means that the type of large and fairly rapid attack scenarios which have figured so prominently in Nordic threat perceptions seem irrelevant for the future, unless the CFE Treaty breaks down or is violated.

If the equipment in permanent storage within Leningrad MD were activated, but still without reinforcements from other MDs, it would be possible to field a total of three to four mechanised divisions and half a dozen of fairly strong brigades. Notable from a Norwegian and Swedish point of view is that the storage sites cannot be placed north of Lake Ladoga; this means that the equipment would have to be moved at least 1,000 km by rail before it could be used in the Far North, making detection — and interdiction — possible.

Hopefully, the reduction of forces as foreseen in the CFE Treaty will lead to a calm and solid military situation. However, simple comparisons of numbers can be misleading. A situation with hundred divisions facing one hundred is not necessarily more dangerous to peace and security, than is a situation with fifty brigades facing fifty. Smaller numbers, and lower force-to-space ratios, offer more room for manoeuvre and open opportunities for action and for surprise not available when larger forces are involved. Also, reductions mandated by CFE and technical developments will reinforce the trend towards fewer but more powerful and mobile units than previously. The difference between standing units — with high standards of equipment and personnel — and mobilising units will increase.

Future decision makers will have to address the fact that the quantity of ground forces will be smaller, compared to that during the cold war. Unless the CFE Treaty is violated before outbreak of hostilities, it will be necessary to either fight with fewer units, or to move up mobilised units after an outbreak of hostilities.

The three hypothetical cases outlined above indicate that adherence to CFE would not necessarily rule out a Russian capability for offensive operations in the region — if such operations are based on surprise, speed, mobility and quality of units, rather than on mass. The likelihood of success for such operations are hard or impossible to calculate with traditional models, as too much would depend on intangibles.

Neither is it easy to credibly assert that such operations would never be launched. It is often assumed that a cool assessment of the facts and rational judgements lie behind decisions of whether to go to war, or not. This is not always the case, as 20th century history has repeatedly shown. The reasons for an attack can be more compelling than a comparison of forces, and comparisons and decisions are often subject to misjudgement and incorrect assumptions.

However, the destabilising temptation to use surprise in order to compensate for deficiencies in mass could be offset by increased transparency in military affairs, making it harder to conceal preparations for an attack. In this context, the intrusive regime of verification laid down in the CFE Treaty, including on-site inspections at short notice, as well as the fact that fewer units will make it possible to concentrate intelligence efforts, are important elements.

Should the CFE Treaty be abrogated, the strategic situation facing the Nordic region could change radically as compared to the description outlined in this essay. Nonetheless, once CFE has been implemented it would take considerable time and effort to re-build the type of permanent force structure that Leningrad MD had before CFE. A temporary deployment of the same magnitude would also take considerable time, which means that violation of the treaty would have to pre-date the commencement of hostilities by a number of weeks. An important feature of the treaty in this context is that an abrogation or a serious violation is

clear signal of warning and could be politically useful as a motive for taking national precautions.

Consequently, the continued integrity of the CFE Treaty, and strict adherence to it by all signatories, is in the interest of the Scandinavian countries for reasons of early warning and transparency, as well as in order to preclude the reappearance of a massive threat. Any Scandinavian government action that might undermine the treaty — even indirectly or unintentionally — would be undesirable.

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Figure 1



(For each alliance)	Tanks	ACVs	Artillery
Zone IV:1 = ATTU	**20,000**	**30,000**	**20,000**
In DPSS:	3,500	2,700	3,000
Flanks = zone V	**4,700***	**5,900***	**6,000***
Zone IV:2	**11,800***	**21,400***	**11,000***
Zone IV:3	**10,300***	**19,260***	**9,100***
Zone IV:4	**7,500***	**11,250***	**5,000***

*** in "Active Units"**

ATTU:	**6.800 Combat Aircraft**	**2,000 Attack Helicopters**
"Ceilings" each state	**5,150 -"-**	**1,500 -"-**

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Figure 2

Hypothetical post-1995 structure of active ground units in Leningrad MD
(geographic position of units indicative only)



Figure 3



Figure 4



Figure 5



DRAFT, NOT FOR QUOTATION FEB 15 ,1993

Paper to be presented at the SIIA
conference on Arms Control and
Nordic Security, February 15-16 1993

NAVIES, ARMS CONTROL AND THE NORDIC REGION

— Robert Dalsjö, Johan Tunberger, Hans Zettermark* —

The purpose of this paper is to examine possible naval arms control measures tailored to the specific Nordic, Baltic and North Atlantic setting, and to assess whether such measures could contribute to stability or not.

The analysis draws on a previous study of naval arms control in general.[1] Initially, some of the results from that study will be recapitulated.

Naval arms control was much discussed in the 1980's, but never entered the serious agenda. The debate was in part fuelled by a determined Soviet effort to include Western — especially US — naval power in the arms control sphere, in order to circumscribe Western freedom of action. Support was rendered by some academics and politicians in the West, many of whom were process-oriented or viewed arms control as a 'merit good', thereby overlooking the interest-driven nature of the Soviet initiatives.

That naval arms control failed to make it to the negotiating tables is largely attributable to determined opposition by Western policy-makers and many strategic analysts. Their position was that the maritime nature of the Western alliance, as well as strategic asymmetries, made Western naval supremacy and freedom of action imperative. Negotiations, or even discussions, on fairly minor measures were resisted on the grounds that it would mean 'entering the slippery slope'.

The clash between these two mindsets made for a rather sterile discussion, in which the inherent weaknesses of most proposals — often modelled on concepts developed for the land military environment — were seldom analysed in substance.

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* The authors are grateful to Lars Wedin for ideas and helpful comments. The views expressed are solely those of the authors and do not imply any official authorisation.

1 Johan Tunberger, Robert Dalsjö, Lars Wedin, "Rethinking Naval Arms Control: From World War Three to Third World Threat", (to be published by SIIA).

Our earlier study covered most proposals made, evaluating them against three criteria: military significance, 'definability'/verifiability and compatibility with the maritime environment and the Law of the Sea. We also tried to assess the strategic effects of some of the more significant proposals, should they be enacted.

Structural arms control — eg, numerical or size limitations — was found to raise the thorny issue of what states should be included, as naval forces are highly mobile and unconstrained by borders. It would also be necessary to agree on which types of units or systems should be subject to limits; should, for example, land-based naval aircraft be taken into account? Finally, even if consensus on these issues could be reached, it would remain to agree on reasonable force levels for the participants. As an ever growing number of states possess significant naval capabilities, a negotiation — in order to be meaningful — would have to encompass so many states that their mere number would seem to guarantee that no results could be achieved.

A different category of measures, often suggested as a way forward, is Confidence- and Security-Building Measures patterned on those applied to land forces within the CSCE context. 'Navalising' such measures as mandatory notification of military activities did, however, raise a lot of practical problems: the definition of 'activities' to be notified, the delimitation of thresholds and areas, as well as other problems related to verification. On the whole, the CSBM approach of the Stockholm/Vienna-type seemed neither workable nor likely to build confidence or security in a naval context.

Finally, the study concluded that a voluntary approach emphasising co-operation and information-exchange, eg, voluntary notification of major naval exercises, might work and could contribute, though rather humbly, to safety at sea.

These were our conclusions of a general nature. In order to assess whether the conditions of the North European scene should yield additional findings, it is necessary examine the northern strategic environment more closely.[2]

The Nordic region borders on three bodies of water with very different characteristics: The Baltic Sea, the North Sea and the Norwegian-Barents Seas. In the following, the North Sea will not be dealt with as it appears likely to remain a calm strategic backwater, barring a major 'renationalisation of security policies' among West European states. The Norwegian-Barents Seas and the Baltic Sea are treated separately, as circumstances and problems differ considerably: strategic conditions in the

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2 For a more comprehensive analysis of the Nordic security environment, see Robert Dalsjö, Johan Tunberger, Lars Wedin, Hans Zettermark, "Nordic Security Considerations and Arms Control", (paper to be presented at the SIIA conference on Arms Control and Nordic Security, February 15-16 1993).

Far North are largely an outflow of residual global strategic competition, while the Baltic area has undergone profound change.

*

Historically, the Baltic Sea has been an undersize Mediterranean, binding the nations on its littoral together both in times of peace and war. However, during the Cold War the Baltic Sea was part of the front-line between East and West, although likely to be dominated by the Soviet Union in case of war.

After the demise of the Soviet Union the Cold War pattern has broken down and the old Baltic pattern is re-emerging. The area is a crossroads where opposites meet: East meets West and the North meets Continental Europe. Within the area, the Baltic Sea is a regional 'common' and a natural point of orientation for Poland, Sweden, Finland, Russia, as well as for the newly independent states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In the latter cases the Baltic Sea has the special importance of being their link and lifeline to the West.

The major potential risk — 'threat' in Cold War parlance — would seem to be associated with a resurgence of interstate rivalry in Northern Europe, in which case the Baltic Sea could become a major scene of confrontation. Lesser, but by no means negligible threats, could result from the continued decay of the former Soviet empire ranging from disputes over, or in, the Kaliningrad oblast, friction in connection with Russian troop withdrawals, mass exodus of refugees, or Mafia activities such as drug trafficking and gun running.

In a naval perspective the Baltic is becoming a place of uncertainty and something of a power vacuum. The Russian Baltic fleet is being confined to St Petersburg and Kaliningrad/Königsberg, and the majority of its ships are reportedly rusting. Its land based assets are being withdrawn from the Baltic states.

The other traditional Baltic naval power, Germany, seems intent on not assuming a leading role — Germany is reducing her navy and a relative shift of German deployment towards the North Sea and the Atlantic is proceeding according to plan.

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have only pitiful means with which to monitor or to defend their coastlines and territorial waters, or their economic zones. The other states along the littoral are notable neither for their naval strength nor for their weakness. Sweden, seeking to play a more active role in Europe, is only beginning to rediscover national interests outside the 12-mile limit.

None of the major non-Baltic naval powers has shown interest in increasing their Baltic presence, on the contrary. It is nonetheless significant — and

from a Nordic and Baltic perspective advantageous — that NATO forces continue to operate in the entire Baltic from time to time. As highlighted in our aforementioned study, naval forces is the primary non-nuclear means which makes security truly global. Gunboat diplomacy in reverse, as it were, often acts as 'equaliser' to the benefit of small states confronted with powerful neighbours.

*

In the Far North the situation is very different. Finnmark and the Kola are distant from their respective heartlands around Oslo and Moscow. No border changes have taken place along the littoral and the actors are the same. By and large, security considerations in the Far North do not hinge on the transition to a new situation, but on the residue of the Cold war confrontation. The importance of the region to strategic nuclear relations is too strong to be ignored, even in times of European introversion. In the event of a return to an Russian-Western confrontation, Atlantic and Arctic waters would again figure prominently in national and alliance strategies highlighting SSBNs, SLOCs, and the Kola bases.

In addition to security concerns of a strategic nature, the waters of the Far North also hold importance for local or economic interests, such as oil, the environment, fishing and shipping.

The prospect of a revival of Russian assertiveness and aggressiveness is taken rather lightly in large parts of the West. One reason is probably that it would take many years before Russia could pose a serious conventional threat to Western Europe or the Atlantic SLOCs. However, the views in Finland, Sweden and Norway are for historical reasons more guarded, as even a relatively minor upsurge could have serious consequences for them.

Such concerns are reinforced by the Nordic perceptions that the unobstructed use of bases and ports on the Kola would, in a future crisis, be even more important as a result of recent Soviet/Russian strategic setbacks elsewhere. Seemingly paradoxical, successful nuclear arms control could increase the strategic significance of the Kola area. The START treaties, if implemented, will result in dramatic reductions of strategic nuclear weapons. Yet, the SSBNs based on the Kola will become relatively more important, as they will hold about half of all Russian nuclear warheads.

WHY NAVAL ARMS CONTROL?

After the demise of the Soviet Union, the push for naval arms control lost its impetus and the subject seems to have vanished from the political horizon. It might, however, resurface; even a return to only modestly traditional policies in Moscow may herald Russian demands for some type of naval

arms control. Such demands would probably centre on the perceived need for security and predictability in the waters bordering Russia.[3]

A possible forum for such efforts towards naval arms control could be the CSCE, particularly within the framework of 'regional tables' addressing security issues.[4] The smaller scale of a regional table might be seen to offer greater opportunities for an agreement. Furthermore, it might look odd to leave maritime matters totally from some regional discussions; the Baltic basin is historically perceived as a region.[5] The inclusion of naval matters in the CSCE would previously have been deemed impossible, due to strong Western resistance, but recent developments suggest this may change. Reportedly, the US has signalled a positive attitude towards the inclusion of naval forces into the CSCE information exchange, Turkey has suggested naval arms may be subject to limitations.

In principle, the types of measures conceivable as proposals in a regional context could be structural or operational in character, the latter of either the security-building or the confidence-building kind. In practice, structural measures would not seem workable, as outside powers could concentrate their naval forces to the region at will.

Turning to operational arms control, the borderline between security building and confidence building is not seldom blurred. However, for analytical purposes, it is useful to distinguish between the two categories. Security building measures — encompassing constraints on deployment, zones of different kinds, intrusive verification etc. — aim at restricting the freedom of action not only in fair weather, but also in times of tension, even crisis. Confidence building measures are "softer" — focusing on contacts and co-operation, increased transparency, etc. — and designed to foster primarily confidence between states concerned and thereby long term trust. The latter class of measures or proposals are primarily thought to forestall a return to adversarial relationship, but would have little utility in, as it were, adverse weather.

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3 A draft Russian Military Doctrine, as published in a special issue of Voennaya Mysl, May 1992 (translated by Per Olov Nilsson and published in *Anteckningar från Östgruppen*, Issue 17 [FOA, Stockholm]) specifically says that Russia will consider the introduction or increase of foreign military troops or naval forces in the vicinity of its borders as a direct military threat. There are also signs of more overt Russian fears that NATO will establish a threatening presence in the Baltic area or the Baltic states. (Nordberg, Deryabin, Kozyrev).

4 What is called "regional" in the CSCE context would be considered "sub-regional" in a global context, as the CSCE itself is a "regional organisation". In this paper we will use CSCE parlance.

5 This may be especially so as the only comparable region in the CSCE area, the Black Sea, already has some type of naval arms control, namely the Montreux Convention.

The findings of our previous study, as well as the dynamics of process, indicate that the softer measures would offer the more promising avenue of approach in the regional context.

THE BALTIC

With the demise of the Soviet Union, new and old states in the Baltic region are redefining their roles. Part of this process is that they engage in a search for new co-operative patterns. In more "realist" terms, Russia might seek to compensate for her territorial setbacks by proposing naval arms control in an effort to forestall a military build up close to her borders.

Certain types of naval arms control may also be offered as solutions to challenges — often not of a military character — emanating from the generally volatile and unruly situation.

Historically, the dominating naval power in the Baltic, or the state controlling its approaches, has tried to impose a *Mare Clausum* régime in the Baltic, efforts which have been resisted by the lesser powers and by major non-littoral naval powers. Moscow has pushed such ideas several times over the years, perhaps most notably in Khrushchev's so called Sea of Peace-initiative in the late fifties. The gist of such proposals was to give the littoral states special rights and privileges and to restrict or annul those of outside powers. Today, also environmental and economic concerns could motivate proposals bringing various degrees of 'clausumness'

A long standing Swedish, and also Danish, policy has been to reject such proposals and to safeguard the Baltic's status as a free sea, open to all. This is not only a matter of principle, but also of Scandinavian interest, as the access of outside naval forces is perceived as a counterweight to Soviet/Russian might. It has also been in the Scandinavian interest not to give Moscow any special rights or privileges which could develop into a *droit de regard* vis à vis the Baltic sea and the Scandinavian countries. In line with this policy, Sweden in 1984 rejected moves within the CSCE to make the Baltic Sea part of 'the whole of Europe' rather than the 'adjoining sea area'.

At times, however, a certain schizophrenia has characterised Swedish policies. During the seventies and eighties, Sweden was fairly active on the naval arms control circuit. Sweden supported several proposals to be applied globally or in European Waters.[6] As the Baltic Sea is small and dominated by its littoral, any measures restricting naval movements or weaponry, such as mandatory pre-notification, constraints or concepts such as 'reasonable seaboard security', would increase the power of the littoral states at the expense of others. Implementation of such proposals would bestow a degree of *clausumness* upon the Baltic.

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6 In both the UN and in the CSCE context

A sort of *clausumness* also follows from developments in military technology. Increasing range and payload of aircraft and missiles lend land-based forces greater weight in the naval balance, as instruments of "inverse power projection"[7]

Perhaps the most spectacular arms control proposal focused on the Baltic region is that of a Nordic nuclear weapons free zone. Initiatives to that effect were taken by the Soviet Union in the 1950s. The idea was later adopted by the Finnish president Kekkonen — the reasons for this move were long debated, but presumably his initiatives should be seen as acts of preventive diplomacy.[8] The official Swedish position was that any such zone would have to include not only the Nordic countries, but also the Baltic Sea, as well as thinning-out arrangements covering adjacent Soviet territory, which at that time were unacceptable to Moscow.

The issue popped up intermittently in different Nordic countries, largely for reasons of domestic politics. In May, 1991, a joint group of senior Nordic officials published a report, in which it was emphasised that a Nordic nuclear weapons-free zone must not be divorced from the establishment of a new security order in Europe. In particular, such a zone must not lead to a regional arrangement which could be perceived as isolated and separate from the rest of Europe.[9]

The report would probably have buried the issue for some time. In addition, from the autumn of 1991 and onwards, a series of US-Soviet/Russian agreements on nuclear arms has made the idea of a Nordic nuclear weapons free zone irrelevant.[10] Short range missile warheads and nuclear artillery shells will be destroyed, naval sub-strategic weapons will be taken ashore, most of them to be destroyed.

It could not be ruled out, however, that some type of regime restricting the storage and transport of any nuclear material in the Baltic basin could come to be advocated for reasons of environmental protection or proliferation

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7 Cf. Tunberger, Dalsjö, Wedin, "Rethinking Naval Arms Control...", pp 4-11 of final draft.

8 Johan Tunberger, *Norden, en kärnvapenfri zon?* (Stockholm: Folk och Försvar, 1982)

9 *Rapport från nordiska ämbetsmannagruppen för undersökning av förutsättningarna för en kärnvapenfri zon i nordiskt område,* (Stockholm: Utrikesdepartementet, 1991).

10 Despite the considerable time it will take to scrap all these non-strategic warheads, and the lack of verification provisions, it would, nonetheless, appear utterly futile to initiate a full-blown negotiation on a Nordic nuclear weapons-free zone just for the sake of it.

control.[11] The possibility of a loss of central control over ex-Soviet military units, eg, in the Kaliningrad area, may fuel such efforts.[12]

There has been at least one recent suggestion that would have singularised the Baltic Sea. The idea is to demilitarise the Baltic in order to prevent mutinous crews of ex-Soviet men-of-war from interfering in local conflicts or from selling off (nuclear) weaponry.[13] It is argued that demilitarisation would serve the interests of Russia, CIS, NATO and the Nordic neutrals — especially Sweden as "Soviet" submarine incursions into Swedish waters would be halted.

Such a regime would of course fundamentally change the legal status of the Baltic. Another major objection against such an idea is that the effects would be militarily skewed. Russia, Germany, Denmark and also Sweden could base naval forces outside the Baltic, ready to enter the Baltic at any time, while Finland, the three Baltic states and Poland would be permanently crippled. In the case of a resurgence of inter-state rivalry the latter states would be placed at serious disadvantage. Moreover, the unstable and unruly conditions prevailing on the eastern littoral seem to call for naval capabilities above the coast-guard level.

The submarine incursions in Swedish waters take place in contravention of international law and despite repeated declarations to the contrary from Moscow. Hence, it is highly doubtful whether the incursions would discontinue if there should be an agreement on demilitarisation of the Baltic.

The proposals and measures discussed could be said to belong to the security building and/or structural types of measures. None seems to constructively contribute to security. In fact, it seems that most of them, if implemented, could be detrimental to the security of many states in the Baltic region. In particular, they would weaken the security link between the region and European and Atlantic security at large. Limiting the access of navies would cause a shift of the geopolitical balance, subtle but significant. The above conclusion seems to be valid also for other conceivable measures of the security building and/or structural types. Also seemingly unassuming measures, eg, mandatory pre-notification of naval exercises

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[11] Cf. Icelandic initiatives, in the wake of a string of accidents with Soviet submarines, to regulate the movements of nuclear-propelled ships in certain areas.

[12] Interview with the Latvian Deputy Secretary of Defence in *Officersförbundsbladet* 7/92.

[13] Robin Ranger and David G. Wiencek, "Watching the Old Enemy", *USNI Proceedings*, April 1992, p 52. Ranger and Wiencek endorse a supposedly Lithuanian proposal.

could have constraining effects that might impede the utility of navies in crisis management.[14]

A more fruitful approach towards increasing security in the Baltic could be to further develop co-operation and contacts. In the civilian sphere co-operative arrangements already exist, not least to protect the threatened maritime environment of this confined sea. Such measures are less spectacular than traditional arms control or CSBMs, but could — as pointed out in our preceding study — contribute to enhanced safety, and possibly security, at sea.[15]

A recent suggestion, taking its point of departure in the risk of semi-anarchy in the Baltic after the fall of the Soviet empire, is for a 'Common Surveillance System'.[16] The stated objectives are to forestall smuggling, illegal fishing, incidents, etc., and to make search-and-rescue more efficient. An ancillary, political, objective is to involve the Russians in Baltic co-operation. A decentralised system based on national resources (military and civilian) is advocated. This would entail making communications systems compatible to allow the pooling of information, the co-ordination of guidelines and planning, and the possibility of drawing on the resources of another state for the fulfilment of operational tasks.

However, professional co-operation — including yearly meetings and joint exercises — between agencies with Coast Guard and SAR functions in the Baltic is already taking place on a regular basis. There is probably room for improvement of the practicalities, but the need for further formalisation and higher-profile agreements with political ramifications remains to be proven — especially as such agreements might cause states to claim *droit de regard* in relation to other littoral and flag states.[17]

In this context the Baltic Council, which was set up in 1992, should be noted as a forum for primarily 'low politics'-issues.[18] Also, more grandiose, albeit vague, plans for a new Hanseatic league have been suggested. So far, little has been achieved by the Baltic Council in concrete terms. The history of the Nordic Council, however, indicates that useful, if not spectacular, results

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[14] Johan Tunberger, Robert Dalsjö, "Strategic developments and the impact of naval arms control in the Baltic region" *Europe and Naval Arms Control in the Gorbachev Era* ed. A. Fürst, V. Heise, S.E. Miller (Oxford: SIPRI/Oxford Univ. Press, 1992).

[15] Tunberger, Dalsjö, Wedin "Rethinking Naval Arms Control...", pp 30-33 of final draft.

[16] Gunnar Jervas, "GÖS gör Östersjön till Fredens Hav", *Internationella Studier*, 2/1992, pp 24-33.

[17] Cf. Cay Holmberg, "Östersjön —fredens innanhav", *Internationella Studier*, 3/92, pp 28-31.

[18] Members are Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Germany. The EC Commission is also represented in the Council. The Council covers many issues, eg, nuclear safety, support for democratic institutions, humanitarian issues, health care, tourism.

might be achieved with time. However, the members of the Baltic Council lack the common basis which shared cultural and linguistic identity gives the Nordic countries.

As indicated above, the CSCE Security Forum, which opened in Vienna in 1992, is mandated to discuss regional issues both in the form of looser 'dialogue' and negotiations about regional confidence- and security building measures. Finnish representatives have displayed a certain predilection for a regional table in some form, The naval dimension has been carefully avoided, presumably in order not to raise the sensitive issue of submarine incursions.

Sweden's and Norway's long-standing policy of avoiding bilateral or regional security-related negotiations with the mighty neighbour in the East, makes it likely that they would demand that 'regional tables' would be open-ended, ie, open for all interested parties. This would mean that Oslo's and Stockholm's acceptance would be made conditional on US, British and German participation. An open-ended table would, of course, also mean that such a table would be open to the Baltic states and Poland — and possibly Belarus.

The prospects for regional co-operation, in the sense that western states should pay for major reconstruction of the eastern littoral, are dim. Furthermore, many of the problems in the region stem from the dismantling of the Soviet empire, eg, the issues of Russian military withdrawal from the Baltic states, Russian military deployment on the Finnish and Norwegian borders, and Russian minorities in the Baltic states.

A regional negotiation covering all, or most, of these aspects would imply the establishment of a complex web of linkages, which could prove to be detrimental to the possibilities of solving any single issue involved. On the other hand, it could be argued that some sort of regional dialogue could perhaps serve as a needed midwife institution.

One should not rule out the possibility that also naval issues could be raised in such a context, perhaps through the dynamics of the process. The inclusion of naval issues could be driven by the fact the more significant problems are just to great to handle in a CSCE regional context.

Measures to be contemplated in this context would presumably include functional co-operation of different kinds. However, as efforts are already under way in other fora, for example concerning the protection of the environment and co-operation between coast guards, the scope for meaningful CSCE initiatives in the non-security field seems limited. Should political impetus require progress of some type, regionally applied confidence building measures — especially military/naval contacts and co-operation — might seem worthy of consideration.

Besides contacts, one could think of more structured co-operation, such as regional hot lines, regional risk reduction centres, and perhaps even regional Incidents-at-Sea agreements. Considering the intense non-military as well as naval use of the Baltic, also more ambitious schemes to reconcile the interests of different interest groups, eg, fishermen and sailors, could be envisioned. As we have suggested elsewhere[19], voluntary notification of major naval exercises by the means of standardised Notice-to-Mariners procedures could be a method of showing due regard for the interests of others.

THE FAR NORTH

Security concerns in the Far North differ from those of the Baltic in two major respects: They are less affected by the political upheavals of later years and there are strong ties to the remnants of superpower confrontation. Strategic nuclear matters and blue water navies, though less visible than before, continue to have a pervading influence in the Far North. An obvious case in point is the home porting there of the larger part of Russia's SSBN fleet.

Thus, many conceivable naval arms control measures with an impact on the region would either be global in scope, or have potentially global ramifications. Notable among such measures are, eg, ASW-free zones and structural limitations. Having dealt with global aspects of naval strategy and naval arms control in an earlier study, we will in this chapter concentrate on naval arms control measures which might possibly be tailored to regional circumstances. However, the global factors cannot be totally left out, as global naval strategy and global interests largely set the regional naval scene.

To determine what might be a possible scope for regional measures, assumptions about future Russian and US/Western naval deployments strategies and interests have to be made.

The Kola base complex will acquire a relatively more salient role in Moscow's strategic and maritime calculus. This is partly because of the restricted conditions in the Black Sea and in the Baltic. More importantly, the Kola and the surrounding waters play an increasingly prominent part as base and patrol areas for Russian strategic nuclear assets.

These forces can be said to epitomise Russia's continued role as a world power. Also, they would be key instruments should Moscow opt for a

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[19]For a more thorough analysis of the feasibility of such measures as well as of their strategic effects, see Tunberger, Dalsjö, Wedin "Rethinking Naval Arms Control...", pp 21-22 of final draft.

'French' nuclear strategy of *dissuasion* — a rather likely possibility in the wake of internal unrest and loss of conventional strength.[20]

Arms control agreements and unilateral reductions also serve to further increase the importance of the SSBNs based on the Kola. Sub-strategic nuclear weapons of most types are being reduced or dismantled, and the START II Treaty will — if implemented — lead to a drastic shift within the Russian strategic triad, where SLBMs would replace ICBMs as the primary weapons system. Presumably, Moscow will retain whatever SSBNs the START II Treaty and other nuclear agreements will allow. Thus, more than half of the entire Russian arsenal of strategic warheads would be placed on SSBNs, the vast majority of these on the Kola.[21]

In all likelihood, Russia will stick to the bastion strategy, and one of the primary missions of its navy will be to protect the Kola bases and the SSBN bastion. With fewer ships, the protection of the SSBN bastion, and the surveillance and defence of its immediate approaches, will leave the Northern Fleet few assets for genuine blue water operations.

Even though the United States will probably remain the unequalled naval power, declining funding will cut the US Navy's size as well as its tempo of operations. Furthermore, US routine patrolling of North Atlantic waters is likely to decline further as missions focus more and more on trouble spots in the Third World.

As a net effect, routine American naval presence in the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea is likely to decline considerably. Carrier battle groups in the Norwegian Sea seems to be a thing of the past; visible presence could very well approach zero. The new American naval doctrine, however, stresses flexibility.[22] No doubt, the US Navy will retain a capability to deploy to Northern waters, although its expertise in Arctic operations will suffer.

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[20] "It is no secret that Russia's status as a great power dependent on its armed forces having nuclear weapons. Strategic nuclear weapons are the basis of our military might.", Boris Yeltsin, Nov. 23 1992, as quoted in George Leopold, Neil Munro, "Russians Emphasize Nuclear Deterrent", *Defense News* Vol. 7, No. 51, December 21-27 1992.

[21] *Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms*, and IISS' *Military Balance 1992-93*, including map appendix. Indeed, the warheads aboard the six Typhoon SSBNs based in the Litsa Fjord near the Norwegian border may by 2003 constitute some 40% of the entire Russian strategic arsenal.

[22] Sean O'Keefe, Frank B. Kelso, II, Carl E. Mundy, Jr.,"...From the Sea". *USNI Proceedings*, November 1992. It should be noted that the increased focus on littoral warfare of the US Navy and the US Marine Corps has alarmed some Russian military men, who tend to view this as a threat.

American attack submarines will presumably continue operations in the North Atlantic although their number will be significantly reduced, perhaps even halved.[23] Airborne ASW/surveillance will probably continue, albeit scaled down.

Indeed, the reduced number and greater role of Russian SSBNs suggest that strategic ASW[24] could, around the turn of the century, become a more realistic option for the US than it was in the heyday of the "Maritime Strategy". If the United States were to reverse its present policies and again pursue such a capability, the impact on the strategic situation in the Far North could be considerable.[25]

NAVAL ARMS CONTROL IN THE NORTH

If the assumptions made about the structures and interests of the Russian and US navies, respectively, are largely correct, there would seem to be little common basis for naval arms control agreements of a militarily significant kind. It seems highly doubtful that Moscow would agree such measures without some *quid pro quo* constraining also the US Navy. Likewise, it seems unlikely that the United States would accept measures constraining the global flexibility of her navy, especially as its number of ships is dwindling. This does not rule out 'softer' measures, such as a scheme for the exchange of information about naval inventories and acquisition plans.

Nonetheless, 'asymmetric' naval arms control issues could possibly be raised again. Soviet military representatives have previously tried to make a START accord contingent on US acceptance of some sort of naval arms control — similar situations might occur again.

Neither can it be totally ruled out that Washington might consider naval arms control in some form, should this be seen as a way to secure Russian acceptance of US policies in other or related fields. This could apply to ratification and implementation of the START II Treaty; especially if the dismantling of remaining SS-18 ICBMs runs into trouble — a major US objective. It could also possibly apply to eliciting Moscow's support for US-led actions in the Middle East or the Balkans. A more political motive for naval restraint could be not to encourage those in Moscow who might rage about 'aggressive' western naval deployments.[26]

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[23] Defense News

[24] To search and destroy SSBNs.

[25] Cf. Robert Holzer, "Weapons Accords Expand Mission For ASW", *Defense News* Vol. 7, No. 51, December 21-27 1992.

[26] There are Russian perceptions of a continued threat, such as expressed by Admiral Oleg Yerofeev of the Russian Northern Fleet: "Our area of operations is from now on the Barents Sea. But one thing makes us discontent: Our defensive strategy is not matched by

One might ponder what type of measures could be considered in such a hypothetical situation. One measure could be some sort of constraint on large-scale western naval exercises in northern waters, or a pledge to pre-notify such activities, or an informal understanding to show restraint.

For obvious reasons, constraints on, or restraint in, the most pertinent naval operations would be the most difficult, as the non-presence of submarines cannot be verified with certainty — at least not without divulging highly secret capabilities. Also, even if an American pledge to restrict submarine operations in Northern waters were to be followed assiduously, there would still not be any guarantee against charges of non-compliance.

From a Nordic, perhaps especially a Norwegian perspective, arrangements like those indicated could create problems; the carefully pursued policy of 'deterrence and reassurance' vis à vis Moscow would then tilt towards reassurance. Constraints on the operation of Western ships could affect perceptions about 'spheres of influence'.

All in all, the prospects for a bilateral Russian-American agreement, going beyond very soft measures or an understanding on restraint, seem remote. Such measures could possibly be contemplated if, and when, Russia irreversibly becomes a true member of the European family of democratic states. Ironically, then there would probably be little need for such agreements.

The question is then if there are naval, or other, arms control measures which could serve to preserve stability on the northern tip of Europe, without unduly hampering the legitimate operations of the Russian and Western navies, respectively?

One possible point of departure could be the unilateral, but to a certain degree reciprocal, restraint in military matters shown by Norway and by the Soviet Union/Russia in the Far North. Norway has practised unilateral restraint since the forties, eg, by not allowing nuclear weapons or troop basing on its territory in peacetime. Furthermore, Norway does not permit allied forces to operate or take part in exercises on Norwegian territory, including territorial waters, east of longitude E 24°, that is slightly east of North Cape

The unilateral restraint shown on the Soviet/Russian side is perhaps less obvious. The naval base complex on the Kola is enormous. However, in light of the traditional Russian propensity for military over-insurance and the importance of the base complex, the ground forces in the Murmansk region

do not appear excessive.[27] Furthermore, beside naval aviation, the Russian air assets seem primarily focused on the air defence role. However, the withdrawal of forces from eastern Europe has resulted in the first permanent deployment of strike aircraft as well as additional attack helicopters in the north.[28]

It is also well worth mentioning, that there has since long been a measure of co-operation at the local military level, in order to avoid friction at and near the common border. The border area has been fairly calm even during the height of the Cold War. These local arrangements have worked pretty well.

A pertinent question is whether there are reasons for trying to "lock in" these low-profile military dispositions on both sides by codifying them in formal agreements, or whether continued policies of mutual, but unilaterally decided, restraint, are preferable.

In substantive terms, Norway would have an interest in keeping the readiness of Russian ground units on the Kola at present or lower levels, and to circumscribe Russian deployment of strike aircraft or attack helicopters to the Kola. Norway would also have an interest in constraining the naval infantry based on the Kola, or its activities. There seems to be little need to further regulate tanks, artillery and armoured combat vehicles as they are severely constrained by the CFE Treaty.[29]

It is hard to pinpoint commensurate Russian security interests vis à vis Norway, as Moscow's main concerns must reasonably focus on the actions and dispositions of other western powers, primarily the US. There are probably people in Moscow who would find it palatable to further circumscribe the US/NATO role in Norway. No doubt, Oslo would reject paying such a price for continued Russian restraint in the Far North. An agreement to that effect would endanger NATO's capability to reinforce Norway, and create the impression that Norway was part of a Russian "legitimate" security zone. Such non-starters aside, Russia might increasingly value continued Norwegian restraint — also on issues such as off-shore oil exploration in the Barents Sea — in the light of Kola's more pivotal role for her nuclear posture.

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reciprocate action by the West. " as quoted (in Norwegian) in "Holst i ordduell med russisk admiral", *Aftenposten* 25? November 1992.

[27] Three understrength motorised-rifle divisions, counting the one at Alakurtti, and 2 naval infantry brigades, one of which fully manned. *Militaerbalansen 1992-1993*, (a Norwegian edition of the IISS' *The Military Balance*, published by the Norwegian Atlantic Committee), pp 163-168

[28] *ibid.*

[29] Cf. Marco Smedberg. with Robert Dalsjö, Hans Zettermark, "CFE and war in the Northern region" (paper to be presented at the SIIA conference on Arms Control and Nordic Security, February 15-16 1993).

Turning from interests to the forms for exercising mutual restraint, the Nordic aversion against entering into bilateral or regional security arrangements with Moscow should be noted. Codifying present dispositions, including the Norwegian base policy, would be a major departure from a long-standing position. Russia, as a major power can change her military dispositions unilaterally at will, but a small power like Norway is dependent on alliance support, which — once shorn — cannot easily be reconstructed.[30]

Hence, formalising existing military dispositions presently seems neither advisable nor likely. A possible exemption to this judgement could be CSBM adaptations negotiated at a regional table within the CSCE framework. Here, lowering the thresholds triggering CSCE observation, or tightening CFE 1A rules for the notification of increases in manning levels, could be contemplated. Other regional adaptations could, eg, aim at constraining the activities or presence of amphibious or airmobile forces.

The fact that security is now seen as a wider concept than earlier is also having effects in the Far North. Since medieval times co-operation and interaction has taken place on the local level, irrespective of national boundaries. The seventy years of Soviet rule broke this pattern. Now, there is a striving, especially in Norway, to "de-militarise" relations with Russia and to actively involve other Nordic and Arctic states in a co-operative relation with Russia.[31] These co-operative initiatives presently concentrate on civilian matters, such as environmental protection, roads, border trade etc. The long-running dispute between Oslo and Moscow over the delineation of exclusive economic zones in the Barents sea is an obstacle to the inclusion of maritime matters. This may change over time if initial efforts are successful.

It should be noted that the Norwegian efforts have led to the establishment of a more formal 'Barents co-operation'. Oslo stresses that the project should be seen as an integral part of the larger European policy vis à vis Russia. It could, therefore, be argued that it would be advisable not to let military matters dominate the endeavours. A clear distinction between civilian co-operation and military matters might be difficult to make, however. The weak civilian infrastructure, the specialised economy, the harsh conditions and the considerable military presence — on the Norwegian as well as on

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[30] This quandary has similarities with the issue of a Nordic nuclear weapons-free zone, although it is not analogous.

[31] "Aktuelle forsvars- og sikkerhetspolitiske problemer", speech by J.J. Holst at the Oslo Military Society, 6 January 1992, reprinted in *Norsk Militaert Tidsskrift* 2/92.

the Russian side — makes for closely intertwined relations which often are symbiotic. [32]

An unexpected step towards the inclusion of naval affairs was taken by the Norwegian Minister of Defence Johan Jørgen Holst during an official visit to Kola in November 1992. Applying the concept of fostering confidence through co-operation and contacts, he raised the issue of joint naval exercises with Russian and Norwegian vessels. Holst also expected ships from other NATO states to take part in these exercises, labelled as training for joint operations in eg, Gulf-type conflicts. Reportedly, the Russian responses were positive. [33]

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Naval rivalry is but a distant aspect of the disharmonies and conflicts afflicting Europe today. However, naval issues could come more to the fore again. Then, demands for naval arms control would probably centre on Russia's perceived need for security and predictability in her vicinity. The Nordic states might have an interest in creating a climate of trust, which could allay such Russian fears, as part of an all-European process aiming at the integration of Russia in the family of democratic states.

The geopolitical position of the Nordic states, wedged as they are between continental Russia and the maritime West, means that no idea or proposal for arms control can be divorced from European and Atlantic security consideration at large.

The possibilities seem remote, but should naval arms control accords between Russia and the western maritime nations be reached, the security ramifications for the Nordics could be considerable. If such accords hampered western naval flexibility, eg, by constraining western access to the Baltic, it could jeopardise the credibility of NATO's security guarantees to Norway and Denmark. Equally important, it could also foster a perception that the Nordic states were situated in a "legitimate" Russian sphere of influence. Should this be the case, the deterrence element of Nordic policies of "deterrence and reassurance" towards Moscow would suffer.

The question is, then, whether the Nordics could pursue naval arms control as an integral part of a reassurance policy without compromising the deterrence determinant. In this context a foremost conclusion is that "hard"

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[32] The situation on Svalbard, with considerable friction and with militarily motivated economic activity within a supposedly demilitarised zone of international co-operation, is an illustration and a case in point.

[33] The Oslo daily *Aftenposten* covered the story extensively during the period Nov. 24 — Dec. 2. Initially, the issue caused an uproar in the parliament.

naval arms control, eg, reductions and constraints on deployment, would have precisely these undesired effects.

If the objective of arms control efforts instead is defined as ensuring regional military stability in the Nordic region and the Far North, a second conclusion would be that it seems more useful to focus on non-naval issues, rather than naval. The unilateral restraint practised by both Norway and Russia in the Far North concerning land and air forces, no doubt, has had such a stabilising influence. The same goes for the utterly non-offensive structures of the Swedish and Finnish armed forces. Furthermore, the CFE Treaty, especially by limiting heavy ground equipment, has contributed greatly to the same effect.

It is possible, but not certain, that additional "harder" arms control measures, eg, constraints on airmobile units or on readiness levels, could be contemplated. Asymmetries in force structures seem to make formal negotiations difficult. Sweden and Finland, to take but one example, are highly dependent on mobilisation.

Returning to naval issues, the cited obstacles to "hard" arms control seem to suggest that more unassuming approaches should be tried. By fostering military contacts and engaging in cooperative endeavours of a "no nonsense" kind — such as cooperation in SAR operations, regional Incidents at Sea agreements, and joint training for UN or other international missions — confidence and trust could be built. Step by step, bolder enterprises could be undertaken. Such enterprises could usefully be complemented by cooperation in other maritime domains than the naval. For example, joint actions against drug and gun trafficking could yield increased trust and professional familiarity as bonus.

The asymmetries in naval interests and resources between states in Northern Europe make it unlikely that "hard" naval arms control regimes will ever come about; superficially even-handed regimes would have vastly asymmetric security implications. However, should "soft" confidence-building be successful, it could pave the way for a more structured dialogue. The most important result of such dialogues could very well be that the subtle art of practising "deterrence and reassurance" could build less on assumptions, and more of direct communication, concerning the security concerns of other states. The best evidence of such dialogue-process having reached maturity, would be that none of the participants attempted to exert *droit de regard*.

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ARMS CONTROL AND NORDIC SECURITY

FEBRUARY 16 1993

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Draft, not for quotation

CSCE and Nordic Security

by Lars Wedin*

The CSCE played an important role for European security during the Cold War. It provided for a measure of security co-operation between the blocs, helped stabilise the military situation and, through the so called third basket, undermined the fabric of communism. When the Cold War ended, there were great hopes for the future of the CSCE as shown by the aims conferred upon it by the Charter of Paris from 1990. As, two years later, the new Security Forum starts working, the picture has once again dramatically changed. The danger of a devastating all-out European traditional war, existing until 1990, has now been replaced by bush-fires of ethnical and religious wars. Euro-euphoria has to a large extent been replaced by Euro-gloom.

A discussion of the CSCE and Nordic Security must take this development into account. Simultaneously, it has to be remembered that the security situation in Northern Europe has not changed as dramatically as in Central or Southern Europe. The Nordic countries are still positioned between the Great Eurasian Land power and the Atlantic Ocean.

The Fall of the Wall has given Sweden and Finland a new sense of freedom of action - as shown by their applications for EC/EU-membership. While membership of NATO now is discussed, in Finland at least, there is a real possibility that NATO in the long run will loose its viability due to, especially, U.S. withdrawal and disarmament. In this situation the CSCE could be seen to offer the prospect of a European Security Area based on the Charter of Paris and the Helsinki Document "Challenges of Change". The situation in Yugoslavia does however point to the need for steadfast security guarantees, if and when there is a real threat to security.

Against this background; is it probable that the CSCE could (help to) create a stable and secure environmen in Europe? Is, in a Europe where conflicts cannot be ruled out, the CSCE a viable security option for Sweden and Finland compared to EU/WEU and/or NATO? If the answers are "no" - what could then the CSCE be counted on to accomplish?

In order to answer these questions, the following road-map will be used:

- short introduction to the CSCE
- current problems
- challenges of change

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* The author is a Captain RSwN, but has written this paper in his capacity as a research-associate at the SIIA. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Swedish Government or of its Armed Forces. The author wishes to thank Messrs Tunberger, Dalsjö and Zettermark of the FOA, which have provided important comments.

  * prospects for avoiding conflicts
  * security in spite of conflicts
- possible achievements and improvements
- conclusion and round-up of Nordic perspectives

Hitherto, the word CSCE is used as if it is a single actor. In reality, this is certainly not true, as the CSCE consists of 53 independent states. As decisions have to be taken by consensus, or, in some grave cases, by "consensus minus one", the notion CSCE rather means the sum of the wills of the participating states. When one says "the CSCE can" it really means "European states can through the CSCE". This should be kept in mind when "the CSCE" is used throughout this chapter.

Sweden and Finland will be the focus in this paper with, due to the author being Swedish, a special emphasis on Sweden. Norway and Denmark face, due to their membership in NATO, very different security problems than those facing these non-allied countries even if all four principally belong to the same geopolitical context.

A short introduction to the CSCE

The CSCE played an important part in the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and hence of the Cold War. The original proposal for the creation of a CSCE was, somewhat ironically, Soviet. The goal was to create a conference to put a seal on the frontiers of the end of World War II and thus the Soviet hegemony of Eastern Europe.

The military-security questions belonged to what was called the first basket at the negotiations leading to the Helsinki Summit of 1975 and were generally seen as the most important. The West pressed for the third basket - human rights - although at the time being widely perceived as rather insignificant. This "basket" however played an important role in the eventual toppling of the communist regimes of Eastern Europe.

The security negotiations within the CSCE had of course important ramifications. They created a structured dialogue on security matters, which slowly eroded the old climate of mistrust. This is what in CSCE-parlance is called *the process*.

Gradually, during meetings and summits, the political process achieved military significant results. In the Final Act of the Helsinki summit 1975 they were called Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). Ten years later their scope had been widened and in the concluding document from the Stockholm conference of 1986 they were called Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs).

The Paris Summit of 1990 marked the end of the Cold War. Institutions were now introduced and the CSCE got a permanent structure, something which hitherto had been considered as a threat to the "process". At the signing of

the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, also the Vienna Document 1990 (VD 90) and the CFE treaty were adopted. The former, to which all CSCE-states subscribed, contains the CSBMs. These encompass information about military forces and activities as well as verification of these. Fairly basic measures for creating confidence by the means of military contacts and for avoiding "wars of mistake" were also introduced.

The CFE treaty is a disarmament treaty to which only the members of NATO and, now former, WTO are members. It is legally binding while the VD 92 is politically binding. The treaty is narrower in scope but goes much deeper, its nature is shaped by the old mistrust. Verification is consequently more intrusive and frequent.

During 1992 the VD 90 was updated into the VD 92. Furthermore, the CFE 1A agreement limiting military personnel was added to the CFE treaty. It is much more soft than the original treaty.

The Open Skies-treaty of 1992 belongs in practice, if not formally, to the CSCE sphere. It will provide for regular airborne surveillance of national territories and might possibly form a basis for a future European Verification Agency.

There are several mechanisms for crisis management both within and outside the context of VD 92. Generally these are triggers for initiating negotiations and for co-operative action when security is perceived as being threatened. There are also measures aimed at avoiding inadvertent escalation.

The Council is the politically leading forum of the CSCE. It is composed of the foreign ministers of the participating states. In practice, its responsibilities are handled by the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO). The Council is chaired by the Chairman in Office (CiO) supported by his/hers predecessor and successor, working together as a "Troika".

It is important to note that the CSCE uses two basic approaches to crisis prevention and management. The traditional approach is to negotiate measures, which are adopted in a document like the Vienna Document 92. This is the main task of the Security Forum in Vienna. The other approach is actual crisis management on a case-by-case basis, which is the task of the Council/CSO. As the Crisis Prevention Centre (CPC) belongs to the Security Forum and also has certain roles in crisis management, the structure is not entirely clear-cut.

This paper concentrates on security in the military context, but one should not forget the non-military institutions. The Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw and the High Commissioner for Minority Rights are important manifestations of the broad view taken on security. In march 1993, an Economic Forum will open in Prague.

Present standing

The Helsinki Document of 1992 with its summit declaration "Challenges of Change" states the goals for CSCE's future both regarding the process itself - the negotiations and the security dialogue with their mandate - and regarding the political management of the organisation.

This document clearly takes a broad view of security, where military security is just one of many aspects - others are minority rights, human rights, economy etc. This is reflected in the different institutions - Security Forum, High Commissioner for Minority Rights, the Office for Democratic Rights and Human Relations, the Economic Forum. The managing structure, particularly the strengthened position of the Chairman in Office (CiO), is intended to work through, and to connect, all these parts.[1]

The mechanisms for crisis management are refined and a peace-keeping option is added.

In this context the CSCE adopts the concept of mutually reinforcing (interlocking) institutions. This means that European security should benefit from several security institutions - NATO, WEU, EU, CIS ...- each with its own potential. This concept would be important should one decide to start a peace-keeping operation as the CSCE has no resources of its own.

The Helsinki Document introduces possibilities for regional deliberations, which could be seen as a departure from the principle of "the whole of Europe". The concept is made important by the expansion of the CSCE. Among the participating states are the worlds most developed industrial nations as well as under-developed, newly founded Asian states. Quite naturally, there are very different views on, and problems of, security as their economic and geostrategical situations are widely different. Hence, it will be difficult to elaborate measures that suits all of them.

Finally, it should be noted that the document contains a Programme for Immediate Action, that is a rather detailed mandate for future negotiations.

Fundamental ideas

Three general CSCE-principles are formal equality between participating states, consensus, and co-operation. These principles were seen as attractive for Sweden in a situation, where the strategic setting was totally dominated by the two blocs. Accordingly, Sweden has for a long time tried to foster the principle of equality, where members of alliances and non-allied should have the same rights and obligations.

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[1] At the meeting of the Council in Stockholm 15.12.92 a decision was made to introduce a Secretary General, supporting the CiO in these matters

The following ideals of the CSCE could be seen as particularly significant in the context of military security:

- war is unthinkable between democratic states. Thus the promotion of democratic ideals also increases the prospects for peace, while a lack of democracy is an indirect threat to peace,

- the concept of deterrence should be replaced by confidence and co-operation as primary means of security. Confidence is to be achieved by information, and subsequent verification, about forces and their activities. The resulting transparency fosters predictability,

-by implementing mechanisms for crisis prevention it will be possible to reduce the risk of war,

- contacts between military personnel produce understanding of the points of views and problems of others; this is an important part of the shaping of a security system based on confidence.

To this should be added that the CSBMs have a dynamic function. They are simultaneously rules to be implemented and vehicles for further development.

Current problems

Although the CSCE is supposed to deal with relations between individual states, its basic structure and *modus* operandi were shaped during the Cold War between the two alliances. Within each bloc there was a considerable discipline as the fundamental conflict was rather clear-cut - which should not be interpreted as simple.

Today the 53 states around the table form different groupings depending on the issue. The Western group is divided because of i.a. the differing views on the future of Europe held by the U.S.. and France respectively. Other groupings are also present - the Nordic for instance and we will probably also have a Turkish led one. Presumably the negotiations will be much more confused and incalculable than before.

The broad view taken on security also means that relations, not only between but also, within states become important. The difference in this regard between the first and the third "basket", which was made until the Paris Charter, is no longer valid. Today, as ethnic, religious and other problems spill over the borders, the relationships between security, nation and state become much less clear-cut and grow in importance. The Swedish scientist, founder of the concept of geopolitics, Rudolf Kjellén wrote in 1911: "The principle of nationality works in two different ways: uniting when the nation

has been wider than the actual frontiers, but dividing when the state has been wider than the borders between nationalities."[2]

The CSCE cannot disregard such intra-state problems, however. The wordings of the Helsinki Document are quite clear about the relations between human rights, minority problems etc. and security. The problem is how to do it.

Another problem related to the intergovernmental structure of the CSCE is that CSBMs are conceived for relations between states and representatives of states. When, for example, information according to the Vienna Document § 10 is forwarded, it is presupposed that all forces belong to a state.[3]

Furthermore, serious negotiations require mature states. They must have disciplined forces, which can be counted on to fulfil undertakings agreed by their government. Today, there are countries where this is not entirely self-evident. Less serious is that new states may have practical problems to implement agreements with requirements for a well-functioning military-administrative system. Plans for deployment can not be informed on if there are no credible plans; doctrines can not be discussed if they have not yet been elaborated.

The basic principle of equality harbours a dilemma. The principle should be valid regardless of national wealth, geographic extension and military power. This view in some way presupposes that all states have equal relationships when it comes to power. Evidently, this is not true. The security problems between states may vary entirely depending on the mutual relations of power. Furthermore, as great powers normally will have to bear the main burden of, for instance, a peace-keeping operation their view on the necessity of the operation will be more important than the one of a small state without possibilities to contribute.

The necessary focus on the instability within and between the new CSCE-states may pose a problem for Sweden and Finland. Looking eastward from Central Europe gives the impression that the military threat is all but gone. Looking eastward from the Nordic area, the picture is not equally bright. While the Nordic countries certainly are dependant on the security situation in the whole of Europe, they still have real security concerns of their own. There is a risk that these are seen as irrelevant when the CSCE concentrates on the new problems.

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2 "Nationalitetsprincipen verkar på tvenne vägar: enande, där nationen har varit vidare än de gifna gränserna, men upplösande, där staten har varit vidare än nationalitetsgränserna." Kjellén, Stormakterna. Konturer kring samtidens storpolitik, Första delen, Hugo Gebers förlag, Stockholm, 1911, p 95

3 § 10 reads: "The participating States will exchange annually information on their military forces concerning the military organization, manpoer and major weapon and equipment systems, as specified below, in the zone of application for confidence- and security -building measures (CSBMs)"

Challenges of change

Introduction

The dissolution of the Soviet Empire has given the CSCE several new members which hardly could be seen as "European". Most of these states have never been independent in a Western sense and have certainly never been democratic.

The CSCE now faces a situation, in its south-eastern parts, resembling that of post-colonial Africa. When the disciplining force - in Africa the colonial powers, in Europe the Soviet Empire and the wide-spread feeling of threat - is gone, the old frontiers prove to be obsolete. Much like the colonial powers in Africa, the victors of the world wars drew frontiers. The Cold War over, old dividing lines again become relevant: barriers laid by history, religion, language and nationalism in general.

If then, the CSCE was instrumental in winning the Cold War, what are the possibilities that it can be instrumental in shaping the new Europe?

Already when the high ambitions of the Helsinki Document were formulated, doubt began to spread as a consequence of the alleged failure in Yugoslavia. Now the CSCE could be described as having a certain hangover with hopes for a future albeit less ambitious than before.

There are two possible, mutually reinforcing, ways to proceed. The ideal one would be to create a climate where conflicts do not occur. The other is to create a system for the handling of conflicts. The latter should have a wide range of options from the set-up of negotiations to peace-enforcement.

Prospects for avoiding conflicts

Political mechanisms

Integration could be the radical way to avoid conflicts. It could take many forms as shown by the several competing, or parallel, trends towards integration now in progress. An obvious one is the EC/EU-WEU process, which in the long run could be conceived as encompassing the whole of Europe in the CSCE-sense. This may be called the "French solution". Another possibility would be to build on NATO and NACC. This would secure the Atlantic link desired by several countries but is contrary to the French view of the future.

The concept of "mutually reinforcing interlocking institutions" may be seen as a third - pragmatic - way to integration. A cynic would, however, perhaps see this as merely a way of hiding that there is no consensus about which organisational track should be given priority.

There is also another CSCE approach - in line of the thinking behind the pan-European security treaty seen as the ultimate French goal. At present, January 93, there are two items on the negotiating table at Vienna, which directly points forward towards an integration of minds and structures. These are the Code of Conduct-proposal and the harmonisation issue.

A Code of Conduct would possibly, in rather explicit terms, state the basic obligations of all member states towards each other and towards their respective populations. As there is a direct linkage between internal freedom and international security, such a concept would make it easier to pinpoint "villains" in the system and ultimately, in line with U.N. chapter VII, take action in the interest of all.[4]

Harmonisation is in CSCE-parlance the merging of the regime accepted by all - the Vienna Document 1992 - and the CFE treaty concluded between members of NATO and the then WTO. Harmonisation would make the far-reaching rights and obligations of the CFE-parties applicable to all. As the treaty is legally binding and militarily significant, it will probably be in force for the foreseeable future. Hence, the process of harmonisation must primarily develop relevant CSBMs in the direction of CFE obligations. This would extend CFE-type information, verification and mutually agreed ceilings to all CSCE-countries.

This military issue also has considerable political implications. As harmonisation would diminish the differences between those states that subscribe both to CFE and VD 92 and those only subscribing to the latter, it could be seen as a stepping stone for the integration of participating states in a joint security structure.

The concept of harmonisation could also be of significance, particularly in combination with a Code of Conduct, when it comes to integrating new, and possibly less mature, states. The resulting transparency of, and the joint *drôit de regard* in, most matters regarding security of participating states would facilitate the incorporation of new participating states in the CSCE and its values.

To conclude, there are some prospects of integration within the CSCE, but in the foreseeable future there will hardly be an all-CSCE encompassing community as strong as, for instance, the EC or NATO. Therefore, there is a serious risk that the words of Rudolf Kjellén of 1911, about Austria-Hungary, are highly relevant: "Those who know that the homogenous nationality is the soul of the modern state, understand that nothing will help - at least not

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[4] The title of this chapter reads: "Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression"

before the fight over space between the small powers is abating within reasonable borders, thus making it possible to create a federal structure."[5]

Military mechanisms

As the issue of harmonisation shows, there are no clear boundaries between military and political mechanisms. It is, however, convenient to make a distinction for "didactic" reasons.

There is an old saying that serious arms control can only be agreed upon in "fair weather" situations. This may not be entirely true, but it is clear that measures designed to defuse crisis situations are negotiated more easily when the situation is stable. It is during "fair weather" that traditions and culture of mutual trust and confidence must be cultivated and established. And, today we have a "fair weather" between the great powers.

In a recent article, Mister Boutros-Ghali, wrote that when it comes to lowering the ever-present threats to peace there are two methods. The first, and the one which will be dealt with here, is to create a balance of forces, where the assailant is likely to loose. The other is to create an imbalance sufficiently in favour of the forces of law and right to make it possible for those to act.[6] The second option will be dealt with during the discussion about crisis management.

The old way of balancing forces was the concept of "mutual deterrence" - nuclear and/or conventional. Evidently, to reinstall this concept is hardly in line with overall CSCE goals. The risk that more or less well-founded suspicions ferment into war has anyhow to be avoided. It would hence be desirable to create a militarily stable security system - founded on the non-existence of incentives for pre-emption.

One hypothetical way to create a system of military stability would be to agree to force structures and levels which fulfil the requirements of the *Defensive Defence*. This is a concept, sometimes discussed, where all states would have the capability to defend themselves but structurally lack the capability to attack.[7]

There are several serious drawbacks with this approach. The first is rather obvious; how and by whom should these structures and levels be defined? To

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[5] "Den som vet att den homogena nationaliteten är den moderna statens själ, förstår också att ingenting kan hjälpa - åtminstone icke förrän smånationernas kamp om rummet börjat afstanna inom rimliga gränser, så att en federativ byggnad kunnat uppföras." Kjellén, p 137

[6] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Les ententes régionales et la construction de la paix, défense nationale, Comité d'Études de Défense Nationale, Octobre 1992 - 48e année, p 12

[7] c.f. for instance Anders Boserup and Robert Neild, The Foundations of Defensive Defence, The Macmillan Press LTD, London, 1990

negotiate "objective" criteria, would be virtually impossible, especially as calculating "balances" have become all the more difficult with the break-up of the bipolar structure.

Somewhat ironically, the now reduced force levels constitute an obstacle to this concept. As the ratio of force versus space decreases, the need for mobile forces is increased. Furthermore, peace-keeping or -enforcement actions, whether in a CSCE or in a U.N. context, requires highly mobile forces with high readiness. Unfortunately, these are the very capabilities required for surprise attacks. From a national point of view, mobile forces are also required to fulfil the perceived need for many states to have an "out-of-area" capability.

Although *Defensive Defence* does not seem to be a practical concept, the creation of military stability is at the very heart of the traditional CSCE process. The CFE-treaty - in addition to the START, INF and Chemical Weapons treaties - is certainly an important step towards stability at reduced force levels. To this disarmament approach should be added the confidence- and security-building approach of both the CFE-treaty and the Vienna Document. These approaches are, possibly, mutually reinforcing.

One important goal would be to change patterns of thinking from deterrence to co-operation. In order to achieve this objective, the risk of escalation in case of conflict needs to be reduced. The role of CSBMs in this context would be to reduce false perceptions of threat, by increasing predictability.

Predictability - answering the question "what will happen"? - requires information about the evolution of the security environment. Long-term plans for military development give information about future military capabilities. Military contacts foster understanding of the thinking in foreign armed forces. Exchange programs, e.g. at War and Staff Colleges, may be especially important in this regard, because they could offer understanding of the evolution of doctrine and hence some understanding of intentions.

Transparency is the basis for predictability - answering the question "what is happening"? The CSBMs are supposed to provide the raw facts by offering information about existing forces, their main capabilities and activities. In order to be of real military value the information should be both quantitative and qualitative. This has yet to materialise, as existing regimes of the CSCE mainly contains the former type. The reason is partly that there is a requirement for verification and qualitative data is very difficult to verify.

Verifiability in general is naturally a very important requirement. If verification is not possible, to a reasonable extent, the information cannot be trusted and hence transparency is not gained. The CSCE have no doubt already reached important results in this regard, but hardly sufficient to eliminate possible false perceptions of threat all together. The problem will now be to proceed further and still continue to address only military significant data.

Furthermore, verification is a process where military personnel from different countries meet each other. These contacts offer a complementary view, the human dimension, of forces and their activities.

Taken together - predictability, transparency and contacts - could foster a general feeling of security based on confidence in the acts and plans of other states. The more static approach of information/verification would be complemented by a dynamic process, where increased understanding between military personnel from different countries plays an important role. This is a process, which must take time as it works with intangibles.
An implicit, but important prerequisite for these measures, is the acceptance by the participating states of a mutual *droit de regard* on the forces of each other. This is particularly true for the CFE-treaty, which is more intrusive as well as more constraining.

This is one reason why the *harmonisation*-issue, discussed above, is so important. It will possibly extend the *drôit de regard* , required in the CFE context, to all participating states, on the assumption that this would be an important step towards military stability.

Nordic perspectives

The strategic situation in the Nordic Area is less changed than that in Central and Southern Europe. The risks and threats are of a different kind, more resembling the situation during the Cold War. The geopolitical situation of the Nordic countries is primarily linked to its position in between the great land power of Russia and the High Seas. This makes the link to the NATO, including the American presence and capability in Europe and in the Atlantic, particularly important from a Nordic security standpoint. As a result of the START treaty, Russian SSBNs will in the future be of even greater strategic importance. U.S.A. will consequently continue to have strategic nuclear interests in the area.

In sum, the security of the Northern area continues to be very dependant of great power-politics. Geoffrey Till has offered this comparison about the security problems in Northern and in Southern Europe: "The Northern theatre scenario is specific, frightening intense but at the moment at least, not very likely, though possible. The Southern scenario is much more likely, but much less threatening and almost impossible to predict or prepare for specifically."[8]

Simultaneously, as Finland and Sweden have applied for membership in the EC/EU, the position of France becomes important. This country pushes for European integration and harmonisation, while the U. S. is more reluctant. The necessary, but hitherto implicit, Nordic security ties with the U.S.A. and

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8 Geoffrey Till, A Post-Cold War Maritime Strategy for NATO, Naval forces III/92, p 15

NATO are generally speaking contrary to French eurocentered interests. Hence, there may be some hard tactical choices to make for these two Nordic countries.

The legacy of neutrality and isolation could make it hard for the Swedes to accept co-operation in security matters - irrespective of organisation, U.N. being an exception. There is still a NATO-phobia which could make decisions difficult regarding CSCE peace-keeping and possible -enforcement actions, where the CSCE would be heavily dependant on NATO resources.

Non-allid Sweden has for a long time tried to foster the principle of equality, where members of alliances and non-allied should have the same rights and obligations. A goal which now is on the agenda - in form of harmonisation.

Harmonisation may involve risks for Sweden and Finland due to the present state of their armies, their geopolitical situation as well as their dependence on a hidden and dispersed mobilisation system.

Restrictive limits on "TLE"[9] could in the worst case render the long-overdue modernisation of their armies virtually impossible. The difference between the Swedish and the Finnish case in this regard could be noted in passing. In the former case it is a self-imposed problem while in the latter it is a direct consequence of the 1947 treaty of Paris and the subsequent dependence on the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the Finnish case may be more easily understood than the Swedish one.

The highly intrusive verification-regime of the CFE, may make it necessary to abandon the present military structures heavily dependant on hidden mobilisation-depots. New doctrines in this regard could probably have some military advantages but also imply prohibitive costs as an extensive restructure would be needed. A less intrusive regime would, however, also have drawbacks in reverse, as the transparency gained from intrusive inspections is an important part of general European military stability.

Another option would be to abstain from harmonisation and hence accept that the goal of "equal rights and obligations" is not attainable. As the strategic situation of Sweden and Finland is different, compared to that of great powers and/or NATO-members, such a conclusion is not illogical from a military standpoint. It is, however, questionable if such an outcome would be compatible with the integration of these countries in the EC/EU and, even more so, if they would strive for membership in the WEU and/or NATO.

This reasoning also raises more general questions of the benefits of CSBMs for small countries versus great powers.

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9 Battle tanks, artillery > 100 mm, armoured combat vehicles, attack helicopters, combat aircraft

As we have seen, there are three aspects as a result of CSBMs - predictability in the long run, transparency about the present situation and a general change of "military culture" towards co-operation.

Long term predictability seems to be beneficial. Generally speaking, small countries - especially non-allied ones - need more time to rearm than great powers, should that be necessary. Predictability is hence very important for such countries. Their gains would be higher than the losses as the democratic traditions of Sweden and Finland always have made it natural to publicise plans for future procurement.

On the other hand, CSBMs are not as important for the short-time security of weak states in relation to strong neighbours. In principle, a small country needs a higher readiness than a great power as its capability to absorb losses is much lower. This is especially true for countries where the army is dependant on mobilisation. Initial losses due to a surprise attack can never be made good. This means, for example, that the fact that an exercise, in a neighbouring state, is notified should not be taken as reason for not being vigilant.

The possible consequences of intrusive information/verification have often been discussed. An important aspect to be added is that static information, i.e. of the peace-time location of materiel, is not balanced. Such information is in fact of greater military value for the would-be attacker than for the defender. On the other hand, information about preparations for an attack - for instance obtained during an inspection - would naturally be of the highest importance.

Taken together, CSBMs should not make a military weak, small country feel secure vis-à-vis a military strong neighbour - with or without CSBMs. On the other hand, the stronger country does not need CSBMs to feel secure.

The regional dimension

The prospects for finding (sub-)regional measures or co-operative arrangements seem to offer possibilities for a Nordic regime that would be relevant in the specific strategic context of that area. A Nordic regional "table" could perhaps handle the specific questions inherent in the fragile balance between the small Nordic countries and Russia. Possibly, the Baltic states could be included as well.

Although promising, there are many problems involved in such an approach. The inherent imbalances in CSBMs discussed above are one important factor. Another is the difficulty to describe the region in a strategic sense. The Nordic region is dependant on the sea-power of U.S./NATO. Furthermore, the SSBN-bases of Kola link the area to strategic nuclear equitation. Hence, the region, in a strategic sense, can not be limited to the Nordic countries. As the region is strategically linked to much larger areas, this is bound to have implications for possible regional deliberations.

Certainly, it might be possible to address problems of lesser strategic significance in a regional context. If the substance would be more low-key, the definition of the region possibly could be less rigorous. An example of such an undertaking could be the discussion of military exchange programs.

It should also be noted, that negotiations between powers with greatly varying military capacity can cause concerns as the militarily stronger generally has more leverage. The Nordic countries consequently have always been reluctant to be put "in the cage with bear". To some extent the regional dimension of the CSCE could make this less risky, as it provides some kind of umbrella - the regional deliberations are a part of the common Security Forum.

The regional dimension is no panacea but holds some promises for meaningful political and military deliberations - probably primarily when it comes to "softer" measures. The choice of the participation states is a very important question - strategic factors as well as the agenda should be taken into account.

Security in spite of conflicts
Means and mechanisms

CSCE as a crisis managing institution is relatively new. In the former Cold War Europe there were little need for such undertakings. The repositioning frontiers and the creation of new states was hardly foreseen at the time of the Helsinki summit in 1975. On the contrary, the notion of inviolable frontiers was at the heart of the CSCE-system.

Now, the creation of new states and the subsequent conflicts have become the major problem of the CSCE area. Existing frontiers are deemed as unacceptable and the creation of new states means claims on territories of existing ones According to fundamental CSCE principles, changes of existing frontiers should be peacefully negotiated. This is - as we see today - anything but self-evident

In the "old" CSCE, when security in a bi-polar situation mainly was defined in military terms, "small" conflicts were - in the general interest - suppressed. Now, with the broad view on security, there are conflicting priorities. There is still, quite naturally, a concern for the danger of fragmentation and the breaking up of known patterns. Conflicts, often tribal, do occur today and often mean serious violations of fundamental human rights. Hence, they cannot be brushed aside by a community earnestly adhering to the goals expressed in the Helsinki Document. The principle of sovereignty will have to be weighed against the importance of humanitarian ideals and of national self-determination.

The preferred CSCE approach, so far, has been to create a structure coupling negotiations to an early warning mechanism - fact-finding, rapporteur- and

monitoring missions. Possibly, this structure will make feasible the detection of problems, before conflicts have been entrenched beyond repair, and then the handling of them at the negotiation table.

There are at least two obvious risks - the early warning system may fail to detect the problem, especially the crucial ones, and the negotiation may not succeed in solving it. A clear-cut bilateral "old fashioned" political quarrel may perhaps be handled this way; if there is a political will to do so. If the problem is internal - and it seems to be the rule in the future - will then the state in question admit that the problem exists and agree to negotiate with a group which, in the early stages of internal troubles at least, probably is seen as criminal?

This is not to say, that this approach is of no importance - quite to contrary. Fires are usually much more easy to fight when they are limited. In ethnic and minority conflicts the feelings of hate and revenge tend to quickly blow up even small problems. Already to bring out such problems in the international limelight is an achievement as any political action has to be based on some kind of general evaluation and understanding.

If, in spite of discussions following an "early warning" and well-defined confidence- and security-building measures, the threat of armed hostilities cannot be avoided, there is a need for a structure to handle those. Ultimately, the second method of Mr Boutros-Ghali will be needed; that is, forces strong enough for joint actions to uphold law, right, and order - peace-enforcement if need be.[10]

There is, as we have seen little prospect for an integration of the CSCE states leading to a joint military capability. The partial solution to this is the concept of mutually interlocking organisations. According to the Helsinki Document, not only national assets but also NATO, or WEU or perhaps CIS, capabilities may be utilised and placed under "CSCE command". NATO has made the parallel decision, to provide means on a case-by-case basis.[11]

This is important but not enough. To be credible the CSCE must dispose, not only efficient forces, but also have provisions for efficient decision-making on the use of force as well as the use of other possible mechanisms.

The decision making process is probably the main weakness of the CSCE institution. The organisation, quite naturally, merely reflects the interests of its members. On the other hand, the principle of equality, means that the CSCE does not reflect relations of power. The prospects for an integration of the CSCE-area, implying some kind of super-government are virtually non-existing. Concepts like a "CSCE-Security Council" or decisions by majority - simple or qualified - binding to all, are not likely to be accepted. It has perhaps to be accepted, that the CSCE-principle, for good or for worse, is

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[10] c.f. footnote 6

[11] NATO Press communique M-NAC-1(92)51 4th June 1992, §11

consensus. Other decision-making systems would imply the creation of a new organisation.

This weakness means that the CSCE either must take very early actions - before conflicts have been gone beyond peaceful repair - or will have to face situations were peace enforcement will be the only option left. And such actions will in turn, always be costly. High costs, in lives and otherwise, however, are normally only acceptable to a democratic government if vital interests are really threatened. And within any multinational organisation there will be diverse opinions about the definition of vital interests. Here again, the great powers are of particular importance, as they are the ones who normally will have to make the most important contributions in the case of an extensive operation. This also implies that they will choose to act within the organisation seen as the most convenient in the actual case.

The role of CSBMs

As a consequence of the weak decision-making process, the CSCE working mode will probably continue to be based on politics rather than on military power.

CSBMs could be instrumental in reducing the risks of tensions escalating into war. In principle, the same as those discussed above in the predictability/transparency context could be used; by information suspiciousness is relieved by confidence and the incentives for pre-emption in a tense situation is reduced. Regional measures could possibly be of great importance because of the possibility to tailor thresholds and ceilings to actual military and geostrategic circumstances.

In this context, the emphasis would be on near-term confidence. This means "now classical" confidence- and security-building measures as prior notification and observation of exercises, inspections of suspicious behaviour as well as constraining provisions.

CSBMs could also be developed as direct conflict-prevention and crisis-management tools. Typical are the structures and mechanisms existing, and under elaboration, aimed at facilitating negotiations between the involved states.[12]

Such CSBMs could have important advantages as they are already agreed upon and they can be used after a national decision. Furthermore, measures

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[12] I.e. §17 of the VD 92: "Participating states will, in accordance with the following provisions, consult and co-operate with each other about any unusual and unscheduled activities of their military forces outside their normal peacetime location which are military significant, within the zone of application for CSBMs, and about which a participating State expresses its security concern."

could have, as already is the case in in the inspection-regime of the VD 92, provisions for multilateral implementation.[13] This concept could be enlarged, making it possible for a small group of states to act without the consensus of all. The cumbersome decision-making process could be avoided.

Hitherto, agreed measures are only applicable to conflicts between states. CSBMs, which also could be used in interstate conflicts are hence needed. The Code of Conduct may perhaps, in the long run, provide the CSCE with a framework for such measures.

Nordic security concerns

The primarily threat against the security of the Nordic countries derives from Russia. There is of course a danger of overspill from crisis and conflicts in other parts of Europe but for geopolitical reasons the Russian power will stay as the militarily most important for the foreseeable future.

The capabilities of the CSCE to handle conflicts of the Yugoslavian type is, as we have seen, questionable. It goes without saying, that the capability of the CSCE to act decisively in a conflict between one of the Nordic - or Baltic - states and Russia is virtually nil. Hence, there does not seem to be any alternative to the western sea-based military counterweight in combination with strong national defences. And, perhaps paradoxically, the CSCE may facilitate an integration by Sweden and Finland in Western/European security co-operation. The Helsinki Document states in fact that NATO is an "integral aspect for security in Europe".[14] This may reduce the "NATO-phobia" still existing in wide circles.

On a smaller scale, the CSCE might play a useful role. Especially the situation in the Baltic republics, and also possibly along the Finno-Russian borders, is disturbing. In the former case, the Stockholm meeting (92.12.15) has just decided to send a fact-finding mission to investigate the situation of the ethnic Russians in Estonia.[15] The outcome is of course difficult to predict but may be very important for the future credibility of the CSCE.

CSCE does not merely offer a more or less credible reassurance - it also requires participation. This could have important repercussions. Both Sweden and Finland have a long tradition of peace-keeping under the U.N. banner. The CSCE concept of mutually reinforcing organisations now could give impetus for a more structured co-operation with NATO/WEU, which will be needed if forces shall be able to work together. In this context one could note, that the concept of interlocking institutions gives countries like, for instance,

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13 §77-111 contain the rules for inspection, the relevant paragraph is § 96 "...The inspecting state may invite other participating States to participate in an inspection...."

14 Challenges of Change, §10

15 Summary of conclusions of the Stockholm Council meeting, 15 december 1992, §6

the UK the possibility to choose the most convenient organisation according to a particular problem. Sweden and Finland, on the other side, has today virtually no other choices than between the CSCE and the U.N.

For Sweden the position as the Chairman in Office will also mean a generally higher profile in European politics than before. Swedish forces will as a consequence probably have to participate not only in peace-keeping but also in peace-enforcement actions - within or without the CSCE context. This would necessitate an adjustement from a rather sterile doctrine of traditional war - deterring large scale invasions - towards a flexible use of its forces in many different scenarios.

These adjustments may not come easily in times of economic difficulties and when the legacy of neutrality is still looming in the Swedish debate on the EC/EU. Will the Swedish - and Finnish - peoples accept the concept of shared responsibilities, even if that means fighting outside their borders?

Possible achievements and improvements

As we have seen, there is little prospect of the CSCE providing "eternal" peace in Europe. This should be rather obvious, but the wordings of the Charter of Paris, the Helsinki Document etc. are very ambitious in this regard. These ambitions fostered high expectations. With conflicts like in Yugoslavia, and general economic and political misgivings about the future the euphoria of yesteryear has been replaced with pessimism which may prove dangerous.

It remains to be seen if a viable CSCE peace-keeping regime will be developed. The decision-making process and, ultimately, the will of the participating states now seems too weak for this. This question is important as such a failure may affect the credibility of the entire CSCE.

The CSCE could anyway continue to play an important part in the fostering of common ideals of democracy etc. It will obviously take a long time before this goal is achieved, but it is nevertheless important to continue in this direction. Here again, the backlashing of too high ambitions may be a dangerous psychological trap.

Consequently, crisis management and conflict prevention - emphasising political mechanisms rather than military - will probable be the most promising area of action. In the long run one should not underestimate the political consequences of the bringing into common light of abuses of human rights etc. This may make it politically possible to act in other fora, NATO or U.N. for example.

The CSCE may be able to provide a structure for a successively more stable militarily situation. The implementation of already agreed regimes and measures, particularly the CFE-treaty, are very important. Their dynamic function should not be forgotten. It is not improbable, that the extensive

verification-program now going on in Europe, will have profound consequences for the European military mind. The Programme for Immediate Action of the Helsinki Document includes some items that could strengthen these gains - particularly the so called harmonisation is important in this respect.

The dynamic aspect of the CSCE *process* may be a problem, however. It implies that the negotiations go on indefinitely and there is a risk for "measures for measures sake". After the great gains during the last years there may be a backlash, if the results will just be some refinements of existing obligations.

The use of CSBMs in crisis management seems particularly important. As they already are agreed on and their use normally is triggered by national decisions, the principle of consensus is no problem. In addition, there is a certain trend towards multilateral options. The outcome would be that a group of states could for example conduct fact-finding missions without being hindered of a lack of consensus in the main body of the CSCE.

The regional dimension is, in this regard, a related idea. It remains to be seen how this possibility will be used in the future. There are here prospects for geographically and strategically well-adapted regimes.

Conclusion and round-up of Nordic perspectives

The fall of the Wall has offered Sweden and Finland the possibility to rethink their strategic options. Indeed, this is a necessary process as the influence and power of U.S.A., and hence of NATO, in all likelihood will be reduced. The first steps have been taken with their applications for membership in the EC/EU. There are meagre possibilities of going back to old neutralist concepts. The weak state of their defences is one important factor in this regard.

The most important factor for the security of the Nordic region is the future of Russia. With a democratic government in the Kremlin, the CSCE may provide structures, processes and measures gradually helping to shape a stable and secure environment in the Nordic area. However, in regard of the inherent imbalances in potential military power, the small Nordic countries would still need Western backup to create a militarily balanced situation. This reassurance can in all likelihood not be offered by the CSCE.

On the other hand, a militaristic, non-democratic Russia will once again pose a military threat to Europe and the Nordic area. Here, traditional CSBMs could be of importance in the same way as during the Cold War. On the other hand, crisis-management and peace-keeping will probably not be useful in this context, as the military balance likely will be overwhelmingly in Russian favour. It is hard to envisage rapporteur-missions investigating the situation in such a Russia or at its borders. Peace-keeping forces, for instance

interpositioned between one of the Baltic republics and Russia, would hardly be effective.

Hence, it is clear that the CSCE will not offer a panacea for the future of security for Sweden and Finland. There is, in the opinion of the author, no alternative to a more close relationship with NATO and/or WEU in combination with strong national defences.

This does not mean that the CSCE is without importance for their future security, on the contrary. The CSCE is still the only regional security organisation they adhere to, and no one can predict what the outcome of present negotiations and plebiscites with the EC will be.

Importantly, the CSBMs will offer insights into the future security environment. Military contacts will break the isolation of Finnish and Swedish military. The new Baltic states need help with their build-up of national defence forces. The possible participation of Swedes and Finns in European peace-keeping, and perhaps also in peace-enforcement, operations within, or without, CSCE context, will also help to create new patterns in this regard.

The importance and the consequences of short-term transparency is less clear, however. This is due to the imbalances in capabilities between Russia and the Nordic states, it may well be that small countries tend to loose more than they win in such relations - at least in the near term.

The last factor is particularly important when dealing with the so called harmonisation-issue. Here, the concept of European stability built on very intrusive inspection/verification of agreed limitations is in the foreground. This collides however with basic Swedish and Finnish defence structures. The hard choice to make may be "between the integrity of the small mobilisation storage depot versus the grand European house".[16]

A similarly hard choice also affects the regional dimension. On one hand, regional deliberations could offer CSBMs well adapted to the geostrategical situation. On the other hand, there is always a risk for a weak group of states to negotiate with someone much stronger. To this one may add the problem of defining the Nordic Area in strategic terms.

This leads to a last remark. Sweden and Finland are relatively militarily weak countries, for different reasons not members of any alliance. The Nordic Area, though, is by its geopolitical position inherently linked to great-power politics. And in this context we are on the threshold to many important changes. The new U.S. government, and the problems of the Russian, will have repercussions not known today - much more important than the CSCE for future Nordic security.

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16 Attributed to Hans Zettermark, co-author of chapter x of this book.

COMMERCIAL SATELLITE OBSERVATIONS AND THEIR APPLICATION IN A NAVAL ARMS CONTROL CONTEXT

INTRODUCTION

The potential naval arms control benefit from commercial Earth observation satellites is complex because of the wide spectrum of satellites available. These are usually making observations of the Earth and its resources and environment. This type of satellite mapping and surveillance has become increasingly important. The US has been a pioneering nation in this area, but the former Soviet Union has also for a long time been active in space surveillance of the Earth. However, the two superpowers are no longer alone in this field and India and France were among the first nations to launch Earth observation satellites. France launched its very successful SPOT-1 satellite in 1986. Soon followed Japan and the member nations of the European Space Agency, ESA. Canada and others will soon join them.

The following list of commercial satellites covers the most important space platforms and sensor carriers that may be used in an naval arms control context.

TABLE 1

During this presentation pictures and images from several of these satellites, their characteristics and capabilities will be presented and commented on.

THE MILITARY SPACE SECTOR

The military space sector is large and very important to both the US and Russia. During the Cold War, space based information was vital to both superpowers. Therefore military space-based observations were pushed continuously ahead following the rapidly advancing technology in this field. Top priority was put on development of high resolution instruments that made it possible to classify and identify types of very small objects like vehicles, artillery, missiles, aircraft and details on the deck of naval vessels.

Even if these are top secret military satellite systems, open sources have given us a good idea about their capacity and capability. Since in the 1980s, the United States has had optical reconnaissance satellites, like KH-11 and KH-12, that transmit their images and observation data in real time to receiving station via geostationary communication satellites. These newest types of KH-satellites are said to be capable of recording surface details down to 10-20 centimeter across. The present operating radar (SAR) satellites, known as Lacrosse, are able to observe ground details down to 1-2 meters in size.

COMMERCIAL SATELLITES

Civilian-commercial satellites are with respect to spatial resolution clearly inferior to military satellites. The best American commercial satellite imaging system is Landsats' Thematic Mapper (TM) which produces pictures of the Earths' surface showing details down to 30 meters in size. The French SPOT satellite that produce B/W images that show details down to 10 meter in size, is the civilian satellite system with the best resolution operating today.

It should be noted that the Russian KFK-1000 cameras on their space platforms hava a 3-6 meters revolution capability. However, this type of photography is not a part of an Earth continuous observing system as represented by the Landsat and SPOT.

DRAMATIC CHANGE IN THE MILITARY USE OF CIVILIAN SATELLITE IMAGERY DURING THE GULF WAR

Civilian satellites' spatial resolution is obviously very poor compared with the above mentioned 10-20 centimeter capability of the KH-11 and 12 satellites. It is known that the US military for several years has used a considerable amount of commercial satellite data. It was especially in the surveillance of large areas and updating of old maps where the US defense community exploited civilian satellite data. However, their attitude was that this was only useful as a secondary and supplementary source of information.

However, during the Gulf War commercial satellite images were suddenly lifted up to a level of importance comparable to the military ones. When preparing for military actions against

Iraq, Landsat and SPOT satellite images were found to be extremely useful and fast in updating old topographical and thematic maps of Iraq and Kuwait. During tactical planning, the American reconnaissance and surveillance satellites proved to be very inadequate. This had nothing to do with the quality of the images, but useful from the limited coverage capacity, which failed to meetrequirements. One should keep in mind that the military reconnaissance and surveillance satellites are aimed at and streamlined toward global strategic imaging and not tactical war applications. For example, when the KH-11 or KH-12 satellites are doing very highresolution imaging, the large volume of observation data is limited with respect to the capacity of the satellites and this enables observation of only a band across the earths' surface during a single passage. The widths of such footprints on the Earths' surface by the satellite sensor/camera are probably in the range of 1000-3000 meters. For example on a map of Iraq such an imaging strip is thin as a pencil line. This type of highresolution imaging is therefore very selective, and only targets of highest priority can be imaged.

It is interesting to note that the successful use of commercial satellite data during Operation Desert Storm also attracted the attention of the US Navy, which before this conflict had very little experience with this type of satellite data. The US Navy has recently established a work station as the first major step in promoting the use of commercial satellite data within the Navy and the Marine Corps. The work station experts will provide target area updates and identification of the exact area to be covered in a successful strike.

PIXEL SIZE AND AREAL COVERAGE

Digital images like those from SPOT and the KH-satellites consist of picture elements, pixels, and the sizes of these define the resolution. The SPOT panchromatic pixels measure 10x10 meters and the 60x60 km scene has 6000 lines, and each line consists of 6000 pixels. Thus it takes 36 million pixels to make up one SPOT scene. The brightness within each pixel is averaged over this 100 m^2 large area, and each single pixel is given a brightness or grayscale level on a fine graded scale from 0 to 255 covering everything from completely black to the very lightest.

If we assume that a specific KH-close look satellite has a resolution of 20 centimeters, the pixel size is by definition 20x20 centimeter. It is easy to calculate that to cover one SPOT

panchromatic pixel no less than 2500 KH-pixels are needed! One may say that the KH-image is 2500 more detailed than the SPOT-picture. Intuitively, imaging results in a strong reduction of the observable area on the Earth surface.

SHIP DETECTION FROM LANDSAT IMAGERY

In an naval arms control verification context, surveillance and reconnaissance cannot be performed by one single type of satellites. The tasks are so widely different that diverse sensors have to be applied. When large open ocean areas and extensive coastal zones are subjected to surveillance, wide field sensors are needed.

For example when the missionis to classify and quantitatively identify naval vessels and their assortment of weapons, this can only be done by using military high resolution satellite imaging of the same type as described above.

On Landsat MSS images with a resolution of 80 meters' we observed several vessels in the Barents Sea during the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs study of the military bases on the Kola peninsula. Several of these were probably large vessels moving at fairly high speed producing long and strong wakes. However, on one late winter day Landsat MSS image we saw clearly tracks of two relatively small vessels, probably submarines shortly after leaving the Gremikha naval base on the northern Kola. They were moving through the ice slush and into the Barents Sea. This is a good example showing that even on moderate resolution images, ships longer than 100 meter, and probably some even smaller, are observable and their direction of motion was determined.

During the same study of Kola, the Landsat TM 30 meter resolution images easily revealed vessels in the open sea, in the fjords and even in portsand naval bases. This include both naval vessels and merchant ships.

IDENTIFICATION OF NAVAL VESSELS AND METHODS TO IMPROVE IDENTIFICATION CAPABILITY

It is however more difficult to classify them using commercial, optical satellites available today, and quantitative identification is impossible except for large targets like aircraft carriers. During the NUPI Kola study, I tried to identify the largest vessels observed in the Kola fjord in the Severomorsk basin, the Headquarters of the Russian Northern Fleet. It should be noted that inherently the situation gave us valuable collateral information. We knew that one Kiev class aircraft carrier and a battle-cruiser of the Kirov class usually are found in the Severomorsk area. We also concluded that the two largest vessels visible in the satellite picture were these two. The slimmest of the two display the shape of Kirov, and by counting pixels it corresponded well with the length of this cruiser. However, by the shape alone we could at once see that the other vessel was an aircraft carrier, and thus "Kiev", as its flight deck and superstructure were easily recognised. By using the dimensions of Kiev and the size of the SPOT pixels, calculation show that about 125 pixels are needed to completely cover the aircraft-carrier. These give a rough picture of Kiev but good enough to provide a possible identification.

Later the large aircraft carrier KUZNETSOV was commissioned to join the Northern Fleet, and it was calculated that 1870 pixels will cover this large vessel. In the same way we found that about 35 SPOT pixels cover completely the very large Typhoon submarine while only 8 pixels are needed the much smaller Whiskey class submarine.

Extrapolating how an KH-12 high resolution image with 20 centimeter pixels would cover the Kiev, shows that more than 300 000 KH-pixels are available to describe this aircraft-carrier.

When we lack satellite images with adequate resolution to classify and identify individual naval vessels, it is possible to obtain better results by using the data on the dimensions and superstructure and architecture of all vessels in question. In the satellite images it is also possible to measure the azimuthal orientation of the vessels. The general satellite data also include information on the altitudal and azimuthal position of the sun in the sky at the time of imaging.

By combining all these data, it is possible by computer modelling to show how the different types of vessels will appear on a satellite image with reference to the time of imaging and

their individual azimuthal orientation. By systematically comparing the appearance of the vessels on the satellite image with the computer model alternatives, the probability of a successful classification and identification will increase considerably.

I have recently had the opportunity to study a Russian KFA-1000 space photo of an coastal area in the US showing several ships of different sizes and types. From the details visible on the ships and their superstructure, the resolution is clearly superior to that of SPOT panchromatic images. Taking into consideration that this is a photographic product, the resolution may equal that of a 3 meter resolution digital image. This indicates that digital images with a spatial resolution of about 2 meters would be a quantum jump in improvement over SPOT panchromatic images with respect to identification of naval vessels as well as all man-made objects and constructions, military and civilian.

THE LOCATION OF NAVY VESSELS

Our experiences using SPOT B/W images of the Murmansk area shows that most of the ships in the Kola fjord are detected. Both the large NATO naval manoeuvres that took place in the fall of 1986 were imaged by the SPOT-1 satellite. The southern one took place in outer Oslofjord coastal area between Sandefjord and Larvik with the main amphibious landing on the sandy beach of Ula.

The northern manoeuvre was imaged when most of the naval units were in the Malangsjforden area south of Tromsø. As in the case of the Ula landing, the northern amphibious landing at the Aglapsvik beach had taken placer before the SPOT imaging of the area. One of the main differences between the southern and northern manoeuvres is that larger naval vessels were involved in the north like the US Navy Aircraft carrier Nimitz and an Royal Navy aircraft-carrier of the Invincible class.

In both cases all the vessels' involved were quite close to land and with a combination of satellite orbital data and good geodetic and map information, it is possible to locate the individual navy ships with an accuracy of 30-40 meters. Naval vessels on the open sea far from the coast, can be located with an accuracy of about 200 meters using the satellites'

orbital information. It is possible to determine the direction of motion for the ships that are not stationary.

NAVAL ACTIVITY DETECTION BY RADAR SATELLITES

Space platforms using side-looking radar instruments (Synthetic Aperture Radar = SAR) are the most promising and effective way to observe and survey the ocean and coastal zones. It is an active sensor as it generates its own energy which is transmitted and received to produce a photo-like picture of land and sea. The advantage with this SAR-imaging is it all weather and day/night observation capability.

It is obvious that this type of observation technique is specially favourable in northern Europe with a long and dark winter and long periods of weather. The first SAT-satellite was the American Seasat that made its observations for 90 days in 1978. The European Space Agency (ESA) launched in 1991 the first operative satellite of this type, ERS-1. It makes thematic observation of the Earth on a global scale.

The study of Seasat data proved that SAR-images are very useful in providing oceanographic information like surface waves, sea current dynamics, tide and flood borders and sea surface pollution like oil slicks.

From the start, Norwegians have taken special interest in ERS-1 because of its potential usefulness in the surveillance and control of the continental shelf and the economic zone of the long Norwegian coast. Digital processing of SAR-images was for many years extremely timeconsuming but fast and high capacity computers have solved this problem. The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (NDRE) has developed the worlds fastest SAR-processing system (CESAR) producing a 100x100 km ERS-1 scene in 8 minutes. An extensive study is under way to find out how useful ERS-1 data is for ship traffic monitoring. Final conclusions are not yet available, but there has also been developed a system that will detect ships and shipwrecks in 6 to 12 minutes within a whole ERS-1 scene.It is clear that the SAR detection capability is strongly dependent on the wind speed (wind stress). Rough seas give strong returns where sometimes small and medium sized ships less than about 100

meter in length, are lost in the sea stat noise. The NDRE automatic algorithms working on ERS-1 SAR images have proved to be capable of detecting ships and wakes, providing their positions (± meters), heading, size and sometimes a rough speed estimate. Preliminary results from the Norwegian study show that SAR-satellite observations will be important in a naval arms control context, both because of the detection capability and the near real time availability of the processed observations.

The ERS-1 SAR images have a resolution of about 25 meters and the Japanese JERS satellites' SAR-instrument detected piers and ships only 19 meters wide. Late next year both an improved ERS-2 and the Canadian RADARSAT will be launched. It is worth noting that RADARSAT will operate in a flexible mode by also haveing the capability to focus on areas of special interest. With normal operation it will have about the same resolution and coverage as ERS. However it can zoom in on an area as small as 45x45 km with a resolution as good as 9-11 meters.

SATELLITE MAPPING OF NAVAL BASES AND THEIR SUPPORTING INFRASTRUCTURE AND SURVEILLANCE OF ACTIVITIES AND CHANGES IN THE AREA

Spot 10 meter resolution image are well suited for mapping military bases and their infrastructure even though the spatial resolution is less than considered ideal. Computed raided change detection technique have also been used.

However, in the "Arms Control and Nordic Security" project of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, also Landsat MMS find TM, ERS-1 images and Russian KFA-1000 space photo have been used in the study. Preliminary results of the study will be presented at the international conference in Stockholm, February 15-16, 1993.

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DRAFT, NOT FOR QUOTATION

FEB. 15, 1993

Paper to be presented at the SIIA conference on Arms Control and Nordic Security, February 15-16 1993

'The general feeling that no nation nowadays can escape the demands of world history has grown ever stronger. The great wheel is spinning fast, and it is no longer up to ourselves to decide, whether we willbe swept away, or not.'[1]

— Rudolf Kjellén, 1911
(Father of the term "Geopolitics")

NORDIC SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL

— ROBERT DALSJÖ, JOHAN TUNBERGER, LARS WEDIN, HANS ZETTERMARK* —

The purpose of this essay is to briefly sketch the changing security environment and its strategic ramifications for the Nordic region. From there we set out to explore risks and possibilities, and discuss ways to handle these, including which part, if any, that arms control could play.

A mere glance at the map shows that Fennoscandia is wedged between the vast Eurasian land mass and the Atlantic Ocean. Irrespective of one's geopolitical view — Mahanist or Mackinderist — the region is a strategic transitional zone.

Maps can skew reality and influence perceptions. To many analysts, the Arctic attic of the European house — if at all considered— is perceived as a desolate area, as an object, while the real actors reside below. Possibly, this view is reinforced by the fact that the Nordic countries[2] are pretty quiet places, not much troubling other states.

For the Nordics themselves the perspective is, of course, very different. They, no less than others, tend to be ethnocentrists. In addition, there is

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1 'Allt starkare har blifvit den allmänna känslan, att ingen nation numera kan stänga sig ute från världshistoriens kraf. Det stora hjulet rullar snabbt, och det bero icke längre ensamt på oss själfva, om vi skola ryckas med eller ej'. Rudolf Kjellén, *Stormakterna. Konturer kring samtidens storpolitik* Vol 1. (Stockholm: Gebers, 1911), p 11.

* The views expressed are solely those of the authors and do not imply any official authorisation.

2 This paper concentrates on problems facing the Fennoscandian countries Finland, Norway and Sweden, but still uses "Nordic" as a label. Iceland and Denmark are also Nordic countries, but their strategic situations are tied to Central Europe and to the North Atlantic.

a streak of aloofness in the North when it comes to security issues. There is little reverence for Rudolf Kjellén or his ideas. Nordics often perceive themselves as unjustly affected by great-power rivalries and other expressions of an essentially immoral *Machtpolitik* pursued by foreigners. Fundamentally, there is a deep feeling that if only others were sensible enough to adopt the same Lutheran social ethos as the Nordics, the world would be a better place.

Hubris or not, a consequence is also that the Nordics tend to think of themselves more as objects — even victims — of the international power game played by others, rather than as actors.

The very rigidity of the Cold War contributed to this. The military dimension of security was paramount, dwarfing other dimensions. The security of the Nordic countries was largely geopolitically defined, as they were situated on the strategic axis of Soviet-US confrontation. The Nordic states perceived the threat as coming from the East and looked to the West, more or less openly, for support.

Within this framework, the four countries founded their military security on a combination of deterrence and reassurance - with different points of gravity. Finland emphasised reassurance. Denmark and Norway have been under the Nato umbrella albeit — very Nordic — with exceptions concerning nuclear weapons and allied troop presence. The policy of Sweden could perhaps be described as "middle of the road". A common credo was that no individual Nordic state should question or complicate the security policy of any other, unless provoked.[3]

Following the end of the Cold War, the immediate threat from the East has receded. The Nordic countries have become more entangled in the international economy while their competitiveness have slumped because of, i.a., swelling welfare bills. The net result is that they today have less freedom of action than they used to in the security dimensions which previously were secondary, while the opposite holds true for the military security dimension.

The Finns, having felt the influence of Moscow more than any other Nordic country, have been the quickest in taking advantage of the new situation.[4] In Sweden and Norway, a good portion of inertia, and sometimes popular nostalgia for the old, predictable times, still make their influence felt. This is evidenced, i.a., by popular resistance against the EC, most notably within the Green movement and the political left.

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3 This was part of a delicate pattern, referred to as the 'Nordic Stability' or the 'Nordic Balance'. The subtlety of the subject matter sometimes resulted in subdued, but theologically bitter, disputes whether the correct word was 'balance' or 'stability', possibly reflecting a lack of self assuredness.

4 Cf. the abrogation of the FCMA Treaty; the application for EC membership; the purchase of F/A-18s.

GEOPOLITICS

In strategic terms, the Nordic area — or Fennoscandia — forms a transitional zone between the continental East and the maritime West. Even if the risk of a major confrontation seems minute in the short or mid-term perspective, geography, pure and simple, helps explain why many Nordics attach such importance to the East-West security dimension.

The geopolitical position of Fennoscandia also implies that the maritime dimensions of strategy are of particular importance. Threats that might emanate from continental Russia can only be counterbalanced by a maritime power — for the foreseeable future by Nato, i.a. the United States.

The US is not only linked to the region by alliance, but also by national interest, not least residual nuclear competition. The risk of escalation makes potential conflicts in Northern Europe different from conflicts in the South — although the probability of conflict, at least for the moment, is smaller in the North.[5]

All in all, two different maritime Nordic aspects could be discerned; one is the Atlantic, the other is the Baltic.[6] The Baltic Sea, with its confined and shallow waters, could be described as something of a northern Mediterranean. Since ages it has been a focus of conflict as well as of commerce. Since Peter the Great Moscow has striven to control its eastern shore so as to get access to "civilised" Europe and to the Sea. During the Cold War, the Baltic became part of the USSR's security zone, and provided SLOCs between the Soviet Union and the then GDR.

Nordic relations with continental Europe have hitherto been first and foremost economic/social and cultural in character. The demise of the Soviet Union, the efforts towards European economic and political integration, and the search for a new European security order contribute to drive the Nordics more out into the open and towards Europe. Those Nordics who in the Cold War era were conditioned to think that any change in the security sphere was intrinsically bad, will be forced to overcome this mind-set, and to come to grips with uncertainties and unpredictability.

Although the drive towards European integration constitutes a new and very dynamic dimension, Nordic security thinking will, no doubt,

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5 "The northern-theatre scenario is special, frighteningly intense but — — not very likely, though possible. The southern scenario is much more likely, but much less threatening and almost impossible to predict or prepare for specifically." Geoffrey Till, " A Post-Cold War Maritime Strategy for NATO", *Naval forces* III/92, p 15.

6 The naval aspects are dealt with in greater detail in Robert Dalsjö, Johan Tunberger, Hans Zettermark, "Navies, Arms Control and the Nordic Region" (conference paper).

still be very much influenced by more traditional dimensions or perspectives, such as the perception of Russia as a potential threat to the Nordic states; of the Atlantic link as the provider of security; and of the North itself as a safe haven.

In the following, the security implications as regards to the different dimensions will be outlined.

THE EASTERN/RUSSIAN DIMENSION

It is important to note that the prevailing West European perspective on Russia differs markedly from the one held in the Nordic countries. The dominant perspective in continental Europe seems to be that Russian developments will not evolve into a military threat, at least for a long time — and, besides, issues like German unification and European integration hold most of the attention. The prevailing Nordic view is one of greater apprehension, since Russia is so close that the Nordics cannot avoid being affected in one way or another.

Presently, Russia and most of the former USSR is in a flux, politically, economically and militarily. She vacillates between reverting to, and breaking with, her imperial-militaristic tradition. A necessary, but probably not sufficient, precondition for a benign development is a stable, successful economy capable of generating self-sustaining growth. The economy, however, will presumably continue its plunge for years to come. What the future might hold is uncertain, but it is possible to sketch some alternatives.

The default option is that Russia will continue to try to muddle through, but with domestic policies having considerably less of a liberal tinge and foreign policy being more assertive. Although there would be problems, perhaps even serious, with Russia's neighbours and with the West, e.g., on minority issues or arms sales, this is still a relatively benign option. In the longer run, however, this scenario seems self-destructive, as a constant economic backslide would create immense pressures for change in one direction or the other.

Other, more troubling scenarios involve nationalist and conservative forces definitely gaining the upper hand, restoring authoritarian rule. Russian policies could then revert to self-reliance, self-righteousness, xenophobia, and repression. Military might would probably once again figure prominently as a national symbol and as the primary tool of an abrasive foreign policy. Such a regime could ultimately aim at restoring the Empire, or at least be suspected of such intentions.

Other scenarios include the disintegration of Russian central power, which could take the form of either peaceful dissolution or violent break-up, i.a., civil war. Peaceful dissolution could follow the path of the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe and the abolition of the USSR in 1991 — and eventually bring about medieval-type town-hinterland "principalities".

The wide spectrum of violent break-up ranges from a Spanish 1930s model ; via a rerun of the Russian civil war of 1918-1921; to a Serbian/Yugoslav war of ethnic secession. Disintegration might eventually lead to a struggle among warlords causing anarchy and desolation.

The security repercussions of such situations may differ widely, but their effects on the Nordic region could be considerable. Military operations might spill over into neighbouring states or international waters. The warring parties may have an interest in internationalising a conflict and drawing in outside powers. Also, the international community, or individual states, may intervene for reasons ranging from humanitarian concerns to fears of loss of control over weapons of mass destruction.

Even if Russia holds together a number of problems could emanate from Russia. Among these are large scale activities of organised crime — such as gun running, drug trafficking or terrorism, refugee movements ranging up to mass migration, environmental desolation and economic disruption. A matter of concern is that these problems would primarily plague the economically, politically and militarily fragile states in Russia's immediate vicinity.

None of the above scenarios appear beneficial, neither for the Russians nor for Europe as a whole. They also seem to condemn Russia to a position of economic inferiority for a long time.

Russian strategic interests will in most cases probably focus on maintaining internal order and cohesion, and ensuring that foreign powers do not interfere in Russian affairs and threaten Russian interests, as defined by Moscow. The Soviet Union sought to preclude threats and foreign interference by establishing and maintaining a glacis of buffer states. Even if Russia does not try to re-establish such a glacis, it still seems reasonable that Russia will strive to influence her vicinity — perhaps even to dominate her neighbours.[7] Moscow will probably also try to retain its status in the great power game, although truly global or overseas commitments will be shorn.

A westernising Russian regime would have a marked interest in economic integration with the West, notably the EC. Even though a full integration in the international economy would at the best take decades, the need for economic interaction with the West will, however, force Moscow to weigh carefully the consequences before embarking on an adventurous foreign policy. A more conservative or authoritarian regime might find itself excluded from economic co-operation with the West and instead focus on restoring old economic

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7 A disquieting case in point is repeated signals from Moscow that "protection" of ethnic Russians living outside Russia will be considered part of the national interest.

ties within the former Soviet sphere of interests. Here, remaining economic dependencies could yield considerable political leverage.

Irrespective of regime, it would probably be in Russia's perceived interests to block the entry of Central European states into Transatlantic or European structures of which Russia is not a member. Furthermore, barring the possibility that Russia breaks up altogether, or becomes firmly embedded in the Western political, social and economic structure, certain military interests will remain.

Regardless of scenario, nuclear weapons will remain Russia's ticket to great power status. Their strategic role will probably become more "French", serving as the ultimate guarantee against foreign interference or against threats to vital interests. Russia will not for some time be in the position, or have the means, to wage conventional war on a continental scale. Nevertheless, barring civil war or total break-down, her considerable conventional forces will be able to intimidate her neighbours. Conceivably, a more assertive regime could use its conventional military forces under the umbrella of a nuclear deterrent, the nuclear weapons acting as a shield while the army provides the sword.

START II will, if implemented, lead to drastic changes within the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal. More than 50% of remaining warheads will be placed on submarines. All but a handful of these will be based on the Kola peninsula and have their patrol areas nearby. Considering the importance of the remaining warheads, it seems reasonable that Russia — at the minimum — must be able to maintain and defend the northern SSBN bastion, and also to achieve Sea Denial in areas adjacent to the bastion.

Rivalry between Russia and the West, might generally increase the perceived need for protective zones. This applies not only in the High North, but also in e.g. the Baltic region, where the rearrangement of borders has upset conditions for air defence of the Russian heartland and reduced Russian ability to exert sea control on the Baltic.

Russia's geostrategic situation in the Baltic basin has deteriorated considerably. In view of this, and of technological developments, Fennoscandia and the Baltic states could be seen in Moscow as a latter-day Karelian Isthmus. It could be argued that these developments might create incentives for offensive or pre-emptive operations in times of tension.

THE SOUTHERN/EUROPEAN DIMENSION

The European integration project and the Europhoria of the late 1980s had great effects on Fennoscandia. The countries of the European Community exert a dominating influence on the economies of the Nordic countries. The EC's surge ahead towards a single market and eventual union made membership seem necessary for the Nordic

countries, if their economies were to remain viable and able to support the weight of a welfare society. The fall of the Berlin Wall made quick membership applications politically possible for the non-allied Swedes and Finns, the industries of which had already begun to move into the community.

Integration into "Europe" is today seen by the governments of the Nordic countries as necessary for continued economic prosperity. A pertinent question for the Nordics is whether European integration — i.a., the EC/WEU/EU — also can help provide for their military security. There is wide-spread scepticism in this respect. This is not only because of differing Nordic and West European views on the former Soviet Union, or because of fears that an "independent Europe" would focus on the south and on the Mediterranean. It is also because of misgivings about the viability of the security aspect of the European project.

Many of the ideas and proposals for European defence co-operation or a European defence identity floated so far seem largely to be intended for political-symbolic posturing. Questions remain concerning the political will of key actors to conduct actual military operations if push comes to shove — concerning as large and diverse a group of states as "Europe" the problems must be formidable. The disorientation when it comes to these crucial issues was highlighted when Germany was paralysed by demands that it should participate in the defence of its Nato partner, Turkey, during the Gulf War.[8]

Europe's inability to handle the crisis in former Yugoslavia also indicates the gap between the solemn declarations and the will — as well as the capability — to defend the elevated principles. This has repercussions for the credibility for the different Europes — CSCE-Europe, EU-Europe, WEU-Europe. Declaratory policy and stated aims set the standards against which actions and actors are judged.

In this context it should be recalled that the Nordics are heavily influenced by the Lutheran legacy that words should be matched by deeds. Inconsistencies between declaratory policy or political visions, on the one hand, and the determination and capability to rigorously carry through decisions taken, on the other, are not only ill received but almost beyond grasp for the Nordic mind.[9]

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8 It could be argued that Sweden is hardly in a position to prescribe that other states should sacrifice their sons for the sake of Sweden. Sweden's policy of neutrality has hitherto, in spite of moralist overtones, been governed by self-interest. It is, nonetheless, reasonable that Sweden should demand a commensurate quid pro quo for its participation in any military co-operation.

9 Cf. differences within the EC concerning the national implementation of community decisions.

It should be noted that the scope of Nato's claims is more limited, but that existing obligations are cast in a joint command structure, joint exercises and in infrastructure. Thus, it seems to be a long way to go before a European option could become a credible alternative to Nato for those seeking security.[10]

At the time of writing the prospects for European Union seem less rosy than just a year ago. Increasingly, states and public opinions have second thoughts about surrendering hitherto national prerogatives to Brussels, and prefer to pursue "narrow" national interests. However, the predicament of the European project appears to be that it must be seen as progressing — if it is not, it is likely to be perceived as regressing.

It cannot be ruled out that a failure in this respect will interact with more nationalistic inclinations to undo what has been achieved since 1986, and perhaps since 1957 or even 1952. In a worst case scenario, including also a severing of the Atlantic link, the re-nationalisation of policies, including security policies, would be the result. Thus, Europe would find itself in a time warp, thrown back to the 1920s.

A perhaps more likely, and more benign, scenario is that EC dialectics will produce a new consensus on slightly less visionary goals for the European project, concentrating on economic integration and "low politics", also allowing for co-operation in the "high politics" sphere, while putting federalist ambitions and the issue of substantive defence co-operation off to a more distant future.

THE WESTERN/ATLANTIC DIMENSION

Even if the EC were to leave hard-core security to Nato, it cannot be taken for granted that, in the long run, a US security commitment to Europe will remain. What seems to be certain, however, is that the forces available to back up such a commitment will be considerably smaller in the future.

The Atlantic link provides Europe with an essential element of its security. What has made the Americans so important is not only the resolve and unique overall military capability they provide, but also the deterrent value stemming from their manifested willingness to intervene, deeply rooted in American political culture.

In the eyes of the American electorate the demise of the Soviet Empire has removed much of the rationale for a US security commitment to Europe and for the maintenance of the large and costly forces necessary for this task. Furthermore, as the uniting effect of a shared threat wanes, differences between the US and European states on political

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[10] Whether Nato might be willing to accept new members is another matter, which will be discussed later.

and economic issues are coming to the fore. Here, initiatives for the creation of purely European defence structures may — intentionally or not — serve to accelerate a process of American alienation from Europe.

Their geopolitical situation, as well as the Lutheran craving for consistency, means that Scandinavians perceive material capabilities and propensity for power projection and assistance as the sine qua non of security guarantees. In the case of Denmark and Norway this has been explicit, while Sweden and Finland have implicitly depended on the countervailing influence of the maritime West.[11]

The trends towards US withdrawal from Europe, and the reduction of forces is viewed with some apprehension in Scandinavia. There is, however, also the conviction that the strategic importance of Russian SSBNs based on the Kola peninsula is such that the High North cannot be ignored by Washington even if there should be a withdrawal from Central Europe. The Start II agreement is likely to make the SSBN force based there relatively more significant than hitherto.

It notable that both Finland and Sweden lately have become more openly positive in their statements about the security role of the United States in Europe, indeed Finland, and to some degree Sweden, no longer rules out future Nato membership. Indeed, it seems that some sort of convergence is taking place among the Nordics.

THE NORTHERN/NORDIC DIMENSION

In the process of reshaping their external policies in a more integrationist direction, Norway, Sweden and Finland each pursue two goals simultaneously: economic and political integration in Europe, and an Atlantic security link — indirect or direct. These two goals may, however, clash with *Nordiqueness*, that particularist social-cultural identity which values honesty, hard work and consensus, but also idealises a purportedly pastoral and egalitarian past, and contains traits of introvert aloofness.

In the domestic debates concerning EC, the need to preserve *Nordiqueness* is often invoked or implied by those opposing membership. As *Nordiqueness* contains neutralist traits — not only in Finland and Sweden, but also in Norway — it could also come into conflict with the open pursuit of an Atlantic security link.

What is not always realised in the Nordic debate is the simmering conflict between the European project and the established Atlantic link,

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[11] This should not be taken to imply that Nato or the US would necessarily have come to the rescue of Sweden and Finland in case of a Soviet attack. However, the mere possibility of this, and — more importantly — Nato preparations for the reinforcement and defence of Norway and Denmark has helped provide stability to the region as a whole, including the two neutrals.

which may complicate their endeavours. It cannot be ruled out that pursuit of one objective may jeopardise chances of attaining the other. Whether a choice between the two becomes necessary, or not, depends largely on developments outside Nordic control. The preferred outcome would be that economic and political integration in Europe were reconciled with Atlantic security. This could happen if Nato continues to function and the EC, i.a., France, drops its ambition to create a European Defence Identity which would compete with Nato in the security arena. Then, the Scandinavians would have the options of seeking membership of both organisations, or of joining only the EC, while Sweden and Finland would expect to continue to draw indirectly on the stability that Nato provides the region.

Important to keep in mind, however, is that the Nordic applications for EC membership have been submitted, and the fact that the European Defence Identity is in limbo, does not mean that the problem is solved. An application may still be rejected, Nato may even fade away, or the European project fall apart. Complications might also arise within the Nordic region; a possibility which cannot be discounted is that the majority of the electorate of one or more Nordic countries may cast their votes rather for Nordiqueness than "Europe".

The results of such Nordic isolationism could be far-ranging: The Argentine example shows the economic and social consequences of autarchy and protectionism for a once wealthy nation. A self sufficient and "green" Scandinavia could end up as the open-air museum of Europe; a nice place for romantic and nostalgic tourism. Rejection of European integration might also act in a mutually reinforcing manner with such trends as radical neutralism and xenophobia; tensions between native Swedes and immigrants have increased in the last couple of years.

Developments such as these could, even in their milder forms, create fragmentation within Scandinavia. A Norwegian decision to remain outside the EC, while Sweden and Finland joined, could create an awkward situation in many respects. Ethnic and minority issues might — though it now seems farfetched — play a larger part in a Nordic region where the states grow apart from each other.[12] Fault lines need not necessarily follow national borders, either; there are great regional differences within Sweden and Norway, perhaps also in Finland, when it comes to the public's attitude to EC membership. The outcome of a highly charged decision on membership could cause bitterness and resentment in the losing region, possibly also to a search for closer ties with a neighbouring country which decided the other way. In case of a

12 For example, Swedish-speakers in Finland and Finnish-speakers in Sweden. However, if a perceived injustice is to have any significant consequences on inter-Nordic relations, it would have to take place in an already tense or gloomy situation where fragmentation is already under way.

Swedish "no", densely-populated southern Sweden might reject the national perspective and seek regional integration with Denmark and Northern Germany

This inventory of not so beneficial developments should not be taken as presaging. At the time of writing, radical isolationism or fragmentation does not seem very likely, even less to be imminent. Whatever the outcome, there would be no way of getting back to the old "safe" point of departure, if a Nordic country opted to withdraw from the process of integration.

ALTERNATIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

The future manifestations of the four security dimensions and their significance for the Nordic region are highly uncertain. The political and military outcome, if any, of the efforts towards European integration will be determined by dynamics, on which the Nordics have limited influence. The uncertainties about the fate of the former Soviet Union are infinite, but what road Russia will take is likely to deeply affect how Europe organises, or deranges, itself. In either case, the consequences for the Nordic states will be considerable.

As non-military aspects of security are becoming more significant the Nordics might be forced to chose what is more important; the north-south-axis, or the east-west-axis — in other words economic growth, or military security? Whether they will actually have a choice, or not, is highly dependent on the future of the Atlantic security link.

In the economic sphere, close economic integration with the EC/EU seems to be a *sine qua non* if the Nordics are to retain their welfare societies; At least that would appear be the rational view.

The esoteric quality of *Nordiqueness* is a wild card also in this context. Supporters of unchanged welfare commitments — sometimes characterised as welfare chauvinists — belong, along with the greens, to the most ardent anti-EC-groups. Depending on how different developments combine into larger scenarios, one cannot exclude that Scandinavian confrontation with continental Europeans could give rise to emotions that would further complicate the picture.

For e.g. Sweden, there seems to be several possible outcomes as to military security; the span, if not all options, could be graphically outlined in a table below:

The diagram below depicts Sweden's relationship to different security arrangements. Underlying the security assessment is the widespread Nordic concern that a threat emanating from Moscow might reappear. The security score attached to each alternative is, of course, highly subjective, indicative, and presupposes rational actors.

	NATO +WEU	**NATO**	**WEU "+"** (No US role; NATO-type mil integration)	**WEU "-"** (No US role; No NATO-type mil integration	**US/UK/ N/(SF)**	**Nordic Alliance**
Sweden member	+ + +	+ + +	+ +	+	+ + +	--
Sweden **not** member	+ +	+ +	+	--	+ +	- - -

Legend:

+++, ++, +, -, --,--- *goes from very secure to insecure.*

NATO+WEU = *Diminished US presence but strong European pillar.*

NATO = *Europe about 1991*

WEU "+" = *No US presence but NATO-type military integration* cum *joint West European security identity.*

WEU "-" = *No US presence; No NATO-type military integration; only ad hoc West European security cooperation.*

US/UK/N/(SF) = *North Atlantic security cooperation* cum *credible reinforcement preparations for assisting Nordics.*

Nordic Alliance = *purely Nordic defence alliance, chosen because of lack of alternatives or* Nordiqueness,

The NATO alternative is more or less the situation of yesteryear. Sweden could increase its security by becoming a member of the alliance, but might also as a non-member have an implicit drawing right — a free ride, if you will —on the over-all security pattern of which NATO is the key ingredient.

The NATO+WEU alternative represents a conscious joint European effort to compensate for the reduced American military presence. It is also presumed that the integrated military structure would persist. Swedish membership in one, or both, organisations would imply an active involvement in European security affairs and two-sided security guarantees, which ought to strengthen Swedish military security. Should Sweden not be a member, European security cohesion would still indirectly benefit Sweden.

The WEU "+" alternative outlines a situation with no, or only symbolic, American military involvement in Europe. A strong, joint European security identity is formed, further reinforced by a NATO-type military integration. The security implications are similar to the previous example, but the absence of in-place U S.-forces — the link to extended deterrence — might make the security pattern more wobbly.

The WEU "-"alternative summarises a scenario with US forces gone combined with the erosion of military integration in Western Europe. Security cooperation is haphazard and ad hoc in Western Europe, indicating an increased fragmentation of security policies and an increased focus on traditional national objectives.

The US/UK/N/(SF) a "North-North Atlantic Alliance" between Anglo-Saxons and Norway, possibly also Sweden and Finland. This could be a result of the previous scenario. If there is little perceived need for a joint European security identity and military integration in continental Europe, Nordic security preoccupation vis à vis Russia could combine with U S. and British concerns about nuclear and maritime threats. The relatively high security score is based on the premise that the arrangement represents a new effort and is substantially underpinned by a viable reinforcement capability — indicating a strong perception of obligation.

The Nordic alliance, finally, could be described as a default option predicating the demise of serious Western defence cooperation, or caused by a massive upsurge of *Nordiqueness*. Without Swedish participation this would not seem to be an option.

As is readily evident from the diagram, the assessment of the authors is that Swedish security is less dependent on membership in the different security arrangements than on the existence or non-existence of a joint political and military security structure in Western Europe. In the latter context the Atlantic link is of key importance. This, of course, is not an unexpected finding; Swedish military security is and will remain highly dependent on overall European stability. In the case of an attack on Sweden, the issue of

military assistance is quite another matter. Here, a formal link would be crucial, as would be actual preparations for such assistance.

THE ROLE OF ARMS CONTROL

No doubt, the future over-all security architecture of Europe will be the determining factor for Swedish, and Nordic, security. A pertinent question is still whether, and how, Arms control-efforts could contribute to Nordic security. In other papers prepared for this conference the impact of agreements on nuclear weapons, CFE-reductions, CSCE-endeavours as well as naval arms control are analysed. The findings will not be repeated here. Instead we will attempt to critically review the utility of various traditional arms control concepts in the new security environment, and to explore emerging arms control approaches, in order to assess how they could contribute to Nordic security in the future.

An important issue here is the definition of arms control. A narrow definition would suggest that arms control are measures aiming at limiting or reducing the number of weapons systems, and the associate verification provisions. In this paper a wider, inclusive interpretation is used: Thus, arms control covers also confidence- and security building measures, including risk reduction and, possibly, peace keeping and -enforcement.

With the withering away of the bi-polar block structure in Europe, a major premise underlying most arms control efforts in the narrow sense is gone: namely, that military balances can be calculated.

Of course, traditional bi-polar bean counting has always been a crude measure of military capability. Intangibles like technical quality, tactics, training etc. could not be objectively defined, counted and verified. Still, politically acceptable, albeit approximate, "balances" could be calculated. This was the underpinning of e.g. the START-, INF and CFE-treaties.

With the break-up of the WTO — and of individual European states— the numbers game is no longer credible as an intellectually and politically honest exercise. This is especially true when it comes to conventional forces. It might also become applicable to the nuclear sphere, as the overwhelming superiority of the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia is radically diminishing. Now,nobody can foretell what coalition of forces might come into conflict with others.

Should a conventional "balance" between, say, Germany and Russia, take interpositioned states, such as Poland and Belarus, into account? Should it perhaps also include other states, based on guesstimates about the war-time behaviour of these? The complexities add up *ad infinitum*. Should, despite this, a "numerically calculated balance" ever be produced between Germany and Russia, both states would anyhow have the military capability to overwhelm many smaller neighbouring states.

In the new reality, limitations and reductions are becoming more and more political. The CFE 1 A agreement on limits on personnel is a case in point:

States declared the "limit" of their choosing, and many states will have lesser numbers than declared.

This is not to propose that existing, and possible future, reductions are not significant, it is rather to submit that the bean counting approach to limitations has outlived its usefulness.

Limits remain significant for two reasons: First, they hedge against massive rearmament; even if technology advances makes it ever more possible to *circumarm* by substituting non-limited equipment for limited, restrictions on the major categories of weapons systems makes rearming more difficult. Secondly, the verification arrangements of latter day agreements — especially if used synergetically — are perhaps even more significant as they provide ample opportunities to monitor military activity in Europe.

Reductions, be they unilateral or negotiated, are not without complications. There is what could be termed the inverted World War I problem: Substantial reductions of forces mean lower force-to-space ratios in any major military confrontation. In many conceivable cases, the number of units available would not suffice for linear, or "front" warfare. Most units, whether attackers or defenders, would have to carry out fluid, mobile, encounter operations. This means that the gap between offensive and defensive warfare is narrowing at the tactical and operational level. The requirements when it comes to weaponry, C^3I, mobility and training are converging.

In principle, one could argue that the requirements posed by strategically offensive and defensive operations would remain very different when it comes to logistics. As a rule of thumb a defensive structure would require much less of an elaborate and expensive logistic organisation, while this is needed to project power over long distances. This still often remains true when it comes to forces structured mainly for the defence of a state's own territory.

However, with national forces dwindling, the ability to quickly send, and to receive, reinforcements will perhaps become even more important in the future than hitherto. Such reinforcement-forces will have to be provided with fairly massive logistic back up if coalition defence is to remain credible. Furthermore, in light of the "new" conflicts — in Europe, e.g. former Yugoslavia, and outside Europe, e.g. the Gulf War — there is today a greater need to be able to project force over long distances for humanitarian purposes, for peacekeeping and for interventions. For these reasons, it would seem ill-advised to propose constraints on logistics.

In the eighties there were a lot of ideas, and research on how to configure force mixes so that they would be structurally incapable of large scale offensive operations— *Strukturelle Nichtangriffsfähigkeit* —, while still capable of an effective defence. Light infantry with advanced anti-tank weapons and other precision guided munitions figured prominently. Despite a lot of intellectual effort, these ideas have never yielded much. The developments briefly outlined above, reinforces a trend in a very different direction,

towards "leaner but meaner forces" with considerable intervention capability. Partly, this is a consequence of technological and operational developments, but to a large extent this is also a consequence of what the disarmament community has traditionally strived for, namely the reduction of forces combined with the need to create a common military security.

Many European states, among them the newly emancipated, will not be able to afford substantial high tech-forces. Others will opt for a high-low mix, with less well equipped reserves representing the low end. A few, most prominently the United States, will focus almost entirely on high value intervention forces. The shifting characteristics of forces will further complicate any attempt to devise arms control proposals with "scientific" pretension.

In sum, the main problem facing arms control efforts in Europe today is that the bi-polar status quo arms control once set out to strengthen simply is not there anymore. One lesson from the mishandling of the Yugoslavian crisis is obvious; it takes a lot more to manage change in Europe than it once did to preserve the status quo.

As numerical balances and structural agreements become increasingly more unattainable, the softer, cooperative aspects of arms control come to the fore. Now, information on military forces and their activities are exchanged, intrusive verification routinely carried out, and military contacts promoted.

When it comes to fostering confidence and security in relations between states which fundamentally adhere to what could be called an European *ethos*, the dividends of softer measures could be considerable. However, the most imminent internal European threats to security today appears to stem from the break-up of states taken for granted during the Cold war, and from groupings which do not play by the "European" rules. If violent fragmentation and massive breaches of human rights are allowed to continue, more traditional threats to European security might very well re-emerge. However, classic arms control seem to have little prospect of curbing or handling the "new threats".

FROM COOPERATION TO COERCION

Obviously, "soft" cooperative measures are not sufficient to handle the new threats, some type of coercion will also be necessary. Lest the European order is going to break down, it rather seems as if the scope of cooperation must be expanded, to also cover cooperation in coercion. So far, the "new threats" seem to directly afflict south-east Europe, rather than the North, which is the focus of this paper. However, it cannot be ruled out that the new threats will spread; the prospect of Russia exploding in ethnic violence is daunting, not least from a Nordic perspective.

If "Europe" cannot come to grips with the new challenges, the security implications might be ominous for the entire continent. There is widespread awareness of the dangers, but the search for viable solutions is haphazard and plagued by thorny problems of institutional set up, and of procedures

for decision making, crisis management, peace keeping, and peace enforcement.

VERIFICATION AND MONITORING

While it seems difficult to find suitable arms control measures of a traditional kind, or to reach agreement on an effective political framework for crisis management, there is one class of measures which could offer promise in a multipolar Europe. Verification and monitoring already fulfil important functions in many aspects of arms control — from loose "contacts" to "smoking gun" verification.

The existing cobweb of functionally interrelated verification and monitoring arrangements could be also coupled to other types of monitoring, such as the early warning function of the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. With an integrated approach to verification/monitoring — very much like that of regular intelligence — there could be crucial early possibilities to detect not only attempts to break out of an, agreed or understood, code of military conduct but also deviations from "European principles" as laid down in various CSCE-documents at an early stage[13].

If verification/ monitoring were elevated from being a tool for ensuring implementation of specific agreements to being a measure in its own right, it could become a powerful tool in the wider sense of arms control. However, this must not overshadow the simple fact that if there is no concerted political will to use the tools available to uphold "European principles", efforts are to no avail. So far, the track record of "Europe" is anything but good.

ARMS CONTROL AND THE NORDIC REGION

While the larger European security problem is to resolve the dilemma of how to uphold "European principles" — if necessary at the expense of traditional national sovereignty — the problems in the Nordic region are different.

A pluralistic, democratic Russia with a market economy would serve to mitigate many Nordic concerns. What the West and the Nordic countries could do to help foster such an "Russian evolution" largely falls outside the scope of this chapter/paper, however.

In the context of this paper two questions are particularly relevant:

- Could arms control — in a wider sense — help alleviate, often traditional, Russian security concerns in a way that would prop up the westernising, democratic forces in the Russian society?

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13 Cf. the Charter of Paris & the Helsinki Document

- Could arms control — in a wider sense — help strengthen Nordic security, should a threat be perceived to re-emerge from Russia?

In attempting to answer the first question, it is worth noting that some Russian officers have expressed concern, e.g. for the prospect that the West will try to fill the military vacuum left by Russian forces in the Baltic states, or that NATO naval forces have not significantly changed their operational pattern in the Far North despite the withdrawal of Russian naval forces[14].

Such signals should not be allowed to determine the content of Western or Nordic policies; clearly, it would be silly to let the most traditional and conservative strata of the Russian military turn a Western policy of reassurance into one of appeasement. Still, it is likely that the fears openly expressed reflect a widespread, if more tempered, Russian concern, which should be taken seriously.

However, Russia's neighbours have concerns, too. Most of them have recent, or historic, experiences of the Russian propensity for establishing, and expanding a *cordon sanitaire* around the Motherland. That is the case with the Nordic countries, and certainly also with the newly emancipated states in Central Europe as well with the Baltic states.

This suggests that a prudent Nordic policy should follow the long standing Norwegian maxim of "avskrekking og beroligelse" the essence of which is to provide for viable defences while refraining from "provocative" military dispositions.[15] A key feature of this policy is that it is unilateral; although consistently implemented it can be reversed, should the situation so warrant. This trait was also evident in the policies of other Nordic states; e.g. for Sweden, the option of abandoning neutrality was an integral part of the policy, although that potentiality was fastidiously denied.[16]

Even a policy of "deterrence and reassurance" cannot be unaffected by the end of the Cold War. One aspect of reassurance was Sweden's and Finland's policies of neutrality. Now, none of Nordic states want to be left outside the search for new cooperative structures and they are also moving closer to existing ones.

Swedish and Finnish participation in substantive European security cooperation need not be detrimental to reassurance, on the contrary. A policy of reassurance would seem to be all the more reassuring if it is consistently conducted within a larger institutional framework. One important reason for this is that if a state's security is adequately backed-up, it presumably is less preoccupied with worst-case scenarios and more free to pursue a policy of reassurance in concert with others. Conversely, it seems

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14 "Holst i orduell med russisk admiral", *Aftenposten.*, November 25?, 1992.

15 This could be seen as a manner of "Cooperation under the security dilemma", as discussed by Robert Jervis.

16 The policy of neutrality was recently abandoned as the official doctrine. Now, Sweden's policy is described as 'not allied'.

likely that states on their own would not have the margin of safety to treat a challenge as an opportunity, but rather perceive is as a threat.

In principle, the ideal solution would be an all-European alliance. In the real world, inclusiveness and effectiveness are not easily reconciled; an all-European alliance would constitute another CSCE, duplicating its merits and shortcomings. The process of finding a workable mix of "deterrence and reassurance" is complex and soul-searching, as is borne out by the acronyms NATO, NACC, EC, EU, WEU, CIS, EDB, etc.

In this context, it should not be ruled out that Finland and long neutral Sweden — now "not allied" — could further reconsider their security policies. Finland has effectively abrogated the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union, is an observer in NACC, and NATO membership is publicly discussed. Sweden positively wants to participate in West-European policy co-ordination and does not 'close doors'. Again, it would presumably be easier for Stockholm and Helsinki to pursue an creative policy of reassurance towards Russia if it were carried out within an alliance, or structure, which could also provide credible security guarantees.

When reviewing the deterrence element of the policy, the effects of force reductions must be factored in. The CFE-treaty is highly advantageous for Nordic security.[17] Especially the zonal arrangements mean that Russian deployment of heavy land forces in the Leningrad military district is severely curtailed. The verification regime provides unprecedented transparency, making detection of violations likely.

At the same time, indigenous Nordic forces are also being drastically cut[18]. Even balanced reductions could have disproportionate effects in operational terms; also after substantial reductions a big power could concentrate forces sufficient for overwhelming a small neighbour should it chose to do so.

This means that the issue of possible reinforcements in the event of a hypothetical Russian threat will be crucial for the deterrence aspect of a policy of "deterrence and reassurance". It is a safe prediction that Norway and Denmark will not see any reason for re appraising their NATO-membership. Whether Sweden and Finland will reappraise their security policies to the point of ensuring assistance in case of need, remains to be seen. However, it must be stressed that joining an alliance takes a lot more than joining the Book of the Month Club; the non-committal NATO-reaction to overtures made by the East European former WTO-states is a clear indication that these issues are not solely for the Swedes, or Finns, to decide on.

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[17] Cf. Marco Smedberg, with Robert Dalsjö, Hans Zettermark, "War in the Northern areas within the limits of the CFE Treaty", (conference paper).

[18] Norway is cutting the number of mobilisable brigades from 15 to six. Sweden is in the process of reducing from 29 to 16 brigades; Finland will cut its defence spending by ten percent. All three, however, are striving to modernise remaining forces.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Keeping the combined "deterrence and reassurance" approach in mind, it seems possible to draw certain conclusions concerning arms control:

From the reassurance standpoint:

- Transparency and openness measures could serve to create confidence by demystifying existing Feindbilder. Such measures could include e.g. exchange of data and plans, military contacts, exchange programmes, joint preparation for peacekeeping and other international operations.

From the reassurance and deterrence standpoint:

- Seemingly paradoxically, one could say that a deterrence lifeline gives greater freedom of manoeuvre in the pursuit of a policy of reassurance. There is less need to hedge one's bets if one has a secure fall-back position.

- Verification measures, and also less intrusive observation/ evaluation, constitute a particularly important class of measures as they have important functions in any situation — from fairly social "contacts", to "smoking gun" verification, and to "alarm bell" function in times of crisis.[19]

From a deterrence standpoint the picture becomes more complicated:

- Before endorsing arms control agreements, Nordic states should seriously consider the net effects on national defence capabilities and on the prospects for timely reinforcement, should need be. Thus restrictions on e.g. military deployments should preferably be unilateral in character, in order to avoid *droit de regard*-situations and to not limit one's options.

Of course, there are valid counter-arguments to this. It would be a mistake to argue that all agreements, binding by treaty or otherwise, are detrimental to Nordic security. To take the most pertinent example, the overall effects of the CFE-treatymust be judged beneficial to Nordic security. The zonal provisions of the CFE-treaty serve to make the "Nordic — Leningrad MD-

[19] An observandum in this context is that both Sweden and Finland have misgivings about some aspects of both information-exchange and verification. For their defence, both states rely to a high degree on the mobilisation of reserves. It is felt that they would be disproportionately hurt, if they would have to give away the exact location of their dispersed depots and give inspectors access to these. Cf. Lars Wedin, "CSCE and Nordic Security", (conference paper).....

balance" on the ground more balanced, by imposing substantial reductions on mechanised Russian land forces.[20]

The CFE-treaty also makes the reinforcement equation more balanced. Should Russia move treaty-limited tanks, artillery or armoured combat vehicles from the centre to the Leningrad Military District, it would be in contravention of the zonal provisions; likewise, a U S deployment of tanks to Norway would be in contravention to CFE-provisions.[21]

If, thus, the balance of ground forces is being levelled out by the CFE-treaty, other asymmetries could be said to remain in regard to air and naval forces. However, to a great extent this is a matter of perspective. The "sub regional" naval balance is overwhelmingly in Russia's favour, but applying a less myopic perspective yields a much different picture. Similar reasoning could be applied to the "balance" of air-power.

To the authors, it would seem futile to even attempt to devise arms control formulae — by necessity, highly asymmetrical and complex — aimed at reconciling the sub-regional and the European or global perspectives. To achieve the objectives of such an endeavour, it seems more preferable if the states consciously strived to show unilateral constraint, taking the security interest of others into account. To accomplish this, "soft" approaches like regional dialogues, frequent contacts, voluntary notification of military activities (also air and naval), which might cause concern in the particular circumstances of North-western Europe, seem more commendable than outright negotiations which almost certainly would stumble on the difficulty of reconciling the two perspectives.

For the Nordics, being the lesser powers, it would be easier to enter into such an exchange if they felt securely anchored in an effective European-Atlantic security structure.

(End)

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[20] One could note that the political stability of the Nordic region makes it more justified to talk in terms of 'balance' in that area, than in other parts of Europe.

[21] As Norway, Greece and Turkey together have 4 700 tanks = the full "flank"-zone allotment for NATO under CFE

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