




ALIBONI

# JOINT WEU - ELIAMEP CONFERENCE 1992

## **Security Challenges in South-Eastern Europe**




**Rhodes, 17-19 September 1992**

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SECURITY CHALLENGES IN SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE  
Western European Union. Institute for Security Studies  
Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy  
Rhodes, 17-19/IX/1992

- a. Programme
- b. List of participants
- 1. "The new security environment in South-Eastern Europe: outline"/  
Roberto Aliboni
- 2. "Developments in the Balkans"/ Hans Stark
- 3. "Security perceptions and security policies of Bulgaria"/  
Wladimir Philipov
- 4. "Security perceptions and security policies of South-Eastern  
European countries: a Romanian standpoint"/ Alexandru A. Farcas
- 5. "The institutional framework for South-Eastern European security:  
the EC and WEU"/ Roberto Zadra
- 6. Prospects for regional cooperation in South-Eastern Europe"/  
Emmanuel Megalokonomos




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# Security Challenges in South-Eastern Europe

## Programme

*Rhodes, 17-19 September 1992*

Western  
European  
Union  
Institute for Security Studies



Hellenic  
Foundation  
for Defense  
and Foreign Policy



# SECURITY CHALLENGES IN SOUTH - EASTERN EUROPE

*RHODES 17 - 19 September 1992*

**Thursday, 17 September 1992**

20:30                      *Departure to Rhodes Palace Hotel*

21.00                      *Official welcome dinner by Secretary General Willem Van  
EEKELEN (WEU)*

**Friday, 18 September 1992**

9.00                      *Introduction (ELIAMEP, ISS)*

**9.30 - 11.00    SESSION I (chair: John ROPER, WEU/ISS)**

*The new security environment in South - Eastern Europe*

introduction:                      *Roberto ALIBONI (IAI)*

discussant:                      *Jacques RUPNICK (CERI)*

11.00 - 11.30                      *Coffee break*

**11.30 - 13.00    SESSION II (chair: Thanos VEREMIS, ELIAMEP)**

*The crisis in former Yugoslavia*

introduction:                      *Hans STARK (IFRI)*

discussant: *John ROPER (WEU/ISS)*

13.00 - 17.00 *Lunch and afternoon break*

**17.00 - 18.30 SESSION III (chair: Roberto ZADRA, WEU/ISS)**

**The security perceptions and security policies of  
South - East European countries**

introduction: *Ambassador Stefanos STATHATOS*

discussant: *Malcolm CHALMERS, University of  
Bradford*

18.30 - 19.00 *Coffee break*

**19.00 - 20.30 SESSION IV (chair: Professor Yannis VALINAKIS, Eliamep).**

**The security perceptions and security policies of  
South-East European countries (continued)**

Bulgaria: *Ambassador Vladimir PHILIPOV  
(Bulgaria)*

Romania: *Alexandru FĂRCAS (ADIRI)*

discussant: *Robert ASPESLAGH (Clingendael)*

21.00 *dinner*

**Saturday, 19 September 1992**

**9:30-11:30 SESSION V (chair: John ROPER, WEU/ISS)**

**The institutional framework for South-East European security**

EC and WEU: *Roberto ZADRA (WEU/ISS)*

NATO, the CSCE  
and the UN: *Fernando RODRIGO (Spain)*

Prospects for regional  
co-operation:

*Ambassador Emmanuel  
MEGALOCONOMOS (Greece)*

discussant:

*Fraser CAMERON(EC)*

*11:30-12:00*

*Coffee break*

**12:00-13:00. SESSION VI (chair: Thanos VEREMIS, Eliamep)**

*concluding session*

*13:00.*

*end of conference*

*14:30-21:00.*

*excursion to Lindos*

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# Security Challenges in South-Eastern Europe

## List of Participants

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## SECURITY CHALLENGES IN SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

International Seminar organised by WEU-ISS & ELIAMEP

Rhodes, 17-19 September 1992

outline of the presentation of Dr. Roberto Aliboni  
Director of Studies, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome

### The New Security Environment in South-Eastern Europe

The conflicts in Southeastern Europe, dominated by ethnic, national and religious factors, have been generated by the serious economic crisis and the profound weakness and fragmentation of civilian society left by the collapse of communism. The feelings of frustrations and impotence produced by this situation drive the people to seek protection in the most rudimentary and traditional forms of identity and solidarity, such as belonging to the same religion, ethnic group, or nation. This trend legitimates nationalistic, ethnic or religious political regimes and often favours conservative forces.

The patterns of conflict are quite similar to those in the Middle East. The attempts of the ethnic/nationalistic majorities (in Serbia and Croatia, in the future in Macedonia) to assert their dominion within the borders alarm the minorities and cause them to look for help abroad. This provokes internal and external conflicts in response to which the regimes seek territorial adjustments. On the other hand, the democratic forces that came to power in some countries (Albania and Bulgaria) have inherited such disastrous economic situations that they lose consensus, which turns toward nationalistic and conservative forces. This causes tension and domestic conflicts, which are bound to have regional repercussions.

Such conflicts are typical of the new international situation facing the West in what has been called the "new arc of crisis". Although they do not pose a direct or immediate threat, they do present risks of involvement and indirect consequences (e.g. the flow of refugees) which the West is not well-equipped to handle.

...

The armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia has spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina. It could spread further within the former Yugoslavia and to other countries in southeastern Europe.

The Kosovo dispute could provide the grounds for this spread. The Serbs' severe repression of the aspirations of the Kosovars' (approximately 90% of which are Albanians) to achieve republic status (referendum of Sept. 1991) has exasperated the ethnic sentiments of the Kosovars and stimulated plans for unification with Albania. The current Kosovo leadership prefers a low profile and passivity towards Belgrade. But intensified Serbian nationalism resulting from the course of the conflict in Bosnia could exasperate the Kosovars and provoke another conflict.

Conflict could also spread to Macedonia. This republic's intention to become independent (referendum of Sept. 1991) also aroused Serbia's opposition. The government in Belgrade immediately expressed concern for the Serbian minority in Macedonia, thus setting the scene for a conflict similar to the one in Croatia and in Bosnia.

...

There is potential for yet other conflicts in the region, besides those in the former Yugoslavia: between Rumania and Hungary over the Magyar minority in Transylvania; and between Hungary and Serbia over the Magyar minorities in Vojvodina. Turkish minorities are disputed in Bulgaria and Greece. Clearly pro-Albanian developments in the Kosovo could draw in Albania, although irredentism towards the Kosovo is not one of Tirana's priorities.

Yet, the spread of armed conflict outside of the former Yugoslavia seems to be linked above all to developments in Macedonia and involves Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey.

Following the referendum on independence held in September 1991, Bulgaria recognized Macedonia. Sofia considers most Macedonians as ethnic Bulgarians, but it admits

that these Bulgarians live in another state. Greece, on the other hand, is against Macedonian independence—and the use of a name that is part of the Hellenic heritage—as it fears that such a state could develop irredentist claims towards Greece that would, perhaps, be supported by Turkey. This is one of the reasons why Greece has in recent years sought closer relations with Serbia, also opposed to Macedonia independence.

If Serbia were to invade Macedonia with the excuse of the Serbian minority in that country, and if Macedonia were to request the help of Bulgaria, Greece could be forced to intervene alongside Serbia. Turkey, in turn, could come to the aid of Bulgaria.

This is a pessimistic scenario, to which serious objections can be raised. However, it shows that the premise for a new war in the Balkans is contained in the progressive spread of the conflict between the components of the former Yugoslavia.

\* \* \*

In the post-Cold War world, conflict in the Balkans can no longer lead to a global conflict. Nevertheless, international involvement could not be ruled out if Greece and Turkey were to become involved.

At any rate, it should be pointed out that even if it does not and will not involve other countries outside of the region, the escalating conflict in southeastern Europe is causing serious damage to international cooperation and is generating negative trends in other countries and regions.

- \* It hinders and could delay the creation of a pan-European order within the framework of the CSCE;
- \* It severely tests the cohesion of the European Community and could contribute to blocking the deepening decided upon at Maastricht;
- \* It has a negative impact on the growth of cooperation in Russia, strengthening nationalistic and conservative forces (in occasion of the adhesion of the Russian government to the UN resolution on Bosnia, the president of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Russian Parliament, Ambarzumov, lamented his country's support of the American position and the abandonment of the historical alliance between Russia and Serbia);
- \* It contributes to reinforcing Ankara's pan-Turkism ("from the shores of the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China", as the moderate Demirel put it during his trip to Central Asia);
- \* It intensifies the controversy between the West and Islam, given the involvement of the Bosnian Muslims (and in the future, those of Albania);
- \* It contributes, more generally, to fuelling religious controversies, such as those between Orthodox and Catholics, and provokes the interference of the Churches in foreign policy matters;
- \* It aggravates the Greek-Turkish dispute and therefore damages the cohesion of the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance.

\* \* \*

Western, and in particular, European security is seriously damaged by the developments in southeastern Europe, even if these developments are contained within the region. The crisis in southeastern Europe has already had some global effects. The reasons advising against military intervention are numerous as are those justifying diplomatic and political failures. However, a more determined and consistent Western policy is both possible and to be hoped for. Governments are complacent in the knowledge that it is not a matter of threats, but only risks. But if not effectively contained, the risks of today can turn into the threats—or even more disastrous events—of tomorrow.

Developments in the Balkan States

September 1992

As far as the war of the Yugoslavians is concerned, one of the major characteristics is that no convincing compromise enabling a peaceful coexistence seems yet to be in sight or even possible. Too many problems account for the disintegration of Yugoslavia. After the collapse of the Roman empire, in the year 395, a political and cultural frontier had split the country down the middle. The same frontier separated thousand years later the Austro-hungarian empire from the Ottoman one. After having been under the influence of Rome, Slovenians and Croats fell under the control of Vienna and Budapest. Serbs, Montenegrins and Macedonians were subjected to the authority of Byzantium, later on Istanbul. The disintegration of Yugoslavia is nothing else than the definitive failure to fill the gap between the latin and the orthodox influence areas on our continent, with Bosnia being at the core of this division.

After the partial collapse of the communist regime in Europe, in 1989, the republics of Yugoslavia tried to follow the political evolution of their different neighbours. Slovenia and Croatia wanted to become respected members of the central-european community and patterned themselves upon the political model of Poland, Tchechoslovakia and Hungary, where conservative and rightist parties came to power. Serbia and Montenegro, on the contrary, as in Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania at the end of the year 1989, refused the political change and remained under communist control. Torn between this two political models, Bosnia and Slavic Macedonia refused both options as well and encouraged the setting-up of truly nationalist regimes. One year before the outbreak of the war in July 1991, Yugoslavia had in fact already disintegrated. As a matter of fact, during 1990 and 1991, the Yugoslavian state has experienced a growing number of elections and referendums on independence on a republican and even inner republican scale. Besides the coming to power of new regional and republican authorities, the federal structures broke down and disappeared. Free elections were held in April and May 1990 in Slovenia and Croatia, in November 1990 in Slavic Macedonia and Bosnia, in December 1990 in Serbia and Montenegro. After the split into three different political orientations brought about by free elections, the country was once again shattered by the increase in the number of referendums on independence. Slovenians and Croats declared themselves in favor of independence in December 1990. Slavic Macedonia follows this example : a referendum on independence was organised in September 1991, without the participating of the major part of the Albanian minority living in this republic. Bosnia, in order to be recognized by the European Community, hold a referendum on independence in March 1992, but without the participating of one third of the population, the Bosnian Serbs.

Apart from Slovenia, which is ethnically homegeneous, national minorities in the former Yugoslavian republics account for large ethnic groups amounting sometimes up to 40 % of the population. On the way to independence, not a single former Yugoslavian republic has taken into account the fact that the future state borders do not correspond to the inner ethnic frontiers. As a consequence of the referundums on independence hold by the republics, ethnic

minorities declared themselves independent from the new republic authorities as the Serbian minority of Croatia did in May 1991 and later on the Serbian minority of Bosnia in September 1991. The Albanian minorities also followed this example by declaring themselves independent in September 1991 in Kosovo and January 1992 in Slavic Macedonia. Before the summer 1992, the former Yugoslavia already split into at least 20 ethnic or national communities which all had voted for independence and have been trying since then to organize themselves politically as well as militarily.

Beside the political and the ethnic factors which are responsible for the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the third and final reason for the bloody war in this country is due to what has to be called the "Serbian question". In the Serbian national consciousness, Serbia is a permanent victim of history and a potential victim of its neighbours. First of all, there are "two Serbias". The defeat at Kosovo Pole in 1389 and later on the Turkish massacres in 1690 brought about the disintegration of the former territory of Serbia which dated back to the Middle Age. The major part of the Serbian population left the country in 1690 and settled down in Bosnia and Croatia. The new emergence of a Serbian State in 1878 after the Berlin Congress, enlarged in 1913 after the second Balkan war by the protocol of London, solved only partially the "Serbian Question". Only a part of the Serbian population was living then in Serbia, together with large minorities : Albanians, Macedonians, Turks and Hungarians after the Second World War. At least one third of the Serbian population still remained under Austro-hungarian control. Since the breakdown of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic has been intending to put an end to this situation and to create the so-called "Greater Serbia". The fear to fall once again victim to a Ustashi genocide, as in the Forties, justifies in the eyes of the Serbs, the systematic use of military means and the concept of ethnic cleansing. The Serbian Orthodox Church, the Serbian intellectuals - especially the academy of sciences of Belgrad, and all political parties profess the idea that the so-called fascist Croatia of Tadjman and the fundamentalist muslim Bosnia of Izetbegovic are planning again a collectif genocide of the Serbian minorities. Therefore, according to Belgrad, the creation of a greater and ethnically homogeneous Serbia is nothing else than an act of national defense and historical justice.

These two aspects of the "Serbian Question", territorial expansionism and the obsessive fear of a genocide perpetrated against Serbian minorities are closely linked together and explain the incredible extent of hatred, cruelty and irrational behaviour this war triggered off. Thus, it is hard to believe that the different peace initiatives of the European Community and the United Nations may put an end to the war and work out a political and ethnic post-war order suitable for all the communities involved.

One of the major problems remains the the "Serbian question". On the one side, this country has to be treated extremely carefully, nearly like a psychopath, in order to strengthen the anti-Milosevic forces. A total ban of Serbia, or even a military intervention against it could only lead to the setting up of a sacred union of all Serbs around Milosevic and testify to the irrational theory of the Serbian nation being threatened in its very existence. The necessary reintegration of Serbia in the international community could be achieved by modifying peacefully the former inner state borders of Yugoslavia. Such an option would necessary concern the territories of the Bosnian and Croatian Krajina, where Serbs account for a large majority. On the other side, it should only be possible to contemplate a peaceful enlargement of Serbia

provided that Belgrad shows respect for human rights of all minorities living in Serbia: Albanians in Kosovo and Hungarians in Vojvodina, who should recover their former status of autonomy, as well as the Muslims in Sandjak. It is rather unlikely that the Bosnian state should survive as it is now. As a matter of fact, neither the Serbs, nor the Croats do recognize the existence of a Bosnian or Muslim nation. The partition of Bosnia between Zagreb and Belgrad seems to be inevitable. Nevertheless, the creation of a smaller but independent muslim Bosnian State where Bosnian refugees could return to, should be imposed on both Serbia and Croatia as a prerequisite to the incorporation of the Krajina by Serbia and of Western Herzegovina by Croatia.

The reintegration of Serbia in the international community should also only be contemplated if Belgrad puts an end to the policy of ethnic cleansing and if it allows the return of all refugees. A territorial enlargement of Serbia in the North, in order to harmonize ethnic and territorial borders requires also such an arrangement in the South of Serbia. The peace arrangements of 1878 and 1913 neither took sufficiently into account the legitimate interests of the Serbian nation, nor solved in a satisfying way the Albanian and Macedonian problems. In this respect, the answers to the Serbian, Albanian and Macedonian questions should be linked together in one single and definite peace settlement.

As a matter of fact, the pre-first world war peace settlements in Berlin and London brought no satisfying solution to the Albanian and Slavic Macedonian issues. Today, the division of the Albanian nation has become one of the major crisis factors in the Balkan States. The unification of two million Albanians from Kosovo, 700 000 Albanians from Macedonia and three million Albanians from Albania in one single state could lead to a new Balkan war. On the other hand, to maintain the present status quo, which would mean a policy remaining unaware of the Kosovo conflict, could reveal as dangerous as the attempt at resolving this problem by recognizing the independence of Kosovo. A compromise should be found on the ground that the legitimate rights of the Serbian minorities in Croatia and Bosnia are not superior to the legitimate rights of the Albanian minorities in Serbia and Macedonia. In case of an international peace settlement, the guarantee that Serbia restores and fully respects the former autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina should be prerequisite to a possible territorial enlargement of Serbia in the North.

The handling of the Macedonian issue has to be linked to the problems of Kosovo and Serbia. In order to prevent a more or less violent dismemberment of the so-called "Slavic Macedonia" by its Serbian, Bulgarian and Albanian neighbours, the recognition of its independence is necessary, since such a situation could also lead to a new Balkan War. On the other hand, international recognition and economic support of this country have to be linked with respect by Skopje for the autonomy of the Albanian minority and for the inviolability of all frontiers after an international peace settlement.

Should no solution be found to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, then fightings in Croatia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina would become more and more violent and even could spread to Kosovo, to Sandzak and even to Vojvodina. The widening war could take on a fully international dimension destroying the unsufficient territorial arrangements that the international community had imposed on the Balkans in 1878, 1913 and 1919. The former Yugoslavia is not the only source of crisis and conflict in this area. Southeastern Europe as a whole is endangered by a great number of potential territorial problems and

various ethnic and religious problems endemic to the former Yugoslavia.

Inside Albania, pressure for unification with Kosovo has increased since the democratic transformation at the end of 1990 and the beginning of 1991. But Kosovo is now a virtual colony of Serbia. An upsurge of unification sentiments in Kosovo could lead to massive repression by Serbian forces and even to war between Albania and Serbia (supported by Montenegro which has a claim to northern Albania around Shkoder). In addition to the two sets of problems generated by the Serbian and the Albanian minority question a third set of problems is related to the Macedonian nationalism that has reemerged in the last two years. The main Macedonian nationalist grouping, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation, is the strongest single party in the Macedonian parliament. In view of the instability in the region nationalist sentiment could threaten four different conflict situations: Within Macedonia itself because of the strong Albanian muslim minority. This could produce national and even territorial conflict with Albania. Conflict with Serbia could also be possible. Many Serbs see Slavic Macedonia being a part of the greater Serbia. Many Macedonians would forcibly resist such ambitions. Open questions remain with Bulgaria, which has recognized the Macedonian state without accepting the existence of a Macedonian nation. Bulgaria also does not recognize the existence of a Macedonian minority in Bulgaria. With Greece many problems remain unsolved as well. Macedonian nationalists claim there is a large Slavic Macedonian minority in northern Greece. Greece, for its part, being aware of the instable situation of the Balkans, refuses to recognize the existence of the Macedonian State, because it usurps the name of Macedonia. Nevertheless, if Slavic Macedonia becomes totally isolated, Skopje, faced with a choice between Serbia and Bulgaria, might choose Bulgaria. This option could be difficult to accept for Serbia and even Greece. The creation of an independent Slavic Macedonian State could therefore be the less evil choice because the only one which does not threaten the borders of the Balkan States.

The Serbian, Albanian and Slavic Macedonian problems discussed above can still be contained. But none will disappear of its own accord. A new international peace settlement is needed if conflicts are not to persist and spread dangerously. Military intervention to keep and enforce the peace can be avoided if conventional diplomacy is supplemented by economic and financial assistance as well as common international pressure. In order to avoid the former divisions among the four traditional external powers - Germany, Italy, Russia and Turkey - divisions which are partly responsible for the many failures of the peace settlements of 1878 and 1913, it is necessary that the international institutions - the UN, the EC, NATO, the WEU and the CSCE decide to involve in the Balkans as much as possible.

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VLADIMIR PHILIPPOV  
BULGARIA

RHODES,  
18 September 1992

## SECURITY PERCEPTIONS AND SECURITY POLICIES OF BULGARIA\*

In the post- Cold War period the relative weight of "classical" (military) and of non-conventional security factors has dramatically changed. Similar is the case with standart and non-traditional ways of addressing problems. In addition, the average time for decision making was seriously reduced.

### THE YUGOCRISIS

Here in the Balkans, a region known to produce more history than can consume, we have the 'privilege' to live door to door to one of the most powerful crisis generators - the thing until recently denominated as Yugoslavia. To the tons of paper, written on it I will dare to add some comments, quite common among the political class in my country. In Yugoslavia the Western preventive potential was paralyzed by wishful thinking both on the level of evaluation and even more of predictions. The idea to leave Kossovo under Serbian domination may turn out to be the last of such fatal illusions. It is likely to produce conditions for a rapidly escalating and difficult to stop chain of events of a true worst case scenario. Its possible stages can be:

- decisive moves in Kossovo to unify with Albania;
- Serbian military action against Kossovo, resistance and guerilla war;
- political support by Tirana, massive populist propaganda of Great Albania as a way to direct internal problems outwards. Intense traffic of people and armaments from Albania through the border with Kossovo and via Western Macedonia, eventually helped by the Albanian minority in the republic;
- Serbian use of force against Macedonia to cut the traffic;
- refugees to neighbor countries in the first place to Bulgaria. Problems for the recipient state, the most grave probably being the inevitable union with local ambitious nationalists, chauvinistic propaganda, recruitment of volunteers etc. Possible union with the still powerful and nationalistic remnants of the communist party. Let me stop the forecast here. Further developments are difficult to predict.

On the other hand, continuing refusal to recognize Macedonia is perpetuating another risk zone. With all due respect to the interests of our Greek hosts, which to a great extent correspond to the Bulgarian concerns, there is a feeling that hesitancy in such a critical situation is not conducive to the overall settlement of the crisis. What is needed is a solution free from historical prejudices and tuned to the European standards.

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\* This paper reflects the personal views of the author



Should events bring about a CSCE or UN decision on a peace-keeping mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, it probably will be wise Balkan States to refrain from participation with armed forces and armaments.

#### MINORITIES AND NATIONALISM

Nationalism is a dangerous thing, but when it becomes institutionalized through official ideology of hatred, a violent conflict is at hand. We have had enough of it during the name changing campaign few years ago. The concept of "definitive solutions" or "national purification" is a way to nowhere. It never worked - neither during Hitler, nor during Stalin or Caeushesku.

The last thing actual Bulgarian government could be accused in is aggressive nationalism. Its background as democratic opposition to the communist regime is probably the unique case in Eastern Europe where the antitotalitarian movement had as basic pillar the struggle against chauvinism. This is a matter of principle - the UDF never played the nationalistic card, even though it promised easy votes during the last two elections. The ambition of the UDF government is to prove that even in the Balkans there is a positive way to address ethnic, linguistic and religious problems. There is a strong belief that integration of minorities in the mechanisms of parliamentary democracy is making them responsible for solving of the country's problems as a whole.

#### ILLEGAL TRAFFIC, LAUNDERING MONEY

It is no secret that big part of what is now foreign debt of the Eastern countries remained in the hands of people who borrowed the money and is being laundered in the West through the network of persons from the former partocracy, secret, diplomatic and foreign trade services. Some may argue this is concentration of capital, so badly needed for the economic reforms. The problem is that at home that money is engaged mainly in speculative activities and not in production and is one of the main stoppers of the real reforms. The international destabilizing dimension is:

1. Dirty money is attracted by dirty business: drug and arms trade, underground activities etc. It has played a decisive role in making UN sanctions on Belgrade little effective.
2. There is a strong tendency of launders (both people and organizations) to integrate and consolidate.

The efforts of the Bulgarian government to curb illegal traffic and money laundering are of course a noble exercise, but let it not look like the Don Quixote fight against windmills. Obviously, efforts to cut off money laundering can be only international. Otherwise in few years the emerging underground syndicate will make Mafia look like Scouts organization. The problem needs urgent treatment, although it may affect certain particular or momentous interests.

## MILITARY BALANCE

The Military balance of the South-East European states reflects the geopolitical configurations of the cold war period. No doubt Paris CFE Treaty made a major war scenario in Europe less likely and the surprise attack virtually impossible. Nevertheless, after the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, the CFE Treaty quotas for troops and armaments became obsolete. In the case of Bulgaria they are simply unjust. The military aid for Greece and Turkey deepens the disbalance and is pregnant with new tensions. And probably the main concern is that it stimulates the aggressiveness of local nationalists. Given that the aid will continue, the only viable way is probably the creation of a compensatory mechanism of inclusion of Bulgaria in the equation alongside Greece and Turkey.

As for the integration with NATO and the WEU, our main interest concern is to be increasingly involved in the consideration and decision-making process, especially on matters concerning security in our immediate vicinity. Might it seem absurd now, we definitely think of a possible full-fledged membership in these organizations one day.

## SOUTH-EASTERN COOPERATION vs. AXES

Bulgaria has denounced the philosophy of axes and formation of blocs. In the Balkans they have always been dangerous. We do not have stronger guarantees for our security than our own policy of good-neighborliness. Such policy is being understood as equal intensity of the relations with all neighbors.

There is no single reason to explain the Balkan problems. Likewise there is hardly a single solution. However, some basic orientations can be emphasized upon:

- no border changes by force;
- respect for minority rights;
- discouraging the formation of axes and opposing blocks in the region
- support of local democratic institutions;
- logistic and institutional support of the economic reforms
- foreign investments instead of humanitarian aid;
- integration instead of isolation.

To conclude, permit me to thank the organizers for having created excellent conditions for our work. The theme, the deliberations and, of course, the personal contacts were extremely stimulating. The mere formula "security perceptions" in the title of the conference was probably the right key to put problems without much make-up.

Thank you.

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"Security Perceptions and Security Policies  
of South-Eastern European Countries. A  
Romanian Standpoint"

Paper presented by Alexandru A. Fărcaș, Director of the Romanian Association for International Law and International Relations (ADIRI) in Session IV of the Seminar on "Security Challenges in South Eastern Europe", organized at Rhodes (17-19 September 1992) by the Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union and the Hellenic Foundation for Defense and Foreign Policy

The disollution of the Warsaw Pact brought a radical change in the strategic equation of the South-Eastern part of the European continent. The former socialist countries of this sub-region found themselves in a real "security vacuum", which continues to exist nowadays.

When speaking about the security in this zone one has to neccessarily refer not to a supra-national abstraction but to the security of Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, etc. Each State has its own preoccupations, historically established patterns of international policies, and specific searches, but no one can escape from two common realities: the impossibility to assure long-term security by exclusively individual means and the particularity of the whole sub-region as a field of contact between three power-areas: the West (in the large sense), Western Asia-Middle East and Russia.

The above mentioned States face multiple security risks, generated by very different sources.

As long as the Yugoslav crisis remains clogged to the space of the former federation one can hardly speak of a conflict menace in the area.

The economic and social issues are top priority because their amplitude and depth touch upon directly the order, stability and normal functioning of these societies. The dramatic decrease of production, disorganization of previously established foreign markets, lack of capital necessary for resurection and the economic impact of recent embargos, coupled with the stringent parallel implementation of a totally different system of internal and foreign economic, financial, banking etc relations are only some of the defining elements of the difficulties of a historically

unprecedented transition.

All these countries, by adopting the values of democracy and free market, have already proved their fundamental option and the belief existing at grass-root levels of belonging to Europe and its model of civilization. Ever increasing social costs underline, alas, in the context of the lack of massive foreign support, the dilemmas connected to the pace of reforms.

The resurgence of chauvinistic circles in these societies represents, on one hand, an over-reaction to ethnic problems amassed for decades and, on the other hand, the illusion of immediate solutions to the whole range of difficulties.

The States of the sub-region react first of all individually to challenges of a complex reality. Their searches, based on the idea of finding a political, military, economic etc security roof through individual relations with the West, sometimes on the expense of others, have triggered a certain competition that bears the risk to undermine local cooperative contribution to the imbetterment of the whole area's situation.

History points out the past existence of periods of efficient functioning of sub-regional stability mechanisms, which unfortunately failed as a consequence of dramatic changes in the relations between world centers of power.

A number of cooperative projects resumed and are being enhanced today.

The international community, more precisely the West, attaches an increasing importance to the sub-region we discuss and acts accordingly, the serious effort in former Yugoslavia being a good example.

Nevertheless the essence of the problem of the "security

vacuum" continues to generate contradictory reactions which range from identification with sheer fantasy to accuses of blackmail aimed at additional economic aid.

This would lead to the fact that the entire sub-region is to remain a "no man's land" open to competition among the three mentioned power-areas.

Actually an escalated move from the West (in the large sense) is being registered in this zone, especially in economic and cultural fields. Lagging differentiation and internal Western disputes (that are still to be smothered) bear the risk of bringing corresponding division and even conflict in South-Eastern Europe.

The Western Asian area is nowadays in a real economic boom and acts accordingly in the Balkans. Yet its center has not been settled and, on the other hand, it is far away from the stage of becoming an autonomous, self identified political and military actor in our sub-region.

Three months after the much celebrated break-down of Soviet Union, Russia has initiated the operation aimed at establishing a strategic beach-head in South-Eastern Europe: Transnistria. It was less noticed that the whole arsenal of power politics (military interference, political pressures, economic blockade and media war) was employed against a new state, recognized as independent and member of the great international fora.

This evolution cannot but have major consequences not only on the immediate neighbour but on the security of this part of Europe. In fact Russia never ceased to be an important supplier of raw materials and a wooer with security guarantees.

This brings us to the real question: how to fill the "security vacuum" in South-Eastern Europe?

Henry Kissinger said once that the source of major conflicts on the Continent during the last two centuries was the power-vacuum area between Russia and Germany.

The quest for Western security guarantees of the East European countries is often derided. Their few attempts to balance between the power areas much criticized. Does this mean we might face again the famous percentages?

Obviously the image of concentric Europe is no longer valid, at least in the field of security, because it implied the idea of an imploded Russia and of a long time the periphery could wait untouched from outside.

The creation of NACC and the spirit of Petersberg Declaration are of course encouraging. Undeniably the public in South-Eastern Europe feels itself a part of the Continent and its civilization. The challenge is to exclude unwanted politically influential positions in this sub-region, encouraging in the same time the multifacet relations based on the values and aims of democratic Greater Europe.

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## THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPEAN SECURITY: THE EC AND WEU

Roberto Zadra\*

**DRAFT - DO NOT QUOTE**

### **I. The European Community and South-Eastern Europe**

Since the signing of the Treaty of Rome, membership of the European Community has been enlarged three times: in 1973, 1981 and 1986. The Final Provisions of the Treaty on European Union, agreed in Maastricht in December 1991 and signed two months later, did not affect the premise that further enlargement was possible. It stated that "any European State may apply to become a Member of the Union".<sup>1</sup> During the following six months, the European Commission worked on a paper dealing with the challenge of enlargement in the post-Cold War era and, at the European Council in Lisbon in June 1992, a statement similar but not identical to the one in Maastricht was issued: "any European State *whose system of government is founded on the principle of democracy* may apply to become a member of the Union" (emphasis added).<sup>2</sup> The change of language in the Lisbon statement suggests that the preconditions of democracy and a good human rights record will probably become more relevant when deciding on any future enlargement of the European Union.

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<sup>1</sup> Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992, Final Provisions, Article O

<sup>2</sup> European Council, 26/27 June 1992, conclusions of the Presidency

The European Council clearly stated in Lisbon that the first European candidates for membership were the countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). A timetable for this initial enlargement has not yet been worked out but the possibility can no longer be excluded that EFTA countries may join the Union within the next three to four years - by 1995 or 1996 or shortly after.

A second group of countries - which have not yet officially applied for membership but which have made clear their intention to do so in the future - are the Central and East European states. Poland, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and Hungary have already signed the European Agreements with the EC, a factor which could place them in a more favourable position with regard to timing for future membership than other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. However, should these countries finally apply, it would seem at present difficult - if only for economic reasons - to imagine that they could join the European Union before the end of the decade, at the earliest around 1998.

A third but very heterogeneous 'group' of potential candidates includes both the countries of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. This 'group' includes widely differing countries such as Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Albania, but also some of the new states which have emerged from the disintegration of the Soviet Union and of the former Yugoslavia, and finally the islands of Cyprus and Malta.

Turkey sought EC membership a few years ago and an Association Agreement has existed since 1964. However, even if there were consensus among the Twelve that relations with Turkey should be improved, it seems difficult to envisage the country joining the European Union as a full member within the next decade.

Both Malta and Cyprus have applied for EC membership, but the Community does not yet seem prepared to accept the two islands as new members before it has enlarged its membership to include EFTA countries. A decision on an eventual admission of the two islands has not been taken yet within the Community but talks are under way and there is a consensus among the EC partners that relations should be developed and strengthened in the coming years. However, the situation seems less complicated with regard to Malta than with regard to Cyprus, since the latter is still a divided island.

The European Council in Lisbon approved the directives for negotiations on Association Agreements with Bulgaria and Romania, two countries which have not yet applied for membership. Substantial progress was made in June and July and further negotiating rounds are expected in the coming months. The possibility that such Agreements with the two countries could be signed in 1993 cannot be excluded. With this, the group of Central and East European countries enjoying a privileged relationship with the EC will have grown to five. Should Bulgaria and Romania finally seek membership, this would need to be considered by the European Union. However, as with Poland, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and Hungary which have not yet applied but which are clearly on the waiting list, enlargement to include Bulgaria and Romania would be considered on a case-by-case basis, although even this seems unlikely before the end of the decade.

Of the republics which once made up Yugoslavia, so far only Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have been recognised as new states by the Community. While a recognition of Macedonia has been postponed and linked to certain conditions,<sup>3</sup> a decision over the recognition of the new federal entity comprising Serbia and Montenegro has not even been considered as a policy option

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<sup>3</sup> In Lisbon the Community and its member states expressed their "readiness to recognise that republic within its existing borders according to their Declaration on 16 December 1991 under a name which does not include the term Macedonia".

for the near future. Slovenia is at present the only successor state of the former Yugoslavia which is holding negotiations on an economic and trade agreement with the Community, and the new government of Ljubljana has already made it clear that its final aim was full membership. Whereas Croatia has not yet been involved in such negotiations, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina remains even more complicated because of the continuing civil war. Finally, the Community has improved its relations with Albania, but no decisions on an economic and trade agreement have been taken yet. X

## II. WEU and South-Eastern Europe

In Maastricht in December 1991, WEU member states issued a declaration stating that "WEU will form an integral part of the process of the development of the European Union and will enhance its contribution to solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance". In a second declaration, states which are members of the European Union were invited to accede to WEU either as full members or as observers if they so wished, while member states of NATO were invited to become associate members of WEU "in a way which will give them the possibility of participating fully in the activities of WEU".<sup>4</sup>

The two declarations issued by WEU foreign and defence ministers in Maastricht directly affect only two countries in South-Eastern Europe - Greece and Turkey. Negotiations with both countries are currently under way and it is likely that they will be concluded before June 1993, when the Italian presidency of WEU ends. At the WEU Petersberg summit in June 1992, WEU member states defined more clearly the conditions for the three different kinds of membership, and they explicitly excluded the possibility of WEU becoming directly involved in an armed conflict between Greece and Turkey. In fact, according to the

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<sup>4</sup> Declarations on Western European Union, 10 December 1991

Petersberg Declaration, Article 5 of the modified Brussels Treaty does not apply in disputes between member states of either WEU or NATO and it therefore excludes WEU support for Greece should it be attacked by Turkey or vice-versa.<sup>5</sup>

Further enlargement of WEU cannot be excluded in the long term, but, since the Nine will become an integral part of the process of the development of the Twelve when the Maastricht Treaty is ratified, this will first depend on enlargement of the European Union. Apart from the EFTA countries which might join the Union before 1995-96, all other future members will probably enter into the Union only after 1998, a date when WEU could be fully absorbed into the European Union. However, this does not exclude the possibility for the Nine of developing in the meantime better relations with other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This process began at ministerial level on 19 June 1992, with the first extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with eight central European states, including Bulgaria and Romania. There is a possibility that, in the medium term, better relations could also be developed between WEU and other countries of South-Eastern Europe, with the condition that these are recognised as states by the European Community/Union.

### III. Some questions for discussion

- What are the possible scenarios with regard to European Union membership for South-Eastern European countries at the turn of the century?
- Are there viable alternatives to membership in European Union for South-East European countries ?

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<sup>5</sup> Article 5 of the modified Brussels Treaty would not in any case be valid in the event of aggression against an *associate* member.

- Which factors promote or hinder the development of better relations between European Union and South-East European countries?

- How far does the fact that WEU will form an integral part of the process of the development of the European Union promote or hinder the opening of the Union to South-East European countries?

- How would the non-ratification of Maastricht affect the debate on WEU enlargement to full and associate members (Greece, Turkey)?

- What are the possibilities and limits for the development of better relations of European Union and WEU with Bulgaria and Romania?

- What are the possibilities and limits for the development of better relations of European Union and WEU with Cyprus and Malta?

- Should the EC/WEU take more responsibility for crisis management in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina? How?

- Will the Twelve recognise Macedonia, and if so, when?

- Are there prospects of the Twelve recognising Serbia-Montenegro?

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## PROSPECTS FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION

### IN SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE \*

E. MEGALOKONOMOS

In spite of all political and psychological obstacles, I would not consider the study of prospects for cooperation as an exercise in futility. In fact, I think the title of this intervention should be "The need for regional cooperation among the S.E. European Countries" or even "The inevitability of regional cooperation among the S.E. European Countries". Because what is troubling many observers and wise politicians is the lack of an alternative. What is the alternative to a cooperation at these troubled times of ours in this troubled crossroads of the Earth? I cannot see any other alternative at this moment but chaos and strife. Chaos and conflict that will not only destabilize this region but will also influence strongly and unfavourably the whole of Europe in its search for unity.

Alan Herikson, Director of the Fletcher Round-table on a "New World Order" in a recent article writes the following: "The next few years seem destined to be one of those liquid elongated moments when the dissolution of an old order is apparent but the outlines of its successor are unknown and yet broadly malleable". I did not find myself in agreement with the total contents of this article and I would hesitate to use the adverb "broadly" when describing the "malleability" of the world situation today. But there is no doubt for me that there is some margin for the International Community to canalise its own future towards the good direction. There is also no doubt that the challenge is enormous, that redoubled efforts must be deployed by all and plenty of imagination and goodwill are going to be needed in the next few years.

\* This paper reflects the personal views of the speaker.

It is therefore indispensable, in my view, for Western Europe to show at this time a mastery of the surrounding circumstances and to convince the interested parties to set aside egotisms, old grievances and expansionist tendencies. This, combined to "a relationship of hope with Western Europe" (words of Jacques Attali) could make the very difference between cooperation and chaos in the years to come for the whole of Europe.

When discussing the prospects of cooperation among South-Eastern European Countries at this time one faces two possible schools of thought in connection of the best timing. The first one consists of a waiting attitude. It is an attitude dictating the need to wait until conditions are more peaceful, until regular exchanges have started all over the region, until rivalries have, at least superficially, settled down. This school brings into the line of argument the fact that as soon as the post cold war period started, many regional initiatives of cooperation started in a hurry but without an obvious and satisfactory result as yet.

The second theory leans towards initiatives to be taken as soon as possible. The argument is that this move could bring together some countries in the region, if the initiative is adequate. As for the rest of the Countries concerned such a start of regional cooperation could function as an attraction towards finding solutions, which would help them join the regional trend. It could also help fractions or ethnic groups to accept proposals that, without a cadre of regional security and multilateral human rights assurances, would not have any hope of being accepted.

I propose now to examine the problems of the framework in which this regional cooperation could be imagined and then proceed to see what are, both the difficulties and the elements of encouragement which could influence the setting-up of such a cooperation. Finally I shall try and define the principles which could guide and the field and sectors which could contain a regional cooperation among the South-Eastern European Countries.

In connection to the most appropriate framework or formation of such a cooperation I think that the best idea would be not to exclude from the outset any country of the region. Any country, geographically belonging to the South-East of Europe, willing to participate in such a cooperation should be entitled to do so. The best method would be, I think, not to limit this mental exercise to given numbers or to established shapes or forms, past or present. For example it could be a mistake for me to say that such a cooperation should take the place of the Balkan cooperation although Greece has contributed very actively for its creation. At this moment though there are one or two Countries, new Countries, which would not be willing to belong to the Balkan group of Countries. On the other side there are others, not belonging to this group but, probably willing to integrate to such a regional cooperation. Other shapes already existing, most of them new formations, either have not yet proven what really is their "raison d'etre" or have contained strong characteristics of fluidity. Finally this exercise should not, as I said before, be identified with any other formation which is exclusive in the choice of its membership.

We do not need to look far away for an example of such a qualitatively and quantitatively progressive cooperation. The European Community is in fact such a case of progressive creation of cooperation on the basis of an open minded philosophy, on the basis of the observance of certain principles, certain prerequisites and of the fulfillment of certain basic

democratic rules. Even among the twelve, or better, even among the original six, their likeness was not sufficient to provide from the very beginning a ready-made pattern of unity and cooperation. You know very well how many phases of deepening and/or enlargement the E.C. has gone through in the last few decades, before it achieved its present stage. A stage which is not static but continuously evolving. Therefore, if we can receive some inspiration of a good and successful example in our Continent we should form the opinion that any regional cooperation in the South Eastern Europe should not start from a prefabricated conception or from a strict initial pattern, but rather be progressively built on the basis of some initial elementary principles.

What could be the principles such a cooperation should use as its basis for its creation and for its survival. These should be principles we all recognise and we all undertake to abide with. We have them almost in all statutes and texts of International Organisations and almost in all agreements and resolutions concerning good relationship among states. But before I mention some of the principles which could be the basis of such a cooperation, I would like to refer to two "rules of thumb" which all countries and all peoples of South-Eastern Europe should first of all realise and "digest" well. Both of these rules refer to the countries advanced and developed economically and socially. The first rule should be formulated as follows: Developed countries have, all of them, liberated themselves from international disputes with their neighbors, otherwise they would not be developed today. Second rule: Developed countries have all democratic, and I mean really democratic systems, otherwise they would not be developed today.

I believe that before any successful cooperation could be attempted, I would say even before we undertake to respect any set of principles, we should really understand and believe strongly in these two previous rules which would make the difference between real and nominal cooperation. In fact, ~~some~~ principles such as the ones we should adopt for a possible cooperation in the S.E. Europe are enumerated practically in every single paper published at the U.N., at the regional organisations or at the various peace conferences. The problem is not to find them and to announce them but to understand and interpret them in the same way and to respect them always; and this independently of the eventuality of some principle not being favourable to a specific interest, for a given country, at a certain time.

In fact, such Principles should include among others: the respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Countries by all Countries. Prohibition of the use or threat of use of force. Absolute respect for the frontiers in the region. Full protection of human rights of all citizens of all states. Consolidation of democratic institutions. Non-interference in the internal affairs of another state. Prohibition of Union between States in order to avoid the creation of political axes. Mutual development assistance. Settlement of all disputes by peaceful means. Equal treatment of minorities by all states.

In this connection I would like to refer to the proposal submitted at the CSCE last May by some delegations concerning the creation of a Code of Conduct on security relationships among participating states. Countries co-sponsoring this proposal were at that time Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Malta, Poland, Romania and Russia. This proposal for the creation of a code of conduct was taken as a "fresh qualitative step" in order to strengthen stability and security in Europe and was put forward by three of the Eastern European Countries (Greece, Bulgaria, Romania), a fact which creates good hopes for the adoption of an analogous "code of conduct" in the region under consideration.

Let us now look a little closer to the difficulties a cooperation among the S.E. European Countries is deemed to face and to try to overcome. We say that we have seen changes which took place in Countries previously under Communist regime. Wrong! We are seeing changes taking place and we are going to be seeing changes for some years to come. Everything is still in the process of shaping, starting from such basic activities as education and training. Such basis as curricula of economics and law and the meaning of trade. Such things as re-visualizing the meaning of human rights and really understanding that now, under democratic rule, they can effectively be protected. When a human being has lived for fifty years (or for all his-her life for a younger individual) under the iron power of the Communist Regime and its Party, under its oppressive mechanism, he or she has a great difficulty to realise that from now on, in a Democratic system every person will have the right unhindered by any central authority, political, ideological, religious or other, to enjoy respect of the human rights recognised to him or her. Hence the terrible conflicts among groups ethnic, religious or even linguistic which have no other interethnic relationship experience but old souvenirs of hatred and recent souvenirs of fear.

How did we help, we in Western Europe, in this psychologically desperate situation? In fact I personally think we did not <sup>enough</sup>. We should have through massive and common information campaign make sure that that people in the East understand that the only solution for their problem of transition could be Democracy strictly applied and respect of Human Rights for all and for every one. We, instead in the west, promoted tendencies of separation through promotion of the idea of self determination of minorities and groups without even first determining what is a minority. Not only this, but as it happened, some circles had promoted even in official papers the notion of the Nation State as an ideal to be pursued in the search for Democracy. Was it ignorance of history or ignorance of the world's realities? Was this an effort to resuscitate a notion which had already caused to Europe so much bloodshed in the past? Whatever the reason, this notion has again ~~had~~ taken its heavy toll. Let us not throw the stone only to those who do ethnic cleansings in the tragic B.E. or, even before, elsewhere. Let us only ask the promoters of the "nation state" notion, if they know of any other method for obtaining a "pure" Nation State out of a mixt population but by the method of "ethnic cleansing"....

The main question mark in our theme, I think, is democracy. I will not say anything new by stating that there is a direct relationship between democracy and peace; therefore, only under conditions of democracy can sincere cooperation be developed, in a peaceful environment. According to Michael Doyle (Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 12, Summer 1983, p. 204), "during the last two centuries there is not one single instance of one democracy going to war with another. The reason is that in non democratic regimes the leadership is seeking some kind of recognition and is inventing or exaggerating external dangers in order to consolidate their own position. Hence, claims, conflicts and clashes". Now, what we have in our region is an exacerbation of nationalism. Partly because nations and minorities alike have had the experience of the oppressive communist regime, partly because some leaderships in the ex-communist countries use nationalism for their own recognition. Or, nationalism is frequently said to be a major competitor to democracy. "More than that", Francis Fukuyama, says: "many argue that the new World Order emerging after the revolutions of 1989 is not one of spreading democracy, but rather of self-ascerting nationalism that will make the world a more dangerous place".

We have therefore to deal with the question if this great change, taking place in our days, is to be a change towards arid nationalism or towards genuine democracy. I think that only in the second hypothesis, which I hope that eventually will be the case, that only in this second hypothesis a real cooperation could be established among the countries of S.E. Europe.

Democracy, we all know, has a heavy cost in efforts and time. This is one first consideration to keep in mind. It is so much easier, like in the past, among the countries in transition, to dictate an order than to try and have a consensus or a vote. It takes, in the bottom line, the formation of a democratic culture. This is a first field where help should be amply provided to the Countries in transition. Western Europe (Greece included) should take an active role in this and at the same time consider with understanding the enormous difficulties involved. When from a totally centralized economy and administration a country exerts efforts to pass to a democratic system, it has to transit through an inevitable stage of a major or minor instability.

**(Footnote:**

F.F. takes the view later that fragmentation of USSR and Yugoslavia should not frighten us "provided that nationalisms take modern forms fully compatible with democratic practice". But it is true that war had not yet started in Yugoslavia when his article was written.)

In fact all the above elements are interlocking. Because in the end hungry people will not embrace reforms, because only through the emergence -with fast assistance- of self sufficient economies can democracy be consolidated and tribalism and extremism moderated.

I would like to stop here enumerating the main difficulties and, in a more optimistic mood, mention some elements encouraging a cooperation among the states of S.E. Europe. They are self explanatory:

First there is the new school of thought concerning international relations of today. There are no more ideological barriers or ideological taboos. From another point of view, all states all over the World are now realising that the economy is to take more and more a global character. This is even more true for Countries of a relatively- small region and therefore these Countries should be easily convinced to find a form for economic cooperation aiming at their development. Despite inevitable diversities and individual interests we have to understand that we share many common objectives and aspirations in respect of the future in this area. Isolation therefore is not a solution neither for western countries nor for countries in transition.

Encouragement for regional cooperation comes also from every source of international authorities. The S.G. of the U.N. in his well known "Agenda for Peace" dedicates a whole Chapter of his report in these regional activities and their potential contribution to collective security. He even refers to the regional arrangements and organisations as elements which could not only lighten the burden of the Security Council but also "contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization of international affairs".

From a more concrete and practical viewpoint it is interesting that all, or almost all countries of the S.E. of Europe are interested either to join as members or to establish an Association agreement with the European Community. Greece could work within this context of desiderata and at the same time aim at a regional cooperation, which could be the vehicle for a common European Community Policy for S.E. Europe. Italy should also participate in a multi-lateral cooperation of S.E. Europe, at least as an observer. Such a cooperation could be useful (and acceptable by the countries concerned) if it could provide to the countries candidate for membership or association with a closer contact to the European Community and more coordinated assistance from it, than what they could obtain without such a cooperation. It is there-



fore a matter of shaping a European Community policy towards the S. Eastern European States, an element which is not yet visible. The fact that such a policy is not yet formulated does not mean though that it is not badly needed. On the contrary it is indispensable if we want to see calm prevailing in this region without more serious socioeconomic dislocations that might develop into more violence and even into a generalised conflict.

Another encouraging factor is that such a cooperation would be useful for all countries in the region. Greece realising the need for cooperation has in many cases initiated moves towards cooperation in economic fields, technology transfers, transports and environmental common problems. We believe in Greece that if such efforts were to have concrete results, the outcome would be beneficial not only to economies but to a very much needed consolidation of confidence and security. Such a cooperation is needed by the countries in transition of the region, even more. They need first of all everything that can be contained in the term "training". Training sometimes starting from the very source of knowledge. This should not be misinterpreted. It is simply a fact deriving from the process of collapse of one system and the need to build another one starting from its very first foundations. I shall limit myself to quote an Eastern European Minister who spoke at a recent unofficial meeting in Crans Montana, Switzerland. He confessed, referring to the economists of his country: "In my country there are two kinds of economic specialists: those who do not know and those who do not know they do not know".

Training therefore is more than essential. In this field specialists have realised that there is a gap even inside the countries in transition, a gap between the personnel of the enterprises -which are considered easily improvable and more reformable- and the personnel of public administration. In this context we have a beginning of, I hope, an important cooperation. Greece has secured an agreement with the European Institute of Public Administration for cooperation in training programs which will aim at the formation of the Public Service of those, among the S.E. European Countries willing to participate.

In a more important field I should mention here a greek proposal to the European Community, put forward last year. It was aiming at the speeding up of the processes towards developing relations between the Balkan Countries and the European Community. It contained as well the idea to form an institutionalised framework for cooperation through the creation of a European Center for Cooperation in the Balkans.

In any case, I think, that for such a regional cooperation to be effective a European Community package deal would be indispensable. This package could contain from one side an economic assistance program for development and from the other a legal framework or institution for the S. Eastern European Countries (to be called for example S.E. European cooperation Council)

Such a SEEECC

could, for example, be associated with other organisations especially aiming in the beginning at least, at economic development of the region and reestablishment of Refugees. An integrated S. E. European policy should at the same time be adopted by the European Community in order to better coordinate efforts and expenses. Signing an agreement on association with all States of the region recognised by the E.C. could also form a sort of S.E. European sub-regional Group under the auspices of the E.C.

Such an arrangement could give the feeling of more security to some countries in transition of the Region. Greece could very well take the role to promote more specific proposals for such a framework, if in the context of the 12 there were, at this very moment, possibilities for a consensus on the matter. We know it is a difficult decision to take and it is a matter of investing great amounts of money in a still new activity inside a still volatile area. But I think the end result is worth the effort, considering the fact that many future dangers could be avoided if we could obtain development and security through cooperation. Considering furthermore that several balkan nationalities and minorities would feel, through such a cooperation framework, much more secure and free of fear, there would be much more hope for their demands to take forms and content considerably more acceptable to their opposing parties. In any case expenses for peace are and will always be less heavy and less painful than expenses of war.

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