REDEFINING REGIONAL SECURITY AND THE NEW FOREIGN POLICIES IN EASTERN EUROPE

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DOMESTIC CHANGE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE NEW EASTERN EUROPE

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and the New Foreign Policies in Eastern Europe"
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Introduction

In the growing literature on economic and political transition in East Europe there has been very little discussion of the impact of this process on the foreign polices of the states involved. While there are chronicles and descriptions of the economic and political changes, there has been little attempt yet to systematically examine the impact on these states' external relations. The aim of this paper is to begin to explore this question.

This is justifiable on several grounds. First, foreign policy is, after all, policy. It may be aimed at a foreign country or audience, may involve a different mix of values or issues and may command a different locus of decision making from domestically-oriented public policy. But it embraces actions and statements taken on behalf of a nation by its government and it has an impact on the public and private behavior of a state's citizens. As such, it deserves consideration as one realm of public policy which should not be excluded *a priori*[1] Second, in a region undergoing dramatic political and economic changes which touch on virtually all aspects of life in the region, why would one assume that such changes would not also affect the states foreign polices? Third, as these changes are taking place in many neighboring states simultaneously, it is likely that the magnitude or impact of the changes will be amplified. The governments in transition will interact not only with their own populations in new ways but with other new governments in new ways as well. Fourth, the changed international environment, part of which is the result of the states' new forms of interaction with each other, will itself have an impact of its own on the states' processes of democratic consolidation and, bringing the relationship full circle, will therefore further affect that states' foreign policies.

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[1] For discussions of foreign policy as public policy see William Zimmerman, "International-National Linkages and Political Processes in Yugoslavia," in *Foreign and Domestic Policy in Eastern Europe in the 1980s*, ed. Michael J. Sodaro and Sharon L. Wolchik (London: Macmillan Press, 1983), pp. 27-46; James N. Rosenau, "Foreign Policy as an Issue Area," in James N. Rosenau, ed., *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, rev. and enl. ed. (London: Frances Pinter, 1980), pp. 461-500.

Finally, of course, it is worth recalling that this century's two brutal global wars began in East Europe and therefore the methods and practices of interaction--old, new and changing--are of more than passing interest to the security concerns of the states themselves, their immediate and more distant neighbors, and the scholarly and policy community who follow developments there.

This paper considers the relationship between the process of domestic transition and these states' international relations in the following way. First, we will describe briefly how the external environment within which foreign policy is being made has itself changed. Second, we will consider how the domestic policy making environment has changed for the East European regimes. Finally, we can offer some suggestions as to what propositions and evidence there might be linking transition and foreign policy .

This work operates on several assumptions which should be made explicit. First, The this paper accepts the notion that the "transition" which is taking place in East Europe is in fact liberalization of both the political and economic systems. While we should be careful not to presume that transition will automatically lead in the direction of greater democracy, an increasing role for market forces and a more open country, it is in fact doing so in East Europe. The process is, needless to say, a differentiated one and is proceeding faster in some places and spheres and more slowly in others. Detailed descriptions of what has happened since the revolutions are beyond the scope of this paper, the aim of which is to consider how these changes are affecting and might affect the states' external relations.[2]

Second, the primary thrust of this paper is to look at the possible impact of domestic change on foreign policy; that is, on the states' actions and statements toward their external environment. The view from the other side, i.e., the impact of the external environment on the states' democratic consolidation, has been considered elsewhere.[3] Third, while there is some conceptual basis for general propositions regarding the relationship between domestic political and economic structure and foreign policy, there exists as yet in East Europe a relatively small empirical field within which to test these propositions. The changes in East Europe began only in 1989 and in the new Commonwealth of Independent States and the Baltic countries only for the last year or so. Thus "results" at this point can only be suggestive.

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[2] Reviews of developments in the region can be found, *inter alia*, in "1991: New Hopes, New Fears," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (3 January 1992); "1990: Democracy in the Year One," *Report on Eastern Europe*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (January 4, 1991); "Toward Democracy in Eastern Europe," *Report on Eastern Europe*, Vol. 1, No. 28 (July 13, 1990); Judy Batt, *East Central Europe from Reform to Transformation* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991). A review devoted to foreign policy is "Foreign Policy in 1991," *Report on Eastern Europe*, Vol. 2, No. 51/52 (December 20, 1991.

The New International Environment of the East European States

The possible impact on states' foreign policies of the ongoing transition in political and economic systems is taking place against a substantially changed international environment. That milieu, the situation to which the states must respond is itself, if not completely new, more new than old.

During the four decades of communist party rule, the key feature of the international environment for the East European states was Soviet dominance. While this did not mean a lock-step mimicking of foreign behavior for the smaller allies, it did mean the enforcement of certain policy parameters by Moscow in conjunction with a local communist party elite loyal to Moscow and cognizant of and responsive to its perceived needs. The foreign policy concerns of the East European states were mediated through the filter of Soviet interests. These were: security, i.e. insuring itself a nonexcludable role in determining the future of a divided Europe and a divided Germany; economic, insuring a steady flow at first of materiel and later manufactured goods; ideological, insuring the replication and expansion of Soviet-style socialism; and political, securing its due as a world power. The mixture of bilateral economic and political dominance of the USSR and ersatz

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[3] Ronald H. Linden, "Democratic Consolidation and International Relations," paper prepared for presentation at second U.S.--Hungarian Political Science Roundtable, Budapest, December 15-18,1991.

"multilateral" alliances embraced the East European states in a relationship which, while confining, was fairly clear. The parameters of acceptable behavior were developed and enforced. Though these were tested and occasionally even violated, foreign policy options were limited and reactions could be estimated fairly accurately.[4]

In contrast to the situation which pertained for nearly four decades, the new environment of the East European states is characterized by high levels of uncertainty. In place of the suffocating hug of the hegemon there is now a new landscape devoid of firm alliances in either the economic, political or military sphere. There are some embryonic efforts to create alliances among the Central European states, most notably the Visegrad triangle of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. A broader group which has gone under various labels--the Alpine-Adria group, the Pentagonale and the Hexagonale--has tried to link Austria, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and the former Yugoslavia along functional lines. Neither of these groups can be said to offer clear guidelines of expected behavior of members, their obligations nor are the expected payoffs from these groupings more in evidence than in aspiration.

Added to this is the uncertainty of response from existing alliances. Some, such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) were designed to erode the Cold War in which they were created. Now, with the Cold War having passed into history, this group has expanded to such an extent as to render its role marginal. Western-based alliances such as NATO and the European Community have proved generally more effective at accomplishing their goals but have shown themselves cool to East European desires to become full members. The former established an ancillary North Atlantic Coordinating Council which is still in its first year, and the latter created and extended

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[4] For a comphrehensive view of this relationship see Charles Gati, *The Bloc That Failed* (Bloomington, IA: Indiana University Press, 1990).

"associate membership" to Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. But the Community deprived these states of the most important benefits of membership, lower import barriers.

Thus the question is rightly being raised in East Europe: "Of what are we a part?" After 1989 the clear desire on the part of the new governments and evidently of their populations has been to "join Europe." If by this was meant a duplication of the existing mode of domestic governance, a start has been made. But if by this was meant full partnership in the international institutions--or markets--of West Europe, this has clearly not happened.[5]

To this uncertainty must be added questions about the nature of the East European neighbors, in two senses. While all of the revolutions which removed the one-party rule of the communist party produced parliamentary democracies, not all of the East European states--not to mention the new states the Commonwealth--have moved equally rapidly to full implementation of democratic practices. Romania and Bulgaria, for example, have been accused of hampering their election processes in various ways, of resisting pluralization of the media and of continued repression against expressions of minority rights. The Serbian government has been charged with these practices as well as more serious violations of human rights against its Albanian population and, moreover, has backed up its self-proclaimed role of protector of Serbian populations outside its borders with the use of force. Whatever their record on democratic achievement, most of the governments of the region are politically weak. This stems from various developments: sharp polarization in Bulgaria; fragmentation of the party system as in Poland; fear of social upheaval as in Romania. Whatever the local causes, the region can not be said to demonstrate yet a substantial history of robust democratic practices and institutions. Therefore in foreign policy making the new democracies of East Europe can not be sure how long the new democracy next door will last or what alternative kinds of states might emerge. East Europe as a whole is not a region with a long history of democratic rule and the possibility of a historical replay of the interwar period when democracy disappeared is not forgotten.[6]

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[5] A sense of this exasperation was characteristically expressed best by the blunt phrases of Lech Walesa:

> Poland is ready for compromise, but Poles know how to count. They know that, at the moment, the West is earning 10:1 in every direction on trade and carries on hampering our exports. We do not want to behave in the same way, because if we were to behave like the West, then nothing would come of our achievements and contacts. We hope that the West will come to see the sense of this. Go into the streets of Warsaw; look at the shops, and you will see that the West is here, but look whether it is the same with Polish goods in the West. So someone is having a joke here on Poland and the countries of East-Central Europe.

Radio Warszawa Network, 30 September 1991 (Foreign Broadcast Information Service [hereafter FBIS], 2 October 1991, p. 22).

There is also uncertainty as to whether the states themselves, as physically integrated national entities will continue to exist. The case of Yugoslavia demonstrates clearly that even seven decades as one nation-state does not guarantee preservation. In fact, this case and possibly that of Czechoslovakia demonstrate that one of consequences of liberalization can be the collapse of ethnically heterogeneous states.

Compared with the repressive certainty of Soviet dominance in the region, these uncertainties, though exhilarating, hold their own fears and would make foreign policy making daunting even if the systems which produce that policy were not themselves changing at the same time.

Not all is uncertainties for the states of East Europe however. Some patterns are fairly clear. Overall economic ties, for example, have shifted dramatically from East to West.[7] The collapse of influence of international organizations dominated by the Soviet Union has to some extent been replaced by the states' increased involvement in both existing western organizations such as the Council of Europe and new institutions specifically created to assist in the transition, such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

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[6] For a discussion of this region during the interwar period see Joseph Rothschild, *East Central Europe between the Two World Wars* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974).

[7] Ronald H. Linden, "The New International Political Economy of East Europe," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Vol. XXV, No. 1 (March, 1992), pp. 3-21.

But with such involvement comes a new aspect of the environment which represents at least potentially a sharp shift of perceptions. The West, held up as the future toward which the newly democratizing states are moving, contains within it also a threat. While the danger of intervention and repression of society originating in the East has eased--although it has not been eliminated--a new danger to new sovereignty has emerged from west. This takes the form of the pressures of economic *diktat* coming from western financial institutions, most importantly the International Monetary Fund. In many respects the IMF can be seen as duplicating the kinds of interference which used to emanate from Moscow. Like the CPSU, the IMF is a powerful external actor, with clear designs as to how the East European states' domestic economic order should be structured. It endorses and imposes explicit, detailed plans designed to create a particular economic and social order in which some social classes will benefit, some will be privileged and some suffer. This external actor prefers a certain set of political elites in power and exercises enormous influence through these elites over policies, especially domestic and external economic policy.

While it may be going too far to say that the IMF and the West in general are seen as the "new Moscow," there is evidence of growing resentment. The presidential candidacy of Stanislaw Tyminski in Poland in 1990 extracted some mileage out of the charge that the Polish government was selling out the country. In February 1991, the National Coordinating Commission of Solidarity 80 demanded that "the Polish economy [be] managed in a sovereign way and not by foreign decision making centers."[8] In April, 1991

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[8] RFE/RL *Daily Report*, No. 37, February 24, 1992.

Stefan Kurowski of the Center Alliance (one of the political descendants of Solidarity) accused the Polish government of Jan Bielecki of "submissiveness" to the IMF.[9]

While the new governments must be concerned about the emergence of a perception of threat from this new direction, they must also worry that old threats in new forms may may reemerge from the same direction. In this case the chief point of concern is Germany. The dominant economy in Europe, its economic and political influence is immense in parts of East Europe. It has become, for example, the largest investor and trading partner of Czechoslovakia and its involvement in western Bohemia and along the Polish--German border has troubled some.[10] While for decades the artificial inflation of the German military threat was a tool for regime manipulation, the present governments are vulnerable to a perceived failure to react to a perception of disproportionate German influence.[11] Such concerns are only increased by the evident power of German involvement in and attempts to control developments in Yugoslavia and EC reactions to those developments.

The international environment of the East European states is new in another respect as well. In the decades which followed the second World War the problem of migration into or across the territory of these states was negligible. If the communist regimes faced a concern with population movement it was the loss of population. This was clearly the case with German Democratic Republic, for example, which in response built the Berlin Wall.

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[9] Ben DeDominicis, *Liberals in Poland* (Pittsburgh: Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 1992), p. 20.

[10] According to Czech Prime Minister Petr Pithart, Germany accounted for 70% of all investment in the Czech Republic during 1990-91. CSTK in English, February 21, 1992 (FBIS, 26 February 1992, p. 2). See also *Financial Times*, February 27, 1992, p. 16; *Christian Science Monitor*, February 26. 1992. On Poland see Jan B. de Weydenthal, "German Plan for Border Region Stirs Interest in Poland," *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 1, No. 7 (14 February 1992), pp. 39-47.

[11] In early 1992 the head of the Office for Foreign Contacts and Information of Czechoslovakia wrote to the government warning of an economic "offensive" on the part of Germany against the country. In response the government called a special meeting to see if there were evidence to back up this claim. Afterwards both the Federal Interior Minister and the Prime Minister of the Czech republic dismissed the claims, calling them "false alarms" and a "mistake." *Respekt*, No. 7, 17-23 February 1992 (FBIS, 25 February 1992, pp. 8-10).

The other East European regimes placed greater or lesser restrictions on emigration but none needed to worry that great numbers of people from other states, socialist or non-socialist, would come to settle temporarily or permanently on their territory.

This has now changed, due both to the economic dislocations which accompany transition and the political changes which mandate a lowering of barriers to emigration. Migration into or across the region is now a distinct issue for the governments of East Europe, especially Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and takes three forms. There is intra-East European migration, from the poorer or strife-torn regions of the Balkans. There is the potential for huge immigration from the states of the former Soviet Union. And there is migration into or across the region from poorer countries outside of Europe such as southwest Asia or Africa. Policy makers in Central Europe treat this issue very seriously and have taken immediate steps and made contingency plans to deal with it.[12]

The new world for East European foreign policy makers also includes the need to respond to problems and threats which, if not new in themselves, were not previously acknowledged and did not exercise a claim on governmental attention and resources. Environmental issues were typically among those where fraternal solidarity prevented their consideration as foreign policy issues and especially prevented consideration of a full measure of possible responses. Now whether such issues are bilateral, such as the Gabcikovo--Nagymaros dam between Czechoslovakia and Hungary or the Bulgarian nuclear reactor at Kozloduy, or multilateral, such as the question of air pollution of the region, none of states cannot afford not to have both a domestic and external environmental policy.

While these aspects present new complexities to which the states of East Europe must be prepared to respond, we should not be so dazzled by this part of the new world order that we forget that foreign policy in this region must also keep in mind the remnants of old issues. Only the most artificial depiction of the new situation would exclude from consideration the influence of resurgent nationalism on these states' international environment, for example. The factors underlying the return of this powerful sentiment on a mass and elite level have been considered elsewhere[13] and will be discussed a bit more below. Here it is important to note that as a powerful sentiment affecting the foreign policies of most of the new states, nationalism represents a sort of old and new wild card. It is old in the sense that intercommunal strife and desire for state-based representation of presumed national communities have deep roots in this region and have both caused and been stimulated by the conflicts which were part of this region's history until the end of World War II. It is new in the sense that during the postwar period Soviet hegemony and forced accommodation into the "socialist commonwealth" muted if not totally eliminated the impact of nationalism on the East European states' foreign policies. With the disappearance of that sort of top-down internationalism, nationalist aspirations are competing with promises of democracy and prosperity as guides to national policy. Examples abound from Lithuania through Macedonia of the reemergence of nationalism as a key dimension of the international environment faced by the states of this region.

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[12] F. Stephen Larrabee, "Down and Out in Warsaw and Budapest: Eastern Europe and East-West Migration," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Spring, 1992), pp. 5-33.

A similar element of the environment which is both new and old is the persistence of Russian national power and interests. While the Soviet Union has disappeared and what has replaced it appears at this point to be both weak and unformed, East European foreign policy makers do not make the assumption that it is destined always to remain so. The Central European states in particular have been active in pursuing ties with the news states of the Commonwealth-some even started before the USSR dissolved--recognzing the mutual interest and advantages of such policies and, not incidentally, trying to strengthen the smaller sovereignties against a future time when threats to all their existences may reemerge. While easy to dismiss as paranoia, the concerns of many of the East European governments that history could be reversed is informed by four decades of experience under a hegemony they do not wish to see repeated. Their fearful reactions to the attempted coup in Moscow in August, 1991 and the strong desire to expedite the removal of former Soviet troops from their countries--to the point where even Czechoslovakia has promised to build housing in Russia to facilitate troop withdrawals--is evidence of the continuation of this as a foreign policy concern. Moreover there exist as well specific issues of potential conflict between some of the East European states and Russia, some of which involve traditional "security" i.e., military, issues.[14]

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[13] Ronald H. Linden, "The Appeal of Nationalism," *Report on Eastern Europe* (June 14, 1991), pp. 29-35.

But even were there not such issues and even given the sea change in economic orientation which has occurred in the region, East European leaders know that the region cannot simply be disconnected from the former metropole without serious consequences. Some of these--such as the impact of a 1/3 cut in the supply of oil to the region--have already occurred. The loss of the Soviet market has crippled or idled several major producers in the region and, given the reluctance of the West Europeans to throw open their markets to the newly marketizing economies, several East European leaders see the need for resuscitating "Soviet" demand, even artificially. This was the aim behind the proposal of the three Central European states to channel western aid to Moscow in a way which obliges them to purchase of East European goods.[15] In addition, the success of the transition of the largest of the Commonwealth countries, but especially Russia, will have a direct impact on the question of migration.

In sum, the foreign policy which is being formulated and implemented in these states undergoing democratic and economic liberalization must deal with an immediate environment which looks substantially different from that which existed for more than forty years. It contains some elements of the old and the legacy of that forty years will not disappear overnight. But in terms of alliance structures, nature of potential partners, direction and nature of potential threats and simply the level of uncertainty itself, the East European states leaders know they are not in Kansas anymore.

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[14] Examples of such issues which have the potential to bring some of the East European states into conflict with Russia are the Kaliningrad enclave, Russian territory now separated from its "home" by Latvia, Lithuania and Belarus, and the involvement of the Russian 14th army in support of the separatist movement in the trans-Dniester region of Moldova.

[15] PAP in English, 24 Jan. 1992 (FBIS, 28 Jan. 1992, p. 19).

The New Domestic Environment

Decision making under the control of the communist parties of East Europe was overwhelmingly top-down. The various communist parties sought to maintain a monopoly of political power, which it protected by enforcing a severely restricted political environment; a dominance to the point of monopoly of the information environment; and the exclusion of the public, except in the form of mobilized support, from involvement in policy making. Politics existed of course under the communist regimes but opposition, when it occurred, was primarily intra-elite and public opposition activities and organization were by definition illegitimate and repressed.[16]

Foreign policy making and execution represented an even more restricted arena since it always carried with it the need to be especially attentive to a powerful external constituency, the Soviet Union. A review of the episodes of divergence from Soviet preferred practices and policies in East Europe--including the revolution in Hungary, the Prague spring, the various Polish upheavals--shows that these stemmed overwhelmingly from differences in the direction of domestic developments.[17] Only the Romanian deviance included substantial, differences in direction of foreign policy.[18]

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[16] See the discussion of the "politics of notables" in Ellen Comisso, "State structures, political processes, and collective choice in CMEA states," *International Organization*, Vol. 40. No. 2 (Spring, 1986), pp. 195-238.

Now in East Europe formulation and execution of foreign policy is subject to public intervention. Foreign policy, as with other policies, lies within the newly created and newly legitimate realm of public discussion, debate and criticism. Virtually all aspects of the process, from agenda setting to implementation is, in principle, now open to intervention by actors who are not creatures of the ruling regime. Though a banal circumstance for western democracies, it is a new dynamic for the East European political elites.

Probably the most significant new actors to exercise an influence on foreign policy of these transition states are political parties. After the revolutions of 1989 and especially during and after the elections of 1990, the political landscape blossomed with parties. The orientation of these parties covers the entire political spectrum, from descendants of the orthodox communist party through social democrats, traditional liberals, center right, overtly nationalist and monarchists. In the Polish elections of 1991 more than 100 parties competed and fully 29 achieved representation parliament. While in general it is the domestic political and economic structure and policies which occupy the center of these parties' attention, foreign policy issues are not absent. For example, in the aftermath of the failed coup in the Soviet coup several political contenders criticized the Polish government for being "passive" and indecisive.[19]

Moreover some of the central issues which motivate the parties' activities involve domestic policies with international implications. In Romania and Bulgaria, for example, a critical issue facing the new governments is their treatment of their minority populations of Hungarians and Turks, respectively. All parties need to take positions on whether and when the minorities can achieve full expression of their cultural and civil rights and in what form, e.g. collective or individual. The positions of the parties whether in the government or in opposition, has resonance outside the country, particularly with the referent country, Hungary and Turkey in this case. In addition, their actions and statements attract attention in the broader international community. Romanian government policy toward its Hungarian minority, for example, directly affects that country's ability to "join Europe" by demonstrating its liberal credentials, with institutional consequences: it still waits in the antechamber of the Council of Europe.

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[17] On Hungary, see Charles Gati, *Hungary and the Soviet Bloc* (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1986); on Czechoslovakia see Gordon Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revoluion* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976); on Poland see Jack Bielasiak, "The Evolution of Crises in Poland," in Jack Bielasiak and Maurice D. Simon, ed., *Polish Politics: Edge of the Abyss* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), pp. 1-28.

[18] See Ronald H. Linden, *Bear and Foxes: The International Relations of the East European States* (Boulder, CO: East European Quarterly, 1979), pp. 177-203; Ronald H. Linden, "Romanian Foreign Policy in the 1980s" in Daniel N. Nelson, ed. *Romania in the 1980s* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 219-253.

[19] *Trybuna*, 29 August, 1991 and *Rzeczpospolita*, 29 August, 1991 (FBIS, 5 September 1991, pp. 19-21).

The impact of political parties on foreign policy in East Europe can be seen at all stages of the policy process. In Romania, for example, opposition parties essentially forced onto the agenda the issue of support for the independence of and then possible unification with the new state of Moldova. They wanted the National Salvation Front government and President Ion Iliescu to do more than speak out in favor of the Moldovans. Opposition parties and political umbrella groups forced Iliescu to publicly defend his hesitance on this issue and ultimately to declare himself opposed to union of the two independent Romanian states.

This is a particularly interesting case, illustrating the way the new political processes are affecting foreign policy. The parties pressing Iliescu, the National Peasant and Liberal parties, were not those offering particularly nationalistic platforms. They are the country's "historic" parties, descendants of those which operated in Romania between the wars when most of what is now Moldova was part of Romania. More importantly, these parties fared very poorly in Romanian parliamentary elections of 1990 and have had very little impact on developments in the country since. It is perhaps not too cynical to suggest that they seized on this foreign policy issue as a way to effectively exploit what they saw a weakness in the government thereby gain some popularity for themselves.

At the same time the nationalist groups, such as *Vatra Romaneasca* (Romania Cradle) approached the question of Moldova surprisingly gingerly. From their point of view, bringing up questions of changing the borders of Romania might reopen the issue of Transylvania, ceded to Romania from Hungary after World War I, then lost and regained after World War II. While not represented in parliament, such groups apparently already had substantial influence with the government, had no wish to weaken it and no political incentive to use this foreign policy issue against a government whose policies on key issues, e.g. toward the Hungarians, they supported. For the Liberals and Peasants, on the other hand, desperate to gain some grounds on which to effectively challenge the government, this foreign policy issue offered a political opportunity.[20]

In most of the countries of the region political parties have not been shy about challenging acts taken or about to be taken by their governments. In Czechoslovakia negotiations on a comprehensive new treaty with Germany opened the government to attacks from the left that it was not being forceful enough in securing guarantees of its borders from its powerful neighbor and from the right that the treaty might open up the possibility for restitution claims from Germans forcibly expelled after World War II.[21]

Other actors consider that foreign policy issues are within their competence and they also try to affect government policy. In most of East Europe trade unions for the first time have begun to act like trade unions. They consider it their obligation to act on behalf of their memberships, or of workers in general, to protect them form the vicissitudes of economic change. Especially at a time of transition, the unions both new and old are faced with a full range of challenges to the welfare of their constituents (or potential constituents, as the unions too must also contest for support). Many of the most deleterious economic changes are perceived to have foreign sources. Witness the statement of Solidarity 80 quoted above. As has happened elsewhere, with implementation of IMF programs, the unions of East Europe are increasingly acting to push their governments not to implement strict IMF guidelines, to move more slowly on ending subsidies to enterprises and allowing bankruptcies, and especially to keep some price controls. No longer the "transmission belts" of economic directives which Lenin envisioned and successive Soviet and East European leaders fashioned, the unions form a powerful counterweight to governments eager to comply with international demands for painful economic reforms. Some of course do support government policy; others rampage through the capital and bring down the government when it tries too hard to economically "join Europe."

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[20] This issue is discussed in Ronald H. Linden, "After the Revolution: A Foreign Policy of Bounded Change," in Daniel N. Nelson, ed. *Romania After Tyranny* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, forthcoming), pp. 205-39.

[21] CSTK in English, 25 February 1992 (FBIS, 27 February 1992, pp. 3-4). At the time of the treaty signing a protest of some 7,000 people was staged in Prague. CSTK in English, 24 February 1992 (FBIS, 25 February 1992, p. 7). See also the discussion in Jan Obrman, "Relations with Germany," *Report on Eastern Europe*, Vol. 2, No. 46 (November 15, 1991), pp. 11-16.

Nor are unions the only interest group the new governments must consider when seeking or making international connections. Farmers for example, have become especially vocal in some East European states. Farmers in Poland object to what they see as a flood of western imports of foodstuffs which drive their products out of the market, while the governments of these very same western countries keep Polish goods off western European markets. In August 1991 the National Council of the Polish Peasant Party Solidarity demanded that the Polish government provide "food security" for the country.[22] The next month a new peasant party, called the "Feed and Defend Peasant Party" warned that the proposed association of the country with the European Community could cause a "sell-out of Polish land" and said it would oppose "the sale of national assets to foreign hands."[23] After the association agreements were signed, the Polish government promised its farmers that high import tarrifs against foreign agricultural products would be maintained.[24]

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[22] PAP in English, 3 August, 1991 (FBIS, 5 August 1991, p. 30).

[23] *Rzeczpospolita*, 21-22 September 1991 (FBIS, 25 September 1991, pp. 22-23).

[24] PAP in English, 24 February 1992 (FBIS, 26 February 1992, p. 22).

If foreign policy makers can no longer count on being able to automatically call into line key national interest groups, they must also deal with other actors whose intervention affects foreign policy and who operate at the subnational or even local level. Under communism, the governments of the East European states were highly centralized, with the exception of Yugoslavia. Since the revolutions, the assertion of regional--often ethnically based--interests has been seen in several instances, with the most extreme and sometimes tragic consequences in Yugoslavia. But even where the state itself has not completely fragmented, the arrangements being argued out to accommodate significant subgroups directly affects foreign policy. In Czechoslovakia, for example, President Havel tried to move quickly to establish Czechoslovakia's good name in international circles by curtailing or ending sales of arms. But since the bulk of the arms factories, with thousands of workers, lie in Slovakia, this international issue has direct regional consequences. As part of the Slovak drive to disengage the administration of Slovakia from Prague and to take what is seen as their rightful control of their region, objections to halting arms sales were raised and in fact the sales have continued. A even more overt challenge to central government control of foreign policy is the establishment by Slovakia of its own Ministry of International Relations.

Even at the local level newly empowered groups or institutions now have the opportunity to exercise some influence over national foreign policy decisions which affect them. For example in Poland a local council for Warsaw doubled the rent to be charged for a US government cultural center provoking embarassment and irritation from the national government.[25] While hardly of the crisis variety, this incident points to the new need of East European governments to build effective mechanisms of policy implementation, something on which western governments may or may not have much to teach.[26]

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[25] *East European Markets*, October 5, 1991, p. 10.

[26] On local involvement in foreign policy in the United States, see Michael H. Shuman, "Dateline Mainstreet: Local Foreign Policies," *Foreign Policy*, No. 65 (Winter, 1986-87), pp. 154-74; Michael H. Shuman,

Considering the possible impact of various levels of government opens up the very large question of the possible impact on foreign policy of institutions. Whether or not the renewed emphasis upon the role of institutions in politics and policy making is appropriate for East Europe is a major empirical question the study of which may require a somewhat deeper empirical field for the region. While major influential institutions existed during the communist period, studying the possible impact on foreign policy now requires looking at old institutions in new settings as well as new institutions altogether. At the very least one should not exclude the possibility that in the East European context institutional actors will affect foreign policy interactions of states. One recent example would be the disinclination of the national bank in Russia to follow the tight money policies advocated by the IMF and accepted by the government. The bank's reluctance to sharply restrict credit undermined the credibility of the Russian government and its assurances to the IMF and world capitalist community that it was serious about ending the practice of allowing essentially cost-free credit to enterprises. The head of the Russian national bank objected to this aspect of austerity and refused to implement such a policy.

The instances of institutions acting virtually independent of central government control offers the most extreme examples of institutional impact on foreign policy. Again examples are in evidence in the Commonwealth of Independent States. Here the Russian armed forces, particularly in the Baltic states and in the trans-Dniester region of Moldova appear to be virtually independent actors, whose actions in support of the local Russian communities directly challenge the sovereignty of the new states involved and, willy-nilly, precipitate foreign policy involvement for the Russian government.

At the same time in both the Commonwealth and East Europe the very nature of key institutions and their relationship is in flux. Struggles to formulate and specify arenas of responsibility, rights and prerogatives can take place in the foreign policy sphere as well

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"Dateline Main Street: Courts vs. Local Foreign Policies," *Foreign Policy*, No. 86 (Spring, 1992), pp. 158-77.

as others. This has been demonstrated in the recent struggles between the president and the prime minister of Hungary, for example.[27] Such struggles for institutional influence, both for its own sake and in order to achieve desired results in the policy area, no doubt occurred before. But for several reasons these struggles are both more open and more consequential.

First and most important, the guiding and controlling hand of what had been the key institution, the communist party, has disappeared. Both the personnel and the policy dictates that previously hemmed in institutional struggles have disappeared and have not been replaced by similar structures. Second, the legitimation of public politics allows for such struggles to become part of the competitive political arena. Indeed there is a positive incentive for institutional actors to seek support in public politics, an option not available previously. Third, the relative independence of institutional actors and the new permeability of the countries' border means that institutions can seek and utilize external actors as allies in domestic policy struggles. These allies can provide important influence and resources in attempts to influence policy.

Finally, both institutional actors and other interests and individuals have the ability to try to influence foreign policy through a pluralized media. Foreign policy, like other policy, is now considered and debated in a much different media environment than that which characterized the communist regimes. All actions are at least potentially subject to criticism and evaluation in the variety of print, and to a lesser extent, electronic media in the states of East Europe. This means that even if a new government would prefer, for example, not to deal with an issue or to handle it discreetly, a critical or opposition press may not permit it.

Liberalization and Foreign Policy: The Research Agenda

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[27] Judith Pataki and John W. Schiemann, "Constitutional Court Limits Presidential Powers," *Report on Eastern Europe*, Vol. 2, No. 42 (October 18, 1991), pp. 5-9.

Clearly the East European states are formulating policies which affect their relations among themselves and with other states in both a new international and a new domestic environment. Any analyses of their foreign policies which ignored one of these environments would represent not only blind commitment to either the realist or liberal paradigm but a crippled substantive inquiry. But what direction should such inquiry take? What propositions are likely to provide fruitful directions of research in what constitutes an enticing and rich political science laboratory? This paper can only begin to suggest a few such directions.

1) Foreign policy activism of the East European states

With the number of new policy actors growing exponentially and the boundaries of permitted international behavior removed or significantly reduced, it is reasonable to expect that the newly democratizing states of East Europe will expand their level of activity and involvement in international politics. Ideological blinders have been discarded and simultaneously the key enforcer of international orthodoxy, the Soviet Union, has disappeared. The removal of the enforced pattern of involvement which shaped the range and level of foreign involvement of the East European states should now produce an increased level and broadened pattern of foreign involvement. New opportunities heretofore proscribed are likely to be pursued by the new leaders in accordance not only with newly dominant ideologies, conservative/liberal views and desire for market economies, but simply as a result of the appearance of opportunities for ties which did not exist before. At least this would be the expectation.

Preliminary evidence form East Europe suggests that in general this has been happening with most states. Enormous activism characterized the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, for example, during the first two years of non communist rule. As expected, most of this was directed toward a "return to Europe"; but Czechoslovakia, Romania and Poland, were also extremely active in pursuing ties in Latin

America. Such impressions do not constitute an empirical test of course. Such a test would have to keep in mind Hagan's findings which suggest that degree of foreign policy activism, as measured by specificity, commitment and independence of activity, is affected in open states by the regime's level of vulnerability and fragmentation.[28] We might expect, then, that open but politically fragmented regimes such as Poland and Bulgaria will not be able to sustain the level of international involvement and commitment seen in the early stages of post revolutionary activism. In fact, most of the East European states would seem to fit the characterization of open and fragmented and thus a systematic, comparative study of the level of international involvement would be very instructive.

2) Seeking other democracies

If this were a study of natural sciences one might consider that what has occurred in Europe is that a group of "more similar systems" has been created. That is, the Eastern European states as newly forming parliamentary democracies are now more like democracies elsewhere than they are like dictatorships. Hence, armed with a dose of liberal philosophy and aware of the stated policy objectives of the new regimes in East Europe, we might expect to see these states not only become more active, but seek out in particular other democracies as alliance partners. Indeed the work of Siverson and Emmons supports in the aggregate the idea that democracies tend to seek alliance with other democracies.[29]

In the East European case, the evidence is strong that this is indeed the direction of foreign policy movement. The cry for a "return to Europe" was followed by virtually immediate petitions on the part of the East European to do away with the alliance systems imposed on them by the USSR (the Warsaw Pact and CMEA) and seek as strong a form of association as possible with the alliances of West Europe, e.g. the Council of Europe, the European Community and NATO. Moving beyond formal alliances to trade flows and other forms of international interactions, there can be no doubt that the East is seeking to move West.[30]

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[28] Joe D. Hagan, "Regimes, Political Oppositions, and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy," in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and James N. Rosenau, ed. *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), pp. 339-65.

[29] Randolph M. Siverson and Juliann Emmons, "Birds of a Feather: Democratic Political Systems and Alliance Choices," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (June, 1991), pp. 285-306. The data suported this proposition more strongly in the post world war II period than in the interwar period.

The causes of this movement are many and may have less to do with having "more similar systems" than with economic necessity. For example, the creation of "alliances" with western banks and the IMF is a direct product of the perceived needs of the states to restructure their economies and to respond to signals and incentives offered by powerful western actors.

In addition, however, the new democracies of Eastern Europe are very much driven to seek out other democracies as *de facto* or *de jure* alliance partners for domestic political reasons. These regimes find themselves in a situation where their legitimacy is high but their perceived efficacy is low and declining. They are clearly recognized as the product of revolutions which removed imposed regimes and placed the country on a path toward democracy and a market economy. They face daunting tasks, however, especially in the latter task, and most have been forced, sooner or later, to take several unpopular actions, such as ending price controls, subsidies, allowing for unemployment and bankruptcies. Foreign policy, on the other hand provides an arena in which these regime can earn popularity relatively cost free. This can be accomplished, among other ways, by aligning the regime most visibly with states popularly perceived to be democracies, i.e.,. the West. Joining with the United States and other European countries in sanctions against Iraq and in the Gulf War, breaking ties with Soviet- imposed "revolutionary" regimes such as Cuba, and reestablishing ties with states formerly on a taboo list, such as Israel, are several ways in which new regimes can demonstrate their break with the past, solidify their *bona fides* as a legitimate national expressions and redefine themselves for their population as part of the group of democratic states. This desire of politically vulnerable governments to redefine their referent community provides a powerful incentive to seek out other democratic states as alliance partners, whether in multilateral organizations such as the Council of Europe, or through formal treaties on bilateral relations with major European democracies.

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[30] Linden, "The New International Political Economy".

3)The effect of public opinion

The fact that public politics and influence on foreign policy is now possible in East Europe and the need of these new democratic regimes to respond to perceived public preferences raises the fundamental question of what will be the effect of public opinion on the foreign policies of these states. Will their appearance make Europe and the world less conflict ridden because they, as democracies, will be less prove to engage in conflict? Despite presumptions that democracies are less warlike, aggregate research suggests that in fact democracies engage in wars about as much as nondemocracies do. But democracies at least tend to fight each other the less.[31] So we might expect than that the East European states will be no less likely to engage in conflict, but at least they will less likely to wage war on each other.

But the guide to expectations provided by aggregate research is even more uncertain. Morgan and Campbell found that the relationship between political constraints (their operationalization of democracy) and war proneness held for major powers but not smaller powers, which the East European states clearly are.[32] What they suggest is that further research into the specific nature of the presumed constraints in democratic polities may be important to understanding war proneness or that the answer may lie less in political or institutional constraints and more in national or political culture. Keeping in mind the troubling return of aggressive nationalism in East Europe since the end of the communist period it would clearly be incumbent upon students of the region to consider this cultural factor as it operates on the formation and execution foreign policy in these new democracies.

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[31] See the discussion in T. Clifton Morgan and Sally H. Campbell, "Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints and War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (June, 1991), pp. 187-211; Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (March, 1989), pp. 3-35.

[32] Morgan and Campbell, "Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints and War".

The empirical field is as yet too narrow to draw any conclusions about how prone the new democracies are to international conflict. The most spectacular case of conflict, that of Serbia vs. Croatia and Serbia vs. Slovenia in the former Yugoslavia would seem to suggest that regimes which have only the gross attributes of democracies--an elected parliamentary government, say, but no genuine effective opposition or independent press--are not only not constrained against fight each other but are even spurred along this path. On the other hand, in the region's other potentially serious international conflict, one also spurred by passionate nationalist feeling, that of Romania vs. Hungary, there are as yet few signs of open warfare. In fact the one area of significant cooperation between these potential adversaries lies in the military sphere, an "open skies" agreement covering their common border.[33]

4) The role of the environment

Morgan and Campbell's conclusion with regard to conflict and minor powers and in fact much other work on small states[34] suggests that democracies or not, the international environment will exercise a powerful influence on the direction of foreign policies of such states. Indeed, work on major powers[35] as well as the author's own on the region itself[36] suggest the important though differentiated impact of international changes on states' polices, foreign policy not excepted. For East Europe, with their neighborhood changed and the nature of both threats and opportunities greatly altered as well, any consideration of consequences of transition must include the environment as a potential factor stimulating or constraining foreign policy choice and action.

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[33] *Rompres*, December 13, 1990.

[34] Maria Papadakis and Harvey Starr, "Opportunity, Willingness, and Small States: The Relationship Between Environment and Foreign Policy," in Hermann, Kegley and Rosenau, ed. *New Directions*, pp. 409-32.

[35] Patrick James and John R. Oneal, "The Influence of Domestic and International Politics on the President's Use of Force," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (June, 1991), pp. 307-32.

One could expect for example that the importance to the East European states of "joining Europe' and thus earning the approval of the established western democracies and their organizations would operate to constrain movement toward escalating conflict. This would only operate, however, insofar as the West European and North American democracies were perceived as willing not only to sketch out the principles upon which the "new world order" are to be based but to back up these principles with incentives or sanctions. In this respect the present Yugoslav case is a crucial test. If in fact the United States, the European Community and/or the United Nations puts into force some effective constraints upon the behavior of Serbia, because it is perceived to be violating norms related to international conflict, one would expect the chances of resort to conflict in East Europe to be reduced. The foreign policy choices, preferred by nationalist political culture or urged by powerful domestic actors would be constrained. If, on the other hand, violation of international norms brings no negative consequences, that is, the environment of the state applies few or weak constraints, then domestic factors, such as the presence of a forceful and nationalist public opinion, would be more likely to produce a resort to conflict.[37]

At the very least the enormous changes which these states immediate international environment is undergoing and the uncertainties these changes contain is raising the

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[36] Ronald H. Linden, *Communist States and International Change : Romania and Yugoslavia in Comparative Perspective* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987).

[37] A framework which approaches the mix of domestic and international factors as a process of "national adaptation" is James N. Rosenau, "The Adaptation of National Societies: A Theory of Political Behavior and Transformation," in Rosenau, ed., *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, pp. 501-34.

salience of foreign policy. Under the previous regimes, foreign policy outcomes could be marginalized, requiring little of the government's resources. This was true in part because they resided in a kind of a *sanctum sanctorum* open to little national influence and in part because the regime could count on the basic picture of the outside world remaining the same. As neither of these pertain any longer and as the outcomes are likely to have consequences for electorally vulnerable regimes, policies must be determined, resources must be allocated, choices must be defended. The public good of security, for example, must be purchased with political and financial resources; it is no longer being provided--even in a perverted form--by a community hegemon. Moreover as they move toward increased involvement with the global economy, political and economic borders are more open. The East European states have become more sensitive to international change even as their domestic regimes are more politically vulnerable. Recognizing this does not automatically tell us in which direction this sensitivity, this higher salience, will push the foreign policy of the East European states. It only tells us to not throw out the realist baby with the bath and keep in the mix both the changing international environment and the consequences for foreign policy of political and economic change at home.

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The Post-Soviet States' Security Concern in East-Central Europe

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The Post-Soviet States' Security Concern in East-Central Europe

Four years ago, in July 1988, nine out of the ten member-states, (Romania abstained) of the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), issued a communique which stated that they had reached an "understanding on gradually creating conditions for the mutual free movement of goods, services, and other production factors with the aim of creating an integrated market of the future."[1] Three years ago the Soviet General Staff was preoccupied with preserving the ability of the Warsaw Pact to conduct effective and, if necessary, offensive theater strategic operations.[2] In the summer of 1991 Mikhail Gorbachev was confidently predicting the ratification of a new union treaty which would preserve a reformist Soviet Union. In June and July, 1991, though, the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact respectively, came to an unlamented end. The Soviet Union has also disintegrated and for Gorbachev success now seems to be restricted to the Western lecture circuit. The multi-ethnic Soviet empire is finished and East-Central Europe (as well as the constituent states of the Union) are free.

For the East Europeans the demise of the Soviet empire may indeed be viewed as a tremendous geopolitical windfall. It is not surprising that the East Europeans greeted it with such euphoria. Democrats in the former Soviet Union also welcomed liberation from the burdens of empire and the oppression of communism although for many particularly in the military, the fall of the empire and the disintegration of the Union have been traumatic. All parties in the region, however, have grand expectations for the future, and with some justice.

First, it can be argued with good reason that the ending of the Cold War and the building of pluralistic democratic societies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were predicated on the disintegration of the Soviet empire. Some have contended that the Cold War could be terminated only if the Soviet threat to Western Europe was removed and that, in turn, required the termination of the Soviet subjugation of Eastern Europe - that is granting self-determination to Eastern Europe.[3] Thus self-determination for Eastern Europe became the principal requirement for the end of the Cold War. Second, the Soviet Union itself, as an artificial political construct, could not indefinitely resist the tide of democratization. As years of evolution in August 1991 were compressed into a three-day democratic revolution that defeated the coup of the hardliners, the breakup of the Soviet Union became inevitable.

The positive aspects of these developments are so great that they clearly outweigh the negative ones. In discussing the latter, though, one need not be seized by nostalgia for the old system. For although the Soviet Union and its instruments, the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA had provided stability and predictability they did so at a horrendous political, economic and psychological cost. Rather the negative elements must be examined and understood in order to deal realistically with current and future problems. And the states of East-Central Europe and the successor states in the former Soviet Union do confront a whole spectrum of dangers. The historian, Paul Kennedy, in 1987 rather pessimistically warned:

> Those who rejoice at the present-day difficulties of the Soviet Union and who look forward to the collapse of that empire might wish to recall that such transformations normally occur at very great cost, and not always in a predictable fashion.[4]

We are yet to tally the cost of that transformation or be able to predict accurately the ultimate outcome. The political, economic and social turmoil in all of these states and, indeed, the existential crisis in some of them has created enormous uncertainty and makes prediction extraordinarily difficult. Yet all of these states need to formulate new strategies in order to ensure their security. Both security and strategy ought to be broadly construed to take in political, economic and psychological factors in addition to the military ones in the best Beaufreeian and Clausewitzian sense.[5] It is difficult to formulate a new strategy under the best of circumstances but these states now must seek to devise one in a highly unpredictable environment.

The focus of this paper will be the military aspect of security but this cannot be done in isolation. Consequently it will examine, at least briefly, the impact of political and economic developments on the security concerns of the successor and the East-Central European states in the region. Furthermore, it will look at the larger European and, indeed, Western context to see how the regional security concerns can be best met. For regional security arrangements must fit into the larger

European/Western security architecture. And although a variety of policies and instruments may help diminish the prospect of conflict and alleviate tensions, true security in the region will require stability and a fair degree of predictability in the relations among these states.

I. THE EAST-EAST RELATIONSHIP

For more than forty years, Pax Sovietica not only created the impression of regional stability in the Eastern part of the continent but it also represented some of the closest intertwining of political, economic and military interests. Moscow looked at Eastern Europe as justified spoils of war, as a source of ideological legitimation, as markets and sources of supply, as a defensive glacis and, if need be, one that could be used for offense. It was an unequal relationship in which imperial Moscow, until at least midway into the Gorbachev era, expected the unquestioning loyalty of the "Little Brothers." By the time the Soviet Union itself collapsed the East European empire was gone. Soviet leaders had persuaded themselves that the burdens of empire and particularly the cost of holding on by force, far outweighed the benefits. The successor states and, for our purposes, the European members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Georgia, did not abandon all interest in East-Central Europe but their attention was refocused inward.

In the case of the East-Central European states, the Soviet Union was the occupying or threatening superpower. The history of military intervention in East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the threat to use force against Poland in 1981 made the Warsaw Pact into a most curious military alliance where the primary threat emanated from fellow allies. It is hardly surprising, then, that the East-Central European states have difficulty viewing the successor states of the Soviet Union as a source of security. This is understandable but given possible opportunities, it may not be wise. The East European states, of course, have been preoccupied with monumental domestic problems and thus have become to an extent more inward looking. By and large though, their foreign policies have been refocused towards the West. There is tremendous emphasis on the West - Ex Occidente Lux.

Of course there are continuing interests and links between the East-Central European states and their post-Soviet neighbours. Leaders, such as Vaclav Havel, have shown repeatedly great sensitivity towards Soviet and then Russian security concerns. Boris Yeltsin has also repeatedly expressed his desire for good relations with the East-Central European states. It is not, then, the case that the various parties have had no further interest in each other or are unaware of the dangers of regional spillover from possible implosions in some states. Rather the problem is that there seem to be far too many lapses of concern with what happens in other states in the region and with their security needs.

A. Political and Economic Developments: Implications for Security

(a) The Post-Soviet states

Many, both in the East and in the West, breathed a great sigh of relief as the Sixth Congress of Peoples' Deputies ended in Moscow in April 1992. Boris Yeltsin not only survived but appears to have prevailed. His economic program for fundamental transformation remained largely intact. He retained his special powers to rule by decree through the end of 1992 and the West was moving forward with its $24 billion aid package, including the creation of a ruble stabilization fund. Having sought and received a popular mandate in 1991 Yeltsin has enjoyed the kind of political legitimacy that eluded Gorbachev.[6] An opinion poll taken during the Congress indicated that his government had the support of 60-70 percent of the population of the Russian republic.[7] Yet Yeltsin had to make significant concessions before and during the Congress. This included a slowing down of agricultural privatization and, even more importantly, a commitment to massive loans to large industries that were threatened with bankruptcy. The universal unhappiness expressed by Western bankers and the postponement of the signing of the "standby agreement" with the IMF (which would allow the use of the ruble stabilization fund) to at least September 1992,[8] are but an indication of how deleterious an effect Yeltsin's concessions may have on economic transformation.

Furthermore, the composition of the Congress remained unchanged and it is largely a hardline body made up of a majority of former communists who have no commitment to pluralistic democracy or marketization. Though unable to successfully confront Yeltsin on this occasion the Congress, nevertheless, retained its ability to threaten his program. Rather than a complete victory Yeltsin won himself some breathing space. The Congress is scheduled to meet again in November 1992 as inflation grows and, as both deficits and unemployment increase, it will be very difficult at best for Yeltsin to achieve the kind of quick economic results that could deter a new, and perhaps more successful attack on, his policies in November.

Moreover, it is rather disquieting that the extra-parliamentary instrument that may be used against Yeltsin and the democratic forces in Russia retain a significant ability for anti-democratic action. The KGB, though, restructured into separate domestic and external agencies with the former incorporated into the newly created Russian Ministry of Security remains, in many ways, intact. Boris Yeltsin chose to co-opt the organization rather than dismantle it.[9] The military, which was supposed to have been depoliticized, retains a significant KGB influence, particularly in the Baltic states.[10] Though the military is fragmented, the competition for its loyalty by Gorbachev and Yeltsin in November and December 1991 and the decision to create a Russian army in the future has encouraged politicization and now nationalism. And although both the KGB and the military proclaim their loyalty to democracy, it is not inconceivable that should Yeltsin falter, these organizations would remain susceptible to manipulation and use by anti-democratic forces. Moreover, it is unlikely that a threat to democracy in Russia could be localized for that state exercises a preponderant influence in the CIS.

In addition to political threats Russia is also feeling the effects of the centrifugal forces of nationalism. Threats of secession by the Chechens and the Tatars are still contained with relative success by Moscow but a combination of increased nationalism, economic catastrophe and political challenges by the forces of repression could create a combination that could lead to an implosion that would have a profound effect for the states in the region.

Though Russia is not a superpower, it remains an enormous military power and a country with great potential. In June 1991 Boris Yeltsin declared in his inauguration address that "great Russia is rising from her knees. We will, without fail, transform her into a prosperous , peace-loving, law governed and sovereign state."[11] But others may wish to go beyond Yeltsin's vision. The belief in some manifest destiny, in a special international role and a right to superpower status may have been submerged under a sea of economic desperation but it is unlikely that they have disappeared altogether. For her neighbours, the shape of the future Russia carries profound security implications. And, for the time being Russia remains both unstable and different from the other countries in the region.

The Baltic states are suffering economically and there is considerable political uncertainty as they seek to build democratic institutions and form stable governments. They are also plagued by ethnic problems and need to confront the major issue of ensuring that all members of society enjoy rights as first-class citizens. Though Lithuania has some disagreements with Poland over the treatment of the Polish minority, the main threat focus for the three Baltic states is Russia and not Eastern Europe. Moreover, in comparison with Russia and particularly the other successor states in the European part of the former Soviet Union, the Baltic states face largely moderate challenges to democracy.

It is, in the remaining post-Soviet states, that political and economic instability (which can pose threats to security) is perhaps the greatest. Ukraine and Belarus, two of the other states that border on East-Central Europe are, as a perceptive Russian observer suggested, dominated by former communists who are trying to outbid the democratic opposition and nationalist movements.[12] The attempts by these former communists to delay pluralistic democracy make these regimes intrinsically unstable. Furthermore, because they lack any depth of political legitimacy it is difficult if not impossible for these regimes to implement fundamental economic changes. This can be seen in the relative slowness (as compared to Russia) with which Ukraine and Belarus have moved towards marketization.

Furthermore, the attempt to use the mantle of nationalism as a source of legitimacy not only becomes subject to its own law of diminishing returns but it has the dangerous side effect that it helps foster nationalist extremism. This impacts first on ethnic minorities within the particular state but later on it can also present a security danger to neighbouring countries. In the case of the Ukraine, the encouragement of nationalism is already helping fuel disputes with Russia over Crimea and the Black Sea fleet but it may also have implications for Moldova, the other state that borders on East-Central Europe. There are significant numbers of Ukrainians, as well as Russians, living in the Dniester region of Moldova who are seeking to create an independent state. As the shock of economic transformation begins to have greater effect in Ukraine and Belarus in the second half of 1992 the governments may find themselves tempted to draw even more heavily on nationalism.

In the case of Moldova, the government, representing the Romanian majority, not only fears secession by the Slav (and for that matter the Gagauz) minorities but also fears interference from Russia and possibly Ukraine. It does look westward to Romania but with considerable apprehension. Though the leadership of Mircea Snegur and the Romanian majority have not excluded the possibility of eventual reunification with Romania they are extremely weary of the neo-communist leadership of Ion Iliescu and prefer independence for the time being.

Armenia and Azerbaijan view each other as a primary security threat. There is political instability and economic disintegration in both states though Armenia has made far more progress towards democratization. Azerbaijan is increasingly looking to Turkey, a NATO member, with whom it enjoys ethnic, linguistic and religious affinities for help in the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Armenia, however, is looking to Western Europe, rather than Eastern Europe, for moral and economic support in its conflict with Azerbaijan. Lastly, Georgia is an illustration of the fragility of democracy and the dangers of ethnic strife. It has shown that even democratically elected leaders can turn dictatorial and that ethnic disputes (over South Ossetia) can lead to the collapse of democracy. Georgia, though, is so preoccupied with its internal problems that it shows little interest in developments in East-Central Europe.

In the former Soviet Union, it is now the individual republics that make policy. Despite hopes expressed in December 1991, at its formation, that the CIS would provide a "common defensive space" and a coordination of economic policies,[13] the organization is barely holding together. It may be premature to declare it dead and it would be an exaggeration to claim that it was stillborn but it is fair to say that it is in extremely poor health. And the individual successor states show, as noted, relatively little evidence of concern with developments in East-Central Europe. At one level this, of course, is a positive development in the sense that there is no perceived threat, or at least of an impending threat, from East-Central Europe. But at another level, this may result in missed opportunities to build stable and mutually beneficial relations.

(b) East-Central Europe

Though in much of East-Central Europe greater progress towards democracy and markets has been made than in the successor states of the Soviet Union, uncertainty persists. Even the most successful East-Central European states, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia are beset by enormous problems. In Poland the prolonged pain of the "shock therapy" combined with a parliamentary system that encourages fragmentation have eroded confidence in the political system. Last year's demonstrations and constant but usually inconclusive battles between the president and parliament have resulted in a significant degree of political immobility which has made economic transformation more difficult. In Czechoslovakia economic decline is compounded by the problems of nationalism and the danger of secession in Slovakia. In Hungary, the government is becoming more bureaucratized and more dependent on nationalism as it encounters increasing difficulty in marketization and privatization. This growth in nationalism may make it more difficult for Hungary to deal with a number of its neighbours which have significant Hungarian minorities.

It is in the southern tier, however, that the problems are the greatest. Yugoslavia has disintegrated in a vicious civil war that is becoming increasingly difficult to contain within the borders of the former federal republic. In Albania the communists collapsed in 1992 but the exaggerated expectations of rescue from the West in this the poorest European states will likely lead to disappointment, increasing turmoil and tribalism. In Bulgaria the communists were defeated in

1991 but they retreated in good order as the second largest party and have not given up the hope of restoring themselves to power in a "gentler, kindler" communist system.

For Romania's long-suffering people the revolution of 1989 is yet to bear fruit. The spontaneous revolution against the Nicolae Ceausescu regime has been hijacked by a group of former Ceausescu officials under the leadership of Ion Iliescu and the National Salvation Front (NSF). Support for the NSF has been declining and they may lose power in the upcoming parliamentary elections. But they have brought enormous damage to the country already in their attempt to cling to power. By encouraging nationalism they have helped to foster a variety of extreme nationalist parties which not only have sought to limit the rights of the ethnic minorities, particularly the Hungarians, but also to expand the frontiers of Romania which could bring them into conflict with Russia, Ukraine and possibly Bulgaria.

The East-Central European states, then, are no longer restrained in their aspiration for political change or economic transformation by the defunct Soviet Union but they do not look East for a solution either. They will undoubtedly retain economic links with the East as suppliers of raw materials mainly and as markets for goods that are difficult to sell elsewhere. But the web of trade and investments and the CMEA's vision of integration are disappearing.

As recently as 1988 and 1989 the East-Central European states conducted the bulk of their trade with the Soviet Union and each other.[14] The Warsaw Pact states, (with the exception of Romania) also cooperated on grand projects for bringing natural gas West through the Progress (Yamburg) Pipeline and were part of the "Mir" electrical power grid system. For instance, Hungary depended for as much as thirty percent of its electricity on the Soviet Union.[15]

The benefits of this trade relationship are the subject of considerable controversy. In the decade after the war there was clearly a massive transfer of wealth from East-Central Europe to the Soviet Union. Afterwards, though, benefits kept shifting. The Soviet Union sold oil to East-Central Europe at below world prices between 1972 and 1982. The size of the subsidy is debated[16] but the Soviet Union did make and, moreover, believed that it was making sacrifices.[17] Some of the East-

Central European states benefitted even after 1982 since Moscow, for political reasons, continued to ship underpriced oil to Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic (GDR).[18]

The East-Central European states also benefitted from their use of the Soviet Union as a "market of last resort." Shoddy, unmarketable (in the West) products could still be sold to the Soviet Union. Some have rightly argued that this, in itself, may have caused long-term damage and that a tightening of trade conditions by Moscow would indeed have a salutary effect on East European economic development.[19] This may be correct yet the trade relationship between the Soviet Union and East-Central European states created a web of economic interdependence that was certainly politically motivated but which sought to ensure in addition to the survival of regimes in all the states involved, stability and security throughout the region.

Since the fall of the communist regimes in East-Central Europe these countries have dramatically shifted their trade. This has been accelerated by the enormous difficulties of the oil and gas industries in the former Soviet Union and by the collapse of the central government. Poland starkly illustrates this trend. From 1990 to 1991 her imports, mostly from the West, rose more than $6 billion to total $15.6 billion.[20] Trade with the former Soviet Union can still cause disruptions, particularly when oil supplies are held up, as happened in Poland at the beginning of 1992. Trade orientation, though, is clearly to the West. Indeed the East-Central Europeans measure their own circumstances against conditions in the West. The post-Soviet states and the East-Central European states do not yet view economic relations with each other as capable of sustaining economic growth or ensuring stability. And, as the web of economic relations continue to disintegrate, economic ties do not have the ability of restrain or perhaps even to moderate policies or actions that could be threats to security. Restraints, for the time being then, are more likely to come through military arrangements.

B. The Military Considerations

For much of the postwar period it was virtually impossible to separate Soviet military and ideological interests in East-Central Europe. In the latter years of the Gorbachev era Moscow, in order to begin to bring the Cold War to an end, had to begin to separate its military from its ideological concerns. This enabled the East-Central European states to reassess their evaluations of the threat from the East and to free themselves from the Soviet empire (that is the Warsaw Pact members). Soviet attempts to separate its security from its ideology were obviated, in a sense, when both the ideology and the Union collapsed. The successor states and the East-Central European countries no longer needed to view security through the prism of Marxism-Leninism and the imperative to preserve the centre of that ideology.

For the successor states, particularly Russia, the main concerns appear to be: one, to minimize the economic and political damage engendered by the withdrawal of troops by seeking an orderly resettlement; and two, an attempt to minimize points of friction with East-Central European states. In the case of the East-Central European states, the threat from the East may not have disappeared but it has certainly diminished. They have tried to ensure that troop withdrawals are completed and that flash points, relating to such issues as separatism in Moldova, are minimized. As noted, all parties, to a significant degree, have become more inward looking, but more than that there have been changes that have removed, or at least drastically reduced, the dangers to security in the region and could restrain conflict.

(a) The restraining factors

Intent and capabilities are, of course, intertwined in the formulation of foreign policy. But, it should be useful to separate them here, at least for analytic purposes, in order to examine the restraining factors primarily in the case of the former hegemon (and especially among the successor states, the largest unit) Russia.

(i) Intent

Intent began to change in Soviet foreign policy both towards the West and East-Central Europe under Gorbachev. It was at the 27th Party Congress of the Communist Party that Moscow first proposed the concept of "reasonable, sufficient defense." At the May 1987 Warsaw Pact meeting Gorbachev claimed that the doctrine of the organization was exclusively defensive in nature. This reflected not only a desire to end the Cold War but was also a recognition (as part of the "new thinking") in Moscow that the Soviet Union might have itself contributed to the threat by making others feel insecure. Conversely, it was possible to increase one's own security by increasing that of others. True, on the ground Soviet military strength continued to grow during the first four years of Gorbachev's rule but at least, "intent" was changing.

Moreover, the change in the perception of threat from the West operated together with a shift in Soviet security concerns in East-Central Europe. Moscow gradually abandoned the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty. By October 1989 Gennadi Gerasimov, rather facetiously but not inaccurately, claimed that the Brezhnev doctrine had been replaced by the "Sinatra doctrine" in Eastern Europe. He referred to the Frank Sinatra song "I did it my way" [sic] and added that "Hungary and Poland are doing it their way."[21]

There was concern among many in the military that too many concessions were being made to the West and that the balance of power was shifting against the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, some democrats and civilian analysts were going beyond Gorbachev's formulation. They put forth formulations that could only be seriously considered after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Civilian analysts, for instance including Andrei Kokoshin, suggested a "defensive defense" that would either reduce or eliminate the mobility of ground units and make offensive actions impossible.[22]

Others argued that the quest for absolute security, with its over-reliance on the military, and the convenience of being able to station large numbers of troops inexpensively in Eastern Europe, all ultimately contributed to increasing the security problems for the Soviet Union.[23] They became part of a systemic problem. Genrikh Trofimenko wrote in 1991 that "it has been said more than once that our distribution system was a military communist economy and as for the state, it turned out to be an appendage of the army that supplied the people with what was left of the resources required for military production.[24]

It was these types of assessments that set the stage for a complete reevaluation in the post-Gorbachev era, an era which really began after the defeat of the August 1991 coup. The West could not be viewed as a threat any longer. Absolute security was unattainable. "Reasonable sufficiency" did not require military parity with the West. And continued large-scale military spending and stationing of troops in Eastern Europe contributed to economic decline in the Soviet Union. By September 1991 the newly appointed Minister of Defense Marshal E. Shaposhnikov repudiated his predecessor's comments about a Western threat and declared that NATO did not present a threat to the Soviet Union.[25] Furthermore, on April 3, 1992, Yeltsin appointed Andrei Kokoshin as one of Russia's First Deputy Defense Ministers.

(ii) capabilities

The other element of the military policy of the Soviet Union and that of the successor states is capability. Soviet military leaders were willing to support Gorbachev's reforms at first because they were convinced that in order to compete qualitatively with Western military forces, the Soviet economy would need to be able to produce the most technologically advanced weapons. This, in turn, could not be achieved unless the economy itself became more efficient and inventive. Indeed, even before Gorbachev came to power, military leaders such as Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov advocated the development of advanced technologies for military purposes.[26] These military leaders were hoping to bring about a third military revolution in Soviet military doctrine where new technologies from the civilian economy would change the basis of military power.[27]

The Soviet economy, however, did not improve or become more innovative. Therefore, the necessary underpinnings for a military revolution were not developed there. Unilateral reductions by Gorbachev, announced in December 1988, and those agreed to in the CFE Treaty of November 19, 1990 have resulted in significant reductions in tanks, artillery and aircraft in the Atlantic to the Urals (APPU) area without a revitalization of the Soviet military. The Soviet military, therefore, became a less potent force against the West, one in search of a new effective military doctrine. Its capabilities against the East-Central European states were also diminished though in that area they remained considerable.

But it has been the dissolution of the Soviet Union that has added the most important restraining element. Despite the continuing existence of the CIS, decisions are basically made at the republican level. As far back as 1990 some analysts, such as Major V. Lopatin, proposed the formation of military units along republican lines.[28] Counterproposals which did not go much beyond the reductions mandated by the CFE Treaty at first seemed to enjoy favour. But, following the August coup, even before the body of the Soviet Union was cold, republican leaders (with the exception of Russia) were rushing to create independent ministries of defense. With the collapse of the Union the CIS forces seem inevitably headed towards transformation into republican units with even Russia deciding by April 1992 that it would move to create its own defense ministry and armed forces. And the fragmentation of the Union forces has significantly reduced, through not eliminated, intervention capabilities in East-Central Europe.

For their part, the East-Central European states (the Warsaw Pact members) have also had to reduce their capabilities, both as a result of treaty agreements and as a matter of economic necessity. The CFE Treaty mandated a reduction of 38% in tax and 37% in artillery.[29] Hungary and Romania for instance, were to reduce to only 835 and 1375 tanks, respectively.[30] In fact, Hungary intends to go beyond the CFE cuts and the Minister of Defense indicated in March 1992 that the military will go down to a total strength of only 90,000 of whom 15,000 would be civilian employees.[31] In Poland, the military forces shrank from 412,000 troops in 1987 to 296,000 by 1991.[32] In June 1992, the CFE terms were reconfirmed by NATO and 8 of the 15 post-Soviet states and the East-Central European members of the defunct Warsaw Pact. They in essence also formalized an accord reached in May 1992 among the former communist states on the apportionment of the reductions.[33] If there is any lingering doubt then in the successor states of the former Soviet Union about a potential military danger from East-Central Europe these drastic reductions should set them at ease.

(b) Lingering threats

Changes in intent and threat perception and a reduction in military capabilities are positive developments that should, significantly, enhance security in the region. Unfortunately, there are other factors at work that endanger these positive developments. There are, as noted, continuing threats to democracy in the former Soviet Union. There is the danger that implosions in states in the region could not be contained and spillovers could lead to a regional conflagration. And there remain sources of tension over national minorities and the cast of troop withdrawal between successor states and East-Central European countries.

First, because there is considerable political uncertainty throughout the former Soviet Union reducing the role and status of the military entails significant risks. True, in Russia, the largest European state, the military has no tradition of Bonapartisme and it is badly fragmented. It is highly unlikely that the army would act on its own but elements of the instruments of repression remain that could take advantage of the increasing frustration within much of the military to present a threat to the democratization process. For instance, even though Yeltsin has incorporated the Central KGB apparatus into the newly created Russian Ministry of Security, he did not dismantle the old structures.[34]

As the Soviet economy encounters increasing difficulties, those who seek to create a more efficient army will likely become increasingly frustrated. In the competition for resources, Yeltsin has indicated repeatedly that the military will need to wait in line with others. But the creation of an efficient force will require enormous resources. Even with great reductions, the Russian armed forces are projected to number 1.2 - 1.3 million men at the end of the transitional period.[35] Marshal Shaposhnikov in calling for the future elaboration of defense policy and military requirements has emphasized the need to create smaller, but more potent, professional military forces.[36] But with declining production, including that of the defense industries, and hyper-inflation this kind of military force would represent an unbearable burden on the economy.

It is not only senior members of the military however, who seek a transformation of doctrine and a change in strategy that may be well beyond the means of the Russian economy. There seems to be a fixation on imitating, or matching, changes in Western strategy such as "AirLand Battle" and "Follow-on Forces Attack" and NATO's decision to create a rapid-deployment force. Even moderate civilian defense experts such as Andrei Kokoshin, now a first Minister of Defense in Russia, has declared that he considered it essential to create a centrally based rapid-deployment force."[37]

Moreover, the State Commission that Yeltsin set up for the creation of a Russian Defense Ministry is dominated by senior officers such as Generals Bronislav Omelichev, Mikhail Kolesnikov, Leontii Kuznetsov and Konstantin Kobets.[38] The Chairman of "Soldiers for Democracy," a progressive group within the armed forces complained that the Commission was incapable of effectively carrying out its tasks because it was dominated by representatives of the old defense establishment.[39]

Problems of funding, a lack of clear direction, the traumatic retreat from Eastern Europe, the breakup of the Union and increasing tensions among the successor states have created a deep, and potentially dangerous malaise within the military. A study published in March 1992 warned that demoralization and the decline of discipline in the former Soviet military had reached a "dangerously explosive" point.[40] Even strong supporters of Yeltsin have expressed their frustration. The newly appointed CIS Chief of the General Staff, General V. Samsonov, for instance, complained about Yeltsin's request to accelerate the withdrawal of the Western Group of Forces from Germany. He wondered how this could be accomplished when there were already 170,000 members of the military without adequate housing.[41]

It is not surprising, then, that many in the military support those leaders who promise to keep the armed forces strong and who wish to limit both democratization and its impact on the armed forces. While Russian Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi's (an opponent of Yeltsin) popularity and credibility is quite limited among the general population of Russia, the results of a survey reported on April 1, 1992 showed the ex-military officer to be the most popular politician among servicemen throughout the CIS.[42] Therefore, there remains a danger that significant elements in the military could, in certain circumstances, act together with other repressive forces against the Yeltsin government. If successful, the new Russian government would, at first, tend to look inwards but sooner, rather than later, it would present a threat both to other successor states and to the East-Central European neighbours.

Second, a threat emanates from the danger of implosion. Yugoslavia presents a stark example of the difficulty of containing such conflict. There is a real danger that Bulgaria and Hungary could be drawn in. Conflict in Moldova could draw in both the Ukraine and Russia as well as Romania. A breakup of the Czech and Slovak Federated Republic could draw in Hungary which may seek to protect the large Hungarian minority in Slovakia.

In the Baltic states and in Russia itself there are virtually infinite numbers of combinations for ethnic conflict and spillover. The unhappy Slav minorities in the Baltic states and secessionist non-Russian minorities in Russia are part of a potentially explosive situation. And although the total size of the armed forces is decreasing, the capacity to fight bloody internal conflicts has far from disappeared.

Third, even if there are no implosions there remain continuing sources of tension. Poles remained concerned with the one million nationals who live in the former Soviet Union, including 250,00 in Lithuania. And, despite attempts by Ion Iliescu to normalize relations with Russia and Ukraine, there is growing concern in Romania with the fate of the three million Romanians in Moldova and Ukraine.

The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland have also illustrated the difficulty of arranging for just compensation and of coping with the legacy of the vast environmental damage caused by Soviet forces. Negotiations were long and tense between Poland and Russia, for instance, over financing the resettling of CIS troops and the cleaning up of the environmental damage.[43] The agreement reached by Lech Walesa in May 1992 for the withdrawal of CIS forces was heavily criticized in Poland because it did not incorporate sufficient protection for the Polish minority on Russian territory.[44] And the level of mistrust was starkly illustrated earlier in March 1992 when Polish officials declared that a concentration of troops in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad constituted a "potential threat" for Poland.[45]

There is, therefore, a great deal that still needs to be done to overcome legacies of mistrust and to ensure that differences or disputes do not lead to conflict. The restraining factors, as noted, are important and potent but so are the potential sources of conflict. Consequently, the post-Soviet states and those in East-Central Europe need to take positive and deliberate steps to address each other's security concerns.

C. Implications of New Security Arrangements

New security frameworks could be bilateral or multilateral to cover a spectrum of dangers. They should involve both what may be called soft military constraints and hard military constraints. The former would diminish possibilities of conflict and would help ameliorate disputes. The latter, though, would need to have the capacity to suffocate potential and actual conflict. Soft military constraints would involve consultation and liaison mechanisms and confidence-building measures. Hard military constraints would require the creation of effective deterrents and alliance and collective defense arrangements.

This section then will deal with attempts to enhance security by strengthening soft and hard military constraints. It will look at attempts by the post-Soviet and the East Central-European states to use instruments of collective security, bilateral relations, regional agreements and (ultimately) membership in a western collective defense organization, to accomplish this. It will touch on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Western European Union (WEU), NATO and the Visegrad triangle which are all covered in greater length in other chapters. The intent here will be to assess how the post-Soviet and East-Central European States perceive these organizations in terms of seeking better hard and soft military constraints in order to assure their own security.

(a) The collective security systems

The CSCE has now been given some institutional framework, weak though it may, be which at least creates the hope for a collective security arrangement in Europe. Certainly the post-Soviet State saw membership as useful and there was a veritable rush to join. By the end of January 1992 all the post-Soviet States east of the Urals with the exception of Georgia had become members. By May 1992 the CSCE had grown to 52 members. The eagerness to join may justifiably be interpreted as a desire for inclusion in a larger security arrangement but particularly one that is linked to the West. It would be another matter however to suggest that the post-Soviet and the East-Central European States invested a great deal of faith in the CSCE. That is, there is little to indicate that they consider the CSCE as anything more than a means of consultation or liaison. It would seem then that they believe that the organization would have a limited role in diminishing tensions. This may be justified on their part of these states for a number of reasons.

First, the very concept of collective security is somewhat fuzzy. It is meant to transcend the balance of power system by relying on a very high degree of consensus, predictability, virtually automatic reaction against aggression and on the power of more suasion. But the reliance on an overwhelming consensus to exercise pressure on and isolate the aggressor fails to overcome some of the principal problems of the balance of power system. Consequently as Josef Joffe has rightly observed "nations are loath to sacrifice their particular interests on the alter of abstract justice".[46] The record of the United Nations despite the action against Iraq, which was an exceptionally clear case of aggression, does not give much encouragement for reliance on collective security arrangements.

Second, in Europe itself at least so far the CSCE has failed the difficult test of Yugoslavia. The hope expressed by some that the CSCE could be recast into a concert-based collective security organization, led by a "security group" of major European powers,[47] has not been realized. The importance of the CSCE in Yugoslavia is striking and following a meeting of NATO in May on the Yugoslav crisis with the possibility of sending peace-keeping forces from the alliance to Yugoslavia was discussed, the Secretary General Manfred Worner stressed that regardless of what the organization would do it has no intention of becoming "the defensive arm" of the CSCE.[48] NATO's expressed willingness in June 1992 to support peacekeeping (but not peacemaking) operations under the auspices of the CSCE[49] ran up against Russian reluctance to sanction such missions.[50]

(b) Bilateralism

Even before the disintegration of the Soviet Union some of the East-Central European states began to cooperate with each other in order to enhance their security. For instance in mid-November 1990 Poland's defense minister called for increased cooperation on security matters between his country and Hungary (and Czechoslovakia).[51] Poland and Hungary sought closer ties on security matters but they ruled out a formal alliance.[52] Thus the arrangements involved only soft military constraints.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union the East-Central European states made further efforts to cooperate militarily with each other on a bilateral basis and with the post-Soviet states. For example members of the security committees of the Czechoslovak parliament met with their Hungarian counterparts in April 1992 and with the officials of the Ministry of Defense. They discussed a wide range of issues from military doctrines to modernization of their armies to closer cooperation. And it was reported that both sides reacted favourably to a proposal for "open" military bases which would allow deputies from one country to visit the military installations of the other.[53] Thus both sides sought to implement confidence building measures (CBMs) in order to enhance their security. But this was not an alliance and therefore they still did not move into the area of hard military constraints.

The East-Central European states also reached out to the post-Soviet states. In March 1992, Hungary and Ukraine signed a military cooperation agreement in Budapest. The agreement called for an exchange of information and cooperation between their two defense ministries on disarmament and training. (The treaty was intended to replace the one the Hungarian Minister of Defense had signed with the Soviet Union in December 1991).[54] The agreement had elements of coordination and CBMs but did not reach into the area of hard military constraints.

(c) Regional Cooperation

As the East-Central European States began to assert and gain their independence from Moscow they began to explore various regional groupings which would help them achieve greater security and stability. The Soviet Union did not loom quite as large as a security threat in 1990 and 1991 but there were continuing East-Central European concerns. Some arrangements such as the Italian-led initiative, the Pentagonale brought together, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Austria and Czechoslovakia in August 1990. (In 1991 Poland was accepted as a full member). It fit into a security arrangement in the broadest terms with the focus being on transportation, communication, hydro-electric power, cultural activities and minority rights.[55] Another loose security arrangement, first suggested by Zbigniew Brzezinski, brought together the northern tier states of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia at the Visegrad Summit in February 1991.[56]

There was also an attempt to bring about multi-lateral cooperation among some of the successor states of the Soviet Union and East-Central European countries. In April 1992 the foreign ministers from Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Romania not only conferred over the conflict regarding the "Dniester Republic" but also resolved to set up three quadripartite bodies: a group of mi
observers to monitor the ceasefire; a group of human rights observers; and a mission of c
and mediation to work out political solutions to the conflict.[57] They also adopted reco
on the disengagement of forces and on maintaining the neutrality of Russia's Fourte
is deployed in the Dniester area of Moldova). This was therefore a security arra
institutionalization and specific goals related to one area of conflict. It was a
the possibility of resolving disputes in the area through the cooperation of t
those of East-Central Europe. The agreement however was vague in term
and therefore did not reach the stage of hard military constraints.

In the case of the Pentagonale and the Visegrad *troikat* there were shades of *ententisme* and exclusivism. Broadly construed in terms of political, economic and security needs the two arrangements looked to the interests of selective groups within East-Central Europe and excluded the post-Soviet states. This not only limited their security functions but also increased the danger of inter-War style, regional fragmentation and mistrust of the type that existed in the inter-War period - precisely what they would wish to avoid.

Moreover, the orientation of the Pentagonale and Visegrad is clearly towards the west. For the Pentagonale a prime objective from the beginning was entry of the East-Central European states into the European Community. The Visegrad group has also looked west, to NATO. In March 1992 in fact, ambassadors to NATO from the Visegrad *troikat* complained that insufficient progress was being made toward establishing closer ties with NATO. They asked that NATO step-up efforts to establish a "privileged" relationship with the three countries (which would then lead to full membership in NATO).[58]

These two regional arrangements though could be useful if they increased the habits of cooperation and function as perhaps a kind of preparatory or training stage for integration.[59] Such integration however needs to present opportunities to *all* the states from the Atlantic to the Urals, even if the sequence is different. Otherwise new fears and barriers would be raised.

II. LOOKING TO THE WEST

None of the states between the Oder and the Urals however, wish to be excluded from the security arrangements made in the western part of the continent. Perhaps because of their eagerness to participate, particularly in the case of the East-Central European States they have not invested enough effort in regional arrangements that could function as an intermediate stage to bring the two halves of the continent together.

The push for inclusion is strong and growing in the East. In December 1991 as the Soviet Union came to an end Boris Yeltsin declared Russia's interest in NATO membership.[60] And since then he has reiterated that membership in NATO remains a long term Russian goal. In July 1991

Lech Walesa expressed not only Poland's desire to join NATO but also his fear of division in Europe. He declared that "the people of Central and Eastern Europe resolutely reject any ideas of 'grey' or buffer zones. They imply a continued division of the continent . . . Without a secure Poland and a secure Central Europe, there is no secure and stable Europe."[61] (emphasis added)

Therefore, what the states east of the Oder are also seeking is a continent wide security arrangement that is voluntary and organic. Among the most positive aspects of that is an underlying assumption, perhaps not sufficiently articulated, that security is not divisible.

NATO is not the only option. The west Europeans in their momentous push for integration have began to emphasize the WEU, a long dormant group to which nine of the twelve European Community (EC) members belong. France and Germany have proposed a joint European force under the auspices of the WEU. And at the Maastricht meeting in December 1991 where the EC states reached an agreement for closer unity they also decided, for the first, time to move towards "the eventual framing of a common defense policy" by strengthening the WEU.[62]

There are difficulties though. First, it is hard to see how the French and German proposals for a European force under the WEU could also be an effective "European leg" of NATO. Secondly the hopes for rapid integration which would include military coordination may not bear fruit for quite some time. Not only has the electorate in Denmark rejected ratification of the Maastricht Agreement but there is increasing opposition to it in France and Germany.

It is not surprising therefore that the states east of the Oder have placed their faith far more in NATO than in the WEU. Boris Yeltsin himself (and other leaders in the region) have made it clear that they believed NATO to be the most effective security institution in Europe today.[63] The Washington Treaty gave NATO both political and military dimensions. This fits in well with the broader concepts of security. It is thus not surprising then that Yeltsin during the August 1991 coup phoned the Secretary General of NATO to ask for political support.

NATO's greatest strength however, is collective defense. It is a far clearer concept than collective security and it creates a smoother path towards a security partnership. Moreover, NATO has enjoyed remarkable longevity as an alliance and over more than four decades has built up a high level of credibility. It has not only protected the members from an external threat but it has also played a useful conflict resolution role within. It could not resolve the extremely complex dispute between Greece and Turkey but the organization played an essential role in helping to suffocate the possibility of direct conflict between the two NATO allies.[64] And it is not inconceivable that in the future the Rapid Reaction Corps which NATO announced in May 1991[65] could be used to deter conflict or employed as a peace-making force in a NATO with extended membership.

In response to requests from the East-Central European states for closer ties, NATO at the Rome Summit in November 1991 created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).[66] The NACC is to enhance cooperation in the political, economic and military areas. It has the potential to grow. The American Secretary of State James Baker suggested that it could function as the primary consultative body between NATO and the liaison states on security and related issues and play a role in controlling crises in Europe.[67] Unfortunately Baker's vision will be very hard to realize unless far more is done to help integrate security in the eastern and western part of the continent. The NACC was the least that NATO could do, and not the most. The states east of the Oder continue to have higher expectations. Perhaps in what is emblematic of the attitudes of these states in March 1992 the Polish Defense Minister announced that the military would be restructured so that it could use NATO weapons systems.[68]

Enlarging NATO would not be an easy task. The states east of the Oder would need to meet certain standards and as in the case of the EC enlargement would occur in stages. What is important is that NATO should give hope to all of the states east of the Oder that once they met the criteria for membership they would have an opportunity to join. And a larger NATO perhaps with an enlarged political vision need not make a commitment to deal with all threats or to formulate doctrine based on abstract threats. Unfortunately as hostile Third World dictatorships on the periphery of Europe acquire missile technology and weapons of mass destruction the threat to the European continent refuses to disappear. A NATO with a strong trans-Atlantic link and a revitalized, democratic Russia as a member, would not only have a greater capacity to resolve problems within that alliance but also would present a far more credible deterrent to such threats.

III. CONCLUSIONS

Inward looking in many respects, yet, fascinated by and drawn to the West, the post-Soviet states and those in East-Central Europe have not done enough to alleviate each others' security concerns. Once the post-Soviet states no longer perceived a threat from the West they dramatically reduced their strategic interests in East-Central Europe. Their concern is more with the more obvious flash points and with any threat of exclusion. Yet given political and economic uncertainty and ethnic strife in the region there is a need for the creation of a much more comprehensive and sustainable relationship.

For their part, the East-Central European states see a greatly diminished threat from the post-Soviet states. But they seem to have difficulty in viewing the latter, especially Russia, as a source for increased regional and continental security and stability. This is particularly unfortunate because Russia under a democratic leadership is likely to be the locomotive for democratization and eventual stability in the former Soviet Union. Unfortunately, all too often the East-Central Europeans continue to think of Russia and the other post-Soviet states in Europe in terms of Josef Brodsky's contemptuous phrase "Western Asia".[69] Such attitudes can only enhance the concern of the post-Soviet states that they are being excluded. Such problems must be overcome in order to be able to build a continent-wide security architecture that can incorporate the kind of hard military constraints which will ensure stability.

First, though the post-Soviet states and those in East-Central Europe need to formulate policies on the basis of inclusion rather than exclusion. Bilateral and regional arrangements should not lead to a new fragmentation. Such arrangements will work best if they are designed as components adding to a larger security arrangement.

Second, as noted, it would be important to enlarge the most effective security institution - NATO. This would need to be done in stages and that in turn could be successful only if the hope is held out to all states from the Atlantic to the Urals that they will have an opportunity to join. NATO therefore would need to re-think the criteria for membership and then make sure that they are fairly applied to all potential applicants.

Third, it is imperative that military security should not be artificially separated from political and economic security. The states east of the Oder are engaged in an extraordinarily difficult, indeed revolutionary transformation and consequently military, political and economic factors are particularly difficult to separate. Momentum is crucial for the success of this transformation. Momentum must be maintained in all areas in order to escape the gravitational pull of repression and the danger of regional conflict. The post-Soviet states, together with those in East-Central Europe and with the help of Western Europe have the potential to use that cooperation to maintain the momentum and to ensure that the area between the Atlantic and the Urals becomes a stable and democratic whole.

ENDNOTES

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Introduction

The collapse of integrated trading regimes in what used to be called the East Bloc has raised a host of imponderable economic issues. These pertain to trade relations between and within the former CMEA countries, as well as to processes of systemic transformation now at work within these countries. The disintegration of the old transnational economic and political structures have been accompanied by reductions in trade flows which have introduced further short-term complications into the task of effecting the transition from socialism to capitalism. This paper examines issues, prospects and implications associated with the collapse of the traditional structures facilitating regional economic integration. Special attention is paid to questions surrounding the extent and desirability of declines in regional trade during 1990 - 1991, as well as to prospects for economic reintegration based upon healthier economic principles.

According to the conventional wisdom prevailing in the region and the West, trade flows within and between Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union collapsed during the 1990 - 1991 period. According to the US International Trade Commission, trade volumes within the former CMEA declined by as much as 50 per cent during this time [Pogany]. Declines in trade are linked to the abrupt transition to the use of world market prices and hard currencies in intra-CMEA trade that took place in 1991, prior to the CMEA's abolition in June 1991. The rapid convergence of intra-CMEA prices towards world-market prices meant dramatic increases in the relative price of energy products and raw materials, which in turn produced a major deterioration in the terms of trade for the Eastern European countries as purchasers of Soviet energy and raw materials exports. Reductions in Soviet energy deliveries to

Eastern Europe was a second shock,[1] as was the effect of German reunification. On the Soviet side, growing macroeconomic instability and balance-of-payments tensions reduced the USSR's abilities to pay for (if not import) East European products.

These reductions in intra-regional trade are widely viewed as inherently undesirable, since they depress production, incomes and employment which in turn creates socio-political difficulties that hamper the transition from socialism to capitalism. This has led to calls for a wide variety of trade-promoting measures, both from within the region and by representatives of Western and international organizations. Included in this have been calls for the creation of Western-funded payments unions, either for Eastern Europe, the economies of the former Soviet republics, or both [Brabant; Soldaczuk; Gotz-Kozierkiewicz].

A second view is now emerging among some Western economists [Brada (1992)] that challenges the conventional wisdom described above. According to this view, data on trade volumes during 1990 - 1991 are fraught with numerous statistical and methodological issues. When properly considered, these problems raise doubts about the extent of the declines in trade flows. Moreover, a share of the trade that disappeared during 1990 - 1991 was not consistent with the principle of specialization according to comparative advantage, the source to which gains from trade are usually attributed under the neoclassical economic paradigm. According to this view, reductions in inefficient trade flows may improve socio-economic welfare, rather than reduce it. Since, in this view, much of the reduction in trade is either fictitious or desirable, there is little need for Western aid to finance a resurgence in trade flows between the former CMEA countries. Indeed, rather than promoting the transition by helping to cushion some of its blows, Western aid could ultimately damage the prospects for economic transformation by unwittingly preserving undesirable trade linkages.

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[1] Soviet oil production declined by some 18 per cent during 1988 - 1991, and the volume of oil exports to Eastern Europe fell by some 30 - 35 per cent in 1991 [Brada].

The "Collapse" of Regional Trade: How Big? How Bad?

As Brada points out [Brada (1992)], data depicting dramatic declines in trade flows are beset by methodological and measurement problems inherent in the manner in which the official statistics have treated intra- versus extra-regional trade flows. The methodological issues relate to questions about the exchange rates used to value intra- and extra-CMEA trade since the late 1980s, as well as the effects of the differing devaluations and inflation rates that have characterized the region since 1989. The measurement issue reflects concerns about the completeness and accuracy of trade data during the 1990 - 1991 period.

The exchange rate issues reflect two inter-related problems. First, numerous distortions were present in the pre-1991 cross exchange rates between the transferable-ruble rates used to measure intra-CMEA trade and the dollar rates used to measure the region's trade with the rest of the world. Second, official statistical measures of ruble-denominated trade in 1991 were generally converted into measures of dollar-denominated trade at exchange rates that overvalued the transferable ruble. Both of these factors had the effect of exaggerating the decline in regional trade during 1990 - 1991.

Prior to the switch in 1991 to hard-currency accounting, the vast majority of intra-CMEA trade was conducted in transferable rubles, while trade with the rest of the world was conducted almost exclusively in dollars (or other convertible currencies). Most CMEA countries' official statistics derived aggregate trade figures by converting dollar and ruble trade flows into domestic currency units according to exchange rates which overvalued the transferable ruble. This artificially overstated the value of intra-CMEA trade.

However, East European countries in the late 1980s began to adopt more realistic ruble-dollar cross exchange rates which, in effect, devalued their currencies against the dollar for trade accounting purposes. Paradoxically, because of the large magnitudes of these devaluations, they had the effect of reducing the comparability of different years' trade data. For example [Brada (1992)], the introduction of the "commercial" exchange rate for the Czechoslovak koruna in 1989 meant that, relative to the "official" exchange rate in force during 1988, the koruna was effectively devalued against the transferable ruble by some 25 per cent, and against the dollar by some 170 per cent in January 1989. While neither of these exchange rates was necessarily an equilibrium rate, they had the effect of dramatically increasing Czechoslovakia's trade with Western countries (measured in koruny) relative to Czechoslovak trade with other CMEA countries. Thus, the 170 per cent increase recorded in Czechoslovakia's Western trade for 1989 produced by the above-mentioned exchange rate effects made a decline in dollar-denominated trade for 1990 a statistically inevitability.

Similar problems appeared in the conversion of statistics on intra-CMEA trade from transferable rubles into dollars in 1991. This conversion of 1990 ruble-trade data into dollar-trade data occurred via exchange rates that overvalued ruble trade, thus artificially increasing the extent of dollar-denominated trade. Some amount of decline in regional trade in 1991 can thus be explained by the fact that official statistics on trade flows (in dollar terms) for 1990 were too high.

The general point is that official measures of the relative magnitudes of intra- and extra-CMEA trade are quite sensitive to the exchange rates used (for accounting purpose) to measure trade flows. While the potential for such manipulation had always existed in the CMEA countries (as in other countries characterized by low degrees of external liberalization) it plays havoc with 1990 - 1991 regional trade data.

The measurement issue reflects two problems. First, the transition to world-market prices and hard-currency financing in 1991 was accompanied by a prohibition on intra-CMEA barter introduced at the behest of the Soviet Union. Because of liquidity problems, however, barter transactions seem to have continued, albeit on a smaller scale. Prior to the relaxation of the prohibition in August 1991, it is likely that few if any of these transactions were reported to the statistical authorities, which would bias the official data for 1991 in a downward direction. Second, official trade statistics focus primarily on the state sector, while coverage of private trading activities is sketchy at best. The authorities' general lack of preparation for monitoring even legal private activities, especially in foreign trade, means that a significant share of legal private trading activity escapes the official statistics. It is instructive that the state monopoly on foreign trade, in the sense of prohibition on private foreign trade activities, generally remained in force until 1989 for Hungary, Poland and (the former) Yugoslavia, and until 1990 or 1991 for the rest of the region. The small-scale nature of much private foreign trade also hampers accurate measurement. Moreover, an important (though indeterminate) share of private foreign trade activities remains in the underground economy, often due to the desire to avoid customs duties and other forms of taxation. While the extent of unrecorded private trade activities is unknown, press reports[2] and casual observation suggest that it is significant. The implication is that the significant declines in intra-CMEA trade recorded during 1990 - 1991 affecting the state sector may have been at least partially offset by increases in private trading activity.

Despite the confusion over numbers, four points about regional trade can be made with some certainty. First, since good measures of the extent of the trade shock of 1990 - 1991 are likely to be some time in coming, statements about a "collapse" in regional trade volumes should be treated with some skepticism. Second, whatever the extent of the decline in regional trade, it seem clear that the shock was worse for some countries than for others. Intra-regional trade volumes seem to have declined most dramatically for Bulgaria, Romania and the former Soviet Union. By contrast, declines in trade among Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia seem to have been more moderate, especially in 1991 [Brada (1992)]. While the shock of declining trade volumes with the former USSR was hardly insignificant for these countries, its effects were partially moderated by the strong increases in extra-regional trade this group recorded during 1990 - 1991. Third, there was a shift in trading activity away from the public sector towards the private sector. This shift was most pronounced in Poland, where the private sector accounted for 19.8 per cent of exports and 46.1 per cent of imports in 1991 [Kostrz-Kostecka]. Fourth, the downward bias in the official data on regional trade flows for 1990 - 1991 imply that post-1991 upturns in trade figures may also be (to a degree) a statistical inevitability. While the adoption of consistent methodologies should ensure that the distortions linked to the conversion of ruble-denominated into dollar-denominated trade in 1991 will be a one-shot affair, improvements in the measurement of private trading activities are likely to produce exaggerated increases in recorded private-sector, and thus aggregate, foreign trade activities.

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[2] According to Polish press reports, "tourists" from the former Soviet Union in 1991 took more than $1 billion out of Poland in revenues from the private sale of Soviet imports in Poland. By contrast, preliminary official data for 1991 list total Polish imports from the USSR at $1.37 billion, and exports at $715 million [Klosinski].

Questions about the extent of the declines in trade volumes are supplemented by confusion over their implications. The likelihood that actual declines in trade volumes are smaller than the official statistics depict implies that, while the trade shock certainly has not helped macroeconomic performance, it is not the sole, or perhaps even the most important, determinant in declines in regional levels of output, incomes and employment. The restrictive macroeconomic policies linked to the stabilization programs introduced since 1990 have certainly played a major role. So have declines in hard-currency imports linked to external disequilibria. Indeed, questions about the importance in explaining the 1990 - 1991 decline in regional trade of policy-induced reductions in import demand, relative to terms of trade effects or the lack or hard-currency financing, have yet to be resolved empirically [Brada & King].

Doubts about the macroeconomic implications of declines in regional trade are accompanied by questions over their microeconomic consequences. As Brada points out, maximizing the static gains from trade was never the foremost purpose of CMEA integration. Instead, the benefits produced by this form of political economy for the Soviet Union in the form of political integration and influence over the Eastern European countries, and for Eastern Europe in the form of subsidized energy prices and Soviet willingness to accept soft Eastern European exports, were probably paramount [Brada (1992); Marrese]. Whatever the political and economic benefits that this form of integration may have provided the Eastern European countries and the former Soviet republics, it had become clear by the late 1980s that they were far outweighed by the costs. Smaller Soviet subsidies reduced the economic benefits of this form of integration for the Eastern Europeans, while Gorbachev's and Shevardnadze's foreign policy based on "new thinking" and then the "Sinatra doctrine" implied corresponding reductions in the Soviet emphasis upon intra-bloc cohesion. Within the Soviet Union, reforms introduced within the framework of Gorbachev's *perestroika* produced a reevaluation and then a renunciation by the republics of the traditional Soviet institutions for internal economic and political integration. Instead, the task of rationalizing and transforming trading links within the former CMEA has come to be perceived as an essential element of the transition from state socialism to capitalism.

Trade links within the CMEA reflected the dominance of political over economic logic. Decisions about locating factories were often made on the basis of national or regional bargaining power, or in order to achieve centrally-set political goals, such as changing the ethnic composition of a given region, or increasing international prestige. Central planning of domestic production and foreign trade activities, as well as the lack of an organic connection between the region's economies and international market forces, meant that production and trade activities were often economically irrational. When valued at world prices, these "value-subtracting" activities reduced GDP rather than increasing it.

The post-1989 collapse of the internal institutions of Soviet-type socialism within the region, combined with the 1991 transition to world prices and hard-currency financing within the CMEA, made the cessation of many irrational production and trading activities during 1990 - 1991 inevitable. The ensuing reductions in production and trade volumes made the redundancy of an important share of the capital stock and labor force transparent, and of course meant hardship for those closely involved with these activities. In the long term, however, the reallocation of the resources engaged in these activities is a necessary precondition for economic transformation and recovery. From an international trade perspective, this reallocation is necessary to reduce barriers to the realization of gains from trade based upon specialization and comparative advantage. Also, to the extent that post-1991 increases in regional trade are accurately captured by the official statistics, they are more likely to connote increases in social welfare than increases in intra-CMEA trade had been under the old system.

The upshot is that, while intra-regional trade volumes have declined since 1989, important questions about the extent and inherent undesirability of this decline remain unanswered. Is Western financial support, in the form of establishing a payments union, for example, necessary to prop up these trade flows? The answer to this question depends upon the answers given to four other questions.

First, to what extent do declines in post-1989 intra-regional trade volumes reflect the rationalization of traditional trading patterns? To what extent have they resulted from a lack of hard currency liquidity or excessively rapid adjustment to world prices? Second, how desirable is the relatively rapid rationalization of traditional trade patterns *per se*? Advocates of shock therapy argue that, the sooner the bill for the transition is paid, the better. On the other hand, many policy-makers and observers have urged the temporary financing of traditional trade flows in order to provide the resources necessary to finance the restructuring of the industries most affected by trade rationalization. Others have argued that the social costs of this rationalization can produce a political backlash capable of derailing the overall economic transformation process. Third, there is the question of the opportunity costs of the Western funds that would be devoted to financing intra-regional trade flows. It is unclear why American taxpayers should be more willing to finance economic restructuring in Eastern Europe than in South-Central Los Angeles, although Western European taxpayers may feel somewhat differently, owing to their proximity to the region. Finally, other mechanisms besides injections of Western liquidity can be used to promote intra-regional trade. These include the reinvigoration of barter and other bilateral clearing arrangements, although they would not promote the desired multilateralization of regional trade. On the other hand, Indeed, the partial recovery in intra-regional trade that seems to have occurred since mid-1991 can in part be traced to increased use of such methods [Brada; Dabrowski].

Definitive answers to these questions are unlikely to be forthcoming in the near future. The second and third questions are normative in nature, while technical issues are likely to prevent a prompt empirical resolution of the first issue. In any case, the confusion surrounding these issues implies that large-scale Western financing for intra-regional trade is unlikely to be in the offing, and that the region is likely to have to deal with its trade problems largely by itself. The reappearance of barter and other forms of clearing arrangements since late 1991 can be seen as confirmation of this hypothesis.

Prospects for Regional Economic Reintegration

Prospects for regional economic reintegration on a healthier basis are closely linked to the domestic economic transformations now occurring throughout the region [Blommestein & Marrese]. Some aspects of the external transformation can be conceptually separated from the domestic economic transition. These include policies towards economic integration. Moreover, the collapse of the old bloc structures does not mean that attitudes towards reintegration are being formed in an international political vacuum. Decisions about membership in multilateral groupings inevitably reflect geopolitical concerns. For Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, full membership in the European Community (EC) seems both a necessity and a realistic possibility. By contrast, EC membership does not seem realistic for many of the former Soviet republics, at least during the next 10 - 15 years. The pull of the Pacific Rim is likely to be much stronger for the Far Eastern areas of the Russian Republic, while many of the new Caucasian and Central Asian states are looking to Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and China for increased trade ties.

This implies that reintegration schemes are likely to be pursued in different configurations by different countries. These configurations include the Confederation of Independent States (CIS), the Polish-Czechoslovak-Hungarian triangle [Tokes], and the Central Asian Consultative Council, established by Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan in August 1991 to coordinate economic policies [Brown]. While integration within these frameworks is unlikely to produce injections of much-needed Western capital, technology and know-how, it could yield important benefits in terms of economic policy coordination, freer trade, protection against undesirable changes in regional trade levels or patterns, as well as increase the bargaining power of member states vis-a-vis other international groupings.

Domestic political and security concerns act as important constraints on the development of policies towards regional economic reintegration. First, there is the **economic sovereignty** issue. The nationalisms that were a driving force behind the collapse of the Soviet empire affect economic policy in numerous ways. Economic sovereignty advocates often oppose the sale of land and property to foreigners. Significant direct foreign investment, trade liberalization that subjects domestic firms to "excessive" import competition, or privatization schemes that do not discriminate in favor of enfranchising the titular nationality in multi-ethnic states are also frequent targets of criticism. Economic sovereignty concerns are most apparent in Polish and Czechoslovak fears about German economic influence, although these concerns have not yet prevented the development of macro-trade strategies emphasizing integration with Western Europe, principally Germany.

There are related **regional security** issues as well. Political elites and much of the body(s) politic in the states of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia seem to prefer economic isolation to economic integration with their neighbors, even at the cost of mutually-destructive beggar-thy-neighbor trade policies. While it may still be possible to cobble together workable trading arrangements in these areas, attitudes towards reintegration will inevitably be dominated by regional security concerns. This will cast a long shadow over the prospects for successful economic (and perhaps political) transition in the former USSR, Yugoslavia, and now the successor states to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.

Prior to the elections of June 5 - 6, 1992 in Czechoslovakia, these problems seem to be least important, and thus prospects for economic reintegration seem best, for the so-called "Visegrad" or "triangle" countries -- Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Their advantageous position can be traced to three inter-connected factors: 1) their relatively advanced state of domestic and external economic transformation; 2) economic integration into Western Europe, both in terms of the progress already achieved and the prospects for future progress (as seen in the accords on EC associate membership that took affect on March 1, 1992); and 3) their willingness to develop their own multilateral economic integration schemes.

The political roots of these schemes can in a sense be traced back to the collaboration between the three countries' democratic opposition movements during the 1980s. Vague theses about the need for closer political and economic cooperation began to take on concrete institutional form in a series of summit meetings, beginning in Bratislava on April 9, 1990, and then continued at Visegrad on February 15, 1991 and in Cracow on October 5 - 6, 1991. The signing of the three countries' (identical) accords on associate membership in the European Community on November 22, 1991 was also an important stimulus on the move towards regional integration [Brada (1991)]. In addition to marking the end of a period of competition between Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia over who would "enter Europe first", the accords imply the eventual establishment of EC-oriented (and thus similar) institutional and policy frameworks in the three countries. The upshot is that successful economic integration with the EC necessarily connotes integration within the triangle.

Given this link between EC and regional integration, it is hardly surprising that the first "triangular" accord on trade liberalization was initialed in Warsaw on November 30, some eight days after the EC association agreements were initialed in Brussels. By early 1992, this agreement in principle had led to work towards the creation of a free-trade zone between the three countries, based on the principle that intra-triangular trade would be no less restricted than trade between these countries and the EC. Since the EC agreements foresee the complete abolition of tariffs on much of trade with Eastern Europe, this implies that creating a free trade area among Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia would also take the form of tariff abolition for intra-triangular trade.

According to Polish press reports [Zukowska], all intra-triangular trade flows are to undergo symmetrical tariff reductions within a five-year period (presumably following the ratification of the free-trade pact by the relevant governments). This contrasts with the asymmetrical reductions agreed upon in the EC association accords, under which EC tariffs on Eastern European goods are generally to be reduced more rapidly than Eastern European tariffs on EC goods. Reductions in tariff rates are to result from a series of bilateral protocols that are to produce three (possibly four) product lists. The first list contains products for which tariffs will be immediately abolished upon the ratification of the free-trade agreement. The second list contains products for which the abolition will be gradual; and the third list contains products for which tariffs will remain in force during an unspecified "protective period" (*okres ochronny*). A fourth list, if it is drawn up, would contain products not subject to tariff liberalization. Tariff abolition is to be accompanied by the liquidation of non-tariff barriers to trade as well.

Four questions have been raised about the effectiveness of these measures. Brada, for example, argues that the impact of tariff reductions on intra-triangular trade would be limited by the fact that "East Europe's tariffs are generally lower than the EC's" [Brada (1992), p. 38]. However, the higher tariffs introduced in Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1992 may have closed this gap for these countries, if not eliminated it altogether.[3] The implication is that reductions in tariff levels would indeed produce significant increases in intra-triangular trade, a proposition supported by a study of the effects of the agreement on Polish trade and macroeconomic variables conducted by researchers at the Foreign Trade Institute in Warsaw [Biskup *et al.*]. A more difficult question is likely to be the determination of the composition of the three (or four) product lists described above.

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[3] Poland's new tariff regime, which tripled average tariff levels to 18.1 per cent, was introduced in August 1991 [Dziewulski]. Much higher tariffs were introduced on a variety of agricultural imports in Czechoslovakia in January 1992 as well [Kobylka].

The second question pertains to non-tariff barriers to regional trade. Despite post-1989 progress in external liberalization, quotas, limits and financial restrictions of various sorts remain important barriers to the expansion of regional trade. These barriers protect sectors that are politically "sensitive", such as agriculture and food processing, pharmaceuticals, and some branches of light industry. As is generally the case in negotiations over such matters, the heterogeneous nature of these restrictions and the political sensitivity of the protected sectors makes negotiating *quid pro quo* reductions in these barriers extremely difficult. Negotiators can claim that their own country's external regimes are the most liberal, and thus demand asymmetrical reductions in non-tariff barriers from the other sides. As one Polish foreign trade official remarked in May 1992 [Zukowska]:

> "We have disarmed ourselves. Other than tariffs, we have virtually no mechanisms for steering imports and protecting the domestic market. Czechoslovakia and Hungary have adopted a much more cautious approach to opening their domestic markets and seeking integration with the international economy. In effect, they have maintained numerous non-tariff barriers in import."

This despite the fact that administrative restrictions were imposed on the import of alcoholic beverages, tobacco, non-ferrous metals, fuels and intellectual property in December 1991 and March 1992 in Poland [Niezgodka-Medvoda]. Moreover, arguments over non-tariff barriers are likely to affect positions taken on tariff reductions, since a country like Poland that believes itself to be more sinned against than a sinner in terms of non-tariff barriers may be unwilling to accept symmetrical reductions in tariff rates.[4]

A third issue is the extent to which trade flows within the free-trade zone would have to be financed in hard currencies, as the negotiators seem to favor [Zukowska]. This raises a series of questions. What, exactly, constitutes a "hard" currency in the Eastern European context, both now and in the future? Does this mean that Western currencies will be used exclusively, or will increasingly-convertible forints, zlotys and koruny also play a role? If so which role for which currencies? The greater convertibility of the zloty relative to the koruna could impose a hardship on Czechoslovak firms, for example. Using domestic currencies to finance intra-triangular trade would also place a premium upon macroeconomic policy coordination, in order to bring about a convergence of inflation rates and reduce exchange-rate risk. On the other hand, the stipulation that intra-regional trade be financed exclusively by Western currencies could reduce the volume of trade, as occurred throughout the former CMEA during 1990 - 1991.

The fourth and perhaps most serious threat to prospects for regional integration is the impending dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. According to the conventional wisdom, the results of the elections on June 5 - 6, 1992 have moved the dissolution from the realm of the possible to the realm of the inevitable. This of course raises a host of economic (and political) issues for the triangle countries. A "nasty divorce" that precludes the renegotiation of Czechoslovakia's external obligations could be an economic disaster for both the Czech and Slovak republics, which could see balance-of-payments support and other sources of external financing dry up. The lack of a prompt decision about the division of the federal government's assets and liabilities could dramatically increase the uncertainty facing foreign and domestic economic actors, and bring the federal privatization program to a halt. But even a "velvet divorce" is likely to entail important short-term economic costs, especially for Slovakia, which would lose the subsidies provided by the federal budget,[5] and would be likely to face new trade barriers on Czech markets. Barriers to Czech exports in Slovakia would have a similarly negative effect upon the Czech economy.

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[4] According to Polish press reports, examples of Czechoslovak and Hungarian non-tariff trade barriers not generally present in Poland include [Zukowska]: 1) quotas and other restrictions on imports affecting hogs and beef cattle, beef, butter, potatoes, vegetable oils, and glucose (Czechoslovakia), as well as consumer goods in general (Hungary); 2) licensing, affecting some 33 per cent of Czechoslovak exports (especially foodstuffs, cement, and pharmaceuticals) as well as 10 per cent of Hungarian imports (primarily foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, cars, telecommunications equipment, coal, and many consumer goods and construction services) and 25 - 30 per cent of Hungarian exports (energy products, some foodstuffs and some textiles); 3) the limited degree of forint and especially koruna convertibility, compared to the zloty; and 4) hidden taxes on imports, such as the requirement that Hungarian firms deposit funds to be used to purchase imports in special bank accounts paying below-market interest rates.

In the longer run, however, the costs of dissolution may be less than the benefits it brings to both parties. For the Czech republic, these include the removal of the economic and budgetary burden that Slovakia is increasingly imposing on the Vaclav Klaus approach to economic transformation that Czechs seem to favor. For Slovakia, dissolution would mean the chance to introduce its own currency, which in turn could be devalued against the Czech (and other) currency(s) in order to improve the competitiveness of Slovak exports.

Favorable long-term economic scenarios about the effects of the break-up depend crucially upon the success of efforts at intra- and extra-regional economic integration. This applies not only to integration between the Czech and Slovak republics, but also with their Polish and Hungarian neighbors and with the EC. Ironically, the dissolution of the federal republic is imperiling the prospects for the economic integration necessary for both republics to prosper on their own. According to preliminary statements from Brussels, the EC association agreements were concluded with a federal Czechoslovakia, not with the Czech and Slovak republics. If the EC sticks to this view, the door to Europe opened during 1990 - 1991 could be shut. Needless to say, the transition from the "triangle" to the "quadrangle" would introduce further complications into the erstwhile negotiations on the free trade zone. Moreover, the fact that the Meciar government was elected on a platform of slowing down the economic transition in Slovakia bodes poorly for attempts at further liberalization and reform in Slovakia. Instead, regional integration seems likely to take a back seat in Slovakia to concerns about economic sovereignty and regional security.

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[5] According to a Czech specialist on the Czechoslovak federal budget, the estimated total amount of this subsidy for 1992 is forecast at 18.2 billion koruny (about $650 million) [Svitek, p. 37]. For a Slovak view of the economics of separation, see Martin [Martin].

The result of these difficulties has been the failure to produce a viable free-trade agreement within the triangle. The chances of meeting the July 1, 1992 date for the agreement seem to be receding into the distance. Moreover, the lack of progress in economic integration has been accompanied by the appearance of growing political tensions within the triangle as well. Hungary's decision in May, 1992 to unilaterally cancel the Bos-Nagymaros-Gabcikovo dam project had introduced an extremely serious, perhaps insoluble, conflict into Hungarian-Czechoslovak relations even prior to the June elections. It remains to be seem whether the appearance of an independent Slovakia will heighten tensions with Budapest, and whether the post-1989 convergence of Polish - Hungarian - Czechoslovak political interests will be definitively disrupted.

Even if a free-trade zone along the lines described above is eventually established by these countries prior to their inclusion into the EC, important aspects of regional economic integration may not be addressed by this zone. These include closer macroeconomic policy coordination, as well as the development of common regulatory standards in health, safety and financial matters necessary to encourage outside investors to view the region as a single unified market, rather than three (or four) sub-markets. Since the entry of Poland, Hungary and the Czech and Slovak republics into the EC as full members would presumably be preceded by the introduction of monetary union and creation of the single market envisioned by the Maastricht treaty, integration with the EC would seem to offer more hope in this context. On the other hand, the worse the prospects seem for implementing the Maastricht vision of the EC seem to be, the more important intra-regional integration becomes for the triangle countries.

However serious the problems Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak republics face in terms of regional integration may be, they pale in comparison with the situation in which the Balkan states and the former Soviet republics find themselves. Not only was the 1990 - 1991 trade shock steeper for these countries, but their prospects for economic reintegration on healthier footing seem much less promising than the triangle countries. In addition to the high rates of inflation and the relatively slow progress of systemic transformation in these economies, the advantages of regional economic integration are likely to be overshadowed by economic sovereignty and regional security concerns for the foreseeable future.

Instead, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak republics are likely to exert the kind of pull on these countries which the EC exerts on the triangle. Indeed, if the triangle countries succeed in establishing the free-trade zone (or other forms of economic integration) without gaining rapid entry into the EC, their Eastern and Southern neighbors may raise the same "widening versus deepening" dilemma that Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have posed for the EC.

Of course, effecting regional integration beyond the triangle requires the resolution of numerous other issues. First, the Balkan and former Soviet states must achieve a measure of economic stability consistent with the introduction of semi-convertible currencies and an important degree of external liberalization. At present, Slovenia, Bulgaria and perhaps Estonia seem to have the best prospects for doing this. Second, the web of external debts and claims left to the region by the disappearance of the CMEA, the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic Yugoslavia (and now perhaps Czechoslovakia) have to resolved. The indebtedness of the former USSR to Eastern Europe (and vice-versa) is perhaps the thorniest of these problems. In addition to the settlement of pre-1992 transferable ruble trade surpluses and deficits, it requires negotiated agreements concerning the value of military property left on the premises of abandoned Soviet military bases, as well as compensation for environmental damage incurred by the Red Army in Eastern Europe. Only Czechoslovakia and Hungary had managed to negotiate the transfer of their transferable-ruble trade claims upon the Soviet Union into dollar-denominated claims prior to the USSR's implosion in late 1991; all other issues remain outstanding.

Conclusions

Despite the progress in economic transformation in the former Soviet bloc that has been recorded since 1989, the prospects for economic reintegration on a healthier footing look less promising now than they did six months ago. Although the decline in intra-regional trade may be starting to bottom out, in and of itself this will hardly be enough to reverse the unfavorable tendencies that are now taking hold. As with much in the region, the prospects look best from Prague, Budapest and Warsaw, and decline precipitously as one moves East. The impending dissolution of Czechoslovakia has even introduced a certain measure of uncertainty into what had seemed to be a sure thing: the triangle countries' eventual integration into the EC. While the association agreements with Poland and Hungary are still in force, the fate of the EC agreement with Czechoslovakia is now in doubt.

While regaining the momentum towards sensible economic reintegration that has been lost depends on many factors, two would seem to stand out. The first is the Czechoslovak question. A quick velvet divorce, followed by a renewed commitment on the part of the Czech and Slovak republics to the goals of internal economic transformation and external reintegration, would seem essential for the prospects of integration within the "quadrangle", as well as for EC integration. Given the campaign platform and now the early rhetoric of the Meciar government, it is difficult to be optimistic on this point. The second question concerns the fate of economic transformation in Russia and Ukraine. If these two countries succeed in stabilizing their economies and introducing convertible currencies, the possibilities for dramatic increases in regional trade and recovery from the post-communist recession brighten considerably. At present, however, the tensions between Russia and Ukraine are preventing the cooperation in macroeconomic and reform policies necessary for the transformation to succeed. It is thus difficult to be optimistic about prospects on this score.

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The Process of Change and Democratization in Eastern Europe: The Case of the Military

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The Process of Change and Democratization in Eastern Europe; The Case of the Military

Dale R. Herspring

In a recent book on the process of change and democratization in the world as a whole, Samuel Huntington argues that the problems facing the political leadership in countries moving from single-party systems differ significantly from those in authoritarian or military regimes. To begin with, he argues, such systems operate on the basis of a single ideology and as result, the state and the party are closely intertwined. For all practical purposes, state institutions and party institutions are identical. Consequently, to be successful, the democratization of such systems (which he defines as "the replacement of a government that was not chosen this way by one that is selected in a free, open and fair election.") necessitates systemic changes. The monopoly of the Leninist party and its ideology must be broken, and all institutions, including the military must be depoliticized. Once the single party's monopoly has been broken, structures and institutions supportive of the new political system must be constructed.[1]

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[1] Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave, (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 9, 117. The purpose of Huntington's most recent book is "to explain why, how and with what consequences a group of roughly contemporaneous transitions to democracy occurred in the 1970s and 1980s and to understand what these transitions may suggest about the future of democracy in the world." (p. 30). Huntington recognizes the need to develop a political culture to support democratic institutions, but does not discuss the issue in detail. For a more in-depth

The role to be played by the military in a democratizing state is critical to both regime stability and viability. Of all the forces in society, it is the military which stands the best chance of reversing the process in a crisis. As Huntington notes, "the military are the ultimate support of regimes. If they withdraw their support, if they carry out a coup against the regime, or if they refuse to use force against those who threaten to overthrow the regime, the regime falls." However, keeping in mind the close intertwining that exists between the state and the party, "The transition from a one-party system to democracy . . . is likely to be more difficult than the transition from a military regime to democracy." In the former case we are talking about the total destruction of the existing system, including the officer corps (or at least that segment which supports the values of the old communist system), while in the latter it is more of a question of getting the soldiers to return to their barracks and play by democratic rules. The advantage of democratizing a single-party system is that once completed, the new political system "is likely to be more permanent."[2]

This paper is about the process of depoliticizing one-party (Leninist) political systems of Eastern Europe. When they came to power in the region, the new non-communist leadership were faced with military organizations dominated by individuals

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discussion of such problems by Huntington, see his classic, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 12-24.

[2] Huntington, The Third Wave, p. 120.

closely tied to the old regime as well as the existence of an all pervasive party-political structure. The latter ensured that the state and the party would be closely intertwined. Not only was it vital to end this close relationship to make certain that the armed forces do not work to reverse the democratizing process; the military's ability to engage in politics, its capability to become a praetorian force also had to be broken. The key to combating the emergence of a praetorian military during this transition period is the undermining of military cohesion and corporate identity.[3]

With this background in mind, I plan to look at a number of steps the political leadership has taken to both depoliticize the armed forces as well as undercut the military's institutional cohesion and corporate identity. They include; the destruction of communist party monopoly through the party-political structures in the military; the civilianization of senior positions within the upper ranks of the military; major cuts in the military budget together with large-scale down-sizing of the country's force structure (which tends to create divisions among military officers as they fight over fewer resources); and the introduction of a new military doctrine (which tends to create chaos as all of the operational plans and forces have to be restructured).[4] Assuming the regime is able to accomplish these objectives -- and the degree to which they have been realized will vary by country -- the next task facing the new political leadership will be to consolidate their rule by building a new political culture; one in which the country's officer corps voluntarily accepts the attitudes and a value system supportive of a democratic polity.

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[3] There is considerable literature on the issue of praetorianism. Among the more important are; Amos Perlmutter, Political Roles and Military Rulers, (London; Cass, 1981); Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, pp. 194-195; Eric Nordlinger, Soldier in Politics, Military Coups and Government, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1977); David Rappoport, "The Praetorian Army: Insecurity, Venality, and Impotence," in Peasants and Bureaucrats, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982); and Amos Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Politics," Comparative Politics, (April, 1969) pp ? 383.

Albania

With the ouster of the communists in Albania, an extensive program of depoliticization was undertaken as party structures were removed from the armed forces. According to the new defense minister, former political commissars with professional qualifications were allowed to remain in the armed forces, while others were transferred to other duties or retired.[5] As far as party membership was concerned, officers are expected to completely non-partisan. To quote the former defense minister, "Depoliticization in all army organizations at all levels has now been carried out de jure . . . and the impartiality of the army in the . . . political race has been ensured."[6]

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[4] These indicators follow along the lines of what Huntington called "subjective control measures" in his classic work, The Soldier and the State, (New York, Vintage, 1964). The aim of such devices as Huntington puts it is "the denial of an independent military sphere." (p. 83).

[5] "The Zhulali Riddle," Zeri i Rinise, April 25, 1992 in FBIS, Eastern Europe, May 7, 1992, p. 6.

Meanwhile, in addition to having civilianized the upper ranks of the country's defense ministry, the size of the armed forces was radically reduced as was its budget. According to figures presented by Army Chief of Staff Kristaq Karoli, the Albanian military is down to 35,000 men -- a figure that is expected to decrease further in coming months, as the length of military service is cut from 24 to 18 months and the size of staffs are reduced. As far as the budget is concerned, in 1990 it stood at 1,030 billion leke, while in 1991 it was down to 895 billion leke.[7]

The Albanian armed forces are currently in a state of transition from the old Stalinist system to a more democratic structure. In the process, the army's cohesion, morale, and corporate identity have been seriously undermined.

Bulgaria

In October 1990, the National Assembly passed a law on depoliticization that forced officers to give up their party affiliation. All but 2% of the country's officers agreed to such a step. Those who refused were subsequently either dismissed or resigned.[8] .The Political structures in the army had been disbanded the previous February, and communist statutes, posters and the formal form of address - comrade - were replaced by traditional pre-communist symbols.

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[6] "We will do Our Utmost to Protect the Existence of Our Brothers," Bujku, August 10, 1991, in FBIS, Eastern Europe, August 20, 1991, p. 2.

[7] See Louis Zanga, "Military Undergoes Reforms," RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe, November 15, 1991, pp. 1-3.

The size of the armed forces was also radically reduced. By December 1991, for example, 85% of all generals who had been on active duty had been retired and the principle of retirement at the appropriate age is reportedly being strictly observed. To replace these generals, only 19 new generals and 39 commanders were appointed. In addition, the overall size of the Bulgarian Armed Forces has also been reduced. For example, at the beginning of January 1991 the size of the armed forces stood at 107,00, down from 129,000 the previous year. According to a spokesman for the Ministry of Defense, by the year 2000, the size of the military will be further reduced to between 80,000 and 93,000 men.[9]

As elsewhere in Eastern Europe, a process of civilianizing the Army's High Command is also underway. In addition to the appointment of a civilian as Defense Minister, a number of civilians have also been appointed to positions of authority (e.g., head of the Military Economy Administration, and chief of Social Policy). The former Chief of the General Staff has been assigned the largely ceremonial post of Chief Inspector of the Bulgarian Armed Forces.[10] Finally, the establishment of an independent officer's organization, the Rakovskii Officers Legion, a sort of trade-union to which large numbers of officers reportedly belong, will inevitably lead to a further civilianization of the armed forces.

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[8] Interview with former Defense Minister Yordan Mutafchief in Vcherni novini, January 30, 1991 as cited in Kjell Engelbrekt, "Reforms Reach the Bulgarian Armed Forces," in RFE/RL Research Report, January 24, 1991, p. 55. See also, "The New Era Indicates the Path of Changes," Narodna armiya, October 8, 1990 in FBIS, Eastern Europe, October 15, 1990 and "Defense Minister on Retaining Political Officers," Sofia Domestic Service in Bulgarian, November 13, 1990 in FBIS, Eastern Europe, November 19, 1990, p. 20.

[9] "Defense Minister: No Fear of Army Intervention," BTA in English, January 26, 1991 in FBIS, Eastern Europe, January 28, 1991, p. 12; "Generals Discuss Army's Future Development," BTA in English, January 23, 1992 in FBIS, Eastern Europe, 24 January 1992, p. 6.

By their reliance on what Huntington calls subjective control measures, the Bulgarian political leadership have significantly changed the nature of their relationship toward the army over the last year. The destruction of the party organization and political structure, the purge of senior officers, the presence of the Rakovskii Legion, and the major budgetary and force structure cut-backs all have made it increasingly difficult for the country's senior officers to maintain either institutional autonomy or cohesion.

Czechoslovakia

Change is even more wide-spread in Czechoslovakia than is the case in Bulgaria. The changes -- which are evident everywhere -- have devastated military cohesion and corporate identity.

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[10] On Mutafchiev's appointment as Chief Inspector, see, "Mutafchiev Appointed Army Chief Inspector," Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian, February 6, 1992 in FBIS, Eastern Europe, 7 February 1992, p. 4.

As in other countries in Eastern Europe, one of the first steps taken by political authorities after the collapse of communism was the depoliticization of the armed forces. All party activities were banned and ideological education in the army was ended. The Klement Gottwald Academy (where political officers were trained) was renamed the Advanced Military School of Pedagogy. Some departments (i.e., those working on ideological issues) were abolished and replaced by new ones dealing with topics such as psychology, sociology or pedagogics.[11]

To further de-politicize the military, a massive purge of the armed forces was carried out. The backgrounds and qualifications of all professional soldiers were reviewed. The first stage involved some 5,000 top-ranking officers. More than 20% of them were declared unfit for further military service. During the second and third stages, the backgrounds of other military officers were checked. "By September 1990, 9,460 (or 15% of the total officer corps) had left the services." To make matters worse -- insofar as the military cohesion is concerned -- of those who left, 71% were thirty years or younger. Among the country's 157 generals, 87 left or were forced to retire. In addition, all of top positions in the Ministry of Defense and in the General Staff were filled with new individuals. To make matters worse from the perspective of professional military officers, a civilian, Lobos Dobrovsky, was appointed Defense Minister.[12]

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[11] "Defense Minister Comments on Coming Army Changes," Prague Television Service, October 31, 1990 in FBIS, Eastern Europe, November 2, 1990.

Together with personnel changes, the Czechoslovak military has also been faced with major changes in force structure and significant cut-backs in its budget. To begin with, the length of compulsory military service has been shorted. Czechoslovak recruits are now required to serve 18 rather than 24 months and the time university students must serve has been reduced from 12 to 9 months. By October 1993 basic military service will be reduced to 12 months. In addition, alternative service for conscientious objectors has been introduced. In 1990 almost 14,000 soldiers asked to leave the military and apply for alternative civilian service. By the end of 1990 military officials were claiming that they were "facing a shortfall of 40,000 soldiers." By the end of 1991 some 30,000 men had refused to serve in the military.[13]

In an attempt to deal with this situation, the armed forces adopted a military reform plan which envisages a drastic reduction in the country's military capabilities by the year 2005. According to this plan, manpower will be reduced by 40,000 men (to about 160,000) and equipment by 40-60%. Compulsory service will be reduced to 12 months by October 1993 and to three to five months by 2005. As a consequence, the percentage of professionals in the military will increase 30% in 1990 to 65%. This will leave a an army of between 80-90,000 men.[14]

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[12] This paragraph is based on Jan Obrman, "The Czecholsovak Armed Forces: The Reform Continues," RFE/RL Research Report, 7 February 1992, pp. 48-49.

[13] Obrman, The Czecholsovak Armed Forces, p. 49.

To further confuse the situation in Czechoslovakia, the country has adopted a new military doctrine. According to this doctrine, the country's defense will be based on the territorial principle. The doctrine does not foresee a specific enemy and as a consequence calls for an equal distribution of troops throughout the country. From a purely military standpoint, the introduction of such a doctrine -- on which factors such as force structure and operational procedures depend -- inevitably leads to major revisions in how the military operates. New weapons systems must be procured, new training systems introduced, and perhaps most importantly, a major redistribution of troops must be carried out (under the Warsaw Pact, they were concentrated in the West opposite the FRG).

Turning to the budgetary situation, the outlook for the Czechoslovak military is bleak indeed. The 1990 budget adopted by Parliament called for 12.5% cut in defense spending. Then on January 30, 1991, it was announced that Defense Ministry is short of 1.5 billion korunas to "secure the defense capability of the state in the event of an alert." On November 20, 1991 the Defense Ministry announced that it was asking for an increase in the budget from 26.5 thousand million crowns to 34-39 thousand million crowns in order to "avoid high outlays in the future," while on November 26, the Chief of Staff announced that "in 1991 our budgeted expenditures were reduced 3.6 billion korunas in comparison to 1990." The result, the general stated, has been "restrictions on troop training and technological modernization. The funds are being used mostly for the maintenance of the troops -- for food, equipment, housing, etc."[15]

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[14] "How CSFR's Military Doctrine is Being Implemented," Krasnaya zvezda, March 27, 1992 in JPRS, The Soviet Union, 14 April 1992, p. 60.

Czechoslovak authorities have done an even better job than their Bulgarian colleagues in breaking down the military's corporate identity and institutional cohesion. The purge of the officer corps, the depoliticization of the military, and the introduction of a new doctrine -- not to mention the major budgetary and force structure cut-backs it is facing -- all serve to decrease the possibility that the military will be able to successfully reverse the democratization process currently underway in Czechoslovakia.

Hungary

Of all the countries in Eastern Europe, the process of change and depoliticization of the armed forces is most advanced in Hungary. The institutional cohesion and corporate identity that existed even three years ago is a thing of the past. In essence, the armed forces have been neutered as a political actor.

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[15] "An Army Without Political Organs and Under the Control of the Public," Izvestiya, November 27, 1990 in JPRS, February 1, 1991, p. 29; "Czechoslovak Military Cut and Reorganized," RFE/RL Daily Report, November 5, 1990; "A New Military Within 36 Months," Mlada fronta dnes, December 13, 1990, in FBIS, Eastern Europe, December 20, 1990; "Chief of Staff on Army Budget, NATO Reductions," CSTK in English, November 22, 1991, p. 17 and "How Much Does the Army Cost Us?" Rude Pravo, November 26, 1991, in FBIS, Eastern Europe, December 10, 1991, p. 18.

As in most other countries, the political organs were initially transformed into "education and socio-political" organs. In August 1990, it was announced that this institution was being abolished with "responsibility for the new spirit of military education passing under the commander officer's sphere of influence." All of the officers affected (about 900 in number) were reportedly offered new posts, although the Defense Ministry stated that it expected many of them to leave the service.[16]

As in Czechoslovakia, a civilian was appointed defense minister. In December, 1989 General Karpati, the defense minister revered to reserve status thereby becoming the country's first civilian defense minister. He was subsequently replaced by Lajos Fur, a former junior lieutenant who was thrown out of the military because of his political views.

In addition, major cuts in Hungarian force structure were also introduced. For example, in December 1990 Budapest announced a 30 to 35 percent cut in manpower. This included a provision requiring that all officers over the age of 55 retire. During 1991 the military claims that 4,000 officers left the armed forces. Indeed, the Commander of Hungary's ground forces announced on March 26, 1992 that the overall strength of

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[16] "Defense Ministry Airs Future Army Issues," Budapest MTI in English, August 6, 1990, in FBIS, Eastern Europe, August 7, 1960.

Hungary's Army is down 35% in comparison with 1986. Current strength, according to this source, is only 40,000 troops (including some 26,500 professionals). Turning to weapons systems, the same source stated that major reductions have occurred in this area as well. "The arsenal of tactical missiles has been scrapped altogether, with the number of tanks reduced by 43 percent, artillery devices by 16 percent, and armored vehicles by 26 percent." As a consequence, there are now 20% fewer officers in the Army than is required.[17]

Like its neighbors, the Hungarian military is also in the process of adopting a new military doctrine. As a consequence, all of the major operational concepts, text-books, even weapons systems must be modified. In addition, the Defense Ministry faces the very difficult -- and expensive -- task obtaining new bases in the Eastern part of the country and of moving troops and equipment to their new positions.

To make matters worse, the Hungarian military faces the most serious financial problems of any armed forces in Eastern Europe. During 1991, the Ministry requested some 60 billion forints. A battle with Parliament ensued. The latter offered a budget of only 40 billion forints for 1991 -- a situation which forced the military to declare an "emergency situation" and make drastic cuts in exercises and training. Eventually, due primarily to the extra expenses faced by the Hungarian Army in dealing with the

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[17] "Army Strength Reduced by 35 Percent." Budapest MTI in English, 26 March 1992, in FBIS, Eastern Europe, 30 March 1992, p. 13.

Yugoslav situation, Parliament allocated some 60.8 billion forints.[18] For 1992, the Defense Ministry requested 67 billion forints. In fact, the Government has already ordered a 4% cut in expenditures from all ministries. And if this were not enough, it was announced that an additional 51 million forints will be cut from the budget.[19] While the 25.4 million forint cut can probably be absorbed by cutting administrative cots, the additional 51 million will have to come out of operational funds. The situation is made worse by the fact that the Yugoslav situation will cost the Hungarian army an additional 150-160 billion forints a day. In light of the foregoing, it is no wonder that the Defense Minister himself labeled the current situation facing the Hungarian Armed Forces as "catastrophic."[20]

The Hungarian Army is in an especially weakened position vis-a-vis the political leadership. Almost all of the senior officers from the communist period have been eliminated, and the entire framework in which those remaining operate has been turned upside down. It will be many years -- if ever -- before the institutional cohesion and corporate identity common to the communist period are restored.

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[18] "What Can 60.8 Billion Forints Cover in the Defense Ministry?" Magyar Hirlap, January 4, 1992, in FBIS, Eastern Europe, 9 January 1992, p. 21.

[19] "Defense Budget Cut by 77 Million Forints," Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian, April 29, 1992 in FBIS, Eastern Europe, 4 May 1992, p. 19.

[20] "The Week," Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian, April 12, 1992 in FBIS, Eastern Europe, April 15, 1992, p. 17.

Poland

As is often the case in Eastern Europe, the Polish approach differs from that followed in other East European states. Where states like Hungary and Czechoslovakia have adopted a vigorous depoliticization program -- one aimed at wiping out any vestiges of the Communist past, Warsaw has been less radical in its efforts to democratize its armed forces. Change has occurred, but at a slower pace. This approach has been challenged -- as illustrated by the "Parys affair" -- but for the present at least, the more gradual approach favored by President Walesa appears to have won out.

As in the other militaries, the armed forces were depoliticized. The Main Political Directorate was abolished and replaced by an Education Department. Political officers were offered the option of receiving "appropriate tactical training over the next decade," or of leaving the service.[21] In addition career soldiers were forbidden to belong to any political party or to pursue any political activities, while conscripts had their party membership suspended for the period of their military service.[22]

As in the other countries of Eastern Europe, the military has also been civilianized. Admiral Kolodziejczyk, who was initially appointed Defense Minister, and given two civilian deputies to assist him, was removed in the beginning of 1992 by Jan Parys, a civilian, as a result of a power struggle between President Walesa and Prime Minister Olszewski. In his enthusiastic effort to de-communize the military, Parys soon clashed with Walesa and his associates over the question of appointments. This struggle, which at times appeared to outsiders to have all of the characteristics of a comic opera, and included charges that Walesa was preparing to use the military to stage a coup, reached its climax on May 18, when Parys resigned. He was replaced by his deputy, Romuald Szeremietiew, also a civilian. What is most important about this episode is not the rumors of a coup attempt -- there is no evidence that the military was in any way involved in such an effort -- but that the battle between Walesa and Parys was over the power to appoint officials in the defense ministry. Both men appear to favor the appointment of civilians -- of which there are a number at present. The key difference between the two men is that Walesa is prepared to work with and attempt to win over officers who served in the communist military, gradually replacing them with non-communists, while Parys favors a more radical break with the past.[23]

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[21] "Army-Church Ties Seen Resuming Prewar Status," Europaeische Wehrkunde, No. 3, (March, 1990), p. 191 in FBIS, Eastern Europe, June 15, 1990.

[22] "Defense Body Rejects Party Affiliation in Army," Zolnierz wolnsoci, February 5, 1990 in FBIS, Eastern Europe, February 21, 1990, p. 45.

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[23] The best discussion of this affair is Louisa Vinton, "Battle over Defense Prerogatives in Poland Continues," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 20, 15 May 1992, pp. 29-30, and Jan B. de Weydenthal, "Political Problems Affect Security Work in Poland," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 16, 17 April 1992, pp. 39-42.

Like its neighbors, the Polish military has also been hit hard by budgetary cut-backs. Indeed, former defense minister Kolodziejczyk labeled the current budget a "survival budget." As a consequence, he maintained, there is little the military can do with regard to modernizing its antiquated equipment until the economy improves. As he put it, "until such time as our economy is in order, we must tidy up our army on the basis of the equipment we already have, even if it is antiquated."[24] To give the reader an idea of just how bad the situation is, Kolodziejczyk stated in February 1991 that "in 1990 we only managed to acquire five MIG-29s and 30 T-72 tanks."[25]

Polish military officers have also had to deal with the introduction of a new military doctrine as well as major cuts in force structure. Military service has been shortened from two years to 18 months and there are plans to cut it further to 12 months. The size of the military eventually will shrink to about 230,000 - 240,000 men and their have been suggestions that it will be further cut to around 200,000 officers and men.[26] Indeed, in the last two years the total number of career officers in the armed forces has shrunk by 14,000 men.[27]

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[24] "Defense Chief Comments on Army, Pact Issues," Warsaw PAP in English, November 15, 1990, in FBIS, Eastern Europe, November 19, 1990, p. 53.

[25] "The Army of a Neutral Country," Zycie Warszawy, February 6, 1991 in FBIS, Eastern Europe, February 13, 1991, pp. 38-39.

[26] "Polish National Defense Committee Meets," RFE/RL Daily Report, February 6, 1992, p. 6.

Insofar as its doctrine is concerned, like the rest of Eastern Europe, Warsaw has adopted a defensive doctrine which calls for the military to deploy its forces so that it will be in a position to deal with threats from all sides.[28] The problem with implementing such a strategy is that it is very expensive to move forces from one part of the country to another. As a consequence, a senior Polish military officer announced on January 10, 1991 that it will not be possible to go ahead with the "planned redistribution of troops this year."[29]

Despite the uncertainty that surrounds the future of the Polish military in the aftermath of the "Parys Affair," current indications suggest that it will be some time before the institution's corporate identity and cohesion are restored. The end of the communist party, the major force cut-backs, budgetary problems, and most important of all, the suspicion that currently surrounds the officer corps concerning its purported support for a possible coup, suggest that institutional anomie is likely to be the order of the day for some time to come.

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[27] "Military Reforms Reduce Army by 14,000 officers," Warsaw PAP in English, January 31, 1992 in FBIS, Eastern Europe, 3 February 1992, p. 27.

[28] The question of just how neutral the military should be also played a role in the "Parys Affair." The latter believed that the main threat facing the country was in the East, that troops should be deployed accordingly and that Warsaw should tie its security and military future to the West. As Parys put it in a speech last January, "The only solution for Poland's security is to abandon military isolation and to ensure that our Armed Forces have support from outside. There is one security system in Europe at the present time. So, we do not have a great choice. Our desire for freedom in determining the fate of the country has to be coupled with the necessity of cooperation with NATO countries." "The Military is the Cornerstone of the State," Polska zbrojna, January 31-February 2, 1992 in FBIS, Eastern Europe, 7 February 1992, p. 15. Walesa also favored closer ties with NATO, but at a more gradual pace. See, "I will do everything to Safeguard Stable Service for Military Personnel," Polska zbrojna, February 28-March 1, 1992 in FBIS, Eastern Europe, 6 March 1992, pp. 15-17.

[29] "No Redeployment of Polish Troops this Year," RFE/RL Daily Report, January 11, 1991.

Rumania

Of all the former Warsaw Pact members, the situation in the Romanian armed forces is the most unchanged. The lack of a serious effort to democratize the country -- as occurred for example in a country like Czechoslovakia or Hungary -- mean that little has been done to rid the country of the communist structures of the past. Nevertheless, there are signs of some movement in that direction within the military.

While the process of depoliticization has not advanced as far in Rumania as it has in other countries in Eastern Europe, some progress has been made in this direction. Political activity within the armed forces has been made illegal. As the current Defense Minister put it, "There are no longer any kind of political structures in the army, must less communist ones. No politics are being practiced in the army."[30] In addition, a new military oath was introduced in April 1990. The oath is apolitical in the sense that it calls on the Romanian soldier to swear loyalty only to his homeland, Rumania, to defend his country, and to obey the country's laws and military regulations.[31]

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[30] "Any Attack on the Army is an Attack on the Country," Curierul National, September 19, 1991 in FBIS, Eastern Europe, September 24, 1991, p. 22.

Unlike its neighbors, the budgetary situation was not too bad in the immediate post-Ceausescu period. Citing the need to counter the military threat from Hungary and Yugoslavia, former Defense Minister Stanculescu convinced the Assembly of Deputies to add 10 billion lei to the 1991 budget. This represented a 44 percent increase.[32] By the following year, however, the situation had changed for the worse. Indeed, it was reported that on March 17, 1992 the Defense Minister was complaining that the proposed budget will provide less than half of what is required to modernize training, and equipment as well as conduct normal maintenance functions.[33]

Compared with the other East European militaries discussed in this article, the process of democratization is least advanced in Rumania. Some in-roads have taken place. For example, the party has been excluded and the functions fulfilled by the political organs have been redefined. In neither case, however, has the process of depoliticization gone as far as it has in other countries in the region. The party-political apparatus may no longer exist in theory, but in practice political officers continue to serve in the army. Recent budgetary problems could lead to internal conflicts within the military (and thereby undercut cohesion), and the retirement of conservative generals -- due to pressure from within the officer corps -- could undermine those voices most opposed to democratization. As a result, military cohesion and corporate identity is probably somewhat less than it was several years ago. Nevertheless, little has occurred in other areas which would disrupt either cohesion or corporate identity. Senior positions in the defense ministry continue to be occupied by professional military officers, the armed forces have not been down-sized, and doctrine remains unchanged.

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[31] See, "New Military Oath of Allegiance Published," Monitorul oficial, No. 5, 51/17, April, 1990, p. 1, in FBIS, Eastern Europe, May 1, 1990, p. 34.

[32] "Rumania to Boost Defense Spending," RFE/RL Daily Report, February 19, 1991.

[33] "Romanian Military Complains About Insufficient Budget," RFE/RL Daily Report, March 19, 1992, p. 6.

Yugoslavia

The disintegration and collapse of the former Yugoslav Republic has had a major impact on the country's armed forces. In place of the latter, we are now presented with five separate, independent armed forces; the Serbian-Montenegrin, the Croatian, the Slovenian, the Macedonian, and presumably the Bosnian. In all of the latter four cases, we are looking at what amount to para-military if not militia forces. All have been depoliticized, all are waging budgetary battles, all are attempting to incorporate a new doctrine, all are trying to make do with whatever weapons were captured from the former Yugoslav army, all are in the process of attempting to absorb officers from the old army as well as build cohesive, viable military organizations.

This leaves the Serbian-Montenegrin armed forces -- the heirs to the Yugoslav military -- at least insofar as the possession of most of its weapons systems and the majority of its professional officers is concerned. Despite the media campaign in recent months and weeks concerning the role being played by the Serbian-Montenegrin army in areas such as Bosnia, it is important to keep in mind that it is also undergoing major changes. To begin with, it is no longer clear that the Serbian-Montenegrin army is the key political actor in areas such as Bosnia as many in the West have suggested. Indeed, much of the fighting that has occurred in recent months is the result of actions by Serbian dominated military formations that do not come under the control of Serbian High Command. Indeed, there are indications that the Serbian-Montenegrin Army may be on the verge of collapse; soldiers defecting to some of the local formations, while others provide them with weapons and ammunition without Belgrade's permission or even knowledge.[34]

Meanwhile, the Serbian-Montenegrin Army faces major changes. To begin with, this is smaller than was the case with the Yugoslav Army in 1989. According to one source, it currently numbers 200,000 and will probably be cut to around 125,000 in coming months.[35] Furthermore, in recent interviews, senior

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[34] The best study of this process of disintegration is James Gow, "Military-Political Affiliations in the Yugoslav Conflict," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 20, 15 May 1992, pp. 16-25.

[35] "Cuts Planned for Yugoslav Army," Reuters, February 29, 1992.

Serbian officials have revealed that the Serbian/Montenegrin Army of the future will:

--probably be headed by a civilian,

--be professional in those areas possessing a high degree of military technology (e.g., tank, and missile units, artillery formations and the navy),

--have a shorter tour of duty for conscripts (e.g., 6-8 months), who will serve on the basis of the territorial principle,

--exempt all nationalities, except Serbs and Montenegrins from compulsory service in the armed forces,

--be completely depoliticized,

--have a new military doctrine,

--be faced with major budgetary cut-backs,

--be considerably smaller in size thereby necessitating the retirement of thousands of officers and civilians currently employed by the army. As one person put it, "Serbia and Montenegro will have fewer people in uniform than ever before in their history."[36] To make matters worse -- from the point of view of institutional cohesion -- it was recently announced that the defense minister and 37 other senior generals and admirals (almost a quarter of those holding flag rank) were being forcibly retired.[37]

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[36] "Time is Seeking a Civilian," Pobjeda, March 20, 1992 in FBIS, Eastern Europe, 8 April 1991, pp. 41-42; "Montenegro and Serbia: A Joint, Considerably Smaller Army," Politika, March 26, 1992 in FBIS, Eastern Europe, 9 April 1992, pp. 45-48.

Assuming Belgrade follows up these personnel changes with the reforms outlined above, the military's corporate identity and institutional cohesion will be undermined. The new influx of new leaders -- even though the majority are professional military officers -- the far-reaching structural changes, the new doctrine, and the budgetary cut-backs will disrupt the way in which this institution has functioned in the past. While much will depend on developments within what was once Yugoslavia and especially Serbia itself, these changes could open the door to eventual democratization of the Serbian-Montenegrin Armed Forces.

Conclusion

With the exception of Rumania and perhaps the Serbian-Montenegrin armed forces, political authorities in all of the other countries have been successful in their efforts to destroy military cohesion and corporate identity. Compared with the Polish military in 1980, for example, these institutions are at present so atomized that the chances that they -- as institutions -- will be able to reverse the process of democratization are low. In this sense, the majority of East European political leadership have done exactly what Huntington suggested; they have broken the monopoly of the Leninist Party and depoliticized the military. Under current conditions any attempt to utilize the military for political purposes -- as Parys suggested might have happened in Poland -- would likely lead to their disintegration and potentially a civil war.

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[37] "Serbian President Purges Army's Senior Commanders," Washington Post, May 9, 1992.

From a political standpoint, the break-down of cohesion and corporate identity is the easy part. And here I find myself somewhat at odds with Huntington's suggestion that because of the "totalitarian nature" of communist systems, the chances of a reversal is low once the monopoly of Leninist Party is ended and the military has been depoliticized. To be effective over the long run, a new political culture, i.e., a set of values and attitudes supportive of the democratic process, must be introduced and voluntarily accepted by the officer corps in particular. A Bulgarian journalist put it best when he stated:

> We are now trying to introduce new moral standards, new forms of social behavior, and it is up to all of us to make sure that close contacts, based on openness, transparency, mutual confidence, and cooperation are established between the Army and parliament, between the Army and Society. The responsibility for the decisions lies with the politicians, but the military is assigned the role of implementing the decisions. It is expected to carry out its obligations, to defend our national security, and not to interfere in political life, which -- just like war -- is a much too serious matter to be entrusted entirely to it.[38]

While this definition of political culture differs somewhat from that normally utilized among Western political scientists, the concept is the same. Unless military officers willingly accept the rules of the democratic game and the values of the new system, the danger of latent praetorianism will never disappear.[39]

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[38] Nikolay Slatinksi, "The Bulgarian Army and the New European Thinking," Demokratsiya, January 29, 1992 in FBIS, Eastern Europe, 4 February 1992, p. 7.

The construction of a new political culture on the part of the officer corps will be a lengthy process and take a variety of forms. Indeed, it will not be fully successful until all those who were socialized under the old regime have been replaced by a new generation of officers fully committed to democratic norms. In the meantime, however, a number of steps must be taken.

To begin with, the educational system will have to be completely revamped, and most of the countries discussed in this article have taken steps in this direction. In addition, it is important that interactions between military officers and civilians be encouraged. This is not to suggest that military officers should become politically active in the sense that they openly support or campaign for one party or another. The steps taken in the vast majority of these militaries to depoliticize them should help avoid this. However, the imposition of a Soviet-style military system after the Second World War led to much greater isolation on the part of professional military officers from the civilian world than is commonly recognized in the West. It is important that -- while remaining politically neutral -- military officers deal regularly with civilians. The assignment of civilians to defense ministries is a step in the right direction. Additional steps that should be taken include; sending military officers to study at civilian universities, using civilians as teachers at military schools, colleges and academies, assigning military officers to civilian institutions such as on the staff of legislatures and the executive, making them members of civilian research institutes, to name only a few. In addition, it is important that exchanges with Western countries be encouraged. In this context I have in mind not only the attendance by East European military officers at Western academies and other schools, but more importantly, the institution of internship programs. For example, the presence of a Hungarian or Bulgarian officer as an intern on the Staff of one of the service's Office of Legislative Affairs will probably not convince that individual that Congressmen and Senators are the easiest people in the world to work with. It will, however, show him that it is possible for the armed forces to work with the legislative, even if the former does not always get what it wants. Likewise, an internship in the Office of Public Affairs will probably not endear the media to an Albanian or Czechoslovak officer. However, the experience will help convince him that despite all of the criticism the military takes (some justified, some not), working with the media can be a positive experience.

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[39] For a discussion of political culture as an analytical concept as used by American political scientists, see Kenneth Jowitt, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist System," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 68, No. 3 (September, 1974), pp. 1171-1191 and Richard Inglehart, "The Renaissance of Political Culture," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 82, No. 4, (December, 1988), pp. 1203-1230.

Finally, it is important to note an important change that is occurring in almost all of these militaries. The focal point of Huntington's work over the years has been institutions. In another classic book he wrote in 1968, he argued that "The primary problem of politics is the lag in the development of political institutions behind social and economic change."[40] He then proceeded to outline a number of steps to be taken to ensure that such institutions become institutionalized.[41] While one can argue with Huntington's basic thesis concerning the importance of institutions, what is important about the East European militaries is that the very nature of these institutions is changing. In a recent interview, for example, Hungarian Major General Lajos Kondor responded suggested that in the future the Hungarian military will resemble the Austrian army.[42]

Assuming Kondor is right -- and other East European militaries follow the Hungarian example as appears to be the case -- what we are talking about is the creation of a militia-type system not unlike that which existed in the Soviet Union during the 20s.[43] No longer will we see large military establishments in the countries of Eastern Europe. Instead, we are witnessing a transition to a system in which a small group of full-time professional military officers is backed up by soldiers who serve for short periods of time (e.g., 6-12 months) and are then transferred to the reserves. The introduction of a military of this type will change the political role of the military significantly. At a minimum, it will be very difficult for any general or colonel to lead a coup against political authorities if he is not backed up a military force that can be quickly mobilized and has a strong sense of corporate identity. Indeed, it was no accident that Marxist theoreticians for many years showed a marked preference for exactly this type of security arrangement.

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[40] Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968), p. 5.

[41] Ibid., pp. 14-24.

[42] "Training Leaders Brought into the Ministry," Nepszabadsag, January 13, 1992 in FBIS, Eastern Europe, 23 January 1992, p. 26.

[43] For an in-depth discussion of the militia concept in the Soviet Union see this writer's forthcoming, From the Soviet Past to the Russian Future; Historical Debates in Contemporary Military Politics, (Princeton University Press).

For most of the countries of Eastern Europe, the initial battle for democratization has been won. The task now is to follow up this initial victory with a broad based program that will help military officers to understand and to relate to the new systems, while at the same realizing that from a political and analytical standpoint the nature of civil-military relations in the region is changing radically. Institutionalization may be important as Huntington suggests. What is just as critical, however, is the recognition that the nature of the institutions and their relationship to the rest of the political system is changing dramatically.

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