
Council of Europe
Conseil de l'Europe

1992: Europe and North America The dialogue of the new solidarities

Strasbourg, 19 and 20 June 1992

Colloquy organised by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe

Council of Europe
Conseil de l'Europe

1992: Europe and North America
The dialogue of the new solidarities

1992: l'Europe et l'Amérique du Nord
Le dialogue des solidarités nouvelles

programme

Colloquy organised and chaired
by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe

Colloque organisé et présidé
par le Secrétaire Général du Conseil de l'Europe

Strasbourg, Palais de l'Europe, 19-20 June/juin 1992

1992: Europe and North America
The dialogue of the new solidarities

1992: l'Europe et l'Amérique du Nord
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Strasbourg, Palais de l'Europe, 19-20 June/juin 1992

The Secretary General of the Council of Europe thanks the City of Strasbourg, the Conseil général du Bas-Rhin, the Conseil régional d'Alsace and Sogenal for their help in enabling this colloquy to take place.

Le Secrétaire Général du Conseil de l'Europe remercie le Conseil général du Bas-Rhin, le Conseil régional d'Alsace, la Sogenal et la Ville de Strasbourg pour leur contribution à la réalisation de ce colloque.

Friday 19 June

Morning

9.30 a.m. — 1 p.m. **Opening session**

The Chairman of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe

Mr **Engin Güner**, Vice-President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

Mrs **Catherine Lalumière**, Secretary General of the Council of Europe

Opening speech

The Rt Hon. Sir **Geoffrey Howe**, QC, MP, former Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, House of Commons, London

Theme I

Common values: a certain idea of democracy and human rights
***Two approaches, one* raison d'être**

Chairperson:

Mrs **Simone Veil**, former President of the European Parliament, Member of the European Parliament

1. Definition and defence of common values (at political and religious levels, in cities, universities and the media)

2. European identity or European identities, North American identities or American identity, Western identity
After the cold war: in search of complementarity and a new humanism

Vendredi 19 Juin

Matin

9 h 30 — 13 h 00 **Séance d'ouverture**

Le Président du Comité des Ministres du Conseil de l'Europe

M. **Engin Güner**, Vice-Président de l'Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe

M^me^ **Catherine Lalumière**, Secrétaire Général du Conseil de l'Europe

Discours inaugural

The Rt Hon. Sir **Geoffrey Howe**, QC, MP, ancien ministre des Affaires étrangères et du Commonwealth, Londres

Thème I

Les valeurs communes: une certaine idée de la démocratie et des droits de l'homme
Deux regards, une même raison d'être

Président:

M^me^ **Simone Veil**, ancien Président du Parlement européen, membre du Parlement européen

1. Définition et défense de valeurs communes (aux niveaux politique et religieux, dans les villes, l'Université, les médias)

2. Identité européenne ou identités européennes, identités nord-américaines ou identité américaine, identité occidentale
Après la guerre froide: la recherche de la complémentarité et d'un nouvel humanisme

Co-Rapporteurs:

Mr **Dominique Moïsi**, Deputy Director, Institut français des relations internationales, Paris

Ambassador **Richard Schifter**, former Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, Department of State, Washington DC

Mrs **Anne-Marie Trahan**, Associate Deputy Minister, Department of Justice, Ottawa

Afternoon

3 p.m. — 6 p.m. *Theme II*

The present interests: conflicts and convergences between Europe and North America

The example of opening up towards Central and Eastern Europe

Chairperson:

Professor **Suzanne Berger**, Head of the Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge

Co-Rapporteurs:

Mr **Anatoly A. Sobchak**, Mayor of Saint Petersburg

Ambassador **Robert D. Blackwill**, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge

Mr **Saša Vondra**, Assistant to the President of the Republic, Director, Foreign Policy Department, Prague

Mr **Jean-Marie Guehenno**, Head of the Centre d'analyses et de prévisions, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris

Corapporteurs:

M. **Dominique Moïsi**, Directeur adjoint, Institut français des relations internationales, Paris

M. l'ambassadeur **Richard Schifter**, ancien ministre délégué aux droits de l'homme, Département d'Etat, Washington DC

M^me^ **Anne-Marie Trahan**, sous-ministre déléguée, ministère de la Justice, Ottawa

Après-midi

15 h 00 — 18 h 00 *Thème II*

Les intérêts en présence: conflits et convergences entre l'Europe et l'Amérique du Nord

Exemple de l'ouverture vers l'Europe centrale et orientale

Président:

M^me^ le professeur **Suzanne Berger**, chef du Département de sciences politiques, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge

Corapporteurs:

M. **Anatoly A. Sobtchak**, maire de Saint-Pétersbourg

M. **Robert D. Blackwill**, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge

M. **Saša Vondra**, assistant du Président de la République, directeur, Département des affaires étrangères, Prague

M. **Jean-Marie Guehenno**, chef du Centre d'analyses et de prévisions, ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris

Saturday 20 June

Morning

9.30 a.m. — 1 p.m. *Theme III*

Security: its new dimensions

Beyond military issues, democracy and the effects of solidarity

Chairperson:

Ambassador **Sergio Romano**, Milan

Co-Rapporteurs:

Professor **Michaël Stürmer**, Director, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen

Dr **Robert Hunter**, Vice President, Regional Programs Director, European Studies Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC

Afternoon

3 p.m. — 5 p.m. *Theme IV*

The role of the Council of Europe

The Council of Europe, the CSCE, the European Community and NATO

A place for the United States and Canada?

Chairperson:

The Hon. **Roy MacLaren**, PC, MP, House of Commons, Ottawa

Co-Rapporteurs:

A Member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

Ambassador **James F. Dobbins**, United States Representative to the European Communities, Brussels

Samedi 20 juin

Matin

9 h 30 — 13 h 00 *Thème III*

La sécurité : ses dimensions nouvelles

Au-delà du militaire, la démocratie et les effets de la solidarité

Président :

M. l'ambassadeur **Sergio Romano**, Milan

Corapporteurs :

M. le professeur **Michaël Stürmer**, directeur, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen

Dr **Robert Hunter**, vice-président, Direction des programmes régionaux, European Studies Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC

Après-midi

15 h 00 — 17 h 00 *Thème IV*

Le rôle du Conseil de l'Europe

Le Conseil de l'Europe, la CSCE, la Communauté européenne et l'OTAN

Une place pour les Etats-Unis et le Canada ?

Président :

The Hon. **Roy MacLaren**, PC, MP, Chambre des communes, Ottawa

Corapporteurs :

Un membre de l'Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe

M. l'ambassadeur **James F. Dobbins**, représentant des Etats-Unis auprès des Communautés européennes

Professor **Gyula Kodolányi**, State Secretary, Senior Adviser to the Prime Minister, Budapest

Summing up of the proceedings

Mr **John Edwin Mroz**, President, Institute for East-West Security Studies, New York

Conclusions

Mrs **Catherine Lalumière**, Secretary General of the Council of Europe

M. le professeur **Gyula Kodolányi**, secrétaire d'Etat, conseiller du Premier ministre, Budapest

Synthèse des travaux

M. **John Edwin Mroz**, Président, Institute for East-West Security Studies, New York

Conclusions

M^me^ **Catherine Lalumière**, Secrétaire Général du Conseil de l'Europe

Personalities attending the colloquy
Personnalités participant au colloque*

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M. **Robert Antretter**, membre de l'Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe

Révérend père **Bernard Ardura**, représentant du Saint-Siège, sous-secrétaire du Conseil pontifical de la culture, cité du Vatican

Rabbi **Andrew Baker**, Director of European Affairs, The American Jewish Committee, Washington DC

Mr **Tony Banks**, Member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

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* subject to confirmation / sous réserve de confirmation

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Membres du comité préparatoire du colloque

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Secretariat of the colloquy
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Practical information
Informations pratiques

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Working sessions / Séances de travail

Working sessions will take place in the Hemicycle on the 1st floor of the Palais de l'Europe / Les séances de travail auront lieu à l'hémicycle, au 1^er^ étage du Palais de l'Europe.

Working languages / Langues de travail

There will be simultaneous interpretation in English, French and German / L'interprétation simultanée sera assurée en anglais, en français et en allemand.

Restaurants

On the ground floor at the far end of the building / Au rez-de-chaussée, à l'arrière du bâtiment.

The restaurant serves breakfast between 8.00 a.m. and 9.30 a.m. (closed on Saturday) / Le restaurant sert des petits déjeuners de 8 heures à 9 h 30 (fermé le samedi).

The snack-bar and self-service restaurants are open between 8.00 a.m. and 4.45 p.m. (closed on Saturday) / Le snack-bar et le self-service sont ouverts de 8 heures à 16 h 45 (fermés le samedi).

The bar near the hemicycle will be open from 9.00 a.m. to 6.00 p.m. (from 9.00 a.m. to 4.00 p.m. on Saturday) / Le bar près de l'hémicycle sera ouvert de 9 heures à 18 heures (le samedi de 9 heures à 16 heures).

Telephones / Téléphones

There are telephones for local, long-distance and international calls both in the entrance hall and near meeting rooms 5 and 9 (2nd floor, lift No. IV on the right of the entrance hall) / Des téléphones permettant toutes communications urbaines, interurbaines et internationales sont situés dans le hall d'entrée et à proximité des salles 5 et 9 (au 2^e^ étage, ascenseur n° IV, à droite dans le hall d'entrée).

Newsagent / Journaux

The newspaper stand in the entrance hall is open from 8.00 a.m. to 6.30 p.m. (from 9.00 a.m. to 2.00 p.m. on Saturday) / Le kiosque à journaux dans le hall d'entrée est ouvert de 8 heures à 18 h 30 (le samedi de 9 heures à 14 heures).

Taxis (Tel. 88 36 13 11/88 36 13 13)

There is a taxi rank at the bottom of the steps which lead down from the Palais de l'Europe / Une station de taxis se trouve devant le Palais de l'Europe, au bas des escaliers.

Travel agency / Agence de voyages

The travel agency in the entrance hall is open from 8.30 a.m. to 12.30 p.m. and from 2.00 p.m. to 5.45 p.m. (5.00 p.m. on Saturday) / L'agence de voyages dans le hall d'entrée est ouverte de 8 h 30 à 12 h 30 et de 14 heures à 17 h 45 (17 heures le samedi).

Bank / Banque

The bank in the entrance hall is open from 8.30 a.m. to 12.30 p.m. and from 2.00 p.m. to 5.30 p.m. (from 10.00 a.m. to 1.00 p.m. on Saturday) / La banque dans le hall d'entrée est ouverte de 8 h 30 à 12 h 30 et de 14 heures à 17 h 30 (de 10 heures à 13 heures le samedi).

Useful telephone numbers / Numéros de téléphones utiles

In the Palais de l'Europe / Au Palais de l'Europe:

Infirmary / Infirmerie	19
Security / Sécurité	17
Reception desk / Comptoir d'accueil	32 88

Outside / A l'extérieur:

Entzheim airport / Aéroport d'Entzheim	88 64 67 67
Strasbourg railway station (information) / Gare de Strasbourg (renseignements)	88 22 50 50

Hotels / Hôtels

Hôtel des Princes
33, rue Geiler
67000 Strasbourg
Tel. 88 61 55 19
Fax 88 41 10 92

Hôtel Régent Petite France
5, rue des Moulins
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Hôtel Régent Villa d'Est
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Réunion du Comité Préparatoire
du Colloque 1992 du Secrétaire Général
l'Europe et l'Amérique du Nord
le dialogue des solidarités nouvelles

Strasbourg, le 18 juin 1992

LISTE DES PARTICIPANTS

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1992: l'Europe et l'Amérique du Nord Le dialogue des solidarités nouvelles

Strasbourg, 19 et 20 juin 1992

Colloque organisé
par le Secrétaire Général
du Conseil de l'Europe

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Council of Europe
Conseil de l'Europe

1992: Europe and North America The dialogue of the new solidarities

Strasbourg, 19 and 20 June 1992

Colloquy organised by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe

THE TRI-POLAR WORLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNIVERSITY

Alan Ryan
Princeton University

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This essay starts from the general theme of this session - the values shared by the USA and Europe - and the idea that there is now a consensus that our task is to secure democratic government and the widest possible implementation of human rights. It pursues this subject, however, in an indirect fashion. In this paragraph, I suggest very rapidly a few ambiguities in the notion that there is such a consensus, and gesture towards some of the differences between American and European conceptions of the place of the state in modern social life, and some of the differences in conceptions of the fundamentals of social life. The idea that 'liberal democracy' is now the sole ideological contender on the world stage is deeply ambiguous. To the extent that 'liberal' means no more than 'moderately attentive to the rule of law and individual social mobility' and 'democracy' means no more than 'unauthoritarian', we may agree that unauthoritarian regimes moderately attentive to the possibilities of social mobility and scrupulous about accepting the constraints of the rule of law are, now, almost uniquely attractive.

But, globally considered this is far from implying that the same set of moral values is universally accepted or acceptable. To take a familiar example, Lee Kuan Yew thinks that 'Confucian authoritarianism' suits Singapore and East Asia - though on the whole he has been a non-despotic ruler, ready to stand for re-election, hesitant to erect a genuinely one-party state, and certainly anxious to foster economic liberty. For our purposes, the point to bear in mind is that the American conception of liberal democracy almost makes the separation of powers, a two party system, federalism, and a litigious legal culture *definitionally* part of liberal democracy. In most sense of 'individualist' it is a highly individualist, rights-based theory of democracy.

Non-Americans, in my experience, find it very strange - too careless of the public interest, too ready to sacrifice social peace to a rigid adherence to the First Amendment, incapable of calling on the public to restrain its pursuit of individual self-interest for any public project, politically incapable of thinking coolly about the need to provide public goods that the market is incompetent to provide. Conversely, the corporatism that comes rather naturally to the citizenry on the eastern littoral of the Atlantic can seem to American observers very like a wholesale unconcern for the citizens' rights. My interest lies in some large questions about how much of each other's culture either side of the Atlantic can borrow, and, prior to that, how much of each other's culture either side of the Atlantic can really understand.

The popularity of the idea that we are living at the 'End of History' coincides rather oddly with the popularity of its direct opposite - the view that the bi-polar world in which most Europeans felt geographically, culturally, economically, and above all militarily ill at ease in an environment dominated by the superpower competition of the USSR and the USA has given way to a tri-polar world anchored on the European Community, the USA, and Japan, whose history is just about to begin. Of course, 'tri-polarity' can be a slogan that spares us thought in much the same ways as 'the end of history'. Not all of America is North America, and not all of North America is the United States; not all of Europe is the E.C., and Japan is a small part of Asia. The concept of tri-polarity is at best a gesture towards the thought that Japan, the E.C., and the USA must take the economic, cultural, and strategic lead in their respective geographical areas, that growth in the developed world and the sponsoring of growth in the less developed world must depend on their efforts, and above all on their cooperation.

These few pages are devoted to some speculation on a subject about which I am entirely inexpert, and where my *locus standi* is essentially that of the university teacher who wants to spend his last two decades working in a productive and relevant institution rather that in one that produces obsolete and irrelevant accounts of a vanished world. The topic is 'what do we most want to know about the political economy of the next two decades, and about its cultural supports and consequences?' My perspective (on this occasion) is that of a somewhat dissident social scientist, rather than specifically that of a philosopher, and my intention is to make maximalist demands on the social sciences, not in the hope of seeing them realised but to suggest that without large ambitions we shall not earn our keep. My thought is that we desperately need to revive a certain kind of institutional economics, or economic sociology - a kind that allows us to understand better than we presently seem to how the various components of a society's culture tie in to its economic performance, and how that economic performance sustains or erodes the culture. I believe this to be a field in which we engage in an infinite amount of (often highly intelligent) anecdote and guesswork, but where we possess rather little reliable knowledge.

One can illustrate what is at stake by considering the way in which Americans so generally believe that in the near to medium term, they face economic disaster because of the inadequacies of American education. Anyone working in the educational field in the contemporary USA is aware that all is not well. American high schools produce as ill-educated a group of eighteen year old as one could imagine; the best schools are hopelessly bad at teaching foreign languages; the best schools teach history, geography, and a real understanding of the litterature and culture of other societies very poorly. In mathematics, the best three of four percent of American students are about on a par with the best seventy five percent of Japanese students.

For all the atmosphere of gloom, this seems (at any rate thus far) to be less damaging to the USA than one might expect. Partly, this seems to be because American universities are rather better than high schools, partly because Japanese universities do not seem to make the same efforts as Japanese high schools, so that by the time the young reach the age of twenty five, the cadre that has been through an advanced graduate education is formally as well educated as its peer group anywhere, save for the traditional American deficiency in language and general cultural formation. It may be that the ill effects of poor secondary education have been slow to show up; it may be that American tertiary education is so good that the inventiveness of entrepreneurs has simply counteracted the incapacity of the workforce; it may be that the American economy is now elaborately divided internally, with a sophisticated, highly paid, intellectually demanding information processing sector and a poorly paid, intellectually undemanding manual and service sector - the view that Robert B. Reich's *The Work of Nations* puts forward. Whichever of those views we accepted, the deficiencies of the *best* American education would appear to matter very much. The defects of high school education would matter a good deal to the manual working class, because they would determine where in the global economy the most sophisticated jobs tended to go - Japan and Germany - and where the less sophisticated metal bashing would be carried on - the USA and Britain. But they would not matter to the economy overall, and particularly not to the better off. The deficiency in linguistic skills and general culture of the leading managers, public servants, and political leaders would be economically irrelevant.

But it is that deficiency that now seems to me to matter increasingly, and for a reason that is becoming increasingly urgent. That is that the more sophisticated an

economy, the more we need to understand how it relates to its cultural context - by which I do not mean that only one kind of culture can support a sophisticated economy, since that is plainly not true, rather than different cultures will do it differently, that some cultural combinations will be possible and fruitful, some impossible, some possible and destructive, and so on. One can see at least the importance of the baleful influence of culture on economy by considering the former communist *bloc*.

The lesson of the collapse of the Soviet *bloc* is not simply that the one-party regime and the command economy are no longer capable of delivering the goods - as the catchphrase has it, they gave the USSR the most impressive 19th Century industrial infrastructure in the world, just about seventy five years too late - but it is at least that, and understanding why the disaster was so comprehensive is of more than purely intellectual interest. It is clear that whatever might be the case in pure economic theory, command economies really do suffer in fact from the inability to secure and process information that writers like Hayek and von Mises claimed to be the Achilles heel of socialism. It is also clear that a more important feature of such systems is the moral rot that they engender; one reason why the information deficit is so damaging is that far too many people have perverse incentives to present misleading and inaccurate data, and too many have perverse incentives to pretend to believe what they know to be entirely false. My colleague Elmer Hankiss wrote *East European Alternatives* just before the collapse of communism in his native Hungary, and in it gave a deeply depressing and deeply convincing account of the way in which the corruption of what was intended as a *mobilising* regime had instead produced what he termed 'the demobilised society'. The demobilised society in turn frustrated all attempts at economic modernisation and growth.

The alternative to the degeneration caused by the vain pursuit of the wholly managed society in which innovation and inspiration is supposed to be provided by a cadre of party enthusiasts is not, however, *laissez-faire* capitalism. One of the innumerable problems of the normalisation process in Eastern Europe has been the thinness of both the local understanding of the enormous role that the state must play even in the most *laissez-faire* economy, and the initial understanding of such matters by western economists who have gallantly been offering help with reform. The immense prestige in which economics is held in the American academy, together with the relative contempt for sociology, has diverted the cleverest students of the social sciences away from institutional economics and into the theoretical analysis of elaborate financial matters where their mathematical skills have the freest play. It is only when they encounter a *really* barren landscape that they appreciate what they have taken for granted in the way of an efficient legal regime with the ability to define and enforce property rights and contracts, and to supply individuals and enterprises with the legal means to create new transferable interests in the goods and services they propose to produce. The eastern European hope that 'civil society' would emerge from beneath the stifling blanket of one-party politics is understandable - there was, after all, a wonderful uncrushed vitality in the opposition to communism - but must leave anxious observers wondering how a state that has lost so much of its authority will be able to create the legal institutions on which the new world is to depend.

I take the moral of the situation to be one that applies to the three elements of the tri-polar world system. There is a creative role for the state in the economy of the 21st century, but *what* that role is may be both circumscribed by culture and facilitated by culture in ways that we shall find very hard to describe, let alone to measure with any exactness. Let me illustrate this thought with two or three contemporary examples, each

of which seems to me to point the same moral about our need for a social science sensitive to the interplay of culture and institutions.

How competitive or uncompetitive American industry currently is is debatable; American automobiles are unloved by American consumers, but American aeroplanes dominate the world market. The mass production of semi-conductor chips lies in the hands of Toshiba and Hitachi, but it is widely believed that Intel will wipe the floor with them in the next decade. American television manufacturing is a thing of the past, but Japanese television producers lose money on television, and apparently remain in the business for the sake of the next generation of HDTV and the like. A great deal of American industry is very good at turning out astonishingly cheap but rather simple products that never get onto a world market, partly because of transport costs, partly because consumer tastes preclude their doing so. American washing machines, for instance, are very much cheaper than anyone else's, but are also huge and clumsy, and not plausible items of export. What is less debatable is that the American commercial and industrial culture is very unlike that of Germany or Japan - I hesitate to say unlike that of the E.C. as a whole, because I think Britain is (though not in the ways that led General de Gaulle to pronounce his successive *nons* back in the 1960s) something of a halfway case.

I mean by this that American industry is run on non-consensual lines in which the 'us' and 'them' line of demarcation between management and workforce is clear, and the conflict of interest between managers seeking returns for shareholders and workers seeking secure and well paid employment is a simple fact of life. By the same token, the pay differentials between American managers and blue collar workers are strinkingly wider than anywhere else in the world, as are the absolute levels of remuneration that CEOs feel entitled to. Donald Trump used to describe some of the more spectacular buildings he owned as 'trophies', and one imagines that the $86 million that the head of Coca Cola takes home is similarly a 'trophy' salary. Nor does the differential reflect the fact that there are fewer American managers, so that they divide the managers' share of a firm's revenues among fewer people. I do not know how the figures are calculated, but it is said that there are five times as many managers in proportion to the workforce as in Japan and three times as many as in Germany. Nor is it the case that the differential reflect the fact that the workers work short hours and at a low intensity. Average American working hours per annum are slightly lower than in Japan and a good deal higher than in Germany.

It is universally known that the USA employs, or at any rate supports, far more lawyers than any other country on earth; on a per capita basis, the US supports one lawyer to 250 people, Japan, one lawyer to 14,000 people. Again, I caution that I do not know the basis on which these figures are compiled, but the order of magnitude is so striking that one or other figure could be out by a factor of ten and the result be pretty astonishing. Now, the interesting question is, what follows, if anything? One ought always to consider the nul hypothesis; perhaps nothing follows at all. There are many ways of doing business, many ways of handling relations between firms, between firms and customers or clients, between firms and governments, and so on; perhaps there is no reason to believe that any particular way is more functionally effective than any other.

This seems implausible, if only because the American public is notably discontented with the behaviour of the American polity and economy over the past several years. Even at the height of the Reagan boom, dissident voices pointed out that the

benefits of prosperity were inequitably distributed, that financial services rather than productive industry were being promoted, that already rich persons who were in a good position to manipulate company finance for their own personal gain were creaming off resources that were not, when taken, used for productive purposes either. The incapacity of the economy to absorb all those who needed steady, reasonably well paid employment was much observed, as was rising crime, and a deteriorating education environment. Where there was growth, it was chaotic, and where there was not, as in the rustbelt, the results were appalling. In other words, running an old-fashioned version of capitalism left something to be desired, even if it did not threaten immediate disaster.

Now, the solutions that have been proposed for this state of affairs vary a lot. Some people, of course, having engineered the situation complained of, still think it was a great success, and that all its costs were necessary costs. What we seem unable to agree on is whether, supposing it was on balance a success - no doubt a moral and political judgment on which it would be all but impossible to secure agreement - it might have been achieved at a lower cost. The reason why it is impossible to obtain an agreement on whether its costs would have been lower is that we simply do not know whether there are such cultural, political and other forms of social obstacle to institutional and behavioural changes of the appropriate sort that we could not have introduced them. *Could* American investment bankers have been innovative without engaging in the excess that sent Michael Millken to jail? *Could* the management of General Motors have been so imbued with an unselfish devotion to the corporation that it worked for lower salaries, imagined ways of restructuring the business that would result in fewer job losses, conducted relations with stock-holders that kept them on board while the firm rebuilt itself, rather than trying to prop up the share price on a short term basis?

Now, such questions raise at once further questions about a second area, namely education. One supposes that it is neither a simple task to transplant other societies' working practices and executive culture, nor absolutely impossible; the natural thought is therefore that such transplanting requires some remodelling of the education system. It is schools, universities, and particularly graduate professional schools that inculcate standards of success, images of individual and societal flourishing on which people implicitly rely when evaluating their careers, whether ahead of time or in retrospect.

Here, once more, we find the same questions immediately ahead of us. One of the interesting, but faintly absurd, features of the present discontent with American education is that the educational methods applied in Asian elementary and junior schools are those that were advocated in 1899 in John Dewey's famous book, *The School and Society*. Dewey was always accused by his enemies of having corrupted American education by his advocacy of a secular, practical, child-centered education. His admirers have equally tended to overstate his impact on American practice. Dewey himself held that the teacher training institutions often paid lip-service to his ideas, but thought in general that he had made very little difference to the practice of elementary schools. He denied that his views were 'child-centered' - the progressive educators' view of a 'child-centered' education, he thought, sometimes suggested that there was no need for teachers at all, and this he thought quite mad.

What his views really were, he insisted, were practice-based; learning was both a form of activity in its own right, and sprang most naturally out of practical activities. At its simplest, this amounted to an appeal to teach chemistry by letting young children learn to cook, and geometry by letting them build boxes to hold their pens and pencils.

As it got increasingly complicated, it meant that teachers should always stress applications rather than rote-learned principles. Moreover, since practice was essentially social, learning ought always to be a group activity; instead of holding children to assessment by individual examinations that set child against child, schools should encourage them to engage in collective projects, where each of them had to contribute something to the group's achievements, where knowledge was pooled, and a variety of skills was drawn on to get a project accomplished. Such anecdotal evidence as there is suggests that one reason why Asian students in American universities do strikingly better in difficult mathematics courses than most Caucasion American students is that they work together on problems, pooling skills and working their way from easier to harder problems with much less strain on the individual student than occurs when students study alone.

What is curious is this. Dewey is widely thought to be the archetypical American thinker; commentators on his work commonly suggest that his philosophy is so to speak the American heartland thinking aloud. He, on the whole, did not think that, though he did think that his ideas were implicit in the consciousness of any 'modern' society. Yet, any idea that one could therefore *easily* make Dewey's ideas the operating theory of American elementary education is plainly false. In spite of the lip-service paid to them for the past sixty years, they do not inform current practice. There is presumably something about the culture that explains why not - though I am at loss to know what it is. It is not enough to gesture hopefully at 'individualim', but what exactly one should gesture at is another matter. Were individualism a sufficiently precise target, it might well serve to explain the phenomenon: we think of the individual knower, not of knowledge as a collective resource, we are fixated on individual creativity as *the* intellectual ideal, we think of the classroom as the individual teacher's property not as one more site of socialisation. Yet, none of these things are entirely true, and to an English observer, the USA often seems astonishingly group-minded.

A third area of topical concern where the same issues arise is that of health care. In several areas, the USA operates a welfare state like almost any other welfare state. This is especially true in the area on which the great bulk of welfare spending actually takes place - old age pensions; here, Americans run the same sort of not-quite-contributory insurance scheme that Britain and most European countries run. Where the USA is simply odd is in health care. No other developed country leaves such a large proportion of its young and working age population without guaranteed provision. No other country wastes so much money on administrative costs. (Those are the costs that are counted; given the way the American system requires the *patient*, who does not charge for his or her time, to fill out endless forms, the true opportunity cost of the administrative overhead is even greater than appears in the accounts.) For a far higher expenditure in absolute terms, and a greater proportionate share of GNP than any other country in the world, the USA provide no or very poor health care to about 15 percent of its population; at the other end of the spectrum, the health of a well to do person over fifty five is certainly better than that of any comparable person in the world.

Americans do not like their health care system. When polled, they say they much prefer the Canadian national health service. Yet, it is evidently extraordinarily difficult to change over to anything resembling the Canadian system. Is this a matter of culture, or simply of the beneficiaries of the present system being well placed to block change. My colleague Uwe Reinhart insists that it is the second; on this matter Americans and Canadians think identically, but the Canadian political system offers fewer opportunities

for veto groups to prevent dramatic, systemic change from occurring, and Canadian politicians are not dependent on PAC money in the way American politicians are. Many Canadians think this is only a small part of the answer - not that it is entirely negligible, but that it makes as large a difference as it does because the American political and economic culture is in various ways less solidaristic, more contractual, and less imbued with an image of the 'caring state' than the Canadian political culture.

In spite of the vast amount of research on political culture that has gone on since the war, it is astonishingly difficult to bring any of this to empirical state. There are good reasons why it is difficult - the view that social scientists are chronically idle and not very intelligent is not one of the good reasons. In the first place, it is perhaps impossible to pick up attitudes that one might think of as intrinsic to 'being American' as opposed to being Japanese or European, if we are trying at the same time to separate out those that are responses to the local institutions. It is a safe bet that a good many attitudes change quite swiftly when institutions change and that a good many do not: not many social scientists are such rationalists that they think all our attitudes are instantly adjustable, nor such anti-rationalists that they think we are stuck with whatever we have been socialised into by the age of twenty five. But, until we have a much surer grasp of cross-cultural political psychology than we currently do, it is impossible to say anything very reliable about how far each view is correct.

What, then, are the implications for the university? On my reading of the matter, universities have a special and particular responsibility to promote what I would like to call multiculturalism save that the term has been stolen for other purposes. That is, the only places where literary, historical, linguistic and social scientific studies can be pursued to the level of sophistication required to make any headway with the questions I have been gesturing at are the universities. But, it is not only that they are the only plausible location for the research I have in mind - to some extent it is not even true, as colleagues who work at non-university institutes keep on reminding me - but that they are the only places where we may systematically educate the leading cadres of the society of the next two decades into at least some fluency in the mental and other habits of other cultures than their own.

My sense is that in this movement, the three elements of the tri-polar world system each has strengths and weaknesses of a distinctive kind. The USA has, as everyone acknowledges, a mass higher education system that reaches out to a higher percentage of the population than most other countries dream of. On the other hand, its students are poorly educated, and American culture is in general insular - though, of course, it is also astonishingly multi-faceted, vivid, and at a popular level exportable. Japan and Europe devote much more effort to the sort of linguistic and cultural formation that is needed, but the European universities seem not to play a very important role in the political lives of their societies, and the elite universities in Japan again train only a small proportion of the appropriate age group. It may well be that the USA will have the greatest difficulty adapting to a tri-polar world, simply because the attractions of being the sole remaining superpower are so great and so obvious that the need to take account of the sensitivities and cultural styles of the rest of the world may impinge only slowly on the American political elite.

In saying all this, I am painfully aware that one invites the question of how much effort one has ever made oneself to achieve these good things. Aside from having wished my native country to join the E.C. ever since I was first politically conscious and the

initial signatories to the Treaty of Rome got the movement toward European unity under way, and having voted accordingly since 1961, I fear I have done next to nothing. But, that is perhaps as good a reason as any for my wishing that my children and their children will be members, if not of a global community - a moral ideal that is fraught with dangers - at any rate members of a society whose understanding of itself and of societies with which it cooperates will have achieved a greater level of sophistication than my generation has done.

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Council of Europe
Conseil de l'Europe

1992: Europe and North America The dialogue of the new solidarities

Strasbourg, 19 and 20 June 1992

Colloquy organised by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe

THE MEDITERRANEAN CHALLENGE
EUROPE AND NORTH AFRICA

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With the end of the Cold War, the world has become less predictable. Conflicts which had been contained for over forty years by the discipline of bipolarity are breaking out; the basic confrontational pattern established by Yalta and Potsdam has ceased to be valid. Especially in the western Mediterranean, the geo-political upheavals of 1989-90 have led to radical change. With the collapse of the communist system, the North African states lost not only a political example, but also a diplomatic option which had always played an important part in the interplay of forces - if only to put pressure on United States and Europe. Finally, the Gulf War demonstrated how fragile the order of the Arab world is.

With the cessation of East-West conflict, however, the reasons for an American military presence in the Mediterranean have also dissappeared. This could mean the end of a historic commitment whose origins go back to the early 19th century. Since the Six Day War in June 1967, the Americans have had to share their absolute domination with the Soviets. The US sixth fleet was matched by the Soviet fifth Eskadra. The allied coalition had not least to thank the dense network of naval bases and harbour facilities built up by the Americans for the smooth execution of their military operations in the Gulf War. The Americans, however, are no longer prepared to play policeman to the world. A phased withdrawal of the United States from the Meditarranean can only mean for Europeans that they are called upon to slip into America's world power role in the Mediterranean area.

The Mediterranean has always been a geo-political arena. Its strategic importance derives from its unique geographical position: it joins three continents, Europe, Asia and Africa and is, at the same time, a sea channel, a trade route and a military highway. NATO strategy had hitherto taken due account of its geographical importance. At the time of the Cold War, the southern flank was the main line of defence against possible attack by the Warsaw pact states. However, for Europe, the Mediterranean is not only the gateway to the Middle East; the Mediterranean has for centuries been a source of rich stimulus for the cultural development of the Old World. Especially the states of the north coast, the EC members, Spain, France and Italy, have special relations with their North African opposite numbers. From the historical bonds which have outlasted the colonial period, they derive their call for a 'new Mediterranean policy'. They rightly point out that the question of enlargement and the return of the Eastern and Central European dictatorships to the European fold has caused the challenge of the South to be neglected. In today's Europe, the South and the East are not treated on equal terms. Yet Western Europe "cannot ignore the problems of the Mediterranean. They are imported with goods and people".[1]

The Mediterranean is one of the scenes of geo-political conflict. Unresolved territorial conflicts and structural economic problems determine the negative image of the North African coastal states. Especially the Maghreb is perceived in Europe as a threat. It is the hazards which originate in this region which oblige Europe to face up to the Mediterranean challenge. Their strategic importance makes the Maghreb states a factor on which the stability of the continent depends just as much as upon the development of

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[1] Weidenfeld, W., Herausforderung Mittelmeer - die europäische Antwort., Strategiepapier der Forschungsgruppe Europa unter Leitung von Werner Weidenfeld, vorgelegt zur Konferenz der Bertelsmann-Stiftung 'Herausforderung Mittelmeer - die europäische Antwort' vom 7. bis 8. Oktober 1991 in Barcelona, Gütersloh 1991, S.4.

Eastern Europe. The states of the Maghreb are united by common problems: Islamic fundamentalism, exaggerated nationalism and a propensity to violence in internal affairs. The treaty concluded on February 17 1989 on the 'Arab Maghreb Union' (AMU) conjures up the myth of the greater Maghreb and, in the preamble, specifically states the aim 'that the Maghreb Arab Union shall open the way to creating complete Arab unity and shall also be a stage towards broader union, embracing the other Arab and African countries'[2], but the wishes and declarations of intent have not been translated into action. The joint parliament formed in June 1989 is merely consultative. The Maghreb Union has never become a counterpart to the EC, as was originally intended. The political differences between the signatory states, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia and Mauritania, prevent political union. The Western Sahara conflict, which has been smouldering since 1975, is an obstacle to rapprochement between Morocco and Algeria, because Algiers has made the cause of the Polisario Saharan Liberation Front its own[3]. The expansionist tendencies of Moroccan foreign policy, which for a time aimed at a Greater Morocco reaching as far as Senegal, continually prevented Algiers and Rabat from standing shoulder to shoulder. Libya, once an Italian colony, plays something of a special political role. Colonel Khadafi has, since 1969 - in people's democracy disguise - ruled with the harsh hand of the dictator. The self-proclaimed standard-bearer of Islamic fundamentalism sees himself as a pioneer of Arab unity, but is being increasingly driven into international isolation by his unpredictability and open support for terrorist movements. Recent events in Algeria, which narrowly avoided the establishment of a political theocracy of radical followers of Islam, were registered with cool detachment in Morocco. King Hassan II, the legitimacy of whose rule is unchallenged and who has consolidated his shereefian power through a semblance of democracy and a skilled policy of divide and rule, will be dissuaded by them from too close relations with the neighbouring state of Libya. His unspoken aim remains to keep the wave of Islamic fundamentalism out of his country. Political co-operation between the EC and the AMU is made yet more difficult because Libya not only has no contractual relations with the EC, but has had sanctions imposed by the European Community. Cooperation between the European Community and the Maghreb states does not obey uniform rules: there are cooperation treaties with Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, whereas the Lomé Agreement is the only link between the EC and Mauritania and with Libya there are only bilateral arrangements.

Where economic development is concerned, the AMU is equally far removed from being a coherent economic area. Yet the Maghreb states may be regarded as well endowed with natural resources: 3.5% of world oil reserves, 3.8% of world natural gas reserves, 75% of known worldwide phosphate reserves, lead, zinc, copper, cobalt and manganese contribute to the natural wealth of an economic area numbering 60 million inhabitants, but this wealth is very unevenly distributed over the member states. Libya, economically the most powerful not only in the AMU, but in the whole of Africa, with a *per capita* gross domestic product of 5,310 US dollars contrasts with Mauritania and its GDP of scarcely 500 US dollars. Regional economic relations are insignificant. Trade between the countries of the Maghreb Union is of little importance: it amounts to scarcely more than 2% of total AMU foreign trade. The main trading partner is still the European Community: imports and exports from and to the EC states account for 70% of total

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[2] The text of the treaty is reproduced in: Europa-Archiv 9, 1989, D 280 f.

[3] Cf. Tzschaschel, J., Die West-Sahara-Frage: Friedenslösung oder Dauerkonflikt, in: Europa-Archiv 21, 1991, S.625 ff.

Maghreb foreign trade - despite Community trade barriers. Important as relations with the EC are for the Maghreb, trade with North Africa is marginal as far as Brussels is concerned: it accounts for less than 2% of total foreign trade[4].

The asymmetrical pattern of trade and the performance gap between the European Community and the South Coast states of the Mediterranean create special problems. The call for a 'new Mediterranean policy' is growing louder. Spain in particular has in recent years become the spokesman for a new partnership with the Maghreb states. In a report submitted a short time ago by the Spanish Foreign Minister Ordonez on 'Europe and the Maghreb', the EC was shown to have a clearly insufficient action programme for the key region of the Mediterranean. Yet as long ago as 25 January 1989 the Economic and Social Committee of the European Community issued a statement intended to serve as the basis for an extension of the Mediterranean policy, arguing that the new movement in the geo-political situation, the globalisation of the economy, the increasing imbalances between North and South and the completion of the European Single Market demand a redefinition of the role of the Community on both the political and economic world stage[5], but nothing came of it. The revolutionary upheavals of autumn 1989 commanded political Western Europe's whole attention. Once again, in May 1990, the Economic and Social Committee of the EC emphasized that an accentuation of the economic and social imbalance between the Community and Mediterranean third countries[6] would be unacceptable. Stability and economic equilibrium in the Mediterranean were in Europe's vital interest and had direct implications for the security of the Community. It was not, however, until the end of November 1991 that the Council did empower the Commission to negotiate with the Maghreb countries, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, the Mashrik countries, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and with Israel concerning a new protocol on financing and technical cooperation[7]. When, in January 1992, the European Parliament refused to ratify a five-year old aid package of 463 million Ecu for Morocco on grounds of human rights violations, a crisis in relations with Rabat appeared imminent.

Negotiations for a comprehensive fisheries agreement between Morocco and the EC were temporarily suspended. Escalation could only be prevented by Morocco agreeing at the last minute to temporarily extend the fishing agreement due to expire on 1 March

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[4] Weidnitzer, E., Regionale Kooperation im *Rahmen der Union du Maghreb Arabe* und Perspektiven der Zusammenarbeit mit der EG, MS Berlin 1991, S. 39.

[5] Stellungnahme des Wirtschafts - und Sozialausschusses der Europäischen Gemeinschaft zum Thema 'Die Mittelmeerpolitik', CES (89) 835 12.7.1989, S;12. (Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the European Community's Mediterranean Policy).

[6] Ergänzende Stellungnahme des Wirtschafts - und Sozialausschusses zu dem Thema 'Die Mittelmeerpolitik der Europäischen Gemeinschaft' CES (90) 512, 2.5.1990, S.3. (Supplementary opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the European Community's Mediterranean Policy).

[7] Zweite ergänzende Stellungnahme des Wirtschafts - und Sozialausschusses zur Mittelmeerpolitik der Europäischen Gemeinschaft CES (91) 1388, 27.11.1991. (Second supplementary opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the European Community's Mediterranean Policy).

1992. Meanwhile Morocco signalled its willingness to enter into close cooperation with the EC and according to soundings undertaken by the Spanish member of the Commission Matutes, the tensions seem to have been laid to rest. The offer, which embraces the conclusion of trade and cooperation agreements reaching as far as association treaties, is meanwhile available only to Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Treaty relations with Libya are at present not on the agenda.

However, behind Spanish pressure for an overall European Mediterranean concept lies another problem. Like Italy, the Iberian Peninsula is particularly affected by a migration movement of unimaginable proportions which C. Nigoul has rightly described as a 'socio-cultural earthquake'[8]. Emigration no longer matches the requirements of the labour market. It is often the only escape from social and economic misery in the countries of origin, a cry of despair and the direct consequence of a population explosion which is out of control. According to United nations calculations, by the year 2025, there will be 131 million people in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, in a region with a present population of sixty million. Every year the birth rate in the Maghreb rises by 3%. The social problems in the poorly prepared immigration countries are legion. Assimilation does not occur because the immigrants equate it with giving up their cultural identity. The preservation of their home traditions and of Islam is identity forming and leads to deliberate dissociation. In the labour market of their host countries the immigrants often repeat the experience of being treated as inferiors. In France, the North Africans form a new proletariat, living mostly in dreary suburban ghettos and constituting a political problem for the town planning minister. As François Heisbourg asked not long ago: will the Maghreb become Europe's Mexico[9]?

Europe needs a Mediterranean policy. The European Community, constituted as at present, cannot meet this challenge. The institutionalisation of the Four-plus-Five group (the four EC states of the Western Mediterranean and the five countries of the Arab-Maghreb Union), which has become the five plus five with the addition of Malta, are a step in the right direction. However, without political resolve and further legal arrangements, they will not be a milestone, but at best a way-stage along the road to a Mediterranean policy worthy of the name. Not only because of the rich fishing grounds and North African oil reserves, development of trade relations with the North African mediterranean coastal sates is in the interests of Europe as a whole. Especially the existing imbalances, the trade deficit, the differing standards of living and the problems accentuated by the population explosion as well as loss of roots and unemployment, are sources of social unrest that are being exported to Western Europe through continuing migration. Both the geographical proximity of the Maghreb and the extent of the problems make it clear that Europe's security is being decided in the South. The future of the European continent will depend on diplomatic initiative and the stabilising effect of economic cooperation. Awareness of the need for a Mediterranean policy is strongest in Europe where there is a history of relations with the Maghreb states and where the threat is felt most directly: in the four EC states of the Western Mediterranean. In Great Britain, Germany and other countries of Northern Europe, on the other hand, it is almost totally absent. This gives rise to considerable difficulties for a policy which has to be

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[8] Nigoul, C., Krisenhafte Entwicklungen im westlichen Mittelmeer. Der Maghreb und Frankreich in: Europa-Archiv 13, S.377 ff.

[9] Heisbourg, F., Population Movements in Post-Cold War Europe in: Survival 1, 1991, S.35.

decided by a majority. Once already, in the geo-political tempest of 1989-90, the concept of a Mediterranean policy has been deferred in favour of the acute challenge in Eastern Europe. The Council of Europe, the European Community and also Western European Union - the institutional centres of the new post-communist Europe - are here particularly called upon to seek dialogue and give direction.

The Gulf War showed in all clarity how fragile is the claimed unity of the Maghreb, but it also helped show the region's key position. The way to Euro-Arab dialogue is via the Maghreb. In Maghreb consciousness, the Sahara is the dividing line between Europe and Africa. The coastal inhabitants of the Maghreb states have observer status at the Middle East peace negotiations. They could play a meditative role in the Middle East peace process, even though numerous manifestations of sympathy for Palestinians have committed them in the Israeli-Arab conflict. It is up to Europe to defuse the Maghreb time-bomb. Europe needs a strategy for the Mediterranean if the common foreign and security policy agreed to at Maastricht is not to remain for ever a long term political objective.

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Council of Europe
Conseil de l'Europe

1992: Europe and North America The dialogue of the new solidarities

Strasbourg, 19 and 20 June 1992

Colloquy organised by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe

CAN NORTH AMERICA REMAIN 'COMMITTED' TO EUROPE ? SHOULD IT ?

Professor David G. Haglund
Director, Centre for International Relations, Kingston

EURANOR (92) 5

Introduction : An American retreat from foreign policy ?

The 12 months that spanned the period between the early springtime of 1991 and 1992 may well turn out to institute the most important year for American foreign and security policy in half a century. Encasing the dawning of a new and different security era like macabre parentheses were two columns of black smoke - that of 1991 over the newly liberated Kuwait, and that of 1992 over the embattled district of South Central Los Angeles. Within these acrid temporal brackets unfolded a set of developments of utmost significance for American foreign and security policy and for the very meaning of the country's external commitments.

Who could have predicted, in the early aftermath of the victory over Iraq, that a year hence the American mood would be characterised by such an abiding sense of fatigue with foreign policy, which had simply become a taboo topic among political contenders, one not to be flaunted even by an incumbent president whose greatest - some say only - successes occurred abroad? In April 1991 there was much talk of America bestriding a unipolar world, throughout which its writ would run to assure the interests of itself, of its allies, and even of the 'international community' as a whole. At that moment, the question was not *whether* America would remain 'committed' but *how* it would do so.

By late April 1992, the mood had been radically altered. Although few were openly advocating isolation, there could be no question that the country's concentration on internal economic and social problems was such that the domestic agenda promised literally to swamp the foreign one for the first time in more than 50 years. Even before the Soviet Union disintegrated, pressures had been building for the country to 'turn inward'. With the demise of the great adversary thought necessary to keep America involved abroad, and especially in Europe, those pressures intensified.

What also could not have been foreseen in April 1991 was the speed with which the domestic malaise would envelop the policy debate in America. Although there is a certain risk of overstatement associated with the near-instantaneous analysis of contemporary events, one can at the very least suggest that the Los Angeles riots will have an impact not only on America's domestic policies, but on its foreign ones as well. The effect of Los Angeles will be felt abroad firstly through the weakening of America's 'soft power', ie, its ability to project influence through the strength of its social and political model. It is not just the country's adversaries such as Libya that have been quick to trumpet the inconsistencies in America's attempt to order the world when disorder is so prevalent at home; even the allies have not hesitated to say, in the manner of France's President, François Mitterrand, 'We told you so'. But that is not all; and America's allies, especially the Europeans, would be wise to reflect on what it might mean for them should Washington really decide that serious attention and resources needed to be allocated to solving the domestic crisis. It does not require powers of prophecy to envision a clamour for diverting to the 'home front' assets that are currently being claimed by foreign obligations, with ultimate consequences no one can foretell.

The 'Canadianisation' Thesis : A question of commitment

In Canada as well, though for reasons that are not identical, there has been a turn inward of both the public and the political class. To be sure, Canadian fiscal realities,

especially the federal deficit, can and do look nearly as foreboding as American ones; but in the Canadian case, there is a domestic constitutional crisis that has contributed to the current mood of introspection and 'nombrilisme'. Reflective of this turn was the announcement, made in February 1992, that Canada would be removing all its stationed forces from Germany, rather than leave in place a task force of 1,100 soldiers, as had been announced in September 1991[1]. Although policymakers in National Defence Headquarters were quick to proclaim that the ending of stationing would not weaken the country's 'commitment' to either NATO or Europe - and pointed to the large Canadian contingent slated for peacekeeping duties in what used to be Yugoslavia as proof of this - the immediate reaction from the European allies was a feeling of abandonment and panic[2].

The sense of abandonment was perhaps more understandable than the sense of panic over the ultimate implication of the Canadian pullout, but the latter is of more significance. For some reason, perhaps known only to Europeans, there has been a linkage imputed between the Canadian stationed forces and the much more important American ones: it has become an article of faith that as Ottawa goes, so too might Washington, hence the urgency with which NATO officials and European allies alike set to work (unsuccessfully) trying to persuade Ottawa to reverse its decision[3]. Washington, it should be recalled, tends not to take its cues from Canadian decisions when matters regarding the future of Europe are at stake: it did not do so in 1914, when Canada entered the first world war simultaneously with Great Britain, while the United States remained neutral for nearly three more years; it did not do so in 1939, when Ottawa hesitated all of a week to join the fray, while Washington needed the Pearl Harbour attack to trigger its belligerency; and it will not do so in the 1990s.

That being said, those who link the Canadian decision with a potential American one are not completely misguided. There may be no direct *causal* connection between Ottawa's and Washington's policies on troop stationing, but there could well turn out to be an indirect connection, more an analogy than anything else. Washington will act as it decides to act: that is both a tautology and a truism. Yet it is my thesis that the ultimate result of the decisions it takes independently may look amazingly familiar to those who have followed the history of Canadian troop stationing in Europe. In short, we may well expect to see, and sooner rather than later, an effective 'Canadianisation' of American policy regarding European security.

What does the Canadianisation thesis entail? It involves the ongoing search for a plausible rationale and optimal level for stationed forces of a distant North American power on what was once the central front of the Cold War. As the Canadian example

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[1] See Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, *Canadian Defence Policy* (Ottowa, April 1992), pp. 8-9.

[2] See Jeff Sallot, 'Canadian troop pullout upsets allies in NATO', *Globe* and *Mail* (Toronto), 5 March 1992, pp. A1, A2; Marc Fisher, 'Europeans ask: If Canada's troops leave, can GIs be far behind?' *Washington Post*, 11 March 1992, p. 16; and Hella Pick et al, 'Canada plans to pull all its troops out of Europe', *Manchester Guadian Weekly*, 8 March 1992, p. 1.

[3] 'Canada will be asked to reconsider European troop exit', *Ottawa Citizen*, 31 March 1992, p. A6.

shows, the guest can be a troublesome one, for policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic. Once it was deemed that Canada's troop commitment to Europe - in the 1960s nearly 10,000 soldiers and airmen, but subsequently fewer than 7,000 - was more important for its political 'symbolism' than for its operational effectiveness, it became exceedingly difficult, and eventually impossible, for Ottawa to resist the logic of reducing troop levels in a bid to save money[4]. After all, went that logic, if 7,000 soldiers could do the job of securing symbolic relevance, then surely 5,000 could as well; and if 5,000 could, why not 1,100? Once a low-enough figure had been attained, it became quixotic indeed to bother distinguishing that one could still be symbolically significant with *no* troops. Besides, has it not been the case that only six of the Alliance's 16 nations had ever seen fit to participate in the stationing regime?[5]

The United States is argued to be a long way from the threshold below which operational effectiveness becomes unimaginable, save in the most benign threat environment. Nevertheless, the threshold could be approached more rapidly than many might imagine, as the American ground and air forces get drawn down from the 1991 level of 300,000 to perhaps some 50,000 or so by the middle of this decade[6]. Here the Canadian experience might bear pondering: for Ottawa did not intend, not even as late as a year ago, to withdraw totally from Europe. Once its force levels got sufficiently miniscule, however, it would have required Herculean powers of persuasion to resist the temptation to rescue some defence programmes (in the 'capital-expenditure' category) by sacrificing the stationing presence[7].

If those Europeans who now doubt that Canada continues to have a 'commitment' to Europe are to be believed, then the litmus test for what remains of the North American commitment is to be found in the future of the United States stationed forces. It is in this context that we should examine the current debate over a 'new isolationism', the subject of the two following sections.

There is a lengthy tradition of European countries equating commitment with presence, and the example of Germany is perhaps most *à propos* in this regard. At a time when it mattered a great deal to them, the Germans never could assure themselves, once they joined NATO in 1955, that the French would come to their defence - and this notwithstanding Paris' having signed both the Washington Treaty of 1949 that created the Atlantic Alliance and the Paris Accords of 1954, establishing the Western European Union. Even more than the earlier pact, the later one appeared to constitute an

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[4] For a good discussion, see Roy Rempel, 'Canada's troop deployments in Germany: Twilight of a 40 year presence?' in *Homeward Bound? Allied forces in the new Germany*, ed. David G Haglund and Olaf Mager (Boulder, Colo: Westview 1992), pp. 213-47.

[5] See David G Haglund and Olaf Mager, 'Bound to leave? The future of the allied stationing regime in Germany', *Canadian Defence Quarterly*, 21 (February 1992): 35-43.

[6] See William W. Allen, 'The United States army in Europe, 1995 and beyond: determinants for a dual-based, smaller, yet substantive force', a paper presented to the Conference on European Security in the 1990s, Queen's University Centre for International Relations, Kingston, May 1992 (hereafter QCIR Conference).

[7] See William R Johnston, 'The Canadian military commitment to Europe: political smoke, military mirrors?' a paper presented to the QCIR Conference, May 1992.

irrefutable commitment on the part of France to come to Germany's defence with all military means, if the latter were attacked[8]. Yet the Germans never could accept that it was treaties - no matter how tightly worded - that protected them; what they wanted, but did not get, from France was a forward deployment of the latter's forces at the inner-German border, where they could be sure to be automatically involved in any battle for Germany.

If the above example suggests that the meaning of commitment must remain situationally dependent, it perhaps also instructs us of the wisdom, when we seek to determine whether North America can or will remain 'committed' to Europe, solely to concentrate upon the intentions of the state or states extending the commitment, and take for granted that the commitment's credibility must remain a matter of some contention - as indeed security guarantees have traditionally been among allies. But focussing solely on the extending state(s) also raised some difficult issues. For the purposes of this paper, perhaps the most salient of these issues is the meaning of isolation, and its likelihood of once more coming to constitute a North American policy orientation.

The meaning of isolation

Canada has had no tradition of foreign policy isolation, even if certain parts of the country, especially Quebec, tended to be as 'isolationist' as much of the United States earlier in this century. It is generally accepted that Canada has been much more a 'European' country than the United States, and while this was certainly true in an earlier era, it is arguable that today Canada is as distant from Europe culturally, economically, and politically as is the United States. Indeed, if the linkage that gives meaning to a North American country's 'Europeanist' dispensation is to be a military one, then it could be claimed that, oddly enough, the United States is now more of a European country than Canada. Whether it will remain so, of course, will depend on the outcome of the current debate over a new isolation.

Nothing seems to be simple any more in the debate over isolation and United States security policy, now that the Cold War is finished. Whatever else one can say about the security challenge posed to the United States by totalitarian powers over the past 50 years (and here I include the nazi as well as the Soviet challenge), it must be acknowledged that the external threat environment constituted a reasonably clear basis for framing policy, all the more so if one accepts that assuring the physical security of the state represents for the United States no less than for other countries the primary responsibility of policymakers.

Thus it should come as no surprise that the current mood in America is characterised by a greater degree of fundamental doubt about security policy than has been witnessed for more than half a century. Symbolic of the re-emergence of security policy complexity is the re-emergence of something else, the spectre of *isolation*. For a policy orientation that presumably was abandoned for good after Pearl Harbour, there has been a surprisingly vigorous discussion in the past year about isolation. Much of that current discussion has been triggered by the exigencies of the 1992 electoral season, and it is hard to deny the impact of one candidate in particular, Republican polemicist Patrick

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[8] On the difference between the treaty undertakings of 1949 and 1954, see Alfred Grosser, 'France-Allemagne: 1936-1986', *Politique étrangère* 51 (Spring 1986): 251-52.

Buchanan, on the revival of interest in putting 'America first'. But Buchanan's message only differs from the mood of the public and elites in degree - at least if his message is taken to be an injunction to spend more time attending to domestic problems and less to foreign ones. There has, elsewhere in America than on the Buchanan campaign bus, been an evident upswelling in support for those who prefer that the country 'turn inward', even if it is true that opinion polls would reveal absolutely no clamour for something called 'isolationism'[9]. Such is the ill-repute of isolationism that it can be routinely denounced not just by confirmed 'internationalists', but also by those who really do think turning inward makes sense now that the Soviet Union has ceased to exist. It is apparent that beating the isolationist drum is hardly the means of securing election in 1992, any more than it has been for the past two generations. But might it possibly be that the American mood in mid-1992 suggests nothing so much as the familiar practice of hating the sinner but loving the sin? Can one really assume, as much of the conventional wisdom appears to, that America will remain committed to Europe?

How one thinks about isolation in the future must be conditioned by how it has been thought of in the past. More so than with most policy issues, there has been an incredible degree of analytical and normative confusion surrounding the question of isolation in United States foreign policy. In this section, I will approach the problem by suggesting that there have been two major fallacies associated with the interpretation of isolation, as well as one major question of category.

Let us start with the fallacies. The first concerns the allegation that since America has never really been an autarkic country in fact, and only once (during the Jefferson presidency) did it even aspire to autarky, then it follows that it has never pursued a policy of isolation - that isolation has been a myth, or a legend. As correct as the above allegation regarding autarky may be, it is rather beside the point, for isolation and isolationism in American foreign policy have justifiably been interpreted not as economic orientations, but as political and military ones. One need go no further than to study the text of the earliest advocacy for an American policy of isolation to apreciate this: in *Common Sense*, Thomas Paine advocated a policy of non-involvement in European political affairs, while at the same time urging the new United States to widen to the fullest extent its trading links, and on the basis of commercial equality with all countries. Moreover, George Washington's farewell address, widely cited as a fount of wisdom for American foreign policy, stipulated that the 'great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little *political* connection as possible'[10].

Although it is often argued today that America could never revert to isolation because it is simply too dependent upon international trade and finance, it bears

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[9] For accounts stressing the current American malaise, see George F. Will, 'The waves from California could cross the continent', *International Herald Tribune*, 31 October 1991, p. 9; Jodie T. Allen, 'Americans are waking up to decline', ibid, 1 November 1991, p. 4; Dan Balz and Richard Morin, 'Americans are losing confidence in the system', ibid, 4 November 1991, p. 6 and Kevin Phillips, 'The politics of frustration', *New York Times Magazine*, 12 April 1992, pp. 38-42.

[10] Quoted in Felix Gilbert, *To the farewell address: ideas of early American foreign policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 145. (Emphasis is included in the source.)

repeating that isolation has little if anything to do with autarky, and much harm can come from confusing the two dispensations. It is true that contemporary 'isolationsists' can sound like and even be protectionists, but it remains the case that not all protectionists are isolationsists, and vice versa. Indeed, although he would probably be embarrassed by the reminder, even Patrick Buchanan's penchant for German cars can be intellectually consistent with political and military isolation.

This of course introduces the second fallacy regarding isolation, namely that it must be a policy orientation that eschews political and military intervention in the affairs of others. Here again the historical record must be invoked to illustrate the nature of the fallacy. It is well known that in its early 'isolated' period America was incessantly expansionist, first claiming and controlling territory in what is today the continental United States (but which then belonged to others), later projecting its influence throughout the western hemisphere and into the Pacific[11]. Whatever else one can say about the historic record, it reveals that in the case of the United States, expansion and isolation could be parallel phenomena. There was, to be sure, one part of the world where America chose not to become militarily involved on a regular basis, and that was Europe - or at least it was until World War II.

If isolation has not meant autarky or even the refusal to intervene selectively, what has it meant? Here we must confront the question of category. Traditionally, isolation has been thought of as an outlook, or ideology. Not surprisingly, it is this way of classifying the phenomenon that has sown endless discord among students of American foreign policy, who have been known to dispute heatedly whether isolationism was a function of region, or ethnicity, or personality, or historical learning. Space does not permit us here to delve very deeply into that sort of exploration, and perhaps the wisest thing to do is simply to note the scholarly division on the matter, and refrain from taking sides as to whether isolationists were that way because they were from the Midwest, or because they were not of Anglo-Saxon origin, or because they were too liberal (or was it too conservative?), or simply because they were just too stupid.

Instead of treating isolation as a psychological predisposition (or an affliction!), it makes more sense to regard it as a species of *policy*. In this light, there are really only two important claims to be made about it. The first is that it was fundamentally characterised by a predilection for unilateralism, itself sustained by an abiding preference for non-entanglement. No one has stated it as well as Albert Weinberg, who more than a half century ago described isolation as nothing else than a policy of non-entanglement, with the latter being so interpreted as to permit 'all single-handed action, from interposition to war, on behalf of national rights'[12].

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[11] America, to one writer, was 'isolated' but not isolationist in the 19th century, for it lacked the means to intervene in Europe; in the interwar ('isolationist') years, it had the means, but lacked the inclination. See Robert W. Tucker, 'Isolation and intervention', *National interest*, No. 1 (autumn 1985), p. 16.

[12] Albert K. Weinberg, 'The historical meaning of the American doctrine of isolation', *American Political Science Review* 34 (June 1940): 545. For a frank defence of non-entanglement by a leading exponent of isolation in the interwar period, see Arthur Hendrick Vandenberg, *The trail of a tradition* (New York: G P Putnam's Sons, 1926), p. 314.

The second defining characteristic of the historic policy of isolation is its geographic referent: Europe, the part of the world that isolationists decreed to be off limits for the purposes of two important policy actions, alliance formation and military intervention. It was there primarily the test of isolation as policy was to be applied - a test that, in the words of Robert W. Tucker, signified 'nothing more nor less than the refusal to guarantee the post World War I status quo ... against change by force of arms'[13]. Outside Europe during the interwar period, it was remarkable how even self-proclaimed isolationists could champion policy activism, even to the extent of military intervention.

A new isolation ?

If all that counted in foreign policy were the avowals of decision-makers, then there would be absolutely no reason for anyone to doubt the ongoing American commitment to European security. The ending of the Cold War has simply had no impact on United States declaratory policy, which has been reconfirmed thusly by Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney, before the NATO Defence Ministers in Brussels in April 1992: 'I can assure you, as was underlined in the NATO summit declaration of last November in Rome, that we in the West are convinced that "our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe'[14]. Cheney's comment represented but the latest in a series of administration statements reaffirming the solidity of transatlantic security linkages.

Why, then, should there be so much discussion of late about the meaning and credibility of the United States commitment? In the most general terms, because the Cold War's demise - and more importantly, the subsequent demise of the Soviet Union itself - really did introduce a novel element in post World War II transatlantic security: for the first time ever, the western allies have lacked a clear and present danger to their individual and joint security. To some analysts, this should pose no great problem; but for others, if the disappearance of the bipolar world need not take us 'back to the future' of intra-European armed conflict, it should at the very least give us reason to contemplate what it is that keeps allies allied when their *raison d'être* has vanished[15].

On a more specific plane, there are at least three reasons for ruminating about the ability of the western states to hang together when it is far from clear that otherwise they must all hang separately; alternatively stated, there are at least three sources of concern about a United States decommitment from European security. The first is a rather old problem, lumped under the rubric of 'burden sharing'. This is not the worry it once was, in the Cold War, but it is nevertheless an issue that has some resonance, especially when

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[13] Robert W. Tucker, *A new isolationism: threat or promise?* (New York: Universe Books, A Potomac Associates Book, 1972), p. 28.

[14] 'United States security tied to all states of Europe', *Text* United States Embassy, Ottawa, 2 April 1992, p. 1.

[15] For the pessimistic interpretation of the Cold War's end, see John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the future: instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Security* 19 (Summer 1990): 5-56. But for optimistic interpretations, at least concerning Western Europe, cf Stephen Van Evera, 'Primed for peace: Europe after the Cold War', ibid 15 (Winter 1990/91): 7-57; and Robert Jervis, 'The future of world politics: will it resemble the past?' ibid 16 (Winter 1991/92): 39-73.

it translates into an attempt to put a price tag on the United States guarantee of European security. Senator Thomas Harkin was sounding an all too familiar note prior to dropping out of the race for the Democratic presidential nomination in early 1992, when he told voters that if they 'want to continue to spend $160 billion ... to defend Europe from the Soviet Union, or whatever it's called now, take your ballot and put it in the Bush box. But if you believe that Europe is strong enough and rich enough and powerful enough to defend itself if it wants, then take your ballot and put it in the Democrats' box'[16].

Whatever the appeal of invitations worded like this (and they do not seem to have done the Iowa senator much good), there is every expectation that the burden-sharing grievance of America - whatever its legitimacy in the past - will be of much less significance in the future, given that the United States will be drastically cutting back its armed presence in Europe. It probably never did make sense to cost that earlier presence at $160 billion a year, although that figure was regularly invoked by the Pentagon; in the future, should the United States have something on the order of 50,000 troops left in Europe, it will make even less sense[17]. The Europeanisation of European defence is definitely under way, and whatever the ultimate security 'architecture' that emerges in Western Europe, it will be one in which the burdens are shifted much more to the Europeans themselves.

Ironically, it is the looming promise of a European pillar of defence, or European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), that serves to symbolise the second source of danger for the transatlantic security bond, namely the prospect of an accelerating continental drift. This is, like the burden-sharing argument, an issue with a lengthy pedigree, and while it may be that the end of the Cold War and the onset of the age of 'geoeconomics' makes it a more real threat than before, it is comforting (though perhaps naive) to imagine that a set of common values and interests will continue to keep the West united. Nevertheless, it may well be that the most menacing future for the West would be one in which the United States and Europe have become ideologically antagonistic, and deeply so, in the societal and economic realms.

Is this a real prospect? Certainly, anti-Americanism is not unheard of in Europe. Less remarked upon has been the incidence of anti-Europeanism in the United States. To be sure, during the mid-1980s there were those in the United States, mainly on the right, who sought to punish an ideologically suspect Europe for endangering American

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[16] Quoted in R.W. Apple Jr., 'Foreign vs domestic policy, Presidential vs congressional clout: balances shift', *International Herald Tribune*, 7 February 1992, p. 3.

[17] For a discussion, see Alice C. Maroni, 'United States perspectives on the economic costs and benefits of a withdrawal of United States troops and facilities from Europe', in *Europe after an American withdrawal: economic and military issues*, ed Jane M.O. Sharp (Stockholm: SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 1990), pp 63-65; United States General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, *United States - NATO burden sharing: allies' contributions to common defence during the 1980s*, GAO/NSIAD 91-32 (Washington, October 1990; and Robert C. White Jr., 'NATO's burden-sharing debate in the 1990s', *Parameters* 20 (March 1990): 88-99.

security[18]. That source of rancour, stemming from differences over 'regional détente', has disappeared. Interestingly, there is now a sense in which too close an identification with Europe and its values is regarded, by those on the left, as not being as 'politically correct' a disposition as they might desire; and it sometimes appears as if Europeans are not aware of the potential significance of the contention among many North Americans that the 500th anniversary of Columbus' discovery of America should be an occasion for lamentation, not celebration. It is probably the case that, demographically, the United States (and Canada as well) is less 'European' and more multicultural than ever; but caution is in order before too many extrapolations are allowed to flow from such a recognition - especially extrapolations bearing on transatlantic security. It need only be recalled that the United States was decidedly more 'European' in the 1920s and 1930s than it has been since.

The final source of concern about the durability and credibility of the United States commitment to European security involves the aparent need for a sense of purpose to justify what is, after all, still an extraordinary undertaking: the stationing of one's troops on the territory of one's allies, and the willingness to bear high costs and take substantial risks on behalf of others. Even should the burden-sharing dispute disappear totally, and the western allies rediscover a kind of transatlantic socio-economic harmony that perhaps only existed in their fantasies, it is doubtful that Americans will wish to continue to be intimately involved in the security affairs of Europe if they can see no apparent reason to be involved.

Some Europeans understand that even with no Soviet threat, there might still be a good reason for Americans to stay in Europe: to help maintain the Western European security community. In a little-noted exchange at a security conference in Munich in February 1992, NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner sought to explain to American politicians in attendance why the United States should remain militarily present in Europe. He gave two reasons. One was to project stability to the East; the other was to stabilise security relations between the *western* Europeans, thereby preventing the emergence of 'renationalised' European defence structures. He remarked that in the absence of NATO, European integration would be retarded, and added, somewhat cryptically, 'I think I know why I say that'. The Secretary General's analysis elicited a response from one Republican senator, Arizona's John McCain, who stated that Americans would never accept that a plausible rationale for their continuing to deploy troops in Europe could be the maintenance of stability between the Western Europeans: 'Most Americans believe [the Europeans] can do this on their own'[19].

Wörner may in fact be correct, but so too is McCain likely to be, and this underscores the point about the need for a sense of purpose that is persuasive not just to Europeans, but to Americans as well. Ironically, it could turn out that Russia has a new

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[18] Two anti-Europeanist analyses were Melvyn Krauss, *How NATO weakens the West* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986); and Angelo Codevilla, 'American soldiers in Europe: hostages to fortune', *National interest*, No. 8 (Summer 1987), pp. 89-93.

[19] Author's notes, '29th Munich Conference on Security Policy', Munich, 9 February 1992.

friend, perhaps even ally, will present the means of keeping America in Europe, just as the Soviet adversary of old was needed to ensure a continuing American commitment to European security once the nazis had been defeated.

Conclusion

With the demise of the rigid bipolar structure of the Cold War in Europe and the emergence of a still-unspecified continental 'security architecture', it will be only logical for Washington policymakers to undertake a thorough review of the United States commitment to Europe. As indicated above, among administration officials there continue to be recognition of an ongoing need for an American presence in Europe, a point most Europeans also agree upon. Indeed, given the current talk in the United States of an American-Russian 'alliance' of sorts, it could be that United States allies see more of a need for America to stay in Europe to deter the Russians than does America itself[20].

It is clear nevertheless that certain assumptions relating to America's European policies will be modified. First, in view of the inevitable reductions in American forces stationed in Europe, Washington's influence over many European key political players should naturally diminish[21]. Furthermore, Europe's progress on the path of political and economic union, if it continues, would almost certainly herald the emergence of a more assertive community, one whose interests would not necessarily coincide with America's. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, has been the recent evident shift in the American domestic political mood, away from foreign policy activism and toward - if not a new 'isolationism' - a refocussing on the domestic social and economic agenda.

Given the above, Washington's apparent desire to preserve NATO, to maintain the commitment to Europe, and to acknowledge the emergence of a European defence identity can only be reassuring to those on both sides of the Atlantic who still believe in the vital importance of the Alliance as a safety net and an indispensable component of Europe's future security architecture. But it would be unwise for Europeans to take American policies for granted. Specifically, behind the accommodating rhetoric of NATO's communiqués, the tone of United States diplomacy has hardened lately and what many perceive as isolated losses of temper may in fact signal a genuine change of course of United States European policy.

It is in this context that one has to interpret the European unease over Canada's recent decision to terminate its European troop stationing before 1995. Although, as I noted earlier, Washington really will not be taking policy instruction from Ottawa on the matter, there is some merit in the analogy of the 'Canadianisation' of America's European policy. Once the current round of downsizing occurs for United States forces in Europe, with their numbers declining to perhaps 75,000 or less in the next three years, one can expect unrelenting pressure for further reductions. Hence the 'Canadianisation'

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[20] See Fred Charles Iklé, 'Comrades in arms: the case for a Russian-American defence community', *National Interest* No. 26 (Winter 1991/92), pp. 22-23.

[21] Although the Bush administration was claiming in early 1992 that the United States would leave 150,000 soldiers in Europe after 1995, many analysts were expecting a figure only half as large. For a discussion, see David G. Haglund, 'American troops in Germany: the evolving context', in *Homeward bound?* pp. 135-66.

phenomenon, expressed by a possible American conviction that the country's post-Cold War European 'commitment' might be adequately guaranteed by United States military forces stationed elsewhere than in Europe. In other words, just as Ottawa continues to maintain, in the wake of the 25 February 1992 decision to terminate stationing, that it remains as militarily 'committed' as ever to Europe, so too might Washington be tempted to imagine that it can have a commitment without pain - or troops.

In light of the contemporary European discussion about a more 'autonomous' (ie, from the United States) security architecture, one discerns taking shape a peculiar logic, bearing the familiar hallmarks of a Catch-22: for if Europe does as the French want it to do, namely prepare for the 'inevitable' day when the United States has pulled out all its troops, it runs the risk of converting a probability into a certainty that few - not even the French - really wish to see transpire. But to fail to prepare for the day when the United States has departed will leave European security all the more at risk should there indeed be value in the 'Canadianisation' analogy.

Ever since the debate about a 'European Pillar' first arose some three decades ago there has been one central question that has defied definitive answering: Does the American troop presence in Europe inhibit the erection of an autonomous European defence entity, or is it rather the case that the defence integration Western Europeans have managed to achieve would have been impossible without the United States troops?

We may now be entering an era in which, finally, that question can be answered. Not until that answer is known can we possibly answer the second question in this paper's title. By then, however, it may be too late to matter anymore.

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Council of Europe
Conseil de l'Europe

1992: Europe and North America The dialogue of the new solidarities

Strasbourg, 19 and 20 June 1992

Colloquy organised by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe

THE IDEA OF CANADA AND THE IDEA OF THE NEW EUROPE AND THE 'ELECTRONIC CANNON'

A GLIMPSE AT TELEVISION, POLITICS AND CULTURE IN OUR TIME

Senator Jerry S. Grafstein, QC[1]
Toronto

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[1] While the responsibility for this exposition is mine, some of the ideas germinated from exacting exchanges with the late Fernand Cadieux who, in 1966, first essayed for me the awesome explosion which would erupt when politics collided with television.

'Farfetched conceits may please others; to me the chief concern seems to be that we draw our speech from the matter itself and apply ourselves less to show off our inventions than to present the thing'.

Erasmus - Colloquies - 1519

'On my death bed I shall forbid my children to read the Colloquies of Erasmus'.

Luther - 1533

The interaction of television and politics by reference to the Canadian experience and evolving European experience flows from our ideas of culture.

The idea of Canada and the idea of the new Europe sprang from common roots. Both ideas grew from the soil of identity and self preservation and cultural pride. We yearn to understand who we are, what we share, and why we are different. Canadians and Europeans alike are undergoing searching introspection. While old Europe's identity is deeply defined, Canada is encountering increasing difficulty grasping its identity.

What is striking is that the idea of Canada and the idea of the new Europe share remarkably similar contours. Both are experimental. Both are flooded by a sea of change in public values. Both are in a state of flux which some regard as revolutionary. Both are underpinned by pluralistic political structures that in turn rest on strong social nets. Both consciously seek validation by distinguishing themselves from the American model of homogeneity. Both share federalist notions. Both celebrate the richness of a diversity of peoples and languages. Both share common cultural and intellectual sources of civilization. Both brood about identity as an existential imperative. Both voice the elusive goal of equality of individuals despite vituperative forces of regional nationalism. Both thirst for new forms of governance which can quicken the pace of social mobility. Both are moving restlessly and relentlessly towards a borderless society, a society of dissolving frontiers, a society without walls - even while reactionary pressures are boiling from within to arrest this seemingly natural evolutionary process.

Despite these parallels, one sad irony stands out. The heart of Europe seems to be groping towards the cosmopolitan ideal - a federation rooted in equality - in commonality - melting divisions of history, language, religion and culture - a governance dedicated to sharing sovereignty. Canada seems to be slipping back towards an asymmetrical federation, a pseudo-federation of collectivities where nostalgic notions of regional nationalism and collective rights are subverting the federalist hope of individual equality. Canada's movement towards the cosmopolitan ideal - the transcendent federalist ideal - appears to be floundering while Europe's movement seems on a faster track. Europe is getting its house in order while Canada's house seems in messy disarray. This divergence keeps growing even though contemporary Canada has enjoyed a liberal history.

The word Canada stems from Iroquois meaning community. Canadian culture, after the 18th and 19th century skirmishes between European empires and the successful efforts to arrest the northern expansion of American 'manifest destiny', cheerfully distilled British culture as its touchstone, enriched by the vibrant French fact, while burying its equally exciting aboriginal past. Canada was a stranger to war at home. While Europe was divided and redivided by religious wars, Canada divided its school and legal systems to finesse its religious and linguistic conflict. War, within Canada, meant endless political quarrels between the regions of Canada and the orders of government, provincial and federal, about 'sovereignty', 'powers', 'language', 'alienation', 'distinctiveness', someone else's taxes and, an independent foreign profile different from our powerful neighbour to the south. Yet Canada keeps outstanding an open invitation to outsiders while Europe is wrestling with exclusionary rules. Nationalism, in Canada, was submerged by the rushing waves of diverse cultures that swept up on our shores. Now, today, the idea of Canada cannot be segregated from its multiculturalism or its neglected aboriginal roots where over one-third of the population has a first language other than French and English.

Europe's history reverberated with ethnic cleavages, religious divisions and endless war at home, colonial clashes abroad and from immigration policies designed to resist the progress of pluralism. European cultures were forged on the anvil of successive occupations by alien forces from without and tribal rivalries and reaction from within. Nationalism surfaced as a dike to stem the tide of 'alien' influences. Europe first toyed with the vogue that nation-states could masquerade as 'multinational' states. Unstable economic conditions prompted these enfeebled monarchic 'multinational' states to revert to nation-states by shedding their cultural coat of many colours. They quickly changed to uniforms of self-righteous culture, bristling with pride, worn only if adorned with epaulettes of ethnic 'purity' and national 'homogeneity'. The idea of nation collided with the very idea of culture. The battle between contesting schools was joined, confusing prejudice with pride.

Jacques Rupnik, a French scholar, has pointed out that the French Revolution galvanized universal ideas of community, a community of citizens, a humanist concept of culture, defined by Julien Benda as the 'autonomy of spirits'. This idea of civic equality, a society of equality was almost drowned by the Teutonic concept of culture which held that 'Volksgeist' - culture rooted deeply in specific geography, culture based on theories of 'purity' and 'heimat', culture premised on 'cults of superiority', culture deifying the 'collectivity' - was the true path of projection for the nation-state. Each European state vacillated between these contesting schools.

So 'national' culture was elevated to iconic proportions propelled by assumptions both false in practice and weak in theory. National cults are not culture. The origins of each 'national' culture was always 'polluted', never 'pure'. The origins of each 'national' culture owes its present to predecessor ideas - and ideas are never the monopoly of one people, one ethnic group, one place. Each idea had roots, hybrid roots, elsewhere. The tapestry of culture has evolved no less than the human species from many strands of history. Interaction between peoples animated culture. Each cultural strand began elsewhere. Culture is the piquant synthesis of 'alien' influences. Only the balance between borrowing from afar and invention at home varied the content of culture from state to state.

Historically, Canada and Europe organised themselves differently - and at a different pace. At first Canada led the way for settling its vast geography by a federalist ideal - a culture balanced on regional and individual equality - where particularity could flourish without inequality. Exhausted multicultural European empires collapsed. Europe became mired in nationalist theories of tribal superiority and particularity that finally exploded into two cataclysmic world wars. Now Europe has regained its poise and leads the way, while Canada lags behind. Still current differences in cultural organisation bear examination.

This is most evident in the most powerful cultural medium of our age - television - the 'electronic cannon' - as Pierre Trudeau once called it. It is now the 'electronic cannon' which is perplexing the new Europe and its Eastern cousins. Fear has replaced anticipation with the arrival of a multiplicity of channels.

The differences might be scrutinised through the prism of regulatory architecture that shaped Canadian television. At first television spectrum was scarce. From this scarce spectrum, at the outset, radio and television were rationed by Canada to construct viable East-West Canadian counterweights to offset the magnet of the mighty North-South pull of American cultural influence, electronic influence which could reach freely over the urban landscape of Canada camped along the endless peaceful border. Canadian content and Canadian ownership rules were established to ensure that the electronic highways in Canada would reserve sufficient economic space for Canadian owners, producers and artists to flourish. The state-owned enterprise CBC was given first priority. Only after CBC was well-established were Canadian-owned private and independent networks nationally and locally allowed to travel on the electronic highway - each licensed with conditions to act as an entrepot of cultural reconciliation and integration. With the advent of cable, the rationing system based on scarcity was obliterated. Abundance replaced scarcity. Satellites galvanised the regulatory control mechanism. Fragmentation of audiences became an economic problem - albeit a soluble problem - as television technology moved relentlessly forward. The choices were expanded by the cable networks. Today, Canada is one of the most cabled nations in the world, with over 75% of all houses connected to 35 channels or more.

Toronto, my home, became the most competitive television community in the world. It is not surprising that Toronto was a test bed for the theories of Marshall McLuhan and his mentor, Harold Innis, who both lived and taught there. Added to accessible American commercial and public networks were the Canadian public networks, the Canadian private networks, the parliamentary network, educational provincial networks, the French language national, provincial networks and independent, regional, and local services. Satellite speciality services, bilingual and third language, Canadian, American and European, were stirred into the mix. Alongside CNN, viewers can now watch a national/regional state news service called 'Newsworld' and federal and provincial parliamentary channels. Toronto is home to a youth cable channel dedicated to the robust teenage community, a music cable channel where the best of the world's pop music integrated with Canadian pop music and personalities gyrate in a dynamic seamless web, and even one channel where all religions must share oecumenically the broadcast week. Toronto's private multilingual station broadcasts 24 hours seven days per week, and, in 19 languages, serving the multifaceted ethnic communities across the metropolitan region. Each city located within the boundaries of greater metropolitan Toronto area has its own cable access channel for local access and information each filigreed with local and neighbourhood ethnic programmes. The organising ethic of Canada's television

architecture was to balance foreign with national, regional, local and ethnic programmes integrated as a mosaic, which in aggregate, enhanced Canadian bilingual and multicultural expression. Canada, by design, chose a process of cultural expression distinct from the United States, less American in style, lavishing greater regard for our European sensibilities and legacies. Canada's porous television architecture was more consistent with Canada's natural love of communications where the world's highest per capita daily telephone calls are placed and the highest per capita books of poetry are published, if unread.

Cities, towns and villages across Canada are offered the broadest range of television choice and at affordable prices. Given this explosion of choice, it is interesting to examine the impact on Toronto of this cornucopia of television. Toronto is one of the most integrated ethnically diverse metropolitan cities in the world - a place, as one wit puts it, where the police can arrest its citizens in over 90 languages and answer emergencies in 144 languages. Now less than 25% of Toronto families trace their origins to Great Britain and Ireland. Television democracy now reflects this new cultural reality - the faces, the voices, the thoughts of its diverse society, matching local access to local needs. Television catapulted the process of empowerment. The threat of civic and ethnic division has ebbed and almost disappeared with the advent of television choice from afar and democratic access to the electronic highway at home. Vigilant, sensitive, daily local coverage of the diverse communities has deflected polarisation and abetted integration. The political scheme from local councils to policing to education has slowly started to mirror the more democratic television profile, even though residues of racism and gender discrimination remain. Integration rather than disintegration, inclusion rather than exclusion became the cultural bridge, as tolerance became, more and more, the conventional wisdom of the electronic media and the totem of civic virtue. Respect for cultural differences crafted on equality, a mosaic rather than a melt-down into homogeneity, beyond cultural co-existence, has been the motivating postulate of television choice. As one author of war novels, mindful of Pascal's point wrote 'all the suffering of the world comes from people not being able to be in a room together.'

Now, Europe is slowly opening spectrum space to alternate choices from the government networks. Perhaps because of entrenched political sensitivity to communications in Europe, the control of communications is still rationed by most European governments. Governments still seem reluctant to open up the airwaves to broader choice. Technology has outpaced governance, indeed TV was itself an instrument of political change in the recent revolution in Europe. Eastern Europe was unable to restrain Western television and radio aroused in the struggle for freedom in the East. It is plain that satellites moved faster than governments. Surprisingly, there is now a growing reactionary movement in Europe against television choice. Recently, Vaclav Havel at Davos equated the expansion of commercial television culture to the great evils of the world such as international pollution. Russia's leading poet Yvegeny Yevtuschenko, recently made the same point in a different way. He despairs of the invasion of American-inspired 'pop' culture, at the expense of elitist domestic cultures. Are these opinion leaders, unwittingly, restyling an old demonology in new clothing? Why this fear of 'electronic colonialism'? Why this anxiety for the democratic distribution of electronic cultural capital? Where does the poet situate the 'city of yes' and the 'city of no'? And, is this not ironic? Both these leading 'dissident' figures fought for freedom and democracy. Both suffered from the limitations and the suffocation imposed by demon states where the electronic media was tightly controlled by the state. And now both fear the expansion of non-government controlled or foreign television - like King Canute of old,

ordering the tides to stop. Should we believe that foreign radio and television played no role in the revolution of the 1980s? Was free television not a powerful propeller in the peaceful revolution that cracked the Berlin wall and the 'Velvet Revolution' that toppled the tyrants of Prague? Or, should we heed the last public message of the late Satyajit Ray, legendary Indian film maker, he of *The Inner Eye*, who praised the profound influence of American films on his life and works?

Yet, critics equate commercial television to 'kitsch', junk culture, as vulgar pandering to the lowest appetites of the masses - thirty-second news-bites of electronic baby food, abstractions which numb the aesthetic sense and distort reality. Neglected are benefits of democratic access to even 'pop' culture, which television has transformed since it reached out to the broadest audiences assembled since Creation. Overlooked are the theories of great artists like Gauguin who sought truth in nature by impressions and abstractions. Are not newspapers, or histories, or poetry, abstractions of reality? Is education', as Laski once suggested, '... the art of teaching men to be deceived by the printed word?' Forgotten too is the fact that books, films, 'live' theatre, and the arts tend to multiply exponentially in urban communities that enjoy wider television choice. Electronic cross-culturalisation has spawned new comedic forms, new art forms such as skating and animation and new dramas through the creative catalyst of international co-production agreements. Magical concerts broadcast around the globe by the masters, Domingo, Carrerras and Pavarotti singing classics in Italian, Spanish, German and English attract new generations of audiences, emancipating music for millions. Co-produced 'mini' 'docu-drama' television series can traumatize old and new generations alike to remember that which the old would choose to forget. Or evening news-clips of a jungle war in distant Viet Nam can engage the soul of a generation, instigate a counter-culture, topple an all-powerful President and recast a nation's agenda. Such is the instant didactic power of the 'electronic cannon'.

Hans Magnus Ezensberger articulated another rationale why the power of television is threatening to some:

> 'The electronic media are entirely different from the older media like the book ... the exclusive class character of which is obvious ... Potentially the new media do away with all educational privileges and thereby with the cultural monopoly of the bourgeois intelligentsia. This is one of the reasons for the intelligentsia's resentment against the new industry. As for the 'spirit' which they are endeavouring to defend against 'depersonalisation' and 'mass culture', the sooner they abandon it the better. The new media are oriented towards action, not contemplation; towards the present, not tradition. Their attitude to time is completely opposed to that of bourgeois culture which aspires to possession ... The media produce no objects that can be hoarded and auctioned ... that is to say, the class-specific handing on of non-material capital.'

McLuhan in his introduction to Innis' pioneering work *The Bias of Communication* described his mentor's perceptions:- 'By bouncing the unknown form against the known forms, he discovered the nature of new or little known forms ... Innis is concerned with the unique power of each form to alter the action of other forms it encounters'. As for Innis himself, he demonstrated that, at times, new enthusiasm and an intense flowering of culture is incidental ... [to] ... a perishing Empire ... [or] ... a declining civilisation ... [when she is], reassembling her intellectual energy to throw a last splendid glow'. Innis

explained that each flowering of culture, each broadening of knowledge, each advance of civilisation, depended on the accessibility to wider, faster and cheaper dissemination of new means of communication 'when a monopoly or an oligopoly of knowledge is built up to the point that equilibrium is disturbed'. In *The Bias of Communication*, Innis concluded that in countries where

> 'culture has had an opportunity to expand, politics have become less of an obsession, and leadership has been given to Western civilization. Culture survives ideologies and political institutions, or rather it subordinates them to the influence of constant criticism. Constant whining about the importance of our way of life is foreign to its temper'.
>
> 'Electronic colonialism' dissipates in direct ratio to its dissemination.

Cultures are quickly transforming organisms that flourish best under conditions of freedom or, when suffocated, illicitly gasp for freedom. Cultures are based best on contesting ideas of truth. And surely truth is based on choice. Truth is inseparable from choice. Michel Foucault in his complete *The Order of Things* premised that 'the structure proper to individual experience finds ... possible choices and ... excluded possibilities'. Knowledge, transmitted by spontaneous new networks is creating a new, as yet undefined, electric cultural synthesis of human communication. The new is not driving out the old. Rather the new is redefining the good. Each ideology that infected the idea of Europe had its own version of truth and culture. Does not cultural creativity thrive precisely in ethnic diversity and interaction - even on peaceful rivalry and artistic collision amongst different cultures? Carlos Fuentes, in his recent work *The Hidden Mirror* has uncovered the dynamic interactivity and tension of the old world with the new on the multiple facets of Spanish culture. He writes:

> 'Peoples and their cultures perish in isolation, but they are borne or reborn in contact with other men and women, with men and women of another culture, another creed, another race. If we do not recognize our humanity in others, we shall not recognize it in ourselves'.

Yet narrow ideas - exclusive ideas, protected ideas, 'patriotic' ideas, ideas that stereotype, isolated ideas, ideas that are not free to be challenged, ideas bred in pride that spawn prejudice persist - ideas can maim and do destroy. This is the lesson of the old Europe. Is this not the moral of the epic struggle between Copernicus and a Church fearful of any attempt even to contemplate a science that would exchange the anchor of one planet as the epicentre of the universe.

The trio of 'isms' - the three miserable brothers of Europe - Fascism, Marxism and Nationalism - continue to haunt Europe. Fascism asserts the superiority of its core citizenry to exclusion of others. Marxism believes in the struggle between classes at the expense of individual freedom. Nationalism believes that the exclusion of other nationalities is the only way. Each 'ism' spawns cells of destruction. Each 'ism' injects a virus into the body politic that harshly undermines individual freedom and respect for the equality of individuals.

Since Charlemagne, the illiterate 'Godfather' of Europe, the idea of Europe has vacillated between two potent messages - ideas best personified by Erasmus and Luther. Erasmus preached the universal message - the message of pluralism - the message of

humanism. Luther preached a message of nationalism - tribalism, determinism, particularism, religion and culture that owed first obedience to the State. Clearly, the one cancerous idea that has plagued the 20th century has been the bellicose excesses of the modern state - the false premise, its chauvinism, its nationalism. The Erasmus idea appears to have overtaken the Luther ideal in the new Europe. Meanwhile, the Lutheran ideal appears to have regained respectability in parts of Canada. Still some despair of the apostasy to the idea of Europe when even moderate European leaders insist 'Germany is not an immigration country' or fulminate that France has been 'invaded' by foreigners and citizenship should be restricted only to children of French parents.

Modern observers note that the young generation has already raced beyond nationalism and obedience to the nation-state to a broader European loyalty - a 'pop' citizenry - a modern humanism of mutual respect for different ideas. They have created a European junk pop culture - a 'Pop' European. This pop culture, that elitists argue is a contradiction in terms, bursts with vitality, celebrates pluralism, diversity, cultural and individual freedom. The pop culture rejects the hangover of nationalism and communism. Pop culture thrives precisely on 'disobedience to the norm', in contradiction to convention, or dissolving dogma and as a check against state power.

The gargantuan appetite for even 'kitsch' North American films and fast foods, music, clothes and hairstyles is merely one measurement of the new openness to ideas. Is the greater evil freedom, or confining state regulation? At the turn of the century Europe enjoyed a burst of cultural openness and picaresque freedom in music, art, theatre and architecture when it embraced 'the marginal, the perverse and the excluded'. Spain enjoyed a similar flowering of cross-culturalisation in the sciences and arts under benign Arab rule almost 1,000 years ago. This new generation in Europe already practises a European polyglot cosmos culture. This electronic pop culture is shared by the youth in Canada. Observe carefully their dress, their styles, listen carefully to their music and watch carefully the films and the television they see and we can detect a growing landscape of universal culture, a boisterous panache, that is joyfully accepted by the youth of the world. 'Star Trek' - the future world - is their living electronic fantasy. Though America may be the predominant cultural force for now, the transformation of 'Star Trek - The Next Generation', with its international crew first led by an American and now commanded by a European augmented by an interplanetary and inter-species crew, faithfully mirrors the evolution of the new culture. This supranational state of mind conciliates rather than feeds upon competing nationalisms. Local ideas and local customs quickly blend into this growing landscape of universalism, this growing pluralist idea. From my vantage point it is the politicians and the political structures which seem to be failing, falling behind. Those that would argue that there should be new walls to electronic media in an age of plenty, of abundant programming, of cable compression and fibre optics is to declare a 'Kulturkampf' - a war against the idea of a borderless Europe, against the idea of imagination networks. Yet TV from afar can contain hidden perils which lurk to arouse resentment if foreign cultural models are imported without assuring the real needs and resources of society share the screen.

Nationalism is rearing its ugly head against the idea of Canada and the idea of Europe. Turbulent economics aggravated by slothful governments is the fertile soil of national discontent. New nostrums are avidly sought. In Canada Quebecois nationalism and reactionary regionalism attack and weaken the federal centre. In Europe, petty nationalism and nascent extremism in France, Germany and elsewhere threaten the European federalist convergence.

Is it possible to detect when the vital signs of liberal democracy begin to ebb and the bacilli of nationalism start to proliferate? Does liberal democracy contain an immune system, an early warning system which sounds the alarm when virulent nationalism courses through the body politic? What are the signs? Watch carefully. Usually, the disease starts with a rush of adrenalin, defined by Freud as 'projection' or 'transference' - the 'humiliation' by others, the 'failure' by others, the 'betrayal' from within by others - at first, a simple hyperbole, then a small falsehood, and finally a lie that inflates. Watch more carefully as addiction appears to take hold - a subtle shift, a transformation and then, suddenly a metamorphosis from politician to scoundrel who, when confounded by collapsing public opinion, manic for help, desperately strung out, stretches for support and solace from the extremes of anxiety to the inner edges of fear and connects to the politics of outrage.

Can free television, with its instant power to magnify, act as democracy's barometer, diagnose a decline, predict the onslaught of a cerebral seizure of chauvinism? Witness when ethics is eclipsed by enmity, and fact is displaced by fetish; when rationality is confused with regression and reason is replaced by repression; when patriotism becomes pregnant with prejudice and plausibility gives way to paranoia; when crowds crave coercion, and discourse overflows with discrimination, when morality is submerged by mendacity and ecstasy is equated with exclusivity; when dreams are delusions - these symptoms of deterioration multiply, as a society loses its balance, amplify, as a seizure gathers strength, and accelerate as, Thomas Mann once wrote, the 'clotting of the brain' begins.

Czeslaw Milosz illuminates yet another period of nationalism, a transference of blind patriotism, unswerving passion that arises when old loyalties are broken and abate.

> 'A faithfulness to one nation may be endowed with a religious aura, especially when the religious beliefs are weakened or eroded ... Utter scepticism and an awareness of the relativity of values are combined with an attachment to one absolute; an unconditional loyalty to one's nation ... This collusion of religious and national feelings must worry some ... for it is full of dangers ...'

Milosz warns that '... to abolish a clear distinction ...' between the secular and the sacred is to ignore the dark lessons of old Europe's past.

If Europe, like Canada, opts for Luther's particular deterministic cultural model, a narrow national model - at the expense of the Erasmus universal model as an idea of the future - will take a curving road backward, backward to the past. Particularism, regionalism and petty nationalisms can usurp the new Europe and return it to the arms of the nation-state awaiting anxiously to divert, pervert and convert the power of the state and technology to narrow national aims. We witness today the older scoundrel generation in parts of Eastern Europe leading the retreat back into tribal enclaves. Perhaps we should remember Kafka's warning that '... the wall ... if it binds itself, soon begins to tear madly at its bonds, until it renders everything asunder, the wall, the bonds, and its very self'. Is it still only the young who comprehend that the environment, the ecology, is a universal priority and not a local issue? Is there any better way than to reach out quickly to open the airwaves to diversity and plurality with all the dangers and all the benefits that such freedom attracts? The acid test is whether the new networks of imagination will be able to capture the best from afar while keeping elbow room for access at the local

level. The delicate task of the new Europe is to craft a creative balance; an equilibrium between reserving and preserving economic space on the new electronic highway for each culture to flourish while lowering the toll gates for access for cultures from afar. The new cable networks provide the ideal mediator to conduct this new concert of Europe.

The biblical tale of the Tower of Babel reminds us that in the beginning one culture, one language and one architectural idea overwhelmed all others. Divine intervention chose a multiplicity of tongues and a diversity of cultures as the better way. Plurality was closer to the universal divinic idea than singularity. The cosmopolitan ideal, confusing, complex, pluralistic became the biblical ideal - the foundation of - one inspired idea, wrapped in human diversity - where the stranger was welcomed as family at every home fire.

We live in an artful modern world - replete with ambiguity and paradox. The late I B Singer prefaced one of his last books: 'Art ... can also, in its small way, attempt to mend the mistakes of the eternal builder in whose image man was created'. The demons still roam among us. Europe's wandering intelligentsia, seduced by the Marxist idea, cuckolded by the Fascist idea, confounded as ever, has yet to regain its footings, and now is tempted, due to the uncertainty of change, to worship once again at the altar of nationalism. While our enthusiasm for a rebirth of Pilsudski's avant garde federalist dream which expected that 'newly liberated [states] ... of Central and Eastern Europe needed each other more than they needed sovereignty ...' has been dampened for now, economic realism married to tangible benefits flowing from the idea of Europe may soon revive Pilsudski's vision. The choices for the idea of Canada, for the idea of Europe, both West and East, seem obvious. Are we moving towards open circuits, universal ideas - pluralism - a catholic pluralism that does not yield to the allure of a particular narrow nationalistic value system promoting exclusivity and self-defined superiority while sacrificing of universalism and mutual respect. French ideas of universality which once animated Central and Eastern Europe and then were embalmed by Marxism were re-awakened from their deep sleep by the dazzling, coalescing energy of Solidarity. Solidarity showed the way. The nervous energy of Solidarity fragmented Marxism by first shattering the glass walls of class dividing its society. Regretfully, the broken shards of class distinction remain sharp and the jagged edges still present a danger to the life and limbs of the pluralist ideal. Pluralism and progress cannot thrive without one another. Only the embrace of unity, only the elation of the shared embrace of pluralism and progress together can lift social mobility and grasp social justice.

Josef Skvorecky espouses a *Bohemia of the Soul* - a patriotism not soiled by false loyalties to geography or hallucinations or homeland, not stained by synthetic faithfulness to notions of nationalism or communism - a commitment to one's culture not at the cost or to the exclusion of another. Salman Rushdie recites that Mahatma Ghandi, when asked what he thought of English civilisation replied, 'I think it would be a good idea'. The cosmopolitan state is the idea of Canada. Will the idea and ideal be achieved? Is it still too soon to predict? Will our poets write eulogies or elegies for this 'savage age'? Will we squander this magnificent opportunity for an electronic solidarity, a shared destiny? Questions, questions, so many questions, too few answers!

John Alleyne, the ingenious Canadian artistic director of Ballet British Columbia, attributed his adventuresome creativity to his recent experience in Europe that he brought back on his return to Canada.

> 'My time in Europe was so important, it was such an education', he says. 'I was exposed to so many art forms and I realised how close they really are and how much we steal from each other and how much we are influenced by each other ...'
>
> Goethe wrote:
>
> 'There is no patriotic art and no patriotic science. Both belong, like every exalted good to the whole world and can be fostered only by the ... free co-operation of all with constant regard for what remains known to us from the past ...'

Is Goethe's idea of Europe contagious or is it still but a mirage? Will we read *The Satanic Verses* as tantalising history or watch them with numb horror re-run on television news? While our external world draws electronically together, our interior geography remains an unexplored wilderness. Hope, like the magic realism of culture, can only be generated by optimism. So, friends, do not look beyond to the satellites or the distant stars, or listen to the echo of the 'electronic cannon', the answer is closer, the answer rests deep inside each of us.

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

1992: Europe and North America The dialogue of the new solidarities

Strasbourg, 19 and 20 June 1992

Colloquy organised by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe

RUSSIA AFTER THE SOVIET UNION :
APPROACHING EUROPE - OR MOVING AWAY ?

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The dismantlement of the Soviet Union has led to the deepest changes on the political map of the continent, even more dramatic than those that had resulted from two other major mutations of the European international system in the 20th century - namely, the revolution of 1917 in Russia and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian empire. It has also affected in the most substantial way the traditional dilemma of Moscow with respect to its self-identification vis-à-vis the external world in general and Europe in particular.

The fragmented political heritage of the former superpower transforms the interaction with Europe into a multi-dimensional problem with specific (and different) parameters for the successors of the USSR. Each of them faces a task of defining its own foreign and security policy priorities. The values of the past (even if associated with the Soviet 'new political thinking') have become irrelevant under the present circumstances, whereas searching for a substitute requires both some internal consolidation (which is often ephemeral) and stable external environment (which is non-existent).

Russia has a special status in facing this challenge. It played the most important role in destroying the USSR - or, to put it in a more appropriate way, in finalising its self-destruction. It is the largest and the most powerful of the former Soviet republics; though for the time being the viability of the country in the world arena is substantially minimised by the deep internal crisis, in the long run it cannot avoid operating as one of the major international actors (even if without global ambitions). Last but not least, Russia is de facto recognised by the international community (including the other CIS states) as having the right and the obligation to take upon itself the lion's share of the legacy of the former Soviet Union.

In all these capacities Russia has to address a number of uncertainties in its European agenda.

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It is impossible to define only one reason responsible for the collapse of the former Soviet Union. They were certainly numerous and deserve special analysis. But it is quite obvious that one of them consisted in the dramatic lack of effective political and economic reforms. The legitimacy crisis of the Gorbachev's leadership was generated primarily by its inability to carry out radical transformation of the society.

From this point of view the advent to power of more radically oriented political forces does represent a real breakthrough in terms of 'Westernisation' of the society - or at least of the political line pursued by the country. Nobody could contest the historical role of Michael Gorbachev in overcoming the self-isolation of the USSR and in opening up a perspective of co-operative relationships with the former 'class enemies'. However, all his international prestige and unprecedented charisma for the West notwithstanding, some limits of this development had been determined at the very initial stages and were actually reached by the beginning of the 1990s.

The insistence on 'socialist choice' proved to be politically fatal to the initiator of perestroika. This 'credo', far from being only a fact of rhetoric or a manifestation of ideological integrity, affected both legislation and allocation of resources. What is more, it was not only an element of the internal political process in the Soviet Union, but that

of the foreign policy thinking as well. For example, the notion of 'common European house', even if connected with a number of specific goals of the Soviet diplomacy, in its direct sense represented an open appeal for more civilised (predictable, less expensive, constructive etc.) relations between two *different* political systems on the continent - thus proceeding from the assumption that both of them would last forever.

The European adherence of the new political elites of Russia, if compared with this recent *mot d'ordre* of the Soviet diplomacy, is by far more radical and substantial. It is no more a question of managing East-West relations, as one of the two parts of this equation has definitely and irreversibly disappeared with the collapse of the USSR. For the same reason it is no more a question of preserving a certain balance of forces in the international arena, even if delicately renamed balance of interests. It is even not a question of searching for some kind of face-saving solutions in order to avoid being humiliated - as the Russian leadership has all the reasons to reject any continuity with respect to the previous inhabitants of the Kremlin.

It is exactly the collapse of the 'real socialism' as political and economic system based on the communist ideology which permits to overcome all ambiguities of the former Soviet Union with respect to its proclaimed 'Europeanisation'. None of traditional considerations could restrain Russia in its reduction of military forces as Moscow does not have to be suspicious towards NATO perceived no longer as the worst enemy but as a partner. Trying to introduce the market economy, Russia has chosen the only possible way to overcome its fundamental incompatibility with the West. Renouncing deeply rooted pretentions on political primogeniture, overcoming illusions (and temptations) of Messianism, recognising the major values of representative democracy, the Russian political consciousness is becoming much closer to Europe than ever before.

It is true that the process is painful and controversial. The price to be paid for such kind of 'Europeanisation' is extremely high; the successful outcome is not guaranteed in the immediate future, whereas serious difficulties affecting not only the national economy and the standards of living but also the political infrastructure, seem inevitable. The national mentality is frustrated both by the collapse of the traditional values and by the uncertainties of the future. However, it is the only way out of the deadlock resulting from a giant social and political experiment. To have such a chance, the demise of the Soviet Union should have been invented even if the latter were still in existence.

However, Russia is emerging out of the Soviet drama as an entity that will not necessarily be closer to Europe. Even if politically it has become much more 'pro-European' (i.e. pro-Western) oriented, the general circumstances of its renaissance are far from being favourable to such kind of *rapprochement* with the 'other Europe'.

The irony of the situation consists in the fact that the reassessment of the *raison d'être* of the state and of the society, so important for the former Soviet Union, has lost the validity of the main 'pro-European' argument.

In the USSR, to introduce a new course with respect to the major aspects of the social life (economic system, political institutions, security policy, fundamentals of relations with the outside world etc.) was equivalent to a peaceful revolution. This in itself constituted a dramatic challenge to the traditional 'anti-western' values and

patterns of political behaviour, thus being a major asset of the reformist leadership in its relations with Europe.

It is no longer the case for the 'new' Russia - exactly because it has emerged as a kind of alternative to the 'old' USSR, with its own values and political foundations. What used to be a dramatic breakthrough in the society getting rid of the totalitarian heritage, should be now just a normal pattern for the society that pretends to be normal. What used to fascinate the political class (and public opinion in general) both inside and outside the country, should not even be a matter of discussion since the 'old regime' is over.

Paradoxically, the continuation of the Soviet Union would have preserved the importance of its ongoing 'conversion'. But what is certainly a virtue for a pagan is just a matter of routine for a true believer. Democracy, market, human rights etc. - all these attributes of the 'European choice' of the former Soviet leadership - are still the necessary, but certainly not sufficient, conditions for being accepted into the European family.

On the contrary, in relative terms the access to Europe has become even more problematic. Since the 'choice' itself is much less important than it was the case until recently, the quality of the above-mentioned attributes are considered as the main test. And it becomes clear that the democracy is not operating and could even remain only declaratory in the absence of real political parties; that the market is only symbolic with the continuation of state-owned monopolies and without adequate legislation; that the human rights could be empty phrase if they are not efficiently defended by the courts.

In other words, the good intentions do not count any more. A great asset of Russia consists in the readiness of its present leadership to go beyond these intentions and to initiate real changes. But the price of the ticket to Europe has substantially increased. To mobilise all economic and political resources for being able to pay the bill represents the fundamental challenge for Russia searching its ways to Europe.

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Another complicating factor for Moscow is also the result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The latter was much closer to Europe in terms of space than Russia is now. What used to be the immediate neighbourhood for the country controlling almost all its Warsaw Pact allies is now separated from Russia by two territorial belts comprising the former 'socialist' countries and the former republics of the USSR.

Having suddenly become the most remote territory of Europe, Russia has to reassess its foreign policy priorities in the most radical way. The second edition of the *'entente cordiale'* between Moscow and Paris, as well as some kind of 'special relationship' with Germany cultivated (or at least hinted at) up until the most recent past will hardly be included into the current international agenda of Russia. Instead, the immediate vicinity becomes a matter of serious concerns.

They seem more than justified with respect to practically all the old and 'new' European neighbours of Russia. The responsibility for the former Soviet troops' withdrawal from the Baltic states, open territorial claims on the part of Latvia and Estonia, a possibility of 'finlandisation' in Karelia with some uncertainty as far as the

reaction of Helsinki is concerned, the development of the 'great schism' with the Ukraine - these are only some of the problems that are becoming of primary importance for Moscow.

Deliberating these and some other issues with the neighbours, Russia in some respects is more vulnerable and open to external pressures as compared with the former Soviet Union. Not only because of the reduced size and military and political weight of the country, but also due to a more compromise-oriented mentality that is being introduced by the new leadership into the Russian foreign policy. For example, the future arrangement with Japan on the question of the Kurile Islands - regardless the format and the time-framework of such an arrangement - could seriously affect the whole problem of territorial claims with respect to Russia, including its European part. Paradoxically, such kind of the 'domino effect' could retroactively justify the rigidity of the unequivocal 'Niet' policy pursued in the times of Mr Gromyko - or even generate a certain renaissance of that policy.

A real challenge for the foreign policy of Moscow is represented by the problem of the so-called 'Russian speaking population' in the former Soviet republics. Even if the issue is potentially much more explosive with respect to the Central Asian states, the relations with the new European neighbours of Russia will most probably be affected as well. Actually, the problem has already worsened the interaction with the Baltic states, thus minimising, if not reducing to zero all the positive potential created by the active support of their move to independence on the part of the democratic forces in Russia (including President Yeltsin).

In a sense, Russia is a victim of the short-sighted and obstinate policy line of the former Soviet leadership which was the strongest incentive for the extremist nationalist tendencies on the periphery of the empire. Even the most developed civil societies in the Baltics could not have prevented the practice that does not fully correspond to the democratic and human rights criteria. This deplorable situation, in its turn, encourages further nationalist feelings in Russia and gives some ground to great power and revanchist speculations *'à la Zhirinovsky'*.

The Russian foreign policy could become a double hostage of both external and internal nationalisms accelerating each other. Even if this model is not a unique one in history, the scale of the challenge seems unprecedented - thus complicating enormously the European agenda for Russia. And may be not only for Russia.

The most impressive illustration is given by the development in the Trans-Dniester region. All the rational considerations in favour of non-involvement, including the obvious argument on the absence of common borders, are far from reducing the attention of the political class and of the public opinion in general towards this explosive issue - which in itself generates some additional pressure on the foreign policy of Russia. Incidentally, the cumulative effect goes further - causing nervousness in Romania and hardly contributing to warm feelings between Bucharest and Moscow. Would it be a pure imagination to think about next possible stages of this development - namely, escalation of nationalist tendencies in Romania up to the revival of the local great power syndrome, increasing tension in its relations with other neighbours, emergence of a new conflict seat in the Balkans, etc? If so, a great historic responsibility of Russia with respect to Europe consists in preventing such kind of worst case scenarios at their very initial phases.

This refers to practically all the issues emerging in the relations of Russia with its neighbours - but most of all to those concerning the Ukraine. The case is of special relevance due to a number of unresolved problems. That of the Black Sea fleet is probably the least important, the sensitivity of Russia being apparently a matter of some symbolism rather than related to rational considerations (though it is quite clear, that the Mediterranean will become actually inaccessible for the Russian navy). But the question of the Crimea has all the chances to become a real apple of discord, taking into account questionable legacy of its belonging to the Ukraine and rather strong support in Russia of a revisionist line. It seems, however, that the latter - if continued - could both damage the 'Europeanism' of Moscow and make its position even more vulnerable with respect to the territorial claims addressed to Russia.

One more issue involving Russia in hot debates with the Ukraine concerns the nuclear status of the latter. But here the international community has certainly much more convincing arguments, whereas Moscow could have some problems in explaining to Kiev why the Russian nuclear arsenal would be necessarily much better than the Ukrainian one. In this case the interests of Europe in preventing the nuclear proliferation seems to correspond completely with those of Russia that will hardly feel more secure while having an independent nuclear deterrent force close to its borders. However, the Russian diplomacy will probably have to be more than cautious in order not to damage the long-term perspectives of relations with the Ukraine - by far more important than a would-be doubtful honour to pull chestnuts out of the fire for the others.

There is one more reason why it seems important for Russia to avoid antagonising itself from the Ukraine. The latter will almost certainly operate as a kind of a challenger with respect to the European policy of Moscow. Both successors of the Soviet Union will compete with each other for political and economic 'attention' on the part of the West. And the pretensions of the Ukraine to be considered as a 'genuine' European country will hardly be based only on some ephemeral considerations of deep-rooted historic legacy or exclusive heritage of the 'Kiev Russia' (9th-13th century). More important is the argument mentioning both geopolitical status and cultural characteristics of the country - as opposed to those of Russia with its huge extension beyond the Urals and Kazakhstan/Central Asian connections.

Actually, for Russia the problem is not limited only by its relations with the Ukraine. For quite a number of obvious reasons Russia cannot permit the luxury of not being an actor in the Asian scene - even if for the moment paying primary attention only to a part of it. On the contrary, the lack of such attention is already a matter of criticism addressed to the Russian diplomacy - for 'oversleeping' Central Asia and creating there a kind of power vacuum.

Whether an alternative policy line would necessarily 'divert' Russia from Europe remains an open question. At the same time the problem should be addressed not only in terms of the interests of Russia, as some more global trends are at stake there. Debates focusing upon the danger of the Islamic fundamentalism - even if they exaggerate somehow the perspective of its offensive - are certainly related to the future development of Central Asia and in this context to the future role of Russia in this region.

However, this role will also depend on the more general self-perception of Russia. The question, if raised in a very simplified form, is to which extent Russia is going to ally with the West - with an alternative approach stressing the necessity to be either a leader

of the less developed countries or a 'bridge' between the North and the South (as a variant: between Europe and Asia). A simple ideological answer to this question of 'double geopolitical identity' of Russia. Will it be a burden or an asset depends to a very large extent on the ability to mobilise the art of diplomacy.

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Due to the ideological and geopolitical changes as well as to the ongoing internal crisis Moscow could (or had to) modify substantially the attitude towards different multilateral mechanisms operating or based in Europe.

In the past the hesitations of the Soviet Union with respect to the European Community reflected the apprehension that it could become a viable alternative to the international influence of Moscow - first of all in Europe. Since the problem itself is removed from the agenda, the EC is no longer perceived as a challenger but rather as the most reliable partner in Europe. Not only the important (and positive) role of the EC is fully recognised, but all the traditional concerns with respect to its possible 'expansion', 'politicisation' or 'militarisation' have been resolutely abandoned.

Apparently, the main reason consists in the ability of the 'Twelve' to provide Russia with the economic assistance which by far exceeds that of the other participants in the 'Club of the rich'. Apart from that, the results of the centripetal development in Western Europe in general and the breakthrough in Maastricht in particular are perceived as especially impressive in the light of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. At last, Moscow has all the grounds to consider very positively the fact that the EC could operate as a 'pacifier' in the general disorder prevailing in the eastern part of the continent.

If there is any uneasiness of Moscow with respect to the Community, this can be only the understanding that a full membership of Russia is hardly possible. When the EC signed the new agreements with Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary whereas the 'ex-neutrals' began to apply for joining the Community, it became clear that the model of 'concentric circles' has all the chances to prevail in Europe - with Russia remaining either in the most peripheral one or outside the whole construction.

It means that with respect to what is emerging as the most viable economic and political structure in Europe neither full membership nor equal partnership is a realistic perspective for Russia. Even if not recognised openly, the assessment of such situation could be rather painful. Here again all the ideological and political changes that have taken place in the country might not be helpful; for example, recognising the right of Finland to participate in the EC does not necessarily imply accepting the border between Russia and Finland as that between Russia and Europe.

NATO has been the matter of even more substantial reassessment in Moscow. Only two years ago the efforts of the Soviet diplomacy were focused upon preventing the participation of the united Germany in this structure - which in itself was a meaningful sign of the perceptions prevailing in Moscow. Only one year ago the argument stating that it is absolutely necessary for NATO to restrain from expanding its zone of responsibility onto the former Warsaw Pact countries in order not to provoke Moscow was more than convincing. Since that not only all these considerations have lost their validity

but NATO itself has been turned into position to play down the excessive enthusiasm of the ex-enemies searching for its guarantees and even insisting on membership.

In principle, security co-operation with NATO could become one of the most important channels of interaction with Europe. Russia as one of the major military powers on the continent has some grounds to pretend on a more respectable status than in other fields where its positions are seriously undermined. However, due to the uncertainties of internal development (in this respect first of all as far as the reorganisation of the ex-Soviet military forces is concerned) any conclusions about the scope and the forms of such co-operation seem for the moment premature.

The dramatic developments in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union have created strong incentives for a 'new start' of the CSCE mechanism. The agenda of Moscow has undergone substantial changes in this respect as well. If in the past there were permanent (and not always unjustified) suspicions that the West wanted to use the CSCE for interfering in the internal affairs of the Eastern partners, now it is exactly this role that Russia seems ready to impose on the 'Helsinki process'. The reason is obvious: to make internationally accountable those of the new neighbours whose behaviour is or could become a matter of concern for Russia.

This approach is not without some theoretically envisageable expenses for Russia as well - if, for example, it is involved in serious external conflicts or if, in the worst case scenario, the force is used inside the country to preserve its integrity. However, for the time being it seems quite probable that Russia will be a strong supporter of any measures that could be suggested in order to increase both the efficiency of the CSCE and its role in ensuring stability.

To turn the CSCE into a corner-stone of the 'new European architecture' has some other advantages for Russia as well. As the main successor of the Soviet Union, it could be considered in this structure (or at least consider itself) not as a newcomer but as one of the founders - which will not be a secondary factor for the Russian diplomacy. Even more important is the participation of the USA in the CSCE, which justifies the participation of Russia as well and nullify the concerns about its size and 'non-Europeanism'.

By and large, the specific interests of Russia coincide with the stirring up of the CSCE and have certainly contributed to this development. Paradoxically, one more result seems quite opposite from the point of view of the future role of the CSCE mechanism - that is the admission of the Asian republics of the former Soviet Union as full members. Though the logic of this hasty expansion is quite understandable, its consequences may have not been sufficiently thought over. Will this bring the 'Europeanisation' of the new independent states or the 'de-Europeanisation' of the CSCE remains to be seen. But one cannot exclude that the perspective of increasing its efficiency has become more questionable.

Against this background the Council of Europe, even if less ambitious in its scope of activity, has a great advantage of remaining a truly continental structure. It is there that Russia could operate first of all as a European country - rather than as the former superpower which has to be counterbalanced by the remaining one, or as a junior partner trying to find its place in the backyard of the 'common European house'.

The very substance of the problems that the Council of Europe deals with is of utmost importance for Russia exactly in terms of its Europeanisation. At the same time, the very participation in this structure will make Russia internationally accountable on a non-discriminatory basis - thus avoiding real or even perceived damages both to political prestige of the country and to its re-emerging national self-consciousness.

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1992: Europe and North America The dialogue of the new solidarities

Strasbourg, 19 and 20 June 1992

Colloquy organised by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE

Robert D. Blackwill
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Three years after the revolutions began in Eastern Europe, the United States' policy toward that region remains a source of at least some transatlantic disagreement. Nevertheless, it seems doubtful at present whether the United States, as most Europeans would like, will be a preeminent actor in the future of Eastern Europe in the 1990s as it has been three times earlier in this century: immediately after World War I under Woodrow Wilson's vision of the new Europe; during World War II when Hitler's armies were vanquished; and throughout the long years of the Cold War when America and its allies refused to accept Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and followed successfully the strategy of containment that eventually contributed to the breakup of the Soviet empire.

Although the United States has been far from idle with regard to Eastern Europe since the revolutions there began in 1989, the United States' hesitation on becoming more significantly involved has several sources. Many Americans in this election year and after the West's victory in the Cold War yearn to take a break from at least some international responsibilities and commitments. In sophisticated expression, this phenomenon is more than classical isolationism. When calling for renewed emphasis on the United States' domestic problems, proponents of this view, of course, point to America's decaying infrastructure and brutal inner cities, its serious educational deficiencies, its decline in international commercial competitiveness, its large balance of trade deficit, its enormous budget deficit, and its huge debt.

But in addition to these familiar and powerful themes, many American strategists are asking fundamental geopolitical questions concerning the implications of the collapse of the Soviet Union and of communism for United States national security policy. They argue that no longer must the United States find, because of Soviet adventurism, a compelling interest in every far reach of the globe. Rather, given the strategic earthquake that has occurred, they say that for reasons of both good sense and budgetary realities, America must become more discriminating with regard to its central international interests and responsibilities.

This is not a foolish conclusion and for the purposes of this brief essay the following question arises: in the context of at least some necessary withdrawal of American international commitment, resources and energy, where should Eastern Europe fit in? One way to get at this issue is to list the United States' objectives that might define what countries, regions and issues should be at or near the top of the post-Cold War American national security agenda.

A first crucial factor often noted in determining the priority subjects on the United States' international agenda has its roots in the slippage of American economic competitiveness and determination in Washington to reverse this corrosive trend. This argument suggests that issues of political economy and especially trade have overtaken security questions as the most critical matters for the United States in the next decade. Although the trade and attendant political disputes between the United States and Japan tend to dominate this item, it is also reflected in United States' worries about European Community protectionism, especially in agricultural products; about the future of the international trading system and the GATT; and it has led to efforts to create a North American free trading system. Again, the nations of Eastern Europe and their problems have no particular relevance in any immediate sense to this set of intense American trade concerns.

The second goal most experts might mention is no stranger to strategists; it is to prevent a nuclear attack on the American homeland, or on United States' forces or allies abroad. This preoccupation, which is closely related to the future political structure and international orientation of Russia, is gaining strength in Washington. It has produced $ 400 million from the Congress to deal with nuclear problems arising from the disintegration of the Soviet Union; increased attention to the likelihood of nuclear proliferation; growing interest in altering or abandoning the ABM treaty in order to erect a minimum United States ballistic missile defence; and American leadership inputting together the $ 24 billion aid package for the Yeltsin government. At least in the short to mid-term, Eastern Europe thankfully does not figure in these nuclear calculations, but therefore neither does it often grip the imagination or precious time of the Washington policy-maker.

Many Americans clearly want the attack on drugs near the top of the national security agenda. Perhaps no other international issue carries such an emotional weight with the American public and this issue routinely tops polls with regard to external concerns of ordinary American citizens.

The fourth and fifth goals that frequently appear in public discussion have to do with protecting America's foreign oil supply and, given the Middle East dimension of that goal, at the same time supporting Israel's right to exist within peaceful and secure borders. The primacy of these considerations animated America's entry into the Gulf war, Secretary of State Baker's many visits to the region in 1991, the Washington and Madrid Middle East peace conferences, and recent United States activism regarding the future of the former Soviet republics of Central Asia. Warsaw, Prague and Budapest are far in distance and relevance from these United States national security objectives.

The sixth major priority often expressed in the media has to do with promoting stability and democratic change in America's immediate vicinity. Although the long-standing worry about Soviet penetration of the hemisphere has disappeared, there remain many social and economic causes of instability in the region that frequently fasten the attention of Washington policy makers. Mexico tops any list in this regard but problems with illegal Haitian immigration, questions concerning Cuba after Castro that have a strong domestic political content, and interest on the part of the rapidly growing hispanic community of the United States in affairs to the South all push policy decisions relating to this goal on to important desks in Washington. Moreover, South America is the United States faster growing international market.

Finally, and closer to Eastern Europe and its challenges, the United States retains from the Cold War the wish to preserve the North Atlantic Alliance that kept peace on the European Continent for more than forty years. The importance of this seventh objective to the American political elite has receded to some degree following the end of the Soviet conventional military threat to Western Europe, but it continues to occupy the United States'policy makers who are concerned that too great a change too soon in NATO's membership and broad mission will confuse Americans as to the Alliance's *raison d'être* following the Cold War, and consequently undermine domestic support for continued United States troop deployments in Europe. So European security retains its place, if diminished, on the United States'national security agenda. Nevertheless, there exists a tension even on this, the sole primary United States national security goal in at least some minds in Washington that directly involves Eastern Europe. That tension is between keeping NATO a vital and effective institution with a predominately Western

cast to it, and responding to the desire of nations of Eastern Europe to be included as full members in the Alliance and in the West's security system in Europe.

Some may well ask at this point why the well being of Eastern Europe has not been made by many American analysts and politicians an integral part of this enumeration of crucials United States national security priorities in the period ahead. After all, the liberalisation and democratisation of Eastern Europe was an explicit moral and geopolitical American objective since the late 1940s. United States' presidents said so again and again through the decades. As indicated at the outset, the United States ties to these countries and major influences on them date from the early years of this century. Millions of Americans have family roots in the region. And, surely, the fate of Eastern Europe will influence prospects for the European Community and for further European political, economic, and eventually military integration, and thus peaceful change on the Continent.

Why, then, is Eastern Europe not higher in Washington's national security concerns? The first reason is that the time and attention of United States' policy makers in the Administration and on Capital Hill are severely limited, as are American resources. This is particularly true during a period of domestic economic hardship and widespread voter preoccupation with America's internal ills. There is no shortage of countries, areas and issues that some would like on the short list of American international priorities. In an ideal world with no time or resource constraints, these would include: South Africa; global poverty and hunger; world health; the earth's environment; China; further negotiated conventional arms control agreements; population control; democracy in Africa; the relationship between India and Pakistan; and many others.

A more subterranean argument that one hears around Washington suggests that although terrible things might happen in Eastern Europe, few such unfortunate occurrences would have a serious impact on United States' national interests. Yes, an economically depressed and unstable region between Central Europe and the nations of the former Soviet Union might largely snuff out democracy in favour of authoritarian rule; stifle the free market and reimpose institutions and practices of the command economy; produce waves of refugees heading West; and even be the site of more civil wars or conventional conflicts between nations in the area. To be sure, these would be awful events for the countries of Western Europe and the European Community. But given the Atlantic ocean and the end of Soviet military threat, some argue quietly that the dangers to American national interests that could emanate from Eastern Europe during this decade are certainly far less immediate and profound than those represented by the previous division of the continent, and the reality for more than forty years that World War III and the possible nuclear destruction of the United States might begin with a Soviet attack on West Germany led by its 30 divisions in Eastern Europe.

Related to this largely private view is a more public judgment by many in Washington that the difficulties of Eastern Europe should be primarily addressed and solved by the governments of Western Europe, and particularly by the European Community. Those who hold this sentiment recall America's long and expensive commitment to the defence of Western Europe during the Cold War and believe that especially during a United States recession and an extended period of severe budgetary constraint, large scale and precious United States' resources should not now be devoted after the collapse of communism and the Soviet State to what is essentially a European problem. Pointing to the prosperity of the European Community and its limited

obligations outside Europe, and to the many pressing United States' global commitments and national needs, these American strategists and politicians want a division of labour in which the future of Eastern Europe, important as it is for the future of the continent, should largely be the responsibility of the European Community.

Finally, the long tragedy of Yugoslavia's Civil War has made many Americans reticent about involving the United States deeply in the affairs of Eastern Europe. As United States' citizens watched on television the ethnic carnage in previously unknown areas with long and bloody histories with which they were unfamiliar, and heard expressions of bitter nationalism by leaders they had never heard of and whose names they would not spell, pronounce or remember, voters sent the clear message to their elected representatives that this was a fight the United States should stay far away from. This was Europe's business, and perhaps that of the United Nations. Thus, the notion that the United States should play a central role in trying to resolve or manage these Eastern European ethnic disputes has little support in Washington, and less in the country at large. Indeed, unlikely nightly reporting on Japan, the former Soviet Union, Haiti and Cuba, and the Middle East, Eastern Europe - except for the primitive violence in Yugoslavia - has all but disappeared from United States prime time television. It has no place in the current American political debate.

As indicated at the outset, these factors do not mean that the United States has been passive since the liberation of Eastern Europe began in 1989. Since that time, the United States has committed $ 1.5 billion in grants and other assistance to Eastern Europe. Unlike some other Western countries whose credits to the region were at least partly designed as instruments of market penetration, American aid has been almost entirely in grants. This reflected the view of the administration and the Congress that grants are the most appropriate form of assistance to Eastern Europe, given the debt burdened economies of the area.

Originally targeted to Poland and Hungary, today the United States' assistance programme also includes Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia (mostly suspended), and most recently, Albania. (I do not address here whether we should include Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in our geographic and conceptual definition of Eastern Europe, as the State Department now does in its publications, but in any event the United States economic assistance now goes to those three nations as well). The administration has requested $ 400 million in Fiscal Year 1992 for bilateral assistance to the region and $ 70 million for the EBRD. Senate Majority Leader and Democrat George Mitchell called this 'a reasonable request that seems generally in line with the level of aid the Congress thinks should be devoted to Eastern Europe.' In addition, $ 200 million committed in 1989 to the Polish Stabilisation Fund may be converted into a direct grant to the Polish government.

This United States assistance, co-ordinated through the C-24 mechanism chaired by the European Community Commission, is focused within three broad categories:

- democratic initiatives: development of the institutions and practices of democratic, pluralised societies based on Western values of human rights and individual freedoms;

- economic restructuring: transformation of centrally planned economies to market-based economies led by the private sector and integrated into the world economy; and

- quality of life: improvement of various dimensions in this respect, including health and the environment, while countries undergo the process of political reform and economic restructuring.

In addition, the United States has been active in seeking debt-relief for Eastern Europe and launched a trade enhancement initiative which includes:

- a significant expansion of duty-free benefits covering East European exports under the Generalised System of Preferences;

- technical assistance on United States' trade laws and regulations to help overcome informational trade barriers; and

- development of a programme through the Commerce Department which will match companies in complementary regions of the United States with those in Eastern Europe.

This modest, but hardly insignificant, United States' assistance to Eastern Europe seems clearly inadequate to some United States' allies in Europe, and especially to Germany. One can understand Bonn's concern and frustration as its immediate neighbourhood to the East vibrates with real and potential instabilities that could immediately and seriously threaten the Federal Republic of Germany's fundamental national interests. One can also appreciate similar concerns held by Germany's partners in the Community, and by the European Community Commission in Brussels. Even so, in the absence of a cataclysmic eruption in Eastern Europe, the United States for the reasons cited above is unlikely to intensify markedly its economic and political engagement there. Some may see this as bad news for Eastern Europe, for Western Europe, and for the transatlantic relationship. But most Americans think they have nothing for which to apologise with regard to present United States involvement in the future of Eastern Europe, and this is the reality with which both sides of the Atlantic are likely to have to cope in the years ahead.

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Council of Europe
Conseil de l'Europe

1992: Europe and North America The dialogue of the new solidarities

Strasbourg, 19 and 20 June 1992

Colloquy organised by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe

THE ROLE OF MUTUALLY REINFORCING INSTITUTIONS IN THE NEW EUROPEAN ORDER

Ambassador Gebhardt von Moltke
Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs, Nato, Brussels

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From an object of history, Europe has become once more a subject of history. As in the past, there is now a wide perception that events here are reshaping the entire global order.

The end of the post-war division of Europe represents a great moral victory for the Western values that both the Atlantic Alliance and the Council of Europe have incarnated: parliamentary democracy; market economics; human rights; the rule of law; and the principle of self-determination for nations.

However, times of change are inevitably times of instability. We cannot ignore that the political, social and economic unification of Europe will be a very long process and will oblige us to face up to many new challenges.

The greatest task that we all face is to ensure that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe permanently make the transition to democracy and market economics. There are immediate problems that we must tackle urgently: (1) pacifying regional conflicts; (2) dealing with the enormous stockpile of nuclear weapons on the territory of the former Soviet Union; and (3) providing economic assistance to support the transition to the market economy in the new democracies. Looking towards the longer term, the challenges are no less daunting: (1) building a new European security system; (2) developing new mechanisms to manage crises and settle disputes peacefully; and (3) coping with such problems as migration and the environment.

Clearly, no single country or institution can handle these tasks alone. Also, they can only be addressed in a stable and secure environment. Therefore, Alliance leaders at their summit in Rome set out a vision of an order of peace and co-operation in Europe based on a framework of interlocking and mutually reinforcing institutions. In this concept, institutions would not only complement each other in theory, but actually work together in practice.

Among other institutions that are the basis of this framework are, in particular, the Council of Europe, the Atlantic Alliance, the CSCE and the European Community. Each offers unique advantages and special expertise. By bringing the assets of these four institutions together, we can generate the resources and bring the influence of the Western democracies to bear on both the immediate and longer term challenges.

But, if we want to fully implement this idea of mutually reinforcing institutions we must urgently do two things. First, we need to further adapt each of our institutions to the evolving environment. Second, we must urgently establish day-to-day contacts between them and identify what practical contributions each can make to the work of the others.

I would like to compliment in this respect the Council of Europe for the dynamic way it has set about both tasks. The Council of Europe is, of course, the oldest of the post-war European institutions, but, the first to welcome the former communist countries into its fold, first as special guests and now increasingly as full members. The Council of Europe is the vital first step in the integration of these states into the democratic community of free nations. Over the years, it has produced over 150 conventions, the most important of which is the European Convention on Human Rights. All of this essential work in the functioning of democratic societies is now accessible to the countries

of Central and Eastern Europe and can serve as a beacon for the establishment of durable democratic structures.

Over the years, the Council of Europe has also made an invaluable contribution to the work of the CSCE. Recently, we have noted the strong and useful presentations made by your organisation at the Seminar of Experts on Democratic Institutions, the Conference on the Human Dimension, the meeting of experts on national minorities, and the Symposium on Cultural Heritage.

Yet I would like to emphasise here today that the Atlantic Alliance has been no less dynamic than the Council of Europe in adapting to the new environment and redirecting its energies towards the problems of Central and Eastern Europe and the tasks of associating them more closely to our Western institutions.

We have adopted a new strategic concept which places emphasis on enhanced crisis management capabilities. We are substantially reducing our forces, making those that remain more flexible and mobile in order to meet the new tasks.

NATO has become a source of ideas and inspiration for strengthening the CSCE process. The London and Rome Summit Declarations were milestones in transforming the CSCE from a process into a pan-European institution with increasing capacities to uphold respect for the Helsinki principles and effectively contribute to the peaceful settlement of disputes. The Alliance in the future will contribute materially as well as politically to CSCE peacekeeping and will also work to ensure solid results from the new CSCE arms control forum.

We have created the North Atlantic Co-operation Council, wherein we discuss a wide range of security issues with our partners from Central and Eastern Europe. Our recently adopted work plan spells out a variety of issues where the Alliance can and will contribute its experience and expertise to respond to the specific needs of co-operation partners. Indeed this work plan has already produced concrete results in practical areas such as defence conversion, defence economics and the military/civilian co-ordination of airspace.

Another function of the Council of Europe has been to promote the political and economic integration of the West European democracies. Indeed, it was originally foreseen as the single institution that would achieve this aim until the decision was made to form the European Community at the end of the 1950s. The essential link between the EC and the Council of Europe was preserved, however. It is symbolised today by the fact that the Council of Europe and the European Parliament are located in the same Palais de l'Europe, here in Strasbourg. The Alliance has had an equal role, however, in fostering the same process. Without the commitment of North America to West European security, France and Germany could not have been reconciled so quickly, nor could the climate of co-operation and trust necessary for European integration have been established.

Today, the alliance continues to promote European integration. We are strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance and helping to build a security and defence component of the European Political Union. We are establishing regular contacts between NATO and the WEU, including the harmonisation of working methods and the synchronisation of important meetings.

Yet even when these efforts finally bear fruit and a credible European security and defence identity has emerged, the Alliance will still be an indispensable element of a secure and united Europe. Only the Alliance has an integrated defence that can guarantee the security of its members and project stability deep into Central and Eastern Europe.

The challenges confronting Europe are too great to be handled by Europeans alone. The resources, ideas and influence of the North American democracies must complement those of Europe if we are to help guide the process of change rather than be guided by it.

Even though the Cold War is now thankfully over, the interests that bind Europe and North America together are stronger than ever. The United States has more investment and trade in Europe today than at any time in its history and also knows that its own position in world politics would be seriously diminished if Europe were perpetually unstable and no longer followed democratic and free market values. Europe in this period of transition knows that the active engagement of the United States is still crucial in determining an orderly and peaceful outcome to many outstanding issues, notably the safe control of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union and encouragement to the process of reform and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe.

In this context, NATO not only represents but also preserves the transatlantic link. Only the American and Canadian military commitment can make Europe secure against the potential risks that come from the accumulation of weapons, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and other problems such as exploding demographics and potential resource conflicts close to its borders.

There are three essential tasks facing the Western democracies today. First, there is the economic reconstruction of the post-communist countries where the European Community and the Western financial institutions are taking the lead. Second, there is the building of democratic institutions, separating the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, and guaranteeing the rights of individuals and minorities. Here the Council of Europe and the CSCE are taking the lead. And, third there is the building of new security relations among the states of Europe based on arms control, smaller and more defensively postured armies, and trust and transparency. Here the Alliance is the vital partner to the CSCE.

All three tasks are equally urgent and they are all interrelated. Progress in one will be impossible unless there is also progress in the others. So, if NATO is successful the other institutions will also be successful and reciprocally.

I see the invitation that you have extended to me today as a sign that the Council of Europe recognises this reality as much as NATO and that the Alliance and the Council of Europe, which were founded more or less at the same time, work, albeit through different routes, towards the same objectives and will be working ever more closely together in the months ahead.

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Council of Europe
Conseil de l'Europe

1992: Europe and North America The dialogue of the new solidarities

Strasbourg, 19 and 20 June 1992

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PEACE DIVIDENDS AND DEFICITS :
THE CHALLENGE OF REUNITING EUROPE

Bennett Kovrig
Professor, University of Toronto

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The European-North American partnership has some experience in winning wars only to lose the peace. World War I brought the demise of continental empires, but the Versailles order failed to fully realise the promises of democratic self-determination and collective security. Neither Wilson's idealism nor Clemenceau's pragmatism could forge a just and stable peace. Yalta also symbolised defeat in victory. The destruction of one tyranny drew another tyranny into the heart of Europe. In both of these watersheds of history, the nations of East-Central Europe were potentially the greatest beneficiaries and actually the greatest losers. No wonder, then, if they regard themselves (in Milan Kundera's words) as representing the wrong side of history, its victims and outsiders. Will the pattern be repeated, leaving the same nations victims of the West's victory in the Cold War?

It is a liberal axiom that truly democratic societies do not wage war against each other. A politically coherent, democratic Europe should therefore be peaceable. The revolutions of 1989-90 in East-Central Europe threw off the totalitarian yoke and made the security of state, nation, regime, and individuals the burden of triumphant liberalism. At least in Central Europe, the vacuum of power left by the suspension of imperial hegemony was filled in a remarkably orderly and democratic fashion. But already new insecurities have emerged, some of them inherent in market democracy, others a function of historical circumstance, and all of them susceptible to the benign influence of the West.

The end of *pax sovietica* necessitated an autonomous recalculation of national security in the newly-emancipated countries. Immutable geography has conditioned historic reflexes, such as the Central Europeans' chronic anxiety about the protracted Russo-German contest for the heartland. When the Soviet Union imploded, and the red flag was lowered for the last time over the ruins of Marxism-Leninism on Christmas Day 1991, its former subjects could breathe more easily; the successor states professed liberal agendas and were likely to be self-absorbed for a long time. On the Western front, all was peaceful and friendly. Germany confirmed the sanctity of its borders with Poland and Czechoslovakia. Apprehensions about the return of German economic and cultural domination were largely cancelled by pan-European visions and the imperatives of recovery. The CSCE symbolised an ideological coherence that was more declaratory than substantive but still without precedent in modern European history.

While the syndrome of great power competition over the lands between is in remission, another wellspring of insecurity and instability has erupted with a vengeance. For the revolutions not only overturned the Yalta order; they also thrust the appropriateness and legitimacy of the Versailles order back on the international agenda. The winds of freedom blew the lid off a Pandora's box of thwarted or repressed ethnonational aspirations, precipitating modern liberalism's deepest dilemma: how to reconcile the sovereignty of multinational states with the implicit right to self-determination of their ethnic components? In Yugoslavia, the question is being resolved by civil war. The threat to the survival of the federation of Czechs and Slovaks has taken a more peaceful course. A multitude of cross-cutting ethnonational issues bedevil the liberal order in post-communist Europe, involving among others Poles in Lithuania, Hungarians in Slovakia, Romania, and Serbia, Albanians in Serbia and Macedonia, Romanians in Ukraine, Greeks in Albania, people in three states who may or may not regard themselves as Macedonian, and gypsies everywhere.

At least some of these issues have already cast a cloud over post-communist interstate relations. To register its objection to the name Macedonia, Greece has waged

diplomatic warfare against both that new state and Bulgaria. Romania and Slovakia show little sign of accommodating Hungary's concern with minority rights. Serbia has become a diplomatic pariah. Only modest progress has been made in regional co-operation. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary - the 'Visegrad Three' - have engaged in some co-ordination of foreign policies, notably with regard to the European Community, but display all the while an unfocused insecurity that leads them to seek partnership with NATO and the Western European Union. What began as the Pentagonal and became a hexagonal stretching from Poland to Italy has, with Yugoslavia's fragmentation, turned into a 'Central European initiative' that has no security to offer. Meanwhile, Ukraine and other Eastern successor states are entering the crowded arena of regional security.

The Helsinki Final Act did allow for the peaceful alteration of frontiers, but this was an implicit concession to West German sensibilities, not an invitation to reconsider the integrity of the Versailles order. Subsequent debates on minority rights produced some admirable resolutions of questionable enforceability. Ideally, security in the region would be nurtured by an international regime that provided criteria, procedures, and guarantees for reconciling the principles and reality of statehood, self-determination, and ethnocultural rights. Alas, the golden mean between isolationist neglect and rigid conservatism à la concert of Europe remains probably beyond reach.

In its current twentieth anniversary session in Helsinki, the CSCE - expanded to an American-European-Asian concatenation of fifty-two states - may find consensus elusive on its hypothetical conversion from a 'diplomatic process' into an authoritative international regime. France's proposal for codifying the CSCE commitments into a formal security treaty backed up by a court of arbitration, Germany's for a CSCE peacekeeping force, the Netherlands' for a 'high commissioner' on national minorities, all imply fundamental change in the nature of the CSCE. They demand a problematic unanimity over tangible commitments to preserve collective security as well as a surrender of sovereignty.

So far, Western institutions have offered little and achieved less (witness the diplomatic fiasco over Yugoslavia) in reinforcing East European stability and security. The present members of NATO are understandably reluctant to expand their institution - at all, or at worst beyond the three Central European states - and thereby to assume the unilateral burden of policing Eastern quarrels. Instead, they have devised the placebo of a North Atlantic Co-operation Council. The Western European Union's mandate, unlike that of NATO, allows it to operate outside its signatories' territories. If it acquired more substance as a defence wing of the European Community, and if its members display the will, the WEU could become a force for regional security. But today's security is not built on tomorrow's experiments. The good news, then, is that presently the states of Central and Eastern Europe are not threatened by extra-regional powers; the bad news is that they must still cope with their own weaknesses and discords.

If the new order of states is unstable, the liberal revolution has redefined the parameters of regime and societal security as well. The security of the political system of liberal democracy rests partly on domestic affirmation, and partly on the novel feature of external accountability.

In the domestic arena, the popularity of liberal democracy owes as much to the dismal experience with authoritarian alternatives as to its intrinsic merits. Predictably enough, societies accustomed to blaming the (socialist) political system for their misery

retain some of the tendency. A public opinion poll commissioned by the European Community and conducted in October 1991 indicated that a majority in every country except Lithuania was dissatisfied with democracy. In the three countries with the longest recent exposure to (and historical experience of) democracy, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, only 22 to 30% expressed satisfaction[1]. To be sure, these soundings do not necessarily signal a precipitous flight from liberal democratic values. Cycles of apathy and protest are not unknown in more mature democratic policies, and similar recent polls in Western Europe have found barely half of the respondents satisfied with democracy. But the East European political cultures retain a streak of impatience with parliamentarism that is bound to manifest itself amid economic crisis.

With regard to external accountability, the incentives are not negligible, for East Europeans are understandably eager to earn the political and economic benefits of Western acceptance. The two principal poles of accountability are the Council of Europe and the CSCE, although other institutions such as the European Community and the EBRD also apply political conditionality in their relations with the East. And the Council of Europe, true to its original mandate, has been unquestionably the most consistent and rigorous in applying the criteria of liberal democracy.

The Council, with its Human Rights Convention and Court, is also the institution best equipped to monitor human rights practices beyond the initial phase of institutional democratisation. The right of individuals to appeal to a European forum against their government's rulings offers inestimable reinforcement of political coherence. And the Council may be better qualified than the CSCE to develop a code of minority rights (including the right of supranational appeal) that its members would feel bound to ratify and observe.

Liberal democracy's most immediate benefit is the protection of political and civil rights, and in this respect most East Europeans - apart from some vulnerable ethnic minorities - can feel more secure than ever before. Few revolutions in history have treated so gently the acolytes of past tyrants. Former communists have been largely free to exploit the economic and political opportunities of the liberal order. For moral as well as practical political reasons there is no comprehensive solution to the problem of defining justifiable misdemeanors in the socialist era and punishing their perpetrators. Even limited job discrimination against the old *nomenklatura*, a measure adopted in Czechoslovakia, is problematic in its application. External accountability is a valuable safeguard against undemocratic temptations. But the best insurance is social stability based on a minimum of economic security.

Liberal market democracy may be the best mechanism so far devised for legitimating the distribution of scarce resources, but it offers no magic short-cut for transforming socialist stagnation into capitalist prosperity. The basic economic security once provided by state socialism is unsustainable in the transition to a market economy. In the more optimistic scenario, the mounting frustrations with pauperisation and growing disparities of wealth will be played out in the democratic ritual of changing governors; and if governments feel insecure, that is not wholly bad for democracy. But no student of political behaviour can rule out the possibility of self-defeating escape into authoritarianism and chauvinism.

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[1] Gallup poll cited by Associated Press, 29 January 1992.

The alarm bells have been rung already on many occasions. Hungary's Prime Minister Jozsef Antall warned back in November 1990, at the Paris summit of the CSCE, that the iron curtain might be replaced by a welfare wall dividing Europe's rich and poor nations. By the time that President Lech Walesa spoke on this podium last February, the warning had become a grievance:

> Nowadays our own people are not getting the feeling that they are any better off. The fruits of the victory have gone sour. Already one can hear some people wondering why we have ever done it. Democracy is losing its supporters. Some people even say: 'Let's go back to authoritarian rule'.

Reality, he said, 'has mocked all those who thought the overthrow of communism would move the Eastern world closer to its Western counterpart'. Walesa blamed the West, which 'was supposed to help us in arranging the economy on new principles, but in fact ... largely confined its effort to draining our domestic markets'. Otherwise 'the richer part of Europe has shut itself off from poorer parts'[2]. In the event, Poland remains locked in a political crisis that owes something to its electoral system but more to economic difficulties that strain social peace.

In the midst of the East European political revolutions it was a common act of faith that the Western cousins would rally round to facilitate political as well as economic reintegration. Forty years of cold war rhetoric had left an imprint. The West would not risk its security to attempt forceful liberation, but it never ceased to dangle the lure of freedom and prosperity before Moscow's captives. The latter, declared Secretary of State Dulles during the Hungarian revolution of 1956, 'must know that they can draw upon our abundance to tide themselves over the period of economic adjustment which is inevitable as they rededicate their productive efforts to the service of their own people, rather than of exploiting masters'[3]. The great testing time has come, and the West has so far failed to fully meet the challenge.

To be sure, one could draw up a most impressive catalogue of Western initiatives, multilateral, bilateral and private, in aid of the rehabilitation of the East. The sum of all these parts is still not commensurate to the enormity of the problems and remains meagre in comparison to the Marshall Plan and the many other aid and commercial preference programmes of the Cold War.

Nor do the association agreements with the European Community reflect an adequate sense of responsibility or generosity of spirit in denying both crucial market access and a firm agenda for membership. The short-sighted logic of economic protectionism conjures up the spectre of unwelcome migration and the remedy of isolating the lands between in a socio-economic ghetto. A more palatable outcome depends on a reordering of Western Europe's and particularly the Community's priorities.

Fear of Soviet power, once the most powerful motivator, has dissipated, carrying with it the West's sense of urgency about helping the victims of Yalta. The reintegration of Central and Eastern Europe has become one dossier among many on the political

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[2] *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto) 5 March 1992.

[3] Council on Foreign Relations *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1956* (New York: Harper, 1957), p. 45.

agenda of the West, displaced by old domestic priorities as well as by new international ones, such as the crisis in the former Soviet Union. The attendant economic costs are being revealed most vividly in the context of German unification. When even Western Germans display growing resentment at this financial burden, it is not surprising that the West perceives even less of a moral imperative - or even self-interest - with regard to the rest of the region.

This decline in interest and priority is understandable but dangerous. A politically coherent Europe could be the greatest dividend of peace after the Cold War. Political elites readily subscribe to this principle, but actions have not measured up to the promise of words. The winds of revolutionary change had barely risen when President Mitterrand declared that the rapprochement of the two Europes was 'la grande affaire de cette fin de siècle'. More recently Secretary of State Baker called for what he termed 'collective engagement' to build market democracy in the former Soviet Union: 'The moving force of collective engagement is American leadership, drawing on the common values and common interests shared by the democratic community of nations'[4]. The growing strength of parochial and protectionist tendencies on both sides of the Atlantic lends urgency to Baker's appeal. While pan-European integration may not (and ought not) depend on American leadership, it is indeed a great enterprise that encompasses the common interests of Europeans, Americans and Canadians and deserves their dedication.

Those who would favour a more Gaullist approach must remember that the United States has tremendous reserves of goodwill in Eastern Europe, where at the same time there linger feelings of vulnerability to the influence of powerful neighbours. A continued American engagement in European affairs ideally could also attenuate more general apprehensions about new imbalances of power and spheres of influence. The transatlantic partnership brings its own complications (one example being the creation of a wholly separate parliamentary assembly for the CSCE) but it is eminently suited to the challenge of reintegrating the Eastern half of the continent. It is a partnership that has yet to demonstrate it can win the peace.

For the foreseeable future the new architecture will be of variable geometry, with complementarity as well as perhaps unavoidable overlap among collective institutions. But solidarity and pluralism are not antithetical. In this regard, the Council of Europe retains a unique mandate and capability for forging a politically coherent Europe, to become what its Secretary General called a Conseil de la Grande Europe. Its parliamentary assembly can independently advocate the substance and economic requisites of such coherence. The various initiatives in the Demosthenes Programme deserve more liberal funding and expansion, especially to benefit the youth of post-communist Europe. And the new members can fully exploit the assets of what is, after all, the most senior European institution.

In sum, the end of the Cold War was also a beginning, for a politically and psychologically transformed Europe. What shape that will take depends in large measure on the will and vision of the transatlantic partnership. To be sure, the full complexity of the challenge could not be anticipated. But after three years into the post-communist era, the pattern is one of drift and disillusionment more than of confident construction. In the final analysis, political freedom is an invitation to civic virtue, not its guarantee. After the false security of imperial and authoritarian misrule, East Europeans are free to forge

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[4] Speech to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 21 April 1992.

authentically peaceable and secure policies. If their more fortunate neighbours and distant friends show solidarity, particularly in fostering common prosperity, the prospects for an authentically secure Europe will be decidedly brighter.

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THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1993 : FORTRESS OR PARTNER ?
THE POLITICS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

Dr. Michael Hodges
London School of Economics and Political Science

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The changing face of Europe

The signing of both the European Community's Maastricht Treaty and the European Economic Area Agreement between the EC and EFTA countries in recent months is clear evidence of the significant progress that is being achieved in the integration of Europe. The European Community is laying the foundations not only of a single European market but also the initial structure of far-reaching and extensive political co-operation which may lead to the creation in Europe of a new type of international actor: not necessarily a federal state with a relatively powerful central government, but an increasingly intensive network of co-operation, interdependence and integration.

If Europe does unite - and I think the evidence indicates that it is unlikely to come together in a sort of United States of Europe during this century - it will pose a number of difficult problems for both its allies and its former adversaries. In this paper I would like to concentrate on one fundamental problem - the 'widening versus deepening' issue, and what consequences this might have for transatlantic relations. In essence this means:

i. how large a membership can the EC sustain without paralysing its decision-making process? (the widening issue) and

ii. what sort of European Community is being built by the twelve member states in terms of integrated policies in a growing number of fields? (the 'deepening' issue).

In February this year the twelve member states of the European Community signed the Maastricht Treaty (named after the Dutch city in which the leaders of the Twelve negotiated it in December 1991), which consolidates past integration efforts and sets ambitious new goals to build 'an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe'. The new Treaty, which now must be ratified by each member state, establishes three 'pillars' of integration, of which the first is the existing body of EC policies, with expanded competence in such areas as the environment, consumer protection and provision of pan-European communications and transport networks. The European Parliament is given a greater say in legislation, and there are detailed plans for establishing economic and monetary union, including an EC central bank and a single currency, by the end of the decade, though only states conforming to a set of tough conditions on economic performance and public debt will be able to participate in the single currency. Britain reserved the right not to participate in monetary union and also to exclude itself from the process of creating a body of common EC social legislation.

The second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty is devoted to the creation of a Common Security and Foreign Policy (CFSP), seeking to improve on the EC's past record of joint action in these fields (the limp and unco-ordinated response to the Gulf War was an example). The EC member states in the Council of Ministers will vote on common objectives by unanimity, with implementation measures dependent on a majority vote. In the security arena, a new competence for the EC, the Western European Union will move from Paris to Brussels and become the EC's defence arm within NATO, although the Treaty makes clear that a future European defence policy must be compatible with the NATO alliance.

The third pillar of the Treaty covers co-operation among the twelve EC members on immigration and asylum policy, the control of drug-trafficking, and the fight against organised crime. It includes the establishment of an EC-wide police intelligence agency - Europol. There were also various protocols attached to the Treaty, some of which may be the subject of considerable political dispute in future - such as the commitment to provide enhanced financial assistance to the economically less developed members of the EC as the quid pro quo for their consent to an irreversible move to monetary union in the EC.

Although the fine print of the Maastricht Treaty still needs to be examined carefully in the ratification process during the coming year, it does represent a milestone in the development of the EC: Europe has come of age. The momentum achieved by the European Community's single market initiative has been translated into a significant expansion of the EC's competence (in theory if not yet in fact). There is no doubt the European Single Market is happening - it is irreversible. This is not to say, however, that all will be smooth sailing in the few months that remain before the target deadline of January 1993 arrives.

Many difficult and sensitive decisions remain to be taken: the question of fiscal harmonisation (especially convergence of corporate and value added tax rates) and the question of the rights of workers and whether or not worker-representatives are to be included in company decision-making and strategy formation remain unsolved. Although the flurry of cross-border mergers and rationalisation of industries within member states is proceeding at a fast pace (if somewhat diminished in the last year because of the adverse economic conditions in Europe), as yet the impact of the single market upon individual firms is not yet entirely clear.

Preliminary estimates, such as the 1988 Cecchini Report on the benefits flowing from the creation of a single market, point to a significant increase in Community product and a reduction in the costs of doing business across national borders within the European Community - but the report speaks about averages, about overall effects, rather than delineating the winners and losers of 1992. For there will not only be winners in the creation of a single European market - there will be casualties as well, perhaps as many as 50% of small and medium-sized firms in hitherto protected or neglected national markets within the European Community. Understandably, the Commission of the European Community tends to focus on the winners of 1992 rather than the losers; but it is the losers that are liable to make the most noise and to fight a rearguard action against the creation of a single European market.

It is the aftershock of 1992 that deserves more attention. History shows us that ruined or disaffected small businessmen and professionals are a dangerous political force - look what happened in the aftermath of Germany's catastrophic inflation in the 1920s and 1930s or the destructive impact of Poujadisme on the stability of the fourth French Republic in the 1950s when small businessmen felt they were losing out. Although there were fears three years ago in the United States and in Japan that Europe 1992 was intent on building 'Fortress Europe', it is now clear that the single European market initiative is designed for knocking down the internal walls in the castle rather than building the fortress walls higher or drawing up the drawbridge against foreign incursions.

Nonetheless the Europeans who are losers in the 1992 process will doubtless demand from their legislators compensation or protection; and the politically least painful

way of providing such compensation or protection is to make foreigners pay for it. So although 1992 is not in itself protectionist - indeed it is a profoundly liberal (in the best 19th century sense of that term) move to freeing up the movement of goods, services, people and resources across national frontiers in the European Community - it is also going to cause a great deal of political upheaval in Europe.

The momentum achieved by the 1992 initiative has already attracted a queue of new applicants to join the European Community. Austria, Turkey, Malta, Cyprus, Sweden and Finland have lodged applications; Switzerland has announced its intention to do so, while Norway is actively considering a membership application. In the newly liberalising countries of Central and East Europe, much enthusiasm is also expressed for closer links with the European Community - Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia have negotiated association agreements that explicitly countenance membership, while Romania, the Baltic States and some of the former members of the Yugoslav federation and the Soviet Union have all indicated a desire to develop closer links.

This raises two fundamental questions:

i. what are the boundaries of 'Europe'? and

ii. how many member countries can the European Community have before the effectiveness of its decision-making institutions is severely undercut by the size and diversity of its membership?

Some committed Europeans see even the admission of Britain to membership in 1973 as a mistake, given perfidious Albion's tendency to adopt a sceptical (some would say obstructive) attitude towards European integration - and the admission of Greece, Spain and Portugal has further increased the economic and social diversity of the European Community.

It is not only the diversity of the members of the European Community - a diversity that can only increase if all or some of the potential applicants are admitted - but also the sheer problem of size of decision-making bodies in what is not a politically integrated organisation. To give a simple example: when the EC Council of Ministers meets (as a Council of Agriculture Ministers or as a Council of Finance Ministers or whatever) it takes almost three hours for the ministers from each member state to make their preliminary statement in the discussion of the most important agenda items. Meetings often last all day and well into the night, and when solutions are reached they are often not the best but the most expedient. A larger European Community would not necessarily be a disaster, but its decision-making procedures would certainly become more complex and slow moving.

On the other hand, the European Community is committed to building (in the words of the Treaty of Rome, repeated in the Maastricht Treaty) 'an ever closer union' among the nations of Europe, and it would be difficult to keep out any democratic European state that wished to apply for membership and did not pose the danger of large and unending resource transfers in order to facilitate its membership. How is this circle to be squared? One answer is to create a 'multiple speed Europe', with only the strongest and most economically and politically compatible states forming the inner core pursuing the most integrated policies and surrounded by concentric circles of states engaged in lesser degrees of integration. On economic and monetary union, for example,

this would involve France, Germany, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg participating together in a single currency, while other weaker, most indebted or inflation-prone economies such as Britain, Italy, Spain and Ireland would participate with the inner core in the exchange rate mechanism to stabilise their currency parities but not give up their independent fiscal and monetary policies or their ability to devalue their currencies to a Euro-Fed central bank. In theory, these 'outer circle' countries would retain independence in economic policy-making. What they would give up, however, is any significant role in setting the EC agenda and shaping the common economic policies of the late 1990s.

The political repercussions of a multiple speed Europe would thus be considerable; there are substantial differences of view between Germany (which supports the Maastricht criteria on economic convergence and enhanced political accountability as essential preconditions for economic and monetary union) and France, which vehemently opposes a two-tier Community and is unenthusiastic about granting more power to the European Parliament. It is doubtful whether Italy - one of the major EC economies and a founder-member of the EC - will be able to satisfy the Maastricht criteria on debt in order to participate in the single currency, and Britain has made clear its lack of enthusiasm for the EC's federal ambitions and has (in retaining the right to opt out of the single currency and not participate in social legislation) actively embraced a multi-speed Europe.

Maastricht therefore marks the beginning of multiple speed/tier Europe, a more variegated approach to integration. This approach does seem to offer a way of permitting the maximum number of European states from both West and East Europe to adhere to the ideals and acquire some of the benefits of European integration. It is inconceivable in the near future that countries such as Poland, Turkey or Lithuania could join the European Community without vastly increasing the political strains acting upon it. Moreover, if the European Community advances along the Maastricht road of European political union and the establishment of a common European foreign and security policy, it is unlikely that some of the Community's neighbours (such as Switzerland) could tolerate the full obligations of membership in the European Community and would require some less inclusive form of participation.

It is my expectation that we will not see the emergence of a United States of Europe, based on some sort of federal structure, during this century - and may never see such an entity appearing at all. What is much more likely is that we will see something more akin to the Swiss Confederation emerging: a relatively weak but nonetheless indispensable government at the centre, performing certain tasks that cannot be effectively carried out by the constituent states of the confederation. Many important decisions would, of course, continue to be made by the existing national governments, but there would also be an increasing tendency to grant more autonomy to subnational regions in Europe - such as Scotland, the Basque country, and Bavaria. The European Community will remain the most prominent regional organisation in the economic sphere, but other organisations (the Western European Union in the security field, the Council of Europe on human rights questions) will continue to perform their functions and will, like the EC, widen membership and deepen their policy competences.

The 1990's in West as well as East Europe, are likely to be a decade of nationalism but not necessarily of the nation-state. Decision-making power will flow upward to the EC level - Jacques Delors, the President of the EC Commission, has estimated that by the

end of this decade over 80% of all major economic decisions will be made in Brussels rather than in national capitals - but power will also flow downward to regions and local communities. This will be a European Community based on the principal of 'subsidiarity' - a piece of Euro-jargon used to describe an essentially simple but very important concept.

Subsidiarity means that decisions and tasks ought to be carried out at the lowest possible level consistent with efficiency and effectiveness. This does not necessarily imply a permanent division of powers between various institutions, as exists in the United States and which, at least in part, accounts for the paralysis that outsiders perceive in the American policy-making process over such difficult problems as deficit reduction, nor does it necessarily imply a clear allocation of functional responsibility between central government and state government such as is typical in a federation. What it does imply is that sovereignty and decision-making power is not the monopoly of any one level or institution. Indeed, it is useful to remember that even in the United States of America the process of integration did not remove all internal market barriers and still permits significant variations in state-level policy and performance.

The American paradigm : integration but not homogenisation

It has now become unfashionable to regard the United States of America as a model for European integration. To some extent this has been the result of a European fear of American economic and cultural imperialism, and indeed there are good reasons for being cautious about applying the American experience to the process of building an integrated Europe. The United States, after all, was able to build its single market and create its federal system of government without substantial external interference and largely in a world where economic shocks were not rapidly transmitted across national frontiers. Nonethelelss, if we look at the American experience, we see some reason for optimism but also some grounds for caution: it is quite clear that the single American market is not homogeneous and permits considerable variations in fiscal and even monetary policy, that individual states within the Union still possess considerable autonomy, and that rather than a strong central government being the main discipline and force for convergence, it is the market that is the major integrator.

On the other hand, we should also note from the American experience that it took over a century from the time that political union was achieved with the Articles of Confederation in the late 18th century to the time when the United States managed to achieve monetary union and that even at the beginning of the 20th century there were considerable differences in per capita income between one part of the United States and another, although now these have narrowed substantially.

As Robert Hormats (in a speech at a Chatham House conference on EMU in June 1991) has pointed out, it was only after the Civil War in 1865 that the United States instituted a single currency and that the Federal Reserve System did not come into being until 1914 - and even at that time the regional Federal Reserve banks in the United States were each permitted to set their own discount rate, subject to the veto of the Federal Reserve Board in Washington. Even today commercial interest rates in various parts of the United States vary considerably from one another. Thus typically interest rates in New York on money market accounts are as much as a one half per cent higher than they are in Philadelphia less than 200 km away. State sales taxes range from 8%

in Texas down to zero in New Hampshire; New York, California and Connecticut currently run large budget deficits, while Alaska, Oklahoma and North Dakota run large surpluses. Thus even a single monetary system does not necessarily lead to a single set of interest rates or dictate uniform fiscal policy - although there are limits which are placed not by the Federal Government but by the market, since heavy tax burdens would drive business away to another location within the single market. Indeed, states within the United States of America regularly compete with each other to provide incentives for inward investment - leading to unseemly 'dowry chasing' by corporations considering establshing plants in the United States.

In one respect the United States has a considerable advantage because it is a politically integrated federation - thus when the price of oil fell during the mid-1980s, the economy of Texas suffered because it could not depreciate the Texan currency (as Britain could do with the pound) and the ensuing recession was more severe in Texas than it might otherwise have been. But much of this was compensated by reduced tax payments from Texas to the Federal Government and increased Federal expenditure, in the form of unemployment benefits, welfare assistance and so on, directed to Texas. Perhaps 30-40% of Texas' loss of income was offset by this combination of lower taxes and increased transfer payments. In the European Community this is simply not possible. The budget of the European Community, although swollen by the massively expensive Common Agricultural Policy, is simply incapable of acting as a sort of shock absorber dampening the variances in economic activity in the various regions of the European Community. The budget of the European Community is much too small, and is indeed dwarfed by national budgets, to emulate the role of the United States Federal Government.

The relatively small size of the EC central budget may turn out to be an advantage, however. The 'deepening' of European integration may be accomplished in a way that does not create a Leviathan bureaucracy in Brussels and in fact accommodates diversity in many (if not all) policy areas. For centralised states such as Britain and France, this will represent a profound structural change - less so for a federal state such as Germany, which is already operating on the basis of regional differentiation for its five Eastern Länder. If this sounds rather over optimistic, I think it is useful to remind ourselves how the 1992 Single Market Initiative has transformed the psychological climate for integration in Europe.

Europe and the world beyond

Although the European Community's single market initiative is clearly not protectionist in intent, there is a danger that the European Community will become very much preoccupied with internal issues (connected with the single market and arising out of the Maastricht Treaty) and will therefore not devote as much of its energy as others - especially the United States - would wish to global economic issues such as the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations and regional issues such as the economic and political liberalisation of Eastern Europe and the new nations of the former Soviet Union. Politically, of course, it is very difficult to negotiate agreements to open up various sectors of the West European economies to increased competition from the outside world, at the very time that they are suffering increased competition from within the European Community. Parties who are injured or disadvantaged by this internal European competition are likely to make considerable demands for protection or compensation and the most politically convenient parties to pay for such protection or compensation will be non-members of the European Community. Already the European Community's use of

anti-dumping suits, its negotiation of an ambiguous 'voluntary' export restraint by Japanese car manufacturers and the maintenance of a degree of pro-EC discrimination in public procurement contracts - all these indicate that the European Community's commitment to economic liberalisation is by no means absolute. If economic recession or even reduced growth continues, this will undoubtedly increase conflict within the EC on distribution of resources and increase protectionist pressures.

Certainly the dramatic changes in the political and economic structure of Europe will necessitate the creation or adaptation of institutions to deal with economic, political and security matters - and these cannot simply be confined to the G7 countries, but must include the former members of the Soviet Union, the whole of Europe and meaningful representation from the developing countries of the Southern Hemisphere. In this process the Europeans generally will be at a disadvantage in comparison with the United States and Japan - both of which (despite the shortcomings of their respective political systems in terms of reaching agreement on radical shifts in policy) can represent their respective positions in international negotiations more effectively than can the Europeans, who remain politically diverse and a tempting target for 'divide and rule' tactics.

The European Community has a special (but as Jacques Delors pointed out, not the sole) responsibility for promoting peace, stability and economic prosperity in Europe. The prosperity and growing integration of the European Community certainly exert a powerful attraction on its neighbours to the East and to the South - both history and geography make the EC a powerful pole of attraction and generator of stability in Europe. The European Community's efforts in this matter are by no means selfless - unless Central Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union can achieve some sustainable economic growth their political systems will remain fragile and subject to threat; their populations will retain the ability to vote with their feet and migrate to more prosperous areas in Western Europe. The prospect of a wave of refugees from political upheaval, economic failure, ethnic conflict and environmental disaster is a nightmare for the European Community. There is no way that the European Community can re-erect the Iron Curtain to prevent such movements (or, as Jacques Chirac has put it, 'replace the Berlin Wall with a new wall made of money') without losing whatever moral authority it currently possesses. By the same token it is in everybody's interest that the most talented (and therefore potentially mobile) people in Central and Eastern Europe should be encouraged to stay where they are and participate in the reconstruction of their home economies; this will require the infusion of capital, of training and technology and - most important - the provision of market access for Eastern Europe's products.

Unfortunately, the prospects for such a wide ranging and sustained programme of assistance on the one hand and market access on the other seems to be diminishing as 1993 approaches. Last year, for example, we saw France blocking efforts by the European Community to improve access for agricultural imports from Eastern Europe (550 tons of beef, to be precise, out of the seven million tons consumed annually in the EC) but the French are not alone in wanting to avoid domestic political conflict by opening up West Europe's markets to exports from Eastern Europe. The recent negotiations between the European Community and Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia on association agreements are notable because they exclude the sectors in which those countries could most rapidly expand their exports to the European Community - agriculture, steel and textiles.

Indeed, if one looks at the history of the European Community's relations with the former colonies of some of its member states - the Yaoundé and Lomé Agreements - we find that even historic and moral obligations accepted by European states are often not enough to overcome powerful sectional producer interests within those states. The ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries have not been allowed to expand their exports of agricultural products, processed products and manufactured goods as rapidly or as extensively as they would wish because of protectionism on the part of the European Community.

The past record of European exports to the ACP countries indicates that there is justification for Poland's fears (expressed in a report last year) that an association with the European Community would lead to a surge of EC exports to Poland, leading to a drop in Poland's domestic production and economic recession and stagnation. Such a development would in turn provoke measures to protect the Polish economy and increase the difficulties of integration of Poland into the European Community. The same problems apply in some measures to Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the three Baltic States, who are all primarily competitive as agricultural and primary products exporters. Jacques Delors' proposal for a triangular system of EC-East Europe-CIS trade would not remove this problem even if massive EC-financed trade credits were extended, but simply defer it.

Where does Europe go from here ?

The fundamental question that divided the six original members of the EEC from Britain and its partners in the European Free Trade Association 30 years ago was the question of inclusiveness versus integration: wider or deeper? As Helen Wallace has put it: 'They have had to ask whether they preferred the firm pledges of a smaller number to embrace ambitious and open-ended goals or the looser affirmations of a larger number to co-operate, but only up to a point'. The subsequent enlargements of the European Community have raised the question of whether extension of membership inevitably reduced ambitions for further integration or even threatens dilution of what has already been achieved. The list of potential members of the European Community is now a long one: Turkey, Austria, Cyprus, Malta, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Finland, Iceland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia. (Let us not yet discuss Slovenia, Croatia or the Ukraine).

Now that the European Single Market is inevitable and irreversible, the twelve have to decide what further steps toward economic integration they are prepared to take and whether these would imply stronger institutions. The current debate on economic and monetary union - and the possibility of a 'two speed Europe' are examples of the sort of dilemma about the successor policies to the single Europe market outlined in the Maastricht Treaty. The momentous events of the last three years in Central and Eastern Europe raise the question of what sort of links the European Community should build eastward - with whom, on what conditions and with what objectives.

The single market initiative itself can be seen as the completion of the original objectives of the Treaty of Rome, while the Maastricht Treaty represents a clear attempt to deepen the institutional competence of the European Community and promote further integration. The big question is whether this process of completion and deepening can be combined with the process of expanding the European Community's membership. The

experience of the EC negotiations with EFTA on the European economic area, which took seven years to produce an agreement, indicates that non-members of the European Community find the prospect even of liberalised trade without some form of representation in the EC decision-making not very attractive. As far as Eastern Europe is concerned, one might question whether the populations of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary will be willing to accept a shift to supranationalism before they have had a chance to enjoy national autonomy and a certain degree of participation and initiative in determining their own paths of political and economic development. Nonetheless, the expansive logic of regional integration makes the question of their membership of the European Community only a matter of time.

These are very difficult problems - and in dealing with them there is a danger that Europe will become self-absorbed and will be reluctant to assume its fair share of responsibility for global peace, security and economic development. Former German Chancellor Willy Brandt once referred to his country as 'an economic giant but a political pygmy'; much the same judgment could be made of the EC. There is a real danger that the EC will become introspective, concentrating on the achievements of its internal goals, and will neglect its international responsibilities. Even if it does not do so, our American allies may well find that Europe becomes a less accommodating and even inflexible partner; common negotiating positions are difficult for the Europeans to achieve and almost impossible to alter. Excessive pessimism is, however, unjustified. Certainly political union is a distant prospect, but further integration is not: integration in the European Community may always have had an underlying political motive (to prevent war in Europe) but it has usually been economically driven.

There is a convergence of business interests - to create a single market from which European companies can launch a battle for global market share - and the political interest in ensuring that Europe has a place in the new world order being created out of the relative decline of one superpower, the United States of America, the collapse of the other, the USSR, and the seemingly irresistible rise of Japan. As with any converging forces, the resulting dynamic may lead in a direction different from that intended by any party: I would argue that it will create a Europe of 'variable Geometry', a French term to describe overlapping and interconnecting collective endeavours undertaken by different groupings of European countries. This would not necessarily be comprehensive and coherent, and would bring despair to the hearts of tidy-minded federalists, but it would create in Europe a zone of peace, growth and relative stability in what appears to be an increasingly unstable and unpredictable world.

(10)

Council of Europe
Conseil de l'Europe

1992: Europe and North America The dialogue of the new solidarities

Strasbourg, 19 and 20 June 1992

Colloquy organised by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe

CONTRIBUTION
BY

Sir Yehudi Menuhin
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Perhaps what marks our epoch and the close of the 20th century is an experience, recognition and a testing of limits - limits of human nature, as well as of our convictions, prejudices, theories, of freedom and control, of planned versus 'laissez-faire' economies, of selfishness versus self-sacrifice, of the rooted versus the nomadic, of capitalism, commercialism, of democracy itself.

We are also exploring the complex interaction between apparently disparate activities - for instance, education, information, conditioning, ambitions, brainwashing, images, advertising, the economy, commerce, industry, rain forests, pollution, weather, behaviour, tastes and the arts. We are witnessing the death throes of the urban internal combustion transport and the confrontation of public versus private interests with the overlapping of each into the other.

We are, therefore, more concerned with the measuring and the understanding of the myriad degrees between and the combination of elements which fill the space between extremes.

How mad, or how normal were the murderers of Auschwitz and their present emulators? How mad, or how normal, are the martyrs, the kamikaze, the terrorists, of so many sad, frustrated or misguided peoples? We can only presume the 'normality' of 'madness'.

The quest for power, wealth, and security generates fear, oppression and exploitation.

We recognize the existence of full circles, or spirals, historically, humanly, socially and in the sphere of economics. In our ever accelerating world we are beginning to bite our tail as we see, within less than a lifetime, order turn to chaos, and back to order - and for the first time we live long enough to witness the penalties of our behaviour.

Victory is hollow, defeat can be victory; contradiction and paradox are the order of the day; progress itself is questioned as we search for fixed, permanent beliefs and situations on which to base our lives. These are no longer available. The truth of constant motion, of *relative* time, space and predictability has finally imposed its inescapable stamp on our thinking, on our being. As a result our minds are more open and flexible; we can travel to the moon, which could not have been achieved by people who believed in a flat earth or in man as God, or in God as man.

We can see the backlash of all those who would cling to an old-fashioned security and predictability - fundamentalists - of nationalist, religious, racial or other stamp.

The 21st century is already almost helplessly bound and gaged by 18th and 19th century beliefs and concepts, inapplicable and fatal if not abandoned.

Never have the often contradictory demands of morality versus survival been so inextricably intertwined as they are today. We can still acquire property, win smaller or larger territorial wars, exterminate populations, both actively and passively exploit humankind, enslave their bodies and their souls; it is a game which is turning against us as we destroy Nature and Life, treating them as enemies, and thereby destroying supporter, consumer and victim alike.

It is most heartening that Mme Catherine Lalumière is organising an international Colloquy at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on Friday 19 and Saturday 20 June 1992, on the theme '1992 : Europe and North America - the dialogue of the new solidarities'.

It is true that at present these two large areas, so closely bound by a common history, facing each other on either side of the Atlantic, do appear as 'solidarities' compared with Africa, Asia and South America. They carry, by definition, a very great and serious responsibility for the future (and the past) of our world.

In discussing the paramount issue of their relationship with each other, of their example to the world, we must not forget the presence of advanced democracies, some still struggling with the principle in various British Commonwealth countries, notably South Africa, certain South American countries, caught in a combat between democracy and rampant capitalism among other problems approaching its limits with widespread racial, religious and economic strife, and, of course, the new Japan and the emerging powers and social orders of China, Korea and Southeast Asia.

In other words, this colloquy or 'dialogue' cannot ignore the rest of the world, including the Third World, whilst concentrating on one predominant human and geographical continuity, at its extremities spilling over in eastern Europe and Alaska into the former Russian-Soviet Empire and in Hawaii to Asia. At our southern borders we have the Arab world, Black Africa and Latino-Americans.

Clearly, we will remain in the hands of Fate and Destiny by virtue of past behaviours, present pressures, both dynamic and immovable, and the inherent inadequacies and limitations of planning on any scale, let alone a global one.

Any projection of trends or statistics on demographic, social and commercial spheres is largely unpredictable and, therefore, unreliable. We would have to assume a very large number of 'ifs' before we could enjoy any degree of predictability.

This does not mean that we should not discuss, debate, study and attempt to understand our sad, troubled, yet so worthwhile world.

A least certain elements are predictable and demand action. Limits and degrees must be outlined, as mentioned above:

- the crying need to develop benign and constant sources of energy as quickly as possible;

- the severe husbanding of all resources of earth and sea life, in public and private life, in industry and military efforts, commerce and excise, instituted without delay;

- the study of the training and retraining in skills, the division and redistribution of labour, together with the cultivation of and education for the use of leisure time;

- a training which might begin as a mandatory period of service throughout life (as in Switzerland), not national but regional and international, ranging from an international police force (civic army) to social service of every description, medical,

educational, etc., extending to the many voluntary ones and to the cultivation of knowledge of infinite variety, and the joys of invention, play, sport, crafts and art.

- It is essential to discuss both the defence of 'Euroamerica' and the simultaneous policing duties of a world army.

- Situations as in Burma or that of the Kurds or of the Palestinians on the West Bank, and others, are simply no longer acceptable.

- The theory and practise of non-intervention in the internal affairs of nations is simply no longer valid nor feasible.

The breaching of frontiers should be the last reason - not the first - for taking military-cum-policing action. Such action always comes too late and is too costly in life and material.

Nato would seem to me the ideal instrument for this dual role of both defence of policing. It might be adapted to these by way of including nationals from all member countries, by an affiliation with the United Nations, and by suitable training in the philosophy and conduct of an exemplary and heterogenous force or body.

Although we cannot predict the world which awaits us twenty years hence nor yet know all the problems we will have to face, we can at least prepare to face up to towering problems which we *know* await us and form some image of a realisable world which would be distinctly superior in the tolerance and dignity of cultures - human, animal and flora - the improvement of our environment - urban, country, mental, spiritual and aesthetic - an image which might include the beginnings of our reconciliation with Nature which we have turned into an enemy, and a political and cultural image of the climate within, between and around cultural entities.

Right now, hideous confusion rages, for neither politician, man-or-woman in the street, nor philosopher, military man, sociologist or historian can define the mode or state of living which we must enter as we perforce must leave our present ones behind.

Pervading the world is this great sense of malaise, for we are at the end of an era. We have a foreboding of the future, as not only we have no conception even of what it might be like and little conception of precisely what we want, but we also nourish a deep fear of what may await us, based on our bad conscience, as we *know* in our heart of hearts that we have earned a terrible penalty.

For there is an accounting over the ages demanded of a humanity which knows a measure of freedom of choice and self-determination, demanded of us all, guilty and innocent alike, for action and reaction are delayed and visited upon future generations.

Perhaps these perils, now under way, will at least induce a missing humility in mankind, a sense of reverence, and a form of meditation on man's and life's fate and on the awesome justice which we dread.

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NORTH AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN SOLIDARITIES : SISTER CITY EXAMPLES

Margaret Collins Weitz
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Rather than speak in a general way about the opportunities and challenges that cities face today, I propose to focus on the dialogue of experience that has taken place between the cities of Boston and Strasbourg for over 30 years now. A dialogue developed through the sister city relationship of these two cities.

Sister city linkings were developed in Europe after World War II in an effort to heal the wounds between nations and prepare for a peaceful future of international co-operation. Jean Bareth, one of the founders and first General Secretary of the Conseil des Communes d'Europe described the linking or *jumelage* as: 'la recontre des deux communes qui entendent proclamer qu'elles s'associent pour agir dans une perspective européenne, pour confronter leurs problèmes et pour développer entre elles des liens d'amitié de plus en plus étroits'. This aim was not long restricted to Europe. On a return visit to his native Strasbourg in 1960, Charles Munch, then conductor of the Boston Philharmonic Orchestra, suggested a special relationship or *jumelage* between the two cities. The idea was enthusiastically implemented by the two Mayors, Pierre Pflimlin and John Collins.

Some activities between Boston and Strasbourg were undertaken from time to time. Then, in 1983, the Boston/Strasbourg Sister City Association was formally organised under Mayor Kevin White. Since that time ever-expanding activities and projects involving the two cities have developed. As both an academic and Vice-President of the Boston/Strasbourg Sister City Association I would like to enumerate briefly some of these activities for they suggest ways of strengthening the new solidarities between North America and Europe.

The 1983 Charter states that the goal of the Boston/Strasbourg Sister City Association is: 'to enable the citizens of the city of Boston and those of the city of Strasbourg to acquire an understanding of one and other as individuals, members of their community and citizens of their countries'. Mrs Ann Collier, President of the Boston/Strasbourg Sister City Association, recently noted that this ambitious goal still obtains today. To try and understand the inhabitants of a foreign city and encourage them to understand one in return are among the first goals needed to become a citizen of the world.

The majority of Boston/Strasbourg Sister City Association activities are educational; taking the word (education) in the fullest sense. All endeavour to help inhabitants of the American city to become more aware of the contributions - past, present and potential - of their European counterpart. The BSSCA functions in a quasi-independent way with the official sanction and encouragement of Boston City Hall. It serves as an umbrella organisation that helps diverse groups, organisations and institutions affiliated with or interested in Strasbourg, and by extension, France. Such linkings offer many opportunities for teachers to extend their programmes. They facilitate exchanges between European and North American students and teachers and helps extend North American and European co-operation and cultural awareness.

As noted, the emphasis is on *education*. Future citizens need to learn of the world beyond the narrow confines of their town or district. Since its founding the BSSCA and its French counterpart have sponsored regular exchanges of high school students during the summer months. Boston and Strasbourg alternate in hosting a dozen or so selected students who stay with families and participate in a variety of activities with their counterparts. Cross-cultural orientation is carefully worked out. For the Boston high

school students chosen to spend three weeks in Strasbourg this has brought enrichment and been a major learning experience. From modest, inner-city homes, many had seldom travelled anywhere before going to Strasbourg; indeed, could not afford to. They return with horizons greatly extended. The majority have since gone on to college; something most had not previously intended to do. (The majority of the students in the Boston public school system do not go on to college). Other indirect results of the high school exchange programme include the creation of a Boston/Strasbourg Youth Group open to all students enrolled in French classes. This particular activity was initiated by an association member who, as a teacher of French, accompanied Boston high school students to Strasbourg. Even more significant has been the increase in the number of students taking French courses and the enrichment in current French language programmes. This is notable because Spanish, as the native language of many students, is traditionally the most important foreign language in Boston public schools. Part of the Boston students' assignment includes preparing a report for classmates when they return. These presentations interest other students in learning more about French language and culture; the so-called ripple effect. For the North American teachers who accompany high school students on their trip to Strasbourg, this has also proved to be a rewarding undertaking. One teacher received a Rockefeller grant for a project that grew out of her work in the exchange programme.

It should be noted that the group of Boston high school students chosen to go to Strasbourg (on merit, not design) reflects the ethnic mix of the populations of major United States cities. The myth of the white, protestant American is fast disappearing. The recent election of officials from diverse ethnic groups (Dinkins in New York; Bradley in Los Angeles, for example) more accurately indicates the spectrum of race and colour in our cities today. Perhaps one of the most important lessons to be learned from the BSSCA high school exchange programme is that these students are all Bostonians and Americans - as well as being outstanding students.

At the junior college level, a non-simultaneous exchange programme was set up between Bunker Hill, a public community college serving less advantaged and less broadly educated students, and the Collège René Cassin, a commercial college in Strasbourg. (Their special status allows American community colleges to issue work permits to foreign students which facilitates work-study exchanges.)

Important advances have been made in securing work experience for university age students in both sister cities. The Business Internship Programmes were set up in direct response to the many requests the association received from students in both cities who wanted to gain work experience in their sister city. Boston students arrive in Strasbourg in mid-June for a six week internship: their Strasbourg counterparts welcome them there and then leave for their internships in Boston. Interns are placed in many settings including banks, department stores, municipal agencies and manufacturing and service corporations. While students from each city pay their own travel expenses (some scholarships are available), the host cities cover the cost of living expenses and pocket money for the student interns. The ultimate success of the internships is due to the mentor in each business or institution who works directly with the intern. The project could not succeed without the mentor/intern relationship.

Thus far there have been a number of informal exchanges among university faculty. The first major academic programme brought together university professors from the two cities for a Bicentennial Symposium on Human Rights in 1989 held at Suffolk

University. Papers analysing the Declarations of Human Rights and the American Bill of Rights focused on the ongoing dialogue over human rights between the two nations. While the delegates met, human rights were being born anew in Eastern and Central Europe. This proved an ideal time to re-examine the heritage of Europe and North America. (The papers were published as *Celebrating Human Rights*, MCW editor.) Another component of the symposium was a human rights 'Round Table' discussion at Boston City Hall. This meeting dealt directly with race problems in Boston and Strasbourg. Responses to other common problems were discussed. The United States has much to learn from the advanced social programmes of European nations.

Professors and administrators from the University of Strasbourg all concurred on the need for exchanges; for more contacts with North American education. At the university level, Strasbourg has in recent years introduced programmes in continuing education, plastic arts, computer programming and televised teaching. These educators look forward to the contribution of American colleagues and the sharing of expertise in these new areas. American academics, for their part, have long appreciated the programmes, research and resources of the Strasbourg universities.

The BSSCA also sponsors programmes centring on the *arts* and *music*. A travel grant is awarded each year for a Boston artist to spend a month in Strasbourg. In effect, artists in the United States are also a 'minority' group in the sense that they receive little or no government support. The most recent of a number of exhibitions was a show from the 'Estampe du Rhin' held at the French Library of Boston, arranged by the Sister City Association. Last year a photo competition was held in the respective cities, with the winner in each city spending a month in the sister city. A joint poster featuring the two winning entries was printed. There were also shows of the winners' work.

Since music brought the two cities together, there are, appropriately, musical exchanges. Boston musical groups frequently perform in Strasbourg. In 1988, to celebrate the two thousandth anniversary of the founding of the city, the Boston Camerata staged the European premiere of 'Tristan and Iseult', a medieval romance in poetry and music there. Boston has held French film festivals co-sponsored by the BSSCA along with other artistic activities.

Even though Boston is the academic centre of the United States not all activities are academic or cultural. Increasingly efforts are made to promote projects that will interest the non-academic public. Contacts and exchange visits among *community garden* club members in the two cities take place. Since Strasbourg is famed for its gastronomy, visits between chefs and students in local culinary schools are under consideration. Several summers ago a group of *bakers* from Strasbourg visited Boston and the New England area. Three Boston *firefighters* still marvel at the hospitality extended to them on an Air France visit to Strasbourg. In turn, the visit of two Strasbourg *pompiers* to Boston was equally successful. Other projects are being planned. As ever, the problem is finding those with time. But here once again the ripple effect is at work. With each visit more contacts are made, more programmes and plans are envisioned. The dialogue continues and extends.

Perhaps the most promising of the BSSCA exchange programmes was the visit last summer to Boston of a group of *minority youths* (largely of North African background) from the Centre Culturel d'Elsau of Strasbourg. They came with the express purpose of meeting their counterparts, the youth of Boston's inner city. The visit itself did much to

extend their views. The project was co-sponsored by the BSSCA, Boston City Hall and Northeastern University (where they were housed). Translators help overcome the language barriers as the youths shared experiences with youth groups, including those of the Black Muslim Community in the Roxbury section of Boston. The young people of both cities discovered they had many problems in common in spite of some obvious differences. A meeting with youths from project Rebound (modelled on the well known Alcoholics Anonymous Programme; it serves as an alternative to court sentencing for drug offences) gave all the chance to discuss responses to similar stresses. The Strasbourg youth also visited housing projects such as Boston City Hall Island Shelter for Homeless which houses over 500 every night. The site features a garden for the homeless; part of Boston's ongoing efforts to address to the ever-increasing problem of the homeless. Here the question of why were there homeless in such a wealthy country naturally arose. The Strasbourg young people learned the sociological profile of an American city where rents doubled in 10 years, leading to the demise of rooming houses as landlords converted them into condominiums. In the course of the wide-ranging programme arranged for them the group from the Elsau Centre also heard of the major problem facing youth and minorities in the United States - unemployment. Plans are now under way for a group of inner city youths from Boston to visit Strasbourg and their guests from the Elsau Centre.

These then are some of the programmes that have been undertaken to strengthen Boston ties with a European city and build upon the new solidarities. Admittedly, Boston is favoured in its contacts with foreign business and culture. Nevertheless, similar linkages have been worked out successfully between North American and European cities of much smaller size. According to the Sister Cities International Association there have been rewarding relationships between small, even isolated communities.

Links with European municipalities provide North American cities with the opportunity to go beyond the classroom and involve the larger community in projects and activities related to a European sister city. A shared heritage serves as a starting point for many activities which can help overcome differences and lead to the appreciation of other cultures. Recently Mrs Trautmann created the Comité de Jumelage Boston-Strasbourg. This represents both a recognition of the success of the *jumelage* and a challenge for the future.

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Council of Europe
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ACHIEVING SOCIAL AND CULTURAL INTEGRATION THROUGH PLURALISM SOME THOUGHTS FROM THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

Rabbi Andrew Baker and **Howard I. Friedman**
American Jewish Committee, Washington

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Jewish tradition suggests that when God created the world he literally moved aside, to allow space in the full and complete heavens for this earthly creation. The result, we are told, is a very human society, created in the image of God but lacking God's perfection, and replete with the faults and blemishes which characterise the human condition. It is understandable if one feels disheartened by this less than perfect legacy; but our teachers assert that we are to see this as an opportunity, for it gives us the mandate to be partners with God in completing the work of his creation. The same Jewish tradition emphasises that the process of perfecting the world is an ongoing one - that the world will never be wholly perfected but that human beings are obliged to engage themselves in the perfecting process. The concurrent obligation to contribute to the perfecting process coupled with the recognition that the task cannot be completed assures for all generations the fulfilling role of doing God's work in the world. Thus, both a civilising and humbling sense of reality and an ennobling moral duty are placed upon the human family. The effect is to provide a critical role to human beings in bringing this less than perfect world to betterment.

At this time in world affairs, after a stirring and historic victory of the values of the West, we are yet confronted by enormous problems, but the challenges of those problems carry enormous possibilities as well. The East-West conflict, which has so defined our economic and political realities, has ended. The problem of escalating nuclear arsenals has now been replaced by the task of physically disposing of them and developing a stabilised defence posture for the future. The winds of freedom have swept across the European continent and democratic societies are taking root in places that have known only totalitarian rule for decades or even generations. Free market economies are being established in these countries with great pain and difficulty, but with the recognition that there is no alternative. Ancient ethnic rivalries and tensions from the impact of immigration in numerous European countries have arisen and threaten the civil peace.

The pressing needs for establishing democratic institutions and free market economies are obvious, and the consequences of failure are equally clear. While these are the most significant matters to be addressed - and, one might even say, short of addressing these problems all others will not matter - they are, nevertheless, not the only ones. In a new Europe of open borders, changing national boundaries, ethnic rivalries and social and economic migrations, harmony and security will not be guaranteed even if a unified parliament and vibrant economies are within grasp. It will also be necessary to establish a system of laws that protect the rights of minorities and individuals and no less important, to create an environment that promotes tolerance and pluralism with solid respect for difference.

A host of governments and private organisations are engaged in all manner of efforts to aid in the development of democracy and democratic institutions in Central and Eastern Europe and in the CIS, and surely an equal number are also involved in promoting economic development and free market conditions in the same countries. The formal establishment of minority rights, for all of its difficulties, will not be overlooked, and the fate of Yugoslavia stands as a warning. But it must be said that legislation and democratic structure alone will not address the social and cultural anxieties that stand in the way of an integrated Europe; a concerted effort must be undertaken to reach the 'hearts and minds' of people and the culture of societies as well.

No one would dare suggest that establishing a democratic society after years of totalitarian rule is simply a matter of convening elections, fostering free political parties and creating a legislature. Neither would one claim that privatising industry and freeing currency restrictions are all that are necessary to achieve an economic transformation. Educating people to democracy and developing open economies are intensive, long-term projects that must reach all elements of society if they are to succeed. In a similar fashion, a socially integrated and multi-cultural Europe will require the same intensive, deep-rooted and long term efforts. And the effort will benefit especially from a genuine trans-Atlantic stance that draws on the resources and insight of the American experience.

It must be acknowledged that American society is far from perfect, and pluralism and tolerance for us remain as much a goal as a patent reality. The recent riots in Los Angeles are evidence that we have much work to do to repair our cities and to provide hope and opportunity to an unfortunate and dangerous underclass, that threatens to disturb the civil order. However, lest it divert attention from this discussion, two things must be emphasised: while 10% of South Central Los Angeles erupted into rioting, 90% of its citizens were the law-abiding victims of that small minority. Further, this was not a problem brought on by immigration or by the cultural diversity of Los Angeles' many minority groups. They have benefited from the openness and possibility in American society and will surely continue to do so. Though there were some very ugly - and well-televised - incidents of racial hatred during those few days, this was not about group bigotry, but rather about individual frustration and individual lawlessness. The Los Angeles events should not cause us to lose sight of the enormous gains that have been achieved in developing in America a society that is fundamentally tolerant of diversity and accepting of diverse ethnic and religious groups.

In this regard, it is instructive to consider some recent opinion survey data that illustrate the level of tolerance to be found in American society. In 1989, the Gallup Organisation polled Americans as to whether or not they would like certain groups as neighbours:

Group	*Yes*	*No*
Catholics	94%	3%
Jews	91%	5%
Protestants	92%	5%
Blacks	83%	12%
Koreans	79%	14%
Koreans, Pakistanis	78%	15%
Hispanics	78%	16%
Vietnamese	75%	18%
Russians	74%	19%

In 1991 the American Jewish Committee, together with Freedom House, conducted a comparative survey in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. It is interesting to examine the reults of a similar question posed to residents of those countries. The response of those who say they would prefer *not* to have certain groups as neighbours was as follows:

Group	*Hungary*	*Poland*	*Czechoslovakia*
Russians	40%	40%	31%
Blacks	48%	54%	57%
Arabs	67%	62%	70%
Asians	42%	51%	57%
Gypsies	76%	72%	85%
Jews	17%	40%	23%

In viewing these statistics, it is instructive to focus on the range of negative responses and to put aside for the moment the individual ethnic and religous groups that serve as the basis of the questions. Americans responded negatively 3% to 19% of the time, while the negative responses of Central Europeans ran between 17% and 85%. Even if one should suggest that in this survey Americans are reluctant to express their true feelings - and surely a reluctance to voice prejudice is a necessary step toward eliminating prejudice - the difference is still quite striking.

It is true that Europe is not America, and the American pluralist mosaic which was moulded by immigrant populations is not the same historical pattern of many of Europe's homogeneous societies. Nevertheless, minority populations are already a feature of many nations on the continent and the inevitable migrations of people accompanying economic and democratic progress will surely increase the phenomenon. Even if America is not a direct parallel, the largely successful American efforts to promote tolerance and respect for difference are worth examining. America can serve Europe as a laboratory where one might adapt current models and find new instruments that will aid an integrated Europe. There is a special role for partnerships and investments; we must draw on individuals and institutions with the interests and skills in human relations to bring their expertise to bear on developments in Eastern Europe and the CIS.

For the sake of discussion, and to provide some paradigms, let us offer a few suggestions:

1. Voluntary organisations have long been a hallmark of American society. There are a great number of organisations that represent and address racial, ethnic and religious communities such as the Urban League, the National Conference of Christians and Jews, the American Jewish Committee, the Japanese Americans Citizens League, the National Association of Arab Americans, and so on. Most of these organisations were initially formed to foster and protect individual group rights and identities. But, they have also come to recognise the need for and the value of acting co-operatively. For all their differences, there is a common goal of combating stereotypes, preventing discrimination and enhancing pluralism. In spite of the different memberships, there are remarkable similarities in the way each group works to shape public opinion, affect local and national legislation and maintain institutional strength. Similar public input comes from the diverse organised religious groups in America.

2. Inter-religious dialogue and respect for religious differences in America have been nurtured by a tradition of church-state separation, which may be unique to the United States and by a stalwart maintenance of the principles of free religious expression. Nevertheless, political pluralism has itself spawned a growing religious pluralism, and American religious leaders are often a prime force for

counselling understanding and appreciation for other religious views. (Many have, in turn, affected their respective international church bodies and the formal policies and positions they adopt; the role of American Catholic Bishops in the Second Vatican Council was one example). The positive expressions and formal statements of national and local religious denominations are critical. But local interfaith efforts are the vehicles to bring home these messages, and working together on common social issues has been a way of forming the bonds and developing a measure of trust that are needed.

3. Many communities have established local and state human relations councils. Most are responsible for adopting and enforcing laws that prohibit discrimination in areas such as housing, employment and social gatherings. They may also be charged with creating educational programmes that teach people what discrimination is and how to address it. Some may go so far as to set up a response network that is capable of drawing together police, government, religious and educational representatives to combat particular cimes of hate violence. Though the particulars vary, the basic premise is the same: laws alone will not eradicate discrimination. It is necessary to tie these laws to a broad-based community body that is sensitive to (and even representative of) the diversity in society and will insure that they are fairly applied and achieve their intended result.

4. Governmental agencies, religious groups and voluntary organisations have, in turn, sensitised and engaged other institutions in the matter of discrimination and the importance of promoting tolerance. Television and print journalists are quite aware of the danger in perpetuating stereotypes and thereby reinforcing prejudice. Advertisers are aware of the need - and in some cases demanded by law - to convey through the messages they project that their products or services do not discriminate. Even sports fans have been put on notice that the names of their teams or their gestures of support might inadvertently offend and need to be reconsidered. Many of these changes will appear petty or contrived and seem awkward when first introduced. But that is how attitudes eventually change. The racial and ethnic stereotypes that were prevalent in America a generation ago are clearly diminishing. Witness the following responses to an ongoing Gallup survey:

'If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for President and he happened to be a Jew/Catholic/Black would you vote for him?' The percentage of those answering *yes*:

	1958	*1961*	*1965*	*1978*	*1983*
Jew	62%	68%	79%	81%	88%
Catholic	68%	82%	86%	91%	92%
Black	37%	50%	59%	75%	77%

These changes did not just 'happen'. The ethnically and culturally diverse picture that *is* American life is increasingly reflected in all the depictions *of* American life. Those differences are not a barrier to one's American identity; they are part of that American identity.

5. Suffusing all of these elements characterising the American experience is the firm commitment of America to a pluralist society. 'Pluralism' in that setting is not only a steadfast openness to diversity and respect for difference; it is also an affirmative commitment that such diverse groups assume the responsibility of impacting the American society in terms of policy formation and the development of American cultural and political postures. In doing so, each group is expected to draw upon its own unique experience and ethos. Thus, pluralism is the foundation stone for seeing diversity as a positive source of securing for the society the vigour and diversity of alternative inputs to the policy-making process. For America, the infusion of immigrant populations has been the indisputable source of providing fresh energy to the entire American enterprise. The process of receiving and nourishing immigrants constitutes a vital national resource in America because such immigrant populations bring to the American scene a freshened appreciation for the values of an open society.

Few would concede that 'European' is or will ever likely be a sufficient badge of personal identity. The success of political and economic integration will not diminish the importance of national, ethnic and religious affiliations, and the European umbrella will still need to shield and nourish them all. Political and economic 'harmony' may need to come first, but social and cultural integration must not be far behind. And the American experience of making pluralism the governing national ethos provides a model which helps illuminate the way.

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TWO CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY

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1. The problem

No subject is more important, in the dialogue between Europe and America, than the character of genuine democracy and of the connection between democracy and individual human rights. The concept of democracy is now more appealing, and demanded in many more nations, then ever before. But it is often overlooked that democracy can be interpreted in a large variety of ways, and that the differences between the different conceptions of democracy are incredibly important. It is crucial, for example, which conception forms the maturing ideal of democracy in Eastern Europe.

I shall put the question of democracy in a special, and I think particularly practical way. Since early in its history, the United States Supreme Court has assumed the authority to declare laws or acts of Congress, or the executive branch, or of the various states unconstitutional and void if the Court thinks them contrary to the abstract provisions of the United States Constitution. The European Court of Human Rights, and constitutional courts in various European nations, have been given, to varying degrees, parallel powers. In both Europe and America those judicial powers - I shall call them the powers of judicial review - are part of national and international schemes to protect individual human rights. But are such powers inconsistent with democracy? Is protecting individual human rights in that way a compromise with democracy?

It is not difficult to understand the argument that judicial review is indeed undemocratic. Democracy means rule by the people and judicial review seems to be rule by the judges instead. In fact there are two respects in which judicial review might seem undemocratic, and a quick summary catches only one of them. Judges on the highest courts are appointed rather than elected. So a system that gives such judges great political powers seems offensive to the principle that in a democracy officials are chosen by and answerable to the people. But that is not the whole story. We do not think it seriously undemocratic that other powerful officials are not elected. Secretaries of State or Defense or Treasury are not elected, and they can do more damage in a week than any single judge can in his or her judicial lifetime. American Presidents are elected, of course. But once they are in place they can wield their promethean powers almost unaccountable for at least four years, in which time they can easily destroy the world.

The real threat a constitution poses to democracy is deeper, and has nothing to do with the fact that judges are not elected. We know that in a complex, representative democracy the majority's will cannot always govern. But for the most part we accept that in any democracy the majority *should* govern; we think that though institutional structures that insulate officials from popular opinion are necessary in practice, they are undesirable in principle. But when constitutions declare limits on the majority's power, this democratic assumption is displaced; decisions are *not* supposed to reflect the will of the majority then. Every official swears loyalty to the constitution, and therefore has a responsibility to defy popular will when the constitution's guarantees are in play. But that responsibility is most vivid when judges are asked to test legislation that has already been enacted, and so tacitly certified as constitutional, by other officials. Judges then claim a right and a duty to stand in the way of what the majority's representatives think proper and in the interests of the community as a whole.

So judicial review is not just undemocratic exceptionally or when it is working badly, as other institutions are, but undemocratic steadily and when it is working well.

Or so most commentators and scholars think. Some of them, though by no means all, believe that judicial review is a just and wise institution; many, though not all, think America and now Europe are better political communities just because they are *not* perfect democracies. But almost everyone concedes that judicial review compromises democratic principles. Lawyers who think this is a very serious fault in their constitution are anxious that the constitution be interpreted narrowly, to minimise that flaw. Those who think the fault less serious, and so support a more generous interpretation, nevertheless agree that it is a fault; they support the constitution, on balance, in spite of that weakness.

In the American Constitution, the provisions that protect individual rights are mainly set out in the Bill of Rights: the first ten amendments and those added after the American Civil War. These provisions, among other things, forbid either the national or any state government from abridging freedom of speech or taking life or liberty or property without due process of law or denying anyone the equal protection under the law, or changing certain established criminal procedures, and so forth. It is these disabling provisions that lawyers have in mind when they claim or concede that the Constitution is inherently undemocratic. They assume that any limit the Constitution places on the power of a majority of electors to do what they think right or best is undemocratic.

I shall argue to the contrary. I shall argue that we must see judicial review as posing not the question whether democracy should be compromised to protect individuals and minority groups from majoritarian oppression, but the even deeper question of what democracy, properly understood, really is. In my view, in the last few decades the nations of Western Europe have been progressively and collectively *changing* the reigning European conception of democracy. They have been moving away from a statistical majoritarian conception of democracy, which is hostile to the idea of individual rights, and which had been characteristic of European political thought. They have been moving toward a more communal conception, which embraces human rights as an integral *part* of democracy, a conception of democracy that was given its first institutional form in the United States two centuries ago, and that has matured and flourished in that country through a great part of this century. In part, this change in West European conceptions of democracy has been collective, achieved through the developing idea that the protection of individual rights is a European matter, and through institutions among which the European Court of Human Rights, here in Strasbourg, has been central. In part the development has been more dispersed, through change of reigning political philosophies in individual countries, even in that capitol of the majoritarian conception, the Palace of Westminster in London.

Though in this way Europe has moved closer to the traditional American conception of democracy, there is a troubling paradox. While Europe has moved away from a barren statistical conception of democracy, toward the American idea that a genuine democracy is possible only when the basic rights of individuals are secure from majority rule, the United States seems to be moving in the opposite direction. Successive Republican presidents, expressly rejecting the communal notion of democracy in favour of the statistical, majoritarian one, have packed the Supreme Court with justices committed to that preference, and these justices have been moving with quite great dedication and speed to overturn many of the past Supreme Court decisions that most powerfully confirmed the communal view. Lawyers and scholars fear that the structure of constitutional law erected on the communal model over many decades will be swept away more quickly than could have been predicted few years ago.

So the discussion I hope to begin is important in several ways and at several levels. Dialogue is important, among other reasons, because America is now challenging what it once endorsed, and Europe is embracing what it once rejected. The old debate has new parties, and will therefore be joined in a different way. It may be a more fruitful way. The European pupil may soon be in a position to tutor America in a kind of democracy America invented. But in any case it is an occasion for turning to fundamentals, for tackling the problem of democracy at a deeper level, if possible, that we have before.

2. Conceptions of democracy

I must define the two conceptions of democracy I have just distinguished more thoroughly, and I begin with a benign but important observation. Democracy, like almost any other form of government, involves collective action. I mean only that in describing any complex form of government we must recognise units of action in which the actor is some group rather than an individual on his or her own. We say that in a democracy government is by the *people*. We mean that the people collectively do things - elect leaders, for example - that no individual does or can do alone.

There are two kinds of collective action, however - statistical and communal - and our conception of democracy will turn on which kind of collective action we take democratic government to require. Collective action is statistical when what the group does is only a matter of some function, rough or specific, of what the individual members of the group do on their own, that is, with no sense of doing something *as a group*. We might say: the people of some country - France, for example - want a more aggressive and interventionist economic policy. We describe a kind of collective action: no one French person can act in such a way that he or she has made it true that the French people think anything in particular. But the reference to the French people is nevertheless only and simply a figure of speech; we do not think there really is a super-person cartoon figure, called the French People, which has opinions of its own. Our remark only makes a rough statistical judgment of some sort about what (say) most French people think. Or we might say that yesterday the foreign exchange market drove up the price of the franc. Once again, we are describing collective action; only a large group of bankers and dealers can affect the foreign currency market in any substantial way. But once again our reference of a collective entity, the currency market, is not intended to point to any actual entity. We could, without in any way changing the meaning of what we say, make an overtly statistical claim instead; that the combined effects of the very large number of individual currency transactions was responsible for the higher price of the franc at the latest trade.

Collective action is communal, on the other hand, when it cannot be reduced just to some statistical function of individual action, because it is collective in the deeper sense that does require individuals to assume the existence of the group as a separate entity or phenomenon. The familiar but very powerful example of collective guild provides a good example. Germans feel responsible for what *Germany* did, not just for what other Germans did; their sense of responsibility assumes that they are themselves connected to the Nazi terror in some way, that they belong to the *nation* that committed those crimes. An orchestra can play a symphony, though no single musician can, but this is not a case of statistical collective action because it is essential to an orchestral performance not just that a specified function of musicians each plays some appropriate score, but that

the musicians play *as* an orchestra, each intending to make a contribution to the performance of the group, and not just as isolated individual recitations.

The distinction between statistical and communal action allows us two different reading of the platitude that democracy involves collective action, two different readings of Lincoln's promise that democracy is government of the people and by the people and for the people. The first is a statistical reading of those ideas: that in a democracy political decisions are made in accordance with some function of the votes or decisions or wishes of the individual citizens one by one. On this reading democracy is different from other forms of government because in a democracy the function in play is majoritarian, or at least plurality, whereas in other forms of government different statistical functions are specified. The second is a communal reading; that in a democracy political decisions are taken by a distinct entity - the *people* as such - rather than any set of individuals one by one. That formulation is intended to remind you of Rousseau's general will, which I am inclined to understand as pointing to a communal rather than statistical conception of democracy.

Our response to the supposed conflict between democracy and judicial review will depend on which conception of democracy we accept, because the two conceptions draw the line differently between those constitutional provisions that establish a democracy - structural provisions - and those that can sensibly be understood as compromising democracy. On the statistical reading, the structural provisions of a constitution are mainly limited to those that are expressly structural - those that define who may vote, how members of parliament or congress are elected, what proportion of them it takes to enact legislation, and so forth. But on the communal conception of democracy structural provisions need not be limited to those matters of procedure and organisation. Further reflection might show, for example, that communal collective action is possible only if the members of the community share certain ideals; if so, the maintenance of those ideals through constraints on majority decision would itself be a matter of structuring democracy rather than qualifying or undermining it.

I expect that only the statistical reading now seems plausible or acceptable to most of you. You think that the communal reading is at best a matter of Hegelian mystification, and at worst an invitation to totalitarian oppression justified on the ground that the state is more important than the individual. I understand these fears and believe that philosophers are in part responsible for them, by failing to identify the important features of similar kind of collective action, like that of an orchestra for example, which are neither mysterious or threatening. Rousseau illustrates both the appeal of a better account of collective political action, and the confusion, into which he fell, in neglecting the distinction between what I shall call *integrated* communal collective action, which insists upon the importance of the individual, and *monolithic* communal collective action, which denies it.

3. Equality of power

I shall begin my argument by trying to point out severe internal defects and inadequacies in the popular statistical reading of democracy. If democracy is a matter of political decisions representing some function of the individual decisions of members of the community, then this must be, as I said, a majoritarian function, or at least some function that does not allow that a political decision might be taken even though it

commands less support among the electorate than a different decision would. It is that feature of the statistical conception that seems so obviously incompatible with most constitutional constraints on majority will. We must therefore ask what political value a statistical conception of democracy, interpreted as requiring a majoritarian function, serves. Why should we want a form of government in which collective decisions are all and only those that are supported by most people?

We should notice, but only to set aside, an epistemological answer to that question: that the majority is more likely to be right about which political decision the community should take than any other group is. That argument might very well be persuasive, at least in principle, about preference-sensitive political decisions; when the character and distribution of people's preferences in part determines which decision is the right one. If the question arises whether the community should use designated funds to build a baseball stadium or an ice-hockey rink, and we believe that decision ought to depend on which would be used more, a majoritarian political process seems the best way to discover the answer. But we have no general reason to think that the majority is more likely to be right than any other group about preference-*insensitive* issues, that is when facts about the mix of preferences or opinions are substantively irrelevant. The fact that a majority of citizens approves capital punishment, for example, is in itself no argument that capital punishment is right. Since the question whether individuals have moral rights the majority should respect is plainly preference-insensitive - it would be absurd to suppose that individual citizens have these rights only if the majority thinks they do - the epistemological argument cannot justify the claim that the statistical conception of democracy is the right one.

Any plausible general justification of statistical democracy must be based on fairness and equality, in other words, not on the soundness of the answers a majority is likely to reach. Consider the following argument. Political equality - treating people as equals in the distribution of political power - means making people equal in their political power, and that can be achieved only by statistical majority rule. If this argument is sound, then one of the most fundamental political ideals, that a political organisation must treat its members as equals, has a dilemma at its core. One part of equality - the input, procedural part - recommends a political system in which a majority is free to deprive minorities of the other part of what equality requires, which is an equal stake as well as an equal part in government. So the question whether treating people as equals does mean making political power equal is a question of general importance for political philosophy. We should begin trying to answer it by asking what equality of political power really is. In fact equality of power admits of different interpretations or readings, and separating these is essential to understanding why they are all misconceived.

Vertical and horizontal dimensions

How is political power to be measured? Under what circumstances is it equal? Any adequate answer must compare political power along two dimensions: not only horizontally, by comparing power of different private citizens or groups of citizens, but also vertically, by comparing the power of private citizens with that of individual officials. If political equality is a matter of equal political power, both dimensions must figure in the accounting. Horizontal equality of power is hardly enough to provide anything we would recognise as a genuine democracy. In totalitarian dictatorships private citizens have equal political power: none. Cynical pretend-democracies with a single political

party are usually scrupulous in providing each citizen with one and only one vote for that party. So the vertical dimension must come into play.

It seems incredible, however, that any genuine vertical equality of power could exist in representative democracies. How could British political structures and practices be revised, for example, short of destroying representative government altogether, so as to give every American citizen of voting age the same power over national affairs as a junior congressman, let alone as the President? So a conception of political equality that demands equality of political power might seem to be caught in a dilemma at the start. If it insists on horizontal equality only, equality among the governed, its most stringent requirements might be satisfied by plainly undemocratic tyrannies. If it demands vertical equality as well, then it is wholly unrealistic.

Impact and influence

We must bear that threatened dilemma in mind when we consider what equality of power might mean. We should distinguish two interpretations: equality of impact and equality of influence. The intuitive difference is this: someone's impact in politics is the difference he or she can make, just on his or her own, by voting for or choosing one decision rather than another. Someone's influence, on the other hand is the difference he or she can make not just alone but also by leading or inducing others to believe or vote or choose as he or she does.

The distinction between political impact and political influence suggests an escape from the dilemma I described. Obviously, vertical equality of power is impossible if that means equality of political impact. A representative structure is necessarily one in which impact is vertically sharply different. But it does make sense to call for vertical equality, as an ideal, if the equality in question is equality of influence. We can even describe a fully representational system in which equality of influence holds, at least to the degree of precision to which it can be measured anyway. Suppose that officials accept that they have a duty to vote as a majority of those they represent wish them to vote. Suppose that elections are held sufficiently frequently, communication between officials and constituents is good enough, and recall mechanisms sufficiently efficient and inexpensive, so that officials do in fact hold to that duty. In those circumstances rough vertical equality of influence is realised. Since Senator X will vote for tax reduction when but only when he believes that a majority of the constituents favour it, the information that he himself would prefer reduction does not increase the subjective probability that he will vote for it any more than the information that any other of his constituents would prefer it increases that probability.

From the horizontal perspective, too, it would be implausible to understand equality of power as equality of impact, but now for the opposite reason. Equality of impact is not too demanding a goal but one not demanding enough. Equal impact does require that each competent citizen have a vote and the same vote, and it also requires one-person-one-vote districting. But it does nothing to justify a central assumption we make about democracy, which is that democracy requires not only widespread suffrage but freedom of speech and association, and other political rights and liberties, as well. My impact in politics is no less than yours when censorship denies me the right to present my views to the public but allows you to do so. Or when you are rich enough to control a newspaper but I am too poor to buy even one copy. We need to reach beyond the idea

of equal impact to equal influence even to begin to explain why censoring the views of some denies equality of power.

Should influence by equal?

But is equality of influence really an attractive ideal? Would we not hesitate to improve vertical equality of influence in the way in which we just saw this to be possible: by insisting that officials always act in whatever way a majority of their constituents, and adopting electoral devices that would punish those who do not? Do we not want our leaders to lead rather than follow our views, at least on preference-insensitive issues?

Equality of influence on the horizontal dimension may seem a much more attractive ideal than it does on the vertical dimension, however. But that appearance is deceptive. The main appeal of horizontal equality of influence lies in the conviction that it is unfair that some private citizens have much more influence in politics than others just because they are much richer. But we can explain that intuition in two ways. We can, indeed, explain it as resting on the assumption that any great lapse from equality of influence among private citizens is a serious lapse in political equality. Or we can explain it in a way that does not appeal to equality of influence, as a general ideal, at all. We can say, for example, that it is unjust that some people have as much money as a Rockefeller because that violates the distributive principles of equality, and then add that the disproportionate political influence of their wealth gives them is a particularly deplorable consequence of the injustice because it allows them, among other things, to perpetuate and multiply their other unfair advantages.

These two ways of objecting to Rockefeller's political influence are, of course, very different. The first is insensitive to the source of his disproportionate influence; it supposes that aggregate influence, from all sources, must be equal. The second makes no assumptions about aggregate influence; it condemns a Rockefeller's influence only because of the particular source of that influence. We can contrast the two objections by imagining a world in which the first would hold but the second would not. Suppose the distributional goals of economic equality were met reasonably well, but some people still had more influence in politics than others. They might have more influence for a variety of reasons, but I shall assume reasons unobjectionable in themselves, because we are considering whether we should object to unequal influence as such. They might have decided to spend more of their initially equal wealth on political campaigns, for example, than other people have. Or they might have invested more in study and training which made other people more likely to consult them or listen to their advice. Or they might have led lives of such conspicuous achievement or virtue that other trust them more, or are more ready to follow them. The first form of objection to a Rockefeller's influence would nevertheless apply to them. We would regard the greater influence of politically motivated or experienced or charismatic people as a defect in political organisation, and take whatever steps we could to eliminate or reduce it. But the second form of the objection would lapse unless we had some other reason, quite independent of any assumption that political influence should be equal, for objecting to a situation in which some people are more politically motivated or trained or charismatic than others.

Consider the common, and wholly justified, complaint that women have too little power of all kinds in most societies. Someone who takes that view might think that social organisation is defective unless the average woman has the same influence over affairs

(measured in some specified way) as the average man does. But someone else who makes the same complaint might mean something very different: not that men and women should, as a matter of right or ideal, have the same influence on average, but that the smaller influence women now have is the result of a combination of economic injustice, stereotype, and other forms of oppression and prejudice, some of which, perhaps, are so fundamental as to be carried in the community's culture. The difference between these two positions emerges more clearly once again, if we try to imagine a society in which economic, social and cultural discrimination against women has been removed. If the average power of men and women is unequal in such a society - as it might be, in either direction - would that fact, just in itself, count as a defect in social organisation?

Once we realise that our most serious worries about inequality of political power can be explained without appealing to equality of influence as an ideal, we are free to consider whether we have any reason, other than wanting to explain these worries, for accepting that ideal. In my view, we do not. An attractive political community wishes its citizens to engage in politics out of a shared and intense concern for the justice and rightness of the results. It encourages citizens to take pride or shame in the community's success or failure as if it were their own; it aims at that communal goal of political activity. The ideal of equal influence denies that ambition, however. When people are fastidious not to have too much influence, or jealous that they do not have enough, their collective concern is only a matter of show; they continue to think of political power as a discrete resource rather than a collective responsibility.

An attractive society also cherishes a further goal for political activity; that citizens should have as much scope for extending their moral life and experience into politics as possible. But people who accept equality of influence as a political constraint cannot treat their political lives as moral agency, because that constraint corrupts the cardinal premise of moral conviction: that only truth counts. Political campaigning under some self-imposed limit of influence, even if it could be achieved, would be attractive only within a community in which each person struggled only to achieve the best life for himself, his family and associates. That ideal is foreign to a genuinely republican form of politics, in which citizens each struggle for the community as a whole.

4. Communal collective action

So the idea that seems so natural to many philosophers, the ideal of equality of political power, is both implausible and artificial. Its defects, fortunately, are also blueprints for an alternative conception of democracy based on a communal rather than a statistical understanding of collective action. But building that conception must start further back, by confronting the problem I acknowledged earlier: that the communal conception seems metaphysically too luxuriant and politically too dangerous to play that role. We must see whether and how we can make sense of a genuine communal action without adding dubious collective entities to the furniture of the universe, and whether and how democracy conceived as communal action can be liberal rather than totalitarian.

In fact we can pursue both projects together by exploring the following suggestion: communal action depends not on the ontological priority of community over individual, but on a certain kind of shared attitudes among individuals. Which attitudes? The answer is complex, and requires a set of distinctions. Whenever we act self-consciously, with a sense that what we do is important and can be done well or badly, we implicitly make two

assumptions about the unit of action in play. We assume, first, a particular unit of responsibility, by which I mean the person or group to whose credit or discredit, achievement or failure, the action redounds, and, second, a particular unit of judgment, by which I mean the person or group whose convictions about what is right or wrong are the appropriate ones for us to use in making that assessment.

Most of the time the unit of responsibility each person assumes is himself or herself acting as an individual. That remains true in cases of statistical collective action. The American people have poisoned the atmosphere, but most of us each takes responsibility only for our own acts. We have already noticed cases, however, in which this is not so. Many Germans who were not born until after World War II nevertheless feel collective responsibility for what their country did before and during it. The actions were not theirs as individuals, but they believe themselves in some complex way to share in the responsibility for them. Musicians in a flourishing orchestra think of the orchestra's performance in parallel terms; they count themselves to have succeeded only when the orchestra as a whole has. Members of a healthy baseball team take the same attitude towards success or failure of the team as a whole; each player feels in some way to have failed when his or her team has. In these cases the attitudes of individuals create and presuppose a new unit of responsibility: the group. The group, we might say, is the unit that does well or badly, and individuals share in its responsibility derivatively because they are members of it.

Again, at least in our culture, the normal or usual unit of judgment for all actions is the individual. It is necessary for my self-respect, I think, that I make my own judgments about what kind of life to lead and how to treat others and what counts as good or bad work at my job. I do not mean that I must (or can) make these judgments wholly in private, with no consultation with or influence from other people or my culture as a whole, but rather that I must be satisfied that I am in the end acting on convictions I have formed myself and not just bowing to what others think right for me. But some people, at least sometimes, reject the view that they act as individual units of judgment. They treat themselves as members of a group whose province it is to make moral and ethical judgments on behalf of its members. They believe not just that their own judgments on these matters will inevitably be influenced by their culture, but that they should be, that justice and ethics are at bottom *constituted* by culture. A German in the 1930s who accepted a collective unit of judgment could not feel shame for Nazi atrocities, because his nation had endorsed these atrocities as historic triumphs.

We may use these distinctions to restate and expand our ideas about collective action. We distinguish statistical from communal collective action in this way. In statistical collective action, individual actors treat the pertinent unit of agency as individual. When currency traders drive up the price of francs, each acts for himself or herself, and each attends to his or her own success or failure not that of the group of currency dealers as a whole. In the case of communal collective action, however, individual actors share attitudes that make the pertinent unit of responsibility collective as well as individual. Musicians treat the orchestra as a separate and distinct unit of responsibility through what it does, and they are therefore vulnerable to success or failure collectively quite apart from their individual performances. Communal collective action is not a matter of metaphysical but (as we might say) of *ethical* priority.

We are now in a position to distinguish two forms of communal collective action: integrated and monolithic. In the case of integrated collective action, while the shared

attitudes of participants create a collective unit of responsibility, they do not create a collective unit of judgment; the unit of judgment remains thoroughly individual. In the case of monolithic action, on the contrary, both the unit of responsibility and the unit of judgment become collective. Once again, this is a matter of shared attitudes. Compare a good orchestra with a theocratic despotism. In the former, musicians are expected to develop and retain their own sense of musical achievement: their pride in what the orchestra has done is based on their own, self-consciously individual, judgments of musical merit. In a theocratic despotism, on the other hand, anyone who claimed an independent platform of conviction would be a revolutionary, even if his or her independent convictions endorsed the theocracy. Such a community judges itself.

So once we reject the majoritarian thesis that democracy is collective action only in the statistical sense, we must choose between two alternative readings of the idea that it is collective in the communal sense. We can treat democracy as a matter of either integrated or monolithic collective action. Of course we much choose the former, and I describe the choice only to show the difference. In the rest of this essay, I shall try to construct an account of democracy of government by the people, understood in the integrated, communal sense, as equals.

5. Democracy as integration

In a genuine democracy, the people govern not statistically but communally. They treat their nation as a collective unit of responsibility, which means that they, as citizens, share derivative responsibility for whatever their government, acting officially, does. But though the people form a distinct unit of responsibility, they do not form a collective unit of judgment. In a communal democracy, each citizen insists that his political convictions are in every important sense his business, that it is his independent responsibility to decide what the nation should do to do well, and whether or how far is has succeeded. As I suggested earlier, the structural constitution of a democracy conceived in those terms must be different, and more complex, than the structure of a statistical democracy. We construct a statistical democracy by choosing some arrangement of power and function among citizens, officials and institutions that allows political decisions roughly to match the will of the majority. We need more than that for a communal democracy; we need background institutions and assumptions that elicit and nourish the needed pair of democratic attitudes: collective responsibility and individual judgment.

Which institutions and assumptions do create and promote democracy on that conception? Studying other forms of integrated communal action can be helpful, in answering that question, only to a point, because few of these will be examples of democracies. (Though an orchestra, for example, can be organised democratically, few are and good ones are not. Democratically organised football teams would be ineffectual and probably suicidal.) We do better to reach the political case directly, and I shall use the following interpretive strategy. We begin with a number of pre-interpretive assumptions about what good democracy is like in practice: that the vote is widely dispersed according to the formula one-person one-vote, that freedom of speech and assembly and demonstration and religion and conscience are recognised and protected as valuable, that no group of citizens is excluded from participating in the community's economy, and so forth. We must see how far these familiar institutions and assumptions can be justified on structural assumptions: that they create and maintain an integrated communal agent, the people, in which individual citizens figure as equal members. I shall organise the

discussion around the three main contributions familiar political institutions might be thought to make to that end. They give individual citizens a part in the collective, a *stake* in it, and *independence* from it.

The principle of participation

In a democracy understood as communal government by equals, each person must be offered a role that allows him to make a difference to the character of political decisions, and the force of his role - the magnitude of the difference he can make - must not be structurally fixed or limited by assumptions about his worth or talent or ability. The first part of this principle - that everyone must have a role - holds for any collective unit of agency; no one counts as a part of a collective agent unless he is in a position to make a difference to what the collective agent does. I cannot sanely treat myself as member of the Berlin Orchestra even if members of that orchestra were willing to call me a member, so long as I continue to have no role in its performances. The principle of participation is democratic only in virtue of its second part, which insists that each member have a role to play consistent with the assumption that he is an equal member. This part of the principle explains why an orchestra is not a democracy, in the ordinary case. The conductor is not chosen by the members; he is imposed on them, and the power he exerts over them, to define and dictate the collective agent's performance, is assigned from outside the community on the justification that he has special talents ordinary members do not. Democracy cannot be like that.

The participation principle is sufficient to explain why we associate democracy with universal or near universal suffrage and single-vote-for-each voting schemes, and with structures of representation that make political offices open in principle to everyone. A scheme of that sort satisfies the principle and no substantial deviation from it would. History, which attaches meanings to structures, plays a part in that judgment. Since electoral schemes that were not based on equal suffrage usually reflected the view that rich people are more worthy to govern than poor ones, or that some races lack the rights or capacities of others, or that one sex is and ought to be subordinate to the other, any contemporary variation from one-person-one-vote must be suspected of bearing a parallel meaning equally offensive to the participation principle. But that is not invariably so, and sometimes history protects rather than condemns an institution that deviates from one-person-one-vote. History explains the composition of the United States Senate, for example, in a non-invidious way. At least in principle other lapses in one-person-one-vote might be justified as inoffensive to the participation principle, including, for example, districting arrangements that allow special voting power to groups that have special needs.

The participation principle also explains why the political liberties, like freedom of speech and protest, are part of the idea of democracy. If each citizen is to be given a role in politics that amounts to a genuine chance to make a difference, then, particularly in a large political community, he must be allowed voice as well as vote. A voting scheme that limited the participation of most citizens to an up-or-down vote when the debate was over would neither encourage nor justify the democratic attitude. And selective content-based censorship would violate the second part of the participation principle, which stipulates that people's political power cannot be reduced by regulations that violate equal respect. But I have not fallen back on the idea of equality of influence that I rejected earlier. Democracy, in the communal understanding, requires that individual citizens

each be in a position to make a difference, and it also requires that their power to make that difference not be limited, *vis à vis* the power of others, by structures or regulations that themselves deny equal respect. Those stipulations do not together make up a positive requirement that each citizen either actually have, or even be in a position to have, as much influence over the collective decision as any other, however. They do not aim at a state of affairs in which someone will not be able to achieve more influence over his fellow citizens in virtue of the appeal of his cause or personality or arguments or convictions.

The principle of stake

In a democracy understood as communal, collective decisions must reflect equal concern for the interests of all members. Once again, this principle of stake reflects our understanding of the root idea of communal agency. Membership in a collective unit of responsibility involves reciprocity: a person is not a member of a collective unit sharing success and failure unless he is treated as a member by others, and treating him as a member means accepting that the impact of collective action on his life and interests is as important to the overall success of the action as the impact on the life and interests of any other member. Though even Germans who actively opposed Hitler feel a measure of collective responsibility for his crimes, it would be absurd, even perverse, for German Jews to feel any such sense. So the communal conception of democracy explains an intuition many of us share: that a society in which the majority distributes resources unfairly is undemocratic as well as unjust. The communal conception unites procedural and substantive justice by insisting that democracy means government both by and for the people; under that conception the distinction between those two departments of justice is only superficial. How the community treats its members is part of what decides whether they are members of it, and therefore whether political decisions are made by a collective agent that includes them.

Does the principle of stake make democracy a black hole into which all other political virtues collapse? Statistical conceptions of democracy at least have the merit that they explain our sense that democracy is only one among political ideals, that it is not the same thing as justice, and that a democratic political system can therefore produce unjust results. The communal conception of democracy, just because it dissolves the line between procedural and substantive justice, seems to threaten that apparently valid and useful distinction. We can check the threat, however, and produce a more successful analysis of communal democracy, if we take the principle of stake to require not that a community must have achieved the best or the right understanding of what equal concern actually requires in order to count as a democracy, but only that it must accept the idea of equal concern as an abstract requirement. Its economic, social and legal arrangements must be such as could in the main be justified by some good faith interpretation of what equal concern requires.

Suppose you and I think that utilitarianism is an unsatisfactory account of equal concern, and that utilitarian political decisions are often unjust. We will nevertheless think that a community satisfies the principle task of stake if its political decision match a utilitarian understanding of equal concern, and this understanding is widely held to be the right one by its members, even though we believe many of its actual actions unjust. In this way we retain the idea that democracy is only one among the political virtues. Nevertheless, there will be a limit to the degree to which a genuine democracy can be

unjust. A political system with equal suffrage, in which the majority distributes everything to itself with no concern whatever for the fate of some racial or other minority, will not count as an unjust democracy on the communal conception, but as no democracy at all. That is not, I think an embarrassment to the communal conception, because our pre-interpretive assumptions reject the idea that outcomes are never relevant in deciding whether a regime is democratic.

The principle of independence

The principle of stake distinguishes communal from merely statistical democracy. A majoritarian tyranny, in which minorities are systematically cheated of their fair share, may nevertheless be a perfect statistical democracy. When we insist that a genuine democracy must treat everyone with equal concern, we take a decisive step towards a deeper form of collective action in which the people is understood to comprise not a majority but everyone acting communally. The third principle - the principle of independence - is necessary to a further distinction, in order that democracy be understood as communal in an integrated rather than a monolithic sense. Citizens of an integrated community must be encouraged to see moral and ethical judgment as their own responsibility rather than the responsibility of the collective unit; otherwise they will form not a democracy but a monolithic tyranny. The principle of independence therefore insists that a democratic government must not dictate what its citizens think about matters of political or moral or ethical judgment, but must, on the contrary, provide circumstances that encourage citizens to arrive at beliefs on these matters through their reflective and finally individual conviction.

As I said earlier, it is undeniable that peoples' personalities are influenced by - at some abstract level they are limited to - what is available in their culture by way of practice, example and vocabulary. And of course we all do and should take an interest in the value of lives that fellow citizens - not just our children and relatives and friends - lead. And, of course, we should think and reason about morality and the good life together, in conversation rather than in solitary monastic confinement. The principle of independence denies or forbids none of this. Nor does it forbid the community from attempting to change individual citizen's minds through persuasion, that is, through means that enhance rather than corrupt cognitive ability. But the principle declares that democracy, on the right conception, is subverted when the community adopts coercive or hidden or indirect means to shape the convictions of its citizens. Any collective ambition to dictate individual conviction would undermine communal democracy in one of two ways. If the collective ambition is general and embraces the whole range of individual beliefs and opinions, as it does in a theocratic despotism, then its very existence as an ambition denies the integrated character of the community; it aims at a wholly monolithic community. If the collective ambition is selective and discriminatory - if it aims only to eliminate certain beliefs collectively judged wrong or degrading - then it destroys integration for those citizens who are the objects of reform, because it excludes them from the community altogether. Independence of judgment, that is, is a structural condition of membership in an integrated community. Just as it is preposterous for a German Jew to accept collective responsibility for Nazi atrocities, it is preposterous that I should think of myself as sharing integrated collective responsibility within a group that denies my capacity to judge for myself.

The principle of independence has crucial consequences for the analysis of democracy. It adds, first, to the case we developed under the principle of participation for treating the political liberties as themselves structural to democracy. It insists on a structural place for constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, association and religion, all of which are necessary to allow and encourage individuals to take responsibility for their own personalities and convictions. The principle of independence has a further consequence that will strike many of you as more surprising, moreover. It makes some form of liberal tolerance of unpopular sexual and personal morality part of the very conditions of democracy. I must be careful not to suggest that this principle - or indeed any one political principle - is sufficient to dispose of all the issues raised by the question of enforcing morality. A great variety of arguments have been made for illiberal constraints on people's freedom of choice about personal morality and ethics, and liberal counter arguments must be tailored to the argument they are required to meet. My present point, once again, is limited but crucial; not that liberal tolerance is in all circumstances a condition of justice, but that in some form it is a condition of democracy in the communal conception.

Someone might object that the principle of independence has nothing to do with liberal tolerance of sexual and other behaviour, because the principle protects freedom of judgment not freedom of action. It is true that laws prohibiting homosexuality, for example, are aimed at conduct not thought. But that distinction is too crude when the individual actor's stake in his own behaviour is very much greater than its consequences for others. In other kinds of cases, when a person's conduct does have important effects on other people, an integrated community must distinguish between belief and conduct; it prohibits what it judges to be harmful behaviour, but it leaves the actor free to believe and to argue that its decision was wrong and should be reversed. But when the putative harm is mainly to the ethical value of the actor's own life, then the distinction between conduct and judgment loses its point. Having ethical commitments, like having religious beliefs, includes living in their light; a community violates the principle of independence as much by making an individual's personal convictions irrelevant to how he actually leads his life as by forbidding him to have those convictions. That is why people who object to moralistic legislation say that they want to 'make up their own minds', not have the majority do it for them, even when the legislation leaves them free to think what they like so long as they do what it says. These observations might also help to explain why constitutional lawyers use the concept of privacy in explaining why moralism is wrong. They perceive, not that decisions of personal commitment are private in the sense that they are taken while alone and unobserved, but that they are private in the sense opposed to public; that in these areas decisions are too closely fused to judgment to permit them to be matters within the collective life of a communal democracy.

Even those who are drawn to liberalism may distrust the suggestion that it is actually part of the meaning of democracy; it seems illegitimate to decide a fundamental debate in political morality by appealing to a definition. But that is the wrong way to understand this part of my argument. Even if I am right that a communal interpretation of democracy makes liberal tolerance part of what democracy is, people who reject liberalism can reject the communal interpretation in favour of a statistical one. If democracy is statistical - government by a majority - then liberal tolerance must be defended not as part of the meaning of democracy but as a matter of justice. So my argument should be construed, not as trying to settle an important issue by the fiat of a definition, but as trying to locate that issue within a larger one by showing how the old debate about enforcing morals connects to a more general debate about how we should

understand democratic government. It might seem paradoxical that an explicitly collectivist conception of democracy yields a form of liberalism that has always been thought individualistic. But that sense of paradox itself reflects an inadequate understanding of the varieties and complexity of collectivist understandings of political action.

6. Community and constitution

Suppose we now accept that the communal conception is the best interpretive account of democracy, particularly in a political community whose constitution restricts majority powers. We can then return to the question with which I began. Once we substitute the communal account of democracy for the statistical account, then the supposed conflict between democracy and judicial review is transformed, because many more constitutional provisions are at least candidates for the status of *structural* of democracy. Of course I do not mean that every conceivable constraint on majoritarian power improves democracy, but only that the range of constraints that do improve it is much larger and more varied once we recognise that government by the people is communal not statistical. It is a further question whether the particular provisions of the United States Constitution, or the European Convention on Human Rights, or of any other national or international constitutions, really do improve rather than contradict genuine democracy. That is a question of great importance, but it is also a question of detail, of case by case analysis and argument. That is the proper subject of trans-Atlantic dialogue, and that dialogue must be conducted free from any confusing and corrupting assumption that any and all protections of individual human rights disfigure democracy. On the contrary, a great many such protections are necessary in order that democracy may exist.

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Council of Europe
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1992: Europe and North America The dialogue of the new solidarities

Strasbourg, 19 and 20 June 1992

Colloquy organised by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe

A SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON INTERCULTURAL RELATIONS

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Taken from outer space, photographs of the earth provide compelling reminders that all peoples of the world share a common fate and confront challenges that can be addressed only globally, (in *both* senses of this term). A united Europe taking shape is evidence that a very significant portion of humankind at last understands the need for a more global consciousness.

Yet nearly everywhere, including Europe and the United States, psychological loyalties to regional, national, ethnic and tribal entities persist. However outmoded, however dangerous, a segmented, ethnocentric consciousness prevails. For the vast majority of human beings, identity as members of particular socio-cultural entities dominates their self perceptions; hence, the world remains divided into 'We' and 'Them' - les Uns et les Autres.

That most persons relate positively to their own particular groups derives, of course, from the socialisation and enculturation processes which exist in every society. From these social processes are derived our individual views of the world, our values, our life-styles, and our sense of belonging. That we identify with our own cultures is not at all surprising since the content of our cultures is internalised by each of us. In a sense, most of us *are* our own cultures. So most people everywhere find it compelling to sense that their way of life is good, their values sound, their identity a matter of some satisfaction, their group worth preserving, and, in all-too-often extreme circumstance, even worth fighting and dying for.

From the fact that most people relate most positively to their own groups, does it necessarily follow that they must relate negatively to groups not their own? A famous discussion of the concept 'ethnocentrism' provides a seemingly discouraging answer.

In the classic treatise on ethnocentrism by the turn-of-the-century American sociologist, William Graham Sumner[1], the concept was defined as 'the technical name for this view of things in which one's own group is the centre of everything, and all others are scaled with reference to it'. Sumner posited ethnocentrism as a human universal when he asserted, 'Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders. Each group thinks its own folkways the only right ones, and if it observes that other groups have other folkways, these excite its scorn.' Thus, Sumner argued that this universal characteristic of loyalty to one's own group is accompanied by and even reinforced by negative attitudes and behaviours directed toward other groups. Indeed, he even went so far as to suggest that the positive in-group attitudes and the negative out-group attitudes were reciprocally inter-related. In his own early 20th century prose: 'The relation of comradeship and peace in the we-group and that of hostility and war toward others-groups are correlative to each other. The exigencies of war with outsiders are what make peace inside, lest internal discord should weaken the we-group for war. These exigencies also make government and law for the in-group, in order to prevent quarrels and enforce discipline ...'

Was he correct? Does in-group solidarity require out-group hostility? Do humans need enemies in order to live in peace?

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[1] Sumner, W.G Folkways, Boston, Massachusetts: Ginn. 1906, pp. 12-13.

Much social science research supports some parts - but not all - of Sumner's thesis. A review of the research will show the extent to which Sumner's ideas help us to understand intergroup relations. But, as I will try to show in this paper, reality is not as hopeless as some readings of Sumner would suggest.

Two relevant studies were done approximately 20 years ago in Eastern Africa, one in Uganda and the other in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania[2].

The Uganda study focussed on one ethnic group, the Banyankore, a monarchy within Uganda, which, in the late 1960s, was abolished as a kingdom in a presidential decree during a speech deploring 'tribalism' and calling on all Ugandans to think of themselves only as Ugandans. Sampling attitudes both before and after the President's actions, Segall *et al* found that the Banyankore thought of themselves mostly as Banyankore was actually stronger after the presidential attempt to suppress it, that everyone was aware of his being Ugandan as well as Banyankore and that nearly everyone was quite willing to think of himself as (hyphenated) Banyankore-Ugandan.

Among the conclusions of this study was that tribal identity is not necessarily an impediment to national integration. The authors argued, in fact, that for leaders of new nations (or any other multi-cultural nations for that matter) to argue that any group within it must give up its identity is very bad nation-building strategy.

The part of the Uganda study that is most relevant to our present concerns dealt with Banyankore attitudes toward other Ugandan groups. From this we learn who the Banyankore like best and how, in quite specific detail, they relate to their Ugandan neighbours. Limited space permits only a summary.

Of all the groups they know, the Banyankore like themselves best and then, how much they like their neighbours and are willing to interact with them is determined mostly by perceived similarity. They like best the groups they perceive to be most like themselves and dislike those whom they perceive to be different. In short, liking and perceived similarity are correlated.

The Brewer and Campbell study, done in three neighbouring Eastern African countries shortly after political independence was attained in the 1960s, also tested Sumnerian ideas by exploring for 30 societies (10 each in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania), the role of cultural similarity in shaping attitudes toward neighbouring groups.

Most individuals in every one of the 30 groups revealed that they felt warmly disposed to groups that were geographically close, and whom were perceived to be most

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[2] The former was reported in Segall, M.H. Doornbos, M. & Davis, C *Political Identity: A Case Study from Uganda*. Syracuse, NY: Maxwell Foreign and Comparative Studies/East Africa XXIV, 1976. The latter appeared in Brewer, M.B & Campbell D.T. *Ethnocentrism and Intergroup Attitudes*. New York: John Wiley, 1976.

like themselves[3]. Reciprocity was also found; if group X liked group Y, Y liked X, - and vice versa.

These findings - that cultural similarity generates shared, reciprocated feelings, positive for similar groups, negative for dissimilar ones - suggest that to reduce negative attitudes held by any pair of groups would require changes in the behaviour of both of them, changes in the direction of models provided by each other, leading to a mutual perception of increasing similarity.

To recapitulate - the findings from these two studies done in Africa during the early days of political independence of former colonial entities - demonstrate the importance of perceived similarity in intergroup relations. This principle - that we can more easily like people whom we perceive to be most like ourselves - takes on added meaning when we consider stereotyping, the tendency to categorically describe groups we do not know very well and to characterise their purportedly common traits as both different from ours and clearly less good than ours.

Many social science studies, most of them done in Europe and in the United States over the past several decades, have shown that stereotyping - much as Sumner predicted - is a mutual, reciprocal process, often reflecting a real, albeit small, difference in life style. But because every language is rich in evaluative adjectives, it is possible for *any* difference to be depicted as revealing *our* moral superiority, no matter who we are. Thus, consider two groups, one of whom actually spends more time working than another. If we are the harder working group, we tend to describe ourselves as industrious and the other as lazy. If, instead, we were the harder playing group, we would likely describe ourselves as fun-loving and relaxed, and the other as compulsive and workaholic.

Other studies have shown that increasing intergroup contact can reduce the tendency to engage in this kind of stereotyping, but only if the contact is equal-status contact. In other words, if we consider the case of two groups in a multi-cultural society where one of the groups dominates politically and economically and actually discriminates by law or practice against the other, contact between the two of them probably will not reduce stereotyping. Indeed, in such cases, it is clear to most social scientists and political activists who understand the social science literature, that improved intergroup relations may be arrived at only by active intervention through the passage and enforcement of anti-discrimination laws.

Another implication of these findings is that significant redistribution of wealth is required, both within multi-cultural nations and among nations and regions of the world before we will be similar enough so that our contact can be more nearly equal-status contacts. So, widening the scope of economic communities by bringing more nations and

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[3] Another variable related to intergroup attraction was perceived modernity. Groups perceived as 'backward' were generally treated as unattractive. Economically favoured and 'modern' groups earned either high or low attractiveness scores depending on their perceived cultural similarity to the group to which the judge himself belonged. With regard to this particular finding, Brewer and Campbell suggested that 'modern' group will be found attractive and worthy of emulation if they are culturally similar but rejected if not, underscoring once more the overriding importance of perceived similarity in shaping intergroup attitudes.

regions within them, spreading economic well-being more equally, and any other process that makes more of us more like each other, are all to be encouraged as means of improving intergroup relations.

Finally, a word about the role of leadership. In the world today, nations remain the single most meaningful geo-political and socio-cultural units. This we know from many different kinds of evidence, including the passionate seeking after nationhood by so many sub-national and international ethnic entities. The EC and EFTA are groups of nations. The United Nations Organisation is just what its name states. So nationalism prevails and national leaders therefore are powerful.

Consequently, national leaders have the power to teach their citizens much about how and what they are to think about various peoples in the world. After all, most people in the world still learn most about other peoples by being told about them, not by close personal contact with them.

And so leaders can point out either how much *like* 'Us' some 'Others' are, or, as so often in the past leaders did, how different from 'Us' those 'Others' are. (Of course, even if they are so similar to us that we cannot tell them from us as we pass them in the street, we could make them wear yellow armbands so that we would know they are the ones we are supposed to hate.)

I have argued in this short paper that cultural similarity, both real and perceived, is a powerful variable in determining the direction and tone of intergroup relations. All public policies, at national and international levels, that emphasise our common humanity, our fundamental similarity to each other, are therefore to be encouraged, if improved intergroup relations are our goal. So, too, are any and all policies that actually make us more like each other.

The social science literature relating to ethnocentrism, stereotyping and intergroup relations, which I could only cursorily refer to in this brief paper[4], shows us that while parochial loyalties are tenacious and easily exploited by politicians who might find scapegoats useful, such loyalties can be accompanied by a growing global consciousness. But this must be fanned, too. Whenever ethnic discrimination is institutionally sanctioned, it must instead be banned, and wherever inter-ethnic enmity has been reinforced by real or perceived differences, those differences must be minimised.

Merely to preach intolerance of human diversity is not, I am afraid, a promising strategy. But taking steps that actually eliminate differences, on the other hand, is exceedingly promising.

This is not an uncontroversial assertion. I am very aware that many will find my encouragement of cultural homogenisation as intuitively unattractive. Certainly all of us who are nationalistic, or those of us who are very concerned with the expression of our own cultural heritage, and all who may fear the possible dilution of our traditional culture, are likely to react to my recommendation the way a bull views a red flag.

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[4] A fuller version of the argument presented in his paper, along with numerous detailed references to the relevant literature, may be found Segall, M.H., Dasen, P.R., Berry, J.W., and Poortinga, Y.H. *Human Behaviour in Global Perspective.* New York: Pergamon, 1990. See Chapter 14 'Intercultural relations in a shrinking world'.

As my own analysis of ethnocentrism implies, the feelings just described are those of most of us, most of the time, and the rest of us, myself included, at least some of the time. So, the real purpose of my paper is to provoke us all to acknowledge the potency of our separatist tendencies while considering the need for a truly integrationist effort. That effort represents a very strong challenge to traditional ways of thinking. However, we can afford little further delay in launching this difficult effort. Each day's news bulletins confirm the urgency.

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

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INTERNATIONAL AGENDA
OF THE RESEARCH UNIVERSITY

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Introduction

> MIT is a research university committed to fostering education and advancing knowledge for the betterment of the human condition. It is, at the same time, a national institution rooted in American culture and traditions, and an integral part of the nation's education and research system.
>
> MIT's responsibility to the nation, in which it was founded and nurtured, is served first and foremost by maintenance of its position as a premier institution in education and research in science and technology. But to remain a premier institution requires that MIT be thoroughly engaged in international activities in science and technology. It must be a full participant in the world trade in ideas.

These words come from a 1991 report by a faculty committee on *The International Relationships of MIT in a Technologically Competitive World.* The growing tension between the national and international roles of all institutions - governments, corporations and universities - is at the heart of this conference. I will describe how these tensions are felt and played out, with special reference to a research university, such as MIT. I will portray the historical backdrop to the relationships among the triad of institutions involved. And I will look forward, noting particularly the challenges faced by universities, whose cultural characteristics present such an opportunity to secure European-American relationships in the future.

Recent changes

Major changes in the last decade have radically altered the scope of the triad of institutions concerned most with the advancement and use of knowledge - governments, corporations and universities. The role of national governments is changing as never before during a time of peace. In Europe, I need hardly mention the changes in national borders, in alliances, and in sovereignty caused by the integration of the European Community and the dropping of the 'iron curtain'. In America, we have only begun to comprehend the new priorities of our government in a world not marked by superpower tension, and the tremendous defence implications of that.

Commerce, too, is undergoing tremendous change, involving the globalisation of industry, the emergence of vast communication networks, increased global interdependence, and a realisation of the planetary impact of issues such as the environmental pollution, global warming and health epidemics. Until recently, each nation and its companies have conducted much of their business within borders, using their own suppliers and experts, and drawing on their own base of intellect. Global competition and the power of information technology change all of this. It is now too easy for your competitor to search, find and use the intellectual resources of the entire world, requiring you to do the same.

What do the borderless information economy and the emergence of the knowledge enterprise really imply? In the first case, a world in which knowledge becomes instantaneous. A world in which student protests in France can be orchestrated by advanced communications technologies; in which television viewers during the recent Los Angeles riots can intervene to halt brutal beatings, and in which police can enforce justice via videotape; a world in which tightly controlled societies of communist governments

have been overthrown in domino style by populations buoyed by the ubiquitous news of the victories in their neighbours.

It is increasingly a world in which wealth is determined, not by natural resources as in the past century but by the skill of a population and work force. In this new world, not just the creation of knowledge, but also its careful gathering and husbanding, are the routes to new markets and products. An island nation like Singapore can embark on a national plan to 'become a developed nation within one decade', by the sheer power of organised information technology. No longer is physical capital or size the issue. Rather, deftness, flexibility, and intelligence are.

The challenge for each firm is to enter and fully understand all markets relevant to its capacities, to take advantage of all available knowledge resources, both internal and external, and to manage production using the most efficient methods available in the world. This argues for a profoundly international stance, one which can take advantage of every one of the world's available resources - human, economic, political.

One could say that the challenge for universities is somewhat the same. Though one does not normally think of universities as competitive institutions in the same manner than businesses compete, it is incumbent upon us to respond more competitively to the markets - students, and those who hire them - than in the past.

Among these many changes, the national identity of products and firms is no longer clear. In 1980, everyone would have agreed on the 'nationality' of the largest 'multinational' companies. Siemens was German; IBM, American; Thomson, French; Olivetti, Italian. But now, what of a company like Asea Brown Boveri? Though its headquarters are Swiss, it employs more Americans than any other national group. And it has very strong cultural roots in Sweden, Germany, and elsewhere. This is the new wave of corporate identity. Even those companies named earlier are trying more and more to 'act European in Europe, Japanese in Japan, American in the US' and so forth.

But let us not leap to the conclusion that national identification will entirely disappear. Even now, in America, consumers buy American brand name products, thinking that there is an element of patriotism in this. Perhaps they learn only after purchase that the product was assembled in Malaysia with components primarily manufactured in Taiwan and Korea. In contrast, the Japanese brand name product may have more American made components within it. This brand-name confusion has led some, led by Harvard political economist Robert Reich to ask 'Who is Us?', as a way of illuminating the many sides of this question of the nationality of corporations, and its impact on national competitiveness. What seems a facetious question becomes more meaningful, as companies attempt to exploit feelings of nationalism on the one hand, while behaving as entities independent of nationalistic motivations. Indeed, the 'borderless enterprise' is a new ideal among the most knowledge intensive firms.

Such is the case for homegrown Massachusetts companies like Digital Equipment Corporation, one of the over 650 companies in Massachusetts alone founded by people and technology coming from MIT. As the company's markets and customers become more international, especially European, its centre of gravity shifts. Company leadership and power remain in Massachusetts - but for how long?

Another firm, Motorola, strives to create an interchangeability among its human resources, aiming to develop the so-called global engineer. But consistent with the 'thinking globally, acting locally' theme we often associate with the environmental movement, this vision can only be realised through strong interactions and citizenship within the many local product and human resource markets in which they operate. Yet to maintain excellence, the firm naturally seeks alliances with universities which will assist it with technology and human resource needs all over its network, from Schaumburg, Illinois, to Phoenix to Malaysia. They press MIT and other universities to open up to the potential of delivering an array of services to the same industrial customer all over the globe.

How will such shifting structures, opportunities, and challenges, affect substantial relationships which exist among the institutions involved? What happens when the different interests of corporations with international markets and activities, governments protective of the national economic well being, and universities both harvesting and disseminating knowledge worldwide rudely intersect?

Universities often take the mistaken view of being at the cutting edge of society. While we may function at the frontiers of discovery and research, this masks the ultimately conservative nature of the university. As the refiner of knowledge, and carrier of the culture, universities tend to lag rather than lead major cross cutting trends in all but a few arenas. But it is this culture-carrier role of the university which creates the opportunity to play a more significant role in enhancing intercontinental ties.

MIT's historical links with business and government

Before addressing the question of what universities can and should do in future, I would like to examine how the linkages between university, industry, and government came to be, primarily focusing on MIT and its relations with firms and the US government. Research universities in the United States have a unique heritage in comparison to European institutions of higher education. MIT's philosophy, combining education, research, and service, has made it a sought-after model in Europe, because of its strong values of real world problem solving and commercialisation.

From its inception in 1861, MIT has operated under a broad set of goals emphasising both education and service to the community. Its focus was not only on the preeminent goal of providing the highest quality education, but also on ensuring that technology be geared to the practical needs of society and made available for use. MIT's interest in practical applications implied close ties with industry, and made the transfer of knowledge from the laboratory to the commercial sector an important operational goal. MIT's charter and environment have given rise to a variety of policies and activities, such as encouragement of faculty consulting, initiatives to start new companies, industrial support for research, student internship programmes, aggressive technology licensing activities, and the creation of the world's first Industrial Liaison Programme in 1948. Presently it is the largest such programme, with a staff of over 50 individuals, including 30 professionals. For twenty years, MIT's involvements with industry have had an international dimension to them. At present, about half of our liaison programme members are non-American, with roughly 20% being European. But we have most recently seen a decline in this number, a trend which is a bit disturbing in the larger context of maintaining European-American relationships.

MIT and government

MIT's relationship with the government of the United States has had an even more profound influence on its development, especially post World War II. MIT's extensive involvement in mission research, indeed the very concept of the research university were formulated during conversations in the late 1930s between Professor Vannevar Bush of MIT and President Franklin Roosevelt. Bush urged Roosevelt to consider forming a national research effort, based at a laboratory at MIT, to develop radar. The Radiation Lab began a half-century of strong alliance between the Federal agencies, such as Defence, Energy and Health, and a series of science based universities and institutions. At present, through its variety of mission agencies, the Federal government provides about 75% of MIT's research funding.

Universities and globalism

The foreign currency of any institution - political, commercial, or educational - is comprised of the diversity of its people, the scope of its activities, its capital assets, and the breadth of its mission. In a university, this equates to its student body, the citizenship of its faculty, its governance board members, its research supporters, its donors, its fields of study, and so forth. With the rare exception of such institutions as INSEAD here in Europe, almost every major university in the world is national in scope.

On the dimensions noted above, MIT's internationalism can be quantitatively measured a follows:

	1990	1980
Student body - Undergraduate	9%	6%
Student body - Graduate	34%	26%
Faculty (foreign born)	30%	NA
Faculty consulting	23%	NA
Campus research sponsorship (all)	3%	1%
Campus research sponsorship - corporate	20%	5%
Liaison Programme members	50%	30%
Governance Board members	1%	0%
Donations (all)	10%	3%
Donations - Corporate	35%	10%
Curriculum	minimal	even less
Institutional joint ventures	minimal	even less

You will notice a trend of growing internationalism in the makeup of the community of scholars. But universities, MIT included, have displayed little adventure in multinationalism in this new era. Few have ventured off the drawing board with significant plans for expansion overseas. Yes, there are a few programmes such as Stanford's campus in Kyoto, and there are executive education programmes which are marketed internationally. But significant new operations or joint ventures with foreign institutes of higher education are not yet a feature of the landscape.

European university - industry alliances

In Europe as well, there has been a smorgasbord of newly created endeavours to link university researchers with their counterparts in industry, normally modulated by the flow of EC or national government money. Prior to the last decade, and aside from the long history of German affiliations among universities, technical societies and companies, there appeared a wide gulf separating academia from industry. Visitors to the MIT campus marvelled at the business interest and savvy of MIT professors, in comparison to those back home. But a decade of EC programming has certainly changed the motivations of both sides. The jury is probably still out on the long term success of these consortia, and others may comment more knowledgeably on the relative success of the EC research efforts, but I can certainly note the increased spirit of co-operation which exists between industry and government in Europe. Such co-operation is a necessary precursor to keep both sectors vitally competitive for the next decade.

Prompted by the momentum of integration sweeping throughout Europe, there have also been an increasing number of joint ventures among European universities themselves, though I believe this to be focused on the newer and smaller institutions. There has also been a dramatic increase in multilateral discussions among European universities. While such discussion auger well for transatlantic co-operations, they may also hinder progress on that front. I will return to this issue shortly.

The present mission of the research university

As the world's political changes unfold, and the Cold War is replaced by a form of economic 'balance of power', it is important to ask what role the university should be playing, and how this role ought to be both shaped by and shaping interactions with foreign institutions of various kinds?

We must recognise that there are a small number of powerful issues which unite us on this earth. First, we have just ended an era in which the threat of nuclear war dominated our security concerns. Nonetheless, with this threat past, we must be ever vigilant to assure continuing *world peace.*

Secondly, it is becoming increasingly clear that many actions of industry and technology have profound and long term impacts on our *planetary environment.* Once again, we have an issue which links all nations and all peoples, and serves as a laudatory mission for a research university, which can both contribute efforts to understand the world's situation, but more importantly prepare leader who will be able to make the proper choices in the future.

Third, the peace and well being of the world seems to depend mightily on the assurance of *economic well-being* for a larger portion of the world. In particular, within our nations, there is great concern about the economic well-being of our populations. And there is great energy available to better understand the problem and contribute to its solution.

Because of the immediacy of the issue of competitiveness, it attracts far more attention in this tougher business climate. The debate in the United States rages about the viability or need for national industry policy to encourage American based industry to be more internationally competitive. MIT's institutional capacity and devotion to service for the national mission have led to programmes aimed at contributions to American industrial strength in technology. One example is the MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity, which conducted studies of nine sectors (including higher education) to discover the determinants of competitive success, and suggested means of overcoming America's competitive slowdown.

The arena in which universities have always excelled has been in gathering and using relevant knowledge from throughout the world, and embodying this knowledge into the product of the university - the curriculum and the student. My colleague, Richard Lester, a co-author of the above-mentioned Made in America treatise, has aptly called universities the 'crossroads of knowledge'. As successful business increasingly depends on those able to function across interfaces, both functional (as in marketing, manufacturing, technological, legal) and geographic, universities will be pressed by industry, their main constituent, to turn out individuals capable of adroitly moving into these interfacial roles.

Thus develops MIT's second effort aimed at educating a new generation of industrial leadership for America. The most remarkable aspect of the Leaders' for Manufacturing programme is the extent of partnership it has engendered within MIT and the 13 supporting companies. The partner companies dedicate senior executives as active members of a governance board, mid-level executives who meet monthly as the Operating Committee, and hundreds of individuals who participate together with MIT students and faculty in the implementation of the programme.

Students learn both from faculty in traditional courses on campus, but also through team research programmes, which have them spending seven of their 24 months on site in partner companies. Interfunctional co-operation is an essential element of learning in this programme, a variance from the emphasis on individual performance so notable in the American and European university tradition.

From national to international role of university

What are the opportunities to play a catalytic role in international affairs? What are the threats to that role? What can we realistically expect from universities? The opportunities are legion. As business becomes global, as consumers become more sensitised to cross cultural issues, there accrues a great premium on individuals with cross-cultural experience. And this cultural learning is more than the traditional language and sociological systems. Much must be learned in terms of technical systems, cultures of thought in technology. These are the currencies of modern business - and this is what must be learned, not only by MBAs, but increasingly by engineers.

Dean Joel Moses of MIT's School of Engineering has called engineering the 'liberal arts of the next century', noting the opportunity to create a new curriculum combining technology with world views.

But my fears argue that nationalism and regionalism will promote a more conservative stance by universities. MIT itself is very dependent on the federal government. If political pressures arising from competitive fears promote new forms of regulation on universities, or subtle forms of persuasion, these will discourage the full development of new forms of international co-operation. One can very readily sense this in relationship to Japan. But if I follow the logic of Dean Lester Thurow's recent arguments in *Head to Head*, the greater economic rival to the United States will be the integrated Europe. Would not similar concerns arise then in the United States, about relationship with European institutions?

And what of European institutions of higher education, themselves, responding to the pressures for integration. In describing the needed depth of relationship required to form real partnerships between corporations and MIT, my friend Tom Eagar, a Professor of materials science, has said 'there are only so many friends you can have'. As the demands for external relationships grow in each job - whether in a company, a university, or in government - something must be sacrificed. Our drop-off in European ILP memberships is one small symptom of Euromyopia, a condition wherein the focus of attention is drawn more and more exclusively to things European.

The battle for preeminence in high definition television offers a useful study of what might be done between the regions. Fiercely regional loyalties are creating true-believers of HDTV technology - those who view anything but digital with sure disdain, others who choose resolution as the battleground. Efforts to create knowledge links among the fiercely competitive efforts are met with rebuffs. And, why? Because the religious fervour of the technology is focused on who will win, and because the stakes are so bloody high.

By barring access to regional research and development programmes, we perpetuate the scenario of winners and losers in technology. A more apt metaphor, offered by John Armstrong of IBM, is that of 'technological balance of power'. A recent arrangement between the competing American HDTV consortia, one of which involves MIT, offers an interesting potential resolution to the matter. The competing entities agreed to share patent royalty revenues if either of their entrants prove to be the one chosen by the standards committees and the market itself. What is to prevent us from encouraging such co-operative ventures across international borders? Why not offer some secondary winning for all, to encourage idea-sharing, which in the long run benefits all of us as consumers and citizens?

Universities in the international sphere - an agenda

I would like to propose the following items be importantly pursued to utilise the unique non-competitive nature of the research university in the international sphere. While I have discussed most of these items with colleagues from MIT, let me stress that these items represent my own thinking, and not a consensus or committee view, as some of my earlier comments have. I propose it, in fact, as a universal agenda for the research university.

1. An opportunity for students to study in foreign settings. Typically, such programmes are sought first in the arenas of management and social science where the relevance of cross-cultural experience is widely appreciated. The success of the MIT Japan Programme which arranges year long internships for MIT technical graduate students working in Japanese industrial laboratories following language and cultural conditioning, though, speaks to the long term value seen by engineers as well. There is no question that on such points Americans have a great deal to learn from Europeans.

2. An opportunity for involvement in major regional-international research programmes such as those operated through Esprit, Eureka, Erato (Japan). Such programmes offer a crucial look into the thinking guiding technology leadership abroad. In this day and age, such insights are vital to maintaining viability as a cutting edge research and educational institution. The development of such connections must have a bilateral purpose. We recognise that European institutions must also be encouraged to take active part in American research programmes.

3. An opportunity to participate in research endeavours with clearly planetary impact. An immediate example is in the area of global climate change, and the broader area of environmental management. Such programmes must go forward with a broad alliance among scientists and engineers in all countries, and with significant opportunities for multilateral research and policy making across the developing trading regions, and across the North-South barriers to the developing world.

4. A world-uniting effort as defense conversion, in support of the agenda of world peace. Most everyone agrees on the value of scaling back defence production. But so much of American and Soviet technological superiority were wrapped up in this effort. The world's security demands that an integrated approach to converting the efforts of both superpower technologists to valuable commercial enterprises will be required for a smooth transition to occur.

5. Some of these goals may only be met, in the long run, by encouraging the formation of a greater number of trans-atlantic joint ventures among institutes and corporations. Opportunity abounds as information technology becomes truly a method for co-operative work, independent of geography.

Conclusion

The events of the last years have undoubtedly made the world a far safer and more co-operative place. Let us take up the challenge to continue the hard won successes of co-operation. Economic and trade barriers may seem harmless enough, or even secure, when viewed in limited fashion. But co-operation is surely the key to a world which can both compete, yet share in the prizes, and can solve the major problems we all face in living in this ecosystem called Earth. I challenge us to break through the barriers of bureaucracy, to build upon the already strong cultural and political connections of our nations and regions, and to achieve new levels of involvement with each other.

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Council of Europe
Conseil de l'Europe

1992: Europe and North America The dialogue of the new solidarities

Strasbourg, 19 and 20 June 1992

Colloquy organised by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe

OUTLINE OF REMARKS

Ambassador Richard Schifter
Department of State, Washington DC

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1. Europe and North America share the intellectual legacy of the Enlightenment: a commitment to democracy and respect for individual rights;

2. That legacy is now reflected in the structure of government, constitutions and legal systems in much of Europe and in North America; differences do exist between Anglo-Saxon and Continental democracies, but are not of major significance;

3. Though there is overwhelming consensus in the more established democracies of Europe and North America in support of democratic *domestic* policy, there are differences within each country as to the extent to which democratic idealism should be infused into *foreign* policy;

4. Traditional, non-interventionist views of diplomacy tend to be given greater weight in Europe than in North America;

5. U.S. leadership encouraged Western Europe in context of NATO to unite in defence of democracy against Warsaw Pact threat; G-7 should now join in an effort to advance cause of democracy worldwide.

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THE NEW DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY : BEYOND THE MILITARY

Michaël Stürmer
Professor, Director, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen

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'Never forecast, if you can help it,
especially the future' (Mark Twain)

Forty years of the Cold War in Europe produced a surrealistic sense of both long-term discomfort and short-term comfort; the particular charms of the long nuclear peace are now only clearly visible when they are waning. The world was global, bi-polar and nuclear; 'paix impossible, guerre improbable', according to Raymond Aron.

The Cold War could be described in the chess metaphor: both sides lined up against each other from the Norway Sea to the Vietnam jungles, an overall rough balance of forces maintained, satellite states kept under tight control, minor skirmishes permitted, major ones carefully managed, check-mate to be avoided at almost any cost. The rules of the game tended to include a fair amount of co-operation in strategic matters from hot lines to NPT, SALT 1 and 2 and, most importantly, the ABM Treaty. The Berlin Agreement of the Four Powers in 1971 as much as the German-German treaty of 1973 should also be included, the Helsinki final act and the CSCE process ever since. But this system has been changed beyond recognition, due to the exhaustion which the Soviet Union achieved through imperial overstretch, technological handicaps and the tendency to arm itself out of existence.

Three defining moments determine the vast changes in the European security configuration:

- The fall of the Berlin Wall and the unstoppable process of German Unification, strategically and logically coinciding with the dismemberment of the Soviet Union's outer empire.

- The decline and fall of the Soviet Union, leaving behind not only a vast arsenal of sophisticated weaponry, but also disputed borders; ethnic, national and religious strife, mass poverty and political helplessness, a vast country close to ecological ruin, the breakdown of order and the loss of direction - in short, a chaotic and unpredictable situation.

- The post-Cold-War crises and conflicts, visible in the fallout of the Gulf War and the bloody battlefield where once was Yugoslavia. Those events imply a dramatic loss of control of the superpowers, growing insecurity and spill-over effects into neighbouring regions with far-reaching implications. What those two crises have in common is not only that they stem from the imperial debris of the Ottoman Empire and the deficient art of peace-making in 1919. They also remind us that, if history comes back, it does so with a vengeance. Today, those post-Cold-War crises are coupled, in Iraq, with the availability of high-tech weaponry, and in former Yugoslavia with the fierceness of ancient tribalism. One way or the other, the effort to contain those crises, let alone resolve them, requires leadership and power that at present are not available to any country except the United States of America. They, however, can be more selective in their engagements and are reluctant policemen. In foreign policy, they are happy to have choice whereas in the bad old days of the Cold War there was only necessity. In domestic affairs, it is obvious that they have a pressing agenda and that others are required to shoulder more of the international burden.

It is obvious that no state on its own, not even the United States or Russia, is able to organise an effective check if crises break out of the magnitude now likely to occur. But an effective framework of co-operation, deterrence or peace enforcement would remain an essential condition for medium or long-term stability.

After the Cold War, the enemy is - as President Bush observed - 'insecurity and instability'. Four principal sources of future instability can be identified:

1. The Soviet succession in its impact both on the dominions of the former Soviet Union and on the outside world. None of the successor states promises inherent stability. The new Community of Independent States when it was created had little in common except a shared interest not to become a nuclear Yugoslavia and a horrendous list of problems without a solution: disputed borders, absence of administrative structures and routines, an inflated currency and a banking system guided by incompetence, run-down industrial stock and an ill-adapted but powerful military-industrial complex. The effects of the Soviet succession on the outside world are no more reassuring. Western Europe may be faced with ecological problems of a new magnitude, such as the breakdown of heavy industries or the burn-out of nuclear reactors. Energy will be short in supply not only in Russia proper, but even more so in the former dependencies and Western Europe will be required to develop the master plan inherent in the European Energy Charter. Mass migrations may take place as a result of such large scale breakdowns, hunger and civil war. If there were to be war, it would happen on a large scale and involve vast parts of the former Soviet army and arsenals, probably including some nuclear exchanges, but the fear of nuclear Armageddon may also have a deterrent and even stabilizing effect and cool down tempers.

   In the rest of the world, the Soviet succession is not greeted with much enthusiasm. India, to take the most obvious example, has lost a partner, an arms supplier and a balancing factor against China, Pakistan and US dominance. The vast country has already taken the plunge into the cold water of the market economy. In the future it will have to mend fences with China and Pakistan, or find US support, or opt for a national nuclear deterrent.

   In the long run, however, Russia will re-emerge as a world power. Nine time zones, one sixth of the Earth's landmass, 150 million intelligent people, tens of thousands of nuclear weapons after the trials and tribulations; Russia is bound to play a decisive role, at the turn of the century possibly the most dynamic economy of Europe.

2. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Even before the fall of Soviet power, means of delivery were available on the world market or could be pieced together by careful combination. While the ex-Soviet strategic arsenal seems to be in safe hands, at least for the time being, the pre-strategic stock-pile is spread over vast territories, ill-guarded, while the premiums on nuclear proliferation are vast. Tadshikistan is selling enriched Uranium to the highest bidder. The world is likely to see the first Islamic nuclear weapon before the turn of the century and it will not be contained in a system of deterrence, as it operated between East and West in the past. While safeguards have worn thin, at present the world has no concept to deal with nuclear blackmail, let alone with a rogue state armed with nuclear weapons and advanced missile technology. It is obvious that no single

state, not even the US or Russia would be able to organise effective controls. A global defence system as envisaged by the US and Russia in terms of GPALS, may now be unavoidable. If nothing happens, nuclear anarchy is likely to ensue.

3. The Islamic Arc is full of conflicts and crises, after the Gulf War even more pronounced than before. Today comes true what French Marshall Lyautey wrote in the 1920s: 'There is a drummer in the Orient and when he beats the drum, the sound will be heard from the Atlas to the Hindu-Kush'. The islamic world has little or no unifying principle. In fact, it has little in common except the perennial failure of democracy, the weakness of long-term state structures, either regimes or family firms, the absence of home-grown industries, the islamic aversion to modern banking and a vast population explosion, all this superimposed on the cultural and political conflicts between radical securalism and various kinds of fundamentalism and a shrewd feeling of humiliation by the West. With the exception of Turkey and Yemen, there is not a single islamic country where population growth does not far outpace growth of GNP: almost everywhere two thirds of the population are under the age of 25; put in three different terms, the population is likely to grow by 25% over the next 10 years. Central Asia is bound to become the focus of much attention.

Special attention should be drawn to the involvement of Iran, Iraq and Turkey in the Soviet succession. The Southern and central Asian Republics of the former Soviet Union will be drawn into the future Asian power play: Iran remembers the ancient glories of Persia, Iraq, those of Babylon and the Turks have not forgotten the powerful Ottoman Empire. But whatever the past is worth, none of those countries can allow hostile neighbours to profit from the Soviet succession. Iran aims for the apparel of the nuclear regional super power while forty million Turkish speaking Muslims are living north of its border, being wooed by Ankara.

4. The most threatening long-term configuration, however, could come from the combined effects of unchecked population growth in the poorest parts of the world, especially Southern Asia and Africa south of the Sahara, people's migrations, ecological breakdowns, scarcity of resources, water disputes, conflicts over the right to pollute the environment or over unsafe industrial installations. At present, the cause of causes seems to be unchecked population growth at a rate of 100 million net growth per annum. While in 1973 world population was estimated at 3.5 bn, it is now 2bn more, with ruinous consequences that are not going to be the exclusive property of the Southern countries. This means long-term destabilization in large parts of what used to be the Third World, with violent and incalculable spill-over effects into the OECD zone and further loss of control in the former Soviet Union. Our imagination will not suffice to describe the scenarios in detail. But we could well be faced with vast parts of the Southern hemisphere drifting into limbo, despair and violence, breakdown of law and order and, indeed, the end of state organisation. Waves of desperate boat-people would try to reach Europe's wealthy shores. But any kind of military Maginot Line could only be a last resort, and whether it would serve Europe better in the 21st century than the original establishment served France in the 20th century would remain an open question.

To sum up:

Security policy in the future must be both short-term and long-term and it must reach out beyond the military - the men in uniform will have their hands full as a last resort. It must combine aid and development with co-operation and a potential for intervention forces. It must cope with global threats from an overburdened environment and ecological warfare, but also contingencies from nuclear blackmail to waves of desperate poor people. It will be far beyond any European nation's means to control this upheaval and keep the horsemen of the new apocalypse at bay. Much of the old security software and hardware will be of little use. That is why our security philosophy as well as our military strategy must be made subject to an agonising reappraisal, not leaving out the public conception that is still largely characterised by both, an illusive relief that peace has broken out and an unbridled desire to cash in on the peace dividend. What is a state, what is an army, what is a war? These questions will continue to be asked in the future and the vagueness of the answers will translate into the uncertainties of the responses.

In 1991, the Persian Gulf War was, according to President Bush, about 'more than one small country; it is a big idea; a new order', with 'new ways of working with other nations ... peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals and just treatments of other peoples'. In the meantime, doubts have risen and the question has been asked: 'What new world order? (Joseph S. Nye, Foreign Affairs, Spring 1992, p.83). The Cold War has gone, and so have its two organising principles, the Soviet threat and its containment. The new pax Americana will have little in common with the old one, except some of the players, notably the United States. But much as security will have to reach out far beyond defence, soldiers and nuclear weapons, the new world order, if it is more than 'the vision thing', will need a strong European pillar, well organized within itself, able to identify a European interest over every national interest, and strong in the preemptive management of crisis that are, in most cases, of a nature that is yet defying our imagination. What Benjamin Disraeli said 120 years ago, faced with Bismarck's German unification and the ensuing changes in the European system, is now much more true than it was at the time:

> 'Not a single principle in the management of our foreign affairs, accepted by all statesmen for guidance up to six months ago, any longer exists. There is not a diplomatic tradition which has not been swept away. You have a new world, new influences at work, new and unknown objects and dangers with which to cope, at present involved in that obscurity incident to novelty in such affairs.'

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TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS AND
THE SECURITY OF THE NEW EUROPE

Willem van Eekelen
Secretaty General of the Western European Union, London

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I should first like to tell you that I am highly honoured to have been invited to speak to you about the security aspect of relations between Europe and North America.

The permanence and renewal of the security link between the continents either side of the Atlantic certainly have to be viewed in the light of the prospects for a dialogue of new solidarities, the highly appropriate theme chosen by the Council of Europe for this colloquy.

The Council of Europe has a vital part to play in the constantly evolving and increasingly fruitful discussions on defining a future comprehensive European security structure involving close links between Western and Central Europe on the one hand and both Eastern Europe, Russia and North America on the other. It was one of the very first organisations with a pan-European mission, and is now involved in the work of the CSCE, in the shape of the third basket. Where both values and law are concerned, in both the cultural and the social spheres, the Council of Europe is fertile ground for cultivating the organisation of continental Europe, the deepening of its identity and the exercise of its influence on the world. This ambitious colloquy, too, seems a positive idea, accurately reflecting the new dimension that the Council of Europe has gained during the European revolution of the past three years.

The speeding up of the historical process in Europe is opening up some exhilarating prospects, while stirring certain ghosts from the past. Here we are facing another Balkan crisis, while Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia are working out new forms of regional co-operation. The disintegration of the Yugoslav and Soviet federations has brought a good number of ethnic conflicts to the surface and made the nationality question, and even nationalism, a worryingly live issue again from one end of Europe to the other. German unity and the end of a political and military division of Europe have given rise to a geopolitical situation completely different from that of the seventies. The risk of a surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact has given way to the perils of Russian isolation since Ukraine and Belarus declared independence, and now that Russian units are continuing their withdrawal from German, Polish and Baltic States' territory, there is also a risk of nuclear and ballistic proliferation unless staff retraining and the reshaping of programmes started by the USSR are completed in the near future. The worldwide threat has effectively disappeared, but the risks associated with residual military capacity and with Russia's far-reaching economic and social crisis remain and must not be underestimated. The consequent need for vigilance by the WEU nations and the future European Union fully justifies their emphasis on the importance of the collective defence responsibilities of the Atlantic Alliance and on the maintenance of a special security link with North America.

The Atlantic Alliance is now working out its strategy in terms of risks and multidimensional instabilities; in the face of the uncertainty and unpredictability of its new security environment, WEU is considering the acquisition of abilities, initially concentrating on appropriate planning and surveillance. It nevertheless seems unlikely that, at least in the near future, the Alliance will take action outside the NATO area. Not because the Treaty forbids this: should the Sixteen reach a consensus, there is nothing to stop them from taking joint action, but because it is politically unrealistic to rely on such a consensus for NATO action outside the area covered by the Washington Treaty. The North Atlantic Council engaged in close consultations at the time of the Iran-Iraq war and the Kuwait crisis. Movements of member states' forces were made in

accordance with the rules laid down within the integrated structure. The dispatch of America's 7th Army Corps from Germany to Saudi Arabia was described by General Galvin as Exercise Reforger in reverse. NATO gave a practical demonstration of its solidarity with Turkey, and would have helped had Turkey been attacked. The Alliance's main functions are still linked to the concept of collective defence, the transatlantic link remaining based on permanent close collaboration on any political/military issues affecting the security interests of all the partners in the Alliance, on both sides of the Atlantic.

In any case, action outside the NATO area would surely require the support of two, or even more, pillars sometimes under North American leadership and sometimes with Europe giving the impetus, depending on the circumstances and the interests at stake. It is clear that the American contribution in fields where European military resources will remain inadequate for some time to come will be as irreplaceable as it is essential. I shall just cite as examples our strategic transport facilities and our satellite monitoring capacity, two areas in particular where Europe is conspicuously lacking and unlikely to catch up in the short term.

Constant collaboration within the Alliance should make it possible to reach general agreement on the most suitable way of achieving the allies' political and military aims in any given crisis.

WEU is currently setting up a military planning cell whose task will be to organise any deployment of WEU forces. It will decide which forces are to be used for each task, which may be humanitarian - in the event of a natural disaster - or be that of peacekeeping or resolving any kind of crisis. Where these forces come from countries within the integrated military structure, they will 'wear two hats', those of NATO and WEU, with the latter being involved when NATO is unable or unwilling to take action, whether in Europe or beyond.

Initially, some European countries had wished to give priority to setting up a WEU rapid reaction force exclusively for tasks outside Europe. However, since the WEU's main role, as defined in Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty, is to provide for the defence of member states at their borders and to participate in the collective defence of Europe within the Alliance, this idea would have given a misleading signal about the nature and scope of the responsibilities that WEU member states intend the organisation to have. In no circumstances could it confine itself to protecting European interests outside Europe or be seen to be, as it were, acting as the Alliance's subcontractor outside its area.

Among the forces reporting to WEU will be the Franco-German Corps, which is intended to be a European unit. Realization of the idea agreed on by President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl on 14 October 1991 has three advantages: it confirms France's clear and straightforward commitment to make a military contribution in a multinational framework; it makes it possible to keep a French military presence in Germany on a new basis; thirdly, it injects an element of reciprocity, as German troops are to be assigned to the corps headquarters on French territory. The Franco-German Corps will - perhaps I am stating the obvious - be able to be used in pursuance of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, to meet the Alliance's collective defence needs.

In any case, the NATO rapid reaction force and WEU forces are and will be among a range of resources available in case of emergency. They will comprise multinational units able to be used under arrangements other than those deriving from their original

specific profile. It also has to be expected that some WEU and Alliance members will probably not always be able to play a direct part in any particular action. In view of the need for maximum flexibility in this respect, WEU would, where necessary, use both ad hoc command structures and existing national or multinational staffs.

WEU's role as the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance will not be restricted to planning with a view to deploying forces in crises for which NATO does not acknowledge direct competence. The move by the WEU Council and Secretarial from London to Brussels will make it possible to harmonize the organisation's work with that of the Alliance, thus giving it an opportunity to make regular contributions to the latter's consultation process.

Synchronization or WEU and NATO meetings will enable the Europeans to Compare and co-ordinate their positions on subjects of particular importance to them, and ultimately to submit their joint conclusions to their NATO partners for discussion. The declaration made by WEU in Maastricht provides for the introduction of *'joint positions agreed in WEU into the process of consultation in the Alliance'*, which, it states, *'will remain the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of Allies under the Washington treaty'*. These contributions will probably be presented by the representative of the Presidency of the Council of WEU, but other methods are also conceivable: the introduction of written contributions or verbal statements relating to specific items. So it is fundamental to future institutional relations between WEU and NATO that arrangements be worked out for including European positions in Alliance debates, it being understood that these positions may give rise to constructive criticism from the other allies and thus be revisable.

The Maastricht summit confirmed the WEU's dual role of embodying the European defence identity and constituting NATO's European pillar. WEU is now a crucial part of the process intended to culminate in the creation of a European Union with a defence element, while remaining firmly anchored in the Atlantic Alliance. This duality will become even more obvious when all the European members of the Alliance are offered a status enabling them to play a full part in WEU activities, giving them a role to play in the preparation of joint European positions. They will also have an opportunity to contribute to WEU activities in the operational co-operation sphere, relating to such matters as space or verification. Maastricht also opens the way to convergence between WEU, the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) and Eurogroup likely to foster the standardization and interoperability of equipment and logistic support. At the heart of European and Atlantic synergy, WEU will, on its arrival in Brussels, endeavour to continue its involvement in the process of building a European Union and its role as a partner in the Alliance. Adapting its institutional relations to meet the specific requirements of both these vital components of European security is now a priority for the Council of WEU.

No major problems should be created by the development of links between a more operational, Brussels-based WEU and NATO, as both ultimately share the same aim and operate on similar lines. Transparency of their activities to each other will depend on political will and reciprocity as much as on organisation. Complementarity should follow automatically. However, a special effort will have to be made in respect of transatlantic relations. Contacts with the American authorities, in both Washington and Brussels, will have to be stepped up. More frequent fact-finding trips should be made, so as to preserve

and develop a common strategic culture, compare analyses and practise joint crises diagnosis. Affirmation of the role and responsibilities of the Alliance's European pillar and close co-operation between WEU and NATO will restore all its credibility to the latter, which will no longer be able to be described as an extension of the USA's dominance into Europe, and will gain acceptance as the special instrument of a security link based on reciprocity.

In February 1991, shortly before a ministerial meeting of the Nine in Paris, the Department of State send a fairly aggressive message on the role of the WEU, known as the Bartholomew telegram, to the capitals. This contained an assortment of objections with a preventative purpose, that of avoiding WEU decisions which Washington feared might be detrimental to the smooth working of the Atlantic Alliance. The message acknowledged WEU's out-of-Europe role, but warned against independent European action in Eastern Europe. The American Administration said that it was inconceivable for action to be taken by WEU countries without its prior consultation and involvement in all decisions. It was particularly afraid that the construction of a European defence during the process of creating European unity would weaken Atlantic solidarity. The Europeans therefore had to convince their North American allies that they were resolved to act together to maintain the Alliance and keep a significant American military presence in Europe. The Americans had to understand that the sole aim of the affirmation of a European defence identity and the definition of military capacities under WEU responsibility was to bolster and strengthen their commitment in Europe as a result of the European's acceptance of new responsibilities.

The effect of the Bartholomew telegram was to make the outcome of the discussions under way in WEU less important than the examination of Europe's role and responsibilities within NATO conducted by the Alliance's Ministers for Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen in June 1991. The NATO summit in Rome last November confirmed recognition of the European defence identity within the Alliance, thus making possible the WEU statements made during the Maastricht summit. The disappearance of the Soviet Union doubtless reassured the Americans that there was no risk of Russian interference in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. They also realized that the Europeans were not really prone to overestimating their ability to take action in Europe within the framework of the CSCE or the Community, and that they had little desire to become embroiled in imbroglio from which the United States would have to extricate them. The situation in Yugoslavia was surely revealing in this respect. By demonstrating both their attachment to NATO's essential tasks and their desire to involve all the European allies in their action, WEU countries were able to persuade the United States that it had no need to fear being used as an ally of last resort to be called upon in a disaster.

The United States did eventually decide to back the arrangements made by the Europeans for preparing a common foreign and security policy extending into the defence field. Europe for its part reaffirmed that its schemes within WEU would strengthen the Alliance and NATO, which would continue to be the main forum for all decisions relating to the commitments entered into under the Washington Treaty. It also confirmed the need to preserve an integrated military structure for the purposes of collective defence. In offering associate membership status to the other European countries within the Alliance, the WEU nations took to heart American worries that WEU remain a closed shop, at the same time giving a tangible demonstration of their intention to give real meaning to the concept of a European defence pillar. WEU's dual commitment in the Gulf

also made the Americans acknowledge the usefulness of its 'out-of-Europe' capacity and encourage it to acquire the means of protecting its vital interests worldwide.

The conclusion may therefore be drawn that 1991 was certainly a fruitful year in terms of the changing relations between the European institutions and the Atlantic Alliance. The effect of the clarification given at the Copenhagen and Rome meetings about the American military presence in Europe remains to be seen. Will this presence continue to diminish whatever happens? Is it conceivable that the American people might feel that Washington is more concerned than the Europeans themselves about European security? Is the probable continued instability in Eastern Europe and beyond the Urals sufficient reason for America to decide to keep genuinely deterrent armed forces in Europe? To be realistic, the Europeans should act on the assumption that it is very probably not, and should avoid banking on an indefinite continuation of the respite currently being enjoyed.

Indeed, relations between Europe and America are not as good as they might be. The international trade negotiations of the Uruguay Round are still bogged down, leading to some degree of tension. This is another area in which it is clearly in both America's and Europe's interest for a compromise based on reciprocity to be reached. In order to achieve this, it would be better to avoid an aggressive attitude likely to have negative effects in areas where competitiveness is out of place.

While strong transatlantic relations unaffected by economic competition and security considerations are crucial to the future of European defence, WEU member states are concerned with creating specific links with the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe on the basis of regular consultations and exchanges of information.

A first series of exploratory trips to Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland was made in the autumn of 1990, followed in November 1991 by trips to Bulgaria and Romania, after which the three Baltic Republics were visited in January 1992. The aim was to find out about the security worries of these countries, now moving towards pluralist democracy and the market economy. WEU countries of course wish to take these concerns into account when preparing their positions and proposals for multilateral negotiations, especially those on disarmament.

WEU has adopted a gradual individualized approach, unlike NATO, which has, in the *North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC)*, engaged in dialogue with all former Warsaw pact countries, including the republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States, which have also been admitted to the CSCE. The problem of the effectiveness of a uniform approach to all these countries will soon arise.

The new democracies of Central Europe will certainly not always be willing to discuss their security concerns in such a wide framework. This is where WEU can offer a more limited area of co-operation , enabling special relationships in the security sphere to be established with countries already having treaties of association with the European Community. They have demands and expectations: we must not let them down. WEU cannot shy away from creating a co-operation link relating to security, requiring it to give thought to association criteria in this field. Links with these countries' CIS neighbours must be of a different kind.

WEU countries regard intensified dialogue with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as a significant contribution to the new peaceful order taking shape in Europe. To this end WEU, NATO, the European Union, the Council of Europe and the CSCE must work together to form a partnership which will be as much pan-European as Euro-Atlantic, as it will stretch from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Its field of action will be security in the widest sense, with its political and military, social and cultural, economic and ecological dimensions. Stability, a precondition for more balanced development, depends on the success of ambitious co-operation involving the whole of Europe on all these matters. However, the likelihood of success will be greater if these projects are based on a network of regional initiatives. It is with this in mind that the WEU wishes to strengthen relations with eight states of Central and Eastern Europe, involving dialogue, consultations and co-operation structured in a way yet to be agreed with them. The Parliamentary Assembly and the WEU's *Institute for Security Studies* will play a major part in developing these contacts.

Europeans and Americans alike will have to redefine their doctrines for use of the military machine in the post-cold war period. The 'partnership in leadership' concept is still the most appropriate in the light of the need to redistribute responsibilities within the Alliance, while reductions in defence budgets and available resources are highly probable. In the political/military sphere, this partnership based on shared responsibility could lead to new transatlantic contract defining the tasks that the Europeans will have to carry out themselves and the most suitable fields for additional US help. In order to keep Alliance forces at a satisfactory level, we must work together to define tasks and criteria for use which are less vulnerable to political haggling and to restrictions imposed for purely financial reasons.

Clearly the continuing US military presence in Europe is more political than it used to be. Europe is going through a period of radical change, and the United States must be associated with the new state of affairs. What is more, our former foes have become the most fervent supporters of NATO and of an active role for the Americans via the NACC and the CSCE. It is very much thanks to their military presence that the Americans may claim that they have an active role to play in Europe. It is regrettable that Canada seems to have forgotten this when deciding to withdraw its forces. We always, rightly, took exception to the parallel drawn between the two 'blocks' during the cold war. It would be illogical now to fall into the trap of false symmetry and agree to the departure of the majority of American forces by 1995, when repatriation of Soviet troops is due to be completed.

There is a need, however, for the minimum level of this military presence to be more precisely defined. From the European viewpoint, the main duties of the United States will lie in nuclear deterrence, the provision of reinforcements in an emergency and the use of high technology equipment so far unavailable to Europe: satellite monitoring, communications and strategic transport. The stationing in Europe of combat material remains the best possible practical demonstration by the United States of its commitment. A redefinition of this kind, emphasizing the complementary roles of Europe and America and the greater room for manoeuvre provided by a multidimensional political/military environment, would enable both Europe and the Alliance to face up to the challenges and changes of the closing years of this century.

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TRANSATLANTIC TENSIONS AND BUREAUCRATIC INTERESTS

Samuel F. Wells, Jr.[1]
Deputy Director, The Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington DC

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By now it is commonplace to note the dramatic changes that have reshaped Europe and the world since 1989. Yet it takes only looking back through some newspaper headlines from the past three years to remember the breathless enthusiasm with which we, on an almost daily basis, greeted the news of the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the stirrings of democratic sentiment in those long-repressed populations, the unification of Germany, the end of the Soviet military threat in classic cold war terms, and finally, in the autumn of 1991, the collapse of the communist system in the Soviet Union and of the Soviet internal empire.

Eastern Europe is moving on what we now recognise as a more difficult road toward democracy than we had initially expected and is facing the challenges, still greater in number and interrelated in a complicated way with the political transformation, of moving toward market-oriented, open economies. Western Europe is committed to economic and political integration and as appropriate terms are worked out, the European Community will widen to include the EFTA states and the states of Central Europe when they are prepared to meet the terms of membership.

We have achieved many of the goals that have been the objects of high political rhetoric since the 1950s, but United States relations with Europe are tense and vituperative nonetheless. With regard to economic issues, there are significant difficulties over environmental protection, aid to the former communist states, and the Uruguay Round on GATT, with the most serious single issue being high levels of subsidies to agricultural products. Among political issues, there are disputes over what role, if any, the United States should have in European Community decision-making, the nature of a European security identity, and the form and substance of the CSCE.

In the issues within both economic and political areas, the rhetoric in both the European capitals and in Washington too often resembles the way issues are dealt with in national elections. Domestic priorities loom very large indeed in all countries at a time when major international transformations are underway. And the ability of the nations of the western alliance to meet the challenges and the opportunities before them will depend upon the will of political leaders to take some risks for the longer term future of the world and the ability of bureaucrats to place the interests of their countries and the populations whom they serve above their shorter-term career enhancement.

It is ironic that with the collapse of command economies and an almost universal recognition of the existence of an interdependent global economy, the leaders of the world are deadlocked over an issue such as subsidies to agriculture. The agricultural lobby in France is said to be the most powerful in Europe, but even in France its actual strength is quite small. Individuals who earn their primary income by farming represent only 2.9% of the population, and agriculture remains only 3.16% of France's gross domestic product, according to the latest available statistics which are for 1988. While the organisational capability of farmers and their capacity for short-term disruption are both high, the political clout of French agriculture should not be critical either to the survival of any political party or to the determination of a national election. In France, as elsewhere, what is needed is for politicians to demonstrate a willingness to take the risk of angering a small but well-organised interest group in order to advance the well-being of all their constituents.

The same imperative applies to a current economic issue in the United States concerning US Government approval of the purchase of LTV's aerospace and defence assets by French-owned Thomson-CSF in co-operation with an American investment group headed by former US Secretary of Defence Frank Carlucci. The prospect of any threat to US security interests from a French firm purchasing part of a bankrupt American defence corporation is so remote that only national pique would explain a decision by the Congress or the administration to block the sale. It is clearly in US national interest to have stable defence industries manufacturing state-of-the-art products that will be adopted by a number of allied governments for military use.

Political issues are less specific and, in many ways, more serious because they go to the heart of European-American relations. With particular attention to the relationship between France and the United States, we would have to say that it is characterised at the present time more by rivalry than by partnership. The most dramatic example among current Franco-American disputes is that over the Franco-German corps, or as French officials would prefer to have us call it, 'the European corps'.

What is this proposed Eurocorps? It is an initiative by France and Germany stemming from the Franco-German Summit at La Rochelle on 22 May 1992 to create, on the basis of French and German contributions, a European defence entity that will form the basis for a subsequent European army. The corps would be a force of 35,000 troops with headquarters in Strasbourg that would be outside the NATO command and would have the initial missions of defending the territory and interests of the participant members, humanitarian assistance, and peacekeeping and peacemaking within Europe and, if authorised, by the member states beyond. The French press release after the La Rochelle summit states that: 'Beginning 1 July 1992, a staff will be set up to oversee the formation of the corps. The corps - at least the French and Germany units - should be ready for action by 1 October 1995'.

All the members of the Western European Union (WEU) have been invited to participate in the European corps. The governments of Belgium, Luxembourg and Spain have expressed interest in the corps but have at this time made no commitments to participate.

Even the French and German creators of this corps do not agree fully on its relationship to NATO. Numerous German officials have said that the troops within this corps could be 'double-hatted', or responsible both to the commands to NATO and to the European members of this corps. The French, on the other hand, insist that the forces within the Eurocorps would be totally European and independent of any NATO command or affiliation.

While there have been some significant questions raised within Europe about this corps, the strongest negative reaction has come from the United States. American officials and strong supporters of the North Atlantic Alliance view this Eurocorps as a direct challenge to NATO. In a characteristically direct riposte, Jeane Kirkpatrick, writing in the *Washington Post* on 1 June 1992 under the headline 'A Second European Defence Force -To Exclude America?', declared that the essential feature of the Eurocorps in contrast to NATO was that it would be 'a multinational alliance of which the Americans could not be part'. After showing how this proposal could undermine support for a continued American military presence in Europe, Kirkpatrick concluded:

With their proposal for an exclusive alliance, France and Germany have interrupted the task of building structures for collective democratic security, as with protectionist policies they erect barriers to a more open world economy.

Too bad. One would think Europe has had enough of exclusive balance-of-power politics and would be ready now to bet on collective security rather than regional armies to secure peace.

My own assessment of the importance of the Franco-German corps is that it does not pose a serious issue for the United States except as a symbol of European intent. If the Eurocorps comes to be seen as an expression of European disinterest in the continued presence of American forces in Europe and the future role of the United States in European security affairs, it will be serious and will become an issue in the debate about whether the United States should continue to play *any role* in European security including that of an ultimate nuclear guarantor. Many in the United States feel, as I do, that the Bush administration's steadfast advocacy of the primacy of NATO is excessive. As the United States ambassador to NATO, William H Taft IV, acknowledged in a speech of 21 May in Brussels, there is in some quarters a 'reluctance to exchange the leading role we have enjoyed traditionally in the alliance for a more balanced partnership'. He could have added that a large number of US diplomatic and military officials are to be found in that group.

Thinking in the United States about future relations with Europe could be helpfully clarified by a basic discussion at the elite level about the importance of NATO and the type of security relationship we should have in coming years to Europe. My own preference would be that the United States return NATO to its originally intended form, before the Korean War turned it into a fully-fledged military alliance with significant US troop deployments of a permanent nature in Europe.

The original form of NATO was that of an alliance designed for political reassurance and ultimate nuclear guarantee. If we returned to such a form of the alliance, NATO headquarters would be essentially a staff for co-ordination and liaison; the United States would have approximately 75,000 troops in Europe with significant numbers of supplies prepositioned on the continent for possible use; the Europeans would be left largely to manage their own security. This could take the form of the Western European Union (WEU) serving as the European pillar of an alliance and the WEU being part of the European Community. Co-ordination mechanisms would be set up to link NATO and the WEU forces for crisis management and for any prospective nuclear contingencies. The United States, for its part, would require careful consultation and arrangements worked out on the linkage between crises, interventions, and any nuclear guarantees. I am confident that as such a debate developed in the United States the vast majority of the political elite and virtually all of the public would accept a sharply reduced American military presence and role in Europe with a careful restriction of the American nuclear guarantee to issues of national survival. Other questions of European security would be largely left for decision among the Europeans themselves, and in these discussions the United States would have very little role unless it were asked for assistance and agreed to provide it.

* * *

One of the most widely honoured among American political and commercial aphorisms is one that states 'You have to go along to get along'. This means that in order to resolve the problems before you, the parties need to accommodate one another through compromise in order to move ahead. I do not know if the phrases of 'You have to go along to get along' translate easily into the French language, but I strongly suspect that the concept does not resonate in French political culture. For relations between Europe, and particularly France, and the United States to improve, the French will need to develop in their range of attitudes for the years ahead the capacity 'to go along'.

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Council of Europe
Conseil de l'Europe

1992: Europe and North America The dialogue of the new solidarities

Strasbourg, 19 and 20 June 1992

Colloquy organised by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe

DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
IN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA

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The organisers of this conference are to be congratulated on promoting a constructive discussion of the role of European and North American collaboration in fostering democracy and human rights both at home and abroad. It goes without saying that any hope of justifying, let alone exporting, the values that the two continents hold in common must begin not just with some definition of those values but also with an analysis of their relative success as signposts to a better world.

For my part, I propose to consider our theme under three main aspects: (1) a brief history of those common values in our time; (2) an evaluation of their strengths and weaknesses in daily practice; and finally (3) some thoughts on how we might reinforce what is socially most useful about them in the uncertain and divided world that lies before us. Given my position as Chief Commissioner of the Canadian Human Rights Commission, my remarks will focus on the primacy of human rights and the rule of law, both of which are indispensable features of the mission that western democracies have set themselves.

It is a commonplace of modern discourse that we are creatures of our own historical context. From that vantage point, it will be clear that many of the key values that we hold in common - and offer as models to the world at large - are of relatively recent vintage and rather more culturally determined that we may at first care to admit. Nevertheless, it must also be agreed that many of those values have become touchstones for acceptable social and political behaviour throughout the globe, and that they are in fact very widely accepted, whatever their provenance.

It is difficult to define the values that have come to characterize western democracies in a sentence or two, but let me try. There is, above all, an emphasis on the inherent value of the individual life and the right to realize one's particular abilities without undue discriminatory pressures from society at large. There is the principle of broad-based and responsible government, which can perhaps best be summed up as 'government of the people, by the people and for the people'. And, finally, I would suggest there is the idea that whatever may be the social contracts which bind us together as particular political entities, the relations within and between those entities must be based on a continuous process of conciliation and mutual accommodation.

The most comprehensive articulation of these ideals is to be found in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* of 1948. In fact, the members of the Council of Europe echoed the *Universal Declaration* by 'reaffirming their profound belief in those Fundamental Freedoms which are the foundation of justice and peace in the world' in *The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.* The *Universal Declaration* and subsequent international undertakings, can be seen as a remarkable attempt to codify and promulgate those values that seemed most necessary to prevent the sort of catastrophic collapse of justice and decency that occurred before and during World War II. One of the surest bulwarks against such a catastrophe lay in asserting the fundamental dignity and equality of all human beings and their right to be dealt with by their governments and their fellow citizens with equal respect, regardless of their race, colour, age, sex or condition. This impulse not only underlay the pursuit of greater individual freedom and social justice at the domestic level, it was also the driving force behind decolonization and what might be called the greater international democracy of peoples.

In considering how well these ideals have fared in practice, we must be struck not just by the persistence of human prejudices and abuses, but also by the endless difficulties we have in propagating values abroad without simultaneously transgressing them at home. Thus, for example, even while the social norms associated with victorious and economically self-confident America were making their way on the international stage, their value as instruments of social justice at home was being severely tested. In practice, the defence of the free world has been accompanied by a continuing and not always successful struggle for emancipation and social justice on the home front, a struggle that has been dramatically embodied in the Civil Rights movement.

What emerges most clearly even from this briefest of retrospectives is that the considerable progress that our two continents have made in democracy and human rights since World War II has been largely borne along by two great forces: (1) the economic recovery and growth that have helped to make them affordable; and (2) the presence of an alternative ideology that, to put it crudely, made our values look good by comparison. The sudden collapse of that alternative, not to mention its immediate socio-economic consequences, has now conspired with other shifts in the global economy to put unprecedented pressures on our western value systems and we are obliged to try even harder to make sure they stand the test.

Any report card on the usefulness and effectiveness of the values embodied in the *Universal Declaration* would have to conclude that the results are to some extent contradictory. On the one hand, the globalizing effects of the last few decades have carried those principles far and wide and reinforced international attention to our domestic efforts to live up to them. If I may cite Canada as a case in point, the moral force of the *Universal Declaration* has made itself felt in both an elaborate network of rights and protections at home and in a reasonably consistent stand towards the claims of conflict-reduction and democratic government abroad. On the other hand, the western values that seem at first sight to have triumphed in the great ideological contest of our times have not been able to prevail in the face of profoundly rooted ethnic and social problems. As the Secretary General of the United Nations pointed out in Montreal just last month, 'The conflicts resulting from the Cold War and, subsequently, from decolonization, which involved opposing world views, or opposing nations, are being followed today by civil wars, ethnic or tribal conflicts and frontier disputes.'

There is something disquieting about the hydra-headed quality of what might loosely be described as ethnic nationalism. Over and above any questions this may raise about the nature of human beings, it poses a special dilemma to the theory and practice of democratic and human rights. The dilemma lies above all in squaring the circle between individual and collective rights, between providing a proper degree of autonomy for identifiable human groups and at the same time ensuring common standards of social justice across group boundaries. This democratic dilemma presents itself most acutely in the New Europe, where a proliferation of potentially antagonistic new states to the south and east sits uneasily with the generally unifying forces to be west. But the clash of individualistic and collectivistic values can be heard in North America as well; both Canadians and Americans have much more than an academic or internationalist interest in finding practical political solutions to these atavistic problems..

I have in mind here not just the obvious problems in Yugoslavia, Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union, I refer also to ethnic and other tensions in the West that may have been exacerbated by recent developments but that just as certainly pre-existed in

advanced societies on both sides of the Atlantic. Even as our communities try to help resolve the Yugoslav conflict, we cannot help looking over our shoulders at the effects that population movements and group resentments are having on our own pluralistic pretensions. My point is that the values to which we dedicated ourselves through the *Universal Declaration*, and our own domestic human rights programs, are increasingly challenged not just by the spin-offs and throwbacks of unresolved problems elsewhere but by some intrinsic failures much closer to home.

In that regard, I believe the central values of western democracies to be those of political and social inclusion and participation. We have committed ourselves to much more than a passive tolerance of human differences; we have also come to a large measure of agreement on positive programs to equalize human opportunities. If we have any claim to offer moral leadership in other quarters of the globe, it perhaps lies less in the benefits of the free market as such and more in the human opportunities that claim association with it. When those opportunities are effectively denied or distributed with manifest inequity on the home front, then our value system has a problem that goes beyond mere international relations. It goes to the heart of the *Universal Declaration* and the very meaning of what we are trying to achieve as western societies.

This conference raises questions about how the New Europe will relate to the New North America in political and economic terms. I must leave it to others to propose strategies for dealing with those new relationships and content myself with hoping that the spirit of co-operation that has marked their course for nearly fifty years will continue to prevail. What concerns me more is how the present shifts of power and the inevitable jockeying for position will affect the rights and freedoms that North America and Europe are supposed to stand for. Already, as I have suggested earlier, those values have come under pressure from several directions:

- from the fragmentation of major political entities that has fanned the old enmities and set whole populations on the move;

- from market forces that may be seen to distribute economic rewards with little regard for equity or the common interest;

- from the undertow of mob emotions that lies largely beyond the powers of reason and thrives on the mix of disillusion and inequity that is at work on both continents; and

- from intrinsic tensions between individual and collective rights that have yet to be satisfactorily resolved.

How strong are our liberal values and democratic principles when faced with the forces of disruption that now confront us? What can we do for those members of our own societies who have become chronically excluded and disadvantaged, not to mention the millions who are defenceless and starving around the world?

It is becoming more difficult in both Europe and North America to make good on the promises of personal fulfilment for all, at least as we have been induced to understand those promises. No only have material expectations consistently outrun our total capacity to deliver, we have also often allowed superficial goals to distort our sense of what it means to lead a worthwhile life. These are, if you will, some of the ills that attend

success. Over and above these diseases of the rich, however, are several stubborn pockets of inequality on which our values seem to have made too little impression. That is not only inexcusable in light of our undertakings of the past, it casts a threatening light on our ability to do better in the future.

If I may take a North American example that is particularly close to my own experience, we must continue to ask ourselves how we can better ensure that the economic and employment opportunities of an advanced market economy do not become so inequitably distributed along ethnic or other lines that they not only deny personal dignity to whole classes of individuals but also undermine the very principles of democratic participation. The crux of the matter is whether we can, by deliberate but non-coercive means, prevail upon society to ensure genuine participation in the work force without discrimination on grounds, for example, of race or ethnic origin. If not, we run the danger of entrenching in our societies a permanent underclass, without jobs and without any political or economic stake in the society that has created it.

Some fundamental equity of access to and participation in the workforce is therefore a test cause for our common values and for the very idea of democracy. Although such outbreaks of urban violence as we have recently seen in Los Angeles are palpably related to racial and age disparities in jobs, incomes and opportunities, we seem unable to agree on apropriate remedies. There is a distrust of the heavy hand of government and a corresponding resort to the familiar placebos of improved education and family values. There is also an endless debate about whether such phenomena - including the breakdown of traditional values - are more attributable to unfettered free-marketry or to the misguided interventions of the welfare state. Meantime, the core conditions tend to deteriorate and the recourse to violence and disrule becomes more frequent.

What seems to me patently clear is that economic growth, has not shown itself to be an automatic answer to impoverishment and alienation, even in the most advanced industrial societies. Whether we like it or not, the social stability and democratic good order of our two continents will hinge on our capacity to manage employment opportunities in the public interest. The alternative, given the immense and unpredictable population pressures that are now making themselves felt both regionally and globally, is almost too unpleasant to contemplate.

The future prospects for democratic values and human rights go beyond the question whether the relatively prosperous societies of the West can positively influence less favoured societies elsewhere. Both the increasing inequalities between North and South and the disparities in our own societies call into question the very effectiveness of the democratic values, economic ethics and human rights principles that we had assumed to be at the core of our legitimacy.

The challenge that this presents to the spirit and experience of Euro-American co-operation may well be greater than anything we have seen in the past. In the absence of any clearly dominant economic and political driving force such as the United States represented at the conclusion of World War II, we need more than ever to rely on the inherent authority of those rights and principles that we established for ourselves in such instruments as the *Universal Declaration* and on our techniques of conciliation and redistribution. For a while it seemed possible to believe that the benefits that had accrued to many citizens of the West would simply spill over to the less advantaged. I submit that such a belief is no longer tenable, either domestically or globally, and we

must therefore apply ourselves to producing a more humanly acceptable balance - or face untold consequences.

I happen to believe that mission is already implicit in the *Universal Declaration* and represents the fulfilment of the Western tradition as we know it. What we need at this point is to follow though on two essential ideas:

- That the principle of non-discrimination must be an active force in creating equality of economic and social opportunity; and

- that the heart of Western liberalism lies in persevering readiness to accommodate for the common good.

The greatest problem facing us today is no longer ideological polarization between super powers but polarization between the haves and the have-nots, both domestically and internationally. The values we are here to promote must be brought to bear on that phenomenon, and with the greatest urgency. The possibilities of individual freedom and development must not be allowed to become the preserve of wealthy nations and affluent individuals. Europe and North-America both still have much to do to fulfil their immediate human rights obligations, but they cannot do so by turning their backs on human conditions that exist elsewhere, and still less those in their own midst. The pressures of our own time and of the future that awaits us will leave us no choice but to share the goods that we enjoy. The challenge for Euro-American values and co-operation is to find ways to include those less fortunate and thus finally to accept - and welcome - the full implications of the principles we have proclaimed as universal values.

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Council of Europe
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1992: Europe and North America The dialogue of the new solidarities

Strasbourg, 19 and 20 June 1992

Colloquy organised by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe

INTERLOCKING INSTITUTIONS, SWEDEN AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

Ingemar Dörfer
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The future security of Europe is based on inter-locking institutions. Since Sweden remained neutral during World War II and non-aligned in the postwar era, her experience of these institutions is not as rich as that of most other European nations. From 1949, Sweden was a member of the Council of Europe and became a United Nations member as early as 1946. From the beginning she was an enthusiastic supporter of the CSCE process in 1975. She took the initiative to the foundation of EFTA in 1958. In 1990, she applied for membership of the EEC and aspires to become a member of the European Union in 1995. Owing to her traditional foreign policy, she is not a member of NATO and the WEU, nor has she yet been invited to join NACC.

Since the Cold War the concept of security in Europe has changed. Great wars between East and West are increasingly unlikely but local economic and ethnic tensions can escalate into greater conflicts and even civil wars, as in the former Yugoslavia. Crisis prevention, crisis management and peacekeeping are skills in high demand. To combat the root of much conflict in Europe, Sweden wants to promote democracy, market economy and human rights in the nations that up till now lacked such attributes. The goal is to create a robust and flexible European architecture that is resilient to attacks. Military forces can be moved around the world in weeks but the architecture should be able to resist shock treatment.

Domestic Contributions to European Security

Some elements of security are not directly anchored in the architecture but related to it in an indirect way. One important factor is the maintenance of credible defence forces to secure the defence forces of one's own territory including the air and sea areas. Together with Turkey, Sweden is the only European nation to increase its defence budget at the present time. During the cold war it was important that Scandinavia was not a military-political vacuum and the armed neutrality of Sweden had a stabilizing effect on the strategic situation in the high North. Now on the borderline between NATO, the Baltic states and Russia and in the future as a member of the European Union, Sweden will continue to bear its share of the defence burden.

Peacekeeping is the method by which Sweden has projected its military power in crisis management and control around the world. Owing to Swedish non-alignment, the United Nations is the institution that until now has been in charge of the Swedish peacekeeping forces, and because of the frozen situation in Europe these efforts have up until now been concentrated outside Europe. Now with Yugoslavia, things are of course different: there are Swedish forces in Yugoslavia, but there are also Swedish observers with a CSCE function in that region.

Without indigenous skilled military forces the Swedish contributions to peacekeeping - 50,000 troops over the years - would have been impossible. In its contribution to democracy and market economy in the former Warsaw Pact nations foreign economic aid and transfer of skills are conducted on a bilateral basis. Three billion SEK are to be distributed over the next three years. Due to geography and old affiliations, the bulk of these economic contributions go to the three Baltic states and the St Petersburg area in Russia. Also Poland and Central Europe receive a contribution. 500 million SEK are distributed via the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development in London.

The annual contribution of one billion SEK to Eastern Europe should be compared with the 14 billion SEK that Sweden annually spends in foreign aid to the rest of the world community.

Interlocking Institutions

A strong democracy, a strong economy and a credible defence force form the home base for Sweden's contribution to the European security architecture of interlocking institutions.

Council of Europe

Democracies by and large do not fight wars against each other. From the beginning Sweden has been an enthusiastic member of the Council of Europe with its emphasis on human rights and democracy - that is low politics rather than high politics. The membership has underlined Sweden's place in the Western democracies but outside the military pact system that has dominated postwar Europe. As François Heisbourg has pointed out, the Council of Europe is the ideal first European institution to join. It is a bridge for the new democracies to cross in a non-provocative manner. In the hierarchy of values, democracy and human rights come first and a strong economy comes second. A strong market economy, of course, promotes democracy but even more so it is democracy and human rights and not marxism-leninism that promotes an advanced economy. It is only logical that the new democracies of Europe first join the Council of Europe while they have to wait their turn until their economies make them feasible partners in the European Economic Area to the European Union.

United Nations

Although founded by the European and American nations that defeated Nazi Germany, the UN is dominated by non-European nations. Sweden's long isolation from Europe, that only now is changing to a more European policy, has placed the UN in the focus of much Swedish foreign policy. Without losing its interest in the United Nations, much energy now has to be directed towards the emerging European institutions. When the UN has intervened directly in European security, such as for the first time seriously in Yugoslavia, the results have been futile. It is not an experiment to be repeated lightly. Yet the Swedish experience with the UN is very positive in one specific sense, in addition to the capability and skills to work easily with international institutions. Through the UN the Swedish public has become accustomed to the idea of international peacekeeping missions and of strong Swedish support for these missions. In the future such missions will be necessary under the auspices of the CSCE process, the European Union and maybe even the WEU. If NATO becomes the executive arm of the CSCE process, as has already been discussed, the Swedish public will accept the idea of Swedish military contributions to European security outside its own borders, in a more organic and natural way over time.

The CSCE

Since Sweden was not a member of NATO, the WEU or the EEC, the CSCE - for half a generation after 1975 - was the only security forum where she could be active in Europe. In the beginning, the emphasis on human rights again favoured Swedish participation in low rather than high politics and when arms control became an important feature of the CSCE, Sweden played an important role in the NN group through its technical expertise. Within the CSCE process, the Stockholm and Vienna documents provide important guidelines on transparency, confidence building measures and other elements of a European security order. Beginning in Vienna in 1986, the CFE negotiations on conventional weapons between NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations became predominant. Since Sweden was non-aligned, she could not participate in these talks, but since the outcome at the time also had profound security implications for Sweden, she followed the talks intensely and even managed to have an impact through close co-operation with the Norwegian and other Western delegations. With the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the unilateral disarmament initiatives of the United States and the former Soviet Union, the CFE treaty is far less important than was believed only two years ago. Still, in these first real negotiations on European security, Sweden learnt the disadvantages of being outside the mainstream of European security talks. In the beginning it seemed that a role as a leading NN nation called for mediating skills that were useful. With the break-up of Yugoslavia and the old blocks, the NN group neither exists nor does it have a purpose in life anymore. Sweden has thus unilaterally harmonized the documentation of its armed forces with those inherent in the CFE treaty and seeks to collapse the CSBM and CFE talks into one round of negotiations after the Helsinki II meeting. The advantage of staying out has turned into a disadvantage and this insight is yet another reason among the Swedish policy-making elite to join the European Union fully. Beginning in December, Sweden will, however, chair the CSCE process. The recent inclusion of ten ex-Soviet republics as well as Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia will make the CSCE group a more difficult, some would say impossible, body to manage. On the other hand, the ethnic conflicts of some Central Asian republics do have an impact on the security of Russia and a stable and democratic Russia is one of the main prerequisites for a peaceful Europe. Within the CSCE process, the United States, Germany, France and Britain can be useful in an unobtrusive manner without flaunting their NATO credentials. Sweden during its chairmanship will seek stronger institutions for the CSCE and support a Vienna security forum where the security situation in Europe can be discussed on a continuous basis.

There is no doubt, of course, that the three centres created under the CSCE auspices in Vienna, Prague and Warsaw still lack the resources for resolute and effective action, as the Yugoslav crisis again reminds us. The various ideas put forth in the CSCE and NATO context to let NATO act as the executive agent of CSCE peacekeeping activities is therefore welcomed by Sweden. Within the CSCE process, various nations could, on an ad hoc basis, offer their support to various contingencies. In many of the world's recent crises, notably during Operation Desert Storm, it has in fact been the United States that has provided the logistics, the infrastructure and often the main peacekeeping force, once you scratch the veneer of diplomatic jingoism.

NACC

Sweden, together with Finland, Austria, Switzerland, Lichtenstein and a few other micro states are not members of NACC formed in December 1991. Since NACC at first was formed as a substitute NATO membership for Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia and has developed into a democratic finishing school for the ex-Warsaw Pact members, this at first sight is not surprising. Yet over time it will be absurd, to quote Finnish spokesmen, to have these tiny white spots in a community of 51 nations in the Northern Hemisphere stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Should Uzbekistan and the Netherlands confer in Brussels but not Sweden and Poland? That is the logical oucome of NACC in its current form. At the NATO summit meeting in Oslo, Finland became an observer to the NACC proceedings. Over time Sweden may reach the same status.

The European Union

The Swedish application to the EEC and now the European Union of July 1, 1991, is without reservations. Currently Austria, Finland and Switzerland as well have all asked for full membership and Norway is likely to follow in November. At Maastricht the long range security policy of the Union was laid down. The West European Union is to report to the European Commission on this co-operation by 1996 and policy is to be finalized by 1998. Since Sweden plans to become a full member in 1995, it hopes to have an impact in these policies. For the time being Sweden is seeking a European identity and is no longer pursuing a policy of neutrality. This orientation is still combined with non-alignment and an effort to remain neutral if a European war should break out in our immediate vicinity.

It is my personal conviction that the attempt to establish a fictitious distinction between security and defence in the European context cannot be sustained in the long run. As we join in 1995 our contribution to defence as spelt out in the 1988 decisions will become clear. Through our UN tradition, contributions to European peacekeeping missions will be the least difficult to explain to the public and will win acceptance. In the case of defence of Europe proper, Sweden, like Finland, will become a net contributor to European defence, not a detractor. Our defence procedures in the high North are well tested and designed to maintain stability on our European borders. We hold the question of membership in the West European Union open. The continued US presence in Europe is a vital security interest and now one of the most important goals of Swedish security policy.

Final Words

Although Sweden has not recently been in the mainstream of European politics and absent from key security institutions, its contribution to European security in the postwar period has been substantial. Through its own defence establishment it has contributed to predictability and stability in Northern Europe. Through its peacekeeping missions, it has supported the maintenance of peace in many spots around the world, including Cyprus and the Middle East. Through its diplomacy it has sometimes helped to open avenues, facilitated communication and resolved differences also in postwar European disputes. Through its support of human rights and democracy, not least in the Council of Europe, it has been a contributor to European democracy. Through its current

economic support of, and investment in Eastern and Central Europe, it facilitates the modernization and reform of these former Marxist economies.

Yet, as Sweden seeks full membership in the European Union, the pace of change accelerates. In many more interlocking institutions than before, Swedes will participate in the building of the new European security architecture. The relative isolation of Sweden from the European foreign policy and security debate will be broken. The civil service, the universities, the media, the entire civic society will be populated by individuals who will think in European rather than narrowly nationalistic and isolationist terms. War, which Sweden has not seen since 1814, will be as difficult to imagine between European democracies as it now is between the Nordic nations. The relatively hidden contributions of Sweden to the security, democracy and prosperity of Europe, will be more visible in an open structure to promote Europe whole and free.

(22)

Council of Europe
Conseil de l'Europe

1992: Europe and North America The dialogue of the new solidarities

Strasbourg, 19 and 20 June 1992

Colloquy organised by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe

THE CHALLENGE OF SHARED VALUES AFTER THE COLD WAR

Dominique Moïsi
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EURANOR (92) 24

There is nothing like a common enemy to unite people. For more than 40 years the alliance between Europe and the United States stemmed from the perception of a common threat posed by an empire and a system, namely Soviet totalitarianism.

Now that the cold war and communism are finished, the United States and Europe find themselves forced to define positively, and not - as before - negatively, the values they have in common. The point is no longer to cope with a threat, but to get together to define priorities.

Today, Europe and the United States eye each other with a combination of ambivalence and doubt. America is not sure what is to be feared most: an over-strong Europe, economically powerful and potentially protectionist, which, as 'Fortress Europe', would compound the threat from Japan with a severe test for American competitiveness; or a dangerously weak Europe falling once again victim to its internal demons of division, paralysis, impotence and civil war. Leading circles in America are increasingly haunted by the pattern of events in Yugoslavia.

The same ambivalence is to be found among Europeans. Should they be more apprehensive of an over-powerful United States, and of its manifest inability as the only super-power in the world to share power and make the change from leadership to partnership? Or of the opposite, a dangerously weak society, whose dream of integration is crumbling and which, in the aftermath of the racial and social riots in Los Angeles, may be tempted to withdraw into itself, in a new kind of isolationism imposed by financial constraints?

In this context, with the risk of bonds being loosened, together with clear signs of mingled irritation, mistrust or even indifference, the only possible safety net we have is attachment to the values we share in common. In the United States and Europe alike, society is based on respect for the rights of the individual, the market economy, political democracy and intellectual liberalism. These are the values in whose name the United States and Europe must act together, in Eastern Europe and the former USSR, which have now become a kind of common frontier.

It is to defend these values that the United States and Europe must intervene jointly in the Yugoslav crisis, which is now becoming a cause of shame to Western democracies. When human beings are killed simply because they belong to a particular ethnic group, standing passively by is unacceptable. European and United States insistence on the defence of shared values would be lamentable hypocrisy if nothing were done to call an immediate halt to the imperialistic, expansionist designs of the present government of Serbia.



THEME I - Common values: a certain idea of democracy and human rights

General discussion (summary)

In our search for common values, we should delight in a shared treasure: our cultural pluralism. Humanist values, such as tolerance, generosity and solidarity, should find their meaning again in all democratic systems.

Dialogue and cultural exchanges should enable us to highlight good examples and experiences, helping us to tackle these questions in a positive and constructive spirit.

The texts of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Council of Europe's Convention on Human Rights are fundamental to the definition of common values.

However, we regretfully have to note that Western democracies have failed to achieve equitable participation for all citizens. Access to education and to work are fundamental extensions to human rights, but we have to acknowledge that economic progress alone is not, as we had previously thought, enough to bring equity in terms of participation and access. However, we must achieve this, not only within our states, thus combating the marginalisation of certain groups in our societies, but also between North and South.

One of the difficulties of defining common values stems from the ambiguity within the very idea of democracy, which may be either statistical (based on a majority) or communal, two concepts which have exerted a different influence on the institutions of North America and those of Europe. Although for two centuries, Europe stressed the majority concept, in our day, the communal concept, which is American in origin, predominates in Europe and the majority concept predominates in America. The difference between these two concepts gives rise to questions such as:

- Are there limits to democracy?

- Must democracy become non-democratic to protect itself?

- Should Europe be based on a community of principles rather than on an economic community?

For the new emerging democracies of Europe, the crucial problem is that of the reconciliation of economic and democratic decisions, the relative value to attach to respect for individuals' rights and the need for social cohesion. How can this balance be struck, and how can these values be institutionalized when a legal system is being set up? Dialogue with the other democracies will be able to play a significant part, and is as necessary as technical assistance.

In the fight against ethnocentricity the younger generations give us hope; they easily and rapidly assimilate common values

(pop music, fashions, food, media, etc.). Our institutions can and should make mobility and cultural exchanges between these younger generations still easier.

Democratic values are fragile and difficult to put into practice, but they are universally recognized as a precious asset. Facing the challenge of extending democracy to the former communist countries, priority should be given to dialogue and to the identification of common values. We can learn from each other; at another Council of Europe colloquy, for example, we could again strive to find this spirit of democracy.

THEME II - The present interests: conflicts and convergences between Europe and North America

Summary of the rapporteurs' introduction

Mrs Berger. Stressing the need to explore common US/European interests in Eastern and Central Europe, Mrs Berger opens the debate and points at three major issues.

- Interests in Central and eastern Europe are viewed from the Northern American perspective with a mood of profound uncertainty. The Northern American society finds it difficult to detect in the evolution of the new democracies, vital interests at stake. For Europeans, on the contrary, interests at stake are clearly identifiable. The threat of mass migration and its consequences in domestic raise of xenophobia and racism, mobilize the attention of European States.

- If interests are believed to actually be at stake, the question of which priority they should be given is still open. As far as the US society is concerned, domestic problems and large scale debates over US/Japanese relations are likely to take priority over Eastern European interests.

- The US and Europe do not have different values, they share a common stock of values but profound contradictions emerge since these values are challenged domestically in both societies, giving very unclear signals to Eastern Europe. Neither Europe nor the US are in a position to give lessons but can make their valuable experience available to the East.

Mr Baranovsky. The irreversibility of the commitment of Russia to democracy stems also from the new orientations of its foreign policy. Four main approaches can be outlined:

- The pro-European approach tries to overcome the division of the continent and believes that only European countries can have a role in the economic growth of Russia and a political interest in its stability. Only European institutions can play a crucial role in helping Russia and its neighbouring countries to solve their crises through an international structure.

- Another approach sees Russian interests in a higher level partnership, in particular with the US, extending to fields such as the UN, arms control and demilitarization. These two first approaches can be complementary.

- Isolationism is a third approach. Domestic problems take up all the resources and no new commitments are sought after.

- The necessity to think of a special Russian role linked to its geopolitical position would make Russia concentrate on its third world features, Muslim population and military potential (Yugoslavia would have been a good training ground for special Russian action).

Ambassador Blackwill. New Europe is emerging with all its problems: political weakness, wars, ethnic conflicts, refugees and nuclear instability. There is a need to establish a new international institution of political economy to manage reforms in the East because the development of these economies will take a long time and because Western strategic interests are strictly connected to this development. This institution should be financed by Western governments and be working for four years; it should be based in Brussels and should deal with: privatisation, helping build commercial, and administrative law, reforms in the educational systems. The accomplishments of such an institution would be equivalent to the Marshall Plan after World War II, since promoting democracy in Eastern Europe is not less important than containing the Soviet threat.

Mr Guehenno. There is a strong link between values and interests, foreign policy can never be reduced to mere interests. Transatlantic relations should concentrate on the new features of Eastern Europe which are given by the following elements:

- Security is being redefined as a political problem and is no longer a specialists' affair. States' reactions to security matters are more diversified since non-specialists' views are coming into play.

- Another difficulty is that choices are more complex, so that political wills must be more cohesive

- The questions of minorities, new sovereignties and self-determination are blurring the frontiers between external and internal jurisdictions and are challenging very deeply rooted traditions.

- The enormous economic challenge is differently perceived and its repercussions are not the same everywhere.

A new political OECD should be put in place where the multilateral discipline, the transparency, the flow of information and peer pressure would help the participants to solve political problems such as that of the minorities. Russia seems to be committed to multilateral framework and should not be considered as a mere appendix of Europe. It is clear that Europeans must act first although Americans should work with us in the re-definition of our political ambitions and help us review concepts such as internal and external sovereignties and the relationship between politics and law.


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(25)

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Foreword

Europe has entered a new phase in its historical development. The division of the continent into two blocs, at loggerheads with each other for more than forty years, is over. So too is the order instituted at Yalta, which made Europe into a mere appendage of the only two powers able, after the Second World War, to shape the world as they saw fit: the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It is now up to Europe itself to reshape its fate. However, the first two years of the new era have shown that, contrary to the promising signs at the time of the 1989 turning-point, this process will require much effort and a considerable time-span. Despite the fact that history is now open once again, after decades of Manichean bipolarism, this requirement of time and effort applies no less to the precipitately declared triumph of liberal values in politics, the economy, and society throughout Europe, and indeed on a global scale.

The Iron Curtain may have fallen in 1989, but a deep rift continues to divide the continent into a western and an eastern part. The dual legacy of the two mass movements of the nineteenth century-socialism and nationalism-weighs heavy in the eastern part of Europe. Socialism, particularly in its Marxist-Leninist variant, was unable to triumph over capitalist methods of production, as it claimed ideologically to be able to do. It managed only to lay the foundations of an industrial society, and to do so only at a slower rate and by resorting to the methods of the authoritarian centralized state. Yet the more economic development progressed, the more that development itself became a barrier to the growth of productive forces, and, in the age of information, it ultimately foundered on its inability to process information adequately in a centralized manner. Socialist internationalism was to suffer a similar fate. Its attempt to solve the national question via the class struggle, and to overcome national fragmentation through social integration, remained tied to the authoritarianism of the communist party. The latter's demise revealed that, against the background of only partial socialist

modernization in eastern Europe, the various forms of national atavism had been largely preserved and had lost nothing of their virulence. Indeed, serving as it did as a synonym for political liberation and economic and social emancipation, nationalism acquired an extra boost which, notoriously, resulted in its translation into physical violence.

The legacy of erstwhile real socialism and the revival of European nationalism constitute challenges which, though having their origins in the Eastern part of the continent, nevertheless affect the whole of Europe. Although the future of the east today lies in the west, that future can only be secured if the western side too demonstrates a willingness to accommodate, to open up, and to engage in joint conflict-resolution. This is all the more important in that the protagonists of the piece have been utterly surprised by the pace of change in Europe, and have not really, to date, acquired adequate tools to bring under control the risks of multipolar disorder which have replaced the former unbending bipolar order. The changes in the political map of Europe provide a graphic example of this. German unification, spurred on by the impatience of the people in the GDR, took place relatively quickly and with the agreement of all the powers involved. In the case of Yugoslavia, on the other hand, the impatience ended in a bloodbath which even the international community has made little headway in stemming.

Nevertheless, the war in Yugoslavia has not yet managed, at it did once before during this century, to disrupt European equilibrium and stability and bring rival alliances on to the scene. The situation could be otherwise in the case of the erstwhile Soviet empire, where a geopolitical realignment of unprecedented proportions and totally unforseeable outcome has begun. Actual and potential inter-ethnic conflicts and border claims, the possible use of military force, and the prospect of external interference-these are the most disturbing factors that could undermine stability both in the region east of the Bug river and beyond.

A serious reassesment is therefore needed, both of the very notion of international security in Europe, and of the methods and means of preserving it. This concerns the protagonists of international politics-the nation-states-as well as residual alliances (NATO) and integrating bodies (EC), and, not least, what continues to be the sole pan-European forum, namely the CSCE. Only joint efforts can ensure that old risks do not become new threats, and that the current problems of transformation do not end in new division and confrontation but are overcome through integration and co-operation.

It is against this background that the authors of the present volume analyse the changes that have taken place on the European continent, tracing their appearance from the beginnings of glasnost and perestroika in 1985 and their acceleration in the wake of the European revolutions of 1989. The analysis is made to a large extent from the perspective of the two states which in the past have played a prominent role in shaping European antagonism and which have been most affected by the sea change, albeit in opposing ways: Germany and the former Soviet Union/Russia. 'Perspective' here relates not only to the actual subject-matter under discussion, namely the significance and role of the two states within the concert of European powers, but also to the fact that the present volume is the product of a two-year period of co-operation between researchers from these two countries, and that, as a result, national perceptions, priorities, and emphases are reflected, both implicitly and explicitly, in the analysis.

In the first section of the book, under the title 'Continuity and Change', stock is taken of the situation, and an assessment is made of the background to, and nature of, the changes that have occurred since 1985 and of the chances and risks they present in regard to the prospect of a new, and henceforward pan-European, order. Gert Krell highlights the fact that, in contrast to the previous modern-day attempts to found such an order-in 1815 (Vienna), 1919 (Versailles, Trianon), and 1945 (Yalta and Potsdam)-there is now an opportunity of establishing a European peace order that is more than just a post-war order, that is to say it would not be hamstrung by the fact of having emerged from the ruins of a war. In addition, following the demise of

Marxist-Leninist socialism, there is now no longer any ideological antagonism; instead, all the states of Europe feel bound to the common principles and norms laid down in 1990 in the Paris Charter for a New Europe. Finally, the rivalry between the (great) powers of Europe that was a characteristic feature of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century is now largely a thing of the past-not least because of the historically unprecedented mutual transparency and interdependence that now exists.

This means that the preconditions for the establishment of a new order, integrating both halves of Europe, are much more favourable today than they ever were in the past. This applies particularly to prospects for far-reaching arms reductions. However, the disintegration of the bipolar order has, as Gert Krell says, another side to it. This is expressed in the fact that the tried and tested mechanisms of war prevention and conflict management between the blocs, and also the avoidance of conflict within the blocs, are scarcely applicable in today's changed conditions. But an increasing need for conflict prevention and management arises from the revival of nationalism and the growing potential for ethno-national conflict. The latter have led to the emergence of new, multiferious types of EastÂEast conflicts in the place of the unidimensional clash between East and West. They are what largely shapes the new security agenda in Europe. The successful implementation of that agenda will determine whether the peaceful integration of the two still very disparate parts goes ahead successfully, and therefore also whether one of the major preconditions for the solution of the two greatest challenges facing the world-the development crisis and the ecological crisis-can be fulfilled.

Like Gert Krell, Yuri Borko claims that one of the outstanding results of the revolutionary changes of 1989 is the fact that it is now possible for the first time to conduct the European dialogue in the universal language of modern civilization. This was not possible under real socialism. Although socialism had its roots in some of the greatest achievements of European thinking, in the wake of the modifications introduced by Lenin and, above all, by Stalin, with his

creation of Marxism-Leninism, it turned increasingly into a totalitarian ideology, which, with its myths and dogmas, cut itself off on principle from Western enlightenment. However, by the beginning of the 1980s at the latest, this ideology had lost its power of persuasion, and with the coming of glasnost, as Yuri Borko explains, the bell finally tolled for it. Socialism proved unable gradually to eliminate capitalism-even in the sense of a synthesis as mooted in the convergence thesis; nor was Michail Gorbachev's attempt to lead socialism back to civilization and secure it an equal place in the 'common European home' granted succcess. And the situation is accentuated by the fact that Russia, as a result of all this, is now faced with an alternative as familiar as it is novel: to turn towards the West or once again set off on a separate Russian path.

The transition from the bipolar, confrontational order to a pan-European structure of co-operation and security calls for a rethinking of existing institutions and procedures. In this connection, says Peter Schlotter in his contribution, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) must be regarded as being of particular significance. With its fifty-plus members, it is the only body to embrace all the states of Europe as well as those which have a direct influence on European security. It has a mandate to deal with all problems which, in the broadest sense, relate to security on the European continent. Finally, since its foundation in the mid-1970s, the CSCE has acquired a wide-ranging fund of experience in conflict management. However, this is also the area in which its obvious weaknesses are rooted. The CSCE too is a product of the East&West conflict, and its achievements in the past were a direct function of the readiness of the two blocs to co-operate. It therefore needed to adapt to the radically different conditions of multipolarity, but developments in this direction have so far only been rudimentary. Peter Schlotter discusses a range of new procedures and institutions which might considerably increase what has up to now been the extremely limited effectiveness of the CSCE as an organ for conflict prevention.

In this connection, the relationship of the CSCE to other institutions and organizations in Europe-notably NATO-is significant. This is the theme tackled by Harald Miler. It is evident that NATO has lost the real justification for its existence-namely to provide a counterweight to the obvious, massive Soviet threat. It therefore needs a new legitimation, and the much-quoted residual risks are not sufficient here. From this, Harald Miler concludes that NATO must become an integral component in a pan-European security system based on the CSCE. In view of the Dutch initiative to entrust NATO with peace-keeping missions within the framework of the CSCE, such an idea shows how quickly the previously inconceivable can today become a political reality.

However, this kind of model depends not only on the NATO's flexibility and readiness to reform, but also on the interests prevailing in the eastern part of Europe, where expectations are currently directed more at the proven guarantees of collective security available within NATO than at the uncertain prospects of a collective security based on the CSCE. Of particular importance in this regard is the former Soviet Union and its two most important successor states, Russia and the Ukraine. Two themes related to this are dealt with in detail here: the evolution of Moscow's policy on Europe, in the article by Vladimir Baranovsky, and the change in Moscow's military policy, discussed by Yuri Streltsov. Both analyses begin with the start of perestroika and close with a look into the uncertain future both of the Commonwealth of Independent States and of Russian policy following the demise of the Soviet Union.

They paint a detailed picture of the convoluted and, up to now, inconsistent paths taken by Moscow's domestic and military policies, of the increasingly complex internal political environment, and of the rapidly changing demands being imposed from outside. Thus, although Moscow's policy over the last seven years has shown an unprecedented degree of readiness and ability to adapt, one cannot talk of a coherent strategy. This is also true to some extent of Russian policy in the post-Soviet era, which, although it has rid itself of many of the half-truths of the past, is now confronted with the problem of

defining the country's new role in a radically altered environment. Thus, although Russia in many ways, particularly from the military point of view, has the potential of a great power, it no longer has the ability unilaterally to shape the international system, nor to assume leading functions at the European level. Given that the country will be dependent on European co-operation for the foreseeable future, and in view of greater ambitions and more virulent fears of Russian dominance, that ability will be subejct to relatively strict limits.

The legacy of the Soviet Union is also the main topic on the present arms control agenda in Europe, and it is this subject which Matthias Dembinski and Hans-Joachim Schmidt tackle in their contribution. The Soviet Union did not ratify the two most important arms control treaties of recent years-START and CFE-nor have its successor states as yet been able, in a concerted and lasting manner, to deal with the legacy of the Soviet Armed Forces in a way consonant with these two treaties. Although some important advances have been made in the reduction of strategic and tactical nuclear weaponry, we are left, for the foreseeable future, with the problem that there is now not one nuclear power, with a predictable system of centralized control, but four-and four whose intentions are extremely unclear. The situation is similar in regard to the reduction of conventional arms in Europe, which, because of the dictates of economic requirements, is currently being conducted mainly on a unilateral basis. The basis on which arms control in Europe has taken place to date-the alliance approach-had already become obsolete when the CFE treaty was signed in December 1990, but no new approaches are yet in sight. It is therefore likely that, after the various desiderata have been dealt with within the framework of the CFE Ia negotiations, negotiated arms control will once again fade into the background, to be replaced by joint efforts to achieve military confidence-building.

From the time of its foundation in 1871, Germany-or rather the German nation-state-had always presented a problem as far as the balance of power on the European continent was concerned. It was from Germany that the two devastating world wars were launched, and the attempt, in

the wake of those wars, to found a European order, was always guided by the notion that Germany's potential must be contained. The re-emergence of the unified German nation-state is, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the clearest sign of the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a new age. Against this background, Bruno Schoch examines the question of whether there is any likelihood that history-in whatever form-will repeat itself. His conclusion remains ambivalent. One the one hand, he points to far-reaching changes, to the integration of Germany into the international community, to the radical turning-point of 1945, and to the modernization of German society-all of which make a resurgence of German great-power politics unlikely. On the other hand, however, the conditions underlying the basic German consensus of the post-war period-manifested internally in post-national constitutionalism and externally in unconditional acceptance of European integration-have undergone radical alteration. As a result, it seems questionable that the Federal Republic's past will also be the future of united Germany. At any rate, the first foreign-policy test to occur after unification-the Gulf War-was, according to Bruno Schoch, not passed.

That the unification of the two German states provoked both fears and, above all, far-reaching expectations from the Eastern point of view, is explained by Alexander Kokeev. He describes the complex relationship between Bonn and Moscow in the forty years since the end of the Second World War. He also emphasises the central role played by the Federal Republic during the period of detente, and the latter's efforts to achieve East&West understanding during the often tense eighties. This prepared the way for the ultimate consent of the Soviet Union to German unification, after a series of half-hearted and inconsistent attempts to slow down the process, and to its consent on conditions that largely coincided with Bonn's wishes. It also gave rise to the notion that Germany was predestined for the task of bridge-laying between East and West, though this is an expectation that can be fulfilled only when the necessary political and economic preconditions have been satisfied on the Russian side.

The bridge-picture, with its insinuation of a special mission for Germany in Europe, and against the background of the special ways Germany has followed during history, has met with many reservations, particularly in the West. Nevertheless, there is probably no question that, in the long term, a pan-European order will survive only if the two halves of Europe move closer together, if there is political and economic realignment, and if the two halves are finally united under a common roof. As an important central European country, Germany undoubtedly plays a very prominent role in this process, but an even more prominent role is played by the European Community, as explained by Vladimir Zuev in his contribution. The EC is not only an object of desire for the eastern half of the continent, in line with Vaclav Havel's formula about a 'return to Europe'; it is also the nucleus on which the new Europe is to be built. Moreover, the Community represents an example of a new pattern of international relations, as well as a model of a new economic, social, and political organization-a model that could probably open the way for overcoming the problems being generated by the current preponderance of nation-states.

However, at the present time neither the EC nor the states of eastern Europe are sufficiently well prepared to do justice to this kind of once-in-a-century mission. By according priority to a deepening of integration rather than to a possible extension, the Community has signalled that its efforts continue to be directed primarily inward. Nor is it clear when the desired membership will be granted to the reforming states of the east: the EC's priorities in this regard lie primarily with the EFTA countries. However, the further integration advances, the greater become the barriers for new members: even now there are considerable reservations in eastern Europe about renouncing recently secured sovereignty in favour of inclusion in a powerful supranational organization.

For the foreseeable future, therefore, the former socialist countries will remain 'at the gates', and will continue to be dependent on outside help in their efforts to bring about the transformation of their economic and social systems. This situation has given a new

boost to ideas about these countries' creating their own system of regional integration. Why COMECON, dissolved in mid-1991 after a series of vain attempts at reform, was not a suitable basis for such a system, is explained by Alexander Nekipelov. As an alternative model of international socialist economic relations, it not only laboured under the systematic defects of the planned economies-it actually increased them. Because of the systematic problems with price-fixing, multilateral payment, and mutual co-ordination of planning, it was never possible, within the framework of COMECON, to exploit the advantages of the international division of labour. Despite the obvious defects, a relatively well-developed network of reciprocal supply-links did establish itself within COMECON. Just how important these links were, however, became painfully obvious when, in 1991, in the wake of unilateral measures by its members, the organization went under, along with trade in eastern Europe. The collapse of commerce between the former socialist countries placed another considerable burden on their efforts to bring about transformation. The tasks that must be tackled in this area are discussed in the last two contributions-by Pavel Kandel, who deals with the political and social aspects, and by Hans-Joachim Spanger, who looks at the economic reforms that have already been introduced. Although the goal of the 1989 revolutions-namely the overcoming of the totalitarian order and the creation of pluralist societies based on individual competition-is not really in doubt at the moment, obstacles which cannot be ignored are piling up on the path that leads to it.The first two years of the new age have shown that insitutional reforms in politics and the economy are scarcely adequate, and that what is really needed is a radical change that reaches right down into individual behavioural attitudes. Given the burden of the socialist legacy, given various historical factors that reach back further than this, and given the profound economic depression, the conditions for such a change are extremely poor. Internal fragmentation, bringing a growth in populism and nationalism; the adoption of hostile stances in external relations, with the risk this brings of a balkanization of the region; and the paralyzing co-existence of Manchester-style capitalism on the one hand, and bureaucratic immobility on the other-these are all clear warning signals. Without comprehensive western support-this much

should at least have become clear-the transformation will not succeed. And this support is all the more urgent in that the future of the whole continent will be decided in eastern Europe.

Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann

Theme III: Security: Its New Dimensions

Beyond military issues. Democracy and the effects of solidarity

With this theme as well, it should also be noted that the reorientation of the German population with regard to the question of whether American troops should continue to be stationed in Germany did not begin following the collapse of the Soviet Union, but rather, the trend began much earlier, in 1987, shortly after Gorbachev took office and introduced the concepts of *glasnost* and *perestroika*.

SHOULD THE AMERICANS WITHDRAW FROM EUROPE?

Table 1
Federal Republic of Germany
Population 16 and over

QUESTION: "If you read in the paper tomorrow that the Americans are withdrawing their troops from Europe, would you welcome this or regret it?"

West Germany	Welcome %	Regret %	Undecided %	%
July 1956	51	22	27	= 100
January 1957	34	33	33	= 100
December 1957	34	34	32	= 100
June 1962	12	59	29	= 100
April 1969	17	56	27	= 100
May 1970	22	51	27	= 100
May/June 1973	23	45	32	= 100
June 1976	15	54	31	= 100
August 1978	17	57	26	= 100
August/September 1979	11	60	29	= 100
September/October 1981	17	59	24	= 100
October 1982	21	55	24	= 100
June 1983	17	52	31	= 100
March/April 1987	34	32	34	= 100
September 1987	32	38	30	= 100
July 1988	36	34	30	= 100
December 1988	33	33	34	= 100
July 1989	38	30	32	= 100
March 1990	49	22	29	= 100
June/July 1990	52	23	25	= 100
December 1991	43	29	28	= 100
March 1992	42	23	35	= 100
East Germany				
December 1991	76	5	19	= 100
March 1992	71	5	24	= 100

SOURCE: Allensbach Archives, IfD Surveys 096, 1003, 1014, 1065, 2051, 2063/II, 2095, 3030/II, 3059, 3073, 4000, 4015, 4028, 4088, 4093/II, 5007, 5015, 5022, 5032, 5037, 5059, 5062

But at the same time, findings show that a large segment of the German population continues to support the existence of NATO.

Of course, the so-called "East German factor" also surfaces in this area. There is considerably greater support for NATO in West Germany than in East Germany, although a majority of the East German population does support the continued existence of NATO.

MEMBERSHIP IN NATO STILL NECESSARY FOR GERMANY'S SECURITY

Table 2
Federal Republic of Germany
Population 16 and over

QUESTION: "Do you think that membership in NATO is still important for the security of our country today, or is it no longer important for our national security, or was it never important?"

West Germany	Sept. 1983	June 1987	May/ June 1988	Oct. 1989	Nov. 1991
	%	%	%	%	%
Still important today	70	66	69	65	63
No longer important	11	15	13	18	19
Never was important	4	4	5	3	4
Don't know	15	15	13	14	14
	100	100	100	100	100

East Germany	Nov. 1991
	%
Still important today	42
No longer important	32
Never was important	6
Don't know	20
	100

SOURCE: Allensbach Archives, IfD Surveys 4033, 4092, 5005, 5026, 5057

Theme III/5

After two major military defeats, the Germans have a fundamentally disturbed relationship towards the entire area of defence, the entire military, insofar as the use of weapons is involved.

Table 3
Population 18 and over

QUESTION: "Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?"

	West Germany	Belgium	France	Great Britain	Northern Ireland	Republic of Ireland	Italy	Netherlands	Portugal	Spain
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Yes	31	33	53	68	55	54	25	60	58	43
No	44	47	28	23	35	35	54	28	27	32
Don't know	25	20	19	9	10	11	21	12	15	25
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
n =	2101	2792	1002	1484	304	1000	2018	1017	1185	2637

SOURCE: European Values Study 1990

In a number of studies, the British political scientist Richard Rose found that the psychological after-effects of a lost war can linger on for more than a hundred years.[1]

These reactions are strongest among the young generation in Germany, particularly among the supporters of the Greens.

[1]Rose, Richard, National Pride: Cross-National Surveys (Studies in Public Policy No. 136). Center for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow 1984, p. 20).

Table 4
West Germany
Population under 30

QUESTION: "Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?"

	Voters, under 30, of the -	
	Greens	other parties
	%	%
Yes	12	34
No	64	43
Don't know	24	23
	100	100
n =	66	338

SOURCE: European Values Study 1990

For this reason, young men who do alternative service in Germany are viewed with greater respect today than those who do military service.

Table 5
Federal Republic of Germany
Population 16 and over

QUESTION: "In general, who do you think renders a more valuable service to society: a young man who serves as a soldier in the armed forces or someone who does alternative service, for example in a nursing or retirement home?"

	West Germany			
	1981	1988	1990	1991
	%	%	%	%
Someone who serves in the armed forces	24	19	10	8
Someone who does alternative service	23	36	48	45
Both the same	46	40	39	45
Undecided	7	5	3	2
	100	100	100	100

	East Germany
	1991
	%
Someone who serves in the armed forces	6
Someone who does alternative service	51
Both the same	40
Undecided	3
	100

SOURCE: Allensbach Archives, IfD Surveys 3098, 5009, 5041/I, 5055

However, there are three important points where it would be possible to gain support for security among the young generation in Germany:

1. The high level of support for NATO, which is found among the young generation as well.

2. The willingness to do armed military service within the framework of a multinational military unit, for example, German-French troops.

3. A very high degree of willingness to show solidarity, to participate in worldwide actions in emergency or catastrophe situations.

Joop Veen
director of The Dutch Advisory Council on Peace and Security

The problems of "interlocking"
Theme III: the new dimensions of security

How nice would it have been to write an academic paper about the so-called interlocking institutions: the Council of Europe, the European Community, NATO, WEU and the CSCE. The Council of Europe as the ticket of entrance to the civilised Europe, the European Community as the economic and political core institution of Europe, NATO as the bedrock of stability, the WEU as the expression of a European defense identity (whatever that is) and CSCE to have a paneuropean security structure to give all nations the idea that they are belong to something. When a potential threat to the peace could not be dealt with by one institution, another would step in and solve the problem. There would be no black hole and by mutual cooperation these institutions would ensure that Europe would not fall into its prewar reflex of solving conflicts by using violence.

However, the black hole in Yugoslavia could not be solved by this network of interlocking institutions and after much bloodshed the United Nations had to step in with its traditional recipe of peacekeeping as far as the parties will allow for. In spite of all the talk about the European Union on its way towards a common security and defense policy, it was the United States which was taking the lead in the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on Serbia and not Europe.

What conclusions can be drawn from this sad picture? Did the Yugoslav crisis came to early for the institutions which have still to learn what exactly interlocking is or do we have to accept the fact that these kind of ethnic conflicts outside the borders of the "zone of stability" in Europe cannot be avoided nor can they be solved by outside involvement?

In my view it is not a question of lack of institutions, but a lack of political will. Political will to act and to act decisively at the moment a conflict can still be prevented. The UN Charter, on which regional security structures in the post Cold War world should be based, offers the UN Security Council the possibility already to act, if necessary against the will of parties involved, if there is "a threat to the peace". At the moment the UN Security Council declares a situation a threat to the peace, enforcement action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter becomes possible. It could be sanctions but it could also be preventive military action. Preventive military action to raise the threshold for starting a war between parties which have differences of opinion.

Of course there are a number of difficulties involved in implementing this concept. First of all the Security Council will always make a political judgement on what constitutes a threat to the peace and what not. This raises questions about the composition of this body and especially its permanent members with their right to veto any decision at any moment. Secondly, even if a threat to the peace is identified, it is not always easy to determine who is the aggressor. The clear-cut case of the aggression

against Kuwait was perhaps an exemption to the rule. In European conflicts things are likely to be more complicated. For example are the Serbs really the only party guilty of what happens in Yugoslavia?

Still, with all of the difficulties involved the concept of preventive enforcement action is a concept which must be used much more than it has been in the past. It is written into the UN Charter and it only takes political will to implement it. Why is it not possible to declare the present situation in Kosovo a threat to the peace and decide upon preventive military action ? It would be a disgrace if the refusal of Libya to hand over the Lockerbie terrorists can be defined a threat to the peace, opening the way to enforcement action (sanctions) and much more serious threats to the peace would be disregarded.

In the final declaration of the ongoing CSCE Helsinki meeting the CSCE will probably declare itself a regional arrangement in conformity with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. This means that for any enforcement action the CSCE would decide upon in the future (if a more limited decisionmaking procedure in CSCE would be realized), the approval of the UN Security Council would be needed.

Perhaps it takes a lot of fantasy, but would it be possible to think of a CSCE deciding upon preventive (military) action, authorized by the UN Security Council and executed by NATO? No doubt there are a lot of questions to be answered first before we know whether or not it is wise to go in this direction.

Is it wise to make ourselves in Europe dependent on a UN body in which a undemocratic and non-European country like China can block any decision ? Will the CSCE ever decide upon enforcement action to prevent conflicts ? Last but not least, will NATO or WEU ever undertake military enforcement action outside its treaty area?

I don't know the answers to these questions. What I do know is the present institutional "interlocking" is a dead-end street from the perspective of the average citizen of Sarajevo.

It will take time for the existing institutions to shift from intervention after a conflict has taken place to preventive intervention. One must also acknowledge that Europe is a rich continent, but time is what it not seems to have. However, the alternative is continuing the academic debate on interlocking institutions and closing our eyes for what happens in the real world.


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Bengt Mollstedt
President CLRAE

(28)

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen!

The United States of America, Canada and the Council of Europe have many values in common. We all work for democracy in our different parts of the world but also for prosperity and a high quality of life for our citizens. A tool to reach such goals is co-operation and solidarity within our continents and between our people.

Since I represent democratically elected local and regional Europeans, it is important to mention that the "cradle of democracy is in the village square". The essence of democracy is demonstrated when free and equal men and women meet at the town-meeting in Concord Mass or at the city square in the Canton Inner Appenzell in Switzerland.

Arthur Schlesinger has in a recent book illustrated how the U.S. faces more "pluribus" than "unum". The traditional united English-speaking culture meets with a pluralistic culture of Asian immigrants in the West and Spanish-speaking immigrants in the South-East.

This pluralistic America resembles the multicultural Europe where we face a regionalsm. The traditional nations are squeezed between supernational international organizations and very strong regions. The German "Länder", the semiindependent Spanish provinces like Catalonia are growing more and more important. The economical growth in Europe is also to a great extent dependent on regional "motors" like Lombardy and other prosperous regions. In other parts of Europe, cultural differences will influence regionalism as in Belgium. There is a tendency in Scandinavia to form larger regions than the traditional small counties, all in order to be able to take part in the European economy in a more competitve way.

Today we meet to exchange ideas, opinions and solutions to problems. Let us be positive and optimistic and choose the good examples. We have all witnessed on television the problems in Los Angeles. We are all aware of the "crack" problem, "hooliganism" and violence. Let us also remember that those problems are big-city problems.

There is also the situation in the small towns of Plymouth and Concord, Uppsala and Lillehammar, Halifax or San Carlos, CA or Heidelberg and Volterra. There must be examples to find in such places as well. Not that everything is spotless in small towns, even in Europe we have seen "Twin Peaks" on television.

Mr. President! Let us find the good examples on this conference and let us be constructive.

Given the high degree of decentralisation in American political and civic life and the existence of reputable and representative national agencies for municipalities, the scope for fruitful co-operation with a European assembly of cities and regions is clearly extensive.

The Standing Conference, where I am President, has already regognized this through the organisation over recent years of a number of joint initiatives with American mayors. Some examples have been conferences in Indianapolis, at the invitation of its Mayor, Bill Hudnut, on different aspects of city

development and, particularly, the economic regeneration of declining industrial cities, often through environmental improvement and social and cultural development.

Reciprocally, delegations of U.S. mayors have attended conferences organized by the CLRAE on different aspects of city development and urban design, a tradition established since the European Campaign for Urban Renaissance in the early 1980s where, at the closing conference in Berlin, a major American delegation was present.

Another area where American and European problems and experience coincide is the unfortunate one of high levels of crime and urban delinquency. The CLRAE was strongly involved in the Conference in Montreal on urban safety and crime prevention, alongside the conference of Mayors and the Federation of Canadian Municipalities.

We have established latterly strong contacts with the U.S. Conference of Mayors and the National League of Cities, as a result of which the political will, to build upon such examples of initial contact, has been firmly expressed on both sides.

The Council of Europe faces, however, another important problem, that of technical educational and emotional aid to the growing democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. Even in this field I see a need for supporting co-operation with our friends from over sea.

I look forward therefore to an exchange of information and experience between the CLRAE and North American counterparts on a wide range of mutually significant problems. I would suggest, furthermore, that some of the initiatives in relation to cities in Central and Eastern Europe, channelled by the Agency for International Development and other federal agencies in Washington, through U.S. associations of municipalities, could be dovetailed with programmes to be launched by the CLRAE in support of cities in such parts of Europe. Why not, for example, some American civic leaders and experts amongst the teams of European experts put together by the CLRAE?

Finally, let me say I have a professional background in infections diseases and quarantine matters. I can tell you there is nothing as contagious as "pessimism", therefore during the bad economic times we live in today, keep up your optimism and let us be constructive in our work today.




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(29)

UKRAINE - RUSSIA: CONFLICTS IS THE WEST RESPONSIBLE?

It is clear to most leading people in the two countries, but also in the outside world, that further sharpening of conflicts between Ukraine and Russia would have very serious economic and political consequences for both countries in question, and an open conflict would lead to a dramatic situation which might effect not only all of Eastern Europe, but all of Europe and much of the rest of the world.

Some of the reasons for conflict relations are obvious. It is psychologically difficult for some of the Russian population and its political elite to accept the fact that Ukraine is becoming truly independent. For too long, Ukraine has been part of the Russian Empire and there are some linguistic and cultural affinities which make many Russians feel that Ukraine and Russia belong together. From the Ukrainian side, the very fact that there is reluctance on the part of Russia to let go of Ukraine hightens the assertiveness of independence and sensitivity about the issue of borders etc. There are also economic reasons. Ukraine, unlike some other republics, is a big country with big agricultural output and broad industrial output. The two economies have been very closely interlinked.

There is another very specific cause of friction to which the outside world has contributed, though probably inadvertently. Immediately after the break-up of the Soviet Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States was established through agreements of all parties. The agreements stipulate that all republics are successor states of the former Soviet Union, except for two elements, Russia assuming the place of the Soviet Union in the United Nations, and the seat on the Security Council. Being successor state meant that the republics divide up the burdens, responsibilities or more specifically, as they have agreed to under some Western pressure, foreign debts, but also all common assets, i.e. all the assets of the former Soviet Union. While Russia signed the treaties and agreed to share the foreign debts, it thus far has not been willing to share the assets. It simply decided that all the Soviet embassies would become Russian embassies, the Soviet banks abroad would become Russian banks, and the Navy should become the Russian Navy. Immediately after this decision and given the fact that the embassies have been staffed in all key positions by Russians, the Russian flag went up, and the outside world has not raised any objection to this. The republics are left without any foreign assets and clearly without any buildings in which to set up their embassies. Ukraine is thus in the following position. Its independence has been recognized by over one hundred countries, most of which wish to establish diplomatic relations, but Ukraine has no facilities in which to locate their embassies abroad and house their personnel, and really has no foreign exchange with which to purchase properties.

While Russia basically does not deny the principle of having to share the assets, in reality it does not want to deal with the issue. The discussion of this matter is postponed from one CIS meeting to another. This also was one of the reasons for the dispute about the Black Sea Fleet, since it is not just a question of having a fleet to defend the sovereignty of a country, but part of the fleet could be sold for substantial sums and in line with international agreements. In fact, some of the fleet's ships have already been sold, but by Russians.

In view of the above, it would seem that one way of helping to establish friendlier relations between Ukraine and Russia, to stop this downward spiral of trade between the two and stabilize that whole area would be to put this item on the agenda of G7, to raise it in other capitals and international conferences in order to force the settling of the question of sharing of the assets and meanwhile ascertaining that in the respective countries around the world, the assets of the former Soviet Union should be considered as belonging to the republics and should not be allowed to change their status until agreement on their division has been reached.

B. Hawrylyshyn

B. Hawrylyshyn
CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF ADVISORS, PARLIAMENT OF UKRAINE

June 20, 1992 BH/dw


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VERS UN NOUVEL ORDRE MONDIAL DEMOCRATIQUE

PAR LES COMMUNAUTES REGIONALES.

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INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION
FOR THE FUTURE OF HUMANITY
(I.A.F.H.)

ASSOCIATION POUR L'ETUDE
DE L'UNION EUROPEENNE
(A.F.E.U.R.)

CENTRE ROBERT SCHUMAN
POUR L'EUROPE
(C.R.S.E.)

INSTITUT ROBERT SCHUMAN
POUR L'EUROPE
(I.R.S.E.)

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"La Communauté Européenne préfigure les solidarités universelles de l'avenir."

Robert Schuman

"La Communauté Européenne elle-même n'est qu'une étape vers les formes d'organisation du monde de demain."

Jean Monnet

1992 began with fifteen heads of state and of government sitting together on the UN Security Council. Each one of them represented a single country. In 1995, the Security Council will celebrate its fiftieth birthday. Is it conceivable that by then, it could be made up of representatives of fifteen or so regional communities covering the whole planet?

Within any regional community, every country, even the smallest, can help to determine the common political will. This means that fifteen or twenty regional communities would be capable of producing a genuinely representative consensus of the political will of all the world's peoples.

What is represented at the United Nations today is not people, but power. If we were to change from nation-state-based representation to representation based on communities of nations, we could get away from power-based relations between states in favour of practical cooperation between peoples.

The world cannot remain forever in the hands of the victors of the Second World War or the so-called richest nations in world affairs a balance needs to be struck to allow decisions to take effective account of the essential interests of all peoples and of humanity as a whole, whether the subject is economics, politics, the environment, the media or security. Unless we set about creating such a balance, the former East-West conflict how happily in the process of being resolved is likely to be replaced by a far more serious North-South conflict, complete with new nuclear threats.

Regional communities of nations are already being organized: not only the European Community, but ASEAN, Central America, CARICOM, MERCOSUR, Gulf Cooperation Council, UMA, Eastern, Southern, Central and Western Africa and, most recently of all, the CIS. But, as the EC felt at Maastricht, the time has surely come for these communities to go beyond mere economic integration, in itself a long and frequently painful process, and achieve a minimal degree of political union, which would allow them to play a part in rebalancing the world's power structures.

With a view to studying the prospects for such a development, we have pleasure in inviting you, on behalf of the organizations we represent, to attend an informal meeting on the premises of the European Parliament in Paris, at 288 Boulevard St. Germain, on 9 (starting at 3 p.m.), 10 and 11 October 1992.

The main working languages will be French and English, in which simultaneous translation will be provided. Other languages will be used as interpretation options allow.

Yours sincerely,

Sadananda MISRA
I.A.H.F.

Robert TOULEMON
A.F.E.U.R.

Bernard ZAMARON
C.R.S.E.

Hans-Albrecht SCHWARZ-LIEBERMAN
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
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(31)

AMERICAN INTERESTS IN EUROPE IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

By Kim R. Holmes
Vice President and Director,
Foreign Policy and Defense Studies
The Heritage Foundation

For over forty years America and Western Europe were partners in containing Soviet expansionism and promoting the Western values of democracy and freedom. With the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, this partnership will change, not only because the common enemy has disappeared, but because the character of Europe as a whole has changed. No longer will the free part of Europe be so dependent on the United States; and no longer will America wield such influence in Europe. America and Europe will still share Western values and many common interests, but the close cooperation of the past forty-five years, which was born of the necessity of the Cold War, may be a thing of the past.

These changes will certainly produce new tensions between Europe and America. Lacking the need to stand together against a common enemy, these two giants will find previously minor differences magnified in importance. Differences over policies in the Middle East and other regions, for instance, which have always existed, will take on added importance. And disagreements over trade and economic policies will gain ground as major

driving forces in the relations between the two continents. In fact, the most important question facing U.S.-European relations today is the extent to which Europe's industrial and trade policies are protectionist. If Europe becomes more protectionist, the U.S. will develop free trade relations with Asia, Latin America and other regions of the world, downgrading U.S.-European economic relations in the process.

To be sure, Europe and America will continue to share common values, security interests in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere, and a common interest in worldwide economic growth. The continued existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, albeit in a weakened form, and other multilateral organizations in Europe will somewhat attenuate political and economic differences and prevent them, in most cases, from developing into outright hostility. So, too, will the many private business and trade ties that blur the boundaries of nations and weaken the ability of governments to manipulate their economies for political purposes. But America and Europe will not have as close a relationship as it enjoyed over the past forty-five years.

AMERICAN INTERESTS IN EUROPE

This is not an unwelcome development. It is in America's interests that Europe take more responsibility for its own

affairs. America's interests in Europe are relatively simple and straightforward--and a more distant relationship (stopping short, of course, of complete disengagement) may actually help protect those interests (or at the very least not damage them). These interests are: 1) to prevent the domination of Europe by a hostile power or bloc of powers that could turn the vast resources of the continent against the U.S.; 2) open markets and free trade; and 3) the spread of Western style democratic and free market institutions into Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Preventing the hostile domination of Europe. The first interest in the balance of power can be ensured so long as the U.S. remains involved in NATO. Washington need not intervene in every European conflict, or take upon itself the task of providing intra-European stability. However, it should protect Europe from outside hostile powers (such as from Russia, if it should become one), or from intra-European threats that endanger the independence and democratic institutions of Europe as a whole. Thus, America's involvement in NATO will serve as an insurance policy against some future strategic threat. American military forces will probably not exceed 100,000 troops by the end of the decade, and NATO will not be nearly as important as before in coordinating security policies of its member states, but it should continue to exist as the principal organization for maintaining American military involvement in Europe.

Europe can and should develop its own security identity and perhaps its own security organization, whether it be through the European Community or the West European Union. It is fitting that these organizations take the lead in providing regional, as opposed to strategic security, for Europe (strategic security, or protection from major strategic threats, however, should be the job of NATO). After all, regional instabilities, such as those currently in Yugoslavia, affect the security of Europe far more directly than the security of the United States. A "Europeanized" security structure for Europe would certainly produce closer cooperation between European countries, but it would not necessarily end up in creating a common European foreign policy. Europe and America did not have common foreign policies as a result of NATO; neither would Europe necessarily evolve a common foreign policy under a European defense organization that parallels NATO.

Free trade. Another U.S. interest in Europe is free trade. The further consolidation of the European Community could pose an economic threat to the United States, in the form of protectionism. The General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs negotiations are going poorly. The U.S. is negotiating free trade area agreements with Mexico and Chile, which should lead to other free trade agreements with Latin American countries, partly because Washington wants an insurance policy against the failure of GATT and the protectionism of Europe and Japan.

Moreover, as the EC expands into Eastern Europe, trade and economic relations between Europe and the United States could worsen. As former Warsaw Pact countries in East and Central Europe join the EC, they will be forced to adopt the exclusionary trade practices and economic policies of the EC. This will put Hungary, Poland and other countries joining the EC at odds with the U.S. in GATT. And as new East European countries join the EC, they will adopt the Community's tax and monetary policies, which will create tensions with Washington over fiscal policies and interest rates.

These tensions need not lead to trade wars. But they could lead to the U.S. relying more and more on bilateral trade agreements with Latin American and Asian countries to offset the consolidation of Europe into a EC-type, exclusionary free trade zone. An example of the EC's harmful protectionist policies was Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia's membership drive. The EC forced a raise in tariffs, as a precursor to membership, thus hurting their fragile economies in the world market.

Democratic and free market institutions. No region of Europe is unaffected by the sweeping economic changes now underway. Western Europe must help ensure that the countries of Eastern Europe and the republics of the former Soviet Union make the transition to free market economies and democratic institutions. This not only will expand markets for European

goods and services, but would advance Europe's strategic interest

in stabilizing the new democratic governments in the Eastern European and Eurasian areas while integrating these states into the West.

To ~~cooperate between the U.S. and Europe to~~ combat protectionism and to bring free markets and free trade to all of Europe, the U.S. should:

* Continue to use GATT as the main forum for liberalizing global trade, targeting EC agricultural subsidies and trade restrictions on farm commodities.

* Expand free trade agreements with other countries and encourage Europe to do likewise.

* Negotiate free trade agreements with East European countries that have embarked on free market reforms.

* Begin laying the foundation for free trade agreements with the European republics of the former Soviet Union.

* Negotiate free trade agreements with other non-EC European countries, particularly Turkey, Iceland and Switzerland.

* Develop with Britain, Germany and Russia separate bilateral relations irrespective of European unity results.

* Ultimately, negotiate an American-EC Free Trade Agreement.

In promoting free markets in Europe, the economies of the

new democracies of Eastern Europe will be bolstered, helping to integrate all areas of Europe into the West. Protectionism and bureaucratic schlerosis within a closed EC will only lead to long-term economic stagnation and eventual decline. America's prosperity--and even more so, Europe's success--will be advanced by the emergence of a whole Europe with markets open to the world, representative governments and economies fully integrated into the West.

Western Europe and the EC should not keep the Eastern Europeans and Russians at arms length, but instead draw them in to a family of free and democratic nations. It is a mistake to think that Europe ends at the Oder River, when it really extends to the Urals and beyond. The Council of Europe has a unique role in that it is the only institution which will allow these countries to become a part of Europe.

Regional interests. America should not be a passive observer in Europe's economic and democratic revolution. Instead, America must pursue a strategy to advance economic and strategic interests in an open and expanding European economy. If the EC refuses to stop it's protectionist trend, the U.S. may be forced to build a free trade area of its own so powerful that the EC will find itself on the outside looking in, and have no choice but to open its borders or risk permanent "second class" economic status.

America's interests in Central Europe are that countries of the region integrate as quickly as possible into a whole, free and prosperous Europe of free markets and democratic institutions. It is also in the interest of the U.S. that Eastern European countries are integrated into a European security framework of some kind; and that ethnic and national disputes do not spread, creating regional instabilities that threaten the security of Europe as a whole.

In the Baltics, it is in America's interest that all ex-Soviet troops leave as soon as possible and the independence and security of borders are secured. The U.S. supports the opening of free markets and free trade there as well. Democratic baltic states should also be allowed to form closer associations with Europe, either with the Scandinavian states, or with the EC, or both.

EC ramifications for the U.S. Aspirations for a single European foreign policy will most likely be illusive and unrealistic. The history of Europe elucidates the differences of foreign policy objectives and aspirations within Europe. It is unlikely that a solidified, monolithic foreign policy, therefore, will emerge in Europe.

A more pragmatic approach would be to recognize Europe's policy and cultural variances and not to allow European

integration to destroy the sovereignty of national foreign policy decision-making. U.S. interests in Europe's foreign policy are focused on the protection against a hostile power, the peaceful transformation of ex-Soviet states, the halting of nuclear proliferation, the opening of markets to free trade, the continued interaction with the U.S. and the peaceful solution to internal European disputes. However, a mutual effort by the U.S. and Europe to form a partnership that promotes free trade, a strong NATO alliance and mutual Western values can benefit both sides of the Atlantic.

Walter RAYMOND Jr.
United States Information Agency, Washington D.C.

(32)

The East and Central European Challenge

The West has been presented with a direct challenge by political change in East and Central Europe. After almost a half century of communism, we have an opportunity to help our colleagues in the East build a democratic pluralistic society. While drawing on many of the core beliefs that lie at the basis of American and West European societies, the peoples of East and Central Europe will need to adapt and design programs which are consistent with their needs, traditions and history.

There are critical bases to democracy which are at the heart of what America stands for but they are not unique: Our colleagues in the Council of Europe share the same basic values. We in the United States start with basic rights--human and civil rights--which we believe are inalienable to citizens in a democratic society. These include the freedom of speech, expression and of the press, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, the right to equal protection under law and the right to private property. To insure these rights we have promulgated a constitution which has confirmed these rights and clarified the relationships--with appropriate checks and balances--among the executive, legislative and judicial arms of democratic governance.

These elements of a democratic polity represent the key programmatic features we (and the COE) have been sharing with our friends from East and Central Europe. While the desire for freedom is innate, the practice of democracy must be learned. Democracy flourishes when tended by citizens willing to use their hard-won freedom to participate in the life of their society. And this concept of participatory democracy is very much an acquired skill.

Basic programs have been developed to strengthen parliamentary practice principally by exchanges whereby East and Central European parliamentarians and staffs have met with West European parliaments, the United States Congress and the Council of Europe to study, train, discuss and observe Western parliamentary process. These contacts have also served as the basis for assistance in drafting critical pieces of basic legislation designed to insure the underpinnings of democracy.

Programs are underway to strengthen the executive branch but they are less developed as there has been ambiguity on both sides as to how to deal with nomenklatura holdovers in the executive bureaucracy. Specific technical assistance has been particularly important when directed to "how to" support for dealing with specific critical policy issues, such as in the areas of economic reform, including privatization and the establishment of banks. Vital assistance has been provided to one or more countries in the training of local government officials.

The judiciary needs to be thoroughly overhauled. Indigenous legal

systems have to be developed so that the court system is available to the people as a process which protects human rights as well as maintains civil order rather than as an uncontrolled extension of state power. The Council of Europe with its European Convention on Human Rights has played a leadership role in establishing standards and guidelines in the field of human rights and the legal protection of the individual. The fact that there are conceptual differences between the US common law system and the continental civil law system, based in varying degrees on the Napoleonic Code, means that there will be some diversity in approach by Americans and their counterparts in the Council. This diversity can add to richness of the assistance. There has been ongoing discussion, in several fora, between US specialists and the COE on rule of law issues. A broad array of programs to help East and Central Europe sponsored by the US and the Council are underway. These programs start with constitutional drafting, but include internships, seminars and training of judges and lawyers as well as technical assistance to revamp and thus establish the independence of the judiciary.

Three additional imperatives are critical to the democratic process. First, a democratic and independent media is an essential building block for a free and open society. Independent media keeps the people informed and an informed citizenry is vital to a democratic and pluralistic society. In today's world this includes print, radio and television. The response by the leaders of East and Central Europe, even in those countries where democracy has its strongest roots, has been very mixed. Few countries have approved national media laws which would provide the basis for protecting writers and editors as well as provide the legal basis for the establishment of independent media. There is also a very important need for training of journalists as well as instruction in how independent media can succeed in a free market place. At the just concluded Helsinki CSCE meeting plans were discussed for a Free Media seminar which could be jointly sponsored by the US, the Council of Europe and the European Commission for Democracy through Law. This is a good step forward. Much still needs to be done.

A second imperative is to strengthen the educational system. This requires a multifaceted approach. At the university level particular attention must be given to curriculum development, enhanced instruction and academic administration. The needs are greatest in the social science fields, including political science, history, law, philosophy, sociology, economics and business management. These sectors were all highly politicized under the former communist regimes. At the same time, attention must be directed to assisting in academic renovation at the secondary school level. Lastly, adult or continuing education is vital if a serious effort is to be made to bring the older portions of the population into the democratic process. A key feature in both secondary school and adult education is the need to include civic education which is vital for citizens to understand what their rights and responsibilities are in a democracy. Such programs are consistent with American programs to help East and Central Europe

and appear to track with Council of Europe's "Demosthemes Program" although I believe we have both tended to focus our programs at the university level and we should expand our focus to a broader slice of the population.

A third critical area is the role of a free market and the concomitant need for the establishment of the appropriate legislative and regulatory basis to give individuals the ability and incentive to engage in private business activity. Market economies may be practical, but they also rest upon the fundamental principle of individual freedom: freedom as a consumer to choose among competing products and services; freedom as a producer to start or expand a business and share its risks and rewards; freedom as a worker to choose a job or career, join a labor union or change employers. It is this assertion of freedom, of risk and opportunity, which joins together modern market economies and political democracy. The American program of support has energetically sought to help the establishment of a market economy.

Many other features make up a civil society which is the basis for democracy. The key is to recognize that we are engaged in a long protracted process to create such societies. There is a tendency in some circles to turn almost exclusively to economic assistance as panacea for the ills of the East. This would be a mistake. In dollar terms, it is anticipated and desirable that more dollars be committed to economic restructuring. But, robust programming, much of which is labor intensive and comparatively low cost, must be sustained to build the political institutions of democracy.

The Council of Europe and the United States can work energetically on parallel (and sometimes joint) tracks to help in the evolution of civil society in East and Central Europe. Because of the COE's special dedication to programs affecting civil society there is a natural partnership in democracy building. The Council has played a unique leadership role in convoking three worldwide conferences on democracy building (1983, 1987 and 1991) as well as facilitating in the creation of the International Institute for Democracy. The Council should certainly be urged to continue its East and Central European programs, particularly the Demosthenes initiative. Greater collaboration with parallel American programs would appear practicable and the proposed establishment of COE information centers in East Europe should help such cooperation.

There are several areas that have not received adequate attention to date, but represent fields for future work and potentially fruitful collaboration. For purposes of discussion I will isolate three topics:

--Programs need to be developed to democratize those elements of society which were used by the communist authorities as their instruments of power and which Westerners tend to stay away from because they were instruments for coercion and viewed as hostile. Some of these sectors, however, must exist in a democratic society and must be renovated so that they can serve as an vehicle for not

against the process of democratic governance. Specifically included are the police, the security organs of state power, the military and the professional bureaucracy. In too many instances in East and Central Europe the top leadership has changed but the structures remain generally in tact. Very little effort has been undertaken to retrain and democratize the institutions and staffs. Among other things, major programs for public administration and job retraining are essential.

--Much more needs to be done in the area of local government training. In this area, both the US and the Council of Europe, through its "Standing Committee on Local and Regional Authorities in Europe" (CLRAE), are on the right track. It is critical that these programs be expanded to each country in the region as soon as open and honest local elections have taken place and democratic partners have been selected. A particularly acute need is in Rumania where the local elections in March resulted in the election of a number of democratic mayors. The lack of trained staff personnel, not to mention their own unfamiliarity with their job, plus the shortage of resources makes this experiment in democracy very difficult in Rumania. Failure by these democrats could impact on future Rumanian elections and political directions in that country. Western assistance may prove to be key to their success.

--Civic Education is vital and provides the tools for citizens to participate in a democratic society. The psychological wounds of over 40 years will take time to overcome. Civic education can help through voter education, a delineation of the responsibility of free citizens, a clarification of the role of private and voluntary associations, the meaning of grassroots democracy, the importance of independent media and the understanding of tolerance, compromise and consensus. The full COE membership to partners in East and Central Europe gives the Council special standing in East Europe and an opportunity to include civic education in a number of programs now or planned.

As we plan or work together on democracy building initiatives in East and Central Europe we have learned several lessons which we believe have strengthened our programs. Technical assistance is best if the Western specialist remains for a comparatively long time in the Eastern country. Language skill is always helpful and that has prompted us to look, when practicable, to ethnic Americans who have native language skills. We have tended to deemphasize large group meetings and conferences in favor of smaller working sessions. Our colleagues have been surveyed and subjected to repeated fact-finding missions; they are looking to us to provide practical functional advice and expertise. We have realized that visiting specialists should always leave behind documents summarizing the highpoints of the advice and counsel being discussed. Whenever possible, books, monographs and articles should be made available to deepen the learning or training experience. In many cases we find it is better to work in the East European country where, among other things, more people can be reached. If East and Central Europeans are brought to the West--and there are

often reasons why this is a preferred option--there should be diversity in the programming and it should not just be in Washington or Strasbourg. It is important to avoid the hand of bureaucracy, even if it is our own hand. We are seeking to strengthen pluralistic societies and, as a consequence, we should use our own innate "pluralism". We seek to engage private lawyers, university professors, institutes, corporations, sister cities and a wide variety of private voluntary associations. Further, we recognize the need to think creatively about funding because governments can not and should not be the sole source of funding and possibly should not even be the majority source in this complex labor intensive field of institution building.

In summary, we remain optimistic about the future of East and Central Europe. The best long term assets in the area are the people themselves. They want to succeed and have a greater willingness to sacrifice to achieve democracy then we in the West understand. At the same time they need our help and it is in our best interests from a strategic, economic and moral perspective to provide the assistance necessary to let the East and Central Europeans help themselves.

Walter Raymond, Jr.
Washington, D.C.
15 June 1992

QUO VADIS 2000...?

☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆☆

Poème d'Europe

Paroles de Bernard ZAMARON
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Composition du Poème:
Caux sur Montreux, Vaud, Suisse, Aout 1968
jusqu'à
Kunming, Yunan, Chine, Avril 1992

Composition musicale:
Georgi OUSPENSKI
Odessa, Ukraine, Mars..... 1992

AVERTISSEMENT

Ce poème a été écrit à partir de la pensée, de la vie, et de l'action de personnes réelles.

Ces personnes ont, parmi d'autres, permis à la Grâce d'En Haut d'apporter l'espoir d'un changement sur les deux rives du Rhin.

De là, ce changement peut-il s'étendre aux deux rives du monde... et de l'existence?

REMARQUES

Les lignes parlées sont précédées d'un •. Elles peuvent être parlées sur silence, sur musique, ou en parler rythmé -. La musique ne se limite pas à accompagner le chant mais comprend d'importantes parties symphoniques qui accompagnent la réflexion propre du spectateur/auditeur, sur les thèmes de la foi, de l'amour, de la haine, du pouvoir, de la révolte, de la lumière ... de l'argent

VOIX

IRENE: .....Mezzosoprano

JEHANNE: .....Soprano

LA JEUNE FILLE/
JEUNE INFIRMIÈRE:.....Soprano lèger.

ROBERT L'HOMME D'ETAT: .....Basse/Barython

UNE VOIX:.....Ténor

CHOEURS

+) le compositeur peut augmenter le nombre de lignes parlées ou bien les parler supprimer s'il veut tout chanté.

" La vie est une aventure
vers la lumière ".

Paul Claudel, Paris, 1930
La Rose Blanche, Munich, 1942

PROLOGUE

L'orchestre développe les thèmes principaux (en symphonie) puis le rideau s'ouvre.

1) Vision du Rhin

1 à 3 minutes de scènes filmées (actualités cinématographiques) de la guerre et de l'occupation.

2) Vision du monde

Séparé par les eaux, les peaux et les drapeaux.

1 à 3 minutes de scènes filmées (actualités télévisées) de guerre et de misères dans divers pays, notamment du Monde Sud.

3) Apparaissent successivement dans la lumière: Irène et la jeune fille/Jeune infirmière, immobiles, debout face à face

Jehanne et Robert, l'homme d'Etat, plus au fond, immobiles, debout, face à la salle.

Le Choeur assis ou sur séant, en avant de la scène, groupé en forme de huit horizontal, bien vêtu d'un côté, en haillons de l'autre.

Dans la perspective de la scène un foyer de lumière blanche s'agrandira progressivement en tache diffuse puis à la fin du choeur se brisera.

CHOEUR: *(en thèmes alternativement calmes et tumultueux, se reprenant en crescendo jusqu'à l'éclatement brusque en même temps que le foyer de lumière)*

-SCIENCE
-CONSCIENCE
-SILENCE

-TERRES
-GUERRES
-UNIVERS

-VIVRE (parmi les en haillons)
-IVRES (parmi les bien vêtus)
-SURVIVRE

-PIEUX
-ENVIEUX
-DIEU

CHOEUR

Où donc vas-tu
Monde qui nous angoisse?
Est-ce des coeurs
Que viendra la lumière?

UNE VOIX REFRAIN *(reprise croissante du foyer de lumière)*

Lumière, lumière
de Dieu
sur terre;

Lumière, lumière
de Dieu
Nos frères;

Lumière, lumière
de Dieu
Le Père.

PREMIERE PARTIE

Scène 1

IRENE *entre*

Je haïssais l'Allemagne!
-Sur un grand océan,
-Je voyais son vaisseau
-foncer vers un trou noir.
-Il allait s'engloutir:
-les corps avec les âmes.
-villes comme campagnes
-Il ne resterait rien.
-Nous serions libérés!

JEHANNE *en arrière plan surélevé, écoute et dit:*

Et pourtant les Anglais, je ne haïssais point.
-Je les boutais dehors,
-Ils n'étaient pas chez eux.
-Mais je plaignais leurs morts,
-car ils étaient des miens.
-Tous les hommes en étaient:
-Français et Bourguignons.
-Anglais et Armagnacs;
-tous les hommes en étaient.

IRENE *continuant sa pensée et regardant droit devant elle vers la salle.*

- Il fallait qu'ils périssent, car le mal venait d'eux.
-Nos enfants torturés,
-Nos chaumières rasées.
-Par trois fois l'occupant,
-nous avait pris la vie.

JEHANNE

-Il fallait qu'ils comprissent, que le Bien vient de Dieu.
-Ils ont brûlé mon corps,
-ils ont jugé mon âme.
-Mais Dieu qui est puissant
-a aimé ceux de France,
-et leur donné le coeur
-d'achever le combat.

Intermède musical de 1 à 3 ' passant du combat à la réflexion puis à la surprise.

Scène 2

Il fait nuit. Un poteau indicateur: "RAVENSBRUCK", comme éclairé par les phares d'une voiture.

RENE

-Pourquoi donc suis-je ici?
-Qui me pousse en ce lieu?

-Voici que je trahis!
-J'entends leurs cris affreux.

Elle s'asseoit la tête dans les mains.
Le jour se lève, tranquille, sur un paysage de vie fertile, éventuellement quelques moutons.

RENE

Se peut-il qu'une voix au fond du coeur me parle?
Se peut-il que leurs voix du passé me parviennent?

JEHANNE

Se peut-il qu'une voix dans la douceur me parle ?

Se peut-il que leurs voix des hauts cieux me parviennent?

Apparait à nouveau, dans un paysage assombri, mais avec lumière d'aube, le poteau indicateur "RAVENSBRUCK".

IRENE

-Elles ne crient pas vengeance.
-La profonde souffrance
-A mis dans leur pensée
-Toute l'humanité.
-Leurs fils seront nos fils.
-Mourantes elles ont prié
-pour qu'au delà des ruines,
-comme au-delà des camps,
-ceux qui leur survivront,
-de Dieu soient les enfants.

Elle se lève.

- Il faut aller vers eux.
- Il nous faut continuer.
Le pardon accordé n'est pas oui au passé.
Le pardon demandé n'est pas soumission.

JEHANNE

Le pardon accordé devance le bûcher.
Le pardon demandé, c'est de Dieu la passion.

Irène sort résolue.

Scène 3

Au fond une ville complètement démolie
A mi-plan des femmes, sans visage humain, déblayant des décombres.

IRENE

-J'ai souhaité ce destin
-mon fils torturé,
-mon peuple déporté;
-il fallait que du vôtre aucune âme restât,
-et que toutes vos villes redevinssent poussière.
-Mais est-ce pour cela que nos enfants sont morts?
-est-ce donc pour cela que nos enfants vivront?

-Et nous qu'avons nous fait de notre acier brûlant?

-Si l'un ici meurtrit, l'autre torture ailleurs.
-Qui condamne aujourd'hui, fut l'accusé hier;
-Aucun peuple, de lui n'a trop lieu d'être fier!

-La revanche a toujours réendurci les coeurs:
-Humilité, amour, seuls restaurent la vie
• S'il vous plaît, pardonnez, car je vous ai haïs.

JEHANNE — - S'il vous plaît, pardonnez ; que l'amour soit vainqueur !

Tout bruit cesse: *Silence*

IRENE et JEHANNE

-Il nous faut reconstruire une Europe de frères,
-un monde où les humains ne vivront plus en guerre.

Le fond du paysage change et ce sont des pagodes, des huttes ou des maisons détruites, le rougeoiement d'un incendie et devant, un petit enfant près du corps de sa mère tuée.

Une jeune Vietnamienne, ou Cambodgienne, ou Palestinienne ou Libanaise, ou Afghane, ou Africaine, ou Centre-Américaine, ou... (d'un pays meurtri du monde Sud) vient vers lui, et le prend avec elle.

LA JEUNE FILLE

Quand je vois les yeux d'un enfant,
Lequel voudrais-je ne plus voir vivre?
Quand je vois les yeux d'un enfant,
C'est de l'univers le grand livre
Tout ouvert entre ses paupières
Pour nous montrer la Vérité,
Qui scintille dans leur lumière,
Et nous appelle à la Bonté.

Quand je vois les yeux d'un enfant,
C'est comme si une prière
Venait des hauts du firmament
Nous redire que sur la Terre,
Il n'est qu'une valeur ultime:
Celle de créer des personnes,
A nous si humbles, don sublime,
Qui sont l'image où Dieu se donne.

A nouveau les bruits et feux de la guerre se font entendre et voir. La Jeune Fille avance vers le devant de la scène et face au public :

- Je ne dis pas qui a raison ni qui a tort
- Mais cela ne peut plus durer longtemps encore
-Il faut que pour tous vienne une nouvelle aurore.
-Il faut que dans le peuple une pass-i-on vraie.
-Guide l'Homme d'Etat vers de nouveaux attraits.

ROBERT, *l'Homme d'Etat, sur le ton d'une déclaration au monde. Sur le côté, Irène et la jeune fille; plus haut Johanne*

S'éclairent progressivement de grands portraits de Schuman d'abord puis d'Adenauer et de de Gasperi, de Monnet, de Churchill et de Spaak et de McBride -

On dispose de enregistrements authentiques de toute ces voix.

Déclaration de Robert Schuman encadré par Adenauer et Monnet.

-"La paix mondiale ne saurait être sauvegardée sans des efforts
- créateurs à la mesure des dangers qui la menacent.
- La contribution qu'une Europe organisée et vivante peut apporter
- à la civilisation est indispensable au maintien de relations
- pacifiques.....
-.....Le rassemblement des nations européennes exige que
- l'opposition séculaire entre la France et l'Allemagne soit
- éliminée. Dans ce but, le gouvernement Francais propose de
- placer l'ensemble de la broduction franco-allemande de
- charbon et d'acier sous une Haute Autorité commune....

La voix va en s'estompant avant de reprendre:
Pendant cette citation les portraits de Schuman puis d'Adenauer sont éclairés plus intensément. 1).

Par la voix de Bernard Clappier, Directeur de son Cabinet lors de ces évènements, nous parviennent ces autres messages de Robert Schuman:

- Ce qui est capital, c'est de créer l'atmosphère, le climat de notre
- collaboration future.... Nous ne le faisons pas seulement pour nos
- nations d'ailleurs, nous le faisons le regard dirigé bien au-delà de nos
- frontières en pensant à ce que toute l'humanité attend de nous."

"Servir l'humanité est un devoir à l'égal de celui que nous dicte notre fidélité à la nation."

Eclairage sur le portrait de Schuman.

-"Des équipes d'hommes entraînes, des apôtres de la réconciliation.
- des artisans d'un monde renouvelé, telle sera, telle est déjà au bout
- de quinze années ravagées par la guerre, l'amorce d'une vaste
- transformation sociale.... La démocratie et ses libertés ne seront
- sauvées que par la qualité des hommes qui parleront en leur nom."

Eclairage sur les portraits de

Winston CHURCHILL, former Prime Minister, United Kingdom,
le 19.9.1946 à Zurich

Yet all the while there is a remedy which, if it were generally and spontaneously adopted by the great majority of people in many lands, would as if by a miracle transform the whole scene, and would in a few years make all Europe, or the greater part of it, as free and as happy as Switzerland is today. What is this sovereign remedy? It is to re-create the European Family, or as much of it as we can, and to provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom. We must build a kind of United States of Europe.

Konrad ADENAUER, Bundeskanzler, Bundesrepublik Deutschland
le 10.12.1951 à Strasbourg

Es bedeutet viel für die politische Entwicklung Europas, dass wir hier in den Organen des Europarates eine Plattform haben, auf der sich die Repräsentanten Europas regelmässig begegnen, ihre Sorgen und Nöte, ihre Wünsche und Hoffnungen austauschen und zwar in einem Geiste der Fairness und der guten Nachbarschaft. Mit anderen Worten, wir haben hier das europäische Gewissen. Ihre letzten Impulse wird die europäische Politik in jedem Lande aus dem gemeinsamen Willen der europäischen Völker empfangen.

Alcide de GASPERI, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'Italie,
le 10.12.1951 à Strasbourg

/Si nous bâtissons que des administrations communes, sans qu'il y ait une volonté politique supérieure, vivifiée par un organisme central, dans lequel les volontés nationales se rencontrent, se précisent et se réchauffent dans une synthèse supérieure, nous risquons que cette activité européenne, comparée aux vitalités nationales particulières, paraisse sans chaleur, sans vie idéale, elle pourrait même apparaître à certains moments un harnachement superflu et peut-être oppressif, tel que le Saint Empire Romain apparut à certaines périodes de son déclin./

/Voilà pourquoi, tout en ayant une claire conscience de la nécessité de graduer la construction, nous jugeons qu'en aucun moment il ne faudra agir et construire de façon que la fin à atteindre ne résulte claire, déterminée et garantie./

Joseph BECH, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, le à

L'idée fondamentale du plan Marshall était d'aider les Européens "to stand on their own feet". Le plan Marshall supposait de la part des Etats-Unis un effort financier et de la part des pays européens un effort d'organisation pour l'utilisation de ces moyens financiers, d'où la création, en 1948, de l'Organisation européenne de Coopération économique (OECE), qui a mené à la création, en 1949, du Conseil de l'Europe.

Jean MONNET, Président de la Haute Autorité de la CECA
le 22.6.1953 à Strasbourg

/Les règles et les institutions ne changent pas la nature des hommes, mais elles transforment leurs comportements les uns vis-à-vis les autres. C'est l'expérience même de la civilisation. Les règles et les institutions que nous établissons contribueront essentiellement à orienter l'action des hommes d'Europe dans le sens de la paix./

Par la voix de François Fontaine, son Chef de Cabinet, lors de ces évènements, nous parviennent encore ces messages de Jean Monnet:

"La Communauté Européenne elle-même n'est qu'une étape vers les formes d'organisation du monde de demain... La meilleure contribution que l'on puisse apporter à la civilisation est d'épanouir les hommes au sein de communautés librement édifiées".

ainsique cet ultime résumé de sa pensée exprimé lors de la conclusion de ses mémoires: " Nous ne coalisons pas des Etats, nous unissons des hommes". "Toute ma vie j'ai cherché à unir des hommes".*

Paul-Henri SPAAK, Ministre des Affaires étrangères de Belgique,
le 18.9.1954 à Strasbourg

"Il y a quelque chose d'autre en Europe que les drapeaux déployés sur les champs couverts de morts, ~~qu'~~il y a nos cathédrales qui dressent vers un même ciel leur appel vers un même Dieu, il y a les peuples qui travaillent et qui souffrent, et qui ont les mêmes intérêts et qui cherchent passionnément à la fois la paix et la prospérité qu'ils méritent. Est-ce que vous ne vous rendez pas compte que nous sommes les hommes d'une même civilisation et quelles que soient nos convictions personnelles et philosophiques, d'une même civilisation qui s'appelle la civilisation chrétienne? "

*/ Voix de J. Monnet de nouveau pour cette dernière phrase

8a

SEAN MCBRIDE, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'Irlande, Prix Nobel et Prix Lénine de la Paix
le 11.8.1950 à Strasbourg

Le conflit qui se produit dans le monde est en somme un conflit qui prend place dans les cerveaux, dans la conscience et dans l'âme humaine. C'est là autant que dans le domaine de la diplomatie ou de la stratégie militaire, que nous, démocrates, devrons gagner la bataille. Notre tâche est donc de gagner la bataille dans la conscience humaine. Nous pouvons la gagner en donnant une réalité ferme aux valeurs morales et spirituelles et aux principes démocratiques de notre civilisation. C'est par un tel idéal qu'il sera possible d'inspirer la foi dans nos buts, non seulement parmi nos peuples, mais aussi parmi les autres peuples de l'Europe qui ne sont pas encore dans le Conseil de l'Europe.

IRENE - directement au public

- Et ces hommes l'ont fait;

LA JEUNE FILLE - Et le monde l'a su.

IRENE Où en est maintenant cet espoir d'une Europe,
Cet espoir neuf du monde?

JEHANNE (en écho)
Cet espoir ~~neuf~~ d'une Europe
Cet espoir neuf du monde?

Leopold Sedar SENGHOR, Président de la République du Sénégal, Président de l'Organisation africaine et mauricienne, le 20.10.1972 à Strasbourg

" J'ai toujours défendu à cette tribune, l'idée, parce que l'idéal, de l'Eurafrique. Je n'aurai donc pas changé aujourd'hui, en intitulant mon exposé "l'Eurafrique ou le rôle de la Méditerrannée

- - - - - - - - - - Premier Ministre du Sri Lanka, présidant l'ouverture de la première Conférence du SAARC, le à

" N'oublions pas que les Allemands et les Français ont appris à vivre ensemble ".

Golda MEIR, Prime Minister, Israel, le 1.10.1973 à Strasbourg

The time will come when our area will duplicate what Europe has done. Together we will sit and discuss problems, and, what is even more important, together we will build our area in real co-operation, knowing that not one single people in our area can be happier if any other people is destroyed. The happiness of all the people in the entire area depends upon our living there in peace and in co-operation.

UTHANT, Secretary General, United Nations, le 3.5.1966 à Strasbourg

These pioneering aspects of the work of the Council of Europe are of particular interest to those of us who work in global organisations, for if these ideas can be made to work in one part of the world, it may be easier to apply them progressively to the affairs of the world as a whole.

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LA JEUNE FILLE

-Oui nous avons besoin de l'Europe.
-d'une Europe qui soit image pour le monde:
-non celle du profit mais celle de l'amour.
-L'Europe nous domina, nous les gens du tiers monde.
-Nous ne sommes pas contre, car nous la connaissons.
-Nous l'aimons car elle est part de nous maintenant.
-Mais l'Europe aime-t-elle?
-Ouil le monde a besoin, et jusqu'au désespoir,
-qu'un peuple riche ici, et là un peuple pauvre...
-s'aiment,
-et choisissent ensemble d'avancer dans le vrai.

CHOEUR

Les peuples de la Terre
Vont-ils enfin s'unir
Pour cette immense affaire
D'un monde à reconstruire?

Les peuples de la Terre
Vont-ils se pardonner
Abaisser les frontières
Et leur meilleur donner?

Les peuples de la Terre
Vont-ils trouver la voie
Où l'amour régénère
Qui nous vient de la foi?

Les peuples de la Terre
Vont-ils lâcher leurs serres,
Délaisser les chimères
Des pouvoirs éphémères?

Les peuples de la Terre
Vont-ils sa vie comprendre
La soigner comme mère
Et sa beauté défendre?

Les peuples de la Terre
Ont encore en leurs mains
Et de par leur prière
Le choix de leur destin.

Les peuples de la Terre
Trouveront-ils la trace
Où passe la lumière
De l'étoile à la Grâce.

Reprise (sans chant) du thème musical du REFRAIN

DEUXIEME PARTIE

Scène 1

Une salle d'attente d'hopital qui donne l'impression d'être sphérique. Les méridiens et parallèles apparaissent extérieurement sur le côté droit avec le mot "d'attente".

Aux murs de grands portraits (dessins ou photos) de Mao Tsé Toung, de Gaulle, Nehru, Kennedy, Lénine, Nasser, Ben Gourion, et Nkrumah : Un groupe de dirigeant politique, économiques, financier, syndicaux ...
D'une part sur des lits ou des fauteuils de malades, d'autre part à terre ou appuyés contre les murs, des gens, jeunes et vieux, de différentes races et couleurs (on peut aussi symboliser avec un malade dans un lit blanc et un malade sur un grabas).

LES PATIENTS — A boire! A boire! A boire!

IRENE

en infirmière sur le pas de la porte vis à vis des patients, s'adressant à la salle.

- Egaux! Ils le sont tous.....
-Dans la douleur;
-Et dans la mort.
-Pourquoi devant la vie cette inégalité?
-Cette inégalité de chance et de bonheur.
-Les maladies pour tous;
-mais un pain différent.
LA JEUNE INFIRMIÈRE → -L'un le jettera tendre, l'autre y casse ses dents.
IRENE → -Si Dieu est là, pourquoi...
-Ne nous parle-t-il pas?

LES PATIENTS — - A boire! A boire! A boire!

IRENE

Il est au coeur de l'homme une force puissante
Il peut souffrir et vaincre.
Il peut sauver sa vie.
Il peut donner sa vie.

LA JEUNE INFIRMIÈRE — -Ils veulent sortir d'ici.
-mais à quoi bon, demain
-Ils referont pareil et reviendront encore.
JEHANNE → -Il faudrait les guérir de la vraie maladie.
-Celle où le coeur est mort
-et l'esprit endormi.

(IRENE CONTINUE)

-Peut-être trouverai-je un jour ce vieux trésor.
-qu'ont possédé certains
-et qui ne se vend plus.

LA JEUNE INFIRMIÈRE
(s'avançant vers les malades)

-Le docteur ne vient pas -
-Il a trop de malades
-Chacun sait se guérir a-t-il dit..... qui le veut.
-Ceux qui avanceront, ils me rencontreront.
-Je les aiderai alors tout au long du chemin...

IRENE
(à part)

Une force de vie
vient à celui qui donne
Et qui ne compte pas le nombre de ses pas.

LA JEUNE INFIRMIERE

-Ici les lits sont pleins
-et chacun pour soi geint.

IRENE
(un temps)

L'homme qui a le pain
Avecque veut le vin.
L'homme qui est comblé
Ne cesse d'amasser.
L'homme qui a sa femme,
Recherche d'autres flammes.
L'homme veut du pouvoir
Et ne voit pas qu'au soir,
C'est l'éclat de son âme
Qui décide du drame.

JEHANNE

La puissance ou l'amour
C'est le choix de toujours;
C'est à chaque personne
Le défi que Dieu donne.

Scène 2

Des hauts-parleurs se font entendre derrière les portraits

Celui de Mao
- A une heure du village
- Aux troncs jusqu'à trois mètres
- point ne restait d'écorces,
- à eux les affamés
- qui les avaient mangées.

Celui de de Gaulle
- Seule querelle qui vaille :
- La querelle de l'homme.

Celui de Kennedy
- Point tant vous demander
- Ce que votre pays
- Peut apporter à vous
- Que de vous demander
- Ce que votre pays
- Peut recevoir de vous.

Celui de Lénine
- Notre lutte jamais
- ne pourra réussir
- que le mythe de Dieu
- n'ait été extirpé
- de l'esprit de chaque homme.

Celui de Nehru
- Je vois venir le jour
- ou dans le peuple entier,
- tout empli de la foi
- pour une grande cause,
- des hommes et des femmes
- deviennent des héros
- qui ouvrent à l'histoire
- de nouveaux champs d'espoir.

Celui de Nasser

Celui de Ben Gourion
- Israël est un rêve ;
- L'Etat n'existera
- qu'il ait conclut la paix
- avecque ses voisins.

Celui de NKrumah
- Du Ghana l'indépendance
- ne prend pour nous de sens
- que comme l'émergence
- d'une Afrique libérée.

L'ensemble des portraits se retire, puis la lumière s'affaiblit et la musique marque un temps

La jeune infirmière avec le petit enfant (jusqu'à la fin de l'acte).
Ces paroles des hommes
ne changent pas le monde,
lors même que les ondes
à tous crient la somme ?

LES PATIENTS
A boire ! A boire ! A boire !

-Le drame de la vie
-N'est pas celui du monde
-Il n'est pas sur les ondes
-Il se passe en esprit.

JEHANNE

Cette trame où l'on prie
Que notre âme la sonde :
La liberté chérie,
Cette flamme profonde,
A ses devoirs et prix
Qui au plus haut se fondent !

LA JEUNE INFIRMIERE *(en rappel sur un ton de regret)*

L'Homme qui est comblé
Ne cesse d'amasser ;
L'Homme veut du pouvoir
Et ne voit pas qu'au soir
C'est l'éclat de son âme
Qui décide du drame.

IRENE

La puissance ou l'amour
C'est le choix de toujours → C'est à chaque personne
Le choix que Dieu donne.) bis

Les Dirigeants

- De l'Argent ! Du Pouvoir !
- Nous voulons le Pouvoir !

IRENE

-Argent, faux dieu brillant
-Qui n'est qu'une écriture
-Pour qui l'on tue et ment
-Et détruit la nature.

LA JEUNE INFIRMIERE

-Qui met l'homme au servage
~~-Et le conduit à vendre~~ Et remplace la vie
~~-Le parfait héritage~~ Par le pauvre héritage
~~-Dont va sa vie dépendre.~~ De mille et un produits -

IRENE → Argent qui tout mesure
Dans un monde d'usure,
Se prétend la valeur
Des terres et des coeurs !

LES DIRIGEANTS

-De l'Argent! Du pouvoir!
-Nous voulons le Pouvoir!

LES PATIENTS *(La masse des patients s'agite, alternativement pauvres et riches, en un tumulte croissant:)*

-Nous ferons la guerre!
-Laissez-nous en paix!
-Faim! nous avons faim!
-Trop! nous avons trop!
-La terre! nous voulons la terre!
-La Terre! nous voulons la fuir!

LES DIRIGEANTS

-De l'Argent! Du Pouvoir!
-Nous Voulons le Pouvoir!

IRENE

-Le monde entier éclate.
-et nous sommes ce monde.
-où est doncque la loi
-Qui pour chacun soit loi?

LA JEUNE INFIRMIERE

N'y a-t-il point de règne
Qui ne soit contre l'autre,
une issue pour chacun
Au service des autres?
Un monde en paix qui croisse
En un destin commun?
Où donne et crée
Soient biens d'éternité?

IRENE

N'y a-t-il point de paix
Où le souci de l'autre
Amène le respect
Du travail où se montre
L'amour de ce qui est
Donné libre en ce monde?

LA JEUNE INFIRMIÈRE

La liberté chérie,
Cette flamme profonde,
A ses devoirs et prise
Qui au plus haut se fondent.

LES PATIENTS

-A boire! A boire! A boire!

LES DIRIGEANTS

-De l'Argent! Du Pouvoir!
-Nous Voulons le Pouvoir!

Scène 3

JEHANNE

Qui n'agit pas de Dieu
N'a pas d'autorité,
Quand même son pouvoir
De tous le ferait craindre;

Qui n'agit pas de Dieu
Ne change pas le monde,
Quand bien révolutions
Et guerres partout grondent;

Qui n'agit pas de Dieu
Porte mort par son fait,
Fussent les intentions
Humainement parfaites.

La gouverne de Dieu
N'est pas une chimère,
Mais l'ultime milieu
Où chercher la lumière;

Constante et disponible
Elle inclut le courage
De tenter l'impossible
Et de retourner l'Age;

Un seul agit pour mille
Dans le champs de bataille
Où de suivre son fil:
Parfait toute la maille.

ROBERT,
L'Homme d'Etat

-Demain un jour nouveau
-Peut naître en politique
-De coeurs et cerveaux
-Qui en font leur pratique.

LES PATIENTS
Reprise en forte)

-Nous ferons la guerre!
-Laissez-nous en paix!
-Faim! nous avons faim!
-Trop! nous avons trop!
-La terre! nous voulons la terre!
-La Terre! nous voulons la fuir!

LES DIRIGEANTS

-De l'Argent! Du Pouvoir!
-Nous voulons le Pouvoir!

OBERT. l'Homme d'Etat

Arrêtez, insensés!
Ne voyez vous donc pas
Que vous allez le monde
Las! Mettre tout à bas?

Surveillez vos pensées
Et comptez tous vos actes:
Ecoutez vos paroles
et faites en la somme!

Vous êtes sur l'abîme
Et préparez des ruines!
Hors de la voie de Dieu.
Ne peut naître aucun mieux.

Ne laissez passer l'heure !
Que celui là décide
Qui pour vie sur la terre
Est d'avenir avide!

ES PATIENTS
Reprise en fortissimo)

-Nous ferons la guerre!
-Laissez-nous en paix!
-Faim! nous avons faim!
-Trop! nous avons trop!
-La terre! nous voulons la terre!
-La Terre! nous voulons la fuir.!

ES DIRIGEANTS

-De l'Argent! Du Pouvoir!
-Nous voulons le Pouvoir!

Scène 4 { Vue de Jérusalem depuis le Mont des Oliviers,
puis des plus célèbres et grands villes du monde,
enfin retour à Jérusalem à la fin de la 5e strophe.

UNE VOIX

-Même au point de périr, ils ne m'écoutent pas
-Ils vont pourtant souffrir, et des larmes de sang.
-Et moi qui suis venu pour leur donner mon coeur
-Combien j'aurais voulu éviter ce malheur!

Homme pourquoi de moi s'écarte ton regard?
Vois, las! que je ne suis ni tyran ni avare
Pourquoi me fuir alors en rêves insensés
Hors de cette voie d'or que je t'ai enseignée?

Demain il est trop tard: la terre sous tes pas
Au jour s'effondrera: la mer te couvrira
Pour laver ton péché volontaire, obstiné,
Alors que tu étais pour le ciel destiné.

Que celui qui entende aujourd'hui ait l'oreille,
Qu'il écoute en son coeur la voix du vrai bonheur
Qu'il s'éloigne de ceux qui promettent merveilles,
Pour atteindre la porte avant qu'ait sonné l'heure.

A l'horizon des jours, il est un paradis,
Et c'est sans un détour que je vous y convie;
Méditez avec soin ce que je vous ai dit
Croyez avec amour et vous aurez la vie.

'orchestre partant du thème de l'avertissement (strophe 4) remonte au ième de la strophe 3 et l'amplifie dans un tumulte d'une intensité croissante squ'à l'extrême, presqu'insoutenable. Long passage symphonique

a lumière qui éclairait les Groupes de couleurs bariolées, devient elle aussi ombre et tumultueuse. La lumière éclairant les portraits diminue peu à peu squ'à zéro.

RENE (Sur la même mélodie qu'au début de la scène I, 1 mais avec plus 'intensité encore et plus lentement, plus distinctement comme quelqu'un qui :moigne)

Il faut haïr le mal!
-Du fond de l'océan
-Je vois l'énorme flot
-foncer vers nos coeurs noirs.
-Il va nous engloutir
-les corps avec les âmes,
-villes comme campagne.
-Il ne resterait rien
-Si n'agissait la foi.

LA JEUNE INFIRMIERE *(Sur la même mélodie qu'à la fin de la scène I. 3 mais avec plus d'intensité encore et plus lentement, plus distinctement comme quelqu'un qui est tout à fait à bout)*

-Je ne sais pas où est l'espoir, où est la mort
-Mais cela ne peut plus ainsi durer encore:
-Il faut que pour tous vienne à nouveau une aurore...
-Il faut que chacun saigne en son âme d'orgueil
-Pour que cesse le sang, s'écarte le linceul.

Musique et lumière peu à peu se calment. L'aurore point paisible sur les bords d'un Rhin devenu immense. L'orchestre marque qu'il s'agit d'une nouvelle ère,

EPILOGUE

fond de scène (Vision des deux côtés du Rhin)

BERT L'Homme d'Etat

Ce qui naquit ici
N'est-il pas pour le monde?
L'oeuvre n'aura de vie
Qu'en devenant féconde.

JS

Si notre amour s'étend
Au delà des frontières
N'avons-nous pour patrie
Notre ensemble divers?

fond de scène (vision des deux côtés du monde Est-Ouest) Images du 9.11.89 à Berlin et autres de l'Amérique du Nord à la Sibérie. de l'ouverture de l'EST

OUPE NORD

C'est un bien grand destin
Que d'ouvrir le chemin
D'un monde qui s'unisse
Et que guerres finissent.

fond de scène (vision des deux côtés de la Méditerranée Nord-Sud)

OUPE SUD

Une tâche assez grande
Pour des générations.
Demandant le secours
D'une divine action.

Sur fond de scène (vision de la moitié habitée de la planète: de l'Amérique au Japon par l'Europe et l'Afrique)

JEUNE INFIRMIERE

- Après le dur hiver
- Après la mue des terres.
- Eclot soudain la fleur.
- Des siècles de combats
- Parsemés de lumières.
- Et l'épreuve finale
- De l'engeance infernale
- Ont conduit nos pays
- A comprendre le sens
- Du "vous êtes tous un!"
- Sur la Terre Promise
- Par Dieu nous révélé.

fond de scène (vision de la planète Terre depuis l'espace)

JS

Si notre amour s'étend
Jusqu'au delà des mers.
N'avons-nous pour patrie
Ensemble notre Terre?

IRENE

De mourir à soi-même:
La folie de la Croix:
Ou de mourir ensemble:
La raison des Etats:
Il n'est point d'autre choix.

JEHANNE

Là-haut dans l'univers
Il est une sagesse
Qui veut sauver la Terre
Et lui apporter liesse:

ROBERT, l'Homme d'Etat

Les hommes, les pays
Qui sauront l'écouter
Conserveront la vie
A notre humanité.

Sur fond de scène (Vision du Cosmos)

TOUS

Si notre amour s'étend
Jusqu'au delà des airs,
N'avons-nous pour patrie
Ensemble l'Univers?

CHOEUR

(reprise du thème de la page 4 modifié de l'interrogation à l'ouverture).

Où donc vas-tu
Monde de l'avenir?
C'est par les coeurs
Que jaillit la lumière.

QUATUOR

(ou Quintet)

La gouverne de Dieu
N'est pas une chimère,
Mais l'ultime milieu
Où chercher la lumière:

TOUS -- REFRAIN *(Reprise du foyer de lumière jusqu'à envahissement de toute la scène)*

Lumière, lumière
de Dieu
sur terre.

Lumière, lumière
de Dieu,
Nos frères

Lumière, lumière
de Dieu
Le Père .

FIN


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8 LUG. 1992

"Building on the European Civil Space"

Background to Remarks of Dr. Robert E. Hunter

1992: Europe and North America
The Dialogue of the New Solidarities

Colloquy organized by the Secretary General
of the Council of Europe
Strasbourg

19-20 June 1992

Two and a half years after the Berlin Wall opened and more than six months since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, we have become used to thinking about European security in new terms -- or rather in old terms revived. After all, the security challenges facing Europe after the Second World War were first and foremost economic and political. And the Marshall Plan and the Treaty of Washington -- both security instruments conceived in economic and political terms -- came well before the creation of Allied Command Europe.

Given the way that the Cold War ended -- not with one single, decisive act, but as part of a process of unraveling assumptions and attitudes of the past -- it is not unnatural that much discussion of security in Europe focuses on institutions, especially those already in being. Should they be updated or scrapped? What new tasks should they take on? What new members? And which of those that remain or are freshly minted should have primacy?

This is all second-order business, however. The first order is to understand the underlying conditions for security, and these can be seen in the very processes that brought the Cold War to an end. Ideas came first -- about liberty and freedom and about prosperity and human progress. Then came the instruments of rebellion and revolt against an archaic system of political and economic organization in the East and of security relations throughout the Continent. In Vaclav Havel's trenchant title to an essay written well before his nation regained its soul: it was "the power of the powerless" that moved the most optimistic transformation of the Continent in this century. This eruption of human aspirations will forever link the year 1989 with 1776 as a time of an historic political, economic, and cultural shift, most of all in the minds and hearts of people. This was a watershed in human experience, in ways of thinking about life, itself.

Security, therefore, is most of all about building on the human potential that has been unleashed during the past few years, and doing so with a new psychology that is rid of the preoccupations of the last several decades, with the stultifying

rigidities in state-run economies, individualism made subservient to sterile and erroneous concepts of the collective, and a militarization of politics that reached into virtually all societies engaged in the enterprise called Cold War.

This analysis leads to two basic conclusions: there will be no lasting security for the peoples of Europe -- now to be conceived as one Europe, a civilization more than a geographic expression -- unless one political culture, that of Western Europe, is essentially preserved and developed and another political culture, that beginning at the old-inner German border and stretching Eastward to an as yet unknown frontier, can be nourished by this self-same inspiration.

The former political culture has effective institutional expression most in the European Community, created for two basic purposes -- to make war between Germany and its neighbors impossible, and to help sustain Western values through the Cold War. Both purposes have now been achieved, perhaps well beyond what even the founders of the European Movement had hoped for. It now has the opportunity to become the most important geopolitical entity in Europe, providing -- alone or in tandem with other institutions -- the most firm and lasting foundation for European security.

In addition to the values it represents, the EC also has succeeded in creating something unique in history -- the abolition of war as an instrument of relations among states that are part of the basic compact. Thus has been created a European Civil Space in which relations among nations and peoples have advanced beyond the tragedies of the past to future possibilities that can validate the struggles needed to make this grand experiment succeed. All strife within the European Community has, of course, not been abolished, as can be seen in Northern Ireland, in Corsica, in Sicily. But at the level of states, the well-spring of the two great wars of this century, this concept of a European Civil Space is developing into a shared culture.

The challenge now is to extend this fundamental notion of security -- free societies and free peoples -- to post-communist societies. The triple challenge is now clear to all: the creation of pluralistic societies and politics, in many cases where there is no historical experience of democracy; the development of market-orient economies, requiring a series of changes with no precedent for success; and the containment, the amelioration -- if possible the resolution -- of a host of ethnic, religious, and national disputes and conflicts that have reemerged with the recent unfreezing of history.

Whatever the future may bring in terms of challenges to European security, there can be no doubt that the challenge, today, lies precisely here, in the numerous experiments in transforming societies and peoples. Security is nothing less than proving the worth, the effectiveness, and the durability of democratic institutions for which so many peoples risked so much in destroying the old communist systems. We can preserve and extend our classic institutions of security and yet still fail, if we do

not collectively succeed in meeting the immense demands posed by the triple challenge, if we do not set as a central security goal, and attain it, the creation of the political, social, economic, and cultural basis for extending progressively Eastward the European Civil Space.

Of course, other institutions of European security -- both those traditionally conceived as such, like NATO, WEU, and CSCE, and those which speak to the deeper demands of security like the Council of Europe -- have their place. Indeed, in a pure definition of the underlying attitudes that provide security in civil societies -- such as the European Civil Space -- the Council is the most precise embodiment of the values to be championed.

Today, debate continues about the appropriate roles of each of these institutions. In particular, NATO has assumed a leading role, not just in holding together the traditional 16 allied nations, but also now in embracing the former members of the defunct Warsaw Pact in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). These practices can be of great service in helping to transform military institutions in the East, to promote civilian control of the military, and to provide a framework and criteria for developing those military forces which countries will have, so that the security of each can support the security of all rather than promoting new tensions and risks.

NATO and NACC are also important in providing a tangible expression of continued American engagement in European security. Ideally, the symbolic aspects of that expression should no longer be needed. Three times in this century, the United States has demonstrated, by committing blood and treasure, that its security and that of Europe are inseparable. Even more enduring, perhaps, is the sense of common, democratic culture that makes America and Europe part of one another in those attitudes and actions that are deeper than any security agreement. These underlying ties will, thus naturally endure, while preserving and modernizing NATO and NACC serve several purposes. NATO in particular is a useful means for providing insurance against untoward events -- where, for example, predicting the future of Russia is surely beyond anyone's ability; for representing the continued engagement of the United States in Europe's future; and for giving Europeans, especially in the East, a sense of partaking in the American connection and American experience.

NATO and NACC are not alone, however. Nor is there any particular reason to assert, at this point, that the American-led European security institutions need to continue, indefinitely, to have primacy, much less exclusivity. WEU, CSCE, Franco-German bilateral military arrangements, and the possibility of European political union (assuming that none of these seriously conflict with one another or with the objectives of the American connection) can all have merit. There is also virtue, in some circumstances, in either cooperation or amalgamation among them. Thus the North Atlantic Council's decision to take part in some peacekeeping activities, with the

implication of moving toward a direct relationship to CSCE, can be a useful step. It should be developed further, as should be the Vienna Conflict Prevention Center and the capacity of the United Nations to engage in peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peacekeeping.

Most important regarding the different security institutions, today there is no need to choose; and, especially because of the lack of definition about the Russian future, such avoidance of unneeded choice is no doubt wise. Pressing for choice reflects less the product of analysis about the future than a hankering for the certainties and the patterns of the past -- including patterns of influence that are necessarily now in flux. Nor is there merit in arguing that rival European security institutions to NATO could lead the U.S. Congress to recall those Anerican troops which remain on the Continent. This smacks of self-fulling prophecy; and it also begs the question whether, should European states become confident of being secure on their own, U.S. forces are indeed necessary. That situation clearly does not now obtain, but if it did -- say, in circumstances where experiments in Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe were obviously successful -- then cleaving to patterns of the past would make no sense for anyone. By the same token, there is no point in making the deployment of a certain level of U.S. forces a test of U.S. commitment; the currently projected level of 150,000 troops is neither necessary to validate European security nor sustainable in U.S. politics. It should be revised downward.

Of special concern is the proper institutional relationship to overall European security for the post-communist countries, which are all now interested in being linked to the West. NATO takes precedence for most of them; but it is likely that this has less to do with concerns about security against aggression -- NATO's essential purpose -- than with the search for an American connection and the preference for an institution that has been a clear winner, especially in view of NATO's visible role in the past as the primary military organ confronting Soviet power. But there are limits to such a NATO role: its purview is essentially military, whereas security, rightly understood, is much more profound and encompassing; there are risks that its mandate will become so broad that it counts for little at any level as a military alliance; and it is not clear that the American people will accept the addition of more countries under the umbrella of total security commitment. Indeed, putting too many countries into NATO could erode the commitments than now exist.

The role of the EC must also be emphasized. In terms of helping societies to meet the triple challenge -- pluralism, market economies, resolving strife -- the EC comes closer than any other current institution to providing the context and the content for assistance, not just through transfers of knowledge and wealth but also through merging the post-communist societies in a relevant political process.

Three special concerns need to be raised. One is relatively minor: the extent to which the evolution of a U.S.-Russian security relationship contributes to European

security, broadly defined. Obviously, this is a moment without precedent: the best chance in a millennium to help Russia find its future in the West, focussing on the political and economic needs of its people. At the same time, however, pushing the U.S.-Russian bilateral relationship too far can both isolate other former Soviet states and perhaps tip the scales in their competitions with Russia, at a time when the success of the Russian experiment is far from certain. Similarly, a U.S.-Russian strategic partnership -- assuming that one could be developed, a point that is not self-evident -- could also lead to emphasis on an essentially military relationship at odds with a more holistic and organic Russian integration within European and Western society.

The second special concern is with the European Community. The so-called "Danish disease" that produced rejection of the Maastricht Treaty clearly is endemic if not pandemic. The EC will survive and prosper, though it will perhaps develop at a slower rate or at different "speeds". But the opportunities for it to play an active geopolitical role (beyond the existential role represented by its economic success and European Civil Space) could be reduced, at least for the time-being. This could put more pressure on the United States to be engaged, politically and economically, in the post-communist societies, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, with concomitant pressures to broaden U.S. security commitments through NATO. This might not be to the liking of the American people, certainly not an increased of transfers of resources. One result could be renewed concern in Europe about transatlantic "decoupling" -- albeit in circumstances that, at least for now, do not bring into question direct challenges to Western security. Current U.S. ambivalence about the EC -- based on reviving fears of Fortress Europe -- may be valid in terms of mercantilist economics, but it still makes no sense in terms of European geopolitics and hence the security of the West as a whole.

Finally, all of this discussion takes on a flavor of unreality, of theory unfounded in practice, when viewed against the backdrop of events in Yugoslavia. It is strange for the West to be debating which institutions should assume European security burdens in the future, when the most intense and long-lasting conflict since 1945 rages on the edge of both NATO and EC territory. To be sure, all the great powers associated with Europe long since agreed that nothing that happens in Yugoslavia can be permitted to upset broader understandings about European politics and security. But Sarajevo need not provoke a replay of World War I to be highly significant; in this case, it can sound the death knell of the so-called new world order.

Thus is it strange that the United States insists that NATO should have primacy if not exclusivity among security institutions, then hangs back for so long in responding to the Yugoslav crisis; Washington asked for the right to lead and then abdicated responsibility. It is strange to see the European Community debating the Maastricht Treaty, along with the foretaste of political union, and then proving unable to respond adequately to the trauma of a near neighbor. The West considers what

might happen in Russia and other post-communist societies, but does not understand the explosive consequences of the lessons that many of them are learning from the Yugoslav experience. So far, the key lessons are that "anything goes" and that possession of territory is the strongest card with which to bargain. And the potential for extending the range of the European Civil Space can surely not be optimistic, if no one in the West is prepared to act decisively in Yugoslavia. Sorting out disagreements among its various peoples is not the West's province. But underpinning local efforts at reconciliation clearly is a Western responsibility, including massive amounts of trade, aid, and investment. So, too, is the need for the West to flood Yugoslavia with military force in order to make a cardinal point: one method, civil war and ethnic violence, is out of bounds.

What we discuss here at the Council of Europe about European security, therefore, will be important in shaping the future security environment; but it will pale against what our several nations are now prepared to do about Yugoslavia. It is the most profound test of European security since the end of the Cold War, and -- if we value our collective future -- we must not continue to shirk it.[1]

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PERSPECTIVE ON YUGOSLAVIA Los Angeles Times - May 25, 1992

A War Awaiting America's Notice

The integrity of a democratic Eurasia depends on resolution of the crisis; threat of U.S. power will hasten peace.

By ROBERT E. HUNTER

Sarajevo earned its place in history as the cradle of World War I. Unless someone acts soon to stop the Yugoslav civil war, the Balkan city can make history again, this time as the place where the "new world order" died. Such stakes justify a major stepping up of U.S. engagement, including the threat—and if need be, the use—of military force.

This conclusion will not seem justified by traditional analysis of U.S. strategic interests. Indeed, when Yugoslavia began coming apart more than a year ago, the great powers reached a common conclusion: Nothing that happens in that out-of-the-way country can be permitted to upset broader political understandings on the European continent.

This hard-headed calculation was reinforced by comparison of Yugoslav turbulence with other events—rather, one other event: the collapse of the Soviet Union. Concern about whether its death throes will produce new democracies or new sources of global conflict dwarfed anything that could happen to the "south Slavs."

But more is at stake for the West than old-fashioned strategy or even the spectacle of human suffering, which is neither unique to Yugoslavia nor awe-inspiring by recent global standards. The underlying significance of the Yugoslav civil war stems from four facts. It is the most intense and long-lasting conflict in Europe since the guns fell silent in 1945. It has become a test case of whether brute force can be permanently rejected as a basis for organizing relations among European states and peoples. It is ineluctably posing the question of whether anything is different—and better—about the world that is emerging from the wreckage of the Cold War system. And what the West tolerates in Yugoslavia will tell other post-communist societies what is—and what is not—acceptable behavior.

Yugoslavia is important precisely because it is part of Europe, on the border of a European Community that is still consolidating a 40-year effort to make war impossible among its members. The EC has created a "European civil space" that has no parallels and whose success is needed to redeem a century that, in European conflicts alone, has produced an unmatched toll of dead. Indifference to the Yugoslav slaughter would not only shame the West but also jeopardize hopes to extend the civil space eastward, eventually embracing Russia, tomorrow's great political and strategic presence across Eurasia.

Stopping the fighting will not end problems in the former Yugoslavia. These can only yield to the efforts of its several peoples, and only if their efforts are lubricated by the same political reform, plus economic aid and advancement, that permitted Western Europe's integration to perform its historic role in abolishing interstate conflict. No outsider can sort out the tangle of bitter memories and contemporary claims. But outsiders can demand that one method, force of arms, be placed out of bounds, and they can enforce that demand by showing willingness to employ overwhelming force of their own.



The United States is inescapably involved. It has a moral debt because the Bush Administration, concerned about the setting of poor precedents for what was still the Soviet Union, endorsed Yugoslav unity. It thus inadvertently gave Serbia's leaders an argument for pursuing their ambitions toward other republics. The United States has a political responsibility because for two years it insisted that NATO, which it dominates, should have no rivals in providing security for Europe.

It also has a strategic interest in stopping the fighting and in asserting the sanctity of Bosnia-Hercegovina's original borders, however much of its territory has been usurped. This is the same concern that brought American military power to the Continent three times in this century: to ensure that Europe's conflicts were not exported across the Atlantic. Today's time horizon is different because there is no Hitler or Stalin menacing the peace. But if the message from the former Yugoslavia to the former Soviet empire is that "anything goes," today's U.S. leaders may incur a heavy debt to the next generation of Americans.

The need for the United States to act on Yugoslavia—with the threat, and potentially the use, of force—is also the logical extension of its countering Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. As in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the United States cannot hide behind the argument that others' interests are also at stake; at this moment in history, American leadership is still the indispensable requirement for common action. Economic sanctions are unlikely to thwart determined leaders if military force is ruled out from the beginning. And there can be little hope of building a new world order if America, along with its Western partners, ducks the issue of principle in what is symbolically its own back yard.

In the 1930s, the League of Nations signed its death warrant when it failed to stop Italy's aggression in Abyssinia, thus informing the world of the poverty of collective security. Today, that instrument of statecraft is again being tested, along with U.S. willingness to play the role that its size and interests require.

The United States continues to base massive military power in Europe, as do its allies. The countries from the Atlantic to the Urals that have a stake in ending the Yugoslav conflict can collectively wield enormous political clout. Thus the mere threat of military intervention by a U.S.-led coalition of states from both West and East should suffice to stop the killing. Whether Washington has the will to act here and now will set a precedent of historic proportions.

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